The Andover Liberals: A Study in American Theology 9780231891882

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The Andover Liberals

The Andover Liberals A STUDY IN AMERICAN THEOLOGY

DANIEL DAY WILLIAMS Assistant Professor of Christian Theology Seminary Chicago Theological

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^Uu? KING S CROWN PRESS MORNINGSIDE HEIGHTS

»941

• NEW YORK

Copyright 1941 by DANIEL DAY W I L L I A M S PRINTED IN T H E UNITED STATES OF A M E R I C A Z6-VT. 4 0 0 - 4 1

Kings Crown Press is a division of Columbia University Press organized for the purpose of making certain scholarly material available at minimum cost. Toward that end, the publishers have adopted every reasonable economy except such as would interfere with a legible format. The work is presented substantially as submitted by the author, without the usual editorial attention of Columbia University Press.

TO

MY FATHER AMD TO THE MEMORY

MY MOTHER

OF

PREFACE In these tragic ig4o's Protestant theology finds itself asking, "What happened to Christian thought in the nineteenth century?" Christian liberals of that time thought they had found the true Gospel. Many tell us now that the Gospel was really lost. In this book I have tried to add something to our knowledge of Christian thought in America in the last century by presenting the thought of the faculty at Andover Seminary in Andover, Massachusetts. During the years 1880 to 1895 these men were developing a Christian theology related to the insights of the historic faith but also aware of the new facts and perspectives which the modern world had secured. At first they called their thought "progressive orthodoxy." Later they moved far enough from orthodoxy so that they might be characterized as "evangelical liberals." Superficial generalizations about liberal theology are all too common. I have therefore tried to set forth in some detail the varied and complex elements which went into the Andover theology, to indicate the factors underlying these developments in Christian thought, and in a final chapter to summarize some of the issues with which the rise and decline of liberalism have left us today. For the opportunity to undertake this research I am deeply grateful to the faculty of the Chicago Theological Seminary which granted a two year fellowship. T h e good friends of the First Congregational Church of Colorado Springs allowed me extra time away from ministerial duties in order to complete the writing, and I am happy to express my appreciation for their generosity. T o Professor Herbert W. Schneider of Columbia University I am especially indebted for his patient criticism, insight, and encouragement throughout the book's preparation. I wish to acknowledge gratefully also the general and detailed criticism given to the research by Professor Eugene W. Lyman of Union Theological Seminary, and the helpfulness on numerous points of the following: Professor W. W. Rockwell of Union, and Professors Horace L. Friess, William Haller, John Herman Randall, and R. L. Rusk of Columbia University. T h e

viii

Preface

indispensable library of Union Seminary was made available to me, and I had also the cooperation of Miss Evah Ostrander of the Chicago Theological Seminary library. Without the constant encouragement of my wife and her typing of the manuscript the book could not have been completed. For the work's shortcomings the responsibility is entirely my own. I wish gratefully to acknowledge the generous permission of the following publishers to quote from the works indicated: Houghton Mifflin Co.: Progressive Orthodoxy by the editors of the Andover Review, What is Reality by F. H. Johnson, My Generation and The Making and Unmaking of the Preacher by William J. Tucker, Robert A. Woods by Eleanor H. Woods; Charles Scribner's Sons: The Evidence of Christian Experience by Lewis F. Stearns, Austin Phelps by Elizabeth S. Phelps; D. Appleton-Century Co.: Evolution, its Nature, its Evidences, and its Relation to Religious Thought by Joseph LeConte; and the Trustees of Andover Newton Theological School, History of Andover Theological Seminary by Henry K. Rowe. DANIEL D .

Chicago July, 1941

WILLIAMS

CONTENTS Preface

vii

î . From Calvinism to Liberalism at Andover I. The Founding II. III.

i

of Andover

The Faith of Calvinisi

2

Orthodoxy

7

A New World in the Making

IV. New Theology

14

in Andover

16

V. The Slavery Issue

22

VI. A New Faculty in the New World

26

2. Evolutionary Philosophies

31

I. Personalism

32

vs. Mechanism

II. God and Evolution

38

3. Ethics and Evolution

47

4. Evangelical Liberalism at Andover

64

5. Evolution and Historical Criticism

84

I. The Christian II. Historical III.

Consciousness

Criticism and the Doctrine

The New Christology

85 of Christ

93 103

6. T h e T h e o l o g y of the Kingdom of G o d

114

7. Social Criticism and Social Action

134

Contents I. Andover Social Criticism—Early Period

134

II. Andover Social Criticism—Late Period

139

III. Andover House 8. A Critical Summary I. The Roots of Liberal Theology II. Man and Salvation

149 155 155 160

III. Progress and the Kingdom of God

165

IV. Christian Knowledge

170

Notes and References

177

Bibliography

193

Index

1 FROM

CALVINISM

TO LIBERALISM

AT

ANDOVER

established in New England was born out of the cultural and spiritual conflicts which reached their high point of intensity at the close of the eighteenth century and during the early decades of the nineteenth. Andover Seminary, founded by Massachusetts Calvinists in 1808, was a major battleground in the warfare of old and new faiths which developed on a prosperous industrial seacoast allied to a frontier, agricultural hinterland. T h e spirit, materials, and methods of an increasingly urbanized society made themselves felt both as enemies to be fought and as elements to be absorbed by Christian theology. Andover's story exemplified the passage from New England Calvinism to the perspectives of liberal American Christianity. T H E FIRST THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL

For almost seventy-five years, until 1881, Andover stood against the main current and defended the Calvinist tradition, though from the very beginning internal tensions weakened this stronghold of orthodoxy. T h e last great representative of the New England theology, Edward A. Park, was an Andover professor. When he retired in 1881 Andover became the champion of an evangelical religious liberalism. T h e new liberal faculty established the Andover Review in 1884, and made it a leading journal in the movement for theological reconstruction. It is in the pages of the Andover Review that we may trace the movement of Andover's thought. T h e prelude to the drama of the later Andover is the passing of the New England theology. T h a t story has been thoroughly told and need not be repeated in detail here. 1 But we must look briefly at the history of the Seminary from its founding in order to understand this transformation of a conservative, Calvinistic institution into a militant apostle of " T h e New Theology," in order to note the major cultural and intellectual forces which set the problems theology faced in the late nineteenth century, and in order to understand the heritage which liberalism received from orthodoxy. Andover liberals worked with new concepts and methods in developing their view of Christian doctrine; but they had to reckon every step of the way with doctrines, concepts, and ideals which the older tradition had maintained. How much of a break with the past this liberalism really represents, we shall attempt to discover.

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I. THE FOUNDING OF AN DOVER

T h e founders of Andover did everything humanly possible to guarantee that it should stand for what was, from their view-point, orthodox Christianity. Their thought is therefore an excellent example of New England Calvinism in the early years of the nineteenth century. From the close of the Revolutionary war orthodox New England Calvinism, found mainly in the Congregational and Presbyterian churches, had been aware of serious opposition arising against it both from without and within the churches. T h e influx of French thought during the revolutionary period had given impetus to rationalistic and atheistic criticisms of religion. Timothy Dwight was sufficiently alarmed at the amount of free thought in Yale College which he found on becoming President in 1795 that he preached a series of sermons outlining and defending Christian doctrine. 2 Within the churches new movements reflected the growth of a liberal and humanitarian spirit. Arminianism with its emphasis upon man's freedom had taken root in America early in the eighteenth century. Jonathan Edwards' great sermons on Justification by Faith, which he preached in 1734, were directed against it. Edwards recalled New England churches and preachers to a High Calvinism. But he had only checked the new spirit for a time. Neither he nor his followers could turn it back permanently. By 1780 Universalism had arisen as a distinct movement holding to belief in the ultimate salvation of all men.3 Unitarianism did not become very definitely separated from Trinitarian Congregationalism until about 1815, but it had been growing steadily for a century. As early as 1718 Samuel Mather felt it necessary to preach a sermon on The Necessity of Believing the Doctrine of the Trinity. King's Chapel in Boston became unitarian in 1785. Harvard called Henry Ware, suspected of unitarian sympathies, to the chair of theology in 1805. Orthodoxy was aware of the threats to its power. In 1807 the Rev. Leonard Woods, Congregational minister at Newbury, Massachusetts, wrote to the Rev. Samuel Spring: It is a day of alarm and danger. There is a flood of anti-Christian error and soul-destroying corruption coming in upon us, and threatening to sweep away every remnant of primitive truth and goodness. Faithful Christians are few in number. 4

The Andover

Liberals

3

When Harvard went over to the Unitarians in 1805, the orthodox were greatly alarmed and believed that they must undertake the most vigorous defense of Calvinism. Defenders of the traditional faith were all the weaker to resist these new movements because of the congregational system of church government in which every church is practically a law unto itself. There was no hierarchy to enforce uniformity of faith or to wage an effective campaign against opponents. Leonard Woods deplored this situation in a survey of the churches which he published in 1806. He found increasing indifference to theological opinion among the ministers and a general neglect and "abuse" of catechetical instruction. He regretted the "moral disorders" found in the churches, partly at least because they furnished an effective argument for the "infidels." His conclusion was a practical one. He proposed a General Association to bring the churches into closer harmony and to remedy the evils he had pointed out. The move toward such an association had already been started in 1802. The need for it became more apparent every year.6 The democratic movement was hostile to the church establishment in Massachusetts. New England orthodoxy and political Federalism were closely allied in spirit and in fact. With the growth of towns and cities Jeffersonian democracy began to make itself felt as a political influence in Federalist territory. The new political spirit encouraged a new theological development. Among the laboring classes it was the Methodist and Baptist sects which made progress, not Congregationalism. William Bentley, a Congregational minister of the period, comments on the town of Beverley: "the majority of the population are in the humblest grades of information. The Baptist minister expects a harvest."8 In the ten years from 1800 to 1810 the Methodist church in New England increased at the rate of a hundred members a month. The Baptists organized 124 churches from 1800 to 1813. At this time when the most vigorous defense of the faith was needed the orthodox found themselves weakened by divisions within their own ranks. The Hopkinsian party was growing almost into the proportions of a new sect.7 Hopkinsianism took its name from Samuel Hopkins whose system of doctrine was published in 1793. Its upholders called it variously High Calvinism and Consistent Calvinism. The Hopkinsians were carrying on Edwards' attempt to give a satisfactory philosophical orientation to Christian doctrine. They shared Edwards' emphasis upon the absolute sovereignty of God, and upon man's moral responsibility for his sin.

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They held the catechism doctrine of "imputed sin" to be unintelligible, and developed in its place the conception of Adam as the "federal head" or representative of the race, thereby hoping to safeguard the emphasis on individual responsibility for sin. Hopkinsians were revivalists, and disliked the laxity in the admission of children as church members which had been a practice of many Old Calvinist churches. A t the time of the founding of Andover, Nathaniel Emmons was the leader of this group. Some of his doctrines aroused the opposition of catechism adherents, particularly his theory that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good, and his theory of the will, based upon a Humian psychology, which disposed of the notion of a general nature underlying man's acts, and held that all sin consists in specific choices.8 A positive cleavage developed in the early years of the century between Hopkinsians and Old Calvinists. Each group had its own missionary organization and published its own magazine. Both parties were aware of the precarious position of any sort of Calvinism in this time, and both began in 1806 the serious consideration of the establishment of theological seminaries which would be means of perpetuating the particular theological views they desired to maintain. In the beginning the two proposals for seminaries were entirely independent. T h e Old Calvinist group was centered at Andover and the Hopkinsians planned their institution in Newburyport. T h e Andover group consisted of Eliphalet Pearson, former Professor in Harvard College, who had left that institution in protest at the appointment of Henry Ware; Rev. Jedidiah Morse, and Samuel Farrar, Esq. Funds for the proposed institution were forthcoming from descendents of John Phillips, founder of Phillips Academy in Andover, and from Samuel Abbott, an Andover business man who had planned to give his money to Harvard but refused to endow a Unitarian institution. In Newburyport the Rev. Samuel Spring, ardent Hopkinsian and follower of Emmons, had found three business men who were willing to endow a Calvinistic seminary. These were Moses Brown, John Norris, and William Bartlet, the last a former shoemaker who had acquired a large fortune "through the smiles of Divine Providence upon his bold but well-guarded plans" as Woods says.9 Leonard Woods was well acquainted with both parties. Through him the Andover group proposed the union of the two projects in one seminary to be established on the foundation of Phillips Academy in Andover. They saw the possibilities of an institution with this doubled

The Andover

Liberals

5

endowment and they feared the consequences of the division in the ranks if the already dangerous separation continued. Said Woods, " I shudder at the thought of the dreadful warfare which must ensue." 10 But the Rev. Samuel Spring raised strong objections. He believed that "Every Christian is at heart a Hopkinsian or a consistent Calvinist;" that "theologians ought to be Hopkinsians in their brains, if they have any;" and that "the transfer of sin, the sin of Adam, and the transfer of Christ's righteousness are scholastic nonsense and jargon." 1 1 He opposed the union, partly because the Andover sponsors were not Hopkinsians, and partly because the Trustees of the proposed institution would be the trustees of Phillips Academy. Many of these gentlemen, particularly those residing in Boston, were either outright Unitarians or very mild Calvinists. Dr. Emmons lent his support to Spring in opposing the Union. A t a certain point the negotiations had apparently broken down completely and the Andover group established their own seminary, with the Westminster Shorter Catechism as its doctrinal basis, on September 2, 1807.12 Woods however did not cease his efforts for union and finally persuaded the Newburyport donors to join the union. Spring was forced to fall in line. Brown, Norris, and Bartlet thus became founders of professorships in the new school. Spring insisted that everything possible be done to guard these "Associate professorships" from theological "error." Woods and Spring drew up a creed which was made the doctrinal standard for all professors. While this creed did not include all the distinctive Hopkinsian tenets it did modify in important respects the language of the catechism, particularly with regard to the ever troublesome doctrines of imputation and moral ability. On these two points the creed reads: I believe . . . that A D A M , the federal head and representative of the human race, was placed in a state of probation, and that, in consequence of his disobedience, all his descendents were constituted sinners; that by nature every man is personally depraved, destitute of holiness, unlike and opposed to GOD; and that, previously to the renewing agency of the DIVINE SPIRIT, all his moral actions are adverse to the character and glory of COD; that being morally incapable of recovering the image of his C R E A T O R , which was lost in A D A M , every man is justly exposed to eternal damnation. I moreover believe that COD, according to the counsel of his own will, and for his own glory hath foreordained whatsoever comes to

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pass, and that all beings, actions, and events, both in the natural and moral world, are under his providential direction; that GOD'S decrees perfectly consist with human liberty; GOD'S universal agency with the agency of man; and man's dependence with his accountability; that he has understanding and corporeal strength to do all that GOD requires of him; so that nothing but the sinner's aversion to holiness prevents his salvation. T h e creed dealt with other major doctrines with similar fullness in its almost one thousand words and the professor was required to swear his opposition "not only to Atheists and Infidels, but to Jews, Papists, Mahometans, Arians, Pelagians, Antinomians, Arminians, Socinians, Sabellians, Unitarians, and Universalists." 13 A l l the Seminary professors were required to subscribe to this creed in public once every five years. Professors on the original foundation also had to subscribe to the catechism at similar periods. T h e question of whether the associate professors were obliged to subscribe to the catechism became a debated one in the history of the seminary. From 1812 to 1826 they did not include the catechism in their public oath. From 1826 to 1842 they were required to subscribe to it. In that year the requirement was removed. T h e associate founders established a Board of Visitors with powers to approve or reject the appointment of any professor and "to take care, that the duties of every Professor on this Foundation be intelligibly and faithfully discharged, and to admonish or remove him, either for misbehavior, heterodoxy, incapacity, or neglect of the duties of his office."14 T h i s board also had general supervisory duties. T h e board was self-perpetuating, a fact which became important in the subsequent history. T o make the Hopkinsian position even more secure Spring induced William Bartlet to found an extra professorship so that the Old Calvinists would not have any superiority in numbers. As a matter of fact the faculty as a whole had Hopkinsian leanings in the first years. As a last precaution the project was regarded as a seven year experiment at the end of which time the associates were to be free to withdraw if they so desired.1® T h e first faculty had three members: Dr. Pearson, Professor of Natural Theology; Leonard Woods, Abbott Professor of Theology; and Dr. Griffin, an outstanding pulpit orator, Professor of Sacred Rhetoric. With the critical division in the ranks of the orthodox apparently overcome, and with a substantially endowed institution for the train-

The Andover Liberals

7

ing of ministers, the founders of the Seminary had high hopes for the triumph of orthodoxy in New England when the new Seminary opened on September 28, 1808. Not all New England Christians were pleased with the new institution. Some of the Old Calvinists thought it too Hopkinsian. Some of the Hopkinsians, including Dr. Emmons, thought it not Hopkinsian enough. 18 And the Unitarians called it "an institution which would have disgraced the bigotry of the Middle Ages." 1 7 T h e Seminary was founded as a means of defense against attacks upon Calvinism which were becoming more and more successful. Parties within the orthodox ranks put aside some of their theological differences in order to combat the more serious apostasy and infidelity. Conservatism and dogmatic Calvinism were written into the very structure of the new institution; for its founders believed they were defending the truth of God against evil and error. They prepared for a long and desperate campaign. II. T H E F A I T H O F C A L V I N I S T O R T H O D O X Y

T o these Calvinists the essential fact underlying all doctrine and all religious practice was man's status as a moral being who either has a primary affection for God or who does not have it, and whose eternal blessedness or damnation is to be determined by his primary choice. T h e religious enterprise consisted therefore in proclaiming to sinful men this fact of their moral status, and doing what could be done to prepare the way for the work of regeneration which God can perform upon the human heart. T h e ultimate standard for judging every doctrine and every practice of Christianity was thus first, Will it help or hinder the salvation of men? and second, Will it help or hinder the increase and prosperity of the church upon whose work most men are dependent for salvation? Changing men from the state of sin to the state of holiness was the basic problem and there were definite notions of what that change involved. Mr. John Norris, one of the associate founders of the seminary, describes in his own experience the sinful state of man: I have often thought of the words of the dejected Psalmist, and have hoped that I could say with Job, " T h o u g h he slay me, yet will I trust in Him!" But oh! this native depravity! the corruption of nature; the indwelling sin! the hard heart! I sometimes can hardly help concluding that it is impossible that there can be the least spark of

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grace in such a heart as mine. Vet I am brought back to confess, that at some particular times I cannot but think I have had some gracious affections. The warfare described at length in Romans vii, and a reflex act of faith, are exercises that afford a hope that God will not take his Holy Spirit from me, and leave me to hardness of heart and blindness of mind. I want holy love! O what don't I want of spiritual blessings.18 T h e change of life from this state of sin to that of holiness is described thus somewhat rhetorically by Austin Phelps of Andover: Conversion is the change from sin to holiness. It is a change from absolute sin to the first dawn of holiness in the soul. It is that unique change which has no parallel and no adequate similitude, in which an intelligent mind, a free mind, a self-acting mind, a mind which has intelligently, freely, of its own will, abandoned God, is led for the first time in its moral history by almighty grace to return and give itself to God. For the first time, then, a sinner appreciates God. For the first time he loves God. For the first time he chooses God. For the first time he enjoys God. For the first time he is born of God. For the first time his life is hid with Christ in God. God, God, GOD is the one being to whom his soul mounts up and in whom he enters into rest. He may be flooded with joy unspeakable, because he is engulphed in the blessedness of God. 19 This change of man's heart was regarded as a supernatural work. The doctrine of election stated literally that God's choice of those to be redeemed was wholly in His own hands, and that the chosen would be saved through His own power alone. But in practice this doctrine did not mean that the work of the preacher and the church was irrelevant. In fact the technique of revivals was worked out with great care. Professor Porter of Andover in his letters on revivals noted for example that the divine choice most often falls upon those who are the children of religious parents, that about two-thirds of the converts in a certain revival are women, and new converts are usually found to be in early or middle life. 20 Converted sinners were the pious, the true Christians. Churches had varying regulations as to whether or not conversion was necessary before one could be admitted to church membership. T h e Seminary Creed specified that only those of godly sincerity could be admitted to the communion.21 Porter's Letters on Revivals stress the importance of

The Andover

Liberals

9

waiting for some time after the revival in order to make sure that the hopeful were really converted before admitting them to church membership. He ascribed the apostasy of church members in the eighteenth century to the fact that many as yet unconverted were admitted to membership. 22 Although the change of heart in man was believed to be an instantaneous and unobservable event in itself, it was held to have definite observable consequences in life. T h e Seminary Creed declared that "perseverance in holiness is the only method of making our calling and election sure." 2 3 Porter quotes the concluding remarks made by a revival preacher to the new converts: Hence my desire narration (the new of boasting, but of to be proved from not. 24

is, that all whom I have alluded to in the above converts) will remember that this is not an hour putting on the harness; and that it still remains their fruits whether they have true religion or

"Putting on the harness" meant living the Christian life of practical morality and piety as that was conceived at the time. T h e two major requirements were participation in religious activities, and the personal virtues of temperate living and brotherly love. Porter lists the following positive effects of one revival: the desire for improvement in religious knowledge; the reading of the Bible and other religious books instead of indulging in frivolous amusement and idle converation; increase in the religious observance of the sabbath; observance of the duties of family religion; harmony among Christians as to doctrine, among ministers as to the manner of conducting revivals; diminished acrimony in political strife; removal of contentions involving families and communities; and humility on the part of the ministers. 26 Andover Seminary emphasized the two movements which were associated with this central emphasis on conversion, revivalism and missions. Andover men took part in the great revival seasons of 1837 and 1857, and the many lesser movements in between. 20 For the first ten years all the missionaries sent out by the American Board except one were Andover men. In 38 years one hundred missionaries went out. Andover men brought about the organization of the American Home Missionary society in 1826, and constituted the Iowa Band in 1843 which was an important factor in the westward expansion of congregationalism.

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T h i s religion was concerned primarily with individual souls. Each person finds or loses his eternal salvation independently of the course of what was called "secular history." W . G. T . Shedd, professor at Andover at about the middle of the century, made this thoroughgoing separation of sacred and secular: There are, therefore, two kingdoms, two courses of development, two histories, in the universal history of man on the globe. There is the account of the natural and spontaneous development of human nature as left to itself, guided only by the dictates of finite reason and impelled by the determination of the free, but fallen, human will, and the impulses of human passion. And there is the history of that supernatural and gracious development of human nature which had been begun and carried forward by means of a revelation from the Divine Mind made effectual by the direct efficiency of the Divine S p i r i t . . . . T h e original single stream of history was parted in the Garden of Eden, and became into two heads, which have flowed on, each in its own channel, and will continue to do so forever more. For although the church is to encroach upon the world in the future to an extent far surpassing anything that appears in the present and the past, we know, from the very best authority, that sin is to be an eternal fact in the universe of God, and as such must have its own awful and isolated development; its own awful and isolated history.27 Shedd admits that there is a certain divine influence in secular history, particularly in restraining the wrath of man. But he holds that "the condition and history of the race remain the same." It is not until a communication is established between the mind of man and the mind of God; it is not until the Creator comes down by miracle and by revelation, by incarnation and by the Holy Ghost, that a new order of ages and a new species of history begins.-8 Shedd's statement was extreme. T h e early Andover men were more truly Calvinist and more ready to acknowledge the work of God and the importance of the church in the secular world. One factor involved was the strong patriotic sentiment of New Englanders. Feelings of pride in America, of the responsibility of the citizen, which ran so deep, were not likely to remain entirely separated from the religious outlook and they did not remain separate. President Porter preached two sermons in 1831 in which he plead for the recognition that the government

The Andover Liberals of God extends over the affairs of all men, and that therefore good government is a Christian concern. 29 He ascribed the triumph of the colonies in the Revolutionary War, not to wise statesmen or patriotism or endurance or bravery, but to the fact that devout men "invoked the God of heaven to guide her (the new nation's) counsels."80 Porter develops the theory that the state depends upon the church to sustain the necessary character in the citizens. He declares that the perpetuation of American institutions depends upon "the extent to which vital and experimental religion shall prevail among its inhabitants through the influence of the Holy Spirit." 31 The sabbath alone does more to prevent crime and promote the public good than the best possible code of laws.32 It is not the function of the church, however, according to Porter, to pass upon political issues except when these involve a specific religious institution such as the sabbath. The Andover pulpit and lecture room were kept largely free of political discussion until slavery became an unavoidable issue. Clinging to the general structure of orthodoxy but engaged in a militant warfare with attacks upon it, Andover men sought convincing arguments in reason and revelation for the faith. The Bible was the final court of appeal. Doctrines of God, of man, and of man's redemption, which they supported from scriptural texts, expressed their convictions about human need and destiny. But these special doctrines were only one factor in the basic evangelical enterprise, and they had a practical function to perform in that enterprise. Porter's Letters on Revivals show this clearly by giving careful instructions as to the use of various doctrines in accomplishing the conversion of the sinner. He urges the most careful handling of the doctrine of the Divine Sovereignty so that neither too much nor too little emphasis is placed on relying on God: T h e special blessing of God usually attends only that kind of preaching which exhibits in due connection the accountability of sinners, and their dependence on divine grace. This is a grand characteristic of revival preaching, that it bears down upon the conscience of the sinner, with the solemn claims of the gospel to "work out his own salvation with fear and trembling," while it shows him that it is "God who worketh in him to will and to do, of his good pleasure." The preaching that does neither of these or that does one and not the other, is radically wanting in pungency and power. 38

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T h i s emphasis on the practical use of doctrines was not restricted to the homiletical department. Woods, professor of theology, closes nearly every section of his published theological lectures with paragraphs on the practical use of the doctrine under discussion. 34 He believed that perversions of character in Christians were due to the fact the individual had been deprived of the good effects of some doctrine. For example, the doctrine of the divine purpose is true, but if one thinks about nothing else the effect may be bad. 35 Even the doctrine of election was given practical justification. Woods admitted that it had "a gloomy and painful bearing on the non-elect." 36 But he quotes a brother minister who had declared that A plain scriptural statement of the doctrine of election at the commencement of a revival of religion, had more effect in making known to sinners the evil of their own hearts and convincing them of sin, than any other truth which he had ever preached. 37 Porter points out that without the doctrine of election no one would have any hope of being saved. Since the evangelical enterprise was more important to these men than the particular scheme of doctrine itself, they were little bothered by logical difficulties in their theological position. Reason was not abandoned. Whenever a rational argument could be found for doctrinal support it would be used. T h e doctrine as a whole had a logical structure depending upon its basic premises. But Woods specifically states that Biblical doctrines are absolutely and divinely true no matter how much they may conflict with human reason. 39 T h e Professor of Systematic Theology held that "we must have a religion which abounds in mysteries." 40 Wood's attitude toward reason appears in his controversy with Nathaniel Taylor over the doctrine of divine sovereignty which Taylor, according to Woods, denied. Woods said that if Christians began to think that Christian truth "must be invested with the costume of philosophy" there would result inevitable injury to "that precious cause which it is our first duty to promote." 41 T h e cause must be preserved. Therefore the faithful can ignore basic intellectual difficulties in religious belief. Woods pleads: It is a fact that the greatest difficulties, and those which human reason is least able to obviate, exist in regard to doctrines which are of the greatest value, and which are supported by the most satisfactory evidence. I might instance in the eternal, uncaused, existence of God,

The Andover

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13

the scriptural doctrine of the Trinity, the Atonement, and the endless punishment of the impenitent. Now if you should adopt the principle that this or that doctrine is not to be believed because it is attended with unsolvable difficulties, what would be the consequence? Evidently that you would reject from your creed the most certain and the most important truths, and in the end be plunged into downright skepticism.42 The usual defense against atheism was not the convincing power of arguments for the existence of God, but the charge that atheism was the result of pride, false philosophy, the practice of vice and impiety, and abandonment by the Holy Spirit.43 The founders of Andover did everything possible to prevent heresy from creeping into the institution. The long creed which has been described was proposed by them as something to remain eternally unalterable. Every article of it should remain "entirely and identically the same."44 The doctrines might be mysterious, but they had to be believed. The founders made careful provision for guarding the students from error. They placed the study of scripture and ecclesiastical history in the third year, after the study of scripture and theology, because they feared that if the students became aware of the historical diversity of Christian opinion before learning the true (Westminster) doctrine, they might become disturbed.45 Students were publicly examined once a year by Trustees, Visitors, and Faculty.46 No student could preach a sermon before his class which had not previously been read and approved by a professor.47 Students were not compelled to subscribe to the creed; but they were required to be pious. Anticipating the first class, Woods hoped that its members would be "serious, thoroughly and firmly orthodox, well-informed and zealous, but prudent and inoffensive."48 One of the first to apply for admission was a young man of talent and scholarly ability named Adoniram Judson. He was admitted only on probation because of his manifest "want of piety." After a time he became convicted of sin and was regularly enrolled.49 The social life of the seminary reinforced the unity and strength of the orthodox religion. The seminary had its own chapel and cemetery. Professors discussed the religious life and belief in Wednesday evening conferences. Yearly fast days were intended to increase the level of pious devotion. Doctrine was outlined in the classroom. As one student said, it was "hammered in . . . hammered down tight and the nail clinched on the other side."80 Even the free time of the students was spent in

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such grim and useful pursuits as building coffins and wheelbarrows in the seminary workshop. Andover professors defended the faith in many well-known controversies. Woods tilted with the Unitarians in 1820, with Nathaniel W . Taylor in 1830, and Mahan of Oberlin in 1841 in the perfectionist controversy. Moses Stuart carried on the debate with the Unitarians in his Letters to Charming (1819) and with the Universalists in Exegetical Essays on Several Words Relating to Future Punishment (1830). Details of these controversies need not be repeated here. 51 It is sufficient to note that Andover men defended the faith against all opponents in the early years. With a strong institution and a "stereotyped" 52 theology the seminary appeared to be that ideal "sacred West Point" for which Moses Stuart hoped when he saw the rising tide of unbelief. 53 Andover supporters in those early years would have been justified in supposing that whatever else took place in American Christianity this school would remain forever devoted to orthodox Calvinism. Yet as early as 1818 a melancholy note sounded in President Porter's address at the dedication of the new chapel. He actually contemplated the possibility that the Andover pulpit and lecture rooms might some day be occupied by men who "deny the Lord that brought them." 64 T h a t he should entertain such an idea in public reveals the underlying uncertainty about Calvinism's capacity to endure. A new world in which this religion could not live was in the making. III. A N E W W O R L D IN T H E M A K I N G

A new material, political, and intellectual culture was growing in New England in the 19th century. Cities were rising, and modern urban culture with its comforts, its free exchange of ideas was becoming the new setting of life. Significantly, Boston had been the center of Unitarianism from the beginning. T h e factories of Lawrence which a student described from a seminary window in 1856 were symbols of the new world. Andover men were not unaware of the effect of the new life on the religion they upheld. In the same address in 1818 in which Porter contemplated the future heresy he put his finger upon the underlying significance of the cultural changes: And just in proportion as our commerce, with her thousand streams, pours in abundance upon us; in proportion as our cities increase in wealth and population, our manufacturing establishments

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in capital, and our canal companies in number and enterprise;—the multitude of careless men will break loose from the restraints of conscience, and the fear of God; and our depravity will be accelerated with the progress of our prosperity.55 Thirty-five years later Andover men were confirming this prediction. Professor Stowe's inaugural in 1852 deplored the increasing preoccupation of Christians with the merely useful. He saw this symbolized in the replacement of the crosses on church steeples with weather-cocks. "The cross is of no particular use for our every day worldly business, and a weather-cock is very convenient for showing the changes and direction of the wind." 50 Professor Phelps believed that commercial prosperity imperiled the church with a "mental and moral effeminacy." 57 Andover could not remain wholly isolated from the changes in thought which the new world was producing. Stuart declared to Channing that it was an age in which "the march of mind was conspicuous."58 New thought from Europe was making its way into New England. German idealism, mediated through Coleridge, interpreted by Emerson and Hedge, offered the philosophical background for the new outlook. Radical Biblical criticism from the Hegelian schools struck at the foundation of the Old Theology. Emerson's Harvard Divinity School address, which offended even the older Unitarians, came in 1838. Now Unitarians had their own heretics to deal with, a fact which gave Andover grim satisfaction.59 Transcendentalism, that blend of romanticism, humanism, and idealism, epitomized the new spirit.80 Samuel Harris, who stood in the line of the New England theologians, but who was sensitive to the wide range of religious thought both in America and in Europe, saw in 1856 that the old religion would have to adjust itself in a new world. His defense of Christianity, published in the Bibliotheca Sacra in that year is an excellent summary of the trends in the general mentality. His thesis is that the attacks on Christianity by infidels are dim reaches after truth, and that Christianity really can satisfy the intellectual cravings of the age. What were these cravings? First, for the recognition of an established law, order, or cause of nature in all things; second, for a religion which will fit man for this world; third, for a religion which would "secure the true progress and healthy development of society;" fourth, for a religion which would satisfy the aesthetic emotions.61 Here in Harris' paper was the whole of the modern religious mind in the process of capturing Christianity. From the standpoint of the actual development of the liberal mind here

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summarized in 1856, the publication of the Origin of the Species three years later appears but an incident. Andover, of course, was far behind Professor Harris in 1856. But the new spirit could not be permanently shut out. T h e spirit of democracy grew in New England during this period. One of its direct effects upon orthodoxy was the disestablishment of the church in Massachusetts. As early as 1807 Congregationalists were afraid that the legislature would not incorporate a Trinitarian institution. 82 By 1811 the establishment was practically ended; and by 1833 it was completely abolished. Court decisions in the intervening years had turned over many churches to Unitarians. Trinitarians had lost 96 churches. After 1833 each party kept the churches which it then controlled. 63 Attempts to strengthen the Trinitarian churches by more strict consociational control of ministers continued with Woods leading in this movement. Emmons' followers, however, successfully opposed the movement away from the traditional independence of each church. 64 T h e political, social, and theological prestige of New England Calvinism had been greatly weakened by the middle of the century. Now it had to depend upon the sheer force of the truth of its doctrine and the vitality of its religious experience in a world which did not believe its doctrine and which was not interested in its religious experience. Inevitably it was engulfed by the forces which it opposed. T h e passing of the faith which Andover was founded to perpetuate can be traced in the History of Andover itself. IV. N E W T H E O L O G Y IN A N D O V E R

In the very act of founding a theological seminary with opportunities for wide acquaintance with theological literature the founders of Andover sowed the seeds of revolt from orthodoxy. They did not believe in burning or refusing to read heretical books. They were forced to answer them in an open fight, and thus their libraries and their minds were made receptive to new ideas. By bringing together professors of different temperaments and experience they invited conflicts within the ranks. Some of those conflicts were openly acknowledged before the seminary was founded. Disputes and problems arose in the first year. Woods sighed regretfully over the constant back-sliding and the reading of light literature among the students. 65 Dr. Pearson, formerly of Harvard, found the seminary uncongenial. He particularly disliked and openly opposed the

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Wednesday Evening conferences and resigned his professorship after one year.66 Woods was at least a moderate Hopkinsian and in 1819 he made some thoroughgoing criticisms of the catechism doctrine of imputation in his debate with Henry Ware. 67 He later removed the offending paragraph from his collected works, and expressed his amazement that the Trustees had not challenged his orthodoxy. 68 James Murdock, Professor of Ecclesiastical History from 1821 to 1828, was dismissed through action of the Visitors. One of the charges against him was that he had asserted his right to disagree with other professors on subjects which fell in their departments.69 Serious difficulties centered around Moses Stuart, Professor of Sacred Literature, "the father of biblical learning in America." 70 Stuart was thoroughly acquainted with the advanced biblical criticism of Germany. He did not fear this rationalism and pointed to the open-mindedness of the seminary founders in filling the book shelves with the works of atheist and rationalist critics. He had serious doubts of the validity of the doctrine of plenary inspiration and expressed his doubts freely in the classroom. Not until the end of his life did he express a definite conviction of divine inspiration for the entire Bible. 71 Stuart used the works of critics like Rosenmiiller and DeWette freely in his class teaching. Onlookers felt grave concern for the effect these writings might have on the students. In 1825 the Trustees appointed an investigating committee to see what could be done. T h e committee reported that the unrestrained cultivation of German studies has evidently tended to chill the ardor of piety, to impair belief in the fundamentals of revealed religion, and even to induce, for the time, an approach to universal skepticism. They admitted that the German scholars had contributed much to knowledge of the Bible. But, they asked, had they "brought forth any truth essential to salvation, or powerfully conducive to holiness?" They did not ask that the works be no longer studied. But they strongly urged the professors to point out to the students those books which should be approached with "a degree of cautious interest." Professors should frequently remind the students of the "reverence, meekness, simplicity, and implicit submission which should attend all their inquiries at the Divine Oracle." 72 Here the basic religious enterprise was in conflict with a merely rational progress in knowledge. The founders had no doubt about which was the more important.

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T h e conflict with scientific cosmologies began also at Andover with Professor Stuart. Lyell's Principles of Geology, published in 1830, was a major threat of the new science against the Biblical account of creation. Stuart published in 1836 an analysis of the problem. Attempts had already been made to harmonize the Biblical account with the geological record by holding that Mosaic days meant ages. But Stuart was too honest and learned a scholar to accept this solution. He declared that the language of the Scripture should be interpreted in terms of the text itself. T h e days of Genesis mean literally days, and nothing else. Stuart turned with deep scorn upon the geologists: Here then are the myriads of ages in which weeds 80 feet in length, lizards longer than the anaconda, mastodons, iguanadons and crocodiles larger than whales—monstra ingentia, horrenda, I might add (if it did not spoil the poetry) quibus lumina adempta flourished and pampered in all their inglorious sloth. A night of twelve hours for all this! T h e Bible gives no more! 73 Stuart did not rest his case with the appeal to Biblical authority. He made an extended analysis of geological theories and pointed out many contradictions. Even Stuart drew one argument from practical necessity. He points out that the authority of the Sabbath derives from the Biblical account of creation, and charges that the geologists are calling in question the precepts and sanctions of religion. Yet there are hints that he realized the necessity for modifying the doctrine of inspiration. He says that the Bible teaches primarily religious truth, not metaphysics. In his later History and Defense of the Old Testament Canon Stuart held that many of the Bible's claims were only temporary in nature and that it had only "relative" perfection. 74 T h e inaugural address of Stuart's successor, Calvin E. Stowe, in 1852 reveals Andover's concern over the attacks of Strauss and the Tübingen school of Baur. Stowe denounced the impiety of these ultra-rationalists, declared that their philogical criticisms were well-nigh worthless and that they carried their own refutation with them. But he devoted the larger part of his address to answering them just the same. 75 Stuart shared Woods's disagreement with the catechism doctrine of imputation. In 1836 he published an inquiry into the scriptural basis of the doctrine and concluded that it had none. 76 Three years later Professors Stuart and Emerson made a strenuous protest against subscribing to the catechism. They contended that Associate Foundation professors were bound only to the creed. 77

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Stuart's controversy with Channing over the doctrine of the Trinity shows him struggling to defend orthodoxy by the use of a theory of language definitely anticipating Horace Bushnell. Stuart said frankly that Trinitarians did not undertake to describe affirmatively the distinctions in the Godhead. "The proceeding from the Father," "the Logos becoming flesh" is all merely the language of approximation toward a complete description. Language from its very nature must be inadequate to such description.... It may nevertheless express enough to excite our highest interest and to command our best obedience." 78 Here again "exciting interest" and "commanding obedience" is the main function of doctrine. Stuart was sympathetic toward the theology of Nathaniel W. Taylor, and thus Andover took another step in its capitulation to liberalism.79 Taylor's system did not break radically from the general framework of orthodoxy, but it had certain definite tendencies toward a more liberal moralism. Taylor attacked the extreme Calvinist doctrine of total depravity, held that man can be held morally accountable only for those acts which he is truly free to perform, and solved the problem of evil in a way objectionable to believers in the Divine Providence by holding that God permits sin because it is impossible for Him not to permit it.80 Taylorism influenced not only Stuart, but Edwards A. Park, Professor of Theology in Andover from 1847 to 1881, and Austin Phelps. In Park the conflict of old and new theologies is revealed. Park had graduated at Andover, studied under Taylor at New Haven and under Kahnis in Germany. His thought is basically High Calvinism with some attempt to modify doctrine in the face of the temper of the age which demanded a softening of some of its harsher features. The German rationalism with which Park came in contact had remarkably little effect upon his thinking. 81 He tried desperately to harmonize the doctrine of the Divine Omnipotence with the facts of sin and evil, and thus keep the central emphasis of the New England theology upon the power and the glory of God. He was a noted and powerful revival preacher, and spoke of the New England theology as a system "fit to be preached." 82 He published almost nothing of his theological system, and our knowledge of it comes primarily from the lectures reported by students, Frank H. Foster and others.83 Park preached one sermon, however, which might well have been the opening word in a crusade for a new theology. He was invited to address the convention of Congregational ministers in Boston in 1850, and on that occasion delivered his famous sermon, The Theology of the

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Intellect and That of the Feelings. Park had Old Calvinists, Hopkinsians, Trinitarians, and Unitarians in his congregation and the sermon was admittedly an attempt to promote the reconciliation o£ these divisions. He began with a distinction between the two theologies. T h e theology of the intellect consists of precise, logical doctrines developed by the rational faculty and commending themselves primarily to the mind. T h e theology of the feelings is the form of belief which is suggested by, and adapted to the wants of the well-trained heart. It is embraced as involving the substance of truth, although, when literally interpreted it may or may not be false.84 This is the theology of the poetic insight. Its language is that of the image. Park held that much of biblical truth was in this latter form. Such a distinction was novel at Andover where both catechism and creed were regularly affirmed as containing the literal truth. Everything depended of course upon the use of this distinction. What was the ultimate test of the truth of a doctrine? Park made himself clear at this point. He was appealing in the name of the moral sense of humanity against the literal interpretation of traditional doctrines such as the imputation of Adam's guilt and total depravity: Whenever we find, my brethren, that the words which we proclaim do not strike a responsive chord in the hearts of choice men and women who look up to us for consolation, when they do not stir our own souls, reach down to our hidden wants, and evoke sensibilities which otherwise had lain buried under the cares of time; or when they make an abiding impression that the divine government is harsh, pitiless, insincere, oppressive, devoid of sympathy with our most refined sentiments, reckless of even the most delicate emotion of the tenderest nature, then we may infer that we have left out of our theology some element which should have been inserted, or have brought into it some element which we should have discarded. Somewhere it must be wrong.85 On the basis of this appeal to "the most delicate emotion of the tenderest nature" Park then attacked the old problems of human freedom and imputation of guilt. The doctrine of imputation, he declared, outraged all known moral feelings. T h e "feeling theology" may out-reach itself

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as it says for example that man "cannot" repent when it really means he "will not." Park was quickly charged with having two theologies. What he had really done was to make moral sentiment the criterion for judging all theologies. His position showed the divergence of his own views from the catechism, and his sensitiveness to the "humane spirit" which Channing had breathed into theology. Had he developed his view he might have laid the ground-work for a new theology of experience which could survive the protest against the harshness of Calvinism and withstand the shifting of cosmological views brought about by science. Park gives no hint in the sermon of the sources of his reflections. We can note, however, that just two years previous Horace Bushnell had delivered his address on Dogma and Spirit at Andover in which he distinguished between opinion which is of the head and knowledge of Christian truth which is of the heart. 86 Whatever the historical connection between these two addresses they both illustrate the growth of the appeal to religious feeling and moral sentiment as a criticism of the traditional creeds which developed when the religious experience underlying those creeds was transformed by cultural forces. Park's theological system shows at many points the influence of the humanitarian tendency. He followed Taylor in striving to vindicate the benevolent character of God by stressing the possibility that in the future life the tragedies of this world would be righted. 87 Park insisted on the absolute divinity of Christ and apparently felt no need to follow his German teacher Kahnis' Hegelian statement of stages in the incarnation. 88 Foster sees some influence of MacLeod Campbell in Park's acknowledgement that Jesus' "confession of humanity" was one element in the atonement. 89 He was aware of biblical criticism, and the scientific developments in his time. He once remarked that "the question of our day is not what the Bible means, but whether we have any Bible; and even whether we have any God." 90 He attempted to meet the new critical understanding of the Bible in his doctrine of inspiration. He defined inspiration as such an influence of the Holy Spirit on the minds of the writers of the Bible as caused them to teach in the best possible manner whatever they intended to teach, and especially to communicate religious truth without any error, either in religious doctrine or religious impression.91

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Students felt the same influences which were modifying the official theology. Dr. Daniel Dana, a member of the Board of Trustees, w h o was an uncompromising conservative in theology addressed to his Board in 1849 a remonstrance which reveals the state of Andover at the time. Dana objected to Park's theology, especially since Andover students were deviating from the orthodox faith. He declared that as a member of various presbyteries he had been present at the examinations of Andover students and for several years had found them failing in essential points, particularly, the doctrine of native depravity. 9 2 It is significant of the extent to which the old theology had lost its grip at this time that four of the five men w h o became editors of the liberal Andover Review in 1883 graduated from Andover during the years when Park was teaching, and when the creed was still, in the main, the doctrinal standard. One of these, W i l l i a m Jewett T u c k e r , tells his own experience at Andover from 1863 to 1866: Near the close of my seminary course, when I was in no little doubt about the reality of what I had to preach, and was therefore hesitating between the law and the ministry, I chanced upon the Life and Letters of Robertson. O n e letter which caught my attention contained a statement of his personal feeling toward Christ. I had never known till then that a man could feel in just that way about Christ. Here at last was reality. It gave me what I wanted. I began at once on my own account the study of the life of Christ. I began with the temptation, the point I judged of greatest reality to him. A n d from that time on I had no question about the ministry. Robertson, with his passionate loyalty to Christ, wakened the answering passion in my soul. 93 O n e stage in the development of liberalism is here clearly marked out. Religious experience is more important than doctrine. Jesus becomes the revealer of human possibilities, the leader of a cause, and his humanity is as fully emphasized as his divinity. V. THE SLAVERY ISSUE

As the conflict of old and new theology developed, the slavery question was demanding more of the attention of Christians. It threatened the disruption of churches, and forced theologians to take a clearer position on the problem of the relationship of Christianity to secular society. It has been pointed out that the moral conduct of individual Christians and the relation of the church to the world had been really a

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crucial element in the early Andover Christianity although, theoretically, morality was a secondary consideration. T h e religious enterprise of saving individual souls was the primary concern, and definite standards of moral behavior were demanded as tests of regeneration. In the early years there were two outstanding moral problems from the conventional point of view, the immoralities of the theatre and drunkenness.94 Dr. J . H. Church wrote a letter to Woods in 1807 telling of a church which had restored discipline after allowing known drunkards to come to the Lord's Table. 9 5 Temperance agitation increased during the thirties. T h e Andover rhetorical society debated the pledge method of promoting temperance. 96 Justin Edwards, Seminary President from 1836 to 1842 was the first agent of the American Temperance Society. 97 Moses Stuart turned his ability in biblical exegesis to account with an extended article in 1830 which attempted to prove that the Bible justifies the use of only the very mildest wines. He concluded that churches should not admit as members any persons who were not total abstainers, or who had any part in the liquor traffic. 98 From the beginning the slave traffic had aroused the consciences of the Andover men at least mildly. T h e Panoplist, early Missionary magazine published brief paragraphs on the abolition of the slave trade in England and material like Cowper's The Negro's Complaint." By 1830 abolition agitation could not be ignored. Porter called the slave traffic the shame of Christianity. 100 Andover professor B. B. Edwards founded the American Society for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Slaves. 101 Andover had a small abolition society. 102 T h e radicals were demanding that churches exclude slave-holders from membership. In this form the issue came directly before the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, which refused to take this extreme position. They held that responsibility for such wrongs must be judged in the light of the fact that they are intimately interwoven with the total social structure. In dealing with the individuals involved "the utmost kindness and forbearance are to be exercised, which are compatible with a steady adherence to right principle." 1 0 3 Professor Stowe of Andover defended this position. 104 Webster's stand for Clay's compromise in 1850 inflamed the abolitionists with new resentment, and Moses Stuart rushed into the controversy with a defense of Webster entitled Conscience and the Constitution. He felt called upon to make his position clear because the abolitionists had raised a moral issue and Christianity is concerned with morality.

