The Arctic in International Law and Policy 9781509915767, 9781509915781, 9781509915774

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The Arctic in International Law and Policy The Arctic is an increasingly important region faced with major challenges caused not only by the effects of climate change, but also by a growing interest in its living and non-living resources, its attraction as a new destination for tourism, and as a route for navigation. It is not only the eight Arctic States that have paid an increased level of attention to the region; several non-Arctic actors from Asia and Europe also seek to gain more influence in the High North. At the same time, the evolving law and policy architecture for the Arctic region has recently played a more prominent role in the political and academic debate. Unlike Antarctica, where the coherent Antarctic Treaty System governs international cooperation, the legal regime of Arctic affairs is based on public international law, domestic law, and ‘soft law’. These three pillars intersect and interact making Arctic governance multi-faceted and highly complex. This book provides an analytical introduction, a chronology of legally relevant events, and a selection of essential materials covering a wide range of issues—eg delineation and delimitation of maritime boundaries, environmental protection, indigenous peoples’ rights, shipping, and fisheries. Included are multilateral and bilateral treaties, UN documents, official statements, informal instruments, domestic laws, and diplomatic correspondence.

Documents in International Law General Editor: Professor Stefan Talmon Director at the Institute of Public International Law, University of Bonn, and Supernumerary Fellow of St. Anne’s College, Oxford ALSO IN THIS SERIES THE LEGAL ORDER OF THE OCEANS Vaughan Lowe and Stefan Talmon (2009) THE IRAN NUCLEAR ISSUE Yaël Ronen (2010) TERRORISM Ben Saul (2012) BASIC DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT PROTECTION Martins Paparinskis (2012) THE SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES: BASIC DOCUMENTS Christian Tams and Antonios Tzanakopoulos (2012) ANTARCTICA IN INTERNATIONAL LAW Ben Saul and Tim Stephens (2015)

The Arctic in International Law and Policy

Edited by

Kristina Schönfeldt

OXFORD AND PORTLAND, OREGON 2017

Hart Publishing An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc Hart Publishing Ltd Kemp House Chawley Park Cumnor Hill Oxford OX2 9PH UK

Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square London WC1B 3DP UK

www.hartpub.co.uk www.bloomsbury.com Published in North America (US and Canada) by Hart Publishing c/o International Specialized Book Services 920 NE 58th Avenue, Suite 300 Portland, OR 97213-3786 USA www.isbs.com HART PUBLISHING, the Hart/Stag logo, BLOOMSBURY and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published 2017 © Kristina Schönfeldt 2017 Kristina Schönfeldt has asserted her right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 to be identified as Author of this work. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. While every care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of this work, no responsibility for loss or damage occasioned to any person acting or refraining from action as a result of any statement in it can be accepted by the authors, editors or publishers. All UK Government legislation and other public sector information used in the work is Crown Copyright ©. All House of Lords and House of Commons information used in the work is Parliamentary Copyright ©. This information is reused under the terms of the Open Government Licence v3.0 (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/opengovernment-licence/version/3) except where otherwise stated. All Eur-lex material used in the work is © European Union, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/, 1998–2017. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN: PB: 978-1-50991-576-7 ePDF: 978-1-50991-577-4 ePub: 978-1-50991-579-8 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Schönfeldt, Kristina, editor. Title: The Arctic in international law and policy / edited by Kristina Schönfeldt. Description: Oxford [UK] ; Portland, Oregon : Hart Publishing, 2017.  |  Series: Documents in international law  |  Includes bibliographical references and index.  |  Description based on print version record and CIP data provided by publisher; resource not viewed. Identifiers: LCCN 2017016524 (print)  |  LCCN 2017017623 (ebook)  |  ISBN 9781509915798 (Epub)  |  ISBN 9781509915767 (pbk. : alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: Arctic regions—International status.  |  Arctic regions—International cooperation. Classification: LCC KZ4110.P65 (ebook)  |  LCC KZ4110.P65 A75 2017 (print)  |  DDC 341.4/5091632—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017016524 Typeset by Compuscript Ltd, Shannon To find out more about our authors and books visit www.hartpublishing.co.uk. Here you will find extracts, author information, details of forthcoming events and the option to sign up for our newsletters.

Preface This collection of documents would not have seen the light of day had it not been for the support and efforts of many institutions and individuals to whom I owe a debt of gratitude. First and foremost, I thank Prof Dr Stefan Talmon LLM MA for the opportunity to be editor of this volume. For their considerable research and translation assistance in the preparation of this volume, I am much indebted to Sebastian Haberland, Nataly Bliznyakova, Robin Ward, Matthias Borchert, Sara Rebekka Vonk, and Irina Zimmermann. In addition, I wish to extend my heartfelt thanks to Henning Dobson (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Birgir Hrafn Búason (Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs Iceland), Elisabeth Kristvik (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Nichola Payne (Embassy of Canada in Washington DC), Heikki Karhu (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland), Anneliese Jost (German Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure), Laila Susanne Vars (Gáldu—Resource Centre for Indigenous Peoples Rights), and Prof William E Butler (Pennsylvania State University) for assistance and advice. I am particularly grateful to the KG Jebsen Centre for the Law of the Sea of the Arctic University of Norway in Tromsø for having me as a visiting scholar. The numerous inspirational and critical discussions I had there have been invaluable for the finalisation of the book. I also thank my parents, Holly Wesener, Thomas Vogt Geisse, Sebastián Mantilla Blanco, Antje Pellowski, and my other colleagues at the Institute for Public International Law of the University of Bonn for their kind support during this long term project. In this regard, I wish to acknowledge the generous financial support of the NorwegischDeutsche Willy-Brandt-Stiftung that made my stay at the Arctic University of Norway possible. Finally, I would like to acknowledge all the materials for which I was kindly given permission to use in this collection. Although I have tried to trace and contact all copyright holders and obtain clearance before publication, this has not been possible in every case. If notified I surely will rectify any errors or ommissions at the earliest opportunity. A significant effort has been made to ensure the correct reproduction of documents. However, the use of British and US-American English in the documents has not been standardised; documents are rather reproduced in their original English language version. Moreover, only obvious typos in the texts have been corrected. It goes without saying that comments and suggestions are highly appreciated. They should be directed to [email protected]. Kristina Schönfeldt Bonn, December 2016

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Contents Prefacev Abbreviations xxxi Analytical Introductionxxxv Chronology of (Legally) Significant Eventsxcix DOCUMENTS PART 1: ARCTIC POLICY3 Arctic Coastal States5 Canada5 Document 1: Toward a Northern Foreign Policy for Canada—A Consultation Paper [extracts only] (25 September 1998) 5 Document 2: The Northern Dimension of Canada’s Foreign Policy [extracts only] (8 June 2000) 15 Document 3: Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future [extracts only] (26 July 2009) 25 Document 4: Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada’s Northern Strategy Abroad (20 August 2010) 33 Denmark48 Document 5: Strategy for the Arctic 2011—2020 [extracts only] (22 August 2011) 48 Document 6: The Faroe Islands—a Nation in the Arctic [extracts only] (11 April 2013) 81 Norway96 Document 7: The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy [extracts only] (1 December 2006) 96 Document 8: New Building Blocks in the North—The next Step in the Government’s High North Strategy [extracts only] (12 March 2009) 120 Document 9: Norway’s Arctic Policy: Creating value, managing resources, confronting climate change and fostering knowledge. Developments in the Arctic concern us all [official summary] (10 November 2014) 178 Russian Federation182 Document 10: Mikhail Gorbachev, Speech in Murmansk at the ceremonial meeting on the occasion of the presentation of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star Medal to the City of Murmansk (1 October 1987) 182 Document 11: The Basics of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic in the period till 2020 and for a further perspective [unofficial translation] (18 September 2008) 187 Document 12: Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and National Security Protection for the Period up to 2020 [unofficial translation] (8 February 2013) 195

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United States210 Document 13: US Department of State, Policy Statement on Polar Regions [extracts only] (1 July 1951) 210 Document 14: US President Richard M Nixon, National Security Decision ­Memorandum 144—United States Arctic Policy and Arctic Policy Group (22 December 1971) 212 Document 15: US President Ronald Reagan, US Arctic Policy (9 May 1983) 213 Document 16: US President Bill Clinton, National Security Presidential Directive No 26 on United States Policy on the Arctic and Antarctic Regions [extracts only] (9 June 1994) 214 Document 17: United States Arctic Policy in 2007: Climate Change and the Arctic—Renewed American Interest in a Changing North (19 April 2007) 217 Document 18: US President George W Bush, National Security Presidential Directive No 66 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive No 25 on Arctic Region Policy (9 January 2009) 222 Document 19: US President Barack Obama, National Strategy for the Arctic Region (10 May 2013) 229 Document 20: US President Barack Obama, Executive Order: Enhancing Coordination of National Efforts in the Arctic (21 January 2015) 238 Document 21: State of Alaska, An Act declaring the Arctic policy of the state (21 May 2015) 242 Other Arctic States245 Document 22: Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region 2013 [extracts only] (23 August 2013) 245 Document 23: Executive Summary of the Report of Össur Skarphédinsson, Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Parliament of Iceland: Iceland’s interests in the High North [extracts only] (14 May 2010) 275 Document 24: A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland’s Arctic Policy (28 March 2011) 276 Document 25: Sweden’s Strategy for the Arctic region [extracts only] (2011) 284 Document 26: Swedish Ministry of the Environment and Energy, New Swedish Environmental Policy for the Arctic (25 January 2016) 303 Non-Arctic States and other Actors307 Document 27: China, Keynote Speech by Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Ming at the China Country Session of the Third Arctic Circle Assembly (17 October 2015) 307 Document 28: India and the Arctic (10 June 2013) 309 Document 29: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Adapting To Change: UK policy towards the Arctic [extracts only] (17 October 2013) 311 Document 30: Guidelines of the Germany Arctic Policy: Assume responsibility, seize opportunities (November 2013) 322 Document 31: Arctic Policy of the Republic of Korea [extracts only] (10 December 2013) 333 viii

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Document 32: Singapore, Minister of State in the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth Sam Tan Chin Siongat, Speech on ‘State of the Arctic—Singapore’s Perspective’ at the 9th Arctic Frontiers Conference at Tromsø (19 January 2015) Document 33: Japan’s Arctic Policy [provisional translation] (16 October 2015) Document 34: Towards an Italian Strategy for the Arctic—National Guidelines (10 December 2015) Document 35: European Parliament, Resolution on Arctic Governance (9 October 2008) Document 36: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: The European Union and the Arctic Region (20 November 2008) Document 37: Council of the European Union, Conclusions on Arctic Issues (8 December 2009) Document 38: European Parliament, Resolution on a sustainable EU policy for the High North (20 January 2011) Document 39: European Commission/High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, Developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region: progress since 2008 and next steps (26 June 2012) Document 40: Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on EU Arctic Policy to address globally emerging interests in the region—a view of civil society (17 April 2013) Document 41: European Parliament, Resolution on the EU Strategy for the Arctic (12 March 2014) Document 42: Council of the European Union, Conclusions on developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region (12 May 2014) Document 43: Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: An integrated European Union Policy for the Arctic (27 April 2016) Document 44: Council of the European Union Conclusions on the Arctic (20 June 2016)

339 343 350 364 367 376 381

393 408 419 428 430 444

PART 2: ARCTIC COOPERATION447 Multilateral Cooperation449 Arctic Council449 Barents Euro-Arctic Council450 Document 45: Kirkenes Declaration (11 January 1993) 450 Document 46: Joint Statement, Second Session at Tromsø (14/15 September 1994) 454 Document 47: Joint Statement, Third Session at Rovaniemi (9/10 October 1995) 460 Document 48: Joint Statement, Fourth Session at Petrozavodsk (5/6 November 1996) 464

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Document 49: Joint Statement, Fifth Session at Luleå (20 January 1998) 468 Document 50: Joint Statement, Sixth Session at Bodø (4/5 March 1999) 469 Document 51: Joint Statement, Seventh Session at Oulu (14/15 March 2000) 475 Document 52: Joint Statement, Eighth Session at Murmansk (14/15 March 2001) 480 Document 53: Joint Statement, Ninth Session at Umeå (2/3 October 2003) 485 Document 54: Kirkenes Declaration on the 10th Anniversary of the Barents Euro-Arctic Cooperation (11 January 2003) 489 Document 55: Joint Statement, Tenth Session at Harstad (9/10 November 2005) 491 Document 56: Joint Statement, 11th Session at Rovaniemi (14/15 November 2007) 496 Document 57: Agreement between the Governments in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region on Cooperation within the Field of Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (11 December 2008) 500 Document 58: Joint Statement, 12th Session at Murmansk (14/15 October 2009) 506 Document 59: Joint Statement, 13th Session at Kiruna (12 October 2011) 512 Document 60: Kirkenes Declaration on the 20th Anniversary of the Barents Euro-Arctic Cooperation (3/4 June 2013) 517 Document 61: Joint Statement, 14th Session at Tromsø (19 October 2013) 522 Document 62: Joint Statement, 15th Session at Oulu (15 October 2015) 525 Northern Dimension529 Document 63: Political Declaration on the Northern Dimension Policy (24 November 2006) 529 Document 64: Northern Dimension Policy Framework Document (24 November 2006) 530 Bilateral Cooperation535 Document 65: Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada on Arctic Cooperation (11 January 1988) 535 Document 66: Agreement between Canada and the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Arctic and in the North (19 June 1992) 536 Document 67: Joint Statement by Canada and the Russian Federation on cooperation in the Arctic and the North (18 December 2000) 539 Document 68: Joint Statement on Canada-Russia Economic and Arctic Cooperation [extracts only] (28/29 November 2007) 541 Document 69: Declaration on Arctic Cooperation between the Russian Federation and Iceland (29 November 2011) 543 Document 70: US-Canada Joint Statement on Climate, Energy, and Arctic Leadership [extracts only] (10 March 2016) 544 x

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Document 71: Cooperation Agreement between the Earth Science Sector of the Department of Natural Resources of Canada and the Swedish Polar Research Secretariat concerning Cooperation in Marine Geoscience and Innovation Activities in the Arctic (11 December 2015) 545 Document 72: Joint Statement on a Strategic Partnership between Japan and the Republic of Finland as Gateways in Asia and Europe [extracts only] (10 March 2016) 547 PART 3: MARITIME ZONES—LAW OF THE SEA RELATED LEGISLATION OF THE ARCTIC COASTAL STATES549 Canada551 Document 73: Note from the US Department of State to the Canadian Embassy in Washington [extracts only] (2 May 1983) 551 Document 74: Territorial Sea Geographical Coordinates (Area 7) Order, Order Respecting Geographical Coordinates of Points from which Baselines May Be Determined, SOR/85-872 (1985) 551 Document 75: British High Commission’s Note No. 90/86 on behalf of the European Community [extracts only] (9 July 1986) 559 Document 76: Diplomatic Note JCD-0257 from the Canadian Department of ­External Affairs to the European Communities (7 August 1986) 560 Document 77: An Act Respecting the Oceans of Canada, S.C. 1996, c. 31 (1996) 561 Denmark (including Greenland and Faroe Islands)581 Mainland581 Document 78: Royal Decree concerning the exercise of Danish sovereignty over the Continental Shelf (7 June 1963) 581 Document 79: Act No 259 concerning the Continental Shelf with the amendments resulting from Act No 278 of 7 June 1972 and Act No 654 of 21 December 1977 (9 June 1971) 582 Document 80: Act No 411 on Exclusive Economic Zones (22 May 1996) 585 Document 81: Act No 200 on the delimitation of Denmark’s territorial sea (7 April 1999) 586 Document 82: Act on the Contiguous Zone (24 June 2005) 587 Document 83: Executive Order on the Demarcation of the Danish Contiguous Zone (29 June 2005) 588 Greenland588 Document 84: Act 277 respecting the Conduct of Business in Greenland [extracts only] (27 May 1950) 588 Document 85: Royal Ordinance No 191 on the Delimitation of the Territorial Sea of Greenland [extracts only] (27 May 1963) 589 Document 86: Royal Decree No 636 on the Delimitation of the Territorial Sea of Greenland (6 September 1991) 590 Document 87: Royal Decree No 1005 on the Entry into Force of Act on Exclusive Economic Zones for Greenland (15 October 2004) 590 Document 88: Executive Order No 1020 on the Exclusive Economic Zone of Greenland (20 October 2004) 591

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Faroe Islands592 Document 89: Decree No 240 on the Coming into Force of the Act on the Delimitation of the Territorial Sea for the Faroe Islands (30 April 2002) 592 Document 90: Executive Order No 306 on the Delimitation of the Territorial Sea of the Faroe Islands (16 May 2002) 593 Norway (including Jan Mayen Island)595 Mainland595 Document 91: Royal Decree Relating to the Sovereignty of Norway over the Sea-Bed and Subsoil outside the Norwegian Coast (31 May 1963) 595 Document 92: Act No 91 relating to the Economic Zone of Norway and appurtenant regulations (17 December 1976) 595 Document 93: Royal Decree relating to the establishment of the Economic Zone of Norway (17 December 1976) 597 Document 94: Royal Decree relating to the baselines for determining the extent of the territorial sea around mainland Norway (14 June 2002) 598 Document 95: Act No 57 relating to Norway’s territorial waters and contiguous zone (27 June 2003) 598 Jan Mayen Island600 Document 96: Act relating to Jan Mayen [unofficial translation] (27 February 1930) 600 Document 97: Royal Decree: Regulations relating to the Limit of the Norwegian Territorial Sea around Jan Mayen (30 August 2002) 600 Russian Federation603 Document 98: Proclamation of Lands and Islands Located in the northern Arctic Ocean as Territory of the USSR (16 April 1926) 603 Document 99: 4604. Declaration of 7 February 1984 603 Document 100: Edict of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet (28 ­February 1984) “On the USSR Economic Zone” (1984) 9 Vedomosti ­Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR (Gazette of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR) 137, confirmed by law of the USSR Supreme Soviet (11 April 1984) On the Confirmation of the Edict of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet “On the USSR Economic Zone” (1984) 604 Document 101: Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet On the Manner of Implementation of Articles 19 and 21 of the Edict of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR “On the Economic Zone of the USSR” (12 November 1984) 605 Document 102: 4450. Declaration of 15 January 1985 606 Document 103: Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the Confirmation of the Statute on the Safeguarding of the Economic Zone of the USSR (1985) 5 Sobranie Postanovlenii (30 January 1985) 606 Document 104: Federal Law on the Continental Shelf of the Russian Federation (25 October 1995) 607 Document 105: Federal Law No 155 on Internal Waters, Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone (31 July 1998) 631 Document 106: Federal Act on the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Russian Federation (2 December 1998) 652 xii

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Document 107: Federal Law N 287-FZ on changes in Federal Law “On the Russian Continental Shelf ” and Federal Law “On Inland Sea Waters, Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone of the Russian Federation” (1 July 2013) 679 United States681 Document 108: US Presidential Proclamation No 2667: Policy of the United States with respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Seabed of the Continental Shelf (28 September 1945) 681 Document 109: United States Oceans Policy/President Ronald Reagan’s Statement on the Establishment of the Exclusive Economic Zone (10 March 1983) 682 Document 110: Presidential Proclamation No 5030: Exclusive Economic Zone of the United States of America (10 March 1983) 685 Document 111: Statement by the Group of Eastern European (Socialist) Countries in connection with the Proclamation issued on 10 March 1983 by the President of the United States of America concerning the establishment of the exclusive economic zone of the United States of America and his statement of the same date concerning United States Oceans Policy (8 April 1983) 686 Document 112: Statement made by the Soviet Government regarding the Presidential Proclamation No 5030 (23 April 1983) 688 Document 113: United States Policy Governing the Continental Shelf of the United States of America (17 November 1987) 689 Document 114: Presidential Proclamation No 5928: Territorial Sea of the United States of America (27 December 1988) 690 Document 115: Department of Sate, Public Notice 2237: Exclusive Economic Zone and Maritime Boundaries [extracts only] (10 August 1995) 691 Document 116: Presidential Proclamation No 7219: The Contiguous Zone of the United States (2 September 1999) 696 PART 4: DELIMITATION AGREEMENTS697 Norway—USSR/Russian Federation699 Document 117: Agreement between the Royal Norwegian Government and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the sea frontier between Norway and the USSR in the Varangerfjord (15 February 1957) 699 Document 118: Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Kingdom of Norway on delimitation on the Maritime Delimitation in the Varangerfjord area (11 July 2007) 700 Document 119: Agreement between Norway and the Soviet Union on a Temporary Practical Arrangement for Fishing in an Adjacent Area in the Barents Sea with Attached Protocol (‘Grey Zone Agreement’) (11 January 1978)  701 Document 120: Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Kingdom of Norway concerning maritime delimitation and cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean (15 September 2010)  702

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Document 121: Joint Statement on Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean (27 April 2010) 708 Denmark (Greenland)—Iceland—Norway (Jan Mayen)711 Document 122: Agreement between Iceland and Norway on Fishery and Continental Shelf Questions (28 May 1980) 711 Document 123: Agreement between Iceland and Norway on the Continental Shelf Between Iceland and Jan Mayen (22 October 1981) 714 Document 124: Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf and the Boundary Between the Fisheries Zone in the Area Between Jan Mayen and Greenland (18 December 1995) 716 Document 125: Additional Protocol to the Agreement of 18 December 1995 between the Kingdom of Norway and the Kingdom of Denmark concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the Area between Jan Mayen and Greenland and the Boundary between the Fishery Zones in the Area (11 November 1997) 718 Document 126: Additional Protocol to the Agreement of 28 May 1980 between Norway and Iceland concerning Fishery and Continental Shelf Questions and the Agreement derived therefrom of 22 October 1981 on the Continental Shelf between Jan Mayen and Iceland (11 November 1997) 719 Document 127: Agreement between Norway and Iceland concerning Transboundary Hydrocarbon Deposits (3 November 2008) 719 Document 128: Agreed Minutes concerning the Right of Participation pursuant to Articles 5 and 6 of the Agreement of 22 October 1981 between Norway and Iceland on the Continental Shelf in the Area between Iceland and Jan Mayen (3 November 2008) 723 Denmark (Faroe Islands)—Iceland—Norway725 Document 129: Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the Area between the Faroe Islands and Norway and concerning the Boundary between the Fishery Zone near the Faroe Islands and the Norwegian Economic Zone (15 June 1979) 725 Document 130: Agreement between the Government of Iceland on the One Hand And the Kingdom of Denmark and the Regional Government of the Faroe Islands on the Other Hand On the Maritime Boundary in The Area Between the Faroe Islands and Iceland [unofficial translation] (1/2 February 2007) 726 Document 131: Agreed Minutes on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles between the Faroe Islands, Iceland and Norway in the Southern Part of the Banana Hole of the Northeast Atlantic (20 September 2006) 729

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Document 132: Letter of the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Denmark to the United Nations Secretary-General (15 June 2009) 731 Denmark (Greenland)—Canada733 Document 133: Agreement between the Kingdom of Denmark and Canada relating to the delimitation of the continental shelf between Greenland and Canada (17 December 1973) 733 Document 134: Exchange of Notes Constituting an Agreement to Amend the Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark Relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Between Greenland and Canada Done at Ottawa on 17 December 1973 (5/20 April 2004) 735 Document 135: Canada and Kingdom of Denmark reach Tentative Agreement on Lincoln Sea Boundary (28 November 2012) 743 Denmark (Greenland)—Iceland745 Document 136: Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark together with the Greenland Home Rule Government, on the one hand, and the Government of the Republic of Iceland, on the other hand, concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf and the fishery zones in the area between Greenland and Iceland (11 November 1997) 745 Document 137: Agreed Minutes on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles between Greenland and Iceland in the Irminger Sea (16 January 2013) 746 Document 138: Letter of the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Denmark to the United Nations Secretary-General of the United Nations (17 January 2013) 748 Document 139: Letter of the Permanent Mission of Iceland to the United Nations Secretary-General (17 January 2013) 749 Denmark (Greenland)—Norway (Svalbard)751 Document 140: Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Norway on the one hand, and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark together with the Home Rule Government of Greenland on the other hand, concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf and the fisheries zones in the area between Greenland and Svalbard (20 February 2006) 751 United States—USSR/Russian Federation753 Document 141: Agreement on the maritime boundary between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1 June 1990) 753 Document 142: Agreement based on an exchange of notes between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to abide by the terms of the Maritime Boundary Agreement of 1 June 1990, pending entry into force (1 June 1990) 755 Document 143: Message to the Senate Transmitting the Soviet Union-United States Maritime Boundary Agreement (26 September 1990) 755

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Document 144: Order of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation No 2880-III GD on the Consequences of the Application of the Maritime Boundary Agreement Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Line of Demarcation of Maritime Spaces of 1990 for the National Interests of the Russian Federation [unofficial translation] (14 June 2002) 756 PART 5: NATIONAL SUBMISSIONS TO THE ­COMMISSION ON THE LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF ­CONCERNING ARCTIC TERRITORIAL CLAIMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS759 Russian Federation761 Document 145: Continental Shelf Submission of the Russian Federation: Executive Summary [extracts only; unofficial translation] (20 December 2001) 761 Document 146: Statement of the Deputy Minister for Natural Resources of the ­Russian Federation during the presentation of the submission made by the Russian Federation to the Commission, UN Doc CLCS/31 [extracts only] (28 March 2002) 761 Document 147: Note Verbale from Canada on the Russian Submission (18 January 2002) 768 Document 148: Note Verbale from Denmark on the Russian Submission (4 February 2002) 769 Document 149: Note Verbale from the United States on the Russian Submission (28 February 2002) 770 Document 150: Note Verbale from Norway on the Russian Submission (20 March 2002) 774 Document 151: Partial Revised Submission of the Russian Federation in respect to the continental shelf of the Russian Federation in the Arctic Ocean: Executive Summary [extracts only] (3 August 2015) 776 Document 152: Note Verbale from Denmark on the Russian Submission (7 October 2015) 792 Document 153: Note Verbale from the United States on the Russian Submission (30 October 2015) 793 Document 154: Note Verbale from Canada on the Russian Submission (30 November 2015) 794 Denmark796 Document 155: Partial Continental Shelf Submission of Denmark together with the Faroes concerning the area north of the Faroe Islands: Executive Summary [extracts only] (29 April 2009) 796 Document 156: Note Verbale from Iceland on the Danish Submission (15 June 2009) 799 Document 157: Note Verbale from Norway on the Danish Submission (7 July 2009) 800 Document 158: Recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in regard to the Partial Submission of the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark together with the Government of the Faroes in respect to the area north of the Faroe Islands [extracts only] (12 March 2014) 801 xvi

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Document 159: Partial Continental Shelf Submission of Denmark, together with Greenland, on the Limits of the Southern Continental Shelf of Greenland: Executive Summary [extracts only] (14 June 2012) 809 Document 160: Note Verbale from Canada on the Danish Submission (15 June 2012) 813 Document 161: Partial Continental Shelf Submission of Denmark, together with Greenland, on the Limits of the North-Eastern Continental Shelf of Greenland: Executive Summary [extracts only] (26 November 2013) 814 Document 162: Note Verbale from Norway on the Danish Submission (21 January 2014) 818 Document 163: Partial Continental Shelf Submission of Denmark, together with Greenland, on the Limits of the Northern Continental Shelf of Greenland: Executive Summary [extracts only] (15 December 2014) 819 Document 164: Comment by the Russian Foreign Ministry on the filing of Denmark’s claim to the Arctic continental shelf (16 December 2014) 825 Document 165: Note Verbale from Norway on the Danish Submission (17 December 2014) 826 Document 166: Note Verbale from Canada on the Danish Submission (29 December 2014) 827 Document 167: Note Verbale from Russia on the Danish Submission (21 July 2015) 828 Document 168: Note Verbale from the United States on the Danish Submission (30 October 2015) 829 Norway830 Document 169: Continental Shelf Submission of Norway in respect of areas in the Arctic Ocean, the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea: Executive Summary [extracts only] (27 November 2006) 830 Document 170: Note Verbale from Denmark on the Norwegian Submission (24 January 2007) 837 Document 171: Note Verbale from Iceland on the Norwegian Submission (29 January 2007) 838 Document 172: Note Verbale from the Russian Federation on the Norwegian Submission (21 February 2007) 839 Document 173: Summary of the Recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in regard to the Submission made by Norway in respect of areas in the Arctic Ocean, the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea [extracts only] (27 March 2009) 840 Canada857 Document 174: Preliminary Information concerning the outer limits of the continental shelf of Canada in the Arctic Ocean (6 December 2013) 857 PART 6: ARCTIC SHIPPING859 Document 175: IMO Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-Covered Areas [extracts only] (23 December 2002) 861 Document 176: IMO Guidelines on Enhanced Contingency Planning Guidance for Passenger Ships Operating in Areas Remote from SAR Facilities (31 May 2006) 883 xvii

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Document 177: IMO Guidelines on Voyage Planning for Passenger Ships Operating in Remote Areas (29 November 2007) Document 178: IMO Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar Waters [extracts only] (2 December 2009) Document 179: IMO International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code) (21 November 2014/15 May 2015) Document 180: Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic [extracts only] (12 May 2011) Document 181: International Hydrographic Organization, Statutes of the Arctic Regional Hydrographic Commission (6 October 2010)

884 886 903 934 944

PART 7: ARCTIC FISHERIES953 International Agreements955 Multilateral Agreements955 Document 182: Convention for the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (12 September 1964) 955 Document 183: Convention on Conduct of Fishing Operations in the North Atlantic [extracts only] (1 June 1967) 958 Document 184: Convention on the Future Multilateral Cooperation in Northwest ­Atlantic Fisheries (24 October 1978) 965 Document 185: Amendment to the Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (28 September 2007) 976 Document 186: Convention on the Future Multilateral Cooperation in North-East Atlantic Fisheries (18 November 1980) 992 Document 187: Convention for the Conservation of Salmon in the North Atlantic Ocean (2 March 1982) 1002 Document 188: Convention for the Conservation of Anadromous Stocks in the North Pacific Ocean (11 February 1992) 1010 Document 189: Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pollock ­Resources in the Central Bering Sea (16 June 1994) 1019 Bilateral Agreements1027 Document 190: Convention for the Preservation of the Halibut Fishery of the North Pacific Ocean and the Bering Sea (2 March 1953) 1027 Document 191: Joint Statement between US President Herbert W Bush and ­Russia’s President Boris Jelzin on The Need for Voluntary Suspension on ­Fishing in the Central Bering Sea (17 June 1992) 1030 Document 192: Agreement between Norway and the Union of Soviet Socialist ­Republics on co-operation in the fishing industry (11 April 1975) 1031 Document 193: Agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway concerning mutual relations in the field of fisheries (15 October 1976) 1032 Document 194: Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Their Mutual Fisheries Relations (19 May 1976) 1035

xviii

Contents

Document 195: Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Mutual Fisheries ­Relations (1 May 1984) 1039 Document 196: Agreement between the Government of the United States and the ­Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Mutual Fisheries Relations (31 May 1988) 1043 Document 197: Diplomatic Note from the United States to the USSR concerning ­fisheries (24 January 1977) 1047 Document 198: Diplomatic Note from the USSR to the United States concerning ­fisheries (24 February 1977) 1048 Document 199: Diplomatic Note from the USSR to the United States concerning ­fisheries (18 April 1977) 1048 Document 200: Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada on Fisheries Enforcement (26 September 1990) 1049 Document 201: Agreement between Denmark on behalf of Greenland and Norway concerning mutual fisheries relations (9 June 1992) 1050 Document 202: Agreement concerning mutual fisheries relations between Denmark (also on behalf of Greenland) and the Russian Federation (7 March 1992) 1052 Document 203: Agreement between the Government of Canada and the ­Government of the Kingdom of Norway on Fisheries Conservation and ­Enforcement (20 June 1995) 1055 Document 204: Agreement between the Government of Iceland, the Government of Norway and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning Certain Aspects of Co-operation in the Area of Fisheries (Loophole Agreement) (15 May 1999) 1057 Document 205: Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation for the Purposes of Preventing, Deterring and ­Eliminating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (11 September 2015) 1060 Policy Documents and National Instruments1065 Document 206: United States, A Joint Resolution directing the United States to initiate international discussions and take necessary steps with other Nations to negotiate an agreement for managing migratory and transboundary fish stocks in the Arctic Ocean (3 June 2008) 1065 Document 207: Chair’s summary of the meeting of senior officials of the five coastal States of the Arctic Ocean in Chelsea: On Arctic Fisheries (22 June 2010) 1066 Document 208: Chair’s summary of the meeting of senior officials of the five coastal States of the Arctic Ocean in Washington DC: On Arctic Fisheries (1 May 2013) 1067 Document 209: Chair’s summary of the meeting of senior officials of the five coastal States of the Arctic Ocean in Nuuk: On Arctic Fisheries (26 February 2014) 1068 xix

Contents

Document 210: Oslo Declaration concerning the Prevention of Unregulated High Seas Fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean (16 July 2015) Document 211: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iceland, Due to “5-state consultation” on fishing in the Arctic Ocean (23 July 2015) Document 212: Chairman’s Statement from Arctic High Seas Fisheries Meeting (21 April 2016) Document 213: Chairman’s Statement from Arctic High Seas Fisheries Meeting (8 July 2016) Document 214: Industry Group Agreement to Cod fishery in the northern part of North-East Atlantic (FAO area 27, ICES division IIb2 and Ib) (25 April 2016) Document 215: Canada, Fishing Zones of Canada (Zone 6) Order 1977 Document 216: Canada, Coastal Fisheries Protection Act as amended in 1994 Document 217: Council of the European Communities, Note Verbale to Canada ­concerning the Coastal Fisheries Protection Law adopted on 12 May 1994 (10 June 1994) Document 218: Diplomatic Note from the US Embassy in Ottawa to the Government of Canada in response to Canada on Custodial Fisheries Enforcement/Jurisdiction [extracts only] (1994)

1070 1072 1073 1075 1076 1078 1083 1092 1094

PART 8: PROTECTION OF THE ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT1095 International Instruments1097 General Marine Environment1097 Document 219: Arctic Council, Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (14 June 1991) 1097 Document 220: Discussion Note of the Arctic Environment Ministers Meeting: Arctic Change—Global Effects [extracts only] (5/6 February 2013) 1115 Document 221: Joint Statement of the Arctic States on Climate Change and the Arctic (31 August 2015) 1126 Document 222: Agreement on Cooperation in Research, Conservation and Management of Marine Mammals in the North Atlantic (9 April 1992) 1127 Document 223: Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (22 September 1992) 1129 Document 224: Convention on the Protection of the Environment between Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden (Nordic Environmental Protection Convention) (19 February 1974) 1152 Document 225: Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Kingdom of Denmark for Cooperation Relating to the Marine Environment (26 August 1983) 1156 Document 226: Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Prevention of Pollution of the Environment in the Arctic (16 December 1994) 1164

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Contents

Document 227: Declaration among the Department of Defense of the United States of America, the Royal Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of Norway, and the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, on Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation (26 September 1996) 1167 Biodiversity1170 Polar Bears 1170 Document 228: Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears (15 November 1973) 1170 Document 229: Polar Bear Range States Meeting Summary at Shepherdstown, USA (28 June 2007) 1172 Document 230: Outcome of the first meeting of the five signatories of the Polar Bear Agreement since signing the 1973 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears (19 March 2009) 1176 Document 231: Outcome of the Meeting of the Parties to the 1973 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears (26 October 2011) 1181 Document 232: Outcome of the Meeting of the Parties to the 1973 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears (4–6 December 2013) 1186 Document 233: Declaration of the Responsible Ministers of the Polar Bear Range States (4–6 December 2013) 1190 Document 234: Outcome of the Meeting of the Parties to the 1973 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears (3 September 2015) 1193 Document 235: Inuvialuit-Inupiat Polar Bear Management Agreement in the Southern Beaufort Sea (3 August 2011) 1197 Document 236: Agreement between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on the Conservation and Management of the Alaska-Chukotka Polar Bear Population (16 October 2000) 1200 Document 237: Memorandum of Understanding between Environment Canada and the US Department of the Interior for the conservation and management of shared polar bear populations (8 May 2008) 1205 Document 238: Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Canada, the Government of Nunavut, and the Government of Greenland for the Conservation and Management of Polar Bear Populations (30 October 2009) 1206 Seals1207 Document 239: Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of Norway on Sealing and the Conservation of the Seal Stocks in the Northwest Atlantic (15 July 1971) 1207 Document 240: Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of Norway Amending the Agreement of July 15, 1971 on Sealing and the Conservation of Seal Stocks in the Northwest Atlantic (8 December 1975) 1209 Document 241: Agreement on the protection and exploitation of the seal stocks in the Northeast Atlantic between Norway and the Soviet Union based on the exchange of diplomatic notes [unofficial translation] (12 April 1983) 1211 xxi

Contents

Whales1212 Document 242: International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (2 December 1946) 1212 Document 243: Inuvialuit Inupiat Beaufort Sea Beluga Whale Agreement (3 March 2000) 1217 Caribou1218 Document 244: Porcupine Caribou Management Agreement (26 October 1985) 1218 Document 245: Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America on the Conservation of the Porcupine Caribou Herd (17 July 1987) 1228 Document 246: IUCN, Protecting the Habitat of the Porcupine Caribou Herd (October 1996) 1231 Birds1232 Document 247: Convention between the United States and the United Kingdom for the protection of migratory birds in the United States and Canada (16 August 1916) 1232 Document 248: Convention between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the Conservation of Migratory Birds and their Environment (19 November 1976) 1237 Marine Oil Pollution and Air-borne Pollution1242 Document 249: Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Norway and the Government of the Russian Federation on cooperation to combat oil-spills in the Barents Sea (28 April 1994) 1242 Document 250: Agreement between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden concerning Cooperation in taking Measures against Pollution of the Sea by Oil or Other Harmful Substances (29 March 1993) 1245 Document 251: Canada, Declaration upon accession to the Protocol of 1978 relating to MARPOL (16 November 1992) 1249 Document 252: United States, Note Verbale in response to Canada’s Declaration [extracts only] (18 November 1993) 1250 Document 253: Communication to IMO from Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom [extracts only] (1993) 1250 Document 254: Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (15 May 2013) 1251 Document 255: Arctic Council, Framework Plan for Cooperation on Prevention of Oil Pollution from Petroleum and Maritime Activities in the Marine Areas of the Arctic (25 April 2015) 1258 Document 256: Arctic Council, Enhanced Black Carbon and Methane Emissions Reductions: An Arctic Council Framework for Action (25 April 2015) 1258 Miscellaneous Policy Documents and National Instruments1259 Document 257: Resolution of Cooperation between the Secretariats of the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna Working Group (14 April 2009) 1259 xxii

Contents

Document 258: Resolution of Cooperation between the Secretariats of the Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds and the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna Working Group (12 July 2012) 1261 Document 259: Resolution of Cooperation between the Secretariats of the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands and the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna Working Group (16 July 2012) 1263 Document 260: Resolution of Cooperation between the Secretariats of the Convention on Migratory Species of Wild Animals and the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna Working Group (29 April 2013) 1264 Document 261: Statement of Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States to the Diplomatic Conference on the Minamata Convention on Mercury (10 October 2013) 1267 Document 262: Canada, Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act 1970 1268 Document 263: Transcript of Canada’s Prime Minister Trudeau’s remarks to the press following the introduction of legislation on Arctic pollution, territorial sea and the fishing zones in the Canadian House of Commons (8 April 1970) 1280 Document 264: Memorandum from Executive Secretary of the US Department of State Theodore L Eliot, Jr to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger on Imminent Canadian Legislation on the Arctic (12 March 1970) 1283 Document 265: Memorandum from the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Johnson to President Nixon (21 March 1970) 1286 Document 266: US Department of State, Press Release No 121: Formal protest against the extension of Canadian territorial waters to twelve miles and the Arctic Waters Pollution Act (15 April 1970) 1287 Document 267: Diplomatic Note from the Embassy of Canada in Washington to the US State Department (16 April 1970) 1288 Document 268: Diplomatic Note from the US State Department to the Embassy of Canada in Washington (5 May 1970) 1293 Document 269: Canadian Declaration Concerning the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (7 April 1970) 1295 Document 270: Letter from the Legal Bureau of the Canadian Department of External Affair: Canadian Sovereignty over Sea Pollution Control Zones (27 February 1973) 1296 Document 271: Declaration by Canada recognizing as compulsory the jurisdiction of the ICJ, in conformity with Art 36, para 2, Statute of the International Court of Justice (10 May 1994) 1297 Document 272: Canada, Shipping Safety Control Zones Order (1978/2010)1298 Document 273: Canada, Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulations (NORDREG) (1 July 2010) 1302 Document 274: Diplomatic Note from the United States to Canada regarding NORDREG (19 March 2010) 1305

xxiii

Contents

Document 275: Diplomatic Note from the United States to Canada regarding NORDREG (18 August 2010) Document 276: IMO, Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on the Canadian NORDREG reporting system [extracts only] (31 August 2010) Document 277: IMO, Safety of Navigation. Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulation, Comments submitted by the United States and INTERTANKO (22 September 2010) Document 278: IMO, Safety of Navigation. Comments on document MSC 88/11/2 submitted by Canada (5 October 2010) Document 279: IMO, Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Eighty-Eighty Session on the Canadian NORDREG reporting system [extracts only] (15 December 2010) Document 280: Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on Measures for Securing the Implementation of the Edict of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet of 26 November 1984 “On Intensifying Nature Protection in Areas of the Extreme North and Marine Areas Adjacent to the Northern Coast of the U.S.S.R.” (1 June 1990)

1307 1308 1310 1313 1316

1320

PART 9: PROTECTION OF ARCTIC INDIGENOUS PEOPLES1321 International (Draft) Treaties1323 Document 281: Lapp Codicil, Supplement to the Frontier Treaty between the Kingdoms of Norway and Sweden concerning the Lapps [unofficial translation] (21 September/2 October 1751) 1323 Document 282: The Nordic Language Convention (17 June 1981) 1330 Document 283: Proposed Nordic Saami Convention (2008) 1332 Policy Documents1345 Document 284: Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (Canada) and the State ­Committee on Northern Affairs of the Russian Federation concerning ­Cooperation on Aboriginal and Northern Development (29 February 2000) 1345 Document 285: Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Arctic Sovereignty (28 April 2009) 1347 Document 286: Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada and the Department of the Interior of the United States of America concerning Indigenous and Northern Issues (29 March 2010) 1352 Document 287: Canada’s Statement of Support on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (12 November 2010) 1353 Document 288: Announcement of US Support for the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Initiatives to Promote the Government-to-Government Relationship & Improve the Lives of Indigenous Peoples (16 December 2010) 1355 Document 289: Joint Statement by Canada and the European Union on Access to the European Union of Seal Products from Indigenous Communities of Canada (18 August 2014) 1368 xxiv

Contents

PART 10: ARCTIC DISPUTES1371 Northwest Passage1373 Document 290: Canada, Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs: ­Canadian Position in relation to Arctic Waters: Passage of the United States Ship Seadragon (10 June 1960) 1373 Document 291: Canadian Interdepartmental Committee on Territorial Waters to the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Territorial ­Waters Passage of the United States Ship Seadragon through the ­Arctic Archipelago (8 June 1960)  1373 Document 292: Telegram 1117 from the Canadian Ambassador to the US Secretary of State concerning the passage of the United States Ship Seadragon through the Arctic Archipelago (28 April 1960) 1374 Document 293: Diplomatic Note from the Canadian Department of External Affairs to the US Embassy in Ottawa concerning the transit of the United States Coast Guard Cutter Polar Sea (31 July 1985) 1374 Document 294: Diplomatic Note from the US Embassy in Ottawa to the Canadian Department of External Affairs concerning the transit of the United States Coast Guard Cutter Polar Sea (24 June 1985) 1375 Document 295: Diplomatic Note from the Canadian Department of External Affairs to the US Embassy in Ottawa concerning the transit of the United States Coast Guard Cutter Polar Sea [extracts only] (11 June 1985) 1376 Document 296: Diplomatic Note from the US Embassy in Ottawa to the Canadian Department of External Affairs concerning the transit of the United States Coast Guard Cutter Polar Sea [extracts only] (21 May 1985) 1377 Document 297: Report concerning the transit of Polar Sea written by James W Dyer, Acting Assistant US Secretary for Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs (26 January 1986) 1378 Document 298: Statement No 85/49 in the House of Commons by the Canadian ­Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark on Canadian ­Sovereignty [excerpts only] (10 September 1985) 1378 Document 299: Canada, Department of External Affairs, Legal Briefing on Arctic Sovereignty (21 May 1987) 1381 Document 300: Diplomatic Note from the US Embassy in Ottawa to the Canadian Department of External Affairs concerning the transit of United States Coast Guard Cutter Polar Star through the Northwest Passage (10 October 1988) 1382 Document 301: Diplomatic Note from the Canadian Department of External Affairs to the US Embassy in Ottawa concerning the transit of United States Coast Guard Cutter Polar Star through the Northwest Passage (10 October 1988) 1383

xxv

Contents

Document 302: Official letter from David Wilkins, US Ambassador in Canada, to Peter Boehm, Assistant Deputy Minister, Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs & International Trade regarding the transit of United States Coast Guard Cutter Healy through the Northwest Passage [extracts only] (27 October 2006) 1384 Northern Sea Route1387 Document 303: Aide-Mémoire from the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the US Embassy in Moscow [extracts only] (21 July 1964) 1387 Document 304: Aide Mémoire from the US Department of State Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs [extracts only] (22 June 1965) 1387 Document 305: Note from the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs to US Embassy in Moscow concerning the voyage of United States Coast Guard Cutter Northwind (27 October 1965) 1388 Document 306: Reply from the US Embassy in Moscow to the Note from the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the voyage of United States Coast Guard Cutter Northwind (26 November 1965) 1388 Document 307: Note from the US State Department to the Soviet Embassy in ­Washington concerning the voyages of the United States Coast Guard Cutters Edisto and East Wind (14 August 1967) 1389 Document 308: Reply from the Soviet Embassy in Washington to the Note from the US State Department concerning the voyages of the United States Coast Guard Cutters Edisto and East Wind (25 August 1967) 1389 Document 309: Message from the United States Coast Guard Cutter Edisto to Coastal Radio Station of USSR at Dikson (28 August 1967) 1390 Document 310: USSR Ministry of Merchant Marine, Oral Démarche to the United States Coast Guard Cutter Edisto (28 August 1967) 1390 Document 311: Diplomatic Note from the US Government to the USSR Government regarding the circumnavigation of the Arctic by the ­United States Coast Guard Cutters Edisto and Eastwind [extracts only] (30 August 1967) 1391 Document 312: US State Department Summary of the incident concerning the voyages of the United States Coast Guard Cutters Edisto and Eastwind (31 August 1967) 1392 Document 313: Joint Statement by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Uniform Interpretation of Rules of International Law Governing Innocent Passage (23 September 1989) 1393 Document 314: Russian Federation, Federal Law No 132-FZ On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation Concerning State Regulation of Merchant Shipping on the Water Area of the Northern Sea Route [unofficial translation] (3 July 2012) 1394 Document 315: Russian Federation, Rules of Navigation in the water area of the Northern Sea Route [unofficial translation] (17 January 2013) 1397 Document 316: Russian Federation, Rules of the application of tariffs for the ­icebreaker escorting of ships in the water area of the Northern Sea Route [unofficial translation] (4 March 2014) 1407 xxvi

Contents

Document 317: Russian Federation, Decree No 813, Rules of the repeatedly crossing by foreign ships of the State Border of the Russian Federation without border, customs (as to the accomplishment of customs operations in connection with the arrival (departure) of ships) and other forms of control (15 August 2014) 1409 Svalbard Archipelago [Spitsbergen]1415 Document 318: Treaty concerning the Archipelago of Spitsbergen (9 February 1920) 1415 Document 319: Norway, Royal Decree relating to a Fisheries Protection Zone around Svalbard [unofficial translation] (3 June 1977, as amended 28 June 2001) 1421 Document 320: Norway, Royal Decree: Regulations relating to the limits of the Norwegian territorial sea around Svalbard (1 June 2001) 1422 Document 321: Soviet Union, On the question of Spitsbergen (15 January 1947) 1422 Document 322: United States, National Security Decision Memoranda 325: United States Policy toward Svalbard (20 April 1976) 1423 Document 323: Aide-Mémoire from the US State Department to the Norwegian Ambassador to the US Sommerfelt (7 May 1976) 1424 Document 324: Aide Mémoire from the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway (27 August 1970) 1426 Document 325: Cable of the US Embassy to The Hague on the Dutch Attitude on ­Svalbard (13 February 1975) 1427 Document 326: Cable of the US Embassy to Brussels on the Belgian Attitude on ­Svalbard (3 November 1975) 1428 Document 327: Cable of the US Embassy to Copenhagen on the Danish Attitude on Svalbard (7 November 1975) 1429 Document 328: Cable of the US Embassy to Luxemburg on Luxemburg’s Position on Svalbard (12 November 1975) 1430 Document 329: Cable of the US Embassy to Ankara on the Turkish Position on ­Svalbard (12 November 1975) 1430 Document 330: Note Verbale from the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway (15 June 1977) 1431 Document 331: Note Verbale No 00146 from the EC Commission, Directorate General of Fishing, to the Mission of Norway at the European ­Communities concerning fishing rights around Svalbard [unofficial translation] (19 July 1977) 1431 Document 332: Note Verbale from the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway (29 April 1982) 1432 Document 333: Note Verbale from the Norwegian Mission to the EC Commission, ­Directorate General of Fishing, concerning fishing around Svalbard (10 July 1986) 1433 Document 334: Note Verbale No 02337 from the EC Commission, Directorate ­General of Fishing, to the Mission of Norway at the EC concerning fishing rights around Svalbard [unofficial translation] (30 July 1986) 1434

xxvii

Contents

Document 335: Note Verbale of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway (14 June 1988) 1435 Document 336: Note Verbale of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Norway to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway (17 July 1998) 1436 Document 337: Note Verbale of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway to the E ­ mbassy of the Russian Federation (19 August 1998) 1437 Document 338: United Kingdom, Position concerning Svalbard’s continental shelf (2 July 1986) 1438 Document 339: Position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iceland on the Status of Maritime Expanses Adjacent to Spitsbergen (30 March 2006) 1439 Document 340: Note Verbale of the Government of Spain on the Norwegian S ­ ubmission to the CLCS (3 March 2007) 1440 Document 341: Note Verbale of Norway in reply to the Note Verbale from Spain on the Norwegian Submission (28 March 2007) 1441 Document 342: Comment by Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Alexander ­Lukashevich on Norway’s response to Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin’s visit to Svalbard archipelago (20 April 2015) 1441 Document 343: Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Comment on Norway’s measures to limit access to Svalbard Archipelago (10 August 2015) 1442 Hans Island1443 Document 344: Peter Bruckner, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Letter to the ­Editor on Hans Island, Kennedy Channel (18 January 1984) 1443 Document 345: Ambassador of Denmark Poul E D Kristensen to Canada/Ottawa, Letter to the Editor, ‘The Hans Island issue’ (28 July 2005) 1443 Document 346: Joint Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, Pierre S Pettigrew, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Per Stig Møller (19 September 2005) 1445 Sverdrup Islands1447 Document 347: Exchange of Notes Regarding the Recognition by the Norwegian Government of the Sovereignty of His Majesty over the Sverdrup I­ slands (8 August/30 November 1930) 1447 Bering Sea1451 Document 348: Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist ­Republics ­concerning Cooperation in Combating Pollution in the ­Bering and Chukchi Seas in Emergency Situations (11 May 1989) 1451 Document 349: Joint Statement between US President Herbert W Bush and Russia’s President Boris Jelzin on Research and Conservation of the Bering Sea Ecosystem (17 June 1992) 1454 Document 350: Joint Statement of the President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Bering Strait Region (26 May 2011) 1454 xxviii

Contents

Document 351: Joint Statement of Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on Cooperation in the Bering Strait Region (8 September 2012) 1455 Document 352: Draft Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Symbolically Linking National Parks in the Bering Strait Region (23 October 2015) 1456 Beaufort Sea1459 Document 353: Convention between Great Britain and Russia concerning the Limits of their Respective Possessions on the North-West Coast of America and the Navigation of the Pacific Ocean (28 February 1825) 1459 Document 354: Treaty for the Cession by Russia to the United States of all Territory and Dominion possessed by Russia, on the Continent of America, and the Adjacent Islands (30 March 1867) 1461 Document 355: Letter from LT Hoffmann, Bureau of Land Management. United States of the Interior, to DG Crosby, Department of Northern Affairs and Natural Resources of Canada (14 May 1965) 1464 Document 356: Letter from the Canadian Department of Northern Affairs and ­National Resources to the United States Department of the Interior (16 June 1965) 1465 Document 357: Diplomatic Note No 103 from the US Embassy in Ottawa to Canada’s Department of External Affairs (20 May 1976) 1466 Document 358: Diplomatic Note No 626 from the Embassy of Canada in Washington to the US Department of State [extracts only] (22 December 1976) 1467 Document 359: Diplomatic Note from the US Department of State to the Embassy of Canada in Washington [extracts only] (16 February 1977) 1468 Document 360: Diplomatic Note No 221 from the Embassy of Canada in Washington to the US Department of State [extracts only] (26 May 1977) 1469 Document 361: Diplomatic Note from the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade pertaining to federal register ­notification of lease sales in the Beaufort Sea (27 February 2003) 1471 Document 362: Reaction from the United States, to Note Verbale of the Embassy of Canada concerning the ‘Beaufort Sea Areawide 2004 Competitive Oil and Gas Lease Sale’ (2004) 1472 Document 363: Alaska Department of Natural Resources, Proposed Beaufort Sea areawide oil and gas lease sale: [extracts only] (2 April 2009) 1473 Document 364: Member of Canadian Parliament Larry Bagnell asks the Canadian Government critical questions with regard to US oil leases in the Canadian Beaufort Sea [extracts only] (30 November 2009) 1473 Index

1475

xxix

xxx

Abbreviations AC AEPS AEWA

ANWR ART AWPPA

Arctic Council Arctic Environment Protection Strategy Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program International Programme for International Military Environmental Co-operation in the Arctic Arctic National Wildlife Refuge Article Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act

BEAC BRC

Barents Euro-Arctic Council Barents Regional Council

CAFF CBD CGS CITES CLCS CO2 CTS

Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna Convention on Biological Diversity Coast Guard Station/Ship Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf Carbon Dioxide Consolidated Treaty Series

DEW

Distant Early Warning (line)

E EEZ

East Exclusive Economic Zone

FAO

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

ICC ICCAT ICES ICJ ICRW IHO ILM IMO IPC IPCC IPHC IPY ISA

Inuit Circumpolar Conference International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna International Council for the Exploration of the Sea International Court of Justice International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 1946 International Hydrographic Organization International Legal Materials International Maritime Organization International Polar Commission Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change International Pacific Halibit Commission International Polar Year International Seabed Authority

AMAP AMEC

xxxi

Abbreviations

ITLOS IUCN IUU IWC

International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (fishing) International Whaling Commission

LNTS LOSB

League of Nations Treaty Series Law of the Sea Bulletin

MARPOL 73/78 MEPC MOU MPA MSC

International Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto Marine Environmental Protection Committee Memorandum of Understanding Marine Protected Area Maritime Safety Committee

N NAFO NASCO NATO NGO NM NO NOAA NORDREG NPAFC NSR

North Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Non-Governmental Organization Nautical Mile Number National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commssion Northern Sea Route

OJ

Offical Journal of the European Union

PAME POPs PSC PSSA

Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment Persistent organic pollutants Pacific Salmon Commission Particular Sensitive Sea Area

RAIPON

Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and Far East

SOLAS SS

Safety of Life at Sea Convention 1974 Steamship

TAC TIAS

Total Allowable Catch Treaties and Other International Acts Series (US)

USN USSR

United States Navy Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

xxxii

Abbreviations

UK UN UNCLOS UNEP UNGA UNTS USCGC USS USSR

United Kingdom United Nations United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 United Nations Environmental Programme United Nations General Assembly United Nations Treaty Series United States Coast Guard Cutter United States ship Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

VMS

Vessel Monitoring System

WCPFC WGS WTO

Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission World Geodetic System World Trade Organization

xxxiii

Source: The World Factbook 2013–14 (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2013), www.cia.gov/ library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.htm.

xxxiv

Analytical Introduction Legal Framework In the course of the last few decades the Arctic has gained a prominent role in political and academic debate. It has become the subject of many disciplines reflecting the myriad environmental, social and economic issues concerning the High North. From a legal perspective, the most virulent questions are: What does the legal regime that applies to Arctic affairs look like? How does it work? Are there any regulatory gaps? And if so, how can they be filled? Unlike in Antarctica, where the legally binding Antarctic Treaty System1 ‘freezes’ sovereignty on land and governs international cooperation, no single comprehensive treaty guides Arctic affairs. Instead the legal regime of the Arctic is based on three pillars: public international law, domestic law, and soft law.2 These three pillars intersect and interact making the governance of the Arctic a very complex and multi-faceted issue. Although a plea for a negotiation of a special Arctic Treaty System3 is occasionally voiced, it was firmly rejected by the Arctic coastal States with the adoption of the Ilulissat Declaration in 2008 in which it was confirmed that—at least with regard to the marine Arctic—the existing body of the law of the sea provides ‘a solid foundation for responsible management by the five coastal states and other users of the Arctic Ocean through national implementation and application of relevant provisions.’ Thus there is ‘no need to develop a new comprehensive legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean.’4 Most academic commentators support the view underlining that ‘there was no need then and there is no need now for a formal instrument.’5 Hence it follows that the Arctic Ocean is first and foremost governed by the 1982 United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)6 and its two implementing agreements, the 1994 Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (Part XI Deep-Sea

1  Done at Washington, 1 December 1959; entered into force 23 June 1961; 402 UNTS 72. See generally B Saul and T Stephens, Antarctica in International Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2015). 2  But see ET Canuel who distinguishes between four pillars (international hard law, soft law, domestic law, transboundary private law) ‘The Four Arctic Law Pillars: A Legal Framework’ (2015) 46 Georgetown Journal of International Law 735. 3 See, eg: The European Parliament adopted a resolution on 9 October 2008 expressing its wish for negotiations designed ‘to lead to the adoption of an international treaty for the protection of the Arctic’ (Doc 35). The Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (Conference Statement, 5–7 September 2012, www. arcticparl.org/files/conferencestatement%2C-final-draft1-2.pdf) also urge for the development of a special Arctic Treaty. For a scholarly perspective: M Watson, ‘An Arctic Treaty: A Solution to the International Dispute over the Polar Region’ (2009) 14 Ocean and Coastal Law Journal 307, and T Koivurova and EJ Molenaar, International governance and regulation of the marine Arctic. Three reports produced for the WWF Arctic international programme (2009) 89. In 1992, the Arctic scholar D Pharand published a draft Arctic Treaty in (1992) 23 Revue générale de droit, 163, 190–195. 4  Ilulissat Declaration, Arctic Ocean Conference Ilulissat, Greenland, 27–29 May 2008, www.arcticgovernance. org/the-illulissat-declaration.4872424.html. 5  J Jabour, ‘Pharand’s Arctic Treaty. Would an Antarctic Treaty-Style Model Work in the Arctic?’ in S Lalonde and TL McCorman (eds), International Law and Politics of the Arctic Ocean. (Leiden, Brill Nijhoff, 2015) 87–107, 87. 6  Done at Montego Bay, 10 December 1982; entered into force 16 December 1994; 1833 UNTS 3.

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Mining Agreement)7, and the 1994 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (Fish Stocks Agreement).8 While Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and the Russian Federation have ratified the UNCLOS as well as both implementing agreements, the United States has only committed itself to the Fish Stocks Agreement. Nevertheless, the United States accepts the basic principles of the UNLCOS as reflecting customary international law and acts accordingly.9 Although the United States had shown interest in establishing a special legal regime for the Arctic region during informal consultations in preparation for the negotiations of UNCLOS, the Soviet Union ‘were negative, urged that Arctic question be kept out of LOS negotiations entirely, and that there could not be international regime for Arctic’ stressing ‘that it is not possible to separate land and marine interests in Arctic area as each affects other.’10 So even within the UNCLOS regime the Arctic is not addressed by name, but at least Part XII concerning the protection and preservation of the marine environment includes Article 234 on ‘Ice-Covered Areas’ which reads as follows: ‘Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. Such laws and regulations shall have due regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the marine environment based on the best available scientific evidence.’11 The wording might indicate that the provision deals with polar regions in general, covering both the Arctic and Antarctica. However, from the negotiation of Article 234 UNCLOS, which was conducted primarily by Canada, the United States, and the Soviet Union, it can be concluded that Article 234 UNCLOS was drafted with special regard to the Arctic Ocean and can be regarded as the ‘Arctic Exception’.12 So far both Canada and

7  Done at New York, 28 July 1994; entered into force provisionally 16 November 1994, definitely 28 July 1996; 1836 UNTS 42. 8  Done at New York, 4 August 1995, entered into force 11 December 2001; 2167 UNTS 88. 9  See eg JA Roach, ‘Today’s Customary International Law of the Sea’ (2014) 45 Ocean Development & International Law 239. The United States intends to ratify UNCLOS sooner or later, at least the last presidents as well a myriad of high officials and US American scholars are in favour of accession (former US Secretary of State H Rodham Clinton, ‘Statement on the UN Law of the Sea Convention’ in MH Nordquist et al, The Law of the Sea Convention. US Accession and Globalization [Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2012] 17). 10 LOS: US-Soviet consultations: May 13–15 (16 May 1974), Cable 1974MOSCOW07351_b, https:// wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974MOSCOW07351_b.html. 11  Done at Montego Bay, 10 December 1982; entered into force 16 December 1994; 1833 UNTS 3. 12 For an excellent analysis of Article 234 UNCLOS see K Bartenstein, ‘The “Arctic Exception” in the Law of the Sea Convention: A Contribution to Safer Navigation in the Northwest Passage?’ (2011) 42 Ocean Development & International Law 22 and P Luttmann, ‘Ice-Covered Areas under the Law of the Sea Convention: How extensive are Canada’s Coastal State Powers in the Arctic?’ (2015) 29 Ocean Yearbook 85. See also U Jenisch, ‘The Arctic Ocean and the New Law of the Sea’ in B Vukas (ed), Essays on the New Law of the Sea (Zagreb, Sveucillisnanaklada Liber, 1985).

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the Russian Federation have relied upon Article 234 UNCLOS for establishing special regimes for the protection of their respective Arctic marine environments.13 Arctic Definitions, Geography, and Ecosystem The term ‘Arctic’ has its roots in the Ancient Greek word ἀρκτικός (arktikós), meaning the region close to the constellation Great Bear that encompasses the Polaris Star located above the North Pole.14 Most of the Arctic is covered by the Arctic Ocean, which is, on the one hand, linked to the Pacific Ocean through a small passage in the Bering Strait and, on the other hand, connected to the Atlantic Ocean through the Greenland and Labrador Seas.15 It is 14,056,000 km2 in size and, with an average depth of 1,038 m, the shallowest ocean in the world. The Arctic Ocean by and large consists of the territorial waters and the EEZ of Canada, Denmark—by virtue of Greenland -, Norway, the Russian Federation, and the United States. Finland, Iceland, and Sweden do not adjoin the Arctic Ocean but their territories extend north of the Arctic Circle. Together they are often referred to as the Arctic Eight. Within the Arctic Ocean there are four high seas enclaves: the Banana Hole in the Norwegian Sea, the Donut Hole in the Central Bering Sea, the Loophole in the Barents Sea and finally the Central Arctic Ocean. While there is no universally accepted definition of the Arctic,16—as one author correctly observes: ‘Finding or choosing one definition of the Arctic to satisfy all purposes is nearly impossible.’17—it is most commonly described as the terrestrial and marine area north of the Arctic Circle (66° 34′N). However, the lower two-thirds of Alaska and the Bering Sea, which separates that part of Alaska from the Russian Federation, are not covered by this definition.18 The Faroe Islands and Iceland suffer the same fate. Although the Faroe Islands aim to be considered as belonging to the Arctic Circle, they are located about 4° south of what is currently considered the demarcation line of the Arctic Circle. A similar problem occurs with regard to Iceland, which has as a major policy goal to secure a seat at the table of the Arctic coastal States, based on the argument that the northern part of the Icelandic EEZ ‘falls within the Arctic and extends to the Greenland Sea adjoining the Arctic Ocean.’19 Other definitions of the Arctic are based on climatic or vegetational factors such as average temperature, meaning a region within which the average daily temperature in summer does not exceed 10°C (so-called Köppen-Geiger climate classification) or the

13 

See Part 8. SJ Hassol, Impacts of a warming Arctic: Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (Cambridge, CUP, 2004) 4. 15  V Golitsyn, ‘The Legal Regime of the Arctic’ in DJ Attard, M Fitzmaurice, and NA Martínez Gutiérrez (eds), The IMLI Manual on International Maritime Law Vol 1 (Oxford, OUP, 2014) 462. In 1953, the International Hydrographic Organization adopted a definition of the Arctic Ocean that is widely used. The definition is of no legal or political but only practical relevance [IHO, Limits of Oceans and Seas (Bremerhaven, 1953), 11 f]. 16  For a comprehensive discussion of multiple definitions see AMAP, Assessment Report: Arctic Pollution Issues (1998) chapter 2. 17  CAFF/HP Huntington (eds), Arctic Flora and Fauna: Status and Conservation (Helsinki, Edita, 2001) 14. 18  R O‘Rourke, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress (Washington DC, 2015) 1. 19  Doc 24. 14 

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northern tree line, which demarcates the northern limit of tree growth.20 While the 10 C° isotherm definition, for instance, excludes Finland, Sweden, and certain parts of Alaska, it covers the entire Bering Sea as well as the Aleutian Islands. In any case since Arctic definitions based on climate-related factors are not very reliable and ‘could circumscribe differing areas over time as a result of climate change’,21 they should be used with great caution. The broadest definition has been adopted by the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), which is a working group of the Arctic Council. It essentially includes ‘the terrestrial and marine areas north of the Arctic Circle (66°32’ N), and north of 62° N in Asia and 60° N in North America, modified to include the marine areas north of the Aleutian chain, Hudson Bay, and parts of the North Atlantic, including the Labrador Sea’.22 In accordance with this definition the Arctic marine area includes the Arctic Ocean, the adjacent Beaufort, Chucki, East Siberian, Laptev, Kara, and Barents Seas, the Nordic Greenland, Norwegian, and Iceland Seas, the Labrador Sea, Baffin Bay, Hudson Bay, the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, and the Bering Sea.23 In this collection, the term ‘Arctic’ will usually refer to the AMAP definition. When thinking of the Arctic, many people will picture an inhospitable area of perennial snow and ice, where the sun hardly shines in winter and barely sets in summer. It is hard to believe that plants and animals can exist at such a harsh if not hostile place. But they do and, in particular during the bright summer months, they do it in all their great diversity. The current record of Arctic species lists approximately 21,000 animals, plants and fungi.24 Whilst the flora ranges from collections of flowers with astonishing blooming beauty, like the Arctic poppy, to mosses, algae and lichens, trees are very rare in the tundra areas and more frequent in the boreal areas.25 The Arctic fauna can be divided into marine and terrestrial. The marine environment is not only inhabited by the iconic polar bear, but also by other groups of marine mammals, like seals and whales, and many different species of fish. In contrast the terrestrial fauna comprises about 67 species such as the caribou, arctic fox or lemming and, depending on the season, is populated by round about 200 bird species, most of them of migratory nature.26 Despite its vast biological diversity there is one unique feature of the fragile Arctic ecosystem that is common to all its parts: The fact that it is both highly sensitive and susceptible to outside interference, and subject to significant environmental stressors which originate from within as well as from outside the Arctic. But plants and animals are not the only living creatures in the Arctic. It is also home to almost 4 million people, of which 10 per cent are indigenous people of different groups and communities.27 Hence modern and traditional ways of life exist side by side and influence each other. In respect to living standards, health, income, and education, the disparities between indigenous and non-indigenous people in the Arctic have been

20 AMAP,

AMAP Assessment Report: Arctic Pollution Issues (Oslo, 1998) chapter 2, 9 f. R O’Rourke, Changes in the Arctic 2. 22 AMAP, Arctic Pollution Issues, chapter 2, 10. 23 AMAP, Arctic Pollution Issues, chapter 2, 20. 24  This includes all species living in the high or lower parts of the Arctic. 25 CAFF, Arctic Biodiversity Assessment. Status and trends in Arctic biodiversity (Akureyri, 2013) chapter 9. 26  For a comprehensive study see CAFF, Arctic Biodiversity Assessment. 27  Though the exact number depends on which Arctic definition is used and thus which boundary is drawn. 21 

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decreasing. While this can be regarded as a welcome improvement, at the same time it challenges the distinctive lifestyles and special traditions of indigenous peoples.28 This development is accelerated by the fact that the Arctic has experienced substantial change during recent decades. For though the Arctic land is still characterised by permafrost and the Arctic Ocean remains almost completely covered by sea ice during winter, due to increasing global warming the Arctic cryosphere is profoundly affected and sea-ice and glaciers partially melt in summer.29 It is observed that the Arctic Ocean will probably become completely ice free in 2030—or even earlier—for the first time in history.30 As a result, the bulk of hydrocarbon resources—oil, gas, coal, and rare earth minerals—which are presumed to be in parts of the Arctic seabed will become more and more accessible. According to an often cited 2008 US Geological Survey, around 10 per cent of the global hydrocarbon resources are located in the Arctic Circle and ‘[t]he total mean undiscovered conventional oil and gas resources of the Arctic are estimated to be approximately 90 billion barrels of oil, 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids.’31 Therefore the interest of industry and States in exploration and exploitation of these resources has been growing over the last decades but not without being accompanied by geopolitical, environmental and social concerns. Although the Arctic resource potential is very promising, the feasibility of their exploitation still remains debatable. Insufficient geological and geophysical knowledge of the polar offshore areas, as well as lack of modern infrastructure, require huge financial investments and further technological developments.32 In addition, the ‘Arctic Paradox’ leads to some crucial questions in relation to the exploitation of hydrocarbon resource, considering that the use of hydrocarbon resources accelerates climate warming, which leads to Arctic sea-ice melt, which in turn opens up the access to further oil and gas resources.33 Taking these factors into account it is worth asking whether extraction activities in the Arctic are too expensive and too risky and should be ceased for the foreseeable future. Documents in this Collection The instruments most relevant to contemporary Arctic governance are reproduced in this collection. Consistent with its focus on international arrangements, it omits multiple 28 For more sociological facts on the past, present and future Arctic population see T Heleniak and D Bogoyavlensky, ‘Arctic Populations and Migration’ in JN Larsen and G Fondahl (eds), Arctic Human Development Report II (Copenhagen, NCM, 2015) 53–104. 29  See on this topic AMAP, Arctic Climate Issues 2011: Changes in Arctic Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost (Oslo, 2012). 30  National Snow & Ice Data Center, ‘Arctic Sea Ice Shatters All Previous Record Lows’ (1 October 2007), www.nsidc.org/news/newsroom/2007_seaiceminimum/20071001_pressrelease.html; N Ahmed, ‘US Navy predicts summer ice free Arctic by 2016’, The Guardian (London, 9 December 2013), www.theguardian.com/environment/ earth-insight/2013/dec/09/us-navy-arctic-sea-ice-2016-melt. 31  USGS, Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle (2008) 4. Comprehensive D Mager, ‘Climate Change, Conflicts and Cooperation in the Arctic: Easier Access to Hydrocarbons and Mineral Resources?’ (2009) 24 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 347, 349–352; M Morgunova, Arctic Offshore Hydrocarbon Resource Development. Past, Present and Vision of the Future (Stockholm, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, 2015). 32 Morgunova, Arctic Offshore Hydrocarbon Resource Development 24 f. See also F Harvey, ‘Drilling for Arctic oil is not viable yet, says IEA chief ’, The Guardian (London, 18 September 2015), www.theguardian.com/ environment/2015/sep/18/arctic-oil-not-for-today-or-tomorrow-says-iea-chief-fatih-birol. 33  T Palosaari and N Tynkkynen, ‘Arctic securization and climate change’ in LC Jensen and G Hønneland (eds), Handbook of the Politics of the Arctic (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2015) 87–104, 91.

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domestic legal and policy instruments that are applicable to and relevant for the Arctic. As an exception to that rule, some of the national instruments purporting to support sovereign claims in the Arctic are therefore relevant from the perspective of public international law and have been included in this collection. For reasons of space, a further restriction had to be made: Except for documents that illustrate the historical emergence of regulatory interest in a specific subject, instruments no longer current have been left out. In any case, the present collection does not claim to be exhaustive. It rather aims to provide government officials, academics, students, and other interested parties with an accessible compendium of 364 documents. Some of these documents are published herein for the first time ever, or appear for the first time in an English translation. Notwithstanding the above, this publication cannot replace a consultation of the excellent monographic and collective works on various legal and politicals aspects of the Arctic that have been written by others.34 Part 1 sets out the latest official Arctic strategies adopted by the eight Arctic States and other interested actors and nations. Earlier strategy documents are sometimes included to illustrate the development of the respective national approach. Canada was one of the first States to adopt a coherent position towards the Arctic. It started in 1998 with a consultation paper entitled Toward A Northern Foreign Policy for Canada. In 2000, The Northern Dimension of Canada’s Foreign Policy was presented followed by Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future in 2009 and the Statement on Canada‘s Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada’s Northern Strategy Abroad one year later.35 Denmark published its Arctic strategy in 2011.36 Although its mainland is not located within the Arctic Circle, Denmark belongs to the group of Arctic coastal States by virtue

34  See, eg: G Osherenko and OR Young, The Age of the Arctic: Hot Conflicts and Cold Realities (Cambridge, CUP, 1989); DR Rothwell, The Polar Regions and the Development of International Law (Cambridge, CUP, 1996); A Manero Salvador, El deshielo del Ártico: Retos para el Derecho Internacional: La delimitación de los espacios marinos y la protección y preservación del medio ambiente (Cizur Menor, Aranzadi, 2011); G Labrecque, À qui l’Arctique? Droit international des frontières maritimes (Québec, Éditions Yvon Blais, 2012); M Byers, International Law and the Arctic (Cambridge, CUP, 2013); N Loukacheva (ed), Polar Law Textbook (Copenhagen, NCM, 2010); N Loukacheva (ed), Polar Law Textbook II (Copenhagen, NCM, 2013); N Loukacheva (ed), Polar Law and Resources (Copenhagen, NCM, 2015); RC Powell and K Dodds (eds), Polar Geopolitics? Knowledges, Resources and Legal Regimes (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2014); EJ Molenaar, AG Oude Elferink, and DR Rothwell (eds), The Law of the Sea and the Polar Regions. Interactions between Global and Regional Regimes (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2013); RW Murray and A Dey Nuttall (eds), International Relations and the Arctic: Understanding Policy and Governance (Amhurst, Cambria Press, 2014); LC Jensen and G Hønneland (eds), Handbook of the Politics of the Arctic (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2015); MH Nordquist, JN Moore, and R Long (eds), Challenges of the Changing Arctic. Continental Shelf, Navigation, and Fisheries (Leiden, Brill Nijhoff, 2016). There are some other document collections—though with a focus on the Canadian Arctic and the history of Arctic policy—which are highly recommended: P Kikkert and PW Lackenbauer, Legal Appraisals of Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty: Key Documents, 1905–56 (Calgary, Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, 2014); PW Lackenbauer and D Heidt, The Advisory Committee on Northern Development: Context and Meeting Minutes, 1948–66 (Calgary, Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, 2015); A Lajeunesse, Ice Islands in Canadian Policy, 1954–1971 (Calgary, Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, 2015). 35  Doc 1–4. 36  Doc 5. An insightful analysis of the Danish strategy is provided by M Nuttal, ‘Territory, Security and Sovereignty. The Kingdom of Denmark’s Arctic Strategy’ in RW Murray and AD Nuttall (eds) International Relations and the Arctic (Amhurst, Cambria Press, 2014) 263–289.

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of Greenland. The Danish Faroe Islands is only an actor in the extended Arctic, but nonetheless prepared its own policy paper in 2013.37 Norway issued its High North Strategy in 2006 followed by the publications of New Building Blocks in the North—The next step in the Government’s High North Strategy in 2009 and Norway’s Arctic Policy in 2014.38 The Russian Federation announced its first comprehensive Strategy for the development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and National Security Protection for the Period up to 2020 in 2009. Four years later, a revised strategy entitled The Basics of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic in the period till 2020 and for a further perspective was adopted.39 As shown in the new national security strategy approved by the Russian President Putin in January 2016, the Arctic remains one of the most important aspects of Russian foreign policy.40 The first Arctic policy document of the United States was presented in 1951 followed by statements made by former National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger in 1971 and former US President Ronald Reagan in 1983.41 In 2009, then US President George W Bush issued Presidential Directive NSPD 66/HSPD 25 establishing a new US policy for the Arctic region42 and replacing 1994 Presidential Directive on Arctic and Antarctic policy.43 In 2013, then US President Barack Obama announced a National Strategy for the Arctic Region, which supplements Presidential Directive NSPD 66/HSPD 25 and is accompanied by an implementation plan.44 On 21 January 2015, just before the United States had assumed the chairmanship of the Arctic Council 2015–2017, Obama issued Executive Order 13689 entitled Enhancing Coordination of National Efforts in the Arctic.45 Sweden promulgated its Arctic strategy in 2011.46 In the same year, after a report by the Icelandic Minister of Foreign Affairs to the parliament, Iceland adopted a parliamentary resolution on its Arctic policy.47 Finland followed with the publication of its Strategy for the Arctic Region in 2013.48 In addition, several non-Arctic States have been actively engaged in developing their own official Arctic strategies in order to influence the political debate and State practice. 37 

Doc 6. 7–9. For a thorough treatise on Norway and its stand on Arctic affairs see eg T Neumann, Die norwegische Arktis im Völkerrecht. Landgebiete—Seegebiete—Grenzgebiete (Hamburg, Dr Kovac Verlag, 2013). 39  Doc 11–12. An overview of the Russian approach is provided by G Yarovoy, ‘Russia’s Arctic Policy’ in RW Murray and AD Nuttall (eds), International Relations and the Arctic (Amhurst, Cambria Press, 2014) 191. A comprehensive analysis is written by M Laruelle, Russia’s Arctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North (Armonk/London, ME Sharpe, 2014). 40 www.arctic.ru/international/20160118/272093.html. 41  Doc 13–15. 42  Doc 18. 43  Doc 16. 44  Doc 19; US Government, Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for the Arctic Region, www. whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/implementation_plan_for_the_national_strategy_for_the_arctic_ region_-_fi….pdf. 45  Doc 20. 46  Doc 25. An in-depth analysis of Sweden’s approach is provided by ECH Keskitalo, ‘Sweden and Arctic Policy. Possibilities for New Wine in Old Bottles’ in RW Murray and D Nuttall (eds), International Relations and the Arctic (Amhurst, Cambria Press, 2014) 291–319. 47  Doc 23–24. On Iceland’s Arctic Policy see eg AJK Bailes and M Cela, ‘Iceland: A state within the Arctic’ in RW Murray and A Dey Nuttall (eds) International Relations and the Arctic (Amhurst, Cambria Press, 2014) 349–379. 48  Doc 22. 38 Doc

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By now, Germany, Italy as well as the United Kingdom presented their respective policy papers;49 while France, Spain, and Poland are still in the drafting process but with a view to present their Arctic strategies in the near future.50 Considering the significant distance between Asia and the High North, it might come as a surprise that several Asian countries have also displayed heightened interest in Arctic affairs. In particular China, but also India, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea51 are eager to become polar region powers52 and although China, Singapore, and India have yet to publish comprehensive strategies, their respective official statements shed some light on their perspective on Arctic affairs.53 Denmark, Finland, and Sweden are the geographical link between the Arctic and the European Union (EU).54 Hence, for the EU ‘[t]he Arctic is an area of growing strategic importance’,55 too. In addition, Iceland and Norway—with the exception of Svalbard Archipelago—belong to the European Economic Area. Iceland had even applied for EU membership and if the application process had gone through successfully, it could have improved the position of the EU in Arctic affairs. But, due to internal reasons, Iceland put the negotiations on hold in 2013 and, in March 2015, requested that ‘Iceland should not be regarded as a candidate country for EU membership’ anymore.56 The EU developed

49  Doc 29, 30, 34. For more insights into UK’s approach, see D Depledge, ‘Emerging UK Arctic Policy’ (2013) 89 International Affairs 1445 and A Bailes, ‘The Arctic’s Nearest Neighbour? An Evaluation of the UK’s 2013 Arctic Policy Document’ (2014) Arctic Yearbook. 50  See for an analysis of Poland’s Arctic policy M Łuszczuk, P Graczyk, A Stępień, and M Śmieszek, ‘Poland’s Policy towards the Arctic: Key Areas and Priority Actions’ (2015) 11 PISM Policy Paper as well as P Graczyk, ‘Poland and the Arctic: Between Science and Diplomacy’ (2012) Arctic Yearbook 139. See on the French Arctic profile J Plouffe, ‘Thawing Ice and French Foreign Policy: A Preliminary Assessment’ (2012) Arctic Yearbook 51. Information provided by S Vavasseur, Email from the Embassy of France in Berlin to editor (29 June 2015). On the Spanish approach see C Cinelli, ‘Spain in the Arctic’ (2010) 16 Spanish Yearbook of International Law Online 1. 51  Doc 27, 28, 31, 32, 33. An overview is provided by L Jakobson and SH Lee, The North East Asian States’ Interests in the Arctic and Possible Cooperation with the Kingdom of Denmark (Stockholm, International Peace Research Institute, 2013). An analysis of Japan’s approach is provided by F Ohnishi, ‘Does the Sun also Rise in the Arctic? Three Pillars of Japan’s Arctic Policy’ (2015) Arctic Yearbook and F Ohnishi, ‘The Process of Formulating Japan’s Arctic Policy: From Involvement to Engagement’, (2013) 1 East Asia-Arctic Relations Paper. For Singapore’s Arctic approach see S Watters and A Tonami, ‘Singapore: An Emerging Arctic Actor’ (2012) Arctic Yearbook. An analysis of the South Korean perspective is provided by A Mathur, ‘South Korea’s Proactive Approach to the Arctic’ in V Sakhuja and GS Khurana (eds), Arctic Perspectives (National Maritime Foundation, 2015), 9–13 and H Jung Kim, ‘Success in heading north?: South Korea’s master plan for Arctic policy’ (2015) 61 Marine Policy 264. For China see S Rainwater, ‘Race to the North: China’s Arctic Strategy and Its Implications’ (2013) 66 Naval War College Review 62. 52 B Feng, ‘China Looks North: Carving Out a Role in the Arctic’ (Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, 30 April 2015), www.asiapacific.ca/canada-asia-agenda/china-looks-north-carving-out-role-arctic. 53 For an analysis of the Indian approach see PW Lackenbauer, ‘India‘s Arctic Engagement: Emerging Perspectives’ (2013) Arctic Yearbook 1; for an analysis of the Chinese approach see eg M Lanteigne, China’s Emerging Arctic Strategies: Economics and Institutions (Reykjavik, Centre for Arctic Policy Studies, University of Iceland, 2014) and N Hong, ‘Emerging interests of non-Arctic countries in the Arctic: a Chinese perspective’ (2014) 4 Polar Journal 271. 54  Between 1973 and 1985, Greenland was part of the EU. Following a referendum held in 1982, it withdrew from the EU. It is now associated under the Overseas Association Decision. According to Articles 204 and 355 para 5 (a) TFEU Denmark’s EU-Membership does not cover Greenland or the Faroe Islands. On 19 March 2015, the EU, Denmark and Greenland signed a Joint Declaration on relations between the European Union, on the one hand, and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark, on the other (www.ec.europa. eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/signed-joint-declaration-eu-greenland-denmark_en.pdf) underlining the close and important relationship between the EU and Greenland. 55 www.eeas.europa.eu/arctic_region/index_en.htm. 56 www.ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/iceland/index_en.htm.

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a number of official policy papers on the Arctic starting in 2008, when the European Parliament passed a resolution concerning the Arctic, and the Commission issued a communication to the European Parliament and the Council entitled The European Union and the Arctic region. Just one year later the Council of the EU presented its Conclusions on Arctic Issues. In 2011, Resolution on a sustainable EU policy for the High North was adopted by the European Parliament followed by the Commission’s paper on Developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region: progress since 2008 and next steps. The latest statements were promulgated in 2014, as the European Parliament adopted Resolution on the EU strategy for the Arctic; shortly thereafter the Council published its Conclusions on developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region of which a revised version was presented in June 2016.57 Part 2 deals with Arctic cooperation. Just as the Arctic is not governed by one international treaty, it is also not governed by one international organisation but rather by a wide range of institutional actors with different yet sometimes overlapping tasks and powers. The Arctic Council is certainly the most important forum for international cooperation in the Arctic region, followed by the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, and the Northern Dimension.58 Part 2 sets out core documents adopted by these three fora. In 1996, by the Ottawa Declaration, the Arctic Council was established as a highlevel intergovernmental forum.59 Though Canada had strongly advocated that the Arctic Council should be an international organisation, it could not persuade the United States to back this plan.60 However, the possibility that the Arctic Council will become a fullfledged international treaty-based organisation in the future is still being discussed.61 In order to strengthen the capacity of the Arctic Council, in 2013 a standing secretariat was established and located in Tromsø. As of today the Arctic Council counts eight Member States, namely Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States. According to Rule 1 of the Rules of Procedure, these eight are called Arctic States.62 57 

Doc 35–44. Other organisations and initiatives whose purpose is to foster cooperation in and governance of the Arctic region: The Nordic Council of Ministers (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden); the Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region and the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region; several indigenous peoples’ organisations (eg Inuit Circumpolar Council, Saami Council, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North Siberia and Far East). An analysis of the institutional cooperation in the Arctic is provided by OS Stokke, ‘International Institutions and Arctic Governance’ in G Hønneland and OS Stokke (eds) International Cooperation and Arctic Governance. Regime Effectiveness and Northern Region Building (Abingdon, Routledge, 2007) 164 and T Williams, The Arctic: Organizations Involved in Circumpolar Cooperation (Canada, Library of Parliament, 2012). For a critical discussion of the present Arctic institutional landscape see OS Stokke, ‘Institutional complexity in Arctic governance: curse or blessing’ in LC Jensen and G Hønneland (eds) Handbook of the Politics of the Arctic (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2015) 328. 59 Ottawa Declaration on the establishment of the Arctic Council, http://hdl.handle.net/11374/85. See generally on the history, structure and output of the Arctic Council, eg: EJ Molenaar, ‘Current and Prospective Roles of the Arctic Council System within the Context of the Law of the Sea’ (2012) 27 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 553. 60  For more on the Canadian proposal for an Arctic Council, see DR Rothwell, The Polar Regions 242ff.; P Graczyk and T Koivurova, ‘The Arctic Council’ blessing’ in LC Jensen and G Hønneland (eds) Handbook of the Politics of the Arctic (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2015) 298–327. 61  See, eg: Finland has underlined in its recent Arctic Strategy that it ‘supports the plan to establish the Council as an international treaty-based organisation.’ (Doc 22). Denmark also favours such a scenario (Doc 5). 62  In 1998, the Arctic Council states adopted very detailed Rules of Procedure based on a draft submitted by the United States. They were revised in 2013 (http://hdl.handle.net/11374/940). The Rules of Procedure are similar to the Rules of Procedure of those for Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings. 58 

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In addition to the status of Member there are two other categories of participation, Permanent Participant and Observer. The status of Permanent Participant has been accorded to six indigenous people groups: the Arctic Athabaskan Council, the Aleut International Association, the Gwich’in Council International, the Inuit Circumpolar Council, the Russian Arctic Indigenous Peoples of the North, and the Saami Council.63 Having full consultation rights in connection with the Arctic Council’s negotiations and decisions, their degree of involvement is quite unique on a global scale. The other category, that of Observer, is further divided into the two sub-groups Permanent Observers and ad hoc Observers. While the latter may only attend specific meetings, the former have the right to participate in all Arctic Council meetings. At time of writing there are twelve countries that have been admitted as Permanent Observers, ie France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, the United Kingdom, the People’s Republic of China, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and India. In addition, nine intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary organisations64 and eleven non-governmental organisations65 have been given Observer status. However, before States like China, Italy or South Korea were admitted as Permanent Observers, concerns had been raised among the Arctic Five ‘that their commercial interests in the Arctic are not aligned with the Arctic Council‘s larger mandate to protect the Arctic environment and its indigenous populations.’66 The EU submitted its first application for Permanent Observer in 2008 but the Arctic Council has not yet reached a final decision on this submission.67 This lengthy process is the diplomatic answer to the fact that Canada and its Inuit vehemently protested against admitting the EU as Permanent Observer due to the European ban on imports of products from commercial sealing.68 Since bilateral discussions between the EU and Canada on the seal ban have recently been concluded, a solution to this problem seems to be within reach. According to a joint statement, Canada agreed to make use of the exemption that exists under the EU seal ban regulation to allow the import of indigenous seal products. Consequently, Canada no longer intends to block the EU’s application.69

63 www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/permanent-participants.

64  International Federation of Red Cross & Red Crescent Societies, International Union for the Conservation of Nature, Nordic Council of Ministers, Nordic Environment Finance Corporation, North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission, Standing Committee of the Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, United Nations Development Program, and the United Nations Environment Program. 65  Advisory Committee on Protection of the Seas, Arctic Institute of North America, Association of World Reindeer Herders, Circumpolar Conservation Union, International Arctic Science Committee, International Arctic Social Sciences Association, International Union for Circumpolar Health, International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, Northern Forum, University of the Arctic, and the World Wide Fund for Nature-Global Arctic Program. 66  Finland welcomes more, but not all, voices in Arctic Council, 10 September 2009, Cable 09HELSINKI337_a, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09HELSINKI337_a.html. 67  www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council/observers. See for a thorough review of EU’s role in the Arctic eg A Maurer, S Steinicke, A Engel, S Mnich and L Oberländer, The EU as an Arctic Actor? Interests and Governance Challenges, Report on the 3rd Annual Geopolitics in the High North—GeoNor— Conference and joint GeoNor workshops, Berlin, 22–24 May 2012 and A Stępień, T Koivurova, and P Kankaanpää (eds), The Changing Arctic and the European Union. A Book Based on the Report “Strategic Assessment of Development of the Arctic: Assessment Conducted for the European Union” (Leiden, Brill, 2015). 68  UK House of Lords, The Select Committee on the Arctic, Report of Session 2014–15 ‘Responding to a changing Arctic’ (27 February 2015) 51. 69  UK House of Lords, The Select Committee on the Arctic, Inquiry on ‘The Arctic’, Evidence Session No 19 (4 November 2014), Witness: M King, Question 253.

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According to Article 1 of the Ottawa Declaration, the Arctic Council’s mandate covers ‘promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous peoples and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic.’ In a footnote to the Ottawa Declaration it is specified that the Arctic Council ‘should not deal with matters related to military security’, but since this declaration is not legally binding, the Arctic Council could address matters of military security, if members reach a consensus to do so.70 In order to fulfil its mandate the Arctic Council uses a wide range of different approaches, for example, scientific assessments, policy statements, guidelines, recommendations, best practices, and—since recently— legally binding instruments.71 Keeping in mind that the Arctic Council is not an international organisation, it in itself does not have the capacity to adopt legally binding treaties. Rather, it serves as a forum in which preparation and negotiation of treaties takes place, as seen with regard to the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic and the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution, Preparedness and Response in the Arctic.72 On the ministerial level the Arctic Council meetings are scheduled biennially, always resulting in a joint declaration and marking the transition from one Arctic Council chairmanship to the next.73 Most of the operative work of the Arctic Council is done by its six working groups: The Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP), Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR), Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), and Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG). The second major actor, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), was founded in 1993 and re-affirmed in 2003 and 2013.74 Like the Arctic Council, the BEAC is not an international organisation but an intergovernmental forum dealing with issues concerning the Barents Region, which stretches from the northern Norwegian coast to the Russian city Vorkuta, covering a total area of 1,755,800 km². Members of the BEAC are Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the European Commission, while Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, the United Kingdom, and the United States have only acquired the status of observers. In addition to the constituent Kirkenes Declaration, the bi-annual meetings of the BEAC usually result in joint statements in which the policy goals of the next two years are presented.75 The BEAC also provided a forum that led to the adoption of the legally binding Agreement between the Governments in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region on Cooperation within the field of Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response signed between Finland, Norway, the Russian Federation, and Sweden in 2008.76 This Barents cooperation mechanism 70 

Molenaar, ‘Arctic Council System’ 569–570. Report of the May 2011 SAOs Meeting, 49. 72  Doc 180, 254. 73 The declarations are available at the Arctic Council Archive, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/ handle/11374/373. 74  Doc 45, 54, 60. In detail how the BEAC works S Hollis and M Ekengren, Regional Organization Study: Barents Euro-Arctic Region (Analysis of Civil Security Systems in Europe, 2013). 75  Doc 45–53, 55, 56, 58, 59, 61, 62. 76  Doc 57. See on this topic K Sydnes and M Sydnes, ‘Norwegian-Russian cooperation on oil-spill response in the Barents Sea’ (2013) 39 Marine Policy 257. 71 

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includes the Barents Regional Council, which was founded together with the BEAC in 1993. It comprises thirteen member States and representatives of the Arctic indigenous peoples Sami, Nenets, and Veps.77 The current main areas of inter-regional cooperation were set out in the Strategy and action plan for the Barents Region until 201078 and in the Barents Programme 2014–2018.79 The Northern Dimension—the third essential forum for multilateal cooperation—was launched in 1996 based on a Finnish initiative.80 Its original purpose was to ‘emphasize the positive interdependence of the EU, Russia and the Baltic Sea regions’ and ‘integrate Russia into European and global structures through increased cooperation.’81 Currently it serves as a common policy framework between the EU, Iceland, Norway, and the Russian Federation with Canada and the United States as Observers. The territorial reach of the Northern Dimension covers the Barents and Baltic Sea region, the Arctic area, NorthWest Russia, Norway, and Iceland. The Political Declaration on the Northern Dimension Policy and the Northern Dimension Policy Framework Document, both adopted in 2006, identify and refine the main policy goals of the arrangement: economic cooperation, civil protection, research and education, protection of the environment, nuclear safety and natural resources, and social welfare, and health care.82 Four partnerships are involved in the operative work: the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership, the Northern Dimension Partnership in Public Health and Social Well-being, the Northern Dimension Partnership on Transport and Logistics, and the Northern Dimension Partnership on Culture. The Northern Dimension serves also as an umbrella organisation for the Arctic Council, the BEAC, the Council of Baltic Sea States, and the Nordic Council of Ministers.83 In particular since geopolitical tensions between the Russian Federation and its European and American partners in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis have nurtured the fear of destabilisation of international cooperation, the Northern Dimension provides a forum to sustain communication and cooperation with Russia with regard to Arctic affairs and beyond.84 The multilateral approach to Arctic cooperation is supplemented by bilateral mechanisms of cooperation which is why the most important documents illustrating this approach are reprinted as well. Setting the scene in 1988, the United States and Canada concluded an Agreement on Arctic Cooperation. The United States and Canada reassured their joint commitment to Polar affairs by issuing an official ‘Statement on Climate, Energy and Arctic Leadership’ in March 2016. An accord on Canadian-Russian Arctic

77 www.beac.st/in-English/Barents-Euro-Arctic-Council/Barents-Regional-Council. 78 www.spatial.baltic.net/_files/Strategy_Barent.pdf.

79 www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs/Barents_Programme_2014_2018_adopted_2_June_2013.pdf.

80  For more information about the history and achievements of the Northern Dimension see C Archer and T Etzold, ‘The EU’s Northern Dimension: Blurring Frontiers between Russia and the EU North?’ (2008) 1 NORDEUROPAforum 7 and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, Northern Dimension (2012). 81  Statement of the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, cited after A Sergounin, ‘Russia and the European Union: The Northern Dimension’ (2000) 138 PONARS Policy Memo 1. 82  Doc 63, 64. More information on the Northern Dimension can be found at www.northerndimension.info. 83  See also Report of the Northern Dimension Institute, Coherent Northern Dimension, The Policy Priorities of the Arctic Council (AC), the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS) and the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM), in comparison with the Northern Dimension objectives (10 January 2012). 84  See T Etzold and S Steinicke, Regional Security and Cooperation in the Arctic and Baltic. Destabilisation Follows Ukraine Crisis (SWP Comments 44, September 2015, Berlin) 2.

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cooperation was reached in 1992 and reaffirmed by the adoption of two—not legally binding—declarations in 2000 and 2007. The Russian Federation and Iceland pledged to deepen their Arctic cooperation in 200985 and, in 2015, Sweden concluded polar science cooperation arrangements with Canada and the United States respectively.86 Part 3 provides a selection of legislation promulgated by the five Arctic coastal States most relevant to the law of the sea. Hereby legislation that leads to the establishment of baselines is of particular importance. Pursuant to the relevent law of the sea provisions, baselines are used to measure the breadth of the territorial sea and other maritime zones of a coastal state. While the usage of normal baselines is the rule (Article 3 UNCLOS), ‘[i]n localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity’ straight baselines may be drawn (Article 7 UNCLOS). Out of the group of Arctic coastal States, the United States is the only one that has used normal baselines in the High North. Canada: By enacting the amendment of the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act of 17 April 197087 Canada extended its territorial sea from 3 nm to 12 nm. In 1973, Canada claimed that these waters were internal.88 With the adoption of the Territorial Sea Geographic Coordinates (Area 7) Order of 10 September 1985,89 Canada implemented a straight baseline system for nearly the entire Canadian Arctic archipelago, affirming the view that these ‘baselines give precise definition to Canada’s historic title to the waters.’90 Notably, in drawing these baselines Canada used the outer edge of Arctic ice formations.91 Canada’s straight baseline system provoked protest from other States. In particular the United States and the EU opined that it had no basis in international law and that Canada was not justified in claiming that all the waters between the Canadian islands in the Arctic were internal.92 Finally in 1996, the Canadian Parliament passed the Ocean Act, which confirms Canada’s 12 nm territorial sea as well as continental shelf of at least 200 nm, establishes a contiguous zone of 24 nm and replaces the previous fishing zone by a 200 nm EEZ—thereby Canada aligned its maritime zones with the UNCLOS provisions.93 Although the Ocean Act repealed the former Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act the straight baseline system promulgated upon it has been retained and is thus still valid. Denmark: Straight baselines around Greenland were established both by Executive Orders of 22 December 1976 and 14 May 1980, for the Faroe Islands straight baselines were drawn by Royal Decree 599 in December 1976. Some amendments were enacted 85 

Doc 65–72. Cooperation Agreement between the Earth Science Sector of the Department of Natural Resources of Canada and the Swedish Polar Research Secretariat Concerning Cooperation in Marine Geoscience and Innovation Activities in the Arctic (done at Ottawa/Stockholm, 9 December 2015); Letter of Intent between the Swedish Polar Research Secretariat and US National Science Foundation for Cooperative Research and Logistical Activities in the Arctic (done at Washington, 19 February 2015). Both documents were kindly provided by the Swedish Polar Research Secretariat and are on file with the editor. 87  Act to Amend the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, c. 68, 1969–70 S.C. 1243 (1970) (Can.). 88  W Østreng et al, Shipping in Arctic Waters. A comparison of the Northeast, Northwest and Trans Polar Passages (Berlin, Springer, 2013) 263. 89  Doc 74. 90  Doc 76. 91  R Rayfuse, ‘Climate change and the law of the sea’ in R Rayfuse and SV Scott (eds), International Law in the Era of Climate Change (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2012) 147–174, 155. 92  Doc 73, 75, 76. 93  Doc 77. 86 

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by Royal Decree of 15 October 2004. Straight baselines for mainland Denmark were drawn in 1999 and amended in 2003,94 also taking the outer edge of ice formations into account.95 In 1999, Denmark extended its territorial sea from 3 nm to 12 nm,96 whereas the territorial sea of Greenland still remains 3 nm until today.97 In 2000, the territorial sea of the Faroe Islands was also extended to 12 nm.98 In 1996, Denmark established a 200 nm EEZ and in 2005 a contiguous zone of 24 nm outside its mainland.99 The establishment of the EEZ off the coast of Greenland was followed in 2004 by Executive Order No 1020, which annulled both Executive Orders of 22 December 1976 and 14 May 1980.100 The Faroe Islands has only a 200 nm fishing zone instead of an EEZ.101 Already in 1963, Denmark claimed sovereignty over its continental shelf; this includes the continental shelf around Greenland.102 Norway: By enacting Royal Decree of 12 July 1935, Norway was the first Arctic State to establish a straight baseline system.103 The most recent legislation on straight baselines along the entire mainland coast is Royal Decree of 14 June 2002, amended in 2003.104 For the Arctic island Jan Mayen, Norway had drawn straight baselines by Crown Prince Regent’s Decree of 30 June 1955,105 however, the Decree was replaced by the Regulations relating to the Limit of the Norwegian Territorial Sea around Jan Mayen laid down by Royal Decree of 30 August 2002.106 For Bjørnøya (Bear Island), Hopen (Island), and the western and southern shores of the Svalbard archipelago, Norway adopted a straight baseline system by Royal Decree of 25 September 1970.107 It was repealed by the Regulations relating to the limits of the Norwegian territorial sea around Svalbard of 1 June 2001.108 Notably, ice had not been used as base points for drawing

94 

Executive Order No 242; Executive Order No 680. Rayfuse, ‘Climate change and the law of the sea’ 155. 96  Doc 81. 97  Doc 85, 86. 98  Doc 89. 99  Doc 80, 82, 83. 100  Doc 87, 88. 101  Decree No 598 of 21 December 1976, The Fishing Territory of the Faroe Islands, www.un.org/Depts/los/ LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/DNK_1976_Decree.pdf. 102  Doc 78. 103  Royal Decree of 12 July 1935 relating to the Baselines for the Norwegian Fishery Zone as regards that part of Norway which is situated to the north of 66°28′8 N Latitude, www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/ PDFFILES/NOR_1935_Decree.pdf. An analysis of this Degree, which was the subject matter of the Fisheries Case between the United Kingdom and Norway before the ICJ (Fisheries (United Kingdom v. Norway) [1951] ICJ Rep 116) is provided by T Scovazzi, ‘The Baseline of the Territorial Sea: The Practice of Arctic States’ in AG Oude Elferink and DR Rothwell (eds), The Law of the Sea and Polar Maritime Delimitation and Jurisdiction (Leiden, Brill Nijhoff, 2001) 69–84, 70–75. 104  Doc 94; for technical details concerning the establishment of baselines see the illuminating article by B Geirr Harsson and G Preiss, ‘Norwegian Baselines, Maritime Boundaries and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea’ (2012) 3 Arctic Review on Law and Politics 108. 105  Crown Prince Regent‘s Decree of 30 June 1955, www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/ PDFFILES/NOR_1955_Decree.pdf. 106  Doc 97. 107  Royal Decree of 25 September 1970 concerning the Delimitation of the Territorial Waters of Parts of Svalbard, www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/NOR_1970_DelimitationDecree. pdf. An analysis of these straight baselines can be found with US DoS, Limits in the Sea No. 39: Straight Baselines: Svalbard (6 March 1972). 108  Doc 320. A criticial legal analysis of the new baselines is provided by S Kopela, Dependent Archipelagos in the Law of the Sea (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2013) 118 ff. 95 

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the Norwegian baselines around Svalbard or Jan Mayen.109 Act No 57 of 27 June 2003 relating to Norway’s territorial waters and contiguous zone extended the territorial waters from 4 nm to 12 nm around the mainland and established a 24 nm contiguous zone. The geographical scope of the Act also covers Svalbard, Jan Mayen, Bouvet Island, Peter I’s Island and Queen Maud’s Land.110 While the mainland of Norway has an EEZ, due to legal considerations Norway has only established 200 nm fishery zones for Jan Mayen and Svalbard.111 Russian Federation: The Russian Federation claims that most of its Arctic straits are internal waters enclosed by straight baselines and not subject to any passage rights.112 Russia’s straight baseline system is based on Declaration 4604 of 7 February 1984 and the Decree On the Confirmation of a List of Geographic Coordinates Determining the Position in the Arctic Ocean, the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea from the Width of the Territorial Waters, Economic Zone and Continental Shelf of the USSR is Measured adopted on 15 January 1985.113 One reason for this legislative action was probably to internalise the straits located between the islands Novaya Zemlya, Novosibirsk Islands and Severnaya Zemlya, which are part of the Northern Sea Route.114 Although the Federal Act on international maritime waters, territorial sea, and contiguous zone adopted in 1998115 authorises the drawing of new straight baselines and coordinates, no modified baseline system has been promulgated yet. Thus the coordinates delineated in Declaration 4604 and Declaration 4450 remain valid. The United States has never recognised these claims arguing that they are contrary to international law.116 The same 1998 Federal Act establishes a 12 nm territorial sea as well as a 24 nm contiguous zone. The 1995 Federal Law on the Continenal Shelf claims a continental shelf of at least 200 nm.117 United States: In 1945, then US President Harry S Truman issued two proclamations—one concerning the conservation of fisheries and another with regard to the continental shelf jurisdiction over natural resources in its seabed and subsoil.118

109  C Schofield and B Sas, ‘Uncovered and Unstable Coasts. Climate Change and Territorial Sea Baselines in the Arctic’ in S Lalonde and TL McDorman (eds), International Law and Politics of the Arctic Ocean (Leiden, Brill Nijhoff, 2015) 291–414, 316. 110  Doc 94, 95. 111  Doc 319. 112  See RD Brubaker, ‘Straits in the Russian Arctic’ (2001) 32 Ocean Development & International Law 263, 265, 271. 113  Doc 99, 103. 114 AS Skaridov, ‘Northern Sea Route: Legal Issues’, in MH Nordquist et al (eds), Changes in the Arctic Environment and the Law of the Sea (Leiden, Brill Nijhoff, 2010) 283–306, 289. A criticial legal analysis of the baselines in the Russian Arctic is provided by Kopela, Dependent Archipelagos 84 ff. 115  Doc 105, 107. 116  US DoD Representative for Ocean Policy Affairs (ed), ‘Russian Federation (as of 2016)’ in Maritime Claims Reference Manual (2014) 1. For an analysis see US DoS, Limits in the Sea No. 109: Continental Shelf Boundary Turkey—USSR and Straight Baselines: USSR (Black Sea) (29 September 1988) 8. In 1992, the United States ‘challenged the Russian straight baselines closing access to the Barents Sea port of Murmansk.’ The nuclear-powered submarine of the United States Navy USS Baton Rouge had collided with a Soviet nuclearpowered submarine in the Barents Sea near Murmansk. The incident had occurred more than 12 nm from shore, and hence—from the US point of view—in international waters. The Soviet Union opposed this view claiming that the collision took place in its territorial sea [JH Cushman Jr, ‘Two Subs collide off Russian Port’ New York Times (New York, 19 February 1992) A6]. 117  Doc 104. 118  Doc 108.

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The 200 nm EEZ, which encompasses both issues, was established almost forty years later.119 Although the United States has not yet ratified UNCLOS, the proclamation of the EEZ was made accordingly. On 7 August 1953, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act was adopted.120 The United States extended its territorial sea from 3 nm to 12 nm in 1988 and, in 1999, established a contiguous zone of 24 nm.121 The United States has repeatedly advocated for a very restrictive use of straight baselines122 and is the only Arctic Coastal State that applies normal baselines. This includes the Alaskan baselines.123 In the Arctic debate one comes across the term sector theory from time to time. The sector theory is an outdated way to substantiate a claim to—maritime—jurisdiction over a sector of the earth’s surface. Its true origin is unclear but one of its roots might be the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1825, defining the boundary between Canada and Alaska.124 The sector theory was again taken up in a speech by Senator Pascal Poirier before the Canadian Senate in 1907 in which he declared that ‘a country whose possession today goes up to the Arctic regions will have a right, or should have a right, or has a right, to all the lands that are to be found in the waters between a line extending from its eastern extremity north, and another line extending from the western extremity north. All the lands between the two lines up to the North Pole should belong and do belong to the country whose territory abuts up there.’125 The adherence to the sector theory was confirmed in 1926 when Canada established by Order in Council the Arctic Islands Preserve.126 Apart from the former Soviet Union which also relied on the sector theory,127 this approach has found no validity in customary international law. On the contrary: other Arctic States, in particular Denmark, Norway, and the United States have constantly denounced its application to the Arctic.128 Also most of legal scholars have been sceptical towards the cogency of the sector theory.129 In 2006, Canada’s Prime Minister Stephan Harper finally explicitly abandoned the sector theory.130 Henceforth

119 

Doc 109, 110. Public--No 212--83rd Congress, Passed 7 August 1953 [H.R. 5134]. 121  Doc 114, 116. 122  Schofield and Sas, ‘Uncovered and Unstable Coasts’ 320. 123  Golitsyn, ‘The Legal Regime of the Arctic’ 467; Schofield and Sas, ‘Uncovered and Unstable Coasts’ 320. 124  For this explanation see Canada, External Affairs, The Sector Theory and Floating Ice Islands in the Arctic, 30 August 1954, LAC, RG 25, Vol 4253, file 9057-40, pt 4FP. 125  Canada, Senate Debates (1907) 271. See also the statement of the Canadian Ambassador to Washington L Pearson: ‘A large part of the world’s total Arctic area is Canadian. One should know exactly what this part comprises. It includes not only Canada’s northern mainland but the islands and frozen sea north of the mainland between the meridians of its east and west boundaries, extending to the North Pole.’ [‘Canada Looks Down North’ (1946) 24 Foreign Affairs 638]. 126  Canada, Gazette, 31 July 1926, 382. 127  The Soviet Union issued a decree in 1926 claiming all the lands discovered and yet to be discovered in its sector, but had not applied the sector theory to the ice or waters beyond territorial limits of 12 nm (Doc 98). See further L Timtchenko, ‘The Russian Arctic Sectoral Concept: Past and Present’ (1997) 50 ARCTIC 29–35. 128  CC Joyner, ‘Ice-Covered Regions in International Law’ (1991) 31 Natural Resources Journal 213, 218 ff. For a profound discussion of the sector theory see D Pharand, Canada’s Arctic Waters in International Law (Cambridge, CUP, 2009) Part I and PW Lackenbauer and P Kikkert, ‘The Dog in the Manger—and Letting Sleeping Dogs Lie. The United States, Canada and the Sector Principle, 1924–1955’ in S Lalonde and TL McDorman (eds) International Law and Politics of the Arctic Ocean (Leiden, Brill Nijhoff, 2015) 216–239. 129  But see O Svarlein, ‘The Legal Status of the Arctic’ (1958) 52 ASIL Proceedings 136, 143, who argues for the adoption of a ‘convention, in which the sector principle is recognized with respect to the territorial apportionment of the Arctic land and islands among the Polar states.’ 130  M Byers, Who Owns the Arctic? Understanding Sovereignty Disputes in the North (Vancouver, Douglas & McIntyre, 2010) 44. 120 

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only with regard to the Russian Federation is it doubtful if the application of the sector theory can be really regarded as part of legal history.131 The delimitation of overlapping maritime areas is another crucial aspect of Arctic governance but it has to be stated that all maritime boundary disputes in the Arctic have been managed peacefully and most of them have already been settled in accordance with international law.132 Part 4 lists all the delimitation agreements concluded between Arctic States. Norway-Russian Federation: In 1957, Norway and the Russian Federation agreed on their respective maritime boundaries in the Varangerfjord area.133 The 2007 Varangerfjord Agreement supplements this 1957 Varangerfjord Agreement setting a single maritime boundary for the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the EEZ, and the continental shelf from the land boundary up to the intersection between the Norwegian median-line claim and Russia’s sector-principle claim.134 The adjustment had become indispensable as Norway had extended its territorial sea from 4 to 12 nm and determined a 24 nm contiguous zone in 2002.135 Since the 1970s Norway and the Russian Federation had also been at odds over their respective EEZs and continental shelf boundary in the Barents Sea and in the Arctic Ocean. In 1978, a first attempt to resolve the dispute in the Barents Sea had been made, when the Agreement between Norway and the Soviet Union on a Temporary Practical Arrangement for Fishing in an Adjacent Area in the Barents Sea with Attached Protocol (Grey Zone Agreement) had been concluded.136 The existence of the so-called Loophole, a pocket of high seas beyond the EEZs of Norway and the Russian Federation, further complicated the settlement of the dispute. In 2010, after decades of intensive negotiations, both countries finally reached an agreement on the delimitation line in the Barents Sea awarding roughly half of the 17,5000 km2 area to each country and terminating the Grey Zone Agreement.137 The 2010 Agreement is deemed to be a model for the successful resolution of maritime boundary disputes in the Arctic.138

131  See AG Oude Elferink, ‘Does Recent Practice of the Russian Federation Point to an Arctic Sunset for the Sector Principle’ in S Lalonde and TL McDorman (eds), International Law and Politics of the Arctic Ocean (Leiden, Brill Nijhoff, 2015) 269–290. 132  See generally on the delimitation of maritime boundaries in the Arctic: AG Oude Elferink, ‘Arctic Maritime Delimitations: The Preponderance of Similarities With Other Regions’ in AG Oude Elferink and DR Rothwell (eds), The Law of the Sea and Polar Maritime Delimitation and Jurisdiction (Leiden, Brill Nijhoff, 2000) 179–199; N Matz-Lück, ‘Current Developments in the Arctic: Continental Shelf Delimitation and Delineation’ (2011) 54 GYIL 155–191; Y Tanaka, ‘Reflections on Arctic Maritime Delimitations: A Comparative Analysis between Case Law and State Practice’ (2011) 80 Nordic Journal of International Law 459. 133  Doc 117. See also Descriptive Protocol relating to the Sea Frontier between Norway and the USSR in the Varanger Fjord of 15 February 1957, 312 UNTS 4523. 134  Doc 118. An analysis of the history of negotiation process can be found in PJ Aasen, The Law of Maritime Delimitation and Russian–Norwegian Maritime Boundary Dispute (FNI Report 1/2010) 66 ff. 135  Doc 94, 95. 136  Doc 119. Comprehensive RR Churchill and G Ulfstein, Marine Management in Disputed Areas: the Case of the Barents Sea (London, Routledge, 1992). Concerning the regulation of fisheries see: E Hey, The Regime for the Exploitation of Transboundary Marine Fisheries Resources (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1989) 169–171. 137  Doc 120, 121. On the negotiation and provisions of this treaty see T Henriksen and G Ulfstein, ‘Maritime Delimitation in the Arctic: The Barents Sea Treaty’ (2011) 42 Ocean Development & International Law 1 and Ø Jensen, ‘Treaty between Norway and the Russian Federation concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean’ (2011) 26 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 151. 138  TL McDorman and C Schofield, ‘Maritime limits and boundaries in the Arctic Ocean’ in LC Jensen and G Hønneland (eds), Handbook of the Politics of the Arctic (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2015) 207, 214.

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Canada-Denmark: The maritime boundary dispute between Canada and Denmark in the Davis Strait, Baffin Bay, and Nares Strait was settled in 1973,139 whereby the agreement only delimits the continental shelf and touches neither the Lincoln Sea boundary conflict nor the controversial status of Hans Island. Rather the agreed boundary terminates in the Robeson Channel before entering the Lincoln Sea, stopping on either side of the low-water mark of Hans Island and leaving a gap of 1 km in Kennedy Channel of Nares Strait.140 The boundary in the Lincoln Sea is an equidistance line stretching 200 nm from the coasts of northern Greenland and Ellesmere Island. Due to a disagreement about whether to take the Danish Beaumont Island into account, which would move the boundary line in Denmark’s favour, an area of approximately 65 nm2 is still being contested.141 Having reached a tentative agreement with regard to their disagreement over the Lincoln Sea in 2012,142 the Lincoln Sea dispute will be settled sooner rather than later. Then only the controversy on the sovereignty over Hans Island will be unresolved. Denmark (Greenland)—Iceland—Norway (Jan Mayen): Denmark, Iceland and Norway had had a dispute over their three overlapping EEZs.143 A first step to resolve this dispute was made in 1980, when Iceland and Norway concluded an Agreement on Fishery and Continental Shelf Questions which established a boundary between Iceland’s EEZ and Jan Mayen.144 Pursuant to Article 9 of the aforementioned Agreement both parties jointly appointed a conciliation commission to submit recommendations with regard to the dividing line for the continental shelf area between Iceland and Jan Mayen.145 The recommendations of the conciliation commission led to the 1981 Agreement between Iceland and Norway on the Continental Shelf Between Iceland and Jan Mayen146 in which, among other things, a joint zone for hydrocarbon development was created. The 1995 Continental Shelf and Fisheries Zone Boundary Agreement between Denmark (Greenland) and Norway (Jan Mayen) is the implementation of the decision of the International Court of Justice in the Jan Mayen case.147 In 1997, both agreements were supplemented by additional protocols following tripartite consultations between Norway, Iceland and Denmark concerning the delimitation of maritime areas between Jan Mayen, Iceland, and Greenland where the lines of the three States involved intersect.148

139  Doc 133, 134. In 2004, the coordinates of the treaty were converted to a newer datum. A detailed analysis of this boundary dispute is provided by JI Charney and LM Alexander (eds), International Maritime Boundaries, Vol I (1993) 371–385. 140  BJ Van Pay, ‘National Maritime Claims in the Arctic’ in MH Nordquist, TH Heidar, and J Norton (eds), Changes in the Arctic Environment and the Law of the Sea (Leiden, Nijhoff, 2010) 61, 75. 141  Canada, Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Backgrounder—Lincoln Sea Maritime Boundary, www. international.gc.ca/media/aff/news-communiques/2012/11/28a.aspx?lang=eng. See on historical and political aspects of the dispute: HN Nicol and J Plouffe, ‘Canada-Denmark: The Lincoln Sea’ in E Brunet-Jailly (ed), Border Disputes. A Global Encyclopedia Vol 2 (Santa Barbara, ABC-CLIO, 2015) 489–495. 142  Doc 135. See also J Hartmann, ‘Canada and Denmark reach an agreement on the Lincoln Sea Boundary’, (EJIL: Talk!, 10 January 2013), www.ejiltalk.org/canada-and-denmark-reach-agreement-on-the-lincoln-sea-boundary. 143 For more information on this dispute see G Ulfstein, ‘Jan Mayen’ in R Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (online edn) and HN Nicol, ‘Denmark-Iceland-Norway: Jan Mayen Island’ in E Brunet-Jailly (ed), Border Disputes. A Global Encyclopedia Vol 2 (Santa Barbara, ABC-CLIO, 2015) 579–588. 144  Doc 122. 145  Conciliation Commission on the Continental Shelf Area between Iceland and Jan Mayen: Report and Recommendations to the Governments of Iceland and Norway (May 1981) 20 ILM 797. 146  Doc 123. 147  Doc 124. 148  Doc 125–126.

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In 2008, Norway and Iceland agreed on an additional accord concerning transboundary hydrocarbon deposits in the Jan Mayen area.149 Denmark (Faroe Islands)—Iceland—Norway: In 1979, Denmark and Norway agreed on the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Area between the Faroe Islands and Norway and concerning the boundary between the Fishery Zone near the Faroe Islands and the Norwegian EEZ.150 The maritime boundary between Iceland and the Faroe Islands was settled in 2007.151 In 2006, Faroe Islands, Iceland and Norway adopted Agreed Minutes on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles in the Southern Part of the Banana Hole of the Northeast Atlantic.152 According to its para 6 ‘[e]ach State will, when submitting its documentation concerning the outer limits of its continental shelf in the area, request that the Commission consider it and make its recommendations on this basis, without prejudice to the submission of documentation by the other States at a later stage or to delimitation of the continental shelf between the three States. The State concerned will in this connection declare that such a request is agreed between the three States.’ The 2006 Agreed Minutes form the basis for prospective continental shelf delimitation arrangements between Iceland, Denmark, and Norway. Denmark (Greenland)—Iceland: In 1997, Denmark and Iceland entered into a provisional agreement on the delimitation of the continental shelf and the fishery zones in the area in question.153 Six years later, both States agreed on non-legally binding minutes on the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in the Irminger Sea.154 These 2013 Agreed Minutes are partially based on the concept of the trilateral 2006 Agreed Minutes mentioned before serving as basis for a final determination of the continental shelf delimitation between Greenland and Iceland. Denmark (Greenland)—Norway (Svalbard): In 2006, Denmark on behalf of Greenland, and Norway entered into an agreement concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf and the fishery zones within 200 nm in the area between Greenland and Svalbard.155 Notably, as the coasts of both Greenland and Svalbard have been used to draw the equidistance line, this agreement supports the Norwegian view that Svalbard generates modern maritime zones playing a role in maritime boundary delimitation.156 Taking the submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) made by Norway and Denmark in 2006 and 2013 respectively into account, there even might be an overlap of claims, which will be resolved through negotiations after the CLCS has issued its recommendation on the continental shelf of Northeast Greenland.157

149 

Doc 127. Doc 129. 151  Doc 130. 152  Doc 131. 153  Doc 136. 154  Doc 137. See for an analysis B Kunoy, ‘Agreed Minutes on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles between Greenland and Iceland in the Irminger Sea’ (2013) 12 Chinese Journal of International Law 125. 155  Doc 140. 156 TL McDorman, ‘Setting the Stage: The Continental Shelf and Marine Science in the Arctic Ocean’ in S Wasum-Rainer, I Winkelmann, and K Tiroch (eds), Arctic Science, International Law and Climate Change (Heidelberg, Springer, 2012) 119–139, 131. 157  TL McDorman and C Schofield, ‘Maritime limits and boundaries in the Arctic Ocean’ in LC Jensen and G Hønneland (eds), Handbook of the Politics of the Arctic (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2015) 207–226, 216. 150 

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United States—Russian Federation: The dispute over the world’s longest maritime boundary was settled by the signing of a treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation in 1990. It establishes a boundary line in the territorial sea, the EEZ and the continental shelf of both States in the Arctic Ocean, Bering Sea, and Chukchi Sea.158 Although the agreement has not yet been ratified by the Russian Federation, based on an exchange of notes from June 1990 it has been provisionally applied since that time.159 Part 5 concerns the delineation and delimitation of continental shelves in the Arctic listing all submissions to the CLCS made by Arctic coastal States to date. Article 76 (1) UNCLOS defines the continental shelf of a coastal State as ‘the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance’. In the Arctic, there are three submarine features that extend across the Arctic Ocean conjoining Russia, Greenland, and Canada: the Lomonosov, Alpha and Mendeleev seafloor highs. The most problematic aspects in determining the extended continental shelf is whether or not one of these features meets the criterion of ‘natural prolongation’, if so, in which State’s territory, and, finally, if a seafloor high shall be deemed as a submarine ridge or a submarine elevation.160 If a coastal State wants to establish continental shelf limits beyond 200 nm, the State shall submit information on the establishment of limits to the CLCS (Article 76 (8) UNCLOS).161 In turn, the CLSC considers the submitted information pursuant to the procedure set out in Annex II to UNCLOS and, finally, prepares recommendations on matters related to the establishment of the limits of the extended continental shelf.162 The extended continental shelf limits which are established by the respective State on the basis of the CLCS’s recommendations are final and legally binding. All Arctic coastal States assert a continental shelf beyond 200 nm and almost all have overlapping claims—within or beyond 200 nm. According to the 2008 US Geological Survey ‘[t]he extensive Arctic continental shelves may constitute the geographically largest unexplored prospective area for petroleum remaining on Earth.’163 Due to the economic and political importance of holding sovereign rights for exploration and

158  Doc 141. See also L Heininen, A Sergunin, and G Yrovoy, ‘Russia-United States: The Bering Sea’ in E Brunet-Jailly (ed), Border Disputes. A Global Encyclopedia Vol 2 (Santa Barbara, ABC-CLIO, 2015) 661–669. 159  Doc 142–144. See on the negotiation history and technical aspects of this agreement RW Smith, ‘United States-Russia Maritime Boundary’ in GH Blake, Maritime Boundaries Vol 5 (London, Routledge, 1994) 91–102. 160  For an in-depth analysis of these problems see Ø Jensen, ‘The seaward limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles in the Arctic Ocean: legal framework and state practice’ in LC Jensen and G Hønneland (eds), Handbook of the Politics of the Arctic (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2015) 227–246, 230 ff. For recent case law concerning the interpretation of the concept of ‘natural prolongation’ which is of high relevance for the questions which part of the Arctic seabed are to be considered belonging to a continental shelf see ITLOS, Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), Case No 16, Judgment of 14 March 2012. 161  Since the CLCS had not adopted its scientific and technical guidelines before 1999, the Assembly of States parties to UNCLOS decided that the ten-year-period would be extended to expire on 13 May 2009. 162  A comprehensive treatise on the role and functions of the CLCS is provided by Ø Jensen, The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. Law and Legitimacy (Leiden, Brill Nijhoff, 2014). 163  USGS, Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle (2008).

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exploitation of these resources it is essential that the Arctic States know the sizes of their respective continental shelves.164 On 20 December 2001, the Russian Federation was the first Arctic State to make a submission to the CLCS arguing that it has a continental shelf up to the North Pole encompassing parts of the Lomonosov, Alpha and Mendeleev seafloor highs.165 Denmark, Canada, Norway, and the United States reacted to the Russian claim by sending diplomatic notes.166 In the end, the CLCS neither rejected nor accepted Russia’s submission but requested more data.167 In 2015, the Russian Federation complied with this request filing a substantially revised claim upon which Denmark, Canada, and the United States again made critical comments.168 On 27 November 2006, Norway followed the Russian lead making an official submission.169 Norway wants to extend its seabed claim beyond the 200 nm EEZ in three areas of the north-eastern Atlantic and the Arctic: the Loophole in the Barents Sea, the Western Nansen Basin in the Arctic Ocean, and the Banana Hole in the Norwegian and Greenland Sea. Notably, the submission regarding the Western Nansen Basin is based on the assumption that Norway could claim a continental shelf around Svalbard. While both of the latter areas had been unchallenged, the submission with regard to the Loophole encouraged protest by the Russian Federation arguing that the region in the Barents Sea was subject to a maritime dispute which had not yet been settled and thus had to be excluded from the submission. Denmark and Iceland also commented on the Norwegian claim in diplomatic notes.170 Despite Russia’s protest, on 27 March 2009, the CLSC issued its recommendation underlining that ‘only a bilateral delimitation between Norway and the Russian Federation remains to be carried out to delineate the extent of each coastal State’s continental shelf in the Loop Hole.’171 That mission was accomplished by concluding the Barents Treaty in 2010.172 Denmark has made five submissions so far, out of which four are—to some extent—relevant to the Arctic. The partial submission with regard to the area north of the Faroe Islands had been made on 29 April 2009, upon which Iceland and Norway commented.173 It is the only Danish submisson on which the CLCS has already made its 164  There is a wide array of literature on claims of extended continental shelves in the Arctic region. See, eg: Matz-Lück, ‘Current Developments in the Arctic’ 155; R Macnab, ‘The Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf in the Arctic Ocean’ in M Nordquist, JN Moore, and TH Heidar (eds), Legal and Scientific Aspects of Continental Shelf Limits (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2004) 301–311; V Golitsyn, ‘Continental Shelf Claims in the Arctic Ocean: a Commentary’ (2009) 24 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 401; LDM Nelson, ‘The Settlement of Disputes Arising From Conflicting Outer Continental Shelf Claims’ (2009) 24 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 409. For a detailed analysis of the submissions see Byers, International Law and the Arctic 92 ff and see Jensen, ‘The seaward limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles in the Arctic Ocean’ 230 ff. 165  Doc 145, 146. 166  Doc 147–150. See further on the US view that the Russian baselines—used in the submission to the CLCS—do not satisfy the requirements set out by UNCLOS, AS Skaridov and MA Skaridova, ‘Legals Aspects of the Russian Perspectives’ in MH Nordquist, JN Morre, and AS Skaridov (eds), International Energy Policy, the Arctic and the Law of the Sea (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2005) 79–98, 83 f. 167  Report of the Secretary-General, Oceans and the law of the sea, 8 October 2002, UN Doc A/57/57/Add.1, para 41. 168  Doc 151–154. 169  Doc 169. 170  Doc 170–172. 171  Doc 173. 172  Doc 120. 173  Doc 155–157.

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recommendations.174 Adjacent to Greenland there are three areas where the continental shelves potentially extend beyond 200 nm. The first area concerns the South-Western part of the Labrador Sea and the eastern part of the Irminger Sea, for which Denmark submitted a claim on 14 June 2012.175 Some baselines used in the submission appear to rely on one or two base points once located on Arctic ice features that may, considering the increased melting or rising waters, now or soon be located in the sea.176 On 26 November 2013, Denmark submitted a claim in respect of the North-eastern continental shelf of Greenland, which is surrounded by the Fishing Protection Zone of Svalbard, Jan Mayen, and Greenland.177 On 15 December 2014, Denmark, together with Greenland, filed another submission in respect of the northern continental shelf of Greenland.178 This submission is particularly interesting since it argues that the Lomonosov seafloor high— which is also engrossed by the Russian Federation and will probably be also claimed by Canada—is an extension of Greenland’s landmass. Provided that the Lomonosov seafloor high will not only be deemed as a natural prolongation but also as a submarine elevation Greenland’s continental shelf would extend even beyond the North Pole.179 Canada has extended continental shelves in the central, western, and eastern parts of the Arctic Ocean.180 For several years Canada has gathered and analysed data to map the seabed’s topography and the thickness of deposits. With regard to the Lomonosov seafloor high, Canada has conducted joint scientific surveys with Denmark since 2006; with regard to the Canada basin and the Chukchi Sea Canada cooperates with the United States since 2008.181 On 6 December 2013, Canada submitted preliminary information indicating it would make a submission at a later date.182 At time of writing, the final submission has not been done but Canada has clearly intensified its efforts. In this vein, on 11 December 2015, Canada and Sweden have concluded an Arctic Science Cooperation Agreement which among other things includes gathering joint data in support of Canada’s continental shelf submission for the Arctic Ocean.183 In the North of Alaska, at the Chukchi Cap, the United States has potential for gaining a large area of an extended continental shelf.184 While collecting the necessary bathymetric and other data to support its entitlement, until the United States has ratified UNCLOS it is neither under the procedural obligation to make a submission nor able to validate its claim through the CLCS process.185 Yet, the United States accepts that the 174 

Doc 158. Doc 159–160. 176  Schofield and Sas, ‘Uncovered and Unstable Coasts’ 315. 177  Doc 161–162. 178  Doc 163–168. 179  Jensen, ‘The seaward limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles in the Arctic Ocean’ 239. 180  A Higdon, ‘The Canadian Submission to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf’ (2014) 9 McGill International Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy 45, 62 ff. 181  Canada, Science, Survey Missions Timeline, www.science.gc.ca/default.asp?lang=En&n=5C9B2416-1. 182 Doc 174. See further E Riddell-Dixon, ‘Meeting the Deadline: Canada’s Arctic Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf ’ (2011) 42 Ocean Development & International Law 368 and Higdon, ‘The Canadian Submission’ 45. 183  Doc 71. 184  L Mayer, ‘Arctic Marine Research: The Perspective of a US Practitioner’ in S Wasum-Rainer, I Winkelmann, and K Tiroch (eds) Arctic Science, International Law and Climate Change (Heidelberg, Springer, 2012) 83–95, 86. 185  For a description of US continental shelf policy and activities see MF Hayes, ‘US Continental Shelf Policy’ in MH Nordquist, TH Heidar, and J Norton (eds), Changes in the Arctic Environment and the Law of the Sea (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2010) 469–476. See also L Mayer, M Jakobsson and A Armstrong, The Compilation and Analysis of Data Relevant to a U.S. Claim Under United Nations Law of the Sea Article 76: A Preliminary Report (2002); Mayer, ‘Arctic Marine Research’ 84. 175 

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‘rules for defining the ECS are based in international law, specifically in Article 76 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea’.186 Due to the huge backlog, it is very unlikely that the CLCS will review the aforementioned submissions in a timely manner. Realistically it will take several years until all Arctic States will have received their respective recommendations from the CLSC. But even after all continental shelves in the Arctic will have been delineated and delimited, there will remain some seabed areas located outside the continental shelves of any Arctic coastal State. Whatever the size of these zones beyond national jurisdictions may be, the conduct of exploration and exploitation activities in the ‘Area’ will in any case be subject to the legal regime set out in UNCLOS and the 1994 Seabed Agreement.187 Part 6 reproduces materials concerning the governance of Arctic shipping.188 The political awareness of an urgent need for a specific legal regime for navigation in polar waters emerged in the 1990s after the Exxon Valdez incident off the coast of Alaska. Today, due to consequent changed ice and water conditions, an even increased shipping activity in the waters within and adjacent to the central Arctic Ocean can be observed. Arctic shipping is not only essential to support offshore oil, gas and mineral exploration, but there will also be growing number of commercial, research, and touristic activities. While this development might be generally very positive for the Arctic, shipping in the High North is not an easy task but comes with major challenges and difficulties like the ‘presence and movement of sea ice, icebergs, cold air and water temperatures, variable and often unpredictable severe weather, magnetic variation, solar flare activity and extended daylight or night time conditions. These environmental conditions, combined with the remoteness of the region from commercial shipping centers and shipping lanes, highlight the need for improved systems to support safe navigation in the Arctic region.’189 Beyond that, most Arctic areas lack in modern and sufficient infrastructure to ensure safe shipping and to effectively respond to naval accidents.190 The fact that less than 10% of the whole Arctic Ocean area is currently covered with adequate hydrographic surveys and nautical charting adds to the list of challenges and is of great concern to shipping stakeholders.191 In order to mitigate this problem the Arctic coastal States agreed to

186 

US DoS, Defining the Limits of the US Continental Shelf, www.state.gov/e/oes/continentalshelf/. MW Lodge, ‘The International Seabed Authority and the Arctic’, in S Wasum-Rainer, I Winkelmann and, K Tiroch (eds) Arctic Science, International Law and Climate Change (Heidelberg, Springer, 2012) 175–188, 176. 188 For an analysis of current and future shipping in Arctic waters and appertaining legal issues see eg L Boone, ‘International Regulation of Polar Shipping’ in EJ Molenaar et al (eds), The Law of the Sea and the Polar Regions (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2013) 193–215 and EJ Molenaar, ‘Status and Reform of International Arctic Shipping Law’ in E Tedsen et al (eds), Arctic Marine Governance (Heidelberg, Springer, 2014) 127–157; F Lasserre and O Alexeeva, ‘Analysis of Maritime Transit Trends in the Arctic Passages’ in S Lalonde and TL McDorman (eds), International Law and Politics of the Arctic Ocean (Leiden, Brill Nijhoff, 2015) 180–193 and Østreng et al, Shipping in Arctic Waters 129 ff. 189  PAME, Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment [AMSA] Report (Tromsø, 2009) 155. 190 According to the AMSA Report 2009 ‘[t]his includes such critical infrastructure components as the accuracy and availability of timely information needed for safe navigations; availability of search and rescue assets, pollution response assets and supporting shoreline infrastructure to respond appropriately to marine incidents; port reception facilities for ship-generated waste; and availability of deep water ports, places of refuge and salvage resources for vessels in distress.’ (154–155). 191  JA Roach, ‘Recent Development in Enhancing Safe Navigation’ in MH Nordquist et al (eds), The Law of the Sea Convention. US Accession and Globalization (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2012) 382–408, 395. 187 

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establish the Arctic Regional Hydrographic Commission in 2010 working through the International Hydrographic Organization.192 Its main purpose is to improve international coordination, to enhance information exchanges, to promote technical cooperation and to strengthen navigational safety, economic development, and the protection of the environment.193 In addition, various international treaties and guidelines of general application adopted under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), a specialised agency of the United Nations, are relevant for commercial (and other) shipping in the Arctic. This includes, for instance, the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 as modified by the Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL), the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW)194, and the International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments (BWM Convention).195 Four guidelines are specifically directed to polar shipping and thereby of particular importance, even though they are not legally binding: The 2002 IMO Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-Covered Areas, 2006 IMO Guidelines on Enhanced Contingency Planning Guidance for Passenger Ships Operating in Areas Remote from SAR Facilities, 2007 IMO Guidelines on Voyage Planning for Passenger Ships Operating in Remote Areas and 2009 IMO Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar Waters.196 To further strengthen the regulatory framework for Arctic shipping, the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment Report 2009 prepared under the auspices of the Arctic Council advocated for a legally binding agreement of Arctic shipping including construction, equipment and operational standards.197 It took several years before this mission was accomplished. The recent adoption of the Polar Code can be considered the beginning of a new era of safety for ships operating in Arctic waters as well as for protection of the marine environment and ecosystem.198 The Polar Code was not crafted as a stand-alone treaty but as an amendment to three already existing IMO conventions 1973/1978 MARPOL, SOLAS, and STCW. In November 2014, the IMO Maritime Safety Committee finally adopted the amendments to SOLAS concerning safe design, construction, operation of ships as well as training and certification for crewmembers working on polar ships. In May 2015, the IMO Maritime Environment Protection Committee followed by approving the amendments to MARPOL which contain provisions regarding the protection of the marine environment. Both parts entered into force on 1 January 2017.199 Although there is no doubt that the adoption of the Polar Code is a 192 

Doc 181. Hains, Status of Arctic Hydrography and Nautical Charting, presentation at PAME II-2014 (16 September 2014). Finland and Iceland have acquired Observer Status. 194  Consolidated versions of these instruments can be found in AV Lowe and S Talmon (eds), The Legal Order of the Oceans (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2009). 195  IMO Doc BMW/Conf./36, 16 February 2000. 196  Doc 175–178. 197  PAME, AMSA Report, 68. 198  Doc 179. See for an overview on the negotiation history, LW Brigham, ‘The Developing International Maritime Organization Polar Code’ (2014) Arctic Yearbook and JA Roach, ‘A Note on Making the Polar Code Mandatory’ in S Lalonde and TL McDorman (eds), International Law and Politics of the Arctic Ocean (Leiden, Brill Nijhoff, 2015) 125–140. 199 See on the new Polar Code J Bai, ‘The IMO Polar Code: The Emerging Rules of Arctic Shipping Governance’ (2015) 30 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 674. 193 D

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great success, the complex relationship between this instrument and the existing national Arctic shipping laws of Canada and Russia as well as the problem of a potential conflict of treaties still remains to be resolved.200 On top of this, under the auspices of the Arctic Council, two legally binding treaties, both dealing with safety of shipping and the attenuation of its repercussions on the Arctic environment, were concluded: the 2011 Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic and the 2013 Arctic Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response Agreement.201 Both instruments illustrate the increasing relevance of Arctic specific agreements for the governance of the High North.202 Part 7 sets out essential documents regarding Arctic fisheries. The broad territorial scope of the Arctic marine area—ranging from the Atlantic to the Pacific—means that it includes a wide range of different ecosystems and fish stocks. Some of them can only be found in the North Pacific, while others are confined to the North Atlantic or have a circumpolar distribution.203 Due to a changed marine environment with reduced salinity and growing acidification some fish stocks may even be threatened with extinction, while others will thrive and become more dominant. Some fish species might change their distribution by moving to Arctic waters and establish themselves there for the first time.204 The increasing water temperature and rapidly diminishing sea-ice will open up new opportunities to exploit previously inaccessible resources. If, where, and with respect to which species or category of species, new fishing opportunities will occur, cannot be predicted with certainty, but there are a great number of fish stocks which could become commercially desirable at some future time, although large-scale fishing in most of the Arctic Ocean is not imminent.205 Various global and regional hard and soft law instruments related to fisheries conservation and management are applicable to different but sometimes also overlapping Arctic marine areas.206 The most important legally binding instruments are the UNCLOS and the Fish Stocks Agreement, which elaborates on the UNCLOS provisions concerning 200  See further TL McDorman, ‘A Note on the Potential Conflicting Treaty Rights and Obligations between the IMO’s Polar Code and Article 234 of the Law of the Sea Convention’ in S Lalonde and TL McDorman (eds), International Law and Politics of the Arctic Ocean (Leiden, Brill Nijhoff, 2015) 141–159 and A Scassola, ‘An International Polar Code of Navigation: Consequences and Opportunities for the Arctic’ (2013) 5 Yearbook of Polar Law 271, 274 ff. 201  Doc 180, 254. There are some first legal and political assessments including some interesting background information on the evolution of the treaties: Y Takei, ‘Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic: an assessment’ (2013) 2 Aegean Review of the Law of the Sea and Maritime Law 81; and A Vasilev, ‘Agreement on Cooperation on Arctic Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response’ in N Loukacheva (ed), Polar Law and Resources (Copenhagen, NCM, 2015) 145. 202  But see SM Kao, NS Pearre, and J Firestone, ‘Adoption of the arctic search and rescue agreement: A shift of the arctic regime toward a hard law basis?’ (2012) 36 Marine Policy 832, 836 f. 203  An overview of the different species and their distribution is provided by EJ Molenaar, ‘Arctic Fisheries Management’ in EJ Molenaar, AG Oude Elferink, and DR Rothwell (eds), The Law of the Sea of the Polar Regions (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2013) 243–266. 204  See JS Jones, I Frederickson, and A Leibmann, ‘Climate Change Impacts to Fisheries and Habitat in the Pacific and the Arctic’ RS Abate (ed), Climate Change Impacts on Ocean and Coastal Law (Oxford, OUP, 2015) 109–132, 119. 205  EJ Molenaar and R Corell, Background Paper Arctic Fisheries (Arctic TRANSFORM, 2009) 4. 206  See generally, eg R Barnes, ‘International Regulation of Fisheries Management in Arctic Waters’ (2011) 54 GYIL 193–230; Molenaar, ‘Arctic Fisheries Management’ 243–266; EJ Molenaar, ‘Status and Reform of International Arctic Fisheries Law’ in E Tedsen, S Cavalieri, and AR Kraemer (eds), Arctic Marine Governance (Berlin, Springer, 2014) 103–125; L Weidemann, International Governance of the Arctic Marine Environment. With particular Emphasis on High Seas Fisheries (Heidelberg, Springer, 2014); E Hay, The Regime for the Exploitation of Transboundary Marine Fisheries Resources (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1989) 155 ff.

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fisheries management for straddling and highly migratory fish stocks, regional cooperation, enforcement of management measures, and dispute resolution mechanisms. Other international instruments providing for sustainable fisheries, although some of them are only of informal character, are the Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas,207 the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries,208 the FAO International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing209, and the Reykjavik Declaration on responsible fisheries in the marine ecosystem.210 In addition to these instruments of general application several bilateral and multilateral accords on the conservation and management of shared fish stocks within the Arctic marine area have been concluded. On the one hand, there are some agreements between Arctic States without a special treaty-based monitoring body, like the two agreements on mutual fisheries relations which have been concluded between the USSR and Canada, on 22 December 1975 and on 19 May 1976 respectively, and were supplemented by an Agreement on Fisheries Relations signed on 1 May 1984.211 Also Canada and Norway adopted an Agreement on Fisheries Conservation and Enforcement in 1995, though its entry into force is still pending.212 In 1992, Denmark, on behalf of Greenland, entered into agreements concerning mutual fisheries relations with the Russian Federation and Norway, implemented through annual consultations.213 Both treaties extend to waters beyond national jurisdiction, not expressly excluding the Arctic Ocean. The United States and Canada have also adopted a formal arrangement on fisheries law enforcement and further agreed to meet on an annual basis for informal consultations on bilateral, multilateral and global fisheries conservation and management issues that are of benefit to both States. Arctic cooperation has played a major role in their ongoing bilateral discussions.214 Recently added to this list of instruments was the Agreement on Cooperation for the Purposes of Preventing, Deterring and Eliminating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing, concluded between the United States and the Russian Federation in September 2015.215 On the other hand, several treaties between Arctic States provide for a special monitoring body or organisation. First, the International Pacific Halibut Commission (IPHC) was established by the Convention for the Preservation of the Halibut Fishery of the North Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea, ratified between Canada and the United States in 1953.216 The IPHC’s mission is to conserve, manage, and re-establish the halibut stocks to levels that would achieve and maintain the maximum sustainable yield from the fishery in the territorial waters and EEZ zones off the western coasts of the United States and Canada, including the Bering Sea. 207 

Done at Rome, 24 November 1993; entered into force 24 April 2003; 2221 UNTS 120. 31 October 1995, ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/005/v9878e/v9878e00.pdf. 209  Adopted 2 March 2001, www.fao.org/docrep/003/y1224e/y1224e00.htm. 210  Adopted 18 October 2001, (2001) 4 Journal of International Wildlife Law & Policy 295. 211  Doc 194, 195. 212  Doc 203. 213  Doc 201, 202. 214  Doc 200. For detailed information on this consultative mechanism see US Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, International agreements concerning living marine resources of interest to NOAA Fisheries Office (Silver Spring, Maryland, 2014) 126. 215  Doc 205. 216  Doc 190. 208  Adopted

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In 2002, Canada and the United States established a second organisation, namely the Yukon River Panel which is associated with the Pacific Salmon Commission established by the Pacific Salmon Treaty in 1985.217 The main objective of the Yukon River Panel is to make recommendations concerning the conservation and management of salmon originating in Canada. A small part of the marine Arctic falls in the ambit of the Yukon River Panel.218 A third relevant organisation, the Intergovernmental Consultative Committee (ICC), was created pursuant to the 1988 Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Mutual Fisheries Relations.219 The agreement expired on 31 December 2013, but in March 2015, US President Obama extended the agreement until 31 December 2018.220 It was supplemented and reaffirmed by a Joint Statement on Enhanced Fisheries Cooperation which was concluded on 29 April 2013221 and the aforementioned 2015 Agreement on Cooperation for the Purposes of Preventing, Deterring and Eliminating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing.222 From a geographical point of view the mandate of the ICC is not restricted. Its substantial area of competence is also wider than furthering the objectives of the agreement, eg it provided a forum for possible efforts on negotiating a fisheries agreement for the Central Arctic Ocean and the Northern Bering Sea,223 even though diplomatic negotiations on a comprehensive Agreement on Conservation and Management of Living Resources in the Northern Bering Sea held under the auspices of the ICC have not made any progress so far.224 In addition, the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission (JRNFC) was set up under the 1975 Agreement on Co-operation in the Fishing Industry, supplemented by the Agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of The Kingdom of Norway concerning mutual relations in the field of fisheries (Mutual Access Agreement)225 and the Grey Zone Agreement,226 which provides for a system of enforcement in the Loophole, a previously highly disputed high seas pocket between the EEZs of the Russian Federation and Norway.227 The joint management of fish stocks under the JRNFC encompasses the species of Northeast Arctic cod, Northeast Arctic haddock, Barents Sea capelin and Northeast Arctic halibut. The JRNFC meets annually to make recommendations on total quotas of three shared stocks, allocates 217  Treaty between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Pacific Salmon, done at Ottawa, 28 January 1985; entered into force 18 March 1985; 1469 UNTS 358. 218  It should be noted that Pacific salmon appears to be expanding its range into Arctic ecosystems. 219  Doc 196. 220  Letter from the President, 10 March 2015, www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/10/letter-presidentrussian-fisheries. 221  Joint Statement of the US Undersecretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere and Administrator for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the Head of the Federal Agency for Fisheries of the Russian Federation on Enhanced Fisheries Cooperation, www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ia/slider_stories/2013/04/us_russia. html. 222  Doc 205. 223 US Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, International agreements concerning living marine resources of interest to NOAA Fisheries Office (Silver Spring, Maryland, 2014) 147. 224  Molenaar, ‘Arctic Fisheries Management’ 258. 225  Doc 192–193. 226  Doc 119; see further K Stabrun, The Grey Zone Agreement of 1978: Fishery Concerns, Security Challenges and Territorial Interests (FNI Report 13/2009). 227 See generally OS Stokke, ‘The Loophole of the Barents Sea Fisheries Regime’ in OS Stokke (ed), Governing High Seas Fisheries: The Interplay of Global and Regional Regimes (Oxford, OUP, 2001) 273–301.

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quotas to the treaty parties and third parties and determines operational restrictions. In 2009, the JRNFC agreed to ‘make a request to ICES on continuous monitoring of the extensiveness in the Arctic Ocean of fish stocks managed by the Commission’.228 The ICES’ recommendation was issued in June 2011.229 After the 2010 Barents Sea Treaty had entered into force, circumstances changed significantly, but Article 1 of Annex 1 of the 2010 Barents Sea Treaty provides for the continuation of the JRNFC and declares that the 1975 and 1976 Agreements establishing and defining its tasks are to remain in force for a further 15 years. Article 4 of Annex 1 amends both agreements from the 1970s through the requirements to ensure relative stability and to apply the precautionary approach widely to the conservation, management and exploitation of the shared fish stocks. The longstanding dispute between Norway, the Russian Federation, and Iceland over Icelandic fishing rights in the Barents Sea has already been settled in 1999 by conclusion of the tripartite Loophole Agreement.230 Finally, there are a significant number of regional fisheries management organisations whose spatial scopes apply to some extent to the Arctic marine area and, thus, are particularly important for fisheries in the High North. On the one hand, this includes bodies and arrangements that are—potentially—relevant to the Central Arctic Ocean, ie the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission, the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, and the North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization. On the other hand, bodies and arrangements whose spatial scope covers the Arctic marine area,—but not the Central Arctic Ocean—like the Central Bering Sea Convention, the North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission, the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization, and the Pacific Salmon Commission will sooner or later play a bigger role in the regulation of Arctic fisheries. The North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) was established by the Convention in Future Multilateral Cooperation in North-East Atlantic Fisheries in 1980 and amended thereafter.231 Denmark in respect of the Faroe Islands and Greenland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, and the EU232 are parties to the Convention, while Canada is a cooperating, non-contracting member. The Convention area covers a significant portion of the Arctic Ocean. The Commission’s regulatory competence is limited to all areas of the Convention Area, which lie beyond the waters under the fisheries jurisdiction of contracting parties.233 This includes the three Arctic high seas pockets Banana Hole, the Loophole, and part of the Central Arctic Ocean. The NEAFC can be regarded as the most important mechanism relating to (future) Arctic fisheries.234 The International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) is responsible for international cooperation in research and conservation of tunas and 228 

JRNFC, para 14.1 of the protocol of the 38th session. Report of the ICES Advisory Committee, Book 3 ‘The Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea’ (2011) 4. 230  Background information is provided by OS Stokke, ‘Managing Fisheries in the Barents Sea Loophole: Interplay with the UN Fish Stocks Agreement’ (2001) 32 Ocean Development & International Law 241. 231  Doc 186. 232  For some background on the European Union’s activities in Arctic fisheries management see B Rudloff, The EU as fishing actor in the Arctic. Stocktaking of institutional involvement and existing conflicts (Working Paper, FG2, SWP Berlin, 2010). 233  Article 1(b) of the NEAFC Scheme of Control and Enforcement. 234 The Oslo Declaration adopted on 16 July 2015 explicitly acknowledges that NEAFC is an existing international mechanism relating to Arctic fisheries (Doc 210). 229 ICES,

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tuna-like species in the Atlantic Ocean and its adjacent seas. It was established by the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas in 1969.235 There are currently 51 contracting parties, among them Canada, Iceland, Norway the Russian Federation and the United States. The Convention for the Conservation of Salmon in the North Atlantic Ocean in 1982 led to the establishment of the North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization (NASCO).236 It is responsible for cooperation on conservation, restoration, enhancement and rational management of migratory salmon stocks in the North Atlantic. Canada, Denmark (in respect of the Faroe Islands and Greenland), the EU, Norway, the United States, and the Russian Federation are contracting parties. Due to financial considerations, Iceland left NASCO at the end of 2009. The Convention applies to more southerly waters in the marine Arctic of the Atlantic, covering salmon stocks migrating beyond areas of fisheries jurisdiction of coastal States north of 36°N latitude throughout their migratory range. The Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pollock Resources in the Central Bering Sea was concluded by Japan, China, Korea, Poland, the Russian Federation and, the United States in 1994.237 The adoption of this Convention had become necessary after both the United States and the USSR had extended their fisheries jurisdiction claims to 200 nm in 1977. As a result, more than 90 per cent of the Bering Sea fell under the jurisdiction of one of these both States and only the so-called Doghnut Hole, a small pocket of 50,000 km2 remained designated as high seas. Pollock fishery in the US-American and Soviet EEZ had rapidly grown and after some time vessels from Japan, Korea, China, and Poland had begun to undertake fishing operations in the Doghnut Hole. This increase in fishing activities led to initial concerns of overfishing, until in 1992 the pollock stocks in the Bering Sea collapsed.238 It can be regarded as an ‘important initiative for high seas fishing within an Arctic subregion […] and a useful model for resource management in situations where both Arctic states and states from beyond the region seek to exploit a single resource within a high seas area.’239 It does not provide for a commission. Instead the contracting parties established a Scientific and Technical Committee which convenes for an annual conference. The area of competence is the high seas area of the Bering Sea beyond 200 nm from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of the United States and the Russian Federation is measured.240 The North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission (NPAFC) was created by the Convention for the Conservation of Anadromous Stocks in the North Pacific Ocean adopted by Japan, Canada, the Russian Federation, and the United States in 1992.241 According to its Article 1 its spatial scope encompasses ‘the waters of the North Pacific Ocean and its adjacent seas, north of 33E North Latitude beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured’. The NPAFC is mandated to promote the conservation of anadromous stocks by implementing conservation measures, promoting scientific study of anadromous species, and enforcing 235 

Done at Rio de Janeiro, 14 May 1966; entered into force 21 March 1969; 673 UNTS 64. Doc 187. 237  Doc 189. 238  DA Balton, ‘The Bering Sea Doghnut Hole Convention’ in OS Stokke (ed), Governing High Seas Fisheries. The Interplay of Global and Regional Regimes (Oxford, OUP, 2001) 143–177, 144 ff. 239 Rothwell, The Polar Regions 317. 240  See generally Balton, ‘The Bering Sea Doghnut Hole Convention’ 143–177. 241  Doc 188. 236 

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fishing restrictions. It is also responsible for the conservation of some ecologically related species, eg marine mammals, sea birds and non-anadromous fish. Since its enactment in 1993 all directed fishing of anadromous stocks in the Convention area is prohibited (Article 2). Both the Russian Federation and the United States have used the NPAFC as a platform for research concerning fisheries, but also ocean acidification and loss of seaice in the Arctic.242 Finally, the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) is based on the Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries of 1979 which eleven States, including the Arctic Five and the EU, have ratified.243 According to Article II NAFO’s objective is to ‘contribute through consultation and cooperation to the optimum utilization, rational management and conservation of the fisheries resources.’ The Convention Area is 6,551,289 km2 comprising all waters north of 35°N and west 42°W, including the 200 nm zones of Canada, Greenland, and United States. The regulatory area is 2,707,895 km2 and includes only those areas straddling and outside the EEZs.

Figure 1: RFMO in the Arctic Marine Area, Originated by Fabio Carocci, Fishery Information Assistant, Fisheries and Aquaculture Resources Use and Conservation Division, Food and Agriculture Organization of the U.N. 242 NOAA, International agreements concerning living marine resources of interest to NOAA Fisheries Office (2015) 136 ff. 243  Doc 184–185.

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Despite all these regional fisheries management organisations and bilateral arrangements, there is a significant regulatory gap in the coverage of the Central Arctic Ocean.244 Therefore, the development for a specific framework regarding the conservation and management of fish stocks in this area has been put on the political agenda. In 2008, a joint resolution was signed by the then US President in order to direct ‘the United States to initiate international discussions and take necessary steps with other Nations to negotiate an agreement for managing migratory and transboundary fish stocks in the Arctic Ocean’.245 One year later, Washington prohibited commercial fishing in the EEZ off Alaska in the Arctic Ocean ‘until information improves so that fishing can be conducted sustainably and with due concern to other ecosystem components.’246 The United States informed both Canada and the Russian Federation of its recent actions indicating that it was prepared to engage in exploratory talks on the issue247 seconded by the EU which had proposed the establishment of a regulatory framework for fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean in the 2009 UNGA Sustainable Fisheries Resolution.248 The other Arctic States did not take up the United States’ offer and strongly opposed the EU’s proposal, taking the view that neither the UNGA nor the FAO or the Arctic Council should become actively involved in fisheries management and conservation.249 In the end the Arctic States declared that they preferred ‘building on and considering this issue within the context of existing mechanisms’.250 Since then the Arctic States are performed volte-face with regard to fisheries in the Arctic Ocean beginning with a meeting of the five Arctic coastal States in 2010, where the ‘participants exchanged views on available scientific information and acknowledged that the current state of information does not allow for a full understanding of the status of fish stocks and the impact of climate change on such stocks in the Arctic Ocean.’251 In May 2013, the Arctic Coastal States met in Washington DC to discuss future fisheries, now, in the Central Arctic Ocean.252 There it was generally agreed that commercial fisheries in the high sea areas of the Central Arctic Ocean is unlikely to occur soon. Hence, the need for establishing a special regional fisheries management organisation (RFMO) for this area was not considered pressing, but for the time being the development of

244  See also S Ryder, ‘The Nuuk Meeting on Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries’ (JCLOS Blog, 15 October 2014), www.site.uit.no/jclos/2014/10/15/the-nuuk-meeting-on-central-arctic-ocean-fisheries. 245  Doc 206. 246  United States, Fishery Management Plan for Fish Resources of the Arctic Management Area (August 2009). 247  Molenaar and Corell, Arctic Fisheries 25. 248  EU, Joint Staff Working Document, The inventory of activities in the framework of developing a European Union Arctic Policy (26 June 2012, SWD(2012) 182 final) 23: ‘In relation to the impacts of global climate change on the sustainability of fish stocks and the habitats that support them, the draft resolution again urges States to intensify efforts to assess and address such impacts. In relation to the possible consequences of climate change on fishery resources in the Arctic Ocean, the EU would, also in the context of the draft resolution on sustainable fisheries, have wished to highlight the state of the Arctic region as a specific area where further scientific studies should be carried out due to the particular implications that climate change may have on fisheries management in that area in the future.’ (UN Doc A/64/PV.56, 4). 249  Molenaar, ‘Arctic Fisheries Management’ 248. 250  Final Report of the Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials at Narvik (28–29 November 2007) 12. 251  Doc 207. 252  As Molenaar observes, the geographical focus of earlier meetings was related to Arctic fisheries in general, but has shifted towards high seas fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean (cited after S Ryder, The ‘Declaration Concerning the Prevention of Unregulated High Seas Fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean’ (JCLOS Blog, 11 August 2015).

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interim measures was regarded desirable.253 Just one year later, the Arctic coastal States convened again—this time in Nuuk—to discuss the development of measures to prevent unregulated fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean and related scientific matters. They came to the conclusion that it was essential to develop ‘appropriate interim measures to deter unregulated fishing in the future in the high seas area of the central Arctic Ocean’ and that no commercial fishing in the high seas of the Arctic Ocean should be undertaken until a competent RFMO is in place.254 On 16 July 2015, the Arctic coastal States adopted the Declaration concerning the Prevention of Unregulated High Seas Fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean (Oslo Declaration).255 It builds upon the 2014 Nuuk Declaration stating a list of specific interim measures that should be implemented thus taking a longawaited further step toward a firm regulatory framework of Arctic Ocean fisheries.256 Expressing its irritation by the decision of the five Arctic coastal States to keep Iceland outside consultations and preparations on the Oslo Declaration, the Icelandic Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a note in which it underlined that ‘Iceland has the same rights and duties to take part in all discussions on the future development on fishing in international waters in the Arctic Ocean and it is therefore completely inconsequent to exclude Iceland from participation.’257 In December 2015, an exploratory follow-up meeting took place in Washington DC, where participants from Canada, China, Denmark, the EU, Iceland, Japan, South Korea, Norway, the Russian Federation, and the United States convened in order to deepen the discussion on the prevention of unregulated commercial fishing in the high seas area of the Central Arctic Ocean.258 Further meetings followed in 2016.259 Another key player in the governance of Arctic fisheries is the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), an intergovernmental organisation first established in 1902 and re-organised in 1964, through a convention.260 According to ICES’ own description its ‘main objective is to increase the scientific knowledge of the marine environment and its living resources and to use this knowledge to provide unbiased, nonpolitical advice to competent authorities.’261 Its spatial scope includes the Atlantic Ocean and its adjacent seas, primarily the North Atlantic. The Arctic is a priority research area for ICES covering topics that include arctic and sub-arctic fish stocks, hydrography, the warming of the Arctic Ocean and environmental risks of increased shipping, and oil and gas exploitation.262 In addition, ICES cooperates with several organisations involved in Arctic science, eg the Arctic Council or the International Arctic Science Committee. 253 

Doc 208. Doc 209. Some argue that such an RFMO should be established under the auspices of the Arctic Council, see TH Heidar, ‘The Legal Regime of the Arctic Ocean’ in G Witschel, I Winkelmann, K Tiroch, and R Wolfrum (eds), New Chances and New Responsibilites in the Arctic Region (Berlin, Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010) 157–162, 160 ff and K Hossain, ‘Governance of Arctic Ocean Marine Resources’ in RS Abate (ed), Climate Change Impacts on Ocean and Coastal Law (Oxford, OUP, 2015) 273–297, 296. 255  Doc 210. 256 An analysis of the Oslo Declaration is provided by EJ Molenaar, ‘The Oslo Declaration on High Seas Fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean’ (2015) Arctic Yearbook 427. See generally N Wegge, ‘The emerging politics of the Arctic Ocean. Future management of the living marine resources’ (2015) 51 Marine Policy 331. 257  Doc 211. 258  For the Chairman’s Statement, see www.state.gov/e/oes/rls/pr/250352.htm#1. 259  Doc 212–213. For the Chairman’s Statements, www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/international/media/statement-declarationeng.htm; http://arcticjournal.com/press-releases/2733/meeting-high-seas-fisheries-central-arctic-ocean. 260  Doc 182. 261 www.ices.dk/explore-us/what-we-do/Pages/default.aspx. 262  Eg, the Arctic Fisheries Working Group’s task is to assess fish stocks in the Arctic (ICES Inside Out, 2012 No. 2). 254 

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Of course, imposing regulatory limits on Arctic fisheries raises not only international issues with regard to high seas and migratory stocks, but also touches the national domain. With the exception of Canada’s 1994 Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, which led to some critique from an international law perspective, domestic instruments and approaches to the conservation and management of Arctic fisheries are not included in this collection.263 The Coastal Fisheries Protection Act is a reaction to the detrimental consequences of overfishing for the marine environment. It prohibits foreign fishing vessels from operating without permission in Canadian waters and authorised the government to board, inspect, arrest and seize any fishing vessel found there. It is to be enforced in the fishing zone in Canadian Arctic waters 200 nm seaward of the Canadian baselines established by both the 1996 Oceans Act and the Fishing Zones of Canada (Zone 6) Order.264 After the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act had been amended in 1994 extending its area of application to cover parts of the high seas in the Grand Banks area, several States vigorously protested against the new legislation as being contrary to the NAFO Agreement and general principles of law of the sea, in particular the rules protecting vessels on the high seas from interference by States other than their own flag States.265 The Arctic region is a highly vulnerable place, in particular with respect to anthropogenic climate change. The average temperature in the High North has risen at almost twice the rate as the rest of the world leading to the melting of glaciers and sea ice, and changes in biological diversity.266 In addition to the impacts of climate change, many other negative implications of human activities—for example air and water pollution, overfishing or acidification—affect the Arctic environment and ecosystem.267 However, the repercussions are felt on a much larger scale as the Arctic plays an important role in the environmental balance of the whole earth, having a far reaching impact on the global ocean circulation and weather patterns. Therefore an effective legal framework for the conservation and protection of the Arctic environment is of utmost importance. Accordingly Part 8 comprises international and national instruments that are particularly relevant for the conservation and protection of the Arctic environment— either due to their substance or geographical scope of application. Many international hard and soft law instruments of general application are also relevant for the protection and preservation of different aspects of the Arctic environment.268 Of particular 263 

Doc 216–218. Doc 215. Canada’s Arctic Waters: Developments in Canada’s Oceans Law Since 1985, www.forces.gc.ca/ en/about-reports-pubs-military-law-strategic-legal-paper/naval-ops-arctic-waters-law.page. 265  See on the diplomatic and legal controversy around the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act WV Dunlap, ‘Canada Asserts Jurisdiction over High Seas Fisheries’ (1994) IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 63. Spain finally instituted proceedings against Canada for violating some provisions of the NAFO agreement and other principles of the law of the sea before the ICJ [ICJ, Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v Canada) (Judgment, Jurisdiction) [1998] ICJ Rep 432 (4 December 1998)]. For a thorough analysis of this case, see RR Churchill, ‘Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Spain v. Canada)’ (1999) 12 Leiden Journal of International Law 597; D Barry, B Applebaum, and E Wiseman, Fishing for a Solution: Canada’s Fisheries Relations with the European Union, 1977–2013 (Calgary, University of Calgary Press, 2014); O Akiba, ‘International Law of the Sea: The Legality of Canadian Seizure of the Spanish Trawler (Estai)’ (1997) 37 Natural Resources Law 809. 266  ‘Rapid Change in the Arctic’ (2014) UNEP Year Book 61. 267  See in general on the implication of clime change on the Arctic SJ Hassol, Impacts of a warming climate (Cambridge, CUP, 2007); J Winther, ‘Climate Change in the Polar Regions’ in N Loukacheva (ed), Polar Law and Resources (Copenhagen, NCM, 2015) 51–62. 268 For an overview on instruments of a general application with regard to the protection of the Arctic environment see the List of Major International Instruments and Policy Declarations Pertaining to the Arctic 264 

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importance are hereby the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,269 the Convention on Biological Diversity,270 the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants,271 the Convention on Long-Range Trans-boundary Air Pollution272 (and Protocols), the Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage,273 the Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats,274 the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat,275 the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals,276 the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora277, and the Minamata Convention on Mercury.278 In addition, there are several multi- and bilateral instruments on the protection of the marine and terrestrial environment that have been concluded between Arctic States. This set includes the Nordic Environmental Protection Convention adopted between Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden in 1974, the primary purpose of which is ‘to ensure that the environmental protection interest of neighbouring Nordic countries would be given equal status in the legislation of each country’;279 the 1983 Agreement for Cooperation Relating to the Marine Environment between Canada and Denmark280, and the 1994 Agreement between the United States and Russia on Cooperation in the Prevention of Pollution of the Environment in the Arctic that aims to enhance cooperation in the field of environmental protection through exchange of scientific personnel, of scientific and technical information, bilateral conferences, and the development and implementation of projects.281 Apart from this general approach, there are legal mechanisms for very specific environmental issues in place: the protection and management of Arctic biodiversity and wildlife and the prevention of marine pollution. Changes in Arctic biological diversity are severe and widespread. Many marine mammals such as polar bears, seals, whales, and caribous are put at risk not only by the accelerating climate change, but also due to the exposure to anthropogenic stressors that had not previously existed in the Arctic, like human habitation, exploration and shipping activities, anthropogenic contaminants, and the introduction of invasive species.282 Environment (Rovaniemi, 10–14 June 1991), L Nowlan, ‘Arctic Legal Regime for Environmental Protection’ (2001) 44 IUCN Environmental Policy and Law Paper; KL Johnsen, B Alfthan, L Hislop, and JF Skaalvik (eds), Protecting Arctic Biodiversity. Limitations and Strengths of Environmental Agreements (Norway, UNEP/ Grid Arendal, 2010) as well as E Burleson, ‘Polar law and good governance’ in S Alam et al (eds), Routledge Handbook of International Environmental Law (London, Routledge, 2015) 529–543. Further recommended reading DP Stone, The Changing Arctic Environment: The Arctic Messenger (Cambridge, CUP, 2015). 269 

Done at New York, 9 May 1992: entered into force 21 March 1994; 1771 UNTS 165. Done at Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992; entered into force 29 December 1993; 1760 UNTS 143. 271  Done at Stockholm, 22 May 2001; entered into force 17 May 2004; 2256 UNTS 215. 272  Done at Geneva, 13 November 1979; entered into force 16 March 1983; 1302 UNTS 218. 273  Done at Paris, 16 November 1972; entered into force 17 December 1975; 1037 UNTS 152. 274  Done at Bern, 19 September 1979; entered into force 1 June 1982; 1284 UNTS 210. 275  Done at Ramsar, 2 February 1971; entered into force 21 December 1975; 996 UNTS 246. 276  Done at Bonn, 23 June 1979; entered into force 1 November 1983; 1651 UNTS 356. 277  Done at Washington, 3 March 1973; entered into force 1 July 1975; 993 UNTS 244. 278  Done at Kumamoto, 10 October 2013; not entered into force yet. See Doc 261. 279  M Fitzmaurice, ‘The Finnish-Swedish Frontier Rivers Commission’ in Hague Yearbook of International Law 1992 (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1993) 33–67, 61. 280  Doc 225. 281  Doc 226. 282  For an assessment of the threats to Arctic biological diversity see CAFF, Arctic Biodiversity Assessment (Akureyri, Iceland, 2013). 270 

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Polar bears: Polar bears are the iconic symbol of the—melting—Arctic.283 They are distributed throughout all five Arctic coastal States. Since sea-ice is pivotal for the survival of polar bears, the continued retreat and fragmentation of sea-ice induced by climate change is life threatening for their populations. But not only environmental changes, also an increased exposure to contaminants and harmful side effects of Arctic shipping, like noise and waste, have become a serious menace to polar bears. The International Agreement for the Conservation of Polar Bears and their Habitat is one of the few Arctic specific instruments currently in place.284 It was adopted by the five polar bears range States—Canada, Denmark, Norway, the then USSR, and the United States—in 1973 as a response to commercial over-hunting of polar bears in some Arctic States. Although the main threat to polar bears at the time of the agreement’s adoption was hunting and killing, whereas the present dangers are instead global warming and the melting sea-ice,285 it still is an important instrument signalling a continued commitment to the protection of polar bears. This is one reason why in 2007, the polar bear range States resumed to coordinate and enhance their conservation efforts and to convene for meetings on a biennial schedule.286 Since the Agreement does not establish an autonomous institutional mechanism monitoring its implementation, the Polar Bear Specialist Group, a sub-committee of the Species Survival Commission of the International Union for Conservation of Nature, fills this regulatory gap by serving as an unofficial scientific advisory committee and monitoring body.287 Other international agreements protecting the polar bear are the Polar Bear Management Agreement for the Southern Beaufort Sea concluded between the Inupiat hunters of Alaska and Inuvialuit hunters of Canada in 2000,288 and the Agreement on the Conservation and Management of the Alaska-Chukotka Polar Bear Population executed between the United States and the Russian Federation in the same year.289 These instruments are supplemented by two MoUs regarding the conservation and management of shared polar bear populations; one was adopted between Environment Canada and the US Department of the Interior in 2008, the other between the governments of Canada, Nunavut and Greenland in 2009.290 Seals: Several species of seal, for example, the ring seals and bearded seals, populate the Arctic. Like polar bears, most seal species depend on ice for the purpose of pupping,

283  For the harmful impact of ice melting on polar bear populations see SM Kao, NS Pearre, and J Firestone, ‘Adoption of the Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement: A Shift of the Arctic Regime toward a Hard Law Basis?’ (2012) 36 Marine Policy 834. 284 Doc 228. See for a critical discussion N Bankes, ‘Has international law failed the polar bear?’ in MH Nordquist et al (eds), Changes in the Arctic Environment and the Law of the Sea (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2010) 365–386. 285  M Jacobsson, ‘International Law and Scientific Research in the Arctic—The Role of Science in Law and the Role of Law in Science’ in G Witschel, I Winkelmann, K Tiroch, and R Wolfrum (eds) New Changes and New Responsibilities in the Arctic Region (Berlin, Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010) 233–244, 237. 286  Doc 229–234. 287  N Bankes, ‘Polar bears and international law’ in N Loukacheva (ed) Polar Law Textbook II (Copenhagen, NCM, 2013) 123. 288  Doc 235. Its territorial scope covers the Canadian portion of the Beaufort Sea region and Chukchi Sea in the United States. 289  Doc 236. 290  Doc 237–238. Of course, polar bears are also protected under the domestic laws of the five range states. For a good overview of instruments of national protection see 11th Meeting of the CoP to the CMS, Agenda Item 24.1, Doc UNEP/CMS/COP11/Doc.24.1.11/Rev. 1 (4 November 2014).

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moulting and resting. The existence of seals also has a human dimension. They are an integral part of Inuit culture and have been essential to the subsistence of the Inuit people for a long time, since they provide meat and oil for food, and skins for clothing.291 There are a number of general agreements whose scope of protection includes seals species living in the Arctic, like Appendix 3 of the Bern Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats.292 In addition, there are a few instruments that specifically apply to Arctic seals.293 One of them is the Agreement on the protection and exploitation of the seal stocks in the Northeast Atlantic between Norway and the Soviet Union based on an exchange of diplomatic notes,294 which was concluded in 1983 replacing the Agreement between Norway and the Soviet Union on measures for regulating the catch and conserving stocks of seals in the Northeastern part of the Atlantic Ocean.295 The other one is the Agreement on Sealing and the Conservation of the Seal Stocks in the Northwest Atlantic entered into by Norway and Canada in 1971 and amended in 1975.296 Also with relevance for Arctic governance is the EU seal regime which gave rise to a sharp diplomatic dispute. The controversy strained the EU’s international relations to Canada, Norway and Greenland, and further lead to the deferral of the admission of the EU as a Permanent Observer at the Arctic Council. The EU’s general ban on the import of seal products was at the heart of the dispute. Although Regulation (EC) No. 1007/2009 of the European Parliament and the Council on trade in seal products includes an exception covering seal products ‘which result from hunts traditionally conducted by Inuit and other indigenous communities’,297 the measure was said to have negative effects over the entire seal product market within the EU. Against this backdrop, in 2009, Norway and Canada made a request for consultations under the WTO Agreement. Iceland would join the consultations at a later stage. At the request of the complaining parties, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body established a Panel in 2011. In 2013, the WTO circulated a final panel report, which was subsequently appealed by the EU, Canada, and Norway.298 One year later, the Appellate Body issued its final report.299 The report was more a defeat than a victory to the EU. The Appellate Body found that

291 

Further on Arctic seals Johnsen, Alfthan, L Hislop, and Skaalvik (eds), Protecting Arctic Biodiversity 64 ff. Bern Convention’s applicability to Arctic seals is very limited. Out of the group of Arctic States only Denmark, Norway, and Iceland have ratified the Convention. The EU also ratified the Convention but since Greenland does not belong to the EU, it is not bound by the Convention. 293  See further on the existing international and domestic legal frameworks for seals and sealing N Sellheim, ‘A Legal Framework for Seals and Sealing in the Arctic’ in N Loukacheva (ed), Polar Law and Resources (Copenhagen, NCM, 2015) 109–118. For some historical background of the protection of Arctic seals see Rothwell, The Polar Regions 323–327. 294  Doc 241. 295  Done at Oslo, 22 November 1957; entered into force 27 June 1958; 309 UNTS 280. 296  Doc 239–240. 297  In fact the case was concerned with two Regulations, which were held to constitute a single ‘measure’: (i) Regulation (EC) No. 1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on trade in seal products (‘Basic Regulation’); and (ii) Commission Regulation (EU) No. 737/2010 of 10 August 2010 (‘Implementing Regulation’). The case additionally pertained to other related measures. See: EC-Seal Products, Appellate Body Report (22 May 2014) 96. 298  WTO Panel Report, Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, WT/DS400/ AB/R, WT/DS401/AB/R. 299 WTO Appellate Body Report, Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, WT/DS400/AB/R, WT/DS401/AB/R. 292 The

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the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade was not applicable to the EC Seal Regime, and therefore reversed the Panel’s findings on this point. Therefore, the Appellate Body focused on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In this connection, the measure was declared to be inconsistent with the most-favoured nation clause (Article I (1) GATT) and the national treatment obligation (Article III (4) GATT). Then, both the Panel and the Appellate Body analysed the measure under the public morals exception set forth in Article XX(a) GATT. Following different legal tests, they both found that the EU had failed to prove the exception. In particular, the Appellate Body declared that ‘the European Union has not justified the EU Seal Regime under Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994’.300 Following the adoption of the reports, Canada and the EU issued a Joint Statement Access to the European Union of Seal Products from Indigenous Communities of Canada on 18 August 2014,301 and the EU adapted Regulation (EC) No. 1007/2009 bringing it into compliance with WTO rules. The amended legislation entered into force on 18 October 2015.302 Whales: Similar to the hunting of seals whaling is a very controversial topic in which different views on the protection of the environment and the preservation of a traditional way of life collide. Currently there are 17 whale species living in Arctic waters. The legal framework of whale management in the Arctic includes several global and regional instruments of general application.303 Of particular relevance are hereby the Convention on Biological Diversity,304 the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,305 the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals,306 but also the Agreement on Cooperation in Research, Conservation and Management of Marine Mammals in the North Atlantic307, and the Agreement on the Conservation of Small Cetaceans in the Baltic, North East Atlantic, Irish and North Seas.308 By far the most prominent instrument is the 1946 International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW), which established the International Whaling Commission (IWC).309 With exception of Canada, all Arctic States are parties to the ICRW. Although the IWC introduced a moratorium on commercial whaling in 1982, it is still undertaken

300  Finding d(iii). For more information on the facts and legal aspects of this dispute and its socio-political implications see eg M Fakhri, ‘The WTO, Self-determination, and Multi-jurisdictional Sovereignty’ (AJIL Unbound, 25 June 2015), www.asil.org/blogs/wto-self-determination-and-multi-jurisdictional-sovereignty; M Henning, ‘The EU Seal Products Ban—Why Ineffective Animal Welfare Protection Cannot Justify Trade Restrictions under European and International Trade Law’ (2015) 6 Arctic Review on Law and Politics 74; N Bankes and E Whitsitt, ‘Arctic marine mammals in international environmental law and trade law’ in LC Jensen and G Hønneland (eds), Handbook of the Politics of the Arctic (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2015) 194–199. 301  Doc 289. 302  Regulation (EU) 2015/1775 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 2015 amending Regulation (EC) No 1007/2009 on trade in seal products and repealing Commission Regulation (EU) No 737/2010, OJ L 262, 7.10.2015, 1. 303  See generally M Fitzmaurice, ‘International Law and Whaling in the Arctic’ in N Loukacheva (ed), Polar Law and Resources (Copenhagen, NCM, 2015) 99–108. Monographic M Fitzmaurice, Whaling and International Law (Cambridge, CUP, 2015). 304  Done at Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992; entered into force 29 December 1993; 1760 UNTS 143. 305  Done at Washington, 3 March 1973; entered into force 1 July 1975; 993 UNTS 244. 306  Done at Bonn, 23 June 1979; entered into force 1 November 1983; 1651 UNTS 356. 307  Doc 222. 308  Done at New York, 17 March 1992; entered into force 29 March 1994; 1772 UNTS 218. 309  Doc 242.

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by Iceland and Norway, since both whaling nations opted out of the moratorium.310 However, the question as to whether the moratorium has ever been or is still scientifically justifiable is at the centre of discussions within the IWC.311 Whaling for scientific purposes is still done by Iceland, while whaling for subsistence is undertaken by some of the indigenous peoples of the Russian Federation, the United States, and Greenland.312 Canada left the IWC in 1982 after the body had decided to prohibit Inuit people from hunting bowhead whales. Since then Canada has established its own whaling regime, in which commercial whaling is banned (the ban was introduced in 1972), while the right to traditional whaling is granted to Inuit people by the Inuvialuit Final Agreement and the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement. For this, Canada has been repeatedly criticized by the IWC. In the early 2000s the IWC changed its position, now allowing for subsistence whaling by allocating quotas to indigenous peoples in Alaska and Greenland. This development has raised the question of whether Canada should re-join the ICRW.313 On a regional level the Inuvialuit Inupiat Beaufort Sea Beluga Whale Agreement is essential for the regulation of Arctic whaling.314 It was concluded between the Inuvialuit of Canada’s Western Arctic and the Inupiat of Northern Alaska in 2000 as an institutional supplement to the Beaufort Sea Beluga Management Plan.315 Porcupine caribou: Porcupine caribou is a trans-boundary species of deer migrating between Alaska and northern Canada.316 Currently, there are approximately 210,000 animals in the Arctic region, most of them living in specially protected habitats. From time immemorial, indigenous peoples have relied on caribous for subsistence, but thawing permafrost, air pollution and climate change threat the existence of porcupine caribous and lead to a decline of one-third since their populations peaked 15 years ago.317 Such changes in the abundance of caribous challenge the traditional ways of life of Arctic indigenous peoples. Before 1980 only informal management schemes had been implemented between Canada and the United States. This changed with the adoption of the 1985 Porcupine Caribou Management Agreement by Canada with the governments of Yukon Territory, Northwest Territories, and several indigenous peoples’ organisations.318 In 1987, Canada and the United States adopted an Agreement on the Conservation of the Porcupine Caribou Herd.319 This initiative sought to preserve Caribou herds and their habitat while allowing traditional uses of the herd by indigenous peoples. It also 310  Critical towards the moratorium and the way it was reached W Aron, W Burke, and MMR Freeman, ‘The Whaling Issue’ (2000) 24 Marine Policy 179. 311  Arguing that the moratorium should be lifted L Kobayashi, ‘Lifting the International Whaling Commission’s Moratorium on Commercial Whaling as the Most Effective Global Regulation of Whaling’ (2006) 29 Environs 202. See also Aron, Burke, and Freeman, ‘The Whaling Issue’ 179. 312  Fitzmaurice, ‘Whaling in the Arctic’ 99. 313  A Speca, ‘In the Belly of the Whaling Commission’ Northern Public Affairs (Inuvik, 18 June 2012), www. northernpublicaffairs.ca/index/in-the-belly-of-the-whaling-commission. 314  Doc 243. 315  LA Harwood and TG Smith, ‘Whales of the Inuvialuit Settlement Region in Canada’s Western Arctic: An Overview and Outlook’ (2002) 55 (Supp 1) ARCTIC 77, 87. 316  See generally KD Lawrence, ‘Caribou’ in A Hund (ed), Antarctica and the Arctic Circle: A Geographic Encyclopedia of the Earth’s Polar Regions (Santa Barbara, ABC-CLIO, 2014) 170 f. 317  Johnsen, Alfthan, Hislop, and Skaalvik (eds), Protecting Arctic Biodiversity 22. 318 Doc 244. See generally on the regulation of the preservation of Caribou herds Rothwell, The Polar Regions 330–332 and GP Kofinas, ‘Caribou Hunters and Researchers at the Co-management Interface: Emergent Dilemmas and the Dynamics of Legitimacy in Power Sharing’ (2005) 47 Anthropologica 179. 319  Doc 245. On the formalisation of bilateral Caribou management see N Bankes, ‘A Migratory Cariboo Convention’ (1980) 18 CYIL 285.

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established the International Porcupine Caribou Management Board which monitors the implementation of the agreement and provides scientific advice to the parties involved on matters regarding the protection and management of the caribou herd. Out of concern for the impact of industrial development on caribou herds, in 1996, IUCN adopted a Resolution on Protecting the Habitat of the Porcupine Caribou Herd.320 Birds: In 1916, the United States and Great Britain (for Canada) signed the Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds. They planned to amend the convention to allow subsistence hunting of waterfowl outside of the normal hunting season, but this amendment has never entered into force. In 1995, the treaty was finally amended by establishing a legal framework for the subsistence take of birds by indigenous peoples in Alaska and northern Canada. In 1976, the United States also agreed with the former Soviet Union on a Convention Concerning the Conservation of Migratory Birds and Their Environment.321 As mentioned before, the prevention of marine pollution is also a major topic on the Arctic agenda.322 All Arctic States are parties to the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and other Matter with its 1996 Protocol,323 to the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships and its 1978 Protocol324 as well as to the 1990 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation325—all three of them apply to the Arctic. Apart from these general instruments, more regional approaches have been developed, such as the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic, which was adopted under the auspices of the Arctic Council in May 2013. Its objective is to strengthen cooperation, coordination and mutual assistance among the parties in the event of an oil spill emergency.326 As a supplement, the Arctic Council devised the non-legally binding Framework Plan for Cooperation on Prevention of Oil Pollution from Petroleum and Maritime Activities in the Marine Areas of the Arctic which was presented at a ministerial meeting in May 2015.327 These initiatives are preceded by several legal instruments concluded between Arctic States, for instance, the 1994 Agreement between Norway and Russia on cooperation to combat oil-spills in the Barents Sea and the 1993 Agreement between Denmark, Finland, Island, Norway and Sweden concerning Cooperation in taking Measures against Pollution of the Sea by Oil or Other Harmful Substances.328

320 

Doc 246. Doc 247–248. 322  See generally Byers, International Law and the Arctic 200–213. 323  Done at London, 29 December 1972; entered into force 30 August 1975, 1046 UNTS 138. Done at London, 7 November 1996, entered into force 24 March 2006, 36 ILM 1 (1997). 324  Done at London, 2 November 1973. As the 1973 MARPOL Convention had not yet entered into force, the 1978 MARPOL Protocol absorbed the parent Convention. The combined instrument entered into force on 2 October 1983. Canada has made a Declaration upon accession that MARPOL ‘is without prejudice to such Canadian laws and regulations as are now or may in the future be established in respect of arctic waters within or adjacent to Canada.’ (Doc 251). 325  Done at London, 30 November 1990; entered into force 13 May 1995; 1891 UNTS 78. 326 Doc 254. On the political and negotiation history of this agreement see A Vasiliev, ‘Agreement on Cooperation on Arctic Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response’ in N Loukacheva (ed), Polar Law and Resources (Copenhagen, NCM, 2015) 145–154. 327  Doc 255. 328  Doc 249–250. 321 

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But there are also other challenges for the environment which have to be covered by the regulatory framework of Arctic governance. An example is the multilateral Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation Programme which is based on the non-legally binding Declaration on Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation signed between Norway, Russia, and the United States in 1996.329 The primary goal of this initiative is the reduction of deleterious effects of military operations on the Arctic environment. Although the Declaration neither articulates a specific objective nor brings any specific environmental issue into focus, in practice special attention is given to the military nuclear contamination threats in the Russian Arctic.330 From an institutional point of view, the Arctic Council plays a unique role in the protection of the Arctic environment. Five years before the Arctic Council was founded, the Arctic States presented the 1991 Rovaniemi Declaration on the Protection of the Arctic Environment in which they not only expressed their deepest concerns with threats to the Arctic environment and emphasised their joint responsibility to protect and preserve the Arctic environment, but also adopted the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy.331 This strategy identified persistent organic contaminants, radioactivity, heavy metals, noise, acidification, and oil pollution as the priority environmental challenges facing the Arctic, and established five working groups which have continued working under the umbrella of the Arctic Council: The Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), focusing on contaminants and their effects in the Arctic environment; the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), to assess the need for further actions or legal instruments to prevent pollution of the Arctic marine environment; the Emergency, Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR), addressing accidental pollution and emergencies; the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), to facilitate initiatives to conserve the diversity and habitats of Arctic flora and fauna; and the Sustainable Development and Utilization (SDU). In particular CAFF has concluded several resolutions of cooperation with secretariats of international organisations, ie with the secretariats of the Convention on Biological Diversity, of the Ramsar Convention, of the Agreement on the Conservation of AfricanEurasian Migratory Waterbirds, and of the Convention on Migratory Species of Wild Animals, to name a few.332 While the protection of the Arctic environment through international instruments is essential, it is also imperative that the Arctic States adopt domestic laws and regulations. While all Arctic States have adopted laws and regulations that seek to protect the marine and terrestrial Arctic environment,333 Canada and the Russian Federation are currently the only ones applying and enforcing marine shipping and environmental protection regulations based on Article 234 UNCLOS.

329 

Doc 227. SG Sawhill and A Jørgensen, Military Nuclear Waste and International Cooperation in Northwest Russia (FNI Report 12/2001) 25. 331  Doc 219. 332  Doc 257–260. See generally on this method of cooperation AM Böhringer, Die Kooperationsvereinbarungen der Sekretariate multilateraler Umweltschutzübereinkommen (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2014). 333 The Soviet Union by adopting the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR On Measures for Securing the Implementation of the Edict of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet of 26 November 1984 ‘On Intensifying Nature Protection in Areas of the Extreme North and Marine Areas Adjacent to the Northern Coast of the U.S.S.R.’ (1 June 1990). 330 

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Canada’s Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA) is probably the most prominent one.334 Canada enacted the AWPPA in 1970 after the US icebreaker SS Manhattan had crossed the Northwest Passage. The AWPPA imposes anti-pollution and marine safety standards for waters up to 100 nm offshore. Canada justified the enactment by referring responsibilities for the welfare of Inuit and other Arctic inhabitants, as well as the preservation of the ecological balance. First and foremost the United States protested against the AWPPA denouncing it as without basis in public international law and thus unacceptable.335 As a defence, Canada expressed its concerns that ‘the ice-infested waters of the Arctic and of the East coast in winter demand safeguards and controls of special scope which are not likely to be covered by internationally agreed standards of universal application’336 and argued that with the adoption of the AWPPA it was merely pursuing functional enforcement powers in order to set a higher standard for pollution prevention but ‘does not make and does not require an assertion of sovereignty.’337 LHJ Legault, then head of the Law of the Sea Section at the Canadian Department of External Affairs at that time corroborated that ‘[a]lthough Canada has always regarded the waters of the Arctic archipelago as Canadian waters, it should be emphasized that the Arctic waters pollution legislation is in no way based on and in no way represents an assertion of sovereignty over the waters concerned. It represents rather a functional exercise of jurisdiction in response to an objective concrete need, and it is based on scientific and ecological considerations rather than territorial imperatives. Thus the issues raised by this legislation concern not sovereignty but the right of the coastal state to take action to protect itself against a grave threat to its environment.’338 In 1970, by modifying its acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ to exclude disputes arising out of anti-pollution measures from the ICJ’s jurisdiction, Canada conceded the possible unlawfulness of the AWPPA in the light of public international law.339 This action ‘effectively shielded Canada from any claims regarding the validity of the AWPPA’.340 Canada’s position was that with the adoption of Article 234 UNCLOS the legal controversy regarding the AWPPA had been resolved.341 On 10 September 1985, former Minister for External Affairs Joe Clark stated in an address to the Canadian Parliament that ‘Canada’s jurisdiction over its continental margin and 200-mile fishing zone is unchallenged in the Arctic as elsewhere. Canada also exercises jurisdiction over a 334  Doc 262. See generally on the legal and political aspects of the AWPPA D Pharand, The Law of the Sea of the Arctic with Special Reference to Canada (Ottawa, University of Ottawa Press, 1973); K Bartenstein, ‘Navigating the Arctic: The Canadian NORDREG, the International Polar Code and Regional Cooperation’ (2011) 54 GYIL 77–124; S Lalonde, ‘Increased Traffic through Canadian Arctic Waters: Canada’s State of Readiness’ (2004) 38 Revue judiciaire Thémis 53. 335  Doc 266–268. 336  Law of the Sea Conference. Canadian Positions on the Main Issues, Canadian Practice in International Law during 1973 as Reflected Mainly in Public Correspondence and Statements of the Department of External Affairs (1974) 12 CYIL 272, 284. 337  Doc 270. ‘Canadian Practice in International Law during 1973 as Reflected Mainly in Public Correspondence and Statements of the Department of External Affairs’(1974) 12 CYIL 272, 283. 338  LHJ Legault, ‘The Freedom of the Seas: A License to Pollute?’ (1971) 21 University of Toronto Law Journal 211, 219. 339  Doc 269. See also R MacDonald, ‘The New Canadian Declaration of Acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice’ (1970) 8 CYIL 3. 340  Lalonde, ‘Increased Traffic through Canadian Arctic Waters’ 63 fn 43. 341  NC Howson, ‘Breaking the Ice: The Canadian-American Dispute over the Arctic’s Northwest Passage’ (1988) 26 Columbian Journal of Transnational Law 337, 354.

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100-mile pollution prevention control zone in arctic waters, in order to protect the unique ecological balance in the area. That too has been recognized by the international community, in a special provision in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.’342 This view was confirmed by former US President Clinton who declared that the primary purpose of Article 234 UNCLOS was to provide ‘the basis for implementing the provisions applicable to commercial and private vessels found in the 1970 Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act to the extent consistent with that article and other relevant provisions of the Convention’.343 The inclusion of Article 234 UNCLOS also led to the immediate withdrawal of the 1970 modification to Canada’s acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ.344 As one aspect of Canada’s new Northern Strategy, in 2009 Canada expanded the geographical scope of the AWPPA up to 200 nm offshore encompassing not only Canadian internal waters and the adjacent territorial waters but also the entire EEZ. In 1978, pursuant to the AWPPA, Canada promulgated the Shipping Safety Control Zones Order establishing the limits of 16 shipping safety control zones in Arctic waters and implementing specific regulatory measures in such zones.345 In 2009, not only was the AWPPA extended to 200 nm offshore but also the limits of the Shipping Safety Control Zone were stretched to 100 nm.346 Pursuant to the Shipping Act of 2001347 Canada passed the Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Regulations (NORDREG).348 NORDREG imposes mandatory reporting requirements for certain classes of vessels preparing to navigate within the Shipping Safety Control Zones and other northern waters such as Hudson Bay and James Bay. NORDREG has also raised some critical issues with respect to its consistency with public international law.349 Within the IMO a joint submission by the United States and the International Association of Independent Tanker Owners INTERTANKO questioned whether the NORDREG system was in compliance with international law,350 but Canada countered that the unilateral imposition of NORDREG can be validly based on Article 234 UNCLOS and, moreover, that ‘[t]he information from vessel reports and the communication link between vessel traffic services and the vessel were critical to

342 

Doc 298. President Bill Clinton, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, with Annexes, done at Montego Bay, December 10, 1982 (the “Convention”), and the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, with Annex, adopted at New York, July 28, 1994 (the “Agreement”), and signed by the United States, subject to ratification, on July 29, 1994, US Senate, Treaty Document 39, 103d Congress, 2d session IV (1994) 40. 344  Doc 271. 345 Doc 272. For more information on how the Shipping Safety Control Zones Order works see DL VanderZwaag, ‘Canada and the Governance of the Northwest Passage: Rough Waters, Cooperative Currents, Sea of Challenges’ in DD Caron and N Oral (eds), Navigating Straits: Challenges for International Law (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2014) 87–121, 94–98. 346  An Act to amend the Order amending the Shipping Safety Control Zones Order, 9 December 2009; An Act to amend the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, received Royal Assent on 11 June 2009. 347 www.laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-10.15/. 348  Doc 273. An analysis of NORDREG within the context of international law is provided by Bartenstein, ‘Navigating the Arctic’ 77 and J Kraska, ‘The Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulations (NORDREG) and the Law of the Sea’ (2015) 30 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 225. 349  Doc 274–279. 350  Doc 277. 343  US

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preventing accidents and responding effectively to emergencies including search and rescue and pollution response.’351 The Russian Federation and its predecessor the Soviet Union have also enacted legislation specifically aimed at the Arctic marine environment based on Article 234 UNCLOS: The 1984 Edict On the Economic Zone of the USSR whose Article 14 is very similar to Article 234 UNCLOS and directly addresses the Russian Arctic, the Edict On Intensifying Nature Protection in Areas of the Extreme North and Marine Areas Adjacent to the Northern Coast of the U.S.S.R.,352 and in 1990, the implementing Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR On Measures for Securing the Implementation of the Edict of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet of 26 November 1984 On Intensifying Nature Protection in Areas of the Extreme North and Marine Areas Adjacent to the Northern Coast of the U.S.S.R.353 These legislative acts provided Soviet and provide now Russian authorities with the power to unilaterally establish and enforce rules for the preservation of the Arctic marine environment.354 In the last decade Russia has taken various steps to modernise and further develop the legal framework of the protection of the Arctic environment. A major achievement was the Strategic Action Program for Protection of the Russian Arctic Environment, which was approved by the Russian Maritime Board and serves as ‘a framework document, the provisions of which are to be taken into account when drafting governmental, federal, regional and corporate programs for the development of industrial and other processes in the Russian Arctic.’355 Part 9 deals with the protection of indigenous peoples in the Arctic. The Arctic is home to more than 4 million human beings, a large portion of them—approximately 500,000—belonging to indigenous peoples of different ethnic groups with great variation of cultural or economic background.356 With the exception of Greenland and some parts of northern Canada, indigenous peoples are minorities in the Arctic States, while Iceland is without any indigenous population at all. Parts of Alaska, Canada, Greenland, and the Russian Federation are populated by the Inuit.357 With approximately 160,000 people they represent the largest indigenous group in the Arctic. In 1973, they founded the transnational Inuit Circumpolar Council, which has had great influence on global discussions regarding climate change and indigenous peoples’ rights as well as was actively involved in the promotion of international agreements 351 

Doc 278. Doc 100–101. 353  Doc 280. 354  At the time of writing they have not been revoked, thus are still in force. For a detailed legal analysis of this set of legislation and its compliance with Article 234 UNCLOS see RD Brubaker, ‘Environmental Regulation in the Russian Arctic’ (1997) 79 INSROP Working Paper 56–61; E Franckx, ‘The New USSR Legislation on Pollution Prevention in the Exclusive Economic Zone’ (1986) 1 International Journal of Estuarine & Coastal Law 155 and E Franckx, Maritime Claims in the Arctic. Canadian and Russian Perspectives (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1993) 178 ff. 355 Strategic Action Program for Protection of the Russian Arctic Environment (2009) 4. See further DV Vasilevskaya, AV Nikolaev, and GI Tsoy, ‘The Environmental Component of the National Maritime Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic Ocean’ in PA Berkman and AN Vylegzhanin (eds), Environmental Security in the Arctic Ocean (Dordrecht, Springer, 2013) 93–101 and T Alieva, ‘Main Expected Changes in Legislative Regulation of Environmental Protection for Environmentally Hazardous Facilities in the Russian Arctic’ (2014) Arctic Yearbook 1. 356  S Adam, T Koivurova, A Gremsperger, and H Niemi, ‘Arctic Indigenous Peoples and the Challenge of Climate Change’ in E Tedsen, S Cavalieri, and RA Kraemer (eds), Arctic Marine Governance (Berlin, Springer, 2014) 71–99. Depending on the Arctic definition the figure can be up to 10 Million people. 357  ICC Canada, Annual Report 2012–2013, 12. 352 

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such as the Stockholm Convention on the Elimination of Persistent Organic Pollutants.358 Prominently, under the auspices of the Inuit Circumpolar Council a petition to the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights was submitted on behalf of all Inuit in Alaska and Canada, in which the petitioners accused the United States of breaching the right to life, to culture and other human rights by pursuing an—alleged—unwarranted climate policy thereby promoting global warming. Although the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights finally decided that the petition was inadmissible on various grounds, this case received a lot of public attention.359 Approximately 70,000 to 100,000 Saami people reside in the so-called Sápmi area, which stretches over the territories of Norway (40,000–60,000), Sweden (15,000–20,000), Finland (9,000), and the Russia Federation (2,000). Many of them are still engaged in traditional activities like fishing or reindeer herding.360 The Saami are represented by three Saami parliaments in Sweden, Norway, and Finland respectively, which together established the so-called Saami Parliamentary Council as an umbrella organisation. While the Finnish, Norwegian and Russian constitutions recognise the Saami as distinct indigenous people,361 the Swedish lacks this recognition but has acknowledged them as an indigenous people in other ways.362 Like the Inuit Circumpolar Council, the Saami people have been actively engaged in pursuing their rights by submitting petitions to different human rights bodies. For instance, on several occasions Norwegian Saami villages took their cases—usually concerning land rights, fishing rights, and the right to traditional reindeer herding—to the European Commission of Human Rights or its successor the European Court of Human Rights; however, most of these cases were deemed inadmissible or were struck out.363 Swedish as well as Finnish Saami chose the 358 For background information on who the Inuit are and how the Inuit Circumpolar Council works see GN Wilson and HA Smith, ‘The Inuit Circumpolar Council in an era of global and local change’ (2011) 66 International Journal: The Arctic is hot, part II 909 and A Lynge, ‘The First Responsibilty’ in G Witschel, I Winkelmann, K Tiroch, and R Wolfrum (eds), New Chances and New Responsibilities in the Arctic Region (Berlin, Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag 2010) 21–26. 359  www.inuitcircumpolar.com/inuit-petition-inter-american-commission-on-human-rights-to-opposeclimate-change-caused-by-the-united-states-of-america.html. 360  Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, James Anaya on the situation of the Sami people in the Sápmi region of Norway, Sweden and Finland (UN Doc A/HRC/18/35/Add.2, 6 June 2011) 4. 361  Art. 17(3) of the Constitution of Finnland: ‘The Sami, as an indigenous people, as well as the Roma and other groups, have the right to maintain and develop their own language and culture. Provisions on the right of the Sami to use the Sami language before the authorities are laid down by an Act. The rights of persons using sign language and of persons in need of interpretation or translation aid owing to disability shall be guaranteed by an Act.’; Art. 110a of the Constitution of Norway: ‘It is the responsibility of the authorities of the State to create conditions enabling the Sami people to preserve and develop its language, culture and way of life’; Art. 69 of the Constitution of Russia: ‘The Russian Federation shall guarantee the rights of the indigenous small peoples according to the universally recognized principles and norms of international law and international treaties and agreements of the Russian Federation.’ 362  IR Bowers, Preparatory Report from the Sami Parliament in Sweden/Sámediggi/Sámedigge/Saemiedigkie/ Sametinget for the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Ms. Victoria TauliCorpuz, prior to her 2015 August visit to Sápmi and Sweden (Kiruna, Sametinget, 2015) 5. 363  One of the first proceedings was the so-called Alta Case in which two Saami individuals submitted a complaint with regard to the harmful impact of modern economic activities on the traditional way of live of indigenous peoples (application nos. 9278/81 and 9415/81, 3 October 1983). The most recent and the only successful complaint has been the case Handölsdalen Sami Village and Others v. Sweden (application no. 39013/04), 20 March 2010. For an insightful discussion of the ECtHR’s case law on Saami rights see T Koivurova, ‘Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights Regarding Indigenous Peoples: Retrospect and Prospects’ (2011) 18 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 1.

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UN Human Rights Committee in order to seek protection for their traditional reindeer herding.364 Although the protection of indigenous people’s culture and traditional livelihoods has been significantly improved and the Nordic countries pay careful attention to indigenous issues, there is still much to be done. Different UN bodies have reminded them on several occasions of their obligations; for instance, in 2013, the UN Human Rights Committee reprimanded Finland and called upon the state to ‘advance the implementation of Sámi people’s rights by strengthening the decision-making powers of the Sámi representative institutions, such as the Sámi parliament.’ In addition, Finland ‘should increase its efforts to revise its legislation to fully guarantee the rights of Sámi people in their traditional land ensuring respect for Sámi communities’ right to engage in free, prior and informed participation in policy and development processes that affect them.’365 Around 9,000 Gwich’in people as well as ca. 32,000 Athabaskans live in an area extending from northeast Alaska to the northern Yukon and Northwest Territories in Canada. About 20,000 Aleut people inhabit the Aleutian archipelago, which comprises west Alaska and the Russian Kamchatka.366 They have formed the Gwich’in Council International, the Aleut International Association, and the Arctic Athabaskan Council in order to strengthen their respective representation in political affairs and to address environmental and cultural concerns. In the Russian Federation, more than 40 groups of different indigenous peoples—eg the Evenks, the Nenets, the Chukchi, the Dolgan, or the Yukagir—reside in the High North, but out of 500,000 persons, only 250,000 are officially recognised by the Russian State.367 This unsatisfactory situation might hopefully change soon as in 2016, a legislative proposal on the establishment of a unified registry of indigenous peoples of the North, Siberia and Far East has been submitted to the State Duma.368 The Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON) serves as an umbrella organisation for 35 regional and ethnic organisations. RAIPON’s mission is to protect

364 See eg: UN Human Rights Committee, Kitok v Sweden (Communication 1971/1985), views adopted 27 July 1988, Report of the HRC, GAOR, Forty-third Session, Suppl. No. 40 (A/43/40), 221–230; Länsman et al v Finland (Communication 511/1992), views adopted 26 October 1994, Report of the HRC, Vol II, GAOR, Fiftieth Session, Suppl. No. 40 (A/50/40), 66–76 and J Länsman et al v Finland (Communication 671/1995), UN Doc CCPR/C/58/D/671/1995. See also UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, James Anaya on the situation of the Sami people in the Sápmi region of Norway, Sweden and Finland (UN Doc A/HRC/18/35/Add.2, 6 June 2011) 19 ff. 365  UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Finland (UN Doc CCPR/C/FIN/CO/6, 22 August 2013) 4. 366 US Census Bureau, The American Indian and Alaska Native Population: 2010, 2010 Census Briefs (January 2012) 17. It has to be noted, that the indigenous peoples of Alaska can be further divided into six major ethnic groups: Unangan (Aleut), Sugpiaq (Alutiiq), Yupik (Central Yup’ik and Siberian Yupik), Iñupiaq (northwest Alaskan Inuit), Athabaskans (Interior Indians) and Tlingit and Haida (Southeast Coastal Indians) [Arctic Human Development Report II (2015) 107]. 367 See on the anthropological, historical and political background A Stammler-Gossmann, ‘“Indigene Völker” Historische Wurzeln der russländischen Minderheitenpolitik’ (2011) 61 OSTERUOPA 417; J Rohr, ‘Indigenous Peoples in the Russian Federation’ (2014) 18 IWGIA Report 10. An analysis of recent domestic legislation regarding indigenous people provides V Kryazhkov, ‘Development of Russian legislation on Northern Indigenous Peoples’ (2013) 4 Arctic Review on Law and Politics 140. An official list of recognised indigenous peoples was approved by the Russian Government on 17 April 2006. 368 www.arctic.ru/population/20160204/293510.html.

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indigenous peoples’ human rights and to defend their legal interests, in particular their right to self-governance.369 In order to have a greater impact on global and Arctic affairs and to join forces, most indigenous peoples have founded organisations representing their interests. Six of these organisations—all of them previously mentioned—have been accorded the status of Permanent Participants at the Arctic Council which entitles them to participate in all its activities and operative work: The Inuit Circumpolar Council, the Saami Council, the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Aleut International Association, the Arctic Athabaskan Council, and the Gwich’in Council International. The Arctic Council Indigenous Peoples Secretariat supports these organisations and facilitates the cooperation between them and the Arctic Council States.370 Despite their ethnic and cultural diversity, substantial changes and challenges due to modernisation and globalisation is a common feature of all indigenous peoples in the Arctic.371 In particular the changing climate poses both a threat as well as an opportunity to all indigenous peoples in one way or another. On the one hand, the opening up of the Arctic Ocean, the North East Passage, and the Northwest Passage could bring significant economic opportunities for them. On the other hand, an increase in economic activities, particularly in the extracting and mining industry, can harm the fragile polar environment destroying the natural habitat on which most indigenous peoples traditionally depend.372 Against the background of the dramatic changes the Arctic has already undergone, it is even more important to preserve the special culture of indigenous people, to promote the recognition of their rights to land and sea and their possibilities for political participation in matters affecting them. In order to achieve this goal, there are several hard and soft law instruments on an international level addressing the rights of indigenous peoples whereby most of them are relevant to indigenous population living in the Arctic. In addition to Article 27 of ICCPR, which provides that ‘[i]n those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.’,373 the most important hard law instruments of general application are the ILO Convention No 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries,374 the Framework Convention

369 www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/permanent-participants/raipon.

