The analysis of social change reconsidered: A sociological study [3rd printing, revised and enlarged ed.. Reprint 2019] 9783111345123, 9783110992526

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THE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL CHANGE RECONSIDERED

P U B L I C A T I O N S OF THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL STUDIES

SERIES MAIOR V O L U M E IV

PROCUL

CERNENS

C L A R I US

OBSERVAT

INTERNATIONAAL

INSTITUUT

V O O R SOCIALE S T U D I E N - ' S - G R A V E N H A G E 1969

THE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL CHANGE RECONSIDERED A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY by

Dr. J. A. PONSIOEN Professor of Sociology Institute of Social Studies The Hague

Third Printing Revised and Enlarged

Edition

1969

MOUTON THE H A G U E . PARIS

© Copyright 1969 Mouton & Co., Publishers, The Hague, The Netherlands. No part of this book may be translated or reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publishers. The responsibility for works published in the series "Publications of the Institute of Social Studies" rests with the authors; publication of a work in this series does not commit the Institute of Social Studies to any opinions stated therein.

First Printing: 1962 Second Printing: 1965

Printed in The Netherlands by Mouton & Co., Printers, The Hague.

NOTES ON THE THIRD EDITION

A volume on Social Change, brought out in a new edition some seven years after the first printing, can hardly remain unchanged. Societies have developed, knowledge about them has increased, and the author's own thinking has also evolved. Old theories have been revived (evolutionism) or have acquired new emphasis on social change (stratification); new theories have presented themselves (systems analysis); more clarifications have been found to be necessary (the ideal type approach), and omissions have had to be remedied (on social movements). The new section on Social Movements has been culled from my book National Development, A Sociological Contribution, also published by Mouton. The Analysis of Social Change Reconsidered has proved to be of some use in the study of social change, and it was therefore thought that this edition should be revised and expanded. The Western and nonWestern worlds are both in turmoil. However poor the results of our investigations into sociological thought on social change may seem to be, they will hopefully form the starting point for further studies which may help society to understand what is happening. This, after all, is the vocation of the sociologist. I am much indebted to Mrs. Jean Sanders for her painstaking work in editing the text of this volume. J. A. PONSIOEN

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

The swirling uncertainties of the human lot are constantly visible in births, deaths, sicknesses, accidents, defects, natural catastrophes and man-made disasters. Against this backdrop, human beings meet their needs for self-maintenance with as much foresight as they have learned. Conceptions of selfmaintenance are broad; they include maintenance of the person, of associates, and of ways of life, not only in the economic, political and familial aspects of existence but also in relation to death, to a supernatural environment, and to invisible causation. Conceptions of foresight are related to those of selfmaintenance as they evolve in our various ethnic traditions; they have led men to devote much of their energies to efforts to counteract or compensate for the processes and possibilities of change in life conditions. Guided by leaders and technicians, often of a very costly sort, a great many men try to erect stronger and stronger barriers in their minds and in their institutions against threats to their own persistence and to the persistence of the groups and ways of life they treasure. The rewards for such leaders and technicians may be costly in popular freedoms as well as in services and property. Fortunately, there are groups and even societies which have experimented with embracing at least some of the implications of change. Their leaders and technicians, as well as their patterns of thought and social institutions, are geared to democratic adaptability. Their leaders are more often facilitators than exploiters; their rewards may be adequate, but they help expand rather than contract popular freedoms. Social efforts to offset change succeed chiefly in building up pressures making for change; sooner or later they force sweeping modifications in unadapting institutions and modes of thought. History teaches little else so clearly as that humanity has assumed much and learned little about the nature of social change. Mankind has even less knowledge about how to search out the present directions and the probable future tendencies of social change, as the conflicting interpretations of econo-

8

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

mic data richly demonstrate. And it is probable that we know least about how to control processes making for and against social change. The few countries which accept to some extent the persistence of social change and build a degree of adaptability into their political and economic institutions and ways of thinking provide needed hope and guidance for all the world. I am happy to be a citizen of one such country. Social scientists agree emphatically that social change is always with us and it takes a bewildering array of guises, but they agree on little else concerning this basic characteristic of society. With selected and biased observations and reports coming to us from the past, with our own intellectual clutter of preconceptions and aspirations, we can provide ourselves with only controversial starting points for our studies of change. If we are to try to contribute, we must continually face and attempt to deal with inevitable controversy. If such points as these were to discourage sociologists from pursuing their studies of social change, there would be nothing more determinate of importance in their field to which they might turn. Perhaps that is why some sociologists find satisfaction in abstract speculations concerning "social" statistics and other aspects of methodology and in studying contrived "laboratory groups". Thus, sociology, as some of us see it, asks the scientist to exhibit a difficult and contradictory set of qualifications. As Professor Ponsioen clearly indicates in this thoughtful book, the sociologist should live as a person emotionally as well as intellectually involved in his society. At the same time, the sociologist must free himself sufficiently from social controls so that he can be an accurate observer, a critic and a diagnostician of that very society, its problems and its tendencies, in all of which he is so deeply immersed. Since my own interest in what I have called the "clinical" study of society is so similar to that of Professor Ponsioen, I share his contention that "the sociologist's goal is to prepare the ground for social therapy". In making this point, he touches a spot rubbed raw by philosophical contradictions in the mind of many a sociologist. These contradictions arise from the compulsive conviction that "sociology" should be "absolutely free from value judgments". A sociologist, like any other scientist, should be as free as possible in his work from the cultural and other social controls of his society and his social groups. This does not and should not free him from the goad of his own curiosity, from his evaluations of social processes and their significance, and from his sense of performing a service he thinks important, all of which involve "value judgments".

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

9

Sociologists have reacted to "social change" as a basic challenge of their field in three particular ways. These reactions are characterised by (1) studies of social change as a separable topic, (2) studies of change unseparated from other specific problems, and (3) ahistorical studies. At times, and this has been especially the case with those who came to sociology from history, economics or comparative cultural anthropology, sociologists have treated social change as a separable topic or aspect of their field. This has given rise to extensive literature under such labels as social evolution, social trends, and cyclical and other recurrent patterns of historical change (both short term and long term). Sociologists with a background in practical affairs have studied social change in terms of deliberate efforts at social planning, control, modification and manipulation. More recently, with the growth of studies in specific aspects of society covering various time periods, many sociologists have come to contend that social change is not a subject wisely separable from concrete studies, that the many guises of social change are best seen in specific contexts. The many sociologists in the third group mentioned appear to hope to develop an ahistorical social science, something which strikes Professor Ponsioen and myself as a warped goal. In this book, Professor Ponsioen has sought to consider critically a broad selection of both the first two types of writings on social change and to suggest in a stimulating way how their and his ideas can be brought into the beginnings of a synthesis. His proposed synthesis is a searching and not a finished or dogmatic one. It is a suggestive one on which more work is needed and to which specific research projects can contribute. He quite evidently tries to avoid attachment to any of the warring sects in sociology. The sincerity of his efforts to derive useful contributions from each theorist is refreshing. In consequence of such a constructive approach, his book is full of probing questions and suggested topics for the further development of this significant aspect of social science. Professor Ponsioen's attitude toward terms and conceptions is typical of his inquiring and stimulating treatment. He recognizes that a science with a static terminology is dead. He contends that a good sociologist should be prepared to use various sets of terms and conceptions as intellectual tools; the choice among them depends upon their utility in meeting the needs of the specific problem at hand. Few believe that social change is capricious. Social scientists generally share a confidence that the processes and directions of social change can become better known and understood. Whether this may or may not

10

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

mean the possible eventual control or at least conscious influencing of such processes and directions is another matter. From what we know of the benefits to be gained by mankind from learning to live with and in adaption to the possibilities of change, more adequate knowledge of its nature without controlling it offers enticement enough to warrant increased research attention. Professor Ponsioen's careful analyses and suggestions should do much to stimulate such attention further. Instituto di Statistica, Università degli Studi di Roma Brooklyn College of the City of New York

ALFRED MCLUNG LEE

TABLE OF

CONTENTS

NOTES ON THE THIRD EDITION

5

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

7

INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF SOCIAL CHANGE

Chapter

Chapter

.