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Professor Stuart begins by saying that political controversy is something new to him. During his study of law he had been an active antiJeffersonian, and had voted in "seasons of peril" such as "the imperial reign of General Jackson." But he had never preached a political sermon or mixed politics with his class room lectures. Now he and his colleagues had been assailed for their lukewarm attitude and he had to take a stand. After one sarcastic fling at the "liberty-men" who, Stuart said, really saw in abolition an opportunity to bring in socialism, he outlines his argument. T h e issue for him as a Christian as it formed itself in his mind was: Is slavery absolutely condemned in the Bible? If so, it is a wrong which must be recognized as such. Churches would then be justified in excluding slave-holders from membership, and Christians could not support any compromise opening new territory to slavery. Undoubtedly the Bible held a commanding place in the thinking of these men, and one cannot simply convict Professor Stuart of a bit of special pleading in order to keep from taking a radical stand. Of course we are not surprised to learn that he cannot find any absolute condemnation of slavery in the Bible. It was sanctioned by Moses, and Paul himself returned a runaway slave. T h e remarkable turn in Professor Stuart's article is that he does not leave the matter thus up in the air but goes on to ask the question which later liberalism so often asked, "What attitude toward this problem did Jesus take?" At one point Stuart seems on the verge of separating Jesus' message entirely from secular morality when he says that the Lord was careful never to appear in opposition to the government in spite of His knowledge of its tyranny and injustice. But he went on to say: He [Jesus] took care to utter truths and establish principles which in their gradual influence and operation would banish slavery from the face of the earth; but he would leave the completion of the work to time, and to the slow but sure operation of the principles which he inculcated. 105 T h e n more boldly he declared: It is impossible for any man to say that he does as he would be done by, in case he subjects his neighbor, a human being to slavery. 106 T h e process by which these principles would bring about the change in society is not discussed in the pamphlet but Stuart undoubtedly con-

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ceived of the regeneration of individual souls as the way to social reform. His thought is in a highly unstable stage. Final Christian judgment is to be passed only upon those practices or institutions which are specifically condemned in the Bible. Slavery is not so condemned. Yet the principles of Jesus are violated by it, and will eventually eradicate it. Is this not a condemnation? Stuart has really admitted that it is, but he wishes the change to come by evolution, not by revolution. He is becoming a liberal, and is losing the Calvinist emphasis on God's immediate and final judgment upon man and his institutions. Stuart of course drew the fire of the abolitionists led by William Jay. 1 0 7 Professor Austin Phelps saw that church conventions were being disrupted by the slavery issue. Such reforms, he believed, were merely provincial, and were not the "imperial questions" in the life of the Church. Missions should not be subordinated to reform, the regeneration of the people of the world should not be considered less significant than social reorganization. With some wistfulness Phelps said: T h a t will be a happy day for the church when questions of social reform shall be so adjusted in the structure of Christian opinion that they shall no more embarrass the distinctive enterprises of Christian benevolence. 108 Both Stuart and Phelps held that the primary business of the church was with individuals' souls. Anything which interfered with the basic enterprise was to be deplored. But slavery had forced some new consideration of the relation of Christianity's moral standards to its gospel of redemption. T h e presence of Professor Stowe's wife, Harriet Beecher, at Andover, is a symbol of the deep undercurrents of feeling which the issue aroused. When men feel strongly about a moral wrong and believe themselves called upon to right it, it is impossible for them to consider their call as a secondary matter. Andover men had not yet begun to speak of the Kingdom of God as a transformed society on earth; but when they found in the teachings of Jesus a basic set of moral principles with implications for the actual structure of society, they had taken a significant step in the development of the liberal social gospel. When the war came Andover men supported the North with unquestioning patriotism and religious zeal. Park turned to the imprecatory Psalms to give expression to his feelings about the South. It was no time for womanish kindness he said. 109 T h e paradoxical attitude of Calvinism toward the world appears clearly in Park's paper on the Psalms in

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1862. Strictly speaking man is a sinner until his heart is regenerated by God. All the acts of unregenerate men are selñsh, devoid of any holy affections. Secular history is therefore a play of forces of which the unbridled ambitions of sinners are primary. But now in the conflict of North and South these Northern Calvinists identified their cause with the will of God. Park claimed for government, as Calvinism usually did, the absolute sanction of God. He held that the North was fighting in a wholly righteous cause, and fighting unselfishly: He who despiseth the civil power (such is the general truth) despiseth not man as man, but as the representative of the King of Kings. Here is the chief sin of disobedience in the family and school, of rebellion in the State. It is resistance to the ordinances of the great Ruler, as underlying the edicts of human rulers. 110 Park regarded the defense of the nation's capitol as a good work comparable to the Hebrew's defense of the Ark of the Covenant. 111 Thus the slavery problem sharpened the issues involved in the conception of the relation of Christianity to secular history and institutions. T h e contradictions, insights, and confusions of these Calvinists are revealed as they grappled with it. What it can mean to say that history made by the selfish wills of sinful men is still moving according to the Will of the Righteous God is the problem this position always ultimately faces. It was one of the tasks of the new liberal theology to work out a more consistent and effective position with respect to the interpretation of history. VI. A NEW F A C U L T Y IN THE NEW WORLD

All the forces which undermined the early Andover were augmented after the war. Economic expansion developed at an unheard of pace; and the influence of modern culture became correspondingly enhanced. Scientific achievements dramatically represented by On the Origin of Species, were destroying the basic premises of the old theology in the general mind. Herbert Spencer's speculative philosophy claiming science as its support and based on the idea of development became the focal point of the modification of basic categories in the general mentality. Andover kept the appearance of adherence to the religion of its Founders until 1879. Professors still subscribed to the creed. Park's theology still ruled that department. T h e professors maintained a discreet silence on the issue of evolution. Park was editor of the Bibliotheca

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Sacra in which the controversy on evolution appeared as it did in many other journals. But no articles discussing the new scientific theories appeared from the pen of any Andover man. George Frederick Wright, a Congregational minister of Andover, published in this journal from 1875 to 1880 a series of careful analyses of the theory of evolution. He concluded that the theory was supported by strong evidence and even began the apologetic task by pointing out harmonious elements between Darwinism and Calvinism. 1 1 2 With the inauguration of Egbert C. Smyth as professor of ecclesiastical history in 1863 a new type of mind appeared on the Andover faculty. Here was one who was willing to sign the creed, who shared its basic evangelical faith, but who had felt the new trends in thought and experience. Smyth was a historian with a conviction that Christianity must be understood in its social-historical development. His lecture to the Senior Class at Andover in 1874 on The Value of the Study of Church History shows the change which the historical approach was bringing about. He points out that up to 1853 the study of church history occupied only one-ninth of the seminary curriculum. He notes the increasing interest in history brought about through the introduction of German thought by H. B. Smith and others. T h e founders of the institution had put church history after theology in the curriculum in order not to disturb the student's thinking. Now Smyth was taking the position that no Christian doctrine could be understood apart from its history. "Theology is not an isolated thing. It is not an absolutely new revelation. It is essentially a growth, and should be studied as a growth." 1 1 3 He said that every doctrine had an essential and non-essential part. Here doubtless, he was explaining his adherence to the creed. 114 Smyth shared with the Founders the same interest in the practical effects of doctrine, but he, characteristically, expresses this effect in the moralized terms of liberalism. History shows "that some dogmas have in them the seeds of reform, of mighty deeds, of heroism, and self-denial." 113 In a final paragraph Smyth expressed the point of view that the history of the church could no longer be separated from the general history of men. 116 T w o new professors came to the faculty shortly after Smyth. These were Charles M. Mead and Joseph H. Thayer who had studied in Germany, and were beginning to use the critical-historical approach to the scripture. Generous endowments in the years following the war helped to add new professors and widen the theological horizon. Lectures were given by Julius Seelye and Francis G. Peabody. 117 One new chair bore

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the title "The Relation of Christianity to the Secular Sciences." John P. Gulliver was inducted into this chair in 1878. He made the usual public subscription to the creed and then delivered his address on Christianity and Science. For the first time an A n d o v e r professor was publicly dealing with the conflict of the new science and Christian doctrine. G u l l i v e r accepted the methods and discoveries of science in its field. Darwin he mentioned in a masterpiece of understatement as "a modest and careful observer" w h o "has discovered some new facts showing that the capacity of animals for variation is somewhat greater than was once supposed." 1 1 8 T h e real threat to Christianity was not from science but from "materialism" as represented in the philosophies of Haeckel, T y n d a l l , and Spencer. Gulliver attempted to defend Christian faith by reason, and to refute the materialists. His argument was presented in barest outline and need not detain us. His problem was that which the later liberalism faced. T h e first open break with the creed came in 1880 w h e n W i l l i a m J. T u c k e r prefaced his oath of allegiance to the creed with this remark: T h e creed which I am about to read and to which I subscribe, I fully accept as setting forth the truth against the errors which it was designed to meet. N o confession so elaborate and with such intent may assume to be the final expression of the truth or an expression equally fitted in language or tone to all times. 119 T w o years later Mead and T h a y e r resigned because they objected to repeating the creed every five years. 120 Both insisted that they never subscribed to the creed except in a "qualified" way. Professor Park retired in 1881 and the choice of his successor brought the conservatives and the liberals into open hostility. T h e trustees chose as his successor Newman Smyth, brother of Egbert Smyth; but the Visitors refused to approve his appointment. T h e stated grounds were an alleged lack of teaching technique on Smyth's part. B u t it is significant that he had openly attacked O l d Calvinism and had endorsed the doctrine of future probation for those w h o have not heard the gospel in this life which was rapidly becoming a leading issue between the old and the new theologies. George Harris, Andover graduate, was finally chosen for the chair. His inaugural address in 1883 began the new phase of the New England T h e o l o g y in Andover. Changes had been taking place since the found-

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ing of the seminary as we have seen. Now the break was unmistakable. Professor Park wrote a long pamphlet denouncing the apostasy of the new faculty. 121 In 1886 the Visitors instituted heresy trials against the faculty. The litigation lasted six years.122 But the new faculty stayed, and the new theology was worked out. The day in which Harris and his colleagues were inaugurated was, like the day of the founding of the seminary, one of alarm and danger for the Christian faith. The Founders had set aside theological differences in order to fight a common enemy. Now seventy-five years later the Christian Union was pleading for unity in the face of great opposition. T h e Union declared editorially that paganism was undermining the sabbath, padlocking the Bible, luring young people from the churches to the theatre, ruining them with drink; families were being wrecked by easy divorces; materialism and infidelity were capturing the average man; ten thousand immigrants were coming to America every week in need of Americanizing and Christianizing. In such a time, the writer said, anyone who stirs up strife among Christians "nails Christ afresh to the Cross." 123 But the conflict of ideas cannot permanently be ignored. Strife among Christians, and between Christians and secular thinkers was inevitable. Harris' address shows that there is to be no absolute break with the past. He accepts the Bible as final authority. The words sin and salvation, revelation and inspiration still have meaning for him; but he is thinking in a new world. The Founders had emphasized man's corruption; Harris stresses his possibilities. The Founders believed in original sin; Harris speaks of the inheritance of social injustice. The Founders strove for the regeneration of the individual; Harris speaks of progress, of the Kingdom of God as a new social order on earth. The Founders accepted without question doctrines unintelligible to human reason. Harris pleads for putting belief on a rational basis, pointing out that the strength of the materialist attack on Christianity lies in its charge that Christianity is irrational. The Founders said that every article of their creed was to remain the same forever. Harris has no creed to present; he makes a plea for broad general agreement on "fundamentals." The Founders most often used the terms Christianity, Calvinism, Hopkinsianism. Harris frequently refers to "religion" in general. 124 Theologians of the new Andover believed that they were carrying on the true Christian enterprise. They believed that God had revealed himself to the world, that His truth could be known, that His power was ade-

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quate for the transformation of life. T o clarify these convictions, and to defend them against new philosophies backed by the prestige of science involved a heart-breaking struggle in the nineteenth century. What Andover did, and what may appear to us as lost or gained in that struggle the following chapters will review.

2 EVOLUTIONARY

PHILOSOPHIES

R A D I C A L EVANGELICAL CHRISTIANITY has three basic elements in its doctrine of the need and nature of man's redemption. In the first place the world is the creation of God who is completely holy and good. He is Lord of all life and nature and has power over all things to achieve His will. Second, God makes himself in his perfect goodness known to man. Therefore, finally, every man must choose between love for God and a love for all lesser objects. Every human being, according to this scheme, is subject to the eternal and final judgment of God regardless of the particular natural or social environment in which he may be found. Each man loves God or rejects Him, and his moral status now and his eternal destiny is determined accordingly. T h e slave boy in Paul's letter to Philemon is as completely subject to the divine judgment, as truly a recipient of the divine grace as is the highly educated and religiously trained apostle who writes the letter. Three major developments in the thought and culture of the nineteenth century made necessary a critical re-examination of the validity and implications of these pre-suppositions. These were: the ideas of the changing world and relativity of moral standards which centered in the concepts of evolution and progress; the criticism which applied the principle of development to the origin and history of Christian doctrine itself; and the problems involved in viewing personality as conditioned by social factors and involved in social conflicts. Under the impact of these ideas and forces the evangelical scheme had to be reconstructed or abandoned. T h e outcome was the faith and the confusion of liberalism. This and the following chapters trace the influence of these three factors on evangelical doctrine at Andover.

T h e new Andover faculty founded The Andover Review in 1884; and used it for the expression of their theological views. T h e editors of the journal were: Egbert C. Smyth, William J. Tucker, J. W . Churchill, George Harris, and Edward Y. Hincks. A l l of the important writings of these men from 1884 to 1893 appeared in the Review. While we are primarily concerned with the Andover theology, the Review enables us to set the Andover thought in the general context of American philosophical and religious thought at this time, for the journal carried papers written by critics, theologians, philosophers, and

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others representing a variety of points of view. Special articles and departments were devoted to the reporting of theological trends in Europe. Making use of the philosophical and religious discussions in The Andover Review, the present chapter outlines the background of Andover's thought by examining the way in which the general religious thought of the period was conceiving and dealing with the problems raised by evolutionary concepts. T h e penetration of secular science and philosophy into the theologian's domain was seen by Noah Porter of Yale, who wrote in 1884: T h e Physicist, the Evolutionist, and the Agnostic of the present day are all theologians, speculating, affirming, and denying concerning matter and mind, duty and sin, the mystery of the universe, its origin, its end, and its signification.1 I. P E R S O N A L I S M VS. M E C H A N I S M

Liberal and conservative theologians alike saw in evolutionary science and philosophy a threat to belief in the existence of God and the traditional view of human values unless these beliefs could be re-interpreted, or their foundations established in a realm which science could not reach. T h e fear of "materialism" is a dominant note in the religious thought of the period. As Borden P. Bowne viewed the effect of the new ideas; "The rising tide of matter threatened to submerge God and the soul alike in its all-embracing flood."2 The religious philosophies which were produced to stem this tide did succeed in finding a place for God, freedom, and value in the universe; but in the defense of religious belief by re-interpretation many of the cardinal tenets and perspectives of the evangelical theology were virtually abandoned. Twenty-five years had passed between the publication of Darwin's On the Origin of Species and the first issue of the Andover Review. In most quarters the first emotional and denunciatory reactions to the evolutionary hypothesis had given way to a more reasoned consideration of the significance of the theory for theology.3 By 1884 the general notion of the evolution of human life from animal life had been accepted by nearly all thinkers except those who refused to surrender a literal belief in the Genesis account of creation. John Fiske was popularizing his theistic interpretation of evolution. Henry Drummond in The Natural Law in the Spiritual World supported religion with evolution by tracing spiritual analogies of biological laws.4 T h e variety of meanings of the term "evolution" was a source of con-

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fusion in the discussions of the relation of theology to the new worldview. Darwin's theory was an attempted explanation of the emergence of new biological species from older species. In addition to its reference to Darwinism and its laws, "evolution" was widely used to indicate connected development in any realm. Thus the popular term "evolution of Christianity" had no necessary relation to the laws of biological development. Sometimes the terms evolution and progress were used synonymously. T h e idea of progress introduces a qualification from the standpoint of a judgment of value into a theory of development. While the idea of human progress was considered by many nineteenth century thinkers as deriving support from the theory of the evolution of man from "lower" forms of life, yet no general law of improvement in human life is demonstrated by the facts of biological evolution. T h e unwarranted identification of the conceptions of evolution and progress was attacked by Andover men among others; but it had a strong hold upon the feeling if not the thought of the age. In addition to the general notions of biological evolution, evolution meaning development, and progress, religious thinkers were confronted with certain special interpretations of the significance of evolution, the most influential of which was advanced by Herbert Spencer. Spencer's metaphysics interpreted the entire activity of the universe as exemplifying a fundamental law of development. This law in Spencer's famous formula was the progress of being from a state of homogeneity toward an individualization or "heterogeneity" of elements. 5 He attempted to show that this law, which was essentially a law of progress, was the principle to which all phenomena must conform. T h e law was derived from the principle of the persistence of force which Spencer held as an axiom, undemonstrable, but necessary.6 Man experiences only phenomena, appearances. Back of them lies an unknowable reality. T h e r e is one "religious truth of the highest possible certainty." It is "the omnipresence of something which passes comprehension." 7 T h e system was imposing. It borrowed for itself the prestige of science, the growing faith in progress, and the theory of biological evolution. Philosophers of religion regarded Spencer's thought as a threat to all religious belief. When they attacked "materialism" they usually appear to have him in mind. There was some justification for this as Spencer's principles were really cast in the form of physical laws. More of the polemics in the Andover Review are directed against Spencer than any other thinker. Professor Dewey may have had him in mind in remarking that if we follow the physical scientist in seeing in nature a merely

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mechanical behaviour, then nature in ceasing to be divine has ceased also to be human. 8 F. H. Johnson regarded Spencer's system, resting wholly on the "persistence of force, as "subversive of every high belief." 9 Theologians joined in condemning this "new trinity of matter, force, and environment." 10 In defending theism and personal freedom against Spencer's rigidly mechanical interpretation of the universe, religious philosophers tried to reduce this "scientific" view of human life to an absurdity. W . R. Benedict, Professor of philosophy in the University of Cincinnati, put the objection to scientific metaphysics as extravagantly as possible: steam and lightning have brought together the uttermost parts of the earth . . . yet there has been no thought, no plan, no foresight. Parents have reared their children and poured out life-blood for their welfare, but there have been no hopes, no desires. Men, women, and children have perished by starvation, disease, and betrayal, but there have been no sorrows. This is the teaching, and the only teaching of physical science. 11 Neither science, nor Spencer's interpretation of it had said anything like this of course. T h e defenders of religion, however, were concerned about the place of God in a universe evolving according to fixed laws, and they were trying to find a place for personal freedom and responsibility. T h e insistence of religious liberals on the importance of recognizing a type of human behaviour not governed by physical or biological laws is typified by the writings of F. H. Johnson, clergyman residing in Andover, who published an extensive analysis of Spencer's philosophy and the relationship of evolutionary concepts to religion throughout the publication of the Review. Johnson feared that if the slightest concession should be made to the interpretation of human ideals in terms of physical law or biological function the dignity and responsibility of human beings would be lost. Hence he framed the issue between his own view and Spencer's in terms almost as unqualified as Benedict's. T h e question is: "Is our conception of spirit as spirit the counterpart of a reality, or is it an illusion?" 12 T h e belief that there is spirit apart from matter underlies all morality according to Johnson: Our belief in a possible self better than the self we know is a purely spiritual conception. . . . All moral distinctions have grown directly from the conviction that each human individual is a soul. 13

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His insistence on the "purely spiritual" nature of morality is a tribute to the prestige of Spencer's philosophy. Unless there is a realm of being which Spencer had ignored, his interpretation of morality must be accepted as the final one. In order to establish the reality and effective working of spirit as spirit in the order of nature, Johnson resorted to the usual two stages of idealistic criticism of naturalism. First, the sphere of science must be restricted. Scientific laws may be proximately proved by convergence of evidence. But so long as the facts to which they are referred exhibit a side which is not only not included in the generalization, but which contradicts it, they must be regarded as imaginative conceptions, based upon one aspect of a many sided reality.14 Johnson holds that when we turn to human nature the facts do exhibit a side which lies outside the realm of scientific laws. Our humanity is characterized by our ability to rise above the realm of mechanism. "All that part of our life which transcends that of the baser tribes is the direct outcome of the belief that we can shape events to our own necessities and desires."16 But can we be sure that personality controls mechanism? Apparently all that we do know is the relationship between objects and events which science describes. Can we know any more about the self? Johnson holds that the self "is made known to us in every selfconscious act." 16 The mechanical conception regards things in their relation to "an abstract principle which we call energy." The conception of personal causation "regards things in their relation to an abstract principle which we call spirit. They cannot agree with each other, they cannot contradict each other. One cannot be the proof of the other, but no more can it be its disproof." 17 By identifying personal causation with the realm of spirit Johnson removed purposeful activity from the domination of natural law. Man is a free being, lord of the whole realm of nature, able to bend it to his will. Of course concessions had to be made. Man may be limited by the external conditions of his life. He may even be enslaved by the passions of his body.18 Yet so long as he acts purposefully he is directing natural forces.19 Having made a primary distinction between the scientific and the intuited understanding of human experience Johnson might well have left the problem of the evolution of the soul alone; but the notion of the development of man out of lower forms of life could not be so easily set aside without consideration in the age of Herbert Spencer. Johnson's

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thought reveals the real struggle which was going on between the spiritualist philosophy he has just stated and the notion than man is a creature involved in the natural order. Johnson was not content to let his view be interpreted as similar to that of the R o m a n Catholic biologist Mivart, who in his Genesis of Species had held that the soul of man has a different origin than his body. 20 H a v i n g separated man from nature, Johnson, in his reply to Mivart, attempted to get man back into nature. He said that Mivart was an unwise defender of the position that man is more than an animal; because the hypothesis of separate origins for body and spirit would put man outside of nature. Johnson affirmed that the religious interpretation of nature does not depend upon finding an extra-natural origin for the human soul. Yet if the soul of man has evolved, if it has appeared within the general development of biological forms, is it not after all an appearance produced by sub-psychical forces? Johnson was thrown back upon the difficulty he had apparently solved. T h e r e was one way out, a new interpretation of evolution. W h e r e Spencer stressed the adherence of phenomena to a general law, and where Darwin emphasized the gradual modification of species, Johnson stressed the idea of emergence of new qualities which, he held, was the important implication of Darwinism itself. T h e tendency of the Darwinians "has been to obscure the importance of the creative factor in evolution" whereas the real thought of Darwin and the facts of biological evolution show clearly that evolution involves the attainment of new and higher stages. 21 Johnson preferred the word epigenesis to evolution because it connoted the factor of emergence. Epigenesis does not imply that the whole contents of the thing said to be evolved previously existed in the antecedents; it affirms, on the contrary, that there not only may be but must be something in the result that did not exist in the antecedents. 22 T h e r e is a difference in kind between a mind with the power of abstract thought and a mind which does not have it. In the evolutionary process the new level of behaviour arises out of the old. 23 T h i s concept of emergent evolution was turned against Spencer. W h i l e the view of the supernatural origin of man's soul was surrendered, the new view saved man's freedom and moral responsibility, in the opinion of the religious philosophers. As one writer expressed the situation, " T h i s spiritual consummation of nature in man makes him not only part of nature, but also superior to the rest of nature." 2 4 T h e possibility

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of emphasizing the emergent aspects of the evolutionary process caused one enthusiastic outburst of gratitude to Darwin: T o this illustrious man we mainly owe it that we are beginning to perceive that the Divine Immutability is not the changelessness of stone, but an infinite flexibility.25 Joseph LeConte, geologist and philosopher at the University of California, reasserted the separation of man from physical nature with the help of the emergent interpretation of evolution. The passage from one level to another in evolution is "at one bound." "When the necessary conditions are present, a new and higher form of force at once appears, like a birth into a higher sphere." 20 Like the other thinkers of his time, LeConte was so deeply influenced by the evolutionary idea, and the Darwinian laws, that he tried to find analogues for the laws of biological evolution in the realm of human life. At the same time he was careful to avoid a view which would bring man under the control of biological forces. His treatment of the idea of survival of the fittest is typical: In organic evolution the fittest are those most in harmony with the physical environment and therefore they survive. In human evolution the fittest are those most in harmony with the ideal, and often especially in the early stages, when the race is still largely under the dominion of organic factors, they do not survive, because not in harmony with the total social environment. But, although the fittest individuals may indeed perish, the ideal survives in the race and will eventually triumph.27 T h e eventual triumph of the ideal was an assumption unwarranted by the meaning of "fitness for survival" in Darwin's theory. Men like LeConte, however, were not in the least concerned to follow out the full implications of biological evolution in the understanding of human life. They were concerned rather to preserve the fundamentals of a religious interpretation of the universe. By giving special meanings to evolutionary categories and concepts they discovered that evolution as a general concept could be used as a defense against materialism and agnosticism. LeConte finally uses his interpretation of emergent evolution as an argument for belief in personal immortality. He points out that all along the course of evolution the new level is "unimagineable from the lower or animal point of view." Immortality may be considered as a phenomenon

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unintelligible to men who have not fully emerged into the realm of spirit.28 Another turn in the use of the distinction between the physical and the psychical was given by John Dewey, then at the University of Michigan, who considered the implications of experimental psychology for the understanding of personality. Dewey recognized the effect of the biological sciences upon the understanding of human life. Human life, he held, develops in accordance with the laws of all organic life. Mental life is to be regarded as essentially organic, that is, it must be interpreted in relation to the whole personality of which it is a part. It is "not a theatre for the recognition of independent autonomous faculties." 29 At the same time Dewey is careful not to try to resolve psychical behaviour into merely physical behaviour. Physiological psychology is valuable in understanding man only as it gives clues to psychic facts. But the clues are not explanations. "Psychical events can be observed only through psychical means, and interpreted and explained by psychical conditions and facts."30 Dewey again is maintaining against Spencer the independence of the human mind and will as effective agents in the total natural process. In this same paper Dewey also opened up a field of inquiry which was scarcely touched by most writers anxious to establish the autonomy of the human spirit against materialistic philosophy. Dewey stressed the importance of social psychology in the understanding of human life. W e can no longer, he said, consider psychical life as "developing in a vacuum." T h e spiritual life itself develops in and is conditioned by the social environment in which it lives. Johnson and LeConte had from their point of view won one battle for human responsibility by avoiding the subordination of man to biological nature. But the fact of the conditioning of the human spirit by its social environment still remained with its profound implications for the conception of man's moral status. Only gradually did theologians come to see how this conception may affect the evangelical doctrine of sin. II. GOD A N D E V O L U T I O N

Another problem for religious thinking remained in Spencer's philosophy. He had substituted an unknowable source of energy behind all phenomena for God. Man was alone in his universe. John Fiske expressed the feeling of the religious philosopher about the implications of scientific materialism: " T h e human soul shrinks from the thought

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that it is without kith or kin in all this wide universe." 31 Men could be reconciled to the universe which nineteenth century science was describing only if they could preserve belief in a personal God as the ultimate and controlling reality. Proofs of the existence of God, in the words of F. G. Peabody "are the philosophical reconciliation which the faith of the heart demands with the scientific aspect of the world." 32 In the attempt to find grounds for believing in the existence of a supreme personality behind phenomena one of two positions has generally been taken. One is the position shared by Hume and Kant that neither science nor reason can demonstrate the existence of God. T h e sphere of reason is limited to experience, and belief in God is possible only on the basis of faith. T h e other position is that reason and experience do reveal valid arguments for the existence of God. It is characteristic of the thinking of most writers for the Andover Review that they have these two positions combined and badly muddled. There is no such attempt at a clear demarcation of the spheres of reason and faith as in the philosophy of St. Thomas, for example. Reason and faith are taken together. They overlap and support one another so that one can never be sure how much is demonstration and how much is assumption. A long period of vague and indecisive thinking on fundamentals of religious philosophy was setting in. There were varying degrees of the trust in reason to be sure. Borden P. Bowne still held that theism was a more rational theory of the ultimate cause of the universe than atheism.33 Both theories, however, are "equally hypothetical and speculative." 34 Theism cannot be proved. The most that cap be said is that atheism, by which Bowne meant Spencer's materialism, cannot be proved, and the theistic hypothesis makes the facts of order, growth and purpose more intelligible. 35 A new use was made of the traditional proofs for the existence of God by F. G. Peabody, Harvard professor, illustrating the attempt to go as far as possible with reason without resting the case on it. Peabody reviews all the classic arguments for God's existence and accepts at every point Kant's refutation of them as proofs. Yet each argument calls attention to one aspect of the world which needs to be explained and for which theism may offer the best interpretation. The cosmological argument calls attention to an organizing power behind the world. T h e teleological argument indicates the possibility of considering the whole of nature as the activity of a power which is working toward an end. T h e moral proof, after Kant, implies that the supreme end of the universe may be considered as the achievement of a moral order. Finally, the

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ontological argument implies that the world is intelligible. This intelligibility of the world Peabody quickly transforms into a "spiritual unity" entirely without proof. He makes no attempt to bridge the gaps between these various arguments. T h e arguments carry weight only to those who have taken the initial step of faith. They do not prove the validity of faith, but they give it some rational support.36 F. H. Johnson undertook an analysis of grounds for belief in God's existence. His thought reveals clearly the equivocal position with respect to reason into which defenders of religion were being forced. Johnson begins with a clear plea for the use of reason. " I shall try to show that our knowledge is sufficiently stable, sufficiently positive, and sufficiently homogeneous to enable us to construct a reasonable and effective theory of the meaning of the world and of the value of our lives in it." 37 T h e argument begins with reference to the same conception of creative evolution which had been used to demonstrate man's uniqueness in nature. Evolution exhibits this development of higher forms out of lower forms. Now, Johnson says: if we postulate inanimate atoms and forces as the original essential realities of the world, it is not only impossible to evolve mind from them, it is impossible to evolve anything. 38 Johnson made an important criticism of both Darwin and Spencer on this point. Darwin had neglected the internal, purposive factors in the adaptation of organisms and treated the tendency to vary "as physicists treat the law of gravitation." 39 Spencer's evolutionary laws were far more physical than biological in character. This organic creativity in nature, Johnson holds, can only be made intelligible if we assume "a positive constructive principle in nature." 40 Johnson does not mean to be satisfied if it is granted that nature has this positive constructive aspect. He is trying to prove the existence of God. Anything short of a personal, intelligent supervision of evolution by a Cosmic Mind is insufficient to account for the process. Yet having brought the argument from design so far Johnson does not call the argument a proof. T h e argument consists only in using the analogy of human intelligence for the interpretation of the cosmic process. " T h e world of man-made mechanism has been called into existence by the inventive intelligence of minds that have, wi'h set purpose, devoted themselves to the accomplishment of definite ends." 41 "Why, then, should we set aside this cause when we are speculating about the adap-

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tations of nature?" 42 So to set it aside would be to break the "law of continuity," that is the unity of the universe. This law implies "that the relations known to exist within the range of our experience exist, in some more or less modified form, under similar circumstances, beyond our experience." If this is a "law" then do we not have a conclusive argument for the existence of God? Johnson says no, for this law of continuity is not a "truth of reason," it is an assumption. Yet his whole argument is based upon it. Johnson is not even willing to go the whole way in using the argument from analogy for it had a fatal weakness as Hume pointed out long before. If the ego of man is made the basis of speculation about the relation of mechanism and intelligence in nature, then it must be held that this directing intelligence is evolved out of non-intelligent orders of being. The ego of man appears only at the end of a long process of development. Shall God be considered as the product of evolution? Johnson gives up reasoning from analogy at this point: It is clearly out of the question, when using the microcosm of the ego for the interpretation of the cosmos, to make any use of the history of the becoming of the ego. As a created being, the fruit of a process, it can give us no help for the solution of the world problem. We must be content to regard it only in its supreme and final aspect. We must see in it only the container, the ruler, the creator. 43 God Himself may be a threat to man's freedom, as Johnson clearly saw. Therefore he made a distinction between the general purposes of God and the details of the course of events. May we not believe that the intelligence that is above ours makes modifications at innumerable points, while leaving most of the details of the great conflict to be determined by those whose lesser intelligence has been given them for that very purpose?44 Johnson's reference to "the great conflict," which he conceived in moral terms, shows his dissent from a completely romantic and optimistic interpretation of evolution. Even the limitation of God's power was acceptable if necessary to preserve man's freedom: If there is any truth in evolution the whole history of the world proclaims a Creator who compasses His ends by gradual approaches

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in very much the same manner that man compasses his . . . the study of his methods indicates that he is limited in some way. 45 In this philosophy reason, analogy, and experience were all used interdependently. They yielded no conclusive argument for the religious interpretation of the universe; but they permitted the development of a metaphysic in which the existence of God and the freedom of man were still intelligible. A new line of defense for religion was introduced into the discussions by W . R. Benedict. What reason cannot supply may be found in emotion. Benedict put the two together without clearly defining the sphere of either: Can a man know without feeling? Can he proceed rationally in estimation of arguments for or against theism prior to any assimilation of theism in its spirit. . . . Arguments brought forward in support of theism cannot be estimated, because they cannot be experienced by the intellect alone. 46 O n the other hand "emotion is no higher light disclosing truths beyond the grasp of reason." 47 Others looked with more favor on feeling as a higher light disclosing truth. Newman Smyth confessed in an autobiographical paragraph that theistic thinking was in need of help. He turned to Samuel Harris' Philosophical Basis of Theism for Harris had found support for religious beliefs in religious experience as interpreted by the German idealists. Smyth welcomed the new emphasis enthusiastically. " W e are not satisfied simply with our own inference that there must be a God; we believe, not in an inferential Deity, but in the living God. We want a philosophy, not of our own inferences up towards God, but of God's impression of his own being upon our being." 48 Knowing God is here interpreted, significantly enough, not as a matter of moral choice, but as a matter of inner experience. "We are ourselves personally present in the omnipresence of God. We have our being in Him, and our higher religious consciousness is God's potential presence in the life of man. . . . Our idea of God, in a word, is the potential of God in our self-consciousness."49 Now the appeal to experience takes the place of the discredited arguments for God. George F. Genung of Amherst College, boldly pointed to the facts of the evolutionary struggle to show the inadequacy of the argument from design.

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Whenever we venture to admire the curious adaptation of talons to the prehension and tearing of prey, and thus to the furnishing of sustenance, the opposite fact that prey is torn and suffering and death produced stares us in the face." 50 If, then, we are to interpret the universe as containing an "Inner principle of benevolence" we are interpreting it, not as it is, but as it is becoming. This can be known only through spiritual insight.51 Genung's interpretation of religious experience was even more subjective than Smyth's. Knowing God is knowing the best of oneself: The religious man does not seek to know God by a purely objective knowledge; he gathers himself into a unity with the object known; he removes from his heart by acquiring a sense of forgiveness, all that consciously hinders him from union with the Infinite Will; he lives in his aspirations, and his purest hopes and longings; he frankly enters into communion with his eternal Ideal by self-crucifixion and assimilation of character. This he calls knowledge of God.52 There were some dissenting voices to the trend away from reason. Professor Dewey looked with disfavor on the increasing reliance upon poetry and emotion as a basis for belief about reality. " I confess," he said, "I do not understand how that can be true for the imagination and for the emotions, which is not also true for the intelligence."53 Poetic sentiment may have its place, but the advantage on the side of method and standard lies with science and philosophy where truth is involved. George Harris of Andover believed that to admit the existence of God could not be proved by reason was too great a concession to agnosticism.65 He took issue with Fiske's position that our idea of God is limited by our own experience. It is rather, said Harris, derived through reason. We can know what God is. In a later book, Moral Evolution, Harris stated an argument for God categorically. Since man is a part of the universe and is intelligent, the whole "must be intelligence."56 Theism has a constant struggle with the problem of evil. Most of the writers refused at this time to accept Johnson's solution of limitation on the power of God. Henry A. T . Torrey, at the University of Vermont, undertook an analysis of the problem on the basis of Leibnitz's Theodicee. He rejected the dialectics of the Theodicee with its conclusion that evil must always contribute to good. Evolution, with its uncounted centuries of struggle and waste, intensified the conviction that evil is real.57 If it be said that God does not will evil but only permits it, Torrey

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replies that "permission always implies power to prevent." 5 8 Now Torrey held that theism implies optimism. Optimism means the belief that the good "shall finally assert its truth and reveal its supremacy." Not even Leibnitz had been able to prove optimism valid by reason. Hence Torrey turns to intuition. He relies on the "natural instincts of man." Now, quite apart from any specific exercise of the intellect in the way of formal demonstration, there exists a sort of natural optimism of the heart, an optimism which asserts itself against all that appears to contradict it. Pessimism is artificial, non-natural. Every man is at heart an optimist. . . . W e accordingly betake ourselves to the shelter and illumination which our moral intuitions afford. . . . If theism is optimism, so also optimism is theism. . . . T h i s is affirmation, indeed, and not argument, but it is, nevertheless, rational, for it is affirmation of the same sort as that upon which all reasoning finally rests.59 Faith also has a claim above reason for Torrey. He once remarked that "undoubtedly pantheism is the most satisfactory form of metaphysics intellectually; but it goes counter to religious faith." 6 0 Mark Hopkins and William Forbes Cooley stressed personal immortality as affording a solution of the problem of the sufferings of the good in this world. 6 1 Only one writer held that evil is non-existent in nature. In an article on The New Natural Theology John Wright Buckham, later professor of theology, took the position that there is no positive ugliness in nature, that strife is a means of bringing about the greatest good, and that "all things natural blend in a harmony of beauty." Progress therefore cannot be from evil to good, it is only from the less perfect to the more perfect. Man does sin; but he, along with nature, is progressing toward perfection. 6 2 These philosophers of religion were engaged in as vigorous a defense of religious belief as that which had occupied their Calvinistic forefathers. W h a t is most important is that they were different beliefs; at least beliefs with an entirely new emphasis. God remains the center of the universe; but the Supreme Lord, transcendent Creator of the world who demands that man turn to him in an instantaneous and miraculous repentance in order to be saved for a blessed life in heaven has now become a creative, intelligent spirit, immanent in the forces of nature, and working for the gradual improvement of the entire creation. Man is not now primarily regarded as a being capable of complete

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love of God and standing under the divine approval or condemnation depending upon whether he has experienced regeneration of heart. Man is rather, like God, a worker toward perfection, an imperfect being laboring to improve himself and his world. He is a "creator and worker together with God," 63 a "being of vast capabilities." 64 This radical departure from the evangelical position is evident in the thought of George A. Gordon, Congregational minister: The battle is on between truth and falsehood, right and wrong, spiritual life and spiritual death, and the Christian warrior asks with the utmost seriousness whether the cause of man has an infinite ally. His supreme concern is to know whether God is really on the side of righteousness, whether the stars in their courses fight against evil, whether the order and power of the universe are in the interest of goodness.05 The question is no longer, does man love God?, but is there a God who supports man? Conviction of sin and hope of redemption have been supplanted in importance by what Gordon calls "this sad earnestness about God," 68 this "wistful yearning after the infinite," 87 a "pathetic wonder as to whether it be true of God and the soul that each can hear the other's call." 68 Gordon significantly retains the element of cosmic conflict between good and evil. This was evangelicalism but in a new setting. Now the conflict was not simply one within the soul of man, one which could be resolved by an instantaneous change of will. It is rather now a conflict extending through the whole course of the world's history. It is the conflict of the value creating activity of the universe not only against human sin, but also against chaos and the struggle of life against life. If there is any real goodness it is in man's struggle for righteousness. Not man's redemption, but God's help is the primary need of the world. This new orientation of the religious spirit was regarded by those who shared it as a profound gain over orthodoxy. Summarizing the spirit of his age Hamilton Wright Mabie wrote: "Compare any recent poem which, like In Memoriam sets forth some great Christian truth, with such a poem as the Paradise Lost, and one is conscious of an immense uplifting of thought." 89 In spite of this "uplifting" of thought, with its more favorable view of human nature, these thinkers reveal a common strain of melancholy in their mood which all the arguments for the existence of a personal

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God seemed powerless to overcome. In reviewing one of the realistic novels of the period Mabie confesses that science has produced disillusionment. He looks forward to the time when artists will again believe "that the Real and the Ideal are one in the divine order of the universe."70 But this time was in the future. Gordon's phrases "wistful yearning" and "pathetic wonder" are the uncertain undertone to his hopefulness. One of the Andover theologians frankly confessed the general uncertainty: Nothing is more evident than that a certain sense of fear which has begun to seize the heart of our generation. We are literally afraid of the world in which we live. It is so great, so uncontrollable, in many ways so unintelligible. Who shall solve the problems of our civilization? Who shall master the forces which have passed beyond our control?71 In these words written in 1892 William J . Tucker expressed, in addition to the uncertainty of religious belief about the universe, the growing sense of inadequacy to deal with social problems. Science and the problems of a machine age alike had undercut the assurance of orthodoxy. In spite of their optimism liberals have consistently tended toward a position of confusion, doubt and disillusionment. The move from liberalism to the pessimism of the Barthian theology is not so far as has been thought. In order to preserve Christian theology at all, the philosophical task of establishing man's freedom and the existence of God in opposition to philosophies like Spencer's was necessary. But the evangelical theologians at Andover saw that far more than answering Spencer was required. The most careful consideration of the nature of God, man, and the world in the light of the evolutionary world view was necessary. If the conceptions of evolution and progress are incorporated into Christian theology they force a radical reinterpretation of the doctrine of salvation. The problem the theologians faced can be more clearly seen as we examine the re-interpretation of ethical philosophy in the light of evolutionary categories.

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re-interpreted the scientific world view of the nineteenth century so as to retain belief in a personal G o d and a doctrine of man as a free, moral being. T h i s re-interpretation did not completely convince even its defenders. T h e y had lost their assurance, and they had set aside in large part the essentials of the Calvinistic scheme of salvation. W h e n the religious man feels that the question of questions is the existence of God, apparently little is left of orthodoxy's insistence that the determination of man's moral status and his eternal salvation is the crucial concern. T h e problems of evangelical doctrine became even more acute when the concepts of sin, of goodness, of perfection, and of man's status before G o d were considered in the light of evolutionary theory. T h e notion of development was now being applied to man's ideals and his relationship to his ideals. W h e n it was recognized that the content of man's idea of the good has undergone a constant change in the course of history it became increasingly difficult to give any intelligible meaning to the orthodox concept of an absolute judgment upon each man in terms of his attitude toward the perfect holiness of God. T h e very concept of moral perfection became harder to define when the evolutionary conception of comparative goods and evils slipping in and out of existence through a long and complex history was emphasized and its implications realized. Again, it became increasingly difficult to speak of man apart from the biological and socio-historical context in which he lives. W h a t meaning could be given to a "universal fall" and to condemnation of each individual person in this process of developing cultures where better and worse are relative terms? As we trace the development of the new concepts with which the liberal theology had to work three elements in the general background of this thought must be noted. It is true, first of all, that the problems involved in the attempt to bring all men under one final and absolute judgment regardless of their capacities, environment, or place in historical development did not appear for the first time with the idea of evolution. T h e questions of damnation of infants, salvation of the heathen, and others who die without knowledge of the Gospel is as old as the New Testament. T h e idea of evolution did intensify these old problems by making men more than PHILOSOPHERS OF RELIGION

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ever aware of the complex relationships in which each life is involved. T h e problem of God's judgment of man now appears no longer as a special and subordinate problem of Christian theology, but as a central problem. Evolution did raise certain special difficulties. Its most important feature with respect to the evangelical world view was the idea of the gradual attainment through a long development of both material and moral values. Evolution was an illustration of the persistent problem of harmonizing the supernatural drama of salvation with the natural data of human life. T h e issue is raised again today with the rise of neo-orthodox theologies. T h e Andover movement is not an isolated episode in apologetic history. A second fact to be noted is that the decline of the New England theology had already led the Andover men some distance from the Westminster Confession and Samuel Hopkins before the opening of the period we are examining. Already the Calvinist conception of regeneration had been partially supplanted by the liberal conception of a gradual development of moral character away from selfishness toward altruism. While Andover theologians did not abandon all the classic scheme of salvation, and re-interpreted its terms wherever possible, the significance of their thought must be seen in the light of the doctrines they neglected entirely as well as in the issues which they themselves chose to draw. T h e y had little to say about total depravity, regeneration through grace, and the atonement. A t the present time liberals themselves are wondering if the realities for which these concepts stood can be so easily set aside. W e shall therefore consider the thought of the Andover school in its relation to Reformation theology even though Andover itself spent little time either attacking or defending Reformation doctrines. Finally, notice must be taken of the leading concept of the nineteenth century, the idea which expresses the hope and the problem of the age, progress. Speaking in retrospect of the importance of the notion of progress in the mind of the late nineteenth century, William J. Tucker said: Men found themselves singularly stirred to think new thoughts and to attempt new methods of action. T h e r e was no manifest unity of purpose in the spirit of the age, but all movements, though often conflicting, were seen to make for progress. Gradually the desire and struggle for progress became the unifying purpose of the generation. 1

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T h e conception of progress and belief in it varied with different men. Some believed that questioning progress "was like questioning the polestar." 2 In an early number of the Review Edward E. Hale gave expression to the popular faith, fusing national pride with belief in the certain rise of the moral level of humanity: The country has advanced through its first century as no baccalaureate prophet, no Phi Beta doctrinaire, no Independence oratory of 1790 or 1800 dared to hope. And the real advance has been in the line of its higher life. More than the country has dared to say, as from hour to hour this progress has gone on, has it been in a deeper religious insight, and in stronger moral conviction.3 Hale's romantic conception of progress was punctured by Andover men as we shall see, but no one could wholly escape the idea and some belief in it. Evolution, if one did not think too much about Darwin's laws, seemed to lend support to the idea of progress. Evolution, progress, and salvation, these were the three central ideas which occupied the attention of theologians beginning in the 1870's. T h e present chapter will attempt to sharpen the background of the theological struggle with these ideas by considering the ways in which writers on ethical philosophy in the Review dealt with the relation of ethics to evolution. T h e consideration of ethical standards in the light of evolutionary concepts produced sharp differences of opinion. Different conceptions of the nature of evolutionary laws produced some of the issues. Much depended upon the importance thinkers were willing to attach to the slow achievement of relative values in time over against the emphasis on moral perfection. A few were willing to discuss ethics in evolutionary terms, most were undecided, and some were wholly critical of the attempt to find ethical standards within the natural processes. James T . Bixby, Unitarian, attempts to find a valid moral standard within the evolutionary process itself. Before he outlines the deduction of the moral ideal from nature, Bixby distinguishes his own conception of morality from that of Herbert Spencer. Spencer contended that moral principles necessarily change with the environment. Bixby replies, following Kant, that morality is in the intention, not the result of an act.4 Like most religious writers on ethics in this period, Bixby distrusted any system which implied a relativity of ethical ideals. The "good will" may remain true to unchanging principles even though its outward

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manifestations vary. Bixby also disagrees with Spencer's position that happiness is the final test of right. T h e concept of happiness, he says, is too vague to give a test of right. Moreover, a consistent evolutionary philosophy must find the test of right in "that toward which the universe is advancing as it mounts step by step the staircase of cosmic progress."® Now if happiness is the end of evolution then happiness should increase with the advancement of the process through time. But this is contrary to the facts. T h e highest type of human life is not the happiest life. Bixby is unwilling to follow Spencer in locating the origin of conscience in social restraints. This again would destroy the finality of any moral ideal. He locates the fundamental principle in the realm of mind, directly accessible to intuition. T h e validity of the insights of conscience can be based solely upon "the ease, directness, and certainty with which our moral reason perceives the quality of right in them." 6 As a final word of warning against Spencer Bixby says that ethical relativity and belief in the social origin of conscience "would destroy the sanction and the binding power of duty, and is fraught with the gravest danger to society if generally adopted." 7 Since he has said that reason perceives the quality of Tightness in acts through direct insight it appears unnecessary for Bixby to look for additional moral sanction from the evolutionary process. He is anxious, however, to make his case as strong as possible against Spencer's by showing that an absolute ethical standard can be found within nature. Shall we, therefore, because of the truth of evolution, admit duty and intuitive right to be but illusions, echoes of ancestral alarms and pressures; self-interest in disguise; or, on the contrary, shall we, in the name of sacred duty, erect at the boundary line of ethics a sign, inscribed with a solemn interdict to the advancing flood of evolution: "Hitherto shalt thou come and no further, and here shall thy proud waves be stayed?"8 Bixby takes neither of the alternatives he here suggests. He considers the influences of evolutionary thinking too great to be ignored. He turns therefore to a consideration of evolution in the hope that when it is thoroughly and logically studied it will reveal "a solid basis for morals." 9 Developing his own interpretation of evolution Bixby finds its most conspicuous feature a "constant upward tendency." 10 Evolution and progress are synonymous. This was Spencerian to be sure. What does

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Bixby mean by an upward tendency? He gives several answers. He points out the development from inanimate to animate, from the sentient to the rational, from the impersonal to the personal. 11 T h e higher species show an increase in rationality, in "penetration and saturation of the flesh by the spirit," 1 2 this in contrast to Spencer's emphasis on happiness. So far Bixby appears willing to discover by analysis and observation what the ends of evolution are and to accept them as the ideal goals for men. T h i s was apparently satisfactory so long as he could substitute spirituality for happiness as the ultimate outcome. Bixby has earlier said, however, that the ideal is perceived by men to be good in itself. Hence he does not say, these are the ends of evolution therefore they are good for man. He says these ends of the process are "recognized as superior to all that has proceeded." 13 He further complicates his position by introducing consciousness in place of rationality and personality as the end of evolution. 14 T h e "development of consciousness" is then made synonymous with the development of all man's possibilities, and finally is interpreted to mean the development of the spiritual personality. 15 Now the development of consciousness might conceivably be regarded as the end of evolution on the ground that greater variety of organic response and self-consciousness have been achieved in the course of time, but two serious problems remained. One was to show that this natural and psychical development had any moral quality. This problem Bixby avoids simply by identifying the concept of consciousness with the idea of spiritual personality which includes for him moral value. He relies upon intuition to guarantee the validity of the spiritual personality as a moral ideal. T h e other problem is that many forces in nature tend to destroy consciousness and spiritual personality. How then are they the true ends of the process any more than happiness? There is a partial answer in Bixby's claim that All our thirst for possessions, our lower ambitions for place, power, success, are but temporary scaffoldings, the unconscious and providential servants of this higher end. 16 Good may come out of evil. He does admit that some natural factors are not conductive to the attainment of the highest ideal. They must be suppressed. T h i s recognition of conflict, however, gives way to the optimistic conviction that the world is bound together in one great unity, an "orderly interdependent divine life." 1 7 Up to this point Bixby has considered the moral ideal in individual

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terms. He discusses next the relation of society to the moral ideal. Again he attempts to find the moral standard within the natural process. He appeals to the general law of the unity of all life, a law which surely could not be found in Darwin; but which Bixby professed to find in Spencer: T h e moral law is seated in the very structure of the universe, for it is the natural concord which manifests the unity of being, and is as indispensable to social existence as the force of gravitation to the continuance of the planetary system. 18 In order to identify social well-being with social unity the further assumption becomes necessary that the interests of the individual and of the group are identical. 10 But what of the struggle of life with life? Bixby calls attention to mutual aid as a factor in evolution and presses the argument as far as possible. 20 He has already said that man's struggle for power contributes to moral ends. Altruistic impulses do the same. Hence the optimistic conclusion is possible that all things work together for the greatest possible good. T h e tendency upward is inevitable and unchecked: T h e power that manifests itself in the universe about us (and equally the power that rules within us) is a power that makes for righteousness. Vice and injustice go to pieces before it. T h e social life and the sympathetic forces gain steadily upon the isolated and the selfish life, so that the union of man with man, and of humanity with all the rest of creation steadily increases. T h e shining ideals of beauty, truth, and virtue draw us upward and onward, toward the goal of an ever enlarging perfection ahead of us. 21 By carefully selecting the features of evolution to which one would give attention, and by using intuition as a basis of knowledge when necessary, evolution could be interpreted in thoroughly optimistic and moral terms. Bixby proved that. In his position evolution, progress, and salvation are all one process. T h e concepts all mean the same thing. Charles F. Dole, Unitarian minister and graduate of Andover in 1872, shared Bixby's general position but gave greater clarity to the test of moral value by holding that utility in the sense of what is ultimately beneficent is at the root of the ethical life and will prove to be the final test of right. 22 He pushes this test as far as possible in the direction of an absolute standard unconditioned by private prejudice or opinion.

