The Armies of East Asia: China, Taiwan, Japan, and the Koreas 9781588261816

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THE ARMIES OF EAST ASIA

THE ARMIES OF EAST ASIA China, Taiwan, Japan, and the Koreas DENNIS VAN VRANKEN HICKEY

b o u l d e r l o n d o n

Published in the United States of America in 2001 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com

and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU

© 2001 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Hickey, Dennis Van Vranken. The armies of East Asia : China, Taiwan, Japan, and the Koreas. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-55587-992-6 1. East Asia—Armed Forces. 2. East Asia—Strategic aspects. I. Title. UA832.5.H53 2001 355'0095—dc21 00-069041

British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America

∞

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.

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To Dad, Mom, and Papa

Contents

Acknowledgments

ix

1 U.S. Interests and Flashpoints of East Asia

5

Introduction

2 The Japanese Military 3 The Chinese Military

1

35

69

4 The Taiwanese Military

119

5 The South Korean Military

169

6 The North Korean Military

195

7 Conclusion

225

243 265 273

Bibliography Index About the Book

vii

Acknowledgments n preparing this manuscript, I’ve benefited from the advice and support of many friends, colleagues, and associates. I would especially like to thank Byron Stewart, Tammy Stewart, Willa Garrett, Lynn Cline, and the entire staff of Southwest Missouri State University’s Duane Meyer Library for their help in obtaining numerous materials relevant to this study. I also would like to thank the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange. Without the foundation’s generous support, I would not have been able to travel to China, Taiwan, and Japan during my sabbatical in 1998. Southwest Missouri State University provided financial support that helped me return to East Asia in 1999 and 2000, and I am most grateful for this assistance. I would also like to express my gratitude to the friends in Beijing, Shanghai, Taipei, and Tokyo who helped arrange interviews with various officials, scholars, and businesspeople over the course of the past several years. These discussions proved most enlightening—even those that were conducted on the condition that I guarantee the anonymity of the person interviewed. A special note of thanks goes to Pauline Woods, administrative secretary of the Department of Political Science at Southwest Missouri State University, for her help in editing the manuscript. It is my sincere hope that she never retires. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Cheng-May, for her patience, endurance, and suggestions while I completed this project. Her insights, assistance, and humor are also most appreciated. Without her guidance, I probably would be lost somewhere in China or Japan. Worse, I may never have left Austin, Texas. Despite the best efforts and advice of friends and colleagues, errors undoubtedly remain in the text. In expressing appreciation for their advice and support, I do not mean to suggest that any of the above individuals or institutions agree with the ideas in this book. I assume sole responsibility. —Dennis Van Vranken Hickey

I

ix

Introduction

n recent decades, many of the countries of East Asia have transformed themselves from backward, agrarian societies into major economic powers. In fact, the region’s economic growth has been astonishing. For example, China now enjoys one of the fastest growing economies in the world and Japan has the world’s second-largest economy. Most East Asian nations appear to have recovered from the financial crisis that rocked the region several years ago. In addition to this remarkable drive toward development, East Asia is experiencing profound political change. Taiwan and South Korea have managed to transform themselves from authoritarian states into full-fledged democracies. In both countries, opposition candidates have been elected to the presidency. Even China now appears to be experimenting with political reforms in the countryside. Perhaps equally surprising, the leaders of South Korea and North Korea held a remarkable summit in June 2000. This meeting has rekindled hopes for a peaceful settlement of the thorny Korean reunification issue. Today, the Western Pacific is more peaceful, stable, and prosperous than at any time in its history. At the same time, however, defense spending is on the rise. According to some estimates, the region’s defense expenditures are poised to overtake those of the Middle East. This study seeks to shed light on the military buildup in East Asia. Chapter 1 provides readers with a broad discussion of the U.S. ties to the Western Pacific and examines U.S. security policy toward the region. The chapter also provides a general overview of several “flashpoints” that could lead to armed conflict in East Asia. Despite the changes in inter-Korean relations, the most serious threat to peace and stability remains the Korean Peninsula. However, tensions over the socalled Taiwan question have escalated markedly in recent years. Another challenge to regional security may be found in the South China

I

1

2

The Armies of East Asia

Sea. China is asserting its claims of sovereignty over the region by improving existing facilities in the area and constructing new ones. The next five chapters provide an in-depth analysis of the armed forces of Japan, China, Taiwan, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and the Republic of Korea (ROK). Each chapter begins with an examination of a state’s basic defense policy. Strategies, tactics, and societal roles are explored.1 A discussion of each military’s structure, composition, and organization follows. An emphasis is placed upon the efforts by these governments to modernize their respective land, sea, and air forces and take advantage of the so-called revolution in military affairs. Finally, each chapter concludes with an examination of the major security issues confronting a state. Problems relating to trade, proliferation, ballistic missile defense, territorial disputes, sovereignty, and a host of other issues are analyzed. Chapter 7, the concluding chapter, discusses some of the common trends and characteristics shared by the militaries examined in preceding chapters. The author suggests that while some regional developments appear encouraging, the potential for conflict remains very real. In fact, the steady accretion of military power in East Asia represents in and of itself a significant challenge to regional—perhaps even global— peace and stability. Recommendations for U.S. policymakers follow. These range from a call for Washington to convene a series of highprofile arms reduction conferences to a strong recommendation that the United States continue to seek to forge a constructive and stable relationship with China. It is fair to say that the military capabilities of the armies in East Asia are growing significantly. This represents a challenge for both academics and practitioners interested in the fields of comparative security studies, East Asian politics, and U.S. foreign policy. It is the author’s hope that this modest study may provide them with a better understanding and appreciation of these trends and thereby help to promote peace and stability in the Western Pacific. Notes

1. Like many other terms and concepts employed in international relations, “strategy” is a word that is subject to multiple interpretations. For the purpose of this study, a broad definition seems appropriate. Military strategy may be defined as “the employment of armed forces to achieve military and

Introduction

3

political objectives.” See Samuel B. Gardiner, “Fundamental Strategic Concepts, Strategists and Their Ideas on War,” in George Edward Thibault, ed., The Art and Practice of Military Strategy (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1984), p. 44.

1 U.S. Interests and Flashpoints of East Asia n terms of foreign policy, the United States has focused traditionally on European affairs. For much of its history, this Eurocentric orientation made sense: until recently, most Americans had come from Europe, and the United States traded primarily with European nations and the region was widely acknowledged as the most strategically important area on the globe. As the United States enters the new millennium, however, no region is more important to U.S. interests than the Asia-Pacific region. This chapter examines the United States’ burgeoning national interests in the Western Pacific and its basic security policy toward the region. It also provides an overview of the three flashpoints judged most likely to spark military conflict in the region—the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea—and U.S. policy toward each of these trouble spots.

I

U.S. National Interests in the Asia-Pacific Region

The United States has fundamental, enduring interests in the Western Pacific. With several states bordering the Pacific Ocean and one state (Hawaii) surrounded by it, the nation itself is a Pacific power. Roughly one-half of the world’s population lives in the region, and an increasingly large number of Americans (over 7 million) trace their ancestry back to the Pacific Rim. The United States has fought three major wars against aggression in Asia during this century, and the world’s three largest nuclear powers rub shoulders in Northeast Asia. Perhaps what is most significant is that a majority of the world’s economic activity now is conducted in the Asia-Pacific region. A U.S. Department of State study has concluded that “the East Asia and Pacific region is the world’s most economically dynamic area.”1 5

6

The Armies of East Asia

Despite the Asian economic meltdown of the late 1990s, no one can dispute the fact that East Asia has experienced phenomenal growth in past decades. With the exception of the DPRK, each of the countries discussed in this study has enjoyed extraordinary growth in their gross domestic product (GDP). China’s average annual rate of GDP growth is particularly impressive (Tables 1.1 and 1.2). According to some estimates, the country now boasts the fastest growing economy in the world. U.S. commercial interests in East Asia first became evident when the clipper ship Empress of China sailed into Canton more than two centuries ago. Since that time, the United States has experienced an important shift in its trade patterns. The Asia-Pacific region has surpassed Western Europe to become the United States’ largest regional trading partner, and countries situated in East Asia now are among the Table 1.1

Japan China Taiwan ROK DPRK

Real Gross Domestic Product in Selected Countries, 1970–1997 (billions of 1996 $U.S.)

1970

1196 513 40 72

1980

1859 887 98 158

1990

2780 2150 199 387

1992

2931 2682 228 444

1993

2925 3044 242 470

1994

2946 3427 258 510

1995

2984 3787 273 556

1996

3106 4154 289 595 21a

1997

3134 4520 308 631 21.8a

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Handbook of International Economic Statistics, 1998 (February 1999) on the World Wide Web at http://www.cia.gov/cia/di/products/hies/index. html Note that the CIA’s GDP estimates are based on purchasing power parity calculations rather than conversions at currency exchange rates. Note: a. Due to the secretive nature of the DPRK regime, reliable GDP is unavailable. 1996 estimates are provided by Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, on the World Wide Web at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/kn.html

Table 1.2

Japan China Taiwan ROK

Average Annual Rate of GDP Growth in Selected Countries, 1971–1997

1971–80 1981–90 4.5 5.6 9.4 8.2

4.1 9.3 7.4 9.3

1992

1.1 14.2 6.5 5.1

1993

–0.2 13.5 6.2 5.9

1994

0.7 12.6 6.5 8.6

1995

1.3 10.5 6.0 8.9

1996 4.1 9.7 5.7 7.1

1997 0.9 8.8 6.8 6.0

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Handbook of International Economic Statistics, 1998 on the World Wide Web at http://www.cia.gov/cia/di/products/hies/index.html

U.S. Interests and Flashpoints of East Asia Table 1.3

7

Top Ten Partners in Total U.S. Trade in 1999 (millions $U.S.) Canada Japan Mexico China Germany United Kingdom Taiwan Republic of Korea France Singapore

364,553 196,572 188,887 94,904 81,882 77,529 54,320 54,216 44,748 34,434

Source: International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, Top 50 Partners in Total U.S. Trade in 1992–99, March 27, 2000, on the World Wide Web at http://www.ita.doc.gov/

top trading partners (Table 1.3). In fact, despite the regional financial crisis, Japan, China, Taiwan, and South Korea were among the world’s top twenty trading nations in 1999.2 Not surprisingly, an increasingly large number of Americans work in the Western Pacific and roughly 3 million hold jobs that depend upon trade with the area. As William Cohen, then U.S. secretary of defense, observed, “As the center of gravity of the world economy has shifted to the Pacific, our increasing economic integration with Asia’s dynamic economies has created enormous opportunities for American businesses and workers.”3 With the Asian economies now climbing out of the crisis that rocked the region during the late 1990s, many believe that this trend will accelerate. It is clear that the United States has vital economic interests in East Asia. But much more than economics binds the country to this region. In addition to the above considerations, a conjunction of political, diplomatic, and security issues help define the significance of the nations examined in this study. Several are provided below. • Two of America’s seven defense treaties are with nations discussed in this study. • These states possess some of the world’s largest and most potent military forces. • The military capabilities of these states are growing. • These states are involved in a plethora of territorial disputes and rivalries. • One of these states (China) occupies a seat on the UN Security Council. • With their enormous populations, the cooperation of these states

8

The Armies of East Asia

•

•

•

•

is vital if the global community hopes to address a wide range of critical environmental and health problems. These states are situated close to some of the world’s most strategically important waterways. Soaring demand for energy in these states, particularly Japan and China, may strain global energy supplies. Industrialization and urbanization in these states will put additional pressures on the region’s already fragile agrarian sectors. Several of these states have experienced profound political changes recently and others may follow.

For these and many other reasons, U.S. officials acknowledge that “peace and stability in East Asia and the Pacific is a fundamental prerequisite for US security.”4 U.S. Security Policy in the Asia-Pacific Region

The traditional goals of U.S. security strategy in East Asia are to foster political stability, ensure access to regional markets, ensure freedom of navigation, promote democracy, and prevent the rise of a hegemonic power.5 These goals help shape the broad outlines of U.S. policy. More specific security objectives are outlined in the 1995 and 1998 U.S. Department of Defense East Asian Strategy Reports as follows: • Work with allies and friends to refocus our security relations on the new post–Cold War challenges. • Strengthen our alliance partnership with Japan, Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines. • Engage China and support its constructive integration into the international community, including participation in global efforts to limit proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and foster transparency in its defense policy and military activities. • Implement fully the Agreed Framework on North Korea’s nuclear program while standing ready to respond if the DPRK does not meet its obligations or threatens U.S. allies. • Expand regional cooperation with Russia. • Contribute to maintaining peace in the Taiwan Strait. • Work with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and others to explore new “cooperative security” approaches through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

U.S. Interests and Flashpoints of East Asia

9

• Encourage creation of a subregional security dialogue in Northeast Asia. • Support efforts by countries in the region to strengthen democracy. • Continue to seek the fullest possible account of those missing in action from the wars the United States has fought in the region in defense of others. • Prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. • Work to halt the flow of narcotics.6

To accomplish these objectives U.S. security strategy rests on three pillars: (1) the forward deployment of roughly 100,000 troops, (2) the maintenance and strengthening of a series of key bilateral alliances, and (3) promotion of the development of regional security institutions. Together these elements form the basis of the U.S. policy of cooperative engagement. The roughly 100,000 forward-deployed U.S. forces in Asia serve as a powerful deterrent and play a critical role in U.S. strategy. Adm. Joseph W. Prueher, then commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, explains: Forward Deployment of Troops

U.S. forward presence facilitates cooperation, increases responsiveness, promotes transparency, and provides more options for U.S. decision makers. Our forces in the area provide the foundation for the “shaping function” of our national strategy and are a critical component of the overall force structure determinations as they provide our ability to respond to crises. U.S. presence also is tangible evidence of our commitment to the region. . . . Our forward deployed forces structure of about 100,000 troops is watched closely by regional players and is the metric for assessing U.S. commitment to the region.7

Forward-deployed units include the Seventh Fleet; Eighth Army; III Marine Expeditionary Force; 5th, 7th, and 13th Air Force; 1st Battalion of the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne); and a variety of other joint special operations forces. Military equipment also has been prepositioned to increase the ability to respond to a crisis. A majority of U.S. forces are based in Japan and Korea (Table 1.4), while a smaller number are in Guam. Despite rumors of a drawdown, both the interim report of the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (a

10 Table 1.4

The Armies of East Asia U.S. Military Posture in Northeast Asia

ROK Japan Guam U.S. Seventh Fleet

Troops

35,910 44,660 6,700 17,150

Division 1 1

Combat Tanks Aircraft 160 70

90 200

140

Armored Vehicles Warships 310 208

50

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1997/98 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) and Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper 1997–1998 (Seoul: Korea Institute for Defense Analysis, 1998), p. 31.

national defense review conducted every four years) and the 1998 East Asia Strategy Report emphasize that the United States will sustain its military presence at current levels. Some high-ranking U.S. military officers even suggest that these forces in the Western Pacific might be reinforced.8 In fact, in September 2000, then-President Bill Clinton warned that despite the progress toward peace on the Korean Peninsula and reform in China, the United States must not reduce its military presence in the region.9 However, U.S. officials also stress that stationing roughly 100,000 troops in East Asia is appropriate and necessary “in the prevailing security environment.”10 The unification of Korea, the revolution in military affairs (i.e., astounding advances in command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) and/or other developments could lead ultimately to adjustments in current force levels.11 In addition to the forward deployment of armed forces, U.S. security strategy depends upon a network of mutual security alliances with Japan, the ROK, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia. This “hub and spoke” alliance system was created during the Cold War when it was widely believed that Asia’s vast size and heterogeneity and the lack of a unified Asian perception of a security threat would doom any drive to establish a NATO-like security structure. In recent years, Washington has sought to strengthen these defense pacts. The initiative yielded big dividends in 1997 when the United States and Japan approved new guidelines for defense cooperation in the event of an emergency in East Asia (see Chapter 2). Bilateral Alliances

U.S. Interests and Flashpoints of East Asia

11

With the end of the Cold War, there is a growing sentiment among East Asian governments that the U.S. network of bilateral alliances can no longer deal with all of the region’s security problems. The United States shares this opinion and now actively supports the establishment of multilateral security institutions. In 1993, the United States hosted the first summit of the Asia Pacific Economic Council (APEC), an organization established in 1989 to promote trade and investment liberalization and to enhance overall economic cooperation in the region. Although APEC is not a multilateral security forum, U.S. officials claim that “it is worth noting that economic discussion builds confidence and eases tensions, and in that way, APEC contributes to regional security.”12 Perhaps more significant, in 1993 the United States also assisted ASEAN in establishing the Asian Regional Forum, the first Asian consultative body concerned solely with security issues. U.S. officials claim that ARF “has already made contributions toward promoting dialogue, encouraging transparency, expanding cooperation and defusing tensions.”13 There is evidence to suggest that Asia is making some progress in the establishment of a regional security organization. In 1999, the turmoil in East Timor led Australia, not an ASEAN member state, and the principal ASEAN member states to form an International Force for East Timor to restore order and security in that country. The United States provided limited support for the operation. Although Washington acknowledges that multilateral solutions to security challenges are emerging and supports the establishment of multilateral security forums, forward-deployed forces and bilateral security alliances remain the two chief pillars of U.S. security policy in East Asia. As U.S. military authorities caution, “We must be careful not to view ARF through western eyes—it is not NATO.”14 Multilateral Security Forums

The Flashpoints of East Asia

As described, the United States has fundamental, enduring interests in the Western Pacific. The region is one of the world’s primary arenas of economic growth and prosperity. The area also is more peaceful than it has been at any time since the nineteenth century. But this could change. East Asia is home to several of the world’s largest military forces and a plethora of territorial disputes. As one U.S. official warned, the

12

The Armies of East Asia

“tremendous progress that Asia has made in the last 30 years can be upset with very small steps.”15 The discussion below examines three flashpoints judged most likely to spark military conflict in the region, outlines U.S. policy toward each of these trouble spots, and explains how Washington hopes to reduce the likelihood of aggression. As World War II came to a close, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to temporarily partition the Korean Peninsula at the 38th parallel. This division ultimately sparked the Korean War—a major international conflict that ended with an armistice (not a formal peace treaty) in 1953. The armistice was only supposed to last several months, but peace talks broke down in 1954 and never resumed. For almost half a century, the Korean Peninsula has remained one of the tensest regions on earth. Throughout the Cold War, relations between the ROK and the DPRK were confined almost exclusively to a military standoff.16 The ROK aligned itself firmly with the United States. The two governments signed a defense pact in 1953 and the United States poured massive amounts of economic aid into the ROK. For its part, the DPRK maintained close bonds with both the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union. In fact, the two communist rivals competed with each other to provide the DPRK with economic and military support, and Pyongyang successfully negotiated formal security treaties with both governments in 1961. For decades, the DPRK pursued a Soviet model of economic development and a peculiar philosophy of self-reliance (juche) advanced by the North’s Great Leader—Kim Il-Sung. Generous infusions of Soviet and Chinese assistance enabled Pyongyang to mask the deficiencies of this system. On the other hand, the ROK pursued a capitalist strategy. The results of these choices have been dramatic. The DPRK’s living standard is far behind that of the ROK. Although Seoul experienced an economic crisis in the late 1990s—a predicament that led to a massive $57 billion International Monetary Fund bailout—Pyongyang confronts a full-scale economic catastrophe. According to calculations compiled by the ROK’s Bank of Korea, the DPRK’s economy shrank roughly 30 percent between 1991 and 1996.17 With the end of the Cold War, North Korea has been left largely to fend for itself. The Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991 and China, which established diplomatic relations with Seoul in 1992, appears to The Korean Peninsula

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

RUSSIA

CHINA

Sonbong •• Najin Ch'ongjin• • Hyesan

• Kanggye • Sinuiju

Hamhung • • Hungnam Sunch'on • Pyongyang • Wonsan

Sea of Japan •Kosong

Korea B a y Nampo • •Songnim Haeju •

Yellow Sea

Kaesong • • Panmunjom Seoul

SOUTH KOREA

13

100 miles 0

100 km

14

The Armies of East Asia

be more interested in generating hard currency than promoting socialist solidarity. During congressional hearings, Gen. John H. Tilelli Jr., then commander in chief of U.S. forces in the ROK, explained that a conjunction of several factors has caused Pyongyang’s economy to contract: Unable to depend on Russia and China for economic assistance, the Kim Jong Il regime finds itself in an untenable situation. . . . This economic situation is primarily caused by food shortages, an inadequate distribution system, an inefficient planning system, over-investment in the military sector and disastrous floods the last two years. Complicating their acute internal situation is a lack of hard currency and excessive expenditures for military capabilities and operations.18

Most analysts agree that, without significant aid or reform, it is unlikely that the DPRK’s economy will recover in the future. During the early 1990s, it appeared that Pyongyang’s relations with both Seoul and the international community might improve. In 1991, officials from the two Koreas signed a nonaggression and reconciliation pact, and in the following year the DPRK signed the nuclear nonproliferation agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). But as the DPRK grew weaker economically and politically, it began to grow more belligerent. In 1992 and 1993, the DPRK refused to allow IAEA inspectors to examine its nuclear facilities. Tensions mounted when Pyongyang announced its intention to withdraw from the Nonproliferation Treaty and expel IAEA personnel. Troops on the Korean Peninsula were put on alert, and the DPRK announced that it would view any UN boycott or embargo directed against it as an act of war. The crisis was defused only after a summit meeting between former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and Kim Il Sung in mid-1994. After months of negotiation, the United States and DPRK signed an accord—the Agreed Framework—in which Pyongyang promised to “freeze” its nuclear program. In return, a U.S.-led international consortium agreed to provide the DPRK with two new light-water reactors— units deemed less capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium than the older, North Korean models. It also pledged to provide Pyongyang with enough petroleum to meet the nation’s needs until the reactors can be put into operation. The ROK has promised to pay most of the costs associated with this project. Despite hopeful projections at the time, the Agreed Framework may not have significantly reduced the North Korean threat. Even if the

U.S. Interests and Flashpoints of East Asia

15

accord is strictly implemented, it enables the DPRK “to maintain its opaque nuclear status for at least five years before Pyongyang is committed to cooperate with the IAEA in clarifying its past nuclear activities.”19 According to Department of Defense analysts, “It is possible Pyongyang has a few nuclear warheads for its missiles.”20 Moreover, the 2000 inter-Korean summit did little to alter troop deployments in the DPRK, which continues to deploy almost 1 million crack troops and the world’s largest array of artillery tubes along its border with the ROK. As General Tilelli observed, “The DPRK’s military deployment and forward posture are overtly offensive and threatening.”21 Indeed, Hwang Jang Yop, a high-ranking DPRK official who defected to the ROK in 1997, claims that “the North’s preparations for war are beyond imagination. . . . [it] is capable of turning South Korea into a sea of flames and can completely annihilate the South with nuclear and chemical weapons and missiles.”22 Finally, Pyongyang has developed a series of short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic missiles. Analysts fear that these weapons, which are capable of being armed with conventional, nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads, might be aimed at Japan or the United States. Developments such as these have led the U.S. Department of Defense to emphasize that the DPRK still poses a serious military threat in East Asia.23 U.S. security analysts have identified several scenarios that might lead to renewed conflict on the Korean Peninsula.24 First, an “incident” (accidental or otherwise) could escalate out of control. This is a real possibility because the DPRK has a history of using terror as a weapon and a demonstrated willingness to engage in brinkmanship. Moreover, the two sides lack a functioning military-to-military channel of communication—a problem that is compounded by the close proximity of the opposing military forces. Second, the DPRK could revive its nuclear weapons program. The U.S. response to such a move might range from a call for UN economic sanctions to a preemptive strike against Pyongyang’s nuclear facilities—and the DPRK would consider either option as an act of war. Third, turmoil might envelop the country: in 1997, reports of hungry North Korean farmers breaking into government grain storage sites began to surface. 25 According to some accounts, more than a million people have recently starved to death in the DPRK.26 Famine or continued economic deterioration could lead a faction to seek to remove Kim Jong-Il and his military supporters from power.27 A coup attempt might lead to civil war and, possibly, intervention by China and/or the ROK. Finally, deterrence could fail—the North might decide simply to attack the South. It is possible that the ensuing

16

The Armies of East Asia

conflict would bring instability not only to the Asia-Pacific region but to the entire international community. In 1949, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the government of the Republic of China (ROC) retreated to the island of Taiwan—a territory “stolen” by Japan during the Sino-Japanese War of 1895 and “restored” to China after World War II.28 At the time, most believed that Taiwan would serve either as a staging ground for Chiang’s forces to retake mainland China or as the scene of his final defeat at the hands of the Chinese Communists. No one could have envisioned that the ROC would thrive on Taiwan for the next fifty years. During the early months of 1950, it appeared that Taiwan would fall to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The United States had stated unequivocally that it would not rescue Chiang’s government and the U.S. chargé in China had informed the Truman administration that “in the opinion of [the] attachés and myself [the] fate of Taiwan [is] sealed.”29 Indeed, the Department of State advised all Americans to withdraw from the island in May 1950. But the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 “transformed American policy from abandonment of the Republic of China to the defense of Taiwan.”30 On June 27, 1950, President Harry Truman ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet to “neutralize” the Taiwan Strait, thereby foiling Beijing’s efforts to take the island. At roughly the same time, massive amounts of U.S. military and economic aid began to pour into the ROC and the two governments concluded a mutual defense treaty in 1954. A lot has changed since the early 1950s. In 1979, the United States terminated its alliance with the ROC and established diplomatic relations with the PRC. U.S. relations with Taiwan now are guided by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA)—and three joint communiqués with the PRC. The TRA is a highly unusual piece of legislation that outlines the provisions of Washington’s “unofficial” relations with Taipei and protects the island with a “tacit alliance.”31 In the communiqués, the United States recognizes the PRC as the legitimate China and “acknowledges” Beijing’s position that there is only one China and Taiwan is a part of it. Washington also promises not to pursue a policy of “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan” and stresses that a resolution of the Taiwan issue is a matter for the Chinese themselves to decide peacefully. As Kurt Campbell, then deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific affairs, explained, these documents provide the “framework” for The Taiwan Strait

The Republic of China on Taiwan

C

N HI

TAIWAN

A

•

Taipei

• Xiamen

iw Ta

an

• Su-ao

it ra t S

Pescadores

T'ai-chung

• •

Chang-hua

T'ai-nan • Kao-hsiung •

100 km

Luzon Strait

17

•Hua-lien

• T'ai-tung

100 miles 0

•Chi-lung

Philippine Sea

18

The Armies of East Asia

U.S. policy and “the United States adheres to the three communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act.”32 The PRC also has changed its policy toward Taiwan. For decades, it threatened to “liberate” the island and from time to time even attempted to seize territory under Taipei’s control.33 In the late 1970s, however, it began to call for the “peaceful unification” of China under the banner of the so-called one country–two systems reunification formula. According to this arrangement, Taiwan would become a special administrative region of the PRC. For its own part, things have changed in the ROC. In two decades, the island has managed to transform itself from a backward, authoritarian state into an economic powerhouse and a full-fledged democracy. In March 2000 it elected a new president—the first opposition candidate to win the office of the presidency in the history of the country. The ROC also has unilaterally renounced the use of force to unify China, no longer competes with Beijing to represent China in the international community, and now acknowledges that the PRC exercises “de facto authority” over mainland China.34 In 1987 Taipei lifted its ban on trade, travel, and investment in the PRC. Not surprisingly, economic exchanges have soared: by 2000, annual bilateral trade exceeded $26 billion and Taiwan’s investment in China was roughly $40 billion.35 Furthermore, over 300,000 Taiwanese are operating businesses on the mainland and the people from Taiwan have made over 13 million visits to the PRC.36 Finally, a formal mechanism for government-to-government dialogue— albeit an “unofficial” one—has been established. In April 1993 the two sides held their first-ever high-level negotiations. Despite these remarkable changes—developments unthinkable only a decade ago—the potential for conflict across the Taiwan Strait remains. In fact, the island was judged to be one of most dangerous places in the world in 1996.37 Taiwan’s recent presidential election has served to heighten fears that a cross-strait war might be imminent. Beijing’s official 2000 Defense White Paper describes the current state of relations between the two sides as “complicated and grim.”38 Arguing that “any sovereign state is entitled to use any means it deems necessary, including military ones, to uphold its sovereignty and territorial integrity,” Beijing has never renounced the use of force to take Taiwan. 39 Since cross-strait tensions eased in the 1970s, PRC authorities have identified several scenarios under which Beijing would feel justified in using coercion to resolve the unification issue. With the end of the Cold War and the changing international environment, some of these conditions appear to have been dropped. Most often, the PRC

U.S. Interests and Flashpoints of East Asia

19

has emphasized that it will attack Taiwan only if the island declares it independence from China.40 During the run-up to the island’s March 2000 presidential election, however, Beijing released a document stating that it reserved the right to use force to achieve unification if Taipei postpones unification talks indefinitely. Although a candidate from the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party, Chen Shui-bian, has been elected president of the ROC, Taiwan has not declared independence. The new president claims that he will not press for independence unless China attacks. 41 However, Beijing fears that the island has been inching closer and closer to independence for over a decade, and these perceptions are contributing to tensions across the Taiwan Strait. In 1995 and 1996, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) initiated a series of provocative military exercises and missile tests off Taiwan’s coastline following Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the United States and during his presidential election campaign. Not since China’s bombardment of the islands of Quemoy and Matsu in 1958 had the attention of the international community been so riveted on the Taiwan Strait. The United States adopted a relatively low-key approach to China’s 1995 wargames, but the 1996 military exercises appeared more belligerent and were held much closer to Taiwan. These maneuvers ultimately led Washington to take the precautionary step of dispatching two carrier battle groups to patrol the waters around Taiwan—the largest U.S. naval deployment in East Asia since the Vietnam War—and threaten that any attack directed against the island would not be tolerated and “could” lead to a U.S. military response.42 Significantly, U.S. authorities drew parallels between U.S. actions taken in Korea in 1950 and Taiwan in 1996. They stressed that the United States originally had not included South Korea within the then defensive perimeter, but had sent troops to repel North Korean aggression nevertheless. Beijing threatened that if the carriers entered the Taiwan Strait they might confront a “sea of fire.”43 PRC officials also implied that the United States was not invulnerable to a nuclear attack. China concluded the military exercises only after Taiwan held its first-ever direct presidential election on March 23, 1996. This crisis of 1996 represented one of the greatest challenges to peace and stability in the Western Pacific in several decades. The PRC’s wargames put the United States and China on a potential collision course. But analysts quarreled over the origins of the crisis. Some blamed succession struggles in Beijing or Chinese nationalism for the rise in tensions. Others pointed to Taipei’s growing assertiveness in

20

The Armies of East Asia

global affairs—particularly its “pragmatic diplomacy” and the quixotic drive to rejoin the United Nations—as the cause of the crisis. Still others argued that inflammatory comments uttered by officials in the highest echelons of Taiwan’s government had provoked Beijing. Finally, some contended that the “strategic ambiguity” of the United States’ defense commitment to Taipei and Washington’s indecisiveness were critical factors. Analysts were similarly stunned by a sudden escalation in tensions during 1999. In July 1999, Lee Teng-hui boldly proclaimed that relations between the PRC and Taiwan should be viewed as “state-to-state” or “special state-to-state” relations. Taipei also declared that it would no longer abide by the “one-China policy.” Beijing’s response was predictable. Officials threatened to invade the island as it was making a “dangerous” lurch toward independence. Once again, Washington scrambled to convince the two sides to tone down their rhetoric and resolve their differences peacefully. Most recently, tensions mounted during Taiwan’s March 2000 presidential campaign. During the weeks leading up to the election PRC authorities issued a wide range of threats. Several days before Taiwanese voters went to the polls, Zhu Rongji, China’s premier, threatened “war if the Taiwan independence forces come into power.”44 When the island’s electorate ignored China and selected Chen Shui-bian, a former independence activist, as the new president, the PLA warned that the “abyss of war” awaits Taiwan if it moves too close to independence.45 Washington has countered that Beijing will face “incalculable consequences” if it initiates hostilities.46 The lessons of the recent crises in the Taiwan Strait vary significantly. In fact many of the lessons of these episodes are unclear, perhaps even contradictory. However, one fact is clear—the Taiwan Strait remains one of the major flashpoints of East Asia. The South China Sea is an area of roughly 648,000 square nautical miles dotted with hundreds of islets, reefs, and shoals. It serves as a vital lifeline for East Asia—almost 75 percent of Japan’s oil imports pass through the waterway—and it is home to potentially rich oil and gas fields. The South China Sea also has been described as “the most disputed area of sea in the world.”47 Seven states—China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, and the Philippines—lay claim to part or all of the South The South China Sea

U.S. Interests and Flashpoints of East Asia

21

China Sea. Six of these nations (China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines) claim all or a portion of the Spratly Islands—a chain of islands generally judged to be the best vantage point to monitor sea lanes and assist oil exploration teams. With the exception of Brunei, each has sought to strengthen claims by establishing military garrisons on the islands. To the north of the Spratlys, both the PRC and Taiwan claim the Pratas Islands, while Vietnam, China, and Taiwan claim the Paracel Islands. To the south, China, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Indonesia claim territories in the Natuna area. All parties to this dispute base their respective claims on historical grounds. For example, Beijing argues that “China has all along possessed indisputable sovereignty” over the Spratlys and cites recent archaeological discoveries as “irrefutable evidence that the Xisha Islands (Paracels) have been Chinese territory since ancient times.”48 Each government also contends that its position is fully supported under international law—including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea—and professes a desire to settle differences through peaceful negotiations.49 Thus far, actual military conflict in the South China Sea has been rare. Much more common is provocative behavior followed by formal complaints, impassioned protests, and thinly veiled threats. Incidents have ranged from serious to ridiculous. On the more serious side, when Hanoi announced a deal with Conoco Oil to explore for petroleum near the Spratly Islands in 1996, Chen Jian, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman, threatened that “we will never accept any exploration by any country in this area.”50 On the other hand, it is likely that Beijing installed Chinese telephone booths (officially described as the “first of their kind”) on uninhabited Spratly islets in 1998 only to irritate Hanoi.51 On occasion governments have resorted to force to resolve disputes in the South China Sea: since the 1970s there have been a number of armed clashes between claimants. In 1974 the PRC overran South Vietnamese forces stationed on the Paracel Islands. In 1988, Beijing and Hanoi fought a small naval battle near the Spratlys, with Vietnam reportedly losing several islets and seventy-eight sailors in the confrontation.52 In 1995, Chinese and Philippine forces skirmished after Manila discovered that Beijing had constructed permanent facilities on Mischief Reef in the Spratlys. More recently, the Philippines dispatched warplanes to protect troops stationed in the Spratly Islands after armed PRC vessels were spotted approaching the islands. Could quarrels over the South China Sea lead to war? In June 1995

The Spratly Islands

Northeast Cay Southwest Cay

South China Sea

Fiery Cross Reef

West York Island Thitu Island Loaita Nan

Lankiam Cay Sand Cay Loaita Island Eldad Reef Itu Aba Island Namyit Island Sin Cowe Mischief Island Reef

Pigeon Reef Spratly Island

Amboyna Cay

Alison Reef

0 0

22

50

Flat Island Nanshan Island

Half Moon Shoal

100 km 50

100 mi

U.S. Interests and Flashpoints of East Asia

23

Mahathir Mohamad, Malaysia’s prime minister, warned that these disputes might lead ultimately to a nuclear confrontation between the United States and PRC.53 Although Mahathir’s fears appear to be exaggerated, the potential for conflict exists nevertheless. U.S. Policy and Potential for Conflict

According to President Bill Clinton, the three core objectives of the U.S. national security strategy “in this era of unique opportunities and dangers” are (1) to enhance U.S. security, (2) to bolster U.S. economic prosperity, and (3) to promote democracy and human rights abroad.54 This strategy is a reflection of cataclysmic transformations in the international system. For almost fifty years, the overriding goal of U.S. foreign policy had been to contain the expansion of the Soviet Union. With the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1991, however, the United States has sought to redefine its role in world affairs. Despite the end of the Cold War, its policy has not changed fundamentally in East Asia. During the early twentieth century the United States sought to contain Japanese imperialism. With the onset of the Cold War in the late 1940s, U.S. policy shifted to prevent the spread of Soviet influence. In fact, as a U.S. Department of Defense study observed, policy in the Western Pacific has been “remarkably consistent over the past two centuries: peace and security; commercial access to the region; freedom of navigation and the prevention of the rise of any hegemonic power or coalition.”55 It is very unlikely that the election of George W. Bush will result in a change of this policy. As described, the United States has reduced its military presence in East Asia and the Western Pacific during the post–Cold War era, but it is an exaggeration to suggest that the United States is withdrawing from the region. As Gen. John Shalikashvili, then U.S. chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, observed in 1995, “our interests in this vibrant region are now so great that it is impossible for us to withdraw or take a back seat as East Asia moves into the next century.”56 The potential for conflict in East Asia—particularly in the three flashpoints—represents a major threat to the United States’ declared interests in the region. The discussion below examines the potential for hostilities in these trouble spots, outlines U.S. policy toward each of them, and explains how Washington hopes to reduce the likelihood of aggression.

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The Armies of East Asia

U.S. military authorities contend that “stability on the Korean peninsula—the historical confluence of Japanese, Chinese, Russian, Korean, and U.S. interests—is inextricably linked to overall [East Asian] regional stability.”57 But with almost 2 million men under arms, the area is widely acknowledged as one of the most dangerous places on earth. To help maintain peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, the United States agreed in 1953 to help protect the ROK from external aggression. The United States also serves as the primary source for the ROK’s arms, and joint U.S.-ROK military exercises are conducted regularly.58 On October 1, 1953, representatives of the United States and the ROK signed the 1954 U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. According to article III of the defense pact, both Washington and Seoul agree that an attack on either country’s territories “would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.” Article IV provides for U.S. military units to be stationed in the ROK. When ratified by the U.S. Senate, lawmakers insisted on adding an “understanding” to the document—the United States would consider military action only if the ROK was attacked by an external enemy. It was the Senate’s intention that “the treaty would not require US action if the ROK launches an attack on the DPRK.”59 The chief objective of U.S. security policy on the Korean Peninsula is to deter DPRK aggression. To accomplish this task, the United States stations roughly 37,000 military personnel in the ROK—including the U.S. 2d Infantry Division and several air force tactical squadrons.60 The United States also protects the south with its nuclear umbrella and maintains a regular schedule of military exercises. As Col. Bill Marshall, commanding officer of the Iron Brigade, part of the 2d Infantry Division, which is stationed in the ROK, explained, “We always stay within a defined band of readiness. . . . There is still only an armistice in effect, not real peace.”61 In addition to deterring a North Korean attack, the United States is seeking “to keep the process of change on the Korean peninsula manageable and peaceful, and to find an alternative to the potentially catastrophic scenarios that have dominated speculation about North Korea’s future.”62 To this end, Washington is attempting to draw the DPRK into more normal relationships with other states, promote an ROK-DPRK dialogue (it strongly supported the June 2000 inter-Korean summit), implement the Agreed Framework, and advance the four-party peace The Korean Peninsula

U.S. Interests and Flashpoints of East Asia

25

talks among the United States, PRC, ROK, and DPRK. Moreover, Washington lifted some sanctions on trade with North Korea in 1999 and 2000 as part of the effort to persuade the country to act more responsibly—and U.S. officials agreed to a series of summit meetings with the North Korean leadership. In short, the United States hopes to engineer a “soft landing” for Pyongyang. At the same time, however, Washington hopes to be prepared for any eventuality that may emerge. Since 1949, Beijing has attempted to seize territory under Taipei’s control on only two occasions. In 1954 and 1958 the PRC attacked the ROC’s offshore islands.63 In recent years, however, threats to seize Taiwan have escalated as the island has become democratized and sought to raise its international profile. Most analysts do not foresee a full-scale war breaking out across the Taiwan Strait unless the island declares independence. As a U.S. Department of Defense study observed, it is more likely that in the short to medium term, “Taiwan-China relations will alternate between periods of stability and potential crisis.”64 Even Taiwanese intelligence officials concede that “unless some special reasons occur that spur Beijing to adopt force, the Chinese communists are not likely to attack Taiwan in five years.”65 At the same time, however, U.S. analysts have cautioned that “it is of course quite possible that the Taiwan problem could get out of control.”66 William Perry, former U.S. secretary of defense, has warned that the island’s March 2000 election has put Washington and Beijing on a “collision course.”67 U.S. policy toward Taiwan is outlined principally in the TRA and three joint communiqués with the PRC. With respect to the island’s security, U.S. officials concede that the TRA “forms the basis of US policy regarding the security of Taiwan.”68 The law provides the United States with an option to defend the island—it is not a treaty. Despite recent tensions in the Taiwan Strait, the United States has no plans to significantly change its ambiguous policy toward the defense of Taiwan. Clinton administration officials disputed charges that the policy was “now outdated.”69 They defended this stance by emphasizing that the president’s “dispatch of two aircraft carriers to waters off Taiwan [in 1996] . . . sent a very strong signal not only to Beijing but to all of the U.S. allies in the region that Washington was, in fact, living up to its commitments.”70 As then-President Clinton stressed during his year-end news conference in December 1997, “nothing, The Taiwan Strait

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The Armies of East Asia

nothing has changed our position on the security of Taiwan.” 71 Moreover, few analysts believe that the administration of George W. Bush will radically change U.S. policy toward the island’s security. The United States continues to transfer both weapons and technology to Taiwan. Officials defend the policy by claiming the sales help promote the long-standing goals of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.72 At the same time, however, Washington has sought to forge a constructive relationship with Beijing and appears determined to avoid provoking the PRC by further upgrading relations with Taipei. For example, the Clinton administration strongly opposed congressional initiatives launched in 1999—particularly the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act—that were aimed at bolstering Washington’s military ties with the island. Perhaps equally as significant, the United States has called on Taiwan to avoid taking “provocative actions” toward China and pledged to continue to abide by the “one-China policy” following Lee Teng-hui’s “two-states” declaration in July 1999. Indeed, throughout 1998 and 1999, a steady procession of prominent private citizens (primarily former high-ranking Clinton administration officials) journeyed to Taipei to pointedly remind the island’s separatists that “there is nothing in the law [Taiwan Relations Act] that says we have to defend Taiwan against all comers under any and all circumstances.”73 Finally, the United States has urged both Chinese governments to engage in negotiations. Believing this might be one of the best ways to reduce cross-strait tensions, then-President Clinton called on the two rivals to open talks “sooner rather than later.” There are several ways a war might break out in the South China Sea. First, a conflict could start by accident. Although most of the disputants are attempting to modernize their militaries, communication with naval forces remains rudimentary. Discipline also presents a problem, since some naval units have been engaged in illegal activities—particularly smuggling. It is possible that the activities of an isolated ship or a rogue naval unit could inadvertently spark a major conflict. Nationalism and/or domestic political considerations might also reduce the maneuverability of governments and help fuel the flames of war. For example, some have argued that because “China’s claims to the South China Sea date back to the Qing dynasty, any perceived compromise of the country’s sovereignty could be destablizing for Jiang The South China Sea

U.S. Interests and Flashpoints of East Asia

27

Zemin’s efforts to cement his position as Deng’s successor.”74 Other regional governments confront similar political pressures. More likely is the possibility that a war could occur sometime in the future—perhaps twenty years from now. At present, none of the potential combatants possess the military capabilities required to sustain naval and aerial warfare over the South China Sea. Moreover, a well-defined incentive for conflict does not yet exist. Although China became a net importer of oil in 1994 and its demand for petroleum is growing steadily, it is still an open question whether the South China Sea is actually rich in oil and gas deposits. Thus far the major discoveries have been limited offshore wells. These factors may increase the potential for ASEAN or some other multilateral forum to ultimately succeed in engineering a settlement agreeable to all parties. However, as one Chinese analyst warned, “if there is a major oil discovery, there could be trouble.”75 Although the potential for armed conflict in the South China Sea appears remote at this time, official U.S. military studies have acknowledged that “contested claims to islands and territorial waters in the South China Sea are a source of tension in Southeast Asia that could carry serious consequences for regional stability.” 76 Nevertheless, Washington has attempted a low-key approach to this quarrel. As one State Department official explained, “We take no position on the merits of competing claims, and we believe they should be resolved peacefully.”77 Indeed, the United States claims to be “willing to assist in the peaceful resolution of the dispute.”78 Washington appears to have adopted a hands-off policy toward the South China Sea squabble. However, it has warned claimants that the United States “strongly opposes the threat or use of military force to assert any nation’s claim” to the area. 79 Moreover, Washington has clearly reminded all governments involved that it considers freedom of navigation in the disputed waterway to be one of the United States’ vital strategic interests. 80 Consequently, defense analysts speculate that Washington is viewed by disputants as “the principal deterrent to any outbreak of military hostilities.”81 The Western Pacific no longer faces the threat of Soviet imperialism. However, the region still confronts an array of complex security challenges. As then U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen observed, the Summary

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The Armies of East Asia

area remains a “tinderbox.”82 The most prominent flashpoint remains the unpredictable security equation on the Korean Peninsula. But relations across the Taiwan Strait and the territorial dispute over the South China Sea also hold the potential to undermine regional peace and stability. Despite the radical transformations that have occurred in the international system, the United States remains committed to the peaceful resolution of each of these disputes. As described, however, this commitment varies significantly from one flashpoint to the next (Table 1.5). Ironically, the U.S. commitment appears to parallel the level of threat. Conclusion

The Western Pacific holds both challenges and opportunities for the United States. There are great hopes for democracy, prosperity, social justice, and peace. At the same time, though, the region remains inherently unstable. Unlike in Europe, the end of the Cold War has not lessened tensions in East Asia. There remains the ever-present risk of economic catastrophe, social oppression, and conflict. The quarrels described above represent only the three principal threats to the East Asian area—the disputes judged most likely to spark military conflict. A more complete discussion would examine a host of other territorial squabbles including the quarrel between Japan and Russia over the so-called Northern Territories, the dispute between Korea and Japan over Tokdo/Takeshima Island, and the battle between China, Taiwan, and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands. Mention also should be made of the transnational security concerns that confront the area. These include smuggling, piracy, environmental degradation, drugs, immigration, and economic stability. The financial crisis that has rocked much of the region since 1997 is particularly worrisome. Highranking U.S. military officers have warned that the region’s economic troubles could have serious implications for stability: Table 1.5

Flashpoint

United States Commitment and Threat Levels

Korean Peninsula Taiwan Strait South China Sea

U.S. Commitment

High Moderate (not guaranteed) Low

Threat Level High Moderate Low

U.S. Interests and Flashpoints of East Asia

29

East Asia’s serious financial crisis has implications for security and stability in the region. The near-term security impact will include slowdowns in the modernization of Southeast Asian militaries, reductions and cancellations in the scope of some training exercises, possible reductions in funding of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, and pressure to reduce host nation support. Beyond these immediate effects, we are watchful for early signs of instability including civil disturbances, labor disputes, increased ethnic rivalries, and some increase in anti-American rhetoric.83

As Stanley O. Roth, then assistant secretary of state, East Asian and public affairs, observed, “Just as peace and stability enabled economic progress, so too did economic progress reinforce peace and stability.”84 The three principal challenges to regional stability discussed in this chapter are not new. In fact, many could be described as long-standing disputes. What is changing, however, are the capabilities of East Asian governments to do something about them. Mainland China has emerged as a great power and possesses the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal. Japan has the second highest defense budget in the world, and its Maritime Self-Defense Force is among the world’s top five navies in terms of submarines, destroyers, and frigates. Taiwan has succeeded in purchasing an impressive array of military hardware. Recent acquisitions include Mirage 2000-5 fighters, AWACS planes, Stinger missiles, Knox-class destroyers, minesweepers, helicopters, M60A3 tanks, F-16 warplanes, LaFayette-class frigates, and a derivative of the Patriot missile air defense system. Finally, the DPRK continues to deploy roughly 70 percent of its forces within fifty miles of the Demilitarized Zone and has attempted to develop nuclear weapons and intercontinental missiles, while the ROK has declared that it intends to obtain a limited bluewater capability, increase the range of its missiles, and maybe even acquire aircraft carriers. Despite the end of the Cold War, military spending is on the rise in East Asia. The outcome of many of the challenges to peace stability in the area could be determined to a large extent by the military capabilities of several key states—including Japan, China, Taiwan, and the Koreas. The following chapters will examine the militaries of each of these governments. Notes

1. Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Economic Relations with East Asia and the Pacific, November 6, 1997, on

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The Armies of East Asia

the World Wide Web at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/fs_us_econ_ rel_asia_971106.html 2. “Seven Asian Nations Among Top 20 Traders,” China Post, April 27, 2000, p. 12. 3. Simon Beck, “Firm Stand to Stay, Says US Defense Chief,” South China Morning Post, October 28, 1997. 4. Stanley O. Roth, assistant secretary of state, East Asian and Pacific affairs, testimony before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Relations Committee, May 7, 1998, on the World Wide Web at http://www.state.gov/www/policy_ remarks/1998/980507_roth_eastasia.html 5. Hans Binnendijk, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, “U.S. Strategic Objectives in East Asia,” Strategic Forum 68 (March 1998). 6. Office of International Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy for the East Asia–Pacific Region (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1995), pp. 3–4, and Office of International Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy for the East Asia–Pacific Region (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, November 1998), p.1. 7. Testimony of Adm. Joseph W. Prueher, commander in chief, U.S. Pacific Command, in Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1998, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, 105th Congress on H.R. 2266/S.1005 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1998), p.193. 8. Conrad Lu, “US Likely to Increase Troops in Asia-Pacific,” Central News Agency (hereafter CNA), February 14, 1997, in Lexis/Nexis. 9. “U.S. to Keep Troops in Asia Regardless of Progress in China, Koreas,” Agence France Presse, September 25, 2000, in Lexis/Nexis. 10. Then U.S. Secretary of Defense Cohen made this statement during a visit to Japan in 1997. For a discussion about the significance of this statement and the possibility of adjustments in U.S. troop deployments, see Ralph A. Cossa, “100,000 Troops: About Right . . . For Now,” Pac Net Newsletter (May 9, 1997), pp. 1–2. 11. The Pentagon insists that “the full promise of the Revolution in Military Affairs remains in the future. The improvements in military hardware and support systems are not yet at the stage of fundamentally altering our strategic perceptions or force structure in the region, or elsewhere around the world.” See The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia–Pacific Region, 1998 edition, p. 16. 12. See Stanley O. Roth, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Relations Committee. 13. Ibid. 14. Adm. Joseph W. Prueher, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1998, p. 196. 15. See “Ensuring Security in the Asia-Pacific Region: An Interview with Kurt Campbell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs,” US Foreign Policy Agenda, USIA Electronic Journal 3, 1 (January 1998), on the World Wide Web at http://www.usia.gov/journals/itps/0198/ijpe/ pj18toc.htm

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16. Sporadic violence occurred along the border nevertheless. Moreover, the DPRK attempted unsuccessfully to assassinate ROK leaders and it bombed a Korean Airlines passenger jet in 1987. 17. Sonni Efron, “North Korea: The Communist Invalid that Refuses to Expire,” Los Angeles Times, December 7, 1997, p. A12 in Lexis/Nexis. 18. “Prepared Statement of General John H. Tilelli,” commander in chief, UNC/CFCC, USFK, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 18, 1997, Federal News Service, March 18, 1997, in Lexis/Nexis. 19. Robert Manning, “Security in East Asia,” in William M. Carpenter and David G. Wiencek, eds., Asian Security Handbook (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1996), p. 23. 20. Lonnie Henley, “Korean Cataclysm,” Washington Post, May 4, 1997, p. C1. 21. “Prepared Statement of General John H. Tilelli.” 22. “Lacks Nuclear Proof, North Korean Says,” New York Times, July 11, 1997, p. A9 in Lexis/Nexis, and Andrew Pollack, “Defector Stirs North Korea Nuclear Scare, New York Times, April 23, 1997, p. A12 in Lexis/Nexis. 23. “U.S. to Keep Troops in Asia Regardless of Progress in China, Koreas.” 24. Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1997 Strategic Assessment (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997). 25. Kevin Platt, “Hunger’s Plea in North Korea Stirs South Korea to Plot a Way to Unity,” Christian Science Monitor, May 8, 1997, p. 1 in Lexis/Nexis. 26. Jasper Becker, “Million Dead in Korea Famine,” South China Morning Post, September 20, 1997, on the World Wide Web at http:www./scmp. com.news 27. In early 1998, reports surfaced that Kim Jong-Il had staged a purge because of fears that he might be overthrown by reformers. For more information, see Jasper Becker, “Kim Jong-il ‘Imposing Martial Law in Purge,’” South China Morning Post, March 26, 1998, World Wide Web at http:/www.scmp. com/news/ 28. On December 1, 1943, the United States, the ROC, and the United Kingdom issued a communiqué stating that “all territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.” See “Conference of President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Prime Minister Churchill in North Africa,” Department of State Bulletin IX, 232 (December 4, 1943), p. 393. 29. “The Chargé in China (Strong) to the Secretary of State, May 17, 1950,” in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. VI (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 340. 30. John C. Kuan, A Review of US-ROC Relations, 1949–1978, (Taipei: Asia and World Institute, 1980), p. 10. 31. The TRA provides the United States only with an option to defend Taiwan; it does not necessarily commit the United States to Taiwan’s defense. For more information, see Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, United States–Taiwan Security Ties: From Cold War to Beyond Containment (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 1994), p. 34. 32. “Ensuring Security in the Asia-Pacific Region: An Interview with Kurt

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Campbell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs.” 33. The PRC has attempted to resolve the Taiwan issue by force on three separate occasions: when Chiang retreated to the island in 1949, when fighting broke out over the offshore islands in 1954, and when fighting broke out over the offshore islands again in 1958. 34. Mainland Affairs Council, Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (Taipei: Mainland Affairs Council, July 1994), p. 9. 35. Elaine Kurtenbach, “Stan Shih Snubbed by Beijing,” China Post, April 28, 2000, p. 12. 36. Deborah Kuo, “Top ROC Negotiator with Beijing Calls for American Moral Support,” CNA, May 20, 1998, in Lexis/Nexis. 37. Victor Lai and Danielle Yang, “Taiwan Strait World’s Riskiest Area: Paper,” China Post (International Airmail Edition), January 2, 1996, p. 1. 38. Information Office, State Council, People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense 2000, on the World Wide Web at http://www.china. org.cn/english/2791.htm 39. Taiwan Affairs Office, The Taiwan Question and the Reunification of China (Beijing: Information Office, State Council, 1993), p. 19. 40. Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, Taiwan’s Security in the Changing International System (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), pp. 10–12. 41. “Chen Again Vows to Call Independence if Attacked,” China Post (domestic version), April 10, 2000, p. 1. 42. Bill Wang, “US Will Not Tolerate Attack on Taiwan,” CNA (Taipei), March 19, 1996, in Lexis/Nexis. For further information, see testimony of Winston Lord, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, in Military Stability in the Taiwan Straits. 43. “Bush Says There Will Be No War,” Hong Kong Standard, March 22, 1996, http://www.hkstandard.com/ 44. “Zhu Rongji Warns Taiwanese Voters Away from Path of Independence,” Agence France Presse, March 15, 2000, in Taiwan Security Research, World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/AFP/AFP-031500Zhu.htm 45. “China’s Army Warns of Taiwan War,” Associated Press, April 15, 2000, in Taiwan Security Research, World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity. org/AP/AP-041500.htm 46. Jane Perlez, “Warning by China to Taiwan Poses Challenge to US,” New York Times, February 27, 2000, in Lexis/Nexis. 47. Peter Lewis Young, “The Potential for Conflict in the South China Sea,” Asian Defense Journal (November 1995), p. 18. 48. “China Hints Move to Settle Islands Dispute,” New York Times, July 31, 1995, p. A3 in Lexis/Nexis, and “Relics Show PRC Sovereignty over Paracels,” Xinhua News Agency, December 2, 1997, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, China, December 7, 1997, World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 49. The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea recognizes a 12-mile territorial limit and a 200-mile economic zone beyond the shoreline of coastal nations. Those areas that lie beyond the 200-mile limit are considered part of the global commons.

U.S. Interests and Flashpoints of East Asia

33

50. “Hanoi-Conoco Oil Pact Reopens Island Dispute,” New York Times, April 13, 1996, p. 6 in Lexis/Nexis. 51. “Phone Booths Built on Disputed Islands,” South China Morning Post, March 3, 1998, World Wide Web at http:/www.scmp.com/news/ 52. Bruce Stanley, “Hanoi Looks to US in Keeping China at Bay,” Christian Science Monitor, July 5, 1995, p. 1 in Lexis/Nexis. 53. Young, “The Potential for Conflict in the South China Sea,” p. 19. 54. President Bill Clinton, “A National Security Strategy for a New Century,” December 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://www2. whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/nschome.html 55. Office of International Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy for the East-Pacific Region, p. 5. 56. Gen. John Shalikashvili, “A Word From the Chairman,” JFQ 7 (Spring 1995), p. 4. 57. Prepared Statement of Adm. Joseph W. Prueher, Department of Defense Authorization for Fiscal Year 1997 and the Future Years Defense Program, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 104th Congress, Second Session on S.1745 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997), p. 826. 58. The massive Team Spirit joint exercises have been canceled since 1994. However, the two militaries continue to hold large-scale drills in the rear areas. 59. William E. Berry Jr., “The Republic of Korea,” in Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti, eds., The Defense Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study, 3d Edition (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), p. 400. 60. “Fact Sheet: U.S., Asia-Pacific Security Alliances,” in U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda, USIA Electronic Journal, January 1998 on the World Wide Web at http:www.usia.gov/journals/itps/ijpe/pj18toc.htm 61. Michael Wilbur, “If Talking Does Not Work; The Iron Brigade Is There to Signal US Resolve,” Asiaweek, June 14, 1996, p. 30. 62. Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1997 Strategic Assessment, pp. 105–106. 63. During the first crisis, the PRC conquered the ROC-held island of Ichiang and ROC forces withdrew from the Tachen Islands. 64. 1997 Strategic Assessment, p. 51. 65. “Military Expansion ‘Cuts Odds of Taiwan Invasion,’” South China Morning Post, April 17, 1997, on the World Wide Web at http:/www.scmp. com/news/ 66. Harvard Professor Ezra Vogel made this observation while visiting Taiwan in early 1998. See Conrad Lu, “Taiwan Issue Critical in Sino-US Ties, Warns Vogel,” CNA, January 18, 1998, World Wide Web at http.//www.Taipei. org/teco/cicc/news/weeknews.htm 67. Robert G. Kaiser and Steven Mufson, “Crisis in the Making? Experts Differ on Whether Rising Tensions Will Lead to a US-China Conflict,” Washington Post, March 16, 2000, in Lexis/Nexis. 68. Winston Lord, “The United States and the Security of Taiwan,” U.S. Department of State Dispatch 7, 6 (February 5, 1996), p. 30. 69. Washington also refuses to play a mediating role in cross-strait relations. See Han Nai-kuo, “James Wood Says US Evaluating Taiwan’s International Role,” CNA, November 10, 1996, on the World Wide Web at

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http.//www.Taipei.org/teco/cicc/news/weeknews.htm and Han Nai-kuo, “US Not to Play Mediator Role in Cross-Strait Ties: Burns,” CNA, July 8, 1996, on the World Wide Web as in preceding. 70. Bill Wang, “US Lives Up to its Commitments to Taiwan: US Defense Secretary,” CNA, January 22, 1997, on the World Wide Web at ibid. 71. Wu Zhong, “Taiwan Ties Solid Despite Beijing Warming: Clinton,” Hong Kong Standard, December 18, 1997, on the World Wide Web at http://www.hkstandard.com/ 72. Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, p. 20. 73. Harvey Feldman, senior fellow at the Asian Studies Center of the Heritage Foundation, made this statement. See Barbara Opall, “US, Taiwanese Opposition Chart Collision Course,” Defense News 13, 12 (March 23–29, 1998), p. 1. Also see Victor Lai and Lilian Wu, “US Officials Urge Restraint on Taiwan Independence,” CNA, December 27, 1997, on the World Wide Web at http:/taipei.org/teco/cicc/news/english/e-12-26-97/e-12-26-97-10.htm 74. William J. Dobson, “Now Vietnam Needs America to Ward Off China,” Christian Science Monitor, April 17, 1997, p. 19 in Lexis/Nexis. 75. Cameron Barr and Sheila Taft, “Uneasy Silence Hangs Over China’s Grab,” Christian Science Monitor, March 17, 1995, p. 6 in Lexis/Nexis. 76. Office of International Security Affairs, United States Security Strategy for the East Asia–Pacific Region, p. 19. 77. George Moffett, “Why US Keeps Hands Off on Spratly Dispute,” Christian Science Monitor, March 17, 1995, p. 6 in Lexis/Nexis. 78. See Office of International Security Affairs, United States Security Strategy for the East Asia–Pacific Region, p. 19. 79. Ibid., p. 20. 80. Ibid. 81. Richard E. Hull, “The South China Sea: Future Source of Prosperity or Conflict in Southeast Asia?” National Defense University Strategic Forum 60 (February 1996), p. 3. 82. Conrad Lu, “US Military Power Is Stabilizing Force in Asia: Cohen,” CNA, January 15, 1998, on the World Wide Web at http.//www.Taipei.org/teco/ cicc/news/weeknews.htm 83. Adm. Joseph W. Prueher, Before the Senate Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense. 84. Roth, testimony before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Relations Committee.