13

I . THEORIES DEALING WITH THE DYNAMICS OF INCLUSIVE SOCIETIES AS COMPREHENSIVE WHOLES

22

A. B. C. D.

22 25 37

By way of posing two types Theories on stages in the history of societies . . The evolution theories Theories which explain the dynamics of Inclusive Society as being fundamentally a rational process

44

I I . THEORIES W H I C H U S E SPECIFIC CONCEPTS IN THE

Chapter I I I .

ANALYSIS OF DYNAMICS

48

A. Introduction: Conceptualization in science . . B. William Ogburn's theory of cultural lag . . . . C. The concepts of acculturation, adaptation, adjustment, assimilation, accommodation, integration D. The concepts of security and of institution . . . E. The concept of anomy F. The concept of equilibrium G. Society as a self-modifying communications network

48 52

THEORIES INCLUSIVE

WHICH

EXPLAIN

SOCIETIES

REGULARITIES

BY

THE

DYNAMICS

GENERAL

LAWS

55 61 65 66 68

OF OR

76

12

TABLE OF CONTENTS

A. Society as a dialectic process B. The succession of civilizations: Arnold J. Toynbee (1889-) C. The criticisms made by Pitirim Sorokin (1889-1966) Chapter I V .

THEORIES

WHICH

EXPLAIN

THE

DYNAMICS

76 81 87

OF

INCLUSIVE SOCIETIES AS A R E S U L T OF THE AGENTS

Chapter V.

INSTIGATING THE PROCESS

93

A. Concepts: leadership, power, elite B. Leadership considered as a variable dependent on change in society C. Relationships between leading groups as variables dependent on social change D. Social change considered as a variable dependent on leadership E. Who innovates society? F. A framework for the study of innovators . . .

93

THEORIES SOCIETY

WHICH AND

EXPLAIN

FOCUS

ON

THE

SPECIAL

DYNAMICS

98 107 109 112 120

OF

SUBPROCESSES

CONSIDERED TO BE PRIME MOVERS

123

A. Demographic change as the prime mover . . . 123 B. Urbanization as the prime mover 127 C. Changing stratification as a prime mover . . . 137 D. A theory of social movements 148 E. Industrialization as the prime mover 157 Chapter V I .

CONCLUSION: R A P I D SOCIAL CHANGE IN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING SOCIETIES

197

AUTHOR INDEX

208

SUBJECT INDEX

210

INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF SOCIAL CHANGE

The study of social change is fashionable in present-day sociology. Yet the field which this study would attempt to analyse and elucidate is often not clear in itself. It was not clear when the Third World Congress of Sociology, devoted to this subject, was opened in Amsterdam in 1956. Distinguished sociologists such as Von Wiese and Gurvitch were inclined from the beginning to identify it with the entire field of sociology, because, they said, social life is life and therefore changes. During the further proceedings of the Congress, no serious attempt was made to establish a workable definition of social change. Nowadays, all textbooks deal with the subject, but it can hardly be said to have been elucidated since the time of the Amsterdam Congress. 1. Indeed, it can be argued that social life, whether as the interaction of individuals or as shared life or both, is human life and therefore cannot be static without being dead. Thus, all social life entails social change. Using the term in such a broad sense, however, does not help to define the scope of a specific study of change. If it presents anything new at all, it seems to the present author to be the fact that so far most sociologists have taken their societies as data within which they could study several variables. The present approach is new in the sense that societies themselves are looked upon in their dynamic nature. This is a specific problem and a workable subject for the study of social change. Science, moreover, is not an isolated phenomenon but a function of life. Social scientists are challenged by the problems of life. The paramount problems of the present-day world are those dealing with the rise of newly independent nations, the construction of new societies within former colonial frontiers, rapid change in societies, traditional societies whose leaders desire to modernize them, and the relations between societies within one humanity. All those who have to deal

14

INTRODUCTION

with such practical problems demand that scientists provide them with insight into the dynamics of the process. That is why the study of social change, viewed as the dynamics of overall societies, is not merely a hobby for sociologists with which to enlarge their field of knowledge, but is also an urgent necessity. This is a legitimate reason for focusing our study on societies at large. 2. But what is a society at large? Is it a thing or a person? Is it the state, or does it at least coincide with state frontiers? Is it merely the addition of all kinds of individual interactions, of all group and intergroup life on a given territory? Is it only the common harmony of those processes, or does it also contain their tensions, conflicts and provisory balances? Is society only a higher level of abstraction which omits all differentiation within a given territory? Perhaps it is merely an image constructed in our minds, symbolized in a word, and then considered to be part of reality. Some scholars have maintained that the concept of society is useless for analytical purposes! If the concept of society covers reality it can be neither a thing nor a person. Our minds incline to personify, to hypostatize whatever we verbalize, although we can correct this tendency by closer consideration. In common with any social life, society falls in the category of combined human individuals. The combination, however, is not primarily made up of things or organisms, but of actions of individuals - actions in their broadest sense: thoughts, feelings, wishes and activities. As Hassaert of Ghent University correctly stated, 1 society is a "synergy". If such is true of all social life, does it make sense to distinguish society within it, to separate it from interactions between persons, from groups and intergroup life? Obviously not. There can be no society without these processes; it is all these processes together, even more than that, more than their addition, more than their interdependence. It is also that which relates and mutually conditions all these processes. A national language is expressed in the speaking and writing of individuals and groups. The language itself is more comprehensive and richer in possible applications than at any moment it is in use. In society at large this means: being such a society, we present ourselves as a social unit. Through this special social unit we try or pretend to be comprehensive (i.e. comprehending all hitherto known aspects and sectors of life) and omnifunctional, satisfying to the largest possible 1

J. Hassaert, Essai de Sociologie

(Gand, 1946).