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W e ought to do right because it is good, but when we say good, we mean not good for us, or good now, but good, eternally good, good for all, good for us only as a part of all. 23 Pressed for a statement as to what the good is, Dole follows Bixby in relying on the knowledge of the "enlightened conscience." 24 How powerfully the idea of progress dominated this thought is evident in Dole's statement that the questions of philosophy reduce themselves to one, namely: "Is there a beneficent drift or tendency of things? Is there such a fact as the good? T h e affirmative of this question is the statement of the existence of God." 2 5 One would normally suppose that the question whether there is a general tendency of things toward the good, and whether anything is good are two separate questions. But not for one under the spell of nineteenth century evolutionary thinking. Strictly speaking Dole had separated these two questions more than had Bixby, for Dole located the test of value in the principle of utility rather than in the ends of natural history. Critics of this optimism appeared. In Europe the philosophies of Schopenhauer and his disciple, Hartmann, painted a very different picture of the universe. In sharp contrast to the optimism of Bixby and Dole, Chauncey B. Brewster, late Episcopal Bishop of Connecticut, relied on Hartmann as support of his contention that so far as nature herself is concerned no optimism about the future of human life is justified. He agrees with Bixby that the end of nature cannot be happiness: It is not upon the low ground of any happiness, however or whensoever, now or hereafter, that life is to be vindicated against pessimistic questionings and despair. Our stand must be taken upon the lofty position of a moral life, to which all else is subordinated, embracing moral ends to which both pain and pleasure are means. 26 Even the attainment of the moral order, however, cannot be looked for in existence. Hence Brewster does not try to show that nature's end is the attainment of moral value. Brewster states the meaning of morality in terms of the possibilities of human life. Behind all doing of duties is the being endowed with life, and therefore capable of growth, endowed with conscious life, and therefore capable of effort, toward perfection, toward the realization, that is, of the possibilities felt within and pressing for fulfillment... . This perfection is broad enough to have a legitimate place for science

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and art, and all those large and impersonal interests without which life is necessarily narrow, and therefore dull and joyless.27 T h e ideal is related, not to nature, but to human interests. This ideal cannot be fully realized in existence. W h y then does his view bring any ultimate security against despair? He might have said that man should be satisfied with what values can be achieved in existence, but he too was searching for an absolute good. Hence the ground of optimism must be found in a reality transcending the world. " A divine perfection is at once the supreme reality, and also the unfailing spring and infinite inspiration of human effort." 28 Only in knowing the perfect God can man be at one with the source of goodness and redeemed from evil. A secure refuge from the misery of pessimism is afforded only by faith in a higher realm of truth and righteousness and love, an eternal order transcending the limitations and shocks of time, while consecrating and blessing the course of this world. 29 Brewster's is a fairly successful attempt to hold together the conception of real values and the obvious limitations of the achieved values of existence without obliterating the distinction between the goods of this world and absolute perfection as the more optimistic thinkers had done. For Brewster man is in the process of achieving a higher life, but never a perfect life. If he does achieve good it is not because nature forces progress in goodness; but because of supernatural aid. Man knows and finds his final assurance of moral Tightness, not by completely transforming himself or the world, but by becoming aware of and living in the light of the divine perfection. T h e possibility of a compromise with Calvinism in which man is saved both by moral progress in time and by the love of eternal holiness was present in Brewster's thought. Men who saw evolution through the eyes of Darwin rather than Spencer did not forget that complete moral assurance could only be found in a transcendent God. Professor Dewey saw only confusion arising from the attempt to deduce moral ideals from the evolutionary process. He pointed out three traits of moral action which cannot be discovered in any physical process. These are activity for an end, activity from choice, and activity towards an ideal. T h e natural process is simply an arbitrary rearrangement of physical patterns. Value and end have no meaning within it. 30 It is by no means certain that the evolutionary process has any concern

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for man and his interests. Man is simply one form of life that the general cosmic process has developed: He may be one form through which the course of evolution passes; but that is all that he can be. What, then, in bold Anglo-Saxon, is the sense of talking about the goal of the process of evolution being a goal for man, except that it be something in which he is absorbed, swallowed up, forever lost. 31 Evolution displays many characteristics diametrically opposed to human ideals: T h e process is one of conflict; its very condition is opposition, competition, selection, survival. T h e ideal is harmony, unity of purpose and life, community of well-being—a good which does not admit of being competed for, but in which all must share. 32 Dewey supports this sharp distinction between the idealistic and naturalistic interpretation of the end of human action by distinguishing between two possible meanings of the term end. It may mean simply the termination of a natural process. But natural terminations have no ethical significance. T h e ethical end "is that which interprets, which gives meaning to, which unifies all processes." 33 T h e constructive development of this end or ideal which is unifying and meaningful is not carried out in his paper. It is clear that the starting point in any case must be with personal values instead of with the cosmic process.34 In a final paragraph Dewey softens the distinction between nature and value on the basis of an idealistic metaphysics: N o one who is convinced that ethics has its basis in the rational and spiritual constitution of reality—denies that there is a tendency toward an end, an end which is described well enough in the terms of Mr. Spencer, but more simply as a perfect harmony, a unity in variety. 35 T h e fact of a goal in nature implies that the purely physical interpretation of reality is inadequate. When the place of moral values in the world is considered "we must substitute a teleological theory of evolution for the mechanical, we must read physical causes in terms of rational purpose." 38 W h e n the conception of the universe is thus broadened to include this ethical tendency it is possible to speak of "the incorporation of ethical ends in the very structure of reality." 37 T h i s

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idealism which begins with a sharp distinction between nature and value may ultimately be pushed in the direction of an integration of nature and value as the later development of Dewey's own thought shows. Dewey's distrust of the derivation of moral ends from an empirical account of evolution was shared by J . H. Hyslop of Columbia University. "Evolution is explanatory, ethics is legislative." 38 Hyslop develops the Kantian conception of a universal moral imperative. He too finds it necessary to take issue with the utilitarians on the question of pleasure and pain as the ultimate basis of all value and dis-value. T o refute this hedonism Hyslop argues on the basis of evolution that perfection and the full development of powers are the real ends to be realized. T o these ends pleasure and pain can be only a means. 39 Hyslop considers the problem of ethical relativity which evolution intensified, not only for ethics but also for evangelical theology. T h e evolutionary idea applied to morals implies that moral commands are relative to specific environments and cultures and are in a constant process of change. Professor Schurman of Cornell had published a book on the ethical import of Darwinism in which he proposed that all philosophizing about ethics be suspended until an ethical science based upon universal ethical principles had been derived. But it was just such a conception of universal moral principles that the developmental doctrine tended to discredit. In reviewing Schurman's book, Hyslop points out that ethics is the science of the ought, and this method of inquiring into the practices of men in order to determine the ought is irrelevant: It is only Locke's false method of rummaging in the brains of babies and savages for failing cases of "innate ideas," and then pronouncing for a theory of man's "nature," which left all the "nature" out of it. 40 Ethics need not be concerned with the empirical inquiry at all. "With this view of the subject we do not care what the practices of savages really are. We may still inquire whether they ought to be what they are." 4 1 Absolute determination of moral principles is possible; but the question of the relation of human moral activity to the processes and powers of existence is still undetermined. Hyslop scorns the derivation of moral ideals from the evolutionary process. "Can we legislate for mankind upon the mere basis of power?" This was a Darwinian view of evolution.

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Hyslop declares that human society has been based from the beginning on a principle opposed to the struggle for power. 42 He does not mean by this that social relationships have always been ordered in accordance with true moral principles. Regarding this theory of conflict of power in society Hyslop admits that " N o doubt it well describes the actual influence of might in determining things as they are." 4 3 But unless this struggle is qualified in society with a recognition of moral imperatives society could not exist at all. Hyslop does not discuss the argument that ethical ideals in any society are derived from and organically related to the struggle for power in that society except to point out that the origin of moral ideas is not a test of their validity. If it be admitted, however, that might determines the order of society, and if the ethical ideal contradicts the law of might, then the ought becomes a transcendent principle wholly unrealized in existence. A rigorous application of the principle that 'evolution is explanatory, ethics legislative,' may quickly be translated into a Calvinistic doctrine of universal corruption. Hyslop does not draw this implication. He represents a last stand against the attempt to derive ethical standards from nature. His ultimate test of the good is social welfare. 44 All these writers ultimately found the basis of the moral standard outside the natural processes. Even Bixby, who tries hardest to find the ought within evolution, makes the ultimate knowledge of right intuitive. In all cases they are agreed that the good is, at least in part, realized in existence. Some of them, with high optimism, believed that all the forces of existence work together for human goodness. Brewster believes that higher types are evolving, but that the realization of perfection is possible only in God. Dewey and Hyslop went further in emphasizing the non-ethical character of the struggle for existence as outlined by Darwin. Dewey admits a trend toward the realization of higher values within nature, but only because nature can be fully understood as embodying a spiritual principle which makes possible the development of moral values out of the physical order. Three aspects of this thought have significant implications for evangelical theology. First, the conception of good as progressing in the world through time places life in a different perspective from that of the revolutionary act of grace which snatches men miraculously from a state of sin. Again evolution raised many questions about the determination of the true ends of human life. Were they to be found within the process itself, or were they to be found in ideals realized only in God? Given a world in which a better is developing out of a worse, man may feel satis-

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fied with the relative goods of existence and feel no great concern over his status in the mind of a perfectly holy God. Evolutionary theories greatly complicated the problem of determining the standard of right and wrong. Sometimes the standard was sought in reason, sometimes in intuition, often in both. Uncertainty as to ethical standards, a growing characteristic of the modern mind from this time on, is certain to cause difficulty for the evangelical doctrine of man. It is hard to separate the sheep from the goats when goats are possibly gradually becoming sheep and it is difficult to say which is which anyhow. Finally, the evolutionary view of man implied that moral judgments must be made in terms of the greatly differing environments in which man lives. Hyslop noted this point and its significance: "Evolution limits our right to assume that all men, even under the same social environment have the same moral capacities." 45 He said that this was, on the face of it, revolutionary. A n d so it was. Evolutionary ethical concepts were directly related to evangelical doctrines by F. H. Johnson. He was aware of the difficulty of the task and referred amusingly to those Christians who try to fit evolution into their thinking, but who find, when they get to the problem of evolution and morals that "their light goes out altogether. They stumble and grope, and in their distress declare the application of the principle to morals impossible; or seek to fly the idea of evolution altogether by calling to mind the missing link." 46 Johnson refused to escape by either route. He attempted to outline a moralized evolutionary doctrine of man. Man has developed as a moral being. T h e fall of man which involved the first knowledge of good and evil was definitely an upward step. T h e development has not been all in one direction. "From the dawn of civilization to the present time, man has suffered losses as well as made great gains." 47 T h e adjective "great" weighted the optimistic side of the picture here. But on the other hand, man is capable of much greater evils than is the animal. He can be more completely and destructively selfish. There may be a very slow general moral improvement. In contrast to Bixby, however, Johnson rests this belief in progress, not on empirical data, but on faith: So long as we keep our faith in God, we can believe and think we see that all this new thought and new life, and all this destruction of old things, marks the opening of a higher and nobler career for man. 48 As far as possible Johnson sought to relate moral principles to natural law. "Morals are not the contradiction of the natural processes."49

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Sacrifice in human life has its counterpart in the plant world where the life of one generation is sacrificed to the next. What of the struggle for existence? Johnson followed Drummond in an attempt to give a moral interpretation of the conflict of life with life. T h e moral life is a life of struggle, not against other life, but against lower instincts and evil forces.50 This was an utterly unwarranted transformation of the idea of struggle in nature. When moralists faced the full implications of Darwin's theory they were desperate. In the struggle against evil moral character is the goal. Spencer's goal of evolution, a condition of harmonious adjustment, would really mean stagnation. T h e highest life emerges from conflict. T h e moral ideal is an illustration of all natural goals according to Johnson. He states the ideal in biological terms. By comparing many individual specimens of a thing we arrive at a conception of its most perfect possible development, and we form an ideal type, which constitutes the fullest expression of the nature of this particular thing. 51 T h e idea of perfection includes "all the power and capabilities of a given thing for sustained well-being and reproduction." 52 T h a t which fully realizes its own nature fully realizes the ideal. Johnson accepts the implications of this conception of the ideal for man's relation to it. T h e goal of human life is the realization in existence of human possibilities. This is God's aim as well as man's. 53 T h e future life becomes significant, not as a final state, but as a further opportunity for development of character. 54 Since the ideal is ascertained by analysis of the type, man's concept of the ideal is never complete. " I t is an attempt in the direction of the perfect ideal, and the direction is, at most, all we can be sure of." 55 Man can know God only as he knows the highest type of human life. Knowledge of God is therefore also imperfect. 58 Love to God has its "germinal stages," and its fuller realization: This moral personality is not a stationary thing. It is a consciously moving existence; and the most prominent thing in its consciousness is the conviction of unrealized possibilities into which it is developing, or may develop. Subtract from personality its sense of immaturity, blot out its _, , . . . Blank misgivings of a creature Moving about in worlds not realized. and you blot out the thing itself. 57

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Calvinism which damns or saves man depending upon one complete and final turning toward love for God topples if man is a "creature moving about in worlds not realized." Johnson has moved practically the whole way toward a naturalistic, evolutionary doctrine of man. What meaning can he give to regeneration, salvation, and judgment in the light of this philosophy? Johnson begins his answer by attempting to translate the evangelical concepts into this new naturalism. Man works out his own salvation in cooperation with God. Salvation may mean "a complete triumph over evil . . . the full realization of man's higher possibilities." 58 Thus understood it is never completed on earth, it is "a process that moves toward its fulfillment." 59 T h e good to be realized is the good of human life: Creation and salvation are but different aspects of one process . . . men are saved not by being snatched out of the process of the world, not by being turned back to a condition previously occupied and lost, but saved into a higher state by the progressive development of spiritual life. 60 Both regeneration and sanctification are synonymous with the development of man's spiritual character. Both are "processes." 61 Calvinists did speak of sanctification as a process, but of regeneration, never. If man is always in process of becoming, how can he find any permanent moral satisfaction? Johnson replies that the only permanent satisfaction is in becoming. 62 T h e attainment of eternal life is always beyond. Love for God, once achieved, must be preserved by effort. Johnson had not entirely lost his evangelical conscience; and after this bold statement of a new position he found conflicts emerging in his thought. After all what are individuals living for if they are simply parts of a general historical development in which millions are born, live, and die? Is each individual purpose only to contribute something to a general advance? Johnson names this conception of the individual as living in the future of the race "corporate immortality." He dissents from it for two reasons. One is that the attainment of high moral character in this life should be rewarded by the persistence of personality after death. If we give up this idea we are without faith and without hope: During untold thousands of years human beings have been toiling, fighting, suffering, for what? Not for anything they can participate in, but for the earthly happiness of some few far-off generations that shall exist when evolution has reached its climax and before it has advanced far on the decline that awaits all material thinars.63

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Each individual must have an opportunity to participate in the final blessedness. This was an important aspect of the evangelical system, and Johnson tries to preserve it. History is a great training school. "Its diploma, WELL DONE, GOOD AND FAITHFUL . . . is given to him alone who has developed moral life and power according to his environment." 64 Men are to be brought before an eternal judgment. The judgment as now conceived is to take into account the environment in which the individual lived. This was a significant modification of evangelicalism. Johnson had retained, however, an emphasis upon the individual moral character in its relation to God. T h e evolutionary achievement of a general human improvement over a long period of time holds too little of goal or hope for religion. T o claim that "the one infinitely worthy product of evolution" is moral character shifts the emphasis from the evolution to the product. 65 Johnson still holds, in contrast to Calvinism, that man is saved through the attainment of moral character. The doctrine of God's revelation of perfection in Christ posed problems for Johnson's evolutionary conception of the ideal. Christ has brought a general moral illumination into human history. Both in his teachings and in his acts he has set before men a higher standard. "In the Sermon on the Mount he took the law of Moses and spiritualized its letter to such a degree as to make righteousness impossible." 66 This was strong language from one who had just been identifying salvation with the attainment of righteousness. Yet Johnson went on: Love one another as I have loved you. This brief commandment makes the whole life of Christ a standing condemnation of every man who accepts him as the truth. T o love men as Christ loved them sets before every one of his followers a hopeless standard. 67 Christ's revelation therefore involves a moral condemnation of man. Since Johnson has said that man's knowledge of the ideal is always imperfect this claim that Jesus embodies human perfection needs proof; but no proof is forthcoming. Having affirmed (without proof) that man does know the ideal in Christ, and that knowing it he realizes his own moral failure Johnson is on the point of reestablishing the whole Calvinist system. He does not go quite that far. He tries rather to harmonize naturalism with man's moral condemnation. He tries to show that the revelation of the ideal in Christ may contribute to the slow, gradual, evolutionary process of salvation, which still is taken to mean the attainment of moral character. "Can we

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discover in this morally destructive work a necessary stage of the great world process?" 68 When the ideal is revealed to man he must make a supreme effort to rise to something higher, or morally perish; for besides the pain of the present there is a sense of peril, the shadow of an impending calamity and the loss of everything.69 This sense of failure can be a stimulus to moral action only if there is hope along side of it. Johnson appeals to the forgiveness of sins, carefully qualified: T h e full and free forgiveness of sins, while it relieves men of the burdens of the past, is, as regards the future, relaxing and ideal obscuring. T o prevent its acting in this mischievous way, therefore, it is necessary that it should be inseparably joined with an impression of the true, the remote, the infinitely difficult ideal of God. 70 Johnson's practical interest is the achievement of moral character. He uses Christian doctrine to that end as the Hopkinsians of a previous age had used doctrine in order to make regeneration possible.71 Johnson has admitted the central point on which the Calvinist scheme ultimately rests, the difference between the perfect holiness of God and the perversity and feeble goodness of man. He must fall back upon the position that salvation consists in the slow, never-completed progress of morjtl character or he must alter the concept of salvation, or he must turn to a Pauline mystical fulfillment of life through union with Christ. He does turn first to Paul. In Christ man has the assurance that: he is expected to conquer in his own strength, but that the Spirit shall work within him; and that faithful striving will, through God, result in a triumphant ending, no matter how great the discouragements of the long conflict. 72 This assurance is not enough. Johnson therefore qualifies his earlier concept of salvation. He had said it was the attainment of moral character, the realization of human possibilities. But now "In Christianity there is developed a higher element than self-realization." He continues in language reminiscent of Jonathan Edwards' disinterested love for God: T h e end of religion is the realization of one's own life in that of another,—the conscious surrender and uniting of the soul which has

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lived in conscious separation. . . . From Him in whom all fulness dwells our lives have flowed, and in Him all our desires, aspirations, and highest emotions shall find an ever-widening and deepening satisfaction. 73 In this "neo-Calvinistic" doctrine Johnson does not separate salvation from attainment of moral character. He refers to Paul who, he says, does not fail to recognize a vital continuity between a life of moral endeavor without Christ and the higher life of realization in Christ. 74 In the course of struggling with the problem, however, Johnson has illustrated in a striking manner the progress from a purely moralistic conception of salvation to one close to the evangelical position under the stress of an emphasis on both man's weakness and moral perfection. In understanding the appeal of Calvinism it must be kept in mind that while Calvinism emphasized man's sin it gave also, to the regenerate, a complete assurance of moral adjustment to the universe. T h e need to feel right with one's world and its ideals is deep in the human soul. Optimists who thought evolution and progress were synonymous could find their assurance within the process. Others who looked more realistically at nature and human life had to look elsewhere for the hope of salvation. T h e Andover theology to which we now turn was a compromise with optimism, not a capitulation to it. It was an attempt to incorporate the new hope for humanity's progress into Christian theology, and at the same time to preserve the assurance which a supernatural goodness and an otherworldly salvation could bring to disillusioned souls.

4 EVANGELICAL

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ANDOVER

T H A T EVOLUTIONARY PHILOSOPHIES a n d t h e o r i e s of p r o g r e s s h a d r a d i c a l

implications for evangelical doctrine was recognized by the new generation of Andover theologians w h o began the publication of the Andover Review in 1884. Most of them had been students of Edwards A. Park; but they no longer believed his High Calvinism. O n e of the Andover editorial writers asked in 1884: Does anyone believe that the truth will be effective if it is presented only in the forms which were appropriate to the centuries which lie behind us? T h e gospel must be translated and interpreted to modern thought in modern terms. 1 A restatement of Christian theology was needed, and A n d o v e r undertook the task. T h e theologians were aware of the difficulties they confronted and were uncertain as to where the new departure might lead. Egbert C. Smyth, for example, a competent historian of theology, wrote in introducing the Review that contributions would be welcome from representatives of other Christian schools of thought w h o might throw new light on perplexing theological problems. 2 T h i s substitution of inquiry into the meaning of the gospel for dogmatic statement of its "eternal" truths is the most striking difference between Andover liberalism and the N e w England theology from which it came. It is the one certain basis on which this school can be called liberalism, for liberalism is not primarily a system of doctrine, but rather an attitude toward doctrine. It is the position that truth can be attained only through a never-ending process of criticism and experiment. It is the willingness to understand many points of view. T h i s attitude is not being defended here. Something in criticism of it will be said at a later point. But the attitude is there. Andover theology of this liberal period can not be set down in one formal statement. T h e thought was in process of development, and was never finished. As we follow the twisting and often inconsistent route of Andover thinking, it must be borne in mind that as liberals these men had a new conception of theology. It is not final statement of truth, but the tentative and partial exposition of a many-sided truth. How to re-state Christian theology and keep the result one that can still be called Christian constitutes one of the persistent problems of lib-

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eralism. Andover men who were aware that they were openly departing from New England Calvinism sought some way to justify their work by relating it to fundamental Christian thought and experience. They found one of the usual liberal solutions. The "New Theology" was to be a return to "pure Christianity." Introducing the Review to the public Professor Smyth stated the aim of the new theological thought to be to "think according to Christianity." This meant to "return to the primitive consciousness of spiritual truth. . . . T o realize the living gospel out of which came the gospel that the Apostles preached."3 Smyth pointed out that Christian doctrine had undergone a continual development through its history. This development was not always an advance. He pointed to the New England theology of Andover's own background as an example of a theology become scholastic, that is too formal, and unrelated to life. Smyth did not believe that a final statement of Christian truth could ever be made: It cannot reasonably be questioned that every reader of these pages is now holding some belief as a part of his Christian faith, some dogma as a part of his theology, which Christian men of later generations will reject. 4 The first major work of the Andover school in this attempt at theological restatement was the publication of a series of editorials dealing with central Christian doctrines. The work was called Progressive Orthodoxy, a title which on the face of it indicated the irenic temper of the thought. The editorials were published over the names of all the editors as was the custom with most of the editorial writings in the Review. Only by chance or special sources can the author of a particular editorial be named. In discussing this editorial material, therefore, reference must be made to "Andover's" position. In the case of Progressive Orthodoxy, fortunately, the names of the authors of particular sections have been revealed by William J. Tucker in his My Generation. Evolution and progress were in the background of this first theological essay. A third factor also must be described. The missionary enterprise had grown in size and significance throughout the great period of nineteenth century expansion. The problem of the relationship of Christianity to other faiths became more acute with each passing year. The Andover school became involved in and almost identified with one particular phase of doctrinal discussion growing out of the missionary enterprise. The problem was really a very old one: What shall Christians

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think about the fate of those who die without saving repentance? Are they condemned to everlasting punishment? It was the old question of the universalist challenge to orthodoxy. T h i s problem of the unsaved persists in evangelical theology. It comes in conflict with belief in a merciful God. T h e expansion of the missionary enterprise emphasized the difficulty and gave it a new turn. T h e very basis of missions, in evangelical thought, was the proclamation of an absolutely necessary gospel to those who without hearing it would be lost. So many millions die without hearing the gospel. Are they all lost? Is the gospel absolutely necessary to salvation? T h e r e were three possible answers. One was the strict insistence that those who die without repenting, whether they have heard the gospel or not will be condemned to eternal punishment. Sensitive and humane theologians increasingly shrank from this position. Orthodox Calvinists inclined to a second view. T h e light of reason and conscience are sufficient for revealing the holiness of God to heathen. T h e heathen who die without repentance are therefore righteously condemned whether they have heard of Christ or not. Andover now raised the question, on this orthodox position what motive remains for missions? Why carry a gospel over the world if reason and conscience are enough? Andover sought a third way out. Knowledge of the gospel is necessary to saving repentance, but those who do not hear the gospel in this life may have opportunity in the future life to know of God's love as it is revealed in Christ, and thus to be saved if they accept the gospel. God will judge men only after each one has had full opportunity to express or deny love to Him. T h i s was the doctrine of "future probation." Newman Smyth, brother of Egbert C. Smyth, had introduced it in America as an answer to a skeptics thrust at Christianity on the matter of unsaved heathen. He edited an English edition of Dorner's Eschatology, which offered this hypothesis. His approval of the doctrine was a factor in the refusal of the Andover Trustees to appoint him as Park's successor in the chair of theology. 5 T h e Andover professors took up the idea. T h e central purpose of Progressive Orthodoxy was to establish the necessity of the gospel for the salvation of all men, and yet avoid the major difficulty of this position by the hypothesis of a future probation for those who do not hear the gospel in this life. T h e controversy over future probation raged for many years. Andover was bitterly attacked and stoutly defended. General Councils of the Congregational Church split over the issue. T h e American Board refused to send out as missionaries Andover graduates who subscribed

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to the new hypothesis, and brought upon itself the wrath, not only of Andover, but of many others in the Congregational fold. Much of the time and thought of the Andover men was devoted to debate on this issue; but the major significance of Andover's theological work lies beyond this relatively minor controversy. Actually Andover theologians were reinterpreting the nature of salvation, as they themselves knew. 6 Progressive Orthodoxy was influenced by the theory of evolution, by the idea of progress, and by the expansion of the missionary enterprise. T h e writers expressed in a paragraph the spirit of the new movement and its setting in the expanding culture of the West: T h e thought is full of encouragement and stimulus that through the various missionary societies, now well organized and conducted by men of large experience, the church today might lay a hand of power and blessing—as it were, the very benediction of Christ—on every island and continent of the globe. . . . Providence has been developing through the century the requisite organizations. It is now giving access to every field, however long closed and sealed. T h e continent of Africa is becoming as open to missions as the sunlight. T h e remotest provinces of China will soon be in active commercial relations with Western civilization. T h e islands of the Pacific and the continents of Asia and Africa will, ere long, be more thoroughly crossed and recrossed by routes of travel and traffic than was the Roman Empire when it was conquered by the early church. As never before the world is prepared for the gospel. Has the church a gospel for the world? 7 With respect to the intellectual setting of their thought the editors had but one remark to make. It had far-reaching consequences: W e add a single remark upon the general philosophical conception of God and his relation to the .universe which underlies these essays. It is a modification of a prevailing Latin conception of the divine transcendence by a clearer and fuller appreciation (in accordance with the highest thought of the Greek fathers) of the divine immanence. Such a doctrine of God, we believe, is more and more approving itself in the best philosophy of our time, and the fact of the Incarnation commends it to the acceptance of the Christian theologian. 8 During the early years of the publication of the Review the problem of the revelation of God in Christ did not trouble the Andover

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theologians. They used, as in this quotation, the convenient emphasis on God's immanence as a connecting link between evolution and the incarnation, thus neatly reconciling science and orthodoxy. The problems involved will occupy our attention in the next chapter. In the stage of thought now under consideration Jesus is simply regarded as the revelation of God to man, a revelation which embodies an absolute moral ideal. "All things point to man and man is perfected in the Son of Man." 9 "His words are not those of any school of thought." 10 He is not a teacher, but the teacher. Christianity is not just one gospel, it is the gospel. This absolute character of the revelation of God in Christ was an important element in the evangelical theology. The holiness of God and man's status in relation to it must be known. Andover was fully aware of the importance of the absolute revelation in Christ: It is evident that the more clearly the reality and worth of the Person of Christ are discerned, the stronger becomes the motive to every Christian virtue. . . . Make its (Christianity's) central Person contingent, relative, transitory, and such is the outlook of men today, and such the whole attitude of their minds to truth, that they cannot be won to that absolute devotion to Christ which is essential to Christian living and Christian work.11 Having assumed this central point of ethical certainty within the changing ideals of an evolutionary world the theologians asked the question regarding man's status before God. Professor Harris began the inquiry with a paper on the atonement. In evangelicalism the primary object of all religious faith and practice is the redemption of men from sin. Harris was continuing the evangelical emphasis by re-stating the significance of Christ's atoning work. But in an age dominated by belief in progress the gradual improvement of mankind had become as important a kind of salvation as a revolutionary regeneration of the individual heart. Therefore in introducing the discussion of the atonement Harris announces that he has a somewhat different attitude toward the evangelical emphasis on the eternal status of sinful men. He declares that "redemption from sin even if the most important is but one of the revelations of God in Christ." 12 This is followed by a statement of Christ's relationship to the universe: The created universe and all rational beings are through Christ and in Christ. There He mediates and reveals God to any part of his universe according to the condition or need which may exist in that

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part. If at any point his world is sick, weary, guilty, hopeless, there Christ is touched and hurt, and there He appears to restore and comfort. 13 T o identify all the creative and restorative forces of the universe with the work of Christ was at least a significant extension of the traditional doctrine if not a radical reinterpretation of it. Having made this concession to the doctrine of progress Harris turns to the atonement. What is the change in man's relationship to God which the life and death of Christ brought about? In Harris' statement of the problem of the atonement his altered conception of man is evident: T h e church comes now to man, well aware that he cannot be separated from custom, habit, heredity, fixedness of character, the social organism of which he is part. It is seen that redemption must be grounded in reason, and must meet the actual conditions of life and character in society. Atonement must express and reveal God as the supreme Reason and perfect Righteousness, who cannot deny himself, and who cannot disregard nor annul the moral law which is established in truth and right. Christian thought, having established itself on the intrinsic, absolute right and on the inexorableness of law so firmly that these may be accepted as postulates in all the inquiry, agreeing so far forth with Anselm on the one hand and with the latest natural ethics on the other, is going forward now to learn if any ethical ends are secured by the revelation of God in Christ, and secured in such a way that God energizes in man and society for a moral transformation so radical and complete that it may be called salvation, redemption, eternal life, divine sonship. 14 Salvation is now "moral transformation." This was the significant conception. T h e redeemed man is the repentant man. This is evangelical enough. But repentance means moral transformation: T h e penitent man, so far as he really repents is in the exercise of a freedom which resists and almost subjugates the forces of evil.15 Moral transformation is the essence of regeneration, not simply its fruit. Christ's atoning work must be given a corresponding re-interpretation. His death is significant, Harris says, not because it removes obstacles to God's forgiving man, but because it helps man to repent. Harris did keep the traditional language by speaking of the substitutionary atone-

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ment; but by this he meant that since the life and death of Christ the human race is in a different relationship to God because it is potentially capable of repentance, whereas before Christ's death the race could not repent: T h e substitution is not of Christ standing on this side for the race standing on that side, but the race with Christ in it is substituted for the race without Christ in it. T h i s Christ in with the race is regarded by God as one who has those powers of instruction, sympathy, purity, which can be imparted to his brethren. Likewise the individual in Christ takes the place of the individual without Christ, is looked on as one whom Christ can bring to repentance and obedience, and so is justified even before faith develops into character. 10 Personal piety toward the figure of Jesus, with a constant stress on the forgiving nature of God is the foundation of this first Andover discussion of salvation. T o the individual, so long as he knows God only on the side of nature and law, God is unreconciled. Not till he sees Christ in his sacrificial love does he know that God can and will forgive. 17 T h i s was a more positive basis of moral persuasion than the orthodox threat of hell. There was a germ here also of the sentimentality which besets all liberal theologies. Interest in the transformation of man's moral character became more and more controlling in Andover thought; but something of the evangelical feeling for the status of sinful man before a perfectly Holy and Righteous God remained in Progressive Orthodoxy. In discussing future probation the authors tried to preserve the doctrine that all men are finally judged: T h e consequences of holiness and of sin cannot be set aside by the will of God. . . . T h e opinion that because God is good he will not let his children suffer, but will forgive them and save them, sees only the happiness of man, and has no perception of ethical well-being. 18 How can the significance be stated of a final judgment upon men who are in process of moral development when this development actually constitutes their salvation? T h i s was the crux of the question and in dealing with it Andover revealed how radically different was the new conception of judgment from that of Calvinism.

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T h e position had been taken that man cannot come to a saving repentance without the motive of Christ's example, his revelation of the Divine Love. Will God leave men without this necessary motive and then condemn them because they do not repent? Andover answered no. If God does not make himself known in Christ to men in this life, he will do so in a future state. What has become now of the conception of the divine judgment? T o call this confrontation of man with the motive of repentance a "probation" involved a curious shift in the idea of what God's judgment upon man involves. For orthodoxy man is condemned for what he is, a sinner whose ways are selfish ways. T h e doctrine of original sin was one way of expressing the belief that man in his natural state is already under condemnation. Harris himself came close to this idea of man's natural sinfulness when he admitted that: the gospel not only admits but assumes and insists that men know the difference between right and wrong. The ethical teaching of Christianity, therefore, is not unlike other codes of ethics, except as it is more clearly and comprehensively enunciated, and more beautifully exemplified in the life of Jesus. What men lack is not the knowledge but the power of goodness.19 Future probation means, therefore, not a new insight into right, but confrontation with God's desire to save. But who would resist the forgiveness of God? The old theology was intelligible at least when it said that man might turn away from God and love some lesser object. But man could not resist the actual exercise of God's grace. In contrast, Andover held that man's probation consisted in his ultimate decision as to whether or not he would accept God's offer of salvation. T h a t this was the ultimate meaning of the theory was tacitly admitted in the Andover belief that as a matter of fact very few men would ultimately be lost. As to these, Andover said little of their punishment: As to the condition of those who are finally condemned the Bible gives only obscure hints and vague imagery, and we certainly have no heart to speculate on either the surroundings or the feelings of the lost.20 William J. Tucker objected to Drummond's application of the law of the survival of the fittest to the souls of men partly on the ground that it would mean the final loss of the greater portion of the human race. 21 This prospect did not daunt the Calvinists; but it did the liberals.

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T h e Calvinist conception of this life as a probation meaning a testing ground preparatory to eternity has become in Andover's thought really no probation at all. Judgment of man is now made on the basis, not of whether man will love God, but of whether he will accept God's love for him. Failure to love God for his own sake is intelligible in an animal being with private interests and desires; but refusal to accept the love of God poured out to man is hardly intelligible. If this latter constitutes man's probation then God's judgment of man's primary affection becomes unimportant. T h e whole structure of New England theology was being pushed to one side by a theology of universal salvation through moral improvement. Professor Tucker's papers on the Holy Spirit and on the Christian contained some different emphases from those of his colleagues. In contrast to Harris, T u c k e r held that men cannot know themselves as sinners without knowing God's revelation in Christ. T h e r e can be no exposure of sin in the heart of Africa, in many of the islands of the sea, in any of the great centers of heathendom. . . . Revelation must precede exposure to make it of avail, to make it possible,—the revelation of holiness, of purity, of love. 22 If fully developed this position made the necessity of a future probation more intelligible, for if knowledge of the historical Christ is necessary to knowledge of sin then the question is raised as to whether or not men can be condemned for not choosing God when they have not known him. T u c k e r stated the significance of Christ's work with even greater emphasis on its ethical effect. Conformity to law is the despair of the most obedient souls. Likeness to Christ is the reverent ambition of the humblest disciple. 23 It is because Christ was a man, and as man achieved perfection of character that others are inspired with hope that such an achievement is possible for them. T h i s essentially Ritschlian position was not further developed by Tucker, but Harris took it up later. T h e divergence of views within the school itself was the inevitable result of a liberal attitude toward doctrine in a time of intellectual confusion. Conflicts appeared even within the thinking of individuals. T u c k e r held at one point that regeneration means becoming like Christ:

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He is the pattern. The Spirit works toward Christ in the reconstruction of character. It is enough to say of his work that it is in the endeavor to make men over into Christians. The end is actual and manifest likeness to Christ. Regeneration thus acquires a large and exact meaning under Christianity. 24 Having said this Tucker at once admits that regenerate lives are lived outside the Christian fold. But when challenged to show why, if regeneration consists in the attainment of moral character, and may occur outside of Christianity, there is any necessity for a future probation Tucker completely reversed his position. 25 Salvation he now declared is not the attainment of moral character, salvation is through faith. This move toward Reformation theology is carried out with an evangelical statement of the nature of the Christian life. It is not a life of immediate attainment of perfection or of radical moral transformation as Harris had described it. It is a life of a new relationship to God, and an assurance thereby of moral progress; but the progress follows the new relationship, it does not constitute it.26 This conception of salvation made possible a renewal of the orthodox insistence that the change from the state of sin to that of holiness is immediate. Man may become immediately conscious of a new relationship to God. Professor Harris did not entirely share this view. He had said that wherever life was made better there Christ was at work. He had to admit that God's work includes a preparation of men for the gospel through a period of time and that there are degrees of guilt among the heathen. 27 Cases of exceptional virtue among the heathen—Socrates and Buddha were familiar illustrations—remained a difficult problem. Harris admitted these were on the way to salvation; but held that they could not be completely regenerate souls until they knew God in Christ. 28 Though the differences we have noted existed in Andover thought, three general conclusions began to crystallize. First, human nature is not totally corrupt. 29 Second, Andover no longer separates the conception of the sinful state from the actual moral behavior of the individual. "It is nearer the truth to say that salvation from condemnation and punishment is in consequence of the renewed character than that a change of character is the result of salvation from those evils.30 These two positions imply a third, that salvation is a process and admits of degrees.31

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Two major factors produced the "New Theology" at Andover. One was the moralizing spirit with its higher regard for the natural man which had been at work as a critical force in the New England theology from the beginning. Darwinism applied to human life might have been made the basis of a radical Calvinism or other theology of human sin as it has been by the Barthian movement. Man is an animal creature engaged in a struggle for survival and for power. The liberals tended to forget Darwinism, and to use the idea of evolution as an undergirding of the idea of progress in which emphasis is not upon human failure, but upon an increasing human achievement of moral worth. In his first paper Egbert Smyth referred to "that enthusiasm for humanity"32 which had taken possession of Christian thought. Calvinisms' description of the human situation appeared not only untrue but inhuman and unjust in the light of this enthusiasm. The other factor was the emphasis on man in process. Both evolution and progress implied development in the nature of man individually and collectively. Progress was identified with the work of God, and the gradual improvement of human life was therefore more important than deciding upon man's primary affection for the world or for God at any one moment of time. The change of life which God works to bring about is not instantaneous, but is rather like that slow accumulation of variations which according to Darwin finally produced new species. Andover anticipated that even in the future state God would work slowly and patiently with men before pronouncing a final judgment upon them. Some noble heathen like Socrates might not need this preparation; but others would and "we can easily imagine that protracted processes of education and discipline may be necessary to make them ripe for decision."33 Thus did Calvinism give way to liberalism in the doctrine of salvation.34 Harris developed and clarified the new position in an article entitled Law and Grace in 1888. He began with the problem of judgment. He had earlier said that all men know the right but may lack power to act righteously. As he saw the problem now it was that men have very different ideas of the good life. How then can all be brought under the judgment of God? There is an evolution of morals apart from the gospel, another apart from the decalogue, another under the gospel. The human race is now at all possible stages of moral apprehension and development. There is no particular code which is placed over all men. To affirm

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that all men are under the same obligation, it must be assumed that all are under the same law. But law must be reduced to a minimum before it can be claimed that all are under the same law.36 Harris now said that what Christ does is to bring to the world a new standard of character, and to enable men to realize that character in their own lives. The realization of a character like Christ's satisfies God. This was a clear-cut position with implications for the doctrine of judgment. If men live in the light of various ideals, then they must be judged according to the ideals they have, as Harris admitted. Those who know Christ are judged according to the ideal of this life. For the others the doctrine of a future confrontation with Christ was held. With the increasing emphasis on the fact that man is a being in process of development the judgment upon man must be, not in terms of his primary choice; but in terms of all his ideals, habits, and actions. Said Harris: It is in view of the totality of man's character and conduct and the entire dealing of God with him in respect to knowledge, motive, and opportunity, that justice makes a decision.38 One could hold on the basis of this position that men are naturally in a state of sin in the sense that they are not yet like Christ. But they are not condemned in this state until God's whole redeeming influence has been brought to bear. Harris loses completely the orthodox emphasis on God's present condemnation of man: T h e question in respect to justice must always be, therefore, whether at a given point, as at death, or at the age of fifty years, or at some point after death, the final stage of divine instruction, discipline, and opportunity for the individual has been reached.37 As the notion of salvation through attainment of character was clarified the doctrine of Christ's work was modified. All the metaphysical problems of his relation to God, his two natures, his payment of the penalty for man's sin were ignored and replaced by one simple idea. In Christ there is the full realization of a perfect character. His fulfillment of the divine requirement of moral character constitutes the atonement: In Christ and his salvation, law and grace are different sides of the same truth. Christ satisfies the law because he is the perfect law, and because he brings the perfect law to gradual realization in the lives

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of his followers. And this is all of grace because his life became perfect through sufferings which He voluntarily endured, and because law is enthroned in the hearts of his followers as the life of self-sacrificing service. T h e doctrine of atonement becomes intelligible and helpful when the law which is satisfied is seen to be not something independent of and different from Christ and his gospel, but the law of his own matchless life and the ideal of life which he is reproducing in his disciples.38 Thus Harris preserved the orthodox language of atonement, satisfaction of God's requirement, grace and redemption; but gave the terms moralized meanings. Harris tries to continue emphasis on the uniqueness of Christ, but the effort is half-hearted. " T h e sinlessness of Christ, his unique personality, and his peculiar relation to the Father, make his power for redemption distinct in kind." 39 The "peculiar relation to the Father" is not further clarified. Obviously it is unimportant if the whole significance of Christ consists in his realization of the ethical ideal. T h e controversy over the Andover theology raged through many books, and in denominational journals and conferences. Professor Philip Schaff of Union Seminary came to its support in the Review.40 Some of the criticism were more vituperative than reasoned such as this which was quoted in the Andover Review from the Methodist Review of 1889: The Andover sect exhibits the normalcy of an error-begotten and error-directed movement. . . . The doctrine of a second probation [a doctrine which Andover does not hold] is the breeder of trouble, of moral disease, and of a general theologic disquiet that augurs disruption and dissolution. As the ark was a terror among the Philistines, so this dogma is an enemy of peace among free-thinkers and heretics. It injures most those who coquet with it, and rather inflames than heals the wounds that sin hath made. It blisters the hands, scorches the feet, leprously infects the body, disorganizes the thinking faculties, poisons the moral affections, alienates intellectual fellowship, and is a pragmatic element of discontent in ecclesiastical legislation and social life. 41 Four years after the appearance of Progressive Orthodoxy Frederic Palmer, Episcopal rector of Andover, published a thorough criticism of that work. He charged the authors with vagueness as to the meaning of the doctrinal terms they used such as salvation, sin, and Christ, a

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charge which was fully justified because of the conflicting meanings given all those terms in the volume. Palmer went on to state that in so far as the Andover theology had been made clear, the writers had made a grave mistake in insisting upon knowledge of Christ for salvation. He quoted their introductory paragraph in which they had said that they were modifying Calvinism's doctrine of God's transcendence by the conception of the divine immanence. 42 They had not carried this idea of immanence into their thinking, however, according to Palmer. If they really held the doctrine of God's immanence in the work of improving life then there was no warrant for separating "personal attainments in character" from "personal appropriation of the righteousness of Christ." Referring to Tucker's statement that men are not saved by moral character, Palmer said that Andover must recognize that any system which took this position had committed suicide. 43 He pointed out that Andover had admitted it is Christ who releases all powers in humanity which make for its improvement; but they refused to recognize this work as equivalent to a revelation of Christ himself in testing the final character of men. Palmer from his own point of view, was moving toward the doctrine of the essential Christ as Park had held it, and on the basis of which Park justified condemnation of the heathen. 44 Palmer applied the principle of man's organic relationship to his environment to the doctrine of probation: Now suppose I am a street Arab in New York. I am, alas, but too familiar with the name of Jesus; I have been once or twice to a Mission Sunday School, and heard that Christ lived and died centuries ago. Have I knowledge enough to pass upon the claims of Christ? 46 Simply and very effectively Palmer had drawn out the full implications of Harris' position that men are all in different stages of moral progress. In the homely illustration Palmer had emphasized the great stumbling block to the orthodox interpretation of man's moral status. Individuals are beings organically related to and modified by the social process in which they live. He concluded his criticism by developing his own conception of the meaning of Christ on the basis of the divine immanence. Christ is both a historical person and the totality of spiritual processes in existence. He is the "presence of God in the soul." 46 This view admittedly diminishes the importance of the historic Christ. T h e incarnation was not a unique event. It was the climax of a long process of development. Its

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effect was not to create an utterly new religious life " b u t to b e its inspirer, its guide, the revealer to it of heights h i t h e r t o u n k n o w n . " 4 7 Since salvation is love for the good, a love w h i c h may vary in sincerity and intensity, degrees of the spiritual life must b e recognized: that one w h o has an eager love for whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, just, pure, lovely,—that he has ipso facto salvation, cannot be denied by anyone w h o holds salvation to b e deliverance f r o m sin. A n d if he is so saved, it must be either that he is saved w i t h o u t the k n o w l e d g e of Christ, or that i n these very things he has the k n o w l e d g e of Christ. For ourselves w e prefer the latter alternative. 4 8 H a d P a l m e r expressed a view contrary to that of A n d o v e r , or was h e simply m a k i n g clear the implications of their position? T h e question was in the balance of whether or not A n d o v e r really desired to m a i n t a i n the evangelical Christianity whose language they still used, or whether they w o u l d capitulate completely to this liberalized faith. A n d o v e r immediately answered Palmer. Hesitantly the writers expressed some concern over the extent to w h i c h P a l m e r h a d pushed the doctrine of immanence. T h e y raised two objections. If G o d is i m m a n e n t h o w d o w e e x p l a i n evil? T h i s was hardly an o b j e c t i o n w h i c h their o w n position avoided. A faint gleam of C a l v i n i s m shone through the second objection. Does not the atonement indicate the ethical transcendence of G o d ? " C a n the incarnation be m a d e to take the place of the atonem e n t in its sublime assertion of the moral transcendence of G o d ? " 4 9 T h e y realized that the question went to the heart of R e f o r m a t i o n theology. T h e y asked: W a s there n o peculiar significance in the l i v i n g e x p e r i e n c e of the church from A u g u s t i n e to Wesley, w h i c h flamed o u t u n d e r L u t h e r in the doctrine of justification by faith?" 5 0 T h i s was the c r u x of the issue, a n d increasingly a live question in the theologies of the post-war disillusionment. W h a t was the answer to this salvation " b y the realization of moral character?" T h e writers answered frankly that they d i d n ' t k n o w : W e w a n t to measure the significance of the transfer of Christian theology f r o m atonement to incarnation. W e w a n t to find the meaning of salvation, its g r o u n d and method a n d end. 5 1

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Having agreed that the meaning of salvation was an open question, the editors did indicate their belief that evangelicalism could not be abandoned entirely. The business of Christianity is to inaugurate, not to complete, the process of salvation. 62 They insisted upon the radical nature of the change from the non-Christian to the Christian life. "Christ-likeness does not mean a little more growth in character, but a radical change, the whole nature possessed by a new principle, and pervaded by a new spirit." 53 In a last sentence they qualified the idea that salvation is becoming like Christ by saying that "all Christ-likeness has a factor in it which Christ's own character did not possess," the element of struggle and repentance. 54 Though thus preserving faintly the evangelical emphasis Andover made it clear that there was no serious quasrel with Palmer's interpretation. He had denied the necessity of a probationary view of life, and had substituted for it what Andover herself was willing to call the "broader" conception of the gradual education of the race. Tucker's autobiography reveals that Professor Churchill of Andover agreed throughout with Palmer that the conception of probation should be discarded entirely. 55 While it was not discarded in the answer to Palmer, neither was it insisted upon. "Christ-likeness is salvation here; it must be salvation everywhere. . . . We do not look with suspicion and distrust upon all character that is produced outside the technical methods of Christianity." 58 Christianity has a two-fold task in redeeming mankind. It may inaugurate a radically new phase in character; but it also "completes, confirms, establishes, character already begun under other conditions." This was the perfect compromise with evangelicalism on one hand, and belief in natural progress in morality on the other. Men may be saved both ways, through radical conversion or through gradual education. The position of Progressive Orthodoxy has been reversed. That work was an apologetic for the missionary movement to show how Christians could hold that without knowledge of Christ none are saved. Andover had a different perspective now: It has not been our desire to show that no one could be saved, in the popular acceptance of the term, without knowledge of God's redemptive love in Christ, but rather that those who apparently would not otherwise be saved, among whom we placed not the few but the many, might have the advantage of this knowledge before passing judgment. 57

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A year later Aridover openly recognized the change which was taking place in her own thinking with an editorial on The Present Tendency in Theology: T h e doctrinal ideas of the early church needed the enlargement of later reflective thought to be adapted to the personal and social needs of modern life. 58 T h i s was no longer an effort to return to primitive and pure Christianity. A t all events the effort of theology now is to find what there is in every fact and doctrine of Christianity for the religious life of society. A merely speculative interest no longer exists, but the practical aim of religious truth is the controlling consideration. . . . T h e final cause of religion, the result it seeks in the person and in society, is to be the decisive consideration in respect to every doctrine of religion, and in respect to the rational and spiritual grounds on which all doctrines are found to rest." T o make the practical effect of doctrine the criterion of its validity was to abandon completely any attempt to base religious thought on reason. Andover took the doctrine of the person of Christ as an example of the new theological method. Instead of the exact distinction of nature and person, the careful separation of divine and human, the precise function of the Second Person of the Trinity, the identity of the Logos with the Son of Man, there seems to be a very indefinite thought of the nature of Christ, a very qualified belief in his actual deity, a disposition to be satisfied with the opinion that in some way He was divinely taught and that H e revealed God's love to men. 60 T h i s was Unitarianism. Yet Andover rejoiced in the new belief and in its lack of clarity: A n d yet the change is from abstractions to realities. T h e endeavor is made to know him as the source of spiritual power, to learn what divineness is as it is embodied in a perfect human character and a sympathizing human heart. . . . God and his world have been comprehended in their intimacy of life because He is felt as immanent presence and palpitating power in the universe. . . . T h e inquiry in every instance is in relation to the power of the truth. In its power

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is found its wisdom. Christ is the wisdom of God to intellectual inquiry largely because He is the power of God to the heart. 61 As now stated the aim of all Christian teaching and practice is moral character and social progress. T h e doctrine of the judgment of God has practically disappeared. T h e needs of man in a world where relative values may be achieved occupy the full attention not only of secular philosophy but of theology as well. Five years earlier Egbert C. Smyth had raised a question as to the ultimate value and meaning of what he called the Latin or Augustinian theology of God's transcendence over against the Greek and modern doctrine of immanence. Smyth was reviewing A. V. G. Allen's The Continuity of Christian Thought. Allen had tried to show that the new theology was in the direct line of Christian thought as it had been developed by Clement and the other Eastern thinkers. Smyth suggested the possibility of over-emphasizing God's immanence and stated an important distinction between ethical and metaphysical transcendence. "If the Latin theology at certain points makes more of the transcendence, less of the immanence of God than the Greek, this is in part due to its deeper doctrine of sin. Moral estrangement is expressed by spatial relations,—absence, distance, separation." 62 God's ethical transcendence must not be forgotten. 63 Now in 1890 it is clear that the whole movement of Andover's thought has been in the direction away from emphasizing God's ethical transcendence. T o be saved is to become like God. Sin is imperfection and in most men will be removed by God's patient and gentle influence working even in the next life if necessary. One evangelical voice was raised in the Review to protest against this trend of the new theology. John Tunis dissented from the emphasis on God's immanence. Tunis realized he was a lone warrior. He thought that the faith of the Reformers had been largely forgotten and that Augustine was rapidly losing his place to Athanasius. 64 T h e trend toward an immanence theology had forgotten one truth, Tunis said. Belief in God's transcendence is not important because it puts God above the world metaphysically, but that it recognizes him as above the world ethically, a restatement of Smyth's position. This truth had been lost from theology for two reasons, Tunis pointed out. T h e first was that when life is easy and men are optimistic about the goods of the civilization they have built, belief in God's immanence is satisfying. T h i s was true in the time of Origen and Clement, and was true again in the

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late nineteenth century.65 In the second place the doctrine of evolution disclosed new forces at work within nature: It was conjectured that the earth contained in itself all that was necessary to account for the present condition. . . . From merely physical considerations thus it became inevitable that if the Providence of God was not to be wholly lost sight of, it must be brought as an immanent energy into the very theatre of events.66 Tunis objected to the way in which the idea of immanence was obscuring the deeper truth of man's moral status before God. "That which affords us so much gratification, and rightly so, is rather the holiday attire of Christian thought." 67 When the holiday was over a return to Calvinism would take place: That which it is so urgent to establish, that which it is so perilous to lose sight of, is the moral nearness of God. Is there any personal being to whom we are accountable, before whom we stand as at a judgment day? . . . Just to the extent to which the doctrine of divine immanence saves this sense of a transcendent person and judge it will aid and inspire us. Just to the extent to which it leads us to slight the moral relation, and lose sight of it in the pretty sentiment of a transfigured and deified nature, it is a miserable curse and an idolatrous lure.68 Tunis had not only pointed out that the concept of God's judgment of man, so essential in the evangelical scheme was being lost, but he had put his finger upon one cause, an optimistic doctrine of man. His point was not attacked or refuted by Andover. No one even bothered to discuss it. A glance back to Samuel Hopkins whose followers helped to found Andover will help emphasize the distance Andover thinking had come. Hopkins knew nothing of man as a partly righteous being, and in so far pleasing to God. He said: Every sin against God, which is an injury and abuse offered to him is a crime of infinite magnitude, consequently the sinner must be punished with infinite evil if he has his desert.69 Hopkins knew nothing of man's changing his status through time: T h e human heart is either a heart of stone—a rebellious heart, or a new heart. . . . There can be no instant of time in which the heart

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is neither a hard heart nor a new heart, and the man is neither dead in trespasses and sin nor spiritually alive.70 Andover now denied both of these statements. God is a power at work, not a judge, and "The Divine purpose is to make man a certain kind of character, not to have it proved or shown whether or not he has it, and whether or not he is fit for some other sphere of existence."71 Belief in the finality of the revelation of God in Christ was still essential to the new theology. Evolution was not enough either to reveal the ideal or to produce it. Historical criticism which applied the idea of development to the scriptures and Christian doctrine raised serious objections to the accepted doctrine of the historical Christ, and opened up again the question of the ultimate validity of Christian doctrine. T o these problems we turn in the next chapter.