2 The Japanese Military his chapter discusses the background and evolution of Japan’s defense policy and security strategy. It also examines the changing composition and structure of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and provides an overview of the major security issues relating to Japan’s armed forces. In conclusion, the chapter suggests that while Tokyo seems willing to assume a greater military role in East Asia, a momentous change in defense policy appears unlikely during the short or medium term. Rather, it is likely that Japan’s security will continue to rest on two pillars—a formidable conventional military, albeit with modest power projection capabilities, and a mutual security treaty with the United States.

T

Defense Policy: The Cold War Era

Japan’s defense policy passed through several distinct phases during the Cold War. Each played a role in shaping Tokyo’s current approach to security. In the first period—which extended from the imperial Japanese surrender in 1945 until the outbreak of the Korean conflict in 1950—Japan possessed no armed forces. Governed (and protected) by U.S. occupation forces, Japan appeared to renounce war as an instrument of national policy in its 1947 constitution. According to article 9 of the document drafted by U.S. occupation officials: Phase One: 1945–1950

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling inter-

35

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national disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

The Japanese government initially adopted a strict interpretation of the new constitution. Shigeru Yoshida, then prime minister, argued that Tokyo could not even defend itself against an attack. The prime minister explained that “since Article 9, Clause 2, as drafted, does renounce both the maintenance of all forms of war potential and the right to belligerency, it follows that war as a means of self-defense and the right of belligerency in self-defense are also renounced.”1 He concluded that “now that we have been beaten, and we haven’t got a single soldier left in our hands, it is a fine opportunity for renouncing war for all time.”2 The second phase in Japan’s defense policy extended from roughly the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 until 1960. As U.S. occupation troops were dispatched to fight in Korea, Prime Minister Yoshida received a stunning directive from Gen. Douglas MacArthur. MacArthur informed Yoshida that he “authorized” the Japanese government to establish a 75,000-strong Police Reserve Force and increase force levels substantially in the Maritime Safety Board—the remnants of the Japanese Imperial Navy. General MacArthur’s order was only the first in a series of events that fundamentally altered Japanese defense policy. In 1951, the formal occupation of Japan came to an end as the two countries signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty and a highly unequal Mutual Security Treaty: Phase Two: 1950–1960

In addition to granting bases to the U.S., it gave the U.S. a veto over any third country’s military presence in Japan, the right to project military power from bases in Japan, and an indefinite time period for the treaty. In addition, the U.S. insisted on extraterritorial legal rights for its military and dependents. At the same time, [Prime Minister] Yoshida was also compelled to recognize Taiwan as the legitimate government of China.3

Although no longer formally occupied, Japan was “a military satellite of the United States.”4 Shortly after the conclusion of these treaties, the Japanese Diet passed legislation combining the Police Reserve Force and the Mari-

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time Safety Board. The ranks of this new, consolidated military organization—known as the Security Forces—swelled as thousands of officers who had served in the armed forces of imperial Japan were encouraged to enlist.5 Armaments also expanded as the Security Forces began to acquire heavy weapons including artillery and tanks. In 1954, the Japanese Diet approved legislation reorganizing the Security Forces into the Self-Defense Forces, a new military with three different service branches—the Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF), Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF), and Air Self-Defense Forces (ASDF). 6 Lawmakers also established the Japan Defense Agency (JDA), a civilian-staffed bureaucracy under the prime minister’s office, to oversee and administer SDF operations. The founding of the SDF appeared to violate key provisions in the Japanese constitution—particularly the stipulation that “land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential will never be maintained.” To surmount this obstacle, Prime Minister Yoshida reversed course and announced that “the country does have the right to self-defense and should war occur upon the use of that right that is unavoidable [emphasis added].”7 Since that time, Tokyo has continued to insist that “as long as Japan is a sovereign state, it is recognized beyond doubt that the provision of this article [article 9] does not deny the inherent right of selfdefense that Japan is entitled to maintain as a sovereign nation.”8 Japan’s general approach toward defense was formalized in the Basic Policy for National Defense, a program adopted by the National Defense Council and approved by the cabinet in 1957. According to this policy, Japan’s security would rely upon a four-point policy: • Promotion of international peace and cooperation • Promotion of a stable and patriotic Japan • Development of “the effective defensive capability necessary for self-defense” • Maintenance of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements9

As one analyst observed, “The abstractness of the policy’s language certainly gave the government a margin for interpretation. The unmistakable aim of the defense bureaucrats was to make the principles as vague as possible to allow themselves latitude for later reinterpretation.”10 Shortly after approving the Basic Policy, Japan launched the first in a series of defense build-up programs of three to five years that would gradually enhance the nation’s military capabilities.

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The signing of a revised bilateral defense pact with the United States in 1960 ushered in the third stage in Japan’s defense policy. Although controversial at the time (the new treaty ignited the largest demonstrations in Japanese history), it is clear that both countries profited from the new defense arrangement. The United States retained basing privileges on Japanese soil, which proved critical as a staging ground and workshop for U.S. forces during the Vietnam War, and secured a pledge from Tokyo that it would cooperate with Washington if “the security of the Far East is threatened.”11 As for Tokyo, it successfully eliminated provisions allowing the United States to intervene in Japanese politics (under the terms of the original treaty the United States could “put down largescale riots”) and gained a voice in the deployment of U.S. forces on its territory. Japan also secured assurances that Tokyo would be consulted before Washington used military bases in Japan for actions elsewhere in Asia. Finally, the alliance gave Japan an explicit guarantee of U.S. protection if attacked (but Japan was not obligated to help defend the United States). During this stage in its defense policy, Japan clarified key elements in its approach to national security and reaffirmed its adherence to an exclusively defense-oriented force structure. Employing press releases, defense white papers, announcements, and the 1976 National Defense Outline (Taiko), Tokyo declared the positions discussed below as fundamental or “basic policies” of its national defense. These continue to influence Japanese defense policy in the post–Cold War era. Phase Three: 1960–1991

Exclusively defense-oriented policy. Throughout the Cold War, the Japanese government argued that only an exclusively defense-oriented strategy was consistent with the spirit of the 1947 constitution. There were three points to this idea: (1) military force cannot be exercised until after an armed attack is initiated against Japan; (2) the scope and level of the use of defense personnel must be kept to the minimum required for the purpose of self-defense; and (3) the defense capability possessed by Japan must be limited to the minimum necessary level.12 The policy was interpreted to mean that Japan could not launch a preemptive strike against a potential aggressor and that there were clear limits on the levels of force that could be employed in a conflict. Moreover, Tokyo argued that the SDF could not acquire weapons systems that appear threatening to other nations. These include long-range bombers, aircraft carriers, and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

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Finally, officials used this policy to defend the position that the SDF cannot participate in operations outside Japanese territory—a practice that annoyed many U.S. military planners.

Not a military power. In its Basic Policy for National Defense, Japan promised to maintain an “effective defensive capability necessary for self-defense.” But Tokyo also swore “not to become a military power that might pose a threat to other countries.” Striking the proper balance between these two policies proved difficult. To reassure the public both at home and abroad that Japan had no plans to revert to its militaristic past, Tokyo has sought to indicate clearly the minimum levels required for its armed forces. In 1976, the Taiko called for the SDF to ensure “the maintenance of a full surveillance posture in peacetime and the ability to cope effectively with situations up to the point of limited and small-scale aggression.”13 The document also appeared to place a ceiling on SDF force levels and military capabilities. That same year, Tokyo announced that defense expenditures would be pegged to a fixed percentage point of Japan’s gross national product (GNP) (roughly 1 percent) and that it would strictly abide by the so-called three nonnuclear principles (no possession, production, or introduction of nuclear weapons in Japan).14

Maintenance of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements. Throughout the Cold War, the U.S.-Japan security treaty played a critical role in Japan’s defense policy. After all, if a hostile state was not deterred by Japan’s conventional forces, it might be deterred by U.S. military power: The US obligation to defend Japan could make any outside party pay dearly for aggression, if it is to make an armed attack on Japan, because it will have to deal with not only the SDF but the overwhelming might of the United States. Because of this, an aggressor nation cannot help but hesitate before attempting an invasion of Japan and foreign aggression can thus be deterred.15

The awesome military strength of the United States and its “nuclear umbrella” also held an additional benefit—it enabled Tokyo to hold its defense budget at roughly 1 percent of its GNP for almost three decades. To bolster the viability of the alliance and cope with a possible emergency in the Western Pacific, Tokyo and Washington agreed in 1978 upon the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation. Given the sharp escalation in superpower tensions at the time, it is clear that

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the guidelines were aimed at the Soviet Union.16 Washington and Tokyo agreed that Japan would “undertake defensive operations primarily in Japanese territory and adjoining waters and airspace.” Shortly after negotiating this accord, Japan acquiesced to U.S. requests that it begin patrolling sea lanes out to 1,000 miles from its coast.

Other basic policies. In addition to those elements in Japanese defense policy discussed above, two other positions merit brief mention. First, the Japanese government consistently emphasized that civilians—not military officers—would exercise control over the JDA and SDF. Second, Tokyo announced in 1976 that it would prohibit the export of arms. This meant that Japan’s substantial defense sector was dependent upon domestic military requirements.

The Cold War had a profound impact on Japan. It helped bring the U.S. occupation of Japan to an early conclusion, provided the impetus for the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and led Washington to encourage Tokyo’s rearmament. The Cold War also facilitated Japan’s remarkable economic recovery. The United States poured massive amounts of economic aid into Japan and also required tons of equipment and supplies to contain the perceived spread of Soviet influence in Korea and Southeast Asia. Japanese industry proved up to the task and these exports helped revitalize the nation’s war-ravaged economy. In fact, the United States went to extraordinary lengths to ensure that Tokyo remained firmly in its camp during the Cold War.17 By the 1970s, Japan had metamorphosized into an economic superpower that played a passive and circumscribed role in global politics— particularly in those areas related to defense and security. Japan defended this position by arguing that the 1947 constitution and the “basic defense policies” described above precluded its playing a greater role in international affairs. It is inaccurate to suggest, however, that Tokyo paid nothing for its defense. Japan served as a forward base of the U.S. military in Asia, and the armed forces of the two countries engaged in frequent joint exercises. It also is noteworthy that by the 1980s, Japan was paying for a substantial portion of the costs associated with stationing U.S. troops in Japan. Moreover, Japan’s defense budget grew steadily—a trend that accelerated in the post–Cold War era—and Tokyo now boasts one of the world’s largest defense budgets (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2). In fact, by the end of the Cold War Japan’s SDF was “the most technologically sophisticated non-nuclear force in the Asia-Pacific.”18 Summary

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The Japanese Military Table 2.1

Japan’s Military Expenditures, 1987–1997 (constant 1997 $ millions) 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997

31,800 33,200 34,500 35,700 36,700 37,500 37,900 38,200 38,800 40,000 40,800

Source: Bureau of Arms Control, U.S. Department of State, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1998 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, February 2000), on the World Wide Web at http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/bureau_ac/wmeat98.html

Table 2.2

Military Expenditures, Top Ten Countries, 1997 ($ millions)

1. United States 2. China 3. Russia 4. France 5. Japan 6. United Kingdom 7. Germany 8. Italy 9. Saudi Arabia 10. South Korea

276,300 74,910 41,730 41,520 40,840 35,290 32,870 22,720 21,150 15,020

Source: Bureau of Arms Control, U.S. Department of State, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1998 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, February 2000), on the World Wide Web at http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/bureau_ac/wmeat98.html

Defense Policy: The Post–Cold War Era

In 1991, the Soviet Union disintegrated and the era of superpower rivalry came to an end. Japan found itself in a world that had fundamentally changed. Officials in Washington and Tokyo could no longer use the Soviet threat as a justification for the U.S.-Japan security treaty, and both the 1976 Taiko and the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation appeared increasingly irrelevant. Moreover, voices in the international community began to call on Tokyo to carry more of its own weight in global affairs. With the end of the Cold War, the time had arrived for Tokyo to reassess its role in global affairs and make some adjustments in its basic defense policies. The discussion below examines three significant

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changes in Japan’s approach to security: (1) the Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations; (2) the 1995 Taiko; and (3) the revised U.S.-Japan security guidelines. Japan has long voiced strong support for the United Nations and it has made enormous financial contributions to the organization. Citing constitutional constraints on SDF operations, however, Tokyo refused to participate in UN peacekeeping operations. This policy changed only after Japan was severely criticized for its limited role in the 1990–1991 Gulf War. Although Tokyo ultimately contributed more than $13 billion to the Allied cause, it did not participate in military operations. In June 1992, the Japanese Diet approved the Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations (the International Peace Cooperation Law, or IPCL). According to this legislation, Japan now may participate in a variety of international peacekeeping and relief operations. These include monitoring elections, monitoring cease-fires, and aiding the victims of international disasters. However, the following preconditions (often described as the five principles) must be met before Japan will agree to participate in such activities: The International Peace Cooperation Law

• An agreement on a cease-fire shall have been reached among the parties to the conflict. • The parties to the conflict, including the territorial state(s), shall have given their consent to deployment of the peacekeeping force and Japan’s participation in the force. • The peacekeeping force shall strictly maintain impartiality, not favoring any party to the conflict. • Should any of the above guideline requirements cease to be satisfied, the government of Japan may withdraw its contingent. • The use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect the personnel’s lives.19

Following passage of the IPCL, Japan has dispatched personnel to participate in a number of international operations. These include “the United Nations Angola Verification Mission II in 1992, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia in 1992–93, the United Nations Operations in Mozambique in 1993–95, the United Nations

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Observer Mission in El Salvador in 1994, Rwanda refugee activities in 1994, and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force in the Golan Heights in 1995–96.” 20 Japanese officials contend that these activities provide tangible evidence that Tokyo now is willing to help in the management of a new international order. In the original 1976 Taiko, Japan stated its intention to establish a “standard defense force” with an ability to “cope effectively with situations up to the point of limited and small-scale aggression.” Any contingency beyond this point would be met through the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The end of the Cold War, Japan’s participation in international peacekeeping operations, and a number of domestic disasters—particularly the 1995 great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake and the sarin gas terrorist attacks—demonstrated the need for a new Taiko. The National Defense Program Outline in and After FY 1996, commonly referred to as the New Taiko, was officially adopted on November 28, 1995. Like its predecessor, this document reaffirms the U.S.-Japan security relationship as fundamental to Japan’s security. However, the New Taiko also differs from the old outline in several important respects. All references to a capability to respond to “limited and small-scale aggression” as the chief goal of the SDF’s defense preparedness have been dropped in the New Taiko. Emphasis now is on Japan’s ability to contribute to the creation of a stable security environment in East Asia. Significantly, the new outline calls on Tokyo to cooperate with Washington under the framework of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty “in areas surrounding Japan.” This means that Japan may play an active role in the maintenance of regional peace and stability. The original Taiko discussed the SDF’s role in disaster relief operations. The New Taiko states that Japan may contribute to “international peacekeeping operations and international disaster relief activities” and expands the definition of disasters to include “acts of terrorism and other situations [emphasis added].” The precise meaning of the phrase “other situations” remains unclear, but it is obvious that this provision could expand the scope of SDF operations. Finally, the New Taiko calls on defense planners to take into account the “changes in the military posture of some of Japan’s neighboring countries” when determining its military deployments and required force levels. In keeping with this mandate, Japan has shifted The New Taiko

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troops and materiel to reflect the new post–Cold War security equation in East Asia. It also is attempting to create a “leaner and meaner” SDF. As described, Japan ultimately contributed billions of dollars to finance the Persian Gulf War. But a strict interpretation of the 1947 constitution prevented Tokyo from joining the allied coalition. This led U.S. critics to demand that the SDF contribute meaningfully to future peacekeeping operations. The 1994 Korean nuclear crisis also served to underscore the limitations of the U.S.-Japan military alliance. Confronted with the prospect of a second Korean conflict, military planners in Washington were unsure about the level of support they could secure from Tokyo if Pyongyang’s bellicose threats proved real. This prompted Joseph Nye, then assistant secretary of defense, to argue that the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation were dangerously outdated. Japanese Foreign Ministry officials also acknowledged that “the present system has many deficiencies.”21 To address these concerns, then-President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto met in Tokyo in early 1996. Following the summit, the two leaders issued a declaration on security on April 17, 1996. Under the terms of the declaration, the United States and Japan agreed to revise the 1978 framework. After more than a year of negotiation and study, new U.S.-Japan defense guidelines were issued on September 24, 1997. The accord was hailed by Kurt Campbell, then deputy assistant secretary of defense, as “the Asian corollary of NATO expansion.”22 Under the terms of the revised security pact, Japan may play a more active role in the event of hostilities in East Asia. Highlights of the agreement include the following measures: The Revised U.S.-Japan Security Guidelines

• Japanese naval vessels may participate in blockades against other nations in support of internationally recognized sanctions. • Japanese naval vessels may engage in minesweeping activities in Japanese or international waters. • Japan will allow U.S. forces to use civilian harbors and bases during a crisis. • Japan will supply food and fuel to U.S. naval vessels during a crisis. • Japan and the United States will increase the sharing of intelligence if hostilities in the region appear imminent.

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• Japan will help locate and rescue U.S. pilots downed at sea. • Japan will help evacuate civilians trapped in unstable countries. • Japan and the United States will cooperate in the ways described above when confronted with “situations that may emerge in areas surrounding Japan.”23

Perhaps the most significant—and controversial—segment in the new defense pact is its provision for joint military cooperation in “areas surrounding Japan.” Most agree that the phrase refers to the Korean Peninsula. After all, it was the 1994 Korean nuclear crisis that prompted U.S. officials to call for a revision of the existing defense guidelines. But the phrase might also apply to other areas—including the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. U.S. officials emphasize that the new defense agreement is “not being aimed at any individual nation, any third nation.” 24 But they refuse to respond directly to questions about the pact’s geographical scope. For example, when asked if Taiwan is included in the scope of the new guidelines, Kurt Campbell replied that “this is an extremely delicate matter. . . . The clear guidelines for U.S. engagement towards Beijing and towards Taipei are encompassed in the three communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act.” 25 When asked if this means that “Taiwan will not be included in the security guidelines,” Campbell replied, “I didn’t say that and I didn’t answer that question.”26 On other occasions, high-ranking U.S. officials have stressed that “the guidelines are not defined in any way geographically” or that the agreement focuses on the help that Japan might be able to give “principally in the Korean Peninsula if the contingency ever arose [emphasis added].”27 Like their counterparts in Washington, most Japanese have been less than forthcoming when asked direct questions about the geographical parameters of the new defense agreement. For example, when Prime Minister Hashimoto traveled to China in September 1997, he never stated that Taiwan would be included or excluded from the scope of the guidelines. The prime minister only assured PRC officials that “my country will never support ‘two Chinas’ or Taiwan independence.”28 On other occasions, however, high-ranking Japanese officials have addressed the issue directly. On August 17, 1997, Seiroku Kajiyama, chief cabinet secretary, said that the new guidelines would “naturally cover” a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait.29 He added that “we have strong anxieties about a possible military liberation of Taiwan by mainland China.”30 Moreover, when discussing the guidelines in the Diet in May 1998, Toshiyuki Takano, then director-general of the Japanese

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Foreign Ministry’s North American Affairs Bureau, admitted that the agreement would cover Taiwan. 31 Not surprisingly, these remarks touched off a storm of protests in Beijing. The changes described above do not represent a radical shift in Japanese defense policy. Japan has agreed to participate in UN peacekeeping operations, but it will participate only under specific conditions. For example, Japan resisted Australian and U.S. pressures to provide troops to the peacekeeping operations in East Timor in 1999. Tokyo has emphasized that “the SDF’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations . . . will never entail the possibility of the use of force or the dispatch of armed forces to foreign countries for the purpose of using force, or the deployment of troops overseas, banned by article 9 of the constitution.”32 Although both the New Taiko and the revised defense guidelines do refer to bilateral military cooperation “in situations in areas surrounding Japan,” there is no specific geographical reference to other countries in these documents. They do not commit Tokyo to the defense of Korea or Taiwan. Indeed, both U.S. and Japanese officials emphasize that the reference is “a situational concept.” In May 1999, when the Japanese Diet ultimately approved legislation authorizing the SDF to aid U.S. forces during a regional crisis, Keizo Obuchi, then prime minister, emphasized that the new guidelines are “purely aimed at achieving the peace and security of our nation.”33 For Japan the real significance of the new policies lies in their shift in emphasis. During the Cold War, “almost no preparation or consideration that should have been made for events occurring elsewhere nearby Japan which would have a significant impact on Japan’s peace and security, was made.”34 With the recent changes in policy, however, “the focus has shifted from the possibility of military aggression against Japan, to responding to other situations which could impact the security of Japan.”35 As Hosei Norota, chief of the JDA, explained, “the law [authorizing the revised defense guidelines] contributes to deterring the breakout of military attacks against our country.”36 Summary

The Self-Defense Forces

The prime minister of Japan serves as the commander in chief of the SDF. He appoints a minister of state for defense who exercises general

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control over the JDA (an external agency of the prime minister’s office) and everyday SDF activities. Like the prime minister and all other state ministers, this official must be a civilian. Within the cabinet, a security council has been established to deliberate on important defense matters and coordinate policies during national emergencies. This body also submits the SDF’s budget and other important legislation related to defense to the Diet for its approval.37 In theory, the Diet exercises the ultimate control over all SDF activities—the power of the purse. In practice, however, it tends to ratify compromises already hammered out by Japan’s leading political parties, the JDA, and various government ministries. Since the 1950s, Japan has been building up its defense capability in line with the Basic Policy for National Defense and other basic policies discussed earlier in this chapter. At the present moment, the SDF is attempting to comply with those modifications outlined in the New Taiko:

• Streamlining the SDF’s defense capability and making the organization more compact • Making qualitative improvements in the SDF enabling it “to be able to effectively respond to a variety of situations” • Ensuring that the SDF is flexible enough “to deal with the development of changing situations”38

The discussion below examines the changing characteristics of the SDF.

Security analysts have described Japan’s GSDF as “the best balanced of the three services in terms of combat capability, save that of strategic or even major tactical mobility.”39 After the changes mandated in the New Taiko are completed, it will be equipped with one armored division, one airborne brigade, one helicopter brigade, eight antiaircraft artillery groups, and fourteen regionally deployed GSDF units (eight divisions with 6,000 to 9,000 personnel and six brigades with 3,000 to 4,000 personnel). Force levels will be cut from 180,000 to 160,000 authorized troops (145,000 regular personnel and 15,000 ready reserve personnel).40 The GSDF will continue to be supported by modern, domestically manufactured main battle tanks, armored vehicles, missiles, and helicopters. Major equipment in the GSDF’s inventory is outlined in Table 2.3. In keeping with basic Japanese security policies, the GSDF’s trainGround Self-Defense Forces

48 Table 2.3

Equipment

The Armies of East Asia Major Equipment of GSDF

Main Battle Tanks Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles Armored Personnel Carriers Towed and Self-Propelled Artillery Multiple Rocket Launchers Mortars Surface-to-Surface Missiles (coastal) Antitank Guided Weapons Rocket Launchers Recoilless Launchers Air Defense Guns Surface-to-Air Missiles Aircraft Attack Helicopters Transport Helicopters

Approximate Number 1,080 60 840 770 110 1,250 80 670 1,430 2,990 80 730 10+ 90 363+

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1999/2000 (London: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 192.

ing is directed toward defense rather than offense. The troops are described officially as “the force of last resort that directly defends the country’s territory and its people from, and repels, an enemy invasion.”41 But defense planners trust that the GSDF’s impressive military capabilities (along with the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty) will deter aggressors by keeping the costs of an attack prohibitively high. In addition to these traditional duties as a military force, the GSDF is charged with the responsibility for combating terrorist threats and performing “wide-ranging duties, such as disaster relief, international peace cooperation and international disaster relief activities.”42 During the Cold War, the GSDF was deployed in such a way as to protect the nation against military threats presented by the Soviet Union. In keeping with JDA plans, however, the GSDF began to shift the focus of its operations in early 2000. Forces now are being transferred from the northern regions of the country to the western regions. JDA sources claim that this will enable Tokyo to handle the threat of guerrilla or terrorist attacks that might arise from an emergency on the Korean Peninsula.43 The chief objective of the MSDF is to defend Japan “against sea-borne invasion and protect maritime traffic on the seas surrounding Japan.”44 Maritime Self-Defense Forces

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The JDA has warned that an obstruction of the sea-lanes surrounding Japan “would have serious consequences on its people’s livelihood, economic activity and the sustenance of its defense capability . . . [and] raise a serious difficulty in receiving aid from the US.” 45 It is the MSDF’s responsibility to secure the safety of maritime traffic to the distance of 1,000 nautical miles. The MSDF is a formidable military force. As outlined in Table 2.4, its inventory includes nine destroyers (some equipped with the U.S. AEGIS guided-missile system), forty-six frigates, sixteen submarines, and roughly 100 warplanes. During the Cold War, the structure of the MSDF emphasized antisubmarine and mine warfare. However, the New Taiko calls for a “more balanced” force that will be able to cope “with any situation which might threaten the safety of maritime traffic vital to the security of Japan.”46 It is anticipated that the MSDF will be able to conduct “a variety of operations ranging from surveillance and patrol in surrounding sea areas to such public welfare support as disaster relief activities.”47 In operational terms, the number of destroyer divisions, minesweeping flotillas, and land-based patrol aircraft units is being reduced. However, naval equipment will continue to be upgraded, training will be accelerated, and force levels will remain constant at roughly 42,000. The world caught a rare glimpse of Tokyo’s growing naval power when two suspected North Korean spy ships sailed into Japanese waters Table 2.4

Equipment

Major Equipment of the MSDF

Destroyers Frigates Submarines Patrol and Coastal Combatants Missile Craft Mine Countermeasures Amphibious LSTs (tank landing craft) Support and Miscellaneous Ships Combat Aircraft Armed Helicopters Antisubmarine Warfare Helicopters Mine Countermeasure Helicopters Transport Helicopters Search and Rescue Helicopters

Approximate Total 9 46 16 3 3 34 6 19 90 90 100 10 4 30

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1999/2000 (London: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 192.

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in March 1999. Responding to the incursion, Japanese ships fired live rounds as warning shots at the vessels—the first live shots fired at an enemy by Japanese warships since World War II. Not surprisingly, the North Korean ships raced home. Japanese defense planners comprehend that, given the nature of modern warfare, it is highly likely that any invasion of Japan would be preceded by an air attack. For this reason and because the SDF adheres to a passive defense policy, the JDA contends that “it is imperative for Japan to have an air defense capability highly capable of instantaneously responding to an invasion of its air space.”48 In addition to defending the nation against attack, the ASDF is supposed to maintain a capability to “carry out missions such as disaster relief dispatch, international peace cooperation assignments and international disaster relief activities.”49 Traditionally, Tokyo has suggested that should a need arise for operations requiring air strikes on enemy targets, it “expects the US air force to carry them out under the Japan-US security arrangements.”50 In 1999, however, the JDA announced that it might launch a preemptive air strike against an aggressor. In fact, according to some accounts, the ASDF has conducted secret studies on launching air raids against missile bases in North Korea.51 The ASDF relies upon modern fighter aircraft and Patriot missiles to carry out its mission. Major equipment in its arsenal is outlined in Table 2.5. Like the other branches of the SDF, the ASDF is a force in transiAir Self-Defense Forces

Table 2.5

Equipment

Major Equipment of the ASDF

Combat Aircraft Reconnaissance Airborne Early Warning (AWACS) Electronic Warfare Transport Aircraft Transport Helicopters Search and Rescue Aircraft and Helicopters Antiaircraft Missiles (Patriot)

Approximate Total 330 20 14 11 31+ 10 60 120

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1999/2000 (London: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 193.

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tion. The aircraft control and warning units are being reorganized and the number of fighter squadrons is being reduced from thirteen to twelve.52 New equipment also is being introduced. The ASDF is acquiring several E-767 Air Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft from the United States. Col. Kunio Orita, AWACS program manager for the ASDF, explains that the new spy planes are needed because “our existing radars do not give us the ability to monitor low-flying aircraft, either over land or sea, so we had to provide long-range coverage that would fill in this gap.”53 It also plans to ultimately acquire midair refueling aircraft that will provide Japanese warplanes with a greater range of operations.54 Moreover, production of the controversial F-2 warplane is proceeding and the first fighter was deployed in late 2000. When ultimately deployed, the ASDF anticipates that the expensive, new fighter will outperform U.S.-built F-16s.55 Finally, Tokyo has considered the purchase of Russian Sukhoi Su-27 fighters and it has agreed to help finance research on a sophisticated theater missile defense (TMD) system.56 With over 1,000 tanks, 330 warplanes, sixteen submarines, and fiftyfive warships, Japan’s SDF is one of the most powerful militaries in the world. As Adm. Robert J. Kelly, then commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, observed, “Japan has the capability to defend itself against all but perhaps a resurgence of the Soviet Union. They have invested a lot of money to build a very capable self-defense force.”57 However, the SDF differs from other modern militaries in one critical respect—it lacks the ability to project power. Summary

Defense Issues

The government of Japan is confronted with a wide range of issues that it has perceived to have serious security implications. These defense questions are now the subject of widespread debate within Japan. As Seiji Maehara, a Japanese lawmaker, observed, “Japan’s allergy to the military has been diluted, so we can now have a more constructive debate about defense issues.”58 The discussion below examines three overarching concerns related to Japan’s defense: (1) relations with the United States, (2) relations with China, and (3) relations with the two Koreas. Subsumed within the

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broad framework of this survey are problems relating to trade, proliferation, ballistic missile defense, the South China Sea, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, Taiwan, Korean unification, and Japan’s overall role in the post–Cold War era. During the Cold War, Japan played a vital role in the U.S. containment policy. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, however, the raison d’être for the U.S.-Japan security pact vanished. Concerns both nations once overlooked for the sake of national security emerged as major issues of contention. As a 1996 National Defense University study observed, the relationship began to deteriorate “because of the disappearance of the Soviet threat, the rise of trade tensions, and inertia or inattentiveness to alliance management.”59 U.S.-Japan trade has skyrocketed. Contrary to popular misconception, however, it is not a one-sided relationship. The United States now exports more products to Japan than it does to any nation outside of North America: Japan is the leading market for U.S. agricultural exports, aircraft, and such raw materials as wood. Nevertheless, Japan remains the United States’ top deficit country (Table 2.6) and many Americans believe that Japan engages in unfair trade practices. For example, an official U.S. government study complains that “while Japan has reduced its formal tariff rates on imports to very low levels, it has maintained non-tariff barriers—such as non-transparency, discriminatory standards, and exclusionary business practices—and a business environment that protects domestic companies and restricts the free Relations with the United States

Table 2.6

Top 10 United States Negative Trade Balances, 1999 ($ millions)

1. Japan 2. China 3. Canada 4. Germany 5. Mexico 6. Taiwan 7. Malaysia 8. Italy 9. Thailand 10. South Korea

–73,920 –68,668 –32,095 –28,305 –22,841 –16,077 –12,350 –12,344 –9,340 –8,308

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, U.S. Foreign Trade Highlights 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/industry/ otea/usfth/ aggregate/H99t13.txt

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flow of competitive foreign goods into the Japanese markets.”60 Some Japanese defense planners fear that with the end of the era of superpower rivalry, these economic frictions could “spill over” and adversely affect the U.S.-Japan security relationship.61 Trade disputes are not the only economic issues that undermine the U.S.-Japan relationship. In 1998, the World Bank warned that East Asia could plunge into a severe economic depression and that “the depression is being exported from one country to the other and everybody is going down at the same time.”62 The United States has long complained that Japan, often considered the engine for economic growth in the region, is not doing enough to reform its economy and stabilize financial markets.63 Other governments share this view. Anwar Ibrahim, former deputy prime minster of Malaysia, claimed that “the weakness of the yen and Tokyo’s slowness in putting its economy in order, particularly its foot-dragging, is threatening the fragile banking system and making the regional situation gloomy indeed.”64 Japan’s sluggish economy continues to undermine the region’s delicate economic recovery. In addition to economic tensions, the end of the Cold War has called into question some of the strategic underpinnings of the U.S.Japan security partnership. One set of issues involves the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan. Under the terms of the defense treaty, Japan hosts a U.S. Navy carrier battle group, the III Marine Expeditionary Force, the 5th Air Force, and elements of the U.S. Army’s I Corps. Some Japanese—particularly those who live in Okinawa—favor a significant reduction in U.S. troop strength. They contend that the “inconveniences” associated with protection under the security umbrella now outweigh the benefits. This argument was bolstered substantially after three American servicemen raped a twelve-year-old Japanese girl in September 1995.65 In early 2000, it appeared that Tokyo and Washington might be on a collision course over the issue of “host nation support.” At the time, the two governments were seeking to hammer out a new five-year support agreement. William Cohen, then secretary of defense, pleaded with Japanese officials not to cut the roughly $5 billion that Tokyo pays to keep U.S. troops in Japan. 66 However, some Japanese have long believed that Tokyo pays far too large a share of the costs associated with keeping such troops in Japan. 67 On the other hand, some Americans counter that “Japan’s much-touted host-nation support of $5 billion a year actually pays only a small fraction of the total cost of the U.S. security commitment.”68 Yet another dispute is associated with the sharing of defense tech-

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nology. Voices in the U.S. Congress have long expressed strong reservations about the joint production of the new Japanese warplane—the F-2. Perhaps the biggest debate, however, has revolved around the role that the SDF should adopt in response to recent changes in the international security environment. As described, the SDF was barred from operating outside of Japanese territory during the Cold War. Officials argued that such deployments would violate the 1947 constitution, and public opinion strongly supported the limitations placed on the SDF. However, the United States successfully pressured Tokyo into revising its policies. The SDF is now authorized to participate in overseas peacekeeping operations, and the governments of the United States and Japan have amended their long-standing guidelines for military cooperation in the event of a crisis or conflict in East Asia. But not all Japanese support these changes. Some Japanese fear that the new U.S.-Japan defense guidelines hold the potential to drag Tokyo into a major conflict with Pyongyang or Beijing. They contend that Tokyo should have more of a voice in the deployment of U.S. troops based in Japan and that the Japanese government should not “blindly” follow the lead of the United States.69 As Akio Watanabe, professor of international relations at Aoyama Gakuim University, observed, “If we’re very careless, we may unnecessarily provoke Beijing.”70 Katsumi Takeoka, former director-general of the JDA, was even more direct. In April 1999, Takeoka warned that “if this goes ahead, Japan will be involved in a war before it knows it.”71 Japanese officials profess that China does not represent an immediate threat to their country. As Kazuo Aichi, former minister of state for defense, explained, “At this point, I don’t think we can refer to China as a major threat.”72 However, Aichi also reflected the opinions of numerous Japanese when he added that Tokyo still needs “to carefully follow the trends in China from the perspective that they may become a threat.”73 Sino-Japanese relations have been troubled for over a century. Problems involve territorial, strategic, and economic issues. One territorial dispute involves islets situated in the East China Sea. Beijing argues that the islands (known as the Diaoyu Islands in Chinese and the Senkaku Islands in Japanese) belong to China and passed a law reaffirming its claims in 1992. In 1996, Japanese rightists built a lighthouse Relations with China

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on one of the islands—a move that ignited popular protests in Taiwan and Hong Kong and increased regional tensions. Another territorial dispute involves China’s claims to the entire South China Sea and Taiwan. Although Japan is not directly involved in these quarrels, it has a vital stake in their peaceful resolution. Tokyo is especially worried that China might resort to the use of force to achieve unification with Taiwan following the election of Chen Shui-bian as president of the latter in March 2000. A conflict in the Taiwan Strait could destabilize the entire region. In addition, a majority of Japan’s petroleum imports pass through waterways located in or near the South China Sea areas, and Japanese firms have expressed an interest in joint development of any energy resources discovered beneath it. In the strategic sphere, Japan’s wars of aggression against China have left an indelible imprint on relations between the two countries. Chinese concerns about a possible revival of Japanese militarism remain strong. The PRC is particularly irked by the recent changes in the U.S.-Japan security guidelines. Zhang Yunling, a Chinese academic, observed that “the Chinese side is very concerned about a US-Japan alliance targeted against them.”74 PRC authorities also contend that any move to put Taiwan within the scope of the U.S.-Japan security pact is a violation of China’s national sovereignty. When meeting with Japanese officials, Li Peng, then PRC premier, declared that “the Chinese government and the Chinese people can never accept any activity directly proposing or hinting obliquely at including Taiwan in the scope of the Japan-US security cooperation.”75 Indeed, PRC authorities have steadfastly insisted that it is “absolutely unacceptable for the Japan-US defense cooperation to cover the Taiwan region directly or indirectly.”76 It is clear that the PRC’s military buildup has unnerved large segments of the Japanese society. Public opinion polls reveal that 54 percent of the population believes that Beijing’s military buildup is a threat to stability in Asia and 46 percent believe the PRC will become a military threat to Japan.77 In April 2000 Shintaro Ishihara, Tokyo’s nationalist governor, declared that “China is the only empire left that still believes in expansionism—this is how the Communist Party is trying to hold on to power.”78 Not surprisingly, the JDA has cautioned that “we need to continue to pay attention to the modernization of its [China’s] nuclear forces, naval and air forces.”79 Finally, economic relations have generated tensions on numerous occasions. Japan is China’s main source of economic assistance, but Tokyo has cut aid on several occasions. For example, when China conducted a series of nuclear tests in 1996, Japan temporarily suspended its

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grants-in-aid program—a move that provoked a strong protest by Beijing. Moreover, Chinese officials resent “alleged efforts by Japanese government-backed companies to dominate key sectors of China’s market.”80 There also is a strong suspicion that Japanese firms operating in the PRC are reluctant to share advanced technologies with local corporations because of fears that the PRC firms will eventually compete with them. As Japan enters the new millennium, it enjoys a relatively amiable relationship with the ROK. Military cooperation between Tokyo and Seoul has expanded significantly. In 1999 the two governments conducted their first-ever joint naval training exercises. Some claim that the maneuvers heralded a new era of Japan-ROK security cooperation. However, many South Koreans still view the growth of Japanese military power with suspicion and alarm. With respect to the DPRK, Japan supports the implementation of the Agreed Framework and Four-Party Talks. Tokyo claims that the Agreed Framework is “the most realistic and effective option to prevent North Korean nuclear development.”81 At the same time, though, Tokyo remains extremely wary of Pyongyang. The JDA has cautioned that “because North Korea’s regime is extremely closed and its development difficult to predict, we need to continue to pay close attention to it.”82 It also has warned that “North Korean movements are raising military tensions on the Korean Peninsula while posing a serious destablizing factor for the entire area of East Asia, including Japan.”83 Particularly worrisome for Tokyo are the series of missiles tests undertaken by Pyongyang in the 1990s. In 1993, North Korea fired four Nodong-1 missiles into the Sea of Japan. That action led Tokyo to begin studying the feasibility of developing a ballistic missile defense system. In 1998, the DPRK fired a two-stage intercontinental Taepo Dong-1 ballistic missile directly across Japan, a move Hiromu Nonaku, Japan’s chief cabinet secretary, described as an “extremely dangerous act.”84 In late 1999, it appeared as if Pyongyang might launch yet another missile—an intercontinental Taepo Dong-2. Some officials fear that these weapons will be ultimately armed with nuclear or chemical warheads and fired at Japan (or the U.S. bases in Japan) if an emergency erupts on the Korean Peninsula. The JDA suspects that the DPRK already possesses at least one nuclear weapon, and most intelligence agencies believe that Pyongyang has tons of chemical weapons.85 Relations with the Koreas

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Pyongyang’s ballistic missile program came as a shock to Tokyo. Kent Calder, a special assistant to the U.S. ambassador to Japan, observed that it has served as “a catalyst for a lot of deep thinking in Japan about security.”86 Indeed, a Japanese defense analyst claimed that “the Taepo Dong came as almost as much a shock (to Japan) as Commander Perry’s black ships.” 87 The 1999 incursion of North Korean ships into Japanese waters—described by Japan’s media as an “invasion”—further heightened anxieties. Public opinion polls reveal that roughly 70 percent of Japan’s population is worried about a war with the DPRK.88 In response to North Korea’s belligerent behavior, Tokyo has agreed to help Washington finance research into a TMD system. According to reliable estimates, Japan will shoulder between $175 and $265 million of the costs associated with the project.89 Moreover, Tokyo has accelerated the development of a satellite surveillance system and plans to obtain an airborne-refueling capability so that its ASDF may retaliate against any North Korean attack. It also has threatened to launch a preemptive strike against any nation preparing a missile strike against Japan. Toshiyuki Shikata, a retired Japanese general, claims that these moves are the only realistic response to a threat from the DPRK: We have four options. We could just keep smiling and continuing the “sunshine policy” toward North Korea, or develop our own longrange missiles, which people in the region and our own public opinion would oppose. Between these two extremes we are choosing two other options: developing a theater missile-defense system with the US, which would take several years, and giving Japan retaliation capability through its air force. If a Korean missile should fall in Japanese territory and particularly cause casualties or some destruction, the Prime Minister could then order the destruction of North Korean missile sites, and I believe the Japanese public would support the Government in these measures.90

Other Japanese military authorities insist Tokyo’s response to Pyongyang is “not so much about making the defense forces bigger. It’s about changing strategy.”91 The collapse and/or implosion of the DPRK represents another potential challenge to Japanese security interests. Given the deep-rooted hostility between Korea and Japan (the Koreans have not forgotten Japan’s brutal occupation of their country from 1895 to 1945), Tokyo cannot rule out the possibility that a united Korea might represent a threat to Japan. In fact, there already is some speculation that the ROK is planning for the day when a united Korea will have to “square off”

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with Japan.92 A related concern is the possibility that unification of Korea might lead to a significant reduction in U.S. force levels in East Asia—a development that could undermine Japan’s passive defense strategy. In addition to the concerns discussed above, there are a wide variety of other issues that could have serious implications for Japan’s security. Tokyo’s relationship with Moscow is one of these. Although no longer viewed as a major threat, Russia continues to occupy the Northern Territories and little progress has been made toward resolving this dispute.93 Furthermore, the 1996–1997 hostage crisis in Peru raised important questions about how the SDF should respond to international terrorist threats. On the domestic front, there are demands for additional defense cutbacks in the face of Japan’s continuing economic difficulties.94 There also have been efforts to elevate the status of the JDA to a full-fledged cabinet-level ministry, while others are pressing the government to lift the ban on arms exports.95 Perhaps most alarming to some of Japan’s neighbors, a rising number of prominent Japanese—including former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone—are now calling on the Diet to scrap article 9 of the constitution. In February 2000, a special commission in the Diet held its first meeting to discuss the possibility of revising the constitution and dropping article 9.96 Other Issues

Conclusion

Despite severe financial difficulties, Japan has entered the new millennium as an economic superpower. It is the world’s second largest trading nation and enjoys a GDP second in the world only to that of the United States. Moreover, Tokyo’s military muscle has grown dramatically in recent years. The country’s armed forces now control fifty-eight warships, sixteen submarines, 330 combat aircraft and roughly 1,100 main battle tanks. This enormous accretion of power, along with Tokyo’s willingness to play a more active role in the maintenance of regional peace and stability, is making some of Japan’s neighbors nervous. China complains that Japan’s military might does not match its

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pacifist pronouncements. It has warned that “few people can see an obstacle to Japan’s development of new weapons” and suspects that the new U.S.-Japan security guidelines “might be a reflection of a renewed Japanese ambition of becoming a world military power.” 97 When Japan’s Diet approved the revised defense agreement in 1999, Zhu Bangzao, China’s foreign ministry spokesman, proclaimed that “China is gravely concerned about Japan’s act of going against the historical trend and its insistence on strengthening Japan-US military cooperation. . . . Japan should honor its solemn commitment not to become a military power.”98 China’s ambassador to the United States, Li Zhaoxing, has even charged that Japan, shielded by its U.S. nuclear umbrella, “constitutes a sort of nuclear threat to China.”99 Similar concerns have been raised on the Korean Peninsula. An editorial in the Korean Herald, a major South Korean newspaper, cautioned that “although the current constitution controls the arbitrary use of force by Japan, skeptics are concerned that once the restrictions are lifted its planes and warships might clear the way for further military advances into the international scene.”100 Like their Chinese counterparts, some ROK officials have voiced deep reservations about the scope of the revised U.S.-Japan security pact.101 Others are concerned about Tokyo’s participation in the TMD and other moves designed to bolster its defensive capabilities. The Korean Herald also has warned that “these defensive measures are now a new source of concern as we believe the projects will make Japan a military power once again with strikingly sophisticated capabilities.”102 As for Pyongyang, it has charged that “the Japan reactionaries, who suffered a miserable defeat during World War II, are still pursuing the ambition for overseas expansion and traversing along the path towards a great military power and nuclear armament, instead of seeking a serious lesson from their defeat.”103 The DPRK believes that Tokyo is “a direct threat to the security of mankind and to global peace.” 104 It describes the U.S.-Japan defense guidelines as “nothing but military steps to reinvade Korea . . . they are even threatening a ‘preemptive attack’ on the DPRK.”105 To some degree, the concerns voiced by Beijing, Seoul, and Pyongyang are justified. For example, Japan has long claimed to abide by article 9 in the 1947 constitution—however, it is clear that the ban on “land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential” has been ignored for almost five decades. Japan now has more tanks and warships than Great Britain and many regional powers. The Diet also has

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established a special commission to study the possibility of scrapping article 9. One does not have to look far to find other inconsistencies in Japan’s defense policy. In the early 1970s, Japan proclaimed that the SDF could not acquire weapons systems that might appear threatening to other nations. Less than a decade later, however, it announced that the SDF could not possess arms that would “cause mass destruction to the territory of neighboring states,” a move some contend “dramatically raised the upper ceiling of the weaponry permitted under the Constitution.”106 In the mid-1990s, the ceiling was raised even further when the JDA stated that the SDF could not possess “offensive weapons that, from their performance, are to be used exclusively for the total destruction of other countries [emphasis added].”107 In 1999, Hosei Norota, director-general of the JDA, proclaimed that “it has been understood that we are legally allowed to have the minimum capability to directly attack enemy bases if there is no other way.”108 In fact, Tokyo’s 1999 Defense White Paper asserts that Japan may launch preemptive strikes against other countries if it feels threatened by them.109 In 1976, Japan officially banned the export of arms and the export of technology used to manufacture weapons. However, several years later Tokyo responded favorably to a U.S. request to quietly lift the ban on technology transfers. Since 1983, Japan has transferred “technology related to portable Surface to Air Missiles, technology for the construction of US naval vessels, technology for the remodeling of US naval vessels, technology related to fighters (the F-2 fighter), related technology for the Digital Flight Control System (DFCS) to be installed on P3C anti-submarine patrol aircraft, technology related to joint research on a ducted rocket engine and technology related to joint research in ‘advanced steel technology,’ as well as technology involving the production of the F-2 system.”110 During the Cold War, Tokyo insisted that it could not participate in international or “collective security” operations because such activities were prohibited by the constitution. For example, during the late 1980s “Japan flatly turned down a request from the United States to participate in the multilateral naval force sent to the Persian Gulf in the wake of an attack on an American ship.”111 Tokyo also refused to send its minesweepers to the Middle East until after the cease-fire was declared in the Gulf War. However, Japan has now agreed to participate in international peacekeeping operations—a move the Diet approved without amending the constitution. Perhaps more astonishing, Tokyo now has agreed to cooperate with U.S. military forces should an emergency arise

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in “areas surrounding Japan.” In late 1999, the armed forces of the two countries engaged in an unprecedented “detailed map exercise” that focused on the military role that the SDF would play should an emergency arise in the region.112 Even one of the most sacred tenets of Japan’s defense policy— adherence to the three nonnuclear principles—appears questionable. Japan claims to abide by the three nonnuclear principles and ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1976. In 1994, Senator Sam Nunn, then chairman of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, said that Tokyo’s ban on nuclear weapons must be viewed as “an interim, temporary position.”113 In 1997, British intelligence sources reported that “Japan has acquired all the parts necessary for a nuclear weapon and may even have built a bomb which requires only enriched plutonium for completion.”114 In sum, Tokyo’s compliance with its declared defense policies has proved to be inconsistent and selective. But these inconsistencies and the recent adjustments in Japanese defense policy should not be exaggerated. Although Tokyo possesses the capability to develop weapons of mass destruction (and delivery systems), it has not done so. It does not yet possess the capability to launch a preemptive strike against a hostile neighbor. Japan does possess an ample supply of destroyers, frigates, and submarines—but these vessels have no aircraft carriers to escort. 115 The SDF’s inventory of modern fighter aircraft is most impressive; however, it has no long-range bombers and it will be some years before it acquires aerial-refueling capability. Tokyo enhanced its ability to gather intelligence by establishing the Defense Intelligence Headquarters in 1997. But it will be some time before it deploys its four spy satellites. Japan’s aging Nike interceptor missiles have been replaced with improved Patriot ground-based antimissile systems. Even so, U.S. defense analysts contend that “no matter how many Patriots could be deployed, there would be no possibility of defending 140,000 miles of territory against even a minimum of North Korean Taepo-Dong ballistic missiles.116 It will be many years before Washington and Tokyo will be able to deploy a TMD in East Asia. (Some contend that the expensive defense system will never work.) Finally, it will probably be five or ten years before Tokyo scraps article 9 of the constitution. As Keizo Obuchi, then prime minister, observed, “In Japan currently it is impossible to revise these provisions immediately.”117 Despite charges to the contrary, it is clear that the present configuration of Japan’s military power complies with its “minimum necessary force” proclamations. At present, the SDF still has no means of con-

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ducting major operations outside its own immediate area and must depend on the United States to cope with major threats. As one defense analyst observed, “It appears Japan is to be denied, or is to deny itself, the critical element of deterrence possessed by a state: the ability to strike back on its own terms.”118 Perhaps equally important, the new U.S.-Japan defense guidelines do not portend a momentous change in policy. Under the terms of the 1960 alliance, Tokyo already was pledged to help the United States if “the security of the Far East [was] threatened.” 119 This fact was acknowledged in a secret study commissioned by the JDA after China staged provocative “missile tests” off Taiwan’s coastline in 1996.120 Indeed, Prime Minister Hashimoto reportedly ordered the JDA to draw up comprehensive plans to support U.S. forces if war broke out during the crisis.121 But with the new defensive arrangement, U.S. planners will have some idea of the level of support they may expect from Tokyo if the United States becomes embroiled in a future crisis in East Asia and they will be able to call upon Tokyo for that support. One Japanese legislator explained that “for Japan, the US and China, the role Japan should play in crisis situations is now more defined. Now it’s become clear exactly how far the SDF can go.”122 The year 2000 marked the fortieth anniversary of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Although the Cold War is over, both Washington and Tokyo continue to derive numerous benefits from the alliance.123 For example, the United States retains forward military bases that could prove critical during a regional crisis. Moreover, Tokyo shoulders a substantial portion of the costs associated with stationing troops in Japan and has agreed to play a more active role in the event of hostilities in East Asia. For its part, “the US-Japan security relationship is and will be indispensable for the security of Japan.”124 Tokyo retains a powerful ally that may help it cope with possible threats from North Korea, China, or a resurgent Russia. Other benefits include the need for only moderate increases in military expenditures, technology, and arms transfers that may help the SDF enhance its defensive capabilities and a powerful partnership that bolsters Tokyo’s bargaining position when negotiating with other states. Not surprisingly, almost 70 percent of the Japanese people support the maintenance of the present U.S.-Japan security arrangement. Polls also reveal that over 80 percent of Japanese and 70 percent of Americans expect the two countries to remain good friends during the twenty-first century.125 So long as the security treaty remains functional, it is highly unlikely that Japan will make any radical changes in its defense-only security posture.

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1. See Tesuo Maeda, The Hidden Army: The Untold Story of Japan’s Military Forces (Chicago: Edition Q, Inc., 1995), p. 38. 2. John W. Dower, Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878–1954 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 380–381. 3. Kenneth B. Pyle, The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1992), p. 27. 4. Ibid. 5. Maeda, The Hidden Army, p. 35. 6. Force levels of the three services were set at 150,000 for the GSDF, 15,808 for the MSDF, and 6,287 for the ASDF. Ibid., p. 76. 7. Maeda, The Hidden Army, p. 39. 8. Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan, 1997 (Tokyo: Defense Agency, 1997), p. 101. 9. Ibid. for a complete text of the Basic Policy for National Defense, p. 281. 10. Maeda, The Hidden Army, p. 99. 11. For more information about Japan’s importance to the United States during the Vietnam conflict, see Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, “Japan’s National Security: Structures, Norms and Policies,” in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., East Asian Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 292–293. 12. Defense Agency, Defense Strategy of Japan on the World Wide Web at http://cssew/01.cs.nda.ax.jp/~yas/JDA/DOJ/Policy.html#NAME1 13. Any crisis beyond that level would be handled by the U.S.-Japan security arrangements. For more information, see Yoshihide Soeya, “Japan: Normative Constraints Versus Structural Imperatives,” Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 212. 14. Japan also ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1976. For more information, see Defense Agency, Defense of Japan, 1997, p. 103. 15. Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan, 1997, p. 112. 16. Maeda has argued that “the presence of the Soviet Union in an official document as a hypothetical enemy was never so clear; the document did everything but name the Soviet Union.” Hidden Army, p. 207. 17. For example, the CIA spent millions of dollars to support conservative politicians in the Liberal Democratic Party during the 1950s and 1960s. The practice only came to an end in the early 1970s. See Tim Weiner, “CIA Spent Millions to Support Japanese Right in 50s and 60s,” New York Times, October 9, 1994, p. 1 in Lexis/Nexis. 18. Ian Gow, “Civilian Control of the Military in Postwar Japan,” in Ron Matthews and Keisuke Matsuyama, Japan’s Military Renaissance? (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), p. 58. 19. Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan, 1997, p. 68. 20. Yoshihide Soeya, “Japan: Normative Constraints Versus Structural Imperatives,” p. 221.

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21. Nigel Holloway, Matt Forney, Peter Landers, and Michael Vatikiotis, “Not to Our Liking,” Far Eastern Economic Review, June 26, 1997, p. 18. 22. Nigel Holloway and Peter Landers, “Ménage à Trois?” Far Eastern Economic Review, October 9, 1997, p. 24. 23. For more information on the specific terms of the agreement, see Lee Myers, “Risking China’s Wrath, U.S. and Japan Bolster Military Ties,” New York Times, September 24, 1997, p. A7 in Lexis/Nexis; Willis Witter, “Japanese Troops to Go Near Combat if U.S. Fights in Area; New Pact Faces Parliamentary Battles,” Washington Times, September 23, 1997, p. A13 in Lexis/Nexis; Todd Crowell and Murakami Mutsuko, “Japan Rising,” Asiaweek, June 20, 1997, p. 20 in Lexis/Nexis; and National Institute for Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review, pp. 323–326. 24. Steven Lee Myers, “Risking China’s Wrath, U.S. and Japan Bolster Military Ties,” New York Times, September 24, 1997, p. A7 in Lexis/Nexis. 25. See “Foreign Press Center Briefing, Issues in the Asia Pacific: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia and Pacific Affairs, Kurt Campbell,” Federal News Service, September 19, 1997, in Lexis/Nexis. 26. Ibid. 27. Joseph Fitchett, “A U.S. Push for Chinese Military ‘Transparency,’” International Herald Tribune, October 9, 1997, p. 10 in Lexis/Nexis. 28. “Japan Backs Beijing on Taiwan Issue,” South China Morning Post, September 6, 1997, World Wide Web at http://www.scmp.com/index.asp 29. Nicholas Kristof, “For Japan, A Quandary on Pleasing Two Giants,” New York Times, August 24, 1997, p. 9 in Lexis/Nexis. 30. Ibid. 31. Following his statement, Takano was removed from his position. See “Foreign Ministry Official Ousted for Remarks on Defense,” Jiji Press Ticker Service, July 7, 1998, in Lexis/Nexis. 32. Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan, 1997, p. 67. 33. “Japan Passes Law to Strengthen US Defense Ties,” Agence France Presse, May 24, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/AFP/AFP/-990524.htm 34. National Institute for Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review, 1996–1997 (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 1996), p. 41. 35. Ibid. 36. “Japan Passes Law to Strengthen US Defense Ties,” Agence France Presse. 37. For more information, see John E. Endicott, “Japan,” in Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti, eds., The Defense Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study, 3d ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994, pp. 365–366. 38. Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan, 1997, p. 122. 39. Brian Cloughley, “Japan Ponders Power Projection,” International Defense Review, 29, 7 (July 1, 1996), p. 27 in Lexis/Nexis. 40. According to the JDA, the ready reserve personnel “are well trained and have ready capabilities who can operate as members of front-line forces along with regular personnel.” See Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan, 1997, p. 192. 41. Ibid., p. 107.

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42. Ibid. 43. “GSDF Plan to Shift Focus to Defense of West of Japan,” Daily Yomiuri, February 20, 2000, p. 1 in Lexis/Nexis. 44. Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan, 1997, p. 108. 45. Ibid., p. 109. 46. Japan Defense Agency, A New Era in Defense, on the World Wide Web at http://www.jad.go.jp/pab/kouho/taikou/made_e.htm 47. Ibid. 48. Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan, 1997, p. 110. 49. Ibid. 50. Ibid. 51. Suvendrini Kakuchi, “Security-Japan: Jittery Over North Korea, East Asian Tensions,” Inter Press Service (Tokyo), August 5, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. 52. Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan, 1997, p. 124. 53. Peter Grier, “AWACS Land in Japan,” Air Force Magazine, June 1998, p. 12 in Lexis/Nexis. 54. Ginny Parker, “Japan Strengthening Its Forces,” Associated Press, September 10, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/AP-AP-Japan-Stengthening-Its-Forces.htm 55. “Japan’s Defense Industry Is Large, Capable and High-Tech—but Isolated, Home Alone,” Economist, June 14, 1997, p. S13 in Lexis/Nexis. 56. Although two ASDF pilots completed an Su-27 training program, Tokyo has announced that it has no plans to purchase the warplanes. See “Japan Completes Su-27 Trials,” Jane’s Defense Weekly 29, 24 (June 17, 1998) in Lexis/Nexis. 57. Peter J. Wooley and Mark S. Wooley, “Japan’s Sea Lane Defense Revisited,” Strategic Review 34, 4 (Fall 1996), p. 49. 58. Chester Dawson, “Flying the Flag,” Far Eastern Economic Review, August 12, 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://203.105.48.72/9908_12/ p18security.html 59. Patrick M. Cronin, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance Redefined,” Strategic Forum 75 (May 1996), p. 2. 60. U.S. Trade Representative, 1997 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997), p. 185. 61. National Institute for Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review, 1996–1997 (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 1996), p. 208. 62. Linda Choy, “Asia on Brink of Depression: World Bank,” South China Morning Post, June 17, 1998, in Lexis/Nexis. 63. David E. Sanger, “US Sees New Villain in Asia Crisis: Japan’s Government,” New York Times, February 22, 1998, on the World Wide Web at http:/www.nytimes.com/library/financial/022298g7-meeting.html 64. Ibid. 65. Following the crime, the United States agreed to return a portion of the land used for U.S. bases in Okinawa to local owners. But troop levels on the island will remain about the same. See William M. Carpenter, “Japan,” in William M. Carpenter and David G. Wiencek, eds., Asian Security Handbook: An Assessment of Political-Security Issues in the Asia-Pacific Region (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1996), pp. 172–173.