370  www.arcticpeoples.org/about. For an overview of how indigenous peoples participate in other organisations and instruments concerning the Arctic see J Diamond, ‘Role of Indigenous Peoples in Managing Offshore Arctic Resources’ in HN Scheiber, J Kraska, and MS Kwon (eds), Science, Technology, and New Challenges to Ocean Law (Leiden, Brill Nijhoff, 2015) 345–366, 352–365. 371 T Koivurova, H Tervo, and A Stepien, Background Paper: Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic (ARCTIC Transform, 2008). 372 See generally on this topic the special edition of the (2014) Nordic Environmental Law Journal on ‘Extractive Industries in the North: What About Environmental and Indigenous Peoples Law?’. For an analysis of the detrimental impact of global warming on traditional caribou and reindeer herders and hunters see eg: WWF, Effects of climate change on reindeer, www.assets.panda.org/downloads/reindeer_factsheet_1.pdf. 373  Done at New York, 16 December 1966; entered into force 23 March 1976; 999 UNTS 179. 374  Done at New York, 27 June 1989; entered into force 5 September 1991; 1650 UNTS 384. See further T Joona, ILO Convention No. 169 in a Nordic Context with Comparative Analysis: An Interdisciplinary Approach (University of Lapland, Rovaniemi, 2012). ILO Convention No 107, concluded in 1957, is the predecessor of the ILO Convention No 169. Although the underlying idea of ILO Convention No 107, ie the goal to assimilate indigenous peoples into the mainstream society, is very outdated now, some States still adhere to this Convention

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for the Protection of National Minorities,375 the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages376, and the Nordic Language Convention.377 So far only two Arctic States—Denmark and Norway—have ratified the ILO Convention No 169 which deals with a variety of issues, eg education, culture, health care, working conditions, and land rights. After strong recommendations by the UN Human Rights Council378 Finland announced it would finally ratify the ILO Convention No 169 but, in 2015, the Finnish parliament decided against the ratification and left the decision up to the next government.379 Sweden does not have ratification on its political agenda either.380 The same applies for Canada, the Russian Federation, and the United States.381 For Finland and Sweden concerns about the interpretation and implementation of the land and resource rights as well as necessary changes in national law after ratification might be reasons for their hesitation.382 As one author rightly observes ‘remarkably and rather unfortunately, the Arctic States can often be seen to be lagging behind the worldwide trend when it comes to endorsing the international human rights standards that concern the indigenous peoples who live in their northernmost areas.’383 The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages have been concluded under the auspices of the Council of Europe. While the former agreement has been ratified by Denmark, Finland, Norway, the Russian Federation, and Sweden, only three Arctic States—Denmark, Finland, and Sweden—are parties to the latter.384 Both instruments present are essential for the protection of language and other minority rights of indigenous people in the Arctic.385 The same applies for the Nordic Language Convention, a regional instrument that was adopted between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden under the auspices of the Nordic Council in 1981, serving as a key instrument for the protection of language

(T Koivurova and A Stepien, ‘How international law has influenced the national policy and law related to indigenous people in the Arctic’ (2011) 19 Waikato Law Review 125 f). 375 

Done at Strasbourg, 1 February 1995; entered into force 1 February 1998; 2151 UNTS 243. at Strasbourg, 5 November 1992; entered into force 1 March 1998, www.coe.int/t/dg4/education/ minlang/textcharter/default_en.asp. 377  Doc 282. On the domestic side see Koivurova and Stepien, ‘National policy and law related to indigenous people’ 123. 378  Universal Periodic Review, CERD/C/FIN/CO/19, para 14; UN Doc A/HRC/8/24; A/HRC/18/35/Add.2, 9. 379 www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2015/03/16/finland-shelves-indigenous-rights-agreement-ratification/ 380  See further AJ Semb, ‘Why (not) Commit?—Norway, Sweden and Finland and the ILO Convention 169’ (2012) 30 Nordic Journal of Human Rights 122. 381  N Bankes and T Koivurova, ‘Legal Systems’ in JN Larsen and G Fondahl (eds), Arctic Human Development Report II (Copenhagen, NCM, 2015) 235. 382  N Bankes and T Koivurova, ‘Introduction’ in N Bankes and T Koivurova (eds), The Proposed Nordic Saami Convention (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013) 4. 383  G Alfredsson, ‘Good Governance in the Arctic’ in N Loukacheva (ed), Polar Law Textbook II (Copenhagen, NCM, 2013) 185–197, 195. 384  A decree of the Russian President on the signing of the Charter was issued in 2001 but has not been gone further (V Kryazhkov, ‘Development of Russian legislation on Northern Indigenous Peoples’ (2013) 4 Arctic Review on Law and Politics 140, 148). 385  For more on language rights and policies in the Arctic see L Grenoble, ‘Leveraging policy to effect change in the Arctic’ in M Jones (ed), Endangered languages and language policy (Cambridge, CUP, 2015) 1–18. A recent assessment of the (threatened) linguistic diversity of northern indigenous languages is provided by T Barry, L Grenoble, and F Friðriksson, ‘Linguistic Diversity’ in CAFF, Arctic Biodiversity Assessment (Akureyri, Iceland, 2013) chapter 20. 376  Done

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rights giving people the right to use their mother tongue in other Nordic countries and promotes linguistic equality within the Nordic area. The proposed Nordic Saami Convention takes a very special position in this array of legal instruments. Released in 2005, it is the first treaty with specific applicability to indigenous peoples in the Arctic addressing the status and rights of the Saami people in Finland, Norway, and Sweden.386 Specifically, it aims to ‘confirm and strengthen such rights for the Saami people as to allow the Saami people to safeguard and develop their language, culture, livelihoods and way of life with the least possible interference by national borders’ (Article 1). For two reasons the Russian Federation has not been a part of the political process leading to the proposed Nordic Saami Convention. First, the Russian government wanted to regulate the rights and status of its indigenous peoples without international interference.387 Second, the expert committee that prepared the draft argued that the Convention should be a Nordic one excluding the Russian Saami.388 After eleven years of negotiations between the Nordic States and the three Saami parliaments the proposed Convention text was finalised at the end of 2016 and signed on 13 January 2017.389 With ratification by Finland, Norway, and Sweden the Nordic Sammi Convention would be the first comprehensive international treaty that specifically protects Arctic indigenous people.390 According to its preamble the Nordic Saami Convention is ‘a renewal and development of Saami rights, established through historical use of land, that were codified in the Lapp Codicil of 1751.’391 The so-called Lapp Codicil, adopted as an annex to the Strömstad Treaty in 1751, is the oldest international instrument concerning Saami territorial rights and cross-border reindeer herding.392 It delimits the border between Denmark-Norway and Sweden-Finland. Although the treaty is ancient, it has still some legal relevance today. In the absence of a later cross-border reindeer herding agreement between Norway and Sweden, at least the Swedish government takes the view that the Lapp Codicil continues to be in force.393 This set of legally binding treaties is supplemented by some soft law instruments of which the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is the most important one. Although not legally binding, it carries a great deal of moral and political force. The Declaration explicitly recognises basic human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples, in particular the right to self-determination, culture, education, and inalienable and collective land and resource rights. With a great majority of

386 

Doc 283. Koivurova, ‘Can Saami Exercise Their Self-determination?’ in N Bankes and T Koivurova (eds), The Proposed Nordic Saami Convention (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013) 105–148, 120. 388  T Koivurova, ‘The Draft Nordic Saami Convention: Nations Working Together’ (2008) 10 International Community Law Review 279, 283 f. 389 A Staalesen, ‘Historic Sámi agreement starts long way towards ratification’ The Independent Barents Observer (16 January 2017), https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/2017/01/historic-sami-agreement-starts-longway-towards-ratification. 390  See generally on the Nordic Sámi Convention N Bankes and T Koivurova, The Proposed Nordic Saami Convention (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013). 391  Koivurova, ‘The Draft Nordic Saami Convention’ 280. 392  Doc 281. See further JG Elbo, ‘Lapp reindeer movements across the frontiers of northern Scandinavia’ (1952) 6 Polar Record 348. 393  Koivurova, ‘The Draft Nordic Saami Convention’ 280 fn 3. 387  T

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143 votes in favour and eleven abstentions—the Russian Federation was one of the abstaining States—the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Declaration on 13 September 2007, after more than 20 years of negotiations between States and groups of indigenous peoples. While Sweden, Finland, and Norway voted in favour of the Declaration, two of the four negative votes came from Arctic States in which a considerable amount of indigenous people live, namely Canada and United States.394 In November 2010, Canada changed its stance and joined the other countries in supporting the Declaration, though emphasising that the Declaration was a not legally binding document and did not reflect customary international law. Merely a couple weeks later the United States followed Canada’s lead and declared its endorsement for the Declaration, but at the same time also reinforcing that the Declaration cannot be regarded as legally binding or as a statement of current international law.395 The Russian Federation still has yet to pledge to the Declaration but indicated it would acknowledge its fundamental principles subject to the condition that they do not conflict with the Russian constitution.396 Further soft law instruments with focus on Arctic indigenous peoples’ rights are the 2000 MoU between the Canadian Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and the State Committee on Northern Affairs of the Russian Federation Concerning Cooperation on Aboriginal and Northern Development, the 2010 MoU between the Canadian Department of Indian and Northern Affairs and the Department of the Interior of the United States of America concerning Indigenous and Northern Issues397, and the Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Arctic Sovereignty which was presented by Inuit leaders from Greenland, Canada, Alaska and the Russian Federation in 2009.398 Part 10 displays essential documents concerning already resolved or still unresolved disputes of various types in the Arctic,399 including controversies with regard to the Northwest Passage, the Northern Sea Route, the Svalbard Archipelago, Hans Island, the Bering Sea, and the Beaufort Sea. Northwest Passage: The Northwest Passage goes through the Bering Strait, Chukchi Sea, Beaufort Sea and then on several different routes through the Canadian Arctic archipelago. Its legal status has been a controversial topic between Canada and the

394 The voting record is available at www.unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?profile=voting&index=. VM&term=ares61295. 395  Doc 288, 289. 396  N Bankes and T Koivurova, ‘Legal Systems’ in Arctic Human Development Report II (2015) 235. 397  Doc 284, 286. 398  Doc 285. Concerning the controversial political background and future implications of this Declaration see Byers, International Law and the Arctic 230–234 and NC Fabbi, ‘Inuit foreign policy and international relations in the Arctic’ in LC Jensen and G Hønneland (eds), Handbook of the Politics of the Arctic (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2015) 482–500. 399  Of minor importance is the disputed sovereignty over the remote Arctic Island Ostrov Viktoriya on which both Norway and Russia have laid claims. The conflict has nearly vanished since Norway seems to have lost any interest in that case [see generally RK Headland, ‘Norway-Russia: Ostov Viktoriya’ in E Brunet-Jailly (ed), Border Disputes. A Global Encyclopedia Vol 3 (Santa Barbara, ABC-CLIO, 2015) 804–808] or the contention between Candada and Norway over the Sverdrup Island, which after an exchange of diplomatic notes were accorded to Norway in 1930 [see Doc 347]; Byers, International Law and the Arctic 24 ff and TT Thorleifsson, Norway “must really drop their absurd claims such as that to the Otto Sverdrup Islands” Bi-Polar International Diplomacy: The Sverdrup Islands Question, 1902–1930 (MA Thesis, Simon Fraser University, 2004)].

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United States for ages.400 While there is no doubt that the Northwest Passage constitutes a geographical strait, the dispute revolves around the question if it fulfils the criteria of the legal definition of an international strait as well.401 Canada has always taken the position that the Northwest Passage belongs to its historical internal waters over which it exercises full and exclusive jurisdiction.402 In contrast the United States considers the Northwest Passage to be a strait used for international navigation subject to the high seas and transit passage regimes.403 The conflict became apparent in 1969, when the commercially operated tanker SS Manhattan, accompanied by two US Coast Guard icebreakers, transited the Northwest Passage without previously having sought Canadian authorisation.404 Since Canada claimed only a 3 nm territorial sea zone at that time, a high seas corridor went through the Northwest Passage. According to the original plan, the SS Manhattan should have remained on this high seas corridor throughout its entire voyage. However, the SS Manhattan had become trapped in the Arctic ice and was forced to depart from its planned route using the narrow Prince of Wales Strait, where ‘it had to go through the territorial waters of Canada because of the presence of the small Princess Royal Islands.’405 Canada granted its permission for the transit nonetheless, sending one of its own icebreakers for assistance and arranged for a Canadian official to be on board of the SS Manhattan. Despite Canada’s permission and participation, the SS Manhattan’s voyage unleashed a political outrage in Canada.406 In the wake of these events Canada extended its territorial sea to 12 nm and enacted the AWPPA, covering Arctic waters up to 100 nm from the Canadian coast. The United States promptly protested against the legislation, arguing that it infringed upon international navigational rights and freedoms,407 but at the same time agreed ‘to consult with Canada in developing standards and operational procedures to facilitate commercial navigation in the Arctic.’408 In 1985, the conflict became heated again when Canada was notified of the pending passage of the US Coast Guard icebreaker Polar Sea.409 Canada re-affirmed its position

400  The literature on the dispute over the functional status of the Northwest Passage is vast. See for a discussion of the arguments both sides put forward eg D Pharand, Northwest Passage: Arctic Straits (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 1984); DL VanderZwaag and C Lamson, ‘Ocean Development and Management in the Arctic: Issues in American and Canadian Relations’ (1986) 39 Arctic 327; S Lalonde, ‘Evaluating Canada’s Position on the Northwest Passage in Light of two possible source of international protection’ in C Schofield, S Lee, and M Kwon (eds), The Limits of Maritime Jurisdiction (Leiden, Brill Nijhoff, 2014) 575–588; EB Elliot-Meisel, ‘Still Unresolved After Fifty Years: The Northwest Passage in Canadian-American Relations 1946–1998’ (1999) 29 American Review of Canadian Studies 407; EB Elliot-Meisel, ‘Understanding the Canadian-United States Arctic Relationship’ in S Lalonde and TL McDorman (eds), International Law and Politics of the Arctic Ocean (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2015) 201–215; TL McDorman, Salt Water Neighbors. International Ocean Law Relations Between the United States and Canada (Oxford, OUP, 2009) 225–254. 401  H Caminos and VP Cogliati-Bantz, The Legal Regime of Straits. Contemporary Challenges and Solutions (Cambridge, CUP, 2014) 140. 402  Doc 293. 403  AR Roach and RW Smith, Excessive Maritime Claims, 3ed edn (Leiden, Brill Nijhoff, 2012) 318. 404  Roach and Smith, Excessive Maritime Claims 319. 405  D Pharand, ‘The Arctic Waters and the Northwest Passage: A Final Revisit’ (2007) 38 Ocean Development and International Law 38. 406  See generally on the SS Manhattan incident eg Lalonde, ‘Evaluating Canada’s Position on the Northwest Passage’ 577. 407  Doc 266. 408 M Nash (ed), Cumulative Digest of United States Practice in International Law (1981–1988) Vol II (Washington DC, US Government Printing Office, 1994) 2043. 409  Doc 293–297. See further PJ Briggs, ‘The Polar Sea Voyage and the Northwest Passage Dispute’ (1990) 16 Armed Forces & Society 437.

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on the legal status of the Northwest Passage requiring all non-Canadian vessels to request authorisation for passage, but the United States did not oblige with Canada’s request, fearing that it would set a precedent in other contentious waters. Nevertheless, the dispute was set aside on an interim basis by agreeing that the Polar Sea could cross the Northwest Passage without prejudice to the differing legal positions. Following the transit of the Polar Sea, Canada wanted to consolidate its stance by implementing straight baselines around its Arctic archipelago, including the Northwest Passage, and defining the outer limit of Canada’s historic internal waters.410 The establishment of baselines has been the object of academic criticism as well as official protest. The United States in particular, but also several other countries argue that the baselines are the result of an excessive interpretation and application of customary as well as UNCLOS-based rules for the drawing of baselines hence contrary to international law.411 In the late 1980s Canada finally announced ‘that it would seek a dialogue with the United States over the Northwest Passage dispute.’412 In 1988, these bilateral negotiations lead to the conclusion of the Agreement on Arctic Cooperation in which Canada and the United States stipulated ‘that all navigation by U.S. icebreakers within waters claimed by Canada to be internal will be undertaken with the consent of the Government of Canada’.413 However, both parties confirmed that their disagreement on the functional status of the Northwest Passage were upheld regardless of the compromise concluded by the agreement: ‘Nothing in this agreement of cooperative endeavour between Arctic neighbours and friends nor any practice thereunder affects the respective positions of the Governments of the United States and of Canada on the Law of the Sea in this or other maritime areas or their respective positions regarding third parties.’ It should be pointed out, that the Agreement is rather of limited application, since it only covers the transit of icebreakers. Moreover, the United States take the view that ‘the Agreement does not affect the U.S. view that our icebreakers, in the absence of marine scientific research, would not be required to seek Canadian consent before transiting the Northwest Passage.’414 Since the Polar Sea controversy, only a small number of transits by US icebreakers and other foreign-flag vessels seem to have occurred.415 According to the cautious forecast of the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment Report 2009 ‘[t]he Northwest Passage is not expected to become a viable trans-Arctic route through 2020 due to seasonality, ice conditions, a complex archipelago, draft restrictions, chokepoints, lack of adequate charts, insurance limitations and other costs, which diminish the likelihood of regularly scheduled services from the Pacific to the Atlantic.’416 Be that as it may, from a medium and long term perspective, the economic potential of the Northwest Passage as a shipping route has increased and probably will further groww. Hence it follows that the dispute is brought back to the centre of political attention. The aspect of ensuring national security might also influence the future debate, since a more accessible Arctic might 410 

Lalonde, ‘Evaluating Canada`s Position on the Northwest Passage’ 579. 73, 75. G Handl, ‘Northwest Passage (Canadian-American Controversy)’ in R Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (online ed) para 12. 412  Elliot-Meisel, ‘The Northwest Passage in Canadian-American Relations 1946–1998’ 407. 413  Doc 65. 414  Doc 302. 415  Handl, ‘Northwest Passage (Canadian-American Controversy) para 5. 416  PAME, AMSA Report 114. 411  Doc

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also become more unsecure, providing transit opportunities for terrorists or organised crime organisations. Taking this into account it seems likely that Canada’s—potential— capability to prevent the transit of actors who pose a high risk to national security could be beneficial not only for Canada but also for the United States, what might influence the ongoing debate.417 Northern Sea Route: The second major functional dispute in the Arctic concerns the legal status of the Northern Sea Route, a key corridor across the Arctic Ocean connecting the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans.418 It has a total length of 5,600 km, comprises nearly 60 different straits, runs through three archipelagos called Novaya Zemlya, Severnaya Zemlya and New Siberian Islands, and crosses through waters of different legal status.419 The Soviet Union, and now the Russian Federation, has always claimed that some of the ice-covered straits in the Northern Sea Route, in particular the Vil’kitskii, Shokl’skii, Dmitrii Laptev and Sannikov Straits, belong to Russian internal historic waters,420 a claim prompting immediate opposition from the United States.421 Clause 14 of the then amended 1998 Internal Waters Act notes that the Northern Sea Route is ‘the historically emerged national transportation route of the Russian Federation.’422 Although Russia’s legal definition of the Northern Sea Route has recently been changed—it reads now as follows: The ‘area of the Northern Sea Route means a water area adjoining the northern coast of the Russian Federation, including internal sea waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone and exclusive economic zone of the Russian Federation, and limited in the East by the line delimitating the sea areas with the United States of America and by the parallel of the Dezhnev Cape in the Bering Strait; in the West, by the meridian of the Cape Zhelania to the Novaya Zemlya archipelago, by the east coastal line of the Novaya Zemlya archipelago and the western limits of the Matochkin Shar, Kara Gates, 417 D van Duyn and HN Nicol, ‘Canada-Denmark-Russia-United States: The Northwest Passage’, in E Brunet-Jailly (ed), Border Disputes. A Global Encyclopedia Vol 3 (Santa Barbara, ABC-Clio, 2015) 748–758, 755. See also the statements of the legal scholars D Pharand ‘It seems to me the United States will never agree to recognize our full control over those waters unless they know that we have the capability to exercise that control, which we do not have at the moment.’ and M Byers ‘They are not convinced that we are truly committed to stepping up to the plate and actually exercising the degree of authority needed to protect their interests. Their worst case scenario is to actually recognize Canada’s sovereignty and then have us do nothing. If they recognize our sovereignty in the Northwest Passage and we do nothing or do not do enough, then they lose.’ before Canada’s Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans in 2009 (Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans, The Senate of Canada, Rising to the Arctic Challenge: Report on the Canadian Coast Guard (2009) 27). 418  Much has been written about the legal, political and economic aspects of the Northern Sea Route. See eg W Butler, Northeast Arctic Passage (Alphen aan den Rijn, Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1978); E Franckx, Maritime Claims in the Arctic. Canadian and Russian Perspectives (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1993); W Østreng et al, Shipping in Arctic Waters. A comparison of the Northeast, Northwest and Trans Polar Passages (Berlin, Springer, 2013); Laruelle, Russia’s Arctic Strategies 168–191; L Tymchenko, ‘The Northern Sea Route: Russian Management and Jurisdiction over Navigation in Arctic Seas’ in AG Oude Elferink and DR Rothwell (eds), The Law of the Sea and Polar Maritime Delmitation and Jurisdiction (Leiden, Brill Nijhoff, 2000) 269–291. 419  L Heininen, A Sergunin, and G Yarovoy, ‘Russia-United States: The Northern Sea Route’ in E Brunet-Jailly (ed), Border Disputes. A Global Encyclopedia Vol 3 (Santa Barbara, ABC-Clio, 2015) 819–826, 821. 420  Doc 303. RD Brubaker, ‘The Legal Regime of the Northern Sea Route—a US/Russian Dispute With a Potential to Stop Foreign Ships?’ in CL Ragner (ed), The 21st Century—Turning Point for the Northern Sea Route (Dordrecht, Kluwer 2000) 209–212, 210; JJ Solski, ‘New developments in Russian Regulation of Navigation on the Northern Sea Route’ (2013) Arctic Review on Law and Politics 90, 102. 421  Eg, Doc 304. A legal assessment of Russia’s claim is provided by Byers, International Law and the Arctic 148–150. 422  Clause 14 replaces the former Article 14 of the Russian Law on the Internal Sea Waters, Territorial Sea, and Adjacent Zone of the Russian Federation which described the Northern Sea Route as ‘the historical national unified transport line of communication of the Russian Federation in the Arctic’.

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Yugorski Shar Straits’423—Russia claims until today most of the Northern Sea Route to be internal waters, whereas the United States keeps arguing that most of the seaways are international straits.424 The dispute had become particularly apparent in the 1960s, when the US icebreaker Northwind traversed the Laptev Sea and the USS Burton Island surveyed the East Siberian Sea.425 These actions lead to some irritation on the Soviet side, wherefore the Soviet government sent an aide-mémoire to the US embassy in Moscow in which it was made clear that these Arctic straits are considered internal waters.426 One year later, the US Government replied by emphasising that from the US point of view the Soviet’s claim was unfounded and that the Soviet Arctic straits were to be qualifie as international straits.427 The diplomatic tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union grew in 1965 as the Northwind again entered the Vil’kitskii Strai, but in order to sooth the waves and to prevent an escalation of the conflict, in the end, the United States cancelled the voyage.428 In 1967, the United States sent the US Coast Guard icebreakers Edisto and Eastwind to survey parts of the Arctic Ocean, in particular the route up to the northern tip of Severnaya Zemlia. By taking this way the ships would have circumvented the controversial Vil’kitskii Strait. The unstable Arctic weather thwarted this plan; due to harsh ice conditions both icebreakers had no alternative but to change their route, heading for the Vil’kitskii Strait instead.429 Before the ships reached Vil’kitskii Strait, Washington had sent a diplomatic note to the Soviet government informing them of the new route.430 The Soviet Union instantly reacted with an aide-mémoire underlining its legal position that Vil’kitskii Strait belongs to Russian territorial waters and must not be entered without prior permission. Like in 1965, in the end the United States refrained from their planned missions under strong protest.431 Since the Northern Sea Route is—arguably—within the Russian EEZ, it is also subject to the special regime of Article 234 UNCLOS. Against this backdrop, Russia has developed an extensive body of regulations for shipping in the Northern Sea Route. This body of regulations includes the 2012 Federal Law of Shipping on the Water Area of the Northern Sea Route, the 2013 Rules of navigation in the water area of the Northern Sea

423  Article 5.1. of the Merchant Shipping Code of the Russian Federation. The terms ‘Northern Sea Route’ and the ‘Northeast Passage’ are often used interchangeably. Such undifferentiated use is misleading since both terms describe different geographical areas with different legal status. The Northeast Passage encompasses a broader area, running up to the North Pole (E Franckx and L Boone, ‘New Developments in the Arctic: Protecting the Marine from Increased Shipping’ in MH Nordquist The Law of the Sea Convention: US Accession and Globalization (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2012) 178–205, 183 fn 22). The former definition reads as follows 1.2: “national transportation route of the USSR, which is situated within the inland waters, territorial sea (territorial waters), or exclusive economic zone adjoining the USSR northern coast, and includes seaways suitable for guiding ships in ice. The [sic] extreme points of which [sic] in the west are the western entrances to the Novaya Zemlya straits [sic] and the meridian running from Mys Zhelaniya northward and [sic] in the east, in the Bering Strait, by the parallel 66°N and the meridian 168°58′37′W.” 424  Caminos and Cogliati-Bantz, Legal Regime of Straits 147. 425  For a more detailed report see Butler, Northeast Arctic Passage 122–127. 426  Doc 303. 427  Doc 304. 428 Byers, Arctic and International Law 145 f. Detailed Franckx, Maritime Claims in the Arctic 148 ff. 429 Franckx, Maritime Claims in the Arctic 150. 430  Doc 307, 309. 431  Doc 311.

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Route, the 2014 Rules of the application of tariffs for the icebreaker escorting of ships in the water area of the Northern Sea Route, and the 2014 Rules of the repeatedly crossing by foreign ships of the State Border of the Russian Federation without border, customs and other forms of control.432 This new set of legislation replaces the former Regulations for Navigation on the Seaways of the Northern Sea Route and some by-laws enacted in 1991.433 Significant changes between the 1991 Regulations and the 2013 Rules have been made concerning the compulsory icebreaker and pilotage assistance.434 During the Cold War period the Northern Sea Route was mainly used domestically, in particular by the Russian extractive industry and for the supply of the Arctic population. Shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union efforts were started to open the Northern Sea Route to international shipping.435 A first step was made by former Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev, who proposed in his famous speech held in Murmansk in 1987 to open the Northern Sea Route to international navigation.436 It took four more years until the official opening of the Northern Sea Route to international shipping was announced. On 13 April 2005, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov re-affirmed the idea to turn the Northern Sea Route into a Eurasian transport corridor.437 Since then the number of ships using the Northern Sea Route has been constantly growing and—as a side-effect—its economic and geopolitical importance. This is based on the fact that the Northern Sea Route provides a significantly shorter route between the Atlantic Ocean and Pacific Ocean in comparison to the transit through the Panama Canal or Suez Canal,438 cutting the distance between Western Europe and Northeast Asian countries by approximately 20–40 per cent. Although the Northern Sea Route has never been completely ice-free, a future, more navigable Northern Sea Route would also significantly reduce transportation time and costs. Political factors like the unstable situation in the Middle East, the threat of piracy attacks before the Horn of Africa and on-going tensions in the Hormuz Strait make the alternative route through the Arctic even more enticing.439 According to the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 the transportation of oil and gas through the Northern Sea Route is ‘technically and commercially feasible’ and, by 2020, the volume of oil and gas transported via the Northern Sea Route could be as high as 40 million tons per year.440 The Northern Sea

432 

Doc 314–317. comparison between the old and new regulations is provided by X Zhang, L Zou, and F Tu, ‘From mandatory icebreaker guiding to a permission regime: changes to the new Russian legislation of the Northern Sea Route’ (2014) 25 Adv Polar Sci 138. 434  Bai, ‘The IMO Polar Code’ 693. With regard to the legally controversial service fees one had to pay for the formerly mandatory icebreaking service see IV Bunik and VV Mikhaylichenko, ‘Legal Aspects of Navigation Through the Northern Sea Route’ in PA Berkman and AN Vylegzhanin (eds), Environmental Security in the Arctic Ocean (Dordrecht, Springer, 2013) 231–239, 235–236. 435  JH Ho, ‘The Arctic Meltdown and its Implications for Ports and Shipping in Asia’ in J Kraska (ed), Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change (Cambridge, CUP, 2011) 33–46, 38. 436  Doc 10. 437 Russian Federation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Transcript of Remarks and Replies to Questions by Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov Before Federation Council Members, www.archive.mid.ru//bdomp/ brp_4.nsf/f68cd37b84711611c3256f6d00541094/b2ce9d31f664bacbc3256fe40037c987!OpenDocument. 438 A Buixadé Farré et al, ‘Commercial Arctic shipping through the Northeast Passage: routes, resources, governance, technology, and infrastructure’ (2014) 37 Polar Geography 298, 301. 439  Heininen, Sergunin, and Yarovoy, ‘Russia-United States: The Northern Sea Route’ 820–821. 440  PAME (ed), Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (2009) 5. 433 A

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Route has not only the potential to facilitate transit-shipping between non-Arctic ports, but also to support destinational shipping, ie maritime cargo activities with an origin or destination in the Arctic.441 Notwithstanding the fact that both the Northwest Passsage and the Northern Sea Route were both open and navigable for the first time in August 2008,442 it remains a challenge to navigate and requires a high level of seamanship. For most of the year the assistance of an icebreaker escort is indispensable. These harsh conditions might be one of the reasons why in the last few years the number of vessels using the Northern Sea Route has constantly increased (41 in 2011, 46 in 2012, 71 in 2013, and—due to very harsh climate and political controversies—a drop in numbers—53 in 2014, and 21 in 2015),443 but still remains quite low compared to the number of ships taking the Suez Canal.444 Nevertheless, the further development of the Northern Sea Route, through the building modern infrastructure, is one of the key characteristics of the Russian Arctic policy.445 Svalbard Archipelago: Svalbard is an Arctic archipelago lying in the Barents Sea between 74°N and 81°N and 10°E and 35°E,446 flanked by Greenland and the Russian archipelagos Franz Josef Island and Novaja Zemlya. Its land mass is approximately 62,400 km2, including the islands Spitsbergen, North-East Land, Barents Island, Edge Island and Bear Island, and some islets and rocks appertaining thereto. Besides, Svalbard is a pristine ecosystem and, thus, a carefully managed wildlife preserve. It is home to polar bears, walruses, seals, whales, birds, and fishes.447 In 1905, after having gained its independence from Sweden, Norway proposed the establishment of a new legal regime for Svalbard, but World War I made effective negotiations on such a new legal regime an impossible endeavour. After the war, in 1919, Norway suggested that the Paris Peace Conference should also examine the legal status of Svalbard. Accepting this proposal the Paris Peace Conference established the Spitsbergen Commission, which drafted the Svalbard Treaty signed on 9 February 1920 and entered into force on 14 August 1925.448 The newly created legal regime meant an

441 

Buixadé Farré et al ‘Commercial Arctic shipping through the Northeast Passage’ 301. Russia’s Arctic Strategies 169. 443  Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty SE, Safety and Shipping Review (2015) 27. 444  Northern Sea Route Information Office, Transit Statistics, www.arctic-lio.com/nsr_transits. 445  President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev, Speech at the Meeting of the Russian Security Council on Protecting Russia’s National Interests in the Arctic (17 September 2008). 446 There is a considerable body of literature on different legal and political aspects of Svalbard. See eg G Ulfstein, The Svalbard Treaty. From Terra Nullius to Norwegian Sovereignty (Oslo, Scandinavian University Press, 1995); EJ Molenaar, ‘Fisheries Regulations in the Maritime Zones of Svalbard’ (2012) 27 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 3; T Pedersen, ‘The Svalbard Continental Shelf Controversy: Legal Disputes and Political Rivalries’ (2006) 37 Ocean Development and International Law 339; DH Anderson, ‘The Status under International Law of the Maritime Areas around Svalbard’ (2009) 40 Ocean Development and International Law 373; RR Churchill and G Ulfstein, ‘The Disputed Maritime Zones Around Svalbard’ in MH Nordquist, TH Heidar and JN Moore (eds), Changes in the Arctic Environment and the Law of the Sea (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2010) 551–594; T Pedersen, ‘The Dynamics of Svalbard Diplomacy’ (2008) 19 Diplomacy and Statecraft 236. For a Russian perspective see AN Vylegzhanin and VK Zilanov, Spitsbergen: legal regime of adjacent marine areas (Utrecht, Eleven International Publishing, 2007). Whilst Spitsbergen or Spitzbergen is the elder English name of the archipelago, which is used in the 1920 Treaty concerning the Archipelago of Spitsbergen, Svalbard is the modern Norwegian name of the archipelago. 447  See for more information on the environmental aspects VM Breting-Garcia, ‘Svalbard Archipelago’ in Antarctica and the Arctic Circle: A Geographic Encyclopedia of the Earth‘s Polar Regions (Santa Barbara, ABC-CLIO, 2014). 448  Doc 318. 442 Laruelle,

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end to the terra nullius status and accorded the sovereignty over Svalbard archipelago to Norway.449 Currently the Svalbard Treaty counts over 50 parties, including all State members of the Arctic Council, China, Japan, North Korea, many EU member States, and others. During the last decades two issues have been the centre of discussion with regard to Svalbard: First, since the UNCLOS came into force, the question arose as to whether Norway would be entitled to establish the full range of maritime zones around Svalbard and, second, if so, whether or not the regime of the Svalbard Treaty would apply. The Svalbard Treaty is silent on this issue. It neither prohibits Norway’s right to claim maritime zones in respect of Svalbard beyond the territorial sea, nor does it provide a crystal-clear legal basis. Although the Svalbard Treaty refers to ‘territorial waters’ several times, it does not mention any other maritime zones. The reason for this omission is obvious, since at the time of the adoption of the treaty no other maritime zones were recognised in public international law. Despite this controversy, Norway extended the territorial sea around Svalbard from 4 nm to 12 nm and authorised the establishment of a contiguous zone, even though it has not actually established such a zone yet. In 2001, Norway also drew straight baselines around Svalbard.450 Norway argues that the other States’ rights enshrined in the Svalbard Treaty do not apply in the maritime areas beyond the territorial sea, whereas most of the other parties take the opposite view.451 This disagreement creates significant problems for fisheries management and with regard to the commencement of hydrocarbon extraction activities on the continental shelf around Svalbard.452 It became particularly apparent in 1977, when Norway designated a 200 nm fisheries protection zone (FPZ)—instead of an EEZ—around Svalbard and began to enforce its domestic fisheries regulations against non-Norwegian vessels fishing in the FPZ.453 While in particular the United States, Iceland, Spain and the Russian Federation, as well as the EU (even though it is not a party to the Spitsbergen Treaty) have challenged the legality of Norway’s fisheries regulations and their enforcement against non-Norwegian ships,454 other States appear not to have taken or explicitly do not want to take an official position.455 The only parties that have explitily lend their support to the Norwegian position—at least temporarily—are Canada and Finland. This can be concluded from a fisheries treaty that Canada signed with Norway in 1995. It states in its preamble that ‘Norway is entitled to exercise exclusively the sovereign rights and jurisdiction accruing to the coastal State under UNCLOS, in particular articles 56 and 77, in the Fisheries Protection Zone around Svalbard and on the Continental Shelf around the Archipelago, and that the Treaty concerning Spitsbergen of 9 February 1920 does not apply to these areas.’456 Since this agreement has not been ratified during the last 20 years, it is 449  Under Sect. 1 of the Svalbard Act of 1925 Svalbard became part of Norway (adopted 17 July 1925; entered into force 14 August 1925). 450  Doc 320. 451  Churchill and Ulfstein, ‘The Disputed Maritime Zones Around Svalbard’ 551. 452  See also Nicol and Heininen, ‘Norway-Russia: The Svalbard Archipelago’ 809–818. 453  Doc 319. 454 Churchill and Ulfstein, ‘The Disputed Maritime Zones Around Svalbard’ 584. See also T Pedersen, ‘International Law and Politics in U.S. Policymaking: The United States and the Svalbard Dispute’ (2011) 42 Ocean Development & International Law 120 and Doc 327–341. 455  Eg Germany, Email from the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs to editor (4 June 2015). 456  Doc 203.

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uncertain if Canada still endorses the view expressed there.457 Finland first seconded the Norwegian view, but appears to have withdrawn its support in 1976.458 During the last years a change of mind among the parties to Svalbard Treaty can be observed taking into account two recent events. In 2006, Norway made a submission to the CLCS in respect of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm to the north of Svalbard, and in the same year, Norway and Denmark entered into a maritime boundary agreement delimiting the continental shelf boundary between Svalbard and Greenland and the boundary between Svalbard’s FPZ and Greenland’s EEZ.459 In doing so Denmark implicitly recognised that Svalbard generates maritime zones other than a territorial sea. The Russian Federation followed the Danish example by concluding the Barents Treaty in 2010.460 Hans Island: Hans Island is an uninhabited islet of approximately 1,3 km2, located in the midst of Kennedy Channel of the Nares Strait between Northwest Greenland and the Canadian Ellesmere Island (80° 49′N, 66° 28′W). It has no deposits of oil or other resources, but the surrounding seafloor might contain natural resources.461 The disagreement between Canada and Denmark over the ownership of Hans Island is the only territorial dispute in the Arctic.462 The dispute first became first apparent in 1973, when both countries established a bilateral maritime boundary commission in order to delimitate the continental shelf between Greenland and Canada. During these negotiations, Canada explicitly claimed sovereignty over Hans Island for the first time.463 Denmark disputed this claim considering Hans Island to be a part of Danish territory. For the diplomats failed to settle the dispute, the final delimitation agreement of 17 December 1973 between Canada and Greenland does not touch the issue but—using an equidistance line—sets the boundary line by connecting the midpoints of 127 straight baselines surveyed between the coasts of both States except from point 122 to point 123, exactly the area in which Hans Island is situated.464 Since the maritime boundary has been settled and the 1973 delimitation treaty leaves the islet without any territorial waters, the dispute over Hans Island has no implication for the surrounding waters or the seabed.465 Hence, even though Hans Island lies in the middle of the Northwest Passage,

457 

Churchill and Ulfstein, ‘Disputed Maritime Zones Around Svalbard’ 564. Pedersen, ‘The Dynamics of Svalbard Diplomacy’ 247. 459 Doc 140. See further T Pedersen, ‘Denmark’s Policies toward the Svalbard Area,’ (2009) 40 Ocean Development & International Law 319. 460 Byers, International Law and the Arctic 21, 38. But see HN Nicol and L Heininen, ‘Norway-Russia: The Svalbard Archipelago’ in E Brunet-Jailly (ed), Border Disputes. A Global Encyclopedia Vol 3 (Santa Barbara, ABC-CLIO, 2015) 809–818. 461  Stevenson, ‘The Struggle for Hans Island’ 267. 462  For a comprehensive disquisition on the dispute and a discussion of the arguments put forward by Canada and Denmark see CH Stevenson, ‘Hans off!: The Struggle for Hans Island and the Potential Ramifications for International Border Dispute Resolution’ (2007) 30 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review 263; Byers, Who owns the Arctic? 22–30; DH Gray, ‘Canada’s Unresolved Maritime Boundaries’ (1997) IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 68; RK Headland, ‘Canada-Denmark: Hand Island’ in E Brunet-Jailly (ed), Border Disputes. A Global Encyclopedia Vol 2 (Santa Barbara, ABC-CLIO, 2015) 483–488; R Kristiansen, ‘Desolate Dispute: A Study of a Hypothetical International Court of Justice (ICJ) Decision’ (2013) 13 Canadian Military Journal 34. 463  Stevenson, ‘The Struggle for Hans Island’ 265. 464  Doc 133. 465 AH Kessel (Legal Adviser, Canadian Dept. of Foreign Affairs and International Trade) at the Foreign Affairs and International Development Committee (20 November 2012), www.openparliament.ca/committees/ foreign-affairs/41-1/55/alan-h-kessel-1/only/. 458 

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the question of sovereignty does not really have an impact on the issue of legal control over the—future—navigation business in Nares Strait.466 Even though the reason for the dispute may be rather national pride than anything else, Canada and Denmark have continued to claim Hans Island as their own,467 re-asserting their sovereignty through regular on-site visits, flag planting468, and the inclusion of Hans Island in their respective national maps and charts.469 Nonetheless both countries have continuously shown interest in finding a solution. In September 2005, they issued a joint statement declaring, that ‘we will continue our efforts to reach a long-term solution to the Hans Island dispute.’470 Since then Canada and Denmark have met to discuss the issue on an annual basis.471 In November 2012, Canada and Denmark reached a tentative agreement on the Lincoln Sea boundary. Although the issue of sovereignty over Hans Island has been left unresolved by this agreement, at this occasion both States expressed their willingness to continue their bilateral negotiations on a future mutually satisfactory solution.472 A likely scenario is that Canada and Denmark will agree to divide Hans Island in halves.473 Bering Sea: The dispute between the United States and the Russian Federation over the maritime boundary in the Bering Sea has been going on for decades.474 The Bering Sea is part of the North Pacific Ocean; it is bordered to the East and North-East by Alaska, to the west by Siberia and the Kamchatka Peninsula, to the south by the Alaska Peninsula and the Aleutian Islands, and to the north by the Bering Strait which separates the Bering Sea from the Arctic Ocean’s Chukchi Sea. It is a semi-enclosed sea according to the definition of Article 122 UNCLOS, covering a total surface area of circa

466  J Hartmann, ‘Canada and Denmark reach agreement on the Lincoln Sea Boundary’ (EJIL talk!, 20 January 2013), www.ejiltalk.org/canada-and-denmark-reach-agreement-on-the-lincoln-sea-boundary. 467  According to A Carroll, then Minister for International Cooperation: ‘Canada has consistently defended its interests in the past and it will continue to do so. Hans Island constitutes part of the national territory of Canada. No assertion by the Danish ambassador or other Danish officials detracts from the absolute sovereignty that Canada enjoys over Hans Island.’ Canada, HoC Debates, 26 March 2004, 1755–56; www.parl.gc.ca/content/lop/ researchpublications/prb0805-e.htm#hansisland. 468  www.byers.typepad.com/arctic/2014/03/creative-thinking-on-sovereignty.html#more; see A Hund, ‘Hans Island Dispute’ in Antarctica and the Arctic Circle: A Geographic Encyclopedia of the Earth’s Polar Regions (Santa Barbara, ABC-CLIO, 2014). 469  Doc 344, 345. 470  Doc 346. 471 (2009) CYIL 422. 472  Doc 135. This approach is confirmed by Denmark’s Strategy for the Arctic 2011–2020 which states that the close co-operation with Canada will be continued as well as by the Canadian Statement on Arctic Foreign Policy which underlines that the possibility of resolving maritime boundary disputes in accordance with international law should be explored. 473  A Humphrey, ‘New proposal would see Hans Island split equally between Canada and Denmark’ National Post (Toronto, 11 April 2012), www.news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/new-proposal-would-see-hansisland-split-equally-between-canada-and-denmark; N Krogh Søndergaard, ‘Canadisk-russisk strid om Arktis positiv for Hans’ Greenlandic Broadcasting Corporation (Nuuk, 26 August 2014), www.knr.gl/da/nyheder/ canadisk-russisk-strid-om-arktis-positiv-hans-%C3%B8. 474 See generally CM Antinori, ‘The Bering Sea: A Maritime Delimitation Dispute between the United States and the Soviet Union’ (1987) 18 Ocean Development and International Law 1; DR Rothwell, ‘The United States and Arctic Straits. The Northwest Passage and the Bering Strait’ in S Lalonde and TL McDorman (eds), International Law and Politics in the Arctic Ocean (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2015) 160–179; L Heninen, A Sergunin, and G Yarovoy, ‘Russia-United States: The Bering Sea’ in E Brunet-Jailly (ed), Border Disputes. A Global Encyclopedia Vol 2 (Santa Barbara, ABC-CLIO, 2015) 661–669.

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2,274,000 km2.475 The Bering Sea has great potential for hydrocarbon exploitation and is a highly important area for both the US and Russian fishing industries, which is also a significant factor in the on-going nature of the dispute.476 Despite of these differences, both bordering countries managed to cooperate with regard to environmental protection and fisheries in the Bering Sea quite well, for instance by signing the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning Cooperation in Combating Pollution in the Bering and Chukchi Seas in Emergency Situations in 1989477 as well as by adopting the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pollock Resources in the Central Bering Sea in 1994.478 In the 1970s, the United States and the Soviet Union became aware of their dispute when both States decided to define the limits of their EEZs in the Bering Sea based on the 1867 Convention line between the two countries.479 They exchanged diplomatic notes in an attempt to ‘respect the line set forth in the 1867 Convention as the limit to each countries’ fisheries jurisdiction where the nautical mile boundaries overlapped’.480 But their respective interpretation of the 1867 Convention differed: whereas the Soviet Union argued that the maritime boundary agreed on was a straight line or rhumb line on a Mercator projection, for the United States, it was a curved or geodetic line on a conical projection.481 It can be reasonably presumed that the selection of these cartographical technical standards and projections had been done deliberately, thus each country could claim a lion’s share of the chord-shaped area disputed territory of approximately 18,000 nm2 in the Bering Sea.482 Finally in 1990, the Soviet Union and the United States signed the Maritime Boundary Agreement delimiting their respective borders in the Bering Sea, Arctic Ocean and northern Pacific Ocean, which focuses on the delimitation of the respective EEZ and continental shelf areas within the Bering Sea region creating with 1,600 nm in length one of the longest maritime boundaries in the world.483 Despite this treaty, both countries still disagree on the legal status of an area of approximately 50,000 km2 in the Bering Sea. The agreement has also gained much criticism by Soviet and Russian politicians for resulting in losses in fishing rights and other maritime benefits.484 Therefore the Russian Federation has refused the ratification until today, but has applied the treaty provisionally since 15 June 1990 pursuant to Article 25 VCLT.485 But even if the Russian Federation continued to refuse ratification, a radical change in attitude would be very difficult, since

475  S Lalonde, ‘Bering Sea’ in R Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (online ed), para 2. 476  Heninen, Sergunin, and Yarovoy, ‘Russia-United States: The Bering Sea’ 661. 477  Doc 348. 478  Doc 189. A detailed analysis of the Convention provides WV Dunlap, ‘A Pollock-Fishing Agreement for the Central Bering Sea’ (1994) IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 49 ff. 479  Heninen, Sergunin, and Yarovoy, ‘Russia-United States: The Bering Sea’ 665. 480  Doc 197–199. 481  US President, Letter of Submittal, Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Maritime Boundary (6 September 1990) V f. 482  Heninen, Sergunin, and Yarovoy, ‘Russia-United States: The Bering Sea’ 665. 483  Doc 141. 484  Heninen, Sergunin, and Yarovoy, ‘Russia-United States: The Bering Sea’ 666. 485  Doc 142.

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it has observed the so-called Baker-Sheverdnadze line for 25 years, providing evidence of state practice and opinio juris.486 The maritime boundary between the United States and the Russian Federation passes not only through the Bering Sea but also through the Bering Strait which is a narrow international strait between the easternmost point of the Asian continent and the westernmost point of the North American continent.487 Its geostrategic importance is based on the fact that it connects the Pacific Ocean to both the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route; in both a significant increase of maritime traffic between Asia, Europe and Northern America can be observed.488 In response to these developments, in 2010 the US Coast Guard commenced a Port Access Route Study in order to assess whether there was a need to create new vessel routing measures in the Bering Strait489 and in 2012, Alaska urged the United States to work within the IMO for the establishment of a Bering Strait Vessel Traffic Separation Scheme.490 A significant feature of the Bering Strait is that it is interspersed with small islands and islets. The two most noteworthy insular features—Big Diomede and Little Diomede—are located right in the midst of the Bering Strait; while Big Diomede belongs to the Russian Federation, Little Diomede is on the territory of the United States. A consequence of this geographical setting is the existence of two viable shipping routes through the Bering Strait, a Russian route to the west of the Diomede Islands and through the Russian territorial sea and a US route to the east of the Diomede Islands and through the US territorial sea. The channel right between Big Diomede and Little Diomede is not very attractive to commercial shipping for two reasons. On the one hand, with a width of only 2.4 nm it is not wide enough for most of the modern container ships. On the other hand, since the Bering Strait is also the subject of the 1990 Agreement with the effect that the waters between both Diomede Islands fall within the contested Russia-US maritime boundary, shipping would be subject to both Russian and US law at different times during transit.491 Despite the unsettled boundary dispute, the demand for a comprehensive cooperative approach to the management of the Bering Strait has been long recognised by both officials and academics and was commenced with the establishment of the joint Beringian Heritage International Park in the early 1990s.492 In recent times on the occasion of a 486  See also Heninen, Sergunin, and Yarovoy, ‘Russia-United States: The Bering Sea’ 668; Laruelle, Russia’s Arctic Strategies 104. 487  The United States and Russia agree on the legal qualification of the Bering Strait as an international strait, eg Rothwell, ‘The United States and Arctic Straits’ 174; AR Thomas and JC Duncan, ‘Annotated Supplement to The Commanders Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations’ (1999) 73 INT’L LAW STUDIES 205. 488 US DoD, Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage (May 2011) 9; DR Rothwell, ‘International Law and Arctic Shipping’ (2013) Michigan State International Law Review 67, 91. For example, from 2008 to 2012, shipping through the Bering Strait increased by 118 per cent [USCG Arctic Strategy (2013) 13]. 489  United States Coast Guards, Port Access Route Study: In the Bering Strait, 75 FR 68568 (8 November 2010), www.federalregister.gov/a/2010-28115. 490 Alaska State Legislature, Findings and Recommendations of the Alaska Northern Taskforce (January 2012) 14 f. 491  This paragraph is based on Rothwell, ‘International Law and Arctic Shipping’ 95. 492  Doc 349; www.congress.gov/bill/102nd-congress/senate-bill/2088/text?q={%22search%22%3A[%22ber ingia%22]}&resultIndex=1; J Kraska, ‘From Pariah to Partner: Russian-American Security Cooperation in the Arctic Ocean’ (2010) 16 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law 517. For a comprehensive analysis of possible bilateral activities for the management of the Bering Sea and Strait see SL Casapulla, Management of the Bering Strait Region: Advocating for a U.S.-Russian Bilateral Agreement (Georgetown University, 2014).

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meeting in Deauville/France in 2011 between US President Obama and Russia’s President Medvedev a Joint Statement on Cooperation in the Bering Strait Region focusing on closer cooperation in environmental, cultural and economic areas was signed.493 In 2012, it was announced that both States would reinforce their cooperation with regard to the Shared Beringian Heritage Program and commence negotiations towards the finalisation of a Transboundary Area of Shared Beringian Heritage that would connect the national parks in Alaska and the Russian Federation.494 A pertinent draft of a MoU had been released in 2013 which drew much criticism from the domestic side, in particular from Alaska’s officials.495 The Ukraine crisis put an additional strain on the bilateral with the result that ‘[t]he United States government suspended almost all its bilateral engagements and negotiations with the Russian Federation, including negotiations about the Beringia MOU.’496 Beaufort Sea: The Beaufort Sea is a sea of the Arctic Ocean covering an area of about 476,000 km2 which is frozen most of the year. The ongoing dispute in the Beaufort Sea concerns the maritime extension between the Canadian and Alaska to the north of the Mackenzie River delta.497 Canada claims that the maritime boundary runs along the 141st meridian as an extension of the territorial boundary dividing Alaska from the Yukon Territory agreed with the United States in Article III of the 1825 Convention between Great Britain and Russia concerning the Limits of their Respective Possessions on the North-West Coast of America and the Navigation of the Pacific Ocean. The United States is in disagreement with the Canadian position arguing that instead an equidistance line should be used for delimitation.498 As a result both states have an overlapping claim to a triangular area in the Beaufort Sea covering around 21,000 km2.499 In 1976, the controversy first came to light after the United States had protested the boundary line Canada was using when granting oil and gas concessions to the extracting industry.500 Later both States endorsed their differing views: Canada used the 141st meridian for the designation of its control zone as established by the AWPPA, while the United States proclaimed a 200 nm wide Fishery Conservation Zone based on its position. Although Canada and the United States then considered the negotiation of a

493 

Doc 350. Doc 351. According to the Shared Beringian Heritage Program Beringia is defined as the land and maritime area bounded on the west by the Lena River in Russia; on the east by the Mackenzie River in Canada; on the north by 72 degrees north latitude in the Chukchi Sea; and on the south by the tip of the Kamchatka Peninsula.’, www. nps.gov/akso/beringia/beringia/index.cfm. 495  Doc 352, www.alaskasenate.org/2014/press/news/giessel-sjr-federal-encroachment-beringia-internationalpark. 496  John Quinley, spokesman for the National Park Service, cited after Z Hughes, ‘Parnell signs resolution opposing Beringia international park as threat to development’ (Arctic Newswire, 16 August 2014), www.adn. com/article/20140815/parnell-signs-resolution-opposing-beringia-international-park-threat-development. A list of further bilateral agreements with application to the Bering Strait region is provided by PA Berkman, AN Vylegzhanin, and OR Young, ‘Governing the Bering Strait Region: Current Status, Emerging Issues and Future Options’ (2016) 47 Ocean Development & International Law 186–217, 191 f. 497  For a comprehensive analysis of reasons, developments, and possible solutions of this dispute see Byers, Who owns the Arctic? 98–105 and McDorman, Salt Water Neighbors 181–189; JS Baker and M Byers, ‘Crossed Lines: The Curious Case of the Beaufort Sea Maritime Boundary’ (2012) 43 Ocean Development & International Law 70. 498  RV Arnaudo, ‘United States Policy in the Arctic’ in PA Berkman and AN Vylegzhanin (eds), Environmental Security in the Arctic Ocean (Dordrecht, Springer, 2013) 81–92, 88. 499  An evaluation of the arguments of each side is provided by McDorman, Salt Water Neighbors 183–187. 500 Byers, Who owns the Arctic? 98. 494 

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package deal settling all four of their bilateral maritime boundary disputes in the Gulf of Maine, Juan De Fuca, Dixon entrance, and finally the Beaufort Sea, in the end these diplomatic efforts turned out to be unsuccessful.501 According to the United States, negotiations over a maritime boundary in the Beaufort Sea have recently been resumed.502 This proposition is in line with the Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy in which it is emphasised that the conflict ‘is well managed, neither posing defense challenges for Canada nor diminishing Canada’s ability to collaborate and cooperate with its Arctic neighbours’ and that ‘Canada will continue to manage these discrete boundary issues and will also, as a priority, seek to work with our neighbours to explore the possibility of resolving them in accordance with international law.503 However, the fact that the 1984 Inuvialuit Final Agreement504 is based on the Canadian position may complicate this endeavour. If Canada was ever to agree with the United States on a new border in the Beaufort Sea, it would have to redraw the westernmost coordinates of the settlement reached in the 1984 Inuvialuit Final Agreement—from a political perspective a highly sensitive issue.505 The circumstance that the settlement of the conflict in the Beaufort Sea would have significant repercussions on the delimitation of the extended continental shelves of Canada and the United States creates some more pressure to resolve the conflict quickly. Paradoxically, the US position regarding the division of the Beaufort Sea would rather favour Canada with regard to the extended continental shelf.506 The disagreement is further fuelled by the fact that the disputed area is known to contain a minimum of 1 billion cubic metres of oil and 1.7 billion cubic metres of gas.507 However, its uncertain legal status makes the area not particularly attractive for the extraction industry. Although in the 1970s and 1980s there were considerable exploratory activities of the extraction industry in the region, Canada and the United States had established a moratorium on hydrocarbon exploration for some time508 and it was only at the end of the 1990s and the middle of the 2000s that the interest of large extracting companies in the region was renewed and successful bids on several blocks within the Beaufort Sea were made.509 Such explorations have occurred in various places in the Beaufort Sea, typically between 69°N latitude to 72°N latitude and between 132°W longitude and 140°W longitude, which encroach on the area being disputed by Canada and the United States. The expectations of the extracting industry have not been

501  R Huebert, ‘Canada-United States: The Beaufort Sea’ in E Brunet-Jailly (ed), Border Disputes. A Global Encyclopedia Vol 2 (Santa Barbara, ABC-CLIO, 2015) 507–513, 507 f. 502  R O’Rourke, Changes in the Arctic 20. 503  Doc 4. 504  Agreement between the Committee for Original Peoples’ Entitlement, representing the Inuvialuit of the Inuvialuit Settlement Region, and the Government of Canada (done 5 June 1984), FAOLEX No: LEX-FAOC136685. 505  R Huebert, ‘Why Canada, U.S. must resolve their Arctic border disputes’ The Globe and Mail (Toronto, 21 October 2014), www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/why-canada-us-must-resolve-their-arctic-border-disputes/ article21189764/. 506  Huebert, ‘The Beaufort Sea’ 511. 507  S Griffith, ‘US-Canada Arctic border dispute key to maritime riches’ BBC News (Ottawa, 2 August 2010), www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-10834006. 508  Gray, ‘Canada’s Unresolved Maritime Boundaries’ 63; KN Scott and DL VanderZwaag, ‘Polar Oceans and the Law of the Sea’ in DR Rothwell et al (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea (Oxford, OUP, 2015) 724–751, 731; Arnaudo, ‘United States Policy in the Arctic’ 88; McDorman, Salt Water Neighbors 187. 509  Huebert, ‘The Beaufort Sea’ 508; McDorman, Salt Water Neighbors 187.

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met though. In September 2015, Royal Dutch Shell PLC announced that it was ending its operations in the Beaufort and Chukchi seas because its first exploration showed only disappointing stores of oil.510 Other extracting companies are also on the retreat.511 At the present time bilateral cooperation in the Beaufort Sea is limited to joint response procedures in the event of a major pollution accident which are set out in an exchange of notes,512 in which Canada and the United States extended their Joint Marine Pollution Contingency Plan to include the Beaufort Sea. On regional level groups of indigenous people living in the Beaufort Sea region have concluded two agreements to foster transboundary governance and research in relation to beluga whales and polar bears.513 Outlook It can be inferred with certainty that the Arctic region will continue its transformative change. For the fact that the High North serves as an early warning system for the global climate situation, this ongoing process will not only have significant repercussions within the boundaries of the Arctic but also far beyond. It is therefore essential to gain a better understanding of the historical evolution and current affairs of the Arctic in international law and policy overall. Of course, it remains to be seen if the present set of legal and policy instruments applicable to the Arctic will be sufficient to address all future changes and challenges this pristine area will face. If it shows that the regulatory architecture will not suffice anymore, in turn it will further have to be responsive and adapt. Until then I hope that this collection will be useful for all those who are interested in the fate of the Arctic.

510  ‘Shell’s withdrawal from the Beaufort and Chukchi seas isn’t all good news for the Arctic’, Los Angeles Times (28 September 2015), www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-0929-shell-20150928-story.html. 511  ‘Imperial Oil, BP delay Beaufort Sea drilling plans indefinitely’ CBC News (26 June 2015), www.cbc.ca/ news/canada/north/imperial-oil-bp-delay-beaufort-sea-drilling-plans-indefinitely-1.3129505. 512  Agreement in the Form of an Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America Adding a Further Annex (Annex V) to the Joint Marine Pollution Contingency Plan (signed 19 June 1974; entered into force 17 March 1982; E101892—CTS 1982 No 32). 513  Doc 235, 243.

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events - 1500 -1 1524 Already in 1524, Giovanni da Verrazano mistakes the entrance to Hudson River (now New York City) to be the entrance of the Northwest Passage. 1576 until 1578 Martin Frobisher is the first British explorer to seek the Northwest Passage. Between 1576 and 1578 he undertakes three unsuccessful voyages up to 60°N.

Early 17th century Throughout the first quarter of the 17th century, a great number of merchants, trappers and cossacks settle in East Siberia and explore the northern Siberian coast along the Northern Sea Route. - 1700 2 October 1751 As an addendum to the Stromstadt Treaty, the Lapp Codicil is adopted. It is often referred to as the Sámi Magna Charta.2

1585 until 1587 Within three years, British explorer John Davis charts the strait west of Greenland that now bears his name.

1775 Greenland becomes a colony of the Danish Kingdom.

1594 until 1596 Dutch navigator Willem Barents leads three expeditions along the coast of today’s Russian Federation in search for a Northeast Passage connecting the White Sea and the Bering Sea.

22 February 1812 By Royal Decree Norway delimits its territorial waters. It is the first Arctic State to do so. The Decree reads: ‘It shall be an established rule that in all cases where Our Majesty’s territorial frontier at sea falls to be determined, it shall be reckoned according to the customary distance in nautical miles from the outermost island or islet not swept over by the sea.’ This system is still used by Norway today.

- 1600 1615 and 1616 The British explorers and navigators Robert Bylot and William Baffin undertake two expeditions to find the Northwest Passage. They explore the northern coast of Greenland up to 78°N and continue their voyage along the Canadian archipelago to Lancaster Sound. Since Baffin mistakes the sound for a bay, he concludes that no Northwest Passage exists. In the aftermath of Bylot’s and Baffin’s voyage, the interest in searching for the passage wanes for the next 200 years.

1  Of course, this chronology is not exhaustive but rather a selection of significant events. Since 2013 an annual report on major developments in Arctic affairs is provided by the Arctic Law and Policy Institute, University of Washington, www.law.washington.edu/ arcticlaw/Resources.aspx.

- 1800 -

11 May 1819 until 30 October 1820 After Scottish polar explorer John Ross failed to discover the Northwest Passage during his expedition in 1818, Ross’ second-in-command, British explorer William E Parry, returns to the area for an expedition lasting from 11 May 1819 until 30 October 1820. He explores Lancaster Sound and proves that Baffin Bay is not landlocked. Parry’s expedition is the first to winter over in the Canadian Archipelago. May 1821 until October 1825 William E Parry’s second and third attempts to discover a Northwest Passage remain unsuccessful. 2 

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events 28 February 1825 In the Treaty of 1825 between Great Britain and the Russian Federation concerning, inter alia, the boundaries of their possessions on the northeastern American coast, the eastern boundary of the British (later Canadian) area is described as ‘la même ligne méridienne du 141me degré formera, dans son prolongement jusqu’à la Mer Glaciale.’ Some Canadian politicians later use this wording to justify a claim to the whole sector above Canada’s archipelago up to the North Pole.3 1852 until 1854 Francis L McClintock is in charge of an expedition to today’s Canadian archipelago from 1952 until 1854. Following Franklin’s route of 1845, he discovers a written record of Franklin’s expedition up to 25 April 1848, which eventually clears Franklin’s disappearance. However, in the following years attention turns away from the Northwest Passage to the attainment of the North Pole. 30 March 1867 In the Treaty between the United States and Russia concerning the Cession of the Russian Possessions in North America of 1867 the western boundary of the Russian (later Alaskan) area is described as ‘said meridian line of the 141st degree, in its prolongation as far as the frozen ocean.’ Later, for some Canadian politicians this wording backs the Canadian authority over the sector above the Canadian archipelago up to the North Pole.4 1871 Hans Island is discovered. With sails set for the North Pole, American explorer Charles F Hall passes through Kennedy Channel between Ellesmere Island and the Greenland Coast. Hall notices a tiny island, so far unmapped and unnamed, and names it after Hans Hendrik, the Greenlandic hunter and guide accompanying him. 3 May 1878 The House of Commons and Senate of Canada ask the British Parliament for the transfer of all Arctic islands and islands between the 141st 3  4 

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Doc 353. Doc 354.

meridian of longitude as well as the series of straits between Ellesmere Island and Greenland, namely ‘on the East by the Atlantic Ocean, which boundary shall extent to the North by Davis Straits, Baffin’s Bay, Smith’s Straits and Kennedy Channel, including all the islands in and adjacent thereto, which belong to Great Britain by right of discovery or otherwise; on the North the Boundary shall be so extended as to include the entire continent to the Arctic Ocean, and all the islands in the same westward to the one hundred and forty-first meridian west of Greenwich; and on the North-West by the United States Territory of Alaska.’5 21 July 1878 until 22 July 1879 The Swedish explorer and Finnish extradite Adolf Erik Baron Nordenskiöld undertakes the first transit through the Northwest Passage within one season. His ship Vega leaves from Tromsø, Norway, on 21 July 1878 and reaches Port Clarence, Alaska, on 22 July 1879. 1 until 5 October 1879 In Hamburg, representatives of Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, the Russian Federation, and Sweden meet to establish the International Polar Commission. The Commission organises the First International Polar Year of 1882 and 1883. Key objectives of the meeting are the number and places of observatories as well as the agreement on uniform observation procedures.6 31 July 1880 Britain assigns to Canada ‘[f]rom and after the first day of September, 1880, all British Territories and Possessions in North America, not already included within the Dominion of Canada, and all Islands adjacent to any of such Territories or Possessions, […] (with the exception of the Colony of Newfoundland and its dependencies)’. Shortly afterwards, Canada begins to expand its presence in the far North

5 Canada, Parliament, Senate, Debates, 3th Parliament, 5th Session, 1878, Vol 1 (Ottawa, CW Mitchell, 1878) 903. 6  See generally S Barr and C Lüdecke, The History of the International Polar Years (IPYs) (Berlin, Springer, 2010).

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events through numerous expeditions and through patrolling and regimenting whaling in the waters of the Canadian archipelago. Later, some Canadian politicians use this demonstration of authority to underpin their claim also to the waters of the archipelago.7 August 1881 until August 1883 US Army Officer Adolphus Greely leads an expedition to the Arctic to establish a station at remote Lady Franklin Bay on Ellesmere Island. The expedition reaches farther north than any previous attempts to get close to or even reach the North Pole. 1882 and 1883 The First International Polar Year takes place with twelve participating countries. In twelve circumpolar Arctic stations scientists experiment to investigate the meteorology and earth magnetic field in high latitudes. In addition, thirteen Arctic expeditions are undertaken. 15 August 1893 After the United States and United Kingdom had agreed to submit their sealing dispute over access to seal stocks in the Bering Sea to arbitration, the award relating to the rights of jurisdiction of the United States in the Bering Sea and the preservation of fur seals is given today. The arbitration panel decides not to recognise the claim of the United State to resource rights over seals beyond the US-American territorial sea.8 6 July 1895 The Queen’s Colonial Boundaries Act of 1895 states that, ‘[w]here the boundaries of a Colony have, either before or after the passing of this Act, been altered by Her Majesty the Queen by Order in Council or Letters Patent, the boundaries as so altered shall be, and be deemed to have been from the date of the alteration, the boundaries of the Colony.’ Despite the vague wording, some

7 Order of Her Majesty in Council admitting all British possessions and Territories in North America and islands adjacent thereto into the Union, dated the 31st day of July, 1880. 8 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol XXVIII (2006) 263–276.

Canadian politicians base a claim of sovereignty over its Arctic land and waters on it. - 1903 1903 The first Royal Canadian Mounted Police posts are built on the Arctic coast in Fort MacPherson, Fullerton, and Herschel Island. In addition, the Canadian ship Neptune begins a voyage to assert Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic archipelago. 24 January 1903 Great Britain and the United States conclude the Convention for the Adjustment of the boundary between Canada and Alaska (Hay-HerbertTreaty), appointing a tribunal to settle the dispute concerning the true meaning and application of certain clauses of their 1825 Convention.9 16 June 1903 until 30 August 1905 Norwegian explorer Roald Amundsen is the first to successfully complete a path from Greenland to Alaska on his sloop Gjøa. He leaves Oslo on 16 June 1903, enters Lancaster Sound, the Eastern entrance to the Passage, on 20 August 1903 and passes Cape Bathurst, on the Southern border of today’s Amundsen Gulf, on 30 August 1905. - 1904 17 July 1904 A Canadian expedition led by AP Low hoists the Canadian flag at Port Leopold, at the south side of the Barrow Strait. Low leaves a copy of the Canadian customs regulations in the boiler of a steam launch, left there by a search party for the 1845 Franklin expedition. 1904 The Canadian Department of the Interior publishes a map, which shows the 141st and the 9  Convention between His Majesty and the United States of America, for the adjustment of the Boundary between the Dominion of Canada and the Territory of Alaska, done at Washington, 24 January 1903, entered into force 3 March 1903; Reports of International Arbitral Awards Vol XV (2006), 485. For an assessment of this dispute see V Konrad, ‘CanadaUnited States: The Alaska Boundary’ in E Brunet-Jailley (ed), Border Disputes. A Global Encyclopedia Vol 2 (Santa Barbara, ABC-CLIO, 2015) 496.

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events 60th meridian as being Canada’s boundaries. The map extends the northern boundary up to the North Pole.10 1904 until 1911 The Canadian ship Arctic, under the command of Captain Joseph-Elzéar Bernier, patrols the waters between the islands of the northern archipelago. In the name of the Canadian government, Bernier collects tolls from whalers and merchants cruising the Arctic waters. - 1906/1907 1906 After the map of 1904, the Canadian Department of the Interior publishes another map that shows the 141st and the 60th meridian as being Canada’s boundaries. It also shows the northernmost islands within those meridians as being Canadian territory. 20 February 1907 Canadian Senator Pascal Poirier proposes in the Senate ‘[t]hat it be resolved that the Senate is of opinion that the time has come for Canada to make a formal declaration of possession of the lands and islands situated in the north of the Dominion, and extending to the North Pole.’ Poirier bases this claim on a theory later called sector theory, according to which ‘[a]ll the lands between the two lines up to the North Pole should belong and do belong to the country whose territory abuts up there.’11 Reportedly, the sector theory was first put forward by Canadian explorer Joseph Bernier in his speech to the Arctic Club in New York, a few years before. In response to Poirier’s speech, however, the representative of the Government in the Senate, the Honourable Sir Richard Cartwright, states that ‘whether we, or whether any other nation is entitled to extend its territory to the North Pole, I would like to reserve my opinion. I am not aware that there have been any original discoverers as yet who can assert a claim to 10  The map is reprinted in J Brown, Case Studies in Oceanography and Marine Affairs (Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1991) 107. 11 Canada, Parliament, Senate, Debates, 10th Parliament, 3rd Session, 1906–1907, Vol 1 (CW Mitchell, Ottawa, 1907) 271.

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the North Pole, and I do not know that it would be of any great practical advantage to us, or to any other country, to assert jurisdiction quite far north as that.’12 - 1909 31 January 1909 Referring to Captain Joseph Bernier’s proposal of a Canadian claim to a sector reaching up to the North Pole, Canadian Prime Minister Sir Wilfried Laurier states in the House of Commons, that ‘if Captain Bernier spoke as he is reported to have spoken, all I can say is that I think he had better keep to his own deck.’ According to Laurier Captain Bernier would go north again this summer only to patrol the waters of the north and assert Canadian jurisdiction.13 6 April 1909 United States Admiral Robert E Peary supposedly reaches the North Pole. However, navigational mistakes and record-keeping errors discovered in the 1980s render his achievement doubtful. Peary may actually have advanced only to a point 50 to 100 km short of the North Pole. 1 July 1909 Canadian Captain Joseph-Elzéar Bernier deposits a bronze plaque at Parry’s Rock on Melville Island, on which is engraved: ‘This memorial is erected today to commemorate the taking possession for the Dominion of Canada of the whole Arctic Archipelago.’14 - 1910 1 February 1910 An appeal by Canadian Senator Poirier to the Canadian Government to appoint a commissioner to supervise the lands and islands of the Arctic remains unanswered by the Canadian government.

12 Canada, Parliament, Senate, Debates, 10th Parliament, 3rd Session, 1906–1907, Vol 1 (CW Mitchell, Ottawa, 1907) 274. 13  Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, 11th Parliament, 2nd Session, 1909–1910, Vol 2 (Parmelee, Ottawa, 1909–1910) 2712. 14 P Pigott, From Far and Wide: A Complete History of Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty (Toronto, Dundurn, 2011) 113 et seq.

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events - 1912–1915 1912 until 1947 In Canada, the Hudson’s Bay Company ship Nascopie begins its regular visits to the Arctic. Its annual voyages end when the ship sinks near Cape Dorset in 1947.15 1913 and 1914 With the help of the ship Nikolay II, the Russian Federation builds two navigation marks on Ostrov Belyy and Vilkitsky Island in the Kara Sea and a permanent telegraph and meteorological station at Yugorsky Strait. In 1914, two more stations are built in the Kara Sea area at the west coast of Yamul and at Vaygach Island. The installations report the ice conditions on parts of the Northern Sea Route in order to make it safe for navigation. 7 July 1914 until 16 September 1915 A government-sponsored Russian expedition on the vessels Taymyr and Vaygach crosses the Northern Sea Route, eager to complete the whole trip from Vladivostok to Archangelsk. They leave Vladivostok on 7 July 1914 and make fast at the city of Archangelsk on 16 September 1915. - 1919 31 July 1919 Canada asks the Danish government to prevent Greenland Inuit from killing musk-oxen on Ellesmere Island. The Danish government forwards the letter to Greenlandic polar explorer Knud Rasmussen, who was the director of the Danish missionary and trade station at Thule. In his reply, Rasmussen writes that the Inuit are independent people who, though generally following his piece of advice, do not owe him obedience. He continues: ‘It is well known that the territory of the Polar Esquimaux falls within the region designated as ‘No Man’s Land’ and there is, therefore, no authority in the district except that which I exercise through my station […] I venture to close with the observation that, in order to carry out the protective measures indicated in this statement, I shall 15  The history of the RMS Nascopie is portrayed by D Gray, R.M.S. Nascopie: Ship of the North (Toronto, Golden Dog Press, 2000).

need no assistance whatever from the Canadian government.’16 - 1920 9 February 1920 The United States, Great Britain, India, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, Norway, the Netherlands, and Sweden conclude the Treaty Concerning the Archipelago of Spitsbergen (hereinafter called by its name today: ‘Svalbard’). In the treaty, the parties recognise the full and absolute sovereignty of Norway over the island notwithstanding some access, fishing and hunting rights all parties and nationals thereof shall enjoy.17 These rights include the exercise and practice of all maritime, industrial, mining or commercial enterprises both on land and in the territorial waters. The parties further agree that no monopoly shall be established on any account or for any enterprise. 20 April 1920 In the dispute on Greenland Inuit killing muskoxen on Ellesmere Island, the Danish government agrees with Rasmussen’s position in its reply to Canada of 20 April 1920. The Canadian government concludes that Rasmussen’s ‘No Man’s Land’ refers to Ellesmere Island. After the Canadian protest against Denmark’s supposed denial of Canada’s authority over Ellesmere Island, the Danish government does not further pursue the issue. 25 November 1920 Canada’s Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joseph Pope, states in a memorandum that ‘[o]ur claim to the islands north of the mainland of Canada rest upon quite a different footing, by reason of their geographical position and contiguity.’ Relating to a potential Canadian claim of Wrangel Island, he writes that the Advisory Technical Board of the Department of the Interior ‘generally considered that any pretensions we might have to this island must be of a very unsubstantial character, and could only result in weakening our legitimate claims to the 16  GW Smith and PW Lackenbauer, A Historical and Legal Study of Sovereignty in the Canadian North: Terrestrial Sovereignty, 1870–1939 (Calgary, University of Calgary Press, 2014) ch 10. 17  Doc 318.

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events Arctic islands contiguous to our own territory, for if we can go so far afield as Wrangel to take possession of islands, unconnected with Canada, what is there to prevent the United States or any other power, laying claims to islands far from their shores but adjacent to our own.’18

Republic sends a note of protest to London on 4 May 1922. However, Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King is reported to have affirmed in the House of Commons that Wrangel Island is part of Canadian territory.21

16 September 1921 A handful of Canadian men sent by Canadian polar explorer Viljalmur Stefansson set foot on Wrangel Island on 16 September 1921 putting up the Union Jack. Wrangel Island lies between the Chukchi Sea and East Siberian Sea in the Arctic Ocean, astride the 180° meridian.19

21 October 1922 At Helsingfors, Finland and Russia agree on a Convention regarding Fishing and Sealing in the territorial waters of both countries in the Arctic Ocean. The Convention deals with the rights of the countries’ nationals to carry on fishing and sealing in the other country’s territorial waters in the Arctic Ocean. It enters into force on 2 July 1924.22

- 1922 -

- 1923/1924 -

1922 The Northwest Territories and Yukon Branch of the Canadian Department of the Interior centralise the northern functions of the government in order to assert Canadian Arctic sovereignty. Since 1922, these annual voyages are called the ‘Eastern Arctic Patrol’. In the same year, the RCMP begins to establish posts on the outskirts of the Archipelago, starting with posts at Craig Harbour, at the south end of Ellesmere Island and at Pond Inlet on Baffin Island. In 1926, the RCMP establishes a sixth post on the outskirts of the Canadian archipelago at the Bache Peninsula on the east coast of Ellesmere Island, at 79° N latitude.20

25 May and 21 August 1923 The USSR reiterates its claim to Wrangel Island in a note of protest of 25 May 1923.

- 1921 -

4 and 12 May 1922 After Stefansson’s private expedition to Wrangel Island in 1921, the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Federated Socialist

18 Cited after GW Smith and PW Lackenbauer, A Historical and Legal Study of Sovereignty in the Canadian North: Terrestrial Sovereignty, 1870–1939 (Calgary, University of Calgary Press, 2014) 231 et seq. 19  P Kikkert and PW Lackenbauer, Legal Appraisals of Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty: Key Documents, 1905–56 (DCASS Number 2, 2014) 83. 20 For more information on the organization and administration of the Northwest Territories, see GW Smith and PW Lackenbauer, A Historical and Legal Study of Sovereignty in the Canadian North: Terrestrial Sovereignty, 1870–1939 (Calgary, University of Calgary, 2014) 34 et seqq.

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6 August 1924 The British Foreign Office officially declares that Great Britain lays no claims to Wrangel Island. In the same year, Canadian Minister of the Interior, Charles Stewart, says that ‘so far as Canada is concerned, we do not intend to set up any claim to the island.’ Since then, the question of sovereignty over Wrangel Island has not come up again.23 - 1925 1 June 1925 With an amendment to the ‘Northwest Territories Act of 1906’ Canada once again attempts to establish its sector in the Arctic. The act applies to the sector between the 60th and the 141st meridians up to the point of their convergence on the North

21  Canada, HoC Debates, 1922, 1751. See further on the Wrangel Island issue GW Smith and PW Lackenbauer, A Historical and Legal Study of Sovereignty in the Canadian North: Terrestrial Sovereignty, 1870–1939 (Calgary, University of Calgary, 2014) 267 et seqq. 22 1924 LNTS 205. According to the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland the agreement is no longer in force. 23  Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, 14th Parliament, 3rd Session, 1924, Vol 2 (Ottawa, FA Acland, 1924) 1110.

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events Pole. According to the amendment, scientists and explorers, who wish to enter the territories, are required to obtain permits or licenses from the proper Canadian government agency. In response to the question of whether Canada claims sovereignty right up to the North Pole, Canadian Minister of the Interior, Charles Stewart, replies: ‘Yes, right up to the North Pole.’24 17 July 1925 The Svalbard archipelago is incorporated into the Kingdom of Norway by Act No 11 relating to Svalbard. 7 August 1925 By Royal Decree Norway promulgates a Mining Code for Svalbard hereby fulfilling its obligation according to Article 8 of the Svalbard Treaty of 1920.25 - 1926 16 April 1926 A Decree adopted by the Soviet Union’s Presidium of the Central Executive Committee states: ‘All lands and islands situated in the Arctic to the north between the coastline of the U.S.S.R. and the North Pole, both already discovered and those which may be discovered in the future, which at the time of the publication of the present decree are not recognized by the government of the U.S.S.R. as the territory of any foreign state, are [hereby] declared territory of the union, […].’ The Decree shows that, like Canada, the Soviet Union at that time claims sovereignty over its Arctic north based on a sector that reaches up to the North Pole.26 12 May 1926 In a joint American-Italian-Norwegian expedition, Roald Amundsen and Lincoln Ellsworth set out from Svalbard on the airship Norge. After a 16-hour flight, the crew reaches the North Pole 24  Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, 12th Parliament, 4th Session, 1925, Vol 4 (Ottawa, FA Acland, 1925) 3773. 25 See further P Hojem, Mining in the Nordic Countries: A comparative review of legislation and taxation (Copenhagen, NCM, 2015). 26  Doc 98.

on the morning of 12 May 1926 where they drop the Norwegian, Italian, and American flags. Today, this is regarded as the first undisputed sighting of the Pole. 19 July 1926 A Canadian order in council establishes the Arctic Islands Preserve ‘to protect the Arctic areas as hunting and trapping preserves for the sole use of the aboriginal population of the Northwest Territories, in order to avert the danger of want and starvation through the exploitation of the wild life by white hunters and traders. Except with the permission of the Commissioner of the Northwest Territories, no person other than native Indians or Eskimos is allowed to hunt, trap, trade, or traffic for any purpose whatsoever in a large area of the mainland and in the whole Arctic island area, with the exception of the southern portion of Baffin Island.’ The area of the Preserve, namely the sector between the 60th and the 141st meridians, reaches up to the North Pole. It is shown on a map published by the Canadian Department of the Interior in 1929. - 1930 8 August 1930 Referring to the Norwegian-Canadian dispute on the Sverdrup Islands, the Norwegian Chargé d’Affaires in London ‘inform[s] His Majesty’s Government in Canada that the Norwegian Government, who do not as far as they are concerned claim sovereignty over the Sverdrup Islands, formally recognise the sovereignty of His Britannic Majesty over these islands.’ At the same time he expresses that the Norwegian government ‘is anxious to emphasize that their recognizance of the sovereignty of His Britannic Majesty over these islands is in no way based on any sanction whatever of what is named‚ the sector principle.’ The Sverdrup Islands are situated in the northern Queen Elizabeth Islands in Nunavut. They were first explored and mapped by Norwegian explorer Otto Sverdrup during his voyage in the Arctic between 1898 and 1902.27 27 See further TT Thorleifsson, Norway ‘Must really drop their absurd claims such As that to the Otto Sverdrup Islands.’ Bi-Polar International Diplomacy: The Sverdrup Islands Question, 1902–1930 (BA, Simon Fraser University 2004).

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events 5/6 November 1930 After an exchange of notes, the Norwegian government, the British government, the Canadian government, and Norwegian explorer Otto Sverdrup settle the sovereignty dispute over the Sverdrup Islands on 5/6 November 1930. In the agreement, the Norwegian government formally relinquishes its claim to the islands.28 - 1932 October 1932 Russian icebreaking steamer Sibiriakov is the first ship to transit through the Northern Sea Route during a single navigation without wintering. The ship has sailed from Archangelsk around Severnaia Zemlia to the Laptev Sea and arrives in the Barents Strait in October 1932. 17 December 1932 By decree of the Council of People’s Commissars, the USSR establishes the Chief Administration of the Northern Sea Route, whose task it is to establish a regular working transport way from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. From 1933 on, all movements of shipping on the Northern Sea Route are carried out under its aegis. In addition, more Russian polar stations and observatories are created. Despite the logistic improvements of the Northern Sea Route, foreign shipping in those waters ends (the only exception being the German raider Komet in 1940). However, the Russian merchant fleet experiences a fast and significant growth and uses the route on a regular basis. 1932 and 1933 The Second International Polar Year takes place in 1932 and 1933. Forty nations participate in Arctic research in the fields of meteorology, magnetism, aurora, and radio science. - 1933 3 May 1933 In the case of Jacobsen v Norwegian Government the Norwegian Supreme Court expresses its views on the legality of a private occupation of terra nullius or ‘no man’s land’. The Court rules that the plaintiff legally occupied parts of 28 

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Doc 347.

Jan Mayen Island, an island approximately half way between Svalbard and Iceland. According to the Court, the plaintiff met the conditions for legal private occupation of ‘no man’s land’ by constructing buildings and the placing of notice boards stating the fact of occupation. Another prerequisite, namely acts aiming at an economic exploitation of the land, had only been prevented by the state-run Norwegian Meteorological Institute. Hence, the Court rules that Norway is not in a position to deny Jacobsen the legal claim to the land.29 5 September 1933 The Permanent Court of International Justice declares Greenland to be part of the Kingdom of Denmark. The controversial status of Hans Island is not addressed in the judgement.30 - 1934 20 September 1934 The Russian icebreaker Fedor Litke makes the first transit of the Northern Sea Route in an east-to-west direction. At the end of its oneseason transit, the ship reaches Murmansk on 20 September 1934. - 1935 12 July 1935 By Royal Decree, Norway establishes a fishery zone based on straight baselines along its Northern coast. The decree establishes ‘lines of delimitation towards the high sea of the Norwegian fishery zone as regards that part of Norway which is situated to the north of 66°28ʹ8 N latitude. The said lines of delimitation shall run parallel with straight baselines drawn between fixed points on the mainland, on islands or rocks, starting from the final point of the boundary line of the Kingdom in the easternmost part of Varangerfjord and extending as far as Traena in Nordland.’ The northernmost point affected by the decree is at 71°11’1” N, 25°40’9” E, at Norway’s Barents Sea coast.31

29 

[1933] 7 ILR 109 (Case No 42). Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v Norway, 1933 PCIJ (ser A/B) No 53 (5 April). 3 1   w w w. u n . o rg / d e p t s / l o s / L E G I S L AT I O N ANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/NOR_1935_Decree.pdf. 30 Legal

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events - 1938 The Canadian Minister of mines and resources Mr Crecar states before the House of Commons that according to the government’s policy Wrangel Island belongs to Russian territory, that the sector theory is ‘now very generally recognized’, and that ‘our sovereignty extends right to the pole within the limits of the sector.’32 - 1940 23 June 1940 until 11 October 1942 Canadian RCMP Sergeant Henry Larsen crosses the Northwest Passage from Vancouver to Halifax. His vessel, the St. Roch, is the first ship to make the trip from west to east. - 1945 28 September 1945 US President Reagan enacts Presidential Proclamation No 2667 on the Policy of the United States with respect to the Natural Ressources of the Subsoil and Seabed of the Continental Shelf.33 - 1946 1946 The Honourable Lester B Pearson, at that time Canadian ambassador to the United States, says in a journal article: ‘A large part of the world’s Arctic area is Canadian. One should know exactly what this part comprises. It includes not only Canada’s northern mainland, but the islands and the frozen sea north of the mainland between the meridians of its east and west boundaries, extended to the pole.’34 In their book on Canadian foreign policy between 1968 and 1984, Professor Ian Head and former Prime Minister PE Trudeau comment on this article, saying that ‘[a]mbassadorial articles, even when written by one as distinguished as Lester Pearson, do not necessarily reflect government policy, and this one certainly did

32 Canada,

Parliament, Senate, Debates, 18th Parliament, 3rd Session, 1938, Vol 3 (Ottawa, Patenaude, 1938) 3081. 33  Doc 108. 34 ‘Canada Looks Down North’ (1945–46) 24 Foreign Affairs 638.

not. But they can contribute to mythology, and this one did.’35 1 May 1946 A memorandum from the Canadian Department of National Defense to the Cabinet Defense Committee, titled Sovereignty in the Canadian Arctic in Relation to Joint Defence Undertakings Introductory, deals with the US request for Canadian approval for Arctic weather stations.36 6 May 1946 A Canadian Memorandum from the Head of the Third Political Division to the Legal Division in the context of a US request to set up a weather station in the Canadian Arctic reveals Canada’s fear of losing its sovereignty over its Arctic islands to the US. The same feelings on the matter are expressed in the reply to the above memorandum by the official of the Legal Divison: ‘Further to our conversations of May 7th concerning the above, it is my view that we should not raise any question concerning our sovereignty in the Arctic in advance of necessity. I say this for two reasons: It would not be wise to indicate that we entertain any doubts with re­gard to our sovereignty; We should take steps to consolidate our knowledge of the position before inviting any conversations in the matter. As suggested yesterday, it would seem that conversations should be had with Mines and Resources and with any other interested Departments with a view [to] ensuring that we have available in consolidated form all material relating to our position in that area.’37 20 May 1946 On the same matter (US weather stations in the Canadian Arctic) IG Wright, an official of the Canadian Department of Mines and Resources, writes a letter to the Head of Third Political Division, which includes the minutes of a meeting between Canadian and US officials.

35  The Canadian Way: Shaping Canada’s Foreign Policy 1968–1984 (Toronto, McClelland & Stewart, 1995). 36 12 (1946) Documents on Canadian External Relations, Doc 907. 37 12 (1946) Documents on Canadian External Relations, Doc 908.

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events After the meeting, Wright states that ‘while I had said nothing on the matter while the Americans were present, the Northwest Territories Council was concerned about the aspect of sovereignty in these remote sec­tions of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago since most of these stations were going to areas where our claims on the basis of actual occupation were very weak. The sector principle on which our claims are largely based has never been accepted internationally and the Council has always taken the view that any projects involving residence in these northern areas should be operated by Canada. In the case of The Arctic Institute of North America we had decided to erect the necessary research stations ourselves so that we would have the complete control over foreigners using them. In the case of the American air bases in the Arctic, Canada recently spent some $31000000 presumably to extinguish any American rights and it would seem rather unwise from the point of view of sovereignty to authorize the Ameri­cans to enter into independent occupation of these weather stations. It was felt that the stations should at least be manned and operated by Canadians as part of a co-operative effort even although the United States might be permitted to contribute a large part of the cost of the project.’38 30 May 1946 Canada’s Department of External Affairs pens another memorandum on the US Proposals for an Arctic Weather Station Programme. It presents the advantages and disadvantages of a Canadian approval and possible causes of action. The list of disadvantages contains under item 1: ‘Should the United States carry out their program without Canadian participation, Canadian sovereignty might be diminished if not endangered by claims by the United States to territory which is assumed to belong to Canada under the Sector Theory.’39 5 June 1946 In a letter to Canadian official H Wrong the Canadian ambassador to the United States, the 38 12 (1946) Documents on Canadian External Relations, Doc 912. 39 12 (1946) Documents on Canadian External Relations, Doc 914.

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Honourable Lester B Pearson, addresses the question of Canadian Arctic sovereignty in the context of the US proposal for an Arctic weather station programme: ‘Without attempting to insist on anything, I think we might persuade the United States authorities that it would be in their own interest at this time to reinforce our claim to the area under the sector principle. Their hesitations in the past have been inspired, no doubt, by a feeling that they might conceivably wish at some future time to occupy some of this area themselves, or at least to establish certain facili­ties thereon, which would be more difficult if our sovereignty had been formally recognized by them. Nevertheless, it might be pointed out to them that, as long as this question remains undetermined in international law, there is always the possibility of some other country, notably Russia, establishing meteorological and other stations in that area on islands that have not been used or occupied by any other country. An open and formal statement on some suitable occasion by the United States that Canada’s sovereignty over this area is recognized might remove the possibility of such a contingency; or at least make it more difficult to bring it about. The deterrent effect that this would have on other states would, it could be argued, be of much greater value to the United States than keeping the position uncertain because of a possible desire on its own part to exploit that uncertainty in the future. I feel that if I were authorized to mention this matter informally to the State Department there would be a good possibility of prevailing on them to adopt this view and take the necessary action. If you agree, therefore, I would be glad to try this on an entirely exploratory and informal basis. If it were done in this way, I do not see that we would have anything to lose and there might be something to gain.’40 24 June 1946 In a memorandum the Canadian Associate Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs gives his opinion on the US weather station in the Canadian Arctic: ‘I hope that the U.S. request concerning the establishment of Arctic weather stations this summer will be considered 40 12 (1946) Documents on Canadian External Relations, Doc 916.

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events by Cabinet this week as they are using a number of different channels in an effort to extract a prompt and favourable decision. I think myself that we should agree to the request under the conditions mentioned in the Cabinet Defense Committee. If the discussion in Cabinet gives rise to argument over Canadian sovereignty in the unoccupied islands, it plight be well to point out that our refusal to cooperate might have the effect of stimulating some challenge to our sovereignty. The present position, it seems to me, can be summed up by saying that Canadian sovereignty in all territories in the Canadian sector is unchallenged but not unchallengeable. We, therefore, must bear in mind two risks which appear to be rather contradictory—(1) if we allow the U.S. to operate in these islands the presence of U.S. establishments (or even possibly of joint establishments) may be construed in some quarters as indicating that our sovereignty is not complete; (2) if we refuse cooperation with the U.S. in establishing posts to which they attach a high degree of importance, they may seek to obtain their ends eventually by claiming sovereignty themselves and treating some of the islands— especially those far from police and trading posts and not covered by Canadian patrols—as their own territory by right of occupation.’41 28 June 1946 Another Canadian memorandum by the UnderSecretary of State for External Affairs deals with the US Request for an Arctic Weather Station. It presents the results of the meeting of the Cabinet on 27 June, where the Cabinet has agreed that the United States request for authority to establish a weather station in the Canadian Arctic could not be approved for the present season and that the United States government be so informed. However, Canada grants permission to the US to re-open weather stations at Padloping Island in the Davis Strait and at Indian Lake House.42 2 December 1946 The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling is adopted.43 It enters into force 41 12 (1946) Documents on Canadian External Relations, Doc 921. 42 12 (1946) Documents on Canadian External Relations, Doc 924. 43  Doc 242.

on 10 November 1948. Canada, the United States, Norway, and the USSR are among the participants. Denmark accedes in 1950, Iceland in 2002. Some Arctic States are actively involved in whaling activities today. Norway has a permit for whaling for scientific purposes. Canada, not being a member of the Convention since 1982 anymore, allows whaling to small Inuit groups in the Canadian Arctic archipelago. - 1947 15 January 1947 The Soviet Union publishes an official statement in which it criticises that the Svalbard Treaty has ‘made a fundamental change in the status of the islands of Spitsbergen which until then has been considered to be terra nullia’ and that ‘Bear Island within the Spitsbegren Archipelago was de facto a Russian island, was signed without the knowledge of the Soviet Union and without its participation’.44 - 1948 19 January 1948 In a Memorandum from Canadian UnderSecretary of State for External Affairs Pearson to the US Secretary of State for External Affairs raises the topic of the work of the Interdepartmental Committee on Arctic Development: ‘The discussion in Cabinet this afternoon may provide another opportunity for emphasizing the importance of directing our defence and development activities northward. There is no doubt that the United States is going to take a very great and increasing interest in this part of the world, and will be proposing plans of one kind or another for that area. It seems obvious that we should ourselves accept responsibility, as far as possible, for carrying out such of these plans as are practicable and necessary. If we cannot carry them out ourselves, we should participate in them, as joint operations, to the greatest possible extent. Otherwise, we will be in the position either of holding up necessary activities because of our inability to undertake them, or of permitting the United States to carry them out alone on Canadian soil. Either course is undesirable, 44 

Doc 321. cix

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events which makes it all the more essential that we should, I think, divert our energies, so far as possible, to that part of the world. This would have two results. It would hold off the Americans and it would emphasize the importance and the potentialities of our “last frontier”. Frontiers are of great significance and value in the development, materially and psychologically, of a nation. The Arctic frontier promises to be almost as significant in this connection as our western one has been.’45 23 September 1948 After the US-American vessels Eastwind and Edisto have returned from their trip to the Arctic, which took them some 6 nm to the west of Cape Sheridan along the north coast of Ellesmere Island, it is stated in a Memorandum for Secretary of State for External Affairs that ‘[t]his event is. you will see, partly `buried’ in the draft release simply because it appears dangerous, from the sovereignty point of view, to make an official announcement to the effect that the ships went further afield than did that of the British explorer Nares (who went much further himself by sled). […] There would be some possible embarrassment for the Canadian Government, vis-à-vis the Canadian public. In issuing a statement indicating that the U.S. Navy has accomplished these feats on Canadian territory. After consulting with the Embassy in Washington and the Geographical Bureau, I am, however, rather afraid that these accomplishments of the U.S. Navy may leak out, either through the TOO-odd U.S. Navy personnel who took part in the Mission, or through learned journals or societies. In the circumstances, I am inclined to believe that the Government risks far greater embarrassment if it remains silent about these matters and that it is therefore desirable for it to ensure that the facts are presented in the best possible light from the outset. I would therefore suggest that the attached draft be submitted to the Departments of National Defence, Transport and Mines and Resources with a view to enquiring whether they would be agreeable to its issue 45  Cited after PW Lackenbauer and D Heidt, The Advisory Committee on Northern Development: Context and Meeting Minutes, 1948–66 (Calgary, DCASS Number 4, 2015) 9 fn 9.

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in Ottawa and Washington (after consultation between the two Governments).’46 11 October 1948 In a document by the Assistant Chief Commonwealth Affairs Division, Department of State of United States, in response to a Canadian request to be informed, why the ships Edisto and Eastwind passed through Hecla und Fury Strait in the Canadian archipelago, which was not the agreed route, it is explained that ‘that according to the Navy Department, the decision for the Edisto and Eastwind to take passage through Hecla and Fury Strait was an operational decision of the expedition commander which was approved and sponsored by the senior Canadian representative present, Captain Albani Chouinard, R.C.N. (R.). Presumably the United States commander felt that Captain Chouinard’s concurrence provided any authority which might be needed from the Canadian side.’ The document also stresses that only ‘probable routes’ were agreed upon that were not binding for the US ships.47 19 November 1948 In an extract from a Memorandum by Defence Liaison Division for Acting Head, the Canadian position on the supposedly unauthorised change of course of the US vessels Edisto and Eastwind the Canadian position becomes clear. Inter alia, Canada regards the routes agreed upon with the US Navy (U.S.N.) as binding and intends to point out that the Canadian government ‘did not want the U.S.N. to feel that they could sail far and wide as they pleased’ in the Canadian Arctic.48 7 December 1948 After the US Navy applied to Canada in November 1948 for permission for its vessel Edisto to carry out certain activities in the Canadian Arctic in the winter of 1949, the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee gives its approval to the plans for this expedition subject to certain conditions. The ship

46 Memorandum for SSEA, 23 September 1948, DCER, Vol 14 (1948) 1538. 47  William P Snow to Magann, 11 October 1948, LAC, RG 25, Vol 3841, file 9061-G-40. 48 14 (1948) Documents on Canadian External Relations, Doc 942.

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events ‘will operate, as practicable, along the eastern coasts of Baffin, Bylot and Devon Islands, N.W.T. (and the west and east coasts of Greenland) with the primary purpose of studying ice conditions and the practicability of operations in the area under winter conditions.’49 - 1949 13 January 1949 Canada reacts hesitantly when the US State Department indicates that photographers from the National Geographic and Life and a journalist of the Washington Evening Star be aboard the Edisto on its voyage to the Arctic. Canadian officials fear that, therefore, stories and pictures would appear when the ship returns and that that there would be leakages about the Canadian portion of the winter expedition. In its response to the Canadian protest, the US assures that the three newsmen will only join the ship after it has left the Canadian Arctic.50 2 March 1949 In a memorandum to the Advisory Committee on Northern Development, Canadian officials Chipman and Newsome deal with the ‘Re-Canadianization of Northern Canada’ showing briefly ‘how, and to what extent, the various departments are succeeding in the government’s policy of keeping the Canadian Arctic Canadian’ in the late 1940s.51 9 April 1949 In the Corfu Channel Case the ICJ expresses its view on the prerequisites for a strait to be regarded as an international strait with according right to innocent passage: ‘It may be asked whether the test is to be found in the volume of traffic passing through the Strait or in its greater or lesser importance for international navigation. But in the opinion of the Court the decisive criterion is rather its geographical situation as connecting two parts of the high seas and the fact of its

49 14 (1948) Documents on Canadian External Relations, Doc 943, 944. 50 15 (1949) Documents on Canadian External Relations, Doc 943, 883. 51  Memorandum to Advisory Committee on Northern Development, 2 March 1949, Re-Canadianization of Northern Canada, DCER, Vol 15, 1949, 1471–1475.

being used for international navigation.’52 The decision is relevant for the question of whether the Northwest Passage can be regarded as an international strait since international traffic in the ice-blocked waters is still insignificant today but will become more and more feasible with the retreat of sea ice in that area. 20 December 1949 Canadian officials of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development discuss the first Arctic voyage of the C.D. Howe, the Canadian Department of Transport vessel that was to replace the Nascopie and carry out the Eastern Arctic patrol. The question arises of whether the C.D. Howe should include Resolute Bay in her itinerary, a settlement on Cornwallis Island in the Canadian Archipelago that borders the Northwest Passage. An extract of the minutes reads: ‘[…] The Northwest Territories Administration were of the opinion that in the interests of Canadian sovereignty, a token visit to Resolute Bay should be included in the proposed itinerary. Transport, however, considered that this would be impractical in that only a small amount of cargo could be carried which the Americans, as in the past, were prepared to handle. Transport went on to point out that there were serious difficulties which might be encountered in attempting to land this small cargo. […] The Committee, after further discussion, agreed that in 1950 no attempt should be made to have the ‘C.D. HOWE’ visit Resolute Bay but that, in view of the national importance of maintaining all evidences and acts of Canadian sovereignty, the question should again be considered as soon as the Transport ice­breaker is available to accompany the ‘C.D. HOWE’.’53 - 1950 27 May 1950 By Act No 277 Denmark claims a territorial sea of three nm around Greenland from the outermost line along which the land is dry at 52  ICJ, Corfu Channel (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Albania), Judgment, Merits, [1949] ICJ Rep 4, 9 April 1949. 53 Extract from Minutes of meeting of Advisory Committee on Northern Development, DCER, Vol 15, 1949, 1489–1492.

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events low tide. Special provisions of the act apply to bays and inlets. Parts of the northern coast of Greenland, which are affected by the act, form the biggest landmass north of 83° N.54 22 June 1950 Hans Island, situated in the channel between Greenland and Canada’s Ellesmere Island, is recorded into the Canadian Permanent Committee on Geographic Names. It is still registered in the database despite the ongoing dispute between Canada and Denmark on the sovereignty over the island.55 - 1952 7 February 1952 After an exchange of notes, Canada grants permission to the United States to establish a number of weather stations on some of its Arctic islands. As Canada does not have sufficient icebreakers to insure annual sea supply missions to the stations, it is agreed that the US Navy shall request approval in advance for the routes to be followed.56 March 1952 With the landing of a C-47 aircraft from Thule Air Base, the US begins its occupation of the ice island T-3. Even though the island floats between the 141st and the 60th meridian—in the sector claimed by Canada—the United States has not asked for Canada’s permission. However, the incident is not addressed by Canadian or US officials.57 - 1953 1953 The status of Greenland changes from that of a colony to a province of Denmark. 54 

Doc 84. Gray, ‘Canada’s Unresolved Maritime Boundaries’ (1997) IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin Autumn 61, 69. 56 See further G Smith, ‘Weather stations in the Canadian North and Sovereignty’ (2009) 11 Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 48. 57 See further F Debenham, ‘The Ice Islands of the Arctic: A Hypothesis’ (1954) 44 Geographical Review 495 and AP Crary, RD Cotell, and TF Sexton, ‘Preliminary Report on Scientific Work on “Fletcher’s Ice Island”, T3’ (1952) 5 Arctic 211.

21 January 1953 In a Draft Memorandum from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Cabinet, the US-Canadian relations concerning the Arctic are addressed. Parts of the memorandum read: ‘If Canadian claims to territory in the Archipelago rest on discovery and continuous occupation, Canadian rights to some relatively unexplored areas may in the future be questioned. For the present, however, the problem is not formal claims to territory since the US Administration has been entirely reasonable and co-operative in Arctic matters. Of more concern is the de facto exercise of US sovereignty, examples of which were numerous during the last war in other parts of Canada. Misunderstandings and petty incidents in recent years have not been lacking, but fortunately few of these have come to public notice. An increasing proportion of US activity in the Arctic would, however, present greater risks of misunderstandings, incidents and infringements of Canadian sovereignty.’58 The following day, the Canadian cabinet discusses the matter.59 2 March 1953 Canada and the Unites States agree on the Convention for the preservation of halibut fishery in the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea, which enters into force on 26 July 1958. It covers the territorial waters and the high seas of the western coasts of the US and Canada including the southern and western coasts of Alaska. The Convention is updated in 1979.60 7 August 1953 In the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act the US announces its policy ‘that the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf appertain to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition as provided in this subchapter.’61 Today, the Act

55  DH

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58  Memorandum from Secretary, Advisory Committee on Northern Development, to Advisory Committee on Northern Development (1954) Documents on Canadian External Relations 1139–1142. 59 19 (1953) Documents on Canadian External Relations, Doc 695. 60  Doc 190. 61  Public–No. 212–83rd Congress [H.R. 5134].

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events still bears some relevance for the claim of the Chukchi cap, an undersea ridge in the Arctic Ocean that the US might be able to claim as part of its extended continental shelf once it has ratified the UNCLOS. 8 December 1953 Canadian Prime Minister St Laurent stresses the growing importance of the High North in the Canadian House of Commons: ‘We must leave no doubt about our active occupation and exercise of our sovereignty in these northern lands right up to the pole.’62 - 1954 12 May 1954 The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil is concluded in London. It enters into force on 26 July 1958. Canada, Denmark, Norway, and the USSR are among the participants. The convention is of particular importance for oil tankers cruising through the Arctic Ocean’s delicate environment. It entered into force 26 July 1958.63 28 May 1954 A Canadian Policy Guidance Paper deals with ‘Public Information on the North’. It reads in parts: ‘The first object of public information on the north is to emphasize that the northern regions are as much a part of Canada as any other area in the country. […] It is also important that the rest of the world should be aware that the Canadian Arctic is not an “Ultima Thule” but is being effectively occupied, administered and developed by the Canadian Government and people. This emphasis should underline all public information on the north whether it relates to long-range policy plans or to spot news. It may be developed through reference whenever possible to the Canadian civil administration and activity in the north in order to draw to the attention of the general public, both at home and abroad, that the north, like any other part of Canada, has its own civil government and a developing economy. There are, of course, 62  Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, 22nd Parliament, 1st Session, 1953–1954, Vol 1 (Ottawa, Edmond Cloutier, 1954) 700. 63  327 UNTS 4.

wide areas where the civil administration is not represented on the ground, but where there are Canadian activities of a military, scientific, or commercial nature. It is important that the public be aware of these activities and the contribution which they are making to northern and national development. As far as possible, however, they should be put in the same sort of perspective as similar activities elsewhere in Canada; that is, their importance should be given full weight without creating the impression that they are the only form of Canadian interest in the areas involved. […] Canada welcomes co-operation with the United States in northern activities which are of mutual concern to the two countries. We fully acknowledge the useful work which agencies of the United States have done in co-operation with Canada in the Canadian north. Northern development, however, is never a joint responsibility; it is a Canadian responsibility which cannot be allowed to go by default or left to others to carry out. Reference to U.S. activities in the Canadian north in isolation should be avoided, if they can be coupled with reference to Canadian work. The status of U.S. defence activities should be clearly defined. For instance, if any mention is made of U.S. troops at Frobisher, it should be accompanied by a report in some form that the installation is an R.C.A.F. station in Canadian command and control. Any extensive reference to the five joint Arctic weather stations should be accompanied by some mention of the large network of Canadian stations. No emphasis should be placed on Canadian claims in the north lest we seem to be on the defensive. Canada owns all the lands shown on official maps of Canada and we recognize no differences in degree of control between any of the northern islands and counties in a southern province. We do recognize, however, that the maintenance of sovereignty in any part of Canada requires continuous, effective administration which there now is and will continue to be. Questions concerning sovereignty over waters on the continental shelf, straits, and narrow passages between islands should, if at all possible, be avoided, or referred to authorities such as the Legal Division of the Department of External Affairs.’64 64 20 (1954) Documents on Canadian External Relations, Doc 508.

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events September 1954 At its 4th General Assembly Meeting in Copenhagen, IUCN adopts Resolutions No 1-3 on the Protection of Arctic Fauna. The participants of the meeting ‘suggest that countries concerned should consider co-operation with a view to preparing an international convention for the preservation of marine mammals of the arctic’.65

30 June 1955 By Crown Prince Regent’s Decree, Norway uses the baseline system to establish a 4 nm fishery zone around the Arctic island of Jan Mayen. The Decree is repealed by a Royal Decree of 30 August 2002 that provides for new reference points for the baselines.67

27 September 1954 The HMCS Labrador completes the Northwest Passage. The Canadian ship cruises through Parry Channel and Prince of Wales Strait. In late September 1954 it passes southward down the Bering Strait towards Bering Sea and the Pacific Ocean. The vessel arrives at Esquimalt, at the southern end of Vancouver Island.

1956 The Nordic Sami Council is created. It serves as a collaborative body for the Sámi people in Finland, Norway, the USSR, and Sweden.

- 1955 1955 until 1990 At the Arctic island Novaia Zemlya, between the Barents Sea and the Kara Sea, approximately 400 km north of the Arctic Circle, Russia carries out a total of 130 nuclear tests high in the atmosphere, at low levels above water, at the water/air interface, below water, and underground. The tests comprise 224 separate explosive devices, including by far the largest atmospheric and underground tests of the Soviet Union. About 265 megatons of nuclear explosive energy is released from 1955 to 1990. August 1955 With the appointment of the first judge for the Territorial Court of the Northwest Territories (today called ‘Supreme Court of the Northwest Territories’), John Howard Sissons, Canada attempts to extend its jurisdiction further North. The Court exercises its jurisdiction on several occasions over offences committed on the sea ice of the Canadian archipelago regardless of the distances from the nearest land or island.66

65  Adopted at the 4th General Assembly Meeting of IUCN at Copenhagen in September 1954. 66 See for further insights on his life and achievements BO Bucknall, ‘John Howard Sissons and the Development of Law in Northern Canada’ (1967) 5 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 159–171.

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- 1956 -

3 August 1956 Asked whether Canada claims ownership to the ice cap north of the land area, the Canadian Minister of the Department of Northern Affairs, Jean Lesage, states: ‘We have never subscribed to the sector theory in application to ice. We are content that our sovereignty exists over all the arctic islands… We have never upheld a general sector theory. To our mind, the sea, be it frozen or in its natural liquid state, is the sea; and our sovereignty exists on the lands and over our territorial waters.’68 - 1957 15 February 1957 Norway and the USSR sign an agreement concerning the sea frontier between the countries in the Varangerfjord. The fjord’s mouth opens into the Barents Sea. The according Descriptive Protocol relating to the agreed frontier is signed at Moscow on 29 November 1957. The agreement is updated in July 2007.69 6 April 1957 While the US construct Distant Early Warning (DEW) line installations along the 70th parallel, the Canadian naval icebreaker HMCS Labrador 67 Royal Decree of 12 July 1935, relating to the Baselines for the Norwegian Fishery Zone as regards that part of Norway which is situated to the north of 66°28ʹ8 N Latitude, www.un.org/depts/ los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/ NOR_1935_Decree.pdf. 68  Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, 22nd Parliament, 3rd Session, 1956, Vol 7 (Ottawa, Edmond Cloutier, 1956) 6955. 69  Doc 117, 118.

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events leads a squadron of American icebreakers across the Bellot Strait south of Somerset Island. Canada’s Prime Minister St Laurent explains to the House of Commons the practical arrangements of the US-Canadian co-operation. There always is a Canadian representative aboard on those US vessels and the American ships are only permitted to carry on hydrographic surveys in order to ensure the supply to their DEW line stations. St Laurent continues that ‘each year the United States Navy has been required to apply for a waiver of the provisions of the Canada Shipping Act, since the cargo ships they charter operate in Canadian costal waters.’70 22 November 1957 At Oslo, Norway and the USSR sign an Agreement on measures for regulating the catch and conserving stocks of seals in the northeastern part of the Atlantic Ocean at Oslo. It comes into force on 27 June 1958 by the exchange of the instruments of ratification at Moscow.71 27 November 1957 During a debate in the Canadian House of Commons, the Speaker Mr Lesage aks if the waters of the Arctic Ocean north of the Arctic archipelago up to the North Pole, in the so-called Canadian sector, are Canadian waters. Alvon Hamilton, Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources, answers as follows: ‘Mr. Speaker, the answer is that all the islands north of the mainland of Canada which comprise the Canadian Arctic archipelago are of course part of Canada. North of the limits of the archipelago, however, the position is complicated by unusual physical features. The Arctic Ocean is covered for the most part of the year with polar pack ice having an average thickness of about eight feet. Leads of water do open up as a result of the pack ice being in continuous motion, but for practical purposes it might be said for the most part to be a permanently frozen sea. It will be seen, then, that the Arctic ocean north of the archipelago is not open water nor has it the stable qualities 70  Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, 22nd Parliament, 5th Session, 1957, Vol 3 (Ottawa, Edmond Cloutier, 1957) 3185–3186. 71  309 UNTS 280.

of land. Consequently the ordinary rules of international law may not have application. Before making any decision regarding the status which Canada might wish to contend for this area, the government will consider every aspect of the question with due regard to the best interests of Canada and to international law.’72 - 1958 1957 and 1958 80,000 scientists from 67 countries participate in the programmes of the Third International Polar Year, which is later renamed International Geophysical Year. The IPY/IGY of 1957 and 1958 follows the tradition of its two predecessors but also includes research outside of the polar areas. 13 February 1958 Before the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, the Canadian Foreign Minister states in a note to the cabinet: ‘In the discussions concerning the rules which might apply to groups of islands, the Delegation should bear in mind the need not to prejudice a Canadian claim to the inter-connecting waters of the Arctic Archipelago.’73 19 April 1958 The Soviet Union accuses the United States of flying planes carrying nuclear bombs over the Arctic in the direction of the borders of the Soviet Union. According to the Soviet Union these flights constitute a grave threat to world peace. The issue is put on the agenda of the UN Security Council.74 72  Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, 23rd Parliament, 1st Session, 1957–1958, Vol 2 (Ottawa, Edmond Cloutier, 1958) 1559. 73 Cited after PW Lackenbauer and P Kikkert, ‘Archipelagic analogues? Indonesian baselines, Canadian Arctic sovereignty, and the framing of mental maps, 1957–62’ (2014) 50 International Journal of Canadian Studies 227–252, 236. 74  See W Jorden, ‘Council Will Consider Charge of Sorties Toward Russia’, The New York Times (19 April 1958) 1. The relevant UN Security documents are UNSC, Verbatim Record S/PV.813 (21 April 1958), 2; Verbatim Record S/PV.814 (29 April 1958) 1; Verbatim Record S/PV.815 (29 April 1958) 1; Verbatim Record S/PV.816 (2 May 1958) 2; Verbatim Record S/PV.817 (2 May 1958) 1.

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events 24 February 1958 until 29 April 1958 Following the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, held at Geneva from 24 February to 27 April 1958, the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea are adopted on 29 April 1958. The conventions comprise: the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the Convention on the High Seas, the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, the Convention on the Continental Shelf.75 Before the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea finally supersedes the Conventions, fewer than 50 States have signed them, among them all Arctic states but Norway. Only few States, however, ratify the Conventions. 1 until 5 August 1958 The USS Nautilus makes its historic underwater cruise from Point Barrow, Alaska, to the Greenland Sea, passing completely beneath the ice cap of the North Pole. 29 December 1958 Norway gives notice that it will withdraw from the IWC; the withdrawal will be effective on 30 June 1959.76 - 1960 29 March 1960 Mr Hellyer, a Member of the Canadian House of Commons asks the Minister of Finance and Receiver General of Canada, Mr Fleming, whether the Canadian government still subscribes to the sector theory of sovereignty. Mr. Fleming answers in the affirmative.77 1 August to 21 August 1960 Having left from Portsmouth, on 1 August 1960, the American nuclear-powered submarine

75  516 UNTS 206; 450 UNTS 12; 559 UNTS 286; 499 UNTS 312. 76  Status of Protocol to the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling signed at Washington under date of December 2, 1946, 6, www. state.gov/documents/organization/191051.pdf. 77  Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, 24th Parliament, 3rd Session, 1960, Vol 3 (Ottawa, Queen’s Printer, 1960) 2577.

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USS Seadragon becomes the first submarine to complete a transit of the Northwest Passage on 21 August 1960. The transit takes place with Canada’s permission.78 5 August 1960 Art. 4[c] of the 1960 Statute on the Protection of the State Boundary of the USSR defines the Soviet historic waters as waters ‘of bays, inlets, coves, and estuaries, seas and straits, historically belonging to the USSR.’ The Statute does not contain a list of specific waters, notwithstanding the fact that the USSR considers parts of the Northern Sea Route as historically Russian.79 23 September 1960 Norway informs the United States, the depositary of the IWC that ‘the continued adherence of the Norwegian Government to the Convention is dependent upon the following conditions being fulfilled: l) that the Government of the Netherlands adheres to the Convention, 2) that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics maintains its pledge of November 1958 to limit the catch of the Soviet expeditions’ share of the total quota established by the International Whaling Commission to 20 percent annually for a seven year period, 3) that an agreement is reached within reasonable time on the division of the remaining 80 percent of the total quota between Norway, Japan, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The Norwegian Government at the same time wishes to emphasize the vital importance of reaching an agreement between the countries engaged in Pelagic Whaling in Antarctic Waters on an International Inspection System for the observance of the regulations drawn up by the International Whaling Commission.’80

78 Doc

305–307. SSSR (1960), no 34, item 324. An unofficial English translation is provided by WE Butler, The Law of the Soviet Territorial Waters (New York et al, Frederick A Prager, 1967) 111. 80  Status of Protocol to the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling signed at Washington under date of December 2, 1946, 7, www. state.gov/documents/organization/191051.pdf. 79 Vedomosti

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events - 1961 29 December 1961 Norway again informs the United States, the depositary of the IWC, that it will withdraw from the Convention, to be effective 30 June 1962.81 - 1962 6 June 1962 Norway informs the United States, the depositary of the IWC, that the notification of withdrawal dated 29 December 1961 is cancelled.82

as outside the maritime boundaries otherwise applicable, but not beyond the median line in relation to other states.’84 This definition of Norway’s continental shelf is updated for the last time so far in Act No 72 of 29 November 1996 relating to petroleum activities. 17 December 1963 Sweden informs the United States, the depositary of the IWC, that it will withdraw from the Convention, to be effective 30 June 1964.85 - 1964 -

7 July 1962 As the USS Seadragon has done in 1960, the nuclear submarine USS Skate crosses the Northwest Passage in 1962. It starts its journey heading for the North Pole on 7 July 1962. The eastward transit takes place in the context of defence arrangements with Canada, the purpose of which is to test the feasibility of submerged transits. - 1963 27 May 1963 Denmark draws straight baselines around Greenland and establishes a 3 nm territorial sea by Order No 191 on the Delimitation of the Territorial Sea of Greenland.83 31 May 1963 By Royal Decree relating to the Sovereignty of Norway over the Sea-Bed and Subsoil outside the Norwegian Coast, Norway claims the seabed and the subsoil in the submarine areas outside the coast of the Kingdom of Norway. According to the Decree, they are ‘under Norwegian sovereignty as regards exploitation and exploration of natural resources, as far as the depth of the superjacent waters admits of exploitation of natural resources, within as well

81  Status of Protocol to the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling signed at Washington under date of December 2, 1946, 7, www.state.gov/ documents/organization/191051.pdf. 82  Status of Protocol to the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling signed at Washington under date of December 2, 1946, 7, www.state.gov/ documents/organization/191051.pdf. 83  Doc 85.

16 July 1964 The Canadian Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act of 1964 is enacted. It provides that ‘the internal waters of Canada include any areas of the sea that are on the landward side of the baselines of the territorial sea of Canada.’ According to this definition, the waters of the Northwest Passage would be regarded as internal waters of Canada, too. 21 July 1964 While the USS Burton Island collects data in the East Siberian Sea, the USSR presents an Aide Mémoire to the US Embassy in Moscow regarding this survey.86 12 September 1964 The Convention for the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea is signed. It enters into force on 22 July 1968.87 - 1965 1965 The USSR adopt a System for Navigating Ships in the Vilk’kitskii, Shoskal’skii, Dmitrii Laptev and Sannikov Straits which establishes compulsory pilotage and icebreaker convoying in the before mentioned straits.

84 

Doc 91. of Protocol to the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling signed at Washington under date of December 2, 1946, 7, www.state.gov/ documents/organization/191051.pdf. 86  Doc 303. 87  Doc 182. 85  Status

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events 14 May 1965 A US official of the Bureau of Land Management of the US Department of the Interior sends a letter to DG Crosby, a Canadian Department of Northern Affairs and Natural Resources official, regarding the maritime boundaries between the countries.88 16 June 1965 The Canadian Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources writes a reply to the US States Department of the Interior regarding the maritime boundaries between the countries.89 22 June 1965 Almost one year after the the receipt of the Russian Aide Mémoire of 21 July 1964, the US sends its response.90 July to September 1965 The USCGC Northwind conducts a transit of the Northern Sea Route. Due to close watch by Soviet craft and strong informal representations by the Soviet government, it is instructed to avoid the Vilkitsky Strait between the Kara Sea and the Laptev Sea.91 - 1967 June 1967 After the closing of the Suez Canal as a consequence of the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967, the Soviet Government offers the Northern Sea Route as an alternative transit route for international navigation. For a fee, the USSR also offers icebreaking support. A Soviet ship makes a demonstration voyage from Western Europe to Yokohama that summer. However, the offer is quietly withdrawn after no international shipping companies have reacted to it.92 1 June 1967 The Convention on Conduct of Fishing Operations in the North Atlantic is adopted. In enters into force on 26 December 1976.93 88 

Doc 355. Doc 356. 90  Doc 304. 91  Doc 305, 306. 92 WV Dunlap, ‘Transit Passage in the Russian Arctic Straits’ International Boundaries Research Unit, (1996) 1 Maritime Briefing 7, 6. 93  Doc 183. 89 

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14 August 1967 In a diplomatic note, the United States advises the Soviet government of the planned route of the USCG icebreakers Edisto and Eastwind, which are supposed to circumnavigate the Arctic and conduct oceanographic surveys. The planned route would take the ships north of Novaia Zemlia and Severnaia Zemlia into the Laptev Sea and the East Siberian Sea. Due to ice conditions along this route and after notification of the change of plan to the USSR, the ships enter the Karsky Sea and proceed towards the Vilkitsky Strait.94 24 and 28 August 1967 Upon the change of course of the USCG icebreakers Edisto and Eastwind, the USSR reiterate the position that the Vilkitsky Strait belongs to Soviet waters and that the US has violated Soviet regulations by not advising the Soviet authorities of the proposed passage thirty days in advance.95 30 August 1967 In response to the Russian reaction to the icebreakers’ Edisto and Eastwind which heading for the Vilkitsky Strait, the United States orders the ships back and sends a protest note to the USSR.96 - 1968 6 February 1968 A Decree of the USSR’s Presidium of the Central Executive Committee concerning the continental shelf reads in part: 1. The USSR exercises sovereign rights over the continental shelf adjacent to the outer limit of the territorial sea of the USSR, for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources. The continental shelf of the USSR consists of the sea-bed and the subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast or to the islands of the USSR but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas. The sea-bed and the subsoil of depressions entirely 94 

Doc 307. 308–310. 96  Doc 311. 95 Doc

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events surrounded by the continental shelf of the USSR, irrespective of their depth, are part of/the continental shelf of the USSR’.97 - 1969 10 March 1969 In a dialogue between John Diefenbaker and Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau, the latter says: ‘I believe the sector theory applies to the seabed and the shelf. It does not apply to the waters. The continental shelf is, of course, under Canadian sovereignty—this is the seabed, but not the waters over the shelf.’ Moreover, Trudeau expresses his view that ‘Canada regards herself as responsible to all mankind for the preservation of] the peculiar ecological balance that now exists so precariously in the water, ice and land areas of the Arctic archipelago. We do not doubt for a moment that the rest of the world would find us at fault, and hold us liable, should we fail to ensure adequate protection of that environment from pollution or artificial deterioration. Canada will not permit this to happen, Mr. Speaker. It will not permit this to happen, either in the name of the freedom of the seas, or in the interests of economic development. We have viewed with dismay the abuse elsewhere of both these laudable principles and are determined not to bow in the Arctic to the pressures of any state. In saying this, we are aware of the difficulties faced in the past by other countries in controlling water pollution within their own jurisdictions. Part of the heritage of this country, a part that is of increasing importance and value to us, is the purity of our water, the freshness of our air, and the extent of our living resources. For ourselves and for the world we must jealously guard these benefits. To do so is not chauvinism, it is an act of sanity in an increasingly irresponsible world. Canada will propose a policy of use of the Arctic waters which will be designed for environmental preservation. This will not be an intolerable interference with the activities of others; it will not be a restriction of progress. This legislation we regard, and invite the world

9 7   w w w. u n . o rg / d e p t s / l o s / L E G I S L AT I O N ANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/RUS_1968_Decree.pdf.

to regard, as a contribution to the long-term and sustained development of resources for economic and social progress. We also invite the international community to join with us and support our initiative for a new concept, an international legal regime designed to ensure human beings the right to live in a wholesome natural environment. In pursuit of this concept I shall be holding discussions shortly about this and other matters with the Secretary General of the United Nations.’98 August-September 1968 The US-owned ice-strengthened tanker SS Manhattan passes through the Northwest Passage without asking Canada’s permission. In an effort to assert its sovereignty, however, Canada grants unsolicited permission, sends a Canadian representative aboard and provides Canadian icebreaker CCGS John A Macdonald for escort. Despite the success of the transit, the Manhattan experiences a lot of damage, which is a setback for the plan to use the Northwest Passage for regular.99 17 November 1969 In a trial against an Inuit who has violated the Territories’ Game Ordinance by killing a polar bear and its cubs on the sea ice close to the Boothis Peninsula, the Territorial Court of the Northwest Territories bases its jurisdiction on the principle of active occupation and patrolling of that area by the RCMP for at least 40 years. According to the Court, this occupation results in Canada’s sovereignty also on the sea ice (R v Tootalik).100

98  Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, 28th Parliament, 1st Session, 1969, Vol 6 (Ottawa, Queen’s Printer, 1969) 6396. 99  T Chung and C Hyslop, The Arctic: A Canadian Parliamentary Chronology (24 October 2008). See for background information EB Elliot-Meisel, ‘Still Unresolved after Fifty Years: The Northwest Passage in Canadian-American Relations, 1946–1998’ (1999) The American Review of Canadian Studies 407–430, 412–413. 100 Cited after CC Joyner, ‘The Status of Ice in International Law’ in AG Oude Elferink and DR Rothwell (eds), The Law of the Sea and Polar Maritime Delimitation and Jurisdiction (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 2001) 46.

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events - 1970 12 March 1970 In response to the Canadian protest against the SS Manhattan’s crossing of the Northwest Passage and imminent Canadian legislation in the Arctic, an Information Memorandum for National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger prepared by the US Department of State presents the outcome of a conversation between the Canadian Ambassador Cadieux and officials of the US Department of State.101 Late March 1970 In a meeting of US senior officials and their Canadian counterparts, including three ministers, the US side presents its firm opposition to any Canadian assertion of sovereignty or jurisdiction over the Arctic seas and announces persistent protest. As Professor Ian Head and then Prime Minister Trudeau state in their book published in 1995, that the United States’ attitude made the Canadian cabinet even more reluctant to abandon the planned legislation but urged it to modify the acceptance of jurisdiction of the ICJ due to the danger of the US filing a law suit against Canada.102 7 April 1970 In a letter to the UN Secretary General, the Canadian Ambassador to the UN modifies Canada’s acceptance of the jurisdiction of the ICJ. He excepts from such jurisdiction ‘disputes arising out of or concerning jurisdiction or rights claimed or exercised by Canada in respect of the conservation, management or exploitation of the living resources of the sea, or in respect of the prevention or control of pollution or contamination of the marine environment in marine areas adjacent to the coast of Canada.’ On 10 September 1985, Canada withdraws the 1970 reservation to its acceptance of the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction before it finally terminates the acceptance on 10 May 1994.103

101 

Doc 264. The Canadian Way: Shaping Canada’s Foreign Policy 1968–1984 (Toronto, McClelland & Stewart, 1995). 103  Doc 269, 271. 102 

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8 April 1970 Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau explains the reasons for the recent Canadian legislative acts concerning the Arctic in a press conference at the Canadian House of Commons.104 15 and 16 April 1970 The Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs explains the implications of Canada’s plan to extend its territorial waters from three to twelve nm: ‘[T]he effect of this bill on the Northwest Passage is that under any sensible view of the law, Barrow Strait, as well as Prince of Wales Strait, are subject to complete Canadian sovereignty.’105 A legal adviser of the Canadian Department of External Affairs shares this perspective testifying before the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence: ‘This [the extension of territorial waters] has implications on Barrow Strait, for example, where the 12-mile territorial sea has the effect of giving Canada sovereignty from shore to shore. To put it simply, we have undisputed control—undisputed in the legal sense—over two of the gateways to the Northwest Passage.’ On the same day, the United States makes a formal protest against both the extension of Canadian territorial waters to twelve miles and the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act because of the laws’ interference with navigational rights and freedoms. The Canadian response to this formal protest follows promptly on 16 April 1970. The United States sends a reply in May.106 26 June 1970 Canada extends its territorial sea from 3 to 12 nm in the Act to amend the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act of 1964, which provided that the internal waters of Canada include any areas of the sea that are on the landward side of the baselines of the territorial sea of Canada, so including the Northwest Passage.

104 

Doc 263.

105 Canada,

Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, 28th Parliament, 2nd Session, 1970, Vol 6 (Ottawa, Queen’s Printer, 1970) 6015. 106  Doc 266, 267.

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events On the same day, the Canadian Parliament adopts the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act.107 6 July 1970 In the case of US v Escamilla a US Court decides that the United States has jurisdiction over the ice island ‘T-3’ that at the moment of the murder committed by US national Escamilla was floating only 200 nm away from the Canadian archipelago. During the proceedings, the US Justice Department regarded the floating island as ‘a vessel on the high seas,’ and set out to prosecute Escamilla under maritime provisions of the US Criminal Code. In a formal diplomatic reservation, Canada took the position that it would not consider itself bound by the decision in this case. A US State Department lawyer said: ‘If Canada decides to claim jurisdiction on an extension of its territorial waters, we could have a mess.’ Eventually, Canada waived jurisdiction. In its reasoning, the Court bases its decision mainly on the general US jurisdiction over its citizens.108 27 August 1970 The Embassy of the USSR in Norway sends an Aide Mémoire with regard to Norway’s intends to establish a boundary of territorial waters of Spitsbergen of four nm calculated from baselines, and areas of the continental shelf lying beyond the limits of four nm, that would become an area of exclusively Norwegian interests. The USSR urges the Norwegian government to refrain from such unilateral steps being allegedly incompatible with the 1920 Treaty on Spitsbergen.109 25 September 1970 By Royal Decree, Norway establishes a straight baseline system in the western and southern part of Svalbard and delimits the island’s territorial waters in this area to four nautical miles. The decree also applies to the Arctic islands of

107 

Doc 262. F 2nd 341 (1972). See LW Aubrey, ‘Criminal Jurisdiction over Arctic Ice Islands: United States V. Escamilla’ (1974–1975) 4 UCLA-Alaska Law Review 419–440. 109  Doc 324. 108 467

Bjornoya (Bear Island) in the Norwegian Sea and Hopen in the Barents Sea. Royal Decree of 1 June 2001 updates the reference points for the straight baselines.110 - 1971 15 July 1971 Canada and Norway sign an Agreement on Sealing and the Conservation of the Seal Stocks in the Northwest Atlantic. It enters into force on 22 December 1971.111 16 September 1971 The Council of Ministers of the USSR adopts a new Statute on the Administration of the Northern Sea Route in order to ensure the safety of navigation in the Arctic. The Statute is rather broad and vague, prescribing basic tasks for the route’s administration. Nevertheless, there is still no international shipping in the route’s waters. 26 October 1971 The Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau submits his report on a meeting with the United States and the USSR regarding the protection of the Northern ecology and how the issue of the pollution of northern waters and the rational development of those waters shall be dealt with. The Prime Minister replies as follows ‘I raised the question when I visited the USSR in May. At that time, the Russian government indicated that it was not interested in a summit or other level of meeting between the several countries interested in the Arctic. So, this time, I did not suggest such a meeting. Instead we discussed a treaty which could be signed by all interested nations. I must admit that the Russians did not appear very enthusiastic about that either.’112 22 December 1971 US President Henry Kissinger issues National Security Decision Memorandum 144 concerning the US Arctic Policy and Arctic Policy Group.113

110 

Doc 320. Doc 239, 240. 112 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, 28th Parliament, 3rd Session, 1971, Vol 9 (Ottawa, Queen’s Printer, 1971) 9037. 113  Doc 14. 111 

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events - 1972In Finland, the Sámi Parliament is created. 23 May 1973 The United States and the USSR sign an Environmental Cooperation Treaty. According to its Article 2 the ‘cooperation will be aimed at solving the most important aspects of the problems of the environment and will be devoted to working out measures to prevent pollution, to study pollution and its effect on the environment, and to develop the basis for controlling the impact of human activities on nature.’ It will be implemented, in particular, in the Arctic and Subarctic ecological systems.114 - 1973 27 February 1973 The Legal Bureau of the Canadian Department of External Affair drafts a letter on Canadian sovereignty over sea pollution control zones explaining legal aspects of the AWWPA.115 15 November 1973 At Oslo, Canada, Denmark, Norway, the United States, and the USSR sign the International Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears. The polar bear nations agree to prohibit random, unregulated sport hunting of polar bears and to outlaw hunting the bears from aircraft and icebreakers. The agreement further obliges the signatories to protect polar bear denning areas and migration patterns and to conduct research relating to the conservation and management of polar bears.116 17 December 1973 Canada and Denmark agree on the delimitation of the continental shelf between Greenland’s west coast and Canada’s east coast. While the delimitation agreement does not cover Hans Island in the Kennedy Channel, it is agreed that the island has no territorial sea. The treaty enters into force on 13 March 1974. The sovereignty

over Hans Island is still disputed between the states today. The 1973 agreement is amended in 2004 by an exchange of notes.117 - 1974 1974 Norway and the USSR begin their negotiations on the division of the continental shelf in the Barents Sea. Norway demands that the line be drawn according to the centre line principle, while the USSR wants the border to follow the sector line. 19 February 1974 Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden adopt the Nordic Environmental Protection Convention. It enters into force on 5 October 1974.118 15 March 1974 The United Kingdom, Norway, and the USSR sign the Agreement on the regulation of the fishing of North-East Arctic Cod. It comes into force that same day. The main part of the area in question, however, lies beneath the polar circle, in a corridor between Iceland and Norway. The agreement is no longer in force.119 June 1974 Officials of the US Embassy to Norway discuss with Director General for Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Eliassen, the upcoming negotiations between Norway and USSR on the delimitation of their maritime boundary in the Barents Sea. Among other aspects, Eliassen ‘volunteered specifically that there was no possibility that Norway would agree to a boundary line more favorable to the USSR than a median line in exchange for Soviet acceptance of Norway’s position that Svalbard did not have its own continental shelf.’120

117 

114  US DoS, Treaties and Other International Acts Series 7345. 115  Doc 270. 116  Doc 228.

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Doc 133, 134. Doc 224. 119  925 UNTS 4. 120  Norwegian/Soviet Off-Shore Boundary, 12 June 1974, Cable 1974OSLO02302_b, https://wikileaks. org/plusd/cables/1974OSLO02302_b.html. 118 

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events - 1975 11 April 1975 Norway and the USSR sign an Agreement on cooperation in the fishing industry. The treaty enters into force on the day of signature.121 23 April 1975 In a Cable of the US Department of State, Henry Kissinger reports on a statement which the Soviet Minister Counselor Vorontsov has delivered to the United States and Canada: ‘At the geneva session of the conference on the law of the Sea, the canadian delegation seeks to include the provisions into the future convention on the law of the sea which would legalize at the internation level the actions of the Canadian government for regulating the navigation and the sea environment protection in the arctic watersa djoining the canadian shores. It is also noted that the U.S. delegation goes even farther in this question and stipulates that the arctic states can adopt rules to regulate the navigation and environment protection in the arctic only under condition that such Rules would be transmitted for approval by the Internation Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) and that all possible disputes in connection with such rules should be submitted to arbitration. The Soviet delegation has stated to both the Canadian and U.S. delegations that the Soviet Union would not agree to submit its rules regulating the navigation in the Arctic waters adjoining the USSR shores for approval by international organizations because these questions are wholly within the competence of the Soviet Union. The Soviet delegation will object any attempts to impose upon the conference any decisions for submitting state laws of Arctic states regulating the navigation and environment protection in the Arctic for approval or even consideration by IMCO or any other organization. In connection with the above said we wish to emphasize that any proposals to submit soviet rules regulating the navigation and prevention of marine pollution in the Arctic re completely unacceptable for the USSR. In Moscow, a great importance is attached to

121 

Doc 192.

this question, and it is expected that the US delegation in Geneva will take into account the above mentioned considerations.’122 22 May 1975 Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs and National Defence, Allan MacEachen, says before the Standing Committee for External Affairs and National Defence: ‘As Canada’s Northwest Passage is not used for international navigation and since Arctic waters are considered by Canada as internal waters, the regime of transit passage does not apply to the Arctic.’123 15 October 1975 Norway and the USSR conclude an Agreement on Mutual Fishery Relations. The parties agree, inter alia, that subject to the agreement’s provisions, each party gives the fishing vessels of the other party access to the fishery resources in an area beyond 12 nautical miles from the applicable baselines in which it exercises management of fish and other living resources, including their conservation, and the regulation of fishing and catches Norway. The agreement enters into force on 21 April 1977.124 8/12 December 1975 By exchange of notes between Canada and Norway, they amend the Agreement of 15 July 1971 on Sealing and the Conservation of Seal Stocks in the Northwest Atlantic. It is no longer in force. - 1976 20 April 1976 The United States publishes its official stand on Svalbard.125

122 LOS: Soviet Approach on the Arctic, Cable 1975STATE094135_b2, 23 April 1975, https:// w i k i l e a k s . o r g / p l u s d / c a b l e s / 1 9 7 5 S TAT E 094135_b2.html. 123 Cited after D Pharand and LH Legault, The Northwest Passage: Arctic Straits (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984) 88. 124  Doc 193. 125  Doc 322.

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events 19 May 1976 Canada and the USSR sign an Agreement on their Mutual Fisheries Relations. It enters into force on the same day.126 20 May 1976 The United States sends a diplomatic note to Canada concerning Beaufort Sea.127 19 November 1976 The United States and the Soviet Union conclude an Agreement Concerning the Conservation of Migratory Birds and Their Environment. It enters into force on 13 October 1978.128 17 December 1976 In a message from the US Embassy in Ottawa to the US Department of State, the Embassy reports ‘that Canada’s Northern Affairs Minister Warren Allmand confirms that Northern Canadian residents and United States authorities will be consulted before any further drilling in the Beaufort Sea is permitted. A comprehensive analysis of Dome Petroleum’s drilling activities this summer will be made public in the spring. Mr Allmand said he was outlining the status of drilling activities in the Beaufort Sea because of possible rumors and misinformation.’129 21 December 1976 By Ordinance No 599 Denmark delimits the territorial sea around the Faroe Islands to three nm on the basis of straight baselines.130 22 December 1976 Canada sends a diplomatic note to the United States concerning Beaufort Sea.131

126 

Doc 194. 127  Doc 357. 128  Doc 248. 129  Consultation before more Beaufort Sea Drilling, Cable 1976OTTAWA04971_b, https://wikileaks.org/ plusd/cables/1976OTTAWA04971_b.html. 130  www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATION A N D T R E AT I E S / P D F F I L E S / D N K _ 1 9 7 6 _ Ordinance599.pdf. 131  Doc 358. cxxiv

- 1977 1977 The Swedish Parliament recognises the Sámi as an indigenous people in Sweden.132 Canada enacts Fishing Zones of Canada (Zone 6) Order. Fishing Zone 6 comprises an area of the sea adjacent to the coast of the mainland and islands of the Canadian Arctic.133 This legislation is later revised in 1978. 16 February 1977 The United States sends a diplomatic note to Canada concerning the conflict in the Beaufort Sea.134 1 March 1977 and 9 March 1977 Negotiations of the continental shelf boundary between Canada and the United States reveal the differing views on their boundary in the Beaufort Sea. Canada traditionally applies the meridian of 141° W, whereas the United States employs the equidistance method.135 26 May 1977 In reply, Canada sends a diplomatic note to the United States concerning the conflict in the Beaufort Sea.136 3 June 1977 By Royal Decree, Norway establishes a fisheries protection zone of 200 nm around the Svalbard archipelago. It was amended in 2001.137 On 15 June 1977, the USSR sends a protest note to Norway arguing that the Royal Decree is a plain contradition with Article 3 of Svalbard Treaty. A similarly worded letter is sent by the European Commission.138

132 www.sametinget.se/9688.

133  Canada

Gazette Part II, Vol 111, SOR/77–173, 24 February 1977, 652. 134  Doc 359. 135  See further Ch Kirkey, ‘Delineating Maritime Boundaries: The 1977–78 Canada-U.S. Beaufort Sea Continental Shelf Delimitation Boundary Negotiations’ (1995) Canadian Review of American Studies 49. 136  Doc 360. 137  Doc 319. 138  Doc 330, 333, 334.

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events 1 August 1977 With the establishment of the ship-reporting system NORDREG the Canadian Coast Guard plans to supervise and control all ship movements within the Canadian archipelago. Before entering the waters, all ships are supposed to report to the Canadian Coast Guard, however, reports are only on a voluntary basis.139 17 August 1977 The Soviet nuclear-powered icebreaker Arktika is the first ship to reach the geographic North Pole. After this, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the USSR use the Arctic waters as a region for the strategic deployment for their nuclear powered submarines. - 1978 11 January 1978 Norway and the USSR agree on an Interim Practical Agreement for Fishing in an Adjoining Area in the Barents Sea, the so called Grey Zone Agreement. The exact delimitation lines between the Norway and the USSR are disputed. Hence, in the Grey Zone Agreement both countries agree to refrain from conducting inspections or from exercising any form of control over the other country’s fishing vessels. The agreement also contains provisions relating to how the parties are to treat third-country vessels. The agreement is regarded as a compromise between the two countries’ initial positions and takes into account the location of important fishing areas. It provisionally entered into force on the same day, but is not in force any more.140 17 February 1978 Since the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships has never entered into force, the 1978 MARPOL Protocol of 17 February 1978 absorbs its parent Convention. The combined instrument—the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Ships, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto (MARPOL 73/78), finally enters into force on 2 October 1983. Pollution from ships is a predominant

139  140 

Doc 273. Doc 119.

topic in the Arctic, where the environment is particularly delicate and endangered by new shipping routes in the Arctic Ocean.141 24 October 1978 The Convention on the Future Multilateral Cooperation in Northwest Atlantic Fisheries is signed and entered into force on 1 January 1979. It is amended in 2007.142 - 1979 1979 Home-rule is established for Greenland. In accordance with home rule, Greenland retains extensive powers of self-government while remaining under the Danish Crown. The Folketing (the Danish parliament) has transferred almost all legislation to the Landsting (the Greenlandic parliament) but the Folketing and the Danish administration retain control over some areas of government. Greenland’s voters elect two representatives to the Folketing. 12 June 1979 Sweden informs the United States, the depository of the IWC, that it will adhere to the Convention from now on.143 15 June 1979 Denmark and Norway sign an Agreement on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the Area between the Faroe Islands and Norway and concerning the Boundary between the Fishery Zone near the Faroe Islands and the Norwegian Economic Zone.144 19 September 1979 The Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Habitats of 1979 is open for signature. Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden are parties to the Convention. Denmark

141  Consolidated versions of MARPOL 73/78 can be found in AV Lowe and S Talmon (eds), The Legal Order of the Oceans (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2009). 142  Doc 184. 143 Status of International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling signed at Washington under date of December 2, 1946, 8, www.state.gov/documents/ organization/191051.pdf. 144  Doc 129.

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events declared upon ratification that the Convention does not apply to Greenland and the Faroe Islands. The Convention enters into force on 1 June 1982. Its major goal is the conservation of wild species and their habitats, this includes Arctic seal species.145

14 May 1980 By Executive Order No 176, Denmark establishes Northern Greenland’s 200 nm fishery zone based on a straight baseline system. Hence, notwithstanding the ice cap, the fishery zone reaches up to almost 87° N.147

13 November 1979 The Convention on long-range transboundary air pollution is concluded at Geneva and comes into force on 16 March 1983. Longrange transboundary air pollution particularly threatens the Arctic environment where direct pollution is so far modest. This is recognised by the 1998 Aarhus Protocol on Persistent Organic Pollutants to the Convention, the preamble of which states: ‘The Parties, […] Recognizing that emissions of many persistent organic pollutants are transported across international boundaries and are deposited in Europe, North America and the Arctic, far from their site of origin, and that the atmosphere is the dominant medium of transport, […] Acknowledging that the Arctic ecosystems and especially its indigenous people, who subsist on Arctic fish and mammals, are particularly at risk because of the biomagnification of persistent organic pollutants, Mindful that measures to control emissions of persistent organic pollutants would also contribute to the protection of the environment and human health in areas outside the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe’s region, including the Arctic and international waters, […].’ Out of the Arctic States, only Canada and Norway have ratified the Protocol (with declarations upon ratification), while Denmark has approved and the United States has signed it.

23 May 1980 Pursuant to Act No 91 a fishery zone in waters off Jan Mayen is established with effect from 29 May 1980. The outer limits of the fishery zone to be drawn at a distance of 200 nm from the baselines established for Jan Mayen, but not beyond the median line to Greenland or out of the line that represents the outer limit of Islands EEZ, as currently defined in Icelandic law No 41 of 1 June 1979.148

- 1980 1980 until 1983 The Canadian-based company Dome Petroleum conducts research on Hans Island. While the Danish government has no knowledge of the activities, the Canadian government also claims ignorance.146 145 

1284 UNTS 210. Kristiansen, ‘Desolate Dispute: A Study of a Hypothetical International Court of Justice (ICJ) Decision’ 13 Canadian Military Journal (2013) 34–41, 36. 146 R

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28 May 1980 In the Agreement between Iceland and Norway on fishery and continental shelf questions, the parties agree on cooperation ‘on practical questions in the fisheries sector, attaching particular importance to measures directed towards conservation, rational exploitation and sound reproduction of the fish stocks which migrate in the sea areas between Iceland and Jan Mayen.’ The parties also determine that the ‘question of the dividing line for the shelf in the area between Iceland and Jan Mayen shall be the subject of continued negotiations,’ which are successfully completed in October 1981. The delimitation line lies in the Norwegian Sea south of Jan Mayen, between 70°35 N and 68°00 N, north of the Arctic Circle.149 18 November 1980 The Convention on the Future Multilateral Cooperation in North-East Atlantic Fisheries is adopted. It enters into force on 17 March 1982 and is amended several times thereafter.150 - 1981 April 1981 Negotiations between the United States and the USSR begin over the disputed boundary 1 4 7   w w w. u n . o rg / d e p t s / l o s / L E G I S L AT I O N ANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/DNK_1980_Order.pdf. 148 www.faolex.fao.org/docs/html/nor13828.htm. 149  Doc 122. 150  Doc 186.

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events in the Bering Sea between Alaska and Siberia. The US-Soviet boundary was drawn in 1867 in the process of completing the sale by the Russian Federation of Alaska to the United States, however, without modern cartographic techniques. The Russian side argues that the course should be plotted on the basis of a Mercator projection (a method of mapmaking in which areas become increasingly distorted as one moves toward the poles). The American side is holding out for arcs of great circles, the method airline pilots use to plot transpolar flight. The application of the two systems results in a disputed area of 18,000 mls².151 17 June 1981 Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden conclude the Nordic Language Convention asserting the right of Nordic nationals to use their mother tongue in other Nordic countries.152 24 June 1981 The Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada gives notice of Canada’s withdrawal from the IWC effective 30 June 1982.153 22 October 1981 Iceland and Norway conclude an Agreement on the Continental Shelf between Iceland and Jan Mayen.154 - 1982 1982 The IWC member states adopt a moratorium on commercial whaling, which enters into force in 1986. Japan, Norway, Peru, and the USSR vote against the moratorium. Norway and the USSR also lodge formal objections and are therefore not bound by the moratorium.155 151  L Heininen, A Serguni, and G Yarovoy, ‘RussiaUnited States’ in E Brunte-Jailly (ed), Border Disputes. A Global Disputes Vol 2 (ABC-Clio, Santa-Barbara, 2015) 661–669, 665. 152  Doc 282. 153 Status of International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling signed at Washington under date of December 2, 1946, 8, www.state.gov/ documents/organization/191051.pdf. 154  Doc 123. 155  US International Trade Commission, International agreements to protect the environment and wildlife (1991) 5-27.

2 March 1982 The Convention for the Conservation of Salmon in the North Atlantic Ocean is signed. It enters into force on 1 October 1983.156 29 April 1982 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR sends a note to the Embassy of Norway objecting Norwegians unilateral action to extend its fishery jurisdiction in the Barents Sea.157 24 November 1982 In its Law on the State Frontier, the USSR describes its frontier at sea as going ‘along the outer limit of the territorial waters (territorial sea) of the USSR’, which includes parts of the Northern Sea Route.158 10 December 1982 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is concluded at Montego Bay. It enters into force on 16 November 1994.159 Except for the United States, all Arctic States have ratified the Convention. - 1983 10 March 1983 US President Ronald Reagan proclaims the EEZ of the United States. On the same day, Reagan announces ‘three decisions to promote and protect the oceans interests of the United States in a manner consistent with those fair and balanced results in the Convention and international law.’ The decisions deal with the acceptance of traditional uses of the oceans by the United States, the exercise of navigation and overflight rights and freedoms in a manner that is consistent with the balance of interests reflected in the UNCLOS and the US exclusive economic zone.160 8 April 1983 In response to the US President’s proclamation concerning the EEZ, the Group of Eastern European (Socialist) Countries accuses the US of an attempt to utilise individual provisions 156 

Doc 187. Doc 332. (1983) 22 ILM 1055. 159  1833 UNTS 3. 160  Doc 109, 110. 157  158 

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events of UNCLOS in order to obtain unilateral advantages for itself. Furthermore, the Group accuses the United States of undermining the fundamental regulations of UNCLOS by refusing to sign and adopting national acts that contradict the convention.161 The USSR also makes a comment.162 12 April 1983 Norway and the USSR conclude an Agreement on the protection and exploitation of the seal stocks in the Northeast Atlantic based on the exchange of diplomatic notes.163 It replaces the Agreement between Norway and the Soviet Union on measures for regulating the catch and conserving stocks of seals in the Northeastern part of the Atlantic Ocean.164 9 May 1983 US President Reagan issues a revised official Arctic policy of the United States.165 26 August 1983 Canada and Denmark conclude the Agreement for Cooperation Relating to the Marine Environment, which mainly focuses on the area between the Canadian Arctic islands and Greenland.166 - 1984 7 February 1984 The USSR issues a declaration that contains a list of the geographical co-ordinates of the points defining the position of the straight baselines for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of the USSR off the continental coast and islands of, inter alia, the Sea of Okhotsk and the Bering Sea. The list is approved by the Council of Ministers of the USSR in a decree dated 7 February 1984.167

161 

Doc 111. Doc 112. 163  Doc 241. 164  Done at Oslo, 22 November 1957; entered into force 27 June 1958; 309 UNTS 280. 165  Doc 15. 166  Doc 225. 167  Doc 99. 162 

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A document by the US Department of State examines the baselines drawn by the USSR as follows: ‘Generally, the Soviet coastline facing the Sea of Japan, Sea of Okhotsk, North Pacific Ocean, and the Bering Sea is smooth with few fringing islands and few localities where the coastline is deeply indented. Many of the baseline segments discussed below are situated in locations that do not meet the geographical criteria set forth in the Conventions cited above.’ It follows a detailed discussion of the baselines and their supposed flaws.168 28 February 1984 By decree, the USSR establishes an EEZ of 200 nm measured from the same baselines as its territorial waters. Hence, the Soviet EEZ reaches far up into the Arctic Ocean. With another decree of the same day on the strengthening of the protection of nature in the extreme north and marine areas adjacent to the northern coast of the USSR, the Soviet Union makes use of the provision of Article 234 UNCLOS. However, the decree is only implemented in 1990.169 1 May 1984 The USSR and Canada sign an Agreement on Fisheries Relations. It enters into force on the same day.170 28 July 1984 Tom Høyem, Danish Minister for Greenland, visits Hans Island, raises the Danish flag, buries a bottle of brandy at the base of the flagpole and, finally, leaves a note saying ‘Welcome to Denmark’.171 31 July 1984 The Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 enters into force. The Act provides for a comprehensive national policy concerning US-American research needs and objectives in

168 US DoS, No 107 Straight Baselines: USSR (Pacific Ocean, Sea of Japan, Sea of Okhotsk, and Bering Sea) (30 September 1987). 169  Doc 100, 101. 170  Doc 195. 171  BBC, Canada island visit angers Danes, 25 July 2005, www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4715245.stm.

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events the High North. It establishes an Arctic Research Commission and an Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee to support the implementation of the Act.172 - 1985 1985 A revised Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act is promulgated. Like its predecessor, the Act encloses the waters of the Northwest Passage. 15 January 1985 By decree, the USSR Council of Ministers approves a list of the geographical co-ordinates of the points defining the position of the baselines for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of the USSR off the continental coast and islands of the Arctic Ocean and the Baltic and Black seas. The decree established a system of straight baselines in the Soviet Arctic.173 17 May 1985 to 31 July 1985 Within two and a half months, Canada and the United States exchange several diplomatic notes regarding the upcoming transit of the Northwest Passage by the US icebreaker CGS Polar Sea. The ship’s mission is to re-supply the American base at Thule, Greenland and then to engage in scientific research off the coast of Alaska. The lack of resources forces the USCG to deploy the Polar Sea for both missions despite the more than tight schedule. Hence, in order to fulfil both tasks, the Polar Sea depends on the Northwest Passage to get to Alaska in time. On 17 May 1985 the US informs the Canadian government that due to operational requirements the ship would be crossing the Northwest Passage in August and invites Canadian Coast Guard personnel to participate. The United States further informs Canada that it considers this transit ‘will be an excuse of navigational rights and freedoms not requiring prior notification.’ In its response of 11 June 1985, Canada restates its position that the waters of the 172  Public Law 98–373 as amended by Public Law 101–609, 16 November 1990. 173  Doc 102.

Northwest Passage are Canadian internal waters. The United States’ response of 24 June 1985 states that ‘although the United States is pleased to invite Canadian participation in the transit, it has not sought the permission of the Government of Canada, nor has it given Canada notification of the fact of transit.’ Eventually, a Canadian diplomatic note of 31 July 1985 states that the country ‘noted with deep regret that the United States remains unwilling, as it has been for many years, to accept that the waters of the Arctic archipelago, including the Northwest Passage, are internal waters of Canada and fall within Canadian sovereignty. […] In this regard, the Government of Canada indeed shares the view of the United States, communicated in the State Department’s Note No. 222 of June 24, 1985 that ‘the transit, and the preparations for it, in no way prejudice their juridical position of either side regarding the Northwest Passage.’ This information and these assurances have satisfied the Government of Canada that appropriate measures have been taken by and under the authority of the Government of the United States to ensure that the Polar Sea substantially complies with required standards for navigation in the waters of the Arctic archipelago and that in all other respects reasonable precautions have been taken to reduce the danger of pollution arising from this voyage. Accordingly, the Embassy is now in a position to notify the United States that, in the exercise of Canadian sovereignty over the Northwest Passage, the Government of Canada is pleased to consent of the requested transit.’174 1 August 1985 The US icebreaker Polar Sea enters the Northwest Passage. 2 August 1985 US State Department spokesman Daniel Lawlor comments on the Polar Sea’s transit of the Northwest Passage: ‘We look at the Northwest Passage as a strait linking two parts of the high seas, and it is of extreme importance to us to have free transit through straits in normal modes of passage.’ He further notes that Washington 174 Doc

293–297. cxxix

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events and Ottawa have agreed the voyage is not meant as a challenge to Canada’s jurisdiction and is necessitated by ‘operational requirements.’ While issuing an official Reagan Administration statement in Washington, State Department spokesman Charles Redman repeats that ‘the two countries have agreed the transit itself is without prejudice to either country’s position with regard to the status of the Arctic waters.’ 6 August 1985 In a telephone interview with The Globe and Mail the press attaché of the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, Evgeni Pozdnyakov, states that ‘[w]hether it is the Northwest Passage or the Northeast Passage does not matter. Our position is based on provisions of international law. The waters around islands belonging to a country are the internal waters of that country.’175 In response to that, a US State official states that the US position that the Northwest Passage is an international strait is the same in regard to the Northwest and Northeast passages and that the US believes traditional navigational principles apply to all the waters of the Arctic.176 10 September 1985 With the Territorial Sea Geographic Coordinates (Area 7) Order Canada draws straight baselines around its archipelago, enclosing all entrances and exits to the Northwest Passage. The basis for Canada’s supposed historic title is recalled in the preamble of the Order, which states that ‘Canada has long maintained and exercised sovereignty over the waters of the Canadian Arctic archipelago’.177 External Affairs Minister Joe Clark says that the 12 nm territorial sea specifically applies to the Arctic Archipelago as the extent of Canadian sovereignty. On the occasion of the new Canadian legislation, Clark makes also a comprehensive statement on Canadian Arctic sovereignty in the House of Commons.178

175 www.globalbrief.ca/blog/2012/02/06/towarda-canada-russia-axis-in-the-arctic/. 176  B Tierney, Freedom of the seas: the debate rages on, The Citizen (Prince George, 10 August 1985). 177  Doc 74. 178  Doc 298.

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26 October 1985 The Porcupine Caribou Management Agreement is adopted between Canada and the United States. It is updated in 1987.179 - 1986 1986 The USSR eventually publishes the System Navigating Ships in the Vil’kitskii, Shoskal’skii, Dmitrii Laptev and Sannikov Straits that establishes compulsory pilotage and icebreaker convoying in those straits. The rules have already existed unpublished since 1965. The straits form part of the Northern Sea Route. 26 January 1986 James W Dyer, Acting Assistant Secretary for Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs, writes a letter to US Senator Charles Mathias Jr concerning the transit of the Polar Sea.180 1 July 1986 By Order No 356, the Ministry of Fisheries of the USSR confirms the Rules for Taking Living Resources for Russian Juridical Persons and Citizens in Internal Sea Waters, Territorial, Exclusive Economic Zone, and Continental Shelf of the Russian Federation in the Barents Sea. 2 July 1986 The British Government opposes the Norwegian view that the Spitsbergen Treaty only applies to the land and the territorial waters of Svalbard and not to the maritime zone beyond.181 9 July 1986 The Member States of the European Community state in a joint note that the Canadian baselines do not conform with the geographical requirements set by international law and that Canada has no according historic title. On 7 August 1986, Canada replies.182 10 July 1986 The Norwegian Mission sends a Note Verbale to the EC Commission, Directorate General of 179 

Doc 244, 245. Doc 297. 181  Doc 338. 182  Doc 75, 76. 180 

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events Fishing, concerning the controversial fishing around Svalbard. A couple of days later, the European Community replies.183 - 1987 21 May 1987 The Canadian Department of External Affairs issues a legal briefing on Arctic Sovereignty.184 12 June 1987 The Norwegian Parliament adds Article 110a to the Norwegian Constitution. Its translation reads: ‘It is the responsibility of the authorities of the State to create conditions enabling the Sámi people to preserve and develop its language, culture and way of life.’ Moreover, Act No 56 concerning the Sameting (the Sami parliament) and other Sami legal matters (the Sami Act) is adopted.185 17 July 1987 Canada and the United States sign the Agreement on the Conservation of the Porcupine Caribou Herd.186 It enters into force on the same date. The Agreement provides for the coordination of the conservation of the Porcupine Caribou herd, which migrates annually between Canada and the United States. 1 October 1987 At the Ceremonial Meeting on the Occasion of the Presentation of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star Medal to the City of Murmansk Gorbachev announces: ‘Depending on the evolution of the normalization of international relations … we could open the Northern Sea Route for foreign shipping subject to the use of our icebreaker pilotage.’187 17 November 1987 The United States publishes its Policy Governing The Continental Shelf of the United States of America.188 183 

Doc 333, 334. Doc 299. 185 The Sámi Act, for an English translation see www.ub.uio.no/ujur/ulovdata/lov-19870612-056eng.pdf. 186  Doc 245. 187  Doc 10. 188  Doc 113. 184 

9 December 1987 The Canadian Senate debates the implications of the planned Canada-US Free Trade Agreement for the Canadian Arctic sovereignty. Hon. Willie Adams: Honourable senators, I have a question for the Leader of the Government in the Senate which is similar to the question that Senator Lucier asked yesterday. I hope that Arctic sovereignty is not part of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States. I think it was approximately two weeks ago that the Leader of the Government in the Senate was invited to attend the First Minister’s Conference in Toronto. Following that conference, I am wondering whether, in the same way that the Yukon and the Northwest Territories suffered in the wake of the Meech Lake Accord, Arctic sovereignty wil be affected by this Free Trade Agreement. Hon. Lowell Murray (Leader of the Government and Minister of State for FederalProvincial Relations): I am sorry I do not quite understand the question. Senator Adams: Then I will try it again. Yesterday Senator Lucier asked a question as to whether the question of Arctic sovereignty fromed part of the Free Trade Agreement. At that time you told him to wait until the agreement was concluded before we could see what had happened. My question is: Will Arctic sovereignty be part of the Free Trade Agreement in the future? Since the maritime fish industry is not included in that agreement, as are neither transportation nor shipping, I was wondering whether Arctic sovereignty has also been excluded, or whether that was something we would have to face in the future. Senator Murray: Honourable senators, the only reply I can give to that question is that there is no relation between the Free Trade Agreement signed between Canada and the United States, on the one hand, and the desire of both our countries for Arctic cooperation and for an agreement covering Arctic cooperation. Senator Adams: What is Arctic cooperation? Is that a new concept? I do not know what is meant by “Arctic cooperation.” Senator Murray: There are varieties of subjects that are to be covered under the general title of Arctic cooperation, including, as has been indicated, the passage of ice-breakers

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events through those waters over which Canada claims sovereignty.189 7-10 December 1987 Ronald W Reagan, President of the United States, and Mikhail S Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, meet in Washington. Reagan and Gorbachev exchange views on means of encouraging expanded contacts and cooperation on issues relating to the Arctic: ‘They expressed support for the development of bilateral and regional cooperation among the Arctic countries on these matters, including coordination of scientific research and protection of the region’s environment.’190 - 1988 1988 The crew of the Danish fishing patrol vessel Tulugaq lands on Hand Island erecting a flagpole with the Danish flag.

respective positions regarding third parties.’ The agreement does not cover warships, submarines or any vessels except icebreakers.192 31 May 1988 The United States and the USSR agree on mutual fisheries relations in Moscow. The agreement specifies the principles that shall govern the access of fishing vessels of one party in the EEZ of the other party. It also deals with the States’ cooperation in the conservation of living marine resources. It enters into force on 28 October 1988.193 14 June 1988 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR sends a note to the Embassy of Norway objecting the planned steps of Norway to extend their exclusive jurisdiction to the continental shelf of the Spitsbergen Archipelago.194

January 1988 In Inuvik, the North Slope Borough and the Inuvialuit Game Council agree on the InuvialuitInupiat Polar Bear Management Agreement. It is revised in 2000.191

16 August 1988 Denmark brings a case against Norway before the ICJ. After more than eight years of negotiations, Denmark now wants the Court to decide on the question of delimitation of fishing zones and continental shelf between Greenland and Jan Mayen.195

11 January 1988 Canada and the United States forge an Agreement on Arctic Cooperation, which is a ‘bilateral attempt to affirm the political will of Canada and the United States to cooperate in advancing their shared interests in Arctic navigation, development and security.’ The ‘Government of the United States pledges that all navigation by U.S. icebreakers within waters claimed by Canada to be internal will be undertaken with the consent of the Government of Canada. […] Nothing in this agreement of cooperative endeavour between Arctic neighbours and friends nor any practice thereunder affects the respective positions of the Governments of the United States and of Canada on the Law of the Sea in this or other maritime areas or their

10 October 1988 With Note No 425 the US Embassy in Ottawa asks the Canadian Department of External Affairs for its consent for the USCGC Polar Star to navigate within waters covered by the Agreement on Arctic Cooperation of 11 January 1988. The Note also contains a passage that assures the vessel’s operation in a manner consistent with the pollution control standard and other standards of the Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act as well as other relevant Canadian laws and regulations. It further invites a Canadian Coast Guard vessel to accompany the Polar Star and welcomes a Canadian scientist and a Coast Guard Officer on board. In its affirmative response, the Canadian Department of External Affairs announces that a

189 Canada, Parliament, Senate, Debates, 33rd Parliament, 2nd Session, 1987, Vol 2 (Ottawa, Queen’s Printer, 1987) 2320. 190  (1988) 27 ILM 260. 191  Doc 235.

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192 

Doc 65. Doc 196. 194  Doc 335. 195 www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/78/6613.pdf. 193 

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events Canadian icebreaker will accompany the US ship and that the Coast Guard will make available an officer to be on board of the Polar Star during the journey.196

requested permission for the icebreaker Polar Star to sail through the Northwest Passage from Greenland to Seattle to prepare for duty in the Antarctic.

27 December 1988 In his Proclamation on the Territorial Sea US President Reagan declares that the territorial sea of the United States extends to 12 nm from the American baselines determined in accordance with international law. The proclamation also contains an explicit right of ships of all countries of innocent passage and of transit passage through international straits.197

23 September 1989 The United States and the USSR sign a Joint Statement on uniform interpretation of norms of international law governing innocent passage, accepting the generally recognised principles of innocent passage in international law.200

- 1989 1989 Norway inaugurates the Sámi Parliament. 24 March 1989 The tanker Exxon Valdez hits Bligh Reef in the Alaskan Prince William Sound and spills an estimated eleven million gallons of crude oil. It is one of the largest spills in US history and one of the largest ecological disasters in the world’s oceans. 11 May 1989 The United States and the USSR conclude an Agreement concerning Cooperation in Combating Pollution in the Bering and Chukchi Seas in Emergency Situations. It enters into force on 17 August 1989.198 27 June 1989 The ILO Convention No 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries is adopted. It enters into force on 5 September 1991. At the time of writing, the Convention has been ratified by twenty countries. Denmark and Norway are among them.199 27 July 1989 A spokesman for the Canadian Government confirms that the United States has again 196 

Doc 300, 301. Doc 114. 198  Doc 348. 199  Done at New York, 27 June 1989; entered into force 5 September 1991; 1650 UNTS 384. 197 

20 November 1989 Canada and the USSR sign an agreement concerning the prevention of incidents at sea beyond the territorial sea in order to ensure, inter alia, the safety of navigation of the ships of their respective armed forces. A new commission will provide a formal framework for dealing with Arctic air and sea pollution, and it sets up a system for co-operating on major oil spills or environmental disasters complete with a hotline linking scientists of both countries. ‘There is no precedent for such a set of agreements between the two biggest countries in the Arctic,’ says Arkady Ostrovsky, the deputy director of the international law department of the Soviet foreign ministry. ‘All our co-operation before had no legal basis.’201 - 1990 1 June 1990 In Washington DC, the United States and USSR agree on co-operation in ocean studies and their maritime boundary between Russia and Alaska, by concluding the Shevardnadze-Baker Agreement.202 It is described as extending from the initial point, 65° 30ʹ N, 168° 58ʹ 37" W north along the 168° 58ʹ 37" W meridian through the Bering Strait and Chukchi Sea into the Arctic Ocean as far as permitted under international law. However, so far the agreement has not entered into force. On the same day, the Council of Ministers of the USSR implements the Edict On the Strengthening of the Protection of Nature in the 200 

Doc 313. at Moscow, 20 November 1989; entered into force on the same day; 1568 UNTS 11. 202  Doc 141, 142. 201  Done

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events Extreme North and Marine Areas Adjacent to the Northern Coast of the USSR’ of 1984. The edict applies to the “Northern Sea Route and adjacent areas.203 4 June 1990 At a summit at Washington DC, the United States and the USSR issue a joint statement committing the two countries to work together to resolve the increasing problem of overfishing in the Donut Hole, in which is stated that ‘the sides reviewed problems posed by the development of an unregulated multi-national fishery for pollock in the central Bering Sea. In light of the magnitude of that fishery, which accounts for more than one-third of the total annual catch of pollock in the Bering Sea, the situation is of serious environmental concern. In particular, there is a danger to the stocks from overfishing. This may result in significant harm to the ecological balance in the Bering Sea and to those U.S. and USSR coastal communities whose livelihoods depend on the living marine resources of the Bering Sea. The sides agreed that urgent conservation measures should be taken with regard to this unregulated fishery. The sides noted that, in accordance with international law as reflected in the relevant provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, all concerned states, including coastal states and fishing states, should cooperate to ensure the conservation of these living resources. To this end, both sides noted that they would welcome cooperative efforts towards the development of an international regime for the conservation and management of the living marine resources in the central Bering Sea.’204 14 September 1990 The USSR Minister of Merchant Marine approves new Regulations for Navigation on the Seaways of the Northern Sea Route. With those regulations the USSR sets binding rules for the area for the ‘purposes of ensuring safe navigation and preventing, reducing and keeping

203 

Doc 280.

204 www.state.gov/documents/organization/28522.

pdf.

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under control marine environmental pollution from vessels since the specifically severe climatic conditions that exist in the Arctic Regions and the presence of ice during most parts of the year bring about obstacles, or increased danger, to navigation while pollution of sea or the Northern Coast of the USSR might cause great harm to the ecological balance or upset it irreparably, as well as inflict damage on the interests and wellbeing of the North peoples.’ 26 September 1990 In a letter US President George Bush asks the Senate to consent to the Agreement between the United States and the USSR of 1 June 1990 on the Maritime Boundary between the USSR and Alaska. The President believes ‘the agreement to be fully in the United States interest. It reflects the view of the United States that the maritime boundary should follow the 1867 Convention Line. The agreement resolves differences over where each Party has the right to manage fisheries and oil and gas exploration and development, as well as exercise other sovereign rights and jurisdiction, in these marine areas.’205 The United States and Canada sign an Agreement on Fisheries Enforcement. It enters into force on 16 December 1991.206 - 1991 Based on a Memorandum of Understanding, Greenland and Canada establish a Joint Commission on the Conservation and Management of Narwhal and Beluga.207 22 May 1991 In an Aide Mémoire concerning amendments to the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act, the United States recognises coastal state claims of jurisdiction over highly migratory species of tuna within the EEZ.208

205 

Doc 143. Doc 200. 207  For further information on this joint commission see MMR Freeman et al., Inuit, Whaling, and Sustainability (Walnut Creek, Altamira Press, 1998) 141 et seqq. 2 0 8   w w w. u n . o rg / d e p t s / l o s / L E G I S L AT I O N ANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/USA_1991_Aidememoire.pdf. 206 

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events 14 June 1991 The eight Arctic rim States adopt the Declaration on Protection of the Arctic Environment and Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy.209 In the non-binding Declaration, the States identify the major pollutants and possible counter-measures and state different objectives and principles of their cooperation, ie regular meetings, the involvement of indigenous people and the establishment of working groups. To implement parts of the AEPS, the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme is established, which later becomes a working group of the Arctic Council. August 1991 For the first time since 1922, the Northeast Passage is transited by a non-Russian ship, the French multi-purpose vessel L’Astrolabe.210 29 August 1991 By Presidential Decree, the USSR closes its main nuclear test site at Semipalatinsk and shifts all testing back to the Arctic islands of Novaia Zemlia. Canada, Norway, Sweden, and Finland express their concern to Moscow, as does the Inuit Circumpolar Conference. Domestically the Russian Association of Polar Explorers calls upon the government to stop nuclear testing in the Arctic.211 7 September 1991 The Swedish icebreaker Oden is the first nonnuclear powered ship to reach the North Pole. - 1992 1991 and 1992 French and Greenlandic vessels start fishing in the so-called ‘loophole’ in the Barents Sea, an area which is disputed between Norway and the Russian Federation. The conflict between Norway and Greenland is solved by an allotment of a Barents Sea quota to Greenland; the French catch is set off against the EU overall quota.

11 February 1992 The Convention for the Conservation of Anadromous Stocks in the North Pacific Ocean is adopted. It enters into force in 16 February 1993.212 7 March 1992 Denmark, on behalf of Greenland, and the Russian Federation conclude an Agreement concerning fisheries relations. It provisionally enters into force on 7 March 1992 and definitely on 16 October 1993.213 9 March 1992 A report published by the US Department of State’s Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs states that concerning the Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act the ‘United States continues to object to the application of the law in so far as it purports to apply to sovereign immune vessels. The United States believes that internationally agreed standards should be developed to replace many of the unilateral provisions. However, the United States considers U.S. commercial vessels subject to this law. The United States has agreed to consult with Canada in the development of standards and operational procedures to facilitate commercial navigation in the Arctic.’214 9 April 1992 The Agreement on Cooperation in Research, Conservation and Management of Marine Mammals in the North Atlantic is signed by the Faroe Islands, Greenland, Iceland, and Norway. It enters into force on 8 July 1992 and establishes the Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission.215 9 June 1992 Denmark, on behalf of Greenland, and Norway conclude an Agreement concerning fisheries relations. The Agreement provisionally enters into force on 24 September 1991 and definitely on 4 March 1994.216

209 

Doc 219. Gerbaud, ‘L’Astrolabe à la découverte du passage du nord-est’ (1991) La Revue Maritime 64. 211 IAEA, The Division of Nuclear Safety and Security, Nuclear Explosions in the USSR: The North Test Site Reference Material (Vienna, 2004) 60 et seq. 212  Doc 188. 210 S

213 

Doc 202. US DoS, Limits in the Sea No 112 (1992). 215  Doc 222. 216  Doc 201. 214 

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events 19 June 1992 Canada and the Russian Federation conclude an Agreement on Cooperation in the Arctic and in the North.217 22 September 1992 The Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic is signed. It is ratified by Belgium, Denmark, the EU, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Luxemburg and Switzerland. The Convention enters into force on 25 March 1998.218 November 1992 At the 15th meeting of the Contracting Parties of the London Dumping Convention, the delegations of Norway and the Russian Federation present the preliminary results of their investigations on the dumping of radioactive materials in the Barents and Kara Sea. After a proposal by Greenpeace International, it is decided to stop referring to the Convention as the London Dumping Convention but instead to refer to it as the London Convention. 5 November 1992 The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages is adopted. It is an important instrument for the protection of the languages of Arctic indigenous peoples. It entered into force on 1 March 1998.219 16 November 1992 Canada accesses the International Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto (MARPOL 73/78). It enters into force in Canada on 16 February 1993. At the time of accession, Canada deposits a declaration with the depositary. The US Government as well as the Belgian, Danish, French, German, Greek, Italian, Dutch, Portuguese, Spanish, and UK Governments wire communications to the depositary commenting on the 217 

Doc 66. Doc 223. 219  Done at Strasbourg, 5 November 1992; entered into force 1 March 1998; CETS 148. 218 

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Canadian declarations made upon accession to MARPOL.220 - 1993 1993 After the news reports of the USSR’s having dumped radioactive waste in the shallow waters of the Arctic Seas for decades, the International Atomic Energy Agency launches the International Arctic Seas Assessment Project. Its main objectives are ‘to assess the risks to human health and to the environment associated with the radioactive wastes dumped in the Kara and Barents Seas; and to examine possible remedial actions related to the dumped wastes and to advise on whether they are necessary and justified. The study involves more than 50 experts from 14 countries and is under the direction of an International Advisory Group, concluded in late 1996. Partially supported by extrabudgetary funding from the United States, the project is co-ordinated with the work of the NorwegianRussian Expert Group for Investigation of Radioactive Contamination in the Northern Areas.’ One of the study’s main conclusions is that ‘[m]onitoring has shown that releases from identified dumped objects are small and localized to the immediate vicinity of the dumping sites. Overall, the levels of artificial radionuclides in the Kara and Barents Seas are low and the associated radiation doses are negligible when compared with those from natural sources. […] The main contributors are global fallout from nuclear weapons testing, discharges from nuclear fuel reprocessing plants in western (sic) Europe, and fallout from the Chernobyl nuclear accident.’221 An Inventory of radioactive waste disposals at sea compiled by IAEA and released in August 1999 shows that the USSR and its successor, the Russian Federation, are responsible for 100 per cent of the dumped nuclear waste in Arctic waters, mainly in the Barents and Kara Seas. 11 January 1993 The intergovernmental cooperation in the Barents Region is formalised when the Foreign 220 Doc

221 

251–253. IAEA Bulletin, 39/1/1997, 21.

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events Ministers of the Nordic countries, the Russian Federation and a representative of the European Commission sign a Declaration that creates the Barents Euro-Arctic Council in Kirkenes, Norway. Participants of the conference are representatives of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden, and the Commission of the European Communities, the conference is attended by observers from the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Poland and the United Kingdom.222 29 March 1993 Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden modify their Agreement concerning Cooperation in Taking Measures against Pollution of the Sea by Oil or other Harmful Substances. The revised Agreement enters into force on 16 January 1998.223 June 1993 After the Northern Sea Route has not been of much interest for many years due to severe ice condition, the International Northern Sea Route Programme is established, sponsored by Japan, Norway and the Russian Federation. It is an ‘international research programme designed to create an extensive knowledge base about the ice-infested shipping lanes running along the coast of the Russian Arctic from Novaia Zemlia in the west to the Bering Strait in the east.’ The programme is completed in March 1999. 14 June 1993 In its judgement the ICJ draws a delimitation line that divides the continental shelf and fishery zones of Denmark and Norway between Greenland and Jan Mayen, so settling the dispute between the two countries.224 9 July 1993 The Nunavut Land Claims Agreement of 1999 between Canada and the Inuit of Nunavut is signed. It provides title to the Nunavut Inuit of 350,000 km² of land in the eastern Arctic. 222 

Doc 45. Doc 250. 224  ICJ, Case concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v Norway) [1993] ICJ Rep 38. 223 

One of the principles concerning marine areas is that ‘Canada’s sovereignty over the waters of the Arctic archipelago is supported by Inuit use and occupancy’. The map of the Nunavut settlement area, though ‘for general information purposes’ only, does not exempt the waters of the Northwest Passage from the agreement.225 14 until 16 September 1993 In Nuuk, the Arctic Council Ministers convene. The meeting of the Arctic Council ministers ends with the signing of the Nuuk Declaration.226 23 November 1993 Norway sends an official protest to the Icelandic government after three Icelandic trawlers are discovered fishing in the 200 nm fishery zone of Svalbard. Conversely, Iceland claims it is entitled to fish within the zone, maintaining the waters are internationally controlled and not Norwegian. Icelandic fishermen are urged to leave their own country’s waters after Iceland’s cod stocks have been seriously dwindling due to over-fishing there.227 - 1994 January 1994 At the 19th Session of its General Assembly, IUCN adopts a Strategy to Protect the Arctic Environment in which it ‘[e]ncourages the Arctic governments to develop new national and international instruments to address the full range of environmental problems facing the Arctic, while respecting the particular social, cultural, economic and political circumstances of the Arctic’s indigenous peoples…’228 10 May 1994 Canada terminates its acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ in conformity with Art. 36 (2) of the Statute of the Court.229 225  www.itk.ca/historical-event/nunavut-landclaims-act-nunavut-act-passed-parliament-canada. 2 2 6   w w w. o a a r c h i v e . a r c t i c - c o u n c i l . o r g / handle/11374/83. 227  See further WV Dunlap, ‘Straddling Stocks in the Barents Sea Loophole’ (Winter 1996–1997) IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 79. 228 Adopted at the 19th Session of the General Assembly Meeting of IUCN at Buenos Aires in January 1994. 229  Doc 271.

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events 12 May 1994 Canada enacts Coastal Fisheries Protection Act as Amended in 1994 which enters into force on 25 May 1994.230 9 June 1994 US President Bill Clinton signs a Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-26 (PDD-26) on Arctic and Antarctic Policy.231 10 June 1994 The European Council delivers a Note Verbale to the Government of Canada indicating its position on the legal situation created by the adoption of Canada’s Coastal Fisheries Protection Law and the relevant implementing regulations. The European Council considers that the law and its implementation are contrary to international law. The United States sends a protest note, too.232 16 June 1994 China, Japan, South Korea, Poland, the Russian Federation, and the United States sign the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pollock Resources in the Central Bering Sea Area in Washington. It enters into force on 8 December 1995. The Convention applies to the sea beyond 200 nm from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of the coastal states of the Bering Sea is measured.233 28 July 1994 With the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 the International Seabed Authority is established.234 14/15 September 1994 The second Ministerial Meeting of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council takes place at Tromsø. It results in a joint statement.235

230 

Doc 216. Doc 16. 232  Doc 217, 218. 233  Doc 189. 234  (1994) 33 ILM 1309. 235  Doc 46.

16 November 1994 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 enters into force, one year after Guyana became the 60th State to adhere to it. 16 December 1994 The United States and the Russian Fedeation sign an Agreement on Cooperation in the Prevention of Pollution of the Environment in the Arctic. It enters into force on the same date.236 - 1995 1995 Another flagpole with a Danish flag is erected on Hans Island by a Danish crew stationed at US Thule Air Base. 1 February 1995 The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, which was crafted under the auspices of the Council of Europe, is signed. The Convention enters into force on 1 February 1998 and is ratified by 39 States, including Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia and Sweden.237 9 March 1995 The Spanish fishing vessel Estai is— supposedly—forcibly boarded and inspected by Canadian fisheries protection officers in the regulatory area some 245 nm off the Canadian coast pursuant to the Canadian Coastal Fisheries Protection Act and the freshly amended Regulations. The ship is seized and escorted to the Canadian port of St John’s, Newfoundland. The crew is taken to a Canadian port. When paying the bail, the Spanish captain emphasizes that he does not recognise the jurisdiction of the Canadian courts. In a statement released by the European Commission on 11 March 1995, Commissioner Bonino said: ‘We condemn in the strongest terms this attempt by the Canadian authorities to apprehend a Spanish fishing vessel. It is a flagrant violation of international law. The European Union is not looking for an

231 

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236 

Doc 226. at Strasbourg, 1 February 1995; entered into force 1 February 1998; 2151 UNTS 246. 237  Done

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events escalation, but if Canada does not stop its actions and refuses to respect international rules, the EU will be obliged to look at other actions to defend its legitimate rights.’ A couple of days later, Spain institutes proceedings against Canada in the ICJ with respect to the dispute. Eventually, the Court declares that it has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon it.238 20 June 1995 Canada and Norway agree on fisheries conservation and enforcement, including the zone around Svalbard. The agreement has not yet entered into force. However, it is rather insignificant in practical terms since Canadian fishermen do not fish in the Svalbard area.239 10 August 1995 The United States promulgates Public Note 2237 on Exclusive Economic Zone and Maritime Boundaries.240 9/10 October 1995 The third Ministerial Meeting of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council takes place at Rovaniemi. It results in a joint statement.241 25 October 1995 The Federal Law on the Continental Shelf of the Russian Federation, adopted by the State Duma, defines the status of Russia’s continental shelf, the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of Russia over its continental shelf and their exercise in accordance with the Russian constitution, the generally recognised principles and rules of international law and the international treaties.242 4 December 1995 The Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish

238 

ICJ, Spain v Canada, 1998 ICJ Rep 58. 239  Doc 203. 240  Doc 115. 241  Doc 47. 242  Doc 104.

Stocks is opened for signature.243 It enters into force on 11 December 2001. The provisions also apply to fish stocks in the Arctic Ocean. Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Russian Federation, and the United States ratify the Agreement. 14 December 1995 The United States and Great Britain for Canada signed a Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds in 1916. The treaty is amended on 14 December 1995 to establish a legal framework for the subsistence take of birds in Alaska and northern Canada by indigenous peoples in both regions.244 18 December 1995 Pursuant to the ICJ’s judgment of 1993, Denmark and Norway agree on the delimitation of the continental shelf in the area between Jan Mayen and Greenland and the boundary between the fisheries zone in the area. They adopt an additional protocol in 1997.245 - 1996 21 March 1996 The second Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council takes place in Inuvik. It results in the adoption of the Inuvik Declaration.246 22 May 1996 and 24 June 1996 By Act No 411 of 22 May 1996 and Executive Order No 584 of 24 June 1996, Denmark determines its EEZ. The Act only applies to the Danish mainland, not to the Faroe Islands or Greenland. However, it may become effective for these areas by Royal Decree, which eventually happens for Greenland in October 2004.247 24 June 1996 Norway ratifies UNCLOS. The Convention enters into force in Norway on 24 July 1996. From this date Norway has 10 years to put forward claims of extending the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm. Upon ratification, Norway 243 

2167 UNTS 3. Doc 247. 245  Doc 124, 125. 2 4 6   h t t p s : / / o a a r c h iv e . a r c t i c - c o u n c i l . o r g / handle/11374/83. 247  Doc 80. 244 

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events makes a detailed declaration.248 On the same day, Norway makes a declaration upon the recognition of the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ.

5/6 November 1996 The fourth Ministerial Meeting of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council takes place at Petrozavodsk. It results in a joint statement.253

19 September 1996 With the Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council in Ottawa, the Arctic Council is founded.249 It absorbs the work of the AEPS. However, it is not an international organisation with legal personality but an intergovernmental forum for addressing many of the common concerns and challenges faced by the Arctic States, namely Canada, Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden, and the United States.

29 November 1996 The Norwegian Act No 72 relating to petroleum activities regulates the subsea petroleum deposits and resource management under Norwegian jurisdiction as well as ‘inside and outside the realm of the Norwegian continental shelf to the extent such application follows from international law or from agreement with a foreign State.’ This is particularly relevant for Norway’s plans to drill for oil in the Arctic Ocean.254

26 September 1996 The Russian, the United States and Norwegian ministers of defence sign the Declaration on Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation. The Declaration constitutes a framework for further cooperation between those three states to solve environmental problems caused by military activities, in particular preventing and cleaning up radioactive contamination and nonradioactive pollution.250 14-23 October 1996 At the First IUCN World Conservation Congress in Montreal, the IUCN General Assembly adopts the resolution An IUCN Strategy for the Arctic251 as well as a Recommendation on the Protection of the Arctic Ocean.252

248 AV

Lowe and SAG Talmon (eds), The Legal Order of the Ocean (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2009) 950 et seq. 2 4 9   h t t p s : / / o a a r c h iv e . a r c t i c - c o u n c i l . o r g / handle/11374/83. 250  Doc 227. 251  Adopted at the IUCN First World Conservation Congress in Montreal, 14–23 October 1996. 252  Adopted at the IUCN First World Conservation Congress in Montreal, 14–23 October 1996. This recommendation was adopted by consensus. The delegations of the State members Norway and United States indicated that had there been a vote they would have voted against. cxl

17 December 1996 Canada and the EU agree on a Joint Political Declaration and Action Plan. Part of the plan is the co-operation ‘on the sustainable development and the environmental protection of the Arctic region.’255 18 December 1996 With the Oceans Act, Canada sets its 12 nm territorial sea and 24 nm contiguous zone. In the Act’s preamble, ‘Canada recognizes that the three oceans, the Arctic, the Pacific and the Atlantic, are the common heritage of all Canadians.’256 - 1997 12 March 1997 The Russian Federation ratifies UNCLOS. It enters into force on 11 April 1997. A declaration is made upon signature and ratification.257 13 June 1997 The Norwegian Act No 42 relating to the Norwegian Coast Guard contains several 253 

Doc 48.

254 www.npd.no/en/Regulations/Acts/Petroleum-

activities-act/. 255 www.canadainternational.gc.ca/eu-ue/commerce_ international/joint_political-politique_conjointe. aspx?lang=eng. 256  Doc 77. 257 AV Lowe and SAG Talmon (eds), The Legal Order of the Ocean (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2009) 956 et seq.

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events provisions relating to Svalbard. The Act applies, inter alia, ‘to the internal waters and territorial sea of Svalbard.’ The Coast Guard is entitled to ensure compliance with various Norwegian statutes, among them ‘provisions in accordance with Act No 11 of 17 July 1925 relating to Svalbard, which regulates fishing and hunting in the internal waters and territorial sea of Svalbard [and] governs the protection of the cultural heritage, the natural environment and fauna.’ Control and the implementation of control and enforcement measures in the internal waters and territorial sea of Svalbard shall in all cases exercised in accordance with instructions issued by the Governor of Svalbard.258 In Alta, the 4th Ministerial meeting of the Arctic Council takes place. It results in the Alta Declaration.259 11 November 1997 In three bilateral agreements, Norway, Denmark and Iceland agree on the delimitations of their continental shelf and the boundary between their fishery zones in the area between Jan Mayen, Greenland and Iceland.260 The boundaries lie in the Norwegian Sea. The agreements supposedly settle the argument between Iceland and Denmark/Norway over the status of ‘Kolbeinsey’, which Iceland claimed to be a base point and which would be Iceland’s only island within the Arctic Circle. - 1998 20 January 1998 The fifth Ministerial Meeting of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council takes place at Luleå. It results in a joint statement.261 May 1998 The US Geological Survey prepares a petroleum assessment on the Alaskan Arctic National Wildlife Refuge: ‘The total quantity of technically recoverable oil within the entire assessment area is estimated to be between 5.7 258 www.faolex.fao.org/docs/texts/nor12724.doc.

2 5 9   h t t p s : / / o a a r c h iv e . a r c t i c - c o u n c i l . o r g / handle/11374/83. 260  Doc 125, 126. 261  Doc 49. 262 www.pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs-0028-01/fs-0028-01. htm.

and 16.0 billion barrels.’ The assessment further aggravates the controversy known as Arctic Refuge drilling controversy.262 17 July 1998 Because of incompliance with the request to leave, the Norwegian Coast Guard arrests a Russian trawler that is fishing in the protection zone of Svalbard. After all Russian flag vessels have left the fishing zone off Svalbard, the Norwegians let go the Russian vessel. The Embassy of Russia in Norway sends a note to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the Norwegian position on the fishery protection zone around the Spitsbergen archipelago. The Russian Federation expresses its objection to enforcement measures taken against Russian fishing vessels and proposes bilateral consultations to agree on mechanisms for establishing measures for the preservation of fish stocks.263 Article 14 of the Federal Act on the internal waters, territorial sea and contiguous zone of the Russian Federation, adopted by the State Duma on 16 July 1998 and approved by the Federation Council on 17 July 1998 reads: ‘Navigation on the waterways of the Northern Sea Route, the historical national unified transport line of communication of the Russian Federation in the Arctic, including the Vilkitsky, Shokalshy, Dmitry Laptev and Sannikov straits, shall be carried out in accordance with this Federal Act, other federal laws and the international treaties to which the Russian Federation is a party and the regulations on navigation on the watercourses of the Northern Sea Route approved by the Government of the Russian Federation and published in Notices to Mariners.’ Thereby the Russian Federation asserts its claims to the Northern Sea Route. The act is amended in 2013.264 19 August 1998 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway replies to several notes sent by the Russian Embassy concerning the Fishery Protection Zone around Svalbard.265 263 

Doc 336. Doc 105, 107. 265  Doc 337. 264 

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events 25 September 1998 A consultation paper entitled Toward a Northern Foreign Policy for Canada places the essential elements of Canadian policy for the domestic and circumpolar north within a comprehensive foreign policy framework. It sets out 33 core objectives arranged under seven major themes, these being sustainable development, environmental protection, social and cultural renewal, regional good governance and democratic development, northern sovereignty and security, bilateral relations with northern neighbours, and the consultative process and national unity.266 17/18 September 1998 At the ministerial meeting in Iqaluit, the Arctic Council adopts the Regional Programme of Action for the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment from Land-Based Activities. The meeting results in the Iqaluit Declaration.267 2 December 1998 By Federal Act, the Russian Federation defines the status of its EZZ, the sovereign rights and jurisdiction in its EEZ and the exercise thereof.268 - 1999 4/5 March 1999 The sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council takes place at Bodø. It results in a joint statement.269 7 April 1999 and 21 April 1999 By Act No 200 of 7 April 1999 and Executive Order No 242 of 21 April 1999, Denmark establishes a 12 nm territorial sea. The Act does not apply directly to the Faroe Islands or Greenland but may become effective for those by Royal Decree.270 15 May 1999 At St Petersburg, Norway, the Russian Federation and Iceland conclude the Agreement concerning

Certain Aspects of Co-operation in the Area of Fisheries (Loophole Agreement). The entry into force is still pending.271 2 September 1999 US President Clinton proclaims the extension of the contiguous zone to 24 nm from the baselines of the US determined in accordance with international law, but in no case within the territorial sea of another nation.272 14 September 1999 Canada enacts the Canadian Environmental Protection Act. As for the definition of ‘sea’, para 122 (2) (d) of the Act refers to arctic waters within the meaning of section 2 of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act of 1970. - 2000 2000 As part of their survey of North Ellesmere Island, geologists with the Geological Survey of Canada visit Hans Island. 29 February 2000 The Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development Canada and the Russian State Committee on Northern Affairs sign a Memorandum of Understanding concerning cooperation on aboriginal and northern development.273 3 March 2000 The North Slope Borough, the Inuvialuit Game Council and the Kivalina Whaling Captains Association agree on the Inuvialuit Inupiat Beaufort Sea Beluga Whale Agreement.274 On the same day, the non-mandatory Inuvialuit-Inupiat Polar Bear Management Agreement is revised and signed again between the North Slope Borough and the Inuvialuit Game Council.275

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Doc 204. Doc 116. 273  Doc 284. 274  Doc 243. 275  CD Brower et al, ‘The Polar Bear Management Agreement for the Southern Beaufort Sea: An Evaluation of the First Ten Years of a Unique Conservation Agreement’ (2002) 55 ARCTIC 362–372. 272 

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events 14/15 March 2000 The seventh Ministerial Meeting of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council takes place at Oulo. It results in a joint statement.276 23 March 2000 By Order of that day, the Canadian Governor in Council exempts the icebreaker USCGC Healy from the application of the Arctic Shipping Pollution Prevention Regulations. The regulatory impact analysis statement addresses the general topic of transits of the Northwest Passage: ‘On July 28, 1999 the United States Department of State requested clearance from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade for a proposed voyage of the U.S.C.G. Cutter ‘Healy’ in the waters off eastern Baffin Island to conduct ice trials and for a transit of the Northwest Passage in the spring and summer of 2000, respectively. In the years 1988, 1989, 1990, and 1993, there were transits of the Northwest Passage by vessels of the U.S.C.G. In each instance consent was given under the Canada-United States Agreement on Arctic Cooperation (signed January 11, 1988), by use of an Order in Council after an assessment for equivalent standards of construction and operation.’277 8 June 2000 Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy releases the Northern Dimension of Canada’s Foreign Policy.278 5 September 2000 The Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean is signed. It enters into force on 19 June 2004.279 4-11 October 2000 At the Second World Conservation Congress in Amman, the IUCN General Assembly adopts resolution IUCN’s work in the Arctic.280 276 

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277 www.ca.vlex.com/vid/coast-guard-icebreaker-

healy-exempting-37948101. 278  Doc 2. 279  2275 UNTS 46. 280 Adopted at the Second World Conservation Congress in Amman, 4-11 October 2000. This Resolution was adopted by consensus. State and Agency members United States abstained from the adoption by consensus of this Resolution.

10-13 October 2000 At the ministerial meeting of the Arctic Council in Barrow, Alaska, the Action Plan to Eliminate Pollution of the Arctic as well as the concluding Barrow Declaration are adopted.281 16 October 2000 The United States and the Russian Federation adopt the Agreement on the conservation and management of the Alaska-Chukotka polar bear population. The Agreement leads to the establishment of a US-Russia Polar Bear Commission composed of one federal and one native representative from each country.282 18 December 2000 Russian President Vladimir Putin and Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien negotiate at the Parliament House in Ottawa and sign a Joint Statement on cooperation in the Arctic and the North.283 - 2001 14/15 March 2001 The eighth Ministerial Meeting of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council takes place at Murmansk. It results in a joint statement.284 23/24 April 2001 After Norway arrested a Russian trawler near Svalbard for carrying an excessive amount of small fish, Russian officials walk out on a meeting of the Russian-Norwegian committee on fishing control and regulation in the Barents Sea. According to the Russian side, ‘such actions by the Norwegian authorities contradict the accords and established practice of fishing in the Barents Sea, including in the waters around Spitsbergen.’ 1 June 2001 By Royal Decree, Norway updates the reference points of the limit of the Norwegian 4 nm territorial around Svalbard, repealing Royal Decree of 25 September 1970.285 281  https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/ 11374/83. 282  Doc 236. 283  Doc 67. 284  Doc 52. 285  Doc 320.

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events 14 June 2001 The Russian Cabinet approves a draft of the basics of the state policy in the Arctic region. It took until 2008 to develop a comprehensive and final Arctic Strategy.286 15 June 2001 By issuance of Act No 79 relating to the protection of the environment in Svalbard, Norway intends ‘to preserve a virtually untouched environment in Svalbard with respect to continuous areas of wilderness, landscape elements, flora, fauna and cultural heritage. Within this framework, the Act allows for environmentally sound settlement, research and commercial activities.’287 19 June 2001 After Russian-Norwegian intergovernmental negotiations, Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov expresses his concerns about the situation on Svalbard: ‘We took with caution the Norwegian parliament’s adoption of a bill that, to our mind, might limit economic activity on Spitsbergen.’ Kasyanov adds that the bill allows to announce a part of Spitsbergen as a nature reserve and to restrict economic activity there. ‘Meanwhile, Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg assured us today that our concerns were unfounded. So we will hope that the bill won’t impose any limits on the Russian economic activity on Spitsbergen.’ On the Norwegian side, Prime Minister Stoltenberg underlines that Norway is bound to adopt laws on the environmental protection of the archipelago, but that can come together with Russia’s wish to continue mining coal there. 20 June 2001 The head of the Russian State Committee for Fisheries, Yevgeniy Nazdratenko, states that Russia does not recognise Norway’s unilateral decision which imposes restrictions on Russian fishing in the area around Spitsbergen: ‘Since 1998, Norway has been taking active steps to expand its jurisdiction to the 200-mile zone around the archipelago, which runs counter

286 

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to the Treaty on Spitsbergen of 1920. […] Norwegian official documents often do not distinguish between such notions as ‘exclusive economic zone’ and ‘fish protection zone’.’288 27 July 2001 By Order No 1387, the Russian Federations’s President Putin approves the Sea Doctrine of the Russian Federation for the period till 2020. Some of long long-term objectives for the Arctic region are protecting the interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic, taking into account the interests of the state defense in exploration and development of bio-resources and reserves of mineral resources in the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of the Russian Federation, and ensuring the national interests of the Russian Federation in relation to the Northern Sea Route. 20 December 2001 The Russian Federation makes a submission to the CLCS, pursuant to Article 76 (8) of UNCLOS. The submission contains the information on the proposed outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. The area claimed comprises parts of the Arctic Ocean stretching out from approximately longitude 30° E to 170° W up to the North Pole. As experts expect, this area may contain 10 billion tons of fossil fuels.289 - 2002 18 January and 4 February 2002 Canada notifies the UN Secretary General that it is not able to form an opinion on the Russian submission to the CLCS since from the Canadian point of view more specific data is required. It further stresses that the absence of opinion neither implies agreement nor acquiescence to the Russian submission. Denmark’s Note Verbale of 4 February 2002 concurs with the Canadian view.290

288  Cited after T Pedersen, ‘The Svalbard continental shelf controversy: Legal disputes and political rivalries’ (2006) 37 Ocean Development and International Law 339–358. 289  Doc 145, 146. 290  Doc 147, 148.

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events 28 February 2002 The United States’ point of view on the Russian submission to the CLCS is that the positions of some lines drawn by the Russian Federation in the Arctic Ocean (namely the 2,500 meter isobath and the foot of the international slope) cannot be examined for accuracy and completeness since they are not included in the executive summary. The United States further points out that the ridges within the territory claimed by the Russian Federation are of volcanic origin (Alpha-Mendeleev Ridge System) or freestanding (Lomonosov Ridge) and hence could not be claimed by any country as being part of the continental shelf.291 20 March 2002 Responding to the submission to the CLCS, Norway points out that the delimitation of the continental shelf between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea has not yet been settled and is the object of ongoing consultations between the countries. With reference to rule 5 (a) of Annex 1 to the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf and Article 9 of UNCLOS Annex II, Norway expects the CLCS not to prejudice matters relating to the according delimitation. Apart from that, Norway does not express any objections to the submission.292 28 March 2002 During a presentation of the Russian submission to the CLCS, the Russian Deputy Minister for Natural Resources states that besides the negotiations with Norway, none of the communications with the other Arctic States indicate disputes concerning the delimitation of maritime spaces between the Russian Federation and those states. As for the United States objections concerning the Mendeleev and Lomonosov ridges, the Minister points to the supposed continental nature of the crust beneath the rises.293 Eventually, as regards the Central Arctic Ocean, the CLCS recommends ‘that the Russian Federation make a revised submission 291 

Doc 149. Doc 150. 293  Doc 146. 292 

in respect of its extended continental shelf in that area based on the findings contained in the recommendations.’294 24 May 2002 The IWC rejects a US-Russian proposal to allow their Arctic indigenous peoples to catch bowhead whales. The proposal fails to clear the three-quarters majority IWC rules require. It is the first time in the IWC’s history that aboriginal whaling quotas have been rejected. After the meeting, Rolland Schmitten, head of the US delegation, states that the result is notably ‘unjustified, unkind and unfair’ in the 56-year history of the IWC.295 14 June 2002 By Royal Decree, Norway enacts regulations relating to the baselines determining the extent of the territorial sea around mainland Norway. The northernmost point is the North Cape at approximately 71° 11’ N, 25° 40’ E.296 The Russian Federation’s State Duma approves a resolution concerning ‘the effects for the national interests of the Russian Federation of the application of the 1990 agreement between the USSR and the United States on the delimitation of the sea space’. According to the resolution, the agreement on the US-Russian delimitation in the Bering Sea of 1 June 1990 is ‘not balanced and called into doubt’ Russia’s national interests. The document also claims that some parts of the area ceded to the United States have been ceded unjustly and are contradictory to UNCLOS.297 13 August 2002 In order to replace the Danish flag placed there in 1995, the Danish ship Vœdderen visits Hans Island.

294 Report of the Secretary-General, Oceans and the law of the sea, 8 October 2002, UN Doc A/57/57/ Add.1, para 41. 295 IWC states as well as conservation groups slam Japan’s voting, www.thefreelibrary.com/IWC+ states%2c+conservation+groups+slam+Japan%27s+ voting.-a086465167. 296  Doc 94. 297  Doc 144.

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events 30 August 2002 By regulations laid down in a Royal Decree Norway limits the Norwegian Territorial Sea around Jan Mayen according to revised reference points, thereby repealing the Crown Prince Regent’s Decree of 30 June 1955.298 10 September 2002 The third Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council takes place in Inari, Finland. It results in the Inari Declaration.299 12 November 2002 During his visit to Norway, Russia’s President Putin and Norwegian Prime Minister Bondevik, express their opinion that a deal on fixing the maritime border between the two nations in the Barents Sea seems years off, despite long years of talks. At a Russian-Norwegian Summit in Oslo, President Putin and Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik discuss plans for joint exploitation of Arctic natural resources.300 12 December 2002 In the UN General Assembly, the Russian delegate Mr Lobach comments on the status of the UNCLOS, on fisheries and on the work of the CLCS: ‘[…] This year we began yet another important phase in the area of international cooperation in maritime affairs. I am referring to the inauguration of the practical work of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. There is no doubt that the Commission has complex challenges before it that will require the use of the most up-to-date geological, geophysical and hydrographic techniques, taking into consideration the sovereign rights of States. We disagree with those who believe that, since even scientific researchers cannot reach agreement on a great many fundamental issues, it is not yet time for States to present claims. We are convinced that the procedure developed by the Commission already allows us objectively to consider the relevant claims, and that the resolution of such claims should not be delayed 298 

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indefinitely. Our country has become a pioneer in this area. A year ago, in December 2001, we submitted a claim to the Commission, reflecting the results of many years of multidisciplinary scientific research by Russian scientists to determine and substantiate the outer rim of the continental shelf of the Arctic and Pacific Oceans. Our claim was submitted in strict conformity with the criteria set out in the 1982 Convention. In preparing our submission, we pulled together a great deal of information received from Russian researchers in the Arctic over a period of more than 40 years. The Commission, however, considered that the information that we had provided did not fully meet requirements and asked us to supply further information. We will continue to work productively and creatively with the Commission to provide the supplementary materials. We would like to note, however, that it is inappropriate to stipulate clearly inflated requirements, in particular with respect to the conduct of very costly maritime expeditions in the difficult conditions prevailing in the Arctic Ocean. In order to develop unified approaches and to define the scientific nature of the Mendeleyev and Lomonosov ridges, the Russian Federation intends to convene an international conference at Saint Petersburg in July 2003. […]’301 23 December 2002 After several States have submitted the so-called ‘Polar Code’ to the IMO in 1998, the Marine Environmental Protection Committee (MEPC) and the lead Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) of the IMO jointly examine the code, now called Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-covered Waters,302 and forward it for consideration to various subcommittees.  The various recommendations of these subcommittees are incorporated into the draft presented to MSC at its 76th session (2 to 13 December 2002) with a recommendation for approval as an MSC/MEPC Joint Circular. The guidelines ‘form the first internationally 301 UNGA, Fifty-seventh session, 74th plenary meeting, 12 December 2002, UN Doc A/57/PV.74, 18 et seq. 302  Doc 175.

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events recognized standards for the construction and operation of ships in Arctic Ice-covered polar waters.’ - 2003 11 January 2003 The prime ministers of the BEAC member countries met in Kirkenes to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Barents cooperation on 11 January 1993. At the end of the meeting, they adopted a second Kirkenes Declaration.303 18 June 2003 As happened before in 2000, an Order by the Canadian Governor General in Council exempts the USCG icebreaker Healy from the application of the Arctic Shipping Pollution Prevention Regulations while it is navigating within a shipping safety control zone. The US State Department has requested clearance from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade for a proposed voyage of the icebreaker on 26 March 2003. 27 June 2003 With Act No 57 relating to Norway’s territorial waters and contiguous zone Norway shapes the rights and obligations of vessels in the country’s territorial sea, internal waters and contiguous zone. According to § 5, the Act also applies to Svalbard and Jan Mayen.304 1 August 2003 The Danish ship Triton visits Hans Island to once again replace the Danish flag. 26 September 2003 The head of Russian northeastern border guard directorate, Valeriy Putov, and the commander of the 17th Coast Guard District of the United States, James Underwood, sign an agreement on cooperation between Russian and US coast guards on the protection of biological resources of the Bering Sea. Relations between those agencies have developed since 1992. They exchange experience and information about the 303  304 

Doc 54. Doc 95.

situation in the sea and poaching cases, and at the time of this agreement have carried out 19 joint operations against illegal fishing and 13 joint rescue operations and training exercises.305 2/3 October 2003 The ninth Ministerial Meeting of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council takes place at Umeå. It results in a joint statement.306 7 November 2003 Canada ratifies the UNCLOS. From this date Canada has 10 years to put forward claims of extending the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm. Upon ratification, Canada makes a detailed declaration.307 3 December 2003 Norway deposits with the UN Secretary General two lists of coordinates of points defining the outer limit of the country’s territorial sea around the mainland, Svalbard and Jan Mayen.308 - 2004 2004 The United States sends a Note Verbale to Canada concerning the Beaufort Sea Areawide 2004 Competitive Oil and Gas Lease Sale’.309 5 April 2004 Canada and Denmark exchange notes which constitute an Agreement to Amend the Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark Relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Between Greenland and Canada Done at Ottawa on 17 December 1973. The amendment enters into force on 16 December 2009.310 16 July 2004 In Polyarnyy on the Kola Peninsula, the first facility for the primary processing of radioactive 305  w w w. p r a v d a r e p o r t . c o m / n e w s / world/26-09-2003/52766-0/. 306  Doc 53. 307 www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/ convention_declarations.htm#Canada. 308  54 (2004) LOSB 41 et seqq. 309  Doc 362. 310  Doc 134.

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events waste in Russia starts its operation. The facility was constructed for the Russian navy under the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation programme ‘to ensure the radiological environmental safety of work involving the treatment of radioactive waste’, says Viktor Frolov, the plant’s chief engineer.

24 November 2004 The Arctic Council meets in Reykjavik for a session at which the presidency of this organisation passes from Iceland to the Russian Federation. On the occasion of this meeting, the Reykjavik Declaration is adopted.314

15 October 2004 and 20 October 2004 By Royal Decree of 15 October 2004, Denmark establishes an EEZ around Greenland. According to Executive Order of 20 October 2004, the EEZ shall comprise waters outside and abutting territorial waters up to a distance of 200 nm from the baselines. The minimum distance from Greenland’s northern coast to the North Pole is less than 400 nm. With Royal Decree of 15 October 2004, Denmark also amends its Royal Decree on the Delimitation of the Territorial Waters of Greenland by replacing several base points.311

1 February 2005 The Government of Iceland promulgates the report North Meets North—Navigation and the Future of the Arctic drafted by a working group of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.315

17-25 October 2004 At the Third World Conservation Congress in Bangkok, the IUCN General Assembly adopts a Resolution Arctic legal regime for environmental protection.312 16 November 2004 Denmark ratifies the UNCLOS. Upon ratification Denmark makes a declaration.313 From this date Denmark has 10 years to put forward claims of extending the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm. For this purpose, the Danish Ministry for Science, Technology and Innovation in co-operation with the Faroese and Greenland home rule governments launches the Danish Continental Shelf Project. On its website, it states that ‘[f]ive potential claim areas have been identified off the Faroe Islands and Greenland, potentially including the North Pole.’

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Doc 87, 88. at the Third World Conservation Congress in Bangkok, 17-25 November 2004. The US Department of State provided the following statement for the record: State and agency members United States abstained during the vote on this motion. 313 www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/ convention_declarations.htm#Denmark%20Upon%20 ratification. 312 Adopted

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- 2005 -

15 June 2005 US President Bush remarks that ‘[t]echnology now makes it possible to reach energy resources in places like the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR). Drilling on less than 1 percent of ANWR’s total area could eventually yield up to one million barrels of oil per day.’ Oil drilling in the refuge is still highly controversial today.316 24 June 2005 Denmark promulgates an Act on the Contiguous Zone for mainland Denmark. The Act does not apply to Greenland and the Faroe Islands, but may be rendered effective for those areas by Royal Decree subject to the variations dictated by their special conditions. So far, no such degree exists.317 29 June 2005 At the Second Barents Parliamentary Conference in Bodø, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway, Jan Petersen, says that ‘[t]he one important issue that Norway and Russia have not yet been able to resolve is the question of the delimitation of the continental shelf and maritime zones in the Barents Sea. Although we would like to see an agreement sooner rather

3 1 4   h t t p s : / / o a a r c h iv e . a r c t i c - c o u n c i l . o r g / handle/11374/83. 315 Icelandic Government, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, North Meets North: Navigation and the Future of the Arctic. Technical Report. Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs (2006). 316 www.2001-2009.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/fs/47961. htm. 317  Doc 82.

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events than later, a fair delimitation is more important than a speedy agreement. When we do agree on a maritime delimitation line, a new potential for co-operation in the oil and gas sector will be released.’318 13 July 2005 Canadian soldiers place a traditional Inuit stone statue (Inukshuk) with a plaque and a Maple Leaf flag on Hans Island one week before the visit of Canada’s Defence Minister Bill Graham. 25 July 2005 Two helicopters of the Canadian Forces pay a visit to Hans Island. Ottawa has informed the Danes of the trip—two days after Canada’s Defence Minister Graham left with the helicopters. ‘I wasn’t there to make some big dramatic statement,’ Graham tells the Canadian Press. ‘My act of going there was totally consistent with the fact that Canada has always regarded this island as a part of Canada […] I was just visiting Hans Island the way I visited other facilities of Canada’s. […] If there were some form of a dispute which took place before an international tribunal, all forms of activity on the island are a normal part of establishing presence,’ he says. Gordon O’Connor, the Conservative party’s defence critic, is also supportive of Graham’s visit: ‘We will lose our sovereignty in the north if we don’t enforce it […] Part of enforcing it is regular visits to some of these more remote areas in our archipelago. […] As global warming takes effect and the ice starts to melt in the north we’re (also) going to have a sovereignty problem with the Northwest Passage. […] We have to start enforcing our sovereignty up there so that everyone understands the entire archipelago—and all the water in between—is our territory.’319 The head of the department of International Public Law at the Danish Foreign Ministry, Peter Taksøe-Jensen, comments for Reuters: ‘We consider Hans Island to be part of Danish territory and will therefore hand over 318  w w w. r e g j e r i n g e n . n o / n o / a k t u e l t / opportunities_and_challenges_in/id270074/. 319  w w w. c n e w s . c a n o e . c o m / C N E W S / Canada/2005/07/22/pf-1143685.html.

a complaint about the Canadian minister’s unannounced visit.’320 In the Verbale Note the Danish government states that it considers a Canadian minister visiting Hans Island without first notifying Denmark as a violation of Danish territory. However, Danish official Peter Taksøe-Jensen downplays the importance of the dispute in Danish-Canadian relations, which he hopes can be resolved at the negotiating table: ‘That’s where the issue must be resolved and we will do so at some point. But I’m not sure that it will be tomorrow or within the next month. The issue does not have any great economic or strategic significance and therefore it isn’t very high on the bilateral agenda between Canada and Denmark.’ 28 July 2005 In an article published in the Ottawa Citizen, Denmark’s Ambassador to Ottawa, Poul ED Kristensen, presents his country’s view on the dispute on Hans Island between Denmark and Canada. He emphasises that Denmark considers Hans Island to be a part of Danish territory, but has a strong interest in resolving the conflict with Canada that claims Hans Island as Canadian territory through dialogue and the rule of law.321 4 August 2005 Denmark sends its Navy’s patrol cutter Tulugaq to Hans Island to enforce Danish sovereignty. The voyage promptly follows the visit by Canada’s Defence Minister Graham to the island in late July. However, an official of the Greenland Command says that the cutter’s journey is an annual event and has not been prompted by the current conflict. ‘We usually replace the Danish flag. It has normally blown away. We then place some emergency rations at the cairn, write in the journal at the cairn and then leave again.’ 15 August 2005 In order to avoid further diplomatic tension between Denmark and Canada, the Danish

320  www.worldatlas.com/articles/hans-islandboundary-dispute-canada-denmark-territorial-conflict. html. 321  Doc 345.

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events Foreign Ministry announces that the Tulugaq will not visit Hans Island this year to replace the Danish flag. 19 September 2005 Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Pierre Pettigrew and Denmark’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Per Stig Møller meet in New York on the margins of an UN GA session. After discussions on the issue of the dispute surrounding Hans Island, Pettigrew states that ‘it remains our firmly held position that Hans Island constitutes part of Canada’s national territory […] As longstanding allies, it is our shared objective to lead by example and resolve this matter, which we agree is about the island, and the island only. Minister Møller and I have agreed that our officials should meet soon to discuss how to move toward a resolution of this issue and report back to us.’ Møller expresses his opinion that ‘Denmark and Canada cannot work for peaceful conflict resolution and then show that they cannot practice it themselves. So we agreed to start a dialogue on the Hans Island problem and that we cannot accept ‘flag wars’. They will not be repeated.’ The meeting ends with a joint statement.322 15 October 2005 The Norwegian Coast Guard pursues the Russian trawler Elektron across the Barents Sea for an alleged violation of Norwegian fishing regulations. Norwegian inspectors board the ship as the Norwegian Coast Guard tries to arrest the boat for violating the fishing protection zone off Svalbard. During the following five-days chase into Russia’s waters the Norwegian inspectors are still aboard. They are eventually transferred to a Norwegian ship.323 26 October 2005 On the same day, the Russian Federations’s emergency situations minister proposes the set-up of a government commission to deal with the radioactive dumping in the Techa River in

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the Chelyabinsk region to prevent the pollution of the Ob River and the Arctic Ocean. ‘This problem has long been overdue,’ tells Sergei Shoigu the Russian Federation Council. The river’s open-air reservoir has accumulated more than 200,000 curies of radioactivity, says Shoigu. ‘I am not talking about evaporation; it is all in the sludge. […] I am talking about a possible dam breach and pollution of the entire river, and [radioactive] penetration into the Ob River and ultimately into the [Arctic] Ocean.’324 In Oslo, an Expert Committee—consisting of an equal number of representatives from Finland, Norway, Sweden as well as and their three Sámi parliaments—submits the draft of the Nordic Sámi Convention to the governments of the three Nordic states and to their Sámi parliaments.325 1 November 2005 The Russian Prosecutor General’s Office opens a criminal case against the captain of a Russian trawler that was involved in a scandal with Norway in mid-October 2005. The captain of the Elektron is being investigated for illegal fishing and holding two Norwegian inspectors on board his vessel for four days. The Russian Prosecutor’s Office confirms that the ship used fine-mesh nets inside their main trawling nets to catch undersized fish, which is illegal according to both Russian and Norwegian laws.326 10 November 2005 The tenth Ministerial Meeting of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council takes place at Harstad. It results in a joint statement.327 20/21 November 2005 Two Spanish trawlers, the Monte Meixueiro and the Garoya Segundo, are arrested by the Norwegian coast guard for illegally fishing for Greenland halibut in the protected area around

3 2 4   w w w. s p u t n i k n e w s . c o m / r u s s i a / 2 0 0 5 1 026/41898770.html. 325  Doc 283. 326  www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4395 938.stm. 327  Doc 55.

