The Ambivalent Alliance: Konrad Adenauer, the CDU/CSU, and the West, 1949-1966 9781782389699

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The Ambivalent Alliance

Monographs in German History Volume 1

Osthandel and Ostpolitik: German Foreign Trade Policies in Eastern Europe from Bismarck to Adenauer Mark Spaulding Volume 2

A Question of Priorities: Democratic Reform and Economic Recovery in Postwar Germany Rebecca Boehling Volume 3

From Recovery to Catastrophe: Municipal Stabilization and Political Crisis in Weimar Germany Ben Lieberman Volume 4

Nazism in Central Germany: The Brownshirts in ‘Red’ Saxony Christian W. Szejnmann Volume 5

Citizens and Aliens: Foreigners and the Law in Britain and the German States 1789–1870 Andreas Fahrmeir Volume 6

Poems in Steel: National Socialism and the Politics of Inventing from Weimar to Bonn Kees Gispen Volume 7

“Aryanisation” in Hamburg Frank Bajohr Volume 8

The Politics of Education: Teachers and School Reform in Weimar Germany Marjorie Lamberti Volume 9

The Ambivalent Alliance: Konrad Adenauer, the CDU/CSU, and the West, 1949–1966 Ronald J. Granieri

THE AMBIVALENT ALLIANCE Konrad Adenauer, the CDU/CSU, and the West, 1949–1966

Ronald J. Granieri

h h Books Berghahn NEW YORK • OXFORD

First published in 2003 by Berghahn Books www.berghahnbooks.com First paperback edition published in 2004 Reprinted in 2005 © 2003, 2004 Ronald J. Granieri All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purposes of criticism and review, no part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without written permission of the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Granieri, Ronald J. The ambivalent alliance : Konrad Adenauer, the CDU/CSU, and the West, 1949–1966 / Ronald J. Granieri. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 1-57181-272-5 (alk. paper) — ISBN 1-57181-492-2 (pbk.: alk. paper) 1. Adenauer, Konrad, 1876–1967. 2. Christlich-Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Germany : West) 3. Christlich-Soziale Union. 4. Germany (West)—Foreign relations—United States. 5. United States—Foreign relations—German (West) I. Title. DD259.5 .G73 2002 943.087'092—dc21

2002025431

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Printed in Canada on acid-free paper Illustrations courtesy of the CDU Cover from author’s collection

To J.C.V., the B.V.

Only one thing matters in international affairs: the interest of one’s own land. When foreign ministers—even allied foreign ministers—sit around a conference table, they are not acting as humanitarians, but as individuals committed to their own national interests. — Konrad Adenauer, 1962

CONTENTS

Preface

viii

Acknowledgments

xii

List of Abbreviations

xiv

Introduction: Konrad Adenauer and the Paradox of Westbindung

1

Chapter 1: The Chancellor and His Allies, 1949–1953

29

Chapter 2: Sovereignty and Its Discontents, 1953–1957

70

Chapter 3: Adrift in a Wider World, 1958–1961

110

Chapter 4: A Paris-Bonn Axis? 1961–1963

150

Chapter 5: The End of the Adenauer Era, 1963–1966

191

Conclusion: Whose West Is Best?

228

Bibliography

233

Index

247

– vii –

PREFACE

It has become a commonplace in contemporary discussions of European politics to argue that the end of the Cold War should force us to rethink older conceptions of Europe’s boundaries. With the collapse of the Soviet bloc, old conceptions of East and West have lost their meaning. No longer bound by such politically charged and geographically dubious categories, Europeans and their allies are free to build their own conceptions of the European future. Although this argument poses an important and useful challenge to familiar modes of thought, it begs an even more fundamental question— whether it has ever been possible to provide a simple definition of the West. A survey of postwar history suggests that this definition was never as clear as Cold War rhetoric tried to make it. Though it was common for European and American political leaders to speak of the West as a unified community, in reality there existed at least two different “Wests,” which sometimes overlapped and sometimes excluded each other, depending on the accent placed upon them by the observer. The most significant area of contestation in the West has been the relationship between Continental Europe and the Anglo-American world. For some, the West has been a large Atlantic community, including both Europe and North America. The United States stands as guardian and exemplar of this community, and the history of the West since 1945 is associated with its gradual and ultimately triumphant “Americanization.”1 This vision of the West, generally more popular in the US and Great Britain than on the Continent, is particularly associated with the notion of a future “clash of cultures” between the West and the rest of the world, with no distinction between Western Europe and North America.2 Such thinking had been current in the mid-1990s, but has of course become even more common since the terrible events of 11 September 2001 and the ensuing global war on terrorism. There is, however, another West, distinct from this Atlantic community, centered on Europe as a distinct cultural and political space. This is the West suggested by former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, when he declared “the united Europe that we are building would have no future if it were understood to be merely a loose community of interest or a glorified Free – viii –

Preface

Trade Zone. This Europe is also more importantly a community of values and culture.”3 Kohl’s statement of the cultural unity and special mission of Europe contrasts with arguments that conflate the West with Americanization. Even such a firm advocate of Atlantic cooperation as Kohl recognized that Europe and the Atlantic powers have distinct cultural and political roles to play in the world. The relationship between them remains open for discussion, and it is by no means automatic that Europe and the US will have identical interests into the future. The tension between these conceptions of the West is more than semantic. Faced with a more complicated world, both Europeans and Americans have devoted much time since 1989 to discussing the future of transatlantic relations, questioning many old certainties. They have asked whether their interests are really identical, and whether the original structures of Atlantic cooperation have outlived their usefulness. Unsure whether the system that provided security and prosperity (and also preserved American hegemony in Western Europe) for forty years could survive in a world without a common threat from the East, even enthusiastic American Cold Warriors have begun to wonder whether the era of a unitary “West” has come to an end.4 In this atmosphere of uncertainty, some Europeans in turn have rediscovered the importance of Continental solidarity, especially Franco-German cooperation, to preserve the future of a more independent Europe.5 The political and strategic disagreements that have arisen over the war on terrorism and future actions in the Middle East are the most recent reminders that the Atlantic Alliance by no means guarantees unanimity among the allies.6 Contemporary awareness of the distinct and possibly divergent interests of the Atlantic and European communities should encourage scholars to reexamine the origins of the Cold War West. Tracing the political debates surrounding the development of this community will offer a clearer understanding of the bonds that unite it and the forces that pull it apart. This examination will reveal that the contemporary issues confronting Europeans and Americans, from “burden sharing” within NATO, to the relationship between NATO and Eastern Europe, to the shape of transatlantic economic cooperation, are not so new after all, but have been the source of intense debate throughout the postwar period. An appreciation of the deeper roots of these problems will be necessary before any enduring solutions can be found. Such an appreciation should pay special attention to the key role played by the Federal Republic of Germany in the development of the postwar West. Divided at the heart of Europe, its human and material wealth as well as its strategic position made Germany the main European prize in the Cold War. The creation of the Federal Republic and its integration into the West (Westbindung) were crucial to securing American influence on the Continent and European economic recovery after the devastation of World War II. This integration in turn became an essential part of West German identity, making the Federal Republic America’s closest Continental ally. – ix –

Preface

Within the Federal Republic, however, even among the most vocal public supporters of Westbindung, there remained an ambivalence about the proper shape of the West and Germany’s role in it. Despite, or perhaps because of, the organic relationship between the Federal Republic and the Cold War West, the Germans engaged in heated debates over their place in the community. These debates echoed through five decades of West German history, and form the basis of contemporary German attitudes toward NATO, the European Union, and the former Eastern bloc. They deserve closer scholarly examination. German unification presents both opportunities and dangers for historians of modern Germany. The information that has come with the collapse of the SED regime opens new research vistas, giving historians at last the chance not only to explore the specific history of the GDR, but also to engage in real comparative studies of the two Germanys. Jeffrey Herf’s acclaimed study of how the two German states dealt with the Nazi past and Uta Poiger’s work on German popular culture offer two examples of how scholars can profit from these sources.7 The sudden access to formerly unavailable material stands with the post-1945 availability of Nazi documents or the opening of Soviet archives after 1991 as an example of how an entire field can be opened at one blow, making this an exciting time for historians and promising many important studies in the years to come. This excitement, however, should be kept in perspective. Comparative studies of the two Germanys have an unquestioned value. Some scholars, such as Peter Bender, even argue that the entire history of postwar Germany needs to be rewritten from an all-German perspective in order to build an all-German future, and have already begun such a project.8 This is a worthy goal, but we should not forget that the two German states, despite their stated desire for unification, did develop along different lines, with different political structures and impulses. The danger for historians is the temptation to lose sight of these individual histories in the enthusiasm for comparative studies. Without a full scholarly examination of the constituent parts of the new Germany, comparisons can distort our historical understanding. Some events did have distinct trajectories, and to force them into a comparative format can either blur distinctions or create false dichotomies, which historians must avoid if we are to see why it has proven so difficult for that which belongs together to grow together. It remains important to understand the history of each German state on its own terms, to clarify our understanding of both the Federal Republic and the GDR. A deeper understanding of those separate histories will help both “Wessis” and “Ossis,” as well as outside observers, to appreciate the challenges facing contemporary Germany. The present volume was written with this particular concern in mind. When Germans from the East packed West German embassies in July and August 1989 and risked life and limb to cross into the Federal Republic, they –x–

Preface

voted with their feet to be part of the “West.” Even then, however, many would admit that they did not actually know what being “Western” meant, beyond a vague sense of prosperity and security. Few considered that joining the West meant becoming a member of NATO or the EC, fewer still devoted much thought to the meaning of “the West” in any cultural sense. They wanted to be part of the system that had worked for the Federal Republic, that was all. Once in the Federal Republic, however, they became part of a polity that was and is still wrestling with the meaning of German Westbindung. Thus the history of Westbindung in the Federal Republic is important for both the past and the future of united Germany. This study will contribute to our understanding of Westbindung by examining the policies of Konrad Adenauer and his party, the CDU/CSU, as they shaped the Federal Republic’s relationship to the West from 1949 to 1966. Combining diplomacy and domestic politics, this book will examine the attitudes behind Westbindung, the debates surrounding specific decisions, and the strategies used to gain electoral support for them. Through a closer examination of the West during the Adenauer era, this book will attempt to discuss what “the West” meant in the context of the early Cold War, and to suggest what it might mean in the future. All translations from the German, unless otherwise noted, are mine. Any errors of fact or interpretation are of course my own responsibility.

Notes 1. See, for example, Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann, The Rebirth of the West: The Americanization of the Democratic World, 1945–1958 (Oxford, 1992). 2. Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Cultures (New York, 1996). 3. Kohl quoted in “Ein neues Goethe-Institut mit bester Adresse: Zu Weimar im Hause der Frau vom Stein,” Deutschland Nachrichten, 17 May 1996, 6. 4. Even the neoconservative Committee for the Free World asked such fundamental questions. See Does the “West” Still Exist? (New York, [1990]). 5. Helmut Schmidt, “Vor Alleingängen wird gewarnt,” Die Zeit Overseas Edition 20, no. 3 (20 January 1995): 3, and Daniel Vernet, “Zwei Freunde, die dich fast verstehen,” ibid., no. 16 (21 April 1995): 1. 6. See, most recently, “You Can Be Warriors or Wimps; or So Say the Americans,” The Economist, 10–16 August 2002, 34–44. 7. Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys (Cambridge, 1998); Uta G. Poiger, Jazz, Rock and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany (Berkeley, 2000). 8. Peter Bender, Episode oder Epoche? Zur Geschichte des geteilten Deutschland (Munich, 1996); see also Heinrich August Winkler, Der lange Weg nach Westen: Deutsche Geschichte, 2 vols. (Munich, 2000). – xi –

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Writing a book can be a lonely process, but that does not mean one can do it alone. I would not have been able to finish this project without significant help from a wide range of individuals and institutions. Recognizing the danger of missing an important contributor, I would nevertheless like briefly to express my thanks to the following. I am deeply indebted to my dissertation adviser, Professor Michael E. Geyer, for suggesting that I study postwar Germany in the first place, and for his support and encouragement during the completion of the book, including reading the manuscript at various stages. Research in German archives was made possible by a Federal Chancellor (Bundeskanzler) Scholarship from the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung during the 1993–1994 academic year, and by a follow-up grant from the same program in the summer of 1998. A MacArthur Fellowship from the Committee for Advanced Studies of Peace and International Cooperation (CASPIC) at the University of Chicago provided welcome assistance during the 1995–1996 academic year for writing the dissertation on which this book is based. Furman University’s Research and Professional Growth committee also provided travel assistance in 1998. I am grateful to all these institutions for their generosity. I am also grateful to the staffs at the archives where I conducted my research. I was received everywhere with admirable professionalism and courtesy, making my work a pleasure. Particularly important were the late Engelbert Hommel at the Stiftung Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus in Rhöndorf, Dr. Brigitte Kaff at the Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik in Sankt Augustin, and Dr. Fritz Hopfenmüller at the Archiv für ChristlichSoziale Politik in Munich. Many colleagues have also offered encouragement and scholarly advice, especially Volker Berghahn, Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, Timothy Fehler, Scott Henderson, Hartmut Lehmann, Thomas Maulucci, and Maria Mitchell. I am grateful for their help. Special thanks go to David Spear and Thomas Schwartz, who both read the entire manuscript.

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Acknowledgments

I would also like to thank Marion Berghahn and her staff, with special thanks to Shawn Kendrick for her patience and good humor. Whenever I feared this undertaking would never end, my family provided the love and encouragement that made it possible to continue. My parents, Ronald and Sandra Granieri, made countless sacrifices for me. My father did not live to see the completion of this book, but I hope he knows that I could not have done it without him. Charles and Brenda Vance never wavered in their support for either this project or their son-in-law, earning my deep gratitude along with my love and respect. My wife, Jennifer Vance-Granieri, has been part of this endeavor from the beginning, and has supported me through the most difficult times. Mere words cannot describe how much her love has meant to me over the years. This book, and my life, are dedicated to her.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Used in Notes AA AAP ACDP ACSP AHK Auftakt

BA Becker

BPA Briefe

Bukamt Büro StS DA DH DPA DUD FAZ FRUS

Auswärtiges Amt (German Foreign Office) Hans-Peter Schwarz, ed., Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Munich, 1994ff.). Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik der KonradAdenauer-Stiftung, Sankt Augustin. Archiv für Christlich-Soziale Politik der Hanns-SeidelStiftung, Munich. Hans-Peter Schwarz, ed., Adenauer und Die Hohen Kommissare, 1949–1951, 2 vols. (Munich, 1990). Udo Wengst, ed., Auftakt zur Ära Adenauer: Koalitionsverhandlungen und Regierungsbildung 1949 (Düsseldorf, 1985). Bundesarchiv, Koblenz Felix Becker, ed., Konrad Adenauer, “Die Demokratie ist für uns eine Weltanschauung”: Reden und Gespräche 1946–1967 (Cologne, 1998). Bundespresseamt (German Federal Press Office) Hans-Peter Mensing, ed., Adenauer Rhöndorfer Ausgabe: Briefe, 8 vols. to date (Berlin, 1985ff.). Cited with the years associated with each volume. Bundeskanzleramt (Office of the Federal Chancellor) Büro Staatssekretär (Office of the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Office, Bonn) Deutschland Archiv Diplomatic History Deutsche Presse Agentur Deutschland Union Dienst Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Foreign Relations of the United States – xiv –

Abbreviations

Heidemeyer

HPM Kabinett

KAE KAR KAZ Krone diary Krone Aufzeichnungen

Lenz diary LG

Maier/Thoß

MB NL NYHT NYT NZZ Osterheld I

Osterheld II

PA-AA RIAS StBKAH SZ

Helge Heidemeyer, ed., Die CDU/CSU Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag: Sitzungsprotokolle 1949–1953 (Düsseldorf, 1998). Historisch Politische Mitteilungen Hans Booms et al., eds., Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung, 9 vols. to date (Boppard, 1982ff.). Cited with the year for each volume. Konrad Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 4 vols. (Stuttgart, 1965–1967). Hans-Peter Schwarz, ed., Konrad Adenauer: Reden 1917– 1967 (Stuttgart, 1976). Dieter Blumenwitz et al., eds., Konrad Adenauer und Seine Zeit, 2 vols. (Stuttgart, 1976). Hans-Otto Kleinmann, ed., Heinrich Krone: Tagebücher Erster Band, 1945–1961 (Düsseldorf, 1995). Heinrich Krone, “Aufzeichnungen zur Deutschlandund Ostpolitik 1954–1969,” in Rudolf Morsey and Konrad Repgen, eds., Adenauer-Studien III (Mainz, 1974), 134–200. Klaus Gotto, ed., Im Zentrum der Macht: Das Tagebuch von Staatssekretär Lenz, 1951–1953 (Düsseldorf, 1989). Landesgruppe (CSU delegation within CDU/CSU Fraktion), also used to cite transcripts of meetings, which are housed at the ACSP and are cited with the date of the meeting. Klaus A. Maier and Bruno Thoß, eds., Westintegration, Sicherheit und deutsche Frage: Quellen zur Außenpolitik der Ära Adenauer (Darmstadt, 1994). Minister Büro (Minister’s Office Files, German Foreign Office) Nachlaß (Collected Papers) New York Herald Tribune New York Times Neue Zürcher Zeitung Horst Osterheld, “Ich gehe nicht leichten Herzens …” Adenauers letzte Kanzlerjahre: Ein dokumentarischer Bericht (Mainz, 1986). Horst Osterheld, Außenpolitik unter Bundeskanzler Ludwig Erhard: Ein dokumentarischer Bericht aus dem Kanzleramt (Düsseldorf, 1992). Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Bonn Radio im amerikanischen Sektor (Berlin) Stiftung-Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus, Rhöndorf Süddeutsche Zeitung – xv –

Abbreviations

Teegespräche

Unserem Vaterland Unter vier Augen Verhandlungen VfZ Vorstand I

Vorstand II

Vorstand III

Vorstand IV

Hanns-Jürgen Küsters, ed., Adenauer Rhöndorfer Ausgabe: Teegespräche, 4 vols. (Berlin, 1984–1989). Cited according to the years included in each volume. Hans-Peter Mensing, ed., Theodor Heuss und Konrad Adenauer: Unserem Vaterland zugute: Der Briefwechsel 1948–1963 (Berlin 1989). Hans-Peter Mensing, ed., Konrad Adenauer—Theodor Heuss: Unter vier Augen: Gespräche aus den Gründerjahren (Berlin, 1997). Verhandlungen des deutschen Bundestages Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte Günther Buchstab, ed., Adenauer: “… es mußte alles neu gemacht werden.” Die Protokolle des CDU-Bundesvorstands, 1950–1953 (Stuttgart, 1986). Günther Buchstab, ed., Adenauer: “Wir haben wirklich etwas geschaffen.” Die Protokolle des CDU-Bundesvorstands, 1953–1957 (Düsseldorf, 1990). Günther Buchstab, ed., Adenauer: “… um den Frieden zu gewinnen.” Die Protokolle des CDU-Bundesvorstands, 1957–1961 (Düsseldorf, 1994). Günther Buchstab, ed., Adenauer: “Stetigkeit in der Politik.” Die Protokolle des CDU-Bundesvorstands, 1961–1965 (Düsseldorf, 1998).