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66. Robert Burns, “Cohen to Press Japan on US Troops,” Associated Press, March 15, 2000, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/AP/AP-031500.htm 67. In 1996, Japan provided $4.57 billion or roughly 78 percent of the total cost of stationing U.S. troops in the country. See Robert G. Sutter, CRS Issue Brief, Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress in the 1990s (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, October 14, 1997), p. 2. 68. Ted Galen Carpenter, “Paternalism and Dependence,” CATO Institute Policy Analysis, November 1, 1995, p. 1. 69. Sheryl WuDunn, “Japanese Move to Broaden Military Links to the U.S.,” New York Times, April 29, 1998, p. A6. 70. Ibid. 71. Michiyo Nakamoto, “Japan: Defense Role Strengthened,” Financial Times, April 30, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. 72. Ronald Brownstein, “Their Views Differ, but Japan, US Horizons Are Dominated by China,” Los Angeles Times, September 15, 1997, p. A5 in Lexis/Nexis. 73. Ibid. 74. Todd Crowell and Murakami Mutsuko, “Japan Rising?” Asiaweek, June 20, 1997, p. 20 in Lexis/Nexis. 75. “Japan Urged to Learn from Past,” Beijing Review 40, 38 (September 22–28, 1997), on the World Wide Web at http://www.chinanews.org/bjreview/ bjreview.http 76. “China Calls Japan Explanation on US Defense Cooperation, ‘Obscure and Unconvincing,’” Xinhua News Agency, October 9, 1997, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, October 11, 1997, in Lexis/Nexis. 77. Pierre-Antoine Donnet, “China Fears Spur Alliance with US,” South China Morning Post, June 6, 1997, on the World Wide Web at http://www.scmp. com/index.asp and “Mainland Growing as Rival to Japan,” South China Morning Post, September 3, 1997, on the World Wide Web at http://www.scmp. com/index.asp 78. “Mainland Official Calls Tokyo Comments ‘Absurd,’” China Post, April 29, 2000, p. 2. 79. Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan, 1997, p. 51. 80. Robert Sutter, “Japan-China Relations: Status, Outlook and Implications for the United States,” CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, October 30, 1996), p. 7. 81. “Japan-US Defense Ties ‘Stablize Asia,’” Agence France Presse, April 24, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/AFP/AFP-990424.htm 82. Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan, 1997, p. 35. 83. Ibid., p. 37. 84. Sheryl WuDunn, “North Korea Fires Missile Over Japanese Territory,” New York Times, September 1, 1998, p. A6. 85. Robert Whymant, “North Korea May Have Nuclear Bomb,” The Times, June 4, 1998, in Lexis/Nexis, and “Japan Sees North Korea Having at least 1 Nuclear Weapon,” Kyodo News International, June 8, 1998, in Lexis/Nexis.

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86. Chester Dawson, “Flying the Flag,” Far Eastern Economic Review, August 12, 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://203.105.48.72/9908_12/ p18security.html 87. “North Korea: Famine, Rockets and Nukes,” Jakarta Post, May 19, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. 88. Howard W. French, “2 Wary Neighbors Unite to Confront North Korea Arms,” New York Times, August 4, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. 89. “Japan, US to Share Missile Research,” Associated Press, August 16, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research, on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/AP/AP-Japan-US-to-Share-Missile-Research.htm 90. Howard W. French, “2 Wary Neighbors Unite to Confront North Korea Arms.” For a more detailed analysis of “possible countermeasures” available to Tokyo, see National Institute for Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review, 1998–1999 (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 1999), pp. 70–76. 91. Parker, “Japan Strengthening Its Forces.” 92. Paul Richter, “South Korea’s Defense Effort Fails to Pass US Muster,” Los Angeles Times, April 12, 1997, p. A9 in Lexis/Nexis. 93. Some Japanese authorities hope that high-level summits scheduled for 2000 and 2001 ultimately may resolve these problems. 94. In 1998, Tokyo slashed $8.6 billion from defense spending planned over the next three years. See “Japanese Arms Exports Ban May Be Eased,” Jane’s Defense Weekly 29, 1, p. 13 in Lexis/Nexis. 95. Ibid. for more information; and see Damon Bristow, “Japan Denies Ministry Status to Def Agency,” International Defense Digest 31, 1 (January 1, 1998), p. 9 in Lexis/Nexis. 96. Jim Mann, “In Asia, Another Rising Star Is Born,” Los Angeles Times, February 23, 2000, p. A5 in Lexis/Nexis. 97. Jasper Becker, “Fears Grow Over Buildup in Japan,” South China Morning Post, December 8, 1995, in Lexis/Nexis, and Mary Kwang, “China Wants Tokyo to Clarify Pact,” Straits Times (Singapore), May 27, 1998, p. 18 in Lexis/Nexis. 98. “Japan Passes Law to Strengthen Defense Ties,” Agence France Presse, May 24, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/AFP/AFP-990524.htm 99. “Japan a Threat to China, Ambassador to US Says,” Japan Economic Newswire, June 13, 1998, in Lexis/Nexis. 100. “Japan’s Growing Arsenal,” Korea Herald, March 31, 1998, in Lexis/Nexis. 101. See “South Korea Slams Japan-US Defense Cooperation Guidelines,” Xinhua News Agency, September 25, 1997, in Lexis/Nexis. 102. Dawson, “Flying the Flag,” Far Eastern Economic Review. 103. “Relations with Japan,” Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang) in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 23, 1995, in Lexis/Nexis. 104. Ibid. 105. “Japan’s Dream of Overseas Aggression Flawed,” Korean News: News from the Korean Central News Agency of the DPRK, May 15, 2000, on the World Wide Web at http://www.Kcna. Co.jp/

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106. Maeda, The Hidden Army, p. 116. 107. Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan, 1997, p. 102. 108. “Japan Criticizes Chinese Missile Launch,” Agence France Presse, August 3, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/AFP/AFP-JapanCriticizes ChineseMissileLaunch.htm 109. Parker, “Japan Strengthening Its Forces.” 110. Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan, 1997, p. 171. 111. Donald C. Hellman, “Contemporary United States–Japan Security Relations: Old Myths, New Realities,” in June Teufel Dreyer, ed., Asian Pacific Regional Security (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute Press, 1990), p. 51. 112. “Govt Plans Map Drill for Korea Emergency,” Daily Yomiuri, November 22, 1999, p. 1 in Lexis/Nexis. 113. Mikio Ikuma, “Nunn Says Japan Could Develop Nuclear Weapons,” Daily Yomiuri, February 1, 1994, p. 1 in Lexis/Nexis. 114. Andrew Mack, “Potential, Not Proliferation,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 53, 4 (July 17, 1997), p. 48 in Lexis/Nexis, and “North Korea Crisis Warning; Japan Has ‘All Parts for Bomb,’” South China Morning Post, January 31, 1994, p. 1 in Lexis/Nexis. 115. According to estimates, “within 30 months, Japan could construct an aircraft carrier from the keel up. . . . If the requirement arose, Japan could produce a worked-up carrier battle group within four years and another the following year.” See Brian Cloughley, “Japan Ponders Power Projection,” International Defense Review 29, 7 (July 1, 1996), p. 27 in Lexis/Nexis. 116. Ibid. 117. “Japan Not Ready to Expand Global Military Role—PM,” Reuters, May 1, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/Reu/Reu-990501.htm 118. Cloughley, “Japan Ponders Power Projection.” 119. As Philip Bowring observed, “The Taiwan Strait has always been implicitly included in the US-Japanese treaty.” See Philip Bowring, “Behind the Noise About Taiwan Is a Chinese Strategic Vision,” International Herald Tribune, September 5, 1997, p. 8 in Lexis/Nexis. 120. Victor Lai and Sofia Wu, “Japan Mulling Its Role in WashingtonBeijing Military Conflict,” Central News Agency, July 27, 1997, in Lexis/Nexis. 121. Jason Blatt, “Scheme to Back Troops,” South China Morning Post, July 28, 1997, on the World Wide Web at http://www.scmp.com/index.asp 122. Holloway and Landers, “Ménage à Trois?” p. 24. 123. For a complete discussion of these benefits, see Shinichi Ogawa, “Significance of the Post–Cold War US-Japan Alliance and Prospects for Security Cooperation,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis VI, 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 57–78. 124. Ibid., p. 61. 125. “Most Pollees Upbeat on Japan-US Relationship,” Daily Yomiuri, December 19, 1999, p. 1 in Lexis/Nexis.

3 The Chinese Military he People’s Republic of China (PRC) should loom large as a factor in any government’s strategic calculations toward East Asia. China enjoys one of the fastest growing economies on earth and is the world’s most populous nation. It also possesses the world’s largest military and third-largest nuclear arsenal. As the Western Pacific moves into the new millennium, many observers believe that the region’s prosperity and security will be shaped increasingly by the economic and security trajectories of China.

T

Defense Policy

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is dedicated to two paramount missions: guaranteeing the internal security of the PRC and defending it against external attack. Although these tasks are not mutually exclusive, it may facilitate analysis to examine each of these duties individually before discussing other basic policies relating to China’s defense. In 1998, Gen. Chi Haotian, then vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, state councilor, and defense minister, proclaimed that “the Chinese people’s utmost important tasks are to develop China’s economy, accelerate construction, transform China’s poverty and backwardness, and upgrade their living standards materially and culturally.”1 This statement did not reflect a change in PRC policy. Officials in Beijing have long stressed that economic development must take precedence over military modernization—defense received the lowest priority in the so-called four modernizations when drafted during the late 1970s Internal Security Policies

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(behind the modernization of agriculture, industry, science, and technology). The collapse of the Soviet empire has reinforced this conviction. China’s leaders now recognize that “national security depends more upon overall national strength, based on a solid economy, than on military might.”2 According to the PLA’s 2000 Defense White Paper, “The Chinese government insists that economic development be taken as the center, while defense work be subordinate to and in the service of the nation’s overall economic construction.”3 Economic modernization is closely tied to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) paramount goal of regime survival. President Jiang Zemin has warned that “if we fail to develop our economy rapidly, it will be very difficult for us to consolidate the Socialist system and maintain long-term stability.”4 Should the rule of the CCP be threatened—a distinct possibility given the myriad of political, economic, and social problems that now confront China—the PLA is charged with the responsibility of defending it. In fact, the PLA plays a central role in maintaining the CCP’s monopoly on power in China. Described by security analysts as “the military arm of the CCP,” the PLA has intervened in China’s domestic politics on numerous occasions to protect the interests of the party.5 The PLA (then the “Red Army”) was responsible for bringing the CCP to power during the late 1940s. During the tumultuous Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), it was often called upon to restore domestic order (some portions of China even came under direct military rule) and/or lend support to various CCP factions. The PLA also played an important role in deposing the so-called Gang of Four shortly after Mao Zedong’s death and, more recently, it was responsible for crushing the pro-democracy demonstrations in Tiananmen Square. China’s military will continue to serve the CCP in the future. President Jiang has vowed that the PLA will remain “under the absolute leadership” of the CCP.6 In addition to protecting the CCP regime from internal threats, the PLA has long played another key role in China’s domestic politics— assisting the state in the critical task of “national construction.” Following the founding of the PRC in 1949, “soldiers contributed to the rehabilitation of China’s battle-scarred economy . . . [and] also assisted in the land-redistribution process, set up state farms, and supported the collectivization of industry and agriculture.”7 The PLA continues to make such contributions. According to official PRC accounts, the military has “taken an active part in and fully supported the nation’s economic construction” in the following ways:

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• Turning military facilities over to the public or converting them to civilian use. For example, over the past twenty years the PLA has opened more than 100 airports, 300 special railway lines, 29 harbors, and 3 million square meters of land to civilian use. • Participating in emergency rescues and disaster work. Over the past two decades, the PLA has participated in such operations on more than 100,000 occasions. • Participating in the construction of key national and local projects. During the past twenty years, the PLA has contributed to hundreds of transportation, energy, and conservation projects. • Bringing the superiority of talented personnel and technology into full play and assisting people with the use of science and technology. The PLA has transferred important findings to the civilian section and/or offered its assistance in resolving “key” technical problems. • Supporting agriculture and assisting poverty relief and development efforts. The PLA has built hundreds of irrigation channels, dams, and dikes. It also has helped poor communities establish over 3,500 village and township enterprises. • Participating in work for the public good. For example, the PLA has planted more than 400 million trees and helped to build schools. • Training competent personnel both for military and civilian services. Since the 1980s, the PLA has organized special training courses to educate officers and enlisted personnel.8

The PLA was particularly active in providing disaster relief when floods swept China in 1998. According to official accounts, “The PLA contributed more than 300,000 officers and men, as well as 12,500 motor vehicles, 1,170 boats and ships and over 200 planes, repaired or reinforced dikes and dams over 10,000 kilometers long, closed breaches and removed dangers in more than 14,000 places.”9 Activities such as these have led the Chinese government to boast that the PLA “has made significant contributions to the country’s prosperity and development.”10 In addition to its domestic responsibilities, the PLA must “consolidate national defense; resist invasion; protect the sovereignty over China’s External Security Policies

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territorial land, air space, and waters, and marine rights and interests; and safeguard China’s reunification and security.”11 Given the fact that the PRC shares borders with fourteen countries, has a seacoast that is 18,000 kilometers long and lays claim to territories not under its jurisdiction, meeting these “basic objectives of China’s national defense policy” has proved to be a daunting task.12 Not surprisingly, the strategies employed to achieve these goals have changed significantly since 1949. As described below, the PRC’s defense doctrine has passed through several stages.

“People’s war.” During the first several decades that followed the establishment of the PRC, the country was beset by powerful enemies. The United States and/or the Soviet Union represented very real threats to the survival of the regime. And, at the same time, China was a relatively backward country with an underdeveloped economy. Consequently, the PLA pursued a military strategy that was quite different from that of other powers. From 1949 until the mid-1970s, the PLA followed a military doctrine described as “people’s war.” Developed by Mao Zedong (who borrowed heavily from Sun Tzu, the classical Chinese strategist), “people’s war” was a strategy by which small numbers of guerrillas could defeat an objectively stronger enemy. Enemy forces would be lured deeply into China and then surrounded, attacked, and ultimately defeated: “People’s War doctrine envisioned swift and mobile guerrilla harassment of an aggressor’s overextended supply line. . . . This active and total defense strategy is based on the PRC’s strengths of geography, manpower, organization, and size. It is a total war concept in which the entire population plays a role.”13 The doctrine is said to have contributed to CCP victories during World War II and the Chinese Civil War. During the 1960s, an additional element was added to this unconventional approach toward defense. On October 16, 1964, China successfully exploded its first atomic bomb. Shortly afterward, Beijing launched its first nuclear missile and detonated its first hydrogen bomb.14 Although China quickly embraced a “no first use” policy with respect to nuclear weapons, the possession of a “minimal low-tech nuclear force” became a critical element in China’s defense policy.15 Beijing’s nuclear arsenal provided the PLA with an ability to deter potential enemies with a limited second-strike capability.16 “People’s war under modern conditions.” In the late 1970s, people’s war was replaced with the doctrine of “people’s war under modern condi-

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tions.” Defense specialists concluded that people’s war was ill equipped to deal with the changing nature of modern warfare, which includes nuclear weapons, advanced conventional arms, new technologies, and new strategies and tactics. Military strategists also feared that “by the time an enemy had been lured deeply enough into the People’s Republic for this [people’s war] to work, the enemy would have destroyed much of the country’s vital industries and transportation nodes.”17 “People’s war under modern conditions” called for major revisions in PLA tactics, organization, and operations. June Teufel Dreyer, an authority on China’s military, explains that “the doctrine is characterized by greater attention to positional warfare, modern weaponry, and combined arms. The concept of luring an enemy deeply into China and then surrounding and attacking him was amended to include the possibility of forward defense.”18 In keeping with the new doctrine, the PRC began to move first-line military units closer to the tense Sino-Soviet border.19 It also launched an ill-fated “defensive counterattack” against Vietnam in early 1979. Although the new doctrine continued to pay lip service to Mao’s contributions to military strategy, most security analysts agree that the new doctrine represented a sharp break with the past. This approach to defense met with limited success. By the early 1980s, it was clear that China still lacked the defense industries, personnel, and research and development infrastructure to field a modern military. As Deng Xiaoping, then China’s paramount leader, complained, the PLA was “arrogant, lazy, overstaffed and incompetent to fight modern warfare.”20

“Local war under ‘high-tech’ conditions.” In June 1985, the PRC’s Central Military Commission concluded that the possibility of a major confrontation with either of the superpowers was remote. Deemed more likely was the possibility of small or local wars erupting somewhere along China’s vast borders. These conflicts would require a strategy distinctly different from the principles of protraction and attrition that guided people’s war or even people’s war under modern conditions. Consequently, the PLA embraced a new doctrine—the doctrine of “limited and local wars.” Today, this doctrine is often described as “local war under high-tech conditions.” China’s new approach to security—with its emphasis on quick decisive results and high technology—represents a “complete break” with the past.21 The doctrine “emphasizes rapid reaction, limited conflict, flexible response, preemptive action, and limited power projection to China’s ‘strategic boundaries.’”22

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As the new approach indicates that the PLA wishes to operate beyond the mainland’s geographic borders—perhaps in the vicinity of Taiwan or the South China Sea—power projection now represents a critical element in the PLA’s military doctrine. Not surprisingly, units in the PLA navy and air force are being strengthened—larger ships are being constructed and more advanced fighter planes are being acquired. The military also is developing or seeking to acquire force multipliers—including mobile ballistic missile systems, land-attack cruise missiles, advanced surface-to-air missiles, space-based weapons, and attack submarines—and has made some significant advances in its command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) capabilities. Indeed, the U.S. Department of Defense claims that China has displayed “an exceptional interest” in the development of an advanced information warfare capability.23 On the domestic front, the most conspicuous impact of the new doctrine has been on PLA force restructuring and downsizing.24 Since the mid-1980s, PLA force levels have been slashed by over 1 million troops, the number of military regions has been cut from eleven to seven (Shenyang, Beijing, Lan-zhou, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou, and Chengdu), and the military’s thirty-six field armies have been reconfigured into twenty-four group armies.25 Moreover, military training has been intensified, elite rapid reaction units have been organized, and interservice coordination is being emphasized. Furthermore, in a move that caught many outside observers by surprise, the PLA was ordered to cease its more than 20,000 commercial operations. Officials hope that this enormous shake-up of the defense sector will reduce PLA corruption and enable the military to concentrate on its primary missions— defending the CCP regime and the nation. Some enduring elements in Beijing’s security strategy include “the primacy of politics, the primacy of people over weapons, the strategy for using a weak force against a strong force, the mobilization of the masses to fight a protracted war against invasion, and the multiple roles of the PLA.”26 There also are other basic tenets of Chinese defense policy that have remained fairly consistent over the years: Other Basic Security Policies

• Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory and the PRC has the right to use all means it thinks necessary, including military means, to safeguard its own sovereignty and territorial integrity.

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• China pursues only a defensive policy and will strike only after an enemy has struck. The PRC adheres to the principle of “we will not attack unless we are attacked, but if we are attacked, we will certainly counterattack.” • China will refrain from joining alliances or stationing troops in foreign countries. • China advocates the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons and vigorously supports nonnuclear proliferation efforts. • China stands for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons. • China advocates the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of biological weapons. • China stands for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of weapons deployed in outer space. • China will not transfer sensitive materials and technologies that might cause the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their carriers.27

In some areas, PRC defense policy appears to have remained remarkably consistent over the past five decades. As described, however, Chinese security policy also is in a state of transition. The PLA’s doctrinal evolution in past decades is a significant development. Also, the PRC is now seeking to expand military-to-military contacts with other countries and participate in numerous confidence-building measures (the Chinese military has established relations with the armed forces of more than 100 other countries).28 In recent years, the PRC also has begun to participate in multilateral regional security forums—perhaps most notably the ASEAN Asian Regional Forum (ARF)—and dispatched a limited number of military observers to UN peacekeeping operations. China contends that it is a peace-loving nation. It has engaged in no major military conflicts since the late 1970s, and it claims that economic modernization is its paramount national priority. Beijing also asserts that it pursues a purely defensive military policy, opposes the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, wholeheartedly supports disarmament, and favors a peaceful unification with Taiwan. It points with pride to the fact that the size of its military has been reduced substantially since the 1970s and that its defense budget has increased only Analysis

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incrementally since the late 1980s. Given such considerations, why are some of Beijing’s neighbors nervous? In many respects, the PRC’s declared defense policies do not mesh well with reality. Notwithstanding the argument that military modernization is subordinate to economic development, the so-called Cox report, a comprehensive and bipartisan U.S. congressional study of the PLA’s modernization drive, found that “the CCP’s main aim for the civilian economy is to support the building of modern military weapons and to support the aims of the PLA.”29 The report cited both statements by high-ranking PLA officers and recent arms acquisitions as evidence. The PRC has indeed used the profits from its burgeoning commercial economy to purchase a number of advanced weapons systems. The most notable of these include the purchase from Russia of 50 Sukhoi Su-27 jet fighters and the production rights for 200 more, two Kilo attack submarines and two Sovremenny missile destroyers. The PRC has also purchased weapons systems or their components from Israel, France, Britain and the United States—including air-to-air missiles, air-refueling technology, Global Positioning System technology, helicopter parts and assorted avionics.30

Beijing claims that its armed forces will be deployed only for defensive operations. But it has launched attacks against neighbors like Vietnam and employed its military muscle to bully the Philippines and other powers with claims in the South China Sea. Moreover, despite its pledges to support disarmament and arms control, “China is widely reported to have active programs related to the development of chemical and biological weapons” and is described in a 1998 U.S. Senate report as “the principal supplier of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology to the world.”31 Indeed, the Cox report charged that China “has provided, or is providing, assistance to the missile and space programs of Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other countries . . . [and] the PRC has provided assistance to the nuclear programs of Iran and Pakistan.”32 The PRC points to its modest defense budget and declining force levels as evidence that it is a peaceful power. However, most defense analysts agree that Beijing’s published defense figures are ridiculously low and that the PRC is not counting PLA-related spending from other government budgets that pay for reserves, direct subsidies to defense industries, and earnings from arms sales. Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense has calculated that the PRC’s real defense budget is roughly three times its officially reported size.33 That means that the official 2000 budget of

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$14.5 billion actually is closer to $43.5 billion.34 The Cox report, however, estimates that actual PLA expenditures are “four to seven times greater than official figures.”35 Perhaps equally significant is that many “deactivated” PLA units actually have been absorbed into the People’s Armed Police. Finally, despite Beijing’s claims to favor the peaceful unification of China, it conducted highly provocative “missile tests” off Taiwan’s coastline during 1995 and 1996. PRC officials will not rule out additional exercises. According to a 1999 U.S. Department of Defense study, Beijing is presently aiming hundreds of redeployed CSS-6 (DF15) ballistic missiles at the island.36 As Andrew Yang, secretary-general of Taiwan’s prestigious Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies, observed, these “missiles have brought the biggest fundamental change to the cross-strait military situation.”37 In late 1999 the PRC also conducted mock invasion exercises to intimidate the island, and in early 2000 it announced that progress must soon be made toward unification or there will be war. Taken together, this evidence undergirds the proposition that China is not a peaceful, status quo power. Indeed, some fear that it is a dissatisfied rising power—perhaps even an aspiring hegemon—that could threaten peace and stability in the Western Pacific. The discussion below analyzes China’s growing military capabilities and examines whether this tendency to view the PRC as the new post–Cold War “bogeyman” is warranted. The People’s Liberation Army

The three most important political institutions in the PRC are the CCP, the state, and the PLA. The PRC constitution of 1982, which superseded the constitution of 1978, reaffirms the CCP leadership’s role in formulating basic political, economic, and social policies. The state is charged with the responsibility of implementing those policies. As described, it is the PLA’s duty to guarantee the internal security of the PRC and defend it against external attack. It also has some additional functions parallel with those of the state. On the surface, the PLA appears to be organized much like the militaries of many other countries. However, there are important differences. Formal control of the PLA is exercised by the CCP and its Central Military Commission (CMC). This eight-member body is chaired by a general secretary—presently Jiang Zemin—while its rou-

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tine work is handled by two vice chairmen (Gen. Zhang Wannian and Gen. Chi Haotin). The PRC slogan that “the party controls the gun” is not an exaggeration. Key members of CMC hold important posts in the CCP, the state, and the PLA. It is believed that “the CMC has a powerful bureaucratic status roughly comparable to that of the Politburo Standing Committee and the State Council.”38 In some respects, the state also appears to hold a modicum of control over the PLA through the National People’s Congress Military Commission. However, it is not clear whether this latter body actually exercises any degree of influence—it rarely meets and its membership generally is identical to the party’s CMC. In fact, according to the organization structure of the PRC government, the state “cannot issue binding orders to the military.”39 Within the PLA, there exists a General Logistics Department, General Staff Department, General Political Department, and General Equipment (or Armaments) Department. The General Staff Department “commands the PLA’s separate force commands—ground forces, air force, navy, and strategic missile (2nd artillery) and has authority over all operations forces during wartime.” 40 The General Political Department is in charge of the political commissars within the PLA and exercises influence over assignments and promotions. The General Logistics Department oversees supplies and transportation. In April, 1998, a new General Equipment, or Armaments, Department was established. This body combines elements of the General Staff Department, General Logistics Department, and the Commission for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (a key link between the PLA and the defense industrial sector that oversees military research and development). 41 It is responsible for coordinating the PLA’s weapons procurement and maintenance. In addition to these institutions there is the PRC Ministry of National Defense. Its chief responsibilities include planning, budgeting, and training. Unlike the defense ministries of most other states, however, it appears to exercise little genuine command and control authority over the military.42 The ministry is dominated by CMC members, and “its role is primarily a ceremonial one.”43 It is noteworthy that important aspects of the PLA’s power and role in the PRC decisionmaking process are not reflected in organization charts. The military has long participated actively in PRC politics. According to some analyses, during the Cultural Revolution “the military assumed the dominant political role in all levels of government and party.”44 Since that time, the PLA’s formal access to the top echelons of

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the PRC decisionmaking process appears to have decreased (there are presently no PLA officers in the powerful CCP Politburo’s Standing Committee). 45 Nevertheless, the PLA continues to be an influential political actor in China. Some studies suggest that the PLA’s role in shaping national security policy, intelligence, and foreign policy is rising.46 Indeed, military officers reportedly have played a pivotal role in crafting policy toward Taiwan.47 According to some analyses, this influence has increased substantially since the victory of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan’s 2000 presidential elections and may help explain Beijing’s strident attacks against some Taiwanese officials.48 PLA hard-liners reportedly have criticized Jiang Zemin as “too soft” toward Taiwan and the United States and liken the island to a “cancer that has to be removed as early as possible.”49 Perhaps as a response to such criticism, it is believed that Gen. Cao Gangchuan, a missile expert who heads the General Equipment Department and is a protégé of Jiang Zemin, has been placed in charge of Taiwan-related policy.50 The PLA is a force of 2.7 million men and women that relies upon both selective conscription and volunteers to fill its ranks.51 It is organized into seven military areas and is composed of ground forces, naval forces (PLAN), air forces (PLAAF), and strategic rocket forces (the 2nd Artillery). The PRC’s armed forces also include the People’s Armed Police (PAP), a paramilitary unit numbering roughly 1 million troops that “undertakes the tasks for maintenance of security and social order entrusted by the state,” and the 1.5 million-strong People’s Militia, an organization that assists in the defense of the nation in the event of an invasion.52 These forces are backed up by PLA reservists who “undergo military training in peacetime according to relevant regulations, and help to maintain social order, if necessary, according to law, and in wartime . . . [are] incorporated in the forces in active service in pursuance of the state’s mobilization order.”53 The discussion below examines recent changes in the active duty forces of the PLA and analyzes Beijing’s drive to modernize its nuclear arsenal. It is not intended to provide readers with a comprehensive assessment of China’s military power; rather, it shows how Beijing is channeling defense funds into key areas of the PLA. Beijing has put a priority on upgrading the major weapons systems in the PLAN and PLAAF. But it also is attempting to modernize elements Ground Forces

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in the ground forces. In addition to reducing its size to roughly 1.87 million troops, the PLA has created a variety of elite, rapid reaction forces (RRFs). These units reportedly include up to fifteen divisions and an additional number of independent regiments and battalions totaling between 200,000 and 300,000 troops.54 The main purpose of the RRF units is to respond quickly to border incidents or other emergencies. Mobility has been enhanced with the addition of locally manufactured and imported helicopters and transport planes. Several of the division-size RRFs are supported by electronic warfare and technical reconnaissance elements (it is believed that some of these units have been structured for offensive operations against Taiwan). Within the PLA ground forces the RRF units receive priority funding, and it is expected that the number of these units will grow in coming years. In addition to the RRF units, the PLA possesses between thirty or forty category A divisions. These units, which include heavy armor, could be battle ready within several weeks of notification.55 Those divisions at category B, the lowest level of readiness, have reportedly been transferred to the PAP. Because the PLA’s ground forces have received the lowest priority in the PRC’s drive to modernize its military, purchases of sophisticated foreign equipment and technology have been both limited and selective. But some new hardware and technology are being acquired. In addition to domestically manufactured equipment, the PLA has reportedly purchased T-72 tanks, Il-76 transports, and Mi-8 and Mi-17 helicopters from Russia.56 It is negotiating with Russia to obtain other advanced technologies, munitions, and weapons. The Chinese navy consists of three fleets—the Northern Fleet (based in Qingdao), the Eastern Fleet (based in Shanghai), and the Southern Fleet (based in Zhangjiang). It is believed that the PLAN hopes eventually to deploy a fourth fleet to reinforce its other naval forces and project power into the South China Sea and beyond. Military analysts contend that the PLAN, a force with roughly 260,000 personnel, is being equipped, trained, and deployed according to a long-term blueprint for the future known as the “three-island-chain strategy.” 57 In the first chain are the coastal territories claimed by China—most notably the South China Sea. The second chain extends about 100 nautical miles beyond Taiwan. The third chain reaches all the PLA Navy

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way to the U.S. territory of Guam. It is the PLA’s objective to extend its naval power projection capabilities gradually from coastal defense to the third island chain. PLA strategists anticipate that the PLA will possess the required sea replenishment capabilities, air protection, and submarine support to reach the third island chain sometime in the middle of the twenty-first century. The PRC is making progress in this drive. In early 2000, the PLAN had successfully conducted its first-ever naval exercises more than 250 nautical miles from mainland China.58 To realize its ambitions to project naval power, the PLAN has been developing, constructing, or purchasing a wide variety of new warships. Recent additions to the PLAN inventory include new classes of surface combatants (Luhai-class destroyers, Sovremenny-class destroyers, Luhu-class destroyers, and Jiangwei-class guided-missile frigates), supply ships (Dayun-class resupply ships), missile boats (Houjian- and Houxin-class missile patrol craft), coastal patrol boats (Huludao-class boats), and nuclear and conventional submarines (Ming-class and Russian Kilo-class submarines).59 Some of these vessels—particularly the 6,000-ton Luhai-class destroyers and the Russian-built 7,000-ton Sovremenny-class destroyers—represent a significant advance in PLAN capabilities. The new warships will be fitted with imported and domestically manufactured antiship cruise missiles (with a 120kilometer range), short-range surface-to-air missiles, torpedoes, and antisubmarine warfare helicopters.60 James Lilley, former U.S. ambassador to the PRC, describes the two Russian warships as “a generational leap for China into a much more advanced type of surface weaponry.”61 Maj. Gen. Tyson G. Fu, director of the Institute of Strategic Studies in the ROC Armed Force University, fears that the ships have helped Beijing “close the gap” in cross-strait naval capabilities. 62 Others describe the missile-armed destroyers simply as “aircraft carrier killers.” The PLAN also has boosted its amphibious and airborne capabilities with the establishment of the PLA Marine Corps, the modernization of naval bombers that can be equipped with antiship missiles and torpedoes, and the purchase of Russian airborne early-warning aircraft and antisubmarine helicopters. Looking to the future, the PLAN hopes to enhance its antisubmarine warfare capabilities, strengthen shipborne air defense capabilities, and develop the capability to conduct sustained operations. Developing an amphibious warfare capability is especially high on its list of priorities. Unless one counts the PLAN’s hundreds of small barges, landing craft, and fishing boats, the navy only possesses the capability to transport one infantry division. The PLAN also aims to boost the utility of its

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largely obsolete submarine force, most of which is relegated to coastal defense duties, by arming a new boat, the Type-094, with new JL-2 (Julang-2 or Great Wave 2) intercontinental ballistic missiles.63 This new vessel should be deployed around 2005. 64 Some boats may be armed with submerged-launch cruise missiles. Two additional Sovremenny-class destroyers also may be purchased from Russia. Finally, although plans to reequip the Varyag, an enormous aircraft carrier the PRC purchased from Ukraine, appear to have been scuttled, the PLAN continues to show interest in acquiring a carrier. It is believed that the PLAN will study the ship in preparation for building its own carrier from scratch.65 According to unconfirmed reports, construction of a carrier could begin at any time.66 In February 1999, Jiang Zemin declared that the PLAAF “holds a very important position in high-technology warfare” and must “heighten its awareness of responsibility and sense of urgency and build a revolutionized, modernized armed force.”67 The CMC chairman added that “we should build an air force capable of both offensive and defensive operations with Chinese characteristics.” 68 When attending Asian Aerospace 2000, Asia’s most important aviation and defense show, Lt. Gen. Liu Shunyao of the PLA proudly boasted that the PLAAF “is shifting from national air defense toward defense plus offense.”69 He predicted that the air force will enable his country to win “local wars directed against China under high-tech conditions on short notice.”70 Despite these proclamations, most of the PLAAF’s inventory of over 5,000 warplanes still comprises obsolete variants of Sovietdesigned aircraft. With the help of foreign technology and hardware, however, the PLAAF hopes to catch up with Western combat aircraft. In 1992, the PRC purchased a squadron of advanced Russian Su-27 “Flanker” jet fighters. 71 Since that time, Beijing has negotiated a follow-on purchase bringing the total close to fifty. Perhaps more significant, in late 1995 the PRC successfully negotiated a $2 billion deal to manufacture the warplane.72 According to the terms of the agreement, everything except the warplane’s avionics and engine will be produced in China. It is believed that the manufacturing facilities ultimately will produce around 200 fighters over the next decade. The Su-27 warplanes have provided the PLAAF with an instantaneous qualitative boost. The combat jet is an air superiority fighter designed for air-to-air combat and is equipped with Russia’s most PLA Air Force

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advanced avionics.73 It has a range of 4,000 kilometers on internal fuel tanks and a combat radius of approximately 1,600 kilometers.74 Some of the planes are armed with China’s new C-801 air-to-surface missiles (a clone of the French Exocet) or advanced Russian-built R77 air-to-air missiles (an equivalent to the U.S.-made AIM-120 AMRAAM). 75 According to reports, “the Su-27 could in some flight envelopes exceed the performance of the US F-16 and F-18, and is a rough match for the F-15—the top US air superiority fighter.”76 When based in southern China, the PLAAF gains the capability to control the skies over the South China Seas.77 The PLAAF’s inventory of modern fighters will receive another significant boost when it begins to take delivery of an undetermined number of advanced Su-30 warplanes. According to some press reports, Moscow agreed to sell sixty of the warplanes—which are equipped with “thrust vectoring” engine nozzles to give them greater maneuverability—in late 1999.78 More recent reports, however, indicate that Beijing has signed a $2 billion contract to only purchase thirty of the fighters.79 In early 2000, PRC and Russian military officials were still trying to hammer out a final agreement. According to a Congressional Research Service study, delivery might not begin until 2004.80 China also is beginning to domestically produce it own fourthgeneration fighter—the F-10. This warplane probably will be armed with advanced beyond-visual-range active radar and air-to-air missiles and could be air refuelable. But it reportedly is still undergoing testing and evaluation. Other domestic fighters—including the F-7 and F-8II—are being upgraded. Most of the PLAAF’s inventory of bombers comprises obsolete Il28/B-5 (Beagle) and Tu-16/B-6 (Badger) aircraft. However, several versions of the B-6 are still being produced. Some of the new B-6s will reportedly carry air-launched cruise missiles, while others will be armed with antiship cruise missiles. A new fighter bomber—the FBC— made its debut at an air show in 1998. These planes may be armed “with traditional bombs and laser guided bombs, as well as air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles.”81 In addition to these aircraft, the PRC has purchased up to twenty Russian Il-76 military transport planes. These transports may help the PLAAF accomplish one of its primary combat missions—providing airlift in support of PLA operations. Moreover, the planes will boost the lift capabilities of the PLAAF’s own 15th Airborne Army (one of the PLA’s primary RRFs). These aircraft also will serve as air-refueling or AWACS platforms. In late 1999, one of the planes was delivered to

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Israel to be fitted with an Israeli-made AWACS system. Robert Karniol, a security analyst for Jane’s Defense Weekly, described this development as “very significant for the Chinese army as it will allow a better control of the airspace.”82 Under strong U.S. pressure, however, Israel canceled plans to provide the PRC with AWACS systems in July 2000. With respect to ground-based air defense, Beijing has bought several batteries of the Russian SA-10 surface-to-air missile defense system—a system comparable to the U.S.-built Patriot system. However, most studies indicate that the PRC’s integrated air defense system capabilities are “rudimentary” and it could take more than a decade before the PLA is able to establish one.83 Most security analysts agree that China’s nuclear force is primarily dedicated to a strategy of minimum deterrence. This means that no enemy can use nuclear force or threaten to use it against the PRC without the certain knowledge of a PLA retaliatory strike. In order to maintain a credible second-strike capability, the PRC possesses a nuclear triad—it is a nuclear power with air- , land- , and sea-based warheads. Estimates of the actual number of warheads in the PRC’s arsenal vary significantly. According to some reports, the PLA possesses approximately 300 deployed nuclear warheads.84 Others, however, have put the number closer to 1,000.85 In addition to its nuclear stockpile, Beijing is armed with the neutron bomb—a weapon designed to kill an enemy’s forces without the widespread material damage caused by other nuclear weapons. Responding to charges that it had stolen the technology for such weapons from the United States in July 1999, the PRC announced that it actually had mastered the design of such weapons during the 1970s and 1980s.86 The air-based leg of Beijing’s nuclear triad consists of long-range, medium-range, and short-range bombers. Although nuclear capable, most of these aircraft are the PLAAF’s old Beagle and Badger bombers. It is believed that these aircraft would “have limited operational capability against modern air defense systems.”87 However, the PLAAF’s newly acquired Russian fighters also are capable of carrying nuclear bombs. The sea-based leg of the PRC’s triad is based entirely on one Xiaclass submarine. This nuclear-powered boat was first deployed in 1986 and is armed with twelve intermediate-range solid-fuel missiles. In 1988, the submarine successfully launched a JL-1 submarine-launched PLA Nuclear Forces

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ballistic missile (SLBM) to a target roughly 1,500 kilometers away. This vessel—and an unknown number of new Type-094 submarines— may eventually be armed with JL-2 intercontinental ballistic missiles. Some speculate that this deployment could lead to significant changes in PRC strategic doctrine: The long range of the JL-2 submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missile will allow the PRC to conduct patrols close to its base, and under the protective cover of the PLA Navy and Air Force. This would provide the PLA submarine fleet with a more survivable nuclear force. The fact that these new nuclear weapons will be far more survivable than the PRC’s current silo-based forces could signal a major shift in the PRC’s current nuclear strategy and doctrine.88

The land-based leg of the PRC’s nuclear triad is under the control of China’s 120,000-man Strategic Rocket Forces or 2nd Artillery. Weapons in the inventory of this force include a variety of short-, intermediate-, and long-range ballistic missiles (see Table 3.1). The PLA’s short-range missiles include the CSS-6 (DF-15), CSS-X7 (DF-11), and CSS-8 (8610). The CSS-6 is an advanced, solidpropellant missile capable of carrying conventional or nuclear warheads. The weapon received a lot of media attention when it was used during Beijing’s 1995 and 1996 “missile tests” against Taiwan (hundreds are now deployed in southeastern China facing Taiwan). Both the CSS-6 and CSS-X-7 (a missile that has not yet entered the PLA’s inventory) will eventually employ satellite-assisted navigation technology to improve their accuracy. The PLA’s intermediate-range ballistic missiles consist of the CSS2 (DF-3) and CSS-5 (DF-21). The CSS-2, a conventionally armed missile, gained international attention when it was exported to Saudi Arabia in 1987. The CSS-5 represents the PLA’s first successful effort to develop a solid-propellant ballistic missile. Capable of carrying a nuclear Table 3.1

PRC Ballistic Missiles

U.S. Designation

PRC Designation Range (in miles) Propellant Type

CSS-2 CSS-3 CSS-4 CSS-5/ JL-1 DF-3 DF-4 DF-5 DF-21 1,926 3,417 7,457 1,119 Liquid Liquid Liquid Solid

CSS-6 CSS-X-7 CSS-8 DF-31 JL-2

DF-15 DF-11 373 186 Solid Solid

8610 DF-31 JL-2 143 4,871 4,871 Solid/ Solid Solid Liquid

Source: U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, Vol. 1, p. 180.

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warhead payload, the CSS-5 is a road-mobile missile with a range of roughly 1,750 kilometers. The CSS-3 (DF-4), the first ICBM developed by China, is a twostage liquid-propellant missile with a range of approximately 3,400 miles. The CSS-4 (DF-5A) is a solid-fueled ICBM with a range of over 5,440 kilometers. At present, approximately twenty CSS-4s are deployed in silos. Despite pledges to the contrary, they are believed to be aimed at the United States. In 1997, a U.S. Department of Defense study noted that “China has embarked on a ballistic missile modernization program.”89 During the current decade, the PLA will deploy up to three new mobile, solidpropellant ICBMS. The DF-31 will have a range of roughly 7,900 kilometers and should be deployed around 2002. The PRC successfully conducted a test launch of this missile in late 1999. According to a U.S. Air Force intelligence report, this truck-based mobile missile “will give China a major strike capability that will be difficult to counterattack at any stage of its operation.”90 The JL-2 is an SLBM version of the DF-31. It underwent testing in 1999 and probably will become operational around 2002 or later.91 A 1999 U.S. intelligence estimate warned that “the JL-2 probably will be able to target the United States from launch areas near China.”92 It is believed that another ICBM, with a range of 12,000 kilometers, is currently under development and also may be deployed. Until recently, China’s nuclear weapons designs were believed to be a generation behind those of the United States. However, in 1999 the world learned that Beijing had made a “great leap forward” in the development of nuclear weapons. According to the Cox report, the PRC has “stolen design information on the United States’ most advanced thermonuclear weapons” and “stolen or otherwise illegally obtained US missile and space technology that improves the PRC’s military and intelligence capabilities.” 93 It is believed that this data will greatly assist the PRC in its campaign to develop mobile missiles, ballistic missiles with multiple warheads, and small warheads for submarines—all the main elements of a modern nuclear force. China’s Foreign Ministry, though, has described the charges contained in the report as “groundless and irresponsible.”94 In addition to the PRC’s engaging in espionage to improve its nuclear arsenal, the Pentagon now believes that Russia has secretly helped the PRC modernize its nuclear forces. According to reports that surfaced in January 2000, U.S. defense officials have discovered that Russian nuclear weapons experts have helped China with “tritium

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extraction” for thermonuclear warheads. 95 This probably will help Beijing develop newer and smaller warheads. Some analysts see the PRC’s military power as a growing threat to peace and stability in the Western Pacific. They warn that “China is now engaged in one of the most extensive and rapid military buildups in the world” and that it is “rapidly becoming the globe’s second most powerful nation.”96 Other dispute these claims: “China is not a superpower. The PLA’s conventional military force cannot project itself beyond China’s periphery; the economy is fragile; the location is geostrategic in a continental sense, but regionally and in a global sense only if China can project sufficient naval force; and the nuclear arsenal is a minimal deterrent.”97 Indeed, James Schlesinger, former U.S. secretary of defense, contends that “China is not going to be a world power in the existing period and possibly never.”98 It is clear that the PLA remains an antiquated force in many respects. Most of its military equipment is obsolete, training is inadequate, morale is low, and the vast majority of PLA personnel (including most officers) are poorly educated. The impact of other factors judged to affect potential military power—including economic stability, levels of technology, national debt, and unemployment—is debatable. Moreover, some studies question whether the PLA has the ability to maintain the advanced military equipment that it has imported. 99 Nevertheless, it would be a grave error to underestimate the PLA. Strategic planners in China fully realize that the PLA cannot match the power of many potential adversaries—including the United States— plane for plane and missile for missile. But it has no intention of doing so. Rather, the 1991 Gulf War and 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis prompted Chinese defense planners to concentrate on ways to confront a technologically superior enemy. NATO’s long-range precision air strikes against Yugoslavia in 1999 served only to bolster the PRC’s determination to pursue such a policy. The Liberation Army Daily, the official mouthpiece of the PLA, has argued that “we have to use the Kosovo crisis to raise the alarm, and work towards high-technology warfare, create new warfare techniques and training methods.”100 The PLA hopes to develop abilities in certain critical areas—particularly missile technology, nuclear warheads, information warfare, computer warfare, electronic warfare, and antisatellite programs. Like Summary

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Mao’s doctrine of people’s war, this is reportedly part of an “asymmetric strategy” that would enable a weaker power to prevail over a stronger one. 101 Evan Medeiros, an East Asian specialist at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, has observed that the PRC hopes to develop “pockets of critical technology to deter or coerce the United States.”102 As part of the effort to accomplish this goal, a 1999 U.S. counterintelligence report claims, China will continue to aggressively recruit foreign scientists to spy for Beijing.103 It will also enlist the aid of Russian scientists and technicians. According to some estimates, “as many as 2,000 Russian technicians are employed by Chinese research institutes working on laser technology: the minaturization of nuclear weapons; cruise missiles; space-based weapons; and nuclear submarines.”104 Beijing’s new approach to warfare is described by one Taiwanese defense analyst as “acupuncture warfare.” 105 In addition to making preparations for “saturated” missile attacks (the missiles will be guided by the PLA’s seventeen spy satellites), the PLA is placing special emphasis on developing the ability to “paralyze” an enemy’s computer systems so the latter’s cruise missiles and other precision-guided weapons cannot find their targets. 106 Gen. Tang Yao-ming, chief of Taiwan’s general staff, contends that “efforts by the Chinese communists on computer viruses and electronic magnetic pulses are shifting into high gear . . . they are planning to develop a computer virus that would be able to paralyze the rival’s command and telecommunications systems.”107 During an interview with the author, another high-ranking ROC military officer also suggested that the PLA already has made substantial progress, and “in some areas, such as information warfare, they are ahead of the Western countries.”108 The general warned that “this might be the decisive weapon system in the next century.”109 The world caught a rare glimpse of the PRC’s growing computer warfare capabilities in August 1999. In retaliation for Lee Teng-hui’s abandonment of the one-China policy, Beijing launched a small-scale Internet war against Taipei. Hackers broke into both government and civilian websites and left pro-PRC messages on them. Although these attacks caused little damage, they served as a wake-up call that prompted Taiwanese lawmakers to demand increased efforts to protect the island’s Internet, communications networks, and other information infrastructure.110 Not all elements in the PLA agree with recent changes in military strategy and doctrine.111 Interestingly, some officers have argued that China should adopt a more radical approach to warfare—“unrestricted

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war.” According to this view, the PLA should not feel compelled to abide by any of the so-called modern rules of warfare—rules they claim were crafted largely by China’s enemies. Rather, these officers argue that the PRC should employ unconventional weapons in its struggle against an enemy—including terrorism, drug trafficking, and environmental degradation.112 Thus far, however, it appears that this doctrine has yet to be embraced by the mainstream elements in the PLA. Security Issues in China

The PRC has taken steps to increase the level of its defense transparency. Since the 1980s, the PLA has expanded its military-to-military exchanges and participated in confidence-building measures with numerous other countries—including the United States. In 1998, the PLA released its first defense white paper. These steps toward greater openness, however, are more than offset by the fact that many of the details about China’s military and its operations remain cloaked in mystery. Although matters relating to defense and security are not subject to widespread debate within the PRC, it is nevertheless possible to identify some of them. The discussion below examines several of the most crucial security issues confronting the PRC. According to the PRC’s 1998 Defense White Paper, “defending the motherland, resisting aggression, safeguarding unity and opposing split are the starting point and underpinning of China’s defense policy.”113 The 2000 Defense White Paper also stresses that “China has always attached primary importance to safeguarding state sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and security.” 114 These statements reflect longstanding PRC policy—Beijing has often expressed its determination to recover those territories stolen by foreign imperialists during the nineteenth century (China’s “century of humiliation”) and prevent any further disintegration of China. As a consequence, separatist movements in areas considered Chinese territory—including Tibet, Xinjiang, and Taiwan—are viewed as formidable threats to national security. When compared to Taiwan, the independence elements in Tibet and Xinjiang are relatively easy to combat. After all, these areas are under the direct control of Beijing, and when apprehended, separatists are Territorial Integrity

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punished severely. For example, in May 1999, ten Muslim separatists in Xinjiang were executed after being found guilty of “criminal activities attempting to split the country.”115 Curbing the separatist movement in Taiwan is a much more formidable task. Today’s Taiwan has little resemblance to the Nationalist stronghold of the Chiang Kai-shek era. Opposition parties openly advocate the establishment of a new country—a Republic of Taiwan—and occupy key positions in national and local politics. In fact, in March 2000 Chen Shui-bian, a former independence activist, was elected president of the ROC. Moreover, communities have passed plebiscites supporting independence, much of the provincial government has been abolished, and the island’s education system no longer emphasizes links to the mainland. Perhaps most distressing to Beijing, however, is the fact that highranking Kuomintang (KMT) authorities—particularly President Lee Teng-hui—appear to have been orchestrating these and other changes. PRC officials now describe the KMT as a proindependence party. Even Taiwanese politicians have accused Lee of favoring “crystal-clear separatism.”116 The independence of Taiwan threatens China’s security in more than one way. In addition to causing the loss of a “an inseparable part of China,” independence for the island could ignite a chain of events that might spiral out of control. During an interview with the author in 1994, the late Gen. Chiang Wego explained why PRC officials would consider it their “duty” to attack a breakaway Taiwan: “Since they [the PRC] think they are the central government, how could they let any part of the PRC be independent? If Taiwan can be independent, Tibet can be independent, Xinjiang can be independent, Inner Mongolia can be independent—the whole country could fall apart.”117 Ironically, in 1999 Lee Teng-hui proposed that China be partitioned into several autonomous regions.118 Beijing employs both carrots and sticks to curb the separatist movement in Taiwan. On the one hand, the PRC has offered Taiwan’s business community very attractive preferential terms for trade and investment. Many Taiwanese firms have responded. According to PRC calculations, Taiwan is now the chief investor in China. Officials hope that these economic linkages will bind the island to the mainland. The PRC has offered Taiwan very generous terms for unification. According to the “one country, two systems” reunification formula, Taiwan would be allowed to “maintain a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative region.”119 It would be permitted to maintain its present socioeconomic system and its own armed forces. Moreover,

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both private-property rights and foreign investment would be protected and Taiwan authorities would be allowed to “take up posts of leadership in the PRC government.” 120 One of the chief negotiators for the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits, Beijing’s “unofficial” negotiating delegation, explained that “under ‘two systems’ Taiwan will have much of the freedom they are enjoying or have been craving for including international recognition and democratic reform.”121 Since making the initial “one country, two systems” proposal, PRC officials have elaborated on some points. For example, Jiang Zemin has promised that Beijing “would not send troops or administrative staff to be stationed in Taiwan.”122 Further, he claims that unification is “not a scenario whereby the mainland would swallow up Taiwan or Taiwan swallow the mainland.”123 Xu Shiquan, president of the Institute of Taiwan Studies at China’s Academy of Social Sciences, has suggested that many matters relating to China’s unification are negotiable: “Under the one-China principle, everything is negotiable including the flag, name of the country and national anthem. Our aim is the peaceful reunification and everything can be talked about and discussed. And the unified China will definitely be different than what it is now.”124 When asked by the author if China might even consider adopting the flag presently used by the authorities in Taiwan, Xu replied, “Well, if that’s what the majority wants.”125 Frustrated by Taipei’s insistence that cross-strait negotiations be limited to practical issues (e.g., fishing disputes, repatriation of criminals, illegal immigration), Beijing has stepped up the campaign for serious unification discussions. As an added incentive, it has proposed that when real progress is made in negotiations, the two sides could undertake a number of confidence-building measures. Beijing has suggested that it might agree to open several of its most sensitive military sites— including the controversial coastal M-9 missile bases—to Taiwan authorities.126 The idea of a cross-strait military “hotline” also has been raised.127 However, Beijing insists that Taipei must agree to its own interpretation of the one-China principle as a precondition for discussions. Despite optimistic proclamations that “China’s reunification process has been advancing during the past two decades,” many PRC officials believe that Taiwan is drifting away from the motherland.128 CCP leaders—including Jiang Zemin—have expressed dissatisfaction at Taiwan’s “stalling tactics” and the slow pace of negotiations. According to some accounts, this sentiment is especially strong within

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the PLA.129 Furthermore, both the civilian and military leadership were shocked and outraged when Lee Teng-hui junked Taipei’s long-standing one-China policy in July 1999. Even more disturbing was the stunning victory of Chen Shui-bian in Taiwan’s March 2000 presidential election. In addition to carrots (positive reinforcement), Beijing employs sticks in its crusade to check Taiwan’s separatist impulses. The drive to isolate Taipei diplomatically has intensified: by the mid-1990s, no important governments maintained formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan. According to Jason Hu, then ROC foreign minister, Beijing has adopted a “three empties” strategy against Taipei. It plans to “lure away all of the ROC’s diplomatic allies, to block any opportunities for Taiwan to join any international organization or activity, and to eliminate all the bargaining chips and clout that Taiwan has used to seek an equal footing with Beijing.”130 Beijing also applies intense pressure on any government that sells advanced arms to Taiwan. For example, France was forced to reduce its diplomatic presence in China following its sale of sixty Mirage 2000-5 warplanes to Taiwan. More recently, China has increased its pressure on the United States—Taiwan’s chief supplier of weapons and military technology—to reduce its military support for Taiwan. In early 1999, Beijing warned that any U.S. transfer of TMD technology to Taiwan would be the “last straw” in Sino-U.S. relations and would “certainly lead to serious consequences.” 131 Likewise, the sale of Aegis-class destroyers to Taiwan is unacceptable. Perhaps most important, the PRC refuses to rule out the use of force to take Taiwan. In March 1999, PRC Premier Zhu Rongji declared that “we are hoping for a peaceful unification of China, but we can by no means abandon the use of force.”132 Zhu explained that “if we do that, Taiwan will be split forever from the motherland.”133 During Taiwan’s 2000 presidential campaign these threats increased markedly. PRC officials realize that action speaks louder than words. In 1995 and 1996, the PRC conducted a series of provocative “missile tests” off Taiwan’s coastline. The PLA thought that the 1996 military exercise “succeeded in its main goal of deterring many voters from backing the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) which had campaigned on a platform of independence for Taiwan.” 134 Since that time, the PLA has transferred ballistic missiles and troops to its southeastern regions facing Taiwan. Some defense experts say that “the amount of missiles deployed is considered the world’s heaviest concentration of strategic weapons in a given location.”135 When cross-strait relations soured in

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late 1999, the PRC conducted a mock invasion of Taiwan. At the time the Chinese media boasted, “How many days can the 400,000-man ‘Nationalist Army’ resist? Once war breaks out, resistance would be four to five days at the most.”136 Most recently, Beijing attempted to intimidate Taiwan’s voters during its presidential elections. In December 1999, Li Zhaowing, PRC ambassador to the United States, had proclaimed that “anybody can be elected [president], except Chen Shui-bian,”137 and only days before the island’s voters went to the polls, Zhu Rongji warned the Taiwanese to “be vigilant” and not to act on “impulse.” 138 He added that “if the Taiwan independence forces come into power it could trigger a war between the two sides of the strait.”139 Following the DPP’s surprising victory, Taiwan businesses operating in China were warned that their investments would not be protected if they supported independence, and Annette Lu, the island’s new vice president, was described as the “scum of the nation” by the PLA’s official newspaper. Many analysts believe that Chen’s victory has ushered in a new era of heightened tensions and potential crises. Jiang Zemin has warned that Taiwan’s “push for independence is a serious contributor to regional, even global, instability.”140 Although some separatists—particularly those residing comfortably in the United States or other foreign countries—bravely proclaim that China’s leaders are only bluffing, the probability of a negative reaction by the PRC to Taiwan’s independence is very high. In an interview with the author, a Chinese academic warned that the PRC will definitely employ military force against Taiwan even if the United States attempts to shield it.141 The ROC military also has warned that the PRC will attack if the island moves too close to independence.142 Since 1990 China’s GDP has grown by an average of 8 percent a year. During the same period foreign trade has almost tripled and direct investment has soared. The CCP regime often cites these impressive economic statistics to justify its continued monopoly of political power. In some respects, therefore, the CCP now defines its legitimacy in terms of enriching the Chinese people. But it is an open question whether the PRC will be able to sustain these high economic growth rates for many more years. On the international front threats to China’s economic security come from many sources. As one of the world’s leading exporters, proEconomic Security

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tectionism is always a constant danger. The PRC has watched the development of regional trading blocs with suspicion and alarm. Maintenance of its much-coveted most favored nation status (MFN) or normal trade relations (NTR) with the United States is another concern. U.S. efforts to tie MFN to PRC concessions on human rights, nonproliferation, and other issues infuriate Chinese leaders, who claim that such linkages are an infringement on the nation’s sovereignty. In late 1999, the United States finally threw its support behind the PRC’s application for membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Most PRC officials believe that accession to the WTO will represent a major boost for the PRC’s export-dependent economy. But others are not so sure. It is clear that the WTO represents both challenges and opportunities for China. Some fear that the new trading rules will have a severe impact on China’s state-owned corporations and millions of workers who depend upon these firms for their livelihood. Perhaps most worrisome for the PRC was the Asian financial crisis. PRC leaders realize that if left unchecked, economic turmoil could spread into China and destabilize the regime. As Xiong Guangkai, deputy chief of the general staff of the PLA, observed, “International financial turbulence caused by the Asian financial crisis has already threatened the national stability in some countries.”143 China’s own stability could have been undermined by the crisis. By early 2000, China’s economy appeared to have recovered from the Asian slowdown of 1998 and 1999. The Asian Development Bank predicted that the country would enjoy a 6.5 percent growth in GDP for 2000 and 6.0 percent growth in GDP for 2001.144 However, economists describe the PRC’s recovery as “delicate” and warn that it “might not be sustainable.”145 Beijing also confronts numerous domestic economic difficulties. China possesses a large (and aging) population and dwindling natural resources. Moreover, its economy strains under the burden of roughly 300,000 state-owned enterprises—many of which are unprofitable. How to transform these sluggish firms into profitable concerns represents a vexing problem to Beijing. Despite reforms, according to some estimates these businesses still employ over 100 million people. 146 Jiang Zemin has conceded that “seizing the opportunity to push forward reforms of our state-owned enterprises and achieve a significant breakthrough will be a pressing task for all of us.”147 Finally, China’s economic restructuring has contributed to widespread unemployment, homelessness, corruption, and crime, all of which represent a threat to the CCP’s legitimacy.