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events Svalbard. Fernando Ruigomez, the director in charge at the Fisheries Ministry in Spain, says that Spain is ready to prosecute the two trawlers and has asked again for the trawlers to be handed over since in Spain’s view Norway has no right to arrest Spanish trawlers in the fishing zone around Svalbard. Meanwhile, Norway has ordered the Monte Meixueiro to pay 12m kroner. The company, which operates it, has also been fined 500,000 kroner and ordered to pay costs of 200,000 kroner.328

by the agreement measures 150,000 km². The treaty enters into force on 2 June 2006.331

7 December 2005 On behalf of herself, 62 named Inuit, and all other Inuit of the Arctic regions of the United States and Canada, Shelia Watt-Cloutier submits a petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights seeking relief from violations resulting from climate change in the Arctic caused by acts and omissions of the United States.329 The petition is ultimately rejected by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights because the information the petition contained did not satisfy the requirements set forth in those Rules of Procedures. The Commission says that the information provided does not enable the Commission to determine whether the alleged facts would tend to characterise a violation of rights protected by the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.330

10 May 2006 Another ‘unresolved sovereignty question’ in the area around Svalbard: ‘Nymark, situated in the Svalbard archipelago in the Arctic, was discovered by London artist Alex Hartley in 2004 when he was part of an expedition of scientists and artists collaborating on a project to highlight global warming. With the melting of ice, previously hidden prehistoric rocks had started to emerge and the protuberance spotted by Mr Hartley is one of those newly visible landmarks. “We landed on it and I staked a claim, written in English and Norwegian, which I left in a baked bean tin,” said Mr Hartley […]. “I also built a cairn. This was the first time I had ever stood on something where no one else had been before.” […] ‘Yngve Melvær, head of maps at the Norwegian Polar Institute, told the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten: “Svalbard is Norwegian, also the parts under the ice. Alex Hartley has no obvious case for his claim to ownership.”’333

- 2006 20 February 2006 Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre, Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig Møller, and the Director of the Greenland Home Rule Government’s Foreign Affairs Directorate sign an agreement on the establishment of the maritime delimitation line between Greenland and Svalbard in Copenhagen. The area delimited

328 Greenpeace Briefing, EU Illegal Unregulated and Unreported Fishing, November 2005. 329  www.ciel.org/Publications/ICC_Petition_ 7Dec05.pdf. 330  www.graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/ science/16commissionletter.pdf.

30 March 2006 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iceland issues its position on the status of maritime expanses adjacent to Spitsbergen. In nuce, Iceland considers the Treaty on Svalbard as the sole basis for any sovereign rights of Norway in maritime areas around Svalbard, an EEZ and the continental shelf.332

16 May 2006 The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs summons representatives of the embassies of the Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, and the United Kingdom, to refute the allegations these countries have made against Norway for its management of the Northeast Atlantic minke whale stocks. The said countries accused

331 

Doc 140. Doc 339. 333  www.theguardian.com/uk/2006/may/13/arts news.arctic. 332 

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events Norway for ‘unilaterally introducing new rules for calculating quotas in order to set higher quotas than IWC rules allow’. In a press release of the same day, the Ministry calls the attacks unfounded.334 31 May 2006 The IMO Maritime Safety Committee approves the non-mandatory Enhanced Contingency Planning Guidance for Passenger Ships Operating in Areas Remote from SAR Facilities. These guidelines are not only applicable to Antarctica, but also to Arctic waters.335 18/19 June 2006 For the first time in more than 20 years at the IWC’s annual meeting the countries in favour of whaling have a majority. With 33 votes to 32 it is ruled that the 20-year-old temporary ban on commercial whaling is no longer necessary. However, this is only a non-binding declaration since a three-quarters majority is necessary to lift the ban. Norway, Iceland, Denmark, and the Russian Federation vote for the declaration. 7 July 2006 A report prepared for the US Congress on the controversies on the Alaskan Arctic National Wildlife Refuge presents the pros and cons of opening the refuge for oil drilling: ‘Development advocates argue that ANWR oil would reduce U.S. energy markets’ exposure to Middle East crises; lower oil prices; extend the economic life of the Trans Alaska Pipeline; and create jobs in Alaska and elsewhere in the United States. They maintain that ANWR oil could be developed with minimal environmental harm, and that the footprint of development could be limited to a total of 2,000 acres. Opponents argue that intrusion on such a remarkable ecosystem cannot be justified on any terms; that economically recoverable oil found (if any) would provide little energy security and could be replaced by cost-effective alternatives, including conservation; and that job claims are

334  www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/norway-

protests-against-unfounded-attack/id419934/. 335  Doc 176. 336 US Congressional Research Service, Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR): Controversies for the 109th Congress, July 2009. clii

exaggerated. They maintain that development’s footprints would have a greater impact than is implied by a limit on total acreage. They also argue that limits on footprints have not been worded to apply to extensive Native lands in the Refuge, which could be developed if the Refuge were opened.’336 The development debate is still on-going. 3 August 2006 At a Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region in Kiruna, former UN Legal Counsel (1994–2004) Hans Corell lays out the position that the LOSC is the international law governing the use of the Arctic.337 3/4 August 2006 Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade informs the US Embassy in Ottawa that the Canadian Coast Guard icebreaker Louis St Laurent will undertake seismic studies in the disputed area of the Beaufort Sea. These studies aim to support Canada’s claim to extend its sovereignty over the seabed and subsurface to the edge of the continental shelf. According to Canadian officials, Canada will not make a formal “Application for Consent to Conduct Marine Scientific Research” but informs the US Embassy a courtesy.338 20 September 2006 Norway, Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Denmark agree on the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles between Norway, Iceland and the Faroe Islands in the southern part of the Banana Hole of the Northeast Atlantic. ‘This is the first time such agreement has been reached in our region. This will provide clarity and predictability with regard to the future exploitation of resources. It will also contribute to the development of international law in this field in accordance with the objectives of the Convention on the Law of the Sea’, says Foreign

337  ‘Reflections on the possibilities and limitations of a binding legal regime for the Arctic’ (2007) 37 Environmental Policy and Law 321. 338  Canadian Coast Guard to conduct Seismic Surveys in Disputed Beaufort Sea, Cable 06OTTAWA2356_a, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06OTTAWA 2356_a.html.

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events Minister Jonas Gahr Støre. However, the Agreed Minutes merely contain the procedure and guidelines for determining future delimitation lines, which cannot be set before the CLCS has considered the documentation submitted by the three parties and made its recommendations.339 25/26 October 2006 The Fifth Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council takes place in Salekhard, Russian Federation. It results in the Salekhard Declaration.340 27 October 2006 US Ambassador David Wilkins sends an official letter to Peter Boehm, the Assistant Deputy Minister at the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade regarding the transit of the US Coast Guard icebreaker Healy through the Northwest Passage.341 24 November 2006 Russian, EU, Norwegian, and Icelandic leaders meet on the sidelines of the Russia-EU summit in Helsinki to discuss a cross-border and external policy initiative, the so-called ‘Northern Dimension’. The Northern Dimension aims to address the specific regional development challenges of northern Europe. These include cold climatic conditions, long distances, environmental challenges including nuclear waste disposal and waste water management, and insufficient transport and border crossing facilities. The objectives of the Northern Dimension are laid down in a Framework Document and a Joint Political Declaration.342 27 November 2006 Norway submits to the CLCS information on the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured for three separate areas in the North East Atlantic and the Arctic:

the Loop Hole in the Barents Sea; the Western Nansen Basin in the Arctic Ocean; and the Banana Hole in the Norwegian Sea.343 As Norwegian Foreign Minister, Jonas Gahr Støre, comments on his government’s submission: ‘This is a historic day for Norwegian High North policy. We are laying the foundation for establishing finally the extent of the coastal state’s authority and responsibility for the seabed. This is therefore an important contribution to the Government’s efforts to create clear, predictable conditions for activities in the High North. The implementation of the rules of the law of the sea is also important in a broader international perspective.’344 The Supreme Court of Norway gives a ruling which—inter alia—touches the issue of the legality of the Svalbard Fishery Protection Zone and the non-discrimination requirement of the Svalbard Treaty.345 1 December 2006 The Norwegian Government publishes its High North Strategy.346 - 2007 24 and 29 January 2007 In their response to the Norwegian submission to the CLCS Denmark and Iceland merely refer to the Agreed Minutes of 20 September 2006 between Norway, Iceland, Denmark, and the Faroe Islands.347 25 January 2007 Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jonas Gahr Støre, delivers a speech on ‘The rule of law and sound resource management in the High North’ at the Norwegian Academy of Science and

343 

Doc 169.

344  www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/norway-

339 

Doc 131.

340  https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/

11374/83. 341  Doc 302. 342  Doc 63, 64.

submits-documentation-on-the-exte/id436866/. 345  HR-2006-1997-A—Rt-2006-1498. The Norwegian Attorney General has in connection with an appeal to the ECHR provisioned an authorized translation into English of this case. Translation retrieved from Lovdata at www.lovdata.no/static/file/871/hr-20061997-a-eng.docx. 346  Doc 7. 347  Doc 170, 171. cliii

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events Letters on the occasion of its 150th Anniversary Symposium on ‘Politics and Law—Energy and Environment in the Far North’. Concerning the controversy regarding the spatial application of the Svalbard Treaty Støre underlines that ‘the differences of view with regard to the geographic scope of application of some of the clauses of the 1920 Treaty, concerning equal treatment and taxation, are well known. I will not go into detail about this here, other than to say that the consistent position taken by this and previous Norwegian governments is that the wording of the treaty is clear: The references to territorial waters actually mean what they say. The clear terms proposed by Norway and adopted in 1920 cannot easily be discarded.’348 2 February 2007 Iceland and Denmark agree on the maritime boundary in the area between the Faroe Island and Iceland. The agreement enters into force on 29 April 2008.349 21 February 2007 In its response to the Norwegian submission to the CLCS, the Russian Federation calls attention to the yet unsettled issue of delimitation of the continental shelf between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea. In the face of the on-going consultations between the countries, the Russia expects the CLCS not to prejudice matters relating to the according delimitation.350 March 2007 After a Russian initiative, the International Polar Year begins. It will actually last for two years, ending 2009. 3 March 2007 In a Note Verbale to the Embassy of Norway, the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation emphasises the rights of parties to the Spitsbergen Treaty and expresses its view that the Norwegian submission and claim of sovereignty over the sea surrounding the

348  www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/the-ruleof-law-and-sound-resource-manag/id446082. 349  Doc 130. 350  Doc 172.

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archipelago will not interfere with those rights as laid down in the treaty. In a note to the UN Secretary General the Permanent Mission of Norway to the UN states in response to the Spanish Note Verbale that the ‘opinions expressed in the said note concern the scope of application and the interpretation of certain provisions of the Treaty of 1920, where there are differences of views. These issues do not affect in any manner the interpretation or application of the rules contained in article 76 of the Convention nor its Annex 11, and have no bearing on the work of the Commission’.351 6 March 2007 In a written statement to the UN Human Rights Council, the Society for Threatened Peoples, a NGO with special consultative status at the UN, calls attention to the situation of the indigenous peoples in the Arctic, stating: ‘[…] The global warming at the same time alleviates the access to oil and natural gas reserves and other resources that are being exploited by companies of the industrialised world. It is estimated that about a quarter of the world’s reserves of raw oil and natural gas, which have not yet been tapped, are to be found in the Arctic. In the north of Norway an installation is now being built in Hammerfest to liquefy natural gas so that this can be exported from the Barents Sea to the US and other countries. With the support of companies from France, the US and Norway, Russia is opening up a gigantic natural gas field north of the Kola Peninsula. The oil and gas boom in the Barents Sea is threatening land rights of indigenous Saami people in Norway and in the Russian Federation. China has set up a research station in Spitsbergen archipelago, which was visited several times by Chinese research ships. The US government is in the process of opening up new raw oil wells in the north of Alaska. All large international oil companies are at present investigating the chances of investment in the polar region. Society for Threatened Peoples is deeply concerned about the attempts of nation states bordering the Arctic to extend their territorial waters in order to secure control over the lucrative natural resources. Russia does not even hesitate to declare half of the Arctic as its 351 

Doc 340.

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events own territory. […]’ (UN Doc A/HRC/4/NGO/21, 5 March 2007, 2–3). 19 April 2007 At Québec, Evan T Bloom, Deputy Director for Polar and Scientific Affairs in the US Department of State, delivers a speech at the Conference on the United States, Climate Change and the Arctic Renewed American Interest in a Changing North. He addresses the state of the US Arctic policy in 2007.352 27 April 2007 Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre meets Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov. The topics they discuss include Norway’s High North Strategy, a possible cooperation zone in the north, energy cooperation and fisheries discuss as well as current international issues. After the meeting, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov, says at a press conference when asked about the progress of talks on the delimitation of the borders in the Barents Sea: ‘The talks are progressing. Another round ended recently, on the basis of whose results we expect to soon ink an agreement on one more, even though small section. It will, of course, take some additional time to complete the talks on all aspects. But it is important that the sphere to be further agreed upon is consistently being narrowed.’353 15 May 2007 US President George W Bush asks the US Senate to ratify UNCLOS: ‘First, I urge the Senate to act favorably on U.S. accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea during this session of Congress.  Joining will serve the national security interests of the United States, including the maritime mobility of our armed forces worldwide.  It will secure U.S. sovereign rights over extensive marine areas, including the valuable natural resources they contain. Accession will promote U.S. interests in the environmental health of the oceans. And it will give the United States a seat at the table when the rights that are vital to our interests are debated and interpreted.’354 352 

Doc 17. Doc 121. 354 www.georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ news/releases/2007/05/text/20070515-2.html. 353 

26-28 June 2007 At Shepherdstown, the Polar Bear Range States meet for discussions. The meeting is concluded with a joint statement.355 9 July 2007 Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper announces that its government will fund the construction of several Arctic patrol ships to help reassert Canada’s sovereignty over the High North. During a ceremony at Canadian Forces Base Esquimalt on Vancouver Island Minister Harper says that ‘Canada has a choice when it comes to defending our sovereignty over the Arctic. […] Either we use it or we lose it. And make no mistake—this government intends to use it.’356 11 July 2007 Norway and the Russian Federation sign an agreement on maritime delimitation of a coastal area at the mouth of the Varangerfjord. The agreement determines a delimitation line for the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf between Norway and the Russian Federation in the respective area of the Varangerfjord. It sets out in more detail the border established in the agreement between Norway and the USSR of 1957.357 2 August 2007 Russian explorers plant their country’s flag on the seabed 4,200 m below the North Pole to further Moscow’s claims to the Arctic. The rust-proof titanium metal flag was brought by explorers travelling in two mini-subs, in what is believed to be the first expedition of its kind. As Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov comments: ‘The goal of this expedition is not to stake Russia’s claim, but to prove that our shelf spreads to the North Pole.’ He hopes the expedition will ‘allow us to acquire additional scientific proof ’ of this claim. Conversely, Canadian Foreign Minister Peter MacKay dismisses Russia’s symbolic flag-planting as a meaningless gesture that does not strengthen 355 

Doc 229.

356  www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa-buying-

up-to-8-arctic-patrol-ships-1.651892. 357  Doc 118, 119.

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21 August 2007 At a press conference after the meeting of US President Bush, Canadian Prime Minister Harper and Mexican President Calderon in Montebello, Bush and Harper answer a question on their States’ dispute on the Northwest Passage: […] Question: President Bush and Mr. Harper, we know the differences between the two

countries insofar as the Northwest Passage is concerned. We heard the former ambassador, Paul Cellucci, that it would be in the best interests of security for the United States to recognize this passage as a Canadian waterway. So we’d like to hear your comments, from both of you. Failing which there is not a way—if we could hear to what extent you would be willing to consider the Northwest Passage to become an international waterway. Prime Minister Harper: I shall reply, to start off with. I did hear the comments of the former Ambassador Paul Cellucci. We also know that there are certain differences of opinion vis-a-vis this passage between our two nations. But quite honestly, Canada’s position is that we intend to strengthen our sovereignty in the Arctic area, not only military, but economic, social, environmental and others. The former agreements of President Reagan and Prime Minister Mulroney in the ’80s, Canada and the United States did resolve their differences in this area … the statement by former Ambassador Cellucci. Canada, as you know, is fully committed to strengthening its Arctic sovereignty on every level, not just military, but economic, society, environmental, any other method, any other means. Canada and the U.S. do have differences on certain aspects of the Northwest Passage. At the same time, since the agreements of Prime Minister Mulroney and former President Reagan in the late 1980s, Canada and the United States have been able to manage these differences, and we think we’ll be able to continue to do that. President Bush: Yes, we’ll manage the differences—because there are differences on the Northwest Passage. We believe it’s an international passageway. Having said that, the United States does not question Canadian sovereignty over its Arctic islands, and the United States supports Canadian investments that have been made to exercise its sovereignty. […].361

3 5 8   w w w. ny t i m e s . c o m / 2 0 0 7 / 0 8 / 0 3 / wo r l d / europe/03arctic.html?_r=0. 359 Russia plants flag on Arctic floor, CNN, 4 August 2007, cited after Russian Analytical Digest No 96, 12 May 2011, 14. 360 www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2007/s2907. htm.

361 www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/remarksby-president-bush-prime-minister-harper-of-canadaand-president-calderon-of-mexico-in-a-joint-pressavailability-58350392.html.

its territorial claim: ‘Look, this isn’t the 15th century. You can’t go around the world and just plant flags and say, ‘We’re claiming this territory.’ Our claims over our Arctic are very well-established. […] Our claims over our Arctic are very well-established. There is no threat to Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic and as you know, we’ve made very strong commitments, the prime minister has been there recently, may be there again (soon), so we’re not at all concerned about this (stunt). It’s basically just a show by Russia.’358 Tom Casey, deputy US State Department spokesman underlines: ‘I’m not sure whether they’ve put a metal flag, a rubber flag, or a bed sheet on the ocean floor […] Either way, it doesn’t have any legal standing or effect on this claim. It’s an issue that’s going to be decided based on those technical merits, not on any kind of particular markers laid down.’359 6 August 2007 The icebreaker USCGC Healy leaves the port of Seattle with a team of scientists from the University of New Hampshire’s Joint Hydrographic Center and the National Science Foundation. According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the expedition is ‘dedicated to enhancing economic security and national safety. […] Scientists will explore this poorly known region to better understand its morphology and the potential for including this area within the United States’ extended continental shelf under the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea.’360

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events 23 August 2007 The Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s 2007 Environmental Scan addresses the question of sovereignty over Hans Island: ‘Canada is facing challenges from several countries over its claims of sovereignty in the Arctic. Canada maintains that the Northwest Passage is an internal waterway while the United States, among others, views the Passage as international waters. In addition, Canada has disputed with Denmark since 1973 over ownership of Hans Island—1.3 km pile of rocks in the Arctic. The Island is of critical importance since control of it ensures control of the strait. To deal with the challenge, the GOC recently announced a number of steps to increase presence in the area (e.g., commitment to build three armed icebreakers, a deep-water port and a military training centre in the area, and more Ranger patrols, etc.).’ 13 September 2007 Denmark announces its invitation of Canada, the United States, the Russian Federation, and Norway to a high-level meeting on the Arctic region in Illulisat, Greenland, on 27 until 29 May 2008. How to govern the new challenges in a peaceful, friendly and sustainable manner, respecting international rules and regulations, and set out guidelines, which will benefit the countries in the region is the subject of the meeting. The UN General Assembly adopts the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People by a majority of 143 states in favour, 4 votes against (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States) and 11 abstentions (Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burundi, Colombia, Georgia, Kenya, Nigeria, Russian Federation, Samoa, and Ukraine).362 25 September 2007 At the International Conference in Tromsø, Norway, Claudia A McMurray, US Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs delivers a speech on the US perspective on energy security in the Arctic in the 21st century: ‘[…] 362  107th plenary meeting. Issued in GAOR, 61st sess., Suppl No 49, Annex: UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 1-11.

Concurrently, we are faced with the rise of what is often called resource nationalism, where consumer countries attempt to “lock-up” upstream assets in the pursuit of a false notion of energy security, and where producer countries reject much needed foreign investment and expertise in the face of declining production levels. Roughly two-thirds of the world’s oil and gas reserves are in countries that provide limited access or are completely closed to foreign investment. National oil companies own about 50 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves. And we are seeing increasing instances of manipulation of resources in countries with large resource bases. Examples include: further limiting access to resources for commercialization; renegotiating contracts or even outright expropriation of assets; renationalizing assets; and cutting off supply. Because of these factors, prices have more than tripled since 2002, and in the last few days have reached record highs, over 84 dollars a barrel. And we don’t project much change in this in the near future because the uncertainties I’ve mentioned will likely still be with us and demand will most certainly increase. As a result of all these factors, the Arctic region is set to play a major role in the world’s future energy security. The United States Geological Survey estimates that the Arctic could be home to more than 25 percent of the world’s undiscovered reserves of oil and natural gas. That said, most would agree that the question is not if the world will extract those reserves, but instead, “How can we do so in an environmentally sustainable and socially responsible way?” The Arctic poses many difficulties in this regard. Because of the harsh conditions and expense of operations, there have only been 35 wells drilled in the Alaskan Beaufort and Chukchi Seas. This is a small area tested compared to the size of the area that has been available to lease. The oil and gas industries are working hard to overcome some of the barriers to drilling. In shallow waters, for example, industry has developed bottom founded drilling platforms that can provide for a year round drilling program. To address concerns about noise from drilling operations during the short open water season, the Department of the Interior’s Minerals Management Service—the federal agency that manages the U.S.’s natural gas, oil and other mineral resources on our outer continental

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events shelf—is involved in several studies to find ways to lessen the sound transmission from drilling structures and seismic noise. Arctic projects face technical, environmental, regulatory and legal challenges because offshore activities are considered new and unproven. There is currently only one Outer Continental Shelf development project, called Northstar, which took 19 years from discovery to first production. Northstar faced several challenges to reach production. It was the first stand-alone island production facility in the Alaskan Arctic. It was developed with no road support so the staging of material to the island was a scheduling and logistics challenge. Moving the oil to market required the design, installation and operation of the first sub-sea pipeline to be installed in the Arctic. Concerns about leak detections led to the installation of a leak detection system, which was also a first for the Arctic. […] Let me in concluding raise a few other challenges that affect our search for energy in the Arctic. Determining the limits of the continental shelves of the five countries bordering the Arctic Ocean and settling the boundaries between them will be resolved through the provisions established under the Convention on the Law of the Sea and through bilateral negotiations between neighboring countries. […]’363 30 September 2007 The icebreaker USCGC Healy returns to its homeport of Seattle, after the successful conclusion of the Arctic West Summer 2007 Deployment. The vessels focus is on mapping the Chukchi Cap area in the Arctic Ocean. As the US Department for Homeland Security writes in a press release, Healy’s science party ‘continued to explore this poorly known region to better understand its morphology and the potential for including this area within the United States’ extended continental shelf under the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).’364   363 C McMurray, Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs. Remarks at the International Conference at Tromso ‘Emerging from the Frost: Security in 21st Century Arctic’, 25 September 2007, www.2001-2009.state. gov/g/oes/rls/rm/2007/93245.htm. 364 www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2007/s2907. htm.

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15/16 October 2007 Representatives of Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Russian Federation, and the United Nations meet in Oslo for informal discussions. A press release from the Norwegian Foreign Ministry reads in part: ‘The participants noted recent scientific data indicating that the Arctic Ocean stands at the threshold of significant changes, in particular the impact of melting ice on vulnerable ecosystems, livelihoods of local inhabitants, and potential exploitation of natural resources. In this regard, they recalled the applicability of an extensive international legal framework to the Arctic Ocean, including notably the law of the sea. They discussed in particular application and national implementation of the law of the sea in relation to protection of the marine environment, freedom of navigation, marine scientific research and the establishment of the outer limits of their respective continental shelves. They discussed cooperative efforts on these and other topics. They also emphasized the commitment of their States to continue cooperation among themselves and with other interested States, including on scientific research.’365 23 October 2007 German Foreign Minister Frank Walter Steinmeier states a conference on climate change in Berlin: ‘There’s a “Cold War” at the North Pole that we have to prevent. Climate change is a threat to worldwide peace and security.’366 5 November 2007 In a press release, an official of the US Department of State comments on the country’s progress in joining UNCLOS: ‘We are pleased that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted out the Law of the Sea Convention. This is an important step forward in the Administration’s efforts to join this treaty, which the President has urged the Senate to approve during this session of Congress. This Convention has the strong support of United States Federal Agencies, including the Departments of Defense,

365  www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/The-ArcticOcean--meeting-in-Oslo-/id486239/. 366  www.reuters.com/ar ticle/environmentg l o b a lwa r m i n g - s e c u r i t y - s t e i n - i d U S L 2 3 3 3 181720071023.

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events Homeland Security, Commerce, and the Interior. This treaty was a victory for U.S. diplomacy—the one chapter that President Reagan disliked was modified in 1994 to overcome all his objections. It would serve both our national security interests, as countless current and former U.S. military officials have stated, by assuring navigational rights of our vessels worldwide, as well as our economic and energy interests, as a wide array of U.S. industries have stated. The treaty would secure U.S. sovereign rights over extensive offshore natural resources, including substantial oil and gas resources in the Arctic. The extended continental shelf areas we stand to gain under the treaty are at least twice the size of California. Joining the Convention is the only viable means of protecting and maximizing our ocean-related interests and the Senate should approve U.S. accession without delay.’367 14/15 November 2007 The 11th Ministerial Meeting of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council takes place at Rovaniemi. It results in a joint statement.368 Asked about discussions on the ownership of the Arctic shelf at the BEAC meeting, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov, says at the press conference after the meeting: ‘The Barents Euro-Arctic Council is absolutely not the place to discuss these issues. There is the special body which has been set up in the United Nations on the basis of the Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the entities there on seabed problems and on continental shelf problems are the sole entities empowered to tackle these matters. Russia in the early 2000s sent the UN an appropriate claim, and this claim is being examined.’369 28/29 November 2007 Canada and the Russian Federation sign several new agreements to strengthen their economic and Arctic cooperation. In a joint statement they vow to use international law to resolve any dispute over their respective territorial claims

367  www.2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/ nov/94622.htm. 368  Doc 56. 369 www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/460D2287A287E98E C3257398003510E1.

in the Arctic. Russian Prime Minister Viktor Zubkov says that both countries plan to develop the Arctic shelf and transport infrastructure in the Arctic and in the Upper North, in particular the Arctic Bridge project, a potential sea route linking the Russian port of Murmansk to Churchill, Manitoba. He continues that he backed the idea of creating a Russian-Canadian coordination committee to promote effective projects, adding that the committee would include representatives of the legislative and executive branches of government.370 29 November 2007 In response to the growing popularity of Arctic and Antarctic tourism, the IMO Assembly adopts non-mandatory Guidelines on voyage planning for passenger ships operating in remote areas.371 10 December 2007 At the 64th plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly, the Norwegian delegate Løvald states: ‘[…] Let me draw attention to a part of the world where we are already seeing clear evidence of the effects of climate change, namely the Arctic. According to scientific data, there has been a significant, persistent downward trend in the extent of summer sea ice over the past 50 years. In September this year, the area of sea ice was only just over half of what it was in the 1950s and 1960s. The Arctic Ocean is about to undergo dramatic change. Melting ice is having significant impacts on vulnerable ecosystems, the livelihoods of local inhabitants and opportunities of exploiting natural resources. The rapid melting of sea ice is having dramatic consequences for animals such as polar bears, walruses and seals. The changing ice conditions are also having an impact on navigation, extending the navigation period and probably opening new shipping routes. At the invitation of the Norwegian Government, representatives of the five coastal States of the Arctic Ocean— Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United States—met at senior-official level on 15 and 16 October 2007 for informal discussions. They recalled the applicability of an extensive international legal framework to the Arctic 370  371 

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events Ocean, including notably the law of the sea. They discussed, in particular, application and national implementation of the law of the sea in relation to protection of the marine environment, freedom of navigation, marine scientific research and the establishment of the outer limits of their respective continental shelves. Commercial fisheries may extend into more northerly areas of the Arctic in the future. The States concerned should begin now to consider how to implement effectively the principles and rules set out in the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement implementing the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, including any future need for appropriate mechanisms. […] However, too little has been done in the way of practical and effective measures to implement the existing legal framework and protect marine biodiversity. For example, many coastal States have not yet established a representative network of effectively managed marine protected areas within their own national jurisdiction. Norway aims to have such a network in place well before 2010. We need better mapping of the seabed and must improve knowledge of the vulnerability of different habitats to existing environmental pressures and to those that are likely to arise in the future. Norway believes that there is an urgent need to implement the ecosystem approach and apply the precautionary principle to the management of human activities so as to ensure the conservation and sustainable use of living marine resources. […].’372 - 2008 21 January 2008 The results of the Arctic Council Oil and Gas Assessment are released: ‘The objective of the assessment is to present a holistic assessment of the environmental, social and economic, and human health impacts of current oil and gas activities in the Arctic, and to evaluate the likely course of development of Arctic oil and gas activities and their potential impacts in the near future.  The assessment offers a balanced and reliable document for decision makers in support of sound future management of oil and gas activities in the Arctic.’373 372 

UNGA Doc A/62/PV.64, 23–24.

373 www.amap.no/oil-and-gas-assessment-oga.

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11 February 2008 The US NOAA publishes news on the joint ocean mapping expedition into Arctic depths by both the NOAA and the University of New Hampshire (UNH). According to the release, ‘[n]ew Arctic sea floor data released today […] suggests that the foot of the continental slope of Alaska is more than 100 nautical miles farther from the U.S. coast than previously assumed. The data, gathered during a recent mapping expedition to the Chukchi Cap some 600 nautical miles north of Alaska, could support U.S. rights to natural resources of the sea floor beyond 200 nautical miles from the coast. … We found evidence that the foot of the slope was much farther out than we thought,’ Larry Mayer, expedition chief scientist and co-director of the Joint Hydrographic Center at UNH, explains.374 3 March 2008 In a joint paper to the European Council on Climate change and international security the European Commission and the SecretaryGeneral/High Representative write: ‘A further dimension of competition for energy resources lies in potential conflict over resources in Polar regions which will become exploitable as a consequence of global warming. […] 6. The Arctic: The rapid melting of the polar ice caps, in particular, the Arctic, is opening up new waterways and international trade routes. In addition, the increased accessibility of the enormous hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic region is changing the geo-strategic dynamics of the region with potential consequences for international stability and European security interests. The resulting new strategic interests are illustrated by the recent planting of the Russian flag under the North Pole. There is an increasing need to address the growing debate over territorial claims and access to new trade routes by different countries which challenge Europe’s ability to effectively secure its trade and resource interests in the region and may put pressure on its relations with key partners. […] Possible actions that could be developed

3 7 4   w w w. n o a a n ew s . n o a a . g ov / s t o r i e s 2 0 0 8 / 20080211_arctic.html.

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events include: […] Develop an EU Arctic policy based on the evolving geo-strategy of the Arctic region, taking into account i.a. access to resources and the opening of new trade routes […].’375 6 March 2008 The USCGC Healy, the US Coast Guard’s largest icebreaker, departs Seattle to begin the Arctic West Summer 2008 Deployment. During the six-month deployment Healy will travel over 25,000 nm and conduct over 2,000 individual science evolutions in the course of completing seven separate science missions. 27 March 2008 The European Commission announces a farreaching reorganisation of the DirectorateGeneral in charge of Fisheries and Maritime Affairs. The new Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (DG MARE) includes a new geographical Directorate ‘Arctic, Atlantic and outermost regions.’ 10 April 2008 The Canadian Government prevents the sale of space equipment and satellite maker MacDonald Dettwiler & Associates (MDA) to an US-American company due to concerns about Canada’s Arctic sovereignty. When the satellite was launched in October 2007, the Government promoted it as a critical component of its efforts to assert its control of the Arctic.376 8 May 2008 Environment Canada through the Canadian Wildlife Service and the US Department of the Interior through the US Fish and Wildlife Service enter into a Memorandum of Understanding for the Conservation and Management of Shared Polar Bear Populations.377 14 May 2008 The US Secretary of the Interior declares polar bears a ‘threatened species’ under the 375  Secretary-General/High Representative Solana and the European Commission, ‘Climate Change and International Security’, S113/08. 376  I Austen, ‘Canada Bars Sale of Satellite Maker to U.S. Buyer’ (The New York Times, 10 April 2008). 377  Doc 237.

Endangered Species Act, a decision which the territorial government of Nunavut condemn.378 28 May 2008 The Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr Per Stig Møller, and the Premier of Greenland, Hans Enoksen, host ‘The Arctic Ocean Conference’ in Ilulissat, where ministers from Denmark, Canada, Norway, the Russian Federation, and the United States meet to discuss the framework for the future handling of the possibilities and challenges in and around the Arctic Ocean that arise as a consequence of climate change. The most important outcome of the conference is the adoption of the Ilulissat Declaration.379 3 June 2008 The US Congress adopts a joint resolution directing the United States to initiate international discussions and take necessary steps with other Nations to negotiate an agreement for managing migratory and transboundary fish stocks in the Arctic Ocean.380 June 2008 The Nordic Council of Ministers publishes an extensive study on The European Union and the Arctic—Policies and actions, and calls to establish a self-standing Arctic-dedicated unit within the European Commission. The document also suggested the EU needs to ‘establish, intensify and possibly formalise international co-operation with Arctic regional bodies’.381 14 July 2008 The Russian Navy announces that warships of its Northern Fleet for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 have resumed patrols in Arctic areas, including off the coast of the Spitsbergen Island. The ships were sent on request for protection from Russian fishermen, who were challenged by the Norwegian navy for illegal fishing.’382 378  www.nytimes.com/2008/05/15/us/15polar. html?pagewanted=all. 3 7 9   h t t p s : / / o a a r c h iv e . a r c t i c - c o u n c i l . o r g / handle/11374/83. 380  Doc 206. 381  The study is available at www.dx.doi.org/10.6027/ ANP2008-729. 382  www.canada.com/topics/news/world/story. html?id=3572ff95-9a88-4dd8-944f-58af497c3fa6.

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events 18 July 2008 Russian President Medvedev announces that he has signed a law amending the Federal Law ‘On the Russian Federation’s Continental Shelf’. From now on instead of the usual tenders and auctions, the law allows the Government to make specific individual decisions on the provision and use of sections of the continental shelf for mineral resource exploration and exploitation purposes.383 23 July 2008 The US Geological Survey releases the CircumArctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle. The study is the first publicly available petroleum resource estimate of the entire area north of the Arctic Circle. According to the assessment the area north of the Arctic Circle has an estimated 90 billion barrels of undiscovered, technically recoverable oil, 1,670 trillion cubic feet of technically recoverable natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of technically recoverable natural gas liquids in 25 geologically defined areas thought to have potential for petroleum. These resources account for about 22 per cent of the undiscovered, technically recoverable resources in the world.384 11 August 2008 The Office of the Spokesperson of the US Department of State issues the following statement: ‘The U.S. Extended Continental Shelf Task Force, chaired by the Department of State, plans two Arctic cruises by the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Healy this summer, one of which will be conducted in collaboration with the Government of Canada. The cruises are part of an interagency effort to collect scientific data about the continental shelf and oceanic basins in the Arctic. The first cruise, August 14 to September 5 from Barrow, Alaska, will employ a sophisticated echo sounder that will collect data to create a three-dimensional map of the Arctic seafloor in an area known as the Chukchi Cap. This cruise is led by the University of New Hampshire’s Joint Hydrographic Center, with support from the National Oceanic and 383 www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/825. 384 www.pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/.

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Atmospheric Administration. The second cruise, September 6 to October 1, also from Barrow, will be conducted in cooperation with Canada. The Healy will map the seafloor and it will also create a straight and open path through the ice, while the Canadian icebreaker, Louis S. St. Laurent, follows and collects multi-channel seismic reflection and refraction data aimed at determining the thickness of sediment. This collaboration will assist both countries in defining the continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean. It will also save millions of dollars for both countries, provide data of great interest to both countries, and increase scientific and diplomatic cooperation. The U.S. Geological Survey will lead the expedition for the U.S., while Natural Resources Canada will lead the Canadian team. […] This will be the fourth summer that the U.S. has collected data in the Arctic in support of defining the limits of its extended continental shelf (the portion of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, where a coastal nation has sovereign rights over natural resources). This data, most of which will be released to the public, will also provide greater scientific insight into relatively unexplored regions of the ocean.’385 21 August 2008 The National Ice Centre, Washington DC, issues a press release which states the following: ‘The National Ice Center, with collaboration and input from the Canadian Ice Service of Environment Canada, has determined that the Southern route of the Northwest Passage (via Peel Sound, Franklin, Victoria Strait and then west through Queen Maud Gulf, Coronation Gulf, and Amundsen Gulf) is now open, meaning there is now a freely navigable route between Baffin Bay and the Beaufort Sea. While the Southern route is open, the Northern route (via Viscount Melville Sound and M’Clure Strait), remains ice-covered. Declaring the NWP to be “open” indicates the presence of a continuous freely navigable path from west to east. In reality, a ship or convoy might take days, weeks, or months to traverse the route, and conditions would undoubtedly change during the voyage due to drifting ice and changing weather. Icebergs and multiyear 385  www.2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/ aug/108119.htm.

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events ice floes, even small ones, still are significant navigational hazards, and even ships with experienced crews may experience difficulty. The Arctic continues to be a harsh environment where conditions may change rapidly, including the conditions within the NWP.’386 12 September 2008 The US Embassy to Canada urges US agencies to delay the release of the new Arctic Policy National Security Presidential Directive/ Homeland Security Presidential Directive until after Canada’s federal election because the publication might have the potential to insert the United States as an issue in the campaign and negatively impact U.S.-Canadian relations. The Embassy points out ‘that all parties vying in the election would criticize a new U.S. Arctic policy, and other parties would be especially harsh in their criticism of Stephen Harper’s Conservatives for not having dissuaded the U.S. from issuing that new policy. That harsh criticism might resonate widely among the electorate, and we run the risk of provoking a response that could lead to a hardening of positions and a lessening of the overall excellent cooperation we maintain with Canada in the Arctic.’387 17 September 2008 A new basic document on Russian state policy in the Arctic in the period until 2020 is promulgated.388 On this occasion President Medvedev delivers a speech on Protecting Russia’s National Interests in the Arctic.389 18 September 2008 In reaction to Russian President Medvedev’s speech on 17 September, the Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Stoere says: ‘Norway and Russia have until now shared very common positions on this, resorting to the Law of the 386 US National Ice Center, Northwest Passage Open 21 August 2008,” press release (Suitland, MD: 21 August 2008). 387 US Embassy to Canada, NSPD/HSPD on Arctic Policy—Request consideration to delay release, Cable 08OTTAWA1198_a, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/ cables/08OTTAWA1198_a.html. 388  Doc 11. 3 8 9   w w w. e n . k r e m l i n . r u / eve n t s / p r e s i d e n t / transcripts/48304.

Sea and the existing principles. I presume that this is also the basis for the reasoning when Russian President Dmitry Medvedev says Russia is working on this question. It’s not unnatural. When he speaks of the importance of clarifying the questions that are possibly still up in the air, that is something all the countries (in the region) feel strongly about. Up until now, the Russians have elaborately documented their claims. It would be very unwise to use other means than those stipulated by the Law of the Sea. I assume Russia will stick to that and I have no reason to believe otherwise.’390 Being asked about the Russian claims to Arctic territory the spokesperson for the US State Department answers as follows: Question: What is our reaction to the Russian government’s attempts to mark the northern Russian border to claim its share of the Arctic territory? Answer: We have no information about proposed Russian domestic legislation concerning the Arctic. Our understanding from Russian President Medvedev’s public remarks is that he called for a law delineating the definition of Russia’s southern Arctic boundary, i.e. its boundary within the Russian land mass. This would be a purely internal matter. There is no universal definition of what constitutes the Arctic. Arctic nations use different criteria for defining the portions of their territory considered to be part of their Arctic regions. These definitions are generally for the purpose of internal administration and have no standing in international law. According to President Medvedev’s remarks, after Russia has defined its southern Arctic boundary, it would then seek to define its continental shelf beyond 200 nm from its coastline. The Russians have been gathering scientific evidence in support of their submission under the Law of the Sea Convention asserting that their continental shelf extends to the North Pole. The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, the technical body under the

390  Norway Urges Russia to Stick to International Law in Arctic, Dow Jones Newswires (18 September 2008), www.rigzone.com/news/oil_gas/a/66814/ Norway_Urges_Russia_to_Stick_to_International_ Law_in_Arctic.

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events Law of the Sea Convention that addresses the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, will ultimately make a recommendation based on scientific criteria concerning any forthcoming Russian submission. Based on information available to us at this point in time, we have no reason to believe the Russians are proposing a different course of action. The Russian Federation is within its rights to delineate an extended continental shelf, so long as the outer limits are consistent with international law, as supported by sound scientific data. Other Arctic nations are in the process of gathering the necessary scientific data to support their own delineations of extended shelf in the Arctic Ocean. In May 2008, by means of the Ilulissat Declaration, the five Arctic Ocean coastal states unanimously re-stated their commitment to the legal framework in place under the Law of the Sea convention in the Arctic and to the orderly settlement of any possible overlapping claims.391 19 September 2008 EU Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs justifies further exploration of the North Pole with guaranteeing Europe’s energy security: ‘You even need to go into hostile environments […] You can’t say 'this is a sanctuary’ because it will not work […] Otherwise, where will we get energy from?’ […] ‘You need clear-cut rules, clear environmental impact assessments and very responsible implementation,’ he said. ‘I believe the Commission should help the countries that actually have these resources under their jurisdiction to develop the technologies or to use the technologies in an appropriate way.’ Piebalgs further underlines that ‘[c]ountries that are bordering the Arctic should be extremely serious about not making conflictual announcements, because whatever solution is found, it should be between all the countries bordering it.’ […] ‘We have rules. Perhaps not perfect. But I think the Convention on the Law of the Sea should be applied. I know that it does not give answers to all the questions but it could be used […] It would be very dangerous to reopen the rules because the countries that have access now to 391  www.2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/ sept/109928.htm.

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these territorial waters would say it is really unfair. They would say: ‘Now guys, you have slept for 50 years and now have you discovered oil, you want to change the rules’ So I believe we should stick to existing legislation.’392 5-14 October 2008 At the Fourth World Conservation Congress in Barcelona, IUCN adopts the resolution Arctic legal regime for conservation.393 9 October 2008 The European Parliament adopts a resolution on Arctic governance with 597 votes in favour, 23 against and 41 abstentions.394 17 October 2008 The Canada-EU Summit concludes with the following statement: ‘We also reiterate our shared interest and objectives for the Arctic and the North, which include, among others, protecting the environment and ensuring that Northerners can contribute to economic and social development in the region now and in future generations. We recognize and reiterate the importance of, and the global interest in, the international scientific community’s research activities. We commit to preparing a joint progress report on Arctic cooperation in 2009, taking into account work completed in the context of the Northern Dimension and the Arctic Council.’395 3 November 2008 Norway and Iceland conclude an Agreement concerning Transboundary Hydrocarbon Deposits. It enters into force on 3 October 2011. They also adopt Agreed Minutes concerning the Right of Participation pursuant to Articles 5 and 6 of the Agreement of 200 October 1981 between Norway and Iceland on the Continental Shelf in the Area between Iceland and Jan Mayen.396 3 9 2   w w w. e u r a c t i v. c o m / s e c t i o n / c l i m a t e environment/news/eu-energy-chief-backs-arcticdrilling/. 393 Adopted at the Fourth World Conservation Congress in Barcelona, 5–14 October 2008. 394  Doc 35. 395  www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES -08-292_en.htm. 396  Doc 127, 128.

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events 12 November 2008 At a press conference in Brussels with Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg, Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso offers the European Union’s support for Norway’s position that the melting North Pole does not mean that the region requires a document similar to the Antarctic Treaty. He said: ‘As a matter of principle, we can say that the Arctic is a sea, and a sea is a sea. This is our starting point.’ Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg comments that ‘It’s important to both Norway and the EU that the [UN Convention on the] Law of the Sea applies. […] Of course there is a need for more regulations from the International Maritime Organisation, but the fundamental approach must be the Law of the Sea. […] It is important to avoid a militarisation of the Arctic,’ he said. ‘We are in favour of disarmament and we will do whatever we can to avoid an arms race in the Arctic. Russia has increased its military activities in the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea. That’s just an expression of a stronger economy, more presence of Russia in many different areas.’397 20 November 2008 The European Commission adopts a Communication on The European Union and the Arctic Region which highlights the effects of climate change and human activities in the Arctic.398 25 November 2008 In a referendum on a self-rule plan for Greenland 75.54 per cent of those who cast ballots are in favour of greater autonomy, while 23.57 per cent are against. Although the referendum is non-binding, Denmark has promised to honour the result. The changes outlined in the plan will take effect on 21 June 2009. The plan between Greenland and Denmark also proposes that Greenland be given rights over its large natural resources.399 397 www.euobserver.com/news/27104. 398 

Doc 36.

399  www.stm.dk/_a_2957.html.

A legal and politial analysis is provided by K Göcke, ‘The 2008 Referendum on Greenland’s Autonomy and What It Means for Greenland’s Future’ (2009) 69 ZaöRV 103–121.

11 December 2008 In Moscow, Finland, Norway, the Russian Federation, and Sweden reach the Agreement in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region on Cooperation in Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response. The Agreement to takes effect on 17 May 2012 upon ratification by all parties.400 - 2009 2009 Canada publishes its first major Arctic Strategy called Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future.401 9 January 2009 US President George W Bush, shortly before leaving office, signs National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD—66; Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD—25 on Arctic Region Policy.402 13 January 2009 Russian Arctic explorer and presidential envoy for international cooperation in the Arctic, Arthur Chilingarov, tells Rossiyskaya Gazeta: ‘We are not prepared to give our Arctic to anyone. […] If these rights are not recognized, Russia will withdraw from the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.’403 28/29 January 2009 Iceland hosts a high-level seminar for NATO officials on Security Prospects in the High North, bringing together civilian and military leaders for a discussion of current and future strategic implications of the developments in the High North for the alliance and individual allies, and for planning an official ‘introduction’ of the issue to NATO’s agenda. The then Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer lays out that he sees a clear role for NATO to play in response to

400 

Doc 57. Doc 3. 402  Doc 18. 403 M Schepp and G Traufetter, Riches at the North Pole: Russia Unveils Aggressive Arctic Plans, SPIEGEL International (29 January 2009), www. spiegel.de/international/world/riches-at-the-northpole-russia-unveils-aggressive-arctic-plans-a-604338. html. 401 

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events greater potential for accidents requiring search and rescue missions in the Arctic, as well as the increased risk of ecological disasters requiring relief operations: ‘Allied nations have the necessary capabilities and equipment to carry out such tasks, and our Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre has the necessary extensive experience to coordinate any relief effort, and support search and rescue operations.’ The former Secretary General suggests that NATO should not only provide a forum for its member States to discuss any Arctic affairs, but also might consider ‘conducting practice search and rescue operations, or even disaster relief exercises … to acquaint the relevant staffs and personnel with the unique challenges presented by the Arctic conditions.’404

26 March 2009 According to the spokesman of the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Andrei Nesterenko, ‘NATO’s activity that we are witnesses to in the Arctic Region can result in the erosion of the present constructive pattern of cooperation between coastal states, and the emasculation of the agenda for the Arctic Region. The situation in the Arctic Region is stable. Russia is interested in ensuring the Arctic’s stable development on the basis of international cooperation. The countries of the region are confronted with common challenges, such as climate change and the shrinkage of the Arctic’s ice cap. They are to be resolved without inviting extra-regional players. The Arctic is no place for confrontation but a place for international cooperation.’407

5 February 2009 The US North Pacific Fishery Management Council votes 11-0 in favour of the Fishery Management Plan for Fish Resources of the Arctic Management Area. The plan is created under authority of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act and goes into effect on 3 December 2009. It bans commercial fishing in US waters from 3 nm to 200 nm across the entire Arctic region from the Canadian border down to the Bering Strait.405

27 March 2009 The CLCS issues its final recommendations on the outer limits of the Norwegian continental shelf in the High North. The recommendations confirm that Norway has substantial rights and responsibilities in maritime areas of some 235,000 km2.408

19 March 2009 The five signatories of the Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears—Canada, Denmark/Greenland, Norway, the Russian Federation, and the United States—meet in Tromsø to discuss how to better save the polar bear. The objective of the meeting is to provide an update on the conservation status for the polar bears, to review implementation of the Agreement, to identify useful polar bear conservation strategies and to discuss mechanisms for enhanced implementation of the Agreement. The signatories issue an outcome document of this meeting.406

404 www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_49745.htm. 405 www.npfmc.org/arctic-fishery-management/. 406 

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Doc 230.

6 April 2009 US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton explains the next steps in the US Arctic policy at the Joint Session of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting and the Arctic Council on the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Antarctic Treaty: ‘The changes underway in the Arctic will have long-term impacts on our economic future, our energy future, and indeed, again, the future of our planet. So it is crucial that we work together. Here in Washington, the State Department coordinates Arctic policy for the United States, and I am committed to maintaining a high level of engagement with our partners on this. That starts with the Law of the Sea Convention, which President Obama and I are committed to ratifying, to give the United States and our partners the clarity we need to work together smoothly and effectively in the Arctic region. There are also steps we must take to protect the environment. For example, we know that shortlived carbon forcers like methane, black carbon, 407 www.wikileaksru.wordpress.com/2009/05/26/.

408 

Doc 173.

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events and tropospheric ozone contributes significantly to the warming of the Arctic. And because they are short lived, they also give us an opportunity to make rapid progress if we work to limit them.’409 14 April 2009 The Secretariats of the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna Working Group jointly adopt Resolution of cooperation to contribute to building and sharing knowledge, creating awareness and enhancing capacity for implementation of the Convention in the Arctic Region.410 17 April 2009 The US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rules that with regard to the entire 2007–2012 Outer Continental Shelf oil and natural gas leasing program, insufficient scientific and environmental analysis before scheduling oil and gas lease sales on the Outer Continental Shelf off Alaska were conducted. On 28 July 2009, the court specifies that its ruling only applies to the Chukchi, Beaufort, and Bering Seas. The US Interior Secretary Ken Salazar comments on the clarification as follows: ‘[…] President Obama has made clear that a comprehensive energy plan that reduces America’s dependence on foreign oil must include domestic production and the Court’s ruling allows us to move forward in a balanced way. […] With respect to the Arctic Ocean and Alaska, we will continue to work expeditiously to address the environmental issues identified by the Court in the existing 2007–2012 5-year plan.’411 20 April 2009 Responding to the announcement of the Alaskan Government to consider the auction of oil and

409  US DoS, Remarks at The Joint Session of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting and the Arctic Council, 50th Anniversary of the Antarctic Treaty, www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/ 04/121314.htm. 410  Doc 257. 411  www.boem.gov/boem-newsroom/pressreleases/2009/pressDOI0729.aspx.

gas exploration rights in a disputed section of the Beaufort Sea along the Yukon-Alaska border, Canada notifies Washington of its objections through diplomatic channels. Japan submits its application for observer status in the Arctic Council. An official at the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s Ocean Division remarks that ‘if Japan is admitted as an observer of the council, we’ll have the advantage of being able to collect information on matters of concern to each country related to the utilization of the Arctic Circle. We aim to join the council [with observer status] at its ministerial meeting in two years’ time.’412 27 April 2009 The Embassy of Canada in Washington delivers a diplomatic note with regard to the planned US fishing moratorium in the Beaufort Sea officially rejecting the purported exercise of jurisdiction by the United States or Alaska in the Beaufort Sea east of the 141st meridian of longitude. 28 April 2009 The Inuit Circumpolar Council adopts the Circumpolar Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic.413 29 April 2009 Denmark submits to the CLCS, in accordance with Article 76 (8) UNCLOS, information on the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured in regard to the area north of the Faroe Islands. Iceland and Norway officially comment on the submission respectively.414 Ministers representing the eight Arctic States convene in Tromsø for the Sixth Ministerial meeting of the Arctic Council. The Tromsø Declaration is the outcome of the meeting.415

412  www.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2009/04/20/ japan-applies-for-arctic-council-observer-status; www.jwelb.oxfordjournals.org/content/5/1/13.full. pdf+html. 413  Doc 285. 414 Doc 155–157. 4 1 5   h t t p s : / / o a a r c h iv e . a r c t i c - c o u n c i l . o r g / handle/11374/83.

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events Denmark takes over from Norway as chairman of the Arctic Council for the next two years. At this occasion, the Arctic Council approves and releases the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment Report 2009. This study outlines a framework for protecting the region’s people and marine environment, focusing on marine safety and environmental protection. Selected recommendations are the development of a comprehensive Arctic SAR agreement, updating relevant parts of IMO’s Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-Covered Waters, increasing cooperation in oil spill prevention and continue to develop circumpolar pollution response capabilities, engage Arctic states with relevant international organizations to further assess the effects on marine mammals of ship noise, disturbance, and ship strikes in Arctic waters.416 The Arctic Council puts on hold the EU’s application to gain permanent observer status as a result of Brussels’ approval of a ban on seal products. Canada convinced the Arctic Council to push back the EU’s application, being displeased that Brussels is moving ahead with the ban despite its insistence that the seal hunt is sustainable and not cruel to the animals. Foreign Affairs Minister Lawrence Cannon said that ‘Canada doesn’t feel that the European Union, at this stage, has the required sensitivity to be able to acknowledge the Arctic Council, as well as its membership, and so therefore I’m opposed to it.’ The applications of China, Italy, and South Korea are also turned down for the time being. 24 June 2009 The Danish Parliament approves the Danish defence plan for the period 2010–2014. The plans underlines that, ‘the growing activity level in the Arctic will change the geostrategic importance of the region and gradually result in more challenges for the Danish armed forces’.417

4 1 6   w w w. p a m e . i s / i n d e x . p h p / p r o j e c t s / arctic-marine-shipping/amsa/amsa-2009-report. 417 www.fmn.dk%2Fnyheder%2FDocuments%2F danish-defence-agreement-2010-2014-english.pdf&u sg=AFQjCNEWMOnKf6fO8tWGW7WzrMLkmwB SyQ.

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30 June 2009 The Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Norway, Sergey Andreyev, and the Minister of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs of Norway, Helga Pedersen, exchange letters concerning the extension of the Interim Agreement on Joint Measures of Fisheries Control and Fishing Regulation in the Contiguous Area of the Barents Sea of 11 January 1978 for one year until 1 July 2010 in Oslo. Both sides noted the significance of the Agreement for the development of effective and mutually advantageous cooperation between Russia and Norway in the management of joint fish resources in the Barents Sea. 22 July 2009 The United States and Canada conduct a second joint survey of the extended continental shelf in the Arctic. The spokesperson of the US Department of State said that ‘[…] the U.S. Extended Continental Shelf Task Force, chaired by the Department of State, will conduct a joint 42-day Arctic mission with the Government of Canada this summer to collect scientific data about the extended continental shelf and Arctic seafloor. The mission, scheduled from August 6 to September 16, will continue the collaboration in extended continental shelf data collection in the Arctic started during last summer’s joint survey, with plans for further cooperation in 2010. The interagency and intergovernmental effort will feature the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Healy and the Canadian Coast Guard Ship Louis S. St-Laurent. The 2009 Continental Shelf Survey will emphasize the region north of Alaska onto Alpha-Mendeleev Ridge and eastwards toward the Canada Archipelago. The mission will help define the extended continental shelf (beyond 200 miles from shore) in the Arctic Ocean, as well as U.S. and Canadian sovereign rights based on criteria set forth in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. […].’418 August/September 2009 Two German merchant ships, Beluga Fraternity and Beluga Foresight, sail from South Korea to the Atlantic Ocean along the northern coast of Eurasia. The voyages capture global media attention and represent a significant new 418 

‘Brief Notes’ (2009) 103 AJIL 770–776, 774.

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events maritime linkage of Asian suppliers to the Russian Arctic.419 25 September 2009 The WMO designates Canada, Norway, and the Russian Federation as members of the newly formed Arctic Metareas and Navareas. From now on these three States are responsible for the promulgation of navigation and meteorological warnings over the Arctic Ocean. The WMO has created the group because of the increase in shipping activities in the High North region.420 5 October 2009 Deepak Obhrai, the Canadian Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, states in a discussion at the House of Commons on the Northwest Passage the following: ‘[…] We currently maintain a broad set of guidelines and regulations that we apply to shipping in the Arctic covering important aspects of shipping such as hull structural requirements and proper waste disposal for ships. These regulations include the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, the AWPPA for short. In August 2008, under the leadership of the Prime Minister, the AWPPA was expanded from 100 to 200 nautical miles from the baselines of the territorial sea so that it now applies to and protects all the waters of Canada’s exclusive economic zone, up to 200 nautical miles. Parliament passed the AWPPA to underscore Canada’s commitment to protect the Arctic environment and its resolve to exercise sovereignty over Canadian Arctic waters. There is no question that the exclusive economic zone provides Canada with the legal authority to exercise sovereign rights and jurisdiction over living and non-living resources up to 200 nautical miles from the shore. Our government has done more to secure Canada’s place in

4 1 9   w w w . d n v. c o m / i n d u s t r y / o i l _ g a s / publications/updates/arctic_update/2010/ 01_2010/BelugaShippingmastersf irstcommercial transitoftheNortheastPassage.asp. 420  IMO 2011, Expansion of World-Wide Navigational Warning System into Arctic Waters marked by IMO, WMO and IHO Chiefs, www.imo. org/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/11-arctic.aspx.

the Arctic than any government before us. In addition to the AWPPA, under this government we are developing the regulations to formally establish the NORDREG zone which would make the current voluntary reporting by ships entering Canada’s Arctic waters mandatory. NORDREG’s objectives are to enhance the safety and efficient movement of maritime transportation, prevent pollution, and most important, to exercise our sovereignty in Canada. […] this government has sent a clear message to the world: Under this government, Canada is a leader on the international stage. Through our actions we have made it clear that the Northwest Passage is Canadian. We are proud to call these waterways the Canadian Northwest Passage.’421 15 October 2009 The 12th Ministerial Meeting of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council takes place at Murmansk. It results in a joint statement.422 30 October 2009 Canada, Nunavut, and Greenland sign a trilateral Memorandum of Understanding on the Conservation and Management of Shared Polar Bear Populations.423 9 November 2009 The State of Alaska publishes a 437-page technical report titled Beaufort Sea Areawide Oil and Gas Lease Sale. It comes with a warning about Canada’s claims to area: ‘The U.S. Department of State has notified the State of Alaska that the tide and submerged land within Tract 001 of the lease sale may be subject to a title dispute with the government of Canada … Potential bidders on Tract 001 should be prepared for possible delays in determining state title to lands within this tract.’424

421 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, 40th Parliament, 2nd Session, 2009, Vol 144 (Ottawa, Canadian Government Publishing, 2009) 1150 et seqq. 422  Doc 58. 423  Doc 238. 424  www.canada.com/stor y_print.html?id= c4adaf28-1d40-4a98-85a0-fe53b194c28e&sponsor=.

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events 2 December 2009 The IMO Assembly adopts Guidelines for ships operating in polar waters.425 7 December 2009 The Parliament of Greenland adopts an Act on Mineral Resources by which the legislative and executive responsibility for mineral resource activities will be transferred to the Government of Greenland with effect from 1 January 2010.426 8 December 2009 The Council of the European Union publishes its Conclusions on Arctic issues. The Council aims for a further formulation of an overarching approach to EU policy on Arctic and sets out a roadmap how to achieve this goal.427 - 2010 1 February 2010 The 2010 US Quadrennial Defense Review Report states that ‘we will seek opportunities to work with Moscow on emerging issues, such as the future of the Arctic’ and that the US Department of Defense ‘will also enhance defense relationships and continue to work with Canada in the context of regional security [and] increased interaction in the Arctic. […] The effect of changing climate on the Department’s operating environment is evident in the maritime commons of the Arctic. The opening of the Arctic waters in the decades ahead which will permit seasonal commerce and transit presents a unique opportunity to work collaboratively in multilateral forums to promote a balanced approach to improving human and environmental security in the region. […] To support cooperative engagement in the Arctic, DoD strongly supports accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.’428 17 February 2010 Catherine Loubier, a spokeswoman with the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, tells Canwest News Service: 425 

Doc 178.

426 Greenland

Parliament Act No 7 on mineral resources and mineral resource activities with all subsequent amendments. 427  Doc 37. 428  US, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2010) 86. clxx

‘The information collected so far suggests there may be a potential overlap of the Canadian and U.S. extended continental shelves in this area [Beaufort Sea]. The extent of the overlap is not yet known. It may make sense to resolve the maritime boundary and any extended continental shelf overlaps at the same time. Canada favours a resolution of the dispute. The issue has been well-managed by Canada and the U.S. and will be resolved on its own merits when both parties are ready to do so.’429 15 March 2010 General Rapporteur Ragnheidur Arnadottir (Iceland) delivers her report on Security at the Top of the World: Is there a NATO Role in the High North at the spring session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. This report will serve as the basis for discussion and further fact-finding.430 29 March 2010 The Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada and the US Department of the Interior sign a Memorandum of Understanding concerning Indigenous and Northern Issues.431 In furtherance of commitments in the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration, Canada invites for a second ministerial meeting of the five Arctic Coastal States. Discussions are held on the need for deepening cooperation as seabed claims are to be submitted, and the importance of addressing the challenges of greater Arctic Ocean accessibility. However, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton expresses her deep dissatisfaction that Iceland, Finland, Sweden, and representatives of the Arctic’s indigenous peoples were not been asked to join the meeting. 28 April 2010 The Russian spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Andrei Nesterenko responds to media question regarding the Russian-Norwegian 429  www.arctic-healy-baker-2008.blogspot. de/2010/02/canada-favors-resolution-of-canada-us. html. 430 NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2010 Annual Session in Warsaw, 213 DSCTC 10 E—Security at the top of the World: Is there a Nato role in the High North? 431  Doc 286.

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events Agreement on Maritime Delimitation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean. Question: How could you comment on the agreement reached during the state visit to Norway by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on the principles of maritime delimitation and cooperation in the Barents Seat and the Arctic Ocean? Answer: Undoubtedly the agreement signifies a tangible breakthrough in bilateral relations and takes them to new horizons of joint activity in the development of natural resources in the northern shelf areas in conditions of the clear bounds of jurisdiction of Russia and Norway. The delegations have preliminarily agreed on a draft treaty concerning delimitation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean, which has been the object of negotiations for over forty years. It is essentially about delimiting nearly all of the Barents Sea and a part of the Arctic Ocean. The size of the disputed area, i.e., the area between the initial claims of the sides is very imposing—more than 175000 square kilometres. An important substantive point: it is not the states’ territory that is being delimited, but their continental shelf, including beyond the 200 mile limit, and the exclusive economic zones. The overall disputed area is divided into two parts of approximately the same size: about 88000 square kilometres for either party. As a result of the delimitation our countries in this vast maritime area will, at last, have clear outer limits of their exclusive economic zones and continental shelf. The delimitation is also essential from the viewpoint of pushing forward our submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. As follows from its recommendations received by us, only after the entry into force of a maritime delimitation treaty with Norway can the outer limit of the continental shelf of Russia in this part of the Arctic be fixed. The delimitation will create a favourable legal environment for developing the oil and gas resources of the Arctic continental shelf. As is known, a moratorium on exploration for and development of oil and gas deposits has been operating in the disputed area over the last thirty years. This moratorium will end upon conclusion of the delimitation treaty. The agreement reached by the two delegations envisions adoption of detailed rules and procedures for Russian-Norwegian cooperation

in the development of deposits that will be cut across by the delimitation line. In fact, this is about a joint regime of their exploitation. There is a common understanding that the conclusion of a treaty on delimitation shall not adversely affect the fishing opportunities of either side. This principled moment is set forth in the draft treaty. After its entry into force, the RussianNorwegian basic agreements of 1975–1976 will remain in effect for at least another fifteen years (with a possible extension for subsequent sixyear periods). Accordingly, the Joint RussianNorwegian Fisheries Commission will continue to work, determining overall catch-limits, fishing quotas and fishing regulations. The sides have committed themselves to act so that fishing continues in a stable manner, with due regard for the interests of the people of the coastal regions traditionally engaged in this activity. Completing the delimitation of the exclusive economic zones creates more explicit and understandable legal conditions for fishing and will objectively narrow the probability of conflict situations in this sphere. The delegations will soon finish technical work on the text of the draft treaty, thus opening the way for its early conclusion.432 14 May 2010 The Canadian Foreign Minister Lawrence Cannon invites the United States to settle the Beaufort Sea Dispute and to come to a bilateral agreement.433 Iceland’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Össur Skarphédinsson, reports to the Parliament of Iceland on Iceland’s interest in the High North. One of the main goals for Iceland is to ‘be considered a full-fledged coastal state on a par with such countries as the USA, Denmark (for Greenland), Canada, Norway and Russia.’434 4 June 2010 Finland publishes its first Arctic strategy. The Finnish Cabinet Committee on European Union http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/ news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/ content/id/253366. 432  

433  www.byers.typepad.com/arctic/2010/05/ canada-ready-to-settle-beaufort-sea-dispute-with-uscannon.html. 434  Doc 23.

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events Affairs adopted the proposal for Finland’s strategy for the Arctic region which was presented to the Committee by a working group appointed by the Office of the Finnish Prime Minister Mari Kiviniemi. The strategy defines Finland’s Arctic policy objectives and suggests ways of promoting them. The strategy also includes proposals for the development of the EU’s Arctic policy. Finland is the first EU Member State that adopts a comprehensive Arctic Strategy.435 10 June 2010 The Government of Canada announces its new Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulations (NORDREG).436 Hereby Canada requires that foreign and domestic ships of a certain size report to the Canadian Coast Guard if travelling through Canada’s Arctic waters. The regulations will require vessels of a certain size to submit reports in three stages: a prearrival information report prior to entering the NORDREG Zone; while navigating within the NORDREG Zone; and upon exiting the NORDREG Zone. The new regulations make the previous voluntary traffic reporting system for the NORDREG Zone mandatory. This mandatory requirement shall ensure ships report information such as identity, position and destination to the Canadian Coast Guard, and will be enforced from shore to 200 nm. This regulation follows legislation passed in June 2009 that expanded the area within Arctic waters over which the government could enforce important Canadian pollution regulations, from 100 nm from shore to 200 nm. This legislative change stirs to some international controversy.437 22 June 2010 The senior officials of the five Arctic Coastal States meet in Chelsea in order to discuss current problems of Arctic Fisheries. The meeting results in a Chair’s statement.438

the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people in the Russian Federation is published.439 This includes indigenous peoples living in the Russian Arctic. 20 August 2010 The Government of Canada releases its Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada’s Northern Strategy Abroad.440 A Chinese Arctic expedition team reaches the North Pole. China conducted three previous Arctic expeditions in 1999, 2003 and 2008. The director of the Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration under China’s State Oceanic Administration said that the purpose of China`s Arctic exploration activity is to research the effects of the Arctic climate change on the climate in China. He added: ‘The aim of China’s Arctic expedition is for peace, science, cooperation and environmental protection. According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as well as relevant international laws, China has the right to carry out normal scientific exploration in the Arctic Ocean.’441 30 August 2010 To better protect Canadian Arctic waters from ship-source pollution, Act to amend the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act comes into force after having received Royal Assent on 11 June 2009. Under the amended Act, Canada has jurisdiction to enforce Canadian environmental laws and shipping regulations in Arctic waters up to 200 nm offshore, doubling the area of coverage previously provided for under the Act.

23 June 2010 The Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya, on

1 September 2010 After having given a speech at NATO Defence College in Rome, Supreme Allied Commander Europe James Stavridis is asked whether ‘Arctic Security’ shall be an issue to be dealt with by NATO. He answers that ‘[t]his should be dealt with by the states that are concerned. And there is also the Arctic Council which was set up to

435  www.geopoliticsnorth.org/images/stories/ attachments/Finland.pdf. 436  Doc 273. 437 Doc 274–279. 438  Doc 207.

UN Doc A/HRC/15/37/Add.5. Doc 4. 441 www.en.people.cn/90001/90776/90881/7132529. html.

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439 

440 

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events deal with these issues. We are not doing any strategic planning on this area in our HQ in Brussels.’ 13 September 2010 In a speech entitled ‘Arctic footsteps in Brussels’ to the 9th Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region Maria Damanaki, European Commissioner for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, says: ‘Indeed, the European Union is an Arctic player in its own right. A unique combination of history, geography, economics and scientific discovery link the European Union to the Arctic. […] European policies in areas such as the environment, climate change, energy, fisheries and transport have a direct bearing on the Arctic regions. […] Since 2008 the Commission has sought to structure an EU policy for the Arctic, around three main axes: First, protecting and preserving the Arctic. This is something that affects each and every one of us—and not least the populations of the Arctic regions. Second, enhancing governance in the Arctic, by helping enforce and build on the relevant agreements and other arrangements. And third, promoting the sustainable use of resources, in accordance with the highest environmental and safety standards. That is an absolute priority.’442 15 September 2010 Norway and the Russian Federation sign the Treaty on maritime delimitation and cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean in Murmansk.443 The treaty is based on the principle that natural resources deposits crossed by the sea border between the two countries can be developed only jointly and as a single whole. It also states explicitly that delimitation must not impair conditions for Russian and Norwegian fishing activities in the neighbouring areas of the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean. The agreement lays to rest a long-running dispute over the Barents Sea. Both countries claimed a 175,000 km2 zone, situated north of Russia’s Kola Peninsula and the Norwegian coast.

4 4 2   w w w. e u r o p a . e u / r a p i d / p r e s s - r e l e a s e _

SPEECH-10-422_de.htm?locale=en. 443  Doc 120.

Russian President Medvedev at a press conference in Murmansk replies to a question about NATO`s role in the Arctic: ‘[…] we could do without NATO in the Arctic because it is part of our common heritage, which, strictly speaking, does not have anything to do with military objectives. We are fully capable of managing there with the use of economic regulation and international agreements we sign. At the same time, of course, NATO has its own policy, which is determined by the alliance itself. In any case, the Russian Federation watches such activity intently and with some concern. Why? Because after all it is an area of peaceful cooperation, economic cooperation, and the presence of a military factor at the very least raises additional issues.’444 22 September 2010 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan announces the establishment of an Arctic Task Force in order to make cross-sectoral approach towards the foreign policy on the Arctic including the aspect of international law. Japan has applied for the observer status in the Arctic Council.445 16 September 2010 The transcript of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Remarks and Answers to Media Questions at Joint Press Conference Following Talks with Canadian Foreign Minister Lawrence Cannon reads: Question: Canada intends to apply for Arctic territories, in particular, the Lomonosov Ridge. How is Canada going to justify these claims? How does the Russian Federation view the attempts of its neighbors in the Arctic to claim some territory? Lavrov: We are absolutely in agreement with our Canadian colleagues that these and similar questions need to be tackled on the basis of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Convention-related mechanisms that are respected by all Arctic countries. We hope that the US will join the Convention on the Law 4 4 4   w w w. e n . k r e m l i n . r u / eve n t s / p r e s i d e n t / transcripts/8924. 4 4 5   w w w. m o f a . g o . j p / a n n o u n c e / a n n o u n c e / 2010/9/0902_01.html.

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events of the Sea and become an active participant in arrangements under which the scientifically supported applications of countries are considered with respect to the outer limits of their continental shelf.  Russia  submitted its application. The Commission considered it in the early 2000’s and recommended that we provide additional information which we are now actively collecting. With specific regard to the Lomonosov Ridge, it was discovered by Russian explorers. But now we are talking about how to scientifically prove that it is an extension of our continental shelf. I have already said that we continue to provide our data to the Commission. Canada has provided its data. Incidentally, Denmark is also thinking about how to announce the Lomonosov Ridge a continuation of Greenland. All these claims should be based on scientifically provable facts. They will be considered by the Commission, which will decide who is right and who is wrong. Question: Mr. Cannon, how did you explain to your Russian counterpart, the desire to militarize the Arctic? Is there a possibility to obtain consent from the Russian side on this issue? Lavrov: Russian President Dmitry Medvedev at the meeting in Murmansk with the Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg after the signing of the Russian-Norwegian treaty on maritime delimitation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean clearly stated our position. does not see what benefit NATO could bring in the Arctic. The Arctic countries, as my counterpart just said, the Arctic Council and the Arctic “five” at the meetings in Ilulissat and Chelsea this year confirmed that all the problems that exist here, or may arise, should be solved by political means on the basis of international law, above all, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The signing of the Russian-Norwegian treaty yesterday in Murmansk shows that these problems are quite amenable to solution via direct agreements between the respective Arctic states on the principles I have set out. I do not think that NATO will do the right thing by taking it upon itself to determine who and how will decide issues in the Arctic. I agree with Minister Cannon that there is no talk about any militarization. However, Russia and Canada as

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the countries whose territory accounts for three quarters of the coastline of the Arctic Ocean are responsible for the security of not only their own borders, but also for the safety of the shipping routes running alongside them. Of course, we will be embodying this responsibility into concrete steps to ensure in practice the security in the region. 6 October 2010 The five Arctic Coastal States establish the Arctic Regional Hydrographic Commission.446 2 November 2010 The Second Ministerial Meeting of the Northern Dimension in Oslo takes place. 12 November 2010 Canada announces tits endorsement of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.447 Originally, Canada voted against the adoption of the Declaration. 6 December 2010 US President Barack Obama signs a Presidential Proclamation on the 50th Anniversary of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. It says that ‘[i]n the decades since its establishment, the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge has continued to be one of our Nation’s most pristine and cherished areas. In the decades to come, it should remain a place where wildlife populations, from roaming herds of caribou to grizzly bears and wolf packs, continue to thrive. The 19.6 million acres that comprise the Arctic Refuge are also home to Native American tribes, including the Inupiat and Gwich’in, and the resources of the Refuge sustain these populations and protect their indigenous traditions and way of life. Today, the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge remains distinct in the American landscape, and we must remain committed to making responsible choices and ensuring the continued conservation of these wild lands.’448

446 

Doc 181. Doc 287. 448  https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2010/12/06/presidential-proclamation-50thanniversary-arctic-national-wildlife-refu. 447 

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events 16 December 2010 During the White House Tribal Nations Conference at the US Department of the Interior, US President Obama announces that the United States now supports the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Originally, the United States voted against the adoption of the Declaration.449

secure Iceland’s position as a fully acknowledged Arctic Coastal State.454

- 2011-

May 2011 Prior to assuming the chairmanship of the Arctic Council, Sweden issues its Strategy for the Arctic region, which concentrates on cooperation in the Arctic Council framework.455

1 January 2011 Due to an amendment of the Swedish Constitution, the Sami are now recognised at constitutional level as an indigenous people.450 12 January 2011 The Report of the Special Rapporteur James Anaya on the situation of the Sami people in the Sápmi region of Norway, Sweden and Finland is published.451 20 January 2011 The European Parliament adopts Resolution on a sustainable EU policy for the High North as response to the Commission’s Communication of 2008. Thereby the Parliament abandons the idea of an Arctic Treaty—which was still supported by the 2008 Resolution—and joins Commission and Council in recognising that an extensive legal framework already exists in the Arctic.452 16 March 2011 Chief of Ground Forces of the Russian Federation, Colonel-General Alexander Postnikov, announces that the Russian Federation will create a special brigade to fight in the Arctic by implementing the Russian Arctic strategy tabled in the Principles of State Policy of Russian Federation in the Arctic for the period up to 2020 and beyond.453 28 March 2011 The Icelandic Parliament adopts a resolution on Iceland’s Arctic policy. One of the objectives is to 449 

Doc 288. See A/HRC/18/XX/Add.Y, 7. 451  UN Doc A/HRC/18/XX/Add.Y. 452  Doc 38. 453 www.svpressa.ru/society/article/40543/. 454  Doc 24. 450 

17 March 2011 Canada’s Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence has tabled an interim report entitled Sovereignty and Security in Canada’s Arctic.

12 May 2011 The 7th Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting takes place in Nuuk This meeting marks the end of Denmark chairmanship of the Arctic Council (2009–2011) and the beginning of Sweden’s twoyear period as Chair of the Council. The meeting results in the Nuuk Declaration.456 On this occasion, the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic, first legally binding treaty negotiated under the auspices of the Arctic Council, is signed. It enters into force on 19 January 2013.457 26 May 2011 US President Obama and Russia’s President Medvedev sign a Joint Statement on Cooperation in the Bering Strait Region.458 21 June 2011 Norway states that the Grey Zone Agreement with the Russian Federation has been extended until 7 July 2011, which is the date when the treaty between Norway and the Russian Federation on maritime delimitation and cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean will enter into force. The extension was formalised through an exchange of letters.

455 

Doc 25.

456  https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/

11374/83. 457  Doc 180. 458  Doc 350.

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events 22 August 2011 Denmark releases a comprehensive Strategy for the Arctic 2011–2020.459 12 October 2011 The 13th Ministerial Meeting of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council takes place at Kiruna. It results in a joint statement.460 26 October 2011 At Iqaluit, the Polar Bear Range States meet again for discussions. The meeting is concluded with a joint statement.461 29 November 2011 The Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and the Icelandic Foreign Minister Ossur Skarphedinsson sign a Declaration on Arctic Cooperation. During the press conference Sergey Lavrov emphasises that any Arcticrelated problems should be solved on the basis of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the decisions of the Arctic Council. There were no reasons for drawing NATO into Arctic affairs.462 - 2012 22 April 2012 More than 2,000 scientists from around the world sign an open letter calling for a moratorium on commercial fishing in the Arctic.463 24 April 2012 China and Iceland sign a Framework Agreement on Arctic Cooperation. Hereby the two States agree to further enhance their exchange and practical co-operation on the Arctic, marine, geothermal, geo-scientific, environment protection, climate change and other issues on the basis. In addition, the Government of Iceland reaffirms its support for China’s application for observer status in the Arctic Council.464

14 June 2012 Denmark submits information on the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in respect of the Southern Continental Shelf of Greenland to the CLCS, in accordance with Article 76 (8) UNCLOS. Canada officially comments on the submission.465 26 June 2012 In response to Council and Parliament, the European Commission and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy submit a Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council Developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region: progress since 2008 and next steps.466 12 July 2012 The Secretariats of the Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds and the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna Working Group sign a Resolution of Cooperation.467 16 July 2012 The Secretariats of the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands and the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna Working Group adopt a Resolution of Cooperation.468 28 July 2012 The Russian Federation enacts Federal Law on Amendments to Specific Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation related to Governmental Regulation of Merchant Shipping in the Water Area in the Northern Sea Route. 6-15 September 2012 At the Fifth World Conservation Congress in Jeju/Republic of Korea, the ICUN General Assembly adopts resolution entitled IUCN and

459 

Doc 5. Doc 59. 461  Doc 231. 462  Doc 69. 463  www.cbc.ca/news/world/arctic-f ishingmoratorium-needed-scientists-say-1.1291084. 464  www.eng.forsaetisraduneyti.is/news-andarticles/nr/7144; www.eng.forsaetisraduneyti.is/media/ 460 

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frettir1/Joint-statement-of-PMs-Iceland-China2013.pdf. 465 

Doc 159, 160. Doc 39. 467  Doc 258. 468  Doc 259. 466 

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events the Arctic region—intensified and coordinated work.469 8 September 2012 Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton sign a Joint Statement on Cooperation in the Bering Strait Region.470 12 September 2012 South Korea and Norway sign two Memoranda of Understanding on Arctic shipping and shipbuilding. Cooperation under these Memoranda will include ‘strengthening of cooperation in the field of maritime transport to facilitate the Northern Sea Route, and development of maritime infrastructure for resource transportation in the Arctic area.’471 28 November 2012 Norway and the Russian Federation obtain IMO approval for a mandatory Ship Reporting Scheme for vessels transiting the Barents Sea. The new mandatory ship reporting system will enter into force on 1 June 2013.472   Canada and Denmark reach a tentative agreement on the disputed Lincoln Sea boundary.473 10 December 2012 The District Court of Nord-Troms rules that the Spitsbergen Treaty does not apply beyond Svalbard’s territorial waters. On 7 July 2013, the Court of Appeals of Hålogaland confirms this

469 Adopted at the Fifth World Conservation Congress in Jeju, Republic of Korea, 6-15 September 2012. State and agency Members of the United States abstained during the vote on this Motion for reasons given in the US General Statement on the IUCN Resolutions Process. 470  Doc 351. 471  Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Trade and Industry of the Kingdom of Norway and the Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs of the Republic of Korea on Cooperation in the Field of MaritimeTransport. The Norwegian Ministry of trade, industry and fisheries kindly provided this document. Document on file with the editor. 472  IMO Resolution MSC.348(91). 473  Doc 135.

ruling. However, the then sought Supreme Court of Norway avoids the delicate issue of territorial application by merely deciding the question as to whether or not the regulations in question were even discriminatory.474 15 December 2012 The International Organization for Standardization publishes specific requirements and recommendations and guidance for the design, construction, transportation, installation and removal of offshore structures in relation to the activities of the petroleum and natural gas industries in Arctic regions.475 - 201316 January 2013 Greenland and Iceland sign Agreed Minutes on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles in the Irminger Sea.476 17 January 2013 The Russian Ministry of Transport enacts legally binding Rules of Navigation in the water area of the Northern Sea Route.477 5/6 February 2013 Ministers and high-level representatives from Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden, and the United States meet in Jukkasjärvi to discuss the environmental changes in the Arctic and how to improve the protection of the Arctic environment on national, regional and global levels, including through the Arctic Council and multilateral environmental conventions. They are joined by representatives of the Sami Council and the Inuit Circumpolar Council, as well as other interested countries and organisations. The

474 See for case comments T Henriksen, www. site.uit.no/jclos/2014/03/18/norwegian-by-catchr eg u l a t i o n s - a l l eg e d - t o - v i o l a t e - t h e - s va l b a r d treaty/#more-59, and I Dahl, www.site.uit.no/ jclos/2014/06/02/norwegian-by-catch-regulations-arenot-disciminatory/. 475 Petroleum and natural gas industries—Arctic offshore structures, ISO 19906:2010. 476  Doc 137. 477  Doc 315.

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events Swedish Ministry of the Environment publishes the conclusions from the meeting entitled Arctic Change—Global Effect.478 20 February 2013 Russian President Putin approves the Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and National Security for the period up to 2020.479 19 March 2013 The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs appoints Masuo Nishibayashi, Ambassador in charge of Cultural Exchange, to be concurrently responsible for Arctic Affairs. The Japanese Foreign Ministry explains this appointment by saying that ‘Japan is located outside the Arctic region, but as a maritime state and one that attaches much importance to global environmental issues, it needs to be appropriately involved in international discussions regarding the Arctic.’480 11 April 2013 In 2012, the Government of the Faroe Islands commissioned a strategic assessment to provide a better understanding of the challenges and potential of the Faroe Islands in the future development of the Artic region. Now the final assessment The Faroe Islands—a Nation in the Arctic is presented to Prime Minister Kaj Leo Holm Johannesen.481 15 April 2013 At Bejing, Iceland and China sign a Free Trade Agreement. In a joint-statement the Prime Minister of Iceland and the Premier of China underline that they want ‘to enhance their exchange and practical co-operation on the Arctic’ and ‘further deepen their mutually beneficial co-operation in the fields of trade and investment.’482

478 

Doc 220. Doc 12. 480  www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press6e_ 000002.html. 481  Doc 6. 479 

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17 April 2013 The European Economic and Social Committee submits its opinion on EU Arctic Policy in order to address globally emerging interests in the region.483 25 April 2013 The General Court of the EU hands down its judgment in ‘Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami et al v European Commission’ (Case T-526/10). The court dismisses the arguments put forward by a group of seal hunters who pleaded—among other things—that the EU acts ultra vires by adopting the ban on trade in seal products on the basis of Article 114 TFEU, since the ban is not aimed at improving the functioning of the European internal market, but rather at the protection of seals.484 29 April 2013 The US Undersecretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere and Administrator for the NOAA and the Head of the Federal Agency for Fisheries of the Russian Federation sign a Joint Statement on Enhanced Fisheries Cooperation. Concerning the Fisheries in the Arctic in which they underline the following: ‘[t]o address the changes that are already underway in the Arctic, it is critical that the scientific community develops a sufficient understanding of the biophysical processes governing the region to assess the ecosystem impacts of climate variability and anthropogenic stressors. U.S. and Russian scientists intend to identify areas for cooperation on scientific research in the Arctic Ocean with the aim of improving their understanding of the Arctic Ocean fishery stocks and their ecosystem(s). We

4 8 2   w w w. l a w p r o f e s s o r s . t y p e p a d . c o m / international_law/2013/04/iceland-and-china-signfree-trade-agreement.html. 483  Doc 40. 484 Judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber), Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v European Commission, Case T‑526/10, 25 April 2013, ECLI:EU:T:2013:215. For case comment see L Ankersmit, ‘The seal product cases (II): Case T-526/10 Inuit Tapriit Kanatami and others’, 7 May 2013, www.europeanlawblog.eu/?p=1738.

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events will also work to ensure that any commercial fishing in the high seas portion of the central Arctic Ocean is managed effectively on the basis of sound science.’485 The Secretariats of the Convention on Migratory Species of Wild Animals and the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna Working Group sign a Resolution of Cooperation.486 1 May 2013 Senior officials of the five Arctic Coastal States meet again, this time in Washington DC in order to discuss current problems of Arctic fisheries. The meeting results in a Chair’s statement.487 8 May 2013 NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen explains on an official visit to Norway that at this present time, NATO has no intention of raising its presence and activities in the High North.488 10 May 2013 US President Obama issues a new comprehensive National Strategy for the Arctic Region supplementing the former Arctic policy directive (NSPD 66/HSPD 25) of 2009.489 15 May 2013 At the Kiruna Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden, and the United States adopt the Kiruna Declaration, revise rules of procedure and sign the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution, Preparedness and Response in the Arctic.490 China, India, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, and Singapore are accepted as new observer states by the Arctic Council, whereas the application of the EU is not approved due to

485 www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ia/slider_stories/2013/04/ statement_signed.pdf. 486  Doc 260. 487  Doc 208. 488  http://www.defensenews.com/article/2013 0 5 2 9 / D E F R E G / 3 0 5 2 9 0 0 2 2 / NATO - R e j e c t s Direct-Arctic-Presence. 489  Doc 19. 490  Doc 254.

diplomatic frictions with regard to the ban of import of seal products. Canada and the United States publish a Joint Marine Pollution Contingency Plan 2013. The plan promotes a coordinated system for planning, preparing and responding to harmful substance incidents in the adjacent waters of the United States and Canada and shall also apply in areas comprising those waters off the Arctic Coast of Canada and the United States in the Beaufort Sea.491 23 May 2013 Hillary Clinton, US Secretary of State, testifies before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations regarding the US’ accession to the UNCLOS. Among other aspects she highlights that the United States would greatly benefit from the Convention’s provisions on offshore natural resources, in particular since the United States would be further advantaged by provisions in the treaty that allow the continental shelf to extend beyond 200 nm in certain areas.492 During the same hearing US Secretary of Defense Leon E Panetta makes the following statement: ‘accession would ensure our ability to reap the benefits of the opening of the Arctic—a region of increasingly important maritime security and economic interest. We already see countries testing new shipping routes and exploring for natural resources as Arctic ice cover recedes. Joining the Convention would maximize international recognition and acceptance of our substantial extended continental shelf claims in the Arctic. As we are the only Arctic nation that is not a party to the Convention, we are at a serious disadvantage in this respect. Accession would also secure our navigation and over-flight rights throughout the Arctic, and strengthen our arguments for

491 Signed at Ottawa, 15 May 2013 and at Washington DC, 1 May 2013; entered into force 15 May 2013, www.uscg.mil/d1/response/jrt/documents/ 2013%20CANUS%20JCP.pdf. 492 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The Law of the Sea Convention (Treaty Doc. 103-39): The U.S. National Security and Strategic Imperatives for Ratification, www.foreign.senate.gov/download/ revised-secretary-clinton-testimony.

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events freedom of navigation through the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route.’493 3/4 June 2013 The prime ministers of the Members States of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council meet to celebrate its 20th anniversary. The meeting results in a third Kirkenes Declaration.494 10 June 2013 India’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs publishes a statement on ‘India and the Arctic’.495 11 June 2013 At the 1173rd meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europa adopts a Resolution on the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by Sweden. One issue of great concern is the legal situation of the Sami as regards winter grazing land rights. According to the Resolution this ‘needs to be clarified in the light of the Supreme Court’s judgment of 27 April 2011 and more efforts are needed to ensure that their traditional way of life is maintained and negative impacts of spatial planning decisions are minimised.’496 28 June 2013 The Directive 2013/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on safety of offshore oil and gas operations and amending Directive 2004/35/EC is adopted. Recital 52 states that the ‘Arctic waters are a neighbouring marine environment of particular importance for the Union, and play an important role in mitigating climate change. The serious environmental concerns relating to the Arctic waters require special attention 493 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The Law of the Sea Convention (Treaty Doc. 103-39): The U.S. National Security and Strategic Imperatives for Ratification, www.foreign.senate.gov/download/ secdef-leon-panetta-testimonydocx. 494  Doc 60. 495  Doc 28. 496  Council of Europe, Resolution CM/ ResCMN(2013)2 on the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by Sweden (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 11 June 2013 at the 1173rd meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies).

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to ensure the environmental protection of the Arctic in relation to any offshore oil and gas operation, including exploration, taking into account the risk of major accidents and the need for effective response. Member States who are members of the Arctic Council are encouraged to actively promote the highest standards with regard to environmental safety in this vulnerable and unique ecosystem, such as through the creation of international instruments on prevention, preparedness and response to Arctic marine oil pollution, and through building, inter alia, on the work of the Task Force established by the Arctic Council and the existing Arctic Council Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines.’ Article 33 (3) urges the Commission to ‘promote high safety standards for offshore oil and gas operations at international level in relevant global and regional fora, including those relating to Arctic waters.’497 23 August 2013 Finland updates its Arctic Strategy following a comprehensive review of its Arctic policies. The updated strategy, which maintains sustainability at its core, focuses on the promotion of growth and competitiveness in the region. Notably, as the only Arctic State Finland supports the recognition of the Arctic Council as a treatybased international organisation.498 24 September 2013 Russian State Duma Deputy Maxim Shingarkin calls upon all Arctic States to harmonise their laws for environmental standards as the top of the world opens for oil drilling.499 10 October 2013 The Minamata Convention on Mercury is adopted by delegates from over 140 States. It will enter into force after 50 countries have joined. The Arctic Council states issued a

497  Directive 2013/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 June 2013 on safety of offshore oil and gas operations and amending Directive 2004/35/EC, OJ L 178, 28.6.2013, 66-106. 498  Doc 22. 499 www.barentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2013/09/ suggests-joint-arctic-environmental-legislations-24-09.

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events statement in which they ‘urge countries to take necessary steps to ratify and implement the Minamata Convention, including to further assess their national mercury situations in order to understand their key challenges, and to begin planning and implementing effective actions.’500 12 October 2013 NATO Special Rapporteur Jadwiga Zakrzewska presents its report on Security in the High North: NATO’s role to the Political Committee of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. He strongly recommends a greater involvement and interest of NATO in Arctic affairs.501 12-14 October 2013 The Arctic Circle is inaugurated at Reykjavik. This non-profit organisation is ‘designed to increase participation in Arctic dialogue and strengthen the international focus on the future of the Arctic.’502 17 October 2013 The United Kingdom publishes a strategy Adapting to change—UK policy towards the Arctic. Among other things the Committee, which drafted the strategy paper recommends that the UK should follow the example of France, Singapore, and Japan in appointing an ambassador for Arctic affairs.503 19 October 2013 Finland takes over the Chairmanship of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council at the 14th Ministerial Session at Tromsø. The meeting results in a joint statement.504 November 2013 The Federal Government of Germany issues Guidelines of the Germany Arctic Policy.505 25 November 2013 The WTO Panel hands down its decision in the complaints made by Canada and Norway 500 

Doc 261.

501  NATO

Parliamentary Assembly, Committee, Doc 156 PCTR 13 E bis. 502 www.arcticcircle.org/about. 503  Doc 29. 504  Doc 61. 505  Doc 30.

Political

concerning measures prohibiting the importation and marketing of seal products. The WTO Panel comes to the conclusion that certain aspects of the EU Regulation on Sealing infringe the EU’s international trade obligations, but that these infringements can be justified on the grounds of public morals.506 26 November 2013 Denmark submits to the CLCS, in accordance with Article 76 (8) UNCLOS, information on the outer limits of the continental shelf in respect of the North-Eastern Continental Shelf of Greenland. Norway comments on the submission.507 December 2013 South Korea announces its first comprehensive Arctic Strategy.508 4–6 December 2013 At Moscow, the Polar Bear Range States reconvene for discussions. The meeting is concluded with a joint statement and a declaration of ministers.509 6 December 2013 Canada submits preliminary information on the outer limits of the continental shelf of Canada the Arctic Ocean to the CLCS.510 - 2014 24 January 2014 Norway disagrees with WTO’s backing of the EU ban on import and sale of seal products. Norway notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal to the Appellate Body certain issues of law and legal interpretations developed by the panel.511 506  WTO Panel Report, European Communities— Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ dispu_e/400_401r_e.pdf. 507  Doc 161, 162. 508  Doc 31. 509  Doc 232, 233. 510  Doc 174. 511 Notification of an appeal by Norway under article 16.4 and article 17 of the understanding on rules and procedures governing the settlement of disputes (DSU), and under rule 20(1) of the working procedures for appellate review, WT/DS401/9.

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events 30 January 2014 The US Administration releases an Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for the Arctic Region.512 31 January 2014 The US Department of the Interior certifies to US President Obama under the Pelly Amendment to the Fishermen’s Protective Act of 1967 that Iceland’s international trade in whale meat and products diminishes the effectiveness of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora.513 US President Obama also issues a Memorandum on Pelly Certification and Icelandic Whaling.514 13 February 2014 Sigurður Ingi Jóhannsson, Minister of Fisheries and Agriculture of Iceland, expresses disappointment with the Pelly Amendment certification of Iceland by the US Department of Interior. According to Jóhannsson there is no legal or scientific basis for this certification.515 24-26 February 2014 The five Arctic Coastal States convene for a meeting on Arctic fisheries in Nuuk. The outcome document calls for interim measures to deter unregulated fishing in the central Arctic Ocean.516 4 March 2014 The Russian Federation enacts new Rules of the application of tariffs for the icebreaker escorting of ships in the water area of the Northern Sea Route.517

512  www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/f iles/ docs/implementation_plan_for_the_national_strategy _for_the_arctic_region_-_fi….pdf. 513  www.fws.gov/news/ShowNews.cfm?ID= 07B03A05-D0BA-0737-ECFADAFD5A84EEA2. 514  www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-off ice/ 2014/04/01/memorandum-pelly-certification-andicelandic-whaling. 5 1 5   w w w. e n g . a t v i n n u v e g a r a d u n e y t i . i s / publications/news/nr/8058. 516  Doc 209. 517  Doc 316.

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11/12 March 2014 The Supreme Court of Norway considers a case concerning the legality of imposing fines and confiscations on the master and owner of a German flagged vessel for violating by-catch regulations for haddock within the 200 nm Fisheries Protection Zone around Svalbard. The defendants seek an acquittal arguing that those regulations violate the Svalbard treaty.518 The European Parliament adopts Resolution on the future EU Strategy for the Arctic.519 The CLCS publishes its recommendations on the submission made by Denmark together with the Faroes on the outer limits of the continental shelf in respect of the area north of the Faroe Islands.520 27 March 2014 The Arctic Economic Council is established.521 15 April 2014 Leona Aglukkaq, Minister of the Environment, Minister of the Canadian Northern Economic Development Agency and Minister for the Arctic Council, announces that she will not attend the Arctic Council working-group-level meetings in Moscow this week: ‘As a result of Russia’s illegal occupation of Ukraine and its continued provocative actions in Crimea and elsewhere, Canada will not be attending working-group level meetings in Moscow this week.’522 25 April 2014 Canada, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and the United States submit a document on Participation in the WMO Voluntary Observing Ships’ Scheme concerning observation of Arctic weather and ice conditions to the IMO SubCommittee on Navigations, Communications, and Search and Rescue. Thereby they invite ‘the Sub-Committee to consider the information set out in this document and to encourage increased participation in the VOS Scheme by all flag

518 

Case reference HR-2014-577-A—Rt-2014-272. Doc 41. 520  Doc 158. 521 www.arcticeconomiccouncil.com. 522 Canada Takes Principled Stand on Arctic Council Meetings, www.news.gc.ca/web/article-en. do?nid=839469. 519 

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events States, in particular those with vessels which sail in Arctic waters.’523

the UNCLOS which have been initiated by the Faroe Islands will be put to an end.527

12 May 2014 The Council of the European Union adopts Conclusions on developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region. The Council confirms that the EU should enhance its contribution to Arctic cooperation, in conformity with international instruments, first and foremost the UNCLOS.524

4 July 2014 The Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, James Anaya, on the situation of indigenous peoples in Canada is published. The Special Rapporteur recommends that ‘Canada must take urgent action to address the housing crisis in indigenous communities both on and off reserve, especially communities in the north, and dedicate increased funding towards this end. In particular, the Government as a matter of urgency should work with Inuit representatives to ensure affordable, sustainable and adequate housing in the Arctic, and to design and construct housing to adapt to the region’s environment and culture.’528

22 May 2014 The WTO Appellate Body partly reverses and partly upholds the WTO Panel’s findings concerning the EU ban on trade in seal regime.525 May 2014 The Chinese billionaire Huang Nubo plans to bid for a privately owned 217 km2 large property on Svalbard Archipelago because he wants to build a resort for Chinese tourists on the island. The Norwegian Government is alarmed: ‘With governmental ownership and Norwegian legislation we will have the best possible basis to administer Svalbard for the common good’, the Norwegian Minister of Trade and Industry Monica Mæland says to the press. The Attorney General undertakes negotiations with the owner to find a solution.526 11 June 2014 The European Commission and the Faroe Islands conclude a political understanding ending their dispute on the management of Atlanto-Scandian herring in the North-East Atlantic. The Faroe Islands will end their unsustainable herring fishing whilst the European Commission is going to submit a draft regulation repealing the trade and access to EU port restrictions that were adopted against the Faroe Islands in summer of 2013. The proceedings against the EU within the dispute-settlement mechanisms of the WTO and

523 

IMO, NCSR 1/27/3. Doc 42. 525  www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ cases_e/ds400_e.htm. 526 www.nytimes.com/2014/09/28/world/europe/ a-rare-arctic-land-sale-stirs-concerns-in-norway. html?_r=1. 524 

15 August 2014 The Russian Federation enacts Rules of the repeatedly crossing by foreign ships of the State Border of the Russian Federation without border, customs (as to the accomplishment of customs operations in connection with the arrival (departure) of ships) and other forms of control.529 The act applies to the Northern Sea Route. 18 August 2014 Canada approves a joint statement setting out a framework for cooperation between EU and Canada. This framework of cooperation enables access of seal products resulting from hunts by indigenous peoples to the European market and includes other possible forms of support from the EU to Canadian indigenous peoples.530 October 2014 Canada announces it will not allow any new commercial fisheries in the Beaufort Sea without further research.531

5 2 7   w w w. e u r o p a . e u / r a p i d / p r e s s - r e l e a s e _ IP-14-668_en.htm. 528  UN Doc A/HRC/27/52/Add.2. 529  Doc 317. 530  Doc 289. 5 3 1   w w w. c b c . c a / m / t o u c h / a b o r i g i n a l / story/1.2803678.

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events 23 October 2014 Canada introduces the Canadian High Arctic Research Station Act as part of Economic Action Plan 2014 Act, N 2 (Bill C-43) in the House of Commons. It is aimed to establish the governance structure for a world-class science and technology research facility. 10 November 2014 The report Norway’s Arctic Policy: Creating value, managing resources, confronting climate change and fostering knowledge. Developments in the Arctic concern us all is presented by Prime Minister Erna Solberg and Minister of Foreign Affairs Børge Brende in Hammerfest.532 21 November 2014 The IMO Maritime Safety adopts the mandatory parts of the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters and related amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life. The expected date of entry into force of the SOLAS amendments is 1 January 2017.533 15 December 2014 Denmark and Greenland file a submission to the CLCS regarding the continental shelf north of Greenland in respect of the Northern Continental Shelf of Greenland. The area consists of approx. 895,541 km2 beyond 200 nm from the coast of Greenland. Canada, Norway, the United States and the Russian Federation submit official comments on the claim.534 - 2015 19 January 2015 Singapore’s Minister of State in the Prime Minister’s Office, Sam Tan Chin Siongat, delivers a speech on ‘State of the Arctic— Singapore’s Perspective’ at the 9th Arctic Frontiers Conference at Tromsø.535 21 January 2015 The US Government publishes Executive Order Enhancing Coordination of National Efforts in 532 

Doc 9. Doc 179. 534 Doc 163–168. 535  Doc 32. 533 

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the Arctic. Among other things it establishes an Arctic Executive Steering Committee that will serve as a coordinating mechanism on Federal Arctic activities and facilitate cohesive guidance to departments and agencies.536 20 February 2015 The US Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement and the US Bureau of Ocean Energy Management release a proposal for regulations to ensure that future exploratory drilling activities on the US Arctic Outer Continental Shelf are done safely and responsibly, subject to strong and proven operational standards. The regulations focus on the Beaufort Sea and Chukchi Sea Planning Areas, which have the greatest resource potential in the Alaska Outer Continental Shelf.537 27 February 2015 The UK House of Lords Select Committee on the Arctic publishes a report titled Responding to a changing Arctic, in which—among other things—the Committee calls to appoint an Arctic ambassador. It also pledges for a moratorium on fishing in high seas of the central Arctic Ocean. 11 March 2015 After twenty years of operation the Nordic Council of Ministers’ shut down all information offices in Northwest Russia. This decision is a reaction to a letter of the Russian Prosecutor’s Office which requires the Nordic Council to register as foreign agent. According to the Council representative C Hansen ‘[t]he office cannot operate in the current conditions. The purpose of the Council of Ministers’ presence in Northwest Russia to create closer links and better networks between the Nordic countries and Northwest Russia is impossible to achieve as a foreign agent.’538 17 March 2015 Due to the increasing commercial shipping traffic, the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric 536 

Doc 20.

537 www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/bsee-boem-

issue-proposed-regulations-to-ensure-safe-andresponsible-exploratory-drilling-offshore-alaska.cfm. 538 www.barentsobserver.com/en/politics/2015/03/ nordic-countries-close-offices-russia-13-03.

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events Administration plans increased Arctic nautical charting operations. The project will collaborate with the US Coast Guard to assess the safety of a potential Arctic shipping route from Unimak Island, the largest of the Aleutian Islands, through the Bering Strait to the Chukchi Sea.539 19 March 2015 President Jean-Claude Juncker, Greenlandic Premier Kim Kielsen and Danish Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt sign a joint declaration on relations between the European Union and Greenland. They state their intention to continue and further strengthen their relations and cooperation in the areas of sustainably managing fish stocks and protection of the marine environment, natural resources, energy, climate, biodiversity, and Arctic issues.540 Gunnar Bragi Sveinsson, Iceland’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, presents his annual report to Parliament on Foreign and International affairs. The Arctic plays an important role in his report.541 April 2015 The Arctic Council Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment working group publishes a 2015 progress report on the implementation of the 2009 Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment.542 13 April 2015 The German Government officially confirms its strong support for the establishment of Marine Protected Areas in the Arctic.543 20 April 2015 The visit of the Russian Deputy Prime Minister and Head of the State Commission for Arctic Development Dmitry Rogozin’s visit to Svalbard leads to some diplomatic stir. Rogozin has 5 3 9   w w w. n o a a n ew s . n o a a . g ov / s t o r i e s 2 0 1 5 / 20150317-noaa-plans-increased-2015-arctic-nauticalcharting-operations.html. 540 www.ec.europa.eu/europeaid/joint-declarationrelations-between-european-union-one-hand-andgovernment-greenland-and-government_en. 541 www.mfa.is/media/gunnar-bragi/EN_FMstatement-to-Parliament_19.03.15.pdf. 542  www.pame.is/images/03_Projects/AMSA/ AMSA_Documents/Progress_Reports/ AMSArecommendations2015_Web.pdf. 543  German Parliament, BT-Drucksache 18/4605.

been banned from entering the EU under the sanctions regime brought in following Russia’s annexation of Crimea. This sanction regime is supported by Norway. The Norwegian Foreign Ministry reacts indignantly by the visit stating that persons covered by sanctions should not enter Svalbard.544 24/25 April 2015 At the ministerial Arctic Council meeting in Iqaluit the United Sates begin its chairmanship of the Arctic Council for a period of two years. The US agenda has three focus areas: economic and living conditions for Arctic communities; Arctic Ocean safety, security and stewardship; and addressing the impacts of climate change. On this occasion the Iqaluit Declaration is adopted and the Framework Plan of cooperation in the prevention of pollution of Arctic sea areas is signed. It aims to strengthen cooperation between the governments of the Arctic states in preventing oil pollution of the sea in order to protect the Arctic environment. The Arctic Council also adopts a Framework on enhanced black carbon and methane emissions reductions.545 11 May 2015 The Alaska’s Arctic policy bill is signed by Governor Bill Walker. It defines Alaska’s involvement in Arctic development. On the occasion Governor Walker makes clear that ‘[o]ur country is an Arctic nation because of Alaska … That is why it is absolutely critical that we have a seat at the table for Arctic development discussions.’546 20 May 2015 The United States and Sweden sign an agreement on a joint Arctic expedition in 2015 and a further expedition in the summer of 2017. ‘Cooperation in the Arctic and in polar and climate research will be a clear indication of how closely we cooperate with the United States and an important contribution to efforts to address the defining issue of our time,’ says the Swedish 544 

Doc 342.

545  https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/

11374/83. 546  Doc 21.

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events Minister for Higher Education and Research Hellmark Knutsson upon signature.547 23 June 2015 The Russian Federations’ Ministry of Transport drafts a law that would significantly restrict shipping with petroleum products in Russian Arctic waters. If adopted, the law would prohibit companies from exporting Russian Arctic oil and gas with ships flying non-Russian flags. This legislative move could be seen as a countermeasure to sanctions imposed by the United States and European countries against the Russia hit its energy industry hard.548 July 2015 The US Administration under President Obama grants to Royal Dutch Shell PLC to begin with limited exploratory oil drilling off Alaska’s northwest coast, in the Chukchi Sea.549 7 July 2015 Accompanied by Norway’s Foreign Minister Børge Brende UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visits the Arctic prior to his attendance of the Paris Climate Conference in December. During the visit Brende points out that ‘nowhere else in the world can we see the effects of climate change so clearly as in the Arctic. Visiting Svalbard makes it easier to appreciate how serious climate change is, and the fact that the UN Secretary-General is visiting Svalbard with this in view sends a clear signal of how important it is to reach an ambitious climate agreement in Paris in December.’550 16 July 2015 Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Russian Federation, and the United States sign a Declaration on research cooperation and

547 www.government.se/press-releases/2015/05/ sweden-signs-research-agreement-with-the-unitedstates-/. 548  www.barentsobserver.com/en/energy/2015 /06/russian-arctic-russian-ships-19-06. 549  www.newsweek.com/shell-secures-final-usarctic-drilling-permit-conditions-356394. 550  www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/ban-kimoon-to-retur n-to-arctic-prior-to-climateconference-in-paris/id2426666/.

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measures to combat unregulated fishing in the international part of the central Arctic Ocean.551 Shortly after Iceland’s Foreign Minister Gunnar Bragi Sveinsson calls in the ambassadors of the abovementioned States to voice its displeasure with the agreement: ‘I hope, of course, that it will be a success in the future. But this is not a good sign for the future if some states are going to make declarations without the others. … For us (exclusion from the agreement is) a decision that is not appreciated in Iceland and it needs to be clarified,’ he complains.552 3 August 2015 The Russian Federation submits a claim for its continental shelf in the Arctic to the CLCS. The claim comprises 1.2 million km2 of the Arctic sea shelf extending more than 650 kilometres from the shore. It includes all of the Lomonosov and Mendeleev Ridges, as well as the Alfa and Chukotskoye Heights and the in between basins of Podvodnikov and Chukotskaya. Canada, Denmark and the United States comment on the submission.553 10 August 2015 As reaction to the unwelcome visit of Russia’s Deputy Primes Minister Rogozin in Svalbard Norway changes its legislation in order to sanctioned people from staying at Svalbard and allowing deporting them. Russia’s Foreign Ministry protests against this legislative move: ‘The Norwegian side’s actions do not conform to the spirit of  international cooperation in Spitsbergen, based on the Spitsbergen Treaty of 1920. We strongly protest against this unfriendly step and demand the immediate revision of the imposed restrictions.’554 September 2015 On a trip to Alaska US President Obama renames Mount McKinley to Denali recognising the traditions of Alaska Native peoples.555 551 

Doc 210.

552 http://www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2015/07

30/iceland-blasts-arctic-f ive-for-exclusion-fromfishing-agreement/. 553 Doc 151–154. 554  Doc 343. 555   w w w. b b c . c o m / n ew s / wo r l d - u s - c a n a d a 34105298.

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events 3 September 2015 The proceedings on the EU ban on trade in seals products go further. The European Court of Justice ECJ delivers its judgment in ‘Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami II’ (Case C-398/13 P) dismissing the appeal against the General Court’s judgment of 25 April 2013.556 8 September 2015 The European Parliament modifies the EU Regulation on seal products in order to bring it into compliance with the WTO ruling of 2014.557 During a joint summit between South Korean’s President Park Geun-hye and Icelandic President Olafur Ragnar Grimsson agree to develop a maritime route in the Arctic Ocean that would save time and costs for shipping.558 11 September 2015 The United States and the Russian Federation sign the Agreement on Cooperation for the Purposes of Preventing, Deterring and Eliminating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing.559 15 October 2015 The 15th Ministerial Meeting of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council takes place at Oulu. It results in a joint statement.560

30 October 2015 At the US Coast Guard Academy in New London, Connecticut, representatives of all eight Arctic States convene and sign an agreement committing their respective coast guards to cooperate and coordinate their work in Arctic Ocean. At the occasion the Arctic Coast Guard Forum is formally launched. It serves as ‘an operationally-focused, consensus-based organization with the purpose of leveraging collective resources to foster safe, secure and environmentally responsible maritime activity in the Arctic.’563 10 November 2015 Italy promulgates is Strategy for the Arctic.564 12 December 2015 At the twenty-first session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 195 States come together to adopt a legally binding global climate agreement. It sets out an action plan to avoid further dangerous climate change by limiting global warming to below 2°C. The so-called Paris Agreement will enter into force after 55 States that account for at least 55% of global emissions have ratified it.565

16 October 2015 Japan’s first comprehensive Arctic policy is presented Arctic Circle Assembly in Reykjavik.561 Due to market conditions and low interest from the industry interest, the US Department of the Interior announces that two potential Arctic offshore lease sales will be cancelled.562

23 December 2015 The US Coast Guard releases an Arctic Strategy Implementation Plan.566

556 Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 3 September 2015, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v European Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2015:535. For case comment see eg, J Krommendijk, ‘The seal product cases: the ECJ’s silence on admissibility in Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami II’ www.europeanlawblog. eu/?p=2843 (11 September 2015). 557 www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/ content/20150907STO91833/html/MEPs-to-decideon-stricter-EU-ban-on-the-sale-of-seal-products. 558  www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/ 2015/11/116_190563.html. 559  Doc 205. 560  Doc 62. 561  Doc 33. 562   w w w. d o i . g ov / p r e s s r e l e a s e s / i n t e r i o r department-cancels-arctic-offshore-lease-sales.

563  www.coastguard.dodlive.mil/2015/10/ establishment-of-the-arctic-coast-guard-forum/. For more information on the Arctic Coast Guard Forum see R Pincus, ‘The Arctic Coast Guard Forum: A Welcome and Important Step’ Arctic Yearbook (2015), www. arcticyearbook.com/commentaries2015/169-thearctic-coast-guard-forum-a-welcome-and-importantstep. 564  Doc 34. 565 www.treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2016/02/ 20160215%2006-03%20PM/Ch_XXVII-7-d.pdf; www.treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src= T R E AT Y & m t d s g _ n o = X X V I I - 7 - d & c h a p t e r = 27&clang=_en. 566 Progress of work in the Commission on the Limits of the continental Shelf—Statement by the Chair—Fortieth session, CLCS/93, 12 et seq.

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Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events - 2016 25 January 2016 The Swedish Ministry of the Environment and Energy publishes a new elaborated environmental policy for the Arctic.567 9 March 2016 The US Arctic Executive Steering Committee publishes the 2015 Year in Review-Progress Report on the Implementation of the National Strategy for the Arctic Region as well as the 2016 Implementation Framework for the National Strategy for the Arctic Region highlighting the United States’ persistent commitment to action on the challenges and opportunities presented by changing Arctic.568 10 March 2016 US President Barack Obama and Canada’s Prime Minister Justin Trudeau sign an US-Canada Joint Statement on Climate, Energy, and Arctic Leadership announcing ‘a new partnership to embrace the opportunities and to confront the challenges in the changing Arctic, with Indigenous and Northern partnerships, and responsible, science-based leadership.’569 Japan and Finland issue a Joint Statement on a Strategic Partnership underlining their strong cooperation with regard to Arctic affairs.570 22 April 2016 The Paris Agreement is signed. It is aimed to strengthen the global efforts to mitigate the disastrous effects of climate change. It enters into force on 4 November 2016.571 25 April 2016 A group of Russian and Norwegian fishermen and companies like McDonald’s, Tesco, Birds Eye, and Espersen, concluded a self-binding

567 

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568  www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2016/03/09/

advancing-implementation-national-strategy-arcticregion. 569  Doc 70. 570  Doc 72. 571 http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485. php.

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Industry Group Agreement to Cod fishery in the northern part of North-East Atlantic stating that their suppliers will now refrain from expanding their cod fisheries further into the northern Barents Sea including the waters around Svalbard.572 27 April 2016 The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, and the European Commission set out a Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: An integrated European Union Policy for the Arctic.573 On the occasion of the publication Karmenu Vella, EU Commissioner for Environment, Fisheries and Maritime Affairs, states as follows: ‘We impact on the Arctic and the Arctic impacts on us. Global weather patterns, our oceans, ecosystems and local biodiversity— the Arctic influences them all. While increasing human development is inevitable, it is in our hands to do it in a sustainable way. We have to do this in full respect of the livelihoods of those who live in the region and by protecting its most valuable resource: the environment.’574 11 June 2016 The heads of the eight Arctic States’ coast guards sign a joint statement in Faneuil Hall in Boston. According to media reports it ‘establishes the frameworks for the development of a multi-year strategic plan, avenues to share information, highlight best practices, identify training exercises, and conduct combined operations in the Arctic.’575 20 June 2016 The Council of the European Union adopts Conclusions on the Arctic.576

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Doc 214. Doc 43. 574 www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-161539_en.htm. 575 www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/2016/ 06/arctic-nations-deepen-coast-guard-cooperation. 576  Doc 44. 577  Doc 213. 573 

Chronology of (Legally) Significant Events 6-8 July 2016 At Iqaluit, delegations from Canada, the United States, the Russian Federation, Norway, Denmark (on behalf of Greenland and Faroe Islands), Iceland, China, Japan, South Korea, and the EU come together to continue negotiations on joint measures for sustainable fishing in the Arctic Ocean.577

August 2016 Parts of the Northwest Passage are nearly ice free. Satellite images show open waters from the Amundsen Gulf to Baffin Bay, with a scattering of broken ice just east of Victoria Island.578

image-of-ice-free-northwest-passage-reveals-the-newnormal/. 578 www.rcinet.ca/en/2016/08/19/nasa-satellite-

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Arctic Coastal States Canada Document 1 Toward a Northern Foreign Policy for Canada—A Consultation Paper [extracts only] (25 September 1998)* Foreword by the Minister of Foreign Affairs [Lloyd Axworthy] I am pleased to present this consultation paper, entitled Toward A Northern Foreign Policy for Canada, which for the first time places the essential elements of Canadian policy for the domestic and circumpolar north within a comprehensive, flexible foreign policy framework. The Government recognizes that a northern foreign policy can be sustained and properly supported in political and resource terms only if it emanates from and resonates with core Canadian values and long-term national objectives that are not subject to being overtaken by events or made irrelevant by external developments. This consultation paper sets out 33 core objectives arranged under seven major themes. Taken together, these provide a coherent policy framework to help guide Canada in choosing the specific goals and action plans it will adopt for the circumpolar Arctic. In the past, Canada’s dealings with the circumpolar north tended to be episodic. It could even be said that Canada has not had a comprehensive northern foreign policy in the sense of a considered, coherent, clearly articulated set of objectives. The new northern foreign policy framework presented here is a long-overdue step forward in focussing attention on this important area. Why, though, is a northern foreign policy needed now in particular? The answer lies in the convergence of significant developments in both the Canadian north and the international Arctic. At home, Canada is entering a new phase in its approach to the north and to Canada’s Aboriginal peoples generally. This is reflected in many developments, including the Government’s response to the Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Gathering Strength, released under the Honourable Jane Stewart, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, and the Honourable Ralph Goodale, Federal Interlocutor for Métis and Non-Status Indians; the ongoing settlement of land claims and the conclusion of self-government agreements; the constitutional renewal and division creating a new northern territory of Nunavut from the existing Northwest Territories, accompanied by the continuing political evolution of the western Arctic; and the continuing devolution of administration and control of public lands and resources from the federal government to the Yukon Territorial Government. All of these domestic developments point to a renewal of relations between northern and southern Canada. They also reflect a greater focus in the north itself on self-reliance and sustainable development. Together, they indicate the need to harness all available means, including foreign policy, to the achievement of the full array of Canadian domestic, and especially northern, interests. Finally, both northern and southern Canadians with an interest in northern affairs are calling for an * Retrieved from the DFATD Digital Library, http://gac.canadiana.ca/view/ooe.b3765064. Contains information licensed under the Open Government Licence—Canada.

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active role in the formulation of foreign policy relating to the region, creating a need for a commonly agreed policy framework within which to work. Externally, the establishment of the Arctic Council provides a new opportunity to focus and clarify Canada’s interests and priorities for circumpolar co-operation. As Canada completes its term as first Chair of the Council, it has an interest in making sure that the Council’s positive beginnings are consolidated and built upon over the years to come. This demands that we be very clear about our own national interests and priorities in the Arctic region. Further, by articulating well-defined national interests in a northern foreign policy, Canada will be in a stronger position in working with its Arctic neighbours. Canada’s new northern foreign policy will be recognized as emanating from an agreed set of national objectives that are there for all to see. In 1996, I stated, “Our foreign policy must be rooted in public acceptance and support. It must take its direction from what Canadians think is possible and desirable.” This applies very much to the north. In the past, Canada’s northern foreign policy was derived from values and perspectives originating in the south and reflecting little awareness of, or concern for, northern interests. In contrast, more than ever before, the northern foreign policy framework presented in this document has been influenced very substantially by input from the north. It reflects the significant body of contributions from northern Canadians over the past few years, as well as that provided by southern policy analysts. To a considerable extent, therefore, it advances a policy framework that has emerged from Canada’s north and reflects the values, perspectives and aspirations of its peoples. This input has been received from a wide range of sources, including the hundreds of witnesses who have testified before Parliamentary committees (notably the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade’s 1997 review of Canada’s Arctic relations), and those governmental and non-governmental representatives who have participated in conferences concerned with Canada’s northern foreign policy. Prominent among the public consultations contributing to this policy was the National Forum on Canada’s Circumpolar Relations, which was held in early 1998 in three northern and two southern centres. The consultations and conferences that have contributed to this new northern foreign policy framework are listed in an appendix to this document. The new northern foreign policy framework presented here is a work in progress. Many Canadians, especially northerners, will see their ideas reflected in it, and hopefully will recognize in it the Government’s commitment to working in partnership with them to advance the national objectives set out here. This paper is intended to constitute a basis for further consultation that will be undertaken in a spirit of partnership with the full range of stakeholders, including northern Aboriginal organizations, the territorial governments, federal departments and agencies, and other concerned Canadians. The result will be a new northern foreign policy for Canada that truly reflects our country’s growing interests in this important region. For nearly 50 years Canadian policies toward the circumpolar north reflected an “outside-in” orientation. External pressures relating mainly to the Cold War were the dominant impulses for Canada’s foreign policy in the Arctic. The end of the Cold War, though, opened the way for a new framework for understanding and pursuing Canada’s northern foreign policy interests. The framework for a new northern foreign policy set out here is intended to re-balance Canada’s approach to the north, bringing to the fore more of an “inside-out” orientation. Relative to external pressures, from now on Canadian domestic northern interests will play a more decisive role in determining Canada’s northern foreign policy. This shift does not stem from the ending of the Cold War alone. 6

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It coincided with two major domestic developments which also demand a new approach to Canada’s northern foreign policy. The first is the turning of a new page in Canada’s relations with northern Aboriginal peoples, as reflected in Gathering Strength. The second is the elevation of environmental issues to prominence in Canada’s policy debate, leading to renewed public and governmental attention to the importance of the Arctic environment to global survival, and the impact of Arctic environmental degradation on northern people, particularly Aboriginal peoples. It bears emphasizing that policy never was wholly “outside-in,” nor will it now be wholly “inside-out.” While the demands of security and sovereignty concerns played an overwhelming role in Canada’s northern foreign policy, other objectives such as the prevention of pollution by supertankers in Canada’s Arctic archipelago obviously played a part as well. Similarly, under the new approach with its “inside-out” orientation, security and sovereignty concerns will not be absent. Canada’s new northern foreign policy will revolve around seven major inter-related themes: –– sustainable development; –– environmental protection; –– social and cultural renewal; –– regional good governance and democratic development; –– northern sovereignty and security; –– bilateral relations with northern neighbours; and –– the consultative process and national unity. Each of these themes frames a number of Canada’s core foreign policy objectives relating to the Arctic, objectives which in turn form the basis for determining specific goals and action plans of Canada’s northern foreign policy. The following sections provide a contextual introduction to the seven themes, followed by a discussion of the core objectives relating to them. Sustainable Development The Arctic countries have made sustainability a central tenet of their approaches to circumpolar development. For its part, Canada laid out a set of sustainable development goals relevant to the north through the sustainable development strategy released by the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development in 1997. Internationally, Canada worked hard to ensure that the 1996 Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council would confirm sustainable development as a key objective of the new Council, building on the work of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS). Sustainable development thus occupies a prominent position in Canada’s northern foreign policy. While efforts to define sustainable development for the north have been contentious, in essence it entails integrating economic, social and environmental concerns in decision making relating to the Arctic and its resources. The sustainability concept is especially meaningful to Arctic Aboriginal peoples because it implies passing the natural environment on unimpaired from one generation to the next, maintaining diversity in economic and cultural development, and integrating these goals with the region’s carrying and assimilative capacities. Sustainability in practice, however, is an ongoing challenge for policy makers and practitioners alike. The following principles guide the approach Canada takes to sustainable development through its northern foreign policy: –– diversification of income- or revenue-producing activities that do not harm the environment; 7

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enhancement of the viability of, and respect for the integrity of, Indigenous cultures and economies as an important element in achieving sustainable development; –– participation of local people in development and resource utilization decisions; and –– maximum retention of benefits from economic growth at the community level. In pursuing sustainable development through its northern foreign policy, the federal government works closely with territorial and provincial governments where they have jurisdiction over natural resources. It will focus on a number of core objectives in this area, guided by the principles set out above. Sustainable Utilization of Renewable Resources Canada’s renewable resource sector spans a wide range of activities, from small family trapping and fishing businesses to large forestry or husbandry enterprises. While this sector accounts for a smaller portion of overall economic activity than the non-renewable resource sector, it is nonetheless important for maintaining traditional ways of life and providing employment. Today, though, virtually all of its component parts—e.g., fur or caribou harvesting, fishing and forestry—face significant challenges relating to distance from markets, vulnerability to environmental threats, and exposure to extra-regional market and political forces. These are forcing northern communities dependent on the renewable resources sector to get better organized politically, and to become more business-oriented, better educated and more connected with the outside world. Yet these demands place new pressures on traditional values. Through both its domestic economic strategies and its northern foreign policy, Canada will continue to support the sustainable utilization of renewable resources in the north. Sustainable Utilization of Non-Renewable Resources In many parts of the Arctic, mining and oil and gas development represent the primary source of revenue and employment. Non-renewable resource development is consistent with the principles of sustainable development when it satisfies certain conditions: if it contributes to the long-term development of the northern economy; if its benefits are equitably shared; if it meets accepted environmental standards; if it includes local decision making; and if it is accompanied by environmental mitigating measures. Sustainable utilization of non-renewable resources thus presents many complexities. How can mining or oil and gas projects generate “economic rent” for developing other economic activity that will support the people of the area beyond the life of the mine or the oil and gas project? How should economic rent be distributed locally? What about local benefits agreements? What impact would various types of rent have in the overall financial burden to an operator? Clearly, the concept of economic rent would need to be defined and assessed within the context of the whole life cycle of exploration, development and production in order to determine net impact. Recognizing that all Arctic countries face these difficult questions, Canada will support the building of a circumpolar consensus on principles and practical approaches to sustainable utilization of nonrenewable resources. […] Environmental Protection As the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs observed in Canada and the Circumpolar World, “Protection of the environment is the sine qua non of sustainability.” It therefore 8

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lies at the heart of Canada’s entire approach to northern sustainable development and foreign policy. Effective policy and action in support of environmental protection are critical to Canada’s northern residents, whose health, livelihoods and cultural survival continue to be closely tied to the environment. Further, as a world commons, the Arctic is of enormous importance to the global environment, underlining the absolute necessity of international co-operation for its protection. The interdependent and sensitive nature of the northern ecology means that activities undertaken in many global forums are critical to sustaining the integrity of the north. For many years, Canada has sought through its own legislation to protect the Arctic environment from domestic sources of pollution. Recognizing the broader nature of the problem, though, it has placed particular emphasis on co-operative global and regional protection efforts. The farthest-reaching of these efforts has been the Rovaneimi Process, through which Canada and its Arctic neighbours created the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), now a central program of the Arctic Council. To implement and build upon the commitments made through the AEPS constitutes the core of Canada’s foreign policy in regard to Arctic environmental protection. This includes the following core objectives. Early Warning of Significant Environmental Threats to Canada’s Arctic Canada has launched the Northern Contaminants Program, which has given it the world’s most comprehensive data on Arctic contaminants. Internationally, it has played a leading role in the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP), which measures pollutants and assesses their effects on the Arctic’s environment and on human health. Canada has also played a leading part in developing environmental impact assessment (EIA) standards for the Arctic, including through the AEPS’ Arctic Guidelines for Environmental Impact Assessment. Effective assessment of threats to the Arctic environment will constitute an important part of Canada’s northern foreign policy. Effective Measures on Global Climate Change Climate change would be dramatic in Arctic regions, and these Arctic effects would in turn have global consequences. The first impacts of climate change may already be evident in the Arctic, with increase in recorded annual temperatures (e.g., Mackenzie Basin), reduction of sea ice cover in the western Arctic, thawed permafrost in some areas, lower lake levels and increased incidence of forest fires. Recognizing that climate change is a global and not just a regional problem, Canada has participated actively in international co-operation on climate change, including the negotiation of the Framework Convention on Climate Change, and its recently negotiated Kyoto Protocol. Effective measures on global climate change will contribute to Canada’s northern foreign policy. Reduction of Long-Range Transport of Air Pollution into the Arctic Over the past 20 years, Canadian scientists have developed evidence that the Arctic acts as a global “sink” for persistent organic pollutants (POPs) and heavy metals. Originating far from the north, these pollutants are transported there over long distances by air, sea and rivers; they enter the fatty tissues of Arctic species, eventually to be consumed by humans. Although few POPs have ever been used in the Arctic, several have reached high-enough levels in top-of-the-food-chain species that human consumption advisories have been issued. Canada is a signatory to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range 9

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Transboundary Air Pollution of the UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), and it actively participated in the negotiations for, and signed, the Persistent Organic Pollutants and Heavy Metals Protocols in June 1998. Also, through AMAP, Canada participates in gathering and exchanging data on the health impacts of contaminants. Achieving effective international measures to reduce transboundary contaminants will feature prominently in Canada’s northern foreign policy. Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment Since the 1970s, Canada has taken a variety of unilateral and co-operative steps to counter the threats posed to the Arctic marine environment by increased shipping; these reflect its determination to exercise control over waters within its Arctic archipelago. While the experimentation that spurred these steps has not yet led to extensive Arctic shipping, Canada shares concerns with its circumpolar neighbours about future shipping developments. For this reason, it has led talks on harmonization of Arctic ship rules with a special focus on environmental protection. Through the working group on Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), it has participated in the development of offshore oil and gas guidelines, the development of a Regional Program of Action for the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment from Land-based Activities, and the development of recommendations for action on current and future shipping activities. This work will continue under Canada’s new northern foreign policy. Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna Across the Arctic some 1400 species of plants and 200 species of fauna are endangered, vulnerable or rare, while serious gaps exist in the protection of vulnerable habitats. In the Canadian Arctic alone, some 35 species of wildlife are at risk. Conservation of species such as the polar bear is central to the cultures of Arctic Indigenous peoples. The Arctic is also important for species from a global perspective: for instance, 15 percent of the world’s birds breed there. These concerns have led Canada to help conclude several international agreements. In the Arctic, it worked with its circumpolar neighbours to establish the Program for the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) under the AEPS, now under the Arctic Council. Canada views CAFF’s work as critical to the protection of Arctic species and habitats, and will continue to work through it and other forums. Effective Waste Management and Disposal Waste left behind by the Cold War, notably nuclear materials related to Russia’s Northern Fleet, poses one of the most critical threats to the Arctic environment. The key challenge stems from the fact that the elements of the problem posing the greatest threat and holding the highest priority are those with the highest price tag for remediation. Canada has assisted Russia through initiatives under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), AMAP and NATO. On another level, while the waste management problems created by Cold War activities pose enormous challenges for Arctic governments, every day communities across the Arctic confront the problem of managing local waste, created by the technical and economic difficulties of waste disposal in a cold climate. Dealing with both of these waste problems offers opportunities for circumpolar co-operation.

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Environmental Emergency Preparedness The growth of developmental activities and shipping across the Arctic has raised concerns about the potential for environmental accidents, including spills of harmful substances. These concerns have led Canada and its Arctic neighbours to conclude a variety of bilateral and multilateral arrangements to deal with environmental emergencies. In 1991 they agreed to strengthen the region’s emergency preparedness by establishing the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response Program, now included under the Arctic Council. Environmental emergency preparedness will continue to be an important element of Canada’s northern foreign policy. […] Strong Circumpolar Commitment to Institutional Development for Arctic Cooperation The effort Canada has invested in the AEPS and Arctic Council reflects its strong national interest in multilateral co-operation in Arctic affairs. It recognizes that the really important Arctic problems can be successfully managed only by co-operative action. Also, multilateral co-operation offers Canada and each of its neighbours a means to rationalize and achieve economies in relation to the cost of addressing common problems in the region. Thus, strengthening co-operative institutions and processes in the Arctic is a central element of Canada’s northern foreign policy. A Strong Northern Aboriginal Voice in Arctic International Decision Making Canada’s successful effort to have Permanent Participant status accorded to northern Aboriginal peoples’ organizations in the Arctic Council reflected the conviction that northern Aboriginal peoples must have a meaningful voice in the work of the Council. Canada is also committed to opening participation for northern Aboriginal organizations not already represented as Permanent Participants, as well as including the territorial governments on its own delegation to the Council. Enhanced Human Rights for Northern Aboriginal Peoples The Aboriginal peoples of Canada, including those living in the north, have travelled a long road in having their Aboriginal and Treaty rights recognized by Canada. Because of that struggle, Canadian Aboriginal organizations have reached out to support the democratic aspirations of Aboriginal peoples in other countries. To that end, Canada has contributed significant funding for Aboriginal institution-building assistance projects. It has also broadened its own concept of human rights to accommodate the right to live in a clean environment, a vital concern in the north. Enhanced human rights for northern peoples will remain a central focus of Canada’s northern foreign policy. Greater Extra-Regional Understanding of and Support for Arctic Interests Management of the Arctic’s problems depends heavily on co-operation from countries outside the region. Also, whether they realize it or not, countries outside the region depend on the solution of key Arctic problems. Thus, Canada and its Arctic neighbours have an interest in fostering understanding and building partnerships with the world outside for their efforts to solve the region’s problems and to realize its potential. An important element of Canada’s northern foreign policy will be to develop constructive links between the Arctic and the rest of the world.

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Rationalization and Strengthening of Arctic Science Co-operation Science contributes to the development of a comprehensive knowledge basis that is essential to strategies for environmental protection, sustainable development, understanding climate change, and tackling many other major problems in the Arctic. For this reason, Canada has taken steps to improve its own contribution to Arctic science, including developing a Federal Strategy on Northern Science and Technology and recognizing the importance of the Polar Continental Shelf Project (PCSP). It is also committed to international co-operation in polar science, and plays an active role in the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) and many other important programs. Canada will continue to participate in and foster Arctic science co-operation. Strengthened Parliamentary Participation in Circumpolar Policy Formulation The experience of the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (SCPAR) has shown that parliamentarians’ involvement can be an effective support for democratic policy development in the region, spurring governments to action, facilitating policy exchanges among stakeholders, acting as agents of political accountability, and so on. Canada recognizes and supports parliamentarians’ involvement in support of circumpolar co-operation. Northern Sovereignty and Security With the ending of the Cold War, discussions of security have come increasingly to deal with economic, environmental, cultural and social security. In the circumpolar world, these civil issues have assumed growing importance. Despite this fundamental change, Canada, like any other country, retains important responsibilities in preserving its sovereignty and responding to any threats to its national security. Canada’s northern foreign policy will include a number of core objectives relating to these “traditional” aspects of security. Exercising Canada’s Full Sovereignty in the North Although the ending of the Cold War has seen a discernible waning of public attention to the threats to Arctic sovereignty that made headlines in the 1970s and 1980s, Canada has continued a variety of sovereignty support activities, such as patrols by long-range patrol aircraft, the Ranger program and operation of the North Warning System. At the same time, northerners have remained concerned that Canada should possess the will and capability to monitor and enforce its laws and regulations with respect to wildlife, pollution, the behaviour of tourists toward northern archaeological sites, and so on. Thus, exercising full sovereignty over the waters of the Arctic archipelago will remain a central element of Canada’s northern foreign policy. Preservation of Regional Security Although the ending of the Cold War has produced a substantial lowering of military alert levels between the nuclear forces of the NATO alliance and Russia, enabled significant reductions in nuclear arms and conventional forces, and lessened military activity generally in the Arctic region, it has not led to the demilitarization of the region. Nor is there any real prospect of such a step in the foreseeable future. In fact, the Government does not support the demilitarization of the Arctic, as this would entail an abandonment of

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the Canadian military presence in the north. A degree of military watchfulness across the Pole is therefore likely to be a more or less permanent feature of circumpolar reality. In this context, strengthening and consolidating regional security will remain an important priority of Canada’s northern foreign policy. Maintaining the Canadian Forces’ Capability to Aid Civil Authorities in the Arctic While the risk from environmental emergencies has attracted considerable attention from Arctic countries, non-environmental accidents are becoming more probable as the volume of developmental and scientific activity and of travel grows within the circumpolar world. Given their possession of the requisite equipment and training, national military forces have a key role to play in aiding civil authorities to deal with such situations. Canada looks to the Canadian Forces to support the civil authorities in responding to natural and human-caused disasters, as well as search and rescue incidents. Co-operation with our circumpolar neighbours in this area will be an important element of Canada’s northern foreign policy. Bilateral Relations with Northern Neighbours While Canada seeks to advance its regional interests through the Arctic Council and other multilateral bodies, those bodies are not appropriate for pursuing all of Canada’s Arctic interests. There, as elsewhere, multilateralism is not a substitute for strong bilateral relations with other countries, particularly when those countries are neighbours. Thus, an important component of Canada’s northern foreign policy will be maintaining and strengthening its bilateral co-operation with its circumpolar neighbours on Arctic issues. Strong Canada–U.S. Co-operation on Arctic Issues Canada shares many common interests with the United States in the Arctic. The end of the Cold War has led to a re-orientation of American policy regarding the region away from traditional security issues and toward environmental, sustainable development and scientific concerns. At the same time, until recently, the Arctic has held a comparatively minor position among American foreign policy priorities. Now, however, as the United States assumes the Chair of the Arctic Council, it will be important for Canada to help ensure that Arctic issues achieve and retain a higher profile in U.S. foreign policy. Strong Canada–Russia Co-operation on Arctic Issues For nearly 15 years, Canada has actively pursued bilateral co-operation with Russia focussing on the north. While working together on a wide range of Arctic issues through the Arctic Council, Canada and Russia have also maintained their bilateral northern cooperation and, where possible, strengthened it. Canada has proposed a Canada–Russia Working Group on the Arctic and the north, to be co-chaired by the two countries’ foreign ministers. New attention is being paid to Aboriginal and northern development. Innovative economic co-operation, such as the “Arctic Bridge” project, is being promoted. Nearly a third of Canada’s bilateral technical assistance budget for Russia has been devoted to northern and Aboriginal projects. Overall, Canada has a major interest in doing all it can, including through its northern foreign policy, to bolster Russia’s political stability, economic renewal, democratic development and constructive international stance.

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Strong Canada–Nordic Co-operation on Arctic Issues Canada enjoys excellent relations with all of its Nordic neighbours, and is actively broadening those relations through new investment, trade, education, culture and tourism programs. It also, of course, employs bilateral channels wherever suitable to advance various mutual interests in circumpolar affairs. In this regard, a broad Canadian objective is to ensure that the membership of four of the Nordic countries in the European Union (EU) and of Canada in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and Norway’s growing engagement with Russia, do not over time diminish Canadian–Nordic co-operation. Canada also has special Arctic-related objectives it seeks to advance through relations with individual Nordic countries, such as co-operation in combating barriers to the trade in furs. Close bilateral relations with its Nordic neighbours will be an important element of Canada’s northern foreign policy. The Consultative Process and Nationality Unity Canada’s northern foreign policy framework includes an open-ended commitment to consultation with key Canadian stakeholders, pointing to the following core objectives. Meaningful Northern Participation in Formulating Canada’s Northern Foreign Policy The Arctic is the homeland of Canada’s northern Indigenous peoples. They and the many non-Aboriginal peoples who have made the north their home clearly have the most direct stake in Canada’s northern foreign policy. These facts underlie the involvement of northerners in Canada’s own delegation to the Arctic Council, the appointment of a northerner as the first Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs, and the unprecedented number of consultations held with northern Aboriginal organizations, the territorial governments and other concerned Canadians on circumpolar issues. The Government recognizes, though, that meaningful participation by northerners, including the territorial governments, in the policy formulation process faces significant hurdles, including resource constraints and the limited attention that northerners, particularly the Aboriginal leadership, are able to give to foreign policy issues. Overcoming these obstacles requires strengthening both the northern and southern constituencies for a northern foreign policy, and designing the consultative process to take account of these realities facing the north’s political leadership and to optimize their participation. Meaningful Participation by Key Southern Stakeholders in the Policy Process Canadians living in southern Canada in the late 1990s are more aware of northern issues than at any previous time. Yet more work needs to be done to increase southern awareness of Canada’s north and the circumpolar world, and to involve southerners in the policy formulation processes that affect the north. Most basically, southern Canadians have a direct interest in the solution of the north’s environmental and developmental problems. In a democratic country such as Canada, the investment of public resources needed to tackle these problems requires broad public support, which will only be forthcoming if southern Canadians understand the issues and their own stake in solutions. The Government will therefore foster participation by key southern stakeholders in the consultative process for Canada’s northern foreign policy.

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Strengthening Canadian Unity and National Identity In the past, Canada’s northernness has often been cited as an aspect of its national identity, and as a feature that could contribute to unity. While this sentiment was a fine one, northern and southern Canadians knew little of one another, and there was little in their relationship to make the north more than a vague, symbolic element of Canadian identity for most southerners. Today, though, mutual awareness and tangible links between northern and southern Canada are growing, creating an opportunity for the northern dimension in Canada to contribute meaningfully rather than merely symbolically to Canada’s national identity and unity. Fostering this potential will be an important aspect of Canada’s northern foreign policy.

Document 2 The Northern Dimension of Canada’s Foreign Policy [extracts only] (8 June 2000)* Introduction—Renewing Our Commitment At home and abroad, the North has taken on new importance in Canadian foreign policy. For the North, this is a time of rapid change. Canada’s own northern territories, for example, are emerging from an historical tradition of being on the periphery of Canadian political life as a result of political reform, reconciliation and decentralization, and are developing new governance structures. Similarly, a circumpolar community with a wide range of (often divergent) interests is also coming into being as a coherent entity. The end of the Cold War lifted the constraints which that period imposed on co-operation among the eight Arctic countries and on interaction among the North’s Indigenous peoples. Circumpolar relations, contacts and activities have now begun to flourish. This has also occurred as a consequence of growing global awareness of the vital ecological role played by the North, and as northerners from across the circumpolar region have begun to press for action to address the serious environmental, economic, social and cultural threats facing their communities. Globalization exposes all regions to new political, economic, social and environmental forces, which often diminish regional control over events—even in the most industrialized countries. These forces include the revolution in information technology (for instance, the emergence of electronic commerce), the transboundary movement of persistent organic pollutants, climate change, and the spread of infectious diseases, such as tuberculosis or AIDS. The transboundary nature of these forces makes international co-operation imperative. The North comprises the Canadian territories of the Yukon, the Northwest Territories and Nunavut, plus Nunavik (northern Quebec) and all of Labrador; the U.S. state of Alaska (except the area known as the Southeast); all of Kalaallit Nunaat (Greenland); *  Retrieved from the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, http://gac.canadiana. ca/view/ooe.b3651149E/1?r=0&s=1. Pictures and some chapters are not repinted here. Contains information licensed under the Open Government Licence—Canada.

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Iceland; the northern regions of Norway, Sweden and Finland; all of what Russia terms the Arctic and the Russian North; and the marine systems of the Arctic Ocean and its adjacent seas, including the Beaufort, Labrador, Bering, Chukchi, Greenland, Norwegian, Barents, Kara, Laptev and East Siberian seas. It also includes what the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples identified as “Mid-North”—that is, large areas of the Canadian provinces of British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario and Quebec that reflect northern conditions. Globalization has also altered the exercise of state sovereignty, partly through the development of a web of legally binding multilateral agreements, informal arrangements and institutions. In the past, much of Canada’s attention to northern foreign relations has focussed on threats to sovereignty. Time has changed the nature and implication of those threats—co-operation has largely overshadowed boundary disputes in the North. Public concern about sovereignty issues has waned, but Canadians still want their governments to enforce their laws and regulations concerning the management of the North. To meet new transborder challenges and further promote co-operation, we will need to intensify dialogue with existing organizations that undertake common action, such as the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). We must also ensure that the Arctic Council effectively complements other initiatives under way within the circumpolar region (in particular, the Nordic Council, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, the Council of Baltic Sea States), and with the EU’s own Northern Dimension Action Plan. Further, we must develop new approaches to deal with issues such as human security and the threats to individual safety and well-being posed by an increasing number of transnational problems. In this regard, the peoples of the circumpolar region are particularly vulnerable. In this situation, Canada needs to bring a comprehensive northern dimension to its foreign policy. To be effective, the new policy must be an integral part of Canada’s broader foreign policy, and must also be reinforced by domestic policies. A comprehensive approach will lead to greater coherence and co-ordination between federal departments and agencies having a stake in the development of the circumpolar region. The Domestic Context—the North Coming into its Own At the dawn of the new century, a fundamental reshaping of northern Canada is taking place. Most significant has been the division of the Northwest Territories into two separate territories in 1999 with the creation of Nunavut. The birth of Nunavut represents a landmark achievement in the political development of the Canadian North, including the commitment to self-government and continued devolution. As pledged in Gathering Strength: Canada’s Aboriginal Action Plan, Canada will work toward the settlement of all outstanding land claims and the completion of self-government agreements in the North as a mechanism for developing a strengthened and forward-looking partnership with Aboriginal peoples. Through the Action Plan, the federal government has sought to contribute to a process of political, economic and social renewal in the North. This devolution and renewal needs to be accompanied by a coherent northern foreign policy strategy that maximizes the opportunities being realized by northern Canadian

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communities, while also supporting and augmenting their efforts to successfully manage the challenges facing the North. One example is resources: world demand is increasing for Canada’s northern resources (including fisheries) and related exploration and processing activities. Another example is climate change, which may have an effect on the potential use of the Northwest Passage. Previously closed by ice, the Passage is now open for several weeks each year. A third is air traffic over the Arctic, which is also growing. In 1999, some 85 000 overflights were recorded, and the forecast annual growth rate is 3 percent to 5 percent. Once Russia opens its northern airspace to international aviation, the number of overflights could increase significantly, with a proportionate rise in the risk of accidents, emergency landings and search-and-rescue requirements. These various developments enhance the potential for tourism and new northern transportation routes, and should create new economic opportunities for the North. However, with such opportunities come additional pressures in the sustainable management of natural resources and the environment, as well as in economic and social development. For this reason, innovations emerging from the northern renewal process are both timely and necessary, as are advances in information technology that can more effectively link developments and knowledge in the Canadian North with the rest of Canada and the circumpolar world. However, equally important will be Canada’s efforts to ensure that international/circumpolar policies, practices and regulations promote and protect northern interests, starting with the preservation of the fragile ecology of the North. Surveillance, enforcement of laws and regulations, and the coordination of emergency-preparedness systems will be critical. In translating the new reality of Canada’s North into foreign policy, we need to move beyond the vague, symbolic visions of the past. We must assess the values and interests emerging from the North’s renewal process, and translate them into sources of international influence. This will require the involvement of Aboriginal and territorial authorities in the implementation of a northern foreign policy. It will also require a commitment to strengthening the widespread but poorly supported research network that exists throughout Canada, which has important expertise, knowledge and experience that must be harnessed more effectively in support of the Northern Dimension of Canada’s Foreign Policy. There must also be the recognition that effective linkages between research and policy analysis networks must extend beyond Canada, reaching out to similar networks within the circumpolar region. Intrinsic to this research and policy analysis network will be the recognition and integration of traditional knowledge. The International Context—an Enlarging Circumpolar Partnership The circumpolar North is not homogeneous. The heterogeneity of development levels, interests and visions among circumpolar countries, coupled with the fact that the region is one of the world’s richest in natural resources, may increase the potential for tension in the North. On the other hand, recognition of the challenges facing the region has led the eight Arctic countries to move forward across a broad front over the past decade to begin building a circumpolar community of interests. From both economic and political perspectives, the North has the potential to become a significant factor in world affairs. The establishment of the Arctic Council in 1996 marked the growing maturity of the circumpolar region. Canada recognized that it shared many common challenges, problems

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and opportunities with its Arctic neighbours, so it sought to expand co-operation through the Arctic Council to create a circumpolar community that would be self-aware and able to work together to solve its problems regionally and globally. Progress toward these goals should contribute to the formation of a strong institutional framework that encourages greater co-operation among northern governments, Aboriginal peoples, industry, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in pursuit of concrete initiatives. Such progress responds to the challenges that we are all confronting in the Arctic, but that are outside the control of any single country. The Arctic Council is, of course, not the only existing circumpolar forum or focal point for circumpolar policy development and cooperation. The Nordic Council was founded in 1972 to target co-operation on regional and common political issues. The creation of the Council of the Baltic Sea States in 1992 and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council in 1993, plus the anticipated adoption of the European Union’s Northern Dimension Action Plan in June 2000, reflect the broader European integration process intended to bridge common northern interests. They are also increasingly focussed, as is the U.S. Northern European Initiative (which is directed primarily at the three Baltic states), at preventing the emergence of a socioeconomic and environmental fault line at the eastern border between the expanding EU, its immediate northeastern neighbours, and Russia. There is a growing recognition in these regional forums of the importance of ensuring effective information sharing, co-ordination and co-funding initiatives for shared priorities. These various institutions and initiatives are not only preoccupied with stability in northern Russia, but also with sustainable development and environmental protection across the Arctic region. Protecting the vulnerable circumpolar ecosystem from environmental degradation and transboundary effects is another area in which international cooperation is vital. Scientific evidence shows that the North acts as a global “sink” for environmental contaminants, including persistent organic pollutants. The pollutants are transported over long distances by water and air currents, and eventually enter the animal and marine life. In fact, food from this source is the main source of nourishment for Indigenous peoples living in the North. The contaminants are absorbed in the fatty tissues of northern animals, eventually to be consumed by humans. The global community has recognized the need to reduce and eliminate the long-range transport of pollutants, and it must cement its commitment through legally binding international protocols and agreements, such as the UN negotiations toward a global convention on persistent organic pollutants. Canada has also had long-standing bilateral agreements with the United States on a range of issues affecting the interests of both countries in the Arctic. The recently developed Canada-Norway Partnership for Action underlines Arctic co-operation as an area of common interest in the context of the joint pursuit of a human security agenda. To realize the full potential of the North, northern Canadians and the circumpolar community need to recognize and act on the basis of being a natural community—bound not only by geography but also linked by common experiences and often values as well. The challenges are to define those shared values and interests; to put them into sharper focus; to make better use of the community of existing organizations and the network of contacts in the circumpolar region; and to draw on our collective resources to address these issues within the circumpolar region.

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The Consultative Process—Listening to Canadians In 1997, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (SCFAIT) took a new look at the North and prepared a comprehensive report, Canada and the Circumpolar World: Meeting the Challenges of Co-operation into the 21st Century. This began a process of extensive consultation and discussion throughout Canada over the next two years that has led to the preparation of this policy statement, the Northern Dimension of Canada’s Foreign Policy. Key elements of the consultative process (starting with SCFAIT’s review and report) included Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy’s September 1998 discussion paper Towards a Northern Foreign Policy for Canada; the 1998 National Forum; a major expert roundtable in December 1998; an extensive round of consultations in 1999 focussed on northerners and other key stakeholders, led by Canada’s Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs Mary Simon; and a final series of discussions held by Minister Axworthy with his Arctic Council counterparts and by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien when he met with the President of Finland and the head of the European Union, Martti Ahtisaari, in December, 1999. Based on these extensive consultations, Minister Axworthy and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) prepared a draft policy statement, which was then subject to further discussions involving key federal agencies responsible for policy areas that touch on the circumpolar North—including the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Environment Canada, Natural Resources Canada and Health Canada—before public release. The Northern Dimension of Canada’s Foreign Policy—Key Objectives As was often pointed out in discussions with Canadians and key circumpolar partners, Canada brings a number of important assets to the circumpolar table: –– our experience in developing northern institutions, community building, and working with Aboriginal peoples and other Northerners; –– an acknowledged expertise in northern science and environmental technology; –– a cutting-edge capability in telecommunications and information technology; –– an innovative approach to governance and natural resource management in the North; and –– a wealth of experience in co-operating with Russia on Arctic affairs. Given these assets, and given the convergence of territories, interests and events in the circumpolar region, a unique opportunity exists for bringing to bear Canada’s northern identity and expertise, and translating them into broader influence. The Arctic is an area of international relations in which we can make a difference, in which we can bring added value. A far-sighted Canadian foreign policy will provide the means and the opportunity to assert our role as a bridge builder. Our active involvement in circumpolar issues will contribute to the consolidation of our interests in the region. In keeping with the international and domestic contexts, our experience, capacity and perceived role, and taking into account the advice and suggestions made during the consultative process, it has been determined that the Northern Dimension of Canada’s Foreign Policy should have four overarching objectives: 1. to enhance the security and prosperity of Canadians, especially northerners and Aboriginal peoples;

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2. to assert and ensure the preservation of Canada’s sovereignty in the North; 3. to establish the Circumpolar region as a vibrant geopolitical entity integrated into a rules-based international system; and 4. to promote the human security of northerners and the sustainable development of the Arctic. These objectives will be pursued through a number of initiatives and venues. In particular, Canada’s northern foreign policy will focus on four priority areas: support for the work of the Arctic Council; participation in the expanding international support for northern Russia; realizing the full potential of the University of the Arctic, and enhancing a Canadian and circumpolar policy research network; and promoting sustainable development through the pursuit of economic and trade opportunities across the circumpolar region. Strengthening the Arctic Council The Arctic Council was founded in 1996 as an umbrella organization to give political impetus and strategic direction to the circumpolar community. As founding chair, Canada sees the Council as the main focus of our emerging northern foreign policy. To maintain our influence in the region, we will deepen our commitment to circumpolar partnerships, beginning through the Arctic Council. A unique feature of the Arctic Council—one that gives it critical legitimacy and relevance—is the direct participation of northerners, particularly Indigenous northern peoples. Building on Indigenous involvement in its forerunner institution, the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, the Council has broken new ground internationally. For the first time—anywhere—Indigenous peoples, as Permanent Participants, have an integral role to play in the work of the Arctic Council. When the Council meets, it does so with the full and active participation of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, the Saami Council, the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, and the Aleut International Association. Their involvement ensures that those with the most at stake have a clear voice in shared forums to resolve common transboundary concerns and to develop common approaches. At the next Arctic Council ministerial meeting in Alaska in October 2000, an additional permanent participant may be approved, which will further broaden and deepen the involvement of northern Indigenous peoples in the work of the Council. However, all Permanent Participants lack sufficient internal resources to participate effectively. They continue to require assistance from Arctic Council member states to ensure effective participation. The five main Working Groups of the Arctic Council collectively carry an agenda that focusses on the sustainable development and environmental protection of the Arctic region. Together, they represent an effort to address the most critical issues facing the circumpolar North, where multilateral co-operation is vital. These include the Sustainable Development Working Group, the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment, the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program, the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response Group, and the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna. There is interest in expanding the work of these groups, and in creating others as well. However, chronic under-funding hampers existing programs and prevents effective expansion.

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The secretariat for the Arctic Council is another issue that must be addressed, not only because of the need to more effectively support the efforts of the Working Groups, but also to ensure its viability and effectiveness. The Arctic Council must be effective in linking with other regional forums, bilateral programs and broader multilateral discussions. Such linkages are crucial in order to avoid duplication and maximize awareness and effectiveness. This need has been recognized by all Arctic Council members, as well as by the other Arctic regional forums previously mentioned. An ongoing commitment to the work of the secretariat is required if it is to be effective. A strong secretariat can build on work that has already been done to catalogue various activities and programs in the circumpolar region. Through the Northern Dimension of Canada’s Foreign Policy, Canada intends to focus policy efforts and increased resources on strengthening existing activities of the Arctic Council and promoting a continued and increased role for Permanent Participants. Indeed, Canadian support for emerging northern civil society could prove invaluable in influencing the decision-making process on Arctic issues in major world capitals. It will facilitate the development of northern people-to-people contacts, and will support increased North-South linkages. It will continue to encourage Indigenous community activities, while promoting the participation and leadership of Aboriginal community leaders. Canada will promote more effective linkages between the Arctic Council and other forums in which Arctic issues are addressed. Where possible, expanding the Council’s work will also be a focus, perhaps starting with the link between emerging economic and environmental issues (e.g. impact of climate change on the Northwest Passage as a commercial route) and also a link to research and education. These last objectives relate, in part, to an identified need for capacity building within Arctic communities; and a search for means to ensure sustainable economic growth in the circumpolar world as traditional economies wane, while maintaining a focus on environmental protection. Canada’s contribution will include: –– increased support to the overall work of the Arctic Council; –– financial and institutional support to Permanent Participants of the Arctic Council; –– leveraged/partnered funding for specific Working Group activities, flowing from the 1998 Iqaluit Declaration endorsed at the Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, including further development of the Children and Youth initiative; and –– support for a capacity-building focus in the Arctic Council. […] Cooperation in Northern Russia A prosperous Russia is crucial to the stability of the international system, and a sustainable and prosperous North is crucial to the stability of Russia. With only 8 percent of the national population, the Russian North produces 20 percent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP), and is one of Russia’s leading hard currency-earning regions. With 80 percent of the North’s total population, Russia is by far the most populous circumpolar area. In 1997, some 12.1 million people, including 200 000 Indigenous people, lived in the Russian Far North. The collapse of the Soviet development strategy has had environmental impacts that are well known and impossible to ignore. For example, sulphur dioxide discharges from metal

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and mining enterprises have damaged vast territories in the Kola Peninsula. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, 150 nuclear reactors from decommissioned submarines are waiting to be dismantled in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. The Agency report also states that more than 8500 tons of highly enriched spent fuel is waiting to be reprocessed and properly stored around the Barents Sea, and an additional 500 million cubic metres of low-level radioactive waste remains to be treated. The situation for Indigenous peoples is even more difficult. With subsidy programs curtailed or ended, some settlements are returning to self-sufficient economies and struggling to revive their traditional culture. Living conditions remain harsh. Finances appear inadequate to support the re-emergence of sustainable Indigenous communities. At the same time, political reform has granted greater autonomy to Indigenous peoples, who are actively looking for ways to become involved in both the domestic and international northern policymaking processes. Although most international attention and assistance has focussed on northwestern Russia, circumstances northeast of the Urals are equally urgent. The situation in the Russian northeast should also be factored into International Financial Institution action plans and programs. Maximum synergies should be sought, so that what is being done in the Barents and Baltic areas would be viewed in the broader context of international efforts to stabilize Russia and integrate it further into the international system. Canada has a historic interest in Russia’s prosperity and security—indeed, we have much at stake there. Given the weight of the Russian North in the future of Russia and the region, immediate and concerted action is urgently needed. The future of the Russian North, therefore, is important to Canada, and is a key focus of the Northern Dimension of Canada’s Foreign Policy. The Arctic identity that Canada shares with Russia provides a special basis for co-operation focussing on the North. Canada has a number of bilateral agreements covering northern issues, especially in areas of scientific and economic development and, more recently, development assistance in the areas of the environment and Indigenous peoples. Because of the environmental similarities, Canada has always had a commercial interest in Russia. With our experience and expertise in tapping natural resources in the Arctic, we have a comparative advantage in Russia, creating excellent opportunities for Canadian investments. Similarly, in the environmental sector, Canadian technology and management techniques are second to none. Through CIDA’s Technical Assistance Program, Canada is already making a significant contribution to democratic development and economic liberalization in Russia. This strategy has been successfully extended to the Russian North, where 20 projects are currently under way in the areas of good governance, economic reform and the environment. Radioactive waste clean-up and environmental remediation are other areas in which our Russian partners would welcome Canadian expertise. Canada can make a major contribution by promoting other policy objectives, such as non-proliferation and disarmament, as well as environmental protection. At the 1999 Group of Eight (G-8) Summit in Cologne, leaders agreed to address these issues by building a broad international partnership on expanded threat reduction. Within this initiative, activities are being considered for addressing the management of radioactive waste originating from military activities, and the decommissioning of Russian nuclear submarines,

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particularly at sites in the Russian Arctic. A multi-year, multi-task program would be developed to identify specific projects for these purposes, with identification of areas that best suit Canadian expertise. The adoption of a funded Canadian strategy would support our aims in the circumpolar region, allowing us to extend our participation in subregional groupings, such as the Baltic and Barents Councils and the Arctic Military Environmental Co-operation program, a joint Russian-American-Norwegian initiative aimed at addressing military-related critical environmental concerns in the Arctic. Perhaps more than any other country, Canada is uniquely positioned to build a strategic partnership with Russia for development of the Arctic. In the short term, this means giving priority to addressing the socioeconomic and environmental issues in the Russian North. Canadian objectives should be formulated in a way that reflects broader international goals, and Canadian activities should take into account the capacity of other partners, especially the United States and the European Union, to undertake funding responsibilities and partnerships. Specific Canadian activities could include: –– contributing funds toward the implementation of the 1992 Canada-Russia Agreement on Co-operation in the Arctic and the North, as well as the 1997 Memorandum of Understanding concerning Co-operation on Aboriginal and Northern Development; –– working to expand bilateral economic and business ties with northern Russia, in co-operation with provincial and territorial governments, as well as business and NGO communities; –– supporting the activities of the Working Group on the Arctic and North, under the aegis of the Inter-governmental Economic Commission. This could include the creation of a Canada-Russia Northern Chamber of Commerce and the promotion of northern transportation routes; and –– including a focus on Russia in northern youth exchange programs and internships to promote people-to-people contacts for future generations. Promoting Sustainable Economic Opportunities and Trade Development As outlined earlier (see The Domestic Context), there are increased pressures and opportunities related to economic development in the Canadian and circumpolar North. As was stated, these will create important challenges that a coherent Canadian policy strategy must address. Trade and investment are certain to increase across the Arctic region. Given the fact that they will help to build capacity in the North to pursue economic growth, this is to be welcomed. Pursuing such initiatives as the Arctic Bridge and intra-Arctic shipping could have important benefits for the livelihood of northerners. However, as has also been stated, these developments will also demand increased vigilance—effective monitoring and management that will ensure that the fragile Arctic ecology is not compromised. Much can be done, through the Arctic Council and research networks, among others, to study and prepare for these developments. An important focus of Canada’s northern foreign policy is to promote both the analysis and the development of management/monitoring/enforcement regimes (in some cases, building on existing frameworks, such as the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act).

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To this end, the Northern Dimension of Canada’s Foreign Policy will promote, among other things, the following: –– discussions with the Arctic Council regarding the expansion of circumpolar transportation infrastructures (e.g. Arctic bridge, polar air route and intra-Arctic shipping) and the reduction of transportation costs; –– the inclusion of a northern trade dimension in future Team Canada missions; –– the launching of talks with our Arctic Council partners to facilitate trade and investment flows in the circumpolar region; –– the creation of a Circumpolar Chamber of Commerce, building upon those existing in the northern regions of Nordic countries and northwest Russia, and on the network of contacts within the Northern Forum; and –– the investigation of the potential of eco-tourism, in co-operation with territorial governments. Ongoing Dialogue with Canadian and Circumpolar Civil Society The announcement and implementation of the Northern Dimension of Canada’s Foreign Policy does not mean the end of the dialogue with Canadians on circumpolar Arctic issues. The government believes that it is critical to maintain an ongoing process of interaction and discussion with interested stakeholders, as the policy implementation process unfolds and new questions and developments inevitably appear that can benefit from further consultation. The government, under the leadership of the Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs, is committed to maintaining this dialogue. In parallel, other venues for discussion and debate, as well as opportunities for organizations to make their views known to members of the Arctic Council, are welcomed and encouraged. Enlarging the circumpolar partnership is essential to the promotion of a greater extra-regional understanding and support for northern and circumpolar interests. For example, the Northern Forum, consisting of 20 sub-national governments, largely from the Arctic Council states, and international NGOs such as the World Wildlife Fund for Nature and the International Union for Circumpolar Health, are encouraged to pursue their interventions on specific issues. In addition, SCFAIT, as well as the Parliamentarians of the Arctic region, should remain actively engaged, and should continue to focus Canadian thinking on our national interests in the circumpolar North. Conclusion The future prosperity of Canada’s North will be influenced by our capacity to work with our regional partners to develop a common strategy for the sustainable development of the circumpolar region. Within Canada and the circumpolar region, there is recognition that future security and prosperity are closely connected with our ability to effectively manage northern issues. This is why we are taking a proactive stance in managing the issues, together with our northern communities. Declaratory foreign policy is not enough to safeguard and promote Canadian interests and meet Canada’s obligations. This Northern Dimension of Canada’s Foreign Policy reinforces the federal government’s commitment to the North and to northern peoples. In circumpolar affairs, Canada has been regarded as an important player. Arctic nations are cognizant of our record and ascribe to us an important role in leadership and

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diplomacy. The Northern Dimension of Canada’s Foreign Policy demonstrates Canada’s continuing commitment to maintaining this role.

Document 3 Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future [extracts only] (26 July 2009)* Introduction Canada’s far North is a fundamental part of Canada—it is part of our heritage, our future and our identity as a country. The North is undergoing rapid changes, from the impacts of climate change to the growth of Northern and Aboriginal governments and institutions. At the same time, domestic and international interest in the Arctic region is rising. This growing interest underscores the importance of Canada to exert effective leadership both at home and abroad in order to promote a prosperous and stable region responsive to Canadian interests and values. The Government of Canada has a clear vision for the North, in which: –– self-reliant individuals live in healthy, vital communities, manage their own affairs and shape their own destinies; –– the Northern tradition of respect for the land and the environment is paramount and the principles of responsible and sustainable development anchor all decisionmaking and action; –– strong, responsible, accountable governments work together for a vibrant, prosperous future for all—a place whose people and governments are significant contributing partners to a dynamic, secure Canadian federation; and –– we patrol and protect our territory through enhanced presence on the land, in the sea and over the skies of the Arctic. We are achieving this vision by delivering an integrated Northern Strategy based on four equally important and mutually reinforcing priorities: –– Exercising our Arctic Sovereignty –– Promoting Social and Economic Development –– Protecting our Environmental Heritage –– Improving and Devolving Northern Governance The Government recognizes what must be done to secure the future of Canada’s North, for the benefit of all Canadians, and is taking concrete action to turn this vision for the North into reality. We are moving much further—and much faster—to prepare for the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century.

“We are a northern country. The True North is our destiny—for our explorers, for our entrepreneurs, for our artists. To not embrace the promise of the True North, now, at the dawn of its ascendency, would be to turn our backs on what it is to be Canadian.” Prime Minister Stephen Harper, August 2008, Inuvik, Northwest Territories *  Retrieved from the Canadian Government, www.northernstrategy.gc.ca/cns/cns-eng.asp. Reproduced with permission by the Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada.

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The North is central to the Canadian national identity. The longstanding presence of Inuit and other Aboriginal peoples and the legacy of generations of explorers and researchers are fundamental to our history. Our ability to meet the opportunities and challenges currently facing the North will shape our future. Canada’s North is first and foremost about people—the Inuit, other Aboriginal peoples and Northerners who have made the North their home, and the Canadians in other parts of the country who recognize how central it is to our shared heritage and our destiny as a nation. Inuit—which means “people” in Inuktitut—have occupied Canada’s Arctic lands and waterways for millennia. Long before the arrival of Europeans, Inuit hunters, fishers and their families moved with the seasons and developed a unique culture and way of life deeply rooted in the vast land. Our nation’s strong presence in the Arctic today is due in large part to the contributions of Inuit, who continue to inhabit the North. The lands just south of the Arctic Circle have been occupied for thousands of years by the ancestors of today’s Aboriginal peoples including the Dene, Gwich’in, Cree and Métis. Today, these Aboriginal peoples live in communities across the Yukon, southern Northwest Territories and northern border regions of mainland provinces. Over the past two hundred years, non-Aboriginal residents from southern Canada and other parts of the world have also chosen to make the North their home. The Arctic on the cusp of change Just a few decades ago, federally appointed Commissioners oversaw decisions about all aspects of life in the North. Today, federal and territorial governments are working in partnership as the territories take on jurisdictional powers and responsibilities similar to those of the provinces. Aboriginal people throughout the North have negotiated land claim and selfgovernment agreements that give them the institutions and resources to achieve greater self-sufficiency. The increasing political maturity and certainty in the North are helping to encourage private sector companies to explore and develop the region’s vast natural resources and to diversify the region’s economies. From the development of world-class diamond mines and massive oil and gas reserves, to the growth of commercial fisheries, to a thriving tourism industry that attracts visitors from around the globe, the enormous economic potential of the North is being unlocked. Areas that require urgent attention—such as infrastructure, housing and education—are being addressed to help ensure Northerners are positioned to seize these unprecedented opportunities. International interest in the North has intensified because of the potential for resource development, the opening of new transportation routes, and the growing impacts of climate change. In September 2007, satellite imaging verified that the Northwest Passage had less than 10 percent ice coverage, making it, by definition, “fully navigable” for several weeks. This was well ahead of most recent forecasts. Although the Northwest Passage is not expected to become a safe or reliable transportation route in the near future, reduced ice coverage and longer periods of navigability may result in an increased number of ships undertaking destination travel for tourism, natural resource exploration or development. […] The effects of environmental change, such as shifting and melting permafrost, melting glaciers, shrinking ocean ice and a shortened season for ice roads could have significant 26

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cultural and economic consequences for the people of the North, and the entire nation. Furthermore, new development projects may increase the number of pollutants, threatening Northerners’ health and the region’s fragile ecosystems. Few countries are more directly affected by changes in the Arctic climate—or have as much at stake—as Canada. We have an important role to play in the ongoing stewardship of the Canadian Arctic, its vast resources and its potential. Canada’s Northern Strategy Exercising Our Arctic Sovereignty Canada’s Arctic sovereignty is longstanding, well established and based on historic title, founded in part on the presence of Inuit and other Aboriginal peoples since time immemorial. However, in a dynamic and changing Arctic, exercising our sovereignty includes maintaining a strong presence in the North, enhancing our stewardship of the region, defining our domain and advancing our knowledge of the region. Strengthening our Arctic presence The Government of Canada is firmly asserting its presence in the North, ensuring we have the capability and capacity to protect and patrol the land, sea and sky in our sovereign Arctic territory. We are putting more boots on the Arctic tundra, more ships in the icy water and a better eye-in-the-sky. “The geopolitical importance of the North and Canada’s interest in it have never been greater. That is why this government launched an ambitious Northern agenda, based on the timeless responsibility so elegantly captured by our national anthem—to keep the True North strong and free.” Prime Minister Stephen Harper, 2008 Significant investments in new capabilities on the land include establishing an Army Training Centre in Resolute Bay on the shore of the Northwest Passage, and expanding and modernizing the Canadian Rangers—a Reserve Force responsible for providing military presence and surveillance and for assisting with search and rescue in remote, isolated and coastal communities of Northern Canada. In the sea we are establishing a deep-water berthing and fuelling facility in Nanisivik and procuring a new polar icebreaker, the largest and most powerful icebreaker ever in the Canadian Coast Guard fleet. This vessel will be named in honour of the late Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker. We are further bolstering Canada’s Arctic-capable fleet by investing in new patrol ships capable of sustained operations in first-year ice. These ships will be able to patrol the length of the Northwest Passage during the navigable season and its approaches year-round. Polar Epsilon, National Defence’s space-based wide area surveillance and support program, will use RADARSAT II to provide the Canadian Forces with greater capacity to monitor Canada and its Maritime Boundary. The Canadian Forces, in cooperation with other federal departments and agencies, will continue to undertake operations in the North, such as Operation NANOOK, conduct regular patrols for surveillance and security purposes, monitor and control Northern airspace as part of North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), 27

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and maintain the signals intelligence receiving facility at CFS Alert, the most northern permanently inhabited settlement in the world. Defence Research and Development Canada will continue to explore options for cost-effective Arctic monitoring systems, building on the current Northern Watch Technology Demonstration Project. Enhancing our stewardship Canada is taking concrete measures to protect our Arctic waters by introducing new ballast water control regulations that will reduce the risk of vessels releasing harmful aquatic species and pathogens into our waters. We also amended the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act to extend the application of the Act from 100 to 200 nautical miles from our coastline, the full extent of our exclusive economic zone as recognized under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This amendment gives us pollution prevention enforcement jurisdiction over an additional half million square kilometres of our waters. In addition, we are establishing new regulations under the Canada Shipping Act, 2001 to require all vessels entering Canadian Arctic waters to report to the Canadian Coast Guard’s NORDREG reporting system. And finally, Canada is working with Northern communities and governments to ensure that its search and rescue capacity meets the needs of an ever-changing North. Defining our domain and advancing our knowledge of the Arctic Canada’s North is a vast region still yet to be fully mapped and studied. As a result of the ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Canada is in the process of conducting scientific studies to determine the full extent of our continental shelf as defined under UNCLOS. This research will ensure Canada secures recognition for the maximum extent of its continental shelf in both the Arctic and Atlantic oceans when we present our submission to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf by the end of 2013. This process, while lengthy, is not adversarial and is not a race. Rather, it is a collaborative process based on a shared commitment to international law. Canada is working with Denmark, Russia and the United States to undertake this scientific work. Canada’s sovereignty over its Arctic lands and islands is undisputed, with the exception of Hans Island, which is claimed by Denmark. The dispute regarding Hans Island is on a diplomatic track following the Joint Statement of September 2005 between Canada and Denmark. This dispute is only about the island, not about the waters, seabed, or the control of navigation. Managed disagreements exist between the United States and Canada regarding the maritime boundary in the Beaufort Sea and between Canada and Denmark over part of the maritime boundary in the Lincoln Sea. The United States and Canada disagree about the legal status of the various waterways known as the Northwest Passage. All of these disagreements are well-managed and pose no sovereignty or defence challenges for Canada. In fact, they have had no impact on Canada’s ability to work collaboratively and cooperatively with the United States, Denmark or other Arctic neighbours on issues of real significance and importance. Canada will continue to manage these discrete disputes and may seek to resolve them in the future, in accordance with international law. The human dimension Northerners have an important role to play in shaping regional priorities and actions. At the Arctic Council, for example, Canada works closely with the six international indigenous 28

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peoples groups that have Permanent Participant status—three of which have strong roots in Canada: the Arctic Athabaskan Council, the Gwich’in Council International, and the Inuit Circumpolar Council. Promoting Social and Economic Development Economic and social development in the North helps ensure that the vast potential of the Arctic region is realized in a sustainable way and that Northerners participate in and benefit from development. Working together with Northerners, the Northern Strategy is helping to build self-sufficient, vibrant, and healthy Northern communities. Supporting Economic Development Economic development is aided by effective institutions and transparent and predictable rules. New investments are being made to establish key institutions of economic development and improve the regulatory environment under which development can occur. In order to strengthen support for economic activity, a new economic development agency for the North is being established. A core activity for this agency will be delivering the renewed Strategic Investments in Northern Economic Development program. The Government of Canada is introducing measures to ensure that regulatory systems across the North protect the environment in a predictable, effective and efficient manner. Efforts such as the Northern Regulatory Improvement Initiative are helping resolve the complex approval process for development projects, to ensure new projects can get up and running quickly and efficiently. Mining activities and major projects such as the Mackenzie Gas Project are the cornerstones of sustained economic activity in the North and the key to building prosperous Aboriginal and Northern communities. Diamond mining in the North is now a $2-billion-per-year industry, which is about half of the economy of the Northwest Territories. The Mackenzie Gas Project—now estimated at over $16 billion—will provide direct benefits to Aboriginal communities through the development of a new model for Aboriginal participation. The Aboriginal Pipeline Group will provide for Aboriginal participation in the developing economy, notably through an ownership position in the Project. In addition to on-shore exploration and development there is renewed interest in the off-shore, including a new era of oil and gas exploration in the deeper waters of the Beaufort Sea. Canada will continue to support the sustainable development of these strategic resource endowments. The large-scale projects already underway barely scratch the surface of the North’s immense store of mineral, petroleum, hydro and ocean resources. However, the full extent of the natural resources potential in the Arctic is still unknown. The Government of Canada announced a significant new geo-mapping effort—Geo-Mapping for Energy and Minerals—that will combine the latest technology and geoscientific analysis methods to build our understanding of the geology of Canada’s North, including in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. The results of this work will highlight areas of mineral and petroleum potential, lead to more effective private sector exploration investment and create employment opportunities in the North. The North is also home to vast renewable and cultural resources that make important contributions to its economy and society. The Government is providing increased funding for tourism promotion and for local and community cultural and heritage institutions. In Nunavut, for example, the Government is helping to establish the Piqqusilirivvik cultural 29

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facility in Clyde River where students will participate in Inuit cultural programs and study many elements of traditional land-based knowledge. […] Protecting our Environmental Heritage Visitors from every corner of the globe are drawn to Canada’s North because of its spectacular scenery, unique fish and wildlife and unequalled opportunities to explore its Arctic wilderness. However, the North also has fragile and unique ecosystems which are being negatively affected by the impacts of climate change. Canada is committed to helping ensure these ecosystems are safeguarded for future generations. Being a global leader in Arctic science Science and technology form an important foundation for Canada’s Northern Strategy priorities and provide the knowledge necessary for sound policy and decision-making. Canada made the largest single contribution of any country to International Polar Year (IPY) 2007–2008, the largest-ever global program dedicated to polar research. Scientific research carried out as part of IPY focused on two key priorities: climate change impacts and adaptation; and the health and wellbeing of Northerners and Northern communities. Aboriginal people and Northerners played a significant role in the planning, coordination and implementation of IPY and were actively engaged in science and research activities. Canada’s IPY investments helped mobilize the participation of hundreds of new researchers, including 90 from Canada’s North. Training the next generation of specialists is a key legacy of IPY, so that we can build on the world-class science being conducted today and secure expertise for the Arctic of tomorrow. Through scientific collaboration with organizations such as the United Nations, World Meteorological Organization, International Maritime Organization and the Arctic Council, Canada is building the baseline of knowledge on the Arctic environment and forming important partnerships around the world. To ensure Canada remains a global leader in Arctic science, the Government of Canada committed to establish a new world-class research station in the High Arctic. There have been extensive consultations at home and abroad about the role of this new research facility and feasibility study is being conducted to determine where the facility will be located. Our vision is that the new Arctic research station will serve as the hub for scientific activity in our vast and diverse Arctic. To that end, an Arctic Research Infrastructure Fund has been established to upgrade other key research facilities across our North. Protecting Northern lands and waters Canada is taking a comprehensive approach to the protection of environmentally sensitive lands and waters in our North, ensuring conservation is keeping pace with development. In the Northwest Territories, Canada has protected large areas from development through land withdrawals and work is underway on a number of conservation initiatives such as the creation of new national parks in the East Arm of Great Slave Lake and in the Sahtú Settlement Area. Canada also committed to a major expansion of the Nahanni National Park Reserve—the world’s first UNESCO world heritage site. Together with Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated, Canada announced the establishment of three new National Wildlife Areas on and around Baffin Island to protect local species and habitat, including the bowhead whale. The Land Claim Agreement with the Inuit of 30

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Labrador gave national park status to the Torngat Mountains National Park Reserve of Canada, creating a new national park in the Arctic wilderness of Labrador. The North also benefits from Canada’s Health of the Oceans initiative, which strengthens the ability of Northern communities to respond to pollution and fosters greater cooperation with domestic and global partners for integrated ecosystems-based oceans management. We are increasing our protection of the marine environment, including fish and fish habitat. One important marine protection initiative is our work towards the establishment of a national marine conservation area in Lancaster Sound, one of the most ecologically significant marine areas in the circumpolar Arctic. Transport Canada continues to assess Canada’s capacity to respond to marine pollution in the Arctic and ensure that the Canadian Coast Guard and communities have the necessary equipment and response systems in place for emergencies. Just as important are our clean-up programs to repair or remediate environmental damage at abandoned mines and other contaminated sites throughout the North. We have learned from past mistakes. Any company now undertaking industrial development in the North must undertake a rigorous environmental assessment, establish a site closure and remediation plan, meet standards for operational and environmental safety and satisfy the requirements of various laws including the Fisheries Act. Improving and Devolving Northern Governance In the past few decades Northern governments have taken on greater responsibility for many aspects of their region’s affairs. One exception was control over lands and resource management, which stayed with the federal government. In April 2003, Yukon became the first territory to take over these responsibilities, putting decisionmaking over its resources squarely in the hands of Yukon citizens. We are making progress toward a similar devolution agreement-in-principle in the Northwest Territories. In Nunavut, we have been working closely with the territorial government and Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated to study the issues relating to devolution and have developed a protocol for future negotiations. […] Made-in-the-North policies and strategies Canada’s North is home to some of the most innovative, consultative approaches to government in Canada and the world. Through land claim and self-government agreements, Aboriginal communities are developing made-in-the-North policies and strategies to address their unique economic and social challenges and opportunities. Today, 11 of 14 Yukon First Nations have signed self-government agreements. A majority of the Northwest Territories is covered by Comprehensive Land Claims Agreements that give Aboriginal people the authority to manage their lands and resources. The Nunavut Land Claims Agreement led to the creation of Canada’s newest territory in 1999, providing Inuit of the Eastern Arctic with some 350,000 square kilometers in the largest Aboriginal land claim settlement in Canadian history. We’ve seen similar progress on agreements with Inuit living in Labrador and in the Nunavik region of Northern Quebec. The Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement, the first modern-day treaty of its kind in Atlantic Canada, provides Inuit in Labrador with defined rights and territory in northern Labrador. The Inuit of Nunavik Agreement-inPrinciple, signed in August 2007, created a new form of public regional government adapted to the needs of the people of Nunavik. 31

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Providing the right tools To build on this progress, Canada and the territories are working closely with First Nations, Métis and Inuit to address pressing issues, implement past agreements and conclude new ones—including outstanding land claims and self-government agreements—more quickly. We are also providing significant financial resources to territorial governments through Territorial Formula Financing in recognition of the unique issues faced by Northern governments, including the enormous challenge of serving a small population in communities spread over vast distances. Recognizing that all regions of the North are at various stages of political development, Canada is committed to continuing to work with all its partners to advance practical, innovative and efficient governance models. […] The international dimension of our Northern Strategy Canada has a strong history of working with our northern neighbours to promote Canadian interests internationally and advance our role as a responsible Arctic nation. Through an Arctic foreign policy, Canada is supporting the international dimension of all four pillars of the Northern Strategy, engaging international partners and advancing Canadian priorities bilaterally, multilaterally and through the Arctic Council. Our Arctic partners The Arctic Ocean connects us in new ways to our neighbours in the Arctic region. Cooperation, diplomacy and international law have always been Canada’s preferred approach in the Arctic. As international interest in the region increases, effective Canadian stewardship of our sovereign territory and the active promotion of Canadian interests internationally are more important than ever before. We continue to work closely with our Arctic partners to achieve our common goals for the region as we advance our priorities at home. The United States remains an exceptionally valuable partner in the Arctic. Canada and the United States share a number of common interests in the Arctic, such as environmental stewardship, sustainable resource development and safety and security— including effective search and rescue services. We have a long history of effective collaboration and cooperation with the United States and continue to deepen cooperation on emerging Arctic issues, bilaterally and through the Arctic Council and other multilateral institutions. The Memorandum of Understanding signed between the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development Canada and the Russian Ministry of Regional Development to examine cooperative projects with Indigenous Peoples is a recent example of Canada’s bilateral efforts with Russia, which include new trading relationships and transportation routes, environmental protection and indigenous issues. We also have common interests with, and things to learn from, our other Arctic neighbours—Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Iceland. Our annual Northern Dialogue with Norway, for instance, covers issues such as climate change adaptation, oil and gas development, oceans management and scientific cooperation. We are also working with non-Arctic states on Arctic issues. For example, Canada and the United Kingdom signed a Memorandum of Understanding for cooperation in polar research.

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The Arctic Council The Arctic Council is an important venue for deepening global understanding of the Arctic and has played a key role in developing a common agenda among Arctic states. Canada was the first Chair of the Arctic Council and has been active in all of its working groups. Canada played a lead role, along with partnering nations, in the Arctic Council’s Arctic Human Development Report, the Oil and Gas Assessment and the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment. Canada will chair the Council again in 2013. Until that time, we are committed to ensuring the Arctic Council has the necessary strength, resources and influence to respond effectively to emerging challenges affecting the Arctic and its inhabitants. There are other forums that provide opportunities to raise Arctic issues. These include scientific bodies working to establish an international legacy for International Polar Year, discussions and negotiations at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and the International Maritime Organization where guidelines are being developed for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-covered Waters. Canada will continue to strengthen our domestic and international partnerships to ensure we are able to seize opportunities and address challenges in the Arctic region. […] “The Government of Canada is dedicated to ensuring that the international spotlight stays focused on the challenges and opportunities facing the Arctic. We are committed to representing the interests of Canadians as we implement the international dimension of the Northern Strategy. Building a strong Canadian North is an essential part of building our nation, an expression of our deepest aspirations.” Lawrence Cannon, Minister of Foreign Affairs March 11, 2009 Canada’s North is at the very heart of Canadian identity. Canada’s future is intimately tied to the future of the North. The Government of Canada recognizes its responsibility to preserve and protect Canada’s rich Northern heritage in the face of new challenges and opportunities. We are working in partnership with Northerners and demonstrating our commitment to the North both at home and abroad. Canada’s Northern Strategy sets out a clear action plan for the North that will leave a lasting legacy and enrich the lives of Canadians for generations to come.

Document 4 Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada’s Northern Strategy Abroad (20 August 2010)* Introduction The Arctic is fundamental to Canada’s national identity. It is home to many Canadians, including indigenous peoples, across the Yukon, the Northwest Territories and Nunavut, and the northern parts of many Canadian provinces. The Arctic is embedded in Canadian *  Retrieved from the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, www.international. gc.ca/arctic-arctique/arctic_policy-canada-politique_arctique.aspx?lang=eng. Pictures are not repinted here. Contains information licensed under the Open Government Licence—Canada.

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history and culture, and in the Canadian soul. The Arctic also represents tremendous potential for Canada’s future. Exercising sovereignty over Canada’s North, as over the rest of Canada, is our number one Arctic foreign policy priority. Our vision for the Arctic is a stable, rules-based region with clearly defined boundaries, dynamic economic growth and trade, vibrant Northern communities, and healthy and productive ecosystems. This Arctic foreign policy statement articulates how the Government of Canada will promote this vision, using leadership and stewardship. It elaborates on Canadian interests in the Arctic and how Canada is pursuing these. New opportunities and challenges are emerging across the Arctic and North, in part as a result of climate change and the search for new resources. The geopolitical significance of the region and the implications for Canada have never been greater. As global commerce charts a path to the region, Northern resources development will grow ever more critical to Northern economies, to the peoples of the North and to our country as a whole. The potential of the North is of growing interest to Canada, to other Arctic states and, increasingly, to others far from the region itself. While the opportunities are great, there are also important social, economic and environmental challenges. Some of these have important international dimensions. Over time, increased access to the Arctic will bring more traffic and people to the region. While mostly positive, this access may also contribute to an increase in environmental threats, search and rescue incidents, civil emergencies and potential illegal activities. How the region as a whole evolves will have major implications for Canada and our role as an Arctic power. The Government of Canada has launched an ambitious Northern Strategy to respond to these opportunities and challenges. Our Northern Strategy lays out four areas where Canada is taking action to advance its interests both domestically and internationally and to help unlock the North’s true potential: exercising sovereignty; promoting economic and social development; protecting our environmental heritage; and improving and devolving Northern governance. In pursuing each of these pillars in our Arctic foreign policy, Canada is committed to exercising the full extent of its sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the region. “The geopolitical importance of the Arctic and Canada’s interests in it have never been greater. This is why our government has launched an ambitious Northern Agenda based on the timeless responsibility imposed by our national anthem, to keep the True North strong and free.” Prime Minister Stephen Harper, August 28, 2008, Inuvik, Northwest Territories Given our extensive Arctic coastline, our Northern energy and natural resource potential, and the 40 percent of our land mass situated in the North, Canada is an Arctic power. We are taking a robust leadership role in shaping the stewardship, sustainable development and environmental protection of this strategic Arctic region, and engaging with others to advance our interests. As we advance the four pillars of our Northern Strategy, our international efforts will focus on the following areas: –– engaging with neighbours to seek to resolve boundary issues; –– securing international recognition for the full extent of our extended continental shelf; 34

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–– –– –– –– –– –– –– –– –– –– ––

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addressing Arctic governance and related emerging issues, such as public safety; creating the appropriate international conditions for sustainable development; seeking trade and investment opportunities that benefit Northerners and all Canadians; encouraging a greater understanding of the human dimension of the Arctic; promoting an ecosystem-based management approach with Arctic neighbours and others; contributing to and supporting international efforts to address climate change in the Arctic; enhancing our efforts on other pressing environmental issues; strengthening Arctic science and the legacy of International Polar Year; engaging Northerners on Canada’s Arctic foreign policy; supporting Indigenous Permanent Participant organizations; and providing Canadian youth with opportunities to participate in the circumpolar dialogue.

Exercising Sovereignty In our Arctic foreign policy, the first and most important pillar towards recognizing the potential of Canada’s Arctic is the exercise of our sovereignty over the Far North. Canada has a rich history in the North, and Canada’s sovereignty is the foundation for realizing the full potential of Canada’s North, including its human dimension. This foundation is solid: Canada’s Arctic sovereignty is long-standing, well established and based on historic title, founded in part on the presence of Inuit and other indigenous peoples since time immemorial. “In exercising our sovereignty … we are not only fulfilling our duty to the people who called this northern frontier home, and to the generations that will follow; we are also being faithful to all who came before us.” Prime Minister Stephen Harper, August 28, 2008, Inuvik, Northwest Territories Canada exercises its sovereignty daily through good governance and responsible stewardship. It does so through the broad range of actions it undertakes as a government— whether related to social and economic development, Arctic science and research, environmental protection, the operations of the Canadian Forces or the activities of the Canadian Coast Guard and Royal Canadian Mounted Police. We exercise our sovereignty in the Arctic through our laws and regulations, as we do throughout Canada. We are putting the full resources of the Government of Canada behind the exercise of our sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the Arctic. We are taking a wholeof-government approach. Since taking office, the Prime Minister and many federal cabinet ministers have made regular visits to Canada’s North. Further evidence of the priority the Government of Canada is placing on the North was the meeting of G-7 finance ministers in Nunavut in February 2010. Since 2007, the Government of Canada has announced a number of initiatives to enhance our capacity in the North and to exercise, responsibly, our sovereignty there. These include significant new commitments to allow Canada to better monitor, protect and patrol its Arctic land, sea and sky and to keep pace with changes in the region. 35

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Within the next decade, Canada will launch a new polar icebreaker. This will be the largest and most powerful icebreaker ever in the Canadian Coast Guard fleet. The Canada First Defence Strategy will give the Canadian Forces the tools it needs to provide an increased presence in the Arctic. Through this strategy, Canada is investing in new patrol ships that will be capable of sustained operation in first-year ice to ensure we can closely monitor our waters as they gradually open up and maritime activity increases. In order to support these and other Government of Canada vessels operating in the North, Canada is investing in a berthing and refuelling facility in Nanisivik. Canada is also expanding the size and capabilities of the Canadian Rangers, drawn primarily from indigenous communities, that provide a military presence and Canada’s “eyes and ears” in remote parts of Canada. A new Canadian Forces Arctic Training Centre is also being established in Resolute Bay. Canada and the United States work together to better monitor and control Northern airspace through our cooperation in NORAD, the North American Aerospace Defence Command. Canadian Forces will also take advantage of new technologies to enhance surveillance capacity of our territory and its approaches. Canadian Forces Operation Nanook, an annual sovereignty operation that takes place in Canada’s Arctic, shows the government’s commitment to protecting and demonstrating control over the air, land and sea within our jurisdiction. In 2010, Operation Nanook will include collaboration with the United States and Denmark in order to increase interoperability and exercise a collective response to emerging cross-border challenges. This increased Canadian capacity demonstrates Canada’s presence in the region and will also ensure that we are better prepared to respond to unforeseen events. Moving forward, our international agenda will complement these efforts further. Three priority areas that Canada will pursue in the Arctic are: seeking to resolve boundary issues; securing international recognition for the full extent of our extended continental shelf wherein we can exercise our sovereign rights over the resources of the seabed and subsoil; and addressing Arctic governance and related emerging issues, such as public safety. On the first priority, Canada will seek to resolve boundary issues in the Arctic region, in accordance with international law. Our sovereignty over Canadian Arctic lands, including islands, is undisputed—with the single exception of Hans Island, a 1.3-squarekilometre Canadian island which Denmark claims. With regard to Arctic waters, Canada controls all maritime navigation in its waters. Nevertheless, disagreements exist between the United States and Canada regarding the maritime boundary in the Beaufort Sea (approximately 6,250 square nautical miles) and between Canada and Denmark over a small part of the maritime boundary in the Lincoln Sea. All disagreements are well managed, neither posing defence challenges for Canada nor diminishing Canada’s ability to collaborate and cooperate with its Arctic neighbours. Canada will continue to manage these discrete boundary issues and will also, as a priority, seek to work with our neighbours to explore the possibility of resolving them in accordance with international law. On the second priority, Canada will secure international recognition for the full extent of our extended continental shelf wherein we can exercise our sovereign rights over the resources of the seabed and subsoil. Most known Arctic natural resources lie

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within the exclusive economic zones of Arctic states—200 nautical miles extending from the coastal baselines. States have sovereign rights to explore and exploit living and non-living marine resources in their respective exclusive economic zones. Arctic coastal states also have existing rights to resources on their extended continental shelves beyond their exclusive economic zones. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) explicitly recognizes the rights of coastal states such as Canada over the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil beyond 200 nautical miles from their coastal baselines and sets out a process by which a state may determine the limits within which it may exercise those rights. Canada will make its submission to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in December 2013 and is currently engaged in the scientific, technical and legal work needed to delineate the outer limits of its continental shelf. Autonomous underwater vehicles—with Canadian technology at their heart—are being used to collect some of the needed data. Canada is investing significantly to ensure that Canada secures international recognition for the full extent of its continental shelf in both the Arctic and Atlantic oceans. The other Arctic coastal states also have extended continental shelves and are involved in a similar process. To maximize data collection in a challenging physical environment, encourage exchange of information and minimize future differences, Canada has been working closely with neighbouring Arctic Ocean coastal states. We will act on a priority basis to ensure Canada has a sound submission by the 2013 deadline. Any overlaps with the submissions of neighbouring states will be resolved through peaceful means in accordance with international law. Beyond concrete steps on boundaries, Canada’s sovereignty agenda will also address Arctic governance and related emerging issues, such as public safety. Increasingly, the world is turning its attention northward, with many players far removed from the region itself seeking a role and in some cases calling into question the governance of the Arctic. While many of these players could have a contribution to make in the development of the North, Canada does not accept the premise that the Arctic requires a fundamentally new governance structure or legal framework. Nor does Canada accept that the Arctic nation states are unable to appropriately manage the North as it undergoes fundamental change. Canada, like other Arctic nations, stands by the extensive international legal framework that applies to the Arctic Ocean. Notably, UNCLOS, as referred to earlier, provides the legal basis for delineation of continental shelves and goes well beyond this to address the protection of the marine environment, freedom of navigation, marine scientific research, conservation and utilization of marine living resources, and other uses of the sea. However, within this broad legal framework, new challenges are emerging. Until now, the Arctic Ocean’s inaccessibility has meant that the region was largely insulated from the sort of safety and law enforcement challenges present in regions further south. However, decreasing ice cover will lead, over time, to increases in shipping, tourism and economic development in the Arctic Ocean region. While the full extent of the changes will take many decades to realize, Canada and other Arctic Ocean coastal states must begin to prepare for greater traffic into the region, with sometimes negative effects. Regional solutions, supported by robust domestic legislation in Arctic states, will be critical. Canada will work in concert with other Arctic nations through the Arctic Council (the primary forum for collaboration among the eight Arctic states), with the five Arctic

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Ocean coastal states on issues of particular relevance to the Arctic Ocean, and bilaterally with key Arctic partners, particularly the United States. We will need to consider how to respond to issues such as emergency response and search and rescue capability and potential future problems related to emergencies (including environmental), organized crime, and illegal trafficking in drugs and people. One very important initiative is the current effort within the Arctic Council to negotiate a search and rescue agreement for the Arctic. Information sharing, coordination of efforts, and pooling resources are all concrete ways in which partnership may be beneficial. The recently held Arctic Ocean Foreign Ministers meeting was an important step not only in advancing our collaboration on continental shelf delineation but also in encouraging forward thinking on the emerging issues in the region. The meeting publicly demonstrated leadership and partnership by Canada and other coastal states on responsible management of the Arctic Ocean. Protecting national sovereignty, and the integrity of our borders, is the first and foremost responsibility of a national government. We are resolved to protect Canadian sovereignty throughout our Arctic. Promoting Economic and Social Development Creating a dynamic, sustainable Northern economy and improving the social well-being of Northerners is essential to unleashing the true potential of Canada’s North and is an important means of exercising our sovereignty. “Not only is the North a land of raw and majestic beauty that has inspired generations of authors, artists and adventurers, and not only is it the home to a rich culture shaped through the millennia by the wisdom of Aboriginal people, but it also holds the potential to be a transformative economic asset for the country.” Prime Minister Stephen Harper, August 18, 2009, Iqaluit, Nunavut The potential for wealth and job creation through resource development, both living and non-living, is great. Canada is the world’s third largest diamond producer. It is estimated that one-fifth of the world’s petroleum reserves lie in the Arctic. That is why the Government of Canada is investing significantly in mapping the energy and mineral potential of the North. Managed in a sustainable manner, Canada’s incredible endowment, including living marine resources such as fisheries, will contribute to the prosperity of Northerners and all Canadians for generations. These resources can and will be a cornerstone of sustained economic activity in the North and a key to building prosperous indigenous and Northern communities. In addition to investments in mapping in the North, the Government of Canada has made a wide variety of recent commitments related to promoting Northern social and economic development. These include measures to improve regulatory systems across the North, to address infrastructure needs including housing, to create the Canadian Northern Economic Development Agency, and to support improvement in indigenous skills and employment. Ensuring sustainable development in the Arctic involves working closely with territorial governments and Northerners and through key international institutions like 38

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the Arctic Council to build self-sufficient, vibrant and healthy communities. The wellbeing of the people of the North—its inhabitants and communities—is fundamental. Canada will actively promote Northern economic and social development internationally on three key fronts: take steps to create the appropriate international conditions for sustainable development, seek trade and investment opportunities that benefit Northerners and all Canadians, and encourage a greater understanding of the human dimension of the Arctic to improve the lives of Northerners. First, Canada will take steps to create the appropriate international conditions for sustainable development in the Arctic, complementing domestic measures to support economic development. This involves understanding the opportunities and challenges of Arctic energy and resource development and developing regulations, guidelines and standards that are informed by Arctic science and research, including traditional knowledge. In no area is this more critical than in oil and gas development. As an emerging clean energy superpower, Canada will continue to support the responsible and sustainable development of oil and gas in the North. Along with the rest of the international community, we have witnessed the terrible environmental, social and economic impacts of the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Canada recognizes and values the importance of working closely with other Arctic states and will take every step possible to prevent such an event in Canadian waters. Canada is showing leadership at home in Arctic safety and environmental requirements for offshore drilling through the review undertaken by the National Energy Board. Moreover, Canadians and our Arctic neighbours can be assured that no drilling will occur in Canada’s deep Beaufort Sea until at least 2014. Canada is a party to a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements and is actively engaged in various international forums, including the Arctic Council, on matters relating to the protection of the marine environment. In the wake of the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, we are furthering our collaboration at the appropriate levels, in particular with the United States and Denmark/Greenland in light of our common interests in the Arctic marine environment. The 2007 Arctic Council Oil and Gas Assessment examined the impacts of current oil and gas activities in the Arctic and potential impacts related to possible future activities. The Oil and Gas Assessment found that while extensive oil and gas exploration activity and production have occurred in parts of the Arctic, much potential exists for future oil and gas development. Related risks need to be managed carefully. Canada made significant contributions to the Assessment. The Arctic Council, with significant Canadian participation, updated its Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines in 2009. These guidelines recommend standards, technical and environmental best practices, management policy and regulatory controls for Arctic offshore oil and gas operations. Canada will act on the request from the Arctic Council that all states apply these guidelines as minimum standards throughout the Arctic and will encourage others to do so as well. Arctic shipping is another key area of focus. The 2009 Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment is the first comprehensive review of circumpolar shipping activities and provides important information about possible future shipping activities and their potential impacts. Among its findings, the Assessment noted that Arctic shipping has increased significantly, with more voyages to the Arctic and between Arctic destinations. However, the various Canadian internal waterways known as Canada’s “Northwest 39

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Passage” are not predicted to become a viable, large-scale transit route in the near term, in part because mobile and unpredictable ice in the Passage poses significant navigational challenges and other routes are likely to be more commercially viable. The Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment also provides guidance on enhancing Arctic marine safety, protecting Arctic peoples and environment, and building Arctic marine infrastructure. Based on these recommendations, the 2009 Arctic Council Ministerial supported the development of a mandatory polar code for shipping by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). As an IMO member, Canada will continue to play a leading role in the development of this code. We, along with other Arctic Council states, have also agreed to work together towards an international agreement on search and rescue operations for the Arctic by 2011. Within the IMO context, Canada has also assumed responsibility for providing navigational warning and meteorological services to facilitate the safe management of marine traffic in two Arctic areas. These cover substantial areas of Arctic waters, including the Northwest Passage. Through this initiative, Canada will deliver services that help mitigate the risks associated with increased Arctic shipping. These services will also enhance environmental protection of the Arctic marine environment, support Northern residents in their maritime activities, and provide necessary services for coastal and marine-based resource development. Canada is playing a key role in the creation of the Arctic Regional Hydrographic Commission to improve our understanding of the features of the Arctic Ocean and its coastal areas, essential knowledge for safe navigation. Canada has offered to host the Commission’s inaugural meeting in fall 2010. Second, Canada will continue to seek trade and investment opportunities that benefit Northerners and all Canadians. Canada will enhance its trading ties with other Arctic states. We have recently implemented a free trade agreement with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) member countries, which include Iceland and Norway. This agreement has the potential to enhance trade and investment between Northern regions of our respective countries. We are also seeking to build new trade ties with other Arctic states to create these same links between our respective Northern regions. These Northern commercial relationships can serve as conduits to expand trade and investment relations not only with our immediate Northern neighbours but also with other states such as those in central Asia and Eastern Europe. Improving air and sea transportation links to create enhanced access across the polar region can help encourage Arctic trade and investment opportunities. For instance, investments have been made to upgrade the Port of Churchill, Manitoba, to facilitate increased export options and the flow of two-way trade with other Northern ports. Third, Canada will continue to encourage a greater understanding of the human dimension of the Arctic to improve the lives of Northerners, particularly through the Arctic Council. The Arctic Council’s Arctic Human Development Report was the first comprehensive assessment of human well-being to address the entire Arctic region. Canada will continue to play a leadership role in Arctic Council initiatives in this area and to host the Secretariat for the Council’s Sustainable Development Working Group. For example, the 2008 Arctic Indigenous Languages Symposium, organized by the Inuit Circumpolar Council with support from the Government of Canada, underlined the importance of preserving and strengthening indigenous languages. 40

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Addressing human health issues in Northern communities is also critically important. Canada has been supporting efforts through the Arctic Council and International Polar Year research to better understand the issues and then develop and implement appropriate health policies. The results of international collaboration are all aimed at improving the health conditions of residents in the Arctic. Canada will play a lead role in the Arctic Council on a range of new health-related projects, including the development of a circumpolar health observatory, a comparative review of circumpolar health systems, and a comparative review of circumpolar nutritional guidelines. Canada’s commitment to Northern economic and social development includes a deep respect for indigenous traditional knowledge, work and cultural activities. Going forward, Canada will promote a better understanding of the interests, concerns, culture and practices of Northerners, including with regard to seals and polar bears. In this context, Canada is committed to defend sealing on the international stage. Seals are a valuable natural resource, and the seal hunt is an economic mainstay for numerous rural communities in many parts of Canada including the North. Protecting the Arctic Environment The Arctic environment is being affected by events taking place far outside the region. Perhaps the most well-known example is climate change, a phenomenon which originates outside the Arctic but is having a significant impact on the region’s unique and fragile environment. The resulting rapid reduction in Arctic multi-year sea ice has had, and will continue to have, profound consequences for the peoples and communities of the Arctic. What happens in the Arctic will have global repercussions on accelerating climate change elsewhere. Strong environmental protection, an essential component of sustainable development, starts at home and is another important way in which Canada exercises its sovereignty in the North. Canada has long been at the forefront in protecting the Arctic environment. As far back as the 1970s, Canada enacted the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA) to protect its marine environment, taking responsibility for enacting and enforcing anti-pollution and shipping safety laws applicable to a larger area of Arctic waters. In August 2009, the application of the AWPPA was extended from 100 to 200 nautical miles. In addition, regulations requiring vessels to report when entering and operating within Canadian Arctic waters have been finalized and are in force from July 1, 2010. “Canada takes responsibility for environmental protection and enforcement in our Arctic waters. This magnificent and unspoiled region is one for which we will demonstrate stewardship on behalf of our country, and indeed, all of humanity.” Prime Minister Stephen Harper, August 27, 2008, Tuktoyaktuk, Northwest Territories These measures and others such as plans to establish a national marine conservation area in Lancaster Sound send a clear message to the world. Canada takes responsibility for environmental protection and enforcement in our Arctic waters. We are demonstrating stewardship in this magnificent ecological region. Canada is committed to planning and managing Arctic Ocean and land-based activities domestically and internationally in an integrated and comprehensive manner that balances 41

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conservation, sustainable use and economic development—ensuring benefits for users and the ecosystem as a whole. We are acting domestically while cooperating internationally. Internationally, we will act in the following four ways: promote an ecosystem-based management approach with our Arctic neighbours and others; contribute to and support international efforts to address climate change in the Arctic; enhance efforts on other pressing international issues, including pursuing and strengthening international standards; and strengthen Arctic science and the legacy of International Polar Year. First, Canada will continue to promote an ecosystem-based management approach with its Arctic neighbours and others. In accordance with Canada’s Oceans Act, Canada is working with land claim authorities, governments, industry and communities to implement an ecosystem approach in the Beaufort Sea and has identified ecologically significant marine species and places. This is part of a broader ecosystem approach in the Arctic by the Government of Canada that also includes activities related to the international co-management of species in the Arctic whose habitat crosses national borders (e.g. caribou, polar bears and Arctic birds). These activities fall under international conventions and agreements such as the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, the Migratory Bird Treaty, and the Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears. International collaborative Arctic science and research is a fundamental aspect of the Government of Canada’s participation in such agreements. Canada and its Arctic neighbours are the stewards of unique wildlife such as polar bears. The Government of Canada recognizes the importance of indigenous knowledge and the need to use it in tandem with Western science in our efforts to better understand polar bears and their habitat. Canada has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the United States for the conservation and management of a shared polar bear population. In addition, Canada has developed agreements with other Arctic nations to jointly manage polar bears, narwhals and belugas. This work must continue in order to manage other shared species. As part of its mandate, the Arctic Council has been playing a lead role in identifying large marine ecosystems in the region and determining best practices in ocean management. Canada will play a leadership role in the Arctic Council’s Arctic Ocean Review which aims to strengthen and ensure the sustainable development of the Arctic Ocean. In pursuing strengthened Arctic Ocean stewardship, we will work with other interested partners and users of the Arctic Ocean as well as through regional and international organizations, including the Arctic Council and the IMO. 2010 is the International Year of Biodiversity and the Arctic is the focus of considerable attention. Canada will continue to lead the Arctic Council’s Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program to ensure information on population status and trends for Arctic species and ecosystems is available and supports initiatives such as the Arctic Biodiversity Assessment. The Council has recently developed the Arctic Species Trend Index, which provides decision-makers with a valuable tool for managing and predicting Arctic wildlife populations. Tracking the index over time will facilitate this prediction of trends and identify species and groups experiencing rapid change. Canada will continue to establish terrestrial and marine protected areas in the Arctic and monitor biodiversity and ecological integrity. Canada recognizes that ecologically sensitive areas are essential for the conservation of Arctic species including polar bears, caribous, migratory birds, and marine mammals and other aquatic species. These sensitive areas play a key role in the survival and recovery of species at risk. They also 42

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provide significant ecotourism opportunities to an expanding market of Canadians and international visitors. Canada has made significant progress in establishing protected areas in over 10 percent of our North, designating 80 protected areas covering nearly 400,000 square kilometres. These areas include 11 national parks, six national wildlife areas and 16 migratory bird sanctuaries and will protect habitat for a wide variety of species. Canada continues to plan for additional protected areas in the North and has an ambitious program to expand the national park system, including the creation of three new national parks. The Government of Canada is moving forward in consultation with communities and industry to add nearly 70,000 square kilometres to Canada’s Northern protected areas network. Canada will be finalizing a Policy Framework for Canada’s National Network of Marine Protected Areas that will guide marine protected area establishment, including the five marine ecoregions found in the Arctic. The creation of the majority of existing national parks in the Arctic proceeded hand-in-hand with land claim negotiations, as are all of the new national park proposals. Second, Canada will continue to actively contribute to and support international efforts to address climate change in the Arctic, including both mitigation and adaptation in the Arctic. Climate change is having a disproportionate impact on the Arctic, and the Arctic Council’s 2004 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment heightened global awareness of the problem. Canada recognizes that climate change is a global challenge requiring a global solution. To that end, the government is committed to contributing to the global effort by taking action to reduce Canada’s greenhouse gas emissions through sustained action domestically to build a low-carbon economy, working with our North American partners and constructively engaging with our international partners to negotiate a fair, environmentally effective and comprehensive international climate change regime based on the Copenhagen Accord. Canada has been, and continues to be, very active in these international negotiations, and will seek to ensure that consideration is given to the Arctic’s unique set of climate change-related challenges in every relevant forum. New evidence suggests that certain short-term factors are having an impact on the rate of climate change. The 2009 Arctic Council Ministerial approved the formation of a task force on “short-lived climate forcers” in the Arctic. While climate agents or forcers, such as black carbon, contribute significantly to climate change, they can potentially be brought under control much more quickly than long-term contributors such as carbon dioxide. The task force will identify existing and new measures to reduce emissions of these forcers and will recommend further immediate action. Canada has been, and will continue to be, active in climate change adaptation initiatives. Canada played an important role in the Arctic Council’s recent Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change in the Arctic project. Underlining the importance of community involvement in planning for and responding to climate change adaptation is one of Canada’s key contributions. Canada recognizes that enhanced action on adaptation will be a significant component of the post-2012 climate change negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Canada plays an active and constructive role in those discussions. In support of these objectives, the Government of Canada has been working in close partnership with Northern communities and governments to assess risks, vulnerabilities and opportunities related to a changing climate. Over the last two years, over 60 projects 43

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have been funded in the Canadian Arctic that have led to the development of community and regional adaptation plans, increasing knowledge and understanding of climate-related implications and the development of strong partnerships essential to implementing adaptation action. Third, Canada will enhance its efforts on other pressing environmental issues, including pursuing and strengthening international standards, where appropriate. Canada will continue to engage in the negotiation of an international regime on access to genetic resources and the sharing of their benefits, under the Convention on Biological Diversity. Researchers around the world are interested in genetic resources found in extreme environments like the Arctic. We recognize the importance of these issues to Northerners and Northern communities. Persistent organic pollutants and mercury, released far from the Arctic, have had serious impacts on Arctic peoples. Canada and the Inuit Circumpolar Council played an important role in the negotiation of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants. Canada will continue to address the problems arising from these contaminants, including waste management practices in the North, and will engage actively in global negotiations to reduce mercury emissions. Canada is setting an international example with the Federal Contaminated Sites Action Plan. The government is providing $3.5 billion over 15 years to address federal contaminated sites, with the majority of resources directed to contaminated sites in the North. Canada is contributing to the global effort to address mercury emissions with a plan to implement new environmental performance standards that will reduce greenhouse gas emissions and pollutants such as mercury from coal-fired electricity generating plants. An international agreement on the reduction of mercury emissions will help reduce the impact of mercury on the health and the environment of Canadians, particularly in the North. Fourth, Canada will contribute to strengthening Arctic science and the legacy of International Polar Year. Arctic science forms an important foundation for Canada’s Northern Strategy, providing the knowledge necessary for sound policy and decisionmaking both on domestic and international issues. To ensure that Canada remains a global leader in Arctic science, the Government of Canada has committed to establishing a new world-class research station in the High Arctic that will serve Canada and the world, and work is proceeding on its development. The station will anchor a strong research presence in Canada’s Arctic and to complement these efforts, Canada has also invested in upgrading existing research facilities in over 30 sites across the Arctic. Canada made one of the largest single contributions of any country to International Polar Year and will be hosting its final wrap-up event in Montreal in April 2012. Canada is also taking a lead role in the Arctic Council’s Sustaining Arctic Observing Networks project. Its purpose is to further international engagement in developing sustained and coordinated pan-Arctic observing and data-sharing systems, particularly related to environmental, social, economic and cultural issues. Improving and Devolving Governance: Empowering the Peoples of the North The Government of Canada is committed to providing Canadian Northerners with more control over their economic and political destiny. Canada is taking steps to endorse the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in a manner fully

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consistent with Canada’s Constitution and laws. In recent decades, Canada’s Northern governments have taken on greater responsibility for many aspects of their region’s affairs. Progress is continuing in this area and represents another way in which Canada is exercising its sovereignty in the Arctic. Canada’s North is also home to some of the most innovative, consultative approaches to government in Canada and the world. Through land claim and self-government agreements, indigenous communities are developing made-in-the-North policies and strategies to address their unique economic and social challenges and opportunities. “We’re committed to helping the region and its residents realize their true potential.” Prime Minister Stephen Harper, March 10, 2008, Yellowknife, Northwest Territories Canada recognizes and values the important role Northern governments, Arctic Indigenous organizations at the Arctic Council (known as Permanent Participant organizations) and other Northerners have played, and will continue to play, in shaping Canada’s international actions. Canada’s Arctic foreign policy bolsters our domestic efforts for strong governance in the North in the following three ways. First, Canada will engage with Northerners on Canada’s Arctic foreign policy. Through the Canadian Arctic Council Advisory Committee, Northern governments and Indigenous Permanent Participant organizations in Canada will have the opportunity to actively participate in shaping Canadian policy on Arctic issues. We will continue to meet regularly in Canada’s North to find common ground and work towards common objectives. Second, the Government of Canada will continue to support Indigenous Permanent Participant organizations in Canada, including financially, to contribute to strengthening their capacity to fully participate in the activities of the Arctic Council. Furthermore, Canada will encourage other Arctic Council states to support the participation of their Permanent Participant organizations. Canada will also support the continued unique status of Permanent Participant organizations at the Arctic Council, which was created to provide for their active participation and full consultation. As interest by non-Arctic players in the work of the Council grows, Canada will work to ensure that the central role of the Permanent Participants is not diminished or diluted. Third, Canada will provide Canadian youth with opportunities to participate in the circumpolar dialogue. The Canadian Arctic Council Advisory Committee chose three young Canadians to attend the 2009 Arctic Council Ministerial meeting. Their participation enhanced the contribution of the Canadian delegation at this meeting, and this successful initiative is one that Canada will continue to support. The Way Forward The rapid pace of change and growing importance of the Arctic requires that we enhance our capacity to deliver on Canada’s priorities on the international scene. Facing the challenges and seizing the opportunities that we face often require finding ways to work with others: through bilateral relations with our neighbours in the Arctic, through regional mechanisms like the Arctic Council, and through other multilateral institutions.