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had begun to describe Christianity in language which did not so much contradict as ignore the concepts of orthodoxy. In the case of "future probation" they felt an immediate necessity, both theoretical and practical, for a modification of doctrine. While they were thus actively engaged in theological criticism, they were also convinced of the necessity of remaining loyal to the church and to what they believed essential in Christianity. Crucial problems arose out of this common dilemma of liberal Protestantism. What is essential in Christian belief? What is the relation of dogma to the origins of the faith, and the history of the church? These questions raised even more fundamental ones. What is the ultimate basis of Christian belief? the relation of faith and reason, the nature of revelation? The change in Andover's own thought forced the working out of a criterion of religious truth and of essential Christianity. ANDOVER THEOLOGIANS

It will be best to take account of Frank H. Foster's judgment of the Andover movement set forth in his Modern Movement in American Theology in connection with the theme of the present chapter. His primary criticism is that the Andover theologians were "incurably conservative" in that they were completely subservient to the historical creeds and ecclesiastical requirements of Christianity. Andover treated the Christian faith, according to Foster, as a practically infallible "closed circle" of truth which it would not discuss nor permit to be questioned.1 This last charge which would convict Andover of illiberalism is clearly unfounded in the light of the fact that the Review embodied a nine year long discussion of all the central problems of Christian theology in which Andover did not hold to an exclusive doctrine. Foster's judgment on the historical orientation of Andover theology requires a more complex answer based on the detailed following through of Andover's use of history and dogma which is carried out in this chapter. The interpretation here documented, not simply with Progressive Orthodoxy to which Foster exclusively refers, but with the other and later material in the Review does not bear him out. It is true that Andover thought did what any Christian theology must do, that is seek to relate itself to the history and dogmas of Christianity. It is not "conservative" to recognize that thought has a historical background.

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The question is, did Andover make devotion to the historical doctrines of Christianity controlling in its conclusions? The following pages show that Andover's method was to develop theology through an interpénétration of historical doctrine and immediate experience, and the history was always ultimately brought to the test of experience. The "experience" of Andover was the spirit of nineteenth century humanitarianism and faith in progress, combined with a moralized interpretation of regeneration. The ultimate grounds of doctrine were never as clearly stated as they might have been, but they were never mainly historical. Andover is to be criticized for having rejected a purely historical or ecclesiastical solution of the theological problem and then failing to make sufficiently clear an alternative method. Foster himself admits that the Andover conception of "the Christian consciousness" was "prophetic." 2 We shall first outline this Andover idea and then turn to the specifically historical problems which faced the theologians. I. T H E CHRISTIAN CONSCIOUSNESS

Liberal Andover tried to synthesize five elements in the criterion of Christian truth: historical fact, traditional doctrine, faith, experience, and reason. It aimed at securing a final and authoritative test of Christian truth which would at the same time allow for the development of the new emphases which it was anxious to promote. Professor Harris attempted a solution of the complex problem. The test of validity of any Christian doctrine could be found through careful analysis of a concept in common use, the Christian consciousness. Harris' definition of this was: the conscious experience of believers who through faith have separately appropriated God's redeeming love, and also the large and manifold experience of the church, realizing the love of God in its various gifts, graces, and growths.3 By including the total experience of the Church in the concept of Christian experience a test of individual experience was provided, yet individual experience was given its place in the development of the faith. What is the function of the Christian consciousness? It gives certainty. Harris illustrated this claim with reference to the divinity of Christ: The believer is certain that the object of faith is real because effects are produced of which he is conscious. The probability that Christ is

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what Hie claims to be passes into certainty when he ventures out on Christ and becomes a new creature. 4 Otherwise stated: the historical fact of a revelation of God in Jesus may be attested to the extent of its probability by reason. It can be made certain by the experience of the believer who finds in his own experience a new relationship to the historical figure and to God. In addition to giving certainty, the Christian consciousness is the organ of the developing knowledge of the church. Harris looked with favor on the theory of a progressive evolution of doctrine toward truth. Individual knowledge of the truth develops, and Christianity in general comes to better understanding of itself through the evolution of doctrine. According to Harris, the individual Christian's apprehension of truth develops as he appropriates the gospel to new uses and understands more of its aspects.5 T h e truest Christian doctrine is therefore that which comes at the end of the development. (This is surely not a "conservative" principle.) We can know the truth or falsity of doctrine by comparison "with what Christians have already verified through experience, and with the best Christian sentiment of the time." 0 How do you know the best Christian sentiment of the time? Harris answered with an essentially democratic faith that "the theology which gains currency at any time is that conception of Christianity which commends itself to the reason and experience of the most enlightened and spiritual Christians." 7 This was a direct application of the doctrine of survival of the fittest to theology, understandable in the light of Harris' belief that he and his colleagues were themselves the representatives of the newest theological thought. T h e phrase "most enlightened and spiritual Christians" while vague and question-begging on the surface really had concrete reference for Harris. Andover believed that the mark of enlightenment and spirituality of Christians was their attitude toward the harsher features of strict Calvinism. T h e damnation of countless millions, the offer of the gospel to some and not to others, were beliefs which, in their opinion, were inhuman and unjust. Believing that Christian thought must not be less just or humane than accepted human ideals, they held that their own doctrine of future probation was justified on the ground that it was more humane than the traditional attitude toward heathen damnation. Harris knew what he meant by enlightenment and spirituality. He meant to bring Christian doctrine to the test of the humane idealism of nineteenth century liberals. Harris illustrates this factor in the appeal to the Christian consciousness by a reference to Jonathan Edwards. He

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says that a sermon by Edwards would fall flat in the late nineteenth century, not because it would not be logical, but because more enlightened Christians of the new era had a more Christian conception of God than had Edwards. Harris applied his test directly to the idea of future probation: It is admitted, and even contended, that every theory concerning the extent of the Gospel's power must be grounded in the word of God, or at least must not be contradicted in any part of the divine revelation. But it cannot be denied that the Christian consciousness, with its certainties concerning God, with its experience of the very heart of God, with its knowledge of his love upon which the world presses and which throbs in sympathy for the whole world, must be satisfied, or at least must not be dissatisfied, with views which are presented concerning the extent of God's grace to mankind in the gospel.8 In judgment on this suggestion we should probably have to conclude that while "the Christian consciousness" had a rough practical value as a test on a definite issue like future probation, it was inadequate as a basis for all Christian doctrine; the revelation of God in the Scripture, belief in the existence of God, the Trinity, the supernatural revelation in Christ. Harris left the relation of reason and experience ambiguously defined: "Theology exhibits Christianity as real, as rational, as true." 9 Yet this rationality of the gospel is qualified: " T h e truths of the gospel are not like a series of propositions in Euclid, nor like the collected enactments of a volume of revised statutes. Spiritual things are spiritually discerned." 10 Is this spiritual discernment a common possession of men like perception of the truths of reason according to the common sense school? Or is it a special faculty of Christians? T r u e to the general type of liberal thought Harris never definitely rests Christian truth upon reason, or intuition or experience taken alone. He is content to leave the problem with the statement that: between those who do and those who do not recognize the authority of the Christian consciousness, there is a great gulf fixed. Those who always demand precise definition, and those who have gained the spiritual and intuitive vision of truth are on different ground. T h e former try to stand on the premises of a syllogism, the latter are on the heights of faith. 11

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Theologians are either born with what Harris calls "the narrowness of the limitations imposed by the logical understanding" or into the larger vision of the spirit. Here Harris' sympathies appear to be with the latter group; but the desire to be rational as well as spiritual constrained him to stress the importance of rational criticism of mystical insight. In his concluding word mysticism and rationalism are inextricably and unintelligibly confused: Rationalism is as ineffective in defense as in attack. It requires the help of mysticism. T h e two, which have so often been enemies, should be allies. Either is powerless alone. Rationalism needs to be converted. Mysticism needs to go to school. There should be, not reason alone, nor feeling alone, but reason glowing with emotion, and feeling illuminated with knowledge. In theology as in oratory, the thought should be all feeling, and the feeling all thought. 12 Harris was immediately challenged by correspondents and by Dr. Patton of Princeton. Patton said that Harris would have "every man make his own Bible," and that he had "one foot in Schleiermacher's slipper and the other in Hegel's boot." 1 3 T h e reference to Schleiermacher hit the mark. Harris' conception of the Christian consciousness followed closely after the German theologian, Dorner, who in turn had used Schleiermacher's interpretation of religious feeling as the basis of his theory of Christian knowledge. Harris had combined this idealistic conception of knowledge through direct experience with the commonsense school derivation of primary truth from those clear ideas which appear in the consciousness of all men. T h a t he had German idealism as well as common-sense in the background of his use of the term is clear from the remark: T h e "consciousness" which grows out of experience has a meaning which is not reproduced by "consensus" or "testimony." It suggests experience, immediateness, and certainty, even when used in its collective sense; and for these no other term yet proposed is an equivalent." Harris' correspondents challenged him to show how his test of general agreement could be of any use when there obviously is not any general agreement among Christians. Specific cases of the universalists and the perfectionists were pointed out. These Christians denied some of Andover's theology. Harris could only reply that the Christian conscious-

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ness was not a perfect test, and fall back upon his democratic method: "In spite of imperfections and crudities, it is not so very difficult to recognize the healthy and preponderant sentiment of the Christian community." 1 5 As to the universalists Harris appealed to the general agreement of Christian doctrines that some will finally be damned. T o the perfectionists he declared that everyone but themselves could see the stupidity of holding that because one had a regenerate heart one could therefore do no wrong. Evidently the Christian consciousness had its difficulties as a test in a time of theological debate. Harris referred only once to faith in his discussion of Christian knowledge, and then used the term as synonymous with "spiritual discernment." Of faith as a primary and inscrutable decision of the religious man to accept as divine revelation some objective word such as the Bible, there is little trace in Andover thought. Like most of the liberal theologians they were trying to defend Christianity against rationalism and naturalism by appropriating the very weapons of these enemies, reason and experience. In an age so self-consciously dominated by scientific thought retreat to a non-rational basis for dogma would mean the death of Christianity in Andover's opinion. 16 Harris left the crucial question of the ground upon which Christianity stands in its claim for a revelation of God in Christ in a vague and unsatisfactory form. T o say that feeling should be all thought and thought all feeling does not help much in determining the validity of belief in the divine authority and supernatural character of an event supposed to be a revelation. At this time (1884) Harris did not try to apply his theory of knowledge to the solution of the problem of revelation. Andover men were not yet fully aware of the effect of historical criticism on the understanding of Christian origins. This criticism was just coming to the fore in the form in which it raised serious problems for theology. Andover did not yet feel that the basic presuppositions of a miraculous life and supernatural truth revealed in the Bible had been seriously questioned. T w o Review contributors came to Harris' aid with different interpretation of the new theory of knowledge. William B. Clarke of Norwich, Connecticut, developed the idea more strictly in line with Scotch Realism. 17 T h e Christian consciousness is primarily constituted by man's intuitive knowledge. Among the general human intuitive certainties, which Clarke followed Reid in listing, are moral obligation, the primary rules of justice, duty to one's family, and the feeling of dependence on God. 1 8 These intuitions are not the exclusive possession of Christians. T h e Christian consciousness includes them and adds new intuitions.

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For example, all religious men have the intuitive feeling of dependence which implies the existence of God. Christianity adds knowledge of the character of God which is now intuitively recognized as perfect: "if we believe the perfections of God as revealed in Christianity, and that we are made in his likeness, the divine standard of character must be accepted as our standard." 1 9 T h e spiritual consciousness of Christians is thus the ultimate test of Christian revelation. Dr. Patton was attacking the concept precisely at this point. If the final test of truth is the intuition of the individual, objective revelation loses its authority. 20 Clarke notices this objection and made a concession to it by trying to incorporate the scripture into his test. T h i s he did by saying that in "trust" the Christian places himself under the authority of the Bible. 2 1 T h i s amounts to a repudiation of common sense in favor of a principle of faith, now defined as trust. Clarke was trying to preserve the definiteness of the objective revelation as a supplement to individual experience. He remarked that "the man who wakes each morning with the feeling that everything is still an open question is so much too much of a Protestant that he does not deserve to be called a Christian at all." Even for the man who trusts the Bible the question still remains: W h o is to interpret the Bible? "Shall it be Professor Patton," asked Clarke. "Shall it be Joseph Cook? Shall it be, if I only dared to say it—Andover?" 2 2 Clarke was driven back to the Christian consciousness, now the "common Christian consciousness." T h i s too must be qualified. Practically, there is no common Christian consciousness. T h e test must lie therefore in the experience of certain Christians, and Clarke suggested a practical way of finding the right Christians. T h e y are those whose lives demonstrate their moral character. T h e Christian consciousness "is not the aggregate of all Christian experiences, it is the particular facts, traits, tendencies of thought, beliefs, that mark, on the whole, those who seem to be the more genuine among Christian people." 2 3 Like Harris, Clarke was caught in a circle. W h o were the genuine Christians? A n attempt to return to Harris' democratic method was made by Asher H. Wilcox. T h e r e is a religious consciousness, a sense of dependence in every human soul. T h e Christian consciousness is the development of this religious consciousness. For W i l c o x the phrase Christian consciousness has a wider meaning than for Clarke. " W e use the phrase as almost the exact equivalent of Christian experience." 2 4 Besides the religious consciousness it includes knowledge derived from the Bible, from scholarship, from philosophy and science, Christian life, Christian history, and prayer. This was entirely too broad and W i l c o x slipped into

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the same circular argument of Harris and Clarke. T h e term common Christian consciousness was restricted to "the most enlightened and pious men in all Christendom about Christ and his truth." 2 5 Since the question of who were the most enlightened Christians was precisely the point to be determined, this was hardly an adequate test. Wilcox finally states a formula which locates the test of truth in the figure of Christ: He, as found in the Scriptures, and as apprehended and interpreted by the common Christian consciousness of each successive age will be, as He should be, the ultimate criterion of all truth. 26 There was strength in this formula. It combined Scripture, Christ, and the common Christian consciousness in one basic rule. Most significantly Wilcox had included a provision for the developing consciousness of the church. T h e test of Christian truth varies with the age. T h e implication for Christian thought is fundamental, doctrine must be restated continually. T h i s was a more radical departure from absolutism than Andover had yet admitted. It was the foundation of the liberal attitude toward doctrine. It provided for a re-interpretation of the meaning of Christ's revelation itself. T h e humanitarian factor in this appeal to the figure of Christ is illustrated by Wilcox. He speaks of "our wider theological outlook, our heightened sense of man's worth, even in his lowest conditions, our sensitiveness to the sufferings of the slave and the prisoner." These sentiments are equivalent to our faith in the Son of Man, "our feeling that Christianity is true." 2 7 Ambiguous as it was, the concept of the Christian consciousness provided a method of preserving loyalty to essential Christianity while accepting the modifications of special doctrines and the development of new emphases. As an appeal to religious experience it grew out of the reaction to the formalism and logical rigour of orthodoxy. As a practical test for the validity of dogma it grew out of the growing attention to the possibility of gradually improving human character over against Calvinism's emphasis on determination of man's status before God. As a demand for humanitarian modification of harsh Calvinistic doctrines it reflected the humanitarian spirit of nineteenth century thought. Jesus becomes the prophet of human values and reveals God's love for man which is more fundamental than His divine wrath or justice. While it expressed these ideas of the liberal theology the Christian consciousness was worthless as a test of the supernatural origin of Chris-

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tianity or its fundamental doctrines. There is no general agreement on Christian doctrines. Moral behaviour may be a test of one's theological insight in a rough sense, but it is a very vague and uncertain test at best. T h e development of this concept and the willingness to rest nearly all the fundamental claims of Christianity upon it indicates the extent to which these fiberals still believed, in the early 1880s that divine, supernatural, and absolute authority of the incarnation could not be seriously challenged. T h e sources of Harris' doctrine of the Christian consciousness are complex. His appeal to "common" experience is in line with the emphasis of the Scottish school; but his emphasis on direct intuition of religious truth leans more toward an idealistic theory of knowledge. As has been noted, Dorner used the phrase and was dependent upon Schleiermacher for it.28 Schleiermacher's thought had come directly into American theology. Henry B. Smith had interpreted him for American theologians.29 Pfleiderer's Religionsphilosophie formed a convenient introduction of German thought in American theological work. 30 Coleridge's Aids to Reflection, which developed a similar theory of religious knowledge, was well known in America. It was published in an American edition by President Marsh of Vermont in 1829, a n d Coleridge's works were edited and published again by W. G. T . Shedd in 1854. 31 Professor Smyth of Andover referred to Coleridge's Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit in 1885, and indicated his belief in "its suggestiveness for the discussion concerning inspiration which are now engaging so widely the attention of the Christian spirit." 32 In 1891 Lewis French Stearns, then professor in Bangor Seminary and contributor to the Andover Review lectured at Union Seminary on The Evidence of Christian Experience.33 This work was a thorough analysis of the use of Christian experience as a basis for Christian theology by an evangelical liberal whose general position was similar to Andover's. Stearns refers to Dorner, with whom he had studied in Germany, as a major source of his thought.34 He also mentions two other principle sources. One was a German theologian at Erlanger, Dr. Fr. H. R . Frank, who developed a theory of Christian knowledge based on a moralized version of Christian experience in his System der Christlichen Geivissheit.35 The other was the English Puritan, Richard Baxter, in his two principal works, The Unreasonableness of Infidelity and The Reason of the Christian Religion.36 Dorner leaned more toward Schleiermacher's idealism than did Frank. Dorner held that knowledge of God is given directly in consciousness;

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but Frank found knowledge of God as an implication of the experience of regeneration. It is regeneration, the new moral life that we know. God we infer.37 Stearns says that he began work on this book agreeing with Dorner and moved over to Frank's view before its completion. His change of views is reflected in his own inconsistency on this point. A similar change can be seen from early Andover writings to those of the last years. George Harris reviewed Steams' book in the Review and said of it, "It is decidedly the most valuable work on Christian Apologetics which has appeared in this country or in England during the last decade." 38 Harris made no dissent whatever from Stearns' work. Use of Christian experience as a basis of knowledge might have been drawn from the New England Theology itself. Jonathan Edwards had included it in his system.39 Stearns quoted Edwards frequently. I I . H I S T O R I C A L C R I T I C I S M AND T H E DOCTRINE O F CHRIST

Andover's confidence in the supernatural basis of Christianity in Christ did not go unshaken for long. Several factors were combining to force a radical rethinking of the basis of Christian knowledge. Historical criticism of the scriptural record and doctrinal development of Christianity combined with the increasing skepticism of the age with respect to supernaturalism, forced Andover to re-state the relations of history and faith, and to adopt a new line of defense for the supernatural claims of Christianity. Egbert C. Smyth, Andover church historian, consistently made a larger place for traditional doctrine in his thinking than did his colleagues. On this count Foster's criticism that Smyth was "conservative" and "churchly" in spirit is in a measure valid.40 Yet Smyth also combined the historical method with a testing through immediate experience in harmony with Schleiermacher whom he eagerly followed.41 Under the pressure of Harnack's thesis of pagan influence on Christian thought, he stated a conception of dogma which was far more experiential and Protestant than "Roman," as characterized by Foster. In his introduction to the Review Professor Smyth raised immediately the question of essential Christianity by his insistence on one hand that re-interpretation of orthodoxy was necessary, and on the other that such criticism must be in harmony with Christian truth. He did not develop his own position fully in the first paper; but the lines of his thought are typical of the entire school as it worked on this problem. They illustrate the complex factors in this situation in which "progressively orthodox" theologians found themselves.

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There are three traditional tests of dogma according to Smyth: catholicity, ecclesiastical tradition, and the scripture. He accepts all of them; but holds that each must be brought to a more profound and comprehensive test. This more fundamental test of Christian truth is "the primitive consciousness of spiritual truth . . . the living gospel out of which came the gospel that Apostles preached." 42 Smyth interpreted this primitive gospel in terms of the figure of Christ in a characteristic paragraph. "God is revealed in Christ. T h e possibility, the unity, the verification of a science of divinity are given in Him and in Him alone." 4 3 T h e precise meaning to be attached to this test of doctrine in Christ himself is not clear. In the nature of the case it cannot be. A personality can hardly be a logical test of thought. Two things, however, were clearly accomplished for the liberal apologetic by this position. One was that the theologian who was determined to modify the inherited doctrine had a court of appeal which was above all specific dogmas. T h e second was that by appealing to the personality of Christ the liberals saw a way of escaping from the rationalism and legalism of orthodoxy, and of emphasizing on one hand the importance of Christian experience, and on the other the ethical aspect of Christianity against orthodox piety. Smyth emphasized Christian experience of Christ both as verification of doctrine and as a source of new religious knowledge: This revelation which God has made of himself in Jesus Christ is given to us in the Scriptures. It is also attested by the witness of the Spirit. A genuine Christian doctrine has a subjective as well as objective basis. T h e divine word is received by faith. There is thus produced a new, a regenerated consciousness, which becomes itself the spring of new knowledge. T h e true theologian is not a mere collector of prooftexts, but a reproducer of the divine testimony. Truth thus received and wrought out is not something simply above human reason and conscience, but something friendly to the soul, commending and attesting itself in life and conduct . . . a law of the spirit of life, which frees from the law of sin and death, and discloses itself more and more fully as absolutely authoritative. 44 Though truth is both discovered and verified in Christian experience Smyth does not forsake reason altogether. "Whatever is truly rational is in harmony with Christianity and allied to it. All thinking not in harmony with Christianity is irrational." 45 Reason itself, however, cannot disclose the full truth of Christianity.

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This essential truth known to the believer in his own experience Smyth holds to be equivalent to the original, and therefore, pure Christianity first disclosed to those who knew the historic Jesus. All doctrine must be tested by its conformity to this primary truth. Smyth found no incongruity with this position in this early writing in the statement that the Apostle's Creed is the symbol of Christianity.40 A few years later historical criticism began to trace the development of the creeds out of "primitive Christianity" through the incorporation of Greek philosophical concepts. Smyth will accept the Apostle's Creed; but not Medieval scholasticism, or the legalistic phase of the New England theology, or Drummond's attempt to recast Christian theology in scientific categories. These are corruptions of the pure truth of Christianity. Smyth is left with two final tests of the truth of any Christian doctrine, the figure of Christ and the personal experience of the Christian. Serious questions were raised by this position. Christian experience is a difficult basis on which to speak for universal Christian truth. Andover was endeavoring to establish a common ground of belief for the church and could not remain in a merely individual apprehension of truth. This would give no basis for social religion. What was to be done with the doctrine of revelation in scripture? Finally, the place of reason in Christian doctrine was not clarified in Smyth's brief statement. Reliance on traditional doctrine was made more difficult by the disclosure of Greek influence on its development. The first reports of the radical results of this historical inquiry appeared in the Review in the Notes on German Thought contributed by Arthur C. McGiffert in 1887. He reported Harnack's thesis that "Christian doctrine is a structure which was reared by Platonists and Stoics upon the gospel as its foundation." 47 This thesis, if substantiated, was enough to destroy the Andover position that pure Christianity could be found in the Apostle's Creed. T h e next step of criticism was the inquiry into the extent to which pagan philosophies had influenced the thinking of the New Testament writers. Pfleiderer's Das Urchristentum, seine Schriften und Lehren reviewed by McGiffert early in 1888, developed the hypothesis that Hellenic ideas influenced Paul's thought.48 This criticism challenged all Andover's theological presuppositions; the finally authoritative revelation of God, the piety which exalted and depended upon the divine-human conception of Jesus, and the belief that the historical Jesus could really be known through the New Testament. Faith had been organically related to history. Now a new history was being written and faith was in a precarious position.

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In an address at Andover in 1890 Smyth admitted the force of Harnack's thesis but tried to point to a greater continuity between the pure gospel and its dogmatic development than the German scholar admitted. He attempted to counteract the emphasis of Harnack upon the late and therefore not purely Christian development of dogma. Smyth said that Christianity had always been a dogmatic faith and that dogma was essential to it. This essential element must have been present in the very origin of Christianity. Revelation implies some concepts. Smyth was again emphasizing the return to beginnings in contrast to his colleague Harris. Smyth believed that the basic dogmas about Christ must have been present in the minds of the disciples. In validating this position Smyth carefully distinguished his own conception of dogma from that of Harnack. He was too thorough a historian not to recognize the truth in Harnack's claim that the creeds of Christianity developed under the influence of Hellenic culture. One could hardly credit Simon the Zealot with a theology as complex as the Nicene Creed. T o the German scholar a dogma was "a theological proposition which lies outside of the sphere of character and is not an outcome of religious faith but of a philosophical interpretation of Christianity." 49 If this be the true definition of dogma obviously it cannot be held that the later interpretations of Christian faith are essential to it. They are philosophical additions and interpretations. Smyth defined dogma in a different way. It is "an immediate truth of the Christian life, a necessary element in the experience produced by the gospel, a principle of love and all goodness."50 Now this type of belief in a simple principle which grows out of a religious experience could be found in Christianity from the beginning, according to Smyth. The essential content of the Christian faith is some apprehension of this presence of God in human history, informing human personality as to its true nature over against its sin, and at the same time meeting the difficulties that become clearer and more arduous the ampler is the revelation. 51 T h e phrase "this presence of God in human history" was highly ambiguous. Did the this refer to the historical Jesus, or to the presence of God revealed through nature and history, or through experience. T h e answer is not clear. The phrase "some apprehension" left wide room for a variety of views on the nature of the divine revelation. Smyth connected dogma closely with experience. Dogma in the form of principle accompanies the experience as an interpretation of it. It was another compromise between tradition and subjectivism.

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Smyth relied upon the spiritual experience of the believer as the criterion of divine revelation. T h e revelation is objective, historical, preserved in the scripture. "But not in its letter alone, nor there at all save as through it and by it we are taught by the Spirit whom Christ sends to all who would be his disciples." 52 Smyth did not separate the development of Christian thought from Christian experience, but he remained closer to traditional Protestantism than some of his colleagues. T h e Bible, Jesus, and dogma are essentials in the Christian faith. Most difficult of all were the questions raised by the historical criticism of the New Testament record. Andover again turned to religious experience as a way of escaping the devastating effects of this criticism on an historically grounded faith. Andover had a tradition of thorough acquaintance with Biblical criticism from the days of Moses Stuart. Stuart and Park had both been careful to define inspiration in such a way as to avoid the claim of absolute truth for every phrase of the Bible. They had been especially sensitive to the point of obvious crudities of theological conception in the Old Testament, and to the conflict between Biblical and geological accounts of creation. They did not question the historical validity of the New Testament record of Jesus, and considered that Strauss's radical theory had been completely refuted. T h e failure of critical thought to find sufficient ground for accepting Strauss's contention that the record of Jesus was a myth gave considerable confidence to evangelical theologians in their position that the gospels are an authentic record of the sayings and deeds of an historical personage. Professor Hincks's paper in Progressive Orthodoxy and a paper by him on the theology of Weiss reveals the general position of Andover on the nature of the revelation in the scripture in the early years of this period. This early inquiry of Hincks into the doctrine of scripture characteristically begins with the explicit assumption that Christianity has a valid claim to divine authority, no matter where that authority may ultimately be lodged. He began, "Our inquiry assumes, of course, to be made by Christians, and to concern itself with one of the facts of a divinely established religion." 63 Both natural and supernatural causes are said to be at work in the events recorded by scripture, and this claim is presupposed.54 Hincks felt that Weiss had not given sufficient weight to this supernatural element in the life of Jesus. On the basis of the record the supernatural element must be included. "Any attempt at writing his biography, in so far as it does not recognize something in our lord's de-

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veloping life beyond human analysis and delineation is unscientific."®8 With divine authority for faith and for the scripture thus established by presupposition, concession could be made to details of the higher criticism. Hincks admitted that some legends had undoubtedly crept into the record. Traces of human interpretation of the divine fact are found in the gospels. 58 J o h n did not distinguish between what he learned directly from Jesus and what he learned through the spirit. 57 T h e book of Acts being history, has less sanction than Romans which is doctrinal. T h e distinction between history and doctrine, or otherwise stated between historical fact and religious insight was important in Hincks' mind, and in subsequent liberal apologetics. T h e central teaching of the Bible is religious and ethical, not metaphysical or historical. It is not even doctrinal. T h e emphasis on Christian experience re-appears. Hincks held that: the revelation of which each apostle was the bearer is not, therefore, to be thought of as a set of religious ideas made over to him to be held as an external possession. T h e man could not be himself without having it; he could not give it without giving his life with it. For it was in essence a personal experience of Jesus Christ in and through whom he lived. God had made his consummated revelation of Himself in the Incarnation a glorious reality in this man's spirit. 58 T h e experience constitutes the essential revelation. T h e reproduction of this experience in the believer is his assurance that the claims regarding the historical Jesus made by the New Testament are justified: T h e central pillar of its (the church's) confidence that the apostolic picture of our Lord was a true representation, was the assurance that God who had presented Christ to its heart as it gazed on the portrait, and had so begotten it into new life, would not have deceived it in giving the assurance that this and no other was its Lord. 5 9 Having shifted the emphasis from the historical fact to the religious experience which is produced by that fact and which interprets it, Hincks had to his own satisfaction proved the validity of the claim to a supernatural revelation in Jesus. He feels free then to make a strong plea for historical criticism. "Supported by this conviction it (the Church) welcomed the most searching scrutiny into the historical sources of its faith." 6 0 When Hincks is pleading for scientific criticism, and is not engaged in the defense of supernatural Christianity he is apparently will-

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ing to leave even the test of revelation to historical science. He speaks of some scholars who have made a presentation of Hebrew history "widely at variance with the conception of Hebrew history which belongs to the Christian writers." These scholars openly maintain that they are naturalists and deny all the supernatural claims of Christianity. Now, said Hincks, We regard ourselves as justified in suspending judgment as to their conclusions, in the suspicion that this mental bias may have warped their treatment of the facts, until the case shall have been fully tried before the bar of science.61 This was with respect to questions of Hebrew history. But Hincks was not so positive about applying the same test to the gospel record. Here the supernatural element was made a presupposition. An Andover editorial escaped the inconsistency by adopting Hincks' distinction between religious perception of religious truth and scientific discovery of fact. The editorial explicitly denied that the Christian consciousness had any significance for the purely scientific inquiry into historical fact: And as for the Christian consciousness, the critic has no private tests of truth; he is not a sophist; he does not make either his reason or his conscience, or his religious consciousness, the measure of all things. He is a seeker of Truth; of historical truth by the methods of the historical sciences.82 Faith and religious experience have no weight in the determination of historical fact; but they are the sources of absolute certainty concerning the religious meaning of the historical record: Faith does not rest on tradition,—that is the root of Protestantism; no more does it rest on science. It stands not in the word or the wisdom of men, but in the power of God. It is invincible in its reality. Two things criticism cannot assail, for they are not within its field. One is, the inspiration of the Scriptures; that is, not merely that they were inspired, but that they are inspired; that here are His words, which are spirit and which are life. The other is the necessary correlate of inspiration, the immediateness of religious experience. 83 The pressure of historical criticism was beginning to be felt. Striking omissions in this delineation of the field of religious experience (here

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equated with faith) are obvious. T h e life of Jesus, the miracles; these are not beyond the pale of criticism. T h e inspiration of the scriptures is a religious concept which science cannot destroy. But even erroneous records may be religiously valuable. T h e writer seems to be anticipating the latest and most critical stage of the historical discussion. He gives some attention to the nature of tradition. Tradition has three characteristics. It is constantly modified in the process of transmission from one age to the next. It becomes more positive the farther it gets from the facts. It does not recognize the fact of its own development. It is always "transferring the present into the past, and ascribing immemorial antiquity to the things of yesterday." 64 Here was a thoroughly evolutionary conception of tradition. T h e historian's problem consequently is to analyze the complex of social and political institutions, customs, laws, which we find at the end, and which tradition often puts at the beginning of the history; and to trace, first upward, then downward, the line of development, the history itself, its substance and reality. 63 Late in 1888 Professor George Foote Moore published a paper on The Modern Historical Movement and the Christian Faith, in which, sensing the logic of the situation, he separated Christian experience almost completely from historical considerations. He accepted entirely the application of the evolutionary hypothesis to all religion. 66 Immediately the question of the absoluteness of Christianity is raised. Moore does not deny its absoluteness but "we must make it perfectly clear wherein the absoluteness of Christianity consists, and upon what grounds our invincible conviction rests." 67 Moore bases this conviction on Christ himself; but is it the historical Christ? T h e answer is not clear. T h e one ground of our faith—here we can appeal to the experience of every Christian—is Jesus Christ himself, in whom God reveals himself to us as the Saviour. Or to put it differently, it is the fact that, in Christ, God has taken hold of us, of heart and thought and life, and made us his own. 68 Now this conviction does not rest on any of our ideas of God, nor upon any knowledge of the doctrines of the person and work of Christ. It rests upon an historical fact; but the fact is Christian experience: Reconciliation to God in Christ through the forgiveness of sins— this, the heart of the gospel, is the absolute in Christianity, which no

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discoveries in intellectual enlightenment, nor moral or religious progress can touch. 69 T h e assurance with which Moore, and others of the times, referred to one type of Christian experience as the normal and typical experience is startling to later readers familiar with James' Varieties of Religious Experience. There is a certain narrowness of range of this early liberal thought which is one of the reasons it could remain as much as it did within the framework of evangelicalism. Later liberalism cannot use the argument from experience in the same way. T o o much is known about the possible differences in that experience, and about the way in which experience is interpreted through the categories at hand. Moore did not deny revelation of God in the historical process, but he related the revelation to evolution. T h e revelation "enters into the conditions of human development. It is therefore limited in every age by the conditions of that age." 70 T h i s was a more radical position than any other Andover writers accepted. It left many questions open. Moore states them and leaves them as questions. What is the relation of the experience of regeneration to the historical revelation of God in Christ? What can be meant by the inspiration of the scriptures? How does one decide whether the scriptural record at any point is historical fact or legend? Other Andover writers would not go so far as Moore. They upheld the importance of history against T . H. Green. Green had denied that the miraculous element in the life of Jesus was either true or necessary as a basis of Christian faith. Mrs. Humphrey Ward popularized Green's position through a much read novel, Robert Elsmere. Andover discussed Green's position and attacked the theme of Robert Elsmere editorially. T h e writers said they believed in a completely spiritual Christianity just as did Green. T h e age, and religious thought were however becoming too subjective. Men were analyzing their own feelings, and even studying religious experience objectively. There was a parallel tendency to emotionalism and sentimentalism. Perhaps Andover was beginning to wonder about her own position somewhat. They said that the correction of subjectivism was to keep the historical Jesus at the center of Christian faith. " T h e Christ of faith must be set before men as the Jesus of history. Otherwise they will worship they know not what." 7 1 One distinguishing characteristic of the Andover liberalism is the final unwillingness to separate Christianity from beliefs about the historic

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Jesus, and more particularly from belief in his supernatural relationship to both God and the world. Since they still were defending the importance of this absolute historical revelation of God it was necessary to re-define belief in the nature of Jesus and to show the grounds for the belief against those, many of them Christians, who were willing to give u p supernaturalism. Andover accepted the task and stated that the prime problem of both faith and scientific criticism was to discover "the actual facts of the history of Jesus of Nazareth." 7 2 In a somewhat melancholy sentence they showed the hold which belief in the miraculous and supernatural personality of Jesus still possessed over them in spite of the new emphasis on personal religious experience as the ground of certainty. Said the writer: If Jesus was not what the apostles believed him to be in respect to his divine Sonship and redemption, there is nothing to discuss concerning the subdivisions of evangelical doctrine. 73 T h e y did not want to leave this critical inquiry to those outside the church, only to be watched and submitted to with reluctant concession by Christians. T h e y desired to pursue it as Christians so that they might know the exact truth concerning Jesus. T h e r e is a certain courage in the background of this liberal spirit toward scientific inquiry. Personal tragedy often underlies theological reform. Having accepted the challenge, Professor Hincks published a month later a careful and scholarly reply to Mrs. Ward's contention that historical criticism revealed the gospels as untrustworthy in so far as they ascribed miraculous deeds to Jesus. T h e problem was to find the trustworthy records within the gospels and see what they claimed of Jesus. Hincks based his defense on the Marcan hypothesis. Mark has the oldest and most authentic records of the life of Jesus. But Mark clearly presents Jesus as a miracle worker. T h e choice before the scholar is clear. H e must "admit that Christ wrought many miracles, or own that we do not know what sort of person He was." 74 Hincks was willing to accept the testimony of those writers whom he believed to have been close to Jesus. T o Mrs. Ward's claim that the miraculous tradition of Christianity should be compared with similar elements in other faiths, Hincks replied that each tradition had to be studied and accepted or rejected by itself. 75 If the comparative method be rejected, and if no other way of separating true from false elements in the gospel of Mark be found, then Hincks' statement of the issue remained the final one, either all of Mark with the miracles, or ignorance as to the facts of Jesus' life.

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Hincks made a similar reply to Dr. Martineau in which he was careful to admit that legendary elements had undoubtedly crept into the gospels, that traces of Greek philosophy could be detected in Paul's letter to the Corinthians, and that there were some heavy considerations weighing against the apostolic authorship of the Gospel attributed to John. 7 6 Creed and Scripture were kept by Andover as Christian essentials, but tested by Christian experience. If Scripture is still regarded in some sense as an objective revelation some point of view with respect to that revelation was necessary. Criticism was making the exact determination of the historical facts underlying the gospels increasingly difficult. Recognition of Hellenistic influences on Christian doctrine made the concept of "pure" Christianity more and more tenuous. Supernatural elements in the record of Jesus appeared to be more adequately interpreted as the development of tradition around a dimly known and faintly remembered figure. Use of religious experience as a test of historical revelation was obviously invalid, and as a test of doctrine it was vague at best, and useless when Christians disagreed. These considerations forced Andover to seek further for a solid undergirding of faith. T h e pre-suppositions of Christian theology were at stake. HI. T H E NEW CHRISTOLOGY

There were four possible developments of the position in which the evangelical theologians found themselves and Andover turned to all of them in the final attempt to achieve a defensible position. One was to take refuge in mysticism. T h e second was to emphasize Jesus' ethical rather than his metaphysical significance. A third was to give up the claim for his absoluteness. Finally one could still try to defend the doctrine of his supernatural divinity by reason, experience, historical testimony, and faith. As their thinking progressed the Andover men stressed more and more the practical and experimental effect of Christian doctrine as more important than its appeal to science or reason. In 1890 they wrote: " A purely speculative interest no longer exists; but the practical aim of religious truth is the controlling consideration." 77 T h i s was a last refuge of men sorely troubled to defend the faith. Andover went on to other defenses also, but they were close to the surrender of everything but religious experience. Professor Harris took the second line of thought. T h e significance of Jesus is not metaphysical but ethical. Harris' paper was expressly in-

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tended to answer the challenge of biblical criticism which, he admitted, had thrown new alarm into the camp of Christianity. 78 This ethical interpretation of Jesus was not new. It grew out of other factors in the total religious situation; but it received new impetus from its obvious uses as a defense against criticism. Harris began by shifting the ground of discussion from the other supernatural facts of the record of Jesus to his ethical perfection. T h e real issue he now said was not the question of the detailed events of Jesus' life. The real question was: Is Christianity correct in holding that in the life of this person there is a work of redemption for men? Said Harris: "The crucial question, in my judgment, is whether or not Paul was right in his conception of the work and person of Jesus Christ." 79 Harris believed there was a basis on which the historical person and the Christ of faith could be held to be one. This is that Jesus "embodied the perfect ethics." 80 Harris renewed his use of the Christian consciousness by appealing to general agreement on this point. Specifically Jesus' ethical perfection consists in his self-sacrificing love. " T h e son of Man came not to be ministered unto but to minister." Jesus is a revelation of God because he exemplifies absolute goodness.81 When from Gospel or Epistle we try to frame a metaphysic of a divine-human person we may fail, or get no further than various negations; but when we are at the very heart of that which is ethical, even love which suffers, we know that our Lord and Master is no other than He whom we must call the eternal Son of God. 82 Harris held that men have knowledge of the divine character of this ideal through direct intuition. "This is original, underived, absolute holiness; as soon as seen, known to be divine." 83 This is a more direct and personal awareness of truth than comes through the Christian consciousness interpreted as a consensus of opinion. Harris seems to have had this more idealistic meaning of the term in mind from the beginning. Biblical criticism cannot assail this position for it rests, not upon the authority of the writings or a theory of their origins but upon direct spiritual insight.84 Late in 1891 an editorial courageously entitled The Positive Side of Biblical Criticism gave up even the claim of the absoluteness of Jesus' ethical revelation, and laid less stress than had Harris on the doctrine of redemption. T h e writer pointed out that the effect of Biblical criticism had been to turn attention away from the literal and mechanical doctrine of inspiration. "Biblical writers learned facts as other writers

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learn them, and reported them with the same liabilities to partial and inexact information." Faith then may be occupied with its real object, the spirit and not the letter. It is "exalted and spiritualized." 85 The Bible still has unique characteristics. The sense of the presence of God, the doctrine of the unity and perfection of God, the doctrine of man's sinful state and his need of redemption, a sober and comprehensive view of the outcome of human life, these are all to be found best stated in the Bible, and some of them only there. What of the revelation in Christ? In one paragraph the writer gives up the faith in Christ's absolute nature which Andover had long defended. Speaking of the historical Jesus the writer said: Tradition may not have preserved his exact words, the memory of his disciples may have failed sometimes, his life may have been interpreted and idealized, and the doctrinal inferences drawn by the apostles may need to be tested in the light of reason and calm reflection; but this much is plain, that Jesus Christ made such an impression upon men that He gave them such a revelation of truth and such an inspiration of life as no other man has ever given. T h e wisdom of the ages is in the words attributed to Him; the hope of the world is in the doctrine which He taught and in the life which He lived and which He sacrificed. This is the conclusion of the most stringent criticism quite as much as it is of the simplest faith. 86 T h e Word of God, the saving truth is to be found in the Bible but it is contained there, it is not the Bible itself. "Enough that it is somewhere," Andover now said. "Even in the Bible it is as treasure hid in a field, we should search for it where it is to be found, and should search for it until it is found." 87 Liberalism's long "search" for religious truth was beginning. Certainty was gone. Having apparently abandoned belief in the supernatural character of the revelation of God in the Bible and in Christ, Andover undertook the task of restating the doctrines of revelation and redemption through Christ. These last theological editorials were entitled The Divinity of Jesus Christ. Their position was not by any means as radical as the paragraph from the editorial just quoted. There was nothing in that statement that could not be said by a Unitarian or even an agnostic, as Andover seemed later to realize. What was to be done with the whole theological structure of trinity, atonement, and redemption? This last work preserved the evangelical language, but gave it a content which showed at every point the struggle which theology was passing through.