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China’s national priority continues to be economic development. It is believed that most of the PLA shares the CCP’s commitment to this goal. As one PLA officer explained, “Deng Xiaoping said we should not fight a war for 50 years. We have to concentrate on economic construction.”148 But, according to some accounts there are elements in the PLA that have begun to argue for a bigger share of the PRC budget. Some officers believe that Beijing needs to place a greater emphasis on speeding up the modernization of the armed forces.149 On September 24, 1997, the governments of the United States and Japan announced an agreement amending their long-standing guidelines for military cooperation in the event of a crisis or conflict in East Asia. Perhaps the most significant—and controversial—segment in the new defense pact is its provision for joint military cooperation in “areas surrounding Japan.” PRC officials fear that this phrase applies to the Taiwan Strait. U.S. officials contend that the pact is designed only to provide defense planners with some idea of the level of support they may expect from Tokyo if the United States becomes embroiled in a future crisis in East Asia—particularly on the Korean Peninsula. In an emergency Washington would be able to call upon Tokyo for that support. After the Japanese parliament approved the changes in early 1999, then-President Clinton emphasized that the new guidelines “should not in any way be seen as directed against China.” 150 Despite such reassurances, the Chinese government views recent changes in the U.S.-Japan security arrangement with alarm. When meeting with Japanese officials in 1997, Li Peng, then PRC premier, declared that “the Chinese government and the Chinese people can never accept any activity directly proposing or hinting obliquely at including Taiwan in the scope of the Japan-US security cooperation.”151 The PRC has not budged from this position. PRC authorities have steadfastly insisted that it is “absolutely unacceptable for the Japan-US defense cooperation to cover the Taiwan region directly or indirectly.”152 Officials have employed a number of arguments to defend this stance. PRC authorities contend that the new security measures constitute a gross interference in China’s internal affairs. According to Beijing, the Republic of China was “finally overthrown by the Chinese people” in 1949 and no longer exists.153 Taiwan is not a government—it is only a U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines

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renegade province of China. Consequently, “the direct incorporation of Taiwan in the Japan-US Defense Cooperation Guidelines constitutes an infringement on China’s sovereignty and will be firmly opposed by the Chinese government and people.”154 PRC officials are not mollified by U.S. or Japanese assurances that the phrase “surrounding situations” refers to “not a geographical concept, but rather a concept pertaining to the nature of events that would have a major impact on Japan’s peace and security.”155 Shen Guofang, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman, describes such explanations as “obscure and unconvincing.”156 In fact, PRC analysts have compiled an inventory of the various ambiguities included in the new defense pact:

• The scope of the Japan-U.S. defense cooperation specified in the new guidelines is ambiguous. • The criteria that the new guidelines use to define the eruption of a war are ambiguous. • The main body to judge what constitutes an “incident” requiring U.S.-Japan security cooperation is ambiguous. • The legal foundation for the new guidelines is ambiguous—they appear to violate Japan’s constitution.157

Many PRC analyses suggest that these obscurities are designed to “cover up” the “real purposes” of the defense guidelines. But they remain divided over what specifically the United States and Japan hope to accomplish. Some fear that the United States will use the revised security pact to advance a new global strategy centered on containing China.158 Others charge that Japan “is trying, by relying on the strength of superpower America, to realize its dream of becoming a great political power and a great military power.”159 Still others argue that the two governments are suffering from a severe case of “enemy deprivation” and require a common enemy to maintain stability in their relationship during the post–Cold War era.160 The 1999 NATO attack on Serbia led the PRC media to speculate that the revised guidelines could signal the establishment of a NATO-like military structure in East Asia “that might intervene in Chinese affairs should a conflict break out over Taiwan, Tibet or Xinjiang.”161 Finally, internal documents circulating among Beijing’s leadership circles reportedly claim that the guidelines “would be used to thwart China’s unification with Taiwan.”162 In sum, Beijing strongly opposes the recent modifications in the U.S.-Japan defense relationship. PRC authorities contend that any move to put Taiwan under the scope of the security pact is a violation of

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China’s national sovereignty, and, though some disagree over the document’s real purpose, all concur that the guidelines have “aroused suspicion” in China.163 Scientists and engineers have long sought to develop ballistic missile defenses. At present, no state possesses an operational national antiballistic missile system. But this could change in the early twenty-first century. The United States has embarked on an ambitious research and development program to study the deployment of a national missile defense system (NMD) and theater missile defense system (TMD).164 The NMD would purportedly help shield the continental United States against a missile attack launched by “rogue states.” In April 2000, the Congressional Budget Office revealed that such a system could cost $60 billion to build.165 On the other hand, the TMD would be less expensive and would be designed to help protect U.S. forces, allies, and friends overseas. The project received a major boost after the DPRK’s successful test-launch of a three-stage Taepo-Dong 1 missile in August 1998. Shortly after the launch, President Clinton requested an extra $6.6 billion in funding for research (total funding now exceeds $10 billion). Perhaps equally important is that Japan has agreed to help bankroll the TMD studies and that missile defense is high on the agenda of the administration of George W. Bush. Some foreign governments—including Russia and the PRC—have blasted both the NMD and TMD systems. Beijing fears that while its present nuclear arsenal might be enough to deter a U.S. nuclear attack, an effective NMD could negate this deterrent. With its growing inventory of short- and medium-range missiles, the PRC appears to be especially irked by the TMD. Beijing officials claim that the DPRK threat is “very much exaggerated” and that the TMD will boost Tokyo’s military capabilities and “enhance military cooperation between Japan and the US and we don’t like it.”166 Authorities also charge that the program “is not conducive to international arms control and reduction . . . [and] it will harm security and stimulate missile proliferation.”167 Perhaps most disturbing to PRC officials are the implications that TMD holds for archrival Taiwan’s defense. Even if the United States succeeds in deploying a TMD system in Asia, it is unclear whether Taiwan will be protected by it. All the same, Taiwan officials have expressed a keen interest in TMD. As Lee Teng-hui explained, “If mainTheater Missile Defense

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land China is not going to reduce their military threat to Taiwan, we must prepare our defense systems.”168 Chinese officials claim that Taiwan’s inclusion under TMD would be the “last straw” in Sino-U.S. relations. Such a move would be considered “a serious infringement on China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”169 They contend that Taiwan’s participation would lead to much closer U.S.-Taiwan defense ties and might even signal the reestablishment of a “semi-military alliance” between Washington and Taipei because U.S. military personnel would be responsible for operating the TMD system.170 Perhaps most disturbing to the PRC is the likelihood that the TMD will embolden the island’s independence activists, perhaps providing them with a “false sense of security.”171 There is evidence to support this view. Taiwan separatists boast that a “TMD umbrella” would ultimately “bring the Chinese leaders to the realization that they cannot force a free and democratic Taiwan to unify, and that they should accept Taiwan as a friendly and independent neighbor and establish diplomatic ties with this new neighbor.”172 In the final analysis, it may make little difference to Beijing whether Taiwan is openly protected by TMD. PRC officials realize that even if the system did not cover Taiwan, it could be brought to the island in the event of a crisis. 173 No one knows how China would respond to a TMD system in East Asia. Some believe it would retaliate by selling missiles and other weapons of mass destruction to rogue states. Others fear that it would build more missiles and deploy them near Taiwan. Still others believe China would build decoys to fool the TMD system. But most U.S. officials agree that the PRC’s reaction to any TMD in East Asia “would be serious.”174 During the 1950s and 1960s, the United States and China were bitter enemies. A number of factors contributed to a rise in tensions, but it was the outbreak of the Korean War that set the stage for roughly two decades of intense belligerence. Following Beijing’s decision to enter the Korean conflict in November 1950, the United States sought to “contain” China with a series of bilateral and multilateral alliances. It also ruled out recognition of the Beijing regime and imposed a trade embargo on economic contacts with the PRC. Finally, for almost two decades Washington sponsored a limited secret war against the PRC.175 Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, U.S. intelligence agencies helped Taiwan stage raids on the Chinese mainland. Relations with the United States

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For its part, the PRC supported the communist forces in North Korea and Vietnam. Beijing also proclaimed its intention to “liberate” Taiwan and attempted to seize ROC territory (the offshore islands) on two occasions during the 1950s. These crises almost led to a direct U.S.-PRC confrontation. During the late 1960s global politics began to shift. Beijing came gradually to be viewed by Washington “as a desirable counterweight to the Soviet Union which was rapidly gaining strategic nuclear parity with the United States.” 176 The PRC also had ample motivation to improve relations with the United States. Threatened with the prospect of a preemptive Soviet nuclear strike, “rapprochement between Washington and Beijing was seen as a quick fix for the Communist Chinese as much as for the Americans.”177 Former President Richard M. Nixon’s historic journey to China in 1972 helped pave the way for the establishment of full diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979.178 Sino-U.S. relations have swung wildly ever since that visit. During the late 1990s, however, bilateral ties appeared to take a real nose-dive. Indeed, in 1999, some analysts claimed that the relationship was at its worst juncture since the Korean War.179 This downward spiral in relations has led to calls by both PRC and U.S. officials to reassess their respective security policies. Kenneth Lieberthal, a leading authority on Sino-U.S. relations, has observed that for some Americans “China is the Great Satan in the international arena, so you use China as the emblem of the world’s worst abuses—abortion, suppression of Christian religious practices, a whole series of issues.”180 In addition to the long-standing quarrels over Taiwan, economic disputes, human rights issues, and China’s military policies are major issues of contention. U.S.-PRC trade grew from a few million dollars in the early 1970s to over $94 billion in 1999. During the same period U.S. investment in China soared. These economic ties have linked the two nations more closely, but they also have created frictions. By 1999, China’s trade surplus was approaching $69 billion per year, and many Americans believe that it may be traced directly to Beijing’s predatory trade practices.181 Even former President George Bush, considered by many to be a strong supporter of engagement with China, has warned Beijing that “you should know this: there is growing concern in the United States about our huge trade deficit with China.”182 Trade disputes are not the only economic issues that undermine the relationship. U.S. corporations complain that rather than easing market access, Beijing actually is tightening rules for Western investors.183

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Moreover, intellectual property rights are not adequately protected, service markets remain largely closed, and PRC corporations regularly ship textiles destined for the United States to a third country, where they are fraudulently labeled as having been manufactured in that country. The Clinton administration threw its support behind China’s application for membership in the WTO in late 1999. In October 2000, the president signed legislation granting normal permanent trade relations (NPTR) to the PRC. In exchange for NPTR, Beijing agreed to open a wide range of markets—a move some contend will help pave the way for the PRC to join the WTO. However, to many U.S. political and corporate leaders it seems inconceivable that China actually will comply with the requirements of WTO membership anytime soon. In addition to economic difficulties the human rights issue will not go away. According to the U.S. Department of State’s 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights, China’s “poor human rights record” has “deteriorated markedly” and Beijing continues “to commit widespread and well-documented human rights abuses, in violation of internationally accepted norms.”184 Those who felt President Clinton’s 1998 visit to the PRC might have improved the prospects for a more tolerant or democratic China have been sorely disappointed. In December 1998, prison sentences ranging from eleven to thirteen years were imposed on three of China’s leading democracy activists, and religious persecution has accelerated. Harold Hongju Koh, then assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights, and labor, has described these and other recent human rights abuses in China as “deeply discouraging.”185 Such practices have led the United States to sponsor UN resolutions criticizing China’s human rights record. Finally, many Americans feel increasingly uneasy about China’s military policies. The PRC’s military buildup, arms sales, and territorial claims have long fueled U.S. suspicions that Beijing is the post–Cold War bogeyman. Recent reports concerning Chinese nuclear espionage activities in the United States, continued illicit shipments of missile technology to rogue nations, illegal campaign contributions, the development of antisatellite laser weapons, and the officially sanctioned attacks on the U.S. diplomatic compounds in China that followed NATO’s accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade served only to reinforce this view. Given such developments, it is hardly surprising that some members of the Bush administration, the Congress, and a significant portion of the American public believe that the policy of “constructive engagement” and/or a “strategic partnership” with China is a failure and

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should be abandoned. Public opinion polls reveal that a plurality of the American people now view China as an enemy or unfriendly power. This represents a dramatic shift in public opinion—during the 1980s most thought of the PRC as a friend or ally (see Table 3.2). Moreover, polls also show that a solid majority of Americans (65 percent) oppose normal trade relations for China.186 Richard Fisher, director of Asian studies at the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank, appeared to reflect the sentiment of numerous Americans when he exclaimed, “How many fund-raising scandals, cases of espionage and now embassy trashings do we need to endure to be convinced that China is really not our friend?”187 One congressional staff member was even more direct when he exclaimed that “China is an adversary. Why use namby-pamby language when China sees through it?”188 From China’s perspective, the United States appears to have metamorphosized into an imperialist aggressor, bent on world domination at China’s expense. An editorial in the People’s Daily, the official mouthpiece of the CCP, outlined some of the PRC’s perceptions: “Since the end of the Cold War the United States has become the single superpower. It considers itself unsurpassed in the world and its hegemonistic ambitions have inflated rapidly.”189 Internal CCP studies speculate that the present generation of Western leaders lacks the historical perspective of their World War II predecessors.190 As a consequence they are “hawkish” and “aggressive.” Other studies have warned that the United States and its allies might use the intervention in Yugoslavia as a precedent for intervention on behalf of Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, or any other restive Chinese territories. Still others claim that Washington has only one goal: “the hegemonic domination of the world.”191 Table 3.2

U.S. Views of the Relationship Between China and the United States

5/8–12, 1988 10/27–29, 1997 6/22–23, 1998 3/12–14, 1999

Ally 5% 4% 3% 1%

Friendly 47% 21% 28% 28%

Unfriendly 18% 27% 25% 26%

Enemy 3% 9% 8% 10%

No Opinion 27% 39% 36% 35%

Source: Frank Newport, “Americans Remain Wary of China,” Gallup Organization Poll Releases, March 31, 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases /pr990331.asp Note: 1998 and 1999 data are based on a half-sample, and margin sampling error is ± 5 percent.

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Perhaps most damaging, however, is the long-standing PRC perception that the United States is to blame for the separation of Taiwan from the mainland. Some even suspect that U.S. forces helped Lee Teng-hui concoct his “two-states” theory in July 1999 in order to permanently divide China. 192 Others speculate that the United States somehow helped engineer Chen Shui-bian’s victory in Taiwan’s 2000 presidential election. According to official PRC accounts, the United States’ “actions have inflated the arrogance of the separatist forces in Taiwan, seriously undermined China’s sovereignty and security and imperiled the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region.”193 U.S. experts have dismissed China’s fears as “a little bizarre.”194 However, these concerns appear very real to elements within Beijing’s leadership circles. A long list of U.S. actions are cited to vindicate those PRC leaders who tend to view Washington’s intentions in the most negative light possible. The Clinton administration’s approval of Lee Teng-hui’s 1995 visit to Cornell University and the dispatch of two aircraft carrier battle groups to Taiwan waters during the crisis of 1996 came as shocks to PRC leaders. To some, it appears that Washington has thrown its support behind Taiwan’s separatist movement and plans to keep China divided and weak. Washington’s efforts to tighten its strategic ties to Tokyo and deploy a TMD system in East Asia also served as a wake-up call for some Chinese officials. These actions have provided evidence for PLA strategists who have warned that the United States plans to “contain” China. As if these moves were not enough to strain the relationship, it was the United States that almost single-handedly blocked the PRC’s thirteen-year drive to gain admission to WTO and that has orchestrated the international community’s efforts to condemn Beijing’s human rights abuses. For example, after a U.S.-sponsored UN resolution criticizing China was defeated in April 2000, the Chinese delegate to the UN Commission on Human Rights declared that the measure was “an anti-China political farce directed by the United States alone.”195 Finally, the United States ignored the PRC’s strenuous objections and spearheaded the NATO attack on Yugoslavia. This military operation led to the air strike on the Chinese embassy in Belgrade—an attack that PRC officials describe as a “planned accident.” Elements in the PLA have reportedly used the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis and 1999 Kosovo conflict to bolster their arguments for a more modern military, closer ties to “nonaligned” nations, and additional purchases of sophisticated Russian military equipment. Like their counter-

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parts in Washington, these hard-liners have called for an end to any U.S.-PRC strategic partnership. To be sure, the United States and China remain divided over numerous issues discussed above, and relations had sunk to a new low in 1999 after U.S. planes accidentally bombed the PRC embassy in Belgrade and government-sponsored mobs trashed the U.S. embassy in Beijing. But these strains should not be exaggerated. The two sides have agreed to the symbolic “detargeting” of their nuclear missiles, a direct channel of presidential communication has been established, and both governments have pledged to cooperate on a wide range of issues, including South Asia, nuclear proliferation, and the international economy.196 Also, military exchanges between the U.S. and PRC defense establishments—contacts that were temporarily suspended after the Tiananmen Square incident—have accelerated in recent years. The military Maritime Consultation Agreement of January 1998 is designed to establish a process for dialogue between the two militaries that will enhance understanding and trust as our maritime and air forces operate in close proximity to one another. DOD has also begun to conduct regular high-level strategic dialogue through annual Defense Consultative Talks, which were initiated in December 1997. Our militaries have exchanged port visits and begun exchanges on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. And we have conducted reciprocal senior defense and military visits and continued defense academic exchanges through our respective National Defense Universities.197

In short, U.S. officials contend that in addition to Washington’s close association with Tokyo, a balanced relationship with Beijing “will be key to regional peace and security.”198 Throughout China’s history, corruption has played a contributing role in the fall of imperial dynasties. Most believe that it was a major factor in the defeat of the Kuomintang regime during the 1940s. Ironically, it is now the PRC and its core institutions—the CCP, PLA, and state—that appear to be riddled with corruption. Chinese authorities warn that “this has aroused strong resentment among the people.”199 Corruption is a universal phenomenon—all governments suffer from it. However, it has reached alarming proportions in China during the post-Mao period. According to some studies, China now is the most Corruption

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corrupt nation in East Asia.200 Several considerations may have led to this development: First, the relaxation of totalitarian control has not been accompanied by a corresponding rationalization of the monolithic officialdom or an overhaul of the outmoded socialist legal framework, thereby providing both officials and common citizens with new leverages or new opportunities to engage in illicit and illegal activities with impunity. . . . Second, the introduction of a free market economy has whetted the aspirations of all for material enjoyment or a better life that cannot be realized yet by their still meager incomes or through legitimate means. Third, the “Capitalization” of both the economy and the society has led to a rapid decline of moral standards and ethical conduct.201

Some contend that only sweeping political reforms will resolve the problem. As one unnamed PRC official explained, “We need a mechanism by which the people can vote corrupt officials out of office when they want to.”202 Thus far the PRC has only experimented with democratic reforms at the local level; some villages appear to be holding free and open elections. With respect to corruption in the PLA, however, an entirely different approach has been adopted. During the late 1970s, Deng Xioping reduced military spending and encouraged the PLA to turn to capitalism to help fund its modernization. The PLA complied with the paramount leader’s wishes. In addition to manufacturing arms, the PLA invested heavily in commercial enterprises ranging from luxury hotels and airlines to farms and real estate, and the net worth of its assets ultimately swelled to billions of dollars. By the early 1990s, it was estimated that the PLA was involved in over 20,000 commercial ventures.203 Some Western analysts feared that the revenues generated from these enterprises would be used to fund China’s military modernization. Upon close examination, though, it was found that a majority of the profits were being employed to raise the living standards of ordinary soldiers and provide officers with foreign automobiles and other luxuries.204 Moreover, these commercial operations contributed significantly to the spread of corruption within the PLA. Military units appeared to be particularly active in the smuggling of automobiles, oil, and other commodities. Revelations of rampant PLA corruption reportedly infuriated the CCP leadership. Senior officials criticized the PLA’s commercial activities as “abnormal” and claimed that “this road wasn’t good for the army . . . it can develop some very unhealthy manifestations.” 205 In 1998 Jiang Zemin ordered the PLA to abandon its profit-making enterprises.

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The handover of PLA businesses has proved to be more difficult and complicated than originally envisioned. The CCP leadership had promised to compensate the PLA for its businesses and increase its budget to make up for any revenue shortfalls resulting from the divestiture. But many PLA officers believe that the government’s compensation is inadequate. Moreover, the military has resisted turning over some enterprises, concealed others, and eagerly dumped unprofitable concerns.206 The PLA now argues that some businesses—including a number of airlines and hotels—are exempt from the order. According to some estimates, the military still owned 10,000 companies as of January 2000.207 David Finkelstein, an analyst at the U.S. Center for Naval Analyses, has observed that the divestiture process is “proving to be a really gutwrenching change.” 208 James Mulvenon, an analyst at the RAND Corporation, agrees that “divestiture is not going that well.”209 It has exposed rifts between the PLA and the CCP and contributed to quarrels within the military. Some analysts believe that this problem will linger as a contentious issue within the PRC for years to come. The discussion above outlines several of the major security issues confronting the PRC. To be sure, these are not the only challenges that Beijing confronts. The standoff on the Korean Peninsula, environmental degradation, a mounting need for energy supplies, and the ever-present threat of war in South Asia also represent very real problems for China. Low morale among PLA troops and the low education levels of both officers and enlisted personnel also represent vexing problems for Beijing.210 What distinguishes the security concerns discussed in this chapter from many others is their relative salience. The PRC’s leadership believes that the nation’s future may very well hinge upon its ability to deal with these matters successfully—each is closely related to the CCP’s paramount goal of regime survival. But these challenges are not considered as equally important by Beijing: Summary

Security threats can be divided into two groups according to their nature and perceived consequences. Challenges to the PRC’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and regime security endanger the state’s identity and values and thus have primary importance; these threats are generally assessed in zero-sum terms and are not regarded as subject to compromise, although minimal concessions could be made

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under certain circumstances. Other security threats are viewed as less fundamental and to a certain extent negotiable.211

This explains in part why the Taiwan issue is so critically important to the PRC. It is likely that Beijing would endure economic disturbances, a complete break with Washington, and numerous other hardships to preserve its territorial integrity and prevent Taiwan’s permanent separation from China. Conclusion

The PLA has experienced a series of organizational and structural reforms in recent years. On balance it should be viewed as a military in transition. The PLA is a force that is seeking to gain the capabilities that will enable it to shift away from the focus on large-scale, defensive warfare that characterized PLA doctrine and tactics under Mao Zedong. Although it remains a military that is antiquated and obsolete in many ways, it also contains a growing number of what some military analysts describe as “pockets of excellence.” Most security analysts concede that the PLA is on the road toward a leaner, meaner force with a greater emphasis on high technology. But no consensus exists over whether China now represents a greater threat to its neighbors. Similarly, it is unclear whether China is likely to become a danger in the future. After all, a state’s rising military capability does not in itself constitute a mounting threat to other nations. How China chooses to employ its military muscle could have a critical impact on regional, perhaps even global, peace and stability in the new millennium. It is in the interest of all of the area’s major actors— including the United States—that Beijing assume a constructive and peaceful role in regional affairs. Notes

1. Le Shaoyan and Gang Ye, “Chi Haotian on PRC Defense Policy,” Xinhua (Beijing), February 4, 1998, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter FBIS), China, February 6, 1998, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 2. Wu Xinbo, “China: Security Practice of a Modernizing and Ascending Power,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 127.

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3. Information Office, State Council, People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense 2000, on the World Wide Web at http://www.china. org.cn/english/2791.html 4. Wu Xinbo, “China: Security Practice of a Modernizing and Ascending Power,” p. 127. 5. It is noteworthy that PLA recruits take an oath to obey and defend the CCP. See prepared statement of Ron Montaperto, senior fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, in The Growth and Role of the Chinese Military. Hearing before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, First Session, October 11 and 12, 1995 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996), p. 46. 6. “China Suggests US Still a Threat,” Associated Press, January 8, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research, on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/AP/AP-990108.htm 7. June Teufel Dreyer, China’s Political System: Modernization and Tradition (New York: Paragon House, 1993), p. 243. 8. Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, White Paper—China’s National Defense, 1998 (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, July 27, 1998), pp. 13–14. 9. China’s National Defense, 2000. 10. White Paper—China’s National Defense, 1998, pp. 13–14. 11. Le Shaoyan and Gang Ye, “Chi Haotian on PRC Defense Policy.” 12. Ibid. 13. Robert J. Skebo, Gregory K. S. Man, and George H. Stevens, “China’s Military Capabilities: Problems and Prospects,” in China’s Economic Dilemmas in the 1990s: The Problems of Reforms, Modernization and Interdependence, vol. 2, Study Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, April 1991), p. 664. 14. China launched its first nuclear missile on October 24, 1966, and detonated its first hydrogen bomb on June 14, 1967. 15. See Michael Swaine, Chinese Military Modernization and Asian Security (Palo Alto, Calif.: The Asia/Pacific Research Center, August 1998), p. 4. 16. According to the PLA’s White Paper—China’s National Defense, 2000, “China possesses a small number of nuclear weapons entirely for selfdefense. China undertakes not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.” See White Paper—China’s National Defense, 2000. 17. Teufel Dreyer, China’s Political System: Modernization and Tradition, p. 252. 18. Ibid. 19. Jack H. Harris, “Enduring Chinese Dimensions in Peking’s Military Policy and Doctrine,” Issues and Studies 15, 7 (July 1979), p. 86. 20. Quoted from Richard Fisher and Paul H. B. Godwin, “Defense Policy and Posture I,” in Hans Binnendijk and Ronald Montaperto, eds., Strategic Trends in China (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1998), p. 66. 21. For more information, see Harlan W. Jencks, “China’s Defense

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Buildup: A Threat to the Region?” in Richard H. Yang, ed., China’s Military: The PLA in 1992/92 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 97–98. 22. Skebo, Man, and Stevens, “Chinese Military Capabilities: Problems and Prospects,” p. 664. 23. See Report of Congress, Pursuant to Section 1226 of the FY98 National Defense Authorization Act, p. 5. The report was provided to the author courtesy of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives. 24. Kim Taeho, “A Reality Check: The Rise of China and Its Military Capability Toward 2010,” Journal of East Asian Affairs XII, 2 (Summer/Fall 1998), pp. 338–342. 25. According to PLA accounts, the manpower cuts of 500,000 troops that were announced in 1997 were achieved by 2000 and “of all the services, the Army was cut by 18.6%; the Navy, 11.4%; the Air Force, 12.6%; and the Second Artillery Force, 2.9%.” See China’s National Defense, 2000. 26. Mel Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China’s Security: The New Roles of the Military (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 94. 27. White Paper: China’s National Defense, 1998. 28. Ibid. 29. See Select Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1999), p. 14. 30. Ibid., p. 15. 31. Federation of American Scientists, “Chemical and Biological Weapons,” Nuclear Forces Guide on the World Wide Web at http://www.fas. org/nuke/guide/china/cbw/index.html and International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services Subcommittee, U.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, The Proliferation Primer, January 1998, on the World Wide Web at http:/www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress1998_r/prolifbk/index.html 32. U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, Vol. 1, p. 198. 33. ROC Ministry of National Defense, 1998 National Defense Report: Republic of China (Taipei: Li Ming Cultural Enterprises Co., 1998), p. 37. Translated from the Chinese by Yang Lien-chung and Chien Wu-nan. 34. John Leicester, “China Increases Military Spending,” Associated Press, March 6, 2000, in Taiwan Security Research, on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/AP/AP-030600-Spending.htm 35. U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, Vol. 1, p. 7. 36. U.S. Department of Defense, The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, February 26, 1999). 37. Thomas Crampton, “High-Tech China Upsets Power Balance,” International Herald Tribune, February 26, 2000, in Lexis/Nexis. 38. U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, Vol. 1, p. 7. 39. Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1995), p. 78. 40. William R. Heaton Jr., “The People’s Republic of China,” in The Defense Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study, 3rd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp. 387–388.

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41. According to the Cox report, the COSTIND “presides over a vast, interlocking network of institutions dedicated to the specification, appraisal, and application of advanced technologies to the PRC’s military aims.” The largest of these institutions are styled as corporations, notwithstanding that they are directly in service of the CCP, PLA and the State. See U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, Vol. 1, p. 8. 42. The Defense Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study, 3rd ed., p. 388. 43. U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, Vol. 1, p. 8. 44. James C. F. Wang, Contemporary Chinese Politics: An Introduction (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1999), p. 228. 45. Tai Ming Cheung, China’s Military Agenda Toward Taiwan: CAPS Papers Number 24 (Taipei: Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies, November 1998), pp. 8–10. 46. Michael D. Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking, rev. ed. (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1998), p. 74. 47. Tai Ming Cheung, China’s Military Agenda Toward Taiwan: CAPS Papers Number 24, pp. 8–10. 48. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “PLA Plays Key Role in Taiwan Strategy,” South China Morning Post, April 13, 2000, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.Org/News/SCMP-041300.htm 49. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “Jiang Branded Too Soft on Taiwan,” South China Morning Post, February 11, 2000, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.Org/News/SCMP-021100-Jiang.htm 50. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “Act Soon if Force Is Needed, Says Jiang,” South China Morning Post, March 29, 2000, p. 8. 51. Only a small proportion of those eligible for service actually enter the PLA. In the past, the enlisted ranks had consisted primarily of rural youths with “good class backgrounds.” But the need for higher education levels prompted the PLA to seek to draw more recruits from the more educated sectors of Chinese society—the large urban areas and the nation’s universities. However, most students choose other career paths. Officers are often drawn from military academies, officer candidate schools, or universities. 52. White Paper—China’s National Defense, 1998, p. 8. 53. Ibid. 54. “Rapid Deployment Key to PLA Modernization,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, April 15, 1998, p. 30. 55. Tai Ming Cheung, China’s Military Agenda Toward Taiwan, CAPS Papers Number 24, pp. 11–13. 56. “Rapid Deployment Key to PLA Modernization,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, April 15, 1998, p. 30. 57. John J. Schultz, “China as a Strategic Threat: Myths and Verities,” Strategic Review XXVI, 1 (Winter 1998), p. 8. 58. “China’s New Naval Strategy,” Stratfor. Com., January 26, 2000, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity. org/IS/Stratfor-01262000-Naval-Strategy.htm

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59. The PLAN has experienced difficulties with its Kilo-class submarines. By late 1998, two of the boats were idled with major problems. See Anthony Davis, “Blue-Water Ambitions,” Asiaweek, March 24, 2000, p. 26 in Lexis/Nexis. 60. “China—New Plans and Warships to Be Put into Production,” Periscope Daily Defense News Capsules, January 20, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis, and “China Launches New Super Warship,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, February 1, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/News/Janes-990201.htm 61. Craig S. Smith, “New Chinese Guided-Missile Ship Heightens Tension,” New York Times, February 9, 2000, in Lexis/Nexis. 62. Author’s interview with Maj. Gen. Tyson G. Fu, director, Institute of Strategic Studies, Armed Forces University, Taipei, April 28, 2000. 63. U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, Vol. 1, p. 187. 64. James Kynge and Stephen Fidler, “China’s Submarine-Launched Missile to Be Tested,” Financial Times, June 3, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/News/ FT-990603.htm 65. Bruce Gilley, “Flying Start: Europeans Offer China Aircraft-Carrier Systems,” Far Eastern Economic Review, March 11, 1999, p. 24. 66. “China’s First Aircraft Carrier Ready for Service in 2005: Report,” Agence France Presse, January 12, 2000, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/AFP/AFP-01122000-AircraftCarrier-htm 67. “China to Continue Developing High-Tech Weaponry: Jiang,” Agence France Presse, March 1, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. 68. Oliver Chou, “President Calls for High-Tech Push by Air Force,” South China Morning Post, March 3, 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://www.scmp.com/news/template/China-T...na&template=Default. htx&maxfieldsize=2496 69. “Chinese Air Force Preparing for High-Tech Warfare,” China Times (interactive edition), February 22, 2000, on the World Wide Web at wyiwg//59/http://www.chinatimes.com.tw/english/epolitic/89022110.htm 70. Ibid. 71. For more information, see Jim Mann, “China Seeks Russian Weapons in Effort to Modernize Military,” Los Angeles Times, July 13, 1992, p. 3. 72. For more information, see “Russia Sells PRC Fighter Plans,” China Post (domestic edition), February 4, 1996, p. 1. 73. John W. R. Taylor, “Gallery of Soviet Aerospace Weapons,” Air Force Magazine, March 1990, p. 75. 74. Ibid. The Su-27’s range could be extended with inflight refueling, another of China’s acquisition priorities. 75. For more information on the R77 air-to-air missle, see Brian Hsu, “China’s Air Force to Get New Missile,” Taipei Times, May 10, 2000, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity. org/TT/TT-051000.htm 76. See testimony of Richard Fisher, in The Chinese Military: Its Role and Growth in Lexis/Nexis.

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77. David A. Fulghum and Paul Proctor, “Chinese Coveting Offensive Triad,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, September 21, 1992, p. 21. 78. “Russian Sale of Fighters to China Almost a Sealed Deal,” Reuters, August 26, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/Reu/Reuters-Rus…ighters-To-China-Almost-ASealed-Deal.htm 79. “Beijing Agrees to Buy 30 Russian Jets,” Agence France Presse, October 9, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/AFP/AFP-991009-Russian-Jets.htm Also see John Pomfret, “China Plans for a Stronger Air Force,” Washington Post, November 9, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. 80. Shirley A. Kan, Christopher Bolkcom, and Ronald O’Rourke, China’s Foreign Conventional Arms Acquisitions: Background and Analysis, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, October 10, 2000), p. 21. 81. “PRC Unveils New Locally Designed Fighter-Bomber,” China Post (international airmail edition), November 17, 1998, p. 4. 82. “Beijing Set to Acquire Israeli Radar System,” Agence France Presse, November 7, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://www.taiwansecurity.org/AFP/AFP-991107-Israeli-radar.htm 83. U.S. Department of Defense, The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait, February 26, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://www.taiwansecurity.org/IS-DL-twstrait-990226.htm 84. Kim Taeho, “A Reality Check: The ‘Rise of China’ and Its Military Capability Toward 2010,” p. 354. 85. ROC Ministry of National Defense, 1998 National Defense Report: Republic of China, p. 41. 86. John Gittings, “China ‘Has Neutron Bomb’; Beijing’s Surprise Claim Fuels Threats Over Taiwan,” The Guardian, July 16, 1999, p. 2 in Lexis/Nexis. 87. U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security: Impact of China’s Military Modernization in the Pacific Region (Washington, D.C.: GAO, June 1995), p. 24. 88. U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, Vol. 1, p. 193. 89. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, November 1997), on the World Wide Web at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/ne_asia.html 90. James Risen and Jeff Gerth, “China Is Installing a Warhead Said to Be Based on US Secrets,” New York Times, May 14, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/NYT/NYT990514.htm 91. James Kynge and Stephen Fidler, “China’s Submarine-Launched Missile to Be Tested,” Financial Times, June 3, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/News/FT990603.htm 92. “U.S. Intelligence: China Likely to Increase ICBMs Pointed at U.S.,” Agence France Presse, September 10, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/AFP/AFP-C…To-IncreaseICBMs-Pointed-At-US.htm

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93. U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, Vol. 1, p. 3. 94. “US ‘Probing Neutron Weapon Espionage,’” South China Morning Post, March 12, 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://www.scmp. com/news/template/China-T...na&template= Default.htx&maxfieldsize=2053] 95. “Russians Found Assisting Beijing on Nuclear Weapons Development,” China Times (interactive edition), January 16, 2000, on the World Wide Web at wysiwyg://37/http://www.Chinatimes.com.tw/english/ epolitic/89011511.htm 96. Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, “The Coming Conflict with America,” Foreign Affairs 76, 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 21, 25. 97. Wortzel, China’s Military Potential, p. 3. 98. Herbert London, “China No Military Threat to US,” Journal of Commerce, March 2, 1999, p. 4A in Lexis/Nexis. 99. One study observed that “poorly maintained equipment often does not work, does not work up to requirements, or worse yet, can severely damage itself, other equipment, or personnel.” See Kan, Bolkcom, and O’Rourke, China’s Foreign Conventional Arms Acquisitions: Background and Analysis. 100. Mary Kwang, “China Army Urged to Relook at War,” The Straits Times (Singapore), May 9, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/News/ST-990509.htm 101. Stephen P. Aubin, “China: Yes, Worry About the Future,” Strategic Review XXVI, 1 (Winter 1998), p. 18 and U.S. Department of Defense, The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait, pp. 2–3. 102. Susan V. Lawrence, “Doctrine of Deterrence: Beijing Hopes an Ability to Inflict Casualties Will Discourage US Military Intervention Over Taiwan,” Far Eastern Economic Review, October 14, 1999, p. 37. 103. Bill Gertz, “China Recruits Spies for Science,” Washington Times, October 11, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. Also see “Beijing Steps Up Spying, US Claims,” Hong Kong Standard (Internet edition), March 10, 2000, on the World Wide Web at http://online.hkstandard.com/today/default.asp?PageType=ach7 104. John Pomfret, “Russians Help China Modernize Its Arsenal,” Washington Post, February 10, 2000, in Lexis/Nexis. 105. “China’s Improved Nuclear Weapons Pose Threat to Taiwan,” Agence France Presse, May 26, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http:/taiwansecurity.org/AFP-AFP-990526.htm 106. For information on China’s spy satellites, see “Spy Satellites Said to Track US Warships,” Agence France Presse, October 6, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/ AFP/AFP-Spy-Satellites.htm 107. “China ‘May Wage Information War Against Taiwan,’” Agence France Presse, May 14, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/AFP/AFP-990514.htm 108. Author’s interview with a high-ranking ROC military officer, Taipei, October 1998. 109. Ibid. 110. “Government Discusses Information Warfare,” China Post (international airmail edition), August 17, 1999, p. 3.

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111. For an overview of the various “schools of thought” in the PLA, see Charles F. Hawkins, “The Four Futures: Competing Schools of Military Thought Inside of the PLA,” March 2000 in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/IS/IS-0300-Hawkins.htm 112. John Pomfret, “China Ponders New Rules of ‘Unrestricted War,’” Washington Post, August 8, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. 113. White Paper—China’s National Defense, 1998, p. 5. 114. Information Office, State Council, People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense 2000, on the World Wide Web at http://www.china. org.cn/english/2791.html 115. Agence France Presse, “Separatists Put to Death in Xinjiang,” South China Morning Post, May 20, 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://www.scmp.com/news/template/China-T...na&template=Default. htx&maxfieldsize=1285 116. Lee Ban-nan, secretary-general of Taiwan’s right-wing, prounification New Party, made this statement. See “Lee’s Book Sparks Angry Backlash,” South China Morning Post, May 20, 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://www.scmp.com/news/template/China-T...na&template=Default. htx&maxfieldsize=1397 117. Author’s interview with Gen. (ret.) Wego W. K. Chiang, Taipei, May 17, 1994. 118. “Lee Pushes Vision of Autonomous Regions,” South China Morning Post, May 17, 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://www.scmp.com/news/ template/templat. ..a//&Prev/Temp=Default.htx//&PrevMFS=1397// 119. Li Jiaquan, “Mainland and Taiwan: Formula for China’s Reunification,” Beijing Review 25, 5 (February 3, 1986), p. 24. 120. Ibid. 121. “PRC ‘Will Tolerate Differences with Taiwan,’” China Post (international airmail edition), January 18, 1999, p. 3. 122. Steven Mufson, “Beijing Assures Taiwan Will Not Be Swallowed,” China Post (international airmail edition), October 16, 1995, p. 1. 123. Ibid. 124. Author’s interview with Dr. Xu Shiquan, president of the Institute of Taiwan Studies at China’s Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, October 8, 1998. 125. Ibid. 126. “Beijing May Open Military Sites to Taipei,” Straits Times, December 15, 1998, p. 13 in Lexis/Nexis. 127. “PRC Think Tank Backs Military Hotline Plan: Report,” China Post (international airmail edition), January 20, 1999, p. 4. 128. PRC Vice Premier Qian Qichen made this statement in January 1999. See “Reunification Cause Urged,” China Daily, January 29, 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://www.chinadaily.nt/cndy/history/di-lqian.a29.html 129. Tai Ming Cheung, China’s Military Agenda Toward Taiwan, CAPS Papers Number 24. 130. “Beijing Adopts ‘3 Empties’ Strategy Against Taiwan,” Central News Agency, September 21, 1998, in Lexis/Nexis. 131. Andrew Browne, “China Says US Missile Defense Plan ‘Last

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Straw,’” Reuters, March 5, 1999, in Taiwan Security Web Page on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/Reu/Reu-990305.htm 132. “Taiwan Finds No Comfort in China’s Missile Stance,” Reuters, March 16, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/Reu/Reu-990316.htm 133. Ibid. 134. Tai Ming Cheung, China’s Military Agenda Toward Taiwan, CAPS Papers Number 24, p. 7. 135. Oliver Chou, “Missile Force ‘Response to Threat,’” South China Morning Post, February 11, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. 136. “China Brags It Could Make Mincemeat of Taiwan,” Reuters, August 11, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/Reu/Reuters-Chi…ags-It-Could-Make-Mincemeat-OfTaiwan.htm 137. “Win for DPP Would ‘Be Unacceptable,’” South China Morning Post, December 14, 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://www.scmp.com/ news/china/article/fulltext_asp_articleID-19991214025925269.asp 138. “Zhu Rongji Warns Taiwanese Voters Away from Path of Independence,” Agence France Presse, March 15, 2000, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.Org/AFP/AFP031500-Zhu.htm 139. Ibid. 140. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “President’s New Tactic on Taiwan; Independence Supporters ‘Risking Instability,’” South China Morning Post, November 29, 1998, in Lexis/Nexis. 141. Author’s interview with Dr. Ding Juisong, director, Division for North American Studies, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, Beijing, October 9, 1998. 142. ROC Ministry of National Defense, 1993–1994 National Defense Report: Republic of China (Taipei: Li Ming Cultural Enterprises, Co., 1994), p. 87. 143. Bian Hongwei, “Military Interference a Threat,” China Daily, December 22, 1998, on the World Wide Web at http://www.chinadaily.net/cndy/ history/d1-5army.122.html 144. “Asia Still World’s Fastest Growing Region, ADB Says,” China Post, April 27, 2000, p. 12. 145. Karby Leggett, “China Recovery Rests on Old Foundation: State Spending,” Asian Wall Street Journal (weekly edition), April 24–30, 2000, p. 2. 146. Robert Manning, “A Rattled PRC Rattles Its Sabres,” China Post (international airmail edition), August 9, 1999. 147. Daniel Kwan, “Jiang Spells Out Recipe to Keep Country Strong,” South China Morning Post, May 31, 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://scmp.com/news/template/China-T...na&template=Default.htx& maxfieldsize=2395 148. James Kynge and James Harding, “Decades Before Beijing Can Challenge Washington in Asia,” Financial Times, February 19, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis.

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149. Pomfret, “Protests May Change Chinese Politics.” 150. Jim Mann, “As U.S., Japan Bond, China Takes Notice,” Los Angeles Times, May 5, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/News/LAT-990505.htm 151. “Japan Urged to Learn from Past,” Beijing Review 40, 38 (September 22–28, 1997), on the World Wide Web at http://www.chinanews.org/bjreview/ bjreview.http 152. “China Calls Japan Explanation on US Defense Cooperation, ‘Obscure and Unconvincing,’” Xinhua News Agency, October 9, 1997, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, October 11, 1997, in Lexis/Nexis. 153. See Taiwan Affairs Office, The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China (Beijing: Information Office, State Council, August 1993), p. 9. 154. “China Opposes Inclusion of Taiwan in US-Japan Defense Pact,” Agence France Presse, January 19, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/AFP/AFP-990119.htm 155. “China Calls Japanese Explanation on US Defense Cooperation ‘Obscure and Unconvincing.’” 156. Ibid. 157. Liu Wenyu, “Commentary: Japan-US Defense Guidelines Ambiguous,” Xinhua Domestic Service (Beijing), October 8, 1997, in FBIS, China, October 9, 1997, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 158. Robert Manning, “US, Japan Deepen Defense Ties—And China Gets Nervous,” Los Angeles Times, September 28, 1997, p. M2 in Lexis/Nexis. 159. This charge was included in an editorial that was published by the PLA’s official Liberation Army Daily. See James Kynge, “China Condemns US-Japan Pact,” Financial Times, June 7, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/News/FT-990607.htm 160. Wen Hui, “China, US Should Rethink Relations,” Beijing Review 40, 38 (September 22–28, 1997) and “Enhanced US-Japanese Security Alliance: Cause for Concern,” Beijing Review 40, 24 (June 16–22, 1997), on the World Wide Web at http://www.chinanews.org/bjreview/BJREVIEW.HTTP 161. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “Beijing Wary of ‘East Asian NATO Threat,’” South China Morning Post, May 31, 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://www.scmp.com/news/template/China-T...na&template=Default. htx&maxfieldsize=3304 162. Willy Wo-lap Lam, “National Security High on Communist Party List,” South China Morning Post, June 10, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/SCMP/SCMP-990610.htm 163. Willis Witter, “Japan Hints of Defense of Taiwan Enrage China,” Washington Times, August 25, 1997, p. A1 in Lexis/Nexis. 164. For a complete overview of the programs, see Leon Sloss, “Ballistic Missile Defense Revisited,” Occasional Paper, Atlantic Council of the United States, January 1999. 165. “Clinton May Postpone Missile Defense Decision,” China Post, April 28, 2000, p. 3. 166. Andrew Browne, “China Says US Missile Defense Plan ‘Last Straw.’”

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167. Chen Yanni, “US Missile Systems Violating Agreements,” China Daily, January 22, 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://www.chinadaily. net/cndy/history/d1-3fm.a22.html 168. Mure Dickie and Peter Montagnon, “Taipei Warns of China Missile Threat,” Financial Times, March 1, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. 169. Chen Yanni, “US Missile Systems Violating Agreements.” 170. Browne, “China Says US Missile Defense Plan ‘Last Straw.’” 171. Ibid. 172. “China’s Military Threat: Tripling of Missiles ‘No New Threat?’” Taiwan Communique, issue 85, March 1999, p. 2. 173. Stephen Fidler and Tony Walker, “Big Powers Flex Muscles over Taiwan,” Financial Times, February 10, 1999, p. 4 in Lexis/Nexis. 174. Ibid. 175. Michael Schaller, The United States and China in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 140. 176. Steven L. Levine, “The Soviet Factor in Sino-American Relations,” in Michel Oksenberg and Robert B. Oxnam, eds., Dragon and Eagle—United States–China Relations: Past and Future (New York: Basic Books, 1978), p. 247. 177. A. James Gregor, Arming The Dragon: US Security Ties With the People’s Republic of China. (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1988), p. 10. 178. To normalize relations, both parties proved willing to set aside temporarily their differences over certain volatile issues—matters that had previously rendered all prospects of a reconciliation hopeless. Perhaps most surprising was the delicate handling of the Taiwan question, an affair long considered as an irredentist issue in Sino-U.S. relations. 179. Richard Halloran, “Prueher Would Face Stormy Seas in China,” Global Beat Issue Brief, no. 54, June 7, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/IS/Halloran-990607.htm 180. Deborah Lutterbeck, “China Bashing,” Far Eastern Economic Review, June 25, 1998, p. 14 181. “George Bush Warns China on Trade,” China News, October 20, 1998, p. 3. 182. Ibid. 183. Jane Perlez, “Hopes for Improved Ties with China Fade,” New York Times, February 12, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. 184. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, February 25, 2000), on the World Wide Web at http://www.state.gov/www./global/human_rights/1999_hrp_report/china.html 185. Harold Koh, Human Rights Highest Priority, testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, January 20, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://www.taiwansecurity.org/IS/IS-Koh.htm 186. Jim Drinkard, “Legislators Feel Trade-Bill Pressure,” USA Today, May 5, 2000, p. 6A.

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187. Susan V. Lawrence and Shawn W. Crispin, “Double-Edged Fury,” Far Eastern Economic Review, May 20, 1999, p. 11–15. 188. Nigel Holloway, “That T-Word Again,” Far Eastern Economic Review, February 20, 1997, p. 18. 189. Quoted from “China Lets Loose a Tirade of Anti-US Rhetoric,” Agence France Presse, May 27, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. 190. Willy Wo-lap Lam, “‘Hawkish Western Leaders’ Berated,” South China Morning Post, June 17, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. 191. John Pomfret, “China Rethinks Security After NATO Attack,” Washington Post, June 11, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. 192. Henry Kissinger, “Not Quiet on the Eastern Front: China and the US Are at Risk of War Over Taiwan,” Ottawa Citizen, September 10, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. 193. Information Office, State Council, People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense 2000, on the World Wide Web at http://www. china.org.cn/english/2791.html 194. “U.S.-China Relations Need Repair,” Associated Press, May 10, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/AP/AP-990510.htm 195. Jane Perlez, “UN Rights Commission Foils US Effort to Condemn China,” New York Times, April 19, 2000, in Lexis/Nexis. 196. For more information, see Jackie Sam, “Decades of Distrust Dissolves in Days,” Hong Kong Standard, July 2, 1998, and Viven Pik-Kwan Chan and Chan Yee Hon, “Positive Tone Augurs Well, Says Professor,” South China Morning Post, June 29, 1998. 197. The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia–Pacific Region (1998 edition), p. 34. 198. See prepared statement of Adm. Joseph W. Prueher, commander, U.S. Pacific Command, before the Senate Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, May 6, 1998, Federal News Service in Lexis/Nexis. 199. John Leicester, “China Increases Military Spending.” 200. According to Hong Kong-based Political and Economic Risk Consultancy Ltd., only Indonesia and India rank ahead of China in corruption in Asia. See Suharsono Hadikusumo, “Asia’s Most Corrupt Country,” Jakarta Post, April 26, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. 201. Pao-min Chang, “Corruption and Crime in China: Old Problems and New Trends,” The Journal of East Asian Affairs XXIII, 1 (Spring/Summer 1999), p. 221. 202. James Kynge, “Corruption Still Spreading in China,” Financial Times, June 4, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/News/FT-990604.htm 203. “China Army Wins Budget Boost for Business Plan,” Reuters, March 4, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/Reu/Reu-990304-2.htm 204. “Giving the PLA the Business,” Asian Wall Street Journal, May 31, 1994, p. 8. 205. John Pomfret, “Chinese Army Out of Business? Beijing Reforms

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Would Strip Military of Its Commercial Empire,” Washington Post, November 23, 1998, p. A20 in Lexis/Nexis. 206. Susan V. Lawrence and Bruce Gilley, “China: Bitter Harvest, The Handover of the Military’s Business Empire Has Stirred Up a Hornet’s Nest,” Far Eastern Economic Review, April 29, 1999, pp. 22–27. 207. Mark Magnier, “Chinese Military Still Embedded in the Economy,” Los Angeles Times, January 9, 2000, in Lexis/Nexis. According to the PLA’s 2000 Defense White Paper, only “290 business management bodies in commercial activities were either completely dismantled or handed over to local governments.” 208. Lawrence and Gilley, “China: Bitter Harvest, The Handover of the Military’s Business Empire has Stirred Up a Hornet’s Nest,” p. 27. 209. Magnier, “Chinese Military Still Embedded in the Economy.” 210. During an interview with the author, a member of the CCP explained that very few of China’s educated population opt to pursue a military career. He argued that “only those who can’t find a job join the military.” Author’s confidential interview with a member of the CCP, May 4, 2000. 211. Wu Xinbo, “China,” p. 138.

4 The Taiwanese Military he Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) enters the new millennium as an economic powerhouse and one of the world’s fledgling democracies. In fact, Taiwan is now described officially by the U.S. Department of State as a “multiparty democracy.” In March 2000 the island elected a new president—the first opposition candidate to win the office of the presidency in the history of the ROC. It is clear that momentous changes have come to Taiwan. Dramatic transformations in Taiwan’s armed forces have accompanied these changes.

T

Defense Policy

Officials in Taipei take a broad view of the island’s security goals. According to Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND), the “ultimate national objective” of the government is “to attain the ideal of the Three People’s Principles, or in other words, to attain the ideal of freedom, democracy, and equal wealth for the people of the [Chinese] nation.”1 The MND emphasizes that “these ultimate objectives will never be changed.” 2 However, the means employed to obtain these goals have changed significantly. After suffering a series of humiliating defeats at the hands of the Chinese Communists, the ROC government retreated to Taiwan in 1949. During the early 1950s, the people were told that the island would serve as a staging area to retake mainland China. Kao Chinglien, an eighty-nine-year-old veteran, lamented that “at that time we thought we could go back immediately.”3 The growing power of the PRC eventually led Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to conclude that the means of returning would have to be “70 percent political.” However, he never abandoned his dream of “national recovery and national reconstruction.”4 Chiang’s successor, 119

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the late President Chiang Ching-kuo, also vowed that the “antiCommunist struggle will never cease until Communism is eliminated from Chinese territory and until the Chinese Communist regime has been destroyed.”5 For roughly three decades, the ultimate goal of the ROC military was to take back the Chinese mainland by force. Military planners concentrated on building an army capable of fielding forty or more divisions. The structure of the armed forces reflected this mission: the ROC maintained one of the world’s largest land armies. But this policy has changed. On May 1, 1991, President Lee Teng-hui terminated the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion. This move formally signified the ROC’s willingness to renounce the use of force to achieve the unification of China. Taipei now professes a desire to ultimately unify the country peacefully through a three-stage unification process outlined in the Guidelines for National Unification.6 Chen Shui-bian, Taiwan’s new president, has promised not to scrap the guidelines despite his proindependence background. Beijing suspects, however, that both Lee and Chen actually support the island’s permanent separation from China. Although Taipei has renounced the use of force to unify China, Beijing has not reciprocated. The PRC has long embraced as a basic policy the position that “every sovereign state has the right to use all means it thinks necessary, including military means, to safeguard its own sovereignty and territorial integrity. In deciding which way to deal with the issue of Taiwan, the Chinese government has no obligation to make a commitment to any country or any person attempting to split China.”7 Consequently, ROC military authorities assert that the PRC is “the greatest menace to our society.”8 In keeping with the stated goal of peaceful unification, the ROC’s military strategy has shifted significantly in recent years. In fact, since retreating to Taiwan, the ROC’s military strategy has passed through three distinct stages: First our military mission was to recover our territory—mainland China. Then, in the mid-1980s, we changed to offense and defense. If we had a chance to use offense to take back mainland China, then we would use offense. Otherwise, we defend. Then, in the past several years we have moved to defense. So, we’ve made big cuts in what we call heavy engineering, bridge building, and things like that.9

According to official MND documents, the current strategy might best be described as “strong defense and effective deterrence.”10

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In sum, the ROC hopes to deter an attack on its territory. However, should deterrence fail, the military is prepared to defend the country. To achieve these objectives, the island maintains a formidable military force and close relations with the United States. In the early 1980s the PRC launched a drive to modernize its military, and since that time the program has accelerated. Taiwan officials view this development with alarm. During an interview with the author, Maj. Gen. Kung Fan-ding, MND spokesman, charged that the PRC is determined “to become a military power dominating the Asia-Pacific region in the twenty-first century. Thus, we can easily sense the rising threat to our security.”11 Taiwan is aggressively upgrading its weapons systems to cope with the PRC buildup. Primary emphasis is being placed on building a more effective navy and air force. At the same time, the armed forces are being reorganized and downsized into a smaller defensive force. Taiwan hopes that its military muscle will help deter PRC aggression. Dr. Chung Chien, a professor at Taiwan’s prestigious War College of the Armed Forces University, has observed that “we want the PRC to know that we have a sting in our tail.”12 A Formidable Military Force

Navy. Taiwan’s navy has long been one of the largest in the world. But this statistic is misleading, because by the 1980s most ROC naval vessels were approaching obsolescence. Taiwan has employed three methods to upgrade its naval power: purchase from abroad, lease from abroad, and domestic construction. During the 1980s, the island purchased two modern submarines from the Netherlands and it recently took possession of the last of six La Fayette-class missile frigates it had ordered from France in the early 1990s. Taipei also has leased eight Knox-class guided-missile frigates from the United States. Finally, as part of the navy’s second-generation warship development plan (the Kuanghau project), Taiwan has commissioned seven advanced Chengkung-class (Perry-class) missile frigates, built several 500-ton naval patrol vessels, and plans to build a fleet of thirty fast-attack missile boats with “stealth” capabilities.13 All warships are equipped with state-of-the-art weapons and technology, including Taiwan’s locally developed antiship missiles. As for Taipei’s two Dutch submarines, naval authorities claim that “they are superior to any diesel submarine in the PRC fleet.”14 It is for these reasons that some Taiwanese defense analysts contend that Taiwan’s mar-

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itime defense level, including ships, weapons systems, and personnel quality, is ahead of that of the PRC’s navy.

Air Force. Taiwan is putting more muscle into its air force. In January 1994, the armed forces began to take delivery of the domestically manufactured Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF), a warplane designed originally to replace Taiwan’s aging stock of 80 Lockheed F-104G and 300plus Northrop F-5E/F aircraft. Current plans call for the acquisition of about 135 IDFs. After rigorous testing, the first IDF came into service in 1997. According to unconfirmed reports, Taiwan may begin to develop a new variant of the warplane—a stealth fighter armed with more powerful engines and updated fire control and radar systems—sometime in 2001.15 Taiwan also has purchased 150 F-16A/B warplanes from the United States and 60 Mirage 2000-5 fighters from France. By 1998, the ROC Air Force had taken delivery of all the Mirage warplanes and 103 of the F-16s.16 Delivery of the remaining 47 F-16s was completed in 1999. In addition to warplanes, Taiwan has purchased four Grumman E2T Hawkeye early-warning planes from the United States. These have enabled the military to drastically improve its surveillance capabilities. The ROC air force also has remodeled one of its U.S.-built C-130 transports into a Tien-kan (Sky Interference) airborne electronic warfare center and plans to remodel ten of its U.S.-made F-16 fighters into reconnaissance aircraft.17

Army. Taiwan’s army is being reorganized and downsized into a smaller defensive force. “Three dimensional” brigades will ultimately replace divisions as the army’s fundamental strategic units. Current plans call for the army to be reduced to 200,000 troops in ten years. Like the navy and the air force, the ROC Army is being equipped with new weapons. Recent acquisitions include tanks, helicopters, and other sophisticated military equipment. The army also mans the three U.S.-made Patriot antimissile missile batteries (which include missiles, wheeled vehicles, and multifunctional radar) that have been deployed around Taipei (the so-called Modified Air Defense System, or MAD), and the army will be responsible for other batteries as they are set up elsewhere on the island.18 Other developments. This discussion outlines only several major developments in Taiwan’s armed forces. A more complete description would contain details about other enterprises as well. For example, the island

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has invested heavily in the construction of underground military installations and arsenals and it has employed separation and camouflage strategies to hide them.19 The first major underground facility, the US$ 820 million Chiashan base, was completed in December 1993. This base is equipped with massive defenses against conventional and nonconventional attack and can house up to several hundred warplanes. Located in a secure mountain stronghold on the eastern side of the island, Chiashan is “entirely self-sufficient, with its own power supply, communications network, hospital and other facilities.”20 The base is tied into the fully automated Qiangwang (Strong Net) air-defense network, “a system that links radar-surveillance stations, air-defense fighter bases, antiaircraft artillery, and surface-to-air missile units.”21 When cross-strait relations nose-dived in late 1999, the MND invited Taiwan’s media to visit two of the island’s secret installations in an effort to boost confidence in the government’s military preparedness. In addition to the Chiashan base, the delegation toured the Hengshan Command Center (HCC), a facility that resembles the U.S. Air Force’s NORAD center in both form and function. Armed with huge monitoring screens, the HCC provides the MND with “up to the minute tracking of all air, sea and artillery elements of the mainland’s PLA located within the region.”22 Taiwan’s military is not content with the status quo. It plans to build bases similar to the Chiashan facility to cover the north, south, east, and central portions of islands. It also has drafted a ten-year development program of major weapons it plans to develop. According to some accounts, the weapons in the plan include long-range radar, submarines, anti-tactical-ballistic missiles, and long- and medium-range ballistic missiles.23 Taiwan’s military concedes that it is developing long-range radar and anti-tactical-ballistic missiles. However, it firmly denies that it is developing submarines or ballistic missiles. In addition to the new basing facilities, Taiwan’s prestigious Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology (CIST), the island’s leading institution for the research, development, and design of defense technology, will continue to develop new weapons systems for the military.24 To date, arms designed, tested, and produced by CIST include the Kung-feng 6A rocket, the Hsiung-feng I and Hsiung-feng II surface-toair missiles (SAMs), artillery fire control systems, naval sonar systems, naval electronic warfare systems, and the Tzu-chiang trainer aircraft. The institute is producing or plans to produce a series of new SAMs, air-to-air missiles (AAMs), and other sophisticated weapons systems. Taiwan’s military research institutes also are seeking to upgrade the

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country’s ability to conduct information or computer warfare. In October 1999, an official MND report warned that “with their efforts to the improvement of electronic warfare capability, the Chinese Communists are expected to pose a threat to Taiwan in 2005.”25 Several months later, however, the ministry revealed that the PRC already “has been attempting to paralyze parts of Taiwan’s national defense, transportation, and financial infrastructure by launching tens of thousands of information attacks.”26 In response to these threats, Taiwan’s military has developed roughly 1,000 computer viruses to use in a cross-strait conflict. Lin Chin-ching, a Defense Ministry official, boasted that “should the People’s Liberation Army launch electronic warfare against Taiwan, the military, armed with about 1,000 computer viruses, would be able to fight back.”27 It is widely anticipated that Taipei will accelerate efforts aimed at improving its electronic warfare capabilities. According to news reports, the MND has earmarked roughly $90 million for investment in electronic and information warfare in 2001.28 This represents part of a new information safety program code-named Chihan that will upgrade different types of software and hardware associated with this modern form of warfare. Another project—the Maihu project—has been launched to develop a protective shield to defend the island’s computer systems against possible electromagnetic pulse bomb attacks.29 With respect to China’s growing missile threat, Taiwan has entered into negotiations on the purchase of several Aegis-class cruisers from the United States and it has agreed to study the possibility of participating in the proposed TMD system. The highly computerized Aegis warships are designed to counter short- and medium-range surface-to-surface missiles and provide early warning against a missile attack. In April 2000, Taipei received word that Washington had turned down its request for the warships. The PRC had warned that the destroyers would be “the straw that breaks the camel’s back,” and one U.S. military authority predicted that the PLA would launch a preemptive strike against the vessels.30 Rather, the island would be provided with sophisticated AAMs and antiship missiles as well as the Pave Paws long-range radar system. However, there remains a distinct possibility that the Bush administration will approve the sale of Aegis-class destroyers sometime in the future. The TMD, a multibillion-dollar system that is to employ sophisticated satellite technology, would purportedly enable Taiwan to detect and intercept incoming ballistic missiles. Like the Aegis warships, the TMD is an extremely sensitive issue. It remains unclear whether Taiwan

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will participate in the program. As Chen Chien-jen, then Taiwan’s foreign minister, explained during an interview with the author in March 2000, “We’ve left the door open and the options open . . . we up to this moment have not said if we will try to get it and participate or not participate.”31 Chen added that “the United States also has not closed the door” on the possibility of Taiwan joining the TMD system.32 Finally, Taiwan officials realize fully that China threatens the island in numerous ways. During China’s “missile tests” off Taiwan’s coast in the mid-1990s, the island’s stock market plummeted. In an effort to stabilize financial markets in the event of another cross-strait crisis, a stock market stabilization fund was created in January 2000. When signing the controversial bill, President Lee described it as a defense against China’s threats and missiles. The president promised that “if you [China] fire your missiles, then I will use money to stabilize the stock market.”33 Ironically, Lee’s pledge was put to the test during the March 2000 presidential campaign when it was used to calm markets after China threatened the island. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his Kuomintang (KMT) government retreated to the island of Taiwan (then Formosa) in 1949. Since that time the United States’ security relations with Taiwan have gone through several phases. During the early months of 1950 it appeared that Taiwan would be overrun by the PRC. But the U.S. government refused to assist the ROC in its efforts to repel communist aggression. On January 5, 1950, President Harry S Truman stated unequivocally that the United States would not become involved in the Chinese Civil War: U.S. Support

The United States has no predatory designs on Formosa or on any other Chinese territory. The United States has no desire to obtain special rights or to establish military bases on Formosa at this time. Nor does it have any intention of utilizing its armed forces to interfere in the present situation. The United States will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China. Similarly, the United States government will not provide military aid or suggestions to Nationalist forces on Formosa.34

The outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950—a conflict viewed by many as the first step in a communist drive for world conquest—led the Truman administration to reverse its position. On June

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27, 1950, the president announced that he had ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet to “neutralize” the Taiwan Strait—thereby intervening in the Chinese civil war.35 As John Kuan observed, “the Korean War transformed American policy from abandonment of the Republic of China to the defense of Taiwan.”36 Between 1950 and 1968 (when U.S. financial aid was terminated), massive amounts of military and economic aid poured into Taiwan. Furthermore, the two governments concluded a mutual defense treaty in 1954. For over two decades following ratification of the treaty, the United States maintained a firm alliance with the ROC. During the late 1960s, a variety of geopolitical and strategic considerations led the United States to seek a rapprochement with the PRC.37 As Beijing came to play a greater role in Washington’s containment strategy, the relative importance of Taiwan declined. Indicative of this change, in 1971 the United States quietly acquiesced to Taiwan’s expulsion from the United Nations and it no longer supported Taipei’s efforts to maintain formal diplomatic ties with other governments. Finally, in 1979 the United States established diplomatic relations with Beijing. To achieve normalization, the United States agreed to accede to Beijing’s long-standing conditions for diplomatic relations: the “derecognition” of the ROC, the termination of the U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty, and the withdrawal of all U.S. forces stationed on Taiwan. With the abrogation of the U.S.-ROC Defense Treaty in 1979, the United States terminated its formal security commitment to Taiwan. However, the United States continues to play a critical role in Taiwan’s defense strategy: U.S. military equipment, technological assistance, and an informal or “tacit alliance” augment the island’s defenses.38

U.S. militar y equipment. According to the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA)—the legislation that guides official U.S. policy toward Taiwan—the United States will “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” Recent sales of U.S.-built military equipment have included missiles, advanced fighter aircraft, sophisticated antisubmarine helicopters, warships, transport planes, tanks, long-range radar, and the Patriot antimissile system. Arms transfers appear not to have been affected adversely by the election of Chen Shui-bian. 39 In the aftermath of the election, the United States has approved two major arms sales to the island. In June 2000, Washington announced a sale valued at $320 million, and in September 2000 the Pentagon revealed that it plans a series of arms

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sales valued at roughly $1.3 billion.40 Taiwanese officials hope that the Bush administration will look even more favorably upon Taiwan’s weapons requests than past administrations. In addition to arms, the United States has transferred critical technologies to Taiwan. This technological assistance has enabled Taipei to manufacture domestically a wide range of military hardware, including advanced warplanes, missiles, warships, and tanks.41 For example, a majority of the necessary parts for the IDF fighter—including the manufacturing technology for the warplane’s engine—are supplied by the United States, and U.S. engineers helped Taiwan’s state-owned China Shipbuilding Corporation build its first two Chengkung-class frigates.42 The United States also has sold data link systems to help Taiwan mold its different air, sea, and land systems into an integrated and cohesive force

U.S. security commitment. The U.S. security commitment to Taiwan is discussed in the TRA and three joint communiqués with the PRC. As Winston Lord, then assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, observed, “The TRA and the joint communiqués precisely express the governing principles of our policy.”43 The U.S. security commitment to Taiwan is outlined principally in sections 2 and 3 of the TRA. Section 2 (b) states: It is the policy of the United States . . . to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States; to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.