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The United States is our premier partner in the Arctic and our goal is a more strategic engagement on Arctic issues. This includes working together on issues related to the Beaufort Sea, on Arctic science, on Aboriginal and Northern issues, and on a common agenda that we might pursue when first Canada and then the United States chairs the Arctic Council starting in 2013. We are also working with Russia, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Iceland to advance shared interests such as trade and transportation, environmental protection, natural resource development, the role of indigenous peoples, oceans management, climate change adaptation and scientific cooperation. However, the key foundation for any collaboration will be acceptance of and respect for the perspectives and knowledge of Northerners and Arctic states’ sovereignty. As well, there must be recognition that the Arctic states remain best placed to exercise leadership in the management of the region. Canada was the first chair of the Arctic Council (1996–98) and will be chairing the Council again starting in 2013. The Arctic Council is the leading multilateral forum through which we advance our Arctic foreign policy and promote Canadian Northern interests. It is a consensus-based, high-level intergovernmental forum that promotes the environmental, social and economic aspects of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic region. The unique structure of the Council brings both the eight Arctic states and the six Arctic Indigenous Permanent Participants together around a common agenda—enhancing the strength and effectiveness of this unique multilateral forum. Canada will engage with Northern governments and Permanent Participants to ensure that the Arctic Council continues to respond to the region’s challenges and opportunities, thus furthering our national interests. From Canada’s perspective, the Council needs to be strengthened to ensure that it is equipped to address tomorrow’s challenges. Canada will act on several fronts. First, we will pursue a greater policy dialogue within the Council. The Council has traditionally played a strong role in science, research, monitoring and assessments, and the development of guidelines (e.g. for oil and gas) in some select areas. Canada will play a proactive role as the Council moves forward to encourage the implementation of guidelines, the development of “best practices” and, where appropriate, the negotiation of policy instruments. The current negotiation of a regional search and rescue agreement (the first ever attempt at a binding instrument under the rubric of the Arctic Council) will serve as an important test case and will inform the scope for future policy endeavours. Canada will also work to ensure that the research activities of the Council continue to focus on key emerging issues to ensure that solid knowledge underpins the policy work of the Council. Second, Canada will lead efforts to develop a more strategic communications role for the Arctic Council. As the profile of the Arctic increases, the image of the Council and information about the broad range of cutting-edge work that it is doing need to be bolstered. In this vein, a greater outreach role for the Council will increase both the understanding of the interests of Arctic states and people, and of the Council and its mandate. Third, Canada will work with other member states to address the structural needs of the organization. While the current informal nature of the body has served Canada well for many years, the growing demands on the organization may require changes to make it

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more robust. Canada will work with other Arctic states to develop options, including with respect to the role of the Council, related “secretariat” functions, and funding issues. Beyond the Arctic Council, Canada will work through other multilateral institutions such as the International Maritime Organization and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change towards global solutions to issues like polar shipping regulations and climate change. Arctic-specific organizations such as the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians for the Arctic Region, the Northern Forum, and the University of the Arctic are important partners on a variety of issues. The increasing accessibility of the Arctic has led to a widespread perception that the region could become a source of conflict. This has led to heightened interest in the Arctic in a number of international organizations including NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Canada does not anticipate any military challenges in the Arctic and believes that the region is well managed through existing institutions, particularly the Arctic Council. We will continue to monitor discussion of Arctic issues in other international forums and intervene when necessary to protect Canada’s interests. Canada is taking other steps to demonstrate leadership, such as the 2010 Arctic Ocean Foreign Ministers meeting. In addition, a new Arctic regional policy and program centre at Canada’s Embassy in Norway has been established, strengthening our on-the-ground interaction and influence in the region. This Canadian International Centre for the Arctic Region is part of a broader concerted effort to support Canada’s foreign policy goals and commercial linkages through analysis, advocacy and outreach—further enhancing Canada’s presence on Arctic issues abroad. Conclusion Through our Arctic foreign policy, we will deliver on the international dimension of our Northern Strategy. We will show leadership in demonstrating responsible stewardship while we build a region responsive to Canadian interests and values, secure in the knowledge that the North is our home and our destiny. Through our Arctic foreign policy, we are also sending a clear message: Canada is in control of its Arctic lands and waters and takes its stewardship role and responsibilities seriously. Canada continues to stand up for its interests in the Arctic. When positions or actions are taken by others that affect our national interests, undermine the cooperative relationships we have built, or demonstrate a lack of sensitivity to the interests or perspectives of Arctic peoples or states, we respond. Cooperation, diplomacy and respect for international law have always been Canada’s preferred approach in the Arctic. At the same time, we will never waver in our commitment to protect our North.

“The True North is our destiny … To not embrace its promise now at the dawn of its ascendancy would be to turn our backs on what it is to be Canadian … As Prime Minister Diefenbaker said … in 1961, ‘There is a new world emerging above the Arctic Circle.’ It is this world, a new world for all the peoples of the Arctic regions that we in Canada are working to build.” Prime Minister Stephen Harper, August 2008, Inuvik, Northwest Territories

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Denmark Document 5 Strategy for the Arctic 2011—2020 [extracts only] (22 August 2011)* Preface The Kingdom of Denmark is centrally located in the Arctic. The three parts of the Realm—Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands—share a number of values and interests and all have a responsibility in and for the Arctic region. The Arctic makes up an essential part of the common cultural heritage, and is home to part of the Kingdom’s population. The Kingdom and its populations have over several hundred years developed modern and sustainable societies based on democratic principles. The development has affected all sectors of society—from education, health and research to the environment, trade and shipping. At the same time, huge and sweeping changes are taking place today in the Arctic. Due to climate change and technological developments, vast economic potential is becoming more accessible. It is our common objective that the Arctic and its current potential must be developed to promote sustainable growth and social sustainability. This development must take place firstly to the benefit of the inhabitants of the Arctic and go hand in hand in safeguarding the Arctic’s environment. With new opportunities come new challenges. The Arctic has to be managed internationally on the basis of international principles of law to ensure a peaceful, secure and collaborative Arctic. The purpose of this strategy is, on the basis of an already strong engagement in the Arctic, to reinforce the foundation for appropriate cooperation on the many new opportunities and challenges that the Arctic is facing. The Kingdom is already a vigorous and important actor in the strategically vital international cooperation on the future of the Arctic and in that connection attaches great importance to creating transparency in and understanding for cooperation. In the Kingdom’s strategy for the Arctic 2011–2020, the Government, the Government of the Faroes and the Government of Greenland have set out the most important opportunities and challenges as we see them today and in the near future. On that basis we have defined our common political objectives for the Arctic. We will—through close cooperation in the Kingdom and with our international partners—work towards the common overall goal of creating a peaceful, prosperous and sustainable future for the Arctic. For the Government of Denmark Lene Espersen For the Government of the Faroes Kaj Leo Holm Johannesen For the Government of Greenland Kuupik Kleist

*  The full document is available at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, www.um.dk/~/media/UM/ Danish-site/Documents/Udenrigspolitik/Nyheder_udenrigspolitik/2011/Denmark%20strategy%20for%20 the%20Arctic%202011-2020.pdf. Pictures and charts are not repinted here. Reproduced with permission by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark.

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1. Introduction 1.1.  A region is opening up One of the most significant global issues over the past 10 years is the vast changes in the Arctic region. The world has again turned its attention to the Arctic, this time mainly because of the climate effects in the Arctic, the economic potential of the region, and the geopolitical implications of changes in the Arctic. The political, economic and social development is already underway, including the flourishing of advanced democratic societies, and the future of the Arctic will be radically different from the reality we know today. Warming in the Arctic is occurring faster than anywhere else on the planet, and the average temperature in the Arctic has surpassed all previous measurements in the first decade of the 21st century. Sea ice has been shrinking, and the melting of Greenland’s ice sheet and other Arctic ice caps will contribute more and more to the rise in global sea levels. Climate change has major implications for the global, regional and local climatic and environmental conditions and requires decisive global action. The Arctic and the global community are presented with both new challenges and new opportunities. Climate change poses new challenges to the peoples of the Arctic and puts pressure on the natural environment. Warming will especially change the basis of the Arctic inhabitants’ lifestyles and the indigenous Arctic peoples’ culture. Moreover, the harvesting of living resources plays a pivotal role in the Arctic, and changes for example in fish stock productivity and distribution is of great importance to the economy. Glaciers in the Arctic and the Greenland ice sheet increasingly contribute to the global rise in sea levels, and changes and dynamics in Arctic systems are crucial to global climate trends. Thus, they are of particular significance for the adaptation to climate change on a global scale and thereby also for the entire Kingdom. Increased economic activity and renewed geopolitical interest in the Arctic results in a number of key challenges to ensuring a stable, peaceful and secure region characterized by dialogue, negotiation and cooperation. Climate change and technological developments are also opening new possibilities for the Arctic. Among them is increased access to the exploitation of oil, gas and minerals, but also new shipping routes which can reduce costs and CO2 emissions by freight between the continents. It is estimated that the Arctic may contain up to 30% of the world’s undiscovered gas resources and about 10% of undiscovered oil resources, and that ships sailing between East Asia and Western Europe could save more than 40% in transportation time and fuel costs by navigating the northern sea lanes north of Siberia rather than the southern route through the Suez Canal. Furthermore, climate change could provide access to new fishing grounds in the Arctic where rising sea temperatures can pull fisheries towards the North. Commercial opportunities in the Arctic are enormous, not least for the Greenland, Faroese and Danish industries, which to a great extent already possess the skills that will be far more in demand with the development of the Arctic region. Overall we can expect a multi-faceted boom in activities in the Arctic over the coming decades. New opportunities and challenges must be handled proactively—with care, with long-term accountability and with respect for the Arctic societies, the rights of Arctic indigenous peoples, the Arctic climate and the environment. The basis for the future of the Arctic is being created now, and the Kingdom must play a key role in the future international cooperation that lies ahead.

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1.2.  Joint strategy for the Arctic The Kingdom consists of three parts—Denmark, the Faroe Islands and Greenland—and, by virtue of Greenland, is centrally located as a coastal state in the Arctic. This involves specific rights and obligations in the region. Today, both the Faroe Islands and Greenland have extensive self-government and the division of legislative and administrative powers between the Kingdom’s three parts requires good cooperation and a joint strategy to meet the opportunities and challenges in the Arctic. The Faroe Islands and Greenland have had home rule since 1948 and 1979, respectively. Home rule arrangements have been continuously modernised, most recently by the Takeover Act on Power of Matters and Fields of Responsibility and the Act on Faroes Foreign Policy Powers of 2005 in the Faroe Islands and the Greenland SelfGovernment Act of 2009. Considerable parts of the separation of powers that are central in an Arctic context are matters that fall within the exclusive powers of the respective Faroese and the Greenland authorities. The Kingdom thus comprises significant political diversity and also accommodates cultural differences. The Kingdom’s Arctic strategy intends no change in the power-sharing that exists between Denmark, the Faroe Islands and Greenland, including responsibility for policy areas taken over and their funding. Regardless of these individual distinctions, the Kingdom has a common interest in addressing the challenges and utilising the opportunities arising from the Arctic region’s rapidly changing conditions and growing interest from the world. One of the areas Greenland has taken over is mineral resources. Decisions on development, exploration and exploitation of resources in Greenland are taken by the Greenland authorities. However, revenues from mineral activities will benefit both the Greenland and Danish people, given that cf. Self-Government Act for Greenland there will be a reduction of the annual block grant in line with possible revenues from mineral resources. A strategy for the Arctic region is first and foremost a strategy for a development that benefits the inhabitants of the Arctic—involving common interests relating to for example international agreements, and regional and global issues. Such a development incorporates a fundamental respect for the Arctic peoples’ rights to utilise and develop their own resources as well as respect for the indigenous Arctic culture, traditions and lifestyles and the promotion of their rights. Denmark and Greenland’s cooperation on Arctic indigenous peoples dates back to 1973 when the Arctic Peoples’ Conference at Christiansborg Palace in Copenhagen became a launching point for the international organising of indigenous peoples. Cooperation between Denmark and Greenland helps in creating new opportunities for the Arctic indigenous peoples. Greenland’s self-government model, natural resource management, climate policy, environmental policy and preservation of its cultural heritage is a model of inspiration for many of the world’s indigenous peoples. This situation constitutes an essential element in the Kingdom’s international efforts to promote indigenous rights and aspirations. Denmark and Greenland will continue constructive cooperation to strengthen indigenous peoples’ rights to control their own development and their own political, economic, social and cultural situation. It is a central goal of Greenland, the Faroe Islands and Denmark that decisions regarding management and utilisation of resources and protection of the environment are taken in accordance with international obligations, and are based on the best scientific

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advice that supports healthy, productive and self-sustaining communities. Based on good collaboration within the Kingdom, policies and mechanisms must be organised in close cooperation with other Arctic nations and other stakeholders with an interest in the Arctic. The premise of this strategy stems internationally from the Arctic Council Declarations and the Ilulissat Declaration of 2008, in which the coastal states of the Arctic Ocean committed themselves politically to giving negotiation and cooperation pride of place in handling disputes, challenges and opportunities in the Arctic, and thus hopefully once and for all dispelling the myth of a race to the North Pole. The Kingdom’s approach to security policy in the Arctic is based on an overall goal of preventing conflicts and avoiding the militarization of the Arctic, and actively helping to preserve the Arctic as a region characterized by trust, cooperation and mutually beneficial partnerships. In an equal partnership between the three parts of the Danish Realm, the Kingdom will work overall for: […] –– A peaceful, secure and safe Arctic –– with self-sustaining growth and development –– with respect for the Arctic’s fragile climate, environment and nature –– in close cooperation with our international partners. The Greenlandic-Danish report, “Arctic in a time of change”, of May 2008 and targets contained herein remains an important basis for the Kingdom’s various activities in the Arctic. The purpose of this strategy is to focus attention on the Kingdom’s strategic priorities for future development in the Arctic towards 2020. The aim is to strengthen the Kingdom’s status as global player in the Arctic. 2.  A peaceful, secure and safe Arctic –– International law and established forums of cooperation provide a sound basis for conflict resolution and constructive cooperation in the development of the Arctic. The Kingdom must help in shaping the future of cooperation on joint challenges and new opportunities in the Arctic. –– Maritime safety is a fundamental priority. The extreme Arctic conditions require preventive measures including training and ship safety, as well as regional cooperation on search and rescue. –– The Danish Armed Forces undertake important tasks in the Arctic including the enforcement of sovereignty, and attach in this respect great importance to confidence building and cooperation with Arctic partner countries. Climate change and rising global demand for oil and gas have resulted in a sharp rise in international interest in the Arctic, and the coastal states of the Arctic Ocean have increased their endeavours to ensure their rights to the greater part of the as yet unexplored Arctic subsoil. At the same time, the prospect is that for a large part of the year, it will be possible to navigate both the Northeast Passage and the Northwest Passage. The rising strategic interest and activity in the Arctic region necessitates a continued prioritising of a well-functioning international legal framework for peaceful cooperation, a special need for enhanced maritime safety, and persistent focus on maintaining the Arctic as a region characterised by peace and cooperation.

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2.1. Basis for peaceful cooperation and with emphasis on the UN’ s Convention on the Law of the Sea The growing international interest in the Arctic has led to increased focus on legal controls in the area. However, the Arctic is not a legal vacuum. The Arctic has been inhabited for thousands of years, in contrast to the Antarctic which is uninhabited. Regions in the Arctic under national jurisdiction are governed by the coastal states legislation. The Arctic is also subject to a number of international laws, in particular the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982 (UNCLOS), which contains detailed regulation of for example navigational rights and management of resources. In recognition of the significant changes that the Arctic faces, Denmark and Greenland arranged a conference in Ilulissat in May 2008 for the five coastal states of the Arctic Ocean. Its aim was to confirm the responsibility of the five coastal states for managing the development of the Arctic. The conference resulted in the Ilulissat Declaration in which the five coastal states of the Arctic Ocean undertook to enshrine close cooperation in developing the Arctic into international law. The five coastal states’ cooperation covers areas such as sea rescue, continental shelf claims and environmental protection. Even though the existing regulation in international law, particularly the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, lays a solid foundation for coastal states’ cooperation on the development of the Arctic, there may be a continuous need for more detailed regulating of certain sectors. An example is the agreement on search and rescue adopted at the Arctic Council Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in May 2011 in Nuuk. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 is the global international legal instrument in relation to the sea around the Arctic, in that the Convention defines states’ rights and responsibilities in relation to their use of the oceans. Denmark ratified the Law of the Sea Convention on behalf of the Kingdom on 16 November 2004 and to date the Convention has been ratified by 161 states. Of the five coastal states of the Arctic Ocean, only the U.S. is not (yet) a party to UNCLOS, though part of the Convention is an expression of customary law and therefore binding on countries not party to the Convention. Moreover, the United States, by Presidential Directive of 9 January 2009 specially approved the Convention as a means of resolving border issues concerning the continental shelf in the Arctic. Under the UN’s Convention on the Law of the Sea, coastal states have the right to create an exclusive economic zone. In this zone, the coastal state has exclusive right to explore and exploit natural resources of the sea as well as the seabed and its subsoil, and any other economic exploitation. The coastal state may also exercise environmental jurisdiction in the zone. The exclusive economic zone can extend to a maximum of 200 nautical miles (approx. 370 km). Denmark and Greenland have an exclusive economic zone while an exclusive economic zone has not yet been declared in the Faroese fisheries territory. Under article 76 of the UN’s Convention on the Law of the Sea, a coastal state has the possibility of extending its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles if within 10 years of the Convention coming into force for the state concerned, it can document to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) established pursuant to the Convention, that a number of scientific criteria are met. The coastal state will then have the right to living and non-living resources on and under the seabed beyond 200 nautical miles, subject to an obligation to make payments or contributions to the International Seabed Authority pursuant to Convention Article 82. 52

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The Kingdom thus has a deadline of 16 December 2014 to submit data and other material to the CLCS as a basis for the extension of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. The time limit can however be exceeded in special cases under a decision made by the convention partners in 2008, as long as preliminary information is submitted to CLCS before the deadline expires. To document the claim on the continental shelf the Danish Realm has launched a continental shelf project that is based in the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation and is run in cooperation with the Government of the Faroes and the Government of Greenland, the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Finance. The project includes the participation of the Danish, Faroese and Greenland authorities and scientific institutions, and is charged with identifying areas where the rights to new seabed claims can be made, and to collect, interpret and document the data necessary to submit a claim to the CLCS. The Kingdom has submitted documentation to the CLCS for claims relating to two areas near the Faroe Islands and by 2014 plans to submit documentation on three areas near Greenland, including an area north of Greenland which, among others, covers the North Pole. The budget for the continental shelf project until 2014 is app. DKK 350 million spread over 12 years. The actual work of the project is a collaboration between Jarðfeingi (Faroe Directorate of Geology and Energy), the Danish Maritime Safety Administration, DTU Space (Institute for Space Research and Technology), National Survey and Cadastre and the Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland (GEUS). Jarðfeingi, together with GEUS, is project manager for the Faroese Continental Shelf Project (half funded by the Faroe Islands) while GEUS is the project manager for the Greenland part where the Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum in Nuuk and ASIAQ (Greenland’s Survey) take part. The continental shelf project is very much an example of a project that is due to all parties’, including both the Faroe Islands and Greenland’s, willingness and ability to cooperate and the will to achieve the project’s targets. Furthermore, the project is an example of how different institutions can cooperate across the Kingdom and benefit from one another. The continental shelf project also has exemplary research cooperation with other countries, such as the Swedish Polar Research Secretariat with which it has carried out many data collection expeditions with the Swedish ice-breaker Oden. The project also has fruitful research-based cooperation with Canada and Russia. The Kingdom’s claims on the continental shelf will in some areas overlap with other country’s continental shelf claims. There is close collaboration with other coastal states in the Arctic Ocean to solve unresolved boundary issues beyond 200 nautical miles. As highlighted in the Ilulissat Declaration, unresolved boundary issues in the Arctic will be resolved in accordance with international law. Besides maritime boundary issues, the Kingdom has an unresolved issue relating to the sovereignty of Hans Island (Hans Ø) as both the Kingdom and Canada claim sovereignty over the island. In September 2005, Denmark/Greenland and Canada made a joint statement on Hans Island, and frequent consultations on the island are in progress. Pending a permanent solution to the issue, the dispute will be handled professionally as would be expected between two neighbouring countries and close allies. –– The Kingdom will work for peaceful cooperation between the coastal states of the Arctic Ocean in accordance with the Ilulissat Declaration. –– The Kingdom will advance concrete international legal regulation of the Arctic in areas where needed. 53

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The Kingdom will seek to resolve outstanding unresolved boundary issues and actively work to reduce the processing time of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf and thereby ensure greater assurance of coastal states’ continental shelf claims in the Arctic. The Kingdom will continue work on the Continental Shelf Project in order to promote its claim pursuant to the UN’s Convention on the Law of the Sea.

The Continental Shelf Project in practice Since 2006 the Danish Realm has conducted a series of expeditions in the Arctic Ocean as part of the continental shelf project. A factor common to the expeditions is close cooperation with other countries. Canada, Russia and the U.S. have also been conducting scientific studies in the Arctic Ocean these years in preparation for an extension of their respective continental shelves. The expeditions “LORITA” (2006), “LOMBAG” and “LOMGRAV” (2009), for example, were based on Canadian logistics. LOMROG I and II expeditions in 2007 and 2009 were carried out with the Swedish icebreaker Oden, in cooperation with Sweden and Canada. In 2007, the expedition was for a period supported by a Russian nuclear icebreaker. Another factor these expeditions have in common is that in addition to the collection of data relevant to the continental shelf project, emphasis is also placed on scientific output and follow-up research in other fields. Thus, ice cores have been collected, ice thickness measured, samples of DNA and bacteria collected, geology, oceanography, plankton ecology all studied, and the accumulation of mercury measured. All collections are conducted in cooperation with Danish, Greenland, Swedish and American research institutions and have led to increased knowledge of the Arctic Ocean’s plate tectonics, palaeoclimatology, physical oceanography and ecosystems. Further expeditions are planned under the auspices of the Continental Shelf Project in 2011 and/or 2012. […] 2.2.  Enhanced maritime safety Navigation in the Arctic is increasing, including in the waters around Greenland and the Faroe Islands. Less ice coverage, especially in the summer months, has led to a significant growth in maritime traffic, including cruise ships to areas of Greenland which until a few years ago were not possible to navigate. In 2010, 43 cruise ships berthed in Greenland ports, compared with 32 in 2009. Furthermore, shipping trade in Faroese waters has increased considerably. Shipping in Faroese waters has risen by 5–6 times from 2008–2010 and 40–50 sizeable cruise ships now call at Faroese ports each year. Shipping operators are exploring new areas still further north as ice conditions permit. Meanwhile, prices of raw materials and not least a long-term expectation of a shortage of oil and natural gas have led to increased trade in the exploration and exploitation of natural resources. The melting of sea ice in the summer also allows for new shipping routes through the Northeast and the Northwest Passage which could ultimately yield significant savings in transportation time by the maritime transport of goods between Europe and Asia. It is believed that the waters around Greenland and the Faroe Islands will experience a significant increase in maritime traffic in the coming years. The increasing maritime activity is closely linked with economic development in the Arctic. For the sake of the fragile environment in the Arctic, it is important to build sustainable growth. For shipping, which is a global industry, this means that internationally high safety standards must be established for ships navigating in the Arctic. Furthermore, 54

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in terms of shipping policy, it is important that the Kingdom is working to promote shipping in the Arctic under high standards where international regulation ensures that ships are competing within a uniform framework. Because of the extreme conditions in sparsely populated Arctic regions, prevention of marine vessel accidents is crucial in the Arctic. Regardless of climate changes, it will still be necessary to take account of ice, low temperatures, extreme weather and the risk of grounding. It is therefore vital that ships are built and equipped so they can operate under these conditions. Despite increasing intensity, marine traffic will still be spread over a vast geographical area far from ports. Therefore, ships should first and foremost use their own rescue equipment if an accident should occur, until the resources offered by the authorities responsible in the area can be deployed to assist. Therefore, preventive measures must be set in place that allow for the continued and increased navigation in the Arctic, while at the same time effectively preventing and minimising marine accidents and mitigating damage to the environment and nature. It is important to implement preventive safety measures, not least for the cruise ships that sail with many passengers, and often with limited local knowledge. Here, experience shows that other cruise ships in the vicinity are crucial to saving lives. The Kingdom is working to promote cooperation on maritime safety in all key forums, particularly in the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), where binding rules for navigation in the Arctic are drawn up, but also through enhanced cooperation in the Arctic Council. To increase the safety of ships navigating in Arctic waters, Denmark has introduced improved port State control of cruise ships planning to sail to Greenland. Moreover, other countries have been urged to do the same when these ships enter their ports before sailing to the Arctic. Furthermore, the Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs has entered into an agreement with the Government of Greenland (Naalakkersuisut) on the establishment of a liaison committee in order to ensure that a high safety level of navigation in Greenland waters is sustained and developed, whether this takes the form of international shipping or in the form of domestic navigation to and from Greenland ports. The liaison committee will prepare a joint plan in 2011 to ensure this. Increased maritime traffic also places greater demands on infrastructure as marine vessels require support in the form of a sound infrastructure. The Government of Greenland has focused on this challenge with the establishment in 2009 of a Transportation Commission and in the coming years will address requirements in this area, based on the recommendations in the commission’s report in 2011. Updating nautical charts will be an important factor under the auspices of the Danish Realm. In the future, ships will increasingly use electronic nautical charts and make use of satellite-based navigation systems such as GPS which impose stricter requirements on the accuracy of charts. In particular, a thorough knowledge of water depth is necessary to navigate safely at sea. In 2009 an agreement was made between the Minister of Environment and the Government of Greenland about a renewal of the nautical charts for Greenland, which means that the charts for most of Southwest Greenland (from Cape Farewell to Uummannaq)—the busiest Greenland waters—will be corrected and digitized no later than 2018. Due to the vast sea areas, large areas of the Greenland waters will be unsurveyed beyond 2018 while still greater areas become accessible to shipping as the ice melts. For reasons of safety at sea the Kingdom will furthermore continue to prioritize the work of the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO), such as in the regional commission on the Arctic which was established in 2010. 55

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Similarly maritime safety is supported by ensuring the availability of reliable information on weather, sea conditions and ice. The Greenland Ice Services at the Danish Meteorological Institute was established in 1959 as one result of the shipwreck of M/S “Hans Hedtoft”. The Service’s main task so far has been to map the ice conditions in the Cape Farewell area for the safe navigation of cargo ships between Greenland and Denmark. Because of changing climatic conditions and altered distribution of sea ice in Greenland waters, the navigational pattern of ships has changed dramatically. Combined with the growth of cruise ship activity and oil exploration, there is a need for intensified ice and weather warning alerts further north in both West and East Greenland. It will therefore be a priority that the existing Ice Services be adapted to the increased requirements for observation, forecasting and dissemination of ice conditions in Greenland waters. Furthermore, enhanced surveillance of maritime traffic in the Arctic will contribute to improved prevention of accidents and coordination of the rescue efforts. It also provides greater opportunity to intervene before an accident can occur. Currently, ships sailing to Greenland must report to the so-called GREENPOS reporting system, which requires ships in Greenland waters to continuously report their position to the Greenland Command. Larger ships already send their positions via the satellite-based LRIT (Long Range Identification and Tracking) system. Surveillance is expected to be improved, for example by using new technology with satellite reception of ships’ AIS signals (Automatic Identification System) as almost all larger ships are equipped with AIS. The Faroese Maritime Authority follows international developments and handles Faroese interests in the IMO because of its status as an associate member of IMO. With the introduction of AIS and LRIT, which are based on IMO mandatory requirements, it has been possible to improve the monitoring of foreign and Faroese vessels in Faroese waters. In addition to this, cooperation has been established between Denmark, Greenland, the Faroe Islands, Norway and Britain for the mutual exchange of AIS data in the North Atlantic region. Over a number of years, both the Faroe Islands and Greenland have entirely or in part been responsible for the monitoring of the marine environment and pollution control in territorial waters. Furthermore, the Faroe Islands has responsibility for search and rescue services. In light of increased activity in the region further knowledge and exchange of findings and cooperation will be needed to solve these tasks. –– The Kingdom will promote cooperation with other Arctic states and other key countries with significant maritime interests in major marine policy issues concerning the Arctic, such as maritime safety. Cooperation with other Arctic states must support a sustainable maritime growth, for example by establishing a better knowledge base on navigation in the Arctic. –– The Kingdom will reinforce concrete preventive measures to improve safety of navigation in the Arctic. In particular this involves endeavours, in cooperation with the other Arctic States, for adoption by the IMO of a mandatory Polar Code to ensure high safety levels in Greenland waters, regardless of the ships’ nationality and for a requirement that crews have the requisite skills for navigation in Arctic waters. –– To work for the inclusion of requirements in the polar code under IMO auspices that cruise ships coordinate their navigations with the emergency services, including other cruise ships, which could come to the rescue if a maritime incident occurs. The Kingdom will work in the Arctic Council to gather knowledge of cruise lines’ 56

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own safety standards for navigation in order to promote “best practices” for the navigation of cruise ships in the Arctic, and also consider the need for increased focus on port State control prior to cruise ships sailing to the Arctic. The Kingdom will continue preparing new nautical charts for Greenland to avoid maritime accidents in Greenland waters and to support mineral resource activities. The Kingdom will support the surveying of the Greenland waters and cooperation with other coastal states of the Arctic Ocean within the Arctic Hydrographic Commission. Maritime safety must also be supported by ensuring the availability of reliable information on weather, sea and ice in collaboration with other Arctic states, better information about navigation in Greenland waters and the tightening up of port State control of ships sailing to the Arctic, and finally working for the international dissemination hereof. The Kingdom will work to introduce binding global rules and standards for navigation in the Arctic and it is a high priority to reach agreement on a global regulation of shipping via the IMO, cf. Ilulissat Declaration. Should it prove that agreement on global rules cannot be reached, and in view of the especially vulnerable Arctic environment and the unique challenges of security, the Kingdom will consider implementing non-discriminatory regional safety and environmental rules for navigation in the Arctic in consultation with the other Arctic states and taking into account international law, including the Convention on the Law of the Sea provisions regarding navigation in ice covered waters. The Kingdom will work to strengthen cooperation with neighbouring countries on monitoring, search and rescue, such as supporting the implementation of the joint Arctic cooperation agreement on strengthening coordination and datasharing in relation to search and rescue, entered into under the auspices of the Arctic Council in May 2011. Given the clear correlation between the rise of maritime activity and economic development in the Arctic, efforts will be strengthened to involve Greenland citizens in tasks within areas of maritime safety, such as surveying, buoying, and search and rescue at sea, perhaps by establishing a voluntary coastal rescue service. The Kingdom will examine the need for the establishment of new shipping routes, and implement this to the extent it promotes maritime safety and marine protection. For example, there is particular need to establish recognized routes in Faroese waters for both cruise ships, tankers and other vessels with respect to safety and the environment. […]

2.3.  Exercising of sovereignty and surveillance The Arctic is and must be a region characterized by peace and cooperation. Even though the working relationship of the Arctic Ocean’s coastal states is close, there will be a continuing need to enforce the Kingdom’s sovereignty, especially in light of the anticipated increase in activity in the region. While the Kingdom’s area in the Arctic is covered by the NATO treaty Article 5 regarding collective defence, the enforcement of sovereignty is fundamentally a responsibility of the Realm’s central authorities. Enforcement of sovereignty is exercised by the armed forces through a visible presence in the region where surveillance is central to the task. In addition, the armed forces play an important role in the provision of a range of more civilian related duties. Within the entire spectrum 57

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of tasks, the Kingdom attaches great importance to confidence building and cooperation with Arctic partner countries. The long-term political agreement on defence (Danish Defence agreement 2010–2014) involves a stronger focus on the tasks of the Danish Armed Forces in the Arctic. The agreement includes four overriding initiatives that must be viewed in light of climate change and increased activity that would foreseeably result in an increase of tasks for the armed forces. Firstly, the Armed Forces North Atlantic command structure will be streamlined by the amalgamation of the Greenland Command and the Faroe Command into a joint service Arctic Command. Secondly, the ability of the armed forces to conduct operations in the Arctic environment will be strengthened through the establishment of an Arctic Response Force. The response force would not be established permanently, but designated from existing armed forces and emergency preparedness units with Arctic capacity or the potential to develop one. The range of tasks of the Arctic Response Force is for defined periods and in defined areas anticipated to strengthen the armed forces’ enforcement of sovereignty and surveillance, for instance through military exercises. The force could also be deployed in other situations such as in assistance to the Greenlandic society. Thirdly, a risk analysis of the maritime environment in and around Greenland is to be conducted in the light of an anticipated expansion of traffic and activity in the Arctic. Fourthly, towards 2014 a comprehensive analysis of the armed force’s future tasks in the Arctic is to be carried out, including opportunities and potential for closer cooperation with partner countries in the Arctic concerning surveillance and the like. In this connection it is to be examined whether the Thule Air Base may play a larger role in regard to the tasks performed in and around Greenland by the Danish Armed Forces in cooperation with other partner countries. –– The Danish Defence aspires, as other public institutions, to reflect the surrounding community. Indeed, it is a Danish-Greenland hope that citizens of Greenland can be increasingly involved in the tasks of the armed forces and with that, participate in a wide range of training opportunities, whether they be basic training, civil/military specialist and management training programs or customized further education at all levels. The armed forces will thereby also greatly benefit from Greenland local knowledge. –– The armed forces must be visibly present in and around Greenland and the Faroe Islands with regard to the enforcement of sovereignty and surveillance. The North Atlantic command structure is to be streamlined by the establishment of an Arctic Command and an Arctic Response Force is to be designated from existing units. –– The Kingdom will reinforce confidence building in cooperation with other Arctic states to maintain the Arctic as a region characterized by cooperation and good neighbourliness, just as the Kingdom will continue to play an active role in creating and promoting new collaborative initiatives between countries in the Arctic. The Kingdom will stress the potential for increased cooperation on surveillance. –– The possibilities to enhance cooperation in regard to the armed force’s tasks will be looked into, including the involvement of Greenland’s citizens in the handling of key tasks of the armed forces in the Arctic. The possibilities for targeted information and recruitment campaigns and the establishment of customized courses will be studied.

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Key tasks of the armed forces in the Arctic Enforcement of state sovereignty is a fundamental task of the armed forces in all parts of the Kingdom. Sovereignty enforcement is the primary task of the Danish Armed Forces in the Arctic and the level of presence in the area is determined accordingly. Units from the army, navy and air force carry out tasks in the Arctic. They undertake surveillance and enforcement of sovereignty of Greenland and Faroese territorial waters and air space, as well as the Greenland exclusive economic zone and the fishing zones to ensure that no systematic violations of territory can take place. Likewise, the Sirius Patrol oversees the National Park in Northeast Greenland and enforces sovereignty there. As part of its presence, the armed forces is building a habitual picture of activities in the waters around Greenland and the Faroe Islands. The armed forces presence and overview of activities in the Arctic establishes a basis for solving many other tasks, including providing assistance to the Greenland community. Activities in the Arctic are largely related to the ocean as a transportation route and to the utilisation of marine resources. Climate change in recent years, in particular the melting of ice masses, has resulted in an increase in the navigable areas and the commercial activities that follow in Greenland in the summer from mid-May to mid-October and this trend looks set to continue. In winter, there has not been a corresponding change of activities in the area. How this development will affect the armed forces’ tasks is analysed as part of the Defence Agreement 2010–2014. The armed forces adapts its deployment of vessels, aircraft and other capacities in accordance with the distinct difference in seasonal activity. Because of the enormous dimensions of the Arctic, international cooperation is an important element in resolving the armed forces’ tasks in the Arctic. 3.  Self-sustaining growth and development –– Mineral resources shall be exploited under the highest international standards of safety, health, environment, preparedness and response, and transparency with high returns for society. –– The use of renewable energy sources must be increased significantly. –– Living resources, including fish, shellfish and marine mammals shall be harvested in a sustainable manner based on sound science. –– New opportunities in the Arctic must be exploited in close cooperation with industry, and an optimal regulatory framework will be created for exports and investments. –– The Kingdom’s Arctic research will be at the global forefront, and research and training efforts must support the development of industry and society in the Arctic. –– The Kingdom will promote Arctic cooperation on health and social sustainability, including research and best practices in areas of shared challenges. It will be an overriding political priority for the Kingdom and particularly in Greenland over the next ten years to seize the many opportunities in the Arctic to create more growth and development. The huge economic potential in the Arctic must be realized while appreciating its human impact, i.e. the economic and social integration of the population and with sensitivity to environmental concerns, thereby creating a healthy, productive and self-sustaining community. Greenland is already a fast changing society 59

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and peoples in the Arctic, including the Greenlanders, may have to adapt to even more extensive changes in the future due to climate change, societal developments and the restructuring of industry. Integration into the new opportunities in the Arctic will place great demands on the populations’ adaptability and mobility. It will also be a significant challenge for Greenland to develop policies which, apart from the goal of social and societal-related sustainability, deal with the prospect of significant foreign labour migration. There is a close correlation between on the one hand realising the potential of natural resources, new trade and investment opportunities, and enhanced research and education contributions while on the other promoting health and social sustainability, which are the areas specifically addressed in this chapter. This concerns a number of strategic priorities for the Kingdom in relation to economic and societal development in the Arctic, but also other important areas such as enhanced economic development and diversification of the economy. This applies i.e. to the development of the tourist industry and bolstering the overall development with adequate infrastructure. Today, tourism, second only to fisheries, is the most important export industry in Greenland, and the tourist industry has potential for growth in the future. This applies both to land-based tourism and the cruise-liner business. Among the benefits of the latter is that even small towns and villages along the coast can be involved in tourism. The land-based tourism generates by far the greatest revenue but is currently dependent on only a few markets, primarily the Danish. Therefore Greenland’s Tourist Board is working on the development of a new national brand that more clearly defines Greenland as an adventure destination focusing on sustainable tourism and which to a greater extent appeals to the global market. Infrastructure is a key element in the development of the Greenland society and to ensure long term sustainable development, the Government of Greenland set up a transportation commission in 2009 for the socio-economic analysis of the entire infrastructure in Greenland. The Commission’s recommendations of April 2011 will form an important element in future policy decisions on the evolution of Greenland infrastructure. This will include decisions on the location of ports and airports. These projects will be costly and therefore private funding is seen as a possibility, just as mining projects located near urban areas could be included in potential funding of larger local infrastructure projects. 3.1.  High standards for the exploitation of mineral resources Studies from the U.S. Geological Survey, among others, estimate that there may be enormous, as yet unproven oil and gas resources in the Arctic, just as previously major discoveries were made of gas especially (in Russia) but also oil (in Alaska). Specifically, it is estimated that the Arctic may contain up to 30% of the world’s undiscovered gas resources and approx. 10% of the oil resources. Approximately 97% of oil and gas resources are believed to lie within the Arctic States’ exclusive economic zones, and are thereby allocated. In Greenland’s case, it is estimated that 31 billion barrels of oil and gas off the coast of Northeast Greenland and 17 billion barrels of oil and gas in areas west of Greenland and east of Canada could be discovered, though the probability is greater for discoveries in Northeast Greenland. Greenland is also rich in mineral deposits, including zinc, copper, nickel, gold, diamonds and platinum group metals, and has substantial deposits 60

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of so-called critical metals, including rare earth elements, several of which are important components of high-end technology, including green energy technologies. The mineral resources sector in Greenland has significantly matured over the last 10–15 years as a result of a long-term and deliberate strategy. After the adoption by Parliament Act No. 7 of 7 December 2009 on mineral resources and activities of relevance hereto, the mineral resources sector was fully taken over by the Greenland Self-Government on 1 January 2010 and is a key element to building growth industries and a self-sustaining economy. In 2008, Greenland had already adopted the Parliament Act No. 6 of 5 December 2008 on Greenland’s Mineral Resources Fund, which is inspired by the Norwegian model so that oil and gas revenues also benefit future generations. The vision is to exploit mineral resources in the Arctic under the best international practices, and in continued close cooperation with relevant authorities of the Danish Realm and international partners. Greenland and the Faroe Islands shall be attractive areas for exploration, and the management of mineral resources must be competent and efficient in ensuring that such mineral resources are explored and exploited under the highest standards of safety, health, environment, emergency preparedness and transparency. The mineral resource industry must be developed while strongly taking into consideration the fragile Arctic environment so it contributes to sound economic development, including the creation of new jobs and a maximum return to society. Mineral resource activities will also be carried out with sufficient preparedness that the public is kept from harm (based on the polluter-pays-principle) and that the Kingdom’s international obligations can be met in case of major unscheduled incidents. This should be a model for resource exploitation across the whole of the Arctic. In the oil and gas sector, licensing rounds have been held biannually since 2002 and alongside rising oil prices in recent years, there has been a breakthrough in the international interest in Greenland’s oil potential. An area of more than 200,000 km² offshore South and West Greenland is now covered by 20 exploration and exploitation licenses, and in 2010 seven new exploration licenses were issued in Baffin Bay off the coast of Northwest Greenland. A licensing round for oil exploration off the coast of the northernmost part of East Greenland will be held in 2012/2013. In the coming years in particular, there will be a need to maintain the level of activity offshore of West and Northwest Greenland, while ensuring a broad professional knowledge building in the more inaccessible areas off Northeast Greenland. With respect to oil and gas finds and subsequent production, a number of new challenges and tasks will emerge. As a result, coordination and cooperation with neighbouring Arctic states with similar challenges will be a major priority. In 2000 the first licenses for exploration of the Faroese shelf were issued. Subsequently there were two licensing rounds in 2005 and 2008. In total, 17 licenses have been issued, of which 12 are currently active with a total of 11 licensees. Of the 7 wells drilled so far, 5 contain hydrocarbons, but finds on a commercial scale have not yet been confirmed. There is still unexplored potential for exploration in structures that could potentially contain large amounts of hydrocarbons. Currently there are two outstanding drilling commitments, of which the first well will be drilled in 2012. The current relatively modest level of activity has already had favourable effects on the Faroese economy through direct and indirect taxes in connection with drilling and area fees. Another significant benefit is the boost in commercial competencies and employment opportunities which wholly or partly are attributable to exploration activity on the Faroese 61

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Continental Shelf. One condition for acquiring a license is that a commitment must be entered into to finance activities that build up local competencies. This enhancement of competence must be commercially oriented though not necessarily be related to the oil industry. The arrangement should be seen as an investment in both the present and future, and already several hundred projects, both large and small, have been carried out. This has created a solid basis for local involvement provided that commercial discoveries are made on the Faroes. In the mineral sector, exploration in Greenland in recent years has especially targeted gold, zinc, iron, copper, diamonds, rubies and a number of critical metals, including rare earth elements. The prospects are bright that the development of the mineral sector can significantly underpin the development of an economically selfsupporting Greenland. The Government of Greenland is expecting that a number of mature projects developed with foreign partners and partial involvement of Danish companies will create over 1,000 new jobs by 2015. Regarding radioactive minerals, the Self Government follows a zerotolerance policy, which means that it does not permit the exploration and exploitation of deposits that contain radioactive elements, either as a main product, by-product or residue. In 2010 an amendment was made to the standard terms for exploration, which permits the carrying out of feasibility studies, including environmental, health and safety studies of deposits containing radioactive elements. –– Greenland will continue the successful licensing policy and strategy of competitive tenders in the oil and gas sector. Sets of rules will be continually adapted to optimize safety, health, environment and transparency standards through the use and improvement of best available techniques and practices. This will include inspiration from other countries’ regulations, not least the Norwegian NORSOK standards. –– Cooperation will be expanded with authorities in similar areas, including Norway and Canada, and participation in relevant international fora such as the Arctic Council’s working groups is to be given high priority. –– The Kingdom will work actively in the United Nation’s Maritime Organisation (IMO) or other international fora, for the establishment of an international liability and compensation convention and a possible international compensation fund for pollution damage caused by offshore oil exploration and exploitation. –– Terms and conditions for licenses to exploit must be reasonable for both larger and smaller companies, resilient to fluctuating market conditions as well as simple and easy to administrate for companies and authorities. –– Mineral sector activities must be conducted responsibly as regards environmental, health and safety concerns, and an appropriate supervisory body must ensure compliance hereof. Oil and gas activities in Greenland High standards for activities In connection with the exploration and exploitation of oil and gas resources regulated by the Greenland Mineral Resources Act, the licensee must ensure that safety, environmental and health risks are identified, assessed and reduced as much as practically and reasonably possible. The Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum (BMP) guidelines and terms of approval are based largely on the Norwegian NORSOK standards which determine how the licensee 62

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can comply with international best practice in relation to specific operational procedures and practices. The BMP follows strict compliance with international standards, supplemented by an emergency committee broadly composed of authorities of the Danish Realm (including the Danish Armed Forces and the Danish Maritime Authority) and Greenland authorities. The Emergency Committee monitors the precautionary actions taken by the licensee, and is responsible for coordinating the authority’s efforts in accident and emergency situations on offshore installations. Thus, permission is only given for exploration and exploitation activities provided that the Government of Greenland is fully assured that the activities are performed properly in a safe and healthy manner and stringent requirements are made of licensees regarding their own capacity to deal with accidents and emergencies. Under the Mineral Resources Act, the responsibility for clean-up operations and compensation always lies with the party causing damage, whereby a number of stringent requirements are imposed following international standards regarding financial guarantees and insurance for oil and mineral activities. Before new offshore areas are designated as oil/gas licensing areas, the Government of Greenland sets in motion the preparation of strategic environmental impact assessments in order to ensure that any oil/gas activities can be implemented on an environmentally sustainable basis. The strategic environmental impact assessments are prepared on a scientific basis by the National Environmental Research Institute and Greenland’s Institute of Natural Resources. In connection with an application for the carrying out of concrete oil/gas activities which are likely to have a significant impact on the environment, such as exploration wells, the licensee is required to conduct a specific assessment of the environmental impact (EIA). The EIA report is submitted for public hearing and must be approved by the Government of Greenland before the application to carry out the activity can be approved. Under the Mineral Resources Act, companies seeking a license for exploitation must also prepare an Assessment of Societal Sustainability (SSA report). The report must, for example, describe the utilisation of Greenland manpower and enterprises in the project, including how the proportion of Greenland employees and subcontractors can be increased through training and skills development […] Licensees in oil and gas sectors in Greenland As of 1st January 2011 there were 20 active exclusive right licenses for exploration and exploitation of oil and gas in the sea around Greenland. During 2012–2013 a licensing round will be carried out covering offshore Northeast Greenland. There is great interest from a number of different companies and as of January 2011 the licensees are: NUNAOIL (Greenland), DONG (Denmark), Maersk Oil (Denmark), ExxonMobil (U.S.), Chevron (U.S.), Husky (CAN), Cairn Energy (UK), PA Resources (SVE), ConocoPhillips (U.S.), Shell (NL), Statoil (NOR), GDF Suez (FRA) and Petronas (Malaysia). Oil activities in the Faroe Islands High standards for activities The execution of exploration activities in the Faroes takes place with continuous regard for the environment and the existing fishing industry. Safety procedures for example are on par with the Danish, Norwegian and British. This includes requirements for the licensees regarding their technical and economic expertise as a part of their responsibilities. 63

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Furthermore, exploration activity must always live up to best practices in the industry and be geared to the circumstances of the specific drilling location. To be updated on developments in safety matters, the Faroe Islands is a member of NSOAF (North Sea Offshore Authorities Forum), an association of offshore safety authorities in countries in Western Europe with an oil industry. As the exploration activity on the Faroese shelf is geographically close to activity in the UK and Norwegian waters, the emergency preparedness is also tied to response equipment on the respective British and Norwegian continental shelves. To a great extent, this places emergency preparedness on the Faroese shelf on a par with that in Norway and the UK. Authorities’ responsibility for oil drilling in the Faroe Islands The Faroese Ministry of Trade and Industry has overall responsibility for exploration activity in the Faroes. The everyday management is delegated to Jarðfeingi (Faroese Earth and Energy Directorate), which also deals with public sector geological interests, and has an advisory function regarding energy issues. Umhvørvisstovan (the Environment Agency) is responsible for the Faroese marine environment act and the Faroe Islands Marine Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) Torshavn is responsible for coordination regarding incidents offshore. Oil companies active in the Faroe Islands Atlantic Petroleum (FO), Cieco (Korea), Dana Petroleum (UK), DONG (DK), ENI (ITA), Exxon Mobil (US), Faroe Petroleum (FO), First Oil Expro (UK), OMV (Østrig), Sagex Petroleum (NOR), Statoil (NOR). Greenland’s strategy for Minerals The Government of Greenland’s strategy and plan of action for exploration and exploitation of hard minerals is described in the sectoral plan “Mineral Strategy 2009”. The main objectives of the strategy are that all projects must be implemented socially sustainably, and ensuring that: 1) The society will receive a competitive share of profits gained from mining. 2) Greenland manpower and enterprises are used to the greatest possible extent. 3) All mineral activities are to be conducted properly in terms of safety, health and the environment. 4) The population is ensured participation and knowledge in the development of the mineral sector. 5) The development proceeds with respect to Greenland values. […] 3.2.  Exploitation of renewable energy potential The Kingdom will pursue ambitious and active energy and climate policies. The energy policy objectives of Greenland, Denmark and the Faroe Islands respectively are to create security of supply, to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases and air pollution while creating a basis for commercial development. A shared ambition is to significantly increase the harnessing of renewable energy sources. Denmark’s commitment to renewable energy targets under the EU is 30% by 2020. Greenland will increase its share of renewable energy to 60% of total energy production by 2020. The Faroe Islands will increase the use of renewable energy, including the target of 75% of electricity production based on renewable energy by 2020. Greenland has a tremendous natural potential for renewable energy, which among other things can be utilised for the development of emerging industry. An example is 64

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the designing, in collaboration with the American company, Alcoa, of an aluminium smelting plant in Maniitsoq which will be operated solely by hydropower. Increasing focus in Greenland is placed on small-scale solutions for renewable energy to be used in smaller towns and settlements where there is currently no access to hydropower. The Government of Greenland provides support for developing renewable energy projects, including micro hydropower plants, and solar and wind power projects that aim at a green and self-sufficient Greenland energy supply. Furthermore, the utilisation of renewable energy in the transport sector is being explored. The development of renewable energy sources is a key issue in Greenland’s international cooperation. –– Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands will increase the share of renewable energy sources in the energy supply in order to increase the security of supply, reduce emissions of greenhouse gases and air pollution, and thus create the basis for enhanced commercial development and knowledge sharing through training and participation in projects. –– The Government of Greenland will continue to promote the utilisation of renewable energy in Greenland. In the smaller towns and settlements, the development of local energy solutions based on renewable energy must be supported. The Government of Greenland will also promote Greenland’s potential to house industrial production based on renewable energy. 3.3.  Sustainable exploitation of living resources The Arctic regions are unique ecosystems that represent important values biologically and socially. The natural resources have shaped the development of Arctic fishing and hunting cultures and traditions, and the utilization of fish and marine mammals has always formed the bedrock of Arctic societies and economies. Historically, supply-related and cultural considerations are fundamental to the Arctic population’s relationship to the exploitation of living resources, whether fish or marine mammals. The exploitation of living marine resources is one of the essential economic factors in both Greenland and the Faroe Islands. The structure, function, diversity and integrity of the ecosystem in the Arctic are crucial to the productivity. The Arctic must therefore be managed so as to ensure a healthy marine ecosystem with economically sustainable species and stocks. Ecosystem-based management means that management of the ecosystem is based on a holistic approach where all parts of the ecosystem and all impacts, including those from human activities, are taken into account in management. The management of living marine resources in the Arctic must ensure a high return within the ecosystem’s capacity, ensure minimal impact on the ecosystem, and guarantee respect for the ecosystem’s capacity for future production of living resources. Greenland and the Faroe Islands’ fishery takes place mainly in the North Atlantic, the Denmark Strait and the David Strait. Greenland’s fishery is based on a quota system whose aim is to ensure a sustainable exploitation of certain stocks. Therefore, an annual “Total Allowable Catch” (TAC) of the principal species is stipulated, based on biological advice and respecting socio-economic concerns, commercial interests and international obligations. The biological advice is provided by the Greenland Institute of Natural Resources and a number of regional organizations, particularly the ICES and NAFO. Faroese fishing of pelagic stocks and fishing in other waters under bilateral and multilateral agreements is mainly based on quota systems, while for groundfish fisheries around the Faroe Islands there is a special system of fishing days and areas which are 65

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closed as required. Besides their own expertise, the Faroese also draw on international advice, particularly ICES. Greenland and the Faroe Islands each have agreements with one another and also with the EU, Norway and Russia, and the Faroe Islands furthermore with Iceland. The Faroe Islands, though also Greenland, shares fishery stocks with close neighbours and exports of fish and fish products form a large part of the economy of both countries. The Faroe Islands’ export of fish and fish products represents approx. 90% of total exports and for Greenland, approx. 85% of total exports. The Greenland fishery industry is facing a structural challenge of adjustment, including the need of larger and more modern vessels and the need for future regulation of the industry in relation to ownership provisions and access to capital. This restructuring process will also cause an outflow of labour to other industries and make demands on social policy. Greenland’s Self-Government has initiated a project concerning the consequences of climate change on the fishing and hunting industry with a view to identifying opportunities for adaptation that manage the challenges while exploiting new opportunities. The adaptation of industry and retraining initiatives in for example the fisheries industry, might be one element of a new phase of partnership between Greenland and Europe. A key element in fishery management is control and enforcement. Control operations are undertaken by the Greenland and Faroese authorities who monitor that both Greenland and Faroese, and relevant international fishery regulations are complied with by all vessels in their respective waters, as well as by Greenland and Faroese vessels operating internationally. The inspection of vessels and catches at sea is undertaken by the Danish Armed Forces and the Faroe Islands Fisheries Inspection Fiskiveiðieftirlitið. Furthermore, regional cooperation on inspections remains a priority. General increases of temperature in the Arctic and rapid melting of ice can make new areas of the Arctic Ocean potentially attractive for fishing. This presents new challenges with regards to national and international regulation of these areas due to insufficient data about them. In addition, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing is a serious threat to marine ecosystems which has considerable implications for conservation and rational management of marine resources. It is a huge task for small communities with large ecosystems to provide adequate expertise for the management and control of fishery. In the Arctic, there is relatively limited knowledge of fish stocks and fishery opportunities, which means that the precautionary principle should be applied to protect the environment and fishery resources. Hunting is an integral part of the Arctic community and a sustainable exploitation of hunting resources is important for the local economy and for cultural self-identity. The best possible basis for decisions should be ensured in the exploitation of these resources nationally and internationally. Similarly, it is essential that hunters have confidence in the basis for decision-making so that limitations on hunting are observed. The Greenland seal-hunting industry is currently under pressure partly because the European and North American markets for sealskin have virtually collapsed after pressure by special interest groups on consumers. Internationally, there is very limited understanding for the catch of marine mammals. This is also true of the Greenland catch of large whales, which is regulated by the International Whaling Commission in accordance with the exemption that applies to indigenous peoples. –– All living resources must be developed and exploited sustainably based on an ecosystem management that ensures a high return in the long term, and is in compliance with international obligations, while at the same time the Arctic 66

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communities’ rights are defended in support of the fishing and hunting industry. Management must be based on scientific advice that is founded on the collection, processing and analysis of data, including from hunters and industry. The Kingdom will work internationally for the Arctic indigenous peoples’ right to conduct hunting and to sell products from seal hunting, as long as it is based on sustainable principles. Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands will work to ensure that the utilisation of living resources, including marine mammals, is founded upon an ecosystembased management model that places emphasis on scientific foundation and sustainability. Work continuously to ensure regular scientifically based monitoring of living resources in the Arctic with the involvement of its citizens. The precautionary principle should apply in cases where there is a lack of adequate knowledge about development in previously ice-covered areas. Effective management and control regimes must be pursued to counter illegal, unreported and unregulated fishery and hunting, and also work for international agreements on potentially attractive Arctic high seas not yet covered by the conservation and management systems. The parts of the Danish Realm will work to ensure that in general fishery does not commence where a conservation and management system is not available. The parts of the Danish Realm will work to strengthen international cooperation on scientifically based management of shared fish stocks and fishery in international waters with a view to promoting consensus on sustainable management plans and allocation formulas for the benefit of all relevant parties. The parts of the Danish Realm will work towards the introduction of a special regional form of control for a prudent fishery in large ecosystems in sparsely populated areas where there is no historical data and where it is particularly challenging to collect data and carry out control. Methods must be developed for sustainable management in situations of scientific uncertainty, whereby models are developed that support a learning management system based on the precautionary principle. […]

3.4.  Stronger integration in international trade New opportunities for economic development in the Arctic are leading to increasing interest from international investors in the area. The Government of Greenland has set itself clear targets to attract more foreign investors, and to ensure that the exploitation of Greenland’s natural resources in the future will constitute a major source of revenue for the Greenland society. The new trading opportunities can contribute to the diversification of Greenland’s economy and create the basis for economic sustainability and prosperity. For the Faroe Islands in particular, the opening of the Northeast Passage will unfold new opportunities as a result of increased navigation. The Government of the Faroes has decided to set up a working group to assess the Faroese strategic opportunities associated with increased enterprise in the Arctic and North Atlantic area. The heightened international interest requires the creation of attractive regulatory frameworks for investments. Therefore, Greenland is working to conform to international trade rules and obligations and create a healthy investment environment. This will not only strengthen Greenland as an attractive investment destination, but also give Greenland more opportunities to penetrate new 67

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markets. By virtue of the Kingdom of Denmark’s membership, Greenland and the Faeroe Islands come under the World Trade Organisation. Since the end of 2005, Greenland has worked continuously to bring Greenland law into compliance with WTO rules. Due to its OCT status (Overseas Countries and Territories) Greenland goods have duty-free access to the EU. The Faroe Islands has duty-free access to the EU for the majority of its goods pursuant to an agreement on mutual tariff exemption in 1991, renewed in 1996. Faroe trade with the EFTA countries, Norway and Switzerland (and Liechtenstein), is covered by free trade agreements concluded in the early 1990s. As regards Iceland, the Faroe Islands entered into a more comprehensive economic cooperation agreement in 2005 (Hoyvík Agreement). Many Arctic regions are favourably located in relation to the world’s two largest markets (the EU and U.S.), especially Greenland. The opportunities for a closer association to the surrounding markets must gradually be expanded as the extent of sea ice decreases. Trading requires infrastructure, and it is essential that the infrastructure be developed to support growing trade. In Greenland, the Transportation Commission has analysed the future needs for adapting the infrastructure and its recommendations of April 2011 will form a weighty element in the basis for decisions on the development of Greenland’s infrastructure. –– A close collaboration with the business community must be ensured regarding the increased opportunities in the Arctic. The markets for Greenland and Faroese export goods are to be expanded, and internal and external barriers to exports removed. –– Inside the Kingdom’s individual customs territories, the closest possible alignment must be ensured with international trade regulations and obligations, in particular the WTO’s regulations. –– Cooperation must be strengthened concerning Greenland adaptation, as deemed appropriate, to the bilateral trade agreements which Denmark enters into via the EU, and the Kingdom will work to maintain—and wherever possible expand— preferential access for products from Greenland and the Faroe Islands in the EU and third countries, including entering into agreements on reciprocal free trade between the Faroe Islands and new third countries. –– Trade relations with the outside world must be managed through an ongoing infrastructure development. […] 4. Development with respect for the Arctic’s vulnerable climate, environment and nature –– The Kingdom will pursue a vigorous and ambitious knowledge building on climate change in the Arctic and its consequences in order to foster global and local adaptation to far-reaching change. –– The Arctic nature and environment must be managed based on the best possible scientific knowledge and standards for protection, and international cooperation in this endeavour must be promoted. The Arctic has increasingly become a part of the international agenda, and global developments have in turn increasingly become a part of the Arctic. With the Arctic Council’s publication of Arctic Climate Impact Assessment from 2005, the world discovered the magnitude and consequences of climate change in the Arctic. However, 20 years earlier, the realization that heavy degradable man-made pollutants and heavy metals lead to pollution and the accumulation of toxins in animals and humans in the 68

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Arctic, had already spurred the creation of the Arctic Council as well as international agreements in 1998 that regulate pollutants. There is rightly an increased international focus on environmental regulation in the Arctic, including nature conservation, biodiversity and the marine environment. There is also considerable attention to the growing impact of toxic substances like mercury and persistent organic pollutants (POPs), which can have harmful effects on public health as well as ecosystems and biodiversity. The following focuses on the strategic priorities to improve knowledge building on the consequences of rapid climate change in the Arctic, and to strengthen the protection of the environment and biodiversity in the Arctic. 4.1.  Improved understanding of the consequences of climate change in Arctic Recent scientific studies conclude that warming in the Arctic since 1980 has been twice as much as the rest of the globe and that in 2005–2010 the Arctic had the highest average temperatures since records began in 1840. Global climate models predict that warming will continue. The effects of continued warming of Greenland’s climate, ice sheet and ocean are studied using regional climate models with a view to facilitating adaptation to climate change. Arctic warming means that snow and ice are steadily melting faster and the permafrost is disappearing in the southern part of the Arctic. The effects of these changes are extensive—including rising sea levels, potential changes in the atmospheric content of greenhouse gases, potential changes in global ocean currents, and so on—and climate change in the Arctic is of crucial importance to global climate and environmental conditions. In order to anticipate how global climate and environmental conditions will evolve, it is crucial to understand how climate change affects the Arctic, and in turn how changes in the Arctic affect global climate trends. Such knowledge is essential for the adaptation to climate change in the Arctic and the rest of the world. The Kingdom is also working to support and promote the conclusion of a global agreement on limiting emissions of greenhouse gases. –– In cooperation with the international research and scientific community, the Kingdom will strengthen the effort to quantify global and regional impacts of climate change in the Arctic, including knowledge about how Arctic ecosystems, sea ice and ice sheets respond to climate change. Such efforts include monitoring and research activities with the involvement of Greenland, Faroese and Danish research centres. –– Research and monitoring must reinforce the knowledge base on climate change impacts and their significance for the populations and communities within and without the Arctic as well as incorporating local and traditional knowledge. Furthermore, cooperation must be strengthened on identifying measures to adapt to climate change within the Kingdom. –– The Kingdom will assist in reinforcing the rights of indigenous peoples in negotiations towards a new international climate agreement by promoting the visibility of indigenous peoples’ situation and also ensuring that the principles of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples from 2007 are observed. […] 4.2.  Protecting the environment and biodiversity The Arctic nature and wildlife are unique and fragile. This is due to the fact that ecosystems have evolved under low temperatures in the Arctic. Global warming is 69

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leading to increasingly ice-free seas in summer periods, and the lower prevalence of sea ice can have a major impact on the living conditions and distribution of species associated with sea ice. Similarly, longer periods of open water will result in increased activity, such as shipping in areas that previously couldn’t be navigated, just as increased mineral exploitation, fishing and tourism pose a risk of pollution and accidents. Increased shipping may also pose a risk of an increased influx of invasive species. To this must be added the slow degrading of problematic chemical substances that are often long-range transported. Climate change may likewise cause direct impacts on terrestrial biodiversity, while a number of climate-related and non climate-related anthropogenic impacts can affect biodiversity. This applies, for example, to increased traffic and its associated disturbance and erosion, fragmentation of habitats, and increasing use of areas in open land for commercial and recreational purposes. On this basis, we can anticipate greater pressure on the Arctic ecosystems and fragile biodiversity. At the same time, there is an accumulation of pollutants through the food chain which could have major implications for the Arctic society. It is therefore essential, in collaboration with international partners, to ensure monitoring and studying of the environmental and health impacts to which the Arctic peoples, the Arctic ecosystem and biodiversity are exposed. It is equally important to ensure knowledge-building by the monitoring and study of migratory species (eg. whales, polar bears, migratory birds), ecosystems and biodiversity to be used in international conservation work. This will ensure the best possible foundation for future management in Greenland that is based on sustainable utilisation and protection of the Arctic environment. Parameters such as migration routes, area utilization and core habitats may also change in line with anticipated changes in climate and ice conditions. Further analysis could lead to more accurate identification of problem areas and to possible future changes. Identifying these areas and estimates of future changes will be of great importance for the implementation of necessary adjustments to ensure sustained and effective protection of nature and the environment. As regards environmental pressures and impacts, it remains necessary to ensure the monitoring and study of, for example, persistent organic pollutants (POPs), mercury, oil, particulates and other pollution to which the Arctic populations and ecosystems are exposed. Many years of continuous data collection of environmental impacts in the area provides important information both about the effect of existing international agreements on the reduction of long-range transboundary pollutants and information for use in future environmental work in the EU and other international fora. The impact of local pollution in the Arctic region has so far been minimal. One consequence of these environmental challenges is that it is necessary to ensure that future monitoring is conducted in a way that assesses all threats and impacts in the Arctic in an integrated way. Efforts are to be focused on the national implementation of international agreements entered into on nature and the environment, and on safeguarding the marine environment against pollution for example by enhancing maritime safety. In doing this, it is essential that the highest international environmental standards are employed in the harvesting of resources in the Arctic, and that due to the special navigational conditions, the best possible prevention of maritime accidents in the Arctic and possible pollution that results can be ensured. –– Nature and the environment must be managed based on the best possible knowledge base. This is ensured through a long term monitoring and systematic 70

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collating of research findings. The protection of biodiversity under international standards must be enhanced by identifying important and ecologically sensitive areas. Efforts will be made to ensure the rights of the Arctic countries and access to the exploration and utilisation of biological resources in the Arctic, since the Kingdom is especially interested in protecting and utilising the genetic and biological resources in the Arctic under the Convention on Biological Diversity. The continued monitoring of long-range transboundary pollutants and their impact on ecosystems and humans in the Arctic must continue. Likewise, continued monitoring and also the prioritization of monitoring species and ecosystems must be assured. Furthermore, it is important to do an overall assessment and monitoring of all the threats to and impacts on the Arctic for the protection of nature and the environment. The most recent knowledge about pollutants in the Arctic is to be made available and applied proactively. Focus must be enhanced on the use of available information in international fora relating to global negotiations of agreements such as the UNEP’s global mercury convention and the Stockholm Convention and other relevant agreements on persistent organic pollutants. Prevention of marine pollution in the Arctic must be reinforced. This includes better international sharing of knowledge and experience on preventative steps and cooperation, especially in the Arctic Council and the IMO on joint prevention measures. The Kingdom will participate in protecting the marine environment as soon as possible by implementing and ratifying the HNS Protocol on compensation and liability for damages arising from hazardous and noxious substances, and also the Ballast Water Convention which will help in protecting the marine environment from invasive species. Moreover, towards 2014, the Kingdom will carry out a risk-analysis of the maritime environment in and around Greenland, including the risk of oil and chemical contamination caused by the expected expansion in traffic and activity in the area. Based on the risk analysis, the Kingdom will assess to what extent it may be useful to strengthen the protection of the maritime environment in the Arctic. Possible initiatives could include increased international sharing of knowledge and experience on pollution control, enhanced preparedness for the prediction of drifting oil spills and strengthened international cooperation on maritime emergency preparedness. […]

5.  Close cooperation with our international partners –– The Kingdom will prioritize global cooperation relevant to the Arctic, including, in particular, an ambitious focus on climate change, protection of nature and the environment, strict global maritime rules, and continue giving high priority to indigenous peoples’ rights. –– The Kingdom will enhance cooperation in the Arctic Council. Cooperation with the EU is to be promoted and the Arctic to be given more weight in the Nordic context. “Arctic 5” is an essential complementary regional forum for the coastal states of the Arctic Ocean. 71

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To optimise the safeguarding of interests, the Kingdom will upgrade bilateral cooperation and dialogue regarding the Arctic, both with established and new partners. International interest in the Arctic will continue to rise in coming years. A growing number of states, corporations, civil society organizations and international organizations will engage themselves in the region. This requires a solid and effective regional and global cooperation that constantly adapts to new opportunities and conditions. It is natural that the Kingdom plays a key role in shaping the future international architecture of the Arctic. Many international agreements and cooperation fora are relevant to the Arctic and whose interests require active safeguarding by the Kingdom. For example, this concerns world trade within the WTO, environmental and nature conservation within UNEP, in research, health, and in security and defence matters in NATO among others. The Kingdom’s Arctic strategy will form the basis of our cooperation with international partners on the Arctic and Arctic issues. A number of themes and organizations discussed in this chapter will make up the Kingdom’s strategic priorities in foreign policy on the Arctic. The point of departure will be that today we have the requisite international legal basis and that the Arctic continues to be a region of cooperation. In particular, we will build on the Kingdom’s firm tradition of cooperation with our Arctic neighbours, in parallel to the prioritising of other relevant collaborations globally, regionally and bilaterally. 5.1.  Global solutions to global challenges The Kingdom will pursue a vigorous and ambitious climate policy to tackle the challenges that climate change poses in the Arctic and other vulnerable regions. The Kingdom’s climate policy stems from the UN’s Climate Change Convention (UNFCCC), whose goal is to stabilize atmospheric greenhouse gases at a level that prevents climate change that is dangerous to humanity. In negotiations on a future global climate agreement, the Kingdom continues to work towards achieving the common objective of limiting global temperature increases to a maximum of 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels. Denmark shares the EU’s ambition of reducing total global greenhouse gas emissions by at least 50% in 2050 compared to 1990, as well as reductions for the industrialized countries of 25–40% and 80–95% in 2020 and 2050, respectively—both compared to 1990. The target requires that sufficient global reductions in greenhouse gas emissions are achieved in the short and longer term. The government’s ambition is that Denmark should become independent of fossil fuels by 2050 and that Denmark’s binding renewable energy target under the EU in 2020 is 30 percent. Greenland aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 5% in the period 2013–2020 for the society, as it looks today, and as regards energy supplies that at least 60% of total energy production in civil society must be based on renewable energy by 2020. Activities within the minerals and hydrocarbons sector that are currently being developed, are not covered by the reduction of emission goals, but will be developed in accordance with international principles of sustainability. Faroese climate policy, which involves a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions of at least 20% by 2020 compared to 2005, will entail that 75% of electricity production must be based on renewable energy by 2020. The effects of climate change are already being felt, and the Kingdom underlines the importance that adaptation measures are carried out in order to mitigate the already unavoidable climate impacts. 72

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The Kingdom will work towards the conclusion of an ambitious global climate agreement that includes reduction commitments and actions which, in accordance with current and future assessments of the UN’s climate panel, are consistent in keeping the global temperature rise to a maximum of 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels. –– The Kingdom will continue, for example, through the Arctic Council, to contribute with knowledge and information inputs on Arctic climate change to the relevant international forums in which a global climate agreement under the UNFCCC is to be promoted. This also includes the need for climate change adaptation initiatives in the Arctic. The Kingdom’s global policy on nature and the environment in relation to the Arctic is particularly focused on the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance. Denmark, the Faroe Islands and Greenland have a long tradition of working together in global fora such as the Ramsar and Biodiversity Convention. The aim is to promote the protection and sustainable harnessing of the Earth’s biological diversity and to ensure regeneration and preservation of the ecosystem services that underpins communities and well-being. Under the Biodiversity Convention of October 2010 in Nagoya, Japan, three important agreements were adopted to preserve biodiversity globally. The agreement contains the Nagoya protocol on access to genetic resources and benefit-sharing (ABS), the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020, and the Resource Mobilization Strategy. Furthermore, reaching a global mercury agreement has long been a priority of the Kingdom. Mercury is a toxic heavy metal that accumulates in the food chain. In the Arctic region especially, mercury is a threat to public health since local and traditional diet such as seal, whale, sea birds and eggs can contain high levels of mercury. Under the auspices of the Arctic Council, there is particular focus on monitoring the levels and effects of mercury, and these findings are a part of the basis of global negotiations. –– The Kingdom will work to ensure that the 20 intermediate objectives of the strategic plan under the Biodiversity Convention are implemented focusing on problem areas of particular relevance to the Faroe Islands and Greenland. The Kingdom will bolster the knowledge base for the international protection and sustainable use of biodiversity and ecosystem services among others through The Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) and the Global Biodiversity Information Facility (GBIF). –– The Kingdom will work in relevant global fora in order to reduce pollutants brought by sea and air to the Arctic. The Kingdom will work for a globally binding mercury agreement under the auspices of UNEP and work to strengthen existing chemical agreements such as the Stockholm Convention on persistent organic pollutants and the LTRAP protocol. Greenland and Denmark have a tradition of close and constructive cooperation in ameliorating the conditions of the world’s indigenous peoples. Indigenous peoples are in some situations particularly exposed to human rights violations when new challenges arise, such as climate change. To the extent that their rights are recognized, which in itself has been difficult at times, one of the major challenges is to ensure respect for and observation of these rights. Denmark and Greenland possess experience and historical background, giving them sound credentials to work together to promote indigenous peoples’ rights. The effort has resulted in the UN, at the initiative of Denmark and 73

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Greenland, having established a Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues which has functioned since 2002. This forum has already proved its worth as a venue for governments and representatives of indigenous peoples worldwide and is the only forum where individuals and groups of indigenous peoples are represented. The forum actively seeks to raise awareness of the situation of indigenous peoples within the UN system. Moreover, Denmark and Greenland have also actively participated in negotiations on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted in 2007. The Declaration is an important starting point for future work in ensuring the rights of indigenous peoples and their survival through respect for their culture, language and way of life. –– The Kingdom will promote and protect indigenous peoples’ rights. Denmark/ Greenland are working to ensure that the principles outlined in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of 2007 are carried out in practice. –– Denmark and Greenland also support the work being done by the UN special rapporteur for indigenous peoples, while also working to ensure that the Expert Mechanism on Indigenous Peoples’ Rights (EMRIP) under the UN’s Human Rights Council contributes positively to promote and protect indigenous peoples’ rights. UN International Maritime Organization (IMO) is the UN’s specialised agency for maritime safety and security of international shipping and the prevention of pollution by ships. The IMO has 169 members, including Denmark, and 3 associate members, including the Faroe Islands. The IMO is absolutely critical to the global establishment of technical requirements of ships to avoid distortion in the world’s free trade. It is a fundamental principle of the IMO that ships must be treated equally, whichever flag they fly. The IMO is working to introduce the highest possible standards for health, safety and environment. Only by establishing global requirements can it be ensured that safety standards are not compromised. In recent years there has been a particular focus on the environmental agenda in the IMO, including the protection of sensitive marine areas, increased regulation of oil transportation, requirements of the ships’ fuel and emissions, and not least the climate change agenda. In these areas, the Kingdom is playing a significant role in ensuring the creation of solutions that benefit both the environment and shipping. –– The Kingdom will ensure in the IMO that the Arctic and Greenland conditions are taken into account in the IMO’s work and decisions regarding development opportunities for the maritime industry, increased maritime safety, protection of the marine environment and coastal zone, and also reduced emissions of greenhouse gases and reduction of air pollution. Danish/Greenland contribution to indigenous peoples’ rights Greenland and Denmark have for many years worked closely to promote indigenous peoples’ rights. Denmark’s first strategy in 1994 to support indigenous peoples was prepared based on a Danish/Greenland initiative, and just working with Greenland has helped to give Denmark a high international profile in the field. Denmark and Greenland have historically been active in a number of relevant international forums where indigenous peoples’ rights are discussed. These include the annual sessions of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, which was also created on a Danish/Greenland initiative and the UN Expert Mechanism on Indigenous Peoples’ 74

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Rights (EMRIP). Denmark/Greenland were also important players in the adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The establishment of the Self-Government arrangement for Greenland in 2009 is an illustration of Denmark’s implementation of the UN Declaration. Finally, Denmark/ Greenland participates actively in negotiations in the UN Human Rights Council and General Assembly, among others, on resolutions relating to indigenous peoples’ rights. In 2011, a review of Denmark’s strategy for support to indigenous peoples was finalised. The review concludes that the Danish/Greenland cooperation has led to groundbreaking institutional results and to improved living conditions for indigenous people. 5.2  Enhanced regional cooperation It is a central goal of the Kingdom to strengthen cooperation in the Arctic Council. As the only organization that has all 8 Arctic states as members and additionally 6 organizations of indigenous peoples as equal partners, the Arctic Council is the primary organ for concrete cooperation in the Arctic. The Council’s work originates from collaboration on environmental issues, but over time has been extended, for example, to include sustainable development and the populations’ living conditions. Recently, the Arctic Council has been instrumental in the development of a binding agreement between the 8 members on search and rescue (SAR) with the Faroe Islands and Greenland as “co-signatories,” which is needed because of the increased access to areas that were previously covered by ice. The Kingdom wants to ensure a future-oriented Arctic Council, i.e. that the Council has an increasingly direct impact on the Arctic peoples. The Arctic Council must evolve from a ‘decision-shaping’ to a ‘decision-making’ organisation. The Council’s function as an instrument exerting influence on nation states and international organizations should be reinforced, and where feasible, the possibility of real decision-making ought to be developed. It is also important to ensure cooperation with all countries and organizations that are of importance to the Arctic and can contribute to cooperation within the Council. During the chairmanship of the Arctic Council 2009–2011, the Kingdom has worked for a strengthening of the Council including the establishment of a permanent, jointly funded secretariat and the admission of new permanent observers. –– The Arctic Council must be reinforced as the only relevant political organization that has all Arctic states and peoples as members. At the same time the Arctic Council must cooperate with all relevant countries and organizations with interest in the Arctic. The Kingdom will emphasize that the human dimension, i.e. people’s living conditions and wellbeing, is given increasingly more space in cooperation. The Kingdom will retain the “Arctic 5” format consisting of the coastal states of the Arctic Ocean—Canada, Denmark/Greenland, Norway, Russia and the US—as a forum for issues primarily relevant for the five coastal states, currently the continental shelf issue. All three parts of the Realm are participating in the continental shelf issue while the Faroe Islands is ensured continued opportunity for scrutiny of any other activities in this forum. “Arctic 5” have met twice at ministerial level in 2008 and 2010, and in some cases at departmental level. Common to these meetings was that they concerned matters relating primarily to these coastal states. –– The Kingdom will promote its Arctic strategy in all relevant meeting formats, including any future meetings under “Arctic 5” auspices concerning specific action on joint issues. 75

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Based on the European Commission’s communication of November 2008, the European Union (EU) adopted in December 2008 and December 2009 the Council’s conclusions on the Arctic and the European Parliament adopted in early 2011 a report on a sustainable EU policy for the Arctic. Both the Council’s conclusions and the report are an expression of the growing interest that the EU has for the Arctic. Thus, the ground has been prepared for the EU to develop an overall Arctic strategy. The EU currently has interests in the Arctic in the form of, among others, research and fisheries and has indirect influence on the Arctic through e.g. its environmental laws. Furthermore, the EU and its member countries have interests in transportation and access in order to benefit from natural resources in the Arctic, including oil, gas and minerals and critical metals such as rare earth elements. Denmark, the Faroe Islands and Greenland work to ensure a broad and close partnership with the EU. It will be in the Kingdom’s interest to leave its mark on the shaping and implementation of EU policies, for example, in energy, climate, fishing, hunting, exploitation of minerals and the relationship to the populations and indigenous peoples in the Arctic. For the parts of the Kingdom that are not in the EU it will be of interest to participate in relevant EU programs where desirable and possible. Furthermore, it will be important that the EU’s involvement in the Arctic takes place on the Arctic populations’ own terms. We must seek to avoid further cases where the laws, traditions, cultures and needs of Arctic societies are neglected, as for example in the EU’s ban on the import of seal products. It is of particular importance to promote good relations between Greenland and the EU and expand the cooperative relations which exist between the parties involved. In addition to this, endeavours must be made to make the Faroe Islands more visible to the EU as part of the Arctic cooperation. The Kingdom will work to ensure that the EU has a place in the Arctic, including in relevant institutions such as the Arctic Council where the Kingdom supports the EU’s wish for observer status. –– The Kingdom will actively contribute to the shaping of EU policies relevant to the Arctic and Arctic challenges, and in this context seeks to ensure the Arctic peoples’ rights and interests. The Kingdom will contribute towards the EU having a space in international discussions on the Arctic. –– The Kingdom collectively and each part of the Danish Realm will advance the development of cooperative relations between the EU and Greenland and the Faroe Islands, respectively. The Nordic Council of Ministers has allocated a grant for collaborative projects concerning the Arctic region and contributes financially to the Arctic Council’s work. In addition, a number of collaborative projects of Arctic relevance are being carried out in the Nordic Council of Ministers’ various ministerial councils. The Kingdom wants the Arctic aspect of the Nordic Council of Ministers’ work both directly and through ministerial councils to be given greater weight, both politically and financially. –– The Kingdom will promote the Arctic as a cross-disciplinary focus area of the Nordic Council of Ministers’ work. Important cooperation in and about the Arctic is being undertaken in a wide range of organizations other than the abovementioned, for example through NORA, the Nordic Atlantic Cooperation (Faroe Islands, Greenland, Iceland and coastal Norway), West Nordic Cooperation (Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Greenland) and in sector organizations, such as NAMMCO

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(North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission—consisting of Iceland, Norway, Greenland and Faroe Islands). To this must be added organizations that cover fishery, environmental or scientific interests. The Kingdom will seek to promote cooperation in and around the Arctic in the range of organizations representing regional or sector-organized interests, especially NORA, West Nordic cooperation and NAMMCO. […]

Thule—future Arctic hub and collaboration platform? The melting of the polar icecap and the consequent increased activity in the Arctic will lead to greater need for the presence of and entail more tasks for the armed forces in the area around northern and north-western Greenland. Under the defence agreement of 2010–2014, the armed forces is carrying out a streamlining of the North Atlantic operational command structure (see section 2.3), and in the course of the duration of the agreement it must be considered whether the Thule base may play a larger role in regard to the tasks of the armed forces in and around Greenland in cooperation with other partner countries. Thule Air Base is, with its deep water port, airport and welldeveloped infrastructure (including tank and storage capacity, workshop, hospital, quarters, support and office facilities), a unique capability in the Arctic region north of the Arctic Circle. There is thus already an existing opportunity to provide the logistical prerequisites for increased presence in the area around the northerly and north-westerly Greenland. Furthermore, Thule Air Base has the potential to become a broader platform for supporting the collaborative intentions of the Illulisat Declaration of 2008 between the 5 coastal states in the Arctic Ocean. Collaboration on the logistical facilities in Thule could thus eventually include assignments and emergency preparedness in relation to the maritime environment, a base for exercises in connection to joint procedures such as search and rescue services, and also be a platform for joint research in the Arctic. 5.3.  Bilateral safeguarding of the Kingdom’s interests The rapid changes and the increasing importance of the Arctic where new opportunities and challenges are constantly arising and a number of new actors are registering their interest in the region, requires that we also make a gear-shift in bilateral safeguarding of the Kingdom’s interests in the Arctic. We will also work closely on a bilateral basis with all our partners. The bilateral cooperation is also a good platform to promote multilateral initiatives in the Arctic, of which the continental shelf project is a good example. Canada, USA, Norway and Iceland will remain key partners for close cooperation in areas such as the exploitation of resources, maritime safety, climate and environment, indigenous peoples, research, education, health and defence. Furthermore, we will maintain close contact with Finland and Sweden on Arctic issues. In addition, the Kingdom also wants to further expand and develop cooperation with Russia, which has been increasingly engaged in international cooperation in the Arctic. For example, under the auspices of the Danish-Russian governing council, there is great mutual interest in closer cooperation on strengthening the safety of navigation in Arctic waters. Enhanced cooperation with Russia could also incorporate scientific

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collaboration, for example, on the continental shelf. It could also include the exchange of findings on economically, socially and environmentally sustainable development, as well as confidence building and studies on potential cooperation between the Danish and Russian defence, particularly in the maritime area. Beyond the Arctic states, other legitimate stakeholders also have increasing interests in the Arctic. These interests are particularly linked to research on climate change, new international transportation opportunities, as well as opportunities to profit from the exploitation of supply related energy and mineral resources in the Arctic. Among these stakeholders is the EU, but also the three Northeast Asian countries, China, Japan and South Korea. Both China and South Korea have significantly increased their researchrelated engagement in the Arctic, including the construction of icebreakers and the establishment of permanent research stations on Svalbard. It is encouraging that the three Northeast Asian countries are joining the consensus among the coastal States that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea must be the central foundation for the legal regulation in the Arctic. The Kingdom supports their respective wishes for observer status in the Arctic Council. Bilateral dialogues have also been established, especially on maritime law issues such as claims on the continental shelf in the Arctic region and unresolved boundary issues. Furthermore, special collaborative projects have been set up, for example between the University of Copenhagen and a number of Chinese universities within natural science, and a budding collaboration between the Danish Technical University and Harbin Institute of Technology on Arctic technology. Global interest in the Arctic will inevitably increase even more in the coming years. More countries will want to gain insight into and influence on international cooperation in the Arctic as its strategic, economic and energy-related potential becomes clearer. Here the Kingdom can play a major role in promoting an open and inclusive dialogue in bilateral relations. The Kingdom will strengthen the dialogue with new stakeholders in the Arctic and benefit from the resources and expertise that they bring along through cooperation in commerce and R & D. Alongside this, the new actors will be integrated into the norms and values that the Kingdom and other coastal states in the Arctic Ocean believe should apply to the Arctic. –– In order to efficiently pursue the Arctic strategy’s diversified goals and interests, the Kingdom will develop close bilateral partnerships with our Arctic neighbours. As a major actor in the Arctic, the Kingdom will play a part in fostering new bilateral collaborations and dialogues on opportunities and challenges in the region. Joint Committee cooperation with the USA Joint Committee cooperation between Greenland, Denmark and the U.S. arose from the Igaliku Agreement, signed in 2004 by then U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, then Minister for Finance and Foreign Affairs Josef Motzfeldt and then Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig Moeller in the South Greenland village of Igaliku. The Igaliku Agreement consists of three parts: –– An agreement on the update of the defence agreement of 1951 and the establishment of an advisory group hereto (Permanent Committee) –– A joint statement on cooperation regarding environmental issues at Pituffik (the U.S. base at Thule) 78

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An agreement on technical and economic cooperation (Joint Committee cooperation) The Joint Committee is a tripartite forum for Greenland, USA and Denmark which aims to strengthen and promote economic and technical cooperation between Greenland and the U.S. with special focus on research, health, technology, education, culture and tourism. Close collaboration with Canada Denmark/Greenland, as part of the Continental Shelf Project in 2002, collected data in three areas north of Greenland. These collections have been conducted in close collaboration with among others Canada, and the close cooperation has led to very successful measurements. In mid-2010 it was decided to intensify the bilateral technical cooperation via the establishment of a joint task force which among other things must explore ways to coordinate submissions of claims to the Commission for Continental Shelf Limits (CLCS). In May 2010 Denmark and Canada signed a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on enhanced operational defence cooperation in the Arctic, focusing on joint military exercises, staff exchanges and cooperation in rescue operations. The agreement serves as a catalyst for intensifying day-to-day collaboration between Greenland’s Command, Joint Task Force North in Yellowknife and MARLANT Maritime Forces Atlantic in Halifax. It is expected that close Danish—Canadian military cooperation will be further enhanced over the coming years partly via mutual exchange of findings in survival techniques in the Arctic, patrolling and surveillance and partly via continued participation in joint military exercises. As a direct consequence of the oil disaster in Louisiana, the Greenland Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum and the National Energy Board of Canada, which are responsible for determining the respective regulations for Greenland and Canadian exploitation of oil and natural gas in the Arctic, entered into a bilateral agreement in 2010. The agreement formalises cooperation between the two authorities on information exchange of regulatory policy, specific oil and natural gas drilling and the overall development of their respective energy markets. The agreement specifies that the parties will meet at regular intervals. Similarly, it paves the way for the exchange of personnel, the carrying out of joint emergency exercises, building up of a joint emergency response, and that henceforth data and reports are shared. The formalized collaboration is a big step forward as both Greenland and Canada will obtain prior knowledge of initiatives which due to their geographical proximity will affect the counterpart. Furthermore, Denmark and Canada are party to the CANDEN-agreement on environmental cooperation, which ensures information exchange in case of oil spills and marine pollution, among other things. 6.  Implementation and follow-up –– In order to ensure effective implementation, a steering committee is to be set up for the Kingdom’s Arctic strategy, reinforced foreign policy coordination and cooperation, and intensified public diplomacy/public relations work regarding the Arctic. The Kingdom’s strategy for the Arctic marks an important milestone towards 2020 and beyond and aims to contribute to a sound foundation for positive development in the Arctic into the future. The Kingdom consists of three 79

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societies, each with their own political priorities and social structures. Therefore, the strategy’s implementation in each individual area will be adjusted to each part of the Realm’s unique legislation, political priorities and budget issues. The Kingdom’s Arctic strategy falls within the existing division of competences and responsibilities between the State and Greenland’s Self-Government, and the State and the Government of the Faroes. A chief aim of the Arctic strategy is to promote information exchange and coordination of efforts in all areas related to development in the Arctic, and thereby to obtain a clearer focus on common priorities and promote collaboration internally and externally where there is mutual interest. The strategy will thus provide the framework for Arctic-related activities of the Kingdom and the three parts of the Realm towards 2020. A number of measures will be initiated immediately to ensure the effective implementation of the strategy: A cross-disciplinary Steering Committee is to be established for the Arctic Strategy, consisting of representatives of the government (ministries with Arctic activities), the Government of Greenland and the Government of the Faroes at high level. The steering committee is to meet on a biannual basis as a minimum. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will serve as chairman and secretariat of the steering committee in close collaboration with the Government of Greenland and the Government of the Faroes and the Prime Minister’s Office. In order to promote the coordination of activities and safeguarding of the Kingdom’s interests in the Arctic, the Foreign Ministry will appoint a special Representative for the Arctic. In collaboration between the Government, the Government of Greenland and the Government of the Faroes concrete efforts are to be initiated to bolster foreign and security policy coordination and cooperation with regard to the Arctic. In addition to the existing dialogue mechanisms (also at ministerial level) and the establishment of a cross-disciplinary platform qua steering committee for the Arctic strategy, elements could include enhanced dialogue regarding multilateral and global economic organizations and issues, more systematic cooperation through the network representation abroad, establishment of an exchange mechanism between the Department of Foreign Affairs in Nuuk and the Foreign Ministry in Copenhagen and also joint public diplomacy/advocacy efforts (see below). At the same time, the Arctic strategy represents an ambition for intensified and more systematic outreach efforts both in the three parts of the Realm and internationally, for example via the representations abroad. This key endeavour, in the form of public diplomacy/advocacy initiatives such as seminars, cooperation with think tanks, etc., could focus on issues such as how climate change affects the Arctic, the Arctic as a region of cooperation, the new trade opportunities in the Arctic, the Kingdom’s cultural and political diversity, international law and the Arctic, etc. The Foreign Ministry will allocate resources hereto. The Foreign Ministry, on behalf of the Government and in cooperation with the Government of Greenland and the Government of the Faroes, will report annually on developments in the Arctic and the status of the Strategy’s implementation. The aim is to carry out a mid-term evaluation of the Strategy in 2014–2015 and consider the preparation of a new strategy in 2018–2019.

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Document 6 The Faroe Islands—a Nation in the Arctic [extracts only] (11 April 2013)* Introduction The Arctic has taken a prominent place on the international agenda in recent years. From being a region largely limited to scientific interest internationally, the Arctic today has become a focal point in global politics. The climate is warmer, the ice is melting at an increasing pace, and new land and sea areas are becoming accessible. It is becoming possible to sail north of Russia and Canada for longer periods of the year than before. At the same time, previously inaccessible sub-surface reserves of oil, gas and minerals can now be exploited. These changes have huge significance for the Faroe Islands. Climate change can have consequences for the very basis of our society. Changes in sea temperature can affect the marine ecosystems and ocean currents, and subsequently also our marine resources. Recent dramatic changes observed in fish stocks are no doubt also related to climate change. Continued scientific research is therefore necessary in order to understand these changes better and to strengthen our ability to make the necessary adaptations. This must be done in active cooperation with our neighboring countries in the region. The Faroe Islands have a key position in the region, both in relation to the Northern sea route and not least situated as they are at the western arm of the Northeast Sea Route, which is expected to have the greatest significance in the years to come. Shipping has already increased in the seas around the Faroes, and this traffic is likely to expand even more in coming years. Increased maritime activity in such a large area, with many associated risks, requires high standards for safety and emergency response, both with respect to safeguarding human life and protecting the environment. This increasing activity also brings with it significant economic opportunities. The number of foreign ships using Faroese ports in the future will no doubt continue to grow. As a result, Faroese companies will have more opportunities to provide these vessels with professional and competitive services. This will also require effective coordination and marketing in the Faroese business sector. Faroese companies are already preparing to offer their services and expertise as sub-contractors in the fisheries, mining and oil sectors, especially in Greenland. With long-term experience and initiative working in the Northern seas as a part of our maritime identity and culture, Faroe Islanders should make the most of these valuable assets. The Faroe Islands have long experience in fisheries in the seas of the High North. It is therefore very important to follow closely negotiations regarding the future management of fisheries in the Arctic sea, in order to ensure appropriate rights to participation in any new fisheries in the area. The economic and cultural basis of Faroese society is similar to that of other Arctic peoples. * The original Faroese version of The Faroe Islands—a Nation in the Arctic was presented to the Prime Minister in April 2013. This English translation was completed in August 2013. Pictures and some parts are not reprinted here. The full document is available at Government of the Faroe Islands, www.government.fo/ media/5345/101871-foroyar-eitt-land-%C3%AD-arktis-uk.pdf. Reproduced with the permission by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Faroe Islands.

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In addition, we share many fundamental challenges, such as the consequences of climate change and the need to ensure population growth and sustainable development. Faroese experts who participate in various specialist areas of Arctic cooperation consider the commonalities we share with other Arctic countries as a great advantage in Arctic cooperation, compared with other international fora for research cooperation. The Faroe Islands should therefore continue to strengthen participation in Arctic research cooperation. The Faroe Islands need to ensure clear policies with respect to decisions that will be taken on circumpolar issues in the future. The Faroe Islands have long played an active role in regional cooperation in a range of different areas, both as a part of the Nordic family of nations, through cooperation in the West Nordic region and across the North Atlantic. Strong and visible Faroese participation in Arctic cooperation, in particular within the framework of the Arctic Council, is a natural part of the continued development of the Faroe Islands as a reliable and constructive partner in international cooperation. The Faroe Islands have the knowledge and experience necessary for the further development of fisheries, shipping and research, as well as the conservation and management of natural resources. In close cooperation with other countries and keeping a keen eye out for new opportunities, we can target our plans and further develop our society. The goal is to create new opportunities for the Faroe Islands, both for individual citizens, as well as for the business sector and the research community. About the assessment The strategic assessment outlines Faroese interests in relation to international cooperation, business, the environment and research in the Arctic context. The assessment is intended as a basis for a broader political discussion on the place of the Faroe Islands in the Arctic, and how the Faroe Islands can best prepare for new conditions in the region. The Faroe Islands are a part of the Kingdom of Denmark’s Arctic Strategy 2011–2020, which includes Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands. The strategy was prepared in cooperation between all three countries and aims to strengthen the role of the Kingdom of Denmark as an active player in the Arctic. The joint strategy deals mostly with areas of overarching interest, grounded in fundamental principles and broad cooperation between the parties. The aim is to ensure a peaceful and safe Arctic, with sustainable economic development that respects the fragility of the Arctic natural environment. Large parts of the joint strategy relate in general to areas for which the Faroe Islands have exclusive competence. The Government of the Faroes has therefore considered it necessary to produce a dedicated national assessment with a focus on areas of particular relevance and interest for the Faroe Islands. […] Valuable underground resources The Arctic region is rich in oil, gas, and minerals. In 2008, the US Geological Survey published new estimates of the raw materials in the Arctic underground. These estimates indicate that the Arctic region contains massive amounts of oil and gas. It is estimated that up to 30 per cent of all unexploited hydrocarbon resources in the world are in the Arctic region, with as much as 13 per cent of the world’s unexploited oil and 30 per cent of unexploited gas located in the region. Most of the resources are likely to be located within the economic zones of the Arctic coastal states. 82

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New shipping routes Climate change is likely to make it possible to sail north of Russia and Canada for a significantly longer proportion of the year than is currently possible. With time it is also expected that it will be possible to sail from the Pacific Ocean to the Atlantic Ocean via the North Pole. These new shipping routes will make it possible to save transportation time and decrease hydrocarbon use in the shipping industry, thereby reducing its carbon emissions. The distance from Rotterdam to Yokohama will decrease by approximately 40 per cent compared to the current route through the Suez Canal, the Gulf of Aden, and the Strait of Malacca. […] The Faroe Islands as a Stakeholder in Arctic The Arctic has become a focal point in international politics. The likelihood of increased activities in the Arctic region and the prospect of new access to valuable resources in its underground open up many new opportunities for the countries in the region. To address these new developments and opportunities, all the countries in the Arctic, including Denmark/Greenland/Faroe Islands, have produced a strategic assessment describing their interests and political objectives for the region. The states with coastal borders to the Arctic Ocean have made claims to parts of the sub-sea continental shelf. These countries are also investing increasing amounts in their military bases in the region. Other world powers, such as the European Union, China, Japan, and South Korea are paying growing attention to the region. The risk of military disputes between the stakeholders in the Arctic Ocean, caused by increased interest and activities in the region, was brought to the forefront of global attention a few years ago. Fears of disputes and environmental disasters, amongst other dangers, have led several environmental organisations to recommend the establishment of a new international treaty for the Arctic area. They argue that the process used to establish this treaty should be the same as that which was used for the Antarctica Treaty, which entered into force in 1961. The outcome of this treaty was that all territorial claims were put aside and it was agreed that Antarctica should be a preserve dedicated to scientific research. Commercial and military activities in the area are banned. The original treaty did not contain provisions about the management of fisheries around Antarctica. However, in 1982 the signatories established the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) to protect the living marine resources in the region and to prevent overfishing, particularly of krill. The countries in the Arctic do not agree that the Arctic needs a similar international treaty. There is a fundamental difference between the Arctic and Antarctica: people live in the Arctic, whereas Antarctica is unpopulated. The Arctic countries are perfectly capable of managing development and cooperation in the Arctic area in a sensible and peaceful manner and in accordance with relevant international treaties and principles. A milestone in Arctic cooperation was the Ilulissat Declaration in 2008, in which the Arctic coastal states committed to resolving any resource related disputes in the region in a peaceful manner. This declaration has as its basis provisions in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as well as other relevant international treaties. The declaration also asserts that the Arctic Council and the large number of treaties that already apply to the area provide a sufficient framework for Arctic cooperation. Today few people fear military disputes between the Arctic coastal states. Instead, the military bases in the Arctic territories are considered an integral part of the emergency and rescue 83

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infrastructure in the area. They also serve the purpose of showing the rest of the world which state presides over a given area. The real safety and security issues in the area concern the consequences of climate change and the risk of accidents that come from the increase in commercial activities in the area. The Faroe Islands in international cooperation The Faroe Islands take an active role in regional and international cooperation, particularly when it comes to the management of natural resources, sustainable economic development, research, and cultural cooperation. […] As a fishing nation, the Faroe Islands play a key role in the Arctic Council, as well as in other international cooperation contexts. The main purpose of this cooperation is to promote the importance of the living resources of the sea, and to assert the right of the Faroes to exploit them in a sustainable manner that protects the environment and ensures a self-sustaining economy. The Faroe Islands’ participation in Arctic cooperation is thus a natural part of its other international cooperation activities, which include working with the Nordic family of nations, with the West Nordic countries, and across the North Atlantic. The Faroe Islands have been part of the Danish delegation to the Arctic Council—together with Greenland and Denmark—since 1998. The Faroe Islands have much in common with the other nations and communities in the High North. In particular, the Faroe Islands and other Arctic societies have similar economic foundations, exist close to nature, have related cultures, and face similar challenges of ensuring population growth and sustainable development. The Faroe Islands in the Arctic Council In contrast to other regional cooperation fora in which the Faroe Islands are represented— either as an independent member or together with Greenland—the Faroe Islands in the Arctic Council are part of a tripartite delegation, together with Greenland and Denmark. The delegation emphasises the visibility of all three nations by including them all in the delegation’s title and by displaying all three flags. Consensus is sought between all parts of the delegation on its common decisions. Most of the topics debated in the Arctic Council relate to political areas for which the Faroese Government has exclusive competence. Therefore, in order for the Faroe Islands to ensure that the decisions made by the Arctic Council are in the interest of the Faroe Islands, it is critical that the Faroes take an active role in expressing Faroese interests and shaping the Council’s decision-making processes to their favour. To achieve this, the Kingdom of Denmark’s delegation must be organised in such a way that the perspectives of all its nations are heard even though the nations work under different sets of conditions and with different political objectives. Strategic prioritising needed Many meetings and activities take place on an intergovernmental level in the Arctic Council. This creates particular challenges for a small administration like the Faroese. Moreover, not all matters discussed under the auspices of the Arctic Council have implications for the Faroe Islands. Therefore, if the Faroe Islands are to make to most of their participation in Arctic cooperation, it is crucial that they take a strategic approach that prioritises effort in the areas of greatest importance and relevance to the Faroe Islands. The Faroe Islands should also advocate a more effective work structure and a more inclusive system of participation in the Arctic Council that makes it easier for 84

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small Arctic countries and entities to contribute and participate in meaningful ways. The majority of the Arctic Council’s reports and guidelines are produced within working groups, and it is also in these groups that proposals are made on which cooperation are-as the Council should prioritise. Faroese participation in these groups is uneven and varies from group to group. It is necessary for the Faroe Islands to set priorities and invest the necessary funding and effort into maintaining sustained participation in the most relevant working groups, particularly in the groups AMAP, CAFF, PAME, and SDWG. Participation in these groups provides excellent opportunities for the Faroe Islands to raise awareness of their perspectives and to foster strategic relations with other countries and organisations that work on areas of high relevance to the Faroe Islands. Such participation should have similar priority in the Faroe Islands as participation of government officials. Developing relations with neighbouring countries and other parties It is important that the Faroe Islands engage in a continuous effort to make themselves visible in the Arctic context—both to make sure that Faroese perspectives are heard and to achieve the best possible opportunities for Faroese experts and businesses to offer specialised expertise and services to relevant stakeholders in the Arctic. In particular, the Faroe Islands should seek to strengthen communication and cooperation with countries and organisations that share its interests and face similar challenges in relation to the significant changes taking place in the Arctic. As a small country, it is in the Faroe Islands’ best interest to nurture relationships with several countries. It is therefore vital to make full use of all possibilities offered by the organisations and cooperation fora of which the Faroe Islands are part to ensure that Faroese perspectives and political objectives are advanced. The Faroe Islands should engage in regular communication and cooperation with their West-Nordic neighbours. […] The Faroes already enjoy in close and active cooperation with Greenland, Iceland, and Norway in several contexts, for instance through the West Nordic Council and the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO), which also includes the Arctic countries Canada and Russia as observer states. The Faroe Islands should seek to further develop and strengthen its relations with Russia, the United States, and Canada. Several of the indigenous populations represented in the Arctic Council share common interests and challenges with the Faroe Islands, particularly with regards to the optimal exploitation of living marine resources. For the Faroe Islands, it is vitally important to nurture these mutual interests and look for a common way forward to ensure that the populations of the Arctic and their right to sustainable development continue to be a central concern in all aspects of Arctic cooperation. In 2012, the European Commission put forward a new proposal for the European Union’s Arctic Policy. The proposal reflects Europe’s growing political and commercial interests in the region and draws attention to areas and ways in which the EU can support Arctic cooperation, with particular emphasis on the many research activities in which the EU is engaged in the region. As the EU’s policy towards the Arctic develops, it will be important to ensure that the EU is aware of Faroese interests and activities in the Arctic context. The Faroe Islands’ joint strategy with Denmark and Greenland makes clear that all three nations should take an active and visible role in international political contexts. As a member state of the EU, Denmark should promote awareness within the EU of the Faroe Islands’ role in Arctic cooperation. 85

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One international body that works on Arctic issues but does not have direct representation from the Faroe Islands is the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (SCPAR). SCPAR was established in 1994 and from its outset worked to support the establishment of the Arctic Council. Since the Arctic Council was established in 1996, SCPAR has worked to promote the Arctic Council’s work. Every second year, it arranges a Conference of Arctic Parliamentarians with parliamentarians from the Arctic countries and the European Parliament. Each conference passes a declaration of recommendations for the Arctic Council, the Arctic member states, and the European Commission. The next conference will take place at the European Parliament on 13–15 September 2013. Both Denmark and Greenland are members of SCPAR and form a joint delegation. The Denmark/Greenland delegation is represented by one of the two Greenlandic parliamentarians in the Danish Parliament. Although the Faroe Islands are not a member of SCPAR, the Faroe Islands have participated in a number of SCPAR meetings, representing the West Nordic Council, which has observer status in SCPAR. The Faroese Parliament should seek direct Faroese representation in SCPAR. The Faroe Islands should also make use of alternative ways of drawing attention to Faroese expertise and perspectives in the Arctic context. An array of conferences take place on a range of Arctic topics, including geopolitics, social conditions, commercial activities, research, and culture. The participation of Faroese experts at such conferences should be encouraged and enhanced. Emphasis should also be on producing more English-language information material on the Faroe Islands and Faroese interests. Recommendations –– Priority should be given to participation in the Arctic Council and all relevant working groups under its auspices. –– A more effective work structure in the Arctic Council should be promoted to enable small countries and entities in the Arctic to participate in a meaningful way. –– The work structure of the Denmark/Greenland/Faroe Islands delegation should be organised in a way that enables and encourages the perspectives of all three nations to be heard. –– A joint West Nordic approach to Arctic cooperation, together with Iceland, Greenland and Northern Norway, should be promoted and enhanced. –– Participation in the Arctic Council should be used to nurture relations and strengthen direct cooperation with member states, permanent participants, and observers. –– The Faroe Islands should seek full membership of the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (SCPAR). –– The Faroe Islands should draw attention to Faroese expertise and perspectives on the Arctic, for instance by participating in relevant conferences on Arctic matters. Emphasis should also be on producing more English-language information material on the Faroe Islands and Faroese interests. On the Northern Sea Route: New Economic Opportunities Faroe Islanders have long experience from the seas of the seas of the High North, and Faroese companies possess valuable expertise in construction and maintenance of 86

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vessels for shipping and fishing in this region. Moreover, Faroese ports have for many years been offering high-quality maritime services to foreign vessels operating in the area. The Faroe Islands are well located in connection with the Northern Sea Route and should make the best possible use of their ports to offer services and transhipment to foreign vessels that use the route. Most maritime services are available in the Faroe Islands, and Faroese maritime companies have excellent competences and storage conditions. Their main challenge—as small-sized companies—will be to handle the large and diverse assignments that are likely to arise from the growing activities in the High North. This means that they need to collaborate and coordinate their activities in order to offer the widest possible range of specialised services to visiting vessels. These specialised services include mechanical repairs, equipment and provisions, arrangement of crew changes, medical examinations, and training courses in areas like safety, hygiene, and the shipping of dangerous goods. […] There are several players in the race to provide services to the growing number of vessels in the High North. Both Russia and Iceland are important potential players in this area. Iceland is particularly interested in the upcoming opportunities arising from increased Chinese transportation through the Central route and has made concrete plans to establish an international cargo or transhipment port. As the Faroe Islands develop their own maritime hub, they will need to make a detailed evaluation of the need for a transhipment port in the Faroe Islands. More market analysis is also needed to explore and identify potential competitors, as well as the types of vessels and cargo that are most likely to need transhipment and other services in the Faroe Islands. […] Fisheries in the Arctic Ocean The warming of the Arctic Ocean and the melting of Arctic sea ice are likely to open up access to new waters and fishing areas in the Arctic Ocean. These changes are influenced by a complex combination of environmental factors, which make it difficult to predict precisely what will happen. According to some researchers, we are unlikely to see significant commercial opportunities for fisheries in the Arctic in the next 10–50 years. Other researchers point out that, as the ice melts and the sunlight penetrates the sea, plankton populations will develop and grow quickly, thereby creating favourable conditions in which new types of fish can thrive. The last few years have seen the ice in the Arctic recede at a significant pace each year. Current estimates indicate that 40 per cent of the international waters in the Arctic are ice-free during the summer. Most of the Arctic Ocean is very deep—up to 3,500 metres. It is therefore conceivable that—while demersal fisheries may become possible where depth allows—pelagic fisheries are likely to become the most relevant form of fishery in the Arctic. The Faroese have long-standing experiences with fisheries in the seas of the High North, especially around Greenland and in the Barents Sea. In 2012, Faroese fishing vessels were active as far north as 81.4 degrees N in the Fisheries Protection Zone north of Svalbard. This is close to the international waters of the Arctic Ocean and further north than any Faroese fishing vessel has ever been before. It is estimated that very few fishing vessels in general have been active so far north. Management of potential fisheries in the Arctic Ocean Since the international waters of the Arctic Sea have always been covered by ice, there is no single regulatory framework for fisheries management in the area. The growing prospects for commercial fishing in the Arctic have led to discussions about the future 87

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management of potential fisheries in the area. There are fears that uncontrolled fishing would threaten the fragile ecosystems in the Arctic. Large parts of the Arctic Ocean, however, are within the territorial waters of the Arctic coastal states. Moreover, several international organisations manage fisheries in the area. NEAFC’s area, which is situated at the longitude between 42 degrees W and 51 degrees E, goes all the way up to the North Pole. NASCO also presides over part of the Arctic area. Moreover, both the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement apply to parts of the area. One large area, however, is not covered by any fisheries management organisation. Discussions are currently taking place among the Arctic coastal states about the management of fisheries in this area. Fisheries management is not dealt with in the Arctic Council, and it appears unlikely that this situation will change. The United States has advocated for the establishment of a new fisheries management organisation for the Arctic area and the imposition of a temporary fishing ban until there is sufficient information available on the changes taking place in the area. Others recommend that the scope of NEAFC should be expanded to include the rest of the Arctic area. There are indications that Russia and to some degree Norway, are hesitant about imposing a fishing ban in the area, for different reasons. Russia argues that a ban agreed by just the five Arctic coastal states would cause disputes with other countries. There are also other factors at play, including the fact that a significant amount of time is likely to pass before the waters of the Arctic become sufficiently warm to attract commercially viable quantities of fish. The position of the Faroe Islands Because of the Faroe Islands’ long history of fishing in the seas of the High North, it is important that they keep a close eye on negotiations over how to manage future fisheries in the Arctic Ocean, especially as several of the fish stocks that the Faroe Islands have historically had a stake in appear to be migrating further north. The Faroe Islands should resist the conclusion of an international treaty that bans fishing in the international waters of the Arctic. If such a ban were accepted, it would be difficult to establish a fisheries management organisation with meaningful authority to manage fisheries in the area. The Faroe Islands should advocate the establishment of such a fisheries management organisation with Faroese representation. The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) has—due to the changes in the Arctic Ocean—decided to place a high priority on research in the Arctic. ICES is an international organisation whose purpose it is to coordinate marine research and provide scientific advice in fish biology, marine biology, fisheries, and similar topics related to the North Atlantic Ocean. It is vital that the Faroe Marine Research Institute stays closely informed about the activities and findings of ICES in the Arctic Ocean. In order to gain more knowledge about the marine environment and fish species in the Arctic, top priority should be given to marine research in the area. Such research should be conducted in cooperation with Faroese vessels already active in the area. The Faroe Marine Research Institute is the relevant authority here, but funding is needed to execute this priority successfully. […] Recommendations It is vital that the Faroe Islands follow closely all negotiations on the future management of fisheries in the international waters of the Arctic Ocean. This is to ensure that the 88

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Faroe Islands can safeguard rights to fish in potential new fishing areas in the Arctic, if and when such fisheries are deemed biologically sustainable. To achieve this, it is recommended that: –– The Faroe Islands take a clear and active role in the aforementioned international cooperation processes governing the future management of fisheries in the international waters of the Arctic Ocean, in order to best ensure potential new fishing opportunities. –– The Faroe Islands, through the Faroe Marine Research Institute, participate actively in the work of ICES with respect to scientific research and assessment of Arctic marine ecosystems and resources. –– Marine research in the Arctic area is given a high priority, in cooperation with the Faroese vessels already active in areas of interest. […] The Environment The environmental interests of the Faroe Islands Oil pollution from industrial vessels, in particular the risk of large oil spills close to shore, is considered to be the greatest threat to the marine environment in and around the Faroe Islands The risk of oil and chemical spills pose a constant threat to the marine ecosystem. Both Faroese fisheries and aquaculture depend on a marine ecosystem that is as clean, productive, and durable as possible, so that it can sustain the biological cycles necessary for these industries to thrive successfully in our marine environment. This applies to both the aquaculture activities that take place in fiords and similar places close to shore, as well as fisheries in home waters and distant fishing grounds. The shipping traffic in the waters around the Faroe Islands is likely to grow significantly in the coming years due to the increase in commercial activities and the advent of new shipping lanes in the Arctic. An increase in the shipping traffic—in Faroese waters, as well as to and from Faroese harbours—will raise the risk of oil spills, both close to the islands and in the open sea. The fact that the vessels are getting bigger—and thus need to be charged with ever-larger amounts of oil and heavy oil—serves to greatly increase the risk of large and hazardous oil spills. It is therefore necessary to strengthen the preventative safety measures for vessels to avoid accidents that could lead to spills, such as crashes at sea or by shores. The necessary preventative measures are discussed at more length in the section on maritime safety and emergency response, while the status of environmental protection, including the contingency planning for oil spills, will be addressed in this section. Large oil and chemical spills into the sea can cause significant damage to and interference with the marine ecosystem, and can therefore seriously endanger the reputation of the Faroe Islands as a fishing nation with a clean and uncontaminated marine environment. For this reason, it is critical that measures to prevent oil spills in Faroese waters are strengthened, and that the best possible level of emergency response is in place, should accidents happen. This places increased demands on contingency planning for oil spills in the Faroe Islands. Strengthening the contingency plan The law on environmental protection from 1988 and the law on protecting the marine environment from 2005 specify legal restrictions on the discharge of pollutants from commercial activities. They apply to activities on land as well as to all vessels operating 89

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in Faroese territorial waters, regardless of whether they carry a Faroese or foreign flag. The requirements stipulated in these laws have their basis in and are consistent with regulations in the international treaties passed by the International Maritime Organisation. Environmental legislation in the Faroe Islands is largely based on international regulations and guidelines. For instance, the discharge restrictions for vessels are based on regulations stipulated in MARPOL and other treaties that the member states of the IMO have passed through the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC). Although the Faroe Islands are an associate member of the IMO, they do not take part in the work of the MEPC. This is due to limitations in the funding and work capacity that the Faroe Islands are able to devote to administering environmental legislation. Different bodies enforce adherence to applicable environmental legislation on land and at sea. The Environment Agency and the municipalities deal with violations on land, while the Faroe Islands Fisheries Inspection and the Faroese Maritime Authority deal with violations at sea. Violations of the laws are reported to the police, and the prosecutor will normally arrange legal proceedings against reported violators of laws, orders, or terms and conditions included in agreements and permits that have been granted on the basis of existing legislation. As a general rule, the public contingency plan for the Faroe Islands is divided between the state and municipal levels. The police are responsible for responding to incidents on land, MRCC/Tórshavn is responsible for responding to incidents at sea, and JRCC/Iceland is responsible for dealing with incidents that start in the air. The Faroese Government is responsible for contingency planning for pollution that happens away from the shore areas and up to the borders of neighbouring countries. Today, most of the large municipalities—either alone or in collaboration with other municipalities—are in a good position to respond to the most common type of oil and chemical pollution, namely pollution that happens close to shore, often in connection with oil bunkering accidents and similar maintenance accidents. However, there is a need for an appropriate national contingency plan for dealing with potential oil spills further away from land, and this task has been assigned to the Faroese Main Road Authority. The expertise needed to implement such a system is already at hand, but funding is needed to purchase the equipment needed for this purpose. There are significant differences between the type of equipment needed to remediate oil pollution close to shore and the type of equipment required to deal with pollution further away from land. The harsh weather that affects Faroese waters for large parts of the year means that specialised, heavy-duty equipment is needed to deal effectively with potential oil spills further away from the shore. International agreements The Faroe Islands are part of two international agreements on oil emergency preparedness, and a third was signed earlier this year. The two existing agreements are Nordic: the Copenhagen Agreement and the Nordic Rescue Services Agreement, which will be described in more detail in the section on safety and emergency response. The Ministry of the Interior represents the Faroe Islands in the Copenhagen Agreement. The third agreement is the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution, Preparedness and Response in the Arctic, which was signed by the Arctic Council Ministers in May 2013. The Faroese Prime Minister signed the agreement on behalf of the Faroe Islands. What all these agreements have in common is that the signatories agree to help each other—according to ability and in return for payment—if accidents happen in 90

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the territory of a signatory country that is unable to respond to the accident alone. The agreements also remove burdensome bureaucratic obstacles to moving equipment and people between the contracting parties. An underlying precondition for the success of the agreements is that each country agrees to focus on certain elements of emergency response to oil spills so that it is able to provide specialised assistance in accordance with provisions in the agreements. Currently, the Faroe Islands would be unable to assist their neighbouring countries in case of serious oil spills. Moreover, the Faroe Islands would not be able to deal with significant oil spills in their own waters without external help due to insufficient equipment. Therefore the Faroe Islands would be highly likely to seek help from neighbouring countries if there was an oil spill. Because of the long distance between the countries of the northerly seas, help to deal with accidents at sea would be sought first and foremost from the closest neighbours, especially Norway and Iceland. However, it would also be possible for the Faroe Islands to seek help from ‘Contact Element Faroe Islands’ under the Danish Defence’s Arctic Command. Other countries could be called for help as well, particularly to assist with airborne transportation and equipment. However, such assistance is very expensive and would only be sought in exceptional cases. Hydrocarbon risks The emergency response requirements for oil companies are legally specified in the law on hydrocarbon activities and a supplemental government order. An oil company that is drilling or has been given permission to start producing oil is required to uphold a strong and extensive contingency plan, including measures to protect Faroese fiords, coves, sounds, and beaches from oil pollution in the case of a so-called ‘blow-out’. The Faroese Earth and Energy Directorate is the authority responsible for managing hydrocarbon risks. It is also responsible for ensuring that oil companies engaged in activities in Faroese waters maintain strong contingency plans that are consistent the national contingency plan and can be coordinated with the contingency plans of other oil companies active in the area. Improving prevention, inspection, and enforcement of environmental legislation Unlike many of the signatories of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Faroe Islands do not preside over an exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Countries with an EEZ have authority to enforce environmental legislation on foreign vessels that are located in their EEZ. These countries’ powers of enforcement within their EEZ are the same as the Faroe Islands’ powers of enforcement within the 12 nautical mile border. Similarly, the Faroe Islands do not preside over a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA) in their territorial waters. Several countries have sea areas that have been designated with a PSSA status by the IMO. The designation enables countries to put in place stricter restrictions on the type of maritime activities and vessels that are allowed in the area. Examples of PSSAs include the Great Barrier Reef in Australia, the sea areas around the Galápagos Islands and the Canary Islands, and the Baltic Sea. In the context of the Faroe Islands, the PSSA of highest interest is the large West European PSSA that reaches all the way from Portugal to Shetland. The main reason that this area was designated as a PSSA in 2004 was the large amount of environmental accidents from tank 91

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vessels in the area. The goal was to achieve better control of the area’s shipping traffic, particularly from tank vessels. It is conceivable that some of the vessels hit by the stricter regulations in the West European PSSA will be forced to sail in waters closer to Faroe Islands. This is likely to increase the risk for environmental accidents in Faroese waters. Shipping traffic is also likely to increase as the oil and gas production in the Barents Sea expands. Moreover, the shipping of nuclear waste to Russia is seen as a growing threat. Guidelines and criteria for designating a PSSA are set out in the IMO resolution A.982(24). Designated areas must fulfil ecological criteria relating to the uniqueness, rarity or diversity of the ecosystem, or its vulnerability to degradation by natural events or human activities. The guidelines also contain social, cultural, economic, scientific, and educational criteria for a PSSA designation. A PSSA designation allows for specific measures to be put in place to control maritime activities in the area, for instance through routeing measures, discharge and equipment requirements for vessels, and installation of Vessel Traffic Services (VTS). There is no so-called Special Area designated in Faroese waters either. MARPOL Annex I, II, IV and V specify that Special Areas can be designated according to similar guidelines and criteria as apply to PSSAs. Such a designation allows for the enforcement of stronger requirements for vessels to prevent discharge of oil, contaminated materials, wastewater, and other waste. Conclusion It is clear that the current framework for contingency planning in the Faroe Islands is insufficient to deal with potential oil spills at sea in an effective and safe manner. The increasing shipping traffic in and around Faroese waters makes the need for a well functioning national contingency plan all the more critical. The political competence for matters relating to the marine environment was devolved from Denmark to the Faroe Islands in 2003. Since then, there has been just one budget appropriation for the national contingency plan. It is clear that the area has not been given a high financial priority. There have been several references in budget debates to the need for a better national contingency plan, and there has been much discussion on what is needed for the Faroe Islands to put in place a so-called ‘first aid kit’ to respond to oil spills. This would not be an expensive emergency response measure to implement, and the cost of running it would not be significant either (see Appendix 1). Appendix 1 also provides an overview of the emergency response equipment currently available in the Faroe Islands. Recommendation –– A national contingency plan for oil spills at sea should be formally adopted and given top political priority. Contingency planning with respect to petroleum activities is a prerequisite for: •• conserving biological diversity in marine and coastal ecosystems; •• safeguarding the vital fisheries and aquaculture interests of the Faroe Islands; •• enabling appropriate responses to oil pollution at sea, regardless of whether it derives from vessels, offshore installations, or other sources; •• the Faroe Islands to adhere to and implement their responsibilities in international, Nordic and Arctic agreements on international cooperation on emergency planning and response; and 92

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•• –– ––

making it possible to limit the spread of an oil spill while awaiting assistance from neighbouring countries. An Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) should be established for the Faroe Islands that allows for increased powers of inspection with regards to vessels sailing under foreign flags. Consideration should be given to establishing a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA) around the Faroe Islands. Such a status would allow specific shipping lanes to be defined, and would make it possible to require formal notification from vessels before they enter Faroese waters.

Maritime Safety and Emergency Response in Faroese Waters It is likely that maritime activities in Faroese waters will increase in the coming years due to growing commercial activities and new shipping routes in the Arctic. This heightens the need for a strong maritime safety and emergency response plan. It is therefore critical that Faroese authorities monitor the development of international standards and regulations on contingency planning, and consider their implementation into domestic legislation. The 2009 Stoltenberg Report on Nordic cooperation on foreign and security policy recommends increased Nordic and Arctic cooperation on safety and emergency response. The Faroe Islands need to be active partners in such cooperation, and to put in place solid preventative measures in support of a strong contingency plan. The shipping traffic within the 200 nautical mile Faroese Fisheries Zone (FFZ) has grown in the past years. The increase is largely due to a significant expansion in the number of tank vessels in the zone, whereas the number of passenger ships has remained relatively steady. The number of foreign vessels coming to Faroese ports is also likely to increase significantly in the future providing new opportunities for Faroese businesses to offer their high-quality maritime services to these visiting vessels. The growing traffic also increases the need for Faroese authorities to perform safety inspections of foreign vessels on a regular basis. Responsibility assignment—maritime safety in Faroese waters The concept ‘safety at sea’ is widely used, and it covers a range of topics including safety procedures on ships, the work environment for crew, wind and weather conditions, and restrictions on sea routes in areas of increased shipping activities. The Faroese Maritime Authority administers the law on safety at sea, the law on crews, and the law on port navigation and maritime traffic control. These laws apply to both fishing vessels and commercial vessels, as well as the crews manning them. Faroese vessels must meet all requirements specified in the Faroese legislation, which are similar to—if not stricter than—international requirements. Faroese authorities ensure that the legislation is adhered to. Because most countries have ratified the international IMO treaties on safety at sea, it is widely recognised that these treaties set out the minimum level of requirements for vessels in international waters. The Faroe Islands are an associate member of the IMO, and the Faroese Maritime Authority—together with other relevant authorities— ensures that Faroese legislation reflects the stipulations in these treaties. The Maritime Authority and related authorities were quality assessed by the IMO in November 2011, with good results. 93

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Member states of the Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control (ParisMoU) have authorisation to carry out so-called ‘Port State Control’ (PSC) inspections to ensure that vessels visiting their waters meet the requirements set out in international agreements. In the worst cases, the relevant authority can hold back vessels that do not meet the requirements. Cooperation between 27 countries—mostly European countries, as well as Canada and Russia—ensures that such inspections happen in a fair and consistent manner and that evaluations take place after each inspection. The ParisMoU is based in The Hague in the Netherlands. The Faroe Islands are not a member of the ParisMoU and therefore cannot carry out PSC inspections according to the above procedures. There are thus no systematic inspections of foreign vessels entering Faroese ports. If accidents and oil spills happen, authorities board ships to carry out PSC inspections according to special Faroese procedures and guidelines devised by the Faroese Maritime Authority. If the Faroe Islands were a member of the ParisMoU, they would be required to conduct a set number of inspections per year () must be conducted in a manner which does not undermine the effectiveness of applicable conservation and management measures and that such measures must be established with due regard to the special interest of the Parties in the portion of these stocks which lies outside the 200-mile zone and the needs of their coastal communities; Further recognizing that Norway is entitled to exercise exclusively the sovereign rights and jurisdiction accruing to the coastal State under UNCLOS, in particular articles 56

*  Done at Oslo; entry into force still pending. The document was kindly provided by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is on file with the editor.

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and 77, in the Fisheries Protection Zone around Svalbard and on the Continental Shelf around the Archipelago, and that the Treaty concerning Spitsbergen of 9 February 1920 does not apply to these areas. Have agreed as follows: Article I The areas to which this Agreement applies, expect as otherwise provided, are the following: a) the NAFO Regulatory Area, established by the Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries of October 24, 1978. b) the areas beyond the limits of national fisheries jurisdiction in the Norwegian Sea (the Atlantic Donut Hole) and the Barents Sea (the Loophole). Article II Each Party shall deny access to its ports and offshore terminals to vessels that engage in activities that undermine the effectiveness of conservation and management measures notified by either Party as applicable to the relevant areas described in Article I, except in cases of force majeure, and should prohibit the landing of the catch of such vessels. Article III 1) The appropriate authorities of each party may board, inspect and search a vessel flying a flag of the other Party (the flag Party). If the authorities of the inspecting Party find evidence of activities referred to in Article II, they may seize the vessel and institute proceedings against it or present such evidence to the flag Party. 2) Upon receipt of such evidence the flag Party shall immediately investigate the matter and, where appropriate, institute proceedings seeking penalties against the vessel which shall be of sufficient gravity to deprive offenders of the benefits accruing from such activities and to deter future offences. 3) Each Party shall promptly inform the other of the proceedings instituted pursuant to paragraph 1 and 2 and of their outcome. 4) Proceedings by the Party which is not the flag Party should be suspended upon the institution of proceedings based on corresponding charges by the flag Party within six months of the date on which proceedings were first instituted. 5) The flag Party shall, in due course, make available to the other Party a full dossier of the case and the records of the proceedings it has instituted whenever proceedings instituted by the other Party have been suspended pursuant to paragraph 4. Article IV Each Party shall subject the export of vessels flying its flag suitable for high sea fishing operations to a requirement to provide it with such information as may be necessary to satisfy it that such vessels shall not engage in activities referred to in article II. Article V Each Party shall notify the other in writing through the diplomatic channel of the completion of all measures necessary for the entry into force of this Agreement. This Agreement shall thereafter enter into force 30 days after the date of the later of the said

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notification. It shall be valid for a minimum period of six years and shall continue in force until terminated by either Party on one year’s notice. DONE at Oslo this 20th day of June 1995 in the English, French and Norwegian languages, each version being equally authentic.

Document 204 Agreement between the Government of Iceland, the Government of Norway and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning Certain Aspects of Co-operation in the Area of Fisheries (Loophole Agreement) (15 May 1999)* The Government of Iceland, Government of Norway and the Government of the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Parties; Determined to ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable utilisation of the fish stocks concerned in their entire are of distribution, and committed to the principle of responsible fishing; Having regard to the importance of close co-operation between the Parties; Having regard to the relevant provisions of the 1982 Unit Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the Unit Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks; Committed to promoting and conducting marine scientific research and to basing their respective management measures for the relevant stocks on the best scientific advice; Recognising that a considerable part of the living marine resources of the northern Norwegian and Barents Seas represents a single regulated biological stock system; Have agreed as follows: Article 1 The Parties agree to enhance co-operation of mutual benefit in the field of fisheries and for this purpose to establish by this Agreement principles and procedures for such cooperation based on a precautionary approach and in accordance with international law. Article 2 The Parties may agree on a reciprocal basis to exchange annual quotas in their respective exclusive economic zones, and to grant vessels of the other Parties access to fish quotas

*  Done at St Petersburg, 15 May 1999; entry into force still pending; (1999) 41 LOSB 53. The Protocol between the Government of Iceland and the Government of Norway under the Agreement between the Government of Iceland and the Government of Norway and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning Certain Aspects of Co-operation in the Area of Fisheries and the Protocol between the Government of Iceland and the Government of the Russian Federation under the Agreement between the Government of Iceland and the Government of Norway and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning Certain Aspects of Co-operation in the Area of Fisheries (both done at St. Petersburg, 15 May 1999) are reprinted in R Churchill, ‘The Barents Sea Loophole Agreement: A “Coastal State” Solution to a Straddling Stock Problem’, 1999 14 International Journal of Marine and Costal Law 467.

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in their respective exclusive economic zones, taking full into account the biological situation and the development of the stocks concerned, as well as the interests of the national fisheries. Article 3 Details of quota exchanges, based on management decisions taken by the coastal states, provisions for access to fishing by the Parties referred to in Article 2, as well as provisions on other matters referred to in Article 8, which the Parties may agree on, shall be regulated in protocols under this Agreement between the Governments of Iceland and Norway, and the Governments of the Russian Federation and Iceland, providing a reasonable balance in their bilateral fisheries relations. The Parties shall make every effort to agree on the protocols. Article 4 The Parties agree that total catches from a stock taken under the protocols referred to in Article 3 by vessels flying their flags, wherever they are taken, shall not exceed the total quotas for that stock as set out in the protocols referred to in Article 3. This provision is without prejudice to any agreement between private entities, concluded in accordance with national rules and regulations of the Parties that may include additional fishing policies. The quotas referred to in Article 2 shall be taken in the exclusive economic zone and the Parties will refrain from any claims for additional fishing possibilities on that stock. Article 5 The Parties will ensure that fishing vessels flying their flag comply with the conservation and management measures as well as national rules and regulations established for the operation of fishing activities referred to in Article 2. Adequate advance notice shall be provided of such measures, rules and regulations. Article 6 The Parties shall work together to investigate possibilities and take measures, when relevant, to discourage any of their nationals from being party to arrangements by which they register a fishing vessel under the flag of another state for the purpose of engaging in fishing activities that undermine the effectiveness of this Agreement and of the management measures referred to in Article 5. Article 7 The Parties agree to take measures to prevent landing in their ports of catches if it has been established that such catches have been taken in a manner which undermines the effectiveness of this Agreement and the conservation and management measures referred to in Article 5, and, subject to obligations according to established international law, to deny access to ports to vessels that engage in such activities, except in cases of distress or force majeure. Article 8 The Parties shall, in accordance with their legislation, encourage contacts and facilitate co-operation on the basis of overall equity and mutual benefit between their enterprises, in 1058

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particular in the establishment of joint ventures in fishing, stock enhancement, processing of fish products, marketing and landing in ports. In addition, the Parties should encourage introduction of new scientific developments and production technologies within the framework of this Agreement. The Parties may enter into agreements that will facilitate the abovementioned activities. Article 9 The present Agreement is without prejudice to existing bilateral agreements between any of the Parties or to existing multilateral agreements to which any of the three Parties are Parties. Article 10 Any disagreement concerning the interpretation and application of the present Agreement will be settled by the Parties through consultations. Article 11 The Government of Norway shall act as Depositary for this Agreement. Article 12 This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of the last written notification to the Depositary through diplomatic channels confirming that the Parties have fulfilled their internal procedures necessary for the entry into force of this Agreement. The Agreement shall be effective for an initial period from the date of entry into force to 31 December 2002, and shall thereafter be prolonged for consecutive periods of four years, unless denounced by any of the Parties in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 4 of this Article. Any of the Parties may request review of the Agreement or a protocol to which it is a party, by formal notification to the Depositary through diplomatic channels, no later than six months before the expiration of the respective period referred to on paragraph 2 of this Article. A Party that has requested review in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article, may denounce the Agreement by formal notification to the Depository through diplomatic channels, no later than three months before the expiration of the respective period referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article. The termination of the Agreement shall take effect on 1 January of the year following the respective period referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article, unless the denouncement is withdrawn prior to that date. Notwithstanding the preceding paragraph and without prejudice to the prolongation of this Agreement under paragraph 2 of this Article, the Parties may agree to another date of termination of the Agreement. The protocols concluded in accordance with Article 3 shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Agreement. The protocols shall remain in force for the same period of time as the Agreement. The protocols shall terminate on the date of the termination of the Agreement. DONE at St. Petersburg this 15th day of May 1999 in one original in the Icelandic, Norwegian, Russian and English language, all texts being equally authentic. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.

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Document 205 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation for the Purposes of Preventing, Deterring and ­Eliminating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (11 September 2015)* The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Noting the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of December 10, 1982, and of the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of December 10, 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks of December 4, 1995, Recalling the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries of October 31, 1995, Mindful of their common interest in the conservation, rational management and optimal utilization of living marine resources, Guided by the provisions of the Agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America on Mutual Fisheries Relations of May 31, 1988, Recalling the provisions of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters of June 17, 1999, Guided by the principles outlined in the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing of June 23, 2001, Noting the Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing of November 22, 2009, Expressing a desire to cooperate for the purposes of preventing, deterring and eliminating illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (hereinafter, “IUU fishing”), as well as illegal trade in living marine resources, Have agreed as follows: Article 1 1. For the purposes of this Agreement, the terms used herein shall have the following meanings: a) “illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing” refers to the activities set out in paragraph 3 of the 2001 FAO International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing; b) “suspect vessel” means any vessel: i) That is observed to have engaged in IUU fishing or fishing-related activities in support of IUU fishing; ii) That is stateless or has no actual connection with its flag state; or iii) For which its flag state provides evidence that the fish or fish products aboard the vessel were harvested or exported illegally.

* 

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c) “competent authorities” means: with respect to the Russian Federation—the Federal Fisheries Agency, the Federal Security Service, and the Federal Customs Service; with respect to the United States of America—the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the U.S. Coast Guard; d) “fish” means all species of living marine resources, whether processed or not; e) “fishing” means searching for, attracting, locating, catching, taking or harvesting fish or any activity which can reasonably be expected to result in the attracting, locating, catching, taking or harvesting of fish; f) “fishing-related activities” means any operations in support of, or in preparation for, fishing, including the landing, packaging, processing, transshipping or transporting of fish that have not been previously landed at a port, as well as the provisioning of personnel, fuel, gear and other supplies at sea; g) “port” means a place used to unload and transship living marine resources and to obtain all types of equipment, defined in accordance with the legislation of each Party’s state; h) “vessel” means any vessel, ship of another type or boat used for, equipped to be used for, or intended to be used for, fishing or fishing-related activities. 2. In case of a change in the competent authorities or the designation of new competent authorities, the Parties shall immediately inform each other thereof in writing through diplomatic channels. Article 2 The Parties shall cooperate for purposes of preventing, deterring and eliminating IUU fishing in marine areas in which either Party exercises sovereign rights and jurisdiction with respect to fishing in accordance with the norms of international law, as well as in high seas areas that are subject to international fishing agreements to which both Parties are party. Article 3 In order to achieve the purposes of this Agreement, the Parties’ competent authorities shall: 1. Cooperate in preventing, deterring and eliminating IUU fishing and fishingrelated activities, including the import into the territory of one Party’s state of fish that were harvested as a result of IUU fishing within waters under the jurisdiction of the other Party. 2. Cooperate in identifying suspect vessels and exchanging information about them, including through the compilation of a list of suspect vessels. The procedure for compiling this list will be determined in the course of the consultations between the Parties provided for by Article 4 of this Agreement. 3. Exchange information concerning: a) on the fifth day of every month: i) the aggregate quantity and types of imported fish that originated from the other Party’s state; ii) vessels of the Parties, as well as suspect vessels, that have unloaded fish that originated in one Party’s state in ports of the other Party’s state, to include information about each vessel, the names of the ports of unloading, the dates of calls and dates of unloading, and where available information about the species and quantities of unloaded fish; 1061

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iii) vessels of the Parties, as well as suspect vessels, that were denied entry into a port of either Party because it was established that they have engaged in or they are suspected of having engaged in IUU fishing or in fishingrelated activities in support of IUU fishing, to include information about each vessel, the names of the ports to which such vessels had requested entry, the dates on which such requests were received, the dates on which entry was denied and, where available, information about the species and quantities of fish that were planned to be unloaded; iv) violations by individuals and/or legal entities of one Party of the legislation of the other Party concerning fishing or fishing-related activities; b) within 10 days of the time of completion of inspections: i) the results of any inspection of fishing-related activities that is conducted by the competent authorities of one Party in its port on a vessel under the other Party’s flag or whose owner is an individual or legal entity of the other Party; and ii) the results of any inspection of fishing-related activities that is conducted by the competent authorities of one Party in its port on suspect vessels that delivered fish that originated in the other Party’s state; c) within the shortest possible time, with respect to the Parties’ vessels, as well as suspect vessels, that are requesting entry to a port of either Party to unload fish, to include information about each vessel, the names of the ports to which such vessels are requesting entry, the dates of receipt of such requests and, if available, information about the origin of the fish aboard such vessels; d) requests made on the basis of Article 5 of this Agreement. 4. Within the framework of their legislation and international agreements to which both Parties are party, cooperate to the fullest extent possible in the investigation and adjudication of cases related to IUU fishing and fishing-related activities in support of IUU fishing. 5. Take necessary measures, in accordance with the Parties’ legislation, with respect to fish that originate in one Party’s state and that have been unloaded or are to be unloaded in a port of the other Party’s state in cases where there is evidence that such fish were harvested as a result of IUU fishing or fishing-related activities in support of IUU fishing provided by the Party where the fish originated. 6. Participate in working consultations and other types of joint activities conducted by the Parties’ competent authorities. Article 4 1. The Parties’ competent authorities, during the annual sessions of the Russia–U.S. Intergovernmental Consultative Committee on Fisheries, shall hold consultations on issues of cooperation in preventing, deterring and eliminating IUU fishing, as well as in implementing this Agreement. 2. The consultations referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be held alternately in the territory of each Party’s state not less often than once a year. 3. All decisions reached during the consultations shall be formalized as protocols. 4. Special consultations may be held on the initiative of one of the Parties. 1062

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Article 5 1. For purposes of exchanging information, one Party’s competent authorities shall forward requests to the other Party’s competent authorities. 2. Requests to obtain information or to cooperate shall be forwarded in writing. Such requests shall contain the following items: a) the full name and job title of the official who is submitting the request; b) the purpose of and grounds for the request, and a summary of the matter, as well as other information needed for a substantive response; c) if necessary, information concerning an investigation being conducted on a lawful basis and with respect to which the request is being forwarded, including the provisions of law that are relevant to the suspected violations; d) the requested actions; e) if necessary, copies of documents pertaining to the matter. 3. In emergencies, the Parties’ competent authorities may submit a request orally, with subsequent written confirmation of the request as soon as possible. 4. In addition, the Parties’ competent authorities shall: a) preserve the confidentiality of information, as well as requests received on the basis of this Agreement, in accordance with conditions specified by the Party providing such information or request; b) not use information obtained under this Agreement for purposes other than those stipulated in its provisions; c) not transfer to third parties any documents provided by the other Party without that Party’s written consent. 5. Should the competent authority of the Party that provided information under this Agreement request that changes be made to the information or that the media containing the relevant information be destroyed, the competent authority of the Party that obtained such information in response to a written request shall promptly incorporate the relevant changes in the information or destroy the media containing the information, with subsequent written confirmation to the competent authority of the other Party that these actions have been taken. 6. In the event of the termination of this Agreement, the Parties’ competent authorities shall take steps to reach agreement on the return, destruction, or continued use and storage of information previously exchanged by them. 7. For purposes of the potential use of information: a) the collection, disposition, preservation, destruction or alteration of documents obtained on the basis of this Agreement shall be carried out in accordance with the legislation of the Parties; b) each Party shall inform the other Party of an unauthorized disclosure or use of the information, providing the details of what occurred, and shall take all necessary measures to prevent such an occurrence in the future; c) each Party may decline to provide information to the other Party if it believes that fulfilling a request will cause harm to the sovereignty, security and public order of its state. Article 6 The provisions of Article 17 of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters of June 17, 1999, shall 1063

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apply, mutatis mutandis, to the treatment of official documents related to the investigation and adjudication of cases related to IUU fishing and fishing-related activities, as well as to use of such documents as evidence and the return of such documents. Article 7 Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of this Agreement shall be settled by consultations between the Parties. Such consultations shall be held promptly upon the request of either Party. Article 8 Nothing in this Agreement shall be deemed to prejudice the rights and obligations of each of the Parties under other international agreements, or the Parties’ positions on issues of the international law of the sea. Article 9 This Agreement may be amended by mutual written consent of the Parties. Article 10 1. This Agreement shall enter into force 30 days following the date of the receipt of the last written notification through diplomatic channels of completion by the Parties of their internal procedures necessary for its entry into force. 2. Each Party may terminate this Agreement by forwarding written notification to that effect to the other Party through diplomatic channels. The Agreement shall terminate six months after the other Party’s receipt of such notification. DONE at Portland, Oregon, in duplicate, on September 11, 2015, each in the Russian and English languages, both texts being equally authentic.

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Policy Documents and National Instruments Document 206 United States, A Joint Resolution directing the United States to initiate international discussions and take necessary steps with other Nations to negotiate an agreement for managing migratory and transboundary fish stocks in the Arctic Ocean (3 June 2008)* Whereas the decline of several commercially valuable fish stocks throughout the world’s oceans highlights the need for fishing nations to conserve fish stocks and develop management systems that promote fisheries sustainability; Whereas fish stocks are migratory throughout their habitats, and changing ocean conditions can restructure marine habitats and redistribute the species dependent on those habitats; Whereas changing global climate regimes may increase ocean water temperature, creating suitable new habitats in areas previously too cold to support certain fish stocks, such as the Arctic Ocean; Whereas habitat expansion and migration of fish stocks into the Arctic Ocean and the potential for vessel docking and navigation in the Arctic Ocean could create conditions favorable for establishing and expanding commercial fisheries in the future; Whereas commercial fishing has occurred in several regions of the Arctic Ocean, including the Barents Sea, Kara Sea, Beaufort Sea, Chukchi Sea, and Greenland Sea, although fisheries scientists have only limited data on current and projected future fish stock abundance and distribution patterns throughout the Arctic Ocean; Whereas remote indigenous communities in all nations that border the Arctic Ocean engage in limited, small scale subsistence fishing and must maintain access to and sustainability of this fishing in order to survive; Whereas many of these communities depend on a variety of other marine life for social, cultural and subsistence purposes, including marine mammals and seabirds that may be adversely affected by climate change, and emerging fisheries in the Arctic should take into account the social, economic, cultural and subsistence needs of these small coastal communities; Whereas managing for fisheries sustainability requires that all commercial fishing be conducted in accordance with science-based limits on harvest, timely and accurate reporting of catch data, equitable allocation and access systems, and effective monitoring and enforcement systems; Whereas migratory fish stocks traverse international boundaries between the exclusive economic zones of fishing nations and the high seas, and ensuring sustainability of fisheries targeting these stocks requires management systems based on international coordination and cooperation; Whereas international fishing treaties and agreements provide a framework for establishing rules to guide sustainable fishing activities among those nations that are * 

Public Law 110–243, S.J. Res. 17, 110th Cong. (2008). 1065

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parties to the agreement, and regional fisheries management organizations provide international fora for implementing these agreements and facilitating international cooperation and collaboration; Whereas under its authorities in the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, the North Pacific Fishery Management Council has proposed that the United States close all Federal waters in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas to commercial fishing until a fisheries management plan is fully developed; and Whereas future commercial fishing and fisheries management activities in the Arctic Ocean should be developed through a coordinated international framework, as provided by international treaties or regional fisheries management organizations, and this framework should be implemented before significant commercial fishing activity expands to the high seas: Now, therefore, be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (1) the United States should initiate international discussions and take necessary steps with other Arctic nations to negotiate an agreement or agreements for managing migratory, transboundary, and straddling fish stocks in the Arctic Ocean and establishing a new international fisheries management organization or organizations for the region; (2) the agreement or agreements negotiated pursuant to paragraph (1) should conform to the requirements of the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement and contain mechanisms, inter alia, for establishing catch and bycatch limits, harvest allocations, observers, monitoring, data collection and reporting, enforcement, and other elements necessary for sustaining future Arctic fish stocks; (3) as international fisheries agreements are negotiated and implemented, the United States should consult with the North Pacific Regional Fishery Management Council and Alaska Native subsistence communities of the Arctic; and until the agreement or agreements negotiated pursuant to paragraph (1) come into force and measures consistent with the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement are in effect, the United States should support international efforts to halt the expansion of commercial fishing activities in the high seas of the Arctic Ocean.

Document 207 Chair’s summary of the meeting of senior officials of the five coastal States of the Arctic Ocean in Chelsea: On Arctic Fisheries (22 June 2010)* At the invitation of the Norwegian Government, representatives of the five coastal States of the Arctic Ocean—Canada, Denmark/Greenland, the Russian Federation, the United States of America and Norway—met at the level of senior officials on 22 June 2010 in Oslo, Norway, to hold informal discussions. These concerned issues related to their particular responsibilities as coastal States under the comprehensive international legal framework that applies to the Arctic Ocean in the field of conservation and management of fish stocks. *  Retrieved from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/5E2FE F2614D7AE2BC32576F600592DE5.

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The participants exchanged views on available scientific information and acknowledged that the current state of information does not allow for a full understanding of the status of fish stocks and the impact of climate change on such stocks in the Arctic Ocean. Though large-scale commercial fishing in the central Arctic Ocean is not imminent, participants stressed the need for further scientific research on the state and nature of fish stocks and their ecosystems. This is necessary in order to assess emerging trends and their implications in light of the climate change and melting of ice in the Arctic Ocean. Bearing in mind the precautionary approach, as required by the relevant legal instruments, the participants noted the need to follow developments closely in order to prevent possible negative effects on fish stocks in the area. They underlined the importance of enhanced scientific cooperation among the coastal states. To that end, they agreed on the need for their scientific experts to meet to evaluate current information and identify future research requirements and priorities and to invite other experts to participate as appropriate.

Document 208 Chair’s summary of the meeting of senior officials of the five coastal States of the Arctic Ocean in Washington DC: On Arctic Fisheries (1 May 2013)* Officials from Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Kingdom of Norway, the Russian Federation and the United States of America met in Washington, D.C. April 29-May 1 to discuss issues concerning possible future fisheries in the central Arctic Ocean. The discussions built on a meeting of officials from these States that took place in Oslo in 2010 and on a meeting of scientific experts that took place in Anchorage in 2011. At the meeting in Washington, officials reviewed the latest scientific information concerning the changes to the Arctic marine environment, including the dramatic changes resulting from the warming climate, that may affect the ranges and distribution of fish stocks and other marine life in the central part of the Arctic Ocean. There was general recognition of the desirability of improving scientific understanding of the Arctic marine environment, in part to determine whether fish stocks might in the future occur in the high seas area of the central Arctic Ocean that could be harvested in commercial fisheries and the possible impacts of such fisheries on the ecosystem in question. Based on available scientific information, it was generally understood that commercial fishing in the high seas area of the central Arctic Ocean is unlikely to occur in the near future. Nevertheless, there was also general recognition of the desirability of addressing the possibility that commercial fishing could, at some point in the future, take place in the high seas area of the central Arctic Ocean. In particular, the following points emerged from the discussions: At least one existing regional fisheries management organization (RFMO)—the NorthEast Atlantic Fisheries Commission—has a mandate to adopt fisheries conservation and * 

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management measures in a portion of this high seas area, should such fisheries ever take place there. –– At present, there is no need to establish any additional RFMO or RFMO(s) for this area. –– In the period from the present until the time when it may become necessary to establish an additional RFMO or RFMO(s) for this area, it is desirable to develop interim measures. –– The interim measures should advance the proposition that commercial fishing in the high seas area of the central Arctic Ocean should take place only pursuant to one or more regional or subregional fisheries management organizations or arrangements that are or may be established to manage such fishing in accordance with modern international standards. –– Any commercial fishing that occurred in this area that was not conducted pursuant to such an organization or arrangement would be considered a form of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. –– The States participating in the meeting will continue to strive to improve the scientific understanding related to these issues. It is also possible that the interim measures could serve as a framework to promote even stronger cooperation to advance relevant scientific understanding. –– It is appropriate for the States whose exclusive economic zones border this high seas area to take the initiative on this matter. –– Those States also recognize the interests of Arctic residents, particularly the Arctic indigenous peoples, in these matters and will engage with them as appropriate. –– Those States also acknowledge that other States may have an interest in this topic and that they should be included in talks at some point in the future as appropriate. The Kingdom of Norway offered to host a workshop in October 2013 to make further progress on the scientific elements. The Kingdom of Denmark offered to host a next meeting of officials to continue policy discussions among the same States on this topic, with the aim of holding that meeting after the science workshop in October and before the end of 2013.

Document 209 Chair’s summary of the meeting of senior officials of the five coastal States of the Arctic Ocean in Nuuk: On Arctic Fisheries (26 February 2014)* Officials from Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Kingdom of Norway, the Russian Federation and the United States of America met in Nuuk, Greenland from 24–26 February 2014 to continue discussions toward the development of interim measures to prevent unregulated fishing in the central Arctic Ocean and to continue discussion of related scientific matters.

* Retrieved from the Government of Greenland, www.naalakkersuisut.gl/~/media/Nanoq/Images/Nyheder/ 250214/Chairmans%20Statement%20from%20Nuuk%20Meeting%20February%202014%202.docx.

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Scientific Matters At the meeting in Nuuk, officials reviewed the outcomes of the 2nd Scientific Meeting on Arctic Fish Stocks held in Tromsø, Norway 28–31 October 2013 and decided on next steps to continue to advance scientific understanding of living marine resources and their ecosystems in the Arctic Ocean. They agreed: –– to continue to promote scientific research, and to integrate scientific knowledge with traditional and local knowledge, with the aim of improving understanding of the living marine resources of the Arctic Ocean and the ecosystems in which they occur; –– to promote cooperation with relevant scientific bodies, including but not limited to the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) and the North Pacific Marine Science Organization (PICES); and –– to hold a 3rd Scientific Meeting no later than the end of 2015 and to finalize in the coming weeks terms of reference for that meeting. Interim Measures The meeting reaffirmed that, based on available scientific information, commercial fishing in the high seas area of the central Arctic Ocean is unlikely to occur in the near future. The meeting therefore also reaffirmed that there is no need at present to develop any additional regional fisheries management organization (RFMO) or arrangement for this area. The meeting agreed on the desirability of developing appropriate interim measures to deter unregulated fishing in the future in the high seas area of the central Arctic Ocean. Such interim measures will recognize that at least one existing RFMO—the NorthEast Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC)—has the competence to adopt fisheries conservation and management measures in a portion of this high seas area, should such fisheries take place there. The interim measures will neither undermine nor conflict with the role and mandate of any existing international mechanism relating to fisheries, including NEAFC. Based on a proposal from the United States, which was developed further during the meeting, officials of the five States agreed that the necessary interim measures will: –– Apply to the single high seas portion of the central Arctic Ocean that is entirely surrounded by waters under the fisheries jurisdiction of Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark in respect of Greenland, the Kingdom of Norway, the Russian Federation and the United States of America. –– Commit States participating in the interim measures to: authorize their vessels to conduct commercial fishing in this high seas area only pursuant to one or more regional or subregional fisheries management organizations or arrangements that are or may be established to manage such fishing in accordance with modern international standards; establish a joint program of scientific research with the aim of improving understanding of the ecosystems of this area; coordinate their monitoring, control and surveillance activities in this area; and ensure that any non-commercial fishing in this area does not undermine the purpose of the interim measures, is based on scientific advice and is monitored, and that data obtained through any such fishing is shared; 1069

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encourage other States to take measures in respect of vessels entitled to fly their flags that are consistent with the interim measures; and not prejudice the rights, jurisdiction and duties of States under relevant provisions of international law as reflected in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, or the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement, nor alter the rights and obligations of States that arise from relevant international agreements.

The Way Forward The meeting agreed that it is appropriate for the States whose exclusive economic zones border the high seas area in question to take the initiative on this matter. They also continued to recognize the interests of Arctic residents, particularly the Arctic indigenous peoples, in these matters and to engage with them as appropriate. The meeting agreed to develop a Ministerial Declaration for signature or adoption by the five States based on the provisions described above. The meeting expressed the desire to finalize the Ministerial Declaration for signature or adoption in June 2014. The meeting also reaffirmed that other States may have an interest in this topic and looked forward to a broader process involving additional States beginning before the end of 2014. The purpose would be to develop a set of interim measures, compatible with the Ministerial Declaration, that would include commitments by additional States. The final outcome could be a binding international agreement.

Document 210 Oslo Declaration concerning the Prevention of Unregulated High Seas Fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean (16 July 2015)* Meeting in Oslo on 16 July 2015, Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Kingdom of Norway, the Russian Federation and the United States of America continued discussions toward the implementation of interim measures to prevent unregulated fishing in the high seas portion of the central Arctic Ocean. They adopted the following Declaration: We recognize that until recently ice has generally covered the high seas portion of the central Arctic Ocean on a year-round basis, which has made fishing in those waters impossible to conduct. We acknowledge that, due to climate change resulting in changes in ice distribution and related environmental phenomena, the marine ecosystems of the Arctic Ocean are evolving and that the effects of these changes are poorly understood. We note that the Arctic Ocean ecosystems until now have been relatively unexposed to human activities. We recognize the crucial role of healthy marine ecosystems and sustainable fisheries for food and nutrition. We are aware that fish stocks in the Arctic Ocean may occur both within areas under the fisheries jurisdiction of the coastal States and in the high seas portion of the central Arctic Ocean, including straddling fish stocks. We note further that the ice cover in the Arctic Ocean has been diminishing in recent years, including over some of the high seas portion of the central Arctic Ocean.

*  Retrieved from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/fishing-arcticocean/id2427705/.

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We recognize that, based on available scientific information, commercial fishing in the high seas portion of the central Arctic Ocean is unlikely to occur in the near future and, therefore, that there is no need at present to establish any additional regional fisheries management organization for this area. Nevertheless, recalling the obligations of States under international law to cooperate with each other in the conservation and management of living marine resources in high seas areas, including the obligation to apply the precautionary approach, we share the view that it is desirable to implement appropriate interim measures to deter unregulated fishing in the future in the high seas portion of the central Arctic Ocean. We recognize that subsistence harvesting of living marine resources is ongoing in some Arctic Ocean coastal States, and that traditional and local knowledge exists among the users of these resources. We desire to promote scientific research, and to integrate scientific knowledge with traditional and local knowledge, with the aim of improving the understanding of the living marine resources of the Arctic Ocean and the ecosystems in which they occur. We also recognize the interests of Arctic residents, particularly the Arctic indigenous peoples, in the proper management of living marine resources in the Arctic Ocean. We therefore intend to implement, in the single high seas portion of the central Arctic Ocean that is entirely surrounded by waters under the fisheries jurisdiction of Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark in respect of Greenland, the Kingdom of Norway, the Russian Federation and the United States of America, the following interim measures: –– We will authorize our vessels to conduct commercial fishing in this high seas area only pursuant to one or more regional or subregional fisheries management organizations or arrangements that are or may be established to manage such fishing in accordance with recognized international standards. –– We will establish a joint program of scientific research with the aim of improving understanding of the ecosystems of this area and promote cooperation with relevant scientific bodies, including but not limited to the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) and the North Pacific Marine Science Organization (PICES). –– We will promote compliance with these interim measures and with relevant international law, including by coordinating our monitoring, control and surveillance activities in this area. –– We will ensure that any non-commercial fishing in this area does not undermine the purpose of the interim measures, is based on scientific advice and is monitored, and that data obtained through any such fishing is shared. We recall that an extensive international legal framework applies to the Arctic Ocean. These interim measures will neither undermine nor conflict with the role and mandate of any existing international mechanism relating to fisheries, including the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission. Nor will these interim measures prejudice the rights, jurisdiction and duties of States under relevant provisions of international law as reflected in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, or the 1995 United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, or alter the rights and obligations of States that arise from relevant international agreements. In implementing these interim measures, we will continue to engage with Arctic residents, particularly the Arctic indigenous peoples, as appropriate. 1071

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We intend to continue to work together to encourage other States to take measures in respect of vessels entitled to fly their flags that are consistent with these interim measures. We acknowledge the interest of other States in preventing unregulated high seas fisheries in the central Arctic Ocean and look forward to working with them in a broader process to develop measures consistent with this Declaration that would include commitments by all interested States.

Document 211 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iceland, Due to “5-state consultation” on fishing in the Arctic Ocean (23 July 2015)* The Ministry for Foreign Affairs has called the ambassadors of the United States of America, Denmark, Canada, Norway and the Russian Federation to a meeting in the ministry and made observations on the consultation of the five states on fishing in the Arctic Ocean, signed in Oslo last week. The declaration of the five states is non-binding but Iceland believes it is important that all parties are on equal footing in order to ensure efficiency and strengthen the basis of collaboration on fishing in international waters, including the Arctic Ocean. Climate change and the warming of the oceans mean that international waters in the Arctic may in the near future become accessible for fishing. The management and arrangement of such fisheries are of great concern for Iceland, which largely bases its earnings on marine resources. Iceland emphasises that its scientific knowledge and fishing experience can contribute significantly to consultations and discussions in this field. It is important that all interested states take part in joint policy-making concerning the Arctic. Iceland was not invited to be party to the declaration, even though maritime affairs are highly important to Iceland and Iceland is among the world’s leading fishing nations. Ever since the five states started their consultation without the participation of Iceland, with the Ilulissat declaration in 2008, the Icelandic authorities have regularly commented on Iceland being kept outside discussions on important affairs concerning the Arctic. The position of the Icelandic authorities is based on the following: –– Maritime affairs are tremendously important for Iceland and Iceland has placed great emphasis on regional collaboration on solid scientific basis. Iceland for example takes active part in the North-East Atlantic Fisheries commission (NEAFC), the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (NAFO) and the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) and is party to the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement which forms the legal framework for fishing in international waters, including the Arctic Ocean; –– Iceland is among the world’s leading fishing nations and none of the Arctic states is as dependent on fisheries as Iceland; –– Iceland admits that the future exploitation of fish stocks in the Arctic is subject to uncertainty, but emphasises that Iceland’s scientific knowledge and fishing experience can contribute significantly to consultations and discussions in this field; * 

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Iceland regrets that although it has repeatedly asked to participate in the collaboration, the five states have decided to keep Iceland outside consultations and preparations on the declaration in question; –– Participation in the discussions of the five states has, rightly, not been conditional on the states having exclusive economic zone to the Arctic Ocean as neither Norway nor the Faeroe Islands meet such conditions. Iceland has the same rights and duties to take part in all discussions on the future development on fishing in international waters in the Arctic Ocean and it is therefore completely inconsequent to exclude Iceland from participation; –– The declaration by the five states is non-binding under international law and is not made under the auspices of or in the name of any international organisation or agreement. Iceland is therefore not bound by this declaration but believes it is necessary that all parties are on equal footing in order to ensure efficiency and strengthen the basis of collaboration on fishing in international waters, including the Arctic Ocean. The Icelandic authorities will continue to emphasise the value of its knowledge and experience of fishing in the Arctic to future policy-making in the field and that Iceland is a recognised participant in the states’ consultation on equal terms.

Document 212 Chairman’s Statement from Arctic High Seas Fisheries Meeting (21 April 2016)* Introduction Delegations from Canada, the People’s Republic of China, the Kingdom of Denmark, the European Union, Iceland, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Kingdom of Norway, the Russian Federation and the United States of America met in Washington, D.C. from 19–21 April 2016 to continue discussions concerning the prevention of unregulated commercial fishing in the high seas area of the central Arctic Ocean. The meeting followed a previous set of talks that took place 1–3 December 2015, also in Washington, D.C. All delegations affirmed their commitment to take interim measures to prevent unregulated commercial high seas fishing in the central Arctic Ocean as part of a “stepwise” process in advance of possibly establishing one or more additional regional fisheries management organizations or arrangements for this area. Some delegations announced that they had obtained a mandate to negotiate a legally binding instrument on this topic. Scientific Workshop The meeting received an update on preparations for the next in a series of scientific workshops, scheduled to take place in Tromsø, Norway on 26–28 September 2016. The terms of reference for the workshop contain two main objectives: (1) to develop a 5-year cooperative research and monitoring plan; and (2) to create a framework for

* 

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implementing that plan. This workshop is intended to broaden the range of participants, as part of a robust commitment to improve scientific understanding. As such, invitations to the scientific workshop have been sent to all delegations and to a number of international organizations. The meeting expressed appreciation to Norway for hosting the workshop. Consideration of Possible Measures The Chair reminded delegations of three possible approaches that were “on the table” at the December 2015 meeting, which could be combined in a stepwise fashion: –– Adjusting the Declaration signed by five of the participating States with input from other participants such that a new, broader non-binding statement could be adopted; –– Negotiating a binding international agreement of the kind proposed by the United States; and –– Negotiating in the foreseeable future an agreement or agreements to establish one or more additional regional fisheries management organizations or arrangements for the area. All three options remain under consideration. During the April 2016 meeting, delegations expressed their willingness to develop interim measures that would prevent unregulated high seas commercial fishing from starting in the central Arctic Ocean and to establish a related joint program of scientific research. All delegations further expressed the understanding that such interim measures would incorporate the ecosystem and precautionary approaches, with inclusion of traditional and local knowledge, and be part of a “stepwise” process. In other words, the interim measures would include a commitment to keep under regular review the question of whether to establish one or more additional regional fisheries management organizations or arrangements for the central Arctic Ocean, based on the best available scientific evidence and relevant policy considerations, with the long-term objective of promoting conservation and sustainable use of living marine resources in the Arctic. Some but not all delegations expressed a preference that the interim measures should be in the format of legally binding instrument. The meeting considered the elements of an updated draft for an international agreement that could form the basis of such interim measures. Many delegations offered suggestions for improving the U.S. proposal. Some of the key points that remain under discussion for future meetings include: –– the provisions of the instrument related to the “stepwise” approach; –– the relationship between the instrument and other international agreements or organizations dealing with related subjects or areas; –– the joint program of scientific research, its governance, and the manner in which science would be used in implementing the instrument; and –– decision-making. The Way Forward Delegations will have the opportunity to submit to the United States written proposals relating to the development of measures concerning this topic by 16 May 2016. The Chairman will circulate an updated text based on suggestions made at the meeting in Washington, and any written proposals it receives, by 25 May 2016.

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Canada offered to host the next meeting to consider the possible instrument and related matters in Iqaluit, Canada on 6–8 July 2016. This Chairman’s Statement attempts to capture the basic elements of the meeting but does not necessarily reflect the views of any individual delegation.

Document 213 Chairman’s Statement from Arctic High Seas Fisheries Meeting (8 July 2016)* Introduction Delegations from Canada, the People’s Republic of China, the Kingdom of Denmark in respect of the Faroe Islands and Greenland, the European Union, Iceland, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Kingdom of Norway, the Russian Federation and the United States of America met in Iqaluit from 6–8 July 2016 to continue discussions concerning the prevention of unregulated commercial fishing in the high seas area of the central Arctic Ocean. The meeting followed previous talks that took place 1–3 December 2015 and 19–21 April 2016 in Washington, D.C. All delegations reaffirmed their commitment to take interim measures to prevent unregulated commercial high seas fishing in the central Arctic Ocean as well as a commitment to promote the conservation and sustainable use of living marine resources and to safeguard a healthy marine ecosystem in the central Arctic Ocean. Most delegations view this as part of a “stepwise” process in advance of possibly establishing one or more additional regional fisheries management organizations or arrangements for this area. Delegations made good progress in resolving differences of view on a number of the main issues under discussion. There was a general belief that these discussions have the possibility of concluding successfully in the near future. Consideration of Possible Measures Delegations recalled the three possible approaches that were identified at previous meetings, which could be combined in a stepwise fashion: –– Adjusting the Declaration Concerning the Prevention of Unregulated High Seas Fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean signed by five of the participating States with input from other participants such that a new, broader non-binding declaration could be adopted; –– Negotiating a legally binding international agreement; and –– Negotiating in the foreseeable future an agreement or agreements to establish one or more additional regional fisheries management organizations or arrangements for the area. The July 2016 meeting continued discussion of these options. Opinions differed whether to develop a new non-binding declaration or a binding international agreement. All options remain under consideration.

* 

Retrieved from the US Department of State, www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/fish/illegal/259944.htm.

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The meeting considered a Chairman’s Text, circulated in advance of the meeting, which reflected proposals from many delegations. On the basis of the Chairman’s Text and many proposals made during the meeting, delegations made progress in refining the basic elements that could be included in either a new non-binding declaration or a binding international agreement. In particular, delegations discussed a joint program of scientific research and monitoring and the importance of indigenous and local knowledge, and noted the need for further discussion of the scope of the program. Delegations looked forward to input from the scientific workshop to be held in Tromsø, Norway on 26–28 September 2016. In addition to the question of the format of the instrument under consideration, some of the key points that remain under discussion for the future include: –– the manner in which the instrument addresses exploratory fishing; –– the conditions under which a decision might be made to commence negotiations on an agreement to establish one or more additional regional fisheries management organizations or arrangements for the central Arctic Ocean; and –– decision-making procedures. The Way Forward The Chairman indicated an intention to circulate an updated text by 15 July 2016. Delegations will have the opportunity to submit written proposals for improving that text by 15 September 2016. The Chairman will circulate a new version of the text reflecting such proposals by 30 September 2016. The Kingdom of Denmark indicated a possibility that it might host the next meeting in the autumn of 2016, to be confirmed through diplomatic channels. Delegations expressed their sincere gratitude to the Government of Canada and to the Government and people of Nunavut for their excellent work in hosting and organizing the meeting and for their warm hospitality. This Chairman’s Statement attempts to capture the basic elements of the meeting but does not necessarily reflect the views of any individual delegation.

Document 214 Industry Group Agreement to Cod fishery in the northern part of North-East Atlantic (FAO area 27, ICES division IIb2 and Ib*) (25 April 2016)** We acknowledge that climate change and the melting of the ice sheet in the above areas have caused concern related to fishing activities in the vast area around Svalbard. We acknowledge Greenpeace’s role in bringing attention to the region under these changing circumstances. *  the part of ICES Division 1b referred is West of the delimitation line as defined in the Treaty between Norway and Russia concerning maritime delimitation and cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean 2010. **  Retrieved from the Norwegian Fishing Vessel Owners Association, http://barentssea.seafood.no/.

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We understand that the marine area around Svalbard have been identified in several scientific programs as important. We recognise that the fisheries in the northern Barents Sea and Norwegian Sea including the marine areas around Svalbard are amongst the best regulated fisheries in the world. Most of these fisheries are independently certified by the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) as compliant with their standard for sustainable and well-managed fisheries. Additionally there are many protected areas already established around Svalbard to safeguard ecological biodiversity. We have agreed that from the 2016 season the catching sector will not expand their Cod fishing activities with trawl gear into those areas where regular fishing has not taken place before. This is a precautionary measure until through initiatives such as those mentioned below the fishing activity in future years will be determined by improved knowledge replacing the need for this precautionary approach. We would like to state that the Industry Group has been successful in gaining agreement to have an action orientated High-Level Roundtable. The Roundtable will include the Norwegian Governmental Fisheries Management agencies and institutions and welcomes other interested public stakeholders to participate. The objectives of the High-Level Roundtable will be to establish a transparent process that will continue to enable Cod to be sourced from the area but also to meet the MSC independent sustainable fishery standard for activities beyond 2016. We call for the governments to assist these efforts and ensure all measures are based on best available science, to properly assess and map the area for example but not exclusively the Mareano program. In parallel with the High-Level Roundtable, the Cod catching industry will accelerate their work to meet the MSC condition regarding Vulnerable Marine Ecosystems (VME’s) identified in the MSC recertification process. Together with the scientists from the Norwegian Institute of Marine Research and other relevant institutions, we will use all available data: –– To define areas that may be vulnerable to trawling. –– To develop effective and proportional measures that prevent environmental degradation in such areas. We are also committed to a voluntary agreement to avoid fishing in such areas on a precautionary basis, whilst the appropriate measures are under development. The voluntary agreement will be in place before the Cod fishing starts in the region in 2016. Supported by: Catching Sector: Fiskebåt -The Norwegian Fishing Vessel Owners Association; Karat Group, Eurofish, Союз рыбопромышленников Севера (Union of Fishermen of the North) Processors and Manufacturers: Espersen; Icelandic/Seachill; Nomad Foods Europe (Birds Eye, iglo & Findus); Young’s Seafood Ltd. Retailers and Food Service: Morrisons, Tesco, ASDA, McDonald’s, Marks & Spencer, Sainsbury’s.

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Document 215 Canada, Fishing Zones of Canada (Zone 6) Order 1977* Oceans Act Order Prescribing as a Fishing Zone of Canada Certain Areas of the Sea Adjacent to the Coast of Canada Short Title 1. This Order may be cited as the Fishing Zones of Canada (Zone 6) Order. Interpretation 2. In this Order, “C.H.S. Chart” means Canadian Hydrographic Service Chart; “geographical coordinates” means the latitudes and longitudes listed in the schedule. “NAD83” means the North American Datum 1983 geodetic system. (NAD83) Prescription of Fishing Zone 3. The area of the sea described in section 4 as “Fishing Zone 6” is hereby prescribed as a fishing zone of Canada. 4. Fishing Zone 6 comprises an area of the sea adjacent to the coast of the mainland and islands of the Canadian arctic, bounded on its outer perimeter (a) by geodesic lines joining the points determined by reference to the geographical coordinates listed in the schedule, and (b) by a line commencing at 72°57′56.050″ N. latitude, 141° W. longitude, and terminating at 86°18′45″ N. latitude, 59°51′57″ W. longitude, every point of which is distant 200 nautical miles from the nearest point of the baseline from which the territorial sea of Canada is measured in the Beaufort Sea, the Arctic Ocean and the Lincoln Sea, but does not include any area of the internal waters or territorial sea of Canada. SCHEDULE (ss. 2 and 4) AREA 1 Beaufort Sea Region Column I

Column II

Column III

Latitude

Longitude

CHS Chart

1.

69°38′45″.727N

141°00′00″W

7601

2.

72°57′56″.050N

141°00′00″W

7000

*  C.R.C., c. 1549, SOR/2009-22, s. 1. Regulations are current to 22 June 2015 and last amended on 29 January 2009.

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AREA 2 Davis Strait, Baffin Bay and Nares Strait Region Part 1 Column I

Column II

Column III

Latitude

Longitude

Geodetic Datum

1.

66°15′00.0″N

62°28′30.0″W

NAD83

2.

66°15′00.0″N

57°37′50.4″W

NAD83

3.

66°18′40.9″N

57°37′33.2″W

NAD83

4.

66°24′30.0″N

57°37′33.6″W

NAD83

5.

66°30′16.3″N

57°38′02.1″W

NAD83

6.

66°36′01.0″N

57°38′59.2″W

NAD83

7.

66°37′52.6″N

57°39′27.1″W

NAD83

8.

66°41′42.8″N

57°40′20.9″W

NAD83

9.

66°49′28.4″N

57°42′50.2″W

NAD83

10.

67°21′31.2″N

57°52′21.1″W

NAD83

11.

67°27′16.5″N

57°54′34.4″W

NAD83

12.

67°28′12.4″N

57°55′00.5″W

NAD83

13.

67°29′09.7″N

57°56′00.1″W

NAD83

14.

67°30′45.7″N

57°57′39.5″W

NAD83

15.

67°35′20.0″N

58°02′04.2″W

NAD83

16.

67°39′46.0″N

58°06′03.2″W

NAD83

17.

67°44′15.3″N

58°09′47.7″W

NAD83

18.

67°56′56.7″N

58°19′37.1″W

NAD83

19.

68°01′53.4″N

58°23′09.2″W

NAD83

20.

68°04′15.5″N

58°24′41.6″W

NAD83

21.

68°06′52.2″N

58°26′34.7″W

NAD83

22.

68°07′24.0″N

58°26′55.6″W

NAD83

23.

68°16′04.1″N

58°33′45.1″W

NAD83

24.

68°21′40.0″N

58°38′38.1″W

NAD83

25.

68°25′15.0″N

58°42′03.4″W

NAD83

26.

68°32′52.5″N

59°01′29.5″W

NAD83

27.

68°34′01.2″N

59°04′27.8″W

NAD83

28.

68°37′51.4″N

59°14′00.5″W

NAD83

29.

68°38′01.2″N

59°14′26.1″W

NAD83

30.

68°56′49.9″N

60°02′12.6″W

NAD83

31.

69°00′52.8″N

60°08′59.3″W

NAD83

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Column I

Column II

Column III

Latitude

Longitude

Geodetic Datum

32.

69°06′47.3″N

60°18′19.9″W

NAD83

33.

69°10′14.3″N

60°23′28.3″W

NAD83

34.

69°12′49.2″N

60°27′23.9″W

NAD83

35.

69°29′24.7″N

60°51′21.8″W

NAD83

36.

69°49′48.9″N

60°57′59.6″W

NAD83

37.

69°55′16.0″N

60°59′24.8″W

NAD83

38.

69°55′49.3″N

60°59′51.2″W

NAD83

39.

70°01′40.7″N

61°04′04.8″W

NAD83

40.

70°07′32.9″N

61°07′55.1″W

NAD83

41.

70°08′49.6″N

61°08′39.9″W

NAD83

42.

70°13′28.9″N

61°10′29.2″W

NAD83

43.

70°33′04.1″N

61°17′06.1″W

NAD83

44.

70°35′32.8″N

61°20′16.7″W

NAD83

45.

70°48′10.2″N

61°37′37.5″W

NAD83

46.

70°51′50.7″N

61°42′32.0″W

NAD83

47.

71°12′06.1″N

62°08′59.1″W

NAD83

48.

71°18′58.8″N

62°17′26.8″W

NAD83

49.

71°25′55.9″N

62°25′22.4″W

NAD83

50.

71°29′23.1″N

62°28′59.4″W

NAD83

51.

71°31′43.9″N

62°31′39.4″W

NAD83

52.

71°32′53.9″N

62°33′21.0″W

NAD83

53.

71°44′42.6″N

62°49′24.5″W

NAD83

54.

71°47′12.6″N

62°52′40.2″W

NAD83

55.

71°52′59.0″N

63°03′51.6″W

NAD83

56.

72°01′39.1″N

63°20′43.6″W

NAD83

57.

72°06′20.0″N

63°30′24.9″W

NAD83

58.

72°10′57.7″N

63°40′32.9″W

NAD83

59.

72°24′53.2″N

64°13′06.9″W

NAD83

60.

72°30′35.0″N

64°26′02.7″W

NAD83

61.

72°36′24.0″N

64°38′44.4″W

NAD83

62.

72°43′47.1″N

64°54′16.1″W

NAD83

63.

72°45′45.6″N

64°58′13.4″W

NAD83

64.

72°47′41.9″N

65°00′37.6″W

NAD83

65.

72°50′53.5″N

65°07′31.3″W

NAD83

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Column I

Column II

Column III

Latitude

Longitude

Geodetic Datum

66.

73°18′28.8″N

66°07′54.4″W

NAD83

67.

73°25′54.0″N

66°24′59.5″W

NAD83

68.

73°31′08.2″N

67°15′31.4″W

NAD83

69.

73°36′30.5″N

68°05′25.1″W

NAD83

70.

73°37′54.8″N

68°12′20.4″W

NAD83

71.

73°41′46.1″N

68°29′39.3″W

NAD83

72.

73°46′10.5″N

68°48′48.7″W

NAD83

73.

73°46′43.9″N

68°51′08.6″W

NAD83

74.

73°52′16.2″N

69°10′52.9″W

NAD83

75.

73°57′32.5″N

69°31′00.9″W

NAD83

76.

74°02′15.2″N

69°50′19.9″W

NAD83

77.

74°02′31.9″N

69°51′25.8″W

NAD83

78.

74°06′09.3″N

70°06′41.2″W

NAD83

79.

74°07′30.2″N

70°12′09.6″W

NAD83

80.

74°10′02.1″N

70°23′07.1″W

NAD83

81.

74°12′25.2″N

70°33′03.4″W

NAD83

82.

74°24′01.3″N

71°25′40.4″W

NAD83

Column I

Column II

Column III

Latitude

Longitude

CHS Chart

83.

74°28′36″N

71°45′48″W

7010

84.

74°44′12″N

72°53′00″W

7010

85.

74°50′36″N

73°02′48″W

7010

86.

75°00′00″N

73°16′18″W

7010

87.

76°41′24″N

75°00′00″W

7071

88.

77°30′00″N

74°46′00″W

7071

89.

78°25′00″N

73°46′00″W

7071

90.

78°48′30″N

73°00′00″W

7071

91.

79°39′00″N

69°20′00″W

7071

92.

80°00′00″N

69°00′00″W

7071

93.

80°25′00″N

68°20′00″W

7072

94.

80°45′00″N

67°07′00″W

7072

95.

80°49′12″N

66°29′00″W

7072

Part 2

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AREA 3 Nares Strait Lincoln Sea Region Column I

Column II

Column III

Latitude

Longitude

CHS Chart

1.

80°49′48″N

66°26′18″W

7072

2.

80°50′30″N

66°16′00″W

7072

3.

81°18′12″N

64°11′00″W

7072

4.

81°52′00″N

62°10′00″W

7072

5.

82°13′00″N

60°00′00″W

7072

6.

82°14′58″N

59°53′35″W

7304

7.

82°16′24″N

59°46′48″W

7304

8.

82°17′40″N

59°39′05″W

7304

9.

82°17′55″N

59°37′55″W

7304

10.

82°20′23″N

59°24′15″W

7304

11.

82°20′35″N

59°23′31″W

7304

12.

82°24′16″N

59°06′57″W

7304

13.

82°27′42″N

58°50′21″W

7304

14.

82°30′41″N

58°42′12″W

7304

15.

82°36′09″N

58°23′20″W

7304

16.

82°36′23″N

58°22′25″W

7304

17.

82°42′06″N

58°07′47″W

7304

18.

82°42′24″N

58°06′54″W

7304

19.

82°50′02″N

57°52′32″W

7304

20.

82°59′33″N

57°36′36″W

7304

21.

83°03′43″N

57°30′53″W

7304

22.

83°11′07″N

57°00′11″W

7304

23.

83°13′41″N

56°59′01″W

7304

24.

84°03′24″N

56°35′56″W

7304

25.

84°14′27″N

56°49′23″W

7304

26.

84°14′45″N

56°49′36″W

7304

27.

84°47′36″N

57°35′40″W

7304

28.

84°51′55″N

57°42′08″W

7304

29.

85°08′17″N

58°17′30″W

7000

30.

85°51′08″N

58°52′15″W

7000

31.

85°58′37″N

59°00′37″W

7000

32.

86°05′32″N

59°09′57″W

7000

33.

86°18′45″N

59°51′57″W

7000

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Document 216 Canada, Coastal Fisheries Protection Act as amended in 1994* Short Title 1. This Act may be cited as the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act. Interpretation 2. (1) In this Act, “Agreement” means the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks adopted by the United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in New York on August 4, 1995; “Canadian fisheries waters” means all waters in the fishing zones of Canada, all waters in the territorial sea of Canada and all internal waters of Canada; “Canadian fishing vessel” means a fishing vessel (a) that is registered or licensed under the Canada Shipping Act, 2001, or (b) that is not registered or licensed under the Canada Shipping Act, 2001 or under the laws of another state but is owned by one or more persons each of whom is (i) a Canadian citizen, (ii) in the case of a vessel that is not required to be registered or licensed under that Act, a person resident and domiciled in Canada, or (iii) a corporation incorporated under the laws of Canada or a province, having its principal place of business in Canada; “fish” includes shellfish, crustaceans and marine animals; “fishing” means fishing for or catching or killing fish by any method; “fishing vessel” includes any ship or boat or any other description of vessel used in or equipped for (a) fishing or processing or transporting fish from fishing grounds, (b) taking, processing or transporting marine plants, or (c) provisioning, servicing, repairing or maintaining any vessels of a foreign fishing fleet while at sea; “fishing vessel of a participating state” means a foreign fishing vessel that has been issued, under the laws of a participating state, a registration number, licence or other document granting it the right to fly the flag of that state or that is otherwise entitled to fly the flag of that state; “fishing vessel without nationality” means a fishing vessel that (a) has not been issued, under the laws of any state, a registration number, licence or other document granting it the right to fly the flag of that state, (b) sails under a flag that it is not entitled to fly, (c) does not sail under the flag of any state, (d) sails under the flag of two or more states, using them according to convenience, or (e) sails under the flag of a state that is not recognized by the international community; *  Coastal Fisheries Protection Act as Amended in 1994 (signed 12 May 1994, entered into force 25 May 1994), R.S.C., 1985, c. C-33. The act was amended several times. With the amendment of 12 May 1994 Canada extended its area of application to cover parts of the high seas in the Grand Banks area.

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“foreign fishing vessel” means a fishing vessel that is not a Canadian fishing vessel; “government vessel” means, subject to subsection 17(2), any vessel that belongs to or is in the service of Her Majesty in right of Canada; “Minister” means the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans; “NAFO Regulatory Area” means that part of the following area, being the Convention Area of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization, that is on the high seas: (a) the waters of the Northwest Atlantic Ocean north of 35°00′ north latitude and west of a line extending due north from 35°00′ north latitude and 42°00′ west longitude to 59°00′ north latitude, thence due west to 44°00′ west longitude, and thence due north to the coast of Greenland, and (b) the waters of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, Davis Strait and Baffin Bay south of 78°10′ north latitude; “participating state” means a foreign state or an organization of foreign states prescribed by regulation; “protection officer” means, subject to subsection 17(2), (a) a fishery officer within the meaning of the Fisheries Act, (b) a member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, or (c) any person authorized by the Governor in Council to enforce this Act. “straddling stock” [Repealed, 1999, c. 19, s. 1] (2) In section 5.4, subparagraphs 6(f)(iv) and (vi), paragraphs 16.1(b) and 17(2)(b), sections 18.01 and 18.02 and paragraph 18.1(a.2), “state” includes an organization of foreign states. Foreign Fishing Vessels 3. No foreign fishing vessel shall enter Canadian fisheries waters for any purpose unless authorized by this Act or the regulations, any other law of Canada or a treaty. 4. (1) No person, being aboard a foreign fishing vessel or being a member of the crew of or attached to or employed on a foreign fishing vessel, shall in Canada or in Canadian fisheries waters (a) fish or prepare to fish, (b) unload, land or tranship any fish, outfit or supplies, (c) ship or discharge any crew member or other person, (d) purchase or obtain bait or any supplies or outfits, or (e) take or prepare to take marine plants, unless authorized by this Act or the regulations, any other law of Canada or a treaty. (2) No person, being aboard a foreign fishing vessel or being a member of the crew of or attached to or employed on a foreign fishing vessel, shall fish or prepare to fish for a sedentary species of fish in any portion of the continental shelf of Canada that is beyond the limits of Canadian fisheries waters, unless authorized by this Act or the regulations or any other law of Canada. (3) For the purposes of subsection (2), “sedentary species” means any living organism that, at the harvestable stage, either is immobile on or under the seabed or is unable to move except in constant physical contact with the seabed or subsoil. 5. No person, being aboard a Canadian fishing vessel, shall bring into Canadian fisheries waters fish received outside Canadian fisheries waters from a foreign fishing vessel, unless authorized by the regulations.

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5.1 Parliament, recognizing (a) that straddling stocks on the Grand Banks of Newfoundland are a major renewable world food source having provided a livelihood for centuries to fishers, (b) that those stocks are threatened with extinction, (c) that there is an urgent need for all fishing vessels to comply in both Canadian fisheries waters and the NAFO Regulatory Area with sound conservation and management measures for those stocks, notably those measures that are taken under the Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, done at Ottawa on October 24, 1978, Canada Treaty Series 1979 No. 11, and (d) that some foreign fishing vessels continue to fish for those stocks in the NAFO Regulatory Area in a manner that undermines the effectiveness of sound conservation and management measures, declares that the purpose of section 5.2 is to enable Canada to take urgent action necessary to prevent further destruction of those stocks and to permit their rebuilding, while continuing to seek effective international solutions to the situation referred to in paragraph (d). 5.2 No person, being aboard a foreign fishing vessel of a prescribed class, shall, in the NAFO Regulatory Area, fish or prepare to fish for a straddling stock in contravention of any of the prescribed conservation and management measures. 5.3 No fishing vessel of a participating state shall, in an area of the sea designated under subparagraph 6(e)(ii), (a) contravene a measure or regulation designated under subparagraph 6(e)(i); (b) conceal, tamper with or dispose of anything that may afford evidence of a contravention of a measure or regulation designated under subparagraph 6(e) (i); or (c) conceal its identity or registration, including displaying a false marking, identity or registration. 5.4 No fishing vessel of a state that is party to a treaty or arrangement described in paragraph 6(f) shall, in an area of the sea designated under subparagraph 6(f)(ii), contravene a measure or regulation designated under subparagraph 6(f)(i). 5.5 No fishing vessel without nationality shall (a) in an area of the sea designated under subparagraph 6(e)(ii), fish or prepare to fish or contravene a measure or regulation designated under subparagraph 6(e)(i); or (b) in an area of the sea designated under subparagraph 6(f)(ii), fish or prepare to fish or contravene a measure or regulation designated under subparagraph 6(f)(i). 6. The Governor in Council may make regulations for carrying out the purposes and provisions of this Act including, but not limited to, regulations (a) for authorizing, by means of licences, permits or otherwise, (i) foreign fishing vessels to enter Canadian fisheries waters for any purpose specified in the regulations, or (ii) persons to do all or any of the things described in paragraphs 4(1)(a) to (e), subsection 4(2) or section 5;

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(b)

(b.1) (b.2) (b.3)

(b.4) (b.5) (c) (d) (e)

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respecting the issuance, suspension and cancellation of any licences or permits provided for under paragraph (a) and prescribing their forms, the fees payable therefor and their terms and conditions, which are in addition to such terms and conditions, if any, as the Minister may specify therein; prescribing as a straddling stock, for the purposes of section 5.2, any stock of fish that occurs both within Canadian fisheries waters and in an area beyond and adjacent to Canadian fisheries waters; prescribing any class of foreign fishing vessel for the purposes of section 5.2; prescribing, for the purposes of section 5.2, (i) any measure for the conservation and management of any straddling stock to be complied with by persons aboard a foreign fishing vessel of a prescribed class in order to ensure that the foreign fishing vessel does not engage in any activity that undermines the effectiveness of conservation and management measures for any straddling stock that are taken under the Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, done at Ottawa on October 24, 1978, Canada Treaty Series 1979 No. 11, or (ii) any other measure for the conservation and management of any straddling stock to be complied with by persons aboard a foreign fishing vessel of a prescribed class; prescribing the manner in which and the extent to which a protection officer is permitted to use the force referred to in section 8.1; prescribing forms that may be used instead of the forms set out in Part XXVIII of the Criminal Code in proceedings against fishing vessels under this Act or the Fisheries Act; for appointing or authorizing persons to enforce the provisions of this Act and the regulations; for securing and keeping any fishing vessels or things seized pursuant to this Act; for the implementation of the Agreement, including regulations (i) incorporating by reference, or carrying out and giving effect to, any conservation or management measures of a regional fisheries management organization or arrangement established by two or more states, or by one or more states and an organization of states, for the purpose of the conservation or management of a straddling fish stock or highly migratory fish stock, and designating from amongst the measures incorporated by reference or regulations made under this subparagraph those the contravention of which is prohibited by paragraph 5.3(a), (ii) designating any area of the sea regulated by the regional fisheries management organization or arrangement, (iii) setting out the circumstances in which a person engaged or employed in the administration or enforcement of this Act may exercise, in a manner consistent with the Agreement and the measures incorporated by reference and the regulations made under subparagraph (i), the powers conferred by or under this Act and setting out any procedures to be followed in doing so,

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(iv) empowering the Minister to authorize a participating state to take enforcement action in respect of a Canadian fishing vessel, (v) respecting the manner of service and the giving and sending of summonses, notices, statements and other documents, (vi) permitting Her Majesty in right of Canada to recover any reasonable costs incurred as a result of the detention in port of a fishing vessel of a participating state, and (vii) prescribing a participating state for the purposes of this Act; and for the implementation of the provisions of any other international fisheries treaty or arrangement to which Canada is party, including any conservation, management or enforcement measures taken under the treaty or arrangement, including regulations (i) incorporating by reference, or carrying out and giving effect to, any of those measures and designating from amongst the measures incorporated by reference or regulations made under this subparagraph those the contravention of which is prohibited by section 5.4, (ii) designating any area of the sea regulated by the treaty or arrangement, (iii) setting out the circumstances in which a person engaged or employed in the administration or enforcement of this Act may exercise, in a manner consistent with the treaty or arrangement and the measures incorporated by reference or regulations made under subparagraph (i), the powers conferred by or under this Act and setting out any procedures to be followed in doing so, (iv) empowering the Minister to authorize a state that is party to the treaty or arrangement to take enforcement action in respect of a Canadian fishing vessel, (v) respecting the manner of service and the giving and sending of summonses, notices, statements and other documents, and (vi) permitting Her Majesty in right of Canada to recover any reasonable costs incurred as a result of the detention in port of a fishing vessel of a state that is party to the treaty or arrangement.

Inspection, Arrest, Seizure and Forfeiture 7. A protection officer may (a) for the purpose of ensuring compliance with this Act and the regulations, board and inspect any fishing vessel found within Canadian fisheries waters or the NAFO Regulatory Area; and (b) with a warrant issued under section 7.1, search any fishing vessel found within Canadian fisheries waters or the NAFO Regulatory Area and its cargo. 7.01 (1) If a protection officer believes on reasonable grounds that a fishing vessel of a participating state or of a state party to a treaty or an arrangement described in paragraph 6(f) has engaged in unauthorized fishing in Canadian fisheries waters and the officer finds the vessel in an area of the sea designated under subparagraph 6(e)(ii) or (f)(ii), the officer may, with the consent of that state, take any enforcement action that is consistent with this Act. (2) Subsection (1) does not affect any powers the protection officer may have in the case of pursuit that began while the vessel was in Canadian fisheries waters. 1087

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7.1 (1) A justice of the peace who on ex parte application is satisfied by information on oath that there are reasonable grounds to believe that there is in any place, including any premises, vessel or vehicle, any fish or other thing that was obtained by or used in, or that will afford evidence in respect of, a contravention of this Act or the regulations, may issue a warrant authorizing the protection officer named in the warrant to enter and search the place for the fish or other thing subject to any conditions that may be specified in the warrant. (2) A protection officer may exercise the powers referred to in paragraph 7(b) without a warrant if the conditions for obtaining a warrant exist but, by reason of exigent circumstances, it would not be practical to obtain a warrant. 8. A protection officer may arrest without warrant any person who the officer believes on reasonable grounds has committed an offence under this Act. 8.1 A protection officer may, in the manner and to the extent prescribed by the regulations, use force that is intended or is likely to disable a foreign fishing vessel, if the protection officer (a) is proceeding lawfully to arrest the master or other person in command of the vessel; and (b) believes on reasonable grounds that the force is necessary for the purpose of arresting that master or other person. 9. A protection officer who believes on reasonable grounds that an offence under this Act has been committed may seize (a) any fishing vessel by means of or in relation to which the officer believes on reasonable grounds the offence was committed; (b) any goods aboard a fishing vessel described in paragraph (a), including fish, tackle, rigging, apparel, furniture, stores and cargo; or (c) any fishing vessel described in paragraph (a) and any of the goods described in paragraph (b). 10. Subject to section 11, any fishing vessel and goods seized pursuant to section 9 shall be retained in the custody of the protection officer who made the seizure or delivered into the custody of such person as the Minister may direct. 11. Where fish or any other perishable articles are seized pursuant to section 9, the protection officer or other person having the custody thereof may sell them, and the proceeds of the sale shall be paid to the Receiver General or deposited in a bank to the credit of the Receiver General. 12. Any fishing vessel or goods seized pursuant to section 9 or the proceeds realized from a sale pursuant to section 11 shall be returned or paid to the person from whom the fishing vessel or goods were seized if the Minister decides not to institute a prosecution in respect of an offence under this Act, and in any event shall be so returned or paid on the expiration of three months after the day of seizure unless before that time proceedings in respect of the offence are instituted. 13. Where a fishing vessel or goods have been seized pursuant to section 9 and proceedings in respect of an offence under this Act have been instituted, the court or judge may, with the consent of the protection officer who made the seizure, order redelivery thereof to the person from whom the fishing vessel or goods were seized on security by bond, with two sureties, in an amount and form satisfactory to the Minister, being given to Her Majesty. 14. When a person or a fishing vessel is convicted of an offence under this Act, the convicting court or judge may, in addition to any other punishment imposed, order that 1088

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(a) any fishing vessel seized pursuant to section 9 by means of or in relation to which the offence was committed, (b) any goods aboard a fishing vessel described in paragraph (a), including fish, tackle, rigging, apparel, furniture, stores and cargo, or, if any of the goods have been sold pursuant to section 11, the proceeds thereof, or (c) any fishing vessel described in paragraph (a) and any of the goods described in paragraph (b), or the proceeds thereof, be forfeited, and on the making of the order the fishing vessel, goods or proceeds so ordered to be forfeited are forfeited to Her Majesty in right of Canada. 15. Where proceedings in respect of an offence under this Act have been instituted and a fishing vessel or goods are at the final conclusion of the proceedings ordered to be forfeited, they may be disposed of as the Minister directs. 16. (1) Where a fishing vessel or goods have been seized pursuant to section 9 and proceedings in respect of an offence under this Act have been instituted, but the fishing vessel or goods or any proceeds realized from a sale pursuant to section 11 are not at the final conclusion of the proceedings ordered to be forfeited, they shall, subject to subsection (2), be returned or the proceeds shall be paid to the person from whom the fishing vessel or goods were seized. (2) Where the proceedings referred to in subsection (1) result in a conviction and a fine is imposed, the fishing vessel or goods may be detained until the fine is paid, the fishing vessel and the goods may be sold under execution in satisfaction of the fine or the proceeds realized from a sale of any of the goods pursuant to section 11 may be applied in payment of the fine. 16.1 Despite the geographic limitations referred to in section 7, any power conferred on a protection officer by or under this Act may be exercised by the officer (a) subject to section 16.2 and to any regulation made under subparagraph 6(e) (iii), in respect of a fishing vessel of a participating state found in an area of the sea designated under subparagraph 6(e)(ii); (b) subject to any regulation made under subparagraph 6(f)(iii), in respect of a fishing vessel of a state party to a treaty or an arrangement described in paragraph 6(f) when the vessel is found in an area of the sea designated under subparagraph 6(f)(ii); or (c) in respect of a fishing vessel without nationality found in an area of the sea designated under subparagraph 6(e)(ii) or (f)(ii). 16.2 (1) A protection officer may, in an area of the sea designated under subparagraph 6(e)(ii), board and inspect a fishing vessel of a participating state to ensure compliance with section 5.3 and any regulations made under subparagraph 6(e)(i). An officer who believes on reasonable grounds that the vessel has contravened section 5.3 may, with a warrant issued under section 7.1 or without a warrant in exigent circumstances, search the vessel and exercise the power under section 9 to seize evidence. (2) If the protection officer believes on reasonable grounds that the vessel has contravened section 5.3, the officer shall without delay inform the participating state. (3) In addition to the powers referred to in subsection (1), a protection officer may, with the consent of the participating state, exercise any powers referred to in section 16.1. The officer is deemed to have received the consent of the state if the state (a) has not responded within the period prescribed by regulation; or (b) has responded but is not fully investigating the alleged contravention. 1089

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Offences and Punishment 17. (1) Every person is guilty of an offence who (a) being master or in command of a fishing vessel, (i) enters Canadian fisheries waters contrary to this Act, or (ii) without legal excuse, the proof of which lies on that person, fails to bring to when required to do so by any protection officer or on signal of a government vessel; (b) being aboard a fishing vessel, refuses to answer any questions on oath put to that person by a protection officer; (c) after signal by a government vessel to bring to, throws overboard or staves or destroys any part of the vessel’s cargo, outfit or equipment; or (d) resists or wilfully obstructs any protection officer in the execution of the officer’s duty. (2) In subsection (1), “government vessel” also includes a vessel that belongs to or is in the service of, and “protection officer” also includes an enforcement official of, (a) a participating state if the vessel or official, as the case may be, is acting in the performance of their duties in relation to the Agreement; or (b) a state that is party to a treaty or arrangement described in paragraph 6(f) if the vessel or official, as the case may be, is acting in the performance of their duties in relation to the treaty or arrangement. 18. (1) Every person who contravenes paragraph 4(1)(a), subsection 4(2) or section 5.2 is guilty of an offence and liable (a) on conviction on indictment, to a fine not exceeding seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars; or (b) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding one hundred and fifty thousand dollars. (2) Every person who contravenes any of paragraphs 4(1)(b) to (e), section 5 or the regulations and every fishing vessel that contravenes any of sections 5.3 to 5.5 or the regulations is guilty of an offence and liable (a) on conviction on indictment, to a fine not exceeding five hundred thousand dollars; or (b) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding one hundred thousand dollars. (3) Every person who commits an offence under paragraph 17(a), (b) or (c) is liable (a) on conviction on indictment, to a fine not exceeding five hundred thousand dollars; or (b) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding one hundred thousand dollars. (4) Every person who commits an offence under paragraph 17(d) is liable (a) on conviction on indictment, to a fine not exceeding five hundred thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to both; or (b) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding one hundred thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to both. 18.01 (1) In a prosecution of a fishing vessel of a participating state or a state that is party to a treaty or arrangement described in paragraph 6(f) or of a fishing vessel without nationality for an offence under this Act, it is sufficient proof of the offence to establish that it was committed by a person on board the vessel, whether or not the person is identified or has been prosecuted for the offence. (2) A fishing vessel on which a summons is served must appear by counsel or agent. 1090

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(3) If a fishing vessel does not appear, the court may, on proof of service of the summons, proceed with the trial in the absence of the vessel. (4) For greater certainty, subsection (3) applies in respect of a trial on an indictment. 18.02 The amount of the fine imposed on a fishing vessel of a participating state or a state that is party to a treaty or arrangement described in paragraph 6(f) or on a fishing vessel without nationality that is convicted of an offence under this Act is a debt due to Her Majesty in right of Canada owed by the person who, at the time the offence was committed, was lawfully entitled to possession of the vessel, whether as owner or as charterer. Application of Criminal Law 18.1 An act or omission that would be an offence under an Act of Parliament if it occurred in Canada is deemed to have been committed in Canada if it occurs, in the course of enforcing this Act, (a) in the NAFO Regulatory Area on board or by means of a foreign fishing vessel on board or by means of which a contravention of section 5.2 has been committed; (a.1) in an area of the sea designated under subparagraph 6(e)(ii) on board or by means of a fishing vessel of a participating state or of a fishing vessel without nationality; (a.2) in an area of the sea designated under subparagraph 6(f)(ii) on board or by means of a fishing vessel of a state that is party to a treaty or arrangement referred to in that subparagraph or of a fishing vessel without nationality; or (b) in the course of continuing pursuit that commenced while a foreign fishing vessel was in Canadian fisheries waters or the NAFO Regulatory Area. 18.2 (1) Every power of arrest, entry, search or seizure or other power that could be exercised in Canada in respect of an act or omission referred to in section 18.1 in the circumstances referred to in that section may be exercised (a) on board the foreign fishing vessel; or (b) where pursuit has been commenced, at any place on the seas, other than a place that is in the territorial sea or internal waters of a state other than Canada. (2) A justice of the peace or judge in any territorial division in Canada has jurisdiction to authorize an arrest, entry, search or seizure or an investigation or other ancillary matter related to an offence referred to in section 18.1 in the same manner as if the offence had been committed in that territorial division. (3) If an act or omission that is an offence by virtue only of paragraph 18.1(a) or (b) is alleged to have been committed on board or by means of a vessel that is registered or licensed under the laws of a state other than Canada, the powers referred to in subsection (1) may not be exercised outside Canada with respect to that act or omission without the consent of the Attorney General of Canada. 18.3 A proceeding in respect of (a) an offence under this Act consisting of a contravention of section 5.2, or (b) an offence referred to in section 18.1 that is committed outside Canada may, whether or not the accused is in Canada, be commenced in any territorial division in Canada and the accused may be tried and 1091

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punished for that offence in the same manner as if the offence had been committed in that territorial division. 18.4 No proceeding in respect of (a) an offence under this Act consisting of a contravention of any of sections 5.2 to 5.5, (b) an offence referred to in section 18.1, or (c) an offence under paragraph 17(1)(d) consisting of resistance to or obstruction of a protection officer in the execution of the officer’s duty in relation to any of sections 5.2 to 5.5 may be commenced without the personal consent in writing of the Attorney General of Canada or the Deputy Attorney General, and such a proceeding may be conducted only by the Attorney General of Canada or counsel acting on his or her behalf. 18.5 All the provisions of this Act and the Criminal Code or the Fisheries Act and the Criminal Code relating to indictable offences that are applicable to or in respect of persons apply, in their application to indictable offences created by this Act or the Fisheries Act, to or in respect of fishing vessels, with such modifications as the circumstances require, and all the provisions of this Act and the Criminal Code or the Fisheries Act and the Criminal Code relating to summary conviction offences that are applicable to or in respect of persons apply, in their application to all other offences created by this Act or the Fisheries Act, to or in respect of fishing vessels, with such modifications as the circumstances require. Jurisdiction of Courts 19. All courts, justices of the peace and provincial court judges in Canada have the same jurisdiction with respect to offences under this Act as they have under sections 257 and 258 of the Canada Shipping Act, 2001 with respect to offences under that Act, and those sections apply to offences under this Act in the same manner and to the same extent as they apply to offences under the Canada Shipping Act, 2001.

Document 217 Council of the European Communities, Note Verbale to Canada ­concerning the Coastal Fisheries Protection Law adopted on 12 May 1994 (10 June 1994)* The European Community and its Member States present their compliments to the Department of Foreign Affairs and, with reference to the Canadian Law amending the coastal fisheries protection law adopted on 12 May 1994 and the regulation implementing the latter, have the honour to inform it of the following.

*  Draft Minutes of the 1766th Council meeting (FISHERIES) held in Luxembourg on Friday 10 June 1994. Annex G to Document No. 7698/94, which was kindly provided by the European Commission, DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries. The document is on file with the editor.

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The European Community and its Member States refer to the letter sent by two Members of the Commission dated 20 May 1994 and, as already emphasized in that letter, consider that this law and the regulation implementing it, conferring as they do on the Canadian authorities powers of intervention with regard to foreign vessels carrying out fishing activities on the high seas, constitute a unilateral act which is totally unacceptable. The European Community and its Member States consider that this Law and its implementation are not only contrary to international law, but also run counter to the efforts made by the international community to improve the management of fisheries resources, particularly on the high seas. In the light of international law, and more particularly of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Canadian Law of 12 May 1994 and the regulation implementing the latter pose grave problems from several viewpoints. The European Community and its Member States reject the spirit and the provisions of the Law in question and of the regulation implementing it. They consider, in accordance with Article 89 of the United Nations Convention, that no State may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty. They regret the initiative recently taken by Canada all the more since it runs counter to the efforts made by the international community to improve the management of fisheries resources on the high seas, in particular. The Canadian Law of 12 May 1994 and the regulation implementing it could jeopardize the entry into force of the Agreement, adopted in November 1993 by the Conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization, designed to promote compliance by fishing vessels on the high seas with international conservation and management measures. The Law and the regulation implementing it also seem likely to compromise the smooth progress of the proceedings of the United Nations Conference on straddling stocks and highly migratory species. Furthermore, the European Community and its Member States consider that it is not for Canada to determine unilaterally a list of stocks to be considered as being straddling. The European Community and its Member States would remind Canada that considerable results have been achieved in the framework of NAFO further to approaches made by the members of that organization, including the European Community, to ensure that vessels flying the flags of States which are not members of that organization comply with conservation and management measures. The Canadian Law of 12 May 1994 and the regulation implementing it run counter to the very interests of NAFO insofar as they weaken them. Finally, the new Canadian fisheries law and the regulation implementing it are in contradiction with both the relevant instruments of international law and the action taken multilaterally, to both of which Canada has, nonetheless, made an important contribution. Given their attachment to international law and international cooperation, the European Community and its Member States can only reject the implications of this Canadian Law and the regulation implementing it. They consider that the latter constitute a precedent

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that is all the more regrettable as it comes on the eve of the entry into force of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The European Community and its Member States take this opportunity to renew to the Department of Foreign Affairs the assurance of their highest consideration.

Document 218 Diplomatic Note from the US Embassy in Ottawa to the Government of Canada in response to Canada on Custodial Fisheries Enforcement/Jurisdiction [extracts only] (1994)* […] unilateral steps of this sort by coastal states, contemplated by the legislative and regulatory amendments in question, exceed the fair balance of interests reflected in the relevant provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea which, in the view of most members of the international community, including Canada and the United States, reflects customary international law. The convention does not provide for coastal states to board, inspect or arrest foreign flag vessels on the high seas, or to prosecute such vessels for fishing operations conducted on the high seas, absent the consent of the flag state. […] The Government of the United States believes that unilateral action in violation of international law of the sort threatened by Canada encourages unilateral action by other states in violation of international law, with attendant damage to the integrity of the law of the sea […]

*  Reprinted from WV Dunlap, ‘Canada Asserts Jurisdiction over High Seas Fisheries’ (1994) IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin July 63, 65.

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International Instruments General Marine Environment Document 219 Arctic Council, Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (14 June 1991)* Preface In September 1989, on the initiative of the government of Finland, officials from the eight Arctic countries met in Rovaniemi, Finland to discuss cooperative measures to protect the Arctic environment. They agreed to work towards a meeting of circumpolar Ministers responsible for Arctic environmental issues. The September 1989 meeting was followed by preparatory meetings in Yellowknife, Canada in April 1990; Kiruna, Sweden in January 1991; and, Rovaniemi, Finland in June 1991. In addition to the numerous technical and scientific reports prepared under this initiative, the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy was developed. This Strategy represents the culmination of the cooperative efforts of the eight Arctic countries: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United States of America. The eight Arctic countries were assisted in the preparation of the Strategy by the following observers: Inuit Circumpolar Conference, Nordic Saami Council, USSR Association of Small Peoples of the North, Federal Republic of Germany, Poland, United Kingdom, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, United Nations Environment Program, International Arctic Science Committee. We commit ourselves to a joint Action Plan of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy which includes: –– Cooperation in scientific research to specify sources, pathways, sinks and effects of pollution, in particular, oil, acidification, persistent organic contaminants, radioactivity, noise and heavy metals as well as sharing of these data; –– Assessment of potential environmental impacts of development activities; –– Full implementation and consideration of further measures to control pollutants and reduce their adverse effects to the Arctic environment. We intend to assess on a continuing basis the threats to the Arctic environment through the preparation and updating of reports on the state of the Arctic environment, in order to propose further cooperative action. We also commit ourselves to implement the following measures of the Strategy: –– Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP) to monitor the levels of, and assess the effects of, anthropogenic pollutants in all components of the Arctic environment. To this end, an Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Task Force will be established. Norway will provide for an AMAP secretariat.