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There were three developments of the doctrine of the Person and Work of Christ in this last work. The writers tried first to make the divinity of the historical person intelligible through the use of the conception of immanence. Secondly, they developed and qualified Harris' position that Christ's central significance is ethical, not metaphysical, by making the figure of Jesus the historical origin of the Christian cultus and the center of personal piety without attempting a definition of his relationship to God. This line of thought was in harmony with the Ritschlian theology of Germany. Finally, they did cling to at least a remnant of the traditional belief in the uniqueness, perfection, and supernatural relationship to God of the historical Jesus. They had gone too far in the one radical paragraph of surrender. The miraculous element re-appears. The importance of this supernatural element to the writers appears in their introductory statement as to what they considered to be at stake in this discussion of the divinity of Christ. Without Christ there could be no reconciliation of the individual with God. Nor do we see any reason to believe that our humanity can in Him be reconciled to God, and restored to God, save as it is true that in Him ethically, spiritually, and—that these words may have their necessary value—metaphysically, and essentially dwells the fullness of God. 88 Without this article in its creed "Christianity ceases to be what it purports to be." 89 Andover never quite succeeded in separating the possibility of Christian truth from the necessity of Christian certainty. They believed it a fundamental proposition of Christian faith that Christianity contains somewhere in its concrete empirical tradition a revelation of God which is final, perfect, and entirely above the relativities of existence. Empirical history and divine perfection have to come together at some point if the church as an institution is to possess an absolute and necessary truth and if Christian experience is to come in contact with an absolute ideal and a saving power. The discussion of the divinity of Christ is begun by noting all the objections to the doctrine. The difficulties with which the writers had been struggling were openly stated. They mentioned one new problem. They pointed out that psychology was making it more difficult to hold that any being could have two absolutely distinct natures and yet be one person.90 It is difficult to see why they felt any force in this objection. Psychology

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in the nature of the case could have nothing to say about how a supernatural personality might function. There is neither data nor theory from which to draw any conclusions. Andover was sensitive to scientific prestige, however. If a position seemed unscientific, that is in definite conflict with science, it was not held for long. The writers adopted the only method which they believed could possibly yield any satisfactory defense of belief in Christ's uniqueness. They considered the problem as one to be settled by historical testimony. Did the primitive church believe Jesus to be a divine being? If it did, Andover declared the doctrine would be "presumptively true" because found in the early church which was "consciously rooted in God." 91 This might have been a justified method of argument if Andover had been using the concept of the Christian consciousness. If the Christian consciousness is the test of truth, then the determination of the Christian consciousness with respect to Jesus would be to find the truth about him. But the Christian consciousness is not referred to by the writers. They were explicitly engaged in trying to demonstrate a doctrine about an historical event by appealing to historical testimony. T h e question at issue of course is, is the historical testimony accurate? and until this point is settled the whole argument hangs in the air. It was easy to show that the primitive church did believe in the divinity of Christ. Historical critics were at the moment showing how the idea of divine revelation in an historical person dominated the gospel writers. Andover held that if those close to Jesus who wrote the synoptic gospels believed him to be divine the charge that this notion of his divinity grew up after his death was refuted. T h e sword cut both ways, however. If the writers of the original sources were under the sway of supernatural concepts the historical accuracy of their writings may be questioned. Andover did not now see this latter objection. T h e editors stated that the gospels are a religious message, not a biographical source; but they believed that in spite of this fact accurate knowledge of the historical events could be obtained through them. After examining the thought of the primitive church they turned to the words of Jesus and asked whether he himself considered that he was divine. 92 It was easy to get a satisfactory answer from the Gospels. T h e objection regarding Jesus' self-confessed lack of knowledge and absolute power in certain situations was removed by stating that his divinity did not mean that he was infinite, but only that the infinite was revealing itself through him. 93 They went on to show that the later church believed Jesus to be the

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Son of God, that this was a truly Christian idea, not dependent on Hellenistic sources although it might have been stated in terms borrowed from these sources. Most confidence was placed, not in the historical, but in a pragmatic argument. If Jesus was not divine, how can you explain the work and power of his church? This last argument they developed at length. Evidence that Jesus is divine is found in the effect of his life, particularly in the success of the institution which he founded. Jesus' work, was three-fold. He brought, first, a new revelation of God to the world. T h e popular emphasis upon the fatherhood of God in liberal theology was at the center of this doctrine; and offers a commentary on the liberal attitude toward evolution. A completely optimistic interpretation of evolution in terms of progress would offer support to belief that the universe was friendly. W e have seen the philosophers of religion, however, becoming more impressed with evolution as lending strength to a "materialistic" interpretation of the universe. T h e strenuous efforts to reinterpret evolution through an idealistic personalism testified to underlying uneasiness about man's relation to the vast and uncontrollable powers of nature. Andover shared this distrust of the scientific world-view taken by itself. Christ is necessary as the assurance of the friendliness of the universe. Without him we know nature only as indifferent at best, cruel at worst toward human life. Looking at Christ we know that the universe is friendly, we see "God in the character of love." 9 0 This Ritschlian attitude toward naturalism and metaphysics is not consistent with the rest of Andover's thought; but the idea was there. Jesus' second major work is the production of a new type of character. T h i s was the familiar argument from the experience of regeneration through Christ. Finally, Christ is the origin and center of the earthly fellowship of the redeemed. T h e creation of the church is a supernatural work. T h e extension of its influence in the world argues for its divine commission. Obviously if nature, identified with evolution, is indifferent and hostile to man, then the moral progress of man, and the building of all worthwhile human institutions must be supernatural. It was this definition of nature, never expressly stated by Andover, but implied in this argument, that lent strength to belief in the supernatural character of Jesus. In the discussion of the founding of the church the writers made a suggestion far-reaching in its implications. They came very close to taking the position that this historical relationship of Jesus to the church and to the believer was the most important element of the Christian doc-

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trine concerning him. They pointed out that Jesus was the real center of the church's faith, the supreme symbol of the cultus whatever one might hold otherwise about his metaphysical significance. The position was Ritschlian and the writers even quote Ritschl's use of Luther's statement about Christ's lordship: The kingdom of Christ, carrying with it his kingship, is acknowledged by those who do not accept traditional doctrines of his person. Albert Ritschl, for example, singles out Luther's acknowledgement of the Lordship . . . as that which embodies all it is necessary to believe concerning Christ.95 This three-fold work of Christ: revelation, regeneration, and founding of the Christian community, is unique in history. It must therefore, Andover said, have a supernatural origin. There are other religions, other men of religious genius, but they belong to a species lower than Christianity. Christianity is the truth. Christ stands therefore above all the relativities of earthly life and thought, and even earthly religion. He is "not to be reduced into any class which at the best consists only of his prophets and interpreters." 96 Just as the earlier debate over future probation had really involved as its central issue, the absoluteness and finality of historic Christianity, so this discussion of Christ represents the same determination to show that Christianity is absolute by basing it upon a revelation of God which is not subject to the vicissitudes of an evolutionary process. Andover did not claim that this argument for the supernatural nature of Jesus was absolutely convincing. An element of faith is necessary to accept this central doctrine, faith still in the sense of spiritual insight: If our view of the nature of Christ's teaching and work is not adopted, no occasion exists for a doctrine of his person as divine. . . . The appeal is to experience and to history. If experience does not imply that work, if history is not read in that light, and if the faith of the church from the outset is thought to be one grand mistake, we can make no other appeal. Spiritual things are spiritually discerned.97 Jesus is divine. What does this mean? How is his relationship to God on the one hand and to nature on the other to be conceived, if indeed a supernatural being can be made intelligible at all. Andover stated their position cautiously, and with somewhat less emphasis on the absoluteness of Christ. They set out to show that Jesus, in

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his divine-human personality was "the embodiment of the light, life, and love of God under human conditions and limitations." 98 A superhuman being under human limitations, could this mean anything? T h e writers even expressed some hesitancy themselves about the answer. " T h e disciple of Jesus may trust him as Redeemer, and adore him as Lord, without affirming, or being able to affirm, anything more than that he is Lord and Master." 99 When Andover was seeking a formula to express Jesus' supernatural personality they repudiated any revelation of God in nature. 100 Now when they are considering his human limitations they are able to find revelation of God in nature. Nature is "the indwelling of God." Humanity is a revelation of God, both in the individual and in society. T h e intellectual and moral powers of man reveal as well as recognize absolute truth and right. Society, as it advances along the path of civilization, realizes a purpose which is not of its own origination, but which is the ideal corresponding to its inherent constitution. 101 This was a gesture away from the anti-metaphysical position of Ritschl toward the personal idealism of Lotze whom the Andover men were also reading with enthusiasm. 102 Their substitution of the term divinity of Jesus for the deity of Jesus was itself a concession to the Unitarian position that divinity in Jesus is a quality of being which is not his exclusive possession. Andover pushed this immanental conception of God as a way of making the incarnation intelligible; but they did not push it too far. Christ is not merely the completion of the lesser revelations. He is not like them, the result of a natural evolution. God is immanent in existence, only in the sense that he carries out his purposes within it and partially reveals himself through it, but he is not restricted to its laws for his activity. There might be an organ of revelation, vitally related to the humanity which is to be perfected, yet not merely the consummate flower of a natural evolution, such as others may also become, but an organ through which God comes to men in grace and love. 103 Jesus is such a revelation. Andover's summarizing sentence is remarkable for its tentativeness and for the effort to keep the idea of God in nature, but to hold at the same time the supernatural element. Of Jesus the writers said:

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It may be then that he was above mankind in his mode of existence, yet organically related to the humanity which he transcends, and that in him the revelation of God completes that which in nature and human life remained incomplete. 104 They did not surrender supernaturalism to the evolutionary naturalistic world view. They struggled with the problem which has puzzled and tormented all Christian theology. How can the God-man be made intelligible? T h e problem was greatly sharpened for these nineteenth century theologians by the evolutionary naturalism which had so much scientific support and which was rapidly gaining ground as a total world view. T h e hesitancy and bewilderment which really existed in Andover's thought is revealed by two paragraphs from this same work on Christ which reveal their desperate attempt to claim both his divinity and his humanity: T h e belief concerning Jesus is not that God in all his absoluteness, omniscience, and omnipotence took on the form of a man and walked about among men in Galilee, so that Jesus knew . . . more than the moderns of science and philosophy, but it is the belief that God was in Christ, so far as God can manifest his life in a human personality at a given period in history, and for the purpose of bringing in his grace and love for the renewal and perfection of men. 1 0 5 "So far as God can manifest his life in a human personality," that can be a purely naturalistic formula for the doctrine of revelation. But Andover did not mean naturalism, for only a few paragraphs later they said that Christ must have had some sense of his préexistence: Those strange, unaccountable impressions which arise at times in all minds, and which are called reminiscences, so weird and fugitive that they are by some referred to a pre-existent state, may suggest to us the reminiscences Christ may have had of the higher, more glorious state from which he came. 1 0 6 In this theological crisis Andover was becoming friendly to the idea that these speculations might be given up if the one point that Jesus reveals the character of God be granted. " T h e revelation of God in Christ pertains less to his absoluteness than to his character. It is the love of God which is made known in Jesus Christ." 1 0 7 Andover is at the transitional stage between supernaturalism and naturalism in liberal theology. Four factors were at work to produce this Andover emphasis on the

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supernatural quality of the revelation in Christ. There is first the inherent difficulty of getting knowledge of an infinite or absolute being out of a finite situation. This gap must be overcome in some way if God is to be known in his absoluteness. T h e doctrine of God in Christ was one solution of the problem of revelation. George A. Gordon held this to be the importance of the Nicene Creed, that "finite and infinite stand to each other in relations both of likeness and contrast, and the relation of contrast we must not ignore. It is impossible by adding to man to make him God." 1 0 8 Christ is therefore not only man but God, and only because he is more than man can he reveal God. T h e doctrine of Christ as stated by Andover also attempts to preserve a moral absolutism. If the perfect life is revealed in Christ then there is a final test for all moral questions, an absolute perspective from which all life may be criticized. Knowing God in an historical figure is, in the third place, an aid to the religious experience of communion with God through which, in this liberalized theology man finds his redemption. This need of religious experience is expressly stated by Tucker in his discussion of the significance of Christ. " T h e desire to know God is not purely an intellectual desire." It is more than "the passionate curiosity which we feel before the mystery of the universe. It has in it the longing for companionship, the craving for communion." 1 0 9 Christ satisfies this longing. Tucker does not clarify his conception of this redeeming work in the present paper; but of the reality of the experience he speaks positively. Most of Tucker's papers reveal a more evangelical view than that of his colleagues. T h e r e are those who are consciously delivered by Christ from sin's bondage and are changed in "the disposition and temper of their minds." 1 1 0 Tucker says that only belief in Christ's divinity makes intelligible this effect He expresses Christ's work of atonement in more evangelical terms than did Harris. "Nothing less than the absolute assurance that the act of Jesus Christ in reversing the course of sacrifice was a divine act can avail to prevent a return of the race to the old course." 111 T h e fourth factor in this clinging to absolutism was the pressure to maintain the authority of the church. Andover again and again stated that the problem of Christ's divinity was the same problem as the divine origin and absoluteness of Christianity. Three traditions came together in the Andover theology: evangelical Calvinism, idealistic metaphysics and epistemology interpreted with relation to the idea of progress, and romanticism by which is meant ex-

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" 3

ploration of the subjective satisfactions of religious experience, and the emphasis on the goodness of human nature. With one exception evangelical doctrines either dropped out of sight or were re-interpreted to harmonize with the romantic and idealistic philosophies as Andover thought developed. T h e exception was the doctrine of the supernatural nature of the historical Jesus, and about this, they were hesitant. They wavered between emphasis on the natural humanity and the supernatural divinity of the historical figure and would never quite say that the human might be divine and the divine human. T h e divine-human Christ has a different function in this theology from that of Calvinism. He is now most important as the revelation of an absolute moral ideal, and the assurance of its attainability. He also is assurance of the friendly interest of the universe in man, the channel for religious communion with God, and finally, as the founder of the church, the guarantee of its divine mission and certain triumph. T h e unresolved difficulty in the position was the scarcity and inconclusiveness of its proof. T h e theologians shuttled between reason, experience, faith and mysticism as the basis of Christian knowledge. No consistent theory of knowledge was stated, nor does one appear to have been held. T h e position that reason is not the final test of truth is difficult enough for theology to maintain; but the difficulty is increased and the confusion multipled when the sphere of reason is not clearly marked off. T h e Christian consciousness in which reason, opinion, and experience were badly confused was totally unsatisfactory as a basis for Christian thought. Andover moved toward the position that the evidence for Christianity is in the experience of the Christian as interpreted by reason; but it was left for a theologian of another school, Lewis French Stearns, to work this position out more fully. Andover's "liberal" attitude toward doctrine meant that they were willing to modify dogma in the light of reason and experience, and to accept the results of scientific inquiry into historical fact. It also meant that they were confused as to both the precise meaning and the fundamental basis of Christian doctrine, and finally that they were willing to keep beliefs which were attested by little or no direct evidence. They were open-minded liberals who made of subjective experience and intellectual humility dubious substitutes for rationality.

6 THE

THEOLOGY

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THE

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as the society of the redeemed has appeared in most Christian theologies. Sometimes the Kingdom is the heavenly society in the future life. Sometimes it is the church in the world. Calvinism, following Augustine's City of God, added to both these ideas that of a reconstructed and Christianized society on earth. Calvin's rule of Geneva was based on the belief that the orders of the world could and should be made to conform with the will of God. The Puritans came to Massachusetts believing that they were establishing the Kingdom of God in the new country, and American Christianity has on the whole found this belief in the Christian re-making of society congenial. T h e Anti-Slavery Calvinists, along with Channing, Parker and their followers, prepared the way for the social idealism of religion in the late nineteenth century. Andover liberals inherited this faith in a redeemed social order. Their conception of the Kingdom of God, their expectations regarding it, their view of the methods by which it should be brought about were newly interpreted to conform with their liberal theological position, and with the dominant expectation of their time for social progress. More and more Andover theologians became preoccupied with the problem of the Kingdom of God to the exclusion of all else. What is called the social gospel was becoming a distinctive characteristic of the liberal American theology.

T H E IDEA O F T H E KINGDOM O F GOD

Andover did not entirely forget the evangelical emphasis on the individual in the midst of the clamour for social change. They combined the doctrines of the transcendence of God, the absoluteness of his revelation in Christ, the possibility of a changed individual life resulting from a new relationship to God with the expectation of social progress and the perception that personality is socially conditioned. They produced a theology in which individual and social salvation are correlate goals. In the present chapter the social setting of the philosophy of progress will be described as a background for the interpretation of the theology of the Kingdom of God as it was stated by Andover in the first of two fairly well marked periods of their social thinking. In the succeeding chapter the later criticism of this theology by Andover itself will be developed as we describe the growing realism in the interpretation of society. Finally we shall see how this theological development was accom-

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panied by practical action in the founding of a social settlement in Boston by the Andover group. T h e pages of the Andover Review are an excellent window through which to view the secular and religious philosophies of the late nineteenth century which reflect that highly complex and rapidly changing culture. These philosophies exhibit a puzzling combination of high expectations from human nature and social development coupled with a growing bewilderment and disillusionment in the face of social realities. Many achievements of the age contributed to the optimistic spirit. Material advances were truly startling. Trade and commerce were expanding. Cities multiplied. Discoveries in science seemed to presage man's rapid conquest of his environment. Pasteur, Lister, Roentgen added to the rapidly growing mass of useful knowledge. Liberal ideals of democracy and humanitarianism seemed to be winning a permanent triumph in Western civilization. 1 Even theology had been "humanized" and theologians thought this a sure sign of progress.2 As the turn of the century approached this hope for the rapid attainment of a practically perfect society grew dimmer. Recurring crises beset the economic system. Panic and depression came in 1873, 1877, 1884, and 1893. Great corporations were extending their monopolistic power, and men began to wonder whether this were good or bad. Huge fortunes were piling up while at the other end of the social and economic scale the poverty of the masses in great cities shocked observers. T h e rise of labor organizations testified that industrial development bred not peace, but conflict. T h e Pullman strike and the Haymarket riot symbolized the growing unrest. Both inside and outside the church sensitive social critics thrust the facts before the comfortable classes. T h e first number of the Review contained an article by Washington Gladden criticizing the "Aestheticism" of the luxurious classes.3 A few months later an extended and sympathetic account of Maurice, the English socialist, appeared. Writing in 1885 William Barrows struck a jarring note by denouncing national imperialism and not sparing the United States in the indictment: Grievous pity it is that the 19th century puts musketry and artillery and ironclads to the front, and stretchers and the Sermon on the Mount and the Lord's Prayer in the rear. Are theological and military schools so closely related and are Hardee's tactics even yet to lead St. Paul's as the gospel goes into all the world?4

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Throughout its history the Review carried numerous such papers of radical Christian thought. The papers came from a group of thinkers impressed not only with social development but also with social unrest, not only with man's control over nature, but with his lack of control over social conflict. Thus there is vagueness and uneasiness underneath the nineteenth century optimism. George A. Gordon expressed the spirit of the time as that of "large and noble expectation amid puzzled and often baffled thought." 5 The very preoccupation of so many writers with the theme of optimism testifies to the underlying uncertainty. Andover itself described the time as one "stirred with expectation not unmingled with uncertainty and apprehension, but on the whole hopeful and eager." 6 Both the hopes and the fears of the time were given expression in the varying philosophies of progress. In this concept Christian theology and the dominant secular philosophy of the time came together. Andover's theology of the Kingdom of God can be interpreted in the light of the reaction of the liberal theologians to the idea of progress. Andover writers shared both the expectation of progress and the increasing doubt about it. The general idea of an increasing conquest by man of his material environment accompanied by a gradual rise in the moral level of human behaviour was extremely prominent in Andover's thought in the first years of the liberal period. The writers could hardly doubt that progress was possible for they believed they saw it with their own eyes. They knew they belonged to a changing civilization. They felt "the pressure of surging life in new and ever shifting relations," 7 and as late as 1887 the changes seemed to be resulting in improvement: Society will develop new economics, new aesthetics, new ethics. (N.B.) The moral standards of the England of today are no further advanced of the coarse customs of Merrie England than the ethical refinements of England in the twenty-third century will be in advance of that rapacity and oppression to which its aristocracy is so indifferent now. The social reciprocities will be developed more and more. In a word, man's present mastery of the planet is but a clumsy adjustment of himself to his environment, and the "best society" of which he boasts is only a display of finery and an ingenious contrivance of delicacies for the palate, not different in motive from the feasts of the Pawnee Indians. Society is in the midst of a moral evolution which has done little more than to make a good beginning in the temperate zones . . . on the whole, progress is going forward. 8

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Here they are confident of progress which includes material advancement, scientific achievement, and moral advance. The statement that society would develop new ethics was careless. Andover certainly could not hold that higher ethical ideals than those of Jesus would be evolved. While they pointed out existing evils, the important point was the belief that the evils could be overcome. Again in 1887, regarding the elimination of poverty, with utterly naive optimism they wrote: When we think of the crowded population of lower New York, one tenement house occupied by three hundred persons, and of what goes with such a condition, we feel discouraged indeed. But on second thought we know that relief is only a question of time, that by degrees improved or at least decent conditions will take the place of filth and disease. T h e bitter cry of outcast London has been ringing of late in the ears of England . . . and already Christian philanthropy and statesmanship are dealing with the problem, the rapacity of the landlord's checked by severe law, and precautions against overcrowding are insisted upon. . . . Great problems face us, but we believe that there are great forces over against them. . . . So many triumphs have been achieved in the power of Christ that the church feels a quickening thrill of energy when it is confronted by remaining evils. . . . A dilettante benevolence, whatever its effectiveness may be, is a significant proof of the extent to which the Christian hope and the Christian law of love have become dominant. 9 Sometimes this naiveté about social problems combined with awareness of some slight effects of Christian and other social work produced a truly romantic optimism about the possibility of a transformed world: Christianity not only expects the removal of social evils within a single nation or within a single generation,—it proposes nothing less than the conversion of the world, a task to which the church has confidently addressed itself. 10 This optimistic faith in progress was one root of the social gospel; but there was another, social need. If optimism was the dominant theme there were other, more sombre overtones. In more realistic moments Andover writers treated the idea of progress with admirable discrimination. At least one of them, William Jewett Tucker, moved sharply away from an easy-going optimism. After all there were problems in society crying for solution. As social conflicts grew more serious and social dis-

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tress more apparent, the theologians stressed more the need for change, and less the certainty of it. Many features of the social scene came in for criticism which will be analyzed in detail in the next chapter. Andover was disturbed by "the tremendous lurch toward materialism and mercantilism." 11 In some papers Andover's criticism of the idea of progress was put in the form of a distinction between material and moral progress, man's conquest of his environment on one hand, and his development of character on the other: Thirty years hence, it will be seen that, in the closing decade of the nineteenth century, men were expecting improvement along economic lines, as thirty years earlier their hopes were directed to political reform. And if the expectations shall by that time have been realized the verdict will be one of disappointment unless there shall also have been hope and effort respecting character and the moral relations of society.12 T h e distinction of moral progress from other kinds of progress may be put in many ways. Andover here separated moral improvement, from improvement of political organization and economic reform. T h e paragraph was written in 1891 when Andover thought was generally tending to break down this distinction. It was a conservative reaction to proposals for economic reform. It is extremely likely that not all the Andover men would have written in just this way at this time. William J . Tucker made a similar distinction between the advance of civilization and true moral progress. He observed the effect of city life upon the home and concluded that the home was being destroyed. Christianity must restore the home "or confess its failure in the presence of the rapid and ruthless march of modern civilization." 13 This description of social trends as "the rapid and ruthless march of civilization" destroying a precious cultural heritage is a long way from an identification of social change with progress. Yet careful discrimination of the meaning of progress is the exception, not the rule in Andover thought. Their general use of the term is stated in an editorial comment on a discussion of progress by Lord Bryce, whose philosophy of progress was published in the English "Speaker" in 1890. Bryce had reviewed the hundred years from 1789 to 1889. He pointed out the apparent gains in the extension of education, the growth of the national spirit, the consolidation of the German Empire.

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He also pointed to the disquieting facts of extremes of wealth and poverty and the growth of armaments. T h e conclusion was that the eighteenth century had been too optimistic about human nature. T h e very improvements in material culture had resulted in serious social problems. Andover editors defended belief in progress against Bryce's conclusion. They said that social inertia and social difficulties do not constitute a refutation of the idea of progress; but they do show that the rate of progress is often misjudged. 14 It is generally slower than optimists expect. Also the rate differs in different countries. Progress in Japan will be rapid for a time because the external changes, the material changes, take place more rapidly. In America the material foundation is already laid; and rapid improvement cannot be expected. T h e country is already too far along the way. T h e supposition that Christian efforts in countries already Christian will produce immediate results is often disappointed, because now there is not a radical change of ideals and standards, but a slow purification of those already adopted. 15 They conclude by saying that though the full realization of God's Kingdom may be far off, men need not be discouraged: There are those who are stimulated best by a magnitude of large and distant results which they may not live to see. They are stirred by reviewing the centuries each of which is seen to have had its own task, and by penetrating the life of the nations to see that each had its own function. T h u s they learn that their plans may be cooperative with a divine and eternal purpose which through the ages runs, and are more deeply moved thus than by the hope of snatching hastily what might prove to be the superficial results of mere human contrivance. 16 T h i s was romantic optimism surely, but it is not simple belief in the constant improvement of the whole human society. Faith in progress came to mean more and more faith in the ultimate triumph of God's will, not a belief in immediate and observable advance in the moral level of mankind. T h e stricture in this statement against trying to bring progress about at once through "human contrivances" by which Andover surely implied radical social reforms, indicates again a social conservatism. They were content to think of the triumph of the perfect society as a long way off:

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It is the wisdom of the Christian Scriptures not to indicate the definite time within which results will be accomplished, but rather to emphasize the nature of the need, the principle of social service, and the certainty of final success.17 An increasing disillusionment with even this qualified optimism appears in Tucker's address to the entering seminary class in 1891. Tucker felt the practical need of the minister in the midst of this changing society. T h e pulpit was losing its authority to speak to men bewildered by the social conflicts of the age. " T h e social confusion is becoming so great as to seriously disturb the aim of the pulpit, and throw a vast deal of truth afield which never finds men." 18 Tucker meant by social confusion, not only unrest, but also the growing feeling among those who had never questioned the fundamental structure of American life that they were not quite sure what the true solution of society's problems might be. Men were growing increasingly skeptical of the capacity of Christianity to provide a solution. 19 T h e family was yielding to the stress of modern culture. Democracy was undergoing a crisis in which it appeared ineffective in the face of economic forces: We turn to democracy as the great political safeguard only to find how powerless it is to preserve social unity under the mighty economic forces which are pushing men into social extremes. We see that the same classification or stratification of society is going on here as elsewhere under the reign of industrialism. We find the old class antagonisms revived under new names and in new forms, creating social disturbance over wide areas. As Mr. Howells has recently said, the Fanners' alliance is the modern form of the Peasant's War. 20 Tucker's analysis of the social scene was so realistic and so critical that he felt it necessary to close with an appeal for faith in the times: One of the first lessons of the ministry I believe to be that one shall learn not to find fault with the Providence of God. It is a matter of surprise to me that preachers are so reckless in their denunciations of their age (it is always so) as if it had no place in the plan of God, and as if his Spirit were not present. 21 This is a remarkable statement from a time supposed to have unqualified belief in progress. T h e liberal theologian turns back to evangelical faith in the Providence of God to bolster up belief in progress. It is not

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easy to answer the question whether Calvinism or liberalism is the more truly optimistic concerning the achievement of the will of God in history. There was a practical pressure on Christian theologians to produce a theology for social reform. Preachers discussed social reform because workingmen asked them to, and because if they did not, dissatisfied classes would turn to leaders and gospels which would promise some help. A clear case of this practical root of the social gospel emphasis appears in Newman Smyth's Sermons to the Workingman, originally preached in the First or Center Church of New Haven, Connecticut, and published in the Review with an introduction by William J . Tucker. Smyth undertook the series because several workingmen requested him to discuss "directly those questions in which they were concerned through their relation to labor and to labor organizations." 22 In introducing the series Tucker expressed the fear that trade unions and "socialistic organizations" were drawing the working class away from the church. 23 Protestantism was losing its hold in industrial centers.24 T h e church must meet this competition: If the workingman . . . will not come to the church, then, go to the workingman, meet him on his own ground, listen, if need be, to his grievances, and recognize his right to open discussion and his capacity for it. Let him choose his own subject. If he is not disposed to consider the claims of personal religion, let him understand the willingness of the church to discuss any serious question in the Christian spirit and according to the Christian method.25 The social gospel arose in part out of the attempt of Christian preachers and theologians to compete with trade-unionism and radical social philosophies for the allegiance of workingmen. Another root of the social gospel was inherent in the logic of Andover's new theological position. They had developed a moralistic conception of salvation. T o be good is to be saved. It matters, then, how men are related to one another in society, for living in right relationships with one's fellows is now conceived as the principal meaning of the Christian life. If by intelligence and effort the moral level of society and of individuals can be raised Christianity must have a hand in this process. In the liberal theology promoting progress is saving men from sin. 26 The social gospel received added emphasis from one other perspective on the human situation which Andover gradually came to recognize. The nineteenth century study of history, anthropology and social struc-

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ture emphasized the understanding of individual behaviour in terms of social environment. Moral character itself is related to and dependent upon the culture in which it exists. Consequently if man is to become good, which is the practical equivalent of becoming saved, not only his own character, but the social situation which produces his character must be reconstructed. Society must be saved if individuals are to be saved. "Society and the individual cannot be separated from one another," said Andover. T h e case of poverty was most frequently used to support the position. Poverty "not only demoralizes, it enervates. It takes away the physical and mental supports of moral action." 27 T h e stress on social conditioning of personality received additional support from the experience of the missionaries who had discovered that very often preliminary social and educational measures had to be undertaken before the evangelical appeal could even be understood, let alone made effective. In reporting the history of East African Missions, George Foote Moore observed that: T h e mission ground had been enlarged and fenced; several thousand plaintain-trees set out; good crops of maize, millet, beans, peas, tomatoes, and sweet potatoes were raised. Not the least of the results of these improvements is that the natives are learning to work for hire. T h e regeneration of labor is the first step in the conversion and civilization of Africa. 28 In Andover's opinion a similar necessity governed the approach of the missionary to the masses of the city. Tucker argued that if Christianity is to be effective the basis of home life must be maintained. Acutely he saw the parallel between the necessity of social work as a preparation for evangelism to the city and the need for social reconstruction which the missionaries saw when they went to tribes in the Pacific. 29 One could hardly overemphasize the significant modification of the evangelical conception of man which this sociological study involved. Man's character, his religious experience, his faith are all organically related to a social structure. A striking modification in Tucker's own thought regarding the relationship of individual and social responsibility for character took place in this period. In Progressive Orthodoxy he wrote of "social sins,"30 and again in 1885 said: "When the pulpit now holds up some special phase of the corrupting influence of society upon the individual, it says no more than can be read every day in the issue of the press." 31 In these first writings, however, Tucker saw Christianity's real problem as that of keeping the sense of personal responsibility for

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sin alive in the face of these social facts. "It is difficult," he said, "to maintain the personal sense of sin under the knowledge of what society has done and is doing to make the individual a sinner." But this must be done. "Theology must guard at all hazards the truth of personal responsibility for sin." 32 In the face of evil social pressure the sense of individual responsibility can be kept by keeping before the individual his relationship to God: in seeking to awaken the personal sense of sin even in the most degraded, (the pulpit) does not resort to the appeal to a bald individualism. It does not attempt to affirm the separateness of man from his fellows, an affirmation which would be false. It does affirm the closeness of his relation to God, which is the most certain, the most glorious, the most awful fact of his being. 83 This position could not be absolutely maintained, however, as Tucker came to see. God may be above the relativities of existence, but man is caught in them. Man's attitude toward God is itself in part qualified by his social environment. In another paper written six years after this first one, Tucker held that preachers needed to be warned, not against too much emphasis on social responsibility for sin, but upon too little. Analyzing the social scene in 1891, he said: It is seen that the difficulty is organic, inhering in large part in society itself. We study pauperism; but we go only a little way before we find that, if we would analyze the poor man's poverty, we must stop and analyze the rich man's wealth. 34 Preachers are failing to recognize this fact. They are still "individualizing while the souls of men are bound up in institutions, in corporations, in unions, in the complicated machinery, industrial, political, and religious of modern society." 35 Souls are social products. Realization of this fact greatly stimulated the interest of liberal Christianity in social conditions. Faith is an individual attitude, but it depends in part on the social soil in which it lives. Andover attempted to incorporate these expectations and concepts, and interpret Christianity's function in meeting social need through the development of the notion of the Kingdom of God on earth as the goal of history and of Christianity. A distinction can be made between the early period of liberal Andover social thought from 1884 to 1888 and the later period from 1888 to 1893. The conception of the Kingdom out-

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lined here in this chapter belongs to the first period. Qualifications and changes of this early position are described in chapter seven. In general terms the Andover idea of the Kingdom of God is easy to state. It means the perfect society reached here on earth at the end of a long process of historical development. In a narrower sense the idea was sometimes used to designate the society of Christians already manifest in the church, but usually the broader meaning of "the renewed and perfected life of man in society" was implied: This Kingdom, considered as the visible organization of believers is the Christian church. Considered as the company of all true followers of Christ, it is the society of persons who are bound together in a spiritual unity of love to each other and of service to the world. Considered still more broadly, it is all Christian thought and life which purifies society through literature, art, laws, customs, and education, and which constitutes Christian civilization. 36 When one asks for Andover's conception of what a distinctly Christian society or civilization would be, the answer is extremely difficult to find. There is a baffling vagueness about the whole discussion of the Kingdom which is one of its most characteristic features. Theologians themselves complained of the vague way in which the term was often used; but they contributed little to its clarification. 30A In most cases when the writers come to the point of attempting a concrete definition of the Kingdom they avoid the question by the statement that men are generally agreed on their conception of it. Statements like the following are all too common: T h i s (the Kingdom of God) is an order of things partly established already in laws, institutions, customs, and personal life, so that it can be recognized in a concrete as well as an abstract form, but which is known to be immeasurably superior to the best existing conditions. There is general agreement as to the characteristics of this Kingdom. Men understand each other when they speak of the Christian society and the Christian State. It is by comparison with this ideal, not yet realized, that customs of various sorts are condemned or approved. 37 Andover defined the term somewhat more precisely by stating that it is that order of society in which the law of love prevails, but this again hardly constitutes a satisfactory basis for intelligent social criticism unless further analyzed. Andover tended to think the phrases were enough:

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It is not difficult to picture society as it would be if the law of Christian love prevailed. Men pray intelligently, thy Kingdom come. It is known what the order of society would be in which not might, but love makes right. 38 Contemporary liberals would give much for such calm assurance as to the implications of Christian ethics for social structure. T h e writers achieved the appearance of definiteness without actually possessing it by using the figure of Jesus as the exemplification of the ideal. "Jesus Christ claims and exercises a spiritual authority of absolute truth and right." 39 T h e ideal of character is "made distinct in the person of Jesus, and the kingdom has already developed so far that its characteristics are familiar." 40 T h e Kingdom then is that order of society in which men treat one another according to the principles of Jesus. These principles are most clearly stated in Matthew 20:26. "Whosoever would be great among you must be your servant, and whoever wants to be first among you must be your slave." 41 The one word "service" was most commonly used to express the Christian principle. We must ask if it is not simply the failure to define more concretely the meaning of love and service which made possible much of the more superficial optimism of some liberal social gospels. Had Andover considered these terms in relation to those actual changes in society which should be brought about in order to honor them fully, not only would they have found no general agreement as to what the good society would be, but they would also have avoided the romanticism of believing that such a society would be easily achieved through a gradual development of humanitarian sentiments and moral idealism. Love and service were sentimentalized until they became ineffective guides to social conduct or reform. In a third attempt to clarify the concept of the Kingdom Andover turned to Kantian ethics. T h e Kingdom is that social state in which all forces in society promote the moral worth of individuals, and in which men treat one another as beings of immortal value. This concept of eternal value implies that the individual is the true end of social development. "A philosophy of life must be adopted before it can be shown what outward activities and intellectual enjoyment will serve the supreme purposes of the individual." 42 T h e philosophy to which Andover referred was that of the supreme value of the individual as an end in himself.48 This knowledge of the worth of the individual is not deduced from

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reason, but is held to be a distinctly religious insight, "His worth is known when he perceives that he is a child of God and destined for immortality." 44 T h e duty of man is to promote the coming of the Kingdom, which means to live in the attitude of love toward all human beings, for all have infinite worth. 45 One must do good to others, not only because others are ends in themselves, but also because service to others is the final test of one's own moral character.40 T h e Kingdom is of value only because it furthers the true value which is the worth of individuals. T h e secular interests of civilization have a function in the Kingdom. They may help to further it as they contribute to character. Conversely, they hinder it if they destroy individual character. Christians therefore do not turn away from worldly interests in seeking the Kingdom. They use secular interests to the end that moral character shall be developed: T h e evangelical dictum, love not the world, was being qualified. It had now become, use the world as an aid to the souls' salvation: It is the wisdom of the present age to utilize secular and social pursuits to the advantage of character and of the Kingdom of God. T h e risks of disproportionate interest in occupation, studies, social pleasures and public affairs are more than outweighed by the immense gain of converting business, culture, art and legislation into allies of Christian life and Christian society. When the right aim is brought into all callings and pursuits they promote the ends which they otherwise threaten to frustrate. Culture and esthetic taste are graceful, like steam floating away in beautiful shapes as it rises from an open boiler; they become mighty forces for personality and for society when they are directed into channels of Christian service, like steam when it is imprisoned and guided. 47 One's occupation may promote or destroy character. "Does not engrossing devotion to business engender pride, contempt, coarseness, indifference to the hardships of unfortunate persons?" and on the other hand the manual laborer may find his personality "well-nigh crushed" out and his soul made into a machine. 48 Since vocations or any other secular pursuit may "threaten to defeat the true ends of a man's life" progress toward the Kingdom is not guaranteed by the multiplication of cultural advantages.49 Here Andover used the distinction they did not always follow between progress in culture and progress in morality. Progress itself, if it is merely in culture, does not mean the coming of the Kingdom of God. "Great social forces,

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strong forces of culture, and general progress may sweep one against the breakers; only by intelligent navigation can one be brought to his desired haven." 6 0 T h e final test of all social systems is the moral character of those individuals included within it: Granting that the mechanism of today is a stage in the evolution of a superior mechanism, so that by reason of what now is done there will follow swifter locomotion, finer fabrics, statelier houses, nobler literature, more splendid galleries, more magnificent orchestras, and wise legislatures, still the value of the late result will be judged by the character of the men who can travel more swiftly, live more luxuriously, gain a finer culture, and appreciate a purer art. 51 Achievement of the individual goal and the social goal are therefore two aspects of one task. 52 Andover once in a while spoke of the "regeneration of society." They had already moralized the New England conception of regeneration. T h i s was an even more radical departure. T h e incorporation of a social aim in Christianity might be a departure from evangelical individualism; but it was true to the ideal of Christian prophecy: T h e most interesting characteristic of the modern spirit of expectancy is its likeness to the Christian spirit of prophecy. . . . T h e age to come is seen again, somewhat as it was seen by the early believers, as a coming order of things on earth. 5 3 Pressing questions are involved in this theology. How can the Kingdom be brought about? What is Christianity's part in progress toward it? Is Christianity needed at all? Are not the natural forces of existence enough? What place does God have in this ideal promoting activity? These questions troubled Andover, especially when they were thinking definitely within the popular philosophy of progress. Harris found these questions all suggested in J o h n Fiske's Destiny of Man. Fiske believed that the whole cosmic process was moving toward the end of a perfected life for individuals and for society. " T h e perfecting of Man is the goal toward which Nature's work has all the while been tending." 5 4 Andover asked, "What, then, is the need for Christianity?" "Were Jesus and Christianity phases of development, mere results of the past, or were they new agencies brought into the world from God for the accomplishment of His eternal plan for Humanity? Is Christianity a mere concomitant or is it a potent and indispensable cause of progress." 58 T o identify the

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goal of Christianity so closely with the goal of progress might turn out to make Christianity less important than nature. Harris only raised the questions in this review in 1885. T w o years later Andover took up this problem in an extended discussion of the relation of Christianity to secular philosophies and movements entitled Christianity and Its Competitors. T h e occasion for the work was the feeling that philosophies of progress and social reform on a secular basis had now displaced physical and biological science as the chief rivals of Christianity. 56 Three principle social movements were offering salvation to men on a basis of faith in progress and in human nature without benefit of religious sanctions or Christian aid. These were utilitarianism, humanitarianism, and secularism. Andover did not underestimate the serious challenge of these rivals. They believed they must show that Christianity is a cause of progress, not a result, and that it has something to contribute to the improvement of society which none of its rivals possess. Their answer demanded a definite statement of the nature of Christian strategy in social improvement. These articles are remarkable for the degree to which the editors maintained their emphasis on individualism. Christianity promotes progress by making individuals Christians. It announces the possibility of a new relationship between the individual and God. This new relationship issues in improved moral character, but is never wholly identified with it. In all work of social reconstruction Christianity contributes the prime essential, the true and perfect ideal of life. "Christianity has a distinct, superior, and absolute system of ethics." 57 This position was defended by criticizing utilitarianism and humanitarianism as ethical theories. They recognized values in these systems. Utilitarianisms' stress on sympathy as a motive for service, on the right of men to pursue a general good, and its impartial view of the rights of all are of value. But utilitarianism is deficient as a guide to moral behaviour because its ultimate good is in happiness and this is a less worthy ethical ideal than is the Christian conception of moral worth. Christianity accepts the humanitarian principles of liberty, equality, progress, morality, and perhaps immortality as valid ideals. In so far as they are valid, however, they have been borrowed from Christianity. Humanitarianism is also hedonistic in its conception of the good: We do not argue that, apart from Christianity the humane sentiments lead to no excellence, virtue, or beauty whatever. Some sym-

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pathy and self-respect come to expression or man ceases to be human. T h e complete truth is that Christianity cultivates the natural sentiments and affections in accordance with man's capability as a person of immortal worth, as a child of God, and as a member of God's great human family, and that only under the truth and motive of the gospel of Christ can there be really good men and a good society.58 This was precisely the same issue, here stated with relation to social progress, that Andover had seen involved in the question of the nature of Christ. Christ is not a creature of natural forces, but an addition to them. So Christianity is not merely a product of progress, unnecessary to its further march, but it is a supernatural and absolutely essential factor in all progress. Society needs Christianity for the attainment of progress for society does not contain within itself the necessary motives, ideals, or dynamic. When the question of Christianity's indispensable part in making for progress was to the fore Andover sharply criticized the optimistic faith in inevitable improvement. T h e blacker they could paint the story of history, the brighter Christianity would shine. They said that facts showed how some national cultures were ascending, some descending in the moral scale. " T h e stagnant nations live side by side with the progressive nations. Some types of national life degenerate. What makes the difference?" 69 Fiske had argued that where industry develops the warlike spirit declines.60 Andover declared this also to be contrary to the facts. " T h e most intellectual and cultivated people have been most warlike, while some of the degraded have been peaceful." 61 Further, in industry itself workers are organizing and threatening violence and destruction worse than that of foreign wars.62 T h e argument against the inevitability of progress under the natural development of human society was reinforced by showing the contrast between the law of evolution and the law of moral behaviour: A fundamental law of evolution is the survival of the fittest. T h e strong displace the weak. Those who have power take all they can get from the defenseless and the inferior, or compel their service. Might makes right. . . . Left to themselves men do strive thus with one another, till society becomes insecure and states break in pieces. . . . But it is predicted by evolutionary ethics that the moral progress of society going forward under this very law will issue in a reign of universal love, when each will do to his neighbor as he would have

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his neighbor do to him. Egoism will become far-seeing and will develop into altruism. . . . Now the law of natural evolution by superior strength is a flat contradiction to the law of love, and by no possible evolution can the one lead to the other. 83 This realistic criticism of the idea of progress, and this important application of the Darwinian theory to the description of social conflict did not, of course, come from Andover as a result of purely disinterested and scientific study of the problems involved. It came out of their eager search for arguments to establish the necessity of Christianity as a supernatural redeeming power in the world. But though not scientific in origin, it was realistic in its result. T h e absurdities of belief in progress "onward and upward forever" were avoided. How is the Christian ideal a power for moral achievement? First of all, by being an ideal to which men respond. Man is limited to the struggle for existence only until he sees the true ideal. " T h e Christian standards impress men both with authority and with attractiveness. By approach to these standards progress goes forward." 64 T h e gospel appeals to "conscience and the sense of obligation." 6 5 Human beings see that the ideal can be attained. Even when the complete realization of the ideal seems far off, it still serves as a principle of judgment on existing society and saves men from the evil of being satisfied with inferior standards. 66 T h e ideal itself has power to change men and society; but Christianity is more than a moral ideal, it is a religion. Christianity's principal contribution to social progress is in the bringing of individuals to a new relationship to God. T h i s new relationship is now interpreted by Andover, as we have seen, in liberal fashion. But the relationship is still insisted upon. It is the religious overtone to what would otherwise be a purely secular faith. It (Christianity) singles out men, one by one, and presents to them a gospel which is capable of producing radical changes now and here. . . . T h e result for society is not a man a little above or a little below customary standards, but a man different in essential respects as to aims, motives, and character from the man produced by the natural evolution of society.67 It must be remembered that the emphasis here on the necessity of Christianity as a gospel for individuals appears in a discussion, not of indi-

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vidual salvation but of social progress and Christianity's contribution to it. This is the Christian strategy: Practicality says that the gospel in seeking the future salvation of individuals neglects the present welfare of society. Christianity contends that by procuring the everlasting salvation of individuals it best advances the welfare of society. The gospel in providing everlasting salvation emphasizes the worth, the absolute worth of every man. 68 It is only through religious experience and insight that man can find the true basis of character, both the ideal and the dynamic for attaining it. "Christianity does not admit that there can be a genuine morality which does not glow with the warmth of religious emotion." 09 Andover thus summed up the Christian essentials necessary to the attainment of moral character: The function of Christianity is to cultivate the spiritual sentiments of men, to deepen reverence, to fix thought upon those things which are eternal, to bring the soul near God, to keep in the view of men their immortal destiny. For this the church preeminently stands. This service men rightly expect of it. They feel the need of spiritual uplifting, so that they shall not be narrowed by secular pursuits nor dragged down by selfish motives.70 This noteworthy passage on religious feeling shows Andover's place within one of the great divisions of Christian experience. There are those who believe that religious experience, spiritual or mystical awareness, is the ground of and essential to the moral life. Another great group would hold that the moral life is the essentially religious life, and not only does not need this mystical experience, but the experience may obscure and corrupt the moral life. The first is the school of Schleiermacher, the second is the school of Kant. Andover belonged to Schleiermacher. Andover's emphasis on the doctrine of immortality is typical of the liberal theology. Immortality makes valid the Christian ideal of the worth of personality. Man's "worth is known when he perceives that he is a child of God and destined for immortality." 71 Knowledge of the Christian belief in immortality is one of those religious insights and experiences which give the Christian adequate incentive for moral striving, and which make him therefore indispensable for the progress of society.72

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In transforming individuals Christianity also creates a society within society which is the Kingdom immanent in the world. This society is the church. T o some degree the new society "leavens the old." 7 3 But in this first period the conception of the church as a social force was not developed. 74 Christianity is a gospel for individuals, and only through them does it affect society. Christianity makes a contribution to progress as it dramatizes the Christian ideal of human equality in worship. T h e church attempts at least to bring all classes together in worship. " T h e natural tendency is at times stronger than the Christian motive, but there is dissatisfaction within the church when the rich and poor do not meet together in the same house." 75 T h e development of society in the direction of the Christian ideal is slow. No radical and sudden changes are expected, or indeed should be attempted; but ultimate success of Christian principles is assured. "Man's greatness is to labor toward the ideal of that perfect society." 76 If it is man's greatness to labor for the perfect society what is the function of God? God is necessary in the Andover philosophy of progress. He is the revealer of the ideal to the world. He is the cosmic spirit with whom man can have fellowship in religious experience and thus find courage and assurance of ultimate victory in his struggle as a Christian to perfect his own character and bring in the good society. In this liberal theology the sense of dependence upon God is weak, the sense of vigorous action on the part of man is strong. T h e sense of the judgment of absolute holiness upon the imperfections and perversity of the race is weak; the sense of the ideal as far off, but as possible of gradual approximation is strong. Andover still used pietistic language. " T h e Kingdom of Heaven is a Kingdom from Heaven." 7 7 But this meant now man's feeling of cooperation with cosmic forces, not his subjugation to them. Man is persuaded into the Kingdom. T h e immortality which in Calvinism was a hope of reward and a threat of punishment, now becomes man's assurance of his value in the sight of God, and the religious guarantee of his ethical importance. T h e Calvinist Shedd had described the two streams of history, the sacred history of redemption and the secular history of sin, as parting in the Garden of Eden and remaining separate for eternity. 78 Andover liberals repudiated this distinction. They repudiated it because they felt, dimly at first, but with increasing realism, the conflict of life with life in the new industrial civilization, because in an expanding, changing culture they believed that these evils could be removed; because the con-

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cepts of evolution and progress emphasized the importance of gradual achievement of good over against the radical change of life from one state to another; because they believed that men cannot be judged or saved apart from the social relationships which condition personality. Not optimism and belief in progress alone, but optimism coupled with the awareness of social need produced the theology of the Kingdom of God. Energy which went into revivalism in the old theology now might be expected to be spent in social reform. This is the first stage of Andover's social theology. It left many problems unsolved. What has Christianity to say about social reform through social action? Is the Kingdom of God really attainable in any sense? As we examine now Andover's reaction to the concrete social problems of the time we find them raising these questions and moving in a new direction.

7 SOCIAL

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ACTION

As T H E E N D O F T H E C E N T U R Y drew near industrial conflict and social tension increased in America. Social and economic problems absorbed the attention not only of secular thinkers but of Christian theologians. T h e Review reflects the increasing concern with social problems. Sociological study of religion was given a special department in its pages. 1 Radicals like Richard T . Ely and Vida Scudder sounded the prophetic note in Christian ethics. 2 Conservatives, liberals, and critics of many schools, both foreign and American, wrote concerning "Social Christianity." Theological seminaries were urged to establish courses in economics and sociology which they quickly did. 3 Theology could no more escape the new social problems than it had been able to avoid the slavery question. T h e general movement has been well treated by James Dombrowski in his The Early Days of Christian Socialism in America. This chapter is therefore confined to showing what the Andover theologians conceived to be the implications of Christianity expressed in concrete social criticism. I. A N D O V E R S O C I A I . C R I T I C I S M — E A R I . Y

PERIOD

A distinction has been made between an early and a later period of Anclover social thought. In the present section we shall consider Andover's social criticism in the first phase during which the idea of the Kingdom of God outlined in the last chapter was developed. At this time, up until about 1888, the same individualism and moralism which underlay the theology of the Kingdom of God appears in Andover's reflections on specific social questions. Each individual is an end in himself. T h e Kingdom is that social order in which the highest moral character of individuals is achieved. Love is a feeling of sympathy and kindness between men of whatever class or interest. T h e Kingdom is brought about by the improvement which Christianity is able to effect in individual character. How did these principles function in the concrete criticism of the economic order? Andover asked this question and answered it: by defending economic individualism and the essentials of the existing order. T h e defense of individualism and of the essentials of capitalism must be understood in these first years in the light of one important belief. T h e Andover writers thought that the laborer had ample opportunity

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for rising in the economic scale if he had the requisite ability and energy. Right or wrong, this belief was fundamental in their social-ethical thought. T h e first editorial printed in the Review discussed the frequent appeals to class feeling in politics, and pointed out that the surest counteracting force to this appeal was the feeling of the laborer that he had a chance to become a capitalist: T h e American workingman aims at proprietorship or its equivalent. True, the great majority can never satisfy this ambition, but the large possibility remains which acts as an incentive, not only to the few, but, indirectly, to the many. . . . In scarcely any instance can capital be found to be at the remove of more than a generation from labor. Maintain this ambition of the American workingman toward proprietorship, and leave the way reasonably open to him, and the formation of a social class, based upon employment, is made impossible on any large scale.4 So long as they held this belief that the way was reasonably open to economic security, it was possible to conceive of poverty as the result of inferior ability, and also of moral failure. Hence Andover at first was optimistic about the economic future. They believed that the problems of poverty, of labor strife, of monopoly could be solved by the religious transformation of individual character and the exercise of intelligence, kindness and sympathy by both owners and workers. T h e extent to which they explained poverty by moral inferiority is shown in an editorial on Social Classes and the Church. T h e editorial grew out of the practical necessities of evangelism. T h e problem was: Why doesn't Protestantism reach the poorer classes? Andover answered that the better and more respectable people naturally come into the church. T h e poor, being neither as good or as respectable, resent those who are in the church and express their resentment by their refusal to come to church. T h e identification of poverty and moral badness was never bluntly put, but that it was an underlying presupposition is shown in this paragraph from the editorial: It must be asserted, then, that dislike of the churches is often no more than the expression of a feeling of antagonism toward the better part of society. T o no small degree, prejudice against the church is one form of communism. . . . In the nature of the case the church is made u p chiefly of respectable, well-to-do people. Those who are envious of them in one relation are sure to be envious at all points.