Should the security or the social or economic system of Taiwan be threatened, section 3 states that “the President is directed to inform the Congress promptly . . . . (and) the President and the Congress shall determine in accordance with constitutional processes, appropriate action by the United States in response to any such danger.” In addition to the TRA, security policy toward Taiwan is guided by three U.S.-PRC joint communiqués: (1) the 1972 Shanghai communiqué; (2) the 1979 normalization communiqué; and (3) the August 17, 1982, U.S.-China joint communiqué. In the 1972 Shanghai communiqué—a document that helped pave the way for eventual normalization

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of U.S.-PRC relations—Washington reaffirmed “its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question.” In the U.S. statement that accompanied the 1979 normalization communiqué, Washington stressed that “the United States continues to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and expects that the Taiwan issue will be settled peacefully by the Chinese themselves.” Finally, in the August 17, 1982, U.S.-China joint communiqué—an agreement that appeared to pledge the United States to decrease its arms sales to Taiwan—the United States stressed that it “understands and appreciates the Chinese policy of striving for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question.” Some argue that the TRA and/or the United States’ stated interest in a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue mean that the United States must come to the defense of Taiwan. But these individuals are mistaken. The TRA provides the United States only with an option to defend Taiwan; it does not necessarily commit the United States to Taiwan’s defense. During congressional hearings held in March 1996, Howard Lange, director of the Taiwan Coordination Staff at the Department of State, was asked by Representative Lee H. Hamilton (DemocratIndiana) whether it was correct that the TRA “does not contain any positive statement about our assistance in case of an attack on Taiwan.”44 The director replied, “That is correct.”45 Lange’s candid testimony did not reflect a change in U.S. policy. Indeed, the 1979 House Committee on Foreign Affairs report that accompanied the TRA emphasizes that “what would be appropriate action, including possible use of force in Taiwan’s defense, would depend on the specific circumstances.”46 U.S. officials refuse to promise to defend Taiwan. In July 1998, Mike McCurry, then White House spokesman, was asked for a “simple answer” to whether the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense if attacked. McCurry replied, “I’m not going to wing an answer on something that is very precisely stated in the Taiwan Relations Act.”47 Officials also refuse to specify the type of PRC provocations against Taiwan that might trigger a U.S. military response or those circumstances that might lead Washington to forsake Taipei. For example, when asked during congressional hearings in 1998 whether he could “envision any conditions under which the United States would not come to Taiwan’s defense,” Kurt Campbell, then deputy assistant secretary of defense for East Asian and Pacific affairs, replied, “Congressman, I am not going to sit here and answer those kinds of hypothetical questions . . . we always refrain from answering those kinds of hypothetical questions.”48 Those who support the policy of “strategic ambiguity” toward

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Taiwan’s defense have long argued that it benefits U.S. interests in a number of ways.49 The uncertainty surrounding a U.S. response to a PRC attack helps deter such an attack; as such, the policy complements U.S. foreign policy goals and objectives by promoting regional stability. This position complements U.S. policy in another way. If the United States states clearly that it will help defend Taiwan if it is attacked, such a declaration will undoubtedly antagonize the PRC and seriously strain U.S.-PRC relations. Finally, some fear that a firm security guarantee might embolden Taiwan’s independence activists and lead the island to declare its formal independence from China. This move probably would lead to a war in the Taiwan Strait—a conflict that might involve the United States. In sum, the United States is not committed to Taiwan’s defense. Douglas Paal, a former senior national security aide, observed that “there’s no such thing as an ironclad commitment . . . the belief that the US will send [aircraft] carriers any time the People’s Republic puts pressure on Taiwan depends on Taiwan’s behavior.”50 Nevertheless, a 1998 National Defense University study observed that “any US administration would come under significant pressure to defend Taiwan were conflict to occur, no matter the cause.”51 Indeed, when cross-strait tensions escalated sharply in late 1999, Susan Shirk, then deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, came very close to saying that the United States would indeed respond to an attack against Taiwan. Shirk told a gathering of Chinese Americans that “we believe that in such an eventuality, the use of force would be catastrophic for China as well as Taiwan—and, of course, would be disastrous for USChina relations, and would, no doubt, put us in an actual war.”52 A senior U.S. military commander was even more direct. In August 1999, Rear Adm. Timothy J. Keating, commander of the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk battle group, warned that “China will know if they attempt to undertake any kind of operation—whether it’s Taiwan or anything else—that they are going to have the US Navy to deal with. . . . We are there in numbers, we’re trained, we’re ready and we’re very powerful.”53 Comments such as these prompted Alexander Downer, Australia’s foreign minister, to warn Jiang Zemin during his 1999 visit to Melbourne that his country considers any PRC attack against Taiwan “as a trigger to a war between China and the United States.”54 Other forms of military support. U.S. military support for Taiwan is not limited solely to arms sales, technology transfers, and the ambiguous defense provisions of the TRA. For example, the two states also share

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intelligence. During the 1995 and 1996 Taiwan Strait crises, Taipei and Washington “exchanged strategic information and cooperated in intelligence gathering efforts.”55 Following the crisis, the United States used the information to advise Taiwan how it might best improve its defensive capabilities. On the other hand, Taipei has long provided Washington with information that its intelligence network has gathered on political and military developments inside the PRC.56 According to some accounts, U.S.-ROC military ties have expanded significantly.57 Although details remain classified, Washington has been particularly active helping Taipei enhance its antisubmarine warfare capabilities.58 Despite the lack of formal diplomatic ties, U.S.-ROC military-tomilitary contacts remain intact. Since 1979, for example, Taiwan has sent hundreds of military officers to the United States for training. Prospective ROC F-16 pilots have received training at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona, and other military personnel have been sent to the United States to study missile technology and observe live Patriot missile exercises.59 For its part, the United States has sent military personnel to Taiwan to inspect military installations and exchange views with their Taiwan counterparts on the island’s defense needs. U.S. defense officials have expressed a strong interest in increasing such ties.60 In addition to these exchanges, in 1998 then-U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen met with Gen. Tang Fei, Taiwan’s chief of general staff, in Washington to discuss the proposed TMD system for East Asia and other unspecified “issues of concern to US and Taiwanese defense.”61 It is also noteworthy that Taiwan enjoys widespread, bipartisan support among members of the U.S. Congress and the American public. Indeed, it has become a common practice for the Congress to pass by overwhelming majorities resolutions supporting Taiwan. Recent resolutions have ranged from a call for this “key ally” of the United States to be allowed to participate in the proposed TMD system to a blunt demand that Beijing renounce the use of force against Taiwan. Perhaps equally significant, public opinion polls reveal that an overwhelming majority of Americans believe that the United States should “firmly support” Taiwan’s security even if that means irritating the PRC. 62 According to some studies, a majority of Americans would be willing to fight to defend Taiwan if it were attacked by China and could accept a high level of U.S. casualties.63 As Senator Slade Gorton (RepublicanWashington) observed in 1998, support for Taiwan is now a “mainstream position” in the United States.64

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Finally, the revised U.S.-Japan defense pact has bolstered the viability of one option available to Washington during an emergency in the Taiwan Strait—namely, the military option. Without ever mentioning China specifically, the revised guidelines nevertheless send a strong signal that the United States now is better positioned to handle any conflict that might emerge in the Taiwan Strait. In that critical respect, they may serve as an additional deterrent to PRC aggression.65 As Maj. Gen. Kung Fan-ding noted, “The ultimate goal of our military build-up is to construct an elite deterrent force.”66 The ROC trusts that this military power—along with its relationship with the United States—will help deter PRC aggression. However, the government is keenly aware that deterrence could fail. Taiwan military authorities contend that, following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the PRC has redeployed M-9 and M-11 ballistic missiles and troops in its southeastern regions and that these forces are aimed at Taiwan. 67 In fact, according to some defense experts, “the amount of missiles deployed is considered the world’s heaviest concentration of strategic weapons in a given location.”68 By March 2000, China had over 200 missiles aimed at Taiwan with plans to deploy fifty more each year.69 Perhaps equally worrisome for Taipei, reports Yin Tsung-wen, director of the ROC National Security Bureau, the PRC has “Taiwan in mind either in training and drills . . . this has been repeatedly proved by information collected.” 70 Indeed, in September 1999, the PRC’s state media announced that the PLA had conducted a mock invasion of Taiwan.71 Xinhua News Agency boasted that “the military exercise provided a spectacular sight of a straitscrossing and landing operation.”72 U.S. defense experts acknowledge that “there’s a pretty good consensus in the intelligence community that the Chinese military has been asked to operationalize a Taiwan invasion in a way they haven’t done in the past.”73 Not surprisingly, the PRC has increased efforts to spy on Taiwan’s military facilities. One high-ranking ROC air force officer observed that “they have shown keen interest in our new jet fighters.”74 PRC authorities have outlined a number of conditions that might lead the mainland to use force against Taiwan. Over time, these circumstances have changed. Most recently, they include the following: Analysis

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• • • •

Taiwan independence Foreign occupation of Taiwan Taiwan’s development of nuclear weapons75 Taiwan’s refusal to negotiate with the PRC for a protracted period

Taiwan analyses also have identified various situations that might lead Beijing to resort to military action. According to a 1998 study prepared by Tamkang University, the PRC would employ force against the island under the following circumstances:

• If Taiwan declared independence • If massive disturbances break out in Taiwan • If the comparative fighting strength of Taiwan’s military weakens significantly • If foreign forces interfere in Taiwan’s affairs • If Taiwan continues to reject reunification talks • If Taiwan develops nuclear weapons76

The report warns that an attack would be most likely between the years 2005 and 2010—after China has completed its military modernization program and before the deployment of the United States’ ballistic missile defense system. However, Luan Ming, a former aide to the late Hu Yaobang, secretary-general of the CCP, stresses that PRC troops are on permanent alert for an attack and that “they will attack Taiwan at any time the CCP gives the order.”77 Should the PRC opt to use force against Taiwan, the MND believes it would resort to one of three actions: • A sea and/or air blockade of Taiwan, • A raid on Taiwan’s outlying islands, or • A full-scale assault on the island.78

The ministry believes that these moves could be undertaken independently, sequentially, or simultaneously. Defense analysts suspect that a “paralyzing” blockade intended to bring Taiwan “to its knees in a rapid, bloodless fashion” would be Beijing’s most likely form of military action.79 To achieve this objective the PRC might employ missile tests, mines, submarines, and surface ships to blockade certain shipping routes and/or announce that waters surrounding Taiwan are in a state of civil war. Either move would lead

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many foreign ships to steer clear of Taiwan and make shipping prohibitively expensive. Hence, Taiwan’s navy and air force purchase equipment and conduct exercises with an eye toward busting any possible blockade that the PRC might attempt to impose on the island. Almost all of Taiwan’s main fighting ships have antisubmarine warfare capabilities and its Knox-class warships were designed specifically for antisubmarine warfare and convoy escort. Moreover, although Taiwan has allowed its 120-day stockpile of strategic petroleum reserves to shrink to about three weeks’ worth of oil, Taiwanese lawmakers reason that the island can probably hold out long enough for the United States (or perhaps even Japan) to come to its assistance.80 However, the PRC hopes that its new Russian-built Kilo-class submarines and Sovremenny-class destroyers—described by some as aircraft carrier killers—will deter U.S. moves to interfere with a blockade. With respect to the offshore islands—territories once considered the front line of Taiwan’s defense shield—they have been heavily fortified for decades. Although the troop levels on Quemoy and Matsu have been reduced (the ROC once deployed half of its troops on the islands), the outposts are now armed with state-of-the-art missiles and artillery. The MND plans to deploy a new army air defense missile platoon—a unit armed with newly acquired man-portable Stinger missiles—on the islands.81 The PLA would confront very stiff resistance if it opted to attack them. Finally, should the PRC attack Taiwan itself, the MND believes that an attempted large-scale landing operation is very unlikely. After all, the PRC lacks the transport and supply ships required for such a massive military undertaking, and the Taiwan Strait—which is three times as wide as the English Channel—is not easy sailing. Furthermore, the PLA would be unable to employ all of its forces in an attack on the island: “I want to point out that in a war in the Taiwan Strait, we have to consider the air zone and the sea zone. The PLA cannot throw all of its forces into such a limited zone to fight with us.”82 Judged much more likely is a PLA surprise attack using mobile forces to occupy key ports and major military posts. Many analysts believe that such an attack would be preceded by missile strikes aimed against critical facilities. Electronic warfare equipment also would be heavily employed to destroy Taiwan’s computer, transportation, and communications systems and interfere with its weaponry and warfare systems.83 To cope with this threat, the ROC military has revised its defensive warfare plan, code-named Ku-An (Security Consolidation).84 Tactics

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have been switched from preparing for a traditional “beachhead engagement” to “beating the invading Chinese Communist mobile forces.”85 Under the new Ku-An plan, combined army, navy, and air force operations are emphasized and training has been adjusted accordingly. Moreover, Taiwan is determined to boost its antiballistic missile capabilities and its ability to conduct electronic warfare. In sum, Taiwanese defense analysts believe that the island must be prepared to cope with several possible attack scenarios. The need is all the more pressing because many believe that the likelihood of some sort of PRC military action against the island is increasing. In fact, in February 2000, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency predicted a “high potential” for a “military flare-up across the Taiwan Strait.” 86 It is unclear which, if any, of these tactics the PRC would choose to employ. Other than a September 1999 pledge to never use nuclear weapons against Taiwan, Beijing has refused to rule out any of its options.87 Military Structure

According to article 36 of the ROC constitution, the president of the ROC has “supreme command of the land, sea and air forces of the whole country.” But day-to-day administration of the military is carried out by the Ministry of National Defense under the executive yuan (cabinet). The MND is responsible “for formulating military strategy, setting military personnel policies, devising draft and mobilization plans, delineating supply distribution policies, arranging for the research and development of military technology, compiling data for the national defense budget, setting military regulations, conducting court martial proceedings and administering military law.”88 Within the Defense Ministry is the minister of national defense (who must be a civilian by law) and the General Staff Headquarters (GSH). Under the GSH are the various services—the Army, Navy, Air Force, Combined Services Force (a logistical command), Armed Forces Reserve Command, the Coast Guard Command, and the Military Police Command. The GSH is responsible for “the planning and supervision of joint war activities, political warfare, personnel, military intelligence, operations, education and training, logistics, organization and equipment calibration, communications, military archives management and medical services.”89 It is headed by a chief of the general staff. In January 2000, Taiwanese lawmakers approved landmark legislation intended to resolve the ambiguous power relationship between the

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minister of national defense and the chief of the general staff. According to the new National Defense Law, the president “passes down orders” to the minister of national defense, who then gives orders to the chief of the general staff. The new Defense Ministry Organization Law also states that the chief of the general staff and his staff offices are directly under the control of the defense minister.90 Unlike China’s military, the ROC armed forces do not owe their allegiance to any political party. According to the National Defense Law, active duty soldiers in the armed forces must maintain “political neutrality.” The law was put to the test with the stunning victory of Chen Shui-bian in Taiwan’s 2000 presidential election. Many officers were unhappy with the election results and some reportedly refused to bow before portraits of the new president—a practice mandated by a law passed during the 1950s.91 However, it is significant that the military has not interfered in the island’s domestic politics. After the election, many analysts believed that Chen’s adroit selection of Gen. Tang Fei, Lee Teng-hui’s defense minister, as premier helped bolster his support in the armed forces.92 However, Tang’s subsequent resignation over the island’s contentious nuclear power plant issue again raised concerns about the military’s support for the Chen administration. The ROC military once trained to take back by force the mainland lost to the Chinese Communists in 1949. But this policy, and Taiwan’s armed services, have changed. One lawmaker observed that “the entire national defense institution is undergoing major changes. This is partly influenced by technological advances. But we no longer need a big military force geared to retaking mainland China.”93 The discussion below examines the new look of Taiwan’s military. Taiwan’s ground forces number roughly 250,000 troops and consist of the ROC Army and Armed Forces Police (military police). The army’s current mission is “focused on defending the territory and ensuring the security of the ROC on Taiwan.”94 The role of the Armed Forces Police is to guard governmental installations, maintain military discipline, support combat troops, and assist civil police when necessary to maintain public security. During peacetime the ground forces are stationed at strategic positions around the island. They also are positioned on the offshore islands (Penghu, Kimmen, and Matsu). Until recently, troops also were deployed on several islets scattered throughout the South China Sea. In ROC Ground Forces

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late 1999, Taiwan withdrew its marines from the Spratlys and replaced them with coast guard units. Although intended primarily to serve as a fighting force, Taiwan’s military helps farmers harvest their crops and provides relief and rescue operations during natural disasters. If the ROC is attacked, the army “with the support of the Navy and Air Force . . . will conduct land defense operations to destroy the invading enemy.”95 Taiwan’s army is organized into combat, combat support, and service support troops. It is subdivided into the following units:

• Three armies • Quemoy, Matsu, Penghu, and Hualien-Taitung headquarters, and Airborne and Special Operations Command • Tungyin Island Command and Chukuang Island Command • Airborne and Special Operations Command (two airborne brigades and two aviation groups) • Two mechanized infantry divisions • Ten infantry divisions • Aix armored brigades • One tank group • Seven reserve divisions • Three mobile divisions • Two air defense missile groups96

The Armed Forces Police has five subcommands and one training center. In keeping with the Chingshih project—a military reorganization plan that was adopted in 1997—army combat units are being both modernized and restructured. Traditional army divisions will ultimately be turned into “joint-branch brigades.”97 Weapons systems include the following: • • • • • • •

M48 and M60H tanks M109 and M110 self-propelled artillery M113, V-150, and CM-21 armored personnel carriers UH-1H helicopters Kung-feng 6A rocket systems TOW-type antitank guided weapons Chaparral SP, Hawk, Tien-kung (Sky Bow), and Tien-chien (Sky Sword) air defense missile systems

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• Vehicle-mounted Avenger missiles and man-portable Stinger missiles • Hsiung-feng I and Hsiung-feng II antiship missile systems98

As described, there also are unconfirmed reports that Taiwan is producing ballistic surface-to-surface missiles in response to China’s provocative missile tests. These missiles—which could be armed with conventional or nuclear warheads—would be capable of striking targets in southern and southeastern China. Since 1949 the ROC has reduced the size of its armed forces on several occasions. The most recent reduction called for downsizing the military into a defensive force of roughly 400,000 troops by the year 2001. A majority of these cuts affected the army—which was reduced from 268,000 to 200,000 troops. But at these levels, the army will continue to make up approximately 50 percent of Taiwan’s total armed services (the navy and air force will each comprise 25 percent). According to unconfirmed reports, a second-stage downsizing program is being planned and will lead to additional cuts in force levels.99 The navy has roughly 68,000 officers and men (including 30,000 marines). During peacetime, the navy “is responsible for carrying out missions such as surveillance and sea patrol, the transportation of supplies to the offshore islands, and the escort of ships.”100 The navy also provides aid to Taiwanese fishing boats requiring assistance. If the ROC is attacked, the navy will play a critical role in the island’s defensive strategy. According to Taiwan’s 1998 National Defense Report, the navy “is expected to take part in joint operations together with the army and air force to conduct counter-blockade at sea, the surface warfare in the area, and the interdiction against the invading enemy.”101 The navy is divided into both operational and land-based forces. The operational forces include the following: ROC Naval Forces

• • • • • •

Two destroyer fleets and one frigate fleet One landing fleet and one landing vessel fleet One submarine group One mine vessel fleet and one minesweeper/layer fleet One service fleet and one logistical rescue fleet One Hai-chiao speedboat group

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• One antisubmarine helicopter group • One Hai-feng shore-based missile group • Two marine divisions, one tank regiment, and one operational service regiment102

Like other branches of the ROC military, the navy is being restructured and streamlined. The number of admirals reportedly will be cut by twenty, and it is likely that the mission of the elite marine force—whose training focuses largely on seizing beachheads as the vanguard of an invasion force—will be revised.103 As an island state, the ROC is especially sensitive to naval developments in the region. Officials are particularly concerned about mainland China’s recent acquisition of Russian Kilo-class submarines (which are capable of laying twenty-two mines each) and Russian-made Sovremenny-class destroyers (reportedly equipped with SS-N-22 antiship cruise missiles). 104 Hu Tsai-kui, ROC Navy chief of staff, has warned that “with the modern weaponry, mainland China could pose a greater threat to Taiwan.”105 Officials also are worried about Beijing’s much-publicized efforts to project its power in the East China, South China, and Yellow Seas and its drive to transform its South Sea Fleet into a blue-water navy. As Fei Hrong-po, a vice admiral in the ROC Navy, lamented, “The gap between them and us is growing bigger and bigger . . . if we don’t do something about it now, it will be too late.106 To cope with the growing PRC threat, the navy is acquiring technology and equipment designed to enhance its ability to engage in warfare at three levels—air, sea, and below the ocean surface. It also has formed an antisubmarine command to study ways to counter a possible PRC blockade.107 Recent moves to enhance naval forces include the following : • Deploying Hsiung-Feng II surface-to-surface (“blockade buster”) missiles on naval vessels, Taiwan’s coastline, and the offshore islands • Purchasing La Fayette-class frigates from France • Constructing eight Perry-class missile frigates • Purchasing U.S.-made minesweepers • Manufacturing several varieties of missile-equipped fast-attack craft • Constructing twelve 500-ton Chin-chiang-class naval patrol boats capable of laying mines in wartime • Refurbishing its World War II-era destroyers

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• Purchasing twelve SH-2F light airborne multipurpose system (Lamps) antisubmarine helicopters from the United States • Leasing Knox-class warships from the United States • Purchasing Mk-46 torpedoes and Harpoon antiship missiles from the United States • Actively attempting to purchase or build up to ten more submarines • Developing a new Hsiung-Feng III supersonic antiship missile

In addition to these activities, the ROC Navy is conducting a growing number of antiblockade and antisubmarine exercises. Adm. Liu Ho-chien, then Taiwan’s chief of the general staff, observed that “the development and survival of our country is dependent on maintaining shipping links with other countries.”108 Officials hope that the navy’s ambitious modernization program will deter, or at least discourage, a PRC blockade or some other form of interference in Taiwan’s key shipping routes—something Beijing might well attempt in the event of hostilities. The air force has approximately 68,000 officers and men. During peacetime, the air force’s mission is to “always keep the airspace situation in control, gain the early warning of air defense, and control allweather air combat patrol and alert by means of the operation control system.”109 In the event of hostilities, “the Air Force will intercept the enemy’s invading aircraft by using fighters, surface-to-air missiles, and anti-aircraft guns which form multi-layered air defense barriers.”110 The air force is divided into two systems—the operational system and logistic support system. The operational system includes the following: ROC Air Force

• • • • • •

Six tactical combat aircraft wings One transport/antisubmarine wing One tactical control wing One communication and air traffic control wing One weather forecasting wing One Air Defense Artillery Guards Command, which contains four commands, fourteen air-defense battalions, and eleven guards battalions111

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Units in the logistics support system include three logistical support divisions, one fuel group, and logistical support divisions, sections, and teams assigned to combat units. Taiwanese officials are nervous about the PRC’s drive to upgrade its air force—especially Beijing’s efforts to obtain sophisticated Russian warplanes and technology. The PRC has purchased fifty advanced Su-27 jet fighters and a handful of military transport planes. Perhaps more important is that in late 1995 Beijing successfully negotiated a $2 billion deal to manufacture the Su-27.112 To counter the growing threat, Taiwan is attempting to beef up its air defenses. Recent activities include the following:

• Purchasing 150 F-16/A and F-16/B aircraft from the United States (the deal also includes 40 spare engines, 900 Sidewinder missiles, 600 Sparrow missiles, and 500,000 rounds of 20mm cannon shells) • Purchasing four E-2T early-warning aircraft from the United States • Leasing T-38 training aircraft from the United States (used to train pilots picked to fly the F-16s) • Purchasing sixty Mirage 2000-5 warplanes from France • Developing the IDF • Purchasing twenty-eight AN/AAQ-13 bombing pods with lowaltitude guidance and infrared night-vision systems from the United States for use on its F-16 A/B fighters • Purchasing data links from the United States that will facilitate communication among Taiwan’s F-16s, E2T early warning aircraft, and warships

Defense officials acknowledge that the PLAAF enjoys a numerical advantage over the ROC Air Force in terms of force levels. At the same, however, defense analysts stress that the air force could handle a PRC attack: “The ROC Air Force has a defensive strategy, and Taiwan’s airspace is too small for the Chinese Communists to send all their aircraft over at once; each attack would be limited to 200 aircraft at the outside, attacking in a maximum of three waves a day.”113 Military authorities claim that “we could easily deal with that [level of attack] at our current strength.”114

In addition to those forces outlined above, Taiwan maintains a coast guard force and a massive force of reservists. The ROC Coast Guard Other ROC Forces

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was created after the dissolution of the garrison command in 1992. With roughly 20,000 troops, the coast guard is charged “to protect the safety of the coastline in the Taiwan-Penghu area . . . [and] execute such tasks as anti-smuggling, anti-criminal, anti-infiltration, and anti-assault, and the preparation for the land operations.” 115 In wartime, it is “also responsible for conducting the ground defense operations.”116 Taiwan’s registered reservists number roughly 3.8 million persons—almost 18 percent of the island’s population. These forces play a pivotal role in the ROC’s defensive strategy. During peacetime they serve as a powerful deterrent. If deterrence fails, however, the reservists may be mobilized rapidly to augment the island’s other defensive forces. Almost 1 million of them are called up for muster and training each year. As one military officer explained, “In case a war breaks out, we can mobilize all of our forces—both military and civilian—for combat.”117 Taiwan’s military strength is impressive. The armed forces are relatively well trained and well equipped. But is its military capacity sufficient to deter an attack by an archrival that happens to possess the largest military and third largest nuclear arsenal in the world? As outlined in Table 4.1, Beijing is superior to Taipei in combat aircraft, 3,566 to 529; in warships, 53 to 36; and in submarines, 63 to 4. But such figures can be very misleading. One Taiwan military analyst observes that “the PLA of Communist China even acknowledges that our air force pilots receive better training and that we have advantages over Communist China in terms of the quality of submarines and electronic equipment for warfare operations.118 At the moment, the U.S. Defense Department agrees that “in terms of the quality of their military Summary

Table 4.1

Comparison of ROC and PRC Military Forces

Military Assets

Active Duty Troops Reservists Warships Submarines Combat Aircraft

Taiwan

376,000 1,657,500 36 4 529

PRC

2,820,000 1,200,000 53 63 3,566

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1998–1999 (London: Oxford University Press, 1998).

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equipment, Taiwan possesses an edge over Beijing, as new weapons systems—particularly fighter aircraft and naval frigates—are entering the inventory.”119 Many Western military analysts believe that Taipei’s military capacity is sufficient to deter an attack at the present time. Some U.S. specialists—including William Perry, former defense secretary, and Anthony Lake, former national security adviser—assert that the PLA is incapable of launching a successful military invasion of Taiwan. 120 When tensions escalated during the run-up to Taiwan’s March 2000 presidential election, Adm. Dennis Blair, commander in chief of U.S. forces in the Pacific, made a similar observation. Blair suggested that “should China undertake military action to try to invade Taiwan, they would not be successful in taking it and holding it.”121 Skeptics often refer to any attempted PRC invasion of Taiwan as “the million-man swim.” Taiwan’s MND disputes these claims. According to the 1998 National Defense Report, the PLA is now capable of launching an air and sea attack on Taiwan, blockading the island or invading the ROC’s other offshore islands. Moreover, in March 1998 Chiang Cheng-ling, then ROC minister of defense, said that “China is capable of invading Taiwan either by launching ‘Western style’ missile attacks or by employing a ‘conventional’ maritime blockade strategy.” 122 Some American studies support these claims. A 1999 U.S. Department of Defense report warned that “by 2005, the PLA will possess the capability to attack Taiwan with air and missile strikes which would degrade key military facilities and damage the island’s economic infrastructure.”123 Even more alarming, a classified Department of Defense study that was leaked in April 2000 suggested that the ROC is vulnerable to an attack from China and “may have trouble defending itself against airplanes and missiles.”124 Recent developments—particularly the escalation in tensions that followed Lee Teng-hui’s pronouncement of the “two states” theory— have led the ROC Defense Ministry to call for significant increases in defense spending. In August 1999, Taiwan’s defense minster suggested that “military spending has to go up to account for at least 3.0–3.5 percent of the gross domestic product.”125 For fiscal year 1999, the ROC had slashed the budget to $7.84 billion—down from $9.46 billion the previous year. 126 As might be expected, the calls for an increase in defense spending have accelerated following the election of Chen Shuibian as president.

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Defense Issues

For more than four decades, questions and concerns pertaining to Taiwan’s security remained shrouded in mystery. With the lifting of martial law, however, questions began to be raised about Taiwan’s security. The following discussion examines some of the current issues relating to Taiwan’s defense. The TMD program was launched by the United States in the mid-1990s. The purpose of this multibillion-dollar initiative is to protect the United States and its friends and allies (most notably Japan and South Korea) from possible missile attacks. The TMD would use sophisticated satellite technology to help detect and destroy incoming ballistic missiles and would become operational around 2007. The TMD is still in the planning stages. In fact, much of it exists only on paper. But the project was energized by the August 1998 launch of a North Korean missile over Japan. Tokyo now has agreed to help finance a portion of the program, and there are unconfirmed reports that Washington has approached Taipei and asked it to help bankroll the project. As might be expected, any suggestion that Taiwan might ultimately be covered by the TMD infuriates Beijing. The PRC claims that “to include Taiwan in any form in the TMD system would constitute a violation of international laws and the three Sino-US joint communiqués.”127 Taiwan military officials realize that they are vulnerable to China’s growing arsenal of ballistic missiles. But the ROC’s initial response to the TMD system might perhaps best have been described as guarded skepticism. This attitude now is changing. In early 1999 Wang Wenhsien, ROC vice minister for national defense, “admitted that the MND is trying to assess the defense value of the TMD against its cost, and has shifted away from its original stance of not joining the high-priced but doubtful efficiency program to a position of ‘wait and see’ if the system might work.”128 Several months later, Taiwan’s defense minister, while conceding that the program confronts problems in the areas of interception accuracy, radar monitoring and search accuracy, and outer-space interception, argued that the TMD system “will succeed sooner or later.”129 He warned that “if we do not participate in and pay for the development today and then to do that later, the cost will be even higher Theater Missile Defense

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because the interest on the money already spent on it will be included.”130 Lee Teng-hui also has observed that an antimissile system “not only responds to current needs, but even more fulfills the nation’s longterm development interests.”131 Some ROC military authorities believe that rather than participating in the high-altitude TMD system, Taiwan should deploy a low-altitude missile shield to counter PRC missile attacks. In fact, on August, 23, 1999, Taiwan’s defense minister announced that Taiwan might build such a system rather than participate in TMD.132 This system would purportedly protect the island from PRC cruise missile and ballistic missile attacks. However, many military officers and politicians remain unconvinced that any missile defense system is capable of defending Taiwan. As described, Taiwan’s military strategy has evolved from offense to defense. The deployment of a TMD system would fit squarely into this defensive posture. But some fear that such an approach to a possible conflict with the PRC is much too passive. Maj. Gen. Liu Hsiang-pin, director of the Strategy Institute at Taiwan’s Three Service University, has described the TMD as a “bottomless pit.”133 He argues that “in terms of military strategy, offense is the best defense . . . it is better to develop surface-to-surface missiles adequate for launching retaliatory attacks than to wait passively for attacks to come; such an attack will be more able to deter the enemy from lightly starting a war.” 134 During meetings with the author in October 1998 and April 2000, ROC military officers raised similar concerns. 135 Moreover, some legislators also have called openly for a change in the military’s defense posture, claiming that “the best defense would really be offense.”136 Perhaps of equal significance, Lien Chan, then ROC vice president, pressed for the development of long-range missiles and “an intimidating military force” in the midst of his faltering presidential campaign in late 1999.137 Not surprisingly, reports surface periodically that Taiwan has resumed research on the production of ballistic missiles.138 According to one source with close ties to the ROC military, “The top brass is now debating having a limited number of medium-range missiles to target Shanghai.”139 When President Lee’s July 1999 declaration that mainland-Taiwan relations should be viewed as “state-to-state” relations led Military Strategy

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to speculation that Beijing might conduct missile “tests” off Taiwan’s coastline, one high-ranking KMT official warned that the ROC might retaliate with its own missile drills. These exercises would reportedly target Shanghai and Hong Kong and “would result in capital flight from China culminating in chaos.”140 Military authorities refused to comment on the threat. However, Vice Defense Minister Sun Tao-yu did say that the statement was “not without sense” and observed that “there are many things that can be said, but cannot be done, while there are some things that can be done, but cannot be said.”141 China appears to be taking the threat of a retaliatory strike seriously: military facilities in Fujian province are being fortified. One Taiwanese defense analyst explained that “apparently they are preparing for an attack by us.”142 According to Gen. Kung Fan-ding, the ROC’s MND spokesman, “We [Taiwan] have never considered developing nuclear weapons and have instead focused on research and development of anti-nuclear arms equipment and facilities as well as on training our servicemen to protect themselves against nuclear arms attacks” [emphasis added]. 143 But Taiwan has long admitted that it has the ability to develop nuclear arms. Moreover, despite the official denials, it is clear that Taiwan has attempted to develop nuclear weapons on at least two occasions.144 From time to time, stories surface that Taiwan has resumed work on a nuclear bomb or that the island’s leadership is contemplating such a move. For example, following China’s “missile exercises” in 1995, Lee Teng-hui reportedly said that Taiwan ought to “reconsider” the question of developing nuclear weapons. 145 Other Taiwanese lawmakers and politicians have made similar suggestions. In August 1999, Cheng Pang-cheng, the presidential candidate for the Taiwan Independence Party (TAIP), declared that “Taiwan has no other option but to develop nuclear weapons in order to ensure national independence and security.”146 Any move by Taipei to develop nuclear weapons would provoke a strongly negative response from Washington, Beijing, and other members of the international community. It also would anger many of the island’s residents. But, given the ROC’s past history in this area, such a move cannot be ruled out entirely. Nevertheless, Taiwan continues to insist that it will not develop nuclear weapons. It also has pledged not to Nuclear Weapons

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manufacture or use chemical weapons despite what the ROC military describes as “a growing Chinese threat of nuclear and bio-chemical weapons.”147 Calls for independence were deemed seditious during the Chiang era. During the “white terror” of the 1950s, an unknown number of activists were jailed. Some were executed. With the lifting of martial law, individuals and political parties are allowed to promote Taiwan’s de jure separation from the mainland. Ironically, they also are permitted to advocate communism.148 Two of Taiwan’s four largest political parties, the DPP and the TAIP, have strong links to the independence movement. The KMT claims that it does not share the DPP’s plans for an independent Republic of Taiwan. During the late 1990s, however, leaders in the two parties appeared to reach a consensus on the explosive issue. Many now claim that there is no need for Taiwan to declare independence because the Republic of China already exists as an independent, sovereign state. Some political analysts describe this development as a move toward the center on the independence issue. Moreover, DPP leaders will not rule out unification as an option for Taiwan in the distant future.149 But the DPP’s party platform still calls for independence, and some highranking ROC officials—including Vice President Annette Lu—contend that the island is not part of China.150 Taiwan’s high-ranking military officers generally oppose independence. Many were surprised and disappointed with the election of Chen Shui-bian, a former independence activist, as president. However, more than politics has led Taiwan’s military to view the independence movement with alarm. Maj. Gen. Tyson G. Fu, director of the Institute of Strategic Studies at Taiwan’s Armed Forces University, explains: Taiwan Independence

At the beginning, when we moved from mainland China to Taiwan, we set a very high goal. We said we wanted to recover the mainland. But later on the KMT made a self-examination and we changed our strategy and just wanted to defend Taiwan and survive and develop ourselves. And now, the DPP has become the ruling party and wants to set the goal of Taiwan independence. I’ve told them that the goal of Taiwan independence is even higher than the goal of recovering the mainland [emphasis added]. Even the US says it does not support Taiwan independence and it is the only superpower in the world. In this kind of situation, how can you achieve that?151

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In short, Taiwan’s strategic planners fear that any move toward formal independence from China will greatly complicate the military’s planning. As Major General Fu observed, the military simply does not possess the resources required to achieve independence. The United States plays a critical role in Taiwan’s defense. The United States sells arms, transfers vital technologies, and protects the island with what some have described as a de facto alliance. However, the United States also has sought to forge a “constructive strategic partnership” with the PRC. As one U.S. official explained, this relationship with Beijing “is something we pursue, in a sense, daily . . . [it is] crucial for managing many of the regional and global challenges that confront us.”152 In 1998, then-President Clinton traveled to China to meet with Jiang Zemin and other Chinese officials to help cement U.S.-PRC ties. During a carefully orchestrated question-and-answer session in Shanghai, the president proclaimed that “we don’t support independence for Taiwan, or ‘two-Chinas’ or ‘one Taiwan, one China.’ And we don’t believe that Taiwan should be a member in any organization for which statehood is a requirement.” Clinton’s remarks ignited a storm of controversy. Voices in Washington, including Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (RepublicanMississippi), characterized the president’s statement as “a serious mistake.”153 Representative Tom DeLay (Republican-Texas), then House majority whip, warned that “President Clinton has upset the [Asian] balance of power.”154 But the administration insisted that there had been “no policy change.”155 The president’s defenders pointed out that past presidents—including Richard M. Nixon and Ronald Reagan—had made similar pledges. The ROC’s reaction to President Clinton’s utterance of the “threeno’s” mirrored the U.S. response. Some Taiwanese—including President Lee Teng-hui—insisted that the United States had “kept its promises” and that there had been no change in U.S. policy.156 Others, such as David Lee, deputy foreign minister, argued that while Clinton’s statement may not have represented a major policy shift, “it has affected the people on the island psychologically.”157 Still others charged that Clinton was “colluding with the communist dictatorship to harm Taiwan.”158 On the other hand, a high-ranking ROC military officer Relations with the United States

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who spoke with the author on condition of anonymity, insisted that the president’s statement actually had augmented the island’s security by helping demoralize the independence movement while simultaneously assuaging PRC fears that the United States was engineering Taiwan’s de jure separation from China. Public opinion polls reveal that most Taiwanese do believe that the “three no’s” policy had “an unfavorable impact” on Taiwan. 159 But the polls also indicate that roughly 80 percent of the population do not know the meaning of the term. What is perhaps more significant is that public opinion polls show that the Taiwanese people are clearly divided over whether the United States will help the island if it is attacked: 46 percent believe that the United States will offer Taiwan military assistance, and 31 percent say it will not help defend the island.160 U.S.-ROC defense ties remain strong. However, Taiwanese defense officials have long emphasized that the island cannot count on assistance from the United States or other friendly powers in the event of a conflict with the PRC. Chiang Chung-ling, the then ROC defense minister, observed that “a nation’s defense should definitely not rely on friendship or ‘goodwill’ from other countries.”161 The election of Chen Shui-bian led to renewed calls for a change in U.S. policy. Some ROC officials—including Vice President Annette Lu—believe that Washington ought to do more to defuse tensions across the Taiwan Strait. The former dissident, who is described officially as “scum” by the Chinese media, has called on Washington to put more pressure on China to stop threatening Taiwan. The vice president explains that “the world must send a strong message that it will not tolerate such military actions.”162 She also has suggested that the United States arrange a summit meeting between President Chen Shui-bian and President Jiang Zemin. Lu contends that “the United States is involved in all major world issues, and it must also get involved in this issue.”163 Other ROC officials—including DPP legislator Paris Chang—have called on Washington to scrap the one China policy and renounce the three no’s.164 Thus far, Washington has held steadfast to its one China policy and the position that the Taiwan issue is a matter to be resolved peacefully by the Chinese themselves. For example, when commenting on the island’s 2000 election, Stanley Roth, then assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific affairs, emphasized that “three principles” remain the foundation of the U.S. position toward Taiwan and China:

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• Our “one China” policy is unchanged. • We have an abiding interest that there be a peaceful approach by both sides to resolving differences. • We support dialogue between the two sides of the strait as the best way for differences to be resolved.165

Madeleine Albright, then U.S. secretary of state, also stressed that, during discussions with Chinese leaders, “we made very clear our usual policy that we have enunciated now, so many times, about a ‘one China’ and the ‘three no’s,’ and various other principles upon which the relationship is based, and the importance that we attach to having a peaceful cross-strait dialogue.”166 Indeed, lest there be any misunderstanding on this issue, when asked directly by members of the press whether the United States still subscribed to the “one China” policy, a State Department official simply replied, “Mm-hmm.”167 Moreover, there is no indication whatsoever that the Bush administration has any plans to jettison the “one China” policy. Taiwan military authorities argue that “our armed forces’ morale is very, very high because all of our soliders know what their duty is. They know how to protect their country.”168 But not everyone agrees with this assessment. Taiwan’s armed forces are being downsized into a smaller, more effective military. Combined force levels are expected to be trimmed substantially by the end of 2001. Among those hardest hit will be the upper ranks of the army: it is anticipated that the number of generals will be slashed by 25 percent, other officers by 11 to 20 percent, and enlisted personnel by 13 percent.169 The navy also will suffer cutbacks. The number of admirals in the navy reportedly will be cut by 20, and scores of other officers will be demoted.170 These moves have lowered morale among army and navy officers. In addition to cutbacks, Taiwan’s military is experiencing troubles attracting and retaining high-quality personnel. Much of this may be attributed to a disparity between the military and civilian sectors in pay and benefits. After completing the two years of mandatory military service, most draftees opt to pursue more lucrative careers in the private sector. But others also are opting out of military careers. Career officers are leaving Taiwan’s military in large numbers. For Armed Forces Morale

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example, air force pilots are very difficult to retain—many prefer to earn more money flying civilian aircraft.171 As Parris Chang, DPP lawmaker, explains: We have to raise the status and the salary of our military officers and our professional army. The best people are retiring. We have to think of ways of retaining more of these people. We have to think about how to increase incentives for people to remain in the service. Now we have so many private airlines. So, retention of our pilots is becoming a very serious issue . . . even our airline maintenance people. They wholesale retire from the military and go into the civilian airline companies. That’s a real problem.172

Perhaps equally worrisome, the ranks of the army’s noncommissioned officers—considered by many to be the backbone of any military organization—have been particularly hard hit as large numbers decide to return to civilian life. When combined with the realities of life in any large, bureaucratic organization that has traditionally discouraged innovation and creativity, the recent cutbacks and poor retention and recruitment rates have generated a predictable impact. As one U.S. government study observed, “Morale, especially among the enlisted ranks, is generally assessed as poor.”173 Finally, concerns have been raised about civilian morale and support for the armed forces. Some fear that the island’s population might not be willing to stand up to pressure exerted by the PRC. Andrew Yang, one of Taiwan’s leading security analysts, explains that “what makes us vulnerable or strong is not F-16s or the lack of them; it’s our vulnerability to psychological warfare from Beijing. Right now we are weak in civil defense. We are weak in a sense of forthcoming danger. Unlike Israel, we are totally oblivious to these things.”174 The low morale of both the island’s armed forces and population might ultimately play a significant role in the outcome of a cross-strait crisis or conflict. At times during the 1990s, Taiwan spent more money on foreign weapons than any other country in the world (Table 4.2). PRC officials complained that “you name any weapon and Lee Teng-hui and the Taiwan military want to buy it . . . it’s Lee Teng-hui’s intention to continue to reinforce the foundation for Taiwan independence.” 175 But Taiwan’s MND hopes to purchase even more arms. The Need for Additional Military Equipment

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World’s Top Arms Importers, 1997 Country

Taiwan Saudi Arabia China Malaysia Turkey India ROK Thailand Egypt UAE Greece USA Japan Pakistan Italy

Amount

$4,049 million $2,370 million $1,816 million $1,346 million $1,276 million $1,085 million $1,077 million $1,031 million $867 million $808 million $715 million $656 million $584 million $572 million $552 million

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute as reported in “Taiwan Tops List of World’s Importers,” China News, June 12, 1998, in Lexis/Nexis.

The acquisition of submarines is high on the MND’s list of priorities. Taipei describes the need for such vessels as “urgent” and has been attempting to buy them for more than a decade.176 Military officials warn that “if we can’t get them from other countries, we have to consider developing them ourselves.177 In addition to submarines, Taiwan authorities hope to purchase advanced AAMs, high-technology “smart weapons,” electronic warfare planes, and artillery-delivered high-precision munitions. Moreover, there remains a strong probability that the island will purchase or manufacture Aegis destroyers despite the Clinton administration’s decision not to sell the warships to Taiwan in April 2000. But some believe that Taiwan does not need to acquire additional arms. Foreign weapons are expensive. As one Taiwanese military analyst complained, the purchase of four Aegis destroyers would “consume nearly half of our annual national defense budget.”178 Moreover, some believe that Taiwan has purchased weapons systems that it does not need and cannot use: “We have to clean up. Our military has their own problems. Interservice rivalry and they want hardware for the sake of hardware. They never really articulate an argument. For example, we bought so many [M60] tanks. Our bridges and highways cannot take them. It’s silly.”179 Some analysts argue that arms purchases are being driven by political considerations rather than military necessity. According to this interpretation, Taiwan purchases arms to cement ties

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with the United States (or other countries) and key lawmakers who reside in states that manufacture the weapons. Finally, questions have been raised as to whether Taiwan’s armed forces can handle its existing inventory of arms properly. Accidents during military exercises have reinforced the view that the ROC military needs a “digestion period” to concentrate on improving the operation, integration, and maintenance of existing weapons systems. According to some reports, the United States has even considered a curb on additional arms sales until Taiwan learns to operate and maintain weapons systems already in its inventory. Rather than lobbying for additional arms, some ROC defense experts believe that the MND needs to press for increased military exchanges with the United States. As Parris Chang further states: I’d like to see more of our military officers have an opportunity to study in the staff colleges—the National War College or the Army War College—because it would be very important for our military officers to be tuned in with the revolution in military affairs and new concepts and operations. We have purchased so many American weapons. But we need to have these people trained and really have the kind of thinking and understanding of what’s going on.180

Chang and others also believe that the MND needs to concentrate on enhancing its command, control, communication, computers, and intelligence (C4I) capabilities—particularly the ability to conduct electronic and computer warfare. The ROC officials concede that Taiwan must upgrade its C4I capabilities, improve training, and increase military exchanges with the United States. However, they also believe that the ROC needs to buy more advanced foreign arms to deter PRC aggression and they bristle at suggestions that political factors drive arms acquisitions. As Chen Chien-jian explained, the “fringe benefits” of buying arms may be “inevitable.”181 The foreign minister hastened to add, however, that “our leaders are intelligent. They are not merely interested in buying political advantages. They know the seriousness of our security and defense.”182 Taiwan managed to escape much of the economic turmoil that rocked the Asia-Pacific region during the late 1990s. In fact, its GDP grew by roughly 5 percent in 1999 while other economies contracted. Some The Asian Financial Crisis

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claim that this may be traced to the fact that the island has one of the world’s largest foreign exchange reserves and lowest foreign debts. Others point out that Taiwan’s banks have the lowest bad-loan ratios in Asia. Still others contend that low taxes, clear regulations, tough bank supervision, a strong bankruptcy code, and a lack of unwieldy corporate conglomerates like Korea’s chaebols were the critical factors. In short, Taiwan appeared to be one of the brightest spots in Asia. But this could have changed quickly. Throughout the financial crisis, unemployment in Taiwan remained low. But it did inch upward and reached a twelve-year high of 2.7 percent in 1998. Particularly hard hit were first-time job seekers—recent high school and college graduates. Economists cautioned, however, that the number of domestic manufacturing plant closings hit a record high and that more checks bounced and that more bankruptcies were reported. Perhaps equally worrisome, the stock market dropped, the Taiwan dollar slid 6 percent, exports slowed, and GDP growth declined. During the crisis, some Taiwanese academics warned that the ROC government was gambling that the economy was recovering and doubted whether the outlook was really as stable as official sources claimed. They also argued that gains on Taiwan’s bourse were largely stateengineered through a new emergency stabilization fund. Finally, experts cautioned that Taiwan is a trading nation that is heavily dependent upon both the mainland Chinese and U.S. economies for its livelihood. This meant that events beyond Taipei’s control were exposing the island to a high degree of risk. For Taipei, the impact of any economic crisis could be devastating. For instance, the ROC depends heavily upon foreign arms for its security. An economic slowdown could hamper Taipei’s ability to purchase new weapons systems at a time when arch-rival Beijing is acquiring Russian-built Kilo class submarines, Su-27 strike fighters, and Sovremenny-class destroyers. During an interview with the author, Maj. Gen. Fan Ding-Kung explained: In the wake of the economic crisis, our GDP and taxation income has declined which has reduced our defense budget. At the same time, the devaluation of the New Taiwan Dollar lowers the military’s procurement ability. In order to reach our combat readiness objectives, we push our work on schedule to reduce the impact to a minimum and the crisis seems to have had little effect on the military balance across the Taiwan Strait.183

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The economic crisis forced Taipei to pare or defer several planned military purchases and seek short-term relief from the U.S. Defense Department.184 Programs affected included the procurement of CH-47 Chinook helicopters and Stinger missiles. A financial crisis also could undermine Taiwan’s security in other ways. Stanley Roth, then U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, warned that “as the economic crisis forces millions back below the poverty line and threatens to eradicate much of Asia’s nascent middle class, progress made on the security front can no longer be taken for granted. As 1930s Europe so dramatically demonstrated, debilitating economic pressures can destroy cooperative instincts and convert constructive competition into controversy and conflict.” Moreover, governments in the region could ultimately be overwhelmed by the sheer scale of unemployment and underemployment brought on by the recession. New kinds of security threats—including piracy and the illegal immigration of large numbers of people—could quickly emerge. Perhaps most alarming for Taipei is the fact that it is the one state that simply cannot afford to slip into an economic quagmire. Unlike Thailand, Korea, Indonesia, and other countries, it cannot even hope for an IMF bailout (it was banished from that organization in 1980). Compounding Taipei’s predicament is the fact that there is little it can do to help the IMF resolve a regional financial emergency. As one ROC government document noted, “Taiwan is not an IMF member at present, and can only provide limited funding through costly indirect channels.”185 Given these facts, it should come as little surprise that the Asian economic crisis has prompted Taipei to accelerate its drive to join economic institutions. The ROC professes that it hopes only to contribute its expertise to these organizations in order to better serve the international community during this time of crisis. But most important, Taiwan authorities realize that the ROC government must be represented in the world’s major financial organizations if it is to gain a voice in their operations (or, in a worst-case scenario, seek assistance during an emergency). Only in this way will it be able to help shape those policies that may reduce the chances of yet another economic meltdown in the short- to medium-term future. However, Taiwan remains locked out of these institutions. How to gain a voice in these organizations remains a critical issue in Taiwan politics.

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The discussion above outlines only some of the major defense issues confronting Taiwan. A more complete analysis would include details of other concerns as well. These include questions about (1) corruption; (2) conscription policies and exemptions from traditional military service; (3) sexual harassment; (4) political warfare classes; (5) efforts to launch ROTC programs on college campuses; (6) efforts to “depoliticize” the military; and (7) the possible establishment of confidencebuilding mechanisms with the PRC.186 Further Concerns

Summary

The ROC military has abandoned its past strategic objective of having a massive military that, beyond defending Taiwan and the offshore islands, would also be capable of liberating mainland China. Military strategy now focuses almost exclusively on defense and deterrence. To achieve these objectives, the ROC is seeking to streamline its military and acquire a new generation of military forces based on the principles of smaller force levels, higher quality weapons systems, and enhanced operational capabilities. The ROC also is seeking to strengthen its military ties with the United States. In addition to the acquisition of arms and technology, Taipei is interested in enhancing military exchanges with the United States. It is likely that these moves will enhance Taiwan’s security. They help to keep the cost of a PRC invasion prohibitively high. However, Beijing is seeking to counter Taipei’s military buildup with its own modernization drive. As the U.S. Department of Defense states: “Force modernization programs on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are interactive in nature. Just as Taiwan’s military acquisitions are intended to address PLA military modernization programs, PRC force planning takes into account emerging capabilities on Taiwan.”187 Tang Fei, then Taiwan’s defense minister, has conceded that “over the last few decades, both sides across the strait are competing on military hardware every single day.”188 Taiwan’s military prowess also helps the island’s security in other ways. During an interview with the author, Lin Chong-Pin, vice chair of the Mainland Affairs Council, suggested that the ROC’s defensive capabilities were one of the considerations that helped bring the PRC back to the negotiating table in 1998.

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Jiang Zemin asked the PLA, “If you begin preparations now, would you have enough time by the year 2000 to get ready?” I think he meant, and this is my interpretation, would you have enough surgical strike capability or informational warfare, nonlethal capability to force Taipei to the negotiating table, and to accept the terms dictated by us. The PLA answered no. They said, later on, maybe, the year 2010, but the year 2000 is too soon. . . . So they reached the conclusion in 1997 that they should resume dialogue ASAP.189

In other words, Taipei’s military power enables it to negotiate with Beijing from a position of strength. In the final analysis, more than force levels, military equipment, and the United States will be needed to protect Taiwan. As Chen Chienjen explains it: Defense is not merely related to military hardware or how many troops we possess. It is much more than that. Security should be interpreted in a broader sense. It includes foreign affairs, science and technology, trade, other things, and political factors. We can’t just defend Taiwan with the military. We have to defend with other means.190

U.S. officials agree with this assessment. As one observed, “In the end, stability in the Taiwan Strait will be contingent on the ability of the two sides of the strait to come to terms with each other on a political basis.”191 Notes

1. ROC Ministry of National Defense, 1996 National Defense Report: Republic of China (Taipei: Li Ming Cultural Enterprises Co., 1996), p. 58. Translated from the Chinese by Vice Adm. Ko Tunhwa (ret.). 2. Ibid. 3. Alice Huang, “Army Town a Reminder of the Past,” China Post (international airmail edition), January 29, 1999, p. 4. 4. John F. Copper, Taiwan: Nation-State or Province (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), p. 30. 5. The late president made this pledge during his 1979 New Year’s message to the Chinese people. See The Republic of China Is on the Move (Taipei: Kwang Hwa Publishing Company, 1979), p. 8. 6. According to the guidelines, “China’s reunification should be achieved in three phases: a short-term phase of exchanges and reciprocity, a mid-term phase of mutual trust and cooperation, and a long-term phase of consultations and reunification.” See Government Information Office, Republic of China Yearbook, 1998 (Taipei: Government Information Office, 1998), p. 122.