* 

Done at Rovaniemi, 14 June 1991; (1991) 30 ILM 1627. 1097

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Protection of the Marine Environment in the Arctic, to take preventive and other measures directly or through competent international organizations regarding marine pollution in the Arctic irrespective of origin;

DECLARATION ON THE PROTECTION OF THE ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT We, the Representatives of the Governments of Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America; Meeting at Rovaniemi, Finland for the First Ministerial Conference on the Protection of the Arctic Environment; Deeply concerned with threats to the Arctic environment and the impact of pollution on fragile Arctic ecosystems; Acknowledging the growing national and international appreciation of the importance of Arctic ecosystems and an increasing knowledge of global pollution and resulting environmental threats; Resolving to pursue together in other international environmental fora those issues affecting the Arctic environment which require broad international cooperation; Emphasizing our responsibility to protect and preserve the Arctic environment and recognizing the special relationship of the indigenous peoples and local populations to the Arctic and their unique contribution to the protection of the Arctic Environment; Hereby adopt the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy and commit ourselves to take steps towards its implementation and consider its further elaboration. –– Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response in the Arctic, to provide a framework for future cooperation in responding to the threat of environmental emergencies. –– Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna, to facilitate the exchange of information and coordination of research on species and habitats of flora and fauna; We agree to hold regular meetings to assess the progress made and to coordinate actions which will implement and further develop the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy. We agree to continue to promote cooperation with the Arctic indigenous peoples and to invite their organizations to future meetings as observers. We agree to meet in 1993 and accept the kind invitation of the Government of Denmark and the Home Rule Government of Greenland to hold the next meeting in Greenland. Wherefore, we, the undersigned Representatives of our respective Governments, recognizing its political significance and environmental importance, and intending to promote its results, have signed this Declaration. 1. Introduction There is a growing national and international appreciation of the importance of Arctic ecosystems and an increasing knowledge of global pollution and resulting environmental threats. The Arctic is highly sensitive to pollution and much of its human population and culture is directly dependent on the health of the region’s ecosystems. Limited sunlight, ice cover that inhibits energy penetration, low mean and extreme temperatures, low species diversity and biological productivity and long-lived organisms with high lipid levels all contribute to the sensitivity of the Arctic ecosystem and cause it to be easily damaged. This vulnerability of the Arctic to pollution requires that action be taken now, or degradation may become irreversible. 1098

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The governments of the Arctic countries have become increasingly aware of the need for, and their responsibility to combat these threats to the Arctic ecosystem. On the initiative of Finland, the eight Arctic countries of USSR, USA, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Finland, Denmark and Canada have met to prepare a strategy to protect the Arctic environment. The Arctic countries realize that the pollution problems of today do not respect national boundaries and that no state alone will be able to act effectively against environmental threats to the Arctic. They have also been moved by the international call for action expressed by the World Commission on Environment and Development as well as the concerns of the indigenous peoples living in the Arctic region. The Arctic countries with the participation of Arctic indigenous peoples have prepared this environmental protection Strategy. The strategy builds on the initiatives already taken nationally and by indigenous peoples to protect the Arctic environment. It is recognized that this Strategy, and its implementation, must incorporate the knowledge and culture of indigenous peoples. It is understood that the cultures and the continued existence of the indigenous peoples have been built on the sound stewardship of nature and its resources. The use of natural resources is an important activity of Arctic nations. Therefore, this Strategy should allow for sustainable economic development in the north so that such development does not have unacceptable ecological or cultural impacts. The Strategy must also rely on the best scientific and technological advice that countries are able to produce and share. Arctic ecosystems are influenced and in some cases threatened by factors occurring also outside the Arctic. In turn, the Arctic also exerts an important influence on the global environment. The implementation of an Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy will therefore benefit both the Arctic countries and the world at large. The Strategy is also designed to guide development in a way that will safeguard the Arctic environment for future generations and in a manner that is compatible with nature. The Arctic countries are committed to international cooperation to ensure the protection of the Arctic environment and its sustainable and equitable development, while protecting the cultures of indigenous peoples. Only through careful stewardship by Arctic countries and Arctic peoples can environmental damage and degradation be prevented. These are the challenges which must be taken up in order to secure our common future. The Strategy is comprised of a number of component parts, beginning with a statement of objectives. These objectives establish the broad direction in which the eight Arctic countries are intending to move. The objectives are accompanied by statements of principle which are designed to guide the actions of Arctic countries individually and collectively, as they move toward achievement of the objectives. The Strategy also describes the problems and priorities which the eight Arctic countries agree need to be addressed at this time. Tools, whether legal, scientific or administrative, are also reviewed in order to define appropriate mechanisms for implementation of the Strategy. This is particularly relevant to that section of the Strategy which defines the specific actions that the eight countries will undertake jointly or individually to deal with priority issues and pollution problems. The implementation of the Strategy will be carried out through national legislation and in accordance with international law, including customary international law as reflected in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

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Finally, the Strategy outlines plans for future cooperation towards the implementation of the Strategy. 2.  Objectives and Principles 2.1 Objectives The objectives of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy are: i) To protect the Arctic ecosystem including humans; ii) To provide for the protection, enhancement and restoration of environmental quality and the sustainable utilization of natural resources, including their use by local populations and indigenous peoples in the Arctic; iii) To recognize and, to the extent possible, seek to accommodate the traditional and cultural needs, values and practices of the indigenous peoples as determined by themselves, related to the protection of the Arctic environment; iv) To review regularly the state of the Arctic environment v) To identify, reduce, and, as a final goal, eliminate pollution. 2.2 Principles The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy and its implementation by the eight Arctic countries will be guided by the following principles: i) Management, planning and development activities shall provide for the conservation, sustainable utilization and protection of Arctic ecosystems and natural resources for the benefit and enjoyment of present and future generations, including indigenous peoples; ii) Use and management of natural resources shall be based on an approach which considers the value and interdependent nature of ecosystem components; iii) Management, planning and development activities which may significantly affect the Arctic ecosystems shall: a) be based on informed assessments of their possible impacts on the Arctic environment, including cumulative impacts; b) provide for the maintenance of the regions’s ecological, systems and ­biodiversity; c) respect the Arctic’s significance for and influence on the global climate; d) be compatible with the sustainable utilization of Arctic ecosystems; e) take into account the results of scientific investigations and the traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples; vi) Information and knowledge concerning Arctic ecosystems and resource use will be developed and shared to support planning and should precede, accompany and follow development activities; vii) Consideration of the health, social, economic and cultural needs and values of indigenous peoples shall be incorporated into management, planning and development activities; viii) Development of a network of protected areas shall be encouraged and promoted with due regard for the needs of indigenous peoples; ix) International cooperation to protect the Arctic environment shall be supported and promoted.

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x) Mutual cooperation in fulfilling national and international responsibilities in the Arctic consistent with this Strategy, including the use, transfer and/or trade, of the most effective and appropriate technology to protect the environment, shall be promoted and developed. 3.  Problems and Priorities At the first meeting in 1989 of the eight Arctic countries there was early recognition that many of the environmental problems that individual nations had been addressing were in fact shared amongst the eight. To begin with, six specific pollution issues were identified as requiring attention. These issues were associated with persistent organic contaminants, oil, heavy metals, noise, radioactivity, and acidification. State of the Environment Reports were prepared on each of these topics and have been published separately. It was also agreed that these will be updated as necessary. It was recognized that the ability to completely understand these issues was restricted by the lack of a comprehensive scientific data base and coordinated monitoring program on the state of Arctic ecosystems. Furthermore, the potential impact of these specific pollutants on Arctic flora and fauna underlined the need to consider establishing a mechanism to facilitate a cooperative approach to their conservation. Other environ­ mental problems including the depletion of the ozone layer and global warming were not addressed because they were already being considered in other fora. It was also determined that since the Arctic environment is particularly vulnerable to accidental discharges and uncontrolled releases of pollutants, enhanced mechanisms to address environmental emergencies in the Arctic were needed. 3.1  Persistent Organic Contaminants The use and production of persistent organic contaminants (e.g. polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), DDT, hexachlorocyclohexane (HCH)), chlordane and toxaphene has been stopped or restricted in some countries, however, many are still widely manufactured and used on a global basis. They are hazardous environmental contaminants due to their high stability and persistence in the environment, potential for bioaccumulation and high chronic toxicity, and the large quantities which have been released into the environment. Although there are no major sources of these contaminants in the Arctic, they, nevertheless, reach the Arctic environment via long-range transport by rivers, the atmosphere and ocean currents from more industrialized centres, particularly Asia, Europe and North America. Due to the highly lipophilic nature of most chlorinated organic contaminants, they become concentrated in the fatty tissues of species in the Arctic food chain. The highest levels of contaminants are therefore detected in the blubber and fat tissue of animals at the top of the food chain (e.g. polar bears, whales and seals). This is of particular concern in the Arctic because of the high level of consumption of lipid-rich wildlife foods by residents, resulting in a pathway of these contaminants to humans. The presence of chlorinated organic contaminants has been reported in human populations throughout the world. The level of PCBs in breast milk samples collected from Inuit women in northern Quebec, was approximately five times higher than that of Caucasian women living in southern Quebec, Canada. The variable and generally sparse database on chlorinated organic contaminants in the Arctic prohibits for the most part, the determination of any spatial or temporal trends. 1101

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In Canadian studies, chlordane compound residue levels in polar bear fat have been reported to be four times higher in 1984 than in 1969, while levels of DDT did not change and other chlorinated contaminants measures were twice as high. Concentrations of chlorinated organic contaminants in the Arctic ecosystem are generally lower than in heavily polluted areas such as the Great Lakes, or the Baltic Sea. There are, however, some exceptions—the more volatile compounds (e.g. HCB, toxaphene) are often detected in the Arctic at concentrations similar to those in source regions. Little is known about the potential effects of chlorinated organic contaminants on the ecosystem. However, there is evidence that a broad spectrum of contaminants is reaching the Arctic and there is sufficient toxicological data as well as field data to make reasonable extrapolations with regard to ecosystem consequences in the Arctic. Chronic effects of chlorinated organic contamination observed in other regions (e.g. reproductive failure, bill and foot abnormalities, cancer) are of the most significance. The lower concentrations detected in the Arctic do not diminish the potential significance of their effects on ecosystem health. 3.2  Oil Pollution The Arctic is one of the areas most vulnerable to adverse impacts from chronic and acute oil pollution. This is due to physical environmental conditions such as low temperature, periods with little or no light, ice cover etc. Low temperatures lead to reduced evaporation of the more volatile, toxic oil components. Dark, cold winters in the Arctic lead to reduced ultraviolet radiation and biological decomposition of oil. In areas of drift ice, oil dispersal caused by wave action is also reduced. Oil in iced areas will be trapped between ice floes or under the ice, and only partly transported to the ice surface. These factors result in a generally slower decomposition of oil in the Arctic than in temperate regions. The period in which a particular oil spill can be harmful to wildlife is thus comparatively longer in the Arctic. The marginal ice zone is particularly vulnerable to oil pollution. A large part of the primary production in the Arctic, is found in this zone, which makes it extremely important for the whole Arctic ecosystem. Although there is no evidence that an oil spill reduces primary productivity to a significant degree, direct effects on marine life can be devastating, especially in the marginal ice zones. Feathers and fur contaminated by oil quickly lose their insulating properties, and the oil will often cause skin inflammation. Both will lead to a negative energy balance of the affected animal. Ingested oil, in particular unweathered oil with a high content of volatile substances, can cause serious intoxication of birds and mammals. No studies indicate that any of these species tend to avoid oil spills. The amount of information available on oil spills in the Arctic, and probably the accuracy of the estimated quantities, varies considerably. Information on continuous discharges is scarce, and estimates of indirect oil transport (atmosphere, ocean currents, and rivers) have not been available. Order of magnitude calculations show that river transport is the main contribution of oil pollution to the Arctic (estimated at 200,000 metric tons per annum). The highest risk of oil spills is connected with transportation activities and production of oil as well as to a lesser degree, exploration activities. Their occurrence will depend on the level of activity in the Arctic, the technical standards of the activity and the preventative measures taken. 1102

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The physical constraints caused by Arctic conditions imply particular technological challenges regarding oil spill clean up. Effective methods and techniques for containing and cleaning up oil spills from water and ice are currently limited. The available information on ambient oil pollution in the Arctic is scarce. More information is needed, obtained with standardized methodologies in order to have comparable data for the whole region, with special emphasis on fluvial inputs and concentrations in surface marine waters. 3.3  Heavy Metals Levels of heavy metals have been found in the air, precipitation, ocean waters, soils, rivers, lakes and bottom sediments of the Arctic as well as in marine, freshwater and terrestrial biota. These levels occur as a result of natural phenomena as well as from regional sources and global transport. Heavy metal concentrations in air and precipitation are mainly due to long-range atmospheric transport from industrial centers resulting in a deposition of heavy metals on vegetation, snow, and the sea which generally decreases from south to north. To a lesser extent discharges from local mining operations and the methylation of inorganic mercury often associated with large scale impoundments of water in previously vegetated areas (i.e. hydroelectric developments), also account for elevated heavy metal concentrations. Canadian and Finnish studies indicate methyl mercury levels in fish rise measurably after the flooding of new reservoirs, depending upon the amount of organic material present. The temporal trends of long-range heavy metal pollution of the Arctic particularly mercury, cadmium, lead, arsenic and nickel have been determined by analyzing ice cores from glaciers. There has been an increasing trend since the middle of the 19th century and a sharp increase in the 20th century. Recent analyses of vegetation seem to indicate that a decrease may now be occurring. The concentrations of heavy metals in lakes and rivers are generally higher than in Arctic sea water. A decrease in pH caused by acid precipitation increases the dissolution rates of heavy metals which may increase the rate of accumulation in the biota. In the Arctic marine environment the concentrations of heavy metals in water are low compared to more southerly latitudes. However, the concentrations in biota increase in the food chain, and in the top level predators such as seals and whales the concentrations, especially of cadmium, increase to levels much higher than observed in other areas. For example, in some Canadian studies, cadmium levels in narwhal kidney were among the highest ever reported in marine mammals. This build-up is probably due to naturally occurring phenomena, but such occurrences make increases in the concentrations of heavy metals in the Arctic marine environment as a result of industrial sources more problematic than elsewhere. The high concentrations of heavy metals in marine mammals and some bird species constitute a problem in districts where tissues from such animals constitute a significant part of the diet. Thus increased concentrations of mercury have been found in Greenlanders from hunting districts. Elevated levels of mercury have also been found in the Native populations of Northern Quebec, Canada. 3.4 Noise The waters of the Arctic region are a unique noise environment mainly due to the presence of ice. The ambient noise is strongly influenced by the dynamic processes of ice formation, melt, deformation and movement. This situation is different from ice 1103

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free waters. In periods where ice cracking and wind noise are absent, areas covered by shore-fast ice are among the quietest underwater environments. Human activities create noise types and levels, which may disturb marine mammals, or mask the “natural” sounds of importance to those mammals. Some types of noise may affect fish as well as marine mammals. There are a number of serious gaps in our knowledge of the effects of underwater noise on marine mammals, including the inability to assess the effect of repeated noise exposure on stocks. There is considerable evidence that most types of disturbance do not cause mortality. However, some noisy activities, including low level overflights by aircraft, near seals and walrus at haul out sites can cause mortality through stampedes or abandonment. Many marine mammals seem able to adapt to or at least tolerate many types of disturbances or increased noise levels. However the scarcity of direct evidence of serious consequences from disturbances does not necessarily mean that marine mammals are not stressed or affected in some other way. Noise from human activities may cause short-term or long-term behavioral reactions and temporary displacement of various marine mammals. The biological significance of most of these reactions is unknown. Moving sound sources, notably boats and aircraft, seem to be more disturbing than stationary sources, e.g. dredges and drill ships. The effects on fish and wildlife of cumulative exposure to noise are largely unknown. 3.5 Radioactivity There have been two major causes of radioactive contamination affecting the Arctic region: atmospheric nuclear-weapons testing during the 1950s and 1960s and the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in 1986. Of greatest concern are the longlived radionuclides, including Strontium-90 (29 year half-life) and Cesium-137 (30 year half-life). Studies have shown that these fallout derived radionuclides are efficiently retained by surface vegetation, especially lichen, in this nutrient-poor environment and are biologically recycled in Arctic ecosystems. As a result, those indigenous peoples and local populations consuming as their main food caribou or reindeer meat with elevated levels of radio-cesium, may have accumulated higher levels. Other radioactive threats to the environment exist, e.g. accidental discharges which are of a biological significance associated with nuclear power sources and transport, storage and disposal of radioactive waste. When considering the total radiation dose, attention should be given to the radiation from man-made sources and to natural radiation. A number of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including those with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), address issues related to exchange of information, early notification of radiation release, emergency preparedness and response to nuclear accidents and transboundary movement of radioactive materials. 3.6 Acidification The most important acidifying substances are sulphur and nitrogen compounds emitted mainly by vehicles, industrial activities and coal and oil based power plants. Long-range transport is the most important factor influencing the air quality in the Arctic, especially in winter. The sulphur and nitrogen emission from industrial activities in the Arctic is also a considerable factor. Until now, little emphasis has been placed on the effects of 1104

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acid deposition on Arctic ecosystems. Furthermore, knowledge derived from studies in temperate zones is not directly relevant to the Arctic. One of the most well known examples of a problem associated with acidity in the Arctic is the Arctic haze phenomenon produced from acid pollutant aerosols. Arctic haze has been under intense study and much is known about its nature, distribution and composition. Acidification is evolving into a prominent environmental problem around certain northern industrial centers. In northern FennoScandia, in the northwestern parts of the Soviet Union and in the eastern parts of Canada, natural factors increase the sensitivity to acidification and anthropogenic impacts have extended through the whole area. The interaction between acidic deposition and the soils of different ecosystems is an important component of the acidification process. A continuous excessive acid load leads to the mobilization of aluminium and heavy metals. The combined effects of acid deposition and the stresses already induced by the harsh climate increase the possibility of vegetation damage in the Arctic. Critical loads, rates of acidification, and conditions influencing cold climate environments need more detailed regional monitoring and research. In general, northern ecosystems are under greater stress than temperate ecosystems. 4.  International Mechanisms for the Protection of the Arctic Environment Before determining the specific actions required to protect the Arctic environment, a review of existing and proposed international and bilateral agreements and policy declarations pertaining to the Arctic environment has been completed. This review has revealed the existence of a number of mechanisms that may be employed to protect the Arctic environment, and provides a useful tool for the implementation of the Strategy. The List of Major International Instruments and Policy Declarations Pertaining to the Arctic Environment has been distributed and will be periodically updated. Through the more specific studies of the six priority areas, some important gaps have been identified. 4.1  Persistent Organic Contaminants International legal instruments which currently control air pollution are not specifically directed at limiting the emission of persistent organic contaminants and related contaminants. Work is underway within the UN ECE Convention on Long-Range Trans­ boundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) to review the problem and identify specific control actions. Any new international legal instrument would need to target contaminant reductions in the industrialized areas of Asia, Europe and North America. Consequently, proper management and protection of the Arctic ecosystem from the effects of these contaminants will require cooperation through effective bilateral and multilateral agreements among both circumpolar and non-circumpolar nations. 4.2  Oil Pollution The main international instruments relevant inter alia to oil pollution in the Arctic are: i) the 1969 international Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC Convention); ii) the 1969 International Convention relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties (Convention on Intervention);

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iii) the 1971 international Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (Fund Convention); iv) the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (London Dumping Convention); v) the 1974 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution—from Land-Based Sources (Paris Convention); vi) the International Convention for the Prevention Of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 1973/78); and vii) the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (not yet in force); viii) the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation, 1990 (not yet in force). Certain issues with respect to oil pollution in the Arctic are insufficiently covered by the existing international agreements and conventions. For example, some instruments are limited in their application and only partially apply to the Arctic region. There is a need to consider the possibility of extending the geographic scope of these instruments. The provisions of the various instruments also need to be further assessed to determine their adequacy under Arctic conditions taking into account the particularly vulnerable nature of the region. Strict standards in the transportation of oil in the Arctic are needed. Such standards should be developed under the framework of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Arctic countries should consider becoming parties to or applying the relevant principles of the various existing conventions and agreements on oil pollution management. 4.3  Heavy Metals There are few multilateral conventions and bilateral agreements which deal with heavy metal inputs in the environment. The UN ECE LRTAP Convention is one of the major international conventions which limits harmful atmospheric emissions. Work is currently underway within this forum to identify and decide upon specific control actions to deal with heavy metals. Control of discharges of heavy metals to the marine environment are governed by both the 1972 Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft (Oslo Convention) and the 1974 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-based Sources (Paris Convention). The UNCLOS provides opportunities for controlling the discharge of harmful substances e.g. heavy metals. There are only a few bilateral arrangements between the Arctic countries controlling these substances. 4.4 Noise Existing legal instruments do not address the effects of noise on the Arctic ecosystem. There may be a need for Arctic countries to agree on the adoption of procedures to ensure that in the planning and conduct of activities in the Arctic, measures are taken to facilitate the adequate monitoring of the potential disturbance from noise including the verification of predicted effects and the identification of any unforeseen effects. Such evaluations should ensure that environmental protection measures are given due consideration. 1106

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4.5 Radioactivity The 1986 international Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, provides an adequate mechanism for cooperation and exchange of information applicable in the Arctic region. In addition, there are a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements in existence which provide for such events as the early notification of accidental radioactive discharges (e.g. between Finland and other Nordic countries, Finland and the USSR, 1987). With respect to emergency preparedness and assistance, the IAEA Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency was established to facilitate prompt international assistance when requested in the event of a nuclear accident. Additionally, a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements have been concluded between the Arctic countries that both supplement and provide greater precision to the IAEA arrangements. These should be examined to ensure that the specific environmental conditions of the Arctic are addressed. Furthermore, consideration should be given to practical mechanisms between national authorities to implement the coordination of emergency measures within the existing international legal framework of the IAEA. 4.6 Acidification The Arctic is exposed to the long range transport of acidifying substances from various sources. A number of control measures have been introduced at the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) and bilaterally. Although, in general, these measures do not contain provisions relating specifically to the Arctic region, they do refer to emission sources that affect the Arctic. Arctic acidification is a complex phenomenon resulting from a wide range of different types of activities also conducted outside the Arctic itself. The extent of acidification in the Arctic is still uncertain, although there is recognition of problems such as Arctic haze and forest devastation and other large-scale acidification effects and regional damage in certain Arctic areas. There is however, insufficient knowledge of the critical loads, to allow for agreement on common standards. The lack of comparable data also presents problems. Consequently, improved monitoring and research directed at the rate and nature of acidification processes under Arctic conditions are needed. Under both the 1985 and 1988 protocols to the UN ECE LRTAP Convention for the Reduction of Sulphur and Nitrogen Oxide Emissions or their Transboundary Fluxes, the Cooperative Program for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-Range Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe (EMEP) is to report annually to the LRTAP Executive Body its calculations of budgets, transboundary fluxes and deposition of sulphur and nitrogen oxides. EMEPs geographical scope is currently limited to Europe but it is suggested that EMEP might be utilized for collecting data on Arctic acidification in cooperation with the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP). Arctic countries should consider becoming parties to all the relevant agreements in this field. This is particularly relevant for those countries in the northern hemisphere where there are major sources of sulphur and nitrogen emissions. 5. Actions The eight Arctic countries agree to proceed cooperatively with the following action plan. These commitments will begin the process of addressing the serious environmental issues 1107

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identified and assessed through the preparation of specific state of environment reports. These issues will require regular updates for evaluation by the eight Arctic countries on the progress being made, and to advise on possible new courses of action. 5.1  Persistent Organic Contaminants i) In order to further define the likely sources, pathways, sinks and effects of these pollutants, and to expand the data base to cover all the component parts of the Arctic environment, the eight Arctic countries will undertake cooperative monitoring (AMAP) and research related to the problem of persistent organic contaminants in the Arctic ecosystem. ii) The Arctic countries will consider the feasibility of developing national inventories on the production, use, and emissions of persistent organic contaminants (e.g. pesticides) to be collected, and made available and summarized in the state of the Arctic environment reports. iii) The Arctic countries will also address the problem of persistent organic contaminants under existing or proposed international agreements and will review other mechanisms to advance this issue in other international fora. iv) In order to achieve an early reduction in the movement of persistent organic contaminants into the Arctic environment, the eight Arctic countries will support the process now under way within the UN ECE LRTAP Convention to further define the problem and to develop proposals for international action on the control of these substances under the Convention. Those Arctic countries which are partners to the Paris and Helsinki Conventions will actively support ongoing inventory and assessment work under those conventions. v) The Arctic countries agree to implement measures to reduce and/or control the use of the following polluting substances: chlordane, DDT, toxaphene and PCBs. Those Arctic countries which have not already done so, also recognize that the elimination of the problem of persistent organic contaminants in the Arctic may also require controls on the production of these substances. vi) The Arctic countries will review the situation with regard to other persistent organic contaminants with a view to establishing priorities and timetables for a program of emission elimination or control in cooperation with other international fora. 5.2  Oil Pollution i) In order to achieve better documentation of the level of oil pollution in the Arctic environment, the initiation of monitoring of hydrocarbons as a part of the AMAP, will play an important role. ii) There is also a need to consider establishment of a reporting system on discharges and spills, with regard to provide adequate documentation on the pollution threat, in the Arctic. iii) The elements agreed upon in Section 8, Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment and Section 9, Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response will comprise the basis for further cooperation in preventing and combatting oil pollution. iv) The Arctic countries agree to take measures as soon as possible to adhere to the strictest relevant international standards within the conventions, to which the countries are parties, regarding discharges irrespective of origin.

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v) The Arctic countries agree to undertake joint actions in relevant international fora to further strengthen recognition of the particularly sensitive character of ice-covered parts of the Arctic Ocean. 5.3  Heavy Metals i) An improved understanding of the dynamics of heavy metals in the Arctic ecosystem is required. The countries will undertake a program of coordinated monitoring (AMAP) and research to identify sources, pathways and sinks of heavy metals; spatial and temporal trends; and, ecological effects with special emphasis on human health effects. ii) The eight Arctic countries agree to implement measures to control conditions that lead to the release of heavy metals by industrial activities including as appropriate the implementation of best available technology and other concerted actions in accordance with appropriate international agreements (e.g. UN ECE LRTAP Convention). 5.4 Noise i) The effects of noise associated with Arctic marine and terrestrial projects should be evaluated as part of the project planning and approval processes, and if significant adverse noise effects on the specific components of Arctic ecosystems are predicted, then measures should be implemented to avoid or mitigate the impact. ii) Efforts should be made to improve the knowledge on marine mammal auditory function, communication and behavior and the current noise exposure assessment techniques. For specific project evaluations, site-specific data should be addressed before and during the evaluation. This includes determining how much exposure migrating stocks are encountering throughout the year. 5.5 Radioactivity i) AMAP should address radioactivity. Common standards and techniques for monitoring and analysis, consistent with IAEA standards and technology should be developed. ii) Future monitoring and health assessments should consider the effects from exposure to radiation from man-made sources together with natural or background radiation. iii) Further consideration should be given to the development of more specific measures, consistent within the international legal framework of IAE procedures, for cooperation amongst Arctic countries to deal with emergencies caused by the accidental release of radioactive substances and to provide mutual assistance in the harsh Arctic environment. iv) All relevant data concerning previous studies and measurements should be collated in the existing relevant data bases of which information should be exchanged between the governments and institutions concerned. 5.6 Acidification i) Regional Arctic research programs should be developed to assess the current loadings and potential effects of acid deposition on representative sensitive Arctic ecosystems. Special attention should be given to those regions or ecosystems for which existing data or assessments suggest that there is or is likely to be an acidification problem. ii) Consideration should be given to expanding deposition monitoring programs, within the framework of AMAP and existing networks such as the ECE/EMEP deposition 1109

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monitoring network, to encompass measurement of acid deposition in the Arctic. Emphasis should also be placed on measuring dry deposition. iii) Emphasis should be placed on defining critical loads and setting target loads for sensitive Arctic ecosystems. In the event that these target loads are being exceeded, steps should be taken to reduce those emissions contributing to the problem, in accordance with international agreements such as the ECE LRTAP Convention. Reduction of emissions of sulphur and nitrogen should be sought by, inter alia, implementing the use of the best available technology. 6.  Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program The eight Arctic countries recognize that the Arctic region represents one of the relatively pristine areas on earth. It is therefore of great importance to preserve and to protect the Arctic. Measurements in the Arctic indicate that pollutants originating from anthropogenic activities in the mid-latitudes are transported to the Arctic by atmospheric processes, ocean currents and rivers, and that pollutants are deposited and accumulated in the Arctic environment and its ecosystems. Exploitation of natural resources, and concomitant urban and industrial expansion within the Arctic region, also contribute to the degradation of the Arctic environment and affect the living conditions for the people of the region. Distinguishing human-induced changes from changes caused by natural phenomena in the Arctic will require monitoring of selected key indicators of the Arctic Environment. Therefore, the eight Arctic countries have agreed to promote development of an Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP) in order to understand and document these changes and so that the monitoring results may be used to anticipate adverse biological, chemical and physical changes to the ecosystem and to prevent, minimize and mitigate these adverse effects. The primary objective of the AMAP is the measurement of the levels of anthropogenic pollutants and the assessment of their effects in relevant component parts of the Arctic environment. The assessments should be presented in status reports to relevant fora as a basis for necessary steps to be taken to reduce the pollution. Two of the most significant threats to the present Arctic environment may come from climate change, induced by global warming, and the effects of stratospheric ozone depletion. Programs to detect and determine the causes and effects of climate change and ozone depletion are to a large extent being developed by other international groupings and in other fora. It is important for AMAP to be aware of these programs and to develop links with them from an Arctic perspective in order to encourage and facilitate an Arctic component in climate programs. Data obtained for assessing climate change will provide important inputs to the AMAP dataset. In turn, AMAP data will be relevant to climate change programs in the Arctic. The pollution data available from the Arctic region are with a few exceptions based on research programs performed within limited subject areas by national programs and not supported by bilateral or international cooperation. There is an urgent need for cooperation among local and regional efforts and global programs in order to obtain better documentation on the environmental situation in the Arctic especially with regard to long-range air and marine pollution. 1110

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From the outset, the AMAP should as far as possible be based on existing programs. The program should be initiated in a step by step fashion as indicated in the proposal for the AMAP. 6.1 Actions i) Distinguishing human-induced changes from changes caused by natural phenomena in the Arctic will require estimates and regular reporting by the Arctic countries of contaminant emissions and discharges, including accidental discharges, as well as transport and deposition. In addition monitoring of deposition and selected key indicators of the Arctic biological environment, are required. The eight Arctic countries should therefore agree to establish an Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP) to fulfill these monitoring objectives. ii) The AMAP should be implemented through the establishment of an Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Task Force and a small secretariat, established by the Government of Norway. iii) AMAP should as far as possible build upon existing programs. Thus, one of the important tasks of the AMAP will be to review and coordinate existing national programs, establish a data directory, and to develop these programs when appropriate in an international framework. iv) As an initial priority, the AMAP should focus on persistent organic contaminants and on selected heavy metals and radionuclides, and ultimately to monitor ecological indicators to provide a basis for assessments of the status of Arctic ecosystems. v) The eight Arctic countries will receive regular State of the Arctic Environment Reports summarizing the results of the AMAP. As a result of these actions, the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program will provide information for: i) integrated assessment reports on status and trends in the condition of Arctic ecosystem; ii) identifying possible causes for changing conditions; iii) detecting emerging problems, their possible causes, and the potential risk to Arctic ecosystems including indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents; and iv) recommending actions required to reduce risks to Arctic ecosystem. 7.  Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment The eight Arctic Countries recognize their particular interests and responsibilities as neighbouring countries in the Arctic, and emphasize the need to take preventive measures directly or through competent international organizations, consistent in particular with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea regarding marine pollution in the Arctic, irrespective of origin. To this end the Arctic countries agree to: i) Apply the principles concerning the protection and preservation of the Marine Environment as reflected in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and, in accordance with the continuing development of international environmental law, to further strengthen rules in order to protect the Arctic; ii) Take measures as soon as possible to adhere to the strictest relevant international standards within the conventions, to which the countries are parties, regarding discharges irrespective of origin; 1111

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iii) Undertake joint actions in relevant international fora to further strengthen recognition of the particularly sensitive character of ice-covered parts of the Arctic Ocean; iv) Review, in accordance with the general aims of this environmental Strategy, the relevance to the Arctic of international instruments connected with the protection of the marine environment, with the aim that all Arctic countries accede, where appropriate, to the instruments, or apply the principles and regulations embodied therein; v) Jointly support the appropriate initiatives of international organizations in developing mandatory standards in order to improve the protection against accidental pollution affecting the marine environment, and actively ensure application of such standards; vi) Carry out studies of pollution in the monitoring activities within AMAP. 8.  Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response At the same time as the Arctic is exhibiting signs of serious contamination from pollutants carried via long range transport from mid latitudes, there has been an increase in development activities and shipping within the Arctic. These activities can have serious environmental consequences in the Arctic as a result of accidents leading, inter alia, to spills and discharges of oil and other harmful substances. The vulnerability of the Arctic ecosystem to these sudden intrusions will be variable. Some limited mapping of areas sensitive to oil spills has been conducted but more remains to be done. The relative hazard/risk associated with different activities is also not well documented, nor is the geographic distribution of high risk activities. There are a number of bilateral, regional and global arrangements which presently exist to deal with accidental pollution, such as the 1983 Canada-Denmark Agreement for Cooperating relating to the Marine Environment, the 1971 Agreement between Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden on Cooperation on Oil Pollution and the 1990 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation. There are other multilateral conventions related to nuclear accidents or radiological emergencies supplemented by bilateral agreements on the exchange of information and reporting relative to nuclear plants and events. The UN ECE has started work on an international convention, on the prevention and control of the transboundary effects of industrial accidents. A part of the work is the establishment or reinforcement of regional and subregional mechanisms for response, assistance and exchange of information on environmental emergencies. 8.1 Actions The Arctic countries agree to the following framework for taking early cooperative action on emergency prevention, preparedness and response in the Arctic. They will take steps to review existing bilateral and multilateral arrangements in order to evaluate the adequacy of the geographical coverage of the Arctic regions by cooperative agreements. They will also take steps to convene a meeting of experts to consider and recommend the necessary system of cooperation, which could include, inter alia, the following elements: i) Actions to respond to significant accidental pollution from any source; ii) Coordination and harmonization of preventive policies, strategies and measures; iii) Establishment of a system for early notification in the event of significant accidental pollution or an imminent threat of such pollution; iv) Assessment of the risks for significant accidental pollution and of the adverse effects in such cases so as to enable the parties to take the necessary preventive, preparedness and response measures; 1112

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v)

Inclusion of studies on effects of accidental pollution in conjunction with the monitoring activities of AMAP; vi) Cooperation in the conduct of research into and development of methods and technologies for prevention of, preparedness for and response to significant accidental pollution in the Arctic; vii) Cooperation in developing a system for exchange of information on research and new developments regarding methods and technologies on response in the Arctic; viii) Exchange of information on legislative and administrative measures as well as policies; ix) Measures for providing information to the public and public participation; and x) Further enhance regional bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the Arctic regarding prevention, preparedness and response by developing, as appropriate, contingency plans, training programs, as well as other measures to facilitate assistance to the parties, in particular mutual assistance for efficient emergency response in the event of significant accidental pollution, or the imminent threat of such pollution. 9. Conservation of the Arctic Flora and Fauna The health of Arctic flora and fauna is a key concern of the Arctic countries. These flora and fauna assume special significance in this region since they are an essential factor helping to define the culture and survival of the people living there. Although isolated geographically from the industrialized temperate regions of the globe, it has now been amply demonstrated that this has not excluded Arctic flora and fauna from the negative consequences of human activities in mid latitudes. The impacts on the Arctic have escalated over the past several decades and both scientific and traditional knowledge have been pointing to the danger signals. Many of these concerns are enumerated in the six Arctic State of the Environment reports. They confirm that Arctic flora, fauna and their habitats are being threatened by large scale economic development projects; long range transport of pollutants; and degradation of habitats. The problems facing Arctic flora, fauna and habitats are not confined to any one country but are circumpolar in nature. Furthermore, because of the uniqueness of Arctic ecosystems, strategies to deal with these problems will differ from those of other regions. Several multilateral and bilateral agreements which pertain to the conservation of Arctic flora and fauna and their habitats are currently in existence. Most however, have been designed to be universally applicable to, or to apply to, a wider geographical area than the Arctic. Only the Agreement on Conservation of Polar Bears and some individual provisions in other agreements provide a specific Arctic focus. The eight Arctic countries should therefore seek to create a distinct forum for scientists, indigenous peoples and conservation managers engaged in Arctic flora, fauna and habitat related activities to exchange data and information on issues such as shared species and habitats and to collaborate, as appropriate, for more effective research, sustainable utilization and conservation. 9.1 Actions The eight Arctic countries are mindful of the need to conserve Arctic flora and fauna and their habitats in their natural diversity, and protect these resources from the pollution threats described in this Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy. They recognize the special relationship and importance of Arctic flora and fauna and their habitats to 1113

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indigenous peoples. The countries also recognize the benefits to be gained from sharing scientific and management information, traditional knowledge, and other data with respect to Arctic flora and fauna and their habitats. With due regard to existing international cooperation, and in an effort to improve research and information aimed at protecting these resources and their habitats from pollution and environmental degradation, they have reached the following understanding: i) The eight Arctic countries will cooperate for the conservation of Arctic flora and fauna, their diversity, and their habitats. Such cooperation shall include, inter alia, exchanges of research and management information and data, and coordination of research, on the following: a) Arctic species, their health and habitats; b) the laws, regulations and practices of the parties with respect to the conservation and management of such species; and c) the importance and relationship to, and use of, such species by indigenous peoples and the unique contribution of indigenous peoples to the stewardship of nature and its resources; ii) Each country will provide to the other countries, as appropriate, such information, publications, and/or documents as may be agreed under the terms of the Strategy; iii) The eight Arctic countries will seek to develop other forms of cooperation, including exchanges of experts, of traditional knowledge, and of other data, as well as engaging in joint projects, bilateral or multilateral meetings, symposia and joint publications, to meet the intent of this Strategy; iv) The eight Arctic countries will each seek to develop more effective laws, regulations and practices for the conservation of Arctic flora and fauna, their diversity, and their habitats in close cooperation with Arctic indigenous peoples; v) The eight Arctic countries agree to establish a mechanism for furthering the following aims in close cooperation with Arctic indigenous peoples: a) Promoting and facilitating exchanges of information and personnel as provided for in this Strategy; b) Making recommendations with respect to the priorities, the orientation and the nature of research and monitoring programs of the Arctic Countries; c) Proposing strategies for enhanced conservation of Arctic species and their habitats; and d) Regularly compiling and disseminating information on activities regarding the conservation of Arctic flora and fauna. vi) The eight Arctic countries will consult, as deemed appropriate with the International Arctic Science Committee and other bodies on any matter that falls within the scope of this Strategy; vii) By October 1991 each Country will identify to the others its national agency designated to coordinate the cooperation envisaged by this section; viii) The Countries agree that the terms and conditions of the cooperation and exchanges provided for in this section will be subject to the laws and regulations of the Countries; ix) Each country will make its best efforts to provide resources adequate to carry out its responsibilities under this section. It is understood that the ability of each country to carry out activities is subject to the availability of funds, and that countries will seek to ensure long-term funding for necessary projects. 1114

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10. Further Cooperation Continuity and further cooperation are essential for increasing the protection of the Arctic environment. In order to ensure, this continuity and cooperation, the eight Arctic countries agree to hold regular Meetings on the Arctic Environment. The date and venue of the next meeting will be agreed upon at the preceding meeting. Decisions on the agenda and participation of observers will be made and communicated to interested parties in advance of the meeting. The decision to invite observers should be based on a pragmatic and functional evaluation of their involvement in and contribution to Arctic environmental questions. In order to facilitate the participation of Arctic indigenous peoples the following organizations will be invited as observers: the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, the Nordic Saami Council and the U.S.S.R. Association of Small Peoples of the North. The Meetings on the Arctic Environment shall serve to: i) identify and coordinate actions to implement and further develop the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy; ii) initiate cooperation in new fields relevant to the environmental protection of the Arctic; iii) make necessary recommendations in order to protect the Arctic environment; iv) improve existing environmental regimes relevant to the Arctic; and v) assess and report on progress on actions agreed upon.

Document 220 Discussion Note of the Arctic Environment Ministers Meeting: Arctic Change—Global Effects [extracts only] (5/6 February 2013)* Arctic development The Arctic is undergoing unprecedented change for reasons mainly linked to increased global resource use. Global emissions of greenhouse gases have made climate change in the Arctic more rapid than anywhere else on Earth with widespread effects for societies and ecosystems. Traditional Arctic products have, with a few exceptions, historically played a relatively marginal role in the global economy, however, as global resource demand and depletion increases resources in the Arctic will become more globally significant and commercially viable. It is estimated that the Arctic contains almost 15 percent of the world’s undiscovered conventional oil resources and about 30 percent of its undiscovered conventional natural gas resources. A significant proportion of these reserves lie offshore, in the Arctic’s shallow and biologically productive shelf seas. With climate change the resource-rich environments are becoming more accessible. Therefore, the economic and development potential in the Arctic has been dramatically reassessed and the Arctic region will likely be under increasing pressure from the economic development. Arctic mineral extraction, oil and gas development and advancing new trade routes are becoming viable as ice-free summers are predicted in the near future. The global development clearly has a major impact on the Arctic, but the Arctic also affects the rest of the world, not only through Arctic tradable resources. Science *  Retrieved from the Swedish Ministry of Environment, www.regeringen.se/informationsmaterial/2013/01/ m2013_02/. Footnotes and pictures are not reprinted here.

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indicates that the Arctic holds important feedback mechanisms and critical tipping points for the earth system, meaning that rapid changes in the Arctic may trigger global effects of unprecedented scale in modern times. A collapse of the Arctic summer sea-ice, accelerating melt of the Greenland ice sheet, releases of methane from melting permafrost and slowdown of the thermohaline circulation are examples of such potential tipping points. Therefore, climate change, global pollution, global markets and socio-economic pressures are all key drivers of change in the Arctic with significant consequences for Arctic societies, Arctic nations and the global community. These increased pressures may in some cases raise potential for conflicts between economic development and environmental conservation and protection requiring informed policy decisions to reach resolution. From an environmental perspective this development presents many risks, but the potential for a positive economic development for Arctic societies, nations and business also offers opportunities. A key challenge is to ensure that measures are put in place to ensure that adverse environmental impacts and risks are effectively mitigated and that capacities to address pressures and on-going change are strengthened. The Arctic Council has an important role in facilitating talks and agreements about sustainable development in the Arctic. Since established in 1996 it has undertaken numerous assessments, critical for the understanding of the Arctic environment and for establishing a scientific foundation for stewardship actions. Increasingly, the Arctic Council has evolved from a discussion forum to a forum where also agreements of legally binding nature are negotiated, notably the recent Search and Rescue agreement and the current negotiations between Arctic countries on an agreement on cooperation to address marine oil pollution. While many of the topics on the Arctic Council agenda are under the responsibility of environment ministers, they do not have a formal meeting space within the Arctic Council. Environment ministers have instead met to discuss Arctic environment issues on the initiative of Arctic Council chairmanships. At their first meeting in Ilulissat, Greenland, during Danish chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2010, the main focus was the protection of the Arctic marine environment1. The meeting of environment ministers in Jukkasjärvi is the second such meeting and is arranged by Sweden. Possible actions It is essential to manage the environmental risks associated with Arctic development. Specific actions are proposed in the different sections of this note. Some more general actions to address these risks were identified in a study on Arctic issues commissioned by Lloyd’s insurance company in 2012, including e.g. the following conclusions: –– It is essential to close knowledge gaps, reduce uncertainties and manage risks and that Arctic economic development can only proceed at a rate that takes into account these factors. Further research is required to ensure that future development takes place in a sustainable fashion and does not cause irreparable damage to the environment. –– Major investment is required in infrastructure and surveillance to enable safe economic activity. Public/private co-operation is needed to provide this infrastructure. –– The mosaic of regulations and governments in the Arctic creates a multijurisdictional challenge. –– Working through the Arctic Council to promote high and common regulations for Arctic economic activity is key. 1116

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Questions for discussion How can we make sure that the opportunities for Arctic economic development does not risk irreparable damage to the Arctic and global environment? Which are the key issues for the Arctic countries to jointly take forward? How can Arctic states and the Arctic Council exert influence beyond the region in the global environmental arena? For example, how should it interact with multilateral environmental agreements and influence policy decisions that affect the Arctic? What is the role for environment ministers in Arctic cooperation on sustainable development?

EFFECTS OF ARCTIC CLIMATE CHANGE Arctic climate change science The Arctic Council’s report: Snow Water Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic (SWIPA), is the most comprehensive compilation of scientific knowledge on the impacts of climate change on the frozen parts of the Arctic. Hundreds of scientists have worked to produce the assessment. It concludes that there is an unprecedented rate of change in the Arctic. Some of the major SWIPA findings are: –– The observed recent changes in sea ice and in the mass of the Greenland ice sheet and Arctic ice caps and glaciers are dramatic. Projections reported by the IPCC in 2007 underestimated the rates of change now observed. –– The warming of the Arctic, due to climate change, has been twice as high as the world average since 1980. Arctic summer temperatures have been higher in the past few decades than at any time in the past 2000 years. –– Virtually all parts of the Arctic frozen components are affected by warming. Temperatures in the permafrost have risen by up to 2°C, and nearly all glaciers and ice caps in most regions of the Arctic have been declining faster since 2000 than in the previous decade. –– Changes cause fundamental changes to the characteristics of Arctic ecosystems and in some cases loss of entire habitats. –– Transport options and access to resources are radically changed. Arctic infrastructure faces increased risks of damage due to changes. The Arctic region continued to break records in 2012. A few of the major findings include the minimum Arctic sea ice extent in September 2012 that set a new record low and the nearly ice sheet-wide melt event on the Greenland ice sheet in July, covering about 97 percent of the ice sheet on a single day. Possible future developments are also described in the SWIPA assessment. The average autumn-winter temperatures in the Arctic are projected to increase by between 3 °C and 7 °C by the late twenty-first century (2080). Arctic rain and snow fall are projected to increase during all seasons, but mostly in winter. Mountain glaciers and ice caps are projected to lose between 10 percent and 30 percent of their total mass by 2100. The Arctic Ocean is predicted to be nearly ice free in summer within this century, likely within the next 30 to 40 years. There is now evidence of a number of potential feedback mechanisms at play in the Arctic. One example is the snow and sea ice interaction with the climate system. As highly reflective snow and ice surfaces are diminishing, darker surfaces absorb more of 1117

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the sun’s energy and increase warming. Clear evidence for this effect has been observed in the Arctic. Studies now show that eight of the feedback mechanisms expected to have strong effects lead to further warming, while only one leads to cooling. In the future, SWIPA projects that global sea level will rise by 0.9–1.6 m by 2100 and that the loss of ice from Arctic glaciers, ice caps, and the Greenland ice sheet will make a substantial contribution to this. Loss of ice and snow in the Arctic enhances climate warming by increasing absorption of the sun’s energy at the surface of the planet. It could also dramatically increase emissions of carbon dioxide and methane and change large-scale ocean currents. The combined outcome of these effects on global climate is not yet known. Arctic Ocean acidification The increasing amount of atmospheric carbon dioxide dissolves into surface waters, form carbonic acid and cause ocean acidification. Other changes in the Arctic (melting sea ice and the decay of terrestrial organic matter) contribute to amplify ocean acidification. As a result, the magnitude of ocean acidification is more pronounced in the Arctic than in other oceans. Expanding low oxygen areas, lower salinity, rising seawater temperatures are together shifting environmental domains in the ocean at a speed that may be unprecedented. –– Ocean acidification is a large-scale process that may have far-reaching effects on marine life and further work is needed to understand the full effects. –– The effects of these changes on marine species of the Arctic are poorly understood, but based on studies from other oceans, it is highly likely that significant changes can occur in Arctic marine ecosystems. –– It is likely that some organisms will benefit from ocean acidification, yet others will be disadvantaged, possibly to the point of local extinction. –– Early life stages and life-stage transitions are, in general, more susceptible to ocean acidification. A major study of the Arctic Ocean acidification is being developed within the Arctic Council and will be presented for foreign ministers at the Kiruna meeting. Possible actions SWIPA resulted in a number of major recommendations to Arctic states focused on mitigation, adaptation and further observation and scientific work. –– On mitigation it was e.g. recommended that Arctic states increase the leadership role in climate change mitigation and contribute to step up efforts in the international negotiations. –– Regarding adaptation the need for adaptation strategies and standards for environmental management was underscored. –– Improved observing and prediction systems and further assessments of cryospheric change were also recommended. A follow up on SWIPA recommendations should be pursued. Arctic states could consider addressing these recommendations both individually as well as jointly through forum including the Arctic Council. As a complement to other actions to address the effects of climate change Arctic states should increase efforts to decrease the occurrence of short lived climate forcers (next section). Actions to reduce ocean acidification include

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mainly reducing carbon dioxide emissions at global scale as well as regionally. However, further work is needed to understand the full effects of acidification. Questions for discussion Rapid Arctic climate change may have global effects. Is there a special responsibility by Arctic countries to show leadership in climate change mitigation and adaptation in the Arctic and globally? How should such leadership be manifested at national level, within the Arctic Council and in other international forums, including within the UNFCCC? A projected Arctic temperature increase of between 3 °C and 7 °C by the late twentyfirst century (2080) would completely change the Arctic region. The basic UNFCCC target is to avoid dangerous interference with the climate system and we have agreed to a global 2-degree target. Is there a need to strengthen targets and actions to protect the Arctic environment and societies? How can Arctic Environment Ministers promote further scientific work on Arctic Ocean acidification? Short-lived Climate Forcers Short-Lived Climate Forcers (SLCFs) are a set of air pollutants that have both significant climate impacts and negative health and environmental effects. According to UNEP, millions of premature deaths and the loss of tens of millions of tonnes of crops would be avoided each year by implementing selected measures. These actions can further reduce global warming by between 0.4 and 0.5°C and Arctic warming by 0.7°C in the coming decades. Carbon dioxide is the dominant factor contributing to observed and projected rates of global warming, and carbon dioxide emission reductions should be the backbone of any climate change mitigation strategy. However, SLCFs contribute significantly to warming and particularly so in the Arctic. Reductions of black carbon emissions in the Arctic could play an important role for the Arctic climate, for slowing the melt of ice and snow, and would have positive health effects in the Arctic due to reduced particulate matter concentrations in the air. Preliminary black carbon inventories by Arctic states and an emission data compilation by the Arctic Council’s Task Force on Short-Lived Climate Forcers have identified the approximate amount and the major sources of black carbon emissions in the Arctic countries. The largest emission sources are on-road and off-road diesel vehicles, open biomass burning (agricultural burning and forest fires) and residential heating. Total emissions from Arctic Council nations are expected to decline, primarily because of diesel engine particulate matter standards. However, marine shipping in the Arctic constitutes a potentially future significant source, especially in the Arctic due to its projected increase over time due to the retreating Arctic summer sea ice and its proximity to snow and ice. Gas flaring is also a potential significant source but the understanding of its contribution is currently uncertain. Sources within the Arctic states likely have a greater climate impact per unit of emission of black carbon due to their proximity to the Arctic, though total black carbon effects from non-Arctic Council nations may be significant. In May 2012 the Executive Body to the UN-ECE Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP), to which all Arctic states are Parties, adopted 1119

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a revised Gothenburg Protocol with new emission reduction commitments for PM2.5 of which black carbon is a fraction. To reduce the negative effects on human health and the environment, and to contribute to a regional slowing down of global warming, Parties are encouraged to target sources known to emit high amounts of black carbon while meeting the reduction target for PM. Most Arctic states are also partners to the Climate and Clean Air Coalition to Reduce Short-Lived Climate Pollutants. The Coalition works to catalyse new actions as well as to highlight and bolster existing efforts on near-term climate change and related public health, food and energy security, and environmental issues. The Coalition is a partnership between developed and developing countries. The Arctic Council recognized in its Nuuk Declaration the rapidly changing climate in the Arctic and emphasized the importance of strengthening the Arctic Council’s efforts to address this change. The Arctic states were encouraged to implement, as appropriate in their national circumstances, relevant recommendations of the Task Force on SLCFs on measures to reduce emissions of black carbon. The Nuuk meeting furthermore decided to establish a Short-Lived Climate Forcer Contaminants project steering group to undertake circumpolar demonstration projects to reduce black carbon and other SLCF emissions. Several projects to implement concrete actions to reduce emissions of SLCFs, with an emphasis on black carbon, have been developed to date. Possible actions Arctic states are in a position to take immediate action and demonstrate leadership to the rest of the world by implementing farsighted measures to reduce, and to avoid future increases in, emissions of black carbon. Such action would also be in line with Arctic countries’ commitments under CLRTAP and its revised Gothenburg Protocol. This would provide substantial health benefits for the populations of Arctic nations, but also contribute to protecting the Arctic from the environmental damage that arises from rapid climate change. Emission inventories are of critical importance to identify emission trends and costeffective mitigation opportunities for black carbon. Preliminary emission inventories for the Arctic countries have been undertaken but there is a need to base the analysis of further emission reduction possibilities on more complete and accurate emission inventories based on a common and transparent methodology. The Arctic states could agree to produce and submit to CLRTAP national emission inventories for black carbon, and this information could be synthesized for Arctic Council purposes. The inventories could be developed in line with the inventory guidelines that are to be agreed upon under CLRTAP in order not to duplicate efforts and to facilitate a more rapid development under that convention. A timeline for inventory development and submission could be established, for example submission to CLRTAP no later than February 15, 2015. Arctic states could support the development of an Arctic Council instrument on black carbon, or on SLCFs more generally, to increase the transparency of emission trends, enhance emission reductions and form a basis for strengthened cooperation among Arctic nations for efforts both internal and external to the Arctic Council. This could also encourage other countries, regions and forums to initiate similar actions. At this time it may be premature to define what legal status such an instrument would have. This would be the outcome of the negotiations leading up to a formal document that can be accepted by all Arctic nations. 1120

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A high-level group could be established at the Kiruna Ministerial meeting and mandated to develop and present a proposal for an Arctic Council instrument to enhance efforts to reduce Black Carbon emissions, potentially including the following: –– a new mechanism for cooperation requiring all Arctic states to submit nationallevel emissions and national action plans on black carbon to the Arctic Council, –– a common vision for black carbon emission reductions, –– joint procedures for consultation on national mitigation action, –– development and promotion of a compilation of best mitigation practices and technologies available, both within Arctic Council nations, but also for the polar region where increased activities are expected, –– targets if desired (binding or non-binding). Any process developed under the Arctic Council should complement, facilitate and accelerate work on black carbon taking place in other forum—not duplicate it. Questions for discussion Are the above outlined actions the most promising for taking action over the medium term to reduce emissions of black carbon in the Arctic? How can an Arctic states’ instrument for black carbon reductions best be developed over the coming years? Arctic resilience Resilience in the Arctic can be conceived as the ability to respond to the challenges created by rapid environmental and social changes. These changes include the impacts of climate change but also changes related to rapid economic development and social transformations. Assessing resilience includes analysis both of the changes that are taking place, including their potential impacts, and the social and ecological capacities for adaptation and transformation, including how these may be changing due to new pressures. Assessing resilience is about preparing for change, where a key concern is to understand how governance institutions and policy decisions can strengthen society’s capacity to protect valuable ecosystem services in the Arctic. The Arctic is already changing rapidly. While some changes are slow and gradual, there is also increasing evidence of threshold changes, which are generally relatively rapid and may be difficult to reverse because they involve feedbacks that reinforce the changes. The rapid decline of Arctic sea ice is an example where large new expanses of open water have created a situation that has primed the Arctic for further warming. The Arctic pack ice has been identified as a tipping element in the world climate systems, making this change significant not only in the Arctic but on a global scale. Another Arctic tipping element of global significance is permafrost, where thawing permafrost leads to release of greenhouse gases that accelerate the warming. Moreover, collapsing permafrost can change the landscape in ways that affect heat transfer and the flow of water. Declining sea ice and thawing permafrost also have large impacts regionally in the Arctic, not least along coasts that are prone to erosion. Some parts of the Arctic feature extremely high erosion rates that threaten community and industrial infrastructure. Permafrost loss is also linked to some very rapid changes in the terrestrial landscape, including draining of lakes over the course of only a few years and shifts in vegetation that have immediate negative impacts on reindeer grazing. 1121

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Other observed ecosystem changes that have threshold characteristics are linked to warmer air temperatures and longer growing seasons. One example is shrub encroachment across the lower Arctic, where a canopy that reached above the snow speeds up the warming. Another is a shift from coniferous to deciduous forest in Alaska, which was directly triggered by increasing wildfires. Within one to two decades such a shift can turn the forest from a carbon sink to a carbon source. Whether society can respond to the challenges related to rapid changes in Arctic landscapes and seascapes without losing important ecosystem services depend on our collective ability for action, which in turn is influenced by rapid social changes in the Arctic. The more and sooner we mitigate emissions, the less we will have to adapt, and the higher the probability for successful adaptation will be. Without effective mitigation, there is a very high risk that our capacity for adaptation will be exhausted. Questions for discussion What are the next steps to introduce considerations of resilience in national management policies and practices? How can Arctic countries increase Arctic capacity to adequately address rapid change and resilience, and what is the Arctic Council role in doing so? Contaminants in the Arctic Addressing contamination of the Arctic environment, biota and communities calls for actions in and outside the Arctic territory. Many pollutants end up in the Arctic irrespective of where they are released into the environment, leading in many cases to accumulation of toxic substances in the food chain. In addition to the present sources of contamination, depositions of previous decades are released into the ocean as the ice and permafrost melt. Work on identifying sources of pollution in the Arctic territories continues to be a significant area of engagement for Arctic nations. Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) accumulate and persist for long periods of time and adversely affect health including by acting upon the immune, reproductive, nervous and endocrine systems. Although international actions have effectively reduced the levels of old POPs (mainly pesticides and industrial chemicals) in the Arctic, levels of many new substances used in consumer products are rising. These include brominated flame retardants in electronics, upholstery and construction products, and perfluorinated compounds in detergents, textiles and upholstery. Among the heavy metals, mercury, lead and cadmium are of major concern because of their presence in animals consumed by people. These metals have multiple toxicological effects, including effects on development and the functioning of the nervous system. Mercury continues to present risks to Arctic wildlife and human populations. The assessment made by the Arctic Council (AMAP 2011) confirms the need for concerted international action if mercury levels in the Arctic (and in the rest of the world) are to be reduced. It is of particular concern that mercury levels are continuing to rise in some Arctic species in large areas of the Arctic, despite reductions in emissions from human activities over the past 30 years in some parts of the world. POPs and heavy metals bioaccumulate in the food web, with the highest concentration of toxins found in top

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predators, including humans. Particular risks of contaminants to the Arctic ecosystems and indigenous communities have been acknowledged in the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, in which the Arctic Countries have played an active part. Radionuclides persist in soil and plants, leading to potentially high exposure levels in humans and can be damaging to health. As radionuclides are at higher levels on land than in the marine food web they are a relatively lesser concern for people eating marine species. Possible actions While the Arctic Council states have been actively contributing to the international activities, attention should still be paid to the Arctic territories. Action will be needed to address e.g. the thousands of tonnes hazardous waste, including obsolete pesticides and PCBs as well as mercury-containing waste stored in the catchment area of the Arctic Ocean. Inventories and improved storage conditions have already been developed for obsolete pesticides stocks in the Arctic territories of the Russian Federation. In the project more than 7 000 tonnes of old pesticides unfit for use were located, taken account and repackaged as necessary. Challenges, however, remain: in the absence of environmentally sound destruction capacity, inappropriate disposal of waste in landfills or dumping take place. The Arctic countries should ensure that only the highest environmental standards are used in hazardous waste management in the vulnerable Arctic territory and regions directly impacting it. These could include banning sub-standard incineration, inappropriate disposal practices for hazardous waste and providing sufficient technical and financial resources to ultimately destroy the existing stockpiles. Resource extraction and energy production are also potentially polluting activities that should be based on highest possible environmental standards. A comprehensive, legally-binding global instrument that will significantly reduce global mercury use and releases will be of large importance for the Arctic. Questions for discussion How could the Arctic states (e.g. through the Arctic Council) play a more active role in relation to Arctic and global governance of contaminants? How can Arctic states better collaborate to improve environmentally sound manage­ ment of hazardous wastes in the Northern regions directly impacting the Arctic? Biodiversity and ecosystem services Arctic biodiversity is an irreplaceable cultural, scientific, ecological, economic and spiritual asset and holds values of global importance. The Arctic Biodiversity Assessment was initiated in with the purpose of synthesizing and assessing the status and trends of biological diversity in the Arctic. It provides a first ever and much needed description of the state of the Arctic’s biodiversity. It provides up-to-date knowledge, identifies gaps in the data record, describes key mechanisms driving change and presents science-based suggestions for actions on how to address major environmental and anthropogenic pressures.

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The first product released from the ABA process—the Arctic Biodiversity Trends 2010: selected indicators of change report—includes the following key findings: 1. Unique Arctic habitats for flora and fauna, including sea ice, tundra, thermokarst ponds and lakes, and permafrost peatlands have been disappearing over recent decades. 2. Although the majority of Arctic species examined are currently stable or increasing, some species of importance to Arctic people or species of global significance are declining. 3. Climate change is emerging as the most far reaching and significant stressor on Arctic biodiversity. However contaminants, habitat fragmentation, industrial development, and unsustainable harvest levels continue to have impacts. Complex interactions between climate change and other factors have the potential to magnify impacts on biodiversity. 4. Since 1991, the extent of protected areas in the Arctic has increased, although marine areas remain poorly represented. 5. Changes in Arctic biodiversity are creating both challenges and opportunities for Arctic peoples. 6. Long-term observations based on the best available traditional and scientific knowledge are required to identify changes in biodiversity, assess the implications of observed changes, and develop adaptation strategies. 7. Changes in Arctic biodiversity have global repercussions. Possible actions The full Arctic Biodiversity Assessment is to be completed in 2013 and presented to the Arctic Council meeting in Kiruna. Based on its draft scientific findings, key actions can be identified including: –– strengthen efforts to reduce climate change; –– implement Ecosystem Based Management; –– make agreed biodiversity objectives effective in Arctic; –– identify biologically, ecologically and culturally significant areas; –– advance the protection and management of a network of areas of importance for marine, terrestrial and freshwater species and habitats; –– protect the Arctic environment from pollutants by international efforts, clean-up activities and best available technologies; –– manage the Arctic living resource in a sustainable way, through e.g. improved data gathering, integration of traditional ecological knowledge, development of management plans for exploited species and reducing by-catch; –– improve public awareness and understanding of the importance of Arctic biodiversity and the challenges it faces; –– address the threats to migratory species, not least through improved international cooperation among and beyond the Arctic. A comprehensive and integrated approach will be needed to address the interconnected and complex challenges facing biodiversity and to ensure informed policy decisions in a changing Arctic. The lack of standardized, long term data presents a critical impediment to our ability to understand and predict what is happening with Arctic biodiversity.

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Discussions at the Conference of the Parties to the CBD in Hyderabad resulted in a strong recognition of the importance of Arctic biodiversity and of Arctic Council work, in particular the Arctic Biodiversity Assessment, and further highlighted the need for international cooperation in conservation and sustainable use within the Arctic. The conference underlined the importance of identification of ecologically and biologically significant areas in the Arctic and areas of high ecological and cultural significance as well as work to promote the implementation of the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020 in relation to the Arctic environment. Questions for discussion What are the most important steps to make biodiversity objectives effective in Arctic? How should we advance the protection of areas of important marine, terrestrial and freshwater habitats? What actions/activities are of high priority to follow up on in the Arctic Biodiversity Assessment? Ecosystem based management Ecosystem based management (EBM) refers to an integrated, science-based approach to environmental management that aims to sustain the health, resilience, culture and diversity of ecosystems while supporting sustainable and equitable use by humans of the services they provide. At a general level, EBM facilitates efficient and science based decisions by providing a way of assessing and managing the effects of multiple stressors affecting the same ecosystem. Locally, through the design of inclusive stakeholder processes that reflect a broad range of scientific as well as traditional and local knowledge, EBM can help ensure that policy outcomes advance ecological, social and economic goals, and help Arctic peoples adapt to changing ecological and socio-economic conditions. Already at the last Arctic Environment Ministers meeting in Ilulissat, ministers highlighted the need for an EBM approach. Within the Arctic Council an expert group on EBM is now preparing to deliver results to the Arctic Council meeting in Kiruna. In its draft report the group makes recommendations to the Arctic Council to advance EBM and proposes that the Arctic Council adopt a policy commitment to EBM in the coastal, marine and terrestrial environments. Possible actions Some of the recommendations by the EBM group strongly related to the ambit of responsibility of ministries of environment are highlighted here: –– make a political commitment to EBM in the Arctic, –– develop an overarching Arctic EBM goal and provide guidance on how to develop and operationalize objectives supporting this goal (one might explore the potential of articulating a conservation objective for the Arctic supported by Ecological Quality Objectives); –– institute periodic Arctic Council reviews of EBM in the Arctic to exchange information on integrated assessment and management experiences, including highlighting examples from Arctic states.

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Questions for discussion Should an overarching conservation objective for the Arctic be formulated? How can the Arctic states best advance EBM implementation in the Arctic? Who is responsible for this process and the cross-sectoral collaboration it requires?

Document 221 Joint Statement of the Arctic States on Climate Change and the Arctic (31 August 2015)* The rapid warming of the Arctic is profoundly affecting communities both in the Arctic region and beyond. As Foreign Ministers and other representatives from the Arctic States—Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Russia, the United States— attending the GLACIER conference in Anchorage, Alaska on August 31, 2015, and recognizing the leadership role of the Arctic States in providing sustainable development and cooperation in the Arctic, we reaffirm our commitment to take urgent action to slow the pace of warming in the Arctic, focusing on actions that impact the global atmosphere as well as the Arctic itself. The Foreign Ministers and other representatives from France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Netherlands, Poland, Singapore, Spain, United Kingdom, and European Union join us in this commitment. We take seriously warnings by scientists: temperatures in the Arctic are increasing at more than twice the average global rate. Loss of Arctic snow and ice is accelerating the warming of the planet as a whole by exposing darker surfaces that absorb more sunlight and heat. Sea ice, the Greenland Ice Sheet, and nearly all glaciers in the Arctic have shrunk over the past 100 years; indeed, glaciers that have endured since the last Ice Age are shrinking, in most cases at a very rapid rate. Arctic sea ice decline has been faster during the past ten years than in the previous 20 years, with summer sea ice extent reduced by 40% since 1979. Loss of ice from Arctic glaciers and ice sheets contributes to rising sea levels worldwide, which put coastal communities everywhere at increased risk of coastal erosion and persistent flooding. And emerging science suggests that rapid warming of the Arctic may disrupt weather patterns across the globe. Moreover, as the Arctic continues to warm, significant feedback loops appear to be coming into play. Warmer, drier weather increases the occurrence, extent, and severity of wildfires that release carbon from vast tracts of burning forests, with about five million acres burned this year in Alaska alone. Warming also promotes thawing of permafrost, which could release substantial stores of greenhouse gas emissions. And the relentless loss of Arctic snow and ice exposes yet more land and water, which in turn absorb yet more heat. Arctic communities are experiencing first-hand the challenges of dealing with a rapidly changing climate. Thawing permafrost is triggering the collapse of roads, bridges and other infrastructure, and coastal erosion is requiring entire communities to consider relocation. Warming-induced changes can also reduce wildlife and fish populations that support subsistence hunting and fishing. These impacts highlight the need for adaptive management and infrastructure, and illustrate the emerging threat to traditional ways of life. * 

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As change continues at an unprecedented rate in the Arctic—increasing the stresses on communities and ecosystems in already harsh environments—we are committed more than ever to protecting both terrestrial and marine areas in this unique region, and our shared planet, for generations to come. In particular, we affirm our strong determination to work together and with others to achieve a successful, ambitious outcome at the international climate negotiations in December in Paris this year. In addition, we acknowledge the importance of the Framework for Action on Black Carbon and Methane, adopted at the Arctic Council Ministerial in April 2015, which provides for enhanced opportunities to act together to reduce emissions of black carbon (soot) that impact the Arctic. Actions to reduce methane—a powerful short-lived greenhouse gas—can slow Arctic warming in the near to medium term. To address the largest industrial source of methane globally, we encourage all oil and gas firms headquartered or operating within our borders to join the Climate and Clean Air Coalition’s Oil and Gas Methane Partnership. We call for additional research to characterize the response of Arctic permafrost and other carbon reservoirs to warming, and resolve to cooperate on wildland fire management, especially in hotspots that have the potential to release particularly large stores of greenhouse gases. We further urge the scientific community, in cooperation with northern communities, to continue to provide the information and tools necessary to assist the Arctic’s most vulnerable communities build resilience to climate impacts and to prioritize further research on, and communication of, the links between a changing Arctic and impacts felt across the globe, including on how such changes may affect mid-latitude weather patterns. We also resolve to work with our Arctic communities to deploy low-carbon solutions that can improve livelihoods, enhance energy security, and promote sustainable economic growth such as renewable energy technologies and energy efficiency measures. Climate change poses a grave challenge in the Arctic and to the world. But these challenges also present an imperative for cooperation, innovation, and engagement as we work together to safeguard this vital region and to inform the world why the Arctic matters to us all.

Document 222 Agreement on Cooperation in Research, Conservation and Management of Marine Mammals in the North Atlantic (9 April 1992)* The Parties, In pursuance of the objectives laid down in the Memorandum of Understanding, signed at Tromsø on 19 April 1990, on cooperation between countries bordering the North Atlantic Ocean in research, conservation and management of marine mammals;

*  Done at Nuuk, 9 April 1992; entered into force 8 July 1992; 1945 UNTS 4 [Registration Number 33321]. From United Nations Treaty Series, by United Nations Office of Legal Affairs Treaty Section, © 2000, United Nations. Reprinted with the permission of the United Nations.

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Having regard to their common concerns for the rational management, conservation and optimum utilization of the living resources of the sea in accordance with generally accepted principles of international law as reflected in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; Desiring to enhance their cooperation in research on marine mammals and their role in the ecosystem, including, where appropriate, multi-species approaches, and on the effects of marine pollution and other human activities; Bearing in mind the need to develop management procedures which take into account the relationship between marine mammals and other marine living resources; Recalling the general principles of conservation and sustainable use of natural resources as reflected in the report of the World Commission on Environment and Development; Convinced that regional bodies in the North Atlantic can ensure affective conservation, sustainable marine resource utilization and development with due regard to the needs of coastal communities and indigenous people; Have agreed as follows: Article 1 There is hereby established an international organization that shall be known as the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO). Article 2 The objective of the Commission shall be to contribute through regional consultation and cooperation to the conservation, rational management and study of marine mammals in the North Atlantic. Article 3 The Commission shall consist of: (a) a Council; (b) Management Committees; (c) a Scientific Committee; (d) a Secretariat. Article 4 Each Party shall be a member of the Council. The functions of the Council shall be: (a) to provide a forum for the study, analysis and exchange of information among the Parties on matters concerning marine mammals in the North Atlantic; (b) to establish appropriate Management Committees and coordinate their activities; (c) to establish guidelines and objectives for the work of the Management Committees; (d) to establish working arrangements with the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea and other appropriate organizations; (e) to coordinate requests for scientific advice; (f) to establish cooperation with States not Parties to this Agreement in order to further the objective set out in Article 2. Decisions of the Council shall be taken by the unanimous vote of those members present and casting an affirmative vote.

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Article 5 Management Committees shall with respect to stocks of marine mammals within their respective mandates: (a) propose to their members measures for conservation and management; (b) make recommendations to the Council concerning scientific research. Decisions of Management Committees shall be taken by the unanimous vote of those members present and casting an affirmative vote. Article 6 The Scientific Committee shall consist of experts appointed by the Parties. Subject to the approval of the Council, the Scientific Committee may invite other experts to participate in the conduct of its work. The Scientific Committee shall provide scientific advice in response to requests from the Council, utilizing, to the extent possible, existing scientific information. Article 7 The Council shall establish a Secretariat. The Secretariat shall perform such functions as the Council may determine. Article 8 The Council may agree to admit observers to meetings of the Commission when such admission is consistent with the objective set out in Article 2. Article 9 This Agreement is without prejudice to obligations of the Parties under other international agreements. Article 10 1. This Agreement shall be open for signature on 9 April 1992 by the Faroe Islands, Greenland, Iceland and Norway, and shall enter into force 90 days after signature. 2. It shall remain open for signature by other Parties with the consent of the existing Signatories. 3. Any Party may withdraw from this Agreement upon giving six months’ notice. DONE at Nuuk on 9 April 1992.

Document 223 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (22 September 1992)* Preamble The Contracting Parties, Recognising that the marine environment and the fauna and flora which it supports are of vital importance to all nations; *  Done at Paris, 22 September 1992; entered into force 25 March 1998; 2354 UNTS 70 [Registration Number 42279]. From United Nations Treaty Series, by United Nations Office of Legal Affairs Treaty Section, © 2009, United Nations. Reprinted with the permission of the United Nations. Text reproduced as amended on 24 July 1998, updated 9 May 2002, 7 February 2005 and 18 May 2006. Appendices 1 (criteria for the definition of practices and techniques mentioned in paragaraph 3(b)(i) of Article 2 of the Convention, 2 (criteria mentioned in paragraph 2 of Article 1 of Annex I and paragraph 2 of Article 2 of the Convention) and 3 (criteria for identifying human activities for the purpose of Annex V) omitted.

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Recognising the inherent worth of the marine environment of the North-East Atlantic and the necessity for providing coordinated protection for it; Recognising that concerted action at national, regional and global levels is essential to prevent and eliminate marine pollution and to achieve sustainable management of the maritime area, that is, the management of human activities in such a manner that the marine ecosystem will continue to sustain the legitimate uses of the sea and will continue to meet the needs of present and future generations; Mindful that the ecological equilibrium and the legitimate uses of the sea are threatened by pollution; Considering the recommendations of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held in Stockholm in June 1972; Considering also the results of the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992; Recalling the relevant provisions of customary international law reflected in Part XII of the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention and, in particular, Article 197 on global and regional cooperation for the protection and preservation of the marine environment; Considering that the common interests of States concerned with the same marine area should induce them to cooperate at regional or sub-regional levels; Recalling the positive results obtained within the context of the Convention for the prevention of marine pollution by dumping from ships and aircraft signed in Oslo on 15th February 1972, as amended by the protocols of 2nd March 1983 and 5th December 1989, and the Convention for the prevention of marine pollution from land-based sources signed in Paris on 4th June 1974, as amended by the protocol of 26th March 1986; Convinced that further international action to prevent and eliminate pollution of the sea should be taken without delay, as part of progressive and coherent measures to protect the marine environment; Recognising that it may be desirable to adopt, on the regional level, more stringent measures with respect to the prevention and elimination of pollution of the marine environment or with respect to the protection of the marine environment against the adverse effects of human activities than are provided for in international conventions or agreements with a global scope; Recognising that questions relating to the management of fisheries are appropriately regulated under international and regional agreements dealing specifically with such questions; Considering that the present Oslo and Paris Conventions do not adequately control some of the many sources of pollution, and that it is therefore justifiable to replace them with the present Convention, which addresses all sources of pollution of the marine environment and the adverse effects of human activities upon it, takes into account the precautionary principle and strengthens regional cooperation; Have agreed as follows: Article 1 Definitions For the purposes of the Convention: (a) “Maritime area” means the internal waters and the territorial seas of the Contracting Parties, the sea beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea under the

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jurisdiction of the coastal state to the extent recognised by international law, and the high seas, including the bed of all those waters and its sub-soil, situated within the following limits: (i) those parts of the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans and their dependent seas which lie north of 36° north latitude and between 42° west longitude and 51° east longitude, but excluding: (1) the Baltic Sea and the Belts lying to the south and east of lines drawn from Hasenore Head to Gniben Point, from Korshage to Spodsbjerg and from Gilbjerg Head to Kullen, (2) the Mediterranean Sea and its dependent seas as far as the point of intersection of the parallel of 36° north latitude and the meridian of 5° 36′ west longitude; (ii) that part of the Atlantic Ocean north of 59° north latitude and between 44° west longitude and 42° west longitude. “Internal waters” means the waters on the landward side of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, extending in the case of watercourses up to the freshwater limit. “Freshwater limit” means the place in a watercourse where, at low tide and in a period of low freshwater flow, there is an appreciable increase in salinity due to the presence of seawater. “Pollution” means the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the maritime area which results, or is likely to result, in hazards to human health, harm to living resources and marine ecosystems, damage to amenities or interference with other legitimate uses of the sea. “Land-based sources” means point and diffuse sources on land from which substances or energy reach the maritime area by water, through the air, or directly from the coast. It includes sources associated with any deliberate disposal under the sea-bed made accessible from land by tunnel, pipeline or other means and sources associated with man-made structures placed, in the maritime area under the jurisdiction of a Contracting Party, other than for the purpose of offshore activities. “Dumping” means (i) any deliberate disposal in the maritime area of wastes or other matter (1) from vessels or aircraft; (2) from offshore installations; (ii) any deliberate disposal in the maritime area of (1) vessels or aircraft; (2) offshore installations and offshore pipelines. “Dumping” does not include: (i) the disposal in accordance with the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto, or other applicable international law, of wastes or other matter incidental to, or derived from, the normal operations of vessels or aircraft or offshore installations other than wastes or other matter transported by or to vessels or aircraft or offshore installations for the purpose of disposal of such wastes or other matter or derived from the treatment of such wastes or other matter on such vessels or aircraft or offshore installations; 1131

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(ii) placement of matter for a purpose other than the mere disposal thereof, provided that, if the placement is for a purpose other than that for which the matter was originally designed or constructed, it is in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention; and (iii) for the purposes of Annex III, the leaving wholly or partly in place of a disused offshore installation or disused offshore pipeline, provided that any such operation takes place in accordance with any relevant provision of the Convention and with other relevant international law. (h) “Incineration” means any deliberate combustion of wastes or other matter in the maritime area for the purpose of their thermal destruction. (i) “Incineration” does not include the thermal destruction of wastes or other matter in accordance with applicable international law incidental to, or derived from the normal operation of vessels or aircraft, or offshore installations other than the thermal destruction of wastes or other matter on vessels or aircraft or offshore installations operating for the purpose of such thermal destruction. (j) “Offshore activities” means activities carried out in the maritime area for the purposes of the exploration, appraisal or exploitation of liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons. (k) “Offshore sources” means offshore installations and offshore pipelines from which substances or energy reach the maritime area. (l) “Offshore installation” means any man-made structure, plant or vessel or parts thereof, whether floating or fixed to the seabed, placed within the maritime area for the purpose of offshore activities. (m) “Offshore pipeline” means any pipeline which has been placed in the maritime area for the purpose of offshore activities. (n) “Vessels or aircraft” means waterborne or airborne craft of any type whatsoever, their parts and other fittings. This expression includes air-cushion craft, floating craft whether self-propelled or not, and other man-made structures in the maritime area and their equipment, but excludes offshore installations and offshore pipelines. (o) “Wastes or other matter” does not include: (i) human remains; (ii) offshore installations; (iii) offshore pipelines; (iv) unprocessed fish and fish offal discarded from fishing vessels. (p) “Convention” means, unless the text otherwise indicates, the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, its Annexes and Appendices. (q) “Oslo Convention” means the Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft signed in Oslo on 15th February 1972, as amended by the protocols of 2nd March 1983 and 5th December 1989. (r) “Paris Convention” means the Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Landbased Sources, signed in Paris on 4th June 1974, as amended by the protocol of 26th March 1986. (s) “Regional economic integration organisation” means an organisation constituted by sovereign States of a given region which has competence in respect of matters

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governed by the Convention and has been duly authorised, in accordance with its internal procedures, to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Convention. Article 2 General Obligations 1. (a) The Contracting Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of the Convention, take all possible steps to prevent and eliminate pollution and shall take the necessary measures to protect the maritime area against the adverse effects of human activities so as to safeguard human health and to conserve marine ecosystems and, when practicable, restore marine areas which have been adversely affected. (b) To this end Contracting Parties shall, individually and jointly, adopt programmes and measures and shall harmonise their policies and strategies. 2. The Contracting Parties shall apply: (a) the precautionary principle, by virtue of which preventive measures are to be taken when there are reasonable grounds for concern that substances or energy introduced, directly or indirectly, into the marine environment may bring about hazards to human health, harm living resources and marine ecosystems, damage amenities or interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea, even when there is no conclusive evidence of a causal relationship between the inputs and the effects; (b) the polluter pays principle, by virtue of which the costs of pollution prevention, control and reduction measures are to be borne by the polluter. 3. (a) In implementing the Convention, Contracting Parties shall adopt programmes and measures which contain, where appropriate, time-limits for their completion and which take full account of the use of the latest technological developments and practices designed to prevent and eliminate pollution fully. (b) To this end they shall: (i) taking into account the criteria set forth in Appendix 1, define with respect to programmes and measures the application of, inter alia, –– best available techniques –– best environmental practice including, where appropriate, clean technology; (ii) in carrying out such programmes and measures, ensure the application of best available techniques and best environmental practice as so defined, including, where appropriate, clean technology. 4. The Contracting Parties shall apply the measures they adopt in such a way as to prevent an increase in pollution of the sea outside the maritime area or in other parts of the environment. 5. No provision of the Convention shall be interpreted as preventing the Contracting Parties from taking, individually or jointly, more stringent measures with respect to the prevention and elimination of pollution of the maritime area or with respect to the protection of the maritime area against the adverse effects of human activities. Article 3 Pollution from land-bases sources The Contracting Parties shall take, individually and jointly, all possible steps to prevent and eliminate pollution from land-based sources in accordance with the provisions of the Convention, in particular as provided for in Annex I.

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Article 4 Pollution by Dumping or Incineration The Contracting Parties shall take, individually and jointly, all possible steps to prevent and eliminate pollution by dumping or incineration of wastes or other matter in accordance with the provisions of the Convention, in particular as provided for in Annex II. Article 5 Pollution from offshore sources The Contracting Parties shall take, individually and jointly, all possible steps to prevent and eliminate pollution from offshore sources in accordance with the provisions of the Convention, in particular as provided for in Annex III. Article 6 Assessment of the Quality of the Marine The Contracting Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of the Convention, in particular as provided for in Annex IV: (a) undertake and publish at regular intervals joint assessments of the quality status of the marine environment and of its development, for the maritime area or for regions or sub-regions thereof; (b) include in such assessments both an evaluation of the effectiveness of the measures taken and planned for the protection of the marine environment and the identification of priorities for action. Article 7 Pollution from other sources The Contracting Parties shall cooperate with a view to adopting Annexes, in addition to the Annexes mentioned in Articles 3, 4, 5 and 6 above, prescribing measures, procedures and standards to protect the maritime area against pollution from other sources, to the extent that such pollution is not already the subject of effective measures agreed by other international organisations or prescribed by other international conventions. Article 8 Scientific and technical research 1. To further the aims of the Convention, the Contracting Parties shall establish complementary or joint programmes of scientific or technical research and, in accordance with a standard procedure, to transmit to the Commission: (a) the results of such complementary, joint or other relevant research; (b) details of other relevant programmes of scientific and technical research. 2. In so doing, the Contracting Parties shall have regard to the work carried out, in these fields, by the appropriate international organisations and agencies. Article 9 Access to information 1. The Contracting Parties shall ensure that their competent authorities are required to make available the information described in paragraph 2 of this Article to any natural or legal person, in response to any reasonable request, without that person’s having to prove an interest, without unreasonable charges, as soon as possible and at the latest within two months. 2. The information referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article is any available information in written, visual, aural or data-base form on the state of the maritime area, on activities or measures adversely affecting or likely to affect it and on activities or measures introduced in accordance with the Convention.

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3. The provisions of this Article shall not affect the right of Contracting Parties, in accordance with their national legal systems and applicable international regulations, to provide for a request for such information to be refused where it affects: (a) the confidentiality of the proceedings of public authorities, international relations and national defence; (b) public security; (c) matters which are, or have been, sub judice, or under enquiry (including disciplinary enquiries), or which are the subject of preliminary investigation proceedings; (d) commercial and industrial confidentiality, including intellectual property; (e) the confidentiality of personal data and/or files; (f) material supplied by a third party without that party being under a legal obligation to do so; (g) material, the disclosure of which would make it more likely that the environment to which such material related would be damaged. 4. The reasons for a refusal to provide the information requested must be given. Article 10 Commission 1. A Commission, made up of representatives of each of the Contracting Parties, is hereby established. The Commission shall meet at regular intervals and at any time when, due to special circumstances, it is so decided in accordance with the Rules of Procedure. 2. It shall be the duty of the Commission: (a) to supervise the implementation of the Convention; (b) generally to review the condition of the maritime area, the effectiveness of the measures being adopted, the priorities and the need for any additional or different measures; (c) to draw up, in accordance with the General Obligations of the Convention, programmes and measures for the prevention and elimination of pollution and for the control of activities which may, directly or indirectly, adversely affect the maritime area; such programmes and measure may, when appropriate, include economic instruments; (d) to establish at regular intervals its programme of work; (e) to set up such subsidiary bodies as it considers necessary and to define their terms of reference; (f) to consider and, where appropriate, adopt proposals for the amendment of the Convention in accordance with Articles 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 27; (g) to discharge the functions conferred by Articles 21 and 23 and such other functions as may be appropriate under the terms of the Convention; 3. To these ends the Commission may, inter alia, adopt decisions and recommendations in accordance with Article 13. 4. The Commission shall draw up its Rules of Procedure which shall be adopted by unanimous vote of the Contracting Parties. 5. The Commission shall draw up its Financial Regulations which shall be adopted by unanimous vote of the Contracting Parties.

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Article 11 Observers 1. The Commission may, by unanimous vote of the Contracting Parties, decide to admit as an observer: (a) any State which is not a Contracting Party to the Convention; (b) any international governmental or any non-governmental organisation the activities of which are related to the Convention. 2. Such observers may participate in meetings of the Commission but without the right to vote and may present to the Commission any information or reports relevant to the objectives of the Convention. 3. The conditions for the admission and the participation of observers shall be set in the Rules of Procedure of the Commission. Article 12 Secretariat 1. A permanent Secretariat is hereby established. 2. The Commission shall appoint an Executive Secretary and determine the duties of that post and the terms and conditions upon which it is to be held. 3. The Executive Secretary shall perform the functions that are necessary for the administration of the Convention and for the work of the Commission as well as the other tasks entrusted to the Executive Secretary by the Commission in accordance with its Rules of Procedure and its Financial Regulations. Article 13 Decisions and Recommendations 1. Decisions and recommendations shall be adopted by unanimous vote of the Contracting Parties. Should unanimity not be attainable, and unless otherwise provided in the Convention, the Commission may nonetheless adopt decisions or recommendations by a three-quarters majority vote of the Contracting Parties. 2. A decision shall be binding on the expiry of a period of two hundred days after its adoption for those Contracting Parties that voted for it and have not within that period notified the Executive Secretary in writing that they are unable to accept the decision, provided that at the expiry of that period three-quarters of the Contracting Parties have either voted for the decision and not withdrawn their acceptance or notified the Executive Secretary in writing that they are able to accept the decision. Such a decision shall become binding on any other Contracting Party which has notified the Executive Secretary in writing that it is able to accept the decision from the moment of that notification or after the expiry of a period of two hundred days after the adoption of the decision, whichever is later. 3. A notification under paragraph 2 of this Article to the Executive Secretary may indicate that a Contracting Party is unable to accept a decision insofar as it relates to one or more of its dependent or autonomous territories to which the Convention applies. 4. All decisions adopted by the Commission shall, where appropriate, contain provisions specifying the timetable by which the decision shall be implemented. 5. Recommendations shall have no binding force. 6. Decisions concerning any Annex or Appendix shall be taken only by the Contracting Parties bound by the Annex or Appendix concerned. Article 14 Status of Annexes and Appendices 1. The Annexes and Appendices form an integral part of the Convention. 2. The Appendices shall be of a scientific, technical or administrative nature. 1136

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Article 15 Amendment of the Convention 1. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 27 and to specific provisions applicable to the adoption or amendment of Annexes or Appendices, an amendment to the Convention shall be governed by the present Article. 2. Any Contracting Party may propose an amendment to the Convention. The text of the proposed amendment shall be communicated to the Contracting Parties by the Executive Secretary of the Commission at least six months before the meeting of the Commission at which it is proposed for adoption. The Executive Secretary shall also communicate the proposed amendment to the signatories to the Convention for information. 3. The Commission shall adopt the amendment by unanimous vote of the Contracting Parties. 4. The adopted amendment shall be submitted by the Depositary Government to the Contracting Parties for ratification, acceptance or approval. Ratification, acceptance or approval of the amendment shall be notified to the Depositary Government in writing. 5. The amendment shall enter into force for those Contracting Parties which have ratified, accepted or approved it on the thirtieth day after receipt by the Depositary Government of notification of its ratification, acceptance or approval by at least seven Contracting Parties. Thereafter the amendment shall enter into force for any other Contracting Party on the thirtieth day after that Contracting Party has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval of the amendment. Article 16 Adoption of Annexes The provisions of Article 15 relating to the amendment of the Convention shall also apply to the proposal, adoption and entry into force of an Annex to the Convention, except that the Commission shall adopt any Annex referred to in Article 7 by a three-quarters majority vote of the Contracting Parties. Article 17 Amendment of Annexes 1. The provisions of Article 15 relating to the amendment of the Convention shall also apply to an amendment to an Annex to the Convention, except that the Commission shall adopt amendments to any Annex referred to in Articles 3, 4, 5, 6 or 7 by a three-quarters majority vote of the Contracting Parties bound by that Annex. 2. If the amendment of an Annex is related to an amendment to the Convention, the amendment of the Annex shall be governed by the same provisions as apply to the amendment to the Convention. Article 18 Adoption of Appendices 1. If a proposed Appendix is related to an amendment to the Convention or an Annex, proposed for adoption in accordance with Article 15 or Article 17, the proposal, adoption and entry into force of that Appendix shall be governed by the same provisions as apply to the proposal, adoption and entry into force of that amendment. 2. If a proposed Appendix is related to an Annex to the Convention, proposed for adoption in accordance with Article 16, the proposal, adoption and entry into force of that Appendix shall be governed by the same provisions as apply to the proposal, adoption and entry into force of that Annex.

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Article 19 Amendment of Appendices 1. Any Contracting Party bound by an Appendix may propose an amendment to that Appendix. The text of the proposed amendment shall be communicated to all Contracting Parties to the Convention by the Executive Secretary of the Commission as provided for in paragraph 2 of Article 15. 2. The Commission shall adopt the amendment to an Appendix by a three-quarters majority vote of the Contracting Parties bound by that Appendix. 3. An amendment to an Appendix shall enter into force on the expiry of a period of two hundred days after its adoption for those Contracting Parties which are bound by that Appendix and have not within that period notified the Depositary Government in writing that they are unable to accept that amendment, provided that at the expiry of that period three-quarters of the Contracting Parties bound by that Appendix have either voted for the amendment and not withdrawn their acceptance or have notified the Depositary Government in writing that they are able to accept the amendment. 4. A notification under paragraph 3 of this Article to the Depositary Government may indicate that a Contracting Party is unable to accept the amendment insofar as it relates to one or more of its dependent or autonomous territories to which the Convention applies. 5. An amendment to an Appendix shall become binding on any other Contracting Party bound by the Appendix which has notified the Depositary Government in writing that it is able to accept the amendment from the moment of that notification or after the expiry of a period of two hundred days after the adoption of the amendment, whichever is later. 6. The Depositary Government shall without delay notify all Contracting Parties of any such notification received. 7. If the amendment of an Appendix is related to an amendment to the Convention or an Annex, the amendment of the Appendix shall be governed by the same provisions as apply to the amendment to the Convention or that Annex. Article 20 Right to Vote 1. Each Contracting Party shall have one vote in the Commission. 2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article, the European Economic Community and other regional economic integration organisations, within the areas of their competence, are entitled to a number of votes equal to the number of their Member States which are Contracting Parties to the Convention. Those organisations shall not exercise their right to vote in cases where their Member States exercise theirs and conversely. Article 21 Transboundary Pollution 1. When pollution originating from a Contracting Party is likely to prejudice the interests of one or more of the other Contracting Parties to the Convention, the Contracting Parties concerned shall enter into consultation, at the request of any one of them, with a view to negotiating a cooperation agreement. 2. At the request of any Contracting Party concerned, the Commission shall consider the question and may make recommendations with a view to reaching a satisfactory solution. 3. An agreement referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article may, inter alia, define the areas to which it shall apply, the quality objectives to be achieved and the methods for

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achieving these objectives, including methods for the application of appropriate standards and the scientific and technical information to be collected. 4. The Contracting Parties signatory to such an agreement shall, through the medium of the Commission, inform the other Contracting Parties of its purport and of the progress made in putting it into effect. Article 22 Reporting to the Commission The Contracting Parties shall report to the Commission at regular intervals on: (a) the legal, regulatory, or other measures taken by them for the implementation of the provisions of the Convention and of decisions and recommendations adopted thereunder, including in particular measures taken to prevent and punish conduct in contravention of those provisions; (b) the effectiveness of the measures referred to in subparagraph (a) of this Article; (c) problems encountered in the implementation of the provisions referred to in subparagraph (a) of this Article. Article 23 Compliance The Commission shall: (a) on the basis of the periodical reports referred to in Article 22 and any other report submitted by the Contracting Parties, assess their compliance with the Convention and the decisions and recommendations adopted thereunder; (b) when appropriate, decide upon and call for steps to bring about full compliance with the Convention, and decisions adopted thereunder, and promote the implementation of recommendations, including measures to assist a Contracting Party to carry out its obligations. Article 24 Regionalisation The Commission may decide that any decision or recommendation adopted by it shall apply to all, or a specified part, of the maritime area and may provide for different timetables to be applied, having regard to the differences between ecological and economic conditions in the various regions and sub-regions covered by the Convention. Article 25 Signature The Convention shall be open for signature at Paris from 22nd September 1992 to 30th June 1993 by: (a) the Contracting Parties to the Oslo Convention or the Paris Convention; (b) any other coastal State bordering the maritime area; (c) any State located upstream on watercourses reaching the maritime area; (d) any regional economic integration organisation having as a member at least one State to which any of the subparagraphs (a) to (c) of this Article applies. Article 26 Ratification, acceptance or approval The Convention shall be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval. The instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval shall be deposited with the Government of the French Republic.

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Article 27 Accessions 1. After 30th June 1993, the Convention shall be open for accession by the States and regional economic integration organisations referred to in Article 25. 2. The Contracting Parties may unanimously invite States or regional economic integration organisations not referred to in Article 25 to accede to the Convention. In the case of such an accession, the definition of the maritime area shall, if necessary, be amended by a decision of the Commission adopted by unanimous vote of the Contracting Parties. Any such amendment shall enter into force after unanimous approval of all the Contracting Parties on the thirtieth day after the receipt of the last notification by the Depositary Government. 3. Any such accession shall relate to the Convention including any Annex and any Appendix that have been adopted at the date of such accession, except when the instrument of accession contains an express declaration of non-acceptance of one or several Annexes other than Annexes I, II, III and IV. 4. The instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Government of the French Republic. Article 28 Reservations No reservation to the Convention may be made. Article 29 Entry into force 1. The Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date on which all Contracting Parties to the Oslo Convention and all Contracting Parties to the Paris Convention have deposited their instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. 2. For any State or regional economic integration organisation not referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, the Convention shall enter into force in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article, or on the thirtieth day following the date of the deposit of the instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession by that State or regional economic integration organisations, whichever is later. Article 30 Withdrawal 1. At any time after the expiry of two years from the date of entry into force of the Convention for a Contracting Party, that Contracting Party may withdraw from the Convention by notification in writing to the Depositary Government. 2. Except as may be otherwise provided in an Annex other than Annexes I to IV to the Convention, any Contracting Party may at any time after the expiry of two years from the date of entry into force of such Annex for that Contracting Party withdraw from such Annex by notification in writing to the Depositary Government. 3. Any withdrawal referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall take effect one year after the date on which the notification of that withdrawal is received by the Depositary Government. Article 31 Replacement of the Oslo and Paris Conventions 1. Upon its entry into force, the Convention shall replace the Oslo and Paris Conventions as between the Contracting Parties.

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2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article, decisions, recommendations and all other agreements adopted under the Oslo Convention or the Paris Convention shall continue to be applicable, unaltered in their legal nature, to the extent that they are compatible with, or not explicitly terminated by, the Convention, any decisions or, in the case of existing recommendations, any recommendations adopted thereunder. Article 32 Settlement of disputes 1. Any disputes between Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation or application of the Convention, which cannot be settled otherwise by the Contracting Parties concerned, for instance by means of inquiry or conciliation within the Commission, shall at the request of any of those Contracting Parties, be submitted to arbitration under the conditions laid down in this Article. 2. Unless the parties to the dispute decide otherwise, the procedure of the arbitration referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be in accordance with paragraphs 3 to 10 of this Article. 3. (a) At the request addressed by one Contracting Party to another Contracting Party in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article, an arbitral tribunal shall be constituted. The request for arbitration shall state the subject matter of the application including in particular the Articles of the Convention, the interpretation or application of which is in dispute. (b) The applicant party shall inform the Commission that it has requested the setting up of an arbitral tribunal, stating the name of the other party to the dispute and the Articles of the Convention the interpretation or application of which, in its opinion, is in dispute. The Commission shall forward the information thus received to all Contracting Parties to the Convention. 4. The arbitral tribunal shall consist of three members: each of the parties to the dispute shall appoint an arbitrator; the two arbitrators so appointed shall designate by common agreement the third arbitrator who shall be the chairman of the tribunal. The latter shall not be a national of one of the parties to the dispute, nor have his usual place of residence in the territory of one of these parties, nor be employed by any of them, nor have dealt with the case in any other capacity. 5. (a) If the chairman of the arbitral tribunal has not been designated within two months of the appointment of the second arbitrator, the President of the International Court of Justice shall, at the request of either party, designate him within a further two months’ period. (b) If one of the parties to the dispute does not appoint an arbitrator within two months of receipt of the request, the other party may inform the President of the International Court of Justice who shall designate the chairman of the arbitral tribunal within a further two months’ period. Upon designation, the chairman of the arbitral tribunal shall request the party which has not appointed an arbitrator to do so within two months. After such period, he shall inform the President of the International Court of Justice who shall make this appointment within a further two months’ period. 6. (a) The arbitral tribunal shall decide according to the rules of international law and, in particular, those of the Convention. (b) Any arbitral tribunal constituted under the provisions of this Article shall draw up its own rules of procedure.

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(c) In the event of a dispute as to whether the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction, the matter shall be decided by the decision of the arbitral tribunal. 7. (a) The decisions of the arbitral tribunal, both on procedure and on substance, shall be taken by majority voting of its members. (b) The arbitral tribunal may take all appropriate measures in order to establish the facts. It may, at the request of one of the parties, recommend essential interim measures of protection. (c) If two or more arbitral tribunals constituted under the provisions of this Article are seized of requests with identical or similar subjects, they may inform themselves of the procedures for establishing the facts and take them into account as far as possible. (d) The parties to the dispute shall provide all facilities necessary for the effective conduct of the proceedings. (e) The absence or default of a party to the dispute shall not constitute an impediment to the proceedings. 8. Unless the arbitral tribunal determines otherwise because of the particular circumstances of the case, the expenses of the tribunal, including the remuneration of its members, shall be borne by the parties to the dispute in equal shares. The tribunal shall keep a record of all its expenses, and shall furnish a final statement thereof to the parties. 9. Any Contracting Party that has an interest of a legal nature in the subject matter of the dispute which may be affected by the decision in the case, may intervene in the proceedings with the consent of the tribunal. 10. (a) The award of the arbitral tribunal shall be accompanied by a statement of reasons. It shall be final and binding upon the parties to the dispute. (b) Any dispute which may arise between the parties concerning the interpretation or execution of the award may be submitted by either party to the arbitral tribunal which made the award or, if the latter cannot be seized thereof, to another arbitral tribunal constituted for this purpose in the same manner as the first. Article 33 Duties of the Depositary Government The Depositary Government shall inform the Contracting Parties and the signatories to the Convention: (a) of the deposit of instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, of declarations of non-acceptance and of notifications of withdrawal in accordance with Articles 26, 27 and 30; (b) of the date on which the Convention comes into force in accordance with Article 29; (c) of the receipt of notifications of acceptance, of the deposit of instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession and of the entry into force of amendments to the Convention and of the adoption and amendment of Annexes or Appendices, in accordance with Articles 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19. Article 34 Original text The original of the Convention, of which the French and English texts shall be equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Government of the French Republic which shall send certified copies thereof to the Contracting Parties and the signatories to the Convention and shall deposit a certified copy with the Secretary General of the United

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Nations for registration and publication in accordance with Article 102 of the United Nations Charter. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorised by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention. DONE at Paris, on the twenty-second day of September 1992 ANNEX I ON THE PREVENTION AND ELIMINATION OF POLLUTION FROM LANDBASED SOURCES Article 1 1. When adopting programmes and measures for the purpose of this Annex, the Contracting Parties shall require, either individually or jointly, the use of –– best available techniques for point sources –– best environmental practice for point and diffuse sources including, where appropriate, clean technology. 2. When setting priorities and in assessing the nature and extent of the programmes and measures and their time scales, the Contracting Parties shall use the criteria given in Appendix 2. 3. The Contracting Parties shall take preventive measures to minimise the risk of pollution caused by accidents. 4. When adopting programmes and measures in relation to radioactive substances, including waste, the Contracting Parties shall also take account of: (a) the recommendations of the other appropriate international organisations and agencies; (b) the monitoring procedures recommended by these international organisations and agencies. Article 2 1. Point source discharges to the maritime area, and releases into water or air which reach and may affect the maritime area, shall be strictly subject to authorisation or regulation by the competent authorities of the Contracting Parties. Such authorisation or regulation shall, in particular, implement relevant decisions of the Commission which bind the relevant Contracting Party. 2. The Contracting Parties shall provide for a system of regular monitoring and inspection by their competent authorities to assess compliance with authorisations and regulations of releases into water or air. Article 3 For the purposes of this Annex, it shall, inter alia, be the duty of the Commission to draw up: (a) plans for the reduction and phasing out of substances that are toxic, persistent and liable to bioaccumulate arising from land-based sources; (b) when appropriate, programmes and measures for the reduction of inputs of nutrients from urban, municipal, industrial, agricultural and other sources.

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ANNEX II ON THE PREVENTION AND ELIMINATION OF POLLUTION BY DUMPING OR INCINERATION Article 1 This Annex shall not apply to any deliberate disposal in the maritime area of: (a) wastes or other matter from offshore installations; (b) offshore installations and offshore pipelines. Article 2 Incineration is prohibited. Article 3 1. The dumping of all wastes or other matter is prohibited, except for those wastes or other matter listed in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article. 2. The list referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article is as follows: (a) dredged material; (b) inert materials of natural origin, that is solid, chemically unprocessed geological material the chemical constituents of which are unlikely to be released into the marine environment; (c) sewage sludge until 31st December 1998; (d) fish waste from industrial fish processing operations; (e) vessels or aircraft until, at the latest, 31st December 2004; (f) carbon dioxide streams from carbon dioxide capture processes for storage, provided: i. disposal is into a sub-soil geological formation; ii. the streams consist overwhelmingly of carbon dioxide. They may contain incidental associated substances derived from the source material and the capture, transport and storage processes used; iii. no wastes or other matter are added for the purpose of disposing of those wastes or other matter; iv. they are intended to be retained in these formations permanently and will not lead to significant adverse consequences for the marine environment, human health and other legitimate uses of the maritime area. 3. (a) The dumping of low and intermediate level radioactive substances, including wastes, is prohibited. (b)1 As an exception to subparagraph 3(a) of this Article, those Contracting Parties, the United Kingdom and France, who wish to retain the option of an exception to subparagraph 3(a) in any case not before the expiry of a period of 15 years from 1st January 1993, shall report to the meeting of the Commission at Ministerial level in 1997 on the steps taken to explore alternative land-based options for those Contracting Parties which have ratified, accepted or approved it on the thirtieth day after receipt by

1  After the entry into force of OSPAR Decision 98/2 on Dumping of Radioactive Waste on 9 February 1999, subparagraphs (b) and (c) of this paragraph ceased to have effect.

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the Depositary Government of notification of its ratification, acceptance or approval by at least seven Contracting Parties. Thereafter the amendment will enter into force for any other Contracting Party on the thirtieth day after that Contracting Party has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval of the amendment. (c) Unless, at or before the expiry of this period of 15 years, the Commission decides by a unanimous vote not to continue the exception provided in subparagraph 3(b), it shall take a decision pursuant to Article 13 of the Convention on the prolongation for a period of 10 years after 1st January 2008 of the prohibition, after which another meeting of the Commission at Ministerial level shall be held. Those Contracting Parties mentioned in subparagraph 3(b) of this Article still wishing to retain the option mentioned in subparagraph 3(b) shall report to the Commission meetings to be held at Ministerial level at two yearly intervals from 1999 onwards about the progress in establishing alternative land-based options and on the results of scientific studies which show that any potential dumping operations would not result in hazards to human health, harm to living resources or marine ecosystems, damage to amenities or interference with other legitimate uses of the sea. Article 4 1. The Contracting Parties shall ensure that: (a) no wastes or other matter listed in paragraph 2 of Article 3 of this Annex shall be dumped without authorisation by their competent authorities, or regulation; (b) such authorisation or regulation is in accordance with the relevant applicable criteria, guidelines and procedures adopted by the Commission in accordance with Article 6 of this Annex; (c) with the aim of avoiding situations in which the same dumping operation is authorised or regulated by more than one Contracting Party, their competent authorities shall, as appropriate, consult before granting an authorisation or applying regulation. 2. Any authorisation or regulation under paragraph 1 of this Article shall not permit the dumping of vessels or aircraft containing substances which result or are likely to result in hazards to human health, harm to living resources and marine ecosystems, damage to amenities or interference with other legitimate uses of the sea. 3. Each Contracting Party shall keep, and report to the Commission records of the nature and the quantities of wastes or other matter dumped in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article, and of the dates, places and methods of dumping. Article 5 No placement of matter in the maritime area for a purpose other than that for which it was originally designed or constructed shall take place without authorisation or regulation by the competent authority of the relevant Contracting Party. Such authorisation or regulation shall be in accordance with the relevant applicable criteria, guidelines and procedures adopted by the Commission in accordance with Article 6 of this Annex. This provision shall not be taken to permit the dumping of wastes or other matter otherwise prohibited under this Annex.

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Article 6 For the purposes of this Annex, it shall, inter alia, be the duty of the Commission to draw up and adopt criteria, guidelines and procedures relating to the dumping of wastes or other matter listed in paragraph 2 of Article 3, and to the placement of matter referred to in Article 5, of this Annex, with a view to preventing and eliminating pollution. Article 7 The provisions of this Annex concerning dumping shall not apply in case of force majeure, due to stress of weather or any other cause, when the safety of human life or of a vessel or aircraft is threatened. Such dumping shall be so conducted as to minimise the likelihood of damage to human or marine life and shall immediately be reported to the Commission, together with full details of the circumstances and of the nature and quantities of the wastes or other matter dumped. Article 8 The Contracting Parties shall take appropriate measures, both individually and within relevant international organisations, to prevent and eliminate pollution resulting from the abandonment of vessels or aircraft in the maritime area caused by accidents. In the absence of relevant guidance from such international organisations, the measures taken by individual Contracting Parties should be based on such guidelines as the Commission may adopt. Article 9 In an emergency, if a Contracting Party considers that wastes or other matter the dumping of which is prohibited under this Annex cannot be disposed of on land without unacceptable danger or damage, it shall forthwith consult other Contracting Parties with a view to finding the most satisfactory methods of storage or the most satisfactory means of destruction or disposal under the prevailing circumstances. The Contracting Party shall inform the Commission of the steps adopted following this consultation. The Contracting Parties pledge themselves to assist one another in such situations. Article 10 1. Each Contracting Party shall ensure compliance with the provisions of this Annex: (a) by vessels or aircraft registered in its territory; (b) by vessels or aircraft loading in its territory the wastes or other matter which are to be dumped or incinerated; (c) by vessels or aircraft believed to be engaged in dumping or incineration within its internal waters or within its territorial sea or within that part of the sea beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea under the jurisdiction of the coastal state to the extent recognised by international law. 2. Each Contracting Party shall issue instructions to its maritime inspection vessels and aircraft and to other appropriate services to report to its authorities any incidents or conditions in the maritime area which give rise to suspicions that dumping in contravention of the provisions of the present Annex has occurred or is about to occur. Any Contracting Party whose authorities receive such a report shall, if it considers it appropriate, accordingly inform any other Contracting Party concerned.

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3. Nothing in this Annex shall abridge the sovereign immunity to which certain vessels are entitled under international law. ANNEX III ON THE PREVENTION AND ELIMINATION OF POLLUTION FROM OFFSHORE SOURCES Article 1 This Annex shall not apply to any deliberate disposal in the maritime area of: (a) wastes or other matter from vessels or aircraft; (b) vessels or aircraft. Article 2 1. When adopting programmes and measures for the purpose of this Annex, the Contracting Parties shall require, either individually or jointly, the use of: (a) best available techniques (b) best environmental practice including, where appropriate, clean technology. 2. When setting priorities and in assessing the nature and extent of the programmes and measures and their time scales, the Contracting Parties shall use the criteria given in Appendix 2. Article 3 1. Any dumping of wastes or other matter from offshore installations is prohibited. 2. This prohibition does not relate to discharges or emissions from offshore sources. 3. The prohibition referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article does not apply to carbon dioxide streams from carbon dioxide capture processes for storage, provided (a) disposal is into a sub-soil geological formation; (b) the streams consist overwhelmingly of carbon dioxide. They may contain incidental associated substances derived from the source material and the capture, transport and storage processes used; (c) no wastes or other matter are added for the purpose of disposing of those wastes or other matter; (d) they are intended to be retained in these formations permanently and will not lead to significant adverse consequences for the marine environment, human health and other legitimate uses of the maritime area. 4. The Contracting Parties shall ensure that no streams referred to in paragraph 3 shall be disposed of in sub-soil geological formations without authorisation or regulation by their competent authorities. Such authorisation or regulation shall, in particular, implement the relevant applicable decisions, recommendations and all other agreements adopted under the Convention. Article 4 1. The use on, or the discharge or emission from, offshore sources of substances which may reach and affect the maritime area shall be strictly subject to authorisation

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or regulation by the competent authorities of 4 Paragraphs 3 and 4 were introduced by amendment to the Annex agreed by OSPAR 2007. The amendment will enter into force for those Contracting Parties which have ratified, accepted or approved it on the thirtieth day after receipt by the Depositary Government of notification of its ratification, acceptance or approval by at least seven Contracting Parties. Thereafter the amendment will enter into force for any other Contracting Party on the thirtieth day after that Contracting Party has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval of the amendment. Such authorisation or regulation shall, in particular, implement the relevant applicable decisions, recommendations and all other agreements adopted under the Convention. 2. The competent authorities of the Contracting Parties shall provide for a system of monitoring and inspection to assess compliance with authorisation or regulation as provided for in paragraph 1 of Article 4 of this Annex. Article 5 1. No disused offshore installation or disused offshore pipeline shall be dumped and no disused offshore installation shall be left wholly or partly in place in the maritime area without a permit issued by the competent authority of the relevant Contracting Party on a case-by-case basis. The Contracting Parties shall ensure that their authorities, when granting such permits, shall implement the relevant applicable decisions, recommendations and all other agreements adopted under the Convention. 2. No such permit shall be issued if the disused offshore installation or disused offshore pipeline contains substances which result or are likely to result in hazards to human health, harm to living resources and marine ecosystems, damage to amenities or interference with other legitimate uses of the sea. 3. Any Contracting Party which intends to take the decision to issue a permit for the dumping of a disused offshore installation or a disused offshore pipeline placed in the maritime area after 1st January 1998 shall, through the medium of the Commission, inform the other Contracting Parties of its reasons for accepting such dumping, in order to make consultation possible. 4. Each Contracting Party shall keep, and report to the Commission, records of the disused offshore installations and disused offshore pipelines dumped and of the disused offshore installations left in place in accordance with the provisions of this Article, and of the dates, places and methods of dumping. Article 6 Articles 3 and 5 of this Annex shall not apply in case of force majeure, due to stress of weather or any other cause, when the safety of human life or of an offshore installation is threatened. Such dumping shall be so conducted as to minimise the likelihood of damage to human or marine life and shall immediately be reported to the Commission, together with full details of the circumstances and of the nature and quantities of the matter dumped. Article 7 The Contracting Parties shall take appropriate measures, both individually and within relevant international organisations, to prevent and eliminate pollution resulting from the

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abandonment of offshore installations in the maritime area caused by accidents. In the absence of relevant guidance from such international organisations, the measures taken by individual Contracting Parties should be based on such guidelines as the Commission may adopt. Article 8 No placement of a disused offshore installation or a disused offshore pipeline in the maritime area for a purpose other than that for which it was originally designed or constructed shall take place without authorisation or regulation by the competent authority of the relevant Contracting Party. Such authorisation or regulation shall be in accordance with the relevant applicable criteria, guidelines and procedures adopted by the Commission in accordance with subparagraph (d) of Article 10 of this Annex. This provision shall not be taken to permit the dumping of disused offshore installations or disused offshore pipelines in contravention of the provisions of this Annex. Article 9 1. Each Contracting Party shall issue instructions to its maritime inspection vessels and aircraft and to other appropriate services to report to its authorities any incidents or conditions in the maritime area which give rise to suspicions that a contravention of the provisions of the present Annex has occurred or is about to occur. Any Contracting Party whose authorities receive such a report shall, if it considers it appropriate, accordingly inform any other Contracting Party concerned. 2. Nothing in this Annex shall abridge the sovereign immunity to which certain vessels are entitled under international law. Article 10 For the purposes of this Annex, it shall, inter alia, be the duty of the Commission: (a) to collect information about substances which are used in offshore activities and, on the basis of that information, to agree lists of substances for the purposes of paragraph 1 of Article 4 of this Annex; (b) to list substances which are toxic, persistent and liable to bioaccumulate and to draw up plans for the reduction and phasing out of their use on, or discharge from, offshore sources; (c) to draw up criteria, guidelines and procedures for the prevention of pollution from dumping of disused offshore installations and of disused offshore pipelines, and the leaving in place of offshore installations, in the maritime area; (d) to draw up criteria, guidelines and procedures relating to the placement of disused offshore installations and disused offshore pipelines referred to in Article 8 of this Annex, with a view to preventing and eliminating pollution.

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ANNEX IV ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE QUALITY OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT Article 1 1. For the purposes of this Annex “monitoring” means the repeated measurement of: (a) the quality of the marine environment and each of its compartments, that is, water, sediments and biota; (b) activities or natural and anthropogenic inputs which may affect the quality of the marine environment; (c) the effects of such activities and inputs. 2. Monitoring may be undertaken either for the purposes of ensuring compliance with the Convention, with the objective of identifying patterns and trends or for research purposes. Article 2 For the purposes of this Annex, the Contracting Parties shall: (a) cooperate in carrying out monitoring programmes and submit the resulting data to the Commission; (b) comply with quality assurance prescriptions and participate in intercalibration exercises; (c) use and develop, individually or preferably jointly, other duly validated scientific assessment tools, such as modelling, remote sensing and progressive risk assessment strategies; (d) carry out, individually or preferably jointly, research which is considered necessary to assess the quality of the marine environment, and to increase knowledge and scientific understanding of the marine environment and, in particular, of the relationship between inputs, concentration and effects; (e) take into account scientific progress which is considered to be useful for such assessment purposes and which has been made elsewhere either on the initiative of individual researchers and research institutions, or through other national and international research programmes or under the auspices of the European Economic Community or other regional economic integration organisations. Article 3 For the purposes of this Annex, it shall, inter alia, be the duty of the Commission: (a) to define and implement programmes of collaborative monitoring and assessment-related research, to draw up codes of practice for the guidance of participants in carrying out these monitoring programmes and to approve the presentation and interpretation of their results; (b) to carry out assessments taking into account the results of relevant monitoring and research and the data relating to inputs of substances or energy into the maritime area which are provided by virtue of other Annexes to the Convention, as well as other relevant information; (c) to seek, where appropriate, the advice or services of competent regional organisations and other competent international organisations and competent bodies with a view to incorporating the latest results of scientific research; 1150

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(d) to cooperate with competent regional organisations and other competent international organisations in carrying out quality status assessments. ANNEX V ON THE PROTECTION AND CONSERVATION OF THE ECOSYSTEMS AND BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY OF THE MARITIME AREA2,3 Article 1 For the purposes of this Annex and of Appendix 3 the definitions of “biological diversity”, “ecosystem” and “habitat” are those contained in the Convention on Biological Diversity of 5 June 1992. Article 2 In fulfilling their obligation under the Convention to take, individually and jointly, the necessary measures to protect the maritime area against the adverse effects of human activities so as to safeguard human health and to conserve marine ecosystems and, when practicable, restore marine areas which have been adversely affected, as well as their obligation under the Convention on Biological Diversity of 5 June 1992 to develop strategies, plans or programmes for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, Contracting Parties shall: a. take the necessary measures to protect and conserve the ecosystems and the biological diversity of the maritime area, and to restore, where practicable, marine areas which have been adversely affected; and b. cooperate in adopting programmes and measures for those purposes for the control of the human activities identified by the application of the criteria in Appendix 3. Article 3 1. For the purposes of this Annex, it shall inter alia be the duty of the Commission: a. to draw up programmes and measures for the control of the human activities identified by the application of the criteria in Appendix 3; b. in doing so: (i) to collect and review information on such activities and their effects on ecosystems and biological diversity; 2 

In accordance with Article 15.5 of the Convention, Annex V and Appendix 3 has entered into force: –– on 30 August 2000 for Finland, Spain, Switzerland, Luxembourg, European Community, United Kingdom and Denmark; –– on 5 October 2000 for Sweden; –– on 18 July 2001 for Iceland; –– on 22 July 2001 for Norway; –– on 24 August 2001 for the Netherlands; –– on 13 January 2002 for Germany; –– on 21 June 2003 for Ireland; –– on 24 November 2004 for France; –– on 28 August 2005 for Belgium; –– on 25 March 2006 for Portugal. 3  In a Note Verbale dated 26 July 2005, the Embassy of Great Britain in Paris informed the French Government that the British government wished to extend the ratification of Annex V and Appendix 3 to the Isle of Man.

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(ii) to develop means, consistent with international law, for instituting protective, conservation, restorative or precautionary measures related to specific areas or sites or related to particular species or habitats; (iii) subject to Article 4 of this Annex, to consider aspects of national strategies and guidelines on the sustainable use of components of biological diversity of the maritime area as they affect the various regions and sub-regions of that area; (iv) subject to Article 4 of this Annex, to aim for the application of an integrated ecosystem approach. c. also in doing so, to take account of programmes and measures adopted by Contracting Parties for the protection and conservation of ecosystems within waters under their sovereignty or jurisdiction. 2. In the adoption of such programmes and measures, due consideration shall be given to the question whether any particular programme or measure should apply to all, or a specified part, of the maritime area. Article 4 1. In accordance with the penultimate recital of the Convention, no programme or measure concerning a question relating to the management of fisheries shall be adopted under this Annex. However where the Commission considers that action is desirable in relation to such a question, it shall draw that question to the attention of the authority or international body competent for that question. Where action within the competence of the Commission is desirable to complement or support action by those authorities or bodies, the Commission shall endeavour to cooperate with them. 2. Where the Commission considers that action under this Annex is desirable in relation to a question concerning maritime transport, it shall draw that question to the attention of the International Maritime Organisation. The Contracting Parties who are members of the International Maritime Organisation shall endeavour to cooperate within that Organisation in order to achieve an appropriate response, including in relevant cases that Organisation’s agreement to regional or local action, taking account of any guidelines developed by that Organisation on the designation of special areas, the identification of particularly sensitive areas or other matters.

Document 224 Convention on the Protection of the Environment between Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden (Nordic Environmental Protection Convention) (19 February 1974)* The Governments of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, considering it extremely important of the urgent need to protect and improve the environment, have agreed as follows: *  Done at Stockholm, 19 February 1974; entered into force 5 October 1976; 1092 UNTS 296 [Registration Number 16770]. From United Nations Treaty Series, by United Nations Office of Legal Affairs Treaty Section, © 1986, United Nations. Reprinted with the permission of the United Nations.

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Article 1 For the purpose of this Convention, environmentally harmful activities shall mean the discharge from the soil or from buildings or installations of solid or liquid waste, gas or any other substance into water courses, lakes or the sea and the use of land, the seabed, buildings or installations in any other way which entails or may entail environmental nuisance by water pollution or any other effect on water conditions, sand drift, air pollution, noise, vibration, changes in temperature, ionizing radiation, light etc. The Convention shall not apply insofar as environmentally harmful activities are regulated by a special agreement between two or more of the Contracting States. Article 2 In considering the permissibility of environmentally harmful activities, the nuisance which such activities entail or may entail in another Contracting State shall be equated with a nuisance in the States where the activities are carried out. Article 3 Any person who is affected or may be affected by a nuisance caused by environmentally harmful activities in another Contracting State shall have the right to bring before the appropriate Court or Administrative Authority of that State the question of the permissibility of such activities including the question of measures to prevent damage, and to appeal against the decision of the Court or the Administrative Authority to the same extent and on the same terms as a legal entity of the State in which the activities are being carried out. The provisions of the first paragraph of this Article shall be equally applicable in the case of proceedings concerning compensation for damage caused by environmentally harmful activities. The question of compensation shall not be judged by rules which are less favourable to the injured party than the rules of compensation of the State in which the activities are being carried out. Article 4 Each State shall appoint a special authority (supervisory authority) to be entrusted with the task of safeguarding general environmental interests insofar as regards nuisances arising out of environmentally harmful activities in another Contracting State. For the purpose of safeguarding such interests, the supervisory authority shall have the right to institute proceedings before or be heard by the competent Court or Administrative Authority of another Contracting State regarding the permissibility of the environmentally harmful activities if an authority or other representative of general environmental interests in that State can institute proceedings or be heard in matters of this kind, as well as the right to appeal against the decision of the Court or the Administrative Authority in accordance with the procedures and rules of appeal applicable to such cases in the State concerned. Article 5 If the Court or the Administrative Authority examining the permissibility of environ­ mentally harmful activities (examining authority) finds that the activities entail or may entail nuisance of significance in another Contracting State, the examining authority shall, if proclamation or publication is required in cases of that nature, send as soon as possible a copy of the documents of the case to the supervisory authority of the other 1153

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State, and afford it the opportunity of giving its opinion. Notification of the date and place of a meeting or inspection shall, where appropriate, be given well in advance to the supervisory authority which, moreover, shall be kept informed of any developments that may be of interest to it. Article 6 Upon the request of the supervisory authority, the examining authority shall, insofar as compatible with the procedural rules of the States in which the activities are being carried out, require the applicant for a permit to carry out environmentally harmful activities to submit such additional particulars, drawings and technical specifications as the examining authority deems necessary for evaluating the effects in the other State. Article 7 The supervisory authority, if it finds it necessary on account of public or private interests, shall publish communications from the examining authority in the local newspaper or in some other suitable manner. The supervisory authority shall also institute such investigations of the effects in its own State as it deems necessary. Article 8 Each State shall defray the cost of the activities of its supervisory authority. Article 9 If, in a particular case, the supervisory authority has informed the appropriate Court of Administrative authority of the State in which the activities are being carried out that in the case concerned the duties of the supervisory authority shall be discharged by another authority, the provisions of this Convention relating to supervisory activities shall, where appropriate, apply to that authority. Article 10 If necessary for determining the damage caused in another State by environmentally harmful activities, the supervisory authority of that other State shall upon request of the examining authority of the State in which the activities are being carried out make arrangements for on-site inspection. The examining authority or an expert appointed by it may be present at such an inspection. Where necessary, more detailed instructions concerning inspections such as referred to in the preceding paragraph shall be drawn up in consultation between the countries concerned. Article 11 Where the permissibility of environmentally harmful activities which entail considerable nuisance in another Contracting State is being examined by the Government or by the appropriate Minister or Ministry of the State in which the activities are being carried out, consultations shall take place between the States concerned if the Government of the former State so requests.

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Article 12 In cases such as those referred to in Article 11, the Government of each State concerned may demand that an opinion be given by a Commission which, unless otherwise agreed, shall consist of a chairman from another Contracting State to be appointed jointly by the parties and three members from each of the States concerned. Where such a Commission has been appointed, the case cannot be decided upon until the Commission has given its opinion. Each State shall remunerate the members it has appointed. Fees or other remuneration of the Chairman as well as any other costs incidental to the activities of the Commission which are not manifestly the responsibility of one or the other State, shall be equally shared by the States concerned. Article 13 This Convention shall also apply to the continental shelf areas of the Contracting States. Article 14 This Convention shall enter into force six months from the date on which all the Contracting States have notified the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs that the constitutional measures necessary for the entry into force of the Convention have been implemented. The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs shall notify the other Contracting States of the receipt of such communications. Article 15 Actions or cases relevant to this Convention, which are pending before a Court or an Administrative Authority on the date when this Convention enters into force, shall be dealt with and judged according to provisions previously in force. Article 16 Any Contracting State wishing to denounce this Convention shall give notice of its intention in writing to the Swedish Government, which shall forthwith inform the other Contracting States of the denunciation and of the date on which notice was received. The denunciation shall take effect twelve months from the date on which the Swedish Government received such notification or on such later date as may be indicated in the notice of denunciation. This Convention shall be deposited with the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which shall send certified copies thereof to the Government of each Contracting State. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, representative of the Contracting States, being duly authorized thereto by the irrespective Governments, have signed this Convention. DONE at Stockholm, this 19th day of February 1974 in a single copy in the Danish, Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish languages, all texts being equally authoritative. PROTOCOL In connection with the signing today of the Nordic Environmental Protection Convention the duly authorized signatories agreed that the following comments on its application shall be appended to the Convention.

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In the application of Article discharge from the soil, or from buildings or installations of solid or liquid waste, gases or other substances into watercourses, lakes or the sea shall be regarded as environmentally harmful activities only if the discharge entails or may entail a nuisance to the surroundings. The right established in Article 3 for anyone who suffers injury as a result of environmentally harmful activities in a neighbouring State to institute proceedings for compensation before a court or administrative authority of that State shall, in principle, be regarded as including the right to demand the purchase of his real property. Article 5 shall be regarded as applying also to applications for permits where such applications are referred to certain authorities and organizations for their opinion but not in conjunction with proclamation or publication procedures. The Contracting States shall require officials of the supervisory authority to observe professional secrecy as regards trade secrets, operational devices or business conditions of which they have become cognizant in dealing with cases concerning environmentally harmful activities in another State.

Document 225 Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Kingdom of Denmark for Cooperation Relating to the Marine Environment (26 August 1983)* The Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the Government of Canada, Conscious of the economic and social importance of the marine environment of the waters lying between Canada and Greenland and of its living resources, Conscious of their responsibility to protect and enhance this unique marine environment for the benefit of their peoples, Taking into account the developments at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, in particular the text on “ice-covered areas”, Conscious of the risk of pollution incidents resulting from the expansion of economic activities in the said waters, Convinced of the need to cooperate closely in preventing and responding to pollution incidents which may result from such activities, Desiring to develop further bilateral cooperation in respect of the protection of the marine environment, particularly with respect to preparedness measures as a contingency against pollution incidents that may affect the marine environment of these waters, Have agreed as follows: Article I Definitions For the purpose of this Agreement: (a) “Areas of responsibility”, unless otherwise provided by any annex to this Agreement for the purpose of that annex, means, with respect to Canada, those areas of Nares Strait, Baffin Bay and Davis Strait lying between Canada and *  Done at Copenhagen, 26 August 1983; entered into force on the same day; 1348 UNTS 122 [Registration Number 22693]. From United Nations Treaty Series, by United Nations Office of Legal Affairs Treaty Section, © 1992, United Nations. Reprinted with the permission of the United Nations.

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Greenland west of the dividing line established by the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the Government of Canada relating to the delimitation of the continental shelf between Greenland and Canada, signed at Ottawa on December 17, 1973; with respect to Denmark, those areas of Nares Strait, Baffin Bay and Davis Strait east of the above-mentioned dividing line; and areas resulting from any subsequent delimitation as may be agreed between the two Governments. “Area covered by this Agreement” means the areas of responsibility of both Parties. “Harmful substance” means any substance, including hydrocarbons, the escape or discharge of which is liable to create a hazard to human health, to harm living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea and adjacent coastal areas. “Pollution incident” means an event or series of events having the same origin involving the actual or probable escape or discharge of any harmful substance or effluents containing such substance into the sea. “Parties” means the Government of Canada and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark.

Article II Application This Agreement applies to the prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the marine environment resulting from activities within the area covered by this Agreement. Article III Pollution Prevention 1. In implementing this Agreement the Parties shall cooperate fully in order to protect the marine environment within their areas of responsibility. 2. Each Party shall, as appropriate and in accordance with international law, comply with a request from the other Party to investigate violations of legislation for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution that are alleged to have occurred within the former’s area of responsibility. Article IV Notification and Consultation 1. Prior to the initiation of any works or undertakings in its area of responsibility which may create a significant risk of pollution in the area of responsibility of the other Party, each Party on its own initiative or at the request of the other Party shall provide the other Party with all relevant information and data, the transmission of which is not prohibited by their respective laws or subject to any understanding with respect to confidentiality, and shall invite the comments of the other Party. 2. Each Party shall enter into consultations at the request of the other Party on any works or undertakings referred to in paragraph 1 and shall pursue such consultations over a reasonable period of time. Such consultations, held in the best spirit of cooperation and good neighbourliness, shall not be used by a Party to delay unreasonably or to impede the works or undertakings on which consultations are taking place. Article V Installations The Parties shall take measures to ensure that installations engaged in exploration for or exploitation of the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil in their respective 1157

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areas of responsibility are designed, constructed, placed, equipped, marked, operated and maintained in such a manner that the risk of pollution of the marine environment is minimized. Article VI Exchange of Scientific and other Information 1. The Parties shall cooperate for the purpose of promoting studies, undertaking programmes of scientific research and encouraging the exchange of information and data acquired relating to pollution of the marine environment, subject to their respective laws or any understanding with respect to confidentiality. In particular the Parties shall cooperate as appropriate in: (a) Complementary or joint scientific research programmes for observation of the quality of the marine environment; (b) The development of compatible marine pollution measurement methods; (c) The development of methods to assess the risk and extent of damage related to any introduction of harmful substance into the marine environment. 2. At the request of a Party, and when appropriate, the other Party shall provide information on existing or proposed legislative, regulatory or other governmental control measures that may affect the marine environment in the former’s area of responsibility. 3. The Parties shall at the request of either Party, or at reasonable intervals agreeable to both Parties, hold consultations on any subject covered by this article. Article VII Vessel Traffic 1. The Parties shall cooperate and assist each other in their respective vessel traffic management or ship reporting services in relation to ships navigating in the area covered by this Agreement. 2. (i) The Parties shall cooperate in identifying, monitoring and reviewing as necessary appropriate routing areas for vessels in the area covered by this Agreement outside territorial waters with a view to avoiding harmful effects to the marine environment and to the economic and social conditions in the area covered by this Agreement. (ii) In assessing the need for such cooperation the Parties shall take into account the type of vessels, the frequency of passage, the nature of cargoes, the means of propulsion, the ice conditions and such other factors as may pose a particular hazard to the marine environment. Article VIII Compensation The Parties shall endeavour to ensure that adequate compensation is available in respect of damage and related clean-up costs caused by pollution of the marine environment from installations engaged in exploration for or exploitation of the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil in their respective areas of responsibility. Article IX Facilitation of Access Each Party shall facilitate, in accordance with its laws and regulations, entry into its area of responsibility of vessels, aircraft, personnel or equipment of the other Party taking part in response operations referred to in the Annexes to this Agreement.

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Article X Relationship to other Agreements 1. Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the position of either Party regarding matters not directly covered by this Agreement in other bilateral relations or in multilateral relations. 2. Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the codification and development of the law of the sea resulting from the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea nor, in this connection, the present or future claims and legal views of either Party concerning the nature and extent of coastal and flag state jurisdiction. Article XI Annexes 1. Any annex to this Agreement shall form an integral part of this Agreement. 2. The Parties may agree on additional annexes which shall enter into force as provided for in an exchange of notes between the Parties. Article XII Amendment 1. This Agreement may be amended by an exchange of notes between the Parties. 2. Any annex to this Agreement may be amended as provided therein. 3. In addition, any supplements to an annex may be agreed upon and amended as provided in the annex. Article XIII Settlement of Disputes 1. In case of a dispute between the Parties as to the interpretation or application of this Agreement, they should seek a solution by negotiation. 2. If the Parties have not been able to resolve their dispute through negotiations within a period of 6 months, such dispute shall be submitted to an ad hoc tribunal at the request of either Party. 3. The ad hoc tribunal shall consist of three members. The parties shall each appoint one member. The two members shall jointly appoint the President of the tribunal. If the President of the tribunal has not been appointed within six months, either Party may request the President of the International Court of Justice to make the appointment. The ad hoc tribunal may establish its own rules of procedure. Article XIV Entry into force and termination This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature by the duly authorized representatives of the Parties and shall remain in force until terminated upon six months notice given in writing by one of the Parties to the other. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto, have signed this Agreement. DONE in two copies at Copenhagen, this twenty-sixth day of August one thousand nine hundred and eighty-three in English, French and Danish, each version being equally authentic.

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ANNEX A Joint Contingency Plan concerning Pollution Incidents Resulting from Offshore Hydrocarbon Exploration or Exploitation Paragraph 1. 1.1. For the purpose of this annex, “areas of responsibility” means, with respect to Canada, those areas of Nares Strait, Baffin Bay and Davis Strait between Canada and Greenland west of the dividing line established by the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the Government of Canada relating to the delimitation of the continental shelf between Greenland and Canada, signed at Ottawa on December 17, 1973, and, with respect to Denmark, those areas of Nares Strait, Baffin Bay and Davis Strait east of the above-mentioned dividing line, and further shall include those areas of the Labrador Sea in which, in accordance with international law, Canada and Denmark have, respectively, sovereign rights. 1.2. The Party within whose area of responsibility a pollution incident occurs shall make an assessment of the nature and extent of the pollution incident or, as the case may be, of the type and approximate quantity of harmful substances floating on, or suspended in the sea, and the direction and speed of movement of such substances. 1.3. In its area of responsibility, each Party shall respond expeditiously and to the best of its ability to a pollution incident that affects or threatens to affect the area of responsibility of the other Party. 1.4. When a pollution incident occurs, each Party shall respond expeditiously and to the best of its ability to a call for assistance from the other Party. 1.5. Action taken by a Party in accordance with this paragraph shall be consistent with its relevant laws and regulations and subject to the operational requirements or other obligations of the appropriate agencies of each Party. Paragraph 2. 2.1. Information shall be exchanged regarding drilling operations and related matters. Such information shall be exchanged when plans are being considered for approval, during drilling operations and in the phases subsequent to the completion of drilling. 2.2. The Parties shall exchange information on the status and implementation of their respective pollution contingency plans including the contingency plans of concessionaires/operators. 2.3. Exchange of information between the Parties in accordance with this paragraph shall be subject to their respective laws or any understanding with respect to confidentiality. 2.4. The Parties shall keep each other informed of: (I) The agencies responsible for coordinating response operations in the event of a pollution incident, (II) The organizations and officials responsible within the aforementioned agencies, (III) The procedures to initiate the contingency plans for the areas concerned, (IV) Such personnel, equipment and other resources as may be available.

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Paragraph 3. 3.1. In the event of a pollution incident that affects or threatens to affect the areas of responsibility of both Parties, the Party in whose area of responsibility the pollution incident has occurred shall immediately notify the other Party. The notification shall if possible include: (I) The geographical position of the pollution incident, (II) The source of the pollution incident, (III) A description of the nature of the pollution incident and of the type and amount of the harmful substance, (IV) Other relevant details and such further information as may reasonably be requested by the other Party. 3.2. The notifying Party and the Party receiving notification shall keep each other fully informed of developments relating to the pollution incident, and of any action they may take or plan to take in order to combat the pollution incident. Paragraph 4. 4.1. The Party in whose area of responsibility the pollution incident occurs shall, upon request by the other Party, provide facilities for a representative or representatives of the other Party to observe the planning, evaluation and implementation of response operations to combat the pollution incident. Paragraph 5. 5.1. The Party in whose area of responsibility a pollution incident occurs shall supervise and command response operations within such area by designating an On-Scene Commander (OSC), who for this purpose need not necessarily be located in the geographical position of the incident. 5.2. In the event of a pollution incident that affects or threatens to affect the areas of responsibility of both Parties, or in the event of a request for assistance to the other Party, the OSC shall be assisted by a Deputy On-Scene Commander (DOSC) appointed by the Party which is not providing the OSC. The DOSC shall also act as the direct liaison between the OSC and the Agencies of the Government which the DOSC represents. 5.3. In the event of a pollution incident which necessitates the extension of response operations into the area of responsibility of the other Party, the Parties shall determine whether and when a shift of supervision and command from one Party to the other may be required by the circumstances of the pollution incident; in such event, the DOSC shall prepare suitable arrangements for such shift of supervision and command or for the coordination of response operations by both Parties. Paragraph 6. 6.1. The Party in whose area of responsibility a pollution incident occurs shall bear all direct costs of response operations: (I) Taken by the other Party upon request of the OSC, (II) Taken by the other Party as agreed between the OSC and DOSC, (III) Taken by the other Party in its area of responsibility as may be necessary and reasonable as an immediate response pending the appointment of an OSC and DOSC, in the event that such pollution incident affects or threatens to affect the areas of responsibility of that Party. 1161

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6.2. The provisions of this paragraph shall apply as between the two Parties, without prejudice to rights of recovery against third parties. The Party to whom costs of response operations are reimbursed will assist as appropriate the other Party in exercising a right of recovery against a third party including the provision of documentation and witnesses. Paragraph 7. 7.1. Agencies designated by the respective parties may agree to amendments to this annex. Such amendments shall come into force on signature. 7.2. The appropriate agencies of the Parties may agree on and amend any supplement regarding operational implementation of this annex. ANNEX B Joint Contingency Plan concerning Pollution incidents Resulting from Shipping Activities. Paragraph 1. 1.1. For the purpose of enhancing the safety of shipping and to protect the marine environment, the Parties shall endeavour to exchange current information as appropriate on the nature and movement of shipping in the area covered by this Agreement. 1.2. The Parties shall exchange information on the status and implementation of their respective ship-source pollution contingency plans. 1.3. Exchange of information between the Parties in accordance with this Paragraph shall be subject to their respective laws or any understanding with respect to confidentiality. 1.4. The Parties shall keep each other informed of: (I) The agencies responsible for coordinating response operations in the event of a shipsource pollution incident, (II) The organizations and officials responsible within the aforementioned agencies, (III) The procedures to initiate the contingency plans for the areas concerned, (IV) Such personnel, equipment and other resources as may be available. Paragraph 2. 2.1. The Parties undertake to request the masters of all ships and pilots of all aircraft in the area covered by this Agreement to report without delay through the channels which may be most practicable and adequate in the circumstances: (I) Any casualty that is causing or likely to cause a pollution incident, (II) The presence, nature and extent of harmful substances likely to constitute a serious threat to the coast or related interests of one of the Parties. Paragraph 3. 3.1. In the event of a pollution incident, the Party within whose area of responsibility the incident occurs shall make an assessment of the nature and extent of the pollution incident in order to enable that Party to decide whether to initiate a response operation to combat the pollution incident. In making such assessment the Parties shall take into account the type and quantity of harmful substances and their direction and speed.

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Paragraph 4. 4.1. In the event of a pollution incident that affects or threatens to affect the areas of responsibility of both Parties, the Party in whose area of responsibility the pollution incident has occurred shall immediately notify the other Party in order to enable the latter Party to decide whether to initiate a response operation to combat the pollution incident. The notification shall if possible include: (I) The geographical position of the pollution incident, (II) The source of the pollution incident, (III) A description of the nature of the pollution incident and of the type and amount of the harmful substance, (IV) Other relevant details and such further information as may reasonably be requested by the other Party. 4.2. The notifying Party and the Party receiving notification shall keep each other fully informed of developments relating to the pollution incident, and of any action they may take or plan to take in order to combat the pollution incident. Paragraph 5. 5.1. When a pollution incident occurs, each Party shall respond expeditiously and to the best of its ability to a call for assistance from the other Party. 5.2. Action taken by a Party in accordance with this paragraph shall be consistent with its relevant laws and regulations and subject to the operational requirements or other obligations of the appropriate agencies of each Party. Paragraph 6. 6.1. The Party in whose area of responsibility the pollution incident occurs shall, upon request by the other Party, provide facilities for a representative or representatives of the other Party to observe the planning, evaluation and implementation of response operations to combat the pollution incident. Paragraph 7. 7.1. Response operations to combat a pollution incident shall be supervised by the Party initiating the response operation who shall designate an On-Scene Commander (OSC), who for this purpose need not necessarily be located in the geographical position of the incident. 7.2. When a Party calls on the other Party for assistance in response to a pollution incident, the first Party shall retain command of the combined operation and the other Party may appoint a Deputy On-Scene Commander (DOSC). 7.3. A shift of supervision and command of combined operations from one Party to the other may be determined by the Parties in light of the development of the response operation. Paragraph 8. 8.1. The costs of a response operation shall be borne by the Party initiating the operation. 8.2. If however, a Party calls upon the other Party for assistance, the first Party shall bear all direct costs of such operations taken by the other Party upon request.

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8.3. Notwithstanding paragraph 8.I., any measure taken by a Party that is necessary and reasonable as immediate response pending designation of the OSC does not constitute initiation of a response operation for the purposes of this Agreement. 8.4. The costs of a response operation subsequent to a shift of supervision and command from one Party to another pursuant to paragraph 7.3 shall be borne by the latter Party. 8.5. The provisions of this Paragraph shall apply as between the two Parties, without prejudice to rights of recovery against third parties. The Party to whom costs of response operations are reimbursed will assist as appropriate the other Party in exercising a right of recovery against a third party including the provision of documentation and witnesses. Paragraph 9. 9.1. Agencies designated by the respective Parties may agree to amendments to this annex. Such amendments shall come into force upon signature. 9.2. The appropriate agencies of the Parties may agree on and amend any supplement regarding operational implementation of this annex.

Document 226 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Prevention of Pollution of the Environment in the Arctic (16 December 1994)* The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation (hereinafter referred to as the Parties), Recognizing the sensitivity of the Arctic environment and our mutual commitment to protect the Arctic environment and to promote the social and economic interests of local, especially indigenous populations, including their traditional way of life; Concerned over the potential threats posed by contaminants in the Arctic region to the health of the indigenous and local populations of the region as well as to its flora and fauna; Convinced that cooperation and sharing of experience between the Parties will contribute to understanding and effective response to any such threat both on a national basis and within broader international efforts to protect the Arctic environment; Desiring to build upon the results of the American-Russian Summit held in Vancouver, April 3–4, 1993; Noting the particular importance of relevant provisions of Part XII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982; the provisions of the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter of 1972; and the provisions of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy of 1991; Have agreed as follows: Article 1 The Parties shall cooperate in the prevention, reduction and control of pollution in the Arctic marine and terrestrial environment resulting from the accidental or intentional introduction of contaminants into that environment. *  Done at Moscow, 16 December 1994; entered into force on the same day; reprinted from BH Weston/JC Carlson, International Law & World Order: Weston’s & Carlson’s Basic Documents (Brill Online, 2015).

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To this end the Parties shall cooperate in research, monitoring, assessment and other activities, bilaterally and in the appropriate multilateral fora. Article 2 1. The Parties shall cooperate in the conduct of scientific research, monitoring, and assessment activities to determine the potential impacts of contaminants in the Arctic environment, including, inter alia: 1) the pathways by which such contaminants reach and are dispersed within the Arctic environment; 2) the effects of such contaminants, including rates of bio-accumulation, upon Arctic flora and fauna, including fish populations; and 3) the effects of such contaminants upon human health in the Arctic environment, especially upon local and indigenous populations. 2. The Parties further shall cooperate in the monitoring and assessment of levels of hazardous contamination in the Arctic environment, including, inter alia: 1) exchange of data and information on the effects of disposal and release of such contaminants introduced directly or indirectly into the Arctic environment; 2) determination of the level, chemical composition, and patterns of such contamination caused by releases from sites at which materials have been stored, processed or disposed; and 3) determination of the amount, concentrations and dynamics of such contaminants introduced into the marine zone, including through rivers and other watercourses, natural or artificial, and via ice transport and ice rafted sediment. 3. The Parties shall consult with regard to technical solutions for the elimination of radioactive and other types of contamination impacts. 4. The Parties shall cooperate in the conduct of joint scientific research to predict ecological impacts of the existing disposals of radioactive waste and consult with regard to technical solutions for the elimination of disposals in places where ecological safety is not insured. 5. Cooperation between the Parties in scientific research and monitoring referred to in this Article shall take place bilaterally, and within the appropriate international, including regional, mechanisms, in particular the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy of 1991 and the International Arctic Seas Assessment Program of 1993 the International Atomic Energy Agency. Article 3 1. Each Party shall facilitate joint activities under Article 2 in areas that are under its jurisdiction in accordance with international law and that are or are believed to be contaminated, under such reasonable conditions as it may establish. 2. The Parties shall ensure that the data and information resulting from such research and monitoring are exchanged and made freely available on a reciprocal basis. Article 4 The Parties shall promote the development of specific measures to give effect to this Agreement, including: 1) programs for the exchange of scientists, students and experts; 2) organization of seminars and meetings of experts; 1165

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3) organization of joint research activities, including marine scientific research cruises; 4) development of Geographic Information Systems, data bases and inventories on Arctic environmental data; 5) cooperation in emergency preparedness exercises and prompt exchange of information concerning major accidental releases of contaminants into the Arctic environment; and 6) exchange of information on technologies and assessment methodologies applicable within the framework of this Agreement and on the relevant environmental protection legislation and regulations. Article 5 Activities under this Agreement, including specific projects and programs, shall be carried out by responsible agencies of each Party in accordance with the Agreement Between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States on Cooperation in Ocean Studies of 1990 and the Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Field of Protection of the Environment and Natural Resources of 1994 and under the overall coordination of the United States-Russian Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation or under any other coordinating body as may be agreed by the Parties. Article 6 1. All activities undertaken pursuant to this Agreement shall be conducted in accordance with the applicable laws, regulations, and procedures in both countries and shall be subject to the availability of funds and personnel. 2. Scientific and technological information resulting from cooperation under this Agreement, other than information which is not disclosed for national security, commercial or industrial reasons, shall be made freely available, unless otherwise agreed. 3. Issues of intellectual property created or furnished in the course of joint activities under this Agreement shall be governed by Annex II of the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation on Science and Technology Cooperation, signed at Moscow December 16, 1993. Article 7 The Parties shall resolve by consultation any differences as to the interpretation or application of this Agreement. Article 8 1. This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature and remain in force for a period of five years, and may be extended for additional five year periods upon written agreement of the Parties. 2. Either Party may terminate this Agreement by so notifying the other Party in writing. Such termination shall be effective six months from such written notification. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement. DONE at Moscow, in duplicate, this sixteenth day of December 1994, in the English and Russian languages, each text being equally authentic.

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Document 227 Declaration among the Department of Defense of the United States of America, the Royal Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of Norway, and the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, on Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation (26 September 1996)* The Department of Defense of the United States of America, the Royal Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of Norway, and the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Recognizing the need to ensure the conservation and sustainable use of the Arctic environment, including through the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation program, hereinafter referred to as AMEC, Understanding that some aspects of military activities, in particular radioactive and chemical contamination issues, may have negative impacts on the Arctic environment, Underscoring the vital importance of cooperation between military organizations to prevent and solve environmental problems in the Arctic caused by their activities, Considering cooperation between military organizations as a valuable contribution to the established framework for international environmental cooperation in the Arctic, Expressing a common desire of the Parties to contribute to the realization of specific projects to protect the Arctic environment, Taking into account –– the Memorandum between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in Environmental Protection Issues of 30 June 1995; –– the Agreement between the Royal Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of Norway and the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation on Cooperation on Defence-Related Environmental Issues of 15 December 1995; –– the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Prevention of Pollution of the Environment in the Arctic of 16 December 1994; and –– the Agreement between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Royal Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of Norway for Cooperation on Environmental Protection in Defense Matters of 19 May 1994, Hereby declare: Article I This Declaration establishes a framework for contacts and cooperation among the Parties on military environmental issues in the Arctic, and does not pertain to matters beyond the competencies of the Parties. Article II Contacts and cooperation under this Declaration are based on reciprocal rights and obligations in accordance with the laws of the United States of America, the laws of *  Signed at Bergen. Retrieved from the Defense Environmental Network and Information Exchange, www. denix.osd.mil/international/upload/Declaration.pdf. In 2006, the United States withdrew from this Declaration.

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the Kingdom of Norway, and the laws of the Russian Federation, and the international obligations of the Parties. Article III Cooperation between the Parties may include the following: –– Discussing the principles, directions, and methods for the repair and protection of the environment with regard to military activities in the Arctic; –– Studying the processes of the movement of contamination and evaluating its environmental impact in the Arctic in connection with military activities; –– Reviewing the methods, technologies, and organization of the work to prevent contamination and carry out clean-up efforts in Arctic conditions, as well as the disposal of military arms and equipment; –– Examining methods of emergency response simulation; –– Reviewing and prioritizing technical and other projects, consistent with the laws of the United States of America, the laws of the Kingdom of Norway, and the laws of the Russian Federation, for the repair and protection of the Arctic environment with regard to military activities; and –– Undertaking other activities upon written mutual agreement of the Parties. Article IV Cooperation between the Parties may take the following forms: –– Meetings of ad-hoc tripartite working groups on specific topics; –– Conferences, seminars, and workshops; –– Exchanges of visits and delegations; –– Communication of AMEC’s achievements and concerns regarding work on military environmental problems in the Arctic through appropriate media; –– Exchange of information on results of environmental monitoring studies in the Arctic and work plans designed to eliminate or reduce the negative impact on the Arctic environment; –– Surveys of the sources of contamination in the Arctic associated with military activities; and –– Research work and technology exchange, upon mutual agreement of the Parties. Article V In principle, each Party will pay its own costs for participation in AMEC activities. All activities undertaken pursuant to this Declaration are subject to availability of funds. For delegations conducting visits to promote activities under this Declaration, the visiting Parties will cover travel expenses to and from the host country, expenses for room and board within the host country, as well as travel allowance and insurance costs. The host party will, to the extent practicable, cover travel expenses within the host country. Each specific AMEC project conducted under this Declaration may be supported by all three Parties in the form of direct financing, the supply of materiel and equipment, or other forms of payment, to the extent permitted by the laws of the United States of America, the laws of the Kingdom of Norway, and the laws of the Russian Federation. Financial arrangements for each specific AMEC project shall be governed by subsequent written mutual agreements of the Parties.

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To the extent permitted by the laws and regulations applicable to the host party, the host party will be responsible for the other costs associated with organizing events in accordance with this Declaration. Other arrangements may be agreed upon, in writing, on a case by case basis. Article VI A Steering Group with representatives from the three countries is created to organize the AMEC Program work. The Steering Group is led by leaders of the environmental organizations, who select and affirm the priority projects on military environmental issues in the Arctic. Each year, the Parties will prepare proposals for cooperation in the fields referred to in Articles III and IV of this Declaration. On the basis of these proposals, the AMEC Steering Group shall develop a work plan to implement the AMEC program. Due account will be taken of related activities in other fora in order to avoid duplication of effort. Not less than once a year, the AMEC Steering Group will inform the Parties about the work being conducted. The AMEC Steering Group will prepare proposals to implement Articles III and IV, including standard operating procedures, for consideration by the Parties and will oversee implementation of the approved program and report to the Parties no less frequently than annually. The AMEC Steering Group is composed of representatives appointed by the Parties to discuss issues as directed by the Parties at times and locations approved by the Parties. The Steering Group currently consists of representatives from the environmental organizations of the Parties. Article VII Ministry of Defense organizations of any other country may participate in activities conducted this Declaration, subject to the written approval of all the Parties. Requests for such participation shall be directed to the AMEC Steering Group. Article VIII Information obtained within the framework of AMEC will be protected and exchanged in accordance with the laws of the United States of America, the laws of the Kingdom of Norway, and the laws of the Russian Federation in this respect. Disagreements as to the interpretation or implementation of this Declaration should be resolved by consultation between the Parties and shall not be referred to a third party. SIGNED at Bergen on the 26 September 1996, in three copies in the English, Norwegian, and Russian languages, each being equally authentic.

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Biodiversity Polar Bears Document 228 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears (15 November 1973)* The Governments of Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, Recognizing the special responsibilities and special interests of the States of the Arctic Region in relation to the protection of the fauna and flora of the Arctic Region; Recognizing that the polar bear is a significant resource of the Arctic Region which requires additional protection; Having decided that such protection should be achieved through co-ordinated national measures taken by the States of the Arctic Region; Desiring to take immediate action to bring further conservation and management measures into effect; Having agreed as follows: Article I 1. The taking of polar bears shall be prohibited except as provided in Article III. 2. For the purposes of this Agreement, the term “taking” includes hunting, killing and capturing. Article II Each Contracting Party shall take appropriate action to protect the ecosystems of which polar bears are a part, with special attention to habitat components such as denning and feeding sites and migration patterns, and shall manage polar bear populations in accordance with sound conservation practices based on the best available scientific data. Article III 1. Subject to the provisions of Articles II and IV any Contracting Party may allow the taking of polar bears when such taking is carried out a) for bona fide scientific purposes; or b) by that Party for conservation purposes; or c) to prevent serious disturbance of the management of other living resources, subject to forfeiture to that Party of the skins and other items of value resulting from such taking; or d) by local people using traditional methods in the exercise of their traditional rights and in accordance with the laws of that Party; or e) wherever polar bears have or might have been subject to taking by traditional means by its nationals.

*  Done at Oslo, 15 November 1973; entered into force 26 May 1976; [Registration Number 50540]. From United Nations Treaty Series, by United Nations Office of Legal Affairs Treaty Section, © 2013, United Nations. Reprinted with the permission of the United Nations.

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2. The skins and other items of value resulting from taking under sub-paragraph (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not be available for commercial purposes. Article IV The use of aircraft and large motorized vessels for the purpose of taking polar bears shall be prohibited, except where the application of such prohibition would be inconsistent with domestic laws. Article V A Contracting Party shall prohibit the exportation from, the importation and delivery into, and traffic within, its territory of polar bears or any part or product thereof taken in violation of this Agreement. Article VI 1. Each Contracting Party shall enact and enforce such legislation and other measures as may be necessary for the purpose of giving effect to this Agreement. 2. Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent a Contracting Party from maintaining or amending existing legislation or other measures or establishing new measures on the taking of polar bears so as to provide more stringent controls than those required under the provisions of this Agreement. Article VII The Contracting Parties shall conduct national research programmes on polar bears, particularly research relating to the conservation and management of the species. They shall as appropriate co-ordinate such research with research carried out by other Parties, consult with other Parties on the management of migrating polar bear populations, and exchange information on research and management programmes, research results and data on bears taken. Article VIII Each Contracting Party shall take action as appropriate to promote compliance with the provisions of this Agreement by nationals of States not party to this Agreement. Article IX The Contracting Parties shall continue to consult with one another with the object of giving further protection to polar bears. Article X 1. This Agreement shall be open for signature at Oslo by the Governments of Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America until 31st March 1974. 2. This Agreement shall be subject to ratification or approval by the signatory Governments. Instruments of ratification or approval shall be deposited with the Government of Norway as soon as possible. 3. This Agreement shall be open for accession by the Governments referred to in paragraph I of this Article. Instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Depositary Government. 1171

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4. This Agreement shall enter into force ninety days after the deposit of the third instrument of ratification, approval or accession. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for a signatory or acceding Government on the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification, approval or accession. 5. This Agreement shall remain in force initially for a period of five years from its date of entry into force, and unless any Contracting Party during that period requests the termination of the Agreement at the end of that period, it shall continue in force thereafter. 6. On the request addressed to the Depositary Government by any of the Governments referred to in paragraph I of this Article, consultations shall be conducted with a view to convening a meeting of representatives of the five Governments to consider the revision or amendment of this Agreement. 7. Any Party may denounce this Agreement by written notification to the Depositary Government at any time after five years from the date of entry into force of this Agreement. The denunciation shall take effect twelve months after the Depositary Government has received the notification. 8. The Depositary Government shall notify the Governments referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article of the deposit of instruments of ratification, approval or accession, of the entry into force of this Agreement and of the receipt of notifications of denunciation and any other communications from a Contracting Part specifically provided for in this Agreement. 9. The original of this Agreement shall be deposited with the Government of Norway which shall deliver certified copies thereof to each of the Governments referred to in paragraph I of this Article. The Depositary Government shall transmit certified copies of this Agreement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for registration and publication in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their Governments, have signed this Agreement. DONE at Oslo, in the English and Russian languages, each text being equally authentic, this fifteenth day of November, 1973.

Document 229 Polar Bear Range States Meeting Summary at Shepherdstown, USA (28 June 2007)* Purpose of the Meeting The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service convened a meeting of competent polar bear authorities in the polar bear Range States to provide an international forum to exchange information on polar bear research and management programs, and on the status of polar bear populations, and to consider recommendations for additional national or collective measures that the Range States may take to conserve the species.

*  Done at Shepherdstown, West Virginia, retrieved from the Polar Bear Specialist Group of the IUCN Species Survival Commission, www.pbsg.npolar.no/export/sites/pbsg/en/docs/PB-Sheph07-outcome.pdf.

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Impetus for the Meeting Recognizing the growing concern over polar bear conservation in light of a number of factors including climate change, contaminants in the Arctic, and other issues, there exists a desire among the Range States to use established venues such as the 1973 Agreement to pursue multilateral approaches for information exchange and collaboration on polar bear conservation challenges. Relationship of the 1973 Agreement to the IUCN Polar Bear Specialist Group The World Conservation Union (IUCN), through its Species Survival Commission (SSC) Specialist Groups, provides a science-based network of experts throughout the world to provide scientific advice to government agencies and others to support the implementation of multilateral environmental agreements. Since 1968, the Polar Bear Specialist Group (PBSG) has provided technical support and scientific advice on polar bear conservation to the government agencies responsible for polar bear management in the Arctic Region. This group was formed prior to the 1973 Agreement. The 1973 Agreement is a multilateral environmental agreement among polar bear Range States to facilitate cooperative research and management for polar bears among their competent authorities. While not formally mandated, it is recognized that the technical support and scientific advice on polar bear conservation provided by the PBSG to the Range States supports the 1973 Agreement and is a vital part of the decision making process that the competent authorities utilize in making their management decisions concerning polar bear conservation. Meeting Outcomes This meeting provided a vehicle to share the current state of information concerning the status and threats to polar bear populations among the Range States and outlined proposed management objectives and priorities of the competent authorities. The Range States agreed that impacts of climate change and the continued and increasing loss of sea ice—the key habitat for both polar bears and their main prey species—constitutes the most significant among several threats to polar bear conservation. The Range States identified opportunities for collaboration in the management of specific shared populations relative to status surveys, harvest quotas, and management plans. The Range States agreed to an enhanced coordination of management activities for shared populations. The Range States recognize the important contributions that the PBSG has made with respect to the Contracting Parties for their implementation of the 1973 Agreement. This expert group has reviewed and identified research and monitoring needs that are critical to worldwide polar bear conservation, and this has provided important advice for consideration by each of the Range States. The Range States agreed that they must work together collaboratively and recognize that informed dialogue is required in order to explore opportunities to address these needs. It is noted that several of the Range States are actively collaborating on research in areas of shared populations and on specific research priorities including contaminants and climate warming impacts on polar bears and sea ice. The Range States agreed that western science and systematically-collected traditional ecological knowledge on population ecology, demographics, and habitats are critical for the informed management of sustainable polar bear populations. At present, and 1173

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often for practical reasons, monitoring of the various subpopulations, including for conservation purposes, occurs at different frequencies and methodologies resulting in data incompatibility and incomplete spatial and temporal polar bear metrics across the vast Arctic ecosystem. The high cost of monitoring in Arctic ecosystems is most often the major impediment to obtaining the information that is required. These limitations need to be overcome collaboratively in the face of changing habitats in order to achieve conservation goals for polar bears in the face of climate warming, industrial development and other threats. The Range States agreed that their most urgent research and monitoring priority in the near term is to secure appropriations and sufficient data on the status and trends of polar bear populations in order to secure sound management, not least where data are insufficient. It is the responsibility of the Range States to establish and maintain necessary programs to facilitate this. The Range States further agreed that the meeting Chair, with the Heads of Delegations of the competent authorities, will facilitate a dialogue with the PBSG to develop a work request for the PBSG to define the minimum information needs and design standards for the ongoing monitoring and reporting of the status of each subpopulation and habitats. When developing the minimum monitoring requirements, both conventional scientific monitoring and systematically collected user observations and traditional ecological knowledge should be considered. This design would be presented by the PBSG to each of the Range States as soon as practicable. The Range States clarified the import/export processes currently in use. The Range States noted that the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) is an important aspect of polar bear management and that all range countries have adequate statutory authority for CITES. Current processes are working well through bilateral dialogue. The Range States recommend that range countries share best practices, and acknowledged the significant progress by Greenland in its implementation of CITES. The Range States clarified the status of sport hunting within the context of Articles III and IV of the 1973 Agreement. The Range States noted that currently Canada allows sport hunting as a part of their subsistence harvest. Greenland is considering sport hunting within its polar bear management framework. Norway, Russia and the United States do not allow sport hunting and do not anticipate allowing sport hunting in the foreseeable future. The Range States agreed that, where it is available, properly managed sport hunting programs do not pose a threat to polar bear conservation and may provide an incentive for polar bear conservation through increased economic benefits. The Range States noted the tradition of indigenous peoples4 for subsistence harvest, and acknowledged the inherent right of Canadian indigenous peoples for subsistence harvest of polar bears, and the need to provide that subsistence harvest, particularly of shared populations, is based on sustainable management programs. The Range States agreed that continued coordination among Range States as part of a scientifically based framework for shared population management is critical. The Range States agreed to a number of action items relative to the issue of bearhuman interactions. For oil and gas development, the Range States agreed that this is an emerging issue and that there is a need for appropriate policies, regulations,

4  The United States notes that the use of the term “peoples” in this report shall not be construed as having any implications as regard the rights which may attach to the term under international law.

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and management measures to minimize impacts on polar bears. There is also a need for monitoring programs and a greater understanding of the impacts on polar bear populations. The forthcoming Arctic Council oil and gas assessment may also provide important information in this regard. For village safety issues, the Range States agreed that there are increasing incidences of polar bear-human interactions, and there are a number of positive examples of programs to reduce this conflict. The Range States agreed to an exchange of information on best practices to minimize conflicts. The Range States agreed that shipping and large vessel traffic is an emerging issue. The Range States noted that the Arctic Council is undertaking an Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment and deferred further consideration until that assessment is complete. For tourism, the Range States agreed that impacts to polar bear conservation are a growing concern, and that there is a need for appropriate policies, regulations, and management measures to minimize impacts on polar bears. The Range States agreed that voluntary best practices and a code of conduct for tourist activities should be considered. For habitat protection measures, the Range States reinforced the importance of Article II of the 1973 Agreement relative to the adequate protection of ecosystems of which polar bears are a part. Further, the Range States welcomed the efforts already undertaken on habitat protection and encouraged continued bilateral cooperation on habitat protection relative to shared populations, as well as land-use planning for conservation purposes. The Range States further agreed to promote land-use planning to conserve critical coastal, marine, and terrestrial areas in need of protection, share experiences on the management of key areas such as the marginal ice zone, and identify appropriate polar bear management initiatives in response to changing sea ice conditions. The Range States recommended that a process be developed within the existing framework of the 1973 Agreement to assess the effectiveness of the agreement to achieve its core objectives. Furthermore, it has been suggested that the Contracting Parties to the 1973 Agreement would benefit from an assessment of its effectiveness in achieving its core objectives. The Range States used this meeting as a starting point for renewed efforts, and explored possible options and ways forward. They also noted that the last meeting of the Contracting Parties occurred in 1981. In accordance with the provisions of the 1973 Agreement, including Articles VIII and IX, the Range States agreed that meetings under the Agreement should be held on a biennial schedule or otherwise as agreed to by the Parties. It was agreed that the first such meeting should be held in 2009. The Range States recognized the need for a coordinated circumpolar action plan for the conservation of circumpolar polar bear populations and agreed that the agenda for the next biennial meeting would be developed by a working group in reflecting items identified by this meeting. The Range States agreed to establish a working group to serve as an interim structure to develop a governance structure for the 1973 Agreement. This working group will be comprised of the Heads of Delegation to this meeting (or their designees) to serve as the representatives of the Range States. The working group will meet periodically via teleconference or in person to assess progress of action items agreed at the 2007 meeting and to consider emerging issues to facilitate the improved implementation of the 1973 Agreement.

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Document 230 Outcome of the first meeting of the five signatories of the Polar Bear Agreement since signing the 1973 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears (19 March 2009)* Climate change has a negative impact on polar bears and their habitat and is the most important long term threat facing polar bears. Action to mitigate this threat is beyond the scope of the Polar Bear Agreement. Climate change affects every nation on the earth and reaches well beyond the five parties to the Agreement so the parties look to other fora and national and international mechanisms to take appropriate action to address climate change. Introduction The Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears was concluded in Oslo, Norway, on 15 November 1973, and today has Canada, Greenland, Norway, Russia and the United States of America as parties. At a polar bear range states meeting in Shepherdstown, West Virginia, USA, 26–28 June 2007, the range states, in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement, including Articles VIII and IX, agreed that meetings under the Agreement should be held on a biennial schedule or otherwise as agreed to by the Parties. The range states also agreed in Shepherdstown that the first such meeting should be held in 2009, and in 2008 the parties welcomed the offer of Norway to host such a meeting. Against this background, the five parties met in Tromsø, Norway, 17–19 March 2009, with an objective to provide an update on the conservation status for the polar bears, review implementation of the Agreement, identify useful polar bear conservation strategies and to discuss mechanisms for enhanced implementation of the Agreement. Harvest Management The parties continue to regard harvest management as an important part of polar bear management. The parties note the important progress made in developing sustainable harvest regimes, including the setting of bilateral coordinating mechanisms. The parties recognized the cultural and nutritional importance of subsistence harvest of polar bears to the Native peoples of the north. Polar bears and climate change The parties agreed that impacts of climate change and the continued and increasing loss and fragmentation of sea ice—the key habitat for both polar bears and their main prey species—constitutes the most important threat to polar bear conservation. The parties noted with deep concern the escalating rates and extent of changes in the Arctic induced by climate change to date and that future changes are projected to be even larger. The parties agreed that long term conservation of polar bears depends upon successful mitigation of climate change. *  Done at Tromsø, retrieved from the Directorate for Nature Management, Final Report of the Meeting of the Parties to the 1973 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears 17–19 March 2009 (Tromsø, 2009) 19–23. This outcome document is not legally binding and creates no legally binding obligations of the parties to the 1973 multilateral agreement for the conservation of polar bears.

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Management responses The parties agreed that conservation of polar bears requires adaptive management in response to climate change. The primary adaptation strategy will be to manage and reduce the other stresses on polar bears and their ecosystems, such as habitat destruction, harvesting, pollution and anthropogenic disturbance. Furthermore, continued climate change amplifies such stressors and underscores the need for proactive and comprehensive management strategies. Resilience of polar bear populations to climate change depends upon proactive approaches and should be explored further to encourage conservation planning that is relevant both today and in the future. The parties have differing capabilities and recognized the advantages of sharing best management practices that address the range of impacts associated with climate change. The parties agreed that effective responses depend upon an understanding of likely regional climatic and ecological changes. Monitoring climate and environmental change—in particular loss of sea ice and denning habitat—and associated responses in polar bear populations and the ecosystems that they depend upon is vital to allow for adjustments in management strategies. Longer term perspectives The parties expressed concern that ultimately, opportunities for polar bear conservation are limited by the magnitude and rate of change in climate and sea ice conditions. The parties were also concerned that their common obligations to protect the ecosystem of which polar bears are a part can only be met if global temperatures do not rise beyond levels where the sea ice retreats from extensive parts of the Arctic. A scientific presentation noted that if sea ice is reduced according to present projections, polar bears are likely to be extirpated from most of their range within this century. On this background, the parties recognized the urgent need for an effective global response that will address the challenges of climate change. Further, the parties recommended that ongoing efforts within appropriate fora negotiating strategies to address climate change should be informed of the significance of climate change to the conservation of polar bears. Habitat protection The parties reinforced the importance of habitat protection as a means of implementing Article II of the Agreement on protection of ecosystems of which polar bears are a part. Parties also welcomed efforts already undertaken on habitat protection, including protected areas and land and seascape planning. The parties also recognized that expansion of protected areas can potentially reduce the vulnerability of polar bear populations and the ecosystems of which bears are a part. It was also recognized that protected areas should be designed with consideration of long-term shifts in sea ice conditions that will result from climate change and the overall integrity of habitats critical to polar bear survival. Contaminants and pollution The parties expressed concern that long range transport of pollutants into the Arctic environment is shown to affect polar bears. The scope of these effects on polar bear populations are only partially understood, but their impacts on some populations may be significant. The parties also recognized that transport mechanisms may be altered and 1177

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effects on polar bears amplified as a result of climate change. Comprehensive monitoring and research on the effects of contaminant loads in polar bears, and synergistic effects of contaminants and climate change is therefore important. The parties recognized the urgent need for an effective global response that will address the challenges of contaminants. Ongoing efforts within appropriate fora negotiating strategies to address contaminants should be informed of the significance of contaminants to the conservation of polar bears. Activities in polar bear areas Industrial development Industrial development continues to expand northward into areas used by polar bears. Several areas of oil and gas interest are identified within these areas. The parties recognize the need to identify key habitats for polar bears and areas in need of protection to establish a basis for land and seascape planning in advance of development. The parties also recognized the importance of having general operating procedures and mitigation measures in place for developed areas. Such measures are in use in the US Beaufort Sea coast oilfields and could provide guidance for other parties. Monitoring impacts of industrial development on polar bears was considered important as was contingency (emergency) planning. The parties agreed that strict environmental regulations and standards are needed to protect polar bears potentially affected by industrial development. Shipping The parties recognized the likelihood of dramatically increased shipping as longer icefree seasons increase access and open new trans-polar sea routes (Northern Sea Route; transiting the Bering Strait; and Northwest Passage). Potential effects of shipping on polar bears include pollution, noise, physical disturbance related to ice-breaking, and waste. Shipping scenarios and associated impact assessments have been developed through the Arctic Council (Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment). This assessment should be considered by the parties in their work to develop specific mitigation measures, including routing of traffic and other maritime safety measures; to identify monitoring and research priorities; and, to establish contingency plans to minimize impacts from shipping on polar bears. Tourism and traffic The parties recognized the value of tourism for economic and education development goals. In some areas, there has been a dramatic increase in the number and range of cruise ships moving further north into areas used by polar bears as open water access has improved. Potential effects of increased tourism include pollution, disturbance and increased risk of defense kills. Actions to address such impacts could include limiting access to sensitive habitats, competence requirements for guides, guidelines and rules for operating in polar bear areas and near polar bears, measures to reduce pollution risks, and post trip reports of wildlife sightings and other activities from tour operators. Polar bear viewing opportunities are expanding in many parts of the Arctic, and the parties recognized the value of Canada’s management experience in Churchill.

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Safety measures for people and communities Bear-human interactions will increase due to expanding human populations, industrial development and tourism. In addition, a continued increase in the number of nutritionally stressed bears on land due to retreating sea ice will result in more bear-human interactions. The parties agree on the need to develop comprehensive strategies to manage such conflicts. Opportunities to share techniques and develop strategies have been identified above. Some existing strategies include active deterrence, reduction of attractants, and community education and outreach. Expertise developed for management of other bear species should be consulted in the development of strategies specific to polar bears. The parties agreed to exchange experiences with management of bear-human interactions and welcomed the US offer to lead such an effort in collaboration with polar bear experts and managers from the other parties. Two specific opportunities identified to develop bear-human interaction strategies are the upcoming workshops in November 2009 in Canada and planned in Alaska in 2010. Development of plans for action In light of the growing concern over polar bear conservation in relation to climate change and a number of other emerging issues, such as oil- and gas activities, shipping and tourism, the parties agreed to initiate a process that would lead to a coordinated approach to conservation and management strategies between the parties. A key aspect of this approach is the recognition that plans for action should be developed at a national level leading up to development of comprehensive circumpolar plans for action that address polar bear conservation. The process to provide advice to the parties will involve the following steps. 1. Parties request of PBSG an outline or identification of topics that should be included in all national plans for action. Furthermore, PBSG should identify elements that could benefit from international cooperation. The parties recognized an interest in accomplishing this step in 2009. 2. Parties will review and discuss outline material provided by PBSG. 3. Parties will identify and initiate specific topics of general interest (such as bearhuman interactions). 4. Parties will identify topics where additional information may be helpful and develop further requests to PBSG as needed. The parties shared a general expectation that significant progress would be made by the next biennial meeting. Traditional Ecological Knowledge The parties recognized that polar bears play an important role in the socio-economical and cultural well being of aboriginal peoples. TEK in concert with western science should be utilized in polar bear management decisions. Scientific advice The parties recognized that Article VII of the Agreement calls for all parties to conduct national research programs, particularly relating to the conservation and management of polar bears, and that they shall coordinate such research and exchange information on

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research programs, results, and data on bears taken. Parties continue to be committed to carrying out research in support of polar bear conservation. The parties also recognized that the technical support and scientific advice on polar bear conservation provided by the PBSG to the parties supports the 1973 Agreement and is a vital part of the decision making process that the competent authorities should utilize in making their management decisions concerning polar bear conservation. The parties agreed to ask the PBSG to accept the role of scientific advisory group to the parties and welcomed the offer by the PBSG chair to bring this to the PBSG for their consideration. Other issues related to the conservation of polar bears Export and import of polar bear products The parties noted that the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) is the key regulatory mechanism for export and import in polar bear products and that all parties have adequate statutory authority for CITES. The parties acknowledged the significant progress made by Greenland in its implementation of CITES. Cooperation in management of shared polar bear populations Several polar bear populations are shared between parties, and the parties recognized the mechanisms in place for cooperation on the management of these shared populations, and encouraged further development of such cooperation. Monitoring The parties welcomed ongoing efforts to monitor status and trends for polar bear populations, and agreed on the need to strengthen monitoring throughout the range of polar bears, and to coordinate and harmonize national monitoring efforts. Assessing the effectiveness of the Agreement The parties agreed that a process should be developed to assess the effectiveness of the agreement to achieve its core objectives, and agreed to come back to this at a later biennial meeting under the Agreement. Commitment to Continued Cooperation In accordance with the provisions of the Agreement, including Articles VIII and IX, the parties reconfirmed that meetings under the Agreement should be held on a biennial schedule or otherwise as agreed to by the Parties. The parties welcomed Canada’s offer to host the next biennial meeting in 2011 and Russia’s offer to host the biennial meeting in 2013, noting that these offers facilitate a multi-year approach to coordinated implementation of the Agreement. Recognizing the urgency of the situation, the parties have agreed to carry out regular, ongoing work leading to the 2011 meeting. Such collaboration would be facilitated by the host of the next meeting informed by the host of the previous meeting.

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Document 231 Outcome of the Meeting of the Parties to the 1973 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears (26 October 2011)* Polar bear are important for people in northern communities, range states and the world. The nature and pace of change in the Arctic requires action locally, nationally and internationally. The five Range State countries have, or are, developing strategies to guide domestic efforts, including both new and on-going initiatives. Complementing this work, a Range States plan is being developed. It will be informed by science and Traditional Ecological Knowledge and will focus on opportunities for collaboration across the range of the polar bear. It is anticipated that a draft will be discussed at the next Range States meeting with formal approval to follow. Introduction The Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears was concluded in Oslo, Norway, on November 15th 1973. The Range States comprises Canada, Greenland, Norway, Russia and the United States of America. As agreed upon at previous meetings (USA 2007, Norway 2009) the Range States, in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement, including Articles VIII and IX, decided that meetings under the Agreement should be held on a biennial schedule or otherwise as agreed to by the Parties. As agreed at the 2009 meeting, the Range States worked inter-sessionnally to begin development of a range-wide action plan. This circumpolar action plan is to be based on national plans developed by the Range States. Against this background, and building on the outcomes of the Tromsø (Norway) meeting, the five Range States met in Iqaluit, Nunavut (Canada) from 24–26 October 2011, with an objective to provide an update on the conservation measures for polar bear, review progress on the development of national action plans, and prepare a workplan for the completion of the range-wide action plan. Further to the 2009 invitation to the PBSG to provide technical and scientific advice to the Range States, the role of the PBSG was formalized at the 2011 meeting. The PBSG accepted their role as the science advisory body to the Range States, will participate fully in meetings, and will contribute to the development of the range-wide plan. Summary of national updates Since the 2009 meeting, the Range States have been working to develop national action plans. Russia’s plan was completed in 2010, and Canada’s plan is in the final stages of approval. All Parties have made significant progress on the development of their plans and this work is acknowledged. Parties are encouraged to finalize their plans, thereby upholding obligations stemming from the 2009 meeting.

*  Done at Iqaluit, retrieved from the Polar Bear Specialist Group of the IUCN Species Survival Commission, www.pbsg.npolar.no/export/sites/pbsg/en/docs/Iqaluit2011-outcome.pdf. This outcome document is not legally binding and creates no legally binding obligations for the parties to the 1973 Agreement for the Conservation of polar bears.

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United States The United States is committed to working with partners in the Range States. We see international partnerships as key to conservation of shared polar bear populations—polar bears do not recognize international boundaries. The United States is also committed to domestic partnerships as demonstrated by our process developing our Polar Bear Conservation/Recovery Plan. While we recognize that increasing greenhouse gas emissions are the primary threat, our focus is on minimizing impacts to polar bears where we can—notably bear/human interactions. The United States views the effort of the Range States to develop an Arctic-wide Action Plan as directly related to our ESA listing– we recognized that polar bears will be adversely affected by climate change. As we identified the primary threats to polar bears range-wide, likewise we need to also manage on a range-wide basis. The United States stands ready to commit to helping draft the plan not only to meet our statutory obligations, but also because we are committed to polar bear conservation. At our last meeting in Tromsø, Norway, the Range States recognized that bear/human interactions will increase due to expanding human populations, industrial development and tourism. In addition, a continued increase in the number of nutritionally stressed bears on land due to retreating sea ice will result in more bear/human interactions; the parties agreed on the need to develop comprehensive strategies to manage such conflicts. A draft database, populated with data from both the U.S. and Norway is ready for review and comment. The United States has made significant progress toward polar bear conservation since we last met in Tromsø, working at all levels of government to collaboratively manage polar bears. We designated “Critical Habitat” for polar bears in the United States under our Endangered Species Act. We maintained our “Incidental Take Regulations” that provide specific guidance to the oil and gas industry and provided Deterrence Regulations for all activities in the range of polar bears. We manage harvest in the Alaska-Chukotka polar bear population under the Agreement between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on the Conservation and Management of the Alaska-Chukotka Polar Bear Population and in the Southern Beaufort Sea through the Inuvialuit-Inupiat Polar Bear Management Agreement for the Southern Beaufort Sea. We conduct “polar bear patrols” in coastal communities. We continue a robust research program that spans demographics, habitat use and overall ecology of polar bears, and aims to understand mechanisms of polar bear response to a rapidly changing sea ice environment. We continue to conduct extensive outreach through workshops, community visits, and publications. Russia The Strategy for Polar Bear Conservation in the Russian Federation was approved by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment of the Russian Federation, Decree No. 26-r of 5th July 2010. Priority measures included in the Strategy include development of international cooperation, improvement of the legal framework, improvement of the network of specially protected natural areas, improvement of the effectiveness of polar bear conservation outside specially protected natural areas, scientific research, monitoring of polar bear populations, prevention and resolution of human-bear conflicts, awareness raising and education. The Action Plan based on the Strategy has been developed and is a recommendation document.

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The Research program on polar bear in the Russian Arctic of the Russian Academy of Sciences has been developed and implemented since 2010. It includes air surveys, ship surveys, satellite telemetry, means of molecular genetics. It performs research on temporal and spatial distribution of polar bears, annual and seasonal movement, identification of natural and anthropogenic factors that affect survival and reproduction, sea ice movement. The 3rd meeting of the U.S.-Russia Polar Bear Commission was held from 27–29 July 2011 in Moscow, Russia. The main questions that were discussed: multi-year quota system, joint monitoring, research and management plans. Different projects were realized on ensuring the full participation of Native peoples in the conservation of the Alaska-Chukotka population and recognition the continued importance of Traditional Ecological Knowledge. Norway Norway informed about efforts related to management, monitoring and research of the polar bear for the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea subpopulation. A comprehensive legal and policy framework is in place for management on Svalbard and in the Barents Sea, including high environmental policy objectives for Svalbard, strict regulations in the Svalbard Environment Act, and protected areas as a key tool for protection of polar bear habitat. Recent development includes work on management plans for protected areas important for polar bear denning and agreement with Russia in 2010 on delineation of the border between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea. Norway provided an update on their monitoring and research priorities and activities, and highlighted the continuous need for monitoring changes in sea ice conditions and consequences for polar bears and for considering the need for management responses. Lastly, Norway informed about key international efforts related to polar bear conservation, including bilateral co-operation with Russia and links to key international agreements inter alia on climate change and pollution. Greenland Management—There are 5 polar bear populations within Greenlandic jurisdiction (East Greenland, Davis Strait, Baffin Bay, Kane Basin, Arctic Basin), with four populations harvested by occupational hunters. In Greenland, polar bear protection and hunting is regulated by the executive order from 2005, whereby a multi-year quota system was introduced in 2006. The last quota period is 2010–2012 and a new multi-year quota will be established in late-2012 for the following period. After the introduction of quotas, the harvest rates have stabilized. The goal is to gain sustainable quotas for all harvested populations. Greenland stated that it is very important that there are good working relations between scientists, management regime and hunters in managing and monitoring of polar bears. Based on Non-Detriment Finding (NDF), Greenland implemented a voluntary export ban on all polar bear products in 2008. Greenland also reported on increased human/polar bear interactions the last 2–3 years, and that they are working on further improvements of the established guidelines. Research—In collaboration with Canada/Nunavut, Greenland has started a biopsy darting sampling programme of the Kane Basin and Baffin Bay subpopulations. From 2011 and forward, Greenland has also implemented a research programme for polar bear

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population in East Greenland. Greenland also continues to work on improvement on the established monitoring programme, including a real-time catch reporting system. Important next steps—Greenland informed also that monitoring is being improved to allow immediate management responses to occurring changes, including biopsy sampling from all hunts in order to ensure continued sustainable quotas. Greenland is also focusing its activities to implement the bilateral agreement with Canada/Nunavut on shared stocks in Kane Basin and Baffin Bay. Greenland informed that further focus will be given to the development of National Action Plan in coordination with the Circumpolar Action Plan. Canada Canada noted that it has a strong management system with federal provincial and territorial engagement. It includes comprehensive monitoring systems, responsive harvest management systems, a respected enforcement regime, export controls and world class human-polar bear conflict management systems. Recent efforts focused on ensuring that the required inter-jurisdictional structures are implemented. A National Polar Bear Conservation Strategy was developed and is now ready for signature by federal, provincial and territorial ministers as well as concerned Wildlife Management Boards. Bilateral work Canada-Nunavut-Greenland In 2009, Greenland, Canada and Nunavut signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the conservation of the Baffin Bay and Kane Basin subpopulations. The Commission set up under the agreement has met twice to date (Ottawa 2010, Ilulissat 2010), and has approved a monitoring plan that is currently being implemented. Once data are available, the Commission will be in a position to formulate advice for harvest management for these two subpopulations. Canada-United States The Secretary of the Department of the Interior and the Minister of Environment, Canada, signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in 2008. This MOU promotes bilateral efforts to conserve and manage the polar bear population shared between the two countries. This MOU builds upon existing agreements and ongoing collaborations and is not intended to supersede previous and significant contributions by Inupiat and Inuvialuit people, FWS, Canadian Wildlife Service, U.S. Geological Survey, and Environment Canada, for the conservation and management of polar bears. The two countries recognize the importance of the Inuvialuit-Inupiat Polar Bear Management Agreement for the Southern Beaufort Sea. The Commissioners of this Agreement recently met and, in response to newly available scientific information, reduced the harvest quota. Russia-United States The shared polar bear population in the Chukchi and Bering Seas is managed under the Agreement between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on the Conservation and Management of the Alaska-Chukotka Polar Bear Population. The Agreement provides a structure for the two countries to coordinate efforts to conserve this population and its habitat and manage subsistence harvest at sustainable levels.

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The U.S-Russia Polar Bear Commission has met twice since 2009 to share scientific and management information, establish take limits, and coordinate management efforts. Polar Bear-Human Information Management System (PBHMIS) The US and Norway presented a polar bear-human interaction system that allows for entry and analysis of human-polar bear conflict data to refine management actions necessary to inform future anticipated increases in human-polar bear conflicts. The Range States agreed to further development and implementation of the system to be explored through a group comprised of members approved by each Range State. PBSG report As noted in the 2007 and 2009 reports of the Range States Meetings, climate change continues to have a negative impact on polar bears in portions of their range and remains the most important threat to their long-term range-wide security. The PBSG noted that changes in sea ice are not expected to affect polar bears in all portions of their range at the same time, or in the same ways, and that polar bears in some portions of their range may see transient but significant benefit from a milder climate. Conservation plans for polar bears must consider highly variable transient effects as well as predictable ultimate effects of the global warming challenge. Range-wide action plan development process The Range States range-wide action plan will supplement the national action plans and will focus on areas that require, or will benefit from, international coordination and collaboration. It will fully leverage and respect the capacities, mandate and responsibility of national governments. The action plan will include principles, vision and goals, information about the species, threats to polar bears, objectives, management efforts and cooperation, range-wide conservation actions, monitoring, research, and implementation of considerations. This plan will: –– need to include an adaptive management approach given the significant change occurring in the Arctic (e.g. changes to sea ice coverage, increased development); –– ensure that according to the principle of subsidiarity: actions will be taken at the appropriate level; –– strive to balance conservation of polar bear with the needs of communities living within the range of the species; –– consider the best available science and increased consideration of Traditional Ecological Knowledge; –– ensure the engagement of Indigenous peoples domestically as well as internationally; –– use the precautionary principle. A number of priority areas for range-wide collaboration were identified. These include: –– Prevention and management of human-bear conflicts; –– Development of strategies to minimize impacts of human activities (e.g. mining, shipping, oil and gas activities, tourism); –– Engage the general public and communities in outreach activities that facilitate communication; –– Development of best management practices for inter alia harvest management; 1185

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Consideration of approaches to facilitate a range-wide overview of status and trends via appropriate monitoring; –– Identification of priority areas of research. Building on the effective collaboration established after the 2009 meeting of the Range States, individually or collaboratively, the parties will take on the drafting of the various components of the Action Plan with the aim of having a first draft ready for review at the next Range States meeting. Closing Host, venue and dates for the next Range State meetings will be identified as soon as possible. Range States thanked Norway for co-leading inter-sessional work with Canada. Canada commits to work with the upcoming meeting host to continue to co-lead work leading up to the next meeting. The Range States thank Canada and Government of Nunavut for hosting the meeting.

Document 232 Outcome of the Meeting of the Parties to the 1973 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears (4–6 December 2013)* The year 2013 marks the 40th anniversary of the 1973 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears, a unique multilateral Agreement to protect the polar bear, the ecosystems of which it is part, and the role of polar bears in the cultural and traditional life of indigenous people of the Arctic. The five polar bear Range States—Canada, Greenland, Norway, Russia and the United States of America—met in Moscow, Russia to commemorate this historic event. A forum on the conservation of polar bears was held 04 December 2013, during which the Range States celebrated the success of the Agreement and recognized emerging challenges for polar bears. The forum culminated in the signing of a Declaration in which the Range States reaffirmed their commitment to work cooperatively for the conservation of polar bears in the 21st century. The forum was followed by the biennial meeting of the Range States 05–06 December 2013. Introduction The Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears was concluded in Oslo, Norway, on November 15th 1973. The Range States comprises Canada, Greenland, Norway, Russia and the United States of America. An International Forum on Conservation of Polar Bears was held in Moscow, Russia on 4th December 2013, Representatives of the polar bear Range States commemorated the 40th anniversary of the Agreement, celebrated the cooperation of the Range States to further the international conservation and management of polar bears and signed a Declaration (Appendix 1) of commitment to continue to work actively to implement the Agreement.

*  Done at Moscow, retrieved from the Polar Bear Specialist Group of the IUCN Species Survival Commission, www.pbsg.npolar.no/export/sites/pbsg/en/docs/range-states-2013-report-final-06dec13-2.pdf. This Outcome document is not legally binding and creates no legally binding obligations of the parties to the 1973 multilateral agreement for the conservation of polar bears.

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As agreed upon at previous meetings (USA 2007, Norway 2009, Canada 2011) the Range States, in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement, including Articles VIII and IX, decided that meetings under the Agreement should be held on a biennial schedule or otherwise as agreed to by the Parties. Against this background, and building on the outcomes of the Iqualit, Nunavut (Canada) meeting, the five Range States met in Moscow, Russia from 05–06 December 2013 and accomplished the following: –– Progress was reviewed on monitoring and scientific priorities for polar bears and local community engagement in monitoring and conservation efforts. –– The Polar Bear Specialist Group (PBSG) of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, in its capacity as scientific advisor to the Range States, was encouraged to determine how to best use Traditional Ecological Knowledge together with scientific approaches. –– The Range States agreed to establish a working group to address emerging issues related to trade of polar bear parts. –– Inter-sessional work on a Circumpolar Action Plan for polar bears was reviewed and next steps in the development of the plan were identified. –– The Range States affirmed the importance of the Polar Bear-Human Information Management System and approved its continued development. –– The Range States agreed to review some rules of procedure for future meetings. Welcome and opening remarks were made by Sergey Donskoy, Minister of Natural Resources and Environment of the Russian Federation. –– Monitoring, research and community engagement: A circumpolar monitoring framework for polar bears, developed by the PBSG, was presented (Vongraven et al. 2012) and research priorities were suggested. –– The Range States recognized the value of this work and noted that it will be considered, along with other information such as available resources efforts. –– Representatives of indigenous governments and organizations in the five –– Range States made presentations on the importance of Traditional Ecological Knowledge, the role of community consultations in polar bear management, and local community engagement in polar bear conservation. Plans were reviewed for updating a Bayesian network model to project circumpolar status of polar bears and evaluate threats to the species. Traditional Ecological Knowledge –– The five Range States agreed to adopt the following resolution from the Declaration: Encourage the IUCN Polar Bear Specialist Group to determine how to best use Traditional Ecological Knowledge together with scientific approaches and analyses of polar bear population status for more effective decision-making and consider their recommendation at the 2015 regular meeting of the range states; –– The Range States noted the role of Traditional Ecological Knowledge holders, social scientists and outside experts in this issue, and Canada offered support in this capacity.

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Trade The Range States agreed to identify a working group to address the following resolutions from the Declaration: Explore mechanisms to counter the threat of poaching and illegal trade in polar bears and polar bear parts, including enhanced cooperation among law enforcement agencies at the national, regional and global levels Strengthen international cooperation to improve the clarity of legal trade data through the adoption of more effective reporting and monitoring practices and help address illegal trade through the adoption of procedures to better identify legally traded specimens and to verify the authenticity of trade documents. The Range States supported this effort. During the inter-session, Canada, Greenland, Russia, and the U.S. will create a working group, which will develop recommendations for consideration by the Range States. The Range States supported involvement of TRAFFIC International, World Conservation Monitoring Center, and law enforcement agencies in the working group. Recommendations will include consideration of how to best address enforcement challenges, and the feasibility of such efforts, such as a coordinated and integrated tagging system for polar bear hides to identify the time and place of harvest, efforts to understand dynamics of the supply chain for polar bear hides, coordination with ongoing efforts to monitor trade (e.g., Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna), establishment of common terminology for polar bear parts, development of a database, administrative procedures to facilitate verification of trade documents, and coordination and information sharing with and among national and international law enforcement programs. The working group will report its progress to the Range States at the next meeting of the parties. The director of TRAFFIC International expressed support for this effort. Circumpolar action plan Since the 2009 meeting of the Parties good progress has been made on development of a Circumpolar Action Plan for polar bears. The Range States affirmed the importance of a Circumpolar Action Plan and its timely completion and identified the following steps for development of the plan: –– The Range States will review the current draft of Volume 1 of the Circumpolar Action Plan (Chapters 1-7), Circumpolar Strategy for Polar Bear), discuss the draft via teleconference in January 2014 or as soon as feasible, and work toward finalization of Volume 1. –– The goal is to finalize Volume 1 by late spring 2014 and then proceed with consultations and approval at the national level. –– The Range States will concurrently work on Volume 2 of the Circumpolar Action Plan (Circumpolar Action Plan for Polar Bear). –– An inter-sessional meeting to work on the Circumpolar Action Plan is tentatively scheduled for the week of 22 April 2014. Norway will consider hosting this meeting. –– The U.S. and Canada will present a draft work plan and timeline for development of Volume 2 in advance of the April 2014 meeting. The importance of allowing time for national consultation processes was recognized. Al list of threats to polar bears (Chapter 6) was developed, and the Range States requested that the PBSG provide an initial assessment and categorization of the threats. This will be 1188

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provided to a working group to be determined by the Range States that includes members of the Range States, PBSG members, and Traditional Ecological Knowledge holders. Polar Bear-Human Information Management System (PBHIMS) The Range States expressed continued support for development of the PBHIMS, including identification of national members to participate on the Range States Human-Polar Bear Conflicts Workgroup. The Range States recognized the need for financial and staff support of this work, and encouraged the timely dissemination to communities of the best practices related to mitigating human-bear conflicts. To assist on these issues, a work plan and timeline for products related to the PBHIMS will be prepared by the Range States Human-Bear Conflict Working Group. Rules of procedure The Range States agreed that the U.S. will draft code of conduct regarding the distribution of documents by nongovernmental organizations at Range State meetings. The Range States will discuss this via Teleconference in spring 2014. The U.S. offered to present code of conduct for other multilateral organization (e.g., the International Whaling Commission, CITES) that may be relevant to the Range States meetings. Noting an existing document that describes the Role of Invites Experts, Observers and Media in Range States meetings, the Range States agreed to not revisit broader rules regarding participation of non-governmental organizations in the meeting of the Parties at this time. The U.S. reserved the right to revisit this question at a future date. The Range States agreed to establish a working group to continue discussions during the inter-session to identify issues with respect to rules of procedure that may merit review by the Range States, including rules related to (1) set deadlines for distribution of shared presentations and documents among the Parties prior to meetings of the Range States, and (2) distribution of presentations and documents circulated by organizations external to the Parties. Other The Range States agreed to communicate via email over the next several months to develop details, and criteria for nomination, for a conservation award that the Range States may present at each meeting to an individual in recognition of achievements. The Range States hopes to present the inaugural conservation award at the next Range States meeting. Recognizing that the Range States represents the primary forum for multilateral issues with regard to polar bear, Canada and Norway agree to draft a letter to the Arctic council exploring opportunities for collaboration between the Range States and the Arctic Council. The Range States will discuss protected areas for polar bears within each of the Range States as part of the Circumpolar Action Plan. Once the circumpolar Action Plan is complete, the Range States will discuss issues related to the polar bear conservation for regions in international waters. Closing Greenland offered to host the next Range States meeting in 2015 prior to the month of September; the location and date will identified as soon as possible. The Range States

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thanked Russia for organizing and hosting the International Forum on Conservation of Polar Bears and the meeting of the Range States.

Document 233 Declaration of the Responsible Ministers of the Polar Bear Range States (4–6 December 2013*) We, the representatives of the parties to the 1973 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears, met in Moscow, Russia, 4 December 2013 at the International Forum on the Conservation of Polar Bears. We commemorated the 40th anniversary of the Agreement and celebrated the cooperation of the range states to further the international conservation and management of polar bears. We welcome and sincerely appreciate all the contributions made by the 2013 International Polar Bear Forum on the issue of polar bear conservation and management. Respectful of the past and looking to the future, we: Recognize the range states are, and should be, the appropriate stewards and protectors of the polar bear in their respective territories; Acknowledge our shared responsibility for ensuring polar bear conservation, research and agreed-to collaborative action; Recognize the significant cooperative polar bear conservation successes we have achieved since the signing of the 1973 Agreement, including helping increase polar bear populations from pre-1973 levels through measures taken by the range states such as the establishment of protected areas and addressing the issue of unsustainable hunting; Recognize that polar bears, a shared resource of global importance and an indicator of biological health in the Arctic, are facing new and complex challenges resulting from a rapidly warming Arctic and subsequent changes to sea ice habitat; Acknowledge the 5th Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and Express concern that it is very likely that the Arctic sea ice cover will continue to shrink and thin as global mean surface temperature rises, and Recognize that the long term loss of sea ice depends on future emission trajectories; Acknowledge that addressing climate change is important for the long term conservation of polar bears; Recognize that there is a need to manage polar bear habitat to reduce the vulnerability of polar bear populations, and take into account the projected long-term changes in Arctic sea ice conditions and the impact of those changes on polar bears and their prey; Recognize that increased incidence of human-polar bear interactions is of concern and will likely continue to increase; Underscore that the conservation of polar bears requires adaptive management in response to climate change, and that the strategy will be to manage and reduce the other stressors on polar bears and their ecosystems, such as habitat destruction, overharvesting, pollution and other anthropogenic disturbances;

*  Done at the International Polar Bear Forum in Moscow, retrieved from the Polar Bear Specialist Group of the IUCN Species Survival Commission, www.pbsg.npolar.no/export/sites/pbsg/en/docs/pb-declaration_final.pdf.

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Recognize the need to proactively manage the responsible development of economic activities in the Arctic, including transportation and infrastructure, to minimize the negative impact of those activities on polar bears; Express concern that long range transport of pollutants into the Arctic environment is shown to affect polar bears and that impacts on some polar bear populations may be significant; Recognize the need for comprehensive and coordinated monitoring and research on the effects of contaminant loads in polar bears, and synergistic effects of contaminants and climate change, and underline the need for effective global implementation and compliance with existing global and regional obligations with respect to the challenges posed by pollutants; Note that continued international cooperation is essential for the protection of polar bears and that in accordance with the 1973 Agreement, each range state is developing and implementing its own national-level polar bear action plans; Note that the range states are developing a comprehensive Circumpolar Action Plan for polar bears that is based on, and is expected to incorporate, actions set forth in the national level plans; Affirm that the polar bear range states’ strategy to develop and implement the Polar Bear-Human Information Management System (PBHIMS) is the appropriate mechanism for international cooperation among the range states regarding documentation of humanbear conflicts, and that the PBHIMS will provide an information basis for the design of programs to reduce occurrences of human-caused polar bear mortality; Note that while continued cooperation and coordination of the range states efforts is critical for the effective management and conservation of the polar bear, effective management and conservation also depends upon the participation of Arctic indigenous people and is enhanced by contributions from other stakeholders, including the international community, private sector, non-governmental and other organizations; Recognize that the polar bear is a significant resource and plays an important role in the social and cultural well-being of Arctic local people and further recognizing the subsistence needs of Arctic indigenous people, such that conservation will be best achieved with the engagement of communities traditionally dependent on the polar bear in management decision making processes; Note that multi-party and bilateral agreements and other cooperative arrangements among local, regional, national and international governmental entities responsible for polar bear conservation and management provide a successful framework for working cooperatively with Arctic indigenous people and other interested entities for the conservation and long-term survival of polar bears; Welcome the work and leadership of the Arctic Council in promoting sustainable development and environmental protection, including the Arctic Biodiversity Assessment, and monitoring activities; Recognize the importance and value of Traditional Ecological Knowledge in informing management decisions and Acknowledge the need for the range states to develop a common understanding of what constitutes Traditional Ecological Knowledge and how it should be used in polar bear management decisions; Recognize that having up-to-date information on the status and trend of each polar bear subpopulation is essential for effective management and conservation of the species; 1191

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Appreciate the historic contributions of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Polar Bear Specialist Group, and welcome their continued role as scientific adviser to the parties of the 1973 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears; Further recognize the need for the IUCN Polar Bear Specialist Group, and each range state, to regularly assess new scientific information and update the conservation status of each population in order to inform management and regulatory decision-making for polar bears. Understanding the importance of the issues we face and their possible impacts on future generations, we, the representatives of polar bear range states declare our commitment to continue to work actively to implement the 1973 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears in order to: Use the Circumpolar Action Plan for polar bear as the appropriate mechanism for international cooperation in managing and reducing stressors on polar bears and their ecosystems, in furtherance of the 1973 Agreement; At the next range states meeting, in 2015, seek to finalize and adopt the Circumpolar Action Plan for polar bear, accompanied by an implementation plan that evaluates human and financial resource implications; Continue to work collaboratively to address human-polar bear conflicts through the range states Human-Polar Bear Conflicts Working Group and the IUCN Polar Bear Specialist Group, using the PBHIMS to provide an information basis for the design of programs to reduce occurrences of human-polar bear conflicts; Identify important current and future habitats for polar bears and continue to develop habitat management systems, including protected areas where appropriate, taking into consideration projected changes in climate, sea-ice distribution and changing patterns of human activity; Advance the conservation of sufficient polar bear habitat through application of ecosystem based management to reduce the negative impact on polar bears and their habitats; Ensure that environmental regulations and standards are in place to protect polar bears potentially affected by industrial development, and that key polar bear habitats are identified to establish a basis for land- and seascape planning in advance of development; Engage Arctic local people in management decision-making processes and promote the collection and maintenance of Traditional Ecological Knowledge by acknowledging the important role polar bear play in the cultural heritage and subsistence of Arctic indigenous people, as well as the role that they play in the long-term conservation and survival of the polar bear. Encourage the IUCN Polar Bear Specialist Group to develop a more comprehensive and updated understanding of the range-wide status and trends of polar bear populations based on the best available scientific data, taking into account results of population monitoring activities and projected changes in sea ice; Encourage the IUCN Polar Bear Specialist Group to determine how to best use Traditional Ecological Knowledge together with scientific approaches and analyses of polar bear population status for more effective decision-making and consider their recommendation at the 2015 regular meeting of the range states; Ensure that the best available information, including the biological status of the polar bear, changes to the ecosystem and current and future human activities such as economic 1192

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development, is shared between range states and is taken into account during decision making; Enhance coordinated actions by the range states through the full implementation of polar bear monitoring programs throughout the range of the species and cooperate to establish population trends for shared populations; Explore mechanisms to counter the threat of poaching and illegal trade in polar bears and polar bear parts, including enhanced cooperation among law enforcement agencies at the national, regional and global levels; Strengthen international cooperation to improve the clarity of legal trade data through the adoption of more effective reporting and monitoring practices and help address illegal trade through the adoption of procedures to better identify legally traded specimens and to verify the authenticity of trade documents. Continue, when appropriate, to look for additional financial resources for the implementation of national action plans for polar bear conservation and management, including through partnerships with business, the private sector, international financial institutions, foundations, non-governmental organizations and other sources; Recognize the importance of the Parties continuing to meet on a regular basis to discuss progress in implementing the 1973 Agreement. Consider future Ministerial meetings to assess progress and build on previous achievements. We reaffirm our commitment to cooperate to achieve effective conservation and management of polar bear populations throughout their range and call on the international community to join us in the conservation of this shared and globally important species.

Document 234 Outcome of the Meeting of the Parties to the 1973 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears (3 September 2015)* Introduction The Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears was concluded in Oslo, Norway, on November 15th 1973. The Range States comprises Canada, Greenland, Norway, Russia, and the United States of America. The Range States have held meetings every two years beginning in 2007. As agreed upon at previous meetings, the Range States, in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement, including Articles VIII and IX, decided that meetings under the Agreement should be held on a biennial schedule or otherwise as agreed to by the Parties. Against this background and building on the outcome of the previous meeting the five Range States met in Ilulissat, Greenland on 01–03 September, 2015 with an objective to provide an update on the conservation measures for polar bears, review progress on the development of national action plans, finalize the Circumpolar Action Plan (CAP), review the recommendations from the trade working group and the work of the conflict working group.

*  Done at Ilulissat, retrieved from the Government of Greenland, www.naalakkersuisut.gl/en/Naalakkersuisut/ Departments/Fiskeri-Fangst-og-Landbrug/Isbjorn. This Outcome document is not legally binding and creates no legally binding obligations of the parties to the 1973 multilateral agreement for the conservation of polar bears. Appendix 1. 10 Year Table and Appendix II. Trade Working Group Recommendations are not reproduced here.

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At its 2009 meeting, the Range States recognized that climate change and the associated sea ice degradation is the most important long term threat to polar bears. This was reinforced during the country reports at this meeting and in the CAP. Country Reports & Bilateral Efforts Each country gave a 40 minute presentation that included an overview of the program and updates on implementation of the Agreement. These presentations will be available on the Range States’ meeting website (www.polarbear2015.gl). Updates on four bilateral efforts were given. The United States had one comment related to the Canada-United States (Inuvialuit-Inupiat Agreement) presentation. The United States and Canada noted they look forward to discussion over the next year on available scientific data and TEK, including understanding and reconciling differences between the two streams of information. Conflict Working Group Human-bear conflicts have been under investigation by the human-bear conflict working group since 2009. They were tasked with examining proactive strategies for mitigating these conflicts, including best practices. A database has been developed to use as a tool for analyzing conflict data at local and regional scales. The database helps to facilitate adaptive management of human-bear conflicts. Membership of the Conflict Working Group was confirmed. The two year implementation plan of the Conflict Working Group was endorsed. The plan includes finalization of a Data Sharing Agreement, Terms of Reference, and a Requirements Document, as well as continued work on the PBHIMS database to fully integrate international data. The Working Group requested commitment from the Range States for financial and human resources. National Action Plans Two Range States have finalized their National Action Plans, and three others are well underway in their efforts. Canada’s National Action plan will incorporate the management plans developed at the territorial and provincial level, and the National Conservation Strategy. It is scheduled for completion in 2016. Norway published its National Action Plan in November 2013. The focus of the plan is knowledge-based adaptive management. Revision is scheduled for 2018. Russia approved its National Strategy in 2010. Its focus is the conservation of existing polar bear populations, and minimization of anthropogenic factors on polar bear populations. It will be reviewed in 2020. United States began working on its plan in 2010. The plan provides a mechanism to communicate the importance of reducing global greenhouse gas emissions, and is a guiding document for sustainable co-management of subsistence harvest in the United States. This plan will be finalized within 6 months. Greenland’s National Action plan is in development. Regulations, a quota system, a reporting system, and monitoring systems are all in place. TEK, sustainable hunting, and PBHIMS will be the focus of planning efforts in the near future.

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The status of the development of the various national plans will be kept up to date on the Range State web site (currently www.polarbear2015.gl). This avoids the need to wait until the next Range State meeting in two years to share this information. Report from the Trade Working Group The Trade Working Group of the Polar Bear Range States proposed six recommendations regarding trade in polar bear for endorsement by the Range States. These recommendations result from completion of the Trade Working Group’s project “International Cooperation for Better Enforcement, Reporting, and Data for Polar Bears”. The trade working group also noted the completion of the trade report and indicated that the report is available in electronic format on the meeting website and on request (to Canada) in hard copies. The Range States endorsed the recommendations. Circumpolar Action Plan (CAP) In 2009 the parties agreed to develop a coordinated approach to conservation and management planning. Each Range State is developing or has developed its own national action plan. These form the basis of the CAP. Presenting and accepting the CAP at this Range State meeting meets the goal established in Moscow at the 2013 Range State meeting. The CAP identifies key threats as climate change, human caused mortality, mineral and energy resource exploration and development, contaminants and pollution, shipping, tourism related activities, and disease and parasites. Its vision is to secure the long term persistence in the wild that represent the genetic, behavioral, life history, and ecological diversity of the species. This vision is supported by six objectives. A full review will be undertaken in 10 years, with a review of implementation actions at each Range State meeting. The Range States unanimously endorsed the CAP and thanked the working group for their significant work. WWF congratulated the Range States on the CAP and noted that the ambitious, longterm nature of the document is a clear demonstration of the Range States’ commitment to polar bear conservation and urged the Parties to provide adequate funding for implementation. Humane Society International (HSI) commended the group on the work that went into the CAP. HSI remains encouraged by the ten year plan. Scientific Reports on Conservation Status and Research Efforts PBSG provided a presentation on its status table, Red List Assessment update, and key scientific publications since the last Range States meeting. Their mission is to coordinate, synthesize and distribute scientific information necessary to guide the long-term viability of polar bears and their habitats. Canada asked the PBSG to develop advice on the type of survey that may be appropriate for the Arctic Basin, its priority, and likely costs. Commitments to the CAP—2 Year Implementation Schedule The ten year action table (Appendix 1) is divided into the four strategic approaches. Each of these has actions and sub-actions. There are six objectives that the actions and subactions address. There are a total of 61 different sub-actions to be undertaken over ten years, with 19 actions being identified as priorities for the next two years. The Range States endorsed an implementation plan detailing commitments for the next two year period. Working groups were created to accomplish the two year actions, 1195

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focusing on Traditional Ecological Knowledge, Communication, Trade & Wildlife Enforcement Network and Trade, Operations, Protocols and Procedures of the Range States, CAP Implementation, and human-bear conflicts. Range States will report at the 2017 meeting on the progress made on those items. Operating Mechanisms The Range Sates’ recognized that the current ad hoc voluntary working group is not adapted to the needs of the implementation of the CAP and as such want to ensure that adequate resources are identified for this. The Range States agreed to create a working group that will prepare recommendations within 12 months for the consideration of the Range States. The mandate of this working group will consider options for the structure, operating mechanisms, procedures and protocols, and finding methods to best facilitate the current and anticipated work of the Range States in implementing the CAP and the Polar Bear Agreement. Earlier in the meeting, IFAW suggested that the Parties develop a Terms of Reference for observers. The working group on operating mechanisms will include this task in their work. Canada and the United States will co-chair the working group. The Range States agreed to have further discussions about how countries make changes to subpopulation boundaries as well as how those are communicated to the PBSG. Cooperation with Other Relevant Multilateral Structures IUCN General Assembly 2016. Range States agreed to seek support from IUCN for implementation of the CAP. IUCN-PBSG. The Range States reaffirmed their support for the PBSG as an independent scientific advisory body. They agreed to continue discussions about the structure and relationships between PBSG, PBTC, and Range States’ scientists. Canada will be submitting a proposal to PBSG to discuss enhanced participation and/or communication. CITES. It was noted that during their country report, the US notified the Range States that the US was likely to submit a proposal to the 17th CITES Conference of the Parties to transfer the polar bear from CITES Appendix II to Appendix I. This proposal is based on concerns the US continues to have about the impacts of commercial international trade in polar bears on the long term survival of the species. The US clarified that no position has yet been finalized and welcomed input and information from the Range States. Convention on Migratory Species (CMS). Last year the CMS listed polar bears on their Appendix II. Norway has received a letter from CMS offering assistance on the issue of polar bears and climate change. Implementation Team will consider this offer, confer with their Head of Delegations, and report back to the group. All the Range States are open to exploring how possible collaboration with CMS could facilitate implementation of components of the CAP.