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. . . Let the fact be recognized, then, that as the church includes the better classes of society, it will be disliked by the worse classes who are yet outside, not because the church is hated, but because the people in it are hated, whether as church-goers, as property holders, as socially respectable, or even as decent and intelligent.® With moral character, decency, intelligence, and property-holding all so perfectly harmonized, it was easy to show that Christianity can approve of a society divided into classes. Men naturally differ in their character and abilities, and their class status is determined by these individual capacities. Far from asking that the church overcome these divisions, Andover approved them as Christian: T h e gospel guides a fundamental law of progress to high issues in producing a society which is somewhat classified . . . the Church in the world not only recognizes, it actually creates, social classes and is always trying to minister suitably to their various wants.6 In a similar statement in Christianity and Its Competitors the editors carefully distinguished their conception of the Christian law of love from a doctrine of social equality: Unity is not uniformity. The Christian Church, with its unity and variety, is a safeguard against extreme social theories. Some preachers may, indeed, out of sympathy for those who subsist on small wages, dwell chiefly on the hardships of the poor; other preachers on account of their own favored place in society, may argue for the preservation of existing conditions. But the Christian law of love, which emphasizes duties as well as rights, faithfulness as well as privilege, distinguishes artificial from real inequalities, and does not (to quote a significant title of Bushnell's) institute a reform against nature.7 Communism and socialism are the movements which try to reform against nature. 8 When Andover made the supreme worth of the individual the basic ethical principle of the Kingdom of God, they meant, at least in part, to safeguard the economic freedom of the individual in a favored position in the existing society. This practical defense of economic freedom did not imply that no difficulties or injustices exist in the system. T h e editors recognized the growing bitterness between labor and capital. It is characteristic of this period that antagonism between classes is regarded as a greater evil than either the poverty of the one or the privilege of the other. "Separation

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into somewhat flexible groups there must be. Mutual antagonism of groups there must not be." 9 How are these antagonisms to be removed? Andover carried out their individualism to the end. T h e problem of class antagonism is to be solved by greater kindness and sympathy on the part of individuals. Christian employers can inspire confidence by decent treatment of employees. Domestic servants should be treated humanely. Pastors should give attention, not only to church members, but also to the poor. 10 T h e heart of social problems lies in human attitudes, not in economic maladjustments: When the duty of the church is reduced to its lowest terms, it is found to consist in the obligations of individuals to cultivate the proper feelings toward others. When there are many who in their hearts have Christian feelings towards their neighbors, practical methods will suggest themselves almost instinctively. Personal influence and public cooperation will then combine to extend the Kingdom of love and peace. 11 Christianity's emphasis on kindness and feeling is practically useful for it helps to check "dangerous social tendencies." It minimizes antagonism. "The sociologist and the statesman would be powerless in dealing with existing social problems were not the harmonizing influence of the church a constant factor." 12 T h e suggestion that the practical problems of expressing good will would be solved "instinctively" was in line with the emphasis on Christian feeling. If these problems are basically problems of ethical attitudes, then the practical solution of even the most complex social conflicts can be dismissed with a word. Strength was lent to the belief that kindness would solve the economic problems by the Andover position in these first years that there was no fundamental divergence of interest between employer and employee. If this were true, then open discussion and mutual sympathy between owner and worker should lead to the quick solution of all economic troubles: What is wanted is more business intercourse between capital and labor, a better understanding of the mutual interests involved, a more honest and hearty endeavor to create a real unity among the productive classes, as against the dangerous classes in society.18 They pointed to some corporations and capitalists who had, by measures favorable to workers, "virtually eliminated the disturbing elements of socialism."14 T h e admission that some corporations were making ten

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to twenty percent profits, and reducing a fourteen hour day only under the threat of a strike, shook somewhat this confidence that wealth and decency were brothers. What reforms were necessary, however, could be brought about by appealing to the humane and Christian sentiments of individuals. Andover's comment on the rise of the Knights of Labor as an organization of the mass of unskilled workers shows some transition from emphasis on individual kindness to realization of the fundamental social pressures of classes with distinct economic interests. T h e Knights were successful for a time. T h e y conducted a strike against Gould's railroad in 1885, and won. 1 5 Richard T . Ely called for the support of the movement by Protestants. Andover began to look at "the poorer classes" with slightly different eyes. They approved labor organizations and regarded them as inevitable in the face of the increasing concentration of capital. "Organized labor is the only power which can treat successfully with capital without recourse to the constant interference of the state." 1 6 They criticized labor unions for preventing non-members from working. 1 7 They admitted that the strike and boycott were legitimate weapons; but at the same time held that violence was wrong. But just what is violence and what is not in a nation-wide strike? And what relevance does the Christian ideal of love have to this conflict of classes? Dimly Andover began to realize how complex the moral judgment involved was becoming, and how difficult application of love and service to social conflict might be: In the contest which is now going on over the country (May 1886) public opinion is holding a very delicate balance. T h e predominant sympathy is on the side of labor, but at the suggestion of unfairness or violence it passes instantly to the other side. And what public opinion says today in respect to individual rights the law will say tomorrow, if no statute exists which meets a given wrong. 1 8 A typical early position with respect to the labor problem was the plea to keep economic questions out of politics. Many times Andover expressed the fear that the emotions and forces underlying industrial conflict would be used by politicians, thereby intensifying class antagonism. 1 9 Andover had so completely moralized the interpretation of politics that they thought economic interests had so far played no part in political life. Tucker commented that if politics were ever manipulated by capital, labor would do likewise. 20 But the possibility was spoken of in the future tense.

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Never at any time did Andover consider that existing standards of justice and morality might be definitely related to special class interests. A case in point was the free silver movement which of course directly affected the economic interests of eastern institutions. Andover commented in 1891 on the silver issue, and held that the demand for free coinage was dishonest. T h e y did not say that all supporters of free silver were dishonest; but held that they had been misled by politicians into believing that more money was needed. T h i s proposal for cheap money was immoral in Andover's mind. It was repudiation of debts. How completely they held a moralized view of politics is further seen in their belief that as soon as the "dishonesty" of silver coinage was pointed out to the agrarian west, the movement would be renounced by the large majority. " T h e hope of defeating such schemes lies in an appeal to the moral sense of the people, and the decision will be according to what they believe to be the actual morality of the situation." 2 1 It is regrettable that the Review was not in existence in 1896 so that we do not have Andover's reaction to what the people of the west believed about the "actual morality" of the situation. In this first period of social criticism A n d o v e r conceived the K i n g d o m of G o d as a practical and imminent possibility; because this conception was not considered to imply a radical change in the existing structure of society. T h e principle of the worth of the individual was used as an apologetic for economic individualism and the existence of social classes. Christian love meant kindness and fairness so far as possible between rich and poor, owner and worker, but involved no abrogation of these differences and relationships. Individual rights were made the basis of criticism of the closed shop. T h e strike and boycott were accepted as legitimate labor weapons; but were, tenuously to be sure, distinguished from violence. Poverty was conceived to be not the cause but the result of moral failure. Mutuality of interest of all groups in the economic order was presupposed. Consequently good will and open discussion among all parties would readily remove the few remaining obstacles in the way of the perfect K i n g d o m of Peace. II. ANDOVER S O C I A L C R I T I C I S M — L A T E PERIOD

From the year 1888 on, a new orientation of social thought appears at Andover. T h e working of the economic system appeared as less and less just. T h e solution of its problems seemed increasingly difficult. Divergence of interest rather than harmony between interests of different classes was more apparent. A rising labor movement demanded at-

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tention to industrial conflict and growing poverty. Andover began to question both the moral validity and the practical effect of their individualistic ethics. They spoke less of the Kingdom of God, more of the pressing needs of society, and urged newer and more radical methods of social reform. The shift from defense to criticism of the economic order was led by William Jewett Tucker, Professor of Homiletics and Pastoral Theology. Tucker's signed papers show his advancing thought. Some of the contradictions in Andover editorials are apparently the result of the fact that Tucker's thought was going beyond that of his colleagues. The whole picture of a society of economic extremes was openly described and subjected to vigorous criticism in this later period. The patronizing and blandly optimistic tone with which a few years earlier these theologians had spoken of the poor tends to disappear. Andover had begun to suspect that the Protestant ministry really understood very little of the problems and attitudes of the poorer classes. Most preachers, even those who have endured no little personal hardship, have become accustomed to a religion of prosperity. They have preached to prosperous people. They have tried to study their temptations, they have tried to teach them their duties.22 Preaching aimed at the prosperous will fail to reach the masses who are much more interested at the moment in "rights" than they are in "duties." Ministers must learn to speak the language, and understand the problems of the poor. With Tucker leading the way, Andover made four basic criticisms of the economic order. Before these are outlined it must be observed that throughout this time no Andover writer took the position that the system of private ownership of the means of production was inherently either unjust or unworkable. In the very last years this possibility was being raised as a question, but no final answer was arrived at. These criticisms of the economic order are criticisms of nineteenth century capitalism as it was working in the late nineteenth century. Whether it could ever work any other way was not decided in Andover's mind. The first criticism of the economic picture was the continuance of poverty. The early expectation that Christian philanthropy would quickly solve this problem proved itself unjustified. Tucker expressed his disillusionment in 1891:

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We say to those who are struggling at the bottom of society, who make up the great social residuum, "Your only hope is in Christianity; all other remedies are a delusion." A n d they not unnaturally or unjustly reply, " T h a t is what you have been saying for years, and here we are." 2 3 T h e persistence of poverty was now used as a black mark against the existing society and not against the poor. Andover men ceased to locate the cause of poverty in inferior ability or moral failure because they were becoming convinced that the order itself was a cause of poverty. Tucker believed the difficulty was "organic." Crime and pauperism were results of the "system." " T o understand the poor man's poverty, we must understand the rich man's wealth." 24 Andover men were not economists. They did not undertake to show by economic analysis that the rich were profiting at the expense of society. T h e position was stated without proof. 25 Poverty at one end of the social scale was one evil. Concentration of wealth at the other end was the second evil. Tucker quoted figures published in the Forum for November, 1889, which showed that over half of the wealth of the nation was possessed by fifty thousand families. 26 In criticism of this fact Tucker put the burden of proof on defenders of the system. Why should this concentration be allowed? He pointed out evil effects of this fact. Large amounts of capital are used for the support of undesirable enterprises such as the liquor traffic. Much of the wealth of the country is in the hands of women and becomes a lure for fortune hunters and "foreign profligates." 27 What was the effect of the system as a whole upon human life? Andover completely reversed the earlier position that capitalism guarantees individual rights and the opportunity for individual development: A n order founded on individualism is already doing much to repress and restrict healthy individual development. . . . It is the great middle class that is beginning to feel the pinch. Men of ordinary capital are crowded out of the traditional forms of business life. . . . Only the great capitalists, or those who unite in combinations, can preserve the conditions which favor the development of individuality. T h e real thing at issue is broader than any question of poverty. . . . It is the question whether society can continue to develop normally and healthfully in all its parts under present conditions. 28

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They did not need here a new principle of ethics. T h e principle of the worth of the individual was itself a sufficient basis of criticism of the order. Andover's basic ethical principle of individual moral worth was supplemented in this later period with ethical principles derived from analysis of social relationships. Three closely related concepts appeared in the new conception of value, social unity, social equality, and social justice. Social unity meant that value inheres in social relationship rather than in individuals considered as isolated entities. Andover sometimes called this principle the socialist principle, not meaning the socialism which referred to a particular type of economic order, but used as a general philosophical principle to be opposed to individualism. Tucker's Phi Beta Kappa oration, The Neit' Movement in Humanity from Liberty to Unity (1892) shows his movement away from individualism as he observed it in social trends and in the philosophies of those trends. He criticized the spirit of individualism as having outlived its usefulness in national, economic, and international life. " T o whom among us would more liberty be a greater good?" 29 An Andover editorial took the same theme and blamed individualism for many of the evils of industrial life. 30 Individualism means self-interest, and self-interest is a low standard of ethics. They realized they were diverging from the individualistic principle which they had made the basis of the ideal society. "By common consent the doctrine of individual rights is for the time giving place to the doctrine of social duties." 3 1 A new theory of human value was here in its beginnings. Whether it could be ultimately unified with the principle of absolute worth of each individual remained a problem, one of those to be debated a long time hence. T h e concept of social equality could have been made a far more precise basis for a theory of social ethics than this too general term, social unity. Andover used the concept social equality, but failed to give it, either, a very concrete meaning. In Tucker's address he said that social equality and social unity mean the same thing, thus leaving both terms up in the air. 32 Strictly speaking, they could have meant two very different things by social equality. They could have meant equality of opportunity or they could have meant equality of economic status. Since they did not clarify the term, we can only interpret it in the light of the practical problem they were facing. When they spoke of social equality they had in mind the extremes of wealth and poverty as a social evil. Practically speaking, they meant by social equality a closing of the gap

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between economic extremes. T h e phrase was useful in pointing to a specific evil; but it needed much clarification in order to be developed into an ethical theory. It could imply a theory of value as a quality of social relationships rather than a quality of individuals, or it could be developed on the basis of individual rights. Andover took the latter way. T h e y were indeed uncertain as to the exact basis on which the concept of equality should be justified; but they gave two brief suggestions. T h e first was pragmatic. T h e inequalities of the order disrupt the social unity. T h e y create disturbance. From the standpoint of peace and order a measure of social equality is desirable. 33 T h e other argument was drawn from the analogy with equal political rights in democracy. If as citizens of the state each counts for one and no one more than one, why is not equal power and equal opportunity a right of each one in the economic system. T h e doctrine of natural rights was implicit here. New Englanders had not forgotten the Declaration of Independence; and they were beginning to recognize its economic implications, though they were yet somewhat vague as to what those implications might be in practical terms: In some of its aspects the contention for social equality seems to be upon the line of progress, supported in its aspirations by the same impulse which gave religious and political advance. In other of its aspects it seems to be the exclusive product of a materialism which ignores alike the gains of religious and political freedom. 34 T u c k e r made use of the theory that value belongs to men in their social relationships, not as individuals, in a reply to Andrew Carnegie's defense of philanthropy. Carnegie had published two articles in the North American Revieiu in 1889 which were re-printed in the Pall Mall Gazette under the title The Gospel of Wealth. His "gospel" was that the few inevitably become extremely wealthy through the working of the economic system, and that the problems of poverty would be solved if those w h o become the possessors of wealth would return it to society in the form of wise benevolences: T h u s is the problem of the rich and poor to be solved: the laws of accumulation will be left free; the laws of distribution free. Individualism will continue, but the millionaire will be but a trustee for the poor; intrusted for a season with a great part of the increased wealth of the community, but administering it for the community far better than it could or would have done for itself. 35

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Tucker called this a gospel of patronage. Patronage is wrong because it destroys a precious value, the self-respect of society. T h i s value of the social spirit is so important that it must be cherished even in the face of practical obstacles. Even if society's advance under its own corporate power should be less rapid than under Carnegie's system, the value of the cooperative spirit must be kept: It is better for any community to advance more slowly than to gain altogether by gifts rather than, in large part, by earnings. Within proper limits, the public is advantaged by the gifts of the rich, but if the method becomes the accepted method, to be expected and relied upon, the decline of public self-respect has begun. There is a public spirit to be cherished as well as a private spirit. 36 Tucker's answer to Carnegie introduced the third principle in Andover's developing ethical viewpoint, social justice. Justice cannot easily be defined, any more than unity or equality, but it can be put in a formula which gives a rough guide to social criticism. Tucker put the concept in economic terms: Does every person in the economic order receive a reward equivalent to the value he produces? Carnegie assumed that the rich are rich because they deserve to be so. Tucker challenged the assumption. T h e whole question of the wage-earner's just share must be settled. In one stunning sentence Tucker put the ethical issue which Christian social critics were beginning to face: " I can conceive of no greater mistake, more disastrous in the end to religion if not to society, than that of trying to make charity do the work of justice." 3 7 Tucker came to no final conclusion about the justice of the existing society. He did raise the question, Is it not possible that some wealth "may now be wrongfully or wastefully in the hands of a few." 38 An answer to the question of what is just in the working of the economic system obviously involves both a theory of value and a study of the actual working of the system. Andover did not develop either inquiry in a systematic way. Nevertheless the fact that the ethical issue had been raised forced Christian theologians to make a first-hand study of economics. Andover Seminary recognized the necessity of such study for the minister in a practical fashion. Under Tucker's leadership a course in Social Economics was established in the seminary. Interest of ministers in the course prompted the publication of an outline of the material covered. 39 Three principal topics were treated: T h e social evolution of labor, the treatment of crime and the criminal classes, and the treatment of pauperism and disease. Each topic was developed both

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historically and with reference to contemporary problems. A section on socialism was included. Beside standard histories and economic works of the classical schools the Bibliography included Marx Capital, Gronlund, Cooperative Commonwealth, and the works of Henry George. T h e course was a radical departure in theological curricula at the time. It reflected the interest in economic problems and the belief that Christianity had a new ethical issue to face. Important modifications of the Andover theory of social change appear in this later period. Instead of progress solely through improvement of individual character, Andover looked to the changing of social conditions through social action. Tucker endorsed profit-sharing, municipal ownership of utilities, the income tax, 40 and government regulation of the conditions of labor. 41 Andover had already recognized the strike and the boycott as legitimate labor weapons. Tucker reiterated the plea for the church's sympathetic understanding of the labor movement, and particularly for recognition of the rights of agitation and organization. 42 Andover dropped the theory that the labor question should be kept out of politics. They now saw that "labor is on the road to power." They professed to welcome the new political force, and, though the outcome was in part a graceful submission to the inevitable, it was an advance on the sentimentality that economic interests can be kept out of political life. "Though there may be, for the time, much effort and struggle of a partisan and selfish kind, we believe that the end will be the broadening and humanizing of our political life." 43 T h e Andover reaction to socialism illustrates the hold which their early individualism and moralism still had over their thought, it shows the tendencies away from this moralism, and again finds them unable to come to a final conclusion as to what type of economic structure Christian ethics requires. While admitting that the socialist state was neither improbable nor inherently impracticable, Andover pointed out certain obstacles to its acceptance in the United States. The difficulties were not raised as absolute barriers, but simply as questions. One difficulty was said to be the corruption of political life, particularly in municipal politics.44 Tucker later withdrew this objection, stating that he thought municipal ownership of utilities would be an aid to political purity. 46 A more significant objection was found in the great number of conflicting economic and sectional interests which a collective society would have to harmonize. Andover never accepted a simplified description of society into two or three classes. They saw the economic structure as

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much more complex, and pointed out the difficulty socialism would have in organizing a collective economic life. T h e major obstacle to socialism was seen in the "materialism" of the various socialist theories being advanced. It is significant for the moralistic presuppositions of Andover's whole point of view that they regarded this socialist materialism as an obstacle to its adoption by the American people. Materialism meant the socialists' insistence on changing the political and economic system, and it meant their lack of emphasis on individual morality either as an end of or a means to the better society. T h e argument was " T h e American people are in their convictions and methods profoundly moral." 4 0 Socialists neglect moral considerations and think of the good society purely in terms of material goods. Therefore the American people are not hospitable to the idea of socialism. When Andover said this lack of emphasis on the traditional standards of individual morality hindered the acceptance of socialism by the American people they were right thus far, that socialism's supposed disregard of moral emphasis in favor of economic change did offer a talking point for those who opposed it. But it is difficult to see more than shadow-boxing in Andover's position. They had admitted that their remarks did not apply to "Christian Socialism." Gronlund's Cooperative Commonwealth put the whole plea for socialism on the basis of its justice, and its contribution to individual and social morality, its harmony with the ideal of the Kingdom of God. 47 Andover had not yet integrated the principle of social justice with its concept of morality. Morality still connoted standards of individual conduct such as temperance and personal loyalty. A distinction was finally made between social morality and individual morality. Socialism stresses the first but forgets the second: the promotion of the brotherhood of humanity is not the only morality. There is an individual morality which must be included if the social end is to be gained. And if it be said that this is of course assumed, we reply that it is not enough that it be assumed; it must be emphasized in any scheme of social reconstruction. 48 This was the point, emphasis. Socialists did not talk enough about "individual" morality; but to hold that this was the major obstacle to the adoption of socialism in America showed clearly how the moralizing of human motives can obscure the realities of social conflict.

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Tucker again was in advance of his colleagues. He saw that social justice could not be distinguished from questions of morality. Of socialism he said: the question must be faithfully put, Is the betterment of condition sought in the interest of character or regardless of character . . . whatever success is to attend the socialistic theory will depend ultimately upon what socialism actually holds of moral, not simply of material improvement . . . the great social conditions of the future, whatever they may be, will come because they have earned the moral right to be. . . , 49 T h i s was moralizing history with a vengeance. But Tucker went on: T h e justification of social change, the inward necessity of social progress, is the ethical principle which in the last analysis is justice. T h a t we must believe if we believe in progress. That we have a right to believe from the testimony of history. 00 Tucker's thought was in transition from the distinction between "individual" and "social" morality to an ethical philosophy in which justice is a basic moral principle. T h i s faith that the desire of the people as a whole for moral advance is the moving force of historical development, is the liberal interpretation of the idea of Providence. T h e ultimate determiner of history is God who works through the moral insight of men to improve his world and its creatures. Consequently, the only successful movements in society will ultimately be those in harmony with the will of God. Tucker based this optimism on faith in progress, which, as we have seen, was not always held at Andover. He also appealed to the testimony of history. T h e nineteenth century was often misled by certain historical advances to make a generalization about the whole of its course and the forces which underlie it. In spite of much criticism of the idea of progress by Andover, it would still on occasion cast its hypnotic spell over their thinking. T h e strike at the Carnegie works in Homestead, Pennsylvania, in 1892, which involved much bitterness and bloodshed, caused Andover to consider more realistically the place of violence as a method of social reform. 5 1 Andover did not condone the violent methods used by either side, and held that it was the duty of the state to keep law and order. "But the maintenance of order in congested labor districts is not the settlement of the labor question.""' 2 Very clearly they now stated that the

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labor question was a moral issue. What, in equity, are the further property rights of labor beyond the daily wage? T h e question was hesitantly asked, but the concluding paragraph took the side of labor. There are unacknowledged rights of the laborer in his job. He has a right to a measure of economic security. Andover still hoped that these rights would be freely granted by ethically-minded employers, but the discussion ended on a new note. Perhaps these rights could not be secured under the system, and changing the system might take coercion: labor has great provocation just because it cannot invoke the law. T h e man who has the law on his side can afford to be cool and patient. T h e equity in political right has seldom been reached except through rebellion. If the equity in the industrial situation is to be reached peaceably, it must be by such forbearance toward those who are seeking the recognition of their unacknowledged and unassured rights, and through such acknowledgement and assurance of their right as the present system of industrialism can be made to allow. Otherwise the wage system will certainly and justly lose its place as the accredited method of industrial business, and something will be devised which will express in larger degree than wages the interest of labor in the means and agencies of production. 53 " T h e equity in political right has seldom been reached except through rebellion," ominous words. T h e coming of the Kingdom may involve more violent change than that of the long slow education of men to have more kindly feelings toward one another. T h i s was Andover's fourth departure from the early stage of social thought. Twenty-five years later, having made this tentative concession to the use of violence, they were accepting its supreme modern illustration, the World War, in the name of peace, democracy, and righteousness. 54 T o Andover men, the W a r did not prove that the Kingdom of love could not come, it only proved that it would have to be achieved in part through violent means. Only after the war was over did many Christian critics decide that it proved other things, even less complimentary to human nature. Andover's later social thought included an ethical criticism of the working of the economic system, a conception of moral character as including the responsibility of seeking social justice, acknowledgement that social action is necessary for social reform, and a concession to the use of coercion in social progress. These ideas were not drawn together in a restatement of the ideal of the Kingdom of God. T h a t early statement agreed closely with the early stage of Andover thought. Its em-

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phasis on individual moral character as the sole factor in social improvement, its sentimentality in the use of the terms love and service, were perfect complements to an individualistic economic theory. T h e restatement of the Kingdom ideal in view of this later thought would have had to give justice a place in the moral standard as well as love. It would have had to make a place for social values as well as individual values. Finally, place in the Christian strategy of social progress would have to be found for social action as well as individual conversion. Christianity would have to be allied in some way with social movements making for that better society in which alone men can be what they ought to be. T h e economic conflict and the World War finally raised the question in liberal theology; Can the Kingdom of Love ever come on earth, or must it be thought of as a transcendent and compelling, but unattainable ideal? Andover men in the nineteenth century never asked that question. They did not believe too easily in progress; but they never doubted that the Kingdom of God, or something very close to it, was a real possibility on earth. This belief was based partly on observation, and partly on the connection of the idea of progress with belief in God. He was working for the perfection of the race. He had already achieved much since the first simple forms of life began to evolve, and He had all the future in which to complete His work. III. A N D O V E R HOUSE

What Andover called "Social Christianity" was never given a complete formal theological statement. It was, however, expressed in an institution, Andover House, in the south end of Boston,—one of the first University settlements in America. T h e settlement movement had been introduced in America only a short time before. T h e work of Stanton Coit was described in the Review in 1890. Coit, a graduate of Amherst and Berlin, had lived in Toynbee Hall. O n returning to America he took up residence on the lower East Side of New York, calling his enterprise the Neighborhood Guild. He began by organizing boys' clubs. Other workers came to help, and after three years—by 1890—the name "University Settlement" could be used to describe the work. 56 By 1892 Vida Scudder could report the work of five settlements in the Review. Three had women residents; Hull House in Chicago; a College Settlement in Rivington Street, New York; and a new settlement in St. Mary's Street, Philadelphia. T h e two with men residents were: Coit's Neighborhood Guild, and Andover House in Boston. 68

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Churches had for some time been mov ing in the direction of a radical change in the approach to the poorer population of cities. Andover described St. George's Church in New York as a pioneer example of the institutionalizing of a church program in order that it might reach the unchurched poor in the city. 57 T h e church must become a church for all classes, and for all legitimate uses.58 Loomis lectured at Andover on the daily programs of English churches of this type. 5u Rev. Charles Dickinson defended his own experiment in Berkeley Temple in Boston, Massachusetts. 60 T h e church has three special functions in the large city: Relief, Entertainment, and Instruction. T h e aim was partly to bring people into the church so that the gospel could be preached to them; but it also represented a breaking down of the distinction between the secular and the religious meeting of human needs: should painting be taught in the name of the church? Why not? . . . What higher work of ministration can the church do than to gather some of these young women together in a bright room, under earnest Christian teachers, who shall teach them how to add a touch of beauty to the dull gray of their monotonous work-day life.*'1 Tucker took the lead at Andover. He suggested to one of his students, Robert Archey Woods, that he spend a year in residence at Toynbee Hall to study the movement. On his return Woods lectured at Andover on English Social Movements. He now had a background of personal experience for the direction of a settlement. In letters dated October 9, 1891, Tucker suggested the formation of an Andover House Association to establish a social settlement in Boston. 62 Tucker was chairman of the council and Woods head of the House which was opened at 6 Rollins Street on January 1, 1892. Five years later the name was changed to South End House. 63 T h e settlement house which took prospective ministers to live in the midst of the poverty and social disintegration of a great city expressed in institutional form the essential characteristics of Andover's liberal Christianity as revivalism and the missionary enterprise had been the institutional counterparts of evangelical Calvinism. In Andover's philosophy of the settlement the more complete integration of the Christian doctrine of regeneration and the secular ideal of an improved human life can be seen. T h e first announcement of the settlement stated two principles of Social Christianity. One was that of brotherly love. In practical reference this now meant response to human need. T h e other principle was the

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improvement of the social environment in order to further the moral character of human beings: It asks how much can be brought to bear upon the individual in proper ways to make him larger, nobler, happier; not how little can be done and secure the final result in the saving of his soul.64 The distinction in language was still retained between regeneration, or the saving of the soul, and the larger, happier life of man; but it was only a concession in language to the last lingering memory of evangelical theology. Practically Andover regarded all improvement of social condition as a definite means of grace, for social conditions, it was now admitted, sustain moral character; and to be moral, is, essentially, to be saved. Tucker's letter and the original charter of the House both stated that the motive and aim of the house were religious.65 This meant that to improve society, to increase friendly feeling and understanding among those whom society separates, and to improve moral character are religious aims. In Andover Christianity the effort to advance society toward the Kingdom through an improvement of the whole life of man takes the place of trying to be the instrument through which men may be prepared for the supernatural act of God's grace which prepares men, not for the Kingdom here, but for the Kingdom in Heaven. What should be the function of the settlement, and what can it accomplish? Woods said the settlement had three tasks. The first, which it should be said is less stressed by Woods in his later writings, is the lifting up of the "lower" elements of society by the better element. There was still a trace of individualistic moralism in Andover's thought: T h e true attitude for every social worker is that of a member of a noble family, in which there is the widest inequality, but equality and inequality are never thought of, and greater knowledge and strength mean only greater love and service.66 Woods wrote vigorously against the cant of "elevation by contact" but he did not quite escape it himself. T h e second function of the settlement is the scientific study of social conditions. T h e third is the furthering of worthy social movements: cooperation with trade unions, political parties, and economic cooperatives. Tucker had said the aim and method of the settlement was religious. What should be the place of religious services, preaching, evangelism in

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the settlement? Woods believed in a working compromise on this point between overt proclamation of religion and complete avoidance of all outward reference to it. He believed that there was a place for institutions representing both of these extremes, and for a third where religion, very broadly interpreted, would not be avoided, though it would not be the center of either the method or the goal. 87 T h e shift in the use of terms from Christianity to religion was in itself significant. It was a concession to the view of religion as a quality of human activity independent of particular forms and doctrines. Liberal optimism was carried over into Woods' first statement of what he believed the settlement could accomplish: T h e settlements are able to take neighborhoods in cities and by patience bring back to them much of the healthy village life, so that the people shall again know and care for each other. They will impart a softer touch to what social powers now act there; and they will bring streams from the higher sources of civilization to refresh and arouse the people so that they shall no more go back to the narrowness and gloom, and perhaps the brutalities of their old existence. 68 Vida D. Scudder gave a different interpretation to the significance of the settlement. She did state her belief that when philanthropic souls were told of existing conditions much improvement would quickly follow; but there was another justification of the settlement. Perhaps it should not be expected to remake the community at once. Perhaps it can never change the city: T h e work of the settlement rivals the Snark for invisibility, and visitors have been known bitterly to complain, because where they expected to behold the great unwashed in person, tamed before the presence of beauty and learning, they have seen nothing but a house, a young woman, and a dozen little children being taught to sew. 6a T h e settlement is the expression and the practical embodiment of the ideal of the good society. Woods had seen the settlement as the attempt of those already blessed by social opportunities to uplift the outcast. Miss Scudder saw in it the pattern of a new social order in which men live together in comparative equality and simplicity, not merely in the spirit of service, but with mutual rather than conflicting economic interests. Settlements are:

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but types and symbols of what shall be; yet they have demonstrated the possibility of simple, wholesome, cultured life free from luxury or false convention, but not free from grace or light, among the very poor. . . . Schemes of social reform are but means to an end. . . . Those who live in a settlement have, for themselves, achieved the end of righteous living by the simple process of refusing to receive more than a just share of the world's good. 70 Woods himself came to an essential agreement with this idealism. Fellowship with men, for fellowship's sake was a more fundamental value than the elevation of the lower by the higher. T h e settlement stands for positive social reconstruction; but it is not by any means the chief force making for progress. T h e true force making for a democratic society: is the gradual progress and gradual recognition of the skilled workman. He must be helped to gain the position he had in the Middle Ages; when the artisans were poets and artists also. T h e settlements are only worthwhile as they lead to this. But it will come whether they continue or not. T h e world is bound to be saved; if not through settlements, churches, etc. then in spite of them. 71 Living contact with the suffering classes helped the pioneers of the settlement to avoid the spirit of paternalism and moral arrogance. T h e settlement became the symbol of a social pattern in which democracy would be extended into economic relationships. It taught theologians humility by showing them how many and how strong were the forces outside of the church which make for social progress. Woods' statement that the world might be saved in spite of the church marks the end of the long development of American religious thought from Jonathan Edwards' Calvinism to Liberal Christianity. T h e founding of an institution marks the beginning and the founding of another institution marks the end of this theological history. T h e beginning was the establishment of Andover Seminary itself, a school dedicated to the defense for all time to come of an Edwardean theology in which the one issue of life is the soul's choice between love for God and love for the world, a choice in which men are saved for an everlasting bliss or damned to an eternity of torture, a choice in comparison with which all earthly goods and evils are as nothing. T h e end of the story is the establishment of Andover House, a social settlement dedicated out of religious motives to the improvement of human social relations, and to the more complete realization of the pos-

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sibilities of earthly existence. T h e House symbolized the liberal Christian's belief in the religious quality of moral action, his conviction of the organic relationship between men's souls and their environment, and his faith that God's work is the progresssive incarnation of His spirit in men and their society. And the House's Head Resident found himself wondering if after all the trade union movement, and not the church, might be God's right arm in the bringing in of His Kingdom.

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have been among the severest critics of liberal Christianity, yet most of them cling to it in spite of their criticisms. 1 Evidently, in their minds, the reforms they propose do not destroy the basic tenets of the faith. It should therefore be possible to state the essentials of this faith. Liberalism in Christian thought is surely more than a complacent acceptance of theological change. T h e central criticism of liberal theology has been its supposedly organic connection with what is called "evolutionary optimism." 2 Liberals themselves, however, are critics of evolutionary optimism. It is important therefore to ask what the essence of liberal theology is, and to see how this essence is related to evolution and to optimism. Among the many variations of liberal thought, only that of Andover is under consideration here. Yet when the main outlines of the position are set forth, it is fair to say that Andover's thought is fairly typical of the main current of American liberalism down to the recent period.3 In this concluding chapter the background of Andover's thought is briefly summarized. Following this, Andover's position on three central doctrines is stated: first, man and his salvation; second, the Kingdom of God and the idea of progress; arid third, the nature of Christian knowledge. I have attempted to distinguish what is essential from what is peripheral in Andover's theology, and to state the major issues which arise from it. T H E O L O G I C A L LIBERALS

I. T H E ROOTS O F L I B E R A L T H E O L O G Y

Theologies rise, flourish, and pass away in close relationship to the cultures in which they live. Sometimes the relationship is one of defiance, sometimes of accommodation. In either case the theology is affected. In the case of Christian liberalism in America it may be said, with reservations, that theology sought accommodation to the new values and concepts which American life sustained. In brief outline here are the principal material and ideological factors in the cultural setting of Andover theology. Liberal theology thrives best in a culture which concerns itself less with the attainment of the goods of a future life, and more with the happiness available in this life. Since the Middle Ages this-worldliness has been a characteristic aspect of western culture. J . B. Bury's remark, " T h e hope of an ultimate happy state on this planet to be enjoyed by future

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generations . . . has replaced, as a social power, the hope of felicity in another world," 4 may be further amplified. T h e enhancement of the goods of this life has tended to replace, as man's fundamental goal, the preparation of his soul for a life beyond. 5 In the light of this evaluation of the world's goods much of the criticism of liberalism from the point of view of a theology which regards the goods of this life as of secondary importance is irrelevant. Belief that achievement in this world is more important than salvation from it will inevitably be reflected in theology. Some men have always found worth in the passing scene of life, in nature, friendship, work, and transitory pleasures. These are not substitutes for the love of God; man has found God within them. Disputation is futile, given the fact of the evaluation. When a given pattern of religious experience is established and reproduced in the religious fellowship, theology tends to interpret and generalize that particular pattern. Hopkinsian Calvinism was in large part an interpretation of the experience produced by revival meetings and pietistic literature. With the rise of nineteenth century urban culture, its greater luxury for some, its multiplication of emotional outlets, its greater self-confidence and diminished sense of sin, all interpreted by a world-view based on the knowledge and power of science, religious experience of a different type emerged, and liberal theology is its interpretation. Unless we are to regard the whole perspective of middle class culture in the nineteenth century as sheer illusion, we must recognize that faith in progress had a basis in fact. Advance in scientific knowledge and control was real. Somewhat more doubtful but not entirely illusory was the growth of a humane spirit in some realms of social behavior. Slavery had been abolished. Humane treatment of criminals was accepted. Political democracy and popular education seemed secure. Whatever mistakes were made in generalizing the idea of progress these facts cannot be ignored. More dubious as a proof of progress, but of impressive appearance to most Europeans, was the expansion of western culture and the missionary enterprise which participated in this world-wide movement. Theologians who, on the whole, did not distinguish between western culture and Christian culture, regarded the missionary expansion as presaging the imminent triumph of God in the world. T h e missionary enterprise had further results. T h e contact of Christianity with other faiths raised more significantly the problem of the relation of Christianity to other religions, dispelled the legend of the total darkness of the heathen, and

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intensified the special problem for Christian eschatology of the fate of those who die without knowledge of the gospel. Beyond examples of and belief in progress there was another dynamic for the social gospel of liberalism which has received less than its share of emphasis. This was the belief that remedies were available for social ills. The theology of the Kingdom of God was stressed when men believed that though the good society was not yet attained they could see the way to work toward it. Dissatisfaction can lead either to the quest for other worldly satisfactions or to the attempt to create security in this world. Christianity has usually made both emphases, and has never entirely neglected its prophecy of social reform born of social need. While unquestionably there was genuine disinterested concern for human welfare in this social gospel, there were also concrete pressures on theologians to incorporate the desire for social change into the structure of Christian thought. The middle class had begun to feel the pinch of depression. Churches were trying to exist in depressed areas where the social environment hindered any stable organization of life. Critics of the church were forcing it to face the ethical foundations of the society in which it lived. Secular movements offered less privileged groups salvation from their situation and accused the church of retarding the cause. In self-defense theologians sought to demonstrate the interest of the church in social improvement. Since ideas have their own implications they can never be wholly explained in terms of the cultural settings in which they appear. Andover theologians attempting to relate the Christian tradition to new patterns of thought, found themselves confronted with logical implications of their positions which raised some of the fundamental problems which may occupy human thought in any culture. Andover's primary intellectual material was the Christian tradition, the scripture, creeds, and dogma of the church, and the figure of Christ. The immediate theological background was New England Calvinism with emphasis on divine judgment, grace, atonement, and the supernatural regeneration of the believer. Andover was committed to the perpetuation of this heritage; but also was in partial revolt against it. The most fundamental change was the incorporation into theology of the idea of development, meaning continuous change from one state or form to another state or form according to a discernible law. This idea involved the criticism of strict logical distinctions in the description of the human situation when these distinctions obscured actual continuities. "Development" is a better term than evolution for this basic

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concept because evolution has historically connoted particular theories of biological development whereas the idea of development is broader and more fundamental than any special application of it. It is the conception of change or passage from one state to another according to a law, not a particular explanation of particular change. This idea is basic in the liberal theology. Are the divine law and human character so absolutely opposed that gradual development of the latter toward the former is not thinkable, or can meaning be given to a movement of individuals or society closer to or farther away from the divine perfection? Andover liberals incorporated the idea of development into the interpretation of character and thus departed from the Calvinism which insisted that all men regardless of moral differences are under equal judgment in a state of sin. They incorporated it into the interpretation of the history of Christian doctrine and of human society. With less clarity and assurance they applied it to the interpretation of religious experience though here the heritage of Calvinism tended to assert itself. Numerous and conflicting theories of development complicated the theologians' problem. Many of the present difficulties of liberalism are explainable by the fact that in the nineteenth century special theories of development were accepted as final which have later had doubt thrown upon them or have been rejected altogether. Herbert Spencer's philosophy, with its almost overwhelming prestige in the 19th century, influenced Christian theology in two important ways. One was that it produced a reaction against the idea of progress. Spencer interpreted progress as the inevitable result of the working of natural laws which, he held, could be deduced from the principle of the persistence of force. The system had no need for God to explain or to guide progress. It attached little importance to changes in individual character as significant for the achievement of the goal of society. It was, so the theologians said, "materialistic." They looked with distrust on a conception of the natural inevitability of progress which made Christianity unnecessary. Thus liberal theology had a special interest in the criticism of evolutionary optimism, and especially of Spencer's interpretation of it. The other effect of Spencer's philosophy was the reaction it produced in religious philosophy against science and scientific method as a satisfactory basis for religious belief. So completely was Spencer's position identified with science, that theologians sought ways to limit and discount scientific method. The effect of this reaction will be examined in the discussion of Andover's doctrine of Christian truth.

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One of the most important cases of the effect of special theories of development on theological thought was the use made of Darwin's theory of the development of new biological species through the operation of the processes of survival of the fittest and natural selection. This theory brought to a focus the developmental interpretation of all human life which had already been given a comprehensive philosophical expression by Hegel, who interpreted the progression of cultures and the logical progression of the categories of thought as parallel and related aspects of the nature of being. Darwin's theory reinforced this dialectical conception of logical categories by the demonstration of the evolution of species through struggle. A logic adequate for the interpretation of evolving species must interpret the categories of thought as so related that one passes into the other. This implication is carried over by the liberals into the interpretation of human nature. There is no absolute separation between human goodness and divine goodness. Far apart as they may be, there is development of one toward the other. T h e goal is implied in the process. Over against the Hopkinsian statement that there is no instant of time in which the human heart is not either wholly rebellious or wholly regenerate, Andover, under the influence of the developmental concept, said that there is no instant of time in which a man is not in process of growth from one orientation of his character to another. T h e extension of the principle of the survival of the biologically most fit to human life raised a serious problem for any ethical theory, and especially for Christianity. Is this the only law of human behaviour? If so, what relevance does any ethical ideal have? We have seen the ways in which this problem forced ethical philosophy into idealistic, intuitional, and, at Andover, supernatural interpretations of the manner in which ethical values can be known and achieved. If nature is what Darwin might be taken to imply then any ideal of human community must be supernatural. With little real warrant the idea of biological evolution was united with and made a support of the conception of progress. T h e biological part of the law of the survival of the fit was dropped out, and survival of all kinds of fitness supposedly implied. A special application was the Andover position that the survival of the fittest theology can be presumed. T h e idea of progress is a special interpretation of development. It has taken a variety of forms. It may mean that the whole of life has improved, is improving, and will continue to improve. 6 It may be applied to certain phases of life or society and not to others as in the familiar dis-

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tinction between material and moral progress. T h e rate and nature of progress may be distinguished, and its possibility may be distinguished from its inevitability. Finally and most significant for theology, the causes, methods and metaphysical significance of progress may be variously interpreted. T h u s a variety of theories of progress and some contrary theories were at hand as material for Andover. It is too simple to say that the liberal theology resulted from an optimistic faith in progress. T h e variations of the idea are practically unlimited. Andover began the process of trying to distinguish the true from the false in the various conceptions. T h i s conception of development in time inevitably raises the question of the relationship of God to the temporal process. T r a d i t i o n a l theology has indeed held that God guides human history toward an end, determining its course through his providential wisdom. Yet in this theology the creation of the world was regarded as a single event. G o d intervened in the world from the outside. Emphasis was put upon the status of man before the Eternal Judge, rather than upon the gradual fulfillment of an historical destiny. T h e idea of development as incorporated into metaphysical systems gave support to a theological idea of God's work of creation as a continuous process in which he is dynamically engaged, and through which, at every moment, he is achieving a progressive good. Social philosophies had their place in the intellectual material available to Andover. Nineteenth century democracy, individualism and capitalism all contributed basic assumptions to Andover's ethical thought in the early years of the liberal period. At the same time, however, increasingly sharp criticism of individualism and of the economic order forced a re-examination of the Christian theory of society. Andover carried on this criticism, and used both the Christian tradition and new social theories as the basis of a new conception of society. Theological liberalism, even in the Andover period, cannot be identified with an individualistic ethics or laissez-faire economics. I I . MAN AND SALVATION

T h e heart of any theology is its doctrine of the human situation and the way of salvation. Salvation in a theistic scheme is the state of being in the highest possible harmony with God's purpose, and participator in the highest possible measure in the benefits of his grace. T h e terms on which this can be obtained, the powers which bring it about, and the obstacles to it are the elements which theology seeks to discover and to

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explain. In summarizing the Andover doctrine of man and salvation five main themes must be included in the organic whole, for it is the whole conception which explains the emphasis of the parts. These five are: man's moral status, his religious needs, the doctrine of God, the doctrine of Christ, and the doctrine of regeneration. Man has impulses in which selfishness and altruism are mixed. T h e relative strength of altruism over selfishness varies from individual to individual and from culture to culture. Natural man, apart from the special influence of Christianity, is more dominated by the selfish element in his character than by the altruistic. The state of character in which the individual acts more with regard to self-interest than with regard to the general good of all life is the state of sin. It is the negation of the will of God. Men are sinners because their selfish desires are too strong for their altruistic impulses; because they are ignorant of the highest ideal, the true good for which they should seek; because they lack an adequate motive for unselfish behaviour; because they lack assurance that ethical living is possible; and finally, because the institutions in which their lives are bound up corrupt them. T w o related concepts are of basic importance in this liberal doctrine of man. One is the position that the altruistic and selfish impulses are organically related in the individual personality. There is no absolute separation between completely good and completely evil impulses. Most human motives involve something of both. Even self-love has the germ of self-respect in it which in turn contributes to the development of love of others. This position is then combined with the notion of development. Human character is in constant process of change. Therefore there is no absolute line between species of moral character. Low moral character may have in it the beginning of development toward high achievement. In addition to the problem of his moral incompleteness and failure, man has certain religious needs. The crux of the Andover doctrine of salvation is this, man's religious needs must be satisfied before he can realize to the fullest degree his moral possibilities. Man's first religious need is to feel at home in the universe, to know that the underlying reality of Being is friendly. He needs the cosmic companionship of God as an assurance that the universe cares for man. The second religious need is for forgiveness of sin. T h e third is for the assurance of immortality. How then are these needs met? God is a personal being, creator of the world, planner of its course, intervening with special acts in its history and therefore transcending it. He is also eternally active within the ere-

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ation, in harmony with its laws, and therefore is an immanent force. Man's redemption consists in the satisfaction of his religious needs through the overcoming of his sense of estrangement from God, the acceptance of God's forgiveness for his sins, and the assurance of immortality. This religious experience results in the transformation of moral character, not in the sense of a complete break with the past, nor in the sense of a complete achievement of obedience to the will of God, but in the sense that altruism becomes more and more the dominating motive of life. T h e work of redemption is accomplished by God, primarily through his incarnation in Jesus Christ, the God-man, who is a supernatural being, embodying in his life and work a complete and final revelation of God's nature and will to man. In Christ man sees God, his forgiveness, his moral law, and has the assurance that the moral law can be obeyed. T h e atonement becomes the dramatization of God's love and mercy through the life of vicarious suffering rather than a satisfaction of divine justice. Some Andover men held that God's law was known apart from Christ. Even these, however, believed that it did not become fully effective as a command to be obeyed until seen in him. Through Christ then the individual finds a different relationship to the universe, and is dominated more completely by the ethical ideal. 7 Andover usually spoke of the transformation of character as taking place immediately in the experience of conversion. This was the heritage of Hopkinsian revivalism. T h e nature of the experience, however, now involves an awareness of God's love and an assurance of his grace, rather than a conviction of radical sinfulness, and a casting of one's soul on his mercy. Furthermore, while Andover emphasized the immediate and radical nature of the change, they did not cut the Christian life off entirely from other manifestations of moral character. They could not do so and maintain the developmental point of view. Men may grow toward the Christian ideal, and even in exceptional cases achieve it in as high a measure as genuine Christians without having knowledge of Christ. Of course these manifestations of moral goodness outside of Christianity do not have a purely humanistic or naturalistic explanation. They are all from the grace of God who brings about whatever values are achieved in existence. Thus Andover kept a distinction, though not an absolute one, between general and special acts of God. In most cases, they held, the fullest development of moral character can result only from man's response to God's special act, his revelation in Christ.

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T h e liberal doctrine of man has been subjected to increasingly severe criticism in the modern period. Before making our own judgment it is necessary to distinguish what is basic in this position from what is not. Some of the elements in the liberal position which have been most criticized are not essential to it. What is essential to this doctrine of man and his salvation? First, that there is a continuity between the good which men can achieve and the good which God requires. Second, that the character of God and his divine law are revealed at least in essence in Jesus of Nazareth. Third, that men can achieve a measure of obedience to the law of love. Fourth, that the moral life admits of degrees of achievement. Fifth, that whatever achievement of good is made it depends not only upon man, but upon God as creator and sustainer of all value. Sixth, that, except in exceptional cases, the relationship of the individual to God, and the assurance of his love is a necessary contributing factor to the achievement of a moral life. It is not essential for the liberal position to agree with Andover or any other liberal school as to the degree to which men can approximate the life of love. Even in most optimistic moods Andover never claimed perfection for Christian character. It is the position that character may develop toward an end which is in harmony with the divine will which is essential. Again, it is not necessary to insist on Andover's interpretation of the meaning of ethical love. With Andover love tended to become a vague and subjective emotion rather than a concept giving accurate guidance to moral conduct. Again, while liberal Christianity has always insisted that the element of religious experience is essential to the fullest realization of the moral life, yet Andover's particular interpretation of Christian experience is not essential. They themselves came to recognize the value of more than one type. Finally, the supernatural interpretation of the figure of Jesus is not essential to the liberal position if God's nature and law can be apprehended through the natural order. Andover qualified this supernaturalism and even hinted at the possibility of surrendering it entirely. T h e point need not be labored that Andover went astray in its overconfidence in human nature. This optimism came from a high estimate of the historical achievements of man judged from the perspective of progress and partly as a natural revolt against the doctrine of depravity. Of especial importance was the early confidence in an individualistic capitalism. No fundamental conflict was perceived between the pursuit of individual interest in economic life and the public good. One could

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speak easily of love as the way of the Christian when it was not conceived to involve any radical sacrifice of a privileged position. Less emphasized in most discussion than optimism, but of far more importance for the fundamental issues, is the fact that the concept of development underlies this liberal doctrine of salvation through moral achievement. Development implies that while men may be only slightly righteous in the sight of God, there is always the possibility that they can and will be more righteous than they are. Liberalism does not hold to perfectionism. T h e real issue is: Can distinctions be made in human nature between greater and less approximations to the pure interest in the moral law as such. There is no such thing in existence as a triangle, yet some figures are closer approximations to triangles than others. Liberals hold that the analogy with human character applies, and further, that in human life we are dealing not with fixed essences but with beings in a process of development in which they move either closer to or farther away from the divine pattern. T h e essential thing is that the process can move in a worthy direction, not that the complete achievement of the goal is possible. T o pass a judgment on this liberal doctrine of man and salvation implies some basis for making the judgment, and here many of the issues of contemporary theology lie. How are we to know that there is an element of genuine distinterestedness in human character or not? T h e liberal appeal is primarily to experience and observation. Of course if this basis of judgment is not accepted, then the issue cannot be put in a debatable form. If faith is to decide on the nature of man, then there can be no discussion. Another block to discussion is found in the position that judgment on human motives is so far an inward matter that no one can judge anyone but himself. This leaves the discussion in a hopeless circle, for liberals who believe that a measure of genuine obedience to the moral law is possible will interpret their experience accordingly. Those who do not believe it possible will scarcely find it within themselves. Discussion of the basis of religious knowledge is reserved to a later section. It may be observed here that if there is to be any proof of the liberal position, liberalism can only define with the greatest possible clarity what is meant by Christian love and then demonstrate in concrete cases that this behaviour is achieved. If the question cannot be decided in this way, it cannot be decided at all. Unquestionably the easy optimism of this thought deserves criticism. Christian love too often became, in the hands of the liberals, a phrase used to characterize any conduct not obviously criminal or blatantly

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anti-social. Clear and concrete definition of what love involves has, of course, prompted liberalism to emphasize the distance between human behaviour and the ideal. It has been necessary to do what A n d o v e r began to do, dissociate the ideal of love from the comfortable charity of privileged classes. Naturalistic critics of liberal theology raise the question of whether or not there is a necessary connection between theistic belief, religious experience and moral character. Andover insisted that the religious relationship of man to G o d was necessary to the fullest development of character. T h e connection, however, was not made convincing. T h a t there is an emotional connection here can hardly be denied in the light of the history of religious experience. Changes in moral character have followed such experiences and have been connected with them. But the necessity of this relationship has not been demonstrated. Andover's admission that there are different types of religious experience raises the question as to whether any particular type of experience is necessary to moral development. Is not moral character attainable on the basis of a humanistic naturalism? H i g h levels of human character are not at all times and in all places connected with belief in G o d , or in immortality. T h e assurance of the possibility of attainment can be derived from observation of human life without reference to any supernatural ground. 8 Humanists point out that emphasis on religious experience may prevent rather than stimulate the fullest release of human energy in desirable directions. O n l y an objective study of h u m a n behaviour can determine whether or not religious experience is a necessary factor in moral attainment. Controlled experiment in this realm is difficult to carry out. So far, however, the liberal position on this point needs critical and experimental defense. III. PROGRESS A N D T H E KINGDOM O F GOD

Because Andover believed that moral character is partially conditioned by environment a conception of social improvement was necessarily an organic part of the doctrine of salvation. G o d must reconstruct society even in order to save individuals. But social change for the liberal theology is more than a means to individual salvation. T h e good society itself becomes a worthy object of human desire, and one of the central goals of God's creative purpose. For Andover, human progress is not explainable in terms of natural law or human effort alone. It depends upon God both in his immanent activity and his transcendent control of the direction of the universe.