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7. Information Office of the State Council, China’s National Defense (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, July 1998), p. 3. 8. ROC Ministry of National Defense, 1998 National Defense Report: Republic of China (Taipei: Li Ming Cultural Enterprises Co., 1998), p. 2. Translated from the Chinese by Yang Lien-chung and Chien Wu-nan. 9. Author’s interview with a high-ranking ROC military officer who spoke with the author on condition of anonymity, Taipei, October 1998. 10. ROC Ministry of National Defense, 1998 National Defense Report, p. 50. 11. Author ’s interview with Maj. Gen. Kung Fan-ding, military spokesman, ROC Ministry of Defense, October 30, 1998. 12. Jackie Chen, “Sea Change: ROC Naval Modernization and the Defense of Taiwan,” Sinorama, December 1997, p. 9. 13. See “Sources—Navy to Build 30 Stealth Missile Boats,” Agence France Presse, March 8, 1998, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter FBIS), China, March 10, 1998, and Sofia Wu, “Navy Christens Locally Built Patrol Boats,” China Post (international airmail edition), August 15, 1998, p. 1. 14. Jackie Chen, “Sea Change,” p. 17. 15. “Taipei to Build New Indigenous Defense Fighter Jet,” South China Morning Post, December 13, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. 16. Sofia Wu, “Air Force Expected to Mark New Mirage Wing,” China Post, October 21, 1998, p. 19. 17. Sofia Wu, “Military Strengthening Electronic Warfare Capabilities,” Central News Agency (hereafter CNA), March 9, 1998, in FBIS, China, March 10, 1998. 18. Current plans call for Patriots to be deployed near Hsintein, Nankang, and Linkou. See “Taiwan Sets Up Patriot Anti-Missile Batteries Around Taipei: Report,” Agence France Presse, August 24, 1998, in the Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://www.taiwansecurity.org/AFP980824.htm 19. According to the MND, a majority of Taiwan’s military facilities and weapons depots have been moved underground. See Sofia Wu, “Military Facilities Moved Underground to Avoid Mainland Attack,” CNA, October 7, 1997, on the World Wide Web at http:/www.taipei.org/teco/cicc/news/english 20. “Military Unveils Secret Bases to Media,” China Post (international airmail edition), September 8, 1999, p. 4. 21. Sunny Goh, “Chinese Military ‘to Surpass Taipei’s,’” Straits Times, May 16, 1998, p. 21 in Lexis/Nexis. 22. See “Military Unveils Secret Bases to Media.” 23. “Taiwan to Develop Ten Modern Weapons,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, July 12, 1998, in Lexis/Nexis. 24. The CIST contains roughly 6,000 scientists and 8,000 technicans. It jointly conducts independent research and development of weapons systems with the Aero Industry Development Center (privatized in the mid-1990s), some manufacturing units of the Combined Services Force, academic institutions, and public and civilian industries. See “National Defense,” in Republic of China Yearbook, 1999 (Taipei: Government Information Office, 1999) on the World Wide Web at http://www.gio.gov.tw/info/yb97/hmtl/content.htm

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25. “China’s Electronic Weapons May Menace Taiwan in Five Years,” Agence France Presse, October 31, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://www.Taiwansecurity.org./AFP/AFP-991031-China’sElectronic-Weapons.htm 26. “Army Says Mainland Cyberattacks Thwarted,” Liberty Times (Taipei), March 14, 2000, in Taiwan Headlines on the World Wide Web at wysiwyg://51/http://www.taiwanheadlines.gov.tw/20000314p1.html 27. “Taiwan Armed with 1,000 Computer Viruses Against China: Report,” Agence France Presse, January 9, 2000, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/AFP/AFP-010900-VirusesAgainst-China.htm 28. Brian Hsu, “Military Sets Aside NT $3bn for E-Warfare,” Taipei Times, October 15, 2000, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://www.taiwansecurity.org/TT/TT-101500.htm 29. Ibid. 30. Jane Perlez, “Warning by China to Taiwan Poses Challenge to US,” New York Times, February 27, 2000, in Lexis/Nexis. 31. Author’s interview with Chen Chien-jen, ROC foreign minister, Taipei, March 31, 2000. 32. Ibid. 33. Willaim Ide, “Lee Says Stablization Fund a Defense Against China,” Taipei Times (online edition), January 16, 2000, on the World Wide Web at http://www.taipeitimes.com/news/2000/01/16/story/0000019809 34. “The President’s News Conference on January 5, 1950,” in Public Papers of The President of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 11. 35. “Statement by the President on the Situation in Korea,” in Public Papers of The Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950, p. 492. 36. John C. Kuan, A Review of US-ROC Relations, 1949–1978 (Taipei: Asia and World Institute, 1980), p. 10. 37. As John Copper, a noted authority on U.S. policy in East Asia, observed, “Military cooperation between the US and China to counter the Soviet threat was the raison d’être of the Washington-Beijing rapprochement.” See John F. Copper, China Diplomacy: The Washington-Taipei-Beijing Triangle (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992), p. 50. 38. Members of the legislative branch have argued that the TRA is “tantamount to establishing an alliance with Taiwan against aggression.” See statement of Representative Mark D. Siljander (Republican-Michigan), Implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act, hearing and markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Its Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations and on Asian and Pacific Affairs, May 7, June 25, and August 1, 1986 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986) p. 42. 39. See Deborah Kuo, “Chen Shui-bian Calls on US to Continue Arms Sales to Taiwan,” CNA, July 11, 2000, in World News Connection on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov/region.html, 7/13/00 40. “Pentagon Approves Arms Sales to Taiwan,” Associated Press, September 29, 2000, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://www.taiwansecurity.org/

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41. For a discussion of U.S. technology transfers to Taiwan, see Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, United States–Taiwan Security Ties: From Cold War to Beyond Containment (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 1994), pp. 41–75. 42. Eric Lin, “War and Peace: Recent Military and Diplomatic Developments in the Taiwan Strait,” Sinorama, November 1998, p. 19, and Sofia Wu, “7th Locally Built Perry-Class Frigate Commissioned,” CNA, December 1, 1998, in FBIS, China, December 2, 1998, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 43. Testimony of Winston Lord, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, in Military Stability in the Taiwan Straits, hearing before the House International Relations Committee, March 14, 1996, Federal News Service in Lexis/Nexis. 44. See testimony of Howard Lange, Director of the Taiwan Coordination Staff at the State Department, in Consideration of Miscellaneous Bills and Resolutions, markup before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 104th Congress, second session on H.Res. 345, H.Res. 379 H. Con. Res. 102, H.J. Res. 158 and H.Con. Res. 148, March 14, 1996 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996), p. 13. 45. Ibid. 46. See United States–Taiwan Relations Act, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 96th Congress, 1st Session, Report No. 96-26, 1979. 47. Nelson Chung, “White House Reiterates Commitment,” China Post (international airmail edition), July 13, 1998, p. 1. 48. See testimony of Kurt Campbell, deputy assistant secretary of defense for East Asian and Pacific affairs, in Hearing on the Direction of US-Taiwan Relations, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the House International Relations Committee, May 20, 1998, in Federal Document Clearing House Political Transcripts in Lexis/Nexis. 49. Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, “America’s Two Point Policy and the Future of Taiwan,” Asian Survey XXVIII, 8 (August 1988), pp. 881–896. 50. Barbara Opall, “US, Taiwanese Opposition Chart Collision Course,” Defense News 13, 12 (March 23–29, 1998), p. 34. 51. Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Strategic Assessment 1998: Engaging Power for Peace (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1998), p. 46. 52. “People’s Daily Responds to Susan Shirk,” South China Morning Post, September 8, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. 53. “China Worries Go Beyond Taiwan to Fear of US,” Associated Press, August 14, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/AP/AP-China-Worries-Go-Beyond-Taiwan-To-FearOf –US.htm 54. “Jiang Arrives in Australia Amid Warnings About Taiwan,” Agence France Presse, September 6, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/AFP/AFP-Jiang-Arrives-InAustrialia.htm 55. Sofia Wu, “Military Strengthening Electronic Warfare Capabilities,” CNA, March 9, 1998, in FBIS, China, March 10, 1998, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov

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56. For more information, see John Pomfret, “Taiwanese Mistake Led to 3 Spies’ Execution,” Washington Post, February 20, 2000, in Lexis/Nexis. 57. Jim Mann, “US Has Secretly Expanded Military Ties with Taiwan,” Los Angeles Times, July 24, 1999, p. A1 in Lexis/Nexis. 58. According to one U.S. official, the United States believes that “the anti-submarine mission for Taiwan, we gauge to be among the most important.” He claims that “hardware including, and in addition to some software, some people-to-people contacts” have helped Taipei confront “this particular challenge.” See testimony of Kurt Campbell, deputy assistant secretary of defense for East Asian and Pacific affairs, in Hearing on the Direction of US-Taiwan Relations, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the House International Relations Committee, May 20, 1998, in Federal Document Clearing House Political Transcripts in Lexis/Nexis. 59. Jay Chen and Sofia Wu, “ROC Takes Delivery of 103 Jet Fighters,” China Post, October 21, 1998, p. 19, and Lu Te-yun, “Military to Test-Fire Patriot Missiles in ’99,” Lien-Ho Pao (Taiwan), August 24, 1998, p. 1 in FBIS, China, September 8, 1998, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 60. “US Offers Military Software Assistance for F-16 Fighters,” China News, May 25, 1998, in Lexis/Nexis. 61. “Taipei-US Defense Meeting,” Associated Press, November 3, 1998, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://www.taiwan.security.org.AP-981103.htm 62. “New Survey Finds Support for Defending Taiwan’s Security,” US Newswire, May 20, 1998, in Lexis/Nexis. 63. “Poll: Americans Could Accept Casualities to Defend Taiwan,” United Daily News (Taipei), November 9, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/News/UDN-991109-Poll-DefendTaiwan.htm 64. Neil Lu and Flor Wang, “Washington Governor Locke Hails President Lee,” China Post (international airmail edition), August 10, 1998, p. 3. 65. Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, “The Revised US-Japan Security Guidelines: Implications for Beijing and Taipei,” Issues and Studies 34, 4 (April 1998). 66. Sofia Wu, “Military Facilities Moved Underground to Avoid Mainland Attack,” Central News Agency, October 7, 1997, on the World Wide Web at http:/www.taipei.org/teco/cicc/news/english 67. “Mainland Missiles Target Taiwan,” China Post (international airmail edition), May 18, 1998, p. 4. 68. Oliver Chou, “Missile Force ‘Response to Threat,’” South China Morning Post, February 11, 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://www.scmp.com/news/template/China-T...na&template+Default.htx& maxfieldsize=2015 69. “China and Taiwan: Taiwan Stands Up,” Economist, March 25, 2000, p. 28. 70. “Intelligence Head Warns of Mainland Military Threat,” Agence France Presse, June 1, 1998, in FBIS, China, June 2, 1998, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 71. Joe McDonald, “China Conducts Mock Taiwan Invasion,” Associated

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Press, September 10, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/AP/AP-China-Conducts-Mock-TaiwanInvasion.htm 72. Ibid. 73. Barton Gellman, “Reappraisal Led to New China Policy, Skeptics Abound, but US ‘Strategic Partnership’ Yielding Results,” Washington Post, June 22, 1998, p. A1 in Lexis/Nexis. 74. “China Steps Up Spying on Taiwan’s ‘Next Generation’ Fighters,” Agence France Presse, December 10, 1998, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://www.taiwansecurity.org/AFP/AFP-981210.htm 75. Hsiao Peng, “PRC Announces Third Reason for Use of Force,” Sing Tao Jih Pao (Hong Kong), November 10, 1998, in FBIS, China, November 10, 1998, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 76. See Shih Kaimin, “White Paper: China Likely to Attack Taiwan 2005– 2010,” Lien-Ho Pao, March 29, 1998, in FBIS, China, April 4, 1998, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 77. Flor Wang, “Political Factors Will Govern PRC Military Attack,” CNA, March 25, 1998, in FBIS, China, March 27, 1998, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 78. “Defense Ministry Reports Details of Chinese Attack Scenario,” CNA in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 18, 1998, in Lexis/Nexis. 79. Eric Lin, “War and Peace: Recent Military and Diplomatic Developments in the Taiwan Strait,” Sinorama, November 1998, p. 13. 80. Flor Wang, “DPP Legislator on Taiwan Deterring Military Attacks,” CNA, December 31, 1997, in FBIS, China, January 2, 1998. For information on the island’s strategic oil reserves, see Miro Cernetig, “Taiwan Outgrows Old Island Image,” Globe and Mail (Canada), August 3, 1999, p. 1. 81. See Lin Chien-hua, “Military Impact of US Sale of Stingers Assessed,” Tzu-Li Wan-Pao (Taipei), September 3, 1998, in FBIS, China, September 4, 1998, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 82. Author’s interview with Maj. Gen. Fan Ding-Kung, MND military spokesman, Taipei, October 30, 1998. 83. For more information on the PRC’s use of electronic warfare against Taiwan, see “Taiwan Warned Against Possible ‘Information War’ by China,” CNA, February 19, 2000, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/CAN/CAN-021900-Information-War.htm 84. “Military Revises Defensive Warfare Plan,” Chung-Kuo Shih-Pao (Taiwan), January 16, 1997, in FBIS, China, January 22, 1997, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 85. Ibid. 86. “CIA Chief Warns of China-Taiwan Flare-Up,” Agence France Presse, February 3, 2000, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/AFP/AFP-020300-CIA-Chief.htm 87. In September 1999, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Sun Yuxi promised that “we will not be the first of use nuclear weapons and will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons countries and regions, let alone against our Taiwan compatriots.” See “China Won’t Use Nukes Vs. Taiwan,” Associated Press, September 2, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the

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World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/AP/AP-China-Won’t-Use-NukesVs-Taiwan.htm 88. “National Defense,” in Republic of China Yearbook, 1999 (Taipei: Government Information Office, 1999) on the World Wide Web at http://www.gio.gov. tw/info/yb97/hmtl/content.htm 89. Ibid. 90. Brian Hsu, “Status of Military Finally Settled,” Taipei Times (online edition), January 16, 2000, on the World Wide Web at http://www.taipeitimes. com/news/2000/01/16/story/0000019815 91. Jason Blatt, “Old Hand Likely to Fill Defense Post,” South China Morning Post, March 27, 2000, p. 7. 92. Caterine Sung, “Chen Draws His Biggest Gun with Tang Fei for Premier,” Taipei Times, March 30, 2000, p. 3. 93. Robert Karniol, “Strong and Self-Reliant,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, July 8, 1998, p. 26. 94. ROC Ministry of National Defense, 1998 National Defense Report: Republic of China, p. 61. 95. Ibid. 96. Government Information Office, Republic of China Yearbook, 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://www.gio.gov.tw/info/yb97/html/ch8_3.htm 97. ROC Ministry of National Defense, 1998 National Defense Report: Republic of China, p. 63. 98. Government Information Office, Republic of China Yearbook, 1999. 99. Lin Chien-hua, “Army to Reduce Troops to 350,000 by 2004,” TzuLi Wan Pao (Taiwan), October 12, 1998, in FBIS, China, October 13, 1998, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 100. ROC Ministry of National Defense, 1998 National Defense Report: Republic of China, p. 64. 101. Ibid. 102. Government Information Office, Republic of China Yearbook, 1999. 103. Jackie Chen, “Sea Change: ROC Naval Modernization and the Defense of Taiwan, Sinorama, December 1997, p. 13, and “Navy Plans ‘Defensive’ Restructure,” Hong Kong Standard, May 6, 1997, on the World Wide Web at http:/www.hkstanard.com/online/news 104. “Military Leaders in Talks with US,” China Post (international airmail edition), November 13, 1998, p. 4. 105. Ibid. 106. John Pomfret, “Taiwan Displays Its Feeble Fleet,” Washington Post, February 25, 2000, in Lexis/Nexis. 107. “ROC Navy Studying Anti-Blockade Strategy,” Central News Agency (Taipei), January 25, 1992, in Lexis/Nexis. 108. “Minesweepers Commissioned in Kaohsiung,” China Post (international airmail edition), March 2, 1994, p. 1. 109. ROC Ministry of National Defense, 1998 National Defense Report, p. 64. 110. ROC Ministry of National Defense, 1996 National Defense Report, p. 155. 111. Government Information Office, Republic of China Yearbook, 1999.

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112. “Russia Sells PRC Fighter Planes,” China Post (domestic edition), February 4, 1996, p. 1. 113. Hsieh Shu-fen, “Who Rules the Skies Over Taiwan?” Sinorama, April 1991, p. 13. 114. Ibid. 115. ROC Ministry of National Defense, 1998 National Defense Report, p. 71. 116. Ibid. 117. Author’s interview with Maj. Gen. Fan Ding-Kung, MND military spokesman, Taipei, October 30, 1998. 118. Wang Ming-yi, “MAC Official on PLA Military Threat,” Chung-Kuo Shih-Pao, December 31, 1997, in FBIS, China, January 4, 1998, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 119. U.S. Department of Defense, The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait, February 26, 1999, p. 19. 120. Maubo Chang, “Former US Defense Head: Beijing Incapable of Invading Taiwan,” CNA, January 19, 1998, in Lexis/Nexis. 121. “Blair: China Not Fighting Taiwan,” Associated Press, March 7, 2000, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/AP/AP-030700-Blair.htm 122. “Defense Chief Says China Could Attack ‘Anytime,’” China News, March 6, 1998, in Lexis/Nexis. 123. U.S. Department of Defense, The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait, p. 23. 124. “US Says Isolation Makes Taiwan Military Outdated,” Taiwan News, April 1, 2000, p. 1. 125. “Taiwan Calls for Increased Military Spending to Counter China Threat,” Agence France Presse, August 27, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/AFP/AFP-Taiwan-Callsfor-Increased-Military-Spending-to-Counter-China-Threat.htm 126. “National Defense,” in Republic of China Yearbook, 1999. 127. “Heat over Missile Defense Turned Up,” South China Morning Post, February 12, 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://www.scmp.com/news/ template/templat...a//&Prev/temp=Default.htx//&PrevMFS=1000// 128. Sofia Wu, “MND Mum on Missile Defense System,” China Post (international airmail edition), January 13, 1999, p. 4. 129. “General on Buying Aegis-Class Ships, Patriot Missiles,” ChungYang Jih-Pao (Taiwan), November 24, 1998, p. 2 in FBIS, China, December 8, 1998, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 130. Ibid. 131. Christopher Bodeen, “Taiwan Leader Backs Missile Defense,” Associated Press, August 18, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/AP/AP-Taiwan-Leader-Backs-MissileDefense.htm 132. The system will purportedly be constructed using both domestic and imported weapons and equipment. See “Taiwan to Build Low-Altitude Missile Shield Against China,” Agence France Presse, August 23, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/AFP/ AFP-T…de-Missile-Shield-Against-China.htm

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133. Lin Chine-hua, “Article Advocates Missile Development Over TMD,” Tzu-li Wan-pao, November 9, 1997, p. 2 in FBIS, China, January 1, 1998, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 134. Ibid. 135. In October 1998, the author interviewed a high-ranking ROC military officer who spoke only on condition of anonymity. This officer claimed Taiwan must develop its own ballistic missile force to deter a PRC attack. On April 28, 2000, the author met with Maj. Gen. Tyson G. Fu, director of the Institute of Strategic Studies at the ROC Armed Forces University. General Fu, while not advocating the development of ballistic missiles, did point out that “in terms of defense costs, I think offensive weapons are a better choice. Generally speaking the ratio between offensive and defensive weapons is one to nine. If the enemy spends $1, you have to spend $9 to defend yourself. Sometimes it costs more.” 136. Mure Dickie, “Missile Threat Fuels Taiwanese Insecurity,” Financial Times, February 13, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. 137. Michael Kitchen, “VP Lien Calls for Long-range Missiles, CrossStrait Hot Line,” China Post (international airmail edition), December 9, 1999, p. 1. 138. See “Taiwan to Develop Ten Modern Weapons,” Deutsche PresseAgentur, July 12, 1998 in Lexis/Nexis. 139. Melinda Liu, “Defending Taiwan,” Newsweek (international edition), May 17, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/News/NW-990517.htm 140. See “Taiwan Threatens Tit-for-Tat Missile Drills,” Straits Times (Singapore), July 27, 1999, p. 12 in Lexis/Nexis. 141. Victor Lai, “Official Comments on Taiwan’s Missile Counterattack,” CNA, July 27, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. 142. Fong Tak-ho, “Taiwan to ‘Fight Fire with Fire,’” Hong Kong Standard, May 10, 2000, on the World Wide Web at http://online.hkstandard. com/today/default.asp?PageType=ach2 143. Sofia Wu, “Defense Minister Reaffirms ‘Non-nuclear Arms’ Policy,” CNA, January 20, 1998, on the World Wide Web at http:/www.taipei.org/teco/ cicc/news/english/e-01-20-98/e-01-20-98-24.htm 144. Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, Taiwan’s Security in the Changing International System (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), pp. 42–46. 145. “PRC Announces 3rd Reason for Use of Force,” Sing Tao Jih Pao (Hong Kong), November 10, 1998, in FBIS, China, November 13, 1998, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 146. “Pro-Independence Candidate Advocates Nuclear Weapons,” Reuters, August 22, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/Reu/Reute…idate-Advocates-Nuclear-Weapons.htm 147. “Taiwan Pledges Not to Manufacture, Use Chemical Weapons,” Agence France Presse, April 12, 2000, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/AFP/AFP-041200.htm 148. “Independence, Communism Now Legal,” China News, April 21, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis.

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149. “DPP Does Not Rule Out Option of Unification, Hsieh Says,” China Post (international airmail edition), October 11, 2000, p. 1. 150. During a visit to El Salvador in September 2000, Vice President Lu declared that “I agree there is only one China in the world, namely, the People’s Republic of China. But Taiwan, with its 23 million inhabitants, is also a sovereign state that does not belong to that one China.” See “Vice President Lu States, ‘One China’ Exists But it Doesn’t Include Taiwan,” China Post (international airmail edition), September 27, 2000, p. 1. 151. Author’s interview with Maj. Gen. Tyson G. Fu, director of the Institute of Strategic Studies at the ROC Armed Forces University, Taipei, April 28, 2000. 152. Stanley Roth, then assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, made this statement. See “Transcript: Roth 1/12 Briefing on US Relations with Asia Pacific,” U.S. Information Agency, on the World Wide Web at http://www.usia.gov/regional/ea/easec/roth112.htm 153. Eric Schmitt, “Lott Leads GOP Attack on ‘Mistakes’ on China Trip,” New York Times, July 8, 1998, p. A4 in Lexis/Nexis. 154. “House Joins the Senate in Reaffirming US Support for Taiwan’s Sovereignty,” Star Tribune (Minneapolis), July 21, 1998, p. 8A in Lexis/ Nexis. 155. Simon Beck, “Albright Stands by Clinton on Taiwan Policy,” South China Morning Post, July 10, 1998, in Lexis/Nexis. 156. Deborah Kuo, “President Lee Lauds US for Its Integrity,” CNA, July 2, 1998, in Lexis/Nexis. 157. Maubo Chang, “Washington Should Not Meddle in ROC Diplomacy: Official,” CNA, July 18, 1998, in Lexis/Nexis. 158. Jeffrey Parker, “Taiwan-China Rift Still Wide Despite Thaw,” Reuters, August 17, 1998, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://www.taiwansecurity.org 159. Stephanie Low, “Most Ignorant of Three No’s: Survey,” China Post (international airmail edition), August 12, 1998, p. 4. 160. Stephanie Low, “Most Against Independence, Poll Says,” China Post (international airmail edition), August 10, 1998, p. 4. 161. Deborah Kuo, “Taipei Minister on Need for Self-Sufficiency in Defense,” CNA, January 17, 1998, in FBIS, China, January 21, 1998, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 162. “New Taiwan VP Asks World’s Help,” Associated Press, April 22, 2000, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/AP/AP-042200.htm 163. Ibid. 164. Nelson Chung, “Taiwan Legislator Hopes US Reviews Taiwan Policy,” CNA, August 5, 2000, in Lexis/Nexis. 165. Stanley O. Roth, “The United States’ Asia Policy: A National Agenda,” Presentation to the Council of American Ambassadors, Los Angeles, California, April 4, 2000 on the World Wide Web at http://www.state.gov/www/ policy_remarks/ 2000/000404_roth _easia.htm 166. Former Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, press conference, China World Hotel, Beijing, June 22, 2000, on the World Wide Web at http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/2000 /000622.html

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167. Phillip Reeker, daily press briefing, U.S. Department of State, May 23, 2000, on the World Wide Web at http://secretary.state.gov/www/ briefings0005/000523db.html 168. Author ’s interview with Maj. Gen. Fan Ding-Kung, military spokesman, Ministry of National Defense, Taipei, October 30, 1998. 169. “Troop Cutbacks Planned to Promote Streamlining,” Hong Kong Standard, July 30, 1997, on the World Wide Web at http:www.hkstandard.com/ online/news/001/china/news006.htm 170. “Navy Plans ‘Defensive’ Restructure,’” Hong Kong Standard, May 6, 1997, on the World Wide Web at http:/www.hkstandard.com/online/news 171. In May 2000, the ROC Defense Ministry confirmed that “the number of pilots for the air force’s second-generation warplanes has fallen short of the officially santioned quota by between 25 percent and 28 percent.” See “Fighter Pilots Fall Short of Official Quota,” China Post (international airmail edition), May 6, 2000, p. 1. 172. Author’s interview with Parris Chang, DPP legislator, Taipei, October 21, 1998. 173. U.S. Department of Defense, Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait, p. 16. 174. John Pomfret, “PRC Threats Test Taiwan’s Readiness,” China Post (international airmail edition), July 29, 1999, p. 2. 175. Yuen Lin, “Taiwan Antimissile Ability Viewed,” Kuang Chiao Ching (Hong Kong), August 16, 1998, in FBIS, China, September 11, 1998, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 176. Author ’s interview with Maj. Gen. Fan Ding-Kung, military spokesman, Ministry of National Defense, Taipei, October 30, 1998. 177. Ibid. 178. Lawrence Chung, “Taiwan Says Reviewing Plan to Buy 4 US Warships,” Reuters, December 1, 1998, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://www.Taiwansecurity.org./Reu/Reu-981201.htm 179. Author’s interview with Parris Chang, Taipei, October 21, 1998. 180. Ibid. 181. Author’s interview with Chen Chien-jen, ROC foreign minister, Taipei, March 31, 2000. 182. Ibid. 183. Author’s interview with Maj. Gen. Fan Ding-Kung. 184. “Taiwan Trims Arms Buys,” CNA, November 30, 1998, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web http://taiwansecurity.org/CNA981130.htm 185. See Government Information Office, Republic of China, Further Integrating Taiwan into International Organizations Promotes Asia’s Industrial Development, April 30, 1998, on the World Wide Web at http://www.taipei.org/ press/gio04303.htm 186. A discussion of some of these issues may be found in Hickey, Taiwan’s Security in the Changing International System, pp. 22–30. 187. U.S. Department of Defense, The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait, p. 3. 188. “New Defense Chief Reserved About Missile Project,” China Post (international airmail edition), February 10, 1999, p. 1.

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189. Author’s interview with Lin Chong-Pin, vice chair, Mainland Affairs Council, Taipei, October 23, 1998. 190. Author’s interview with Chen Chien-jen. 191. Jay Chen and Sofia Wu, “Roth Reaffirms US Commitment to Taiwan’s Security,” CNA, June 19, 1998, in Lexis/Nexis.

5 The South Korean Military ince the 1980s, the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) has experienced a dramatic political transformation. On the domestic front, the nation has made the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. It also managed to avert an imminent financial collapse in 1997, and now appears to be well on the way to economic recovery. On the international front, the ROK has been embraced by many of its former adversaries—including China and Russia. Perhaps equally significant, Seoul has adopted a new approach toward relations with its archrival on the Korean peninsula—the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). These developments truly are remarkable, but they cannot alter the fact that the touchstone for the ROK’s national security—the DPRK threat—remains. Over 1 million Korean soldiers remain deployed against each other along the world’s most heavily fortified border. Moreover, the U.S.-ROK military alliance continues to serve as the cornerstone for deterrence against an attack from the north. In short, despite dramatic changes in both domestic and international politics, the Korean peninsula remains one of the most dangerous places on earth.

S

Defense Policy

According to the ROK’s Defense White Paper, 1999, the government of South Korea has several national security objectives. These include (1) the maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean peninsula; (2) the improvement of inter-Korea relations; and (3) the strengthening of cooperation with the international community.1 The discussion below examines each of these goals. 169

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According to U.S. calculations, a war between Seoul and Pyongyang would lead to 490,000 ROK troop causalities within 90 days. 2 The United States probably would suffer 52,000 troop losses.3 Although most analyses conclude that the ROK and the United States ultimately would prevail in any conflict, both sides hope to avoid such a catastrophe. The ROK employs several tactics in an effort to maintain peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. In addition to improving relations with the DPRK and working toward a permanent peace on the peninsula, Seoul hopes to deter a war by maintaining a robust military capability and a strong alliance with the United States. Seoul acknowledges that “the current force capability of the ROK armed forces is quantitatively inferior to that of North Korea.”4 When the two militaries are compared soldier for soldier, warship for warship, or warplane for warplane, the DPRK has the clear advantage (Table 5.1). But the ROK’s military is qualitatively superior to the North’s Korean People’s Army (KPA). During the 1960s and 1970s, more than 30 percent of the ROK national budget was devoted to military spending.5 With South Korea’s economic development, this percentage has dropped dramatically (Table 5.2). By the mid-1990s defense spending had plummeted to less than 15 percent of the national budget, or roughly 3.4 percent of the GNP. As for the DPRK, it spends an astonishing 30 percent of its GNP on defense. Although ROK defense spending grew substantially during the early 1990s, the financial crisis of the late 1990s ultimately led the government to slash military expenditures. In 1998 defense spending dropped to $9.8 billion, and $11.6 was allocated the following year.6 Maintenance of Peace and Stability on the Korean Peninsula

Table 5.1 ROK DPRK

Comparison of ROK and DPRK Military Strength Force Levels 690,000 1,100,000

Tanks

2,250 3,800

Submarines 10 90

Fighters 520 770

Source: Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper, 1999 (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 1999) on the World Wide Web at http://www.mnd.go.kr/mndweb/mnden/ mnd/m_2index.htm

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The Ministry of National Defense (MND) requested a modest increase for 2000. Despite the budget cuts of the late 1990s, most analyses agree that the ROK spends more on defense than the DPRK in absolute terms. This investment has paid off handsomely in terms of state-of-the-art military equipment. A majority of these arms are purchased from the United States (Table 5.3). Despite economic hardships and the restrictive economic programs that were stringently enforced during the late 1990s, the ROK boasts a thoroughly modern military arsenal. The ground forces are armed with new tanks, infantry combat vehicles, and SAMs. The navy is seeking to Table 5.2 Year

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

ROK Defense Expenditures 1990–1995 Military Expenditures (constant 1995 $) 12,390 11,950 12,740 13,050 14,280 14,410

Percent of Gross National Product 4.2% 3.7% 3.7% 3.6% 3.7% 3.4%

Percent of Central Government Expenditures 22.3% 19.6% 19.8% 19.5% 17.4% 13.6%

Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1996 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997), p. 78.

Table 5.3 U.S. Military Sales Agreements with the ROK, 1990–1998 Fiscal Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

Amount ($ Thousands) 467,912 408,483 2,351,640 231,251 387,397 476,462 889,018 853,987 266,929

Source: Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts as of September 30, 1998 (Washington, D.C.: Deputy for Financial Management, Department of Defense, Security Cooperation Agency, 1998), pp. 1–2.

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graduate from a coastal patrol force to a blue-water navy. Six new German Type-209 submarines recently joined the fleet. The air force is armed with modern license-built F-16 fighters and is developing an indigenous trainer (the KTX-2). These developments may help explain, in part, the DPRK’s growing sense of inferiority and crisis. In addition to its impressive military muscle, the ROK relies upon the 1954 U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty to deter a DPRK attack. U.S. military authorities contend that the alliance “has been the primary factor in maintaining the Armistice over the last 45 years. It is strong, vibrant and evolving.”7 They also claim that this “strong US and ROK security posture” has fostered the 1994 Agreed Framework, the FourParty Talks peace process, and other moves toward reducing the threat of war on the peninsula.8 The United States stations roughly 37,000 troops in South Korea, including the U.S. Army’s 2d Infantry Division and several air force tactical squadrons. Along with the ROK military, these forces maintain a high state of readiness—an essential element in the strategy of deterrence. Like their counterparts in the DPRK, many are forward deployed. Our forces are deployed in a defensive posture, arrayed to stop the North Korean Army’s advance into the South and prevent the capture of Seoul. If attacked, we will interdict and attrit the North’s lead and follow-on forces and when the proper combat ratio is achieved, we will attack and destroy their remaining forces.9

As then U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen observed, “The US will cope with any attack against Korea at any time on the spot and it will especially keep offering a nuclear umbrella for as long as it’s needed.”10 To coordinate operations between U.S. and ROK forces, a Combined Forces Command (CFC) was established in 1978. The commander in chief of the CFC (CINCCFC) is a U.S. general who also commands the CFC and serves as commander of the United Nations Command (UNC) and the U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK). An ROK officer serves as deputy CINCCFC. In an effort to “prevent any asymmetrical decisionmaking by either side,” an equal number of staff officers from each military serve in the CFC.11 Furthermore, the head of the UN Military Armistice Commission is now a Korean officer, and peacetime operational control over ROK military units was transferred to the chairman of the ROK joint chiefs of staff in 1994. The United States supports these and other moves aimed at the “Koreanization” of the ROK’s defense.

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In order to maintain readiness, the U.S. secretary of defense and the ROK minister of defense meet annually (the security consultative meetings), and the two sides engage in joint military exercises each year. These include Ulchi Focus Lens (a combat exercise), Foal Eagle (a reararea operations exercise), and Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (or RSOI, an exercise aimed at improving the ability to accept and integrate forces from off the peninsula). The massive Team Spirit exercises were suspended in 1994. In recent years, several important aspects of the U.S.-ROK security relationship have changed. In 1994, peacetime operations command of all South Korean military units was transferred to the ROK armed forces. Furthermore, Seoul has agreed to pay a larger portion of the costs associated with stationing U.S. forces in the ROK. This support grew steadily during the 1990s. By the late 1990s, the ROK was paying roughly $400 million in host-nation support. U.S. military officials claim that “this contribution makes it less expensive to keep troops in Korea than it is to maintain them in the US.”12 During the early 1990s, a series of high-level discussions between Seoul and Pyongyang yielded several agreements. In 1991, the two sides issued the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In February 1992, the archrivals concluded the South-North Korean Agreement on Reconciliation, Cooperation, and Exchanges. Several months later, they agreed to the so-called nonaggression protocol. Although some complain that the DPRK appears to have violated each of these accords, they remain popular in the South. Many Koreans hope for discussions that will lead ultimately to a permanent peace on the peninsula. Not surprisingly, the announcement that the top leaders of the ROK and DPRK would meet in June 2000 was greeted in Seoul with euphoria. In 1998, the government of the ROK launched a new approach to relations with the DPRK. In his inaugural address, President Kim Daejung announced three principles on which the South’s policy toward the North would be based: The Improvement of Inter-Korean Relations

• The ROK will not tolerate armed provocations from the DPRK. • The ROK has no intention to either destroy or absorb the DPRK. • The ROK hopes to press ahead with a policy of reconciliation and cooperation with the DPRK.13

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The president also has made clear that the ROK will not oppose the DPRK’s efforts to improve its ties with other nations so long as Pyongyang reciprocates and does not interfere with Seoul’s foreign relations. President Kim’s new “sunshine policy” employs a mixture of both carrots and sticks. For example, the Hyundai Corporation has been permitted to ferry South Korean tourists to the North’s culturally important Mt. Kumgang. The giant corporation will pay the DPRK nearly $5 billion for this privilege over five years. The South also has called for a series of confidence-building measures to reduce tensions on the peninsula. These include the establishment of a hotline between the Korean militaries and prior notification about military exercises.14 Perhaps the highlight of the policy was the stunning summit meeting between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-Il in June 2000. On the other hand, programs such as the Mt. Kumgang tours could be suspended or terminated if the North engages in provocative behavior. Furthermore, the ROK is determined to continue beefing up its military capabilities and strengthening its alliance with the United States. The ROK will be prepared to handle a military crisis should the policy of engagement fail. In 1991 South Korea joined the United Nations. Since that time, the ROK has actively been engaged in various UN activities—including peacekeeping operations. In 1993, the first ROK peacekeepers were dispatched to help with operations in Somalia. By 1999, almost 1,500 South Koreans had participated in peacekeeping activities in five world regions.15 In addition to shouldering its responsibilities in the UN, Seoul plays an active role in the Asian Regional Forum (ARF) and the nongovernment Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region. It also has called for the establishment of new regional institutions to promote security cooperation. For example, in 1994 the ROK officially called for the creation of the Northeast Asia Security Dialogue. This forum would have included the United States, Japan, China, Russia, and both Koreas, but the idea was dropped due to Pyongyang’s opposition.16 The ROK’s participation in international organizations and multilateral activities is impressive. However, even more surprising are the strides that Seoul has made in its bilateral security ties with its neighbors—particularly China, Russia, and Japan. Strengthening Cooperation with the International Community

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In 1992 the ROK established diplomatic relations with the PRC. Throughout the remainder of the decade military ties expanded steadily: in 1993 the ROK opened a military attaché office in Beijing, and shortly afterward the Chinese reciprocated by opening an attaché office in Seoul. Following these developments, the two sides quickly agreed to hold high-level defense exchanges. Although the PRC technically remains aligned militarily with the DPRK, the ROK Navy has made port visits to China (Hong Kong). Moreover, since 1996, the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis and the China Institute for International Strategic Studies have held annual meetings to discuss issues related to regional peace and security. Perhaps what is most significant, however, was President Kim Daejung’s journey to China to meet with President Jiang Zemin in 1998. During these negotiations, PRC officials expressed strong support for the ROK’s sunshine policy and the two presidents agreed to construct an “ROK-China Cooperative Partnership for the twenty-first century.” The discussions also helped to pave the way for the ROK defense minister to visit China in 1999 and for the PRC defense minister to travel to South Korea in 2000. As Chun Yong-taek, ROK defense minister, explained, “I have a great interest in increasing military exchanges with China in various fields in an effort to break up the Cold War structure on the peninsula.”17 In some respects, the development of South Korea’s military ties with Russia has followed a similar trajectory. After the establishment of diplomatic relations in the early 1990s, the two sides agreed to a series of meetings and defense exchanges. In May 1999, President Kim journeyed to Moscow to meet with Boris Yeltsin, then Russian president. In other ways, however, the South Korea–Russia relationship differs markedly from the South Korea–China relationship. Unlike the PRC, Russia has terminated its defense treaty with the DPRK. It is no longer obligated to help defend Pyongyang should a conflict break out on the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, Russia has agreed to sell advanced arms to South Korea. Despite DPRK protests, Moscow has transferred T-80 tanks and BMP-3 infantry combat vehicles to Seoul in partial payment for its outstanding loans.18 It also hopes to sell more weapons, including Kilo-class submarines, Sukhoi combat aircraft, and S300 surface-to-air missiles.19 In addition to the burgeoning security relationship with Beijing and Moscow, Seoul’s military ties with Tokyo have expanded. Defense cooperation between the two countries began during the 1960s.

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However, problems related to history—particularly Japan’s colonial past—impeded the development of a comprehensive security relationship. This began to change during the 1990s. Since the early 1990s the scope of Seoul’s military ties with Tokyo has expanded. The two countries now hold annual defense talks and engaged in their first-ever joint military exercises in 1999. As described in Chapter 2, the revised U.S.-Japan defense guidelines also legitimate a much larger role for Japan should a conflict break out on the peninsula. ROK defense officials stress, however, that Tokyo and Washington must consult Seoul before Japan’s Self-Defense Forces take “any actions concerning the Korean peninsula.”20 They also emphasize that “the Japanese Defense Force will not enter the ROK’s operational areas and take action without the ROK’s consent.”21 The ROK government acknowledges that there are numerous “security flashpoints” in East Asia. The MND also has cited “China’s increased military spending, Russia’s instability, and Japan’s continued force modernization program as possible mid- to long-term threats to Northeast Asian security.”22 But the North Korean threat continues to be the most immediate concern for South Korean defense planners. Pyongyang represents very real dangers to Seoul. Militarily, the North threatens the South with a blitzkrieg attack. Diplomatically, the DPRK hopes to drive a wedge between the ROK and its chief ally, the United States. Internally, the DPRK could destabilize the entire peninsula should its economic difficulties ultimately cause the country to descend into turmoil or civil war. It is for these reasons that the ROK government seeks a comprehensive and long-term solution to the Korean conflict. Summary

The ROK Military

For much of its history, the ROK could perhaps best be described as an authoritarian regime. Until relatively recently, a series of strongmen with close ties to the armed forces and security agencies ruled the country. In May 1960, Maj. Gen. Park Chung Hee seized control of the government shortly after demonstrations had forced Syngman Rhee, the ROK’s first president, to resign. Although Park “retired” from the mili-

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tary in 1963, he retained his grip on power by winning several highly controversial elections. Park ruled the country with an iron fist until he was assassinated by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) in October 1979. Following Park’s assassination, Maj. Gen. Chun Doo Hwan and his military supporters staged a coup. The Chun administration was marked by numerous demonstrations, repression, and violence. In 1980, the government attempted to restore order and silence the opposition by declaring martial law. This move, however, led to a critically important event in South Korea’s modern political history—the Kwangju uprising—in which government troops killed at least 200 civilians. Yielding to mounting domestic and international pressures, Chun turned over the government to his handpicked successor, Gen. Roh Tae Woo, in 1987. Roh’s election as president did not end the massive demonstrations against the military’s rule. The continuing disturbances helped convince Roh to restore civilian rule and help to pave the way for democracy. In what were generally considered to be fair and open elections, he was succeeded by President Kim Young Sam in 1992. Throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the ROK military had been a powerful force in ROK politics. In fact, it was largely responsible for crafting the country’s defense and foreign policies. It is no exaggeration to say that the military had ruled the roost in South Korea since the 1960s. Two military coup d’etats had given birth to the Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan regimes. And the military and the intelligence organizations had gained much clout with the government by assigning their personnel to other governmental organizations.23

To be sure, South Korea was a military dictatorship. But those days came to an end during the late 1980s. Since 1987 South Korea has experienced profound political liberalization. Perhaps most important, the country has adopted a new constitution that has revitalized the legislature, restored freedoms of expression and assembly, and led ultimately to free and fair elections. Power is now shared between the president and the National Assembly—a unicameral legislature. The constitution also calls for the military to observe “political neutrality.” According to the 1987 ROK constitution, executive power is vested in a popularly elected president who is commander in chief of the armed forces. The president appoints a prime minister and all members of the State Council (or cabinet)—including the minister of defense. He

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may also appoint and remove the nation’s leading military officers. When crafting defense policy, the president is most often assisted by the National Security Council (an advisory group), the National Intelligence Service (successor to the KCIA), and the Foreign Affairs and Trade Ministry. In some instances, other agencies and officials may be invited to play a role in decisionmaking. Under the new constitutional arrangement, the president has lost some important powers—including the power to dissolve the National Assembly. However, the president has retained the power to issue edicts that carry the force of law during a national emergency and the power to declare martial law.24 Moreover, the controversial National Security Law—legislation that provides the president with sweeping powers to curb “antistate” activities and forbids “unauthorized contact” with the North—remains on the books. During the era of military rule, this law was employed frequently to silence domestic political opponents. But the present administration has vowed that the “government will never exploit the National Security Law politically or use it for oppression as the previous military regimes did.”25 In 1997 Kim Dae-jung, a former political prisoner who had narrowly escaped execution in a military prison, was elected president of the ROK. This election was a milestone in South Korea’s history: it marked the first time that an opposition party candidate had been elected to the presidency since the country’s founding in 1948. It was also noteworthy because the winning candidate had campaigned on a platform calling for a new approach to North Korea—the so-called sunshine policy. Furthermore, the new administration vowed to modernize and reform the ROK military. The discussion below examines recent trends in the ground, sea, and air forces of the ROK. Numbering roughly 560,000 troops, the ROK ground forces form the core of South Korea’s defense. To maintain current force levels the government employs a universal conscription system. All male youths fit for military service enter active duty at the age of twenty (service may be postponed to attend college). Most men serve in the army for a total of twenty-six months. Those who opt to enlist in the other services (the navy and air force rely upon volunteers) will serve a longer tour of duty. During peacetime the ROK army’s chief mission is to deter an attack by the DPRK. A wide variety of military equipment helps the ground forces achieve this goal (Table 5.4). However, the army also has ROK Ground Forces

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The South Korean Military Table 5.4 Type

Numbers

ROK Ground Force Military Equipment Tanks 2,250

Armored Vehicles 2,300

Field Artillery 4,850

MRLs 150

Missiles 30

Helicopters 560

Source: Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper, 1999 (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 1999), on the World Wide Web at http://www.mnd.go.kr/mndweb/mnden/ mnd/m_2index.htm

other peacetime duties. Military units aid farmers in the planting and harvesting of rice, build roads, and assist civil authorities during and following natural disasters. For example, thousands of troops were mobilized to help control flooding during Typhoon Olga in 1999.26 Should deterrence fail, the overall goal of the ROK ground forces is to “bring all ground combat to victory.”27 Two of the ROK army’s three field armies—the First ROK Army and the Third ROK Army—are charged with the responsibility of defending the region that stretches from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) to the greater Seoul metropolitan area. Each of these units consists of an army command and several corps commands, divisions, and brigades. The ROK Second Army is responsible for defending rear areas. Like the forward-deployed armies, it consists of an army command and several corps commands, divisions, and brigades. In addition to combating DPRK infiltration forces in rear areas, the Second Army guards the coastlines, defends the sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and mobilizes materials and reserve forces. Several other units merit brief discussion. All three ROK field armies are assisted by the army’s new Aviation Operations Command (AOC). As part of the MND’s drive to reform and streamline the army, the AOC replaced the old Army Aviation Unit. The AOC, which is equipped with heavily armed helicopters, provides the ground forces with fire support, airlift, and reconnaissance support. In some instances it may also attack the enemy’s rear areas. The Capital Defense Command consists of several divisions and is responsible for maintaining the security of Seoul. In order to gather intelligence on the enemy, the army relies upon a Special Warfare Command that consists of several brigades. Finally, a reconnaissance battalion and a decontamination battalion make up the Chemical, Biological and Radiological (CBR) Defense Command. This unit supports CBR defense operations and conducts research on issues related to CBR warfare. In recent years, efforts at ground force modernization have focused

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on “reinforcing combat engineering equipment, combat service support elements, and core force capabilities such as tanks, armored vehicles, self-propelled artillery, and helicopters in order to execute threedimensional, high-speed maneuver warfare.”28 Since the mid-1980s, the army has acquired new “Korean-model tanks and armored vehicles that have excellent firepower, mobility and protection capability.” 29 As already described, it also has acquired a variety of new Russian weapons, including tanks and armored personnel carriers. Finally, the army has attempted to shift its “manpower-intensive force structure into a technology-intensive one with an emphasis on high-tech weapons systems.”30 Efforts to modernize the army will accelerate in the future. According to the MND’s midterm defense program for 2000–2004 (the so-called five-year plan), “the army will launch phase by phase programs to secure portable route clearing equipment, armored vehicles for commanders, short-range ground-to-air missiles, Chonma night-vision gauge identification equipment, and a next-generation anti-aircraft system called Piho.”31 Additional projects call for the upgrading of the army’s domestically produced K-1 tanks and the acquisition of additional 230mm multiple-launch rocket systems. There are also plans to downsize the army and merge some field commands as the army begins to realize the technological advances resulting from the revolution in military affairs.32 Like the ground forces, the chief duty of the ROK Navy is to deter a DPRK attack. Unlike the army, however, the 66,000-man navy (which includes the marines) relies entirely upon volunteers who serve for a period of twenty-eight months. In addition to deterrence, the peacetime navy’s missions include “upholding national sovereignty by protecting maritime rights, supporting government foreign policies, and enhancing national prestige.”33 During wartime, the navy “exercises control over the sea and the SLOCs that will ensure the safety of our maritime activities, prevents the enemy from exercising its own maritime operations, and carries out surprise landing operations on the enemy’s flanks and in the rear areas.” 34 To accomplish these missions, the ROK Navy Operations Command consists of three fleets with one based in the East Sea, another based in the Yellow Sea, and the third based in the Korea Strait. It possesses a variety of surface combatants (e.g., destroyers, escorts, ROK Naval Forces

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speedboats), submarines, and aircraft. The Marine Corps Command is divided into two divisions and one brigade. It possesses amphibious vehicles (including amphibious tanks), landing equipment, and its own means of fire support to assist in amphibious operations. In recent years, the ROK has sought to put more muscle into its navy by domestically producing its own warships and submarines. The first 3,900-ton KDX destroyer, described by the MND as “armed with ultra-modern weapons systems and equipment,” was put into service in July 1998.35 In May 1998, the seventh license-built German submarine, a 1,200-ton boat called Lee Sunsin, went into service. The ROK plans ultimately to construct nine of these subs. In addition to these domestically manufactured ships and boats, the navy has enhanced its antisubmarine warfare capability with the acquisition of imported antisubmarine warfare helicopters and maritime patrol aircraft. There is some speculation that the ROK hopes eventually to obtain a limited blue-water capability and may ultimately acquire aircraft carriers.36 Although the carrier program appears doubtful, the MND’s fiveyear defense plan does call for the acquisition of an undetermined number of domestically built Aegis-class destroyers (the KDX-III program).37 It also includes provisions for the construction of nextgeneration submarines and minesweepers.38 Like the naval forces, the ROK Air Force relies entirely upon volunteers. Recruits who opt to join the air force must serve for thirty months. At the present time, roughly 63,000 personnel serve in the air force. Within the air force are the Air Force Headquarters, Combat Air Command, Air Defense Command, and Air Traffic Control Center. Two flight wings belong to the Air Force Headquarters, while the Combat Air Command possesses nine flight wings and one training wing. The Theater Air Control Center retains direct control over all air operations. During peacetime, “the Air Force constantly keeps a watchful eye on the enemy, while at the same time maintaining a firm combat readiness posture which will enable immediate retaliation should the enemy launch any provocation.”39 In wartime, the goal of the air force is “to achieve air superiority so as to prevent the enemy from having access to our air space, to neutralize the enemy’s will by destroying its principal and potential warfighting capability, and finally, to give full support to ground and naval operations.”40 ROK Air Force

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To accomplish its missions successfully, the air force possesses almost 800 modern aircraft (Table 5.5). The mainstay of the air force is its chief fighter plane—the license-built F-16 C/D warplane. Seoul ordered 120 of the fighters in 1992 (with deliveries to 1999). An order for 20 additional F-16s was placed in 1999.41 All of these aircraft are armed with precision-guided mid-range air-to-air missiles, air-tosurface missiles, and air-to-ship missiles. In addition to these fighters, the air force possesses a wide variety of transports, helicopters, reconnaissance planes, and other aircraft. With respect to future plans, the ROK is developing a jet-propelled trainer—the KTX-2. This will be the first-ever aircraft of its kind produced domestically. The ROK also hopes to acquire four U.S.-built airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) aircraft and begin development of an unmanned surveillance aircraft. Due to financial difficulties, however, the timetables for KTX-2 and AWACS projects have been moved back.42 Looking further out, Seoul hopes to launch a military satellite, acquire new attack helicopters, purchase refueling aircraft, and develop a next-generation fighter.43 According to the MND’s five-year plan, forty new warplanes will be built domestically with U.S., French, or Russian assistance.44 According to the MND, the country’s reservists have long played a “pivotal role in deterring North Korea’s war provocations.” 45 After completing their obligatory military service, all troops are required to serve an additional eight years in the reserves. At the present time, the ROK’s reserve forces number over 3 million troops. During peacetime they engage in training exercises on a regular basis, and should war break out on the Korean Peninsula, the reservists will be called up for active duty. Many will be assigned to combat units, while others may serve in a support capacity. Reserve Forces

Table 5.5 Type

Numbers

ROK Air Force Military Equipment Fighters 550

Special Aircraft 40

Transport Aircraft 30

Training Aircraft 150

Helicopters 30

Other 10

Source: Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper, 1999 (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 1999), on the World Wide Web at http://www.mnd.go.kr/mndweb/mnden/ mnd/m_2index.htm

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The MND is attempting to reform the reserve system. For example, training has become more focused and reservists spend more time training for critical wartime operations. Moreover, the frequency of training has decreased, while the time for each training period has increased. MND officials believe that these moves will enhance the warfighting capabilities of the reserves. Due to its unique geopolitical position and the constant threat of an attack by the DPRK, defense planners in the ROK agree that the country must be prepared for conflict. It is for these reasons that Seoul maintains a security alliance with Washington and possesses a modern military with formidable defensive capabilities. Like the other armed forces of East Asia, though, the ROK military is a force in transition. Chun Yong-taek, ROK defense minister, has called for the creation of a “small and efficient military” that is “equipped with state-of-the-art weaponry.”46 Accordingly, the MND’s five-year defense plan provides for the acquisition of a lot of new high-technology equipment—including warplanes, military satellites, destroyers, surveillance aircraft, and missiles. As one Defense Ministry official explained, “Our force improvements program is designed to foster capabilities strong enough to safeguard the country.”47 Whenever possible, the new military equipment is to be produced domestically to help the country achieve the stated goal of “laying the foundation for a self-reliant defense capability.”48 It is for this reason that the MND has invested heavily in research and development and maintains a close cooperative relationship with industries, universities, and government-funded research institutions. Despite these efforts, however, financial difficulties have caused the government to postpone the acquisition of weapons systems. In addition to providing the armed forces with new equipment, the ROK government is seeking to reform and restructure the military. The MND, the joint chiefs of staff, and each branch of the service has been reorganized to increase its efficiency. In an effort to reduce corruption, the acquisition and/or development of weapons systems has become more transparent. There also is a concerted effort to develop a fair and impartial system for promotions within the armed forces and to ensure that all eligible males actually do serve their mandatory time in the military, irrespective of family ties, social status, or other considerations. As discussed below, not all segments of South Korean society have welcomed these changes. Summary

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Issues in ROK Defense Policy

During the period of military rule in the ROK, few people dared to openly question the government’s defense policy. With the country’s democratization, it is becoming apparent that there exists substantial discord between key elements in ROK society over security issues. The following discussion examines several of the current questions relating to South Korea’s defense. President Kim Dae-jung launched his new approach in relations with the DPRK shortly after he was sworn in as president in 1997. As described, this bold initiative calls for Seoul to employ both carrots and sticks in its relationship with Pyongyang. Despite some obvious setbacks, the president’s supporters claim that “the policy has begun to work, as seen in positive responses from the North like the opening of Mt. Kumgang, Pyongyang’s proposal for a military officers meeting and the opening of its skies to foreign airliners.”49 Many have high hopes for a series of summits between the leaders of the two rival regimes. During the June 2000 meetings between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-Il, the two sides agreed to a number of measures including permitting the reunions by families torn apart by the Korean War. The leaders also agreed to work for peaceful reunification. Following the meeting, Kim Dae-jung proclaimed that “it became clear that we will not ever go to war again.”50 Critics of the policy remain unconvinced. As might be expected, members of the Grand National Party (GNP), the country’s chief opposition party, have been particularly vocal in their criticism of the sunshine policy. Kim Ki Choon, a GNP lawmaker, charges that “provision of food, fertilizer and dollars has led the North to expedite development of artillery and missiles, threatening our security.”51 Other high-ranking GNP officials describe the policy simply as “appeasement.”52 Although GNP politicians generally supported the inter-Korea summit of June 2000, some claimed that the meeting actually did very little to ease tension or promote peace on the peninsula.53 In addition to opposition party politicians, elements in the ROK military are uncomfortable with the sunshine policy. Some officers suspect that the government now “pulls its punches” whenever the DPRK misbehaves and that it downplays provocative incidents like the 1998 Relations with North Korea

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DPRK submarine-borne infiltration attempt. One high-ranking officer complained that “when we are risking our lives to salvage the sub from the sea, the government is sending dubious signals doubting our word that it’s an infiltration attempt. It is only natural that we feel enervated.” 54 Administration officials retort that the military’s misgivings about the new policy are understandable because “if one is brought up on kimchi and rice, it would be difficult to change his diet to bread and butter overnight.”55 They insist that the policy is producing the desired results. As already noted, the United States plays a key role in the ROK’s defense policy. The U.S. defense commitment—particularly the troop presence in the South—helps deter a DPRK attack. Despite this close alliance, there are some key issues over which there are differences in the positions of the United States and the ROK. Although security ties between the ROK and the United States remain close, Seoul’s political leadership now is more willing to complain publicly about what it considers as the United States’ high-handed approach to defense issues on the Korean Peninsula. This was perhaps best exemplified by charges that Washington had “betrayed” Seoul when it embarked upon bilateral negotiations with the DPRK to defuse the 1994 nuclear crisis. Even ROK President Kim Young Sam warned the United States not to rush into an agreement with the DPRK.56 To make matters worse, under the terms of the nuclear accord, Seoul must pay most of the costs (estimated between $4 billion to $5 billion) to provide the DPRK with two new light-water reactors. Suh Jae Jean, an analyst at the ROK’s prestigious Research Institute of National Unification, voiced the sentiments of many South Koreans when he complained that “we pay the bill and Americans take the credit.” 57 Public opinion polls at the time revealed that more than 83 percent of the South Korean population believed that the ROK should not have accepted the agreement and 73 percent did not believe that Pyongyang would really give up its nuclear weapons program. 58 Following the election of Kim Dae-jung as president in 1997, however, tensions over differing approaches toward North Korea eased substantially. Washington’s military planners believe that U.S. troops should remain in the ROK after unification. President Kim Dae-jung agrees. In fact, the president has “seized every opportunity to assert that the stationing of the US armed forces in South Korea was necessary not just Relations with the United States

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for now but even after the unification of the country.”59 Officials fear that a U.S. withdrawal would create a power vacuum in the region that might jeopardize Korean security. But not everyone agrees with this proposition. Some ROK politicians fail to see a need for U.S. troops after unification. Like the Japanese, many are tired of the “inconveniences” associated with the stationing of foreign troops on their soil. Public opinion polls reveal that most Koreans share these feelings. According to a survey conducted in 1999, “the majority of Koreans oppose even a symbolic presence of US troops in a unified Korea.” 60 Indeed, the poll found that roughly 70 percent opposed the idea. Given such overwhelming opposition, it is difficult to see how the ROK will be able to sustain popular support for the deployment of U.S. troops in a unified Korea. Some Koreans—including President Kim— have floated the idea of some sort of multilateral security structure that might eventually replace the U.S.-ROK alliance.61 In any event, most South Koreans agree that U.S. force levels must decrease substantially after unification. Much more than the future status of U.S. troops on the Korean Peninsula divides Seoul and Washington. For several years the two sides have squabbled over the ROK’s missile program. The ROK wants to extend the range of its missiles beyond the 300-kilometer limit that is permitted under a 1999 agreement with the United States.62 The South Koreans reason that longer range missiles might serve as a deterrent against a North Korean missile strike. The Americans fear, however, that such weapons will irritate the DPRK, China, and Japan and fuel an arms race in the region.63 Some suspect that Seoul is extending the range of its missiles secretly despite the U.S. objections. The question of “burden sharing” is another contentious issue. In 1989, a Pentagon study revealed that the United States was paying $2.6 billion to station troops in the ROK. At the same time the ROK’s trade surplus with the United States was rising steadily. Consequently, the two governments signed an accord in 1991, the Special Agreement Relating to Article V of the Status of Forces Agreement, whereby Seoul promised to pay an increased portion of the expenses associated with stationing U.S. troops in the ROK. Since that time, ROK contributions have increased significantly (Table 5.6) and Seoul has built new facilities for U.S. forces. Officials in both Seoul and Washington face pressure to reduce government spending. The economic turmoil that engulfed South Korea in the late 1990s increased domestic political pressures on Seoul to

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The South Korean Military Table 5.6 1991 150

ROK Portion of Defense Burden-Sharing, 1991–1995 ($ Millions)

1992 180

1993 220

1994 260

1995 300

1996 330

1997 363

1998 399

Source: Ministry of National Defense, The Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper 1997– 98 (Seoul: Korea Institute for Defense Analysis, 1998), p. 77.

resist U.S. demands for additional support to cover the costs of troops stationed in the country. South Koreans also resent demands that the ROK open up its economy to U.S. products and services. South Koreans have expressed reservations about Washington’s plans for Japan to play a more active role in East Asian security. As discussed earlier, they are particularly nervous about the revised U.S.Japan Security Guidelines and their implications for Japanese military operations on the Korean Peninsula. Nevertheless, many Koreans believe that a more active Japanese defense posture, if carried out in conjunction with the United States, will enhance regional peace and stability. Finally, the United States has expressed concern over ROK efforts to diversify the sources of its imported arms. Claiming that foreign weapons will lead to interoperability difficulties, Washington has argued that Seoul should purchase only U.S. arms. Elements in the South Korean defense establishment, however, suspect that this position has more to do with profits than other considerations. Some also suspect that the United States will use arms exports to control the level of technology transfers to the ROK. When President Kim Young Sam was sworn in as president of the ROK in 1992, he presented himself as a reformer. He pledged that he would do something about corruption—the “Korean disease” that has infected the armed forces and many other segments of Korean society. 64 Although Kim did manage to expose and root out a notorious secret military faction known as the Hanahoe (One-mind Society), his anticorruption campaign met with limited success. During the presidential campaign of 1997, Kim Dae-jung vowed to pick up where his predecessor had left off. After winning the election, the new president moved quickly to promote officers he suspected were Corruption

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overlooked because of their provincial origin. Officers from the Cholla region—Kim’s constituency—have been promoted to the highest posts in the military. Natives of the area also have been given the top positions in the Defense Ministry and intelligence community.65 As might be expected, these promotions have stirred resentment among those who hail from other parts of the country. Prior to the 1997 presidential election, two scandals involving the military had rocked Korean politics. The first emerged in the mid1990s, when it was revealed that high-ranking military officers had received huge sums of money as kickbacks on major defense contracts. To prevent similar problems in the future, President Kim has sought to open up the bidding process and make it more transparent. Another major scandal was unearthed in the midst of the 1997 presidential campaign. This incident involved the country’s universal draft and has been described as “the biggest graft scandal in Korean military history.” 66 More than 100 military doctors and draft officials were arrested for taking bribes to falsify reports and declare healthy draft-age males ineligible for service. It appeared to have become a common practice for wealthy Korean parents—including the GNP’s unsuccessful presidential candidate—to purchase deferments for their draft-age children. 67 To prevent similar abuses in the future, President Kim has ordered that the military provide whistle-blowers with rewards and has called for a review of the entire conscription system. The government of Kim Dae-jung has taken measures to deal with corruption. According to some accounts, however, corruption remains a pervasive feature of South Korean politics, and it might even threaten the nation’s recovery from the Asian financial crisis.68 Most South Koreans agree that the state of morale within the ROK military is low. Some even claim that it has descended to a “crisis level.”69 But there exists considerable disagreement as to what exactly led to this sad state of affairs. Members of the GNP charge that “the sunshine policy [has] caused confusion over just who our chief enemy is and this resulted in lax discipline and low morale.” 70 Others claim that the frequent military reshuffles and preferential treatment of officers from the Cholla region are taking their toll. But Kim Dae-jung and his followers dispute these findings. Kim and his supporters contend that morale in the armed services Morale in the ROK Armed Services

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was low before the new president took office in 1997. They point to studies suggesting that a vast majority of retired officers cite the unfair conscription policies as the chief cause of low morale. 71 They also believe that the military’s irrational promotion policies have long generated ill feelings among both officers and enlisted men. According to this view, the only way to boost morale is to adopt the reform measures advocated by Kim Dae-jung. Given the uncertain strategic environment on the Korean Peninsula, it is understandable that there exists considerable disagreement over questions relating to defense. In addition to those issues discussed above, South Koreans hold different views about nuclear weapons (whether or not to manufacture or possess them), relations with the country’s larger and more powerful neighbors (particularly Japan and China), and the government’s economic reform policies. In fact, President Kim Daejung once described the country’s economic turmoil as “the greatest crisis since the end of the Korean War.”72 Questions such as these continue to surface in conversations related to the ROK’s security. However, many believe that the country’s economy has finally turned the corner and is on the way to a full recovery. According to the Asian Development Bank, South Korea’s GDP grew 10.7 percent in 1999, and was expected to reach an annual GDP growth of 7.5 percent in 2000 and 6.0 percent in 2001.73 Moreover, questions about weapons of mass destruction tend to focus primarily on the threat from the North. Inside South Korea, the only serious discussion in this area revolves around the development of larger missiles. Finally, relations with Japan and China appear relatively stable, and some might even argue that they have never been better. Other Issues

Summary

In general, the ROK’s national security policy is characterized by caution and stability rather than sudden innovation or change. Despite recent moves toward relaxing tensions with Pyongyang, Seoul is determined to maintain its close security relationship with Washington and a robust military capability. The United States shares this view. As a Pentagon study stated, “Even after the North Korean threat passes, the US intends to maintain its strong defense alliance with the Republic of

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Korea, in the interest of regional security.”74 U.S. officials have continued to emphasize this position even after the remarkable inter-Korea summit of June 2000 and the thaw in U.S.-DPRK relations that has followed the meeting. A conflict between the ROK and DPRK remains the primary challenge to the security of South Korea. However, Seoul also confronts security challenges of its own creation. The economic turmoil that swept the country during the late 1990s represented a serious threat to the nation’s stability. In addition to undermining the government’s ability to pursue its military modernization program, the crisis shook the very foundations of South Korean society. Moreover, the bribery and corruption scandals within the armed services have tarnished the military’s image among the Korean population and contributed to a dramatic drop in morale. Finally, several decades of dictatorial rule reduced the legitimacy of the ROK government in the eyes of many of its citizens. If not for the election of Kim Dae-jung in December 1997 and the initiation of his reform measures to address these problems, the ROK’s security outlook might appear much less promising than it does at the present moment. Notes

1. Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper, 1999 (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 1999), on the World Wide Web at http://www. mnd.go.kr/mndweb/mnden/mnd/m_2index.htm 2. Kim Yong-hui, “Difference of Opinion Over DPRK Missile Viewed,” Chungang Ilbo (Internet version), August 3, 1999, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter FBIS), East Asia, August 3, 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 3. Ibid. 4. Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper, 1999. 5. Chung-in Moon, “South Korea: Recasting Security Paradigms,” in Muthiah Alagappa, Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 269. 6. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1999–2000 (London: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 175. 7. Prepared statement of General John H. Telelli, Jr., commander in chief, UNC/CFCC, USFK, Before the House National Security Committee, March 4, 1998, in Hearings on National Defense and Authorization Act for Fiscal Year, 1999—H.R. 3616 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs Before the Committee on National Security, House of Representatives, 105th Congress, 2d Session, Full Committee Hearings on Authorizations and Oversight, February 5, March 4, 5, 12, and 26, 1998 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1999), p. 262.

