The Atlantic Pact forty Years later: A Historical Reappraisal [Reprint 2010 ed.] 9783110857894, 9783110127386

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The Atlantic Pact Forty Years Later

The Atlantic Pact Forty Years Later A Historical Reappraisal Edited by Ennio Di Nolfo

W DE

G Walter de Gruyter · Berlin · New York 1991

Die Deutsche Bibliothek — Cataloging-in-Publication Data The Atlantic Pact forty years later : a historical reappraisal / ed. by Ennio Di Nolfo. — Berlin ; New York : de Gruyter, 1991 ISBN 3-11-012738-5 NE: Di Nolfo, Ennio [Hrsg.]

© Copyright 1991 by Walter de Gruyter & Co., D-1000 Berlin 30. All rights reserved, including those of translation into foreign languages. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Printed in Germany. Typesetting and Printing: Arthur Collignon GmbH, Berlin. Binding: Lüderitz & Bauer-GmbH, Berlin.

Preface This volume presents, in a revised and completed form, most of the papers discussed at the international symposium held in Florence on 3 — 5 April 1989, on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the signing of the Atlantic Pact (Washington, April 4, 1949). The symposium was arranged by the Dipartimento di Studi sullo Stato of the University of Florence, with the financial support of the University, of the Tuscan Regional Administration, and of the Provincial and Municipal Administrations of Florence. The organization of the symposium was carried out by the Accademia Europea di Studi Internazionali (European Academy of International Studies) of Florence. The 40th anniversary of the Atlantic Pact was a favourable occasion for a new reappraisal of the historical work that has been done in this field during recent decades, primarily as a consequence of the opening up of new sources. The changes in the international situation, already in the air in April 1989, gave further impulse to the debate and suggested new ideas. The symposium was divided into three parts: the first one was dedicated to a general appraisal of the negotiations leading to the Alliance; the second, to the attitudes of most of the parties involved in those negotiations and the third to the major aspects of the problem from the Italian point of view. In publishing this volume at a time when the Alliance is moving towards a new phase of its life, the Editor thinks that this purely historical reappraisal may be useful in the understanding of forthcoming events. To the participants in the symposium the Editor wishes to express his gratitude both for their contributions and for their suggestions regarding this volume. A special recognition is expressed here for the collaboration of Dr. Antonio Varsori, Dr. Leopoldo Nuti and Dr. Bruna Bagnato, whose help has been invaluable in the completion of this work. Florence, June 1991

Ennio Di Nolfo

Contents Preface of the Editor Section 1. The Negotiations leading to the Pact

1

ENNIO Di NOLFO The Forming of the Atlantic Pact: Some Problems of Interpretation . . .

3

ANTONIO VARSORI The First Stage of Negotiations: December 1947 to June 1948

19

OTTAVIO BARIE The Final Stage of Negotiations: December 1948 to April 1949

41

Section 2. The Attitudes of the Countries Involved

59

GADDIS SMITH The Atlantic Pact as a Problem of U.S. Diplomacy

61

RITCHIE OVENDALE Great Britain and the Atlantic Pact

72

BRUNA BAGNATO France and the Origins of the Atlantic Pact

79

NORBERT WIGGERSHAUS The Other "German Question". The Foundation of the Atlantic Pact and the Problem of Security against Germany

Ill

OLAV RISTE Nordic Union or Western Alliance? Scandinavia at the Crossroads 1948 - 1949

127

CIES WIEBES & BERT ZEEMAN The Origins of Western Defense. Belgian and Dutch Perspectives 1940-1949

143

VIII

Contents

BOLESLAW ADAM BOCZEK The Eastern European Countries and the Birth of the Atlantic Alliance 163 MASSIMO DE LEONARDIS Defense or Liberation of Europe. The Strategies of the West against a Soviet Attack (1947-1950)

176

Section 3. Italy and the Atlantic Pact

207

PIETRO PASTORELLI De Gasperi, the Christian Democrats and the Atlantic Treaty

209

SEVERING GALANTE The Italian Left and the Atlantic Pact: The Nation vs. Proletarian Internationalism

220

LEOPOLDO NUTI The Italian Military and the Atlantic Pact

247

The Authors

261

Index of Names

263

Section 1. The Negotiations leading to the Pact

The Forming of the Atlantic Pact: Some Problems of Interpretation by Ennio Di Nolfo

There might perhaps be other ceremonies to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of the signing of the Atlantic Pact, but a meeting of scholars can have only one result — a historiographical discussion. This gathering offers a moment of calm reflection and the opportunity for an exchange of experiences and interpretative proposals. This meeting, taking place in Florence right on the anniversary of the signing, represents the fruits of at least twenty year's productive work, carried out in Italy on the basis of sources which have gradually become accessible1. The results of the work, which remain little known only because of linguistic barriers, are important for the historiography of the whole Atlantic question, and not only as regards Italy 2 . The researches effected in the various nations of the Atlantic Alliance, both our own and the other innumerable better-known and more impressive 1

2

On this, see: S. Galante, La politica del PCI e il Patto atlantico. "Rinascita", 1946-1949, Padua, 1973; Idem, La fine di un compromesso storico. PC/ e DC nella crisi del 1947, Milan, 1980; D. Ardia, // Partita Socialista Italiano e il Patto Atlantico, Milan, 1976; E. Di Nolfo (ed.) Italia e Stati Uniti durante I'amministrazione Truman, Milan, 1976. Reference is made to research groups operating in Florence, Padua, Milan, Rome. The results of their work is indicated in the previous note. The following contributions should be added: D. Ardia, Alle origini dell'alleanza occidental, Padua, 1983; O. Barie (ed.), L'alleanza occidentale. Nascita e sviluppi di un sistema di sicurezza collettivo, Bologna, 1988; A. Breccia, L'ltalia e la difesa dell'Europa. 11 piano Pleven, Rome, 1984; E. Di Nolfo, Motivi ispiratori e genesi dell'Alleanza atlantica, in the volume, Trent'anni di alleanza atlantica, Rome, 1979; E. Di Nolfo, R. H. Rainero and B. Vigezzi (eds.), L'ltalia e la politica di potenza in Europa. 1945-50, Milan, 1988; L. Nuti, L'esercito italiano nel secondo dopoguerra 1945-1950. La sua ricostruzione e I'assistenza militare alleata, Rome, 1989; P. Pastorelli, La politica italiana del dopoguerra, Bologna, 1986; A. Varsori, // Patto di Bruxelles (1948). Tra integrazione europea e alleanza atlantica, Rome, 1988; B. Vigezzi (ed.), La dimensione atlantica e le relazioni internazionali nel dopoguerra. 1947—1949, Milan, 1988.

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projects, have served to widen our knowledge of the problems, yet we have still not reached the end of the debate on a moment which ranks among the most important in the international political history of the post-war period. On the contrary, this broadening of knowledge has brought to light a series of still open questions which it would be opportune to discuss with the aim of clarifying the respective reasonings and motivations. It is necessary, therefore, to synthesize the historiographical problems which deserve reflection, within the limits of the knowledge and experience gained so far, and with the awareness that this attempt, too, will be incomplete and thus approximate. Synthesizing problems means posing questions. My own contribution will accordingly bristle with questions. Too many questions some might say, an excess of interrogatives, at times deliberately rhetorical. Yet how can we tackle a joint task without clarifying the questions which give rise to it? Immediately following my presentation, each contributor will present his/her own version: the replies will not necessarily be homogeneous, but they will certainly converge in throwing more light on the interpretation of the subject under discussion. The problem which poses itself right from the beginning is understanding whether, in order to explain the Atlantic choice, it is sufficient to consider only the span 1947-1949 (i.e., the period of containment policy), or if it is necessary to extend the analysis to cover a longer time-span. I should, however, like to clarify, at the outset, that today's contributors will deal with the negotiations leading up to the forming of the Atlantic Pact. For this reason, it perhaps lies within the competence of the introductory contributor to lay stress on what at first sight appears less visible or less apparent. Yet, in developing this premise, I run the risk of advancing hypotheses which may be too unilateral or anyway too remote from the effective context in which the Atlantic choice was made. Nevertheless there is a clear need to widen the framework and this gives rise to the first reflection I think it right to make in my introductory presentation; it concerns the points which in my view constitute the different sectors of an analysis of the birth of the Atlantic Pact. The framework must, at least allusively, be less restrictive than the Atlantic framework. We cannot isolate the subject of the Atlantic negotiations from the more general context, also in the broad political sense, in which it is set. The analysis should therefore cover a longer time-span, reflecting the whole period starting with the conclusion of the Second World War. It is necessary in this respect to re-examine some of the concepts of American revisionism (although by then a remote and, for the most part, obsolete debate), as it contains some elements or ideas which will help to set the theme of the Atlantic Pact against a wider background.

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One might think, to mention just a few names, of the theses advanced by Alperovitz, Gimbel, Kolko3, all controversial authors, on whom it is advisable to draw with caution, adapting their contingent arguments to the present historiographical subject, i. e., using them in the context of the more articulated and up-to-date vision of events now revealed by new sources. It seems inevitable to start from the events following the Second World War, as it was the war that produced the situation from which would spring not only the Cold War but, in the ambit of the Cold War, one of its most obvious manifestations, the Atlantic Pact. At the heart of the Second World War in Europe lay the German question. The end of the war was characterised by the inability of the Allies to find an acceptable and lasting solution to this question. To summarise, there are two reasons for this failure: the first is linked to changes in the concept of international security following the cessation of hostilities. Alperovitz has contributed pages on this and although we may not, analytically speaking, share his views, they are still worth of consideration in that they emphasise the way in which the atomic bomb, and the American atomic monopoly, were able to alter the perspectives of the European security problem, obviating the necessity for too great a sacrifice on the altar of collaboration with the Soviets. If the true role of atomic weapons in Western defence strategy was only taken into account at the beginning of the 1950s, yet the fact remains that as early as 1945 — 46 atomic superiority represented, if only at the political level, a new element whose innovative value was borne in mind in relation to the European picture and therefore in relation to the American concept of the security problem 4 . The second reason for the Allies' inability to resolve the German question is the absence from the political stage at the crucial time of the two protagonists who were vital for the solution: the absence of France and of Germany herself. Nothing could be decided about Germany in 1945 without the two leading actors in the drama. Yet, on the contrary, the French were only in time to take part in the concluding phase of the debate on how to wipe out the Third Reich, and the Germans were excluded from any say in their own future by the Casablanca diktat (i.e., the formula of unconditional surrender, imposed by Roosevelt in January 1943). As a result, at the end of a war over the German question (a war detonated by the issue of Poland but generated by

1

4

G. Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy. Hiroshima and Potsdam. The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power, New York, 1965; J. Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945-1949, Stanford, 1968; Idem, The Origins of the Marshall Plan, Stanford, 1976; J. and G. Kolko, The Limits of Power. The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954, New York, 1972. G. Alperovitz, op. cit., chapter VI.

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German policy in Europe), the question of Germany herself remained unsolved, an open wound in the heart of Europe. Furthermore, the solutions proposed were of an ambiguous and provisional nature. Ambiguity: between Yalta and Potsdam the solutions devised were such as to lead indirectly to a Soviet presence on the Rhine and a Western presence on the Elbe or the Oder-Neisse, without any guarantee of security and without anyone being clear about the nature of the agreement. In other words, at a time when the victors decided to divide Germany, but decided that Germany should be administered as one economic entity, they entrusted to divided interlocutors (independently of the position of each single interlocutor) the power to interfere in German affairs either as far as the Rhine or as far as the Oder-Neisse and, in generating ambiguity, left open or rather deepened the wounds caused by the war. Although the war was an attempt to put an end to German hegemony on the Continent, the formula for the future which was to follow the fall of such hegemony was never defined, and all the attempts made in this direction between 1945 and 1947 met with failure. So that, from 1945 onwards, the German question represented the drama of postwar Europe. Provisional status: a time bomb one could say; because no matter what was asserted then, or can now be said in a historiographical context, in 1945 there was no realistic political perspective on the future of Germany. No-one either could or should have been under the illusion (seeing that the duty of a statesman is to understand and anticipate problems) that a provisional status, such as that created for Germany in 1945, might possibly have a long duration. It was this provisional status which, per se, would indubitably lead to traumas and crises in the Europe of the future. Yet this detail (if we may so euphemistically refer to it) was not considered of great importance by the statesmen dealing with the German question at that time. So the problem of Germany became a coin with "fusion" engraved on one side and "confusion" on the other. Confusion because a four nation policy (as foreseen at Yalta and even at Potsdam) proved impossible; a three nation policy, including France, at length proved difficult if not impossible also; only a two nation, Anglo-American policy emerged as being sufficiently realistic, but at very high cost. In fact, the result of Anglo-American policy in Germany (and, one should say, above all of American policy), was to widen the breach between the four zones. The consequence of this (if my inference is logically acceptable and valid), was to cause a crisis in Poland which found itself in the front line facing the Soviet Union (without a protective German line-up to the rear). Poland also immediately felt the effects of the Soviet need for security, becoming the first bulwark of Stalin's "cordon sanitaire". On the other hand, the result of the policy was to force France into a premature

The Forming of the Atlantic Pact: Some Problems of Interpretation

7

choice between traditional (and non-traditional) alliances and the rebirth of Germany. In other words, the lack of a solution to the German question gave rise to a more extensive conflict, which later coalesced into the Cold War, making Germany the trouble spot of Europe and resulting in the division of Europe and the development of processes of parallel aggregations in her two opposing camps. In the East the Soviet Union, due to this same lack, felt constrained to make the political systems of Poland, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria and, in due course, the German Democratic Republic, homogeneous with her own, creating a dependency almost colonial in nature. In the West, the period 1946-49 saw the development of a process of integration and assimilation which may be defined as the "framing process" for German rebirth, punctuated by the difficulty of internal debate in America as to the limits of the role the United States would or should play in terms of a political-military committment beyond their economic one. While this contradicted American praxis, it had the effect of consolidating the interdependence between the United States and Western Europe. Within these parallel processes (and here we are approaching the Atlantic theme), but also within the "frame" which we neither can nor should ignore, the first turning point was the "triptych" which makes the change in U.S. German policy explicit. After the total abandonment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff resolution 1067, American policy had oscillated between the proposal for a 25 year guarantee treaty, made by Byrnes in April 1946 and soon rejected by Stalin5 and the Stuttgart speech made by Byrnes on 6 September 19466. Immediately afterwards came the "triptych" representing the turning point in American policy on Germany. It comprised three decisions: December 1946, the creation of the Anglo-American Bizonia; March 1947, the Moscow conference and the decision to break off negotiations with the Soviets on the peace treaty with Germany 7 ; June 1947, the announcement of the Marshall Plan and the subsequent decision to extend the promised aid to the Western occupied zones of Germany. Without embracing all Gimbel's ideas on the origins of the Marshall Plan, which he linked entirely to the desire to make France accept Anglo-American policy on Germany, we should give them due weight and keep in sight their connection with French resistance to changes in U.S. policy on Germany. In other words, if changes in U.S. policy were unwelcome and undesirable to the French, the latter had the right to dem5

6

7

See it in: Documents on American Foreign Relations, vol. VIII, July 1, 1945 - December 31, 1946, Princeton, 1948, pp. 79-81. See it in: Documents, op. cit., pp. 210- 18; on its meaning see: J. F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, New York - London, 1947, pp. 187-94. Cfr.: F. C. Pogue, George C. Marshall. Statesman 1945 - 1959, New York, 1987, pp. 168 - 196.

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onstrate and broadcast their perplexity, and to make their concessions conditional on precise guarantees, as they had consistently tried to do from 1919 onwards. The eternal problem of French policy could be seen, almost in the same political spirit, if not in the same terms8. It is clear, however, that this hypothesis is not completely developed; it is an open question. And it is difficult for me to say how far such a hypothesis might be shared by other interlocutors. So we come to 1947, year of the creation of Western Europe. Western indeed, in the sense that it was structured as "Western" Europe; the year in which the countries whose governments contained Communists saw the expulsion of Communist party members from those governments; the year of the rebirth of political life in Germany. In May, the Bizonia witnessed the creation of the Social and Economic Council, embryo of political representation; in July the Allies issued a directive on the necessity for a political organisation in Germany 9 . In the meantime, a new theme was emerging around these developments: European reactions to the American commitment. The reactions were different: dictated by the wish to have a strong nucleus within Europe and to recover a kind of Franco-British duopoly animated — as in 1919 — by the barely concealed rivalry between the two powers, both on the road to decline in terms of new global commitments, but both reluctant to renounce their international roles and both, although for different motives, employed in the search for common safeguarding formulas. The first manifestation of this theme was the drawing up of the Dunkirk treaty between France and Great Britain on 4 March 1947. Danilo Ardia, who has devoted a volume to this treaty10, poses right at the start the crucial question on the political significance of this two nation entente. To what degree was it right to consider this agreement only pro forma as an antiGerman treaty or, if not anti-German, as a treaty of prevention and guarantee in relation to the rebirth of Germany? After 1948 it became the established formula to consider all declarations explicitly preventive of the possible rebirth of a German threat, as if these forms served almost as a screen for their true aim, always concealed with the end purpose of smoothing over the controversy. Yet in reality everyone had to know that the real purpose, the real function of the alliance, was to stem the growth of the Soviet threat. But is this "deformation" correct? Is it right to give the Dunkirk treaty any meaning other than the mutual French and British promises to follow a 8 9

10

See on this: J. Gimbel, The American occupation, op. cit. See it in: A Decade of American Foreign Policy 1941-1949, Revised edition, Washington, 1985, pp. 330-38. D. Ardia, Alle origini, op. cit.

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common policy, an equal policy regarding Germany and exploitation of the Ruhr coal supply? Ardia uses some very eloquent phrases to convey the extreme need of the French iron and steel industry to see a growth in Ruhr coal production, but without this leading to any dangerous effects11. A question then: was the Dunkirk treaty a staging or arrival point in the process of creating the Western formation? To answer the question we must first say that the second turning point in the rebuilding of the European order came at the end of 1947 after the London conference, held from 25 November to 16 December, resuming discussion on the theme of Germany, had dissolved in a resounding failure. So resounding, in fact, was the failure, that it was obvious two weeks before the conclusion of the conference and left no doubt as to the imminence of radical changes12. The changes were, in turn, so radical as to point to the conclusion that it was really this failure that caused moves towards a wider alliance: but a solely European alliance like the Brussels agreement, or maybe even then a wider alliance, like the Atlantic Pact? Is it fair to establish a link of this kind? It is an open question which presupposes yet another: did the London conference represent the discovery of a "need" for alliance in the face of and against the Soviet refusal to collaborate (after all, the Cominform had only just been constituted and the Communist parties placed on the offensive towards Western Europe)? Or was the break with the USSR just one phase in a process which had already begun in early 1947, or even at the end of 1946? If we place the elements of the situation side by side (i. e., the lack of a solution to the German question; the Franco-British alliance and the break with the USSR on this same question in a climate containing strong connotations of the "rivalry" proclaimed by Zdanov and the reaffirmation of the division of the world into two, inevitably hostile, camps), we might put forward an interpretative hypothesis. This hypothesis would affirm that the Brussels agreement represented a phase, implying no important changes except for the certainty, more obvious in the light of the Marshall Plan and the establishment of the Cominform, that relations with the Soviet Union had reached their breaking point, and that the German question was poised at the centre of the crisis. We now come to a further critical passage regarding the true motives for the Brussels agreement and the developments which followed it. The question usually formulated on this subject, with respect to the validity of fears of Soviet aggression, provoked, and generally still provokes, a chorus of negative 11 12

D. Ardia, Alle origini, op. cit., pp. 85-102. F. C. Pogue, G. C. Marshall, op. cit., p. 283.

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replies13, except for alarmism in certain French and German circles or Western Europe's fears of an internal economic-social collapse. Instead the dominant theme still seems to be: to what extent was German economic recovery, i. e., greater exploitation of the Ruhr coal production, or German political recovery, with a more active role and a more realistic way of looking at relations with the USSR, compatible with the by then appalling relations existing between the West and the Soviets? And how far was it acceptable in the West? It is in relation to these questions, these themes, that Bevin's vehicle was set in motion. But it is necessary to make some clarifications regarding a particular time-span in order to understand the subsequent connections. This is the period from mid-December 1947 to 22 January 1948, between the failure of the London conference on Germany and Bevin's speech to the House of Commons on the problems inherent in the creation of Western Europe. Bevin's speech of 22 January is usually seen as a surprise move. But can it, instead, be considered apart from the talks that preceded it? This question may be phrased in another way: can it be dissociated from the talks that preceded and prepared the ground for it? The sense is obviously different. Is there merely a chronological sequence or also a logical sequence? The aim of a global revision seems to precede, prepare for and accompany the London conference. On 4 December 1947, Bevin and Marshall agreed on the expectation of failure 14 . After 15 December there was a more animated exchange of opinions15. What was this exchange of opinions about? — the nature of the solution to the crisis, the widening of the hypotheses to be formulated, the forms, the German role, to what extent to reconsider the problem of Germany and predictable French reactions. Was Bevin at the centre of the action as a mediator or did he also take the role of keeping the positions separate, on the divide and rule principle, seeing himself as the protagonist of the European choice? A series of understandings with the Americans emerged, but what was the nature of these understandings? In the weeks between mid-December and Bevin's speech, how far did the American position remain undefined? How were roles in the restructuring project to be apportioned between the United States, Great Britain and France?

13

14

15

E. Reid, Time of Fear and Hope; the Making of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1947-1949, Toronto, 1977, pp. 36 ff.; Foreign Relations of the United States. 1948, vol. Ill, Washington, 1974, Minutes of meetings of exploratoiy talks, pp. 152-53, 155-60, 169-83. M. de Leonardis, I tre cerchi; il Regno Unito e la ricerca della sicurezza tra Commonwealth, Europa e "relazione speciale" con gli Stati Uniti, in the volume: O. Barie (ed.), L'alleanza occidentale op. cit., p. 24. M. de Leonardis, op. cit., pp. 24-27.

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These problems are the axis on which the interpretation of the final phase of this preparatory period of the Atlantic Alliance revolves, problems which can be investigated with the aim of achieving a thorough understanding of the Bevin plan. Since the moment when the supposed Soviet aggression was seen, whilst bearing in mind the very recent events in Prague, to be at worst an indirect threat, what can we say of the motive for the Brussels agreement: an attempt to contrive a two nation reorganisation of Europe? or a French-inspired mechanism which, once set in motion, would engulf the United States whilst keeping German reconstruction firmly under European control? In any case this is the correct point of departure. We should ask if the fulcrum of the debate cannot be more or less summarised in the following terms: if the countries of Western Europe offered a pretext outwardly relating to European unity, was the United States disposed — or politically constrained — to participate in a European guarantee based on a special understanding with Great Britain and, through the Dunkirk alliance, with France and, further, with someone else? By someone else I mean Benelux and a step towards Germany, i.e., an action aimed at reassuring France as to the future of European relations but also at taking the German problem out of cold storage. In other words, the German question formed the centre of the debate at that time, but was "in hibernation" due to the effects of the conflict with the USSR. It could be resolved only with the help of a different U.S. commitment. Is it not then correct to assume that during those few weeks of debate (December 1947 — January 1948) the discussions between American, English and French diplomats concerned the possibility of taking the German problem out of storage and initiating a solution, in exchange for a sort of guarantee on the part of the countries of the Dunkirk pact and the United States to the other small European countries, thereby opening the way for the definition of European blocs and their respective borders? As Kaplan observes, it was the State Department, more than the Secretary of State, which awaited Bevin's initiative in order to co-operate16. This would confirm the interpretation which affirms that the discussion during those five crucial weeks was preparatory, and not just chronologically earlier. From this springs the conviction that this line of interpretation outweighs the others. Bevin's speech of 22 January (coming to the kernel of the formation phase of the Western Alliance), marked the beginning of the operative phase which, however, it would be misleading to terminate on 17 March with the signing of the Brussels Pact. In fact, both Bevin's speech and the Pact pose problems in at least three directions.

16

L. S. Kaplan, The United States and Nato. The Formative Years, Lexington, 1984, p. 58.

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The first, regarding relations with the Soviet Union, seems to be the most vaunted, i. e., the one given most emphasis, but it certainly does not represent the most urgent aspect of the problem. In the second instance, we should reflect on the greater military strength given to the defensive provisions of the Brussels Pact by the fact that the French and British armies would ultimately be assisted, in case of war against Germany, by the (also respectable) armies of Benelux. No-one could present a political argument based on this affirmation with any credibility. It is necessary, therefore, to look towards the third direction, the direction which appears to be more realistically grounded in the political process taking place and which posed, or rather repeated, the usual questions. To what extent, and where exactly, were France and Great Britain committed to Europe? On the Rhine or the Elbe? In other words, the question could be phrased in this way: was France disposed to accept Great Britain as guarantor of Germany's return within the European line-up, and that the guarantee would be reinforced with American support? With American support. But is this formula sufficient or, rather, is it not necessary to extend the reasoning further and say with American participation? Had this participation perhaps (and this is an open question) already been foreseen and promised in Truman's declaration of 17 March 1948, the day of the signing of the Brussels Pact? And was this a mere matter of form, or a coincidence? Yet in history, coincidences must be noted, interpreted and carefully studied, even though I am aware that, as regards this particular coincidence, the interpretation given value in my exposition will not win a unanimous consensus. Is the Brussels Pact then a kind of "staging point" or a kind of "result" which should have led towards a comprehensive guarantee, comprising or already contained within the Brussels Pact itself, or a comprehensive guarantee which should have been enriched by new elements? This is the basic interpretative problem of the diptych "Brussels Pact — Atlantic Pact". Was the Brussels Pact considered as a potentially finished result per se, or were its authors aware from the outset of the limitations of the result achieved and, therefore, of the duty to proceed beyond it, towards a widening of the agreements? Before replying to this question, a chronological observation may serve to clarify the matter. The Brussels Pact was signed on 17 March 1948, the month following the events in Prague; in April there were elections in Italy; in June the rupture between Tito and Stalin; in June, also, the beginning of the Berlin blockade. Looking again at the chronological order, regarding the Soviet and German problems, in March Marshall Sokolowski left the Allied Control Commission; in June the Allies took the decision to start work on the German constitutional charter; the monetary reform decision

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was taken on 20 June; in September 1948 it was decided to begin the work of the Constituent assembly in Bonn. If the Brussels Pact, instead of being considered per se, in isolation, is placed within this international dynamic, and we cannot not so place it; then we understand that, rather than resolving problems, it opens a whole range of them. We may give them either continuist answers, or answers which negate the continuity; answers which affirm the existence of a process conceived and desired not as a fruit already ripe, but as an evolving strategy, or answers which, as we reflect on the development of the situation, affirm instead the almost accidental joining up of events. Does continuism presuppose an already formulated strategy? Not necessarily. A general orientation is sufficient. When it is affirmed that both American and Western policies towards the formation of alliances or the restructuring of Europe contain an undeniable element of continuity, is it also affirmed that this continuity is expressed in the early identification of all the results it was desired to reach, or is it affirmed only, as seems more correct, that the objectives were clearly defined and the means to attain them were gradually adapted to this end? A general orientation is sufficient; to deny its sufficiency is to give credit to velleities which only Field Marshal Montgomery took seriously, and on which the texts published by Varsori and de Leonardis contain some interesting comments, interesting to the point of appearing, with hindsight, paradoxical17. An overestimation of European — United States dualism also seems impossible, for the same reasons. In fact, and here we come at last to the logical conclusions of the political process, the importance of the moment was in essence that the passage, or sequence, from March 1948 up to July 1948 shows how in reality, supposing (but not conceding) the existence of a plan of this kind, a solely European scheme, it had to give ground to the problem of American intervention which, after touching on economics in 1947, was then touching on politics. The time-span between March and July 1948 marked the definite entry of the United States as guarantor of the political-diplomatic system then rising on the ashes, the ruins of Europe, by virtue of the healing of the wounds left open by the war. The system was based on the following premises: 1) The iron curtain divided Europe in two and excluded the Soviet Union from collaboration with the nations of the West for an indefinite period. 2) There was a strong British propensity to maintain a power role which would develop into a definite, effective and by no means negligible role of mediation in relations between Europe and the United States.

A. Varsori, // Patto di Bruxelles, op. at., pp. 170-76, 214-20, 222-33, 235-38.

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3) There was the French desire for Continental domination, made tangible by a real French system of alliances and by strict containment of Germany. Strict and guaranteed indeed this time (unlike 1919), as otherwise, French assent to the re-unification of the three Western occupied zones of Germany would not have been given. 4) In France there was preoccupation that the uncertain status of Germany might, as in 1922, again drive the Germans towards a tradition of oscillation between West and East, i. e., towards an independent dialogue with Moscow. 5) There was American willingness to act in relation to such problems, i. e., to take these premises into consideration and infer the necessity for a commitment. On this level, moving on from the presuppositions stated, the nature of the discourse changed from European, as had been the case, to Atlantic. Stripped of all electoral uncertainties and obvious political hesitations, the dominant fact of the debate at that time was American willingness, which became specific rather than strategical. From being general and indeterminate as to means, it became qualified in the articulation of phases and forms of commitment. Is it possible to dispute American willingness? Is it possible to affirm that this willingness did not exist, as the letter of the Atlantic Pact was to demonstrate? It seems impossible to doubt American willigness to guarantee the new European order both from the inside and as regards threats from without. If, prior to 17 March, this willingess had been a political line bereft of praxis, a look either at the Pentagon talks of March 1948 or at the May 1948 debates of the Foreign Commission of the U.S. Senate18 on the approval of the Vandenberg resolution is sufficient to indicate the importance of the process then under way and on the road to conclusion. The extent to which the U.S. political system was penetrated by American willingness to participate in the European security system 1948, on the eve of the Vandenberg resolution, is clearly apparent from these debates. There was full awareness of the double value, internal and external, of the commitment undertaken; there was the sense of a turning point, the importance as regards the Soviet Union, the true importance of this turning point for relations with France, the importance for the whole of Europe and a sense of the difficulty that such a turning point would have caused and resolved in Franco-German relations. The commitment the Americans were approaching by means of a long, exhausting but conscious debate was that of executing a political operation of great ambitiousness and scope: to 18

The Vandenberg Resolution and the North Atlantic Treaty. Hearings in the Executive Session before the Committee on Foreign Relations. United States Senate, 80th Congress ... and 81st Congress, Historical Series, Washington 1972, pp. 31 ff.

The Forming of the Atlantic Pact: Some Problems of Interpretation

15

guarantee Western Europeans that the results of the Second World War would be stabilised, no longer thanks to a "grand design" Roosevelt-style, but thanks to the direct intervention of the United States. Such intervention would be limited to Western Europe, since to overstep the boundary would be to strike a blow against the spirit of the Yalta agreement, fidelity to which was the bulwark of American reasoning. In this sense it is fundamental to bear in mind that from 1939 there had been no European diplomatic system capable of selfdirection. The Americans proposed themselves as the force that could fill this gap and guarantee the stability of the new European system from outside. All the rest derived from this axiom. As a derivation of this, unless the vote on the Vandenberg resolution and the start of the so-called Exploratory Talks are placed in the correct context, it appears that the preceding work was done by chance, for recreation, in ignorance or by mistake, and not as a task preparatory to an alliance in which the United States would take part; an alliance which transcended FrancoBritish hopes and fears. Therefore, from July onwards, the theme acquired a different nature: no longer whether to make an alliance, but which alliance to draw up, and how to balance the incentives towards specific geographical areas or problems. And did the Brussels Pact survive? Was it destined to have a future? Let us permit ourselves the observation, with all due respect to institutions that survive, that it survived like the Council of Europe, as an empty shell. In other words, the central problem is the sub-division of the Exploratory Talks into phases relating to fundamental problems which, in synthesis, might be described as follows: a) the first phase, the conception of an alliance with an exclusively "Atlantic" role; b) the second phase, characterised by French dissatisfaction with the progress of events; c) the third phase, marked by French uncertainty regarding a guarantee which omitted too large a part of Europe. One usually thinks of the raising of French shields in January 1949, with the threat of nonparticipation in the Atlantic Alliance unless Algeria were included in the guaranteed area, as the instrument of a better defence for French colonies; as the instrument for obtaining Italian participation in the Atlantic Alliance. To these firmly grounded convictions we must add the consideration that, for France, the Alliance in process of formation — going beyond the hypothesis of separate agreements in "concentric circles" — was too tied one might say, to the "oceanic" fact, i. e., the defence of the Northern Atlantic, and too little immersed in the Continent. And it would be immersed in the Continent solely in the case of Italy's participation, as it should not be forgotten that Italy at that time guaranteed French defence as far as the Eastern Alps and the free

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passage to Austria and, from Austria, to Germany (this being prior to the state treaty of 1955)19. The problem of clarifying the French position leads to a critical moment for the whole of the negotiations: marginally it concerned the area of guarantee but, centrally, the importance of the Pact. The strength of the French threat to withdraw from the negotiations was due neither to a special predilection for Italy nor, entirely, to the Algerian question, which the French had no interest in bringing too much to the fore, but to the "too Atlantic" and "too little Continental" nature of the Alliance. France was not very interested in a "maritime" alliance, but extremely interested in a Continental commitment which would shift the defence area to the Eastern Alps and the Elbe, so confirming the central role of France from a geopolitical viewpoint, and therefore the equal status of Paris with Washington and London. It is surely a coincidence, but a very eloquent one, that the German Trizonia came into being on 8 April 1949, four days after the signing of the Atlantic Pact. Before concluding an introduction already abounding in question marks, it is maybe a good idea to re-formulate, in synthesis, the basic questions underlying the debate on the negotiations to which successive papers will lead. It is therefore necessary to ask once more, in the most basic form, why it was felt necessary to draw up the Atlantic Pact. Is a univocal answer to such a univocal question possible? On the contrary, it opens up a whole range of unsatisfactory hypotheses. These can be traced back to two main factors. First, the Pact was drawn up in response to fear. But since fear is not an abstract feeling, it must be correlated to an object that commands fear, whence derives a more specific question: fear of whom or of what? If we are talking about fear of Soviet aggression, the unanimous reply of historiography is in the negative. There is a wide convergence of opinion affirming that the USSR harboured no aggressive intentions at that time and, indeed, was in no position to harbour them. In subordinate terms, then, one might talk about fear of the fact that the USSR might Sovietize Eastern Europe and that this would lead to favourable opportunities for the Communist parties of Western Europe. But this explanation is contradicted by the fact that the Sovietization of Eastern Europe was already an established fact by February 1948 (the Prague coup) and that a reply more than a year later would have been incongruous, untimely and superfluous. To assume it as the explanation for the Atlantic Pact is impossible. One might then think, reflecting on what has just been said, of the fear of Communism in Western Europe, i.e., worry that the forces of the Communist parties might start destabilising movements in the fragile Western democracies, 19

FRUS 1948, vol. Ill, pp. 808-12 e 883-87; FRUS 1949, vol. IV, pp. 5, 7-9, 13, 23-24, 2732, 41, 43, 62, 87, 124-26, 126-35, 141-45, 151-63, 233-34, 253-54.

The Forming of the Atlantic Pact: Some Problems of Interpretation

17

winning the field due to internal surrender on the part of the defenders. But an ironical response on this theme is also possible. What reason was there to fear a party like the PCI, overwhelmingly defeated on 18 April 1948, a party which reacted moderately (albeit with a few slight tremors) even to the attempted murder of its leader, Palmiro Togliatti, in July 1948? From the sum of these arguments emerges the conclusion that to explain the Atlantic Pact in terms of a response to definite fears explains it neither exhaustively nor convincingly. We must look in other directions for this. The political reasons for the Alliance must be sought, and several plausible hypotheses can be formulated on this point. In the first place there was the British desire to build a bridge between the United States and Europe, but a bridge firmly founded on the continuation of Britain's imperial role. In the second place there were French fears of the gradual rise of a system of separate stage alliances, in closed sectors, such as to circumscribe France in a Continental role, placing her on the side lines of the "European concert" and the Atlantic guarantee, or reducing her to the position of a hinge between separate Atlantic and Mediterranean systems, which would explain the tenacity of French rejection in regard to this subordinate hypothesis and the participation, in the end, of Italy. In the third place the Pact could be the result of an American decision to participate in the guarantee by a presence within the Alliance, since this would confer seriousness and, in a certain sense, substance, on a treaty whose concrete provisions were at the time susceptible to argument. The choice was made firmer by European appeals which, whether based on rational or irrational motives, yet expressed a deeply anxious call for help in the face of a future filled with imponderable dangers. This then represented a political motive, or a convergence of diverse political motives, linked to the need for better structuring of the West compared with formerly, but not determined by negative reasons like fear. It is worth drawing attention to the fact that the formulation of article 5 of the Treaty, binding operative decisions in relation to the casus foederis to individual parliamentary procedures, rendered the Treaty a fragile Alliance with little credibility. Certainly the American requirement not to deprive the Senate of its institutional prerogatives cast a worrying light on the credibility of the undertaking given. However, examining the situation carefully, this observation only acquires weight if we insist on the military and defensive character the Alliance and, as I have tried to demonstrate in the foregoing, this was in 1949 only a subordinate element compared to the primary purpose of strengthening the West, before responding to a vague and indistinct fear. To dwell on formal aspects means nothing when one considers that, little more than a year later, the Americans, with scant heed to provisos and internal procedures, intervened in Korea because it was in their interests and because they needed to do so. By understanding this one point one grasps, in my

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opinion, the real and lasting significance of the Alliance: its being not necessarily a military alliance but a prevalently political treaty. Above all, the Alliance comprised a political guarantee with respect to an existing order or, as regards Germany, one in process of definition. So article 5 of the Alliance was, in the end, a secondary issue compared with the existence of the Alliance per se. In 1949 no-one truly believed in its coming into force. When this point came up in 1950, resort was made to further organisational developments. But explaining what occurred in 1949 side by side with what happened in 1950 is to push the interpretation beyond the threshold of logical coherence. It remains, in conclusion, to spotlight the stabilising value of the agreement. In Western Europe it supplied the framework for the birth of the Federal Republic of Germany, i. e., for the realistic solution of the German problem which had until then been impossible. Outwardly it established a certain lineup, the post-war line-up: after 1949 the Soviets, no matter what is said about the campaign against the European Defence Community, fought only rearguard battles in Europe. In 1954 they achieved a tactical success with the defeat of the EDC in the French National Assembly but were forced, the following year, to resign themselves to the definitive stabilisation of Europe. This stabilisation was marked by both the contemporaneous end of the ratification of treaties which brought Germany back within the Western community, and the signing of the Warsaw Pact.

The First Stage of Negotiations: December 1947 to June 1948 by Antonio Varsori

The negotiations that led to the Atlantic Pact have been the subject of constant attention from American and European historiography, especially since the latter half of the 1970s when the "Foreign Relations of the United States" for the years 1948719491 were first published and access to the main archives of the Western diplomacies, from Washington to London to Paris, was allowed. These two events have permitted thorough, well-documented investigation of the motivations and origins of the treaty, of the converging but also conflicting interests and objectives of its makers, of the modes in which the alliance was formulated. In the contributions of the Americans Ireland and Kaplan 2 , the Canadian Reid3, the British Ovendale, Bullock and Warner4, the Norwegian

1

2

3

4

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, III, Western Europe, Washington, US Government Printing Office, 1974; and in the same collection 1949, IV, Western Europe, Washington, US Government Printing Office,1975. T. P. Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance. The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Westport, Connecticut, Greenwood Press,1981; L. S. Kaplan, The United States and NATO, The Formative Years, Lexington, Kentucky, The University of Kentucky Press,1984; and the more recent: Id., NATO and the United States, The Enduring Alliance, Boston, Twayne, 1988. E.Reid, Time for Pear and Hope, The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty 1947-1949, Toronto, McLelland & Stewart, 1977. R. Ovendale, The English Speaking Alliance. Britain, the United States, the Dominions and the Cold War 1945-1951, London, Allen & Unwin, 1985, in particular Chapters 2 and 3; R. Ovendale (ed.), The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments 1945-1951, Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1984, in this volume in particular the contributions of D. C. Watt, Britain, the United States and the Opening of the Cold War, and of G. Warner, The Labour Governments and the Unity of Western Europe 1945 — 51. As for A. Bullock, Ernest Bevin Foreign Secretary 1945 — 51, London, Heinemann, 1983, in particular Chapters 16 and 17. Cf. also the recent contribution of M. Dockrill and J. W. Young (eds.), British Foreign Policy 1945 — 56, London, Macmillan, 1989, in particular the essay by J. Kent, Bevin's Imperialism and the Idea of Euro-Africa 1945-49.

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Riste5, the French Melandri and Vaisse6, the Italians Di Nolfo, Barie and Vigezzi7, a common effort has been exerted to offer new interpretations, to trace original perspectives yielding more precise knowledge of this subject. Why then should the origins of the Atlantic Pact be once again examined? How should a contribution be formulated if it is to offer some innovative element?8 The first question finds immediate response in some considerations that, while apparently obvious, cannot be disregarded. The Atlantic Pact is not only a historical event, but also a current reality. In the last forty years it has been the symbol, as well as the mirror, for the bond that, following World War II, has been forged between one shore and the other of the Atlantic Ocean. The emergencies, the accomplishments, the changes in NATO have always been manifest signals of developments in this relationship.9 Within the Atlantic Alliance, moreover, the changing relations between the nations of Western Europe have often found expression, obviously in addition to the confrontation between East and West.10 Continuing to investigate the origins of the Atlantic Pact means, among other things, attempting to explain the current state of relations between the New and the Old Continent. As regards 5

6

7

8

9 10

O. Riste (ed.), Western Security: The Formative Years. European and Atlantic Defence 1947—1953, Oslo, Norwegian University Press, 1985. For another recent contribution of miscellaneous nature cf. N. Wiggershaus, R. G. Foerster (herausgegeben von), Die westliche Sicherheitsgemeinschaft 1948 — 1950. Gemeinsame Probleme und gegensätzliche Nationalinteressen in der Gründungsphase der Nordatlantischen Allianz, Boppard am Rhein, Harald Boldt Verlag, 1988. P. Melandri, L'alliance atlantique, Paris, Gallimard/Julliard, 1979; Id., Les Etats-Unis face a ['unification de l'Europe 1945-1954, Paris, A. Pedone, 1980, pp. 171 - 187; M. Va'isse, L'echec d'une Europe franco-britannique ou comment le Pacte de Bruxelles fut cree et delaisse; in R. Poidevin (sous le direction de), Histoire des debuts de la construction europeenne (mars 1948 - mai 1950). Actes du colloque de Strasbourg (28-30 novembre 1984), Brüssels, Bruylant,1986, pp.369-390. For the same year cf. also J. Doise, M. Va'isse, Diplomatie et outil militaire 1971-1969, Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1987, pp. 401-420. E. Di Nolfo, Motivi ispiratori e genesi diplomatica del Patto Atlantico, in AA.VV., Trent'anni di alleanza atlantica, Roma, Editrice Europea, 1979, pp. 4-42; B. Vigezzi (a cura di), La dimensione atlantica e le relazioni internazionali net dopoguerra (1947-1949), Milan, Jaca Book, 1987; O. Barie (a cura di), L'alleanza occidentale. Nascita e sviluppi di un sistema di sicurezza collettivo, Bologna, il Mulino, 1988, in particular the contributions of O, Barie and M. de Leonardis. The present contribution attempts to integrate some themes recently considered by A. Varsori, U Patto di Bruxelles (1948): tra integrazione europea e alleanza atlantica, Rome, Bonacci, 1988. On this subject cf. the interesting observations in L. S. Kaplan, NATO ..., cit., pp. 165-184. This subject has been dealt with, for example, in G. Mammarella, Europa-Stati Uniti un'alleanza difficile, Florence, Vallecchi, 1974; A. Grosser, Les occidentaux. Les pays de ['Europe et les Etats-Unis depuis la guerre, Paris, Fayard, 1978. For an interesting analysis referred to a particular period cf. the recent contribution of P. Melandri, Une incertaine alliance. Les Etats-Unis et l'Europe 1973-1983, Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne, 1988.

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the manner in which this subject should be dealt with, it may be useful to briefly summarize the unfolding of events in a critical perspective, keeping clearly in mind the most recent interpretations and the most significant elements of the historiographical debate and attempting, where possible, to assess their validity. One of the most concise definitions of the origins of the Atlantic Pact — since it is perhaps not entirely correct to use the term "negotiations" for the events that took place up to June of 1948 — has been offered by J. L. Gaddis in his "Strategies of Containment". The American expert on the Cold War has stated that: "The initiative for the North Atlantic Treaty came from the West Europeans themselves, and reflected the uneasiness they felt over the disparity in the military power on the European continent (...). Concern over this situation led Great Britain, France and the Benelux countries to form their own military alliance, the Western Union in March 1948 and to seek to associate the United States with it. The State Department was sympathetic: by June it had secured the Senate authorization to engage in such discussions, and by September the Western Union countries, together with the United States and Canada, had agreed on the outlines of the providing that an attack on any one of them or any other nations that might be included within the term of the treaty would be regarded as an attack upon all".11 Gaddis' brief remarks serve as stimulus to a long series of questions, some of which have been formulated by other scholars of the period. In the first place — as Nicolaj Petersen has asked — "Who pulled whom and how much?" 12 In other words, was the Atlantic Pact one of the stages in a precise American strategy designed to involve the United States in a global commitment, a strategy whose previous reference points can be seen in the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan? 13 Or was it a sort of 'imposition', a 'trap' that the leaders of Western Europe, the British Ernest Bevin in particular, laid for the United States with the aim of involving it in an entangling alliance with the old world countries? Beyond this first problem, and referring again to one of Gaddis' general statements, the question of the relationship between the Brussels Pact and the Atlantic Alliance must be asked. On this matter in particular, British historians seem to be divided among those, E. Barker 14 for instance, who have viewed the European alliance as a mere tool designed to 11

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14

J. L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment. A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 72. N. Petersen, Who Pulled Whom and How Much? Britain, the United States and the Making of the North Atlantic Treaty, "Millennium — Journal of International History", vol. II, 1982, no. 2, pp. 93-114. An example of this view in S. E. Ambrose, Rise to Glohalism, American Foreign Policy, 1938-1976, London, Penguin Books, 1979 (3 ed.), pp. 150-153, 153-166, 176-182. E. Barker, The British between the Superpowers, 1945-50, London, Macmillan, 1983, p. 127.

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capture the attention — and the commitment - of Washington in regard to defense of the Old Continent, and others — G. Warner for instance15 — who have evaluated the Five-Power Pact as an independent aspect of Bevin's policy toward Europe, an element which only subsequently would be transformed into the means for creating a broader alliance, or rather an Atlantic political/ military system.16 There were also those who saw in British action, especially during the first stages of negotiations for the Atlantic Pact, the expression of a complex strategy aimed at creating a bond between various systems: from the Commonwealth, to Western Europe, to the special relationship,!, e., the wellknown "three circles". According to this interpretation, the initiatives taken by London were not designed exclusively to defend the West against the Soviet Union, but also, and perhaps predominantly, to conserve Britain's place as a great power on the worldwide level.17 Once again, Gaddis' vague statements arouse further questions. Was the Atlantic Pact in its first stages of formulation merely the result of European fears? Did the hypothesis of alliance with the United States represent a simple military response to Stalin's policy? And moreover, did the West perceive the Soviet 'threat' as a predominantly military danger?18 Nor should it be forgotten that investigation of the making of the Atlantic Alliance brings up the problem, by no means secondary, of the relationship between France and Great Britain, offers some interesting elements for understanding the function of Italy in the Western context and, lastly, throws light on the origins of the process of European integration. In attempting to find an answer, at least a partial one, to these questions while briefly reviewing the course of events between late 1947 and mid-1948, it may be useful to point out some chronological and thematic milestones. 15

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18

G. Warner, op. cit., pp. 66 - 67. This author has recently dealt also with the subject of the relationship between Great Britain and the United States in an interesting article; cf. G. Warner, The Anglo-American Special Relationship, "Diplomatic History", vol. 13, no. 4, Fall 1989, pp. 479-489. An analysis of the evolution in the British attitude from interest in Europe to interest in an "Atlantic community" in J. W. Young, Britain, France and the Unity of Europe 1945-1951, Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1984, p. 143 ff. The attention focussed on an 'imperial' strategy is evident in R. Ovendale, op. cit., passim. Cf. also the interesting evaluation in M. de Leonardis, / "tre cerchi": il Regno Unito e la ricerca della sieurezza tra Commonwealth, Europa e "relazione speciale" con gli Stati Uniti (1948-1949), in O. Barie (a cura di), op. cit., pp. 9-114. On the Western 'perception' of the Soviet military 'threat', cf., for example, the stimulating essay by D. C. Watt, British Military Perceptions of Soviet Union as a Strategic Threat, 1945-1950, in J.Becker, F. Knipping (eds.), Power in Europe? Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany in a Postwar World 1945-1950, Berlin/New York, W. de Gruyter, 1986, pp. 325-338.

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23

Although chosen arbitrarily, these reference points nonetheless provide a framework for interpretation. Briefly stated, they are the following: 1st stage — realization by the West that the Cold War was imminent. 2nd stage — declaration of Cold War by Great Britain, with the corollaries of selecting "war objectives" and searching for allies. 3rd stage — The British ambition to achieve the maximum in advantages with the minimum in costs, or the 'illusion' that a 'peripheral strategy' could be applied to the Cold War. 4th stage — The conflict between British hopes and ambitions and the fears and needs of its continental partners, as well as with the long-term strategy pursued by Washington. 5th stage — The laborious formulation of a compromise solution between American demands, those of Britain and those of the other nations in the Brussels Pact. 6th stage — The birth of the project for a "great alliance", destined to become the heart and the symbol of the Western system. As regards the first stage, a series of events occurring in 1947 (from the Truman Doctrine to the failure of the four-power Moscow conference on Germany, from the Soviet refusal to take part in the Marshall Plan to the creation of the Cominform) convinced the leaders of the major Western nations that the West was moving inevitably toward conflict with the Soviet Union. This development in the international situation brought to light some elements of weakness in the Western front, all concentrated within the European context: the power vacuum that had been created in the centre of the continent with the temporary eclipse of Germany, a widespread state of economic and social depression, the apparent force of attraction exerted by the USSR from the ideological and political/military points of view, the growing influence of the Communist movement, the fears and hesitations of the moderate leadership in some European nations, France and Italy in particular. Dominating over all was the feeling that these elements might induce Moscow, almost automatically, to impose its hegemony, either directly or indirectly, over all of the Old Continent.19 Confronted with such a situation from the early months of 1947, the West felt two urgent needs; on the one hand, that of cooperation, especially in the economic field, on the other that of security. The United States had assumed responsibility through the Marshall Plan for responding to the first of these two needs, thus returning to a traditional interest in the fate of 19

As regards the origins of the "Cold War", cf. the bibliography in E. Aga Rossi (a cura di), Gli Stati Uniti e le origini delta guerra fredda, Bologna, il Mulino, 1984, pp. 283-297. For a recent contribution cf. H.Thomas, Armed Truce. The Beginnings of the Cold War 1945-46. London, Hamish Hamilton, 1986.

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European economy, demonstrated by such episodes as the establishment of UNRRA and the decisions of Dumbarton Oaks, whose roots went back to the Dawes and Young Plan.20 But America showed itself to be more cautious, if not actually reluctant, to choose the arms to be wielded in facing the need for security. Moreover, America felt that concordant evaluation by the Western leaders of the nature of Stalin's challenge was necessary. Some leaders of the West considered the political/ideological component to be predominant in the Soviet threat, drawing nourishment from the economic and social crisis. Accordingly, the project for European reconstrution devised by Marshall represented an adequate response21. For others, especially in Paris, Brussels and London, the force of attraction of the USSR was based also on military power and, conversely, on the evidence of Europe's weakness in this sector. While few among Western leaders considered armed aggression by Moscow to be likely, at least over the short term, many were aware that the apparent military superiority of the USSR constituted, in an indirect manner, one of the supporting pillars of Stalin's policy. Furthermore, the possibility that conflict might break out consequent to an 'accident' was not excluded, and in this case, occupation of the entire continent by the Red Army was taken for granted.22 While the Western European leaders were fully confident that subsequent "liberation" by the Americans would take place, they were not willing to face the costs of foreign occupation, only a few years after that of the Nazis, and of a war waged on 20

21

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On the Marshall Plan cf., among others, J. Gimbel, The Origins of the Marshall Plan, Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1976; E. Aga Rossi (a cura di), // Piano Marshall e I'Europa, Rome, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 1983; M. J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan. America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947—1952, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987. More generally on the process of economic reconstrution of Western Europe cf. A. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-1951, London, Methuen & Co., 1984. Cf. for example the position assumed by George Kennan in 1948. Cf. D. Yergin, Shattered Peace. The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State. London, Penguin Books, 1980, pp. 388-390. On this subject cf. the evalutions of the French Chief of Staff, Gen. Georges Revers, expressed during a meeting with British military figures, in Service Historique de l'Armee de Terre (SHAT) (Chateau de Vincennes), EMDN, 4Q37D2, memorandum, 20. 1. 1948. For analysis of the position of the French military cf. J. Delmas, Reflections on the Notion of Military Power through the French Example (1945-1948), in J.Becker, F. Knipping (eds.), op. cit., pp. 339 — 352. The evaluations of the British military leaders as to the possibility of a conflict with the USSR were more optimistic but, in case of war, it was practically taken for granted that the continent would be occupied. On the British position cf. Public Record Office (PRO), FO 800/452, COS(48)26(0), COS Committee Memorandum "Problem of Future War and the Strategy of War with Russia" by B. Montgomery, 30. 1. 1948, secret. Documents of the Public Record Office, subject to crown copyright, appearing with the consent of the Keeper of Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

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the soil of the Old Continent — as Georges Bidault was to state "he did not wish to be for the second time the leader of a resistance movement".23 But, to go on to a response on the level of defence as well, Western leadership had to demonstrate unequivocally to itself as well as to public opinion that a state of "war", regardless of how "cold" it might be, did actually exist. This would allow a more efficient mobilization of resources, the search for allies, formulation of the objectives to be pursued. In Autumn of 1947 the leaders of Western Europe, those of Great Britain in particular, began to take into serious consideration the hypothesis that the response to Stalin's challenge should utilize not only economic instruments, but also political and military ones. For Britain, in this context, France was obviously the primary partner in dialogue, if only for the traditional bond that had linked the two nations, from the "entente cordiale" to the Dunkerque Pact, in the common need to defend the continent from the hegemonic ambitions of a third power.24 But if during World Wars I and II the United States had been a determinant element in saving Europe from German hegemony, now with even greater reason only Washington could, within the context of the impending Cold War, furnish London and Paris with the necessary resources for confronting the new aspirations to domination of the continent, this time emanating from Moscow. In this regard however, a new "casus belli" was needed to compel America — or rather public opinion and Congress — to accept the idea of participating in a new conflict, albeit one not fought out on the battlefields. The failure of the London four-power conference on the German Peace Treaty (November 1947) seemed to Bevin to provide an appropriate "casus belli" favouring the first step toward a Western "great alliance".25 But this alliance would require a 'declaration of war' as well as the development of a strategy with clear objectives to be 23

24

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This statement by Bidault to Bevin; cf. PRO, FO 800/465, memorandum "Anglo-French Conversations", by P. Dixon, 1. 12.1947, top secret. On developments in French-British relations, in addition to the already mentioned volume of J. W. Young, cf. D. Ardia, Alle origini dell'alleanza occidental, Padova, Signum, 1983; as well as Id., Londra, Parigi 1947: l'Europa tra Mosca e Washington, "Storia delle relazioni internazionali", III, 1987, no. 2, pp. 295-341. On the London Conference within the sphere of the Cold War cf., for example, V. Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War 1941 - 1947, London, Jonathan Cape, 1983, pp. 288 - 290. Especially important are the conversations between Marshall, Bevin and Bidault. On this subject cf. the documentation in PRO, FO 800/465; and in Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres (MAE), Archives Diplomatiques (AD), Serie Z Europe 1944-49, sous-serie Grande-Bretagne, vol.38; FRUS, 1947, II, Washington, US Government Printing Office, 1975, pp. 811 —815. For the significance of these conversations see, in addition to the already mentioned contributions of Young, Vai'sse, Varsori, J. Baylis Britain, the Brussels Pact and the Continental Commitment, "International Affairs", 1984, pp. 615-629.

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pursued. This need was met — and this marks the second stage of events — by the Foreign Office's issuing of some important memorandums, foremost among them "The First Aim of British Foreign Policy", and by Bevin's speech before the House of Commons on January 22, 1948. With their documents the British Secretary of State and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, subsequent to the definitive rupture with the USSR over the future of Germany, pointed to Soviet policy as the chief threat to the very survival of the West, and stressed the need for a "great alliance", the Western Union.26 As for Bevin's speech, in addition to discussing these two themes, it also fulfilled other objectives: a) that of reassuring the moderate political groups on the continent, those of France in particular, as to British intentions, b) informing public opinion that the conflict between East and West had now reached the "point of no return", c) launching a warning to Stalin as to the firm resolution of the Western World, d) inviting the United States to come out openly in favour of Great Britain and her European allies.27 Although for the British government the main objective of its policy was that of thwarting the presumed Soviet aggression, strictly national aims and interests were also present. Especially for Bevin, the guiding role that would be assumed by Great Britain in the design for the creation of a Western system - in all probability more political than military - was also aimed at: a) reinforcing Britain's leadership of the Old Continent, while simultaneously confirming France's role as junior partner, b) fortifying the special relationship with Washington, since Britain would have acted as go-between — as well as backer — of the new bond between one shore of the Atlantic and the other, c) strengthening relations with the Commonwealth, which would have looked again to Britain for that guidance which had been temporarily eclipsed during World War II in favor of the United States.28 Bevin's ambitious policy — not by chance did Whitehall soon begin to speak of a "grand design" - had to reconcile itself to some substantial limitations. The very grandiose scheme, but also vagueness, of the "Western Union" project, was designed to conceal from Britain's partners the discrepancy between her ambitions and her capabilities. The British objective — apart from the basic requirement for a Western response to Soviet action — was 16

27 28

PRO, CAB 129/29, CP(48}6, memorandum "The First Aim of British Foreign Policy", by E. Bevin, 4. 1. 1948, top secret. Numerous authors including Bullock, Barker, Baylis and Young have examined the significance of this document. Among the first to emphasize the importance of Bevin's memorandum cf. D. Dilks, Introduction, in Id. (ed.), Retreat from Power. Studies in Britain's Foreign Policy of the Twentieth Century, II, After 1939, London, Macmillan, 1981, pp. 23-24. For an interesting evaluation of Bevin's speech cf. A. Bullock, op. cit., pp. 518 — 522. On the postions of Bevin and the Foreign Office cf., for example, PRO, CAB 129/24, CP(48)46, memorandum "Western Union" by E. Bevin, 10. 2. 1948, top secret.

The First Stage of Negotiations: December 1947 to June 1948

27

that of obtaining the maximum advantages, especially on the political and strategical level, with the minimum of sacrifices on the level of military and economic commitments. This brings us to deal with the third stage. The skill in manoeuvering and the diplomatic experience of the Foreign Office would in the end have forced the Americans to provide the instruments with which the West, under the high patronage of London and of Washington, was to bring to completion Bevin's "great design".29 In this regard, the jingle "It's true they have the money bags, but we have all the brains", springs to mind spontaneously.30 In the dialogue between London and Washington the European partners, France and the Benelux countries in particular, were supposed to content themselves with the part of useful, obliging "clientes". The British formulation of its own policy explains why, on the morrow of Bevin's speech to the Commons, Britain believed that, with the aid of France, it could limit the concrete aspects of its own struggle against Stalinist aggression merely to the prospect of including Benelux in the Dunkerque Treaty.31 If on the one hand the choice of the Anglo-French treaty as a model served in a short-term perspective, thanks to its anti-German connotation, to reassure the French and to bind Paris increasingly closer to the initiatives taken by London, on the other hand the British moves made in January and February of 1948 seemed in keeping with the preference expressed by Churchill in 1940—1941 for a peripheral strategy, in the expectation that the United States would soon enter the war.32 These ambitions and hopes were based on the implicit assumption that the British government's partners would be passive witnesses to the development of events, the Americans blocked by their isolationist tradition, by their presumed 'inexperience' and by the complex changes in their domestic politics; 29

On the special relationship cf. in general, in addition to the already mentioned essay by G.Warner, D. Reynolds, A 'special relationship'? America, Britain and the International Order since the Second World War, "International Affairs", vol. 60, 1986, no. 1, pp. 3-20; as well as Id., Rethinking Anglo-American Relations, "International Affairs", vol.63, 1989, no. 1, pp. 89-111. 30 Cit. in R. N. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy in current perspective, New York, Columbia University Press, 1980 (3 ed.), p. xiii. " Cf. PRO, FO 371, Z 353/273/72, draft by E. Bevin, 12. 1. 1948; Z 354/273/72, draft by E. Bevin, 12. 1. 1948; Z 273/273/72, tel. no. 52, Foreign Office to Paris, 13. 1. 1948, immediate, top secret. 12 On Churchill as 'strategist' cf. B. Liddell Hart, The Military Strategist, in AA.VV., Churchill Four Faces and the Man, London, Penguin Books, 1973, pp. 155 —202. On the dualism between 'indirect' strategy and commitment on the continent cf., for example, M. Howard, The Continental Commitment. The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era of the Two World Wars, London, Penguin Books, 1974.

28

Antonio Varsori

the Europeans virtually paralysed by the fears deriving from the nearness of the Soviet military presence (as expressed by de Gaulle's comment on the stationing of the Red Army at a distance of "two laps of the Tour" from the French border).33 In reality, both at Washington and on the Old Continent, precise conclusions had been drawn from the failure of the London conference and from Bevin's proposal of a Western Union - and with this we arrive at the fourth stage mentioned previously. In the American capital, the objective of transforming the United States into a power with responsibilities and interests on a worldwide scale was taking increasingly clearer shape. While this intention was sufficiently obvious and by now widely accepted, there existed no full agreement as to the means through which this goal should be pursued. On the one hand - as in the opinions of George Kennan, for example - it was felt that America should promote the strengthening 'from without' of Western Europe, especially through the process of economic reconstruction. On the other hand — it is sufficient to recall the positions of John Hickerson and Theodore Achilles — the possibility of some form of direct American commitment on the Old Continent, even within political and military spheres, was not excluded.34 The latter hypothesis was however in conflict with the limitations imposed by the traditional refusal to enter entangling military alliances with European powers in times of peace, by persistent isolationist sentiments, by a domestic political situation now dominated by the approaching presidential elections. In spite of the diversity of opinions existing within the Truman administration, Truman himself considered — in accordance with the criteria of self-help and mutual aid already applied in the Marshall Plan — that it should be the Europeans themselves to take the first step. The American response to the appeal expressed in Bevin's speech35 and to the subsequent "demarches" of the British Ambassador to Washington, Lord Inverchapel,36 was thus clear. Before the "Western Union" could be born, a "Western European Union" would have to be established. The Truman ad33

34

35 36

This image had been evoked by de Gaulle in a speech given at Rennes on July 27, 1947. On that occasion the General had stated that the 'border' of the Eastern block "n'est separee de la notre que par 500 kilometres, soit a peine la longueur de deux etapes du tour de France cycliste". This definition had met with particular success. Cf. J. Chariot, Le gaullisme d'opposition 1946-1958, Paris, Fayard, 1983, p. 82. On this difference of opinion cf. W. Isaacson, E.Thomas, The Wise Men. Six Men and the World They Made. Acheson, Bohlen, Harriman, Kennan, Lovett, McCloy, London, Faber and Faber, 1986, pp. 446 — 448. For the initial opinions of Kennan and Ickerson on the British project for Western Union cf. FRUS, 1948, III, pp. 6-8, J. Hickerson to G. C. Marshall, 19. 1. 1948, top secret; G. Kennan to G. C. Marshall, 20. 1. 1948, top secret. For an analysis of the American position refer to the essays of L. S. Kaplan. FRUS, 1948, III, pp. 12 — 14, memorandum of conversation R. Lovett — Lord Inverchapel — S. Reber, 27. 1. 1948, top secret; as well as PRO, FO 371, Z 748/273/72, tel. no. 23, Lord Inverchapel (Washington) to the Foreign Office, 27. 1. 1948, immediate, top secret.

The First Stage of Negotiations: December 1947 to June 1948

29

ministration would have assessed the efficiency, the determination, the will of the Europeans to organize politically and to defend themselves. Only after they had passed this examination would the American government have been able to resolve its own doubts and to enter the lists with the goal of guaranteeing the security of the Old Continent and, more generally, of the West as a whole.37 As regards London's European counterparts, the most interesting response to the British projects was that of Benelux. In Brussels, as in the Hague and in Luxemburg, the statements made by the British Secretary of State on January 22nd had been interpreted as the definitive clarification of an objective situation of division and conflict between East and West, already manifest since 1947. In the eyes of personages such as P. H. Spaak, the overly cautious British and French leaders had been late to recognize this situation. But precisely because they were convinced of a now irreparable rupture with Moscow, because they were closer to one of the areas of greatest friction, Germany, and probably also because they were weaker than Britain and France, the Benelux countries were unable to accept the vague formulation offered by Bevin, with the agreement of France, of Western reaction to Stalin's strategy. The hypothesis of merely extending the Dunkerque Pact was in any case to be rejected. Not only was this type of alliance insufficiently binding for the parties involved, it also pinpointed the wrong danger. Not Germany, but the USSR, was the enemy against which Europe must defend itself, as the Benelux nations saw it. With the eminently European nature of their international role, with their limited commitments outside of the Old Continent, with the attention they had shown on numerous occasions to the process of integration, the three Benelux nations believed that Bevin's project could become the first step toward the creation of a solid, homogeneous Western European nucleus, within whose framework could be developed forms of political, economic and military cooperation. Moreover, the Belgian government had clearly understood some aspects of the American position. Only an effective multilateral alliance, which would soon be transformed into a true European organization, would have sufficed to convince Washington of European self-help and of the consequent feasibility of more direct American commitment. 38 It may be wondered at this 37 38

FRUS, 1948, III, pp. 17-18, R. Lovett to Lord Inverchapel, 2. 2. 1948, top secret. Archives Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres (Bruxelles) (AMAE), dossier no. 12.237, memorandum by H. de Gruben, 28. 1. 1948; "Compte-rendu de la reunion tenue ä Luxemburg le 29 Janvier entre les Messieurs Hirsch et Boon du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres des PaysBas et le Baron de Gruben et Monsieur Loridan du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres de Belgique". On the Belgian position cf. also F. van Langenhove, La securite de Belgique. Contribution ä l'histoire de la periode 1940-1950, Brussels, Editions de l'Universite de Bruxelles 1971, pp. 205-215; R. Coolsaet, Histoire de la politique etrangere beige, Brussels, Vie ouvriere, 1988, pp. 125 -143, On the role of Spaak cf. the interesting contribution by J. Stengers, Paul-Henri Spaak et le Tratte de Bruxelles de 1948, in R. Poidevin (edited by), op. at., pp. 119-142.

30

Antonio Varsori

point how Paris interpreted the succession of events and what the French contributed to the debate being held on the subject of the security of the West. The French capacity for analysis and elaboration appeared seriously befogged by the difficulty of reconciling the need to confront Soviet policy - Paris was one of the few Western capitals in which military aggression from the USSR was considered possible — with that of re-formulating a policy toward Germany. The Cold War had been experienced as a conflict that was particularly 'inconvenient' for France, in which only the Parisian leaders believed that the nation had been involved against its will and against its own interests consequent to the breakdown in relations between the USSR and the "Anglosaxon" powers.39 Deprived of the possible Soviet counterweight to the tendency of Washington and London to re-create a German state, France found itself transformed into the 'first line' of the West by its own allies, who were however safely on the other side of the English Channel or the Atlantic Ocean. In this situation, France limited herself, on the one hand, to repeating increasingly urgent appeals for American aid, and on the other to confirming the hope that a future Western 'great alliance' would not be merely another repetition of the privileged relationship between the English-speaking nations, already experienced by de Gaulle during World War II.40 From this originated the French acceptance, marred by more or less unexpressed suspicions and fears, of the British initiatives, which was in effect substantial subordination to London, comparable in some ways to the French attitude toward the appeasement policy in 1938.41 Between February and March of 1948 the decisive phase began - the fifth stage in the scheme outlined here — that of the emergence of a solution. British policy, although partially successful, had clashed with the existence of 39

Cf. for example the tones used by Gen. Revers in a memorandum from August of 1947, in which he ended by rejecting, apparently with some regrets, the hypothesis that France could remain neutral in a conflict between the USSR and the Anglo-American powers; cf. SHAT, 1K331, carton no. 7, memorandum "Question de la neutralite", 22. 9. 1947, tres secret. Cf. also what President of the Republic Auriol wrote in his diary on February 10, 1948, in V. Auriol, Journal du Septennat 1947-1954, II, Paris, A. Colin, 1970, p. 82. On the French position during this period, in addition to the already mentioned essay by M. Va'isse, cf. R. Girault, The French Decision-Makers and their Perceptions of French Power in 1948, in J. Becker, F. Knipping (eds.), op. cit., pp. 47 — 66. «° Cf. FRUS, 1948, III, pp. 29-30, 34-35, J. Caffery (Paris) to the Secretary of State, 22.2. 1948, top secret; J. Caffery (Paris) to the Secretary of State, 2. 3. 1948, secret. On FrancoAmerican relations cf. the recent I. M. Wall, L'influence americaine sur la politique francaise 1945-1954, Paris, Balland, 1989, in particular pp. 192-198. I am not however in agreement with some of the evalutions of this a., who seems to overestimate American capacity to 'determine' the foreign policy of Paris. "" On the French position cf. the several times cit. contribution of M. Va'isse, as well as A. Varsori, op. cit., pp.75, 80-81.

The First Stage of Negotiations: December 1947 to June 1948

31

precise objectives both at Washington and in Benelux and had been constantly obliged to take into account the fears and hesitations of Paris. It urgently required re-definition in the light of the indications coming from overseas and from the other side of the Channel. What seemed necessary above all was greater commitment, a more definite course, a plan limited in its goals but more clearly formulated. The almost obvious consequence was the substantial acceptance of the Benelux proposals, as well as of the implied American suggestions. The vague project for "Western Union" thus yielded before the hypothesis of "Western European Union" which was to find expression in the Brussels Treaty, signed on March 17th by representatives of Great Britain, France and the three Benelux nations.42 This multilateral alliance, rapidly concluded also under the influence of the psychological shock of the "Prague coup",43 seemed to comply with the individual needs of the five member nations, as well as with the requirements expressed by the American authorities. Benelux could consider the Pact both a sufficient proof of European selfhelp to be exhibited to the Truman administration, 44 and a first step toward greater European cooperation.45 As regards the German issue, France saw its own interests safeguarded to some degree, thanks to the inclusion in the Treaty of a precise reference to the "danger" of German "revanche".46 At Paris it was hoped that this initiative would in the end ensure the involvement of the United States in the question of European security47, trusting that this would confirm to the outside world the existence of an "equal partnership" on a par with that of London48. Lastly, for the British, the Pact, while representing a potential commitment toward its continental partners, was supposed to im42

41

44

45

46 47 48

On the negotiations that led rapidly to the signing of the Brussels Treaty see A. Varsori, op. cit., in particular Chapt. Ill (pp. 62 106). On the "Prague coup" cf. F. Fejto, Le coup de Prague 1948, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1976. As regards the influence of the episode on the negotiations for the Brussels Pact cf., for example, R. Massigli, Une comedie des erreurs 1943 — 1956. Souvenirs et reflexions sur une etape de la construction europeenne, Paris, Plon, 1976, pp. 110—111. On the British position cf. A. Bullock, op. cit., pp. 525 —528. For the French attitude cf. G. Bidault, Autobiography of Georges Bidault, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1967, pp. 154—156, as well as I. M. Wall, op. cit., pp. 195-196. FRUS, 1948, III, pp. 76 — 78, memorandum of conversation between Lovett, Spaak, Silvercruys, Hickerson, Achilles, Kirk, 5. 4. 1948, top secret. AMAE, dossier no. 12.237, J. Van Tichelen (Direction Generale Industrie et Commerce) to Baron C. Snoy et d'Oppuers, 27. 3. 1948, as well as the note fom the Direction Generale du Commerce Exterieur to Baron C. Snoy et d'Oppuers, 31. 3. 1948. This was provided for by Art. 7 of the treaty. M. Vai'sse, op. cit., pp. 383-386. Cf. in particular the attitude assumed by the French Ambassador to Brussels, de Hautecloque, on the occasion of the first meetings between the representatives of the five-party alliance; cf. AMAE, dossier 12.237, doc. no. PV/S/1, 24.3.1948; cf. also MAE, AD, Serie Z Europe 1944-49, sous-serie Grande-Bretagne, vol. 38, note by J. Chauvel, 30. 3. 1948.

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Antonio Varsori

press Washington to the point of forcing the Americans to accept the initial project for "Western alliance"49. The signing of the treaty also entailed for Great Britain some possible collateral advantages, linked however to certain risks. On the advantage side, the Pact seemed to confirm Britain's role as guide for Western Europe and offered Field Marshal Montgomery the illusion of being able to count on the instrument that would assure Great Britain's strategical leadership in the plans for defense of the West.50 This opinion was not however shared by the other British military leaders who, backed up by some Labour Party leaders and some sectors of the Foreign Office, were well aware of the risk that the fivepower alliance might, under the influence of the European members, draw Great Britain toward the Old Continent to the point that it would lose its convenient characteristic of being - and wishing to continue to be — both a European and an extra-European power.51 Nor did London ignore the fact that in the United States some isolationist political circles might seize upon the Brussels Pact as a pretext for justifying the uselessness of American involvement in the defence of Europe.52 Accordingly, the British government exerted great efforts to achieve an uneasy balance, in its relations with Washington, between demonstrating effective European self-help and urgently seeking American political and military aid. Meanwhile, as regards the continental allies, their predictable hopes that Britain would make a "European" choice had to be restrained. The American reaction to the signing of the Brussels Pact was positive, in two different ways. On the public level and in relations with the five-party alliance as such, it did not go beyond general assurances of support, verbal expressions of solidarity and invitations to Europe to continue along the path of closer political and military cooperation.53 In a more reserved sphere, Washington viewed favourably the start of the first negotiations on the subject of safety in Europe — the so-called "Pentagon Talks" - held in March and April of 1948 among the represen-

49

FRUS, 1948, III, pp. 55-56, E. Bevin and G. Bidault to the Secretary of State, 17. 3. 1948, top secret. 50 Montgomery had expressed hopes in this sense since February 1948; cf. PRO, DEFE 4/10, COS(48)16th meeting, 2. 2. 1948; as well as COS(48) 18th meeting, staff conference, 4. 2. 1948. On Montgomery, refer to N.Hamilton, Monty: the Field Marshal 1944—1976, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1986. 51 Cf., for example, PRO, DEFE 4/11, JP(48)28 (Final), memorandum "International Security Arrangements" by T. M. Brownrigg, G. P. D. Blacker, G. A. Mills, 17. 3. 1948, top secret; COS(48) 42nd meeting, staff conference, 19. 3. 1948. Present, among others, Attlee, Alexander, McNeil, Tedder, Cunningham, Montgomery, Hollis. 52 PRO, FO 371, Z 3650/273/72, "Pentagon Talks" memorandum by G. Jebb, 5. 4. 1948, top secret. " FRUS, 1948, III, pp. 54-55.