INTRODUCTION

15

extent all the needs of ourselves, its members. Society encompasses all groups but it also unites and animates them with a common language, with common values, a common outlook, a common fate. Society is an overall structure embracing the unifunctional, multifunctional and territorial social units, imbuing them with a feeling of belonging. Harmony among all these units does not seem to be essential. They often conflict within one society without breaking the ties with their society, without losing the fundamental conviction that the conflicts are within themselves, being society. Certainly, society as such is not experienced by an individual in his daily life. Some may say they do not see it, just as the man who climbs the mountain does not see the mountain. Society can be observed only from a distance when we try to get the whole thing into perspective. What we observe then is not our image, not our own expectation, but a reality which is often quite unexpected. A clear picture of a society necessitates recognition of its boundaries: where does it end? This is a specific problem today as closed societies no longer exist. In practice, the frontiers of society are identified with those of its political organization, and thus with those of only one of its functional organizations. This seems to be rather haphazard as there is no evidence that economic, linguistic, cultural or other boundaries coincide with political confines. Historically speaking, when political boundaries were created, they seldom coincided with the others. Yet the same history teaches us that political organizations tend to shape one society out of the human resources within their territory, to develop one economic system, one overall culture, one overall social structure and one common language. Few societies have grown spontaneously; they have been created or, more accurately, have been stimulated and directed by a national state policy. This explains why all sociologists speak so easily about American, British, Chinese, Danish societies. But we must realise that some societies are in the process of formation, others in the process of extending their boundaries; some political organizations may envelop two or more societies or divide others.2 In other words, boundaries in social life are not so easy to establish as in a physical environment. A more realistic approach to societies looks upon them as fields of forces which have their concentration within political boundaries but which, at the same time, radiate far beyond these boundaries and are The inhabitants of some isolated valleys in Ethiopia do not communicate in any way with the Ethiopian administration, culture or economy. On the other hand, the Somali are divided over Somaliland, Kenya and Ethiopia.

2

16

INTRODUCTION

affected by all outside influences. In actual fact, all societies have an impact on each other, without losing their own identity. Political boundaries remain an operational method by which societies are identified in spite of the numerous kinds of relationships which their members have with individuals and groups in other societies. A last question: since society is an omnifunctional, comprehensive social process, is it a suitable subject for study or is it too complicated? It is an impossible task to see at one glance the universe of millions of interactions of individuals and families, of thousands of groups and of hundreds of aspects or sectors involved in any one society at a given moment. Were we to abstract from all this, however, nothing would remain. The solution must be found in whether we can reach a sufficiently high level of abstraction which does not omit those that are actually relevant to a given society, and on the other hand, can reduce the complexity of that society so far that it can be grasped as a whole. We might e\jen try to go a step further by studying not only one concrete society but society as such, in order to find rules applicable to every society. Whether such abstractions are valid or not must be judged theoretically by stating that no process of abstraction may leave out essential elements. Practically, the validity can only be proved by testing the concepts framed and the rules discovered in that abstract study by applying them to the analysis of concrete societies. We may then discover that the highest form of abstraction is useless. It may also be possible to make half-way generalizations and to develop different types of overall societies which can be studied in their dynamics. Let us try to reach the dynamics of society, without losing contact with what we want to discover. To the present author, many a theory presented as a general law for all societies appears merely to be a theory for a group of societies or for all societies under certain conditions: theories of the middle-range, as Merton labelled them. 3

3

T o Merton, theories of the middle range (see On Theoretical Sociology, N e w York, 1962) are rather special theories for special areas within the society, such as stratification, deviant behaviour, social control, interdependence of institutions, a general theory being an all-embracing conceptual framework or all-embracing empirical generalizations (the two often being mixed by Merton) from which concepts can be borrowed or statements deduced for special analyses. In this way, a theory as a general conceptual framework and theories about macrosocieties are confused. Merton's basic assumption or hope is that institutions (e.g. a girls' college), systems (e.g. an educational system), a society, a culture, societies, cultures and humanity are subject to basically the same "laws", otherwise the transition from special to general theories can never b e made.

INTRODUCTION

17

3. An abstraction may never omit essential elements. This brings us back to the question of whether a specific study of change in societies is useful. If we abstract from change we kill society because it is in itself a process, it is life, it moves. Society differs in spring, in summer, in autumn or winter, on Sundays, holidays or working days; at morning, noon, evening or night. Within the time dimensions, we can also make use of levels of abstraction. As a science, history usually works on a high level, looking only at what is relevant to a certain historical situation from the standpoint of the writer's own situation. Sociologists aim at a higher level yet, or even various higher levels, as shown by Pareto's theory of cyclical movements of elites within one civilization, Toynbee's theory of cyclical movements in a selected number of civilizations, and Sorokin's theory of types of civilization throughout all history. In studying social change, sociologists hope to discover simplified trends of simplified dynamics of societies. This makes sense under the assumption that progressive use of the process of abstraction will enable us to find ever more fundamental traits of dynamism. Again, the validity of such an assumption can only be proved by the operational value of the findings, by the practical answer of the question of how to understand better and how to become more capable of directing the dynamics of concrete societies. The importance of such an abstract study lies in the fact that it gives insight into the changes of basic structures of societies, into the fundamental forces which move them. We shall learn how to recognize the facts behind the facts, which escape daily observation but which may determine our fate. This, I think, is the value of a study such as that of overall social change. 4. Some students of social change of societies prefer to distinguish between the study of "moving" societies (the internal dynamics of society) and that of "changing" societies (the transition from one type of society to another). In he same way, Parsons distinguishes change 4 within a society from change of the society. A study of social change, he argues, should deal with the latter. In the study of social change, in particular, the possibility should be considered that each level has its own originality, its own tendencies, and that these affect each other. If each level has its own originality, it may also require its own methodology for research, including the "impressionistic" or "phenomenological" types. Methodology should be adapted to the problems to be investigated and not the problems to the preferred methods. 4 Talcott Parsons, The Social System (London, 1952), p. 480.

18

INTRODUCTION

Serious doubts must be raised against this distinction as long as clear criteria are not offered to justify it. When Parsons speaks of the process of transition from one type of society to another, it must be remembered that types are primarily intellectual tools, framed in order to recognize and analyze dynamic life which may be continuous. At different points in history, a given society may be more easily understood with the aid of differing tools. However, this does not justify the conclusion that discontinuity occurred in the process. The distinction also forces us to decide on which forces are so essential to a given society that, if they change, society also changes. Important examples of discontinuity such as the pre-Latin American and the Latin American societies, the Indian societies and the North American, are not changes at all but implantations of new societies on the territory of older ones. Another example can be found in the change of Czarist Russia into Soviet Russia. This undoubtedly was a change of political regime, but it was also a change in Russian society, which continued to exist. All authors on this particular case agree that social life under the two successive political regimes showed a great deal of continuity. The distinction raises another theoretical problem, that of the identity of a given society during its dynamic life. Identity surely is not granted merely by territory. The identity of a society is at least affected, if not made, by its past history as related by members of that society. It is the society's present conviction, its conception of its own past, which makes it identify itself with that past. However, it is not only a case of image making. In many respects, we are products of the past in the material as well as cultural aspects of life. This is very clear for the immediate past, but becomes less and less clear in proportion to regression in time. It seems that image-making or myth-making grows in the same proportion until, finally, it is merely image or myth respectively. Europeans identify themselves more easily with Roman and Greek civilization than with the barbarians who invaded the Roman empire centuries later; they do not identify themselves with Roman or Greek societies. To conclude: change in society would be the dynamic process of a society as long as it identifies itself either realistically or mythically with the past; change of societies would be the same process under the connotation that the present society does not identify itself collectively with the past. However, this does not change the process, and the distinction is therefore useless.