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INTRODUCTION: KONRAD ADENAUER AND THE PARADOX OF WESTBINDUNG

In October 1960, in the midst of the Berlin crisis, West German Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer invited French Prime Minister Michel Debré to Bonn to discuss the state of the Atlantic Alliance. Adenauer was concerned that French resistance to NATO military integration under American command threatened Western unity. Debré responded that the organization of the alliance was illegitimate, placing Europeans at the mercy of strategic and political decisions made in Washington. This American “power monopoly” robbed European governments of autonomy and sapped Europeans’ will to defend themselves, weakening the very alliance that integration was intended to strengthen. Only a Europe freed from American dominance could be true to both its American ally and its own interests, Debré concluded. Adenauer rejected this gloomy assessment, countering that integration actually encouraged European political stability. “The closer European states are allied with America, the stronger their domestic position will become …,” he argued. “Even if one sacrifices some military authority to integration, he gains so much internal authority among his own people.” There could be no security against a nuclear-armed Soviet Union without the US and its nuclear arsenal, so only integration into the American-led alliance could guarantee European security. Such security would in turn translate into public gratitude toward governments that advanced integration and would fortify their domestic position. Integration in the American system would thus lead not to political apathy and enervation, but to the creation of strong and stable governments in Europe. “In any case,” Adenauer concluded modestly, “I have won three elections doing this.”1 Two years later, Adenauer had a very different discussion with American National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy. Now it was Adenauer who challenged American claims to know what was best for Europe. Why, he asked Bundy, did the Americans oppose the French nuclear force de frappe while accepting—even encouraging—a British nuclear force? European self-reliance within the alliance would only strengthen the West, Adenauer –1–

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argued. When Bundy advocated British membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) as part of President Kennedy’s “Grand Design” for Europe, Adenauer was unreceptive. The British, according to Adenauer, did not consider themselves Europeans, preferring to draw on the Commonwealth and act as a world power, and he doubted the sincerity of their enthusiasm for European integration. He counseled Bundy to remember that Britain and France were rivals for European leadership, and the Americans should mediate rather than take the British side. As outsiders in Europe, the Americans and British needed to be more tactful and respectful of French and European concerns, rather than forcing them to accept a larger Atlantic community. Adenauer’s argument was a clear challenge to the Kennedy administration’s policy. Even more clear was Bundy’s response. After listening to Adenauer discuss Anglo-French rivalry, Bundy bluntly informed him that it would be best for the Europeans to accept American leadership and the American “nuclear umbrella,” and put aside their national interests. A separate European identity within the alliance was neither practical nor sensible in light of world realities. Too weak individually or collectively to stand on their own, Europeans needed to see that their true interests lay in Atlantic cooperation, even submission to their American patron. “For at least the next 15 years,” Bundy declared, “the leading power in Europe will be neither Britain, nor France, nor Germany. It will be the United States of America.”2 According to witnesses, Adenauer was extremely irritated by Bundy’s assertion of American dominance. In later discussions during his remaining year in office, he often returned to these comments as proof of American indifference to European concerns.3 In an ironic historical inversion, he used Bundy’s comments as the inspiration for a long criticism of American policy during a June 1963 meeting with French Ambassador Roland de Margerie in Bonn. Where Debré had had to listen to a lecture on the advantages of Atlantic solidarity, de Margerie heard Adenauer discourse upon the need for greater Franco-German cooperation to protect European interests. De Margerie, ever the diplomat, was circumspect enough to avoid commenting that neither he nor his government needed much convincing. If Adenauer was aware of the irony, he gave no sign.4 Adenauer’s comments in these discussions reflect both sides of a debate that took place within the West during the Cold War. The comments to Debré are a textbook statement of what has become known as “Atlanticism,” the ideology endorsing the integration of Western Europe into the world system dominated by the US. This wide-ranging network of relations, including both formal political organizations and complex ties of culture, trade, exchange, and consumption, is properly seen as one of the most significant products of the postwar era. Atlanticism as an international and domestic ideology served the dual purpose of defending participants from any real or imagined Communist threat and promoting the reconstruction –2–

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of Western European economics and politics according to an American model. As defined by Mary Kaldor, Atlanticism remade European society through “a commitment to parliamentarianism and a form of managed capitalism which combined a liberal international economy with state interventionism at home” while developing a “common interest in combating the Soviet threat,” as defined by the US.5 Atlanticism encouraged the creation of a stable system that all but eliminated major upheaval within the industrialized world. Institutions from NATO to student exchanges reinforced Atlanticism by creating a transnational political elite committed to preserving the values and structures of the community.6 The price Western Europeans paid for membership in this stable system was acceptance of American geopolitical and economic hegemony. For some, this price was too high. American hegemony, necessary and welcome in the immediate postwar period, created friction between the US and its European allies. Latent resentment of American leadership, combined with dreams of a more independent Europe between the superpowers, encouraged the development of an alternative ideology within the West. Eventually labeled “Gaullism” in recognition of its most prominent advocate, French President Charles de Gaulle, it rejected American tutelage and pursued an independent Continental policy within a broad (if only vaguely defined) Western alliance.7 As Debré told Adenauer, the Gaullists, while pledging support to the West, sought to limit “Anglo-Saxon” influence at all levels, from high politics to popular culture, to preserve a uniquely Continental European identity, excluding the British Isles and Scandinavia. The US would be outside this community, an ally against the East but not a dominant leader. Comparing Adenauer’s comments at different moments, the reader is faced with a paradox. How could the same man at one time sound like a committed Atlanticist and at another like a Gaullist? Adenauer enjoyed a well-earned reputation as an agile politician who had learned through his fifty-year political career to tailor statements to his audience and circumstances. He is alleged, for example, to have responded to a reporter’s question about an apparent contradiction: “What do I care about the stupid thing I said yesterday?” In foreign affairs, however, he made his reputation as a tireless advocate of stability, drawing contrasts with Germany’s history of a “see-saw policy” (Schaukelpolitik) between East and West. For Adenauer, the Germans had to make a choice after 1945, and the choice was clear. When asked in a 1960 television interview what he considered his most important decision in office, he unhesitatingly cited the decision “to ally ourselves firmly with the free West.”8 The shape of this “free West” and the relationship between its members, however, remained fluid, which is the source of the paradox. For in the same television interview, Adenauer responded to a question of whether the dream of a completely integrated Europe would ever be realized by declaring: –3–

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“Certainly! And thank God the United States will help us do it.” This statement could be read as a declaration of Atlantic solidarity, hinting at continued close relations between the US and an integrated Europe. What, however, was to be the ultimate purpose of this integrated Europe? His television interviewer did not pose this question, but at other times Adenauer offered answers suggesting greater distance from the US. On his way to a landslide reelection in 1957, for example, he trumpeted the importance of European integration “so that we Europeans can again have a large economic area, can have influence in the world, and so that we can preserve our European culture [and] share it with other peoples, including the Americans.”9 If the US was an important and welcome partner in the creation of the new Europe, it nonetheless remained separate, an outsider who could benefit from a dose of European culture. The apparent paradox in Adenauer’s words is also reflected in his actions. As the leader of a German government that depended on American aid and protection and hosted several hundred thousand American troops, Adenauer was obviously aware of the advantages of Atlanticism. A tireless advocate of West German membership in the Atlantic Alliance, Adenauer cultivated close relationships with American leaders and used public events to emphasize his good relations with Washington. Allying the Federal Republic with the West (Westbindung) was for Adenauer both a political and a moral/ideological imperative that would help the Germans overcome their past and become respected members of the international community. This combination of practical calculation and ideological preference made the chancellor and his party, the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (collectively known as the CDU/CSU or “the Union”), the foremost advocates of Westbindung. After their narrow victory in the first West German elections in 1949, Adenauer and the Union made a conscious choice to pursue close integration into the American-led system, and, as Adenauer indicated to Debré, they were rewarded by a grateful electorate with a series of impressive victories, making the Union the leading governing party for the Federal Republic’s first two decades. His advocacy of close relations with the West even won Adenauer the dubious honor of being labeled “Chancellor of the Allies” by his greatest political foe, Social Democratic Party (SPD) Chair Kurt Schumacher.10 As we have seen, however, if Adenauer advanced the Atlanticist cause, he could also act very much like a Gaullist, both before and after his discussion with Debré. Only three months before that meeting, for example, Adenauer had met with President de Gaulle at the latter’s country residence in Rambouillet, and had expressed general agreement with de Gaulle’s vision of a largely independent Europe and rejection of supranational and Atlantic integration.11 In January 1963, a few months after his conversation with Bundy, Adenauer joined de Gaulle in concluding a treaty that cemented FrancoGerman cooperation, over American and British objections. Adenauer’s last –4–

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years would be marked by his growing dissatisfaction with American policy and by increasing public criticism of the United States.12 It is emblematic of this estrangement that this man, whose name is associated with bringing the Federal Republic into the Atlantic Alliance, ended his public career with a February 1967 speech in Madrid declaring: “The interests of Europe and the United States are not always identical, and the European states must use European integration to advance their own interests.”13 Contemporary critics of Adenauer considered these manifestations of Gaullism a response to the policies of the Kennedy administration. Some attributed them to the aging chancellor’s nostalgia for Europe’s glory days as the center of the world, a nostalgia shared with the old-fashioned president of France. British historian A. J. P. Taylor, for example, derided Adenauer and de Gaulle as “[t]wo old gentlemen … lost … in the dreams of their youth,” calling their “Franco-German community built on Roman Catholic conservatism … the fantasy of a world which has passed away.”14 Many historical treatments of the Adenauer era have adopted this perspective. One historian, paraphrasing American officials, characterized the Adenauer-de Gaulle relationship as a “geriatric romance.”15 The contention that Adenauer became more Gaullist as he aged and became estranged from the Kennedy administration has some merit in a broad sense. It is certainly true that developments in the 1960s, especially after the building of the Berlin Wall, led to serious differences within the Atlantic Alliance. It is also true that de Gaulle’s return to power in France, with his suspicion of American domination and his willingness to take controversial stands against his Anglo-Saxon allies, made it easier for European critics of American policy to speak their minds. These differences did not, however, simply spring from the fevered imaginations of two relics of the nineteenth century. Enthusiasm for closer Continental European solidarity and suspicion of the long-term goals of the United States and Great Britain were limited neither to the early 1960s nor to a small circle of nostalgic old men. For all his force of personality and his visibility as a statesman, Charles de Gaulle did not invent “Gaullism,” at least not insofar as the term implies a preference for a Europe independent of an Atlantic community. Concerns about the ultimate structure of the West were part of the drive for European integration in the first place. While agreeing that (Western) Europe’s best interests would be served by closer political and economic cooperation, Europeans often differed over whether this more integrated Europe would function as part of a broader Atlantic community or as an independent “Third Force” between the competing ideologies of American-style capitalism and Soviet-style communism.16 As Adenauer’s 1957 comments reveal, recognition of differences between Europe and the Anglo-Saxons was current even before de Gaulle’s return to office. Part of the problem is the term “Gaullism” itself. Although it can be useful as shorthand for a complicated ideology,17 its identification with General –5–

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de Gaulle obscures its lengthier intellectual pedigree. The use of the terms “Gaullism” and “Atlanticism” as polar opposites also implies a clear division that may not have existed. General de Gaulle himself, critical as he was of the Atlantic Alliance, recognized the value of that alliance, even as he separated France from its military structure. One of his last acts in office, for example, was to renew French membership in NATO in 1969. For the Germans, the division between Atlanticism and Gaullism was even more blurry. The Federal Republic’s obvious dependence on American forces for its defense, and American-sponsored trading agreements for its prosperity, not to mention the moral difficulties attendant on any German effort to pursue a policy of national grandeur, made it difficult for any responsible German to consider breaking Atlantic ties, however much they might complain about American policy and wish for greater European independence.18 Adenauer himself, recognizing this, forbade the use of the terms “Atlanticist” and “Gaullist” in his presence, claiming that they were “irresponsible” press creations. He argued that his criticisms were aimed at American policies that displayed an insufficient understanding of European interests, and sprang from a disappointed desire for closer cooperation. If the Americans were not interested in an equal partnership, he reasoned, then Europe needed to become stronger in order to defend its own interests.19 These terms can still be useful as broad definitions of attitudes, but recognizing their fluidity suggests that the paradoxical combination of Atlanticism and Gaullism in Adenauer’s statements cannot be explained solely by reference to circumstances and advancing age. The paradox sprang from the very heart of Adenauer’s policy of Westbindung. On the surface, Westbindung appeared unequivocal. Adenauer rejected any accommodation with the Soviet bloc and any plans for European neutral zones that would have separated the Federal Republic from the West. If the commitment to the West was unequivocal, however, the meaning of the West was much less so. Though Adenauer and the Union publicly defended Westbindung as the best way to provide a secure and stable community within which the Federal Republic could regain its sovereignty, the shape of that community was open to discussion. Different groups within the Union had different conceptions of the West. While using a common vocabulary and sharing the same roster of enemies, advocates of these differing conceptions competed for control of policy on topics as fundamental as the scope and direction of European integration, the proper division of responsibility within NATO, and the role of the Federal Republic in East-West détente. Their competition revealed a profound ambivalence about the proper relationship between the Federal Republic, an integrating Europe, and the US, an ambivalence common, at different levels of intensity, across Europe. This ambivalence is an important concept for expanding our understanding of European development since 1945, drawing on recent trends in scholarship. Recent studies of the Cold War have discussed whether –6–

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American hegemony constituted an “Empire by Invitation,” with Europeans encouraging the US to assume its imperial role in order to enjoy the security of American protection.20 Despite problems with the concept, the ensuing debate has helped shape our understanding of subsequent events. Scholars have come to appreciate that individual states possessed an important degree of autonomy in shaping their contributions to the West, encouraging greater interest in European perspectives, beyond decisions made in Washington.21 An appreciation of the complex interchange across the Atlantic, respecting the significance of both American and European policy, has also inspired a new boom in studies of the processes of “Americanization” or “Westernization” in postwar Europe. The difficulties inherent in providing precise definitions for these terms has actually increased their intellectual value, as scholars who agree that profound changes occurred in European life after 1945 seek a common analytical framework for understanding them.22 The difference between these terms reflects the ambivalence of the European-American relationship. Were the changes that took place in European politics and society after 1945 the product of broad trends in the development of the West, or were they specifically American imports? The answer to that initial question would help shape European responses to the larger phenomenon, as Europeans had to determine how these changes affected Europe’s identity and autonomous place in the world. The initial popularity of American aid for European economic and political reconstruction is beyond question. At the same time, however, the very significance of the European-American relationship raised serious questions about what should happen when/if Europe could consider itself “reconstructed.” Although they certainly desired the security and stability of an alliance with the US, most Europeans neither saw nor comported themselves as imperial provinces. The conflict between unity and autonomy has become even more significant since the end of the Cold War, as issues ranging from cultural exports to global antiterror strategies expose tensions over the proper balance between American and European interests. Recognizing the complexity of the European-American relationship in the contemporary world should encourage us to reexamine the cultural and generational conflicts beneath the united image of the West during the Cold War. Fearing that public disagreements would weaken the alliance against the Soviet Union, Americans and Europeans often hid their differences behind general formulas, speaking of the West as one unified community. Nevertheless, members of that community had different visions of its shape at different times, leading to bitter internal quarrels that sometimes spilled over into the public arena. Much work remains to be done on these quarrels that arose during the construction of the postwar West. Such reexamination should also help us to understand the intersection between politics and culture. The development of –7–

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the postwar West was not simply a function of politics. Europeans also had to respond to growing American cultural influence, which created friction, as Europeans had to decide what, if anything, remained distinctly “European” within the West, sometimes in opposition to the messages received from across the Atlantic.23 This struggle to define European identity was also generational, as younger Europeans, disillusioned by the war and occupation, turned both to American popular culture and to the idea of a united Europe to replace the failed nationalism of the past. Resolving tensions between these two ideals, however, was difficult, and had to be worked out within the postwar political architecture of the West. Political structures such as NATO were thus both avenues of cultural exchange and forums for resolving tensions on the cultural as well as the political level. The story of those tensions—the hidden history of the Cold War— deserves closer attention. At a recent conference on contemporary German history, one scholar complained that, despite a flood of recent work on postwar history, “[t]he domestic and foreign policy conceptions of [German] politicians … have received little attention.”24 The purpose of this book is to examine a part of that hidden history by analyzing the competing political conceptions that motivated Adenauer and the Union during the construction of German Westbindung. The Union’s commanding position in the government of the Federal Republic until 1969 and Adenauer’s role as the first chancellor make them logical subjects for such a study. Of course, Westbindung had implications for all West German political parties and institutions, which struggled to find their places in the postwar order. It would strain the limits of one book to discuss all parties equally. This study is intended to encourage further work on those other parties as well. The internal debates within the Union about the West would have an enormous impact on German and European politics, magnifying Adenauer’s role as chancellor and CDU chair in managing them. To understand the relationship between Adenauer, the Union, and Westbindung, therefore, one needs to take a closer look at Westbindung as a subject of historical inquiry, before moving on to an examination of the Union and its leader.

The Federal Republic of Germany and the Making of the Cold War West The Federal Republic offers an especially interesting case study in the development of postwar European-American relations. Westbindung was the subject of intense contemporary debate, and has provided a rich source of political and historical dispute ever since. Scholars generally agree that a pro-Western anticommunist consensus was a key element in the stability of West German democracy. The Federal Republic’s geopolitical position, status as an occupied state until 1955, and continued security –8–

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dependence on its occupier/allies after 1955 reinforced the connection between foreign and domestic policy. As SPD Chair Kurt Schumacher put it in 1945: “The contest over foreign policy is at the same time the contest over internal policy and the social content of the political order.… Foreign policy sets the limits to the possibilities of our economic and social policy.”25 Adenauer used almost the same words when he told reporters a decade later: “Everything depends on foreign policy … the entire economy, what we accomplish in social policy….” Forging closer relations with the liberal democracies of the West was also a commitment to creating a liberal democratic order at home.26 As the leading power in the West, and the dominant cultural, political, and economic force in Germany, the US was immensely influential, and has played a central role in the scholarship on “America’s Germany.”27 Westbindung and the alliance with the US were not simply aspects of foreign policy; they were a key source of the Federal Republic’s identity. The significance of Westbindung in transforming postwar Germany intensified the controversies that accompanied it. Andreas Hillgruber, one of the most eminent postwar German historians, emphasized that choosing close ties to the West was a break with traditional German policy.28 This break could be justified with references to the Cold War division of Europe and the absence of realistic alternatives, but it remained controversial. The center of contemporary disputes about Westbindung was its connection to national reunification, because choosing sides in the Cold War meant rejecting, at least in the short term, national unity. Even as Adenauer argued that an alliance with the West would eventually force the Soviets to give up their satellites, he admitted that this was at best a long-term goal (his most common prediction was that it would take “ten to fifteen years”) and urged the Germans to be patient.29 Adenauer and the Union rejected plans to trade Westbindung for immediate unification, attracting criticism from those who advocated a more active national policy. The controversy over the relationship between Westbindung and reunification dominated the political debates of the 1950s, and continues to divide scholars into hostile camps. On the one side are those who argue that Union leaders consciously placed ties to the West over national unity. Adenauer is especially singled out for opprobrium as a “Rhineland separatist” whose hostility to Prussia and lack of interest in Protestant East Germany made him reject unity.30 A branch of this school searches West German history to “rediscover” political figures who opposed Adenauer, describing them with an air of nostalgic regret for lost opportunities.31 The other side in this debate portrays Adenauer’s policy as a combination of realism and vision, a triumph of tenacity and patience that paid off when the Soviet bloc collapsed in 1989. Though not always completely comfortable in defending Adenauer’s methods, these authors, as well as Adenauer’s self-proclaimed political “grandchildren,” deny that Westbindung was based –9–

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on a willful disregard of German national interest. Quoting Adenauer’s predictions that patience and commitment to the West would eventually lead the Soviets to admit defeat, his defenders point to reunification as the ultimate justification for Westbindung.32 The debate over who was most committed to national unification is, unsurprisingly, as much political as scholarly. Adenauer and the Union based many election campaigns on the argument that only their vision of Westbindung could defend Germany from the Soviet threat, often charging that the opposition was at best misguided and at worst actively conspiring to undermine West German security. In one famous speech in 1957, Adenauer charged that SPD plans to replace NATO with a European security system would mean “the end of Germany.”33 Such attacks polarized the West German electorate and intelligentsia. This polarization increased during the strident arguments over Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik in the early 1970s, when Union politicians accused Brandt and the SPD of betraying Germany’s national interests in pursuit of détente. The bitter attacks on Brandt led some to turn the charge of national unreliability back upon Adenauer, citing his failure to pursue a constructive Ostpolitik of his own. Thus, one’s attitude toward Adenauer’s policies became a reflection of one’s position in the political debates of the 1970s and 1980s. It is therefore not surprising that the author of one of the first critical analyses of Adenauer’s governing style and policy went on, at the behest of Brandt’s partner, Federal President Walter Scheel, to write one of the first historical treatments of Brandt’s government.34 Nor is it surprising that Helmut Kohl often drew direct connections between his policies and those of his party’s patriarch, and even edited an early scholarly attempt to analyze Adenauer’s life and work.35 A glance across the German-German border suggests that there was a degree of parallelism between the two states. The same apparent choice between stabilization of their own system and reunification also faced the government of the GDR. As recent work by Michael Lemke has shown, Walter Ulbricht and the GDR leadership chose, mutatis mutandis, to pursue Ostbindung as a way to consolidate their version of “real existing socialism.”36 Though it is important not to underestimate the differences between the two regimes, it is clear that both had to decide how to adapt to the division of Germany and Europe. Research on the development of the GDR is still in its early stages, as scholars take advantage of the recent availability of sources on the regime, and bears close observation, opening the possibility of future comparative studies of the internal dynamics of each German state’s international identity.37 Before comparative work can be truly successful, however, it is important to liberate our understanding of West German history from its heavy political baggage—to use the fresh perspectives offered by reunification to transcend the stale debates that have dominated the historiography of Westbindung. As long as Germany remained divided, the question of who – 10 –

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was to blame for division, and the rush to prove which side had done the most to reverse it, hung over every work on the period. That era has clearly passed. Young representatives of the “New Right” in Germany, advocating a more independent national policy, have recently criticized Westbindung as a choice forced upon the Germans contrary to their national interest.38 The lack of appeal for this position in the scholarly community, however, demonstrates how much the end of Germany’s division has reduced the political divisiveness of the Westbindung discussion. Now that Germany is, in Hagen Schulze’s phrase, “a Western nation like any other,” Westbindung and national unity no longer seem irreconcilable.39 By escaping the Westbindung/reunification dichotomy, it is now possible to take a fresh look at the varieties of German responses to the Cold War, and to engage in a more fruitful dialogue with specialists in other fields about the context in which decisions were made. An examination of this context reveals that in many cases the old dichotomy was based on faulty international and domestic assumptions. On the international level, the dichotomy ignored the degree to which the division of Germany and its alignment with the West were established realities before the Germans had much to say about it. The international constellation after 1945 pointed toward the division of Germany, even as the occupying powers continued to speak of their responsibility for “Germany as a whole.” The division of Germany and Europe can be considered a practical fact from the time of the Marshall Plan, which signaled a divergence in European economic and political development, or at least from the 1948 currency reform in the Western zones of occupation.40 These decisions undermined four-power cooperation, and made German reunification increasingly unlikely. From this perspective, the creation of the Federal Republic in May 1949 was the culmination, rather than the initiation, of the process that left Europe divided for four decades. The premises of superpower rivalry, and especially the logic of American plans for domestic and world economic recovery, made the division of Germany more appealing than four-power cooperation.41 While both the US and the USSR sought to stabilize their spheres of influence, neither was interested in a settlement that would force it to give up any part of those spheres.42 The division of Germany fit well into the Western policy of “double containment,” that is, restraining both Soviet expansionism and German nationalism, and provided a way to draw on German strength while keeping the Germans themselves under control.43 Western leaders were plagued by images of a German return to a “see-saw” between East and West or another “Rapallo” arrangement that would unite Germany and Russia, and were determined to anchor the Federal Republic firmly into their sphere.44 Double containment turned the Federal Republic, in Hermann-Josef Rupieper’s pithy phrase, into an “occupied ally.” The problem of reunification, so important to the Germans, was of marginal interest to their allies, – 11 –

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especially as the developing European stalemate led to the conclusion that there were no peaceful alternatives to division.45 This is not to say that the allies were always hostile to reunification, only that they were not prepared to allow German desire for reunification to threaten the international order. Alliance politics, however, dictated that they had to respect German opinion in order to secure German cooperation, even when calls for reunification were increasingly distant from political reality. The trick for German governments was to keep the reunification issue legally and rhetorically open while still enjoying the benefits of participation in this Western system. An appreciation of this international context, the product of relating work on American foreign policy to studies on German politics, blunts some of the more vitriolic attacks on Westbindung. However one may feel about the world situation after 1947, it would be difficult to deny that superpower rivalry placed severe limitations on German freedom of action. To charge that German advocates of Westbindung were primarily responsible for dividing the nation is to ignore the international constellation after 1945.46 If a German statesman was responsible for this situation, it is clearly not Konrad Adenauer, but Adolf Hitler. A clearer understanding of the international context also reveals the second faulty assumption that needs correction. Where critics of Westbindung tended to ignore the international context in their search for villains, defenders tended to underestimate the domestic consensus in favor of cooperation with the West in their search for heroes. Despite Adenauer’s sometimes demagogic rhetoric, acceptance of ties with the West was by no means limited to the Union. Every West German political party (except the Communists) voted to accept Marshall Plan aid, and thus made some sort of commitment to the West. Anticommunism, a desire to secure American reconstruction aid, and a commitment to some form of European cooperation were shared aspects of West German political culture.47 Even the SPD, whose leader Kurt Schumacher had a rocky relationship with American leaders worried about his nationalism, recognized that the Americans were an important source of security against Soviet encroachments on German democracy.48 Even after Schumacher’s death in 1952, when the SPD took a more pacifist line and argued for an “alliance-free” reunited Germany, its leaders were quick to argue that they did not want to separate Germany from the culture and values of the West. Rather, they believed it was possible to be tied to the West while escaping the military blocs dividing Europe. Unable to convince either the allies or the West German electorate, the SPD eventually accepted the domestic and international policies of the Adenauer government, endorsing the “social market economy” at their Bad Godesberg party conference in 1959 and NATO membership in 1960.49 The SPD’s gradual acceptance of the political and ideological premises of Westbindung (a subject that itself requires further research) was mirrored by the behavior of other parties, who also adjusted to changed political – 12 –

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realities. Accommodation was possible, however, only because of a general consensus in favor of cooperation with the West. Agreement on the need for cooperation with the liberal democracies, opposition to the model offered by the Soviet bloc, and the external constraints of the international system left opponents few alternatives. Contrary to the view that posits fundamental differences between advocates and opponents of Westbindung, a clearer understanding of the domestic and international contexts reveals a debate over means rather than ends, over the best route toward a common goal, the integration of the Federal Republic into the political, cultural, and economic community of the West. This is not to argue that there was no opposition to Westbindung, either within the Union or in the West German polity, for such opposition certainly did exist. The purpose is, rather, to shift the discussion away from the focus on the Westbindung/reunification duality and the retrospective search for heroes and villains that has obscured other approaches to the history of the Adenauer era. Recognizing the dominant role played by Westbindung in the development of the Federal Republic and the broad consensus in favor of some connection to the West makes it more important to understand the particular form that Westbindung assumed under Adenauer. Hindered by history and international realities from pursuing an independent national policy, most Germans saw in the West—and especially the popular concept of European integration—a “ladder” for escaping postwar misery and advancing national interests without threatening their neighbors.50 How this ladder was to be constructed was the most important question, and it was around this question that the political debate raged. This brings us back to Konrad Adenauer and the CDU/CSU, the architects of Westbindung in that formative period of postwar German history. To appreciate the shape and scope of Westbindung, and to understand the historical narrative to follow, it is necessary to understand the variety of attitudes within the Union toward the West and the role which Adenauer played within the Union. It is to these topics that we will now turn.