The First Stage of Negotiations: December 1947 to June 1948

33

tatives of the United States, Great Britain and Canada. 54 These talks showed once again how the United States had no intention of merely accepting passively the European, or better British, projects. In awaiting further clarification of the international situation and, perhaps more important, of the domestic one, the Truman administration, without losing sight of its final objective of playing a more incisive role in Europe, intended to move according to schedules and methods determined by the relationship between executive power and legislative power, by the development of the debate within the administration, by the top ranks of the military, by public opinion. In the short term view, Washington thus aimed at obtaining from its European counterparts proof of self help which could consist of, for instance, the extension of the five-power alliance to other nations and the reinforcement of its structures. On the American side it was in the meantime conceded, especially through the Washington talks in which France and Benelux were excluded and Canada was included, that a new form of cooperation should be set up among the English-speaking nations.55 In this sphere however American decisions were conditioned by the opinions of its military leaders, according to whom very little could be done, at least over the short term, to oppose possible Soviet aggression in Europe.56 The majority of the British Chiefs of Staff also accepted this evaluation. Consequently, with the exclusion of Montgomery, they tended to favour a "peripheral strategy", interpreting the Brussels Pact as a mere instrument for the realization of a "western union" that would in reality reinforce still further the special relationship.57 The positions held by the Foreign Office were certainly more complex. For Whitehall the attitude assumed by Washington was a necessary but not sufficient condition for solution of the problems relevant to the security of the Old Continent and the international role that Great Britain intended to play. There thus emerged in the British capital the project destined to reconcile British ambitions with American plans and, to a lesser degree, with the

54

On the significance of the Pentagon Talks, tefer to the sources cit, in notes 1 through 7. " The reports of the Pentagon Talks in FRUS, 1948, III, pp. 59-75. For a series of appraisals of the American position, refer in particular to the volumes by Ireland, Reid and Kaplan. 56 On the position of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, refer to K. W. Condit, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, II, 1947-1949, Wilmington, Delaware, Michael Glazier Inc., 1979. 57 For an analysis of the position of the British military, refer to A. Varsori, Stati Uniti e Europa Occidentale: dal Patto di Bruxelles all'alleanza atlantica, "Nuova Antologia", no. 2166, April/ June 1988, pp. 170 — 214; as well as M. de Leonardis, op. cit., passim. As regards Montgomery's attitude, see N. Hamilton, op. cit., and Montgomery of Alamein, The Memoirs of FieldMarshal Montgomery, New York, Da Capo Press, 1982. As regards the "special relationship" in the military field cf. J. Baylis, Anglo-American Defence Relations 1939— 1984. The Special Relationship, London, Macmillan, 1984.

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demands of its European partners. Influenced to some degree by the apparent Soviet threat to Norway and favoured by the reality of the Brussels Pact, the project for a military and political system formed of several sub-systems — or treaties of alliance — began to take shape. The Brussels Pact was thus to be accompanied by a Mediterranean Pact and, in particular, an Atlantic Pact. The United States, which must perforce take an interest in the defence of the ocean on which it bordered, would have been a direct participant in the latter. This solution, in addition to representing the means by which Washington could be involved, no matter how indirectly, in the defence of the Old Continent, had other advantages, including that of confirming the central role of Great Britain in the Western front. London would have been the go-between and guarantor of the relationship between America and Europe, thus avoiding the risk of being degraded to the rank of predominantly European power.58 To achieve this objective the British government had to offer the Truman administration further demonstrations of European efficiency and determination. This explains why, on the morrow of the Pentagon Talks, London took on the task of reinforcing the structures of the Brussels Pact, transforming the treaty of alliance into a true organization and favoring the creation within it, first with the Military Committee, then with the Committee of the Commanders-in-Chief, of an integrated structure for strategic planning and command in embryo form. 59 We have thus arrived at the last stage, the sixth, during which the various negotiations for the creation of the Atlantic Pact began. If, as has been noted, this project had emerged in London as a compromise solution between the various demands of Great Britain's partners, the latter had not remained inactive in the meantime. The idea of an Atlantic alliance began to arouse interest in Washington too. In the American capital the outlines of this project differed from those it had assumed in Britain. The future alliance would not be an element in a Western system centring around London but would, on the contrary, become the central element in the Western system. This however would call for geographical extension of the future pact beyond the five nations of the Brussels Pact and Canada, a commitment to mutual aid less binding than that of the Brussels Pact and more similar to that of the Rio Pact, as well as some kind of tie with the United Nations Organization.60 Some of these conditions were closely linked with questions of domestic 58

59 60

For one of the first manifestations of this project cf. FRUS, 1948, III, pp. 44-45, British Embassy (Washington) to the Department of State, 11. 3. 1948, top secret; PRO, DEFE 4/11, COS(48) 37th meeting, 15. 3. 1948, present: Cunningham, Robb, Templer, Hollis, Kirkpatrick. Cf. A. Varsori, Stati Oniti..., cit., passim. For changes in the American position, refer to the analysis of the documents in FRUS, 1948, III, and to the contributions already cit., that of L. S. Kaplan in particular.

The First Stage of Negotiations: December 1947 to June 1948

35

political balance. It was not merely by chance that the Exploratory Talks on Security were preceded by the Vandenberg Resolution, symbol of that "bipartisan policy" which alone would allow the Truman administration to maneuver in the international field without running up against formidable obstacles.61 Moreover, the start of negotiations occurred almost simultaneously with the "Berlin blockade", an event that seemed to confirm predictions as to the expansionist nature of Soviet policy, motivating as well as justifying before national and international opinion the possibility of stronger U.S. commitment to the cause of European security.62 France too was emerging from the uncertainty and lethargy that had been the hallmarks of its position. Immediately after signing of the Brussels Pact, Paris had first cherished the illusion that tripartite talks would soon begin, that they would lead to an American commitment in Europe, a commitment imagined somewhat na'ively in the French capital as an immediate flow of equipment and men directed toward the Old Continent.63 Deluded by the apparent indifference of the USA and still knowing nothing of the Pentagon Talks, the French government had for some time taken refuge in the hope of setting up a privileged relationship of military cooperation with Washington.64 Frustrated in this aspiration as well, which was moreover in contradiction with the American principles of self-help and mutual aid, the French leaders had viewed with growing concern the worsening of the Cold War on the continent and the reinforcement of the British role as spokesman for Europe both within the Brussels Pact and with the United States. Lastly, France had been forced to accept a series of decisions regarding the future of Germany, resulting from the London Conference, which were by no means consonant with her own interests.65 Faced with these events and with the emerging hypothesis of Atlantic alliance, the French authorities decided to react. The future agreement which would of course have influenced the fate of Germany *' For the text of the Vandenberg Resolution cf. FRUS, 1948, III, pp. 135 — 136, "Senate Resolution 239 (Vandenberg Resolution)", 11.6. 1948. 62 On the significance of the "Berlin blockade", for the United States and Great Britain cf. A. Shlaim, The United States and the Berlin Blockade, 1948-1949: A Study in Crisis DecisionMaking, Berkeley, California, University of California, 1983; Id., Britain, the Berlin Blockade and the Cold War, "International Affairs", vol. 60, no. 1. *·' MAE, AD, doc. cit. in note 48. M Cf. in particular the "avances" made to the Americans by Gen. P.-G. Billotte; FRUS, 1948, III, pp. 110-111, A. C. Wedemayer to G. C. Marshall, 4. 5. 1948, top secret. On the attitude of the French military cf. also P. Guillen, La France et la question de la defense de l'Europe occidentale du Pacte de Bruxelles (mars 1948) au Plan Pleven (octobre 1950), "Storia delle relazioni internazionali", II, 1986, no. 2, pp. 305 —326. Interesting documents also in J. de Lattre, Ne pas subir. Ecrits 1914- 1952, Paris, Plon, 1984. 65 Ample documentation on the London Conference concerning Germany in FRUS, 1948, II, Washington, US Government Printing Office, 1973.

Antonio Varsori

as well as relations between Europe and the United States, could not, must not be a confirmation of Great Britain's place as spokesman for the Old Continent. It was essential for France to call itself to the attention of America and of its European partners as the nation offering a clearly-defined political project of broad scope, as the true guide and spokesman for Europe with an extra-European power, the United States, and with a country, Great Britain, that did not wish to be only European. Only in this way could Paris negotiate with Washington and London on an equal footing on the subject of the security of the Old Continent. The instrument selected for this purpose by personages such as Bidault and Schuman was Europeanism, and this turning point in French policy found expression, significantly only a few days after the start of the Exploratory Talks, in the open French support of the Federalist projects presented by the European movements at the Hague Conference held in May of 1948. 66 Shortly thereafter France was to assume responsibility for favoring the inclusion of Italy in the Atlantic Alliance with the aim of ensuring the treaty would not be transformed into a confirmation of the AngloAmerican special relationship with some European offshoots.67 On July 6, 1948, the so-called Exploratory Talks on Security began at Washington. Going beyond differences of opinion and interests, the road to realization of the Atlantic Alliance, to be concluded on April 4th of the following year, was opened.68 This latter portion of events surrounding the drawing up of the North Atlantic Treaty does not fall within the scope of this paper. It thus seems useful at this point to trace a brief balance of the analysis made up to now, reexamining some of the interpretational hypotheses formulated and keeping in mind the questions raised initially. If we ask again who "pushed" and "how much" toward the realization of the Atlantic Pact, it could be sustained that these "pushes" came from more than one international protagonist, launched with different force depending on the particular moment, and from different angles. While the central role played by Great

66

67

68

On France's backing of Europeanism cf. J.-B. Duroselle, 1948: les debuts de la construction europeenne, in R. Poidevin (sous la direction de), op. cit., pp. 11—24. In particular on the role of Robert Schuman cf. R. Poidevin, Robert Schuman komme d'etat 1880-1963, Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1986. For a different interpretation of French policy, but in our opinion profoundly influenced by ideological conditioning, cf. A. Lacroix-Riz, Vers le Plan Schuman: les jalons decisifs de I'acceptation francaise du rearmement allemand (1947—1950), "Guerres Mondiales et Conflits Contemporaines", nos. 155 et 156, July and October 1989, pp. 25 — 41, 73 — 87. On the significance of the Hague Conference refer to A. Varsori, // Congresso dell'Europa dell'Aja del 1948, paper presented at the Congress "I movimenti per 1'Unira europea negli anni 1945-1954" (Pavia, Oct. 19-21, 1989). On Franco-Italian relations during this period cf. in general J.-B. Duroselle, E. Serra (edited by), Italia e Francia 1946-1954, Milan, ISPI-Franco Angeli, 1988. Ample documentation on the "Exploratory Talks on Security" in FRUS, 1948, III.

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Britain in these initiatives is unquestionable, it would be insufficient without the indications of Benelux and of France, and without the implied suggestions coming from Washington. It may perhaps be wondered whether these "protagonists" were all pushing in the same direction. In the light of our analysis, some doubts emerge on this point. Especially in the beginning, the final goal of these efforts was neither clear nor unequivocal, and national interests were not of secondary importance in determining the stances taken by the nations involved. The final objective — the Atlantic Pact — was thus the result of interaction between different initiatives which were modified and adapted along the way.The result was certainly different from the "grand design" initially conceived by Bevin and the Foreign Office. While the project for a Western political and military system was indeed implemented, London was no longer its centrepin, and the other systems linked by London, such as the Commonwealth, the special relationship, Western Europe, ended up not alongside, but within the ranks of the Atlantic Alliance. As for relations between the Brussels Pact and the Atlantic Pact, it is certain that the former was the indispensable prerequisite for the latter. The five-power alliance however was not only an important instrument in the process destined to involve the United States in the defence of the Old Continent; it was also an opportunity missed. The Pact should have become the opportunity for transforming Atlantic negotiations into a dialogue held on an almost equal footing between the United States on the one hand and Western Europe on the other. The reasons for this failure are many and merit thorough examination. In the first place, the Brussels Pact as the actual nucleus of European political and military cooperation called for a relationship of full equality and mutual trust between London and Paris. In the British capital only Bevin and such personages as Duff Cooper and Sir Oliver Harvey seemed to believe for a short time in the reliability of the French.69 More sceptical over France's capacity for recovery was the Foreign Office, and the Prime Minister himself.70 As for the British military, its sense of realism, which concealed shortsightedness and arrogance, seemed to justify as the only valid choice the reinforcement of the special relationship, of which the Atlantic Alliance itself would have been a reflection. In this context the Brussels Pact could not be evaluated 69

70

On this subject it is interesting to compare Bevin's wish to take into consideration French demands during negotiations on the Brussels Pact in March 1948 with the irritation of the Secretary of State in regard to Europeanist projects proposed by Bidault at the Hague in July of the same year. Cf. PRO, FO 800/452, E. Bevin to C. R. Attlee, 1.3. 1948, as well as R. Massigli, op. cit., p. 156. For the British attitude, that of the Foreign Office in particular, toward France, refer to J. W. Young, op. cit., passim. As for Attlee's position in regard to the continent cf. the significant observations in K. Harris, Attlee, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1982, p. 315.

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as mere instrument of a policy attentive mainly to the positions taken by Washington and, to a lesser degree, by the Commonwealth.71 Only Bernard Montgomery really believed in European military integration and in the roles of France and Benelux, but his strategical and political views were interpreted on the continent, also due to his lack of tact, merely as personal ambitions or as expression of the British desire to let the French fight, but with American ammunition and under British control, in a possible encounter with the Red Army. 72 Montgomery, moreover, seemed deliberately to ignore America, perhaps in the vague illusion of living again a second 'liberation' of the European continent without the encumbering presence of an Eisenhower or a Patton.73 Nor should it be forgotten that in the eyes of many British politicians, those of the Labour Party in particular, the Brussels Pact represented the maximum limits of British commitment to Europe. Consequently, they feared that if a five-power alliance should further strengthen its own structures, to the point of becoming a true nucleus of European cooperation, London would be forced to abandon the special relationship and the Commonwealth.74 Nor was France able to grasp the opportunity offered by European alliance. Such an alliance rapidly became, in the opinion of numerous French political figures, the symbol of Britain's attempt to set herself up as spokesman and guide for Western Europe with the American authorities. The French objectives thus became, starting from mid-1948, on the European level, that of going beyond the Brussels Pact through a policy of Europeanism,75 on the level of relations with the United States, the creation of an alliance that was not merely 'Atlantic', and thus a confirmation of Anglo-American predomi71

72

73

74

75

Representative of the hostility felt toward a "continental commitment" was Admiral Cunningham, First Sea Lord. On his position cf., for example, PRO, DEFE 4/14, Confidential Annex, COS(48) 85th meeting, 23. 6. 1948. Montgomery's lack of tact resulted in a series of clashes with French, Belgians and Dutch. As regards the stormy relationship with Jean de Lattre de Tassigny cf., for example, PRO, FO 371, Z 9690/2307/72, dispatch s.n., Sir O. Harvey (Paris) to H. McNeil (Foreign Office), 25. 11. 1948, top secret. As regards the attempt to impose on the Belgians their own strategical views cf. PRO, FO 371, Z 9345/2307/72, dispatch no. 521, Sir G. Rendel (Brussels) to H. McNeil (Foreign Office), 15. 11. 1948, top secret. Lastly, as regards contrasts with the Dutch, cf. PRO, FO 371, Z 781/1078/72, tel. no. 46, Sir P. Nichols (The Hague) to the Foreign Office, 25. 1. 1949, immediate, top secret. Cf. Montgomery's statements in PRO, DEFE 4/13, Confidential Annex, COS(48) 75th meeting, 1. 6. 1948, top secret. Cf. the position expressed by the Labour Party in Feet on Ground. A Study of Western Union, London, Labour Party, 1948. Cf. MAE, AD, Serie Z Europe 1944-49, sous-serie generalites, vol. II, Direction d'Europe, sous-direction d'Europe du Nord, "Projet d'assemblee europeenne", 22. 10. 1948; as well as the note by the Direction d'Europe, 23. 10. 1948. On the French position cf. also R. Poidevin, op. cit.\ as well as M.-T. Bitsch, Le role de la France dans la naissance du Conseil de ['Europe, in R. Poidevin (sous le direction de), op. cit., pp. 165 — 198.

The First Stage of Negotiations: December 1947 to June 1948

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nance, but more ample, European and 'Mediterranean', incorporating the Algerian territory and Italy, designed to form a Western defence system in which the poles represented by Washington and London would be flanked by that of Paris.76 For United States politics too, the Brussels Pact represented an important element. Although this alliance was a European 'construction', it was also the indirect result of American pressure and of the U.S. approach to European issues, based on the criteria of self-help and mutual aid. Without the signing of the five-party alliance, it is unlikely that the projects of the Truman administration would have made any further progress, and the realization of the Pact became a useful tool used by the American government to convince public opinion and Congress that it was advantagous for the United States to enter an entangling alliance.77 As suggested by the above remarks, the stimulus that induced Western Europeans and Americans to initiate the political and diplomatic process that was to conclude with the signing of the Atlantic Pact was not merely the expression of the "fears" of the moderate leaders on the Old Continent, nor was it intended to consist of initiatives of a military nature alone. As regards the first evaluation it is obvious, in the light of the present analysis, how in both Europe and North America the search was for a political and defensive completion of the new system of relations between Western nations that had initiated with the Marshall Plan. As regards the second observation, I have attempted to demonstrate that the need for security, while always clearly present, was almost never construed simply as a reaction to sudden armed aggression by the USSR, except perhaps during the initial moment of the Berlin crisis. It can on the contrary be sustained that in the course of the diplomatic process, during the period between Bevin's speech to the Commons and the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, the West attempted above all to create the conditions, the political premises for military intergration, which were to become a primary exigency some time later, with the Korean War, the plans for German rearmament and the creation of NATO. Before concluding, one last observation should be made. Precisely at the moment in which the negotiations proper for the Atlantic Pact initiated, with Britain's evident instrumental use of the Brussels Treaty, with the French search for an alternative to British leadership on the continent through the Europeanist approach, the premises were laid for Western Europe to present a divided front in negotiations with the United States. The mutual suspicions 76

77

For the position of Paris cf. the attitude assumed in the course of the Washington negotiations on the Atlantic Alliance, taken from an analysis of FRUS, 1948, III, and FRUS, 1949, IV. Cf. also the considerations in the essays by J. Delmas, P. Guillen and M. Vaisse. Cf. in particular the opinions of L. S. Kaplan.

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between French and British, the increasingly obvious British tendency to favour the special relationship and the Commonwealth, laid the groundwork for a situation in which the Atlantic Alliance was not the expression of a community of interests and objectives, a relationship of equality between one shore and the other of the Atlantic, but had instead become the symbol of the United States' protection of the Western portion of the Old Continent. This is a contradiction that has influenced, and perhaps still influences, an alliance which should have contributed - and should still contribute - not only to formulating the Western response to Soviet policy, but also to shaping and clarifying the relationship between the United States and Western Europe.

The Final Stage of Negotiations: December 1948 to April 1949 by Ottavio Barie

As preface to an investigation of the process that led to the Atlantic Alliance, some preliminary reference points seem indispensable for conducting a discussion that is free from the political and ideological residue of the postwar period, thus achieving an adequate critical level if not an all inclusive historiographical one. The latter reservation is based mainly on two considerations. We do not yet have available Soviet documentation nor that of other Eastern European nations such as Yugoslavia, nor that of Oriental countries such as China, sufficient to clarify the picture of what the West was constructing to confront a world power considered at the time to be strictly opposed to it. Moreover we do not have, in spite of the abundant bibliography on the period in general and its specific aspects, any real indepth studies on the different "national ways" leading to the alliance. Lacking these, there is some difficulty in arriving at the next and conclusive level, that of a systematic, balanced reconstruction of the entire multiform process which does not give precedence, inevitably inexact if not actually erroneous, to some nations or even some bureaus and departments, precisely because they were the ones to face the issues created by what I have termed "national ways". My first preliminary reference point may seem only too obvious. We have all arrived, I believe, at the conclusion that a process of gradual development marked the state of international tension short of war which we term "Cold War" and that this strongly conditioned the question of the origins of the alliance. In examining this problem it should be noted how this gradual development derived from different causes and was expressed in different forms in the various nations involved. For instance, to comprehend the course taken by the United States up to the alliance and beyond, it is essential to realize that the decision to face the Cold War and thus to stipulate the alliance was based on the United States government's assessment of the economic and social aspect as crucially important for coordination of the forces and for launching a counteroffensive from the West. This was, in brief, the evaluation of the Marshall Plan, whose

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strategy, initially presented as the best if not the only way of solving the problems of Europe, later came to include — and not merely to support — the Atlantic Pact. It is equally important to examine, as regards Europe, how this process developed in the nation strategically central to the defence of the continent, France, where the reluctance to shift concern over attack from Germany to fear of the USSR was to become a basic problem in the ethical and political development of the nation, a problem which cannot be disposed of merely by specifying the moment at which the French Foreign Minister proclaimed his adhesion to Atlanticism. Linked with this evalution of the Cold War as a gradual phenomenon, many-faceted and decisive for the creation of the alliance, is that of the "war scare". It seems certain that French diplomacy was strongly conditioned, as regards the alliance that was in the making, by the fact that the General Staff of National Defence had informed the Government of its pressing anxiety over the military weakness of the nation. Was this anxiety really inspired by the fear of imminent invasion from the East, or was it based instead on the precise intention of making the French military system newly efficient to all effects, against old enemies and possible new adversaries, but also in the eyes of friends reluctant to assign to France the place that General de Gaulle had taught her to claim? As concerns the issue of alliance, France's attitude may have been entirely particular. Interpretation of this attitude is made more difficult by the fact that the French documentation is much more fragmentary than that of the other founding members of the alliance. To return to the general level, however, we may well wonder, as concerns the prospects for the outbreak of a new world war, if this was a genuine concern of the states involved or rather a phenomenon of mass media or even of parliamentary opinion used, even exploited, by the governments. We know that not all, but most of the makers of Western international policy, from Ernest Bevin to Henri Spaak, to the various Kennans, Bohlens, etc. of the State Department, did not believe that the Soviet Union was about to wage war either today or tomorrow. What then is the significance of the fact that these men called for or at least accepted negotiations for a military alliance? The temptation is to answer that there were many different reasons, depending on the nation, the men and the institutions that they represented. If these pass unnoticed, the history of the conferences held among the representatives of the various nations and the numerous memorandums compiled by civil and military bureaus may seem vacuous and shallow. However, even taking for granted a tendency to a collective and constructive attitude, it must be asked whether this depends — and to what degree — on the concern that war would eventually break out (but only after a certain number of years calculated according to different criteria) or on the belief, felt especially in certain American spheres, that a

The Final Stage of Negotiations: December 1948 to April 1949

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treaty of military alliance perform absolve a basically political function, that of reassuring the Europeans in their efforts at achieving reconstruction and developing industrial democracy while simultaneously discouraging the Soviet Union from any attempts to extend the Communist area, considering also the control it could exert over the Western Communist parties. For both Americans and British, during the year elapsing between the Czechoslovakian coup and the signing of the Atlantic Pact, the fear of an impending, perhaps immediate advance of the Communist-Soviet area was certainly real. What was feared however was the conquest from within accomplished by a coup de main as in Czechoslovakia or through regular electoral victories, as might have happened in the Italian elections of April 18, 1948. In the latter case, the British and American fear was so strong as to arrive at the brink of intervention, a policy which Bevin accepted and which George Kennan actually suggested from Manila as a preventive measure. The adversary of the head of the Policy Planning Staff within the Department of State, the Director of the Bureau of European Affairs Hickerson, in sustaining the "Rio model" with his European counterparts, was thinking also of Art. 6 of this treaty of mutual assistance in the Western hemisphere, which provides for the intervention of the members of the pact as a whole to ensure safety and thus in practice also to secure the internal situation of each of them. While it may seem superfluous to bring up the classic issue of the pre-eminence of domestic policy or of foreign policy, I do so merely to note immediately that, in the period in question, the true difficulty lay in establishing where one ended and the other began. Now it is precisely this difficulty which appears to be an essential element in clarifying the process of formation of the alliance. In the United States, the concept of the U.N. and the red scare were so closely linked with the work of diplomacy that their processes of development and of mutual interference must be studied in parallel. The former element (as Roosevelt in his last months of life was well aware) renewed old illusions and set new conditions, placating the collective conscience and offering a simplified formula with which to resolve international issues. It also furnished the vehicle for expression, through the mass media, the opinion polls, the ethical and psychological effects of the various scares, of a conspicuous, at times predominant part of the foreign policy of the government, up to the vehement demonstrations of our own times. The abnormal, misleading weight of "public opinion" on foreign policy decisions, while especially evident in the United States, was certainly present elsewhere as well. In France the anxious urge to obtain protection "once and for all" from a new invasion by Germany, although felt more strongly by the nation at large than by the government, nonetheless conditioned the international policy of the latter, while reinforcing the hopes of the General Staff of

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Defence for a proud return to military strength. In Italy the wide-spread reluctance to give up the colonies and with them a status that had gratified the "last of the great powers" in very special ways was an obstacle to the nation in deciding to take the route leading westward. In my long-term study of the origins of the alliance I have developed the concept, as a working hypothesis, of an American way and a European way, two streams that flow together during the last period of the making of the Atlantic Pact. The American way, while certainly less premeditated, started earlier — with, I would say, the Truman Doctrine in its significance both as opposition to international Communism and as specific commitment to aid two nations at the southern margins of Europe, Greece and Turkey. With the Marshall Plan the American initiative was soon to become more precise, more consistent and more determinant. It might even be considered (as suggested by the thoughts and actions of a conspicuous number of the Marshall planners within the State Department) a means of focussing the aim, i.e., of specifying commitments, forms, and limitations of American policy in relation to the preceding, controversial verbal exploit of the Doctrine. The result was (as was the intention, substantially) that of provoking separation from and anticipating confrontation with the U.S.S.R., as well as that of verifying how many Eastern European nations the U.S.A. could manage to keep within its sphere of influence; in other words, of occasioning the definitive fracture of Europe (after the preliminary one of 1945), thus allowing America to aim with no further hesitation nor formal scruples toward retrieving Western Europe. The European way is inherent to the situation at the end of the war, in the sense that it is linked to the state of weakness and insecurity of the Western European nations survivors of German attack. The British or Anglo-Belgian wartime Western Union project had an obviously anti-German bias, although less basic and unswerving than the one conceived by France. It should be considered the European way to Atlantic Alliance only from the moment when Bevin and the Foreign Office, without abandoning the project, realized that in post-war Western Europe where — at least as regards Britain — the winds of danger from the East had early begun to blow from another direction, no solution to the security problem could afford to leave aside the United States. Victor Rothwell may have been right when he observed that in 1947 Britain's closest ally was France.1 The Anglo-French relationship of that period undoubtedly contained something that was lacking in the special relationship with the United States — the sense of a mutual, newly confirmed nearness in the face of danger, while America was instead far away; a common awareness

V. Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War 1941 - 1947, London, 1982, pp. 443 ff.

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of the importance of the military factor while the United States remained stubbornly attached to the belief that everything could be resolved through economic aid; and lastly, a sense of the common scarcity of means as compared with the vast American resources that the two nations could draw on together to obtain the instruments for defence. But the desired concord and the inevitable contradictions in the British policy of the three circles (leadership of Western Europe; the special relationship with the United States; coordination with and involvement of the Commonwealth) 2 all tended to confirm the predominance of one of the circles over the others — that of the relationship with the United States, linked to a de facto understanding that went back to the late nineteenth century, strengthened by the experience of close military collaboration during the war and the postwar period; by the geographic, economic and ethical/political collaboration, halfway between the United Kingdom and the United States, of important members of the Commonwealth such as Canada or Australia; by the tacitly acknowledged sharing of tasks in the project for transforming the British Empire in the Middle East and resisting Soviet pressure in that region; by the quasi-dependency, accepted although obviously without enthusiasm, of the pound on the dollar; and lastly by the awareness, ever present in the mind of Bevin, not only that the reconstruction of Europe and the resistance of the European nations to Communist pressure from within depended on American economic aid, but above all that the safety of Western Europe depended on prompt military intervention (and not merely supplies of ammunition, for instance) by the United States3. Within this context, which forms the background of British policy in regard to the Atlantic Alliance up to its conclusion, the step taken by Bevin in late 1947 with Secretary of State Marshall can be seen as the first proposal for an Atlantic entente made by a European minister to an American one. After that, the "European way" followed its course up to the Brussels Pact and the agreements for military collaboration that were designed to implement defence measures. But while it is easy to see in the Brussels Pact the ostensible result of what Western Europe had been able to arrange independently for its defence, it is not difficult on the other hand to realize the extent to which this result was influenced by concern for presenting the United States with an acceptable balance of the efforts toward self-help made by their closest friends abroad. This took place at a moment in which the Americans, disappointed by the reluctance of the European nations to respond 1

3

M. de Leonardis, I "Tre Cerchi": il Regno Unito e la ricerca della sicurezza tra Commonwealth, Europe e "relazione speciale" con gli Stati Uniti (1948 - 1949) in L'alleanza occidentale. Nascita e sviluppi di un sistema di sicurezza collettivo, ed. by O. Barie, Bologna 1988, pp. 9-11. Ibid, pp. 18ff.

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to the Marshall Plan as the Washington planners had hoped they would, were especially eager to verify how much those nations were willing to unite in all senses: economic, political and military. President Truman's speech made on the same day that the Brussels Pact was signed, praising the pact and promising American support, assumes in this context the significance of an exhortation, while immediately forging a first link between the two ways, the European and the American. It would seem that the West had arrived at a decisive stage, in more than one sense, on March 17, 1948, especially in view of the significance of this date as a political and psychological response to the coup de main in Czechoslovakia; but this stage could in the long run turn out to be a road leading nowhere. In effect, this date marked the beginning of a period of several months in which the two ways branched out in developments of uncertain, occasionally contradictory, nature. On March 17 the President of the United States, in promising America's support to the Europe of the Five, seemed to endorse initial accord with the Brussels Pact. However, in the negotiations starting a few days later at Washington, the Pentagon talks, which can be considered an introduction to or even a "launching" of the Atlantic Alliance,4 participation was limited to the United States, Great Britain and Canada. This was a virtually emblematic confirmation of the tendency, the inveterate instinct one might almost say, of Great Britain and the U.S.A. to base the system of Atlantic security on their special relationship, consolidated even further in this case by the intentional exclusion of France and by the presence of the Canadian "bridge". Nor was this merely a preliminary launching. The clear, repeated impression was given that the special relationship would form the cornerstone for negotiations also when, at the beginning of July, these were extended to include the other members of the Brussels Pact. This is obvious even without the confirmation found in the personal notes taken by the Canadian diplomat Escott Reid on the men, brought together by a common culture and language, by similar or identical educational backgrounds, by long-standing personal friendships, who became so closely linked among themselves as to form a group within the group of negotiators of the Seven founding nations5. From the Pentagon talks, more than one signal was sent out for the Atlantic Pact negotiations, and the nature of these signals was often decisive up to the signing of the treaty and beyond. Significant among them are: C. Wiebes and B. Zeeman, "The Pentagon Negotiations March 1948; the Launching of the North Atlantic Treaty", International Affairs, 1983, pp. 351-363. E.Reid, Time of Fear and Hope. The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1947-1949, Toronto 1977, p. 67.

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A) The tendency, confirmed day after day by the documents on strategic and military collaboration among the General Staffs, to confer on the system a marked North Atlantic perspective, in which the "stepping stones" — the island territories, Greenland, Iceland and also Ireland - facilitated communications between Canada and Britain, shortening even more the already brief route between Northern America and Nothern Europe, in a network reaching as far as Norway. This nation, exposed to particularly dangerous pressure from the Soviet Union already at this time and subsequently, was to be assigned the place of eighth participant in the Exploratory Talks during the final stage of negotiations. B) The willingness of Great Britain - explicitly stated in the instructions from Long — to offer no opposition and to comply with the decisions of the United States even when different directives or special interests might point to conclusions dissident from the American line. C) The American concern that negotiations be carried out within the sphere of the U.N. Statute, not only to avoid offending its universalistic spirit, but also in the attempt to apply its articles exactly; and the consequent concern to propose the "Rio model" as a typical treaty for cooperation and regional defence which, insofar as it regarded mainly the Western Hemisphere and had already been discussed and approved by Congress, would if imitated render the Atlantic Treaty more familiar and more acceptable. In the Pentagon Talks Hickerson, as head of the American delegation, assumed his responsibilities, even too much so, outlining the procedure that would be followed by the United States in passing from the current stage of presidential promise of support to the next stage of actual participation by America in an organization for regional defence defined by a treaty. The United States, along with Britain and France and with the consent of Benelux, would take immediate steps with Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland "and (after the elections had been held) Italy as well" to ascertain whether they were ready "to accede in the near future to the treaty of the Five Powers (the Brussels Pact) and to undertake negotiations for the North Atlantic defence accord". After these nations had accepted and had shown their willingness to defend themselves, they would be invited to a conference to conclude "an agreement for collective defence... intended to give the maximum effect among the parties to the regulations of the United Nations Charter"6. I have dwelled at length on these preliminaries to show how far the American delegation had pushed ahead months before the start of the Exploratory Talks. While this is true, it is also true that in the following months the well-planned lines of development set forth in the final document of the 6

"Final project" upon conclusion of the Pentagon Talks (Washington, undated). Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, I, pp. 72-75.

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Pentagon Talks were, if not actually called into question, at least modified by events whose implications provoke questions to which no precise answers can yet be given. Two of these events occurred during the month of April. To what extent did the victory of the parties representing Western democracy in the Italian elections of April 18th (apart from the specific issue of whether Italy was to remain within the ranks of the West or be lost to it) eliminate the need felt by governments and diplomats for opposing the advance of Soviet Communism within the individual nations, thus modifying to some degree the intentions of the constituent alliance? To what point did Congressional approval of the first phase of the Marshall Plan encourage both the American government and its European counterparts (and beneficiaries) to go ahead with the plan for an Atlantic military system? In the late Spring, no lightening of the horizon could be seen. Tension between the occupying powers at Berlin was building up rapidly, culminating in the Soviet blockade of land communications which, starting on June 24th, followed by one day the invitations sent out by the State Department to the six nations that, with the United States, were to participate in the Exploratory Talks. Was this because of, or in spite of, the Vandenberg Resolution passed by the American Senate on June llth which confirmed and completed President Truman's commitment of March 17th? It was the Vandenberg Resolution — states Lawrence Kaplan — and not the secret talks of the Pentagon in March or the documents of the National Security Council in April that "opened the way" to Atlantic Alliance7. The resolution was without doubt one stage (perhaps the most important) of the "American way" in which the correct value should be attributed to different components of the political/ constitutional process within the American government. Of primary importance, besides the fact that the Resolution was drawn up not by Congress but by the State Department, was the elaboration by the latter of the ways and means for arriving at a treaty of alliance and the informative, almost instructive activity performed by a group of its leaders with the President and with members of Congress, among them Senator Vandenberg, who were involved in international policy. According to this basically American perspective (which however assumes a general value insofar as it became the decisive viewpoint), it may be stated that the Resolution opened the road to stipulation of the Atlantic treaty also because it provided for — and this was a great deal - the participation of the United States in "regional or collective agreements based on individual and mutual help, effective and continuous". At the same time however it should be stressed that it was presented as a mode of procedure typical of American foreign policy 7

L. S. Kaplan, The United States and NATO. The Formative Years, Kentucky Univ. Press, 1984, p. 75.

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— along with the "doctrines" and Presidential statements — thus giving ample moral and political assurances, but not guaranteeing the immediate, automatic American intervention in Europe deemed indispensable by Ernest Bevin in particular. For the British Foreign Minister, the Vandenberg Resolution was most welcome, on condition that it would soon be surpassed; on condition that a real treaty could be quickly reached, in which the United States would overcome once and for all the barrier of its refusal to enter entangling alliances, a treaty which would not allow those nations inclined to slide into neutrality — from the Scandinavian States to Italy — to take refuge in a dangerously isolated manner behind the promise of aid from the American super-power8. It was within this multiform context of recent and very recent facts and developments - from the Czechoslovakian coup de main to the Brussels Pact; from the Italian elections to Tito's first steps toward withdrawal from the Soviet Union; from France's adoption of an Atlantic perspective to the Vandenberg Resolution, to the Soviet blockade of Berlin — that the Exploratory Talks between the United States, Canada and the five European nations of the Brussels Pact were to begin. While the basic tendencies were largely those that had already emerged within the narrower context of the Pentagon Talks, the result of the Italian elections cast light on an essential sector: that of the struggle against internal strife. The Vandenberg Resolution clarified another issue, that of the State Department's freedom to negotiate an alliance, backed up by the Government of the United States. If Gladwin Jebb, the British Special Delegate to the Pentagon talks, had been able to assess in April as 50% the probabilities that the United States would participate in a system of military security along with the European nations of the Western Union, this likelihood had substantially increased by the opening of the Exploratory Talks in July. How close did this come to 100%, that is to the point that the talks, regardless of how "exploratory" they might be, really consisted of negotiations on the structure that a "planned" alliance should have? Whatever the answer may be, it is a fact that the episodes marking the second half of the year up to the first months of 1949 are less dramatic. These events included, on the positive side, the upturn in European economy along with the initial implementation of the Marshall Plan, and the first evaluations of the consequences of Yugoslavia's defection; on the negative side, the occasional heightening of tension in Berlin and the heavier Soviet pressure exerted on Norway. While the events that accompanied the talks and influenced them were less dramatic than those that preceded them, it was nonetheless during this second stage that the alliance assumed its characteristic traits. To start with, 11

Bevin to Sir Oliver Franks, first British delegate to the Exploratory Talks, London, 28 June 1948, Public Record Office, Foreign Office, 371-73071-9855, top secret.

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not all the participants initially considered it to be the best solution to the problem of their security. It seems natural to insinuate, moreover, that the very name given to the talks appears to emphasize their still preliminary, precautionary nature; a name which during the second stage, starting from December, by no means matched their content, which had now become decisive. In the absence of external events important enough to exert an influence on the negotiations — apart from, toward the end, the intensified Soviet pressure on Norway — the treaty was formulated through a process in which contrasts, dissension and crises were present, but took place within the framework of the Western governments and their diplomatic corps. These contrasts and the resulting adaptations were strong enough to generate a sense of uncertainty as to the progress of the negotiations, pointing to the conclusion that, rather than two ways, one European, the other American, it was now necessary to speak of several directions, converging but often coinciding only at the conclusive stage and occasionally only because some conclusion had to be reached. One example of this may be seen in the impatience with which the delegations from the more important nations viewed the fact that the Benelux countries had not yet been able to agree among themselves on a common line of action.9 This sense of uncertainty, this fear of encountering serious if not insuperable obstacles, nonetheless reveals some characteristics that may be observed in Atlantic relationships from the very start and that now began to emerge more clearly — from the Anglo-American "special relationship", placed well above the Canadian-American and the CanadianBritish relationships, to the United States' increasingly evident and unquestioned assumption of responsibility for directing the negotiations, a position that was to be officially sanctioned from the first session, held on July 6th. The fact that the United States formulated the situation in July in a very different manner from how they had left it two months before at the conclusion of the Pentagon Talks may at first sight appear disconcerting. Plausible reasons for this may be sought for in the events that had in the meantime taken place in relation to the program set up at the conclusion of the Pentagon Talks. To give a single example, one possible reason may be the impasse provoked by Italy's more or less clearly stated refusal to enter the Brussels Pact, matched by a similar reluctance of the Five to accept her. The chief reason however undoubtedly lay in the development of the issue of European security within the United States. As this issue developed, it emerged from the almost secret context of the Pentagon Talks and — in this Kaplan is particularly discerning — was projected, with the consent and participation of the State Department, 9

Memorandum from the Secretary of States (Washington) dated 2 March 1949. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, I, pp. 141-42.

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into the public context of the Vandenberg Resolution. Specifically, the fact that the issue had arrived at the Vandenberg Resolution indicated to the State Department that it would have to carry out exploratory talks on a level that was formally higher than that of the Pentagon Talks. Accordingly, the leadership of the American delegation was no longer entrusted to the Director of the Bureau of European Affairs (obviously a member) but to an Under Secretary of State who was personally very close to Marshall, Robert Lovett. Now Lovett considered the programming perspectives opened up by the Vandenberg Resolution, which he had helped to formulate, to be the maximum point at which the United States could arrive. He wished to establish, from the very first day, two indispensable reference points: consideration of American national interest, of which his view was more restricted than that of the emerging advocates of the "National Security State"10, and verification of the actual will of the members of the alliance to oppose the advance of Communism. In the meetings held during the following days, Lovett urged the delegates to create "a regional association that was really circumscribed by the Atlantic", but with an obvious northward projection that would allow it go beyond the strictly Atlantic sphere when it was a question of including the entire "Scandinavian peninsula" and "West Germany" 11 . This mode of conceiving the Atlantic defence system was thus quite different from that of Hickerson, who in the Pentagon Talks had advanced the concept of an "Atlantic-Mediterranean" framework for the alliance and had forcefully insisted on the criterion of planned extension of the system to all the nations "covered" by the Marshall Plan. Considering moreover that the two diplomats deemed the best Sovietologists in the State Department, Kennan and Bohlen, both members of the delegation, were originally opposed to the Alliance and later anxious to keep it as strictly Atlantic as possible (while Kennan specified that it would not include nations in close contact with Sovietized Eastern Europe), it may be concluded that the Department was clearly split over the alliance project, to the point that Lovett was induced to put this fact on the records in a talk with Hickerson on August 31st. Kennan also participated in this meeting, and was even designated, curiously enough (since he was anything but impartial, and was also subordinate to Lovett), to act as judge 12 . The State Department was divided within itself, and the only other diplomatic corps that had dedicated studies, special departments and men to 10

11

12

D. Yergin, Shattered Peace. The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State, Boston 1977, especially p. 303 ff. Minutes of the fifth session of the Exploratory Talks, Washington 9-7-1948. F.R.U.S., vol. cit. p. 128. Memorandum from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Kennan, to Under-Secretary of State Lovett, Washington, 31 August 1948. F.R.U.S., vol. cit., p. 225.

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the problem, that of Britain, was equally divided. Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick and Gladwyn Jebb, two of the foremost experts in the Foreign Office, were intent on deciding what should be the Southern Flank of NATO, while Bevin was attracted by the strictly North Atlantic Lovett-Kennan formula, brusquely termed "Kennan's argument" by the British Foreign Minister13. As for France, in the instructions for the head of the delegation at the Exploratory Talks, the Ambassador to the United States Bonnet, Bidault established a precise distinction between the various threats menacing Western Europe: a possible future threat from Germany; a growing generalized threat from the Soviet Union; an immediate threat from Soviet action in Germany. In the absence of detailed documentation from the Quai d'Orsay, it can be provisionally stated that the Exploratory talks were at least the occasion for the French Government to take a decided step ahead in regard to the Atlantic plan (on a level different from that of the Western Union) toward resolving the German threat/Soviet threat dilemma. While France's diplomacy continued to be dominated in the Exploratory Talks too by the anxiety for obtaining from beyond the Atlantic the means for achieving rearmament, a new element was now added — that of localization of the danger from the East. More precisely, it was now confirmed that a new potential enemy existed in that same territory beyond the Rhine from which the French had for so many generations feared invasion. This led Bidault to continue to consider less urgent the creation of another defence system, in which France was however directly interested, which starting from Italy and embracing both shores of the Mediterranean, would extend to the Persian Gulf and to the Northern border of Iran 14 . The three major powers participating in the Exploratory Talks tended (in spite of the differences of opinion existing between the diplomats of at least two of them) to favour a strictly Atlantic treaty. Among these three powers, the two most influential ones, the USA and the United Kingdom, adopted a strong North Atlantic viewpoint, facilitated by the strategy of the "stepping stones" (which at a certain point came to include even the Portuguese Southern Azores) and by the implicit backing of the other nations participating in the talks; the obvious, natural support, already clearly expressed in the Pentagon Talks, of Canada and that of the Benelux nations, looking northward and at the same time anxious not to be involved in geographically distant

'·' Franks to the Foreign Office, Washington, 26 August 1948; Bevin to Franks, London, 30 August, and comments by I. Kirkpatrick, P.R.O., P.O., 371-73075, 76322, top secret. 14 The American Ambassador to France to the Secretary of State, Paris, 29 June 1948, containing a summary of Bidault's instructions to the French Ambassador at Washington (instructions up to now impossible to find in the archives of the Quai d'Orsay). F.R.U.S., vol. cit., pp. 142-43.

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foreign sectors. Support was expressed also by those nations which, like Norway, could in certain foreseeable circumstances be more easily involved in negotiations. During the Summer sessions of the Exploratory Talks France, faced with this strong northern bias, offered no resistance, at least for the moment, the "watch on the Rhine" being indirectly in her favour. We may thus speak of an initial de facto convergence of opinion, based on different motivations, as to the restrictive nature of the future system of North Atlantic security. But in the American delegation matters were to change once more. At a month or slightly more from the start of the talks, a broader view than that of Lovett's scheme was suggested by Charles Bohlen when the State Department Counsellor admitted, despite his basic agreement with the ideas of Kennan and Lovett, that it was necessary to take into consideration "those nations that are essential to military security from the European point of view, such as Italy and Sweden", the two Southern and Northern wings of an advanced defence formation 15 . Another month having elapsed (after Hickerson had already in late July launched his attack during the sixth meeting of the working group chaired by Bohlen while in the three-party talk with Lovett and Kennan on August 31st he had forcefully sustained his concept of a more extensive and flexible system),it was decided to extend the alliance to nations not belonging to the North Atlantic area so uncompromisingly defined by Lovett at the start. In the conclusive document of the Summer session of the talks (the "Washington Paper" issued in September) the extension, while not covering the entire area of the OEEC nations as Hickerson desired (through a process of gradual incorporation) referred to "any state within Western Europe or bordering on it, the maintenance of whose territorial or political integrity directly involves the security of the parties". To clearly illustrate the new perspective, the document indicated Italy and Sweden as examples of "new participating nations that could enter the pact either as full members or with limited commitments (...) according to special agreements which could be necessary due to their geographic location or their international obligations". The talks were suspended for three months. The interruption — caused mainly by events in American domestic politics, especially Truman's surprise electoral victory-blocked the progress of Atlantic Pact negotiations (at least as regards the Seven who met in Washington) but did not stop the processes of coordination going on in Europe. I mention this related but distinct aspect merely to note how Bevin's opposition to any attempt to divest the Western Union of its central role in the process of European unification was based on the concern that its place Memorandum from the ninth session of the Working Group participating in the Explorative Talks, Washington, 9 August 1948. Ivi, pp. 208-11.

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as primary partner in dialogue with the United States should not be compromised. Bevin intended, without relinquishing the predominant Anglo-American special relationship, to retain for the Five a privileged position, as compared to that of the other European nations, in negotiation with the United States. The British Foreign Secretary expressed in his concern the urgent need common to the Five, rendered even more pressing by the long American electoral pause, that of acting quickly, now that the preparatory phase of the Exploratory Talks had provided the negotiators with the elements for concluding. The second stage of the negotiations, starting on December 10th, did not fulfill the expectations of a relatively serene and predictable conclusion that the Washington Paper of three months before had seemed to promise. At least two facts were to alter the regular, predictable course of negotiations, while a third, which I have mentioned previously, the direct assumption by the new Secretary of State Dean Acheson of responsibility for directing the negotiations, represents in its turn an important factor whose effect was perhaps that of delaying or perhaps that of changing the final result. The first fact is the change of direction in French policy. Its general significance may be briefly assessed without going into the policy of France in detail, nor dwelling on the Italian problem which is the most obvious subject of this change16. The documentation of the Quai d'Orsay — as some of us know from direct experience, either from discussions with those involved or because it is clear from their studies — does not provide enough evidence to establish precise, explicit internal motivations for this change. What can be schematically determined is that Ambassador Bonnet, upon the resumption of negotiations, endeavoured to shift the axis of the Atlantic Alliance southward to confer on France a less peripheral position than it would have held, in spite of its centrality in regard to the German front, with northward accentuation of American and British Atlanticism. This led Bonnet to insist first that the area covered by the treaty should include all of French North Africa — including the areas that were at the time French protectorates — then at least Algeria, a Metropolitan territory, then Italy as well17. This was the course taken by French diplomatic activity at Washington during the first three sessions of the second stage: or at least this is what appears from the reports and is indirectly confirmed by a dispatch from the Quai d'Orsay to the French Ambassador in Rome on December 21st. 16

17

For which refer to O. Barie, "GH Stati Uniti, l'Unione Occidentale e I'inserimento dell'Italia nell'Alleanza Atlantica" in UAlleanza Occidentale. Nascita e sviluppi di un sistema di sicurezza collettivo, pp. 182 ff. Ibid. p. 184.

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In early January, some changes in the French position became apparent. These changes did not involve Algeria — although the Americans were opposed to having it covered by the treaty — but rather the associated issue of Italy. On this subject Bevin, ostensibly due to concern over the uncertain intentions of some elements in the Italian government, was pressing for a negative judgement at Paris, i.e., for the exclusion of Italy. A new development was to come to the aid of the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, after Ambassador Tarchiani had consigned to Hickerson on January 12th the two notes that allowed the pro-Italian Director of the Bureau of European Affairs to speak of "a new factor in the question of Italy's participation". This development was the re-emergence of the Norway issue, projected into the foreground by the renewal of pressure from the USSR. Truly worrying in itself, the problem of Norway was such as to provoke a series of reactions in Washington, which were to mark the conclusive stage of the negotiations. Due to the firmness shown by the Norwegian government in the emergency, to the strategical implications for the British Isles of any dangerous situation in Norway, as well as for the fact that Norway's participation in the alliance completed the maritime system of northern territories on which Britannic (as well as American) Atlanticism rested, the arrival of a Norwegian mission presided over by the Foreign Minister allowed Bevin to insist on a conclusion to the negotiations with one eye turned toward this wing of the Atlantic formation. Simultaneously, the Norwegian bombshell provoked a strong reaction in French policy, but in the opposite direction. This occurred in spite of the pause, due perhaps to second thoughts on the inclusion of Italy, resulting from the massive intervention of Bevin, who promised to have Algeria included if France would let the Italian issue drop. On January 13 — 14, Robert Schuman and the flower of French diplomacy had given the impression at London of not being entirely convinced of wanting at all costs to include Italy; but in the session of the Exploratory Talks held on February 25th, Bonnet returned to the intransigence of the days just before Christmas and in an "extraordinary exhibition" (to use Acheson's expression) demanded that Italy not only be included in the alliance, but that it be granted a position on a level with that of Norway in the Exploratory Talks. Otherwise, France would have to reconsider its entire policy in regard to the alliance. Bonnet did not entirely succeed in his intention, since Norway was admitted to participate in the talks, joining the Seven, and Italy was not. But he did succeed, after the preparation carried out in the sessions of the Talks and in the Working Group prior to Christmas, in posing the Italian question in such a way as to determine a severe impasse, perhaps the most serious to occur during the second stage of the talks. In reality, the French ambassador rendered the atmosphere so tense that it was

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impossible to proceed in an orderly manner to deal with the basic problems still open until the Italian issue had been resolved. We have now arrived at March 1st. It was at this point that Dean Acheson decided to cash the blank check left him by the senators (Vandenberg, Connally and George, after the cautious work of preparation carried out by the Secretary of State, had referred the decision to the executive branch), obtaining Truman's consent to concluding negotiations on the basis of the inclusion of Italy 18 . I must apologize if, under the influence of an analytic study on the inclusion of Italy in the alliance, I may have yielded to the temptation to give the problem, at this moment — i.e., after the Norwegian issue had been successfully solved - excessive weight. I will be sincerely grateful if someone can, on adequate grounds, demonstrate to me that the problem of Italy was not the single issue that, during the last weeks, dominated, or if you wish, disturbed, the talks and in a broader sense (involving the White House and even Congress to some extent) the Washington political and diplomatic scene. A reconstruction of the final developments between February and March 1949 shows Dean Acheson's work to be determinant. It was he who in the first week of March, after having obtained from the Senators an unwilling mandate that concealed their unchanged reservations as to the casus foederis, interpreted the still flexible moods of the ambassadors and in two briefly spaced talks induced the President to change his opinion, and was thus able to charge Hickerson with the task of overcoming the last obstacles (British) and initiating the procedure for the signing of the treaty. One question must go unanswered. Though Acheson's reserved personality makes it difficult to find an answer, the question inevitably arises, in relation to what is known of the splits within the State Department, of where the new Secretary should be placed among the various schools of thought on Western alliance. The way in which Acheson conducted negotiations in the final phase would lead us to believe that he was not in favour of a restrictive, semi-isolationist concept of alliance limited to the shores of the North Atlantic. It should however be noted that such a concept had already by then been abandoned (with greater or lesser conviction or resignation) even by its backers within the State Department. On the other hand, Acheson's work must be viewed within a broader context, since he had to deal simultaneously with different factors such as the White House (the simplest matter, at least for him), Congress, the State Department and, outside of the Washington political scene, the six (to be exact, seven) ambassadors and the governments behind them, as well as the governments not included in the Seven, such as Italy, for whom it was essential not merely to be included, but to be included now. Memorandum from the Secretary of State (Washington), 2 March 1949. F.R.U.S., vol. cit. pp. 141-42.

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Acheson's work should really be viewed within a framework even broader than this, at least if we accept the interesting thesis that, in the process of gradual re-evaluation of yesterday's enemies as tomorrow's friends which has distinguished American policy since the close of the 1940s, Acheson marks the moment in which the United States went on to manifest acknowledgement and open, fully aware realization of this need. An indepth analysis of the personality and work of the new Secretary of State would be a major element in investigating the conclusive stage of the process through which the alliance was defined, and it would be equally important to obtain thorough, precise knowledge of French policy and of the role played by the Norwegian question. I have attempted to point out the special importance of these questions expressly in the hope that others will be able to propose solutions.

Section 2. The Attitudes of the Countries Involved

The Atlantic Pact as a Problem of U. S. Diplomacy by Gaddis Smith

My assignment is to discuss the Atlantic Pact as a problem of U.S. diplomacy. The problem, in a word, was ghosts: ghosts of Woodrow Wilson, Neville Chamberlain and Adolf Hitler; ghosts from the military history of the Second World War; and fearsome ghosts of the imagined future. The present and future were filled with ominous, unanswerable questions. What were Soviet intentions and capabilities? Could and would Europe do anything to save itself from a third cycle of war in a little more than a single generation? Did the United States have the will and intelligence to prepare deterrent military power in time? Uncertainty in the present turned minds and arguments both explicitly and implicitly to the past, and thus brought in the ghosts. Today we know that the ghosts and the doubts which they stimulated were exorcised sufficiently so that the North Atlantic pact was signed and that we can now celebrate a fortieth anniversary. But in the 1940s their presence was palpable. They shaped the nature of American diplomacy during the formation period of the Atlantic pact and added real suspense up to the moment of signing. The ghost of Adolf Hitler was the most obvious and was a familiar cliche. Listen to British Foreign Secretary Bevin pleading with Americans in March 1948 for an Atlantic security system: "The alternative is to repeat our experience with Hitler and to witness helplessly the slow deterioration of our position, until we are forced in much less favorable circumstances to resort to war in order to defend our lives and liberty."1 Listen to President Harry S. Truman addressing Congress in a week later: "Aggressors in the past, relying on our apparent lack of military, have unwisely precipitated war. Although they have been led to destruction by their misconception of our strength, we have paid a terrible price for our unpreparedness."2 Or Senator Arthur Vandenberg in the Senate in February 1949: "If the Kaiser in World War I and the Führer in World War II had been on notice that an armed attack against 1 2

FRUS, 1948, III, aide memoire of March 11, 1948. Address to Congress, March 17 1948, Public Papers of the President, 1948, p. 185.

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any of the friendly nations with whom we associate ourselves would be considered a cause for even us to consider and study and determine whether or not we would enter into the common defense, it would have stopped both those wars before they occured."3 Hitler's ghost did not haunt alone. It came accompanied by sinister transAtlantic siblings: the ghost of appeasement and the ghost of isolationism. Listen now to 1947 Jack Hickerson, director of the State Department's Office of European Affairs and a man rightly hailed by contemporaries and historians as the staunchest advocate of an American commitment. Almost a year before the idea of an Atlantic pact was formally broached, Hickerson wrote to a colleague that the Soviet aggression must be stopped "by force of arms if necessary". Appeasement would not do. That method was tried with Hitler and the lessons ... are fresh in our minds. One cannot appease a powerful country intent on aggression. If the lessons we learned from efforts to deal with Hitler mean anything, concessions to the Soviet Union would simply whet their appetite for more.

Hickerson worried, however, that the British might be tempted to make a deal with Moscow behind the back of the United States and in defiance of the principles of the United Nations. Such behavior by the British, he said, "would touch off an upsurge of isolation sentiment in the United States which would be irresistible ... the American people would say 'to hell with all of them'". 4 This ghostly dialectic between isolationism and appeasement pervades the diplomacy of the pact and its antecedents. Americans were uneasy in January 1947 when Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, was ostentatiously entertained by Stalin in Moscow and was presented with a proposal for an Anglo-Soviet military alliance. British Foreign Secretary Bevin dismissed the Soviet overture as a crude attempt to split the United States and the United Kingdom and reaffirmed Anglo-American solidarity, but the doubts lingered.5 Perhaps the Americans were uneasy because Stalin even lent Montgomery his own fur coat and hat for the trip to the airport. Along the same line Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson complained that elements in the British press and Parliament were advocating that the United Kingdom act as an honest broker between the United States and the Soviet Union. Why, Acheson asked, hasn't the British government and especially the Foreign Office "supplied background press guidance as effectively as they customarily do when important British interest are at stake?"6 3 4 5 6

Congressional Record February 14, 1949, p. 1164. To H. Freeman Matthews, FRUS 47, I, 715 - 6. FRUS 47, IV, 517-24. FRUS, 47, I, 750

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Sometimes the roles were reversed. For example, in May 1948 the Soviets published a distorted account of a conversation initiated by the United States between Ambassador Walter Bedell Smith and Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov. The implication intended by Moscow was that the United States was abandoning the Western European countries in favor of a bilateral settlement with the Soviet Union. This time the French complained, warning of the danger of separate negotiations. The State Department replied not to worry. The ghosts of isolationism and appeasement were present in the central dialogue between Bevin on the one hand and American Secretary of State George C. Marshall and Under Secretary Robert Lovett. It was Bevin, as we all know, who raised with Marshall in London in December 1947 the idea of "a powerful consolidation of the West" whose purpose would be to make "clear to the Soviet Union that having gone so far they could not advance any further-'. 7 Bevin was a man in a hurry. In January 1948 he proposed what soon became the Brussels pact and pressed the United States — via Lord Inverchapel, the British Ambassador in Washington — for a specific commitment. He also proposed a bilateral Anglo-American alliance on the argument that "if the United States were able to enter with Great Britain into a general commitment to go to war with an aggressor, it is probable that potential victims might feel sufficiently reassured to refuse to embark on a fatal policy of appeasement".8 Bevin was invoking not so subtly the ghost of Neville Chamberlain to frighten the ghost of American isolationism. [I agree with Dr. Varsori that Bevin was also seeking to cancel British weakness by recruiting the United States as an instrument of British purposes. American leaders, however, were quite aware of what Bevin was seeking.] Marshall and Lovett refused to be rushed. Their reiterated message was that the United States could make no precise response until the specifics of the European self-help program which Bevin had initiated were clear. The American position, in Lovett's words, was that the British were asking the United States "pour concrete before we see the blueprints". Bevin, quite rightly, complained that the discussions were "getting into a vicious circle". The Europeans needed American assurance before they could perfect their plans, but the Americans were unwilling to provide assurance until European plans were perfected. The impasse reminds me of the apocryphal story of an American state legislature in the 19th century confronted with the problems of train wrecks where rail lines intersected. The lawmakers solved the problem by decreeing that when two trains approached each other at an intersection, 7 11

FRUS, 47, II, 815 Inverchapel to Lovett, January 27, 1948

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both would stop, and neither would proceed until the other had passed through the intersection. The ghost of how the Second World War had been fought contributed to a current of distrust throughout during the diplomacy of the pact. For the American Joint Chiefs of Staff in the years immediately after 1945 a major security problem for the United States was quite literally North Atlantic, that is oceanic. They thought primarily in terms of defending the maritime approaches to North America and of keeping open the supply lines from America to Europe. With strong memories of the battle of the Atlantic against Hitler's Germany, the military chiefs in 1945 recommended the annexation of Greenland by the United States and the acquisition of permanent rights for a base in Iceland. As discussion of a pact progressed, Greenland, Iceland, and the Portuguese Azores were at all times presented by the United States as the indispensable "stepping stones" without which a defense relationship with Europe would offer nothing for the United States. It is significant in this regard that the specific development which pushed Secretary of State Marshall off his wait-and-see perch and toward specific discussions with the United Kingdom and Canada of an American commitment was not the February 1948 Communist coup in continental Czechoslovakia (a development long anticipated), but an apparently imminent Soviet demand on maritime Norway for a non-aggression pact on the Soviet-Finnish model. Bevin told Marshall, via the British ambassador in Washington, that it was essential to convince the Norwegians "that we and you mean business and are prepared to see this thing through and not stop short at exhortations".9 Marshall agreed. On March 12, 1948, Marshall simultaneously invited the British and Canadians to send representatives for specific conversations on a pact and sent this message to Norway: If Soviet demands are made on Norway, in our opinion it is imperative that Norway adamantly resist such demands and pressure. Events in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere demonstrate the futility of any other course. Soviet demands on Turkey and Iran were resolutely and successfully resisted by those countries. The American Government supported both Turkey and Iran in resisting Soviet demands.10

Because the Soviet demand did not in fact materialize at the time — either because it was deterred by evident Anglo-American support for Norway or because it had not been planned at all — the American message of March 12 has not received the broad attention it deserves.11 But for a moment in early March the issue was crucial. 9

FRUS 48, III, 52. FRUS 48, III, 51. " Geir Lundestad, America, Scandinavia and the Cold War, 1945 — 1949. New York, Columbia University Press, 1980. 10

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The secret Pentagon talks among the members of what historian J. B. Brebner in 1945 named "the North Atlantic triangle" (United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada) were held between March 22 and April 1. They focussed extensively on how to define the geographical area of a proposed pact. The very words — "North Atlantic Pact" — which we now celebrate came out of those talks. Had the French (who were deliberately excluded) been present, terminological agreement, and strategic agreement implicit in it, would not have come so readily. This point was addressed in yesterday's comments. The French were haunted by their own memories of the Second World War — the trauma of defeat and long occupation. This ghost was vividly invoked in January 1948 by Foreign Minister Georges Bidault and Defense Minister Pierre Henri Teitgen in important exploratory talks with a visiting American general and Ambassador Jefferson Caffery in Paris. The French accused the United States of planning in the event of war with the Soviet Union to fall back to North Africa or perhaps a defensive line at the Pyrenees. The French said — quoting from the American record of the conversation — they had a fear complex stemming ... from the belief that should war break out, the United States will abandon Western Europe to the Soviet; that the Russian hordes will occupy the area, raping women and deporting the male population for slave labor in the Soviet Union; that France and Western Europe will be occupied and devastated by the Soviet hordes and atomized by the United States ... if Western Europe were not defended the United States would find after the struggle that this area, as a result of Soviet occupation and atomic warfare, would be completely devastated and depopulated. There would be no Western European civilization or population to share with the United States the task of reconstruction ... the United States after its victory would have only Asiatics and African and Colonial natives with whom to cooperate in the task of world reconstruction. 12

Averell Harriman, then head of Marshall Plan operations in Europe, heard the same story and in July 1948 reported it as an "almost universal" belief in France that the U.S. could not prevent the Russians from overrunning Western Europe. Many French, therefore, were inclined toward accomodation with the Soviet Union. "Appeasement psychology, like isolationism in the United States, is not deeply buried" said Harriman, thereby linking the two ghosts.13 For the short term Harriman recommended some token military shipments to France, and in September President Truman did approve the transfer of enough material from U.S. stocks to equip three French divisions.14

12 13 14

FRUS 48, 111,617-22. FRUS 48, III, 183. FRUS 48, HI, 253.

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But the tension over divergent responses to the experience of the Second World War remained to trouble Franco-American relations, never to be fully resolved. Ghosts haunted the internal bureaucratic and political debates over the pact in the United States just as much as they affected the diplomacy. George F. Kennan, head of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, was of course the most notable skeptic about the need for a military pact at all. He was one of the few to challenge the conventional invocation of the ghost of Hitler and the accompanying meaning of the military history of the Second World War. It was dangerous, said Kennan during the Working Group talks in Washington in July 1948, to draw parallels between "Stalinism and Hitlerism". The Soviets had no intention of launching an armed attack. "They had not yet repaired the devastated areas of Russia. The people were war weary. In view of the lessons of the two World Wars the Kremlin could not be sure of overcoming Europe without first knocking out North American industrial potential. It believed it could win ideologically more easily than militarily."15 Kennan's ideas were anathema to the Europeans and to American advocates of a military pact. They suggested a smug American confidence that as long as the United States was militarily secure Europe had nothing to fear. This smugness, unintentionally, fed grim fantasies about eventual American liberation of a depopulated, atomized continent. French fears in particular were reinforced in those same meetings by Under Secretary Lovett's blunt assertion that "Greenland and Iceland were more important than some nations in Western Europe to the security of the United States and Canada ... As far as the United States was concerned, and also presumably Canada, the ultimate criterion was whether or not its national security was affected".16 Now I want to comment briefly on the question of which countries might or might not be invited to sign the pact. The membership question was connected with American memories of the Second World War and with the American strategic style. Secretary Marshall as American Chief of Staff during World War II believed in concentrating strength. He had been opposed to the peripheral strategy. As Secretary of State he had the same attitude toward membership in the Pact. He was conscious of the limits of American resources. He did not want to see them dissipated. Membership, therefore, should only be for nations whose territory was washed by the waters of the Atlantic Ocean. Marshall was supported by George Kennan in this geographical purism. Kennan preferred no pact at all, but if there had to be one keep it as tightly restricted as possible. Note, however, what a long list of nations there were whose membership in or association with the pact was mentioned during 1948 — either as 15 16

FRUS 48, III, 157. ibidem, 165.

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desirable, or because they wanted to be included, or because they were mentioned as examples of nations whom it was necessary to include. There were of course the Brussels five plus Canada and the United States. That makes seven. There were the favored American "stepping stone" nations — Portugal for the Azores, Ireland, Norway and Denmark. That makes eleven. Italy was of course eventually invited - but against misgivings by the geographical purists. The misgivings were overcome by the high political and strategic significance assigned to Italy, by the heavy French pressure, and by the lack of senatorial opposition. That makes twelve. Ireland was certainly North Atlantic and the Dublin government said it would be delighted to accept an invitation — provided the British would withdraw from Northern Ireland. American leaders knew enough about the history of the Irish question to awaken that ghost. Dublin was told that there could be no discussion of Ireland's membership as long as the partition issue was on the agenda. That makes thirteen nations mentioned. Bevin at the beginning of discussions listed Spain and West Germany as members — when circumstances permitted. The Americans agreed, but the necessary change of circumstances for Spain seemed too far in the future to require much immediate discussion. Spain, however, makes fourteen. The time when Germany might join also seemed remote — but Germany's role was obviously much in American thinking. I would not go so far as to say that Germany was the central problem — that was the Soviet Union. But West Germany integrated into the Western community was an essential part of the solution. French fears about Germany were an obstacle to the solution of the problem of the Soviet Union. One of Lovett's favorite sayings was that the United States did not want to return to a "firetrap" meaning Europe where twice in memory there had been war between Germany and Britain and France. By integrating Germany, Western Europe would be "fireproof". Open discussion by Americans of actual German rearmament would not come, however, until after the outbreak of the Korean war. Germany, however, is fifteen on our list. Austria and Switzerland were listed early as possibilities in some American documents — but that was unrealistic. Austria was still under occupation and no informed diplomat believed Switzerland would ever abandon traditional neutrality. But those countries bring to seventeen the number listed. Sweden was much discussed, but the idea of membership was rebuffed by Stockholm. The problem was to persuade the other Scandinavian nations to seek security within an Atlantic association rather than within a Swedishled neutrality league. Sweden brings the list to eighteen. Greece, Turkey and Iran wanted to be included. But here geographical purism prevailed — until the Korean war in the case of Greece and Turkey.

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The United States eventually built a special relationship with the Shah of Iran — but that is another story. Greece, Turkey and Iran bring the number to twentyone. Americans in the 1948 discussions were cool to the British suggestion of associating the Atlantic pact with a Middle East pact which might then raise the question of Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and even China. Depending how many Middle Eastern countries would be included that brings the list of countries mentioned to at least thirtyone. And then there was Australia and New Zealand. Thirty three. And twenty Latin American countries. No leader wanted them — but the fear of having to consider Latin American association was one of several reasons for adhering to the terminology North Atlantic. Latin America brings the number to fifty three. The most bizarre possibility mentioned was the Soviet Union. As the pact was to follow the Rio treaty model whereby aggression by one member against others would be dealt with, then, as Hickerson of the State Department said, even the Soviet Union could be a member — which brings the grand total to fifty four. By September 1948 — to return to the narrative — the summer Working Group and ambassadorial negotiations in Washington had completed a sketch of a North Atlantic treaty. Now the pace of diplomacy slowed for the American presidential season. In December 1948 there was another spate of negotiations which produced a draft text. Then came another hiatus until February 1949 after re-elected President Truman had appointed a new Secretary of State, Dean Acheson. Professor Barie yesterday raised the question of Acheson's impact. It was considerable. He replaced an old, tired and ailing George Marshall — a man with little energy left in 1948 and considerable caution toward the idea of the pact. Acheson was full of vitality after eighteen months out of government. He wanted to get things done and was impatient of obstacles. Also with Acheson's arrival the influence of George Kennan — always negative on the pact — went into sharp decline. Acheson was disappointed to find that much work on the treaty still needed to be done and he soon found himself confronting ghosts in the minds of American senators, ghosts of Woodrow Wilson, the 1919 fight over American membership in the League of Nations, and even the Monroe Doctrine. The basic issue was whether the pact would or would not bind the United States legally and morally to any particular course of action and, furthermore, whether the President alone or only President and Congress could commit the United States in a specific situation. Although the passage in June 1948 by the Senate of the Vandenberg resolution was fulsomely acclaimed a precedent-breaking American commitment to Europe's security, the resolution was vague and ambiguous on precisely

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what, if anything, the United States might do if an armed attack in Europe occurred. European governments, as we know, wanted an ironclad, automatic commitment similar to Article 4 of the Brussels Pact whereby all members in event of attack on any would "afford the party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power". To this Americans replied, with liturgical monotony, that the 1947 Rio de Janeiro treaty of Inter-American assistance was the model to follow. Europeans cringed at the insistent repetition of this idea. Rio did affirm that all members would regard an attack on one as an attack on all, but in Article 20 it stated that "no State shall be required to use armed force without its consent". Furthermore, the Rio treaty was seen by its enthusiasts in the United States as a hemispheric, implicitly anti-European, expression of the Monroe doctrine. For example, Senator Vandenberg and John Foster Dulles told Marshall and Lovett in April 1948 that the Monroe Doctrine was central to their thinking about an inter-American regional pact, justified (in Dulles' words) by "clear historical association of over 125 years", but "such association in the North Atlantic did not exist as far as he knew".17 The words "Rio Pact " played well to U. S. Congressional ears, but not in London or Paris. The French were most outspoken in denouncing the Rio model and on this issue they had the support of their European colleagues. In August 1948, for example, the French member of the Working Group said that France might not participate in a pact which "did not provide for advance planning and immediate military assistance".18 However, the State Department believed that draft treaty text of December 24, which had been reviewed by Senatorial leaders, had put the issue to rest. The State Department was wrong, as revealed by the famous February 14, 1949 exchange on the floor of the United States Senate — an occasion mentioned in every memoir and NATO history, usually in tones of outrage or disparagement over senatorial muddleheadness, or even senility. For example, Nicholas Henderson, second secretary in the British Embassy in Washington, wrote shortly after that "Senator Connally did not at this time fully comprehend all the issues ivolved, for age had added to his limitations, not his virtues".19 The discussion began when Senator Forrest C. Donnell of Missouri asked if the proposed treaty would involve the United States in a moral commitment to fight. Dean Acheson had dismissed Senator Donnell with biting satire and, in truth, Donnell was not one of America's intellectual giants.20 But every informed listener recognized the phrase "moral commit17 18 19 20

FRUS 48, III, 107. FRUS 48, III, 213. Nicholas Henderson, The Birth of NATO, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982, p. 91. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation, 281.

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ment"as a ghostly echo of the debate in 1919 between President Woodrow Wilson and senatorial critics led by Henry Cabot Lodge the elder over the nature of the American commitment to fight under Article 10 of the League of Nations Covenant. The issue was as old as the American Constitution: the never-to-be-resolved question of the location of the war power as between the executive and Congress. Senator Tom Connally, who had just assumed the position of chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, replied: "I certainly would not desire the adoption of any language which would morally commit us to fight ... [That] would mean letting European nations declare war and let us fight". Connally then made his point even more unsettling by invoking another ghost: "since 1823 we had made the Monroe Doctrine our national policy, and that we were ready to fight without any treaty if any country in the western hemisphere were attacked". And finally in his most frequently quoted passage he declared: "We cannot ... be Galahads, and every time we hear a gun fired plunge into war and take sides without knowing what we are doing, and without knowing the issues involved. That is my attitude."21 The European and Canadian reaction to Connally's remarks was instant and appalled. For example, on instructions, the Canadian Ambassador in Washington declared that "the purposes of the Treaty are not going to be fulfilled by an undertaking which is so watered down that it does not create even a moral obligation to take effective action ... This is reducing the proposed North Atlantic Treaty almost to the level of a Kellogg — Briand peace pact". Canada, said the Ambassador, might not be able to adhere to such a nullity. 22 That was a sharp cut indeed, for no ghosts of the past was more disparaged by State Department realists in 1949 than the Kellogg — Briand pact of 1928, supposedly banishing war. Secretary Acheson met this particular challenge by conferring immediately with Senators Connally and Vandenberg and working out the compromise text of Article 5, acceptable to the Senate and the other signatories. The obligation of all parties to assist any one or more who had been attacked was affirmed, but broad discretion remained in the promise of each to take "such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain international peace and security". And so the treaty was ready for signature. The signing ceremony in Washington on April 4, 1949, was an occasion for mutual congratulation. Indeed the entire spring of 1949 was, from the American point of view, as close to euphoria as any other time during the Cold War. I will even say that American leaders for a brief moment might 21 22

Cong. Rec., Feb. 14 1949, 1165-1166. Quoted by Escott Reid, in Nicholas Sherwen, ed., NATO's Anxious Birth, p. 79.

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have agreed with Professor Di Nolfo's remarkable suggestion that by 1949 the Cold War was over. The Treaty was on its way to Senate approval by a comfortable margin (82— 13). Soon the Soviets lifted the Berlin blockade. The formation of West Germany was proceeding on schedule. European economic recovery was accelerating under the stimulus of the Marshall Plan. Secretary of State Acheson believed the North Atlantic allies had prevailed from their position of strength, that the Soviet threat had been courageously faced and Moscow was pulling back, and that the use of armed force by the Soviet Union was now remote. All the ghosts had been banished, or so it seemed. Whether the ghosts would return and under what circumstances could not, in 1949, be foretold.