INTRODUCTION

19

5. What is the sociologist's own viewpoint in studying the dynamics of societies? This, as any insider knows, is an old dispute. Older sociologists considered sociology to be the science which had to deal with social life as a whole, whereas other human sciences should deal with special sectors or aspects. Sociology should be a mother-science assisted by adult daughters such as economics, psychology, social policy (as a discipline). The status of history, medicine or law - older sciences academically - was not clearly set in this relationship. Modern sociologists are less ambitious and restrict themselves to more strictly social phenomena such as interrelationships, groups, structures and functions, which occur in any sector of life. Specifications according to different sectors such as industrial sociology, political sociology, sociology of knowledge or thought, sociology of religion etc. thus arose. This does not prevent many scholars of other disciplines from designating to sociology parts of facts which they need for their own sciences, parts which they themselves neglect or are unable to explain. Economists incline to designate to sociology all consumptive behaviour and the total family life, although these are of primary importance for economic life. Medicine inclines to allocate to sociology the social causes of illness, mainly mental illness. Both economists and medicos expect sociologists to deal with the consequences of the practical application of their theories to human life. Every outsider expects sociologists to prepare the ground for social policy. The present writer is not opposed to the latter position and tends to recognize that the practical work of sociology, as an analytical science, is to prepare the ground for social therapy, mainly by helping people to recognize and understand their social situation. This is an unorthodox but realistic statement which opens the way for the sociologist to choose his fields of study and to act as a critical observer. It would be absurd for a modern sociologist to pretend to be an overall social scientist, embracing and coordinating all human sciences. Neither can he limit himself to interactions of individuals and groups, to structures and functions, but must deal equally with institutions, attitudes, roles, norms, rights and duties, with organizations, values, belongingness etc. Sociologists usually feel some embarrassment in defining their own field. Is it because they lack the courage to recognize themselves? Theorists who study social change should accept the idea that the work of the sociologist is to prepare the ground for social therapy; after all, this is what they themselves are actually doing. However, they never express it openly and very seldom call their theories a diagnosis.

20

INTRODUCTION

as did Mannheim. Fellow sociologists often feel compelled to maintain the conviction that their science should be absolutely free of value judgments. It is not surprising that many of them refuse to study societies at large since this involves so many choices as to relevance and importance of factors. Those who bravely take up this job manifestly have three elements in common: first, they all deal with "problems" in society; second, they choose these problems independently and not on the command of politicians or planners; third, in analyzing the problem, they furnish warning signals to the reading public. Nevertheless, it would be a great injustice to accuse them of behaving as prophets and not as scientists. Their diagnosis is usually based upon elaborate analytical tools; they make earnest attempts to test their hypotheses on historical data and they publish their findings, thus laying themselves open to criticism by their fellows. Most of their theories are one-sided, of course, because they are not occupied with the healthy part of society, or with that part that seems healthy to them. It would be better if scientific research institutions paid more attention to the research of overall societies. However, as universities are mainly educational institutions, it is understandable that they prefer to train students in handling research instruments for the study of interactions and small groups which are better elaborated than those used for the analysis of a highly complex society. Moreover, students have to be trained to be exact in their observations, the statistical approach being most appropriate for that purpose. However, few aspects of societies at large can be quantified properly; when it is possible, such immense work is required (think of Lazerfeld's scaling) that research institutions of universities cannot even contemplate a statistical analysis of their society as a whole. So far, the majority of aspects and trends in the dynamics of societies have been discovered by critical but general observation and by personal insight, and then tested on selected data. In describing their observations, theorists of the dynamics of society used all existing sociological concepts and framed new ones. It is an interesting fact that each author has his own theory, makes his own choice of the problems and makes his own diagnosis of what is wrong with societies. Authors seldom contradict one another simply because each one deals only with that part of society which he considers to be problematic. Therefore, the best way by which to introduce the student to this study is to review the main theories developed so far. This must be done very critically. Most authors, in speaking about society, identify part of that society with the whole. Moreover, the danger is very real

INTRODUCTION

21

that sociology of societies may become an alarmist science. What we must consider in the following chapters is the degree of truth in the answers to the problems studied. We shall classify existing theories in a way which seems most likely to furnish some insight into their different approaches. 5 Some authors identify the whole process of changing societies, for example, with industrialization or urbanization, which clearly is only part of the process. Others are mainly concerned with the forces which make society move, whether in the sphere of groups or in the field of dynamics, by discovering regularities in them. Others again try to explain the process through new concepts which should bring enlightenment. Finally, there are those who try to analyse changing societies as comprehensive wholes. This study will be based mainly on reputed authors. From time to time we shall also consider less serious theories which, although not dealt with by anyone of renown, are in fact so commonly accepted in many popular writings that it would be unwise to bypass them. All theories will be subject to evaluation.

5

Although the various theories will be summarized in the coming chapters, this is in no way intended as substitution for the authors' original works. On the contrary, knowledge of their systems is presupposed. Their presentation is biased firstly by our specific subject, secondly by a formulation tending towards critical reformulation.

CHAPTER I

THEORIES DEALING WITH THE DYNAMICS OF INCLUSIVE SOCIETIES AS COMPREHENSIVE WHOLES

A.

BY WAY OF POSING TWO TYPES

The first, rather simple theory to be considered under this heading is that rather wellknown statement by Ferdinand Tonnies (1855-1936) that society is moving from Gemeinschaft (community) to Gesellschaft (association). 1. Society is community: a rather undifferentiated, strongly integrated social unit to which its members belonged automatically, spontaneously, by Wesenwille (essential will or nature). The community dominates the individuals, who have no will other than that of the community. Individuals share the same values and beliefs, mores and customs, which they have fully integrated personally. They also share property. This community appears as a natural datum, a kind of organic body; it does not appear as being man-made. However, society becomes more and more a Gesellschaft, an association or organization, in which individuals associate together for private interests. They can choose their own place within it (Kiirwille = will of choice) and can enter and leave at will. Contacts between individuals are of a commercial nature, based upon private property or interest. Society appears here as being man-made, not a natural but a utilitarian unit. It is ruled by rationally formulated laws, themselves compromises between individual interests. Society is now very differentiated, even disintegrated, as the various utilitarian groups are not only clearly distinguished by different functions but moreover linked together only by their private interests. 2. Criticisms of this picture are not difficult to find. Tonnies apparently refers to his own German society. Is this process of transition a perennial process of society? No. It is one which was observable in his time. Did