Das Abendland or Der Westen: The Union and the West The formation of the CDU/CSU was one of the most important developments in German political history. Building on the ideals and leadership of the Catholic Center, the Bavarian People’s Party, and a variety of prewar liberal, conservative and moderate parties, the Union represented both the culmination of a long-standing dream of uniting Catholic and Protestant Germans in a single “Christian” party and the emergence of a new force in German politics, the “catch-all” or “people’s party” (Volkspartei). Nonideological in the traditional sense, the Union appealed to voters of all classes and confessions within a broad democratic consensus. The nature of the – 13 –

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party reflected the circumstances of its origin in divided Germany. In contrast to the SPD, which could claim a long historical pedigree and in the West came quickly under the control of the reconstructed party headquarters in Hanover, the Union was the product of disparate movements spread across Germany that converged in the immediate aftermath of the German defeat.51 This diversity inspired both respect and derision. Writing in 1946, a French newspaper quipped: “This party is socialist and radical in Berlin, clerical and conservative in Cologne, capitalist and reactionary in Hamburg, and counterrevolutionary and particularistic in Munich.”52 Local electoral successes in 1946 and 1947 helped the Union rise to national importance, culminating in victory in the 1949 Bundestag elections. Beyond an informal “working group,” however, the creation of a federal organization did not come until the first national congress of the CDU in October 1950, when Konrad Adenauer, chair of the CDU in the British occupation zone, was elected national chair. In keeping with Bavarian traditions, the CSU remained formally distinct from its larger counterpart, existing only in Bavaria and allying with the CDU at the national level to form a common Bundestag parliamentary group (Fraktion), while also maintaining a separate Landesgruppe of Bavarian representatives within the Fraktion.53 What brought the diverse movements together and set the Union apart from its competitors was its self-image as a Christian party, which allowed it to claim parts of a rich tradition in German politics while separating itself from the “materialist” traditions of socialism, communism, and especially National Socialism.54 Emphasis on Christian principles served two purposes. First, it allowed the Union to develop a political identity that separated it from the Nazi past. By claiming descent from traditional political Catholicism and Christian morality, the Union could claim to represent the “other Germany,” distinct from Prussia and its Nazi stepchild. The connection of many founders of the Union to the resistance against Hitler was often used as proof of the unblemished historical pedigree of Christian Democracy.55 The explicit reference to Christian values also served a direct political purpose. By attacking “materialism” as the opposite of Christianity, Union speakers indicted not only the Nazis and the Soviets, but also their largest political competition in the new Germany, the SPD. Kurt Schumacher unintentionally contributed to the success of this argument with vitriolic attacks on organized religion and especially the Catholic Church. His references to the Church as the “fifth occupying power” in Germany disturbed religious voters, even those within the SPD’s target audience of workers, making them more receptive to the Union’s message.56 In time the SPD would develop its own appeal to religious voters with emphases on social justice and peace, but until then, the Union enjoyed virtually unanimous support among devout Catholics and Protestants. Although the Union included an important “Christian Socialist” wing drawn from Christian labor unions, the distinction between Christian and – 14 –

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materialist conceptions of society allowed the Union to integrate this labor wing while separating itself from the SPD. The Union thus became a political home for large segments of the German electorate. It offered a democratic alternative of the center/right, a process repeated by other Christian Democratic parties across Western Europe.57 In this way the Union made an important contribution to the reconstruction and stabilization of the West German political system, holding together groups that had splintered during the Weimar Republic and hindering the development of a right-wing antidemocratic party. This pleased the Western powers, especially the US, who encouraged the creation of such moderate, broad-based parties to secure postwar German democratization.58 Building on its ideological foundation, which clearly rejected cooperation with the Soviets, the Union was an enthusiastic exponent of Westbindung. Within this consensus, however, there existed competing conceptions of the West. Two terms summarize these divergent conceptions. One group was committed to das christliche Abendland, the “Christian West,” essentially those areas of Continental Europe regarded as the cradle of humanist civilization, distinct from the Anglo-American world. The other preferred to speak of der Westen in general, including the US and Great Britain. The former group considered European integration as a primary goal, an end in itself, with the US and Britain as friendly outsiders, while the latter preferred to view European integration as the first step toward an Atlantic community. In these competing conceptions of the West, we see the origins of the later division into “Gaullists” and “Atlanticists.” As a self-proclaimed Christian party, it was obvious that the Union would include many who focused on the protection of das christliche Abendland. It is a difficult concept to define. Although Abendland can be translated as “the West,” as in Oswald Spengler’s Der Untergang des Abendlandes, its actual meaning, as with such other German words as Volk or Gestalt, is more complex.59 When a German spoke of the Abendland, he or she might mean the West as distinct from the East, but not the West of the Enlightenment or the French Revolution. Rather, this is the culture of medieval Continental Europe, above both the alleged barbarity of the East and the materialist secularism of the West. It is a concept associated with German intellectual life before World War I, and could have seemed completely out of place in the mid-twentieth century. Nevertheless, it actually gained popularity amid the physical and moral devastation of postwar Europe, in opposition to both secularism and Soviet totalitarianism. Both conservatives such as Romano Guardini and liberals such as Wilhelm Röpke embraced the concept of the Abendland as an expression of Europe’s distinct cultural mission to rebuild a shattered world.60 Contemporary critics might joke that “even the Catholics” did not really believe in “that Abendland nonsense [Abendländerei],”61 but for many Germans, especially Catholics in the Union, this vision of a special European – 15 –

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cultural identity and mission corresponded with their conception of the Union as the barrier to materialism. The ideology of the Abendland provided a powerful rallying point for Union enthusiasts for European integration. An example is a CDU rally in the Palatinate in October 1948, which included appearances by representatives of the French MRP and the Dutch Catholic Party. Despite the absence of any formal German government, all speakers moved beyond local politics to emphasize their commitment to European cooperation. As the Union press service concluded: “Here a German political party rally expands into an international declaration of will, which finds its complete expression in the political reorganization of Europe out of the spirit of Christian Humanism.”62 Visions of protecting the Abendland held special appeal for Catholics and for Germans from the South and West in particular, those areas and people least comfortable in the old German empire and most accustomed to looking across Germany’s borders to cooperation with their Western European neighbors. As fate would have it, precisely those elements predominated within the Federal Republic, where the collapse of traditional nationalism left a political and intellectual vacuum, especially among young people. The Union filled that void by emphasizing European integration. While Social Democrats and Liberals voiced skepticism about “little Europe,” Union politicians became the most enthusiastic supporters of early integration schemes, finding natural allies in the other Christian Democratic parties of the Continent. Informal meetings between European Christian Democrats in Geneva from 1947 to 1956 laid the groundwork for interparty and intergovernmental cooperation. This “black international” became the most active supporter of European integration, a movement represented in the early 1950s by the three most prominent Christian Democratic statesmen in Europe: Robert Schuman in France, Alcide De Gasperi in Italy, and Adenauer.63 It is important to recognize that this bias toward Continental cooperation was part of the very nature of the Union, rather than solely a product of later controversies. As we will see in the following chapters, at various points in the history of Westbindung, members of the Union expressed their commitment to a separate European identity and their reluctance to accept submersion in a larger Atlantic system. They were at the very least skeptical about American culture and American intentions toward Europe. While these sentiments cannot always be labeled anti-American, they represent a powerful school within the Union that preferred to think of (Western) European integration as an end in itself, distinct from the Atlantic world. The other wing of the Union offered a different view of the West, one that relied less on philosophical antimaterialism and more on the desire for prosperity and reconstruction. If the Abendland wing represented the party’s ideological/emotional wellsprings, the Atlantic wing represented its more pragmatic side. The Union’s 1949 adoption of the Düsseldorfer Leitsätze, which made the neoliberal Social Market Economy of Ludwig Erhard its – 16 –

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official economic policy, marked a departure from the “Christian socialism” of earlier pronouncements.64 By endorsing the Social Market Economy and export-driven capitalist production, the Union placed itself firmly against all socialist economic planning and won the support of German business interests. Its 1949 election strategy followed this line, and the decision to pursue a “little coalition” with the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) was made with explicit reference to their commitment to a market-driven economy. A commitment to neoliberal economics at home also carried implications for foreign policy. Erhard advocated free trade above all, transatlantic economic ties, and a more instrumental approach to European integration. For Erhard, the US was not simply a distant protector, but a positive model for the future of Germany and Europe. “Economic mistakes and economic sins cannot be healed by proclaiming them European … we can only achieve our political and economic goals through the closest cooperation with the United States and Great Britain …,” he once wrote to Adenauer.65 Erhard and his adherents within the Union, along with sympathetic business groups such as the powerful Bundesverband der deutschen Industrie (BDI) supported early efforts at European integration, but were considerably less entranced by the vision of a unified Abendland. They preferred an Atlantic community that de-emphasized religious-philosophical speculations in favor of pragmatic cooperation, and rejected an exclusive Continental focus.66 This position, originally endorsed by more secular liberals, especially North German Protestants, as well as export-oriented segments of the economy, would gain adherents through the course of the 1950s. By the 1960s, the secularization of German society and the prosperity unleashed by the “economic miracle” reduced the appeal of the Abendland, especially among the younger generation, opening a new liberal era in Germany.67 This division of the Union into advocates of das Abendland and der Westen intentionally leaves one perspective out of the discussion, namely, those members of the Union who expressed a commitment to reunification above all. The “national” wing, drawn especially from the founders of the CDU in Berlin, has been the subject of much research, reflecting the earlier focus on the Westbindung/reunification dichotomy. Most prominent was Jakob Kaiser, Catholic labor official and cofounder of the CDU in the Soviet zone. Kaiser served as minister for all-German affairs in the first two Adenauer cabinets, and distinguished himself in the immediate postwar years with his argument that Germany needed to play its historic role as a “bridge” between East and West. Even after the superpower stalemate robbed this conception of its practical basis, Kaiser remained a tireless advocate of reunification, sometimes leading him into conflict with the rest of the party.68 Some authors have tried to set up a conflict within the Union between Adenauer and Kaiser as symbols of the choice between Westbindung and reunification. The dichotomy, however, is as overdrawn in this specific case as it is in general. Kaiser went to great pains to assure Adenauer that he did – 17 –

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not deviate from Union policy, despite his agitation for reunification. He considered himself loyal to the chancellor, differing only in details.69 Although Kaiser and other nationalists spoke of reunification, their anticommunism left few alternatives, and their concept of Germany as a bridge also harmonized with conceptions of the Abendland. Furthermore, traditional nationalism enjoyed only limited influence on governmental policy, as one comment from Herbert Blankenhorn, one of Adenauer’s closest aides, indicates. Summarizing the difficult process of drafting a statement on Berlin in 1952, Blankenhorn wryly wrote in his diary: “A draft from Jakob Kaiser ends up in the wastebasket—as usual.”70 A clear look at the international and domestic political contexts indicates that, despite the attention paid to it in the past, the most important division within the Union, where the crucial debates over international orientation occurred, was not between advocates of reunification and advocates of Westbindung, but between the competing conceptions of the West. These differences can be traced back to the Union’s origins, which helps explain both the persistence and the intensity of intraparty conflicts over the direction of Westbindung throughout the Adenauer era. Holding the two wings of the party together was possible as long as the discussion focused on general principles. With agreement on an alliance with the West and some form of European integration, the Union could present a united front in the early Adenauer years. Once the first phase of Westbindung was completed, however, with the achievement of limited sovereignty and NATO membership in 1955, differences became more apparent, leading to the bitter feuds of the 1960s. To say these conflicts were predestined would be too strong. But neither were they merely the product of circumstances. They emerged from a combination of contrasting convictions and responses to events, which we will trace in the chapters that follow.

The Juggler: Konrad Adenauer and the Union An awareness of the variety of “Wests” within the Union helps to illuminate the role played by Adenauer in balancing these competing conceptions, and to explain how it was possible for him to make the contradictory statements cited at the beginning of this introduction. Adenauer’s career has been the subject of two major treatments in the past decade that have highlighted the complexity of his thinking and his skill at political leadership.71 Both praised and damned for his political skills and his sometimes unscrupulous use of power to achieve his ends, Adenauer has been labeled the “fox” of German politics. When it came to managing the Union and West German foreign policy, the fox also needed the skills of a juggler. Adenauer was a clear practitioner of Realpolitik. In a characteristic speech to a delegation from one of Germany’s allies, for example, he declared: – 18 –

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“Alliances are not a matter of emotions; they must be based on a foundation of common political and economic interests and goals. That is the first requirement for their longevity.” Or, as he told a party gathering: “In foreign policy—and this is true of all countries—individual interests are decisive, and we should not assume that anybody is going to help us Germans based on our good looks and charm [um unsere schönen Augen willen].”72 These statements summarize Adenauer’s diplomacy nicely. They take on added meaning when one realizes that he made the first speech not as federal chancellor, but as deputy mayor of Cologne in 1916 before a delegation from Bulgaria, while the second came near the end of his chancellorship in 1963. The extra information reminds the reader that Adenauer already had many experiences behind him before he became chancellor, and that he gained many of these experiences in a world where, as he later wrote, “[t]he United States had no army worth mentioning, no considerable navy, and had not yet entered world politics.”73 That this man of the nineteenth century—as Adenauer, born in 1876, must be described—was able to maneuver so successfully in the complex postwar world was an impressive accomplishment. His skill in managing the Federal Republic’s relations with the US and other allies was a product of his political experience, which taught him the importance of flexibility and of foreign policy as “the art of the possible.”74 He had seen too much to believe that any political circumstance was permanent, and constantly maneuvered to gain the maximum advantage. Adenauer jokingly referred to himself as a “child of the Roman occupation,” in reference to both his age and his roots in the Catholic, western milieu of Cologne.75 His geographical roots helped shape his political conception, combining a firm attachment to the idea of a unified West with a pragmatic evaluation of the European situation and a skepticism about German nationalism. Long an advocate of Franco-German reconciliation, Adenauer was convinced of the importance of European integration. As early as October 1945, he argued that the division of Europe was a “fact,” and that Western Europe and West Germany should recognize it and join together to protect themselves against further encroachments from the East.76 European integration and Western unity were more important than immediate reunification, since a reunited Germany that was not part of the West would be too vulnerable to Soviet power and its own internal devils.77 Germany, by this reasoning, needed to find its place within the Abendland in order to guarantee the creation and stability of democratic structures. While Adenauer’s background marked him as an advocate of the Abendland, his political instincts encouraged him to be open to Atlanticism as well. He was aware of the symbolic and practical importance of close relations with the US, both as a source of security and reconstruction aid and as a symbol of Germany’s return to the family of civilized nations. Thus it is no surprise that Adenauer ended the first volume of his memoirs with an emotional description of his first visit to the United States and the wreath-laying – 19 –

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ceremony at Arlington National Cemetery in April 1953. The presence of the German chancellor in Washington and the warmly respectful welcome that he received from the American public and government were perfect symbolic moments on the road to German rehabilitation. With this in mind, the Union used the images of this visit as a centerpiece of its election propaganda in 1953.78 Adenauer’s flexible conception of the West made it possible for him to balance the competing claims within the Union and to lead it to political successes. He may have been determined that Germany abandon Schaukelpolitik between East and West, but that did not prevent him from engaging in his own version of Schaukelpolitik between the competing factions of his own party.79 He chose his positions based on what appeared most likely to advance German security. When the Europeans appeared unwilling to act decisively to create an integrated Europe, such as when France rejected the European Defense Community in 1954, he was prepared to embrace Atlantic cooperation. When, however, he feared a weakening of Anglo-American commitment to Germany and Europe, he turned to his Continental neighbors, especially France, in search of a stable commitment. With his international prestige and the fabled structures of “Chancellor Democracy,” which strengthened the executive, he was able to hold the Union together as he made these shifts.80 At each turn, he could count on the support of that part of the Union that endorsed the vision of the West most appropriate to the situation. This juggling act was not the only way to handle West German foreign policy, yet it was more than a matter of an old politician’s whim. Adenauer’s flexible conception of the West sprang from his sense of the Federal Republic’s insecure position in the postwar world. While convinced of the importance of Westbindung for the future of the Federal Republic, he was far from sure of the constancy of the West’s commitment to the Germans. Adenauer’s suspicion of his allies—foreign and domestic—was legendary, as was his “nightmare vision” of another Potsdam Conference, an Allied agreement at Germany’s expense.81 Adenauer wanted Germany to be a part of the West, but did not expect his allies always to act with Germany’s interests in mind. As he told a group of journalists in 1953: “I believe we should understand that the Americans … follow an American policy, not a French policy or a German policy.”82 From his perspective, it was only natural that the other states acted in their own interests, and he was determined that his policy be equally fixed on German interests. Maneuvering between the allies and within the Union was necessary, he believed, to maintain the benefits of Westbindung. Although he can be praised for his successes, it is worth noting that Adenauer often engaged in devious behavior. It was a trait he shared with another chancellor with whom he was often compared. As A. J. P. Taylor wrote of Bismarck, one could say that Adenauer “was certainly a political genius,” but “he often displayed the – 20 –

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genius of a pavement-artist who first ties himself up with knots and then brilliantly escapes from them.”83 Adenauer’s vision of Germany corresponded with his conceptions of politics and human nature; that meant he both created problems and solved them, not always in the same proportion. For better or worse, he placed a personal stamp on West German politics with which his successors had to wrestle, often with less success than the man who had bequeathed it. The apparent paradox of Westbindung with which we began this introduction is therefore part of a larger paradox surrounding Konrad Adenauer. For in apparent contrast to his commitment to European integration, and his constant rejections of old-style nationalism, Adenauer remained very much a German statesman, committed to his vision of Germany’s interests. In practical terms, this meant preserving German stability and security, and keeping the German question as open as possible, while maintaining the Federal Republic’s integration into the West. Westbindung was not, as some critics charged, the opposite of a national policy. It was, rather, a form of national policy that sought, through close cooperation with the West, to secure the maximum advantage for the Federal Republic within the context of the Cold War division of the world. Adenauer’s policy of juggling the different conceptions of the West sprang from his insecurity about the Western commitment to the Federal Republic. His insecurity made him much less willing to change the status quo than some of his party allies. Any change would be dangerous because it might encourage the Allies to retreat from their commitment to Germany and seek an arrangement with the Soviets. Adenauer’s opposition to any moves that would relieve the Western powers of their legal commitments to Germany was remarkably consistent, culminating in May 1962 when he both revealed and disavowed the Kennedy administration’s secret plan for a multinational board to control access to Berlin.84 Adenauer’s turn away from Kennedy and toward closer cooperation with de Gaulle after 1962 thus did not reflect a nostalgic yearning for a Carolingian past, but rather was the last in a series of attempts to strike what he considered to be the best balance between Germany’s interests and its ties to the West. In his later years, Adenauer’s power within the Union began to wane and with it his ability to control the balance between the competing conceptions of the West within the party. As the opposition parties, especially the SPD, embraced Westbindung, they ceased to provide the necessary “bad example” against which Adenauer could rally the Union. Adenauer was so successful in shaping the West German political consensus on Westbindung that the rest of the party leadership became more confident of the Federal Republic’s position in the West, and were more trusting of their allies than was their leader. The unwillingness of many in the Union to follow Adenauer in his final turn toward de Gaulle was the culmination of a long process in which they learned to operate within the West. As the gulf between Adenauer’s – 21 –

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suspicions and American calls for greater flexibility grew, these critics became bolder, claiming that their positions were more in line with American policy than that of the “Chancellor of the Allies” himself. American and British criticism demonstrated the declining willingness of those allies to allow him to play his accustomed role. Adenauer wanted to continue juggling, but he had lost his audience. •• •• Westbindung was Konrad Adenauer’s greatest political achievement, part of the larger West German “success story.”85 Building on a general consensus in favor of a relationship with the West, Adenauer led his party and his country into a series of alliances that helped secure their stability, security, and prosperity for decades. This success was, however, marked by personal and political paradox. A product of provincial Prussian city administration, cast aside by the Nazis in 1933, Adenauer returned to politics at age 70 to become the leader of a modern political party and an internationally respected statesman. A conservative Catholic, he forged an enduring relationship between Europe and the modern, secular US. In the end, having forged this bond, he ended his career as a critic of the Americans, battling members of both the opposition and his own party in defense of what he considered to be vital European interests. By the time he left the political scene, the Federal Republic had gone from a divided, occupied land to a solid member of the West. Adenauer may not have looked at all aspects of this West with enthusiasm, but even the things he did not like were a function of the policies he had advanced. It is a story that deserves closer examination. This book will attempt to tell it by interpreting the foreign policy conceptions of Adenauer and the Union from Adenauer’s first election as chancellor to his retirement from CDU leadership in 1966. The chapters that follow will focus on political and diplomatic events to explain the context within which the Federal Republic developed, and to encourage further work on the period. We will see Adenauer and the Union struggle with the paradoxes of Westbindung, moving within a complex web of domestic and international circumstances, and between their own competing conceptions of the West.