Great Britain and the Atlantic Pact by Ritchie Ovendale

In the years immediately after the end of the Second World War, the Cold War was almost global in scale, extending across Europe and Asia, penetrating the Middle East and Africa. It was the British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin who was the architect of the western alliance that was formed to deter the threat. Though virtually bankrupt, Britain was still an imperial and world power. The Labour government was determined that it should remain so. It was necessary to prevent the United States from withdrawing into isolation, and to make that country realize what appeared to be the reality of the Russian menace. By early 1946 Bevin had the long-term aim of reviving the old wartime Anglo-American alliance. Initially, it seemed only possible to do this on the level of military co-operation. By the end of 1946 that was well under way. Co-operation was close, except in the atomic field. And there was the suspicion that Britain could not always rely on the United States. President Harry S. Truman's Palestine policy, dictated by Zionist pressure groups and a fear of electoral punishment, convinced British ministers that the United States could be an uncertain ally. Bevin was an opportunist. His timing was good. He reacted to the Harvard speech and organized Europe in preparation for Marshall Aid. He initiated the Western Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. But Bevin's vision extended far beyond Europe. As he told the Commonwealth Prime Ministers at Colombo in 1950, Britain was a world power. The Foreign Secretary outlined his global strategy to George Marshall, the American Secretary of State, on the evening of 17 December 1947. Bevin explained that this was the gist of a policy that he was formulating to deal with what Walter Lippmann, the American columnist, a few months earlier had described as the 'Cold War'. Bevin felt that it was important to take a wider view of the situation, and not just regard it as a dispute between Russia and the Western powers. A positive plan was essential for the association of the Western democratic countries — including the United States, Britain, France, Italy and others — and the Dominions. This was not to be a formal alliance, but an

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understanding backed by power, money and resolute action', 'a sort of spiritual federation of the West'. Bevin preferred the British conception of informal and unwritten understandings to the written constitutions. A powerful consolidation of the West would show Russia that it could not advance any further. Marshall commented that it was necessary to distinguish between the material and spiritual aspects and that the two of them should reach an understanding between themselves as soon as possible on immediate objectives: 'They must take events at the flood stream and produce a co-ordinated effect.' (Frus 1947(2), pp. 815- 16, Anglo-US French conversations, British memorandum of conversation, Top Secret, undated.) Churchill had proposed an association of the English-speaking peoples in March 1946 at Fulton, Missouri. Louis St Laurent, the Canadian Foreign Minister, addressing the General Assembly on 17 December 1947, had mentioned that nations might 'seek greater safety in an association of democratic and peace-loving states willing to accept more specific international obligations in return for a greater measure of national security'. St Laurent felt, however, that such association could be formed within the United Nations. (E. Reid, Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty 1947—1949 (Toronto, 1977), p. 33.) But what Bevin seems to have envisaged at the time was something like the alignment that Neville Chamberlain had brought about by September 1939 with the United States and the old Dominions. (See R. Ovendale, 'Appeasement' and the English Speaking World (Cardiff, 1975).) Bevin summarized his policy towards Russia in a Cabinet paper early in 1948. He explained that throughout Eastern Europe the pattern of a Russiandominated political and economic structure was becoming increasingly obvious. Even Czechoslovakia was threatened. Western and particularly British and American interests and influence were being eliminated everywhere. This undermining was also the keystone of Russian policy in the Middle East. The Foreign Secretary concluded; 'It is thus evident that the success of Russian expansionist plans would threaten the three main elements of Commonwealth defence, the security of the United Kingdom, the control of sea communications, and the defence of the Middle East:' (Public Record Office, London, CAB 129/23, fos 30 - 6, CP(48)7, Review of Soviet policy by Bevin, Confidential Annex, 5 January 1948.) To meet this menace Bevin outlined to the Cabinet, on 8 January 1948, a suggestion that Britain should try to form, with the backing of the United States and the Dominions, a Western democratic system comprising Scandinavia, the Low Countries, France, Italy, Greece and possibly Portugal. This might include Spain and Germany at a later stage. This did not have to be a formal alliance, though the Foreign Secretary did concede that Britain had an alliance with France and could conclude alliances with other countries, Bevin thought it important also to mobilize the resources of Africa and the other British and European colonial territories. The Cabinet

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supported the proposal, and Bevin sent a copy of his memorandum to Marshall. (CAB 128/12, CM2(48), Secret, 8 January 1948; Frus 1948(3), pp. 4-5, Inverchapel to Marshall, 13 January 1948.) Bevin also sent a copy to Paris, and on 13 January the British ambassador, Sir Oliver Franks, was asked to impress on Georges Bidault that Britain wanted close co-operation with France. The two countries should make a simultaneous approach to Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg offering treaties like that of Dunkirk signed in March 1947 between Britain and France. At the same time they should think how Italy, other Mediterranean countries and Scandinavia could be included. Bidault liked the idea, and on 22 January Bevin announced to a crowded House of Commons that talks had been proposed to the Benelux countries. The Foreign Secretary spoke to the house of a 'Western Union' to meet the threat of Russia, and stressed that he was not just thinking of Europe as a geographic conception, but of collaboration with the Commonwealth and European territories overseas, initially in Africa and South-East Asia. Sensitive to American opinion he did not mention the United States. (A. Bullock, Ernest Bevin. Foreign Secretary 1945-1951 (1983), pp. 520-1; Sir Nicholas Henderson, The Birth of NATO (1982), pp. 2-5.) On 19 January Marshall told the British ambassador, Lord Inverchapel, that he was considering what procedure would be the most effective, and at what point he could suggest the participation of the United States in Bevin's plan. (FO 800/460, fol 65, Eur/48/1, Inverchapel to Bevin, Top Secret, 19 January 1948.) Bevin was not worried about the form of the American approach, provided that they were prepared 'to come in'. (FO 800/460, fos 69 — 70, Eur/48/4, Bevin to Inverchapel, Telegram no. 1032, Top Secret, 26 January 1948.) For a while the Americans hesitated. Bevin, too, had his problems: with the Chiefs of Staff and the Prime Minister. Committing British troops to the European continent was anathema to some of the military planners. Sir John Cunningham, Admiral of the Fleet, reminded the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 2 February 1948 that it had been traditional British policy in the past to avoid European continental commitments: 'Twice in the past we had given a guarantee to assist a continental nation to the limit of our power by the provision of land forces. On both occasions we had suffered severely, first at Mons and more recently at Dunkirk.' On 4 February Clement Attlee told the Chiefs of Staff that he was disturbed by this new idea that Britain might send land forces to the continent. He had thought that the British plan was to develop a counter-offensive from the Middle East. Attlee did not see how Britain could support forces on the European continent as well: 'Previous experience had shown how Continental commitments, initially small, were apt to grow into very large ones.' Bevin fought his Prime Minister. The Foreign Secretary asked the Chiefs of Staff to consider how the forces of Britain, France, the Benelux countries and possibly Italy should be organized

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and rationalized so as to form one effective whole. He could then make the Americans realize that they had to join any future war at the outset. The meeting resolved that the sending of land forces to the European continent needed further study, and in the meantime policy would be along the lines suggested by Bevin. (FO 800/452, fos 19-30, Def/48/5, COS(48)26(0), Memorandum by Montgomery on the problem of future war and the strategy of war with Russia, 30 January 1948; fos 32-41, Def/48/5A, COS(48)16, Confidential Annex, 2 February 1948; fos 47-52, Def/48/7, COS(48)16, 4 February 1948.) While the Chiefs of Staff were evolving a strategic policy to implement the new British foreign policy little progress was being made in Washington. Further advances by Russia, however, changed that. On 25 February there was a coup in Prague, and the Russians took over Czechoslovakia, the country which in 1945 the United States had anticipated would develop free from interference of East or West. The next day Bevin saw the American ambassador, Lew Douglas, and told him that 'we were now in the crucial period of six to eight weeks which I had long foreseen would decide the future of Europe'. New heart had to be put into the countries directly menaced such as Italy and even France. Bevin wanted a meeting of the western governments including the United States. (FO 800/460, fos 86-95, Eur/48/13, Record of conversation between Bevin and Douglas on 26 February 1948, Top Secret.) Bevin presented the Cabinet with a paper entitled 'The Threat to Western Civilisation', and, on 5 March, in giving its general support, the Cabinet laid special emphasis on the need to strengthen the democratic forces in France and Italy, and to prevent the weakening of the Commonwealth through the secession of India and possibly Pakistan. (CAB 129/25, fos 47-64, CP(48)72, Memorandum by Bevin, Top Secret, 3 March 1948; CAB 128/12, fol. 128, CM19(48), Secret, 5 March 1948; 14 CM19(48), No Circulation, 5 March 1948.) Later that day, after the Cabinet's approval for a policy of a wider conception of Western Union, Frank Roberts, Bevin's new principal private secretary, noted down the thoughts of the Foreign Secretary. Bevin hoped for the general co-ordination and defence of the whole world outside the Russian orbit, the United Nations as it should have been had the Russians co-operated. (FO 800/460, fos 79 - 80, Minute by Roberts, approved by Bevin, Top Secret, 5 March 1948.) Shortly afterwards, apparent Russian moves against Norway seemingly led Bevin to conclude that the time was right for a specific approach to the United States. On 11 March Marshall received a message from Bevin asking for immediate consultations on the setting up of an Atlantic security system. Bevin mentioned the defence system being negotiated at that time in Brussels, but thought that it would be impractical to ask the Scandinavian countries to join that. Instead 'the most effective steps would be to take very early steps,

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before Norway goes under, to conclude under Article 51 of the Charter of the U. N. a regional Atlantic Approaches Pact of Mutual Assistance, in which all the countries directly threatened by a Russian move to the Atlantic could participate, for example U. S., U. K., Canada, Eire, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Portugal, France (and Spain, when it has a democratic regime)'. The Foreign Secretary suggested three defence systems: the first involved Britain, France, and the Benelux countries with American backing; the second was a scheme of Atlantic security with which the United States would be even more closely concerned; and the third was a Mediterranean security system which would particularly affect Italy. These proposals also went to the Canadian Department of External Affairs. William Lyon Mackenzie King and Marshall were both enthusiastic. Marshall consulted Truman, ignored his obstructionist State Department officials and replied on 12 March that Washington was 'prepared to proceed at once in the joint discussion on the establishment of an Atlantic security system'. He wanted British representatives in Washington early the following week. (FRUS 1948(3), pp. 46-8, British Embassy to Department of State, Top Secret, 11 March 1948; p. 48 Marshall to Inverchapel, Top Secret, 1 March 1948; Bullock, Ernest Bevin, pp. 528-31; C. Wiebes and B. Zeeman. 'The Pentagon negotiations March 1948: the launching of the North Atlantic Treaty', International Affairs, vol. 59(1983), pp. 351-63 at pp. 353-4.) On 17 March Bevin confided to Bidault that he felt the Americans should underwrite the Brussels treaty. If there were war the United States should be in from the first day. (FO 800/460, fos 130-4, Eur/48/17, Record by Roberts of conversation between Bevin and Bidault on 17 March 1948.) The Treaty of Brussels, signed that same day, set up the Western European Union. It was to last for fifty years. The five signatories, Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, were to come to the aid of any one of their number which was attacked. It was understood that other powers could join. (Bullock, Ernest Bevin, p. 537.) Opinion was changing in the United States. The day the Brussels Treaty was signed Truman asked Congress for selective service to maintain the strength of American armed forces. The coup in Czechoslovakia so shook Congressmen that the bill for Marshall Aid had a relatively easy passage. It was against this background that delegates from Britain, Canada and the United States met in the Pentagon between 22 March and 1 April. The Americans blocked French participation on the grounds of security. One of the British delegates, however, was Donald Maclean, the Russian spy, and it seems evident from an article in the Polish press of 4 April that the Russians knew what went on. Bevin's envisaged triple system of alliances was abandoned. It was evident that if the United States were to join any defence system it would have to be in association not only with certain selected western European democracies but if practicable with all of them. If possible Italy

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would have to be admitted. In the end the issue focused on whether the Americans should propose a collective defence agreement for the North Atlantic area as a whole, or whether a presidential declaration of support of the Western European democracies would be enough. Bevin thought that the Russians would not be deterred by a presidential declaration, and in any case Britain would be lucky if Truman and the leaders of the Senate pronounced in favour of 'a treaty binding the United States for the first time in her history to accept positive obligations in the way of the defence of her natural associates and friends'. Later in April Robert A. Lovett, the Under Secretary of State, saw Senator Arthur Vandenberg. As a result of the meeting, helped by a declaration by St Laurent in Canada, the Senate adopted Resolution 239 on 11 June: it recommended the 'association of the United States, by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect tis national security'. In the end the negotiations with all the states concerned did not start until 6 July 1948. (FO 800/515, fos 67-79, US/48/32, Bevin to Attlee, Top Secret, 6 April 1948; fos 85-7, Annex B, Minute by Jebb, 5 April 1948; Wiebes and Zeeman, 'The Pentagon negotiations', pp. 351 — 63.) But the British embassy in Washington warned that the Americans were in no hurry: they did not regard themselves as equal partners in the enterprise. 'They still feel that they are in the position of a kind of fairy godmother handing over favours to the less fortunate Western European countries — provided always that the latter can justify their claims for such favours.' (FO 800/453, fos 83-6, Def/48/40, British Embassy Washington to Foreign Office, Top Secret, 13 July 1948.) Bevin, however, was confident. He was not shaken by the Russian 'peace offensive' which took the form of exchanges between the American ambassador in Moscow, Walter Bedell Smith and Molotov during April and May 1948. (J. S. Walker, '"No more Cold War"; American foreign policy and the 1948 Soviet peace offensive', Diplomatic History, vol. 5(1981), pp. 75 —91.) Without meaning any offence, the Foreign Secretary explained that 'he realised that America had not so much experience in foreign affairs as we had and that while she was developing a sense of responsibility remarkably well, there must occasionally be setbacks to which he did not attach excessive importance'. (FO 800/483, fol. 2, NA/48/1, Roberts to Wright and Jebb, 1 June 1948.) The Berlin blockade encouraged Western unity, and was a favourable background for the negotiations leading to the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. During these Bevin was irked by unofficial hints, spurred on by speeches from Churchill, that Britain should become part of a united Europe. He told Marshall that Britain was not 'a small country of no account'. (FO 800/460, fos 200-1, Eur/48/48, Extract of a conversation between Bevin and Marshall on 4 October 1948.) On 19 October 1948 Bevin

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explained to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers meeting in London that he did not favour an immediate attempt to establish a united states of Europe. Within the foreseeable future it was not practicable: 'It was alien to the British inclination to create grandiose paper constitutions.' (Australian Archives, Canberra, A5954, Box 1970, PMM(48)9, Secret, 19 October 1948.) At this gathering Bevin also tried to complement the Washington discussions with his earlier scheme to involve the Dominions. Following the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, bilateral defence discussions and strategic planning were started between Britain, Australia and New Zealand. (A5799, 48/15, Attlee to J. B. Chifley, Top Secret, 29 December 1948.) Talks with South Africa began in 1949. (R. Ovendale, The English-Speaking Alliance. Britain, the United States, the Dominions and the Cold War 1945 - 51 (1985), pp. 245 - 72.) By the end of 1948 the caution of the American delegates negotiating the Atlantic Pact evaporated. In the summer they had been worried about committing Congress, and the likelihood of Truman losing the presidential election. But Truman was returned against all the odds, and opinion in the United States moved strongly in favour of a pact. The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington on 4 April 1949 by twelve governments. Bevin felt that the pact had 'steadied the world'. (FO 800/483, fol. 75, NA/49/13, Bevin to Franks and Lady Franks, 14 April 1949.) On 17 December 1947 Bevin had envisaged an association of the Western democratic countries — including the United States, Britain, France, Italy and others — and the Dominions. By the middle of 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty had been signed, and defence discussions initiated with Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. Bevin saw the Cold War not just in European but in global terms. It was spreading to the Middle East, Asia and Africa.

France and the Origins of the Atlantic Pact by Bruna Bagnato

Saturday, December 8, 1941, the day after the Japanese attack on the American fleet at Pearl Harbor, Charles de Gaulle declared: "Good, this war is over. Certainly there will still be operations, battles and fighting, but the war is over because from now on the outcome is certain. In this industrial war, nothing can withstand the power of American industry ... Now the West will commit a number of political mistakes sufficient to ensure that by the end of this conflict, the conditions will have been created for another one ... with Russia". "How right he was!" was to be the comment, thirty-eight years later, of one of de Gaulle's closest collaborators, General Pierre Billotte, to whom the future President had made this grim prophecy.1 De Gaulle's eschatological prediction emerged from Billotte's memory in July 1945,2 when the military leader had "realized for the first time that it would soon become necessary to reconstitute, under other forms and with other partners and adversaries, the alliance of World War Π".3 One simple element was sufficient to explain the birth of this "emergency": the British and American desire to abandon the continent. In Great Britain the success of the Labour Party in the July elections, which had brought Clement Attlee to the head of a government in which Ernest Bevin was Foreign Minister, had been largely due to the fact that public opinion was exhausted by the war, and thus especially sensitive to slogans that touched the chords of emotion with appeals to peace and disengagement. In the United States, public opinion was calling for the return home of the "boys" sent to fight in Europe, where their presence seemed no longer necessary after the end of the hostilities. If France did not wish to be alone in opposing the hegemonic temptations of the U.S.S.R., she would have to act swiftly before British and American demobilization was completed. It was in fact with extreme rapidity that the 1 2 3

General P. Billotte, Le passe au futur, Paris, Stock 1979, p. 33. As Billotte himself relates in Le Temps des armes, Paris, Plon 1972. General P. Billotte, Le passe au futur, cit. p. 33.

Bruna Bagnato

Commander of the 2nd Army Corps took action, preparing, as soon as August 17, 1945, a note "on the definition of a French military policy which responds to the urgency of the situation", a note discussed by the author with de Gaulle in September. "I confirm to you my general agreement with the military policy you have outlined", the head of the Provisional Government told him. "I appoint you Deputy Chief of Staff of National Defense. In this capacity, you will inform yourself on all matters falling within the competence of the General Staff ... Once having been invested with this responsibility, you will go to meet Marshall and Eisenhower, Alan Brooke and Montgomery and their ministers. You will thus find out whether the Anglo-Americans are willing to engage themselves in peacetime; the Americans, in particular ...".4 De Gaulle's resignation, in January 1946, made these projects a dead letter. Billotte was not appointed Deputy Chief of Staff of National Defence. In March 1946 he left instead for the United States, as a member of the French delegation to the United Nations. At the moment of taking leave of Edmond Michelet, Minister "des Armees", it was agreed that Billotte would initiate negotiations for a possible future alliance between France and the Anglo-American powers only if it should become evident that the United Nations was incapable of promoting a true general disarmament backed up by formulas designed to guarantee collective security. The impossibility for the international organization of assuming the responsibility for guaranteeing world peace became clear to Billotte in the Spring of 1947. For approximately one year the General tried to make or to re-establish contacts "as close as possible with the American personages in all the governing spheres responsible for major decision-making". This allowed the French General to "find out their opinions on the situation".5 The result of this delicate investigation was a "note de renseignements" on the risks facing Europe in the event of a conflict, written by Billotte in the months between April 1946 and the end of 1947. The first part of the note, whose considerations were "entirely approved" 6 by George Marshall, analyzed the probable direction that would be taken by a Soviet offensive, on the basis of information gathered by French counter-espionage combined with analysis of Moscow's traditional strategical concepts as well as the doctrinal positions of Marxism-Leninism and its Stalinist "deviations". Absolute priority would be given, in Moscow's plans, to preparations for a war against Europe. Conversely, no fronts of intervention toward the Indian Ocean or the Pacific were envisaged. 4 5 6

ibid, p. 35. ibid, p. 36. ibid, p. 37.

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The second part of the note attempted to "measure the level of danger by which the free world is threatened, according to the vicissitudes of the arms race and the progress in reorganization of its security measures". According to Billotte's calculations, three periods could be distinguished. The first, from early 1948 to the Spring of 1949 - the date set for the constitution of a valid military defence for the Western nations - was characterized by application of the policy of economic reconstruction of Europe launched by the Marshall Plan and by the attempts of the Kremlin to sabotage from without the recovery of the continent. In the event of conflict, the AngloAmerican "Combined Chiefs of Staff" would abandon all of Continental Europe, setting up a line of defence that incorporated the Pyrenees and Great Britain. The United States, bound by no alliance, would hesitate to utilize atomic weapons on European territory, opposing no obstacle to the flood of Soviet conventional forces that would inundate Europe. The second period would start as soon as a valid military force had been established in Western Europe (1949) and would come to an end at the time when the Soviet Union possessed atomic weapons in industrial and operational quantities (approximately 1952). From the politico-economic viewpoint, the Marshall Plan would already have exerted all of its beneficial effects and the American government, after going through the crisis of presidential elections, would have its hands free to promote a policy of consolidation of its military system. A balance between Europe-U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. would be achieved in conventional forces, while the further development of the atom bomb by the U.S.A. would lead the White House to utilize it to block any attempt at Soviet expansion. The third period — 1952-1955 — would see the start of negotiations between Americans and Soviets for the utilization and strategic neutralization of the atom bomb, in a situation of substantial equilibrium as regards conventional weapons. From the description of the three periods hypothesized, it was clear that the most favourable stage for Soviet action was the first, which would terminate only when the Western nations had managed to prepare the means for valid defence and to consolidate their political and economic recovery. The U.S.S.R. could not have this period elapse in vain, with the prospect of no longer finding circumstances equally favourable for the total submission of Europe. Unless, of course, Moscow might be hoping to propose to Washington a division of the world in order to have enough time to prepare the final destruction of the American capitalist system.7 Billotte waited for the situation in France to become "normalized", with the exclusion of the Communists from the Ramadier government, before 7

ibid, pp. 37-40.

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presenting to the new Premier, Robert Schuman, at the end of 1947, a personal and secret note on the means to be employed for guaranteeing the security of France. In the document Billotte insisted on the risks of war and on the shifting sands on which attempts were now being made to lay the bases for the security of the nation. Such security no longer resulted from a system of international guarantees, but rested on the shaky, decaying foundations of a balance of foreign powers that diplomacy was attempting to maintain and consolidate without much success. The only exit from this political stalemate would be the adoption of a common global strategy for the United States and its European allies which would ensure France protection of its main territory and unity of the Union Franfaise. And the only way to persuade the Americans to put their trust in the Europeans was to construct a union of the Old Continent which Washington would feel compelled to support. This manoeuvre would have allowed France to enter the exclusive Anglo-American club, engaging herself without risk in the strategic game of London and Washington; to guarantee the security of her territory and the unity of her empire; and to assume a topranking role in the eventuality of conflict. If war had not then broken out, the French government would be able to implement a policy of national independence within the European union. The note was accompanied by two memoranda. The first of these was entirely technical in nature. After demonstrating the impossibility of neutrality, in consideration of the prevailing political, legal, economic and military conditions, the document stressed the urgency of a definitive decision in favour of the Anglo-American camp, the only valid option for a France that wished to safeguard her independence and her security. The second memorandum was a sort of working outline for the dialogue with the Anglo-Americans. In it Billotte analyzed the strategic options available in the event of conflict with the Soviet Union, pointing out the risks and the advantages of the two main hypotheses: the abandonment of Europe, with refusal to fight the initial battle along the Elbe line, evacuation of Western Europe and falling back on the Great Britain-Pyrenees-North Africa line; or, on the contrary, maintaining the "Elbe position". The first hypothesis presented "dramatic problems". Europe's resources would fall into the hands of the Soviets, who would have free access to the Mediterranean and to the Atlantic and would occupy the Scandinavian peninsula. The peoples of Europe would feel themselves sacrificial victims, probably becoming sensitive to the appeals of Moscow. The "Elbe position" instead presented more advantages than problems, as it was geographically more feasible. In this case too, however, a certain margin of time would be needed before the European defence system could withstand any offensive from the U.S.S.R.8 8

ibid, pp. 41-45.

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Schuman, to whom the project was submitted, fully approved it in principle. The French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault also expressed agreement with Billotte's worries during a "discreet" visit made by him to the General in October 1947 at his private residence near New York, where Bidault had gone to attend a session of the United Nations. Urged on by Billotte, at the end of 1947, Bidault had a meeting with Marshall, during which the head of French diplomacy suggested to the American Secretary of State that the United States should contribute to the defence of Europe. Marshall was "favourably surprised" by the French initiative, expressing his agreement to starting "tres secretes" talks between the British, French and Americans and designating General Matthew Ridgway as American delegate. Only three personages from each country were to be informed of the project: Attlee, Bevin and General Morgan for Great Britain; Schuman, Bidault and Billotte for France; Truman, Marshall and General Ridgway for the United States.9 The problem of European defence had been raised by Bidault and by Bevin during the London Conference of November 1947. In a meeting with his British colleague the head of the Quai d'Orsay had, even before the end of the conference, expressed French concern for the worrying development of events in Europe and for the growing tension between the Americans and the Soviets.10 The United States was now aiming toward reconstituting a government for Western Germany which would definitively confirm the rupture of the accord established in wartime. The Soviet reaction would not be long in coming. Bidault predicted an offensive in Czechoslovakia, from where an attack on Austria would be launched, and a less direct offensive, through the Communist "fifth columns", in Italy and France. Faced with this hypothesis, France could not allow herself to be left alone to resist the destabilizing manoeuvres of the Kremlin. The Foreign Minister believed that the only possible response would be the creation of a military security corps which would include France, Belgium, the United States and Great Britain. 11 The 9

10

11

ibid, pp. 58 - 59, Cf. P. Melandri, France and the Atlantic Alliance 1950 -1953; Between Great Power Policy and European Integration, in O. Riste (ed.), Western Security: The Formative Years. European and Atlantic Defence 1947—1953, Oslo, Norwegian University Press 1985, pp. 266-282: p. 267. On the Bidault-Bevin meeting, cf. A. Varsori, // Patto di Bruxelles (1948): tra integrazione europea e alleanza atlantica, Rome, Bonacci 1988, pp. 37 ff. V. Auriol, Journal du Septennal, I, 1947, Paris, Colin, 1970, p. 695. Cf. also P. Melandri M. Va'isse, De la prise de conscience de l'impuissance a la quete de l'influence, in R. Girault — R. Frank (eds.), IM puissance francaise en question! 1945- 1949, Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne 1988, pp. 77-91. More generally, on problems of defence, cf. P. Guillen, "La France et la question de la defence de l'Europe occidentale du pacte de Bruxelles (mars 1948) au Plan Pleven (octobre 1950)", in Storia delle relazioni internazionali, II, (1986/2) pp. 305-327.

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French appeal to Western solidarity was heard by Bevin who, in a meeting with Marshall on the afternoon of December 17th, informed the American Secretary of State of British apprehensions and those — even greater — of the French. However, he did not wish to precipitate a decision by the United States which, while showing sympathy for the fears of its European allies, deemed it impossible to assume immediately a precise, binding commitment, postponing a clearer stance to a time when the Europeans would advance more concrete, definite proposals. Marshall's caution did not prevent implementation of the project for holding talks between the major states. On December 29, 1947, Billotte sent the American Secretary of State, through Ridgway, a note verbale12 confirming that he had been charged by the French government with contacting topranking American authorities to study the conditions in which the bases could be laid for a secret military agreement between the two governments, designed to assure the security of the two nations and of the Atlantic world through a common strategy. This was a strategy, wrote Billotte in the aide-memoire devoted to the conversation with Marshall and brought to the attention of Bidault, that should involve the Western part of Europe, compatible with French opinion on the basis of which, in case of Soviet aggression, the fighting would take place as far to the East as possible. From the political point of view, Billotte concluded, this would lead to greater cohesion and solidarity between the governments of the West.13 In the personal letter for Bidault that accompanied the aide-memoire, the General stressed the intimate link between the reconstruction of Western Europe and its security, while pointing out that it was impossible for the Americans to associate themselves with a programme designed to ensure the defence of the Old Continent before the governments of Western Europe had made public their own intentions in this regard. While awaiting an explicit affirmation of self-help from the British and French governments, Billotte, Ridgway and Morgan met in a stronghold in the vicinity of New York to establish the principles for a common policy of security and a direct global strategy, on a footing of equality, between the United States, France and Great Britain. The postulate at the basis of the discussion was that of the eventuality of Russian aggression, in order to 12 13

General P. Billotte, Le passe au futur, cit., p. 59. Archives Nationales (hereinafter referred to as A. N.), Papiers Georges Bidault, vol. 25, General P. Billotte, General Staff Committee of the United Nations, French Military Delegation, Jan. 9, 1948. The Author wishes to thank Madame S. Bidault for having allowed her to consult the papers of her husband, and expresses profound gratitude to Madame Bonazzi, Director of the Contemporary Section of the Archives Nationales, for her courteous and invaluable collaboration.

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confront which, according to Ridgway, the contribution of the German divisions would be needed. "Nothing proves that the political leaders were informed of the projects of the Chiefs of Staff", G. Elgey has however pointed out. "In any case, even if they had been informed, it is not certain that they would have taken them seriously. Among the duties of the Chiefs of Staff was that of formulating the most widely varying hypotheses. Thus it would be rash at best to conclude that in 1948 the American, British and French governments had decided to rearm Germany". 14 It was however evident that in France fear of the Soviet Union was now prevailing over fear of the rebirth of Germany. 15 To the American Ambassador to Paris, Jefferson Caffery, Bidault had already explained in early March that what he really wanted was "a concrete military alliance against a Soviet attack with definite promises in relation to definite events that would take place under certain circumstances. He wanted an explicit mention of Germany only for reasons of internal policy".16 This need for concreteness was the constant and most conspicuous element of the French approach to the subject of security; an element which is present from the very beginning of contacts with the American Administration to establish a common formula of guarantee. On March 4, 1948, Bidault wrote Marshall a personal letter in which he expressed French concern for the situation in Europe and advanced precise proposals for a Franco-Anglo-American alliance. The French Foreign Minister recalled the progressive stages of the Communist takeover of Eastern Europe (the creation of the Cominform in September; the hanging of the leader of the agrarian party in Bulgaria during the same month; the suppression of the peasants' parties in Rumania in October; the dissolution of the opposition parties in Hungary in November; the Prague coup d'etat in February). Bidault wrote: "The French government is resolved to do everything in its power to consolidate the last barrier preserving the free territories on the European continent and the intransigent will to resist. It will exert every effort, in accord with Great Britain, to organize the common defence in conjunction with all the European democratic powers". But, he continued, "The hour is too dire, the danger is too urgent, Soviet power is too mighty for France, just recovering from the wounds of war, to assume alone, even with the support of the allies which it is trying to organize, the role of defender of the Western territories". G. Elgey, Histoire de la IVe Kepublique. l. La Kepublique des illusions 1945-1951, Paris, Fayard 1965, p. 381. Cf. J. Fremaux - A. Martel, French Defence Policy 1947-1949, in O. Riste (ed.), cit., pp. 92 — 103, in particular the paragraph entitled "German or Soviet Threat?", pp. 96 - 97. Foreign Relations of the United States (hereinafter to be referred to as FRUS), 1948, vol. Ill, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1974, p. 35.

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It was due to this awareness of "impotence" that Bidault turned now to Marshall and, through Marshall, to the President of the United States, "imploring them to consider the gravity and perhaps the imminence of the danger". "The United States", continued the leader of the Quai d'Orsay, "shows an admirably generous concern for putting its immense resources at the service of the reconstruction of devastated peoples", but it was now necessary "to consolidate on the political terrain and as rapidly as possible on the military terrain, collaboration between the old and the new worlds, so firmly united in their attachment to the only civilization of any worth ... It is my duty to state that my nation and the other European countries which are resolved to resist will not have the means of resistance proportional to the force of the assault except in the measure to which agreements with the American government will allow them to acquire what they are lacking in strength". For this reason, he concluded, "I propose that the French, British and American governments inaugurate the political consultations called for by the gravity of the present situation and that in particular they examine without delay the technical questions posed by the problem of common defence against a danger that may be immediate".17 On the next day, March 5th, Marshall discussed with President Truman the message sent by Bidault. In a memorandum of the 12th addressed to the White House, the Secretary of State concluded that it was "necessary, to strengthen the morale of the free nations of Europe, France and Italy in particular" to provide the governments in Paris and Rome with "at least an indication of our willingness to consult on the means to be used to block the further extension of Communist dictatorship in Europe". The discussions taking place in Brussels would indicate "how far the governments of France, Britain and the three Benelux nations were willing to go in committing themselves to common defence and would furnish a starting point for consultations between them and the United States".18 The Soviet threat, which Bidault had described as imminent in the letter dated March 4th in relation to developments in Czechoslovakia, seemed truly urgent in the light of Soviet requests to the government in Oslo for the conclusion of a pact that would establish, in conjunction with the pact with Finland, the political hegemony of Moscow in the Scandinavian region. An alarming aide-memoire sent by the British Embassy to the State Department stressed British concern over the evolution of the situation in Northern Europe where the Soviet "offensive" in Czechoslovakia, Finland and now Norway called for an urgent response. "There was no time to lose" in reacting to the 17

18

A. N., Papiers Bidault, vol. 25, dossier 1, letter by G. Bidault to G. Marshall, Paris, March 4, 1948. FRUS, 1948, III, p. 49.

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strategy of Moscow. Bevin suggested that a mutual assistance pact should be concluded, in which all the nations directly threatened by the "Russian march to the Atlantic" would participate.19 The Soviet threat to Norway acted as catalyst in the process of formation of an American political will. Marshall replied immediately to the aidememoire of March llth, declaring that the United States was "ready to proceed immediately with mutual discussion on the establishment of an Atlantic system of security", and proposing that the British delegation should come to Washington the following week.20 The invitation was addressed to Great Britain and Canada. France and the Benelux nations were not informed of the talks held in Washington starting on March 22nd to avoid the risk of "news leakage before a final agreement".21 This exclusion of the French representatives from the innermost circles of security tells much about the scarce trust placed by Washington in the French services, where Soviet infiltration was feared, and about the confirmation of a "special relationship" between the Anglo-Saxon nations. While Marshall, urged on by the danger of the situation in Norway, proposed to the British that contacts should begin immediately, with Bidault he responded on a general level. To the desperate appeal of March 4th, the American Secretary of State replied on the 12th, stating that the United States "agreed with the French as to the gravity of developments in Europe and the urgency of determining the best measures for preventing the expansion of the area of Communist dictatorship in Europe", but an essential prerequisite for American involvement in the defence of the Continent was the conclusion of the five-nation agreement that was about to be signed at Brussels.22 This was an accord that Bidault had since February considered destined to be "high-sounding" but inoperative without the concrete engagement of the U.S.A.23 On the signing of the Brussels Pact, on March 17th, Bidault and Bevin sent Marshall a joint message stating that they had appreciated his "encouraging message" of March 12th and declaring themselves ready to discuss with the American representatives what further progress "might be desirable".24 19 20 21 22 23 24

FRUS, 1948, III, p. 47. FRUS, 1948, III, p. 48. FRUS, 1948, III, p. 97. FRUS, 1948, III, p. 50. FRUS, 1948, III, p. 29. FRUS, 1948, HI, p. 55; A. N., Papiers Bidault, vol. 24, Dossier 1. Bidault relates in his memoirs: "It was about the beginning of 1948 ... when I wrote twice to General Marshall to inform him that danger could strike from one moment to another over all of Western Europe, that the Russian advance troops were within 200 kilometres of the Rhine and that, consequently, safeguarding the West demanded the presence of American forces and the formal alliance of

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Bidault and Bevin had also been particularly attentive to Truman's speech to Congress on March 17th, in which the President had affirmed that Soviet determination should be met by equal American determination to help the free European nations to protect themselves.25 The French Ambassador to Washington, Henri Bonnet, confirmed from his privileged observation post the change of direction in American policy from acquiescence to determination. In a series of urgent and confidential telegrams sent to the Quai d'Orsay, the diplomat analyzed the development of American positions, noting the American desire to establish a methodological symmetry between the programme of economic aid, already launched in the Marshall Plan, and the project for military support. As regards the problems of security too, the United States wanted the Europeans to take the initiative. Truman and Marshall, reported Bonnet, were clear on this point. The speech to the Congress had not been merely an isolated manifestation of the concern with which the American Administration followed the development of European issues. Truman, on the occasion of the Irish holiday of Saint Patrick's Day, had given a speech in which he affirmed American responsibility for protection of the free world and the need to unite America's strength to that of people striving to defend themselves. Marshall had spoken to the Senate's Armed Forces Committee on reestablishing the draft and on the institution of compulsory military training. At a luncheon held by a journalists' association, Marshall had stressed the threat that the Soviet Union was holding over a Europe still in the stage of reconstruction and thus incapable, alone, of holding out against a possible offensive. The American position was thus, concluded the Ambassador, free from ambiguity.26 This change in the American attitude produced contrasting reactions at the Quai d'Orsay. Bidault had taken the trouble to write personally to Marshall, inviting the United States to assess the risks for the integrity and independence of Europe and to abandon restraint and passivity. But now this abrupt change of tactics in the State Department, which was launching an anti-Communist crusade, seemed to expose the still defenseless nations of Western Europe to possible reactions from Moscow.

25

26

the United States to re-establish, in the face of this urgent danger, the precarious security of our peoples ... General Marshall answered me essentially that, to allow the government of the United States to influence its own public opinion, it would be necessary for Europe itself to exert efforts to achieve unity and organize its own defence". G. Bidault, D'une resistance a l'autre, La presse du Siecle, Paris 1965, p. 160. Cf. H. Truman, The Memoirs of Harry Truman, vol. II, Years of Trial and Hope 1946 —1953, Hodder and Stoughton, New York, 1956, pp. 255 ff. A.N., Papiers Bidault, vol.24, dossier 1 confidential-urgent telegram ns. 1194 — 2000, H. Bonnet to G. Bidault, Washington, March 17, 1948.

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On March 18th the Secretary General of the French Foreign Ministry Jean Chauvel wrote a personal letter to Bonnet pointing out these perils.27 The starting point for Chauvel's reflections was the effect of the Prague coup d'etat on relations between the Americans and the Soviets. Both Caffery (to Bidault) and the American Ambassador to London, Douglas, (to Bevin), had proposed to the French and British governments that the three ambassadors should be recalled from the Czechoslovak capital "for consultation". In full agreement with the Foreign Office, the Quai d'Orsay had replied that it was not at all favourable to breaking off diplomatic relations with Prague, considering that, "as it is a question of confronting Russia, the time for spectacular manifestations is past, while the moment for effective defense measures has arrived". Since then, continued Chauvel, the anti-Communist tone of the American officials had become, if possible, even more vehement. Truman himself, in the Saint Patrick's Day speech in New York, had launched into a diatribe against Moscow. "We are currently in a highly dangerous period, which began with Truman's speech of March 1947, and from which we will only emerge on the day when our military preparation and the organization of Western Europe's security hinging on the United States will be sufficient to make Moscow reflect", wrote Chauvel. "Up to that moment we must choose between two different problems: to do nothing so as not to provoke a reaction from Moscow, or to do something, accepting the risk that the Kremlin will take its own protective measures". At the point matters now had reached, the choice had already been made. It was obvious that France had committed herself to a project of accord with the United States. But, continued the Secretary General of the Quai d'Orsay, "I believe it would be tempting fate if, at the very moment in which we are trying to make up for a real delay, one or the other of us starts to amuse himself by waving the red flag in front of the bull". Chauvel had no doubt that the reason why the Americans were raising up the Soviet spectre had to do with questions of internal policy, "exciting other bulls". But the American Administration would have to be made aware of the fact that its incendiary statements could have dramatic consequences, that there was a bond of cause-and-effect between Truman's speech of March 1947 and the communistization of Eastern Europe and that the nations not yet absorbed in the Soviet orbit — among them France — were concerned with avoiding imprudent language while endeavouring to work effectively, with as little noise as possible, to organize their own security. 27

Archives du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres (hereinafter to be referred to as AMAE), serie Papiers d'Agents, Papiers H. Bonnet, vol. 1, letter by J. Chauvel to H. Bonnet, Paris, March 18, 1948.

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What the Europeans expected from the United States was not speeches that were violent, dangerous and devoid of positive effects, but rather concrete, binding commitments. "What interests us today", continued Chauvel, "is that real bonds are established and effective work is initiated to allow us not only to reconstruct our economies, but also to rebuild the military strength that permits us to locate the frontier of the Western world along the Rhine or better still along the Elbe". In conclusion, purely verbal harshness had to be avoided28 due to the effects that such "perfectly useless manifestations" could have on the Soviet government which, unlike the American one, was much more strongly attached to concreteness. The Quai d'Orsay and the Hotel Matignon were also, like the Kremlin, "concrete" and Chauvel's letter was, in this sense, an act of accusation against American policy which, with light-hearted unconcern for the dangers threatening Europe in the event of Soviet reaction to the declarations issuing from Washington, had declared ideological war without assuming any commitment with regard to a possible clash. The letter sent by Marshall to Bidault on March 25th in reply to the joint Bevin-Bidault demarche of March 18th was a kind of answer to such accusations. The American Secretary of State wrote to the Foreign Minister that the French would soon realize that the Americans "were no longer in the period of oratory demonstrations; these were accompanied by decisions, military decisions in particular, that should be taken seriously".29 In Washington, the three-way talks on security among the Americans, Canadians and British were continuing. These initial contacts, of an explorative nature, went on until April 1st, when a final draft was compiled, which gave effect to Truman's declaration of March 17.30 The Quai d'Orsay, while unaware of this initiative, was pleased by the signals of interest coming from the American capital where, reported Bonnet, the government was attentively studying the Brussels Treaty to decide on the role the U.S. would play in an extension of security measures. The French Ambassador pointed out the traditional American preference for "unwritten" 28

29

30

Chauvel was referring to the case of Finland. The American Ambassador to the Helsinki government had been charged with making a demarche with the Finnish government on the occasion of the ultimatum given it by Stalin. Tourquoi faire, Grands Dieux!" exclaimed Chauvel. "The Finnish government is aware that nobody can do anything for it. Fortunately, it is aware of this, since if it mistook the expressions of sympathy and encouragement it has been given for truth, it could be tempted to take refuge, like Schuschnigg and Benes in 1938, behind a false sense of security". AMAE, Serie Papiers d'Agents, Papiers H. Bonnet, vol. 1, letter by G. Marshall to G. Bidault, Washington, March 25, 1948. FRUS, 1948, III, pp. 59-72, "Final Draft", ibid, pp. 72-75.

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formulas of alliance, but reported that the United States had acknowledged and proclaimed the role and the responsibility that would be incumbent on it in the event of international crisis, ensuring support for the nations of the Brussels Pact — albeit in general terms — and trusting in the success of the plan for economic reconstruction as a requisite for allowing the European nations to "regain the strength to resist the Soviet Union".31 Support for Europe was however still too vague and undefined to appear satisfying in French eyes. The French were annoyed by the Americans' failure to comprehend the imminence of the danger, and followed with close attention the technical solutions that the State Department was devising to free itself from the fetters of the prohibition against concluding alliances in times of peace. "Due to constitutional aspects and the current state of the American forces as well as the inevitable repercussions, any commitment to the Brussels Pact nations would represent a particularly arduous task" — wrote the French charge d'affaires in Washington, Armand Berard, in a personal letter to Chauvel at the end of March. "The formulas which seem to find the greatest favour should affirm the determination of the American government to oppose all the brutal actions tending to prevent implementation of the Marshall Plan". However, this posed delicate problems, since such a guarantee would have been extended to all the beneficiaries of ERP aid, among whom were states neutral by law, such as Switzerland, and de facto, such as Sweden and Ireland. In Washington, the advisability of extending the Brussels Pact to the Scandinavian nations was debated, but it was feared that if this were done, a Soviet reaction would be swift to follow. The State Department, Berard continued, thus seemed oriented toward providing a limited guarantee to the five Brussels Pact nations, to which it was hoped there would soon be added Italy and the countries which had formed groups similar to that of Brussels in Northern Europe. The Americans however, commented the French diplomat, were too superficial to understand that it was impossible for the European democracies to associate themselves with nations like Greece and Spain. As for the form which the guarantee was to take, the United States seemed to opt for a "special relationship" rather than for "full-fledged participation".32 The news from Washington, while reassuring insofar as it indicated that the Americans were seriously studying the possibility of an accord capable of guaranteeing European security, was not entirely reassuring since it did not 31

32

A. N., Papiers Bidault, vol. 24, dossier 1, H. Bonnet to G. Bidault, telegram ns. 1303 — 1304, urgent confidential, Washington, March 25, 1948; ibid, H. Bonnet to G. Bidault, telegram n. 1335, Washington, March 25, 1948. A. N., Papiers Bidault, vol. 25, dossier 1, personal letter from A. Berard to J. Chauvel, Washington, March 26, 1948.

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specify how much time would elapse before the United States could assume a binding commitment in this sense. "I know, from the indications that the State Department has given to the French Embassy, the diligence with which the administrations involved are studying in Washington the possibilities of formulating a political guarantee" — wrote Bidault to Marshall on April 13th — but "I insist on the need to study the possibilities of concrete, rapid military assistance",33 concluded the head of the Quai d'Orsay, fully aware that it was impossible for France to confront alone a Soviet aggression that would overwhelm the nation, according to military predictions, within ten days.34 Bonnet, at the Washington Embassy, dedicated all of his energy to following the intricate debate on the two fundamental aspects of the American guarantee: its formula and its extent. The Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak had told him that he believed the American government was seeking a formula from which a guarantee of Art. 51 of the United Nations Charter could be derived. Spaak believed that one factor influencing the Americans' hesitant decision-making was the fear that providing a guarantee only to the Brussels Pact nations would be interpreted by Moscow as a signal that the way was open to launch offensives against the other European nations.35 The same problem had also been discussed by Bonnet with the State Department Adviser Charles Bohlen who, while first stating that his government would have to take into account the obligations deriving from the UNO Charter, favoured a guarantee to the 16 beneficiary nations of the ERP, a solution that would have allowed the United States "not to bind itself to a specific group of countries and simultaneously to strengthen its own security".36 The manoeuvres for squaring the circle as regards the political formula through which the American guarantee was to be expressed were followed with amazement and disappointment in Paris, especially in view of the indefinite extension of the period of uncertainty for the Europeans resulting from this long-drawn-out work. "The policy of a guarantee comparable to the 33

34

35

36

A. N., Papiers Bidault, vol. 25, dossier 1, telegram by G. Bidault to G. Marshall, Paris, April 13, 1948. Thus the President of the Republic V. Auriol tells of the debate in the Council of Ministers on April 14th: "If we are alone, the battle will last ten days. We must have the support of the United States. The essential thing is military preparation. At this point, Bidault shows me a personal telegram which he has just sent to Marshall signalling the danger and expressing his anxiety about this danger. He requests of him that firm solidarity be shown and that concern be dedicated to military defence". V. Auriol, Journal du Septennat, II, 1948, Paris, Colin 1974, p. 177. A. N., Papiers Bidault, vol. 24, dossier 2, H. Bonnet to G. Bidault, telegram ns. 1559- 1569, confidential-very urgent, Washington, April 11,1948. Cf. also P. H. Spaak, Combats inacbeves. I. De I'independance a I'Alliance, Paris, Fayard 1969, pp. 258 ff. A. N., Papiers Bidault, vol. 24, dossier 2, telegram n. 1673, private-confidential, H. Bonnet to G. Bidault, Washington, April 15, 1948.

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Marshall Plan", wrote Chauvel to Bonnet on April 15th, "is a long-term policy, and conflict may erupt in Berlin any day. What interests us, therefore, is much less the political and legal definition of a guarantee than precise indications as to what concerted military action could be taken and what means the allies could rely on in relation to such action". The attention devoted by the American Administration to studies for establishing solidarity with the Europeans "could have a very strong moral effect" as a "deterrent" for any Soviet initiatives. But Washington was still nebulous and vague on too many points. Not only had a formula not yet been found but also - and more important — the State Department still had not decided which European strategy to pursue. There existed, in fact, for the Secretary General of the Quai d'Orsay, "two possible policies" and alternatives: either a policy of concessions to allow the economic, political and military reconstruction of Europe in a climate of detente; or "a consistent policy ... of reacting immediately against all those Soviet initiatives that go beyond a limit to be set".37 Between a policy of appeasement and one of firmness the Americans had not yet finally decided. "The two policies ... are not contradictory for Washington", stated Bonnet. The United States "is pursuing the economic, political, and eventually military reconstruction of Europe and is at the same time resolved to react immediately against any Soviet initiatives". "Respect for logic", noted the Ambassador sarcastically, "is not always, as you know, a determining element in Anglo-American policy". However, precisely due to the poor American "capabilities" for protecting the boundaries of the European nations, the Chiefs of Staff "fervently"supported the hypothesis of rearmament for the Western nations. Washington's decision to re-equip its armed forces to create a "solid instrument for the regime of armed peace" would not, in fact, be completely effective for another two years. As regards the rashness with which the White House had inaugurated its policy of intransigence toward the Soviet Union, Bonnet considered the American policy of "no more concessions" and "non-provocation" to be a difficult one since "the boundary between firmness and provocation was a fragile one, especially with regard to a government as mistrustful as the Russian one". The only cautious step was, in this sense, the continuous and precise clarification that any guarantees of assistance to the European nations were aimed at keeping the peace.38 37

38

AMAE, serie Papiers d'Agents, Papiers Bonnet, vol. 1, letter by J. Chauvel to H. Bonnet, Paris, April 15, 1948. AMAE, serie Papiers d'Agents, Papiers Bonnet, vol. 1, letter by H. Bonnet to J. Chauvel, Washington, April 17, 1948; also in A. N., Papiers Bidault, vol. 24, dossier 2.

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While this animated correspondence between Chauvel and Bonnet continued, particularly interesting insofar as the Ambassador and the Secretary of the Foreign Ministry confronted problems in a direct style devoid of circumlocutions,39 appeals from the Europeans for a final decision by Washington continued to be heard. On April 17th, Bevin and Bidault again wrote to Marshall, stating that the communication issued at the end of the meeting of the five Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Brussels Pact nations sanctioned their agreement to the organization of an Advisory Council and the opening of military talks. While aware of the fact that "it was necessary to take all measures for preparing our defence", Bevin and Bidault stressed the "need for assistance from the United States effective for the organization of the defence of Western Europe", which, they explained, was in its current condition, incapable of defending itself alone. "It seems imperative that the United States take some initiative or at least inaugurate talks" since, in spite of the difficulties of the American Administration, "if it was wished to lose no further opportunities, thus giving new impetus to international Communism", it was "essential" to proceed with negotiations.40 Bonnet and the British Ambassador Inverchapel sent the message not to Marshall, who was in Bogota, but to the interim Secretary of State, Robert Lovett. The American reply was "disappointing":41 the State Department asked the five Brussels Pact nations to "aller plus avant"42 with the organization of their relations and the coordination of their efforts, reminding them that the American administration, under the terms of the letter of March 17th, was committed to start talks only after a "definition of their intentions in a more complete and detailed form, especially regarding military problems" had been formulated. Lovett did not fail to repeat that the United States intended to proceed on defence problems in the same manner as it had done for economic issues. The only positive note in this "cold shower" was Lovett's statement that, during this stage of waiting for the Europeans to solve their problems, the United States would not abandon its policy of firmness toward the U.S.S.R. and, in case of immediate threat, would be "automatically" involved since any

39

On the eve of his resignation as Secretary General of the Quai d'Orsay, Chauvel wrote to Bonnet that he had "particularly appreciated their collaboration across the seas. I doubt that it will continue much longer, but I will remember it with great pleasure". AMAE, serie Papiers d'Agents, Papiers Bonnet, vol. 1, J. Chauvel to H. Bonnet, Paris, January 5, 1949. 40 AMAE, Serie Papiers d'Agents, Papiers R. Massigli, vol. 79, G. Bidault to H. Bonnet, telegram n. 2072, Paris, April 17, 1948; also in A. N., Papiers Bidault, vol. 24, dossier 2. 41 V. Auriol, op. cit, II, p. 192. « ibid.

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offensive by the Kremlin would inevitably strike at the American troops stationed in Germany.43 This was a real "slap in the face" to French concerns; a slap that was not erased by Marshall's letter of April 22nd, in which he wrote to Bidault that he agreed with the need to establish co-ordinated plans for defence, hoping no doubt existed as to the intentions and the determination of the American government with regard to all that concerned the free nations of Europe.44 The United States, commented Bonnet, was convinced that a conflict could have been avoided by letting the Soviet know, simply but clearly, that, if the independence of any of the nations of Western Europe should be threatened, Washington would immediately support that nation.45 But this assurance was not enough to relieve the anxiety of the French, who had long been imploring "something concrete". It was Chauvel who explained "what the French were expecting from the Americans", in a long and bitter letter to Bonnet46 which started with the following words: "I believe that the American government, regardless of its good intentions and its fastpaced rearming, will be unable for some time to help us hold any line of defence in Europe. For my part, I have had no doubt that this was the position. But they must give us a confirmation, an official one if possible". Chauvel then went on to other observations, distinguishing between the concept of guarantee and that of assistance, and between the different types of guarantee. The guarantee should cover the territories of the 16 beneficiary nations of the Marshall Plan, to which were to be added the occupied zones of Germany. Thus it should not be limited to the five Brussels Pact nations. "I wonder whether the fact of having accepted the plan of assistance should be considered as an element that already establishes a certain solidarity between debtors and creditors, solidarity that could manifest itself on the occasion of any obstacle opposed to the functioning of the Plan by a power foreign to the group. I will have a study carried out on this". This formula seemed preferable both because it implied a common acknowledgement by the parties involved of their solidarity with the United States — and was therefore not a unilateral declaration by Washington —

43

44 45

46

A. N., Papiers Bidault, vol. 24, dossier 2, confidential telegram ns. 1713 —1725, H. Bonnet to G. Bidault, Washington, April 19, 1948. ibid, telegram ns. 1784— 1785, secret, H. Bonnet to G. Bidault, Washington, April 22, 1948. ibid, telegram ns. 1781 —1783, confidential, top secret, top priority, H. Bonnet to G. Bidault, Washington, April 22, 1948. AMAE, Serie Papiers d'Agents, Papiers Bonnet, vol. 1, letter by J. Chauvel to H. Bonnet, Paris, April 22, 1948.

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and because the Marshall Plan was an economic instrument potentially utilizable by all; consequently, an acknowledgement of solidarity would have positive effects without arousing aggressive images. Certainly, it had to be taken into account that some reluctance among the Swiss or the Scandinavians might be encountered but, noted Chauvel, "we can try". There existed another form of guarantee that had been relegated to second place due to tension with the U.S.S.R.: the guarantee against Germany. It was important that "the concern for a guarantee against the Russians" did not eclipse the need for a guarantee against Germany. As regards assistance, on the other hand, the United States wanted the five Brussels Pact nations to make precise proposals before initiating talks with Washington. "It is a choice of method" observed Chauvel; "the important thing is to be agreed upon the method to follow". However, Washington was perhaps unaware of the fact that the conclusions of the signers of the Brussels Pact would be exclusively theoretical without American assistance. Such assistance would have to cover "this narrow peninsula of which France represents the outermost point" and would involve the security of the United States from at least three points of view: the availability of a starting point for reconquering the Continent; keeping the Ruhr basin in Western hands (if the Ruhr had fallen into Soviet hands, it would have turned the balance of power heavily in favour of the Kremlin); and keeping control of the oil deposits of the Arab world. On the basis of these three elements, it was necessary to hypothesize two fronts: the first was designed to cover the Ruhr — and the Brussels Pact represented its basis; the second would instead follow the Northern frontiers of Turkey and Iran. As regards the constitution of this second front, "nothing had been done". In spite of American intervention in Greece, in the Palestine affair, in Turkey, in Iran, and in spite of the British bases in Kenya and Cyrenaica, the French did not consider that a concerted Anglo-American strategy for defence in that sector had been established. The defence of the Middle East presupposed the "maitrise" of the Mediterranean coastline and especially of North Africa, in which the United States was greatly interested. The system to be established would therefore cover all of the Mediterranean and, "if things are done well", France would be an essential element in the scheme. It was thus evident that the United States-Great Britain-France triad urgently needed to establish a concerted strategy for planning and implementing the defence of the Eastern "cul de sac", a task delegated to them "given the assembly of aveugles, homes et de paralytiques" inhabiting those areas. It was within this system that Italy should be integrated, both because of her geographical situation, projecting into the Mediterranean theatre and not

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into that of Central Europe, and because of the resistance of Benelux to any plans for extending the Brussels Pact to the peninsula. "I believe", continued Chauvel, "and the Minister agrees with me, that in this field France should take an initiative" and that "she should act in this direction without waiting too long, since events are swift and ideas circulate rapidly", with the resulting risk that the project might slip out of the hands of French diplomacy. The prospects for success seemed encouraging. Quaroni had reported to Chauvel that several Americans passing through Rome had proposed the idea of two pacts, one for the Northern front and one for the Mediterranean front, suggesting that France act as "hinge" between the two systems: "Precisely what I have in mind", concluded Chauvel.47 The Secretary of the French Foreign Ministry expressed his thought to the Ambassador to London Rene Massigli, informing him of his proposal for a Mediterranean system that would include Italy, forming a front "from Iran to Gibraltar" which, in case of conflict, would support the Northern front formed by the Brussels Pact nations and possibly the Scandinavian states.48 From Washington, however, Bonnet warned that the State Department, "in its current state of mind", would be unable to propose a hypothesis for a Mediterranean Pact "with any chance of being listened to". Not because the American General Staff was not "fervently" interested in the fate of the Middle East - especially in the light of the strategic value of the sector - but because a guarantee to the Mediterranean would make it impossibile for the United States to deny any accusation of "encirclement" made by Moscow. For this reason the hypothesis did not arouse great enthusiasm among the Americans,49 who were, moreover, exasperatingly slow, in French eyes, with regard to the idea of Euro-American talks. 47

48

49

On the same day H. Bonnet wrote a personal letter to V. Auriol. The Ambassador insisted that "the opinion in American governing circles was that war was not going to break out ... they believed that the strength of America and her industrial might constituted a serious guarantee of peace. At the same time, while strictly applying a policy of 'firmness', they were making sure that it was free from provocation. In any case, the Americans accepted the risks inherent to that attitude, in spite of what could have been, at the current stage, the consequences for their allies". The Europeans thus had to take their "precautions". "First of all, the pacts concluded or to to be concluded would have preventative value only under two conditions: that they were translated into a real strengthening of the parties involved and that their purpose, that of keeping the peace, was understood by all, even by those who could have ignored it." Europe's interest, concluded the Ambassador, lay in contributing to facilitate detente so that the work of economic reconstruction could be successfully completed. AMAE, serie Papiers d'Agents, Papiers Bonnet, vol. 1, personal letter by H. Bonnet to V. Auriol, Washington, April 22, 1948. AMAE, serie Papiers d'Agents, Papiers Massigli, vol. 95, note by J. Chauvel to R. Massigli, Paris, April 29, 1948. A. N., Serie Papiers Bidault, vol. 24, dossier 2, confidential telegram n. 1870, H. Bonnet to G. Bidault, Washington, April 3, 1948.

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"The problem was always the same: when would the Americans decide?" wrote Massigli in early May.50 The Ambassador was by no means reassured. The United States was engaged in Europe "in an imprudent policy that could provoke brutal reactions one day or the other" while the Administration was still groping through a political-legal labyrinth from which no exit had yet been found. This was an irresponsible policy implemented by Washington, based on the "trust that the Americans have in their star and in their political genius". But this faith, observed Massigli, had not been sufficient in the past to keep them from making mistakes. "And now we will be the ones to pay for the mistakes". Making the picture even gloomier was the realization of the scant trust placed by the United States in its French partner, especially "on the level of discretion". The Americans still feared "the presence of the friends of Moscow in our services" and were inclined "by preference" towards an accord with Great Britain, in a further confirmation of that Anglo-American "club" to which France had long been applying for admission. It was not merely the difficulty in finding a formula acceptable to the Congress that kept Washington from taking a stance. To the hesitations of the American government, Bonnet reported, were added the objections of the military leaders. In a conversation with the French Ambassador, the Chief of Staff of the Army, Bradley, had stated that there were three great problems: the reconstruction of Europe; co-operation between the United States and the Western Union and an American guarantee to the signers of the Brussels Pact; and the supplying of arms to the Allies. Bradley, after laying stress on the "personal and friendly" nature of the conversation, had said that if there were no difficulties concerning the first aspect — since the European states would be able to rebuild their military power only when economic prosperity and industrial strength increased — the other two instead posed delicate problems. American adherence to the Brussels Pact would be considered an aggressive move by Moscow, to which the Kremlin would feel compelled to respond. Similarly, any true European rearmament financed by America would provoke a Soviet reaction. At any rate, it would be impossible, since American industry was not ready to fulfil the needs of the European nations. Bradley also stated that the American army was prepared to furnish aid to the allies but that its support would "lack effectiveness" in the aircraft field. What conclusion could be drawn from these indications? Bonnet believed that the military leaders were in agreement with the governmental policy of firmness and "non-provocation", but he stressed the difficulty of the task facing the American Administration, for which the concession of a guarantee to Europe represented the "bouleversement" of long-standing political tradi50

AMAE, Papiers d'Agents, Papiers Massigli, letter by R. Massigli to J. Chauvel, London, May 3, 1948.

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tion. "It was not yet possible to see exactly what would be the nature of the solution proposed", concluded the Ambassador. It was however essential that it strengthens European security without heightening tension with the U.S.S.R., thus inaugurating a period of detente that would allow the normal economic recovery of Europe.51 A turnabout in American policy was to take place shortly thereafter with the presentation of the Vandenberg Resolution to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate on May 19th. Five days before, on the 14th, the interim Secretary of State Lovett had authorized Ambassador Jefferson Caffery to "emphasize to Bidault that we are not thinking and have never thought in terms of 'guarantees' but in terms of practical concrete measures to consolidate the security of Western Europe".52 On the next day Caffery showed the document relevant to the Vandenberg motion to Chauvel. The Secretary General of the Quai d'Orsay, to whom the American diplomat had delivered Lovett's message, stated that the signals coming from Washington were encouraging but that the French continued to be alarmed. From the latest information of the Washington Embassy, it appeared that a close correlation could be seen between the assistance of the United States and the rythm of its rearming. It could be predicted, therefore, that only in the long term would military supplies from overseas arrive in Europe. Consequently, Europe was in the short term unprotected against possible Russian reactions, especially in relation to developments in the German issue.53 A new element of tension was now beginning to disturb relations between the United States and France. Conversations between the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov and the American Ambassador to Moscow Walter Bedell Smith seemed to announce, in the Soviet version, a new policy from Washington, tending to seek for direct accord with the Kremlin, i. e., abandonment by the State Department of its "European policy". But the United States managed to soothe the anxiety of the Europeans, who had been unpleasantly "surprised" by this sudden initiative of American diplomacy.54 It was in a climate of mutual incomprehension that, in July, the French and Americans began to discuss, along with their partners the British, the Canadians and the three Benelux nations, a pact designed to guarantee the security of the West. In the meetings held in Washington the difference of opinion between the Quai d'Orsay and the State Department became very 51

52 53

54

A. N., Papiers Bidault, vol. 24, dossier 3, secret telegram from H. Bonnet to G. Bidault, Washington, May 3, 1948. FRUS, 1948, III, p. 151. A. N., Papiers Bidault, vol. 24, dossier 3, note by the Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry on the Caffery-Chauvel conversation, Paris, May 15, 1948. ibid, vol. 25, dossier I, G. Bidault to O. Harvey, Paris, May 20, 1948.

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clear, especially as regards the formula and time schedule for preparing European defence and for extending the area covered by the security system. The State Department focused on drawing up a long-term treaty of alliance, within which the question of rearming the European nations would be confronted and resolved. The French repeated that the Soviet threat was too menacing and too imminent to allow further delay in the American decision to supply military aid to her European allies. The French government was interested primarily in obtaining supplies as soon as possible, while it was much more luke-warm over the question of political involvement, which would find application only in the mid- and long-term. The State Department Adviser Charles Bohlen stated, to the French charge d'affairs Armand Berard, who was stressing the discrepancy between Washington and Paris on this aspect, that it would be difficult to persuade Congress to authorize sending supplies to the Brussels Pact nations, a measure that would respond only in part to the problems of European security; and moreover, the United States did not possess any surplus material to be put immediately at the disposal of the Europeans.55 On July 17th a note from the Secretary General of the Quai d'Orsay drew up a first balance sheet of the Washington talks, stressing that "from the French point of view the concrete support of North America was more important than the aspect of an American guarantee, in spite of the psychological value of the latter". It was then pointed out that Canada and the United States envisaged a regional pact of Atlantic solidarity which would include the Scandinavian nations, Iceland and Greenland rather than Italy and Portugal. This would have implied a shifting westwards and northwards of the centre of gravity of mutual assistance.56 At the meeting held on July 20th, Bonnet insistently returned to the question of the difficult position of France, which "had to solve immediate problems in regard to which a long-term pact would be ineffective. France wanted military supplies immediately and needed some form of insurance for that very day". France, explained Bonnet, was the nation which was the prime candidate for being the first Western victim in case of Soviet aggression. The French people did not feel that the American troops stationed in Europe represented a sufficient guarantee for their safety; the French wanted tanks and military supplies. To Lovett it was obvious that, for the French, the rearmament of their nation held top priority over all other issues under discussion. In addition, 55 56

FRUS, 1948, III, p. 208. A. N., Papiers Bidault, vol. 24, dossier 3, Note by the Secretary General, top secret, Paris, July 17, 1948.

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Bonnet did not believe in the argument opposed by the Americans to his request, namely, that there existed no American surplus to be sent to France.57 The state of extreme tension in Franco-American relations fully emerged in the statements made by Bidault at the Hague conference on the 19th and 20th of July. "Up to now", Bidault stated, "the Washington talks have been nebulous, as are the designs of the American Administration at times. The impression gained by the French government is the following: the United States intends to apply the Vandenberg Resolution; it is favourable to military assistance under the form of lend-lease; in a pre-electoral period, the USA does not want to take on commitments that could prejudice the decisions of Congress, insisting on the commitments already assumed by the Marshall Plan and by American rearmament and on the difficulty of assuming any others ... The current attitude of the American Administration is, to a certain degree, in contradiction with the positions previously held by accredited representatives of the United States ... Let us not forget that we have been encouraged to stipulate the Brussels Pact, that they have asked us for a demonstration that Western Europe is willing to defend itself alone, that we have kept General Marshall informed by telegraph as to the stipulation of a pact with which we assume certain risks in virtue, it could almost be said, of certain American promises." Today, instead, "the U.S.A. seems much more interested in its own defence and it is not our place to encourage this trend by giving it the means to placate the American conscience at a bargain price. The French government assigns only relative importance to the formal aspect of the planned guarantees, It is instead extremely interested in the concrete means of defence that will be put at our disposal, because the risks we are running are primarily military risks". Bidault then called for "prudence"; prudence in evaluating the seriousness of American foreign policy, dangerously fickle and inconstant; prudence, as a consequence, in evaluating the reliability of the Atlantic Pact as well. "I fear that such a proposal" continued the head of the Quai d'Orsay, "as substitute for more concrete support, will have the result, if we accept it too easily, of reassuring and satisfying the American conscience". "This Atlantic Pact of which we are speaking" he continued "is a mythological animal, a unicorn; no text has been submitted to us. Before assuming solemn commitments we have to know exactly what they have in mind". It was therefore necessary to "take great care not to discourage the United States and not to give it the impression that we have taken its suggestions in bad part, which could offend its feelings ... The French Ambassador to Washington sends us information in which the French spirit of logic and systematic thought is able to impose a

57

FRUS, 1948, III, p. 218.

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certain order; but reading the complete compte-rendus leaves an impression of confusion and even of rambling vacuity. It would be an excellent thing if we could see more clearly".58 The need to do something concrete — the foremost element in the French approach to the problems of security — was now added, in the negotiations stage, to the call for clarity in the formulas. The formula proposed by the Americans, for defence organized along the lines of the 1947 Rio Treaty, would probably not arouse objections in the Senate, stated Hickerson. But Berard, the French delegate to the Working Group, replied that a pact that did not provide immediate assistance would have no chance at all of being ratified by France.59 Between the European preference for a simple, binding formula such as that of Art. 4 of the Brussels Treaty and the United States' desire to use the Rio Pact as a model for its involvement in the defence of Europe, a compromise was finally found, expressed in the Washington Paper of September 10th. By that date, the delicate issue of immediate French rearmament had been resolved. The insistence of the French government on this matter had risked exasperating the Americans, but had finally been successful. Faced with the blackmail of a threat to abandon the negotiations, the United States yielded, agreeing to equip three French divisions on German territory.60 But both the Washington Paper of September 10th and the Draft Treaty of December left unresolved the problem of Italy's adherence to the Pact, a problem of exceptional importance for French diplomacy. On December 29th the governments involved were presented with the preliminary text of the treaty. At the Council of Ministers of January 12th, the Foreign Minister Schuman, who had succeeded Bidault the previous July, illustrated the content of the pact, emphasizing that, although the text might be acceptable, there still remained two problems to be solved: the admission of Italy and the coverage of North Africa. These were two questions of capital importance for Paris. Ramadier insisted to Schuman that maximum firmness should be shown over the protection of French North Africa. The Minister of Defence declared that he "could not conceive how it was possible to assume a commitment to Alaska and not see the interest of the pact concerning the North African territories".61 To this paradox, the French diplomats were to 58 59 60

61

AMAE, Serie Papiers d'Agents Papiers Massigli, vol. 79. FRUS, 1948, III, pp. 207-218. Cf. L. S. Kaplan, The United States and NATO. The Formative Years, The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky, 1984, p. 81. V. Auriol, op. at., Ill, 1949, p. 9. As early as 1947, however, Bonnet had been warning that the Arctic region was considered by the United States to be the country's "new frontier". AMAE, serie Υ Internationale 1944-1949, vol. 11, telegram n. 1228, Washington, June 9, 1947.

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return frequently. The Embassy Adviser at Washington, Armand Berard, who represented France on the permanent committee of experts studying the Atlantic Pact project, tells in his memoires how he received instructions to have the entire African Maghreb included in the protected area but, in the face of the resistance encountered, France was obliged to limit its demands to Algeria alone. Berard warned however that the compliance shown by his government in regard to Tunisia and Morocco would not be repeated for Algeria: "This was a minimum and ... on this point, France would not yield". "The departments of Algeria were constitutionally a part of France. How could the latter accept entering a pact in which they were amputated? Parliament would not ratify it". And again: "How could Algeria be excluded when Alaska was included within the sphere of application of the treaty?".62 The problem of including the three Algerian departments in the area protected by the security system was closely correlated to the question of Italy's adherence to the pact. At the end of December 1948 a confidential, top secret telegram sent by the Secretary General of the Quai d'Orsay to the Ambassadors in Washington and in Rome stated that France would have to "formally recommend Italy's participation", "the more so since it seemed that if Italy were not included in the treaty, the Anglo-American powers would hesitate to include French North Africa among the territories guaranteed against all aggression".63 The Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry Chauvel affirmed without hesitation, in his memoirs, the "instrumental" character of France's support of Italy: the adherence of the latter to the pact would make the French request on Algeria consistent and logical, and would also have shifted the barycenter of the alliance toward the Mediterranean, allowing France to "place herself at the centre of the system and not, as originally foreseen, on the outskirts".64 The debate over Italian participation and over the inclusion of Algeria absorbed the energies of French diplomatic and political circles. Early in the year, a note from the Secretary General of the Quai d'Orsay addressed to the Minister stressed how, with agreement already reached, the two problems risked becoming the proverbial banana skins for the final stage of negotiations.65 France vigourously defended the immediate inclusion of Italy for reasons of a political and strategic nature (strengthening the Rome government;

62

63

64 65

A. Berard, Un ambassadeur se souvient. Vol. 11, Washington et Bonn 1945— 1955, Paris, Plon 1978, pp. 181-182. AMAE, Serie Z Europe, sous-serie Generalites 1944-1949, vol.25, telegram ns. 5668-5670 (Embassy in Washington); ns. 1564—1566 (Embassy in Rome), Paris, December 23, 1948. J. Chauvel, Commentaire, vol. II, D'Alger a Berne (1944-1952), Paris, Fayard 1972, p. 208. A. N., Papiers Bidault, vol. 26, dossier 1, note by J. Chauvel to the Minister, Paris, January 7, 1949.

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covering the French South-eastern border), but this hypothesis met with only lukewarm agreement from Washington and Ottawa, and decided opposition from London. The Americans themselves, who at the time of Marras' visit66 to Washington had seemed willing to support the possible candidature of Italy, had become uncertain and hesitant. Faced with these difficulties, it was stated in the note, Paris could accept, as subordinate to the hypothesis of Italy's immediate adherence, the maintaining of contacts with the Rome government. Such elasticity was not conceivable for Algeria. "It would be absolutely impossible for any French government to assume a commitment in the Arctic without covering, at the same time, the whole of our metropolitan territory, in Africa as in Europe". The instructions sent to Bonnet ordered the Ambassador to "make the United States understand that, if not Tunisia and Morocco, at least Algeria should be covered by the security system". If the partners opposed objections, it would be preferable to omit from the treaty any specific geographic limitations, merely establishing commitments of a general nature. The reasons of policy, both internal and international, and of strategy involved in the Algerian issue were too important — concluded the note — to allow France to be flexible on this point. The question of Italy, however, was soon to change aspect. On January 12th the government in Rome made an official request to participate in the pact and the United States, with Hickerson as its spokesman, expressed their support for this request on January 18th. For the Quai d'Orsay, there existed four formulas for extending the pact to Italy. Briefly summarized, these can be stated as follows: Italy, Greece and Turkey could be the subject of a declaration published at the moment in which the Atlantic Pact was signed (British hypothesis); Italy would be admitted as an original member (French, and partially American, hypothesis, but Washington requested the simultaneous adherence of Italy to the Brussels Treaty or to the Council of Europe); Italy would accede simultaneously to the Brussels 66

On Marras' trip to Washington, cf. L. Nuti, "La missione Marras, 2-22 dicembre 1948", Störte delle relazioni internazionali, II (1987/2) pp. 343 — 368. On December 17 and 21, Marras met with P. Billotte, who then reported to the Quai d'Orsay that he had found the Italian General "very likeable" and grateful to France for the support given Rome by the government in Paris in regard to the colonial issue. AMAE, Serie Papiers d'Agents Papiers Bonnet, letter by P. Billotte to H. Bonnet, New York, Dec. 23, 1948. The Foreign Minister Schuman held Billotte's opinions in great esteem. On December 25th he wrote a personal letter to Bonnet stating that "the presence of General Billotte, who is in permanent contact with the American General Staff as regards technical and strategic problems, should be profited by during the negotiations. I therefore believe", he wrote, "that I must advise you to convoke Billotte and consult him on all military aspects of the pact. He will certainly be highly useful to you". AMAE, Serie Papiers d'Agents Papiers Bonnet, vol. 1, letter by R. Schuman to H. Bonnet, Paris, Dec. 25, 1948.

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Treaty and to the Atlantic Pact (a solution that was objectionable to the Benelux nations and to Great Britain, which did not desire Italian participation on the permanent military committee - France would approve this solution); Italy could enter the Council of Europe immediately and the Atlantic Pact subsequently (the French objection was relevant only to the uncertainty of the "date of birth " of the European organization). 67 At the beginning of February the problem became more complicated. With the progress in Atlantic negotiations, Stalin had asked Norway, on January 29th, for information on her position after the failure of the plan for a Scandinavian Pact to unite Norway to Denmark and Sweden, a plan swiftly shipwrecked on the shoals of the Stockholm government's neutralist policy. Norway, after this failure, stated her intention of adhering to the Atlantic Pact. When on February 5th Moscow proposed to her a pact of non-aggression, it was already too late. On the next day, February 6th, talks between Acheson and the Norwegian Foreign Minister Harald Lange were to begin. This extension of coverage to the Scandinavian region was viewed with a certain alarm by Paris. "The Americans, in my opinion, are making a mistake", wrote Auriol in his diary; "their desire to set up a barrier against Russia is really going too far, and this takes the form of an encirclement that risks being highly dangerous in its political consequences".68 Schuman instead interpreted the problem on the basis of much more "French" co-ordinates. The Foreign Minister informed his colleagues, during the Council of Ministers held on March 2nd, of America's decision to admit Norway to discussion of the Atlantic Pact and of the "suggestions" that had been given him not to oppose this. But, declared the head of the Quai dOrsay, "there is Italy and she has a promise. Now the United States say that this is not the right moment and that they will talk about it after the signing. This puts Italy in a delicate situation, impairs her prestige but above all, for military reasons, harms French interests". If Norway were admitted to the Pact and Italy excluded, there would be a shift in the balance of forces; thus it was "the French interest that was at stake".69 Moreover, a completely satisfying reply from the Americans was still lacking on the Algerian issue. The situation was resolved expressly due to the intransigence of Paris. Bonnet declared that France would oppose the inclusion of Norway unless Italy's candidature were accepted. The official version from the French government explained that Paris was not opposed as a general principle to including the Nordic nations, although it considered this to be 67

68 69

A. N., Papiers Bidault, vol. 26, dossier 1, note from the Secretary General to the Minister, top secret, Paris, Jan. 19, 1949. V. Auriol, op. cit., Ill, p. 113. ibid, March 2, 1949.