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T h e way in which God works to bring about progress was variously interpreted. In the early years Andover thought of God's primary method as that of bringing about the regeneration of individuals who, living in harmony with the law of love, would as individuals make the necessary adjustments with other individuals which were necessary to the improvement of society as a whole. Later the thought moved away from this individualism and looked more to organized social movements as forces of social progress. Along with this shift there came a recognition of coercion as a necessary factor in social change. Liberal support of America's entrance into the World War is clear evidence that modern liberalism cannot be wholly identified with individualism or with pacific techniques of persuasion. T h e liberal analysis ol the good society had two central tenets. One was that it involved the full realization of the possibilities of human nature for growth in wisdom, culture and creativity. T h e other was the ethical principle of love as the moral test of the social order. Love was at first interpreted primarily as an individual attitude. It later was developed as a concept involving social value and social justice. It is often charged that romantic faith in progress blinded nineteenth century Christians to the true nature of man and his institutions, offered him a false hope, and now has confronted him with disillusionment and despair. 9 It is important to ask whether the liberal theology is organically or only superficially related to "evolutionary optimism." T h e six essentials of the Andover doctrine of social progress are these: First, that God, the ultimate ground of the universe, is working toward the establishment of a social order which exemplifies his moral will. Second, that the salvation of individuals can be completely realized only when society is made to conform with the will of God. T h i r d , that man can have knowledge of the social order which God wills and can judge particular societies in the light of this ideal. Fourth, that social orders exemplify the ideal order in greater and less degrees. Fifth, that human intelligence and effort is a necessary factor in the achievement of the divine society. Sixth, that the group relationships of man must be judged by the same ethical laws which apply to individuals. Most of the beliefs which critics have attacked in the liberal position are not essential to it. It is the conception of development applied to the history of social institutions which underlies the liberal position. It is not necessary to hold that the perfect society will ever be reached in time. If to regard the establishment of a perfect society as an impossibility is to consider all existing societies as under the judgment of God,

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then there is no dispute with any Reformation theology. T h e perfect society is neither reality nor possibility. T h e real question is: Can societies more or less exemplify the divine pattern? It is not necessary in the liberal position to hold that progress is at any given rate, or that the whole movement of history is always in the direction of improvement. It is not necessary to hold, and Tucker at Andover hinted that he doubted it, that modern western civilization represents a more desirable stage of social development than past ages. It is not particular judgments on particular societies which are in question. It is the possibility of social improvement. It is not ncccssary to this position to hold to the particular theories of social ethics such as those developed at Andover. It is not necessary to hold any particular theory of social change, except that at Andover at least, neither individual changc nor social change were regarded as sufficient in themselves. Particular theories of change varied all the way from the conversion of individuals, to strikes, war, and other forms of collective violence. T h e factors producing the optimistic elements in this view have been described; but it will bear repeating that belief in progress arises out of a social situation in which social change appears imminent and necessary. Bury has pointed out that it was the desire for reform which gave root and popularity to the idea of progress in France. 10 T o state a belief in progress is after all to state a criticism of things as they are. Just because belief in progress implies criticism of the status quo, Andover men took a conservative attitude toward progress. They warned against too hasty attempts to bring progress about by radical social changes, and insisted that genuine progress must include improvement of individual moral character as well as a reorganization of society. Emphasis on the gradualness of progress and on the importance of the individual has been characteristic of liberalism. It glows out of the attachment of the liberal movement to the society from which it comes, and out of the religious emphasis on the importance of individual moral and religious living. T h e theologian is speaking for the church. Any theory of inevitable improvement of society, or any theory which holds to the inevitable perfection of the individual in the perfect society makes a particular institution such as the church unnecessary. In spite of these conservative pressures, the Andover emphasis on the importance of social change for the sake of the individual increased. The settlement movement gave concrete expression to it, and the experience of the settlement reinforced the new orientation of the Christian approach to the salvation of the world.

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Andover defended the position that the law of love which is the law of God is relevant to the social organization of life, that each society exemplifies in greater or less degree the ethical law, and that men can, within limits, through intelligence and action, cooperate with God in establishing society on a more Christian basis. Can this position be proved or disproved? T h e problem of knowledge is immediately involved. If the question can be decided on the basis of reason and experience, then the way to a conclusion is a survey of the facts. Can we give intelligible expression to the nature of the good society, and do societies exemplify these requirements in a greater or less degree? Can man, as a matter of experience, eliminate or subordinate types of evil in the social order? When the discussion is put on this basis, the obvious problem is that much of the proof or disproof of the position must lie in the future where we have no experience. All the evidence is not in, and human history probably has a long course yet to run. T h e sentimental moralizing of history into which Andover slipped deserves criticism. They never fully realized the depth of the struggle for power between groups as a moving force in history. T h e moralizing on the silver issue is a case in point. They did not see how particular economic interests were bound up with their own perspective of the dispute, and they assumed that the question would be decided by the people in general on the basis of their view of the "morality" of the situation without regard to economic self-interest. A crucial question for liberalism is here raised. Is it possible for the relations of nations, races, and economic groups to be ordered on a basis of mutuality, or must there always be a struggle for power between groups, the most which can be hoped for as a result being a balance of power and a relative justice as Reinhold Niebuhr has held? 11 Liberalism has held that even groups can obey in a measure the law of love. T h e success or failure of attempts to make a better world alone can prove or disprove the liberal position. If we ask for the Andover conception of the relation of the church to human progress, we meet a typical blind spot in this liberal theology. Andover men had practically nothing to say about the church. In the whole of the Andover Review there are only a few paragraphs by Andover men dealing with its nature or function. There was brief mention of the contribution of worship to human progress, the beginning of a sociological analysis of the behaviour of the church in different types of communities; but for the most part the church is simply assumed as the organization which preaches and practices Christianity without

The Andover Liberals further analysis. The Andover men were not eager to discuss moves toward church unity. These involved discussion of creeds, and the controversy through which they themselves were passing was so tense that they hoped for a period of free theological discussion without the additional problems which debate of creedal positions would involve. 12 Liberal Protestantism has only very recently perceived any important problem in the determination of the nature of the church. Three metaphysical problems are involved in the liberal conception of progress as the result of God's plan and activity. First is the problem of evil. How is the relation of God to the incompleteness of the world to be interpreted? Why does not progress consistently take place? The evolutionary perspective implies that the cosmic spirit labors under difficulties. Andover never questioned God's omnipotence, but their interpretation of God's relationship to the world made even more serious this persistent problem. Granted belief in any theory of cosmic progress, the position that a cosmic planner, or God, is necessary to explain it takes liberalism along with all theology back to the problem of proving God's existence. Is nature simply material to be used by human intelligence and efforts for human ends, or is there within nature a direction toward value and a power or powers which create and sustain value? If the latter is true, does this creative activity within nature have a supernatural ground, or is the only value creating activity which can be known to be found within nature itself? Andover was undecided as to whether God is partially an activity within nature or whether nature is so completely governed by the laws of matter and by the brute struggle for survival that a strictly supernatural revelation and supernatural power is required to transform it. T h e conception of a universe completely explainable by physical and biological laws threatened the foundations of religion, and strengthened the hold of traditional supernaturalism on Christian theology. At the same time the liberals shared the modern spirit which sets a high value on the enjoyments of this life, and could not think of nature as completely indifferent to man. Contemporary naturalism freed from the narrow boundaries of nineteenth century science can look with more assurance to those processes and powers within nature itself which create and sustain whatever values can be realized in human life. From the point of view of Andover liberalism, any acceptance of the position that God is limited by evil, and that He, however conceived, is wholly immanent in nature is unsatisfactory because no assurance is

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given of the ultimate success of the divine plan. T h e liberals did not hold that the Kingdom of God in all its perfection must necessarily become a reality in existence, but they did hold that in the long run evil would be so subordinated that God would bring the Kingdom to pass as a practical reality. Is this assurance of ultimate victory for God either helpful or necessary? There is no conclusive evidence for it. It has not been demonstrated that one must believe in the success of the outcome before giving himself whole-heartedly to the struggle. T h e basic achievement of the liberal social gospel was its separation of the Christian way of life from a complacent acceptance of the social order in which Christians live. Ii was the liberal theologians who brought the whole of nineteenth century culture under the criticism of Christian ethics. T o be sure, the criticism was not as thorough or as comprehensive as it should have been; but it did imply that all social relationships fall short when judged by the standard of Christian ethics. It is a curious but undeniable paradox that theologies with extreme stress on man's sin have usually accepted the given social order as ordained by God. T h e Congregationalism from which Andover came was a ready ally of New England economic and political interest. A typical example of the way in which the doctrine of depravity can be combined with belief in the providential establishment of a given social order is found in the prayer of one of the earlier Andover Calvinists: I also thank Thee, O God, for Thy condescending watch over my pecuniary interests. I commit them anew to Thee. Do Thou continue to save me from losses! . . . Protect my estate at Bar Harbor and save me from discomfort and misfortune there. . . . Thy will not mine, be done in these things. Yet Thou knowest that I need them without my asking. Do Thou grant them as Thou dost care for the falling sparrow! Amen. 13 By forcing a consideration of the meaning of the law of love in all social relationships, Andover became increasingly aware that something besides divine providence is involved in the pecuniary holdings of men, and increasingly critical of the identification of any given culture with the will of God. IV. CHRISTIAN KNOW'I.KDGK After the liberal position is stated a final question remains: On what grounds does liberalism claim validity for its beliefs? Here Andover was least clear.

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Andover applied the category of development to the history of Christian doctrine, with implications similar to those in respect to human character. N o statement of Christian truth is wholly false or wholly true. This implies the liberal policy of tolerance of diverging views of religion, and acceptance of the method of shared insight and mutual criticism as the way to the achievement of religious truth. Andover men defended this view of Christian truth against the dogmatic positions of church officials, and through the bitter experience of a heresy trial. It is fundamental in liberal theology that the fundamentals may be variously stated. W h a t are the tests of truth? Interpretation of Andover's position is difficult on this point because the liberal episteniology is characteristically vague and shifting. If we ask for proofs or evidence as support of the A n d o v e r theology, all the following answers are given: intuition, reason, historical testimony, inner experience, faith, general agreement of Christians, an application of the theory of survival of the fittest to doctrinal development by which it is held that the latest doctrine is the truest, the scriptural test of the truths revealed in the New Testament, and the pragmatic test of the effect of religious doctrine on individual and social life. T h e problem is complicated in that Andover seldom used any one line of argument or one type of evidence to support a given position. T h r e e principal positions on knowledge can be distinguished. First is the attempt to combine the developmental theory of doctrine with an authoritative and absolutist conception of revelation. N o historic creed or theology was accepted as an absolutely authoritative statement. Even in the scripture distinction must be made between what is temporary and what is permanently valid. But the revelation of G o d in Christ is final and absolute with respect to God's character and his moral will. T h i s means that the development of Christian theology is a progressive attempt to understand a revelation which in essence has been given once for all time. T h u s a working compromise was achieved between the developmental view and revelation. T h e second feature of this epistemology is the liberal assumption that man is able through experience, reason, and apprehension of the divine revelation to find true knowledge of God. Continuity between human truth and divine truth is held as is continuity between human morality and the divine character. T h e liberals usually did not rest the case on a faith which is unsupported by experience or reason. T h e y were defending religion against the increasing prestige of scientific ways ot

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knowing, and believed that the retreat to faith was a confession of weakness. T h e third aspect of this interpretation of Christian knowledge is the view of the relation between science and theology. Andover accepted science as a valid method of discovering truth and as a valid set of discoveries in the realms of physics and biology, and within limits, psychology and sociology. Historical science also is valid even in the field of Christian origins and development. T h e scientific method, however, is not accepted as the sole way of gaining truth about the universe, and particularly of the objects of religious interest. Special religious insight, religious experience, and reason are all necessary supplements to scientific knowledge. Andover men did not mark off clearly the sphere of science. On the crucial problem of the nature of Jesus they at times held that the question must be decided on the basis of scientific evidence alone. On the other hand, they often defined deity and divinity as a quality of being which can only be perceived by special insight which need not be subjected to scientific scrutiny or other verification. There was a vagueness also as to how religious experience is to be used as an evidence. At times the experience of the Christian in relationship to Christ was stated in terms of such complete subjectivity that it was removed entirely from the realm of social verification. At other points Andover men, and their more precise colleague, Lewis French Stearns, tried to put the argument from religious experience in a way in which it could be experimentally verified. It is impossible to say what is essential and what is not in such an uncritical epistemological position. Probably the one essential of the Andover position is that there are many ways to religious truth. Liberalism has characteristically held arriving at religious truth to be of more importance than the manner of arriving. Three things were most emphasized in the Andover position: First, the argument for the truth of Christian belief from the evidence of Christian experience. For example, Christ is proved a supernatural being through the radical conversion which relationship with him produces in the believer. Second, scientific or experimental method is inadequate as a basis for religious doctrine. Third, the doctrine of the absolute authoritativeness of the revelation of God in Christ. It must be noted, however, that Andover was uncertain as to the sense in which finality could be claimed for this revelation. Qualifications in the matter of Jesus' omniscience and omnipotence were accepted, but that there is in Jesus a revelation which cannot be superseded was never questioned.

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T h e particular descriptions of religious experience which Andover accepted are not essential to the position. T h e very use of the term religious experience made it broad enough to include many varieties, both Christian and non-Christian. If there are different types of religious experience, of course the argument for the truth of any belief on this basis becomes correspondingly weaker. What explains this uncertainty of Andover about the grounds of Christian belief? One factor was the complexity of the culture in which churches found themselves. Since many varieties of belief and experience could be found within any church, toleration of different statements of and arguments for Christian truth was a practical necessity. Another factor was the critical situation in which the liberals found themselves with respect to theology. Their own theology was changing. T h e scriptural stronghold of faith was being subjected to critical analysis with disturbing results. Science was sketching a new picture of the universe which forced a reconstruction of the idea of God. In consequence liberals searched frantically in every direction for support of their beliefs, and as a result achieved a disorganized jumble of evidences which only the patient criticism of later liberals may succeed in making into a consistent whole. When the category of development was so freely applied why did Andover insist on the supernatural perfection of the revelation of God in Christ? This absolute gave security in a period of theological confusion. It preserved the authority of Christianity and the church. It was an inherited belief which, until the closing years of the Andover period, had not been sufficiently challenged to require serious defense or criticism. Liberal theology has been both attracted and repelled by the possibility of the limitation of human knowledge to that which is scientifically verifiable. It has accepted science as the valid interpretation of certain aspects of nature and has avoided accepting the full consequences of this acceptance. Science was successful and its prestige was growing, therefore the theologians felt constrained to find some empirical data on which to base religious belief to put over against world views built upon physical science. The argument from religious experience became more and more prominent. This type of apologetic had a pseudo-scientific appearance and gave some comfort to the defenders of religion. On the other hand, the liberals tried to limit the spheres of inquiry in which scientific method is valid. In the background of this distrust

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of science is in large part the character of most world-views built upon scientific discoveries since the time of Newton, and particularly the agnostic, rigidly mechanical metaphysics of Herbert Spencer. For Andover the scientific world-view was synonymous with Herbert Spencer's philosophy. Spencer was agnostic about God and the other foundations of Christian theology. Therefore science was agnostic. John Fiske's theistic interpretation of Spencer did not carry much weight with Andover because Fiske laid no stress on Christ, regeneration, and other essentials of evangelical doctrine. When Andover avoided science as the basis for reconstructing the world view of Christian theology, it was avoiding the philosophies erected on a scientific naturalism based upon the extension of special physical and biological laws to the whole of human life and the universe. T h e r e was no genuinely humanistic naturalism giving full place to the possibilities of man in nature to offer an alternative. Like the idealists of a century before, the liberals kept an emphasis on human experience in the face of dehumanized world views. Thus a narrow nineteenth century naturalism has given liberal Christianity a bias against science and against naturalism which, added to the inherited supernaturalism of theology, still constitutes a major issue between Christian liberalism and contemporary naturalism. In Andover's time, of course the critical development of scientific method to a genuinely experimental philosophy of knowledge had barely begun. Hence liberals could more easily accept scientific method in restricted spheres, and yet not regard it too seriously as a rival theory of general metaphysical truth. T h e developmental point of view applied to Christian doctrine, with its implication that no theology is all true or all false, underlies the liberal position that theological truth is to be found through mutual sharing and criticism of different point of view. This is an achievement permanent in its worth. Freedom of theological inquiry from the rigid control of an imposed system was won by Andover along with others at the price of heresy trials and other more subtle and annoying forms of persecution. Whatever criticism of the Andover position must be made, the willingness to accept criticism was an achievement of the Andover liberals. T h e gravest difficulties of the liberal position remain in the problem of the basis for Christian belief. Unless liberal theology can state its position clearly and show convincing evidence for holding it, it must lose the respect of critical thought. It is difficult to criticize the Andover theory of knowledge because

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it was so incoherently stated. T o say this is to point up the primary criticism. Andover tended to substitute sentiment for clarity of theological statement, and feeling for logical argument. There are examples at every crucial point in the position. T o argue that Christ is a supernatural being because men have a moral transformation in connection with his life and teachings is to beg the question. Does moral transformation imply a supernatural revelation? The same difficulty is involved in Andover's religious pragmatism. Belief in God or in the deity of Christ or in immortality is justified by its beneficial results. But again there is no evidence that the results cannot be otherwise obtained, and even if they could not, the argument has only practical and not logical value. Beneficial effects of belief have no necessary connection with its objective validity. Another example of the same failure of the Andover position to be either clear or convincing in the matter of evidence is with respect to the interpretation of Christian ethics. Here Andover's struggle with its own position is instructive. In the early period of social criticism the term love was used without further definition than to say that it was the spirit of Christ and of the Sermon on the Mount. As a symbol of the charitable feelings of individuals this had some practical value; but as a basis on which to make an ethical judgment concerning the Tightness of a given social order, it contributed more to confusion than to clarity. Later Andover thought tried to correct this vagueness. A pattern of the good society sufficiently detailed and concrete to give guidance to social experimentation is still a primary need of all liberal social philosophy. It is always possible so to state and circumscribe the sphere of religious belief that experimental criticism is impossible. Andover generally followed this method of defending Christian truth as they saw it. The basic issue involved in this conception of religious truth remains then, what of the relation of religious knowledge to experimental knowledge? An experimental theory of knowledge in religion has two consequences which Andover was unwilling to accept: one is tentativeness, and the other is the restriction of religious belief to that which can be experimentally verified. Experimentalism accepts completely the developmental theory applied to human knowledge. T h e truth is never finished. Andover accepted this tentativeness on most points, but would not apply it to the revelation of God in Christ. Must Christian theology cling to an absolute revelation? Andover said yes, and thus left a clear issue with experimentalism. Religious belief, in the Andover view, necessarily extends to certain

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truths experimental verification of which is impossible for men; a personal God, immortality, assurance of the ultimate triumph of God's purpose. These beliefs may be based on faith or inner experience or reason, but not upon overt controlled experimentation. Shall Christian theology hold to beliefs which cannot be so tested? Andover said yes. But can we really speak of more than one kind of knowledge? Are not observation, reason, and experiment the final tests of all beliefs? For one who accepts an experimental epistemology the issue with the liberal theology is clear. God must be found as an experimentally discoverable reality within the process of nature, not a being apart from it; and belief in immortality must await genuine objective verification. Christianity's conflicts with the scientific enterprise have resulted in a policy of gradual retreat and concession on the part of theology. A completely naturalistic religion holding only experimentally verifiable belief is now being explored. It is a natural result of the application of the ideas of development, and of the exploration of religious experience by human techniques which liberalism began but which, at Andover, it was reluctant to carry through. T h e genuinely naturalistic element in the Andover theology was the conviction that man, released from authority and superstition can, with the tools of intelligence and good will, make a better life and better world for himself, and that in all increase of value he is cooperating with a superhuman power which guides and sustains him. Only the experiment of attempting this task within the time and the conditions allotted to it can show whether this liberal faith is based on reality or illusion.

N O T E S A N D REFERENCES CHATTER ONE

1. Haroutunian, Joseph: Piety versus Moralism. Foster, F. H.: A Genetic History of the New England Theology. 2. Memoir of the Life of President Dwight in Theology Explained and Defended, 1825, p. 20. 3. Foster: op. cit., p. 199. 4. Woods, Leonard: History of Andover Seminary, pp. 485-486. 5. Woods, Leonard: A Survey of the State of Churches in New England. Panoplist, Vol. II., 1806, pp. 210, 173, 269, 504. 6. Bentley, William: Journal, Vol. Ill, p. 515. Robinson, William A.: Jeffersonian Democracy in New England traces the growth of the democratic movement. 7. Woods: History, p. 41. 8. A summary of Hopkinsian tenets approved by Dr. Emmons and Spring will be found in Woods History, pp. 32-34. 9. Woods: History, p. 65. 10. Ibid., Letter to S. Farrar, p. 506. 11. Ibid., pp. 632, 623. 12. Ibid., p. 92. 13. The creed was a part of the Associate Statutes of the Seminary, article two. Woods, History contains the original Statutes and Laws of the Seminary in full. 14. Associate Statutes, article 20. 15. Ibid., article 28. 16. Woods: History, pp. 133-135. 17. Ibid., p. 330. See Monthly Anthology, 1808, p. 30. 18. Ibid., p. 67 f. 19. Phelps, Austin: "Conversion—Its Nature", Bibliotheca Sacra, January 1866, XXIII, pp. 48-73. 20. Porter: Letters on Revivals, p. 9. 21. Associate Statutes, article 2.

22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53.

Porter: op. cit., pp. 144, 147-8. Associate Statutes, article 2. Quoted Porter: op. cit., p. 91. Ibid., pp. 93 ff. Rowe: History of Andover Theological Seminary, Chaps. 5-6. Shedd: The Nature and Influence of the Historic Spirit in Discourses and Essays, pp. 147-148. Ibid., p. 149. Porter: The Christian Citizen, or the Duty of Praying for Rulers. Ibid., p. 11. Porter: Letters on Revivals, p. 3. Porter: The Character of Nehemiah, or Jerusalem Built Up. Porter: Letters on Revivals, p. 111. Woods, Leonard: Works. Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 552-553. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 540. Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 563-564. Porter: Letters on Revivals, p. 26. Woods: Works, Vol. I, p. 8. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 29. Woods: Works, Vol. IV, p. 352. Woods: Ibid., Vol. I, p. 13, Dedicatory Address. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 196. Associate Statutes, Article 27. Woods: History, p. 188. Ibid., Laws of the Seminary, Chapter 8. Ibid., Chapter 5, Section 8. Ibid., p. 505. Ibid., pp. 136-137. Rowe: History, p. 35. Haroutunian and Foster deal with them fully. See note one. Woods' phrase. History, p. 359. Stuart's remark quoted in Nathan Lord, A Letter to the Rev. Daniel Dana D.D. on Professor Park's

178

Notes

55. 56.

57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73.

74. 75.

References

76. Stuart, Moses: "Have the Sacred Writers Anywhere Asserted that the Sin or Righteousness of One Porter: Dedicatory Sermon of the New Chapel, Sept. 22, 1818, pp. is Imputed to Another?" Biblical 28-29. Repository, April 1836, pp. 241Ibid., pp. 74-75. 330Stowe, C. E.: Inaugural Address 77. Woods: History, pp. 367-448. at Andover 1852, The Right In- 78. Stuart, Moses: Letters to Chanterpretation of the Sacred Scripging, pp. 156-157tures; the Helps and Hindrances, 79. Woods: History, pp. 152-153. Cf. p. 14. Rowe, History, p. 166. Phelps, Austin: Christian Char- 80. Taylor, N. W.: Concio ad Clerum, acter a Power in the Redemption New Haven 1828. of the World, p. 19. 81. Foster: A Genetic History of the Stuart, Moses: Letters to ChanNew England Theology, pp. 258ning on Religious Liberty, p. 329. 269, and chapter 17 gives a resume Ibid., p. 354. of Park's system based on his own Turner: The United States i8jolecture notes, and notes of stu1850 gives an objective summary dents. On Park's opinion of Gerof the intellectual developments. man theology, see his address The Harris, Samuel Y.: The Demands Utility of Collegiate and Profesof Infidelity Satisfied by Chrissional Schools, given in Tremont tianity, 1856. Temple, May 29, 1850, p. 28. Woods: History, p. 86. 82. The Andover Controversy. Park, Meyer: Church and State in Masagainst Hodge, p. 25. The consachusetts from 1740 to 1883. troversy was carried on in the Dexter: Congregationalism as Bibliotheca Sacra from 1850-1852. Seen in its Literature, pp. 515-16. 83. Park published almost nothing of Woods: History, pp. 158, 169-170. his theological system. Ibid., pp. 146-147. Foster, F. H.: The Life of EdWoods: Letters to Unitarians, pp. wards Amasa Park, p. 245. 45-4684. Park, E. A.: The Theology of the Woods: Works, Vol. IV, p. 34. Intellect and That of the Feelings, Woods: History, pp. 180-181. pp. 5-6. Foster: op. cit., p. 289. 85. Ibid., pp. 16-17. Lord: Letter to Dr. Dana. 86. Bushnell, Horace: Dogma and Woods: History, pp. 173-178 Spirit in God in Christ, pp. 301-2. quotes the report in full. 87. Foster: History of the New EngStuart, Moses: "Critical Examinaland Theology, pp. 395. tion of Genesis 1 with Remarks on the Present Modes of Geological 88. Ibid., p. 268. Reasoning," Biblical Repository, 89. Ibid., pp. 514-515. 90. Ibid., p. 493. Vol. VII, January 1836, p. 74. Stuart, Moses: Critical History 91. Park: The Associate Creed of Andover Theological Seminary, and Defense of the Old Testap. 87. ment Canon, p. 420. Stowe: The Right Interpretation 92. Dana: A Remonstrance. 93. Tucker, William J.: The Making of the Sacred Scripture. Theology

54.

and

of New England,

pp.

The Andover Liberals

949596. 9798. 99-

102. 103.

104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109.

and Unmaking of the Preacher, p. 52. The Panoplist, 1806, Vol. II, p. 280. Woods: History, p. 488. Rowe: History, p. 45. National Cyclopedia of American Biography, Vol. X , pp. 100101. Stuart, Moses: Essay on the Prize Question. Panoplist, 1806, Vol. II, pp. 238, 521-522. Porter: The Christian Citizen, p. 6. National Cyclopedia, Vol. X, pp. 101-102. Rowe: History, p. 77. Phelps, Amos: Letters to Professor Stowe and Dr. Bacon, N. Y. 1848, quotes the Board's report, pp. 13-14. Ibid., p. 1. Stuart, Moses: Conscience and the Constitution, p. 46. Ibid., p. 123. Jay, William: Reply to Remarks of Rev. Moses Stuart. Phelps, Austin: Christian Character a Power, p. 15. Park: The Imprecatory Psalms, p. 206.

179

110. Ibid., p. 185. 1 1 1 . Ibid., p. 197. 112. Wright, G. F.: "Science and Religion. Some Analogies Between Calvinism and Darwinism." Bibliotheca Sacra, 1880, Vol. 37, pp. 49-74. 113. Smyth, Egbert C.: The Value of Church History, p. 14. 114. Ibid., p. 16. 115. Ibid., p. 20. 116. Ibid., p. 27. 117. Rowe: History, pp. 171-172. 118. Gulliver, J . P.: Christianity and Science, p. 31. 119. Rowe: History, p. 19. 120. Ibid., p. 171. Cf. E. J . H. Ropes, Paper on Thayer read in Divinity Chapel, Cambridge, March 28, 1902. Park, E. A.: The Associate Creed of Andover Theological Seminary. 122. Literature on the trials will be found in the Bibliography. 123. The Christian Union: Editorial on Andover Seminary, June 14, 1883, p. 466. 124. Harris, George Y.: Inaugural Address, Christian Union, June 14, 1883, pp. 469-473.

CHAPTER TWO

References to The Andover Review are abbreviated: A. R. Editorials are indicated by Ed. 1. Porter, Noah: " T h e Christian Ministry as a Profession," A. R., I, 1884, pp. 345-363. 2. Bowne, Borden P.: " T h e Natural History of Atheism," A. R., X , 1888, pp. i6g-82. p. 174. 3. A summary and source material for the early reaction of New England Theologians to evolution is to be found in an article by B. J . Lowenberg: "Evolution in New

England, 1859-1873," The New England Quarterly, Vol. VIII, 1935, No. 2. Drummond's Natural Law in the Spiritual World was reviewed by E. C. Smyth, A. R. I, 1884, pp. 104107; and by Edward A. Lawrence, A. R „ VI, 1886, pp. 22-34. Spencer, Herbert: First Principles, 4th ed. N. Y., Burt, 1880, p. 343. 6. Ibid., p. 166, p. 39.

Notes and

i8o

7. Ibid., p. 39. 8. Dewey, John: "Poetry and Philosophy," A. R., X V I , 1891, pp. 105-116. p. 109. 9. Johnson, F. H.: "Mechanical Evolution," A. R. I, 1884, PP649. p. 631. 10. Gulliver, J . P.: Christianity and Science. Inaugural lecture at Andover, p. 33. 1 1 . Benedict, W. R.: "Theism and Evolution," two articles. 1. A. R., VI, 1886, pp. 337-350. 2. A. R., VI, 1886, pp. 607-62*. This reference p. 610. 12. Johnson, F. H.: What is Reality, Introduction, p. 7. 13. Ibid., p. 8. 14. Johnson : " M echan ical Evolution," loc. cit., p. 636. 15. Johnson: What is Reality, p. 89. 16. Ibid., p. 127. 17. Ibid., pp. 93-94. 18. Ibid., p. 214. 19. Ibid., p. 137. 20. Mivart, Genesis of Species. Referred to in Johnson: "Theistic Evolution," A. R., I, 1884, pp. 363381, pp. 374 ff. 21. Johnson: "Theistic Evolution," loc. cit., p. 374. 22. Johnson: The Evolution of Conscience in What is Reality, Appendix A, p. 481. 23. Johnson: "Theistic Evolution," loc. cit., p. 376. 24. Brewster, Chauncey B.: " T h e Supernatural," A. R., X I X , 1893, PP- 5 I 3"5 2 5> P- 5'925. Starbuck: "Religious Thought in England," A. R., X , 1888, pp. 473491. p. 477. 26. LeConte, Joseph: Evolution, Its Nature, Its Evidences, and Its Relation to Religious Thought, p. 3«527. Ibid., p. 88.

References 28. LeConte: " T h e Natural Grounds of Belief in a Personal Immortality," A. R., X I V , 1890, pp. 1-13. p. 7. 29. Dewey, John: " T h e New Psycholog)-," A. R., II, 1884, pp. 278-289. p. 285. 30. Ibid., p. 282. 31. Benedict, W. R . : "Theism and Evolution," II, A. R., VI, 1886, pp. 607-622. p. 620. 32. Peabody, F. G.: " T h e Office of Proof in the Knowledge of God," A. R., II, 1884, pp. 1-17. p. 4. 33. Bovine, Borden P.: " T h e Natural History of Atheism," A. R., X , pp. 181-182. 34. Ibid., p. 181. 35. Ibid., pp. 175-176. 36. Peabody: loc. cit., " T h e Office of Proof in the Knowledge of God." 37. Johnson: What is Reality, p. 110. 38. J o h n s o n : " M e c h a n i s m T r a n s formed," A. R., X I I I , 1890, pp. 120-139. p. 136. 39. Johnson: What is Reality, p. 260. 40. Ibid., p. 264. 41. Ibid., p. 277. 42. Ibid., p. 282. 43. Ibid., pp. 307-308. 44. Johnson: "Creative Intelligence," A. R., XV, 1891, pp. 280-297. P2 9745. Johnson: What is Reality, pp. 309-3 1 1 46. Benedict: "Theism and Evolution," I. A. R., VI, p. 346. 47. Ibid., p. 347. 48. Smyth, Newman: "Professor Harris's Contributions to Theism," A. R., I, 1884, pp. 132-148. p. 138. 49. Ibid., p. 144. 50. Genung, G. F.: " T h e Trustworthiness of the Spiritual Apprehension," A. R., VII, 1887, pp. 138148. p. 144. 51. Ibid., p. 145. 52. Ibid., p. 140.

The Andover 53. Dewey, John: "Poetry and Philosophy," A. R., XVI, 1891, pp. 105-116. p . 107.

54. Ibid., p. 115. 55. Harris, George: Review of Fiske's The Idea of God as Affected by Modern Knowledge. A. R„ V, p. 100, 1886.

56. Harris: Moral Evolution, p. 186. 57. Torrey, Henry A. T.: " T h e 'Theodicee' of Leibnitz." A. R., IV, 1885. Three articles. 1. Oct. 289«99. 2. N o v . 407-417. 3. Nov. 493512. p. 501.

58. Ibid., p. 501. 59. Ibid., pp. 509-510. 60. Quoted by John Dewey in Contemporary American Philosophy, N. Y„ 1930, Vol. II, p. 14. 61. Cooley, William Forbes: "A Word in Behalf of Eudaemonism." A. R. XVI, 1891, p p . 583-591.

Hopkins, Mark: "Optimism," A. R., I l l , 1885, p p . 197-210.

62. Buckham, John Wright: " T h e New Natural Theology," A. R.,

Liberals

181

XVIII, 1892, pp. 563-572. p. 571. 63. Johnson: "Cooperative Creation," A. R., I l l , 1885, p p . 326-346, p p .

436-455- P- 346. 64. Ibid., p. 342. 65. Gordon, George A.: " T h e Contrast and Agreement Between the New Orthodoxy and the Old," A. R., XIX, 1893, pp. 1-18. p. 9. 66. Gordon: " T h e Preacher as Interpreter," A. R., VI, 1886, pp. 225239. p. 238. 67. Ibid., p. 233. 68. Ibid., p. 233. 69. Mabie, H. W.: " T h e Spiritual Element in Modern Literature," A. R „ VI, 1886, p p . 364-378. p .

37270. Mabie: "A Typical Novel," A. R., IV, 1885, p p . 417-429. p p . 428-429.

T h e novel was William Dean Howells' The Rise of Silas Lapham. 71. Tucker, William J.: "Life in Himself," A. R„ XVIII, 1892, pp. 18695- P- »93-

CHAPTER THREE

1. Tucker, William J.: My Generation, p. 2. 2. Buckham, M. H.: Review of Sir Henry Maine's Popular Government. A. R., V, 1886, pp. 547"550. U l f , * jit ..-ru ^ 3. Hale, Edward E.: T h e Govern, ment of America," A. R„ II, 1884, PP-352-365-P-3594. Bixby, James T . : "Morality on a Scientific Basis," A. R„ XIX, pp. 208-220. p. 209. 5. Ibid., p. 209. 6. Ibid., p. 209. 7. Ibid., p. 209. 8. Ibid., p. 209. 9. Ibid., p. 210.

10. Ibid., p. 210. Ii- Ibid., p. 210. Ib d | - P- a 1 1 Ibid »3- P- 2 1 P 21 " '' 15. Ibid., p. 212. l6 - Ibid., p. 212. r U., 17. TIbid., p. 220. ^ Ibid p 211 9 : Ibid.! p". 217'. 80 Ibid p 2,4 Ibid., p. 219. a, 2 2 . Dole, Charles F.: "The Problem of Duty," A. R„ XII, 1889. pp. 624-645. p. 643. 23. Ibid., p. 645. 24. Ibid., p. 643. 25. Ibid., p. 632.

Notes

and

26. Brewster, Chauncey B.: A. R., XVI, 1891, p p . 235-248. p. 246. 27. Ibid., p. 246. 28. Ibid., p. 246. 29. Ibid., p p . 247-248. 30. Dewey, J o h n : "Ethics a n d Physical Science," A. R., VII, 1887. p p . 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49.

573-59'. P- 5®°Ibid., p. 586. Ibid., p. 580. Ibid., p. 589. Ibid., p. 581. Ibid., p. 590. Ibid., p. 591. Ibid., p. 591. Hyslop, J . H . : "Evolution a n d Ethical Problems," A. R „ IX, 1888, p p . 348-366. p. 353. Hyslop: "A Decade of Ethics," A. R „ VI, 1886, p p . 449-466. p. 462. Hyslop: Review of Schurman's Ethical Import of Darwinism. A. R „ IX, 1888, p p . 203-206. p. 204. Ibid., p. 205. Hyslop: "Evolution a n d Ethical Problems," loc. cit., p p . 352-3. Ibid., p. 353. Hyslop: "A Decade of Ethics," loc. cit., p. 464. Hyslop: "Evolution a n d Ethical Problems," loc. cit., p. 365. Johnson, F. H.: "Theistic Evolution," A. R., I, 1884, PP- 363-381, p. 366. Ibid., p. 380. Ibid., p. 380. J o h n s o n : " T h e Evolution of Conscience," A. R., II, 1884, p p . 529548. pp. 533-4.

References 50. J o h n s o n : "Cooperative Creation." T w o articles. 1. A. R „ III, 1885, p p . 326-346. 2. A. R., I l l , 1885, p p . 436-455. T h i s reference, Vol. I l l , p p . 326-7. 51. J o h n s o n : " T h e Evolution of Conscience," loc. cit., p. 530. 52. Ibid., p. 530. 53. J o h n s o n : What is Reality, p. 247. 54. J o h n s o n : "Cooperative Creation," loc. cit., p. 334. 55. J o h n s o n : " E v o l u t i o n of C o n science," loc. cit., p. 530. 56. J o h n s o n : " T h e Evolution of T r u t h , " A. R., VI, 1886. p p . 268288. p. 288. 57. J o h n s o n : "Cooperative Creation," loc. cit., pp. 448-9. 58. J o h n s o n : "Creation a n d Salvation," A. R., VII, 1887. p p . 275294. p. 284. 59. Ibid., p. 284. 60. Ibid., p. 277. 61. J o h n s o n : "Cooperative Creation," loc. cit., p. 329. 62. Ibid., p. 445. 63. Ibid., p. 451. 64. Ibid., p. 451. 65. Ibid., p. 453. 66. J o h n s o n : What is Reality. Chap. X V I I I . The Continuity of the Process, p. 462. 67. Ibid., p. 463. 68. Ibid., p. 464. 69. Ibid., p. 465. 70. Ibid., p. 466. 71. E.g. Porter. See C h a p t e r One. 72. J o h n s o n : What is Reality, p p . 467468. 73. Ibid., p. 468. 74. Ibid., p. 470.

CHAPTER FOUR

Ed. " T h e Accountability of the Ultra-Conservatives." A. R., I, 1884, p p . 653-658. p. 654. Smyth, E. C.: " T h e Theological

Purpose of the Review," A. R., I, 1884, p p . 1-13. p. 12. 3. Ibid., p. 1. 4. Ibid., p. 6.

The Andover Liberals Tucker: My Generation, p. 108. Cf. Ed. " T h e Doctrinal Appeal to the Churches," A. R „ VIII, 1887,

V. " T h e Work of the Holy Spirit," IV, 1885, pp. 256»63. VI. " T h e Christian," IV, 1885,

PP- 5 3 3 - 5 3 6 - p. 5 3 4 - 5 3 5 .

Smyth's first statement of the doctrine appeared in a series of sermons preached in the first Presbyterian Church of Quincy, Illinois, entitled Negative and Positive Elements in the Conception of the Future Life. T h e source of the doctrine of future probation in Smyth's own thought is not clear. In 1887 an Andover graduate published in the Review a paper in which he quoted four European theologians as subscribing to the doctrine. These were: Dorner: The System of Christian Doctrine. Van Oosterzee: Dogmatics. Edited by Schaff and Smith of Union, pp. 558-781. Miiller, Julius: Christian Doctrine of Sin. Martensen: Dogmatics. T h e article is " T h e Andover Theory of Future Probation" by Thomas P. Field, A. R., VII, 1887, pp. 461-475Ed. "Christianity and Its Competitors." A. R., VI, 1886, p. 5 1 1 . Progressive Orthodoxy appeared as a series of jointly signed editorials by the editors of the Andover Review. T h e list of editorials and their location is here given: I. "Criteria of Theological Progress," III, 1885, pp. 466-472. II. " T h e Incarnation," III, 1885, pp. 554-564. III. " T h e Atonement," IV, 1885, pp. 56-68. IV. "Eschatology," IV, 1885, PP143-163.

183

pp. 345-354.

VII. " T h e Scriptures," IV, 1885, pp. 456-477V I I I . "Conclusion. Christianity Absolute and Universal," IV, 1885, pp. 568-581. T h e papers were published in book form under the title Progressive Orthodoxy in Boston in 1886. T h e papers were somewhat expanded and a new chapter entitled Christianity and Missions added. References here are to the pages of the book, noted as P. O. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

30.

P. O., pp. 189-190. Ibid., p. 16. Ibid., p. 35. Ibid., p. 19. Ibid., p. 37. Ibid., pp. 42-43. Ibid., p. 44. Ibid., pp. 50-51. Ibid., p. 55. Ibid., p. 56. Ibid., pp. 61-62. Ibid., p. 48. Ibid., p. 89. Ibid., pp. 69-70. p. 76. Tucker, W. J . : "Some Present Questions in Evangelism," A. R., I, 1884, pp. 233-244. pp. 242-243. P. O., pp. 124-125. Ibid., p. 127. Ibid., pp. 126-127. Ibid., p. 134. n. Ibid., p. 145. Ibid., p. 110. p. 83. Ibid., pp. 85-86. Ed., A. R., "Christianity and Its Competitors," VII, 1887, p. 541. (For complete reference to this series of articles, see notes of chapter six.) Ibid., p. 544.

184

Notes

and

3 1 . P . O . , p. 253. 32. Smyth: " T h e Theological Purpose of the Review," loc. cit., V. I, p. 12. 33. P . O . , p. 253. 34. T h e Andover writers were extremely careful to avoid attributing their thought to any particular sources. T h r e a t e n e d as they were with a heresy trial, they avoided taking on responsibility for approval of any theological system except their own. T h e sources of Andover thought therefore must be traced a n d detected through a few references a n d through suggestions of others. I t is clear that a m a j o r source of the stage of thinking represented by Progressive Orthodoxy was the German "Mediating T h e o l o g i a n , " Dr. I. A. D o r n e r of Berlin. Dorner's m a j o r works are listed in the Bibliography of this chapter. H e defended the doctrine of f u t u r e probation, (A System of Christian Doctrine—Eng. trans. Vol. IV, p p . 408-413); a n d preserved in his system the doctrine of the absolute metaphysical a n d ethical uniqueness of Christ. Christ is the universal man, m a n himself in his perfection, (op. cit., Vol. I l l , p p . 32 >-324) After Dorner's death The Review carried an appreciative sketch of his life a n d thought. (Ed. " D r . I. A. Dorner," A. R., II, 1884, p p . 176-186.) W h i l e n o t professing complete adherence to "Dornerism" the writer, who has obviously h a d personal acquaintance a n d probably study with Dorner, says of his System of Christian Doctrine: "to those who would d o something by joining in the common labor to promote a theology which shall minister to the needs

References of their own time, this latest work of a great teacher will prove a discipline a n d a guide than which we know not a superior; for it leads to the cross of Christ a n d the heart of God, a n d makes of science a n angel of penitence a n d faith, a n d teaches reason its freedom, its nobility, a n d its dependence." (p.

35.

36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

41.

42.

43. 44.

45. 46. 47. 48. 49.

>85) F u r t h e r use of Dorner's work will be noted in the next chapter. Harris, George H.: "Law a n d Grace," A. R „ IX, 1888, p p . 449465- P- 453Ibid., p. 462. Ibid., p. 463. Ibid., p p . 461-462. Ibid., p. 461. See C. A. Briggs: Whitherf A Theological Question for the Times, N . Y„ 1890. Schaff, Phillip: " T h e Calvinistic System in the Light of Reason a n d the Scripture," A. R., XVII, 1892. Q u o t e d f r o m the Methodist Review, March 1889, by J . A. Faulkner in an article, "Methodism a n d the Andover Theology," A. R., X V I I I , 1892, p p . 487-508. p. 490. Palmer, Frederick: "Some Criticisms of the Andover Movement," A. R „ X I I I , 1890, p p . 181-201. p. 188. Ibid., p. 194. Foster, F. H . : Edwards Amasa Park, p. 240. Quotes sermon by Park delivered at o r d i n a t i o n of Rev. H . H . Leavitt in 1882 as pastor of the Congregational Church at N o r t h Andover. Palmer, loc. cit., p. 193. Ibid., p. 192. Ibid., p. 198. Ibid., p. 199. Ed. " M r . Palmer's Criticism of the Andover M o v e m e n t , " A. R., X I I I , 1890, p p . 434-442- P- 439-

The Andover 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55.

Ibid., p. 439. Ibid., p. 439. Ibid., p. 441. Ibid., p. 442. Ibid., p. 442. Tucker: My Generation, pp. 149150.

56. Ed., "Mr. Palmer's Criticism," loc. cit., p. 441. 57. Ibid., p. 441. 58. Ed., " T h e Present Tendency in Theology," A. R., XIV, 1890, pp. 59. 60. 61. 62.

298-303. p. 301.

Ibid., p. 301. p. 299. Ibid., p. 300. Ibid., p. 300. Smyth, E. C.: Review of A. V. G.

Liberals

185

Allen's The Continuity of Christian Thought, A. R., Ill, 1885, pp. 286-291. p. 288.

63. Ibid., p. 290. 64. Tunis, John: "The Doctrine of the Divine Immanence," A. R., 65. 66. 67. 68. 69.

X I V , 1890, p p . 389-404. p. 390.

Ibid., p. 394. Ibid., p. 400. Ibid., p. 402. Ibid., pp. 402-403. Hopkins, Samuel: Works, Boston, 1854, Vol. I, p. 180. 70. Ibid., p. 368. 71. Ed., "The Use of the Word Probation," A. R„ IX, 1888, pp. 413416. p. 414.

CHAPTER FIVE

1. Foster: The Modern Movement in American Theology, p. 30. 2. Ibid., p. 31. 3. Harris, George: "The Function of the Christian Consciousness," 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

15. 16. 17.

A. R „ II, 1884. p p . 338-352. p. 340.

Ibid., p. 341. Ibid., pp. 344-345. Ibid., p. 345. Ibid., p. 345. Ibid., pp. 347-348. Ibid., p. 345. Ibid., p. 349. Ibid., p. 350. Ibid., p. 351. Patton, Francis L.: "Dr. Harris on the Christian Consciousness," The Independent, Dec. 4, 1884. Harris, George: "The Christian Consciousness—Criticism a n d Comment," A. R., II, 1884, pp. 593-599- P- 594Ibid., p. 598. E.g. Harris' Inaugural Address, quoted in chapter one. Clarke, W. B.: "The Nature and Working of the Christian Con-

sciousness," A. R., VII, 1887, pp. 376-390. p. 387.

18. Ibid., p. 381. 19. Ibid., p. 387. 20. Patton: loc. cit. Harris replied to Patton in the Independent, Dec. 25, 1884, in an article entitled "The Christian Consciousness and Dr. Patton." Borden B. Bowne joined the controversy: "Concerning the Christian Consciousness," Independent, ]zn. 8, 1885. 21. Clarke: loc. cit., p. 385. 22. Ibid., pp. 385-386. 23. Ibid., p. 388. Clarke acknowledged his indebtedness to both Reid and the German idealism, Ibid., p. 381. 24. Wilcox, Asher H.: "The Ultimate Criteria of Christian Doctrine," A. R„ VIII, 1887, pp. 337-351. p. 34325. Ibid., p. 345. 26. Ibid., p. 351. 27. Ibid., p. 344.

i86

Notes and

28. Stearns, Lewis F.: The Evidence of Christian Experience, p. 298. 29. Smith, H. B.: Faith and Philosophy, N.Y., 1877, pp. 36 ff. 30. Stearns: op. cit., p. 445. 31. Ueberweg: History of Philosophy, Vol. II. 32. Smyth, E. C.: Review of Movements of Religious Thought in Britain During the Nineteenth Century, by John Tulloch (1886), A. R., V, 1886, pp. 107-110. p. 110. 33. Stearns: op. cit. 34. Ibid., p. 401. 35. Ibid., pp. 401-402. 36. Ibid., pp. 391-39437. Ibid., p. 424. 38. Harris: Review of Stearns, Evidence, A. R., XV, 1891, pp. 115117. p. 115. 39. Edwards, Jonathan: Works (1830) Treatise on the Religious Affections. Vol. V, pp. 121 ff, 314 ff. 40. Foster: op. cit., pp. 24-25. 41. Smyth, E. C.: From Lessing to Schleiermacher or from Rationalism to Faith. 42. Smyth, E. C.: " T h e Theological Purpose of the Review," A. R., I, 1884, pp. 1-13. p. 1. 43. Ibid., p. 2. 44. Ibid., pp. 2-3. 45. Ibid., p. 2. 46. Ibid., p. 4. 47. A. C. McGiffert: "Notes on German Thought," A. R., VIII, 1887, PP- 548-550- P- 549Harnack, Adolph: Grundriss der Dogmengeschichte. 1886-87. 48. McGiffert: "Notes," A. R., IX, 1888, p. 201. 49. Smyth, E. C.: "Dogma in Religion," A. R., XIV, 1890, pp. 491508. p. 494. 50. Ibid., p. 494. 51. Ibid., p. 497. 52. Ibid., p. 507.