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Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

17. 18.

19. 20.

21.

22.

KAE IV, 70–76. Quotes on page 75. Osterheld I, 147–148 (Diary entry for 2 October 1962). Osterheld I, 179 (14 January 1963); 217 (3 June 1963). Memorandum of conversation between Adenauer and de Margerie, Bonn, 11 June 1963. AAP 1963 vol. 2, 617–629, especially 619–621. See also Osterheld I, 220 (14 June 1963). Mary Kaldor, The Imaginary War (Oxford, 1990), 94–95. Kees van der Pijl, The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class (London, 1984). Richard Kuisel, Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization (Berkeley, 1993), 131–153. See also Wilfried Loth and Robert Picht, eds., De Gaulle, Deutschland und Europa (Opladen, 1991); and Robert O. Paxton and Nicholas Wahl, eds., De Gaulle and the United States: A Centennial Reappraisal (Oxford and Providence, 1994). Adenauer interview with John Rich (NBC), 25 April 1960, ACDP NL Felix von Eckardt, I010-002/2. Speech in Kaiserslautern, Landwirtschaftshalle, 2 August 1957; see also his speech in Braunschweig, 9 August 1957, ACDP NL Eckardt I-010-001/1. Verhandlungen 1. Wahlperiode, 18. Sitzung, 525. See below, chapter 1. KAE IV, 59–67. See below, chapter 3. Werner Link, “Adenauer, Amerika und die deutsche Nachwelt,” in Klaus Schwabe, ed., Adenauer und die USA [Rhöndorfer Gespräch 14] (Bonn, 1994), 130–151. See below, chapter 6. The text of the speech is in KAE IV, 238–248. The quote is on page 243. Der Spiegel vol. 17/41 [9 October 1963]. Stiftung Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus, ed., Konrad Adenauer im Spiegel von Zeitgenossen: 30 Jahre danach (Rhöndorf, 1993), 21–22. Frank A. Ninkovich, Germany and the United States: The Transformation of the German Question Since 1945 (Boston, 1988), 143. Derek W. Urwin, The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration Since 1945 (London, 1991); David W. Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe: Western Europe, America, and Postwar Reconstruction (London, 1992). As in Fritz Stern, “Germany in a Semi-Gaullist Europe,” in idem, Dreams and Delusions: National Socialism in the Drama of the German Past (New York, 1989), 197–218. Georg Schröder, “War Konrad Adenauer ein Gaullist?” KAZ I, 618–626. See also Rainer Marcowitz, “Wendejahre 1963/64: Die deutsch-französische Beziehungen in der Endphase der ‘Ära Adenauer’ und zu Beginn der Kanzlerschaft Erhards,” Francia 22, no. 3 (1995): 83–103. Anneliese Poppinga, Meine Erinnerungen an Konrad Adenauer (Stuttgart, 1970), 106–108. Geir Lunestad, “Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945–1952,” in Charles S. Maier, ed., The Cold War in Europe: Era of a Divided Continent (New York, 1991), 143–165. The concept is used extensively in John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford, 1997). Charles S. Maier, “Hegemony and Autonomy within the Western Alliance,” in Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter, eds., Origins of the Cold War: An International History (London and New York, 1994), 154–174. A fine example of this trend is William I. Hitchcock, France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944–1954 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1998), the first in a new series on Cold War history from the University of North Carolina Press. Some recent work on this subject, with a German focus, includes Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, “Turning to the Atlantic: The Federal Republic’s Ideological Reorientation 1945– 1970,” 1998 Annual Lecture at the German Historical Institute, available from the GHI. See also idem, Wie Westlich sind die Deutschen? Amerikanisierung und Westernisierung im 20. Jahrhundert (Göttingen, 1999). See also Detlef Junker, ed., Die USA und Deutschland im Zeitalter des Kalten Krieges: Ein Handbuch, 2 vols. (Stuttgart, 2001), especially vol. 1:

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23.

24.

25. 26.

27.

28. 29. 30.

31. 32.

33. 34.

35. 36. 37. 38.

1945–1968, and the papers from the conference “The American Impact on Western Europe: Americanization and Westernization in Comparative Perspective,” which was held at the German Historical Institute, Washington, DC, 25–27 March 1999, and is available online at . On the level of high culture and politics, see Volker R. Berghahn, America and the Cultural Cold Wars in Europe (Princeton, 2001). On popular responses, see Reinhold Wagnleitner, Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria After the Second World War, trans. Diana M. Wolf (Chapel Hill, NC, 1994). For European responses, see Kuisel, Seducing the French; Richard Pells, Not Like Us (New York, 1996); and Uta G. Poiger and Heide Fehrenbach, eds., Transactions, Transgressions, Transformations: American Culture in Western Europe and Japan (New York, 2000). Hanns Jürgen Küsters, quoted in Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, ed., Adenauerzeit: Stand, Perspektiven und methodische Aufgaben der Zeitgeschichtsforschung (1945–1967), [Rhöndorfer Gespräche 13] (Bonn, 1993), 53. Quoted in Wolfram F. Hanrieder, West German Foreign Policy, 1949–1963: International Pressure and Domestic Response (Stanford, 1967), 5. Adenauer, interview with German journalists, 1 March 1956. Teegespräche 1955–1958, 61. See also Gregor Schöllgen, “Außenpolitik als Ziel und Methode: Zum Stellenwert der auswärtigen Beziehungen in der Ära Adenauer,” in Doering-Manteuffel, Adenauerzeit, 86–96; and Franz Knipping, “‘Firm with the West!’ Elements of the International Orientation of West Germany in the Mid-1950s,” in Ennio di Nolfo, ed., Power in Europe? II: Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy and the Origins of the EEC 1952–1957 (Berlin, 1992), 517–529. Thomas Alan Schwartz, America’s Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge, MA, 1991). See also idem, “The United States and Germany after 1945: Alliances, Transnational Relations, and the Legacy of the Cold War,” DH 19, no. 4 (fall 1995): 549–568; as well as the essays in Reiner Pommerin, ed., The American Impact on Postwar Germany (Providence, 1994); Michael Ermarth, ed., America and the Shaping of German Society (Providence, 1993); and Jeffry M. Diefendorf et al., eds., American Policy and the Reconstruction of West Germany, 1945–1955 (Cambridge, 1993). Andreas Hillgruber, Deutsche Geschichte 1945–1986: Die “deutsche Frage” in der Weltpolitik, 7th ed. (Stuttgart, 1989), 32. Hans-Peter Schwarz, “Das außenpolitische Konzept Konrad Adenauers,” in Konrad Repgen and Rudolf Morsey, eds., Adenauer Studien I (Mainz, 1971), 99–102. Most prominently, Josef Foschepoth, ed., Adenauer und die deutsche Frage (Göttingen, 1988), especially Foschepoth’s essay, “Westbindung statt Wiedervereinigung: Adenauers Deutschlandpolitik 1949–1955,” 29–60. Rainer Zitelmann, Demokraten für Deutschland: Adenauers Gegner, Streiter für die Einheit (Erlangen, 1991). For examples, see Hans-Peter Schwarz, Adenauer: Der Staatsmann, 1952–1967 (Stuttgart 1991), 991–995; and Klaus Gotto, “Konrad Adenauer: Der Realist als Visionär,” Die Politische Meinung 249 (March/April 1990): 6–13. Konrad Repgen, “Finis Germaniae: Untergang Deutschlands durch einen SPD-Wahlsieg 1957?” KAZ II, 294–315. See also below, chapter 2. Arnulf Baring, Außenpolitik in Adenauers Kanzlerdemokratie: Bonns Beitrag zur Europäischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft (Munich, 1969) and idem, Machtwechsel: Die Ära Brandt-Scheel (Stuttgart, 1983). Helmut Kohl, ed., Konrad Adenauer 1876/1976 (Stuttgart, 1976). Michael Lemke, Einheit oder Sozialismus? (Cologne, 2001). An early comparative effort is Peter Bender, Episode oder Epoche? Zur Geschichte des geteilten Deutschland (Munich, 1997). Rainer Zitelmann et al., eds., Westbindung: Chancen und Risiken für Deutschland (Frankfurt, 1993). – 24 –

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39. Hagen Schulze, Germany: A New History, trans. Deborah Lucas Schneider (Cambridge, 1998), 340. 40. Charles Maier and Günther Bischof, eds., The Marshall Plan and Germany (New York, 1991). 41. Carolyn Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944–1949 (New York, 1996). 42. John Lewis Gaddis, “Spheres of Influence: The United States and Europe, 1945–1949.” In idem, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York, 1987), 48–71. See also Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, 1992); and Thomas J. McCormick, America’s Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War and After, 2nd ed. (Baltimore, 1995). 43. Wolfram Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe (New Haven, 1989), 1–62. See also Rolf Steininger et al., eds., Die Doppelte Eindämmung: Europäische Sicherheit und deutsche Frage in den Fünfzigern [Tützinger Schriften zur Politik 2] (Munich, 1993). 44. Axel Frohn, “Der ‘Rapallo-Mythos’ und die deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen,” in Jost Dülffer et al., eds., Deutschland in Europa, Kontinuität und Bruch: Gedenkschrift für Andreas Hillgruber (Frankfurt a.M., 1990), 135–154; and Cyril Buffet, “Rapallo: Sirens and Phantoms,” in Cyril Buffet and Beatrice Heuser, eds., Haunted by History: Myths in International Relations (Providence, 1998), 235–258. 45. Hermann-Josef Rupieper, Der Besetzte Verbündete: Die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik, 1949–1955 (Opladen, 1991). See also Wolfgang-Uwe Friedrich, ed., Die USA und die Deutsche Frage, 1945–1990 (Frankfurt/New York, 1991). 46. Schulze, Germany, 293. 47. Hans-Peter Schwarz, Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik: Deutschland im Widerstreit der außenpolitischen Konzeptionen in den Jahren der Besatzungsherrschaft, 2nd rev. ed. (Stuttgart, 1980). 48. Hans-Jürgen Grabbe, Unionsparteien, Sozialdemokratie, und Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, 1945–1966 (Düsseldorf, 1983), 57–64. See also Dietrich Orlow, “Ambivalence and Attraction: The German Social Democrats and the United States, 1945–1974,” in Pommerin, The American Impact on Postwar Germany, 35–51. 49. Grabbe, passim. See also Kurt Klotzbach, Der Weg zur Staatspartei: Programmatik, praktische Politik und Organisation der deutschen Sozialdemokratie 1945 bis 1965 (Berlin/Bonn, 1982); and Gordon D. Drummond, The German Social Democrats in Opposition, 1949–1960: The Case Against Rearmament (Norman, OK, 1982). 50. Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent, paperback ed. (New York, 1994), 19–25. 51. Hans-Otto Kleinmann, Geschichte der CDU (Stuttgart, 1993); Winfried Becker, CDU und CSU 1945–1950: Vorläufer, Gründung und regionale Entwicklung bis zum Entstehen der CDUBundespartei (Mainz, 1987); Günther Buchstab and Klaus Gotto, eds., Die Gründung der Union: Traditionen, Entstehung, und Repräsentanten, 2nd ed. (Munich, 1990); Alf Mintzel, Die CSU: Anatomie einer konservativen Partei 1945–1972 (Opladen, 1978) and idem, Geschichte der CSU (Opladen, 1977). Useful studies in English include Geoffrey Pridham, Christian Democracy in Western Germany: The CDU/CSU in Government and Opposition 1945–1976 (New York, 1977); and Noel D. Cary, The Path to Christian Democracy: German Catholics and the Party System from Windhorst to Adenauer (Cambridge, MA, 1996). For the most recent work, which appeared too late to be included in this work, see Frank Bösch, Die AdenauerCDU: Gründung, Aufstieg und Krise einer Erfolgspartei (1945–1969) (Stuttgart, 2001). 52. Quoted in Christoph Kleßmann, Die Doppelte Staatsgründung: Deutsche Geschichte, 1945– 1955, 5th ed. (Bonn, 1991), 143. 53. On the CSU’s special role, along with the works cited above, see Hanns Seidel Stiftung, ed., Geschichte einer Volkspartei: 50 Jahre CSU (Munich, 1995). 54. Maria Mitchell, “Materialism and Secularism: CDU Politicians and National Socialism, 1945–1949,” Journal of Modern History 67, no. 2 (June 1995): 278–308. 55. See Günther Buchstab, Brigitte Kaff, and Hans-Otto Kleinmann, eds., Verfolgung und Widerstand, 1933–1945: Christliche Demokraten gegen Hitler, 2nd ed. (Düsseldorf, 1990). – 25 –

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56. “Die fünfte Besatzungsmacht—Eine Notwendige Antwort,” Union im Wahlkampf 13 (6 July 1949). For a discussion of Schumacher’s comment and its effect on the 1949 election, see Hans-Peter Schwarz, Adenauer: Der Aufstieg, 1876–1952 (Stuttgart, 1986), 612–613. 57. Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe, 42–44. 58. Daniel E. Rogers, Politics After Hitler: The Western Allies and the German Party System (New York, 1995). 59. For a concise attempt to define the Abendland, which informs part of the following, see Günther Barudio, Politik als Kultur: Ein Lexikon von Abendland bis Zukunft (Weimar, 1994), 1–4. I am indebted to Maria Mitchell for alerting me to this citation. 60. Axel Schildt, Ankunft im Westen: Ein Essay zur Erfolgsgeschichte der Bundesrepublik (Frankfurt, 1999), 160–165. See also idem, Zwischen Abendland und Amerika. Studien zur westdeutschen Ideenlandschaft der 50er Jahre (Munich, 1999). 61. Rüdiger Altmann, Das Erbe Adenauers (Stuttgart, 1960), 17. 62. “Bekenntnis zur abendländischen Idee,” DUD, 26 October 1948. 63. Bruno Dörpinghaus, “Die Genfer Sitzungen—Erste Zusammenkünfte führender christlichdemokratische Politiker im Nachkriegseuropa,” KAZ I, 538–565; Roberto Papini, The Christian Democrat International, trans. Robert Royal (Lanham, MD, 1997), especially 67– 76; Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe, 169–170. 64. Kleinmann, Geschichte der CDU 79–96; and Becker, CDU und CSU, 43–53. 65. Erhard to Adenauer, 11 April 1956, StBKAH III/23. See also Daniel Koerfer, Kampf ums Kanzleramt: Erhard und Adenauer, paperback ed. (Berlin, 1998). 66. Werner Bührer, “Der BDI und die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik in den fünfziger Jahren,” VfZ 40 (1992): 241–261. 67. Schildt, Ankunft, 165–180. See also idem, Zwischen Abendland und Amerika, 68–82; and Axel Schildt et al., eds. Dynamische Zeiten: Die 60er Jahre in den beiden deutschen Gesellschaften (Hamburg, 2000). 68. Zitelmann, Demokraten für Deutschland, 29–52; Werner Conze, Jakob Kaiser: Politiker zwischen Ost und West, 1945–1949 (Stuttgart, 1969) and Erich Kosthorst, Jakob Kaiser: Bundesminister für gesamtdeutsche Fragen, 1949–1957 (Stuttgart, 1972). For a recent collection of Kaiser’s speeches and writings, see Christian Hacke, ed., Jakob Kaiser: “Wir haben Brücke zu sein”: Reden, Äußerungen und Aufsätze zur Deutschlandpolitik (Cologne, 1988). 69. See, for example, Kaiser to Adenauer, 8 April 1952, BA NL Kaiser 18/89, and 20 February 1955, ibid., 18/172. 70. Blankenhorn diary, 10 June 1952, BA NL Blankenhorn 351/10, 211. 71. Hans-Peter Schwarz, Adenauer: Der Aufstieg, 1876–1952 (Stuttgart, 1986) and Adenauer: Der Staatsmann, 1952–1967 (Stuttgart, 1991); Henning Köhler, Adenauer (Frankfurt, 1994). Schwarz’s biography has been translated into English, 2 vols., Louise Willmot (I) and Geoffrey Penny (II) (New York, 1995–1997). Citations in this book will refer to the original German versions. 72. The first quote is found in Schwarz, Aufstieg, 164; the second is from Adenauer’s comments at a retirement party held by the CSU, 5 October 1963, StBKAH 02/31. 73. Adenauer, Memoirs 1945–1953, trans. Beate Ruhm von Oppen (Chicago, 1966), 16. 74. Hanns Jürgen Küsters, “West Germany’s Foreign Policy in Western Europe: The Art of the Possible,” in Clemens Wurm, ed., Western Europe and Germany: The Beginnings of European Integration 1945–1960 (Oxford, 1995), 55–86. See also Schildt, Ankunft, 31–32. 75. Herbert Blankenhorn, Verständnis und Verständigung: Blätter eines politischen Tagebuchs (Frankfurt, 1980), 43. 76. Adenauer to Heinrich Weitz, text in Adenauer, Memoirs, 35–36. 77. Schwarz, “Konzept,” 84–85. See also Werner Weidenfeld, Konrad Adenauer und Europa (Bonn, 1976); and Anneliese Poppinga, Konrad Adenauer: Geschichtsverständnis, Weltanschauung und politische Praxis (Stuttgart, 1975). 78. Adenauer, Memoirs, 438–456. See below, chapter 1. 79. I am indebted to Professor Peter Hayes for suggesting this expression. – 26 –

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80. Kurt Sontheimer, Die Adenauer-Ära: Grundlegung der Bundesrepublik (Munich, 1991), 171– 174; Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, “Strukturmerkmale der Kanzlerdemokratie,” Der Staat 36 (1991): 1–18; and Karlheinz Niclauß, Kanzlerdemokratie: Bonner Regierungspraxis von Konrad Adenauer bis Helmut Kohl (Stuttgart, 1988). 81. On the “Potsdam Complex,” see, among many others, Köhler, Adenauer, 643–644. 82. Adenauer, conversation with journalists, 22 February 1953, Teegespräche 1950–1954, 409. See also his comments to the CDU Bundesvorstand, 11 March 1953, Vorstand I, 431. 83. A. J. P. Taylor, Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman (New York, 1955), 73. 84. See chapter 4, below. 85. Schildt, Ankunft, 31–32, and passim.

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Chapter 1

THE CHANCELLOR AND HIS ALLIES, 1949–1953

“

The only path to freedom is to try, in cooperation with the Allied High Commission, piece by piece to expand our freedoms and our authority.” In his first government declaration as chancellor, Konrad Adenauer offered this simple formula for his foreign policy. Admitting that the Occupation Statute under which his government would operate was “anything but an ideal,” he nonetheless argued that it was a reality that had to be respected. By showing a willingness to cooperate with the Allied authorities, the Germans could regain the sovereignty and equality among nations lost in the aftermath of World War II.1 This pragmatic approach served an important political purpose. It provided a ready counterargument against those in the opposition, and even within the governing coalition itself, who advocated a more assertive course to regain German sovereignty. Forced to explain how their proposals would accord with international and historical realities, they risked being politically marginalized as unrealistic or dangerously nationalist. Pragmatism alone does not, however, explain the politics of Westbindung. Adenauer was not the only German who believed that the Federal Republic needed to find a place in the West; indeed, one could argue that any federal chancellor in 1949, confronted with the same international and domestic context, sooner or later would have made similar choices. Nevertheless, Adenauer’s policies bore his particular stamp. Pragmatism, while claiming to be based upon objective realities, is based on the individual pragmatist’s estimation of those realities. We are, after all, discussing not any theoretical chancellor, but rather the 73-year-old former lord mayor of Cologne who was elected to the post in September 1949 and whose policies flowed from his assessment of the risks and opportunities facing postwar Germany. Of central importance was his deep belief that Germany, or as much of it as could be brought together, needed to become part of the West. Adenauer often argued that German history would have turned out better if the southern and western regions of the Reich had been able to exert more – 29 –

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influence. With the creation of the Federal Republic, he had a chance to test this theory. As he proclaimed in the same declaration: “There is no doubt in our minds that we, based on our origins and our basic convictions [Gesinnung], belong to the western world.”2 This was both a statement of the facts as Adenauer saw them and a fervent hope. In expressing it, he was determined to convince his fellow Germans and his allies that it was true. His determination was based on his further belief that, whatever its historical justification, this commitment to the West would not come about automatically. The Germans had to show good faith to ensure that the Allies would allow them to claim membership in the West. Here Adenauer’s “Potsdam complex” combined with fear that the Germans might not seize the opportunities before them, meaning steps had to be taken quickly to forge bonds with the West before either the Allies or the Germans fell prey to their baser natures. In the words of one scholar: “[Adenauer’s] policy, committed to quick success, cannot be seen as purely pragmatic …, but rather as a policy which from the beginning stood under the merciless pressure to consolidate a newly created state, without identity or tradition, as quickly as possible.”3 Alongside Adenauer’s pragmatism, therefore, existed a deep insecurity. He believed the Federal Republic belonged in the West, based on its best traditions and its place in the developing division of the world. It would, however, have to earn its place through its actions, and as quickly as possible, before the Allies lost either interest or faith in German goodwill, or the Germans themselves veered off in another direction. This combination of pragmatism and insecurity guided his responses to circumstances; understanding this combination allows for a clearer appreciation of the political contest over Westbindung. Adenauer’s assessment of the situation encouraged him to view Westbindung as an immediate necessity, and to reject any challenges that would force him to alter course or slacken his tempo. It also kept him from understanding that there could be alternate means to reach the same ends, which sometimes led him to respond more negatively to alternate policy suggestions than was helpful or necessary. Whenever problems did arise over the pace and direction of Westbindung, however, Adenauer could rely on a broad consensus within the Union to smooth over differences in detail. As he wrote shortly after the elections, his “primary goal” was “to develop a close relationship with our neighbors in the Western world, especially with the United States,” while also trying “with all our energy to see that Germany be admitted as a member of the European federation with equal rights and responsibilities.”4 Here he was echoing themes the Union had used throughout the 1949 campaign. Calls for the Federal Republic to assume a “worthy place in Europe” were often used in appeals to younger voters, where enthusiasm for Europe was especially strong.5 European unification was also a part of the appeal to Christian voters, reflecting the Union’s commitment to the Abendland. In a joint – 30 –

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Protestant-Catholic proclamation in Hesse, for example, made up of ten “political commandments,” the “ninth commandment” read: Thou shalt consider yourself not only a German, but also a European. Avoid a narrow-minded and fruitless nationalism, which separates us from the rest of the world and is the father of war. Of course the world needs Germany and the creative strength of her people. We, however, need the world and its willingness to rebuild our land even more. Germany’s great chance is “Europe.”6

It is important here to note that at this point Adenauer and the Union placed equal emphasis on relations with both Europe and the US within the West. Few considered it necessary to distinguish between European and Atlantic cooperation; the two were inextricably linked. Reconciliation with France was important in itself, but it was also a key to relations with the US, where sympathy for France was strong and proof of German goodwill was necessary.7 This was to be the start of a new era. As one member of the Union Fraktion put it: “[T]oday, German policy means a decision for the West. The methods of German politics going back to 1871 need to be radically revised….”8 The turn to the West was to be a permanent departure from the past, and Adenauer’s policy aimed at putting Germany irreversibly on this new path. The first legislative period, from 1949 to 1953, was dominated by this search for a West within which the Federal Republic could gain some measure of sovereignty and equality with its neighbors. In this chapter, we will see how Adenauer and the Union began that search in the debates over European integration and German rearmament, culminating in Adenauer’s triumphant North American tour in April 1953.