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much less important than the adherence of Italy. The problem, already broached several times, had never before been stated in such final terms. Bonnet's daring remarks provoked a strong reaction from Washington; it was precisely the threats to Norway that put an end to American hesitation. The United States could not allow the loss of significance from a pact which, precisely because it was Atlantic, should naturally include the Scandinavian nations.70 On the other hand, explained a note from the French Foreign Minister, "it would be difficult for France to understand that Italy should not participate in the Atlantic Pact while Norway, for example, became a member".71 Intransigence was a successful tactic. On March 2, 1948, Dean Acheson, who had replaced Marshall as Secretary of State in February, explained to Truman that the French had threatened to withdraw from the alliance if their requests on Algeria and Italy were not accepted. Truman capitulated, thus awarding Paris a great diplomatic victory.72 The atmosphere in Franco-American relations seemed to have become more serene, but the recent storm had left a trail of tension in its wake. The French were beginning to assess more carefully the commitments that adherence to the Atlantic Pact entailed for their nation, and debate was opened on some points that seemed particularly intricate. On March 3rd the "Institut des Hautes Etudes de Defense Nationale" made public the final document on the study that had been carried out as a thorough investigation of the Atlantic Pact. In this document, it was stressed that the defensive pact of alliance should contain clauses of a strictly military nature; it should not be "an exclusively political instrument, but be 'armed and armour-plated'", It should be able to guarantee "a) the effective defence of Europe through methods appropriate to all circumstances; b) material and financial aid allowing programmes for national rearmament to be carried out; c) unification of armaments and the working out of a common strategy". "Our policy", it was emphasized, "should be aimed at keeping Our soil inviolate', because, if France should be subjected to a new invasion and a new foreign occupation, the Americans, after such a cataclysm, would find only a cadaver to liberate". American caution, which had been expressed in the rejection of any automatic commitment, was the subject of deep reflection. Two possibilities were seen: "Either the United States is willing to participate immediately in fighting on 70

71

72

Cf. I. M. Wall, L'influence americaine sur la politique franfaise, 1945 — 1954, Paris, Balland 1989, p. 212. AMAE, Serie Z Europe 1944 — 1949, sous-serie Generalites, vol. 25, circular n. 69 of the Service d'Information et de Presse, March 3, 1949. Cf. D. Acheson, Present at the Creation, Hamish Hamilton, London 1969, p. 278; I. M. Wall, at., p. 213.

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the European Continent, sending ground and airborne means; and then it would be possible for France to accept total solidarity; or the Americans cannot intervene immediately, and then Soviet troops would flood over the country up to the Pyrenees and perhaps as far as Gibraltar within a brief span of time". Since the government in Washington had refused to guarantee, on paper, that its intervention would be automatic, France should be allowed the right to express her co-operation, in case of aggression not involving her directly, in non-military forms. The hypothesis that seemed most acceptable was that of French non-belligerence since, it was explained, "an ally without means is more dangerous than a non-belligerent; history supplies numerous examples". As regards the area covered by the security system, it was important "to strengthen Continental influence" to allow France and the Benelux nations to be able, in case of aggression, to rely on "substantial arrieres". These "arrieres" consisted of the Iberian peninsula and Italy. It was therefore necessary "given the gravity of the situation" for Paris to normalize its relations with Madrid as soon as possible, passing over the reserve of the Franco regime, since "strategy rules policy". Stress was also placed on the strategic importance of North Africa and the error of extending the protected area to "outlying states" such as Scandinavia and the Middle East.73 If these were the conclusions of the military, they did not differ greatly from those of political circles, which in discussing the "non-automatic" nature of American intervention, painted frightening scenarios for the nation in the event of Soviet attack. "What will happen within the first eight days of a war? What will the armies of the Atlantic Pact do in the first few days?"74, the Minister of Defence Ramadier asked Schuman, whose back was against the ropes due to the objections raised during the Council of Ministers on March 7th. To these questions Schuman could only reply evasively, stressing "the moral certainty" of American intervention, which was instead subject to the real uncertainties of the Senate's vote. The President of the Republic Auriol, already annoyed at not being informed of the negotiations, was open to the confidences of the anxious officials of the Quai d'Orsay. A. Parodi, who on February 2nd had replaced Chauvel as Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry, expressed his concern at the traditional "inconstancy" of the Americans (recalling the Mexican War of 1846-1848 and 1916 and the Cuban War of 1898) and at the anti-Communist obsession that had spread like wildfire through Washington. "What worries me most" said Parodi, "is their encirclement of Russia. We must take a firm 73 74

AMAE, serie Z Europe 1944-1949, sous-serie Generalites, vol. 25, March 3, 1949, top secret. V. Auriol, op. at., Ill, p. 146.

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stand stating that we consider this pact to be a defensive pact within the sphere of the UNO".75 The fear of evoking Soviet reactions; the fear of not having obtained sufficient guarantees for the security of the nation; the persistence of a certain "mefiance" toward the American ally, too Manichean in its interpretation of international events and too childish in its reactions - these were the elements for reflection which engaged the politicians and attracted the attention of public opinion. While, by this time, at the Hotel Matignon, the Elysee and the Quai d'Orsay, the advantages of neutralism were no longer proclaimed, there were still those who, considering the uncertainty of American intervention, pointed to the need for further study of this hypothesis. Professor Etienne Gilson, of the Academic Fransaise, became the spokesman for this proposal. On March 2nd, in an article published in Le Monde, Gilson emphasized that the American refusal to fight in Europe — "a perfectly understandable decision" — should be matched by "our right to refuse to sacrifice ourselves for the United States". Neutrality for Europe was not inconceivable, continued Gilson, "as long as it was armed neutrality". In case of invasion, the nation would not defend itself any worse, isolated and without a treaty, than it would isolated and with a treaty of assistance which failed to provide assistance. The chances that the nation will be invaded will not be greater, but less". Therefore, he concluded, "Let us confess that this is one more reason not to reject (neutrality) without having examined it".76 Gilson's article aroused sharp controversy. But to the statement made by M. Ferro, who pointed out that, for the United States, the Atlantic Pact was an instrument for preventing another invasion of France,77 Gilson replied unperturbed that "the problem was not the good faith of the President, but the opinion of the Senate".78 To the objections of cultural circles were added the cautious, prudent, if not actually negative, evaluations of the pact made by the military. On March 23rd Billotte was still writing that he was "troubled and concerned" about the Atlantic Pact, and suggested that "before the initialling and the signing of the treaty" the French should obtain from the Americans the drawing up of a common strategy that would assign absolute priority to European defence. If the Americans should not agree to this point, the French position would have to be "reconsidered".79 The French Minister of Defence was no less 75

ibid, p. 148.

76

E. Gilson, "L'alternative", Le Monde, March 2, 1949. M. Ferro, "On precise a Washington la portee et les consequences du Pacte Atlantique", Monde, March 4, 1949. E. Gilson, "L'equivoque", Le Monde, March 6-7, 1949. A. N., Papiers Bidault, vol. 26, dossier 1, letter by P. Billotte, New York, March 23, 1949.

77

78 79

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critical, as within the same period he wrote to General Revers that American military assistance would not safeguard France from possible occupation.80 To this discontent in political and military circles there was added, obviously, ferocious criticism from the Communist Party. 81 To the outside world however, the French government showed itself firmly consistent in defending the Atlantic choice. The "Service d'information et de presse" of the Quai d'Orsay prepared a document specifying the ways in which it was possible to rebut, point by point, the arguments in opposition to the Atlantic Pact.82 Auriol defended the validity of the formula in a speech delivered on March 10th at a dinner given in his honour by the regional newspapers' syndicate.83 Schuman ended his speech, broadcast over the radio on March 18, 194984, by stating that "it was with a clear conscience that the French government would sign and propose to Parliament for ratification this instrument of peace and security", and the treaty was analyzed article by article at the press conference held on March 23rd.85 On the eve of his departure for the United States, the Foreign Minister spoke of the pact as "a guarantee of peace and security". "The historical event that will take place on April 4th", he continued, "will express the will of the free peoples to preserve their common civilization and to work to build a more fraternal world. Our peaceable force must banish fear and the risks that fear has aroused".86 At his return from the United States the tone was, if possible, even more enthusiastic: "The Atlantic Pact represents for France a historic act of incalculable significance, much more important than the Briand-Kellogg Pact,

"° ibid, Ministry of National Defence to General Revers, March 21, 1949, nr. 91 DN/l/SR, secret, confidential. 81 Especially in relation to the "peace offer" of Stalin who on January 30th had stated that he was ready for a declaration by the Soviet Union and the United States rejecting war which would be a prelude to final disarmament. Cf. L'Humanite, January 31, 1949 ("Importantes declarations de Staline sur les relations entre l'Union Sovietique et les Etats Unis" and P. Courtade, "Pieces en mains"), February 21, 1949 ("Ceux qui preparent la guerre" and A. Carrel, "Le choix de M. Bidault"), February 23, 1949 ("Une declaration capitale de Maurice Thorez"). Again on the Soviet peace offensive cf. "L'offre du Kremlin", Le Monde, February 1, 1949; "Les violentes accusations de 1'Urss contre la France et I'Angleterre sont denuees de fondement", L'aube, January 31, 1949. Bidault replied to the criticism of L'Humanite of Febrary 21 from the pages of L'aube ("Le 'collabo' de Staline", February 22, 1949). 82 AMAE, Serie Z Europe, 1944—1949, sous-serie Generalites, vol. 26, Service d'information et de Presse, March 19, 1949. 81 ibid, Service d'information et de Presse, Circular no. 81, March 11, 1949. 84 ibid. 85 ibid, Service d'information et de Presse, circular no. 95, March 24, 1949. 86 ibid, circular no. 101, March 30, 1949.

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because it adapts itself to the facts, leaving to each member nation its own sovereignty and independence".87 It was with a speech reflecting these thoughts that Schuman persuaded the National Assembly on July 25th to grant its authorization for ratification of the pact. After a hardfought debate, the final result was an overwhelming majority of favourable votes (395). The 189 opposing votes were cast by the Communists (168), the Progressives (8); the members of the Rassemblement Democratique Africain (6); to which were added 4 representatives from the MTLD, 2 from the MRP and one from the UDI.88 Although these numbers speak clearly, they do not tell all. They fail to reveal either the survival of strong neutralist tendencies in internal public opinion, or the scarce trust placed by a vast number of French citizens in their overseas partner. For example, interesting data emerge from the results of public opinion polls carried out between 1952 and 1957. In 1952, 45% of those interviewed replied to the question "In case of war between the Soviet Union and the United States, whose side should France take?" by stating their preference for neutrality (in answer to the same question, formulated in 1957, the percentage was to rise to 62%). "In case of war, would France be able to rely on the United States?" was another question in the survey; and 37% of those interviewed replied "up to a certain point".89 The French partner was an insecure and anxious one; often loth to accept American "patronage", to admit subordination to Washington, and marked by outbursts of dignity and grandeur whose effects were almost always disastrous. And the history of relations between France and the United States in the Fifties tells of minor and major crises, of the vigour with which Paris defended the margins of autonomy not engulfed by the Atlantic framework.

87 88

89

AMAE, Serie B Amerique 1944- 1952, sous-serie Etats-Unis, vol. 120, April 19, 1949. "Armee Politique", 1949, pp. 390-7. Cf also nrs. 1090 and 1142 of Documentation Franfaise, of March 10 and June 2, 1949 respectively. Cited in J. B. Duroselle, La France et les Etats-Unis des origines a nos jours, Paris, Seuil 1976, pp. 195-6.

The Other "German Question". The Foundation of the Atlantic Pact and the Problem of Security against Germany by Norbert Wiggershaus

In the Federal Republic of Germany, the "German Question", the question of the chances of reunification of the two German states, is still a subject of great political debate, with bilateral, domestic and foreign policy implications. In this debate, a factor frequently underestimated is the fact that this complex subject has been closely intertwined, although in different forms, with the international order, and it has often been overlooked in recent times, how strongly the question of an emerging German nation-state affected in many ways foreign interests and the European balance of power since it first appeared at the beginning of the 19th century. * The "German Question" as a problem for the other powers took shape together with the awakening national movements in the resistance against Napoleon's "Grand Empire"2. Although the revolutionary attempt to create a 1

1

A wide range of recent scientific literature seeks to broaden narrow perspectives. See, i. a., Josef Becker, Andreas Hillgruber (ed.): Die Deutsche Frage im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Referate und Diskussionsbeiträge eines Augsburger Symposions 23. bis 25. September 1981, München 1983; Josef Foschepoth (ed.): Kalter Krieg und Deutsche Frage. Deutschland im Widerstreit der Mächte 1945-1952, Göttingen 1985; Axel Frohn: Neutralisierung als Alternative zur Westintegration. Die Deutschlandpolitik der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika 1945—1949, Frankfurt 1985; Michael Stürmer, Dissonanzen des Fortschritts. Essays über Geschichte und Politik in Deutschland, München 1986; Die Deutschlandfrage und die Anfänge des Ost-West-Konflikts 1945-1949, Berlin 1986; Hans-Georg Ehrhart: Die „deutsche Frage" aus französischer Sicht (1981-1987), München 1988. On this and the subsequent discussion: A. Hillgruber: Die Deutsche Frage im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert — zur Einführung in die nationale und internationale Problematik, in: Becker/ Hillgruber, Die Deutsche Frage, pp. 3 - 15. Abridged version of the paper entitled "Ewiges Dilemma: Die Deutsche Frage. Vom unvollendeten und unvollendbaren deutschen National-

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unified nation-state in 1848/49 with its exaggerated and, therefore, menacing claims for political power failed, the German nation-state founded in 1871 with Prussian dominance did disturb the system of the balance of power in Europe right from the beginning, despite the fact that it represented a voluntary limitation to a Germany without Austria. Germany then became a great problem when it developed, in economic and in military power, into the leading power on the continent and the successors of the founder of the Reich, Bismarck, left his course of moderation in foreign policy to claim an active role in "world politics". One of the main reasons which prompted the victorious Allies of the First World War to leave the German nation-state intact in 1918/19 was their own interest in a counterbalance in Central Europe to Bolshevik Russia which aimed at revolutionizing Europe. Thus, the German Reich, as the small national solution, continued to exist in almost the same form as before, and it even had some chance of regaining a position of power of European importance in view of the "permanent opposition" between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers. Hitler forfeited this chance with his attack on the power structure and the order of life in Europe and eventually failed completely against the Alliance comprising North America, Western Europe and the Soviet Union. Defeated and under occupation, Germany was no more than an "object of politics"3, basically at the disposal of the winners.4 How would they apply their comprehensive responsibility for the "German Question"?

The victorious powers were primarily united in the conviction that the industrial potential of an unbridled Germany would also represent a danger to her neighbors and to the world in the future. The JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) Directive 1067 of April 1945 to the Supreme US Commander in Germany expressed the Allied consensus: the main objective of the Allies is "to prevent Germany from ever again becoming a threat to the peace of the world." 5 For Staat", in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 25, 30 January 1982. Cf. M. Stürmer: Nationalstaat und Massendemokratie im Mächtesystem 1948, in: Becker/Hillgruber, Die deutsche Frage, pp. 37 — 50. Wilhelm Cornides: Die Weltmächte und Deutschland. Geschichte der jüngsten Vergangenheit 1945 — 1955. Mit einem Nachwort von Peter Rassow, Tübingen 1957, p. 14. Werner Link, Zum Problem der Kontinuität der amerikanischen Deutschlandpolitik im zwanzigsten Jahrhundert, in: Manfred Knapp (ed.): Die deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen nach 1945, Frankfurt/M., New York 1975 (= Campus, Reihe: Politik und Gesellschaft), p. 99. Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers (FRUS). The Conference at Malta and Yalta 1945, Washington 1955, p. 143 ff. (Quotation p. 143); Final directive in: Department of State Bulletin, October 21, 1945, vol. XIII, pp. 596-607. In Paul Noack, Die deutsche Nachkriegszeit, München, Wien 21973 (= Geschichte und Staat, Bd. 114/115), p. 187.

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years, the Allies had considered the division of Germany into several states to be the only reliable way of achieving this, and had put forward more or less clear concepts on this, but quite soon London, Moscow and Washington began to back down from these proposals — each for different reasons. In the spring of 1945, the only reminders of the original plans to carve up the country were the reconstitution of Austria as an independent state and the planned compensation of Poland with some Eastern provinces of Germany to replace the territory lost to the Soviet Union. However, the French were still demanding the division of Germany and/or the cession of German territory in the West. The generally accepted way of pacifying Germany now rested solely on keeping the country under continuous control, notably through demilitarization, to include her industry. Proper functioning of the control of the Four Powers over Germany did, however, require a unanimous policy on their part. Because of the differing interests of the victorious powers, their views of a joint policy and, above all, a guarantee against the threat of a resurgent Germany diverged very soon. Finally, the conditions of the global "Cold War" affected the policy toward Germany in all respects. Subsequently, the American draft of a Four Power Agreement failed, a draft that was to be a cooperative effort to satisfy the French, British and Soviet security interests and called for an unarmed Germany for a period of 25 years after the end of the occupation. This meant that the promising approach of a comprehensive international solution to the German security problem, with the superpowers United States and Soviet Union as guarantors, had failed. 6 In the open conflict between East and West, the policy toward Germany of the opposing parties was subsequently determined by the securing and integration of their respective politico-economic and geo-strategic "property". Neither side could do without a political and economic activation of its part of Germany. Nor was the other side to be allowed to gain control of all of Germany, a move which would have seriously upset the balance between East and West.7 Consequently, the foundation of a West German state with an anti-communist orientation was already ingrained in the concept of the American policy of containment. 8 6

7

8

A stringent presentation of the American concept for a cooperative effort to secure peace in Germany is made by Werner Link, Die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik 1945 — 1949, in: Die Deutschlandfrage und die Anfänge des Ost-West-Konflikts 1945 — 1949. Mit Beiträgen von Alexander Fischer u.a., Berlin 1984 ( = Studien zur Deutschlandfrage. Hrsg. vom Göttinger Arbeitskreis, Bd. 7), pp. 7-23. National Archives Washington, Diplomatie Branch, Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1947-1953 (NA, DB, RG 59, PPS), Country and Area Files, Box 23 — USSR, Memorandum for the Secretary, Bases for Settlements, October 3, 1953, Tab B: Possible Accomodations with the Soviets in Europe. Cf., i.a., Manfred Knapp, Zum Stand der Forschung über die deutsch-amerikanischen Nachkriegsbeziehungen, in: M. Knapp. Die deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen (Note 4), p. 9.

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However, the risk "that Germany could thus be driven out of the sphere of influence of the West"8a excluded from this concept plans for the neutralization of Germany. But could, in the eyes of the West, the de facto division of Germany with the prospect of two German states, the subsequent implementation of security measures dating back to the time of the war, reliably and permanently "defuse" the "explosive power of Germany"? Had it not become necessary to revise fundamentally the ideas on the "German Question" in view of the situation? In fact, one had to take, quite unexpectedly, the opinion of the Germans into consideration again, who were well aware of their key international role, even in the changed setting. How could one, under the conditions of the East-West conflict, "effectively restore the economic and political potential of Germany, without turning her once again into a danger to her neighbors?"9 We shall now examine carefully the most important elements of the Western security concept vis-a-vis Germany: the economic and political integration of WestGermany into the Western European group of states, including monitoring and control of the West German state which was yet be founded, plus the guarantees of the European and Atlantic Alliance. And finally, we shall outline some early West German responses to the "German Question".

In the United States, the concept developed by John Foster Dulles, the foreign policy advisor to the Republican presidential candidate, and the State Department, calling for the integration of the "German Question" into a European solution, prevailed even before mid-1947. Germany was to be tamed by integrating her into the growing political and economic unification of Europe. "This policy was, however, governed from the outset by the awareness that a strong linking of America and Europe would be necessary, which was achieved later, as we know, in NATO."10 After the onset of the Cold War, the thorough application of this concept became virtually self-evident.11 Its implementation was facilitated by more or less full agreement between London and Washing81

9

10 11

Rolf Steininger: Review: Andreas Hillgruber: Alliierte Pläne für eine „Zentralisierung" Deutschlands 1945-1955. Opladen 1987 (= Rheinisch-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Geisteswissenschaften. Vorträge G 286), in: MGM 2/88, pp. 227 — 228. Hans Buchheim, Die Deutschland- und Ostpolitik Konrad Adenauers, in: Politische Bildung 4 (1971), p. 32. Link, Deutschlandpolitik, pp. 16-18, 22 (Quotation on p. 18), S. FRUS, 1948, II (Washington 1973), pp. 71, 1310; FRUS, 1948, III (Washington 1974), pp. 308, 655; FRUS, 1949, III (Washington 1974), pp. 94, 118 ff., 131 ff., 297.

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ton.12 An international instrument to achieve the economic linkage between the Western occupation zones and the victorious Anglo-American side already existed in the Organization for the European Recovery Program (ERP, Marshall Plan). As a matter of fact, the inclusion of German economic potential (at least that of the Western zones) in the recovery program for Europe had, for economic reasons, been an element of American and European considerations and demands from the very first days (May/July 1947), because this seemed to be the only way of ensuring the success of the recovery and strengthening of the European states.13 At the same time, West Germany could "be irrevocably integrated into the Western camp"14, could be held in check and controlled economically, with the collective self-organization of the Europeans in the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). The American political effort which was inextricably bound up with this was designed "to give the Western part of Germany as a whole economic and, at the same time, political substance,"15 but could be successful only in close cooperation with France. Since early 1948, Washington had been increasingly trying to break down French resistance to a recovery of the German economy, primarily motivated by security concerns, and the possible creation of a (West) German state. In an address to the French government on 19 February, the Secretary of State, George Marshall, explained the American view of the German problem in the context of the new situation posed by the Cold War16: "French preoccupation with Germany as major threat at this time seems to us outmoded and unrealistic. Germany might possibly become threat in distant future but in meantime real threat to France seems to us to be another power which will undoubtedly seek to utilize substantial segments of German economy if unable to get control of Germany. In our opinion French security for many years to come will depend on integration of Western Europe including western German economy. Unless western Germany during coming year is effectively associated with Western European nations, first through economic arrangements, and ultimately perhaps in some political way, there is a real danger that whole 12

13

14

15 16

FRUS, 1948, III, pp. 10, 1069, 1095; Public Record Office (PRO), Richmond-Kew, CAB 1297 23, C.P. (48) 6, The First Aim of British Foreign Policy, Bevin, 4. 1. 1948. See also David Dilks: Britain and Europe, 1948-1950: The Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the Cabinet, in: Origins of the European Integration, Ed. by Raymond Poidevin, Bruxelles, Milan, Paris, Baden-Baden 1986, pp. 391-418. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation. My Years in the State Department, New York 1969, p. 260 (8 May 1947); FRUS, 1948, III, p. 419 f.; Alfred Grosser, Das Deutschland im Westen. Eine Bilanz nach 40 Jahren, München, Wien 1985, p. 61; Hans-Jürgen Schröder, Marshallplan, amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik und europäische Integration 1947-1950, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 18/1987, pp. 9- 11. Günther Mai, Dominanz oder Kooperation im Bündnis? Die Sicherheitspolitik der USA und der Verteidigungsbeitrag Europas 1945 - 1956, in: Historische Zeitschrift Bd. 246 (1988), p. 356. Grosser, Deutschland, p. 61 f. FRUS, 1948, II, p. 71. Quoted in Link, Deutschlandpolitik, p. 18.

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of Germany will be drawn into the Eastern orbit with obvious dire consequences for all of us."

The ensuing gradual rapprochement of the French policy to the politicostrategic aims of the United States in Germany resulted more and more from a growing fear of the political pressure exerted by the Soviet Union and was further fuelled by the coup in Prague on 24 February 1948. Contributing factors were a certain Anglo-American accommodation on questions of economic integration of the Saar Region into the French economy on 20 February 1948 and the emergence of the first prospects of international control over the Ruhr. Against this background, Paris agreed in early March 1948 to the integration of the three Western zones of Germany into the European recovery program. This led to the speedy inclusion of the three zones in the Marshall Plan (OEEC). The next spectacular step toward creation of a federal West German state with a democratic system of government, the London Declarations of the three Western occupying powers and the three Benelux States on 1 June 1948, was based to a large extent on the guaranteed containment of Germany's military power through the formation of a political alliance of the Atlantic states, which had begun in the spring of that year. From the point of view of the West Europeans, especially the French, the most important aspect of the London agreements may well have been the fact that the planned organization of the Western zones into a state could cement the division of Germany. 17 Moreover, the establishment of an international authority to control the Ruhr was an essential element of the agreements. French policy, which continued to "rest above all on the perceived need for security"18 in the phase of the foundation of the West German state focussed understandably for obvious reasons on the enforcement of efficient controls, which got a mixed reception in America —19, but was also a stepby-step "policy of outstretched hands" toward the West Germans20. At least

17

18

19

20

Frank Roy Willis, The French in Germany, 1945-1949, Stanford/Calif. 1962 (= Stanford Studies in History, Economics and Political Science, 23), p. 245. Somewhat reminiscent of this: Francois Seydoux de Clausonne, Beiderseits des Rheins, Erinnerungen eines französischen Diplomaten, Frankfurt a. M. 1975, p. 111 f. Raymond Poidevin, Frankreich und die deutsche Frage 1943—1949, in: Becker/Hillgruber, Die Deutsche Frage, p. 420. FRUS, 1948, II, p. 520 (Marshall); p. 1340 (Robert Murphy, Political Adviser for Germany); FRUS, 1948, III, p. 309 f. (Averell W. Harriman, United States Special Representative in Europe). Raymond Poidevin, Die Neuorientierung der französischen Deutschlandpolitik 1948/49, in: Josef Foschepoth (ed.), Kalter Krieg und Deutsche Frage. Deutschland im Widerstreit der Mächte 1945-1952, Göttingen, Zürich 1985, p. 138.

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the European Division at the Quai d'Orsay was "mostly satisfied"21 with the control measures eventually agreed upon. The occupation statute for the Federal Republic of Germany stated that the occupying powers would continue to exercise "supreme power" in Germany. The International Authority for the Ruhr prevented the incipient state from drawing freely upon its economic potential. The Military Security Agency in Koblenz supervised the demilitarization of Germany. In addition, some concessions on banned and restricted industries and also on reparations213 had been gained from the Americans. All in all, this ensured that the new state would, at least for a while, remain cut off from the outside world and subjected to many controls. Its economic development would be restricted for a long time. But above all, the Western powers refrained from granting her sovereignty. Alongside the more technical security measures, there were political and psychological ones, like those contained in the constitution, the "Grundgesetz", which embodied the principles of a parliamentary democracy and a democratic judicial system and reflected the interest of the Western Allies in achieving a consensus in the setup of the democratic system. Most likely, the British and the Americans regarded a stable pluralistic democracy in West Germany as the best way of guaranteeing the security of her neighbors. At least, that was what was expressed by Robert Murphy, Acting Director of the Office of German and Austrian Affairs at the State Department, and John J. McCloy, the American High Commissioner for Germany. Murphy wrote as early as March 1949: "If nor squandered through disagreement among the Western allies, the opportunity exists for the establishment of a stable democratic government in Western Germany. Under such circumstances there would be a real prospect for the successful assimilation of Western Germany into Western Europe, first economically and in due course perhaps politically as well22."

The French after the British and the Americans, had also realized by now that institutional integration as part of Western European integration and the acceptance of West Germany into international organizations was in fact in line with the control principle. With that aim, they put great hope in the

21 2la

22

Ibid, p. 144. For the importance of the "Level of German Industry" to Paris and London see PRO, CAB 129/32,2, C.P. (49) 23, 7. 2. 49; ibid., CAB 128/15, CM. 10 (49) 1, 8. 2. 1949; ebd., DEFE 4/ 18, C. O. S. (48) 180th Meeting, 16. 12. 48, Minute 20; DEFE 4/19, C. O. S. (48), 20th Meeting, 8. 2. 1949. FRUS, 1949, III, p. 125. For McCloy's statements (to Adenauer, for example, on 4 May 1950 in Frankfurt) see interview of the author with Herbert Blankenhorn, former Ambassador, on 19 June 1979. Cf. FRUS, 1950, III, p. 1026f. (Acheson).

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Council of Europe founded on 5 May 194923 and - a year later — in the European Coal and Steel Community. Murphy also regarded the Federal Republic of Germany as "a manageable portion of Germany", thus at the same time characterizing the relief of the West Europeans at not having to deal with "a united Germany of preponderant magnitude and uncertain orientation"24, at least for some time to come. Obviously, these measures of integration and control alone would not have provided adequate security for the western neighbors of Germany, had not the military and alliance-based supplementary measures been actively pursued early on and with full American involvement25. It is surprising in this context that for some time France wished to forestall the creation of the Atlantic Pact and pursued other priorities.

IV. After the start of the Cold War, France faced a triple threat: "(1) an eventual threat, which is Germany; (2) an actual threat, which is the Soviet Union; (3) an immediate threat, which is Soviet action in Germany"26. Therefore, the French government was already pursuing two aims in the negotiations in March 1948 which were to lead to the Brussels Pact, firstly the use of the Western Union Defense Organization (Brussels Pact) as an instrument against the German threat as well, and secondly the use of the Brussels Pact as a means of implementing a more "comprehensive Atlantic solution".27 The French wanted to see "a direct reference to a possible aggression by Germany" included in the body of the Treaty of Brussels. They "even insisted at first on taking two articles from the Dunkirk Pact and merely inserting them in the Brussels Pact."28 This demand, however, met with unanimous resistance from Great Britain and the Benelux countries. London took the American position into account that, in view of the substantial role Germany would play one day in a European Union, "general adoption of a mutualassistance pact based squarely on defense against Germany is a poor way to 23

24 25

M 27 28

Poidevin, Neuorientierung, p. 144. On British support of the inclusion of West Germany in international organizations. Cf. FRUS, 1949, III, pp. 269 — 271. FRUS, 1949, III, p. 125. Harriman argued that the control instruments as a whole were a convincing security guarantee. FRUS, 1948, III, p. 309. Ibid, p. 142 (Georges Bidault, 29. 6. 1948). Mai, Dominanz, p. 344. Public Archives Canada, Ottawa (PAC), RG 2, B 2, Vol. 113, U-40-8, 1948, Tel. 107, Brussels, 11 March 1948.

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prepare the ground for the eventual entry of the Germans into this concept29." Thus, no express reference to Germany was made in the Treaty of Brussels of 17 March 1948. Nevertheless, the French concern over a military safeguard function of the alliance was not left totally unanswered; on the one hand, the treaty contained a clause (Article 4) which guaranteed military assistance from her Pact partners in the event of an attack, and on the other hand, the signatories, in one of eight declarations of intent, pledged to "take all steps that prove necessary in the event of aggressive intent by Germany."30 Moreover, the Secretary of State, George Marshall, recognized that the Brussels Pact, in the eyes of the French, could not replace completely the failed Four Power Agreement on disarmament of Germany, and therefore informed the French Foreign Minister, Bidault, that the United States "will continue to seek in association with French, British and Benelux appropriate means of preventing Western European security again being threatened by Germany' 1 ." Already three weeks before the signing of the Treaty of Brussels, Bidault had requested his American counterpart to consider a "US association with the Anglo-Franco Benelux group"32. And some of, or all the members of the Brussels Pact constituted a means of forming "a union of concerned parties able to facilitate the implementation of American military assistance."33 The British government considered a number of definitive commitments by the United States to be indispensable and aimed for a treaty in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter, with American involvement. The "presence of United States forces in Germany is not alone sufficient to remove French uneasiness about their own security34." The Exploratory Talks (on an expansion of the pact) that began a few days after the signing of the Brussels Pact between the Americans, British and the Canadians had a clear anti-Soviet orientation. The additional aspect of the containment of West Germany by means of an Atlantic alliance organization seems to have been brought up first by Bevin in early April 1948: 19

30

31 32

33

34

National Archives, Washington, Diplomatic Branch (NA, DB), RG 59, Policy Planning Staff (PPS) 1947-1953, Country and Area Files, Box 27 (Europe, 1948-1949), Memorandum, 20 January 1948 (quotation); FRUS, 1948, III, p. 10. Quoted in Alfred Grosser, Das Bündnis. Die westeuropäischen Lander und die USA seit dem Krieg, Paris, München, Wien 1978, p. 126. FRUS, 1948, III, p. 34. Ibid, p. 33 (Quotation); PRO, F.O. 371/68067, AN 1195/1195/G, Washington Tel. No. 1257 (Lord Inverchapel), 17. März 1948. J. Chauvel, Commentaire: d'Alger a Berne (1944-1952) (Fayard, Paris, 1972), p. 267, quoted in: Jacques Fremeaux and Andre Martel, French Defense Policy 1947—1949, in: Olav Riste (ed.), Western Security. The Formative Years. European and Atlantic Defense 1947—1953, Oslo, Bergen, Stavanger, Troms0 1985, p. 97. PAC, RG 2, B 2, Vol. 112, U-40-4, 1948 (March - Oct.), Memorandum "Atlantic Pact", 22 May 1948.

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Norbert Wiggershaus "If a defense arrangement were set up which resulted in a really solid backing for the Brussels Treaty and which produced a sound Atlantic Security system, this would have a profound influence in dealing with a long standing German problem. France, of course, had hoped for the four-party treaty proposed by Mr. Byrnes and supported by Mr. Marshall. This would have given France a feeling of security in the event of a resurgence of the German menace. The French are still nervous and there is concern here too. In addition if the new defense system is so framed that it relates to any aggressor it would give all the European States such confidence that it might well be that the age-long trouble between Germany and France might tend to disappear.35"

When the Vandenberg Resolution of 11 June 1948 gave the United States the right to conclude pacts outside of the American continent in peacetime, and the creation of the North Atlantic pact was begun purposefully, the plans for the foundation of a West German state could be realized more smoothly, and France's allies could dispel French reservations more easily with the argument "that a pact of this nature would give France a greater sense of security against Germany as well as the Soviet Union and should materially help in the realistic consideration of the problem of Germany36". Eventually, even the French put forward the argument of the security benefits of the Atlantic Pact vis-a-vis Germany, when French Foreign Minister Schuman declared in a radio broadcast on 18 March 1949: "Today we have achieved what we vainly hoped for in the inter-war period: the United States recognizes that there can be neither peace nor security for them if Europe is in danger."17

Alongside the guarantee offered by the pact, President Truman's calculated statement to Congress that "it is of vital importance, for example, that we keep our occupation forces in Germany until the peace is secured in Europe37a" offered equal reassurance to France and to Germany's other Western European neighbours. In the early stages of the negotiations however, Paris had not put her stakes on the political card of the Atlantic Security System and the US-Canadian involvement in Europe, much to the surprise of her partners, but had advocated during the Washington Exploratory Talks between the ambassadors of the six states involved on 6 August 1948 "that a 35

FRUS, 1948,111, p. 79 f. FRUS, 1948, III, p. 327 (Under Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett); NA, DB, PPS 1947-53, Country and Area Files, Box 27 (Europe, 1948 — 49), Memorandum of Conversation, 20 August 1948 (Canadian Under Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester B. Pearson); FRUS, 1949, IV, p. 109 (Secretary of State Dean Acheson, quotation). 37 Quoted in Grosser, Bündnis, p. 131. 37a FRUS, 1949, HI, p. 296; PRO, F.O. 371/68067, AN 1276/1195/G, Washington Tel. No. 1371 (Lord Inverchapel), 22. 3. 48 (Quotation from an address by President Harry S. Truman, 17. März 1948). 36

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political pact was more for the future than for the present ...". France was convinced "that the important thing was to accelerate the development of some military strength on the continent38." The Canadian Embassy in Paris reported a narrowing of the French perspective to two acute issues: "First, obtaining military equipment from the United States to rearm their Forces, and, secondly, the development of an allied strategy which would ensure active United States cooperation in stemming the tide of Soviet invasion whether on the Rhine or further East39." In another round of talks, Ambassador Henri Bonnet, stressing the immediacy of a Soviet threat, again stated that arming the French forces was a "matter of top priority".40 In a telephone conversation with the Secretary of State, George Marshall, Bonnet even said "that the French would only accept an Atlantic security pact on the following three conditions: unity of command at once; immediate movement of U.S. military supplies to France; immediate movement of U.S. military personnel to France41." None of France's partners in the negotiations, with the exception of Belgium, showed any political understanding of the deferral of the comprehensive Atlantic Security System in favour of a national effort aimed at strengthening the armed forces. A Canadian diplomat dismissed the French attitude as "far from statesmanlike".42 In the open debate, the isolated Bonnet proved to be completely insensitive to the warnings of his colleagues about the political myopia and military futility of an armament effort detached from the development of the alliance "to the extent of, say, half a dozen divisions". 43 The strict rejection of all French demands by Washington and a feverish exchange of opinions at several bilateral levels resulted in the French government fully supporting the idea of an Atlantic pact as early as the first week of September. To crown it all, so to speak, the United States now announced their readiness to equip three French divisions with arms.44 The reasons for the French intermezzo remain nevertheless somewhat obscure. The motive,

·'" NA, DB, RG 59, PPS 1947-53, Country and Area Files, Box 27 (Europe, 1948-49), Memorandum of Conversation, 6 August 1948 (Charge d'Affaires Armand Berard - Charles E. Bohlen). Cf. ibid, letter from Berard to Bohlen, 9 August 1948; FRUS, 1948, III, p. 205 f. For a comprehensive description of the whole process, see Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope. The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty 1947-1949, Toronto 1977, pp. 113 ff. 39 PAC, RG2, B 2, Vol. 112, U-40-4, 1948 (March-Oct.), C. S. A. Ritchie to Pearson, 20 August 1948. 40 That was the impression of Robert A. Lovett. NA, DB, RG 59, PPS 1947-53, Country and Area Files, Box 27 (Europe, 1948- 49), Memorandum of Conversation, 20 August 1948. 41 Quoted in Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p. 117. 42 See FN 39, Ritchie to Pearson, 20 August 1948. 43 Memorandum of Conversation, 20 August 1948, see note 40. 44 Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p. 122.

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claimed by the French, of the threat posed by the proximity of the Soviet power is substantiated by much documentary evidence and judgment in historical research, which indeed paint an exaggerated picture of French fears.45 That might, as a contemporary Canadian observer suggested, "blind the French to wider vistas". France was probably wrong in considering transatlantic security agreements as mere guarantees on paper. From a psychological point of view it is obvious that "if a man is threatened with armed robbery he might prefer a gun now to a promise of conditional assistance later".46 But other, more profound reasons seem also to have played a role. Firmly convinced that the United States could not afford to abandon France as the leading power on the continent, "the country attempted to dump the military and financial burden of national and European security on the U.S.A. to regain room to maneuver for restoring its position as a world power against the United States"47. Related to this was the aim, quite understandable given the situation in 1948, of pursuing first and foremost the stabilization of France as a power factor against the West German state which was yet to be founded and integrated into the Western community. In this respect, it made sense, also at a psychological level, for France to reinforce and modernize her own armed forces early on, irrespective of any steps towards an alliance, especially because those negotiating the Atlantic Pact did not rule out the prospect of West Germany becoming a signatory at a later date. Before negotiations could begin or Germany could sign the pact, as Prime Minister Rene Pleven was to state later, "we Allied powers must be strong — and strong in Germany473."

V. In his concept of an Atlantic-European defense system, the Foreign Secretary, Bevin, had, as early as the end of 1947/beginning of 1948, "as soon as circumstances permit", planned the accession of Germany and Spain, "without whom no Western system can be complete48", "though", and this was clear to the Foreign Office, "naturally Spain and Germany could only join in circumstances very different to the present483." 45

4ft 47 47a

48

4lia

See Fremeaux/Martel, French Defense Policy, p. 97f.; PRO, P.O. 371/72979, Z 8937; ibid, 371/73070, Z 4615. See FN 39, Ritchie to Pearson, 20 August 1948. Mai, Dominanz, p. 344. Cyrus Leo Sulzberger, A Long Row of Candles: Memoirs and Diaries 1934-1954, London 1969, p. 516. Public Record Office, Richmond-Kew (PRO), CAB 129/23, C.P. (48) 6, The First Aim of British Foreign Policy, Bevin, 4 January 1948 (quotations); FRUS, 1948, III, p. 5. PRO, F.O. 371/68067, AN 1196/1195/G, Tel. No. 727, 15. März 1948 (Sir Orme Sargent to Bevin in Paris).

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Bevin's view and his wording were included in the Pentagon Paper, i. e. the recommendations of the joint British, American and Canadian working group which had the first exploratory talks on an Atlantic Pact from 22 March to 1 April 1948 in Washington: "When circumstances permit, Germany (or the three Western Zones), Austria (or the three Western Zones) and Spain should be invited to adhere to the Five Power Treaty and to the Defense Agreement for the North Atlantic Area."49 In the Washington Exploratory Talks of the Six Power Ambassador Committee, starting on 6 July 1948, it was obvious from the outset that any later participation of Germany "would be difficult to appraise"50. The French representative initially voiced serious reservations about the future integration of Germany. 51 But in the joint "Washington Paper" of 9 September 1948, it was agreed "that the ultimate relationship of Spain and Western Germany (if Germany remains divided) to a North Atlantic security arrangement must eventually be determined but that it would be premature to attempt to do so at this time".52 Once the long-term nature of this question had been accepted and the possibility of accession had been left open, it was possible to remove it from the agenda of the Atlantic Pact negotiations. At any rate, this bone of contention, which continued to irritate and worry the French government but which aroused much interest internationally, would have had adverse effects on future negotiations on the Pact.53 The public debate on a German contribution to the defense effort gave rise not just to such provocative and farsighted prognoses as that the rearmament of Germany was contained in the Atlantic Pact like the embryo in an egg, as "Le Monde" wrote in an editorial on 6 April 1949. The discussions also addressed almost the whole range of arguments and possible procedures for an integration of West Germany into a Western European and Atlantic defense system and for the taming of any German military power.54 Among the political arguments in favor of this was 49

FRUS, 1948, HI, pp. 72-75 (quotation p. 75). Ibid, p. 169 (quotation), 203, 205. 51 NA, DB, RG 59, PPS 1947-53, Country and Area Files, Box 27 (Europe, 1948-49), Notes on Western Union Working Group Meeting, 28 July 1948. " FRUS, 1948, III, pp. 237-248 (quote p. 242), Washington Paper. ·" On the early debate on a West German defense contribution, see N. Wiggershaus, Zww Problem einer militärischen Integration Westdeutschlands 1948-1950, in: Norbert Wiggershaus, Roland G. Foerster (ed.), Die westliche Sicherheitsgetneinschaft 1948 1950. Gemeinsame Probleme und gegensätzliche Nationalinteressen in der Gründungsphase der Nordatlantischen Allianz, Boppard/Rhein 1988 (= Militärgeschichte seit 1945, 8), pp. 311-341. 54 Cf. Norbert Wiggershaus, Zum alliierten Pro und Contra eines westdeutschen Militärbeitrages, in: Militärgcschichte. Probleme - Thesen — Wege. Im Auftrag des Miltärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamtes aus Anlaß seines 25jährigen Bestehens ausgewählt und zusammengestellt von Manfred Messerschmidt, Klaus A. Maier, Werner Rahn und Bruno Thoß, Stuttgart 1982 (= Beiträge zur Militär- und Kriegsgeschichte, Bd 25), pp. 436 — 451. 50

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the desire for permanent integration of Germany into the West. The proposed model corresponded to the principles of controlled step-by-step integration of West Germany, which was seeking to become a state, into the Western system of states at an economic and political level. Almost all proposals called for a firmly "integrated" form of participation in the Alliance. Although these considerations and proposals lead us to ask whether the European and Atlantic governments had, even during the formative phase of NATO, viewed the integration of Germany into the Brussels Pact and into NATO, similar to integration into the ERP and the Council of Europe, as a way of taming Germany — this could have been supposed in the Fifties — we can safely assume that this was not the case. To date, I know of even one study from the late Forties which examines this approach and advises against it in unequivocal terms: "It seems politically unfeasible and unrealistic to start along the line of including Germany in the framework of the Brussels or North Atlantic Pacts, whose principal significance is military - unfeasible because of the strong and justified Western European fears of German rearmament, unrealistic in view of our declared policy of preventing German rearmament."55

VI. The "German Question", which preoccupied Germany's western neighbours and the Atlantic pact countries, received several initial responses from the incipient West German state, its people, its political parties and its government, which lived up to the hopes and aspirations of the western Allies. I shall deal briefly with some of the most important of them. The western powers had placed crucial emphasis on convergence of the Allies and West Germany where political order was concerned. It was for precisely this reason that, while exercising influential control over the Parliamentary Council, West Germany's constituent assembly, they did not dictate a constitution. The people of West Germany did not disappoint them. In the first elections to the Bundestag (78.5% turn-out at the election; 5.7% of the KPD) their wide-spread approval of parliamentary democratic order was evidence of a very positive return to democracy. The approach to foreign policy and practical politics of Chancellor Adenauer, who played an undisputed leading role on the political stage in the incipient Federal Republic of Germany and who put his own stamp on West German foreign policy, fitted perfectly into the Allied concept of containment on the world political scene and in Germany. Adenauer supported and prac55

FRUS, 1949, III, p. 133 f.

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tised a policy of close ties with the West, characterized by a firm rejection of any East-West seesaw policy, membership of the Atlantic Pact and integration into a powerful and united Europe as well as an enduring agreement with France. In addition, it was important for West Germany's former enemies who were now her negotiating partners to realize that not only the Chancellor and the CDU but also the other political parties and their leaders were almost unanimously in favour of the Marshall Plan 56 , economic co-operation among European nations and the incorporation of West Germany into the economy of Europe57; it was apparent that this unanimity even went as far as agreement and co-operation on foreign policy with the Allied supporters of the foundation of the West German state58. Besides, the West German democrats, upon the setting-up of their constituent state, pleaded for freedom before unity, thus dispelling foreign fears of the spectre of a German nation-state59. Germany's co-operation with the Allies in the control of West Germany was especially convincing and inspired confidence in the European nations, in need of security. In any case, such an attitude was part of the "good conduct" which was very much expected of the newly founded state60. Even in her first freely negotiated agreement with the high commissioners, the "Petersberg Agreement" of 22 November 1949, the Federal Government faced up to the political reality, which was so important psychologically: she became a member of the international Ruhr authority (thus sanctioning the statute which had been decreed for the Ruhr) — we do not need to consider here the concessions made by the Allies — and she stated her willingness to co-operate closely with the Military Security Office and pledged her assistance in the decartelization of German industry and the dismantling which remained to be carried out.

VII. In the early days of the Federal Republic of Germany, the guarantee offered by the Atlantic Pact as well as the integration and control imposed by the western powers combined with the policy of "self-containment"61 implemented by the "Allies' Chancellor" — as the head of the government was referred to 56

57 58

59 60 61

Ludolf Herbst, Option für den Westen. Vom Marshallplan bis zum deutsch-französischen Vertrag. Munich 1989, p. 67. Schröder, Marshallplan, p. 11. Poidevin, Neuorientierung, p. 133 (re. the recognition by the SPD mouthpiece "Die Freiheit" of the need for French-German rapprochement). Cf. Schröder, Marshallplan, pp. 11 ff. See also Link, Deutschlandpolitik, p. 20. FRUS, 1949, III, p. 297. Adenauer's policy was thus described by Wolfram Hanrieder, Die deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen in den Nachkriegsjahrzehnten, in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 26/86.

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by the chairman of the SPD, Dr. Kurt Schumacher - constituted a strong and, as far as one can judge, fully adequate barrier for "security against Germany". But the German and the international scene were soon developing in a way which was impossible to predict. The early revival of the German economy, which was being accomplished at breakneck speed, the question of the re-armament of West Germany, which resulted from the unexpectedly premature escalation of the East-West conflict and precipitated decisions, as well as the ineradicable Rapallo trauma of an Eastern orientated Bonn, brought old worries to the surface. Thus, relations between the Germans and the Allies, from the Schuman Plan in 1950 to the setting-up of the European Economic Community in 1957 — the Germans were gradually acquiring the role of a partner — were developing into a race to absorb Germany into Europe and co-operate with her while maintaining control, a race, in which the military presence of the Americans and the British on the continent, the existence of the integrated NATO forces in Europe, the nuclear potentials of the Allies and the military integration of West Germany through NATO and the European Defence Community provided indispensable guarantees of security.

Nordic Union or Western Alliance? Scandinavia at the Crossroads 1948-1949 by Olav Riste

Introduction For the Scandinavian countries, situated on Europe's northern perifery, the Second World War brought revolutionary changes in their strategic positions. In regard to Sweden, the Russian —German power balance in the Baltic region had been shattered in three stages: First, by the Winter War between the Soviet Union and Finland which, although it ended in a relative stalemate, suggested that Russia was on the move with attempts to improve its position vis-a-vis Germany. Second, by Germany's "Barbarossa" campaign, which for a time held out to Sweden the promise of a removal of the "Russian menace" although at the price of accepting a complete German hegemony. Third, by the 1945 advance of the Red Army to the gates of Berlin, which meant that the old power balance had been replaced by Soviet dominance of the whole of the eastern and southern shores of the Baltic. 1 For Denmark, Soviet control of East Germany right up to Lübeck meant the presence of a new and potentially more dangerous enemy at the gates. Norway, too, had aquired the Soviet Union as its immediate neighbour, on the Arctic coast, as a consequence of the disappearance of the Finnish Petsamo corridor. To the Norwegians, however, the main lesson of the war was the realisation that their territory was a strategically important gate between the Atlantic Ocean and the Eurasian landmass. 2 Adjusting to such momentous changes was bound to take time. There was also uncertainty as to the impact of the Grand Alliance on the future ' A thorough description in English of Sweden's position in the Second World War is Wilhelm Carlgren, Swedish Foreign Policy in the Second World War (London 1977). 2 An excellent analysis, on which the present paper draws heavily, is Kersti Blidberg, Just Good Friends: Nordic Social Democracy and Security Policy 1945— 950 (No. .5, 1987, in the series Forsvarsstudier published by Forsvarshistorisk forskningssenter, Oslo).

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direction of Soviet policy: Had the defeat of the German enemy; the enormous increase of Soviet power; and the experience of co-belligerence with the Western powers, laid the foundation for the Soviet Union's entry as a "normalised" player in world affairs? Such hopes mingled with traditional caution as the Scandinavian states attempted to assess their new situation in the light of their markedly different wartime experiences. The process of reappraisal was easiest in Sweden, whose armed nonbelligerency had yet again emerged unscathed by foreign invasion or occupation. Relying on a tacit assumption among the great powers that Swedish territory offered no prize worth the risk of bloodying their noses on Sweden's not inconsiderable armed forces, policy adjustments would suffice to establish a watchful but business-like relationship with Sweden's new and immensely powerful neighbour across the Baltic. In Denmark, the change from the inter-war to the postwar security situation chiefly meant that the country was now defenceless against a new great power. In the short run, however, protection lay in the presence of allied forces of occupation in Germany. And in the longer run there was comfort in the assumption that the Western powers would in one way or another attempt to make sure that Western Germany did not fall under Soviet control. Norway's situation was markedly different. As a member of the Grand Alliance, albeit with its home territory under German occupation, Norway had established a closely knit mesh of military links with Great Britain. The Norwegian Government in exile had also, in the early stages of the war, taken the lead in proposing a postwar alliance aimed at preserving and extending the security cooperation between the countries bordering on the Atlantic. The motive, at least for the time being, was to form a united front against a future resurgent Germany. But as the Soviet Union soon came to suspect ulterior motives, and as the United States preferred the global United Nations concept to anything that smacked of balance-of-power politics, Norway's Atlantic security scheme was placed on the back-burner. In 1945, therefore, Norway enthusiastically joined in the founding of the United Nations Organisation as the new instrument for maintaining international peace and security.3 From 1945 until the winter of 1948, then, all three Scandinavian countries sought to combine a detachment from power politics with support for the United Nations. Only when non-alignment was incompatible with economic interests, as in the process whereby the Marshall Plan was transformed into an organisation for Western European economic cooperation (OEEC), did they publicly declare their position in the burgeoning East-West conflict. For Norway and 3

See i.a. Olav Riste, "Norway's 'Atlantic Policy': The Genesis of North Atlantic Defence Cooperation", in A. de Staercke and others, NATO's Anxious Birth (London and New York 1985).

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Denmark, however, their declared non-alignment shielded an under-current of military cooperation with the United Kingdom, visible in such matters as their contribution, as part and parcel of the British Army on the Rhine, to the allied occupation of Western Germany. In Norway's case cooperation extended to massive purchases of British equipment for its armed forces, and training in Britain for officers and technical personnel.4 The underlying assumption, in terms of national security, became apparent in the preamble to the "Three Years' Plan" for the reconstruction of Norway's armed forces, presented in August 1946: It is difficult to imagine that Norway should have to defend itself against assault without having allies, and it is necessary to realise that Norway with her limited military and economic resources could not alone resist for any length of time against superior military power. But Norway's armed forces must be able to hold on alone until we get effective assistance from those who may become our allies." 5

In the circumstances it was hardly necessary to identify those potential allies. In Denmark in 1945 —1947 contemplated arms purchases from the Soviet Union as well as from the West, and successive Foreign Ministers stressed Denmark's complete non-alignment. In practical terms, however, the defence of Denmark also relied on "eventual armed assistance from the United Nations or from other friendly nation", meaning of course the allied forces in Germany. Even in Sweden, whose security policy was encapsulated in the motto "non-alignment in peacetime with the aim of neutrality in wartime", the doctrine was based on a strategic defensive in order to gain time for assistance "from the other side" i.e. the Western powers.6

4

5

6

Helge 0. Pharo, "Bridgebuilding and Reconstruction: Norway faces the Marshall Plan", in Scandinavian Journal of History, Vol. I (1976) pp. 125-153; O. Riste, "Was 1949 a TurningPoint? Norway and the Western Powers 1947- 1950", in O. Riste (ed.), Western Security: The Formative Years (Oslo and New York 1985), esp. pp. 135 — 137; also O. Riste, "Functional Ties - a Semi-Alliance? Military Cooperation in North-West Europe 1944—1947", in A. Martel (ed.), Forces Armees et Systemes d'Alliance (Montpellier 1984). On Norwegian and Danish force contributions to the British army of the Rhine see Rolf Tamnes, "Kamp mot russerne pa tysk jord? Tysklandsbrigaden og den kalde krigen 1947—1953" (with English summary), in R. Tamnes (ed.), Forsvarsstudier V, 1985 (Oslo 1986) pp. 82-172. Stortingsforhandlinger (Parliamentary Proceedings) 1945 — 46: White Paper no. 32 (Defence Ministry): Plan for en ferste reising av Norges forsvar, p. 3. Udenrigsministeriet, Dansk Sikkerhedspolitik 1948-1966, I (Copenhagen 1968) pp. 22-23; Michael H. Clemmesen, "Udviklingen i Danmarks forsvarsdoktnn fra 1945 til 1969", in Militarhistorisk Tidskrift (Stockholm 1987) p. 11.

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The End of Bridge-building The trigger for a reappraisal, which in the course of twelve months would transform the Scandinavian security calculus, was British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin's landmark statement to the House of Commons on 22 January 1948. Bevin did not refer to the Scandinavian countries as potential participants in "the consolidation of Western Europe". Official reactions in Scandinavia were accordingly non-committal, and restricted to a re-statement of established policy. Not unexpectedly, however, Swedish Foreign Minister Unden came closest to rejecting an association with any such western bloc. Denmark's Prime Minister Hans Hedtoft, in a broadcast on 30 January, said that his country was "not at all" in the process of joining any bloc. Halvard Lange, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, said nothing.7 In fact, although Scandinavian security problems were on Bevin's mind as he planned his pivotal statement to the House of Commons in January, he saw the point of his advisers that a mention of the Scandinavian countries would only lead to embarrassing questions about what Britain could contribute to their defense. Also, as later explained in a memorandum from the Foreign Office to the State Department, it was pointless to invite the Scandinavians to the Western Union talks since, even taken together, the Brussels pact countries could not by themselves effectively defend that part of the world against pressure.8 Evidently, everybody considered a trans-Atlantic security association as a sine qua non for the inclusion of Scandinavia in a western defence pact. Norwegian aloofness from the process that led to the Brussels Pact was therefore not so much a case of residual neutralism as a reflection of an almost instinctive feeling that the right framework had not yet been formed. Both public opinion and political positions in Norway seem to have taken a sharp westward turn during the winter of 1948. An increasing number of newspapers, including many of the Labour papers, called for a change of course for the nation's foreign and security policy. Some, and notably the main Labour party organ in Oslo, even advocated a Western military alliance with participation of the United States. In the non-socialist opposition, criticism of the Labour Government's unwillingness to take a strong public stand in favour of the principle of western security cooperation in one form or another was increas-

The most comprehensive study of Norwegian foreign policy 1948 —1949 is Magne Skodvin, Norden eller NATO (Oslo 1971). On reactions to Bevin's statement see pp. 73 — 80. H. Turner, Britain, the United States, and Scandinavian Security Problems 1945 1949 (unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of Aberdeen 1982) pp. 177-178.

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ing. And strong elements in the Labour party made similar demands in the inner circles of the party. 9 One of the principal advocates of an open declaration of at least moral support was the party's Secretary General, Haakon Lie, and together with Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen he succeeded in having a resolution passed by the council of the Oslo branch of the party on 3 February 1948. While the text of the resolution said nothing about cooperation in the defense or security field, and stressed the primary need for "new and more practical forms of Nordic cooperation", the central message was clear enough: "The initiative taken by the British Labour Government for extended economic and political cooperation must also have our support." Four days later, representatives of the Nordic social democratic parties gathered in Stockholm for one of their frequent high-level consultations. The Norwegian delegates apparently came with hopes that a decision would be made to explore the possibilities of economic, political and military cooperation, in the first instance within a Nordic framework, but without excluding an association with the western powers. But as the delegates of the other three countries were opposed, the outcome was limited to a resolution of approval for the Marshall plan and a call for intensified economic cooperation within Scandinavia. 10 The comparative leisure of such discussions was first shattered by the events in Czechoslovakia towards the end of February. And the emergency grew into a crisis on the news of the Soviet pact offer to Finland, which was made public on 28 February. The significance of those events, coming on top of each other, was twofold: The coup in Czechoslovakia — a country hitherto seen by Scandinavians as pursuing a kindred policy of "bridge-building" between East and West — raised the spectre of communist subversion from within. And the Soviet pact offer to Finland, followed by reports that Norway was next on the list, suggested that Northern Europe was now uppermost on Stalin's agenda for political expansion. Both Denmark and Norway took measures to increase their vigilance and military preparedness." On 8 March the Norwegian Foreign Minister informed the ambassadors of the United States and Britain of Norway's determination to reject a possible Soviet pact offer, and intimated a desire to know what assistance might be expected in such an eventuality. Similar enquiries were made by the Danish embassy in Washington. No specific assurances were forthcoming. But we now know that 9

For a thorough analysis, see K. E. Eriksen, DNA og NATO (Oslo 1972), chapters 2 and 3 in particular. 10 Haakon Lie, Skjebneär 1945-1950 (Oslo 1985) pp. 287-290. " Minutes of meetings of the Defence Council, Meetings of 20 February and 10 March 1948. For Denmark see Clemmesen, op. cit. pp. 11 — 14.

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the Norwegian emergency was one of Bevin's primary baits to involve the United States in talks about the security of Western Europe — "before Norway goes under", as the British embassy in Washington put it when reporting Bevin's views to the State Department.12 The Norwegian Government's dilemma during those weeks was reflected in the somewhat tortuous language used by Foreign Minister Lange in his statement to a secret session of the Storting at the beginning of April: It is perfectly clear that neither the British Government nor any other party to the Brussels Treaty plans to encourage the Nordic countries to adhere to this Treaty unless we ourselves expressly wish to join. We know that strong reservations exist both in Sweden and in Denmark concerning such adherence. For Norway's part it would be more natural to think in terms of a direct association between the Scandinavian countries and Great Britain rather than an association with the Brussels Treaty ... If it were possible to obtain assurances that we would not be left standing alone in the unlikely case of being exposed to aggression, without binding ourselves to automatic involvement in every war in Western Europe through membership in the western pact, then that would be the most favourable solution to our security problem, while being at the same time the solution least likely to complicate the preservation of intimate cooperation with the other Nordic countries.13

Leading members of the Norwegian Cabinet did toy with the idea of a British-Scandinavian defence union during the spring of 1948. In a secret memorandum, dated 4 April and addressed to four of his Cabinet colleagues, Defense Minister Hauge put forward the following proposals: Norwegian foreign policy makers should presently start quiet work on the outlines of a "Northern Union" between the Scandinavian countries and England concerning economic, cultural, and military cooperation. Once we are clear in our minds about what a "Northern Union" ought to be, we should take the initiative both towards the Scandinavian countries and England. It should not be impossible that such an initiative could lead to results in one form or another. The alternative of Scandinavian adherence to the Five-Power Treaty, which other parties may well decide to join, is less favourable and less realistic.14

However, it soon transpired that Hauge's idea of a "Northern Union" was, in Haakon Lie's words, "stillborn". During the remainder of 1948, the question of a Scandinavian defence pact came to dominate the political agenda of all three countries.

12 u 14

FRUS (Foreign Relations of the United States) 1948, III, p. 47. Quoted in M. Skodvin, Norden eller NATO (Oslo 1971), p. 121 -122. Quoted in H. Lie, op. cit. p. 286-287.

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The Scandinavian Option Significantly, whereas Norwegian and Danish reactions to the crisis of February—March 1948 included approaches to the Western powers, Sweden's response included a reaffirmation of its policy of "freedom from alliances and engagements that would turn our country into a pawn in the power play of international policy."15 It was therefore natural that the first concrete initiative for a separate Scandinavian defense pact should come from the Swedish Government. Initial explorations began during Swedish Foreign Minister Unden's visit to Oslo on 3 May, and continued when the three Scandinavian Prime Ministers met during the Swedish Social Democratic Party's annual conference in Stockholm a week later. Thus began a process of studies and negotiations which was to last for nine months before ending in failure. 16 The basic fissure became apparent already in the preparatory stages of determining an official mandate for the deliberations. Sweden's proposal, that the envisaged defence cooperation should aim to keep the three countries "outside of any grouping of other states", proved unacceptable to the majority of the Norwegian cabinet. A Norwegian counter-proposal, for an exploration of the issue without any precondition of non-alignment, was equally unacceptable to Sweden. The end result was a compromise, finalised in September, whereby Norway agreed to participate in a "feasibility study" of military cooperation on the basis of neutrality provided this basis was not made public. Norway also undertook not to discuss defence cooperation with other states while the Scandinavian option was being studied. The Scandinavian Defence Committee, attended by a number of military and civilian expert advisers, worked intensively from the middle of October until the middle of January 1949. But international and internal political processes could not be stopped. All three governments in varying degrees kept in touch with the process towards an Atlantic security alliance — Norway as a potential member; Sweden as a potential customer for military equipment; and Denmark somewhere in between.17 Internally, divisions were becoming apparent between those who fervently desired the Scandinavian option to succeed and those who were more inclined towards the alternatives of a "status quo", in Sweden, or membership of an Atlantic alliance, in Norway and — to a lesser extent — in Denmark. In the British Foreign Office, 15 16 17

Skodvin, op. cit. p. 101. Blidberg, op. cit., has the most detailed analysis of this process. An excellent account of the interplay between the Scandinavian and Western processes is Knut E. Eriksen, "NATO, Norden og 'den utro tjener' Halvard Lange", in Internasjonal Politikk No. 2 (Oslo 1977) pp. 261 -302.

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compromise solutions whereby a Scandinavian pact might be more or less visibly linked with an Atlantic alliance, were — somewhat optimistically — being studied.18 The final report of the Scandinavian Defence Committee is still a classified document on account of its detailed discussion of defence plans and prospects. Its main conclusions have however been made public. On the crucial question of deterrence, the Committee unanimously concluded that a Scandinavian Defence Association whose members have shown in words and in action their will to common defence against attack, can be expected to a certain extent to have a preventive effect and to constitute some guarantee against isolated action. A defence association cannot however by itself be considered sufficient to forestall an isolated or coup-de-main attack ...

With this question mark regarding the deterrent effect of an isolated Scandinavian alliance, the Committee went on to state that a defence association, or any otherwise constituted prepared cooperation among the three Scandinavian countries, does not exclude the necessity for outside assistance. In peacetime, assistance will be required for the build-up and modernisation of the armed forces. If they were to be attacked, armed assistance would be needed already in the initial phase.

The Norwegian and Danish members of the Committee drew from this the further conclusion that, even after Scandinavia's own defence forces had been built up, the three countries would not be able to withstand an armed attack from a great power for any longer period. Armed assistance from the Western powers would therefore be needed under any circumstances, and such assistance, to be sufficiently rapid and effective, would have to be prepared in peacetime. Any agreement would therefore have to be so fashioned that it did not debar Scandinavia from receiving such assistance.19 In full awareness of those conclusions the Defence, Foreign, and Prime Ministers met at Karlstad at the beginning of January for a determined, almost desperate, attempt to bridge the differences. Stretching their will to compromise to the utmost, the Norwegian Ministers agreed to consider abandoning their insistence on formal links with the West, provided the United States gave some form of informal or implicit promise of assistance. The Swedish Ministers in return accepted that the three countries would make a joint approach to the Western powers to ascertain their attitude towards an independent Scandinavian defence pact. The compromise thus reached was extremely tenuous, and broke down already at the next crossroads. Meeting in Copenhagen 22 — 24 January, the '" For a detailed study of development on the British side see H. Turner, op. at. 19 Conclusions of the study translated by the present author from verbatim quotes in Skodvin, op. cit.

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Ministers and their advisers got to grips with the essential issue: assuming that Norway agreed to a Scandinavian defence union which was formally and explicitly non-aligned, would Sweden be prepared to discuss with the U. S. Government some form of "guarantee" from the Western powers in case of war? To this question from Norwegian Defence Minister Jens Chr. Hauge Sweden's answer was an unequivocal "no"20, whereupon the Norwegian Prime Minister took it upon himself to sum up Sweden's position: Sweden's reasoning was also based on the desire for military assistance from other democratic states; they felt that the provision of such assistance would be in the Western powers' own interest, and that we could therefore calmly wait for this to happen. In Norway's view this was too optimistic, hence a joint Scandinavian union had to be established "in understanding with" the Western powers. 21 A final meeting in Oslo the following weekend had the aspects of both an inquest and a burial. A Norwegian draft containing guidelines for a joint Scandinavian approach to the Western powers was presented. But as it contained a provision allowing each of the three countries, if attacked, to request assistance from outside powers, and as this logically entailed an opening for preparatory staff talks, this was also rejected by the Swedish delegation. 22 After that it remained only to draft a final public statement admitting the failure but reaffirming Scandinavian fraternal feelings. So why did the attempt to form a Scandinavian defence union fail? It seems more appropriate to ask how it could possibly succeed. The basic problem was the insufficient strength of the combined forces of the three countries to provide adequate deterrence against an attack from the Soviet Union. Even in the strictly military sense of defence capabilities it was clear that there could be no common defense of the remoter areas and islands of Norway and Denmark. 23 Behind the term "adequate deterrence", however, lay the fundamentally different strategic and security equations of the three countries. For Sweden, its considerable military strength combined with its territory's lack of strategic value meant that it could hope to remain outside a great power conflict or at least could afford to defer the question of Western assistance until attacked. For Norway and Denmark, on the other hand, their exposed strategic positions combined with the weakness of their indigenous defence capability to heighten the requirement for adequate deterrence, since their need for quick and effective armed assistance from outside was both obvious and absolute. 20 21 22 15

Blidberg, op. cit. stresses this point in particular. I am grateful to Haakon Lie for providing me with copies of the minutes of this meeting. Skodvin, op. cit. p. 284-287, has ;in excellent account of these proceedings. See Skodvin, op. cit. pp. 251.

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Norway Turns Westward After the debacle, while Denmark tried a futile last-minute effort to resurrect the defunct union or replace it with a bilateral arrangement with Sweden24, Norway turned westward. A fact-finding mission led by Foreign Minister Halvard Lange went to Washington to enquire about the conditions regarding Norway's eventual accession to the impending Atlantic alliance. However, since Scandinavian defence cooperation still had many adherents, not least in the governing Labour party, Lange's brief also required that he first and foremost ascertain American attitudes to a Nordic alternative — including the possibility of arms deliveries. US attitudes in those respects had so far been quite negative. Lange was therefore to stress certain aspects of the Scandinavian option which might be of general benefit to the free world - particularly the advantage of having Sweden's considerable armed strength shoulder a large share of the burden of defending Scandinavia, thereby relieving the Western powers of that burden in case of a Soviet attack in Europe. Two further points sought to elicit US views concerning a Scandinavian union with the absolute minimum of an "opening towards the West" which the Norwegian government could consider: namely "an expression of their (i. e. the Western powers') interest in seeing the integrity of the Scandinavian states respected"; and "a certain contact between the military authorities in connection with arms deliveries" as a substitute for staff talks.25 The American responses on these two points revealed clear scepticism as to the value of such a minimal "opening". Since it was also almost certain that Sweden would reject it, the matter was not pursued. The value of enlisting Sweden in the defence of Scandinavia was on the other hand clearly appreciated, and this, coupled with the American desire to avoid being castigated as having torn Scandinavia apart, made for a somewhat more open-handed attitude in the question of arms deliveries. Subsequent complaints that Lange did not attempt to exploit this new opening seem however misplaced.26 Arms deliveries without some form of implicit "guarantee" and a minimum of staff talks would still have been insufficient for Norway's security needs. On the alternative of Norway's possible accession to the Atlantic Pact the Norwegian delegation raised one major issue: that of bases for allied 24 25

26

Blidberg, op. at. pp. 56-57. Lange's brief is extensively reviewed in Skodvin, op. cit. pp. 288 — 295. Reports on Lange's conversations in Washington can also be found in FRUS 1949, IV, pp. 102- 106. See Geir Lundestad, "USA, skandinavisk forsvarsforbund og Halvard Lange: En revurdering", in Internasjonal Politikk No. 1, 1977. Lundestad's subsequent modified view can be found in his America, Scandinavia and the Cold War 1945-1949 (Oslo and New York 1980).

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armed forces. Such bases were from the beginning clearly unacceptable to Norway, both for internal political reasons and from a desire to avoid provoking the Soviet Union, and this had been made clear on principle to the American Ambassador already in the summer of 1948. Replies to a preliminary enquiry through the Norwegian ambassadors in Washington and London in December had then suggested that such bases would not be required. 27 A few days before the departure of the Norwegian delegation for Washington, a surprise demarche from the Soviet ambassador in Oslo had asked whether Norway intended to join the Atlantic alliance, and, if so, whether this would mean bases in Norway for foreign air and naval forces. Norway's reply was the well-known "bases policy" which declared that Norway "will not open bases for the armed forces of foreign countries unless attacked or threatened with aggression." Seeking high-level assurances, Lange now asked his interlocutors in the State Department whether such bases would be required under the Atlantic Pact. The answer was still negative as far as the United States was concerned. Whether the future Atlantic Council might at some stage propose that Norway provide certain "facilities" was a different matter: It would then be up to Norway to decide.28 It may at first sight seem surprising that questions about Soviet reactions did not figure more prominently in the Scandinavian countries' choice between a Nordic and an Atlantic alliance. Sweden attempted to raise the issue indirectly, mainly through muted warnings about the likelihood of Soviet reprisals against Finland if the other Nordic countries became linked with a Western bloc. In that connection it is worth noting that the Swedish Ministers during the Scandinavian negotiations repeatedly, and in spite of Norwegian assurances to the contrary, claimed that allied military bases would be an inevitable consequence of any Scandinavian association with a Western alliance.29 However, so far as it is possible to ascertain from the available Soviet evidence, the Russians were firmly convinced that a Scandinavian defence union, even if nominally non-aligned, would in fact form part of a Western bloc. The final result, whereby Sweden at least retained its neutrality, was therefore in Soviet eyes the best that could be hoped for in the circumstances.30 27 28 29 30

Skodvin, op. cit. pp. 228 - 229. Ibid., pp. 324-325. Blidberg, op. cit. pp. 39-40. The best analysis of Soviet policies toward Scandinavia in the period is Tom Hetland, "Da Moskva sa nei til Norden. Sovjets syn pä Norden og NATO 1948-1952" (with English summary), in R.Tamnes (ed.) Forsvarsstudier IV, 1985 (Oslo 1985) pp. 13-62. But see also the Russian emigre historian Aleksander Kan's excellent study of Soviet-Norwegian relations after 1945 as reflected in Soviet sources - A. Kan, Naboskap under kald krtg og perestrojka (with English summary), No. 6, 1988 in the series Forsvarsstudier.

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Final Decisions Foreign Minister Lange returned from Washington — via London — to face three hurdles on the way to Norway's decision in favour of the Atlantic Pact. The first was the Cabinet, several of whose members still hankered after a Scandinavian solution. Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen had himself for a long time been one of the more convinced "nordists". After the burial of the Scandinavian option at the end of January, however, he decided to lend his determined support to the Atlantic alternative, and that settled the issue as far as the Cabinet was concerned. There remained the hurdle of the Labour Party, which held its National Conference on 17 — 19 February. Here the opponents, whose considerable strength was crumbling after the Prime Minister and party leader's stand had become known, made their last and somewhat half-hearted pitch, after which the Conference voted unanimously for the leadership's proposal - that the country's security problem should be resolved through "a commitment to solidarity and cooperation with the western democracies".31 The final hurdle was Parliament, which at the beginning of March was presented with a Government motion formally proposing that Norway should participate in the preparatory talks on the Atlantic Pact. The outcome here was not in doubt, since all the political parties except the Communists with their eleven representatives had declared in favour of the Atlantic option. But 16 Labour representatives abstained, and two voted against the motion. Those two "diehards" also voted with the eleven Communists when the Atlantic Treaty came up for ratification at the end of March. The failure of the Scandinavian alternative at the end of January meant that each of the three countries had to solve its security problem in isolation from the others. Having reviewed Norway's path to the Atlantic pact, it needs to be said that Norway in a sense had an easier task than the others. Although it had failed in achieving its political first priority aim — a Scandinavian defence union linked with the Western powers — Norway was on the way to seeing its security requirements fulfilled. Denmark, on the other hand, had in a sense lost out since its government had invested so much political capital and prestige in the Nordic alternative. It was therefore with some reluctance that Denmark in February, through its ambassador in Washington, sought clarification about the modalities of its eventual accession to the Atlantic alliance. The ambassador was even instructed to state Denmark's clear conviction that a Nordic defence union was the best ·" The pioneering study of the Labour Party and the Atlantic pact is Knut Einar Eriksen, DNA og NATO (Oslo 1972). But see also Trond Bergh's account in Vol.5 of the History of the Labour Movement in Norway, Storhetstid 1945-1965 (Oslo 1987).