THE DYNAMICS OF COMPREHENSIVE WHOLES

23

Tonnies compare the past with the unknown future, or the countryside with the town at the end of the 19 th century? Our main criticism, however, must be directed towards his method. Gemeinschaft and Gesellschajt may be useful concepts if considered not as indicating two different time units of society but as ideal types (in the Weberian sense); his statement should have been formulated to show that there was more community before than there is now, or less association before than there is now, Le. in 1900. Perhaps any society shows a double tendency: one towards the natural, spontaneous belonging as human beings, the other towards the artificial, functional, utilitarian association for private interests, while both seek a balance appropriate to the situation of the society. In short, Tonnies has often been rightly criticized for a romantic appreciation of the past and a pessimistic view of the future. But a stronger criticism remains: Tonnies tells us so little about the actual dynamics. He teaches a kind of comparative statics and not the why and how of the change from one type to another. This is the subject in which we are interested. 3. A somewhat similar picture of changing society is given by Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) in De la division du travail social. In this first great contribution to sociology in the French language (1893), two theses are intermingled: i) when division of labour increases as a result of expanding population, the society changes from a mechanistic to an organic type; ii) in each of these types, the "collective fact" appears to be a prime factor which is irreducible to individuals (law); this collective fact is a proper subject for sociological study. Although Durkheim's second thesis is most essential, it is on the first that we shall concentrate our attention here. Durkheim tends to identify his older type of society with primitive tribes, calling its solidarity "mechanic". It is mainly characterized by homogeneity of individuals, sharing common manners, opinions, beliefs. It does not permit deviation from common standards, such deviation being punished by repression of the individual. The group is believed to be sacred, violation of group rules sacriligious. The group is not ruled by artificially formulated laws but by tradition. Only tradition, the law of heredity, can produce some differentiation within the homogeneity. At the other extreme, Durkheim tends to identify "organic" solidarity with modern Western society. Increased division of labour gives rise to differentiation among individuals who are no longer bound by tradition

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and heredity but by organized specified labour, because they are no longer sufficient to themselves. Laws are no longer maintained by punishment or repressive sanctions, but much more by retributive sanctions: the criminal merely has to make amends to his victim. The group loses its sacred character, there is much more freedom within the society, which itself is now of an opportunist character. 1 To Durkheim, therefore, division of labour is the determining factor which causes change in all sectors of society. This again is a consequence of a demographic factor: population pressure. Social change itself, however, is change in the form of solidarity among the members of society. 4. Any criticism of Durkheim cannot accuse him of giving either a pessimistic or an optimistic evaluation of the process. He points out the rise of freedom which many would evaluate positively, but he also recognizes that suicide, nervousness and dissatisfaction are increasing together with the organizational traits of society. Sorokin is of the opinion that Durkheim intentionally gave his social types names which were contrary to those given by Tonnies. 2 This may indicate an opposite evaluation but he certainly does not stress it. To Durkheim, the two kinds of society are not so much two phases of history as "types", two poles of a continuum, without affirming that the "modern" type developed out of the "primitive" one. This would seem to show that his approach is much more that of comparative statics: the one type clarifying the other by its very opposition. Although Durkheim indicates population pressure as a factor causing the change (a very doubtful statement), he does not clarify the process of the changing society itself: how it changes. 5. Evaluation. We have criticized both Tonnies and Durkheim for using comparative statics instead of describing the process of transition. 3 This does not mean that they are useless for our purpose. A certain method is involved in their approach which seems worth investigation. 1

Although this society could be said to be individualistic, Durkheim strongly emphasizes that it also has its collective element and cannot be explained by a social contract made by individuals (Rousseau). The contracts, he points out, are ruled in their form, their application and their contents by collective convictions about right or wrong. 2 Pitirim Sorokin, Contemporary Sociological Theories (New York, 1928), p. 491. 3 Cooley applies a similar kind of opposed concepts when he uses the terms primary and secondary relationships. However, these are not types of overall societies, nor are they meant for the analysis of change from the one type into the other. They are tools for the discovery of different actual relationships.

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25

What are they actually doing? Are they researching two different historical periods, or two different cultures? They do neither. Rather, they seem to be aware of their own time and culture in which they discover elements that are dying out and other apparently new trends which are going to mark the future. They conceive of dying elements as of a total society and place them back in time: Tonnies in the form of rural communities, Durkheim in that of primitive societies. Again, they build an image of the new trends as of a complete society and project it into the future. So far, we remain in the sphere of statics, although the placing in past and future denotes a time element. Some insight into the dynamics can be obtained by comparing the two images. The dynamics are not described: description of change seems impossible as it breaks down the film into static pictures. It is the comparison in comparative statics which keeps the film moving, which provides insight into the very qualitative element of change. This insight seems to be furthered, or at least facilitated, by evaluating the ongoing changes, as Tonnies apparently does when he judges the changes to be a loss of values. This evaluation may be a subjective matter; it may debase the insight, but not necessarily. Durkheim evaluates the changes partly positively, partly negatively; if the norms are made explicit, there can be no objection to this. We do not wish to agree with either of them insofar as they describe the past and future of Western society (Tonnies) or of mankind (Durkheim). Other societies may have a different past and future in the sense of old and new elements in the present. However, the method by which the dynamic nature of the present is analyzed by comparing such past and future images founded on present trends, is helpful for the study of any society.

B. THEORIES ON STAGES IN THE HISTORY OF SOCIETIES

1. Many sociologists describe the history of society or of mankind in terms of stages. To mention a few: August Comte (1798-1857) indicated a theological, a metaphysical and a scientific stage through which the philosophy of mankind was progressing. Marx mentions the pre-capitalistic stage(s), the capitalistic stage divided into competitive and monopolistic eras, the stage of dictatorship of the proletariat and finally, the ideal classless state. Mannheim speaks of the succession of the traditional, the competitive and the planned stages; Riesman discusses the

26

THE DYNAMICS OF COMPREHENSIVE WHOLES

tradition-oriented and the inner and outer-directed societies. Similarly, Tonnies and Durkheim also thought in terms of stages. The first observation that comes to mind is that each author chooses that characteristic of society which helps him to establish the stages. Comte takes the intellectual approach of human beings to reality, Marx the pattern of production; Mannheim the type of organization, Riesman the fundamental attitude of people towards expectations; while Tonnies and Durkheim choose forms of human relationships. Some authors justify their choice, as do Marx and Mannheim, but not all of them. The second observation is that all authors are really thinking about the Western world even when speaking about mankind in general. Similar studies about China or Black Africa, for example, have yet to make their appearance. However, there seems to be a more fundamental methodological problem. In speaking about stages, the same problem is faced which confronts the historian when he divides history into periods. When does one stage start and the other end? Three hundred years from now, it may be argued that a new period started today, although to us no special event has been noticeable. Perhaps a book is edited in Milan, a law passed in the Palais de Bourbon in Paris, a child born in Karachi who is destined to become a great physician, or an invention publicized in a Detroit newspaper. Life simply goes on. Periods and stages are introduced by the student to enable him to cope with events. Stages are merely types introduced into the history of society in order to pin down its dynamics. 2. How are these types constructed and what is their scientific value? We must first discuss something of the method of typology in general. This methodological concept was introduced by Max Weber. 4 An ideal type is a concept systematically framed by selecting important and interdependent elements out of the infinitely diverse and complex social reality in order to understand them by their mutual consistency. Its instrumentality is in discovering causal or functional relationships among the elements, and the logical impact they have on each other. These important elements and their consistency are found to be present in the historical context from which they are isolated by intellectual operation and then exaggerated to an absolute configuration. The characteristics are thus: selection, consistent configuration, isolation and 4

See Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (Glencoe, 1949), p. 601 seq.