References 53. Hincks: The Scriptures. Chap. 8 in Progrèssive Orthodoxy, p. 191. References to this work are given in the notes to chapter 4. 54. Ibid., p. 194. 55. Hincks, E. Y.: "Weiss's Theology," A. R „ I, 1884, pp. 253-270. p. 255. 56. Ibid., pp. 257-258. 57. Ibid., p. 258. 58. Progressive Orthodoxy, p. 201. 59. Ibid., p. 229. 60. Ibid., p. 229. 61. Ibid., p. 225. 62. Ed. "Tradition, Criticism, and Science," A. R„ III, 1885. pp. 47-53. p. 50. 63. Ibid., pp. 52-53. 64. Ibid., p. 48. 65. Ibid., p. 43. 66. Moore, George Foote: "The Modern Historical Movement and the Christian Faith," A. R., 1888, pp. 333-344- P- 33667. Ibid., p. 338. 68. Ibid., p. 339. 69. Ibid., p. 339. 70. Ibid., p. 340. 71. Ed. " T h e Preservation of Spiritual Christianity," A. R., XI, 1889, pp. 180-184. P- j 83. 72. Ed. " T h e Real Issue," A. R., XI, 1889, pp. 516-520. p. 516. 73. Ibid., p. 518. 74. Hincks, E. Y.: " T h e Gospel Miracles and Historical Science," A. R., XI, 1889, pp. 561-569. p. 566. 75. Ibid., p. 568. 76. Hincks, E. Y.: "Dr. Martineau's Criticism of the Gospels," A. R., XV, 1890, pp. 1-26. passim. 77. Ed. " T h e Present Tendency in Theology," A. R., XIV, 1890, pp. 298-30378. Harris, George: "Ethical Christianity and Biblical Criticism," A. R., XV, 1891, pp. 461-471. p. 461.

The Andover 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85.

Ibid., p. 463. Ibid., p. 465. Ibid., p. 466. Ibid., p p . 469-470. Ibid., p. 469. Ibid., p. 469. Ed. " T h e Positive Side of Biblical Criticism," A. R „ XVI, 1891, p p . 172-175. p p . 172-173. 86. Ibid., p. 175. 87. Ed. "Religious Authority," A. R., XVII, 1892, p p . 298-307. p. 307. 88. Ed. " T h e Regression of the Critical Attack o n the Deity of Christ," A. R „ X V I I , 1892, p p . 402-404. p. 404. T h e editorial series entitled The Divinity of Jesus Christ will be f o u n d as follows: I. " I n t r o d u c t i o n , " XVII, 1892, pp. 510-512. II. " T h e Primitive C h u r c h , " XVII, 1892, p p . 598-606. III. " T h e Self-Consciousness of Jesus," XVIII, 1892, p p . 829°IV. "Revelation a n d R e d e m p tion," X V I I I , 1892, p p . 263272. V. " T h e D i v i n e - H u m a n Personality," X V I I I , 1892, p p . 392-408. VI. " T h e Early Church," XVIII, 1892, p p . 509-518. VII. " T h e Early C h u r c h , " (Concluded), X V I I I , 1892, p p . 633-646. V I I I . " T h e Satisfaction of H u manity in Jesus Christ," XIX, 1892, p p . 78-86. (Tucker) Dorner's History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ is noted as the m a i n source of p a r t VI. X V I I I , p. 509. T h e reference to Dorner's work is to Div. I, vol. 1, pp. 92-184.

Liberals

187

89. "Divinity of Christ. Introduction," A. R., XVII, p. 512. 90. Ibid., XVII, p. 5 1 1 . 91. Ibid., XVII, p. 598. 92. Ibid., XVIII, p p . 82-90. Passim. 93. Ibid., p. 82. 94. Ibid., p. 265. 95. Ibid., p. 268. A thorough statement of the Liberal a n d Ritschlian theology in Germany in comparison a n d contrast was published in the Review by Frank C. Porter of Yale. A. R., XIX, 1893, p p . 440461. " T h e Liberal a n d the Ritschlian Theology of Germany." 96. Ed. "Divinity of Christ," X V I I I , p. 270. 97. Ibid., p. 271. 98. Ibid., p. 263. 99. Ibid., p. 272. 100. Ante., p. 175. 101. "Divinity of Christ," X V I I I , p. 393102. E.G. Ed. "A C o n t r i b u t i o n to Christian Theology f r o m the Philosophy of History," A. R., XIV, 1890, pp. 640-644. T h i s is a n o t e on Lotze's Philosophy of History as developed in Microcosmus. Bk. 7, Chap. 2. Die Meinung History. " T h e doctrine of a Christian judgment in which the issue of h u m a n history is to be determined by relationship to H i m who is its principle a n d goal, is the counterpart in revelation and for Christian faith of the view so effectively presented by Lotze as the teaching of a true philosophy of history." p. 643. 103. " T h e Divinity of Christ," X V I I I , P- 393104. Ibid., p. 394. 105. Ibid., pp. 397-398. 106. Ibid., p p . 406-407. 107. Ibid., p. 398.

i88

Notes and

108. Gordon, G. A.: " T h e Contrast and Agreement Between the New Orthodoxy and the Old," A . R., X I X , 1893, pp. 1-18. p. 14. 109. "Divinity of Christ," VII. " T h e Satisfaction of Humanity in Jesus Christ," X I X , pp. 78-86. T u c k e r indicates in his autobiography his authorship of this

References last paper in the series. This quotation, p. 79. 110. Ibid., p. 81. 111. Ibid., 84. A similar position is taken by C. A. Beckwith in " T h e Place of Christ in Modern Thought," A. R „ X I X , 1893, pp. 385-409.

CHAPTER SIX

1. E. G. Lewis French Stearns in The Evidence of Christian Experience, p. 366. "Today Christianity is the power which is moulding the destinies of the world. T h e Christian nations are in the ascendant. Just in proportion to the purity of Christianity as it exists in the various nations of Christendom is the influence they are exerting upon the world's destiny. T h e future of the world seems to be in the hands of the three great Protestant powers—England, Germany, and the United States. T h e old promise is being fulfilled: the followers of the true God are inheriting the world." 2. Beard, Charles A. and Mary: The Rise of American Civilization, Part II. 3. Gladden, Washington: "Christianity and Aestheticism," A. R., I, 1884, pp. 13-24. 4. Barrows, William: "Commerce, Civilization and Christianity in their Relations to Each Other," A. R., IV, 1885, pp. 317-332. p. 33 1 5. G o r d o n , G e o r g e A . : " T h e Preacher as Interpreter," A. R., VI, 1886, pp. 225-239. p. 238.

6. Ed. " T h e Spirit of Expectancy," A. R., X V , 1891, pp. 426-430. p. 426. Ed. "Christianity and Its Modern Competitors." T h e series will be found as follows: I. " T h e Moral Evolution of Society," A. R., VI, 1886, pp. 642-658. II. "Social Ethics," A. R., VII, 1887, pp. 64-77. III. "Humanitarianism," A. R., VII, 1887, pp. 295-313. IV. " T h e Worth and Welfare of the Individual," A. R., VII, 1887, pp. 391-405. V. "Pseudo-Christianity," A. R., VII, 1887, pp. 537-548. References to this work are indicated by Ch. C. 7. Ch. C. VI, 513. 8. Ibid., p. 646. 9. Ibid., pp. 652-3. 10. Ibid., p. 653. 11. Ed. " T h e Accountability of the Ultra-Conservatives," A. R., I, 1884, pp. 653-658. p. 654. 12. Ed. " T h e Spirit of Expectancy," loc. cit., A. R., XV, p. 429. 13. Tucker, W. J.: "Some Present Questions in Evangelism," A. R., I, 1884, pp. 233-244. p. 236.

The Andover 14. Ed. "The Rate of Social Progress," A. R., XIII, 1890, pp. 426-430. p. 426. 15. Ibid., p. 429. 16. Ibid., pp. 429-430. 17. Ibid., p. 430. 18. Tucker, William J.: "The Authority of the Pulpit in a Time of Critical Research and Social Confusion," A. R „ XVI, 1891, pp. 384402. p. 385. 19. Ibid., p. 395. 20. Ibid., p. 400. 21. Ibid., p. 401. 22. Smyth, Newman: "Sermons to the Workingman." I. "Claims of Labor," A. R „ III, 1885, pp. 302-12. II. "Use and Abuse of Capital," A. R., Ill, 1885, pp. 423-436. III. "Social Helps," A. R., Ill, 1885, pp. 508-519. Introduction to the Series by William J . Tucker: "Social Problems in the Pulpit," A. R., Ill, 1885, pp. 297-302. This reference, A. R., Ill, p. 298. 23. Ibid., pp. 300-301. 24. Ibid., p. 301. 25. Ibid., p. 301. 26. Ibid., p. 300. 27. Ed. "East and West—A Religious Comparison," A. R., II, 1884, pp. 491-494. p. 493. 28. Moore, George F.: "Protestant Missions in East Africa," A. R., I, 1884, pp. 387-404. p. 403. 29. Tucker, W. J.: "Some Present Questions in Evangelism," loc. cit., p. 236. 30. P.O., p. 128. 31. Tucker, W. J.: "The Influence of the Contemporary Pulpit Upon Theology," A. R., Ill, 1885, pp. 1-14. p. 10. 32. Ibid., p. 11. 33. Ibid., p. 11.

Liberals

34. Tucker: "The Authority of the Pulpit," XVI, p. 399. 35. Ibid., p. 385. 36. Ed. "Revelation and Redemption," A. R „ XVIII, 1892, pp. 263272. pp. 267-268. 36A. A. R „ VII, P- 3°737. Ibid., VI, p. 650. 38. Ibid., VII, p. 304. 39. Ed. "Revelation and Redemption," A. R „ XVIII, p. 268. 40. Ch. C., VII, p. 401. 41. Rev. and Red., XVIII, p. 268. 42. Ch. C„ VII, p. 399. 43. Ibid., p. 400. 44. Ibid., p. 401. 45. Ibid., p. 399. 46. Ibid., p. 404. 47. Ibid., p. 402. 48. Ibid., p. 393. 49. Ibid., p. 393. 50. Ibid., pp. 401-402. 51. Ibid., p. 400. 52. Progressive Orthodoxy, p. 154. 53. Ed. "The Spirit of Expectancy," loc. cit., 15, pp. 429-430. 54. Fiske, John: The Destiny of Man, p. 25. 55. Harris, George: Review of Fiske, The Destiny of Man, A. R., Ill, 1885, pp. 82-85. p. 84. 56. Ch. C., A. R „ VI, pp. 512-513. 57. Ibid., VII, p. 74. 58. Ibid., VII, p. 308. 59. Ibid., VI, p. 648. 60. Quoted Ibid., VI, pp. 642-643. 61. Ibid., p. 647. 62. Ibid., p. 648. 63. Ibid., p. 649. 64. Ibid., p. 649. 65. Ibid., p. 654. 66. Ibid., p. 650. 67. Ibid., p. 654. 68. Ibid., VII, p. 71. 6g. Ibid., p. 306. 70. Ibid., p. 76. 71. Ibid., p. 401.

190

Notes and

72. Ibid., p. 304. 73. Ibid., VI. p. 655. 74. T u c k e r wrote in Progressive Orthodoxy of Christianity as " a n organic social force entering into every relation and diffusing itself through every influence." (p. 74)

References B u t this was a very unusual remark in this early period. 75. Ch. C „ V I I , pp. 304-5. 76. Ibid., VI, p. 653. 77. Ed. " T h e Spirit of Expectancy," loc. cit. X V , p. 430. 78. Chapter One.

C H A P T E R SEVEN

1. Dike, Samuel W . : "Sociological Notes," A. R „ V, 1886, pp. 3 1 1 319. 1886, pp. 97-103. 2. Ely, Richard T . : "Socialism," A. R „ V, 1886, pp. 146-153. Scudder, Vida: "Socialism and S p i r i t u a l Progress—A S p e c u l a tion," A. R., X V I , 1891, pp. 49-67. 3. Dana, Malcolm: " A New Chair," A. R „ X V I , 1891, pp. 872-278. 4. Ed. "Social Classes in American Politics," A. R „ I, 1884, pp. 76-79. p. 78. 5. Ed. "Social Classes and the Church," A. R., II, 1884, pp. 2902 97- P- «936. Ibid., p. 292. 7. Ch. C., Full ref. in notes to chap. 6, A. R „ V I I , p. 305. 8. Ed. "Social Classes and the Church," loc. cit., II, p. 292. 9. Ibid., p. 292. 10. Ibid., pp. 293 ff. 1 1 . Ibid., p. 297. 12. Ibid., p. 297. 13. Ed. "Social Classes in American Politics," A. R „ I, pp. 78-79. 14. Ed. " T h e Signs of Spiritual Energy in the Church," A. R., V, 1886, pp. 291-29G. p. 295. 15. Woodward, W . E.: A New American History, p. 629. 16. Ed. " T h e Centralization of Lab o r , " A. R., V, 1886, pp. 529-532. p. 530.

17. 18. 19.

20.

21. 22.

23.

24. 25.

26.

27. 28.

29.

Ibid., p. 532. Ibid., p. 532. Ed. "Social Classes in American Politics," loc. cit., I, p. 76. Cf. Ed. " T h e Centralization of L a b o r , " loc. cit., V, p. 532. T u c k e r , W i l l i a m J . : Review of Contemporary Socialism by J o h n R a e . (N. Y. 1884) A. R „ I I , 1884, pp. 621-2. p. 622. Ed. " T h e Moral U n d e r t o n e , " A. R „ X V , 1891, pp. 546-549. p. 549. Ed. " T h e Waste in Preaching," A. R., X I I I , 1890, pp. 543-550- P548. T u c k e r , W . J . : " T h e Authority of the Pulpit in a T i m e of Critical Research and Social Confusion," A. R „ X V I , 1891, pp. 364-402. p. 395Ibid., p. 399. E d . " Socialism U n d e r Democracy," A. R., X I I , 1889, pp. 205-214. p. 213. T u c k e r , W . J . : " T h e Gospel of W e a l t h , " A. R „ X V , 1891, pp. 631-645. p. 638. Ibid., pp. 637-639. Ed. "Socialism Under Democracy," A. R . , X I I , 1889, pp. 205-14. p. 213-14. T u c k e r , William J . : The New Movement in Humanity from Liberty to Unity, pamphlet, p. 14.

The Andover Liberals 30. Ed. "Socialism Under Democracy," loc. cit., X I I , p. 207. 3 1 . Ibid., p. 207. 32. Tucker: The New Movement in Humanity, p. 15. 33. Tucker: "Authority of the Pulpit," X V I , p. 400. 34. Ed. " T h e Future of American Politics," loc. cit., I X , p. 418. 35. Carnegie, Andrew: The Gospel of Wealth. Quoted by Tucker, " T h e Gospel of Wealth," A. R., X V . p. 633. T h e italics which Tucker introduced are omitted. 36. Tucker: " T h e Gospel of Wealth," loc. cit., p. 637. 37. Ibid., p. 634. 38. Ibid., p. 640. 39. An outline of the topics treated in the course is given by Tucker under the title "Social Economics, No. I. T h e Outline of an Elective Course of Study," A. R., X I , 1889, pp. 85-89. 40. Tucker: " T h e Gospel of Wealth," A. R., X V , pp. 643-645. 4 1 . Tucker: "Social Economics," A. R., X I I , p. 437. 42. Tucker: "Authority of the Pulpit," X V I , p. 398. 43. Ed. " T h e Social Value of the Time Gained by the Eight Hour Movement," A. R., 1890, X I I I , pp. 661-664. p. 664. 44. Ed. "Socialism Under Democracy," X I I , pp. 210 ff. 45. Tucker: " T h e Gospel of Wealth," X V , p. 64346. Ed." Socialism Under Democracy," X I I , p. 212. 47. Gronlund, Laurence: The Cooperative Commonwealth, Chap. 12. 48. Ed. "Socialism Under Democracy," X I I , p. 212. 49. Tucker: " T h e Gospel of Wealth," X V , p. 640. 50. Ibid., p. 640.

19»

5 1 . Adams: The March of Democracy, Vol. II, p. 214. 52. Ed. " T h e Impending Question in the Industrial World," A. R „ X V I I I , 1892, pp. 272-278. p. 273. 53. Ibid., p. 278. 54. E.g. Tucker: My Generation, (1919). A quotation from " T h e Crux of the Peace Problem," printed in the Atlantic Monthly, April, 1916. "War, in itself, essentially evil, may acquire moral character as the instrumentality for serving a righteous cause." pp. 430-1. Tucker spoke of America's entrance into the war as the most effective of all peace movements. 55. Swift, Morrison I.: " T h e WorkingPopulation of Cities, and What the Universities Owe Them," A. R „ X I I I , 1890, pp. 589-613. 56. Scudder, Vida D.: " T h e Place of College Settlements," A. R „ X V I I I , 1892, pp. 339-350. p. 340. 57. Ed. " T h e Readjustment of City Churches," A. R „ I X , 1888, pp. 76-7958. Ibid., p. 79. 59. Loomis, S. L.: Modern Cities and Their Religious Problems. Lectures at Andover. 60. Dickinson, Charles A.: "The Problems of the Modern City Church," A. R., X I I , 1889, pp. 355-37261. Ibid., p. 369. 62. T h e letter appears in full in The Review, X V I I , 1892, pp. 85-6. 63. Woods, Eleanor H.: Robert A. Woods. Champion of Democracy. p. 47. 64. Ed. "Social Christianity—The Andover House Association." A. R., X V I I , 1892, pp. 82-88. Contains the articles of Association, pp. 8788. This quotation, p. 83.

192

Notes and

65. Ed. "Social Christianity—The Andover House Association," loc. cit., pp. 86-87. 66. Woods, R . A.: " T h e University Settlement Idea," A . R „ XVIII, 189«, pp. 317-339. p. 3*3. 67. Woods, " T h e University Settlement Idea," X V I I I , pp. 330-1.

CHAPTER

1. See for example John Bennett: " A Changed Liberal But Still a Liberal," Christian Century. Vol. L V I , No. 6, pp. 179-181. Feb. 8, »9392. A u b r e y : Present Theological Tendencies, pp. 42-43, 58-9. 3. I take the following to be among the typical contemporary statements of liberal Christianity in America: Calhoun, R . L.: God and the Common Life. Brightman, E. S.: The Problem of God. Is God a Person. Harkness, Georgia: The Recovery of Ideals. Horton, Walter M.: Realistic Theology. Lyman, E. W.: The Meaning and Truth of Religion. T h e Hazen books offer a convenientstatementof Christian thought from the liberal point of view. 4. Bury, J. B.: The Idea of Progress, p. viii. 5. Smyth, Egbert: " T h e T r u e Use of the World; Three Types of the Christian Life," A. R., X V , 1891,

References 68. Ibid., p. 336. 69. Scudder, Vida D.: " T h e Place of College Settlements," A . R., X V I I I , 1892, pp. 339-350. p. 34*. 70. Ibid., p. 347. 71. Woods, Eleanor A.: Biography of R. A. Woods. Quoted, p. 83.

EIGHT

6.

7.

8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

13.

pp. 510-525. " T h e true use of the world is, not merely to rise above it, not chiefly to gain its discipline, but to save it." Bury; op. cit., p. 2. T h i s is a slight rewording of Bury's definition of progress. A qualification of Andover's position has been omitted from this summary as having been insufficiently developed and aside from the main line of Andover thought. It is the later tendency to a Ritschlian position that Christ is not to be interpreted in terms of metaphysical categories, but only as the fulfiller of the moral law and founder of the church. See e.g. Dewey, John: A Common Faith. Brunner: The Mediator. Part one. Bury: op. cit., p. 218. See Niebuhr: Moral Man and Immoral Society. Ed. " T h e Prospect of Theological Unity," A. R., XIII, 1890, pp. 6974Phelps, E. S.: Austin Phelps, pp. 176-177.

BIBLIOGRAPHY CHAPTER O N E

General Works Bendey, William: The Diary of William Bentley. 4 vols. Salem, Mass., 1905. Darling, Arthur B.: "Jacksonian Democracy in Massachusetts," American Historical Review. Vol. X X I X , pp. 871-287. Dexter, H. M.: Congregationalism of the last three hundred years as Seen in Its Literature. N. Y „ Harpers, 1880. Fisher, George Park: History of Christian Doctrine. Vol. 4. International Theological Library. N. Y., 1896. Part III, Period V. Chapter two. Foster, Frank Hugh: A Genetic History of the New England Theology. N. Y., 1907. Meyer, Jacob C.: Church and State in Massachusetts from 1740 to 1883. Cleveland, 1930. Robinson, William A.: Jeffersonian Democracy in New England. New Haven, 1916. Turner: T h e United States 1830-1850. N. Y „ Holt, 1935. Walker, George Leon: Some Aspects of the Religious Life of New England. Boston, 1897. Walker, Williston: A History of the Congregational Church in the United States. N. Y., Scribners, 1916. : T e n New England Leaders. N. Y., 1901. : Theological Changes of a Quarter Century. Twenty-fifth anniversary of installation of George A. Gordon. Boston, 1909. Haroutunian, Joseph: Piety vs. Moralism. N. Y., Holt, 1932. : T h e National Cyclopedia of American Biography. N. Y., 1896. Biographies of most of the Andover Professors. History of Andover Seminary Bacon, Leonard: A Commemorative Discourse on the Completion of Fifty Years from the Founding of the Theological Seminary at Andover. Pamphlet, Andover, 1858. Bartol, C. A.: T h e Andover's Bottle's Burst. A Sermon. Boston, 1882. Morse, James K.: Jedidiah Morse, A Champion of New England Orthodoxy. N. Y., 1939. Rowe, Henry K.: History of Andover Theological Seminary. Newton, Mass. »933Williams, Thomas: The Catechism of Westminster Assembly the Standard of New England Theology and the Doctrinal Foundation of the Andoverian Seminary. Pamphlet. Providence, 1858. Woods, Leonard: History of the Andover Theological Seminary. Boston, 1884. Works of Andover Professors and Relevant Material Woods, Leonard: A Survey of the State of Congregational Churches in Massachusetts. Panoplist. Vol. II. 1806. Article over Woods' editorial signature of "Pastor."

»94

Bibliography

: Works. Five vols. N. Y., Dodd, 1849. Includes Theological Lectures, Letters to Unitarians; Letters to Rev. Nathaniel W. Taylor; Letter to Mahan. : Letters to Unitarians. Andover, 1822. 2nd ed. : Lectures on Church Government. N. Y., Turner, 1844. Porter, Ebeneezer: Letters on the Religious Revivals which Prevailed about the Beginning of the Present Century. Boston, 1858. Originally written for the Andover revival Association, 1832. : T h e Fatal Effects of Ardent Spirits. A Sermon. Hartford, 1 8 1 1 . : T h e Magnitude of the Preacher's Work. A Sermon. Andover, 1815. : T h e Character of Nehemiah, or Jerusalem Built Up. Andover, 1816. Porter, Ebeneezer: A Sermon Delivered September 22, 1818 at the Dedication of the New Edifice Erected for the Use of the Theological Seminary in Andover, Andover, 1818. : Unity of Ministerial Influence. A Sermon. Andover, 1827. : T h e Christian Citizen; or the Duty of Praying for Rulers, two sermons preached at Andover, 1831. Stuart, Moses: Essay on the Prize Question Whether the Use of Distilled Liquors, or Traffic in Them is Compatible, at the Present Time, with Making a Profession of Christianity, N. Y., 1830. Pamphlet. : Exegetical Essays on Several Words Relating to Future Punishment, 1830. : "Critical Examination of Passages in Genesis 1; with Remarks on Difficulties that Attend some of the Present Modes of Geological Reasoning," Biblical Repository and Quarterly Observer, Vol. VII, 1836, pp. 46-106. : "Have the Sacred Writers Anywhere Asserted that the Sin or Righteousness of One is Imputed to Another?," Biblical Repository and Quarterly Observer (April, 1836), pp. 241-330. : Miscellanies, Andover, 1846. Includes the letters to Channing. : Critical History and Defense of the Old Testament Canon, N. Y., 1849. : Conscience and the Constitution: with Remarks on the Recent Speech of the Honorable Daniel Webster in the Senate of the United States on the Subject of Slavery, Boston, 1850. Pamphlet. : Letters, Andover, 1819. (On Stuart see also) Park, Edwards A.: Sermons, pp. 179-217. Jay, William: Reply to Remarks of the Rev. Moses Stuart on Hon. John Jay, and an Examination of His Scriptural Exegesis Contained in His Recent Pamphlet entided: Conscience and the Constitution, N. Y., 1850. Pamphlet. Stowe, Calvin E.: The Right Interpretation of the Sacred Scriptures; T h e Helps and Hindrances, Andover, 1853. Inaugural Discourse, 1852. Phelps, Amos A.: Letters to Professor Stowe and Dr. Bacon. On God's Real Method with Great Social Wrongs in Which the Bible is Vindicated from Grossly Erroneous Interpretations, N. Y., 1848. Phelps, Austin: Three Articles: "Conversion—its Nature;" "Regeneration— the Work of God;" "Human Responsibility as Related to Divine Agency;" Bibliotheca Sacra, Vol. X X I I I (1866), pp. 48-73, 286-308, 645-672. : Christian Character a Power in the Redemption of the World, Andover, 1854. Sermon.

The Andover

Liberals

195

: My Portfolio, N. Y„ 1882. : T h e Relation of the Bible to the Civilization of the Future. In Christianity and Skepticism, Boston, 1871. Phelps, Elizabeth Stuart: Austin Phelps, a Memoir. N. Y., 1891. Park, Edwards A.: The Theology of the Intellect and T h a t of the Feelings, Andover, 1850. : T h e Associate Creed of Andover Theological Seminary, Boston, 1883. Pamphlet. : "The Imprecatory Psalms Viewed in the Light of the Southern Rebellion," Bibliotheca Sacra. Vol. XIX (1862), pp. 165-210. : Discourses on Some Theological Doctrines as Related to the Religious Character, Andover, Draper, 1885. : Memorial Collection of Sermons, Boston, Pilgrim Press, 1902. : Article in Smith's Bible Dictionary on Miracles. : Article in the Schaff-Hertzog Encyclopedia on The New England Theology. (Park was one time editor of Bibliotheca Sacra in which he published numerous articles including his "Memoir on Emmons" and "Memoir on Edwards." T h e controversy with Professor Hodge appeared in part in this journal. Foster's Life of Park gives the Bibliography of the controversy in full. p. 155.) Foster, Frank H.: The Life of Edwards Amasa Park, N. Y., 1936. Storrs, R. S.: Professor Park and His Pupils, Boston, 1899. Dana, Daniel: "A Remonstrance Addressed to the Trustees of Phillips Academy, on the State of the Theological Seminary under Their Care," 1849. In a volume of pamphlets The Andover Controversy, Boston (1853). Lord, Nathan: A Letter to the Rev. Daniel Dana, D. D. on Professor Park's Theology of New England, Boston, 1852. Cooke, Parsons: The Condition of the Congregational Board of Publication Set Forth in a Protest Against a Recent Vote of Its Executive Committee, Boston, 1856. Barrows, E. P.: "The Bible and Slavery," Bibliotheca Sacra (July, 1862). : Articles in Bibliotheca Sacra on "Revelation and Inspiration" concluding in July, 1872. Shedd, W. G. T.: Discourses and Essays, Andover, 1856. Taylor, John L.: How Shall We Provide the Ministry that We Need, Andover, 1858. Smyth, Egbert C.: Value of the Study of Church History in Ministerial Education, Andover, 1874. Gulliver, John P.: Christianity and Science, Andover, 1850. Inaugural Address, 1879. Harris, George Y.: "The Rational and Spiritual Verification of Christian Doctrine," Christian Union (June 14, 1883), Inaugural Address. Editorial in Christian Union (June 14, 1883), "Andover Seminary," p. 466. Fiske, Daniel T.: The Creed of Andover Theological Seminary, 2nd ed. Boston, 1887. Robbins, Sarah Stuart: Old Andover Days, Boston, 1908. Holmes, Oliver Wendell: Pages from an Old Volume of Life, Boston, 1891. (P- »49)

ig6

Bibliography

Other Works Boardman, G. N.: A History of New England Theology, N. Y., 1899. Bushnell, Horace: God in Christ, Hartford, 1852. Contains "Dogma and Spirit," address at Andover, 1848. Harris, Samuel: "The Demands of Infidelity Satisfied by Christianity," Bibliotheca Sacra, Vol. XIII (1856), pp. 272-314. Platner, J . Winthrop: "The Congregationalists," paper in The Religious History of New England, Cambridge (1917). Smyth, Egbert C.: The Andover Heresy, Boston, 1887. Taylor, N. W.: Moral Government, N. Y„ 1859. Tucker, William J.: The Making and Unmaking of the Preacher, Boston, 1898. Wright, G. F.: "Recent Works Bearing on the Relation of Science to Religion," articles in Bibliotheca Sacra from 1875 to 1880. Article 5 was "Some Analogies Between Calvinism and Darwinism," Vol. XXXVII, pp. 49-74. The Andover Trial Arguments on Behalf of the Complainants in the Andover Case in the Matter of the Complaint Against Egbert C. Smyth. Argument of Rev. J . W. Wellmann. The Question at Issue in the Andover Case. Arguments of Rev. J . W. Wellmann and Orpheus T. Panphear. Prepared for Board of Visitors Hearing, Sept. 11, 1892. Boston, 1893. The Andover Trial, Professor Smyth's Argument with the statements of Professors Tucker, Harris, Hincks, and Churchill, Boston, 1887. Evans, Daniel: The Subscription to the Andover Seminary Creed Required by the Decision of the Supreme Judicial Court for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 1927. CHAPTER

TWO

The Andover Review., A Religious and Theological Monthly. Published in Boston by Houghton Mifflin and Company. Nineteen Volumes. The first number appeared in January 1884. The last number was published for NovemberDecember 1893. The review appeared monthly until 1893, during which year it was published every other month. An index to the first ten volumes was published. The editors of the Review were Egbert C. Smyth, William J . Tucker, J. W. Churchill, George Harris, and Edward Y. Hincks, professors in Andover Theological Seminary. Drummond, Henry: Natural Law in the Spiritual World. N. Y., 1890. Gordon, George A.: My Education and Religion. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, >925Gulliver, J . P.: Inaugural Lecture at Andover, 1878. Harris, George: Moral Evolution. Boston, 1899. Johnson, F. H.: What is Reality. Boston, 1891. LeConte, Joseph: Evolution, Its Nature, Its Evidences, and Its Relation to Religious Thought. Second edition, 1894. N. Y., 1888. : "God and Connected Problems in the Light of Evolution." A paper published in Howison, The Conception of God, N. Y., 1897. pp. 65-78.

The Andover

Liberals

»97

Mivart, St. George Jackson: O n Genesis of Species. London, 1871. Spencer, Herbert: First Principles. Fourth edition. N. Y., Burt, 1880. CHAPTER

The Andover

THREE

Review

Bixby, James T . : T h e Crisis in Morals. Boston, 1891. Dole, Charles F.: T h e Coming People. N. Y., 1897. : T h e Smoke and the Flame. Boston, 1902. Johnson, Francis H.: What is Reality. Boston and N. Y., 1891. Spencer, Herbert: T h e Data of Ethics. N. Y., 1887. Stephen, Leslie: Science of Ethics. N. Y., 1882. Tucker, William J.: My Generation. Boston and N. Y., 1919. CHAPTER

FOUR

Allen, Alexander V. G.: T h e Continuity of Christian Thought. Boston, 1884. Briggs, Charles A.: Whither? A Theological Question for the Times, N. Y., 1890. Buckham, John Wright: Progressive Religious Thought in America. Boston and N . Y . , 1919. Dorner, I. A.: Entwicklungsgeschichte der Lehre von der Person Christi. (1856) Eng. trans. History of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ. Edin. 1868. : System der Christlichen Glaubenslehre. (1879-81) 2nd ed. Berlin, 1886. Eng. trans. System of Christian Doctrine. 4 vols. Edin. 1883-85. : T h e Future State. N. Y., 1883. Eng. trans, of eschatology from the System. : Christlichen Sittenlehre. 1886. Eng. Trans, by Mead of Andover and Cunningham. "System of Christian Ethics." N. Y., 1887. Reviewed by W . H . Cobb, Bib. Sac. (1883), pp. 374 ff. Munger, Theodore T.: " T h e Freedom of Faith." Boston, 1883. First essay, The New Theology. Pfleiderer, Otto: T h e Development of Theology in Germany since Kant and its Progress in Great Britain since 1825. Eng. trans. London, 1890. pp. 156164 on Dorner. Smyth, Newman: T h e Religious Feeling. N. Y., 1877. : Old Faiths in New Light. N. Y „ 1879. : T h e Orthodox Theology of Today. N. Y., 1881. CHAPTER

FIVE

Foster, Frank H.: T h e Modern Movement in American Theology. N. Y., 1939. Green, T . H.: Prolegomena to Ethics. 4th ed. Oxford, 1899. Harnack, Adolph: Outlines of the History of Dogma. Eng. trans. N. Y., 1893. Harris, George: Moral Evolution. Boston, 1899. Hatch, Edwin: T h e Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church. London, 1892. 4th ed. Lotze, H.: Microcosmus. Eng. trans. N. Y., 1885. Patton, Carl: " T h e Perplexed Student." Chicago Theological Seminary Register. Vol. XVIII, No. 2 (March 1928), pp. 5-10.

i98

Bibliography

Reid, Thomas: Works. Charlestown. 1815. Ritschl, Albrecht: T h e Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation. N. Y., 1900. Smyth, E. C.: "From Lessing to Schleiermacher or from Rationalism to Faith," in Christianity and Skepticism. Boston, 1870. Stearns, Lewis French: T h e Evidence of Christian Experience. N. Y., Scribners, 1890. Ward, Mrs. Humphrey: Robert Elsmere. 1888. CHAPTER

SIX

Bury, J. B.: T h e Idea of Progress. London, 1920. Fiske, John: T h e Destiny of Man. Boston, 1895. Beard, Charles A. and Mary: T h e Rise of American Civilization. N. Y., 19*7. C H A P T E R SEVEN

Adams, James T . : T h e March of Democracy. Vol. 2, N. Y., 1933. Bellamy, Edward: Looking Backward, 2000-1887. Mem. ed. Boston, 1898. Carnegie, Andrew: " T h e Gospel of Wealth." First printed in June and December numbers of the North American Review. (1889). Later published under the above title in the Pall Mall Gazette and in New York. (1900). Dombrowski, James: T h e Early Days of Christian Socialism in America. N. Y., 1938George, Henry: Progress and Poverty. N. Y „ 1879. Gronlund, Laurence: T h e Cooperative Commonwealth. Rev. ed. Boston, 1890. Loomis, S. L.: Modern Cities and Their Religious Problems. N. Y., 1887. Rae, John: Contemporary Socialism. Rev. ed. N. Y., 1898. Scudder, Vida D.: On Journey. Autobiography. N. Y., 1937. Tucker, W. J.: T h e New Movement in Humanity from Liberty to Unity. Boston and N. Y., 1892. Pamphlet. Woods, Eleanor H.: Robert Archey Woods, Champion of Democracy. N. Y., '929Woods, Robert Archey: English Social Movements. N. Y., 1891. Woodward, W. E.: A New American History. N. Y., 1936. CHAPTER

EICHT

Aubrey, E. E.: Present Theological Tendencies. N. Y., 1936. Barth, Karl: Credo. Munchen. 1935. : T h e Knowledge of God and the Service of God According to the Teaching of the Reformation. N. Y., 1939. Bennett, John: Social Salvation. N. Y „ 1935. Brunner, Emil: T h e Mediator. N. Y., 1934. Eng. trans. Bury, J. B.: T h e Idea of Progress. London, 1921. Calhoun, R. L.: God and the Common Life. N. Y., 1935. Dewey, John: Experience and Nature. N. Y., 1925. : A Common Faith. New Haven, 1934. Harkness, Georgia: T h e Recovery of Ideals. N. Y., 1937. Horton, Walter M.: Realistic Theology. N. Y., 1934.

The Andover Liberals

>99

: Contemporary English Theology. N. Y., 1936. : Contemporary Continental Theology. N. Y., 1938. Lyman, E. W.: The Meaning and Truth of Religion. N. Y „ 1933. Niebuhr, Reinhold: Moral Man and Immoral Society. N. Y., 1936. Oxford Conference Publication: The Kingdom of God and History. Chicago, '938. Phelps, Elizabeth Stuart: Austin Phelps. N. Y „ 1891. Wieman, H. N.: The Growth of Religion, with W. M. Horton. Part II. Chicago, 1938.

INDEX American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, 9, 23, 66-67 Andover House, 149-154 Andover Review, 1, use of in this study, 31-32, 65; first number of, 64-65; editorials of, 65; Notes on German Thought, 95; a n d 19th c e n t u r y thought, 1 1 5 - 1 1 6 ; social problems in, 134; and University Settlements, 149 Andover Theological Seminary, founding of, 1-7; founders, 4, 7-8; Creed of, 5-6, 9, 13, 27-28; discussion over chair of Prof. Park, 28; heresy trials referred to, 29, 171, criticism of New Theology of, 76; new chair of Social Economics, 144-145; establishment of Andover House, 153-154 Atonement, doctrine of, 21, 68-76, 78, 112, 162 Barrows, William, 115 Benedict, W . R., 34, 42 Biblical Criticism, in early Andover, 1718, 21; in Hegelian schools, 15; new criticism in Andover, 27, 94; crisis in, 97-105. See also Stuart, Moses Bibliotheca Sacra, 15, 26-27 Bixby, James T., 49-52, 57 Bowne, Borden P., 32, 39, 185 Brewster, Chauncey B., 53-54, 57 Bryce, James, view of progress criticized by Andover, 118-119 Buckham, J o h n Wright, 44 Bushnell, Horace, Dogma and Spirit, address at Andover, 21 Calvinism, nineteenth century, characterized, 1-14, 31, 156, 170; and evolution, 82; social ideals of, 114; Andover's departure from, 48, Chap. IV, 132-133; on fate of heathen, see Future Probation; neo-Calvinism of F. H . Johnson, 60-63 Carnegie, Andrew, The Gospel of Wealth, W. J. Tucker's criticism, 143-144 Christian Consciousness, Andover theory of, 85-93, 99 Christianity and its Competitors, Andover editorials, 128-132, 136 Christology, first liberal interpretation

of at Andover, 22, 67-68, 76-81, 94, 98; later version of, 100-113, 125, 162, 1 7 1 172; of F. H . Johnson, 61-63. See also Atonement Church, the Christian, Jesus as founder of, 108-109, 1 1 2 - 1 1 3 ; as Kingdom of God, 124; and social reform, 132, 135136. 153-154. 157, 167-169; institutional, 150

Churchill, J. W., editor of Andover Review, 31, 79 Clarke, William B., 89-90 Coleridge, S. T „ 92 Common sense school of philosophy, 8890. 98 Congregationalism, New England, in early nineteenth century, 1-4; missionaries of, 9; split over Future Probation, 66-67 Cooley, William Forbes, 44 Dana, Dr. Daniel, 22 Darwinism, 26-28, 32, 36-37, 49, 54, 5657, 74, 129-130, 159. See also Evolution Development, idea of, definition of, 157160; and doctrine of Man, 164; and progress, 166-167, a n d Christian doctrine, 27, 64-65, 73-74, 86, 91, 100-101, 158, 171, 173-175. See also Evolution Dewey, John, 33-34, 38, 43, 54-57 Dickinson, Charles, 150 Divinity of Jesus Christ, Andover editorials on, 105-113 Dogma, Andover's attitude toward, 27, 64-65, Chap. V. esp. 93-96 Dole, Charles F., 52-53 Dorner, I. A., 66, 88, 92-93, 184, 187 Drummond, Henry, 32, 59 Dwight, Timothy, 2 Economic problems, panic and depression, 115; in cities, 1 1 7 - 1 1 8 ; industrial unrest, 120, 123, Andover's attitude toward, Chap. VII, and social gospel, 157 Edwards, Jonathan, 2, 86-87, 93. >53 Edwards, Justin, 23 Ely, Richard T., 134, 138 Eschatology, Andover's. See Future Probation, Progress Ethics, norms of, 49-59, 68-76, 159; and

The Andover Liberals

201

Christ, 103-104, U2,128-130; social, 142149, 160, 170, 175, 163-165 Evil, problem of, philosophical solutions, 43-44, 51; in liberal theology, 45, 169170 Evolution, 32, 33, 47-48, 61, 82, 108-109, 129-130, 157-159, and ethics, Chap. I l l

Immanence of God, see God, idea of Immortality, idea of, 37, 44, 59-60, 126, 131-132, 162, 175-176. See also Future Probation Individualism, in Calvinism, 23-25; and the Social Gospel, 122-123, 127, 140-142, 167; economic, 134-136, 139, 160, 163

Fiske, John, 32, 43, 127-129, 174 Forgiveness, man's need of, 62, 71, 79, 81-82, 161 Foster, Frank H., 19, 21, 84-85, 93 Frank, F. H. R., 92-93 Future Probation, doctrine of, 65-67, 7177, 86-87, >83

Johnson, F. H., defense of personalism, 34-36, criticism of Darwinism, 36; argument for existence of God, 40-42; on ethical norms and evolution, 58-59; on salvation, 60-63

Genung, George F., 42-43 Gladden, Washington, 115 God, in Calvinism, 31, liberal interpretation of, 44-45, 83, 161; transcendence and immanence of, 67-68, 77-79. 81-82, 106, 110-111, 147, 149, 154, 160-162, 165166, 169-170; knowledge of existence of, 1 75- 1 7 6 - See a l s o 32 33. 38-43. 59' Revelation Gordon, George A., 45-46, 112, 116 Gronlund, Laurence, 145-146 Gulliver, John P., 27-28 Hale, Edward E., 49 Harnack, Adolph, 95-96 Harris, George, inaugural address at Andover, 28-29; editor of Andover Review, 31; on existence of God, 43; on atonement, 68-71, 73, 74-76; on The Christian Consciousness, 85-93, 185; on Christology, 103-104 Harris, Samuel, 15-16, 42 Harvard University, 3 Hegel, G. W. F., 88, 159 Hincks, Edward Y „ editor of Andover Review, 31; on Biblical criticism, 97100, 102-103 History, interpretation of, W. G. T . Shedd, 10; F. H. Johnson, 61; as conflict of good and evil, 45; on Andover's see Progress Hopkins, Mark, 44 Hopkinsianism, 3-7, 82-83, 156, 158, 162 Hume, David, 39, 41 Hyslop, J. H., 56-58 Idealism, German, its influence on American theology, 15, 42, 88, 92

Kant, Immanuel, concept of reason, 3940; 125, 131; Kantian ethics, 49, 125, 131 Kingdom of God, Andover conception of, 124-134,165-170; redefinition of needed, 148-149, 151 Knowledge, religious, see Christian Consciousness, Religious Experience, Reason LeConte, Joseph, 37-38 Liberalism, theological, roots of, 155-160; spirit of, 44-46, 91, 132-133, 154; and total depravity, 48; and traditional doctrine, 64-65, 80-81, 84-85, 105; doctrine of salvation, 74, 163-165, and social gospel. Chap. VI; and optimism, 155; and idea of development, 158; and progress, 165-170; and religious knowledge, 170-176, 113; critical analysis of. Chap. VIII Loomis, Samuel L., 150 Lotze, Hermann, 110, 187 Love, Christian, see Ethics Mabie, Hamilton Wright, 45-46 McGiffert, Arthur C., 95 Man, doctrine of, Andover's, Chap. IV, 122-123, 159-165; in Calvinism, 7-9; freedom of, 34-38, 41 Mead, Charles M., 27-28 Missions, Andover's relation to, 9; effect on theology, 65-67; on social theology, 122, 151, 156-157. See also Future Probation Mivart, St. George, 36 Modern Movement in American Theology, F. H. Foster, 84-85 Moore, George Foote, 100-110, 122 Morse, Jedidiah, 4 Murdock, James, 17

202

Index

Naturalism, 60, 108, 1 1 1 , 165, 169, 174-176 O p t i m i s m , in n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y thought, 29, 43-46, 52-55, 58, 63, 67, 74, 81-82, 108, 1 1 5 - 1 2 1 , 132-133, 147, 149, 152, 155-156, 159-160, 163-165, 166-168. See also Progress Palmer, Frederic, 76-79 Park, Edwards A., Andover professor, 1, theology characterized, 19; The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings, 19-21; 25-26; retires, 28; criticism of new faculty, 29; 64; on future probation, 77 Patton, Francis L „ 88, 90 Peabody, Francis G „ 27, 39-40 Personalism, in religious philosophy, 324 1 , 108 Phelps, Austin, 8, 25; quoted, 170 Politics, Christianity and, Calvinist attitude toward, 1 0 - 1 1 , 22-26, Andover's changing conception of, 1 1 8 , 138, 145 Porter, Ebenezer, Letters on Revivals, 89, 1 0 - 1 1 , 14 Progress, idea of, enters New England theology, 15-16, 29; criticism of in 1850's, 14-15; significance of for theology, 3 1 , 57-58; 155-160; related to evolution, 49, 50-52; American faith in, 48-49, 53; and doctrine of redemption, 68-70, 74; Andover's belief in, 1 1 6 - 1 1 8 , 165-170; distinctions concerning, 1181 1 9 , 126-133, '43- >47- W 6 « » ; means of bringing about, 1 1 7 - 1 3 3 , 145, 148149, 150-154 Progressive Orthodoxy, Andover editorials, 65-81, 84, 97, 122, 183 Providence, idea of, 67, 120, 147 Reason, in theology, Calvinist attitude toward, 12-13, 66; E. A. Park's use of, 19-21; proofs of God, 39-44; and ethics, 58, Chap. I l l ; Andover's use of, 80, 8788, 94-95, 103, 1 1 3 , 1 7 1 - 1 7 2 . Religious experience, 22, 42-44, 96-101, 109, 1 1 2 - 1 1 3 , 1 3 1 , 156, 158, 161-162, 165, 171-176. On Andover's view of see also Christian Consciousness. Revelation, 67-68, 89, 94, 96-97, 100-113, 1 1 1 7 " 7 3 > >75 Revivalism, 7-9, 156 Ritschlian theology, 72, 106, 108-109,

Rowe, Henry K., History Seminary, cited, 13

of

Andover

Salvation, Andover theory of, individual, 160-165, Chapter I V ; social, 1 1 4 , 1 2 1 , 127, 1 5 1 - 1 5 4 ; F. H . Johnson on, 61-63 Schleiermacher, F. D. E., 88, 92-93, 1 3 1 Science, and theology, 18, 27-28, 32, 46, 156, 158, 169, 1 7 1 - 1 7 6 . See also Darwinism, Biblical Criticism. Scriptures, see Biblical Criticism. Scudder, Vida D., 134, 14g, 152 Secularism, 14-16, 29, 80-81, 1 1 5 , 1 2 1 - 1 2 2 , 128-129, 132-133. 155-157 Shedd, YV. G . T „ 10. 92 Silver issue, Andover's reaction to, 139 Sin, Calvinist doctrine of, 5 - 1 1 , F. H. Johnson on, 59-63; Andover theology of. Chap. IV, social, 122-123, 158, 161 Slavery controversy, and Andover, 22-26 Smyth, Egbert C., inauguration, 27; on The Value of Study of Church History, 27; editor of Andover Review, 3 1 ; on theological method, 65; on optimism, 74; on transcendence, 8 1 ; on dogma, 93-97 Smyth, Newman, 28, 42, 66, 121 Social Economics, course in established in Andover Seminary, 144-145 Social Gospel, Calvinist version of, 1 0 - 1 1 ; Samuel Harris defends, 15; 29; becomes central in theology, 80, 1 1 4 , Chaps. VIV I I , 157, 160-170. See also Slavery, T r a d e Union Movement, Economic problems. Socialism, Andover's first reaction to, 135137; opposed to individualism, 142; Andover's criticism of, 145-147; linked to Anti-Slavery movement, 24 Spencer, Herbert, 33; philosophical criticisms of, 33-36, 40 : 49-52, 55, 59; the "Unknowable," 38-39, 55; reaction of Andover to, 158, 174 Spring, Samuel, 2, 4-6 Stearns, Lewis F., The Evidence of Christian Experience, 92-93, 1 1 3 , 188 Stowe, Calvin E., 15, 23 Stowe, Harriett Beecher, 25 Strike, right to, See T r a d e Union Movement Stuart, Moses, 14, 15, " T h e father of biblical learning in America," 17, at-

The Andover

Liberals

203

titude toward geology, 18; critic of "imputation" theory, 18; controversy with Channing, 19; in slavery controversy, *S*5

vidualism, 142-145, 147-148; founding of Andover House, 150-152 Tunis, John, 81-82

Taylor, Nathaniel W., 19; controversy with Leonard Woods, 12-14 Thayer, Joseph H., 27-28 Torrey, Henry A. T „ 43-44 Trade Union Movement, 115, 121, 135, 145, 151, 153-154, 167; Knights of Labor, 138-140; Homestead strika, 147 Transcendence of God, see God. Tucker, William Jewett, as student at Andover, 22; qualified acceptance of creed, 28; editor of Andover Review, 31, on social problems, 46; on Drummond; 71-72, on Holy Spirit and Christian Life, 72-73; on Christian experience. 112; on progress, 117-118, 120-121; social and economic criticism, 118, 120123, 138, 140-143; criticism of Carnegie's Gospel of Wealth, 143-144; on indi-

Unitarians, and Harvard University, «-3, attitude toward Andover, 5, 7; separation of, 16; Emerson and, 15; theology of, and Andover, 80-81, 110 University Settlement Movement, 149-154 Utilitarianism, 50, 52-53, 128 War, Christian attitude toward, 115, 119, 129, 148-149, 166-167 Ward, Mrs. Humphrey, Robert Elsmere, 101-102 Ware, Henry, 2, 17 Wilcox, Asher H., 90-91 Woods, Leonard, founding of Andover, 1-5, Professor of Theology, 6; theology of, 12-13, 17 Woods, Robert Archey, 150-154 Wright, George F., 27