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solution for all concerned.32 However, and in spite of Danish Prime Minister Hedtoft's strong personal attachment to Nordic cooperation, there was hardly any doubt that Denmark would follow Norway into the Atlantic Alliance. For Sweden also, and even more so since it was the initiator and main promoter of a Nordic alternative, the downfall of the Scandinavian defence union was a political defeat. But it was not unanimously felt as such. Some apparently reacted with a sigh of relief that Sweden had escaped the burden of defending their inadequately armed Scandinavian neighbours. Others, particularly in Swedish military quarters, feared Sweden's security isolation and were concerned that this might deprive Sweden of access to the products of advanced military technology. And as early as the end of February voices in the parliamentary committee for foreign affairs called for an exploration of the possibilities of limited Swedish-Norwegian military cooperation. The Cabinet reacted with great caution, but since such cooperation was so obviously in the mutual interest of the two countries it got under way without much delay."

'Western Attitudes to Scandinavia This paper, by concentrating on the internal Scandinavian process, may inadvertently have created the impression that Denmark's and Norway's paths to the Atlantic Pact, and Sweden's decision to remain neutral, depended only on their own choices. It is therefore necessary to review, however briefly, the views and attitudes of the Western powers as the permutations of the Scandinavian interplay unfolded. From the beginning, Great Britain stood out as a clear advocate of Scandinavian defence cooperation provided it was linked with a wider Western alliance that had at least the backing if not the participation of the United States. Without the United States, Britain saw the Brussels Treaty powers as too weak to take on any commitments to Scandinavia. Britain's desire to see Scandinavia included was further strengthened when the United States representatives in the Washington exploratory talks came close to insisting on including Norway, Iceland, and Denmark on account of Greenland, as territories which could "serve as a link between Western Europe and North America". Sweden's military strength was also "essential to military security from the European point of view."34 12

Skodvin, op. cit. pp. 305 - 308. Danish attitudes are also reviewed in Sven Henningsen, "Searching for Security in the North: Denmark's road to NATO", in A. de Staercke and others, NATO's Anxious Birth (London and New York 1985). ·" Blidberg, op. cit. pp. 57-59. 34 FRUS III, 1948, p. 165, 180, 210-211.

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During the autumn of 1948 the British Foreign Office, in awareness of the common desire of the three Scandinavian countries to establish a defence union in one form or another, attempted to work out a scheme for combining a western with a Scandinavian alliance. The so-called "Hankey plan", put forward in October, envisaged a Scandinavian defence union combined with Danish and Norwegian membership of a Western alliance. This curious plan, which would have given Sweden the benefit of Western solidarity whereas its obligation would be limited to the defence of Scandinavia, was turned down by Norway for two very good reasons: If the Atlantic powers were willing to offer a one-way commitment to Sweden, why should Norway — and Denmark — have to settle for less? Besides, even on those beneficial terms such an "association" with the Atlantic alliance would be unacceptable to Sweden as being incompatible with its non-aligned posture.35 The hope to bring Sweden into some sort of relationship with the Atlantic alliance lingered on in British and — to some extent — American quarters right up to the end, for two obvious reasons: Sweden's military strength would constitute a major reinforcement of the alliance's defence capability in Northern Europe. And the association of all three Scandinavian countries would free the United States and Great Britain from the risk of being blamed for dividing Scandinavia. In retrospect it is clear that this hope was in fact a chimera. But the hope was strongly nourished by the tenacious efforts of the Scandinavians themselves to work out a common solution, - as well as by the strongly pro-western utterances by which the Swedish ambassador in Washington sought to counteract the image of Sweden's doctrinaire neutralism conveyed by his Foreign Minister.36 By February, however, the two Anglo-Saxon powers had to accept the inevitable and concentrate on enlisting Norway and Denmark. And at this stage the argument for including them was more political than strategic. With the Soviet Union putting pressure on Norway — first through the January demarche about foreign military bases and then by its February offer of a bilateral non-aggression pact — Norway's defection from the western ranks would have constituted a political defeat for the West. Besides, if Norway joined then Denmark and Iceland would be more likely to follow suit, thus securing the important "stepping stones" between North America and NorthWestern Europe.37 3i

36

37

K. E. Eriksen's article in Internets}onal Politikk No. 2, 1977, pp. 274-276, is particularly clear on this point, On ambassador Boheman's views see Krister Wahlback, "USA i Skandinavien 1948 — 49: II", in Internationella Studier No. 1, 1977. National Archives, Washington DC: State Dept, RG 353, Lot No. 53 D 68. Verbatim transcripts of Washington exploratory talks. 12th meeting, 8 February 1949.

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There was nevertheless one final hurdle to be overcome, in the guise of the opposition of France. Already in the Washington exploratory talks in the summer of 1948 France had expressed doubts about the desirability of watering down the Brussels Pact by extending it to Scandinavia. Preying on M. Bonnet's mind was presumably not so much the obligation to defend Scandinavia as the prospect of having to share U. S. military assistance with more countries — particularly as the French wanted to extend western solidarity southward, to French North Africa and the Mediterranean. 38 The issue was settled for the time being when the eight countries represented in the exploratory talks agreed to put Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal and Ireland in a special category as potential members. But it was reopened during the preparatory talks in Washington in February 1949.39 France was then actively working for the admission of Italy to the future alliance, and it was known that Norway, if and when it came into the process, was opposed to the inclusion of Italy. M. Bonnet on 25 February then made a determined effort to use the issue of inviting Norway as a lever to lift Italy into the same category — even going so far as to threaten French nonparticipation if Italy, and by implication Algeria, were not covered by the treaty. The French got their way, first by a confirmation from Dean Acheson that Algeria would be covered, and then, by President Truman's acceptance to include Italy. On 1 March Norway was officially invited to take part in the preparatory talks, and on 4 March the Norwegian ambassador took his seat at the negotiating table. Italy, along with Denmark, Iceland, and Portugal, were then admitted to sign the pact on 4 April 1949 as original members.

Conclusion A Swedish historian has characterised the policy process reviewed in this paper in these words: "What went on in 1948—49 was in reality a tug-of-war between Sweden and the United States over Norway. It was decided in Norway, above all inside the Labour Party. In its parliamentary group a majority for a long time preferred the Scandinavian alternative. But the situation in the Government was the opposite, particularly among those with responsibilities for security policy."40 It is in many ways an acute observation, but it is apt to mislead. Firstly, the wide support for a Scandinavian alternative cannot be interpreted as support for the Swedish version whereby all ties with the West 18 19 40

FRUS III, 1948, e.g. Bonnet's statement at the fourth meeting, 8 July 1948, p. 163. As note 37, 13th meeting, 25 February 1949. Krister Wahlback, "USA i Skandinavien 1948-1949: I", in Internationella Studier No. 5, 1976, p. 193.

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would have been severed. Moreover, the statement falters in its main premise because it fails to take into account the long-term historical context within which the three countries arrived at their decisions. By conjuring up a picture where Norway stands in the middle of a cross-roads, trying to make up its mind which of two clearly separate roads to choose, it neglects the question of where Norway came from. It has often been said that Norway's international orientation comprises three circles: The Nordic, the European, and the Atlantic circles. The same, mutatis mutandis, can be said about Denmark, whereas for Sweden the Atlantic circle counts for very little. For Norway's national security equation, however, the Atlantic connection has been the vital one ever since Norway gained its independence.41 Norway therefore did not make its decision from a deadcentre position, but from a situation resembling a functional or informal alliance with Great Britain. This informal alliance had its roots in the close military cooperation of the wartime alliance, and built on the lesson from 1940 that the "implicit guarantee" which British sea power in the North Sea constituted was no longer sufficient. Norway's choice in 1948 —1949 was therefore never one between the Western powers and Sweden, but between different degrees of linkage with the only power group deemed able to provide sufficient reassurance. Sweden, or the Scandinavian option, was an alternative only to the extent that it could accomodate a minimum of such linkage. The whole contest therefore revolved around the determination of that minimum. When it eventually transpired that zero was the only "westward opening" that Sweden would accept, the Scandinavian option was dead, and Norway — and somewhat similarly, Denmark — crossed over from an informal to a formal alliance with the West.

This long term perspective is developed further in my chapter on "The Historical Determinants of Norwegian Foreign Policy" in J. J. Holst (ed.), Norwegian Foreign Policy in the 1980s (Oslo 1985).

The Origins of Western Defense. Belgian and Dutch Perspectives 1940-1949 by Gees Wiebes 8t Bert Zeeman

In the summer of 1948, as the negotiations on a security pact for the North Atlantic area were gaining momentum, Belgian prime minister and foreign secretary (and future Secretary General of NATO) Paul-Henri Spaak thought that a North Atlantic security pact was premature and that the provocative effect on the Soviets was not justifiable if one took into account the military potential of the North Atlantic countries. A few days before the actual signature of the North Atlantic treaty on 4 April 1949 in Washington, his Dutch colleague Dirk Uipko Stikker (another future Secretary General of NATO) even told American Secretary of State Dean Acheson that United States policy with regard to the colonial dispute between the Netherlands and Indonesia could "result in the reconsideration by his government of the advisability of signing the Pact."1 Yet, among the signatures under what is still the actual basis of Western defense, both Spaak's and Stikker's signature figure prominently. Moreover, from the second stage onwards, both Belgium and the Netherlands had been actively involved, on a basis of formal equality, with the United States, Britain, Canada and France in the negotiating process leading up to the North Atlantic treaty. Unlike Italy, Iceland, Portugal, Norway and Denmark they were thus able to influence the final outcome of the negotiations.2 Therefore, if a definitive account of the creation of NATO is ever going to the published, the views and actions of these two small countries bordering the North Sea have to be taken full account of. This contribution is partly meant to fulfil that function. It gives a general outline of Belgian and Dutch ideas about, motives for and actions with regard 1

2

For Spaak: Escort Reid, Time of Fear and Hope. The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty 1947-1949, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977, p. 115. For Stikker: Foreign Relations of the United States (henceforth FRUS) 1949, Vol. IV. Western Europe, pp. 259-261. Given its acknowledged, limited role, we will pay no attention to Luxemburg. Norway participated only in the last few weeks of the negotiations.

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to the creation of military alliances in post-war Western Europe. In separate paragraphs the creation, and partially the development, of the Treaty of Dunkirk (4 March 1947), the Treaty of Brussels (17 March 1948) and the North Atlantic Treaty (4 April 1949) will be discussed on the basis of research in the archives of the states involved in the negotiations leading up to these military alliances, and of recent scholarship. The three paragraphs will be preceded by a short introduction in Dutch and Belgian war-time and postwar thinking about military alliances, to put their behaviour in the period 1947—1949 in proper historical perspective. During the war both governments developed projects which proved to be viable in circumstances which neither had predicted.3

I. After the German attack on Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg and France in the morning of 10 May 1940 and the subsequent occupation of their territory, both the Dutch and the Belgian governments (although the latter after quite some hesitations) found refuge in London. Their exile in Britain proved to be much longer than anyone had expected in 1940. The Belgian government returned to Brussels after four years in September 1944, whereas the Dutch even had to wait a year longer. They only returned in May 1945 after the final defeat of Hitler Germany. Liberation and economic reconstruction of their countries was the no. 1 priority of both governments during the war, but that did not blind them to other post-war issues they would face. Among those issues the problem of the post-war organization of peace and security figured quite prominently from the winter of 1942-43 onwards, after the tide had definitely turned against Germany and Japan. Dutch post-war planning in the field of foreign policy was dominated by foreign secretary Eelco Nicolaas van Kleffens, a career diplomat who had become a member of the Dutch cabinet in 1939.4 Before the war Van Kleffens had been raised and educated in that peculiar brand of neutralism, termed "aloofness", so conveniently suited to Dutch economic and political interests, 3

4

This essay forms part of our research on the origins of NATO and the role of the Belgian and Dutch governments. Ideas developed herein have been presented at conferences in Friedrichroda (GDR), Kent, Ohio (USA) and Rotterdam. They have been partly published in: Cees Wiebes and Bert Zeeman, 'Nederland, Belgie en de sovjetdreiging (1942-1948)', Internationale Spectator, Vol. 41 No. 9 (September 1987), pp. 468-477. Cf. his memoirs: E. N. van Kleffens, Belevenissen, I (1894-1940) en II (1940-1958), Alphen aan den Rijn: A.W. Sijthoff, 1980 and 1983. Van Kleffens was Foreign Secretary from 1939 until 1946. In 1947 he became Dutch ambassador to the United States.

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but the war experience did not fail to have its influence on his thinking. In the period 1941 —1943 he developed a scheme for post-war security which must be evaluated as a creative and novel contribution to the thinking about the maintenance of post-war peace.5 According to Van Kleffens "no universal or quasi-universal organisation can be the corner-stone of international order and its preservation." Therefore he proposed the creation of five regional security organizations, centring around the world's oceans and seas.6 To contain Germany and Japan, the only aggressive states in Van Kleffens's opinion, he advocated an Atlantic, Pacific, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean and Baltic organization, to be based on sea-power and with active participation by the United States. In addition, but less thought out, he envisioned similar organizations based on land-power in Eastern Europe and the Balkans with a prominent role for the Soviet Union. With regard to the Atlantic regional organization, he considered the United States, Canada and the other British Dominions to be the arsenal; Britain to be the base; and France, Belgium and the Netherlands to be the bridge-head. Van Kleffens's scheme gives occasion to a number of observations. Firstly, his proposal for some kind of Atlantic alliance was clearly influenced by similar ideas of his (likewise exiled) Norwegian colleague Trygve Lie. The latter discussed these ideas already in the winter of 1940-41 at the British Foreign Office and subsequently with Van Kleffens and Spaak.7 However, and this is the second observation, Van Kleffens projected Lie's scheme on a worldwide scale, giving the Netherlands the chance to profile itself as a 'middle power'. Because of its colonial possessions in Asia and the Caribbean, the Netherlands would become a member of more than one regional security organization and thus distinguish itself from, for instance, Denmark or Norway. Thirdly, the success of his scheme depended upon United States participation. They would have to become member of all regional organizations, clearly replacing Britain as the sheetanchor of Dutch foreign policy. As to the Soviet Union, and this is the last observation, the lack of attention for this new ally (the Netherlands only recognized the Soviet Union on 10 July 1942!) must be seen as a consequence of the strong current of Dutch anti-communism, 5

6

7

A. E. Kersten, 'Van Kleffens' plan voor regionale veiligheidsorganisaties 1941 — 1943", in: Jaarboek van het Departement van Buitenlandse Zaken 1980-1981, 's-Gravenhage: Staatsuitgeverij, 1981, pp. 161 — 164. Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague (henceforth NMFA), Legation London Secret Archives, Box 21, Folder 0.7/3, Memorandum by Van Kleffens, 28 May 1942. Cf. O!av Riste, 'Norway's "Atlantic Policy". The Genesis of North Atlantic Defence Cooperation', in: Andre de Staercke et al., NATO's Anxious Birth. The Prophetic Vision of the 1940s, London: C. Hurst & Co. 1985, pp. 18-29 and Kersten, 'Van Kleffens' plan', pp. 157164.

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although Van Kleffens recognized "that continued cooperation with the U.S.S.R., also because of collective security, dictated itself".8 Belgian post-war planning was more limited and more comprehensive at the same time. More limited in the sense that in the eyes of the chief policy makers, Spaak and his secretary general Fernand Van Langenhove9, Belgium's future should be sought in a Western European entente under British guidance; more comprehensive in the sense that one should aim for military, political as well as economic cooperation at the same time. The experiences of the inter-war period (the secret military treaty with France; Belgium's participation in the Locarno system; the return to neutralism in 1936) forced Spaak already in November 1939 to profess that in his opinion the Belgian government ought to aim for such a Western European entente.10 The German attack in May 1940 and the exile in London merely reinforced his conviction. During the war Spaak therefore tried to lure the British government into concluding a bilateral Anglo-Belgian agreement as a first step towards a more encompassing Western European entente, only to be rebuffed by his British hosts. For instance, on 9 November 1944 Spaak, at the request of British foreign secretary Anthony Eden, presented an elaborate memorandum, outlining the guiding principles of projected Belgian foreign policy: 1) regional cooperation between Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, France and Britain in the military, political and economic fields; 2) the containment of Germany as the major objective; and 3) a regional Western European entente as a component of a universal organization. 11 Spaak again advocated an AngloBelgian agreement, but all to no avail. Belgian post-war planning also lends itself to a number of observations. In the first place, Spaak intended to build his system of post-war international relations from the bottom upwards. As he told parliament in December 1944, his system consisted of a three storeyed peace: the regional associations being the floor, the next floor a European alliance, and the top floor being the world organization 12 , and clearly the ground floor was essential to build the others. 8

State Institute for War Documentation, Amsterdam, Collection Van Kleffens, Van Kleffens to Loudon, 11 Mar 1944. 9 Cf. Paul-Henri Spaak, Cotnbats Inacheves, Tome 1. De ['Independence a I'Alliance, Paris: Fayard, 1969 and Fernand Van Langenhove, La Belgique en Quete de Securite, 1920—1940, Bruxelles: La Renaissance du Livre, 1968 and La Securite de la Belgique. Contribution a l'bistoire de la periode 1940-1950, Bruxelles: Editions de l'Universite de Bruxelles, 1971. Spaak was Foreign Secretary of Belgium continuously from 1939 until 1949. 10 Jacques Willequet, Paul-Henri Spaak. Un homme, des combats, Bruxelles: La Renaissance du Livre, 1975, p. 93. " Printed in: Van Langenhove, La Securite de la Belgique, pp. 131 — 134. 12 Cf. Paul F. Smets (ed.), La Pensee Europeenne et Atiantique de Paul-Henri Spaak (1942 — 1972), Tome 1, Bruxelles: Goemaere, 1980, pp. 52-63.

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This leads to the second observation: Soviet participation in Spaak's European alliance was of paramount importance; he even assessed the 1942 Anglo-Soviet treaty of alliance as "the cornerstone of world peace".13 In the third place, British concurrence was a sine qua non for a successful implementation of the scheme. Spaak was not prepared to jump at the overtures of the French government to deal with them first. There had to be an Anglo-Belgian agreement from the outset, or there would never be a regional Western European organization. Comparing Dutch and Belgian post-war planning, some important differences come to the fore. Dutch world-wide aspirations, as evidenced by their stress on the middle power concept and their desire to remain involved in other regions than Europe, clearly contrast with the Belgian preoccupation with its regional, European future. Spaak, for instance, opposed Van Kleffens's scheme because he feared that powers with limited interests, like Belgium, would risk becoming involved in war because of the adventures of those with world-wide interests. l4 This difference in aspiration carries over in the way both governments intended to defend their interests in the post-war world. Whereas the Dutch expected to occupy a middle position between the big haves and the small have-nots and thus to hold their own vis-a-vis the outside world, the Belgian government modestly decided to align itself with one of the Big Three in order to have some influence in the future world organization. In their choice of primary allies, the two countries also differed. Spaak pinned all his hopes on Britain, so much so that the press commented that 'Belgium is Britain's Baby'. Van Kleffens, on the other hand, expected salvation from the other side of the Atlantic. He preferred to play the American 'ace' instead of the British 'king'.15 Lastly, Belgian post-war planning was much more comprehensive than Dutch thinking. Van Kleffens was solely preoccupied by the security issue, whereas Spaak had a much keener eye for the interrelationship of economic, political and military issues. Apart from the differences, Belgian and Dutch post-war planning had one major characteristic in common, i. e. the importance attached to the ideas about a future world organization (embodied first in the Four Power Plan, later in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals and culminating in the United Nations Organization). Van Kleffens's reluctance to accept a universal organization as the corner-stone of worldpeace has already been mentioned. The unwillingness 11

14

15

Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brussels (henceforth BMFA), File 12237, Spaak to Le Ghait, 13 Nov 1944. NMFA, Legation London Secret Archives, Box 21, Folder 0.7/3, Spaak to Van Kleffens, 30 Nov 1942. BMFA, File 12237, Goris to Spaak, 27 Dec 1944 and NMFA, Collection Van Kleffens, Files III/A-Z, Loudon to Van Kleffens, 10 Sept 1941.

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of the great powers during the 1945 San Francisco conference to honour Dutch claims to be treated as a middle power and the subordinate role assigned to the non-permanent members of the Security Council merely reinforced Dutch aloofness towards the United Nations. From another starting-point, Spaak also hesitated to embrace wholeheartedly the new organization. What good was to be expected if the international community seemed to start building the roof (the universal organization) as the groundfloor (the regional organizations) had not even left the drawing-board? Both countries therefore accepted the primacy of collective security, embodied in the United Nations, in their post-war foreign policy only grudgingly.16 Given the attitude of Britain and the United States there was hardly another choice for Belgium and the Netherlands. As long as these two nations openly expressed their confidence in and allegiance to the United Nations, the other Western nations were to follow suit. Moreover, instead of favouring treaties with the smaller Western European nations, the United States government concentrated all their efforts on the Four Power (Byrnes) treaty against Germany, whereas the British lent priority to a treaty with France before dealing with others. It took the two governments almost two years after the end of hostilities in Europe before they were able to reach such an agreement. On 4 March 1947 they finally concluded the Treaty of Dunkirk.

With regard to the Treaty of Dunkirk both Sean Greenwood and John Young have concluded that it signified the end of a distinct era, lasting from 1944 to 1947, in which it had been hoped to build world peace on the cooperation of the Big powers and the United Nations.17 The Anglo-French treaty, directed against German aggression, completed the triangular treaty-system between Britain, France and the Soviet Union. The cracks opening up between the Western powers and the Soviet Union during the Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) conference in March —April 1947, the Soviet refusal to accept the Marshall Plan offer in the summer of 1947, and the final breakdown of Four Power negotiations during the London CFM in November — December 1947 all support this point of view. 16

17

However, Spaak became the first chairman of the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Netherlands was elected one of the non-permanent members of the first Security Council. Cf. Sean Greenwood, 'Return to Dunkirk: The Origins of the Anglo-French Treaty of March 1947', in: Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 6 No. 4 (December 1983), pp. 49-50 and John W. Young, Britain, France and the Unity of Europe, 1945 — 51, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1984, pp. 50-51.

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However, as Brouwer has noted cogently, to the Belgians the signature of the Dunkirk Treaty marked the beginning of a new era.18 After two years of frustration, the conclusion of the Anglo-French treaty removed the main stumbling-block the British government had thrown up to resist Belgian overtures. Spaak still preferred a regional entente over the system of collective security, and the Dunkirk Treaty with its military and economic provisions presented an opportunity to move forward. Already before the actual signature of the treaty by Ernest Bevin and Georges Bidault, he therefore launched a major diplomatic offensive in the first months of 1947. In a rather off the cuff-way he took the initiative because the psychological moment for a closer union of the countries of Western Europe seemed at hand. As the British and French were still in the process of completing the treaty text, Spaak proposed to both governments that Belgium was prepared to integrate herself with the Anglo-French alliance "since an alliance solely with either would be inacceptable to Belgian public opinion."19 He repeated his offer (dating from 1944) to the Soviet government to conclude a treaty of friendship and alliance and he suggested the Dutch should take the same initiatives, without however suggesting the creation of a Belgian-Dutch alliance. In Spaak's opinion, relations were already so close that a formal alliance was superfluous. The Dutch reaction to Spaak's overtures is a clear indication of his overoptimistic evaluation of Belgian-Dutch relations. Foreign secretary Baron van Boetzelaer was clearly annoyed by Spaak's unilateral initiative. He considered it ill-timed given the fact that the Byrnes-treaty was still on the agenda of the CFM and the United States government's attitude towards the security of Western Europe was still unclear. Van Boetzelaer therefore instructed his ambassador in Brussels to tell Spaak that he was not prepared to copy Belgian 'pactomania'. He even assumed more sinister motives, as he professed to detect behind Spaak's initiative the direction of the French government to which siren the Belgians were never impervious. 20 The initiative of the Belgians floundered, despite the encouraging remarks by Bevin, en route to Moscow, who told officials of Spaak's ministry at the Brussels railway station that Britain was prepared to conclude treaties of 18

19

20

Jan Willem Brouwer, 'Repondre a la Politique Europeenne Fran£aise. La Belgique et le Conseil de Cooperation Economique, 1944-1948', in: Michel Dumoulin (ed.), La Belgique et les Debuts de la Construction Europeenne, de la Guerre aux Traites de Rome, Louvain la Neuve: Ciaco, 1987, p. 61. Washington National Records Center, Suitland (henceforth WNRC), RG 84, Brussels Post Files, Confidential Files, Box 23, 710 Alliances, Kirk to Sec of State, No. 303, 28 Feb 1947. Cf. NMFA, DNW archive WEU, 999.1, Box 4, Folder 12, Van Boetzelaer to Van Harinxma, DPZ 19633-1448, 6 Mar 1947 and Memorandum by Van Boetzelaer, DPZ 26170-1935GS, 21 Mar 1947.

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alliance with all her Western European neighbours. Both the British and the French advised Spaak to wait for the outcome of the Moscow CFM. Spaak had gambled and lost, at least for the time being. The time was not ripe for his conceptions yet. Nevertheless, the issue of closer economic, political and military cooperation among Western European countries had been tabled, not to be shelved again. Spaak instructed his officials to study the issue of alliances in detail to be better prepared when the next occasion would arise. 21 He did not like this passive attitude, as he told the Dutch and Americans, but circumstances forced him to wait and see. The conclusion of the Moscow CFM at the end of April 1947 brought him back into play. Only a week after Bevin's return in London, Belgian officials again suggested an early discussion of the alliance issue. At first, prospects seemed to be brighter for Spaak. Although the British Foreign Office reacted reticent, to Spaak's chagrin, Bevin ordered a reconsideration of Western European cooperation.22 In the slowly deteriorating relations between East and West, Bevin advocated closer cooperation with Britain's neighbours just as the Americans were doing with the Latin American countries and the Soviets with their Eastern European neighbours. He ordered the preparation of a cabinet paper after the Chiefs of Staff had given their opinion. In the meantime Spaak doubled his energy to convince the Dutch that closer Western European cooperation was a necessity, given the evolution of the East-West relationship. Aiming at the heart of Dutch objections, he tried to convince them that the United States would not turn its back on a united Western Europe. On the contrary, in Spaak's opinion the United States might equally well be encouraged to help those who were prepared to help themselves.23 Having thus covered the ground with his future allies and allowed the British some time to rethink their policy towards alliances, Spaak prepared another diplomatic initiative at the beginning of June. Two days before Marshall's celebrated Harvard speech, a high level meeting was organised at his ministry. Those assembled decided to relaunch the issue of closer Western European cooperation with renewed vigor, aiming for a network of bilateral treaties directed against German aggression. Contrary to the abortive attempt of February/March, however, a preliminary tuning to Dutch policy was considered essential. In Spaak's own words: "It is difficult to imagine that regarding such a fundamental issue, our respective policies diverge".24 If there was to be a new initiative, it had to be a joint Belgian-Dutch one. 21

22 21

24

See the memoranda in BMFA, File 12237 and Studycenter for the History of the Second World War, Brussels, De Gruben Papers, PG 6, File 71. Young, Britain, France and the Unity of Europe, pp. 59-61. Public Record Office, Kew, Richmond (hereafter PRO), FO 371/67646, Z 3830/50/4, Harrison to Hoyer-Millar, No. 8/27/47, 10 Apr 1947. BMFA, File 10957 bis, Year 1947, Spaak to Guillaume, No. P/452/26/3894, 19 June 1947.

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This time The Hague reacted in a more positive way, but in the middle of June a concerted Anglo-French action dealt a deathblow to Spaak's intentions. The British and the French told him that it was an inappropriate moment to start discussions on treaties of alliance in view of the proposals of George Marshall for the economic rehabilitation of Europe. Priority should therefore be given to European cooperation in the economic field. As Bevin told his officials, "I have great doubts about pressing political issues when I am trying to keep everything on the economic plane". 25 Spaak accepted his defeat graciously. He called off any planning about political and military alliances and concentrated all his efforts on the economic side of Europe's future. During the Marshall Plan conference in Paris he played a leading role in aligning the Western European nations.

In the beginning of November 1947, shortly before the opening of the London CFM, Van Boetzelaer volunteered Spaak's opinion about the conclusion of treaties of alliance. Spaak, this time with unusual cautiousness, replied that the time was not ripe yet. 26 Six weeks later all had changed. The failure of the Big Four to reach any kind of agreement on the future of Germany, or any other issue for that matter, presents a watershed in the history of postwar Europe. After Marshall, Bevin, Bidault and Molotov adjourned sine die on 15 December 1947, policy alternatives which had been brushed off the table in the previous period became feasible again. This was realized both in Brussels and The Hague. At the foreign ministries officials rehearsed the options and possibilities regarding Western European cooperation, but no initiatives were contemplated. As the Director of Political Affairs in The Hague, Han Boon, concluded, this time the smaller nations would have to be the 'invitees' in stead of the 'invitors'.27 The invitation arrived on the eve of Bevin's celebrated Western Unionspeech on 22 January 1948 in the House of Commons. The governments of the Benelux countries were informed about the contents of Bevin's speech and about his ideas with regard to closer Western European cooperation. 28 Spaak warmly welcomed the British move. He had become quite critical of British 25 26

27 28

PRO, fO 371/67724, Z679J/737/72G, Comment Bevin, 11 July 1947. NMFA, Embassy iMndon Secret Archives, Box 26, File C 8/16(1), Polder Germany, Memorandum of conversation Van Boet/.elaer with Spaak on 6 November 1947, 8 Nov 1947. NMFA, DNW archive WEU, 999.1, Box 4, Folder 12, Comment Boon, undated. For the general background to Bevin's speech: Alan Bullock, Ernest Kevin, Foreign Secretary, London: Heinemann, 1983, pp. 513 — 518.

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unwillingness to commit itself after the rebuffs of 1947. His exasperation reached a new peak after the CFM failure. Unaware of the planning taking place in London in preparation of Bevin's speech, Spaak began to look to the United States for political guidance, but even Washington was leaving the Western Europeans in the dark as to the consequences it attached to the CFMfailure. 29 His primary public reaction was therefore as enthusiastic as it had been after Bevin's remarks at the Brussels railway station in March 1947, but this time his enthusiasm was well-founded. He immediately broached consultations with his Dutch and Luxemburger colleagues in order to discuss Bevin's proposals. Britain finally seemed to have taken the lead he had been asking for for over five years and the fulfilment of his war-time dream seemed to be at hand.30 Unlike Spaak, Van Boetzelaer did not embrace Bevin's plans outright. He did not want to rush things yet. Van Boetzelaer agreed, however, with his Belgian colleague that a prompt reaction was needed and therefore the Benelux countries decided to use an already scheduled meeting of prime ministers and foreign secretaries in Luxemburg to discuss Bevin's proposals and to decide upon a common approach. During their meeting on 31 January the three governments agreed to act together and to present the British and French with a united front. 31 Given the fact that those countries were the 'invitors' and the Benelux countries the 'invitees', they considered themselves in a stronger position to realize their special wishes. One of these wishes, to become full partners in the discussions over the future of Germany (at least the three Western zones), was complied with within a few weeks. Shortly before the opening of the three-power conference on Germany opening up on 23 February in London, the Benelux powers were invited to take their seats at the conference table. The governments concerned considered this invitation an immediate result of their united stand and the invitation thus strengthened their conviction that they would be able to catch even bigger fish during the Western Union-negotiations. Actual negotiations over Bevin's proposals started in earnest after the exchange of separate but identical British and French memoranda on the one hand and a joint Benelux memorandum on the other on 19 February 1948.32 The Anglo-French offer consisted of the expansion of the Dunkirk Treaty by 29

National Archives, Washington (hereafter NA), RG 59, Confidential File 1945-1949, Box C38, 711.SSI I - 948, Millard to Sec of State, No. 13, 9 Jan 1948. 30 See Spaak, Combats Inacbeves, pp. 253 — 255: Jean Stengers, 'Paul-Henri Spaak et le Traite de Bruxelles', in: Raymond Poidevin (ed.), Histoire des Debuts de la Construction Europeenne, Mars 1948-Mai 1950, Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1986, pp. 126-132 and Wiebes and Zeeman, 'Nederland, Belgie en de sovjetdreiging', pp. 474 — 475. " BMFA, File 12237, Minutes of meeting, 29 Jan 1948 and Unsigned memorandum, 1 Feb 1948. 32 All proposals in NMFA, DNW archive WEU, 999.1, Box 4, Folder 12 and BMFA, File 12237.

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a series of bilateral treaties linking Britain and France with each of the Benelux countries. In their opinion there was no need to depart from the Dunkirk model. Any other formula would only provoke unnecessarily the Soviet Union and might present the American government with an excuse not to commit itself militarily to the European continent given the impression that Western Europe seemed to take care of its own security. However, the Benelux counter-proposal, hammered out in a number of high level meetings between 31 January and 14 February, suggested such a new formula. They proposed from the outset a multilateral, five-power, treaty; covering not only military assistance but political and economic cooperation as well and therefore necessitating the creation of organizational machinery. They considered the Treaty of Dunkirk "an insufficient basis" to accomplish the goals Bevin had alluded to on 22 January, since that treaty did not correspond any longer to the changed international situation. Instead they preferred a treaty modelled on the Inter-American Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, signed the previous fall. The Benelux preference was to a large extent motivated by Spaak's vision of Western European cooperation. After all those years of waiting and all the changes in the East-West relationship, he did not want to end up in the deadend alley of bilateral treaties. The great thing, as Stengers puts it, was that of Europe.33 Now that the opportunity finally presented itself and the actions of the Soviet Union were driving the western nations closer together, Western European cooperation should be given a solid base. Given this objective, Spaak was quite susceptible to American diplomats eloquently advertising the virtues of the Rio Treaty.34 The American support reinforced Spaak's conviction that the Benelux way was the only right way to go. The attitude of the American government also convinced the Dutch government that their multilateral approach was the correct one. At the beginning of February they had been unpleasantly surprised to find out that Bevin's proposals were founded on less solid ground than they had appeared to be.35 Van Boetzelaer knew that they first had to act in Western Europe itself, but given the British attitude and the fixed Dutch distrust of French intentions a future link with the United States was needed. To go forward in the direction the Americans themselves were advocating was therefore neces-

33 34

35

Stengers, 'Paul-Henri Spaak et le Traite de Bruxelles', p. 129. Cf. for instance: NA, RG 59, Confidential File 1945 - 1949, Box C-38, 711.55/1 - 948, Millard to Sec of State, 9 Jan 1948; and WNRC, RG 84, Brussels Post Files, Confidential Files, Box 38, 710 WESP, Millard to Sec of State, 16 Jan 1948 and Millard to Kirk, 3 Feb 1948. Especially the meeting of Bevin's deputy Hector McNeil with Spaak, Van Boetzelaer and Bech on 5 February in Brussels was revealing in this respect. Cf. NMFA, Embassy London Secret Archives, Box 23, Folder GA/C8, Van Boetzelaer to Michiels, 6 Feb 1948.

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sary. Both Belgians and Dutch felt so strong in this respect that they decided on the eve of the discussions in Brussels to refuse to negotiate if the British and French persisted in their bilateral, Dunkirk approach.36 The Benelux countries reaped the second success of their united stand before the discussions between the experts on the actual treaty text opened up on 4 March 1948 in Brussels. First the British government and subsequently the French gave up resistance to the multilateral approach in the face of their inflexible attitude. Two other factors played also into the Beneluxers' hands. Reference has already been made to the American backing of the multilateral formula. At the end of February American diplomats in London and Paris greatly intensified their pressure on the British and French governments to accept the Benelux proposal. At the same time the events in Czechoslovakia, the so-called 'Coup de Prague', provoked an unusual alarmist situation in French governmental circles which ultimately paved the way for the acceptance of a multilateral treaty. More successes followed during the discussions in Brussels from 4 until 15 March.37 With regard to closer economic cooperation the Benelux representatives were able to overcome British resistance to agreements which might lead to the duplication of work already done in existing organizations. Bevin wanted to give a preeminent place to the newly created Organization for European Economic Cooperation and resisted for a long time the Benelux proposal to intensify economic relations through new five powermachinery. In the end he gave in. Likewise, with regard to the mutual assistance clause, Benelux demands prevailed. Their opposition to a clause without geographical limits proved successful. In order not to become involved in conflicts in the Sudan or (with foresight!) the Falklands, they advocated automatic military assistance only in the case of aggression against the metropolitan territories in Europe. The British and French ultimately agreed. Although it would be unfair to present the outcome of the Brussels Treaty negotiations as a catalogue of Benelux successes (for instance, in the case of deleting references to Germany in the treaty they did not have it their way), the final result bore definitely their stamp.38 The prime motive of their success was undoubtedly their concerted action. Faced by a united front, the British and French were all too ready to give in to their demands. However, as soon as their unity dissipated, they were forced by their opponents to concede (for instance with regard to the mention of Germany and the role of overseas 36 37

38

BMFA, File 12071, Minutes of Meeting of Benelux representatives, B/PV/1, 3 Mar 1948. Full documentation on the Brussels Treaty negotiations can be found in: NMFA, DNW archive WEU, 999.1, Box 4, Folder 13 and Box 5, Folder 15. Stengers, in our opinion, is unnecessarily negative in his evaluation of Benelux results. Cf. Stengers, 'Paul-Henri Spaak et le Traite de Bruxelles', pp. 138 —140.

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dependencies). Other motives, each of course reinforcing the others, were the fact that the Benelux countries were invited by the British and French, and therefore were able to be more demanding than if the situation had been the other way around, and the fact that in the background the American government supported almost all the issues the Benelux countries hoped to include in the treaty text. With regard to the last motive an additional observation has to be made. At the time and also in recent scholarly accounts the Benelux representatives, and especially Spaak, have been accused of being manipulated by the Americans. As Pierre Melandri puts it: "the Belgian prime minister seemed to have been charged with the task of representing the United States vis-a-vis his future allies."39 There is no need, and there are certainly no grounds, to deny that Spaak (and Van Kleffens in Washington) kept in very close contact with American diplomats and officials. They certainly enjoyed the willing ear presented by the Americans and were strengthened in their conviction that their proposals with regard to the future treaty were the right ones. It is too easy, however, to read too much in American charge Millard's note to Washington that Spaak was "exceptionally gratified and appeared enjoy exchange bouquets with Department" after the British and French had given up their resistance to a multilateral treaty. Stengers correctly notes that in this case the objectives of the Benelux governments and those of the American government were almost identical and both reinforced the position of the other vis-a-vis the British and French.40 Finally, the Benelux successes should not blind one to the different goals these governments were ultimately aiming for. The prospect of a Western European entente following the conclusion of the Treaty of Dunkirk, — tempted Spaak to an active policy in February-March 1947 which was not shared by his Dutch colleague. In the spring of 1948 the possibility of United States involvement generated a joint Belgian-Dutch attitude. The two countries coordinated their strategy and were able to influence the outcome of the Brussels Treaty negotiations to a considerable extent. However, whereas the Belgian government essentially was working for the fulfilment of its November 1944 memorandum (a Western European entente with benevolent and detached American backing), the Dutch were aiming for the achievement of their wartime dream. During conversations at the State Department, ambassador Van Kleffens did not fail to draw American attention to his concept of a regional 39

40

Pierre Melandri, Les Etats Unis face a ['Unification de ['Europe, 1945-1954, Lille: Service de Reproduction de Theses, 1979, p. 294. FRUS 1948, Vol. Ill, p. 38 and Stengers, 'Paul-Henri Spaak et le Traite de Bruxelles', p. 136.

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Atlantic security organization.41 This fundamental difference of objective surfaced quite clearly after the Belgians and Dutch became involved in the North Atlantic treaty negotiations.

IV. The immediate origins of the Atlantic alliance date back, like those of the Brussels Treaty, to the events following the failure of the London CFM and culminating in Bevin's Western Union speech. Bevin's strategy was twofold: organizing Western Europe and bringing in the United States to restore the balance of power in Europe. In the months following his speech he therefore conducted two separate sets of negotiations: on the one hand with his Western European neighbours and on behalf of them with the United States, and on the other secret bilateral Anglo-American discussions (later trilateral, including Canada). The first set led to the Brussels Treaty and the joint Anglo-French request, on behalf of all five nations, for American support on 17 March. At the same time, the second set led to the ultra-secret Pentagon negotiations at the end of March 1948 in Washington. Unknown to its Brussels Treaty allies, the British hammered out the contours of a future North Atlantic treaty with Americans and Canadians.42 Although the Anglo-Saxon conferees decided to keep everything as secret as possible, some of those who were not present at the conference table in the bowels of the Pentagon found out that secret discussions were taking place. Following the signature of the Brussels Treaty, Bevin intimated to his smaller allies, in a disguised way and without going into any details, that he was broaching discussions with the Americans. Perhaps alerted by this hint, the Dutch embassy soon found out that British Under-Secretary of State Gladwyn Jebb had arrived in Washington, ostensibly for discussions with the British representative to the U. N. Security Council. When they directed themselves to the State Department, however, no information was provided. The Americans were better at keeping secrets than the British (even leaving aside the presence of Donald MacLean during the Pentagon negotiations). Notwithstanding their awareness that something involving the United States was going on, the Belgians and Dutch really wanted to put teeth into the Brussels Treaty Organization. They proposed regular meetings of the ministers of Foreign Affairs as the Consultative Council foreseen in article 41

42

NA, RG 59, Confidential File 1945-1949, Box C-509, 840.20/3-448, Memo of Conversation Hulley, 4 Mar 1948. Cf. Cees Wiebes and Bert Zeeman, 'The Pentagon negotiations March 1948: the launching of the North Atlantic Treaty', International Affairs, Vol. 59 No. 3 (Summer 1983), pp. 351-363.

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VII, once a month at least and convening in the city where the secretariat would be housed (preferably Brussels). Likewise they foresaw the creation of politico-military and economic-social committees and they expected a strong Secretary General.43 However, they met with fierce, although unorchestrated, British and French resistance. The British were opposed to almost all Benelux suggestions, whereas the French were prepared to accept them provided that the organizational structure was housed in Paris. Eventually the five reached a compromise: London was to be the seat of the committees and the secretariat; the Consultative Council would meet every three months, alternately in one of the capitals of the member states; and the Netherlands was to designate a Secretary General. These preliminary skirmishes boded ill for the future of the Brussels Treaty Organization. The organizational problems, however, were nothing compared to those in the field of logistics and armaments. The five Western European countries (three of them fighting colonial wars in South-East Asia) were hardly in a position to defend themselves. In May 1948 their answer to the American questionnaire about the state of their defense and their military plans, was full of good intentions but lacking any hard figures.44 Bevin and his French colleague Bidault therefore stepped up pressure on the American government to open discussions with the Brussels Treaty powers as soon as possible, but the Western Europeans had to wait for internal American backing before president Truman was willing to go ahead in an election year. The Vandenberg Resolution secured an ex post facto legitimation of the Pentagon negotiations, gave Truman the green light and within a fortnight invitations were sent to the Brussels Treaty powers and Canada to start discussions on an Atlantic alliance. Belgium and the Netherlands were both invited to participate in these discussions on an equal footing with their larger allies. Shortly after the Pentagon negotiations the Americans had expressed their preference for one Benelux representative (favouring Van Kleffens), but Spaak insisted on separate representation. Being aware of Van Kleffens's Atlanticist bent, Spaak preferred not to be represented by the Dutchman. In the period after the signature of the Brussels Treaty, Spaak, as the Americans and Canadians found out when he visited them early in April, placed all his hopes on closer Western European cooperation with some American backing. He did not aim for, and he certainly did not expect, an Atlantic alliance to come to fruition within a short period 43

NMFA, Embassy Brussels Secret Archives, Box 39, Folder Western Union, Proposal Benelux, 23 Mar 1948. The Dutch sounded their former minister of Foreign Affairs J. H. van Roijen for the post of Secretary General.

44

See FRUS 1948, Vol. Ill, pp. 123-126.

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of time. He therefore wanted to have his own representative at the conference table in Washington. During the actual negotiations, taking place from 6 July until 10 September 1948; from 10 until 24 December 1948; and from 14 January until 15 March 1949, the Belgian and Dutch representatives (ambassador Silvercruys, Roger Taymans and Robert Vaes on behalf of Belgium: ambassador Van Kleffens, Otto Reuchlin and Gees Vreede on behalf of the Netherlands) did not play as prominent a role as their American, British or French colleagues. In his contemporary account of the negotiations, Nicholas Henderson for instance concludes with regard to Silvercruys that he, while serving as an excellent lubricant, "rarely contributed much in the way of ideas". Henderson is more positive with regard to Van Kleffens who was invariably sensitive and sensible. He always "sought to contribute by clear analysis and timely suggestion to the success of the negotiations".45 The Dutch and Belgians, however, were clearly the minor powers at the conference table and therefore hardly in a position to dominate the discussions or to propose controversial issues. Most of the time, at least during the second round of negotiations, they occupied a middle position between the British and the French; the Dutch leaning more to the British in their insistence on an Atlantic security arrangement and the Belgians leaning more to the French point of view that priority should be given to American military aid and emergency planning. Especially the Belgian attitude is noteworthy. After one month of negotiations, one of the Canadian representatives reported full of exasperation to Ottawa that the Belgian contribution, like the French, had so far been "exactly zero".46 Spaak, in the summer of 1948, still seriously doubted the wisdom and urgency of concluding an alliance that would tie the United States to Western Europe. One of Spaak's collaborators, Baron Robert Rothschild, denies these allegations, claiming that none of the obstacles which had to be cleared between the signing of the Brussels Treaty and the conclusion of the North Atlantic treaty was created by the Belgian government.47 The confusion created by Spaak during his visit to Canada and the United States in April 1948, the instructions to his representatives in Washington48, and his attitude during the meeting of the Brussels Treaty Consultative Council at the end of July in The

45

Sir Nicholas Henderson, The Birth of Ν ΑΤΟ, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982, p. 42. "** Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, File 283(s), North Atlantic Security Pact, Part 2, Stone to Pearson, 10 Aug 1948. 47 Cf. Robert Rothschild, 'Paul-Henri Spaak - Future Secretary General. Belgium sees its hopes fulfilled', in: De Staercke, NATO's Anxious Birth, p. 114. 48 BMFA, File 12071 Year 1948, Spaak to Silvercruys, 26 June 1948. Also: Vincent Auriol, Journal du Septennat, Tome 2, 1948, Paris: Armand Colin, 1974, p. 298.

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Hague49, all point in a different direction. Spaak was not one of the most outspoken supporters of an Atlantic alliance in the preliminary stages of the treaty negotiations.50 In the course of August the Belgian attitude changed. As the American government increasingly showed itself prepared to commit itself to the security of Western Europe; the Berlin Blockade heightened tension between East and West, and even the French government accepted the urgency of an Atlantic alliance, the Belgians fell in line. On 10 September during the concluding discussion of the so-called Washington Paper, the final result of the second negotiating round, Silvercruys wholeheartedly endorsed the Canadian view that the continued certainty about the long-term position of the United States as a partner in a North Atlantic security system far outweighed whatever new risks might conceivably arise from the conclusion of the pact.51 This was a long way from Spaak's previously expressed doubts. The Dutch attitude during the second stage had been, on the whole, more constructive. Van Kleffens never deviated from the course he had set in wartime London. The elections and formation of a new cabinet in July — August 1948 in the Netherlands gave him considerable leeway in the negotiations and after the new cabinet had been formed, the successor to Van Boetzelaer, Dirk Stikker, was such a newcomer in foreign affairs that Van Kleffens permitted himself liberties which other, more experienced ministers, would not have tolerated.52 He warmly recommended the Washington Paper to his new chief. The agreement on that paper and its approval by the American, Canadian and Western Union governments, paved the way for the discussion of the actual text of the treaty and the membership issue. After Truman's reelection and the meeting of minds of the Brussels Treaty powers as to the provisions they wanted included in the treaty text, the negotiations were resumed in Washington on 10 December. A number of contentious issues arose whose solution, in a number of cases, was seriously influenced by the attitude of the Belgian and Dutch representatives. With regard to the mutual assistance clause, the Belgians and Dutch merely reinforced the attitude of the British and Canadians (that the clause 49

w

51 52

PRO, Records of the Brussels Treaty Organisation, DG/1/1/1, Minutes of the Second Session of the Consultative Council, 19 — 20 July 1948. Cf. Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, pp. 113-125 and Escott Reid, The Art of the Almost Impossible. Unwavering Canadian support for the emerging Atlantic Alliance', in: De Staercke, NATO's Anxious Birth, pp. 80-81. FRUS 1948, Vol. Ill, pp. 249-250. Cf. L. G. M. Jaquet, Minister Stikker en de souvereiniteitsoverdracht aan Indonesie. Nederland op de tweesprong tussen Azie en bet Westen, 's-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982, pp. 35 — 36 and Adrien Manning, 'Les Pays-Bas face a l'Europe', in: Poidevin, Histoire des Debuts, pp. 425 and 437.

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had to be as strict as possible) vis-a-vis the United States government. This issue, however, was settled between Acheson and the leaders of the American Senate, much to the dismay of the Europeans.53 As to the membership issue (especially Italy and French North Africa), the wording of the article on economic and social cooperation (the famous article 2) and the principles guiding the allocation of military aid under the North Atlantic treaty the Dutch, supported by the Belgians, made their influence felt. Italian membership in the Atlantic alliance had been envisioned since the Pentagon negotiations. Italy was listed among the participating nations in the Pentagon Paper. After the loss of the communists in the general election of 18 April, however, the sense of urgency felt in relation to Italy lost much of its force. Five months later, the case of Italy was considered "a particular problem", but the country was not listed among the nations considered essential to be included.54 Italian membership was most strongly favored by the Americans, whereas the Western Europeans wavered. In November Spaak, for instance, seemed prepared to accede to the wish of the American government, but a month later he again sided with the British, Canadians and Dutch against Italian inclusion. Matters came to a head when the French government decided to press for Italian membership, partly as a means to strengthen their arguments for inclusion of French North Africa. During the December 1948 discussions the conferees were thus forced to prepare a paper listing all the pros and cons of Italian participation; the French strongly favouring Italy becoming an original signatory to the treaty (supported by the Americans)· and the British, seconded by the others, opposing.55 Reid lists a number of reasons why Italy became an original member, in spite of the solid opposition, but fails to mention the crumbling solidarity among those who opposed.56 As a consequence of a French memorandum in early January 1949, the Dutch government decided to abandon their resistance and support the French, in exchange for French support in the Security Council over the Indonesian dispute.57 After the Dutch staged their second military intervention in Indonesia in December 1948, they

53 54

i5 56 57

Full discussion in: Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, pp. 143 — 156. Cf. FRUS 1948, Vol. Ill, p. 73 and pp. 240-241. For the American and British point of view: E. Timothy Smith, 'The Fear of Subversion: The United States and the Inclusion of Italy in the North Atlantic Treaty', in: Diplomatic History, Vol. 7 No. 2 (Spring 1983), pp. 139-155 and Martin H. Folly, 'Britain and the issue of Italian membership of NATO, 1948 — 49', in: Review of International Studies, Vol. 13 No. 3 (July 1987), pp. 177-196. FRUS 1948, Vol. Ill, pp. 339-342. Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p. 200. NMFA, Archives Embassy Washington, Box 171, File P-1.8/48.7a, Aide-Memoire Riviere to Stikker, 2 Jan 1949 and Stikker to Van Kleffens, 4 Jan 1949.

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almost stood alone and decided to use every possibility to bolster their international standing. Dutch support did not just apply to the issue of Italian membership, but also to the inclusion of French North Africa under the mutual assistance clause. Stikker even brought the Belgian government round to his point of view, thus strengthening the French in their insistence on inclusion. Even when Paris threatened to block Norway's entry if Italy was not invited simultaneously, the Dutch did not falter in their support, although the coupling of Norwegian to Italian participation was seriously resented in The Hague.58 A similar deal was struck by the Dutch and Canadians with regard to article 2. The Canadian government was not satisfied with the compromise text agreed upon in December 1948 and they tried to strengthen the clause in the final stages of the negotiations. They solicited Dutch support in this venture by suggesting in exchange Canadian support for the Dutch in the Security Council, just as they proposed a deal with the British in this respect.59 In both instances the Western European governments accepted the deals, the Dutch again promising to bring the Belgians also round to their point of view, and the Canadians were thus able to strengthen the wording of the article they seemed to cherish most. Finally, the principles guiding the allocation of American military aid to the Western Union countries almost brought the number of original signatories to the North Atlantic treaty down to eleven. In the course of the first months of 1949, as a consequence of American condemnation of Dutch policies with regard to the decolonization of Indonesia, relations between the two future allies deteriorated to such an extent that Stikker wondered aloud "whether it would be wise to join the Atlantic Pact under this coercion".60 American policy in the Security Council (forcing the Dutch to accept full Indonesian independence) and the threat not to allocate American military aid to the Netherlands before the Indonesian tangle had been settled satisfactorily, forced the Dutch foreign secretary to a desperate move. 58

59

60

For the Dutch-Belgian connection: NMFA, Departmental Archives, Code 9, 912.10, File 283, Memorandum by His Excellency, 5 Jan 1949 and Memorandum of conversation Stikker Spaak, 8 Jan 1949. For the Dutch-Canadian deal: NMFA, Archives Embassy Ottawa, Secret Archives, Box 6, No. 999, Stikker to Van Roijen, 16 Feb 1949 and Van Roijen to Pearson, 16 Feb 1949. For the British-Canadian deal: National Archives of Canada, Ottawa (hereafter NAC), Brooke Claxton Papers, MG 32 B 5, Volume 112, File WMWE, Robertson to Pearson, 16 Feb 1949, and PRO, FO 371/79218, Z1675/1074/72G, Jebb to Hudd, 18 Feb 1949. NMFA, Archives Embassy Washington, Box 172, P-1.8/48.7a, Van Boetzelaer to Van Kleffens, 6 and 7 Mar 1949; and Manning, 'Les Pays-Bas face a 1'Europe', pp. 439 — 441.

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Early March, only a month before the signature of the treaty, Stikker for a short period of time seriously contemplated not signing.61 Despite the advice of his senior advisors, the embassy in Washington was instructed to inform the State Department of the Dutch state of mind. The Americans, however, were not that impressed by Stikker's threat. Whereas the inclusion of the socalled 'stepping stone' countries (Iceland, Denmark, Norway and Portugal) was considered essential from the American point of view, the Netherlands was regarded a 'quantite negligeable'. As the British and Canadians were thinking the same way, the Dutch threat only backfired.62 In the days preceding the signature on 4 April, as the foreign secretaries of the twelve Western nations assembled in Washington, Acheson told Stikker in no uncertain terms that the Americans ran this show and that the Dutch had no choice but to toe the line. During heated discussions Stikker's Western Union partners, especially Bevin and Spaak, came to his help but Acheson did not yield.63 The crucial phrase in the Western Union request for military aid, 'equality of treatment' in the distribution of the aid among the five powers, was cancelled because of American objections. Stikker gave in, grudgingly, and signed the North Atlantic treaty. During the Atlantic treaty negotiations the Belgians and Dutch acted not as a single Benelux delegation, but as separate partners within the larger Western Union. They were clearly the minor powers at the conference table, in contrast to the Brussels Treaty negotiations. Their influence was therefore more limited than in the previous talks, except at those moments that the larger powers themselves differed over an issue or when they felt their national interests seriously threatened. Even at those moments, however, they were not in a position to stand up to the American government. Stikker tried but failed.

61

62

63

For all the details: Gees Wiebes and Bert Zeeman, 'Stikker, Indonesie en het Noordatlantisch verdrag. Of: hoe Nederland in de pompe ging', in: Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenes der Nederlanden, Vol. 100 No. 2 (1985), pp. 225-251. NA, RG 59, Confidential File 1945 - 1949, Box C-512, 840.20/3 - 1849, Memorandum by John D. Hickerson, 18 Mar 1949; NAG, Hume H. Wrong Papers, MG 30 E 101, Volume 6, File 35, Wrong to Pearson, 23 Mar 1949 and Wrong to Pearson, 29 Mar 1949; Bullock, Ernest Bevin, p. 675. See for the discussions: NA, RG 353, Records Related to NATO, Box 1, Verbatim record of Meetings, 2 and 4 Apr 1949.

The Eastern European Countries and the Birth of the Atlantic Alliance by Boleslaw Adam Boczek

The objective of this paper is to present the reaction of the Eastern European countries to the establishment of the Atlantic Alliance by the Treaty of Washington some two score years ago. The topic is rather unusual in the sense that whereas there exists an abundance of scholarly publications analyzing in detail the origins of the North Atlantic Pact with special focus on the position of each of the Alliance members during the negotiation process, very little has been written on the specific topic of the East European perception of, and reaction to, the foundation of NATO. While there are, of course, occasional references to Soviet reactions to the diplomatic activity in the West in the period directly preceding the formation of the Alliance and immediately following it,1 there does not seem to be available any comprehensive treatment of the Soviet and other Eastern European perception of the Atlantic Pact specifically at the time of the inception of NATO in the tense months of the late '40s. This gap may be due to at least two reasons. First, in the Stalinist period, when the Atlantic Treaty was being born, the perception of the Alliance in the eyes of the Soviet leadership and the satellites' governments was fairly simple and perhaps not worth scholarly analysis in the West: the Atlantic Pact was an aggressive imperialist scheme designed to prepare an aggressive war against the Soviet Union and the people's democracies in Eastern Europe while at the same time subjecting Western Europe to Anglo-American supremacy. Second, unlike in the open Western society where, despite some bibliographical problems, the student of NATO's origins can utilize a variety of primary sources, the secrecy of the closed communist society made a scholarly study of the topic, here under discussion, virtually impossible. Hence the Soviet and 1

See in particular Lawrence S. Kaplan, The United States and NATO: The Formative Years 93-97 (1984).

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Eastern European reaction to the birth of NATO must be based primarily on statements by Soviet and other communist leaders2 and the echoing voices of the news media, at that time absolutely subordinated to the totalitarian party and Stalin's personal rule. The interpretation of these pronouncements in the light of both the Marxist-Leninist ideology and the historical experience of the Russian and Soviet state, must be complemented by the study of the actual Soviet behavior in the late '40s, which despite general uniformity displayed some variations in details. The study of the Eastern European reaction to the birth of NATO is, in a sense, made easier because of the monolithic nature of the Soviet empire in the Stalinist era. Whatever statement or memorandum was made public by the Soviets was in turn paraphrased in the news media such as the two major dailies Pravda and Izvestiya,* and, of course, faithfully repeated by the satellites, at that time still including Albania but not any more Yugoslavia since the Stalin-Tito break in 1948.4 There was absolutely no deviation from the Stalinist line on any foreign policy issue, including treatment of the Atlantic Pact, so that in fact the Soviet perception of NATO at its birth had to be loyally imitated by the fraternal people's democracies. Hence hereinafter "Soviet" will have to include "Eastern European" as well. Only some permissible variations determined by a satellite's special concerns could be touched upon in a people's democracy. For example Poland, because of its historical experience and its high stake in the new Soviet-approved border in the West (the Oder-Neisse border), would elaborate more extensively on the Atlantic powers' designs to use German "revanchism and militarism" for aggression against Poland, other people's democracies and the fatherland of socialism, the Soviet Union. With all this apparent simplicity of the task to study the Soviet reactions to the formation of the Atlantic Alliance there is, however, one important 2

3

4

The main source on the position of the Soviet Union is Memorandum from the USSR. Government on the North Atlantic Treaty, 31 March 1949, sent to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, France, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg and Canada, published in Pravda and Izvestiya and translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press 1: 14, 31—33. Another document is the lengthy Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR on the North Atlantic Pact, 29 January 1949, published on the same day in Pravda and Izvestiya and translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press 1: 5, 9—18. The addresses of the Soviet representative at the U. N. General Assembly did not add anything essential to the Soviet position. Articles in Izvestiya signed "Observer" were considered to be official comments by the USSR government. However, Yugoslavia voted for the Soviet draft resolution in the General Assembly condemning the alleged U. S. and British preparations for a new war. Draft Res. A/996, rejected by a vote of 40 to 6, with 5 abstentions. Y. B. of the U. N. 1948 — 49, 429. Also at the special session in 1949 Yugoslavia joined the Soviet block.

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question mark. Did the Soviets really perceive a threat from the West and were they really convinced that the Atlantic Pact was not a defensive arrangement but an aggressive alliance whose aims "are most closely linked with plans for the forcible establishment of Anglo-American hegemony under the aegis of the United States of America"5 and which was directed against the USSR and its allies? Or was all the almost hysterical anti-NATO rhetoric, conjuring up visions of an imperialist Anglo-American plan of world domination, only "a convenient bogey to manipulate their Soviet and East European populations and to mislead Western military policy-makers".6 Some speculative thoughts on the sources of the Soviet perception of the Atlantic Treaty will be offered in the following paragraphs. Subsequently this paper will turn to the Soviet reactions to the Western diplomatic and political measures which culminated in the signing of the Treaty in April 1949.

Although much of the Soviet reaction to the Western progress towards the formation of NATO must be treated as primitive rhetoric and propaganda, typical of the Stalinist era, this does not mean that the Soviets did not at all believe in the Anglo-American threat. In the Marxist-Leninist ideology the outside, capitalist, world had to be perceived as hostile, a perception which had been strengthened by the history of the Soviet state at its inception when it was threatened by the capitalist intervention in the early years following the First World War.7 However, as noted by the father of the policy of containment, if a man reiterates frequently enough that "the world is his enemy" and "makes it the background of his conduct he is bound eventually to be right,"8 the more reason for the socialist state to make all efforts possible to destroy the capitalist menace, first at home and then abroad. It appears that here, in the ideological sphere, lies the primary source of the escalation of the mutal "mirror image"9 of hostility which, temporarily muted during 5 6

7

8

9

Soviet For. Ministry Statement (note 2) 12. Robert W. Clawson and Glee E. Wilson, "The Warsaw Pact, USSR, and NATO: Perceptions from the East," in Lawrence S. Kaplan and Robert W. Clawson eds., NATO after Thirty years 109 (1981). See Stalin's perception of the allied intervention, published later in the '30s: M. Gorky et al., The History of the Civil War in the USSR (1936), cited in Clawson and Wilson (note 6) 112n. 6. X [George F. Kennan], "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs 25 (1947), reprinted in part in Lawrence S. Kaplan ed., NATO and the Policy of Containment 1-2 (1968). Uri Bronfenbrenner, "The Mirror Image in Soviet-American Relations," The Journal of Social Issues 17: 2 (1961) 46-51.

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the coincidental wartime alliance, re-emerged with redoubled intensity in the immediate years following the Second World War. There is no need here to elaborate on the Soviet expansionist moves and probes in that period. Suffice it to say that, led by Stalin, the Soviet Union perceived great opportunities in the conditions of the post-war Europe. Direct territorial gains, satellization of Eastern Europe, and pressures upon noncommunist states, were the major elements of this expansionist policy which could not fail to arouse Western fears of further expansion. There is no need to elaborate upon the fact that in the Soviet and Eastern European literature any idea of Soviet expansionism or danger to Europe was a "myth" invented by the West in order to conceal the capitalist designs against the Soviet Union and the people's democracies.10 A question is often asked whether Stalin had designs against Western Europe. A common sense answer is that he obviously did, but not (at least at that time when the Soviet Union was by far inferior, in its military and economic potential, to the West) by means of military aggression. As an opportunist, he tried to extend Soviet influence in all directions, from Iran to Norway, but, as a basically cautious man, he knew how far he could go with relative impunity; where necessary he would even withdraw (e.g. in Iran). However, whatever Stalin's intentions were, the Soviet actions had to cause profound anxiety in Western Europe and the entry of the United States into the affairs of the Old Continent with the Truman Doctrine in March 1947 was followed shortly thereafter by the announcement of the Marshall Plan in June of that year. In the Soviet view the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine was a "major step towards the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization"11 and the Marshall Plan "a means of adapting the policy and economic life of the 'Marshallized' countries to the narrowly selfish and military-strategic plans of Anglo-American hegemony in Europe."12 The announcement of the E.R.P. initiated a period of intense Soviet propaganda pressure against the West. The Czechoslovak coup occurred a few months later, in February 1948. Any idea of East European cooperation with the American-sponsored E.R.P. was turned down; the Cominform was created in October 1947; and the Communist parties in the West discarded all pretense of parliamentary cooperation with non-communists, intensifying the pro-Soviet campaign. The Brussels Treaty was condemned as an effort to alter the balance of power in Europe and — in the words of a Soviet commentator — "although 10

See M. Kukancv, NATO - Threat to World Peace 22 (1971); Gerhard Keiderling, "Der Mythos von der 'sowjetischen Gefahr' und die Gründung der NATO," Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 24: l (1976) 1093-1102. " Kukanov (note 10) 23. 12 Soviet For. Ministry Statement (note 2) 11.

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couched in defensive phraseology, it was a preparation for aggression".13 In an attempt to drive a wedge in Western unity, the Soviets distorted Bedell Smith's position in his talks in Moscow by giving the wrong impression that the United States was prepared to start separate bilateral negotiations with Moscow, all of which caused great concern in Paris. 14 The French fears were allayed, but they showed to what lengths the Soviets would go in their campaign against the Western defense preparations. The Vandenberg Resolution (11 June) was soon followed by the start of the Berlin blockade on June 24, which, albeit apparently related to the currency controversy, further escalated the tension. The direct discussions on North Atlantic defense of a more inclusive nature which started on July 6 were presented by the Soviets as resulting from American dissatisfaction with the narrow scope of the Brussels Treaty and a desire to replace it with a broader military and political alliance under direct U. S. control. IS It is interesting to note that the Soviet sources emphasize the "strictest secrecy" of the Washington talks "to prevent 'Soviet agents' from learning about them."16 In retrospect, it is known that the Soviets were intimately acquainted with the purpose and content of the negotiations through their spy, Donald MacLean, who as First Secretary of the British embassy in Washington, had access to all details of the talks.17 Perhaps a certain slackening in the intensity of the Soviet propaganda that was noticeable in the winter of 1948 — 49 was due to the knowledge (or rather, corroboration of the Soviet belief), supplied by the Soviet mole in the British intelligence service, that the proposed alliance in the West was not necessarily so aggressive as the Soviet propaganda alleged it to be for public consumption.18 In the meantime, however, the Berlin blockade continued (until May 1949) and in September 1948 the defense ministers of the Brussels Treaty countries set up the Western Union. In the statement released by the Soviet Foreign Ministry on January 29,1949 this defense organization was condemned as "an instrument of the aggressive Anglo-American bloc in Europe" as well

'·' Ibid.; Kukanov (note 10) 31. Sir Nicholas Henderson, The Birth of NATO 30-31 (1983). 15 See on this Paul Jochen, "Die USA und die Vorbereitungen zur Gründung des NATO-Paktes," Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 24: 7 (1976) 776-785. 16 Kukanov (note 10) 33. 17 In response to a query from Senator Eastland, Theodore C. Achilles, who headed the office of Western European Affairs, stated that "MacLean had a thorough knowledge particularly of the Anglo-Canadian-US meetings in the Pentagon". Memorandum, 22 Dec. 1955, W. N. Chase to Loy W. Henderson, "The Department and the Former U. K. Diplomats, Donald McLean and Guy Burgess, Revealed as Soviet Spies,", cited in Kaplan (note 1) 241 (n. 43). 18 See Kaplan (note 1) 75, 93, referring also to Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty 80 (1977). 14

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as a complete change, with U. S. support and encouragement, in the British and French policy on the German question.19 An examination of the Soviet reaction to the progressive shaping of the Western defense organization in the years 1948 — 49 reveals that as far as the West as a target is concerned, the Soviet pressures (apart from Berlin) were limited basically to a propaganda campaign which, albeit vitriolic in its condemnation of the Anglo-American plans, was essentially of a preventive, blocking, nature. In one region of Europe, namely Scandinavia, the Soviet pressures were more intense and went beyond mere propaganda.

The Scandinavian dimension of the formation of the Western European defense cooperation has been exhaustively described in numerous studies and it is not the subject of this paper to elaborate on this topic.20 Hence the discussion will focus, in a summary manner, on the Soviet attempts to disrupt the plans for the Western defense in the North of Europe. As early as March 1948, in the tense atmosphere following the Prague coup, the British and U. S. ambassadors in Oslo were informed by the Norwegian government that according to reliable information the Soviet Union would soon address a request to Norway for the conclusion of a defense pact, perhaps even before the Soviet-Finnish treaty was finalized. In response to Norway's plea, Washington proposed an extension of the Brussels Treaty to encompass Scandinavia. The idea suffered a setback by the Swedish pressure upon Norway and Denmark to commit these countries to complete neutrality, a policy that Sweden wished to follow itself for (probably well-founded) fear that membership in a Western alliance would be regarded by the Soviet Union as a provocation and might lead to the occupation of Finland. At the same time, however, Sweden proposed a Scandinavian alliance of Sweden, Norway and Denmark. While a debate on this issue was still going on, the Soviet Union intervened diplomatically and (on the same day that its ministry of foreign affairs released a "white paper" denouncing the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the Western Union, and the plans for an Atlantic Pact)21 warned Norway in a note against joining the Atlantic Pact and allowing its territory to be used for military bases by the prospective Pact. In its measured 19 20

21

Soviet For. Ministry Statement (note 2) 9— 10. For a convenient survey see, e.g., John Fitzmaurice, Security and Politics in the Nordic Area Ch. 2 ("Toward the New Nordic Balance") (1987); Grethe Vaern0, "Norway and the Atlantic Alliance," NATO Rev. (June 1981) 16-20. See Soviet For. Ministry Statement (note 2).

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reply Norway argued that, as a result of the failure of the United Nations collective security system, it was forced to seek alternative security arrangements, but would never permit its territory to be used for aggression and would never permit foreign military bases on its territory unless attacked or threatened with attack. This answer did not satisfy the Soviet Union which in its final diplomatic effort to prevent Norway's entry into the Atlantic Alliance invited it to conclude a non-aggression treaty. 22 Notwithstanding this offer the negotiating powers invited Denmark and Norway (along with Iceland, Italy and Portugal) to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. Shortly thereafter the Norwegian Storting voted overwhelmingly in favor of joining the Treaty, following in this respect the vote of the Danish Folketing. Although eventually the Soviet Union acquiesced in the membership of Denmark and Norway in NATO, it warned those countries that their entry into a U. S.-led alliance "far from promoting their security, could result in their involving in the policies of a certain group of powers which sought to achieve far-reaching goals."23 The Soviet attitude towards the plan of a Scandinavian alliance was rather ambiguous. 24 Clearly, the Soviet Union would have preferred a completely fragmented Scandinavia, but it appears that such an alliance, albeit in the Soviet perception a worse development than total neutrality, would have been more acceptable than an entry of Sweden into the Atlantic Alliance. As subsequent events demonstrated, the Soviets realistically got reconciled with Denmark's and Norway's membership in NATO, as modified by those two countries' "base and ban" policy and other self-imposed limitations, largely brought about by the Soviet intimidations. In this sense, the Soviet pressures upon Scandinavia were not without success.25 The final blast of the Soviet propaganda prior to the signing of the Atlantic Treaty was the Memorandum of the Soviet government of March 31 to the twelve prospective signatories. This Soviet act claimed, inter alia, that the Treaty was directed against it and its allies; that it violated the U. N. Charter; and that it was contrary to the British-Soviet and Franco-Soviet wartime treaties of 1942 and 1944 respectively. These charges will be discussed in the following sections. 22

23

M

25

See Yu. Komissarov, "Problems of Peace and Security in Northern Europe," International Affairs [Moscow] (July 1985) 60. Y. Denisov, "Sixty Years of Relations Between the USSR and North European Countries," International Affairs [Moscow] (July 1984) 60. For a detailed analysis of the Soviet position with regard to the negotiations on the Scandinavian alliance see Krister Wählback, Norden och Blockuppdelningen 1948-49 (1973). See Boleslaw A. Boczek, Scandinavia: New Focus of Soviet Pressures (1989).

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IV. The Soviets claimed that, like the Brussels Pact, the Atlantic Treaty was directed against them and the people's democracies because none of them was invited to join these treaties. Apart from the fact that these Western arrangements were a defensive reaction against a reasonable fear of the Soviet danger, the Soviet claim concerning the invitation was not entirely true since both the Brussels Pact and the Atlantic Treaty are open to accession by any other European state on the condition of unanimous invitation by the members.26 None of the bilateral treaties of mutual assistance which formed a dense network of alliances in the Soviet block contained such a clause.27 Furthermore, the Soviet Union had been invited to join in a mutual assistance treaty with the United States, Great Britain and France, but missed this opportunity in 1945 and again in 1946.28 In addition to the "closed alliance" argument, the Soviet Union saw the proof of the Atlantic Pact's aggressive nature in the fact that it was directed against "armed attack" in general, originating from whatever third power. The Soviet Union contrasted this with its own and its satellites' bilateral agreements which "have a bilateral character and are aimed only against the possibility of a repetition of a German aggression."29 Again this argument is not convincing since an examination of the Soviet block's bilateral agreements reveals that all of them may also apply against any third state. Although they do mention aggression on the part of Germany, their very flexible casus foederis formula makes it possible to undertake a joint military action against any other state that might join Germany's aggressive policy, directly or in any other way.30 This formulation could refer to any act of a third state that in the Soviet interpretation was an accomplice of any future German aggression even if such third state itself had not committed any aggression. Moreover, seven of the bilateral treaties in the Soviet block are openly aimed not only against the possibility of aggression by Germany but also against any third state irrespective of such a state's policy towards Germany.31

26

Brussels Treaty, Art. 9; Atlantic Treaty 10. W. W. Kulski, "The Soviet System of Collective Security Compared with the Western System," Am. ]. Int'l Law 44, 453, 455 (1950). 28 Ibid. 29 Soviet Memorandum (note 2) 31. 30 Typical is the formula of the Czechoslovak-Hungarian Treaty. See Kulski (note 27) 457. ·" For example see Article 3 of the Romanian-Hungarian Treaty, in Kulski (note 27) 459. 27

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V. The Soviet Union mobilized a number of international legal arguments in its campaign against the Atlantic Pact. Among them a prominent place was occupied by the charge that despite multiple references to the U. N. Charter the Atlantic Pact was "directly contrary to the principles and aims of the U. N. Charter and leads to undermining the U. N.".32 The Soviet arguments concern the relationship of the Atlantic Pact to the Charter with respect to two issues: the right of self-defense under Article 51 and regionalism under Articles 52 — 54 (Chapter VIII). As is well known, the North Atlantic Treaty bases the right of the parties to resort to defensive measures on Article 51 of the Charter which recognizes "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs ... until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security ...".33 The Soviets argued that since no actual attack had occurred the North Atlantic states had no right to conclude in advance any agreements for collective self-defense under Article 51.34 Legally the Soviet argument was untenable.35 While it is true that a country may exercise the right of self-defense only after an armed attack has occurred,36 this right is "inherent", that is "natural", and as such it cannot "arise"; it is always there. Furthermore, the Charter does not define the conditions of the exercise of the collective right of self-defense, and each 32

33

34

35 36

Soviet Memorandum (note 2) 14. For further elaboration of this argument see also Soviet For. Ministry Statement (note 2), Part 11: The North Atlantic Alliance — Undermining the U. N.. The whole argument was reiterated by Vyshinski in his speech before the U. N. General Assembly on Sep. 23, 1949. See also, e.g., M. Marinin, "Conspiracy against Peace, against the United Nations," Pravda, April 10, 1949, translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press 1: 15, 29 — 31. The Soviets were happy to refer to the Wall Street Journal which adopted the line that the Atlantic Pact was contrary to the principles of the U. N. Charter. See "Atlantic Pact Nullifies Principles of the U. N.: Eloquent Appeal of American Businessmen's Newspaper," Pravda and Izvestiya, April 9, 1949, p. 6, translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press 1: 15, 31. The Soviet press also noted with satisfaction the opinion of Henry Wallace, representing the Progressive Party, whose arguments were identical to the Soviet ones. See Henry A. Wallace, "North Atlantic Treaty," Hearings, U.S. Senate Comm. on For. Rel. 81st Cong., 1st sess (1949), reprinted in Kaplan (note 8) 23 —27. Cf. the East German view echoing the Soviets, in Das Atlantische Dilemma: Aggressivität und Krise der NATO 1949-1969 22 (1969). For a cogent rebuttal of the Soviet allegations see Kulski (note 27). The wording of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty corrects the Charter's oversight and includes also the words "restore and ...". There had been some doubts concerning the legality of prior self-defense arrangements even in the West. See Kaplan (note 1) 116. See the analysis in Kulski (note 27) 463-464. But even this is controversial as demonstrated by the debate over the right to pre-emptive self-defense.