THE DYNAMICS OF COMPREHENSIVE WHOLES

27

absolute presentation. Outstanding examples of such ideal types are the Calvinist in Weber's study of the origin of capitalism, the entrepreneurs as defined by Schumpeter, the economic man of the classical economists, the system of free competition as the regulator of the market, the bureaucracy as again described by Weber, companionship and contractual marriage. These are all complexes, configurations of behavioural patterns, which never exist in a pure form and isolated fashion in real life, but which make part of behaviour more understandable. An ideal type is not an average of a Gauss curve; it is rather its asymptote on the positive side. Neither is it a sample: the typical banker is not the average banker. Typology is useless in physical sciences: it is not possible to construct an ideal type of men's height, but only of human behaviour, attitudes, roles, as these have a meaning, a sense to be understood. The word "ideal" in this connection originally had nothing to do with an ideal to be reached. Derived from the idealistic philosophy, the word is connected with the sense, the meaning, the idea that makes facts and events intelligible. This philosophy (Dilthey) argues that the idea is not found in reality unless it is attributed to it by men. The sociologist does not need to enter into the debate on whether sense and meaning are abstracted from reality or attributed to it. He finds these meanings present in human groups. In constructing types, he isolates those which he finds to be coherent in social behaviour and exaggerates them up to one hundred percent in order to study the coherence. This should not be understood to mean that the typology is merely an intellectual tool. To a lesser degree and intermingled with non-consistent factors, coherent behaviour is a fact. Neither should one think that the ideal type does not affect reality in any way. Firstly, social groups have their own types, their own constructs of what is a typical professor, a typical student, a typical sportsman. These soon become normative models for those who take the jobs or roles in question. Sociologists who develop the type of a modern family, of a planner in a society in transition or of a new stage in society (as did Comte with his scientific stage) may, once groups in society recognize them as modern, consistent or desirable, provide a normative model. Secondly, as the aim of typology is understanding and interpretation, new types offered to the groups in society help them to re-interpret social life. Think of Riesman's inner and outer-directed individuals. Re-interpre-

28

THE DYNAMICS OF COMPREHENSIVE WHOLES

tation of behaviour certainly affects that behaviour, as interpretation by groups of themselves or others is always accompanied by a judgement about desirability or undesirability, however much the sociologist may wish to refrain from these connotations. 3. Typologies can be used not only for groups or for roles of individuals, but also for the study of such highly complex entities as overall societies. One speaks regularly about feudal societies or a feudal society, knowing full well that there is a marked difference between the medieval European society, Japanese society prior to 1868, or Ethiopian society before 1940, all of which are indicated as feudal. In doing so, we are well aware that in using this term we intend to indicate the feudal elements within these concrete societies (the medieval European cities were certainly not feudal), traces of which can even be found in presentday society. But a feudal society is one in which feudalism is characteristic of its structure, its administration and its culture, pervading all sectors and groups. The methodological problem of construction of ideal types of overall societies is the validity of selecting some traits among the many as being basic to, and pervading, the others. A further problem is that of constructing stages in ongoing societies. The first is solved by sociologists in considering their own field as presenting the basic elements of societies, as did Parsons in selecting the values or attitudes implied in human relationships, or Gurvitch in selecting the political and economic structures or, as we shall propose in the present study, in comparing the institutions which appear in all societies with their basic orientations. The second problem, that of stages, belongs fundamentally to the evolutionistic outlook with which we shall deal later. But independent of evolutionist doctrine, there are also successive types of situations in which societies have found themselves. 3.1. An example of types of overall society structure without reference to succession in time is given by Talcott Parsons, who uses as criterion the "social value orientation" of societies. 5 According to Parsons, in dealing with each other, authors in the social systems are influenced 5 The Social System (London, 1952) p. 107 seq.; Parsons & Shils, Toward a General Theory of Action (Cambridge, 1952) p. 80 seq. In a later publication, "Evolutionary Universal® in Society" (American Sociological Review, 1964, Vol. 29, p. 339 seq.) Parsons uses at least some pattern variables in an evolutionistic perspective.

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29

by certain fundamental attitudes and values with which they are impregnated through their culture. He uses a dialectic method by which to clarify these orientations, opposing two extremes each time on different lines of values. In this way, his defined relationships become in fact ideal types, complete presentations without interference by other factors. In a somewhat simplified fashion, particularly with regard to Parsons' terminology, the alternatives are: a) on the basis of how individuals are evaluated when interacting - universalism is the attitude by which general standards are applied equally to all, in whatever relationship, - particularism is the attitude by which others are evaluated according to the particular relationship an individual has with any one of them; b) on the basis of how others are perceived - ascription is the attitude by which others are judged as they are believed to be in themselves (to Parsons, ascription is, for example, the inherent quality of being a father), - achievement-oriented attitude is that by which others are perceived according to what they do, what they perform, irrespective of birth or status; c) on the basis of whether or not private interests prevail over collective interests in social relationships - self-orientation is the general attitude by which everyone is expected to care for himself, - collectivity orientation is the attitude by which everyone is expected to contribute to his communitiy for the satisfaction of common needs; d) on the basis of whether or not restrictive norms are involved in social relationships - affectivity is the general attitude by which satisfaction is looked for in the relationship itself, regardless of existing norms and without being controlled by them, - neutrality is the attitude by which satisfaction in relationships is submitted to generally accepted norms; e) on the baas of the nature of the social relationship - diffusiveness is the attitude by which individuals contact each other in their total complexity, embracing all aspects, - specificity is the attitude by which an actor contacts another person

30

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only in a certain role, not touching upon aspects which are not directly or functionally involved in the relationship (reduced relations). Parsons asserts that by combining these alternatives, 32 types of inclusive societies can be established and studied in their logical consequences. As such, it is a mere theoretical scheme for studies to be made of possible overall societies. He states, however, that the four possible combinations of alternatives (a) and (b) constitute major types and that the other alternatives constitute subtypes of these. The reason, according to Parsons, is that alternatives (a) and (b) are found prior to the organization of the social system and the others are part of it. This is not clear. A feudal society is particularistic and adscriptive because of its structure. Self-orientation and collective-orientation seem to be cultural traits which are more decisive for the structuring of a society, although partly also a consequence of it. A discussion of the priority of structure over culture or vice versa is most unfruitful because they are always mutually determinative. In describing his four major types, Parsons gives us little more than a description of some wellknown societies, with scanty reference to the logical necessities of the devised alternatives. 6 3.2. Rudolph Steinmetz (1862-1940) was a successful advocate of the theory of stages in the evolution of mankind. He made a famous contribution to the classification of social types, 7 in the first part of which he presents two criteria: the development of thought and the development of economic techniques, thus combining the 19th century French and German traditions in evolution. In presenting the development of thought, Steinmetz is closely associated with Comte, distinguising the phase of associative thinking combined with animism, the phase of systematic mythology (faith or theology and myth considered to be identical), and lastly the phase of critical, rationalistic thought. Following the line of progress in economic techniques, the commonly mentioned phases are found: of capture, of hunting, of nomadic herdsmen, of shifting agriculture, of stable agriculture, the social division of labour, craftmanship and, finally, industry. In the second part of his presentation, Steinmetz raises doubts regard8

The Social System, p. 180 seq. "La classification des types sociaux" L'Année sociologique III (1898-99), pp. 43-147. 7