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8. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, United States Security Strategy for the East Asia–Pacific Region (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, November 1998. 9. See prepared statement of Gen. John H. Telelli Jr., p. 267. 10. “More on ROK, US Agreement to Counter DPRK Threats,” Chungang Ilbo (Seoul, Internet version), January 15, 1999, in FBIS, East Asia, January 15, 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 11. Ministry of National Defense, The Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper, 1997–98 (Seoul: Korea Institute for Defense Analysis, 1998), p. 77. 12. Prepared statement of Gen. John H. Telelli Jr., p. 265. 13. For more information, see Reunification Policies, National Intelligence Service of Republic of Korea on World Wide Web at http://www.nis.go.kr:7000/national/index.html or National Institute of Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review, 1998–1999 (Tokyo: National Institute of Defense Studies, 1999), p. 85. 14. “ROK to Propose Opening of Inter-Korean Hotline,” Yonhap (Seoul), January 15, 1999, in FBIS, East Asia, January 15, 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 15. Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper, 1999. 16. For more information, see ROK Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper, 1998 (Seoul: Korea Institute for Defense Analysis, 1999), pp. 140–141. 17. “ROK to Enhance Military Ties with PRC,” Korea Times (Internet version), March 8, 1999, in FBIS, East Asia, March 8, 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 18. National Institute of Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review, 1998–1999 (Tokyo: National Institute of Defense Studies, 1999) pp. 87–88. 19. Shim Jae Hoon, “Russia Returns,” Far Eastern Economic Review, January 13, 2000, p. 21. 20. “KBS Interviews ROK Defense Minister,” KBS Television Network (Seoul), January 23, 1999, in FBIS, East Asia, January 26, 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov. Also see “ROK, Japan Agree on Closer Security Cooperation,” Yonhap (Seoul), July 14, 1999, in FBIS, East Asia, July 14, 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 21. Ibid., “KBS Interviews . . .” 22. Scott Snyder, “South Korea,” in William M. Carpenter and David G. Wiencek, Asian Security Handbook: An Assessment of Political-Security Issues in the Asian Pacific Region (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), p. 227. 23. East Asian Strategic Review, 1998–1999, pp. 82–83. 24. These actions may be nullified by the National Assembly. 25. “Kim Tae-chung Not to Scrap National Security Law,” Yonhap (Seoul), March 11, 1998, in FBIS, East Asia, March 11, 1998, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 26. “Army Deployed to Combat Typhoon in Manner to Stage Combat,” Yonhap (Seoul), August 3, 1999, in FBIS, East Asia, August 3, 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 27. Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper, 1999. 28. ROK Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper, 1998, p. 169.

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29. Ibid. 30. Ibid., p. 170. 31. Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper, 1999. 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid. 35. Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper, 1998, pp. 170– 171, and East Asian Strategic Review, p. 89. 36. Snyder, “South Korea,” in Carpenter and Wiencek, Asian Security Handbook, p. 226. 37. “More Details on ROK’s Five Year Defense Plan, Budget,” Korea Times, February 13, 1999, p. 1 in FBIS, East Asia, February 13, 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 38. Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper, 1999. 39. Ibid. 40. Ibid. 41. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1999–2000 (London: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 175. 42. Ibid. 43. “ROK Military to Improve Information Gathering on DPRK,” Korea Times, January 2, 2000, in FBIS, East Asia, January 2, 2000, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 44. Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper, 1999. 45. Ibid. 46. “Defense Minister Urges Creation of Elite, Informed Forces,” Yonhap (Seoul), April 3, 1999, in FBIS, East Asia, April 3, 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 47. “ROK Military to Improve Information Gathering on DPRK,” Korea Times, January 2, 2000. 48. Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper, 1999. 49. “Lawmaker Says US-Japan Plan for TMD Worries Neighbors,” Korea Times, March 14, 1999, in FBIS, East Asia, March 14, 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov. 50. “North, South to Reconnect Railways, Jointly Tackle Floods,” Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), June 16, 2000, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 19, 2000, in Lexis/Nexis. 51. “Lawmakers Call for Tougher DPRK Deterrence,” Korea Times (Internet version), July 8, 1999, in FBIS, East Asia, July 8, 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 52. “GNP’s Yi Hoe-Chang Criticizes Sunshine Policy,” Korean Times (Internet edition), March 2, 1999, in FBIS, East Asia, March 2, 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 53. “South Korean Opposition Condemns Lack of Concessions by North,” Agence France Presse, June 19, 2000, in Lexis/Nexis. 54. “ROK Military Has ‘Hard Time Coping’ with Sunshine Policy,” Korea Times (Internet edition), June 25, 1998, in FBIS, East Asia, June 29, 1998, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 55. Ibid.

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56. National Institute for Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review, 1996–1997 (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 1996), p. 73. 57. Shim Jae Hoon, “Nuclear Test: Can Reactor Project Heal North-South Rift?” Far Eastern Economic Review, September 4, 1997, p. 16. 58. For more information, see Lee Soong Hee, “The North Korean Nuclear Issue Between Washington and Seoul: Differences in Perceptions and Policy Priorities,” The Journal of East Asian Affairs XI, 2 (Summer/Fall 1997), pp. 334–335. 59. National Institute of Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review, 1998–1990, p. 87. 60. “IFANS Report on Presence of US Forces after Unification,” Yonhap (Seoul), January 21, 1999, in FBIS, East Asia, January 21, 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 61. Ibid. Also see National Institute of Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review, 1998–1990, p. 87. 62. “ROK, US Agree on Extending Missile Range,” Tong-A Ilbo (Seoul, Internet version), April 21, 1999, in FBIS, East Asia, April 21, 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 63. Kim Yong-hui, “US Selfishness Regarding ROK Missile Development Noted,” Chungang Ilbo (Seoul, Internet version), July 6, 1999, in FBIS, East Asia, July 6, 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 64. Donald Stone Macdonald, The Koreans: Contemporary Politics and Society, 3d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996), p. 126. 65. East Asian Strategic Review, pp. 82–83. 66. “Suspects of Draft Dodging Pass Medical Tests,” Korea Times (Internet version), June 7, 1999, in FBIS, East Asia, June 7, 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 67. Oh Young-jin, “Defense Ministry Relieved Military Neutrality Preserved,” Korea Times, December 19, 1997, in FBIS, East Asia, December 19, 1997, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 68. Bill Tarrant, “Korean Corruption Endangering Recovery,” China Post (international airmail edition), September 26, 2000, p. 2. 69. “Daily Views Military Morale at ‘Crisis Level,’” Chungang Ilbo (Internet version), December 9, 1998, in FBIS, East Asia, December 24, 1998, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 70. “President Kim to Discipline Military Leaders,” Korea Herald, December 9, 1998, in Lexis/Nexis. 71. “Majority of Retired Officers Forecast Another Korean War,” Korea Times, January 24, 1999, in FBIS, East Asia, January 24, 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 72. “US Presence Needed to Hold Back Arms Race in Asia: Kim DaeJung,” Agence France Presse, March 10, 1998, in Lexis/Nexis. 73. “Asia Still World’s Fastest Growing Regions, ADB Says,” China Post, April 27, 2000, p. 12. 74. U.S. Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy for the East Asia–Pacific Region, p. 10.

6 The North Korean Military he Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) is a small, xenophobic, and diplomatically isolated nation. It also is one of the world’s most militaristic states. Despite the downward spiral of its economy, the DPRK rejects meaningful economic reform and continues to maintain one of the world’s largest armed forces. In addition to a robust conventional military, Pyongyang is armed with weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, and perhaps even nuclear weapons) and the delivery systems to use them.

T

Defense Policy

In 1910 Korea was formally annexed to the Japanese Empire. Along with numerous other occupied territories, it was liberated following the Japanese surrender and the end of World War II in 1945. In keeping with wartime agreements, the Korean peninsula was divided temporarily at the 38th parallel. However, UN-sponsored efforts to unify the country peacefully ended in failure. As a consequence, two rival regimes were established on the peninsula. In the northern zone, the Soviet Union installed a communist regime and helped train a communist army. On September 9, 1948, the DPRK was officially founded. The new state was headed by Kim IlSung, a hard-line Communist known for his anti-Japanese guerrilla activities during the 1930s. Most Soviet forces withdrew from North Korea that same year. In the South, the United States helped to establish a pro-Western regime headed by Syngman Rhee, a nationalist leader. On August 15, 1948, the ROK was officially established. Most U.S. troops withdrew from the peninsula in early 1949. 195

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Following the withdrawal of the U.S. and Soviet forces, tensions on the peninsula rose sharply. Border clashes along the 38th parallel intensified and pro-DPRK forces in the South attempted unsuccessfully to topple the ROK government. On June 25, 1950, the DPRK military launched a massive invasion of the South. Kim Il-Sung evidently reasoned “that a weak-kneed UN would act either too late or not at all.”1 The DPRK’s calculations proved to be inaccurate. The United Nations quickly branded Pyongyang as an aggressor and agreed to send troops and assistance to the South.2 However, the United States provided the vast majority of this aid. The Korean conflict, though officially a United Nations action, was overwhelmingly an American responsibility. Only sixteen of the sixty member nations sent armed contingents, and all but one were tiny. . . . The United States furnished the great bulk of the air units, of the naval forces, of the supplies, and of the money—over $15 billion. Except for the ROK, it provided most of the men. More than a million Americans served, of whom about 150,000 suffered casualties, including some 33,000 battle deaths.3

Throughout 1950 and 1951 the battle lines fluctuated north and south. China’s decision to intervene in the war drastically complicated the conflict, and some feared that the battles raging in Korea would escalate into World War III. In late 1951, the Soviet Union’s delegation to the United Nations raised the subject of a truce. After two years of slow and difficult negotiations, representatives of the UN Command, DPRK, and PRC signed an armistice agreement at Panmunjom on July 27, 1953. Neither the United States nor the ROK signed the agreement, but both adhere to it through the UNC. According to the terms of the armistice, an international conference would find a political solution to Korea’s division. However, efforts to reach a settlement broke down in 1954. To this date, no comprehensive peace treaty has replaced the 1953 armistice. Consequently, a state of war technically still exists between the two arch-rival Korean states. The DPRK is not content with the military and political standoff on the Korean peninsula. Indeed, the signing of the 1953 armistice did little to dissuade Pyongyang from attempting to achieve its ultimate goal: the unification of the Korean peninsula under DPRK control. Pyongyang plans to use two strategies to reach this objective: violent revolution in the ROK and/or an invasion from the North.

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As described, the DPRK attempted to topple the ROK regime with the assistance of indigenous forces of the South prior to the Korean conflict in 1950. After the signing of the 1953 armistice these activities continued. In its drive to destabilize the Seoul government, the DPRK continued to employ both special operations forces (SOFs) and proPyongyang sympathizers in the South. The DPRK has resorted to terrorism on numerous occasions in an effort to overthrow the ROK government. In 1968, DPRK commandos infiltrated the South in order to attack the Blue House—South Korea’s presidential mansion. Four years later, special agents attempted to assassinate President Park Chung Hee. In 1983, Pyongyang tried to blow up members of the cabinet of President Chun Doo Hwan in Rangoon. Roughly four years after this attack, DPRK agents successfully downed a Korean Airlines passenger jet. In addition to these activities, there also are still reports that Pyongyang’s agents have long sought to whip up popular discontent among elements in the ROK population—particularly laborers and students. Some ROK authorities suspect that the DPRK has played a role in the South’s numerous student uprisings.4 Believing that the United States is a major obstacle to the liberation of the South, these same forces also help foment anti-U.S. sentiment among the population. In recent years, the DPRK has made several statements condemning terrorist activities. In fact, in 1991 both the DPRK and the ROK pledged to “refrain from all acts destroying and overthrowing the other side.” 5 More recently, Pyongyang disbanded its 100,000-strong 8th Army Corps—the DPRK’s key SOF that was designed to infiltrate the South and commit acts of terrorism.6 Despite promises to the contrary, it is clear that the DPRK will continue to rely on unconventional conflict as a part of its strategy to achieve hegemony over the entire Korean Peninsula. Pyongyang possesses a wide range of military equipment (including low-flying An-2 transport aircraft, speedboats, and small submarines) whose sole purpose appears to be the insertion of commando units into the ROK. In September 1996, the DPRK attempted to use one of its minisubmarines to infiltrate a squad of commandos into the ROK. Responding to the international outcry that followed this incident, Pyongyang again pledged to refrain from such operations in the future. However, “in June 1998, another North Korean submarine manned by fully-armed agents was caught in a fishing net within South Korea’s territorial waters.”7 It Violent Revolution in the ROK

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also is noteworthy that Pyongyang has not dismantled its SOFs; rather, the elite 8th Army Corps has merely been integrated into another special warfare unit known as the “light guidance bureau.”8 In addition to employing assassination, commando raids, and other unconventional means to topple the ROK regime, the DPRK seeks to acquire the requisite military strength to unify the peninsula by force. Throughout the Cold War, Pyongyang skillfully played Beijing and Moscow off of each other—obtaining bountiful amounts of economic and military aid from both governments while never becoming a satellite of either. In 1961, the DPRK enhanced its security significantly against an outside attack by concluding formal mutual security treaties with both the communist giants. By the late 1960s, some feared that the North’s economic and military might could ultimately far surpass that found in the ROK (the DPRK held the lead in per capita income until the early 1970s).9 But conditions have changed. The end of the Cold War has complicated Pyongyang’s strategy to liberate the ROK with military force. Moscow has curtailed its economic assistance and abrogated the Soviet-DPRK defense treaty. Moreover, the PRC has reduced its economic aid and established diplomatic relations with the ROK. At the same time, democratization has helped to stabilize the ROK government and its economy has grown, while the DPRK’s economy has contracted. Nevertheless, the DPRK continues to maintain the world’s fourth largest military. In keeping with its juche philosophy of self-reliance, the DPRK has long sought to secure an independent war-fighting capability. This determination is reflected in the four-point military guidelines, measures that were adopted in 1962 and ultimately included in the DPRK constitutions of 1992 and 1998. The objectives of the four-point guidelines are as follows: Invasion of the ROK

• • • •

Instill leadership or cadre potential in every solider. Modernize the entire military. Arm the entire population. Turn the entire nation into a fortress.10

By adhering to the four-point guidelines, Pyongyang has been able to become largely self-sufficient in basic military hardware, thereby avoiding many of the difficulties that might otherwise have been associ-

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ated with the end of the Cold War. A plethora of arms are manufactured domestically—ranging from mortars to ballistic missiles—and munitions plants have been moved underground to ensure their continued production in the event of a conflict. The DPRK possesses a huge military machine. A vast majority of these forces are forward deployed along the DMZ. North Korea has an army of approximately 1 million ground troops, armored units equipped with about 3,000 tanks and commando units that carry out unconventional warfare. It is believed that North Korea has deployed about two-thirds of its armed forces and a large number of long-range artillery pieces, including 240-mm multiple-launch rockets and 170-mm guns, in areas adjacent to the demilitarized zone.11

When the critical moment arrives—perhaps when the ROK is swept by turmoil and/or the United States withdraws a significant number of its troops—these forces will launch a blitzkrieg-like invasion of the South, while commando units are dropped simultaneously into rear areas. North Korea’s military strategy toward the South is short-term blitzkrieg, which aims at creating great panic in the South in the early stage of a war by launching simultaneous attacks in the forward and rear areas, plunging quickly and deeply into the South with maneuver forces armed with tanks, armored vehicles and self-propelled artillery to take the initiative in the war, thus sweeping the entire South before USFK reinforcements come. . . . Blitzkrieg is regarded as the only strategy it could use for a war.12

U.S. officials warn that in addition to its large conventional force, it is likely that the DPRK would use chemical weapons and ballistic missiles in such an attack.13 For almost half a century, the DPRK has embraced the strategy outlined above. It has sought to destabilize the ROK and launch a blitzkriegstyle invasion of the South during the ensuing turmoil. For much of its history, this strategy appeared to make sense: after all, the ROK was ruled by unpopular and repressive regimes. Summary

This record of unstable and repressive regimes in the South has been a lure to the North. In light of such obvious discontent among a large portion of the South Korean populace, the North’s hopes that attack-

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ing the South Korean leadership might result in chaos or collapse were certainly justified.14

As already described, conditions in the ROK and the international community have changed dramatically in recent years, and these transformations represent serious challenges to DPRK military strategy. Despite profound economic difficulties, increased diplomatic isolation, cataclysmic changes in the international system, and the astonishing democratization of the South, the DPRK has not abandoned its strategy of employing force to unify the Korean Peninsula based on the principle of “one Chosun.” By adhering to the four-point guidelines, the Kim regimes have sought to turn the entire North Korean society into a self-sufficient and lethal military machine. Some suspect that, rather than seek a genuine détente with the South, the DPRK has sought to reinforce its offensive military capabilities and deploy additional forces in an offensive military posture near the DMZ. According to this view, Kim Jong-Il views the 2000 interKorea summit and other recent steps to reduce tensions with the ROK as a means by which Pyongyang can extract all economic concessions possible from Seoul. The Korean People’s Army

In keeping with revisions to the DPRK constitution in September 1998, the National Defense Committee (NDC) is responsible for maintaining control of the armed forces of North Korea (see Figure 6.1). This body “decides on and controls the overall force capability and national defense construction projects.”15 It is headed by a chairman—a position described as “the highest post of the state with which to organize and lead the work of defending the state system of the socialist country . . . through command over all the political, military and economic forces of the country.”16 In other words, the NDC chairman, Kim Jong-Il, is the supreme commander of the entire North Korean nation. The position of DPRK president was essentially abolished following the death of Kim Il-Sung. In addition to the NDC, two other government institutions merit brief mention. The Department of the People’s Armed Forces (DPAF) is the rough equivalent of a ministry of national defense. As outlined above, it is under the direct control of the NDC. Its chief responsibilities include “managing and implementing overall activities of the

Figure 6.1 North Korea’s Military Command System

NATIONAL DEFENSE COMMITTEE STATE SECURITY BUREAU General Rear Service Bureau

General Political Bureau XXX

Regular Corps (12)

XXX

Mechanized Corps (4)

DEPARTMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S ARMED FORCES Security Guard Command XXX

Tank Corps

General Staff Department XXX

Artillery Corps (2)

Executives’ Office

XXX

Pyongyang Defense Command East Sea Fleet Command

Source: Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper, 1998.

Military Prosecutions Bureau

Navy Command

Yellow Sea Fleet Command

Military Justice Bureau

Air Command

Air Division (6)

Light Infantry Instruction Guidance Bureau

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Regular Corps through the General Political Bureau, the General Staff Department, and other organizations under the DPAF.”17 Day-to-day command and control of military operations is the responsibility of the General Staff Department. Unfortunately, neat organizational charts may fail to reflect the true nature of power structures and institutional relationships in a given state. This observation applies with special force to the DPRK. North Korea is much more than a one-party, totalitarian regime. Through purges, terror, and intrigue, the DPRK has evolved over time into a onefamily state or dynasty. The two most important political institutions in North Korea are the Workers Party of Korea (WPK) and the Korean People’s Army (KPA).18 As general secretary of the WPK and chairman of the NDC, Kim JongIl controls both of these bodies. He also exercises control, albeit technically indirect, over the state apparatus. It is noteworthy that these responsibilities were not thrust upon an indifferent or reluctant son. Rather, available evidence suggests that “it was Kim Jong Il who actively sought to succeed his father.”19 For over two decades Kim Jong-Il worked hard to prepare for the day when he would assume the reins of leadership in the DPRK.20 As part of this strategy, he actively sought the support and loyalty of the KPA. As might be expected, since realizing his ambition, “the positions assigned to military officers in the rankings of the party and the state have been elevated.”21 During the DPRK’s Tenth Supreme People’s Assembly election that was held in July 1998, the number of military personnel in the body almost doubled.22 WPK members and government bureaucrats have not fared as well under the new Kim leadership, and some suspect that they are being blamed for the economic woes that have plagued the DPRK for almost a decade. The chief responsibility of the KPA is to defend the DPRK against outside attack and assist Pyongyang in its drive to unify the peninsula. However, the military also plays other roles. For example, KPA units have been dispatched to help the nation’s beleaguered cooperative farms harvest crops and engage in other economic activities during the financial crisis. In fact, the military is now “characterized as the main force of the economy.”23 Perhaps equally as significant, it is the duty of the KPA to protect the Kim regime from all internal threats. As vice marshal Jo Myong Rok, director of the General Political Department of the KPA, warned, the military will “mercilessly punish betrayers of the revolution.”24 Despite its financial difficulties, Pyongyang still represents a signif-

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icant military threat to its neighbors. In 1999 the DPRK acknowledged that it was spending $9.5 billion, or roughly 30 percent of its national budget, on its military.25 The discussion below examines recent developments in the KPA. It also analyzes Pyongyang’s efforts to develop and deploy weapons of mass destruction. The DPRK possesses roughly 1 million ground troops organized into twenty corps-size commands. These include 12 infantry corps, 4 mechanized corps, 2 artillery corps, 1 tank corps, and the light guidance bureau’s SOF. The KPA’s ground force combat units “consist of 175 divisions and brigades in total, including 32 infantry divisions/brigades, 10 security brigades, 36 instruction guidance divisions, and 2 missile brigades.”26 Almost half of the KPA ground forces are forward deployed—south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line. In order to achieve the element of surprise, the DPRK has constructed numerous tunnels under the front lines. Seoul suspects that Pyongyang will use these to avoid impediments positioned along the DMZ and “would secretly inject massive units into the South via these tunnels before the war starts in order to support an all-out surprise attack against the South.”27 As described above, the DPRK also would drop its 100,000 SOF troops into rear areas of the ROK. As outlined in Table 6.1, the KPA’s inventory of ground force weaponry includes thousands of tanks (T-55, T-62, T-72, and light tanks), armored personnel carriers, and pieces of field artillery. In keeping with DPRK military objectives, most the field artillery is selfpropelled. In fact, a majority of KPA ground units “are geared for mechanized warfare reminiscent of the Nazi blitzkrieg.”28 According to some accounts, the DPRK has quietly trimmed KPA ground force levels by as much as 100,000 troops,29 and much of the Ground Forces

Table 6.1 Type of Weaponry

Number

DPRK Ground Force Weaponry Tanks 3,800

Armored Vehicles 2,300

Artillery (including MLRS) 12,000

Air Defense Weapons 13,800

RiverCrossing Equipment 2,960

Source: Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper, 1998.

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equipment in the KPA’s ground force inventory is considered obsolete by Western standards. However, the DPRK has begun to deploy reconfigured T-62 tanks and new Chonmaho tanks “extensively in forward areas and around Pyongyang.”30 Both types of tanks are equipped with snorkels enabling them to cross rivers up to 5.5 meters deep. Moreover, a new armored vehicle, purportedly with a light-tank capability, also is being deployed. Finally, the KPA has deployed a wide variety of selfpropelled multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS). The ROK military fears that these weapons could “devastate the Seoul area in a short time.”31 The DPRK Navy possesses roughly 990 vessels and 48,000 personnel. It is divided into two fleets—the East and Yellow Sea fleet commands. Ten combatant groups (570 vessels) are deployed in the East fleet command, while six combatant groups (420 vessels) are deployed in the Yellow Sea fleet command. Table 6.2 provides an overview of the vessels in the DPRK Navy’s inventory. The DPRK Navy, though considered small and/or obsolete by Western standards, is well positioned for a war with the ROK and its friends and allies. Like the ground forces, most of the DPRK Navy is forward deployed—roughly 60 percent of its vessels are stationed near the demarcation line.32 Most of Pyongyang’s submarines are old and slow, but they are quite capable of conducting operations in the waters around the peninsula. The same observation applies to the navy’s landing ships, hovercraft, midget submarines, and patrol boats. Although they may not be able to conduct operations on the high seas, these vessels could block sea lanes near the ROK, attack surface combatants, place mines in ROK waters, or insert commandos into the South. The DPRK’s torpedo and guided-missile boats “are particularly dangerous . . . [and] capable of launching missiles against large naval vessels.”33 Finally, the DPRK has deployed surface-to-ship SAMLET and Naval Forces

Table 6.2 Type

Number

DPRK Naval Force Vessels Surface Combatants 440

Submarines 40

Landing Vessels 260

Other 250

Total 990

Source: Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper, 1998.

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Silkworm missiles—with a range of 83 to 95 kilometers—along both its eastern and western coasts. Like the vessels in the DPRK Navy, these land-based weapons would represent a very real threat to an adversary. Analysts suspect that the DPRK plans to put more muscle into its navy. Additional submarines appear to be especially high on its list. According to some unconfirmed accounts, the DPRK plans to increase its number of submarines (including midget submarines) to ninety.34 The DPRK Air Force consists of roughly 1,690 planes and 103,000 personnel. It is divided into six divisions—three for combat (fighter and bomber regiments), two for transport, and one for training. Table 6.3 provides an overview of the DPRK Air Force’s aircraft. The DPRK maintains roughly seventy air bases. In keeping with national strategic objectives, almost half of its aircraft are deployed at forward bases. This enables the air force to participate in a surprise attack against the ROK. The remaining warplanes are scattered throughout the country. Most of the warplanes in the air force’s inventory are old and obsolete. Outmoded aircraft include MiG-19/21, MiG-15/17, and Su-7 fighters, Il-28 bombers, and H-500 and Mi-2/4 helicopters. But some of these ancient aircraft are still quite useful. ROK military authorities are particularly concerned about the DPRK’s 300 low-flying AN-2 transports—some of which have been modified to carry bombs. These planes are capable of flying below radar and transporting SOFs deep behind ROK lines.35 Although the DPRK Air Force is old, it has made some progress in its effort to obtain more sophisticated aircraft. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Pyongyang acquired the parts from the Soviet Union to assemble sixteen MiG-29s. In 1999, it reportedly acquired ten more of Air Forces

Table 6.3 Type

Number of Aircraft

DPRK Air Force Aircraft Fighters

Bombers

Support Aircraft

Helicopters

Total

770

80

520

320

1,690

Source: Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper, 1998.

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the sophisticated fighters.36 It remains unclear, however, how the DPRK obtained the funds required to purchase these planes. In addition to warplanes, the DPRK maintains a very robust air defense system. Pyongyang learned some hard lessons about air defense from its unfortunate experiences during the Korean War and from dazzling U.S. air operations during Desert Storm. Consequently, the DPRK has reinforced its early-warning radar systems and deployed some 13,800 antiaircraft artillery and portable missiles and 330 surface-to-air missiles, including low-altitude SA-3s, mid-altitude SA-2s, and highaltitude SA-5s. In addition to the active duty forces described above, the DPRK possesses a massive reserve force. According to ROK estimates, over 7 million men and women now serve in reserve units.37 This number grew during the 1990s. In terms of combat readiness, the most potent reservists are the 1.73 million personnel in the so-called instructional guidance units. These forces, which are made up of men between the ages of seventeen and forty-five and women between the ages of seventeen and thirty, are under direct control of the KPA. They train for a total of forty days every year. During wartime they would serve as front-line troops.38 Other reserve units include 4.14 million Worker and Farmer Red Guards, 1.18 million Young Red Guards, and 390,000 quasi-military security and engineering forces. The Worker and Farmer Red Guards consist primarily of males between the ages of forty-six and sixty who receive one month of training each year. The Young Red Guards are primarily middle school teenagers. They receive 160 hours of on-campus drills each year and spend Saturday afternoons in drill sessions. Both groups are under the control of the KWP and would help maintain security in rear areas during wartime. These reservists play an important role in the DPRK’s defense strategy. Because Pyongyang retains a very tight control over work and travel within the country, “North Korean reserve forces can be mobilized at any time needed.”39 Reserves

Defense planning on the Korean Peninsula, always difficult, grew vastly more complicated during the 1980s and 1990s. For much of the Cold Weapons of Mass Destruction

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War, it was believed that a conflict between the two Koreas would be limited to conventional arms. Although Washington had stationed tactical nuclear weapons in the South, neither of the Koreas possessed nuclear arms. The United States removed its land-based nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula in 1991. At roughly the same time, however, Pyongyang appeared intent upon acquiring a nuclear capability. It also seemed determined to bolster its chemical and biological warfare capabilities and develop the delivery systems required to use these weapons.

Nuclear Arms. According to most accounts, the DPRK initiated its nuclear program in the 1950s.40 In the 1960s, it constructed a largescale atomic energy research complex in Yongbyon—located roughly 90 kilometers north of Pyongyang. Although the DPRK joined the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1974 and signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1985, satellite photos revealed that it had begun to unload weapons-grade plutonium from its 50-MW reactor in 1989. Perhaps equally as disturbing, the DPRK began testing bomb components and opened a plutonium-processing plant in 1990. As described in Chapter 1, the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula was resolved ultimately as a result of the 1994 Agreed Framework. Key provisions of the framework are outlined in Table 6.4 The DPRK’s moves toward a nuclear capability led to what one

Table 6.4

North Korea

Key Provisions of the 1994 Agreed Framework

United States

Freeze graphite-moderated nuclear reactors and other related facilities at Yongbyon. Dismantle above facilities after significant portions of the first light-water reactor are constructed. Allow safe disposal of spent fuel from 5-MW (electric) reactor.

Set up international organization (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization). Provide Department of Energy personnel to safely can and dispose of spent fuel from the 5-MW (electric) reactor

Korean Peninsula International Consortium including the Republic of Korea, Japan, Energy Development and the United States. Arrange for delivery of heavy fuel oil to offset Organization (KEDO) North’s energy loss. Finance and construct two light-water reactors by 2003.

Source: William S. Cohen, Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, November 1997, on the World Wide Web at http://www.defenselink.mil:80/pubs/prolif97/ ne_asia.html#north

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analyst has described as “an international soap opera.”41 Throughout this drama, however, there remained a distinct possibility that these theatrics might lead ultimately to war. The United States gave serious consideration to launching a preemptive strike against the DPRK’s facilities in 1994. 42 For all its faults (critics describe the accord as “appeasement”), the Agreed Framework has appeared to reduce the likelihood of conflict on Korean Peninsula. It remains unclear why Pyongyang sought to develop nuclear weapons, but analysts have offered numerous explanations. Some speculate that the DPRK’s increasing isolation and stagnant economy played a major role in the decision to go nuclear.43 Others believe that the program was intended as a bargaining tactic—a strategy to wring concessions from the international community. 44 Still others contend that Pyongyang wanted simply to gain another weapon to “communize the entire peninsula and strengthen its international influence.”45 Whatever the motivations, most analysts agree that the DPRK has halted its efforts to develop nuclear weapons. However, as a U.S. Department of State study warned, Pyongyang “retains key technology and expertise to restart its effort, should it decide to do so.”46 Moreover, both U.S. and ROK government officials will not discount the possibility that the DPRK already possesses a small number of nuclear warheads.47

Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents. In the early 1960s, the DPRK established research facilities capable of producing chemical and biological warfare (CW/BW) agents. By the 1980s, it had obtained the ability to produce massive quantities of such weapons. It is likely that these arms have a special appeal for Pyongyang because they are relatively inexpensive, very effective, and difficult to detect. North Korea claims that the international community is “preposterously” alarmed about its “non-existent biochemical weapons.” 48 In 1999, however, South Korea’s MND announced that the North has stockpiled 5,000 tons of CW/BW agents.49 The DPRK has ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. However, Seoul insists that Pyongyang still maintains “several facilities for cultivating and producing biological weapons.”50 Washington also contends that the DPRK “continues to have the scientists and facilities for producing biological products and microorganisms.”51 As a precautionary measure, the United States has inoculated troops stationed in the area against anthrax, and the ROK planned to do the same in 2000.

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The DPRK has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention. It has manufactured a wide array of chemical weapons—including nerve, blister, choking, and blood agents—and is prepared to use CW agents in a conflict with the South. According to a U.S. Marine Corps study, the North believes that the weapons are intended to “demoralize defending forces, reduce their effectiveness, and deny use of mobilization centers, storage areas, and military bases without physically destroying facilities and equipment.”52 KPA units have been trained to operate in a chemically contaminated environment and have been provided with protective gear and decontamination and detection equipment. Indeed, the KPA has organized special CW/BW units up to the regiment level. Also, North Korean civilians take part regularly in CW drills and the population is required to keep protective gear stored in their homes.53 Finally, the DPRK possesses the means for CW/BW ammunition delivery, including mortars, field artillery, and a wide variety of missiles and aircraft.

Missiles. During the 1980s, the DPRK launched an aggressive missile development program. This drive focused initially on the production and export of Scud short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). Today, several missile factories manufacture two variants of the former Soviet Union’s Scud—the Scud B and Scud C. Those missiles not produced for export are deployed at one of the North’s ten missile bases. According to U.S. estimates, the DPRK now has hundreds of Scuds in its inventory and has the capability to produce between four and eight of these weapons monthly. Other sources claim that North Korea “is churning out 100 Soviet-type Scud missiles a year.”54 Irrespective of the numbers being produced, most Scuds would find their targets in the ROK in less than three minutes.55 In addition to SRBMs, the DPRK has developed a variety of other missiles. In 1993, it successfully test-fired the Nodong-1 medium-range ballistic missile with an estimated range of 1,000 kilometers. ROK authorities believe that Pyongyang has deployed fifty of these missiles in Shino-ri, Chongju, and Pyoung-pukto. 56 Many are installed on mobile launch vehicles. Perhaps most alarming, however, is the development of the Taepo Dong-1 and Taepo Dong-2. On August 31, 1998, the DPRK launched a three-stage Taepo Dong-1 missile without warning. Unlike the 1993 test of the Nodong-1, which had splashed down off the Noto Peninsula of Japan, this missile flew across Japan and landed in the ocean off the Sanriku coast—the northern portion of the mainland island of Japan. The launch of the Taepo Dong-1 sent shock waves through the

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international community. DPRK claims that the missile had been fired to launch a satellite into orbit proved unconvincing. It was more likely that Pyongyang was intent on the development of a long-range ballistic missile. As Japan’s Defense Agency observed, “It is highly likely that North Korea had launched the ballistic missile primarily for the purpose of testing various technology with a view to extending the range of its ballistic missiles.”57 The test appeared to indicate that the DPRK could strike Japan or any of the U.S. forces stationed on Japanese territory. Since the launch, Pyongyang has pointedly warned Tokyo that it is “just under the nose of the DPRK and in its striking sphere.”58 In response to the Taepo Dong-1 incident, Tokyo delayed signing the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) agreement, the U.S. Congress temporarily froze the U.S. share of the KEDO budget, and the Secretary-General of the United Nations released a statement criticizing the DPRK. Perhaps much more significant than these diplomatic gestures, the Taepo Dong-1 launch energized the U.S.-led TMD program in East Asia. In late 1999, it appeared as if Pyongyang was determined to launch yet another missile—a Taepo Dong-2. The U.S. intelligence community warned that “a two-stage Taepo Dong-2 could deliver a severalhundred-kilogram payload to Alaska and Hawaii, and a lighter payload to the western half of the United States. A three-stage Taepo Dong-2 could deliver a several-hundred-kilogram payload anywhere in the United States.” 59 In other words, a Taepo Dong-2 could deliver a nuclear warhead or a BW/CW agent to targets in the United States. The possibility that the DPRK might test a missile capable of striking the United States prompted Washington to pursue negotiations with Pyongyang. During these discussions, Washington threatened to slow food and oil shipments if the DPRK fired another missile. Japan issued similar warnings, while the ROK threatened to cut off trade, tourism, and all but the most essential humanitarian aid if Pyongyang went ahead with the launch.60 Ultimately, it appears that Washington’s promise to lift nearly fifty years of restrictions on trade, travel, and banking prompted North Korea to agree not to undertake additional testing. However, continuing concerns about the DPRK’s missile program led then U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to travel to Pyongyang on a landmark mission to ease tensions in October 2000. Pyongyang has pledged not to launch a Taepo Dong-2. But it continues to insist that it has a “sovereign right” to do so. The North also argues that “the real threat of missile warfare” on the Korean peninsula

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comes from the South Korean “war maniacs.” 61 Comments such as these have caused U.S. officials to warn that the U.S.-DPRK missile agreement depends on “the always questionable sincerity of the North Koreans” and that “they could be back in business with the missiles in a hurry.”62 Voices in the U.S. Congress have complained that “we are once again entering a cycle of extortion with North Korea.”63 Several considerations may have prompted the DPRK to pursue a long-range missile development program. The North could believe that these delivery systems provide it with a deterrent against potential adversaries. They might also furnish Pyongyang with additional leverage in negotiations with Washington. On the other hand, the missile program could help the DPRK market its missiles in the Middle East and elsewhere. According to Japanese reports, Pyongyang has sold roughly $800 million in arms—including missiles—to international customers since 1991.64 Finally, domestic politics may have played a role. The missiles—like other arms—might be intended to boost the prestige of the Kim regime among the North’s population. The DPRK possesses one of the largest militaries in the world. It also spends an extraordinary percentage of its national budget on its armed forces. 65 According to some analyses, however, the ability of the million-man KPA to sustain a military offensive against the South has deteriorated: Summary

Training has fallen off dramatically, and fuel, maintenance and spares have become largely unavailable with the end of Chinese and Russian aid. Moreover, wartime stockpiles are not being refreshed, particularly food, which doesn’t have a long shelf life. The only three groups that appear to have been sustained at mid-1980s levels of readiness are the artillery, Scud missile brigade and special forces.66

The KPA may also be plagued by numerous other problems, including low morale, obsolete equipment, and a severe shortage of technicians required for modern warfare. Despite such shortcomings, the military potential of the DPRK should not be discounted. As William Perry, then special adviser to the president, observed in his 1999 report, Review of U.S. Policy toward North Korea, Pyongyang’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, long-range missiles, or the combination of the two could undermine stability on the

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Korean Peninsula. The acquisition of such weapons also holds the potential to spark an arms race throughout the region (or elsewhere if the DPRK opts to export the weapons).67 Given the fact that the ROK now enjoys a vast qualitative edge over the DPRK in terms of conventional military power, some argue that Pyongyang believes that it has no choice but to develop nuclear arms, CW/BW warfare agents, or other weapons of mass destruction. The DPRK has astonished defense analysts with its ability to manufacture such weapons, and Japanese diplomats caution that “they still might be hiding some advanced technical development.”68 This development holds important implications for peace and stability in East Asia. Security Issues in the DPRK

Due to the secretive nature of the Kim Jong-Il regime, it is extremely difficult to identify, much less analyze, security issues in the DPRK. Nevertheless, it is still possible to briefly outline some of the more obvious matters related to North Korea’s defense. During the mid-1990s, it appeared that the DPRK’s economy might collapse. A conjunction of several factors—including centralized planning, excessive military spending, natural disasters, and reduced foreign aid—brought the country to the brink of total starvation. Pyongyang’s stubborn resistance to economic reform had aggravated these problems: rather than overhaul the agricultural system, emphasis was placed on the development of heavy industry—the prerequisite to a strong military.69 The Korean Central News Agency explains that “we will rapidly develop the national economy proudly, smashing the enemies’ argument about crisis and collapse of Korean socialism on the strength of the revolutionary line of giving priority to the army as ever.”70 As might be expected, the financial crisis has represented a serious threat to regime stability and survival. Reports of starvation, social unrest, desertions in the military, and people migrating throughout the country in search of food became commonplace. Defections to the ROK and unauthorized border crossings into China also increased markedly. These developments led some analysts to speculate that a collapse of the North Korean regime was imminent. Reports of the DPRK’s demise proved to be exaggerated. ROK anaEconomic Crisis

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213

lysts now believe that the North’s economy has stopped contracting and may have even grown slightly in 1999 and 2000.71 Despite this turnaround, the economic crisis had a profound impact on North Korea’s security: the North Korean people’s unswerving faith in the DPRK leadership may have been shaken, and the ability of the KPA to sustain high levels of military spending (and preparedness) is questionable. North Korea’s internal politics are an enigma to most security analysts. Given the opaque nature of the regime, much of the outside world’s understanding of political processes inside the DPRK is necessarily speculative. However, there is some evidence to suggest that a degree of factionalism exists among the DPRK leadership. As described, the number of DPRK defections to the ROK grew during the 1990s. But more significant than the rise in numbers is the fact that some of the defectors were quite prominent. For example, Sung Hae Rim, the former wife of Kim Jong-Il, fled the country. Moreover, Hwang Jang Yop, one of Kim Jong-Il’s mentors and an architect of the juche philosophy, also defected to the West. To many outside observers, the departure of such important political figures indicates that loyalty of portions of the core political elite could be shaky.72 In addition to the rise in defections, there is speculation that elements in the KPA sought to thwart Kim Jong-Il’s accession to power.73 Like his father, however, it now appears that the younger Kim has managed to outmaneuver his opponents and purge those who opposed his installation as the “dear leader” of the DPRK. More than the succession issue may divide the leadership cohort in Pyongyang. According to some reports, the poor performance of the KPA during its 1999 naval clashes with the ROK has resulted in a major reshuffling of military leaders.74 Hard-liners in the military, those who oppose reform and improved ties with the outside world, appear to be gaining ground against the military officers and bureaucrats who support increased cooperation with the South.75 Jee Man Won, a military commander in the ROK, has observed that “the army is anxious to scuttle peace talks with the South.”76 In sum, there is evidence suggesting that the stability and strength of the DPRK’s chief political institutions is exaggerated. Despite recent improvements in the North Korean economy, there remains a danger that political discontent could lead ultimately to a collapse of the government. Leadership Stability

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The DPRK’s ultimate goal is to achieve the unification of the Korean Peninsula on its own terms. As already described, two strategies are employed to reach this objective: violent revolution in the ROK and/or an invasion from the North. However, the ROK’s democratization and economic development have greatly complicated the DPRK’s strategy. Today any call for an uprising in the ROK would generate little, if any, popular support among the South Korean people. Further complicating matters, the ROK now plays an important role in the survival of the DPRK regime. South Korea’s sunshine policy has encouraged investment and business activity in the Rajin-Sonbong Free Trade Zone and elsewhere. Tourism, albeit tightly controlled, also has been authorized. The Hyundai Corporation has launched an ambitious plan to invest roughly $1 billion in North Korean tourism. These moves help prop up the North’s struggling economy. It also is noteworthy that the ROK is paying the largest portion of the costs associated with the KEDO project and has promised to supply the North with tons of fertilizer and infrastructure improvements. In fact, some suspect that it was the promise of bountiful aid that prompted Kim Jong-Il to agree to a summit meeting with Kim Dae-jung in June 2000. Increased cooperation and interaction with the South must hold some appeal for the North. At the same time, however, it is likely that political and economic modernization in the ROK, coupled with the DPRK’s economic problems, has increased Pyongyang’s sense of insecurity and fears of eventual absorption by Seoul. Hard-liners in the North view the South’s sunshine policy as a Trojan horse that will enable Seoul to infiltrate and subvert the DPRK. In addition to these concerns, the North Koreans are irked by the ROK’s defense modernization program. They are especially outraged at Seoul’s willingness to conduct naval exercises with Korea’s traditional enemy—Japan. To Pyongyang’s leadership, it appears that Seoul is extending an olive branch while preparing for war. Consequently, how best to cope with the South continues to represent a troublesome issue in the North’s security calculations. Relations with the ROK

When the DPRK was established with Soviet support in 1948, the United States did little to prevent this development. But the DPRK’s invasion of the ROK in June 1950 put the two nations on a collision Relations with the United States

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course. For roughly three years, U.S. and DPRK forces were engaged in fierce combat on the Korean Peninsula. The Korean conflict ended with an armistice in 1953, but Washington and Pyongyang remained bitter enemies throughout the Cold War. It was only during the late 1980s and early 1990s that the representatives of the two governments began to meet in Beijing to explore ways to improve the relationship. By 2000, the two sides had agreed to hold a series of high-level meetings and some speculated that Pyongyang was swinging from hard-line confrontation to extreme friendliness toward Washington. The DPRK’s relations with the United States have changed markedly in recent years. The two sides have held negotiations about important issues including the Four-Party Talks, the return of the remains of U.S. forces personnel who ended up as prisoners of war or missing in action during the Korean War, and the DPRK’s testing of long-range missiles. The North also has suggested that it might be willing to accept a U.S. military presence on the Korean Peninsula if its mission was redefined to serve as a “peacekeeping force.” Ironically, Pyongyang now requires Washington’s assistance to ensure that the Stalinist regime will continue to survive. The United States contributes more food aid to the DPRK than any other country. One U.S. lawmaker observed that “we face the ironic situation where North Korea, with which the U.S. technically remains at war, has become the largest U.S. aid recipient in East Asia.”77 One member of Congress warned that “Congress tends to view the Administration’s North Korea policy as a high risk gamble.”78 An improvement in relations with the United States represents numerous opportunities for the DPRK. Some claim that it provides the North with an opportunity to seek the support of a major power after having been totally abandoned by the former Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, China. Others believe that a normalization of relations might help Pyongyang drive a wedge between Seoul and Washington— after all, this is one of the DPRK’s long-standing security objectives. It is most likely that a conjunction of considerations has led Pyongyang to seek a rapprochement with Washington. ROK military publications contend that Pyongyang “has made its best effort to improve relations with the United States in order to solve its three-fold difficulties: system crisis, economic deterioration and international isolation.”79 Despite these developments, however, the United States still represents a threat to the DPRK. As Stephen Linton, an authority on DPRK politics, observed, “North Korea has been an enemy of the United States longer than any

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other nation in its history.”80 The United States appears determined to maintain its security commitment to the ROK and continues to station roughly 37,000 troops on the peninsula. Moreover, Pyongyang and Washington quarrel over numerous issues—particularly arms exports, nuclear weapons, and missiles. Because a large segment of the U.S. body politic is uncomfortable with the direction of U.S.-DPRK relations and has called for a reassessment, there is a distinct possibility that agreements concluded in recent years could unravel quickly. Despite the high-level meetings that took place in late 2000, many analysts warn that tensions could rise on short notice. Pyongyang is especially unnerved by recent U.S. military actions in Europe and elsewhere. Elements within the North Korean leadership claim that the United States is now attempting to piece together an “Asian version of NATO.”81 Some may fear that the military campaign against Yugoslavia has legitimized the use of force against nations that commit crimes against humanity.82 The official North Korean news agency has warned that “if the US imperialists try to apply in the DPRK the logic of strength they did in Yugoslavia, they will be wiped out to the last man.”83 In short, it is clear that Washington’s victories in the Gulf War and the Balkans have rattled North Korea’s leadership. In addition to those relationships described above, the DPRK’s ties with Russia and China have clouded its security outlook. As noted, Russia has terminated its security treaty with North Korea and no longer props the country up with economic aid. Moscow also has recognized the government in Seoul. Perhaps most disturbing to Pyongyang, however, is the fact that Russia has established military ties with the ROK. According to Russia’s calculations, Moscow has sold roughly $240 million in arms to Seoul.84 Deliveries thus far have included tanks, armored personnel vehicles, portable tactical rocket systems, and air defense systems. Russia also has offered to sell its Amur-class diesel-electric submarines to the ROK.85 Furthermore, South Korean military officers are being trained in Russia, and the two countries have agreed to conduct joint naval exercises. These developments have led the DPRK to lash out at Russia and brand it as the “country responsible for dividing the Korean Peninsula in 1945.”86 In the past such criticism was reserved for the United States.87 Pyongyang’s ties with Beijing are not as acrimonious as its relationship with Moscow. The DPRK-PRC security treaty remains intact, and Relations with Russia and China

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the PRC has long argued that some powers (particularly the United States) tend to exaggerate the North Korean military threat. It is still possible that U.S. military action directed against the DPRK could trigger a PRC response. Unlike Russia, China continues to provide North Korea with economic aid. According to some reports, Beijing has even helped Pyongyang in its recent drive to develop long-range missiles.88 ROK military sources acknowledge that the Taepo Dong-2 “is similar to that of the CSS-3 missile of China.”89 According to other accounts, however, Pyongyang’s “ballistic missile program relies heavily on Japanese-made components” while its spy submarines’ engines are “made by an American company.”90 Still other reports claim that the DPRK’s missiles were developed with Russian assistance.91 Although China remains North Korea’s closest ally, the DPRK is still unhappy with it.92 In 1992, Beijing infuriated Pyongyang by establishing diplomatic relations with Seoul. The DPRK also has expressed its displeasure with the PRC’s “capitalist” reforms and resisted Chinese pressures that it also reform. As for Beijing, it opposes the construction of KPA missile bases near its border and Pyongyang’s behavior that is responsible for the renewed enthusiasm for U.S. missile defenses in East Asia.93 Not surprisingly, high-level contacts between the two countries have declined and it is unclear how much influence the PRC now exercises over the DPRK.94 DPRK officials are keenly aware that any additional strains in the country’s ties with its closest friends could have a negative impact on its security. Consequently, Pyongyang is working hard to make some progress in its ties with Moscow and Beijing. For example, Kim Jong-Il traveled to Beijing in 2000 and Russia’s President Vladimir Putin journeyed to Pyongyang in July 2000. However, the future trajectory of these relationships remains uncertain. The discussion above outlines only several of the major issues pertaining to the DPRK’s security. A more complete discussion also might include the increased flow of outside information that is penetrating the North, Pyongyang’s response to the revolution in military affairs, and the DPRK’s relationship with Japan, Taiwan, and other Asian states. Like those considerations examined above, though, the scanty knowledge about matters relating to North Korea’s domestic politics should make any analyst cautious in drawing inferences about relationships between these issues and security policies. In fact, scholars know so Summary

218 Table 6.5 Forecast

The Armies of East Asia Korean Experts’ Forecasts for DPRK, 1997–2002

Percentage Agree

Remain Unchanged Adopt Reforms Under Foreign Control or ROK Control

25% 40% 26%

Source: The poll represents the opinions of forty international DPRK experts. Sonni Efron, “North Korea: The Communist Invalid That Refuses to Expire,” Los Angeles Times, December 7, 1997, p. A12 in Lexis/Nexis.

little about what happens in North Korea that it is unclear whether such matters have any impact at all. Conclusion

The DPRK has been described as “the longest-running intelligence failure in the world.”95 Not surprisingly, predictions about the country’s stability and future differ substantially. Analysts cannot agree whether the Pyongyang regime will survive intact, adopt reforms, or collapse (see Table 6.5). It is clear that no consensus has emerged concerning the DPRK’s future. However, most agree with former President Clinton’s observation that “tensions on the Korean Peninsula remain the principal threat to the peace and security of the East Asia region.”96 It appears that the North Korean leadership shares this view. In 1996, Kim Kwang-jin, DPRK vice minister of defense, said in a public speech that “the question is not if there will be another war on the Korean Peninsula, but when.”97 It also is noteworthy that despite Kim Jong-Il’s remarkable summit meetings with South Korean and U.S. officials in 2000, Pyongyang has not removed any of its missiles or forward-deployed troops from the Korean border. Indeed, William Cohen, then U.S. Secretary of Defense, noted that the North Koreans “are training harder this year [2000] than in years previously so they have increased their state of readiness.”98 Notes

1. Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, 9th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1974), p. 819.

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2. This was possible only because Jacob Malik, the Soviet delegate to the United Nations, had walked out earlier to protest the continued presence of the ROC (Taiwan) on the Security Council. 3. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, p. 821. 4. Author’s confidential discussion with ROK defense analyst, August 1999. 5. U.S. Department of State, Background Notes: North Korea, June 1996, on the World Wide Web at http://www.state.over/www.Background _notes/north_korea_0696_bgn.htm 6. Yi Yong-chong, “DPRK Reportedly Sets Up Special Anti-ROK Commando Unit,” Chungang Ilbo (Seoul), March 30, 1999, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter FBIS), East Asia, April 1, 1999. 7. National Institute for Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review, 1998–99 (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 1999), p. 100. 8. Yi Yong-chong, “DPRK Reportedly Sets Up Special Anti-ROK Commando Unit.” 9. Aidan Foster-Carter, “North Korea in Retrospect,” in Dae Hwan Kim, ed., The Korean Peninsula in Transition (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), p. 117. 10. Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper, 1998, on the World Wide Web at http://www.mnd.go.kr/mndweb/ mnden/mnd/m_2index.htm 11. National Institute for Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review, 1998–99, p. 99. 12. Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper, 1998, on the World Wide Web at http://www.mnd.go.kr/mndweb/ mnden/mnd/m_2index.htm 13. William S. Cohen, U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, November 1997, on the World Wide Web at http://defenselink. mil:80/pubs/prolif97/ne _asia.html#north 14. David Kang, “North Korea: Deterrence Through Danger,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 259. 15. Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper, 1998. 16. National Institute for Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review, 1998–99, p. 93. 17. Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper, 1998. 18. Charles K. Armstrong, “The Politics of Transition in North and South Korea,” in David R. McCann, ed., Korea Briefing: Toward Reunification (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), p. 20. 19. Dae-Sook Suh, “Kim Jong Il and New Leadership in North Korea,” in Dae-Sook Suh and Chae-Jin Lee, North Korea After Kim Il Sung (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 23. 20. For information on Kim Jong-Il’s rise to power, see Evolution of Kim Jong-Il’s Control, National Intelligence Service, Republic of Korea, on the World Wide Web at http://www.nis.go.kr:7000/democratic/index.html 21. National Institute for Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review, 1998–99, p. 94.

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22. The number rose from 62 out of 687 to 111 out of 687 according to the Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper, 1998. 23. National Institute for Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review, 1998–99, p. 98. 24. Ibid., p. 99. 25. “Despite Economic Difficulty, North Korea Keeps Beefing Up Its Military,” Associated Press, October 12, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. These figures are close to U.S. Central Intelligance Agency estimates, according to which Pyongyang spent between $5 billion and $7 billion, roughly 30 percent of its GDP, on military expenditures in 1997. See “North Korea” in CIA World Factbook on the World Wide Web at http://www.odci.gov/index.html 26. Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper, 1998. 27. Ibid. 28. “The KPA: Troops and Equipment” in Republic of Korea, National Intelligence Service on the World Wide Web at http://www.nis.go.kr:7000/ democratic/index.html 29. Yi Yong-chong, “DPRK Reportedly Curtails Its Armed Forces,” Chungang Ilbo (Seoul, Internet version), July 18, 1999, in FBIS, East Asia, July 18, 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov. According to other reports, however, the KPA has added roughly 10,000 troops to its ranks. See “More on 1999–2000 Defense White Paper,” Korea Times (Internet version), October 12, 1999, in FBIS, East Asia, October 12, 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 30. Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper, 1998. 31. Ibid. 32. “The KPA: Troops and Equipment” in Republic of Korea, National Intelligence Service. 33. Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper, 1998. 34. “Despite Economic Difficulty, N.Korea Keeps Beefing Up Its Military,” Associated Press, October 12, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. 35. “The KPA: Troops and Equipment” in Republic of Korea, National Intelligence Service. 36. “North Korean Motives for Modernizing Weapons Analyzed,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 26, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. 37. Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper, 1998. 38. “The KPA: Troops and Equipment” in Republic of Korea, National Intelligence Service. 39. Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper, 1998. 40. Doug Bandow, “Nuclear Issues Between the United States and North Korea,” in Dae-Sook Suh and Chae-Jin Lee, North Korea After Kim Il Sung, p. 124. 41. Ibid. 42. “CNN: US Planned Pre-Emptive Strike on Korea in 1994,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, October 4, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis.