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Document 235 Inuvialuit-Inupiat Polar Bear Management Agreement in the Southern Beaufort Sea (3 August 2011)* The Inuvialuit of Canada and Inupiat of the United States, Noting that both groups have traditionally harvested a portion of polar bears from the same population in the Southern Beaufort Sea; And Noting that the continued hunting of polar bears is essential to maintain the dietary, cultural, and economic base of the groups; And Noting that the maintenance of a sustained harvest for traditional users in perpetuity requires that the number of polar bears taken annually not exceed the productivity of the population; And Noting that the International Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears provides for cooperation in the research and management of shared populations; And Noting that nothing in this Agreement shall be read to abrogate the responsibilities of Federal, Provincial, or State authorities under existing or future statues; And Noting that the Inuvialuit and the Inupiat will have a long-term fundamental influence on the maintenance and use of this resource and that the efforts of other parties will also be required to ensure effective conservation; Have agreed as follows: Article I Definitions (a) The species considered in this Agreement is the polar bear (Ursus maritimus). (b) The area covered by this Agreement is the Southern Beaufort Sea from approximately Pearce Point, Canada to Icy Cape, USA, along the mainland coast, and extending north to a line approximately equidistant between Banks Island and the mainland coast. (c) The people covered by this Agreement are the Inuvialuit of Canada and the Inupiat of the North Slope of Alaska. (d) The settlements and their outpost camps whose hunting practices may be affected by this Agreement are Barrow, Nuiqsut, Wainwright, Atqasuk and Kaktovik in the United States and Inuvik, Aklavik, Tuktoyaktuk and Paulatuk in Canada. (e) Acceptable annual harvest level which does not exceed net annual recruitment to the population and accounts for all forms of removal from the population, and which considers the status of the population, based on the best available scientific information. (f) A cub-of-the year is a young polar bear that is less than one year of age; a yearling polar bear is older than one year of age but less than two years of age and still with its mother; a family group consists of a mother with one or more cubs-of-the-year or yearlings. (g) A Joint Commission with responsibility to implement this agreement will be formed and shall consist of two (2) representatives designated by each of the Inuvialuit Game Council and the North Slope Borough Fish and Game Management Committee. A Technical Advisory Committee with responsibility for collecting and evaluating scientific data and making recommendations shall be appointed by the Joint Commission including members from the following agencies: the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the *  This Agreement supersedes the previous Agreements between the Inuvialuit and the Inupiat on Polar Bear Management in the Southern Beaufort Sea signed in January 1988 and revised in March 2000. Original provided by and reproduced with permission by the Inuvialuit Game Council.

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U.S. Geological Survey, the North Slope Borough Department of Wildlife Management, the Canadian Wildlife Service, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Government of the Northwest Territories, Wildlife Management Advisory Council (NWT) and WMAC (North Slope). Article II Objectives (a) To maintain a healthy viable population of polar bears in the Southern Beaufort Sea in the near term and in perpetuity. (b) To manage polar bears on a sustainable yield basis in accordance with all the best information available. (c) To provide increased protection to female polar bears by encouraging that the female proportion of the harvest not exceed one-third of the sustainable total. (d) To encourage the collection of adequate scientific, traditional, and technical information in a timely manner to facilitate management decisions. (e) To minimize detrimental effects of human activities, especially commercial activities, and scientific research on bears or their habitat. (f) To identify research priorities, such as to further refine the eastern and western boundaries of the population of polar bears, and to re-estimate the population size in a timely manner. (g) To encourage the wise use of the polar bear population and all polar bear products. (h) To continue facilitation of the cultural exchange of polar bear meat and products between traditional users in Alaska and Canada. (i) To legalize the sale of hides and other products from polar bears harvested by the traditional Alaskan user in Alaska (Enabling legislation required). (j) To meet annually to review the best available information on the polar bear population in the Southern Beaufort Sea, and make recommendations for research and management; then to review this Agreement every 10 years, or sooner if requested. Article III Regulations This Agreement supersedes the previous Agreements between the Inuvialuit and the Inupiat on Polar Bear Management in the Southern Beaufort Sea signed in January 1988 and revised in March 2000. To conserve this population of polar bears, the Inuvialuit and the Inupiat have agreed as follows: (a) All bears in dens or constructing dens are protected. (b) All members of a family group are protected. (c) Hunting seasons shall be based on traditional ecological knowledge principles. (d) The acceptable annual harvest shall be determined by the Joint Commission in consultation with the Technical Advisory Committee and shall be divided between Canada and Alaska according to an annual review of scientific evidence. Allocation agreements shall be negotiated and ratified annually that will apply to the next hunting season. Each signatory to this Agreement shall determine for itself the distribution of the harvest within its jurisdiction. (e) The use of aircraft or large motorized vessels for the purpose of taking polar bears shall be prohibited. (f) The taking of polar bears is discouraged within the immediate vicinity of hone piles formed from fall whaling activities and active walrus haul-outs. 1198

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(g) Each jurisdiction shall prohibit the exportation from, the importation and delivery into, and traffic within its territory, of polar bears or any part of product thereof taken in violation of this Agreement. (h) Polar bears in villages during closed seasons should, whenever possible, be deterred from the area. (i) Polar bears threatening human safety or property, including those killed during research activities, may be taken at any time of the year and will be counted as part of the total quota as allocated by the Joint Commission. (j) These regulations do not preclude either party from unilaterally introducing additional conservation practices within their own jurisdictions. (k) Quotas will not be reduced in future years just because the full quota is not taken. (l) Any readjustment of the boundaries may necessitate a readjustment of user allocations under the management plan, and an amendment of this Agreement by mutual agreement, as outlined in Article V (c). Article IV Collection of data and sharing of information (a) The following data will be recorded for each bear killed: sex, date and location of the kill, and hunter’s name. (b) The following specimens should be collected from each bear killed: the lower jaw or an undamaged post-canine tooth to be used for age-determination, ear tags, lip tattoos, and radio collars if present, the baculum from each male, and/or other specimens as agreed to by the hunters of either jurisdiction for additional studies. (c) A summary of all harvest information and pertinent research plans or results from each jurisdiction shall be exchanged annually. (d) The number of collars deployed for research purposes shall be limited to the minimum number necessary to provide accurate population information. (e) There shall be prior notification and consultation prior to undertaking research. Article V Duration and administration of Agreement (a) This Agreement shall enter into force when it has been signed by the representatives of each party. (b) This Agreement shall remain in force unless either Contracting Party requests it be terminated. (c) Amendments to the Agreement may be proposed by either signatory, then accepted or rejected by mutual agreement after consultation with North Slope Borough Fish and Game Management Committee and the Inuvialuit Game Council. Formal written notification of any management changes or amendments to the Agreement approved and accepted by both parties should be made to the Marine Mammals Management section of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service in Anchorage, U.S.A., the Wildlife Management Advisory Council, (NWT) and WMAC (North Slope), Canadian Wildlife Services, and ENR (GNWT). The Alaskan signatories of this document have no authority to bind and do not purport to bind the North Slope Borough to any agreement which would otherwise be in violation of the exclusive federal treaty power established by the United States Constitution, but are acting solely as representatives of the local traditional user group of the polar bear resource in furthering the consultation, management, and information exchange goals of the International Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears. SIGNED on this the 3rd day of August 2011 in Anchorage, Alaska, U.S.A. 1199

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On behalf of the North Slope Inupiat: Enoch Oktollik, Chairman North Slope Borough, Fish & Game Management Committee Taqulik Hepa, Director North Slope Borough, Department of Wildlife Management On behalf of the Inuvialuit: Frank Pokiak, Chair Inuvialuit Game Council Charles A. Gruben, Commissioner Inuvialuit Game Council

Document 236 Agreement between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on the Conservation and Management of the Alaska-Chukotka Polar Bear Population (16 October 2000)* Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation on the conservation and management of the Alaska-Chukotka polar bear population The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation, (hereinafter referred to as the “Contracting Parties”); Desiring to further the goals of the 1973 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears (hereinafter referred to as the “1973 Agreement”); Affirming that the United States and the Russian Federation have a mutual interest in and responsibility for the conservation of the Alaska-Chukotka polar bear population; Acknowledging the vital interest of the Autonomous Region of Chukotka and the State of Alaska in the conservation and management of the Alaska-Chukotka population of polar bears; Recognizing that reliable biological information, including scientific data and traditional knowledge of native people, serves as the basis for development of an effective strategy for the conservation and management of this population; Recognizing that polar bears represent a valuable subsistence harvest species for the native people of Alaska and Chukotka; Affirming the authorization of the native people of Alaska and Chukotka, in accordance with each Contracting Party’s domestic laws, to hunt polar bears to satisfy their traditional subsistence needs, and to manufacture and sell handicrafts and clothing; Desiring to meet the subsistence needs of native people while affording further protection to polar bears; Recognizing that illegal taking, habitat loss or degradation, pollution, and other human-caused threats could compromise the continued viability of the Alaska-Chukotka polar bear population;

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Done at Washington, 16 October 2000; entered into force 23 September 2007; (2001) 40 ILM 397.

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Recognizing the important ecological role and aesthetic value of the polar bear and the need to maintain broad public support for the conservation of polar bears; Affirming the essential role of the native people of Alaska and Chukotka in the conservation of the Alaska-Chukotka population of polar bears, welcoming the steps taken by those people with the goal of cooperation in the conservation and management of this population, and desiring to ensure their full involvement in the implementation and enforcement of this Agreement. Have agreed as follows: Article I In this Agreement the following definitions shall apply: (a) “sustainable harvest level” means a harvest level which does not exceed net annual recruitment to the population and maintains the population at or near its current level, taking into account all forms of removal, and considers the status and trend of the population, based on reliable scientific information. (b) “taking” means hunting, killing or capturing. (c) “native people” means the native residents of Alaska and Chukotka as represented by the Alaska Nanuuq Commission and the corresponding Union of Marine Mammal Hunters, or their successor organizations recognized as such by the Contracting Parties. Article II The Contracting Parties shall cooperate with the goal of ensuring the conservation of the Alaska-Chukotka polar bear population, the conservation of its habitat, and the regulation of its use for subsistence purposes by native people. Article III This Agreement applies to the waters and adjacent coastal areas subject to the national jurisdiction of the Contracting Parties in that area of the Chukchi, East Siberian and Bering Seas bounded on the west by a line extending north from the mouth of the Kolyma River; on the east by a line extending north from Point Barrow; and on the south by a line describing the southernmost annual formation of drift ice. The Contracting Parties may, by mutual agreement, modify the area to which the Agreement applies. Article IV The Contracting Parties shall undertake all efforts necessary to conserve polar bear habitats, with particular attention to denning areas and areas of concentration of polar bears during feeding and migration. To this end, they shall take steps necessary to prevent loss or degradation of such habitats that results in, or is likely to result in, mortality to polar bears or reduced productivity or long-term decline in the Alaska-Chukotka polar bear population. Article V Any taking of polar bears from the Alaska-Chukotka population inconsistent with the terms of this Agreement or the 1973 Agreement is prohibited.

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Article VI 1. Native people may take polar bears of the Alaska-Chukotka population for subsistence purposes, provided that: (a) the take is consistent with Article III(1)(d) of the 1973 Agreement; (b) the taking of females with cubs, cubs less than one year of age, and bears in dens, including bears preparing to enter dens or who have just left dens, is prohibited; (c) the use of aircraft, large motorized vessels and large motorized vehicles for the purpose of taking polar bears is prohibited; and (d) the use of poisons, traps or snares for the purpose of taking polar bears is prohibited. 2. Consistent with the 1973 Agreement, polar bears from the Alaska-Chukotka population may be taken for the conduct of scientific research, for the purpose of rescuing or rehabilitating orphaned, sick, or injured animals, or when human life is threatened. Animals being maintained in captivity for purposes of rehabilitation or which are determined by either Contracting Party not to be releasable to the wild may be placed on public display. Article VII 1. Nothing in this Agreement is intended to authorize the taking of polar bears for commercial purposes, or to limit the ability of native people, consistent with the domestic law of the Contracting Parties, to create, sell, and use traditional articles associated with native harvest of polar bears. 2. The Contracting Parties shall undertake, in accordance with domestic law, measures necessary for the prevention of illegal trade in polar bears, including their parts and derivatives. Article VIII 1. To coordinate measures for the conservation and study of the Alaska-Chukotka population of polar bears, the Contracting Parties hereby establish the U.S.-Russia Polar Bear Commission, hereinafter referred to as “the Commission,” to be composed of two national sections, a United States Section and a Russian Section. 2. Each national section shall consist of two members appointed by the respective Contracting Party in order to provide for inclusion in each section of a representative of its native people, in addition to a representative of the Contracting Party. 3. Each section shall have one vote in the Commission. A decision or recommendation of the Commission shall be made only with the approval of both sections. 4. The Contracting Parties shall be responsible for organizing and supporting the activities of their respective national sections as well as the joint activities of the Commission. 5. The Commission, at its first meeting, shall adopt rules of procedure, including provisions for accreditation of observers who can attend Commission meetings as representatives of interested organizations who can contribute to the Commission’s work. 6. The Commission shall hold an annual meeting and may hold other meetings at the request of either Contracting Party, or on such a schedule as the Commission may determine. Annual meetings shall alternate between the United States and Russia.

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7. The Commission shall carry out the following tasks: (a) promoting cooperation between the Contracting Parties, between the native people, and between the Contracting Parties and the native people; (b) determining on the basis of reliable scientific data, including traditional knowledge of the native people, the polar bear population’s annual sustainable harvest level; (c) determining the annual taking limits not to exceed the sustainable harvest level; (d) adopting measures to restrict the take of polar bears for subsistence purposes by the native people within the framework of the established annual taking limits, including seasons and restrictions on sex and age additional to those in Article VI(1) of this Agreement; (e) working to identify polar bear habitats and developing recommendations for habitat conservation measures; (f) considering scientific research programs, including jointly conducted programs, for the study, conservation, and monitoring of polar bears, and preparing recommendations for implementing such programs, and determining criteria for reporting on and verification of polar bears taken; (g) participating in the examination of disagreements between the native people of Alaska and Chukotka on questions regarding subsistence use of polar bears and their conservation and facilitating their resolution; (h) issuing recommendations concerning the maintenance in captivity of orphaned and rehabilitated polar bears; (i) examining information and scientific data about polar bears, including information on harvested polar bears and those taken in cases where human life is threatened; (j) preparing and distributing conservation materials and reports of each Commission meeting; and (k) performing such functions as are necessary and appropriate for the implementation of this Agreement. 8. The Commission shall establish a scientific working group and other working groups as it deems necessary to assist in carrying out its tasks. 9. The Commission shall bring to the attention of the competent authorities of the Contracting Parties and of native people its determinations with respect to the matters covered in this Article. Article IX Each Contracting Party shall have the right to harvest one-half of the annual taking limit of polar bears determined by the Commission. If a Contracting Party does not intend to harvest one-half of the annual taking limit it may, subject to the agreement of the Commission, transfer to the other Contracting Party part of its remaining share of the annual taking limit and shall so notify the other Contracting Party through diplomatic channels. Article X 1. Each Contracting Party shall take such steps as are necessary to ensure implementation of this Agreement. 2. Each Contracting Party shall monitor the harvest of polar bears in those areas subject to its national jurisdiction. 1203

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3. Each Contracting Party shall report to the Commission annually on: (a) steps taken in accordance with Paragraphs 1 and 2 above, including the adoption of laws and regulations, and measures to enforce them; (b) steps taken to involve native people in the implementation and enforcement of this Agreement; and (c) scientific data and information on the Alaska-Chukotka polar bear population, including harvest information provided by native people. Article XI Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted as limiting the right of each Contracting Party to take additional measures, including designation of specially protected natural areas, to protect polar bears in areas under its national jurisdiction. Article XII In the event of any disagreement with regard to the interpretation or application of the provisions of this Agreement, the Contracting Parties shall consult with a view to resolving the disagreement through negotiation. At the request of either Contracting Party, the Commission shall examine any point of disagreement. The recommendations of the Commission in such matters shall be presented to the Contracting Parties. Article XIII 1. This Agreement shall enter into force 30 days after the date on which the Contracting Parties have exchanged written notification through diplomatic channels that they have completed their respective domestic legal procedures necessary to bring the Agreement into force, and shall remain in force unless terminated in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article. 2. Either Contracting Party may terminate this Agreement upon written notification to the other through diplomatic channels. Any such notification shall be made not later than June 30 of any calendar year for termination to become effective on January 1 of the following year. Notifications made later than June 30 shall become effective on January 1 of the year after the following year. DONE at washington, D.C. on October 16, 2000, in duplicate in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

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Document 237 Memorandum of Understanding between Environment Canada and the US Department of the Interior for the conservation and management of shared polar bear populations (8 May 2008)*

*  Unfortunately, permission to reproduce this document was not granted. The document can be retrieved from the Government of Canada, https://www.ec.gc.ca/international/default.asp?lang=En&n=6D70FB59-1.

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Document 238 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Canada, the Government of Nunavut, and the Government of Greenland for the Conservation and Management of Polar Bear Populations (30 October 2009)*

*  Unfortunately, permission to reproduce this document was not granted. The document can be retrieved from the Government of Canada, https://www.ec.gc.ca/international/default.asp?lang=En&n=B32CD8A1-1.

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Seals Document 239 Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of Norway on Sealing and the Conservation of the Seal Stocks in the Northwest Atlantic (15 July 1971)* The Government of Canada and the Government of Norway; Desirous of continuing and further developing the close co-operation in solving common problems concerning sealing and the conservation of the seal stocks in the Northwest Atlantic; Desirous of developing and maintaining the most effective conservation measures in order to secure the best possible protection of the seal stocks in this area and a rational utilization of these resources; Desirous of extending and co-ordinating their scientific research concerning the seal stocks in this area; Desirous of ensuring that humane catching methods are used in sealing; and, Desirous of taking effective steps jointly and separately in attaining these aims; Have agreed as follows: Article I The area to which this agreement applies shall, subject to Article XII, include all waters of the Northwest Atlantic North of 45° North latitude and West of 45° West longitude. Article II This agreement applies to harp seal (Phoca groenlandica). On a proposal by the commission established under Article III the application of this agreement may be extended to hooded seal (Cystophora cristata), bearded seal (Erignatus barbatus) and walrus (Odobenus rosmarus). Article III The contracting parties shall establish a commission consisting of three representatives appointed by each country. The commission shall hold at least one regular annual meeting at such time and place as may be agreed upon. The Chairman of the meeting shall be provided alternatively by Canada and Norway. The representatives of the contracting parties attending meetings of the commission may be assisted by experts or advisers. Each contracting party shall have one vote in the commission. Decisions shall be taken by unanimous vote.

*  Done at Ottawa, 15 July 1971; entered into force 22 December 1971; 870 UNTS 86 [Registration Number 12497]. From United Nations Treaty Series, by United Nations Office of Legal Affairs Treaty Section, © 1978, United Nations. Reprinted with the permission of the United Nations.

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Article IV The commission is entrusted with the following functions: (a) on the basis of scientific and practical research to submit proposals to the contracting parties with regard to, inter alia, sealing and the conservation of the seal stocks, national quotas, opening and closing dates, humane hunting methods and the prevention of cruelty or suffering to the animals, (b) to submit proposals to the contracting parties with regard to the establishment of inspection and control procedures required to ensure the implementation and enforcement of the provisions of this agreement, (c) to submit proposals to the contracting parties concerning scientific research to be undertaken jointly or separately with respect to sealing and the conservation of the seal stocks, or concerning the co-ordination of such research. Article V The contracting parties undertake as far as possible to supply the commission with such information of a statistical, practical and scientific nature as the commission deems necessary for its work. Article VI Each contracting party shall bear the costs of its participation in the commission and of its scientific research. Expenditures incurred in joint research projects and other joint expenditures shall be shared between the parties, as may be agreed in accordance with Article VII, following upon proposals of the commission. Article VII The proposals of the commission concerning conservation measures, other measures to regulate sealing activities, scientific research, the sharing of the expenses of joint research or other joint expenditures, and the extension of this agreement to other species, shall be submitted to the contracting parties for their approval and shall be binding upon them following such approval. Approved proposals of the commission with regard to conservation measures and other measures to regulate sealing shall be put into effect by the parties not later than two months following approval, unless the parties agree otherwise. Article VIII Each contracting party undertakes to put into effect and enforce such measures as may be necessary to implement this agreement. Article IX Each contracting party shall be entitled, subject to this agreement, notwithstanding national quotas agreed by the contracting parties, to issue permits to its nationals for the taking of the species covered by this agreement on the high seas or in its own territorial sea, for the following purposes: (a) for scientific research (b) for the local population (c) for expeditions, provided that the catch is used for food, animal feed or similar needs. 1208

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The contracting parties shall inform the commission of such permits issued. Article X Either contracting party may terminate this agreement by three years’ notice in writing. No such notice shall be given by either party before December 31st, 1975. Upon such notice the contracting parties shall as soon as possible enter into negotiations in good faith on future arrangements concerning conservation and sealing. Article XI By agreement of the contracting parties, other states interested in the conservation of the species referred to in this agreement may be invited to accede to Articles I to X of this agreement. Article XII Subject to the provisions of this agreement, in view of the fact that the movements of the seal herds are governed by unpredictable weather conditions and consequently that, in certain years, the ice on which the seals are concentrated drifts inside the Canadian territorial sea, Norwegian vessels engaged in sealing operations are allowed, notwithstanding the provisions of the Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of Norway of July 15, 1971, to take seals within the outer nine miles of the territorial sea on the Atlantic coast of Canada between 48º00′ North latitude and 55°20′ North latitude, and up to but not closer than three miles from the nearest land in all the waters of Notre Dame Bay and of the Strait of Belle Isle northeast of a straight line drawn from the lighthouse at Amour Point to the lighthouse on Flowers Island in Flowers Cove, Newfoundland. Norwegian sealing is not otherwise allowed in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. Article XIII This agreement is subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which shall take place at Oslo as soon as possible. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement. DONE in two copies at Ottawa this fifteenth day of July 1971, in the English, French and Norwegian languages, each version being equally authentic.

Document 240 Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of Norway Amending the Agreement of July 15, 1971 on Sealing and the Conservation of Seal Stocks in the Northwest Atlantic (8 December 1975)* The Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada to the Ambassador of Norway Ottawa, December 8, 1975 No. FLA-738 His Excellency Knut Hedemann * 

Done at Ottawa, 8 December 1975, E103265—CTS 1975 No 27.

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Ambassador of Norway Ottawa Excellency, I have the honour to refer to the Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of Norway on Sealing and the Conservation of Seal Stocks in the Northwest Atlantic, done at Ottawa on July 15, 1971, which entered into force on December 22, 1971. In accordance with arrangements discussed during the fourth meeting of the CanadaNorway Sealing Commission held at Edinburgh, Scotland on June 9, 1975, I have the honour to propose on behalf of the Government of Canada that Articles II and XII of the Canada-Norway Sealing Agreement be amended to read as follows: Article II “This agreement applies to harp seal (Phoca groenlandica), hooded seal (Cystophora cristata), bearded seal (Erignatus Barbatus) and walrus (Odobe­nus rosmarus).” Article XII “Subject to the provisions of this agreement, Norwegian vessels engaged in sealing operations are allowed, notwithstanding the provisions of the Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of Norway of July 15, 1971, constituting an Agreement with Respect to Norwegian Fishing Practices off the Atlantic Coast of Canada, to take seals: a. within the outer nine miles of the territorial sea on the Atlantic coast of Canada between 48°00′ North latitude and 55°20′ North latitude; and b. outside a line drawn between Gull Island 50°00′01ʺ North, 55°21′15′ West, and Turr Islet 49°50′llʺ North and 54°08′45ʺ West, but not closer than three miles from the nearest land; and c. inside the Strait of Belle Isle up to a line joining Barge Point and Cape Norman Light, but not closer than five miles from the nearest land off Newfoundland between Cape Norman and Cape Bauld, and not closer than three miles from the nearest land between Barge Point and Double Island, including Belle Isle; and d. up to three miles from the nearest land between Double Island 52°15′30ʺ North, 55°32′58ʺ West, and Outer Gannet Island 54°00′00ʺ North, 56°31′12ʺ West; and e. up to but not inside the baseline between Outer Gannet Island 54°00′00′ North, 56°32′12ʺ West and East Rock (White Bear) 54°27′06ʺ North and 56°32′12ʺ West. Norwegian sealing is not otherwise allowed in the Gulf of St. Lawrence.” If the foregoing proposals are acceptable to your Government I have the honour to propose that this Note, the English and French versions of which are equally authentic, and your Excellency’s reply in Norwegian to that effect shall constitute an Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of Norway which shall enter into force on the date of your reply. Allan J. MacEachen Secretary of State for External Affairs

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The Ambassador of Norway to the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada Ottawa, December 12, 1975 The Honourable Allan J. MacEachen Minister for External Affairs Ottawa Your Excellency, I have the honour of referring to your Note of December 8, 1975, which reads as follows: [See Canadian Note No. FLA-738 dated December 8, 1975] I have the honor of informing you that the Norwegian Government has accepted the proposals mentioned above and of confirming that your Note and this reply Note constitute an agreement between our two governments, and that it will enter into force on the date of this reply Note. Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration. Knut Hedemann Ambassador

Document 241 Agreement on the protection and exploitation of the seal stocks in the Northeast Atlantic between Norway and the Soviet Union based on the exchange of diplomatic notes [unofficial translation] (12 April 1983)* Note of 12 April 1983 from the Norwegian embassy in Moscow to the Ministry of Fisheries of the Soviet Union: I have the honor to refer to the negotiations which took place in Moscow the 12–15 October 1982 between a Norwegian and Soviet delegation concerning the connection between Norway and the Soviet Union regarding the protection and exploitation of seal populations in the Northeast Atlantic and I will suggest the following: The Norwegian part confirmed that the connection between the parts regarding the protection and exploitation of seal populations within the current areas in the Northeast Atlantic are regulated according to the agreement from the 15 October 1976 between the Government of the Kingdom of Norway and the Government of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics about the mutual fisheries relations. Deliberations that may arise regarding protection and exploitation of the seal populations, particularly the quotas for each of the parties’ fishing vessels and also the coordination of scientific examinations in this field, shall take place within the framework of the mixed committee founded according to the agreement from the 11 April 1975

* The original Norwegian version of this exchange of notes was kindly provided by Elisabeth Kristvik, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It replaced the Agreement between Norway and the Soviet Union on measures for regulating the catch and conserving stocks of seals in the Northeastern part of the Atlantic Ocean (Done at Oslo, 22 November 1957; entered into force 27 June 1958; 309 UNTS 280 [Registration Number 4476]). This unofficial translation was provided by F Schmitt.

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between the government of the Kingdom of Norway and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics on the cooperation within the fishing industry. I have the honor to confirm the receipt of your letter with the following content: […] I have the honor to suggest that this letter and your affirmative answer shall make up an agreement between our two sides and that this agreement shall come into effect on the date of your reply. At the same date the agreement from the 22 November 1957 between the Government of Norway and the Government of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics about a measure to regulate the catch of seal and the protection of seal populations in the Northeastern part of the Atlantic shall stop to be in force. Reply of 12 April 1983 from the Ministry of Fisheries of the Soviet Union to the Norwegian embassy in Moscow: I have the honor to confirm the receipt of your letter from today which reads as follows in Russian translation: […] I confirm, Mr. Ambassador, that the suggestions contained in your letter are acceptable for the Soviet side and that your letter and my answer to it shall make up an agreement between two parties concerning this question.

Whales Document 242 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (2 December 1946)* The Governments whose duly authorised representatives have subscribed hereto, Recognizing the interest of the nations of the world in safeguarding for future generations the great natural resources represented by the whale stocks; Considering that the history of whaling has seen over-fishing of one area after another and of one species of whale after another to such a degree that it is essential to protect all species of whales from further over-fishing; Recognizing that the whale stocks are susceptible of natural increases if whaling is properly regulated, and that increases in the size of whale stocks will permit increases in the number of whales which may be captured without endangering these natural resources; Recognizing that it is in the common interest to achieve the optimum level of whale stocks as rapidly as possible without causing widespread economic and nutritional distress; Recognizing that in the course of achieving these objectives, whaling operations should be confined to those species best able to sustain exploitation in order to give an interval for recovery to certain species of whales now depleted in numbers;

*  Done at Washington, 2 December 1946; entered into force 10 November 1948; 161 UNTS 74 [Registration Number 2124]. From United Nations Treaty Series, by United Nations Office of Legal Affairs Treaty Section, © 1953, United Nations. Reprinted with the permission of the United Nations. The Convention was amended by Protocol to the International Whaling Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, done at Washington on 19 November 1956. It entered into force 4 May 1959 (338 UNTS 366). The Protocol extended the application of the Convention to helicopters and other aircrafts. The text reproduced is a consolidated version incorporating the amendments made by the Protocol.

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Desiring to establish a system of international regulation for the whale fisheries to ensure proper and effective conservation and development of whale stocks on the basis of the principles embodied in the provisions of the International Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling, signed in London on 8th June, 1937, and the protocols to that Agreement signed in London on 24th June, 1938, and 26th November, 1945; and Having decided to conclude a convention to provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks and thus make possible the orderly development of the whaling industry; Have agreed as follows: Article I This Convention includes the Schedule attached thereto which forms an integral part thereof. All references to “Convention” shall be understood as including the said Schedule either in its present terms or as amended in accordance with the provisions of Article V. This Convention applies to factory ships, land stations, and whale catchers under the jurisdiction of the Contracting Governments and to all waters in which whaling is prosecuted by such factory ships, land stations, and whale catchers. Article II As used in this Convention: “Factory ship” means a ship in which or on which whales are treated either wholly or in part; “Land station” means a factory on the land at which whales are treated whether wholly or in part; “Whale catcher” means a helicopter, or other aircraft, or a ship used for the purpose of hunting, taking, towing, holding on to, or scouting for whales; “Contracting Government” means any Government which has deposited an instrument of ratification or has given notice of adherence to this Convention. Article III The Contracting Governments agree to establish an International Whaling Commission, hereinafter referred to as the Commission, to be composed of one member from each Contracting Government. Each member shall have one vote and may be accompanied by one or more experts and advisers. The Commission shall elect from its own members a Chairman and Vice-Chairman and shall determine its own Rules of Procedure. Decisions of the Commission shall be taken by a simple majority of those members voting except that a three-fourths majority of those members voting shall be required for action in pursuance of Article V. The Rules of Procedure may provide for decisions otherwise than at meetings of the Commission. The Commission may appoint its own Secretary and staff. The Commission may set up, from among its own members and experts or advisers, such committees as it considers desirable to perform such functions as it may authorize. The expenses of each member of the Commission and of his experts and advisers shall be determined and paid by his own Government. Recognizing that specialized agencies related to the United Nations will be concerned with the conservation and development of whale fisheries and the products arising therefrom and desiring to avoid duplication of functions, the Contracting Governments will consult among themselves within two years after the coming into force of this 1213

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Convention to decide whether the Commission shall be brought within the framework of a specialized agency related to the United Nations. In the meantime the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland shall arrange, in consultation with the other Contracting Governments, to convene the first meeting of the Commission, and shall initiate the consultation referred to in paragraph 6 above. Subsequent meetings of the Commission shall be convened as the Commission may determine. Article IV The Commission may either in collaboration with or through independent agencies of the Contracting Governments or other public or private agencies, establishments, or organizations, or independently; (a) encourage, recommend, or if necessary, organize studies and investigations relating to whales and whaling; (b) collect and analyze statistical information concerning the current condition and trend of the whale stocks and the effects of whaling activities thereon; (c) study, appraise, and disseminate information concerning methods of maintaining and increasing the populations of whale stocks. The Commission shall arrange for the publication of reports of its activities, and it may publish independently or in collaboration with the International Bureau for Whaling Statistics at Sandefjord in Norway and other organizations and agencies such reports as it deems appropriate, as well as statistical, scientific, and other pertinent information relating to whales and whaling. Article V The Commission may amend from time to time the provisions of the Schedule by adopting regulations with respect to the conservation and utilization of whale resources, fixing (a) protected and unprotected species; (b) open and closed seasons; (c) open and closed waters, including the designation of sanctuary areas; (d) size limits for each species; (e) time, methods, and intensity of whaling (including the maximum catch of whales to be taken in any one season); (f) types and specifications of gear and apparatus and appliances which may be used; (g) methods of measurement; (h) catch returns and other statistical and biological records; and (i) methods of inspection. These amendments of the Schedule (a) shall be such as are necessary to carry out the objectives and purposes of this Convention and to provide for the conservation, development, and optimum utilization of the whale resources; (b) shall be based on scientific findings; (c) shall not involve restrictions on the number or nationality of factory ships or land stations, nor allocate specific quotas to any factory ship or land station or to any group of factory ships or land stations; and (d) shall take into consideration the interests of the consumers of whale products and the whaling industry. Each of such amendments shall become effective with respect to 1214

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the Contracting Governments ninety days following notification of the amendment by the Commission to each of the Contracting Governments, except that (e) if any Government presents to the Commission objection to any amendment prior to the expiration of this ninety-day period, the amendment shall not become effective with respect to any of the Governments for an additional ninety days; (f) thereupon, any other Contracting Government may present objection to the amendment at any time prior to the expiration of the additional ninety-day period, or before the expiration of thirty days from the date of receipt of the last objection received during such additional ninety-day period, whichever date shall be the later; and (g) thereafter, the amendment shall become effective with respect to all Contracting Governments which have not presented objection but shall not become effective with respect to any Government which has so objected until such date as the objection is withdrawn. The Commission shall notify each Contracting Government immediately upon receipt of each objection and withdrawal and each Contracting Government shall acknowledge receipt of all notifications of amendments, objections, and withdrawals. No amendments shall become effective before 1st July, 1949. Article VI The Commission may from time to time make recommendations to any or all Contracting Governments on any matters which relate to whales or whaling and to the objectives and purposes of this Convention. Article VII The Contracting Government shall ensure prompt transmission to the International Bureau for Whaling Statistics at Sandefjord in Norway, or to such other body as the Commission may designate, of notifications and statistical and other information required by this Convention in such form and manner as may be prescribed by the Commission. Article VIII Notwithstanding anything contained in this Convention any Contracting Government may grant to any of its nationals a special permit authorizing that national to kill, take and treat whales for purposes of scientific research subject to such restrictions as to number and subject to such other conditions as the Contracting Government thinks fit, and the killing, taking, and treating of whales in accordance with the provisions of this Article shall be exempt from the operation of this Convention. Each Contracting Government shall report at once to the Commission all such authorizations which it has granted. Each Contracting Government may at any time revoke any such special permit which it has granted. Any whales taken under these special permits shall so far as practicable be processed and the proceeds shall be dealt with in accordance with directions issued by the Government by which the permit was granted. Each Contracting Government shall transmit to such body as may be designated by the Commission, in so far as practicable, and at intervals of not more than one year, scientific information available to that Government with respect to whales and whaling, including the results of research conducted pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article and to Article IV. 1215

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Recognizing that continuous collection and analysis of biological data in connection with the operations of factory ships and land stations are indispensable to sound and constructive management of the whale fisheries, the Contracting Governments will take all practicable measures to obtain such data. Article IX Each Contracting Government shall take appropriate measures to ensure the application of the provisions of this Convention and the punishment of infractions against the said provisions in operations carried out by persons or by vessels under its jurisdiction. No bonus or other remuneration calculated with relation to the results of their work shall be paid to the gunners and crews of whale catchers in respect of any whales the taking of which is forbidden by this Convention. Prosecution for infractions against or contraventions of this Convention shall be instituted by the Government having jurisdiction over the offence. Each Contracting Government shall transmit to the Commission full details of each infraction of the provisions of this Convention by persons or vessels under the jurisdiction of that Government as reported by its inspectors. This information shall include a statement of measures taken for dealing with the infraction and of penalties imposed. Article X This Convention shall be ratified and the instruments of ratifications shall be deposited with the Government of the United States of America. Any Government which has not signed this Convention may adhere thereto after it enters into force by a notification in writing to the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America shall inform all other signatory Governments and all adhering Governments of all ratifications deposited and adherences received. This Convention shall, when instruments of ratification have been deposited by at least six signatory Governments, which shall include the Governments of the Netherlands, Norway, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, enter into force with respect to those Governments and shall enter into force with respect to each Government which subsequently ratifies or adheres on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification or the receipt of its notification of adherence. The provisions of the Schedule shall not apply prior to 1st July, 1948. Amendments to the Schedule adopted pursuant to Article V shall not apply prior to 1st July, 1949. Article XI Any Contracting Government may withdraw from this Convention on 30th June, of any year by giving notice on or before 1st January, of the same year to the depository Government, which upon receipt of such a notice shall at once communicate it to the other Contracting Governments. Any other Contracting Government may, in like manner, within one month of the receipt of a copy of such a notice from the depository Government give notice of withdrawal, so that the Convention shall cease to be in force on 30th June, of the same year with respect to the Government giving such notice of withdrawal. The Convention shall bear the date on which it is opened for signature and shall remain open for signature for a period of fourteen days thereafter. 1216

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IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized, have signed this Convention. DONE in Washington this second day of December, 1946, in the English language, the original of which shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America shall transmit certified copies thereof to all the other signatory and adhering Governments.

Document 243 Inuvialuit Inupiat Beaufort Sea Beluga Whale Agreement (3 March 2000)* Whereas the Inuvialuit of Canada’s Western Arctic and the Inupiat of Northern Alaska have for generations depended upon the beluga whale for subsistence and cultural needs, And whereas the hunting, taking and subsistence use of beluga whales have been a central part of their tradition and lifestyle for centuries past, And whereas both groups wish to provide that same opportunity to their children and their children’s children, for generations to come, And whereas studies have shown that the group of beluga whales identified as the Beaufort Sea Stock are important to subsistence users in both Canada and the United States, And whereas the subsistence users of the stock in Canada’s Western Arctic are the Inuvialuit of Aklavik, Inuvik, Tuktoyaktuk, Paulatuk, Holman Island and Sachs Harbour, and in Northern Alaska are the Inupiat of Kaktovik, Barrow, Point Hope, Kivalina and Little Diomede, And whereas the Inuvialuit have agreed to manage their use of beluga whales in the manner described in their Beaufort Sea Beluga Management Plan, And whereas the Inupiat have agreed to manage their use for beluga whales in the manner described in the Alaska Beluga Whale Committee Management Plan, The Parties to this agreement hereby agree to: 1. Establish an Inuvialuit and Inupiat Beluga Commission consisting of four appointees of the Inuvialuit Game Council, three appointees of the North Slope Fish and Game Management Committee and one appointee from the Kivalina Whaling Captains Association, to oversee the terms of this agreement. 2. Facilitate, within the limitations of funding, meetings of the Commission as required, to meet at least once every two years. Whenever possible, the meetings of the Commission will alternate between countries. The Chair of each meeting shall be a Commissioner from the host country. 3. Exchange, on or before the 31st of December of each year, their best estimate for their respective areas of the number of beluga whales struck and landed, the locations of the hunts and the sex composition of the landed beluga whales. This information will not be shared outside the Commission without prior consent of all parties. * Retrieved from the Wildlife Management Advisory Council for the Yukon’s North Slope, www.fishfp. sasktelwebhosting.com/publications/Inuvialuit_Inupiat%20Beluga%20agreement.pdf. Reproduced with permission of the Inuvialuit Game Council.

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4. Exchange, on or before the 15th of May of each year, information regarding the nature of research on the stock that is being planned for that year. 5. Plan and conduct, where desirable, joint research projects for the betterment of the stock and those who depend upon it. 6. Establish, as necessary, technical committees whose task will be to guide such joint research identified in Clause 5, and to report to the Parties on that research. 7. Exchange information of traditional ecological knowledge, hunting methods and uses of beluga whales. 8. Changes to this agreement can be made at anytime with the agreement of all parties. Chairman, Inuvialuit Game Council Chairman, North Slope Fish and Game Management Committee Chairman, Kivalina Whaling Captains Association

Caribou Document 244 Porcupine Caribou Management Agreement (26 October 1985)* This agreement made on the 26 day of October, 1985 between: The Government of Canada, as represented by the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and the Minister of the Environment, (hereinafter referred to as “Canada”); –– and—The Government of Yukon, as represented by the Minister of Renewable Resources, (hereinafter referred to as “Yukon”); –– and—The Government of the Northwest Territories, as represented by the Minister of Renewable Resources, (hereinafter referred to as “GNWT”); –– and—The Council for Yukon Indians, (hereinafter referred to as“CYI”); –– and—The Inuvialuit Game Council, (hereinafter referred to as “ IGC’); –– and—The Dene Nation and the Métis Association of the Northwest Territories (hereinafter referred to as the “Dene/Metis”). Whereas the Porcupine Caribou Herd within Canada historically migrates across the boundary between Yukon and the Northwest Territories; And whereas the continued well-being of the Porcupine Caribou Herd and the maintenance of its habitat require co-ordinated management, good will and co-operation between Governments and the traditional users of these caribou; And whereas the parties hereto recognize the value of these caribou to Canada generally and that a special relationship exists between native users and these caribou. Now therefore this Agreement Witnessed that the Government parties hereto, under their respective authorities to enter into agreements of this kind, agree to act within their legislative authorities for the management of Porcupine Caribou and the protection and maintenance of Porcupine Caribou habitat, in a co-operative manner together with the other parties to this Agreement, to give effect to its terms as follows.

*  Retrieved from the Porcupine Caribou Management Board, www.pcmb.ca/PDF/general/Board-Operations/ Canada%20Porcupine%20Caribou%20Management%20Agreement.pdf

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A. Definitions In this Agreement: 1. “Allowable harvest” means that level of harvest of the Porcupine Caribou Herd in Canada as set pursuant to the terms of this Agreement. 2. “Board” means the Porcupine Caribou Management Board established herein. 3. “Conservation” means the management and use of Porcupine Caribou and its habitat which best ensures the long term productivity and usefulness of the Herd for present and future generations. 4. “Habitat” means the whole or any part of the biosphere upon which the Porcupine Caribou Herd depends, including all of the land, water and air that it inhabits, crosses or utilizes at any time. 5. “Harvest” means to shoot, kill, harm, capture, trap, or collect for any purpose, or to attempt to engage in such activities. 6. “Management” means the methods and procedures which are necessary to ensure the health and protection of the Porcupine Caribou Herd and the maintenance of its habitat, which may include but are not limited to the following activities associated with wildlife and land management: law enforcement, research, census-taking, monitoring, public information, education and functions provided for in this Agreement. 7. “Minister(s)” means the appropriate responsible Minister of the Government of Canada, Government of Yukon or Government of the Northwest Territories. 8. “Native user” means a person whose entitlement to the subsistence harvest of Porcupine Caribou has been recognized by a native user community and who is: (a) an aboriginal person who is a traditional user of the Porcupine Caribou or the descendant of such a person; or (b) an aboriginal person who is a current user of the Porcupine Caribou at the time of signing this Agreement and meets a reasonable residency requirement satisfactory to his native user community; or (c) A Canadian aboriginal person who has not traditionally or currently harvested the Porcupine Caribou but meets a reasonable residency requirement satisfactory to the Board. 9. “Native User Community” means any one of the communities of Old Crow, Dawson, Mayo, Fort McPherson, Arctic Red River, Aklavik, Inuvik or Tuktoyaktuk and may a]so include such other new communities as may be determined through native user agreements in effect from time to time. The native users within these communities shall be represented by a Chief and Council, a Hunters and Trappers association or other appropriate native leadership body, including those bodies defined through the comprehensive land claims process. 10. “Parties” means the parties to this Agreement and may include their successors or assigns, as defined through the comprehensive land claims process or otherwise. 11. “Porcupine Caribou” means members of that herd of barren ground caribou which regularly bears its young in north-eastern Alaska and north-western Yukon and historically moves southward within Alaska, Yukon and the Northwest Territories for the winter. Its Canadian range, the limits of which are defined within Yukon by current Yukon game management subzones, is generally depicted for Yukon and the Northwest Territories on the map attached as Appendix I to this Agreement.

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12. “Preferential Right” means the right to harvest Porcupine Caribou for subsistence usage and to be allocated, subject to conservation and the terms of this Agreement, quantities of Porcupine Caribou sufficient to fulfill the native users requirements for subsistence usage before there is any allocation for other purposes, such right of allocation being provided for by the establishment, when necessary, of the allocation hereinafter referred to as the “native user allocation.” B. Objectives of the Parties 1. To co-operatively manage, as a herd, the Porcupine Caribou and its habitat within Canada so as to ensure the conservation of the Herd with a view to providing for the ongoing subsistence needs of native users; 2. To provide for participation of native users in Porcupine Caribou Herd management; 3. To recognize and protect certain priority harvesting rights in the Porcupine Caribou Herd for native users, while acknowledging that other users may also share the harvest; 4. To acknowledge the rights of native users as set out in this Agreement; and 5. To improve communications between Governments, native users and others with regard to the management of the Porcupine Caribou Herd within Canada. C. Establishment of the Porcupine Caribou Management Board 1. The Government parties to this Agreement shall establish a Board, to be known as the Porcupine Caribou Management Board, to provide advice and recommendations to the Ministers. 2. Subject to paragraph 3(f) of this Part: (a) The Board will always include representation from each of the parties to this Agreement. (b) The Board will always contain equal Government and native representation and equal representation of native users from Yukon and the Northwest Territories. 3. Eight voting members shall be appointed within a reasonable time to the Board, as follows: (a) Canada shall appoint one member to represent Canada; (b) (i) Yukon shall appoint two members to represent Yukon; (ii) CYI shall nominate two members to represent the native users of Old Crow, Dawson and Mayo; (c) (i) GNWT shall appoint one member to represent GNWT; (ii) The Dene/Métis* shall nominate one member to represent the Dene/ Métis* native users or Aklavik, Inuvik, Fort McPherson and Arctic Red River; (iii) IGC shall nominate one member to represent the Inuvialuit native users of Aklavik, Inuvik and Tuktoyaktuk; (d) Upon receipt of notification from the parties, the Ministers shall confirm the nominations and appointments as required; (e) The members of the Board shall be appointed for a term of five years, subject to the right of the parties to terminate the appointment of their respective appointees at any time and have Board members reappointed in accordance with the above terms of reference;

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(f) If, within a reasonable time, nominations or appointments are not made as provided for in this paragraph, the Board may discharge its responsibilities with those members who have been nominated or appointed. 4. (a) A majority of the members of the Board shall nominate from outside the membership of the Board a Yukon resident as the first Chairman and shall notify the Ministers accordingly; (b) The Board shall determine criteria for the nomination of subsequent Chairmen; (c) If agreement on nomination of a Chairman cannot be reached within a reasonable time, any party to this Agreement may refer the matter to a Judge of the Supreme Court of the Yukon Territory acting as an arbitrator under the provisions of the Arbitration Ordinance and if the Court shall not provide a Judge, then to an arbitrator under the provisions of the Arbitration Ordinance; (d) The majority of the members of the Board shall confirm the acceptability of the Chairman as nominated and shall notify the Ministers of its confirmation; (e) The Chairman shall have tenure for a term of five years and may, with the approval of the Board serve additional terms; (f) Upon receipt of notification from the Board, the Ministers shall confirm the appointment or dismissal of Chairmen as required. D. Duties of the Board 1. The Board shall establish and maintain communication with the native users of the Porcupine Caribou, between the native users of the Porcupine Caribou, between native users and Governments, among Governments and with other users, in order to assist in co-ordinated management and conservation of Porcupine Caribou and its habitat. 2. The Board shall determine the actions that are necessary to achieve the objectives described herein and shall recommend them to the Minister. 3. The Board shall hold such public meetings as are reasonably necessary to report on and discuss with native users and others its findings and recommendations and, in any event, shall inform the native user communities in writing of the Board’s recommendations to the Minister. 4. The Board shall review technical and scientific information relevant to the management of the Porcupine Caribou Herd and its habitat and may advise the Minister of its adequacy. 5. The Board shall encourage native users and other harvesters of Porcupine Caribou to participate in the collection of statistics and biological information. 6. The Board shall maintain a list of eligible native users for each native user community and up to-date information on the suballocation of the native user allocation among communities all of which shall be made available to Governments for management purposes. E. Recommendations of the Board Without restricting the generality of Part D of this Agreement, the parties agree that the Board may do the following: 1. The Board may make recommendations to the Minister on any matter affecting the Porcupine Caribou and its habitat, including recommendations related to the making of policy, legislation and regulations regarding: (a) management strategies for the Porcupine Caribou Herd; 1221

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(b) a herd management plan for the Porcupine Caribou Herd; (c) guidelines for native users’ participation in Porcupine Caribou Herd management plans; (d) training required to enable native users to participate in the management or the Porcupine Caribou Herd and the conservation of its habitat; (e) a predator management plan in respect of the Porcupine Caribou Herd, provided that no such plan shall be put into effect until the Minister has consulted with the Board; 2. The Board may also: (a) review and recommend development of Porcupine Caribou research proposals: (b) review available information and recommend further research where there ­appears to be a need; (c) review and recommend methods of data collection and presentation; (d) review the conservation and management of the Porcupine Caribou Herd and its habitat and make appropriate recommendations so as to ensure that productivity is maintained; and, (e) recommend criteria according to which non-native subsistence users may qualify to share in the native user allocation from the Porcupine Caribou Herd, if the affected native user community approves. 3. (a) Because of the dependence of caribou on its habitat, the Board may make recommendations to other boards and agencies, as well as to the Minister, on land use planning and land management throughout the Canadian range of the Porcupine Caribou Herd or any portion of it. Recommendations of measures to ensure the conservation and protection of habitat shall include, but are not limited to, measures related to specific projects, plans or activities which may: (i) impede, delay or disrupt Porcupine Caribou movements, affect behavioural patterns or reduce productivity; (ii) affect Porcupine Caribou habitat; or (iii) affect interactions between native users and Porcupine Caribou; (b) The Board may also identify sensitive habitat areas requiring special protection and recommend measures to protect such areas. F. Minister’s Responsibilities 1. The Minister shall consider the recommendations of the Board and report his decisions or comments in a timely manner. The Minister shall, within thirty days of receipt of recommendations, either provide the Chairman with his response or, where he is not able to respond fully, he shall so inform the Chairman and advise him when his full response will be provided. When advised by the Board that an emergency situation has arisen and that a decision on a recommendation is necessary forthwith, the Minister shall govern himself accordingly. 2. The Minister may consult with the Board on any matter related to the Porcupine Caribou and its habitat. 3. Recommendations of the Board shall be submitted in writing to the Minister. 4. If the Minister disagrees with a recommendation or any part thereof, he shall refer the matter back to the Board for reconsideration with due consideration for any time schedule imposed by any statutory or regulatory requirements. 1222

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5. Where, as the result of a matter being referred back to the Board recommendations are submitted, the Minister may accept or reject the recommendations in whole or in part. 6. Where the Minister rejects a recommendation in whole or in part, he shall provide the Board with reasons therefore. 7. Where it appears to the Minister that an emergency situation has arisen which affects the well being of the Porcupine Caribou or its habitat, and where time does not permit consultation with the Board, the Minister may take such action as is necessary before consulting with the Board. 8. Where emergency action has been taken pursuant to paragraph 7 above, the Minister shall forthwith inform the Chairman and solicit the continuing advice of the Board. G. Proceedings of the Board The Board shall establish and make known, from time to time, rules and procedures for its functioning, provided however, that: (a) thirty days’ notice of meetings shall be given by mail, telephone, telegram or other appropriate means; (b) the Board shall establish its own quorum; (c) decisions of the Board shall be by consensus wherever possible, and shall always require a majority vote in favour, with each member having one vote; (d) the Board may decide that alternates be appointed to represent members when they are unable to attend Board meetings and shall establish the terms and conditions of the appointments. If it is decided that alternates are necessary, the parties shall each appoint alternates forthwith according to the terms provided for the appointment of Board members in Part C of this Agreement; (e) the Chairman shall, in the event of a deadlock or tie vote, be responsible for resolving the disagreement of the Board and shall, where necessary, cast the deciding vote on any issue which cannot otherwise be resolved; (f) the Board shall hold formal meetings at least twice yearly unless it decides otherwise; (g) the Board shall keep summary minutes and records of all its meetings and circulate them to its members; (h) the Board may establish and instruct such committees as it deems necessary to carry out its functions. H. Board Secretariat There shall be a secretariat to administer the operations of the Board which shall be responsible to the Board under the direction of the Chairman. The secretariat shall receive and distribute information, prepare and circulate minutes of Board meetings and perform such other functions as the Board requires. I. Finances 1. Subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement and to funds being appropriated by legislati ve authority on an annual basis the Government parties shall fund reasonable costs of the Board and Secretariat in equal portions and in such amounts as agreed annually, to ensure the Board and Secretariat functioning in a manner herein stated. 2. For further clarity, particular expenditures of the Board which are to be shared by the funding parties may include: 1223

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(a) any salary or honorarium, and all travel, accommodation and related expenses incurred while working on Board activities, paid to the Chairman, provided that same is in accordance with Treasury Board guidelines; (b) the production of an annual report and its distribution; (c) a modest technical review capability in respect of primary research conducted by Governments and other sources; (d) the production of information or educational material, such as newsletters; and (e) such other costs as the funding parties may agree upon. 3. The Government parties shall be responsible for any salary or honorarium, and all travel, accommodation and related expenses of their Board members. In addition, Yukon shall be responsible for these expenses related to the participation of the Board members for CYI and GNWT shall be responsible for these expenses related to the participation of the Board members for IGC and the Dene/Metis. 4. The Board shall prepare and submit annual budgets for all expenditures under its control to the appropriate Government parties and shall be accountable for the expenditures of the Board and secretariat. 5. The Board shall account annually for all monies received and disbursed by the Board and secretariat and records of this accounting shall be made available to any of the parties to this Agreement for inspection upon thirty days written notice to the Chairman. J. Allocations of Annual Allowable Harvest in Canada l. Any of the parties to this Agreement may provide the Board with information that will, in the opinion of the submitting party, assist the Board in determining its recommendation of the annual allowable harvest from the Porcupine Caribou Herd. 2. (a) After the Board has considered all relevant information, the Chairman shall submit its report to the Ministers to facilitate the enactment of any necessary regulations. (b) The report of the Board may include, but is not restricted to, recommendations related to the following: (i) annual allowable harvest; (ii) categories and priorities of harvest allocations; (iii) methods of harvest; (iv) areas of harvest; (v) means of access; (vi) seasons; (vii) age and sex of Porcupine Caribou to be harvested; and (viii) research study requirements related to the harvest. (c) In determining the native user allocation the Board shall take into account, among other things, the following criteria: (i) food and clothing requirements of the native users; (ii) usage patterns and levels of harvest by the native users; iii) ability of caribou and other wildlife populations to meet the subsistence requirements of the native users; and (iv) projections of changes in caribou populations. (d) The Board may also include in its report the appropriate principles, considerations and procedures that should be used in order to calculate a total annual allowable harvest and its allocations, and more generally to define the conservation limit for the harvest of the Porcupine Caribou Herd. 1224

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(e) If the Porcupine Caribou Herd is healthy and of sufficient numbers to satisfy all reasonable completing needs, the Board may recommend that the setting of an annual allowable harvest is not required. 3. The territorial Governments shall, upon taking into consideration the recommendations of the Board and consistent with the preferential right of native users to harvest: a) establish the total annual allowable harvest of Porcupine Caribou in Canada; and b) determine the allocation of the annual allowable harvest in Canada for native users, taking into account the criteria set forth in paragraph 2(c) of this part and the reservation of two hundred and fifty (250) Porcupine Caribou referred to in paragraph 4 below. 4. Taking into consideration the interests of other users, the territorial Government shall allocate as they see fit from that portion of the annual allowable harvest not allocated under paragraph 3(b) of this Part, which shall consist of no fewer than two hundred and fifty (250) Porcupine Caribou, and shall regulate harvesting pursuant to their respective legislative authorities. 5. (a) The native users shall sub-allocate native user allocation among themselves on a community basis. (b) The details of the sub-allocation shall be provided to the Board annually by CYI, IGC, and the Dene/Métis* on behalf of the native user communities represented by them respectively so that the necessary information will be available for management purposes. (c) The respective hunting areas for native user communities are identified on the map attached as Appendix II to this Agreement. (d) When access to its community hunting area has been granted by a native user community to a native user or users from another community, notice in a form acceptable to the appropriate Governments shall be provided. 6. Where a sub-allocation of Porcupine Caribou is made to the native users of Dawson and Mayo, the Yukon Wildlife Management Board (that is referred to in the Yukon Indian Agreement in-principle) and Yukon shall be so informed by the Board. 7. The parties recognize the respective responsibilities of the Yukon Wildlife Management Board for all wildlife south of 65°30′ in Yukon and of the Porcupine Caribou Management Board as set out in this Agreement. Therefore, in territorial game management subzones or parts thereof, where the Hart River and Wernecke Caribou or other herds in Yukon mix with the Porcupine Caribou, Yukon may, on the advice of and in consultation with the appropriate board(s), take the necessary measures to protect these herds that mix with the Porcupine Caribou Herd for such periods of time as are required. 8. The parties recognize the special dependence of all native users on the Porcupine Caribou and in particular, the unique dependence of the native users of Old Crow on the Porcupine Caribou. K. The Rights of Native Users l. The rights of native users as set out in this Agreement are subject to laws of general application with regard to conservation and public safety. 2. Subject to the terms of this Agreement, native users shall have a preferential right to harvest Porcupine Caribou.

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3. Native users shall have the right to harvest Porcupine Caribou without being required to pay fees or obtain licenses, permits or tags except that licenses, permits or tags may be required for conservation and management purposes. In such circumstances any such licenses, permits and tags will be issued locally and without cost. 4. The Government parties to this Agreement shall use their best efforts to enact any laws and regulations to allow native users the right to transport lawfully harvested Porcupine Caribou across any jurisdictional boundary within the Canadian range of the herd. 5. Native users shall have the right to employ traditional and current methods to harvest the Porcupine Caribou and the right to both possess and use all equipment reasonably necessary to exercise that right. 6. The development of lists of eligible native users shall be made in each native user community with the assistance of the appropriate native leadership body. These lists shall he provided to the Board annually by CYI, IGC and the Dene/Métis on behalf of the native user communities and shall be updated as required. 7. Notwithstanding paragraph 3 of this Part, native users may be required for conservation and management purposes to show evidence that they are native users. L. Commercial Harvest 1. There shall be no commercial harvest of Porcupine Caribou in Canada. 2. Notwithstanding paragraph I above, native users may: (a) barter or trade with other native users for caribou meat; and (b) subject to paragraphs 2(c) and 2(d) of this Part, sell caribou meat to other native users who are unable to hunt by virtue of age, illness or other disadvantages or where there is an emergency situation when access for the hunting of caribou is not feasible for a native user community, provided that the money received for the sale does not exceed the reasonable expenses incurred. (c) The Board shall establish guidelines from time to time on: (i) the circumstances that qualify a native user as being disadvantaged, for example when a family does not have a provider; (ii) categories of costs which may be considered reasonable expenses; (iii) the circumstances that would create an emergency situation when access for the hunting of caribou is not feasible for a native user community. (d) The Board shall establish procedures for the expeditious consideration of individual situations contemplated by paragraph 2(b) of this Part which do not fall within the guidelines established pursuant to paragraph 2(c) above. 3. Native users shall be permitted to sell the non-edible parts of legally harvested Porcupine Caribou. 4. This part does not apply to commercial guiding or outfitting activities. M. Information 1. All parties to this Agreement agree to use their best efforts to provide the Board with all available information requested by it that is necessary to carry out its functions. 2. The Board may advise the parties on the adequacy of information provided to it by native users and others. 3. Subject to paragraph 4 of this Part, the Board shall provide available information upon request and may distribute its reports and recommendations to the public. 4. The Board will respect the confidentiality of such information provided to it on a confidential basis. 1226

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N. General 1. The parties hereto shall jointly and severally indemnify and save harmless the Board and the individual members thereof, against any and all liability, loss, damage, cost or expenses, which the Board, or its individual members jointly or severally incur, suffer or are required to pay as a consequence of any contract or other obligation lawfully undertaken in accordance with the terms of this Agreement. 2. All public reports, summaries or other documentation prepared or otherwise completed by the Board shall become the joint property of all parties hereto and any and all income derived therefrom shall be jointly shared among the parties in proportion to the expenditures incurred by each party generating such income. 3. The parties hereto agree to be bound by this Agreement, notwithstanding subsection 14(2) of the Northwest Territories Act, R.S.C. 1970, and subsection 17(3) of the Yukon Act, R.S.C. 1970. 4. The Government parties to this Agreement will attempt to enact any laws and regulations that may affect the Porcupine Caribou Herd and its habitat in a manner consistent with this Agreement. 5. This Agreement may be amended following unanimous approval in writing by the parties hereto, and the Government parties agree to attempt to secure passage of any necessary legislation. 6. Those parties to this Agreement which are negotiating parties in comprehensive land claims shall act as soon as possible following the signing of this Agreement to incorporate this entire Agreement by reference, by means of sub-agreement or interim agreement, into the completed or ongoing Yukon Indian, Inuvialuit and Dene/Métis* comprehensive land claims respectively. If any consequential amendments to existing sub-agreements, interim agreements or overall agreements are required as a result of the signing of this Agreement, they shall be made no later than the time of incorporation by reference referred to herein. 7. It is the intention of the parties to this Agreement that its provisions not be used to interpret or derogate from the provisions of any comprehensive land claims settlement and that the provisions of any comprehensive land claims settlement not be used to interpret the provisions of this Agreement. 8. In recognition of the fact that the Porcupine Caribou Herd is an international resource with a substantial part of its habitat in Alaska, the parties agree that it is desirable to negotiate a Porcupine Caribou bilateral agreement following the completion of this Agreement. In recognition of the fact that the provisions of a bilateral agreement might involve aboriginal and treaty rights within the meaning of the Constitution Act, 1982, as well as the Legislative and management responsibilities of the territorial Governments and the Porcupine Caribou Management Board in its role, Canada agrees to consult with the other parties to this Agreement prior to and during the course of any such bilateral agreement negotiations. 9. For greater certainty, and pending compliance with paragraph 6 of this Part, as well as final settlement of the Yukon Indian, Inuvialuit and Dene/Métis comprehensive land claims, it is intended that this Agreement shall come into full force and effect upon signature by the parties and that the Board shall carry out its functions in accordance with the terms of this Agreement.

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Document 245 Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America on the Conservation of the Porcupine Caribou Herd (17 July 1987)* The Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America, hereinafter called the “Parties”: Recognizing that the Porcupine Caribou Herd regularly migrates across the international boundary between Canada and the United States of America and that caribou in their large free-roaming herds comprise a unique and irreplaceable natural resource of great value which each generation should maintain and make use of so as to conserve them for future generations; Acknowledging that there are various human uses of caribou and that for generations certain people of Yukon Territory and the Northwest Territories in Canada have customarily and traditionally harvested Porcupine Caribou to meet their nutritional, cultural and other essential needs and will continue to do so in the future, and that certain rural residents of the State of Alaska in the United States of America have harvested Porcupine Caribou for customary and traditional uses and will continue to do so in the future; and that these people should participate in the conservation of the Porcupine Caribou Herd and its habitat; Recognizing the importance of conserving the habitat of the Porcupine Caribou Herd, including such areas as calving, post-calving, migration, wintering and insect relief habitat; Understanding that the conservation of the Porcupine Caribou Herd and its habitat requires goodwill among landowners, wildlife managers, users of the caribou and other users of the area; Recognizing that the Porcupine Caribou Herd should be conserved according to ecological principles and that actions for the conservation of the Porcupine Caribou Herd that result in the long-term detriment of other indigenous species of wild fauna and flora should be avoided; Recognizing that the Parties wish to establish co-operative bilateral mechanisms to co-ordinate their activities for the long-term conservation of the Porcupine Caribou Herd and its habitat; Recognizing that co-operation and co-ordination under this Agreement should not alter domestic authorities regarding management of the Porcupine Caribou Herd and its habitat and should be implemented by existing rather than new management structures; Have agreed as follows: Definitions For the purpose of this Agreement only: “Porcupine Caribou Herd” means those migratory barren ground caribou found north of 64°, 30′ north latitude and north of the Yukon River which usually share common and traditional calving and post-calving aggregation grounds between the Canning River in

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the State of Alaska and the Babbage River in Yukon Territory and which historically migrate within the State of Alaska, Yukon Territory, and the Northwest Territories. “Conservation” means the management and use of the Porcupine Caribou Herd and its habitat utilizing methods and procedures which ensure the long-term productivity and usefulness of the Porcupine Caribou Herd. Such methods and procedures include, but are not limited to, activities associated with scientific resources management such as research, law enforcement, census taking, habitat maintenance, monitoring and public information and education. “Habitat” means the whole or any part of the ecosystem, including summer, winter and migration range, used by the Porcupine Caribou Herd during the course of its long-term movement patterns, as generally outlined on the map attached as an Annex. Objectives The objectives of the Parties are: To conserve the Porcupine Caribou Herd and its habitat through international co-operation and co-ordination so that the risk of irreversible damage or long-term adverse effects as a result of use of caribou or their habitat is minimized; To ensure opportunities for customary and traditional uses of the Porcupine Caribou Herd by: in Alaska, rural Alaska residents in accordance with 16 U.S.C. 3113 and 3114, AS 16.05.940(23), (28) and (32), and AS 16.05.258(c); and in Yukon and the Northwest Territories, Native users as defined by sections A8 and A9 of the Porcupine Caribou Management Agreement (signed on October 26, 1985) and those other users identified pursuant to the process described in section E2(e) of the said Agreement; To enable users of Porcupine Caribou to participate in the international co-ordination of the conservation of the Porcupine Caribou Herd and its habitat; To encourage co-operation and communication among governments, users of Porcupine Caribou and others to achieve these objectives. Conservation The Parties will take appropriate action to conserve the Porcupine Caribou Herd and its habitat. The Parties will ensure that the Porcupine Caribou Herd, its habitat and the interests of users of Porcupine Caribou are given effective consideration in evaluating proposed activities within the range of the Herd. Activities requiring a Party’s approval having a potential impact on the conservation of the Porcupine Caribou Herd or its habitat will be subject to impact assessment and review consistent with domestic laws, regulations and processes. Where an activity in one country is determined to be likely to cause significant longterm adverse impact on the Porcupine Caribou Herd or its habitat, the other Party will be notified and given an opportunity to consult prior to final decision. Activities requiring a Party’s approval having a potential significant impact on the conservation or use of the Porcupine Caribou Herd or its habitat may require mitigation. The Parties should avoid or minimize activities that would significantly disrupt migration or other important behavior patterns of the Porcupine Caribou Herd or that would otherwise lessen the ability of users of Porcupine Caribou to use the Herd. 1229

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When evaluating the environmental consequences of a proposed activity, the Parties will consider and analyze potential impacts, including cumulative impacts, to the Porcupine Caribou Herd, its habitat and affected users of Porcupine Caribou. The Parties will prohibit the commercial sale of meat from the Porcupine Caribou Herd. International Porcupine Caribou Board The Parties will establish an advisory board to be known as the International Porcupine Caribou Board, hereinafter called the Board. The Parties will each appoint four members of the Board within a reasonable period following the entry into force of the present Agreement. The Board will: adopt rules and procedures for its operation, including those related to the chairmanship of the Board; and give advice or make recommendations to the Parties, subject to concurrence by a majority of each Party’s appointees. The Board, seeking, where appropriate, information available from management agencies, local communities, users of Porcupine Caribou, scientific and other interests, will make recommendations and provide advice on those aspects of the conservation of the Porcupine Caribou Herd and its habitat that require international co-ordination, including but not limited to the following: the sharing of information and consideration of actions to further the objectives of this Agreement at the international level; the actions that are necessary or advisable to conserve the Porcupine Caribou Herd and its habitat; co-operative conservation planning for the Porcupine Caribou Herd throughout its range; when advisable to conserve the Porcupine Caribou Herd, recommendations on overall harvest and appropriate harvest limits for each of Canada and the United States of America taking into account the Board’s review of available data, patterns of customary and traditional uses and other factors the Board deems appropriate; the identification of sensitive habitat deserving special consideration; and recommendations, where necessary, through the Parties as required, to other boards and agencies in Canada and the United States of America on matters affecting the Porcupine Caribou Herd or its habitat. It is understood that the advice and recommendations of the Board are not binding on the Parties; however, by virtue of this Agreement, it has been accepted that the Parties will support and participate in the operation of the Board. In particular they will: provide the Board with information regarding the conservation and use of the ­Porcupine Caribou Herd and its habitat; promptly notify the Board of proposed activities that could significantly affect the conservation of the Porcupine Caribou Herd or its habitat and provide an opportunity to the Board to make recommendations; consider the advice and respond to the recommendations of the Board; and provide written reasons for the rejection in whole or in part of conservation recommendations made by the Board.

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International Responsibility The Parties will consult promptly to consider appropriate action in the event of: significant damage to the Porcupine Caribou Herd or its habitat for which there is responsibility, if any, under international law; or significant disruption of migration or other important behavior patterns of the Porcupine Caribou Herd that would significantly lessen the ability of users of Porcupine Caribou to use the Herd. Implementation Co-operation and co-ordination under and other implementation of this Agreement shall be consistent with the laws, regulations and other national policies of the Parties and is subject to the availability of funding. Interpretation and Application All questions related to the interpretation or application of the Agreement will be settled by consultation between the Parties. Entry into force—Amendments This Agreement which is authentic in English and French shall enter into force on signature and shall remain in force until terminated by either Party upon twelve months written notice to the other. At the request of either Party, consultations will be held with a view to convening a meeting of the representatives of the Parties to amend this Agreement. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement. DONE at Ottawa, in duplicate, this 17th day of July, 1987 in the English and French languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Document 246 IUCN, Protecting the Habitat of the Porcupine Caribou Herd (October 1996)* Recognizing that the Arctic region contains unique ecosystems essential to the well-being of our planet and important cultural resources, many of international significance; Aware that elements of these ecosystems have already been subjected to pollution and other damage as a result of human activities; Aware also that ministers of the eight Arctic nations signatory to the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy have endorsed the protection of large areas of the Arctic, and have called for cooperation in protecting the Arctic environment; *  Adopted at the IUCN First World Conservation Congress 1996 in Montreal. Reprinted with permission by ICUN—Science and Knowledge Unit. This Recommendation was adopted by consensus. The delegation of the State member Germany indicated that it had not participated in discussion of the Recommendation nor would it have participated in any voting. The delegations of the State members Norway and Sweden indicated that had there been a vote they would have abstained. The use of the term “indigenous peoples” in this Recommendation shall not be construed as having any implications as regards the rights which may attach to that term in international law.

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Recognizing that the range of the porcupine caribou herd (Rangifer tarandus groenlandicus) covers a unique ecosystem within Canada and USA, and that the two governments concluded in 1987 the Agreement on the Conservation of the Porcupine Caribou Herd to protect the herd and its habitat, but that this agreement alone does not prevent industrial development in the range; Pleased that within this vast wilderness range straddling the Alaska-Yukon border the Government of Canada and the resident indigenous peoples have set aside Ivvavik National Park and the adjacent Special Conservation Area comprising about 1.4 million hectares and Vuntut National Park and the Old Crow Special Management Area comprising 1.2 million hectares, and that the US Government has set aside the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge of 7.6 million hectares; Concerned that other portions of the herd’s range, including areas of sensitive habitat identified under the international agreement, harbour an extraordinary endowment of wildlife and supply the subsistence needs of the Gwich’in, Inupiat and Inuvialiut, but do not enjoy permanent protection under national law and therefore could become degraded by industrial development; The World Conservation Congress at its 1st Session in Montreal, Canada, 14–23 October 1996: Calls on the governments of Canada and USA, in full consultation with other levels of government, indigenous communities and appropriate wildlife management bodies to: a) provide permanent protection under national law for the calving grounds of the porcupine caribou herd and other sensitive habitat areas that are not now so protected; b) to work together to consider whether an international designation would enhance protection and management of part or all of the herd’s range.

Birds Document 247 Convention between the United States and the United Kingdom for the protection of migratory birds in the United States and Canada (16 August 1916)* The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada Reaffirming their commitment to achieving the purposes and objectives of the 1916 Convention between the United Kingdom and the United States of America for the Protection of Migratory Birds in Canada and the United States; *  Done at Washington, DC, 16 August 1916; entered into force 7 December 1916; 2478 UNTS 34 [Registration Number 1305]. From United Nations Treaty Series, by United Nations Office of Legal Affairs Treaty Section, © 2010, United Nations. Reprinted with the permission of the United Nations. Canada and the United States signed an agreement on 30 January 1979, to amend the treaty to allow subsistence hunting of waterfowl outside of the normal hunting season, but the amendment has never been took effect. The treaty was again amended on 14 December 1995 to establish a legal framework for the subsistence take of birds in Alaska and northern Canada by indigenous peoples in Alaska and Canada (LEX-FAOC119572). This text is a consolidated version of the 1916 treaty and the 1995 amendment. Article XI of the 1995 amendment provides that ‘This Protocol is subject to ratification. This Protocol shall enter into force on the date the Parties exchange instruments of ratification, shall continue to remain in force for the duration of the Convention and shall be considered an integral part of the Convention particularly for the purpose of its interpretation. […]’

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Desiring to amend and update the Convention to enable effective actions to be taken to improve the convention of migratory birds; Committed to the long-term conservation of shared species of migratory birds for their nutritional, social, cultural, spiritual, ecological, economic, and aesthetic values through a more comprehensive international framework that involves working together to cooperatively manage their populations regulate their take, protect the lands and waters on which they depend, and share research and survey information; Aware that changes to the Convention are required to ensure conformity with the aboriginal and treaty rights of the Aboriginal people of Canada: Acknowledging the intent of the United States to provide for the customary and traditional taking of certain species of migratory birds and their eggs for subsistence use by indigenous inhabitants of Alaska; and Affirming that it is not the intent of this Protocol to cause significant increases in the take of species of migratory birds relative to their continental population sizes; Have agreed as follows: Article I The High Contracting Powers declare that the migratory birds included in the terms of this Convention shall be as follows: 1. Migratory Game Birds: Anatidae, or waterfowl (ducks, geese and swans); Gruidae, or cranes (greater and lesser sandhill and whooping cranes); Rallidae, or rails (coots, gallinules and rails); Charadriidae, Haematopodidae, Recurvirostridae, and Scolopacidae, or shorebirds (including plovers and lapwings, oystercatchers, stilts and avocets, and sandpipers and allies); and Columbidae (doves and wild pigeons) 2. Migratory Insectivorous Birds Aegithalidae (long-tailed tits and bushtits); Alaudidae (larks); Apodidae (swifts); Bombycillidae (waxwings); Caprimulgidae (goatsuckers); Certhiidae (creepers); Cinclidae (dippers); Cuculidae (cuckoos); Emberizidae (including the emberizid sparrows, wood-warblers, tanagers, cardinals and grosbeaks and allies, bobolinks, meadowlarks, and orioles, but not including blackbirds); Fringillidea (including the finches and grosbeaks); Hirundinidae (swallows); Laniidae (shrikes); Mimidae (catbirds, mockingbirds, thrashers, and allies); Motacillidae (wagtails and pipits); Muscicapidae (including the kinglets, gnatcatchers, robins, and thrushes); Paridae (titmice); Picidae (woodpeckers and allies); Sittidae (nuthatches); 1233

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Trochilidae (hummingbirds); Troglodytidae (wrens); Tyrannidae (tyrant flycatchers); and Vireonidae (vireos) 3. Other Migratory Nongame Birds Alcidae (auks, auklets guillemots, murres and puffins); rdeidae (bitterns and herons); Hydrobatidae (storm petrels); Procellariidae (petrels and shearwaters); Sulidae (gannets); Podicipedidae (grebes); Laridae (gulls, jaegers, and terns); and Gaviidae (loons). Article II The High Contracting Powers agree that to ensure the long-term conservation of migratory birds, migratory bird populations shall be managed in accord with the following conservation principles. To manage migratory birds internationally; To ensure a variety of sustainable uses; To sustain healthy migratory bird populations for harvesting needs; To provide for and protect habitat necessary for the conservation of migratory birds; and To restore depleted populations of migratory birds Means to pursue these principles may include, but are not limited to Monitoring regulation enforcement and compliance; Co-operation and partnership; Education and information; Incentives for effective stewardship; Protection of incubating birds; Designation of harvest areas; Management of migratory birds on a population basis; Use of aboriginal and indigenous knowledge, institutions, and practices: and Development, sharing and use of best scientific information. 1. Except as provided for below, there shall be established the following close seasons during which no hunting shall be done (a) The close- season on migratory game birds shall be between March 10 and September 1, and the season for hunting shall be further restricted to such periods not exceeding three and one-half months as the High Contracting Powers may severally deem appropriate and define by law or regulation; and (b) The close season on migratory insectivorous birds and other migratory nongame birds shall continue throughout the year. 2. Except as provided for below migratory birds, their nests, or eggs shall not be sold or offered for sale. 3. Subject to laws, decrees or regulations to be specified by the proper authorities, the taking of migratory birds may be allowed at any time of the year for scientific, educational, propagative, or other specific purposes consistent with the conservation principles of this Convention. 1234

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4. Notwithstanding the close season provisions in paragraph I and the prohibition on the taking of eggs in Article V, and respecting aboriginal and indigenous knowledge and institutions. (a) In the case of Canada, subject to existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, and the regulatory and conservation regimes defined in the relevant treaties, land claims agreements self-government agreements, and co-management agreements with Aboriginal peoples of Canada. (i) Migratory birds and their eggs may be harvested throughout the year by Aboriginal peoples of Canada having aboriginal or treaty rights, and down and inedible by-products may be sold, but the birds and eggs so taken shall be offered for barter, exchange, trade or sale, only within or between Aboriginal communities as provided for in the relevant treaties, land claims agreements, self-government agreements, or co-management agreements made with Aboriginal peoples of Canada; and (ii) Migratory game and non-game birds and their eggs may be taken throughout the year for food by qualified non-aboriginal residents in areas of northern Canada where the relevant treaties land claims agreements, self-government agreements, or co-management agreements made with Aboriginal peoples of Canada recognize that the Aboriginal peoples may so permit. The dates of the fall season for the taking of migratory birds by qualified residents of Yukon and the Northwest Territories may be varied by law or regulation by the proper authorities. The birds or eggs taken pursuant to this sub-paragraph (ii) shall not be sold or offered for sale (b) In the case of the United States (i) Migratory birds and their eggs may be harvested by the indigenous inhabitants of the State of Alaska. Seasons and other regulations implementing the non-wasteful taking of migratory birds and the collection of their eggs by indigenous inhabitants of the State of Alaska shall be consistent with the customary and traditional uses by such indigenous inhabitants for their own nutritional and other essential needs. (ii) Indigenous inhabitants of the State of Alaska shall be afforded am effective and meaningful role in the conservation of migratory birds including the development and implementation of regulations affecting the non-wasteful taking of migratory birds and the collection of their eggs by participating on relevant management bodies. 5. Murrcs may be taken by non-aboriginal residents of the province of Newfoundland and Labrador for food, subject to regulation during the period from September 1 to March 10 but the murres so taken shall not be sold or offered for sale. The season for murre hunting shall be further restricted to such period not exceeding three and one-half months as the proper authority may deem appropriate by law or regulation Article III The High Contracting Powers agree to meet regularly to review progress in implementing the Convention. The review shall address issues important to the conservation of migratory birds, including the status of migratory bird populations, the status of important migratory bird habitats, the effectiveness of management and regulatory systems and 1235

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other issues deemed important by either High Contracting Power. The High Contracting Powers agree to work cooperatively to resolve identified problems in a manner consistent with the principles underlying the Convention and, if the need arises, to conclude special arrangements to conserve and protect species of concern. Article IV Each High Contracting Power shall use its authority to take appropriate measures to preserve and enhance the environment of migratory birds. In particular, it shall, within its constitutional authority (a) seek means to prevent damage to such birds and their environments, including damage resulting from pollution; (b) endeavor to take such measures as may be necessary to control the importation of live animals and plants which it determines to be hazardous to the preservation of such birds; (c) endeavor to take such measures as may be necessary to control the introduction of live animals and plants which could disturb the ecological balance of unique island environments; and (d) pursue cooperative arrangements to conserve habitats essential to migratory bird populations Article V The taking of nests or eggs of migratory game or insectivorous or nongame birds shall be prohibited except for scientific educational propagating or other specific purposes consistent with the principles of this Convention under such laws or regulations as the High Contracting Powers may severally deem appropriate or as provided for under Article 11, paragraph 4. Article VI The High Contracting Powers agree that the shipment or export of migratory birds or their eggs from any state or province, during the continuance of the close season in such state or province, shall be prohibited except for scientific or propagating purposes, and the international traffic in any birds or eggs at such time captured, killed, taken, or shipped at any time contrary to the laws of the state or province in which the same were captured, killed, taken, or shipped shall be likewise prohibited. Every package containing migratory birds or any parts thereof or any eggs of migratory birds transported, or offered for transportation from the Dominion of Canada into the United States or from the United States into the Dominion of Canada, shall have the name and address of the shipper and an accurate statement of the contents clearly marked on the outside of such package. Article VII Permits to kill any of the above-named birds which, under extraordinary conditions, may become seriously injurious to the agricultural or other interests in any particular community, may be issued by the proper authorities of the High Contracting Powers under suitable regulations prescribed therefor by them respectively, but such permits shall lapse or may be cancelled, at any time when, in the opinion of said authorities, the particular exigency has passed, and no birds killed under this article shall be shipped, sold, or offered for sale. 1236

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Article VIII The High Contracting Powers agree themselves to take, or propose to their respective appropriate law-making bodies, the necessary measures for insuring the execution of the present Convention. Article IX The present Convention shall be ratified by His Britannic Majesty and by the President of the United States of America, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof. The ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington as soon as possible and the Convention shall take effect on the date of the exchange of the ratifications. It shall remain in force for fifteen years, and in the event of neither of the High Contracting Powers having given notification twelve months before the expiration of said period of fifteen years, of its intention of terminating its operation, the Convention shall continue to remain in force for one year and so on from year to year. In faith whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Convention in duplicate and have hereunto affixed their seals. DONE at Washington this sixteenth day of August, 1916.

Document 248 Convention between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the Conservation of Migratory Birds and their Environment (19 November 1976)* Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning the Conservation of Migratory Birds and Their Environment The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Considering that migratory birds are a natural resource of great scientific, economic, aesthetic, cultural, educational, recreational and ecological value and that this value can be increased under proper management; Recognizing that many species of birds migrate between the United States and the Soviet Union or that species of birds which occur in the United States and the Soviet Union have common flyways, breeding, wintering, feeding or moulting areas which should be protected; Considering that effective protection of migratory birds and their environment requires substantial national effort, but recognizing that international cooperation in this area can provide significant assistance; Recognizing that certain species of birds in both countries are endangered and in need of particular protective measures; Desiring to cooperate in implementing measures for the conservation of migratory birds and their environment and other birds of mutual interest; Have agreed as follows: *  Done at Moscow, 19 November 1976; entered into force 13 October 1978; 1134 UNTS 98 [Registration Number 17738]. The appendix is not reprinted here. At the time of writing the Convention is still in force. From United Nations Treaty Series, by United Nations Office of Legal Affairs Treaty Section, © 1988, United Nations. Reprinted with the permission of the United Nations.

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Article I 1. In this Convention, the term “migratory birds” means: (a) The species or subspecies of birds for which there is evidence of migration between the Soviet Union and the United States derived as a result of banding, marking or other reliable scientific evidence; or (b) The species or subspecies of birds, populations of which occur in the Soviet Union and the United States and have common flyways or common breeding wintering, feeding, or moulting areas, and for these reasons there exists or could exist an exchange of individuals between such populations. The identification of such species or subspecies will be based upon data acquired by banding, marking, or other reliable scientific evidence. 2. In this Convention, the term “competent authority” means a national scientific or management agency authorized by the Contracting Party to implement the activities under this convention. At the time of entering into force of this Convention, the Contracting Parties shall notify each other of their competent authorities for migratory birds pursuant to this Convention. 3. (a) A list of species and subspecies of bird s by families, determined to be migratory in accordance with Paragraph I of this Article, is set forth in an Appendix to this Convention entitled “Migratory Birds”; (b) The competent authority of each Contracting Party shall be authorized by its government to review the “Migratory Birds” Appendix, and, if necessary, make recommendations for amendments thereto. The Appendix shall be considered amended upon the date when such recommendations are accepted by the competent authority of the other Contracting Party. 4. This Convention shall apply: (a) For the United States of America: To all areas under the jurisdiction of the Unites States of America. (b) For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: To all territories under the jurisdiction of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Article II 1. Each Contracting Party shall prohibit the taking of migratory birds, the collection of their nests and eggs and the disturbance of nesting colonies. Also, any sale, purchase or exchange of these birds, whether dead or alive, or their nests or eggs, and any sale, purchase or exchange of their products or parts, shall be prohibited. The importation and exportation of migratory birds and their nests, eggs, parts, and products shall also be prohibited. Exception to these prohibitions may be made on the basis of laws, decrees or regulations of the respective Contracting Parties in the following cases: (a) For scientific, educational, propagative, or other specific purposes not inconsistent with the principles of this Convention; (b) For the establishment of hunting seasons in accordance with Paragraph 2 of this Article; (c) For the taking of migratory birds and the collection of their eggs by the indigenous inhabitants of the Chukchi and Koryaksk national regions, the Commander Islands and the State of Alaska for their own nutritional and other essential needs (as determined by the competent authority of the relevant Contracting Party) during seasons established in accordance with Paragraph 2 of this Article; and 1238

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(d) For the purpose of protecting against injury to persons or property. 2. The hunting seasons for migratory birds provided for in Paragraph 1 (b) of this Article, and the seasons during which the indigenous inhabitants mentioned in Paragraph 1 (c) of this Article may take such birds and collect their eggs for their own nutritional and other essential needs (as determined by the competent authority of the relevant Contracting Party), shall be determined by the competent authority of each Contracting Party respectively. These seasons shall be set so as to provide for the preservation and maintenance of stocks of migratory birds. 3. With regard to a particular species of migratory bird, if the need arises, the competent authorities of the Contracting Parties may conclude special agreements on the conservation of these species and on the regulation of their taking. Such agreements shall not be inconsistent with the principles of this Convention. Article III Each Contracting Party agrees to take, as soon as possible, the measures necessary to insure the execution of this Convention and its purpose. Article IV 1. To the extent possible, the Contracting Parties shall undertake measures necessary to protect and enhance the environment of migratory birds and to prevent and abate the pollution or detrimental alteration of that environment. 2. Among other things, each Contracting Party shall: (a) Provide for the immediate warning of the competent authority of the other Contracting Party in case of substantial anticipated or existing damage to significant numbers of migratory birds or the pollution or destruction of their environment. The competent authorities of the Contracting Parties will establish necessary procedures for such warnings and will cooperate to the maximum possible degree in preventing, reducing, or eliminating such damage to migratory birds and their environment and in providing for the rehabilitation of their habitat. (b) Undertake measures necessary for the control of the import, export and establishment in the wild of live animals and plants that may be harmful to migratory birds or their environment. (c) Identify areas of breeding, wintering, feeding, and moulting which are of special importance to the conservation of migratory birds within the areas under its jurisdiction. Such identification may include areas which require special protection because of their ecological diversity or scientific value. These special areas will be included in list number I on the Appendix to this Convention entitled “Migratory Bird Habitat”. The initial identification of areas shall be prepared within one year from the date of this Convention’s entry into force. This list may be augmented or revised by the competent authority of each Contracting Party in relation to the areas under its jurisdiction. Such amendment enters into force upon notification of the competent authority of the other Contracting Party. Each Contracting Party shall, to the maximum extent possible, undertake measures necessary to protect the eco systems in those special areas described on list number I against pollution, detrimental alteration and other environmental degradation. 1239

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3. The competent authorities of the Contracting Parties may by mutual agreement designate areas of special importance to the conservation of migratory birds outside the areas under their jurisdiction. These areas of special importance shall be included on list number II on the “Migratory Bird Habitat Appendix to this Convention. This list number II may be amended by mutual agreement of the competent authorities of the Contracting Parties. Each Contracting Party shall, to the maximum extent possible, undertake measures necessary to ensure that any citizen or person subject to its jurisdiction will act in accordance with the principles of this Convention in relation to such areas. The Contracting Parties will take measures to disseminate information about the significance of these areas to the conservation of migratory birds. Article V 1. The Contracting Parties agree that, for the conservation of those species and subspecies of migratory birds which are in danger of extinction, special protective measures are necessary and should be taken. 2. If one Contracting Party has decided that a species, subspecies or distinct segment of a population of migratory birds is in danger of extinction, and has established special measures for its protection, the competent authority of that Contracting Party shall inform the competent authority of the other Contracting Party of the decision and of any subsequent modification of such decision. 3. Upon notification, the other Contracting Party will take into account such protective measures in the development of its management plans for the conservation of migratory birds. Article VI 1. The Contracting Parties shall promote research related to the conservation of migratory birds and their environment, and agree to coordinate their national bird banding programs. In cases where it is desirable, such research may be conducted under agreed upon programs coordinated by the competent authorities of the Contracting Parties. 2. The competent authorities of the Contracting Parties shall exchange scientific information and publications related to the conservation of migratory birds and their environment. Article VII Each Contracting Party shall to the maximum extent possible, undertake measures necessary to establish preserves, refuges, protected areas, and also facilities intended for the conservation of migratory birds and their environment, and to manage such areas so as to preserve and restore the natural ecosystems. Article VIII In addition to those species and subspecies of birds named on the “Migratory Birds” Appendix, each Contracting Party may implement within the areas under its jurisdiction or with regard to any citizen or person subject to its jurisdiction, as it deems appropriate and necessary, any and all of the protective measures under this Convention for any species or subspecies of birds not listed in the “Migratory Birds” Appendix but belonging to the same family as a species or subspecies listed in the “Migratory Birds” Appendix.

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Article IX This Convention shall in no way affect the right of the Contracting Parties to adopt stricter domestic measures which are deemed to be necessary to conserve migratory birds and their environment. Article X The competent authorities of the Contracting Parties shall consult regarding the implementation of this convention upon the request of the competent authority of either of the Contracting P arties. Article XI If necessary to improve the conservation of migratory birds or their environment, this Convention may be amended by the agreement of the Contracting Parties. Article XII 1. This Convention shall be subject to ratification or confirmation pursuant to the domestic laws of each Contracting Party and shall enter into force on the day that instruments of ratification or confirmation are exchanged in agreement with international procedures. 2. This Convention shall remain in force for a period of 15 years from the date of its entry into force. Thereafter, it shall be renewed automatically on an annual basis, provided that any Contracting Party may terminate its rights and obligations under this Convention. Such termination shall take effect on the next expiration date of this Convention and may be accomplished by transmitting written notification of termination to the other Contracting P arty at least six months prior to that expiration date. DONE in Moscow this 19th day of November, 1976, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. JOINT DECLARATION The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Considering that the migratory birds covered by the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Birds and Their Environment are an international resource of great ecological value and that they migrate between other countries as well as the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; Recognizing that the protection of these migratory birds and their environment requires expanded international cooperation and that it would be highly desirable to have other countries accede to this Convention; Have agreed to consider the expansion of the Convention to include additional Contracting Parties and have agreed to initiate the necessary procedures to accomplish this goal. DONE in Moscow this 19th day of November, 1976, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

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Marine Oil Pollution and Air-borne Pollution

Document 249 Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Norway and the Government of the Russian Federation on cooperation to combat oil-spills in the Barents Sea (28 April 1994)* The Government of Norway and the Government of the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Conscious that exploration, exploitation, and production of natural resources, and marine transport, pose a threat of significant oil pollution in the Barents Sea. Mindful of the vital importance of precautionary and preventive measures in avoiding oil pollution, Recognizing that, in the event of an oil pollution incident or the threat thereof, prompt and effective action should be taken, in order to organize and coordinate preventive and pollution combatment activities. Bearing in mind the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation of 1990, Desiring to avert, through the adoption of measures to prevent and combat pollution resulting from oil spills, damage to the marine environment of the Barents Sea. Have agreed as follows: Article I The Parties undertake to render assistance to each other in combatting oil pollution incidents which may affect the areas of responsibility of the Parties, regardless of where such incidents may occur. Such assistance shall be rendered consistent with the provisions of this Agreement. To such end, the competent authorities of the Parties shall develop the Joint Contingency Plan Against Oil Pollution in the Barents Sea, hereinafter referred to as the Plan, which shall enter into force upon their written agreement. Article II For the purpose of this Agreement: “Oil pollution incident” means a discharge or an imminent threat of discharge of oil from any source of such a magnitude or significance as to require an immediate response to prevent such a discharge or to contain, clean-up or dispose of the substance to eliminate the threat to or to minimize its harmful effects on the marine environment, public health or welfare. “Oil” means oil in any form, including crude oil, fuel oil, sludge and oil wastes, and refined products. “Competent authority” means, with respect to Norway, the Norwegian State Pollution Control Authority, and with respect to the Russian Federation, the Marine Pollution Control and Salvage Administration attached to the Department of Marine Transportation of the Ministry of Transportation of the Russian Federation. *  Done at Moscow, 28 April 1994; entered into force 30 January 1996. I am indebted to the Unit for Treaties and Documentation of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for providing me with this document. Document on file with the editor.

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“Area of responsibility” of a Party means the waters within the Barents Sea which are the respective Party’s internal waters or territorial sea, and the sea area beyond the territorial sea in which that Party exercises its sovereign rights and jurisdiction in accordance with international law. “Response resources” means the personnel, vessels, equipment and other means used to combat oil pollution. Article III The Parties commit themselves, within their capabilities, to the development of national systems that permit detection and prompt notification of the existence or the imminent possibility of the occurrence of oil pollution incidents, and to providing adequate means within their power to eliminate the threat posed by such incidents and to minimize the adverse effects to the marine environment and the public health and welfare. Article IV The competent authority of one Party shall immediately notify the competent authority of the other Party of an oil pollution incident which may affect the other Party. Such notification shall be made in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Plan. Article V The Parties shall on a regular basis exchange up-to-date information and consult each other in order to guarantee adequate cooperation between their competent authorities, with regard to activities pertaining to this Agreement and the Plan. Article VI The implementation of the Plan shall be the primary responsibility of the competent authorities of the respective Parties, and of other authorities of the Parties, to the extent of such other authorities’ competence under applicable law. The Plan may be amended, consistent with this Agreement and the procedures set forth in the Plan, by the competent authorities. Article VII The competent authority of the Party in whose area of responsibility an oil pollution incident occurs, or whose area of responsibility is affected by such an incident, shall direct response operations within that area. Article VIII The Plan may be invoked whenever an oil pollution incident affects or threatens to affect the areas of responsibility of both Parties or, although only directly affecting the area of responsibility of one Party, is of such a magnitude as to justify a request for the other Party’s assistance. Article IX The joint response provided for under the Plan can only be undertaken when the competent authorities of the Parties agree. The competent authorities of the Parties will determine the appropriate action required for each oil pollution incident.

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Article X Requests for assistance will be communicated by use of means of communication between the competent authorities of both Parties. Requests for assistance by telephone shall be confirmed by telex, telegraph or facsimile. A Party shall endeavour to provide requested assistance as soon as possible to the extent that the Party determines the resources to be available. The availability of response resources for a specific oil pollution incident is understood to be dependent upon funding and the requirements of other missions. The requesting Party shall provide all possible support to the response resources of the assisting Party. Article XI The assisting Party may fully or partly terminate its assistance if that Party determine that it is necessary to do so. Notice of termination shall be communicated to the competent authority of the requesting Party. The requesting Party shall release the response resources made available as soon as possible after the assistance has been terminated. The requesting Party shall promptly inform the assisting Pany when the need for assistance no longer exists, and release as soon as possible the response resources made available by the assisting Party. Article XII The Parries shall periodically conduct joint oil pollution response exercises and meetings in accordance with the provisions of the Plan. The competent authorities of the Parties shall alternate in the supervision of the exercises. Article XIII The requesting Party shall, to the greatest extent possible, facilitate the arrival and departure of response resources made available by the assisting Party for response activities pertaining to this Agreement. The Parties shall cooperate in implementing the provisions of this Article. Article XIV The requesting Party shall reimburse the assisting Party for the expenses associated with response resources. The amount shall be reimbursed in accordance with the rates and currency determined by the assisting Party. In all other cases and circumstances, unless otherwise agreed, each Party shall bear the expenses of its own activities pertaining to this Agreement. The expenses involved in conducting joint exercises shall be borne by each Party respectively. Article XV Nothing in this Agreement shall in any other way affect the rights and obligations of either Party as a result of other bilateral and multilateral agreements. The Parties will implement this Agreement in accordance with the general rules and principles of international law and their respective national legislation. Article XVI This Agreement shall enter into force on the date both Parties have notified each other in writing that necessary internal procedures have been completed, and shall remain in 1244

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force unless terminated by either Party by written notice six months in advance to the other Party of its intention to terminate this Agreement. Termination of this Agreement shall not affect response Operations which have been taken hereunder and have not yet been completed at the time of termination unless otherwise agreed by the Parties. This Agreement may be amended by written agreement between the Parties. DONE in Moscow, in duplicate, on 28 April 1994, in the Norwegian and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Document 250 Agreement between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden concerning Cooperation in taking Measures against Pollution of the Sea by Oil or Other Harmful Substances (29 March 1993)* The Governments of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, agreeing that contamination of the sea by oil or other harmful substances can pose a serious threat to the marine environment and essential interests of these States, being convinced that protection of the marine environment demands active cooperation and mutual help among the States, appreciating the progress already achieved among the States concerning measures against oil pollution of the sea, aiming to improve the cooperation further to protect the marine environment against contamination by oil or other harmful substances, have come to an Agreement about the following: Article 1 General commitments The Parties commit themselves to cooperate in protecting the marine environment against contamination of the sea by oil or other harmful substances which pose a serious and imminent threat to essential interests of one or several Parties. Article 2 Spheres of application This Agreement is used by contamination of the sea by oil or other harmful substances in the coastal waters, territorial waters and other waters within the respective fishing zones, the continental shelf and economic zonal boundaries of the Parties. These boundaries are used by demarcation according to this Agreement between the waters of the Parties, if the Parties have not agreed otherwise. Article 3 Monitoring Within their respective waters, the Parties are responsible for appropriate monitoring. The Parties mutually agree common monitoring or coordinate the monitoring.

*  Done at Copenhagen, 29 March 1993, entered into force 16 January 1998. Retrieved from the Environment Agency of Iceland, www.ust.is/library/Skrar/COPA/engelsk.pdf.

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Article 4 Investigation If contamination of the sea by oil or other harmful substances, which can pose a serious threat to the marine environment, is detected in connection with the monitoring or a Party in another manner has obtained knowledge of such threat in its waters, the Party will immediately initiate an investigation of the present situation in order that the necessary measures can be taken. Article 5 Reporting 1. A Party who has obtained knowledge of substantial contamination of the sea by oil or other harmful substances will immediately inform the other Parties of this and of the measures that have been taken or have been planned. 2. A Party will immediately inform another Party of an established violation of regulations aimed to prevent contamination of the sea by oil or other harmful substances, if the violation has occurred in the waters of the other Party. Article 6 Production of evidence The Parties will to the greatest possible extent assist each other in securing evidence in connection with legal measures by contamination of the sea by oil or other harmful substances, when it is due to suspected violations of regulations, and is to be used for claiming compensation for expenses and damage in consequence of such pollution. Article 7 Pollution control 1. The Parties will establish an appropriate preparedness for pollution control of the sea after contamination by oil or other harmful substances. 2. By the establishment of the national preparedness, it must be taken into account that it shall be possible to render assistance to another Party. 3. The Parties will take appropriate measures for pollution control within their waters of contamination of the sea by oil or other harmful substances, particularly if the pollution can be spread to the waters of another Party. Article 8 Assistance 1. A Party that needs help for pollution control within its waters of contamination of the sea by oil or other harmful substances can request assistance from the other Parties. A Party that receives a request for assistance will do what is possible in order to render such help. 2. The authority of a Party that is responsible for pollution control after contamination of the sea by oil or other harmful substances can request assistance direct with the competent authority of another Party. The authority that receives the request for assistance decides if this can be rendered. 3. The authority of the Party requesting help bears the full responsibility for the direction of the effort within his waters. Personnel from the helping Party are at disposal under the direction of their own supervisors and perform the duty on the territory of the Party seeking help in accordance with the service regulations which are in force in their own state.

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Article 9 Crossing of frontiers 1. It is the responsibility of the Party seeking help to ensure that vehicles, rescue equipment and other materials that are used in connection with an effort can cross the frontiers without import and export formalities and without having to pay customs duties, taxes and other duties. Vehicles, rescue equipment and other materials can be used in accordance with the regulations in force in the helping state without special permission. After an effort has been completed, vehicles, rescue equipment and other materials will be transported from the country as soon as possible. Similar rules apply in connection with exercises. 2. If the assistance consists of military personnel, state vessels, state aircraft and military vehicles which require a special permission to enter, the authority in the helping state requesting assistance will obtain such permission. Before the permission has been issued, the limit of territorial waters cannot be crossed. 3. At the request of the Party seeking help or the Party rendering help, the Parties will take measures to ease a transit through their own territories to and from the territory of the Party seeking help of duly registered personnel, vehicles, rescue equipment and other materials in connection with the assistance. Article 10 Reimbursement of expenses The expenses for the relief effort in accordance with this Agreement will be paid according to the rules below, unless other arrangements have been made in the individual cases. a) The helping Party is entitled to reimbursement by the Party seeking help for expenses for its measures to the extent that they can be referred to the rendered assistance. b) The Party seeking help can any time cancel its request for assistance. In such cases, the helping Party is entitled to reimbursement for the expenses inflicted on it. c) The helping Party must always be prepared to leave information to the Party seeking help about the estimated expenses for the assistance. d) The direct expenses must underlie the calculations of the expenses. e) These regulations do not limit the Parties’ right to demand that the expenses are covered by a third party in accordance with other regulations and rules which apply in accordance with national legislation or international law. Article 11 Compensation 1. The Party seeking help is responsible for damage caused by the assistance and rendered in accordance with this Agreement. The Party seeking help is committed to participate in a trial or to negotiate about a settlement concerning claim for compensation which is addressed from a third party against the helping Party or its personnel. The Party seeking help is responsible for expenses as a result of a trial and for other expenses which can be referred to such claims. 2. The Party seeking help will pay compensation to the helping Party for deaths or personal injuries inflicted on the latter’s personnel, also for loss or damage to equipment or materials caused by the assistance. 3. The helping Party will, however, vouch for damage occurring on its own territory.

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4. The Party seeking help is entitled to submit a counterclaim for compensation paid by the Party in accordance with this Agreement against an individual of the helping personnel who intentionally or by gross negligence has caused the damage. Article 12 General exchange of information The Parties will inform each other of: a) Their organisation and preparedness and the authorities whose business it is to implement pollution control of contamination of the sea by oil or other harmful substances and who are in charge of monitoring, b) their experiences with the use of means and methods by pollution control of contamination of the sea and the result of the monitoring activity, and c) their technological research and development. Article 13 Implementation of the Agreement 1. The Parties will work in favour of a development of the cooperation in the area through preparation of plans and guidelines and by implementing exercise activities. 2. For the practical implementation of this Agreement it is assumed that the Parties’ competent authorities are in direct contact with each other. This can also take place at regional and local level in accordance with the plans and guidelines that are prepared by the Parties. 3. Meetings will be held within the frames of this Agreement when found to be appropriate. Article 14 Change of the Agreement 1. Proposals from a Party for change of this Agreement will be considered at a meeting among the Parties. If the proposal is unanimously accepted, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs will inform the Parties of the change. 2. The change comes into force 30 days after the day that all Parties have informed the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs of their approval of the change. The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs will inform the other Parties of the receipt of these messages and of the time of the implementation of the change. Article 15 Coming into force The Agreement comes into force 30 days after the day that all Parties have informed the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs of their approval of the Agreement. The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs will inform the other Parties of the receipt of these messages and of the time of the implementation of the Agreement. In the case of the Faroe Islands and Greenland, however, the Agreement does not come into force until 30 days after the other Parties have been informed by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the conditions for approval have been fulfilled. Article 16 Annulment of former Agreement By the implementation of this Agreement, the Agreement of 16 September 1971 between Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden about cooperation concerning measures against contamination of the sea by oil is annulled.

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Article 17 Withdrawal A Party can denounce the Agreement by written message about this to the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs which will inform the other Parties of the receipt of the message and of its contents. A denunciation applies only to the Party that has submitted it and will become effective six months after the day that the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs received the message about the denunciation. Article 18 Deposition of the Agreement The original copy of this Agreement is deposited in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs which will forward certified copies of the Agreement to the other Parties. In confirmation of this, the undersigned authorized representatives have signed this Agreement. DRAWN UP in Copenhagen on 29 March 1993 in one copy in Danish, Finnish, Icelandic, Norwegian and Swedish all of which texts will have the same validity.

Document 251 Canada, Declaration upon accession to the Protocol of 1978 relating to MARPOL (16 November 1992)* 1. Optional Annexes In accordance with article 14 of the Convention Canada declares that it does not accept Annexes III, IV and V of the Convention at this time. 2. Arctic Waters Canada makes the following declaration based on Article 234 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, signed by Canada on December 10, 1982: (a) The Government of Canada considers that it has the rights in accordance with international law to adopt and enforce special non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered waters where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such waters for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. (b) Consequently, Canada considers that its accession to the Protocol of 1978, as amended, Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 (MARPOL 73/78) is without prejudice to such Canadian laws and regulations as are now or may in the future be established in respect of arctic waters within or adjacent to Canada.

* 

IMO Doc PMP Circular 105, 7 December 1992. 1249

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Document 252 United States, Note Verbale in response to Canada’s Declaration [extracts only] (18 November 1993)* […] refer to the declarations concerning Arctic waters contained in the instrument of accession by the Government of Canada to the Protocol of 1978 to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as amended. The Government of the United States of America considers that Canada may enact and enforce only those laws and regulations in respect of foreign shipping in arctic waters that are within 200 nautical miles from the baselines use to measure the breadth of the territorial sea as determined in accordance with international law: That have due regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the marine environment based on the best available scientific evidence in arctic waters, and That are otherwise consistent with international law, including articles 234 and 236 and other relevant provisions of the 1982 united Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Document 253 Communication to IMO from Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom [extracts only] (1993)** […] refer to the declaration made by Canada at the time of its accession to the Protocol of 1978 to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from ships (MARPOL 1973) relating to Article 234 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982. […] takes note of this declaration by Canada and considers that it should be read in conformity with Articles 57, 234 and 236 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. In particular, the Government recalls that Article 234 of that Convention applies within the limits of the exclusive economic zone or of a similar zone delimited in conformity with Article 57 of the Convention and that the laws and regulations contemplated in Article 234 shall have due regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the marine environment based on the best available scientific evidence.

* Reproduced from IMO, Status of multilateral Conventions and instruments in respect of which the International Maritime Organization or its Secretary-General performs depositary or other functions as 14 July 2015, 123 fn 1. ** Reproduced from IMO, Status of multilateral Conventions and instruments in respect of which the International Maritime Organization or its Secretary-General performs depositary or other functions as 14 July 2015, 123 fn 1.

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Document 254 Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (15 May 2013)* The Government of Canada, the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark, the Government of the Republic of Finland, the Government of Iceland, the Government of the Kingdom of Norway, the Government of the Russian Federation, the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden, and the Government of the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as “the Parties”, Taking into account the relevant provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Being Parties to the 1990 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation, Taking also into account the 1969 International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, Taking further into account the “polluter pays” principle as a general principle to be applied, Recalling the 1996 Ottawa Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, Highlighting that in the 2011 Nuuk Declaration on the occasion of the Seventh Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council, ministers representing the eight Arctic States decided to establish a Task Force to develop an international instrument on Arctic marine oil pollution preparedness and response, Acknowledging the role of the International Maritime Organization, in particular in the development and adoption of additional rules and standards to address risks specific for operations in the Arctic environment, Conscious of the threat from marine oil pollution to the vulnerable Arctic marine environment and to the livelihoods of local and indigenous communities, Mindful that in the event of an oil pollution incident, prompt and effective action and cooperation among the Parties is essential in order to minimize damage that may result from such an incident, Recognizing the challenges posed by harsh and remote Arctic conditions on oil pollution preparedness and response operations, Mindful also of the increase in maritime traffic and other human activities in the Arctic region, including activity of Arctic residents and of people coming to the Arctic, Mindful further that indigenous peoples, local communities, local and regional governments, and individual Arctic residents can provide valuable resources and knowledge regarding the Arctic marine environment in support of oil pollution preparedness and response, Recognizing also the expertise and roles of various stakeholders relating to oil pollution preparedness and response, Aware of the Parties’ obligation to protect the Arctic marine environment and mindful of the importance of precautionary measures to avoid oil pollution in the first instance, *  Done at Kiruna, 15 May 2013; entry into force still pending, retrieved from the Arctic Council, www.arcticcouncil.org/eppr/agreement-on-cooperation-on-marine-oil-pollution-preparedness-and-response-in-the-arctic.

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Recognizing further the importance of the Arctic marine ecosystem and of cooperation to promote and encourage the conservation and sustainable use of the marine and coastal environment and its natural resources, Emphasizing the importance of exchanging information, data and experience in the field of marine oil pollution preparedness and response, especially regarding the Arctic environment, and on the effects of pollution on the environment, and of regularly conducting joint training and exercises, as well as joint research and development, Have agreed as follows: Article 1 Objective of this Agreement The objective of this Agreement is to strengthen cooperation, coordination and mutual assistance among the Parties on oil pollution preparedness and response in the Arctic in order to protect the marine environment from pollution by oil. Article 2 Terms and Definitions For the purposes of this Agreement: 1. “Oil” means petroleum in any form including crude oil, fuel oil, sludge, oil refuse and refined products. 2. “Oil pollution incident” means an occurrence or series of occurrences having the same origin, which results or may result in a discharge of oil and which poses or may pose a threat to the marine environment, or to the coastline or related interests of one or more states, and which requires emergency action or other immediate response. 3. “Ship” means a vessel of any type whatsoever operating in the marine environment and includes hydrofoil boats, air-cushion vehicles, submersibles, and floating craft of any type. Article 3 Scope of Application of this Agreement 1. This Agreement shall apply with respect to oil pollution incidents that occur in or may pose a threat to any marine area over which a State whose government is a Party to this Agreement exercises sovereignty, sovereign rights or jurisdiction, including its internal waters, territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf, consistent with international law and above a southern limit as follows: –– Canada—marine areas above 60 degrees North; –– The Kingdom of Denmark, including Greenland and the Faroes—marine areas above the southern limit of the Greenland exclusive economic zone and the Faroese fisheries zone; –– Finland—marine areas above 63 degrees 30 minutes North; –– Iceland—marine areas above the southern limit of the exclusive economic zone of Iceland; –– Norway—marine areas above the Arctic Circle; –– The Russian Federation—marine areas above the coastlines of the White Sea, the Barents Sea, the Kara Sea, the Laptev Sea, the East Siberian Sea and the Chukchi Sea, and the mouths of the rivers flowing into these seas seaward of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured; –– Sweden—marine areas above 63 degrees 30 minutes North; and

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The United States of America—Marine areas seaward of the coastal baseline from the border between the United States and Canada at the Beaufort Sea along the north side of the mainland of Alaska to the Aleutian Islands, above 24 nautical miles south of the Aleutian Islands, and, in the Bering Sea, east of the limits of the exclusive economic zone of the United States. 2. Each Party shall also apply Articles 6, 7, 8, 10, and 15 and other provisions of this Agreement as appropriate to areas beyond the jurisdiction of any State, above the southern limit set forth in paragraph 1 of this Article, to the extent consistent with international law. 3. This Agreement shall not apply to any warship, naval auxiliary or other ship owned or operated by a State and used, for the time being, only on government non-commercial service. However, each Party shall ensure by the adoption of appropriate measures not impairing the operations or operational capabilities of such ships owned or operated by it, that such ships act in a manner consistent, so far as is reasonable and practicable, with this Agreement. Article 4 Systems for Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response 1. Each Party shall maintain a national system for responding promptly and effectively to oil pollution incidents. This system shall take into account particular activities and locales most likely to give rise to or suffer an oil pollution incident and anticipated risks to areas of special ecological significance, and shall include at a minimum a national contingency plan or plans for preparedness and response to oil pollution incidents. Such contingency plan or plans shall include the organizational relationship of the various bodies involved, whether public or private, taking into account guidelines developed pursuant to this Agreement and other relevant international agreements. 2. Each Party, as appropriate, in cooperation with other Parties and with the oil and shipping industries, port authorities and other relevant entities, shall establish: a. a minimum level of pre-positioned oil spill combating equipment, commensurate with the risk involved, and programs for its use; b. a program of exercises for oil pollution response organizations and training of relevant personnel; c. plans and communications capabilities for responding to an oil pollution incident; and d. a mechanism or arrangement to coordinate the response to an oil pollution incident with, if appropriate, the capabilities to mobilize the necessary resources. Article 5 Authorities and Contact Points 1. Each Party’s national system for responding promptly and effectively to oil pollution incidents shall include as a minimum the designation of: a. the competent national authority or authorities with responsibility for oil pollution preparedness and response; b. the national 24-hour operational contact point or points, which shall be responsible for the receipt and transmission of oil pollution reports; and c. an authority or authorities entitled to act on behalf of the Party to request assistance or to decide to render the assistance requested. 2. The entities designated by each Party pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article are specified in Appendices to this Agreement. Each Party shall promptly inform the other 1253

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Parties in writing through its competent national authority or authorities and through diplomatic channels of any changes to those designations. The Appendices to this Agreement shall be modified accordingly. Article 6 Notification 1. Whenever a Party receives information on oil pollution, or possible oil pollution, it shall: a. assess the event to determine whether it is an oil pollution incident; b. assess the nature, extent and possible consequences of the oil pollution incident, including taking appropriate steps within available resources to identify possible sources; and c. then, without delay, inform all States whose interests are affected or likely to be affected by such oil pollution incident, together with (i) details of its assessments and any action it has taken, or intends to take, to deal with the incident, including mitigation measures, and (ii) further information as appropriate, until the action taken to respond to the incident has been concluded or until joint action has been decided by such States. 2. When the severity of such oil pollution incident so justifies, the Party shall notify all the other Parties without unnecessary delay. Article 7 Monitoring 1. Each Party shall endeavor to undertake appropriate monitoring activities in order to identify oil pollution incidents in areas under its jurisdiction and, to the extent feasible, in adjacent areas beyond the jurisdiction of any State. 2. In the event of an oil pollution incident, the Party or Parties affected shall, to the extent possible, monitor the incident to facilitate efficient and timely response operations and to minimize any adverse environmental impacts. 3. The Parties shall endeavor to cooperate in organizing and conducting monitoring, especially regarding transboundary oil pollution, inter alia, through conclusion of bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements. Article 8 Requests for Assistance and Coordination and Cooperation in Response Operations 1. The Parties may request assistance from any other Party or Parties to respond to an oil pollution incident. 2. The Parties requesting assistance shall endeavor to specify the type and extent of assistance requested. 3. The Parties shall cooperate and provide assistance, which may include advisory services, technical support, equipment or personnel, for the purpose of responding to an oil pollution incident upon the request of any Party affected or likely to be affected. Article 9 Movement and Removal of Resources across Borders In accordance with applicable national and international law, each Party shall take the necessary legal or administrative measures to facilitate: a. the arrival and utilization in, and departure from, its territory of ships, aircraft and other modes of transport engaged in responding to an oil pollution incident 1254

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or transporting personnel, cargoes, materials and equipment required to deal with an oil pollution incident; the expeditious movement into, through, and out of its territory of personnel, cargoes, materials, response supplies and other equipment referred to in subparagraph (a).

Article 10 Reimbursement of Costs of Assistance 1. Unless an agreement concerning the financial arrangements governing actions of the Parties to deal with oil pollution incidents has been concluded on a bilateral or multilateral basis prior to an oil pollution incident, the Parties shall bear the costs of their respective actions in dealing with pollution in accordance with subparagraph (a) or subparagraph (b). The principles laid down in this paragraph apply unless the Parties concerned otherwise agree in any individual case. a. If the action was taken by one Party at the express request of another Party, the requesting Party shall reimburse to the assisting Party the cost of its action. The requesting Party may cancel its request at any time, but in that case it shall bear the costs already incurred or committed by the assisting Party. b. If the action was taken by a Party on its own initiative, this Party shall bear the costs of its action. 2. Unless otherwise agreed, the costs of action taken by a Party at the request of another Party shall be fairly calculated according to the law and current practice of the assisting Party concerning the reimbursement of such costs. 3. The assisting Party shall be prepared to provide upon request documentation and information to the requesting Party on the assisting Party’s estimated costs for the assistance and on the assisting Party’s actual costs following the provision of any assistance. The Party requesting assistance and the assisting Party shall, where appropriate, cooperate in concluding any action in response to a compensation claim. 4. The provisions of this Agreement shall not be interpreted as in any way prejudicing the rights of Parties to recover from third parties the costs of actions to deal with pollution or the threat of pollution under other applicable rules of national and international law. Special attention shall be paid to international instruments and national law on liability and compensation for oil pollution damage. Article 11 Joint Review of Oil Pollution Incident Response Operations After a joint response operation, the Parties shall make best efforts to conduct a joint review of the operation, led by the Party or Parties that coordinated the operation. Where appropriate, and subject to relevant national law, Parties involved in a joint review should document their findings and conclusions and make the results of such joint review publicly available. Article 12 Cooperation and Exchange of Information 1. The Parties shall promote cooperation and exchange of information that may serve to improve the effectiveness of oil pollution preparedness and response operations. Such cooperation and information exchange may include, inter alia, the topics identified in the Appendices to this Agreement. 2. Each Party, subject to its national law and international law, should endeavor to make information provided to other Parties under paragraph 1 of this Article publicly available. 1255

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Article 13 Joint Exercises and Training 1. The Parties shall promote cooperation and coordination by endeavoring to carry out joint exercises and training, including alerting or call-out exercises, table-top exercises, equipment deployment exercises, and other relevant activities. 2. Joint exercises and training should be designed to incorporate lessons learned. 3. Where appropriate, the Parties should include stakeholders in the planning and execution of joint exercises and training. 4. When conducting joint exercises and training, the Parties should apply the relevant provisions of this Agreement to the extent possible. Article 14 Meetings of the Parties 1. The Parties shall meet no later than one year after the entry into force of this Agreement, as convened by the depositary, and from then on as decided by the Parties. At these meetings, the Parties shall review issues related to the implementation of this Agreement, adopt Appendices to this Agreement or modifications to the Appendices as provided in Article 20 of this Agreement, as appropriate, and consider any other issues as decided by the Parties. Parties may elect to convene such meetings in conjunction with meetings of the Arctic Council. 2. On a regular basis the Parties through their competent national authorities shall discuss and review operational issues related to the implementation of this Agreement, in cooperation, as appropriate, with relevant bodies including but not limited to the Arctic Council. Operational issues include, but are not limited to, cooperation and exchange of available information. Article 15 Resources 1. Except as otherwise provided in Article 10 of this Agreement or otherwise agreed, each Party shall bear its own costs deriving from its implementation of this Agreement. 2. Implementation of this Agreement, except for Article 10, shall be subject to the capabilities of the Parties and the availability of relevant resources. Article 16 Relationship with Other International Agreements Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as altering the rights or obligations of any Party under other relevant international agreements or customary international law as reflected in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Article 17 Non-Parties Any Party may, where appropriate, seek cooperation with States not party to this Agreement that may be able to contribute to activities envisaged in this Agreement, consistent with international law. Article 18 Settlement of Disputes The Parties shall resolve any disputes concerning the application or interpretation of this Agreement through direct consultations. Article 19 Amendments to this Agreement 1. This Agreement may be amended by written agreement of all the Parties. 2. An amendment shall enter into force 120 days after the date on which the depositary has received the last written notification through diplomatic channels that the Parties have completed the internal procedures required for its entry into force. 1256

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Article 20 Appendices 1. The Appendices to this Agreement do not constitute an integral part of this Agreement and are not legally binding. 2. At meetings of the Parties referred to in Article 14 of this Agreement, the Parties may adopt additional Appendices or modifications to existing Appendices, except for those Appendices referred to in Article 5 of this Agreement, which may be modified as provided therein. Article 21 Operational Guidelines 1. The Parties shall develop and maintain a set of Operational Guidelines to assist in the implementation of this Agreement. The Operational Guidelines will be included among the Appendices to this Agreement and be modified as appropriate. 2. The Operational Guidelines shall address, inter alia, the following topics: a. a system and formats for notification, requests for assistance, and other related information; b. provision of assistance, as well as coordination and cooperation in response operations involving more than one Party, including in areas beyond the jurisdiction of any State; c. movement and removal of resources across borders; d. procedures for conducting joint reviews of oil pollution incident response operations; e. procedures for conducting joint exercises and training; and f. reimbursement of costs of assistance. 3. In developing and modifying the Operational Guidelines, the Parties shall seek input from relevant stakeholders as appropriate. Article 22 Provisional application, Entry into Force and Withdrawal 1. This Agreement may be applied provisionally by any signatory that provides a written statement to the depositary of its intention to do so. Any such signatory shall apply this Agreement provisionally from the date of its statement or from such other date as indicated in its statement. 2. This Agreement shall enter into force 30 days after the date of receipt by the depositary of the last written notification through diplomatic channels that the Parties have completed the internal procedures required for its entry into force. 3. Any Party may at any time withdraw from this Agreement by sending written notification thereof to the depositary through diplomatic channels at least six months in advance, specifying the effective date of its withdrawal. Withdrawal from this Agreement shall not affect its application among the remaining Parties. 4. Withdrawal from this Agreement by a Party shall not affect the obligations of that Party with regard to activities undertaken under this Agreement where those obligations have arisen prior to the effective date of withdrawal. Article 23 Depositary The Government of Norway shall be the depositary for this Agreement. DONE at Kiruna this 15th day of May, 2013, in the English, French and Russian languages, all texts being equally authentic. The working language of this Agreement shall be English, the language in which this Agreement was negotiated. 1257

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Document 255 Arctic Council, Framework Plan for Cooperation on Prevention of Oil Pollution from Petroleum and Maritime Activities in the Marine Areas of the Arctic (25 April 2015)* Document 256 Arctic Council, Enhanced Black Carbon and Methane Emissions Reductions: An Arctic Council Framework for Action (25 April 2015)**

*  Unfortunately, permission to reproduce this document was not granted. The document can be retrieved from the Arctic Council, www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/category/604-declaration-saoreport?download=2736:iqaluit-sao-report-to-ministers-annex-3-framework-plan-for-cooperation-on-preventionof-oil-pollution-from-petroleum-and-maritime-activities-in-the-marine-areas-of-the-arctic. **  Unfortunately, permission to reproduce this document was not granted. The document can be retrieved from the Arctic Council, www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/events/meetings-overview/ministerial-meeting-2015.

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Miscellaneous Policy Documents and National Instruments Document 257 Resolution of Cooperation between the Secretariats of the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna Working Group (14 April 2009)* Background The Arctic plays host to a globally significant array of biodiversity. The size and nature of Arctic ecosystems make them of critical importance to the biological, chemical and physical balance of the globe. Dramatic changes (e.g. climate change) now underway are threatening the resiliency and sustainability of the Arctic’s biodiversity and the overall balance of its ecosystems. Continued rapid change in the Arctic will have global repercussions affecting the planet’s biodiversity as a whole. Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) The Arctic Council (AC) is an international, intergovernmental circumpolar forum with eight member states (Canada, Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russian Federation, Sweden, and the United States) and six indigenous Peoples’ organizations, which are known as Permanent Participants (The Aleut International Association (AIA), The Athabaskan Arctic Council (AAC), the Gwich’in Council International (GCI), the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON), and the Saami Council (SC)). The Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) program is the biodiversity working group of the Arctic Council. Its mandate is to address the conservation of Arctic biodiversity and communicate its findings to the governments and residents of the Arctic, helping to promote practices which ensure the sustainability of the Arctic’s living resources. In order to successfully conserve the natural environment and allow for economic development, baseline data on long-term status and trends of Arctic biodiversity, habitats and ecosystem health is required. CAFF’s projects provide data for informed decision making on biodiversity issues. Possible joint activities in the future could include such key CAFF activities as the Arctic Biodiversity Assessment (ABA), the Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program (CBMP), and work under the present CAFF expert groups on Seabirds (CBIRD) and on Arctic Flora (CFG). The core objectives of CAFF are: –– To monitor Arctic biodiversity; –– To conserve Arctic species and their habitats; –– To consider the establishment of protected areas; –– To conserve nature outside of protected areas; and

* Retrieved from the Convention on Biological Diversity website, www.cbd.int/doc/agreements/agmtcaff-2009-04-14-moc-web-en.pdf. See also the CoP to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Decision on Cooperation with other conventions, international organizations, and initiatives: “Collaboration on Arctic Biodiversity”, adopted in Hyderabad/India, 8-19 October 2012, Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/XI/6 (5 December 2012) 5–6. Reprinted with permission by the CAFF International Secretariat.

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To integrate both conservation objectives and measures into the economic sectors of society.

Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) Although the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) has not adopted a specific programme of work on Arctic biodiversity, the issue is, nevertheless, reflected in many aspects of the Convention’s work. This is particularly true when considering the importance of Arctic biodiversity to indigenous and local communities and the threats posed to Arctic biodiversity from climate change. A number of activities requested by the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the CBD reflect the particular vulnerability of Arctic ecosystems to the impacts of climate change. This was highlighted during the recently convened ninth meeting of the conference to the parties to the convention in Bonn, Germany, in May 2008. These impacts also strongly affect traditional lifestyles in the Arctic. Both the CBD and CAFF objectives and activities complement one another in that CAFF as a Working Group of the Arctic Council provides a vehicle for knowledge and action in the Arctic region while the CBD provides an important global framework for biodiversity efforts. The CBD can help place Arctic Biodiversity within a global framework while CAFF can help inform the CBD on the status and trends of biodiversity in this globally significant region. Objectives In the face of increasing threats to Arctic biodiversity, cooperation towards the enhanced phase of implementation of the CBD within this fragile and unique ecosystem is extremely important. A memorandum of cooperation between the Secretariats of the CBD and CAFF can contribute to building and sharing knowledge, creating awareness and enhancing capacity for implementation of the Convention in the Arctic Region, as appropriate. Governments and other Stakeholders may see the activities of CAFF and the CBD as mutually supportive. The CBD Secretariat intends to use relevant and available opportunities to promote the importance of Arctic biodiversity, including status, trends and threats, including the sponsorship of Arctic side-events at CBD meetings and the dissemination of CAFF material where appropriate. CAFF intends to seek opportunities to raise awareness of and develop supportive actions for the International Year on Biodiversity (IYB). CAFF intends to have some of its outreach projects, such as the first phase of the ABA ready for IYB in 2010. CAFF also intends to seek to ensure that the ABA may contribute information on Arctic biodiversity to the third Global Biodiversity Outlook, which is scheduled to be released in 2010, and to the 2010 Biodiversity Indicators Partnership (2010 BIP). Objectives may also include other areas of cooperation as may be mutually determined by both parties.

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Document 258 Resolution of Cooperation between the Secretariats of the Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds and the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna Working Group (12 July 2012)* Background The Arctic plays host to a globally significant array of biodiversity. The size and nature of Arctic ecosystems make them of critical importance to the biological, chemical and physical balance of the globe. Dramatic changes (e.g. climate change) now underway are threatening the resiliency and sustainability of the Arctic’s biodiversity and the overall balance of its ecosystems. Continued rapid change in the Arctic will have global repercussions affecting the planet’s biodiversity as a whole. Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) The Arctic Council (AC) is an international, intergovernmental circumpolar forum with eight member states (Canada, Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russian Federation, Sweden, and the United States) and six Indigenous Peoples’ organizations, which are known as Permanent Participants (The Aleut International Association (AIA), The Athabaskan Arctic Council (AAC), the Gwich’in Council International (GCI), the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON), and the Saami Council (SC)). The Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) program is the biodiversity working group of the Arctic Council. Its mandate is to address the conservation of Arctic biodiversity, and communicate its findings to the governments and residents of the Arctic, helping to promote practices which ensure the sustainability of the Arctic’s living resources. In order to successfully conserve the natural environment and allow for economic development, baseline data on long-term status and trends of Arctic biodiversity, habitats and ecosystem health is required. CAFF’s projects provide data for informed decision making on biodiversity issues. Possible joint activities in the future could include such key CAFF activities as the Arctic Biodiversity Assessment (ABA), the Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program (CBMP), and work under the CAFF expert group on Seabirds (CBIRD). The core objectives of CAFF are: –– To monitor Arctic biodiversity; –– To conserve Arctic species and their habitats; –– To consider the establishment of protected areas; –– To conserve nature outside of protected areas; and –– To integrate both conservation objectives and measures into the economic sectors of society.

*  The UNEP/AEWA Secretariat kindly provided me with a copy of this Resolution. It is on file with the editor. Reprinted with permission by the CAFF International Secretariat.

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African-Eurasian Waterbird Agreement (AEWA) The Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds (AEWA) is an intergovernmental treaty developed under the auspices of the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (GMS) dedicated to the conservation of migratory waterbirds using the African-Eurasian Flyways. The Agreement covers 255 species of birds ecologically dependent on wetlands for at least part of their annual cycle. The treaty covers a large geographic area, including Europe, parts of Asia, Canada, the Middle East and Africa. So far 64 out of the 119 countries in this area and the European Union (EU) have become Contracting Parties to AEWA. Parties to the Agreement are called upon to engage in a wide range of conservation actions which are described in a comprehensive Action Plan. This detailed plan addresses such key issues as: species and habitat conservation, management of human activities, research and monitoring, education and information, and implementation. Objectives AEWA and CAFF objectives and activities complement one another in that the CAFF Working Group provides a vehicle for knowledge and action in the Arctic region, while AEWA provides an important framework for conservation efforts as related to migratory waterbirds along the African-Eurasian Flyways. AEWA can help place Arctic migratory waterbirds and the habitats they depend on within a larger framework while CAFF can help inform AEWA on the status and trends of biodiversity in the Arctic. In the face of increasing threats to Arctic biodiversity, cooperation with regards to understanding biodiversity changes within this fragile and unique ecosystem is extremely important. A Resolution on cooperation between the AEWA and CAFF can contribute to building and sharing knowledge, creating awareness and enhancing capacity for understanding change. This cooperation can help focus more attention on migratory birds and flyways in this period of a rapidly changing Arctic climate. This RoC will contribute to international cooperation and build capacity regarding the conservation of migratory waterbird species within the African-Eurasian flyways. The AEWA Secretariat intends to use relevant and available opportunities to promote the importance of Arctic biodiversity, including status, trends and threats, including the registration of Arctic side-events at AEWA meetings and the dissemination of CAFF material where appropriate; and to seek for cooperation with CAFF with respect to the development and implementation of Single Species Action Plans (SSAP) for the conservation of Arctic species. CAFF intends to seek opportunities to raise awareness and to use relevant and available opportunities to promote the importance of migratory waterbird species including the promotion of World Migratory Bird Day (WMBD) in the CAFF region. In addition CAFFs Arctic Biodiversity Assessment and Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program may provide additional opportunities to include migratory waterbird related information.

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Document 259 Resolution of Cooperation between the Secretariats of the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands and the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna Working Group (16 July 2012)* Background Status—the Arctic The Arctic plays host to a globally significant array of biodiversity. The size and nature of Arctic ecosystems make them of critical importance to the biological, chemical and physical balance of the globe. Dramatic changes (e.g. habitat fragmentation, climate change) now ongoing and underway are threatening the resiliency and sustainability of the Arctic’s biodiversity and the overall balance of its ecosystems. Continued rapid change in the Arctic will have global repercussions affecting the planet’s biodiversity as a whole. Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) The Arctic Council (AC) is an international, intergovernmental circumpolar forum with eight member states (Canada, Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russian Federation, Sweden, and the United States) and six Indigenous Peoples’ organizations, which are known as Permanent Participants (The Aleut International Association (AIA), The Athabaskan Arctic Council (AAC), the Gwich’in Council International (GCI), the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON), and the Saami Council (SC)). The Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) program is the biodiversity working group of the Arctic Council. Its mandate is to address the conservation of Arctic biodiversity, and communicate its findings to the governments and residents of the Arctic, helping to promote practices which ensure the sustainability of the Arctic’s living resources. In order to successfully conserve the natural environment and allow for economic development, baseline data on long-term status and trends of Arctic biodiversity, habitats and ecosystem health is required. CAFF’s projects provide data for informed decision making on biodiversity issues. Possible joint activities in the future could include such key CAFF activities as the Arctic Biodiversity Assessment (ABA), the Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program (CBMP), nature conservation and work under the present CAFF expert groups on Seabirds (CBIRD) and on Arctic Flora (CFG). The core objectives of CAFF are: –– To monitor Arctic biodiversity; –– To conserve Arctic species and their habitats; –– To consider the establishment of protected areas; –– To conserve nature outside of protected areas; and –– To integrate both conservation objectives and measures into the economic sectors of society. *  Retrieved from the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna Working Group, www.caff.is/images/Press_ releases/RamsarCAFF_ROCagreement.pdf. Reprinted with permission by the CAFF International Secretariat.

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Ramsar can help place Arctic wetlands within a global framework while CAFF can help inform Ramsar on the status and trends of water and biodiversity in this globally significant region. The Nordic-Baltic Wetlands Initiative (NorBaiWet), which includes six out of the eight Arctic nations and operates as a regional initiative under the framework of the Ramsar Convention, could become an operational mechanism for cooperative projects and programmes. Areas of cooperation In the face of increasing threats to Arctic water quality biodiversity, cooperation with regards to understanding biodiversity changes within this fragile and unique ecosystem is extremely important. A Resolution on cooperation between the Secretariats of Ramsar and CAFF can contribute to building and sharing knowledge, creating awareness and enhancing capacity for understanding change. This cooperation can help focus more attention on trends in wetland biodiversity and ecosystem services in this period of a rapidly changing Arctic climate. Governments and other stakeholders may see the activities of CAFF and Ramsar as mutually supportive. The Ramsar Secretariat intends to use relevant and available opportunities to promote the importance of Arctic biodiversity and ecosystem services, including status, trends and threats, including the co-organising of Arctic side-events at Ramsar meetings and the dissemination of CAFF assessments and other materials where appropriate. CAFF intends to seek opportunities to raise awareness of Arctic wetlands and to use relevant and available opportunities to promote the importance of Arctic wetlands. CAFF’s Arctic Biodiversity Assessment (ABA) and Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program (CBMP) provide concrete opportunities to include wetland-related information, and to contribute wetland-relevant information from Arctic assessments into Ramsar’s planned Global Wetland Reporting System (GWOS) and periodic reporting on the state of the world’s wetlands. Other areas where Ramsar and CAFF can potentially cooperate are through the Expert Monitoring Groups which are being formed under CAFF’s Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Programme. These cover freshwater and terrestrial ecosystems and an Arctic Protected Areas monitoring framework, which could include monitoring of designated Ramsar Sites in the Arctic region.

Document 260 Resolution of Cooperation between the Secretariats of the Convention on Migratory Species of Wild Animals and the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna Working Group (29 April 2013)* Background 1. The Arctic plays host to a globally significant array of biodiversity, including migratory species. The size and nature of Arctic ecosystems make them of critical importance to the biological, chemical and physical balance of the globe. Dramatic changes (e.g. climate change) now underway are threatening the resiliency and sustainability of the Arctic’s *  Retrieved from the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna Working Group, www.caff.is/images/_Organized/ Policy/RoC-cms-caff__FINAL_signed.pdf. Reprinted with permission by the CAFF International Secretariat.

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biodiversity and the overall balance of its ecosystems. Continued rapid change in the Arctic will have global repercussions affecting the planet’s biodiversity as a whole. Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) 2. The Arctic Council (AC) is an international, intergovernmental circumpolar forum with eight member countries (Canada, Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russian Federation, Sweden, and the United States) and six Indigenous Peoples’ organizations, which are known as Permanent Participants (The Aleut International Association (AIA), The Athabaskan Arctic Council (AAC), the Gwich’in Council International (GCI), the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC),the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON), and the Saami Council (SC)). 3. The Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) program is the biodiversity working group of the Arctic Council. Its mandate is to address the conservation of Arctic biodiversity, and communicate its findings to the governments and residents of the Arctic, helping to promote practices which ensure the sustainability of the Arctic’s living resources. In order to successfully conserve the natural environment and allow for economic development, baseline data on long-term status and trends of Arctic biodiversity, habitats and ecosystem health is required. CAFF’s projects provide data for informed decision making on biodiversity issues. 4. The core objectives of CAFF are: –– To collaborate for more effective research, sustainable utilization and conservation –– To cooperate to conserve Arctic flora and fauna, their diversity and their habitats –– To protect the Arctic ecosystem from human-caused threats –– To seek to develop more effective laws, regulations and practices for flora, fauna and habitat management, utilization and conservation –– To work in cooperation with the Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic –– To consult and cooperate with appropriate international organizations and seek to develop other forms of cooperation –– To regularly compile and disseminate information on Arctic Conservation Convention on Migratory Species (CMS) 5. The Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS) is an intergovernmental treaty administered by the United Nations Environment Programme, dedicated to the conservation of migratory species on a global scale. Since the Convention’s entry into force, its membership has grown steadily to include 118 (as of 1 December 2012). Parties come from Africa, South and Central America and the Caribbean, Asia, Europe and Oceania.5 6. Wild terrestrial, aquatic and avian species that migrate across or outside national jurisdictional boundaries are particularly vulnerable to human pressures all along their migration routes. The protection of these species and their habitats requires concerted and coordinated actions by all States across their migration range in order to maintain or 5  As of January 8th, of the Arctic Council countries: Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden are CMS Parlies and signatories of selected CMS instruments (species agreements or MOUs); Russia and USA are not CMS Parlies but have signed selected species instruments; Canada and leeland have signed neither the CMS parent convention nor any CMS species instrument.

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restore a favourable conservation status as a prerequisite to any form of shared sustainable use and poverty reduction. 7. CMS acts as a framework Convention: so far 26 agreements at a regional or global level have been concluded to meet the conservation needs of single species or groups of species throughout their migratory ranges. Mandates and Synergies 8. Article IX of CMS requires the CMS Secretariat to maintain liaison with, inter alia, international organizations concerned with migratory species. The CMS Strategy Plan stresses the need for cooperation in areas of mutual interest. CMS Resolution 7.9 and subsequent decisions of the CMS Conference of the Parties have emphasized the need for cooperation with relevant key partners and the capturing of synergies in pursuit of shared targets. Further, CMS Resolutions 9.9 and 10.10 recognize the importance of the Arctic and requests the CMS Secretariat to strengthen collaboration with the Arctic Council (in particular CAFF). 9. CAFF’s mandate is outlined above in clauses 3 and 4. 10. Both the CMS and CAFF objectives and activities complement one another in that CAFF as a Working Group of the Arctic Council provides a vehicle for knowledge and action in the Arctic region while CMS provides an important global framework for biodiversity efforts as related to migratory species. CMS can help place Arctic migratory species within a global framework while CAFF can help inform CMS on the status and trends of migratory species in this globally significant region. 11. Cooperation is also relevant on issues of common interest between CAFF and some of CMS’s independent species agreements and memoranda of understanding. This is already evidenced by CAFF’s RoC with the CMS Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds (AEWA), an intergovernmental treaty dedicated to the conservation of migratory waterbirds and their habitats across Africa, Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia, Greenland and the Canadian Archipelago. Objectives 12. In the face of increasing threats to Arctic biodiversity, cooperation with regards to understanding biodiversity changes within this fragile and unique ecosystem is extremely important. A resolution of cooperation between the Secretariats of CMS and CAFF can contribute to building and sharing knowledge, creating awareness and enhancing capacity for understanding change. This cooperation can help focus more attention on migratory species in this period of a rapidly changing Arctic climate. Governments and other Stakeholders may see the activities of CAFF and CMS as mutually supportive. This RoC will contribute towards international cooperation and capacity regarding the conservation of migratory species. 13. The CMS Secretariat intends to use relevant and available opportunities to promote the importance of Arctic biodiversity, including status, trends and threats, at CMS meetings and the dissemination of CAFF material where appropriate. 14. CAFF intends to seek opportunities to raise awareness and to use relevant and available opportunities to promote the importance of migratory species. CAFFs Arctic Biodiversity Assessment and Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Programme provide concrete opportunities to include migratory species related information.

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Joint Activities 15. Possible joint activities in the future could include: –– CMS participation in key CAFF activities as the Arctic Species Trend Index (ASTI), the CAFF Assessments, the Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program (CBMP), and work under the CAFF expert group on Seabirds (CBIRD). –– CAFF participation in CMS Scientific Council working groups on flyways, birds and climate change, and a future CMS strategic review of protected area systems and ecological network initiatives for migratory species. 16. Potential areas of cooperation can be identified in a separate Joint Work Plan which can be appended to this RoC and updated as required. General Provisions 17. The Parties also agree to the following provisions related to use of logos, status of staff and termination: –– Use of either Party’s logo will be approved in advance by the other Party, and not be used for commercial purposes. –– The Parties will each maintain a clear distinction between their identities as well as the identity of the CMS Secretariat as an organ of the United Nations. Neither Party will represent the other without approval in advance. –– Staff of the CAFF are neither “staff members” under the Staff Rules and Regulations of the United Nations nor “officials” for the purpose of the Convention of 13 February 1946 on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. –– This RoC will take effect upon signatures by both Parties unless terminated by either Party giving three months’ written notice, or if it is replaced by another new agreement. –– In the event of termination of this RoC, the Parties will ensure that their rights and obligations on any on-going joint activities are completely fulfilled. –– The Parties will use their best efforts to settle amicably any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of the implementation of this RoC. Any mediation will take place according to a procedure agreed by both Parties, and if such mediation fails to achieve an amicable settlement, the RoC will terminate immediately. –– The Parties will each be solely and completely responsible and accountable for all services performed by their own staff members or agents.

Document 261 Statement of Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States to the Diplomatic Conference on the Minamata Convention on Mercury (10 October 2013)* Canada, as the current chair of the Arctic Council, on behalf of the Arctic Council States—Canada, Kingdom of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Russia and the United States—and the six Arctic Council indigenous permanent participant organizations, takes this opportunity to congratulate delegates gathered at the Diplomatic *  Done at Kumamoto/Japan, retrieved from www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/ category/407-statements?download=1898:minamata-convention-on-mercury-october-2013.

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Conference on the Minamata Convention for recognizing the international significance of mercury in the Arctic, as well as its specific effects on Arctic communities. The Arctic Council States have long been supportive of a global mercury agreement. The Arctic Council’s 2004 Heavy Metals Report was instrumental in laying the foundation for current global knowledge of mercury and its effects in the Arctic. The Council’s 2011 Mercury Assessment and the 2013 joint technical report with UNEP on global mercury assessment provided further information on mercury and informed the global mercury negotiations. We are pleased that the Arctic Council was able to contribute to a greater understanding of the environmental impacts of mercury, including issues related to food safety. The Arctic Council States welcome the adoption of the Minamata Convention and look forward to working with all nations so that we may expeditiously experience the health and environmental benefits of this Convention. We therefore support early and effective implementation of the Convention and its rapid entry into force. At this Diplomatic Conference we have made further progress in laying the groundwork for global reductions of mercury emissions. Arctic Council States urge countries to take necessary steps to ratify and implement the Minamata Convention, including to further assess their national mercury situations in order to understand their key challenges, and to begin planning and implementing effective actions. As Arctic Council States, we look forward to playing an active role in supporting the Minamata Convention, by implementing national actions and supporting the continuing work of the negotiating committee and future Conferences of the Parties. The Arctic Council will continue to contribute to mercury monitoring and assessment activities. Earlier this year, the Arctic Council welcomed several new observer States. We are confident in their ability, tools, knowledge and desire to make major contributions to the goal of reducing global mercury emissions. Finally, we would like to express our thanks to both UNEP and the Government of Japan for their support throughout the process, and for organizing and hosting this successful meeting. Thank you.

Document 262 Canada, Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act 1970* An Act to prevent pollution of areas of the arctic waters adjacent to the mainland and islands of the Canadian arctic Preamble Whereas Parliament recognizes that recent developments in relation to the exploitation of the natural resources of arctic areas, including the natural resources of the Canadian arctic, and the transportation of those resources to the markets of the world are of potentially great significance to international trade and commerce and to the economy of Canada in particular; And whereas Parliament at the same time recognizes and is determined to fulfil its obligation to see that the natural resources of the Canadian arctic are developed and *  R.S.C., 1985, c. A-12; Act current to 17 June 2015 and last amended on 1 April 2014; online available at the Government of Canada, www.laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/A-12/.

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exploited and the arctic waters adjacent to the mainland and islands of the Canadian arctic are navigated only in a manner that takes cognizance of Canada’s responsibility for the welfare of the Inuit and other inhabitants of the Canadian arctic and the preservation of the peculiar ecological balance that now exists in the water, ice and land areas of the Canadian arctic; Now therefore, Her Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and House of Commons of Canada, enacts as follows: Short Title 1. This Act may be cited as the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act. Interpretation 2. In this Act, “analyst” means a person designated as an analyst under the Canada Water Act, the Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act or the Nunavut Waters and Nunavut Surface Rights Tribunal Act; “arctic waters” means the internal waters of Canada and the waters of the territorial sea of Canada and the exclusive economic zone of Canada, within the area enclosed by the 60th parallel of north latitude, the 141st meridian of west longitude and the outer limit of the exclusive economic zone; however, where the international boundary between Canada and Greenland is less than 200 nautical miles from the baselines of the territorial sea of Canada, the international boundary shall be substituted for that outer limit; “ice-breaker” means a ship specially designed and constructed for the purpose of assisting the passage of other ships through ice; “owner”, in relation to a ship, includes any person having for the time being, either by law or by contract, the same rights as the owner of the ship with respect to the possession and use thereof; “pilot” means a person licensed as a pilot pursuant to the Pilotage Act; “pollution prevention officer” means a person designated as a pollution prevention officer pursuant to section 14; “ship” includes any description of vessel or boat used or designed for use in navigation without regard to method or lack of propulsion; “shipping safety control zone” means an area of the arctic waters prescribed as a shipping safety control zone by an order made under section 11; “waste” means (a) any substance that, if added to any water, would degrade or alter or form part of a process of degradation or alteration of the quality of that water to an extent that is detrimental to their use by man or by any animal, fish or plant that is useful to man, and (b) any water that contains a substance in such a quantity or concentration, or that has been so treated, processed or changed, by heat or other means, from a natural state that it would, if added to any other water, degrade or alter or form part of a process of degradation or alteration of the quality of that water to the extent described in paragraph (a), and without limiting the generality of the foregoing, includes anything that, for the purposes of the Canada Water Act, is deemed to be waste.

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Application of Act 2.1 In the event of an inconsistency between the provisions of this Act, or any regulation made under this Act, and the provisions of the Marine Liability Act, the provisions of that Act prevail to the extent of the inconsistency. 3. (1) Except where otherwise provided, this Act applies to the arctic waters. (2) In so far as this Act applies to or in respect of any person described in paragraph 6(1)(a), the expression “arctic waters” includes all the waters described in the definition of that expression in section 2 and all waters adjacent thereto lying north of the sixtieth parallel of north latitude, the natural resources of whose subjacent submarine areas Her Majesty in right of Canada has the right to dispose of or exploit, whether the waters so described or those adjacent waters are in a frozen or liquid state, but does not include inland waters. Incorporation by reference 3.1 (1) Regulations made under this Act incorporating standards by reference may incorporate them as amended from time to time. (2) Subsection (1) is for greater certainty and does not limit any authority to make regulations incorporating material by reference that exists apart from it. Deposit of Waste 4. (1) Except as authorized by regulations made under this section, no person or ship shall deposit or permit the deposit of waste of any type in the arctic waters or in any place on the mainland or islands of the Canadian arctic under any conditions where the waste or any other waste that results from the deposit of the waste may enter the arctic waters. (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to the deposit of waste in waters that form part of a water quality management area designated pursuant to the Canada Water Act if the waste so deposited is of a type and quantity and is deposited under conditions authorized by regulations made under paragraph 18(2)(a) of that Act with respect to that water quality management area. (3) The Governor in Council may make regulations for the purposes of this section prescribing (a) the type and quantity of waste, if any, that may be deposited by any person or ship in the arctic waters or in any place on the mainland or islands of the Canadian arctic under any conditions where that waste or any other waste that results from the deposit of that waste may enter the arctic waters; and (b) the conditions under which any such waste may be so deposited. 5. (1) Any person who (a) has deposited waste in contravention of subsection 4(1), or (b) carries on any undertaking on the mainland or islands of the Canadian arctic or in the arctic waters that, by reason of any accident or other occurrence, is in danger of causing any deposit of waste described in that subsection otherwise than of a type, in a quantity and under conditions prescribed by regulations made under section 4, shall forthwith report the deposit of waste or the accident or other occurrence to a pollution prevention officer at such location and in such manner as may be prescribed by the Governor in Council. (2) The master of any ship that has deposited waste in contravention of subsection 4(1), or that is in distress and for that reason is in danger of causing any deposit of waste 1270

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described in that subsection otherwise than of a type, in a quantity and under conditions prescribed by regulations made under section 4, shall forthwith report the deposit of waste or the condition of distress to a pollution prevention officer at such location and in such manner as may be prescribed by the Governor in Council. 6. (1) The following persons, namely, (a) any person who is engaged in exploring for, developing or exploiting any natural resource on any land adjacent to the arctic waters or in any submarine area subjacent to the arctic waters, (b) any person who carries on any undertaking on the mainland or islands of the Canadian arctic or in the arctic waters, and (c) the owner of any ship that navigates within the arctic waters and the owners of the cargo of any such ship, are respectively liable and, in the case of the owner of a ship and the owners of the cargo thereof, are jointly and severally liable, up to the amount determined in the manner prescribed by regulations made under section 9 in respect of the activity or undertaking so engaged in or carried on or in respect of that ship, as the case may be, for costs, expenses and loss or damage described in subsection (2). (2) Liability under subsection (1) is (a) for all costs and expenses of and incidental to the taking of action described in subsection (3) on the direction of the Governor in Council, and (b) for all actual loss or damage incurred by other persons resulting from any deposit of waste described in subsection 4(1) that is caused by or is otherwise attributable to the activity, undertaking or ship, as the case may be, referred to in subsection (1). (3) Where the Governor in Council directs any action to be taken by or on behalf of Her Majesty in right of Canada to repair or remedy any condition that results from a deposit of waste described in subsection (2), or to reduce or mitigate any damage to or destruction of life or property that results or may reasonably be expected to result from such a deposit of waste, the costs and expenses of and incidental to the taking of that action, to the extent that those costs and expenses can be established to have been reasonably incurred in the circumstances, are, subject to this section, recoverable by Her Majesty in right of Canada from the person or persons described in paragraph (1)(a), (b) or (c), with costs, in proceedings brought or taken therefor in the name of Her Majesty. (4) All claims pursuant to this section against a person or persons described in paragraph (1)(a), (b) or (c) may be sued for and recovered in any court of competent jurisdiction in Canada, and all those claims shall rank (a) first, in favour of persons who have suffered actual loss or damage as provided in paragraph (2)(b), which claims shall among themselves rank pari passu, and (b) second, to meet the costs and expenses described in subsection (3), up to the limit of the amount determined in the manner prescribed by regulations made under section 9 in respect of the activity or undertaking engaged in or carried on by the person or persons against whom the claims are made, or in respect of the ship of which any such person is the owner or of all or part of whose cargo any such person is the owner. (5) No proceedings in respect of a claim pursuant to this section shall be commenced after two years from the time when the deposit of waste in respect of which the proceedings

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are brought or taken occurred or first occurred, as the case may be, or could reasonably be expected to have become known to those affected thereby. 7. (1) The liability of any person pursuant to section 6 is absolute and does not depend on proof of fault or negligence, except that no person is liable pursuant to that section for any costs, expenses or actual loss or damage incurred by another person whose conduct caused any deposit of waste described in subsection 6(2), or whose conduct contributed to any such deposit of waste, to the degree to which that other person’s conduct contributed thereto. (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a reference to any conduct of “another person” includes any wrongful act or omission by that other person or by any person for whose wrongful act or omission that other person is by law responsible. (3) Nothing in this Act shall be construed as limiting or restricting any right of recourse or indemnity that a person liable pursuant to section 6 may have against any other person. (4) Notwithstanding anything in this Act, no person is liable pursuant to section 6, either alone or jointly and severally with one or more other persons, by reason only that the person is the owner of all or any part of the cargo of a ship, if the person can establish that the cargo or that part thereof is of such a nature, or is of such a nature and is carried in such a quantity, that, if it and any other cargo of the same nature that is carried by that ship were deposited by that ship in the arctic waters, the deposit would not constitute a contravention of subsection 4(1). 8. (1) The Governor in Council may require (a) any person who engages in exploring for, developing or exploiting any natural resource on any land adjacent to the arctic waters or in any submarine area subjacent to the arctic waters, (b) any person who carries on any undertaking on the mainland or islands of the Canadian arctic or in the arctic waters that will or is likely to result in the deposit of waste in the arctic waters or in any place under any conditions where that waste or any other waste that results from the deposit of that waste may enter the arctic waters, (c) any person, other than a person described in paragraph (a), who proposes to construct, alter or extend any work or works on the mainland or islands of the Canadian arctic or in the arctic waters that, on completion thereof, will form all or part of an undertaking described in paragraph (b), or (d) the owner of any ship that proposes to navigate or that navigates within any shipping safety control zone specified by the Governor in Council and, subject to subsection 7(4), the owners of the cargo of any such ship, to provide evidence of financial responsibility, in the form of insurance or an indemnity bond satisfactory to the Governor in Council, or in any other form satisfactory to the Governor in Council, in an amount determined in the manner prescribed by regulations made under section 9. (2) Evidence of financial responsibility in the form of insurance or an indemnity bond shall be in a form that will enable recovery, directly from the proceeds of the insurance or bond, by any person entitled pursuant to section 6 to claim against the person or persons giving that evidence. 9. (1) The Governor in Council may make regulations for the purposes of section 6 prescribing, in respect of any activity or undertaking engaged in or carried on by any person or persons described in paragraph 6(1)(a), (b) or (c), or in respect of any ship of 1272

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which any such person is the owner or of all or part of whose cargo any such person is the owner, the manner of determining the limit of liability of any such person or persons pursuant to section 6. (2) In the case of the owners of a ship and its cargo, the manner prescribed under subsection (1) shall take into account the size of the ship and the nature and quantity of the cargo carried or to be carried by it. Plans and Specifications of Works 10. (1) Where any person proposes to construct, alter or extend any work described in subsection (2), the Governor in Council may require the person to provide the Governor in Council with a copy of such plans and specifications relating to the work as will enable the Governor in Council to determine whether the deposit of waste that will or is likely to occur if the construction, alteration or extension is carried out in accordance therewith would constitute a contravention of subsection 4(1). (2) Subsection (1) applies in respect of any work on the mainland or islands of the Canadian arctic or in the arctic waters that, on completion thereof, will form all or part of an undertaking the operation of which will or is likely to result in the deposit of waste of any type in the arctic waters or in any place under any conditions where that waste or any other waste that results from the deposit of that waste may enter the arctic waters. (3) If, after reviewing any plans and specifications provided to the Governor in Council under subsection (1) and affording to the person who provided those plans and specifications a reasonable opportunity to be heard, the Governor in Council is of the opinion that the deposit of waste that will or is likely to occur if the construction, alteration or extension is carried out in accordance with those plans and specifications would constitute a contravention of subsection 4(1), the Governor in Council may, by order, either (a) require such modifications in those plans and specifications as the Governor in Council considers to be necessary; or (b) prohibit the carrying out of the construction, alteration or extension. Shipping Safety Control Zone 11. (1) Subject to subsection (2), the Governor in Council may, by order, prescribe as a shipping safety control zone any area of the arctic waters that is specified in the order, and may, as the Governor in Council deems necessary, amend any such area. (2) A copy of each order that the Governor in Council proposes to make under subsection (1) shall be published in the Canada Gazette and no order may be made under that subsection, based on any such proposal, except after the expiration of sixty days following publication of the proposal in the Canada Gazette. 12. (1) The Governor in Council may make regulations applicable to ships of any class specified therein, prohibiting any ship of that class from navigating within any shipping safety control zone specified therein (a) unless the ship complies with standards prescribed by the regulations relating to (i) hull and fuel tank construction, including the strength of materials used therein, the use of double hulls and the subdivision thereof into watertight compartments, (ii) the construction of machinery and equipment, the electronic and other navigational aids and equipment and telecommunications equipment to be carried and the manner and frequency of maintenance thereof, 1273

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(iii) the nature and construction of propelling power and appliances and fittings for steering and stabilizing, (iv) the manning of the ship, including the number of navigating and look-out personnel to be carried who are qualified in a manner prescribed by the regulations, (v) with respect to any type of cargo to be carried, the maximum quantity thereof that may be carried, the method of stowage thereof and the nature or type and quantity of supplies and equipment to be carried for use in repairing or remedying any condition that may result from the deposit of any such cargo in the arctic waters, (vi) the free-board to be allowed and the marking of load lines, (vii) quantities of fuel, water and other supplies to be carried, and (viii) the maps, charts, tide tables and any other documents or publications relating to navigation in the arctic waters to be carried; (b) without the aid of a pilot, or of an ice navigator who is qualified in a manner prescribed by the regulations, at any time or during one or more periods of the year, if any, specified in the regulations, or without ice-breaker assistance of a kind prescribed by the regulations; and (c) during one or more periods of the year, if any, specified in the regulations or when ice conditions of a kind specified in the regulations exist in that zone. (2) The Governor in Council may by order exempt from the application of any regulations made under subsection (1) any ship or class of ship that is owned or operated by a sovereign power, other than Canada, where the Governor in Council is satisfied that (a) appropriate measures have been taken by or under the authority of that sovereign power to ensure the compliance of the ship with, or with standards substantially equivalent to, standards prescribed by regulations made under paragraph (1)(a) that would otherwise be applicable to it within any shipping safety control zone; and (b) in all other respects all reasonable precautions have been or will be taken to reduce the danger of any deposit of waste resulting from the navigation of the ship within that shipping safety control zone. (3) The Governor in Council may make regulations (a) providing for the issue, to the owner or master of any ship that proposes to navigate within any shipping safety control zone specified therein, of a certificate evidencing, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the compliance of that ship with standards prescribed by regulations made under paragraph (1)(a) that are or would be applicable to it within that shipping safety control zone; and (b) governing the use that may be made of any such certificate and the effect that may be given thereto for the purposes of any provision of this Act. 13. (1) Where the Governor in Council believes on reasonable grounds that waste is being deposited or is likely to be deposited in the arctic waters by a ship that is within those waters and is in distress, stranded, wrecked, sunk or abandoned, the Governor in Council may cause the ship or any cargo or other material on board the ship to be destroyed, if necessary, or to be removed if possible to such place and sold in such manner as the Governor in Council may direct.

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(2) The proceeds from the sale of a ship or any cargo or other material pursuant to subsection (1) shall be applied towards meeting the expenses incurred by the Government of Canada in removing and selling the ship, cargo or other material, and any surplus shall be paid to the owner of that ship, cargo or other material. Enforcement 14. (1) The Governor in Council may designate any person as a pollution prevention officer with such of the powers set out in sections 15 and 23 as are specified in the certificate of designation of that person. (2) A pollution prevention officer shall be furnished with a certificate of his designation specifying the powers set out in sections 15 and 23 that are vested in the officer, and on exercising any such power a pollution prevention officer shall, if so required, produce the certificate to any person in authority who is affected thereby and who requires the officer to do so. 15. (1) Subject to subsection (3), a pollution prevention officer may at any reasonable time (a) enter any area, place or premises occupied by any person described in paragraph 8(1)(a) or (b) in which the officer believes on reasonable grounds that (i) there is any waste that may be or has been deposited in the arctic waters or on the mainland or islands of the Canadian arctic under any conditions where that waste or any other waste that results from the deposit of that waste may enter the arctic waters in contravention of subsection 4(1), or (ii) there is being or has been carried on any activity that may result in or has resulted in waste that may be or has been so deposited; (b) examine any waste found in that area, place or premises in bulk or open any container found therein that the officer believes on reasonable grounds contains any waste and take samples thereof; and (c) require any person in that area, place or premises to produce for inspection or for the purpose of obtaining copies or extracts any books or other documents or papers concerning any matter relevant to the administration of this Act or the regulations. (2) Subject to subsection (3), a pollution prevention officer may at any reasonable time (a) enter any area, place or premises in which any construction, alteration or extension of a work described in subsection 10(2) is being carried on; and (b) conduct such inspections of the work being constructed, altered or extended as the officer deems necessary in order to determine whether any plans and specifications provided to the Governor in Council, and any modifications required by the Governor in Council, are being complied with. (3) No pollution prevention officer may, pursuant to paragraph (1)(a) or (2)(a), enter a ship, a private dwelling-place or any part of any area, place or premises other than a ship that is designed to be used and is being used as a permanent or temporary private dwelling-place. (4) A pollution prevention officer may (a) board any ship that is within a shipping safety control zone and conduct such inspections thereof as will enable the officer to determine whether the ship complies with standards prescribed by any regulations made under section 12 that are applicable to it within that shipping safety control zone; 1275

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(b) order any ship that is in or near a shipping safety control zone to proceed outside the zone in such manner as the officer may direct, to remain outside the zone or to anchor in a place selected by the officer, if (i) the officer suspects, on reasonable grounds, that the ship fails to comply with standards prescribed by any regulations made under section 12 that are or would be applicable to it within that shipping safety control zone, (ii) the ship is within the shipping safety control zone or is about to enter the zone in contravention of a regulation made under paragraph 12(1)(b) or (c), or (iii) the officer is satisfied, by reason of weather, visibility, ice or sea conditions, the condition of the ship or its equipment or the nature or condition of its cargo, that such an order is justified in the interests of safety; and (c) where the officer is informed that a substantial quantity of waste has been deposited in the arctic waters or has entered the arctic waters or where, on reasonable grounds, the officer is satisfied that a grave and imminent danger of a substantial deposit of waste in the arctic waters exists, (i) order all ships within a specified area of the arctic waters to report their positions to the officer, and (ii) order any ship to take part in the clean-up of the waste or in any action to control or contain the waste. 16. The owner or person in charge of any area, place or premises entered pursuant to subsection 15(1) or (2), the master of any ship boarded pursuant to paragraph 15(4)(a) and every person found in the area, place or premises or on board the ship shall give a pollution prevention officer all reasonable assistance to enable the officer to carry out his duties and functions under this Act and shall furnish the officer with any information he may reasonably require. 17. No person shall obstruct or hinder, or knowingly make a false or misleading statement either orally or in writing to, a pollution prevention officer while the officer is engaged in carrying out his duties or functions under this Act. 18. (1) Any person who contravenes subsection 4(1) and any ship that contravenes that subsection is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding, in the case of a person, five thousand dollars and, in the case of a ship, one hundred thousand dollars. (2) Where an offence referred to in subsection (1) is committed by a person on more than one day or continued by him for more than one day, it shall be deemed to be a separate offence for each day on which it is committed or continued. 19. (1) Any person who (a) fails to make a report to a pollution prevention officer as and when required under subsection 5(1), (b) fails to provide the Governor in Council with evidence of financial responsibility as and when required under subsection 8(1), (c) fails to provide the Governor in Council with any plans and specifications required of the person under subsection 10(1), or (d) constructs, alters or extends any work described in subsection 10(2) (i) otherwise than in accordance with any plans and specifications provided to the Governor in Council in accordance with a requirement made under

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subsection 10(1), or with any such plans and specifications as required to be modified by any order made under subsection 10(3), or (ii) contrary to any order made under subsection 10(3) prohibiting the carrying out of the construction, alteration or extension, is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding twentyfive thousand dollars. (2) Any ship (a) that navigates within a shipping safety control zone when the ship does not comply with standards prescribed by any regulations made under section 12 that are applicable to it within that shipping safety control zone, (b) that navigates within a shipping safety control zone in contravention of a regulation made under paragraph 12(1)(b) or (c), (c) that, having taken on board a pilot in order to comply with a regulation made under paragraph 12(1)(b), fails to comply with any reasonable directions given to it by the pilot in carrying out his duties, (d) that fails to comply with any order of a pollution prevention officer under paragraph 15(4)(b) or (c) that is applicable to it, (e) the master of which fails to make a report to a pollution prevention officer as and when required under subsection 5(2), or (f) the master of which, or any person on board which, contravenes section 17, is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding twenty-five thousand dollars. (3) Any person, other than the master of a ship or any person on board a ship, who contravenes section 17 is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction. 20. (1) In a prosecution of a person for an offence under subsection 18(1), it is sufficient proof of the offence to establish that it was committed by an employee or agent of the accused, whether or not the employee or agent is identified or has been prosecuted for the offence, unless the accused establishes that the offence was committed without the knowledge or consent of, and that all due diligence to prevent its commission was exercised by, the accused. (2) In a prosecution of a ship for an offence under this Act, it is sufficient proof that the ship has committed the offence to establish that the act or neglect that constitutes the offence was committed by the master of or any person on board the ship, other than a pollution prevention officer or a pilot taken on board in compliance with a regulation made under paragraph12 (1)(b), whether or not the person on board the ship has been identified. (3) For the purposes of any prosecution of a ship for failing to comply with any order or direction of a pollution prevention officer or pilot, any order given by the officer or any direction given by the pilot to the master or any person on board the ship shall be deemed to have been given to the ship. 21. (1) Subject to this section, a certificate purporting to be signed by an analyst and stating that the analyst has analyzed or examined a sample submitted by a pollution prevention officer to the analyst and stating the result of the analysis or examination is admissible in evidence in any prosecution for a contravention of subsection 4(1) and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, is proof of the statements contained in the certificate without proof of the signature or official character of the person appearing to have signed the certificate. 1277

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(2) The party against whom a certificate of an analyst is produced pursuant to subsection (1) may, with leave of the court, require the attendance of the analyst for the purposes of cross-examination. (3) No certificate shall be admitted in evidence pursuant to subsection (1) unless the party intending to produce it has given reasonable notice of that intention, together with a copy of the certificate, to the party against whom it is intended to be produced. 22. (1) Where any person or ship is charged with having committed an offence under this Act, any court in Canada that would have had cognizance of the offence if it had been committed by a person within the limits of the ordinary jurisdiction of that court has jurisdiction to try the offence as if it had been so committed. (2) Where a ship is charged with having committed an offence under this Act, the summons may be served by leaving it with the master or any officer of the ship or by posting the summons on a conspicuous part of the ship, and the ship may appear by counsel or agent but, if it does not appear, a summary conviction court may, on proof of service of the summons, proceed ex parte to hold the trial. Seizure and Forfeiture 23. (1) Where a pollution prevention officer suspects on reasonable grounds that (a) any provision of this Act or the regulations has been contravened by a ship, or (b) the owner of a ship or the owner of all or part of the cargo thereof has committed an offence under paragraph 19(1)(b), the officer may, with the consent of the Governor in Council, seize the ship and its cargo anywhere in the arctic waters or elsewhere in the territorial sea or internal or inland waters of Canada. (2) Subject to subsection (3) and sections 24 to 26, a ship and cargo seized under subsection (1) shall be retained in the custody of the pollution prevention officer making the seizure or shall be delivered into the custody of such person as the Governor in Council directs. (3) Where all or any part of a cargo seized under subsection (1) is perishable, the pollution prevention officer or other person having custody of it may sell the cargo or the perishable portion, as the case may be, and the proceeds of the sale shall be paid to the Receiver General or shall be deposited in a bank, or an authorized foreign bank within the meaning of section 2 of the Bank Act, that is not subject to the restrictions and requirements referred to in subsection 524(2) of that Act, in respect of its business in Canada, to the credit of the Receiver General. 24. (1) Where a ship is convicted of an offence under this Act, or where the owner of a ship or an owner of all or part of the cargo thereof is convicted of an offence under paragraph 19(1)(b), the convicting court may, if the ship and its cargo were seized under subsection 23(1), in addition to any other penalty imposed, order that the ship and cargo or the ship or its cargo or any part thereof be forfeited and, on the making of the order, the ship and cargo or the ship or its cargo or part thereof are or is forfeited to Her Majesty in right of Canada. (2) Where any cargo or part thereof that is ordered to be forfeited under subsection (1) has been sold under subsection 23(3), the proceeds of the sale are, on the making of that order, forfeited to Her Majesty in right of Canada. 25. (1) Where a ship and cargo have been seized under subsection 23(1) and proceedings that could result in an order that the ship and cargo be forfeited have been instituted, the court in or before which the proceedings have been instituted may, with the consent of 1278

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the Governor in Council, order redelivery of the ship and cargo, to the person from whom they were seized, on the giving of security to Her Majesty in right of Canada by bond, with two sureties, in an amount and form satisfactory to the Governor in Council. (2) Any ship and cargo seized under subsection 23(1) or the proceeds realized from a sale of any perishable cargo under subsection 23(3) shall be returned or paid to the person from whom the ship and cargo were seized within thirty days from the seizure thereof unless, prior to the expiration of the thirty days, proceedings are instituted in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by the ship against this Act or in respect of an offence under paragraph 19(1)(b) alleged to have been committed by the owner of the ship or an owner of all or part of the cargo thereof. (3) Where a ship and cargo have been seized under subsection 23(1) and proceedings referred to in subsection (2) have been instituted, but the ship and cargo or ship or cargo or part thereof or any proceeds realized from the sale of the cargo or any part thereof are not at the final conclusion of the proceedings ordered to be forfeited, they or it shall, subject to subsection (4), be returned or the proceeds shall be paid to the person from whom the ship and cargo were seized. (4) Where the proceedings referred to in subsection (3) result in a conviction and a fine is imposed, (a) the ship and cargo or proceeds may be detained until the fine is paid; (b) the ship and cargo may be sold under execution in satisfaction of the fine; or (c) the proceeds realized from a sale of the cargo or any part thereof may be applied in payment of the fine. 26. Where proceedings referred to in subsection 25(2) are instituted and, at the final conclusion of those proceedings, a ship and cargo or ship or cargo or part thereof are or is ordered to be forfeited, they or it may, subject to section 27, be disposed of as the Governor in Council directs. 27. (1) The provisions of sections 74 to 77 of the Fisheries Act apply, with such modifications as the circumstances require, in respect of any ship and cargo forfeited under this Act as though the ship and cargo were, respectively, a vessel and goods forfeited under subsection 72(1) of that Act. (2) References to “the Minister” in sections 75 and 76 of the Fisheries Act shall, in applying those sections for the purposes of this Act, be read as references to the Governor in Council and the phrase “other than a person convicted of the offence that resulted in the forfeiture or a person in whose possession the vessel, vehicle, article, goods or fish were when seized” shall be deemed to include a reference to the owner of the ship where it is the ship that is convicted of the offence that results in the forfeiture. Delegation 28. (1) The Governor in Council may, by order, delegate to any member of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada designated in the order the power and authority to do any act or thing that the Governor in Council is directed or empowered to do under this Act and, on the making of such an order, the provisions of this Act that direct or empower the Governor in Council and to which the order relates shall be read as if the title of the member of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada designated in the order were substituted therein for the expression “the Governor in Council”. (2) This section does not apply to authorize the Governor in Council to delegate any power vested in the Governor in Council under this Act to make regulations, prescribe 1279

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shipping safety control zones or designate pollution prevention officers and their powers, other than pollution prevention officers with only those powers set out in subsection 15(1) or (2). Disposition of Fines 29. All fines imposed pursuant to this Act belong to Her Majesty in right of Canada and shall be paid to the Receiver General.

Document 263 Transcript of Canada’s Prime Minister Trudeau’s remarks to the press following the introduction of legislation on Arctic pollution, territorial sea and the fishing zones in the Canadian House of Commons (8 April 1970)* Question: Sir, without asking you to condense it in thirty seconds, the letter to the United Nations is in anticipation of a challenge of this policy? Prime Minister: It is in anticipation to the possibility that some nations won’t agree with our policy. The statement—the position we take is that international law that now stands does not sufficiently protect countries on the pollution aspect of international waters. And it is important for Canada to take forward steps in this area to help international law develop. Now we were told in the House of Commons by the Leader of the Opposition and of the N.D.P. that we should have discussed this in Parliament before making such reservations—that of course is very basic ignorance of what the law says. If we had discussed this in Parliament before making the reservation, if we had waited until the law had been debated and perhaps passed, it would have been then too late to make a reservation because once courts have entered into litigation it is too late to make reservations, so it was important to make the reservation the moment we introduced the law for fear that at any moment there may be some litigation begun which we would be too late to withdraw from … Question: Does this mean that any country which objects, Sir, will have to deal with Canada directly? Prime Minister: Yes, that means the courts themselves in this particular instance will not be able to adjudicate on a case which will be binding to Canada Question: Mr. Prime Minister, would you outline what the anti-pollution control measures are—the twelve mile limit and so on. It also mentions a 100-mile figure there—I wonder if you could clarify this? Prime Minister: Well, there are two aspects of the two bills actually which we introduced. One is with a view to prevent pollution in the Arctic. This is the one which draws a loosely defined 100-mile zone outside from the Canadian islands in the Arctic and saying that within this zone we will exercise certain anti-pollution controls and these controls will be developed by regulations. I’m gladly prepared to say that we will only adopt these regulations after we have consulted with other nations, such as the United States who are interested in sailing up there. But the important thing is that we do, from

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Parliament, have authority to ensure that any danger to pollution there, and therefore any danger to the delicate ecological balance of the Arctic be prevented or preserved against by Canadian action. This is the first bit of legislation—it is not an assertion of sovereignty, it is an exercise of our desire to keep the Arctic free of pollution and by defining 100 miles as the zone within which we are determined to act, we are indicating that our assertion there is not one aimed towards sovereignty but aimed towards one of the very important aspects of our action in the Arctic. If I can give the second part of the answer—the twelve miles—this is another bill—this is merely an extension of the territorial sea of Canada which is now three miles to twelve miles. This is following some almost sixty nations of the world which have done that. We are absolutely certain that international law is moving from the three to the twelve mile limit, therefore we are asserting that Canadian territorial seas henceforth will be coming under the twelve mile limit law. Now, on this there is no reservation in the courts. If some nation takes it to the courts and establishes that international law says it’s three miles and not twelve, then we will stand by the judgment of the court. In other words, in one case where the law exists, it may be developing from three to twelve, but the law exists. We’re prepared to stand by the judgment of the world courts, world opinion. In the other case, where no law exists, or where law is clearly insufficient, there is no international common law applying to the Arctic seas, we’re saying somebody has to preserve this area for mankind until the international law develops. And we are prepared to help it develop by taking steps on our own and eventually, if there is a conference of nations concerned with the Arctic, we will of course be a very active member in such a conference and try to establish an international regime. But, in the meantime, we had to act now. Question: Would not the prosecution of any violation of the pollution regulations in the Arctic be an exercise in sovereignty, sovereignty claim? Prime Minister: They would be an exercise of authority given by Parliament to the Executive Branch to apply a certain statute. Now, this doesn’t necessarily mean that you’re asserting sovereignty over those seas any more than the Continental Shelf Doctrine for instance entails sovereignty with it. When the Truman document was proclaimed in 1945 saying that the continental shelf of the United States was part of the United States for the purpose of developing the shelf, there was no claim that this was an assertion of sovereignty by the United States over those waters, or even over the sea bed in the normal sense. Therefore, the distinction between the absolute claim of sovereignty which means that you own everything, the land, the water, the resources in the water and so on, which is the case for the international waters of any nation—this is the sovereignty aspect of it—against the other aspect which is not an assertion of sovereignty, but an assertion of determination to control certain aspects of what is happening there. In the same way as you have this happening in the airways. The United States and Canada exercise some form of control over airships approaching Canada for hundreds of miles out over the Atlantic Ocean. This doesn’t mean we are asserting sovereignty over that. Question: But Sir, could these bills be described as another step along the way to asserting sovereignty? Prime Minister: You can describe them the way you want. But it’s quite clear that in our two bills, there are two approaches—one is asserting sovereignty on the twelve mile basis, the other is asserting a desire to prevent pollution and this is where we introduced the 100 mile zone where we want to exercise some control. You know it doesn’t mean we’re going to control everything within the 100 miles. The regulations will determine what 1281

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we will do within these 100 miles and perhaps we will only begin to adopt regulations concerning those areas where there is shipping or where there is exploitation of oil or where the currents make it dangerous for pollution to take place and so on. We’re just making sure that government has the authority to adopt regulations which will cover a wide enough area that we don’t have to come before Parliament next year and say, well, look, extend the lines a little further because it’s obvious that to prevent pollution you have to stop them at point X rather than point Y. Question: Mr. Prime Minister, your Government is convinced that if there is a bias in the international law, it favours the international oil exporters and shippers, is that it? Prime Minister: Yes, the way international law exists now, it is definitely biased in favour of shipping in the high seas and in various parts of the globe. And in the past this has probably been to the benefit of the states of the world because there has been, because of this bias in international law, a great deal of the development of commerce in all parts of the globe. But now …. Question: But no protection for countries like Canada—is that the implication? Prime Minister: That is the implication, that international law has been developed in the past in order to have the concept of high seas which is favourable to navigation and to commerce everywhere. And this was fine in the past, but now with the advance of technology and the importance which is coming forth to us all in all parts of the world— of not only thinking of commerce, but also of quality of life. We’re saying international law has not developed in this direction. It’s beginning, that’s why there was a meeting in Brussels last year which Canada attended and that’s why I talked to the Secretary General of the U.N. this fall to indicate Canada’s willingness to participate in every aspect of the development of international regimes which would prevent pollutions of coastal states. But until this international regime has developed we are stuck with the law as it has developed in the past centuries, and the centuries before when in the era of steamships and sailing ships, there was no danger of pollution, and it was important for commercial and other reasons that the nations could communicate on the high seas. Question: Mr. Prime Minister, do you feel that the three measures you’ve taken today will now satisfy those that have been very critical of your Government for not being more firm in the assertion of sovereignty? Prime Minister: I think I’ve renounced the hope of satisfying those who are critical of this Government from the statements in the House today by the N.D.P. and the Conservatives. It’s obvious we’re not going to satisfy them. They have been extremely critical in the past because we haven’t gone ahead and sort of grabbed the whole Arctic and made a tremendous big grab of all this and saying it’s ours. And now that we’re taking steps to ensure not only a grab in territorial the sense by moving from three to twelve miles, but also taking steps to ensure the quality of life up there is preserved, they are damning the Government for making reservations in the International Court of Justice. We are doing the very thing that they have suggested we do. If we hadn’t made such a reservation, and having been taken to the courts we had, shall we say, lost a case on pollution, then I am sure they would have damned us for remaining within the jurisdiction of the court. But you can’t please everybody, and we’re not attempting that, we’re attempting to do what’s right in the Arctic—to protect those interests which are Canadian, and to protect those aspects which have to be protected. And we believe that this package of legislation is doing that. We’re preserving the North and the balance up there. We’re asserting sovereignty to the twelve mile extent. 1282

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We’re ensuring that we’re not taking a chauvinistic or jingoistic view on sailing in the North. We’re not adopting such laws as to preclude the ships of all nations and all conditions from going up there because it’s in the interests of Canada that the North be developed. We just want to make sure that the development is compatible with our interests as a sovereign nation, and our duty to humanity to preserve the Arctic against pollution. Question: Do you foresee any problems in enforcing these laws? Prime Minister: I don’t see any problems. In one case, if there is a problem we will be taken to the courts, and we’ll fight it there and, as I say, we have the trend of international law in our direction—the twelve miles. In the other case, there is no law so we can’t be taken to the courts. I’m sure this action may accelerate the convening of international meetings by many nations to do multilaterally, by international law, what, as of now, we’ve had to do alone because nobody else can act in the Canadian Arctic if we don’t.

Document 264 Memorandum from Executive Secretary of the US Department of State Theodore L Eliot, Jr to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger on Imminent Canadian Legislation on the Arctic (12 March 1970)* The Canadian Ambassador, Marcel Cadieux, along with Alan Beesley, Legal Adviser to the External Affairs Minister, and Ivan Head of the Prime Minister’s Staff, called on Alex Johnson yesterday to discuss Canada’s position on matters relating to the Canadian Arctic archipelago and law of the sea issues. For some months we have been discussing with the Canadians the prospect of bilateral consultations on these questions, focussing particularly on the preservation of the Arctic ecology and prevention of Arctic pollution. There has been mounting public pressure in Canada for unilateral Canadian action to prevent Arctic damage and Prime Minister Trudeau has been successful in fending off demands for an assertion of sovereignty over the whole archipelago including the waters and ice between the islands which we consider to be high seas. We had indicated to the Canadians our willingness to discuss the problem. The Ambassador said that no Canadian Government could take a position inconsistent with Canadian sovereignty over the waters of the Canadian archipelago. He referred to various statements of the Prime Minister and the Minister of External Affairs spelling out the serious concern, of the Canadian Government over the possibility of permanent damage in the Canadian Arctic as a result of oil pollution. Cadieux further maintained that Canada must very soon take positions on the questions of Arctic sovereignty, pollution control and the establishment of exclusive fishing zones. Cadieux then said that three courses of action were now under active consideration by the Government: A. Drawing straight baselines around the outer perimeter of the Arctic islands. This amounts to a flat assertion of Canadian sovereignty over large areas of the high seas and would in the Canadian view constitute the whole area as Canadian internal *  EC Keefer, SK Holly, WB McAllister (eds), Foreign Relations 1969–1976, Vol E-1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969–1972 (Washington, US Government Printing Office, 2005) Doc 367.

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waters. Cadieux indicated that the Canadian Government would recognize a right of innocent passage subject to Canadian regulations designed to safeguard the Arctic environment and Canadian coastal interests. B. Establishment of a 100-mile Arctic pollution zone. The zone would extend 100 miles out from every point of Canadian land in the Arctic. The preventive legislation establishing such a zone would apply to all of the waters of the Arctic archipelago. The proposed legislation would prohibit negligent or deliberate acts of pollution, would require ships entering designated “shipping safety control zones” to meet prescribed safety standards, would impose requirements of financial responsibility, compulsory insurance and liability and would include enforcement provisions, among them the authority to arrest and detain vessels. The same legislation would also establish a 12-mile territorial sea applicable to all of the Canadian coast. C. Establishment of fisheries closing lines across the Gulf of St. Lawrence, Bay of Fundy and other areas presently outside of Canadian territorial waters and beyond 12 miles of the Canadian coast. Cadieux requested our views and said that “they would be taken into account.” In the ensuing discussion the Canadians acknowledged that the Prime Minister had earlier talked about an international regime of the Arctic (a concept which we have endorsed in principle) but said that unless the regime were to come into being “immediately” and were to meet all of the Canadian requirements, Canada would have to act unilaterally since it is faced with “imminent irreparable damage.” The Canadians made it clear that legislation on the 100-mile pollution zone would be introduced in Parliament prior to the Easter recess, i.e. within the next two weeks. Legislation on the fisheries closing lines would be introduced either simultaneously or shortly thereafter. The Canadians would not say whether or when legislation along the lines of course an assertion of sovereignty would be introduced. During the discussion it became clear that the Canadians were not interested in having our comments, suggestions, modifications, or alternatives. They admitted their embarrassment in giving us so little advance notification. It is equally clear that the Canadian presentation was in fact only a notification and that they did not anticipate real bilateral consultations before the legislation is a fait accompli. The Canadians indicated that Prime Minister Trudeau is under “tremendous” pressure to assert sovereignty in the archipelago and must act very soon. The Canadians said they would be prepared to enter into multilateral discussions after the legislation is enacted looking towards a possible regime, but that any multilateral convention would have to “confirm” the Canadian legislation rather than reduce its effectiveness. Legal Background The proposed Canadian legislation is in our view entirely unjustified in international law. There is no international basis for the assertion of a pollution control zone beyond the 12-mile contiguous zone; there is no basis for the establishment of exclusive fishing zones enclosing areas, of the high seas; and there is no basis for an assertion of sovereignty over the waters of the Arctic archipelago. The proposed Canadian unilateral action ignores our frequent request that Canada not act until we have had an opportunity for serious bilateral discussions.

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Comment The consequences of the intended Canadian action are serious for private United States interests. They are critical for national security interests and seriously degrade the entire United States law of the sea posture on which military mobility depends. Part of this complex problem is that the SS Manhattan, a United States privately owned (ESSO) oil tanker and icebreaker, is preparing for an April 1 voyage through the Northwest passage as a follow up to its unprecedented passage through the same area several months ago. These passages have given tremendous support to inflamed nationalists pressing for declarations of Arctic sovereignty. They argue that such voyages with their attendant risk of oil spills which will irreparably harm Arctic ecology require immediate action by Canada to declare its sovereignty. If the Canadians impose their legislation prior to the next Manhattan voyage and if the Manhattan goes through, Canada may well assert that the Manhattan complied with Canadian law in recognition of Canadian jurisdiction over the North-west passage. On the other hand, if the Manhattan does not make the voyage, the strong inference is that it held back because it either could not or would not comply with Canada’s requirements, thus implying recognition of Canada’s right to regulate. The third alternative is also damaging: if the Manhattan should make the trip in violation of Canadian regulations, the Canadians may well take enforcement measures against the vessel. The Canadian Transport Minister has stated in Parliament that “no icebreaker assistance or any other assistance will be provided unless the [Manhattan] meets with the qualifications that would, in fact, be in effect if the legislation were implemented.” We have learned informally that the Humble Company will try to avoid any correspondence with Canadian officials relative to meeting any regulations which Canada may advance concerning ships voyaging into the Canadian Arctic. We cannot accept the assertion of a Canadian claim that the Arctic waters are internal waters of Canada nor can we accept their other proposals. Such acceptance would jeopardize the freedom of navigation essential for United States naval activities worldwide, and would be contrary to our fundamental position that the regime of the high seas can be altered only by multilateral agreement. Furthermore, our efforts to limit extensions of coastal state sovereignty over the high seas worldwide will be damaged when other nations see that a country—physically, politically and economically—as close to the United States as Canada, feels it can undertake such action in the face of United States opposition. Our opposition to the establishment of fishery closing lines by Canada has been restated many times and is well known to the Government of Canada. In 1967, bilateral discussions were held with Canada which resulted in a generally agreeable formula which provided not only for the special interest of the coastal state in fisheries conservation, but also the economic interest of the coastal state in fisheries adjacent to its coast. Since then and in a modified form the same principles have been incorporated in the United States/Soviet initiative for a law of the sea conference on the territorial sea and related issues (fisheries). One of the principal elements in the 1967 United States/Canadian draft proposal was that it would provide preferences for Canadian fisheries in areas off its coast which would not be protected by the utilization of fishery closing lines. This factor is still relevant and valid and should serve as a basis for reopening the issue with Canada as the best alternative to the establishment of fishery closing lines.

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Document 265 Memorandum from the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Johnson to President Nixon (21 March 1970)* In accordance with your telephone conversation with Prime Minister Trudeau on March 17, I yesterday visited Ottawa and met all day, until late in the evening, with State Secretary for External Affairs and Acting Prime Minister Sharp (Trudeau was in Winnipeg for several days), and two other Canadian Ministers, the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development Chretien, and Donald MacDonald, President of the Privy Council and Government Leader in the House. Ambassador Cadieux and other senior Canadian Government officials were also present. I was accompanied by Under Secretary of the Navy Warner and senior representatives from DOD, DOT, Interior and the Chief Counsel of the Coast Guard. In summary, I believe we have caused the Canadians to rethink, and undoubtedly to make some revisions in the proposals they are committed to make to Parliament next week. However, as it is quite clear they face overwhelming political pressures on the pollution issue in the Arctic and nationalistic claims to the waters in the area (this is clearly the present political issue in Canada), I am not sanguine that they will find it possible to eliminate all of those features that we find objectionable. However, the tabling of legislation next week is only the first step and I am satisfied that they intend to handle the matter in a manner that will buy as much time as possible for both of us to try to work out mutual solutions. In addition to making the points contained in the “talking paper” attached to Secretary Rogers’ memorandum of March 16 to you, I proposed to the Canadians the immediate formation of a Joint U.S.-Canadian Commission under which we would enforce against American flag vessels mutually agreed regulations for operations in the Arctic off both of our coasts. The Canadians would do the same with respect to their vessels. I pointed out that this would meet the immediate practical needs and also avoid the issue of principle for both countries while buying time to work out a wider international solution. While appreciating our effort to offer a constructive solution, the Canadian representatives felt that the political pressures they faced were such that they could not accept a solution which would appear to give the “big and powerful” U.S. such a strong voice in how they handle their Arctic waters. Much of our discussion through the day revolved around various possible alternatives to this proposal, formulae for Canadian legislation, and other possible solutions. The Canadians are very sensitive on its becoming known that they are discussing with us legislation being considered by the Government before its presentation to the Parliament. The Canadians themselves are meeting again today on the subject and plan to discuss the matter with the Prime Minister when he returns this afternoon. I offered to leave in Ottawa any members of my delegation that would be helpful, but Sharp suggested that we keep in touch through Ambassador Cadieux, who returned to Washington with me. I have promised to follow up work here on the problem and expect to hear from Cadieux not later than Monday. However, I think it also possible that Prime Minister Trudeau might telephone you. *  EC Keefer, SK Holly, WB McAllister (eds), Foreign Relations 1969–1976, Vol E-1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969–1972 (Washington, US Government Printing Office, 2005) Doc 369.

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Document 266 US Department of State, Press Release No 121: Formal protest against the extension of Canadian territorial waters to twelve miles and the Arctic Waters Pollution Act (15 April 1970)* Last week the Canadian Government introduced in the House of Commons two bills dealing with pollution in the Arctic, fisheries and the limits of the territorial sea. The enactment and implementation of these measures would affect the exercise by the United States and other countries of the right to freedom of the seas in large areas of the high seas and would adversely affect our efforts to reach international agreement on the use of the seas. The bills seek to establish pollution zones in Arctic waters up to 100 miles from every point of Canadian coastal territory above the 60th parallel. Within these zones, Canada would assert the right to control all shipping, to prescribe standards of vessel construction, navigation aid operation, and to prohibit, if Canada deemed it necessary, the free passage of vessels in those waters. Additionally, the legislation seeks to authorize the establishment of exclusive Canadian fisheries in areas of the high seas beyond 12 miles, such as the Gulf of St. Lawrence and the Bay of Fundy, and of a 12-mile territorial sea off Canada’s coasts. International law provides no basis for these proposed unilateral extensions of jurisdictions on the high seas, and the United States can neither accept nor acquiesce in the assertion of such jurisdiction. We are concerned that this action by Canada if not opposed by us, would be taken as precedent in other parts of the world for other unilateral infringements of the freedom of the seas. If Canada had the right to claim and exercise exclusive pollution and resources jurisdiction on the high seas, other countries could assert the right to exercise jurisdiction for other purposes, some reasonable and some not, but all, equally invalid according to international law. Merchant shipping would be severely restricted, and naval mobility would be seriously jeopardized. The potential for serious international dispute and conflict is obvious. The United States has long sought international solutions rather than national approaches to problems involving the high seas. We are working for appropriate action within the United Nations framework looking toward the conclusion of a new international treaty dealing with the limit of the territorial sea, freedom of transit through and over international straits and defining preferential fishing rights for coastal states on the high seas. We are also seeking new international means for controlling pollution on the high seas. Last fall 47 countries, including the United States and Canada, participated in the preparation of two international conventions establishing the right of a coastal state to take certain limited anti-pollution measures against vessels on the high seas, and also imposing strict liability upon the owners of vessels responsible for pollution. These conventions which the United States has recently signed were concluded under U.N. auspices & Brussels. Other international approaches to control of pollution are underway at NATO and the U.N. Moreover, the United States is acutely aware of the

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peculiar ecological nature of the Arctic region, and the potential dangers of oil pollution in that area. The Arctic is a region important to all nations in its unique environment, its increasing significance as a world trade route and as a source of natural resources. We believe the Arctic beyond national jurisdiction should be subject to internationally agreed rules protecting its assets, both living and non-living, and have noted with pleasure the Canadian Prime Minister’s public statement that Canada would be prepared to enter into multilateral efforts to develop agreed rules of environmental protection. To this end, we intend shortly to ask other interested states to join in an international conference designed to establish rules for the Arctic beyond national jurisdiction by international agreement. We would be pleased if Canada were to join us in organizing such a conference. We regret that the Canadian Government, while not excluding these cooperative international approaches to our mutual problems involving the oceans, now proposes to take unilateral action to assert its own jurisdiction and establish its own rules pending the conclusion of international agreements satisfactory to it. For the reasons indicated earlier the United States cannot accept these unilateral jurisdictional assertions and we have urged the Canadian Government to defer making them effective while cooperating in efforts promptly to reach internationally agreed solutions. If, however, the Canadian Government is unwilling to await international agreement, we have urged that in the interest of avoiding a continuing dispute and undermining our efforts to achieve international agreement, that we submit our differences regarding pollution and exclusive fisheries jurisdiction beyond 12 miles to the International Court of Justice, the forum where disputes of this nature should rightfully be settled. Canada’s action last week excluded such disputes from its acceptance of the International Court’s compulsory jurisdiction. However, such action only prevents Canada from being forced into the Court. It does not preclude Canada voluntarily joining with us in submitting these disputes to the Court or an appropriate chamber of the Court. With respect to the 12-mile limit on the territorial sea, we have publicly indicated our willingness to accept such limit, but only as part of an agreed international treaty also providing for freedom of passage through and over international straits. The history of U.S.-Canadian relations is unique in world affairs for its closeness and cooperation. We are confident that, in this spirit, our two countries will continue to resolve our differences amicably and with mutual understanding.

Document 267 Diplomatic Note from the Embassy of Canada in Washington to the US State Department (16 April 1970)* The Ambassador of Canada presents his compliments to The Honourable the Secretary of State and has the honour to refer to the Secretary’s Note of April 14 outlining the views of the Government of the United States regarding certain legislation recently introduced by the Canadian Government in the House of Commons. It will be recalled that one of these Bills, namely the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Bill, is intended to protect

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the delicate ecological balance of the Canadian Arctic by laying down anti-pollution measures, while the second Bill is intended to extend Canada’s territorial sea from 3 to 12 miles and to provide for the subsequent establishment by the Government of new fisheries zones. The Canadian Government is unable to accept the views of the United States Government concerning the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Bill and the amendments to the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, and regrets that the United States is not prepared to accept or acquiesce in them. The Canadian Government cannot accept in particular the view that international law provides no basis for the proposed measures. For many years, large numbers of states have asserted various forms of limited jurisdiction beyond their territorial sea over marine areas adjacent to their coasts. The position of the United States Government is that the waters beyond a three-mile limit are high seas and that no state has a right to exercise exclusive pollution or resources jurisdiction on the high seas beyond a three-mile territorial sea. The Canadian Government does not accept this view which indeed the United States itself does not adhere to in practice. For example, as early as 1790, at a time when the international norm for the breadth of the territorial sea was without question three miles, the United States claimed jurisdiction up to twelve miles for customs purposes and enacted appropriate enforcement legislation, which is still in force. Since 1935 the United States has claimed the authority to extend customs enforcement activities as far out to sea as 62 miles, in clear contradiction of applicable international law. In 1966, the United States established exclusive fisheries jurisdiction beyond its three-mile territorial sea extending out to twelve miles from shore, and the United States has just passed analogous legislation asserting exclusive pollution control jurisdiction beyond its three-mile territorial sea and up to twelve miles. Canada reserves to itself the same rights as the United States has asserted to determine for itself how best to protect its vital interests, including in particular its national security. It is the further view of the Canadian Government that a danger to the environment of a state constitutes a threat to its security. Thus the proposed Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Legislation constitutes a lawful extension of a limited form of jurisdiction to meet particular dangers, and is of a different order from unilateral interferences with the freedom of the high seas such as, for example, the atomic tests carried out by the United States and other states which, however necessary they may be, have appropriated to their own use vast areas of the high seas and constituted grave perils to those who would wish to utilize such areas during the period of the test blast. The most recent example of such a test by the United States and its consequences for the freedom of the high seas, as was pointed out by some governments at that time, occurred in October 1969 when the United States warned away shipping within a 50-mile radius of the test it was conducting at Amchitka Island. The proposed anti-pollution legislation, proposed fisheries protection legislation and the proposed 12-mile territorial sea constitute a threat to no state and a peril to no one. It is a well-established principle of international law that customary international law is developed by state practice. Recent and important instances of such state practice on the law of the sea are, for example, the Truman Proclamation of 1945 proclaiming United States jurisdiction over the continental shelf and the unilateral establishment in 1966 by the United States of exclusive fishing zones. Overwhelming evidence that international law can be and is developed by state practice lies in the fact that in 1958, at the time of the first of recent failures of the international community to reach agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea, some 14 states claimed a 12-mile territorial sea, whereas by 1970 1289

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some 45 states have established a 12-mile territorial sea and 57 states have established a territorial sea of 12 miles or more. Indeed, the three-mile territorial sea, now claimed by only 24 countries, was itself established by state practice. The United States Government is aware of the major efforts made by Canada at the 1958 and 1960 Geneva Law of the Sea Conferences to bring about an agreed rule of law on the breadth of the territorial sea and on the breadth of contiguous zones for the exercise of various other types of limited jurisdiction. Subsequent to the failure of the 1958 and 1960 conferences Canada joined with other countries in a further extensive and vigorous multilateral campaign to bring about agreement on these questions, but these efforts failed because the United States ultimately declined to participate in them. In 1964, when Canada passed legislation establishing a nine-mile contiguous fishing zone, the United States objected to it, only to follow suit two years later, thereby confirming its acquiescence in both the substance and the manner of Canada’s action. In discussions between Canada and the United States from time to time over the last ten years, Canada has made clear its serious concern over the unresolved questions of the breadth of the territorial sea and the rights of coastal states to assert limited forms of jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea for the purpose of protecting their vital interests. With respect to the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Bill, the Canadian Delegation at the November 1969 Brussels I.M.C.O. Conference made strenuous efforts to bring about international agreement on effective pollution prevention measures, but the results of that conference fell short of effective protection for coastal states and the world’s marine environment. It is well known that Canada takes second place to no nation in pressing for multilateral solutions to problems of international law, and that Canada has repeatedly and consistently shown its good faith by its continuous efforts to produce agreed rules of law. The Canadian Government is, however, determined to fulfil its fundamental responsibilities to the Canadian people and to the international community for the protection of Canada’s offshore marine environment and its living resources, and the proposed legislation is directed to these ends. The Canadian Government has long been concerned about the inadequacies of international law in failing to give the necessary protection to the marine environment and to ensure the conservation of fisheries resources. The proposed anti-pollution legislation is based on the overriding right of self-defence of coastal states to protect themselves against grave threats to their environment. Traditional principles of international law concerning pollution of the sea are based in the main on ensuring freedom of navigation to shipping states, which are now engaged in the large scale carriage of oil and other potential pollutants. Such traditional concepts are of little or no relevance anywhere in the world if they can be cited as precluding action by a coastal state to protect this environment. Such concepts are particularly irrelevant, however, to an area having the unique characteristics of the Arctic, where there is an intimate relationship between the sea, the ice and the land, and where the permanent defilement of the environment could occur and result in the destruction of whole species. It is idle, moreover, to talk of freedom of the high seas with respect to an area, large parts of which are covered with ice throughout the year, other parts of which are covered with ice most of each year, and where the local inhabitants use the frozen sea as an extension of the land to travel over it by dogsled and snowmobile far more than they can use it as water. While the Canadian Government is determined to open up the Northwest Passage to safe navigation, it cannot accept the suggestion that the Northwest Passage constitutes high seas. 1290

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In these circumstances the Canadian Government is not prepared to await the gradual development of international law, either by other states through their practice nor through the possible development of rules of law through multilateral treaties. The Canadian Government has repeatedly made clear that it is fully prepared to participate actively in multilateral action aimed at producing agreed safety and anti-pollution standards and protection of the living resources of the sea but is not prepared to abdicate in the meantime its own primary responsibilities concerning these questions. With respect to the Bill which would authorize the establishment of a 12-mile territorial sea off Canada’s coasts, the large number of coastal states now claiming a territorial sea of 12 miles or more, and the recent efforts of the United States directed towards a rule of law on the territorial sea, rights of passage and fisheries jurisdiction, provide the best evidence of the validity of the Canadian position on this question. The Canadian Government is aware of United States interest in ensuring freedom of transit through international straits, but rejects any suggestion that the Northwest Passage is such an international strait. The widespread interest in opening up the Northwest Passage to commercial shipping and the well-known commitment of the Canadian Government to this end are themselves ample proof that it has not heretofore been possible to utilize the Northwest Passage as a route for shipping. The Northwest Passage has not attained the status of an international strait by customary usage nor has it been defined as such by conventional international law. The Canadian Government reiterates its determination to open up the Northwest Passage to safe navigation for the shipping of all nations subject, however, to necessary conditions required to protect the delicate ecological balance of the Canadian Arctic. Canada’s new reservation to its acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the international court does not in any way reflect lack of confidence in the court but takes into account the limitations within which the court must operate and the deficiencies of the law which it must interpret and apply. Canada’s readiness to submit to the international judicial process remains general in scope and is subject only to certain limited and clearly defined exceptions rather than to a general exception which can be defined at will so as to include any particular matter. It is the earnest hope of the Canadian Government that it will be possible to achieve internationally accepted rules for Arctic navigation within the framework of Canada’s proposed legislation. It is recognized that the interests of other states are inevitably affected in any exercise of jurisdiction over areas of the sea. These interests have been taken into account in drafting this legislation; Canada has, for instance, provided that naval vessels and other ships owned by foreign governments may be exempted from the application of Canadian anti-pollution regulations if the ships in question substantially meet Canadian standards. Canada will give the interests of other states, including the United States, further consideration in entering into consultations with them before promulgating safety regulations under the Arctic Waters Bill. The Canadian Government is pleased to note that the United States confirms that it is acutely aware of the peculiar ecological nature of the Arctic region and the potential dangers of oil pollution in that area. The Canadian Government agrees that the Arctic is a “region important to all nations in its unique environment, its increasing significance as a world trade route, and as a source of natural resources”. The Canadian Government does not, however, agree that the Arctic as a whole should be subjected to an international regime protecting its assets both living and non-living, if that is what is proposed by the 1291

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United States. Canada’s sovereignty over the islands of the Arctic Archipelago is not of course, in issue, nor are Canada’s sovereign rights over its northern continental shelf and the Canadian Government assumes that the United States Government is not suggesting an international regime to cover these environments (nor the land mass and adjacent submarine resources of Alaska). With respect to the waters of the Arctic Archipelago, the position of Canada has always been that these waters are regarded as Canadian. While Canada would be pleased to discuss with other stated international standards of navigation safety and environmental protection to be applicable to the waters of the Arctic, the Canadian Government cannot accept any suggestion that Canadian waters should be internationalized. The Canadian Government notes that the United States intends shortly to ask other interested states to join in an international conference designed to establish internationally agreed rules protecting the living and non-living assets of the Arctic beyond national jurisdiction, and notes that the United States Government would be pleased to join the Canadian Government in such a conference. Before the Canadian Government can express a definitive view on this question, further information will be required as to the scope, nature and territorial application of the rules the United States proposes, since the Canadian Government obviously cannot participate in any international conference called for the purpose of discussing questions falling wholly within Canadian domestic jurisdiction. With regard to matters properly of an international character, the Prime Minister took the lead in his statement to Canadian Parliament on October 24 last, in inviting the international community to join Canada in promoting a new concept, an international legal regime to ensure to human beings the right to live in a wholesome natural environment. With respect to the proposed legislation permitting the establishment of exclusive fishing zones, it is the considered view of the Canadian Government that neither existing customary international law nor contemporary conventional international law are adequate to prevent the continuing and increasingly rapid depletion of the living resources of the sea. The Canadian Government is aware of the proposals of the United States and other states concerning possible solutions to this problem through a multilateral approach, and intends to participate actively and constructively in any conferences to be held to consider such questions. The Government in the meantime proposes to take all measures necessary for the protection and conservation of the living resources of the sea adjacent to Canada’s coast. It is Canada’s expectation that other states will take similar action since it is becoming increasingly apparent that there is no other effective way of preventing the rapid depletion of the living resources of the marine environment. The Canadian Government is pledged to the development of the use of Canada’s Arctic waters for the encouragement and expansion of Canada’s northern economy and has adopted a functional and constructive approach to these questions which does not interfere with and indeed can facilitate the legitimate activities of others, The two bills reflect the determination of the Canadian Government to fulfil its responsibilities to its own people and to the international community to preserve the ecological balance of Canada and to protect and conserve the living resources of its marine environment. The Canadian Government reaffirms its faith in the spirit of co-operation which Canada and the United States have shown throughout so much of the history of their relations and is confident that it will be possible to resolve their differences amicably and with mutual understanding.

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Document 268 Diplomatic Note from the US State Department to the Embassy of Canada in Washington (5 May 1970)* The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Canada and has the honor to refer to the Ambassador’s Note of April 16 regarding certain legislation recently introduced by the Canadian Government in the House of Commons. In view of certain statements contained in the Note, the Government of the United States believes it would be desirable to clarify various aspects of the views it has earlier expressed. With respect to the jurisdiction of coastal states, the United States does not dispute that international law recognizes limited enforcement powers of the coastal state in a zone of the high seas which does not extend beyond twelve miles from the coast or appropriate baselines. This is clearly stated in the United Nations Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. The recent amendments to the United States Federal Water Pollution Control Act explicitly refer to the criteria of that Convention. The United States strongly supported the efforts of the United Nations to codify the law of the sea, signed and ratified the four United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea, and has taken no action inconsistent with those Conventions. It neither sought nor obtained recognition of any coastal state jurisdiction over navigation in a zone of the high seas extending beyond twelve miles. The 1935 legislation referred to by the Government of Canada in fact explicitly limits the customs waters of the United States to twelve nautical miles from the coast. Its provisions with respect to vessels hovering on the high seas within fifty miles beyond customs waters and engaged in liquor smuggling into the United States are inapposite; they have not in any event been enforced since the 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. The establishment of an exclusive fisheries zone in 1966 extending to twelve miles from the coast was consistent with the position taken at the United Nations Conferences by nearly every state attending, including Canada, and followed similar action or agreement on such action by nearly all other maritime nations, including Canada. The Government of Canada has also referred to the United States nuclear test at Amchitka. This test was conducted in a manner consistent with the treaty obligations of the United States and international law. The United Nations issued no prohibition of navigation on the high seas; the forty-eight-hour suspension of innocent passage within the three-mile territorial sea surrounding Amchitka was in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. In issuing a warning of the test to vessels on the high seas in the area, the United States considers that it was acting in furtherance of its obligations to other nations and international shipping. The United Nations Convention on the High Seas requires that the freedoms of the high seas be exercised with reasonable regard to the interests of other states in their exercise of the freedoms of the high seas. The United States considers that this standard was fully satisfied. Although frequent reference is made to the 1945 Truman Proclamation on the Continental Shelf to justify a variety of unilateral actions, the United States must *  ICJ,

Gulf of Maine Case, Reply of the United States of America, Annex 8, 536–537. 1293

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point out that it did not in 1945 or thereafter receives any objection from any other state regarding the Truman Proclamation. Unlike the waters of the high seas, the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf beyond the territorial sea had not been the subject of developed principles of international law or extensive legal study or discussion. Such precedent as did exist tended to support the concepts of the Truman Proclamation. Nevertheless, the Truman Proclamation was followed by extensive and unreasonable assertions of sovereignty or jurisdiction over the high seas by some states which were clearly in contravention of applicable principles of international law and which resulted in international dispute. It is this experience in particular which convinces the United States that unilateral action, especially at a time when so many channels for international action have been developed, is unwarranted and unwise. The United States Government is deeply concerned at the possible precedential effects of Canada’s action in taking these unilateral protective measures in the present circumstances. That concern prompted the United States to suggest, in the Secretary of State’s note of April 14, 1970, that Canada join with the Court of Justice. The United States is particularly concerned with the implication in the Canadian Note that the International Court of Justice cannot perform an adjudicatory function when in the view of one of the parties to the dispute, the international law relevant to the dispute is “deficient”. The Court, as a judicial body expressly constituted to resolve disputes between nations, is fully capable of applying and developing the law in terms of contemporary problems. Accordingly, the United States reiterates its invitation to the Government of Canada to join with the Government of the United States is submitting these questions to the Court. At the same time, it should be clearly understood that Submission of these issues to the Court has no direct relation to the convening of an international conference on the protection of the Arctic environment or to the results of that conference. The Government of the United States welcomes the interest of the Government of Canada in such an international conference and once again notes with pleasure the Prime Minister’s proposals in this regard. The United States believes that such a conference should be convened at the earliest possible time with a view to achieving early agreement on appropriate measures to protect the Arctic environment. Such a conference would be convened for the purpose of creating new treaty law and therefore would not need to await decisions by the Court on the validity of unilateral protective measures or to take such decisions into account. The United States Government agrees that the international conference on protection of the Arctic environment should be limited to matters properly of international concern. The Government of the United States does not believe that differing views regarding the unilateral enactment of the protective measures proposed by the Canadian Government should prevent the achievement of international agreement on effective, permanent measures to protect the Arctic environment. The problem of ocean pollution knows no boundaries. Oil spilled on the high seas hundreds or thousands of miles away can be washed on shore by unpredictable currents and winds. The problem cannot be resolved effectively by unilateral state action; such action will inevitably lead to conflicting assertions of jurisdiction and standards of regulation, whereas the dangers of pollution call for the highest degree of cooperation between nations and a standardized approach to regulation and control. For these reasons, the United States has strongly supported, and continues to support, efforts at international agreement to protect the ocean environment and the adjacent 1294

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coastlines. The United States Government will give urgent and serious consideration to the adoption by international agreement of standards and measures designed to protect the Arctic environment.

Document 269 Canadian Declaration Concerning the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (7 April 1970)* Excellency, On behalf of the Government of Canada, (1) I give notice that I hereby terminate the acceptance by Canada of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice hitherto effective by virtue of the declaration made on September 20, 1929 and ratified on July 28, 1930, under Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, and made applicable to the International Court of Justice by paragraph 5 of Article 36 of the Statute of that Court. (2) I declare that the Government of Canada accepts as compulsory ipso facto and without special convention, on condition of reciprocity, the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, in conformity with paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court, until such time as notice may be given to terminate the acceptance, over all disputes arising after the present declaration with regard to situations or facts subsequent to this declaration, other than: (a) disputes in regard to which parties have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to some other method of peaceful settlement; (b) disputes with the Government of any other country which is a member of the Commonwealth of Nations, all of which disputes shall be settled in such manner as the parties have agreed or shall agree; (c) disputes with regard to questions which by international law fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of Canada; (d) disputes arising out of or concerning jurisdiction or rights claimed or exercised by Canada in respect of the conservation, management or exploitation of the living resources of the sea, or in respect of the prevention or control of pollution or contamination of the marine environment in marine areas adjacent to the coast of Canada. (3) The Government of Canada also reserves the right at any time, by means of a notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and with effect as from the moment of such notification, either to add to, amend or withdraw any of the foregoing reservations, or any that may hereafter be added. It is requested that this notification may be communicated to the governments of all the States that have accepted the Optional Clause and to the Registrar of the International Court of Justice. Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration. Yvon Beaulne, Ambassador and Permanent Representative * 

(1970) 9 ILM 598. 1295

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Document 270 Letter from the Legal Bureau of the Canadian Department of External Affair: Canadian Sovereignty over Sea Pollution Control Zones (27 February 1973)* The Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act received Royal Assent on June 26, 1970, and was proclaimed in force on August 12, 1972. At the same time, appropriate regulations were promulgated under the Statute. The Act responded to Canada’s view of the special status of Arctic waters and ice and the special rights and responsibilities of the Arctic coastal states, with particular respect to the preservation of the Arctic ecology. It reflected also the Canadian Government’s policy on the environmental implications of economic development. The Act makes clear that the Arctic waters are open for the passage of shipping of all nations. However, such passage might be precluded if the ships do not meet certain requirements designed to prevent pollution of the environment. Moreover, persons or vessels responsible for pollution damage are liable for cost clean-up and compensation without proof of fault or negligence. Some countries, while understanding and sympathizing with Canada’s anxieties on the subject of marine pollution and recognizing that the ecological problems affecting the Arctic might require different methods of treatment from those suitable in other parts of the world, questioned this legislation on the ground that Canada had no right to extend its jurisdiction over waters lying beyond Canadian territorial waters up to 200 miles from the coast of Canada. However, the Arctic Waters Pollution legislation does not make and does not require an assertion of sovereignty. The legislation is related to pollution control in Arctic waters only. It represents a lawful extension of a limited form of jurisdiction which was required to ensure the preservation of the Arctic environment, having regard to the unique nature and the particular vulnerability of this environment, the disastrous consequences which could flow from its pollution or degradation, and the especially severe risks involved in the navigation of Arctic waters. The exercise of various forms of jurisdiction by coastal states beyond the limits of their territorial waters is a well-established principle of customary international law, as reflected in the practice of numerous states including the major maritime powers. The view has often been expressed that the preservation of the Arctic marine environment called for international solution rather than for unilateral action. The Canadian Government has always considered that the action taken by Canada was not inconsistent with the development of internationally-agreed standards of navigation safety and pollution control in Arctic waters, which should take into due account the special rights and responsibilities of the Arctic coastal states. The Government has carried out a series of intensive negotiations with the US and the USSR and other Arctic countries concerning the possibility of developing a multilateral agreement to ensure the prevention of pollution and the safety of navigation in Arctic

*  (1974) 12 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 272, 283. Contains information licensed under the Open Government Licence—Canada.