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31

ing the validity of this classification and the a priori approach. He would have it tested as a hypothesis and the possibility left open for other criteria to be included in the research. He then jumps to the other extreme. He suggests that an inquiry be made among 1000-1500 still closed communities on the basis of a questionnaire with twelve items (on economic organization, family life, religion, social and political organization, property etc.) in order to find basic common traits in these various sectors, and to enable types of overall societies to be drafted on the basis of these traits. Sociologically speaking, the idea is sound; perhaps in 1900 it was still possible to find so many "closed" communities. Even if such a study could have been carried out, it would not have justified the presentation of stages of development in an evolutionistic sense. It would have lacked historical perspective. At the most, such a study would have found typologically different societies whose basic institutions show fundamental coherence. It would not have explained the change from one type to another. 3.3 An author who used a strongly historical approach but avoided any idea of evolutionistic process was Georges Gurvitch (1894—1966), who also avoided any a priori criteria. In both aspects, Gurvitch was the reverse of Talcott Parsons in trying to give types of overall societies. Parson's approach was formalistic and non-historical. Gurvitch, who made the subject his lifework, merely attempted to discover the characteristics of the categories of societies which presented themselves to his notice. In Sociology of Law, Gurvitch distinguishes seven types of society for the purpose of studying law and the way in which it operates in societies:8 the magical-religious, charismatic-theocratic, patriarchal, feudal, city-empire, territorial state, and contemporary societies (the word "contemporary" does not even express what is typical of such societies). In La vocation actuelle de la sociologie, Gurvitch refuses to present any typology of overall societies, but argues that each is so unique that generalization is impossible. 9 In Déterminismes sociaux et liberté humaine, however, he takes up the idea again and elaborates it extensively.10 He distinguishes four 8 8 t0

New York, 1942, p. 257 seq. Paris, 1950. Paris, 1955, p. 200 seq.

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types of non-historical, six types of historical and four types of contemporary societies.11 The non-historic, archaic or non-literate societies are intended to help understand the findings made by anthropologists among tribes in various parts of the world. These types are tentative generalizations of dispersed observations from which he isolates the predominantly structural traits. Gurvitch distinguishes the tribes of the Australia and Amazon regions, Polynesia and Melanesia, North America, and Central Africa. In this way, he tries to provide structural frameworks for the interpretation of cultural traits. The six types of historical societies are constructed to help us understand several periods of human history. These are: the theocratic-charismatic, patriarchal, feudal and city-empire types; the structures giving rise to enlightened despotism and capitalism; and the liberal-democratic type. The four conflicting types of present-day societies are constructed to aid the understanding of the fundamental conflicts between different sets of rationalities (or types) within Western society, and very likely in all societies today. Gurvitch mentions organized capitalism, technocratic bureaucracy or fascism, planning based upon state collectivism, and planning based upon pluralistic collectivism (competing pressure groups). 3.4 The student of social change realises that the ideal type approach to overall societies does not offer much chance for the study of change itself, even if types are presented as stages. At first glance, the approach contributes to the study in a negative way, i.e. showing impediments to change. Ideal types show sets of consistencies in social reality and the very consistency of factors has a tendency to perpetuate itself. Moreover, presenting stages of development by ideal types does not show how one stage makes the transition to another. However, Gurvitch tries to show a way when he discusses conflicting types, or rather societies, in which sets of consistent factors, intellectually represented by ideal types, conflict with each other. As such, we could designate for modern societies the democratic pattern, the laissez-faire or free competition pattern, the mono- or oligopolistic pattern, the technocratic patttern, the planning pattern and the fascist (enforcement of views of powerful minorities upon the majority) pattern. 11 In Traité de sociologie I (Paris, 1958), Gurvitch analyses the same types from the point of view of their structures, omitting the non-historic or archaic types.

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33

The clash between such types, as far as they are present in the same present-day society, causes such a society to upset recognized balances and to become more dynamic. We should not think about such "modern" patterns as if previous stages had died out. Nationalism is fully alive, although in a society based upon rationality and efficiency, it can easily be proved mythical and very inefficient from a welfare point of view. Nazi Germany professed to be mythological in its basis (Rosenberg, Mythus der XX Jahrhuntert), and was also highly technological in its planning. Clear feudal elements can be found in the stratification of modern Western societies. Today's developing societies are often as much tribal as they are national, feudal as capitalist, mythological as scientific; all these elements act as consistent sets of behaviour, conflicting with and adapting to each other, and pushing these societies into a turmoil of rapid change. 3.5 The previous remarks on expounded theories induce us to attempt to work out some ideal types of inclusive societies in a more empirical way, using two sets of variables. The first set includes the eighteen elements presumed to be present in any kind of society (this to avoid too much subjective choice of characteristics for one type or another) in order to examine how they vary with the other set. The latter set of variables consists of five structural elements thought to be fundamental in that they are supposed to procure or promote inner consistency among the other elements of culture. These fundamentals have been chosen in a purely operational way to discover stages of gradual development. They are less historical and more theoretical than the types developed by Gurvitch, more historical and less theoretical than those developed by Parsons. They are historical inasfar as they are isolated from history and some historical situations are thought to be representative. They are theoretical inasfar as the inner consistency of the elements are spotlighted. Even in this way, they are not valid in a situation of abrupt change such as is seen today in Africa, or such as occurred during the 19th century in the formation of the United States of America. But they seem to apply to most cultures which have developed gradually, such as those of Europe, India, South America. Any idea of progress in a normative sense should be avoided, neither should it be thought that a return to older forms is impossible or that these stages cannot co-exist. In a dominating war situation, any society can become mythical. In the most modern society, rural peasants may

34

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•8 • technocrats exploitation, 77-79 fascism, 32 factory system, 132, 160, 161-166 family functions, changes in, 189-192 family life, changes in, 39, 184-192 feedback, 85, 69-75 feudal society, feudalism, 28, 56, 108, 146, 200, 205, 207 finality, 38, 68 teleology folk-society, 36, 118, 119 founders, 96 freedom in society, 24, 72, 94, 102, 153, 165, 175-181, 186-187 freedoms, economic, 167