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member of the United Nations can declare in advance, for example in a treaty, that an attack upon any of the parties would be considered an attack upon all of them. The Soviet statement on the Atlantic Treaty contradicted itself since, following its restrictive interpretation of Article 51, the Soviet mutual assistance treaties with the people's democracies and similar bilateral treaties among the satellites could not be justified otherwise than also by the right of self-defense. As already noted, these treaties were aimed not only against renewal of German aggressive policy but also against any third state. If only Germany (or other "enemy state" under Article 53 of the Charter) were the target of the Soviet block's network of bilateral treaties, then these treaties would enjoy the benefit of the Charter provision of Article 53 (1) which allows armed action without any authorization of the Security Council against "enemy states". This provision concedes a much wider freedom of action than that under the self-defense Article 51 since armed measures can be taken even without any armed attack having occurred on the part of the "enemy state". Although the Soviet Union claimed the benefit of Article 53, it denied it to the other side. As far as the regionalism argument is concerned, the Soviet Memorandum of 31 March 1949 alleged that the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty had indicated that it was a regional agreement in the meaning of Article 52 of the Charter. This was not exactly true because, although initially the drafters of the Atlantic Treaty were tempted to relate the Alliance to Chapter VIII of the U. N. Charter (on Regional Arrangements),37 they soon realized that, considering the need to obtain authorization of the Security Council (with a certain Soviet veto), it was clearly more appropriate to anchor the Treaty to Article 51.38 Yet, it could be argued39 that even if the Atlantic Alliance were to be considered a regional arrangement, the U. N. Charter provisions on the duty to obtain the Security Council's authorization would have to yield to the overriding inherent right of self-defense. As a postscript to the Soviet charges against the Atlantic Treaty of the alleged undermining of the United Nations, it might be added that if the Soviet Union hoped to win the Organization to its arguments, it must have been disappointed. By coincidence, a special session of the U. N. General Assembly was convened the day after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty and it 37 38

39

See Kaplan (note 1) 116. Ibid. Both Acheson and Bevin made statements to the effect that the Atlantic Pact was not a regional organization in the meaning of Article 52 of the U. N. Charter. See Richard H. Heindel, Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, and Francis O. Wilcox, "The North Atlantic Treaty in the United States Senate," Am. ]. Int'l Law 43, 638-639 (1949). However, the Ambassador of the Netherlands considered the Pact a regional arrangement. See E. N. van Kleffens, "Regionalism and Political Pacts, with Special Reference to the North Atlantic Treaty," ibid. 669. See Kulski (note 27) 466-467.

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was obvious that the session would serve the Soviets as a convenient forum for denouncing the "conspiracy against peace, against the United Nations."40 However, apart from the fact that the Soviet representative did not add anything to what had already been stated in the Soviet Memorandum of 31 March and rehashed in the communist press, the Soviet Union failed to win over the General Assembly, including the few African and Asian states that in 1949 were already members of the United Nations.41 While adopting a posture of the champion of the U. N. principles, the Soviet Union refused to join the majority position on restraints in the use of the veto, thereby exposing itself as a real enemy of the U. N. collective security system.42 At the regular session of the General Assembly in 1949 the Soviet attempts at having the Assembly condemn the Atlantic Treaty as a plan for a war against the Soviet Union and violation of the Charter also ended in failure. 43

VI. The Soviet Union levelled special charges of violating international law against Great Britain and France, alleging that the Atlantic Treaty was contrary to the Soviet-British and the Soviet-French treaties of mutual assistance of 1942 and 1944 respectively.44 The Soviets claimed that by joining the allegedly aggressive Atlantic Pact the two countries violated their treaty obligation "to cooperate in maintaining peace and international security and 'not to conclude any alliances nor to take part in any coalition directed against the other High Contracting Party' "45. The Soviet charges did not rest on sound legal grounds, 40 41

42

43

44

45

That was the title of an article in Pravda. See Marinin (note 32). Lawrence S. Kaplan, "The United States, the NATO Treaty and the UN Charter," NATO Letter 17 (May 1969) 24-25. Only the Soviet Union (with the Ukraine and Byelorussia), its satellites, and (still) Yugoslavia voted against a subcommittee recommendation for voluntary curbs on the use of the veto, U.N. Gen, Ass. 3d sess., 195th Meeting, April 14, 1949, GAOR 129 ff. See the discussion in Kaplan (note 41). The Soviet action defending Italy's claims to its lost Africal colonies did not improve the Soviet image in the eyes of the Asian and African members of the United Nations. See ibid. The Soviet draft resolution on a new "five power pact" was rejected by only 6 votes in favor to 40 against, with 5 abstentions. On the other hand, a Western resolution (Res. 267 (III)) against excessive use of the veto was adopted by 43 votes to 6, with 2 abstentions. U.N.Y.B. 1948-49,429-430. Treaty between the USSR and Great Britain of 26 May 1942, reprinted in Am. J. Int'l Law: 36, Supp. 216 (1942); Treaty between the USSR and France of 10 Dec. 1944, reprinted in Am. }. Int'l Law. 39 (1945) 83. Art. VII of the Soviet-British and art. V of the Soviet-French Treaty. As part of their campaign of intimidation, the Soviets threatened to suspend the effect of these treaties should Great Britain and France go ahead with their Atlantic Pact plans. For the French reaction see Kaplan (note 1) referring to articles in the French press.

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however. It is true that Great Britain and France had the obligation not to participate in any alliance or coalition hostile to the Soviet Union but, first, the Atlantic Treaty is not in legal terms directed against the Soviet Union and, second, even assuming that it was, the above-mentioned two treaties with the Soviet Union had to be interpreted in the light of Article 103 of the Charter which reads that "In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail." This provision applies, first of all, to the obligation to comply with the Security Council decisions on enforcement action. Even if no such decision were forthcoming because of a veto by the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France would still have the inherent right of collective self-defense overriding a bilateral clause on non-participation in hostile coalitions.46 Incidentally, the French were interested in their 1944 treaty with the Soviet Union, not just to restrain Germany but possibly to prevent what the Soviets called "Anglo-American domination of Europe". Yet the Soviets failed to take advantage of this opportunity to split the West, adopting a crude high-handed policy against it, without any diplomatic refinement.47

VII. The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty signalled the defeat of the Soviet attempts to frustrate the Western plans for an organized defense against any further Soviet expansion. However, the anti-NATO campaign continued both in verbal attacks and through various front organizations in Western Europe and North America, setting a pattern for a variety of "peace" campaigns, antinuclear, anti-missile and other Moscow-directed anti-NATO movements.48 The basic objectives of Soviet policy towards the Western Alliance remained the same until the era of Gorbachev's "new thinking": to encourage discord within the Alliance and bring about the withdrawal of the United States from Europe. In retrospect, despite the Soviet predictions at the birth of the Atlantic Treaty that the Alliance would disintegrate because of internal dissension, it is evident that NATO survived and continued to cope with ever new challeges 46 47

48

See the argument in Kulski (note 27) 469-470. See on this Michael Howard, "Introduction", in Olav Riste ed., Western Security: The Formative years 15-16 (1985). For a detailed survey of the Soviet front organizations and peace campaigns see Clive Rose, Campaign against 'Western Defence: NATO's Adversaries and Critics (1985) (especially Ch. 7: Campaigns against NATO).

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from the East. The other Soviet prediction forty years ago that the Atlantic Pact would start an aggressive war engulfing Europe in another armed conflict turned out to be equally wrong. If there was any aggression in the old continent it was committed by the Soviet Union against its own allies in 1956 and 1968. Apart from that, Europe has enjoyed the longest period of peace since the Roman times, it is reasonable to say that the decision taken in Washington some forty years ago played the major role providing a foundation for this unprecedented development.

Defence or Liberation of Europe. The Strategies of the West against a Soviet Attack (1947-1950) by Massimo de Leonardis

When the North-Atlantic Treaty was signed even public opinion was aware that the alliance "ensures Western Europe's liberation from an invader but does not guarantee it against invasion", as the authoritative Economist stressed.1 This essay only considers the strategical problem of the defence of Western Europe and its political and diplomatic implications in the period between the Anglo-American preparation of their first strategic "plans"2 for a possible war against the USSR and the outbreak of the Korean War, which largely changed the Western conceptions in this field.

The Common Strategic Background of Great Britain and the United States In April 1946 a first important document of the British Chiefs of Staff (COS) in which the USSR was singled out as the only likely enemy examined the "Strategic Position of the British Commonwealth",3 starting from the speci1

2

3

The Economist, 19-3-49, Atlantic Pact, p. 498. On its part The Times of 11-3-49 wrote that "Europe must be defended, not liberated". The U. S. Secretary of State Acheson in February 1949 answered in the negative to Norway's Foreign Minister Lange who had asked if the territorial integrity of signatories would be guaranteed (D. Acheson, Present at the Creation, New York 1970, p. 367). The word is used in inverted commas, because as a matter of fact in various instances these were not real operational plans. Strategic Position of the British Commonwealth, Public Record Office, London (PRO), Cabinet Papers - Defence Committee (CAB 131), 2, DO (46) 47, 2-4-46. The document was discussed on 5-4-46 in the presence, among others, of Attlee and Bevin, see CAB 131/1, DO (46) 10th. The documents in the PRO which are Crown Copyright are quoted with the permission of the Superintendent of Her Majesty's Stationery Office. At that time Lord Alanbrooke was Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Lord Cunningham of Hyndhope First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff, Lord Tedder Chief of Staff of the Royal Air Force.

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fication of the "main support areas", that is to say those "which contain concentrations of man-power, industrial potential or sources of food or raw material, such as are essential to our war effort": the United Kingdom itself, the American continent, Africa south of the Sahara, Australia and New Zealand. The joint conrol with the United States of these areas and of the communications, mainly maritime, between them was of capital importance. On the other hand, during peace time it was impossible to limit the commitments just to these areas, otherwise at the outbreak of hostilities Britain would find herself in a very disadvantageous position; therefore the problem was posed of the other "areas of strategic importance", or "protective zones", as Premier Attlee described them during the discussion, among which were the European continent, North Africa, the Middle East. The loss of all these territories, having also a heavy influence on sea communications, would have reduced the United Kingdom "to a Malta-type existence", that is to say to being, like that island during the Second World War, a besieged fortress. Therefore in peace it was necessary to prevent these regions from falling under Soviet influence. In war the very great preponderance of Russian land forces made it almost impossible to prevent the conquest of Western Europe; in the Middle East "we should clearly do our utmost — the document observed — to maintain our position in the area as long as we can". This document is not so much interesting as a realistic appraisal of the situation or as a basis for future developments, since too many factors were still undetermined and the proposals seemed formulated with poor precision and little correspondence to reality. While the United States' support was taken for granted, as it was to be for a long time to come, there was no certainty as to the moment when they would enter the war; the political settlement of Europe and of part of the Middle East was still uncertain, as was that of India; Britain's economic and financial crisis had not yet reached its climax; there was a clear gap between available means and ambitious goals (so that the Secretary of State for the Dominions "said he was agreeably surprised at the small force which the Chiefs of Staff thought necessary to retain the Middle East"). But the document is very significant in enlightening the background views inspiring the British strategic conceptions. Here these appear still completely "imperial". In a certain sense the British frontier was still, as in Pitt's times, on the Himalayas; in fact South-East Asia and India were practically placed on the same level as Europe and the Middle East among the "other areas of strategic importance". The British position in the Mediterranean and the Middle East was considered vital not only for the oil fields existing there, but also for Britain's role as a great power,4 in particular On the Middle East's strategic importance see W. R. Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East 1945 — 51. Arab Nationalism the United States and Postwar Imperialism, Oxford 1984,

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for her influence in Southern Europe and in Turkey and also for the development of that West-European group envisaged by Bevin.5 Geography was to dictate strategic requirements which, as the COS observed, "will not be radically altered by new developments in methods or weapons of warfare". The superiority of Soviet land forces was to be countered by the naval and air forces and by supremacy in the scientific and technical field. The Middle East was the most suitable base for an airborne attack on the industrial zones and oil fields of the USSR. Prime Minister Attlee several times expressed doubts as to Great Britain's chances of maintaining her positions in the Middle East, and proposed drawing a new line of defence at the level of East Africa, but was later to accept the opinion of Bevin and of the COS.6 Field-Marshall Montgomery, who in June 1946 had succeeded Lord Alanbrooke as Chief of the Imperial General Staff sustained from the beginning the need for Great Britain to commit itself to fighting on the European continent within the framework of a "strong Western bloc" which would protect the European nations "against any invasion from the East".7 Such a commitment, conceived by Montgomery as an addition to, and not a replacement of, the others, was not however shared by his two colleagues, the Chiefs of Staff of the Navy and of the Air Force, thus a memorandum from the COS in January 1947 stressed the vital importance of "a firm hold in the Middle East Area", postponing to further study the question of the support that the United Kingdom would give (and could receive) from a possible "Western Region of Defence centred on France", the establishment of which should however be encouraged.8 There was little possibility, stated a report by the Joint Planning Staff (JPS) in the following June, that the nations of Western Europe could hold out against a land attack, but they could at least be useful in delaying the enemy's advance. While Britain might be ready to send troops to the Continent to confront a rebuilt Germany, she

5 6

7

8

pp. 4 — 5, 15 — 17. The strategy based on the Middle East had also the purpose of denying USSR access to Africa, where the development of colonies should have contributed to alleviate the British economic crisis (see C. Bartlett, The Long Retreat. A Short History of British Defence Policy 1945—70, London 1972, p. 19). On Britain's considerable military presence in the Middle East, see R. Ovendale, The English Speaking Alliance, Britain, the United States, the Dominions and the Cold War 1945-51, London 1985, pp. 51-53, 93. The COS fully concurred on these points which had been stressed by Bevin. For who threatened to resign if the Government should decide the retreat from the Middle East, see N. Hamilton, Monty: the Field-Marshal 1944-1976, London 1986, p. 676. Montgomery of Alamein, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein KG, London 1960, pp. 442 — 43. Future Defence Policy, PRO, Chiefs of Staff Memoranda (DEFE 5), 3, 23-1-47. Admiral Sir John Cunningham had replaced his cousin Lord Cunningham of Hyndhope as First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff.

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was certainly not required to give any guarantee in this sense in case of "aggression by a major power from the East", that is by the Soviet Union. 9 The American strategic appraisals proceeded along lines parallel to those of the British. In March 1946 the Joint War Planning Committee (JWPC) emphasized in one of its documents that in case of war between the USSR and the United Kingdom, it was "vital to the ultimate security of the United States to prevent the defeat of Great Britain" and that America should step in as soon as possible. Given the Soviet superiority in this field, any attempt to match the land forces in Europe would be "fruitless and the cost prohibitive". The forces withdrawn from Europe could contribute to the defence of the Suez area, even if, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) stated, the attempt should be made to maintain a bridgehead on the Continent.10 In April 1947 a document of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee of the 11 JCS, in evaluating the importance of the various nations for the security of the United States and thus the advisability of providing them assistance, attributed to Western Europe as a whole primary strategic importance within the sphere of the Cold War, immediately followed by the Middle East as area of secondary strategic importance. But in case of hot war the Middle (or Near) East would acquire foremost importance, as one of the zones, along with the British Isles and India, from which to launch most effectively a strategic air offensive (and if necessary, a land offensive as well) against the Soviet oil fields and industrial zones. This was stated by the JCS in April 1947,12 and the assessment made by a British document in the following November was practically identical.13 It was again the JSC to repeat that Western Europe would be conquered within a short time, while there were better hopes for defending the Near and Middle East. Later, in August 1948, a document from the American State-Army-Navy-Air Force-Coordinating Committee14, in the attempt to assess the advisability of furnishing military aid to the various nations of the world, was to put Europe and the Near and Middle East on the same level at the top of the priority list, either for solely military reasons or solely political long-term considerations, or for both together depending on the situation of the moment. 9

PRO, Chiefs of Staff - Minutes of Meetings (DEFE 4), 4, JP (47) 70 (Final), 4-6-47. See J. F. Schnabel, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, I, 1945-1947, Wilmington 1979, pp. 151-57. " United States Assistance to Other Countries from the Standpoint of National Security, 29-447, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), i947, I, pp. 738-50. 12 Strategic Guidance for Industrial Mobilization Planning, 1-5-47, in T. H. Etzold — J. L. Caddis (eds.), Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945—1950, New York, 1978, pp. 302-11; see also Schnabel, op. cit., pp. 165-71. 13 Review of World Strategic Situation, DEFE 5/6, COS (47) 227 (0), 19-11-47. 14 FRUS, 1949, I, p. 262. 10

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The common "recognition that the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and of the Middle East was vital both to the United States and the United Kingdom"15 emerged from the Anglo-American Pentagon Talks of October — November 1947, held consequent to the intention expressed by Great Britain in late July of withdrawing its last remaining troops from Greece. Britain was supposed to retain in the area considered her primary military responsibility,16 which it would then attempt to share with the Dominions, while the United States would supply the necessary economic support. The agreement was the more significant in that it concerned an area in which the two nations were divided over the Palestine issue. The de facto alliance between Great Britain and the United States, their "special relationship", was obviously at the basis of the process of formation of a Western alliance. Subsequently, the formalizing of the latter through the signing of the North-Atlantic Treaty was preceded by several examples of collaboration between the two nations in the military field and by the drawing up of strategic plans, first based on similar, although not explicitly agreed upon, hypotheses, then in the course of 1948, developed jointly. Great Britain and the United States held in common a strategic view of ample scope deriving from their role as great powers with worldwide responsibilities. The military field was the area in which the gap between the two powers was least evident,17 considering that Great Britain controlled strategically important territories all over the world, had demobilized more slowly than the United States and had retained compulsory conscription. While these elements were to a certain extent illusory, they fitted well into Bevin's scheme for showing more strength than was really the case and for yielding terrain only when it became inevitable to do so. The United States would persuaded to take on the commitments abandoned by the United Kingdom,18 but the 15

16 17

18

PRO, Bevin Papers (FO 800), 476, ME/47/21, p. 1; FRUS, 1947, V, p. 566. However the JCS, consulted after the talks, downgraded the importance for the USA from "vital" to "critical" (K. W. Condit, The History of the joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, II, 1947-1949, Wilmington 1979, p. 28). On this see also FRUS, 1948, I, p. 520. "Britain's armed forces were one of her most valuable assets in her endeavours to influence American policy" (C. Bartlett, The Military Instrument in British Foreign Policy, in J. Baylis (ed.), British Defence Policy in a Changing World, London 1977, p. 49). "We should shoulder all external liabilities and commitments compatible with the maintenance of tolerable living conditions at home. If under the necessity of preserving those conditions, we are forced to abandon some commitments, we should do our best to induce the Americans to take them on. Failing that, and if there is a choice, we should try to see that the position sacrified is the less important ... The British lion is already regarded as wounded; if he gives the impression of being seriously ill the other animals are not likely to assist him overmuch". So on 19-3-47 Gladwyn Jebb, Assistant Undersecretary of the F. O., concluded the Stocktaking U (PRO, Foreign Office General Correspondence (FO 371), 67587c, 17249), a long document which recapitulated the aims of British foreign policy.

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ultimate aim of Bevin was the establishment of a "Western Union" guided by Great Britain as a third force of decisive significance in world politics. However, it was precisely with those elements which should have formed part of this bloc, Western Europe in particular, that military collaboration was poor. The Dunkirk treaty had brought about no progress in this area19 and even when, in Autumn 1947, plans for closer Anglo-French cooperation were outlined, or even after Bevin's explicit formulation of his Western Union proposal, London showed itself "disinclined" toward any large-scale collaboration with Paris in the area of defence. In their meeting on December 17, 1947, Marshall and Bevin agreed in fact to keep Anglo-American military conversations separate from the Anglo-French ones which, observed the Foreign Secretary, would certainly be less important than the former.20 The British attitude was motivated by reasons that were in greater or lesser degree serious and important. Strong fears were felt over the strength of the French Communist Party (which under the Ramadier government controlled the Ministry of the Defence from January to May 1947) and its ability to infiltrate military and state structures, with the result that Moscow would soon be informed of the content of any Anglo-French conversations. Due to the same fear, the Americans might have restricted their collaboration with the British.21 An objection of the opposite type was raised against the Chief of Staff of the French Army, General Revers, accused of Rightist extremism, 22 and the Ambassador to Paris, Duff Cooper, noted the contradiction and opportunism of these considerations, which revealed the a priori mistrust of the French. If Britain could not rely on France and thus had to abandon the Continent, it would "entail the transfer of the capital of the Empire to Ottawa".23 In reality the prospects for Anglo-French military collaboration depended on factors going far beyond personal matters and party politics, which should be viewed within the framework of the Western Union project launched by Bevin in late 1947.24 The immediate need was that of consolidating Western 19

20

21 22

23 24

The ambassador in Paris, Duff Cooper, a long-standing convinced supporter of the collaboration with France, lamented the absence in the text of the treaty of any reference to military conversations (Duff Cooper to Harvey (Deputy Permanent Undersecretary), 7-2-47, Churchill College, Cambridge, Norwich Papers (DUFC) 4/6). See the British memorandum of conversation, FO 800/447, CONF 47/9, pp. 7-13, partially published in FRUS, 1947, II, pp. 815-22. See Permanent Undersecretary Sir Orme Sargent's minute to Bevin, 21-12-46, FO 371/67670. See Crosthwaite's note, 21-11-47, FO 371/67674; Revers was accused of intending to build an anti-Soviet bloc, of wishing for British help in case of internal strife in France, of having discussed his ideas with a Spanish general. Duff Cooper to Bevin, 5-12-47, ibid., Z 10271. On the policy of Western Union in relation to the problem of security and to the formation of the Atlantic Alliance, here I refer to M. de Leonardis, / "tre cerchi": il Regno Unito e la ricerca delta sicurezza tra Commonwealth, Europa e "relazione speciale" con gli Stati Uniti

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Europe politically and economically, to shelter her from the threat of Communism. Over the long term, it was a question of building a third world power, consisting of the European nations and the territories linked to them, guided by Great Britain, independent of the United States but allied with it on an equal footing. Before achieving this objective however, Europe would need, in addition to the economic aid it was already receiving, a commitment from America guaranteeing its security, to obtain which it would have to prove its determination to improve its own defence. Moreover, the British government did not consider realistic the risk of a Soviet military attack over the short- or medium-term, at least not until after the Prague coup de main had taken place. Bevin did not intend to over-emphasize military aspects in collaboration with the other European nations. Above all there was the risk, noted by the COS, that Anglo-French military conversations would reveal (also to the Russians, in view of the well-known fears over the unreliability of French security procedures) the weakness of the British armed forces and their inability and aversion to supplying effective aid to the Continent in case of war, and certainly not before having verified the attitude of the Americans.25 The Foreign Office declared itself convinced that military conversations could be held "without going into any great detail" and that there was space for discussions "without entering into any commitment for the protection of their Eastern frontiers".26 In the talks held on January 21 and 23, 1948 with his British counterpart, General Revers was left with the erroneous but for him reassuring impression that the British battle plans provided for a commitment to defending the Rhine line.27 In reality, this was the personal position held by Montgomery, who was at that moment arousing discussion on this issue that was to go on for more than two years. The government's defence policy and the strategic concepts prevailing among the Chiefs of Staff and in the British governing class were in fact opposed to any Continental commitment. The programming of the defence

25

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27

(1948-1949), in O. Barie' (ed.), L'alleanza occidentale. Nascita e sviluppi di un sistema di sicurezza collettivo, Bologna 1988, pp. 9—113; M. de Leonardis, // Regno Unito e la NATO, in Storia delle relazioni internazionali, III, 1987, n. 1, pp. 127-44; ID., // Regno Unito, la Western Union e I'alleanza atlantica: lo sforzo per rimanere una grande potenza, in B. Vigezzi (ed.), La dimensione atlantica e le relazioni internazionali nel dopoguerra (1947— 1949), Milano 1987, pp. 281 309; A. Varsori, // Patto di Bruxelles (1948), tra integrazione europea e alleanza atlantica, Roma 1988. See Stapleton (secretary of the COS) to Sargent, 24-12-47, Sargent to Stapleton, 1-1-48 and Crosthwaite's minute, 30-12-47, FO 371/67674, Z 11127; Crosthwaite's other minute, Treaties of Alliance with Belgium and Holland, 29-12-47, FO 371/73045. So spoke Kirkpatrick (assistant undersecretary) at the COS' meeting on 7-1-48, DEFE 4/10, COS (48) 3rd. See Varsori, op. cit., pp. 54-56; Hamilton, op. cit., p. 699.

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budget started from two basic assumptions; the first was the priority of economic recovery over maintaining vast armed forces,28 while attempting however to fulfil all the "imperial" responsibilities; the second, which justified the first, was the perception that the risk of war up to 1953—54 would be slight, increasing to the threatening point only around 1957. The USSR would not possess atomic weapons for another seven or even ten years. The army was the most sacrificed armed force; "as it was not envisaged we should send an army to hold off the enemy in Europe and since there was little risk of this country being invaded" — as Attlee argued at a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff29 - "the necessity for maintaining a substantial army armed with modern weapons and equipments appeared arguable". The opinion held by the Prime Minister, by the Minister of Defence and the Chiefs of Staff of the Navy and the Air Force, as to the unlikelihood of the army being called to resist an invasion, was not shared by Montgomery, who renewed his request for commitment to the land defence of the Continent. This subject was confronted in preparation for Anglo-American military conversations, held to be imminent as a development of the Western Union proposal, in which the situation of Western Europe would also be discussed.30 In addition Admiral Connolly, Chief of the American Naval forces in Europe, had renewed an invitation to the First Sea Lord at the opening of the Dunkirk Talks to plan the withdrawal of Anglo-American occupation troops from the European Continent in case of threat of war. This request seemed to the British extremely dangerous, since they were attempting to arouse the Europeans' will to resist, and the COS decided to limit to a minimum contacts on this issue. In regard to strategy in Western Europe the JPS prepared in late January a report31 in which the importance of Western Europe was considered in relation to the supreme objective of the British defence policy ("to prevent war, provided that this can be done without prejudicing our vital interests") 28

29

30

31

Given these premises, at the beginning of 1948 the Government aimed at a defence budget for the next two years of six hundred million pounds, equivalent to 7% of national income and more than 20% of State budget; the COS had requested at least 825 million and in the end for the first year 692.6 million were assigned. On 1st April 1948 the total members of the Armed Forced had to be 940,000 (534,000 in the army, 145,000 in the navy, 261,000 in the RAF), a year later the number had to go down to 716,000 (345,000, 145,000 and 226,000 respectively). DEFE 4/9, COS (47) 158th, 16-12-47; see Hamilton, op. cit., p. 690. With its proposal of continental commitment, therefore, Montgomery aimed also to revalue the army's role. The fact that the JPS in its agenda of the subjects for discussion with the Americans had given priority to the Far East in respect to Western Europe may be considered revealing of the "imperial" and not European outlook existing among the British officers; however the COS quickly inverted the order of priorities (see DEFE 4/10, JP (48) 4 (Final), 6-1-48, COS (48) 7th, 14-1-48, Confidential (Annex). Ibid., JP (48) 16 (Final), 27-1-48.

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and the three "basic strategic requirements": "a) The defence of the U. K. and its development as an offensive base, b) The control of essential sea communications, c) A firm hold in the Middle East and its development as an offensive base".32 The importance of a strong Western European union as deterrent to war and the need to keep the enemy as far to the East as possible were acknowledged. It remained to be seen what contribution the United Kingdom would make to the defence of the European Continent. Three strategies were possible: 1) a "continental" one, in which Europe would become the main theatre of operations in the West with the aim of halting Soviet invasion, but which would be unachievable at least until 1957. 2) A "strategy entailing a foothold in Europe" on the Pyrenees in order to distract enemy resources from attacking the United Kingdom and the Middle East, ensuring communications in the Mediterranean and avoiding having to repeat a landing such as that of Normandy. Such a strategy could be adopted only in agreement with the Americans. 3) The JPS concluded in favor of an "air strategy", which would provide for participating in the defence of Europe only with aviation based in England, and recommended "most strongly that in the forthcoming talks we should enter into no commitment to send land and air forces to the Continent". Montgomery expressed his "definite disagreement" with the conclusions of the JPS, approved instead by Tedder and Cunningham, countering it with a document of his own dated January 30, and two meetings were held, the second in the presence of Attlee, Bevin and Alexander, to settle the controversy.33 The Chief of the Imperial General Staff34 insisted on the importance of strengthening the defence of the United Kingdom, rendering it less vulnerable to rocket bombardment and short range bombing, and sustained the possibility of resisting along the Rhine.35 He calculated that the Russians would not be able to deploy along the river more than 33 divisions two weeks after the outbreak of war and 73 after a month. To resist this attack, 23 divisions would be needed within the first fifteen days and 48 within a month. He believed that France alone would be able to furnish thirty divisions at the outbreak of hostilities and that Britain would have to supply no more than two (in addition to the occupation forces). If Great Britain (and the Com32

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Object and strategic requirements diffusely described in the Review of World Strategic Situation, cit., where it was pointed out that the United Kingdom could rely less than in the past on European allies and that only the United States could guarantee the victory of the democracies. See DEFE 5/10, COS (48) 26 (0), 30-1-48; DEFE 4/10, COS (48) 14th, 16th, 18th 28-1, 2-2, 42-48. His ideas were to be better clarified during the following March, see below. If the attack could not be held on the Rhine at least time would have been gained to organize the defence of Britain.

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monwealth) would not give guarantees of full participation in the defence of Europe (to be furnished even in the absence of an American commitment) the Western Union would have no chance of survival. Montgomery then touched on an extremely delicate question, alluding to the prospect of a treaty between Britain and Germany and to the inclusion of the latter in the Western Union. However, he proposed only a defence action; an invasion of Russia from the West was out of the question, and the war would be won mainly thanks to air superiority. Tedder and Cunningham evoked instead the spectres of Mons and Dunkirk to motivate their opposition to a Continental strategy, maintaining above all that no commitment could be taken until the American position was known and until the role of atomic weapons had been evaluated. Attlee said "he was disturbed at this new idea that we might send land forces to the Continent" and unconvinced that the offer of two divisions would do very much to encourage the Western Union.36 A future war between Russia and the United States could break out in the Far East and not in Europe and in any case the Middle Eastern theatre should be favoured. The Prime Minister believed it dangerous to consider Russia the only potential enemy and did not like to hear German rearmament spoken of.37 The decision taken on February 4 in a first very timid step toward commitment on the Continent, consisting of studying the possibility of sending two reinforcement divisions at the outbreak of war, was reached on the basis of Bevin's considerations (backed up by the Minister of Defence, Alexander). The Foreign Secretary declared himself convinced that the nations of the Western Union had sufficient manpower to withstand attack and although he had shortly before opposed sending an expeditionary corps to the Continent, he now declared that the issue of Europe's defence would have to be faced on the basis of common planning and task-sharing with the other nations. Probably the Continental countries "would provide the bulk of the manpower for the land forces", but if it turned out that Britain "had land forces to spare, he had no fundamental objections to their fighting on the Continent". As for Germany, Bevin feared that "we might find it impossible to avoid building her up again until once again she became a menace". The change in Bevin's position was probably dictated by awareness that the Americans would not engage in the defence of Europe unless they had seen that Great Britain was willing to participate fully also in operations on the Continent. In fact, a letter from Under-Secretary of State Lovett had just arrived in which the lack of firm British assurances in this regard was noted.38 36 i7 58

Cunningham expressed this same opinion. Cunningham too spoke against the German danger. l.ovett to Inverchapel (ambassador in Washington), 2-2-48, Inverchapel to Bei/in, 2-2-48, PRO,

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In effect there were already British troops on the Continent, the occupation forces in Germany (without counting those in Austria and Trieste) amounting to almost two divisions. While diplomatic contacts with the Americans were at a stalemate, Bevin gave instructions to Montgomery to go in the first half of February to confer with the three "Allied" commanders in Germany for the purpose of coordinating their plans in regard to a Soviet attack.39 The visit was made unknown to the Chiefs of Staff of the Navy and the Air Force. In writing of this to his United States counterpart Bradley, Montgomery assured him40 that in case of war Great Britain would immediately send two reinforcement divisions, although admitting that the ideas expressed in his document of January 30 (of which he sent a copy) had not yet been approved. American reinforcements too should be immediately available, so it could be decided whether to send them first to Europe or to the Middle East. The United States would also have to furnish a great part of the equipment needed for 45 or 50 divisions. Montgomery also proposed to Bradley the appointment of supreme commanders, British or American, in all the world's strategic zones: in the Middle East a British supreme commander (to be appointed immediately) with the commanders-in-chief of the three armed forces initially all British; in Europe an American supreme commander (to be designated even if his immediate appointment was "politically impossible") with initially British commanders-in-chief.41 The Far East would be divided into two areas, one under British, the other under American responsibility. The disagreement over the question of Continental commitment, which had taken on harsh tones in January — February, also due to poor relations between Montgomery and his two colleagues, Lord Tedder in particular,42 was to a certain degree attenuated in subsequent discussions among the COS, called in mid-March to formulate instructions for the delegation that was to meet the American Joint Staff Planners as well as to evaluate the security

39

40 41

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Embassy and Consular Archives - USA (FO 115), 4359; FRUS, 1948, III, pp. 12-16. Bevin's and F. O.'s original idea was not to send troops on to the continent, taking for granted that also the Americans would refrain from that; but if the United States would enter with Britain "into some general commitment to go to war with an aggressor" that might perhaps reassure "the potential victims ... as to eventual victory" (Ivone Kirkpatrick's memorandum Implementation of the Secretary's of State Cabinet Paper on Foreign Policy, 9-1-48, FO 371/73045, Z 352). Bevin did not let Montgomery accept the invitation to return, on 22nd March, Revers' visit, considering that other discussions at political level should precede (see Hamilton, op. cit., pp. 702-3). Montgomery to Bradley, 8-3-48, FO 800/453, DEF/48/11; see Hamilton, op. cit., p. 699. Montgomery admitted that the appointment of a Briton as land forces commander would be strongly opposed by the French; an American should later take over as air force commander, like in the Middle East. See Hamilton, op. cit., pp. 640-43.

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systems, the Atlantic, Mediterranean and Brussels Pacts with American support, that Bevin, on the wave of the Prague coup and then of the Soviet threat to Norway, had proposed to Marshall on March 11. The document43, signed by the Vice-Chiefs of Staff (presumably, it is obvious, with the agreement of their superiors), stated: "We are in no position at the present moment to reinforce our occupational garrison in Germany, neither should we commit ourselves to fighting on the Continent until the military recovery of the Western European countries has been established. The land forces we possess would be required for the defence of the United Kingdom and the Middle East. Nor in these circumstances could we send any air forces".44 Not even the United States would have been able to prevent a Soviet conquest of Western Europe. A strategic air offensive from the Middle East and from the United Kingdom and the use of the atom bomb were the best arms of the West. It was therefore recommended, in stipulating the pacts in question,45 to avoid any military clause involving commitments to send troops to the Continent and also to avoid conversations with the European Chiefs of Staff on the deployment of forces until the nations of Western Europe were convinced that "(a) The proposed pacts, coupled with the threat of American atom bombs, really stand a first-rate chance of avoiding war. (b) If war comes within the next few years, the use of the bombs would give a really good chance of giving physical protection to the countries concerned".46 If the use of the adjectives "firstrate" and "good" was not merely casual, there was obvious disparity between deterrence and defence. Moreover, the three Chiefs of Staff 47 declared themselves in agreement "that there could be no question of our deciding to defend any part of Europe until we knew we were going to have American support" and reformulated the instructions to their delegation that was to be sent to Washington so as to include among the "desirable strategic objectives" also the aim "to defend Western Europe as far to the East as possible". Certainly, some divergences 41 44

45

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47

DEFE 5/10, COS (48) 59 (0), 18-3-48. For the defence of the Middle East the Commonwealth's collaboration was necessary (see de Leonardis, ί "tre cerchi" ..., cit., pp. 79 — 81, 96). In particular "The Middle East was really the first line of defence of the (South-African) Union", DEFE 4/19, COS (49) 3rd, 7-1-49, p. 7. Of these, which were all important and complementary to each other, the most urgent was the Atlantic pact, considering the threat to Norway and since the United States had already shown their willingness to engage themselves in the Mediterranean. Three months later, general Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, general inspector of French armed forces, asked himself: "Can the Americans guarantee that their scientific superiority assures peace for 5 or 6 years?" and if the answer was affirmative he seemed to prefer that Western Europe should maintain "at least an appearance of independence in respect to the United States" (Note sur la Defense de I'Europe Occidental, 20-6-48, in J. De Lattre, Ne pas subir. Ecrits 1914-52, Paris 1984, p. 389). DEFE 4/11, COS (48) 39th, 17-3-48, Confidential Annex.

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of opinion remained48; for Tedder the latter should have been the collective objective of the Western democracies, but Western Europe did not seem to him vital to the security of the United Kingdom, which thus should send no reinforcements to its air and land forces already stationed there, to be left as a "token", while instead Montgomery considered vital France, Benelux and the North-African coast and only very important Italy, Greece, Scandinavia and Denmark 49 and believed it necessary to do everything possible, admitting that this was very little, to "bolster up" the nations of Western Europe. He specified that for the next 18 months none of the nations in question would be able to face a conflict of vast proportions and thus he "saw no purpose in examining our strategy between now and 1950", while it was more important to plan for the subsequent period. In effect, in his memorandum of January 30 the Field-Marshal had stated that he wished to confront the strategic problem "in relation to some date between 1957 and 1960; but our preparations must take into account the possibility of an earlier outbreak". From April 12 to 21, the British and American staff planners met in Washington. The Americans had drawn up in the preceding weeks the BroilerFrolic plan, of which Admiral Denfeld, Chief of Naval Operations, had protested the part relevant to abandoning Western Europe without fighting.50 The plan that emerged from the Anglo-American discussions, initially termed Doublequick by the British and Halfmoon by the Americans,51 was based on the hypothesis that war would break out by 1949, and considered only the first year of hostilities. The plan did not provide for any reinforcement of the occupation troops, but on the contrary contemplated their immediate withdrawal along the Rhine and subsequently, although with delaying actions against the Soviet advance, towards the Pyrenees or the ports along the French coast. The oil-producing areas of the Middle East would also be conquered, and six months after the outbreak of hostilities Spain might be occupied and Mediterranean communications cut off, while the United Kingdom also would

48

Ibid., COS (48) 42nd, 19-3-48. From the point of view of the navy, Admiral Cunningham, even if unwilling to describe them vital, nevertheless considered Scandinavia, Denmark and Italy very important. 50 See Condit, op. cit., pp. 286-87. " See Etzold-Gaddis, op. cit., pp. 315 — 23 and Condit, op. cit., pp. 288 — 91. The plan's updated versions were named Speedway by the British and Fleetwood, Trojan and Doublestar by the Americans. The plan was approved by the JCS on 19-5 "for planning purposes", a restrictive formula due to the uncertainty over the authorization to use the atomic bomb; in fact President Truman, still unconvinced about using to it, ordered the preparation of an alternative conventional plan, but on 28th July the Secretary of Defence Forrestal on his own authority ordered the continuation of planning for an atomic offensive (see D. A. Rosenberg, The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy 1945—1960, in International Security, spring 1983, pp. 12-13).

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be threatened by invasion and reinforcements of fighter aircraft and antiaircraft artillery would have to be sent. The Western air offensive would have started from England, from the Khartoum-Cairo-Suez area, and from Okinawa (from the latter, with atom bombs). A year from the outbreak of war, the West would have undertaken campaigns for re-opening the Mediterranean and reconquering the oil-producing areas of the Middle East. Montgomery stressed the disastrous effect that a withdrawal of occupation forces would have on the Continental allies and asked for a firm decision to fight along the Rhine; however "if an emergency arose, within the next eighteen months — which he thought was most unlikely - he would not recommend any reinforcement of our forces on the Continent except for the necessary administrative backing". He obtained the agreement of his colleagues and of Alexander on this point and on the cancellation, from the British version of the plan, of any reference to withdrawal of the occupation troops.52 But the British commitment to participation in the battle on the Continent remained surrounded by doubts and subjected to multifold conditioning. Bevin recalled that in 1914 Europe had been in difficulty because Britain had not clearly declared her intentions in advance; in 1939 she had declared them but had failed to re-arm sufficiently to put them into practice; now he wanted to repeat neither of these mistakes. Thus before embarking on a promise to the allies to combat with land forces on the Continent he intended to ascertain what forces were available.53 "The plan for the defence of Western Europe — it was sustained at a meeting of the Defence Committee on June 2154 — to which France and the Benelux countries naturally tended to attach the highest importance, was, in fact, only a part of our overall strategy". Thus before indicating with precision her own contribution, as France was urging her to do, Great Britain had to evaluate the needs of the other theatres and above all had to know precisely what assistance would be furnished by the Americans. As Bevin further observed, it was the latter point which mattered to the Europeans: the Western Union would certainly not fail merely because Great Britain refused to guarantee two reinforcement divisions in 1951. While Bevin's 52

53

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DEFE 4/13, COS (48) 64th, 10-5-48. Admiral Cunningham said to understand the political motivations of this decision but to consider more realistic from the military point of view the American opinion. PRO, Cabinet Papers - Private Collections - Sir Norman Brook (CAB 127), 341, 7-5-48. The day before Montgomery had raised the problem of the armed forces' inadequacy; during the summer, also under the impact of the Berlin blockade, a number of meetings of the Defence Committee were held and approved the extension of the period of conscription, an increase of the defence budget and an addition of 75,000 men to the armed forces, of which 67,000 to the army (see de Leonardis, / "tre cerchi" ..., cit., pp. 76 — 78). CAB 131/8, DO (49) 16th.

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reasoning was not without logic, it ignored the fact that this appeal to Washington would undermine British leadership in Europe as well as the political-military autonomy of the Europeans.

The Apprehensions of France Paris was much more painfully aware of Western Europe's vulnerability than was London, where for geographic reasons this perspective could be viewed with greater detachment, and the French viewed with suspicion the AngloAmerican strategical concepts that accepted with resignation the idea of Soviet conquest.55 National pride, which prevented the French from acknowledging British leadership, the different geographical situations of France and England, the objective inadequacy of the forces of the Brussels Pact alone56, made it necessary to recur to American aid. It was a question of obtaining it without delegating negotiations to the British, and on bases partially different from those laid down by London. While in the British capital the complex nature of American policy was better understood, the "special relationship" represented a de facto alliance, and it was easier for the government to resign itself to awaiting the long procedure of Congressional approval of a treaty of guarantee to be followed by concrete military assistance, more impatience was felt in Paris. Guarantee and assistance, concepts that, according to the French, were not sufficiently distinguished by the illogical Anglo-Americans,57 appeared to them clearly distinct: what mattered to Paris was "much less the political and legal defi55

56

57

See Bonnet to Chauvel, 17-4-48, Chauvel to Bonnet, 21-4-48, (Ministere des Relations Exterieures - Paris MRE), Papiers d'Agents, Henry Bonnet, vol. 271, fol. 40-41, 45-50. This same awareness which on one hand caused Belgian foreign minister Spaak's doubts, similar to the French ones, on the effectiveness of an "Atlantic" pact, on the other hand gave rise in Italy both to the neutralist tendencies of the ambassador in Moscow and to the prudence towards a collective security pact of political and military circles, prompting the latter to establish contacts with their French colleagues (see de Leonardis, / "tre cerchi" ..., cit., p. 86; Id., Manlio Brosio a Mosca e la scelta occidental, in E. Di Nolfo, R. H. Rainere, B. Vigezzi (eds.), L'ltalia e la politica di potenza in Europa (1945-50), Milano 1988, pp. 140-44; A. Varsori, La scelta occidentale dell'ltalia (1948 —1949), in Storia delle relazioni internazionali, I (1985), n. 1, pp. 129-53; L. Nuti, La missione Marras,2-22 dicembre 1948, ibid., Ill (1987), n. 2, pp. 350, 354,363-64). See P. Guillen, La France et la question de la defense de l'Europe occidentale du Pact de Bruxelles (mars 1948) au Plan Pleven (octobre 1950), ibid., II (1986), n. 2, pp. 307 - 9; M. Va'isse, L'echec d'une Europe franco-britannique ou comment le pacte de Bruxelles fut cree et delaisse, in R. Poidevin (ed.), Histoire des debuts de la construction europeenne (mars 1948 —mat 1950), Bruxelles 1986, pp. 383-86. Bonnet to Chauvel, 17-4-48, cit.

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nition" of a guarantee than "precise indications on a concerted military action and on the means available".58 Ambassador Bonnet, to whom in April General Bradley had confided that the United States did not have "troops ready to send to Europe" and that "American industry was not ready to furnish the means for effective re-arming of Europe",59 was to demand of Marshall with great harshness, during the summer negotiations in Washington, "unity of command at once; immediate movement of US military supplies to France; immediate movement of US military personnel to France".60 The French government, noted the Secretary General of the Quai d'Or61 say, was oriented toward "complete collaboration with the Anglo-Americans", expressly on the basis of the assumption of a change in their strategic concepts that would include defence of Continental Europe. Chauvel himself had fully approved of the Italian Ambassador Quaroni's suggestion of "two pacts, one for the Northern front, the other for the Mediterranean, France representing in Europe the hinge between the two systems".62 In this way, the strategic barycentre of the alliance would be re-balanced and the politicalmilitary role of France would be enhanced. Another sphere in which France had to make her presence felt, insinuating herself between Britain and America, was that of the inter-allied military commands. This problem too63 had been brought up by Montgomery in early 58

59

60

61 62 6!

Chauvel to Bonnet, 15-4-48, vol. 271, cit., fol. 43. Moreover the fear of German danger remained largely diffused in Paris, so that "the concern to have a guarantee against the Russians — Chauvel wrote to Bonnet on 21-4-48 — must not make us lose sight of the opportunity of a guarantee against Germany". So General Bradley had spoken to Ambassador Bonnet on 30th April (Bonnet to Bidault, 35-48, vol. 271, cit., fol. 61 — 62). Apparently the French were less interested in troops: General Revers, Marshal Juin and Defence Minister Ramadier explained to the Americans they were able to mobilize more than one million men, but they lacked heavy equipment for them (see the memorandum of conversation Revers — Wolfers (a professor in international relations who worked also for the Department of State), in Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part II: 1946-1953. Europe and NATO, Frederick 1980 (microfilms), reel IV (JCS) and W. Millis (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries, New York 1951, p. 521, 11-11-48). W. Park, Defending the West. A History of Ν ΑΤΟ, Boulder (Co.) 1986 p. 13; see FRUS, 1948, III, pp. 218—19. In June 1949 the French government threatened to ratify with reservations the north-Atlantic treaty if guarantees were not given on France's participation in the pact's top military command and the real protection afforded by it (see FRUS, 1949, IV, pp. 306 — 8). Chauvel to Bonnet, 3-8-48, vol. 271, cit., fol. 83. Chauvel to Bonnet, 21-4-48, ibid., fol. 50. On the events leading to the formation of Bruxelles pact's military command see de Leonardis, / "tre cerchi" ..., cit., pp. 93 — 94, with the sources there indicated, to which might be added Varsori, llPatto ..., cit., pp. 148—52,168 — 76; Hamilton, op. cit., pp. 714— 17; the memoranda Command Arrangements, 14-7-48, Interim Command Arrangements, 21-7-48, Newport Conference, 23-8-48, JCS; Condit, op. cit., pp. 368 — 71.

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June. With reluctance, the British government had approved on July 9 the idea of the Brussels Pact command structure. London thus contacted the Americans on this subject, urging that one of their officers be designated Commander in Chief. The JCS assessed the advantages and disadvantages of such a solution.64 This was followed by exchanges of views between British and Americans as to the person to be appointed, the composition of the command and the higher authority on which it would depend,65 until on August 23 the JCS recommended the appointment of a British or French Allied Commander-in-Chief for Western Europe (with an American Vice Commander), naming as acceptable officers Alexander, Montgomery or Juin, although on the same day Marshall expressed a clear preference for the second of these. At the outbreak of war this commander, as well as an Allied Commander-in-Chief for the Mediterranean and the Middle East, would be responsible to an American Supreme Allied Commander-in-Chief (West). In actual fact, for the moment no appointment or designation was made by the Americans and the French had to resign themselves by the end of September to accepting a structure that did not reassure them as to the commitment of the United States and that placed in a preeminent position the British Montgomery. The latter however could not feel fully satisfied, as his authority was merely that of first among his peers, as chairman of a committee of Commanders-in-Chief, the British Air Marshal Robb and the French Vice-Admiral Jaujard and General de Lattre de Tassigny.66 Between the latter and Montgomery conflict emerged immediately, not only due to the clash between two strong personalities but for a much more important question of principle. France in fact wanted a "guarantee that 64

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66

The appointment looked like a mere device to remedy the lack of an effective defence organization; an American commander as symbol of United States leadership would cause the laying on his country of the burden of a defeat or would generate strong political pressure to send immediate American reinforcements to Europe at the outbreak of war. On the other hand "Lacking further forces to commit to the battle, the next most effective act would seem to be to furnish the Allied Commander-in-Chief" (Interim Command ..., cit., p. 9). The Americans proposed that he should depend on the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff, enlarged to the French; but the British objected to the French admission and stressed the impossibility of having the Bruxelles organization depend on an external body, making the counter-proposal of subordinating him to the committee of the pact's chiefs of staff with an American observer added. See Hamilton, op. cit., pp. 715 —16. Marshal Juin had refused the office considering the approved structure "purely artificial and void of substance" (A. Juin, Memoires, II, Paris 1960, pp. 166-70) and de Lattre had been appointed instead, "a most unsatisfactory appointment", according to Marshall, to whom French premier Schuman had declared that he himself and "the entire French Army" concurred with that opinion assuring that he would never receive the appointment (Meeting of the Secretary of Defence and the Service Chiefs with the Secretary of State, 10-10-48, JCS).

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defence on the Continent would be kept up to the end", but, observed de Lattre on March 9, 1949, "The exercise of supreme command by a British or by an American cannot give this assurance if the supreme commander has the sole responsibility. It would be entirely different if the Commander-in-Chief of the land forces, who is a Continental and whose armies effectively cover Western Europe, were invested with direct and personal responsibility, the extent of which should be specified".67 It should be noted that others reasoned differently, and their reasons were to prevail; an American had to be the Supreme Commander, because only in this way would it be possible to guarantee the commitment, above all in atomic warfare, of the United States. For his part Schuman, just one month after the establishment of the Brussels Pact command, had remarked: "The Atlantic Pact should give us the chance to take the Supreme Command in the West away from Field-Marshall Montgomery in favour of an American".68 In reality this hope was to remain unfulfilled for at least another two years. Within the context of the Atlantic Alliance, the standing committee placed France on a footing of formal equality with the two Anglo-American powers; but the "special relationship" between Great Britain and the United States remained emphasized not only by the extensive preliminary discussions held by the two nations on the military structure of the alliance, but above all by the fact that the American Joint Chiefs of Staff intended to make of the close relationship with Great Britain a means "to properly guide the North Atlantic Treaty military organization" and considered that, outside of the North-Atlantic area, "close coordination" was desirable only with the British, the only others who possessed "worldwide responsibilities". Moreover, the fact that the Americans did not participate in the regional planning groups of the alliance on a full-membership basis seemed a serious sign of their disengagement. Only in May 1950, after the Atlantic Council meeting at the Hague, did the American Secretary of Defence Johnson admit that this non-participation had the opposite effect to the one desired ("We are suffering all the costs of membership without having a strong voice in the determination of the regional plans"), and stressed that there was in the alliance the need for "a command organization or at least a nucleus for a command organization".69 67

68 69

J. De Lattre, op. cit., p. 40; see ibid., pp. 400-3, 420-25; J. De Lattre, Jean de Lattre mon mart, II, 1945-1952, Paris 1972, pp. 145-46; R. Massigli, Une Comedie des erreurs 19431956, Paris 1976, pp. 126-27; Hamilton, op. cit., p. 749. Va'isse, op. cit., p. 386. See De Leonardis, / "tre cerchi" ..., cit., p. 95; the sources there indicated; DEFE 4/20, JP (48) 129th, 10-3-49; DEFE 4/23, COS (49) 113th, 3-8-49; The Joint Chiefs of Staff Position on British-U. S. Cooperation for Planning within the North Atlantic Treaty, 7-7-49, Johnson to Bradley, 3-5-50, JCS; Condit, op. cit., pp. 382-95.

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The Difficult Defence of Europe On October 6, 1948, the representatives of the Chiefs of Staff of the Brussels Pact nations approved a document on the defence policy of the Western Union, whose supreme objective was "to convince Russia that war would not pay". It was recommended that there be "a steady but continuous increase of our military resources so far as our economic situation allows", and that they be organized and utilized in common. In case of war the first of the "vital interests" of the Pact was "holding the enemy in Germany as far to the East as possible".70 The short-term plan approved at the end of the year by the committee of Commanders-in-Chief of the Brussels Pact nations specified as objective guaranteeing the territorial integrity of the member nations, halting the enemy, in the North, along the line of the Rhine and Ijssel rivers (actually, this excluded more than a third of Dutch territory), in the South, along the French-Swiss and French-Italian borders.71 That this was mere wishful thinking was a secret to no one. Examining at Washington, with the participation of the Canadians, the newly completed revision of the Anglo-American short-term plan,72 the COS stressed the impossibility of withstanding Soviet attack even along the Rhine. The Western forces for the defence of this line amounted to 10-11 divisions and 500 aircraft, while it was estimated that the Soviets would have attacked with 50 divisions and 5 — 6,000 aircraft. 73 As for the Middle East, it was hoped to have "a reasonable chance of at least defending Egypt".74 The only means with which to strike the USSR would be an atomic offensive launched by American bombers, but the British had already complained to the Secretary of Defence Forrestal that they knew practically nothing of United States plans 70

71 72

73

74

FO 371/73079, Metric, P.P. (48) 49). For the COS' appreciation see DEFE 4/17, COS (48) 151st, 25-10-48. DEFE 5/13, COS (49) 50, Metric, 25-1-49. Digest of plan "Speedway", DEFE 5/9, COS (48) 210, 16-12-48. Sir William Slim and Lord Fräser of North Cape had replaced Montgomery and Cunningham respectively. In the plan already mentioned (above n. 70) the Bruxelles commanders-in-chief estimated that, without preliminary preparations, the Soviets could attack with 25 divisions including 5,000 tanks, 800 heavy bombers and 2,000 tactical aircraft (these last could be doubled within a few days); making preparations, the Soviets could employ 75 divisions and 5,000 tactical aircrafts within one month. See also De Lattre, Ne pas subir ..., cit., pp. 431 —32. The support of Commonwealth forces in this area, as in South-East Asia, was considered likely, but, with the exception of Canada, at the moment there were no detailed plans. In summer 1949 more detailed discussions took place with the Dominions; in the same period the French too proposed conversations with their Indian Ocean command. On the strategic situation in the Middle East, see DEFE 5/13, COS (49) 9, 9-2-49; DEFE 5/15, DCC (49) 51, 15-6-49, COS (49) 239, 18-7-49.

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for using the A-bomb. 75 General de Lattre de Tassigny also centred his analysis, in January 1949, on the role of atomic warfare. 76 An atomic attack launched on Soviet territory seemed to him ineffective insofar as it would have left untouched the divisions stationed in Germany and Poland destined to attack the Rhine line. To defend the latter, it seemed to him necessary on the one hand that atomic attack should be launched "without delay or even beforehand" in Germany territory, on the other hand that the conventional forces of the West should be reinforced and substantially modernized.77 Both aspects implied, the first of them exclusively, the participation of the United States. The Americans continued to consider atomic weapons as a sector pertaining exclusively to them, in which the European nations should have no voice.78 Moreover, the Americans themselves, while formulating from 1948 on79 plans that envisaged using the atom bomb, debated among themselves for a good part of the same year whether it should actually be utilized in case of war, until on September 13 during a meeting at the White House, President Truman stated that he was ready to give it his authorization. 80 The following April 6, 1949, the President made public this decision.81 The debate then centred mainly around the way atomic weapons should be used and their real effectiveness. The Trojan plan drawn up between December 1948 and January 1949 also included a specific appendix on atomic warfare, listing as priority targets 75

76

77

78

79

80

81

See The forrestal Diaries, cit., p. 525 and the minutes of the Anglo-American meeting, 1311-48, FO 800/545, DEF 48/62. Note sur les possibilites d'attaque sovietique contre l'Europe occidentale et les moyens ä y opposer, 3-1-49, in J. De Lattre, op. cit., pp. 429-33. A little more than one month earlier at a meeting of the French National Defence Committee the insufficiency of effectives and the wear of the army's equipments were noticed (see Guillen, op. cit., p. 307). So the American military delegation sent in July 1948 to the Bruxelles pact had to "avoid discussing with any of the foreign conferees the policy or plans of the United States with respect to the employment of atomic weapons in warfare" (FRUS, 1948, II, p. 191) and Secretary of State Marshall wished that in discussing Western Union's command structure it should be made "crystal clear" that the JCS reserved for themselves the exclusive control of strategic air forces (Meeting ..., 10-10-48, cit.). Also with Great Britain the exchange of information had been interrupted, this being the only exception to the special relationship. A document of 18-7-49 directed to evaluate the opportunity of resuming collaboration with London is revealing of the American attitude of almost "hysterical" caution for the tone (even if purposedly exaggerated) of the unfavourable arguments raised (FRUS, 1949, 1, pp. 48689). Previous plans had excluded, or did not consider, the employment of atomic weapons (see Etzold — Gaddis, op. cit., pp. 302 4; Schnabel, op. cit., p. 166). See The Forrestal Diaries, cit., p. 487. Three days earlier a National Security Council document had recommended that no action should be taken to obtain a decision in the matter (FRUS, 1948, I, p. 628; see ibid., pp. 570 — 73, 624 — 31, on the debate inside U.S. administration). FRUS, 1949, I, p. 463.

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70 cities in which the demographic and industrial potential of the USSR was concentrated, to be struck by 133 bombs within one month. 82 However, Forrestal was sceptical as to the Air Force's chances of striking the assigned targets and winning the war only though atomic bombardments, and a commission chaired by General Harmon was appointed which, in May 1949, concluded that the planned atomic offensive would have reduced Soviet industrial potential by 30 to 40%, but that the capability of the enemy of advancing rapidly into selected areas of Western Europe, the Middle East and Far East "would not be seriously impaired", although its possibilities of sustaining the advance would be seriously limited; nor would this in itself have brought about capitulation. However, while stressing "certain ... reactions detrimental to the achievement of Allied war objectives" that were to be expected in the event of an atomic offensive, the Harmon Report concluded by pointing out that "the advantages of its early use would be transcendental".83 These conclusions and those of a report by General Vandenberg, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, on the possibility of striking the designated targets, not only provoked strong conflict with the Navy, which was subordinated to the requirements of air forces and which came out loser from the encounter, but also led to an increase in the production of bombs and induced the JCS to give the Strategic Air Command instructions to try to delay Soviet advance in Western Europe. But, as Rosenberg has noted, "Through 1950, the nuclear stockpile was still too small and the weapons too large and unwieldy to be used against true tactical targets, such as troops and transportation bottlenecks".84 In effect, the change in the Anglo-American and Atlantic strategic plans in 1949 and the first half of 1950 was based on the dual need for utilizing the atom bomb and for strengthening conventional forces. In April 1949 the JCS decided to prepare a new short-term plan for the years 1950 — 51. After seven 82 83

84

See Etzold-Gaddis, op. cit., pp. 357-60; Condit, op. cit., p. 293. See ibid., pp. 311 — 15; Etzold - Gaddis, op. cit., pp. 360 — 64; Rosenberg, op. cit., p. 16. The casualties of the initial atomic offensive were calculated in 2,700,000 dead and 4,000,000 injured. Op. cit., p. 16; see ibid., pp. 14 — 15; L. Sebesta, "Two scorpions in a bottle". Genesi di una scelta difficile: la bomba H tra strategia e politica, in Storia delle relazioni internazionali, II, 1986, n. 2, pp. 340-42. The United States had two bombs at the end of 1945 and 50 in July 1948; the number of B 29 bombers modified to carry the bomb rose from 30 during most of 1948 to 60 in December of the same year and to 250 in June 1950. All the bombers were stationed in New Mexico; the B 29s moved to England in July 1948 were modified only in 1949/50 and therefore their transfer to Europe was only a symbolic gesture (see J. Baylis, Anglo-American Defence Relations 1939—1980. The Special Relationship, London 1981, p. 34). On anxious French interest in the magnitude and quality of American atomic stockpile see Ambassador Bonnet's despatches, 29-6-49, 17-5-50, 5-6-50, MRE, Serie B Amerique 1944 — 1952, Etats Unis, vol. 214, fol. 275-79, vol. 215, fol. 186-95.

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months of discussion, also with the British and Canadians, the JCS approved on December 8 the Offtackle plan, whose British version, named Galloper, was approved in the following March. 85 As in the previous plan, the impossibility of preventing a Soviet conquest of Europe was admitted. The order of strategic priorities in Western Eurasia put in first place defence of the United Kingdom "to ensure its availability as a major base for all types of military operations"; next in priority was "control of the Western MediterraneanNorth African area (to include Tunisia)", which entailed defence of the Pyrenees line or at least of an area for protecting Gibraltar; last came "control of the Cairo-Suez area". This priority list, which subordinated the Middle East to the maintaining of a bridgehead on the European Continent, was a point of disagreement between the British (who would have liked to invert its order) and the Americans. Assessing that the Soviet advance in the Middle East would have been slower than previously estimated (so that the decisive attack would have come after six months and not after three), the Americans would not send there during the first ninety days either troops or aircraft, leaving the responsibility for defence of the area to the British alone.86 Moreover, the strategic air offensive would no longer be launched from the Middle East, but from England and from North Africa. Another point of divergence between London and Washington concerned the location of the bridgehead to be maintained in Europe. While the Americans favoured Spain, linked with North Africa, and were thus in agreement with French strategists such as de Lattre who intended to make this region, under French sovereignty, the main base for the Western allies, the British would have preferred Brittany as a bridgehead, since the air protection necessary to hold it would also have defended their own island, whose basic role would have been further emphasized. However, maintaining a bridgehead in Europe, while necessary to avoid having to mount another Overlord operation (extremely risky especially after the USSR had exploded her atom bomb) appeared to be a very difficult feat. To prevent the communizing of the Continent, the offensive for its reconquest would have to start "as soon as possible", but it was estimated that this would have been possible no earlier than two years from the outbreak of war.87 85

For this discussion of Galloper-Offtackle, see DEFE 4/23, JP (49) 73, 26-7-49, COS (49) 112th, Confidential Annex, 2-8-49; DEFE 4/24, COS (49) 131st, 8-9-49; DEFE 5/17, 5-10-49; DEFE 4/29, JP (49) 132, 1-3-50; DEFE 4/30, JP (50) 36, 22-3-50; Short-Term Strategic Concept and Emergency War Plan as related to the North Atlantic Pact, 7-9-49, JCS; Etzold-Gaddis, op. cit., pp. 324-34; Condit, op. cit., pp. 294-303; W. S. Poole, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, IV, 1950-1952, "Wilmington 1979, pp. 161-65. "6 Therefore a strong resistance by Turkey acquired decisive importance, while the British JPS remarked that, considering the period until the end of 1951, "no substantial Commonwealth forces will be available in the first year of the war" (DEFE 4/23, JP (49) 73, cit., p. 5). 87 The duration of war was forecast as "at least five years" in a report by a NSC working group (FRUS, 1949, I, p. 344).

Massimo de Leonardis

As for using the atom bomb, Offtackle envisaged launching 292 missiles over a vast range of industrial targets. It was however admitted that the "degree of retardation of the Soviet advances" resulting from this was "unpredictable". Clearly, some residual doubts remained as to using the atom bomb, since in November 1949 the JCS, in formulating their directives for drawing up the first medium-term plan for the Atlantic Alliance, had accepted an objection raised by the Assistant Secretary of Defence and decided to replace the expression "will be used", referring to the atom bomb, with the less categorical "may be used".88 However, the basic concept stated in the plan was that, if war should break out, the atom bomb alone would not be able to prevent the conquest of Western Europe, and that conventional rearmament was needed. This was what the French were pointing out, requesting, among other things, that the United States increase "their military presence on the Continent". 89 By no means, however, did this coincide with American plans: the Joint Strategic Plans Committee (the name assumed by the Joint Staff Planners) stated in September 1949 that "the trend towards reduction in the size and capabilities of the U. S. forces is more likely to be continued than to be halted or reversed". Consequently, it was the Europeans who would have to furnish the bulk of the ground and tactical air forces to halt the first shock of the Soviet attack; the shortage of manpower could be obviated by developing "lightly armed German military units".90 Meeting in Washington with the British Chiefs of Staff, General Bradley, now chairman of the JCS, clarified that the United States would send troops to France only if the Rhine line had resisted for the first two or three months.91 A similar conclusion was reached in March 1950 by the British defence committee, which approved the sending of a Corps of two Infantry Divisions as a 88 89 90

91

See Condit, op. cit., pp. 401 — 2. Guillen, op. cit., p. 311. Short-term Strategic Concept..., cit.; see Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area, 1-12-49, FRUS, 1949, IV, pp. 353-55, where it was re-affirmed that "the hard core of ground forces will come from the European nations". The problem of German rearmament was raised since January 1949 by Montgomery, who proposed not "German units" but, according to the traditions of the Hanover dynasty, the enlistment of Germans in the British army (FO 800/455, DEF 49/4, 19-1-49). Since January 1950 the question was amply debated by the British. While from the military point of view the inevitability of German rearmament was acknowledged, politically there was much hesitation to admit it; Attlee considered interesting Churchill's proposal of integrating German forces in the armies of Western Union countries, a prefiguration of EDC (see DEFE 5/19, COS (50) 8, 10-1-50; FO 800/467, GER 50/2; DEFE 4/30, JP (49) 156, 15-3-50; DEFE 5/20, COS (50) 108, 3-4-50; DEFE 4/31, JP (50) 46, 21-4-50; CAB 129/39, CP (50) 80, 26-4-50). DEFE 5/17, 5-10-49, cit.

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reinforcement to the British Army of the Rhine. 92 However, since these were divisions of the Territorial Army, they would be able to embark only with advance notice of three months, during which it would be seen whether France would be occupied or not, thus reducing to a minimum the risk of a new Dunkirk. The decision was motivated by re-evaluation of the strategical importance of the European continent 93 for defence of the "United Kingdom which could (not) survive for long the weight of attack that could be brought to bear by the Russians in possession of the Channel coast", and moreover now in possession of the atom bomb; thus "the defence of the United Kingdom and Western Europe must be considered together". This was accompanied by the previously mentioned evaluation of the delayed threat to the Middle East and the consideration that "Western civilisation is unlikely to survive even a temporary Russian occupation of all Continental Europe". Certainly there were no illusions that two divisions more could be decisive however it was trusted that the British gesture would induce the United States to act likewise and would serve as incentive to the commitment and the morale of France. On the eve of the Korean War the conventional forces available for the defence of Western Europe were substantially equivalent to those existing more than two years earlier, and the proposals of Montgomery, de Lattre and Revers to shift the defence front eastward, arriving as far as the Elbe, and to extend it to include the northern and southern flanks (Scandinavia and Italy), in themselves strategically valid, 94 could not fail to appear as an escape in the forward direction.

92

A more limited measure, the sending of an infantry brigade group as reinforcement to the Dutch, had been proposed by the COS in January 1949, but rejected by the Defence Committee. During 1949 the debate on the United Kingdom contribution to the defence of Western Europe went on until the final decision, maybe favoured also by the replacement of Lord Tedder by Sir John Slessor as RAF chief of staff. See CAB 131/7, DO (49) 3 and 45, 7-1-49, 17-6-49; CAB 131/8, DO (49) 2nd, DO (50) 5th, 10-1-49, 23-3-50; CAB 131/9, DO (50) 20, 20-3-50; DEFE 4/21, COS (49) 75, 20-5-49; DEFE 4/22, COS (49) 86th and 88th, 13 and 16-6-49; DEFE 5/16, COS (49) 298, 12-9-49; DEFE 5/18, COS (49) 387 and 413, 12 and 26-11-49; DEFE 4/ 26, COS (49) 168th; DEFE 4/29, JP (50) 22, 10-3-50; DEFE 4/30, COS (50) 46, 21-3-50. " However for the time being this was not followed by a general rethinking of "the old basis of British imperial strategy" (J. Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation. The Retreat from Empire in the post-war World, London 1988, p. 144). 94 See Hamilton, op. cit., p. 794; De Lattre, Ne pas subir, cit., pp. 440, 446-49; Varsori, op. cit., p. 240.

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An Uneasy Future Prior to the Korean War the defence budgets of the United States,95 Great Britain 96 and France97 had tended towards reduction. The rearmament of the five Brussels Pact nations decided in July 1949 raised problems on the financial level, so much so that France decided to postpone until July 1954 the implementation of the military programs planned for the end of 1951.98 Once again the Europeans tried to solve the problem through American aid. Throughout 1948 and part of 1949, their requests had contrasted with the indications of the JCS which, before assuming commitments for alliance with the European nations and/or supplying them weapons, requested reinforcement of the American armed forces; moreover, the assistance given should be consistent with the strategical concepts approved by the JCS.99 Now, at the same time as the signing of the Atlantic pact, the Military Assistance Program (MAP) was being submitted to legislative approval. This program was to give substance to the pledge sanctioned by art. 3 of the treaty. At the basis of the MAP was however the principle that "The military strength of the participating Powers should be developed without endangering economic recovery and the attainment of economic viability, which should accordingly have priority".100 It appeared "evident that the putting into effect of a military 95

96

97

98

99

In January 1950 Truman introduced a defence budget for 1951 reduced by 6% compared to the previous one (see Sebesta, op. cit., p. 336). On previous budgets see Forrestal, op. cit., pp. 401-539, passim; FRUS, 1948, I, pp. 669-72. The British JPS remarked: "Thus no significant improvement can be foreseen in the availability of Anglo-American forces in 1951" (DEFE 4/23, JP (49) 73, cit.). After a close debate on the defence budget, originated in June 1949 by the COS denunciation that the amount proposed did not permit keeping armed forces able to face Great Britain's commitments, in December a compromise was reached between military requests and financial exigencies, involving the reduction of armed forces personnel from 739,000 to 677,750 on 1st April 1953 (see DEFE 5/14, COS (49) 214, 16-6-49; CAB 131/7, DO (49) 50, 51, 65, 22-6, 276, 15-10-49; CAB 131/8, DO (49) 21st, 21-11-49; DEFE 5/16, COS (49) 313, 27-9-49; CAB 129/37, CP (49) 245, 8-12-49; R. Rosecrance, Defence of the Realm. British Strategy in the Nuclear Epoch, New York 1968, pp. 118-19). When then the budget was increased it was to face the expenses of war in Indochina (see P. M. De La Gorce, Le armi e il potere. L'esercito francese da Sedan all'Algeria, Milano 1967, pp. 471 -72; Guillen, op. cit., p. 307). Ibid., pp. 322 — 23. Commenting on the first effort by Bruxelles Treaty powers to relate the estimated requirements of forces for the defence of Western Europe with available resources, the British remarked that between the two "for at least the next four years there will be a considerable discrepancy" (PRO, CAB 134/732, Metric 277, 24-5-49). See FRUS, 1948, I, p. 588, III, pp. 560-64; Condit, op. cit., pp. 361, 365, 413-17. Also noticed was the inopportuneness of rebuilding on the European continent war industries which might be seized by the Soviets. FRUS, 1949, IV, p. 286; see ibid., p. 254; FO 800/460, EUR/49/10, 1-3-49; L. S. Kaplan, A Community of Interests: NATO and the Military Assistance Program 1948 — 1951, Washington 1980, pp. 71-77.

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programme of adequate size to give Western Europe true military security against an all-out attack would be beyond the capacity of the Western Union countries, irrespective of the magnitude of U. S. assistance; thus account would be taken of the "economic and financial resources which can be made available rather than the requirements evolved from an adequate strategic plan of defence".101 In other words, "NATO officials were shocked more by the great sacrifices needed to carry out plans than they were by their current state of unpreparedness".102 The initial medium-term plans drawn up in 1949 — 50 by the strategists of the Alliance were thus viewed with concern. In March 1950 the Standing Group of the Alliance approved a medium-term plan for war in July 1954 that however, of the four stages of the predicted conflict, dealt only with the first, that of halting the initial Soviet attack and launching an allied air offensive. To ensure the substantial integrity of the European territories of the nations forming the Alliance (and to control sea communications), the programme called for 90 divisions (19 of them armoured), 7 brigades and 252 infantry battalions, 1705 anti-aircraft batteries, 2856 ships and 8820 airplanes, of which 54 divisions, 6 brigades, 160 battalions, 1241 batteries, 610 ships and 5864 air planes for the central front of Western Europe. The JCS judged these objectives highly unrealistic, and they were still undergoing revision at the outbreak of the Korean War.103 Moreover in the United States a Long Range Strategic Planning Group had completed, in October 1949, a long document of 172 pages which was submitted to the Canadians and British.104 The latter found it fully consonant with many of their views (entire sections of British documents had been copied), but were alarmed at the prospect outlined by the Americans for winning the war: a campaign through Europe of 150 Allied divisions in the third year of war. The British also realized that the defence of the Middle East had been included among the strategic priorities (although in third place after defense of the United Kingdom and of North Africa with, possibly, Spain) only in deference to the British point of view. 101 102 103

104

FRUS, 1949, IV, p. 57. Kaplan, op. cit., p. 72; see also Condit, op. cit., pp. 424-36. See ibid., pp. 399-407; CAB 131/9, DO (50) 31, 28-4-50; CAB 134, AOC (50) 3), 28-6-50. The plan followed the directives formulated by Bruxelles defence ministers in their meeting at Luxembourg in September 1949. Montgomery's and de Lattre's estimates of forces necessary to hold the Rhine front fully coincided (see Hamilton, op. cit., p. 762; De Lattre, Ne pas subir, cit., p. 438). See DEFE 4/25, JP (49) 133 and 136, 14 and 20-10-49. The British were satisfied to note that Canadians showed strategic conceptions broader than in the past, envisaging, to the Americans' surprise, the possibility of sending two of their divisions to the Middle East. The plan was never examined by the JCS (see Condit, op. cit., p. 303).