To the Schuman Plan: First Steps toward a European Community After Adenauer was formally elected chancellor on 20 September 1949, the Federal Republic officially had a government. That sounds more impressive than it actually was, for Bonn was hardly a typical national capital. Befitting its provisional status, the city was marked by improvisation. From the hastily renovated Teacher’s College housing the Bundestag to the former barracks and villas converted to ministries and official residences, Bonn reflected both the Germans’ desire to build a new democracy and the long way they had to go to get there.9 Adenauer began work in temporary quarters at the Natural History Museum, surrounded by stuffed elephants and giraffes covered with white sheets. As an occupied territory, represented internationally by the Allied High Commission (AHC), the Federal Republic did not have a Foreign Ministry in 1949. Adenauer had also opposed the creation of a cabinet level “Office for – 31 –

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Inter-State Affairs,” as some had suggested.10 Instead, relations with the AHC, the only international relations permitted at the time, were run through the Chancellery, that is, by Adenauer, assisted by his two trusted aides, Walter Hallstein and Herbert Blankenhorn. Cabinet ministers were required to route any contact with the AHC through the Chancellery. This organization, combined with a constitution that gave the chancellor broad powers to determine policy, allowed Adenauer to advance his conception of Westbindung with limited institutional barriers, to the occasional dismay of Union politicians.11 Adenauer demonstrated his conception of Germany’s role in the West at his first official meeting with the AHC as chancellor, on 21 September 1949. The AHC had established itself in the Petersberg, a former hotel on a high hill across the Rhine from Bonn, from which it could quite literally oversee the West German government. After their swearing-in, Adenauer and his cabinet were invited to the Petersberg to receive their official copy of the Occupation Statute. The AHC had planned a formal ceremony emphasizing its superior position. Adenauer, however, was also aware of the symbolism of the visit, and was determined to make a gesture of his own. Protocol required that Adenauer remain standing with his ministers on one side while the High Commissioners, standing on a carpet near the center of the reception room, read a formal declaration. After the declaration, Adenauer was to step forward onto the carpet to receive the statute. Adenauer, however, surprised his hosts by departing from the script. First, he did not bring his entire cabinet with him, but rather a select group of Ministers and civil servants, to avoid the impression that the makeup of the cabinet was dependent on Allied approval. Upon arrival, he walked directly onto the carpet to hear AHC Chair Andre François-Poncet’s declaration, then responded with a short speech of his own. Declaring his government’s commitment to immediate reconstruction, he concluded by emphasizing the need for European integration with German participation. Rather than stand aside and receive orders, he joined the High Commissioners on their level, or at least on their carpet. His gesture so changed the dynamics of the meeting that the Commissioners decided to skip the formal presentation of the Occupation Statute. After the reception, a staff member hurriedly handed Herbert Blankenhorn a parcel. Opening it on the way back to Bonn, Blankenhorn saw that it was the official copy of the statute.12 Adenauer’s “carpet policy” (Teppichpolitik) highlighted his conception of Westbindung. With a few extra steps, he informed the Allies that he did not intend for his government to be permanently subservient. While recognizing the power imbalance between the Federal Republic and the Allies, Adenauer used the carpet to express his desire for an equal partnership in the West. The moment has become legend in West German history, part of every subsequent account of the state’s origins. When in the late 1980s the organizers of the planned “House for the History of the Federal Republic of – 32 –

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Germany,” were scouring the land for artifacts, the Petersberg carpet was near the top of their list. Unfortunately, earlier renovations had removed the building’s original decorations, and the historic carpet had been unceremoniously thrown out with the trash.13 Although the carpet has not survived, the sentiment behind Adenauer’s gesture did. Throughout the autumn, the chancellor tried through a combination of aggressive bargaining and conciliation to convince the AHC to speed German integration into the West and to soften remaining economic controls. Of particular concern was the Allied policy of dismantling heavy industry to limit Germany’s potential to wage another war. In a state where unemployment remained a major problem and full economic recovery had not begun, the sight of Allied soldiers closing plants led to clashes with the local population, and threatened to ruin any chance of fruitful cooperation between the Germans and the Allies. Dismantlement was directly related to French worries about a reborn German military threat, so Adenauer tried to allay French fears by emphasizing European integration. In a November 1949 letter to Sir Brian Robertson, the chair of the AHC at that time, Adenauer declared his government’s willingness “to respect the need for security against [Germany]” and “to participate in any organization that aims to control Germany’s war potential.” In a further memorandum on 7 November, he supported an international Ruhr authority to control production in that vital industrial region, in order to encourage “German participation in closer economic cooperation between France, Italy, and the Benelux countries as soon as possible.”14 Adenauer combined these private arguments with an aggressive public relations campaign. Lacking embassies, the only way to reach foreign leaders without going through the AHC was through interviews, a tool that Adenauer would often employ in the future. On 3 November, he used an interview with Ernst Friedländer of the influential weekly Die Zeit to stress his commitment to European integration. Calling reconciliation with France “a cardinal point” of his foreign policy, Adenauer asserted that “a Federal Chancellor must simultaneously be a good German and a good European. Because I desire to be both, I must work for Franco-German understanding.” Hoping to attract support in Washington as well as Paris, he gave an interview to the Baltimore Sun (chosen because Harry Truman allegedly read it daily) on 7 November, repeating his earlier comments and adding a provocative idea, suggesting that the French purchase up to 40 percent of German industry, making them partners in German reconstruction. The US could contribute to reconciliation by providing the French with the capital for such an investment.15 Adenauer’s conciliatory course brought mixed results. At home, SPD Chair Kurt Schumacher charged that French talk about security was just an excuse to control German reconstruction, and accused Adenauer of being more interested in satisfying French and German business interests than in – 33 –

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protecting the interests of the German people. Among the Allies, however, Adenauer’s statements struck a responsive chord. American High Commissioner John McCloy, sensing growing opposition to dismantlement in Germany and the American Congress, began to lobby both the AHC and the State Department for a change in policy. One concrete result came on 13 November, when Secretary of State Dean Acheson agreed to accompany McCloy to Bonn as part of a European tour. Acheson was the first Allied foreign minister to visit Bonn, and his presence signaled American support for the Federal Republic. Adenauer used his meeting with Acheson to reassert his commitment to European cooperation and working with the Americans. Perhaps more important than anything Adenauer might have said to ingratiate himself with Acheson, however, was the secretary’s later meeting with Kurt Schumacher. The mercurial Social Democrat proved himself a valuable, if involuntary, ally for Adenauer; his nationalist rhetoric and aggressive critique of Allied policy convinced Acheson that he was “a fanatic of a dangerous and pure type,” reinforcing American support for Adenauer.16 The subsequent shift in the Allied attitude toward the Federal Republic became clear at Adenauer’s meeting with the AHC on 15 November. Robertson announced that their instructions now aimed at “the integration of Germany into the community of European nations,” and offered Adenauer the chance to negotiate a new relationship based on his proposals of 7 November. From that point, events moved swiftly. On 17 November, Adenauer and the AHC sketched a new agreement on dismantlement, completing it in an eleven-hour session on 22 November. Although the AHC would not announce an immediate halt to dismantlement, as the Germans had hoped, the list of affected factories was cut drastically. Adenauer was ebullient as he and Blankenhorn returned home that night, commenting that they “had made a decisive contribution to closer Western European cooperation.” On 23 November, the cabinet and representatives of the governing parties gave Adenauer a warm reception as he reported on the agreement.17 Harmony within the government did not, however, translate into harmony between government and opposition. The SPD violently opposed Adenauer’s compromises. Their attacks reached such a high pitch on 15 November that Adenauer retorted with the question: “Who do you think lost the war?” A large majority in the Bundestag supported the government, as did the press, which criticized the SPD’s “national socialism,” but the deep divisions between the Union and the SPD had become apparent to all. In his meeting with the AHC on 17 November, Adenauer told the High Commission that the bitter rhetoric of the opposition reminded him of the debates over “fulfillment” of the Versailles treaty during the 1920s. The only difference, he added, was that this time the nationalists were coming from the Left, not the Right.18 The stage was thus set for a major political battle when Adenauer gave his government declaration on the Petersberg Agreement to the Bundestag – 34 –

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in the late afternoon of 24 November. Reminding his audience again that the Germans had lost the war, Adenauer presented the agreement as the best that could be expected at the time. Claiming that the agreement represented a major advance because it was the first time since the end of the war that a German head of government had negotiated with representatives of other states “on an equal level and in an atmosphere of rational cooperation,” Adenauer emphasized the need for patience and warned the Germans against believing that world opinion toward them had changed. The Germans needed to regain the trust of the world, he stated, and such trust would have “to be gained slowly, step by step.”19 The ensuing debate stretched into the early morning hours. Adolf Arndt of the SPD charged Adenauer and the AHC with “authoritarianism” for negotiating in secret, while Carlo Schmid and Kurt Schumacher rejected the International Ruhr Authority. The debate reached its climax at around three o’clock in the morning of 25 November. Armed with support from an unusual quarter in the form of a declaration from the German Trade Union Association (DGB) supporting the agreement (the result of Adenauer’s promise to DGB Chair Hans Böckler that the government would hinder the return of monopoly cartels to the Ruhr), Adenauer rose to defend the Ruhr Authority, arguing that it was the only way to stop dismantlement. He baited the SPD by charging that their refusal to accept the necessity of German participation indicated that they would rather see the process continued to the end. The house erupted in protest. Cries of “Are you still a German?” and “Do you speak as German Chancellor?” were followed by Kurt Schumacher’s now famous taunt, “The Chancellor of the Allies!”20 Schumacher’s words temporarily ended the debate as Bundestag President Erich Köhler called him to order. The Bundestag Council of Elders subsequently voted to exclude the SPD chair from the chamber for twenty days for “insulting” the chancellor and the state. The penalty was eventually reduced, and Schumacher sent a written apology to Adenauer a few days later. By then, the press and public opinion rallied to Adenauer. His success earned him greater international recognition, even an appearance on the cover of Time magazine.21 In his memoirs, Adenauer cited the Petersberg Agreement as the first step toward “breaking the ring” surrounding the Federal Republic. All segments of the Union embraced the plan, both European enthusiasts and Erhard’s Federal Ministry of Economics. The board of the United Steel Works, one of the most important firms in the Ruhr, thanked Adenauer for his “tenacious and committed” defense of German economic interests.22 Despite this success, however, the weeks after the Petersberg Agreement did not bring any further advances. The Saar territory, which France intended to make an economic protectorate, remained a source of friction that even a January 1950 visit by Robert Schuman to Bonn could not remove. The conclusion of the Saar Convention between France and the – 35 –

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semiautonomous territory in March made things worse. Adenauer did not hear of this until a day before the signing, when François-Poncet coldly informed him during a regular meeting with the AHC. Adenauer responded with equal coolness, but added that “naturally this will create enormous complications in the European situation.” Such complications were immediately apparent, as criticism of the French policy on the Saar grew loud in the Federal Republic.23 With this provocation, Adenauer’s policy threatened to collapse. Adenauer now faced a difficult choice. To advocate continued compromise risked political defeat; to move toward confrontation, however, would contradict his previous arguments for patience, encouraging the opposition and possibly alienating the AHC. As he had done on the dismantlement question, Adenauer tried to resolve the problem with a public initiative aimed at allaying French fears. In two interviews with American journalist Joseph Kingsbury-Smith, Paris bureau chief of the International News Service, on 7 and 21 March 1950, Adenauer proposed the creation of a Franco-German economic union, modeled on the German Zollverein of the nineteenth century. Like the German model, this union would move from economic to political cooperation, serving as the core of a new Europe, eliminating territorial issues such as the Saar. Adenauer’s surprising offer raised eyebrows across Europe and the Atlantic, but official responses were lukewarm. The most positive response came from General Charles de Gaulle. In an ironically prescient press conference on 16 March, the maverick French politician endorsed the idea of a Franco-German union, recalling that Franks, Gauls and Romans had cooperated to defeat Attila and save the Abendland once before.24 Adenauer’s offer of a Franco-German union aimed to serve to purposes; to satisfy French concerns over German recovery, and to convince the other Allies that his government was still committed to European integration. Adenauer realized that the Federal Republic could not make progress toward full membership in the West without French support, but the target for these proposals, as with his comments to Friedländer and the Baltimore Sun, extended beyond Paris. Using an interview with an American journalist indicated that his intended audience was in Washington as well. Recognizing continued American interest in European integration, Adenauer sought to prove that the Germans were willing to cooperate. Again, Adenauer could count on the support of the Union Fraktion and press. Even as deputies complained about the chancellor’s penchant for solo declarations, they shared his sentiments. Many feared that European failure to move forward with integration would lead the Americans to “to lose their patience” and withdraw support from Europe.25 European integration and close relations with the US were inextricably linked. Despite the linkage, Adenauer did not lose sight of the role that Europe could play in the postwar world. As he lobbied for European cooperation, he sometimes used arguments that in the next decade would be labeled – 36 –

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“Gaullist.” In a May 1950 Fraktion debate on German membership in the Council of Europe, Adenauer argued that increasing tension between the US and the USSR made European unification a necessity. “The [superpower] conflict will continue,” he declared, “if a third power does not emerge that can successfully throw its weight into the scale of peace. This Third Force is a united Europe. We must always keep this long-term goal in mind.” This great idea should not fail because of German opposition, Adenauer argued, hinting that a potentially “generous proposal” from the French would “become moot” if the Germans did not show their commitment to Europe.26 These comments offer a tantalizing suggestion of the motives behind Adenauer’s enthusiasm for European integration, but also reveal the basic weakness of the German position. German commitment to integration was essential, but none of that would matter unless the Allies themselves acted. Thus, he urged his colleagues not to flag in their enthusiasm for European integration in the hope that this would move the Allies to act. What Adenauer did not tell the Fraktion was that he already knew that French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman had decided to take a bold step. Under the influence of Jean Monnet, an advocate of European integration and former head of the French Commissariat for Modernization and Investment, Schuman embraced the idea of integrating the French and German coal and steel industries, overseen by a High Authority to regulate production. Schuman informed Adenauer confidentially of his plans on 7 May; Adenauer immediately embraced this “decisive step” toward uniting the “free West.” In a private letter, Adenauer praised Schuman for taking this step after a period in which Franco-German relations “had suffered many setbacks,” and predicted that the plan would receive “strong support” from the German public, “because for the first time since the catastrophe of 1945, Germany and France shall work together as equals on a common task.” After his confidential proposals were endorsed by Adenauer, Schuman announced his plan publicly on 9 May.27 The Schuman Plan would develop into the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), a major breakthrough that allowed further German economic development while providing the necessary insurance for French security. For the French, the plan promised access to German products and markets with protection against German competition. For the Germans, it was the breakthrough they had been waiting for. In a 16 May meeting with the AHC, Adenauer repeated his unreserved acceptance of the plan by noting that it contained ideas about Franco-German cooperation that he and his colleagues had developed in 1925. Beyond any economic benefits, Adenauer was particularly pleased with the political implications of the Schuman Plan. “Because we see in this plan the cornerstone of a truly lasting foundation for a European confederation,” Adenauer told the AHC, “we intend to work for it with all our strength.”28 The Schuman Plan provided the momentum to overcome the stagnation of the previous months. By early June, when the six interested nations—France, – 37 –

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Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Italy, and the Federal Republic— began negotiations in Paris, optimism about German participation in the West had reached new heights. The Union press service summed up the general feeling with the simple headline “Germany’s Return.” The editors saw “a direct path [leading] from the Petersberg Agreement to … the recovery of Germany’s complete equality” and concluded: “That we have successfully followed this path is mainly Dr. Adenauer’s work, and that of those individuals who have supported him in spite of all resistance. Our goal still lies far ahead, but most important is that Germany is now on the correct path.”29 At least temporarily, the Schuman Plan rescued Adenauer’s policy of small steps toward Westbindung. The French turnabout appeared to justify his belief that the Allies would reward German patience, and American support reinforced the linkage between European integration and close ties with the US. As long as the Germans were willing to cooperate, it appeared that the goal of equality was in sight. The summer of 1950, however, would bring new questions about the price that the Germans would be expected to pay for membership in the West. War in another divided land thousands of miles away raised the question that no one had wanted to confront: whether membership in the West meant rebuilding the German army.

The Skeleton Key? Rearmament and German Sovereignty The German rearmament issue has probably received more scholarly attention in the past few decades than any other single aspect of postwar German history, a testament to the immense political, strategic, and moral complexities surrounding the decision to re-create the German military less than a decade after Germany’s unconditional surrender.30 It would be impossible to treat this complex subject fully in a single chapter, so this study will focus on the degree to which rearmament related to the larger question of German “membership” in the West. As we will see, rearmament went from unthinkable to inescapable within a very short period, based on Adenauer’s desire to see the Federal Republic receive sovereignty within the West as quickly as possible. The idea that German soldiers would be essential for European defense hung over Western strategic planning throughout the early years of the Cold War. Though officially out of the question as the Allies went about “demilitarizing” Germany, the rearmament question would not go away. As the venerable French newspaper Le Monde commented on the creation of NATO: “[T]he rearming of Germany is contained in the Atlantic Pact like the yolk in the egg.” Western military leaders, sometimes to the dismay of their civilian bosses, often expressed intense interest in securing the cooperation of their former enemies. It simply made no military sense to – 38 –

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station thousands of troops in Germany, ostensibly to defend the Germans, without requiring the Germans themselves to contribute. Andreas Hillgruber has written how both the Allies and the Soviets believed in the “myth of the German soldier,” whose skills could be decisive in any future European war, making it increasingly difficult to keep German rearmament off the agenda.31 For the German public at large, however, the issue was clear. There was little enthusiasm for rearmament, even within the Union. At the time of the Petersberg Agreement, Adenauer publicly declared that his government had not discussed rearmament and had no plans to do so. The Union press greeted these comments enthusiastically, declaring that the Germans, concerned with reconstruction, had no interest in being soldiers again, but “wanted a happy future in peace.” Even advocates of European integration became nervous when faced with the possibility of rearmament, preferring a peaceful neutrality outside of Europe to armed participation within it. Bundestag deputy Maria Dietz spoke for many when she wrote that she was committed to German membership in the Council of Europe, but was disturbed by rumors that membership meant “yes to NATO.” As a mother, she would “rather resign my seat in the Bundestag than move my little finger to help rearmament and burden my conscience.”32 Adenauer assured Dietz and other opponents of rearmament not to worry, but his other statements reveal a more complex attitude. In December 1949 he told the Cleveland Plain Dealer that the Federal Republic, while unwilling to create its own army or send its soldiers to serve in foreign armies, would be willing to discuss participation in “the army of a European federation.” This statement caused quite a stir in both Germany and Allied capitals, since it sounded like a departure from the consensus against rearmament. Public outcry, even from the Fraktion, forced Adenauer to issue a clarification, emphasizing that his government would accept rearmament only within a European framework, and then only under conditions of equality with its partners.33 Adenauer’s flirtation with rearmament sprang from two sources. One was his concern about the Federal Republic’s physical security. The presence of large Red Army contingents in the GDR, facing relatively small and lightly equipped Western occupation forces, made him worry about the Allies’ ability or willingness to defend Germany west of the Rhine. Most Western plans at this time foresaw no serious defense of the European mainland beyond the Pyrenees, aiming at a World War II-style “liberation” after a Soviet conquest. News that the Soviets were helping the GDR create a paramilitary “people’s police” (Volkspolizei or “Vopos”) increased Adenauer’s worries. As early as December 1949, he implored the AHC to issue a formal declaration that the Federal Republic would be defended. In April 1950, citing the Vopos, he requested permission to create a federal police force of twenty-five thousand men.34 – 39 –