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waters. However, this possibility is not yet in sight. I would also point out that the Canadian authorities concerned have never envisaged converting the Arctic into an international area.

Document 271 Declaration by Canada recognizing as compulsory the jurisdiction of the ICJ, in conformity with Art 36, para 2, Statute of the International Court of Justice (10 May 1994)* On behalf of the Government of Canada, (1) I give notice that I hereby terminate the acceptance by Canada of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice hitherto effective by virtue of the declaration made on 10 September 1985 in conformity with paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court. (2) I declare that the Government of Canada accepts as compulsory ipso facto and without special convention, on condition of reciprocity, the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, in conformity with paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court, until such time as notice may be given to terminate the acceptance, over all disputes arising after the present declaration with regard to situations or facts subsequent to this declaration, other than: (a) disputes in regard to which the parties have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to some other method of peaceful settlement; (b) disputes with the government of any other country which is a member of the Commonwealth, all of which disputes shall be settled in such manner as the parties have agreed or shall agree; (c) disputes with regard to questions which by international law fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of Canada; and (d) disputes arising out of or concerning conservation and management measures taken by Canada with respect to vessels fishing in the NAFO Regulatory Area, as defined in the Convention on Future Multilateral Co-operation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, 1978, and the enforcement of such measures. (3) The Government of Canada also reserves the right at any time, by means of a notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and with effect as from the moment of such notification, either to add to, amend or withdraw any of the foregoing reservations, or any that may hereafter be added. It is requested that this notification be communicated to the governments of all the States that have accepted the Optional Clause and to the Registrar of the International Court of Justice. Louise Frechette, Ambassador and Permanent Representative

* 

Done and entered into force 10 May 1994, 1776 UNTS 9. 1297

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Document 272 Canada, Shipping Safety Control Zones Order (1978/2010)* Order Prescribing Certain Areas of the Arctic Waters as Shipping Safety Control Zones Short Title 1. This Order may be cited as the Shipping Safety Control Zones Order. Interpretation 2. In this Order, seaward boundary means the outer limit of the exclusive economic zone of Canada. However, where the international boundary between Canada and Greenland is less than 200 nautical miles from the baselines of the territorial sea of Canada, the international boundary shall be substituted for that outer limit. Shipping Safety Control Zones 3. The areas of the arctic waters described in the zones set out in Schedule 1 and shown in Schedule 2, other than any rivers, lakes or other fresh waters, are hereby prescribed as shipping safety control zones. SCHEDULE 1 (Section 3) ZONE 1 COMMENCING at latitude 76°40′, longitude 99°00′; THENCE along parallel of latitude 76°40′, to longitude 96°25′; THENCE along a line to latitude 80°25′, longitude 88°00′; THENCE along a line to the intersection of latitude 82°00′ with the seaward boundary in Robeson Channel; THENCE along the seaward boundary northerly and southwesterly to longitude 141°00′; THENCE along meridian of longitude 141°00′ to latitude 71°20′; THENCE along a line to latitude 71°15′, longitude 137°00′; THENCE along a line to latitude 71°30′, longitude 134°00′; THENCE along a line to latitude 72°00′, longitude 131°30′; THENCE along a line to latitude 72°40′, longitude 131°00′; THENCE along a line to the most westerly intersection of latitude 74°20′ with the shore of Banks Island, near Cape Prince Alfred; THENCE along the northerly and northeasterly shore of Banks Island to its most easterly intersection with latitude 73°30′, near Russell Point; THENCE along a line to latitude 74°30′, longitude 112°50′; THENCE along a line to latitude 75°30′, longitude 106°10′; THENCE along a line to latitude 75°50′, longitude 99°00′; THENCE along meridian of longitude 99°00′ to the point of commencement. ZONE 2 COMMENCING at latitude 74°30′, longitude 99°00′; THENCE along parallel of latitude 74°30′, to longitude 112°50′; THENCE along a line to the most easterly intersection of latitude 73°30′ with the shore of Banks Island, near Russell Point; THENCE along the easterly shore of Banks Island to its most easterly intersection with latitude 72°45′; THENCE along parallel of latitude 72°45′, to longitude 117°20′; THENCE along a line to latitude 70°00′, longitude 110°00′; THENCE along parallel of latitude 70°00′, * 

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to longitude 99°00′; THENCE along meridian of longitude 99°00′ to the point of commencement. ZONE 3 COMMENCING at latitude 76°40′, longitude 96°25′; THENCE along parallel of latitude 76°40′ to longitude 88°30′; THENCE along a line to latitude 79°15′, longitude 75°30′; THENCE along parallel of latitude 79°15′ to the seaward boundary in Nares Strait; THENCE along the seaward boundary to latitude 82°00′ in Robeson Channel; THENCE along a line to latitude 80°25′, longitude 88°00′; THENCE along a line to the point of commencement. ZONE 4 COMMENCING at latitude 70°30′, longitude 141°00′; THENCE along parallel of latitude 70°30′, to longitude 138°00′; THENCE along a line to latitude 72°00′, longitude 127°00′; THENCE along a line to latitude 73°30′, longitude 125°00′; THENCE along parallel of latitude 73°30′, to its most westerly intersection with the shore of Banks Island, near Bernard Island; THENCE along the westerly shore of Banks Island to its most westerly intersection with latitude 74°20′, near Cape Prince Alfred; THENCE along a line to latitude 72°40′, longitude 131°00′; THENCE along a line to latitude 72°00′, longitude 131°30′; THENCE along a line to latitude 71°30′, longitude 134°00′; THENCE along a line to latitude 71°15′, longitude 137°00′; THENCE along a line to latitude 71°20′, longitude 141°00′; THENCE along meridian of longitude 141°00′ to the point of commencement. ZONE 5 COMMENCING at latitude 69°30′, longitude 84°00′; THENCE along parallel of latitude 69°30′ to longitude 93°20′; THENCE along meridian of longitude 93°20′ to latitude 67°00′; THENCE along parallel of latitude 67°00′ to longitude 84°00′; THENCE along meridian of longitude 84°00′ to the point of commencement. ZONE 6 COMMENCING at latitude 76°40′, longitude 99°00′; THENCE along meridian of longitude 99°00′ to latitude 75°50′; THENCE along a line to latitude 75°30′, longitude 106°10′; THENCE along a line to latitude 74°30′, longitude 112°50′; THENCE along parallel of latitude 74°30′ to longitude 99°00′; THENCE along meridian of longitude 99°00′ to latitude 70°00′; THENCE along parallel of latitude 70°00′ to longitude 93°20′; THENCE along meridian of longitude 93°20′ to latitude 69°30′; THENCE along parallel of latitude 69°30′ to longitude 84°00′; THENCE along meridian of longitude 84°00′ to latitude 70°50′; THENCE along parallel of latitude 70°50′ to longitude 87°00′; THENCE along meridian of longitude 87°00′ to latitude 73°45′; THENCE along parallel of latitude 73°45′ to longitude 95°00′; THENCE along meridian of longitude 95°00′ to latitude 75°00′; THENCE along parallel of latitude 75°00′ to longitude 82°00′; THENCE along a line to the intersection of latitude 76°30′ with the seaward boundary in Baffin Bay; THENCE along the seaward boundary to latitude 79°15′ in Nares Strait; THENCE along parallel of latitude 79°15′, to longitude 75°30′; THENCE along a line to latitude 76°40′, longitude 88°30′; THENCE along parallel of latitude 76°40′ to the point of commencement. 1299

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ZONE 7 COMMENCING at latitude 70°00′, longitude 93°20′; THENCE along parallel of latitude 70°00′, to longitude 104°50′; THENCE along meridian of longitude 104°50′, to latitude 66°20′; THENCE along parallel of latitude 66°20′, to longitude 93°20′; THENCE along meridian of longitude 93°20′ to the point of commencement. ZONE 8 COMMENCING at latitude 64°20′, longitude 93°20′; THENCE along parallel of latitude 64°20′ to its most westerly intersection with the shore of Baffin Island, at Foxe Peninsula; THENCE along the westerly shore of Baffin Island to its most southerly intersection with longitude 84°00′; THENCE along meridian of longitude 84°00′, to latitude 67°00′; THENCE along parallel of latitude 67°00′, to longitude 93°20′; THENCE along meridian of longitude 93°20′ to the point of commencement. ZONE 9 COMMENCING at the most easterly intersection of latitude 66°35′ with the shore of Baffin Island, near Cape Dyer; THENCE along parallel of latitude 66°35′ to the seaward boundary in Davis Strait; THENCE along the seaward boundary to latitude 73°35′ in Baffin Bay; THENCE along a line to the most easterly intersection of latitude 72°30′ with the shore of Baffin Island, near Cape Macculloch; THENCE along the easterly shore of Baffin Island to the point of commencement. ZONE 10 COMMENCING at latitude 66°35′, longitude 69°00′; THENCE along meridian of longitude 69°00′, to latitude 64°20′; THENCE along parallel of latitude 64°20′ to the seaward boundary in Davis Strait; THENCE along the seaward boundary to latitude 66°35′ in Davis Strait; THENCE along parallel of latitude 66°35′ to the point of commencement. ZONE 11 COMMENCING at latitude 70°00′, longitude 104°50′; THENCE along parallel of latitude 70°00′ to longitude 110°00′; THENCE along a line to latitude 72°45′, longitude 117°20′; THENCE along parallel of latitude 72°45′ to its most easterly intersection with the shore of Banks Island; THENCE along the southeasterly shore of Banks Island to its most southerly intersection with longitude 123°00′, near Cape Lambton; THENCE along a line to latitude 66°20′, longitude 121°45′; THENCE along parallel of latitude 66°20′ to longitude 104°50′; THENCE along meridian of longitude 104°50′ to the point of commencement. ZONE 12 COMMENCING at latitude 70°30′, longitude 141°00′; THENCE along meridian of longitude 141°00′, to latitude 66°20′; THENCE along parallel of latitude 66°20′, to longitude 121°45′; THENCE along a line to the most southerly intersection of longitude 123°00′ with the shore of Banks Island, near Cape Lambton; THENCE along the southwesterly shore of Banks Island to its most westerly intersection with latitude 73°30′, near Bernard Island; THENCE along parallel of latitude 73°30′, to longitude 125°00′; THENCE along a line to latitude 72°00′, longitude 127°00′; THENCE along a 1300

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line to latitude 70°30′, longitude 138°00′; THENCE along parallel of latitude 70°30′, to the point of commencement, excluding the following waters: (a) the waters of Shallow Bay, Shoalwater Bay, Trent Bay and Mackenzie Bay as far seaward as a line drawn along the parallel of latitude 69°00′; and (b) the waters of Kugmallit Bay as far seaward as a line drawn along the parallel of latitude 69°31′. ZONE 13 COMMENCING at the intersection of latitude 76°30′ with the seaward boundary in Baffin Bay; THENCE along a line to latitude 75°00′, longitude 82°00′; THENCE along parallel of latitude 75°00′ to longitude 95°00′; THENCE along meridian of longitude 95°00′ to latitude 73°45′; THENCE along parallel of latitude 73°45′ to longitude 87°00′; THENCE along meridian of longitude 87°00′ to latitude 70°50′; THENCE along parallel of latitude 70°50′ to longitude 84°00′; THENCE along a line to the most easterly intersection of latitude 72°30′ with the shore of Baffin Island, near Cape Macculloch; THENCE along a line to the intersection of latitude 73°35′ with the seaward boundary in Baffin Bay; THENCE along the seaward boundary to the point of commencement. ZONE 14 COMMENCING at latitude 60°00′, longitude 77°10′; THENCE along a line to the most westerly intersection of latitude 64°20′ with the shore of Baffin Island, at Foxe Peninsula; THENCE along parallel of latitude 64°20′ to its most westerly intersection with the shore of Southampton Island; THENCE along the westerly shore of Southampton Island to its most southerly intersection with longitude 87°10′, near Cape Kendall; THENCE along a line to latitude 60°00′, longitude 92°00′; THENCE along parallel of latitude 60°00′ to the point of commencement. ZONE 15 COMMENCING at latitude 60°00′, longitude 77°10′; THENCE along parallel of latitude 60°00′ to the seaward boundary in the Labrador Sea; THENCE along the seaward boundary, to latitude 64°20′; THENCE along parallel of latitude 64°20′, to longitude 69°00′; THENCE along meridian of longitude 69°00′, to latitude 65°00′; THENCE along parallel of latitude 65°00′, to longitude 75°00′; THENCE along a line to the most westerly intersection of latitude 64°20′ with the shore of Baffin Island, at Foxe Peninsula; THENCE along a line to the point of commencement. ZONE 16 COMMENCING at latitude 60°00′, longitude 92°00′; THENCE along a line to the most southerly intersection of longitude 87°10′ with the westerly shore of Southampton Island, near Cape Kendall; THENCE along the westerly shore of Southampton Island to its most westerly intersection with latitude 64°20′; THENCE along the parallel of latitude 64°20′, to longitude 93°20′; THENCE along a line to latitude 60°00′, to longitude 95°00′; THENCE along parallel of latitude 60°00′ to the point of commencement. Note: In the descriptions of the shipping safety control zones set out above, (a) all lines are the shortest lines between points named, unless otherwise specified; (b) “shore” means the upper limit of the shore; and (c) the geographical names are based on the Atlas of Canada, published by the Department of Natural Resources. 1301

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SCHEDULE 2(Section 3) SHIPPING SAFETY CONTROL ZONES Map of Canada’s Arctic showing the sixteen Shipping Safety Control Zones

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Document 273 Canada, Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulations (NORDREG) (1 July 2010)* Her Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Transport, pursuant to paragraphs 136(1)(a) (see footnote a), (b) (see footnote b) and (i) (see footnote c) of the Canada Shipping Act, 2001 (see footnote d), hereby makes the annexed Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulations. Interpretation 1. The following definitions apply in these Regulations. “Act” means the Canada Shipping Act, 2001. “berth” includes a wharf, a pier, an anchorage and a mooring buoy.

*  Entered into force 1 July 2010, SOR/2010-127. Regulations are current to 3 March and last amended on 1 July 2010. Schedules omitted.

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“dangerous goods” means the substances, materials and articles covered by the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code. “NORDREG Zone” means the Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone established under section 2. “oil” has the same meaning as in section 165 of the Act. “pollutant” has the same meaning as in section 185 of the Act. “SOLAS” means the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, and the Protocol of 1988 relating to the Convention, as amended from time to time. Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone 2. The Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone is established. It consists of (a) the shipping safety control zones prescribed by the Shipping Safety Control Zones Order; (b) the waters of Ungava Bay, Hudson Bay and Kugmallit Bay that are not in a shipping safety control zone; (c) the waters of James Bay; (d) the waters of the Koksoak River from Ungava Bay to Kuujjuaq; (e) the waters of Feuilles Bay from Ungava Bay to Tasiujaq; (f) the waters of Chesterfield Inlet that are not within a shipping safety control zone, and the waters of Baker Lake; and (g) the waters of the Moose River from James Bay to Moosonee. Prescribed as classes of vessels 3. The following vessels are prescribed as classes of vessels for the purposes of subsections 126(1) and (3) of the Act in respect of the NORDREG Zone: (a) vessels of 300 gross tonnage or more; (b) vessels that are engaged in towing or pushing another vessel, if the combined gross tonnage of the vessel and the vessel being towed or pushed is 500 gross tonnage or more; and (c) vessels that are carrying as cargo a pollutant or dangerous goods, or that are engaged in towing or pushing a vessel that is carrying as cargo a pollutant or dangerous goods. Obligation 4. The master of a vessel of a class prescribed by section 3 must ensure that the requirements of sections 5 to 10 are met in respect of the vessel. Reports 5. (1) Every report required by any of sections 6 to 9 must begin with the term “NORDREG” and be followed by whichever of the following two letters corresponds to the report: (a) “SP”, in the case of a sailing plan report; (b) “PR”, in the case of a position report; (c) “FR”, in the case of a final report; (d) “DR”, in the case of a deviation report. (2) The report must include the applicable designators required by sections 6 to 9 and set out in column 1 of the schedule, followed by the information that is about the subject set out in column 2 and that is specified in column 3. 1303

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6. (1) A sailing plan report must be provided (a) when a vessel is about to enter the NORDREG Zone; (b) more than one hour but not more than two hours before a vessel departs from a berth within the NORDREG Zone, unless the vessel is moving to another berth in the same port; and (c) immediately before a vessel gets underway within the NORDREG Zone, if the vessel (i) has been stranded, (ii) has stopped as a result of a breakdown in the main propulsion or steering system, or (iii) has been involved in a collision. (2) The sailing plan report must include (a) in the circumstances set out in paragraph (1)(a), the designators A, B, either C or D, E, F, G, H, I, L, O, P, Q, S, T, W and X; (b) in the circumstances set out in paragraph (1)(b), the designators A, B, either C or D, H, I, L, O, P, Q, S, T, W and X; and (c) in the circumstances set out in paragraph (1)(c), the designators A, B, either C or D, I, L, O, P, Q, S, T, W and X. (3) If the vessel is about to enter the NORDREG Zone directly from the Eastern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone and has obtained a clearance issued under paragraph 126(3) (a) of the Act with respect to that zone, the designators O, Q and T do not need to be included. (4) In the case of a report required by paragraph (1)(b) or (c), the designators O, P, Q, S, T, W and X do not need to be included if the corresponding information specified in column 3 of the schedule has not changed since the previous sailing plan report. 7. (1) A position report must be provided (a) immediately after a vessel enters the NORDREG Zone; and (b) daily at 1600 Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), if a vessel is underway within the NORDREG Zone, unless the information required by regulation 19-1, Long-range identification and tracking of ships, of Chapter V of SOLAS, is being transmitted in accordance with that regulation. (2) A position report must also be provided as soon as feasible after a vessel’s master becomes aware of any of the following, if the vessel is within or about to enter the NORDREG Zone: (a) another vessel in apparent difficulty; (b) any obstruction to navigation; (c) an aid to navigation that is not functioning properly or is damaged, out of position or missing; (d) any ice or weather conditions that are hazardous to safe navigation; and (e) a pollutant in the water. (3) The position report must include the following designators: (a) A, B, either C or D, E, F and S; and (b) X, in the case of a position report required by subsection (2). 8. (1) A final report must be provided (a) on the arrival of a vessel at a berth within the NORDREG Zone; and (b) immediately before a vessel exits the NORDREG Zone. (2) The final report must include the designators A and K. 1304

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9. (1) A deviation report must be provided when (a) a vessel’s position varies significantly from the position that was expected based on the sailing plan report; or (b) a vessel’s intended voyage changes from the sailing plan report. (2) The deviation report must include (a) the designators A, B, and either C or D; and (b) the other designators included in the sailing plan report, if the corresponding information specified in column 3 of the schedule has changed since that report. 10. Every report must be addressed to NORDREG CANADA and be provided to one of the Marine Communications and Traffic Services Centres that is designated by the Canadian Coast Guard to receive the report. Coming into force 11. These Regulations come into force on July 1, 2010.

Document 274 Diplomatic Note from the United States to Canada regarding NORDREG (19 March 2010)* Embassy of the United States of America Robert Turner, Manager, Navigation Safety and Radiocommunications, Operations & Environmental Programs, Marine Safety Directorate, Department of Transport, Place de Ville, Tower C, 330 Sparks Street, Ottawa, Ontario KlA ON5 Ottawa, Canada March 19, 2010 Subject: Canada Gazette, Part I, Saturday, February 27th, 2010; Vol.144, No. 9: Proposed Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulations Dear Mr. Turner, On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, the Embassy wishes to provide comments on the proposed Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulations (NORDREG) published in the Canada Gazette on February 27, 2010. The United States of America compliments the Government of Canada’s continued efforts to provide for the safety of navigation and protection of the marine environment in the Arctic area. As conditions in the Arctic evolve, all Arctic coastal states will need to consider ways to protect and preserve this sensitive region. We note the collaborative efforts we have taken with Canada in this regard. * 

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The notice of proposed regulations states that the proposed regulations are “consistent with international law regarding ice-covered areas.” In light of this, the United States understands that Canada considers Article 234 of the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC), entitled, “Ice-covered areas,” to provide an international legal basis for its proposed NORDREG Zone Regulations. That article provides a coastal state with authorities to adopt and enforce certain laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of its exclusive economic zone when certain conditions are met. While we appreciate Canada’s stewardship efforts in the Arctic region, we wish to take this opportunity to express our concerns that the new regulations appear to be inconsistent with international law, including LOSC Article 234. First, the regulatory impact analysis statement accompanying the proposed regulations indicates that Canadian permission would be required for foreign flagged vessels to enter and transit certain areas that are within Canada’s claimed exclusive economic zone and territorial sea and that enforcement action could include prosecution. If so, this would be a sweeping infringement of freedom of navigation within the exclusive economic zone and the right of innocent passage within the territorial sea, both of which are bedrock principles of the law of the sea. While Article 234 of the LOSC allows Coastal States to adopt and enforce certain laws and regulations in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, these laws and regulations must be for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels and have “due regard to navigation.” The United States does not believe that requiring permission to transit these areas meets the obligation set forth in Article 234 of having due regard to navigation. Second, under LOSC Article 234, laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone must also be non-discriminatory. The proposed regulations rely on Canada’s Shipping Control Act, which exempts vessels chartered to the Canadian Forces. However, it appears neither the Shipping Control Act nor the proposed regulations contain a provision for similarly-situated foreign vessels. This would be discriminatory, in contravention of LOSC Article 234. Third, while the Shipping Control Act exempts vessels belonging to a foreign military force, the proposed regulations do not appear to provide an exemption for all sovereign immune vessels, including chartered vessels carrying military supplies. However, LOSC Article 236 specifies that Article 234 is among those provisions of the Convention that “do not apply” to sovereign immune vessels. Fourth, under LOSC Article 234, laws and regulations adopted must be based on the “best available scientific evidence.” The Notice of the regulations did not refer to any scientific studies in developing the proposed regulations. The United States is interested to know the scientific evidence that was considered in the development of these proposed regulations. Article 234 is likewise limited to “ice-covered areas,” namely those areas covered by ice for “most of the year.” Recognizing that the Notice states that “ice levels have recently been observed to be at an all-time low,” the United States is likewise interested to know what information has been used to determine how this condition has been met throughout the entire area covered by the NORDREG Zone. Finally, we note that the usual process for ensuring safety of navigation and prevention of pollution from ships is to establish such measures at the International Maritime Organization (IMO). In this regard, we would like to bring to Canada’s attention relevant 1306

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provisions of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, in particular Chapter V, Regulations 10 and 11, that require mandatory ship routing and reporting systems to be submitted to the IMO for adoption. We would be interested to learn whether Canada will avail itself of such an approach. The United States would welcome the opportunity to work with Canada and with others at the IMO in this regard. The United States also reiterates its longstanding view that the Northwest Passage constitutes a strait used for international navigation. At a minimum, a measure such as the NORDREG Zone Regulations for an international strait would need to be proposed and adopted at the IMO. In conclusion, we wish to emphasize that the United States does not oppose the Government of Canada’s voluntary vessel traffic services zone and voluntary provisions for vessel registration and reporting. We likewise do not discount the need for action to protect the sensitive areas of the Arctic. The United States supports the stewardship goals of the proposed NORDREG Zone Regulations. Such proposals, however, must have a firm international legal foundation and be implemented in a manner consistent with the law of the sea. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the proposed regulations. We look forward to our continued collaboration on this and other areas of mutual interest. Sincerely, Eric Benjaminsan Minister-Counselor, Economic Energy and Environment Affairs

Document 275 Diplomatic Note from the United States to Canada regarding NORDREG (18 August 2010)* The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and has the honor to refer to the Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulations (NORDREGs) which entered into effect on May 1, 2010. The United States notes its support for the navigational safety and environmental protection objectives of NORDREGs and commends the Government of Canada for its efforts to promote the protection of the marine environment in the Arctic. As conditions in the Arctic continue to change and the volume of shipping traffic increases, Arctic coastal States need to consider ways to best protect and preserve this sensitive region. The Government of the United States of America advises, however, that it continues to be concerned that the NORDREGs are inconsistent with important law of the sea principles related to navigational rights and freedoms and recommends that the Government of Canada submit its vessel traffic services and mandatory ship reporting system to the IMO for adoption. Among our concerns, the NORDREGs purport to require Canadian permission for foreign flagged vessels to enter and transit certain areas that are within Canada’s claimed exclusive economic zone and territorial sea and that enforcement action could include * 

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prosecution. In the view of the United States, this is not consistent with navigational rights and freedoms within the exclusive economic zone, the right of innocent passage within the territorial sea, and the right of transit passage through straits used for international navigation, all of which are bedrock principles of the law of the sea. While Article 234 of the Law of the Sea Convention (the Convention) allows coastal states to adopt and enforce certain laws and regulations in ice covered areas within the limits of their exclusive economic zones, these laws and regulations must be for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels and have “due regard to navigation.” The United States does not believe that requiring permission to transit these areas meets the condition set forth in Article 234 of having due regard to navigation. Additionally, the NORDREGs do not provide express exemptions for sovereign immune vessels from the applicability and enforcement of the final regulations. While the NORDREGs note that enforcement action would be consistent with international law, the United States wishes to note that, by virtue of Article 236 of the Convention, sovereign immune vessels are immune not only from enforcement of NORDREGs but also their applicability. The United States expects that this is a matter upon which our governments agree. Finally, from a safety of navigation perspective, the United States has concerns about whether the NORDREGs vessel traffic services system is consistent with IMO guidance on the establishment of vessel traffic services. In our view, measures like those contained in NORDREGs should be proposed to and adopted by the IMO to provide a solid legal foundation and broad international acceptance. The United States would welcome the opportunity to work with Canada and with others at the IMO on this matter. The United States also reiterates its long-standing view that the Northwest Passage constitutes a strait used for international navigation. At a minimum, a measure such as the NORDREGs for an international strait would need to be proposed at and adopted by the IMO. The United States noted with concern the references to “sovereignty” in the statements accompanying the announcement of the regulations. The United States wishes to note that the NORDREGs do not, and cannot as a matter of law, increase the “sovereignty” of Canada over any territory or marine area. The Embassy of the United States of America avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade the assurances of its highest consideration.

Document 276 IMO, Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on the Canadian NORDREG reporting system [extracts only] (31 August 2010)* Canadian NORDREG reporting system 19.21 The delegation of the United States stated that, on 1 July, the Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulations had come into effect. Among other things, the new regulations contained provisions on mandatory ship reporting and the regulation of transiting vessels that, in the view of the United States, raised some critical issues with * 

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respect to consistency with international law. The United States complimented Canada’s efforts to provide for the safety of navigation and protection of the marine environment in the Arctic area. As conditions in the Arctic evolved, all Arctic coastal States would need to consider new ways to protect and preserve this sensitive region. At the same time, the United States wished to note the important role of the Organization in the development of such measures. The United States did not believe that the new Canadian northern zone regulations were consistent with key law of the sea principles related to freedom of navigation, including the right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage through straits used for international navigation. However, the United States supported the stewardship goals of the proposed Canadian NORDREG Zone Regulations. In the view of the United States, Arctic coastal States should propose such measures to the Organization to receive the most solid foundation for them, rather than act unilaterally. The United States welcomed the opportunity to work with Canada and with others on this issue within the Organization. 19.22 The delegation of Canada stated that pursuant to Canada’s Northern Strategy for enhancing their stewardship in the Arctic, Canada had replaced its voluntary Arctic reporting system, which had been in place for over 30 years, with a mandatory reporting system. At the same time, it had also formally established the vessel traffic services zone that covered the reporting area, known as NORDREG. Regulations giving effect to these changes had come into force on 1 July 2010. The reporting area covered Canada’s northern waters out to the limit of its Exclusive Economic Zone. As provided for in SOLAS regulation V/11.4, Canada intended, in the near future, to submit to the Organization details of the reporting system for recognition and dissemination. The purpose of the new regulations was to promote safe and efficient navigation and protect the Arctic marine environment. The Marine Communication and Traffic Services of the Canadian Coast Guard provided information that contributed to onboard navigational decision-making, including up-to-date ice routeing information and conditions, and icebreaker assistance. The information from vessel reports and the communication link between vessel traffic services and the vessel were critical to preventing accidents and responding effectively to emergencies including search and rescue and pollution response. The Regulations were consistent with international law. In particular, Article 234 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provides that “Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone”. Moreover, not only are the regulations consistent with SOLAS V, regulations V/11 and V/12, the reporting requirements and format were based on accepted international guidelines for ship reporting systems. 19.23 The BIMCO observer stated that they fully acknowledged the particularly sensitive nature of the Arctic as well as its strategic importance and understood the background for Canada’s overall wish for the Arctic marine environment to be properly protected. In February 2010, BIMCO had provided comments on the proposed Canadian Regulation relating to the Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone. BIMCO had noted that reporting requirements would be based on international principles for ship reporting systems consistent with international law regarding ice-covered areas. In this respect, the consultation undertaken on the proposed regulation appeared to have focused exclusively on national entities and BIMCO found it was relevant to provide input from a global industry perspective. BIMCO had expressed concern that the informal 1309

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NORDREG zone would be made mandatory and extended to 200 nautical miles. As a consequence, vessels of the prescribed classes would be required to obtain clearance for the NORDREG zone and to make reports. A decision would be taken whether clearance should be granted and, without clearance, a vessel would not be authorized to proceed. The risk of not being granted authorization to proceed in case of non-compliance caused concern, as this could be seen as effectively interfering with the right to innocent passage. From BIMCO’s perspective, it would have been desirable if the regulation had been brought forward for evaluation in the Sub-Committee. 19.24 The Sub-Committee took note of the information provided.

Document 277 IMO, Safety of Navigation. Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulation, Comments submitted by the United States and INTERTANKO (22 September 2010)* […] Introduction 1. On 1 July 2010, the Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulations entered into effect. The regulations require certain foreign-flagged ships to register with and report to the Canadian Coast Guard if entering into and while transiting through Canadian-claimed Arctic waters. The regulations require clearance before entering into the claimed territorial sea and exclusive economic zone. Failure to comply with the regulations could result in criminal enforcement action and the imposition of a severe fine. At NAV 56, concerns were expressed that the provisions on mandatory ship reporting and regulation of transiting vessels raised some critical issues with respect to consistency with international law. 2. The co-sponsors support Canada’s intention to provide for the safety of navigation and protection of the marine environment in the Arctic area. As conditions in the Arctic evolve, all Arctic coastal states will need to consider ways to protect and preserve this region. At the same time, the co-sponsors wish to note the important role of the Organization in the development of such measures. In the view of the co-sponsors, Arctic coastal States should propose such measures to the Organization to receive the most solid foundation for them, rather than act unilaterally. Concerns about mandatory ship reporting 3. Setting aside its obligatory nature, SOLAS regulation V/11 provides a practical process for establishing mandatory reporting for international shipping. In particular, resolution A.851(20) and MSC/Circ.1060 should be observed before a new reporting system is proposed. Had these regulations followed the usual course, they would have been submitted to the Sub-Committee on Safety of Navigation for consideration within the Ships’ Routeing Working Group. The existing process that provides for the proposed system to then be submitted to the Committee with normally a 6-month waiting period * 

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before becoming effective is also important to ensure ship operating companies and nautical charts and publications are appropriately updated. As the NORDREG mandatory ship reporting system was not submitted to the Organization, this means that it is neither adopted nor recognized by the Organization in accordance with SOLAS chapter V. Concerns about the Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) Zone 4. The regulations purport to establish a vessel traffic services zone whose consistency with current guidance on the establishment and implementation of a VTS is unclear and possibly in violation of SOLAS regulation V/12.3. The zone extends to the limits of the Canadian-claimed exclusive economic zone. Because SOLAS regulation V/12.3 provides that use of a VTS may only be made mandatory in sea areas within the territorial sea of a coastal state, the confusion as to the geographic limits of this zone creates uncertainty as to whether it is intended to be mandatory or voluntary. If compliance is intended to be mandatory, it exceeds the coastal State’s authority in SOLAS regulation V/12.3; if it is intended to be merely voluntary, it contains provisions that in the English text are inconsistent with that intention. 5. In areas outside the territorial sea of a coastal State, the Organization is recognized as the only international body for developing guidelines, criteria and regulations on an international level for ships’ routeing. The Organization achieves this through the adoption of ships’ routeing systems and/or ship reporting systems. Additional guidance provided by IALA Guideline No. 1071, identifies the following three methods to achieve a Vessel Traffic Service beyond territorial seas or in international straits: the voluntary use of VTS, approval under SOLAS regulation V/12, or approval under SOLAS regulation V/11. The Organization’s Guidelines and Criteria for Ship Reporting Systems recognize that an adopted ship reporting system may or may not be operated as part of a vessel traffic service. In this instance, none of the options listed in IALA Guideline No. 1071 appears to have been selected. 6. Also, in planning and establishing a VTS, the Contracting Government should ensure that a legal basis for the operation of a VTS is provided for and that the VTS is operated in accordance with national and international law. Key parts of the Organization’s Guidelines for Vessel Traffic Services, resolution A.857(20), reflect that a VTS information service ensures that essential information becomes available in time for on-board navigational decision-making; the efficiency of a VTS will depend on the reliability and continuity of communications, and on the ability to provide sound and unambiguous information. As well, the VTS should have the capability to interact with the traffic and to respond to traffic situations developing in the VTS area. 7. It is unclear what type of VTS is established by the regulations. The regulations provide that vessels require “traffic clearance”, and that sailing plans are “required before entering the area”. This would suggest that the VTS scheme is for a Traffic Organization Service (TOS) which the IALA guidance considers to be an advanced level of VTS. As reflected in that guidance: “A Traffic Organisation Service provides essential and timely information to assist the on-board decision-making process. It may involve the provision of information, advice and instructions. Traffic Organisation concerns the forward planning of movements to maintain vessel safety and to achieve efficiency. This service may involve: –– The position, identity, intention and destination of vessels; –– Amendments and changes in promulgated information concerning the VTS area such as boundaries, procedures, radio frequencies, reporting points; 1311

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The mandatory reporting of movements; Information such as meteorological and hydrological conditions, notices to mariners, status of aids to navigation; –– Specific information such as traffic congestion and special vessels with limited manoeuvrability which may impose restrictions on the navigation of other vessels or any other potential hindrances; –– The allocation of water space; –– Establishing and operating a system of traffic clearances—all or certain classes of vessels may be required to participate in this service and shall not proceed without clearance; –– Establishing routes to be followed and speed limits to be observed and such other measures as may be considered necessary and appropriate by the VTS; –– Specific information, such as traffic congestion and advice about vessels with VTS sailing/route plans. These are an instrument of traffic organisation and the ability of a VTS to contribute to vessel safety. It is a major source of information to the VTS. The category of vessels for which a VTS sailing plan is compulsory and the details required should be clearly identified. A VTS sailing plan normally includes the intended route, the estimated time of arrival in the VTS area or the departure from a berth or an anchorage in the VTS area. It may also take into account the general flow of traffic, efficiency and co-ordination with allied services.” 8. The foregoing is critical since it relates to the level of service to be anticipated in this apparently mandatory zone, and there appears to be a good deal of uncertainty about that level. There is no information available of the VTS training provided to those personnel providing VTS services, such as the IALA-recommended V-103/1 which is an essential minimum requirement for operating a TOS. In NORDREG’s delivery of VTS services, it is uncertain whether these personnel appear to be communications operators only, and the level of suitable training for domain awareness, traffic clearances or providing advice on passage planning and routeing is similarly uncertain. 9. Additionally, to provide a TOS, a VTS requires coherent and effective radar, AIS and radio coverage of the area being monitored. Without additional information, it is difficult to envisage how comprehensive radar coverage over the extensive zone area can be provided for traffic identification and situational/domain awareness. 10. Given the foregoing, it is unclear whether these mandatory requirements are consistent with the provisions of SOLAS chapter V and related guidance and other relevant instruments and whether they serve the objectives outlined therein. The Committee may wish to seek clarification of these important points because confusion thereon can lead to expectations on the part of international shipping that would result in unsafe navigation conditions. Pending further action on these issues, and recognizing in principle the potential benefits of the regulations, the Committee should: 1. determine that the Canadian system is not established in accordance with applicable IMO requirements for the establishment of mandatory ship reporting and vessel traffic services systems; 2. recommend that Member Governments encourage ships entitled to fly their flag to provide the reports and other information set forth in the regulations on a voluntary basis; and 3. request that Canada submit an appropriate proposal to the Committee if it wishes to make its ship reporting and vessel traffic services systems mandatory. 1312

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Action requested of the Committee 11. The Committee is invited to note the above information, including the proposal in paragraph 10, and take action as appropriate.

Document 278 IMO, Safety of Navigation. Comments on document MSC 88/11/2 submitted by Canada (5 October 2010)* Background 1. Article 234 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (UNCLOS) codifies special rights and responsibilities of Arctic coastal states, with respect to the preservation of the marine environment in ice-covered areas. During negotiations, Canada played a central role in advocating for an article to be included that would recognize the rights of coastal states to protect the fragile marine environment in ice-covered areas. Canada had already enacted, in 1970, the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act which was aimed at preventing pollution of its Arctic waters. Consistent with Article 234, NORDREG promotes safe and efficient navigation in Arctic waters for the protection of the marine environment. 2. Despite reduced summer sea ice in recent years, the area is subject to extreme variability in severity and duration of sea ice. Potentially greater quantities of old ice will be more mobile, drifting into shipping areas and contributing to hazardous choke points. Mariners in northern waters will continue to be confronted by a wide range of unpredictable ice conditions creating significant navigational challenges. The probability of an incident and the associated risk of environmental damage increases with traffic. A mandatory system reflects these ongoing hazards and is consistent with Canada’s Northern Strategy for enhancing stewardship in the region. 3. Enacted 30 years ago as a voluntary ship reporting system (SRS), NORDREG continues to be critical to preventing accidents and responding effectively to emergencies including prompt pollution response and search and rescue as required. Recent events have strongly reinforced NORDREG’s critical role in responding to emergencies. Despite the changing ice conditions, these reporting areas still satisfy the condition under Article 234 that ice cover be present for most of the year which creates exceptional hazards to navigation. 4. Following up on a commitment at NAV 56, Canada has recently submitted NORDREG to the IMO for recognition and dissemination as per SOLAS regulation V/11.4. To date, mariners have been advised through notices to shipping, notices to mariners and through the VTS, as appropriate. Comments 5. The following addresses MSC 88/11/2 and the United States and BIMCO’s concerns from NAV 56: 1. International law authority for implementing NORDREG Article 234 of UNCLOS provides for the right of coastal States to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of * 

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marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Article 234 permits States to enact these laws and regulations without seeking prior IMO approval. Accompanying the right to enact such laws is a general obligation under Article 192 to protect and preserve the marine environment. Article 234 can be compared and contrasted with other provisions in the Convention dealing with the protection of the marine environment such as Article 211, paragraphs 5 and 6 which require the coastal State to conform to “generally accepted international rules and standards established through the competent international organization”. In contrast, no such requirement is included in Article 234, which establishes its own sui generis code for appropriate unilateral coastal State measures. Article 234 overrides Article 211 in ice-covered areas. The uniqueness of Article 234 is apparent by the fact that it was not included within other sections dealing with the protection of the marine environment; rather, it stands distinct, as the only Article in Section 8 of Part XII. Article 234 provides a complete legal justification in international law for NORDREG. Further, NORDREG is consistent with SOLAS chapter V, regulation 11.4 that provides that “Ship reporting systems not submitted to the Organization for adoption do not necessarily need to comply with this regulation” and regulation 12 which provides that “use of VTS may only be made mandatory in sea areas within the territorial sea”, qualified by “nothing in this regulation shall prejudice the rights and duties of governments under international law…”. Canada’s rights and duties under Article 234 of UNCLOS take precedence over the 12NM limitation. 2. Due regard to navigation NORDREG promotes safe and efficient navigation and the protection of the marine environment. Thus, clearance and reporting requirements are not inconsistent with the obligation to give due regard to navigation. That NORDREG does not unduly restrict navigation is evident from the high level of compliance with NORDREG when it was voluntary. Further, as discussed above, Article 234 enables coastal States to impose more stringent requirements than set out in SOLAS. To suggest that due regard to navigation requires States to follow the usual rules relating to navigation within the exclusive economic zone, would defeat the purpose of Article 234. 3. Vessel Traffic Services The Canadian Coast Guard—Marine Communications and Traffic Services (CCG MCTS) provides both VTS and maritime distress and safety services in the NORDREG zone. The VTS follows the IMO Guidelines and Criteria for VTS (IMO resolution A857(20)), as well as the International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities (IALA) Recommendations and Guidelines. The SRS requirements are consistent with IMO resolution 851(20) concerning the IMO general principles for SRS. With respect to training, CCG MCTS personnel are trained and certified in accordance with IALA Recommendation V103 “Standards for Training and Certification of VTS personnel”. 6. NORDREG comprises both a coastal VTS information service, to ensure that essential information becomes available in time for on-board navigational decision-making, and a traffic organization service. Services provided in the NORDREG Zone are as follows: (a) Information Service (INS) –– broadcasting any amendments and changes in promulgated information concerning the VTS area; 1314

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ensuring that vessels, on a mandatory basis, report vessel movement (sail plan report, position report, final report; and deviation report); and –– providing meteorological and navigational information to ships (navigational warnings, ice information and ice routeing information and meteorological conditions). (b) Traffic Organization Service (TOS) –– position, identity, intention and destination of vessels; –– specific information such as ice routeing and contingency measures; and –– establishing and operating a system of traffic clearances for certain classes of vessels. (c) Ice Related Services –– NORDREG VTS includes the dissemination of up-to-date information on ice conditions, advice on routes, aids to navigation, icebreaker support when available and considered necessary, and organization of convoys as required by prevailing navigational conditions. 7. Traffic clearance from CCG MCTS is required before entering the zone, before departure and before getting underway after an incident. The clearance ensures CCG MCTS has a comprehensive picture of vessels operating in the zone, can assess the vessel’s compliance with Canada’s 1970 Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, can relay relevant safety and ice information to the vessel for its transit, taking into account prevailing conditions, and to allow any safety and environmental concerns to be addressed as early as possible. 8. The MCTS centre is equipped to provide the INS and TOS services. Communications coverage throughout the NORDREG Zone is accomplished by utilizing two different systems, Inmarsat and MF, HF and VHF radiocommunications. The VTS communications systems have backup systems. Furthermore, a VTS traffic image is represented on a traffic situation and information display. 9. Recalling that this VTS service has been in operation for 30 years, Canada considers that there should be no confusion now as to the level of service that could lead to expectations on the part of the shipping industry that would result in unsafe navigation conditions. Enforcement 10 The objective of the system is to support safe and efficient navigation and the protection of the marine environment through the exchange of information between ship and shore. MCTS will use all means to encourage and promote full participation of vessels required to submit reports. In response to non-compliance, Canada will take appropriate action consistent with international law, including, if deemed necessary, requesting the vessel leave Canadian waters or EEZ, contacting the flag State, or, prosecution in accordance with Canadian law. Sovereign immunity 11. Pursuant to Article 236 of UNCLOS, States must ensure that their vessels which enjoy sovereign immunity from the provisions of the Convention regarding the protection and preservation of the marine environment, shall act in a manner consistent, so far as is reasonable and practicable, with the Convention. As such, sovereign immune vessels are requested to voluntarily comply with NORDREG. 1315

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Recommendation 12. Recognizing the rights and duties of States, established under Article 234 of UNCLOS, to take measures for the prevention of marine pollution from vessels in icecovered waters, and that NORDREG helps to ensure safe navigation and protection of the marine environment in Canada’s ice-covered waters, Canada recommends that the Committee support Canada’s initiative. Action requested of the Committee 13 The Committee is invited to consider the above submission and, in particular, the recommendation in paragraph 12 and take action accordingly.

Document 279 IMO, Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Eighty-Eighty Session on the Canadian NORDREG reporting system [extracts only] (15 December 2010)* 11.28 The Committee noted that, on 1 July 2010, the Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulations had entered into effect. The regulations required certain ships to register with and report to the Canadian Coast Guard when entering into and while transiting through the area, and failure to comply with the regulations could result in criminal enforcement action and the imposition of a severe fine. At NAV 56, the United States and BIMCO had expressed concerns that the provisions on mandatory ship reporting and regulation of transiting vessels raised some critical issues with respect to consistency with international law. 11.29 The Committee also noted that, at NAV 56, the delegation of the United States had brought to the attention of the Sub-Committee the issue of coming into force of the Zone regulations. The delegation of Canada had explained its rationale for establishing the mandatory ship reporting system and also stated that Canada intended, in the near future, to submit to the Organization details of the reporting system for recognition and dissemination. On its part, the BIMCO observer had outlined its members’ concerns from a global industry perspective. NAV 56 had noted the information provided by the United States, Canada and BIMCO. 11.30 The Committee further noted that, on 30 September 2010, the Secretariat had received details of the mandatory Canadian Ship Reporting System in Canada’s Northern waters (NORDREG) for recognition under SOLAS regulation V/11.4 and issued the corresponding SN.1/Circ.291. 11.31 The Committee considered document MSC 88/11/2 (United States and INTERTANKO), expressing maritime safety concerns over the recently established Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone. 11.32 The delegation of the United States, in introducing the document, commended Canada on its desire to improve marine safety and environmental protection in the Arctic waters off its coast; however, the delegation had a number of serious marine safety concerns related to the recent enactment of Canada’s NORDREG mandatory ship

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reporting and VTS system requirements, which had been done without referring the regulations to this Organization for adoption. Such unilateral action was not consistent with the normal practice of IMO, and was contrary to both the letter and spirit of SOLAS. The NORDREG, as the United States understood it, conditioned entry into Canada’s claimed territorial sea and EEZ on mandatory ship reporting of certain information from covered vessels—essentially all non-sovereign immune ships. It was not clear from the NORDREG or the other information provided by Canada that it complied with the communications capability guidelines or the operator training and proficiency skill sets set forth in the Organization’s or IALA’s guidelines for the development and implementation of a control VTS. That participation was mandatory for ships seeking to enter and transit claimed Canada’s EEZ was also problematic under SOLAS regulation V/12. IMO was the only international body competent to develop guidelines and criteria for regulations of ship reporting systems on an international level, and SOLAS did not permit unilateral adoption of this kind of mandatory ship reporting system. SOLAS regulation V/11.2 required that Contracting Governments shall refer proposals for the adoption of ship reporting systems to the Organization. Additionally, SOLAS also provided that a Contracting Government’s VTS might only be made mandatory in that State’s territorial sea. SOLAS regulations V/11 and V/12 were very clear in that respect. The United States submission had requested a declaration from the Committee that the NORDREG was not consistent with the requirements of SOLAS chapter V for a mandatory ship reporting system, and for vessel traffic services. In conclusion, the United States reiterated its desire to work co-operatively with Canada and others in the Organization on the adoption, by the Organization, of a mandatory ship reporting system and VTS system, to be proposed by Canada, that was consistent with SOLAS and the other guidelines of the Organization. In the meantime, the Committee might wish to urge IMO Member States to encourage ships entitled to fly their flag to provide the requested information voluntarily to Canada. 11.33 The Committee considered document MSC 88/11/3 (Canada) submitting its comments with respect to document MSC 88/11/2 concerning Canada’s Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulations (NORDREG). 11.34 The delegation of Canada stated that it had submitted the particulars of the NORDREG regime to IMO for recognition and dissemination (SN.1/Circ.291) and that NORDREG was consistent with international law including UNCLOS and SOLAS, and conformed to all relevant IMO resolutions. Enacted 30 years ago as a voluntary SRS, Canada had instituted NORDREG as a mandatory system taking into account new and ongoing navigation hazards, with the purpose to prevent pollution in the ice-covered NORDREG Zone and to promote safe and efficient navigation. Clearance was an integral requirement to ensure that vessels navigating these hazardous waters did so safely without unduly endangering the fragile marine environment. Article 234 of UNCLOS provided for the right of coastal States to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the Exclusive Economic Zone, permitting these States to enact these laws and regulations without seeking prior IMO approval—even where IMO had related regulations. NORDREG was also consistent with SOLAS, since regulation 11.4 of SOLAS chapter V clearly contemplated that submission of ship reporting systems for adoption was not required in all cases and, furthermore, regulation V/11.9 specified that “nothing in this regulation or its associated guidelines and criteria shall prejudice the 1317

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rights and duties of Governments under international law.” Regarding VTS, the limit of regulation V/12 to territorial seas was qualified by regulation V/12.5 which provided that “nothing in this regulation or the guidelines adopted by the Organization shall prejudice the rights and duties of Governments under international law”. The delegation stated that Canada’s rights and duties under Article 234 of UNCLOS took precedence over regulations V/11 and V/12, as clearly established in both regulations and that NORDREG followed the relevant IMO guidelines and criteria for VTS (resolution A.857(20)) and conformed with IALA recommendations and guidelines. NORDREG VTS personnel were trained and certified in accordance with IALA Recommendation V103 “Standards for Training and Certification of VTS personnel”. The delegation requested the Committee to support Canada’s NORDREG initiative. The full text of the statement of the delegation of Canada is set out in annex 27. 11.35 The delegation of Germany stated that it shared the views and concerns expressed by the United States and INTERTANKO regarding the recently-established northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulations (NORDREG). However, Germany also supported Canada’s intention to provide for the safety of navigation and protection of the marine environment in the Arctic area and was of the view that it was of great importance to submit any appropriate proposals for new routeing measures to the Organization before implementing them. Germany emphasized that the Organization was the only competent organization for the adoption of ships routeing measures, as explicitly addressed in the SOLAS Convention, such as mandatory ship reporting systems and vessel traffic services. It was the view of the German delegation that the establishment of mandatory ship reporting systems and the introduction of vessel traffic services should follow the well functioning and worldwide accepted procedures of the SOLAS Convention, relevant resolutions and associated circulars, not only for legal and practical reasons, but also in the interest of the shipping industry to obtain a clear understanding of the new proposed systems, by making use of the expertise of the Ships’ Routeing Working Group of the NAV Sub-Committee. Therefore, Germany invited Canada to submit appropriate proposals to the Organization for consideration and adoption. 11.36 The delegation of Singapore, in supporting Canada’s intention to uphold the safety of navigation and to protect the marine environment in the Arctic region, also recognized the need and importance for any proposed measure to be consistent with international law, including UNCLOS, and to follow the regulations and guidelines adopted by IMO. The delegation was of the view that, as a best practice, Member Governments should follow IMO’s guidelines on the preparation and submission of proposals on ship reporting systems for adoption, and encouraged Canada to do the same. The delegation further stated that it was important to ensure that any measures taken did not compromise the freedom of navigation and that it was not clear how the NORDREG’s proposed requirement for clearance would adequately give “due regard to navigation”, as provided for in UNCLOS. The full text of the statement of the delegation of Singapore is set out in annex 28. 11.37 The Committee had an extensive debate and a number of delegations spoke on this issue. Some delegations were of the view that for the adoption of a mandatory ship reporting system and establishment of Vessel Traffic Services (VTS), the widely accepted SOLAS procedures including the associated guidelines should be followed. Other delegations were of the view that the issue was much wider and was not within the remit of the NAV Sub-Committee, the Committee or even the Organization itself. 1318

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11.38 The delegation of the United States stated that they had listened carefully to the interventions made and it was their opinion that the majority of those who spoke had favoured the position expressed in document MSC 88/11/2, namely that the Canadian NORDREG system had not been established in accordance with applicable IMO requirements for the establishment of mandatory ship reporting systems and vessel traffic services. With respect to the recognition and dissemination of Canada’s NORDREG system through the circulation of SN.1/Circ.291, the United States understood that recognition, as provided in SOLAS regulation V/11.4, was not an assessment by the Organization of the legitimacy of the system or the validity of its legal basis. This was even more the case as the Committee had decided that the matter was not under the purview of the NAV Sub-Committee or the Committee. 11.39 The Chairman, in his summing up, stated that: 1. two relevant documents had been submitted containing the essence of the issues; 2. the documents had highlighted the "ongoing" bilateral discussions; 3. essentially, this was a legal issue and whilst appreciating suggestions to refer the matter to the NAV Sub-Committee, this was not under the purview of the NAV Sub-Committee or the Committee; 4. there were existing guidelines regarding adoption of a mandatory ship reporting system and establishment of Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) and States were encouraged to follow those guidelines; and 5. a majority of delegations had expressed appreciation for Canada’s effort while a number expressed the view that Canada should have submitted its proposal to the Organization.

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Document 280 Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on Measures for Securing the Implementation of the Edict of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet of 26 November 1984 “On Intensifying Nature Protection in Areas of the Extreme North and Marine Areas Adjacent to the Northern Coast of the U.S.S.R.” (1 June 1990)*

*  An unofficial English translation was provided by E Franckx, L Voronin and M Shkabardnia, ‘USSR Nature Protection in the Arctic: A New Soviet Legislative Initiative’ (1986) 6 International Journal of Estuarine & Coastal Law 377, 379–383. At the time of writing this legal act has not been revoked. Permission to reprint this translation could not be obtained.

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International (Draft) Treaties Document 281 Lapp Codicil, Supplement to the Frontier Treaty between the Kingdoms of Norway and Sweden concerning the Lapps [unofficial translation] (21 September/2 October 1751)* In order that the customary transfrontier movements of the Lapps and the payments therefor and the jurisdiction over the foreign Lapps during the mentioned transfrontier movement period hereafter shall give no cause for dispute and misunderstanding, and so that one may know clearly who will be known hereafter as Norwegian or Swedish Lapps, as well as how one shall reciprocally associate with them in all matters, the Commissioners mentioned in the above Frontier Treaty and signatories here have agreed on certain hereto related items as follows: Article 1 The new Norwegian Lapp tax, which since the year 1742 and during the time of this Frontier Commission has been levied, at certain places in the county of Nordland, on Lapps under Swedish ecclesiastical and civil jurisdiction, and the thereby introduced summer-land rents and conveyances to the mentioned Lapps for a yearly tax, shall, as conflicting with some of the below-mentioned agreed clauses and contributing to new incorrectness in the Lapp Administration, be abolished and cease, whereas such measures as are noted in various places hereunder shall be implemented. Article 2 No Lapp shall hereafter own tax-land or leaseholds in more than one country, in order that all occasion for community of subjects and land be avoided. Article 3 As the mountain ridge has been determined as the frontier as from Bøgefjell to Bonnræsfjell, in the beginning of the county of Nordland, and between the bailiff (Norwegian = fogd, at the time of the codicil: tax collector, prosecuting authority and head of police) district of Helgeland on the Norwegian side and the Lapp lands of Andermanland and Uma on the Swedish side, thereby causing the loss on both sides of the old tax-land and the subjects which have hitherto lived in the area stretching across the mountain ridge, it is agreed, with effect as from now, that the Lapps with their families who are at present owning tax-land on the Swedish side of the frontier shall be considered as Swedish subjects and owe allegiance to the same side, irrespective of from which side they have previously leased the same tax-lands and to which side they have paid tax thereof; as the Lapps with their families which at present possess old leaseholds on the Norwegian side of the frontier at the same places likewise shall belong to Norway.

*  Done at Stmmstedt, 21 September/2 October 1751; the original version is reprinted in Norges Lover 1687–2014 (Bergen, Fagbokforlage, 2015) 29–32. This translation is retrieved from the Arctic Centre, http://www.arcticcentre. org/EN/research/Projects-and-Research-Networks/networks/arctic-law/Publications.

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Article 4 If any Lapp is found at present to have an old Norwegian or Swedish summer tax-land, which is a land for which tax has been paid to Norway or Sweden prior to 1742, he shall be free to choose the side of which he wants to be the subject hereafter, all as far as he does not own winter tax-land on either side. If he owns winter tax-land on either side, Swedish or Norwegian, then he belongs to the side on which territory he owns such winter tax-land. Article 5 If on the stretch between Bonnesfjell and Halde, where the frontier of Kautokeino starts, that is on the Norwegian side: all of Salten, Senja and part of Troms bailiff districts of the county of Nordland, and on the Swedish side all of Pita and Lulla and a part of Toore Lapp lands, any Lapp is found to own such summer tax-land on the Norwegian side of the frontier for which tax has been paid to Norway before 1742 but at the same time to own winter tax-land on the Swedish side of the frontier, then he shall be free to choose whether he wants to be a Norwegian or Swedish subject hereafter, keeping for all future the taxland he owns on the same side of the frontier, but losing the tax-land he has owned on the other side of the frontier. Article 6 To ensure that it be known who are Norwegian or Swedish subjects, the free choice of the Lapps mentioned in Articles 4 and 5 above shall be made during the setting of the frontier cairns, in the presence of the officials appointed to stake the frontier, as soon as possible, without any impediment, allurement, or inducement, serving of liquor and presenting of gifts, promise of easier taxation, or any other cajolery which private landowners on either side could attempt, so that they may have an entirely free and unrestrained choice. Article 7 The Lapps thus being found, when this Convention has been implemented, to have both summer and winter tax-land, or one or the other: those having either summer or winter tax-land on the Swedish side of the frontier, shall, with their family, that is children or those who are in the place of children, such as foster children and relatives being part of one and the same food community, as well as servants and cotters, be considered to be Swedish subjects. The same is also to be understood concerning the Lapps with families who have old leaseholds on the Norwegian side of the frontier. By this one shall hereafter be able to determine of which side he is the subject, and no Lapp may have tax-land or leaseholds on both sides or in other ways acquire it except as provided in this Convention. Article 8 If any Lapp marries a Norwegian Lapp wife, who has her own tax-land in Norway or has more reindeer than he has, he is free to become a Norwegian Lapp without any impediment or taxation of his property. He shall then report to the Swedish bailiff and prove these circumstances, whereupon the bailiff shall grant him a written permission for transference and note the same in the tax register and delete him from the Swedish tax record. The same shall apply to a Norwegian Lapp in identical cases. Under other circumstances the wife shall follow the husband. 1324

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Article 9 If a Lapp wants to leave his country and become the subject of another state, the same procedure shall apply to him as to other Norwegian and Swedish subjects in identical cases: he shall pay 6th and 10th money of all his property to the side which he wants to leave and bring with him to the side to which he wants to move proof that he has paid his duty and obtained permission to leave. Article 10 As the Lapps might need the land of both states, they shall, according to old practice, each autumn and spring be allowed to move with their flocks of reindeer across the frontier into the other state. They shall hereafter as before, in the same way as the subjects of the state, except at such places as described below, be allowed to use land and shore for the subsistence of their animals and themselves and they shall be received in a friendly manner and be protected and helped to adapt, even in times of war, which shall not make any difference in the Lapp Administration whatsoever. And least of all should the foreign Lapps be exposed to the looting or any sort of the coercion and violence occurring at times of war, but always be considered and administered as subjects of the side where they are staying as foreigners. Article 11 No Lapp who needs to move with his animals across the frontier must in times of war commit any act of hostility; if he is found to do so, he shall not be treated according to wartime practice, but be punished as if his crime had been committed in peaceful times. Article 12 Where there are protected hunting grounds for seal and bird nesting cliffs on the Norwegian side for which certain subjects are paying annual taxes, it shall be prohibited for the Swedish Lapps, under such punishment as is provided by Norwegian law for Norwegian subjects, to hunt or in any other way cause damage. In all other places they shall be entitled to such hunting and all other hunting and fishing in the same way as Norwegian subjects; and the Norwegian Lapps shall also have the same freedom on the Lapp lands on the Swedish side. Article 13 Swedish Lapps who wish to move with their animals across the frontier, but without having access to the sea or the fiords and there do any fishing or seal-hunting, shall pay a rent for each twentieth animal in their train, large and small of both sexes, except for calves born the same spring, which shall nor be counted: one Danish shilling or one Swedish styver in copper coins and nothing more. If they fish or use the hunting grounds for seal in the sea or the fiords on the Norwegian side, they shall pay for each twentieth animal the double of what is determined above, that is 2 Danish shillings or 2 Swedish styvers in copper coins, all while not counting the spring calves of the same year. Nothing more must be taken from the Swedish Lapps, no matter under what name or appearance, neither must they be charged to do any personal work or service. Article 14 Norwegian Lapps who in the autumn are moving with their animals across the frontier to the Swedish side shall pay a rent for each twentieth animal in their train, large and 1325

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small of both sexes, including spring calves of the same year, two Danish shillings or two Swedish styvers in copper coins, as these Lapps will remain there for the main part of the year and the spring calves at that time need the same subsistence as the other animals. Should they also want to use the fisheries and hunting grounds in the Lapp lands, they shall pay twice as much, that is 4 Danish shilling or 4 styver in copper coins. Nothing more must be taken from the Norwegian Lapps no matter under what name or appearance, neither must they be charged to do any personal service or work. Article 15 For each district where there are Lapps moving across the frontier there shall be appointed a lensman for the Lapps (a lensman was a local official representing the bailiff) and two jurors (sworn laymen selected to judge cases concerning real estate and “life and honour” cases jointly with the professional judge[s]) who shall not pay anything for their transfrontier movement. Article 16 The Lapp lensman and the jurors shall reciprocally see to it that the Lapps moving across the frontier have sufficient subsistence for their animals, but provided, however, that the Lapps who are paying taxes for the land shall not themselves be superseded by the foreign Lapps and suffer distress. For this purpose the Lapp lensmen and the jurors should be well acquainted with the nature of the tax-lands at the side of these Lapps and also know the number of animals owned by the Lapps paying tax for the land so that the foreign Lapps, if necessary and on request, may be allotted suitable areas. The foreign Lapps on both sides shall take strict care during their transfrontier movement travels not to cause any damage, neither winter nor summer, to the proper inhabitants of the country or to forests, fields or grasslands, cloudberry bogs or anything else, subject to punishment under the law, and any damage shall be compensated immediately according to assessment by impartial men. Article 17 Before any Lapp, Norwegian or Swedish, moves across the frontier with his animals, he shall declare to his own Lapp lensman and jurors the number of animals in his train, that is the number of his own animals as well as of the animals belonging to his children, servants and cotters, and present the rent to the mentioned lensman against documentation for the declaration as well as for the payment of the rent. He shall also at the same time declare whether he will be using the fisheries and the hunting grounds, whereupon the rent shall be computed and payed and noted on the declaration and the documentation. With this mentioned documentation he may subsequently cross and return without impediment and further questioning. Article 18 Before the Lapp lensmen with their Lapps cross the frontier, they shall render to the Lapp lensmen of the other side a specified inventory of the tax-Lapps and the animals of their districts that will cross the frontier that year. At the same time the rent shall be presented to the mentioned foreign Lapp lensmen against documentation of the inventory and payment concerned. For want of Lapp lensmen who can receive the mentioned documentation and payment from the foreign side, he or they who are entitled to the rent 1326

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shall appoint a representative who shall be staying at the most suitable place possible, that is in the Lapp parish situated the closest to the frontier on the Swedish side and on the Norwegian side by one of the closest lakes and on the main-land. Article 19 If so requested, the Lapps shall be obliged once every year but not more often, to produce before the Lapp lensmen of the territory to which the rent is belonging, or to whoever the owner of the rent appoints in writing, all the animals which are in their train and let them be counted as proof of the correctness of their declaration. If they refuse to do so or if they treat the person mentioned badly in word or deed, then a Swedish Lapp shall, just for his refractoriness, be fined the first time 12 dalers of silver coins, and a Norwegian Lapp 4 Danish rigsdalers, half of it to the so injured persons and the other half to the Crown. For each time such a crime is committed the punishment shall be doubled; if the Lapp uses violence against the persons concerned further than can be considered as simple refractoriness, he shall in addition be punished therefore according to the law. Article 20 If any Lapp, Norwegian or Swedish, is found fraudulently to have declared the number of his animals in such a way that he has 20 animals more and above compared with what has been declared, he shall pay for each twentieth animal of the whole herd two times the amount prescribed above. If he is found to have committed such falsity a second time, he shall pay twice as much as the first time and so on, so that the punishment shall be doubled each time, all in equal parts to the informant and the owner of the rent. For want of an informant, the owner of the rent keeps all. Article 21 If the Lapp lensmen or the jurors are found to have colluded with the Lapps in their false declarations, or if they have falsified their own inventory and kept some of the rent that they have collected, they shall pay three times as much as the person in question has been or could have been swindled for, one half to the informant and the other half to he or they to whom the rent belongs. The second time they shall be removed from their office and be treated as thieves. Article 22 Disputes occurring between Lapps from the same side, concerning either their transfrontier movements and the place where they intend to stay during the time of their transfrontier movement, or being about missing reindeer, fighting, small debts that do not exceed 12 dalers of silver coins or 4 Danish rigsdalers, all divisions of the estates of deceased persons or other minor matters concerning the Lapp Administration in particular and the customs of the Lapps, can, if reconciliation cannot be obtained, be decided immediately by the same side's Lapp lensman and his two jurors, and if the person concerned does not want to appeal to the district court, be executed at the same place, irrespective of the territory on which the fact has occurred or where the case was instituted. If, however, such cases occur between parties of separate nations or between a Norwegian and a Swedish Lapp, it is due to the plaintiff's lensman and jurors to judge immediately, irrespective of jus territorii, and to execute the judgment, if it is not being appealed against, but so that two jurors from the side of the defendant shall join the 1327

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bench and that the Lapp lensman of the defendant, as his defense counsel, shall have the right to be present in court if requested, all without payment to the officials concerned in both cases. If one of the parties is dissatisfied with the doings of this Lapp court, and wants to take the matter further, appeal shall be made to the district or municipal court on whose territory the fact has occurred or, in the case of a distribution of the estate of a deceased person, where the deceased belonged in his lifetime. Article 23 All other cases between Lapps, whether from one and the same nation or from separate nations, fall under the ordinary district and municipal courts, and are there to be instituted, judged, and if they are not brought before higher courts, executed, all in the territory where the act has taken place, with the only difference, which is mentioned in the preceding article, that when one of the parties is a, foreign subject, or the act has been committed on a foreign subject or property, two jurors from the foreign side, being in all respects of the same reputation and having the same rights and authority as the other jurors, shall join the court, and the foreign Lapp lensman shall be entitled to be present in court as defence counsel and attorney for the person from the same side. If the two foreign jurors do not appear, although it is demonstrated that they have been legally called to sit on the court, two other reasonable and honest Lapps from the same side may be appointed. Can such persons not be found, there will be no change in the ordinary court. The judgment shall be pronounced on the spot and the deed shall be given to the person present from the other side, either the Lapp lensman or the two jurors, in the presence of witnesses or against their receipt, written without payment, so that one may know on the other side how the law is carried out. If a judge commits an offence against any circumstances described in this convention, he shall have forfeited his office. Article 24 When legally summoned, persons from the foreign side, both parties and witnesses, are obliged to appear before this combined court and account for the case or deliver their testimonies. If the defendant does not appear, or if he does not present and prove to the court at the same time as he has been summoned to appear, his unavoidable absence and impediment, and nevertheless proof exists that he has been legally summoned, the case shall be proceeded with as if he were really present, and tried and executed according to the claim or the writ and the evidence presented. If, at the next time court is being held, the defendant can prove his lawful absence, both that he himself was unable to appear and that he could not make this known to the court on the day he was called to present himself, the case must be heard and tried anew. If the witnesses fail to appear when the first court is being held, the case shall be adjourned until the next court if the case cannot be clarified without them, and the witness shall be fined one Danish rigsdaler or 3 dalers of silver coins to the Crown he is the subject of for the non-appearance. Article 25 No execution or distraint, unless according to the Lapp Court decision mentioned in Article 22, may be levied on the estate of any foreign Lapp, except according to a written judgment and against proof of the payment, delivered on the spot to the Lapp on whose estate the execution or distraint is being made. Offence against this provision is punishable as an act of violence. 1328

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Article 26 If any Lapp fleeing a capital punishment crosses the frontier of the state in which the punishable act has been committed, he shall be treated as any other Norwegian or Swedish subjects in an equal case. Article 27 All Lapp cases shall be reviewed and described on flat paper without revenue stamps when a foreign Lapp has an interest in the case. Article 28 The inhabitants of Utziocki, who now, following the agreement about the frontier, have become subjects under Swedish ecclasiastical and civil jurisdiction, must in all matters related to trade, including both the products of the country and goods being brought into the country, be treated in the same way as the Norwegian royal subjects in the area and benefit equally with them by the Royal Letter of Trade Privilege, both as existing and as given in the future, and other arrangements established to further trade, so that they shall be paid according to the Royal Letter of Trade Privilege for what they deliver to the Norwegian merchants and so that they shall be given what they want to purchase at the price of the Royal Letter of Trade Privilege, but the Trading Company shall nevertheless not be obliged to grant to these Swedish subjects the credit that they in certain circumstances are to give to the Norwegian subjects according to the Royal Letter of Trade Privilege. Article 29 All royal officials concerned on both sides, especially the provincial commissioners, should keenly supervise how the foreign Lapps are being treated and faithfully see to it that they have what is due to them and for them to enjoy according to this Convention. When they are travelling to visit the country in their official capacity, they should in good time notify these foreign Lapps of the time and place they are to be found in the vicinity, in order that the Lapps, if they have complaints, may personally present themselves to them and submit their petition. Article 30 Finally it is declared that these previously stipulated transfrontier movements, with the arrangements dependant thereupon, shall in no way be understood to mean that the Kingdoms, Norway or Sweden, thereby are given any jurisdiction or rights of any kind across the frontier of the other Kingdom, but that it is nothing more than an acceptance and reciprocal compliance which cannot easily be avoided if the Lapps on either side shall be sustained and kept in good shape and order politically. Consequently, the frontier line decided and determined in the Frontier Treaty shall remain in full force as concerns the Lapps and their districts as otherwise applying to the other Norwegian and Swedish subjects and their districts, so that neither the passing of time nor the negligence, collusions and actions of the officers and subjects concerned or any prescriptive right or usage across the same frontier (no matter how old it becomes or the form or nature it takes) can or may make any change in it. So each state shall hereafter on its side of the mentioned frontier be entitled to exercise and carry on all Regalia and Jura Majestatis in spiritual as well as temporal matters. 1329

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This Codicil or Supplement to the Frontier Treaty shall as concerns all items be of the same force as the above mentioned Frontier Treaty itself, exactly as it is therein noted word for word. For further certitude it has been made in two copies which have been signed by His Royal Majesty's Commissionaires Authorised by His Royal Majesty and confirmed by their general signets, executed in Stromstad anno Domini one thousand seven hundred and fifty one, the 21st September/2nd October.

Document 282 The Nordic Language Convention (17 June 1981)* Convention between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden on the right of Nordic nationals to use their mother tongue in other Nordic countries. The Governments of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, Considering that greater linguistic equality within the Nordic area is of considerable importance for the Nordic sense of community and for broader contacts among the Nordic peoples, Deeming it important that Nordic nationals should be able to use their mother tongue to the greatest extent possible in dealings with the authorities and other public agencies of another Nordic country, Recognizing that a good language service for Nordic immigrants is essential in order to facilitate their adjustment and ensure that they enjoy social security and equal treatment in the community, Have, in keeping with the intention underlying recommendation No. 29/1966 of the Nordic Council, agreed as follows: Article 1 The languages covered by this Convention are Danish, Finnish, Icelandic, Norwegian and Swedish. The Convention shall apply to both oral and to written contacts with authorities or other public agencies, but not to telephone contacts. Article 2 The Contracting States undertake to make efforts to enable a national of one Contracting State to use his mother tongue, where necessary, in contacts with the authorities and other public agencies of another Contracting State. This shall apply to contacts with the courts and also in particular, to contacts with public agencies such as public-health, hospital, social-service and child-welfare authorities, and also with labour-market, tax, police and school authorities. In cases before the courts and other public agencies, the authorities shall, as far as possible, endeavour to ensure that nationals of another Contracting State receive the necessary assistance with interpretation and translation. In criminal cases, nationals shall always receive the necessary assistance with interpretation.

*  Done at Bornholm, 17 June 1981; entered into force 1 March 1987, retrieved from the Nordic Council, www.norden.org/en/om-samarbejdet-1/nordic-agreements/treaties-and-agreements/language/the-nordiclanguage-convention. Reprinted with permission by the Nordic Council of Ministers.

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Article 3 The costs of interpretation or translation in the cases covered by article 2 shall be paid from public funds. The costs of interpretation in cases involving public prosecution shall always be paid from public funds. The foregoing provision shall not prevent a Contracting State from claiming full or partial reimbursement of costs for the translation of a document from the person submitting the document if the latter is lengthy or of minor importance, or if there are other special reasons for making such a claim. Nor shall a Contracting State be prevented from applying rules concerning the right of the public authorities to claim reimbursement of interpretation or translation costs from a person who, as the losing party or for another reason, is liable for the legal costs of a case. Article 4 A person staying in a home or other institution shall, as far as possible, be given the opportunity to associate with other persons having a command of the mother tongue of the person in question. Article 5 The Contracting States shall promote the establishment of public language-service agencies or other types of interpretation and translation services in places where nationals from another Contracting State who do not understand the language of the host country are present in large numbers. Where such measures are justified by the number of such nationals residing in the host country or in particular areas thereof, the host country shall promote the translation and distribution of such instructions, brochures, forms, etc., as are designed to facilitate contacts between the individual and the public authorities. Article 6 The Contracting States undertake to endeavour to make special efforts in the matter of language services, where the circumstances so require, and to promote direct co-operation among the authorities of the various States with a view to the achievement of the purposes of the Convention. Article 7 Nothing in this Convention shall preclude the possibility of two or more Contracting States concluding, where appropriate, any special agreements providing for more extensive commitments than those specified in this Convention. Article 8 Each of the Contracting States shall designate an authority or other agency to be responsible for monitoring the application of the Convention in that State and for promoting co-operation among the States in matters covered by the Convention. The Nordic Council of Ministers shall also monitor the application of the Convention. Article 9 The Contracting States may accede to this Convention by: (a) Signing it without any reservation regarding ratification; or (b) Signing it subject to a reservation regarding ratification in conjunction with subsequent ratification. 1331

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The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the month beginning two months after the date on which four of the Contracting States have acceded to the Convention. In the case of a Contracting State which accedes to the Convention at a later date, the Convention shall enter into force two months after that State has acceded to the Convention. Any State may, with respect to any of the other States, terminate the Convention upon six months' notice. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed this Convention. DONE at Svaneke, Bornholm, on 17 June 1981, in a single copy in the Danish, Finnish, Icelandic, Norwegian and Swedish languages.

Document 283 Proposed Nordic Saami Convention (2008)* The Governments of Finland, Norway and Sweden, affirming –– that the Saami is the indigenous people of the three countries, –– that the Saami is one people residing across national borders, –– that the Saami people has its own culture culture, its own society, its own history, its own traditions, its own language, its own livelihoods and its own visions of the future, –– that the three states have a national as well as an international responsibility to provide adequate conditions for the Saami culture and society, –– that the Saami people has the right of self-determination, –– that the Saami people’s culture and society constitutes an enrichment to the countries’ collected cultures and societies, –– that the Saami people has a particular need to develop its society across national borders, –– that lands and waters constitute the foundation for the Saami culture and that hence, the Saami must have access to such, –– and that, in determining the legal status of the Saami people, particular regard shall be paid to the fact that during the course of history the Saami have not been treated as a people of equal value, and have thus been subjected to injustice, that take as a basis for their deliberations that the Saami parliaments in the three states –– want to build a better future for the life and culture of the Saami people, –– hold the vision that the national boundaries of the states shall not obstruct the community of the Saami people and Saami individuals, –– view a new Saami convention as a renewal and a development of Saami rights established through historical use of land that were codified in the Lapp Codicil of 1751, –– emphasize the importance of respecting the right of self-determination, that the Saami enjoy as a people, *  Proposal, not entered into force yet. This official English translation was retrieved from the Government of Norway, www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/aid/temadokumenter/sami/sami_samekonv_engelsk.pdf.

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particularly emphasise that the Saami have rights to the land and water areas that constitutes the Saami people’s historical homeland, as well as to natural resources in those, maintain that the traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions of the Saami people, integrated with the people’s use of natural resources, constitutes a part of the Saami culture, hold that increased consideration shall be given to the role of Saami women as custodians of traditions in the Saami society, including when appointing representatives to public bodies, want that the Saami shall live as one people within the three states, emphasize the Saami people’s aspiration, wish and right to take responsibility for the development of its own future and will assert the Saami people’s rights and freedoms in accordance with international human rights law and other international law,

that have elaborated this convention in close cooperation with representatives of the Saami, deeming it to be of particular importance that the Convention, before being ratified by the states, be approved by the three Saami parliaments and that commit themselves to secure the future of the Saami people in accordance with this convention, have agreed on the following Nordic Saami Convention. CHAPTER I  THE GENERAL RIGHTS OF THE SAAMI PEOPLE Article 1  The objective of the Convention The objective of this Convention is to affirm and strengthen such rights of the Saami people that are necessary to secure and develop its language, its culture, its livelihoods and society, with the smallest possible interference of the national borders. Article 2  The Saami as an indigenous people The Saami people is the indigenous people of Finland, Norway and Sweden. Article 3  The right of self-determination As a people, the Saami has the right of self-determination in accordance with the rules and provisions of international law and of this Convention. In so far as it follows from these rules and provisions, the Saami people has the right to determine its own economic, social and cultural development and to dispose, to their own benefit, over its own natural resources. Article 4  Persons to whom the Convention applies The Convention applies to persons residing in Finland, Norway or Sweden that identify themselves as Saami and who 1. have Saami as their domestic language or have at least one parent or grandparent who has or has had Saami as his or her domestic language, or 2. have a right to pursue Saami reindeer husbandry in Norway or Sweden, or 3. fulfil the requirements to be eligible to vote in elections to the Saami parliament in Finland, Norway or Sweden, or 4. are children of a person referred to in 1, 2 or 3. 1333

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Article 5  The scope of the State’s responsibility The responsibilities of the state pursuant to this Convention apply to all state bodies at national, regional and local levels. Other public administrative bodies and public undertakings also have such responsibilities. The same applies to private legal entities when exercising public authority or performing other public duties. In applying this Convention, the Saami parliaments and other Saami bodies, regardless of their legal status under national or international law, shall not be deemed to fall under the concept state, except when exercising public authority. Article 6  State measures with respect to the Saami people The three states shall effectively establish conditions enabling the Saami people to secure and develop its language, its culture, its livelihoods and its society. The states shall create favourable conditions for maintaining and developing the local Saami communities. To a reasonable extent, the states’ responsibility to take measures pursuant to this Convention shall apply also to Saami persons who are residing outside the traditional Saami areas. Article 7  Non-discrimination and special measures The Saami people and Saami individuals shall be ensured protection against all discrimination. The States shall, when necessary for the implementation of Saami rights pursuant to this Convention, adopt special positive measures with respect to such rights. Article 8  Minimum rights The rights laid down in this Convention are minimum rights. They shall not be construed as preventing any state from extending the scope of Saami rights or from adopting more far reaching measures than contained in this Convention. The Convention may not be used as a basis for limiting such Saami rights that follow from other legal provisions. Article 9  Saami legal customs The states shall show due respect for the Saami people’s conceptions of law, legal traditions and customs. Pursuant to the provisions in the first paragraph, the states shall, when elaborating legislation in areas where there might exist relevant Saami legal customs, particularly investigate whether such customs exist, and if so, consider whether these customs should be afforded protection or in other manners be reflected in the national legislation. Due consideration shall also be paid to Saami legal customs in the application of law. Article 10  Harmonization of legal provisions The states shall, in cooperation with the Saami parliaments, strive to ensure continued harmonization of legislation and other regulation of significance for Saami activities across national borders. Article 11  Cooperation on cultural and commercial arrangements The states shall implement measures to render it easier for the Saami to pursue economic activities across national borders and to provide for their cultural needs across these borders. For this purpose, the states shall strive to remove remaining obstacles to Saami 1334

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economic activities that are based on their citizenship or residence or that otherwise are a result of the Saami settlement area stretching across national borders. The states shall also give Saami individuals access to the cultural provisions of the country where they are staying at any given time. Article 12  Cooperation on education and welfare arrangements The states shall take measures to provide Saami individuals residing in any of the three countries with the possibility to obtain education, medical services and social provisions in another of these countries when this appears to be more appropriate. Article 13  The symbols of the Saami people The states shall respect the right of the Saami to decide over the use of the Saami flag and other Saami national symbols. The states shall moreover, in cooperation with the Saami parliaments, make efforts to ensure that the Saami symbols are made visible in a manner signifying the Saami’s status as a distinct people in the three countries. CHAPTER II  SAAMI GOVERNANCE Article 14  The Saami parliaments In each of the three countries there shall be a Saami parliament. The Saami parliament is the highest representative body of the Saami people in the country. The Saami parliament acts on behalf of the Saami people of the country concerned, and shall be elected through general elections among the Saami in the country. Further regulations concerning the elections of the Saami parliaments shall be prescribed by law, prepared through negotiations with the Saami parliaments pursuant to Article 16. The Saami parliaments shall have such a mandate that enables them to contribute effectively to the realization of the Saami people’s right of self-determination pursuant to the rules and provisions of international law and of this Convention. Further regulations concerning the mandate of the Saami parliaments shall be prescribed by law. The Saami parliaments take initiatives and state their views on all matters where they find reason to do so. Article 15  Independent decisions by the Saami parliaments The Saami parliaments make independent decisions on all matters where they have the mandate to do so under national or international law. The Saami parliaments may conclude agreements with national, regional and local entities concerning cooperation with regard to the strengthening of Saami culture and the Saami society. Article 16  The Saami parliaments’ right to negotiations In matters of major importance to the Saami, negotiations shall be held with the Saami parliaments before decisions on such matters are made by a public authority. These negotiations must take place sufficiently early to enable the Saami parliaments to have a real influence over the proceedings and the result. The states shall not adopt or permit measures that may significantly damage the basic conditions for Saami culture, Saami livelihoods or society, unless consented to by the Saami parliament concerned. 1335

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Article 17 The rights of the Saami parliaments during preparation of other matters The Saami parliaments shall have the right to be represented on public councils and committees when these deal with matters that concerns the interests of the Saami. Matters concerning Saami interests shall be submitted to the Saami parliaments before a decision is made by a public authority. The states shall investigate the need for such representation and prior opinions from the Saami parliaments. This must take place sufficiently early to enable the Saami parliaments to influence the proceedings and the outcome. The Saami parliaments shall themselves decide when they wish to be represented or submit prior opinions during such preparation of matters. Article 18  The relationship to national assemblies The national assemblies of the states or their committees or other bodies shall, upon request, receive representatives of the Saami parliaments in order to enable them to report on matters of importance to the Saami. The Saami parliaments shall be given the opportunity to be heard during the consideration by national assemblies of matters that particularly concern the Saami people. The national assemblies of the individual states shall issue further regulations concerning which matters this applies to and concerning the procedure to be followed. Article 19  The Saami and international representation The Saami parliaments shall represent the Saami in intergovernmental matters. The states shall promote Saami representation in international institutions and Saami participation in international meetings. Article 20  Joint Saami organizations The Saami parliaments may form joint organizations. In consultation with the Saami parliaments, the states shall strive to transfer public authority to such joint organizations as needed. Article 21  Other Saami associations The states shall respect and when necessary consult Saami villages (samebyar), siidas, reindeer herders’ communities (renbeteslag), the village assemblies of the Skolt Saami (byastämma) and other competent Saami organizations or local Saami representatives. Article 22  A Saami region The states shall actively seek to identify and develop the area within which the Saami people can manage its particular rights pursuant to this Convention and national legislation. CHAPTER III  SAAMI LANGUAGE AND CULTURE Article 23  Saami language rights The Saami shall have the right to use, develop and pass on to future generations its language and its traditions and have the right to make efforts to ensure that knowledge 1336

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of the Saami language is also disseminated to Saami persons with little or no command of this language. The Saami shall have the right to decide and retain their personal names and geographical names, as well as to have these publicly acknowledged. Article 24  The states’ responsibility for the Saami language The states shall enable the Saami to preserve, develop and disseminate the Saami language. To meet this end, states shall ensure that the Saami alphabet can be used effectively. It shall be possible to use the Saami language effectively in courts of law and in relation to public authorities in the Saami areas. The same shall also apply outside these areas in disputes and cases first dealt with in the Saami areas or which in any other manner have a particular association with these areas. The states shall promote the publication of literature in the Saami language. The provisions of this article shall also apply to the less prevalent Saami dialects. Article 25  Saami media The states shall create conditions for an independent Saami media policy which enables the Saami media to control its own development and to provide the Saami population with rich and multi-faced information and opinions in matters of general interest. The states shall ensure that programmes in the Saami language can be broadcast on radio and TV, and shall promote the publication of newspapers in this language. In cooperation with the Saami parliaments, the states shall also promote cooperation across national borders between media institutions that provide programmes or articles in the Saami language. The provision of the second paragraph concerning the Saami language shall also to a reasonable extent apply to the less prevalent Saami dialects. Article 26  Saami education The Saami population residing in the Saami areas shall have access to education both in and through the medium of the Saami language. The education and study financing system shall be adapted to their background. Such education shall enable attendance of further education at all levels while at the same time meet the needs of Saami individuals to continuously be active within the traditional Saami livelihoods. The study financing system shall be arranged in such a way as to enable higher education through the medium of the Saami language. Saami children and adolescents outside the Saami areas shall have access to education in the Saami language, and also through the medium of the Saami language to the extent that may be deemed reasonable in the area concerned. The education shall as far as possible be adapted to their background. The national curricula shall be prepared in cooperation with the Saami parliaments and be adapted to the cultural backgrounds and needs of Saami children and adolescents. Article 27  Research The states shall, in cooperation with the Saami parliaments, create good conditions for research based on the knowledge needs of the Saami society, and promote recruitment of Saami researchers. In planning such research, regard shall be paid to the linguistic and cultural conditions in the Saami society. 1337

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The states shall, in consultation with the Saami parliaments, promote cooperation between Saami and other research institutions in the various countries and across national borders, and strengthen research institutions with a primary responsibility for such research referred to in the first paragraph. Research concerning Saami matters shall be adapted to such ethical rules that the Saami’s status as an indigenous people requires. Article 28  Education and information about the Saami The Saami people’s culture and society shall be appropriately reflected in education outside the Saami society. Such education shall particularly aim to promote knowledge of the status of the Saami as the country’s indigenous people. The states shall, in cooperation with the Saami parliaments, offer education about the Saami culture and society to persons who are going to work in the Saami areas. The states shall, in cooperation with the Saami parliaments, provide the general public with information about the Saami culture and society. Article 29  Health and social services The states shall, in cooperation with the Saami parliaments, ensure that health and social services in the Saami settlement areas are organized in such a way that the Saami population in these areas are ensured health and social services adapted to their linguistic and cultural background. Also health and social services outside the Saami settlement areas shall pay regard to the linguistic and cultural background of Saami patients and clients. Article 30  Saami children and adolescents Saami children and adolescents have the right to practise their culture and to preserve and develop their Saami identity. Article 31  Traditional knowledge and cultural expressions The states shall respect the right of the Saami people to manage its traditional knowledge and its traditional cultural expressions while striving to ensure that the Saami are able to preserve, develop and pass these on to future generations. When Saami culture is applied commercially by persons other than Saami persons, the states shall make efforts to ensure that the Saami people gains influence over such activities and a reasonable share of the financial revenues. The Saami culture shall be protected against the use of cultural expressions that in a misleading manner give the impression of having a Saami origin. The states shall make efforts to ensure that regard is paid to Saami traditional knowledge in decisions concerning Saami matters. Article 32  Saami cultural heritage Saami cultural heritage shall be protected by law and shall be cared for by the country’s Saami parliament or by cultural institutions in cooperation with the Saami parliament. The states shall implement measures for cooperation across national borders on documentation, protection and care of Saami cultural heritage.

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The states shall make efforts to ensure that Saami cultural heritage that has been removed from the Saami areas and that is of particular interest to the Saami community is entrusted to suitable museums or cultural institutions as further agreed with the countries’ Saami parliaments. Article 33  The cultural basis The responsibilities of the states in matters concerning the Saami culture shall include the material cultural basis in such a way that the Saami are provided with the necessary commercial and economic conditions to secure and develop their culture. CHAPTER IV  SAAMI RIGHT TO LAND AND WATER Article 34  Traditional use of land and water Protracted traditional use of land or water areas constitutes the basis for individual or collective ownership right to these areas for the Saami in accordance with national or international norms concerning protracted usage. If the Saami, without being deemed to be the owners, occupy and have traditionally used certain land or water areas for reindeer husbandry, hunting, fishing or in other ways, they shall have the right to continue to occupy and use these areas to the same extent as before. If these areas are used by the Saami in association with other users, the exercise of their rights by the Saami and the other users shall be subject to due regard to each other and to the nature of the competing rights. Particular regard in this connection shall be paid to the interests of reindeer-herding Saami. The fact that the Saami use of these areas is limited to the right of continued use to the same extent as before shall not prevent the forms of use from being adapted as necessary to technical and economic developments. Assessment of whether traditional use exists pursuant to this provision shall be made on the basis of what constitutes traditional Saami use of land and water and bear in mind that Saami land and water usage often does not leave permanent traces in the environment. The provisions of this article shall not be construed as to imply any limitation in the right to restitution of property that the Saami might have under national or international law. Article 35  Protection of Saami rights to land and water The states shall take adequate measures for effective protection of Saami rights pursuant to article 34. To that end, the states shall particularly identify the land and water areas that the Saami traditionally use. Appropriate procedures for examination of questions concerning Saami rights to land and water shall be available under national law. In particular, the Saami shall have access to such financial support that is necessary for them to be able to have their rights to land and water tried through legal proceedings. Article 36  Utilization of natural resources The rights of the Saami to natural resources within such land or water areas that fall within the scope of Article 34 shall be afforded particular protection. In this connection, regard shall be paid to the fact that continues access to such natural resources may be a prerequisite for the preservation of traditional Saami knowledge and cultural expressions.

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Before public authorities, based on law, grant a permit for prospecting or extraction of minerals or other sub-surface resources, or make decisions concerning utilization of other natural resources within such land or water areas that are owned or used by the Saami, negotiations shall be held with the affected Saami, as well as with the Saami parliament, when the matter is such that it falls within Article 16. Permit for prospecting or extraction of natural resources shall not be granted if the activity would make it impossible or substantially more difficult for the Saami to continue to utilize the areas concerned, and this utilization is essential to the Saami culture, unless so consented by the Saami parliament and the affected Saami. The above provisions of this article also apply to other forms of natural resource utilization and to other forms of intervention in the nature in such geographical areas that fall under Article 34, including activities such as forest logging, hydroelectric and wind power plants, construction of roads and recreational housing and military exercise activities and permanent exercise ranges. Article 37  Compensation and share of profits The affected Saami shall have the right to compensation for all damage inflicted through activities referred to in Article 36, paragraphs two and four. If national law obliges persons granted permit to extract natural resources to pay a fee or share of the profit from such activities, to the landowner, the permit holder shall be similarly obliged in relation to the Saami that have traditionally used and continue to use the area concerned. The provisions of this article shall not be construed as to imply any limitation in the right to a share of the profit from extraction of natural resources that may follow under international law. Article 38  Fjords and coastal seas The provisions of Articles 34–37 concerning rights to water areas and use of water areas shall apply correspondingly to Saami fishing and other use of fjords and coastal seas. In connection with the allocation of catch quotas for fish and other marine resources, as well as when otherwise regulation such resources, due regard shall be paid to Saami use of these resources and its importance to local Saami communities. This shall apply even though this use has been reduced or has ceased due to the fact that catch quotas have not been granted or owing to other regulations of the fisheries or other exploitation of resources in these areas. The same shall apply if the use is reduced or has ceased owing to a reduction of marine resources in these areas. Article 39  Land and resource management In addition to the ownership or usage rights that the Saami enjoy, the Saami parliaments shall have the right of co-determination in the public management of the areas referred to in Articles 34 and 38, pursuant to Article 16. Article 40  Environmental protection and environmental management The states are in cooperation with the Saami parliaments, obliged to actively protect the environment in order to ensure sustainable development of the Saami land and water areas referred to in Articles 34 and 38. Pursuant to Article 16, the Saami parliaments shall have the right of co-determination in the environmental management affecting these areas. 1340

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CHAPTER V  SAAMI LIVELIHOODS Article 41  Protection of Saami livelihoods Saami livelihoods and Saami use of natural resources shall enjoy special protection by means of legal or economic measures to the extent that they constitute an important fundament for the Saami culture. Saami livelihoods and Saami use of natural resources are such activities that are essential for the maintenance and development of the local Saami communities. Article 42  Reindeer husbandry as a Saami livelihood Reindeer husbandry, as a particular and traditional Saami livelihood and a form of culture, is based on custom and shall enjoy special legal protection. To that end, Norway and Sweden shall maintain and develop reindeer husbandry as a sole right of the Saami in the Saami reindeer grazing areas. Acknowledging Protocol No. 3 of its Affiliation Agreement with the European Union concerning the Saami as an indigenous people, Finland undertakes to strengthen the position of Saami reindeer husbandry. Article 43  Reindeer husbandry across national borders The right of the Saami to reindeer grazing across national borders is based on custom. If agreements have been concluded between Saami villages (samebyar), siidas or reindeer grazing communities (renbeteslag) concerning the right to reindeer grazing across national borders, these agreements shall prevail. In the event of dispute concerning the interpretation or application of such an agreement, a party shall have the opportunity to bring the dispute before an arbitration committee for decision. Regarding the composition of such an arbitration committee and its rules of procedure, the regulation jointly decided by the three Saami parliaments shall apply. A party who is dissatisfied with the arbitration committee’s decision of the dispute shall have the right to file a suit on the matter in a court of law in the country on which territory the grazing area is situated. In the absence of an applicable agreement between Saami villages (samebyar), siidas or reindeer grazing communities (renbeteslag), if a valid bilateral treaty regarding reindeer grazing exists, such a treaty shall apply. Notwithstanding any such treaty, shall a person asserting that he or she has a reindeer grazing right based on custom that goes beyond what follows from the bilateral treaty, have the opportunity to have his or her claim tried before a court of law in the country on which territory the grazing area is situated. CHAPTER VI  IMPLEMENTATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONVENTION Article 44 Cooperation Council of Saami ministers and presidents of Saami Parliaments The ministers in Finland, Norway and Sweden responsible for Saami affairs and the presidents of Saami Parliaments from each of these countries shall convene regularly. The said cooperation shall promote the objectives of this Convention pursuant to Article 1. The meetings shall consider relevant Saami matters of common interest. Article 45  Convention committee A Nordic Saami Convention Committee shall be established to monitor the implementation of this Convention. The committee shall have six members serving in their independent 1341

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capacity. Each of the three states and each of the three Saami parliaments appoint one member each. Members shall be appointed for a period of five years. The committee shall submit reports to the governments of the three countries and to the three Saami parliaments. It may submit proposals aimed at strengthening the objective of this Convention to the governments of the three countries and to the three Saami parliaments. The committee may also deliver opinions in response to questions from individuals and groups. Article 46  National implementation In order to ensure as uniform an application of this Convention as possible, the states shall make the provisions of the Convention directly applicable as national law. Article 47  Economic commitments The states shall provide the financial resources necessary to implement the provisions of this Convention. The joint expenses of the three countries shall be divided between them in relation to the Saami population in each country. In addition to situations referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 35, it shall be possible for the Saami to receive the necessary financial assistance to bring important questions of principle concerning the rights contained in this Convention before a court of law. CHAPTER VII  FINAL PROVISIONS Article 48  the approval of the Saami parliaments After being signed, this Convention shall be submitted to the three Saami parliaments for approval. Article 49  Ratification This Convention shall be subject to ratification. Ratification may not take place until the three Saami parliaments have given their approval pursuant to Article 48. Article 50  Entry into force The Convention shall enter into force thirty days after the date that the instruments of ratification are deposited with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs shall notify Finland, Sweden and the three Saami parliaments of the deposit of the instruments of ratification and of the date of entry into force of the Convention. The original of this Convention shall be deposited with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which shall provide authenticated copies to Finland, Sweden and the three Saami parliaments. Article 51  Amendments to the Convention Amendments to this Convention shall be made in cooperation with the three Saami parliaments, and with respect for the provision in Article 48. An amendment to the Convention enters into force thirty days after the date that the parties to the Convention notify the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the amendments have been approved by them.

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IN WITNESS WHEREOF the representatives of the parties to the Convention have signed the present Convention. Which took place at … on … 20… in a single copy in the Finnish, Norwegian, Swedish and Saami languages, all texts being equally authentic.

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Policy Documents Document 284 Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (Canada) and the State ­Committee on Northern Affairs of the Russian Federation concerning C ­ ooperation on Aboriginal and Northern Development (29 February 2000)* Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND) and the State Committee on Northern Affairs of the Russian Federation (GOSKOMSEVER), hereinafter referred to as “the participants”: Recognizing that Canada and the Russian Federation, as Arctic states, are facing a wide range of common interests and issues peculiar to the Arctic and northern regions of both countries; Conscious of the importance of promoting and ensuring sustainable development, including environmental protection, in the Arctic and the North; Affirming the commitment of both countries to the well-being of its northern population, including the recognition of the unique interests and the special relationship of Aboriginal peoples of the Arctic; Taking into account the federal responsibility and mandate of the Participants for northern and Aboriginal affairs in their respective countries; Drawing on the long relationship between Canada and the Russian Federation in the area of Arctic and northern cooperation, and wishing to contribute further to the commitment of both countries to enhanced circumpolar cooperation in accordance with the objectives of the Arctic Council; and Recognizing that for all activities undertaken under the Memorandum of Understanding, the Participants wish to optimize the participation of provincial/regional, territorial and local governments, Aboriginal organizations and other non-governmental organizations. Have reached the following Understanding: Article I 1. The Participants will develop further and strengthen bilateral cooperation concerning Aboriginal and northern issues on the basis of equality, reciprocity and mutual benefit, in the following areas: –– northern policy development; –– policy and legislation related to the situation of Aboriginal peoples; –– socio-economic and cultural development of Aboriginal peoples; –– northern environment and conservation; –– capacity building through partnerships; and –– any other areas as may be mutually agreed. 2. A work program to carry activities in these areas will be developed by the Participants. *  Done at Ottawa. Retrieved from the Government of Canada, www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100014645/ 1100100014647. Annex A is not reprinted here. Reproduced with permission by the Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada.

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Article II Cooperation between the Participants will take the following forms: –– visit by and/or exchange of officials, experts, and northern peoples; –– co-operative projects and consultations; –– joint organization of seminars and workshops; –– exchange of information; and –– other mutually agreed forms of cooperation. Article III For the purpose of this Memorandum of Understanding, the Participants will encourage and facilitate, as appropriate, the direct contacts between regional, territorial and local governments, Aboriginal groups and organizations of the northern regions of both countries, academic and scientific institutions and the private sector, including the conclusion of working arrangements on the implementation of specific projects and programs. Article IV Cooperation under this Memorandum of Understanding will be realized in accordance with the laws and regulations of each country. Article V Unless otherwise arranged between the Participants, international travel expenses, as well as in-country travel expenses, will be borne by the Sending participant. Efforts will be made to develop, where it is appropriate, cost-sharing arrangements in support of work programs undertaken under the present Memorandum of Understanding. Article VI In proposed cooperative activities where it is foreseeable that intellectual property rights might arise, the Participants, in accordance with their national laws, will agree in advance as to the effective protection and allocation of those intellectual property rights. Article VII 1. To implement this Memorandum of Understanding, the Participants will establish a Joint Committee which will consist of equal numbers of representatives from Canada and Russia, designated by the Participants. 2. The Co-chairs of the Joint Committee are: for the Canadian side: The Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development; for the Russian side: The Chairman of the State Committee on Northern Affairs 3. The Committee will: –– oversee the development of a co-operative work plan; –– serve as a forum for the exchange of information, consultation and facilitating contacts between the Participants; –– provide general directions and management for the Memorandum of Understanding; and –– review, and report annually, on the achievements of the cooperation under this Memorandum of Understanding. 4. The Joint Committee will meet at least once every year. 1346

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5. Coordination of activities under the MOU will be conducted through the Secretariat designated by the Participants. For the Canadian side: The Circumpolar Liaison Directorate. For the Russian side: International Affairs Division. Article VIII Cooperation under this Memorandum of Understanding will be carried out in consideration of other existing agreements between Canada and the Russian Federation. Article IX 1. This Memorandum of Understanding will take effect upon signature by the Participants, and will be in effect for another period of three years, and may be extended with the consent of the Participants. It may be terminated at any time with a six month written notice. 2. This Memorandum of Understanding may be amended at any time by mutual consent of the Participants. DONE at Ottawa, Canada in this 29th day of February 2000 and will replace the MOU between Participants signed on October 20, 1997 the Russian, French and English languages, all texts being of equal validity.

Document 285 Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Arctic Sovereignty (28 April 2009)* We, the Inuit of Inuit Nunaat, declare as follows: 1.  Inuit and the Arctic 1.1 Inuit live in the Arctic. Inuit live in the vast, circumpolar region of land, sea and ice known as the Arctic. We depend on the marine and terrestrial plants and animals supported by the coastal zones of the Arctic Ocean, the tundra and the sea ice. The Arctic is our home. 1.2 Inuit have been living in the Arctic from time immemorial. From time immemorial, Inuit have been living in the Arctic. Our home in the circumpolar world, Inuit Nunaat, stretches from Greenland to Canada, Alaska and the coastal regions of Chukotka, Russia. Our use and occupation of Arctic lands and waters pre-dates recorded history. Our unique knowledge, experience of the Arctic, and language are the foundation of our way of life and culture. 1.3 Inuit are a people. Though Inuit live across a far-reaching circumpolar region, we are united as a single people. Our sense of unity is fostered and celebrated by the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), which represents the Inuit of Denmark/Greenland, Canada, USA and Russia. As a people, we enjoy the rights of all peoples. These include the rights recognized in and by various international instruments and institutions, such as

* Done at Tromsø. Retrieved from the Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada, www.inuitcircumpolar.com/ sovereignty-in-the-arctic.html. Reprinted with permission by the Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada.

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the Charter of the United Nations; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action; the Human Rights Council; the Arctic Council; and the Organization of American States. 1.4 Inuit are an indigenous people. Inuit are an indigenous people with the rights and responsibilities of all indigenous peoples. These include the rights recognized in and by international legal and political instruments and bodies, such as the recommendations of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, the UN Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), and others. Central to our rights as a people is the right to selfdetermination. It is our right to freely determine our political status, freely pursue our economic, social, cultural and linguistic development, and freely dispose of our natural wealth and resources. States are obligated to respect and promote the realization of our right to self-determination. (See, for example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR], Art. 1.). Our rights as an indigenous people include the following rights recognized in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), all of which are relevant to sovereignty and sovereign rights in the Arctic: the right to self-determination, to freely determine our political status and to freely pursue our economic, social and cultural, including linguistic, development (Art. 3); the right to internal autonomy or self-government (Art. 4); the right to recognition, observance and enforcement of treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements concluded with states (Art. 37); the right to maintain and strengthen our distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining the right to participate fully in the political, economic, social and cultural life of states (Art. 5); the right to participate in decision-making in matters which would affect our rights and to maintain and develop our own indigenous decision-making institutions (Art. 18); the right to own, use, develop and control our lands, territories and resources and the right to ensure that no project affecting our lands, territories or resources will proceed without our free and informed consent (Art. 25-32); the right to peace and security (Art. 7); and the right to conservation and protection of our environment (Art. 29). 1.5 Inuit are an indigenous people of the Arctic. Our status, rights and responsibilities as a people among the peoples of the world, and as an indigenous people, are exercised within the unique geographic, environmental, cultural and political context of the Arctic. This has been acknowledged in the eight-nation Arctic Council, which provides a direct, participatory role for Inuit through the permanent participant status accorded the Inuit Circumpolar Council (Art. 2). 1.6 Inuit are citizens of Arctic states. As citizens of Arctic states (Denmark, Canada, USA and Russia), we have the rights and responsibilities afforded all citizens under the constitutions, laws, policies and public sector programs of these states. These rights and responsibilities do not diminish the rights and responsibilities of Inuit as a people under international law. 1.7 Inuit are indigenous citizens of Arctic states. As an indigenous people within Arctic states, we have the rights and responsibilities afforded all indigenous peoples under the constitutions, laws, policies and public sector programs of these states. These rights and responsibilities do not diminish the rights and responsibilities of Inuit as a people under international law. 1348

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1.8 Inuit are indigenous citizens of each of the major political subunits of Arctic states (states, provinces, territories and regions). As an indigenous people within Arctic states, provinces, territories, regions or other political subunits, we have the rights and responsibilities afforded all indigenous peoples under the constitutions, laws, policies and public sector programs of these subunits. These rights and responsibilities do not diminish the rights and responsibilities of Inuit as a people under international law. 2.  The Evolving Nature of Sovereignty in the Arctic 2.1 “Sovereignty” is a term that has often been used to refer to the absolute and independent authority of a community or nation both internally and externally. Sovereignty is a contested concept, however, and does not have a fixed meaning. Old ideas of sovereignty are breaking down as different governance models, such as the European Union, evolve. Sovereignties overlap and are frequently divided within federations in creative ways to recognize the right of peoples. For Inuit living within the states of Russia, Canada, the USA and Denmark/Greenland, issues of sovereignty and sovereign rights must be examined and assessed in the context of our long history of struggle to gain recognition and respect as an Arctic indigenous people having the right to exercise self-determination over our lives, territories, cultures and languages. 2.2 Recognition and respect for our right to self-determination is developing at varying paces and in various forms in the Arctic states in which we live. Following a referendum in November 2008, the areas of self-government in Greenland will expand greatly and, among other things, Greenlandic (Kalaallisut) will become Greenland’s sole official language. In Canada, four land claims agreements are some of the key building blocks of Inuit rights; while there are conflicts over the implementation of these agreements, they remain of vital relevance to matters of self-determination and of sovereignty and sovereign rights. In Alaska, much work is needed to clarify and implement the rights recognized in the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) and the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA). In particular, subsistence hunting and self-government rights need to be fully respected and accommodated, and issues impeding their enjoyment and implementation need to be addressed and resolved. And in Chukotka, Russia, a very limited number of administrative processes have begun to secure recognition of Inuit rights. These developments will provide a foundation on which to construct future, creative governance arrangements tailored to diverse circumstances in states, regions and communities. 2.3 In exercising our right to self-determination in the circumpolar Arctic, we continue to develop innovative and creative jurisdictional arrangements that will appropriately balance our rights and responsibilities as an indigenous people, the rights and responsibilities we share with other peoples who live among us, and the rights and responsibilities of states. In seeking to exercise our rights in the Arctic, we continue to promote compromise and harmony with and among our neighbours. 2.4 International and other instruments increasingly recognize the rights of indigenous peoples to self-determination and representation in intergovernmental matters, and are evolving beyond issues of internal governance to external relations. (See, for example: ICCPR, Art. 1; UNDRIP, Art. 3; Draft Nordic Saami Convention, Art. 17, 19; Nunavut Land Claims Agreement, Art. 5.9). 2.5 Inuit are permanent participants at the Arctic Council with a direct and meaningful seat at discussion and negotiating tables (See 1997 Ottawa Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council). 1349

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2.6 In spite of a recognition by the five coastal Arctic states (Norway, Denmark, Canada, USA and Russia) of the need to use international mechanisms and international law to resolve sovereignty disputes (see 2008 Ilulissat Declaration), these states, in their discussions of Arctic sovereignty, have not referenced existing international instruments that promote and protect the rights of indigenous peoples. They have also neglected to include Inuit in Arctic sovereignty discussions in a manner comparable to Arctic Council deliberations. 3.  Inuit, the Arctic and Sovereignty: Looking Forward The foundations of action 3.1 The actions of Arctic peoples and states, the interactions between them, and the conduct of international relations must be anchored in the rule of law. 3.2 The actions of Arctic peoples and states, the interactions between them, and the conduct of international relations must give primary respect to the need for global environmental security, the need for peaceful resolution of disputes, and the inextricable linkages between issues of sovereignty and sovereign rights in the Arctic and issues of self-determination. Inuit as active partners 3.3 The inextricable linkages between issues of sovereignty and sovereign rights in the Arctic and Inuit self-determination and other rights require states to accept the presence and role of Inuit as partners in the conduct of international relations in the Arctic. 3.4 A variety of other factors, ranging from unique Inuit knowledge of Arctic ecosystems to the need for appropriate emphasis on sustainability in the weighing of resource development proposals, provide practical advantages to conducting international relations in the Arctic in partnership with Inuit. 3.5 Inuit consent, expertise and perspectives are critical to progress on international issues involving the Arctic, such as global environmental security, sustainable development, militarization, commercial fishing, shipping, human health, and economic and social development. 3.6 As states increasingly focus on the Arctic and its resources, and as climate change continues to create easier access to the Arctic, Inuit inclusion as active partners is central to all national and international deliberations on Arctic sovereignty and related questions, such as who owns the Arctic, who has the right to traverse the Arctic, who has the right to develop the Arctic, and who will be responsible for the social and environmental impacts increasingly facing the Arctic. We have unique knowledge and experience to bring to these deliberations. The inclusion of Inuit as active partners in all future deliberations on Arctic sovereignty will benefit both the Inuit community and the international community. 3.7 The extensive involvement of Inuit in global, trans-national and indigenous politics requires the building of new partnerships with states for the protection and promotion of indigenous economies, cultures and traditions. Partnerships must acknowledge that industrial development of the natural resource wealth of the Arctic can proceed only insofar as it enhances the economic and social well-being of Inuit and safeguards our environmental security. The need for global cooperation 3.8 There is a pressing need for enhanced international exchange and cooperation in relation to the Arctic, particularly in relation to the dynamics and impacts of climate 1350

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change and sustainable economic and social development. Regional institutions that draw together Arctic states, states from outside the Arctic, and representatives of Arctic indigenous peoples can provide useful mechanisms for international exchange and cooperation. 3.9 The pursuit of global environmental security requires a coordinated global approach to the challenges of climate change, a rigorous plan to arrest the growth in human-generated carbon emissions, and a far-reaching program of adaptation to climate change in Arctic regions and communities. 3.10 The magnitude of the climate change problem dictates that Arctic states and their peoples fully participate in international efforts aimed at arresting and reversing levels of greenhouse gas emissions and enter into international protocols and treaties. These international efforts, protocols and treaties cannot be successful without the full participation and cooperation of indigenous peoples. Healthy Arctic communities 3.11 In the pursuit of economic opportunities in a warming Arctic, states must act so as to: (1) put economic activity on a sustainable footing; (2) avoid harmful resource exploitation; (3) achieve standards of living for Inuit that meet national and international norms and minimums; and (4) deflect sudden and far-reaching demographic shifts that would overwhelm and marginalize indigenous peoples where we are rooted and have endured. 3.12 The foundation, projection and enjoyment of Arctic sovereignty and sovereign rights all require healthy and sustainable communities in the Arctic. In this sense, “sovereignty begins at home.” Building on today’s mechanisms for the future 3.13 We will exercise our rights of self-determination in the Arctic by building on institutions such as the Inuit Circumpolar Council and the Arctic Council, the Arcticspecific features of international instruments, such as the ice-covered-waters provision of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the Arctic-related work of international mechanisms, such as the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, the office of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples, and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 4.  A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic 4.1 At the first Inuit Leaders’ Summit, 6–7 November 2008, in Kuujjuaq, Nunavik, Canada, Inuit leaders from Greenland, Canada and Alaska gathered to address Arctic sovereignty. On 7 November, International Inuit Day, we expressed unity in our concerns over Arctic sovereignty deliberations, examined the options for addressing these concerns, and strongly committed to developing a formal declaration on Arctic sovereignty. We also noted that the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration on Arctic sovereignty by ministers representing the five coastal Arctic states did not go far enough in affirming the rights Inuit have gained through international law, land claims and self-government processes. 4.2 The conduct of international relations in the Arctic and the resolution of international disputes in the Arctic are not the sole preserve of Arctic states or other states; they are also within the purview of the Arctic’s indigenous peoples. The development of international 1351

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institutions in the Arctic, such as multi-level governance systems and indigenous peoples’ organizations, must transcend Arctic states’ agendas on sovereignty and sovereign rights and the traditional monopoly claimed by states in the area of foreign affairs. 4.3 Issues of sovereignty and sovereign rights in the Arctic have become inextricably linked to issues of self-determination in the Arctic. Inuit and Arctic states must, therefore, work together closely and constructively to chart the future of the Arctic. We, the Inuit of Inuit Nunaat, are committed to this Declaration and to working with Arctic states and others to build partnerships in which the rights, roles and responsibilities of Inuit are fully recognized and accommodated. On behalf of Inuit in Greenland, Canada, Alaska, and Chukotka Adopted by the Inuit Circumpolar Council, April 2009

Document 286 Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada and the Department of the Interior of the United States of America concerning Indigenous and Northern Issues (29 March 2010)* The Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada and the Department of the Interior, of the United States of America hereinafter referred to as “the Participants”; Recognizing that Canada and the United States of America work on a wide range of common interests and issues in the context of indigenous and northern issues; Wishing to promote mutually beneficial exchanges in areas of policy development, institutional building, program delivery, research, legislation, and other pertinent areas; Taking due note that Indigenous peoples and communities in each country have different languages, political structures, customs and beliefs, and that Indigenous peoples and communities are located in urban, rural and remote settings; Desiring to respect the dignity and rights of Indigenous peoples within the respective countries through mutual cooperation; and Intending to strengthen cooperation in indigenous affairs through processes that facilitate the mutual exchange of information, experiences, ideas and knowledge, in order to improve the quality of life of Indigenous peoples in each country; Have reached the following understanding: The Participants intend to develop bilateral cooperation in accordance with paragraph 2, concerning indigenous and northern issues in the following areas: –– policy and legislation experience; –– socio-economic development of Indigenous peoples and the North –– institutional building and governance for Indigenous peoples; –– northern environment and sustainable development –– capacity building through partnerships;

*  Done at Ontario. Retrieved from the Government of Canada, www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100014184/ 1100100014185. Reproduced with permission by the Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada.

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preservation and development of traditional Indigenous economies, traditional way of life and unique cultures of Indigenous peoples; –– indigenous education; –– consultation with and accommodation of indigenous communities; –– indigenous land tenure, title and planning; –– emergency preparedness and law enforcement on indigenous reserves, including how related cultural concerns are addressed in indigenous communities located near our shared border; and –– other mutually decided issues. The Participants intend to cooperate by: –– visiting and/or exchanging officials and experts; –– meeting and video conferencing on indigenous and northern issues; –– cooperating in projects and consultations through existing and ongoing means; –– exchanging information, sharing experiences and research; and –– other mutually decided forms of cooperation. For the purpose of this Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), the Participants intend to encourage and facilitate direct contacts between tribal/aboriginal governments, regional, territorial and local governments of both countries, academic institutions and the private sector. Where travel is involved, the sending Participant should pay for international travel expenses, as well as in-country travel expenses of its participants and representatives, unless otherwise arranged. The Participants intend to make arrangements in advance regarding the payment of any other expenses incurred in consequence of this MOU. Cooperation under this MOU is subject to Canadian and American laws and regulations, and treaties and international agreements to which Canada and the United States of Americas are both a party. The Participants intend to designate officials to co-ordinate activities under this MOU through the development of a joint work plan. Activities pursuant to this MOU may commence upon its signature by the Participants. Either Participant may discontinue its participation in activities under this MOU at any time by providing a written notice to the other Participant. The Participants may modify this MOU in writing at any time upon their mutual written consent. SIGNED in duplicate at Ontario this 29th day of March 2010 in the English and French languages.

Document 287 Canada's Statement of Support on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (12 November 2010)* Today, Canada joins other countries in supporting the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. In doing so, Canada reaffirms its commitment to promoting and protecting the rights of Indigenous peoples at home and abroad. *  Retrieved from the Government of Canada, www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1309374239861/1309374546142. Reproduced with permission by the Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada.

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The Government of Canada would like to acknowledge the Aboriginal men and women who played an important role in the development of this Declaration. The Declaration is an aspirational document which speaks to the individual and collective rights of Indigenous peoples, taking into account their specific cultural, social and economic circumstances. Although the Declaration is a non-legally binding document that does not reflect customary international law nor change Canadian laws, our endorsement gives us the opportunity to reiterate our commitment to continue working in partnership with Aboriginal peoples in creating a better Canada. Under this government, there has been a shift in Canada’s relationship with First Nations, Inuit and Métis peoples, exemplified by the Prime Minister’s historic apology to former students of Indian Residential Schools, the creation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the apology for relocation of Inuit families to the High Arctic and the honouring of Métis veterans at Juno Beach. These events charted a new path for this country as a whole, one marked by hope and reconciliation and focused on cherishing the richness and depth of diverse Aboriginal cultures. Canada continues to make exemplary progress and build on its positive relationship with Aboriginal peoples throughout the country, a relationship based on good faith, partnership and mutual respect. The Government’s vision is a future in which Aboriginal families and communities are healthy, safe, self-sufficient and prosperous within a Canada where people make their own decisions, manage their own affairs and make strong contributions to the country as a whole. The Government has shown strong leadership by protecting the rights of Aboriginal people in Canada. The amendment to the Canadian Human Rights Act, the proposed Gender Equity in Indian Registration Act and the proposed legislation concerning matrimonial real property rights on reserve are just a few recent examples. This government has also taken concrete and viable actions in important areas such as education, skills development, economic development, employment, health care, housing and access to safe drinking water. These are part of a continuing agenda focused on real results with willing and able partners. At the international level Canada has been a strong voice for the protection of human rights. Canada is party to numerous United Nations human rights conventions which give expression to this commitment. Canada has a constructive and far-reaching international development program that helps to improve the situation of Indigenous peoples in many parts of the world. Canada’s active involvement abroad, coupled with its productive partnership with Aboriginal Canadians, is having a real impact in advancing indigenous rights and freedoms, at home and abroad. In 2007, at the time of the vote during the United Nations General Assembly, and since, Canada placed on record its concerns with various provisions of the Declaration, including provisions dealing with lands, territories and resources; free, prior and informed consent when used as a veto; self-government without recognition of the importance of negotiations; intellectual property; military issues; and the need to achieve an appropriate balance between the rights and obligations of Indigenous peoples, States and third parties. These concerns are well known and remain. However, we have since 1354

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listened to Aboriginal leaders who have urged Canada to endorse the Declaration and we have also learned from the experience of other countries. We are now confident that Canada can interpret the principles expressed in the Declaration in a manner that is consistent with our Constitution and legal framework. Aboriginal and treaty rights are protected in Canada through a unique framework. These rights are enshrined in our Constitution, including our Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and are complemented by practical policies that adapt to our evolving reality. This framework will continue to be the cornerstone of our efforts to promote and protect the rights of Aboriginal Canadians. The 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games were a defining moment for Canada. The Games instilled a tremendous sense of pride in being Canadian and highlighted to the world the extent to which Aboriginal peoples and their cultures contribute to Canada’s uniqueness as a nation. The unprecedented involvement of the Four Host First Nations and Aboriginal peoples from across the nation set a benchmark for how we can work together to achieve great success. In endorsing the Declaration, Canada reaffirms its commitment to build on a positive and productive relationship with First Nations, Inuit, and Métis peoples to improve the well-being of Aboriginal Canadians, based on our shared history, respect, and a desire to move forward together.

Document 288 Announcement of US Support for the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Initiatives to Promote the Government-to-Government Relationship & Improve the Lives of Indigenous Peoples (16 December 2010)* I. Introduction In his Presidential Proclamation last month honoring National Native American Heritage Month, President Obama recommitted—to supporting tribal self-determination, security and prosperity for all Native Americans. He recognized that—while we cannot erase the scourges or broken promises of our past, we will move ahead together in writing a new, brighter chapter in our joint history. It is in this spirit that the United States today proudly lends its support to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Declaration). In September 2007, at the United Nations, 143 countries voted in favor of the Declaration. The United States did not. Today, in response to the many calls from Native Americans throughout this country and in order to further U.S. policy on indigenous issues, President Obama announced that the United States has changed its position. The United States supports the Declaration, which—while not legally binding or a statement of current international law—has both moral and political force. It expresses both the aspirations of indigenous peoples around the world and those of States in seeking to improve their relations with indigenous peoples. Most importantly, it expresses aspirations of the United States,

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aspirations that this country seeks to achieve within the structure of the U.S. Constitution, laws, and international obligations, while also seeking, where appropriate, to improve our laws and policies. U.S. support for the Declaration goes hand in hand with the U.S. commitment to address the consequences of a history in which, as President Obama recognized,—few have been more marginalized and ignored by Washington for as long as Native Americans—our First Americans.|| That commitment is reflected in the many policies and programs that are being implemented by U.S. agencies in response to concerns raised by Native Americans, including poverty, unemployment, environmental degradation, health care gaps, violent crime, and discrimination. II.  The Review of the U.S. Position on the Declaration The decision to review the U.S. position on the Declaration came in response to calls from many tribes, individual Native Americans, civil society, and others in the United States, who believed that U.S. support for the Declaration would make an important contribution to U.S. policy and practice with respect to Native American issues. The decision by the United States to support the Declaration was the result of a thorough review of the Declaration by the relevant federal agencies. In conducting its review of the Declaration, U.S. agencies consulted extensively with tribal leaders during three rounds of consultations, one in Rapid City, South Dakota, and two in Washington, D.C. In addition, the agencies conducted outreach to indigenous organizations, civil society, and other interested individuals. Tribal leaders and others contributed to the review through their attendance at the consultation and outreach sessions, participation in those sessions by means of conference calls, and written submissions. In total, over 3,000 written comments were received and reviewed. Tribes, groups, and individuals who participated in the review of the U.S. position on the Declaration presented a wide range of views on the meaning and importance of the Declaration. While they could not all be directly reflected in the U.S. position on the Declaration, they were all considered in the process. III.  The Declaration and U.S. Initiatives on Native American Issues The United States is home to over two million Native Americans, 565 federally recognized Indian tribes, and other indigenous communities. U.S. support for the Declaration reflects the U.S. commitment to work with those tribes, individuals, and communities to address the many challenges they face. The United States aspires to improve relations with indigenous peoples by looking to the principles embodied in the Declaration in its dealings with federally recognized tribes, while also working, as appropriate, with all indigenous individuals and communities in the United States. Moreover, the United States is committed to serving as a model in the international community in promoting and protecting the collective rights of indigenous peoples as well as the human rights of all individuals. The United States underlines its support for the Declaration’s recognition in the preamble that indigenous individuals are entitled without discrimination to all human rights recognized in international law, and that indigenous peoples possess certain additional, collective rights. The United States reads all of the provisions of the Declaration in light of this understanding of human rights and collective rights.

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U.S. agencies are currently engaged in numerous initiatives to address the concerns raised by Native American leaders and issues addressed in the Declaration. Many involve the continuation of activities highlighted in the White House Tribal Nations Conference Progress Report released in June 2010. Additional efforts to strengthen the governmentto-government relationship, protect lands and the environment and provide redress, address health care gaps, promote sustainable economic development, and protect Native American cultures are addressed below. III.  1 Strengthening the Government-to-Government Relationship As President Obama noted:—Washington can’t—and shouldn’t—dictate a policy agenda for Indian Country. Tribal nations do better when they make their own decisions. The record over the forty years since the United States adopted its policy of greater tribal autonomy is clear—tribal self-determination has enabled tribal governments to establish, develop, and enhance tribal institutions and infrastructure ranging from those addressing the health, education, and welfare of their communities to those such as tribal courts, fire protection, and law enforcement. The clear lesson is that empowering tribes to deal with the challenges they face and that taking advantage of the available opportunities will result in tribal communities that thrive. The United States is therefore pleased to support the Declaration’s call to promote the development of a new and distinct international concept of self-determination specific to indigenous peoples. The Declaration’s call is to promote the development of a concept of self-determination for indigenous peoples that is different from the existing right of self-determination in international law. The purpose of the Declaration was not to change or define the existing right of self-determination under international law. Further, as explained in Article 46, the Declaration does not imply any right to take any action that would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States. For the United States, the Declaration’s concept of self-determination is consistent with the United States’ existing recognition of, and relationship with, federally recognized tribes as political entities that have inherent sovereign powers of self-governance. This recognition is the basis for the special legal and political relationship, including the government-to-government relationship, established between the United States and federally recognized tribes, pursuant to which the United States supports, protects, and promotes tribal governmental authority over a broad range of internal and territorial affairs, including membership, culture, language, religion, education, information, social welfare, community and public safety, family relations, economic activities, lands and resource management, environment and entry by non-members, as well as ways and means for financing these autonomous governmental functions. Federal agencies are engaged in a wide range of activities to enhance tribal selfdetermination in areas crucial to the well-being of tribal members. The Department of Justice (DOJ), for example, is deeply committed to strengthening tribal police and judicial systems. Accordingly, the President’s FY 2011 Budget Request provides $321 million to DOJ for tribal public safety initiatives, an increase of 42% over FY 2010. This includes $255.6 million for grants to Indian tribes for tribal law enforcement efforts. The FY 2011 Budget Request also sustains FY 2010 appropriations increases of over 21% for Bureau of Indian Affairs-funded public safety and law enforcement efforts

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and includes an additional $19 million to support 81 new FBI positions (45 agents) to investigate violent crimes in Indian Country. These increases build on over $250 million in American Reinvestment and Recovery Act (Recovery Act) funds made available to tribes in FY 2009 to address criminal justice needs. In addition, on July 29, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Tribal Law and Order Act (TLOA). This comprehensive bill is aimed at improving public safety on tribal lands. The statute gives tribes greater authority to prosecute crimes and increases federal accountability for public safety in tribal communities. In conformity with the TLOA, the Attorney General established the Office of Tribal Justice as a separate component within the organizational structure of the Department of Justice. The Office has played, and will continue to play, a key role in DOJ’s ongoing initiative to improve public safety in Indian Country, and it serves as the primary channel for tribes to communicate their concerns to the Department, helps coordinate policy on Indian affairs both within DOJ and with other federal agencies, and seeks to ensure that DOJ and its components work with tribes on a government-to-government basis. The Departments of the Interior, Justice, and Health and Human Services are engaged in an unprecedented effort to consult with tribes to develop policy and implement this new law. In response to tribal input, DOJ has also streamlined its grant-making process. The Coordinated Tribal Assistance Solicitation (CTAS) combines ten different grant programs into a single solicitation. In September 2010, hundreds of American Indian and Alaska Native communities received the first grants under CTAS—almost $127 million to enhance law enforcement, bolster justice systems, prevent youth substance abuse, serve sexual assault and elder abuse victims, and support other tribal efforts to combat crime. During consultation sessions conducted by the Department of Education with over 350 tribal leaders in 2010, those leaders stressed the importance of greater tribal control over the education of Indian students. The Administration agrees. Therefore, the Department of Education has proposed changes to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) to enhance the role of tribes in Indian education and allow greater flexibility in the use of federal education funds to meet the unique needs of Native American students. Sixteen different tribes, from Maine to Alaska, participated this summer in the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Indian Affairs Water Training Program. The Training Program is taught by instructors from several Department of the Interior bureaus. The program strengthens tribal governments and prepares them to manage their own natural resources with qualified tribal government employees who have the necessary expertise to help alleviate the shortage of technical expertise on Indian reservations. Other agency programs that enhance tribal self-determination are discussed in subsequent sections. In addition to enhancing the self-determination of federally recognized tribes, the Obama Administration has supported the Native Hawaiian Government Reorganization Act, which provides a process for forming a Native Hawaiian governing entity that would be recognized by, and have a government-to-government relationship with, the United States. Congress has also enacted many more narrowly focused statutes for Native Hawaiians similar to those for other native people, such as the National Historic Preservation Act, which provides protections to properties with religious and cultural importance to Native American Indian tribes and Native Hawaiians; the Native Hawaiian Education Act, which establishes programs to facilitate the education of Native 1358

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Hawaiians; the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act, which provides housing assistance in the form of grants and loans; and the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, which protects Native American Indian, Alaska Native, and Native Hawaiian gravesites. U.S. Government efforts to strengthen the government-to-government relationship with tribes cannot be limited to enhancing tribal self-determination. It is also crucial that U.S. agencies have the necessary input from tribal leaders before those agencies themselves take actions that have a significant impact on the tribes. It is for this reason that President Obama signed the Presidential Memorandum on the implementation of Executive Order 13175,—Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, and directed all federal agencies to develop detailed plans of action to implement the Executive Order. In this regard, the United States recognizes the significance of the Declaration’s provisions on free, prior and informed consent, which the United States understands to call for a process of meaningful consultation with tribal leaders, but not necessarily the agreement of those leaders, before the actions addressed in those consultations are taken. The United States intends to continue to consult and cooperate in good faith with federally recognized tribes and, as applicable, Native Hawaiians, on policies that directly and substantially affect them and to improve our cooperation and consultation processes, in accordance with federal law and President Obama’s call for better implementation of Executive Order 13175. The United States does so with the firm policy objective, where possible, of obtaining the agreement of those tribes consistent with our democratic system and laws. At the same time, the United States intends to improve our engagement with other indigenous individuals and groups. The United States will also continue to implement the many U.S. laws that require the agreement of federally recognized tribes or indigenous groups before certain actions can be taken or that require redress for takings of property. U.S. Government efforts in this area are numerous. Federal agencies have submitted the consultation plans required by the Presidential Memorandum and are currently implementing them. A number of agencies have created new offices to ensure proper implementation of their consultation policies. Examples are the Office of Tribal Government Relations in the Department of Veterans Affairs, which will be established in 2011, and the Office of Tribal Relations in the Department of Agriculture. Other agencies, like the Department of Energy, found it appropriate to establish a Tribal Steering Committee to analyze the agencies’ consultation practices. Similarly, the Department of Health and Human Services established a Secretary-level Tribal Advisory Committee to create a coordinated, department-wide strategy to improve consultations with Indian tribes. In addition, some agencies have experimented with—webinars—and other online technology to permit tribal leaders to participate in consultations without incurring the costs and time commitments of in-person sessions. These innovations show the seriousness with which federal agencies are taking consultations. In addition, the Administration is continuing its multi-agency collaborations with tribal governments to develop comprehensive policy for Indian Country. Several agencies are working together on policy priorities and are coordinating on consultation sessions. For example, the Departments of the Interior and Education have been working closely to combine and coordinate their resources, and to maximize their efforts to impact Indian education. As part of the United States review of its position on the Declaration, fourteen 1359

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federal agencies participated in tribal consultations, which included sessions held in Indian Country and at the State Department. Federal agencies have put their consultation plans to work over the past year in a wide variety of contexts, and the valuable input received from tribal leaders is reflected throughout U.S. policies and programs in Indian Country. III.  2 Protection of Native American Lands and the Environment, and Redress The United States recognizes that some of the most grievous acts committed by the United States and many other States against indigenous peoples were with regard to their lands, territories, and natural resources. For this reason, the United States has taken many steps to ensure the protection of Native American lands and natural resources, and to provide redress where appropriate. It is also for this reason that the United States stresses the importance of the lands, territories, resources and redress provisions of the Declaration in calling on all States to recognize the rights of indigenous peoples to their lands, territories, and natural resources. Consistent with its understanding of the intention of the States that negotiated and adopted the Declaration, the United States understands these provisions to call for the existence of national laws and mechanisms for the full legal recognition of the lands, territories, and natural resources indigenous peoples currently possess by reason of traditional ownership, occupation, or use as well as those that they have otherwise acquired. The Declaration further calls upon States to recognize, as appropriate, additional interests of indigenous peoples in traditional lands, territories, and natural resources. Consistent with that understanding, the United States intends to continue to work so that the laws and mechanisms it has put in place to recognize existing, and accommodate the acquisition of additional, land, territory, and natural resource rights under U.S. law function properly and to facilitate, as appropriate, access by indigenous peoples to the traditional lands, territories and natural resources in which they have an interest. U.S. agency initiatives in this area are numerous. Perhaps most significantly, the Obama Administration has acquired over 34,000 acres of land in trust on behalf of Indian tribes, which is a 225 percent increase since 2006. Lands held in trust for tribes are used for housing, economic development, government services, cultural and natural resource protection, and other critical purposes. Recovering and protecting the tribes’ land base is a hallmark objective of this Administration. After the recent Supreme Court decision in Carcieri v. Salazar, Congress introduced, and the Administration has fully supported, legislation to reaffirm the authority of the United States to take land into trust on behalf of all federally recognized Indian tribes. In addition, the United States intervened in a federal suit, Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan and United States v. Granholm, and worked to facilitate a settlement that recognizes the tribe’s entire reservation to be Indian Country, resolving over a century of disputes over the boundaries and existence of the reservation. The court approved that settlement on November 23, 2010. This settlement, which involves the tribe, the United States, the State of Michigan, and local governments, will promote greater intergovernmental cooperation and provide the clarity necessary for effective law enforcement and civil regulation on the reservation. The United States has also sought to protect tribal lands, and tribal jurisdiction over those lands, in several other court cases, including the City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, Cayuga Nation v. Gould, and Water Wheel v. LaRance. 1360

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Other agency initiatives include the release by the Forest Service of $37.3 million in Recovery Act funds directly to tribes for wild land fire management and the improvement of habitat and watersheds. Of the total Forest Service funding received under the Recovery Act, $213 million was provided to benefit tribes and tribal lands. The Obama Administration has also made extensive efforts to resolve longstanding Native American legal claims against the United States and private entities related to lands, natural resources, and other issues. In 2009, the United States reached an agreement for over $1.79 billion to address contamination at over 80 sites in 19 states pursuant to resolution of the American Smelting and Refining Company, LLC (ASARCO) bankruptcy. The settlement includes approximately $194 million for the recovery of wildlife, habitat, and other natural resources managed by the federal, state, and tribal governments at more than a dozen sites. The settlement is part of the largest environmental damage bankruptcy case in U.S. history, and resolves ASARCO’s environmental liabilities from mining and smelting operations that contaminated land, water, and wildlife resources on federal, state, tribal, and private land. In late October 2010, the Administration reached a $760 million settlement with Native American farmers and ranchers, in Keepseagle v. Vilsack, a case alleging discrimination by the Department of Agriculture in loan programs. Under the agreement, the Department of Agriculture will pay $680 million in damages and forgive $80 million of outstanding farm loan debt. The federal government also agreed to create a 15-member Native American Farmer and Rancher Council to advise the Department, appoint a Department ombudsman, provide more technical assistance to Native American borrowers, and conduct a systematic review of farm loan program rules. On December 9, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Claims Resolution Act, which includes the Cobell v. Salazar settlement agreement. In 1996, Elouise Cobell charged the Department of the Interior with failing to account for billions of dollars that it was supposed to collect on behalf of more than 300,000 individual Native Americans. After fourteen years of litigation, enactment of the Claims Resolution Act finally closes an unfortunate chapter in our history. The Act creates a fund of $1.5 billion dollars to address historic accounting and trust management issues, and it also allocates up to $1.9 billion dollars to convert some of the most highly fractionated individual Indian lands into land that can be managed for the broader benefit of the respective tribe. As part of the $1.9 billion, a trust fund of up to $60 million dollars is being created for a scholarship fund for Native Americans. In addition, this law includes an unprecedented package of four water settlements benefitting seven tribes in Arizona, Montana, and New Mexico. This law finally gives the Crow, White Mountain Apache Tribe, and the Pueblos of Taos, Tesuque, Nambe, Pojoaque, and San Ildefonso permanent access to secure water supplies year round. As noted by Secretary of the Interior Salazar,—Congress’ approval of the Cobell settlement and the four Indian water rights settlements is nothing short of historic for Indian nations.|| He explained that the settlements—represent a major step forward in President Obama’s agenda to empower tribal governments, fulfill our trust responsibilities to tribal members and help tribal leaders build safer, stronger, healthier and more prosperous communities. They demonstrate not only that the United States has a well-developed court system that provides a means of redress for many wrongs suffered by U.S. citizens, residents and others—including federally recognized tribes and indigenous individuals 1361

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and groups -- but also that redress is available from the U.S. Congress under appropriate circumstances. The United States will interpret the redress provisions of the Declaration to be consistent with the existing system for legal redress in the United States, while working to ensure that appropriate redress is in fact provided under U.S. law. The Administration is likewise committed to protecting the environment, and recognizes that many indigenous peoples depend upon a healthy environment for subsistence fishing, hunting and gathering. The Administration therefore acknowledges the importance of the provisions of the Declaration that address environmental issues. While there is far more that needs to be done, the United States is taking many steps to address environmental challenges in Indian Country and beyond. In July 2010, President Obama signed Executive Order 13547, Stewardship of the Ocean, our Coasts, and the Great Lakes, drafted with substantial input from tribes, which established a Governance Coordination Committee with three tribal representatives, as well as tribal engagement in developing priority action areas. Of special interest are the priority areas of the Arctic and developing coastal and marine spatial plans. In 2010, the Department of the Interior (DOI) provided grants worth more than $7 million through the Tribal Wildlife Grants Program for 42 Native American tribes to fund a wide range of conservation projects in sixteen states. The Tribal Wildlife Grants program has provided more than $50 million in the past eight years for 400 conservation projects administered by 162 federally-recognized tribes. The grants provide technical and financial assistance for the development and implementation of projects that benefit fish and wildlife resources and their habitat, including non-game species. DOI has also engaged in numerous cooperative resource protection efforts with tribes, including a water quality and biologic condition assessments agreement with the Sac and Fox on the Iowa River, restoration of the Klamath River though possible dam removal and in partnership with the Klamath River Basin tribes, and assistance to the Great Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife Commission to assess the impact of land use and climate change on wetlands. Over the past year, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) awarded targeted grants to tribes for specific preventative tasks to address environmental degradation, including $150,000 to the Eight Northern Indian Pueblo Council to establish a Brownfields Tribal Response Program that will promote environmental health for several Pueblos and tribes in New Mexico and West Texas. Two additional grants were made for projects run by tribes in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan as a part of President Obama’s Great Lakes Restoration Initiative, a $475 million program that represents the largest investment in the Great Lakes in two decades. The grants are to the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community to develop a sustainable hazardous waste collection program to serve tribal and nontribal community members, and help prevent toxic contaminants from entering Lake Superior, and to the Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa to improve habitat and water quality in the Bear River Watershed, which directly affects waters flowing into Little Traverse Bay on Lake Michigan. The Department of Agriculture also invested $84.8 million dollars in water and environmental projects benefitting tribal communities in the lower 48 U.S. states during FY 2010 and an additional $66.2 million dollars for similar projects benefitting tribal communities in Alaska through the Rural Alaska Village Grants program. A further $120.8 million was invested in essential community facilities benefitting tribal communities.

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The Department of Energy (DOE) provides grants to many Indian communities to allow them to develop renewable energy resources and energy efficiency measures in their communities in ways that benefit not only those communities, but the whole planet, while serving as models for other U.S. communities. With DOE assistance, tribes are developing a wide-range of renewable energy resources and conservation measures, including geothermal, solar energy, wind and biomass technologies and comprehensive recycling programs. These programs reduce the carbon footprint of tribal communities, while creating jobs and reducing costs. DOE has also worked closely with the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes to clean up contamination from Cold War storage of hazardous waste at the Idaho National Laboratory, the tribes’ ancestral home. The Shoshone-Bannock Tribes have the technical capabilities and qualifications, funded by a DOE-Idaho Cooperative Agreement, to assist the Department and the regulators in reviewing the effectiveness of the cleanup work and assuring that the environment, and particularly the Snake River Plain Aquifer, are not contaminated or threatened. The Fisheries and the Northwest Protected Resources Division of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) also consults formally and informally with the Northwest treaty tribes when considering the designation of critical habitat for endangered species, including salmon, to ensure the agency is informed of relevant tribal science and any potential impacts to the tribe that may arise from a designation of tribal lands as critical habitat. Documented information from these consultations with NOAA has ensured the protection of listed species and minimized any impact to tribal trust resources. Additionally, NOAA Fisheries and NOAA General Counsel for the Northwest consult with four tribes with ocean treaty fishing rights for groundfish in conjunction with the Pacific Fishery Management Council process. An example of the success of this practice is that, in 2010, NOAA Fisheries adopted a tribal whiting allocation that was agreed to by all affected tribes and the State of Washington. III.  3 Addressing Health Care Gaps The Obama Administration understands the priority tribal leaders place on improving the delivery of health care services in their communities, as well as the significance of related provisions in the Declaration. The Administration has responded, as evidenced by the 13% increase in funding for the Indian Health Service (IHS) in FY 2010 and the 9% additional increase for IHS proposed in the President’s FY 2011 Budget Request. These increases are on top of $500 million provided to the IHS under the Recovery Act. After President Obama signed the Affordable Care Act into law in March, making permanent the Indian Health Care Improvement Act, IHS initiated consultations with tribal leaders to implement the Act and determine their priorities. Tribes identified longterm care, behavior health, and diabetes/dialysis as their primary concerns. IHS held a meeting on Long Term Care in Indian Country on November 1-2, 2010 to begin the conversation about implementation priorities with tribes. IHS is also continuing the Special Diabetes Program for Indians, a Congressionally-approved grant program now in its thirteenth year, which has resulted in increased control of diabetes in indigenous communities and decreasing rates of end stage renal disease. Related demonstration projects have also shown significant promise. Tribes also stressed the need to improve the collaboration and coordination of services for veterans eligible for both the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and IHS services. 1363

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The IHS Director met with VA Secretary Shinseki in May 2010, and they agreed to update the 2003 VA-IHS MOU governing their agencies’ cooperation. The updated MOU was signed in October 2010 and a letter to tribal leaders initiating a consultation on the implementation of the MOU was released in November 2010. The Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of the Interior are working together to combat the problem of suicide in Indian Country. The two Departments launched a series of listening sessions between November 2010 and February 2011 to obtain the input of tribal leaders on how the agencies can effectively work within their communities to prevent suicide. The information gathered will inform a major Suicide Prevention Summit to be held in Spring 2011. III.  4 Promoting Sustainable Economic Development The Obama Administration has also taken numerous steps, consistent with the Declaration, to promote the economic wellbeing of indigenous peoples in the United States. A priority for the Administration has been to combat unemployment in Indian Country as evidenced by the President’s FY 2011 Budget Request, which includes $55 million, representing a 4% increase over FY 2010 funding, for the Department of Labor’s Employment and Training Administration’s Indian and Native American Program, which grants funding to tribes and Native American non-profits to provide employment and training services to unemployed and low-income Native Americans, Alaska Natives, and Native Hawaiians. Additionally, the Recovery Act allocated over $17 million for the Native American Supplemental Youth Service Program to support summer employment and training opportunities for disconnected youths. In addition, this summer, the Department of Labor awarded approximately $53 million to 178 grantees to provide quality employment and training services specifically for Native American adults who are unemployed, underemployed and low-income individuals. It awarded an additional $13.8 million in grants to 78 tribes, tribal consortiums, and tribal non-profit organizations to offer summer employment and training activities for American Indian, Alaska Native and Native Hawaiian youth between the ages of 14 and 21, residing on or near Indian reservations or Alaska Native villages. The youth program targets high school dropouts and youth in need of basic skills training and provides an array of employment and training services, including job placement assistance, work experience, and occupational skills training. In addition, the Recovery Act included $17.8 million in grant funding for Native American youth activities, including summer employment and training opportunities. The Department of Labor has also been working to address the needs of Native Americans with disabilities. It has collaborated with tribal colleges and universities through the Workforce Recruitment Program to provide internship opportunities for students with federal employers. The Department, tribal colleges and universities, and the National Indian Health Board have worked together to develop a training curriculum for tribal members with disabilities that will provide the opportunity for them to become Community Health Aides. In addition, Add Us In, a new initiative sponsored by the Department, is designed to identify and develop strategies to increase employment opportunities within the small business community for individuals with disabilities. This initiative includes targeted Native American owned and operated small businesses. In addition, the Treasury Department has a program to strengthen the economic health of Native American communities generally. The Native American Community 1364

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Development Financial Institutions (CDFI) Assistance Program, or NACA Program, now includes 57 certified Native CDFIs. CDFIs are non-government financial entities whose primary mission is to promote community development, principally by serving and being accountable to a low-income community, and by providing development services. Native participation in NACA increased significantly in 2009 and 2010, and on April 30, 2010, the CDFI Fund announced awards totaling $10.3 million to be used for small business/ venture capital, affordable housing, and consumer loans. Tribal leaders regularly identify the lack of adequate housing as a major impediment to economic development in their communities. To assist with addressing housing needs, the Recovery Act allocated $510 million to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) for the Native American Housing Block Grant program for new housing construction, acquisition, rehabilitation, and infrastructure development. By December 1, 2010, tribal recipients had already expended almost two-thirds of those funds for new construction, rehabilitations, energy-efficient improvements, and infrastructure development in Indian Country. In addition, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has a number of other housing initiatives. On October 12, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Indian Veterans Housing Opportunity Act. The Act amends the definition of—income for HUD’s Indian Housing Block Grant program so that the determination of a family’s income excludes amounts received from the Department of Veterans Affairs for a service-related disability, dependency, or indemnity compensation. The new law will benefit disabled Native American veterans and their families who might otherwise be ineligible for low-income housing assistance under HUD’s program. In 2011 and 2012, HUD will conduct a comprehensive, national Native American Housing Needs Assessment Study. Before field research begins, the Office of Native American Programs is sponsoring a series of seven regional outreach meetings with tribal housing stakeholders, including tribal leaders; federal agencies; and private sector, nonprofit, and state entities to discuss the upcoming study and to lay the groundwork for maximum participation. These outreach meetings will provide a forum for discussing the community and economic impact housing has on tribal communities as well as identifying the needs for creating sustainable reservation communities and economies. These meetings will continue the ongoing dialogue between HUD and tribal leaders in Indian Country. The Administration is also committed to supporting Native Americans’ success in K-12 and higher education. The Recovery Act invested $170.5 million in Indian education at the Department of Education and $277 million in Indian school construction at the Department of the Interior. The President’s FY 2011 Budget Request provides $31.7 million in funding for Tribally Controlled Colleges and Universities in the Department of Education, a 5% increase over FY 2010. The Budget Request includes $127 million for postsecondary education for Native Americans under the Department of the Interior. The Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act increases the maximum Pell Grant award by the Consumer Price Index, which is estimated to raise the award from $5,550 to $5,975, according to the Congressional Budget Office. In addition, the law provides $300 million for Tribally Controlled Colleges and Universities, $50 million for Native American-Serving Nontribal Institutions, and $150 million for Alaska Native and Native Hawaiian-Serving Institutions over the next ten years. These investments will be made in order to renew, reform, and expand programming so that students at these institutions are 1365

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given every chance to reach their full potentials. These efforts respond to the concerns of Native American leaders as well as priorities identified in the Declaration. In addition, President Obama appointed members to the Department of Education’s National Advisory Council on Indian Education (Council), as authorized by the ESEA, who met for the first time on November 3, 2010. The current Council consists of fourteen members who are Native Americans. The Council is required to advise the Secretary of Education concerning the funding and administration of Department programs that include or may benefit American Indians and Alaska Natives, make recommendations to the Secretary of Education for filling the position of Director of Indian Education, and submit a report to Congress on any recommendations that the Council considers appropriate for the improvement of federal education programs that include or may benefit Native Americans. The Department of Education is also working to combat discrimination against Native Americans in education. In March 2011, the Department’s Office for Civil Rights will provide technical assistance on civil rights issues that affect Native American communities in California, with particular focus on national origin and race discrimination, harassment, and bullying, to an audience of parents, activists, tribal leaders, teachers, and school leaders. Together with the Department of Health and Human Services, it will also provide in fall 2011 technical assistance to parents and students, as well as social outreach service providers for the Native American communities, on civil rights issues that affect Native American communities in Minnesota and North Dakota. The Administration is also working with tribal leaders to bring their communities into the 21st Century by equipping them with high speed access to the Internet. Both the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Commerce have programs to do so. The Department of Agriculture recently awarded $32 million to bring high speed, affordable broadband to the Navajo Nation. The Department of Agriculture also received Recovery Act funds to expand broadband access. It provided grants and loans totaling over $158 million to expand broadband access in tribal communities through the Broadband Initiatives Program. This included ten infrastructure investments directly to tribes and tribally-owned businesses and eleven technical assistance awards to tribes to assist with regional broadband plans to promote economic development. The National Telecommunications and Information Administration of the Department of Commerce awarded almost 30 percent of the $4.7 billion that the Department received from the Recovery Act to Indian tribes and recipients that indicated that their projects will benefit tribal areas. This funding will be used to increase access to broadband services in underserved areas of the country. Similarly, the Department of Agriculture’s Rural Development office made $216.3 million in Recovery Act investments benefiting American Indian and Alaska Native populations, including $36.3 million for community water and wastewater infrastructure, $97.5 million for community facilities, and $81.1 million for single family housing (691 home loans). In addition, the Recovery Act allocated $310 million to the Department of Transportation for the Indian Reservation Roads Program and over $142 million to the Department of the Interior for roads maintenance. III.  5 Protecting Native American Cultures As President Obama has recognized, the indigenous peoples of North America have—invaluable cultural knowledge and rich traditions, which continue to thrive in 1366

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Native American communities across our country. The many facets of Native American cultures—including their religions, languages, traditions and arts—need to be protected, as reflected in multiple provisions of the Declaration. Because of the breadth and depth of Native American cultures, they affect and are affected by the activities of many U.S. agencies. Some of those agencies’ efforts are noted in this section. In July, President Obama signed into law the Indian Arts and Crafts Amendments Act to strengthen the Indian Arts and Crafts Act, which makes it illegal to sell, offer, or display for sale any art or craft product in a manner that falsely suggests it is Indian-produced, an Indian product, or the product of a particular Indian tribe. The new act empowers all federal law enforcement officers to enforce this prohibition and differentiates among penalties based on the price of the goods involved in the offense. The total market for American Indian and Alaska Native arts and crafts in the United States is estimated at a billion dollars, with an unknown but substantial amount of those sales going to misrepresented, non-authentic works. The Secretary of Agriculture, in a letter of July 2, 2010, directed the Department of Agriculture’s Office of Tribal Relations and the Forest Service to begin a process of review of all Forest Service policies and to consult with interested tribes about how the Department and the Forest Service can do a better job addressing sacred site issues while simultaneously balancing pursuit of the agency’s mission to deliver forest goods and services for current and future generations. He emphasized the need to examine the effectiveness of existing laws and regulations in ensuring a consistent level of sacred site protection that is more acceptable to the tribes. On July 30, 2010, the United Nations inscribed the Papahānaumokuākea Marine National Monument as the first mixed (natural and cultural) World Heritage Site in the United States. The Department of the Interior played a leading role in coordinating the development of the nomination dossier and successful inscription by the World Heritage Committee. Papahānaumokuākea’s inscription as a World Heritage Site is important to Native Hawaiians because it recognizes and incorporates the richness of the habitat and wildlife with the living, indigenous, cultural connections to the sea—where modern Hawaiian wayfinders (non-instrument navigators) still voyage for navigational training on traditional double-hulled sailing canoes; an aspect of inscription unique to Papahānaumokuākea. Additionally, World Heritage status places this traditional skill, which was used to navigate across the world’s largest ocean—one of the greatest feats of human kind—onto the world stage. Since April 2010 the Department of Education has held six regional consultations with tribal officials regarding reauthorization of the ESEA. Among the statements heard time and time again were those on the importance of preserving Native languages. In response, the Administration has proposed changes to the ESEA that support, among other things, flexibility in the use of federal education funds to allow funding for Native language immersion and Native language restoration programs. Due to joint efforts of federal agencies and tribes, 152 notices of decisions to repatriate human remains and cultural items were published in the Federal Register in 2010. Each of these notices is a direct consequence of museums and federal agencies consulting with tribes concerning the repatriation of human remains and cultural items previously held in collections. These notices account for 1,628 human remains and 9,062 associated funerary objects, an additional 2,052 funerary objects not associated with an individual, 1367

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11 sacred objects, 10 objects of cultural patrimony, and an additional 388 items that are both sacred objects and objects of cultural patrimony. In addition, the Forest Service is exercising its authority to assist tribes over the next several years in reburial of over 3,000 sets of human remains and their associated cultural items that had been removed from National Forests. The Department of the Interior, through the Fish and Wildlife Service, has also begun efforts with tribes to facilitate eagle feather possession for cultural and traditional uses and to promote coordination in wildlife investigations and enforcement efforts to protect golden and bald eagles. Moreover, the Department of the Interior awarded over $8 million to support historic preservation programs and projects for Indian tribes, Alaska Natives, and Native Hawaiian organizations. $7,250,000 was awarded to 100 Tribal Historic Preservation Officer programs, and $899,316 to 26 communities for a broad range of cultural heritage projects. IV. Conclusion The United States has made great strides in improving its relationship with Native Americans and indigenous peoples around the world. However, much remains to be done. U.S. agencies look forward to continuing to work with tribal leaders, and all interested stakeholders, so that the United States can be a better model for the international community in protecting and promoting the rights of indigenous peoples.

Document 289 Joint Statement by Canada and the European Union on Access to the European Union of Seal Products from Indigenous Communities of Canada (18 August 2014)* Purpose This joint statement sets out the framework for cooperation to enable access to the European Union of seal products that result from hunts traditionally conducted by Canadian indigenous communities and which contribute to their subsistence. Introduction Having regard to the values, interests, culture, and traditions of indigenous communities; Recognising that the hunting of seals by indigenous communities of Canada has been an integral part of their tradition, culture, and identity since time immemorial and that they rely on the seal hunt for the direct necessities of life and to sustain their communities economically through the income it generates; Recalling that the European Union's regulations on trade in seal products seek to ensure that the fundamental economic and social interests of indigenous communities which hunt seals for their subsistence will not be adversely affected; Canada and the European Union confirm the following: * 

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Principles An expert group representing the two sides will work expeditiously towards the establishment of the administrative arrangements required for access to the European Union, in accordance with applicable laws and regulations, of seal products that result from hunts traditionally conducted by Canadian indigenous communities and which contribute to their subsistence. When doing so, both sides will be guided by the following principles: the particularities and special challenges of establishing an attestation system for seal products from Canadian indigenous communities should be taken into consideration; the attestation conditions for seal products from Canadian indigenous communities will be no less favourable than those which have been and will be applied to seal products from any other indigenous community which obtain or seek access for seal products to the European Union; nothing should prevent the participation of Canadian non-indigenous persons and entities processing, manufacturing, and marketing Canadian indigenous seal products; the placing on the market of seal products that result from hunts traditionally conducted by Canadian indigenous communities and which contribute to their subsistence should not be limited based on the type of seal products or the purpose for which the product is imported to the European Union from Canada; and, the European Commission will take appropriate measures to inform competent authorities, including customs officials, in the Member States of the European Union regarding market access of seal products from Canadian indigenous communities that meet the conditions for import into the European Union. With the aim of enabling access to the European Union of seal products from Canadian indigenous communities as soon as possible, Canada will endeavour to provide, at its earliest convenience, the information necessary to enable the European Commission to complete its assessment of the attestation system in accordance with applicable laws and regulations. The European Commission will endeavour to complete this assessment expeditiously. Support for Indigenous Communities Recognising the importance of preserving the traditional way of life of indigenous communities, including their ability to benefit from the indigenous exemption, while at the same time enabling them to benefit from economic development, the two sides will: pursue discussions on possible participation by Canadian partners in the new European Union Northern Periphery and Arctic Programme; explore possibilities for supporting indigenous communities and traditional ways of life through capacity building and exchange of best practices; explore how indigenous communities can benefit from the new opportunities to be opened up by the Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, to develop their economic, social, and environmental potential; explore how bilateral European Union-Canada research cooperation, including the incorporation of traditional knowledge, can bring benefits relevant to indigenous communities;

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identify other areas of mutual interest where exchange of expertise and dialogue could benefit indigenous communities, including the marketing of traditional products; and, continue to engage in regular dialogue with representatives of indigenous communities, with a view to increasing mutual understanding. This joint statement is without prejudice to any measures taken by the European Union to implement the findings and recommendations of the World Trade Organization Panel and the Appellate Body in the disputes European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, WT/DS400 and WT/DS401.

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Northwest Passage Document 290 Canada, Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs: ­Canadian Position in relation to Arctic Waters: Passage of the United States Ship Seadragon (10 June 1960)* You will recall that Canadian Naval Headquarters received notification of the intended transfer of the Nuclear Submarine Seadragon in August or September of this year from the Atlantic to the Pacific through the Northwest Passage. You have been considering the implications of this notification and the reply which might be made to it. The earlier notification from the United States was apparently only preliminary advice that the passage was being considered. The transfer of the vessel to the Pacific has now been decided upon and “Canadian concurrence” for the voyage has been requested. This request will greatly strengthen our claim to the waters of the Canadian Archipelago as internal waters. It is recommended, therefore, that advantage be taken of this development and that the request be granted in accordance with the Canada-United States agreed clearance procedure for visits by public vessels between Canada and the United States by a reply being sent on a service to service basis. NA R[obertson]

Document 291 Canadian Interdepartmental Committee on Territorial Waters to the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Territorial ­Waters Passage of the United States Ship Seadragon through the ­Arctic Archipelago (8 June 1960)** Dear Mr. Cadieux: Further to my letter dated 9 May, 1960 concerning the transfer of the nuclear submarine USS Seadragon from the Atlantic to the Pacific Fleet via the Northwest Passage, attached for information is a copy of the message received from the USN through the Naval Member Canadian Joint Staff Washington. It is noted that the USN have requested Canadian concurrence for the proposed transfer of Seadragron via Lancaster Sound, Viscount Melville Sound and McClure Strait during period 1 to 20 August 1960. This request is in accordance with Canada-US agreed clearance procedure for visits by public vessels between Canada and the United States (Local Notification Procedure). Copy of this procedure is attached for information. The passage of the Seadragon is classed as an operational visit and in such cases normally notification only is required on a service to service basis. *  (1960) 27 Documents on Canadian External Relations Doc 665. Contains information licensed under the Open Government Licence—Canada. **  (1960) 27 Documents on Canadian External Relations Doc 664. Contains information licensed under the Open Government Licence—Canada.

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Subject to the concurrence of the Interdepartmental Committee, it is proposed to forward concurrence to this passage. No reply will be made to MCCM 833 dated 25 April 1960 as this was purely an informative memorandum. It is requested that this may be given earliest consideration to ensure that the reply to the USN request is not delayed. […] Following despatch received from Chief of Naval Operations “further to MCCM 833 dated 25 April concerning transfer USS Seadragon (SSN 584) from Atlantic fleet to Pacific fleet. Preliminary planning studies have been completed and it is now proposed to transfer Seadragon via Lancaster Sound CMM Viscount Melville Sound and McClure Strait during period 1 to 20 August. Request you obtain Canadian concurrence.” 2. Request reply.

Document 292 Telegram 1117 from the Canadian Ambassador to the US Secretary of State concerning the passage of the United States Ship Seadragon through the Arctic Archipelago (28 April 1960)* The naval attaché, Commodore Robertson, has informed us that the Secretary, USA Section, Military Cooperation Committee, has advised the Secretary of the Canadian Section under MCM-833 of 25 April 1960 as follows: “(1) In order that Canadian military authorities may have advice of USA intentions, the following date is provided as a matter of info on a USA navy project. (2) During August-September, 1960 USA navy intends to transfer the USS Seadragon (SS(N)584) from the Atlantic fleet to the Pacific fleet. (3) The planned route is via Baffin Bay, Lancaster Sound, Viscount Melville Sound, McClure Strait, thence via the Arctic Basin and Bering Strait to the Pacific Ocean. Seadragon will conduct under-ice exploration and scientific studies while in the Arctic Basin. The duration of the voyage will be about thirty-five days.” 2. It is our understanding that Commodore Robertson has been invited to make the trip with Seadragon and has accepted, subject to naval headquarters approval. Meantime Commodore Robertson is sitting in on USN meetings at which plans are being laid for this voyage and has undertaken to keep us informed of developments. 3. We understand that the above-quoted text is intended as early advance info of the USN’s plans. Commodore Robertson understands that later a request for permission will come forward in accordance with procedures governing entrance of USA vessels into Canadian waters.

Document 293 Diplomatic Note from the Canadian Department of External Affairs to the US Embassy in Ottawa concerning the transit of the United States Coast Guard Cutter Polar Sea (31 July 1985)** The Government of Canada has noted with deep regret that the United States remains unwilling, as it has been for many years, to accept that the waters of the Arctic archipelago, *  (1960) 27 Documents on Canadian External Relations Doc 663. Contains information licensed under the Open Government Licence—Canada. **  US Department of State, File No P85 0118-0711/0714. Contains information licensed under the Open Government Licence—Canada.

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including the Northwest Passage, are internal waters of Canada and fall within Canadian sovereignty. The Government of Canada must accordingly reaffirm its determination to maintain the status of these waters as an integral part of Canadian territory, which has never been and never can be assimilated to the regime of high seas or the regime of international straits. Canadian sovereignty in respect to Canada’s Arctic waters has been and remains well established in fact and law, and the voyage of the Polar Sea can in no way affect that situation. In this regard, the Government of Canada indeed shares the view of the United States, communicated in the State Department’s Note No. 222 of June 24, 1985, that “the transit, and the preparations for it, in no way prejudice the juridical position of either side regarding the Northwest Passage.” The Government of Canada has also noted the cooperative approach proposed by the United States regarding the voyage of the Polar Sea and is prepared to follow such an approach on the basis of a clear understanding as to the non-prejudicial nature of the voyage. In particular, the Government of Canada has welcomed the consultations held both at the diplomatic level and between the United States Coast Guard and the Canadian Coast Guard, and the information and assurances provided in relation to the Polar Sea itself and the arrangements for its voyage, always without prejudice to the legal position of either government. This information and these assurances have satisfied the Government of Canada that appropriate measures have been taken by or under the authority of the Government of the United States to ensure that the Polar Sea substantially complies with required standards for navigation in the waters of the Arctic archipelago and that in all other respects reasonable precautions have been taken to reduce the danger of pollution arising from this voyage. Accordingly, the Embassy is now in a position to notify the United States that, in the exercise of Canadian sovereignty over the Northwest Passage, the Government of Canada is pleased to consent to the proposed transit, and that, on the basis of the information and assurances provided, and in conformity with subsection 12(2) of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, it is also pleased to issue an order exempting the Polar Sea from the application of Canadian regulations under subsection 12(1) of the said Act. The relevant Order-in-Council will be issued on Thursday, August 1, 1985. The Government of Canada is also pleased to accept the United States invitation to participate in the voyage of the Polar Sea. Arrangements for such participation will be made between the Canadian Coast Guard and the United States Coast Guard. In addition, the Government of Canada wishes to inform the United States that Canadian agencies will be monitoring the progress of the voyage and will be prepared to render appropriate assistance as required.

Document 294 Diplomatic Note from the US Embassy in Ottawa to the Canadian Department of External Affairs concerning the transit of the United States Coast Guard Cutter Polar Sea (24 June 1985)* The United States notes the Canadian statement that the waters of the Arctic archipelago, including the Northwest Passage, are internal waters of Canada and fall within Canadian *  M Nash (ed), Cumulative Digest of US Practice in International Law 1981–1988 Vol II (Washington DC, US Government Printing Office, 1994) 2047.

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sovereignty. As the Government of Canada is aware, the United States does not share this view. For this reason, although the United States is pleased to invite Canadian participation in the transit, it has not sought the permission of the Government of Canada, nor has it given Canada notification of the fact of the transit. The United States shares the desire of the Government of Canada that the transit be facilitated in the spirit of cooperation that has long characterized the relationship between our two Coast Guards. The United States is therefore pleased at the positive response of the Government of Canada to the Embassy’s advice of May 21, 1985, that an invitation would be issued for Canadian participation in the transit voyage. As part of that invitation, the United States Coast Guard has already informed the Canadian Coast Guard regarding the timing and routing of the transit. The Government of Canada can be assured that the transit will be conducted in a manner that will pose no danger to the environment or ecology in the vicinity of the Northwest Passage. The Canadian Coast Guard is fully aware of the capabilities, including the specifications, of the icebreaker Polar Sea. The United States considers that this transit, and the preparations for it, in no way prejudice the juridical position of either side regarding the Northwest Passage, and it understands that the Government of Canada shares that view.

Document 295 Diplomatic Note from the Canadian Department of External Affairs to the US Embassy in Ottawa concerning the transit of the United States Coast Guard Cutter Polar Sea [extracts only] (11 June 1985)* […] refer to the notification of the proposed transit of the Northwest Passage by the United States Coast Guard icebreaker Polar Sea in August of this year, as conveyed to the Department of External Affairs by the United States Embassy in Ottawa on May 21, 1985. The Government of Canada welcomes the United States offer to proceed with this project on a cooperative basis and to provide the opportunity for Canadian participation in the voyage. The waters of the Arctic Archipelago, including the Northwest Passage, are internal waters of Canada and fall within Canadian sovereignty. Canada, of course, is committed to facilitating navigation through these waters and is prepared to work toward this objective in the spirit of cooperation that has long characterized the relationship between the Canadian and United States Coast Guards. This is the spirit that also underlies the Volpe-Jamieson Agreement, and the Government of Canada welcomes the United States reference to this accord as a factor to be taken into account in considering the United States proposal. The Canadian authorities are prepared to consider any form of cooperation with the United States authorities regarding the proposed voyage, including on-board participation by Canadian representatives. The United States authorities will understand, however, the Canadian Government’s concern to ensure that the Arctic waters adjacent to the mainland and islands of * M Nash (ed), Cumulative Digest of US Practice in International Law 1981–1988 Vol II (Washington DC, US Government Printing Office, 1994) 2046. Contains information licensed under the Open Government Licence—Canada.

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the Canadian Arctic are navigated in a manner that takes cognizance of Canada’s responsibility for the interests of the Inuit and other inhabitants of the Canadian Arctic and the preservation of the peculiar ecological balance that now exists in the water, ice and land areas of the Canadian Arctic. Given the unique geographical and ecological features of the area, the impact of any voyage, particularly any adverse environmental consequences, will affect the territory of Canada and of no other country. Such voyages are by their very nature extraordinary occurrences and must be carefully planned and coordinated to ensure protection of the environment and other related vital interests. Even a voyage that is free from incidents causing environmental damage can have other negative effects on the Arctic ecology and on the interests of the inhabitants of the area. The Government of Canada looks forward to receiving from the United States authorities more information with respect to the timing and routing of the proposed voyage, as well as the specifications of the Polar Sea. Canada would welcome an early opportunity to consult with the United States on all matters related to the voyage.

Document 296 Diplomatic Note from the US Embassy in Ottawa to the Canadian Department of External Affairs concerning the transit of the United States Coast Guard Cutter Polar Sea [extracts only] (21 May 1985)* The United States Coast Guard is preparing its summer schedule for icebreaker operations in Arctic waters. Operational requirements are such that west coast based icebreaker, the Polar Sea, will transit the Panama Canal in order to reach the US east coast and thereafter perform icebreaking duties in the vicinity of Thule, Greenland. Upon completion of its duties in the Thule areas, the Polar Sea will need to return to the west coast, both to be able to participate in testing pursuant to the Volpe-Jamieson Agreement and, subsequently, to conduct operations in Antarctic waters. The limited time available requires the movement from the Thule are to the US west coast to be made by navigating through the Northwest Passage. That voyage will occur in August of this year. So that the Canadian government can share in the benefits of this transit, the US Coast Guard will issue to the Canadian Coast Guard an invitation to provide on-board participants. The United States considers that this transit by the icebreaker Polar Sea will be an exercise of navigational rights and freedoms not requiring prior notification. The United States appreciates that Canada may not share this position. The United States believes that it is in the mutual interests of Canada and the United States that this unique opportunity for cooperation not be lost because of possible disagreements over the relevant judicial regime. The United States believes that the two countries should agree to disagree on the legal issue and concentrate on practical matters.

* 

JA Roach and RW Smith, Excessive Martime Claims (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 3rd edn 2012) 320–321. 1377

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The United States desires to raise this matter with the Government of Canada now, so that we can each begin to make arrangements for Canadian participation in the transit. The United States considers that this discussion with the Government of Canada in the forthcoming invitation to participate in the transit is not inconsistent with its judicial position regarding the Northwest Passage and believes that the Government of Canada would consider its participation in the transit not to be inconsistent with its juridical position. […] The United States looks forward to the opportunity to have the Canadian Coast Guard participate in a voyage that will have significant benefits for both countries.

Document 297 Report concerning the transit of Polar Sea written by James W Dyer, Acting Assistant US Secretary for Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs (26 January 1986)* Last August [1985] the U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker Polar Sea sailed from Thule, Greenland, to Alaskan waters through the Northwest Passage. The voyage provoked a major public outcry in Canada, where it was seen as a challenge to Canada’s sovereignty. On September 10, 1985, the Government of Canada claimed all the waters among its Arctic islands as internal waters, and drew straight baselines around its Arctic islands to establish its claim. The United States position is that there is no basis in international law to support the Canadian claim. The United States cannot accept the Canadian claim because to do so would constitute acceptance of full Canadian control of the Northwest Passage and would terminate U.S. navigation rights through the Passage under international law. Acceptance would also complicate our maintenance of navigation rights in other areas, such as Indonesia and the Aegean.

Document 298 Statement No 85/49 in the House of Commons by the Canadian ­Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark on Canadian ­Sovereignty [excerpts only] (10 September 1985)** Mr. Speaker, Sovereignty can arouse deep emotion in this country. That is to be expected, for sovereignty speaks to the very identity and character of a people. We Canadians want to be ourselves. We want to control our own affairs and take charge of our own destiny. At the same time, we want to look beyond ourselves and to play a constructive part in a world community that grows more interdependent every year. We have something to offer and something to gain in so doing? The sovereignty question has concerned this government since we were first sworn in. We have built national unity, we have strengthened the national economy, because unity

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and strength are hallmarks of sovereignty, as they are hallmarks of this government’s policy and achievements. In unity and strength, we have taken action to increase Canadian ownership of the Canadian petroleum industry. We have declared a Canadian ownership policy in respect of foreign investment in the publishing industry. […] We have arrested foreign trawlers poaching in our fishing zones. We have taken important steps to improve Canada’s defences, notably in bolstering Canadian forces in Europe and in putting into place a new North Warning System to protect Canadian sovereignty over our northern airspace. And we have reconstructed relations with traditional friends and allies, who have welcomed our renewed unity and strength and the confidence they generate. In domestic policy, in foreign policy, and in defence policy, this government has given Canadian sovereignty a new impetus within a new maturity. But much remains to be done. The voyage of the Polar Sea demonstrated that Canada, in the past, had not developed the means to ensure our sovereignty over time. During that voyage, Canada’s legal claim was fully protected, but when we looked for tangible ways to exercise our sovereignty, we found that our cupboard was nearly rare. We obtained from the United States a formal and explicit assurance that the voyage of the Polar Sea was without prejudice to Canada’s legal position. That is an assurance which the Government of the day, in 1969, did not receive for the voyage of the Manhattan and of the two United States Coast Guard icebreakers. For the future, non-prejudicial arrangements will not be enough. The voyage of the Polar Sea has left no trace on Canada’s Arctic waters and no mark on Canada’s Arctic sovereignty. It is behind us, and our concern must be what lies ahead any countries, including the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, are actively preparing for commercial navigation in Arctic waters. Developments are accelerating in ice science, ice technology, and tanker design. Several major Japanese Firms are roving to capture the market for icebreaking tankers once polar oil and gas come on stream. Soviet submarines are being deployed under the Arctic ice pack, and the United States navy in turn has identified a need to gain Arctic operational experience to counter new Soviet deployments. Mr. Speaker, The implications for Canada are clear. As the Western country with by far the greatest frontage on the Arctic, we must come up to speed in a race of marine operations that hear on our capacity to exercise effective control over the Northwest Passage and our other Arctic waters. To this end, I wish to declare to the House the policy of this government in respect of Canadian sovereignty in Arctic waters, and to make a number of announcements as to how we propose to give expression to that policy. Canada is an Arctic nation. The international community has long recognized that the Arctic mainland and islands are a part of Canada like any other. But the Arctic is not only a part of Canada. It is part of Canada’s greatness. The policy of this government is to preserve that greatness undiminished. Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic is indivisible. It embraces land, sea, and ice. It extends without interruption to the seaward-facing coasts of the Arctic islands. These islands are joined and not divided by the waters between them. They are bridged for most of the year by ice. From time immemorial Canada’s Inuit people have used and occupied the ice as they have used and occupied the land. The Foreign Policy of this government is to maintain the natural unity of the Canadian Arctic archipelago, and to preserve Canada’s sovereignty over land, sea, and ice undiminished 1379

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and undivided. That sovereignty has long been upheld by Canada. No previous government, however, has defined its precise limits or delineated Canada’s internal waters and territorial sea in the Arctic. This government proposes to do so. An order in council establishing straight baselines around the outer perimeter of the Canadian Arctic archipelago has been signed today, and will come into effect on January 1, 1986. These baselines define the outer limit of Canada’s historic internal waters. Canada’s territorial waters extend 12 miles seaward of the baselines. While the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act requires 60 days’ notice only for the establishment of fisheries limits, we consider that prior notice should also be given for this important step of establishing straight baselines. Canada enjoys the same undisputed jurisdiction over its continental margin and 200-mile fishing zone in the Arctic as elsewhere. To protect the unique ecological balance of the region, Canada also exercises jurisdiction over a 100-mile pollution prevention zone in the Arctic waters. This too has been recognized by the international community, through a special provision in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea application of Canadian civil and criminal law to offshore areas, in the Arctic and elsewhere. This government will do so. To this end, we shall give priority to the early adoption of a Canadian Laws Offshore Application Act. The exercise of functional jurisdiction in Arctic waters is essential to Canadian interests. But it can never serve as a substitute for the exercise of Canada’s full sovereignty over the waters of the Arctic archipelago. Only full sovereignty protects the full range of Canada’s interests. This full sovereignty is vital to Canada’s security. It is vital to Canada’s Inuit people. And it is vital even to Canada’s nationhood. The policy of this government is to exercise Canada’s full sovereignty in and over the waters of the Arctic archipelago. We will accept no substitutes. The policy of this government is also to encourage the development of navigation in Canada’s Arctic waters. Our goal is to make the Northwest Passage a reality for Canadian and foreign shipping, as a Canadian waterways. Navigation, however, will be subject to the controls and other measures required for Canada’s security, for the preservation of the environment, and for the welfare of the Inuit and other inhabitants of the Canadian Arctic. In due course, the government will announce the further steps it is taking to implement these policies, and especially to provide more extensive marine support services, to strengthen regulatory structures, and to reinforce the necessary means of control. I am announcing today that the government has decided to construct a Polar Class 8 icebreaker. The Ministers of National Defence and Transport will shortly bring to Cabinet recommendations with regard to design and construction plans. The costs are very high, in the order of half a billion dollars. But this government is not about to conclude that Canada cannot afford the Arctic. Meanwhile, we are taking immediate steps to increase surveillance overflights of our Arctic waters by Canadian Forces aircraft. In addition, we are now making plans for naval activity in eastern Arctic waters in 1986. Canada is a strong and responsible member of the international community. Our strength and our responsibility makes us all the more aware of the need for cooperation with other countries, and especially with our friends and allies. Cooperation is necessary not only in defence of our own interests but in defence of the common interests of the international community. Cooperation adds to our strength and in no way diminishes our sovereignty. The policy of this Government is to offer its cooperation to its friends and allies, and to seek their cooperation in return. We are prepared to explore with the United States all means of cooperation that might promote the respective interests of 1380

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both countries, as Arctic friends, neighbours, and allies, in the Arctic waters of Canada and Alaska. The United States has been made aware that Canada wishes to open talks on this matter in the near future. Any cooperation with the United States, or with other Arctic nations, shall only be on the basis of full respect for Canada’s sovereignty. That too has been made clear. In 1970, the government of the day barred the International Court of Justice from hearing disputes that might arise concerning the jurisdiction exercised by Canada for the prevention of pollution in Arctic waters. This government will remove that bar. Indeed, we have today notified the Secretary General of the United Nations that Canada is withdrawing the 1970 reservation to its acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court. The Arctic is a heritage for the people of Canada. They are determined to keep their heritage entire. The policy of this Government is to give full expression to that determination. We challenge no established rights, for none have been established except by Canada. We set no precedent for other areas, for no other area compares with the Canadian Arctic archipelago. We are confident in our position. We believe in the rule of law in international relations. We shall act in accordance with our confidence and belief, as we are doing today in withdrawing the 1970 reservation to Canada’s acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court. We are prepared to uphold our position in that Court, if necessary, and to have it freely and fully judged there. In summary, Mr. Speaker, these are the measures we are announcing today: 1. Immediate adoption of an order in council establishing straight baselines around the Arctic Archipelago, to be effective January 1, 1986; 2. Immediate adoption of a Canadian Laws Offshore Application Act; 3. Immediate talks with the United States on cooperation in Arctic waters, on the basis of full respect for Canadian sovereignty; 4. An immediate increase of surveillance over flights of our Arctic waters by aircraft of the Canadian Forces, and immediate planning for Canadian naval activity in the Eastern Arctic in 1986; 5. The immediate withdrawal of the 1970 reservation to Canada’s acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice; and 6. The construction of a Polar Class 8 icebreaker and urgent consideration of other means of exercising more effective control over our Arctic waters. These are the measures we can take immediately. We know, however, that a long-term commitment is required. We are making that commitment today.

Document 299 Canada, Department of External Affairs, Legal Briefing on Arctic Sovereignty (21 May 1987)* Canada is determined to exercise full sovereignty over the historic internal waters of the Arctic archipelago and is prepared to uphold its position before the International Court of Justice if necessary. *  (1987) 25 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 406. Contains information licensed under the Open Government Licence—Canada.

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These Canadian internal waters have now been delineated by straight baselines that became effective on January 1, 1986. The Government is also moving forward with plans for the construction of a Polar class icebreaker and other measures to ensure effective control of Canadian Arctic waters. Canada’s claim is well-founded in law and fact. It establishes no precedent that might be cited to justify interference with international navigation in other parts of the world because it is based on unique circumstances: –– the Canadian Arctic archipelago is unlike any other archipelago in the world in geographical terms; –– these waters are covered with ice for all or most of the year: –– they have been used and occupied like the land itself by Canadian Inuit people from time immemorial; –– they have not been customarily used for international navigation and the Northwest Passage does not constitute an international strait Canada will encourage the development of international navigation in Canadian Arctic waters, but only subject to the controls and other measures required for Canada’s security, for the preservation of the environment, and for the welfare of the Inuit. Canada is prepared to enter into cooperative arrangements with the United States to promote the mutual interests of the two countries in the Arctic waters of Canada and Alaska, on the basis of full respect for Canadian sovereignty.

Document 300 Diplomatic Note from the US Embassy in Ottawa to the Canadian Department of External Affairs concerning the transit of United States Coast Guard Cutter Polar Star through the Northwest Passage (10 October 1988)* The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Department of External Affairs and refers to the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada on Arctic Cooperation, signed by Secretary of State Shultz and Secretary of State for External Affairs Clark in Ottawa on January 11, 1988. As provided by the terms of that Agreement, the Government of the United States hereby requests the consent of the Government of Canada for the United States Coast Guard Cutter “Polar Star,” a polar class icebreaker, to navigate within waters covered by the Agreement, and to conduct marine scientific research during such navigation. Any information developed would be shared with the Government of Canada, as envisioned by the Agreement on Arctic Cooperation. On September 28, while immediately north of Point Barrow, the “Polar Star” responded to a call from the master of the Canadian Coast Guard icebreaker “Martha L. Black,” to assist the Canadian icebreaker “Pierre Radisson” and “Martha L. Black,” in accord with the policy of cooperation embodied in the Agreement on Arctic Cooperation. The “Polar Star,” which was then en route from Point Barrow, Alaska, to Seattle, Washington,

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rendezvoused with the nearby Canadian icebreakers to assist them in their transit to Victoria, British Columbia. Unusually heavy ice caused the “Pierre Radisson” and the “Martha L. Black” to abandon their operational plan and to proceed east toward Saint John’s, Newfoundland, via the Northwest Passage. After having rendered assistance to the Canadian icebreakers through October 1, which required it to change its own operational plans, the “Polar Star” now finds itself compelled by heavy ice conditions, adverse winds and engineering casualties to proceed east through the waters of the Northwest Passage in order to exit the Arctic, as did the Canadian icebreakers. The Government of the United States would welcome the presence of a Canadian scientist and an officer of the Canadian Coast Guard on board the “Polar Star” and would also be pleased if a Canadian Coast Guard vessel were to choose to accompany the “Polar Star” during its navigation and conduct of marine-scientific research in the Northwest Passage. “Polar Star” will operate in a manner consistent with the pollution control standards and other standards of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act and other relevant Canadian laws and regulations. Costs incurred as a result of a discharge from the vessel, including containment, cleanup and disposal costs incurred by the United States or Canada and any damage that is an actual result, will be the responsibility of the United States Government, in accordance with international law. In view of the necessity for prompt action by the “Polar Star” due to deteriorating weather conditions, the Government of the United States requests a prompt reply to its request for the consent of the Government of Canada to the “Polar Star’s” navigation of waters covered by the Agreement on Arctic Cooperation. The Embassy of the United States avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Department of External Affairs the assurance of its highest consideration.

Document 301 Diplomatic Note from the Canadian Department of External Affairs to the US Embassy in Ottawa concerning the transit of United States Coast Guard Cutter Polar Star through the Northwest Passage (10 October 1988)* The Department of External Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America and has the honour to refer to the Embassy’s Note No. 425 of October 10, 1988, in which, pursuant to the terms of the Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America on Arctic Cooperation, signed on January 11, 1988, the Government of the United States requests the consent of the Government of Canada for the United States Coast Guard cutter “Polar Star”, a polar class icebreaker, to navigate within waters covered by the Agreement, and to conduct marine scientific research during such navigation. The Department notes the assurance provided by the Embassy that the “Polar Star” will operate in a manner consistent with the pollution control standards and other provisions

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(1989) 28 ILM 145. Contains information licensed under the Open Government Licence—Canada. 1383

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of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act and other relevant Canadian laws and regulations and that costs incurred as a result of a discharge from the vessel, including containment, cleanup and disposal costs incurred by the United States or Canada and any damage that is an actual result will be the responsibility of the United States Government in accordance with international law. The Department has the honour to inform the Embassy that the Government of Canada consents to the “Polar Star’s” navigation with waters covered by the Agreement. The Department has the further honour to inform the Embassy that the Government of Canada also consents to the conduct of marine scientific research during such navigation. The Department notes that the information obtained in such research will be shared as envisioned in the Arctic Cooperation Agreement. The Department is pleased to inform the Embassy that the Canadian Government has scheduled the Canadian Coast Guard icebreaker “John A. MacDonald” to accompany the “Polar Star” during its navigation in the Northwest Passage. Canadian authorities will also be pleased to make available an officer of the Canadian Coast Guard to be on board the “Polar Star” during this journey. The Department of External Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the United States the assurances of its highest consideration.

Document 302 Official letter from David Wilkins, US Ambassador in Canada, to Peter Boehm, Assistant Deputy Minister, Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs & International Trade regarding the transit of United States Coast Guard Cutter Healy through the Northwest Passage [extracts only] (27 October 2006)* Dear Mr. Boehm: This is in reply to your office’s request to release to Parliament the texts of the Embassy’s Notes No. 437 of July 28, 1999, and No. 310 of March 26, 2003, regarding transit of the U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker USCG Healy through the Northwest Passage. The United States has no objection to the release of these notes to Parliament. In light of recent public statements in Canada, and recognizing that Canada does not agree, I wish to take this opportunity to restate the longstanding United States position regarding Canada’s maritime claims in the Arctic and to put these two notes in their proper context. For the record, the United States sees no basis in international law to support Canada’s drawing of straight baselines around its Arctic islands and its claim that all the waters among the Canadian Arctic islands, including the Northwest Passage, are internal waters of Canada. The Northwest Passage is a strait used for international navigation. Therein, all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage, in accordance with international law as reflected in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. The enjoyment of transit passage is not subject to notice to, or permission from, Canada as the State bordering the strait. However, an activity that is not an exercise of the right of transit passage, such as marine scientific research, remains subject to the other applicable provisions of international law. * 

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Canada, consistent with its right as a coastal State under international law, requires that marine scientific research may be conducted in its waters only with its consent. Accordingly, as set out in the Agreement on Arctic Cooperation of January 11, 1988, the United States agrees to seek Canada’s consent when U.S. icebreakers intend to conduct marine scientific research as they transit the Northwest Passage. The Embassy’s notes of July 28, 1999, and March 26, 2003, were provided to Canada in accordance with that Agreement. The Agreement expressly provides that neither it nor any practice thereunder affects the legal views of the two Parties. Thus, the Agreement does not affect the U.S. view that our icebreakers, in the absence of marine scientific research, would not be required to seek Canadian consent before transiting the Northwest Passage. Sincerely, David Wilkins

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Northern Sea Route Document 303 Aide-Mémoire from the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the US Embassy in Moscow [extracts only] (21 July 1964)* […] The Northern seaway route is situated near the Arctic coast of the USSR. This route quite distant from international seaways, has been used and is used only by ships belonging to the Soviet Union or chartered in the name of the Northern Seaways […]. It should also be kept in mind that the northern seaway route at some points goes through Soviet territorial and internal waters. Specifically, this concerns all straits running west and east in the Karsky Sea. Inasmuch as they are overlapped two-fold by Soviet territorial waters, as well as by the Dmitry, Laptev and Sannikov Straits, which unite the Laptev and Eastern Siberian Seas and belong historically to the Soviet Union. Not one of these stated straits, as is known, serves for international navigation. Thus over the waters of these straits the statute for the protection of the state borders of the USSR fully applies, in accordance with which foreign military ships will pass through territorial seas and enter internal waters of the USSR after advance permission of the Government of the USSR. […]

Document 304 Aide Mémoire from the US Department of State Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs [extracts only] (22 June 1965)** While the United States is sympathetic with efforts which have been made by the Soviet Union in developing the Northern Seaway Route and appreciates the importance of this waterway to Soviet interests, nevertheless, it cannot admit that these factors have the effect of changing the status of the waters of the route under international law. With respect to the straits of the Karsky Sea described as overlapped by the Soviet territorial waters it must be pointed out that there is a right of innocent passage of all ships through straits used for international navigation between two parts of the high seas and that this right cannot be suspended. This is clear from the provisions of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone adopted at Geneva in 1958 to which both the United States and the Soviet Union are parties. In the case of straits comprising high seas as well as territorial waters there is of course unlimited right of navigation in the high seas areas […]. For the reasons indicated the United States must reaffirm its reservations of its rights and those of its nationals in the waters in question whose status it regards as dependent on the principles of international law and not decrees of the coastal state.

*  US Department of State Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Limits in the Seas No 112, United States Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims (1992) 71. **  US Department of State Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Limits in the Seas No. 112, United States Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims (1992) 71–72.

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Document 305 Note from the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs to US Embassy in Moscow concerning the voyage of United States Coast Guard Cutter Northwind (27 October 1965)* According to information of competent Soviet authorities, US Coast Guard icebreaker, Northwind, during its voyage in the Kara Sea in July-September of this year, conducted there explorations of the sea bottoms and sub oceanic area. This was also reported in the American press. As is well known, [the] bottom and suboceanic area of the Kara Sea, being in geological respect [the] direct continuation of [the] continental part of [the] U.S.S.R., constitutes continental shelf which, pursuant to [the] Geneva Continental Shelf Convention of 1958, is subject to [the] sovereign rights of the U.S.S.R. Said Convention, to which both [the] U.S.S.R. and [the] U.S.A. are parties, provide[s] in article 5, paragraph 8, that agreement of [the] littoral state is required for continental shelf exploration[.] Conduct of [the] above-mentioned explorations of [the] continental shelf of [the] U.S.S.R. in [the] Kara Sea, without agreement thereto having been obtained from [the] competent U.S.S.R. authorities, constituted [a] violation of the Continental Shelf Convention of 1958. The Ministry protests against [the] unlawful conduct by [the] American icebreaker of exploration of [the] Soviet continental shelf in [the] Kara Sea and expects that [the] Government of [the] United States of America will take [the] necessary steps to prevent similar actions.

Document 306 Reply from the US Embassy in Moscow to the Note from the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the voyage of United States Coast Guard Cutter Northwind (26 November 1965)** The Ministry’s note referring to the voyage of the United States Coast Guard Northwind in the Kara Sea during July to September of this year charges that the vessel carried on explorations of the seabed of the continental shelf without obtaining the permission required by paragraph 8, Article 5 of the Convention on the Continental shelf adopted at Geneva in 1958 to which both the United States and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics are parties. The Ministry is misinformed. During its voyage of oceanographic exploration in the area the Northwind did take a number of core samplings of the seabed. A few of these samplings were taken in the deep which parallels Novaya Zemlya on the east and a more extensive sampling of the sea bottom was done in the deep water north of Novaya Zemlya and east of Zemlya Frantsa losifa and also in the deep water west of Severnaya Zemlya.

* M Nash (ed), Cumulative Digest of United States Practice in International Law (1981–1988) Vol II (Washington DC, US Government Printing Office, 1994) 1815. ** M Nash (ed), Cumulative Digest of United States Practice in International Law (1981–1988) Vol II (Washington, US Gov’t Printing Office, 1994) 1815–1816.

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The data collected during this operation will be made available to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics through the World Data Center System. There was no exploration of the continental shelf in the Kara Sea. In view of the foregoing the Ministry’s protest is rejected as without foundation in fact.

Document 307 Note from the US State Department to the Soviet Embassy in ­Washington concerning the voyages of the United States Coast Guard Cutters Edisto and East Wind (14 August 1967)* The Department of State wishes to advise the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that two United States oceanographic icebreakers will, as in previous years, undertake regular survey operations in the Arctic Ocean in the summer of 1967. The U.S. Coast Guard icebreakers Edisto and East Wind will conduct oceanographic research surveys from approximately August 10 to September 21. From a point south of Greenland, the ships will proceed eastward on a track running north of Novaya Zemlya and Severnaya Zemlya into the Laptev Sea, the East Siberian Sea, and through the Canadian Archipelago before returning to the United States. As in previous oceanographic surveys of this sort, the operations will be conducted entirely in international waters.

Document 308 Reply from the Soviet Embassy in Washington to the Note from the US State Department concerning the voyages of the United States Coast Guard Cutters Edisto and East Wind (25 August 1967)** By its aide-memoire of August 16, 1967, [the] U.S. Department of State informed [the] U.S.S.R. Embassy in Washington of [the] Arctic circumnavigation by [the] U.S. Coast Guard icebreakers Edisto and East Wind, stating that they would proceed eastward along [a] route north of Novaya Zemlya and Severnaya Zemlya. However, according to [the] information of [the] competent Soviet authorities, [the] above mentioned American icebreakers have entered [the] Karsky Sea and are proceeding in [the] direction of [the] Vilkitsky Straits, which are territorial waters of the U.S.S.R. In this connection, [the] Ministry recalls to [the] Embassy that navigation by any foreign naval vessel through [the] Straits of [the] Karsky Sea, as well as through [the] Dmitry Laptev and Sannikov Straits, is subject to [the] Statute on [the] Protection of the U.S.S.R. Borders, under which foreign naval vessels shall pass through territorial and internal sea waters of [the] U.S.S.R. with prior permission by [the] Government of [the] U.S.S.R. * M Nash (ed), Cumulative Digest of United States Practice in International Law (1981–1988) Vol II (Washington DC, US Government Printing Office, 1994) 1816. ** M Nash (ed), Cumulative Digest of United States Practice in International Law (1981–1988) Vol II (Washington DC, US Government Printing Office, 1994) 1816–1817.

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to be requested 30 days in advance of [the] passage contemplated. The position of the U.S.S.R. Government on this question was set forth in detail in [the] U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs aides-mémoire of July 21, 1964, and July 26, 1965.

Document 309 Message from the United States Coast Guard Cutter Edisto to Coastal Radio Station of USSR at Dikson (28 August 1967)* From USCGC Edisto To Coastal Radio Station of USSR at Dikson BT Please pass the following message to the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet Union, Soviet Socialist Republics. U.S. Coast Guard Icebreakers Edisto and Eastwind, undertaking a west to east circumnavigation of the world via Arctic basin for purpose of collecting oceanographic data, have been blocked by heavy ice from passing north of Severnaya Zemlya. In accordance with instructions from the Coast Guard Commandant, as approved by the United States Department of State, this Squadron will on or about 31 August 1967, make a peaceful and innocent passage through the straits of Vilkitskiy, adhering to the centerline as closely as possible and making no deviation or delay. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR has been notified by Diplomatic Note.

Document 310 USSR Ministry of Merchant Marine, Oral Démarche to the United States Coast Guard Cutter Edisto (28 August 1967)** From Moscow Highly Urgently BT Inform through Radio Dikson. Icebreaker Edisto and Icebreaker Eastwind Vilkitskiy Straits is within USSR territorial waters therefore sailing of any foreign navy ships in the strait is subject to regulations of safety of USSR frontiers. For passing the strait according to the above regulations military ships must obtain preliminary permission of USSR Government through diplomatic channels one month before expected date passing. USSR Ministry of Merchant Marine

*  RD Wells, ‘The Icy “Nyet!”’ (April 1968) Proceedings 73, 77. Reprinted from Proceedings with permission; Copyright © 1968 U.S. Naval Institute/www.usni.org. **  RD Wells, ‘The Icy “Nyet!”’ (April 1968) Proceedings 73, 78. Reprinted from Proceedings with permission; Copyright © 1968 U.S. Naval Institute/www.usni.org.

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Document 311 Diplomatic Note from the US Government to the USSR Government regarding the circumnavigation of the Arctic by the ­United States Coast Guard Cutters Edisto and Eastwind [extracts only] (30 August 1967)* The Embassy of the United States of America refers to the aide-mémoire of August 24 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and to the statement by the Ministry’s authorized representative on August 28, and, on instructions, strongly protests the position taken by the Soviet government with regard to the peaceful circumnavigation of the Arctic by the United States Coast Guard icebreakers Edisto and Eastwind. As the Ministry is aware, the circumnavigation by the Edisto and Eastwind was undertaken as a part of regular scientific research operations in the Arctic Ocean. The Department of State, as a matter of courtesy, informed the Soviet Government of these operations. Owing to unusually severe ice conditions, the icebreakers failed in their efforts to pass north of Sevemaya Zemlya and, accordingly, on August 24 [the] Embassy informed the Ministry by note that the vessels would find it necessary to pass through Vilkitsky Straits in order to continue their voyage. Rather than facilitating the accomplishment of this peaceful voyage, the Ministry in its aide-mémoire of August 24 and particularly in the oral statement of its authorized representative on August 28 has taken the unwarranted position that the proposed passage of the Edisto and Eastwind would be in violation of Soviet regulations, raising the possibility of action by the Soviet Government to detain the vessels or otherwise interfere with their movement. These statements and actions of the Soviet Government have created a situation which has left the United States Government with no other feasible course but to cancel the planned circumnavigation. In doing so, however, the United States Government wishes to point out that the Soviet Government bears full responsibility for denying to United States vessels their rights under international law, for frustrating this scientific endeavor, and for depriving the international scientific community of research data of considerable significance. Furthermore, the Statute on Protection of the U.S.S.R. State Borders, cited in the Ministry’s aide-mémoire of August 24, cannot have the effect of changing the status of waters under international law and the rights of foreign ships with respect to them. These rights are set forth clearly in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of April 29, 1958, to which the Soviet Union is a party. The United States Government wishes to remind the Soviet Government, as it has on previous occasions, that there is a right of innocent passage for all ships, warships included, through straits used for international navigation between two parts of the high seas, whether or not, as in the case of the Vilkitsky Straits, they are described by the Soviet Government as being overlapped by territorial waters, and that there is an unlimited right of navigation in the high seas areas of straits comprising both high seas and territorial seas. * M Nash (ed), Cumulative Digest of United States Practice in International Law (1981–1988) Vol II (Washington DC, US Government Printing Office, 1994) 1817–1819.

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Moreover, since the Ministry in its aide-mémoire of August 24 has referred to the Dmitry Laptev and Sannikov Straits, although they are not involved in the present case, the United States Government wishes to reiterate its position, stated most recently in its aide-mémoire of June 22, 1965, that it is not aware of any basis for the Soviet claim to these waters. The United States Government wishes to emphasize that it regards the conduct of the Soviet Government in frustrating this scientific expedition as contrary both to international law and to the spirit of international scientific cooperation [for] which the Soviet Government has frequently professed its support. Actions such as these cannot help but hinder the cause of developing international understanding and the improvement of relations between our two countries.

Document 312 US State Department Summary of the incident concerning the voyages of the United States Coast Guard Cutters Edisto and Eastwind (31 August 1967)* On August 16 the United States Coast Guard announced that the 269-foot Coast Guard icebreakers Edisto and Eastwind planned an 8,000-mile circumnavigation of the Arctic Ocean conducting scientific research en route. Their itinerary called for them to travel north of the Soviet islands of Novaya Zemlya, Severnaya Zemlya, and the New Siberian Islands. The planned course was entirely on the high seas and, therefore, the voyage did not require any previous clearance with Soviet authorities. Nevertheless, the Soviet Government was officially informed of these plans just prior to the public announcement. However, heavy ice conditions made it impossible for the vessels to proceed north of Severnaya Zemlya. On August 24 our Embassy in Moscow notified the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs of this situation and stated it would be necessary for the two vessels to pass through [the] Vilkitsky Straits south of Severnaya Zemlya in order to complete their journey. In response the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs made a statement to our Embassy that the straits constituted Soviet territorial waters. On August 28, as a result of a routine message from the icebreakers to the Soviet Ministry of the Maritime Fleet, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs reaffirmed its declaration of August 24 and made it clear that the Soviet Government would claim that passage of the ships through the Vilkitsky Straits would be a violation of Soviet frontiers. Under these circumstances, the United States considered it advisable to cancel the proposed circumnavigation. The Edisto has now been ordered to proceed directly to Baffin Bay, and the Eastwind was ordered to remain in the area of the Kara and Barents Seas for about a month to conduct further oceanographic research. On August 30 our Embassy in Moscow sent a note strongly protesting the Soviet position. The note pointed out that Soviet law cannot have the effect of changing the status of international waters and the rights of foreign ships with respect to them. These rights are set forth clearly in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of April 29, 1958, to which the Soviet Union is a party. * M Nash (ed), Cumulative Digest of United States Practice in International Law (1981–1988) Vol II (Washington DC, US Government Printing Office, 1994) 1819–1820.

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There is right of innocent passage for all ships through straits used for international navigation between two parts of the high seas, whether or not, as in the case of the Vilkitsky Straits, they are described by the Soviet Union as being overlapped by territorial waters, and there is an unlimited right of navigation on the high seas of straits comprising both high seas and territorial waters. Clearly, the Soviet Government, by denying to U.S. vessels their rights under international law, has acted to frustrate a useful scientific endeavor and thus to deprive the international scientific community of research data of considerable significance.

Document 313 Joint Statement by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Uniform Interpretation of Rules of International Law Governing Innocent Passage (23 September 1989)* Since 1983, representatives of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Social Republicies have been conducting friendly and constructive discussions of certain international legal aspects of traditional uses of the oceans, in particular navigation. The Governments are guided by the provisions of the 1982 United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea, which, with respect to traditional uses of the oceans, generally constitute international law and practice and balance fairly the interests of all States. They recognize the need to encourage all States to harmonize the internal laws, regulations and practices with those provisions. The Governments consider it useful to issue the attached Unifom Interpretation of the Rules of International Law Governing Innocent Passage. Both Governments have agreed to take the necessary steps to conform their internal laws, regulations and practices with this understanding of the rules. For the United States of America /s/ James A. Baker III Jackson Hole, Wyoming

For the Union of Socialist Republics /s/ E.A. Schevardnadze September 23, 1989

UNIFORM INTERPRETATION OF RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW GOVERNING INNOCENT PASSAGE 1.

The relevant rules of international law governing innocent passage of ships in the territorial sea are stated in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Convention of 1982), particularly in Part II, Section 3. 2. All ships, including warships, regardless of cargo, armament or means of propulsion, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea in accordance with international law, for which neither prior notification nor authorization is required.

* 

Done at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 23 September 1989; (1989) 14 LOSB 12. 1393

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3. Article 19 of the Convention of 1982 sets out in paragraph 2 an exhaustive list of activities that would render passage not innocent. A ship passing through the territorial sea that does not engage in any of those activities is in innocent passage. 4. A coastal State which questions whether the particular passage of a ship through its territorial sea is innocent shall inform the ship of the reason why it questions the innocence of the passage, and provide the ship an opportunity to clarify its intentions or correct its conduct in a reasonably short period of time. 5. Ships exercising the right of innocent passage shall comply with all laws and regulations of the coastal State adopted in conformity with relevant rules of international law as reflected in Articles 21, 22, 23 and 25 of the Convention of 1982. These include the laws and regulations requiring ships exercising the right of innocent passage through its territorial sea to use such sea lanes and traffic separation schemes as it may prescribe where needed to protect safety of navigation. In areas where no such sea lanes or traffic separation schemes have been prescribed, ships nevertheless enjoy the right of innocent passage. 6. Such laws and regulations of the coastal State may not have the practical effect of denying or impairing the exercise of the right of innocent passage as set forth in Article 24 of the Convention of 1982. 7. If a warship engages in conduct which violates such laws or regulations or renders its passage not innocent and does not take corrective action upon request, the coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea, as set forth in Article 30 of the Convention of 1982. In such case the warship shall do so immediately. 8. Without prejudice to the exercise of rights of coastal and flag States, all differences which may arise regarding a particular case of passage of ships through the territorial sea shall be settled through diplomatic channels or other agreed means.

Document 314 Russian Federation, Federal Law No 132-FZ On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation Concerning State Regulation of Merchant Shipping on the Water Area of the Northern Sea Route [unofficial translation] (3 July 2012)* Clause 1 Paragraph 1 of Clause 4 of the Federal Law dated August 17, 1995 N 147-ФЗ On Natural Monopolies (Collection of Laws of the Russian Federation, 1995, N 34, Clause 3426; 2003, N 2, Clause 168; N 13, Clause 1181; 2006, N 1, Clause 10; 2007, N 46, Clause 5557; 2011, N 29, Clause 4281; N 50, Clause 7343) to be complemented as follows: “Icebreaker assistance to vessels, ice pilotage channeling for vessels in the water area of the Northern Sea Route” Clause 2 Clause 14 of the Federal Law dated July 31, 1998 N 155-ФЗ On Internal Sea Waters, Territorial Sea and Adjacent Zone of the Russian Federation (Collection of Laws of the *  Adopted by the State Duma on 3 July 2012; approved by the Federation Council on 18 July 2012, retrieved from the Northern Sea Route Administration, www.nsra.ru/en/zakon_o_smp/.

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Russian Federation, 1998, N 31, Clause 3833; 2008, N 30, Clause 3616) to be formulated as follows: “Clause 14. Navigation in the water area of the Northern Sea Route Navigation in the water area of the Northern Sea Route, the historically emerged national transportation route of the Russian Federation, shall be performed according to the commonly accepted principles and norms of the international law, international agreements of the Russian Federation, this Federal Law, other Federal Laws and other regulatory legal documents issued in relation with the above”. Clause 3 To amend the Merchant Marine Code of the Russian Federation (Collection of Laws of the Russian Federation, 1999, N 18, Clause 2207; 2001, N 22, Clause 2125; 2005, N 52, Clause 5581; 2006, N 50, Clause 5279; 2007, N 46, Clause 5557; N 50, Clause 6246; 2011, N 25, Clause 3534; N 30, Clause 4590; 2012, N 18, Clause 2128) as follows: 1) Paragraph Five, Clause 2 after the word “pilotage” to be complemented with, “ice pilotage”; 2) in Item 4, Clause 5: a) in Paragraph One the word “lines” to be replaced with the word “water areas”; b) in Paragraph Two the words “on the lines” to be replaced with the words “in the water area”; 3) to add Clause 5.1 with the contents as follows: “Clause 5.1. Navigation in the water area of the Northern Sea Route 1. The water area of the Northern Sea Route shall be considered as the water area adjacent to the Northern coast of the Russian Federation, comprising the internal sea waters, the territorial sea, the adjacent zone and the exclusive economic zone of the Russian Federation and confined in the East with the Line of Maritime Demarcation with the United States of America and Cape Dezhnev parallel in Bering Strait, with the meridian of Cape Mys Zhelania to the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago in the West, with the eastern coastline of the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago and the western borders of Matochkin Strait, Kara Strait and Yugorski Shar. 2. The navigation rules in the Northern Sea Route water area approved by the executive body authorized by the Government of the Russian Federation shall be applied to ensure safe navigation as well as to prevent, minimize and control the sea environment pollution by vessels, and contain: 1) organization procedures for navigation in the water area of the Northern Sea Route; 2) rules of icebreaker support for vessels in the water area of the Northern Sea Route; 3) rules of ice pilotage channeling support for vessels in the water area of the Northern Sea Route; 4) rules of vessels pilotage on the lines in the water area of the Northern Sea Route; 5) regulations of navigation and hydrographic and hydro-meteorological support for navigation in the water area of the Northern Sea Route; 6) rules of radio communication during navigation in the water area of the Northern Sea Route; 1395

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7) other regulations related to organization of navigation in the water area of the Northern Sea Route. 3. Organization of navigation in the water area of the Northern Sea Route lies within responsibility of Northern Sea Route Administration established in the form of a federal government institution and addressing the following major tasks: 1) receipt of applications for permits for navigation in the water area of the Northern Sea Route, review of such applications and issuance of permits for navigation in the water area of the Northern Sea Route; 2) monitoring of hydro-meteorological, ice and navigation conditions in the water area of the Northern Sea Route; 3) approval of navigation equipment installation and areas for hydrographic survey operations in the water area of the Northern Sea Route; 4) delivery of information services (associated with the Northern Sea Route) related to navigation arrangement, navigation safety requirements, navigation and hydrographic support for vessels, and ice channeling of vessels; 5) development of recommendations for navigation routes planning and use of icebreaking fleet vessels in the water area of the Northern Sea Route considering the hydro-meteorological, ice and navigation conditions in a specific area; 6) facilitation of arrangement of search-and-rescue operations in the water area of the Northern Sea Route; 7) issuance of certificates to persons responsible for ice pilotage channeling, to license ice pilotage channeling in the water area of the Northern Sea Route; 8) assistance in response operations to eliminate the effects of pollution by vessels with hazardous or harmful substances, sewage or garbage. 4. Permits for navigation in the water area of the Northern Sea Route as provided for by Subitem 1, Item 3 of this Clause are issued if the vessel complies with the requirements related to navigation safety and marine environment protection from pollution by vessels (associated with the water area of the Northern Sea Route) and the rules of navigation in the water area of the Northern Sea Route as established by international agreements of the Russian Federation, the law of the Russian Federation, the Regulations for navigation in the water area of the Northern Sea Route specified in Item 2 of this Clause and submits the documents to confirm insurance required by international agreements of the Russian Federation, the law of the Russian Federation, or other financial security of civil liability against damage caused by pollution or other damage caused by the vessel. 5. The amount of payment for icebreaker support and ice pilotage channeling in the water area of the Northern Sea Route shall be determined according to the Natural Monopolies Law of the Russian Federation considering the vessels’ tonnage, the vessel’s ice class, the distance of channeling, and navigation period. The payment for icebreaker support and ice pilotage channeling in the water area of the Northern Sea Route shall be effected based on the amount of services actually delivered.”; 4) Item 1 Clause 79 to be complemented with the words: “including documents confirming availability of insurance required by international agreements of the Russian Federation, the law of the Russian Federation, or other financial security of civil liability against damage caused by pollution or other damage caused by the vessel”; 5) Item 1 Clause 107 to be complemented with the words:”, as well as lifting, removal, and elimination of property sunk in the water area of the Northern Sea Route”; 1396

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6) Clause 247 to be formulated as follows: “Clause 247. Application of the rules stipulated in this Clause 1. The rules stipulated in this Clause shall be applied unless otherwise is agreed upon by the parties. In cases clearly specified in this Clause agreement between the parties that fails to comply with the rules stipulated in this Clause shall be considered null and void. 2. The rules stipulated in this Clause shall also be applied in relation to vessels navigating in the water area of the Northern Sea Route.”; 7) Item 3 Clause 249 after the words “International Ship Register,” to be complemented with the words “and foreign vessels”. Clause 4 This Federal Law shall come into effect on expiration of one hundred and eighty days after the date of its official publication.

Document 315 Russian Federation, Rules of Navigation in the water area of the Northern Sea Route [unofficial translation] (17 January 2013)* I. General 1. Rules of navigation on the water area of the Northern Sea Route (hereinafter referred to as Rules) were developed in compliance with items 2 and 4 of article 5 of the Federal Law dated April 30, 1999, No. 81- ФЗ (FL) “Code of commercial navigation of the Russian Federation”) (hereinafter referred to as CCN) and item 5.2.53.12 of the Provision on the Transport Ministry of the Russian Federation approved by the Decision of the Government of the Russian Federation dated July 30, 2004, 3952) and establish the order of the organization of navigation of ships in the water area of the Northern Sea Route, rules of the icebreaker assistance in the water area of the Northern Sea Route, rules of the ice pilotage of ships in the water area of the Northern Sea Route, rules on the track assistance of ships in the water area of the Northern Sea Route, provision on the navigational hydrographic and hydrometeorological support of the navigation of ships on the water area of the Northern Sea Route, rules of the radio communication of the navigation of ships in the water area of the Northern Sea Route, requirements to ships in relation to the safety of navigation and protection of the marine environment against the pollution from ships, other provisions relative to the organization of the navigation of ships in the water area of the Northern Sea Route. II.  Procedure of the navigation of ships in the water area of the Northern Sea Route 2. In accordance with item 3 of article 51 of CCN, management of the navigation of ships in the water areas of the Northern Sea Route is realized by the Northern Sea Route

*  Approved by the order of the Ministry of Transport of Russia dated 17 January 2013, retrieved from the Northern Sea Route Administration, www.nsra.ru/en/pravila_plavaniya/. Annex 1“Information on ship and voyage” and Annex 2 “Criteria of the admission of ships to the Northern Sea Route in compliance with category of their ice strengthening” are not reprinted here.

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Administration established as a federal government institution (hereinafter referred to as NSR Administration). In the water area of the Northern Sea Route the authorizationbased order of the navigation of ships is in force. 3. Granting permission for the navigation of ship in the water area of the Northern Sea Route (hereinafter referred to as permission) is effected by the NSR Administration on the basis of application of shipowner, representative of shipowner or ship master (hereinafter referred to as application) with the indication of full denomination and (if any) of identification number of the International Maritime Organization (hereinafter referred to as IMO number 1), family name, first name, patronymic (if any) of the applicant, contact phone, fax, e-mail address for a physical person. The application should contain the confirmation that shipowner ensures the compliance of ship with the present Rules prior to the entering of ship into the water area of the Northern Sea Route. The application in Russian and in English is presented in the electronic form (pdf format file). 4. The following documents in Russian and/or in English presented in the electronic form (pdf format files) are attached to the application: 1) information about ship and voyage according to annex 1 to the present Rules; 2) copy of the classification certificate; 3) copy of the measurement certificate; 4) copies of documents certifying availability of the insurance or of other financial provision of the civil liability for the damage by pollution or any other damage inflicted by ship2 established by international treaties of the Russian Federation, legislation of the Russian Federation; 5) for the ship making one-time passage outside the specified areas and season of navigation—copy of the certificate issued by the organization authorized for the classification and certification of ships and which has approved project of the one-time passage; 6) for the ship carrying out towing including that of floating drilling rigs—copy of the certificate issued by the organization authorized for the classification and certification of ships and which has approved project of the towing. 5. If applicant is a physical person authorized by shipowner the following documents in Russian and/or English presented in the electronic form (pdf format files) are additionally attached to the application: 1) copy of a document identifying person of the applicant; 2) copy of a document confirming the authority of person who signed the application. 6. The application with the documents attached in compliance with items 4 and 5 of the present Rules is to be sent to the e-mail indicated in the contact information on the official site of the NSR Administration in Internet (hereinafter referred to as official site) not earlier than 120 calendar days and not later than 15 working days before the intended date of the entering of ship into the water area of the Northern Sea Route. 7. The application is accepted for consideration on the date of its reception by the NSR Administration and if the application was received on day off or on holiday—on the first day following day off or holiday. 8. The NSR Administration not later than in two working days after the reception of the application for consideration allocates information on the received application (indicating date of the reception of application for consideration) on the official site.