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43. Kang, “North Korea,” p. 260. 44. William J. Taylor Jr. and Abraham Kim, “Korean Security in an Insecure Post–Cold War Era,” in Jae H. Ku and Tae Hwan Ok, Change and Challenge on the Korean Peninsula: Developments, Trends, and Issues (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1996), p. 32. 45. Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper, 1998. 46. Cohen, Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response. 47. Ibid. Also see Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper, 1998. 48. “Pyongyang Radio Denounces US for Aggravating Tensions on Korean Peninsula,” Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), December 14, 1999, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 17, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. 49. George Wehrfritz and B. J. Lee, “Pyongyang’s Arsenal Is Scarier than You Think,” Newsweek (Atlantic edition), October 25, 1999, p. 68 in Lexis/Nexis. 50. National Defense, Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper, 1998. 51. Defense Intelligence Agency, “Strategic Issues,” North Korea: The Foundations for Military Strength—Update 1995 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1995), on the World Wide Web at http://www.fas.org/irp/dia/product/knfms95/1510-101_chp3.html#HDR13 52. “US Handbook Says North Korea Would Use Chemical Weapons,” Kyodo News Service (Tokyo), November 11, 1999, in BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific-Political, November 11, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. 53. Cohen, Proliferation: Threat and Response. 54. “N. Korea Reportedly Flush with Missiles,” Times-Picayune, March 27, 1999, p. A5 in Lexis/Nexis. 55. Wehrfritz and Lee, “Pyongyang’s Arsenal Is Scarier than You Think.” 56. “Lawmaker: DPRK Fully Prepared for Biological War,” Korea Times, September 29, 1999, in FBIS, East Asia, October 30, 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 57. National Institute for Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review, 1998–99, pp. 65–66. 58. Shino Yuasa, “N.Korea Says Japan Is Within Striking Distance,” Agence France Presse, January 22, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. 59. Statement for the record to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee September 16, 1999, on Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015 by Robert D. Walpole, national intelligence officer for strategic and nuclear programs, Central Intelligence Agency, on the World Wide Web at http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/ walpole.htm 60. Sonni Efron, “S. Korea Tries Brandishing Stick at Intransigent North,” Los Angeles Times, July 13, 1999, p. A1 in Lexis/Nexis. 61. “Pyongyang Radio Denounces South’s Missile Development,” Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), December 9, 1999, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 11, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. 62. Philip Shenon, “North Korea Said to Agree to End Missile Tests,” New York Times, September 13, 1999, p. A7 in Lexis/Nexis.

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63. Terence Hunt, “After Half a Century, Clinton Eases North Korea Sanctions,” Associated Press, September 17, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. 64. “North Korea Sells About 800 Mil. Dlrs in Weapons in 8 Years,” Kyodo News Service, September 28, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. 65. “Despite Economic Difficulty, N.Korea Keeps Beefing Up Its Military,” Associated Press, October 12, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. 66. David A. Fulghum, “North Korea Forces Suffer Mobility Loss,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, November 24, 1997, p. 62 in Lexis/Nexis. 67. Review of United States Policy Toward North Korea: Findings and Recommendations. Unclassified report by William J. Perry, U.S. North Korea Policy coordinator and special adviser to the president and the secretary of state, Washington, D.C., October 12, 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/991012_northkorea_rpt.html 68. Yoichi Funabashi, “Japan Needs Both ‘Soft’ and Hard Deterrence,” Asahi News Service, March 29, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. 69. East Asian Strategic Review, 1998–99, p. 98. 70. “North Korea Putting Military First,” Agence France Presse, June 16, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. 71. “Despite Economic Difficulty, N.Korea Keeps Beefing Up Its Military,” Associated Press, October 12, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. 72. Charles K. Armstrong, “The Politics of Transition in North and South Korea,” Korea Briefing: Toward Reunification,” p. 20. 73. Ibid. 74. Yi Yong-chong, “Article Views Possible Changes in DPRK Military,” Chungang Ilbo, June 17, 1999, in FBIS, East Asia, June 24, 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 75. Ibid. 76. Shim Jae Hoon and Shawn W. Crispin, “Peninsular Paradox,” Far Eastern Economic Review, June 24, 1999. 77. Representative Doug Bereuter, chairman, House International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, “Congressional Priorities in East Asia,” in US Foreign Policy Agenda, USIA Electronic Journal 3, 1 (January 1998). 78. Ibid. 79. Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper, 1997–1998, p. 43. 80. Stephen W. Linton, “Life after Death in North Korea,” Korea Briefing: Toward Reunification, p. 86. 81. “DPRK Lambasts US-Japanese-S.Korean Military Alliance,” Xinhua News Agency, January 19, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. 82. Efron, “S.Korea Tries Brandishing Stick at Intransigent North.” 83. “North Korea Stresses Military Strength Doctrine,” North Korean News Agency in BBC Monitoring Service Asia Pacific-Political, August 19, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. 84. “Moscow Ready for Close Military Cooperation with Seoul,” Interfax Russian News, September 3, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. 85. “S.Korea, Russia: Closer Military Ties,” United Press International, September 2, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis.

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86. “N. Korea Slams Old Ally Russia for Talking Defense with S. Korea,” Agence France Presse, August 27, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. 87. To be sure, the DPRK still describes the U.S. “occupation” of the South as “their greatest crime in the world in the 20th century” and blames the United States for the nation’s division. See “North Korean Daily Says ‘Yankee’ Occupation Worst Crime of the Century,” Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), September 11, 1999, in BBC Monitoring Service Asia PacificPolitical, September 11, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. 88. Bill Gertz, “China Breaks Vow, Sends N. Korea Missile Materials,” Washington Times, January 6, 2000, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://taiwansecurity.org/News/WT-010600-Nkorea-Missile.htm 89. “Sources Say DPRK Missile Similar to Chinese Missile,” Yonhap (Seoul), July 20, 1999, in FBIS, East Asia, July 20, 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 90. “DPRK Missile ‘Relies Heavily’ on Japanese Components,” Chungang Ilbo (Seoul, Internet version), July 9, 1999, in FBIS, East Asia, July 9, 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov 91. Jim Mann, “N. Korean Missiles Not N.Korean?” China Post (international airmail edition), September 8, 2000, p. 2. 92. For a discussion of DPRK-PRC ties, see Global Beat: DPRK Report No. 19, Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network Special Report, Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies, July–August 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/ asia/CNS0899.html 93. According to ROK reports, the DPRK is building an underground missile base “only 20 kilometers from the Chinese border.” See “North Korea Building Rocket Launch Site on Chinese Border,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, July 7, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. 94. Shawn W. Crispin, Shim Jae Hoon, Susan V. Lawrence, and Andrew Sherry, “Divided We Stand,” Far Eastern Economic Review, March 18, 1999. 95. Sonni Efron, “North Korea: The Communist Invalid that Refuses to Expire,” Los Angeles Times, December 7, 1997, p. A12 in Lexis/Nexis. 96. President Bill Clinton, “A National Security Strategy for a New Century,” May 1997. 97. “Prepared Statement of General John H. Tilelli,” commander in chief, UNC/CFCC, USFK, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 18, 1997, Federal News Service, March 18, 1997, in Lexis/Nexis. 98. Tim Witcher, “N. Korea Urged to Make Concession,” China Post (international airmail edition), September 23, 2000, p. 2.

7 Conclusion he preceding chapters gave an overview of the armed forces of five East Asian states—Japan, China, Taiwan, South Korea, and North Korea. They examined the composition and structure of each country’s military and discussed some of the major security issues relating to their defense. From the foregoing analysis, it is clear that these nations’ militaries share some common characteristics.

T

Common Trends and Characteristics

All of the militaries discussed in this study play a positive—and often overlooked—role in their respective societies. They help harvest crops, build roads, and combat natural disasters. Perhaps China’s PLA has been most active in this area. It played a major role in the country’s reconstruction following the Chinese Civil War and continues to contribute in meaningful ways to its modernization. But each of the other East Asian militaries also does more than simply safeguard the territorial integrity of a state. In most of the states examined, there has been substantial movement toward the establishment of a more professional, nonpoliticized military. In some instances the armed forces have been removed almost entirely from politics. This is certainly the case in Japan and, to a lesser extent, in Taiwan and South Korea. Civilian rule is now well established in each of these countries. In China and North Korea, however, the armed forces continue to exercise varying degrees of influence in policymaking at the highest levels of government. Some militaries discussed appear to share common problems. Recruitment and retention of qualified personnel represent a serious challenge to all East Asian militaries (and many elsewhere in the world). Low morale is an especially serious issue confronting China, 225

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Taiwan, and both of the Koreas, while corruption seems to be particularly troubling to China, Taiwan, and South Korea. There also is some evidence to suggest that corruption has become an acute problem in financially strapped North Korea. With the exception of North Korea, all the armies of East Asia have taken concrete steps to increase military exchanges with other nations. Without question, Japan has been most active in this area. The Japan Defense Agency now considers such contacts an integral part of the nation’s defense posture. Other confidence-building measures—including greater transparency of military establishments—are also becoming more common. Even China now publishes a defense white paper. Perhaps most troubling to observers is the fact that East Asia as a whole appears to be engaged in an arms buildup of unprecedented proportions. Each government is seeking to take advantage of the revolution in military affairs to modernize its military. The emphasis now is being placed on qualitative improvements—particularly the use of technology and information systems—rather than a traditional increase in force levels. It also is clear that the spread of missiles and weapons of mass destruction is accelerating. These developments hold important implications for peace and stability in the Western Pacific. The East Asian Arms Race

In major ways, the future of East Asia still appears to be a bright one. Current events suggest that the Asian financial crisis may now be contained: many states are enjoying improved growth forecasts, reduced unemployment, and increasingly positive trade balances. And, international investors are cautiously bringing their money back to the region. For these reasons U.S. officials describe the Asian recovery as “remarkable.”1 Another positive trend is the spread of democracy. In 1997 a former political prisoner was elected president of the ROK. This election marked the first time that an opposition party candidate had been elected to the presidency since the country was established in 1948. In March 2000 Taiwan’s voters also elected a new president—the first opposition candidate to win the office of the presidency in the history of the ROC. Even the PRC, a government described officially by the U.S. government as “an authoritarian state,” appears to be experimenting with democratic reforms in the countryside.2 Still another momentous development was the June 2000 summit

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meeting between South Korea’s Kim Dae-jung and North Korea’s Kim Jong-Il. The historic meeting rekindled hope that two Koreas might be able to achieve a peaceful, step-by-step reunification. The fact that this summit has been followed by a series of high-level negotiations between Pyongyang and Washington has further fueled the hopes for a permanent peace on the peninsula. To be sure, these and other developments appear encouraging. But the region’s principal flashpoints have not disappeared. As thenPresident Clinton observed in December 1999, “tensions on the Korean peninsula remain the leading threat to peace and stability in East Asia.”3 Despite the remarkable summit meeting between Korean leaders in June 2000, the prospect of an armed confrontation in Korea, a conflict with unimaginable human and economic costs, still is a distinct possibility. Tensions also have mounted in the Taiwan Strait—particularly since President Lee outlined his two-states theory and an independence activist was elected president. Finally, there remains the threat of war over natural resources in the South China Sea. Should China’s predictions of the area’s petroleum reserves ever prove accurate, the likelihood of conflict may increase markedly. As noted in Chapter 1, the principal challenges to stability in East Asia are not new. Indeed, many could be described as long-standing disputes. What is changing, however, are the capabilities of East Asian governments to do something about them. Sophisticated military equipment is being acquired to bolster projection capabilities, and strategic weapons systems are being introduced and/or upgraded to deter or defeat potential enemies. Highlights of the buildup are summarized below. Military spending is on the decline in much of the world. Despite widespread force reductions, however, it is accelerating in East Asia (see Figures 7.1 and 7.2). With respect to ground forces, troop levels are being cut and units are being restructured. Perhaps the most dramatic example is provided by China’s announced intention to slash 500,000 personnel from the PLA. Even North Korea—arguably the most militaristic society in the world—claims to have reduced force levels. At the same time, however, most states—including China and North Korea—are seeking to increase mobility and firepower. Combat helicopters already are operational in each of the militaries examined in this book. Modern battle tanks, Trends in Equipment Acquisitions

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Figure 7.1 World Military Spending, 1987–1997

2500

Billions of 1997 $

2000 1500 1000 500 0 1987

89

91

93

95

97

95

97

Source: U.S. Department of State, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1998, Washington, D.C., 2000.

Figure 7.2 East Asian Military Spending, 1987–1997

200

Billions of 1997 $

150 100 50 0 1987

89

91

93

Source: U.S. Department of State, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1998, Washington, D.C., 2000.

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armored vehicles, and transport aircraft also are being acquired. This equipment bolsters the combat effectiveness of rapid-deployment forces and other elite units that are becoming the hallmark of the modern Asian military. In the Asian context, navies have traditionally been relegated to coastal patrol duties. But that is changing: naval power now is being viewed as an instrument of power projection. All the countries examined in this study now operate submarines. In recent years China has acquired four Russian-built boats, while South Korea has acquired seven license-built German submarines. China also is pushing to develop a new class of nuclear submarine. And Taiwan has been seeking to acquire new submarines for over a decade. In addition to submarines, a new class of modern surface combatants has steamed into Asian harbors. China’s Sovremenny-class destroyers seem to have captured the most attention. But Japan’s Aegisclass destroyers, Taiwan’s Knox-class frigates, and South Korea’s planned KDX-2 destroyers also represent a significant boost in naval capabilities. These modern vessels—and other warships being acquired, manufactured, or refurbished—are often fitted with advanced missile systems, radar, sonar, and shipborne helicopters. Some analysts contend that it is only a matter of time before China and/or South Korea acquires an aircraft carrier. Turning to air power, advanced fighter aircraft have been acquired by all the countries examined in this study. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have procured modern U.S. warplanes, while China and North Korea have turned to the former Soviet Union for new fighters.4 Most of these countries also have introduced (or hope to introduce) modern, domestically manufactured warplanes into their inventories. Like the foreign acquisitions, many of the new indigenous fighters are armed with advanced beyond-visual-range missiles and other state-of-the-art weaponry. Air power should receive another significant boost with the introduction of mid-air refueling tankers. At the present moment, both Beijing and Tokyo intend to acquire such aircraft. Airborne reconnaissance and signals intelligence capabilities also are being boosted. Japan and Taiwan already operate airborne warning and control aircraft, while China and South Korea hope to acquire them soon. Military satellites appear to be the next step. China has successfully launched satellites into orbit and Japan, Taiwan, and both of the Koreas harbor such ambitions.

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Until recently, the PLA was the only East Asian military possessing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). But this is changing. In August 1998 Pyongyang test-launched a Taepo Dong-1 missile. The test showed that North Korea could strike Japan or any of the U.S. forces stationed on Japanese territory. Roughly one year later, it appeared that the launch of an even longer range North Korean missile was imminent. Although the testing of the Taepo Dong-2 missile, an ICBM capable of delivering a several-hundred-kilogram payload to the continental United States, was canceled, the CIA has warned that work on the missile is continuing.5 U.S. officials also emphasize that the June 2000 inter-Korea summit meeting appeared to have no impact on North Korea’s missile program.6 Another tier of missile activity is represented by the development of ballistic missiles with a more limited range. China has deployed roughly 300 intermediate-range ballistic missiles directly opposite Taiwan. This move has prompted Taipei to reconsider the production of medium-range missiles to target China’s coastal cities—including Shanghai and Hong Kong. On the Korean peninsula, Pyongyang has manufactured hundreds of Scud B and Scud C missiles (variants of the former Soviet Union’s Scud missile) and successfully test-fired the Nodong-1 medium-range ballistic missile with an estimated range of 1,000 kilometers. This has led the ROK to test-launch missiles with a longer range than that agreed upon by Washington and Seoul. Perhaps equally as worrisome, Tokyo now claims to have the right to launch a preemptive air strike against a potential enemy’s missile bases. The region’s missile proliferation is leading some countries to develop a keen interest in the development of defense systems against ballistic missile attacks. The DPRK’s Taepo Dong launch served to energize the joint U.S.-Japan TMD research program—and Taiwan also has expressed an interest in such a system. These developments have outraged China. Peter W. Rodman, an analyst at the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom in Washington, D.C., explained that “the Chinese hate TMD because it blunts their new weapons.”7 In retaliation, Beijing is threatening to deploy more missiles or export ballistic missiles to “rogue nations” or other potential enemies of the United States. U.S. intelligence officials even warn that the PRC might resort to “military action” if the United States implements “a robust theater missile defense system that nullified Chinese deterrence or included Taiwan (directly or indirectly).”8 Trends in Strategic Weapons and Delivery Systems

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In addition to modern delivery systems, both China and North Korea have aggressively increased their stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction. Some security analysts believe that the DPRK now possesses several nuclear warheads, while others suspect that it is manufacturing more of them. Moreover, according to recently revised ROK estimates, Pyongyang has stockpiled 5,000 tons of chemical and biological warfare agents. For its part, China has miniaturized its nuclear warheads (and increased their payloads), developed ballistic missiles with multiple warheads, and acquired the neutron bomb. Although Tokyo, Taipei, and Seoul have not developed nuclear weapons, they possess the ability to manufacture them. Is East Asia now engaged actively in an arms race? If so, is there reason to believe that such a contest could contribute to the outbreak of war in the region? Or are such fears exaggerated? Some claim that East Asia is not yet engaged in an arms race. Wu Xinpo, a professor at Shanghai’s prestigious Fudan University, contends that “at the moment, a region-wide arms race has not been triggered except for some tacit competition on the Korean peninsula and chain reactions to the US-Japanese Theater Missile Defense system.”9 Others protest that they are seeking only to defend themselves against potential enemies. For example, Taiwanese officials claim that whether or not an arms race develops entirely “depends on Beijing.”10 However, Lin Yufang, a professor in Tamkang University’s Graduate Institute of International Affairs in Taipei, disagrees. He argues that “as a matter of fact, an arms race is going on.”11 It is clear that the five East Asian countries examined in this book are seeking aggressively to upgrade their existing military capabilities. In fact, the region is now experiencing an arms buildup of unprecedented scale. There is a new emphasis on naval and air power and a corresponding campaign to upgrade command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence systems. In some countries—particularly China and Taiwan—there appears to be a mad rush to develop an ability to conduct information or computer warfare. A Taiwanese security analyst has observed that “the revolution in information technology and computer science has added one more powerful catalyst for the continuing upgrading of military hardware and software.”12 Defense analysts often point out that a state’s military capability does not necessarily constitute a threat to other states. Canada and Analysis

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Mexico, for example, do not feel threatened by the military strength of the United States. A state’s intentions are as important as its capabilities. But the steady accretion of military power in East Asia, in and of itself, represents a very real challenge to regional—perhaps even global—peace and stability. Scholars of international relations have long recognized that states exist in a quasi-anarchic or “self-help” environment. Due to this anarchy, they are believed to confront a security dilemma. As Glen Snyder explains it: Even when no state has any desire to attack others, none can be sure that others’ intentions are peaceful, or will remain so; hence each must accumulate power for defense. Since no state can know that the power accumulation of others is defensively motivated only, each must assume that it might be intended for attack. Consequently, each party’s power increments are matched by the others, and all wind up with no more security than when the vicious cycle began, along with the costs in having acquired and having to maintain their power.13

In short, a state must rely on itself to protect its sovereignty and security. In preparing to protect itself, however, a state will become a cause of insecurity for other states. Their response will be to engage in similar activities—to increase their own armaments. As a consequence, arms races take place—competitions that may ultimately lead to the outbreak of a major war. One does not have to look far to find examples of conflicts that have been generated by the security dilemma. Thucydides, in his History of the Peloponnesian War, explained how the rise of Athens’ power contributed to the outbreak of war with the Spartans: In these years the Athenians made their empire more and more strong, and greatly added to their power at home. . . . So finally the point was reached when Athenian strength attained a peak plain for all to see and the Athenians began to encroach upon Sparta’s allies. It was at this point that Sparta felt the position to be no longer tolerable and decided by starting this present war to employ all her energies in attacking and, if possible, destroying the power of Athens.14

In recent years, scholars have suggested that the security dilemma contributed to the tensions, arms races, and power conflicts that led ultimately to the outbreak of hostilities in the modern era—particularly World War I.15 There is ample reason to believe that it also could lead to a major war in East Asia.

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Steps Toward Managing Conflict in East Asia

Recent military developments in East Asia are most interesting. To academics who focus on international relations theory, the region’s festering disputes represent a wide variety of fascinating puzzles about sovereignty, nationalism, and statehood. They also have proved to be fertile ground for game theory and mathematical modeling. However, to foreign policy analysts and practitioners—those individuals who actually craft policy—the disputes represent countless headaches and difficulties. As the world enters the new millennium, many believe that it is time to chart a new direction for U.S. defense policy. In East Asia, a plethora of long-range concerns—including nuclear proliferation, regional economic instability, and a host of lingering territorial disputes—must be addressed. Some contend that Washington may also need to make some hard decisions about its relationships with some of the countries discussed in this book. There is a range of options available to decisionmakers who wish to change, alter, or otherwise revise present U.S. security policy in East Asia. These options form a spectrum of sorts. At one extreme, there are neo-isolationists calling for a complete U.S. military withdrawal from Asia. They reason that the United States’ friends and allies in the Western Pacific have long enjoyed a “cheap ride in the security realm” and that the United States should withdraw its ground forces from the region and abrogate its treaty commitments. The US currently has about 100,000 military personnel stationed in Asia, all of whom should be brought home and demobilized. The US should end its commitments to Japan and South Korea, cease military cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), withdraw from the Australia, New Zealand, United States Pact (ANZUS), and terminate the implicit guarantee to Taiwan, giving those nations new incentives to take care of themselves.16

According to this view, the East Asian countries should find the resources—and perhaps even develop nuclear weapons—to defend themselves. At the opposite end of the gamut are the internationalists who hope to bolster the United States’ security ties with certain states, particularly Taiwan. For example, Representative Tom DeLay (Republican-Texas) supports strengthening the U.S. security commitment to Taiwan and argues that China will never attack the island if Washington, “in no

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uncertain terms,” informs Beijing “that we would not tolerate it and we would stand by the democratic free market country.”17 He also contends that the time has arrived for Washington to “jettison” its one-China policy and accept that “there are, in fact, two Chinese States.”18 Some members of this camp even hope to establish a new overarching regional security structure to contain the PRC. To be sure, these proposals represent only two extremes in a growing assortment of plans calling for change in U.S. security policy. A more complete analysis would also include many other recommendations as well. In fact, it now appears as if there is a whole cottage industry on the outside of government that is looking at other ways to consider the security situation in East Asia. Unfortunately, the problem with most of these proposals is that they hold many unintended consequences, and, if adopted, many would actually jeopardize peace and stability in the Western Pacific. The neo-isolationist approach to security in East Asia might save some resources in the short run. Eventually, however, it would represent a threat to U.S. economic, political, and security interests: Over time a minimalist foreign policy could end up being most costly. Neglect will prove to be malign. Conflict on the Korean Peninsula, for example, would disrupt trade and economic life throughout the region. There would be no way the United States could wall itself off from its effects. . . . Indeed, a posture of minimalism, whatever its near-term savings, could increase the likelihood that critical problems or threats to vital US interests will emerge.19

In a similar vein, those who want to provide Taipei with a firm security guarantee or construct an anti-China alliance fail to appreciate that it is in Washington’s best interest to maintain a stable, constructive relationship with both Taipei and Beijing. It makes no sense for the United States to remain permanently at odds with the world’s most populated country—a nation that also happens to enjoy the fastest growing economy on earth. Moreover, Beijing’s cooperation will be essential if the international community hopes to address a wide range of pressing global problems, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, environmental degradation, health issues, the standoff on the Korean Peninsula, and dwindling energy supplies, to name just a few. The proposition that China is an expansionist power bent on regional or global domination is patently absurd.20 It is far beyond the scope of this modest study to outline all the var-

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ious steps that the United States might take to help preserve peace and stability in the Western Pacific. However, a brief discussion of some recommendations might be warranted. With respect to the security equation in East Asia, the following points seem paramount:

• As a first step, decisionmakers in Washington (and elsewhere) must acknowledge that East Asia is indeed engaged in an arms race that may lead ultimately to potential miscalculation and war. Then, as the world’s only superpower and the preeminent military power in East Asia, the United States ought to convene a series of high-profile arms reduction conferences in an effort to prevent what appears to be an unintended drift toward war. • Citing the situation on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait as examples, Domingo Siazon, foreign minister of the Philippines, described East Asia’s lack of a formal mechanism to deal with war and other security problems as “worrying.” 21 Officials in Washington, Tokyo, Seoul, Taipei, and elsewhere have voiced similar concerns. But most concede that the current situation is unlikely to change. Building upon the arms reduction conferences discussed above, the United States should energetically seek to establish a genuine multilateral security forum for East Asia. It is not enough for Washington to claim that it now supports such an institution, it must actively seek to construct one. • The United States must continue to maintain a robust military presence in the Western Pacific. This provides Washington with an ability to manage problems and encourage the peaceful resolution of disputes. Prior to making major adjustments in defense policies or deployments, however, decisionmakers should study very carefully how these changes might affect the security equation in the region. Before deploying a TMD in East Asia, careful consideration must be given to the likely consequences that such a move might provoke. Washington must seek to become part of the solution to the arms race in East Asia, not part of the problem. Consideration should be given to employing a TMD as a bargaining chip in regional arms reduction conferences. It is noteworthy that Chinese officials have indicated that U.S. missile defenses could be deployed in a way that would not antagonize Beijing.22 • U.S. officials must recognize that despite the end of the Cold War, no relationship is more important to the stability of the Western Pacific than the U.S.-Japan alliance. Washington must pay close attention to Tokyo’s security concerns and increase regular consultations

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with Japanese defense planners. The United States should seek to build on the successes of the revised defense guidelines and continue to increase bilateral security cooperation. • As long as the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty remains functional, it is unlikely that Japan will make any radical changes in its defense-only security policy. During confidential discussions with the author, authorities in Tokyo’s Defense Agency suggested that the country would rearm immediately if the treaty was abrogated. A major Japanese military buildup would provoke a negative response from China and both Koreas. Despite the protests by China and other nations, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty must remain intact. • Washington should seek to convince Tokyo that scrapping article 9 of the Japanese constitution is both unnecessary and provocative. It is obvious that Japan has not complied with the provision for several decades. Japan may play a more active role in regional security without revising its constitution. This symbolic gesture would only infuriate Japan’s neighbors—particularly China and North Korea. • Despite recent developments, North Korea remains the major threat to peace and security in East Asia and the country most likely to involve the United States in a major war. As such, the United States and the ROK must maintain their forces in a high state of readiness to deter Pyongyang (or prevail should deterrence fail). At the same time, Washington should continue to emphasize that it supports dialogue and contacts between the two Koreas as a means to decrease tensions on the peninsula. High-level meetings and negotiations between the United States and the DPRK also are a positive trend and should be continued. Should North Korea cease to be a threat to peace in East Asia, the United States must be prepared to reevaluate its continued military role on the Korean peninsula. • North Korea continues to act in ways that make it very difficult for many to support a policy of engagement. But there appears to be no better alternative to the present policy toward Pyongyang. No one seems to have any real solution for how to deal with North Korea. Given the substantial risks involved, the United States should proceed cautiously in its relationship with the DPRK. It should follow the advice of the so-called Perry report and adopt a two-track policy toward the DPRK—a cooperative track that involves rewards for constructive behavior (e.g., forgoing missile tests, freezing its nuclear program) and a punitive track that seeks to enhance deterrence should these rewards fail to yield concrete results. • In 1998, the U.S. Department of Defense’s East Asian Strategy

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Report emphasized that “the United States understands that lasting security in the Asia-Pacific region is not possible without a constructive role played by China.” This fact has not changed. Beijing’s cooperation is essential if Washington wants to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, the Korean Peninsula, the South China Sea, and Southeast Asia. Moreover, with China’s seat on the Security Council, the United States needs the PRC’s support in the United Nations. China also has played a constructive role in efforts to stabilize financial markets in East Asia, and its support will be essential if the international community hopes to address a wide range of pressing global problems. In short, despite the protests of those who prefer to see Beijing as “the great Satan,” Washington must continue to seek to forge a constructive partnership with the PRC. • The United States must be firm when negotiating with China and should continue to press for basic human rights and political reforms in appropriate forums. However, a confrontational approach should be avoided. As one analyst observed, “preachiness and high-handedness are no substitutes for firm coherent policy implementation with clear priorities.” 23 Moreover, the United States should seek to apply its human rights standards universally—it is hypocritical to apply one standard to Saudi Arabia and another to China. Finally, U.S. officials should not harbor naïve illusions about China—the PRC will continue to pursue its own national interests in domestic and international politics. • U.S. decisionmakers must recognize that no other issue holds more potential to damage Sino-U.S. relations than Taiwan’s independence. In fact, it would threaten peace and stability in the entire AsiaPacific region. It is for these reasons that the United States should continue to pursue a one-China policy and not encourage, promote, or otherwise support Taiwan’s de jure independence from China. • Although the United States should continue to stress that it will not support or promote Taiwan’s independence, the United States should resist PRC pressures that it go further on this matter. The present policy toward the island’s future enables the United States to adapt easily to practically any eventuality that may emerge with regard to Taiwan’s status: options remain open. If Taiwan declares independence (an occurrence the United States does not presently support, advance, champion, or pursue), decisionmakers may nevertheless make a reassessment of conditions in China and/or Taiwan that led to this development and then determine the U.S. position toward the survival of such a republic. • In keeping with long-standing policy, the United States should

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resist calls that it “mediate” a settlement of the Taiwan question. However, Washington should continue to encourage Taipei and Beijing to be flexible and pursue the bilateral negotiations that were suspended in October 1998. The United States might also consider adding some flexibility to its own long-standing hands-off policy toward negotiations and study the feasibility of hosting a summit between leaders of the two rival states. These talks could reduce cross-strait tensions and promote peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States also should continue to emphasize that it would welcome cross-strait confidence-building measures and other agreements designed to reduce tensions. • Using quiet diplomacy, the United States (and other states) should continue to encourage Beijing to look at the unification issue in a more creative light. Almost no one on Taiwan supports the “onecountry, two-systems” unification plan. There are reports that think tanks in the PRC have proposed alternative schemes ranging from “onecountry, three-systems” to “one-country, multisystems.” Such creative thinking should be applauded. It is particularly needed now that an opposition candidate has been elected president of Taiwan. • The United States should maintain the present policy toward Taiwan’s security. The TRA provides the United States with an option to defend Taiwan and increase or decrease military support for the island: options remain open. This enables Washington to establish a linkage between U.S. policy and the policies and actions of other states and contains an element of uncertainty that may lead elements on both sides of the Taiwan Straits to act with restraint. Although wellintentioned, efforts by Congress to micromanage security relations with Taiwan could undermine the island’s security by emboldening independence activists while enraging hard-liners in the PRC. • With respect to the dispute in the South China Sea, the United States should continue to oppose the use or threat of force to resolve competing claims to the various islands, reefs, and atolls in the area and urge all claimants to exercise restraint and avoid destabilizing actions. The United States also should continue to push for a multilateral solution to this dispute and discourage moves by China, Vietnam, and other states to establish more military facilities in the region. • Washington should continue to remind all parties involved that it has an abiding interest in the maintenance of peace and stability in the South China Sea and that maintaining freedom of navigation is a fundamental interest of the United States. It also should continue to urge

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those involved to abide by international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. • The United States should continue to take no position on the legal merits of the competing claims to sovereignty over the South China Sea or otherwise appear to take sides in this quarrel. Summary

Only a few years ago, it seemed to many that East Asia was progressing steadily toward greater political stability, prosperity, and economic integration. Some analysts even spoke confidently of the dawn of an “Asian century.” The past several years, however, have witnessed multiple negative events, including the Asian economic crisis, increased assertiveness by China and North Korea, and the mounting fear of nuclear proliferation. Especially worrisome is the region’s accelerating arms race and the possible conflict that this rush toward military modernization might unleash. It is clear that challenges and threats abound in East Asia. A comprehensive review of these trends and their uncertainties suggests that the region is becoming more insecure as it enters the new millennium. But it still would be a gross exaggeration to claim that the smell of war is in the air. Promoting peace and stability in East Asia will undoubtedly continue to represent a significant challenge to the United States. It is a task that will be both complicated and demanding. But if the United States and its friends and allies in the region cooperate and act effectively, the future could unfold in a way that will benefit the entire world. Notes

1. “Challenges Asia Faces in 2000: Stanley Roth,” China Times (interactive edition), January 9, 2000, on the World Wide Web at http://www. chinatimes.com.tw/english/epolitic/89010806.htm 2. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State, 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights: China, on the World Wide Web at http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1999_hrp_report/ china.html 3. President Bill Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Century, December 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://www2.whitehouse. gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/nschome.html

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4. Even North Korea, an isolated and bankrupt nation, has somehow managed to purchase MiG-21 warplanes from Kazakhstan. For more information, see statement of Representative Benjamin Gilman (Republican-New York), in “Hearing of the House International Relations Committee, Subject: North Korea,” March 16, 2000, in Federal News Service, March 16, 2000, in Lexis/Nexis. 5. Ibid. 6. As Walter B. Slocombe, under secretary of defense for policy, said, “Not from the summit and not from any of the other things have we seen any signs that they are changing their program to develop missiles.” See Steve Lee Myers and Eric Schmitt, “Korean Accord Fails to Stall Missile Plan,” New York Times, June 18, 2000, p. 1 in Lexis/Nexis. 7. Bob Drogin, “Defense Project Strains US-China Ties,” Los Angeles Times, March 22, 1999, p. A1 in Lexis/Nexis. 8. See Statement of J. Stapleton Roy, Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research, DOD, Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 2, 2000, on the World Wide Web at http://www.state.gov/www/ policyremarks/ 2000/000202_roy_security.html 9. “China–East Asia Seeks Stability,” China Daily, December 29, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. 10. Christopher Bodeen, “Taiwan’s Lee Says China Risks Sparking Arms Race,” Associated Press, June 24, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. 11. “Taiwan Missile Plan Raises Arms Race Fear,” South China Morning Post, December 13, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. 12. You Ji, “Cold War Clouds Remains Over the Asia Pacific Region, Taipei Times, December 17, 1999, in Taiwan Security Research on the World Wide Web at http://Taiwansecurity.org/TI/TI-991217-Cold-War-Clouds.htm 13. Glen H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics 36 (July 1984), p. 461. 14. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, translated by Rex Warner (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1954), p. 77. 15. For more information, see Michael Howard, The Causes of War (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983). 16. Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, “Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation,” International Security 21, 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 5–48. 17. “US Congressman Urges ‘Tough’ China Policy to Support Taiwan,” AFX News Limited, March 19, 2000, in Lexis/Nexis. 18. Richard N. Haass, “Digging for a China Policy,” IntellectualCapital. Com, March 23, 2000, on the World Wide Web at http://www.brook. edu/views/op%2Ded/haass/20000323.htm 19. Richard N. Haass, “Beyond Containment: Competing American Foreign Policy Doctrines for the New Era,” in Eugene R. Wittkopf and Christopher M. Jones, The Future of American Foreign Policy (New York: Worth Publishing, 1999), pp. 22–38. 20. Ironically, adherents of this view often cite China’s policies toward Hong Kong and Taiwan—Chinese territories—as evidence of its imperialist designs on the world.

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21. “East Asia’s Lack of Formal Security Forum Worrying: Philippine FM,” Agence France Presse, November 18, 1999, in Lexis/Nexis. 22. Some Chinese officials have indicated that Beijing will not oppose U.S. moves to protect their troops with missiles. As Chen Kai Zeng, vice chairman of the government-linked China Institute for International Strategic Studies, observed, “If you want to defend your forward deployment, we can’t say anything.” See Bob Drogin, “Defense Project Strains US-China Ties,” Los Angeles Times, March 22, 1999, p. A1 in Lexis/Nexis. 23. Prepared statement of Douglas Paal, president, Asia Pacific Policy Center, in Crisis in the Taiwan Strait: Implications for US Foreign Policy, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 104th Congress, Second Session, March 14, 1996 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996), pp. 81–82.

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Index

Agreed Framework on North Korea’s nuclear program, 8, 14, 24, 56–58, 207tab, 208 Aichi, Kazuo, 54 Albright, Madeleine, 149, 210 APEC, 11 Arms reduction, 2 ASEAN. See Association of Southeast Asian Nations Asian Aerospace 2000, 82 Asian Development Bank, 94, 189 Asia Pacific Economic Council, 11 Asia-Pacific region: economic activity in, 5; wars in, 5 Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits, 91 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 27; Regional Forum, 8, 75, 174 Australia: alliances with, 8; in International Force for East Timor, 11; security alliances with, 10

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, 208 Blair, Dennis, 142 Brunei, 20, 21 Bush, George, 99 Bush, George W., 23, 26, 97–98, 100, 127, 149 Calder, Kent, 57 Campbell, Kurt, 16, 44, 45, 128 Cao Gangchuan, 79 Carter, Jimmy, 14 Chang, Parris, 148, 150, 152 Chang Pang-cheng, 145

Chemical weapons: North Korean, 56–58; Taiwanese, 146 Chemical Weapons Convention, 209 Chen Chien-jian, 21, 125, 152 Chen Shui-bian, 19, 20, 55, 92, 93, 120, 126, 135, 142, 148, 101102 Chiang Cheng-ling, 142, 148 Chiang Ching-kuo, 120 Chiang Kai-shek, 16, 32n33, 90, 119, 125 Chiang Wego, 90 Chi Haotian, 69–71, 78 China: agricultural policies, 70; air forces, 79, 82–84; “asymmetric strategy” in, 88; attacks on Vietnam, 76; Central Military Commission, 69–71, 73, 77, 78; chemical/biological weapons development, 76; Chinese Communist Party, 70, 77, 93, 107n5; Civil War, 125, 126, 7272; collectivization in, 70; corruption in, 74, 94, 103–105, 117n200; Cultural Revolution, 70; defense budget, 76, 77; Defense Consultative Talks with United States, 103; defense policy in, 69–77; disaster relief in, 71; economic assistance to, 55; economic development, 69, 70, 71, 75, 94; economic growth in, 1, 6; economic security issues, 93–95; expansionism of, 55; external security policies, 71–74; Gang of Four in, 70; gross domestic/national product, 6, 6tab, 93, 94; ground forces, 79–80; guerrilla warfare in, 7272; imports to, 27; information warfare by, 88, 133; intellectual property

265

266

Index

rights and, 100; internal security policies, 69–71; investment in, 18, 90; Japan and, 51, 54–56, 55, 59; in Korean War, 196; land-distribution in, 70; local war under “high-tech” conditions, 73–74; military equipment and weapons, 74, 76, 81, 82–87, 110n74; military intervention in domestic politics, 70; military training in, 74; missile program, 77, 84–86, 92; most favored nation status of, 94; National People’s Congress Military Commission, 78; naval forces, 79, 80–82, 110n59; normal trade relations status of, 94, 100, 101; North Korea and, 12, 14, 56–58, 99, 198, 216–217; nuclear weapons, 29, 84–87, 107n14, 107n16, 161n87, 72; peacekeeping operations, 75; People’s Liberation Army, 19, 69, 70, 71, 74, 76, 77–89, 133; “people’s war” and, 72; “people’s war under modern conditions,” 72–73; political reform, 1; protectionism in, 94; provocative military exercises by, 19; rapid reaction forces in, 80; relations with United States, 2; religious persecution in, 100; security issues, 89–106; South Korea and, 174, 175; Soviet Union and, 72; spying by, 88, 100; state ownership in, 94; Taiwan and, 16, 18, 19, 25, 74, 77, 79, 89–93, 131–134; territorial integrity and, 89–93; “three empties” strategy against Taiwan, 92; three-islandchain strategy, 80–81; Tiananmen Square demonstrations, 70; trade with, 93; trade with Taiwan, 18; trade with United States, 99; unemployment in, 94; in United Nations, 7; United States and, 19, 25, 72, 95–103; Vietnam and, 73, 99; in World Trade Organization, 94, 100, 102 Chun Doo Hwan, 177 Chung Chien, 121 Chun Yong-taek, 175, 183 Clinton, Bill, 10, 23, 25, 44, 95–97, 97–98, 100, 147, 218, 227, 101–102

Cohen, William, 7, 27, 30n10, 53, 130, 172 Conflict: flashpoints for, 1, 11–23; management, 233–239; potential for, 2, 27; territorial, 7, 11 Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), 21, 32n49 Corruption: in China, 74, 94, 103–105, 117n200; in South Korea, 187–188; in Taiwan, 155 Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region, 174 Cox Report, 76, 77, 109n41 Cultural Revolution, 70

Defense Consultative Talks, 103 Defense policy: Chinese, 69–77; Japanese, 35–46, 60, 61; North Korean, 195–200; South Korean, 169–176, 184–189; Taiwanese, 119–134 Defense treaties, 7, 35, 36, 41, 43, 48, 52, 55, 61, 62 DeLay, Tom, 147 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. See North Korea Deng Xiaoping, 73, 95, 104 Diaoyu Islands, 28, 54 Disaster relief: in China, 71; in Japan, 48, 50; in South Korea, 179; in Taiwan, 136 Downer, Alexander, 129 DPRK. See North Korea Dreyer, June Teufel, 73 Drugs, 9, 28, 89

East Asia: arms race in, 226–232; conflict management in, 233–239; financial crisis, 1, 6, 7, 28, 29, 53, 152–155; flashpoints of, 11–23; military spending, 228fig; trade patterns in, 6; trade with United States, 6 East Asia Strategy Report (1998), 10 East Timor, 11 Economic: depression, 53; development, 69; growth, 1, 6, 11; recovery, 53; stability, 28 Energy: demand for, 8 Environmental degradation, 28, 89

Index Fan Ding-Kung, 153 Fei Hrong-po, 138 Finkelstein, David, 105 Fisher, Richard, 101 Formosa. See Taiwan Four-Party Talks, 56–58, 172, 215 Fu, Tyson G., 81, 146, 147, 164n135

Gang of Four, 70 Gorton, Slade, 130 Gross domestic/national product: Chinese, 6, 6tab, 93, 94; Japanese, 6tab, 39, 58; North Korean, 6tab; South Korean, 6tab, 189; Taiwanese, 6tab, 152–153 Guam, 9, 10tab, 81 Hamilton, Lee H., 128 Hashimoto, Ryutaro, 44, 45, 62 Hawaii, 5 Hong Kong, 145 Hu, Jason, 92 Hundai Corporation, 214 Hu Tsai-kui, 138 Hu Yaobang, 132 Hwang Jang Yop, 15, 213

Ichiang Islands, 33n63 Immigration, 28 Indonesia, 20 Industrialization, 8 International Atomic Energy Agency, 14, 15, 207 International Force for East Timor, 11 International Monetary Fund, 12, 154 International Peace Cooperation Law (1992), 42–43 Investment: liberalization, 11 Iran, 76 Ishihara, Shintaro, 55

Japan: Air Self-Defense Forces, 37, 50–51; alliances with, 8; ban on nuclear weapons in, 61; Basic Policy for National Defense, 37, 39; China and, 51, 54–56, 59; containment of, 23; defense budget, 29, 40, 41tab, 67n94; defense cooperation with, 10; defense issues, 51–58; defense policy, 35–41, 60, 61; defense technolo-

267

gy sharing, 53–54; disaster relief in, 48, 50; discriminatory business standards, 52; economic aid to, 40; economic assistance to China, 55; economic growth, 1, 40; economic reform in, 53; gross domestic/national product, 6tab, 38, 39, 58; Ground Self-Defense Forces, 37, 47–48; Gulf War and, 44, 60; hostage crisis in Peru, 58; imports, 20, 55; International Peace Cooperation Law, 42–43; joint training exercises with South Korea, 56–58; Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 42–43; Liberal Democratic Party in, 63n17; Maritime Safety Board, 36, 37; Maritime Self-Defense Forces, 29, 37, 48–50; military equipment and weapons, 47–48, 48tab, 49, 50, 50tab, 51, 60; missile defense interests, 57; Mutual Security Treaty with United States, 35, 36, 41, 43, 48, 52, 55, 62; National Defense Council, 37; New Taiko, 43–44, 49; North Korea and, 51, 59; Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and, 61, 63n14; in peacekeeping operations, 42–43, 46, 60; Police Reserve Force in, 36; post–Cold War defense policy, 41–46; protectionism in, 52; public welfare support in, 49; right to self-defense, 37, 38, 39; role in global affairs, 41; Russia and, 58; security alliances with, 10, 39–40; SelfDefense Forces, 35, 37; South Korea and, 51, 56–58, 174, 175, 176; technology transfers, 60; territorial disputes with China, 54, 55; trade with United States, 52, 52tab, 53; United States and, 37, 38, 51, 52–54, 95–97; United States occupation, 35, 36; United States troops in, 53, 54, 65n65, 66n67 Japan Defense Agency, 37, 47 Jee Man Won, 213 Jiang Zemin, 26–27, 70, 77, 79, 82, 91, 93, 94, 104, 129, 147, 148, 156, 175 Jo Myong Rok, 202

268

Index

Kajiyama, Seiroku, 45 Keating, Timothy J., 129 Kelly, Robert J., 51 Kim Dae-jung, 173, 174, 175, 178, 184, 187, 188, 189, 214, 227 Kim Il-Sung, 12, 14, 195, 196 Kim Jong-Il, 15, 31n27, 174, 184, 200, 202, 212, 213, 214, 218, 227 Kim Ki Choon, 184 Kim Kwang-jin, 218 Kimmen Island, 135 Kim Young Sam, 177, 185, 187 Koh, Harold Hongju, 100 Korean Peninsula: armistice agreement on, 196; Demilitarized Zone, 29, 179; as flashpoint for conflict, 12–16; Kafin-Sonbong Free Trade Zone, 214; maintenance of peace on, 170–173; nonaggression and reconciliation pact, 14; unification of, 10; United States policy toward, 24–25 Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, 29 Korean War, 12, 16, 125, 126, 196, 215 Kuan, John, 126 Kung Fan-ding, 121, 131, 145 Kuomintang, 90, 103, 125, 146

Lake, Anthony, 142 Lange, Howard, 128 Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (1992), 42–43 Lee, David, 147 Lee Teng-hui, 19, 20, 92, 97–98, 120, 125, 135, 142, 144, 145, 147, 150 Lieberthal, Kenneth, 99 Lien Chan, 144 Lilley, James, 81 Lin Chin-ching, 124 Lin Chong-Pin, 155 Linton, Stephen, 215 Li Peng, 55, 95 Liu Ho-chien, 139 Liu Hsiang-pin, 144 Liu Shunyao, 82 Li Zhaoxing, 59, 93 Lord, Winston, 127 Lott, Trent, 147 Lu, Annette, 93, 146, 148, 165n150 Luan Ming, 132

MacArthur, Douglas, 36 McCurry, Mike, 128 Maehara, Seiji, 51 Malaysia, 20, 21, 53 Mao Zedong, 70, 73, 88, 7272 Maritime Consultation Agreement (1998), 103 Markets: financial, 53; regional, 8 Marshall, Bill, 24 Matsu, 19, 133, 135 Medeiros, Evan, 88 Military equipment and weapons: Chinese, 74, 76, 81, 82–87, 110n74; Japanese, 47–48, 49; North Korean, 197, 199, 203tab, 204, 205, 206; South Korean, 171, 172, 180, 182, 182tab; Taiwanese, 126–127, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 150–152; trends in, 227–232 Military forces, air: Chinese, 79, 82–84; Japanese, 50–51; North Korean, 205–206; South Korean, 181–182; Taiwanese, 122, 139–140, 166n171; United States, 9 Military forces, ground: Chinese, 79–80; Japanese, 47–48; North Korean, 203–204; South Korean, 178–180; Taiwanese, 122, 135–137; United States, 9 Military forces, naval: Chinese, 79, 80–82, 110n59; Japanese, 29, 48–50; North Korean, 204–205; South Korean, 180–181; Taiwanese, 121–122, 137–139; United States, 9 Military modernization, 69 Mischief Reef, 21 Modernization, 2 Mt. Kumgang, 174, 184 Mulvenon, James, 105 Nakasone, Yasuhiro, 58 Natuna, 21 Nixon, Richard, 147 Nonaku, Hiromu, 56–58 Normalization Communiqué (1979), 127, 128 Norota, Hosei, 46, 60 Northeast Asia Security Dialogue, 174 North Korea, 13map; air forces, 205–206; assassination attempts by,

Index 31n16, 197; attacks on South Korea, 196; chemical/biological weapons, 56–58, 199, 208–209; China and, 12, 14, 99, 198, 216–217; defections to South Korea, 213; defense budget, 170; defense policy, 195–200; Department of the People’s Armed Forces, 200; diplomatic isolation, 195, 200; economic assistance to, 12, 14; economic crises, 12, 14, 15, 198, 200, 212–213; General Political Bureau, 202; General Staff Department, 202; gross domestic/national product, 6tab; ground forces, 203–204; interKorean relations and, 173–174; invasion of South Korea, 198–199; Japan and, 51, 56–58, 59; Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, 173; juche philosophy, 12, 198, 213; Korean People’s Army, 200–212; Korean War and, 12; leadership in, 213; light-water reactors for, 14; living standard in, 12; military budget, 203; military equipment and weapons, 15, 197, 199, 203tab, 204, 205, 206; missile testing by, 56–58, 57, 143, 209–211; National Defense Committee, 200; naval forces, 204–205; nuclear nonproliferation agreement and, 14, 207; nuclear weapons, 15, 56–58, 207–208; “one Chosun” principle, 200; political opposition in, 15; reserve forces, 206; Russia and, 216–217; security issues, 212–218; South Korea and, 175, 184–185, 214; Soviet Union and, 12, 14, 195; special operations forces, 197, 198; spying by, 49–50; summit with South Korea, 1; terrorism and, 197; tourism in, 174, 210, 214; trade sanctions on, 25; troop deployment, 15, 29; United States and, 214–216; war preparations, 15; Worker and Farmer Red Guards, 206; Workers Party of Korea, 202; Young Red Guards, 206 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, 14, 61, 63n14, 207 Nunn, Sam, 61

269

Obuchi, Keizo, 46, 61 Okinawa, 53, 65n65

Paal, Douglas, 129 Pakistan, 76 Paracel Islands, 21 Park Chung Hee, 176, 177, 197 Penghu Island, 135 People’s Liberation Army, 19, 69, 70, 71, 74, 76, 77–89, 107n5; air forces, 79, 82–84; commercial ventures, 104; Commission for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense, 78; control of, 77, 78; decisionmaking role, 79; General Equipment (Armaments) Department, 78, 79; General Logistics Department, 78; General Political Department, 78; General Staff Department, 78; ground forces, 79–80; internal security and, 77; membership, 79; morale issues, 87; naval forces, 79, 80–82, 110n59; recruitment in, 109n51; reservists in, 79 Perry, William, 25, 142, 211 Philippines, 20, 21; attacks by China, 76; security alliances with, 10 Piracy, 28 Political: change, 1, 8; liberalization, 177; neutrality, 177; opposition, 1; reform, 1, 104; stability, 8 Pratas Islands, 21 Prueher, Joseph W., 9 Quemoy, 19, 133

Reagan, Ronald, 147 Regional: cooperation, 8; markets, 8; security, 1 Republic of China, 16 Republic of Korea. See South Korea Rights: human, 102; intellectual property, 100 Roh Tae Woo, 177 ROK. See South Korea Roth, Stanley, 29, 148, 154 Russia: Japan and, 58; in Northern Territories, 58; North Korea and, 216–217; regional cooperation with, 8; South Korea and, 174, 175

270

Index

San Francisco Peace Treaty (1951), 36 Satellite surveillance, 57 Saudi Arabia, 76 Schlesinger, James, 87 Security: alliances, 10; cooperation, 8, 174; economic, 93–95; organizations, 11; policy, 1, 5; regional, 1, 11, 75, 174; subregional, 9; transnational, 28 Senkaku Islands, 28, 54 Shalikashvili, John, 23 Shanghai, 145 Shanghai Communiqué (1972), 127 Shikata, Toshiyuki, 57 Shirk, Susan, 129 Sino-Japanese War (1895), 16 Smuggling, 28, 104 South China Sea, 1–2, 20–23; claims to, 20, 21; conflicts in, 21; importance to Japan, 55; oil exploration in, 21; United States policy toward, 26– 27 South Korea: Air Defense Command, 181; Air Force Headquarters, 181; air forces, 181–182; Air Traffic Control Center, 181; Army Aviation Unit, 179; assassination attempts by North Korea, 31n16, 197; attempts at revolution in, 197–198; authoritarianism in, 176; Aviation Operations Command, 179; Capital Defense Command, 179; capitalist strategy in, 12; Central Intelligence Agency, 177; Chemical, Biological and Radiological Defense Command, 179; China and, 174, 175; civilian rule in, 177; Combat Air Command, 181; Combined Forces Command, 172; corruption in, 187–188; in Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region, 174; defense budget, 170, 171, 171tab, 187tab; defense policy, 169–176, 184–189; democracy in, 1, 169, 177; disaster relief in, 179; Foal Eagle exercise, 173; Foreign Affairs and Trade Ministry, 178; Grand National Party, 184; gross domestic/national product, 6tab, 189; ground forces, 178–180; Hanahoe in, 187; Hyundai

Corporation, 174; inter-Korean relations and, 173–174; international cooperation and, 174–176; invasion by North Korea, 198–199; Japan and, 51, 56–58, 174, 175, 176; Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, 173; Korean War and, 12; Kwangju uprising, 177; Marine Corps Command, 181; martial law in, 177, 178; military assistance to, 24; military equipment and weapons, 171, 172, 179tab, 180, 182, 182tab; military morale issues, 183, 188–189; Ministry of National Defense, 171, 183; Mutual Defense Treaty with United States, 24, 172; National Intelligence Service, 178; National Security Council, 178; National Security Law, 178; naval forces, 180–181; in Northeast Asia Security Dialogue, 174; North Korea and, 175, 184–185, 214; in peacekeeping operations, 174; political liberalization in, 177; political transformation in, 169; Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration exercise, 173; reserve forces, 182–183; Russia and, 174, 175; security alliances with, 10; Special Agreement Relating to Article V of the Status of Forces Agreement, 186; Special Warfare Command, 179; summit with North Korea, 1; sunshine policy, 174, 175, 178, 184; suspicions of Japan, 56, 57; Theater Air Control Center, 181; troop deployment in, 24; Ulchi Focus Lens exercise, 173; in United Nations, 174; United States and, 170, 185–187; United States troops in, 172, 186; universal conscription in, 178 Soviet Union: China and, 7272; disintegration of, 41, 70; North Korea and, 12, 14, 195 Spratly Islands, 21, 22map, 136 Suh Jae Jean, 185 Sung Hae Rim, 213 Sun Tao-yu, 145 Sun Tzu, 7272 Syngman Rhee, 176, 195

Index Tachen Islands, 33n63 Taiwan, 17map, 119–156; air forces, 122, 134, 139–140, 166n171; Armed Forces Reserve Command, 134, 140, 141; Army and Armed Forces Police, 135; Chihan project, 124; China and, 16, 18, 19, 25, 74, 77, 79, 89–93, 131–134; Chingshih Project, 136; Coast Guard Command, 134, 140, 141; Combined Services Force, 134; corruption in, 155; defense issues, 143–144; Defense Ministry Organization Law, 135; defense policy, 119–134; democracy in, 1, 18, 119; Democratic Progressive Party, 19, 79, 92, 93, 146; “derecognition” of, 126; diplomatic isolation of, 92; disaster relief in, 136; economic aid to, 16, 126; electronic warfare, 124, 133; expulsion from United Nations, 126; as flashpoint for conflict, 16–20; gross domestic/national product, 6tab, 152–153; ground forces, 122, 134, 135–137; Guidelines for National Unification, 120; Hengshan Command Center, 123; independence issues, 90, 97, 98, 120, 129, 146–147; intelligence sharing with United States, 129–130; investment in China, 18, 90; Kuanghau project, 121; Ku-An Plan, 133–134; Kuomintang in, 90, 103, 125, 146; Maihu project, 124; military aid to, 16, 126; military equipment and weapons, 26, 29, 121–125, 126–127, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 150–152; military morale issues, 149–150; Military Police Command, 134; military strategies, 120–121, 144–145; military structure, 134–142; military-to-military contacts with United States, 130; Ministry of National Defense, 120, 133, 134, 142; Ministry of National Defense in, 119; missile program, 97–98, 123–125, 143–144, 145; modernization of military forces, 121; Modified Air Defense System in, 122; National Defense Law, 135; National Security Bureau, 131; naval forces, 121–122, 134, 137–139; need

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for economic stability in, 152–155; nuclear weapons, 145–146; one country-two systems formula, 18, 20, 26, 90, 91; Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion in, 120; potential attack on, 131–134, 142; pragmatic diplomacy of, 20; Qiangwang air-defense network, 123; as special administrative region of China, 18; strategic ambiguity policy toward, 128–129; “three empties” strategy against, 92, 148; Three People’s Principles in, 119; trade with China, 18; underground military installations in, 123, 157n19; unemployment, 153; United States and, 16, 25–26, 125–131, 147–149; United States security commitment to, 127–129 Taiwan Independence Party, 145, 146 Taiwan Relations Act, 16, 18, 25, 31n31, 45, 126, 127, 128, 158n38 Taiwan Security Enhancement Act (1999), 26 Takano, Toshiyuki, 45 Takeoka, Katsumi, 54 Takeshima Islands, 28 Tang Fei, 130, 135 Tang Yao-ming, 88 Team Spirit exercises, 33n58 Terrorism, 48, 89, 197 Thailand: alliances with, 8; security alliances with, 10 Tiananmen Square demonstrations, 70 Tibet, 89, 90, 102 Tilelli, John H. Jr., 14, 15 Tokdo Islands, 28 Trade: blocs, 94; disputes, 99; liberalization, 11; regional, 94; sanctions, 25; tariffs, 52 Trends: military equipment and weapons, 227–232; spread of democracy, 226 Truman, Harry S, 16, 125 United Nations: Angola Verification Mission II, 42–43; China in, 7; Commission on Human Rights, 102; Convention on the Law of the Sea,

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Index

21, 32n49; Disengagement Observer Force in Golan Heights, 43; economic sanctions by, 15; efforts to unify Korea, 195; Military Armistice Commission, 172; Observer Mission in El Salvador, 43; Operations in Mozambique, 42–43; peacekeeping operations, 75; Transitional Authority in Cambodia, 42–43 United States: bilateral alliances, 10; Central Intelligence Agency, 134; China and, 16, 19, 25, 72, 95–103; commercial interest in East Asia, 6; containment policy, 52, 98; defense commitment to Taiwan, 20, 31n31; Department of Defense, 15, 23, 25, 86, 103; Department of State, 16, 128; Eurocentric orientation of, 5; foreign policy, 5, 23; forward deployment of troops by, 9–10; House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 128; intelligence sharing with Taiwan, 129–130; interest in East Asia, 5–29; Japan and, 37, 38, 51, 52–54, 95–97; military sales to South Korea, 171tab; military-tomilitary contacts with Taiwan, 130; missile defense interests, 57, 97–98; multilateral security forums, 11; North Korea and, 214–216; and potential for conflict in East Asia, 23–27; public opposition to China, 100–101, 101tab; public support of Taiwan, 130; relations with China, 2; security arrangements with Japan, 39–40; security commitment to Taiwan, 127–129; security policy, 1, 5, 8–11; Senate Armed Services Committee, 61; South Korea and,

170, 185–187; Taiwan and, 16, 125–131, 147–149; trade partners, 7tab; trade patterns, 6; trade with China, 99; trade with East Asia, 6; trade with Japan, 52, 52tab, 53; troop deployment in Asia, 10tab; troops in Japan, 53, 54, 65n65, 66n67; troops in South Korea, 24, 172, 186 Urbanization, 8 U.S.-China Joint Communiqué (1982), 127, 128 Vietnam, 20, 21; attacks by China, 76; China and, 73, 99

Wang Wenhsien, 143 Watanabe, Akio, 54 Weapons of mass destruction, 9; chemical, 56–58; Chinese, 76; North Korean, 199, 206–211 World Bank, 53 World Trade Organization, 94, 100, 101–102

Xinjiang, 89, 90 Xiong Guangkai, 94 Xu Shiquan, 91

Yang, Andrew, 150 Yeltsin, Boris, 175 Yin Tsung-wen, 131 Yoshida, Shigeru, 36, 37 Yugoslavia, 101, 102, 103 Zhang Wannian, 78 Zhang Yunling, 55 Zhu Bangzao, 59 Zhu Rongji, 20, 92, 93

About the Book

his comprehensive study provides a detailed analysis of the military buildup in the East Asian countries: China, Taiwan, Japan, and North and South Korea. Hickey assesses the capabilities, strategies, intentions, and performance of each government’s military in the context of the potential for regional instability and conflict. In his concluding chapter, he also explores U.S. objectives in the region and examines the implications of recent developments for U.S. foreign policy.

T

Dennis Van Vranken Hickey is professor of political science at Southwest Missouri State University. His publications include United States–Taiwan Security Ties: From Cold War to Beyond Containment and Taiwan’s Security in the Changing International System.

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