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The security issue, however, was only one aspect of Adenauer’s thinking on rearmament. The other was the possibility of using rearmament as a lever with which to achieve greater West German sovereignty. German willingness to participate in European defense could, Adenauer believed, convince the Allies of German goodwill, and help the Federal Republic claim the right to be treated as an equal partner. As he would tell the Fraktion: “An army [Wehrmacht] is … the external sign of sovereignty … a state without an army [would] be treated as a second-class partner.”35 Rearmament, therefore, continued the pattern Adenauer had begun with his economic proposals, using offers of cooperation with Europe to improve the Federal Republic’s political status in the West. It was not until the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950, however, that Adenauer’s calculation could be tested. As North Korean armies captured Seoul, swift, if not completely accurate, parallels were drawn between the two divided states. Adenauer warned the AHC throughout the summer about the danger of panic, and asked for an Allied declaration to calm German fears. To underscore his sense of urgency and place more pressure on the Allies, he repeated his thoughts about a German defense contribution in an August interview with the New York Times.36 Adenauer would have more success in convincing the AHC than in convincing the parliamentary opposition. After a meeting with Adenauer, Schumacher argued that the GDR’s Vopos posed no threat to the Federal Republic. Unlike South Korea, the Federal Republic was the home to several thousand allied troops, who, he noted sarcastically, “I hope are not only for decoration.” The Germans should certainly be ready to participate in Western defense, Schumacher contended, but only after the Allies had proven their commitment to Germany by increasing their troop presence along the zonal border and treating the Germans as equals. To offer an interim solution, such as the police force, would give away the “last trumps” the Germans possessed to gain sovereignty.37 Schumacher’s argument was the polar opposite of Adenauer’s. For Adenauer, rearmament would be the beginning, not the end, of the path to sovereignty. The Korean crisis offered a chance for the Federal Republic to take another step into the West. It is important to see that the disagreement lay not in the question of German participation in Western defense, but in the timing of that participation. Schumacher did not reject rearmament out of hand; he preferred to wait for a better deal. Once that deal was available, however, he would take it. This should give pause both to Adenauer’s critics and to his champions. The German public may not have been prepared for rearmament, but political leaders were already considering questions that reached beyond “if” toward “how.” As the Allies prepared to meet in New York in mid-September to negotiate a compromise between Anglo-American enthusiasm and French reluctance for German rearmament, Adenauer decided to take another decisive – 40 –

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step. Knowing that McCloy wanted more detailed West German suggestions for European security before he flew to New York, Adenauer sent him two memoranda on 29 August emphasizing the connection between rearmament and sovereignty. In the first, which dealt with “securing the federal territory against threats from within and without,” Adenauer repeated his desire for strengthened Western contingents in Germany and his proposal for a federal police force. He also hinted at a broader willingness to cooperate in European defense in a curiously worded passage, noting that “[t]he Federal Chancellor has repeatedly expressed his willingness, in the event that an international Western European army is created, to contribute a German contingent. This is to clearly state that the Federal Chancellor rejects a remilitarization of Germany through the creation of a national military force.”38 In these sentences, Adenauer indirectly offered German troops for European defense, if the Allies created a European army, as some were considering. A national army, however, was out of the question. Here he was in harmony with the majority of the Union, and Adenauer’s cautious language can be traced to the advice of Fraktion Chair Heinrich von Brentano, who had urged Adenauer to “weigh every word carefully” when distinguishing between German willingness to participate in a European army and rejection of purely national forces. Nevertheless, Adenauer did not want to appear publicly to be offering German troops. When American officials drafting the final communiqué in New York suggested a specific reference to German willingness to participate, Adenauer declined. He replied that it would be more useful for the Allies to “put the issue in the form of a question,” which he could then place before the Bundestag and the public.39 This not-quite offer of German troops would play an important role in future conflicts. Along with the security memorandum, Adenauer also sent McCloy another paper “on the question of reshaping the relationship between the Federal Republic and the occupying powers.” Here Adenauer clarified the connection between rearmament and sovereignty. Noting that the Occupation Statute was created “in conditions which to a large extent have ceased to apply today,” and citing the Federal Republic’s participation in the Council of Europe and the Schuman Plan as proof of its commitment to European cooperation, Adenauer argued that the Federal Republic “must have enough freedom of action and responsibility for the fulfillment of duties to appear meaningful. If the Germans are to make every sacrifice for their defense, they must find the way to freedom just as open to them as to any other people of Western Europe.” Adenauer offered three concrete proposals. Along with a termination of the state of war between the Federal Republic and the Allies and a redefinition of the occupation to emphasize “protection against external danger,” Adenauer requested that “relations between the occupying powers and the Federal Republic … be progressively replaced by a system of contractual agreements.” This last proposal was key. As he told the AHC, it – 41 –

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was impossible to expect the Germans to contribute to European security unless “they can in the near future return as equals to the community of peoples.” In calmer times, such a promise could be made through gradual reforms. “Today, however, something more impressive must happen.”40 The New York conference in September 1950 did not bring complete clarity, but it did produce important results for the future. The Allies agreed to end the state of war with Germany, to recognize the Federal Republic as the sole legitimate successor to the Reich, to affirm their commitment to German reunification, and to revise the Occupation Statute to allow the Federal Republic to create its own Foreign Office. They also agreed to increase Allied troop contingents in Germany, to create an integrated NATO military command, and to extend NATO security commitments to the Federal Republic and Berlin. On rearmament, however, they were unable to agree. The French remained opposed, and no amount of pressure could move them. The final communiqué reported only that the foreign ministers had discussed rearmament and had referred it to the NATO Council. These results were open to a variety of interpretations. The SPD portrayed the conference as a defeat for Adenauer, citing its failure to agree on German rearmament despite the chancellor’s lobbying. In his discussion with the AHC, however, Adenauer glossed over any disappointment he may have felt, praising the security commitment and the pledge to end the state of war as representing “great progress” in returning Germany to the “community of peace-loving and free nations.” Public statements from both the government and the Union followed this line, adding that it was best to go slowly on rearmament, as long as progress continued on European cooperation.41 Adenauer’s optimistic reaction was, of course, born of necessity. It would have done no good to berate the AHC for failing to reach agreement on rearmament. There is also, however, good reason to believe that the chancellor was pleased with the conference, for his strategy was always based on more than rearmament for its own sake. Of greater long-term importance was the acceptance of German membership in the West. As long as the Allies were discussing German participation in Western defense and were willing to consider alterations to the occupation regime, the momentum toward wider German sovereignty within the West could be maintained. The advances of New York, however, were forced into the background as Adenauer had to face a major domestic crisis. Interior Minister Gustav Heinemann, who was opposed to rearmament and was upset at Adenauer’s governing style, threatened to resign from the cabinet. The immediate cause of the rupture was Adenauer’s security memorandum of 29 August. Heinemann, as interior minister, was technically responsible for internal security, and he felt that Adenauer had overstepped his authority in sending the memorandum to McCloy without discussing it with either him or the cabinet as a whole.42 Adenauer, however, was unwilling to engage in a public conflict with a cabinet minister before the New York conference, and delayed – 42 –

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responding to Heinemann’s resignation for over a month while trying to smooth things over. Adenauer had good reason to avoid a confrontation with Heinemann, beyond his desire to avoid the appearance of disunity on the eve of the New York conference. Heinemann’s position as president of the Synod of the German Evangelical Church (EKD) made him a symbol of balance within the Union between Catholics and Protestants. As preparations began for the official creation of the national CDU—the first national conference was scheduled for late October 1950 in Goslar—Adenauer, who planned to be elected national chair, could not afford a confrontation, certainly not one with confessional overtones. This situation contained a bitter irony, for Adenauer had not wanted Heinemann in his cabinet in the first place. Though Heinemann had performed valuable service to the Union in attracting Protestant voters, Adenauer, citing Heinemann’s reluctance to leave his church positions, and his repeated refusal to run for a Bundestag seat, did not think he possessed the administrative and political skills to serve in the cabinet. Nevertheless, after intensive lobbying by other Union Protestants, Adenauer gave in. The two men’s differing approaches to foreign affairs, however, were a constant source of friction. As one of the only organizations in the Federal Republic that continued officially to represent all of Germany, the EKD maintained contacts in the Soviet zone, leading to conflict with government policy. Heinemann’s decision to participate in an EKD gathering in East Berlin in April 1950 had already led to his first offer to resign.43 The dispute over Adenauer’s security memorandum was the last in a chain of conflicts, with the outcome more or less inevitable. The final straw between the two men came in early October. Pastor Martin Niemöller of the Confessing Church (the Protestant Church organization formed in response to Nazi domination of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in the 1930s), a former member of the anti-Nazi resistance, a public opponent of rearmament, and a close associate of Heinemann, sent Adenauer a letter accusing the chancellor of having made a secret deal with the Americans and British to raise German divisions immediately. Citing statements from generals allegedly involved in this secret plan, Niemöller charged Adenauer with trying to thwart democratic procedures. The letter was accompanied by another signed by thirty-eight members of the Confessing Church declaring their opposition to this “rape of our people.”44 In a meeting on 9 October, Adenauer denied the accusations and called on Heinemann to repudiate Niemöller for making such wild and unfounded charges. Heinemann refused, and also refused to skip a scheduled speaking engagement with Niemöller. Later that day, Adenauer officially accepted Heinemann’s resignation, effective 10 October. The new interior minister would be veteran politician Robert Lehr, also a Protestant, who had been Adenauer’s first choice for the post in 1949.45 – 43 –

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The conflict between Adenauer and Heinemann was more than a difference of political opinion; it was a clash of basic world-views. Both men considered themselves “Christian” politicians, with a sense of responsibility to a higher authority and a belief in the cultural mission of the West. The nature of that mission, however, and the means to accomplish it were matters of intense dispute. As one author put it, Heinemann was “as prone as Adenauer to cloak his pronouncements in divine authority, but the divinity he invoked was the unbending Lutheran ‘Word of the Bible,’ not the more flexible authority of Catholic Realpolitik.” Heinemann’s sense of morality and of Germany’s historical guilt made it impossible for him to follow Adenauer’s tactical participation in Allied security plans. Calling on Germans East and West to have the “patience and the courage to wait” and to concentrate on improving social conditions, Heinemann refused to compromise, concluding: “No one can release me from my responsibility before God.” Adenauer had no sympathy for this position. Characterizing Heinemann with the quotation (which Heinemann denied making): “God has twice struck the sword from our hands; we should not reach for it a third time,” Adenauer accused Heinemann of fatalism. As he told the AHC, Adenauer believed that “God has given us a head for thinking and arms and hands to act.” Or, as he argued in a letter to a leading Protestant pastor, “I do not believe that it is God’s will that we offer no resistance to Christianity’s archenemy, Bolshevism.”46 Heinemann counseled patience, but patience was a virtue that Adenauer lacked in the rearmament debate. Hoping to use the Korea crisis to advance Westbindung, Adenauer pushed hard for an agreement on German defense. What distinguished him from Heinemann, as from Schumacher, was not the desire to be part of the West, but rather his belief that the Federal Republic had little time to waste. The key was not German divisions per se, but Allied protection and a seat at the table where Western decisions were made. His sense of urgency led Adenauer very far out on a limb in his security memorandum of 29 August. Whether he intended the memorandum to be an offer of German troops or not, he was certainly aware that the Allies might take it that way, and was willing to risk conflict within his own government. The Heinemann crisis offers a clear picture of Adenauer’s governing style, and it is not a picture that his admirers will like. Adenauer was so convinced of the need for action on rearmament that he did not want to be bothered by consultations with either the Bundestag or his own cabinet. One can agree or disagree with Adenauer’s goals, but his tactics were hardly democratic. Guided by his interpretation of Germany’s interests, Adenauer was willing to skirt democratic niceties in the defense of German democracy. This would not be the first time during the Cold War that a politician, German or otherwise, would make such a paradoxical choice, but it was a fateful moment for West German politics all the same. – 44 –

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Particularly striking about the Heinemann controversy, however, is how quickly Adenauer was able to gather the Union behind him against his interior minister. In cabinet meetings on 10 and 17 October, where Heinemann’s resignation was discussed, no one stood with the rebel. The Fraktion offered no support, though some criticized Adenauer’s decision to accept his resignation without first consulting them. Even among Protestants, Niemöller was considered a controversial figure, and this perception harmed Heinemann’s case. Niemöller’s violent verbal assaults on Adenauer and Catholics in general alienated conservative Protestant leaders, who shared Adenauer’s desire for a stronger Western defense. Eugen Gerstenmaier and Bundestag President Hermann Ehlers, for example, two prominent Union Protestants who had agitated for Heinemann’s appointment in 1949, turned against Heinemann in the crisis. Gerstenmaier, who had already garnered “great applause” in the Fraktion for criticizing the failure of “certain circles” to recognize the threat from the East, especially rose to defend Adenauer’s willingness to discuss a German defense contribution. With this support, Adenauer was able to ride out the storm over Heinemann’s resignation. At the CDU convention in Goslar, he did not mention Heinemann at all, focusing his attacks instead on Niemöller. Protestant delegates declared their commitment “to the person and policies of the Federal Chancellor,” and elected Adenauer chair by a large margin. Heinemann was marginalized, and would eventually leave the party.47 Two factors can explain the Union’s behavior. One was Adenauer’s dominant position in the party and the government. Open rebellion was unappetizing, requiring a willingness to risk one’s position that is far from characteristic of ambitious politicians. Heinemann himself complained that many who were critical of Adenauer when he was not around lost their voices when the chancellor entered the room. There was also much to be gained from supporting Adenauer. Gerstenmaier especially profited from opposing Heinemann; he became one of the most prominent Protestants in the Union and succeeded Ehlers as Bundestag president in 1954. More important, however, was the strong enthusiasm within the Union for European integration. Through participation in the Council of Europe in the summer of 1950, Gerstenmaier, Heinrich von Brentano, and Kurt Georg Kiesinger, all of whom would become prominent Union foreign policy spokesmen, had become acquainted with the attitudes of other Europeans about a German defense contribution. When Winston Churchill made his speech before the council assembly on 11 August 1950, calling for the creation of a European army with German participation, Union delegates joined the majority in supporting the idea. Their support for European integration colored the delegates’ responses to rearmament, even those who had expressed doubts before the outbreak of the Korean War. When Adenauer asked the Fraktion if they would accept responsibility “for German participation in European defense,” even if the other parties did not, he – 45 –

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received (with one anonymous abstention) unanimous support. As Gerstenmaier argued in a confrontation with Heinemann in late September, rearmament was “an expression of the will to cooperate with the Western world.”48 Whatever they may have thought about his governing style, Adenauer’s implied offer of troops for Europe was welcomed by these European enthusiasts, not condemned. Adenauer was more than happy to use enthusiasm for European integration to advance his plans for sovereignty through rearmament, though his characteristic suspicion of both friends and enemies kept him from being carried away by grand visions. When French Prime Minister Réné Pleven, building on Churchill’s idea, announced his plan for an international European army in October 1950, based on integration down to the smallest possible level, Adenauer’s initial response was cool. Fearing that the plan was a French attempt to delay German equality, he did not take a public position, preferring to await reactions from Washington and London while repeating his requests for a fundamental reorganization of relations between the Federal Republic and the Allies. The Germans, he told the AHC, scarred by the war and influenced by the opposition to rearmament from the SPD and Niemöller, were not prepared to make sacrifices for their defense. The only way to convince them was for the Allies to reconsider his request for contractual agreements “and to make the ugly phrase ‘Occupation Statute’ disappear.” Though he denied presenting “demands or requirements,” he went on to list a series of economic and political concessions that he felt would be necessary to “put us in a position to educate the German people and to begin a campaign to defend the freedom of Europe.”49 Adenauer’s statements before the AHC summarized the arguments he had been making since his security memorandum in August. Rearmament and sovereignty were complementary; Allied desire for the former was the lever that Adenauer hoped to use to extract concessions on the latter. The military benefits of German troops were not as important to him as their political value. At the same time, Allied planners were beginning to appreciate the importance of the link between rearmament, sovereignty, and European integration. In the words of Thomas Schwartz, German rearmament became the “skeleton key” that would serve both European security and economic recovery by creating structures to harness German power.50 For Adenauer, rearmament could unlock the door to full participation in the West. As the Pleven Plan became the European Defense Community (EDC), it attracted European enthusiasts within the Union and the German public at large, and Adenauer embraced it as the best way to reach his political goals, emphasizing the same themes of hope and insecurity that he had been developing since he took office. The Federal Republic had to make its commitment to the West as clear as possible, lest the West reject Germany. As he wrote to Schumacher in early 1951, warning of a “latent isolationism” in the US and suspicions in Europe, Adenauer was convinced that the Federal Republic – 46 –

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“must declare its readiness to make a contribution befitting its circumstances” if it hoped to be accepted as part of the West.51 Throughout the winter and spring of 1950–1951, talks began on several levels to work out the details of rearmament and sovereignty. A compromise in December 1950 at the Brussels NATO conference led to parallel negotiations in Paris and at the Petersberg on German participation in the EDC, beginning in January and February 1951. In March, the first revision of the Occupation Statute became official, and the Federal Republic formally created a Foreign Ministry. The first foreign minister, to the disappointment of some (especially Fraktion Chair Heinrich von Brentano) and the surprise of no one, was Konrad Adenauer. (When in the future the chancellor would have disputes with the cabinet, he would often be heard to sigh that “the only minister that I can depend on is the foreign minister.”) On 10 May, the first meeting took place between German and Allied legal experts at the Petersberg on the transformation of the Occupation Statute.52 Though the talks would not always go smoothly, there was movement on all fronts. In April 1951, Adenauer traveled to Paris to sign the ECSC treaty.53 The trip to Paris was his first official visit abroad as foreign minister, and the choice of the French capital was intended to reaffirm his commitment to Franco-German reconciliation within a European framework. The talks went smoothly, and Adenauer and Schuman exchanged letters reflecting their governments’ positions on the Saar to defuse the dispute as a threat to the signing. On 18 April 1951, the treaty signing took place at the Quai d’Orsay, and the first step toward European economic cooperation and West German participation in the West was complete. Returning to his suite at the Hotel Crillon, Adenauer discovered an unusual gift. Waiting for him was a letter from a French woman praising his efforts at Franco-German reconciliation; included was the Croix de Guerre that her father had won in World War I. Touched by this gesture, Adenauer kept the medal with its note in a frame on his desk for years thereafter as a reminder of his commitment to better relations with France. The gift was a double symbol of Adenauer’s concept of Westbindung—reconciliation with past victims of German aggression and cooperation within a new community. The anonymous Frenchwoman’s magnanimous gesture, coming at a time when Westbindung appeared closer to becoming a reality, offered Adenauer reassurance that he was on the right track.

1952: Year of Crisis and Decision The turn of the year 1951–1952 added to the positive momentum for Westbindung. On 22 November, Adenauer and the Allied foreign ministers initialed the draft of the Contractual Agreements on German sovereignty. In December, he traveled to London, where Prime Minister Winston Churchill – 47 –

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reaffirmed British commitments to the Continent. On 11 January 1952, the Bundestag ratified the ECSC treaty with an 89-vote majority. Parallel negotiations were underway in London and Luxemburg to reach settlements on Germany’s wartime debts and reparations to Jewish organizations and the state of Israel. There were, however, problems on the horizon. The Bundestag was becoming increasingly impatient with Adenauer’s negotiating tactics. Adenauer refused to release the complete text of either the Contractual Agreements or the EDC treaty, which would eventually come before the Bundestag, arguing that he did not want to prejudice ongoing talks. For many parliamentarians and journalists, such “undemocratic” behavior smacked of authoritarianism.54 Even Union deputies were becoming restive, speculating publicly about provisions that they would or would not accept. Adenauer’s attempts to control the flow of information about the negotiations had been part of his strategy of moving quickly in pursuing Westbindung. As the speculation continued, however, it became clear that the Bundestag was not willing to play the passive role Adenauer had scripted. If he wanted parliamentary support for the treaties, he would have to include the Bundestag in the negotiations. To quell the growing criticism, Adenauer agreed to a Bundestag debate on a German defense contribution in early February. At first this strategy appeared to backfire, as the government stumbled before a national radio audience. Adenauer, visibly tired and overworked, began the two-day debate with a long and rambling speech that even his supporters admitted was not very good. The SPD did much better, with both Fraktion chief Erich Ollenhauer and foreign policy spokesman Carlo Schmid expressing their fundamental opposition to rearmament. They demanded negotiations on German reunification, and charged Adenauer with violating democratic principles by refusing to share the text of the draft EDC treaty.55 The SPD’s confident performance surprised and unnerved the Union. Neither Adenauer nor Brentano could regain the rhetorical initiative, and it looked as though the government would suffer a public embarrassment. They were rescued, however, by a dynamic speech from Franz Josef Strauß of the CSU. Strauß, who until then had been just another young (though obviously ambitious) backbencher, grabbed headlines with his speech defending the “unhappy necessity” of rearmament. Combining rhetorical polish with a clear understanding of security issues, Strauß presented the rearmament case with renewed vigor and received a standing ovation from his colleagues. His speech and the press reaction to it are generally considered the start of Strauß’s swift rise within the Union, which would make him defense minister by 1956. It marked the emergence of a new political talent and of a new generation that would shape postwar German politics.56 Despite Strauß’s success, the February debate signaled the difficulties to come in the final push to complete the EDC treaty and the Contractual – 48 –

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Agreements. The SPD was no more willing to accept the logic behind the treaties than before, and Adenauer’s tactics made it virtually impossible to win them over. The failure to create a consensus in foreign affairs would haunt West German politics, leading to increasingly bitter constitutional wrangling between government and opposition and polarizing the electorate. This polarization would bring electoral benefits to the Union, but it also made the passage of important legislation much more difficult. Of more immediate concern in early 1952, however, were events that threatened to derail the treaties by raising questions about their relationship to national unity. The first came from the outside, with a new Soviet initiative on the German question. The second came from within, as members of both the opposition and the Union criticized the wording of the Contractual Agreements. These twin crises—and Adenauer’s response to them—provide further evidence of the combination of hope and fear in his conception of Westbindung, and shed light on the internal dynamics of the Union. The possibility that the Soviets or their East German allies might try to disrupt the ongoing negotiations with a new unification initiative had long been a concern in Bonn. In November 1950, as rearmament was gaining momentum, the Soviet and East German governments proposed a conference on the German question. The initiative led to preparatory four-power talks in Paris at the Palais Marbre Rose, beginning in March 1951. On 21 June the discussions broke off without concrete results. With the Soviets primarily interested in halting rearmament and the Americans determined to pursue plans for European defense, there was little room for agreement, and the Paris meetings would often be cited as proof of the futility of openended four-power discussions. A February 1952 initiative from GDR Minister President Otto Grotewohl for German-German talks tried to place the Adenauer government under renewed pressure, but Grotewohl’s refusal to discuss democratic mechanisms for building a unified German government gave the Federal Republic an opening for a counterproposal emphasizing free elections as the first step toward reunification. That sufficed to stymie further talks.57 Grotewohl’s initiative was quickly overshadowed by an even more impressive Soviet move the following month. On 10 March 1952, Stalin issued a formal note to the Allies with a plan for reunifying Germany.58 Stalin’s message included a draft peace treaty offering reunified Germany complete political sovereignty and, surprisingly, its own defense forces and industries. It would become a full member in all international organizations, and occupying troops would be withdrawn. Although “the existence of organizations inimical to democracy and the maintenance of peace must not be permitted,” all Germans, even former Nazis and high-ranking military officers serving sentences for war crimes, would be given “[c]ivil and political rights equal [to] all other Ger[man] citizens for participation in [the] building of [a] peace loving democratic Ger[many].” There was only – 49 –