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At the time of the outbreak of the Korean War the two rivals, Montgomery and de Lattre, reached the same conclusions on the impossibility of defending Europe.105 Concluding in May the Unity exercise, the Viscount of El Alamein declared: "There is today no effective fighting force in Western Europe that could offer any effective resistance to Russian aggression. Nor is any effective fighting force in sight in any foreseeable future".106 In similar manner de Lattre, by initiating at the end of August the Triade exercise, admitted the total ineffectiveness of the existing short-term plan.107 Nonetheless there had been a change in Anglo-American strategical thought in the sense of recognizing the importance of preventing the conquest of the Continent, and not merely for reasons of formal solidarity with the Allies. In December 1949, at a meeting of the Policy Planning Staff, Paul Nitze observed that the conquest of Western Europe would have put at the disposal of the USSR, aided by the Communist Parties, all the existing resources, making the Soviet war potential almost equivalent to that of the United States, and thus rendering subsequent liberation extremely difficult.108 In the wellknown document NSC 68, the first draft of which was issued in April 1949, these pessimistic forecasts were further developed, considering that the growth of the atomic arsenal of the USSR (whose first bomb had been exploded in August 1949, two or three years in advance of Anglo-American forecasts) would have allowed her to make the United Kingdom unusable as an advance base for the United States, to prevent amphibian operations for landing in an occupied Europe, and to attack the North-American territory.109 In about 1954 the USSR would have had a reasonable probability of defeating the United States. The document NSC 68 also questioned the attitude prevailing up to then that the Atlantic Pact was a sort of bet placed by the United States: although 105

106 107 108 109

Here we may just mention M. A. Evangelista's opinion that "the Soviet military threat was considerably exaggerated during this period ... the notion of an overwhelmingly large Soviet army facing only token Western forces was inaccurate ... Soviet troops were not capable of executing the kind of invasion feared in the West during the late 1940s" (Stalin's Postwar Army Reappraised, in International Security, Winter 1982/1983, p. 111). But if his arguments to demonstrate the limits of the still powerful Soviet armed forces appear to be sound, the data on the Western forces he gives, inferring them from inadequate sources, look very exaggerated in the light of available documentation. See FO 371/77650, N 1242, 31-1-49; CAB 129/21, CP (47) 272, 30-9-47; FRUS, 1947, I, pp. 718-19, 1948, I, p. 665; De Lattre, N* pas subir, cit., pp. 434 — 37; A. Cockburn, La Minaccia: dentro la macchina militare sovietica, Milano 1984, p. 153; Park, op. cit., pp. 22-25; Schnabel, op. cit., pp. 152, 212-29, 237-39; Condit, op. cit., pp. 420-23, 561. Hamilton, op. cit., p. 762. De Lattre, Ne pas subir, cit., p. 440. FRUS, 1949, I, pp. 414-15. This occurrence was already examined in a memorandum by the secretary of defence on 811-49, Etzold - Gaddis, op. cit., pp. 366-68.

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by signing the treaty America furnished a political and military guarantee, she expected not to be called on to put it into practice, since signing alone would serve to prevent war. Now during the preparatory work for drawing up NSC 68, Acheson had stressed that the important thing was not the intentions of the USSR, as was sustained by Kennan and Bohlen, but its capacity for aggression.110 When, with the Korean War, the capacity for aggression was put into action, it seemed reckless to continue to gamble on the deterrent effect of the mere existence of the treaty, and it became necessary to create the NATO structures.

Deterrence: the risky bet The basic fact emerging from an examination of the military strategies of the West in 1947 — 50 is the supremacy of politics and economy, the confirmation of the predominantly political nature of the Atlantic Alliance in its early years. The supremacy of politics is revealed also by the choice of the founding members of the Alliance. The countries of the Near and Middle East were excluded, although this zone was considered by the nations leading the negotiations, the United States and Great Britain, to be of very great strategic importance, while Italy was instead included, a country whose military contribution was held to be virtually nil and whose peninsular territory was not included in strategic defence plans. But above all, the supremacy of politics emerged considering the purpose of the Atlantic Aliance which, then as now, was not so much that of winning, but rather of preventing war. Moreover, prior to the Korean War, the persistence for an indefinite period of a situation of unbalance between forces that would allow the conquest of at least half of the members of the Alliance was consciously accepted. As Acheson noted, "The military considers that if the Red Army got started they would not be able to stop it, even with the bomb"; consequently "our objective is to prevent war". For the Americans the purpose of the alliance and of the MAP was that of admonishing the Russians that if they wanted war they would have to strive to the utmost; "on the other hand, the Europeans want(ed) to go considerably farther in that they insist on feeling 1

'° J. L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: a critical appraisal of postwar American national security policy, Oxford 1982, p. 84; see Etzold - Gaddis, op. cit., p. 384. NSC 68 marked a turning point also because, by harking back to the Second World War example, it maintained that the United States could tolerate at least a tripling of defence expenditures without significantly impairing current standards of living.

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that they have a chance successfully to resist a Russian invasion".111 However, the Europeans did not wish for and were unable to pay the costs of such a possibility. Although the traditional alliances also had the purpose of preventing war, they nonetheless prepared for it by raising sufficient military forces to defend themselves and to win. This was not the case with the Atlantic Alliance, whose "essential objective was an increased security and not an increased military strength",112 and in fact the signing of the treaty was followed by no substantial rearming. While this judgement by the American Senate's Committee on Foreign Affairs was perhaps ad usum delphini, the alliance undoubtedly replaced the concept of defence with that of deterrence. As Acheson noted113, "We do not believe that to discourage military aggression it is necessary to create Western European forces which are by virtue of their size capable of successfully resisting an all-out attack. What is required is, rather, sufficient strength to make it impossible for an aggressor to achieve a quick and easy victory". However, even this "sufficient strength" was provided only by America's possession of the atom bomb. And there were those in America, such as Secretary of Defence Johnson in June 1959, who believed that if the European nations were to rearm sufficiently, America would even be able to withdraw its armed forces.114 The American monopoly on the atom bomb (or at any rate its net superiority in this field) was thus undoubtedly a fundamental element in deterrence, although it seems that the Europeans were relying on this to a greater extent than the Americans. Moreover, awareness of the innovative nature of atomic weapons and strategic doctrine on their utilization developed slowly, and it is amazing how the American strategists minimized the effects of using them, predicting that the war would continue for years even after dozens of atom bombs had been dropped on the Soviet Union. But above all, as with conventional arms, even the commitment of the U. S. to atomic defence of Europe risked seeming rather uncertain. In fact, after the explosion of the Soviet atom bomb and in view of the developments that were to lead to the thermonuclear bomb, the Americans questioned themselves as to the advisability of utilizing these weapons to defend Western Europe, thus facing the risk of an atomic attack on their own territory.m 111 112

113

1M 115

Meeting of the Policy Planning Staff, 16-12-49, cit.; see also Kaplan, op. cit., p. 73. Quoted in A. Grosser, Affaires Exterieures. La politique de la France 1944— 1984, Paris 1984, p. 85. Moreover "Some of the architects of the treaty, notably Pearson, believed that the Atlantic Alliance as a security organization was a security expedient" (E. Reid, Time of Fear and Hope. The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty 1947 1949, Toronto 1977, p. 187). Quoted in Rosecrance, op. cit., p. 94; see ibid., pp. 92-97, an acute discussion of the new concept of deterrence. See Kaplan, op. cit., p. 77. See FRUS, J949, I, pp. 604-17, in particular pp. 613 and 616.

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De Lattre on the contrary proposed dropping the atom bomb as a barrier to the enemy's advance even in Germany.116 The signing of the Atlantic Alliance reinforced the persistent conviction of the West that no immediate threat of war existed.117 This conviction provided an alibi for postponing difficult decisions such as that of increasing military spending and rearming Germany. "At the moment few people in Europe expect a Russian aggression in the near future", remarked Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, Permanent Undersecretary for the German section of the Foreign Office118. "We can therefore afford the luxury of an Atlantic defence system which excludes the Germans and does not give us assurance of security. But this happy state of affairs may not last long". Thus in their talks on May 9 and 10,1950, Bevin and Acheson, ignoring the assessments of the military, "both agreed on the desirability of avoiding any talk about the rearmament of the Germans".119 The figure of Montgomery, often bitterly criticized, merits some consideration. Undoubtedly he was a difficult, intractable personality, irascible with his colleagues and with political figures, frequently irritating for his outspoken frankness. But, in comparison with his colleagues the Chiefs of Staff of the Navy and of the Air Force (Cunningham in particular) who refused to take into consideration non-military factors and remained tenaciously grasped to the traditional strategy of the British past, more or less recent, 12° Montgomery was the only one who possessed political sensitivity121 and a view of the problem of 116

117

118 119 120

121

See De Lattre, Ne pas subir, p. 432; but he advocated also conventional rearmament. Opposed, but isolated, was the position of Denmark, which asked not to use the bomb to defend the territories of the treaty's signatories (see FRUS, 1949, IV, pp. 362 — 64; L. S. Kaplan, The United States and NATO. The Formative Years, Lexington 1984, p. 142). During the entire period considered in this essay, and with the exception for a moment of General Clay (who however changed his mind almost immediately, see The Forrestal Diaries, cit., p. 527) on the eve of Berlin blockade, Anglo-Americans always thought that the danger of a deliberate Soviet aggression would become real only around the mid-fifties, even if a war after escalation of not well considered political moves could not be excluded. Therefore the cold war could be given priority in respect to the hot war, the struggle against the communist movement in respect to that against USSR, economic recovery in respect to rearmament (see de Leonardis, // Kegno Unito, la Western Union ..., cit., p. 296; FRUS, 1948, I, pp. 551, 660, 1949, I, p. 614; Gaddis, op. cit., p. 83). DEFE 5/19, COS (50) 8, 10-1-50. CAB 129/40, CP (50) 114, 19-5-50. The debate on the continental commitment was based on historical precedents and recalled for example the discussion between Westerners and Easterners during the First World War. It should be remarked that the strategy of disengagement advocated by the Navy and the Air Force was certainly "old" and did not consider the nature of the danger in Europe and how modern weapons had made Britain less "isolated". But in a certain sense it was also anticipating developments of these last years when the obsession for the central front has diminished and both the threat and the counter-attack have acquired a larger geographic dimension. See for example his report on his visit to Paris, FO 800/465, 14-7-48.

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European defence that included political factors. Not by chance the only political figure with whom he agreed was Bevin,122 who alone among the leaders of the British government had a clear understanding of strategic problems. I do not believe that Montgomery can be attributed with overestimating the Brussels Pact, with wanting to exclude the Americans from military direction of the war on the Continent (he who since March 1948 had urged the appointment of one of them as Supreme Commander!), or with nourishing a blind faith in British leadership in Europe, nor should he be placed in isolated opposition to the decisions of British policy-makers.123 On the contrary, his attitude was I believe very similar (also in its use of bluffing) to that of Bevin: aspirations toward achieving an autonomous British position in Europe, but progressive acknowledgement of the indispensable primary role of the Americans. Kaplan has observed that, with all its limitations, the military integration of Europe between 1948 and 1950 was more substantial than the political and economic one. This author also recalls that only after the outbreak of the Korean War did "the vague commitment of American assistance to Western Europe in the event of attack ... become specific guarantees of American involvement".124 The race to Washington in which Bevin and Bidault,125 London and Paris, were the chief rivals, followed by all the others, had for the moment obtained less than had been hoped, perhaps little more than had already been achieved before the signing of the Atlantic Alliance. In any case the defence of Europe was of fundamental interest to the Americans themselves, although they were understandably reluctant to admit this to the Europeans. A different path had been indicated in June 1948 by de Lattre de Tassigny, with loosely sketched ideas that were to be developed later in the strategic concepts at the basis of France's autonomous nuclear force126 and in General de Gaulle's policy: "Nor is there a solution to be found in vassallage to America ... the fatal limit of American vassallage is obviously that of combating between two equal forces. In effect, if the Western bloc organizes solely in dependency to America, it takes an a priori position — that of forming nothing more than a whole with America. The play would be freer with a Western Europe seeking at least an appearance of independence. But then it is German policy as a whole that must be revised. As for the Germans it would perhaps be necessary, as I believed in June 1945, to show them strength while stretching out to them a hand".127 122 123 124 125 126 127

See Hamilton, op. cit., p. 694. These seem to be the opinions recurrent in Varsori, op. cit., for example at pp. 282 — 83. Kaplan, The United States, cit., pp. 144-45. See Vaisse, op. cit., p. 371, n. 9. See General Beaufre, Difesa della bomba atomica, Milano 1965. Note sur la defense, cit., p. 389.

Section 3. Italy and the Atlantic Pact

De Gasperi, the Christian Democrats and the Atlantic Treaty by Pietro Pastorelli

1. A special aspect of Italy's participation in the Atlantic Pact is the attitude of De Gasperi and his party. Years ago, during a Conference on Italy, I spoke on De Gasperi's position as Presidente del Consiglio, focusing on the formative process of his personal orientation and the government's decision in view of the numerous international difficulties, primarily the position of ex-enemy, which hindered Italy's full reinstatement in the community of peoples.' The subject has since been taken up, with admirable developments and different standpoints, by various other scholars, in particular by Brunello Vigezzi2, who has seen part of the Italian diplomatic documentation, by Ottavio Barie3, who explored the papers of the Department of State and by Antonio Varsori4, who enriched his research at the Public Record Office. Each has contributed according to his sources and individual talent. But on the focal points regarding De Gasperi's attitude, which I mention above, I do not think any substantial novelties have emerged. Perhaps, among the explored diplomatic material, the value of De Gasperi's speech in Brussels on 20th November 1948 has been underestimated. I should have, on my part, further stressed the election results of 18th April 1948 among the determining elements of De Gasperi's decision. 1

Pietro Pastorelli, L'adesione dell'ltalia al Patto atlantico, in De Gasperi e I'eta del Centrismo, 1947—1953, Acts of the congress of study organized by the Dipartimento cultura scuola e formazione della Direzione centrale della D. C., Lucca, 4-6th March 1982, edited by Giuseppe Rossini, Rome, Cinque Lune, 1984, pages 75-93. Also published in 'Storia contemporanea', 1983, n. 6 (from which I quote) and then included in Pietro Pastorelli, La politica estera italiana del dopoguerra, Bologna, 11 Mulino, 1987. 2 Brunello Vigezzi, De Gasperi, Sforza e la diplomazia italiana fra patto dt Bruxelles e patto atlantico (1948 — 49), in 'Storia contemporanea', 1987, n. 1, pages 5 — 43. ' Ottavio Barie, Gli Stati Uniti, L'Unione Occidentale e I'inserimento dell'ltalia nell'alleanza atlantica, in L'alleanza occidental: Nascita e sviluppi di un sistema di sicurezza collettwa, edited by Ottavio Barie, Bologna, II Mulino, 1988, pages 115-207. 4 Antonio Varsori, La scelta ocddentale dell'ltalia (1948 -1949), in 'Storia delle relazioni internazionali', 1985, nn. 1 and 2, pages 95-159 and 303-368.

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Di Nolfo writes, in keeping with the title of his good book: "The Christian Democrat's victory was the result of fear ... It was a victory for all those who had feared hunger, feared poverty, feared the anti-Christ, feared losing freedom ..."5. But equally justifiably, one could also say that it was the result of hope in better economic conditions and hope in a regime of freedom. And to be able to affirm that, it is enough to consider the point of view of those defeated and those who won the election. In fact the Christian Democrats certainly fought against the Socialist-Communist bloc, but also had an electoral programme that was consistent in the defence of liberty at all levels and in the "reinstatement of Italy with full independence and dignity", said the electoral manifesto, "in the context of peaceful collaboration between peoples" that has "assured, especially to the Italian working classes, the advantages of international economic solidarity". 6 This meant alignment with the West and the Marshall Plan. In simpler terms one can say that the absolute majority of the electorate (considering also the three lay parties) said "no" to the left wing promises that had as examples the countries of so-called real socialism, and said "yes" to the promises of the Christian Democrats that had the Western world, and in particular the United States, as their concrete point of reference. Naturally the election victory was considered such by De Gasperi and his party, as he declared to the U. S. ambassador on the 15th September, "As far as Italy is concerned, there is no question of choice between East and West. We are already in the Western group as has been clearly shown by the elections".7 The result of the elections had certainly placed Italy in the Western sphere, in the sense that the electorate had freely and clearly demonstrated that the majority favoured the pro-Western policies that had been adopted initially by the Christian Democrats alone (with various elements on its right) and then, from December 1947, with the governmental participation of the Social Democrats, Liberals and Republicans. But that result also called for a closer participation in the life of the Western world, tightening political and economic relations. The electorate had indicated a path; it was up to the elected to specify how to follow it. And De Gasperi, the statesman, was certainly aware of this in the formative phase of his decision. The essays by Alberto Monticone, Umberto Corsini and Jean Dominique Durand 8 help us to understand the starting point of the De Gasperian reflec5

6

7

8

Ennio Di Nolfo, Le paure e le speranze degli italiani, 1943-53, Milan, Mondadori, 1986, p. 267. Atti e document! della Democrazia cristiana 1943-1967, edited by Andrea Damilano, Rome, Ed. Cinque Lune, 1968, page 378. Dunn telegram of 15th September 1948, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, vol. Ill: Western Europe, Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1974, page 252. Alberto Monticone, Alcide De Gasperi e la scelta politica per la democrazia occidentale, in Konrad Adenauer e Alcide De Gasperi: due esperienze di rifondazione della democrazia,

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tions. The first points out some of the basic concepts of the State as such and of the policies of De Gasperi; the second underlines the doctrinal and political origins of the internationalist philosophy of this statesman from Trento; the third goes through the quotations that appear in his writings, his cultural itinerary. These are three important contributions which make up for, at least in some aspects, the lack of a biography that is the fruit of deep, historical research into his background 9 . 2. In the above-mentioned report, there were only a few, fleeting comments on the Christian Democrat attitude which took for granted a majority within the party in favour of Italy's adherence to the Atlantic Treaty - for the same reasons that guided De Gasperi — and an opposing minority. With regard to this I was thinking of Dossetti's letter to De Gasperi of 22nd February 1949 to explain the cause of De Gasperi's vagueness in the Consiglio Nazionale on 20th February which inspired it10. In another point I mentioned the Christian Democrat minority regarding the negative response from the United States to the Italian proposal of a bilateral pact of warranty "which was the hypothesis", I wrote, "on which even a part of the Christian Democrat minority agreed11. I had, of course, read Di Capua's book which includes reproductions of the reports on the discussions within the Christian Democrat parliamentary groups12. And this reading left me with the impression that the minority had some consistency and a policy of its own. The following studies on the matter, due to Guido Formigoni, Elisabetta Vezzosi and Giorgio Rumi 13 , have brought me to drastically modify that impression. In particular, the essay by Formigoni is the result of deep delving into the available sources and brings to light new and interesting elements of judgement, as does the essay by Vezzosi. Rumi's work, on the other hand, is a rigorous synthesis in which the general evaluations are brought forward.

edited by Umberto Corsini and Konrad Repgen, Bologna, II Mulino, 1984, pages 55-78; Umberto Corsini, Le origini dottrinali e politiche del pensiero internazionalista e deH'impegno europeistico di Alcide De Gasperi, ibidem, pages 249 — 293; Jean Dominique Durand, Alcide De Gasperi ovvero la politica ispirata, in 'Storia Contemporanea', 1984, n. 4, pages 545-591. 9 The biography that came out straight after the death of the statesman from Trento is still valid, Giulio Andreotti, De Gasperi e il suo tempo, Milano, Mondadori, 1956. 10 Pastorelli, art. quote, page 1030. " Ibidem, page 1024. 12 Giovanni Di Capua, Come I'ltalia aderi al patto atlantico, Rome, EBE, 1971. 13 Guido Formigoni, La Sinistra cattolica italiana e il patto atlantico, in '11 Politico', 1985, n. 4, pages 631 -668; Elisabetta Vezzosi, La sinistra democristiana tra neutralismo e patto atlantico (1947-1949), in L'Italia e la politica di potenza in Europa (1945-50), edited by Ennio Di Nolfo, Romain Rainere, Brunello Vigezzi, Milan, Marzorati, 1988, pages 195 221; Giorgio Rumi, Opportunismo e profezia: Cultura cattolica e politica estera italiana 1946 - 6.3, in 'Storia contemporanea', 1981, n. 4 — 5, pages 811-828.

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However, before explaining why these studies changed my original impression, in correspondence with the common opinion held on the problem, I owe an answer to Formigoni who points out in the essay mentioned14 and repeats in its second edition15, that he could find no trace of agreement among the left-wing Christian Democrats as to the hypothesis of a bilateral pact of warranty within the existing documentation. In the beginning I could not find such a trace either. But starting from the assertions that De Gasperi made in the Senate on 27th March 1949, about the impossibility of obtaining a bilateral pact with the U. S.16, I asked myself why he should have stressed that aspect of the negotiations: certainly in order to report on the hypothesis explored by the Italian diplomacy, but no less certainly in order to answer those to whom that particular hypothesis was acceptable, or more acceptable than the Atlantic Treaty. And so, rereading the account published by Di Capua on the joint reunion of the parliamentary groups held on llth and 12th March 1949, I found this sentence on page 179: "According to Dossetti there were two possibilities: 1) the inclusion of Italy in the Atlantic Treaty, levelling out the differences; 2) the gradual and elastic adhesion that took into account the existing gap between Italy and the other Western powers, and relied on a unilateral guarantee from the United States. The latter, Dossetti underlined, had not been sufficiently illustrated in the USA nor sufficiently supported by Italian diplomacy. The problem was now one of direction and realization; the second solution would have been better than the Atlantic Treaty". And on page 185: "Gui criticized the haste with which the president of the Consiglio had, in his opinion, dealt with the question of an eventual unilateral convention with America and declared that he considered this policy had been attempted without tenacity or conviction and that he considered it, furthermore, still "experimental" and perhaps he meant "experimentable". Concluding, on page 187, there is Piccioni's answer: "The unilateral guarantee of the United States was not, he thought, to be considered an element of autonomy, but the opposite: it would have meant a protectorate to all effects. Then, in these matters, he went on, there must be two sides, and Italy did not have the strength necessary to negotiate". One could object that these statements bring us to March 1949. In reality this position was not new: it had been discussed before. Ardigo writes of the "United States guarantee" in his article published in 'Cronache Sociali' of 31st January 1949 and which the same Formigoni quotes17, "Because the Atlantic Treaty is not enough to save Europe", but the idea was much older, going 14 15 16 17

Formigoni, art. quoted, page 659. In JJalleanza occidentale, quoted, page 249. Alcide De Gasperi, Discorsi parlamentari, Rome, Camera dei Deputati, 1973, page 640. Formigoni, art. quoted, page 658.

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back to December 1947 when De Gasperi, just before the occupying American troops left Italy, had asked the United States for a declaration affirming that "it was their right and duty to intervene should the territorial integrity of Italy be endangered or the democratic nature of its government be threatened"18. Of course the Italian intention was that Italy make a request for intervention. In other words a policy of bell-ringing. Marshall obviously refused. In Italy though, the idea remained and there is trace of it in the diplomatic correspondence of 1948, reproduced, though not quoted, by Toscano in his 'Notes on negotiations for Italy's participation in the Atlantic Treaty'19, the whole of which is now published by Vigezzi20. And the same memorandum note of 6th January 1949 makes a more explicit reference in the third to last paragraph, when it says: "Concluding, we must know as soon as possible if the U. S. will assume the obligation to assist Italy's security along our frontiers"21. And again this time there was no reply. Well, it has been shown that some deputies among the left wing Christian Democrats had seen some of the Foreign Ministry documents, and this not because Di Capua says so but 22 because it is clear from the contents of the interventions he reproduces23. They were therefore aware of the idea well before January 1949 and might have shown their propensity for this hypothesis without saying so to the press until January 1949 so as to hide the clandestine source of information. The substantial aspect of tracing some concrete element of the negotiation interested me in the question of the bilateral pact of warranty; I found it strange that an idea be considered for more than a year and yet receive no answer from the other side. I had therefore put forward the hypothesis that a survey could have been carried out by the Marras mission of December 1948. The person questioned denied this hypothesis by letter.24 It is true that the proposal was singular, against which objections made by Piccioni25 could be brought forward, but it is also true that at the time and in the circumstances in which it had been suggested, it had an explanation, as I have illustrated elsewhere26. The strange thing is that the Italian diplomacy continued to insist. 18 19

20

21

22 23 24 25

26

Pastorelli, La politica estera italiana del dopoguerra, quoted, page 118. In 'Storia e Politica', 1962, nn. 1 and 2, pages 1-37 and 196 — 231 and then in Pagine di storia diplomatica contemporanea, Milano, Giuffre, 1963, vol. II, pages 455 — 519. In La dimensione atlantica e le relazioni internazionali del dopoguerra (1947—1949), edited by Brunello Vigezzi, Milan, Jaca Book, 1987, pages 65-189. Carlo Sforza, Cinque anni a Palazzo Chigi: la politica estera italiana dal 1947 al 1951, Rome, Atlante, 1952, pages 204 — 208, where the whole document is reported. Di Capua, op. quoted, pages 100 and 107. See, for example the 'declaration' of Del Bo and Roselli ibidem, on page 113. Pastorelli, art. quoted, page 1024. Leopolde Nuti, La missione Marras, 2 — 22 dicembre 1948, in 'Storia delle relazioni internazionali', 1987, n. 2, pages 343-368. Pastorelli, La politica estera italiana del dopoguerra, pages 107— 122.

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3. This is not the position that characterized the left wing Christian Democrat attitude. In his analysis, Formigoni starts from a given fact which he states like this: "the habit of limited attention to the international scene on behalf of the catholics, with the obviously consequential lack of knowledge of the real questions in play and of the fundamental dynamics of that moment"27, which is to say that they knew very little and had very little feeling for international problems. And Rumi, more or less along the same lines, speaks of the oscillation between "opportunism and prophecy"28. Underlining this lack of foundation is correct if we refer to some of the smaller groups of the catholic world, but to attribute such a quality to the whole party seems to me to be somewhat exaggerated. The political culture of the party structure and of the one million members can be considered limited, just as it is in all the political parties, with the exception of a few individual cases, but nevertheless, awareness and information of what was happening were not lacking. Not everyone was able to envisage solutions to the problems, but they were certainly able to evaluate the worthiness of those found by others. From the above studies three specific elements emerge which characterize the attitude of the leftist Christian Democrats: the aversion towards the diplomatic circles, a certain amount of anti-Americanism and the refusal to unite the various factions. The best known evidence of the first elements is that of Dossetti who wrote to De Gasperi: the proper organs of foreign policy "either operate without any serious methodology, or else, when they do show some capability, (such as that attributed to Count Sforza) they effectively operate with criteria already surpassed by old chancellorship, foreign to our own feelings, without sufficient guarantees of a real moral commitment"29. With such a judgement of the Italian diplomacy and of Carlo Sforza, their aversion was understandable. Why such an opinion was formed is still to be explained, but this is not the place to do so. Here just one precise fact must be registered. Regarding the second element, the anti-Americanism, I choose this quotation among many, from 'Cronache Sociali' of 15th June 1947: "A certain irrational, extreme criticism and opposition to the Rooseveltian social experiment, an involution of the workers legislation, a somewhat gross and aggressive ingenuity of the anti-communist controversy leads some people to believe that America is moving inwards, belatedly, and of course, with singular transpositions, towards a sort of American fascism, and that, as far as 27 28 29

Formigoni, art. quoted, page 638. As in the title of his quoted article. Dossetti to De Gasperi, letter of 22nd February 1949, in Italian De Gasperi scrive: corrispondenza con capi di stato cardinali, politici, giornalisti, diplomatic!, Brescia, Morcelliana, 1974, vol. I, page 301.

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international relations go, though not loving and not wanting war, but through the inability to fight and overcome her own mistakes and, again on the European example, she (America) has now lost the path to peace". On this basis it is not surprising that judgement of the Marshall plan was as critical as it was in those days. This extremely negative evaluation of the United States, classifying them as fascist, a serious insult at that time, did not derive from aversion to that country as such but from that which it stood for, the symbol of capitalism. And in October 1948, in the cultural newspaper of the Catholic University we find a gentler tone: "We know that although on the one hand rigid Marxism prevails and denies spiritual and religious values in the social organization, on the other, capitalism, carried to the exasperation of its manifestations, has equally severe rules that deny, to no lesser extent, spiritual values". From this premise and the axiom that the Alliance meant war, a third element arose: the refusal to take sides with either of the opposing blocs. The refusal was not, of course, an end in itself, but was a political indication to be reassumed in the formula 'neutrality and mediation for peace'. The concept is not expounded by all the left wing parties in the same terms, be it because of the differences between them, or be it, at times, because of the garbled language, but the substance is the same. Here are some examples: Orientamenti Sociali' wrote on 10th March 1948, "The natural position of Italy is between East and West: and her independence can form a connecting bridge between the two blocs so as to favour agreement and peace". 'Cronache Sociali' of 15 —30th September 1948 asked itself if Italy could maintain a neutral policy and answered itself affirmatively, underlining the desire of the Italian people "now stable in its religious orientation towards the Catholic Church and politically towards the Christian Democrats, two organizations whose centre of gravity is well away from both opposing blocs" and added that such neutrality should be achieved in accordance with America because of the existing economic relations, but also in accordance with Russia, persuading both possible antagonists of the usefulness such neutrality would have for each side. In 'Politica Sociale' of 31st October 1948 one reads: "Italy must not renounce the possibility of remaining neutral. Italy must work towards a federative structure, if possible, beyond the forms of partnership and alliance that do not resolve the problem, a structure that reduces the limitations of each confederate's sovereignty to the indispensable and does not hinder Italy's aspiration to its own and world-wide peace". This excerpt is from an article titled 'Towards a realistic and independent foreign policy". The last sample piece is from Dino Del Bo's intervention at the Congress held in Pesaro on 14th November 1948 by his group. In the case of war, says Del Bo, Italy must take "an autonomous position that permits the identification of right from wrong, that makes her the bearer of justice, so to speak, and that makes her

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an effective instrument of peace"30. A few days later De Gasperi gave his speech on the "moral foundations of democracy", that appears not to have had any echo in the press. And it was natural that so it was. These were the standpoints of the left when, on 29th November 1948, the discussion on Nenni's motion calling for a neutral policy was taken up within the groups. The day before, the party leader, Piccioni, talking at Lucca, had summarized the opinion of the top party members in these terms: "There is no need to spend many words in convincing ourselves that the ideal of peace is an integral part of our conscience. But, on the other hand, no one can think that a defenceless, detached and disinterested Italian attitude can in any way help achieve peace. History teaches that the very recent conflict, a tragedy for the whole world, was 75% due to the Western Powers' negligence over the aggressive designs of the German dictator, Hitler. There is no doubt that a more decisive attitude from the Western Powers would have saved humanity much bereavement and blood. Can anyone think that such an error should be repeated, allowing the same terrible results?"31 And this was exactly what the centre-left European political powers professed and was one of the major inspiring criteria of the Atlantic Treaty. The leftist Christian Democrats' thoughts were somewhat different. In the group headquarters Del Bo confirmed his favouring neutrality that, he observed, was "an active and voluntary concept, different from the concept of neutralization, which could have meant limitation of sovereignty".32 He later presented, with Roselli, a document in which attention was drawn to article 11 of the Constitution from which, in their opinion, "the sense of an active neutrality" derived, and which, regarding the process of European unity, involved the reservation that "our federalist support must not obstruct our contacts and collaboration with all European areas"33. Dossetti, after a long and rather tortuous speech, such that I cannot summarize, presented his order of the day that invited "an agreement with the other European countries securing a formula capable of initiating a peaceful and constructive unification of Europe: more precisely, a gradual formula that was to be found outside particular groups of military inclination"34. This translated into simple terms meant only a policy of neutrality. Finally Gronchi said that "accepting, as we have, the schism, in his opinion, we increase the tension. If a third bloc had been created between the two, this would have been efficient; if Italy had been 30

Del Bo's speech is published in 'Politica sociale', 21st November 1948. Attilio Piccioni, Scritti e discorsi 1944-1965, Rome, Ed. Cinque Lune, 1979, vol.1, pages 322-323. 32 Di Capua, op. quoted, page 96. ·" Ibidem, pages 110-111. 34 Ibidem, page 100. 31

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able to become a determining element in this third power, it would have helped deter war"35. In spite of the fact that fair support for these positions had been given,36 it appears that no-one else took them up. Only Del Bo spoke in the Chamber to illustrate his concept of neutrality, explaining that one could be neutral without being isolated or equidistant 37 . The debate within the party was renewed at the Consiglio Nazionale from 21st to 23rd December 1948 but there were not enough forces to sustain the position of the leftists, which was not, however, changed, even though they knew perfectly well that they were weak both politically and numerically. Thus, as Formigoni writes38, research into an alternative formula had begun. "We want to find a formula," said 'Studium' of December 1948, "that on the one hand fully conserves Italy's independence with respect to the opposing blocs and opposing ideologies, and on the other permits Italy to act in the complex of mediating powers". Such research brought the following results. Gronchi developed his idea of the third power: "the Western peoples of Europe should find the basis for their power and for their ability of defence, firstly in themselves and their solidarity and secondly in agreements with the United States and England. Those who, like me, believe that an effective and free accord between peoples this side of the Iron Curtain would constitute an immediate opposing force to war, would win the trust of the U.S.A. and Great Britain without binding them to their intercontinental power policy, and would become attractive to some of the Eastern countries that today seem lost forever to the cause of democracy"39. 'Cronache Sociali' of 31st January 1949 proposed exploring "the possibility of American support and guarantee of a federalist policy among the still neutral nations of Europe, and hence a belt that went from Sweden to Italy, through Western Germany and Austria and Switzerland". And the magazine went on: "the neutral belt can save Europe from the worsening of the cold war if the flag of federalism is hoisted with purity and honesty of intent by the nations that can still avoid the rigid alternative of blocs. This policy of neutral but armed nations against the dangers of the fifth column deeply felt by Atlantic Europe as a safety guarantee to be worth as much as the plea to unite". So these were the results of the research into an alternative formula to the Atlantic Treaty: for the Gronchi supporters, a sort of Western European confederation; for the Dossetti group, a federation •w Ibidem, page 116. 36 Ibidem, page 145. 37 ' Ibidem, page 126 1Z6. 38 Formigoni, art. quoted, pages 655 -656. 39 In 'Politics sociale', 23rd January 1949.

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of neutral European countries, formulae that represented a step back compared to the respective starting points of the third power and neutrality because they were totally unrealisable and therefore constituted nothing as a political proposal. The party Consiglio nazionale, held from 18th to 20th February 1949, was void of discussion because there was nothing to discuss. In fact Washington had sent no reply to the memorandum of 6th January. And on the basis of that answer, proposals would have been formulated, eased by a parliamentary vote. As is known, only on 8th March did the invitation of the seven to participate in the Atlantic Treaty arrive. Soon after, the discussion within the parliamentary groups was renewed at intervals between llth and 14th March. From the Left, Gronchi, Guerrieri, Dossetti and Gui spoke to confirm their positions40 (Roselli announced that he had changed his mind). Again they said only as much as I have referred in answer to Formigoni's posthumous questions regarding the government's scarce exploration of the possibility of obtaining a military warranty from the U. S., already obscured in the Del Bo — Roselli document of the end of November 1948 and in the proposal of 'Cronache Sociali' of 31st January 1949. At the end of the discussion, the order of the day in favour of adhesion to the Atlantic Treaty was voted on. Here I take note of the results of the election from the paper on which the vice secretary, Taviani,41 registered them: absentees — 15, among whom Gronchi; abstained — 5, Ambricco, Cappugi, De Cocci, Guerrieri and Rapelli; against — 3, Dossetti, Del Bo and Gui; pro — 282. Out of the 305 members of the parliamentary group of the Chamber, those against were 8, which can be rounded off with some of the absentees to make up 4% of the Christian Democrat deputies. A rather slender figure. From what we know, only Del Bo vented his disappointment in 'Politica Sociale' of 20th March 1949 with these words: "Even in the Atlantic Treaty there is, after all, the risk of isolation: isolation from the possibility of progress, from the desire to improve international relations and from evolution of the people". Words that have proven to be, luckily, far from prophetic. Recently it has been asked why "the Christian Democrat opposition to the Atlantic Treaty was limited to rumours in the political papers and only assumed a very feeble voice in parliament" 42 . At this point it seems to me that the answer is simple: because political and numerical consistency was lacking. On the political side, the left did not produce a reasonable, concrete and practicable alternative because we must have the intellectual honesty to rec40 41

42

The discussion is referred to in Di Capua, op. quoted, pages 169 — 188. My acknowledgement and thanks to Senator Paolo Emilio Taviani for access to a photocopy of this document. Vezzosi, art. quoted, page 221.

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ognize that all the ideas that I have briefly quoted were ingenuous fantasies that hardly masked the preference for neutrality theory in the political situation of that time. On the numerical side we must bear in mind that the Christian Democrat parliamentary group of the first republican legislation was almost entirely made up of people who had been active in the civil society and not that of the party. They came from the world of work in its widest sense, from the farm labourer to the professor, and were therefore equipped with that good common sense that comes from having to overcome daily problems and which made them uninterested in running after the above mentioned fantasies. They were the expression of an electorate, not strictly Christian Democrat, that had trusted the Christian Democrat party on a fairly precise political proposal which, as I noted at the beginning, turned out to be in tune with the Catholic Church's position. These are the reasons for which the research on the left wing Christian Democrats has induced me to change my original opinion: I don't think it the case to talk of a Christian Democrat minority being opposed to involvement in the Atlantic Treaty. As a minority it had neither the numerical consistency nor the distinctive political profile but was rather a matter of single cases of opposition, which never produced an alternative political proposal. It was, quite simply, the normal and natural dissent that crops up in all large families. It would, therefore, be unjust not to recognize that within the Christian Democrat party there was no real minority group against adhesion to the Atlantic Treaty.

The Italian Left and the Atlantic Pact: The Nation vs. Proletarian Internationalism by Severino Galante

It is well known that the PCI and the PSI fought a hard battle against Italy's accession to the Atlantic Pact. Today, forty years later, it may now be asked what remains of the reasons for which the Left was then opposed to the Atlantic option. To this question, the most recent events provide unequivocal answers. On January 15, 1989, on the occasion of the seventieth birthday of Giulio Andreotti - then Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Italy - the official Communist Party organ attributed to the Christian Democrat leader's years of "political maturity" the merit of having accomplished the "assiduous formulation of a foreign policy that has united the nation". But already ten years before this recognition of De Gasperi's personal role, and in a much more authoritative and formal arena than that of a daily newspaper, namely the XV National Congress of the Communist Party, Enrico Berlinguer, Secretary General of the PCI, had stressed "the great value" to be attributed to "the substantial convergence of all the democratic forces of our nation on questions of Italian foreign policy after thirty years in which foreign policy was perhaps the major reason for division and splits".1 In substance, then, even the major opposition party has long accepted the basic lines of foreign policy followed by all of the Italian governments since 1947. This clearly shows that, with the slackening of the major ideological tensions, since the mid-1970s "Atlanticism" and European unity — denounced as anti-national and combated from the start by the Italian Left — have been widely accepted on all political levels. These tenets thus form one of the pillars of a foreign policy common to the entire nation. While this policy may occasionally be the target of criticism, reserve or particular emphasis, even in regard to very important issues, its 1

XV Congress of the Italian Communist Party, Atti e risoluzioni, Rome, Editori Riuniti, 1979, p. 550.

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general direction remains unchanged. In other words, adherence to the Atlantic Pact and European unity have become fundamental, constituent components of a common political viewpoint, and thus factors promoting the national unity of the Italians under the Republic. 2 A distinction should however be made between the terms "Atlantic option" and "Atlanticism". Given the strong ideological undertones of the latter term, its use would be inappropriate in an analysis which — starting from acknowledgment of the current consensus of opinion — seeks to pinpoint in the political/cultural world the deeper reasons for the dissension that in the late 1940s and subsequently saw the Italian Left bluntly opposed to the foreign policy which the government of the moment was trying to impose on the new Italy. In brief, this analysis attempts to determine what, in the opinion of the Left, the fundamental new element was to be for postwar Italy, by what values and what principles it was to be inspired, whether it was to attribute (and if so, why) Atlantic policy with the capacity for negating this new element, and lastly whether it considered (and if so, for what reasons) rejection of the Atlantic Pact to be a contribution in a positive direction. The "demonstrative obstructionism" 3 implemented by the Left in March 1949, which went on without a break for over fifty hours and consisted not only of speeches made by the most important leaders but also of statements of opposition from all the members of parliament elected in the lists of the Fronte Democratico Popolare, was merely the most obvious symbolic aspect of a vast campaign of opposition to the Atlantic Pact waged for months all over Italy. Widespread mobilization of public opinion preceded and accompanied the Parliamentary obstructionism. With political assemblies, the collection of signatures, public manifestations, strikes organized in almost every town, Communists and Socialists attempted to ensure that Parliamentary opposition would be backed up by vast popular consensus of opinion, in headon opposition to governmental policy. This campaign, which was to be protracted for many years to come, had initially the purpose of pointing out "effectively (...) to national and international public opinion the gravity of the commitments" involved in signing the Atlantic Pact, and subsequently that of keeping open even after the majority vote "a question of extreme gravity not only for foreign policy, but for the very future of Italy". 4 On the importance attributed by the forces of the Left 2

3 4

I believe that this aspect, certainly not a secondary one, of the history of the Republic is not taken into consideration in the otherwise stimulating reflection by S. Lanaro, L'italia nuova. Identitä e sviluppo 1861-1988, Turin, Einaudi, 1988. E. Santarelli, Nenni, Turin, Utet, p. 306. Cf. the Avvertenza to the volume, published by the PCI, // Patto Atlantico at Parlamente italiano. Le dichiarazioni del governo e i discorsi dell'Opposizione (11—18 marzo 1949), Rome, CDS, 1949.

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to the latter objective, and on the determination with which they intended to pursue it, Pietro Nenni's declaration of vote could not have been clearer: "We have, after an uninterrupted session of 50 hours, only one thing to add: the struggle against the Atlantic Pact does not end but begins with the vote we are about to cast. We will do everything in our power to make execution of the Pact impossible. We will create as many difficulties as we can. In this way we will have the consciousness not only of serving our political ideals, but also of serving the nation and the people against a policy that we do not hesitate to define as one of provocation and betrayal"5. The harshness of the forms in which the Left manifested its opposition to the Atlantic choice was matched by political evaluations and arguments of the same nature. Both PSI and PCI accused the Government of "begging"6 for Italy's accession to a pact that was aggressively anti-Soviet, that concretely opened the way to a new war, that compromised the security of the nation by exposing it to the risk of becoming a real battlefield, that turned it into a vassal of the United States depriving it of its national independence, and lastly that promoted a process of conservative restoration of Italian society bringing with it the fear of further degeneration towards authoritarianism. 7 The similarity of their perceptions and political evaluations did not prevent the two parties from employing different emphases. With the Communists — who adhered rigidly to the scheme of the "two camps" devised by the Cominform in response to the bipolarity of the Truman Doctrine — these emphases fell mainly on the structural roots of imperialistic aggression (and therefore, in accordance with Lenin's categories of analysis, on the inevitable military and belligerent outcome of the United States' post-war foreign policy); on the opposed structural basis of the Soviet peace policy; and lastly, on the international solidarity based on class of the Italian Communists with the "proletarians of the Soviet Union", contrasted by the PCI to the similar class solidarity of the Italian governing class with imperialism.8 The Socialists tried instead to avoid such a clear-cut choice of camp, which would have been lacerating for a party already fragmented into factions and torn by bitter dispute over the prospects of the international situation. 5 6 7

8

P. Nenni, Discorsi parlamantari, Rome, Camera dei Deputati, 1983, p. 149. Cf. ibid, p. 140. Cf. D. Ardia, // Partita socialista e il Patto atlantico, Milan, Angeli, 1976, which is still today the most systematic and complete study of Socialist international policy in the latter half of the 1940s; and S. Galante, La politica del PC/ e il Patto atlantico. "Rinanscita" 1946-1949, Padua, Marsilio, 1973. Cf., in particular, the speech given by Togliatti to the House on March 15, 1949, in P. Togliatti, Discorsi parlamentari, Rome, Camera dei Deputati, 1984, pp. 409 — 431; and, more in general, S. Galante, La politica del PCI ... op. cit.

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Those who spoke officially on behalf of the party 9 stressed mainly, however, the subject of governmental responsibility, of the contrast between its policy of prestige and the lack of any means to implement such a policy, of the tragic risks to which the government was exposing Italy merely to win worthless "panache". They insisted in particular that neutrality was the only possible alternative to a choice of camp that threatened to be ruinous for the independence of the nation as well as dangerous for the autonomy of the parties. Nor did the leaders of the two parties fail to differ in the tones they assumed and the warnings they pronounced. For example, Nenni claimed the right to continue to oppose the Atlantic Pact with all the means provided by the Constitution, while Togliatti, much more bluntly, admonished the government not to delude itself that it could make war against the Soviet Union, since the people would keep it from doing so, without however specifying what means the PCI had decided to employ for this purpose. Nonetheless, in spite of the different emphases which — if examined with the philological sensitivity which is the historian's privilege — could reveal a situation that was much more turbulent than it would seem at first sight, the sharp tones of the denunciations were to prevail, making the parties of the Left appear much more united than was really the case. This was, moreover, inevitable. In a phase of negative thinking, in times of Cold War, the ayes that divided the Socialists (and, among them, Riccardo Lombardi's Centrists and Giuseppe Romita's Right-wing even more than Nenni's Left) from the Communists were less important than the noes which united them. What was mainly perceived as significant, at that moment and in that context, were not the premises and the arguments, but rather the conclusions, that is to say the common rejection of the Atlantic Pact. In addition to this, at the centre of the denunciations of governmental foreign policy by the PCI and the PSI was a genuinely unifying political core, a common basic requirement that transcended individual differences and made possible the harmonious discord of the Leftist parties: that of pursuing a foreign policy based on identification of the "permanent interests of the Italian nation".10 On the absolute priority of this political objective among the leaders of the Left there existed no basic disagreement, although they had arrived at this conclusion starting from cultural premises that were often dissimilar, and from different ideological convictions. Nenni — while paying the ritual tribute to Marxism - believed that governmental foreign policy was essentially the result of two psychological and ideological factors: the theological hatred of 9

10

Cf. the Parliamentary speech by P. Nenni on March 12, 1949, in Discorsi parlamentari, op. cit., pp. 127— 145; and, for a critical reconstruction, D. Ardia, // Partito Socialisla ..., op. cit. P. Togliatti, Discorsi parlamentari, op. cit., p. 338.

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the Church and the fear of the reactionary classes. Hatred and fear nourished a climate of passionate emotion which fouled the political air, determining "the current impossibility of agreeing upon a national policy of detente", consisting on the outside of "freedom from commitments of political and military character, i. e., (...) of neutrality" and on the inside of "efforts exerted to remove the poison from relations between majority and opposition". Accordingly, so as not to "widen the schism splitting the world and the Italians among themselves", the Socialist leader insisted on the need to restore normal political relations, thus making it possible to pursue a "national policy" intended as "mutual commitment to solve the problems of existence of our people", (my italics) avoiding "sacrificing the national programme for reconstruction to a revival of illusions of power"11. Togliatti too evidenced the ideological dimension assumed by the political conflict but, consistent with the Marxism of the Cominform vulgate, saw its origins in structural aspects typical of the Capitalist system rather than in psychological factors such as the fear for which the U.S.S.R. was also implicitly responsible. The Communist leader too insisted, however, on the need to overcome the obstacles set up by excessive ideological conflict, to bring about a convergence of different social and political forces around a common "national interest". "A national foreign policy begins precisely at the point in which those who differ in adhering to different systems of ideas feel the need, in the supreme interest of the nation, of agreeing on a common policy at which both have arrived, by different routes, from different starting points"12. Like the Socialist leader, the Communist one also indissolubly linked the international and the internal dimension in his proposed national policy, evoking through allusions, but not incomprehensibly, the strategy of the "national way to Socialism"13 which had been erased from his political lexicon after the PCI's adherence to the Cominform. However, differentiation was not lacking even in regard to this strategical nodal point. Basically, it consisted of verbal shadings, which reflected the different requirements and interpretational slants of the leaders of the two parties; the Objectivity' of the structural processes and the geo-political dimension, for Togliatti; the significance to be attributed also to the subjective and psychological background of political decisions, for Nenni. On the political core of the proposal however, both Socialists and Communists were in substantial agreement. 11

P. Nenni, Discorsi parlamentari, op. cit., pp. 142 — 143. P. Togliatti, Discorsi parlamentari, op. cit., p. 370. " Cf. S. Galante, "Π PCI e la genesi della politica d'impotenza (1941-1949)", in E. Di Nolfo, R. H. Rainero, B. Vigezzi (eds.), L'ltalia e la politica di potenza in Europa (1945-1949), Milan, Marzorati, 1988, p. 346.

12

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Starting from this paradox — the specified objective of national unification pursued, however, through forms of struggle that heightened opposition and through arguments that emphasized division — the thesis I propose to sustain is that for the PCI and for the PSI, Italy's accession to the Atlantic Pact was the crowning of a strategic defeat. By this I do not intend the obvious, namely the Parliamentary outcome of the clash and the specific international option that it endorsed. I believe, instead, that it is can be demonstrated that the defeat of the Italian Left was already present in the content and in the forms of the battle joined, even before its outcome. And that, accordingly, the theme of strategic defeat must be examined in depth, cutting down to the innermost core, cultural and political, of the overall projects of the two parties, so far as to be able to say, paraphrasing Palmiro Togliatti, that it came from far away and had far to go. I speak of general projects of the two parties to insist again on the indissoluble interweaving of the internal and the international dimensions in the policies of the Italian parties of the Left. If, in fact, on the level of historical research it may at times be necessary, for reasons of analysis, to distinguish between the two levels, in political reality — that is to say, in the concrete evaluations and actions of those involved — the two planes were always united (certainly in different and particular forms). In other words, there were distinct but interconnected manifestations of unitary strategic designs. In spite of their strategic and tactical differences, the political plans of the PSI and the PCI for the post-war period14 actually turned on the same axis. They included, in fact, not only some analytic premises (for example, the conviction that the international dimension would play a determining role in implementation of the national plans of the various parties) and some political requirements (such as that of unity of the "working class parties") which, although placed in highly different strategic contexts which substantially modified their significance, were nonetheless common to both parties, but also and more important involved the use of conceptual categories and social references springing from the same cultural matrix. To evaluate both the strategic planning and the concrete political options of the Italian mass parties in the wartime and postwar period, it is essential to note the central place held by the ideal-ideological dimension in unison with the historic culture of their leaders. 14

Cf. P. Spriano, Storia del Partita comunista italiano, vol. V, La Resistenza, Togliatti e il Partito nuovo, Turin, Einaudi, 1975; A. Agosti (ed.), Togliatti e la fondazione dello stato democratico, Milan, Angeli, 1986; E. Di Nolfo -G. Muzzi, La ricostituzione del PSI. Resistenza, Repubblica, Costituente, in Storia del Socialismo italiano, vol. V, // secondo dopoguerra (1943 - 1955), pp. 1-254, Rome, II Poligono, 1981; F. Taddei, // socialismo italiano del dopoguerra. Correnti ideologiche e scelte politiche (1943 - 1947), Milan, Angeli, 1984.

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In spite of the different strategic interpretations given it, the plan to bring "from opposition to government"l5 those whom they wished to represent was common to both the leaders of the "Catholic" party and those of the "workingclass parties". This plan had a significance reaching far beyond the immediate political and party-based aspects. It tended, in fact, toward a basic objective which, if achieved, would have strongly affected the long-term social and political processes of national history. This objective derived from the nature that the mass parties attributed themselves, and from their interpretation of the history that had moulded them. Both the PCI and the PSI proclaimed themselves "working-class parties", representatives and instruments of a component of Italian society that had been historically extraneous to the risorgimental process, just as it had occupied a marginal role in defining the subsequent shaping of the national state. The fundamental aim of the Left was thus that of placing the working class — with its interests and values, as well as its union and party organizations — among the founding, constituent elements of the new Italy that was to arise from the regenerating bath of the "second Risorgimento"16. The explicit risorgimental appeal of the Left was not a late-flowering manifestation of its "post-risorgimental language".17 For Nenni, for Togliatti, and for all the other leaders of the PSI and the PCI as well, it was the expression of a deeply-rooted political culture, whose purpose was that of remodelling concepts of identity and national interest by re-proportioning the traditional components and blending them into a new mixture; that is to say, by reinterpreting national interest also in relation to the worker, mediating with other social and party components the interests and values of the working class, with the intention of having them adopted as legitimate, constituent 15

16

17

I intentionally use with reference also to the parties of the Left the title of the well-known collection of writings by Alcide De Gasperi, / cattolici dall'opposizione al governo, Bari, Laterza, 1955. The interpretation of the Resistance as a second Risorgimento was not proposed exclusively 'a posteriori' by the Communists — cf. for example the collection of writings of Eugenio Curiel edited by E. Modica, published under the title Classi e generazioni nel secondo Risorgimento, Rome, Edizioni di Cultura Sociale, 1955 — but it was politically dominant On the field' in the years 1943 — 45, as a tendentially unifying factor with explicit subjective convictions and multiple individual motivations — public for the most part, but also private; realistic and mythical; national and international; patriotic, classist, "civil" and so on — of those who participated in various ways in the struggle for national liberation. Consequently, I do not agree with (and I confess that I find difficulty even in classifying it scientifically) the recurrent unilaterality of certain debates midway between the historiographical and the political - such as, to give merely one of the many possible examples, the one that developed at the Belluno Symposium in October 1988, and then in the daily press, around the subject of the Resistance as "civil war".

Thus E. Santarelli, Nenni, op. cit., p. 307, defines the language of the Socialist leader.

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elements of the rules of the game in post-fascist Italy, and thus as original features of its new identity, not to be violated without trauma. The need to re-formulate the very concepts of nation and national interest as premise to the refounding of the State, while issuing from a strong ideological matrix, was entirely foreign to the category of myth. On the contrary, it was based on a particular critical interpretation of national history - that of Gramsci's notes on the Risorgimento as passive revolution, interwoven with the concept of Fascism not only as the most authentic "revelation" (according to the well-known definition of Giustino Fortunato) of the class limits of the process of national unification, but also as regards the new elements introduced by it into the social foundations and organization of the State. It was also based on an evaluation of the need for unity of the various national sectors, especially as regards the future; both in the more immediate perspective of those who regarded internal unity as one of the meagre resources available to aid Italy to emerge from the national impotence into which the nation had fallen; and in that less 'contingent' viewpoint of those who aimed at overcoming the major historical fractures of Italian society in the belief that, if they were not thoroughly healed, on the level of the nation's economic and social structures, by cutting through their characteristic "reactionary layer", they would threaten the democratic stability of Italy forever.18 The cultural and political centrality of the class issue produced in the two parties a further effect, essential for a comprehension of the general international tendencies of the PCI and the PSI in the later post-war period, and of the mutual bonds and conditioning between the two parties on the specific occasion of the Atlantic option. The concept of class, adopted not only in the recent national context, but also in the more typically MarxistLeninist version of "international proletariat", had led both parties to recognize the USSR as the first "workers' state". This nourished a Soviet-centred internationalism in which the U.S.S.R. was an indispensable reference point but, even more, an unquestioned political guide for working class parties the world over. A common basis of the internationalism of both the PCI and PSI was in fact the assumption of the universal nature of the working class, and thus of the substantial communion, going beyond all national boundaries, of its principles of pacifism and solidarity, its goal of socialist transformation of society, and its commitment to the struggle against capitalism. The assumption of the universal nature of the working class implied the concept that each fraction of it was following everywhere the same principles and aims, and Cf. S. Galante, // PCI e la genesi ..., op. cit.; D. Ardia, // rifiuto della potenza: il Partita socialista italiano e la politica di potenza in Europa (1943 —1950), in E. Di Nolfo, R. H. Rainero, B. Vigezzi (eds.), L'ltalia e la politica di potenza ..., op. cit., pp. 253-278).

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that it should utilize the force available to it in the common interest; the force of the state as well, so that the Soviet state was considered nothing less than an instrument of emancipation for the universal working class.19 On the basis of these doctrinaire premises the solidarity of the Leftist parties with Soviet policy appears to be an obvious form of class autosolidarity. But this posed the strategic problem of how to reconcile the two versions - national and international — of class-concepts in politics: how to weld "proletarian internationalism" with the specific national identify that Communists and Socialists intended to re-shape in a working-class key. From the viewpoint of the Left, the re-formulation of the concept of national interest (and the consequent defence of this concept) had initiated in the practical sphere even prior to the doctrinarian one, during the experience of the Resistance. It was at this time that the premises were laid, through the determining contribution of the working class to the struggle for liberation, for the creation of a "new" national state that would transcend the limits of the risorgimental one in-as-much as it hinged on the active participation of the working class, on the unifying capacity of its social and political action (even when conflictual), and on the fact that the Constitution guaranteed the possibility of such profound social transformation. The integration of the working class into the state from which it had from the start been excluded — the completion on the social level, in effect, of the risorgimental process — was thus seen as the chief result of the struggle of the Italian proletariat against the imperialistic involution of the bourgeoisie, which had arrived at the point of threatening the very existence of the nation. It purified the national state of the imperialistic aspects imprinted on it by the bourgeois mould. It was, in fact, expressly in the struggle against the national roots of Fascist imperialism that the working class had become national, capable of thinking and acting in terms of the nation's interest, of defending its sovereignty, independence and freedom; national, however, "in a universal sense", with an idealistic and political international bias, in consequence of the fact that the oppression of the working class acknowledged no boundaries 19

For a systematic exposition of this concept cf. P. Togliatti, // Partita comunista italiano, Rome, Editori Riuniti, 1961, pp. 128—131, and in particular p. 131 where he states: "The working class does not renounce its internationalist principles when it reaches power; on the contrary, it reaffirms them, it translates them into the positive action of a State". As for the PSI, cf. A. Canavero, "Nenni, i socialisti italiani e la politica estera", in E. Di Nolfo, R. H. Rainero, B. Vigezzi, L'italia e la politica di potenza ..., op. cit., pp. 228 — 230; and cf. also E. Di Nolfo, "II socialismo italiano tra i due blocchi", in Trent'anni di politica socialista. Atti del Convegno di Parma gennaio 1977, Rome, Mondo Operaio-Edizioni Avanti!, 1977, pp. 47-66; Idem, "1 problemi dell'internazionalismo socialista durante la guerra fredda", in Storia del Partita socialista. Dalla ricostruzione all''alternativla, vol. Ill, Venice, Marsilio, 1979, pp. 11—20.

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and that each national fraction of it was defending its interests as well as the 'national' interests of all the peoples assailed by imperialism. 20 From the viewpoint of the Left, the struggle against Nazi-Fascist imperialism had already concretely welded together nation and internationalism in the policy of the working class parties. Nonetheless, given the existing balance of forces and the reactionary trend characteristic of Italian society, this political design had not yet produced irreversible and universally accepted results. Accordingly, the re-establishment of the national identity on mass, democratic bases called for a consistent policy of alliances that would consolidate and extend the results achieved in the struggle for liberation. The concept of national interest that the Left was progressively developing thus included both an internal dimension and an international one of alliances, closely interlinked. The former postulated a social compromise (between proletariat and productive bourgeoisie) a political one (specifically, between the Left and the Christian Democrats) 21 and an institutional one, which were supposed to lead to the construction of a new national unity, marked by conflict as regards the pursuit of special interests and values, but remaining within a perimeter of general values and interests held in common. Such values and interests were those mutually acknowledged in the founding stage of the new Italy, and had thus become the transcendental conditions (in the Kantian sense of that which precedes experience and makes it possible) of subsequent evolution in the political struggle. Within this context the main objective of the Left was that of creating a wide-spread consensus of opinion on the basic objectives of national policy, a goal to be achieved through mutual approach and, if possible, convergence not only as regards policy and interests but also values (in the plans of some Communist leaders) between the major social and ideological currents in Italy. 22 2U

21

22

Cf. on these subjects, but dealt with from the particular perspective of the relationship between the PCI and DC, my Alia ricerca delta potenza perduta, Manduria, Lacaita, 1990. Who, vice versa, were then engaged in a similar strategic operation of historical importance aimed at making the Catholic 'world' the barycentre of postwar Italy, through a sort of reverse Gentiloni pact: cf. S. Galante, La fine di un compromesso storico. PCI e DC nella crisi del 1947, Milan, Angeli, 1980; and M. G. Rossi, Da Sturzo a De Gasperi, Rome, Editori Riuniti, 1985. For example, the laborious construction of the Constitutional connective tissue. Normally, the compromises or concessions among the various parts involved in this work arc evidenced. While these findings are undoubtedly important, they still say little unless we go deeper into the political intention underlying them, which reveals the goal of national recomposition common — within certain limits — to the leaders of the major Italian political currents; the scope of placing at the foundation of the new Constitution the popular masses, reconciling them with the risorgimental state, and doing this while simultaneously initiating the healing of the greater ideological splits while moderating in terms of co-existence the interests and values of distinct sub-cultures, none of which could consider itself a majority or hegemonistic force in Italy.

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In a similar manner, the supporting plank of the second component, the international one, in the concept of national interest developed by the Left, was an orientation of Italian foreign policy that favoured international cooperation between the great anti-Fascist powers which, in different ways, were the external reference points — and, in some aspects, the guarantee — of the major Italian political forces. In spite of the fact that the national and international events of 1947 put an end, on both levels, to the policy of alliances pursued by the parties of the Left, they did not feel that this struck at the heart of their strategy. Although they intensified the sharpness of the social and political battle, they did not do the same in the Constituent sphere23. They were aware that the extremely significant outcome of the elections of April 18, 1948, detracted all credibility from the hypothesis of returning to collaboration with the Christian Democrats. Moreover, they expressed the fear that from a clash over political decisions the next step would be that of destroying the very rules of conflictual coexistence. Nonetheless, they did not believe that the conflict would entail a definitive split, complete and irreversible, of the nation. Not even the attempted assassination of Togliatti, although it pushed many areas of the country to the verge of civil war, induced the Communist and Socialist leadership to assume a different attitude. On the contrary, these leaders viewed all of these episodes as successive stages in a process that was developing in the direction opposite to their wishes: a process of vertical splitting of the nation which they did not wish to encourage, but in which they were forced to participate. On the other hand the attitude of the PCI and PSI was to change when the problem of Italy's accession to the Atlantic Pact became an issue. On that occasion, in fact, the parties of the Left judged (but with significant differences between Communists and Socialists and, above all, within the ranks of the latter24: differences that were particularly significant for men of Action Party origin and culture such as Lombardi, in whom the class tradition was undoubtedly less pronounced than in other Socialist leaders), that not only was a specific decision harmful to the national interest being made but that — a much more serious indication of a notable difference of evaluation of a problem of decisive political importance — the very concept of a national interest comprising also essential interests of the Leftist opposition was being nullified. It was thus from this moment, and within this context, that the leaders of the Left began to instigate behaviour that actively contributed to destroying the 13

24

Cf. A. Gambino, Storia del dopoguerra. Dalla liberazione al potere DC, Rome — Bari, Laterza, 1975; and more in general, on the policy of the Left during this period, cf. S. Fedele, Fronte popolare. La sinistra e le elezioni del 18 aprile 1948, Milan, Bompiani, 1978. Cf. D. Ardia, // Partito socialista e il Patto atlantico, op. cit.

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remaining bonds between majority and opposition, assuming attitudes that revealed the existence of two opposing concepts of national interest. Without underestimating the political significance of the Atlantic option and without forgetting the climate of sharp ideological dispute in which it took place, such an emphatic stance and the behaviour that it triggered seem inconsistent with the analyses by which they were justified and the objectives they proposed. The rooting of Italy in the Western "camp" had now taken place in the economic, political and ideological contexts. As the Left itself admitted, accession to the Atlantic Pact completed and perfected a now irreversible process. Now the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, Brussels Pact and Atlantic Pact were strung on a single thread, making the latter appear to be the natural, inevitable evolution of the preceding options. Why then should a decision that appeared to be merely the explicit manifestation of what was implicit, the formalization of decisions already made, the confirmation of irreversible tendencies, have such new and disturbing effects, not only on the international position occupied by Italy but also on the solidarity of the various national sectors? Furthermore, why was so much effort exerted for popular mobilization, why was there so much threatening exhibition of force? Purposely, it seemed, to accentuate just that fear of the more anxious middle classes15 which, according to Nenni, was one of the basic causes preventing agreement on a national policy of detente. An opportunistic calculation — calibrated on an exclusively national scale but exposed, in all probability, to a new accusation of opportunism on the international scale — should have suggested the need for more flexible behaviour, also to unite the force of the Leftist opposition to the dissension notoriously present in the majority, in the Catholic world and in the DC itself in regard to the Atlantic Pact. The attitude of the PCI was instead one of total rigidity. The PSI followed it along the same path, although the Socialist Left-wing, and even more the new and ephemeral centrist majority, showed a greater willingness to debate the issue. The Left clearly wished to differentiate its own sectors, rather than to seek for points of union and convergence, at least partial, with sectors of the majority. What was the reason for this? The diaries of Pietro Nenni offer invaluable indications — which, within certain limits, can be considered exemplary — for those seeking an in-depth response to such a question, seen from the viewpoint of the Left. Precisely due to the profound reluctance and almost instinctive aversion of the Socialist leader for the prospect of having to take sides, his observation point is particularly suited to give an account of the inner maturing of an opposing political conviction. Cf. E. Di Nolfo, Le paure e le speranze degli Italiani (1943-1953), Milan, Mondadori, 1986.

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As early as in the late Spring 1948 Nenni had warned of the symptoms of an alarming tendency. Sentiments of unity and national identity seemed to him to be retrogressing in the direction of the 19th century instead of proceeding towards the higher synthesis envisaged by the Left. "To grasp the political sense of the day" he noted on June 9, 1948, "we must hark back to the moment when the "clerical" majority, rising to its feet, joined in the cry of 'Hurrah for the Pope' and the extremists, shortly thereafter, echoing a remark of Gullo as to the 'irrevocability' of September 20th, shouted: 'Hurrah for September 20th'. This is where we are, with a leap backwards of eighty years".26 Against this tendency — which was uniformly diffused within the ranks of those emerging from April 18th - the leaders of the Leftist parties acted consistently, even to the point of contradicting the expectations of their followers. "Togliatti spoke yesterday, to some degree disappointing his followers by his excessively conciliating tone", observed Nenni on June 13, 194827, and he was referring to the Parliamentary speech on the vote of confidence in the government formed after April 18th. At the conclusion of his speech the Secretary of the PCI had repeated that the fundamental objective of the Communists, "authors of the Republican Constitution", was the creation of a vast mass movement "for the implementation of the new political and social principles" contained in it.28 For their part, the more responsible of the Christian Democrat leaders behaved in the same manner, showing some willingness, if not for a dialogue, at least to avoid deeper splits. In a message obviously aimed towards detente, De Gasperi on June 18th had the trusted Andreotti ask the Socialists whether Nenni had "noted the deference with which the Premier (had) argued" with Togliatti and with Nenni himself. 29 However, the climate of diffidence and mistrust between former allies had now become too strong to allow calmer evaluation of reciprocal intentions. Increasingly, men fell prey to their own personal prejudices, as well as to the clash between their ideologies, so that to Nenni, De Gasperi's approach seemed nothing more than an instrumental manoeuvre aimed at making him "an accomplice in the bourgeois restoration".30 He perceived only the scheme which was in effect entertained by more than one of the Christian Democrats, and not merely by Gronchi, who was the leader in this tendency — to divide the Socialists from the Communists. However, he failed to grasp the fact that 26

27 28 29 J0

P. Nenni, Tempo di guerra fredda. Dian 1943 - 1956, Milan, SugarCo, 1981, p. 435. September 20th was the anniversary of the Italian occupation of Rome in 1870. Ibid, p. 436. Cf. P. Togliatti, Discorsi parlamentari, op. cit. pp. 322 — 323. P. Nenni, Tempo di guerra fredda, op. cit., p. 437. Ibidem.

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De Gasperi's attitude, given the national and international political situation in which Italy was embroiled, had the potential (and, presumably, also the intention) towards a different trend and more general value. The attempted assassination of Togliatti on July 14, 1948 could not fail to worsen this climate of mistrust and insecurity, transforming political opinion into personal suspicion, and vice versa. Nenni immediately interpreted the attempt as a consequence of the breakdown in the "anti-Fascist union" 31 and judged De Gasperi's speech in Parliament to be "a confused, cold, contentious speech (...) (as crusader not as head of the government)", to the bias of which the Socialist leader responded by deciding to severe even further personal and political relations with the leader of the Christian Democrats: "On Wednesday I had offered De Gasperi a hand. I stated today that in view of his negative response, we were leaving to the government the responsibility for the situation and its developments".32 In spite of this, although July 14th tended to disrupt international relations as well, the leaders of the Left were unwilling to carry the logic of rupture and opposition to its extreme consequences, either in Parliament or in public: "The awareness of responsibility toward the nation holds us back. To defeat Scelba's police would not be impossible. But then what? It is in the face of the 'then' that the masses have retreated, not in the face of the tanks".33 The basic restraint that, in the Summer of '47, kept the Leftist forces still mindful of their "responsibility towards the nation", that nourished their sense of national identity and that led them to control the emotions and discipline the wrath of the popular masses, was thus the problem of the implications of a vertical split in the nation, as a result of which internal factors and, presumably, external ones as well would have made any political prospect of unitary recomposition impossible, even on minimal levels. In this case, the only realistic alternative would have been the end of national unity and independence. The split produced by the government's decision to accede to the Atlantic Pact thus had its precedents, and a long period of incubation. However, it was the Atlantic option which induced Communists and Socialists to fully accept, on the political level — but always avoiding the extreme consequences of the Nennian "then" - the logic of division which they had always refused to follow. This happened because the Atlantic option introduced into the scenario of the perceptions and evaluations of the Left a new fact, which seemed to " Ibidem, p. 485, on the date of July 14th. 12 Ibid, p. 446, on the date of July 16. " Ibid, p. 447, on the date of July 18th.

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strike at the very heart of their class identity as well as their strategy of political compromise. The basis for any compromise is an understanding of reciprocal motivations - especially between adversaries - and a respect for each other's most vital, genuine requirements. These motivations must be stripped of the psychological and ideological incrustations with which they are nearly always coated, and of the contingent instrumentalization by which they are frequently accompanied. Obviously, this task involves all the protagonists of the hypothetical compromise, who must create the conditions for clarifying to themselves and to others the true goals of their actions, reducing misunderstanding to a minimum. Conversely, in the case of Italy's accession to the Atlantic Pact, secrecy and suspicion prevailed from the start. The unknown is often more frightening than the known, and even more so when emotional and ideological instincts are unrestrained by any verifiable information. It was in just this situation that the leaders of the PCI and the PSI found themselves when, in the Autumn of 1948, the first vague news of the negotiations going on began to filter through. The principle and common difficulty encountered by Communists and Socialists derived from the nature of this information: generic, imprecise, uncertain; rumours, rather than news. The common reaction was that of demanding more precise information, denouncing the real or presumed manoeuvres of the government that refused to provide such news, gathering all the known facts of both an international and national nature which, in any way whatever, could have — or gave the impression of having — any pertinence at all to the negotiations, exerting all efforts to link them together, to interpret them, in the attempt to obtain a consistent, politically plausible picture. Since the lack of information on the exact terms of the negotiations made it impossible to examine the validity of the issue — and this situation continued at length, so that at the opening of the Parliamentary debate in March 1949 the representatives, and not only those of the Left, had not yet seen the text of the treaty - a political evaluation of undifferentiated type prevailed. The Communist and Socialist leaders were politically certain of only one thing: that negotiations were being held to entrap Italy into a Western, anti-Soviet military bloc. From this single certainty they could start to link, through the nodes of their ideology and culture, the previous hypothesizing of the respective parties. According to the leaders of the PCI, the Pact in the making represented no radical change in the policy of the United States since it was simply an obvious military appendage to the Marshall Plan. After the creation of the Cominform the Italian Communists had totally assimilated the opinion of the

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Stalinist leadership, i. e., that the Plan was the fundamental imperialistic instrument conceived by the United States to resolve the crisis of postwar over-production threatening its economy by enslaving Western Europe economically and politically.34 Since, however, this instrument had shown itself only partially effective, the U.S. was now proposing to make the Soviet Union too pay directly for its difficulties, by building a military bloc to threaten her, to snatch from her the conquests won in the anti-Nazi war and to destroy socialism. In the eyes of the PCI, the Atlantic Pact was an instrument for the defence of capitalism, of the European bourgeoisies and the colonial system, a sort of new anti-Comintern Pact, a military bloc for international class war. It was "the pact of reaction against progress, of servitude against freedom, of oppression against independence, of civil war against democracy, of imperialistic war against peace. The Atlantic Pact (was) the coalition of the forces of reaction against the forces of progress of the entire world".35 Faced with such a blunt alternative the choice of the PCI was, inevitably, to remain on the side of the "forces of progress" and therefore, on the side of the USSR which seemed to be their most highly advanced representative. The leaders of the PSI had also reached similar conclusions, although starting from very different premises. The Congress of Genoa in June 1948 had confirmed that the various sectors of the party were profoundly split over the international situation. One of the nodes of the controversy was that of how to concretely reconcile the political concept of balance between East and West with the more properly ideological one of non-equal distance between Soviet Union and United States. The Socialist Left-wing maintained, in an opinion that was similar but not identical to that of the PCI, that there was a real, imminent threat of war caused by the United States, resolved to crush the USSR and that portion of the European workers' movement that remained linked to it. In this situation, the PSI could not remain indifferent or neutral, and was instead impelled to side with the international proletariat, defending through resolute class struggle both the peace and the Soviet Union. Within the sphere of this struggle it was feasible to propose the tactical goal of keeping Italy neutral between the two contenders but if, in spite of everything, conflict should break out, then the Italian proletariat would have to pass from class struggle to class war against United States imperialism. Radically different was the analysis of the Centrist group of the PSI. It rejected identification of the interests of the international working class with 34

35

Cf. S. Galante, // Partito comunista italiano e I'integrazione europea. II decennio del rifiuto 1947-1957, Padua, Liviana, 1988. M. Scoccimarro, "Un patto di guerra", in Rinascita, 1949, no. 4.

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those of the USSR and, while stating that the defence of the Soviet Union remained a primary duty for all genuine Socialists, it denied that this necessarily meant acceptance of the principle of the guiding nation. Consequently, the Centrists rejected both the logic of confrontation between the blocs and the need to take sides with one of the contenders, affirming instead that it was necessary to abandon the terrain of the Cold War — construed as an international and national ideological clash — to embrace a strategy rooted in the specific interests of the Italian workers' movement. For them, neutrality thus had to form the main axis of the Party's international activity and, at the same time, the strategic objective toward which Italy's foreign policy should be oriented in all circumstances. These positions — the dominant ones within the PSI, where, to complicate matters still further, other minor currents were also present, Romita's right wing, in particular — were evidently incompatible. It was expressly the issue of the Atlantic Pact that was to bring them together. Thanks to the centripetal and cohesive force of the need to oppose a common defence to a threat of still uncertain but nonetheless alarming outlines, the Party's Left and Centre forces tended on some positions to approach each other, using the same password although disagreeing as to its interpretation. Simultaneously, under pressure from the Left Wing and the party base — but still with the opposition of Romita's right wing — the Centrists also developed a greater willingness to act in unison with the PCI against the foreign policy of the government. Although sharp controversy continued, the Socialist Centre and Left-wing managed to define a common line of foreign policy. In opposition to the "hypocritical and suicidal policy" of the government — as defined by Lombardi — dictated, according to Nenni, by "fear and hatred" of the conservative forces for the workers' movement, the PSI proposed neutrality extended to both the military and the political spheres. Such neutrality thus rejected "European Union, Brussels Pact and Atlantic Pact", as being the "organisms of a single policy directed against the Soviet Union and the new popular democracies and aiming, within each nation, to restore the forces, the institutions and the interests formerly united around Nazi-Fascism".36 It was thanks to this common judgement — according to which accession to the Atlantic Pact would bring with it not only reaction but also the concrete risk of war for Italy — that the union between Communists and Socialists could now be welded (perfectly, at least on the surface). In substance, judging the course of the Atlantic issue on what they did not know — given the secrecy with which the governments promoting it, as well as De Gasperi and Sforza, surrounded it — but which their ideology abundantly explained a priori, both

36

On all these aspects cf. D. Ardia, // Partita socialista e il Patto atlantico, op. cit.