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9. The NSR Administration considers the application within 10 working days since its reception for consideration. 10. In case of the decision of the NSR Administration to grant permission for ship to navigate in the water area of the Northern Sea Route, not later than in two working days after the decision is taken the permission is allocated on the official site providing the following information: 1) name of ship; 2) flag of ship; 3) IMO number; 4) date of the beginning and end of the permission validity (time of the validity of permission should not exceed 365 calendar days); 5) route of the navigation (area of operation) of ship in the water area of the Northern Sea Route; 6) information on the need of icebreaker assistance of ship under heavy, medium and light ice conditions with the indication of sections of the water area of the Northern Sea Route (south-western part of the Kara Sea, north-eastern part of the Kara Sea, western part of the East Siberian Sea, eastern part of the East Siberian Sea, western part of the Laptev Sea, eastern part of the Laptev Sea, Chukchi Sea) and period of navigation indicated in annex 2 to the present Rules, when ship is to navigate under the icebreaker assistance. 11. In case of the decision of the NSR Administration to refuse permission for ship to navigate in the water area of the Northern Sea Route, a notification is to be sent by e-mail to the applicant signed by the head of the NSR Administration (or by a substituting person) with the indication of reasons of the refusal to grant the permission. 12. The NSR Administration not later than in two days after taking decision of the refusal to grant the permission allocates relevant information on the official site. 13. Ship which was granted permission should not enter the water area of the Northern Sea Route earlier than on the date of the beginning of the term of validity of the permission and should leave the water area of the Northern Sea Route not later than on the date of the end of the term of validity of the permission. If ship cannot leave The Northern Sea Route water area before the expire of the validity of the permission shipmaster immediately informs The NSR Administration about that indicating the reasons of the violation of the requirements of the first paragraph of present item and acts according to The NSR Administration instructions. 14. When ship moves towards the water area of the Northern Sea Route from the west, 72 hours before approaching meridian 33° E (hereinafter referred to as Western boundary) and when ship moves towards the water area of the Northern Sea Route from the east, 72 hours before approaching parallel 62° N and/or meridian 169°W (hereinafter referred to as Eastern boundary) or immediately after the departure from sea port (if the navigational period of ship after the departure from sea port to the Western or to the Eastern boundary is less than 72 hours) ship master informs the NSR Administration about the planned time of arrival of ship to the Western or Eastern boundary accordingly as well as sends the following information: 1) name of ship; 2) IMO number of ship 3) port/place of destination

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4) 5) 6) 7) 8)

maximum operating draft of ship in m; type and amount of cargo carried by ship in metric t; presence, amount in metric t and class of dangerous cargo carried by ship; fuel capacity in metric t at the moment of report; fresh water capacity subject to the replenishment by fresh water from the ship’s distilling plant (if any) at the moment of report (number of days is specified when ship can move without the replenishment of fresh water); 9) subsistence reserve and other types of the ship’s supply at the moment of report (number of days is specified when ship can move without replenishment of provision and of other types of supply); 10) number of crew members and passengers; 11) information on the malfunction of ship’s machinery and/or of maintenance facilities (if any). 15. 24 hours before approaching the Western or Eastern boundary ship master notifies again the NSR Administration of the planned time of the arrival of ship to the appropriate boundary. 16. At the departure of ship from a sea port of the Russian Federation situated in the water area of the Northern Sea Route ship master immediately informs the NSR Administration of the time of departure as well as sends the information in compliance with item 14 of the present Rules. 17. At the entrance of ship into the water area of the Northern Sea Route from inland water ways of the Russian Federation ship master informs the NSR Administration of the time of the entrance as well as send the information in compliance with item 14 of the present Rules 18. While entering the Western or Eastern boundary ship master informs the NSR Administration of the planned time of the entrance of ship into the water area of the Northern Sea Route, geographical coordinates, track and speed of ship at the moment of report. 19. At the entrance of ship into the water area of the Northern Sea Route ship master informs the NSR Administration of the actual time of the entrance of ship into the water area of the Northern Sea Route, geographical coordinates, track and speed of ship at the moment of report. 20. After the completion of navigation in the water area of the Northern Sea Route on leaving the water area of the Northern Sea Route ship master informs the NSR Administration of the actual time of leaving the water area of the Northern Sea Route, geographical coordinates, track and speed of ship at the moment of report. After the completion of navigation in the water area of the Northern Sea Route while ship is calling at a sea port of the Russian Federation situated in the water area of the Northern Sea Route immediately after the call of ship master informs the NSR Administration of the time of the call of ship at port with the indication of name of the sea port. III.  Rules of the icebreaker assistance of ships in the water area of the Northern Sea Route 21. Icebreaker assistance is rendered by the icebreakers authorized to navigate under the State flag of the Russian Federation. 22. Icebreaker assistance involves ensuring safety of navigation of ship in the water area of the Northern Sea Route the ship being in the zone covered by radio communication 1400

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with icebreaker on channel 16 of very high frequency (hereinafter referred to as VHF2), namely the ice reconnaissance by icebreaker making channels in ice, formation of a group of ships and allocation of ships following the icebreaker/icebreakers, sailing of ship through the channel behind icebreaker in tow, without towing in the independent mode or within a group of ships. 23. Information on the necessity to use the icebreaker assistance under heavy, medium and light ice conditions while sailing in the water area of the Northern Sea Route is provided by the NSR Administration in the permission (sub-item 6 of item 10 of the present Rules). 24. In compliance with item 5 of article 51 of CCN the fee rate of the icebreaker assistance of ship in the water area of the Northern Sea Route is determined according to the legislation of the Russian Federation about natural monopolies taking into account the capacity of ship, ice class of ship, distance of the escorting and period of navigation. 25. Point and time of the beginning and end of the icebreaker assistance of ship are agreed by shipowner with the organization rendering service of the icebreaker assistance in the water area of the Northern Sea Route (hereinafter referred to as organization rendering service of the icebreaker assistance). 26. While approaching the point of the formation of a group of ships to follow the icebreaker/icebreakers (hereinafter referred to as convoy) the coordinates of which are fixed by the organization rendering service of icebreaker assistance or in case of the escorting by icebreaker of one ship to the point of meeting with icebreaker the coordinates of which are fixed by icebreaker master, the ship establishes radio communication on the VHF channel 16 and acts in compliance with his instructions. 27. The ice convoy is under control of master of the icebreaker rendering the icebreaker assistance of ships. 28. Order of the allocation of ships within the ice convoy is specified by master of the icebreaker rendering the assistance. 29. Ships within the ice convoy, at the command of the icebreaker rendering assistance, change over to the VHF channel of communication indicated by the icebreaker 30. Master of ship while moving in the ice convoy has to ensure: placing the ship within the convoy in compliance with the instruction of master of the icebreaker; abidance by ship of the place within the ice convoy, ship’s speed and distance to a ship ahead in compliance with the instruction of master of the icebreaker; fulfillment of the instructions of master of the icebreaker in connection with the icebreaker assistance; immediate transfer to the icebreaker of the information about the impossibility to maintain the place fixed for ship within the ice convoy, speed and/or distance to other ship in the ice convoy; verification of water level in bilge wells every hour and after powerful impact of ship against ice; immediate transfer to the icebreaker of the information about damages inflicted on ship. IV.  Rules of the pilot ice assistance of ships in the water area of the Northern Sea Route 31. Pilot ice assistance of ships is carried out with the purpose of ensuring safety of the navigation of ships and prevention of accidents as well as protection of the marine environment in the water area of the Northern Sea Route. 32. In compliance with item 5 of article 51 of CCN fee rate for the pilot ice assistance in the water area of the Northern Sea Route is determined in accordance with legislation 1401

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of the Russian Federation about natural monopolies taking into account the capacity of ship, ice class of ship, distance of the escorting and period of navigation. 33. Person carrying out the pilot ice assistance of ships authorized for the pilot ice assistance in the water area of the Northern Sea Route with a service record not less than for three years as ship master or chief mate on sea ships with a capacity of 3000 t and more out of which at least six months of the navigation of ship under ice conditions.and being worker of the organization rendering services of the pilot ice assistance of ships in the water area of the Northern Sea Route (hereinafter referred to as ice pilot) gives recommendations to ship master during the navigation of ship under ice conditions in the water area of the Northern Sea Route. 34. During the pilot ice assistance of ship ice pilot gives to the ship master recommendations regarding: assessment of ice conditions and possibility of the safe navigation of ship under these conditions; selection of optimum route of the movement of ship and of the relevant scenario of the navigation of ship in ice independently; selection of speed and ways of performing manoeuvres of ship avoiding dangerous interaction of hull and rudder propeller system with ice; ways of the maintenance of safe speed and distance to icebreaker or ship ahead when moving in convoy; ways of the execution of instructions of masters of the icebreakers rendering assistance to ships. 35. For carrying out pilot ice assistance ice pilot should have at his disposal the following logistic support and equipment: 1) navigational nautical charts, guides and manuals describing the water area of the Northern Sea Route; 2) navigational, hydrometeorological and hydraulic information in relation to the water area of the Northern Sea Route; 3) special warm clothing matching climatic conditions of the water area of the Northern Sea Route. 36. While carrying out the pilot ice assistance in the water area of the Northern Sea Route ice pilot is, entitled: 1) to use shipboard radio station and other means of communication; 2) to use all shipboard means of navigational equipment and auxiliary facilities; 3) to receive from ship master information on structural, operational features and current state of navigational instruments, engine installations, steering, thruster, anchor and other arrangements ensuring the ship’s movement and maneuvering control; 4) to receive from ship master information on ship name, call signs, characteristics of ship (length, beam, draft, height of masts above water, speed, availability of thrusters, data on draft, loading, stability and insubmersibility. 37. Before the beginning of the pilotage of ship ice pilot is liable: 1) on the arrival aboard ship to show to ship master a certificate; 2) to agree with ship master plan of the forthcoming voyage in the water area of the Northern Sea Route; 3) to agree with ship master plan of the forthcoming movement in the ice convoy or sailing solo behind the icebreaker; 4) to agree with ship master the order of interaction in the control of ship as well as the control of consequences of the execution of instructions of ship master in process of forthcoming pilot ice assistance of ship; 5) to agree with ship master time of rest of the ice pilot. 1402

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38. Ice pilot is taken aboard at sea port of the Russian Federation, at foreign port from which ship is to move to the water area of the Northern Sea Route or at point of the reception of ice pilot. 39. Ice pilot disembarks at sea port of the Russian Federation, or at foreign port being the first port of the calling of ship after the transit in the water area of the Northern Sea Route as well as at point of the disembarkation of ice pilot. 40. 24, 12 and 3 hours before approaching the point of taking aboard an ice pilot ship master informs the organization rendering services of the ice pilot assistance of time of the approach of ship to the point of taking aboard an ice pilot. 41. Ice pilot after having been taken aboard is liable to show to ship master a certificate and receipt to put down the following information: 1) number of receipt; 2) name, first name, patronimic (if any) of ice pilot; 3) name of ship; 4) flag of ship; 5) IMO number of ship; 6) call sign of ship; 7) type of ship; 8) ship’s dimensions: overall length, overall width in meters; 9) forward and aft draft in meters; 10) last port of the ship’s call; 11) port of destination; 12) type and amount of cargo in metric tons; 13) number of passengers; 14) name of shipowner; 15) name of ship agent; 16) date and time of the arrival of ice pilot aboard ship; 17) date and time of the departure of ice pilot from ship; 18) information on initial and final points of the route of the pilot ice assistance; 19) information on the comments of ship master (if any); 20) family name, first name, patronymic (if any) of ship master; 21) date of the filling of receipt. The receipt is to be signed by ship master and certified by ship’s seal. All entries in the receipt should be duplicated in English. V.  Rules of the assistance of ships on seaways of the water area of the Northern Sea Route 42. When ship moves on seaways in the water area of the Northern Sea Route after crossing the Western or Eastern boundary and before leaving the water area of the Northern Sea Route once a day at 12.00 of Moscow time ship master sends to the NSR Administration the following information at the moment of reporting: 1) name of ship and her IMO number; 2) geographical coordinates of ship (latitude and longiture); 3) planned time of the ship leaving the water area of the Northern Sea Route or planned time of the arrival of ship to the seaport situated in the water area of the Northern Sea Route; 4) route of ship with an accuracy of one degree; 1403

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speed of ship in knots with an accuracy of one knot; type of ice, thickness of ice in meters and concentration of ice in points; temperature of ambient air in centigrade degrees with an accuracy of one degree; temperature of outside water in centigrade degrees with an accuracy of one degree; 9) direction of wind with an accuracy of 10 degrees; 10) speed of wind with an accuracy of one meter per second. 11) visibility in nautical miles with an accuracy of one mile; 12) during the movement of ship in open water—height of waves in meters with an accuracy of one meter; 13) amount of fuel aboard in metric tons; 14) amount of fresh water aboard in metric tons; 15) information on accident with a crew member, passenger or ship (if any); 16) information on the detected malfunction or lack of navigational equipment (if any); 17) other information regarding safety of navigation and protection of the marine environment against pollution from ships (if any). 43. In case of the detection of pollution of the environment ship master immediately informs about that the NSR Administration. 44. Ship moving towards the place of meeting with icebreaker/icebreakers should navigate in ice in compliance with her category of ice strengthening. If ship is approaching the ice through which she cannot move independently ship master should inform the organization rendering services of the icebreaker assistance and master of the icebreaker waiting for the above ship at the point of meeting and act further on in accordance with the recommendations of icebreaker master. 45. Ship which in compliance with the permission navigates in the water area of the Northern Sea Route without icebreaker assistance, when approaching the ice in which she cannot move independently, immediately informs about that the NSR Administration and acts in compliance with its recommendations. VI.  Provision about the navigational-hydrographic and hydrometeorologic support of the navigation of ships in the water area of the Northern Sea Route 46. The navigational-hydrographic support of the navigation of ships in the water area of the Northern Sea Route involves the investigation of the submarine relief in order to maintain navigational nautical charts, guides and manuals for the navigation at the up-to-date level and making provision of the water area of the Northern Sea Route for the navigation facility equipment (hereinafter referred to as NFE) as well as informing seafarers of change of the navigational situation. 47. In compliance with item 4 of article 5 of CCN the navigational-hydrographic support in the water area of the Northern Sea Route is provided by the federal body of execution power performing functions of rendering state services and state property control in the sphere of sea transport (Rosmorrechflot). 48. In compliance with item 3 of article 51 of CCN, as far as the navigationalhydrographic support of the navigation of ships in the water area of the Northern Sea Route in concerned, functions of the agreement of the installation of NFE and areas of carrying out hydrographic works in the water area of the Northern Sea Route as well as of rendering information services (as applied to the water area of the Northern Sea Route) 1404

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in the sphere of requirements for the navigational-hydrographic support of the navigation of ship are performed by the NSR Administration. 49. Number, type and arrangement of NFE in the water area of the Northern Sea Route are defined on the agreement with the NSR Administration. 50. Hydrographic works in the water area of the Northern Sea Route are carried out in the areas agreed with the NSR Administration. 51. While moving en-route in the water area of the Northern Sea Route ship master having detected malfunction or the lack of NFE indicated on the nautical chart or in the navigational manual informs about that the NSR Administration in compliance with item 42 of the present Rules. 52. In compliance with item 3 of article 51 of CCN, as far as hydrometeorological support of the navigation of ships in the water area of the Northern Sea Route is concerned, functions of monitoring hydrometeorological, ice and navigational conditions in the water area of the Northern Sea Route are performed by the NSR Administration. On the basis of information received from organizations and institutions of the Federal service on hydrometeorology and monitoring of the environment (hereinafter referred to as Roshydromet) and information received from ships in compliance with item 42 of the present Rules the NSR Administration daily allocates on the official site hydrometeorological and ice analysis regarding the water area of the Northern Sea Route as well as hydrometeorological and ice forecast for 72 hours in relation to the water area of the Northern Sea Route. VII.  Rules of the radio communication during the navigation of ships in the water area of the Northern Sea Route 53. Radio communication between ships, icebreakers and the NSR Administration is carried out with the use of radio equipment designed for the application within the operating zones of sea regions A1, A2, A3 and A4 of the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (hereinafter referred to as GMDSS) in compliance with the Rules of radio communication of the maritime mobile service and maritime mobile satellite service of the Russian Federation approved by the order of the Transport Ministry of Russia, Communication Ministry of Russia, State Committee of Fishery (Goskomrybolovstvo) dated November 4, 2000, No.137/190/2911. 54. While moving in ice convoy, icebreaker/icebreakers and ships keep continuous radio watch on the VHF channel 16. 55. Contact information for the communication with the NSR Administration is allocated on the official site. 56. While moving in the ice convoy, radio communication between ships and between ship and icebreaker/icebreakers is carried out on the VHF communication channel established by icebreaker master supervising the movement of the ice convoy. 57. Radio talks not related to the movement of the ice convoy or safety of navigation on the VHF channel established in compliance with item 56 of the present Rules are prohibited. 58. In the independent sailing of ship within sea region A4 of GMDSS (outside the coverage zone of the INMARSAT system, to the north of parallel 75° N) ship master informs the NSR Administration about the planned geographical coordinates of points of the intersection of parallel 75° N during the movement of ship from the south to the north and from the north to the south. 1405

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The NSR Administration informs ship master about ships used as mediators for the communication by radio (hereinafter referred to as ships—mediators) and scheme of the communication of ship with the NSR Administration using ships-mediators. 59. The NSR Administration sends information on the assigned ships-mediators to the State Maritime Rescue and Coordination Center (SMRCC) and/or appropriate Maritime Rescue and Coordination Center (MRCC), Maritime Rescue Sub-Center (MRSC). VIII.  Requirements to ships pertaining to the safety of navigation and protection of the marine environment from the pollution from ships 60. Ship when navigating the water area of the Northern Sea Route should have aboard: 1) present Rules; 2) sea nautical charts and manuals along the entire route of movement through the water area of the Northern Sea Route; 3) supplementary emergency equipment including: during the polar night navigation—one searchlight with power of at least two kW with a set of spare lamps which can be installed in the fore body of ship or at one of the wings of conning bridge; per one set of warm clothes for each person on board and in addition to the above amount of warm clothes—three spare sets; hydrosuits in a number matching maximum admissible number of persons who can be on board during the navigation. 61. The following requirements should be met on ship navigating in the water area of the Northern Sea Route: 1) tank or tanks capacity for the collection of oil residues 1 should be sufficient taking into consideration type of ship power plant and duration of voyage in the water area of the Northern Sea Route; 2) on board ship there should be storage tanks of sufficient capacity for the collection of waste (sludge) produced in the operation of ship taking into consideration duration of voyage in the water area of the Northern Sea Route; 3) amount of fuel, fresh water and provision on ship should be sufficient for the navigation in the water area of the Northern Sea Route without replenishment taking into consideration maximum possible duration of navigation. 4) during the period from November to December and from January to June ballast tanks adjoining external side above operating waterline should be heated. 62. When granting the permission to leave a sea port of the Russian Federation in compliance with article 80 of CCN, for the subsequent navigation in the water area of the Northern Sea Route, sea port master takes into account availability of the permission granted to the ship 63. When ship is following the icebreaker alone or in an ice convoy the power plant of ship should be prepared to immediately change the mode of ship movement. 64. On the conning bridge of the ship navigating in the water area of the Northern Sea Route under ice conditions ice concentration exceeding point three there should be present ship master or chief mate. 65. Discharge of oil residues into the water area of the Northern Sea Route is prohibited. IX.  Other provisions in relation to the organization of the navigation of ship in the water area of the Northern Sea Route 66. The NSR Administration allocates on the official site the following information: 1) contact information; 2) the present Rules in Russian and English; 1406

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3) 4) 5) 6)

information on the applications considered by the NSR Administration; information on granted permissions; information on refusal to grant permission; data on the organizations rendering services for the icebreaker assistance in the water area of the Northern Sea Route indicating their contact information; 7) data on the organizations rendering services for the ice pilot assistance with the indication of their contact information; 8) information on the movement of ships in the water area of the Northern Sea Route; 9) long-range ice forecast for 30 and 90 days in relation to the water area of the Northern Sea Route; 10) hydrometeorological and ice analysis in relation to the water area of the Northern Sea Route; 11) hydrometeorological and ice forecast for 72 hours in relation to the water area of the Northern Sea Route; 12) recommended routes of the navigation in the water area of the Northern Sea Route and information on the passage draft on these routes; 13) recommendations for the communication in the water area of the Northern Sea Route. 67. Information on the movement of ships in the water area of the Northern Sea Route contains the following: 1) names of ships and icebreakers being in the water area of the Northern Sea Route or moving towards the water area of the Northern Sea Route; 2) planned and actual time of the crossing by each ship and icebreaker the Western or Eastern boundaries and their geographical coordinates, route and speed at the moment of crossing; 3) geographical coordinates, route and speed of each ship and icebreaker at 12.00 Moscow time of the reporting day; 4) planned time of the departure of ships out of the water area of the Northern Sea Route or planned time of the arrival of ships to sea ports located in the water area of the Northern Sea Route.

Document 316 Russian Federation, Rules of the application of tariffs for the ­icebreaker escorting of ships in the water area of the Northern Sea Route [unofficial translation] (4 March 2014)* 1. The tariffs for the icebreaker escorting of ships in the water area of the Northern Sea Route (hereinafter referred to as tariffs) are applied for the payment for services of the icebreaker escorting of ships rendered in accordance with the Rules of navigation in the water area of the Northern Sea Route approved by order of the Ministry of Transport of Russia dated 17.01.2013 N 7 (registered by the Justice Ministry on 12.04.2013, registration number is 28120) (hereinafter referred to as Rules of navigation). 2. The tariffs are applied regarding the consumers to whom are rendered services of the icebreaker escorting in the water area of the Northern Sea Route. * 

Retrieved from the Northern Sea Route Administration, www.nsra.ru/en/rules_icebreaker_escorting_nsr/. 1407

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3. The tariffs are applied depending on the differentiation by ship’s capacity, ice class of ship, distance of escorting and period of navigation. 4. In the application of the tariffs the gross tonnage of ship determined in accordance with article 10 of the Code of commercial navigation of the Russian Federation (hereinafter referred to as Code of commercial navigation) is to be taken into account. For the ships having no tonnage certificates envisaged by articles 10, 25 of the Code of commercial navigation the gross tonnage is to be determined by a conventional volume of ship calculated in cubic meters as a product of three ship values—overall length, overall breadth and overall freeboard, indicated in ship’s documents using coefficient 0.35. 5. For the purpose of using the tariffs ice class of ship is taken bearing in mind rules of classification and construction of ships published in accordance with part 2 of article 24 of the Code of commercial navigation. 6. While applying the tariffs the distance of icebreaker escorting is taken to be equal to a number of zones of the water area of the Northern Sea Route, where the icebreaker escorting was carried out (hereinafter referred to as zone). Number of zones increases when crossing the boundary of a zone irrespective of distance and time of escorting within each zone. When two or more escortings of one ship are carried out, tariff is applied for each escorting depending on a number of zones, where each icebreaker escorting of ship was carried out. As zones for the purpose of the application of the tariffs, sections of the water area of the Northern Sea Route are taken defined in the Rules of navigation, namely: south-western part of the Kara Sea (Kara Strait, Novaya Zemlya, meridian 68°35ʹ E in the west and meridian 79°00ʹ E in the east); north-eastern part of the Kara Sea (meridian 79°00ʹ E in the west and meridian 105°00ʹ E in the east); western part of the Laptev Sea (meridian 105°00ʹ E in the west and meridian 125°00ʹ E in the east); eastern part of the Laptev Sea (meridian 125°00ʹ E in the west and meridian 140°00ʹ E in the east); south-western part of the East Siberian Sea (meridian 140°00ʹ E in the west and meridian 160°00ʹ E in the east); north-eastern part of the East Siberian Sea (meridian 160°00ʹ E in the west and meridian 180°00ʹ E in the east); Chukchi Sea (meridian 180°00ʹ E in the west and meridian 168°58ʹ37ʺ W in the east). 7. Periods of navigation for the purpose of the application of the tariffs are taken in accordance with the periods of navigation defined in the Rules of navigation, namely: summer-autumn period of navigation (1 July— 30 November); winter-spring period of navigation (1 December— 30 June). While carrying out escorting during two period of navigation the tariffs are applied proportionally to the time spent for the escorting during each period of navigation. 8. When carrying out the escorting of research ships which possess the permission for the realization of the marine research in the inland sea waters, territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf of the Russian Federation issued by the federal executive body administering the realization of the state policy in the field of scientific, research activity in accordance with the Rules of carrying out marine research in the 1408

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inland sea waters, territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf of the Russian Federation approved by the regulation of the Government of the Russian Federation of 30.07.2004 N 391 (Code of the legislation of the Russian Federation, 2004, N 32, art. 3338; 2010, N 31, art. 4247; 2011,N 43, art. 6085; 2012, N 43, art. 5874; 2013, N 19. art. 2424), the tariff is applied with a coefficient of 0.5.

Document 317 Russian Federation, Decree No 813, Rules of the repeatedly crossing by foreign ships of the State Border of the Russian Federation without border, customs (as to the accomplishment of customs operations in connection with the arrival (departure) of ships) and other forms of control (15 August 2014)* In accordance with part twenty of article 9 of the Law of the Russian Federation “On the State Border of the Russian Federation” the Government of the Russian Federation decrees: To approve the attached Rules of the repeatedly crossing by foreign ships of the State Border of the Russian Federation without border, customs (as to the accomplishment of customs operations in connection with the arrival (departure) of ships) and other forms of control. 1. The present Rules establish the single order of the repeatedly crossing of the State Border of the Russian Federation without border, customs (as to the accomplishment of customs operations in connection with the arrival (departure) of ships) and other forms of control (hereinafter—repeatedly crossing of the State Border of the Russian Federation by foreign ships navigating between Russian ports or marine terminals as well as in case of their leaving Russian ports for the inland waters or the territorial sea of the Russian Federation for the purpose of commercial navigation (except the activity in connection with the use of ships for fishery) with the subsequent arrival in Russian ports and also in other cases approved by the Government of the Russian Federation. The present Rules are applied to foreign ships if they meet the requirements, conditions and restrictions specified by parts 20 and 23 of article 9 of the Law of the Russian Federation “On the State Border of the Russian Federation”. 2. Foreign ships cross the State Border of the Russian Federation at sea in accordance with the Law of the Russian Federation “On the State Border of the Russian Federation”. 3. As to foreign ships, people, cargo and animals carried aboard, the border and customs control and in the cases established by international agreements of the Russian Federation and federal laws, other types of control are exercised in the points of admission across the State Border of the Russian Federation set in sea ports open for foreign ships on the arrival onto the territory of the Russian Federation and on the departure out of the territory of the Russian Federation. 4. After the border and customs control and in the cases established by international agreements and federal laws also other types of control in points of the admission across

* Retrieved from the Northern Sea Route Administration at www.nsra.ru/en/rules_border_vls/. Annex I “Application form”; Annex 2 “Permission form”, Annexes 3–5 “Notification forms” are not reprinted here.

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the State Border of the Russian Federation on the arrival upon the territory of the Russian Federation foreign ships may realize the repeated crossing of the State Border of the Russian Federation on the basis of the permission for the repeated crossing of the State Border of the Russian Federation without border, customs (as to the accomplishment of customs operations in connection with the arrival (departure) of ships) and other forms of control (hereinafter—permission for the repeated crossing of the State Border of the Russian Federation) granted by border authorities depending on the location of port out of which the departure of foreign ship for the purpose of commercial shipping in relation to the repeated crossing of the State Body of the Russian Federation is planned. 5. To obtain the permission for the repeated crossing of the State Border of the Russian Federation, shipowner or authorized person (hereinafter—applicant) hands in an application to border authorities depending on the location of port out of which the departure of foreign ship for the purpose of repeated crossing of the State Border is planned for the permission of the repeated crossing by a foreign ship of the State Border of the Russian Federation without border, customs (as to the accomplishment of customs operations in connection with the arrival (departure) of ships) and other types of control made by the form according to annex № 1 (hereinafter—application). 6. The application is to be sent by facsimile or by e-mail not later than 10 days in advance of the arrival of foreign ship in a Russian port. 7. The following is attached to the application: a) transit plan of a foreign ship; b) crew list; c) list of passengers (if any). 8. Applicant on his own initiative can attach to the application a copy of permission for the transportation and towing in coasting trade as well as for other types of activity in the sphere of commercial navigation by foreign ships (hereinafter—permission for the transportation and towing) (if the availability if such permission is required by the legislation of the Russian Federation). 9. If a copy of the permission for the transportation and towing is not submitted by applicant on his initiative the information thereof needed for taking decision as to the issue of the permission for the repeated crossing by foreign ships of the State Border of the Russian Federation is requested by border authorities with the state bodies participating in rendering public services having relevant information including that within the framework of the interdepartmental information interaction. 10. Decision of the issue or denial in granting the permission for the repeated crossing by foreign ships of the State Border of the Russian Federation is to be taken by the head of border authorities or public officer of the border authorities (hereinafter—public officer of the border authorities) within 8 working days since the receipt of the application. 11. Permission for the repeated crossing by foreign ship of the State Border of the Russian Federation is presented in the form according to annex № 2, is signed by an official of the border authorities and sealed. Forms of the above permissions are documents of the strict accountability having registration series and number. 12. Permission for the repeated crossing by foreign ship of the State Border of the Russian Federation is granted for the time indicated in the application (but not exceeding 1 year) and within the time of validity of the permission for transportation and towing (if availability of the permission for the transportation and towing is required by the legislation of the Russian Federation). Permission for the repeated crossing by foreign ship of the State Border of the Russian Federation is valid within the specified route of

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the navigation of foreign ship and (or) area, where the repeated crossing of the State Border of the Russian Federation by a foreign ship is anticipated. 13. Permission for the repeated crossing by foreign ship of the State Border of the Russian Federation is to be sent to the applicant by posting with the delivery receipt within 2 days after the decision is taken about its issue. At the same time, a copy of the above permission is to be sent to the applicant by facsimile or by e-mail. During the whole period of the validity of permission for the repeated crossing by foreign ship of the State Border of the Russian Federation its copy and copy of the permission for the transportation and towing (if the availability of such permission is required by the legislation of the Russian Federation) is in the possession of captain of ship. Copies of the permission for the repeated crossing by foreign ship of the State Border of the Russian Federation are to be sent as well to a customs body depending on the location of port out of which a foreign ship is to depart for the purpose of the repeated crossing of the State Border of the Russian Federation and to master of this port by facsimile or by e-mail within 1 day since the decision is taken about the issue of the above permission. 14. Notification about the denial of the issue of permission for the repeated crossing by foreign ship of the State Border of the Russian Federation is presented in the form in accordance with annex № 3 and is to be sent to the applicant by posting with the delivery receipt within 2 days after the decision is taken of the denial to issue such permission. At the same time, a copy of such notification is to be sent to applicant by facsimile or by e-mail. 15. Reasons for the denial of the issue of permission for the repeated crossing by foreign ship of the State Border of the Russian Federation are as follows: a) filing of the application with violation of the requirements established by items 6 and 7 of the present Rules; b) inadequate or incomplete information in the application; c) endangering of the Russian Federation; d) violation of the legislation about the State Border of the Russian Federation committed by captain of a foreign ship or shipowner during a year preceded the date of the application for permission for the repeated crossing by foreign ship of the State Border of the Russian Federation. 16. Validity of the permission for the repeated crossing by foreign ship of the State Border of the Russian Federation is terminated in the following cases: a) denial of applicant of the possibility of the repeated crossing by foreign ship of the State Border of the Russian Federation. Applicant must in advance notify the border authorities issuing the permission for the repeated crossing by foreign ships of the State Body of the Russian Federation of his decision by facsimile or by e-mail. b) termination of the validity of permission for the transportation and towing (if the availability of such permission is specified by the legislation of the Russian Federation); c) submission of unreliable information about the location of a foreign ship; d) violation by captain of a foreign ship within the period of validity of the permission for the repeated crossing by foreign ship of the State Border of the Russian Federation of international agreements and legislation of the Russian Federation about the State Border including unfulfilled requirements specified by items 21–26 of the present Rules. 17. Validity of the permission for the repeated crossing by foreign ship of the State Border of the Russian Federation is suspended in cases of the cessation of the transmission by technical facilities of the control of the location of ship of the information of the location of a foreign ship for the period longer than 6 hours.

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18. After the decision about the cessation (suspension) of the validity of the permission for the repeated crossing by foreign ship of the State Border of the Russian Federation a public officer of the border authorities immediately sends to the applicant and captain of a foreign ship by facsimile or e-mail the notification about the cessation (suspension) of validity of the permission for the repeated crossing by foreign ship of the State Border of the Russian Federation in the form in accordance with annex № 4 with the indication of reasons of such decision. Captain of a foreign ship having received the information about the cessation (suspension) of the validity of the permission for the repeated crossing by foreign ship of the State Border of the Russian Federation must make appropriate logging. If the validity of the permission for the repeated crossing by foreign ship of the State Border of the Russian Federation ceased when foreign ship is outside the territorial sea of the Russian Federation she must in the shortest time to call at the nearest port of the Russian Federation en route. 19. Validity of the suspended permission for the repeated crossing by foreign ship of the State Border of the Russian Federation is restored by the decision of a public officer of the border authorities after the elimination of the reason being at the basis of suspension of the permission. 20. Registration and taking account of the permissions for the repeated crossing by foreign ship of the State Border of the Russian Federation, notifications of denials of the issue of permissions or of termination (suspension) of their validity is performed by the border authorities in the log book and border authorities information systems established by the legislation of the Russian Federation. 21. Captain of foreign ship or applicant not later than 24 hours prior to the departure of foreign ship out of the Russian port by facsimile or by e-mail sends the notification of the departure of foreign ship out of the Russian port (hereinafter—notification of the departure of ship out of the port) made in form according to annex № 5 to the border authorities depending on the location of port (the nearest border authorities) and submits to it a list of crew members as well as a list of passengers (if any). 22. Captain of foreign ship or applicant within 1 hour after sending to border authorities the notification about the departure of ship out of port verifies by telephone its receipt by the border authorities. 23. Departure of foreign ship out of the Russian port earlier than at time stated in the notification about the departure of ship out of port is not allowed. 24. In case of the one-off denial of the intention to cross the State Border of the Russian Federation, captain of foreign ship or applicant immediately by facsimile of e-mail informs about that the border authorities to which the notification of the departure out of port was sent and after one hour verify by telephone the receipt by the border authorities of the indicated information. 25. Captain of ship notifies the border authorities depending on the location of port (nearest border authorities) by facsimile or by e-mail about all changes in the lists of crew members and (or) passengers (if any) at the moment of the departure of foreign ship out of the Russian port. 26. Change of the stated route of navigation as well as of the date, time and geographical coordinates of the location of crossing by a foreign ship of the State Border of the Russian Federation without agreement with border authorities depending on the location of the crossing point of the State Border of the Russian Federation is prohibited.

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27. At the actual crossing of the State Border of the Russian Federation captain of foreign ship transmits by radio communication, facsimile or by e-mail to the border authorities within the responsibility zone of which the crossing point of the State Border of the Russian Federation is situated the information of the foreign ship, of time and geographic coordinates of the location of crossing point by this ship of the State Border of the Russian Federation and the appropriate entry is introduced into the log book.

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Svalbard Archipelago [Spitsbergen]* Document 318 Treaty concerning the Archipelago of Spitsbergen (9 February 1920)** The President of the United States of America; His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India; His Majesty the King of Denmark; the President of the French Republic; His Majesty the King of Italy; His Majesty the Emperor of Japan; His Majesty the King of Norway; Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands; His Majesty the King of Sweden, Desirous, while recognizing the sovereignty of Norway over the Archipelago of Spitsbergen, including Bear Island, of seeing these territories provided with an equitable regime, in order to assure their development and peaceful utilisation, Have appointed as their respective Plenipotentiaries with a view to concluding a Treaty to this effect: Who, having communicated their full powers found in good and due form, have agreed as follows: Article 1 The High Contracting Parties undertake to recognize, subject to the stipulations of the present Treaty, the full and absolute sovereignty of Norway over the Archipelago of Spitsbergen, comprising, with Bear Island or Beeren-Eiland, all the islands situated between 100 and 350 longitude East of Greenwich and between 740 and 810 latitude North, especially West Spitsbergen, North-East Land, Barents Island, Edge Island, Wiehe Islands, Hope Island or Hopen-Eiland, and Prince Charles Foreland, together with all islands great or small and rocks appertaining thereto. Article 2 Ships and nationals of all the High Contracting Parties shall enjoy equally the rights of fishing and hunting in the territories specified in Article 1 and in their territorial waters. Norway shall be free to maintain, take or decree suitable measures to ensure the preservation and, if necessary, the re-constitution of the fauna and flora of the said regions, and their territorial waters; it being clearly understood that these measures shall

*  It would be beyond the scope of this collection to include all existing diplomatic correspondence on Svalbard issues. Therefore, tis part contains merely a small selection of notes and aide-mémoires. For more material see eg, ‘Post-war diplomatic exchanges between Norway and the U.S.S.R. concerning Svalbard’ (1953) 6 Polar Record 830–836; T Pedersen, ‘The Dynamics of Svalbard Diplomacy’  (2008) 19 Diplomacy and Statecraft 236–262; **  Done at Paris, 9 February 1920; entered into force 14 August 1925; 2 LNTS 7 [Registration Number 41]. From United Nations Treaty Series, by United Nations Office of Legal Affairs Treaty Section, © 1920, United Nations. Reprinted with the permission of the United Nations. See also the Norwegian Act relating to Svalbard, adopted 17 July 1925; entered into force 14 August 1925; available at the University of Oslo library, www. ub.uio.no/ujur/ulovdata/lov-19250717-011-eng.pdf; the Norwegian Mining Code for Spitsbergen (Svalbard) (1925/1975), laid down by Royal Decree of 7 August 1925, as amended by Royal Decree of 11 June 1975, available at the Governor of Svalbard, www.ub.uio.no/ujur/ulovdata/for-19250807-3767-eng.pdf; and the Act No 79 Relating to the Protection of the Environment in Svalbard, entered into force 1 July 2002, amended by the Act of 20 April 2012 No 20, available at the Norwegian Ministry of Climate and Environment, www.regjeringen.no/ en/dokumenter/svalbard-environmental-protection-act/id173945/.

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always be applicable equally to the nationals of all the High Contracting Parties without any exemption, privilege or favour whatsoever, direct or indirect to the advantage of anyone of them. Occupiers of land whose rights have been recognized in accordance with the terms of Articles 6 and 7 will enjoy the exclusive right of hunting on their own land: 1) in the neighbourhood of their habitations, houses, stores, factories and installations, constructed for the purpose of developing their property, under conditions laid down by the local police regulations; 2) within a radius of 10 kilometres round the headquarters of their place of business or works; and in both cases, subject always to the observance of regulations made by the Norwegian Government in accordance with the conditions laid down in the present Article. Article 3 The nationals of all the High Contracting Parties shall have equal liberty of access and entry for any reason or object whatever to the waters, fjords and ports of the territories specified in Article 1; subject to the observance of local laws and regulations, they may carryon there without impediment all maritime, industrial, mining and commercial operations on a footing of absolute equality. They shall be admitted under the same conditions of equality to the exercise and practice of all maritime, industrial, mining or commercial enterprises both on land and in the territorial waters, and no monopoly shall be established on any account or for any enterprise whatever. Notwithstanding any rules relating to coasting trade which may be in force in Norway, ships of the High Contracting Parties going to or coming from the territories specified in Article 1 shall have the right to put into Norwegian ports on their outward or homeward voyage for the purpose of taking on board or disembarking passengers or cargo going to or coming from the said territories, or for any other purpose. It is agreed that in every respect and especially with regard to exports, imports and transit traffic, the nationals of all the High Contracting Parties, their ships and goods shall not be subject to any charges or restrictions whatever which are not borne by the nationals, ships or goods which enjoy in Norway the treatment of the most favoured nation; Norwegian nationals, ships or goods being the other High Contracting Parties, and not treated more favourably in any respect. No charge or restriction shall be imposed on the exportation of any goods to the territories of any of the Contracting Powers other or more onerous than on the exportation of similar goods to the territory of any other Contracting Power (including Norway) or to any other destination. Article 4 All public wireless telegraphy stations established or to be established by, or with the authorisation of, the Norwegian Government within the territories referred to in Article 1 shall always be open on a footing of absolute equality to communications from ships of all flags and from nationals of the High Contracting Parties, under the conditions laid down in the Wireless Telegraphy Convention of July 5, 1912, or in the subsequent International Convention which may be concluded to replace it. Subject to international obligations arising out of a state of war, owners of landed property shall always be at liberty to establish and use for their own purposes wireless telegraphy installations, 1416

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which shall be free to communicate on private business with fixed or moving wireless stations, including those on board ships and aircraft. Article 5 The High Contracting Parties recognize the utility of establishing an international meteorological station in the territories specified in Article 1, the organisation of which shall form the subject of a subsequent Convention. Conventions shall also be concluded laying down the conditions under which scientific investigations may be conducted in the said territories. Article 6 Subject to the provisions of the present Article, acquired rights of nationals of the High Contracting Parties shall be recognized. Claims arising from taking possession or from occupation of land before the signature of the present Treaty shall be dealt with in accordance with the Annex hereto, which will have the same force and effect as the present Treaty. Article 7 With regard to methods of acquisition, enjoyment and exercise of the right of ownership of property, including mineral rights, in the territories specified in Article 1, Norway undertakes to grant to all nationals of the High Contracting Parties treatment based on complete equality and in conformity with the stipulations of the present Treaty. Expropriation may be resorted to only on grounds of public utility and on payment of proper compensation. Article 8 Norway undertakes to provide for the territories specified in Article 1 mining regulations which, especially from the point of view of imposts, taxes or charges of any kind, and of general or particular labour conditions, shall exclude all privileges, monopolies or favours for the benefit of the State or of the nationals of anyone of the High Contracting Parties, including Norway, and shall guarantee to the paid staff of all categories the remuneration and protection necessary for their physical, moral and intellectual welfare. Taxes, dues and duties levied shall be devoted exclusively to the said territories and shall not exceed what is required for the object in view. So far, particularly, as the exportation of minerals is concerned, the Norwegian Government shall have right to levy an export duty which shall not exceed 1 per cent of the maximum value of the minerals exported up to 100000 tons, and beyond that quantity the duty will be proportionately diminished. The value shall be fixed at the end of the navigation season by calculating the average free on board price obtained. Three months before the date fixed for their coming into force, the draft mining regulations shall be communicated by the Norwegian Government to the other Contracting Powers. If during this period one or more of the said Powers propose to modify these regulations before they are applied, such proposals shall be communicated by the Norwegian Government to the other Contracting Powers in order that they may be submitted to examination and the decision of a Commission composed of one representative of each of the said Powers. This Commission shall meet at the invitation of the Norwegian Government and shall come to a decision within a period of three months from the date of its first meeting. Its decisions shall be taken by a majority. 1417

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Article 9 Subject to the rights and duties resulting from the admission of Norway to the League of Nations, Norway undertakes not to create nor to allow the establishment of any naval base in the territories specified in Article 1 and not to construct any fortification in the said territories, which may never be used for warlike purposes. Article 10 Until the recognition by the High Contracting Parties of a Russian Government shall permit Russia to adhere to the present Treaty, Russian nationals and companies shall enjoy the same rights as nationals of the High Contracting Parties. Claims in the territories specified in Article 1 which they may have to put forward shall be presented under the conditions laid down in the present Treaty (Article 6 and Annex) through the intermediary of the Danish Government, who declare their willingness to lend their good offices for this purpose. The present Treaty of which the French and English texts are both authentic, shall be ratified. Ratifications shall be deposited at Paris as soon as possible. Powers of which the seat of the Government is outside Europe may confine their action to informing the Government of the French Republic, through their diplomatic representative at Paris, that their ratification has been given, and in this case, they shall transmit the instrument as soon as possible. The present Treaty will come into force, in so far as the stipulations of Article 8 are concerned, from the date of its ratification by all the signatory Powers; and in all other respects on the same date as the mining regulations provided for in that Article. Third Powers will be invited by the Government of the French Republic to adhere to the present Treaty duly ratified. This adhesion shall be effected by a communication addressed to the French Government, which will undertake to notify the other Contracting Parties. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the abovenamed Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty. DONE at Paris, the ninth day of February, 1920, in duplicate, one copy to be transmitted to the Government of His Majesty the King of Norway, and one deposited in the archives of the French Republic; authenticated copies will be transmitted to the other Signatory Powers. Annex 1. (1) Within three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, notification of all claims to land which had been made to any Government before the signature of the present Treaty must be sent by the Government of the claimant to a Commissioner charged to examine such claims. The Commissioner will be a judge or jurisconsult of Danish nationality possessing the necessary qualifications for the task, and shall be nominated by the Danish Government. (2) The notification must include a precise delimitation of the land claimed and be accompanied by a map on a scale of not less than 1:1,000,000 on which the land claimed is clearly marked. (3) The notification must be accompanied by the deposit of a sum of one penny for each acre (40 ares) of land claimed, to defray the expenses of the examination of the claims. (4) The Commissioner will be entitled to require from the claimants any further documents or information which he may consider necessary. 1418

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(5) The Commissioner will examine the claims so notified. For this purpose he will be entitled to avail himself of such expert assistance as he may consider necessary, and in case of need to cause investigation to be carried out on the spot. (6) The remuneration of the Commissioner will be fixed by agreement between the Danish Government and the other Governments concerned. The Commissioner will fix the remuneration of such assistants as he considers it necessary to employ. (7) The Commissioner, after examining the claims, will prepare a report showing precisely the claims which he is of opinion should be recognised at once and those which, either because they are disputed or for any other reason, he is of opinion should be submitted to arbitration as hereinafter provided. Copies of this report will be forwarded by the Commissioner to the Governments 'concerned. (8) If the amount of the sums deposited in accordance with clause (3) is insufficient to cover the expenses of the examination of the claims, the Commissioner will, in every case where he is of opinion that a claim should be recognised, at once state what further sum the claimant should be required to pay. This sum will be based on the amount of the land to which the claimant’s title is recognised. If the sums deposited in accordance with clause (3) exceed the expenses of the examination, the balance will be devoted to the cost of the arbitration hereinafter provided for. (9) Within three months from the date of the report referred to in clause (7) of this paragraph, the Norwegian Government shall take the necessary steps to confer upon claimants whose claims have been recognised by the Commissioner a valid title securing to them the exclusive property in the land in question, in accordance with the laws and regulations in force or to be enforced in the territories specified in Article 1 of the present Treaty, and subject to the mining regulations referred to in Article 8 of the present Treaty. In the event, however, of a further payment being required in accordance with clause (8) of this paragraph, a provisional title only will be delivered, which title will become definitive on payment by the claimant, within such reasonable period as the Norwegian Government may fix, of the further sum required of him. 2. Claims which for any reason the Commissioner referred to in clause (1) of the preceding paragraph has not recognised as valid will be settled in accordance with the following provisions: (1) Within three months from the date of the report referred to in clause (7) of the preceding paragraph, each of the Governments whose nationals have been recognised will appoint an arbitrator. The Commissioner will be the President of the Tribunal so constituted. In cases of equal division of opinion, he shall have the deciding vote. He will nominate a Secretary to receive the documents referred to in clause (2) of this paragraph and to make the necessary arrangements for the meeting of the Tribunal. (2) Within one month from the appointment of the Secretary referred to in clause (1) the claimants concerned will send to him through the intermediary of their respective Governments statements indicating precisely their claims and accompanied by such documents and arguments as they may wish to submit in support thereof. (3) Within two months from the appointment of the Secretary referred to in clause (1) the Tribunal shall meet at Copenhagen for the purpose of dealing with the claims which have been submitted to it. (4) The language of the Tribunal shall be English. Documents or arguments may be submitted to it by the interested parties in their own language, but in that case must be accompanied by an English translation. 1419

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(5)

The claimants shall be entitled, if they so desire, to be heard by the Tribunal either in person or by counsel, and the Tribunal shall be entitled to call upon the claimants to present such additional explanations, documents or arguments as it may think necessary. (6) Before the hearing of any case the Tribunal shall require from the parties a deposit or security for such sum as it may think necessary to cover the share of each party in the expenses of the Tribunal. In fixing the amount of such sum the Tribunal shall base itself principally on the extent of the land claimed. The Tribunal shall also have power to demand a further deposit from the parties in cases where special expense is involved. (7) The honorarium of the arbitrators shall be calculated per month, and fixed by the Governments concerned. The salary of the Secretary and any other persons employed by the Tribunal shall be fixed by the President. (8) Subject to the provisions of this Annex the Tribunal shall have full power to regulate its own procedure. (9) In dealing with the claims the Tribunal shall take into consideration: (a) any applicable rules of International Law (b) the general principles of justice and equity; (c) the following circumstances: (i) the date on which the land claimed was first occupied by the claimant or his predecessors in title; (ii) the date on which the claim was notified to the Government of the claimant; (iii) the extent to which the claimant or his predecessors in title have developed and exploited the title claimed. In this connection the Tribunal shall take into account the extent to which the claiments may have been prevented from developing their undertakings by conditions or restrictions resulting from the war of 1914–1919. (10) All the expenses of the Tribunal shall be divided among the claimants in such proportion as the Tribunal shall decide. If the amount of the sums paid in accordance with clause (6) is larger than the expenses of the Tribunal, the balance shall be returned to the parties whose claims have been recognised in such proportion as the Tribunal shall think fit. (11) The decisions of the Tribunal shall be communicated by it to the Governments concerned, including in every case the Norwegian Government. The Norwegian Government shall within three months from the receipt of each decision take the necessary steps to confer upon the claimants whose claims have been recognised by the Tribunal a valid title to the land in question, in accordance with the laws and regulations in force or to be enforced in the territories specified in Article 1, and subject to the mining regulations referred to in Article 8 of the present Treaty. Nevertheless, the titles so conferred will only become definitive on the payment by the claimant concerned, within such reasonable period as the Norwegian Government may fix, of his share of the expenses of the Tribunal. 3. Any claims which are not notified to the Commisioner in accordance with clause (1) of paragraph 1, or which not having been recognised by him are not submitted to the Tribunal in accordance with paragraph 2, will be finally extinguished. 1420

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Document 319 Norway, Royal Decree relating to a Fisheries Protection Zone around Svalbard [unofficial translation] (3 June 1977, as amended 28 June 2001)* Pursuant to Royal Decree of 3 June 1977 and amended by Royal Decree of 12 August 1994, Royal Decree of 16 September 1994, Royal Decrees of 13 July 1995, of 19 July 1996 and of 5 July 2001. With legal basis in a law from 17 December 1976 relating to Norway’s economic zone the following regulations relating to the fisheries protection zone around Svalbard around Svalbard are promulgated: Section 1 A fisheries protection zone in the seas adjacent to the coast of Svalbard shall be established for the conservation of the living resources of the sea and the regulation of fishing and hunting. The outer limit of the fisheries protection zone shall be drawn at a distance of 200 nautical miles (1 nautical mile = 1,852 metres) from the applicable baselines, or where baselines have not been established, from lines joining the outermost points of the archipelago. The fisheries protection zone shall further be limited by the outer limit of the economic zone off the Norwegian mainland, as established by Royal Decree of 17 December 1976. Where the fisheries protection zone is adjacent to the area of jurisdiction of another State, the limit shall be drawn according to agreement. Section 2 The provisions of Section 3 of Act No. 91 of 17 December 1976 relating to the economic zone of Norway shall not for the time being applied in the fisheries protection zone. Section 3 The Ministry of Fisheries shall be empowered to establish: 1. Prohibition against the conduct of fishing in specified areas in order to protect the growth of juvenile stocks and ensure recruitment to the stocks. The prohibition may apply for the entire year or for parts of the year. 2. Provisions relating to gear restrictions and minimum size of fish. 3. Total allowable catches for each species. The catch volume may be distributed throughout the year as appropriate. And to states that participate in fisheries. 4. Provisions regarding which states vessels have permission to operate fishing. 5. Provisions regarding the registration and other requirements for the permission to operate fishing. 6. Provisions regarding mesh size, extent and shaping of fishing tackle. 7. Provisions regarding allowable bycatch. 8. Prohibition against or regulation of fishing methods and use of gear. 9. Prohibition against a specific usage of the catch. * Retrieved from the Norwegian Directorate of Fisheris, www.fiskeridir.no/Yrkesfiske/Regelverk-ogreguleringer/J-meldinger/Gjeldende-J-meldinger/J-139-2001. This unofficial translation is provided by F Schmitt.

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10. Prohibition against having particular gear on board and storage of fishing tackle which cannot be used in the territory the vessel is located. 11. Provisions regarding the contract duty and the obligation to notify the quantity of the catch, species, duration, major fishing area, fishing tackle o.e. 12. Provisions regarding the conduct of inspections, hereunder obligations for drivers/owners of a vessel. 13. Provisions regarding the obligation to have and use specific equipment for control, reporting and location. The ministry shall be empowered to establish to which extent vessels shall cover costs when purchasing, installing and using such equipment. Section 4 Anyone wilfully or negligently violating the provisions of these regulations or of provisions issued in pursuance thereof is subject to penalties and confiscation under the provisions of § 8 and § 9 of the Act of 17 December 1976 relating to Norway’s economic zone. Section 5 These regulations shall enter into force immediately.

Document 320 Norway, Royal Decree: Regulations relating to the limits of the Norwegian territorial sea around Svalbard (1 June 2001)* § 1. The limit of the Norwegian territorial sea around Svalbard is to be drawn 4 nautical miles (cf. Royal Decree of 22 February 1812) outside and parallel to the straight lines between the points listed below by coordinates. No line is to be drawn between islands that are given separate headings in the list below. […] The coordinates in the list are given in the geodetic datum EUREF89. A straight line means the shortest distance between two points (the geodetic line). § 2. These regulations enter into force on 1 July 2001. As from the same date, the Royal Decree of 25 September 1970 relating to the limit of the Norwegian territorial sea around Svalbard is repealed. […]

Document 321 Soviet Union, On the question of Spitsbergen (15 January 1947)** In recent years in the Norwegian Press, and also in the press of certain other foreign States, communications have appeared concerning negotiations taking place between * Retrieved from the UN, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, www.un.org/depts/los/ LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/NOR_2001_DecreeTS.PDF. Coordinates are not reprinted here. The repealed Royal Decree of 25 September 1970 concerning the Delimitation of the Territorial Waters of Parts of Svalbard is reproduced in The Law of the Sea Baselines: National Legislation With illustrative Maps (1989) 244–246. ** Reprinted from AN Vylegzhanin and VK Zilanov, Spitsbergen. Legal Regime of adjacent Marine Areas (Utrecht, Eleven International Publishing, 2007), Annex 12, 136–137. Used with permission by Eleven International Publishing.

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the Soviet and Norwegian Governments relative to Spitsbergen (Svalbard Archipelago). With regard to these negotiations authoritative Soviet circles have communicated the following to TASS. At the end of 1944 and beginning of 1945 negotiations took place between the Soviet and Norwegian governments relative to the islands of Spitsbergen, the Soviet side having raised the question of the need for a revision of the Treaty on Spitsbergen concluded at Paris on 9 February 1920. This Treaty, having made a fundamental change in the status of the islands of Spitsbergen which until then has been considered to be terra nullius, and Bear Island within the Spitsbergen Archipelago was de facto a Russian island, was signed without the knowledge of the Soviet Union and without its participation. Since, moreover, among those who signed this Treaty are powers which have been designated States that fought against the Allied Powers, this treaty cannot retain its force. The interests of the security of the USSR in the North are not taken into account at all in this Treaty, nor as vital economic interests of the Soviet Union. As regards the question of security of the USSR, as the Second World War has especially shown, the islands of Spitsbergen, where egress to the ocean in the west lies, have in this respect exceptionally important significance for the Soviet Union in the North. Economically, the significance of the Spitsbergen Archipelago for the Soviet Union is evident from that fact that before the Second World War the northern areas of the USSR and the Soviet maritime fleet in the North were supplied with coal which was mined by Soviet organizations on an island of Spitsbergen in the quantity of about 400,000 tons per year with the total of coal mined on the islands of Spitsbergen reaching 600 to 650 thousand tons. During the said Soviet-Norwegian negotiations an arrangement was reached relative to the need for joint defense of the islands of Spitsbergen. Also in mind were consultations with respective allied governments relative to a revision of the 1920 Treaty. But the negotiations have not ended. In November 1946 during the session of the General Assembly in New York an exchange of views occurred between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, V. M. Molotov, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway, Mr. Lange, concerning this question in the spirit of the negotiations previously held (TASS).

Document 322 United States, National Security Decision Memoranda 325: United States Policy toward Svalbard (20 April 1976)* The President has considered the response to NSSM 232 on US policy toward Svalbard/ Spitsbergen submitted by the Acting Chairman of the NSC Under-Secretaries Committee on April 7, 1976, together with recommendations relating thereto. The President has decided that the United States objectives with respect to Svalbard are to prevent Soviet encroachments in a region which is part of the NATO area and to protect commercial and scientific rights in the Svalbard area accruing to the United

* Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Vol E–15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973–1976, Doc 191.

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States as a signatory to the 1920 Treaty. The President directs that, in consultations with Norway and other signatories to the Spitsbergen Treaty concerning Norwegian-Soviet negotiations on their Barents Sea boundary dispute and the broader question of the status of the Svalbard shelf, the following guidelines should shape the US policy. The United States should counsel firmness in defense of Norway’s legitimate rights and should provide diplomatic support to Norwegian efforts to assert more vigorously its sovereignty on Svalbard through expressions of support for Norway by our allies and other Treaty signatories, and demarches to the USSR. Demarches to the USSR should draw on US-Soviet mutual interest in relaxing tensions and maintaining stability in the northern are and should include assurances that Norway seeks carefully delimited objectives without constraint on legitimate Soviet prerogatives. The United States should seek to protect its economic and strategic interests on the continental shelf and those of its allies through guarantees by Norway in the context of full acceptance of Norway’s sovereignty rights over the shelf rather than through extension of Spitsbergen Treaty rights. The United States reservation of rights under the Treaty to exploration and exploitation of mineral resources of the continental shelf should be maintained while eliciting Norwegian views and plans for a regulatory regime to guide exploration of hydrocarbon resources under the waters of the Svalbard region. The President has directed that the following specific steps be taken to implement the above policy guidelines: The Department of State should inform the Norwegian Government of US views and policy toward Svalbard, consulting with the Department of Defense on related security matters including US law of the sea interests and demilitarization of Svalbard. The United States should urge Norway to continue to reject Soviet attempts to use the sector line approach to resolve their continental shelf boundary dispute. Discussions with allies, the USSR and others in support of Norwegian assertions of sovereignty on Svalbard and with regard to the status of the Svalbard continental shelf should be taken by the Department of State. The Director of Central Intelligence should prepare an intelligence survey of present Soviet dispositions and activities in the Svalbard region to provide a base-line against which to measure future activity. The Department of States and the Federal Energy Administration should prepare a preliminary study of possible regulatory regimes that might be applied to exploration and exploitation of the hydrocarbon resources in the waters of the Svalbard region under various types of jurisdiction. Brent Scowcroft

Document 323 Aide-Mémoire from the US State Department to the Norwegian Ambassador to the US Sommerfelt (7 May 1976)* As the Norwegian Government is aware, the government of the United States has reviewed the strategic, economic, political and legal issues related to the region of the Svalbard *  Cable 1976STATE114779_b, retrieved from Wikileaks, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1976STATE114779_ b.html.

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archipelago. In so doing, the government of the United States has endeavored to take into account the considerations set forth by the Norwegian Government on this subject. The following presents some of the considerations which have emerged from our review with respect to Svalbard and its territorial waters, and with respect to the waters and continental shelf adjacent thereto. The United States looks forward to further discussions with the Government of Norway, with the governments of our mutual allies, and with other parties to the Spitsbergen Treaty as required to develop a consensus for a cooperative approach to the problems of security and economic development in the region. The United States Government affirms the importance of adherence by all parties to the terms of the 1920 Treaty of Spitsbergen. It attaches particular importance to responsibilities assumed by Norway by virtue of its sovereignty over Svalbard under the terms of the treaty, and to the obligations of all parties not to use the territories for warlike purposes. These responsibilities and obligations supply the essential framework for maintenance of peace and stability in the area. The United States is most desirous of maintaining these conditions which are in the interest of all nations. The United States would consider changes in these conditions or efforts to establish a condominium of other favored position in the area to be destabilizing. The United States recognizes soviet sensitivities in a region neighboring the Kola Peninsula and the sea lanes between the Norwegian and Barents Seas. Continued respect for all provisions of the Spitsbergen treaty by all parties will minimize security concerns for the Soviet Union and for the NATO allies in this sensitive area. The United States believes that firm and effective Norwegian administration of the Svalbard archipelago, in a manner totally non-discriminatory among treaty parties, is the approach best calculated to produce stability in the area. In attempting to assess how sovereignty on Svalbard is to be exercised in cases where Norway’s sovereign rights appear to be disregarded by other Treaty parties, the United States would look first to Norway’s own perception of its requirements. The United States has considered the role of us commercial and scientific activities in the Svalbard area. There does not appear to be any significant interest on the part of American firms to expand their presence on Svalbard at the present time. Several promising scientific opportunities appear to exist. It is hoped that a clearer picture of these opportunities will emerge in the near future, and that discussion with the Norwegian Government of specific scientific programs may then be undertaken. The United States Government has carefully studied the legal arguments set forth by Norway with regard to the extent of Norwegian jurisdiction over the continental shelf areas around Svalbard. The US has undertaken its own legal review of the matter, including consideration of the views expressed by other parties, for example, in the reservations presented to Norway by Great Britain and Italy. It seems clear that Norway is entitled, by virtue of sovereignty over Svalbard as set forth in the Spitsbergen Treaty, to exercise coastal state maritime jurisdiction and rights generally recognized under international law with respect to the continental shelf appertaining to Svalbard; however that shelf boundary might be delineated. The United States Government has not, however, been persuaded by the arguments put forward by the Government of Norway that non-Norwegian parties to the Spitsbergen treaty have no rights to the resources of the continental shelf and adjacent waters. Therefore, the United States Government will maintain its reservation of November 1974 without, however, making any determination of the extent of those rights at the present time. Without prejudice to the legal position of either side, the United States Government believes that 1425

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there are a number of important considerations other than legal ones which must be taken into account in establishing the conditions under which the resources may be developed and exploited. These include the Soviet military presence in the Arctic, and attendant security concerns for both east and west. Particularly with regard to eventual exploration and exploitation of petroleum resources that may be present on the continental shelf, there could arise significant practical problems related to allocation, policing, pollution controls, pace of development, and so forth. In this connection, the useful Norwegian presentation at the December 1975 talks of the practical difficulties that could arise under a Spitsbergen Treaty regime, i.e., under a legal regime in which the resource provisions of the treaty were applied to the shelf, is noted. These talks did not, however, address the possibilities of various specific arrangements for development and regulation of shelf resources in the Svalbard area. Therefore, the US Government is interested in any views or preferences the Norwegian Government is able to present on these questions. This would be a suitable topic for discussion in a future round of US-Norwegian talks. In essence, the United States Government proposes to set aside, for the time being, the legal issues arising from the Spitsbergen Treaty, and to explore the practical problems. In this process, a regulatory arrangement for petroleum development on the shelf might be sought that was also acceptable to our allies and other nations with a legitimate interest in the area. Questions related to other resources located in waters adjacent to Svalbard but beyond its territorial sea, would also require consideration. A realistic resource regime for the waters around Svalbard would reflect the need for orderly economic development, environmental protection, the security interests of the region, and the importance of evaluation of potential new energy resources, even if eventual exploitation is long deferred for technological or other reasons. The United States Government expresses its appreciation for the information provided by the Government of Norway on its current bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union to delineate the continental shelf boundary in the Barents Sea. The Government of Norway will clearly wish to establish a continental shelf delimitation line that most accords with Norwegian national interests. The United States Government wishes to note that it has never accepted the soviet assertion of the sector line approach in the Arctic and hopes that the Government of Norway, consistent with its own interests, will continue to reject soviet attempts to specify the continental shelf boundary by means of a sector line

Document 324 Aide Mémoire from the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway (27 August 1970)* According to reports in the Norwegian press, the Norwegian side intends in the near future to establish by way of legislation a boundary of territorial waters of Spitsbergen of four nautical miles calculated from baselines, and areas of the continental shelf lying beyond the limits of four nautical miles would become an “area of exclusively Norwegian interests.” * Reprinted from AN Vylegzhanin and K Zilanov, Spitsbergen. Legal Regime of adjacent Marine Areas (Utrecht, Eleven International Publishing, 2007) Annex 13, 138/139. Used with permission by Eleven International Publishing.

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The Soviet Union as a party to the 1920 Paris Treaty on Spitsbergen and as a State whose special economic interests on the Archipelago are recognized by Norway itself cannot fail to be interested in the situation on Spitsbergen, located in direct proximity to the northern boundaries of the USSR. The sovereignty of Norway over the Spitsbergen Archipelago on the stipulations provided in the Treaty of Paris was recognized by parties to the Treaty, and therefore the intention of the Norwegian Government to establish a boundary of four-mile territorial waters in the area of the Archipelago cannot in and of itself fail to arouse objections, of course, if such an act would affect the rights and interests of its parties established by the said Treaty, including the USSR, on Spitsbergen. As regards the expanses of the continental shelf lying beyond the limits of the territorial waters being proclaimed an “area of exclusively Norwegian interests”, one should bear in mind that the shelf of Spitsbergen is, just as any other shelf, the surface and subsoil of the seabed comprising the natural extension of the land and forming with it a unified and inextricable whole. It follows that the legal regime established by the Paris Treaty on Spitsbergen extends fully to the shelf in the area of the Archipelago. Therefore, the appropriation of any exclusive rights to this shelf cannot be effectuated by unilateral actions since this would signify an attempt to change the regime of Spitsbergen established by the Treaty. As is well-known, in accordance with the provisions of the Paris Treaty, in particular Articles 3 and 7, the parties thereto enjoy equality when conducting industrial, mining and other operations in the area of Spitsbergen. This cannot fail to relate also to the prospecting and exploitation of natural wealth of the continental shelf. Therefore, without consent of all other parties to the Treaty “exclusive” interests or rights with respect to the shelf in the areas of Spitsbergen cannot be established and exercised. From the Soviet side the hope is expressed that competent Norwegian authorities will take the aforesaid into account and refrain from unilateral steps incompatible with the 1920 Paris Treaty on Spitsbergen.

Document 325 Cable of the US Embassy to The Hague on the Dutch Attitude on ­Svalbard (13 February 1975)* 1. Following receipt reftel, Embassy discussed interpretation of 1920 Spitzbergen Treaty as it concerns right of exploitation on the continental shelf with MFA legal advisor Riphagen. 2. Riphagen observed that since several Governments had made their views known regarding the treaty, GON which is also a signatory felt it likewise should express its view which it did in course recent GON-Norwegian consultations. 3. Riphagen said there are three possible interpretations of the treaty. One is the Norwegian position that the treaty gave rights to other parties and those rights should be interpreted restrictively. Another is the position taken by certain other countries that the treaty gave rights to Norway and those rights should be interpreted restrictively. *  Cable 1975COPENH03273_b, 1975COPENH03273_b.html.

retrieved

from

Wikileaks,

https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/

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A third position, taken by Dutch, is that the treaty recognized Spitzbergen as being under Norwegian sovereignty but not a part of Norway, and that the regime of Spitzbergen should apply to its continental shelf. According to median line principle, that shelf extends halfway to Norwegian coast. This interpretation thus draws distinction between continental shelf of Spitzbergen and continental shelf of Norway. Under it, signatories to treaty would be allowed to exploit continental shelf of Spitzbergen regime. 4. Riphagen emphasized that Dutch position is only a legal or theoretical stance, since no country at this juncture is attempting to exploit the area involved. He did not know if there are other nations who share Dutch interpretation. 5. As for possible interpretation of treaty by ICJ, Riphagen noted that treaty contains no clause covering its referral to the court and said it was not clear how any dispute regarding the treaty might be handled.

Document 326 Cable of the US Embassy to Brussels on the Belgian Attitude on ­Svalbard (3 November 1975)* 1. Belgian position on Spitzbergen continental shelf and security question posed by soviet activities there last defined on 12 Feb 74. Foreign Ministry on that date sent Belgian ambassador in Norway outline of its position on these questions, which has not changed subsequently. Following is embassy translation of the substantive portion of that communication (fact we have document is no form; substance may be discussed): The Treaty of Paris of 9 Feb 1920 to which Belgium adhered on 27 May 1925 is rather clear. Article 3 gives to the contracting parties (and thus to Belgium because it does not say signatory States), equal freedom of access to the territory formed by Bear Island and the islands located between 10 and 35 degrees east longitude and 74 and 81 degrees north latitude. Article 2 gives the right to fish and hunt in these regions and ‘their territorial waters’. Article 3 gives equal treatment to mining enterprises both on land and in territorial waters. Article 7 foresees in the same zone the exercise of the right of property ‘including mining rights’. “Taking these texts literally they give these rights only for the territorial sea, however, it must be realized that in 1920 only the concept of the territorial sea was known The concept of the continental shelf appeared only with the Truman Proclamation of 1945 and entered into international law only by the 1958 Geneva Convention. In 1920 all which was not territorial seas was considered high seas open to all. The 1920 treaty did not incorporate Spitzbergen in Norwegian territory. The preamble recognized Norwegian sovereignty over the Spitzbergen archipelago, giving that grouping its own international status with certain conditions. It, thus, is a dependency of Norway and not

*  Cable 1975BRUSSE09860_b, retrieved from Wikileaks, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975BRUSSE09860_ b.html.

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part of Norway proper. Innovations in international law subsequent to signature of the treaty must be applied “mutatis mutandis” to the archipelago. The latter, therefore, has its own continental shelf as it will have its own economic zone if the third law of the sea conference agrees to this concept (which, by the way, the Norwegians have vigorously preached). The principle of equality of rights for the contracting states should normally apply. The ‘security’ aspect of the question appears exaggerated by Norway for obvious reasons. In fact the 1920 Treaty demilitarized Spitzbergen in article 9 by affirming that Norway agreed neither to build nor to permit the establishment of any naval base in the regions under discussion and to build no fortification in these regions, which should never be used for military purposes. It is Norway’s responsibility to see that this provision is respected, which does not prevent freedom of navigation for the warships of any state whatsoever. We do not understand how the exploitation of resources by other powers would be of such a nature as to modify this situation. Furthermore, this status conforms to the preamble of the treaty which invokes the wish ‘to see these regions provided with an equitable regime of its own to assure their development and peaceful utilization.’” 2. Belgian Government interest in Spitzbergen questions is marginal, except for legal question of principle raised over Spitzbergen continental shelf. Belgium has no economic interests in Spitzbergen area. Belgian government LOS expert has been following Norwegian/soviet talks re delineation of Barents Sea shelf, but Belgian government has not and will not take position. Belgians note there is no issue of law involved, as solution is up to parties involved in absence of another agreement, and the “equidistant” rather than “sector” principle applies (though there are three different “equidistant” systems, all valid, each producing different results). Belgium has never considered spitzbergen as an issue for NATO discussion. That view is not apt to change unless new situation or facts are brought to light. Firestone

Document 327 Cable of the US Embassy to Copenhagen on the Danish Attitude on Svalbard (7 November 1975)* 1. While discussing other matters with MFA’s NATO Director, Torben Frost, Polcouns was able to explore general Danish attitudes toward Svalbard. Frost, who said he shared MFA responsibility on Svalbard with the Ministry’s legal office, confirmed our conclusion that the Danish Government had issued no statements on Svalbard over the past two years. In fact, frost said that the Danes have not had to do hard thinking on the matter since Svalbard has not come up as a practical problem for them. Consequently, he said the MFA was not really as well informed as it might be if the subject was an active one. 2. For security reasons the Danes would support what frost understands is the Norwegian position on the continental shelf: that is, that the narrower extension provided by metropolitan Norway’s continental shelf should apply to Svalbard. This argument,

* Cable 1975COPENH03273_b, retrieved from Wikileaks, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975COPENH 03273_b.html.

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frost said, would mean that the treaty signatories could claim rights to exploit the land of Svalbard and its territorial waters but that the economic zone beyond the territorial waters would remain exclusively under Norwegian national sovereignty and not be subject to claims by treaty signatories. 3. The counter argument to the Norwegian position mentioned by frost was based on the assertion that Svalbard’s continental shelf should be measured not from metropolitan Norway but from Svalbard itself. The 200-mile economic zone in that case would impact on the similar zone measured from Greenland resulting in the drawing of a mid-line between the two. 4. Frost added that, conceivably, Danish support for the Norwegian position could be attenuated. He postulated the “unlikely event” of Danish interest in searching for oil in that part of the Svalbard economic zone which would be claimable to treaty signatories only if the measurement of the distance was based on the continental shelf of Svalbard itself.

Document 328 Cable of the US Embassy to Luxemburg on Luxemburg’s Position on Svalbard (12 November 1975)* Government of Luxembourg (GOL) has made no statements nor taken any positions relating to Svalbard or Norwegian/Soviet negotiations re continental shelf. Frankly, GOL has no official attitude toward the area, either bilaterally or as NATO member, but would likely support U.S. efforts to resolve problems when and however appropriate.

Document 329 Cable of the US Embassy to Ankara on the Turkish Position on ­Svalbard (12 November 1975)** Government of  Turkey (GOT) has issued no statement on Svalbard within past confidential two years. According to MFA working-level specialist on law of the sea, MFA’s perception of the dispute is that Norway argues that a median line should be applied in the Barents Sea; the USSR on other hand had not made its position clear but appeared to argue that a solution should be based on the “special circumstances” pertaining in the area. GOT has no intention of making any comment on the subject. However, the LOS specialist was interested in the outcome of the talks, and in particular the soviet argumentation for “special circumstances”. GOT interest will focus on how progress of talks might affect Turkey’s Aegean continental shelf dispute with Greece, he said.

* Cable 1975LUXEMB00919_b, retrieved from Wikileaks, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975LUXEMB 00919_b.html. **  Cable 975ANKARA08369_b, retrieved from Wikileaks, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975ANKARA 08369_b.html.

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Document 330 Note Verbale from the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway (15 June 1977)* The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics conveys its respect to the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway and has the honor to state the following: On the 3 June 1977 the State Council of Norway adopted a decision to establish a 200-mile fisheries protection zone around Spitsbergen. In the text of the royal Resolution received by the Embassy, attention is attracted by its clear failure to conform to the obligation assumed by Norway under the 1920 Treaty on Spitsbergen. The decision adopted by the Norwegian Government unilaterally and based on internal legislation of Norway, although it concerns a special area which falls under the operation of the said Treaty. In plain contradiction with Article 3 of the 1920 Treaty consolidating the principle of free access of all States which are parties thereto for engaging in economic activity in the area of operation of this Treaty, the decision proceeds from the possibility of Norway to prohibit fishing by other States-parties to the Treaty in this area and even provide norms of punishment with respect to their citizens. The Soviet side already twice has drawn attention to the fact that the measures planned by Norway with regard to the limitation of fishing around Spitsbergen directly would affect the rights and interests of the Soviet Union, which together with Norway traditionally engages in fishing in the waters of the Archipelago. The Soviet Government assesses the decision adopted by 3 June 1977 was the next step of Norway directed towards the illegal expansion of its rights in the area of Spitsbergen contrary to the provisions of the 1920 Treaty, which goes beyond the framework of purely fishing problems. Under these conditions the Soviet Government reserves the possibility to take respective measures ensuring the interests of the USSR.

Document 331 Note Verbale No 00146 from the EC Commission, Directorate General of Fishing, to the Mission of Norway at the European ­Communities concerning fishing rights around Svalbard [unofficial translation] (19 July 1977)** The Directorate General of Fishing presents its compliments to the Mission of Norway at the European Communities and has the honour to refer to the notes dated June 8 and 15, 1977 relating to fishing off the coast of the Spitzbergen territories.

*  Reprinted from AN Vylegzhanin and VK Zilanov, Spitsbergen. Legal Regime of adjacent Marine Areas (Utrecht, Eleven International Publishing, 2007) Annex 14, 140. Used with permission by Eleven International Publishing. **  The original document in French was kindly provided by the European Commission, DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries. The English translation was provided by Robin Ward. Original document on file with the editor.

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The Directorate General of Fishing is in a position to inform the Norwegian authorities that the measures to which they refer under Royal Decree dated June 3, 1977 are currently being reviewed by the different decision-makers. For the present, the Community is prepared to discuss temporary measures which it seems necessary to adopt in order to protect the various stocks of fish exploited off the coast of these territories and to safeguard the fundamental rights of Community fishers. The Community wishes to point out that the activities in which the Community would be called upon to participate in or undertake with regard to fishing in this region may not in any way prejudice its position or that of its Member States with regard to the provisions applicable to these territories and that their rights in this matter are fully reserved. The Directorate General of Fishing therefore proposes to proceed with these discussions on July 25, if this date is convenient for the Norwegian authorities. The Directorate General of Fishing avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Mission of Norway at the European Communities the assurances of its highest consideration.

Document 332 Note Verbale from the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway (29 April 1982)* The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics conveys its respect to the Embassy of Norway and, referring to the aide memoire of the Embassy of 31 March 1982, sent to the address of the Ministry of Fisheries of the USSR, relating to the decision of the Government of Norway to increase from 1 January 1983 the size of holes in trawling catch implements up to 135 mm. in areas to which Norwegian fisheries jurisdiction extends, has the honor to state the following. The Soviet side has repeatedly emphasized its negative attitude towards unilateral measures for the regulations of fishing of those stocks which are unified ecological complex of the Barents and Norwegian seas. The Soviet side proceeded from the existence of a common understanding that additional measures directed towards the restoration of these stocks should be considered in the Mixed Soviet-Norwegian Commission for Fisheries. In this connection that fact that the Norwegian side unilaterally introduced a new measure for the regulation of fishing which affects principally the interests of Soviet fishing is a source of surprise. The said actions of the Norwegian side cannot be regarded by us other than as a violation of the arrangements previously reached with respect to taking into account mutual interests when working out measures for the preservation and rational use of living resources exploited by fishermen of both countries and directed towards complicating Soviet-Norwegian relations in the domain of fishing which are based on the principles of good-neighbourliness consolidated in respective agreements for fishing between our two countries. *  Reprinted from AN Vylegzhanin and VK Zilanov, Spitsbergen. Legal Regime of adjacent Marine Areas (Utrecht, Eleven International Publishing, 2007) Annex 16, 143 Used with permission by Eleven International Publishing.

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As regards areas of Norwegian fishery jurisdiction to which the said measure of regulation extends, the Soviet side affirms its position set out in the Note of the Embassy of the USSR in Norway to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway of 15 June 1977. The Ministry takes advantages of the occasion to renew to the Embassy assurance of its high regard.

Document 333 Note Verbale from the Norwegian Mission to the EC Commission, ­Directorate General of Fishing, concerning fishing around Svalbard (10 July 1986)* The Norwegian Mission to the Communities presents its compliments to the Directorate General for Fisheries of the Commission to the European Communities, and has the honour to draw its attention to the present situation with regard to the EC fisheries in the Svalbard area. The Norwegian Authorities wish to refer to the consultations conducted this winter between Norway and the European Community on the EC cod fishery in the Fishery Protection Zone round Svalbard, as a result of which agreement was reached on a total EC catch for the year 1986 of 15.800 tons. The fact that EC until now has been unable to take the necessary steps to regulate its fishery in the said area, has been viewed with considerable concern by the Norwegian Authorities. It is pointed out that the increase in the catches this year of all EC-Countries indicates a total catch on an annual bases which would be completely incompatible with the overall resource situation for Norwegian arctic cod. As of 7 July 1986, West-German catches of cod have thus increased tenfold, to 2774 tons this year, with an efficiency increase of (measured in catch per fishing day) of 25 per cent. Similarly, the Spanish catches have increased from 40 tons to 1218 tons, with an efficiency increase of 120 per cent, and Portuguese catches have increased from 105 tons to 1514 tons, with an efficiency increase of 104 per cent. It should be obvious that continued fishing on this scale would undermine any attempt by the Norwegian Authorities to administer the available stocks in a proper and reasonable manner. The Norwegian Authorities are exercising a greater degree of restraint in the Svalbard Fishery Protection Zone than would be necessarily required by the Norwegian policy of non-discrimination. It must be envisaged that this self-restrain might under the circumstances be brought to an end. It is expected from the Norwegian side that the EC will exercise the necessary responsibility by basing their cot regulations in the Svalbard area on the result of the consultations between Norway and EC mentioned above. The Norwegian Authorities underline that a lack of limitation of the EC cod fishery in the protection zone this year will place a serious strain on the cooperation between Norway and EC in the field of fishery. Referring to the conditions set out in the Mission’s

* The document was kindly provided by the European Commission, DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries. Document on file with the editor

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note No. 4 of 10 March 1986, it should furthermore be pointed out that an unlimited fishery might have repercussions for the EC fish-quotas in the Norwegian Economic Zone. The Norwegian Authorities base themselves on the assumption that the EC—in line with the Norwegian policy—attaches a decisive importance on avoiding measures which may prove harmful, to the good cooperation between Norway and the EC in the fisheries field. The Norwegian Mission avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Directorate General for Fisheries of the Commission of the European Communities the assurances of its highest consideration.

Document 334 Note Verbale No 02337 from the EC Commission, Directorate ­General of Fishing, to the Mission of Norway at the EC concerning fishing rights around Svalbard [unofficial translation] (30 July 1986)* The Directorate General of Fishing of the Commission of the European Communities presents its compliments to the Mission of Norway at the European Communities and has the honour to refer to note verbale no. 11 of July 10, 1986 relating to fishing activities off the coast of the Spitzbergen region and the additional considerations of July 24, together with the regulatory measures concerning this region notified by the Norwegian authorities on July 29, 1986. The Directorate General of Fishing would first like to remind the Norwegian authorities of the long-standing position of the Community as regards fishing activities in the region in question, a position which was in particular explained and communicated to Norway in its notes verbales no. 140 of July 19, 1977, no. 256 of February 28, 1979, no. 294 of February 26, 1980 and no. 2471 of September 7, 1982, and regularly confirmed on other occasions by way of appropriate declarations. The Directorate General of Fishing renews its objections with regard to all measures unilaterally contemplated by Norway which would lead to a restriction of fishing activities without a scientific basis, measures which would be taken in discriminatory fashion by the parties responsible for the conservation of fishery resources in this region and whose implementation would not be the result of an appropriate consultation process. As a consequence, it expresses to the Norwegian authorities its grave concern about the unilateral measures envisaged for cod fishing, measures which have no basis under the rights and obligations ensuing from the Treaty of Paris or the relevant provisions incorporated in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, in particular Article 63. Although this Convention has not yet come into force, the Community and Norway make reference thereto in their international fishery relations; such measures cannot therefore be deemed on the part of the Community as being enforceable against vessels flying the flag of one of its Member States. The Directorate General of Fishing gives its assurance to the Norwegian authorities that it shares their concerns regarding the protection of the fishery resources developing *  The original document in French was kindly provided by the European Commission, DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries. The English translation was provided by Robin Ward. Original document on file with the editor.

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in this region and seeing an appropriate fishing régime established which respects the rights and obligations of all the States affected. With this in mind, the Community is for its part prepared to cooperate actively and in a positive manner in all efforts undertaken to this end with the partners concerned. As a consequence, the Directorate General of Fishing reiterates that the Community is completely willing to participate with Norway, especially in carrying out an analysis of the biological situation of the stocks affected by fishing activities in this region and reflecting on the regulatory requirements governing their exploitation with a view to ensuring the conservation and development of these stocks. Within this context, it is ready to participate immediately in a working group consisting of scientific personnel from the Community on the one hand and from Norway on the other, entrusted with the task of reviewing the different factors to be taken into consideration so as to be able to assess the current situation and the development prospects of the fish stocks in the region in question, taking account of the effects on these prospects entailed by the fishing efforts likely to be undertaken here. The Directorate General of Fishing of the Commission of the European Communities avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Mission of Norway at the European Communities the assurance of its highest consideration.

Document 335 Note Verbale of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway (14 June 1988)* The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics conveys its respect to the Embassy of Norway and has the honor to communicate the following. The planned practical steps of the Norwegian authorities to extend their exclusive jurisdiction to the continental shelf of the Spitsbergen Archipelago cannot fail to disquiet the Soviet Union as a party to the 1920 Treaty on Spitsbergen and as a State having natural historical, economic, and political interests on the Archipelago determined by its geographical proximity to the boundaries of the USSR. According to published information, the Norwegian authorities unilaterally and on the basis of national legislation effectuated a preliminary division of the shelf of the Archipelago into concession areas and parcels, having in view their subsequent distribution among interested oil companies. In the course of the next concession rounds it is planned to commence the allocating of blocks for parcels 7319–7323 and 7419–7423 which lie within the boundaries of the operation of the 1920 Treaty on Spitsbergen. Drilling work already is being carried out in block 7321/8 which is in direct proximity to the boundaries of the zone of the Archipelago. Authorizations to conduct geophysical research on the shelf of Spitsbergen also are being issued by the Norwegian authorities on the basis of national regulations. The aforenoted facts clearly testify to the intentions of Norway in circumvention of the 1920 Treaty on Spitsbergen to regulate oil and gas prospecting and extractive activities *  Reprinted from AN Vylegzhanin and VK Zilanov, Spitsbergen. Legal Regime of adjacent Marine Areas (Utrecht, Eleven International Publishing 2007) Annex 17, 144–145. Used with permission by Eleven International Publishing.

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on the shelf of the Archipelago in accordance with the procedure operating for analogous work on the continental shelf of Norway and to thereby create the prerequisites for resolving the question of the international legal status of the shelf of Spitsbergen to its advantage. In this connection the Soviet side expresses regret on the occasion of the said actions of the Norwegian authorities and refers to its position of principles with respect to the legal status of the shelf of Spitsbergen set out in the aide memoire of the Embassy of the USSR in Norway of 27 August 1970. In so doing the Soviet side considers it necessary on the basis of the legal argumentation well-known to the Norwegian side to additionally set out the following basic provisions of the position of the USSR: The legal regime established by the 1920 Treaty on Spitsbergen wholly extends to the shelf of the Archipelago. The external boundaries of the shelf of Spitsbergen coincide with the limits of operation of the 1920 Treaty as established in Article 1 of the said Treaty. In the absence of the procedure for access and conducting of economic activity on the shelf of the Archipelago worked out in accordance with the 1920 Treaty on Spitsbergen, such activity must be effectuated on the principles of the said Treaty and be regulated by the Mining Regulations for Spitsbergen. Together with this the Soviet side would be ready in the event of corresponding interest of the Norwegian side to conduct a bilateral exchange of the opinions of experts for the purposes of working out a common understanding concerning the forms of regulating economic activity on the shelf of the Archipelago on the principles of the 1920 Treaty on Spitsbergen. Simultaneously, the Soviet side expresses the hope that in the absence of an international legal status of the shelf of the Archipelago recognized by all State-parties to the 1920 Treaty on Spitsbergen, the Norwegian side will refrain from unilateral practical actions in the direction of extending its exclusive powers to this area. Such steps would make justified the taking by the Soviet side of adequate practical measures in confirmation of its position of principle, responsibility for the further development of events lying with the Norwegian side. The Ministry takes advantage of the occasion to renew to the Embassy assurance of its high regard.

Document 336 Note Verbale of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Norway to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway (17 July 1998)* The Embassy of the Russian Federation conveys its respect to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway and has the honor to state the following. The position of Russia with respect to the fisheries protection zone around the Spitsbergen Archipelago set out in the Note of the Embassy of the USSR in Norway, No. 60, of 15 June 1977 remains unchanged. In this connection the prohibition against

*  Reprinted from AN Vylegzhanin and VK Zilanov, Spitsbergen. Legal Regime of adjacent Marine Areas (Utrecht, Eleven International Publishing, 2007) Annex 18, 146. Used with permission by Eleven International Publishing.

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fishing established by the Norwegian authorities in June of this year in the area westward from Bear Island is regarded as unlawful and contrary to the 1920 Treaty on Spitsbergen. Enforcement measures taken by the Norwegian side against Russian fishing vessels in this area as consequently qualified as being without legal grounds. We draw attention to the severity of the actions of the Norwegian side, not adequate to the situation and not corresponding to the traditions of Russo-Norwegian goodneighborliness. The Russian side is convinced that the language of ultimatums and enforcement measures are unacceptable in normal inter-State relations. The Russian side recalls that at the extraordinary session of the Mixed RussianNorwegian Commission for Fisheries held on 22–24 June 1998 at Kirkenes an arrangement was reached concerning the working out of a unified scheme for taking decisions with regard to the establishment of limitations on fishing on the fisheries area. In displaying a constructive approach and being guided by the joint interests of Russia and Norway in the sphere of fishing, the Russian side expresses its readiness for dialogue and suggests bilateral consulations be held to discuss the working out of the mechanism for establishing measures for the preservation of fish stocks on the basis of scientific research conducted. The Ministry takes advantage of the occasion to renew to the Embassy assurance of its high regard.

Document 337 Note Verbale of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway to the ­Embassy of the Russian Federation (19 August 1998)* The Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway has the honor to confirm receipt from the Embassy of the Russian Federation Notes Verbale of 17 July 1998 and 18 August 1998 concerning fishery protection zones and wishes to state the following. 1. As a coastal State on the Spitsbergen Archipelago, Norway has the right to exercise fishing jurisdiction up to 200-nautical miles from the coasts of Spitsbergen. Norway cannot share jurisdiction with regard to the regulation and ensuring of order in this area with any other State. 2. The provisions of the Treaty on Spitsbergen relative fishing do not extend to maritime areas beyond the territorial waters of Spitsbergen. These provisions therefore do not include the fisheries protection zone. Moreover, these established prescriptions do not contain anything contrary to the Treaty on Spitsbergen, even if the Treaty did not extend to the fisheries protection zone. 3. The measures of preservation established by the Norwegian authorities in June of this year and the enforcement of these measures with respect to Russian ships in this area correspond full to the rights, jurisdiction, and duties of Norway as a coastal State and as established by international law. In light of the situation which has arisen the measures to ensure order were as necessary as the situation is required. The criticism of the actions

*  Reprinted from AN Vylegzhanin and VK Zilanov, Spitsbergen. Legal Regime of adjacent Marine Areas (Utrecht, Eleven International Publishing, 2007) Annex 20, 148–149. Used with permission by Eleven International Publishing.

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of Norwegian authorities set out in the Note of the Embassy of the Russian Federation of 17 July 1998 therefore is unfounded. 4. In this connection with also refer to the negotiations held in Moscow from 13–16 March 1978 between the then Minister of Fisheries of the Soviet Union, Alexander Ishkov, and the then Minister of the Law of the Sea of Norway, Jens Evensen, and the joint communiqué published after these negotiations. The Norwegian side greatly regrets that Russian fishing vessels in June and July of this year, for the first time since 1978, operated contrary to the understanding reached in the course of these negotiations. The behavior of the Russian vessels does not correspond either to the traditions of Norwegian-Russian good-neighborliness or to the common interests of our two countries in the domain of fishing. 5. The Norwegian side fully takes into account the significant fishing interests of the Russian Federation in those areas where the fisheries protection zone is close to Spitsbergen. These interests were taken into account in the Treaty on Cooperation in the Domain of Fishing of 11 April 1975 and the Treaty on Bilateral Relations in the Domain of Fishing of 15 October 1976. 6. Proceeding from the above legal situation, the Norwegians are always ready for dialogue with the Russian authorities in accordance with the traditions of RussoNorwegian good-neighborliness and common interests of both our countries in the domain of fishing and with common responsibility for the stocks of migratory fish in the Barents Sea. 7. The Norwegian side is ready to give a more detailed explanation to the Russian representatives concerning the Norwegian point of view on the legal questions in connection with their interpretation of the Treaty on Spitsbergen. Discussions during the session at Trondheim on 20–22 August 1998 between the heads of fishing authorities of our two countries should be confined to the questions relating to the mandate of the Mixed Russian-Norwegian Fisheries Commission. We suggest it is not advisable to discuss questions connected with the fisheries protection zone near Spitsbergen at this session. The Ministry takes advantage of the occasion to renew to the Embassy assurance of its high regard.

Document 338 United Kingdom, Position concerning Svalbard’s continental shelf (2 July 1986)* Lord Kennet asked Her Majesty’s Government: What in their view is the status in international law of the various areas of continental shelf round the Svalbard Archipelago. Baroness Young: In our view Svalbard has its own continental shelf, to which the regime of the Treaty of Paris of 1920 applies. The extent of this shelf has not been determined.

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Document 339 Position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iceland on the Status of Maritime Expanses Adjacent to Spitsbergen (30 March 2006)* In the view of Iceland, the sole basis for any sovereign rights of Norway in maritime areas around Svalbard, including an exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf, is the Svalbard Treaty of 1920. The sovereign rights of Norway are subject to important limitations provided for in the Svalbard Treaty, including the principle of equality. These limitations apply equally on Svalbard, within the territorial sea, within an exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf around Svalbard can obviously not be greater than the rights of Norway on Svalbard from which the first mentioned rights are derived. As far as the continental shelf around Svalbard is concerned, in the view of Iceland it appertains to Svalbard and not to the mainland of Norway as maintained by the Norwegian authorities. The exploitation of any oil and gas resources of the continental shelf around Svalbard is subject to the provisions of the Svalbard Treaty, including the principle of equality. The Norwegian authorities have repeatedly violated the provisions of the Svalbard Treaty. In 2004, after having refused to prolong the five-party Agreement on the management of the Atlanto-Scandian Herring stock and claimed a huge increase of Norway’s share of the stock, the Norwegian authorities set a regulation limiting the fisheries from the herring stock in the so-called Fisheries Protection Zone off Svalbard, obviously in an attempt to improve their negotiating position. In the view of the Icelandic authorities, there was no scientific basis for such limitation and it was in breach of the provisions of the Svalbard Treaty. In 2005, the Norwegian authorities applied similar restrictions. Furthermore, they decided unilaterally to increase Norway’s herring quota by 14%. For 2006, the Norwegian authorities have decided to raise the quota even higher, by 35%. In the view of the Icelandic authorities these unilateral acts by Norway are both unjustified and irresponsible, and may undermine the conservation and management of the Atlanto-Scandian Herring stock. As a consequence of the repeated violations by the Norwegian authorities of the provisions of the Svalbard Treaty, the Government of Iceland decided in August 2004 to initiate preparations for legal proceedings against Norway concerning the issue of Svalbard before the International Court of Justice in The Hague. The Icelandic authorities have received a very thorough Legal Opinion by a foreign legal expert which provides a good basis in this respect. Furthermore, bilateral consultations have been held with a number of Contracting Parties to the Svalbard Treaty and further consultations are planned in the near future. Legal proceedings are obviously not a goal in themselves, but in the current circumstances they seem to be the only way for Iceland to protect its legitimate interests against an unreasonable and inflexible position by the Norwegian authorities and their repeated violations of the provisions of the Svalbard Treaty.

*  Reprinted from AN Vylegzhanin and VK Zilanov, Spitsbergen. Legal Regime of adjacent Marine Areas (Utrecht, Eleven International Publishing, 2007) Annex 21, 150–151. Used with permission by Eleven International Publishing.

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Document 340 Note Verbale of the Government of Spain on the Norwegian ­Submission to the CLCS (3 March 2007)* The Permanent Mission of Spain to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary General of the United Nations and, in relation to Circular CLCS 07.2006. LOS (notification concerning the continental shelf), dated 21 December 2006, on the receipt of the submission by Norway to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, has the honour to convey to you that on 2 March 2007, Spain sent a Note Verbale to Norway expressing Spain’s position on the maritime zones situated around the Svalbard Archipelago. The Note stated that, pursuant to the provisions of the Treaty concerning the Archipelago of Spitsbergen (Svalbard), signed in Paris on 9 February 1920, to which Spain is a party, Spain reserves its rights concerning the exploitation of the resources located on the continental shelf, including the extended area, that might be defined beyond the Svalbard Archipelago. The aforesaid Note Verbale is attached to the present. The Permanent Mission of Spain requests the Secretary General to kindly distribute, for information purposes, this Note Verbale and the attached Note Verbale to the members of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf and also to have it published on the website of the Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea of the United Nations Secretariat. The Permanent Mission of Spain avails itself of this opportunity to reiterate to the Secretary General of the United Nations the assurances of its highest consideration. Spain, Note Verbale to the Royal Embassy of Norway (2 March 2007) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation presents its compliments to the Royal Embassy of Norway, and following the Norwegian submission of extension of its continental shelf, is honoured to refer to the Treaty concerning the Archipelago of Spitsbergen (Svalbard), signed in Paris on 9 February 1920. In view of the submission of extension of the continental shelf of Norway, including the Svalbard Archipelago, before the Commission on the limits of the Continental Shelf which was deposited on 27 November 2006, Spain considers it appropriate to express its position regarding the maritime zones surrounding the aforesaid archipelago. The Paris Treaty is the basis for the recognition of the sovereignty of Norway over Svalbard. Such sovereignty, albeit full, nevertheless also entails the obligation by which Norway must allow free access, without any discrimination/under the same conditions of equality, to the archipelago’s biological and mineral resources to the nationals of all the Contracting Parties, pursuant to Articles 2, 3, 7 and 8 of the Treaty. Not intending to make any pronouncement whatsoever concerning Norway’s competence to establish new maritime zones from the Svalbard Islands, Spain wishes to reiterate that the above-mentioned principles of liberty of access and nondiscrimination are applicable to any maritime zone that might be defined from Svalbard, including, as appropriate, the continental shelf, both within and beyond a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, *  Retrieved from the UN, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/ submissions_files/submission_nor.htm.

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Inasmuch as the continental shelf extension submitted by Norway is intended to be effected from Svalbard towards the north—in the Western Nansen Basin region—and towards the east—in the region called the Loop Hole—, Spain considers that the Paris Treaty fully applies to those regions and reserves its rights to the resources of the continental shelf that may be defined around Svalbard, including the extension thereof. Spain trusts that Norway will respect the rights of the other Contracting Parties recognized by virtue of the Treaty of Paris. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation avails itself of this opportunity to reiterate to the Royal Embassy of Norway the assurances of its highest consideration.

Document 341 Note Verbale of Norway in reply to the Note Verbale from Spain on the Norwegian Submission (28 March 2007)* The Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations presents it compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to refer to note dated 3 March 2007 to the Secretary-General from the Permanent Mission of Spain to the United Nations informing that Spain on 2 March 2007 sent a note to Norway expressing Spain’s position regarding the maritime zones situated around the Svalbard archipelago. Since reference is made in the note to the Treaty concerning Spitsbergen done at Paris on 9 February 1920, the Mission would for the sake of good order refer to the fact that the archipelago of Svalbard is a part of the Kingdom of Norway. The opinions expressed in the said note concern the scope of application and the interpretation of certain provisions of the Treaty of 1920, where there are differences of views. These issues do not affect in any manner the interpretation or application of the rules contained in article 76 of the Convention nor its Annex 11, and have no bearing on the work of the Commission. The Mission requests the Secretary-General to kindly publish this note on the website of the Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea of the United Nations Secretariat. The Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations avails itself of the opportunity to renew to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the assurance of its highest consideration.

Document 342 Comment by Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Alexander ­Lukashevich on Norway’s response to Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin’s visit to Svalbard archipelago (20 April 2015)** On April 19, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, Head of the State Commission for Arctic Development, attended the opening of the new North Pole 2015 Russian drifting station.

*  Retrieved from the UN, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/ submissions_files/submission_nor.htm. **  Retrieved from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/170467DD26EFF30543 257E2D0062A14D.

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In this connection, he made two technical stopovers at the Longyear airport in Norway’s Svalbard archipelago. From there, ceremony participants boarded a Russian aircraft able to land on and take off from ice floes, which flew them to the station and back. On April 18, weather conditions near the station deteriorated, and it was impossible to receive the aircraft there for some time. While on the ground, the passengers visited the Russian town of Barentsburg in Svalbard. The use of the archipelago for reaching the North Pole 2015 station was motivated by purely logistical factors and by the requirements of aviation safety in high latitudes. This circumstance appears to be absolutely natural, and it would have been reasonable to expect the Norwegian side to react with understanding in the spirit of Arctic partnership, which Norway has, until now, always displayed. Nevertheless, Oslo has responded negatively to the Svalbard visit by Mr Rogozin, who is included in the well-known EU sanctions list, also supported by Norway. The official representative of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry has told the media that persons covered by sanctions should not visit Svalbard and has expressed regret over Mr Rogozin’s visit there. The Norwegian side is expecting an explanation from us. We are perplexed by this response. It is inexplicable and absurd from the standpoint of international law. Article 3 of the 1920 Spitsbergen Treaty allows citizens of signatory states to freely enter the archipelago. The above-mentioned unilateral sanctions do not abolish this provision of the Treaty and are, in this case, irrelevant. Therefore there are no grounds in international law for presenting any claims to the Russian side. Moreover, Norwegian legislation was not violated either, as is admitted by the Norwegian side. We regret Norway’s decision to join the anti-Russian EU sanctions, which spells negative consequences for Russian-Norwegian relations and, as we can see, also distorts our Norwegian neighbours’ perception of reality.

Document 343 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Comment on Norway’s measures to limit access to Svalbard Archipelago (10 August 2015)* On August 7, Norway issued a temporary instruction on the deportation from the Svalbard Archipelago of people included in the UN Security Council’s sanction lists and individuals whose international travel is restricted. Apparently, the latter category includes those who are covered by the EU’s anti-Russian sanctions. These actions by Norway do not correspond with the spirit of international cooperation on Svalbard on the basis of the relevant 1920 Treaty. We resolutely protest this unfriendly action and demand the immediate revision of the introduced restrictions. The Russian side also emphasises that this measure taken by the Norwegian authorities affects not only the interests of Russia but also all other parties to the 1920 Treaty, without the consent of which Norway has no right to impose restrictions on the internationaltreaty-established free access to the archipelago. *  Retrieved from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/ cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/1648216?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw&_101_INSTANCE_ cKNonkJE02Bw_languageId=en_GB.

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Hans Island Document 344 Peter Bruckner, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Letter to the ­Editor on Hans Island, Kennedy Channel (18 January 1984)* The Editor, Journal of Glaciology Sir, R.D. Hudson’s letter to the editor (1983) concerning the direction of glacial flow across Hans Island, Kennedy Channel, is accompanied by a footnote on the discovery and national Status of Hans Island. It is stated that “according to legal authority in Ottawa ‘Canada exercises sovereignty over Hans Island and it is part of Canadian territory’. It is so shown on Canadian maps and charts”. It is not in dispute that this statement reflects the view of Canadian authorities. However, according to the view of the Danish Government, Hans Ø constitutes part of the national territory of Denmark and as such is within the jurisdiction of the government of Denmark and subject to Danish law. Hans Ø is shown as part of Denmark on Danish maps and charts. The conflicting views of the Governments of Denmark and Canada reflect the present state of affairs that the question of sovereignty over Hans Ø is still unresolved. There exists a common understanding between Denmark and Canada to the effect that since the question of sovereignty over the island has not yet solved no action should be taken by either side might prejudge the settlement of the issue.

Document 345 Ambassador of Denmark Poul E D Kristensen to Canada/Ottawa, Letter to the Editor, ‘The Hans Island issue’ (28 July 2005)** Canada and Denmark are neighbours in the North, allies in NATO and the UN working closely together for peace and democracy in challenging spots like Afghanistan, the Middle East and Sudan. Indeed close friends in relations across the board. Canadians of Danish origin are numerous. Cultural and commercial exchanges flourish between us. In the North the Inuit populations of Greenland and Canada have communicated during centuries. Their oral languages are nearly identical. In order to emphasise the relationship and facilitate even closer cooperation in the future Denmark is in the final phase of opening an honorary consulate in Iqaluit, making Denmark the first country to be represented on the spot in Nunavut. As in every real substantive friendship there are also tiny irritants like the territorial belonging of Hans Island. Issues to be dealt with deftly to strengthen the friendship. *  Reprinted from ‘Correspondence: Home lsland, Kennedy Channel’ (1984) 30 Journal of Glaciology 256. Used with permission by the International Glaciological Society. **  Ottawa Citizen, 28 July 2005, retrieved from ‘Who Owns the Arctic? Arctic Sovereignty and International Relations’, www.byers.typepad.com/arctic/2009/02/hans-island-denmark-responds.html.

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The Government of Denmark considers Hans Island to be a part of Danish territory. This will be of no surprise to readers of the Ottawa Citizen or to others following occasional developments in this case of disputed sovereignty. It is generally accepted that Hans Island was first discovered in 1853 on an expedition done in agreement with the Danish authorities with the participation of the famous Greenlander Hans Hendrik of Fiskenæsset. His place in the expedition earned Hans Hendrik of Fiskenæsset a place in the history of exploration and the island was named after him—“Hans Ø” (Hans Island). Since then it has been our view that the island, by virtue of its belonging to Greenland, is part of the Kingdom of Denmark. Relevant evidence in connection with defining the area of Greenland, such as geological and geomorphological evidence, clearly supports this point of view. In 1933, when the Permanent Court of International Justice declared the legal status of Greenland in favour of Denmark, the Court did inter alia refer to the note from the British Government, acting on behalf of Canada, which in 1920 assured the Danish Government that it recognized Danish sovereignty over Greenland. Therefore, when Canada in 1971 during negotiations with Denmark on the maritime boundary between Greenland and Canada laid claim to the territory of Hans Island it was the first time the Government of Denmark was officially informed about this. We did not reach an agreement at the time and since then our two Governments have agreed to disagree. In order to settle the dispute in a mutually acceptable way, the Danish Government has repeatedly declared its willingness to reassume consultations with the Government of Canada at an appropriate time. This invitation is still very much open. In the view of the Danish Government, Canada and Denmark have every reason to pursue an already fruitful cooperation on Arctic matters and we should not let the issue of Hans Island become a stumble stone in this process. Let me give you a recent example of cooperation in the North. A unique cooperation project between Canada and Denmark was launched as late as June this year. In Ottawa a memorandum was signed between Canada and Denmark to work together on collecting data needed for the redrawing of the Continental Shelf line in the Arctic Ocean north of Ellesmere Island and Greenland. Both Denmark and Canada have ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and that gives us the right to make claims beyond 200 nautical miles of new land and under water resources in that area. Now, we could have decided that due to the sensitivities involved we would do this work individually. Instead we have adopted a much more constructive approach—joint operation. We will share equipment, manpower, and knowledge and save time and money. And when the time comes to file our individual claims, hopefully we will be much better equipped to divide the land and sea according to each country’s wishes. Denmark appreciates that the larger issue of sovereignty in the North is a real concern to Canada. Greenland, and thus the Kingdom of Denmark is also a part of the North. Denmark is not intruding in the area. We are only trying to protect what we believe to be part of our Kingdom. We recognize that Hans Island is claimed by Canada as well, that there is a genuine dispute. Nobody has an interest in letting such an issue sour our warm relations. That is why we suggest, as we have done in the past, that we turn to dialogue and the rule of law, as we generally do. We look forward to working with Canada on this issue.

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Document 346 Joint Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, Pierre S Pettigrew, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Per Stig Møller (19 September 2005)* We, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, Pierre S. Pettigrew, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Per Stig Møller, met today, September 19, 2005, in the margins of the United Nations General Assembly, in New York, to reaffirm our excellent, long-standing bilateral relations as friends, allies and Arctic neighbours. The Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs was accompanied by the Deputy Premier of Greenland, Josef Motzfeldt. Mr. Larry Bagnell, Member of Parliament for the Yukon, accompanied Minister Pettigrew. Together, we reviewed many of the issues which will be addressed at this General Assembly and on which we are close partners, including climate change, effective multilateralism, transatlantic relations, counter-terrorism, Afghanistan, and the Middle East. We also took note of the upcoming 60th anniversary this December of the establishment of our diplomatic relations. We have much in common, and we have worked together over many years in advancing the welfare of the Arctic region and its peoples. Through the Arctic Council and other means, we already collaborate closely on challenges facing the Arctic and the North, such as climate change, resource extraction and transport. We also expressed our satisfaction at the recent launch of our joint project to map the seabed of the Arctic Ocean. We acknowledge that we hold very different views on the question of the sovereignty of Hans Island. This is a territorial dispute which has persisted since the early 1970s, when agreement was reached on the maritime boundary between Canada and Greenland. We underscore that this issue relates only to the island as such, and has no impact on that agreement. Firmly committed as we are to the peaceful resolution of disputes, including territorial disputes, we consistently support this principle here at the United Nations, and around the world. To this end, we will continue our efforts to reach a long-term solution to the Hans Island dispute. Our officials will meet again in the near future to discuss ways to resolve the matter, and will report back to Ministers on their progress. While we pursue these efforts, we have decided that, without prejudice to our respective legal claims, we will inform each other of activities related to Hans Island. Likewise, all contact by either side with Hans Island will be carried out in a low key and restrained manner. We will continue to pursue our common goal of ensuring the sustainable development of the Arctic region to the benefit of all, and in the tradition of cooperation in the region between our scientists we will explore the feasibility of joint scientific projects on or in the area of Hans Island. Such projects might fall within the research being planned in the context of the International Polar Year 2007–08. *  Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, News Release 2005 No 165. The document was kindly provided by the Legal Bureau of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada. It is on file with the editor. Reproduced with permission by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark.

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Sverdrup Islands Document 347 Exchange of Notes Regarding the Recognition by the Norwegian Government of the Sovereignty of His Majesty over the Sverdrup ­Islands (8 August/30 November 1930)* The Norwegian Chargé d’Affaires, London, to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, London ROYAL NORWEGIAN LEGATION LONDON, August 8th, 1930 No. 95/1930 The Right Honourable Arthur Henderson, P.C., M.P., etc., etc., etc. Sir, Acting on instructions from my Government I have the honour to request you to be good enough to inform His Majesty’s Government in Canada that the Norwegian Government, who do not as far as they are concerned claim sovereignty over the Sverdrup Islands, formally recognise the sovereignty of His Britannic Majesty over these islands. At the same time my Government is anxious to emphasize that their recognizance of the sovereignty of His Britannic Majesty over these islands is in no way based on any sanction whatever of what is named “the sector principle”. I have the honour to be, etc., Daniel Steen Chargé d’Affaires a. i. The Norwegian Chargé d’Affaires, London, to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, London ROYAL NORWEGIAN LEGATION LONDON, August 8th, 1930 No. 96/1930 The Right Honourable Arthur Henderson, P.C., M.P., etc., etc., etc. Sir, With reference to my note of to-day in regard to my Government’s recognition of the sovereignty of His Britannic Majesty over the Sverdrup Islands, I have the honour, under instructions from my Government, to inform you that the said note has been despatched on the assumption on the part of the Norwegian Government that His Britannic Majesty’s Government in Canada will declare themselves willing not to interpose any obstacles

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to Norwegian fishing, hunting or industrial and trading activities in the areas which the recognition comprises. I have the honour to be, etc., Daniel Steen Chargé d’Affaires a. i. The British Chargé d’Affaires, Oslo, to the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Oslo BRITISH LEGATION OSLO, 5th November, 1930 No. 122 Son Excellence Monsieur J. L. Mowinckel, etc., etc., etc. Monsieur le Ministre d’État, At the instance of His Majesty’s Government in Canada and under the instructions of His Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I have the honour to invite reference to the two notes addressed to His Majesty’s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs by the Norwegian Chargé d’Affaires in London on August 8th last, in regard to the recognition by the Norwegian Government of the sovereignty of His Britannic Majesty over the Otto Sverdrup Islands, and to inform you that His Majesty’s Government in Canada has noted the desire on the part of the Norwegian Government that no obstacles should be interposed to Norwegian fishing, hunting, or industrial and trading activities in the area which the recognition comprises, and wishes to assure the Norwegian Government that it would have pleasure in according any possible facilities. It wishes, however, to draw attention to the fact that it is the established policy of the Government of Canada, as set forth in an Order in Council of July 19, 1926, and subsequent Orders, to protect the Arctic areas as hunting and trapping preserves for the sole use of the aboriginal population of the Northwest Territories, in order to avert the danger of want and starvation through the exploitation of the wild life by white hunters and traders. Except with the permission of the Commissioner of the Northwest Territories, no person other than native Indians or Eskimos is allowed to hunt, trap, trade, or traffic for any purpose whatsoever in a large area of the mainland and in the whole Arctic island area, with the exception of the southern portion of Baffin Island. It is further provided that no person may hunt or kill or traffic in the skins of the musk-ox, buffalo, wapiti, or elk. These prohibitions apply to all persons, including Canadian nationals. Should, however, the regulations be altered at any time in the future, His Majesty’s Government in Canada would treat with the most friendly consideration any application by Norwegians to share in any fishing, hunting, industrial, or trading activities in the areas which the recognition comprises. I avail myself of this opportunity to assure you, Monsieur le Ministre d’État, of my highest consideration. Kenneth Johnstone The Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Oslo to the British Chargé d’Affaires, Oslo [Translation]

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ROYAL NORWEGIAN MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OSLO, 5th November, 1930 Mr. Kenneth Johnstone, Esq., The British Government’s Chargé d’Affaires, etc., etc. Monsieur le Chargé d’Affaires, I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 5th instant in reply to the two notes from the Norwegian Chargé d’Affaires in London to the British Foreign Minister of the 8th August last regarding Norway’s recognition of His Britannic Majesty’s sovereignty over the Otto Sverdrup Islands. The Norwegian Government has noted that the Canadian Government would willingly have granted every possible facility to Norwegian fishing, hunting or industrial and trading activities in these regions, but that it is a leading principle in the policy of the Canadian Government to preserve the Arctic regions as hunting and trapping preserves for the sole use of the Aboriginal population of the Northwest Territories, in order to prevent their being in want as a consequence of the exploitation of the wild life by white hunters and trappers, and that they have drawn up more definite regulations to this end by means of several Orders in Council. The Norwegian Government has further noted that should these regulations be altered in the future, the Canadian Government will treat in the most friendly manner any application from Norwegians for facilities to carry on fishing, hunting, industrial or trading activities in the areas which the Norwegian Government’s recognition comprises. I beg to inform you that in these circumstances the Norwegian Government find themselves able to concur in this reply to the above-mentioned notes of 8th August last. I avail myself, etc. (for the Minister for Foreign Affairs) Aug. Esmarch

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Bering Sea Document 348 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist ­Republics ­concerning Cooperation in Combating Pollution in the ­Bering and Chukchi Seas in Emergency Situations (11 May 1989)* The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the “Parties”, Conscious that exploration, exploitation, and production of natural resources, as well as related marine transport, pose a threat of significant pollution by oil or other hazardous substances in the Bering and Chukchi Seas, Recognizing that, in the event of a pollution incident or the threat thereof, prompt and effective action should be taken, to organize and coordinate prevention and pollution combatting activities, Taking into account the Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed May 23, 1972, and desiring to develop further the principles of mutually beneficial cooperation, and Desiring to avert, through the adoption of measures to prevent and combat pollution resulting from oil and other hazardous substance spills, damage to the marine environment of the Bering and Chukchi Seas, including coastal areas, Have agreed as follows: Article I The Parties undertake to render assistance to each other in combatting pollution incidents which may affect the areas of responsibility of the Parties, regardless of where such incidents may occur. Such assistance shall be rendered consistent with the provisions of this Agreement. To such end the competent authorities of the Parties shall develop the Joint Contingency Plan Against Pollution in the Bering and Chukchi Seas, hereinafter referred to as the “Plan”, which shall enter into force upon their written agreement. Article II For the purpose of this Agreement: “Pollution Incident” means a discharge or an imminent threat of discharge of oil or other hazardous substance from territorial sea in which that Party exercises its sovereign rights and jurisdiction in accordance with international law. Areas of responsibility of

*  Done at Moscow, 11 May 1989, entered into force 17 August 1989; 2190 UNTS 180 [Registration Number 38657]. From United Nations Treaty Series, by United Nations Office of Legal Affairs Treaty Section, © 2004, United Nations. Reprinted with the permission of the United Nations. A list of further bilateral agreements with application to the Bering Strait region is provided by PA Berkman, AN Vylegzhanin and OR Young, ‘Governing the Bering Strait Region: Current Status, Emerging issues and Future Options’ (2016) 47 Ocean Development & International Law 186–217, 191–192.

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the Parties where they are adjacent will be separated by the maritime boundary between the two countries. “Response resources” means the personnel, vessels, equipment and other means for combating pollution. Article III The Parties, consistent with their means, commit themselves to the development of national systems that permit detection and prompt notification of the existence or the imminent possibility of the occurrence of pollution incidents, as well as providing adequate means within their power to eliminate the threat posed by such incidents and to minimize the adverse effects to the marine environment and the public health and welfare. Article IV The Parties shall routinely exchange up-to-date information and consult to guarantee adequate cooperation between their competent authorities, with regard to activities pertaining to this Agreement and the Plan. Article V The implementation of the Plan shall be the primary responsibility of the competent authorities of the respective Parties, and of other authorities of the Parties to the extent of such other authorities’ competence under applicable law. The Plan may be amended from time to time, consistent with this Agreement and the procedures set forth in the Plan, by the competent authorities. Article VI The competent authority of the Party in whose area of responsibility a pollution incident occurs, or whose area of responsibility is affected by such an incident, shall direct response operations within that area. Article VII The Plan may be invoked whenever a pollution incident occurs that affects or threatens to affect the areas of responsibility of both Parties or, although only directly affecting the area of responsibility of one Party, is of such a magnitude as to justify a request for the other Party’s assistance. Article VIII The joint response provided for under the Plan can only be undertaken when the competent authorities of the Parties agree. The competent authorities of the Parties will determine the appropriate response action required for each pollution incident. Article IX Requests for assistance will be communicated between the competent authorities of both Parties. Requests for assistance by telephone shall be confirmed by telex, telegraph, or facsimile. A Party shall endeavor to promptly provide requested assistance as soon as possible to the extent that the Party determines the resources are available. The availability

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of response resources for a specific pollution incident is understood to be dependent upon funding and the requirements of other missions. The requesting Party shall provide all possible support to the response resources of the assisting Party. Article X The assisting Party may fully or partly terminate its assistance if that Party determines that it is necessary to do so. Notice of the termination shall be communicated to the competent authority of the requesting Party. The requesting Party shall release the response resources made available as soon as possible after the termination. The requesting Party shall promptly inform the assisting Party when the need for assistance no longer exists, and release as soon as possible the response resources made available by the assisting Party. Article XI The Parties will periodically conduct joint pollution response exercises and meetings in accordance with the provisions of the Plan. The competent authorities of the Parties shall alternate in the supervision of the exercises. Article XII The requesting Party shall, to the greatest extent possible, facilitate the arrival and departure of response resources made available by the assisting Party for response activities pertaining to this Agreement. The Parties shall cooperate in implementing the provisions of this Article. Article XIII The requesting Party shall reimburse the assisting Party for expenses associated with response resources. The amount to be reimbursed will be determined by the rates of the assisting Party. In all other cases and circumstances unless otherwise agreed, each Party will bear the expense of its own activities pertaining to this Agreement. The expenses involved in conducting joint exercises shall be borne by each Party respectively. Article XIV Nothing in this agreement shall affect in any way the rights and obligations of either Party resulting from other bilateral and multilateral international agreements. The Parties will implement this Agreement in accordance with rules and principles of general international law and their respective laws and regulations. Article XV This Agreement shall enter into force upon the date the Parties notify each other in writing that necessary internal procedures have been completed, and shall remain in force unless terminated by either Party upon six months advance written notice to the other Party of its intention to terminate this Agreement. Termination of this Agreement shall not affect response operations which have been taken hereunder and are not yet completed at the time of termination unless otherwise agreed by the Parties. This Agreement may be amended by written agreement between the Parties. DONE at Moscow, in duplicate, this eleventh day of May, 1989, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. 1453

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Document 349 Joint Statement between US President Herbert W Bush and Russia’s President Boris Jelzin on Research and Conservation of the Bering Sea Ecosystem (17 June 1992)* In the course of the state visit by the President of Russia to the United States of America, the sides stated their common interest in the wise use of the natural resources of the Bering Sea. The sides noted that the Bering Sea is one of the world’s most productive marine areas, with many species of marine mammals, seabirds, and approximately 450 species of fish, crustaceans, and mollusks. The sides also noted that the Bering Sea fishery accounts for approximately 10 percent of the world’s annual fishery production. The sides noted with concern that populations of several species of Bering Sea animals are declining, and that some species of fish and shellfish are at depressed levels. The sides also expressed concern that certain marine mammal and seabird populations have declined substantially in the past 15–20 years. The scope and magnitude of these declines indicate fundamental changes may be occurring in the Bering Sea ecosystem. In this connection, the sides agreed that there is need for more careful study of the Bering Sea. In particular they recognize the need to employ an expanded comprehensive ecosystem approach to Bering Sea research. The sides agreed that it is important to cooperate in the conservation of the Bering Sea resources to protect the biodiversity of the Sea, to maintain the viability of coastal communities that depend on its resources, and to continue to manage the fisheries in a manner that insures sustainable yields.

Document 350 Joint Statement of the President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Bering Strait Region (26 May 2011)** The President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation: –– Calling for protection of the shared natural and longstanding cultural heritage of Alaska and Chukotka; –– Recognizing the worldwide cultural and natural significance of the Bering Strait region, both as an ancient crossroads and as an area of present-day cooperation between our two countries; –– Noting that the Bering Strait region is important to the economies of both countries; –– Recognizing the many successes of the “Shared Beringian Heritage Program” in better understanding our shared history and sustaining the cultural vitality of the native peoples in the Central Bering Strait Region today;

* 

US Department of State, Dispatch, Vol 3, No 25, 22 June 1992. Done at Deauville/France, retrieved from the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, www.whitehouse. gov/the-press-office/2011/05/26/joint-statement-president-united-states-america-and-president-russian-fe. ** 

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–– ––

–– –– –– ––

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Confirming the mutual interest of both countries in deepening cooperation and strengthening ties, particularly in the region of our common boundary in the Bering Strait; Noting the important need to protect the rights of native peoples residing in Alaska and Chukotka, and to ensure that residents and native peoples engaged in cultural and traditional activities aimed at providing for their personal needs have continued access to natural resources in accordance with each nation’s laws; Conscious of the importance of cooperation to protect nature and natural resources in the Bering Strait region and to apply effective strategies aimed at sustainable development of the Arctic regions of our countries; Understanding the significance of unique Arctic ecosystems of Alaska and Chukotka in the Bering Strait region; and Conscious of the effects of climate change and other pressures on the common natural and cultural heritage of the Bering Strait region; Declare an intention to deepen cooperation between the United States of America and the Russian Federation in the cross-boundary Bering Strait region, including the expansion of interaction between the national agencies that are responsible for the specially protected natural territories/areas of both countries in the State of Alaska and the Chukotka Autonomous District, including their commitment to developing a dialogue with native peoples to help determine the specific goals and methods for such cooperation.

Document 351 Joint Statement of Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on Cooperation in the Bering Strait Region (8 September 2012)* Foreign Minister Lavrov and Secretary Clinton reaffirm the longstanding interest of the Russian Federation and the United States of America in protecting the shared natural and cultural heritage of Chukhotka and Alaska. The Bering Strait region represents both an ancient crossroads and an area of present-day cooperation between Russians and Americans. Over the past twenty years, the “Shared Beringian Heritage Program” has promoted a better understanding of shared history and helped to sustain the cultural vitality of the indigenous peoples in the Bering Strait region. Both Russia and the United States seek to deepen cooperation and strengthen ties in the region of their common boundary in the Bering Strait. In that regard, both sides recognize the need to protect the rights of indigenous peoples residing in Chukotka and Alaska, and to ensure that residents and indigenous peoples engaged in cultural and traditional activities aimed at providing for their personal needs have continued access to natural resources in accordance with each nation’s laws. Foreign Minister Lavrov and Secretary Clinton have agreed to pursue a Transboundary Area of Beringian specially protected natural territory, in consultation with local and

* Done at Vladivostok, retrieved from the US Department of State, www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/09/ 197522.htm.

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tribal governments, linking the proposed Beringia National Park in Chukotka with the Bering Land Bridge National Preserve and Cape Krusenstern National Monument in Alaska. The intent of the proposed link between these specially protected natural territories will promote –– conservation of flora, fauna and the natural ecosystem; –– preservation of kinship ties, cultural traditions, subsistence lifestyle and language of the indigenous peoples of the region; –– and collaboration on conservation, management scientific research, and effective monitoring of the environment. The objective is to conclude an agreement on the proposed Transboundary Area of Beringian specially protected natural territory between Russia and the United States by December 31, 2012.

Document 352 Draft Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Symbolically Linking National Parks in the Bering Strait Region” (23 October 2015)* The Government of the Government of the United States of America and the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Governments, calling for protection of the shared natural and longstanding cultural heritage of Chukotka and Alaska; recognizing the worldwide cultural and natural significance of the Bering Strait region, both as an ancient crossroads and as an area of present-day cooperation between our two countries; noting that the Bering Strait region is important to the economies of our two countries; recognizing the success of joint cooperation under the National Park Service’s “Shared Beringian Heritage Program” in preserving and strengthening the shared heritage and cultural vitality of the indigenous and other local inhabitants in the Bering Strait region; confirming the mutual interest of our two countries in deepening cooperation and strengthening ties, particularly in the area of the U.S.-Russian boundary in the Bering Strait region; noting the important need to protect the rights of indigenous and other local inhabitants in Chukotka and Alaska and to ensure their access to natural resources in accordance with each country’s laws; highlighting the importance of bilateral cooperation in protecting the environment and natural resources and preserving cultural heritage in the Bering Strait region; understanding the significance of unique Arctic ecosystems of Chukotka and Alaska in the Bering Strait region; conscious of the effects of human activities, climate change, and other environmental factors on the natural resources and cultural heritage of the Bering Strait region,

*  Alaska

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affirm that the linking of national parks in the Bering Strait region on both sides of the border between United States and Russia is intended to promote conservation of flora, fauna, and natural ecosystems; preservation of kinship ties, cultural practices, and languages of indigenous peoples of Chukotka and Alaska; and collaboration on environmental protection in the Bering Strait region and environmental research and monitoring, and also symbolize the link of two continents, our Governments, and people. The Governments have reached the following understandings: 1. The Governments designate the following Participants for the implementation of cooperation under this Memorandum: for the United States of America—the National Park Service of the U.S. Department of the Interior. for the Russian Federation—the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment of the Russian Federation; 2. The geographic scope of cooperation under this Memorandum is defined as the Bering Strait region, including the transboundary area comprising the Beringia National Park, which is located in the Russian Federation, and the Bering Land Bridge National Preserve and Cape Krusenstern National Monument, which are located in the United States of America. The Participants acknowledge that they have exchanged information concerning the boundaries of these national parks, including their cartographic coordinates. Either Government may change the aforementioned boundaries of the national parks in its territory in accordance with its country’s laws. In the event either Government changes the aforementioned boundaries, a written notification should be sent to the other Government. 3. The linking of national parks in the Bering Strait region under this Memorandum is intended to: exemplify constructive cooperation between the Participants at the national level; provide an opportunity for social and economic benefit for both countries by promoting ecological tourism, recreation, and sustainable development, as well as environmental awareness and education; foster mutual understanding and cooperation respecting environmental protection and the preservation of cultural heritage and in public education; advance the unique, traditional way of life of indigenous peoples of the Bering Strait region; respect subsistence rights of indigenous and other local inhabitants, in accordance with each country’s laws; promote the study and enjoyment of natural resources, as well as the study and understanding of cultural heritage of international significance in the region; support cultural, scientific, and educational exchanges and exchanges of experts and specialists; and provide a framework for the people of Russia and the United States to participate in the conservation of the natural and cultural heritage and to work jointly to protect the fragile Arctic ecosystems in the Bering Strait region. 4. The Participants intend to develop a joint action plan that describes the specific work to be accomplished under this Memorandum and that identifies specific projects and types of activities, as well as the roles and responsibilities of the both countries’ Participants and organizations in implementing them. The Participants intend to annually review and update the plan as needed. 1457

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5. Each Participant confirms that it intends to designate a Coordinator responsible for developing and coordinating implementation of the joint action plan. Each Participant may designate a different Coordinator at any time by notifying the other Participant in writing. The Coordinators should interact directly with one another and may also facilitate direct contacts among the Participants, institutions, and other organizations of both countries to achieve the goals of this Memorandum. 6. Cooperative activities that may occur under this Memorandum include exchanges of information and technical expertise concerning natural and cultural resource management and use, including study tours, internships, training courses, workshops, symposia, joint research projects, and other forms of joint activities, including activities related to cultural traditions, subsistence, kinship, and languages of indigenous peoples, as mutually decided by the Participants and reflected in the joint action plan. Where appropriate either Participant may seek the assistance of other agencies or organizations in performing requested actions in support of the implementation of this Memorandum. 7. Cooperation under this Memorandum is subject to the availability of personnel, funds, and other material resources of each Participant. Additionally, each Participant intends to approve and conduct activities under this Memorandum in accordance with its country’s laws. Nothing in this Memorandum is intended to affect other existing or future arrangements between the Governments or between one of the Governments and a third party. 8. This legally nonbinding Memorandum is not an international agreement and does not create any rights or obligations under international law. 9. Cooperation under this Memorandum commences upon signature. Either Government may discontinue cooperation under this Memorandum for any reason, in which event the Government discontinuing cooperation should take all possible measures to provide the other Government written notification at least 90 (ninety) days in advance. 10. Nothing in this Memorandum abrogates or in any way infringes upon the sovereign rights and authorities of each of the Governments and their Participants to manage lands within its respective borders in accordance with its country’s laws, or upon the rights of third parties. The Participants intend to resolve any differences in interpretation or application with respect to this Memorandum through consultations between them.

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Beaufort Sea Document 353 Convention between Great Britain and Russia concerning the Limits of their Respective Possessions on the North-West Coast of America and the Navigation of the Pacific Ocean (28 February 1825)* In the Name of the Most Holy and Undivided Trinity His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russians, being desirous of drawing still closer the Ties of good Understanding and Friendship which unite them, by means of an Agreement which may settle, upon a basis of reciprocal convenience, different points connected with the Commerce, Navigation, and Fisheries of their Subjects on the Pacific Ocean, as well as the limits of their respective Possessions on the North West Coast of America, have named Plenipotentiaries to conclude a Convention for this purpose, that is to say:His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, The Right Honourable Stratford Canning, a Member of His said Majesty’s Most Honourable Privy Council, &c., and His Majesty The Emperor of all the Russians, The Sieur Charles Robert Count de Nesselrode, His Imperial Majesty’s Privy Councillor, a Member of the Council of the Empire, Secretary of State for the Department of Foreign Affairs, &c., and the Sieur Pierre de Poletica, His Imperial Majesty’s Councillor of State, &c., Who, after having communicated to each other their respective Full Powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon and signed the following Articles: I. It is agreed that the respective Subjects of the High Contracting Parties shall not be troubled or molested, in any part of the Ocean, commonly called the Pacific Ocean, either in navigating the same, in fishing therein, or in landing at such Parts of the Coast as shall not have been already occupied, in order to trade with the Natives, under the restrictions and conditions specified in the following Articles. II. In order to prevent the Right of navigating and fishing, exercised upon the Ocean by the Subjects of The High Contracting Parties, from becoming the Pretext for an illicit Commerce, it is agreed that the Subjects of His Britannic Majesty shall not land at any Place where there may be a Russian Establishment, without the permission of the Governor or Commandant; and, on the other hand, that Russian Subjects shall not land, without permission, at any British Establishment on the North-West Coast. III. The line of demarcation between the Possessions of the High Contracting Parties, upon the Coast of the Continent, and the Islands of America to the North-West, shall be drawn in the following manner: Commencing from the Southern-most Point of the Island called Prince of Wales Island, which Point lies in the parallel of 54 degrees 40 minutes, North Latitude, and between the 131st and 133d Degree of West Longitude (Meridian of Greenwich), the said line shall ascend to the North along the Channel called *  Done at St Petersburg, 28 February 1825, British and Foreign State Papers, Vol 12, 38. This Convention is applicable to the United States as a result of the acquisition of Alaska from Russia in 1867 (Convention Ceding Alaska Between Russia and the United States).

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Portland Channel, as far as the Point of the Continent where it strikes the 56th Degree of North Latitude; from this last mentioned Point the line of demarcation shall follow the summit of the mountains situated parallel to the Coast, as far as the point of intersection of the 141st Degree of West Longitude (of the same Meridian); and, finally, from the said point of intersection, the said Meridian Line of the 141st Degree, in its prolongation as far as the Frozen Ocean, shall form the limit between the Russian and British Possessions on the Continent of America to the North West. IV. With reference to the line of demarcation laid down in the preceding Article it is understood; 1st. That the island called Prince of Wales Island shall belong wholly to Russia. 2d. That wherever the summit of the mountains which extend in a direction parallel to the Coast, from the 56th degree of north Latitude to the point of intersection of the 141st degree of West Longitude, shall prove to be at the distance of more than ten marine leagues from the Ocean, the limit between the British Possessions and the line of Coast which is to belong to Russia, as above-mentioned, shall be formed by a line parallel to the windings of the Coast, and which shall never exceed the distance of ten marine leagues therefrom. V. It is moreover agreed, that no Establishment shall be formed by either of the Two Parties within the limits assigned by the two preceding Articles to the Possessions of the Other: consequently, British Subjects shall not form any Establishment, either upon the Coast, or upon the border of the Continent comprised within the limits of the Russian Possessions, as designated in the two Preceding Articles; and, in like manner, no Establishment shall be formed by the Russian Subjects beyond the said limits. VI. It is understood that the Subjects of his Britannic Majesty, from whatever Quarter they may arrive, whether from the Ocean, or from the interior of the Continent, shall for ever enjoy the right of navigating freely, and without any hindrance whatever, all the rivers and streams which, in their course towards the Pacific Ocean, may cross the line of demarcation upon the line of coast described in Article 3 of the present Convention. VII. It is also understood, that, for the space of ten Years from the signature of the Present Convention, the vessels of the Two Powers, or those belonging to their respective Subjects, shall mutually be at liberty to frequent, without any hindrance whatever, all the inland Seas, the Gulfs, Havens, and Creeks on the Coast mentioned in Article 3 for the purpose of fishing and of trading with the Natives. VIII. The Port of Sitka, or Novo Archangelsk, shall be open to the Commerce and Vessels of British Subjects for the space of ten Years from the date of the exchange of the Ratifications of the present Convention. In the event of an extension of this term of ten years being granted to any other Power, the like extension shall be granted also to Great Britain. IX. The above mentioned liberty of Commerce shall not apply to the trade in spirituous liquors, in firearms, or other arms, gunpowder or other warlike stores; the High Contracting Parties reciprocally engaging not to permit the above mentioned articles to be sold or delivered, in any manner whatever, to the Natives of the Country. 1460

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X.

Every British or Russian Vessel navigating the Pacific Ocean, which may be compelled by storms or by accident, to take shelter in the Ports of the respective parties, shall be at liberty to refit therein, to pro- vide itself with all necessary stores, and to put to sea again, without paying any other than Port and Lighthouse dues, which shall be the same as those paid by National Vessels. In case, however, the Master of such Vessel should be under the necessity of disposing of a part of his merchandise in order to defray his expenses, he shall conform himself to the Regulations and Tariffs of the Place where he may have landed. XI. In every case of complaint on account of an infraction of the Articles of the present Convention, the Civil and Military Authorities of the High Contracting Parties, without previously acting or taking any forcible measure, shall make an exact and circumstantial Report of the matter to their respective Courts, who engage to settle the same in a friendly manner, and according to the principles of justice. XII. The present Convention shall be ratified, and the Ratifications shall be exchanged at London within the space of six weeks, or sooner if possible. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the Seal of their Arms. DONE at St. Petersburgh, the Twenty eighth (Sixteenth) Day, of February, in the year of our Lord one Thousand Eight Hundred and Twenty-five.

Document 354 Treaty for the Cession by Russia to the United States of all Territory and Dominion possessed by Russia, on the Continent of America, and the Adjacent Islands (30 March 1867)* By the President of the United States of America—A Proclamation Whereas a treaty between the United States of America and his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russians was concluded and signed by their respective plenipotentiaries at the city of Washington, on the thirtieth day of March, last, which treaty, being in English and French languages, is, word for word as follows: The United States of America and His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russians, being desirous of strengthening, if possible, the good understanding which exists between them, have, for that purpose, appointed as their Plenipotentiaries: the President of the United States, William H. Seward, Secretary of State; and His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russians, the Privy Councillor Edward de Stoeckl, his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States. And the said Plenipotentiaries, having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in due form, have agreed upon and signed the following articles: Article I His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russians agrees to cede to the United States, by this convention, immediately upon the exchange of the ratifications thereof, all the territory and dominion now possessed by his said Majesty on the continent of America and in

* 

Done at Washington, 30 March 1867; entered into force 20 June 1867; (1867) 134 CTS 332. 1461

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the adjacent islands, the same being contained within the geographical limits herein set forth, to wit: The eastern limit is the line of demarcation between the Russian and the British possessions in North America, as established by the convention between Russia and Great Britain, of February 28–16, 1825, and described in Articles III and IV of said convention, in the following terms: “Commencing from the southernmost point of the island called Prince of Wales Island, which point lies in the parallel of 54 degrees 40 minutes north latitude, and between the 131st and the 133d degree of west longitude, (meridian of Greenwich,) the said line shall ascend to the north along the channel called Portland channel, as far as the point of the continent where it strikes the 56th degree of north latitude; from this last-mentioned point, the line of demarcation shall follow the summit of the mountains situated parallel to the coast as far as the point of intersection of the 141st degree of west longitude, (of the same meridian;) and finally, from the said point of intersection, the said meridian line of the 141st degree, in its prolongation as far as the Frozen ocean. IV. With reference to the line of demarcation laid down in the preceding article, it is understood— 1st. That the island called Prince of Wales Island shall belong wholly to Russia, (now, by this cession, to the United States.) 2d. That whenever the summit of the mountains which extend in a direction parallel to the coast from the 56th degree of north latitude to the point of intersection of the 141st degree of west longitude shall prove to be at the distance of more than ten marine leagues from the ocean, the limit between the British possessions and the line of coast which is to belong to Russia as above mentioned (that is to say, the limit to the possessions ceded by this convention) shall be formed by a line parallel to the winding of the coast, and which shall never exceed the distance of ten marine leagues therefrom.” The western limit within which the territories and dominion conveyed, are contained, passes through a point in Behring’s straits on the parallel of sixty-five degrees thirty minutes north latitude, at its intersection by the meridian which passes midway between the islands of Krusenstern, or Ignalook, and the island of Ratmanoff, or Noonarbook, and proceeds due north, without limitation, into the same Frozen ocean. The same western limit, beginning at the same initial point, proceeds thence in a course nearly southwest through Behring’s straits and Behring’s sea, so as to pass midway between the northwest point of the island of St. Lawrence and the southeast point of Cape Choukotski, to the meridian of one hundred and seventy-two west longitude; thence, from the intersection of that meridian, in a south-westerly direction, so as to pass midway between the island of Attou and the Copper island of the Kormandorski couplet or group in the North Pacific ocean, to the meridian of one hundred and ninety- three degrees west longitude, so as to include in the territory conveyed the whole of the Aleutian islands east of that meridian. Article II In the cession of territory and dominion made by the preceding article are included the right of property in all public lots and squares, vacant lands, and all public buildings, fortifications, barracks, and other edifices which are not private individual property. It is, however, understood and agreed, that the churches which have been built in the ceded territory by the Russian government, shall remain the property of such members of the Greek Oriental Church resident in the territory, as may choose to worship therein. Any government archives, papers, and documents relative to the territory and dominion 1462

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aforesaid, which may be now existing there, will be left in the possession of the agent of the United States; but an authenticated copy of such of them as may be required, will be, at all times, given by the United States to the Russian government, or to such Russian officers or subjects as they may apply for. Article III The inhabitants of the ceded territory, according to their choice, reserving their natural allegiance, may return to Russia within three years; but if they should prefer to remain in the ceded territory, they, with the exception of uncivilized native tribes, shall be admitted to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States, and shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion. The uncivilized tribes will be subject to such laws and regulations as the United States may, from time to time, adopt in regard to aboriginal tribes of that country. Article IV His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russians shall appoint, with convenient despatch, an agent or agents for the purpose of formally delivering to a similar agent or agents appointed on behalf of the United States, the territory, dominion, property, dependencies and appurtenances which are ceded as above, and for doing any other act which may be necessary in regard thereto. But the cession, with the right of immediate possession, is nevertheless to be deemed complete and absolute on the exchange of ratifications, without waiting for such formal delivery. Article V Immediately after the exchange of the ratifications of this convention, any fortifications or military posts which may be in the ceded territory shall be delivered to the agent of the United States, and any Russian troops which may be in the territory shall be withdrawn as soon as may be reasonably and conveniently practicable. Article VI In consideration of the cession aforesaid, the United States agree to pay at the treasury in Washington, within ten months after the exchange of the ratifications of this convention, to the diplomatic representative or other agent of his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russians, duly authorized to receive the same, seven million two hundred thousand dollars in gold. The cession of territory and dominion herein made is hereby declared to be free and unencumbered by any reservations, privileges, franchises, grants, or possessions, by any associated companies, whether corporate or incorporate, Russian or any other, or by any parties, except merely private individual property holders; and the cession hereby made, conveys all the rights, franchises, and privileges now belonging to Russia in the said territory or dominion, and appurtenances thereto. Article VII When this convention shall have been duly ratified by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, on the one part, and on the other by his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russians, the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington within three months from the date hereof, or sooner if possible. 1463

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In faith whereof, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed this convention, and thereto affixed the seals of their arms. DONE at Washington, the thirtieth day of March, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-seven. And whereas the said Treaty has been duly ratified on both parts, and the respective ratifications of the same were exchanged at Washington on this twentieth day of June, by William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States, and the Privy Counsellor Edward de Stoeckl, the Envoy Extraordinary of His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russians, on the part of their respective governments, Now, therefore, be it known that I, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States of America, have caused the said Treaty to be made public, to the end that the same and every clause and article thereof may be observed and fulfilled with good faith by the United States and the citizens thereof. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. DONE at the city of Washington, this twentieth day of June in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-seven, and of the Independence of the United States the ninety-first.

Document 355 Letter from LT Hoffmann, Bureau of Land Management. United States of the Interior, to DG Crosby, Department of Northern Affairs and Natural Resources of Canada (14 May 1965)* Dear Mr. Crosby: Thank you for the maps showing locations and holders of the offshore oil and gas permits you have issued on the east and West wasts. We also appreciate the copy of your printed oil and gas land regulations. As a matter of some concern to us, we believe that you have issued offshore permits on the Outer Continental Shelf pertaining to the United States. We believe this is the case in the Gulf of Maine, off the Straits of Juan de Fuca, and Dixon Entrance. We are unable to comment on the permits you have issued in the Arctic Ocean as we do not have a map showing their locations. Inasmuch as the location of a median line might be subject to different interpretations, we suggest that you check the locations of your permits which approach submerged lands in the United States jurisdiction to see if they are within Canadian jurisdiction under an application of Article 6 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf of the 1958 Geneva Conference. This communication is being written solely in the interest of seeing if there is a basis for disagreement as to the location of a median line separating our respective jurisdictions on the Outer Continental Shelf. As an operating Bureau, we of course, have no authority

* 

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to enter into any formal discussion of the location of a median line in case of a dispute. However, we are hopeful that there would be a simple misunderstanding on either our part or yours, of the elements positioning a median line. If this is the case, then the manner would be amicably determined without resort to high authority. In the last paragraph of your letter of April 8 you ask for the location of leases we might have issued off the east coast and the State of Washington. No Federal oil and gas leases on the Outer Continental Shelf off the east coast have been issued. However, certain seismic permits have been issued. These permits allow only geophysical activities and no deep drilling. Although a number of blocks off Washington were leased as a result of our October 1, 1964 sale, we believe you will be interested in only Blocks 21 N. and 61 and 62 W. that are nearest to the Canadian-United States boundary. Sincerely yours, L. T. HOFFMAN Assistant Director

Document 356 Letter from the Canadian Department of Northern Affairs and ­National Resources to the United States Department of the Interior (16 June 1965)* Dear Mr. Hoffman: Thank you for your letter of May 14, concerning the matter of Canada Oil and Gas Permits and United States Leases in off-shore areas on the continental shelf. We can appreciate your concern respecting the positions of the lines of demarcation of the resources of the sea bed on the continental shelf off the east and west coasts. We wish to assure you that we have utilized a median line as described in the third paragraph of your letter, constructed in accordance with the equidistance principle as defined in Article 6 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf, to determine the limits of the offshore areas within which to issue Canada Oil and Gas Permits. It may help clarify matters somewhat to explain that since the exact position of such a median line may be open to some interpretation, we issue permits covering grid areas up to and straddling these off-shore median lines. In the case of a permit straddling a median line, a cautionary statement is induced in the permit to the effect that it is issued subject to the lands covered thereby being Canada Lands. I believe the foregoing answers the various points raised in your letter. Yours sincerely, A.D. Hunt, Chief, Resource Management Division

*  ICJ, Gulf of Maine Case, Memorial of Canada, Vol I, Annex 6, 371. Contains information licensed under the Open Government Licence—Canada.

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Document 357 Diplomatic Note No 103 from the US Embassy in Ottawa to Canada’s Department of External Affairs (20 May 1976)* The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Department of External Affairs and refers to the matter of continental shelf boundaries between the United States and Canada. It has only recently come to the attention of the Government of the United States that the Government of Canada has granted oil and gas concession in the Beaufort Sea as far west as 141 degrees west longitude. Furthermore, the Government of the United States has heard from public sources that the Government of Canada has granted similar concessions in the Dixon Entrance and Strait of Juan de Fuca areas. Reportedly, some of these concessions were granted as many as ten years ago. The United States notes these actions with concern, since they occur in areas where the continental shelf boundaries between the United States and Canada have not been determined. The United States was neither consulted nor notified concerning Canadian intentions in these areas of common interest. The Government of the United States recalls that in its Note of November 5, 1969, in which it reserved its rights and those of its nationals with respect to the Gulf of Maine continental shelf boundary, it also reserved its rights and those of its nationals with respect to areas in the vicinity of other continental shelf boundaries between the United States and Canada. The United States wishes to emphasize that since the Truman Proclamation of 1945 Canada has known that the position of the United Sates with respect to continental shelf boundaries with Canada is that they shall determined by agreement in accordance with equitable principles, and that this is confirmed by the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf and Other Relevant Principles of International Law. Unilateral acts of Canada cannot lay a foundation for a Canadian claim to specific boundary areas. Until the exact location of the United States-Canada continental shelf boundaries in the Beaufort Sea, Dixon Entrance and Strait of Juan de Fuca areas are determined, the United States can neither accept nor recognize as valid any Canadian authorization of exploration or exploitation of the natural resources of the continental shelf areas that are or may be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The United States once again reserves its rights and those of its nationals with respect to those areas, particularly in the Beaufort Sea. The Government of the United States also wishes to note that the views regarding presumptions in favour of equidistance expressed by the Canadian delegation in the negotiations concerning the continental shelf boundary in the Gulf of Maine area, and the views which were expressed in the Embassy of Canada Note No. 52 of February, 1975, are not consistent with the Canadian action in the Beaufort Sea area. The United States, for its part, is not aware of circumstances that would justify assertions of Canadian jurisdiction as far west as the 141st meridian. Moreover, the use of the meridian raises questions regarding the so-called sector theory which as the Government of Canada is aware, has been associated with attempts interfere unlawfully with navigational and other

* 

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freedoms. Accordingly, the United States must restate its long-standing position that the so-called “sector” theory is not an accepted principle of international law. The Government of Untied States requests that the Government of Canada furnish to the United States information concerning the western extent of Canadian oil and gas leases or other permits in the Beaufort Sea, the northern extent of any such leases or permits in the Dixon Entrance area, and the southern extent of any such leases or permits in the Strait of Juan de Fuca areas. In this connection the Government of the United States would welcome an explanation of the legal arguments regarding delimitation upon which the Government of Canada is relying to justify those actions in each case. The Government of the United States expresses its willingness to enter negotiations concerning these continental shelf boundary areas at an appropriate and mutually convenient time. The Embassy of the United States takes this opportunity to again convey to the Department of External Affairs the assurances of its highest consideration.

Document 358 Diplomatic Note No 626 from the Embassy of Canada in Washington to the US Department of State [extracts only] (22 December 1976)* The Embassy of Canada presents its compliments to the Department of State and has the honour to refer to Note No. 103 of May 20, 1976 from the United States Embassy in Ottawa to the Department of External Affairs concerning continental shelf boundaries and to Public Notice No. 506 entitled “Maritime Boundaries Between the United States and Canada” published in the United States Federal Register of November 4, 1976. The Embassy notes that in a number of areas the coordinates of the limits of the continental shelf and prospective fisheries jurisdiction set out in Notice No. 506 differ from the co-ordinates for the relevant areas set out in the text of the proposed Orderin-Council published in the Canada Gazette on November 1, 1976, a copy of which is enclosed While the Order-in-Council relates to fisheries jurisdiction only, the co-ordinates set out therein in respect of boundary regions also encompass areas of the continental shelf over which Canada has exercised jurisdiction for a number of years. The Government of Canada does not accept or recognize as valid, for the reasons set out below, the co-ordinates set out in the United States Notice where they encroach upon the prospective Canadian fishing zones as described by the co-ordinates set out in the proposed Order-in-Council. The Embassy wishes to take this opportunity to make clear the views of the Government of Canada on each of the boundary areas in question. The Department of State will note from the following that Canada has used the median or equidistance approach in each case except where the boundary has already been regulated by international agreement or international arbitral award: […] (f) The United States co-ordinates in the Beaufort Sea do not take into account the international boundary established by the Treaty of 1825 between Great Britain and Russia and confirmed in the Treaty of 1867 between the United States and Russia. *  ICJ, Gulf of Maine Case, Memorial of Canada, Vol I, Annex 46, 430. Contains information licensed under the Open Government Licence—Canada.

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The Government of Canada has for many years exercised jurisdiction in the Beaufort Sea up to the 141° meridian boundary including sovereign rights over the continental shelf. While Canada has refrained from asserting jurisdiction beyond the equidistance line for the delimitation of those maritime boundaries between Canada and the United States not already delimited by treaty or arbitration, it reserves its rights with respect to areas beyond the equidistance line in those cases where there exist circumstances comparable to those on which the United States’ claim in the Gulf of Maine area is based. (Attached are charts setting out the limits of Canadian claims based on the same principles as those on which the United States’ claims are based, and which would be relevant in the event of a reference of this question to third party settlement.) The Embassy is pleased to note that the co-ordinates set forth in the United States Notice are intended to be without prejudice to any negotiations with Canada. It will be recalled that the Canadian Order-in-Council published on November 1, 1976 similarly states that “… the limits of the fishing zones of Canada as established in the annexed Order are intended to be without prejudice to any negotiations or to any positions which may have been or may be adopted respecting the limits of maritime boundary jurisdiction …” Canada will continue to pursue negotiations with the United States towards a mutually acceptable settlement in the spirit of longstanding friendship and co-operation which has characterized Canada/United States relations. The Embassy of Canada avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Department of State the assurances of its highest consideration.

Document 359 Diplomatic Note from the US Department of State to the Embassy of Canada in Washington [extracts only] (16 February 1977)* The Department of State refers to Note No. 626 of December 22, 1976, from the Embassy of Canada in Washington to the Department of State. The Department notes that over the past months the respective legal advisers of the Department of State and the Ministry of External Affairs have engaged in legal discussions which have clearly set forth the legal positions of the two governments concerning maritime boundaries. The Department is disappointed that Note No. 626 is a further exposition of the Canadian legal position on each maritime boundary, rather than a movement toward negotiations. In light of the statement of position in the referenced Note, the Government of the United States is compelled to respond with a brief legal statement of the position of the Government of the United States on each maritime boundary. This statement is intended to be a general statement of the position of the Government of the United States, and is not intended to address the specific arguments raised in Note No. 626. The Department reserves the right to make further comments at a later time. The position of the Government of the United States is that under the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, and applicable principles of international law, maritime boundaries are to be determined by agreement and in accordance with equitable

* 

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principles. The Government of the United States is also of the view that equidistance is an appropriate method for determining a maritime boundary when there are no special circumstances in the area and when equidistance results in a boundary in accordance with equitable principles. […] In the Beaufort Sea the position of the Government of the United States is that there are no special circumstances in the area and that equidistance produces a maritime boundary in accordance with equitable principles. The Government of the United States notes that the Government of Canada wishes to reserve its rights to make new claims “in those cases where there exist circumstances comparable to those on which the United States’ claim in the Gulf of Maine area is based”. The Government of the United States fully agrees with the basic proposition that where special circumstances exist, they are relevant factors to be taken into account in a determination of a maritime boundary in accordance with equitable principles. However, during the course of the aforementioned legal discussions, the Canadian negotiator repeatedly asserted that there were no special circumstances in the maritime boundary areas between Canada and the United States. Of course, the Government of Canada is free to change its position concerning these matters; however, the Government of the United States does not believe that there is any basis in law or fact to support or to justify the positions identified in the charts attached to Note No. 626 which the Government of Canada claims are based on the same principles which the Government of the United States has argued as being relevant in the Gulf of Maine area. The Government of the United States remains committed to the pursuit of negotiations toward a mutually acceptable settlement of the United States-Canada maritime boundaries and urges an immediate resumption of negotiations.

Document 360 Diplomatic Note No 221 from the Embassy of Canada in Washington to the US Department of States [extracts only] (26 May 1977)* The Embassy of Canada presents its compliments to the Department of State and has the honour to refer to the Department of State Note of February 18, 1977. The Embassy does not propose to address at this stage all the points raised in the Department of State’s Note and reserves the right to make further comments at a later date. However, the Embassy considers it important, to avoid misunderstandings, to address at this time certain questions of fact concerning the Canadian position as advanced in negotiations to date and certain questions of international law raised by the Note. […]. With respect to applicable principles of international law, since both states are parties to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, it is assumed that it is common ground that Article 6 of the Convention is the applicable law: “1. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or more States whose coasts are opposite each other, the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to such States shall be determined by agreement between them. In the absence of

*  ICJ, Gulf of Maine Case, Memorial of Canada, Vol I, Annex 54, 444. Contains information licensed under the Open Government Licence—Canada.

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agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary is the median line, every point of which is equidistant from the nearest point of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured. 2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two adjacent States, the boundary of the continental shelf shall be determined by agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary shall be determined by application of the principle of equidistance from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured.” The Canadian Government regards as at variance with the plain meaning of Article 6 the position of the USA Government as stated in the Note of February 18 that: “ … under the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, and applicable principles of international law, maritime boundaries are to be determined by agreement and in accordance with equitable principles. The Government of the USA is also of the view that equidistance is an appropriate method for determining a maritime boundary when there are no special circumstances in the area and when equidistance results in a boundary in accordance with equitable principles.” The Canadian Government is not aware of any legal authority for such an interpretation of the Convention which, in its view, is not consistent with Article 31 (1) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which states, “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” The Government of Canada assumes that it is common ground that both countries are bound by the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf and that it constitutes the essential basis for determining the rights and obligations of the two countries under international law with respect to the delimitation of the continental shelf between them. In order to avoid any misunderstanding as to the basis on which negotiations are to be carried forward, it is important that both sides have a clear understanding, prior to the resumption of those negotiations, of the views of the other regarding the legal rights and obligations of the two sides. The Government of Canada notes that the position of the USA Government in the Beaufort Sea is that “… there are no special circumstances in the area and equidistance produces a maritime boundary in accordance with equitable principles.” It will be recalled that in the United States Embassy Note No. 103 of May 20, 1976, the Government of the United States stated that “the views regarding presumptions in favour of equidistance expressed by the Canadian delegation … are not consistent with the Canadian action in the Beaufort Sea area.” In the presentation of the Canadian delegation at the bilateral discussions on maritime boundaries held in Washington on July 23, 1976, and in the Canadian Embassy’s Note No. 626 of December 22, 1976, it was pointed out that the 141 ° meridian was established as the international boundary in that area by the Treaty of 1825 between Great Britain and Russia. As the Treaty is binding upon Canada and the United States as successor states, it is the view of the Canadian Government that the presumptions in favour of equidistance referred to in the United States Embassy Note No. 103 of May 20, and presumably reflected in the United States Coordinates set out in Public Notice No. 506 of November 4, 1976, are not applicable.

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In this context, the Canadian Government further recalls the reference in the United States Embassy Note of May 20, 1976, to the Truman Proclamation of 1945. It would appreciate clarification of United States views as to the precise nature, extent and scope of the Declaration in light of subsequent state practice of other states based on it, involving, in certain cases, interference with freedom of navigation and other freedoms. It will be recalled that, although the Government of Canada was invited to associate itself with the United States action at that time, it did not do so. With regard to the reference in the Note of May 20 to the sector theory, the Canadian Government is not aware of those circumstances referred to in which the sector theory has been associated with attempts to interfere unlawfully with navigational and other freedoms, and would be grateful to receive clarification on this point. […] The Government of Canada favours an early resumption of negotiations with the United States with a view to concluding a mutually acceptable maritime boundaries settlement in the spirit of longstanding friendship and co-operation which has characterized Canada/ USA relations. The Embassy of Canada avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Department of State the assurances of its highest consideration.

Document 361 Diplomatic Note from the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade pertaining to federal register ­ otification of lease sales in the Beaufort Sea (27 February 2003)* n The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America and has the honour to refer: to the Embassy’s diplomatic note no. 169 of 18 February 2003; and (b) to the publication in the federal register vol. 68, no. 34 of 20 February 2003 by the Minerals Management Service of the United States Department of the Interior of a notice of availability concerning the proposed notice of sale for proposed outer continental shelf oil and gas lease sale 186 in the Beaufort Sea which is tentatively scheduled to be undertaken on 24 September 2003. The Embassy has the further honour to inform the Embassy that: (a) Canada notes with concern that the areas covered by the proposed lease sale in the Beaufort Sea extend eastward of the 141st meridian on longitude and, therefore, into an area of the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of Canada over which Canada exercises exclusive sovereign rights in respect of the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil; (b) Canada also notes with concern that the map published by the Minerals Management Service of the United States Department of the Interior on 8 January 2003 depicts proposed oil and gas lease areas which extend eastward

* Retrieved

from Wikileaks, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/03OTTAWA595_a.html (Canonical ID:

03OTTAWA595_a).

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of the 141st meridian of longitude and/or show the maritime boundary between Canada and the United States of America as lying eastward of the 141st meridian of longitude; and, (c) Canada rejects any purported exercise of jurisdiction by the Government of the United States of America or the state of Alaska over that part of the seabed, water column or natural resources thereof, in the Beaufort Sea region east of the 141st meridian of longitude and does not acquiesce in any measure taken by the government of the United States of America or by the State of Alaska which would infringe upon Canadian sovereignty or sovereign rights in this area. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the United States of America the assurances of its highest.

Document 362 Reaction from the United States, to Note Verbale of the Embassy of Canada concerning the ‘Beaufort Sea Areawide 2004 Competitive Oil and Gas Lease Sale’ (2004)* [The United States] … refers to Note No. UNEC0814 of the Embassy of Canada of August 20, 2004 concerning the sale announcement published by the State of Alaska’s Department of Natural Resources on July 29, 2004 regarding the “Beaufort Sea Areawide 2004 Competitive Oil and Gas Lease Sale.” The Government of the United States does not accept that any part of the “Beaufort Sea Areawide 2004 Competitive Oil and Gas Lease Sale” encroaches on Canada’s sovereign rights under international law. The United States does not share the Canadian view that the location of the maritime boundary in this area follows the 141st west meridian of longitude. The United States on many occasions has informed Canada of the proper location of the maritime boundary in this area, which has been followed in the case of the “Beaufort Sea Areawide 2004 Competitive Oil and Gas Lease Sale.” The Government of the United States notes that on August 23, 2004, the State of Alaska’s Department of Natural Resources issued a supplemental notice containing the following statement: “The United States Department of State has notified the State of Alaska that land within Tract 001 of the Beaufort Sea Areawide Lease Sale may be subject to a title dispute with the government of Canada. Potential bidders on Tract 001 should be prepared for possible delays in determining state title to lands within this tract if an acceptable bid is received for this tract.” In recognition that there is no agreed maritime boundary, the State of Alaska does not intend to issue any leases in the disputed area at this time. The State of Alaska’s special treatment of the area in question is without prejudice to U.S. rights and interests or the future settlement of the boundary.

*  US State Department, Digest of United States Practice in International Law 2004, 734–735. Unfortunately I could not manage to get hold of the Note UNEC0814 of the Embassy of Canada dated 20 August 2004.

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Document 363 Alaska Department of Natural Resources, Proposed Beaufort Sea areawide oil and gas lease sale: [extracts only] (2 April 2009)* The U.S. Department of State has notified the State of Alaska that the tide and submerged land within Tract 001 of the lease sale may be subject to a title dispute with the government of Canada […] Potential bidders on Tract 001 should be prepared for possible delays in determining state title to lands within this tract.

Document 364 Member of Canadian Parliament Larry Bagnell asks the Canadian Government critical questions with regard to US oil leases in the Canadian Beaufort Sea [extracts only] (30 November 2009)** Hon. Larry Bagnell: ‘Mr. Speaker, time and time again, I have raised the fact that the United States is putting out oil leases in the Canadian Beaufort Sea and there is no response from the government. It waxes eloquent about protecting Canadian sovereignty. […] A couple of weeks ago, on November 9, the state of Alaska put out a 437 page document entitled “Beaufort Sea Areawide Oil and Gas Lease Sale”. Once again, in spite of any diplomatic letters we have written in the past or any mild complaints that the Canadians have not really heard about, the Americans keep on putting out leases on Canadian property. We should be sitting down and working out this dispute instead of allowing the Americans to go ahead and threaten our sovereignty in these ways. The next issue that came up was the fisheries. The Americans have decided to put a moratorium on Canadian fisheries in our part of the Beaufort Sea. Once again, what is the response other than a letter? We hear nothing about sitting down and working this out. This area of the Canadian Beaufort is also managed by six Inuit communities in the western Arctic on the terms of the 1984 Inuvialuit final land claim agreement. Not only all Canadians, but specifically and legally the Inuvialuit, have a big interest in this area. We sent a letter on April 27 saying that this was not acceptable and that this was our territory. What was the result from the United States in this well managed disagreement? On August 27, Secretary of Commerce Locke announced that the Americans were going ahead and doing it anyway, once again ignoring Canada’s claims. Finally, one suggested solution was that Canada would also put a moratorium on our side. As opposed to challenging the United States, we would do what we want by passing our own law.

* Alaska Department of Natural Resources, Proposed Beaufort Sea areawide oil and gas lease sale: Preliminary finding of the Director (2 April 2009) 49. This document is available online on the Division of Oil and Gas website, www.dog.dnr.state.ak.us/oil/. **  Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, 40th Parliament, 2nd Session, 2009, Vol 144 (Ottawa, Government Printing Office, 2010) 1920 et seqq.

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Deepak Obhrai (Parliamentary Secretary To The Minister Of Foreign Affairs, Cpc): […] Canada’s sovereignty over its Arctic lands and waters is longstanding, well established and based on historical title. This government will continue to protect our sovereignty. There are three exceptions to this, found on the outer edges of our Arctic: the 1.3 square kilometre Hans Island claimed by Denmark; a 65 square nautical mile maritime boundary dispute with Denmark in the Lincoln Sea; and our dispute with the United States over the maritime boundary in the Beaufort Sea. All three of these disputes are well managed by all involved. The Canada-U.S. dispute in the Beaufort Sea is north of the Yukon and Alaska. To be clear, this is an international maritime boundary dispute between two nations, not subnational governments like the territory of Yukon and the State of Alaska. The disagreement that exists between the United States and Canada regarding the maritime delimitation of part of the Beaufort Sea is well managed and is not a major bilateral irritant. Our position is, and always has been, very clear on this matter. Canada’s consistent and long-held position is that the 141st meridian is the proper boundary between Canada and the U.S. in the Beaufort Sea. This is based on the 1825 Anglo-Russian treaty, which also set the international land boundary that falls between the Yukon and Alaska. Canada and the U.S. have managed the dispute for many years and will continue to do so. Our position is clear. This government continues to reject any measures taken by the U.S. government that would infringe upon Canadian sovereignty. We would like to find a resolution to this dispute but, of course, in the meantime, we will assert our right to enforce Canadian law in our territory. This matter will be resolved when Canada and the United States deem it necessary to resolve. Hon. Larry Bagnell: Mr. Speaker, the parliamentary secretary just said that Canada stands by the border at the 141st meridian. He then went on to say that the dispute is well managed, but the Alaskans have once again put out oil leases on Canada’s side of that 141st meridian. How well managed is that? Canada sent a diplomatic note to the U.S. in April saying that the U.S. could not put a fishing moratorium on our side of the 141st meridian. What happened in August? The American national government went ahead and provided the moratorium on the Canadian side of the Beaufort Sea. How well managed is that? Both the State of Alaska and the United States federal government are challenging Canada, and the Conservative government is not answering that challenge or protecting the Canadian Beaufort Sea. Deepak Obhrai: Mr. Speaker, the hon. member was advised in June that no formal discussions between the governments of the United States and Canada have been held in recent years regarding resolution of the Beaufort Sea maritime boundary. This is because neither Canada nor the U.S. has found it warranted to resolve the issue at this time. The member is right in noting that the United States and Canada have both issued oil and gas exploration licenses and leases in the disputed zone in the Beaufort Sea. The area may have oil and gas potential, but nobody knows for sure. Traditionally, neither country has allowed exploration or development in the area pending resolution of the dispute. Canada and the United States have a strong history of engaging in bilateral and multilateral co-operation in the Arctic, and we look forward to continuing this co-operation.’

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Index The numbers refer to the document numbers which can be found in the top outside corner of each page. 1825 Convention  353, 354, 358, 360, 364 1867 Convention  13, 17, 141, 143, 197–199, 354, 358 Aboriginal people  1–4, 66, 67, 77, 230, 237, 247, 284, 287 community/group/population  2, 284, 347 land 3 participation  3, 67 organisation/institution  1, 77, 237, 238, 284 traditional knowledge  237 person 244 Accumulation ice/snow  175, 178, 179 knowledge 11 pollutants/toxics  5, 219, 220, 226 Acidification  8, 21, 22, 219, 220 Adjacent coast  113, 132, 138, 139, 148, 149, 152–154, 156–161, 163, 166, 168, 170, 171, 225, 236, 268 (see also delimitation) Agenda  21, 45, 50, 53, 55 Agreement on Arctic Cooperation 1988  65, 300–302 Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbird Agriculture  258, 260 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears 1973  8, 219, 228–236, 238 Air space  5, 12, 13, 57 Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act  285 Aleut  2, 21, 40 Aleut International Association  257–260 Aleutian Islands  146, 254, 354 Basin 189 Alpha Ridge  146, 151, 163, 174 Amchitka Island  267, 268 Amerasian Basin  146, 151, 164 Amundsen Basin  151, 163, 174 Anadromous stocks  187, 188, 193–195 Antarctica  5–8, 16, 18, 25, 30, 34, 35, 38, 40, 71, 177–179, 181 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting  178 Anthropogenic impact  12 Appurtenance 173 Arctic Athabaskan Council  3, 257–260 Arctic Council Ad hoc Observer  30, 38–41 Arctic Biodiversity Assessment (ABA)  22, 220, 257–260 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA)  4, 5, 7, 35, 40, 53, 55 Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA)  4, 17, 22, 37, 38, 229 Arctic Ocean Review  4

Conservation for Arctic Flora and Fauna Working Group (CAFF)  1, 6, 257–260 Protection of the Arctic Marine Enviroment Working Group (PAME)  1, 6, 38 Permanent Observers  5, 24, 25, 30, 36–41 Permanent Participants  1, 2, 4, 6, 17, 22, 24, 29, 32, 34, 40, 41, 257–260, 285 Secretariat  2, 22, 30, 38 Task Force  4, 9, 31, 33, 34, 43, 180, 219, 220, 254 Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS)  1, 16, 17, 46–48, 219, 246 Arctic Five  5, 25, 40 Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR)  4 Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation  17, 227 Arctic Regional Hydrographic Commission  4, 29, 31, 181 Arctic Security Forces Roundtable  29 Area, The  131, 149 Arrest (see also crew; detention) of persons  77, 104–106, 188, 196, 216 of ships  104–106, 188, 196, 216, 218, 264, 298 Artificial islands  77, 80, 92, 104–107 Assistance to persons or ships  57, 95, 120, 180, 315 technical  1, 2, 16, 46, 48, 50, 67, 181, 303 Atlanto-Scandian Herring  184, 339 Atmosphere  7, 8, 16, 22, 25, 30, 31, 33, 34, 43, 105, 106, 219, 221 Autonomous underwater vehicles  33 Autonomy  22, 285, 288 Baffin Bay  5, 24, 30, 133, 134, 185, 185, 215, 216, 225, 231, 238, 272, 292, 312 Island  3, 272, 347 Ballast water  3, 178, 179 Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO)  276, 278, 279 Baltic Sea  2, 6–8, 22, 38–40, 43, 52, 53, 63, 64, 183, 186, 219, 223 Banana Hole  24, 127, 131, 132, 137, 155–157, 169–171, 173 Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC)  2, 8, 22, 24, 25, 30, 36–42, 44–48, 50–64 Barents Euro-Arctic Transport Area  38, 50–52, 58, 59 Barents Regional Council  8, 22, 25, 40, 48, 51–53, 55, 56, 58–62 Barents Sea delimitation  7, 25, 39, 59, 120, 121, 146, 150, 151, 172, 173, 322, 326, 328, 329

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Index fisheries  6–8, 29, 36, 38, 119, 193, 203, 204, 206, 214 Grey Zone  119 Loop Hole  7, 159, 169 173, 203, 204, 340 Loophole Agreement  204 natural resources  2, 6–9, 34, 40, 41 prevention of oil spill in  249, 254 shipping in  8, 40 Baselines (see also bays; reefs) archipelagic 73 normal  78, 41, 81–83, 88–90, 92–95, 99, 102, 104–106, 110, 113–116, 120, 123, 129, 131, 137, 140, 141, 144–146, 149–151, 154, 155, 158–161, 163, 166, 169–174, 184, 186–189, 193, 197, 223, 240, 252, 254, 260, 298, 319, 324, 340, 360 straight  76, 86, 99, 105, 133, 151, 264, 297–299, 302 Bays  81, 84, 85, 89, 105 Beaufort Sea  3, 4, 18, 24, 73, 180, 215, 230, 231, 235, 243, 254, 357–364 Belts  77, 81, 85, 89, 105, 159, 163, 183, 186, 223 Bering Sea  99, 115, 144, 146, 189–191, 196, 349 Bering Strait  141, 151, 175, 178, 292, 350–352 Best scientific evidence (see also scientific evidence) 186, 187, 195 Biodiversity  4, 5, 7, 8, 19, 22, 25, 26, 29–34, 36, 37, 39, 41–43, 46, 50–53, 55, 56, 58, 59, 62, 64, 70, 77, 185, 214, 219, 220, 233, 257–260, 349 Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program  4, 17, 257–259 Bioprospecting  7–8, 29 Black carbon  19, 22, 29, 34, 37, 38, 43, 70, 220, 221, 256 Black Sea  22, 46 Bouvet Island  95 Canada Arctic Archipelago  1, 3, 73, 74, 76, 151, 163, 264, 267, 291–295, 298, 299 Arctic Policy  1–4 Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA)  3, 4, 38, 262, 270, 278, 300, 301 baselines  74–77, 215, 262, 272, 298, 299, 302 claims over sovereignty Coast Guard  3, 4, 77, 273, 276–279 continental shelf  77 continental shelf beyond 200 nm  174 cooperation with  65–68, 70, 71 delimitation 133–135 exclusive economic zone  77 internal waters  76, 77, 200, 215, 216, 262, 264, 290, 293–295, 297–299, 303, 303 NORDREG  3, 273–279 territorial sea  77 Canada-Russia Mixed Commission on Cooperation in the Arctic and the North  66 Capelin  122, 184 Carbon footprint  288

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Cargo (ships)  5–8, 11, 24, 30, 31, 47, 105, 175, 178, 179, 216, 225, 254, 258, 262, 273, 318 Cartography  11, 151, 181, 352 Catadromous fish  106, 185 Cetaceans 106 (see also marine mammals) China  5, 6, 8, 9, 22, 24, 25, 27, 30–32, 34, 38, 40, 41, 43, 189, 212, 213 Chukchi Sea  142, 152, 317 Clark, Joe  298, 300 Climate and Clean Air Coalition to Reduce Short-Lived Climate Pollutant  39, 220 Clinton, Hillary  351 Clinton, William J  116 Cold War  1, 2, 7, 16, 17, 24, 288 Collective rights  287, 288 Collisions at sea  104–106, 177, 273 with ice  30 Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS)  3, 4, 5, 7, 22, 24, 25, 36, 38, 40, 131, 137, 146–149, 152–166, 168, 173, 174, 340 Common heritage of mankind  25, 30, 111, 263 (see also mankind) Compensation  5, 57, 79, 104–106, 224, 225, 250, 254, 270, 283 Concession  12, 78, 79, 335, 357 Consensus  1, 4–6, 24, 25, 30, 32, 37, 149, 181, 184, 185, 188, 189, 238, 244, 323 Contaminants  1, 2, 8, 17, 18, 59, 219, 220, 226, 229, 230, 233, 234, 288 Contiguous zone  18, 77, 82, 83, 95, 105, 107, 116, 264, 267, 268, 304, 311, 312 Continental margin  77, 104, 146, 149, 151, 155, 158, 159, 161, 163, 169, 173, 174, 298 Continental slope  77, 104, 145, 146, 149–151, 155, 158, 159, 161, 169, 173 Contingency plan against pollution/in case of emergency  6, 23, 176, 177, 179, 225, 230, 254, 348 Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft (Oslo Convention)  219, 223 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention)  26, 30, 38, 39, 43, 223 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)  5, 22, 26, 29, 30, 38, 41, 48, 223, 257 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo Convention)  38, 39, 45 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution 1979  1, 5, 18, 29, 34, 38, 39, 43, 219, 220 Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (Stockholm Convention)  4, 5, 25, 38, 39, 43, 49, 59, 220 Copenhagen Agreement  6 Corporate Social Responsibility  40, 50, 62 Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBBS)  2, 22, 45, 48, 58, 61, 63, 64

Index Crew arrest of  106 assistance to  6, 105 illegal acts by  196, 216 jurisdiction over  105, 242 training and qualifications of  5, 22, 25, 30, 31, 175, 178, 179 Crime  4, 8, 17, 22, 53–56, 59, 60, 64, 105, 281, 288 Cryosphere  29, 34 Cultural heritage  5, 7, 8, 11, 40, 46, 52, 59, 116, 179, 233, 283, 288, 350–352 Customary international law  5, 16–19, 29, 30, 34, 43, 76, 109, 185, 218, 219, 223, 254, 267, 270, 287 (see international law) Customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary laws  77, 82, 95, 105 Davis Strait  133, 134, 159, 184, 185, 216, 225 Delineation  4, 24, 72, 81, 89, 104, 146, 155, 158, 159, 161, 163, 169, 173, 231, 298, 299, 323, 326 Democracy  36, 39, 345 Denmark Arctic Policy  5 baselines 78–83 contiguous zone  82, 83 continental shelf  78, 79 continental shelf beyond 200nm  5, 148, 151, 152, 155–168, 170 delimination 122–140 exclusive economic zone  80 internal waters  81 territorial sea  81 Denning  228, 230, 231, 236 Depletion of living resources  38, 220, 267 of ozone lawyer  219 Detention of ships  106, 216 (see also arrest) Disaster response  21, 30, 35, 57 Discrimination (see non-discrimination) Dispute settlement (see settlement of disputes) Distress persons in  25, 57, 95, 105, 180, 204, 281 ships in  262, 278 Dolphin 29 Dumping coastal State jurisdiction over  45, 104–106 enforcement with respect to  104 pollution by  45, 104, 106, 223 prohibition of  16, 105–106, 223 use of term  104–106, 223 Ecological balance  22, 55, 247, 262, 263, 267, 295, 298 Ecosystem based management  29, 41, 220, 233 protection of  229, 230 Eirik Ridge  159 Ellesmere Island  24, 135, 151, 163, 345

Emergency call by ships  105 equipment  175, 178, 315 exercise 5 management 39 plan 176 preparedness  1, 2, 5, 7–9, 41, 42, 57, 60, 179, 219, 286 response  4–7, 8, 21, 25, 31, 36, 38, 39, 57, 59, 70, 179 service  5, 7, 53–58, 62, 107, 178 Enforcement (see also coastal States; port States) against foreign ships  5, 77, 104, 265, 267, 271, 278, 279, 334 settlement of disputes concerning  269, 271 of polar bear proection regulations  228, 231–234, 236, 238, 276 of environmental regulations  2–4, 6, 22, 38, 44, 69, 109, 122, 197, 239, 244, 245, 247, 251, 252, 264, 267, 268, 274–276, 278, 279 of fisheries regulations  4, 5, 7, 8, 18, 183–185, 187–1190, 196, 197, 200, 203, 216, 218, 334, 336, 337 of sovereignty  5, 7, 11, 19 Environment (see marine environment) Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)  1, 22, 38, 41, 45, 48 Equidistance  18, 356–360 Equitable sharing  29, 34 Equity  20, 196, 204, 318 Escape measures  175, 178, 179 Eurasian Basin  146, 151, 169, 173 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)  38, 43, 64 European Energy Charter  45 European Environment Agency  36, 37, 39 European Free Trade Association  4, 5, 36–38 European Investment Bank  30, 36, 38, 43, 64 European Maritime Safety Agency  38, 41 European Polar Board  30, 36 European Space Agency  8, 22, 36 European Union EU Arctic Information Centre  22, 38, 40–42 European Commission  5–8, 22, 25, 30, 34, 38–40, 43, 44, 46–60, 64, 217, 289, 331, 333, 334 European Economic and Social Committee  40, 41 Faroe Islands cooperation with  24, 39 delimitation  129–131, 137 fisheries  186, 187, 213 maritime zones  89, 90 prevention of pollution  250 submission to CLCS  155, 156, 158, 159, 161, 163 Feeding grounds  8, 35, 106, 228, 248 Fee for the use of pilot/icebreaker assistance  315 for the use of resources  5, 77, 105, 106, 190, 216, 244, 283

1477

Index for the use of sea routes  31, 36 for visa  8 Finland Arctic Strategy  22, 25, 38, 41 cooperation with  4, 5, 7, 8, 18, 24, 25, 30, 37–41, 43, 45–62, 72, 180, 219 First Nations  3, 287 Fisheries and fishery resources conservation and protection of  77, 184–186, 190, 196, 334 exploitation/utilisation of  8, 36, 193, 201 management of  8, 33 Fjord  6, 8, 173, 242, 283, 318 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)  40, 185, 205 Food chain  1, 5, 219 Force majeure  95, 105 Forestry  1, 18, 22, 25, 38, 41, 52, 53, 59 Fram Strait  173 Framework Agreement and Protocol on a Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Programme in the Russian Federation 50–54 France  7, 24, 28, 30, 34, 38, 40, 41, 45–48, 50–52, 169, 221, 223, 253 Franz Joseph Land  34 Freedom of navigation (see navigation) Gakkel Ridge  151, 163, 169, 173 Galileo satellite system  8, 36, 38–43 Galway Statement  42, 43 Gardiner formula  151, 155, 159, 163, 169 Gender equality  24, 53, 55, 56, 58, 61, 62 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea  326, 357, 360 Geodetic datum/line  86, 88, 94, 97, 115, 118, 120, 124–126, 130, 131, 137, 140–142, 150, 151, 155, 159, 161, 163, 215, 320 Geographical coordinates  12, 74, 77, 104–106, 118, 120, 141, 151, 159, 161, 163, 173, 215, 315, 317 (see also charts; geodetic datum) Germany  7, 22, 24, 25, 30, 34, 38, 40, 41, 45–48, 50–52, 183, 219, 221, 246, 253, 279, 298 Glaciers  3, 5, 8, 18, 20, 22, 24, 25, 29, 31, 39, 219–221 Global warming  5, 7, 22, 25, 26, 30, 33–35, 40, 43, 60, 219, 220, 231 Good faith  185, 239, 267, 288, 354, 360 Greenland baselines  85, 86 continental shelf beyond 200nm  159–168 cooperation with delimitation  7, 122–140 exclusive economic zone  40, 87, 88 fisheries  24, 41, 183–185, 187 internal waters  85 territorial sea  81, 85, 86 Greenland Sea  7, 24, 162, 169 Greenhouse gas  4, 5, 8, 20, 24–26, 29, 30, 32, 39, 40, 43, 60, 70, 221, 231, 234, 285 Gwich’in Council International  257–260 Grey Zone Agreement  119

1478

Habitat of fish  3, 5, 106 of migratory birds  1, 4, 5, 247, 248 of polar bears  1, 4, 8, 35, 228–231, 233–238 of porcupine caribou  4, 16, 244, 246 of whales  29, 242 protection of  22, 26, 34, 46, 51, 77, 104, 206, 219, 220, 223, 257, 260, 288, 318 Hans Island  3, 5, 344–346, 364 Harper, Stephen  2–4, 68 Harvest management  230, 231 Harvesting  5, 7, 8, 37, 60, 104, 106, 185, 195, 196, 210, 244 Hazardous substances  7, 25, 53, 348 Hazard to human health  105, 225 Heavy metals  5, 36, 43, 219, 220, 261 Hedberg formula  151, 155, 159, 161, 163, 169 Highly migratory species  106, 109, 110, 185, 186 (see also migratory species) Historic title  75, 76 Hoyvik Free Trade Agreement  24 Hydrographic survey  77, 105, 146, 179, 181, 314 Hudson Bay  273 Human rights  1, 5, 7, 22, 24, 25, 36, 38, 39, 43, 283, 287, 288 Human Rights Council  5, 38 Hunting  25, 34, 38, 84, 92, 93, 221 caribous 244 industry 5 of marine mammals  5, 25, 35, 36, 105, 106, 228–236, 238, 239, 242, 243, 281, 288, 289 of birds  22, 247, 248 traditions  5, 221, 283, 285 Hydrocarbon deposit  118, 120, 123, 127, 128 Ice-covered areas  33, 175, 274, 276, 278, 279 Icebreaker assistance of  10, 12, 179, 264, 276, 278, 294, 297, 298, 314, 315 fee for usage  314–316 manufacture of  5, 12, 17, 22, 36, 38, 248, 299 research with  3–5, 25, 27, 31, 34, 36, 65, 151, 163, 174, 296, 300–302, 305, 207–312 technical requirements  175, 178, 179, 298 use of term  262, 175, 178, 179 Iceland Arctic Policy  22–24 cooperation with  3–5, 8, 13, 22, 25, 36–41, 43, 63, 64, 69 delimitation  88, 122–132, 136–139, 155–159, 169–171, 173 stand on Svalbard  339 Igaliku Agreement  5 Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing  5, 7, 8, 185, 205 Ilulissat Declaration  5, 6, 25, 29, 35, 38, 121, 135, 211, 285 Immigration  53, 54, 64, 77, 82, 95, 104–106 Imprisonment  79, 216 (see also arrest; detention) Incineration  220, 223 India  8, 9, 28, 30, 40, 41, 43, 318

Index Indigenous people autonomous area  11, 24, 30, 39, 45, 48, 50, 57, 223, 236, 250 Industry exploration  5, 36, 41, 104 fishing  5, 9, 12, 22, 41, 109, 120, 144, 192, 193, 214 forest 22 mining  3, 22, 25, 26, 41 petroleum/oil  5, 7, 8, 22, 55, 231, 298 seal-hunting 5 shipping  5, 6, 8, 9, 12, 22, 29, 41, 278, 279 tourism  3, 5, 8, 9, 22, 41, 58 Information exchange  5, 8, 36, 229, 235, 254 Informed consent  29, 36, 285, 287 Infrastructure  3–5, 7–9, 19, 21, 22, 25, 29, 46, 47, 220, 221, 288 for rescue operations  6, 8, 18, 22, 29, 36, 61 for research  7, 8, 31, 34, 36–39, 41, 43 for shipping  4, 5, 7, 18, 33, 39, 69, 104, 106, 175 for transportation  7, 11, 12, 19, 22, 25, 36, 40, 41, 45, 46, 48, 50, 52, 55, 56, 58, 61, 20, 233 Innocent passage  36–42, 95, 105, 114, 264, 268, 274–276, 304, 309, 311–313 Inspection of ships  5, 6, 77, 105, 106, 184, 185, 188–190, 196, 223, 262, 319 (see also boarding of ships) Insurance  5, 18, 12, 18, 34, 57, 104, 107, 220, 227, 262, 264, 314, 315 Intellectual property  226, 284 Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission  149 Intergovernmental Consultative Committee (US-Russian Federation)  205 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)  8, 17, 25, 26, 233 Internal waters (general)  180, 184, 196, 223, 249, 254 Interim measures to prevent IUU fishing  9, 208–210, 212 International Arctic Science Committee (IASC)  1, 24, 25, 27, 30, 33, 45, 219 International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO)  277, 279 International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities  278 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)  1, 47, 50, 219 International Barents Secretariat  56, 58, 62 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)  6, 43, 180 International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships Ballast Water and Sediments  3, 5, 43, 179 International Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Ships (MARPOL Convention)  6, 29, 30, 33, 34, 175, 178, 179, 219, 251, 253 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS Convention)  29, 33, 34, 175, 177–179, 279 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue 180

International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW Convention)  33, 175, 178, 179 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage Convention on Early Notification of A Nuclear Accident and Convention on Assistance in the Case of A Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency  219 International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES)  6–8, 182, 186, 187, 209–211, 222 International Court of Justice (ICJ)  120, 124, 127, 183, 223, 225, 268, 269, 271, 298, 299, 339 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 285 International Energy Agency (IEA)  34 International Hydrographic Organization (IHO)  5, 181 International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention (ISM Code)  175, 176, 178 International Maritime Organization (IMO)  3–5, 7, 8, 18, 19, 22, 25, 27, 29, 30, 33, 39, 109, 177–179, 219, 274, 315 Polar Code  4–6, 8, 9, 22, 25–27, 29, 33, 38–43, 61, 179 Marine Environment Protection Committee  6, 38, 175, 177, 178 Maritime Safety Committee  175, 177, 178, 276, 279 International Northern Sea Route Programme (INSROP)  46, 48, 51 International Pacific Halibut Commission  190 International Polar Foundation  40 International Polar Year  3, 4, 8, 17, 34, 35, 37, 39, 56, 58, 346 International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREG)  175, 178, 179, 183 International Seabed Authority  5, 22, 25 International strait  10, 24, 114, 266, 267, 275, 277, 293, 299 International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN)  22, 233, 234, 246 International Whaling Commission  5, 29, 36, 184, 232, 242 Inuit  3, 4, 39, 40, 76, 219, 238, 285, 287, 295, 298, 299, 345, 364 Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Arctic Sovereignty 285 Inuit Circumpolar Council  2–4, 257–260, 285 Inuit Land Claims Agreement  3 Inuvialuit and Inupiat Beluga Commission  243 Irminger Sea  137–139, 159 Islands (see also artificial islands) and baselines  72, 73, 76, 84, 99, 102, 130, 133, 263, 264, 297, 298, 320 disputes with regard to  3–5, 12, 340, 344–347, 364 jurisdiction over  11, 27, 73, 74, 96, 98, 169, 198, 215, 262, 263, 267, 272, 295, 2989, 362, 318, 321, 353, 359

1479

Index Isobath  145, 146, 149, 151, 173 Italy  8, 24, 30, 34, 37, 38, 40, 41, 47, 48, 51–53, 221, 253, 318, 323 Jan Mayen  7, 13, 24, 88, 92, 95–97, 119, 122–128, 131, 155, 158, 169, 173, 175, 178, 201 Japan  5, 24, 28, 33, 38, 41, 46, 54, 72 Jurisdiction civil  105, 281 criminal 105 Kara Sea  12, 40, 173, 206, 254, 305, 306, 315, 316 Strait  314, 316 Kola Peninsula  7, 8, 10, 323 Kyoto Protocol  1, 7, 33, 39, 53–55 Labrador Sea  159, 225 Lake  77, 84, 106, 219, 220, 224, 272, 288 Lancaster Sound  3, 4, 291, 292 Land claim agreement  3 Language rights  38 Lapland  22, 25, 34, 38, 40–42, 45, 50, 57 Lapps 281 Lapp Codicil 1751  25, 281 Laptev Sea  40, 151, 254, 307, 315, 316 Liability for damage to the environment  5, 22, 30, 41, 105, 175, 178, 254, 262, 264, 266, 314, 315 for exploration  106 License for exploitation  5, 107 for exploration  5, 364 for fishing vessels  190, 202, 216 for harvesting  104, 244 for pilotage  262, 314 Lincoln Sea  73, 135, 163, 215 Linguistic equality  282 Living resources (see also conservation and management of living resources; exclusive economic zone; high seas; pollution) access to  36 development of  8, 33, 77 disputes concerning  269 exploitation of  5, 6, 77, 104–106, 109, 112, 122, 184–186, 196, 332 harvesting of  5, 37, 104, 192 management  7, 120, 121, 184–186, 193–195, 200, 201, 203, 222, 314 Lofoten  7–9, 25, 38, 169, 173 Lofoten Basin  169, 173 Logging  38, 55, 283, 317 Lomonosov Ridge  24, 146, 149, 151, 163, 174 Low-tide elevation  77 Low-water line  74, 77, 95, 97, 105, 133, 151 (see also baseline) Low-water mark  85 Machinery  175, 178, 179, 262, 315 Makarov Basin  146, 151 Mandatory ship reporting  275–277, 279

1480

Mankind (see common heritage of mankind) Manning regulations  33, 84, 105, 179, 262 Mapping of maritime areas  4, 8, 19, 123, 146, 133, 175, 178, 219 of resources  8, 9 of seabed  3, 4, 8, 9, 25, 38, 39, 41, 68, 146 Marine areas beyond national jurisdiction  26, 29, 36, 43, 264 Marine protected areas  4, 7, 26, 29, 36–39, 43, 77 Maritime casualty  105, 106, 240 Marine environment damage to  38, 249, 348 threat to  6, 8, 250, 253 harmful effects on  104, 105, 122, 179 introduction of alien or new species to  5, 30, 43, 179 monitoring of  5, 7, 8, 25 pollution of  106, 251, 269 protection and preservation of  1, 3–6, 10, 16, 18, 22, 30, 33, 38, 43, 50, 64, 77, 80, 104, 105, 109, 110, 120, 219, 220, 223, 225, 250, 252, 253, 267, 270, 274–279 settlement of disputes over  269 Marine life  2, 106, 178, 206, 208, 219, 220, 223, 225 Marine mammals  4, 5, 7, 35, 36, 77, 106,109, 110, 179, 206, 219, 222, 235, 349 Marine scientific research agreement on  4, 34, 65, 300, 301 artificial islands for  104 coastal State consent to  301, 302 criteria/guidelines for  77 promotion of  204, 226 jurisdiction with regard to  77, 80, 104–106, 109 use of term  104–106 Master of a ship  106, 262 McClure Strait  291 Median line  80, 81, 89, 91, 92, 95, 133, 134, 136, 140, 173, 325, 328, 355, 356 Mendeleev Ridge  149, 151, 163 Mercury  4, 5, 18, 19, 25, 29, 39, 43, 61, 219, 220, 261 Metis  1,3, 244, 287 Migration of people  5, 8, 11, 12, 25, 70 of species  8, 104, 106, 179, 206, 228, 245, 248 routes  5, 22, 25, 187, 260 Migratory species  5, 29, 258, 260 Military (see also warships) activity  1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 10–12, 18, 22, 24, 33, 47, 109, 264, 323, 326 aircraft  19, 57, 104, 106, 250 and environment  2, 12, 17, 22, 227 conflict  6, 10, 13, 16, 22, 25, 45 devices  12, 45, 105 exercise  5, 7, 10, 17, 29, 54, 55, 283 vessels  19, 57, 104, 106, 274, 292, 303, 310 Minamata Convention on Mercury  5, 7, 43, 261

Index Mineral resources  5, 8, 9, 11, 12, 19, 24, 26, 30, 33, 34, 39, 60, 104–107, 109, 112, 130, 133, 151, 159, 161, 163 Mining  1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 12, 22, 25, 26, 29, 34, 38–40, 45, 67, 109, 219, 231, 288, 318, 324, 326, 335 Mohns Ridge  161, 173 Monaco Declaration  38 Mother tongue  282 Mouths  105, 173, 236, 254 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization  5, 29 Nansen Basin  151, 169, 173, 340 Nares Strait  30, 88, 133, 215, 222, 225 National jurisdiction over  36, 185, 236 beyond the limits of  26, 29, 36, 37, 39, 43, 109, 185, 266, 267 Native users  244 Natural resources (see also living resources; mineral resources; non-living resources) existence of  3, 4, 9, 17, 24, 38, 40, 43, 55, 60, 124, 267, 352 exploration and exploitation of  5–9, 12, 22, 23–36, 37, 38, 57, 78–80, 91, 92, 104–106, 108, 109, 122, 129, 133, 220, 262, 283, 348–252, 357 jurisdiction over  1, 4, 108, 109 management of  2, 6–8, 11, 12, 18, 34, 55, 288 protection of  7, 18, 19, 104 sovereign rights of States to exploit  4, 8, 18, 19, 38, 77, 80, 104, 106, 109, 110, 133, 140, 141, 143, 155, 161, 163, 169, 184–186, 193–196, 200, 203, 205, 359, 361, 362 sustainable use of  7–9, 12, 18, 21, 22, 24, 34, 37–41, 45, 50, 58, 59, 61, 72, 219, 222 Naval auxiliary  254 Navigation aids to  18, 77, 177, 179, 277, 278 straits used for international  18, 274, 275, 276, 299, 302, 304, 311, 312 due regard to  106, 252, 253, 274, 275, 278, 279 freedom of  4,18, 19, 30, 33, 36, 37, 39, 41, 42, 106, 109, 264, 267, 274, 276, 279, 326, 360 hazards to  33, 106, 251, 278 safety of  5, 12, 33, 43, 104, 105, 175, 178, 179, 181, 270, 274–279, 313, 315 Nenets  8, 11, 45, 48, 50, 51, 54, 57 Nodules 109 Noise of human activities  36, 219, 224 of ships  18, 230 Norwegian-Soviet Fisheries Commission  119 Non-discrimination access to resources  323, 333, 334, 340 foreign ships  36, 105, 183, 185 people  60, 62, 64, 283, 288 pollution laws and regulations  5, 251, 274, 276, 278, 279 Non-governmental organization  2, 16, 50, 62, 64, 67, 185, 232, 233, 237, 284

Non-living resources  5, 12, 36, 77, 79, 104–106, 109, 112 (see also mineral resources) Non-renewable resources  1, 38 Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM)  5, 22, 35, 43, 46–48, 52, 53, 55, 56–58, 62, 64, 282 Nordic Declaration of Solidarity  25 Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO)  22 Nordic Environment Finance Corporation (NEFCO)  55, 61, 62 Nordic Investment Bank (NIB)  38, 64 Nordic-Baltic Wetlands Initiative  259 North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)  3, 14, 17 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)  1 North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO)  5, 6, 222 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)  2 North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC)  7, 30, 36, 38, 40 North Pacific  22, 115, 143 fisheries in  188, 190, 196, 206, 209, 210, 354 North Pacific Fishery Management Council  206 North Pacific Marine Science Organization  209, 210 North Pole  5, 6, 8, 10, 22, 34–37, 40, 41, 77, 98, 146, 149, 164, 180, 342 Northeast Passage  5, 9, 25, 30 (see Canada) Northern Dimension  2, 7, 8, 22, 24, 25, 30, 35–44, 49–56, 58–64 Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership  22, 30, 36, 39–41, 55, 56, 58, 59, 62–64 Northern Dimension Partnership on Transportation and Logistic  41 Northern Forum  51 Northern Sea Route  105, 230, 303–307 Northwest Passage  2–5, 17–19, 24, 25, 29, 30, 35, 36, 40, 230, 264, 267, 274, 275, 290–302 Northwest Territories  1–4, 32, 77, 244, 245, 247 Norway Arctic Policy  7–9 Coast Guard  7, 8 Cooperation with  1–3, 5, 7–9, 13, 22, 24, 32, 38–41, 45–64 contigouos zone  95 continental shelf  91 continental shelf beyond 200nm  169–173 delimitation  24, 25, 30, 38, 88, 146, 50, 117–132, 140, 151, 155, 157, 161–163, 165 exclusive economic zone  92, 93 fisheries  183, 184, 186, 187, 192, 193, 201, 203, 204, 207–214 internal waters  95 stand on Svalbard  7, 13, 318–320, 333, 334 territorial sea  94, 95 Norwegian Sea  7, 8, 30, 161–163, 165, 173, 193, 203, 214 Novaya Zemlya  10, 169, 173, 306–308, 314 Nuclear power plant  7, 12, 47, 48, 50, 219 Nunavut  1–4, 72, 213, 231, 232, 238, 262, 285, 345

1481

Index Obama, Barack  19, 20 Off-shore exploration  3, 40, 43, 356 Oil (see also petroleum) discharge of  6, 25, 32, 178, 179, 219, 224, 249, 254, 315, 348 pollution  6, 8, 9, 16, 19, 22, 30, 42, 43, 46, 106, 175, 178, 179, 219, 220, 249, 250, 254, 255, 264, 266, 267 spill  4–9, 12, 16, 19, 21, 22, 34, 38, 40, 41, 61, 62, 107, 219, 249, 254, 264, 268 Opposite or adjacent coasts  132, 138, 139, 148, 149, 152–154, 156–161, 163, 166, 168, 170, 171 (see delimitation) Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)  2, 49, 51, 52 Outer continental shelf (see continental shelf beyond 200 nm) Overflight  2, 77, 219, 298 over exclusive economic zones  92, 106, 109, 110 over high seas  109, 116 over straits  18, 19 Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control 6 Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA)  6 Passage (see innocent passage; transit passage) Peace and security  39, 48, 285 Peaceful purposes use of Arctic for  30 Permafrost  1, 3, 5, 8, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25, 30, 31 34, 36, 39, 40, 43, 220, 221 Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ)  345 Persistent organic pollutants  1, 4, 5, 18, 25, 39, 43, 59, 61, 220 Petroleum exploration  123, 323 extraction  5–9, 128, 169, 254, 255, 323 industry  5, 9, 12, 33, 50, 159, 298 resources  3, 4, 7, 8, 25, 104 Pilotage  81, 262, 314, 315 Pipelines (see cables and pipelines) Plateau  151, 163, 169, 173 Platform for observation  34 for policy and cooperation  7–9, 24, 30, 32, 41, 51, 55, 56, 58 for research  5, 7, 18, 25, 33, 37 Poaching  232, 233, 248 Podvodnik Basin  146, 151 Poland  24, 30, 38, 40, 41, 46–48, 50, 51, 53, 186, 189, 219, 221 Polar Bear Specialist Group  229, 232, 233 Polar Code (see IMO) Pollock  184, 189, 191 Polluter pays principle  223, 254 Pollution (see also dumping; marine environment; noxious substances; oil; waste) atmospheric 39 1482

from artificial islands  106 from exploration activities  7, 41, 45, 47, 255 from ships  6, 7, 29, 34, 41, 106, 175, 178, 315 in ice covered area  175, 178, 251–253, 274–276, 278, 279, 315 land-based sources of  223 Porcupine Caribou  1, 16, 244–246 Porcupine Caribou Management Board  244 Port State Control 5–7 enforcement action by  185 use of term  175, 185 Precautionary principle  5, 29, 36, 223 Prosecution  6, 77, 104–106, 183–185, 190, 216, 218, 262, 263, 274, 275, 278, 281, 282, 288 Property  12, 15, 20, 57, 68, 79, 92, 96, 120, 224, 235, 244, 248, 262, 281, 283, 287, 288, 315, 318, 326, 354 Protection and preservation of the marine environment (see marine environment) Quotas of catch  120, 202 (see also living resources) Radioactivity  2, 5, 7, 8, 12, 16, 17, 22, 36, 40, 45, 48, 50–52, 54, 60–62, 104, 106, 219, 223, 226, 227 Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance  5, 259 Reagan, Ronald  15, 109, 110, 114 Redress 288 Reefs  6, 84, 105 Regional economic integration organisation  223 Regional or subregional fisheries management organizations  185, 206, 209, 210, 212, 213 Reindeer husbandry  7, 8, 22, 25, 45, 283 Renewable resources  1, 8, 22, 25 Resources (see living resources; mineral resources; natural resources; non-living resources) Resilience  21, 25, 26, 29, 34, 43, 44, 70, 220, 221, 230 Rhumb line  86, 175, 178, 183 Ridges  151, 155, 169 oceanic  77, 146, 149, 158 submarine  149, 158, 173 Roadstead  81, 84, 85, 89, 105 Rocks  84, 106, 149, 151, 159, 163, 318 Routeing systems  7, 8, 178, 277–279 Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North 257–260 Russian Federation baselines  99, 102 claims over sovereignty  11, 12 Coast Guard  7, 11, 12 continental shelf  104, 107 continental shelf beyond 200nm  245–154 delimitation  13, 18, 21, 39, 117–121, 141–144, 163, 164, 167, 169, 172, 173, 353–364 exclusive economic zone  100, 101, 103, 106 fisheries  184, 188, 189, 191–196, 199, 202, 204, 207–214 internal waters  102, 104–106

Index territorial sea  105, 107 stand on Svalbard  321, 324, 330, 332, 335, 337, 342, 343 cooperation with  1, 16, 17, 21, 22, 26, 36, 38, 40, 45–64, 66–69 contiguous zone  105, 107 Saami  7, 8, 22, 32, 36, 38–41, 45, 283 Nordic Saami Convention  38, 283 Saami Council  34, 219, 257–260 Saami Parliament  7, 8, 22, 38, 283 Safety at sea  5–8, 43 Safety zones  77, 79, 104 Salvage  6, 105, 179, 249 Sanctions  184, 185, 186, 342, 343 Scientific evidence  2, 12, 29, 34, 38, 186, 187, 195, 212, 252, 274 Scientific research (see  marine scientific research) Sea lanes  5, 19, 29, 32, 33, 104, 105, 313, 323 Seals  4, 16, 35, 36, 219, 239–241, 289 Sealing  4, 39, 239–241 Sector theory  13, 151, 164, 322, 323, 347, 357, 360 Sedentary species  77, 104, 106, 184–186, 216 Self-determination  283, 285, 288 Settlement of disputes  36, 43, 57, 104–106, 180, 185, 186, 223, 254 Severnaya Zemlya  169, 306–309, 317 Sewage  179, 223, 314 Ships anchorage of  277 assistance to  314, 315 design, construction and manning of  125, 178, 179, 262 discharge from  105, 106, 300, 301 dumping from  219, 223 immunity of  105, 223, 279 nationality of  242 Polar Class  175, 178, 179, 298–301 registry of  77, 104, 106, 183, 188, 189, 216, 223 for research  33, 105, 316 seizure of  196 Short-lived climate pollutants  22, 43, 61 Singapore  9, 32, 38, 40, 41, 43, 279 Slope (see continental slope) Spain  38, 41, 173, 253, 340, 341 Spawning  8, 119, 106, 194, 195 South Korea  5, 6, 31, 40, 43 Sounds  6, 81, 85, 89 Sovereign rights  4, 8, 11, 12, 18, 24, 27, 29, 30, 34, 41, 77, 115, 120, 127, 180, 181, 225, 249, 254, 267, 305, 323 (see also coastal States; exclusive economic zones; natural resources) USSR/Soviet Union (see Russian Federation) Spitsbergen (see Svalbard) Strait of Malacca  6, 32 Strömstad Treaty  25 Submarine cables and pipelines  92, 104–106, 110, 116

Submarine elevation  151, 173 (see banks; plateaus; rises) Submarine ridges (see ridges) Submarines  2, 8, 10, 48, 105, 146, 298 Subregional fisheries management organizations (see regional or subregional fisheries management organizations) Subsidiarity pinciple  64, 231 Subsistence  16, 18, 21, 29, 34, 36, 39, 44, 49, 106, 206, 210, 221, 229–231, 233, 234, 236, 243, 244, 246, 247, 281, 285, 288, 289, 351, 352 Substances discharge of  6, 32, 104–106, 179, 219, 223–225, 249, 254, 300, 301, 315 harmful  1, 104–106, 175, 179, 219, 225, 250, 314 noxious  5, 32, 105, 175, 179 psychotropic 105 toxic  5, 220 Suez Canal  5, 6, 8, 29, 33, 39 Superjacent waters  79, 91, 104, 109, 110 Surveillance  3–5, 7–9, 12, 17, 22, 24, 25, 36–40, 43, 50, 106, 220, 298 of fisheries  185, 189, 205, 210 Sustainable development  1–9, 12, 16–19, 22, 25–27, 29–34, 37–56, 58–60, 62, 64, 77, 220, 221, 233, 283, 346, 350 Sustaining Arctic Observing Networks  4, 25, 38, 40 Svalbard  5–9, 11–13, 22, 24, 25, 27, 30, 31, 34, 38–40, 43, 88, 95, 140, 151, 155, 161–163, 165, 169, 172, 173, 201, 203, 214, 231, 318–343 Fisheries Protection Zone  6–8, 24, 140, 201, 203, 319, 330, 333, 336, 337, 339 Sverdrup Islands  347 Sweden as Arctic State  2–5, 18, 22–26, 30, 34–41, 43, 180, 219, 257–261 as member of the BEAC  45–62 environmental protection  220, 221, 224, 250, 254 fisheries  183, 187 indigenous people  281–283 polar research  71 Telecommunications  2, 8, 11, 12, 43–47, 64, 262, 288 Temperature increasing  1, 5, 7, 8, 18, 20, 25, 26, 29, 35, 36, 38, 40, 41, 43, 206, 220, 221, 230, 233 low  5, 8, 12, 31, 175, 178, 179, 219, 220 Terrorism  11, 18, 346 Technical assistance  1, 2, 116, 46, 48, 50, 67, 181, 288 Territorial integrity  105, 288 Thickness formula  151, 158, 159, 169 Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea  111, 122, 184, 187, 225 Traditional knowledge  8, 17, 20–22, 25, 39, 59, 60, 70, 219, 236–23, 283 Traffic separation scheme  8, 19, 105, 313 Trafficking in drugs  4, 53, 64 in people  4, 53–56, 64 in fish  188 1483

Index Transparency  5, 7, 20, 22, 25, 39, 40, 51, 52, 55, 56, 63, 64, 220 Transit passage  18, 114, 275, 276, 302 Trapping  1, 84, 347 Tree line  24, 26, 29 Total allowable catch (TAC)  92, 106, 120, 122, 190, 193–196 Tourism as risk for the environment  5, 8, 11, 12, 25, 30, 34, 36, 39, 62, 229–231, 234 development of  2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 12, 18, 22, 25, 36, 38, 40, 45, 46, 50, 60, 66, 352 ecotourism  2, 4, 8, 12, 22, 24, 39, 43, 50, 53, 55, 62 industry  3, 5, 7, 9, 22, 24, 25, 58 sustainable  5, 25, 30, 36, 39, 44, 55, 59 Tundra  3, 10, 22, 220, 285 United Kingdom  3, 24, 25, 29, 46–48, 50–52, 129, 183, 186, 223, 242, 247, 253, 353 United Nations Charter  27, 105, 182, 183, 186, 188, 223, 228, 285 Unilateral action  24, 218, 264, 266, 279 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea  3–6, 8, 18, 19, 24–26, 29, 30, 33, 34, 37, 38, 42, 43, 73, 111–113, 118, 120, 121, 131, 132, 137–139, 144, 146, 148–156, 159–165, 167–171, 173, 174, 180, 181, 185, 186, 189, 191, 202, 203, 205, 209, 210, 216–219, 222, 226, 251–254, 276, 278, 285, 298, 313, 334, 345 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stock (Fish Stocks Agreement)  6, 24, 29, 206, 209, 211 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP)  4, 5, 25, 38, 285, 287, 288 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 25 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN EEC)  1, 43, 48, 219 United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)  3, 8, 25, 53 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)  5, 8, 22, 25, 34, 37, 39, 40, 220, 261 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)  1, 3, 4, 5, 18, 24, 25, 27, 34, 37, 38, 40, 43, 58, 220 United Nations General Assembly  23, 38, 111, 173, 321, 345 United States of America Arctic Policy  13–21 Coast Guard  16, 21, 293–298, 300–302, 305–312 cooperation with  1–4, 6, 13, 16, 19, 21, 24, 26, 30, 37–40, 42, 43, 45–54, 65, 174 continental shelf  108, 113 continental shelf beyond 200nm  3, 5, 18, 19, 149, 153, 163, 168 contigouos zone  116 delimitation  4, 13, 18, 141–144, 353–364,

1484

exclusive economic zone  109–112, 115 fisheries  18, 183, 184, 187–191, 196–200, 205, 213, 218 internal waters  114, 200 territorial sea  224 stand on Svalbard  322, 323 University of the Arctic  4 US Geological Survey  6, 39 US Russian Polar Bear Commission  231, 236 USCGC Eastwind  309–312 USCGC Edisto  307–312 USCGC Healy  302 USCGC Polar Sea  293–297 USCGC Polar Star  300, 301 USS Seadragon  290–292 Varangerfjord  117, 118, 120 Vessel Traffic Services (VTS)  6, 194, 288–294 Vessel-source pollution (see pollution) Vilkitsky Strait  105, 308, 311, 312 Visa agreement  7, 8, 55 procedures  7, 8, 46, 56, 59, 61, 64 Volpe-Jamieson Agreement  295, 296 Voyage planning  177, 179 Wandel Shelf  163 Warsaw Treaty Organization  10 Warship  104–106, 175, 178, 254, 311, 313, 326 Waste management of  1, 4, 11, 12, 39, 43, 48, 50, 62, 179, 220, 235 disposal of  1, 16, 22, 25, 30, 104–106, 179, 185, 223, 262 radioactive/nuclear  2, 6, 40, 45–52, 54, 55, 219, 223, 226 water  6, 12, 22, 30, 39, 105 Weather conditions  8, 22, 25, 29, 34, 38, 68, 163, 175, 178 global impact  5, 6, 29, 30, 33, 40, 43, 221 monitoring  5, 8, 13, 19, 22, 43 “weather kitchen”  10 Welfare of the Arctic people  7, 8, 22, 36, 41, 46, 50, 51, 56, 64, 76, 249, 262, 283, 288, 298, 299, 318, 346, 348 of coastal communities  195, 195 Wetlands  43, 62, 258, 259, 288 Whaling  5, 29, 184, 232, 235, 242, 243 moratorium on commercial whaling  29 White Sea  102, 254 Wildlife management  11, 231, 238, 246 World Geodetic System (WGS 84)  88, 118, 120, 124–126, 130, 131, 134, 136, 140, 141, 150, 151 World Meteorological Organization (WMO)  22, 34, 37, 106, 175, 178, World Trade Organization (WTO)  5, 22, 38, 39, 41, 289 Yukon  1–4, 21, 77, 244, 245, 247, 346, 364