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one significant limitation. As the price for unity, Germany would “not … enter into any kind of coalition or military alliance directed against any power which took part … in [the] war against Germany.” Stalin’s note unleashed the most heated debate over German reunification since the end of the war, and began a controversy that would echo throughout the next five decades. Whether the note represented serious Soviet willingness to abandon the GDR and accept German unification or was merely designed to disrupt Westbindung is a question that has bedeviled politicians, journalists, and scholars ever since, going to the roots of West German political identity. Although the ensuing exchange of notes ended in mutual recriminations in September 1952, the discussion of Western and Soviet motives has gone on unabated.59 The debate over the “Stalin Note” can be broken down into three interrelated questions. First is the obvious question of Soviet intentions. The second concerns the sincerity of the Allies’ commitment to German reunification— whether their emphasis on free elections as the first step toward reunification represented an actual bargaining position or was aimed more at placing the blame for German division on the Soviets. The third question, which is of particular interest to this study, concerns the West German response to the notes, especially in regard to the role of Adenauer and the Union. Discussions as to whether Adenauer sincerely wanted reunification and whether the Germans appreciated and exploited the chance presented by the notes have produced the most bitter disputes. Although this study makes no claims of finality, a closer examination of the relationship between these three questions reveals that much of the discussion up to now has been misdirected, focusing too much on the conflict between Westbindung and reunification and not enough on the complexity of Westbindung itself. Adenauer’s behavior and the reactions within the German polity suggest that it was not the German commitment to the West that was in question, but the proper relationship between the Federal Republic and its allies within the West. Furthermore, Adenauer’s behavior can only be understood as a reflection of the combination of hope and fear that formed the basis of his conception of Westbindung. Questions about Soviet intentions during the exchange of notes are as obvious as they have been difficult to answer. The experience at Marbre Rose suggests that the gulf between the Soviets’ willingness to discuss reunification and their willingness to take concrete steps toward that goal could be very wide indeed. Nevertheless, some scholars consider Stalin’s offer as proof of his genuine commitment to solving the German question. Rolf Steininger argues that the Soviets were willing to “make sacrifices” for German unity, even accepting the collapse of the GDR, if they could be sure that this new Germany would not become part of the Western military structure.60 More recent research, however, has concluded that the Soviet initiative was aimed more at hindering the Federal Republic’s Westbindung than at creating a unified and neutral Germany.61 Other historians have also – 50 –

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suggested that Stalin intended to use the notes as an “alibi” to appeal to West German national opinion while behind the scenes the East German government worked to expand its authority and deepen the division of Germany.62 Supporters of the argument that Stalin’s offers were sincere respond to their critics by contending that if the Allies had been willing to discuss Stalin’s first note, an agreement would have been possible. This assertion has an indisputable rhetorical advantage, because it forces critics to prove a negative. How, after all, can anyone say with certainty that there was absolutely no chance for reunification once talks had begun? Experience may have shown that four-power talks in previous years had led only to endless debate and deadlock, but that does not exclude the possibility of a breakthrough. Since negotiations never took place in 1952, this argument cannot be completely refuted. The reason such negotiations were not initiated, as Steininger correctly points out, is because the Allies had little interest in a neutral and reunified Germany. Regarding this second major question surrounding the Stalin notes, there is considerably broader agreement. Even those analysts who believe that the Soviet offer held no chance for reunification cannot deny that Allied behavior reflected a preference for European integration and German Westbindung over reunification. Immediately after the first note arrived on 10 March, Allied foreign ministers agreed that it was a “tactical move designed to disturb Western public opinion” and to disrupt conclusion of the treaties. Western policy aimed at continuing treaty negotiations while engaging the Soviets in enough dialogue to convince German opinion that the Allies were not indifferent to reunification. Allied responses thus emphasized free elections as the first step and the creation of a United Nations committee to determine if conditions for free elections existed. Although all agreed that a reunified Germany firmly integrated into Western Europe would be ideal, they preferred integration of the Federal Republic into the West over a neutral and reunified Germany.63 Focusing on free elections and the UN Commission, both unacceptable to the Soviets, helped the Allies gain the initiative in the “battle of the notes” without having to face the actual possibility of reunification. The line between diplomacy and hypocrisy is often blurred, and the 1952 exchange of notes between the Soviets and the Allies is a textbook example of how blurry that line can become. Whether Stalin truly believed that a reunited, neutral Germany would ever be acceptable to either Soviet strategy or the Allies may never be proven. It is nevertheless difficult to believe that he was unaware of the difficulties that he could cause for Western diplomacy by promising reunification in return for neutrality. It is also certain, based on the available evidence, that Stalin’s conception of a “democratic and peaceloving Germany” would not have corresponded to Western conceptions. Even if the Allies had agreed to talk in 1952, an agreement would have come, if ever, only after very long negotiations. The offer promised benefits for – 51 –

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Stalin irrespective of the chances for Western acceptance, and demonstrates that the debate over Stalin’s intentions toward Germany is irrelevant. It is much easier to believe that Stalin, a shrewd negotiator and vigilant defender of Soviet interests, wanted to stop the process of Westbindung than it is to believe that he was motivated by a desire to do favors for the Germans. Even if he were interested in a reunified, neutral Germany, this must be considered part of a general desire to disrupt American plans for European reconstruction through German Westbindung.64 It is hard to see how Stalin could have expected the Allies to accept such a situation— even harder to understand how anyone can be surprised that they did not. The Allies are equally vulnerable to the charge of hypocrisy. Their advocacy of free elections was aimed more at placating German opinion than actually satisfying German national desires. The Allies, especially the French, were not interested in having a reunified, neutral Germany for a neighbor, much less one with its own army and armaments industry. Realizing that reunification remained important for German public opinion, and unwilling to embarrass the Adenauer government, the Allies used the “Battle of the Notes” to place as much blame as possible on the Soviets for the failure to reunify Germany.65 Therefore, the proper question is not “Was Stalin’s offer genuine?” but rather “Were any of the four powers genuinely interested in reunifying Germany in 1952?” The answer to both questions is no. With this international context in mind, an analysis of the German role in the exchange of notes takes on different contours. Discussions that assume Soviet sincerity often include attacks on Adenauer for failing to take advantage of the opportunity, leading to charges that Adenauer did not want reunification and encouraged the Allies to reject Stalin’s offer. Considering the priorities of the four powers as sketched above, whose agreement after all would be necessary to make reunification a reality, it is difficult to draw such a conclusion. Whatever his own attitude toward reunification, Adenauer’s ability to influence Western policy was limited by the preferences of his more powerful allies. Adenauer’s recent biographers have emphasized the complexity of the international constellation to minimize any negative role the chancellor may have played in determining Western policy, though with differing accents. Hans-Peter Schwarz emphasizes the heroism of Adenauer’s “struggle against Moscow’s note offensive.” The more critical Henning Köhler rejects Schwarz’s formulations, but concludes that even if a different government had attempted to “test” Soviet intentions, it would eventually have faced the reality that the four powers were unlikely to reach an agreement in 1952, and would have pursued essentially the same policy as Adenauer’s.66 Understanding the larger context of the note exchange undermines the more politically charged criticisms of Adenauer’s decisions. This does not, however, mean either that his actions were above reproach or that a discussion of the notes is irrelevant to an understanding of Westbindung. Precisely – 52 –

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because Adenauer should have been able to count on Allied support, it is especially interesting to see how he continued to be motivated by a combination of hope and fear, and how the discussion over the notes highlighted the complexity of his and the Union’s conceptions of the West. Adenauer’s first reactions to the 10 March note were marked by caution and worry. He saw it as a threat to the treaty negotiations, with its promises to both the Left (neutrality) and the Right (a national army and political participation for former Nazis). Several members of the cabinet, however, viewed the note as a success. As they had hoped, Westbindung had forced the Soviets to modify their policy. Even though they rejected neutrality, they hoped that the note was a sign of better things to come. Adenauer was considerably less sanguine. Warning of possible negative Western reactions to German nationalism, he admonished the cabinet: “We must under no circumstances give the impression that we are changing our policy.” Days later he repeated his warnings, declaring: “The most important thing we can do is keep quiet.”67 This was the line Adenauer followed in his discussions with the AHC. In their meetings immediately following the first note, all of the participants agreed that the Soviet initiative “would not influence the continuation of the [treaty] negotiations.” A week later, responding to a question from FrançoisPoncet, Adenauer assured the AHC that his government was not going to turn away from Westbindung. The Soviet goal, he asserted, was an endless series of talks designed to delay European integration. Adenauer counseled the Allies not to reject the Soviet suggestions, but rather to present counterproposals emphasizing the need for free elections and the importance of German participation in European integration. In this way, the Allies could demonstrate interest in reunification without committing themselves to discussions that would delay the treaties. These comments reflected Western opinion, and were welcomed by the AHC.68 Adenauer’s immediate response to Stalin’s note, colored by fear lest the Allies become mistrustful of German nationalism, reflected his desire to see the treaties completed quickly. This should not, however, lead to the simple conclusion that Adenauer was uniformly hostile to reunification. Invited to comment on the Allied draft response to the Soviet note, Adenauer repeated his commitment to European integration but also “warned against treating [German] unification as something of no great importance.”69 Though he believed Germany should make a commitment to the West, he did not want the Allies to be indifferent to the German question. What he did reject was neutrality as the route to unification, citing both the German past and the difficulties inherent in preserving that neutrality. The point is not whether Adenauer was “correct” or not, but rather to see how his approach to the notes fit with his conception of the Federal Republic’s place in the West. Adenauer’s rejection of the two poles of neutrality and the legal abandonment of reunification would remain consistent for the rest of his career. – 53 –

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Moreover, one need not be an uncritical champion of Adenauer’s policies to understand the arguments against neutrality. An alliance with the West offered security, which neutrality could not, and made possible German participation in European integration. Since the note of 10 March specifically denied a reunited Germany the right to participate in any alliance aimed at the USSR, and Soviet propaganda had labeled every organization for European cooperation from the Marshall Plan to the ECSC as “aggressive,” it was not difficult for Adenauer to point out to the Fraktion that “if Germany were neutralized … European integration would be made impossible, and the dream of a united Europe would vanish forever.” Nor was Adenauer alone in rejecting neutrality. SPD leader Erich Ollenhauer had declared in Washington in February 1951 “that Germany has made its decision for the West and that no one should doubt the commitment of the SPD on this point.” Armed neutrality based on vague Soviet guarantees was not particularly attractive to any group along the German political spectrum in 1952, even Adenauer’s critics in the press.70 In the Bundestag debate over the Soviet notes in early April, Adenauer was able to confound the opposition by forcing them to confront the neutrality question. SPD speakers were forced into the difficult position of agreeing with the chancellor in rejecting neutrality while at the same time arguing for a thorough “sounding out” (Ausloten) of the Soviet offer, opening them to the charge that they had no clear conception of how these discussions would end. Their weak position made it easier for the government to pass its resolution calling for free all-German elections, earning Adenauer the praise of both his party colleagues and the AHC.71 In his public statements on the notes, Adenauer especially used the language of European solidarity to defend his decisions. In a speech to the first meeting of the CDU’s Evangelical Working Group (EAK) on 16 March 1952 in Siegen, his first public response to the 10 March note, Adenauer warned that the Soviets, “the true enemy of Christianity,” aimed at the neutralization of Germany because they hoped eventually to bring this neutral Germany under their control. Only Westbindung and a unified Europe could bring real peace and security. Once the West was united and strong, the time would come for negotiations with the Soviets, even to a “new order” (Neuordnung) in Eastern Europe. He hoped that the Allies would respond constructively, but was not willing to slow the pace of Westbindung. Combining confidence in his policy with his trademark worry about the future, Adenauer warned his audience: “[W]e should under no circumstances allow a delay in the creation of the European Defense Community, for such a delay would most likely mean the end of these common efforts. One cannot, when these things are so close to completion, simply put them on ice. That is impossible. If these things are not brought to a successful conclusion now, then they are in my opinion lost forever. For this reason, I repeat that the general attitude toward this note must be: We must make the most of every opportunity to create a reorganization of Western Europe.”72 – 54 –

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Some scholars, such as Andreas Hillgruber, have emphasized the rhetoric of strength in this speech, seeing a German version of John Foster Dulles’s policy of “rolling back” communism. As Henning Köhler has noted, however, the “rollback” rhetoric was more tactics than conviction. In searching for a politically useful way to combine commitment to the EDC with hope for reunification, Adenauer tested this new doctrine of “strength.” When, however, the public objected to the aggressive implications of a “new order” in Eastern Europe, Adenauer dropped this argument “like a hot potato.”73 More interesting than the focus on “rollback” is an understanding of how the Siegen speech fit in with Adenauer’s strategy of uniting the Union. Adenauer had chosen the audience for his first public discussion of the Soviet note very carefully. The EAK was created in 1952 to counter the charge that the Catholic-dominated Union and its Catholic chancellor were indifferent to the interests of Protestants, especially Protestant East Germans. In his speech, Adenauer used all of the familiar themes that had been used in the formation of the Union to bridge confessional differences: the difference between Marxist “materialism” and Christian principles, and the need for all Christians to recognize their common interest in opposing communism. In this spirit, Adenauer could wrap his rejection of neutrality and advocacy of European integration in the mantle of Christian principle, and received a rousing response, allowing him to keep control of the party. “Nationalists” such as Jakob Kaiser and Fraktion Chair von Brentano had originally been critical of Adenauer’s handling of the notes, but in the end, their enthusiasm for European integration and suspicion of the Soviets brought them into line as well.74 Adenauer’s rejection of Soviet neutrality offers should not surprise anyone familiar with his policies. As he would later tell British journalists, “no Soviet offer could move him to break ties to the West,” because those ties were too important for Germany’s future.75 What deserves more attention, however, is Adenauer’s fear of the fragility of those ties to the West. From his initial recommendation that the Germans “keep quiet” to his warning in Siegen that any delay on the EDC would mean losing forever an opportunity for European integration, Adenauer again revealed the equal roles played by hope and fear in his foreign policy. However firmly he believed that Westbindung was the best thing for the Germans, he remained worried about the West’s assessment of Germany. The Germans, according to Adenauer, could not deviate from the path toward the West, because any deviation could bring Westbindung to an end. Adenauer’s differences with other members of the Union can be traced to this sense of fragility. Advocates of “testing” Soviet intentions believed that it was possible to make such a test and then return to the treaty negotiations if Soviet offers proved illusory. Adenauer, however, feared that “sounding out” the Soviets would only reawaken Allied suspicions, and thus held back until public opinion turned – 55 –

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his way. We will never know for certain whether a different policy would have led to progress on unification; we do know that Adenauer’s view of the Federal Republic’s place in the West made any different policy inconceivable, at least to him. The pattern of hope and fear, of intraparty disagreement followed by harmony, repeated itself in the other major crisis of 1952—the text of the General treaty on Germany, or, as Adenauer preferred to call it, the “Germany treaty” (Deutschlandvertrag).76 The outline of the agreements, which would form the legal basis for the Federal Republic’s sovereignty, had been settled by German and Allied negotiators in November 1951. On 22 March 1952, the treaty was practically complete, and Bundestag deputies were impatient to see the draft. Brentano warned that the Fraktion would not sign any “blank checks,” while Franz Josef Strauß, declaring the CSU’s patience at an end, threatened to go public with criticisms of the chancellor.77 Reluctantly bowing to the pressure, Adenauer agreed to brief leading deputies. Instead of quelling the criticism, the briefing only gave critics more reason for concern, regarding provisions that limited German sovereignty in a national emergency and the costs of the German defense commitment. The most important source of discord, however, was Article VII, section 3 of the Germany treaty, the so-called “binding clause” (Bindungsklausel).78 According to the draft of 22 March, Article VII committed all of the parties to work “by peaceful means” to create “a reunified Germany that possesses a free and democratic constitution similar to that of the Federal Republic and is integrated into the Western European community.” Section 3 related to these goals by declaring that a reunited Germany would be bound by all treaty provisions, and in return would receive the same rights as the Federal Republic.79 Critics of the Bindungsklausel wanted it stricken, fearing that attempting to tie the hands of future governments could make reunification impossible, since nothing would stop the Soviets from imposing a similar provision on the GDR, thereby committing both German states to rival alliances. That Article VII would become such a problem for Adenauer is ironic, since members of his inner circle considered the article as a whole, with its Allied commitment to reunification within an integrated Europe, an important success for German diplomacy. Herbert Blankenhorn had responded to the charge that Adenauer was not interested in reunification with the argument that Article VII secured Allied help in bringing East Germany into Europe. Adenauer had also hinted at the terms of Article VII when he assured members of the coalition in a January 1952 meeting that the Germany treaty would “apply to all of Germany.”80 When the Allies joined the Soviets and representatives of East and West Germany in the “Two Plus Four” negotiations on German reunification in 1990, they did so in fulfillment of their obligations under a revised Article VII. Whether anyone in May 1952 expected that this would ever happen is, of course, impossible to say. What one can say is that the controversy over the Bindungsklausel in – 56 –

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May 1952 was an unexpectedly serious challenge to Adenauer’s policy. Disagreements over the clause would occupy a series of cabinet meetings and special conferences through May. Adenauer’s belated recognition of the need to consult with an increasingly restive coalition and Fraktion resulted in the first of a series of special cabinet meetings on 10 May.81 Ill and with bandaged hands caused by an attack of eczema, Adenauer warned that rejection of the treaty after a year of negotiations would mean the end of Westbindung. The Allies had no intention of renegotiating the major points, and the Germans could only accept or reject the agreement once it was signed. Many in the West continued to fear the Germans and had not forgotten the war, Adenauer asserted. If the Germans suddenly refused to cooperate, the Allies would seek alternatives that could be considerably less palatable than the imperfect treaties. Citing especially the danger of a return to isolationism in the US, Adenauer concluded that Germany was still occupied, and that even though the Allies had loosened many restrictions, without the treaties there was nothing to stop them from tightening them again. “What is happening now is the liquidation of our lost war,” he argued, “and we are fooling ourselves if we believe that the favorable … developments since [19]49 have already brought us into the ranks of free and equal peoples. We are not. We are a conquered people….”82 Adenauer’s remarks are a prime example of his conflicting attitudes of optimism and concern. Reaffirming his belief that cooperation with the Allies offered the best chance for a secure future, Adenauer nonetheless also warned that these positive developments would come only if the Germans were willing to make immediate sacrifices. If the Germans made too many demands, they would find themselves back where they started in 1949. As he reminded his colleagues on 10 May, the clause not only bound the reunited Germany to the Allies—it also bound the Allies, especially France, to support German reunification. Striking the Bindungsklausel would give the Allies the chance to make a deal without consulting the Germans.83 With this reference to the “Potsdam complex,” Adenauer certainly dramatized the situation in order to disarm the opposition. Nevertheless, frequent repetition of these arguments suggests that he remained worried about the fragility of German-Allied cooperation. Many Union members did not allow themselves to be frightened off by Adenauer’s warnings. Brentano led the attack, arguing that while he agreed with the spirit of the clause, he considered it unwise to limit the freedom of a future German government.84 He suggested more “flexible” language, if not outright elimination of the passage. In the end, Adenauer, supported by the Allies, who for their own reasons refused to eliminate the clause, and by key cabinet Ministers such as Ludwig Erhard and Finance Minister Fritz Schäffer, was able to head off a resolution against the clause. Brentano, however, did not give up, and arranged to meet with Acheson on the eve of – 57 –

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the signing to advocate new wording. Acheson proved willing to make a deal, and at the final round of discussions presented an alternative—that both the future German government and the Allies would be free to accept or reject the rights included in the treaties, if they accepted the responsibilities.85 The last hurdle cleared, the Germany treaty was signed in Bonn on 26 May, and the EDC treaty in Paris on 27 May. Brentano’s tenacious negotiating showed that the Germans enjoyed more room for maneuver than Adenauer had suspected. Although the signing of the treaties was clearly a victory for his policy, the dispute within the Union over the Bindungsklausel, like the dispute over the Stalin notes, revealed the complexity of both Adenauer’s view of Westbindung and the dynamics within the Union. In both cases, Adenauer was guided by both hope and fear, mixing a desire to cooperate with the West with warnings about possible recriminations if the Germans strayed from the path he outlined. His success in maintaining his leadership position, despite challenges, can be attributed to his skillful strategy and to the nature of the opposition. So-called “nationalists” such as Brentano, who led the charge against the Bindungsklausel, were also in favor of European integration and Westbindung. Brentano’s appeal to Acheson indicated more, not less, commitment to Westbindung, and more faith in Allied flexibility than Adenauer expressed. Even Jakob Kaiser and the representatives of the “East-CDU,” for all their commitment to reunification, were pledged to “continuing on the path we have begun.” Eugen Gerstenmaier summarized this reality when he reminded his colleagues that the treaty was the logical result of their commitment to the West, an “advance payment for a European policy,” that would demonstrate Germany’s positive development since 1945. “In our hearts,” Gerstenmaier declared, “every supporter of the government has already endorsed this policy.”86 With this strong consensus in favor of Westbindung, Adenauer could count on support from all groups within the Union to overcome any objections to details. Adenauer had grand plans for the symbolic exploitation of the Germany treaty, including a new national holiday and a torchlight parade. Conflict with the SPD, however, put an end to these hopes. Instead of a shared celebration of sovereignty, the signing of the treaties demonstrated increasing polarization. Kurt Schumacher called the treaty “a triumph for the Alliedclerical coalition over the German people,” adding that “whoever signs this treaty ceases to be a German.”87 Though invited to the signing, SPD representatives stayed ostentatiously away, heralding the bitter ratification fight to come. The treaties nevertheless helped Adenauer cement his position as leader of the Union and as a partner with the West. Dean Acheson reflected Adenauer’s new stature in a letter to President Truman, commenting “I hope we [will] have him with us a long time.”88 The Federal Republic and its chancellor were on their way to full membership in the West. A year later, that membership would receive symbolic reinforcement. – 58 –