212

SUBJECT INDEX

free enterprise, 176-177 free professions, 128, 145, 177 friction ->- tensions frustration, 207 functionalism, 68 Gemeinschaft, 22, 98, 99, 134 generation conflict, 198, 199 genius, 112 Gesellschaft, 22, 99 government, 52, 53 harmony, 15, 201 hierarchy, 182 Hindu religion, 84 home, closed or open, 188-189, 191 ideal types ->- types idealism, 45 ideas, 50-51 identity —, in spite of change, 18, 61, 63 ideology, 45, 79, 88 ideology, idealistic, ideational, sensate, 88 image-making, 14, 15 individualism, 36, 159 industrial revolution, 129 industrial town, 132-136 industrialisation in non-Western countries, 192-196 industrialism, 78-79, 158 seq. industrialism, preconditions to, 81, 193 information, —, polycentric, systems of —, oligocentric, systems of —, monocentric, systems of, 177-179 ->• communication theory in-group, 117 innovation, 52-53, 63, 65, 206 innovation, attitude towards prerequisites to, 102-121 innovators, 112-122, 152 inputs into social systems, 71 institutions, 51, 61-64, 114 institutions, —, organizational, —, cultural, 63 institutions and systems, 180 integration, 55-61 interdisciplinary approach, 69

interests, role of, 22 intra-group, 106 invention, 52-54 inventors of ideas, 96 involution, 41 irrational, the, 47, 110 Islamic religion, 84, 149 isolationism, 60 Japan, 57-58, 196, 207 job stratification, 141 labour, division of, 23, 128, 132, 161162 labour relations, models of, 162-164 law, functions of, 63, 64 law, origin of, 128 layers of social reality, 51, 54, 77-78, 87, 152-154, 199-200 leadership in society, Chapter IV, 154, 207 management, modern modes of, 177, 179-181, 204 managers, 101-106, 145, 161 experts manual work, evaluation of, 113, 160 manufacturies, 160, 162 marginality, 115-120, 152, 155, 206 marriage, 184-194 masse, 95-98 mass media, 131, 135-136 mass society, 101, 127-196 materialism, 54, 77 memory, —, borrowed —, and tested, 72, 206 mercantilism, 166 messages, 70-75 methods of sociological research, ->- typology, dialectics, behaviorism, participant observation Middle Eastern societies, 139-140 middle-range theories, 16 migrants as innovators, 114-118, 207 military governments (regimes), 91, 206 minorities as innovators, 114-120 mobility, social, 134-136, 137, 139, 167169 modern society typified, 198-199 mores, 64 morganatic marriage, 143 movements, social, 60,113-114,148-157, 199, 202

SUBJECT INDEX

movement, crystallization of, 97-98 movements, emancipation, 149-150, 202 movements, imperialistic, 149 movements, independence, 149,202 movements, labour, 169-172 movements, nationalist, 149 movement, socialist, 154, 171 myth making, 18 mythical society, 34-35 national development, 120 ->• developing countries national socialism, 103 nationalism, 83 nationhood, 119 Nazi regime, 100, 102 neutrality, patterns of, 29 non-literate societies, 32 normative change, 181-183, 198 normative self-image, 73, 74 normative system, 50, 55 one-party system, 205 opposition —, revolutionary —, defensive —, constructive, 171, 183 oppression as a source of change, 154156 order, 66 organistic theory, 38-40, 81 organization —, formal —, intorniai (spontaneous) —, authoritarian, 51, 55, 95, 164-165, 194 Orthodox religion, 84 output of social systems, 71 parochialism, 83 participant observation, 203 particularism, patterns of, 29 political party, 104 paternalistic society, 34-35 patronage, 162, 207 planned society, 174-181 planning, 44, 100-102, 204 planning, indicative, 176, 179 planning principle, arguments against, 175-176 planning board, 176 planning office, 176 planning, systems of, 176-177

213

—, overall, national, 177-181 planning, sharing the, 122, 180 planning, town, 134-135, 168 poles of growth, 196 political organization ->- state poverty and social change, 124 power, 94, 110 political power, access to, 108 praxis, 80 prejudice, 183 pressure groups, 108 prestige, 138, 160 private initiative, 165, 179 ->- free interprise private property, 78, 103 privileges, economic, 182 production, forms of, 77-79 progress, human, 38, 45, 79, 81 proletariat —, inner —, outer, 78, 83-86 ->• labour class proletariat, pre-industrial, 194 propaganda, 122 protestantism, 149, 160 psychoanalysis, 153 public opinion, 174 Puritanism, 160 racism, 40 rapid social change, 13, 33, 63, 64, 67, 100, 197 seq. ratio, 44-47 rationalism, 159 rationality, 38, 54, 110, 201 rationality, —, external, 44 —, formal, 99 —, functional, 45, 101 —, inner, 44 —, practical, 45 —, substantial, 45, 46, 99 —, theoretical, 44 reactionists, 138 realism, 45, 46 rebellion, 65-66 recreation, 191 religion, 77, 84, 91 religious systems, 146 reproduction, the family and, 185-186 resistance to change, 195 response group, 96, 107 restoration, 201 retreatism, 65, 130

214

SUBJECT INDEX

revivalism, 60, 130, 201 revolution, 64, 67, 73, 105, 111, 155 reward system, 57, 73-74, 113, 146 rhythm of change, 91-92 ritualism, 65-66 role, social, 165 roles, cross cultural, 58 routinization of charisma, 114 science, 54 science, social, —, cause-effect approach —, means-end approach —, functional relationship approach, 68 secularization, 36, 38 security-oriented society, 34-35 security, social, 61-64, 85 segmented society, 60 self-correction of a culture, 57 self-orientation, patterns of, 29 service, concept for social analysis, 75 sexual life, 189 slums, shanty towns, 131 social control, 57, 62, 94, 205 social justice, 182 social life, 13, 14, 19, 27 social policy, 68 social reform, 66 social scientists, 97 social services, 191 social structure of industrialization, 166-181 social systems, 28, 30, 54 social systems, flexible, rigid, 57 socialism, 103 -V movement, socialist socialization, 88 society, 14, 15, 16, 45-46 society, integration of, 107 society, —, open society —•, closed society, 15, 56-57 society, pluralist, 107 sociology, functions of, 19, 20, 23 sociology of knowledge, 90 solidarity, 182, 183 solidarity, mechanic vs organic, 23-24, 200 Soviet society, 138 specialities of a culture, 57 specificity, patterns of, 29 stages (historical), 25-37, 42 stagnation, 197-198

state, political organization, 14, 15, 38, 63, 64, 91, 166 status symbols, 144 strategy, rules of-in class struggle, 173175 stratification, 52, 113, 137-148, 169-174, 182

stratification, between cultures, 56 stratification, —, feudal type of functionalj of —, ranking / —, conflict type of, 143-146 stratification, —, macro —, meso —, micro, 142 strata, 140 structuralization, 71 structure, 30, 33, 50, 51 students, 118 subjection, 39-40 subversion, 66 symbol systems, 58, 88 symbols, 70-72 systems, social, —, relational —, cultural —, normative, 50 systems and institutions, 180 systems theory (analysis), 68-75, 202 technical assistance, 61 technocracy, 101, 104-105, 166 technology, 47, 60, 157-159, 166 tensions within society, 37, 57, 65, 107 - > conflicting types theocracy, 95 theory and concept, 49 trade unions, 104, 132, 134, 171, 194195 tradition, 23, 98 traditional society, 34-35 transportation, function of —, means of, 132, 134 tribal society, 138, 147, 200 tribes, 32, 38 turnover, 168 types, ideal = typology, 23, 26-28, 32 types, ideal — as normative models, 27 typology, conflicting types, 32 unemployment, 103

SUBJECT INDEX universalism, patterns of, 29 universals of a culture, 57 university, 20, 73, 178 urban revolution functions of, 127-130 urbanization, 127-137, 168 urbanization, over-, 129 urbanization, stages of, 130-136 utilitarianism, 23, see also rationality, functional utopia, 38, 45

215

value judgements, evaluation, 20 value system, changes in the, 181-183 values, 50-51 values, natural vs cultural, 73-74 vested interests, 112, 157 violence, 38 western civilisation, 84 world federalism, 84