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the parties of the Left shared Nenni's evaluation, considering that "in spite of an apparent 'accalmie' (...) the threat of war, from virtual, had now become actual".37 The perception of this danger was the decisive factor behind the changed attitude of the Leftist parties, and their decision to adopt a policy of head-on opposition. The threat of war had already entered the ideological frame of reference of the Left some time before as a result of the rigidly doctrinaire use of the Marxist-Leninist category of imperialism reinstated by the Cominform. Nonetheless, its practical irruption was a politically unexpected event, resulting from the interplay of the Atlantic negotiations and the international hysteria of the Berlin crisis, exploding in June '48 and resolved only slightly less than one year later. The now "actual" threat that, consistent with the nature attributed it by Leninist doctrine, imperialism would trigger an anti-Soviet "class war" in the heart of Europe, struck in fact at an interest judged by the Left to be priority and indispensable, namely, that class-based and pacifist-leaning internationalism which represented, as had been seen, a substantial component of the concept of working class and thus an essential part of the ideological and political identity of the Left.38 With the perception of this peril, the alternative "war or peace?" moved from the abstract theoretical sphere to that of concrete policy, to become "the problem of problems",39 inducing both Socialists and Communists to modify their priorities and their behaviour. By adhering to the Atlantic Pact, the government placed Italy on the side of the United States against the Soviet Union, and thus prevented the survival, even at a minimal level, of the ideal of national interest which the Leftist parties had tried to promote. A war against the Soviet Union, against the "proletarian state" would inevitably have been, in fact, a class war against the entire "international proletariat", and thus also against the Italian working class which formed part of it. Obviously, no genuinely national interest could subsist when a war against a part of the people was being planned. The first effect of Italy's accession to the Atlantic Pact thus appeared to the Left to be the splitting of the nation, resulting from a class oriented

-17 Cf. P. Nenni, Tempo di guerra fredda, op. cit., p. 470, on the date of December 31, 1948. 18 I believe, in short, that the manner in which Italy's accession to the Atlantic Pact was prepared, mingling it with the ideological and cultural components common to the Leftist parties, offers some suggestions for answering the questions of those who ask "why the battle against the accession to the Atlantic Pact has become confused with adherence to international Communism, to the cause of the U.S.S.R." (G.Tamburrano, Pietro Nenni, op. cit., p. 259). 3V P. Nenni, Tempo di guerra fredda, op. cit., p. 470, on the date of December 31, 1948.

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international choice made by the Italian bourgeoisie. Consequently, the dangers of "Fascism" within and "war" without that the Communists had already judged menacing after April 18, 1948^ now seemed more than ever concrete. So concrete as to induce a notoriously cautious and prudent leader like Togliatti to consider that the "threat of war" was now "real and not a distant prospect" and therefore to present, at the meeting of the Communist Central Committee of March 28, 1949, alarming scenarios as well as surprising hypotheses and practical initiatives. Considering that Togliatti had, in spite of the creation of the Cominform and the attempt against his life, continued up to 1949 to curb the tendencies toward extreme radicalization of the political conflict present within his party 41 , the explicit formula containing, along with traditional concepts, conclusions and proposals extraneous to its general orientation, is highly surprising: "Situation of imperialistic groups to whom the war offers an outlet. Value of the Chinese victories and danger for the Japanese front on which they have repercussions. Symptoms of economic crisis. The forces of peace can, despite all this, still prevail. The battle to be fought calls for mobilization of all the forces of peace. Will we be able to mobilize and put them into action? Against fatalism and the expectation of war. Formation of a wide front for peace with awareness of the sharpest struggle and of the rupture that may be near. At the same time we must manage to extend the front. (...) Elements which are working against us: national sentiment and religious sentiment. Vindicating national sentiment. Papal stance in favour of alliances derives from an objective situation. Real prospects for war: it is good that the Party prepares itself and good that something be done. Applying the traditional rules that allow us to face situations of civil war. Preparing to direct a great mass movement and not a small group of propagandists".42 In Togliatti's reasoning there were, moreover, other arguments which counterbalanced such radical indications. He warned against "falling into warmongering fatalism" and, as regards practical action, gave only indications on the organization of the Peace Congress, and on the need to guarantee "the authenticity" of the signatures gathered against accession to the Atlantic Pact; a concern with legality in evident contrast with a prospect of civil war where quite different problems would have clamoured for attention. But most symptomatic of all is the fact that, to his formulation of the dramatic prospect of civil war, the other members of the PCI Central Committee did not react — 40 41

42

Cf. "Fascismo e guerra", in Rinascita, 1948, no. 3. Cf., on these subjects, my work "La fondazione del Cominform. Considerazioni sopra alcuni document! editi e inediti", in Storia delle relazioni internazionali, 1990/1. Fondazione "Istituto Gramsci", Rome, "Archivio del Partito comunista italiano", papers "Verhalt della Direzione del Pet. 1949", L "Direzione del Pci. 28 marzo 1949".

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according to the records — except with an incredible "brief discussion on membership cards", a few mentions of "work for soldiers" and of the "problem of discipline" in the party. We cannot know whether this should be attributed to the prudence of the recording secretary or, as is possible, to the fact that Togliatti's companions, familiar with his convictions and his mentality, were more attentive to the admonishments typical of him than to a prospect foreign to his usual style. In any case, not even this playing down of the situation can cancel the fact that the hypothesis of civil war was actually evoked, confirming the existence of a psychological climate of wide-spread fear. It is only within the context of this true war psychosis that the prospects outlined by Togliatti appear comprehensible and explicable, regardless of whether he did in fact consider them to be realistic or was instead formulating them to reply in advance to questions he knew existed within the governing group of the PCI. For his part, on March 12, 1949, Pietro Nenni had already noted with great clarity in his diary a conviction similar to the one described by the Communist leader to the Central Committee of his own party: "Atlantic Pact as pact for dividing the world and the nation", he wrote, adding; "It creates a situation in which the great problems left open by World War I are transformed into problems of force. Arms in place of negotiations".43 Within this context — in which the urge to divide took the place of the search for unitary solutions, with the result that policy tended to narrow down to mere relationships of force, to be translated into clashes and into war — to Nenni the attempts of some leaders of the Christian Democrats to soften with words the sharpness of the conflict triggered by political factors appeared devoid of practical effectiveness, if not actually suspect and treacherous. Commenting on the Parliamentary speech made by the Secretary of the DC Giuseppe Cappi44, Nenni stated: "Only the intention of playing down the contrast has been praiseworthy, leaving some margin for a policy of national concord. Except that Cappi does not realize (or pretends not to realize) that the Atlantic Pact and detente are mutually incompatible".45 In the opinion of the Left, the act of April 4, 1949 was of much graver import than the outcome of April 18, 1948 - which, in spite of the adversary's unscrupulous use of all the political resources available, still fell within the established rules of the game. Conversely, the Left considered that the act of April 4th affected the rules themselves, modified basic accords, fragmented the compromise of the Resistance that they had placed at the basis of the new 41 44

45

P. Nenni, Tempo di guerra fredda, op. cit., p. 481. Cf. A. Zanibelli (ed.), Discorsi di Giuseppe Cappi, Soresina, Tip. Rossi Silvio, d. d., pp. 93 — 113. P. Nenni, Tempo di guerra fredda, op. cit., p. 481, on the date of March 14, 1949.

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Italy's national unity, rendering inevitable the defeat of the entire national strategy pursued during and after the Resistance.46 In other words, the Italian Left assessed that April 4, 1949 had irreparably torn apart what April 18, 1948 had ranged in antithetical political arrays, and what July 14th of the same year had placed in head-on opposition in the public sphere. They thus experienced Italy's accession to the Pact as an intolerable vulnus, which struck at the working class in both the national and the international aspects of its identity, which refused to recognise this class as a legitimate component of the nation while simultaneously denying it the right to act as co-author of a particular direction in national foreign policy. In the latter area the parties of the Left believed themselves capable of providing (expressly due to their class-conscious nature) a link between Italy's internal renewal and its position within an international system thoroughly renewed by the incisive presence of the "proletarian state". Vice versa, according to Pietro Nenni, "with the vote that we are about to cast we are overthrowing the foreign policy of the new Republican State, we are falling back into the disastrous policy of the monarchy and of Fascism".47 Consequently, according to the well-known Nennian principle that Italy would have the same internal policy as her foreign policy, internal policy too would be disrupted. Fundamentally, it was the very basis of the new Italy that was being "overthrown", with the exclusion of the working class and its parties. Such a radical disruption — not a simple change — was obviously unacceptable to the parties of the Left, which felt called upon to react with vigorous, unceasing struggle. This was a struggle in which the direct connection between foreign policy and internal policy entailed an obvious corollary: "To avoid an armed clash, there is only one means: to destroy from within the opposition of the blocs and the political/military system on which it rests"48. Communists and Socialists agreed in considering this to be the only way possible to curtail the dramatic risks that accession to the Atlantic Pact involved for the entire world. Accordingly, they believed it inevitable that the Government's aggressive external decision should be matched by intensification of the internal struggle to curb the freedom of movement of the majority and its allies, thus contributing to safeguarding the peace, while leaving open the possibility of restoring in future more normal internal dialectics that would put Italy back on its feet again, on the basis of the values of the Resistance and the Constitution. 46

47 48

F. Taddei, // socialismo italiano del dopoguerra ..., op. cit., p. 30 notes how wide-spread throughout the PSI was "the concept of the inevitability of defeat when the international balance of power is unfavourable to a determined course of national events". P. Nenni, Discorsi parlamentari, op. cit., p. 145. P. Nenni, Tempo di guerra fredda, op. cit., p. 484, on the date of April 4, 1949.

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Interwoven with the dominant theme of defending the peace (i. e., of the Soviet Union, considered the most advanced section of the international working class) there was also — but more subdued in tone, and now subordinated to the first objective — the need to remedy the most severe lacerations that the Atlantic option was producing in national unity. This was to be done by proclaiming the Resistance roots of the Left to legitimate its national role, and the constitutional nature (in the unitary sense mentioned above) of Leftist opposition, at the very moment in which it was becoming sharper: "For all these reasons, honourable colleagues, we will vote against ratification of this pact: as Communists, as Socialists, as Italians, even — if you don't mind, since this is the truth — as leading party of that popular struggle for liberation to which we are indebted if Italy today counts for something in the world". 49 But it was expressly the lack of balance between the two goals that was to generate the paradox mentioned before in the policies of the Left: a paradox which, blending and jumbling in contention over the Atlantic Pact political motives of a pragmatic nature and those of 'principle', nourished in its turn the proposal to arrogate to a single portion - and a minority one at that of the nation, the capacity for expressing a genuinely national foreign policy. The parties of the Left, in fact, were convinced that, faced with the new "betrayal" of national interest by the forces of the bourgeoisie, the working class would be left with no other choice but to pick up the flag as it had done some years earlier during the Resistance and to make itself, in the policy of its parties, the most genuine representative of national interest as a whole. In other words, as during the Resistance the working class had become nationalized in the struggle against Nazi-Fascist imperialism so now, a few years later, it had to continue and to consolidate the same process in the struggle against United States imperialism. In this case too, anti-imperialism seemed to provide the chance for welding together, practically and theoretically, nation and internationalism, as well as for expanding the concept of the working class beyond its boundaries to include, tendentially and ideally, the entire nation; to the point of making a part morally and politically representative of the whole. The request to submit to popular referendum the issue of accession to the Pact — in spite of the fact that this was opposed by that very Constitution to which the Left systematically and, in this case, contradictorily referred — followed this direction. It tended to institute a direct relationship with the nation, passing over the barrier interposed by the Parliament elected on April 18th which, according to the Left, falsified the will of the majority of citizens, betrayed by the Atlantic option; and restoring, by this means, full harmony among class, nation and internationalism. 50 ** P. Togliatti, Discorsi parlamentari, op. cit., p. 478. 50 It could be interesting to make a further comparison between these positions and, more

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Stated in these terms, for the Atlantic problem of the Left — as an immediate necessity as well as an opportunity to construct a separate identity proclaimed to be national — it is evident that the significant fact, in evaluating the results of their political struggle, was not the outcome, i. e., a parliamentary defeat in itself inevitable and expected, given the existing balance of forces, but rather the way in which it took place. Particularly significant in this perspective was, along with mass mobilization, the recourse to Parliamentary obstructionism. It was in fact the first time that, in the new-born Republic of Italy, the Left adopted a technique of such strong symbolic and demonstrative value; and also subsequently it was to employ this method with great parsimony, always insisting on its exceptional nature and its applicability only to questions of principle; as a confirmation, albeit a posteriori, that through this method they intended to transform a political option into a choice between principles, between values, between ends; in short, between opposing concepts of life and mankind; in a choice between civilizations, as the advocates of "Atlanticism" were then saying. This happened precisely because the conflict over the Atlantic Pact seemed so radical as to eliminate any possibility of influencing the decisions of the government, of achieving a minimum of "national concord" (in the words of Nenni) on the basic decisions of Italy. This unitary prospect having failed, it seemed to the Left that the only possible alternative was that of constructing and consolidating its own separate identity. For this objective — as demonstration of identity within and token of membership without — the form and the symbols now counted as much as the political substance. As regards this aspect, the Socialist proposal of neutrality constituted — more than a feasible operating hypothesis — a major element of politicalsymbolic differentiation between the parties of the Left, within their common class-conscious theoretical framework and their common anti-Atlantic practice. The proposal remained, in fact, faithful to the prospect of a policy of "equal distance" and, as far as possible, of mediation between Washington and Moscow51 which for the Communists was theoretically inconceivable, even before being politically unacceptable. Given their primary, essential bonds of iron with the USSR — consisting of interests and values held in common, or considered to be so — they could in fact only be 'equally close' to the United States and the Soviet Union when the two powers were moving in

generally, the policy of nationalization of the popular masses in the late postwar period, and the culture of "national radicalism" wide-spread in the Italy of Giolitti - the subject of the study by E. Gentile, // tnito dello stato nuovo daH'antigioliitismo al fascismo, Rome —Bari, Laterza, 1982 - in which the leaders of the Left had their cultural and political apprenticeship. On the precedents for this idea cf. Canavero, Nenni, i socialist! italiani e la politica estera, op. cit., p. 243.

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syntony, as for example during the period of the Great Alliance. But if their routes diverged or collided, the PCI could not fail to reject the hypothesis of neutrality and openly take the side of the U.S.S.R. Moreover, the neutrality proposal was also linked to a pervading sentiment among the ranks of the majority, and was thus a 'symbol' of the Socialists' desire not to radicalize the internal clash beyond certain limits, and to safeguard a minimum of "national unity". "Many things irreparably divide us", admitted Nenni, but he did not resign himself to allowing policy to be dominated by intransigent ideological "principles". "There are also men among you who feel that things cannot continue to go on like this; that there is need for a certain detente in action and in feelings; there is a need not to confuse majority and opposition, but to curb passions". And, addressing himself expressly to the secessionists of '47, he added: "It is not capriciously that I believe that there are among you men who could take the initiative of a national policy".52 From his point of view, the Socialist leader thus had good reason to stress that the neutrality which he had proposed and defended was "much more" than "a case of conscience.53 It was an attempt to transcend the international and national bipolar logic, to avoid taking sides, to act as a statesman in a perspective still unitary and national, rather than merely as a party man, as he believed that both De Gasperi and Togliatti were now acting.54 However, the independent Socialist motivations — not merely the political, but also the cultural ones — were to be overshadowed by the common ideological categories55 and were therefore difficult to perceive from the outside. So that, in the end, they seemed to be more than anything a means for instrumentally differentiating the PSI from the PCI, avoiding the chance that the latter might consolidate as "the only antagonist of the Christian Democrats".56 Moreover, the symbolic value of this political proposal was rapidly stifled by the much noisier significance of the obstructionist battle that Communists and Socialists — dominated by the "sense of the grandeur and drama of these events"57 decided to fight. 52

P. Nenni, Discorsi parlamentari, op. cit., p, 143. Cf. P. Nenni, Tempo di guerra fredda, cit., p. 482, on the date of March 14, 1949. 54 On the Communist leader, cf. Nenni's comment of March 15, 1949: "Togliatti had spoken as a man of party, without presenting any alternative" (Ibid). 55 In the first place, by that of the "international proletariat": and cf. also in D. Ardia, // rifiuto delta potenza ..., op. cit., p. 270, the distinction and, at the same time, the parallelism between the Socialist dimension (values, ideology, class concepts of politics, etc.) and the Italian dimension (culture and national politics). •w P. Nenni, Tempo di guerra fredda, op. cit., p. 474, on the date of January 9, 1949. 57 Ibid, p. 483, on the date of March 20, 1949. 51

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In other terms, based on an ideological foundation of an intense emotional and metaphysical nature, the obstructionist option with its underlying corollary of popular mobilization — contributed to introducing a further strong element of national divergence as a constituent factor in the 'new' postwar Italy. It consolidated directly (in the masses of the Left) and indirectly (in the rest of public opinion) the idea that there was by now a permanent split in the national community, a conviction that no contingent political decision (not even one of great importance such as that of the Atlantic Pact) would be able to justify. It may be asked whether on the occasion of the Atlantic option the leaders of the Left experienced transformation of the political clash into ideological conflict, or whether they desired this. But this would be an idle question. While Togliatti, like Nenni, explicitly condemned "the atmosphere of ideological passion" created by the majority which prohibited any calm debate on the Atlantic Pact, and called for an end to this attitude58, it must be noted that he also allowed himself to be involved, and participated like all the other members of Parliament and political leaders. Moreover, the ideological factor had always been massively present in Italian society and the Cold War — with Fulton's speech, with the Truman Doctrine and with the Cominform — had only expanded it on to a vaster scale. In substance, the ideological and cultural dimension (class concepts of politics - internationalism — imperialism) specific to the Italian Left, developed to an abnormal degree by the universal conflicts of the Cold War, spurred both Communists and Socialists to charge the Atlantic option with meanings that were also universal. As a consequence, it induced them not only to abandon their original plan for constructing a new national identity on the basis of an a priori compromise between different principles and values, but also to deem impossible the search for practical accord on political programmes, or on specific political objectives. For this reason — mirroring the attitude of the opposing ranks — the Left assumed the task of representing in its partiality the nation as a whole. Accordingly, each accusing the adversary of anti-nationalism, the duellers both slid in the direction of intense unitarianism which automatically barred them from considering themselves, and acknowledging themselves to be, parts of a whole. For the forces of the Left, the radicalization of the confrontation was a sort of protective ebb tide. Refuge was sought in the consolidation of a separate identity - counter-culture, counter-society and counter-world — which the different sectors of the Italian workers' movement had constructed in almost a century of history, and which only recently it had attempted to

Cf. P. Togliatti, Discorsi parlamentari, op. cit., p. 412.

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transcend. But this behaviour was harmful first of all to the Left itself. The exasperation of the opposition to the Atlantic option (viewed more in terms of taking sides than in those of content and alternative proposals) introduced an irremediable contradiction in their national strategy. In their concept of the national interest, the Leftist parties were theoretically much more ambiguous than they had been on the terrain of practical behaviour. This concept could be held in common — either wholly or in part — only within the framework of an ambience that was univocally ideologized, or united by previous agreement on basic issues. Conversely, the Italian reality did not fall within either of these two cases. It was on the contrary evolving, with the active contribution of the Leftist parties, toward growing political-ideological conflicts that were to place it in a position of clear-cut inferiority to the predominant array of forces. The isolation of all the major figures in national politics within their respective counter-worlds prevented any of them from acknowledging the real motivations of their opponents. The worsening of internal ideological splits, aggravated by the Cold War, rendered even more contradictory the contrast of interest and values — between which politics should, instead, have proposed to mediate — and irremediably blocked the process of cohesion between the anti-Fascist forces that had begun amidst great difficulties during the Resistance. By participating in this obstructionist process, the Left also contributed to delaying the maturing of a more comprehensive Italian national conscience. In this way the PCI and the PSI barred themselves, not from the founding of the 'new' Italy — in which they did instead participate decisively — but from further delineation of its characteristics as regards international affairs. The retreat of the Left into the defensive trench for the construction of a separate identity — a state of necessity, for the Communists; an opportunistic decision, for the Socialists — was in fact a constriction that nullified their already limited possibilities of positively influencing the general trends of Italian foreign policy. To present Italy's international problems in terms of an alternative to the majority choice of the Atlantic Pact and, subsequently, of European unity, eliminated any possibility of seeking a vaster national consensus over the basic decisions of Italian foreign policy, shifting the subject of debate on to the many specific implementations of these choices. It also produced another effect, whose significance is hard to measure precisely but which presumably had an effect on Italy's chances of occupying a less restricted space in the international system of the Fifties. The continuous bitter political and social conflicts marking the early part of that decade, triggered and further embittered by the struggle of the Left against the government's foreign policy, contributed to form the external

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image of a nation poorly united, weak and unreliable in its Western commitment, thus reducing still further the nation's power to negotiate while proportionally increasing the marginality and impotence of Italy's relations with its Atlantic partners. Nor, on the other hand, was this effect compensated for by any advantage obtained by Italy through the very limited influence that the two parties of the Left could exert on their party "brothers" or "friends" governing Eastern Europe. Thus in fact, head-on opposition to the Atlantic Pact entailed for the Left abandonment of the attempt to find points of sectorial or gradual convergence in Italy, without recompense of any kind (except that of ideological legitimation which, through fidelity to the Soviet myth, reinforced around the two parties the cohesion of the popular masses). It meant choosing to give testimony rather than to make policy; but, above all, it meant renunciation of encouraging, through a common cultural maturing process, the integration of the Socialist and Communist masses into the political system, and with this also the foundation of a more advanced national consciousness. This sanctioned the failure of the scheme to have the most important components of the nation converge on the major directions of its development. But since this had been the fundamental objective of the parties of the Left, it was precisely a question of their strategic defeat. The PSI was to attempt to remedy this situation starting from 1956, when the 'internationalist' incrustations that had been superimposed on its tradition and culture were to be swept away, and this opened the road towards new political experiences. The path taken by the PCI was instead to be, as initially stated, much slower and stickier.

The Italian Military and the Atlantic Pact by Leopolde Nuti

In his much quoted memoirs Dean Acheson told how during the ceremony for the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty the band of the Marine Corps played some tunes from Porgy and Bess, including It ain't necessarily so, which, Acheson believed, "added a touch of unexpected realism".1 Had De Gasperi and Sforza been familiar with Gershwin's masterpiece, they would have certainly agreed with the US Secretary of State, because during the previous months the Italian military and political leaders had painfully realized through a long and convoluted process that things were not necessarily as they expected them to be. In fact in the aftermath of the electoral success of April 18th, 1948, the Italian cabinet and the General Staff of the Army had reached the conclusion that they could base their defense policy on the unconditional military assistance of the United States: thus, for a short period at least, they did not deem it necessary to get involved in the construction of the alliance system which was then being discussed in the capitals of Western Europe. It was only a few months later, when they found out that the very premises of this policy were wrong, that the Italian leaders decided upon a revision of their previous course of action. The purpose of this paper is to outline the main trends of strategic thinking within the Italian General Staff in 1948, as well as to describe how the government and the military leaders believed they could build a realistic defense policy. Thus the first section of the paper briefly considers the direction of Italian military policies between 1945 and 1948, while a second section focuses upon the main threats to Italian security in 1948 and the relative countermeasures worked out by the General Staff. A final section deals with the increasing difficulties that the Italian leadership met in trying to obtain US military assistance.

Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation. My Years in the State Department (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 284.

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1. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War the High Command frankly acknowledged what had been demonstrated by the conflict. The war had shown how dramatically inferior Italy had been in the amount of material resources she could mobilize, and how, compared to the other countries at war, her industry had been unable to keep up the pace of production both from a qualitative and from a quantitative point of view. Moreover, the very course of the hostilities revealed how developments in technology had made possible operations hitherto regarded as very difficult, if not impossible, such as large scale landings of naval units or paratroopers, and how this had further compounded the problem of defending the country's frontiers, which from relatively safe had now become exposed, at least in theory, to attacks from all points of the compass. As if this were not enough, the country was emerging from a two-year civil war that had ravaged large parts of her territory, her relationship with the winning powers was still very ambiguous, and her economy was in such dire straits that it was difficult to forecast if, and when, it would ever return to its prewar levels of productivity. No wonder that most military thinking about the future of Italian defense capabilities showed a remarkable lack of optimism, as in the December 1945 report of the Italian Chief of General Staff, General Trezzani: in the present situation, both because of Allied coercion and because of our scarcity of means, it is useless to think that Italy might have such armed forces as to enable her to have an independent international life as well as to conduct a foreign policy based not only on rights alone, but also on military forces able to support them and protect them. We lack raw materials; our extremely modest war industry will have to be transformed into civil industry; our financial conditions prevent us from acquiring abroad the immense amount of supplies required by a modern army; nor do we have the financial resources for its maintenance. 2

Thus the Italian military leadership openly admitted that the country's armed forces would be, in the future, based on quality rather than on quantity, and that they would be small but efficient. According to a number of General Staff studies, their main purpose was to be either to guarantee the security of the national territory from limited aggressions or, in case of a major war, to defend it long enough to ensure the arrival of the reinforcements provided by 2

Linee fondamentali del futuro Esercito Italiano, [Basic Lines of the Future Italian Army], memo forwarded by the Chief of General Staff to the War Ministry and the Army Chief of Staff, December 23, 1945, in Archivio Ufficio Storico Stato Maggiore Esercito [Archives of the Army Historical Office; from now on, AUSSME], Diario Storico dello Stato Maggiore Generale, [Historical Diary of the General Staff] December 1945, annex φ 165. (Also reproduced in Leopoldo Nuti, L'E,sercito Italiano nel secondo dopoguerra. ].a sua ricostruztone e I'assistenza militare alleata, Rome 1989, as annex φ 5).

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the United Nations — or by those countries with whom the Italian government had established a relationship of military cooperation. From the awareness that Italy could not rely on a self-sufficient military structure stemmed the necessity of guaranteeing the overall security of the country through international cooperation. A consequence of an inveterate diplomatic tradition bent on seeking the support of powerful military allies, this policy was also the outcome of the complicated relationship between the Italian and the Allied armed forces during the so-called cobelligeranza. In the years that followed the end of the hostilities, in fact, the Western Allies remained for all purposes the main point of reference of Italian military policy, because at the end of 1945 the Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean was authorised by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to continue the wartime practice of supplying the Italian armed forces with allied surpluses3. Thus, even if the Allied governments imposed a number of formal restrictions on the development of Italian military forces in the clauses of the peace treaty, they were at the same time responsible for maintaining a bare minimum of military efficiency in Italy through the flow of supplies granted from November 1945 to May 1948. It is obvious, therefore, that the relationship with the Allies was regarded by the Italian military and political leaders as the keystone of any Italian defense policy. General Cadorna, Army Chief of Staff from 1945 to 1947, did not seem to have any doubts on this regard when he wrote: "without their [of the Allies] direct help we will never be able to rebuild a modern, efficient army" 4 .

The creation of a viable modern military structure, and ultimately the security of the country itself, seemed therefore to depend on the relationship that the Italian government was to develop with the Allies. While this point was firmly established, the form that such a relationship would take was not clear at all, and it was only in the second half of 1947 that it began to be closer to Italian expectations. In fact only after the British military assistance had been completely replaced by United States aid in the Summer of 1947 did the relationship between the Italian and the Allied armed forces lose those traits of stiff, suspicious tutorship that had been the hallmark of British supervision, all the more unpalatable to the Italians because some of the harshest clauses in the peace treaty had been introduced under British insistence. 3

4

CCS to SACMED (FAN 621), September 30, 1945, in National Archives, Washington (From now on, NAW), Record Group 165 (Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs), ABC 420 Italy (30 oct. 1943) Sec. 1-B. Appunto su una riunione al Ministero della Guerra, [Note on a Meeting at the War Ministry], December 10, 1945, quoted in Raffaele Cadorna, La riscossa, (Rome: Bietti, 1976), pp. 76 — 77.

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The transition from British to American military assistance, however, was neither easy nor straightforward: the problem became acute when the supplies from British military deposits in Italy were exhausted, because it then became necessary for the SACMED to determine whether to continue the assistance granted up to that time. Only with the utmost caution, and not without many contradictions, did the US military decide to take over the task of supervising the reconstruction of the Italian armed forces from the British.5 The US decision to do so was probably determined by the dissolution of the parliamentary coalition supporting the Italian government that led to the expulsion of the left wing parties from the cabinet in May 1947: these events strengthened the State Department's determination to back the first Italian postwar cabinet which did not rely on Communist support.6 In the next few months the deterioration of the international situation after the launching of the Marshall. Plan gave US efforts to strengthen the Italian armed forces a new urgency. Moreover the creation of the Cominform and the growing unrest fomented by the Italian Communists increased the fear that a revolutionary uprising might take place in between the final withdrawal of the Allied occupation troops in December 1947 and the 1948 Spring elections. In the second half of 1947 and early 1948, therefore, Italy and her armed forces were the object of careful concern on part of the Truman administration, which set up a number of initiatives ranging from propaganda to economic and military assistance to prevent an electoral victory of the left and to defeat an eventual revolutionary uprising.7 Thus by early 1948 growing American concern with the improvement of the Italian military set-up seemed to dovetail with Italian defence planning, which in turn reinforced the belief of the Italian government that Italy could count on almost unconditional military assistance from the US. 2. After this rather long introduction it is necessary to turn to how the problem of Italian security was perceived by the Italian General Staff in the early months of 1948, at the very time when the definition of a common strategy for containing Soviet expansionism was being debated in the other Western countries. To study the main ideas of the Italian General Staff I had to rely on records of curious origin, namely a number of studies drafted by the Offices of the Italian General Staff between April and May 1948 that 5

6

7

On this episode see Leopoldo Nuti, "Gli Alleati e la ricostruzione delle Forze Armate italiane (1945-1948)", in Ennio Di Nolfo, Romain Rainero, Brunello Vigezzi (eds.), L'ltalia e la politica di potenza in Europa, 1945-1950 (Milan: Marzorati, 1988), pp. 575-599. See James E. Miller, The United States and Italy, 1940-1950. The Politics and Diplomacy of Stabilization (Chapel Hill/London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1986), pp. 223 — 235. James E. Miller, "Taking Off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948", in Diplomatie History 7 (Winter 1983), pp. 35-56. Nuti, L'Esercito italiano pp. 125-131.

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cannot be found in any Italian archive but only (in their English translation) at the National Archives in Washington (and consulted thanks to the FOIA). As the US military attache wrote in the letter with which he sent those records to Washington, their value is rather limited, since the studies were prepared shortly before the elections of April 18th and were therefore conceived to put pressure on the Truman administration. Nevertheless these documents provide very useful information on the orientation of the Italian High Command, all the more interesting as many of the initiatives taken by the Italian military in the following months seem to follow their conclusions. These records can be regarded therefore as a sort of blueprint for the defense policies pursued by the Italian government after the elections of April 1948 and, though not wholly reliable, they are among the few available documents by which to verify the incomplete, partial information of other scarce primary sources about Italian military choices in 1948. The most important is probably the study titled "Potentialities of the situation of domestic security in Italy" which analyzes all the possible repercussions of the April 1948 elections.8 In case of a Communist defeat or, even worse, in case of a marginal victory in only one of the two Chambers, it forecast a whole range of reactions by the Communist party ranging from local riots and isolated armed uprisings to a general revolutionary insurrection supported by the armed intervention of the Eastern bloc and of Jugoslavia in particular. These conclusions were based on a number of detailed studies both of the paramilitary structure of the PCI — the so-called "apparato" — and of the aggressive capabilities of Jugoslavia, whose armed forces were described as able to carry on combined operations on the Adriatic coast as well as either infiltrations or attacks on a large scale along the Eastern frontier of Italy. The possibility of Jugoslav support would give an eventual uprising such strength that its repression would necessarily involve a full scale military operation. Moreover, the study assumed that it would be possible to contain the attack on the Eastern frontier only if the Jugoslav support was very limited: if the rioting covered large sections of the national territory and if it was supported by a large scale offensive of Jugoslav troops, the Italian armed forces would have to be concentrated in a position in order to maintain at all costs the control of the Thyrrenian region by defending the Apennine line between Tuscany and Emilia-Romagna. 9 8

9

Office of the Military Attache, American Embassy in Rome, to Director of Intelligence, GSUSA, Dept. of the Army: Italian General Staff Study, Potentialities Internal Security in Italy, 28 April 1948, in NAW, RG 319, P and Ο 091 Italy TS, Box 17 - Tab 21 - STAT. Part I, Probable Military Repercussions As Result 18 April Elections in Italy; Part II, Outline of the Organization of the Italian Communist Military Apparato; Part 111, Possibilities of Landings on the Adriatic Coast, in Italian General Staff Study, Potentialities Internal Security in Italy.

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The study concluded that the Italian armed forces had very limited capabilities to meet the double threat of both an insurrection and an attack on the Eastern frontier. The dispersion of troops over the national territory to preserve public order prevented the necessary concentration of forces for a defence of the Jugoslav border. In order to meet both tasks, the Italian army and the other services would therefore require substantial supplies of foreign equipment as well as the cooperation of the Allied occupation troops deployed in Austria and in the Free Territory of Trieste. The US Air Force, in particular, would have to bear the brunt of an eventual Jugoslav attack. If this cooperation could be counted upon, even the limited delaying action that could be performed by the Italian armed forces at the beginning of the hostilities would become more important, because it would contain the attack long enough to permit the arrival of the Allied reinforcements. The Allied forces in the FTT and in Carinthia, moreover, would pose a considerable threat on both flanks of the aggressor. The other studies forwarded by the Italian General Staff to Washington developed some of the topics only touched upon in the first document. One of them stressed the importance of the control over Italy for the Russian strategy in the Mediterranean in order both to disrupt the Allied lines of communication with the Middle East and to outflank the Allied forces in central Europe, and pose a direct threat to France.10 A later document, drafted by the end of April and sent to Washington by early May, briefly described the plans for rearming the Italian army and listed the corresponding requirements in arms and ammunition of US production needed to allow Italy to deploy 4 Corps of 12 divisions and 3 alpine brigades.11 By mid 1948 the main threat to Italian security was therefore regarded by the Italian General Staff as a subtle combination of insurrectional outbursts and real military operations, or as a sort of continuum going from limited local riots on the one hand to a general uprising supported by foreign intervention on the other. In the following months the terms of the problem were not substantially modified, and both the armed insurrection and the Jugoslav aggression remained the main hypotheses around which the Italian General Staff centered its defense planning. Even the schism between Moscow and Belgrade, apparent by the end of June 1948, did not lessen the danger of Office of the Military Attache, American Embassy in Rome, to Director of Intelligence, GSUSA, Dept. of the Army: Italian General Staff Studies, Function of Italy in the AngloAmerican Strategic Plan For the Mediterranean, 28 April 1948, in NAW, RG 319, P and Ο 091 Italy TS, Box 17 - Tab 21 - STAT. Office of the Military Attache, American Embassy in Rome, to Director of Intelligence, GSUSA, Department of the Army: Italian General Staff Study (Views on the Immediate Requirements of Arms of American Make in the Proposed New Organization-Ar my), 3 May 1948, in NAW, RG 319, P and Ο 091 Italy TS, Box 17 - Tab 21 - STAT.

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Jugoslav aggression in the eyes of the Italians, as they were convinced that either the break between the two communist states was a bluff or, if it was serious, that it would not last long because sooner or later the Stalinist wing of the Jugoslav communist party would regain the upper hand. As for the fears of a general uprising, the serious riots that followed the attempted assassination of Togliatti in the second half of July 1948, (which in some cases required the intervention of army units with tanks and armored cars) reinforced the belief of the political and military authorities that a masterplan for a national insurrection existed. With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to agree with writers who saw those riots as the passing of an era of revolutionary turmoil, but at the time the General Staff was very much concerned with a possible armed coup. A document drafted by the Office of Operations of the Army General Staff in early August 1948 clearly stated that the recent events undoubtedly reinforce the thesis of the existence of the insurrectional plan aiming at subverting the official powers of the State, and they also reveal something of its executive techniques, which reveals the full gravity of the situation that could arise if the whole plan were implemented. It seems that plan will entail: first, the provoking of isolated riots between masses of demonstrators and the police with the purpose of dividing and exhausting the security forces by forcing them to intervene in separate locations far apart; second, as soon as favorable conditions have been created, the intervention of the formations of the left-wing paramilitary apparato.12

This belief was strengthened to the point that at a meeting held in early August between members of the Ministries of the Interior and of Defence and top-ranking officers of the three services it was agreed that the closest coordination would be necessary to cope successfully with possible large scale disturbances. 13 What defense policy was made necessary by this configuration of possible threats to the security of the Italian state? Limited threats seemed to require limited responses, and to meet them the Italian General Staff regarded as more than sufficient the continuation of the informal relationship of military assistance developed between the United States and Italy in the previous months. The defence policy recommended by both the military and the government was therefore a very cautious, almost muffled, one: its main prerequisite was to verify whether further US military assistance could be obtained without the 12

13

Ministero della Difesa, Stato Maggiore Esercito-Ufficio Operazioni: Insegnamenti da trarre dai recenti disordini, 6 agosto 1948, in AUSSME, I 4, race. 59, cart. 10. Stato Maggiore della Difesa, 3° Sezione: Verbale della Riunione ehe ha avuto luogo U 12 agosto presso lo S.M. Difesa allo scopo di esaminare se le norme in vigore per I'ordine pubblico rispondano ad ogni esigenza e di proporre al ministro della difesa eventuali aggiunte o varianti, 24 agosto 1948, in AUSSME, 1-4, race. 59, cart. 10.

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clamor of a parliamentary debate. Such a policy would in fact protect the government from the attacks of the left wing parties and enable a substantial buildup of the Italian armed forces, and at the same time Italy would be spared the bother of trying to join an alliance such as the Brussels Pact. The latter, in fact, was regarded by the Italian cabinet as not only absolutely powerless from a military point of view, but also as dominated by the hegemony of Great Britain, a power whose relationship with Italy was still marred by a number of unsolved problems.14 Both the Italian and the US records allow a sufficiently detailed reconstruction of the ups and downs of this policy. In early May 1948 the information conveyed to the Italian General Staff through the US Embassy in Rome seemed to confirm the interest of the US in continuing military assistance to the Italian armed forces by mentioning the possibility of special credits for the procurement of warlike surplus material. On the basis of this information the General Staff began to formulate its first plans for the buildup of the Italian armed forces: for instance a document of July 1948 mentioned as possible sources for financing the future rearmament both part of the funds of the Marshall Plan (to be used to reinvigorate the production of the national military industry) and the concessions of US credits for the procurement of military surpluses.15 At the same time, key members of the government openly confessed their trust in the continuation of US military assistance, which, as De Gasperi said to Tarchiani, would allow "a de facto rearmament for the defence of the frontiers". 16 In early August further information provided by Col. Stilwell, the special military adviser to ambassador Dunn, seemed to confirm once more the availability of credits for Italian rearmament. 17 The future buildup was therefore taking the form of a flexible program which would enable the Italian government to improve the country's security through a multiplicity of financial sources, while awaiting the eventual outcome of discussions about a Western alliance. Writing in September to the Italian ambassadors in the main Western capitals, and commenting upon the current negotiations in Washing14

15 16

17

Italy tried in fact a very cautious approach to the British government to find out whether she was prepared to negotiate her participation in the Brussels Pact, which was rather abrubtly turned down by the Foreign Office: after that Italy maintained a rather aloof attitude toward the pact. The whole episode is described by Antonio Varsori, "La scelta occidentale dell'Italia (1948-1949)" [Italy's Western Choice, 1948-1949], in Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali, ns. 1 - 2 (1985): 95 - 159, 303 - 368. Trezzani to Pacciardi, July 27th, 1948, in AUSSME, Diario Storico SMD, July 1948. Alberto Tarchiani, Died anni tra Roma e Washington, (Verona: Mondadori, 1955), pp. 149 — 150. Zoppi to the Ministero della Difesa e allo Stato Maggiore Difesa, August 4th, 1948, in ASMAE, Direzione Generale Affari Politici, Italia 1948, b. 150, f. 1.

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ton relative to a possible alliance between the Brussels Pact, the United States and Canada, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Sforza, made the point that Italy might well consider her inclusion in such an alliance in the future, but that for the time being it was necessary to implement a policy that would enable the country to reach a satisfactory level of military security as soon as possible. The Italian ambassador in Washington, Alberto Tarchiani, was singled out by Sforza as the one who should negotiate the necessary agreements with the US to meet this objective. 18 De Gasperi and Sforza, in all probability, regarded this policy as perfectly compatible with the defence plans of the other Western countries: Sforza in particular seemed to believe that until Italy had substantially improved the quality of her fighting forces, a position of neutrality would be of mutual benefit both for Italy and for the Brussels Pact. Moreover this was to be a very sui generis kind of neutrality, based as it was not only on the supplies of US military surpluses, but also on the possibility of an informal coordination of the Italian defence plans with those of the other Western states. It was for this reason that in early October some key Italian military figures made informal overtures to their French and American counterparts: in Berlin General Efisio Marras met General Lucius P. Clay, Governor of the US occupation zone in Germany and Commander in Chief of all the US forces in Europe19, while at about the same time in Paris Admiral Maugeri, Chief of the Italian Naval Staff, visited the Chief of Staff of the French Army General Revers.20 In both cases, but in the first one in particular, the Italian officers tried to verify whether "an informal coordination" of the respective defence plans could be achieved, with specific reference to those of the Allied occupation troops in Austria and the Free Territory of Trieste. This complicated interweaving of informal, semi-official surveys and in fieri rearmament projects began to be questioned around mid-October 1948 because of news from Washington that seemed to deny the arrival of further US military supplies. On October 16 the State Department informed Ambassador Dunn that the request submitted by the Italian Navy in May for the 18

19

20

Sforza to Ambasciate d'ltalia a Washington, Parigi, l^ondra e Mosca, August 31, 1948, in ASMAE, Ambasciata di Londra 1861-1950, b. 1360, f. 1. The contrast between the Italian Ambassadors and Palazzo Chigi had already been highlighted by Mario Toscano, Appunti sui negoziati per la partecipazione dell'ltalia al Patto Atlantico, in Pagine di Storia diplomatica contemporanea, vol. II, Origini e vicende della seconda guerra mondiale, (Milan: Giuffre, 1963), pp. 445-519. Clay to Bradley, October 5th, 1948, and Clay to Marshall, October 15th, 1948, in The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, edited by Jean Edward Smith, (London/Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), pp. 891-892 and 906-907 respectively. Quaroni to Zoppi, October 4th, 1948, in ASMAE, Ambasciata di Parigi, 1948, b. 405, f. 1. See also Franco Maugeri, Ricordi di un marinaio (Milan: Mursia, 1980), pp. 289—293.

256

Leopolde Nuti

provision of radar equipment could not be met21, and almost at the same time Colonel Stilwell communicated to the Italian General Staff that the credits for the purchase of surplus material he had announced early in August had to be considered suspended at least for the time being.22 The General Staff summed up the situation in a memo: a) the issue of a "military build up" [presumably of Western Europe], by overlapping with that of "surplus" material, forces its slowing down since the United States are very cautious before making a decision, as they want to be sure about our intentions towards the Western Allies; b) the US Congress has still to implement the Vandenberg resolution concerning aid to the Western bloc, and this cannot take place before the election of the new President; c) the Congress is not inclined to grant us the "surplus" we asked for because first it wants to know the requirements of the other European countries interested in strengthening their armed forces; d) as Ambassador Tarchiani has pointed out, there is a remarkable amount of confusion between the departments involved [*] in the concession of surplus material.23

Thus the rejection of the Italian requests for military items, limited though they were, helped to clarify some of the ambiguities in the Italo-American relationship after the elections of April 18. Above all the Italian government had tried to develop a privileged relationship with the United States under the assumption that it could use American power for its own peculiar aims, while at the time the Truman administration was interested in harmonizing the Italian requests with those of the other European countries in a program as homogeneous and consistent as possible. Therefore Washington did not deem it possible to satisfy the individual requests of the European countries until a common program had been finally worked out. Partly because of the substantial failure of other initiatives of the Italian government on the European diplomatic scene24, the formulation of the Italian defence policy was then gradually revised. As a bilateral military relationship with the United States turned out to be much more difficult than anticipated, it became all the more necessary to find out what form the Alliance then being discussed by the Western countries would take, and above all whether such an alliance would satisfy those requirements for military assistance and mutual coordination of plans of operations that were the cornerstones of Italian defence. 21 22

23

24

Lovett to Dunn, October 16th, 1948, in FRUS, 1948, vol. Ill, pp. 806-807. Stato Maggiore Difesa-2° Sezione a Ministero Difesa, Gabinetto, October 14th, 1948, in AUSSME, Diario Storico SMD, 1948. Stato Maggiore Difesa-2° Sezione a Ministero Difesa, Gabinetto, October 14, 1948, in AUSSME, Diario Storico SMD, October 1948. See Varsori, "La scelta occidental del]'Italia", pp. 304-307.

The Italian Military and the Atlantic Pact

257

On this regard the Chief of the Intelligence Office of the Army Staff remarked in November: For purely military purposes it would be convenient if Italy could be included in the Atlantic Pact outside of the Brussels Pact, so that her military build up depended directly on the USA. Undoubtedly, in fact, if Italy were to join the Brussels Pact, even if this implies her automatic inclusion in the Atlantic Pact, the division of American assistance [sic] granted to the Western Union would be concentrated in the hands of Great Britain, who, leaving aside her interest in satisfying her own defense requirements first, is not, as is well known, very soft towards us.15

Inclusion in the Alliance became therefore the best possible way to obtain for Italy what had been taken for granted thanks to the existing relationship with the US, and had instead been suddenly put in doubt during the Fall of 1948. The Italian government was forced to a slow, gradual and above all very difficult revision of the course hitherto regarded as safe. The most important steps in this long turn, which eventually led to Italy's inclusion in the North Atlantic alliance, were both the parliamentary debate on the foreign policy motion introduced by the Socialist party and the mission of General Marras to the United States. In the former, the Italian government opened the way to a possible participation in the Alliance should Italian expectations be satisfactorily met26; thanks to the latter, a large amount of information was gathered concerning the alliance itself, the plans for military assistance that the Truman administration intended to implement, and the possibility of coordinating the operational plans of the Italian and American armed forces.27 During the interviews between General Marras and his US counterparts, in fact, General Schuyler of the US Army P and Division, clarified two basic issues to his Italian guest, while avoiding any specific commitment: 1) at that time the US government could not consider any request for military supplies because it was setting up a coordinated program of assistance for the Western European countries as a whole, and therefore requests from single countries would be met only in cases of the utmost necessity; 2) he personally shared Marras' approach to Italian defense planning, but so long as the Italian 25

26

27

Verbale deüa Riunione dei Capi Ufficio "l" presso lo SM Difesa [Minutes of the Meeting of the Chiefs of Intelligence Offices held at the Defense General Staff], November 15, 1948, in AUSSME, Diario Storico SMD, November 1948. On the Nenni resolution, sec Danilo Ardia, // Partita Socialista e il Patto Atlantico, (Milan: Angeli, 1976); on the instrumental purpose of the Giacchero resolution sponsored by the government, see llaria Poggiolini. "Europesimo degasperiano e politica estera dell'Italia: un'ipotesi interpretativa" in Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali, I, 1985, # 1, pp. 67 — 93. For a specific analysis of Marras' trip to the United States, see my "La Missione Marras, 2-22 dicembre 1948", in Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali, III, 1987, * 2, pp. 343-368.

258

Leopolde Nuti

foreign policy was somewhat ambiguous, no coordination of operational plans was deemed feasible.28 From these conversations both General Marras and Ambassador Tarchiani reached similar conclusions, even if there are different nuances in the way they described them to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Tarchiani, who openly favored the inclusion of Italy in an Atlantic defensive system, wrote to Sforza that the Washington talks between Marras and key members of the US Defense Department had clearly shown that only participation in an Atlantic pact would guarantee the actual security of Italy.29 Marras was more cautious: Italy might receive the necessary assistance for her defence "depending on her inclusion in the Brussels Pact, and on her following participation in the Atlantic Pact, otherwise in so far as the US was interested in the preservation of her domestic security".30 Although the available documentation does not allow us to identify the exact moment, it was probably by the end of December that De Gasperi and Sforza, thanks to the information provided by Marras as well as to the almost contemporary Cannes talks with the French, reached the conclusion that to meet the basic requirements of Italian defense policy some sort of connection with the alliance that was being set up had better being envisaged, rather than pursuing an unfruitful bilateral relation with the United States, that seemed to become more and more difficult.31 This conclusion does not intend to reduce the meaning of Italy's participation in the Atlantic alliance to the mere government's desire for continuing US military aid: that event was of such importance for the whole of Italian postwar history that it cannot certainly be interpreted only in such reductive terms. Nor does it intend to convey the idea that the inclusion of Italy was merely a one-sided affair, depending only on the whims of the Italian leaders, as it is well known that the final decision about Italy was made by President Truman at the very last moment, namely in early March 1949. The purpose of this paper is rather to draw attention to the role that this kind of military consideration might have played in shaping the final decision of the Italian government, in the light of the defense policy established by the Italian General Staff in the years between 1945 and 1948. The decision to base its security policy almost exclusively on US military assistance is also demonstrated by the absolute inertia of the Italian government 28

29 30

31

Final Discussions with General Marras, Chief of Staff, Italian Army, December 21st, 1948, in NAW, RG 319, P and Ο 091 Italy TS (Section III, Case 15 only, Book I, Sub* 1-10). Tarchiani to Sforza, December 21st, 1948, in ASMAE, Ambasciata di Parigi, 1948, b.411, f.2. Memorandum per il Signor Ministro degli Affari Esten, [Memo for the Minister of Foreign Affairs], December 28th, 1948, in ASMAE, Ambasciata di Parigi, 1949, b.444, f. 1. For the Cannes meeting, see Sforza's memoirs Cinque anni a Palazzo Chigi, (Rome: Atlante, 1951), pp. 103-105.

The Italian Military and the Atlantic Pact

259

in the months that followed the signature of the Treaty. While in fact the Truman administration was trying to persuade Western Europeans to even a modest increase of their defense expenditures, the Italian government was very reluctant at having to step up its budgetary allocations for defense, and preferred to wait for the assistance promised by the Mutual Defence Assistance Program (which, however, arrived much later, and initially in much smaller quantity, than expected, as the program had been submitted to quite a number of modifications). One may therefore understand De Gasperi's mood in July 1950, when, during the heated debate about rearmament that followed the outbreak of the Korean war, he bitterly complained in a letter to Defense Minister Pacciardi: I personally sustained within the majority [coalition] a long and harsh battle in favor of the Atlantic Pact: you may well understand that military assistance played some role in it.32

This disappointment cannot but remind one of the other tune that, still according to Dean Acheson, was played by the Marines Band on April 4, 1949, I've got plenty of nothing, that seems to reflect the reaction of the Italian government to the scant results achieved in the first few months of the Atlantic Pact.

Ά

De Gasperi to Pacciardi, July 14th, 1950, in De Gasperi scrive. Corrispondenza con capi di stato, cardinali, uomini politici, giornalisti, diplomatics, edited by Maria Romana De Gasperi, (Brescia: Morcelliana, 1981), pp. 278-281.

The Authors BRUNA BAGNATO is research associate in History of International Relations at the Faculty of Political Sciences of the University of Florence (Italy). OTTAVIO BARIE is professor of Contemporary History at the Faculty of Political Sciences of the Catholic University of Milan (Italy). BOLESLAW BOCZEK is professor of History of Eastern Europe at the Lyman L. Lemnitzer Center for NATO Studies of the Kent State University (U.S.A). MASSIMO DE LEONARDIS is researcher in History of International Relations at the Faculty of Political Sciences of the Catholic University of Milan (Italy). ENNIO Di NOLFO is professor of History of International Relations at the Faculty of Political Sciences of the University of Florence (Italy). SEVERING GALANTE is associate professor of History of Political Parties at the Faculty of Political Sciences of the University of Padua (Italy). LEOPOLDO NUTI is research associate in History of International Relations at the Faculty of Political Sciences of the University of Florence (Italy). RITCHIE OVENDALE is lecturer in International History at the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth (United Kingdom). PIETRO PASTORELLI is professor of History of International Relations at the Faculty of Political Sciences of the University of Rome (Italy). OLAV RISTE is Director of the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (Oslo) and professor of International History at the University of Bergen (Norway). GADDIS SMITH is professor of History at the Yale University (U.S.A). ANTONIO VARSORI is researcher in History of International Relations at the Faculty of Political Sciences of the University of Florence (Italy).

262

The Authors

CIES WIEBES is lecturer at the Department of International Relations and International Law of the University of Amsterdam (the Netherlands). NORBERT WIGGERSHAUS is a colonel and the Director of Research Group IV at the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt of Freiburg (Germany). BERT ZEEMAN is reference and acquisition librarian at the University Library of the University of Amsterdam (the Netherlands).

Index of Names Acheson, Dean, 54-57, 62, 68, 69, 70-71, 104, 106, 115 n, 120 n, 141, 143, 160, 162, 172 n, 176 n, 203-205, 247 n, 259 Achilles, Theodore, 28, 31 n, 167 n Adenauer, Konrad, 117 n, 124, 125 n Aga Rossi, Elena, 23 n, 24 n Agosti, Aldo, 225 n Alanbrooke Lord, 80, 176 n, 178 Alexander, Albert V., 32 n, 184-185, 189 Alexander, Harold (Earl of Tunis), 192 Alperovitz, Gar, 5 n Ambricco, Gaetano, 218 Ambrose, Stephen E., 21 n Andreotti, Giulio, 211 n, 220, 232 Ardia, Danilo, 3 n, 8, 9, 25 n, 222 n, 223 n, 227 n, 230 n, 236 n, 243 n, 257 n Ardigo, Achille, 212 Attlee, Clement R., 32n, 37n, 74, 77-79, 83, 176 n, 177-178, 182, 184, 198 n Auriol, Vincent, 30 n, 83 n, 92 n, 94 n, 97 n, 102 n, 105, 107, 109, 158 n Barie, Ottavio, 3 n, 10 n, 20, 45 n, 54 n, 68, 182n, 209 Barker, Elizabeth, 21, 26 n Bartlett, C, 178 n, 180 n Baylis, John, 25 n, 26 n, 33 n, 180 η, 196 n Beaufre, Andre, 206 n Bech, Joseph, 153 n Becker, Josef, 23 n, 24 n, 30 η, 111η, 112η, 116n Benes, Eduard, 90 Berard, Armand, 91, 100, 102, 103, 121 n Bergh, Trond, 138 n Berlinguer, Enrico, 220 Bevin, Ernest, 10-11, 21, 25 n, 26, 27, 2829, 32 n, 37, 39, 42-45, 49, 52, 53, 55, 61-63, 72-79, 83, 84, 87-90, 94, 115n, 122 n, 123, 130, 132, 149, 150, 151, 152154, 156-157, 162, 172 n, 176 n, 178, 180, 181, 182, 185, 186, 187, 189, 205-206 Bidault, Georges, 25, 31 n, 32 n, 36, 37 n, 52, 65, 74, 76, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 90, 91,

92, 94, 95, 97 n, 99, 100 n, 101 - 102, 103 n, 105 n, 108 n, 109 n, 118 n, 119, 149, 151, 157, 206 Bidault, Suzanne, 84 n Billotte, Pierre-Gaston, 35 n, 79, 80-83, 84, 104 n, 108 Bismarck, Otto von, 112 Bitsch, Marie-Therese, 38 n Blacker, G. P. D., 32 n Blankenhorn, Herbert, 117n Blidberg, Kresti, 127 n, 133 n, 135 n, 136 n, 137 n, 139n Boczek, Boleslaw A., 169 n Bohemann, Erik C., 140 n Bohlen, Charles E., 42, 51, 53, 93, 100, 121 n, 203 Bonazzi Mme, Chantal de Tourtier, 84η Bonnet, Henri, 52, 54-55, 88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 97, 98, 99 n, 100, 101, 102 n, 104, 105, 106, 121, 141, 190 n, 191, 196 n Boon, Hendrik, 29 n, 151 Bradley, Omar, 98, 186, 191, 193 n, 198, 255 n Brebner, J. B., 65 Breccia, Alfredo, 3 n Briand, Aristide, 70, 109 Bronfenbrenner, Uri, 165 n Brosio, Manlio, 190 n Brouwer, Jan Willem, 149 Brownrigg, T. M., 32 n Buchheim, Hans, 114n Bullock, Alan, 19, 26 n, 31 n, 74, 76, 151 n, 162 n Byrnes, James F., 7, 148 - 149

Cadorna, Raffaele, 249 Caffery, Jefferson, 30 n, 65, 85, 89, 99 Canavero, Alfredo, 228 n, 242 n Cappi, Giuseppe, 239 Cappugi, Renato, 218 Carlgren, Wilhelm, 127 n Carrel, Andre, 109 n Chamberlain, Neville, 61, 63, 73 Chariot, Jean, 28 n

264 Chase, W. N., 167 n Chauvel, Jean, 31 n, 89, 90, 91, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98 n, 99, 103, 107, 119 n, 190 n, 191 Chifley, J. B., 78 Churchill, Winston S., 27, 73, 77, 198 n Clay, Lucius P., 205 n, 255 Clawson, Robert W., 165 n Clemmesen, Michael H., 129 n, 131 n Cockburn, Andrew, 202 n Condit, Kenneth W., 33 n, 180 n, 188 n, 197 n, 198 n, 200 n, 202 n, 202 n Connally, Tom, 56, 69, 70 Conolly, Richard, 183 Coolsaet, Rik, 29 n Cooper, Alfred Duff, 37, 186 Cornides, Wilhelm, 192 n Corsini, Umberto, 210, 211 n Courtade, Pierre, 109 n Crosthwaite, Moore P., 181 n, 182 n Cunningham of Hyndhope Lord, 176 n, 188n Cunningham, Sir John H. D., 32 n, 34 n, 38 n, 74, 178n, 184, 185, 188n, 189n, 194n, 205 Curiel, Eugenio, 226 n Damilano, Andrea, 210 n Darwin, J., 199 n De Cocci, Danilo, 218 De Gasperi, Alcide, 209-211, 212, 213, 214, 216, 220, 226 n, 232-233, 236, 243, 247, 254-255, 258,259 De Gasperi, Maria Romana, 259 n Del Bo, Dino, 213 n, 215, 216, 217-218 Delmas, Jean, 24 n, 39 n Denfeld, Louis E., 188 Denisov, Y., 169 n Di Capua, Giovanni, 211, 212, 213, 216 n, 218 n Dilks, David, 26 n, 115 n Di Nolfo, Ennio, 3 n, 20, 71, 190 n, 210, 21 I n , 224 n, 225 n, 227 n, 228 n, 23 I n , 250 n Dockrill, Michael, 19 n Doise, Jean, 20 n Donnell, Forrest C., 69 Dossetti, Giuseppe, 211 -212, 214, 216218 Douglas, Lewis, 75, 89 Dulles, John Foster, 69, 114 Dumoulin, Michel, 149 n Dunn, James C., 254, 256 n

Index of Names Durand, Jean Dominique, 210, 211 n Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste, 36 η, 110η Eastland, James O., 167 n Eden, Anthony, 146 Ehrhardt, Hans-Georg, 11 I n Eisenhower, Dwight David, 38, 80 Elgey, Georgette, 85 Eriksen, Kurt E., 131 n, 133 n, 140 n Etzold, T. H., 179 n, 188 n, 195 n, 196 n, 197 n, 202 n, 203 n Evangelista, Μ. Α., 202 n Fedele, Santi, 230 n Fejto, Francois, 30 n Ferro, Max, 107 Fischer, Alexander, 113n Fitzmaurice, John, 168 n Foerster, Roland G., 20 n, 123 n Folly, Martin H., 160 n Formigoni, Guido, 211, 212 n, 214 n, 217, 218 Forrestal, James, 188 n, 194, 196 Fortunato, Giustino, 227 Foschepoth, Josef, l l l n , 116 n Franco, Francisco, 107 Frank, Robert, 83 n Franks, Sir Oliver, 49 n, 52 n, 74, 78 Franks, Lady, 78 Fr ser of North Cape, Lord, 194 n Fremaux, Jacques, 85 n, 119 n, 122 n Frohn, Axel, llln Gaddis, John Lewis, 21, 22, 179 n, 188 n, 195 n, 196 n, 197 n, 202 n, 203 n, 205 n Galante, Severino, 3 n, 222 n, 224 n, 227 n, 229 n, 235n Gambino, Antonio, 230 n Gardner, Richard N., 27 n Gaulle, Charles de, 28, 30, 42, 79 - 80, 206 Gentile, Emilio, 242 n Georges, Walter, 56 Gerhardsen, Einar, 131, 138 Giacchero, Enzo, 257 n Gilson, Etienne, 108 Gimbel, John, 5,7, 8n, 24 n Giolitti, Giovanni, 242 n Girault, Rene, 30 n, 83 π Gorbachev, Mikhail S., 17 n Goris, 147 n Gorky, M., 165 n

265

Index of Names Gramsci, Antonio, 227 Greenwood, Sean, 148 Gronchi, Giovanni, 216-218, 232 Grosser, Alfred, 20 η, 115η, 119 n, 120 n, 204 n Gruben, Herve de, 29 n Guerrieri, Filippo, 218 Gui, Luigi, 212, 218 Guillaume, Jean, 150 n Guillen, Pierre, 35 n, 39 n, 83 n, 190 n, 195 n, 198 n, 200 n Gullo, Fausto, 232 Hamilton, Nigel, 32 n, 33 n, 178 n, 182 n, 183 n, 186 n, 191 n, 192 n, 193 n, 199 n, 201 n, 202 n, 206n Hankey, Sir Maurice, 140 Hanrieder, Wolfram, 125 n Harmon, Hubert R., 196 Harriman, Averell, 65, 116 n, 118 n Harris, Kenneth, 37 n Harrison, 150 n Harvey, Sir Oliver, 37, 38 n, 99 n Hauge, Jens C., 132, 135 Hautecloque, Jean de, 31 n Hedtof, Hans, 130, 139 Heindel, Richard H., 172 n Henderson, Loy W., 167 n Henderson, Sir Nicholas, 69, 74, 158, 167 n Henningsen, Sven, 139 n Herbst, Ludolf, 125 n Hetland, Tom, 137 n Hickerson, John, 28, 31 n, 43, 47, 51, 53, 55 — 56, 61, 68, 102, 104, 162 n Hillgruber, Andreas, l l l n , 112η, 114η, 116η Hirsch, 29 n Hitler, Adolf, 61-62, 64, 144, 216 Hogan, Michael J., 24 n Hollis, Sir Leslie, 32 n, 34 n Hoist, J. J., 142 n Howard, Michael, 27 n, 174 n Hoyer-Millar, Frederick, 150 n Hudd, 161 n Hulley, Benjamin M., 156 n Inverchapel, Lord, 28, 29 n, 63 n, 74, 76, 94, 119 n, 120 n, 185n Ireland, Timothy P., 19, 33 π Isaacson, W., 28 n

Jacquet, L. G. M., 159 n Jaujard, Robert, 192 Jebb, Sir Gladwyn, 32 n, 49, 52, 77, 156, 161 n, 180n Jochen, Paul, 167 n Johnson, Louis, 193, 204 Juin, Alphonse, 191 n, 192 Kalijarki, Thorsten V., 172 n Kan, Aleksander, 137 n Kaplan, Lawrence S., 11, 19, 20 n, 28 n, 33 n, 34 n, 39 n, 48, 50, 102 n, 163 n, 165 n, 167 n, 171 n, 172 n, 173 n, 200 n, 201 n, 204 n, 205 n, 206 Keiderling, Gerhard, 166 n Kellog, Frank Billings, 70, 109 Kennan, George F., 24 n, 28, 42-43, 51, 5253, 66,68, 165 n, 203 Kent, John, 19 n Kersten, A. E., 145 n Kirk, Alan G., 31 n, 149 n Kirkpatrick, Sir Ivone, 34 n, 52, 182 n, 186 n, 205 Knapp, Manfred, 112n, 113n Knipping, Franz, 22 n, 24 n, 30 n Kolko, Gabriel, 5 Kolko, Joyce, 5 Komissarov, Y., 169 n Kukanov, M., 166 n, 167 n Kulski, W. W., 170 n, 171 n, 172 n, 174 n Lacroix-Riz, Annie, 36 n La Gorce, Paul-Marie de, 200 n Lanaro, Silvio, 221 n Lange, Halvard, 105, 130, 132, 136, 137-138, 176 n Lattre de Tassigny, Jean de, 35 n, 38 n, 187 n, 192, 193, 194 n, 195, 199, 201 n, 202, 205, 206 Le Ghait, 147 n Lenin, Vladimir Ilic Ulianov, 222 Leonardis, Massimo de, 10 n, 13, 20 n, 22 n, 33 n, 45 n, 182 n, 187 n, 189 n, 190 n, 191 n, 193 n, 205 n Liddell Hart, Sir Basil, 27 n Lie, Haakon, 131, 132, 135 n Lie, Trygve, 145 Link, Werner, 112n, 113n, 114n, 115n, 125 n Lippmann, Walter, 72 Lodge, Henry Cabot, 70

266 Lombardi, Riccardo, 223, 230 Loridan, Walter, 29 π Loudon,146, 147 n Louis, William R., 177 n Lovett, Robert, 28n, 29η, 31η, 51, 52-53, 63, 66-67, 69, 77, 94, 99-100, 120 n, 121 η, 185,256η Lundestad, Geir, 64 n, 136 n Mackenzie King, William Lyon, 76 Maclean, Donald, 76, 156, 167 Mai, G nther, 115η, 118η, 122η Maier, Klaus A., 123 π Mammarella, Giuseppe, 20 n Manning, Adrien, 159 n, 161 n Marinin, M., 171 η, 173η Marras, Efisio, 104, 213, 255, 257, 258 Marshall, George C., 10, 24, 25 n, 28 n, 35 n, 45, 51, 63-64, 66, 68-69, 72-77, 80, 83-85, 86, 87, 88, 90, 92, 94-95, 101, 106, 115, 116 n, 119, 121, 150-151, 181, 191, 192 n, 195 n, 213,255η Mattel, Andre, 85 n, 119 n, 122 n, 129 n Massigli, Rene, 31 n, 37 n, 94 n, 97, 98, 102 n, 193 n Matthews, Freeman H., 62 n Maugeri, Franco, 255 McCloy, John J., 117 McNeil, Hector, 32η, 38η, 153η Melandri, Pierre, 20, 83 η, 155 Messerschmidt, Manfred, 123 n Michelet, Edmond, 80 Michiels, 155 Millard, Hugh, 152 n, 153 n, 155 Miller, James E., 250 n Mills, G. A., 32 n Milward, Alan S., 24 n Modica, M., 226 n Molotov, Vyacheslav, 63, 77, 99, 151 Montgomery, Bernard Law (Viscount of Alamein), 13, 24η, 32, 33, 38, 61, 75, 80, 178, 182, 183, 184-185, 186, 189, 191193, 194 π, 198 π, 199, 201η, 202, 205-206 Monticone, Alberto, 210 Morgan, Sir William, 83 - 84 Murphy, Robert, 116η, 117-118 Muzzi, Giuseppe, 225 n Nenni, Pietro, 216, 222, 223, 224, 226, 231, 232, 236, 237, 239, 240, 243, 244, 257 n

Index of Names Nichols, Sir Philip, 38 n Nitze, Paul, 202 Noack, Paul, 112n Nuti, Leopoldo, In, 104n, 190n, 213n, 248n, 250 n Ovendale, Ritchie, 19, 22 n, 73, 78, 178 n Pacciardi, Randolfo, 254 n, 259 n Park, Wesley, 191 n, 202 n Parodi, Alexandre, 107 Pastorelli, Pietro, In, 209n, 21 In, 213n Patton, George, 38 Pearson, Lester B., 120 n, 121 n, 122 n, 161 n, 162 n, 204 n Petersen, Nikolaj, 21, 29 n Pharo, Helge Ο., 129η Piccioni, Attilio, 212-213, 216 Pitt, Sir William, 177 Pleven, Rene, 122 Poggiolini, Ilaria, 257 n Pogue, F. C, 7n, 9n Poidevin, Raymond, 20 n, 36 n, 38 n, 115 n, 116n, 118n, 125 n, 152n, 159 n, 190n Poole, W. S., 197 n Quaroni, Pietro, 191, 255 n Rahn, Werner, 123 n Rainero, Romain H., In, 190n, 211 n, 224n, 227 n, 228 n, 250 n Ramadier, Paul, 102, 107, 181, 191 n Rapelli, Giuseppe, 218 Rassov, Peter, 112n Reber, Samuel, 28 n Reid, Escott, 10 n, 19, 33 n, 46, 70, 73, 121 n, 143 n, 159 n, 160, 167 n, 204 n Rendel, Sir George, 38 n Repgen, Konrad, 211 n Reuchlin, Otto, 158 Revers, Georges, 24 n, 30 n, 109, 181 -182, 186 n, 191 n, 199,255 Reynolds, David, 27 n Ridgway, Matthew, 83 - 85 Riste, Olav, 20, 83 n, 85 n, 119n, 128 n, 129 n, 145 n, 174 n Ritchie, C. S. A., 121 n, 122 n Riviere, Jean, 160 n Robb, Sir James, 34 n, 192 Roberts, Frank, 75 — 77

267

Index of Names Robertson, 161 n Romita, Giuseppe, 223, 236 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 5, 15, 43 Rose, Clive, 174 n Rosecrance, R., 200 n, 204 n Roselli, Enrico, 213, 216, 218 Rosenberg, D. A., 188 n, 196 Rossi, Mario G., 229 n Rossini, Giuseppe, 209 n Rothwell, Victor, 25 n, 44 Rotschild, Robert, 158 Rurni, Giorgio, 211, 214 Santarelli, Ezio, 221 n, 226 n Sargent, Sir Orme G., 122 n, 181 n, 182 n Scelba, Mario, 233 Schnabel, J. F., 179 n, 202 n Schroder, Hans J rgen, 115 n, 125 n Schumacher, Kurt, 126 Schuman, Robert, 36, 55, 82-83, 103, 104 n, 105, 107, 109-110, 120, 192 n, 193 Schuschnigg, Kurt Edler von, 90 n Schuyler gen., 257 Scoccimarro, Mauro, 235 n Sebesta, Lorenza, 196 n, 200 n Serra, Enrico, 36 n Seydoux de Clausonne, ΡΓ3ηςοΐ5, 116η Sforza, Carlo, 213 n, 214, 236, 247, 255, 258 Sherwen, Nicholas, 70 n Shlaim, Avi, 35 n Silvercruys, Robert, 31 n, 158, 159 Slessor, Sir John, 99 n Slim, Sir William, 194 n SIcodvin, Magne, 130 n, 132 n, 133 n, 134 n, 135 n, 136 n, 137 n, 139 n Smets, Paul F., 146 n Smith, Jean Eduard, 255 n Smith, Timothy E., 160 n Smith, Walter Bedell, 63, 77, 99, 167 Snoy et d'Oppeurs, Jean-Charles, 31 n Sokolovsky, Vassily Danilovitch, 12 Spaak, Paul-Henri, 29, 31 n, 42, 92, 143, 145, 146, 147, 148 n, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 155, 157, 158, 159-160, 161 n, 162, 190 n Spriano, Paolo, 225 n Staercke, Andre de, 128 n, 139 n, 145 n, 159 n Stalin, Josef Visarionovic Dzugasvily, 6, 12, 22, 24-25, 29, 62, 90 n, 104, 109 n, 164, 165 n, 166 Stapleton, D. C., 182 n

Steininger, Rolf, 114n Stengers, Jean, 29 n, 152 n, 153, 154 n, 155 n Stilwell, Richard G., 254, 256 Stikker, Dirk Uipko, 143, 159, 160 n, 161, 162 St. Laurent, Louis, 73, 77 Stone, 158 n St rmer, Michael, l l l n , 112n Sulzberger, Cyrus Leo, 122 π Taddei, Francesca, 225 n, 240 n Tamburrano, Giuseppe, 237 n Tamnes, Rolf, 129 n, 137 n Tarchiani, Alberto, 55, 254, 255-256, 258 Taviani, Paolo Emilio, 218 Taymans, Roger, 158 Tedder, Lord Arthur, 32 n, 176 n, 184-186, 199 n Teitgen, Pierre-Henri, 65 Templer, Sir Gerald, 34 n Thomas, E., 28 n Thomas, Hugh, 23 n Thorez, Maurice, 109 n Tho , Bruno, 123 n Tito, Josip Broz, 12, 49, 164 Togliatti, Palmiro, 17, 222 n, 223, 224, 225 226, 228 n, 230, 232, 233, 238-239, 240 n, 243, 244, 253 Toscano, Mario, 213, 255 n Trezzani, Giovanni, 248, 254 n Truman, Harry S., 12, 28, 31, 33, 46, 48, 53, 56, 61, 65, 68, 72, 76-78, 83, 86, 87, 8990, 106, 120, 157, 159, 188 n, 195, 200 n Turner, H., 130 n, 134 n Unden, Osten, 130 Vaerno, Grethe, 168 n Vaej, Robert, 158 Va'isse, Maurice, 20, 25 n, 30 n, 31 n, 39 n, 83 n, 190 n, 193 n, 206 n Van Boetzelaer van Oosterhout, Carol G. W., 149, 151, 152, 153, 159, 161 n Vandenberg, Arthur, 14, 35 n, 48, 56, 61, 6970,77 Vandenberg, Hoyt, 196 Van Harinxma Thoe Sloeten, Binnert B. P., 149 n Van Kleffens, Eelco Nicolaas, 144, 145, 146, 147, 155, 157-159, 160 n, 161 n, 172 n Van Langenhove, Ferdinand, 29 n, 146

268

Index of Names

Van Roijen, J. H., 157 n, 161 n Van Tichelen, J., 31 n Varsori, Antonio, I n , 13, 20n, 25n, 30n, 31 n, 33 n, 34 n, 36 n, 63, 83 n, 182 n, 190 n, 191 n, 199 n, 206 n, 209 n, 254 n, 256 n Vezzosi, Elisabetta, 211, 218 n Vigezzi, Brunello, I n , 20, 182n, 190n, 209, 211 n, 213, 224 n, 227 n, 228 n, 250 n Vreede, Gees, 158 Vishinsky, Andrei, 171 n

Wilcox, Francis O., 172 Wilhelm II, Kaiser, 61 Willequet, Jacques, 146 n Willis, Frank Roy, 116 n Wilson, Glee E., 165 n Wilson, Woodrow, 61, 68, 70 Wolfers, Arnold, 191 n Wright, 77 Wrong, Hume H., 162 n

Wahlback, Krister, 140 n, 141 n, 169 n Walker, J. S., 77 Wall, Irwin M., 30η, 31η, 106η Wallace, Henry, 171 η Warner, Geoffrey, 19, 22, 27η Watt, Donald Cameron, 19 n, 22 n Wedemayer, Albert C., 35 n Wiebes, Gees, 46 n, 76-77, 144 n, 152 n, 156 n, 162

Yergin, Daniel, 24 n, 51 n Young, John W., 19 n, 22 n, 25 n, 26 n, 37 n, 148, 150 n Zanibelli, A., 239 n Zeeman, Bert, 46 n, 76-77, 144 n, 152 n, 156 n, 162n Zoppi, Vittorio, 254 n, 255 n

W DE

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