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Symbol or Substance? Adenauer in America On 19 March 1953, the Bundestag ratified the Bonn and Paris treaties, making the Federal Republic the first Western European state to do so. The Bundestag’s action, coming the day after the ratification of the reparations treaty with Israel, gave Adenauer and the Union the tangible success they had long desired. Despite the controversies over the Bindungsklausel and the Stalin notes, the Germans had demonstrated their commitment to the West. As Adenauer informed the cabinet: “[T]he last two days have been of particular importance for the German image in the world.” Later that same day, as Adenauer and Walter Hallstein met with a select group of journalists, Hallstein called the votes “the most important domestic endorsements of foreign policy decisions that we have ever experienced….”89 The two treaties were steps toward both confronting the legacy of the past and moving into the future. Beyond the rhetoric, the treaties also provided Adenauer with an important accomplishment to take with him on his eagerly anticipated visit to the US. As the first sitting German head of government ever to cross the Atlantic, Adenauer knew that the trip would have immense symbolic importance, and so it has been regarded ever since, becoming one of the most lasting images of the Adenauer era. Historians agree that the visit was a “crucially symbolic … watershed in US-German relations as well as a personal triumph for Adenauer.” Adenauer himself concluded the first volume of his memoirs with the visit, writing that it “symbolized the end of the years of enmity” and “showed the world that … the Federal Republic was accepted once more in the circle and company of the free peoples.”90 If one were to believe Adenauer’s memoirs and the intense public relations campaign that accompanied the visit, the trip to the US was an unqualified success for the man and his policies. This is certainly true, though not in exactly the way that Adenauer originally intended. The visit was a crucial symbolic moment, but a closer examination of the background reveals a more complicated picture, illuminating Adenauer’s vision of Westbindung and his sense of politics as the art of the possible. Beginning with detailed plans, Adenauer shifted to symbolic politics only after it became clear that the trip would not produce concrete political results. Plans for Adenauer to visit the US had begun as early as 1951. With the conclusion of the Bonn and Paris treaties, preparations began in earnest, though it was agreed that the visit would not occur until after the treaties were signed, only to be delayed further by the American presidential elections.91 Following Eisenhower’s victory, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’s first official trip to Europe in February 1953 finally brought a formal invitation to visit Washington in the spring, an invitation that Adenauer eagerly accepted. From the start, the Germans were aware of the public relations significance of introducing Adenauer to the American public. Thus, the official visit to Washington would be only one part of a – 59 –

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transcontinental odyssey including stops in New York, Chicago, San Francisco, and Ottawa. The itinerary called for appearances before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, the National Press Club in Washington, and the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, as well as the television program “Youth Wants to Know,” in which the aged chancellor fielded questions from a live audience of American teenagers.92 He would also receive an honorary degree from Georgetown University, and arrived in the US armed with scholarships to encourage American students to study in the Federal Republic. While the preparations continued, Adenauer quietly tested the boundaries of German-American cooperation. In early March, he sent Herbert Blankenhorn to Washington with ambitious suggestions for the agenda. Fearing leaks, Blankenhorn traveled secretly, informing neither the AHC nor Adenauer’s staff of his instructions. Chief of Staff Otto Lenz, for example, did not find out about Blankenhorn’s trip until 8 April, and even then was unaware of its purpose.93 On 15 March, Blankenhorn met with McCloy to tell him “that this is probably the only time in his life that [Adenauer] will be visiting the United States” and he hoped that “the visit will be of significance, not merely atmospheric.” Fearing that the Europeans would delay final ratification of the treaties, Adenauer hoped that the Americans would agree to an immediate improvement in the Federal Republic’s status, granting the sovereign rights promised in the Germany treaty. He was, however, to be disappointed. The Eisenhower administration, only in office a few months, feared upsetting its European allies, especially an increasingly uneasy France. Any changes in German status would have to wait until the ratification of the treaties by all of the signatories, and Blankenhorn was told that Adenauer “should not be too disappointed if the communiqué was somewhat thin on the subject of US commitments.”94 Though this response could have been considered final, Adenauer made one last effort to advance his agenda. In a meeting with the new High Commissioner, James Conant, in Bonn on 30 March, Adenauer, citing upcoming Bundestag elections and his concern that the SPD would use the lack of concrete advances against him, asked that the German mission in Washington be raised to the status of an embassy, and that the High Commissioners carry the title of ambassador, to signal a new relationship between the Federal Republic and its allies. As was to be expected from such an experienced politician, however, Adenauer came to this meeting with his retreat already prepared. When Conant rejected his suggestions, the chancellor handed him a memorandum in English outlining German expectations for the visit that better reflected American wishes. Here there was no mention of specific German requests, merely a desire for a “thorough exchange of views” and a discussion of “joint measures [that] could be taken even before [the] coming into force of [the] treaties in order to avoid that delay in ratification of treaties [that] might have harmful effects on Western defense preparedness.”95 – 60 –

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Adenauer’s tactical retreat is further evidence of his cautious diplomacy toward the Allies and especially the US. By keeping the Blankenhorn mission and his own suggestions secret, Adenauer was able to test his limits without public embarrassment. Once he reached those limits, he adjusted his statements to shape expectations. In a press conference with American journalists on 31 March, he remarked that he had “no specific requests for the Americans,” but was only going “to offer the thanks of the German people” for American support since 1945. Adenauer followed this same disingenuous line in his memoirs, in which he discusses neither Blankenhorn’s trip nor his own proposals. “No special program had been drawn up for the negotiations in the US, and it was not expected that precise decisions would be taken as a result of my visit,” he wrote more than a decade later, concluding with the technically accurate comment: “I did not go … with the expectation of concluding agreements.”96 When exactly he determined that no agreements would be forthcoming he left unspoken. Once Adenauer and his entourage departed for New York on the ocean liner United States on 2 April 1953, German strategy aimed solely at cultivating an image of German-American reconciliation and cooperation. Despite a sensationalist book published at the same time, Germany Plots with the Kremlin, the American press and public welcomed Adenauer warmly.97 From New York, Adenauer flew to Washington for three days of friendly discussions with Eisenhower and Dulles. Only once did Adenauer reiterate his request that the High Commissioners be promoted to ambassadors. When Dulles repeated that this was not possible without consulting the British and French, however, Adenauer retreated, focusing instead on the conclusion of a trade agreement and an exchange of notes on German-American cultural cooperation. The communiqué emphasized their mutual assessment of the international situation, especially a common willingness to respond to Soviet peace initiatives without abandoning either the EDC or German reunification.98 The appearance of unanimity was preserved. Success in managing relations with the Eisenhower administration was but one part of the challenge facing Adenauer and his staff. The other part was managing Adenauer’s public appearances and their interpretation in the American and European press, which was an unqualified success. The American press proved almost uniformly supportive, offering glowing reports of Adenauer’s statesmanlike bearing, suggesting comparisons with Winston Churchill. Even the European press, which originally viewed German public relations efforts as excessive, were impressed by how Adenauer won over American opinion. French newspapers, who had originally dismissed the trip as meaningless propaganda, now worried that Adenauer had so captivated his hosts that the Germans would have too much influence over future American policy.99 The most memorable event of the trip was Adenauer’s visit to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Arlington National Cemetery on 8 April. Accompanied – 61 –

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by a military honor guard, Adenauer laid a wreath while a military band played the American and German national anthems. At once a gesture of sympathy, repentance, and solidarity, this piece of political theater offered tangible proof of the new German-American relationship. The image dominated press reports, and forms the climax to Adenauer’s discussion in his memoirs. As with many memorable public events, the visit to Arlington had been carefully scripted for maximum effect. A member of the German staff noted that the ceremony had proceeded according to a written plan, congratulating his colleagues for the “painstaking preparations” that had ensured success.100 Similarly extensive planning went into the ceremonies surrounding Adenauer’s return to the Federal Republic. Otto Lenz arranged for Adenauer’s plane to arrive in Hamburg just in time for the CDU national convention. The plane was to be met at the airport by hundreds of well-wishers and journalists, and Adenauer was to be taken in a motorcade to the official Hamburg guesthouse. Despite conflicts with the SPD-led government of Hamburg, Lenz was able to deliver an impressive demonstration of the chancellor’s new popularity. Bad weather over the Atlantic delayed Adenauer’s plane more than five hours, but when he arrived late on 19 April, thousands of cheering fans greeted him, bursting through police barriers and streaming around him as he was officially welcomed by the cabinet and Union leadership. Lenz also arranged for several hundred people with torches and banners to wait for Adenauer under the balcony of his apartment, where he twice emerged to accept their cheers. Adenauer followed up his public reception with an appearance at the CDU convention on 20 April, where he urged the party faithful to use his successful trip as a springboard for the upcoming campaign.101 The visit to the US sealed Adenauer’s reputation as an internationally respected statesman, which in turn confirmed him as the undisputed leader of the Union. It would have been difficult not to be caught up in an immediate sense of triumph. Otto Lenz remarked in his diary how excited the chancellor was, even immediately after the tiring plane trip to Hamburg. “His heart was clearly running over,” Lenz wrote of their discussion over tea. Adenauer’s public remarks reflected this state of mind, spreading the notion that the Germans had “arrived” as respected members of the world community, and that “[e]verywhere the name of Germany means something again.” He repeated these sentiments in comments to both the Union leadership and the cabinet, describing his reception in America as “so surprisingly good, that one could not imagine it being any better.” Coming from the habitually pessimistic Adenauer, these comments bordered on giddy, reflecting the combination of elation and relief at having completed the important first steps toward his “chief aim … to lead Germany back as an equal in the European community of nations and to achieve the integration of Germany into the free world.”102 – 62 –

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Conclusion: A Community Takes Shape Impressive as Adenauer’s domestic and international successes appeared in April 1953, it is important not to lose sight of the complicated developments that led to them. Adenauer began with his own preference for integration into the West. To translate this personal conviction into policy, however, required tenacious work and great tactical flexibility. Adenauer had to satisfy French fears of a resurgent Germany as well as American desires for German recovery. He was prepared at different times to appeal more directly to one or the other of the Allies when he felt that such an appeal would advance his larger goal of Westbindung. This explains his offer of a Franco-German union in 1950 and his efforts to woo American opinion in 1953. He tried to maneuver between the hopes and fears of his allies, always looking for opportunities to score points for his policy. Similar tactical flexibility was also required to maintain his control of the Union, as when he used his colleagues’ enthusiasm for European integration to build support for rearmament, or to dampen enthusiasm for the neutralism implied in the Stalin notes. Lest one get the impression, however, that Adenauer was simply a virtuoso manipulating foreign and domestic allies, it is important to remember the degree to which his maneuvers were as much a product of insecurity and perceived necessity as far-sighted strategy. Adenauer was committed to integrating Germany into the West, but that does not mean that he always enjoyed the maneuvers. He pursued his complex strategy because he was worried about the Allied commitment to Germany, and always looked for the best way to master any potential conflict between German national interests and Westbindung. Thus, Adenauer was especially cautious in both the Stalin note and Bindungsklausel crises, while party colleagues, equally committed to the West, demanded more decisive action. Plagued by his sense of the Federal Republic’s weakness and of the latent Allied mistrust of German intentions, Adenauer tried to shape policy to minimize potential damage, even if this meant manipulating his colleagues and the structures of the infant Federal Republic. For better or worse, the lessons that Adenauer learned, or believed he had learned, in his first four years in office would guide him for the next ten. Driven by his hope for a German role the West as well as his fear that the Germans would prove unable to gain the trust of their allies, Adenauer would spend the years after 1953 trying to solidify both the Western community and German attitudes toward it within an increasingly restive Union. This effort would bring success, but would also eventually expose the differences between the chancellor and his allies.

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Notes 1. Adenauer, government declaration to the Bundestag, 20 September 1949, KAR, 153–170, quote on 167. 2. Ibid., 167–168; see also Herbert Blankenhorn, Verständnis und Verständigung: Blätter eines politischen Tagebuchs (Frankfurt, 1980), 43–52. 3. Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der Ära Adenauer (Darmstadt, 1983), 250. 4. Adenauer to Helene Wessel, 27 August 1949, Briefe 1949–1951, 96–97. 5. “An alle jungen Deutschen!” CDU Election Files 1949, ACDP VII-003-001/3. 6. “Gemeinsamer Aufruf,” CDU Election Files 1949, ACDP VII-003-001/2. 7. Adenauer in the cabinet, 18 October 1949, Kabinett 1949, 138. 8. Josef Kleindinst in the Fraktion, 9 November 1949, Heidemeyer, 56. 9. Otto Schumacher-Hellmold, “Wenn es die PÄDA nicht gegeben hätte”; idem, “Bonns Trümpfe: Kasernen und Millionärsvillen”; Paul Zurnieden, “Drei Städte und zwei Dutzend Dörfer,” in Rudolf Pörtner, ed., Kinderjahre der Bundesrepublik (Munich 1992), 16–47, 50–55, 56–75. 10. Memorandum of conversation, Adenauer and Hans Ehard in Frankfurt, 20 August 1949, Auftakt, 30–32. 11. Adenauer to Justice Minister Thomas Dehler, 3 October 1949, on relations with the AHC (copies sent to all ministers), StBKAH III/21; Arnulf Baring, Außenpolitik in Adenauers Kanzlerdemokratie, 1–48; Heinrich von Brentano in the Fraktionsvorstand, 18 and 19 October 1949, Heidemeyer, 34 and 38. 12. Adenauer, Memoirs, 183–185; Blankenhorn, Verständnis, 62–63 (21 September 1949); Schwartz, America’s Germany, 57–58. 13. Conversation with Daniel Kosthorst at the AA, 7 June 1994. 14. Adenauer to Robertson, 1 November 1949, Briefe 1949–1951, 133; Adenauer, Memoirs, 201–202. 15. Ibid., 200–202; Blankenhorn, Verständnis, 71–72 (3 November 1949); Schwartz, America’s Germany, 75. See also Köhler, Adenauer, 567–573; and Schwarz, Aufstieg, 684–685. 16. Blankenhorn, Verständnis, 74–76 (9 and 13 November 1949); Schwartz, America’s Germany, 68–80; Hans-Jürgen Grabbe, Unionsparteien, Sozialdemokratie, und Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika (Düsseldorf, 1983), 57–64. See also Brentano in the Fraktion, 15 November 1949, Heidemeyer, 64. 17. Meeting of 15 and 22 November, in AHK I, 9–17, 467–495; Blankenhorn diary, 17, 22, and 23 November 1949, BA NL Blankenhorn 351/2, 42, 45–46. See also Adenauer in the Fraktion, 9 November 1949, Heidemeyer, 55–56. 18. Blankenhorn diary, 15 November 1949, BA NL Blankenhorn 351/2, 40. For press reactions, see Ernst Friedländer, “Schumacher’s Nationaler Sozialismus,” Die Zeit, 17 November 1949; “Sichere Mehrheit für Adenauers Außenpolitik,” NZZ 17 November 1949; and “Der Start zur deutschen Außenpolitik,” Kölnische Rundschau, 17 November 1949, ibid. Blankenhorn, Verständnis, 76–80; Adenauer comments, 17 November, AHK I, 18–35, especially 18–20. 19. Blankenhorn, Verständnis, 83–84; Verhandlungen, 1 WP, 18th Meeting, 449–527. 20. Ibid., 525; Blankenhorn diary, 21 November 1949, BA NL Blankenhorn 351/2. 21. “Erklärung vom 1.12.1949,” quoting Adenauer and Schumacher, ACDP NL Schröder, I483-090/1; “Die Abkommen vom Petersberg,” NZZ, 26 November 1949. “A Good German,” Time (5 December 1949), 30–34. 22. Adenauer, Memoirs, 231; “Vom Führungsanspruch zur Selbstbehauptung,” DUD 3, no. 260 (28 December 1949), 3–4; Kutscher [Economics Ministry] to Blankenhorn, 19 November 1949 and Erhard to Adenauer, 21 November 1949, BA NL Blankenhorn, 351/2; Adenauer to the Vorstand of the Vereinigte Stahlwerke, 29 November 1949, Briefe 1949–1951,

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23.

24. 25. 26. 27.

28.

29. 30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35. 36. 37.

38. 39.

40. 41.

139–140. For excerpts from the letter from Hans-Gunther Sohl, Wolfgang Linz, and Siegfried Seelig to Adenauer on 24 November, see ibid., 464. Köhler, Adenauer, 583–611; Schwarz, Aufstieg, 690–710; Ludolf Herbst, Option für den Westen (Munich, 1990), 11–34; Adenauer, Memoirs, 232–238; Blankenhorn, Verständnis, 90–91; François-Poncet and Adenauer comments, 2 March 1950, AHK I, 144–145; Adenauer to Kaiser, 30 January 1950, Briefe 1949–1951, 167–169. Adenauer, Memoirs, 244–248; Köhler, Adenauer, 598–600; Schwarz, Aufstieg, 700–702. Discussions in the Fraktionsvorstand, 22 March 1950, and in the Fraktion, 28 March 1950, Heidemeyer, 248–252; “Wenn Amerika die Geduld verliert …” DUD (21 March 1950). Adenauer in the Fraktion, 9 May 1950, Heidemeyer, 264–265. Hitchcock, France Restored, 116–132; Adenauer, Memoirs, 256–260. Adenauer to Schuman, 8 May 1950; Adenauer’s official response to Schuman, 8 May 1950, Briefe 1949–1951, 208–209; Schuman to Adenauer, 7 May 1950, ibid., 508–510. John Gillingham, Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe (New York, 1991); Urwin, The Community of Europe, 43–57. Blankenhorn, Verständnis, 100–105 (8/9 and 23 May 1950); Adenauer in the AHC, 16 May 1950; AHK I, 208. See also Adenauer to Paul Silverberg, 11 May 1950, Briefe 1949–1951, 209. “Deutschlands Rückkehr,” DUD 4, no. 109 (5 June 1950). Most recently David Clay Large, Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era (Chapel Hill, NC, 1996). For an extensive survey, see Militärisches Forschungsamt ed., Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945–1956, 4 vols. (Munich, 1982–1997). Le Monde quoted in Frank Ninkovich, Germany and the United States: The Transformation of the German Question Since 1945 (Boston, 1988), 84. Hillgruber, Deutsche Geschichte 1945–1986, 48. “Deutsche Wehrmacht? Eine Gewissensfrage,” DUD 3, no. 234 (22 November 1949). Maria Dietz, MdB (CDU) to Adenauer, 25 May 1950; StBKAH 11/02, 147–150; Adenauer to Dietz, 2 June 1950, Briefe 1949–1951, 223. Schwarz, Aufstieg, 727–750; Köhler, Adenauer, 611–618; Adenauer Memoirs, 267–269; Fraktionsvorstand meeting, 7 December 1949, and Fraktion meetings on 8 and 14 December 1949; Heidemeyer, 122, 126, 135–136. For Western strategy, see Marc Cioc, Pax Atomica: The Nuclear Defense Debate in West Germany During the Adenauer Era (New York, 1988), 3–11. Adenauer in the AHC, 8 December 1949; AHK I, 54–56. See also Köhler, Adenauer, 615. Adenauer in the Fraktionsvorstand, 19 February 1951, Heidemeyer, 359; Adenauer to Dehler, 20 November 1951, Briefe 1951–1953, 145–146. Large, Germans, 65–69; AHC meetings, 29 June and 17 August 1950, AHK I, 217–218, 222–230; “Bonn Chief Calls for Defense Force,” New York Times, 18 August 1950, 1. “Adenauer und Schumacher zur Sicherheitsfrage” and “‘Ungefragtes Angebot zur Mitarbeit’ nennt Schumacher die Vorschläge des Kanzlers”; SZ, 24 August 1950, reporting on Adenauer and Schumacher’s separate press conferences on 23 August. For the German text of the memorandum, see Kabinett 1950b, 85–90. Brentano to Adenauer, 22 August 1950, BA NL Brentano 239/154, 278–280; memorandum of the Office of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State, 18 September 1950, Maier/Thoß, 61. The complete memorandum is in Adenauer, Memoirs, 280–281; AHC meeting, 31 August 1950; AHK I, 231–237. Large, Germans, 82–91; Hitchcock, France Restored, 134–147; H. Steinitz, “Folgen der New Yorker Außenministerkonferenzen,” SPD Pressedienst, 25 September 1950; “Schumacher: Keine Entscheidungen,” FAZ, 20 September 1950. Meeting with the AHC, 23 September 1950; AHK I, 238–246, especially 242–243. See also the meeting between McCloy’s deputy, General George Hays, and Adenauer, 17 September; ibid., 499–501. Federal Press Office, “Mitteilung an der Presse,” 20 September 1950; “New Yorker Zwischenbilanz,”

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42.

43.

44.

45.

46.

47.

48.

49.

50.

51.

52. 53.

DUD 182 (19 September 1950); “Eine gute Grundlage,” DUD 185 (20 September 1950); and “Reifen lassen,” DUD 189 (26 September 1950). Cabinet meeting of 31 August 1950, Kabinett 1950a, 663–671; Heinemann, undated memorandum on his resignation, Kabinett 1950b, 104–108; and Heinemann to Adenauer, 3 September 1950, ibid., 101–102. See also Diether Koch, “Heinemanns Kritik an Adenauers Deutschlandpolitik,” in Foschepoth, Adenauer und die deutsche Frage, 207–234; and Diether Koch, Heinemann und die Deutschlandfrage (Munich, 1972). Kleinmann, Geschichte der CDU, 124–130; Heinemann, memorandum of conversation with Adenauer, 15 September 1949, Kabinett 1950b, 64–66. Hermann Ehlers in the Fraktion, 14 September 1949, and Adenauer’s response, Auftakt, 392–396; Ehlers, Eugen Gerstenmaier and Die Zeit publisher Gerd Bucerius met with Adenauer on 14 September to lobby for Heinemann, Blankenhorn, Verständnis, 58–59; Adenauer to Heinemann, 14 April 1950, Briefe 1949–1951, 193–194. Niemöller’s letter and the letter from the Confessing Church, both 4 October 1950, are in Kabinett 1950b, 180–183. See also Niemöller to McCloy, 9 October 1950 and Blankenhorn memorandum of a telephone conversation with McCloy, 13 October, ibid., 195–196, 218–219. Adenauer to Heinemann, 9 October 1950 and Adenauer, memorandum of conversation with Heinemann, 9 October 1950; Briefe 1949–1951, 289–292. On Adenauer’s original preference for Lehr, see his comments in the Fraktion, 14 September 1949, Auftakt, 394–396. Large, Germans, 75; Heinemann memorandum [11 September 1950], Kabinett 1950b, 112–113; Adenauer, memorandum of conversation with Heinemann, 11 September 1950, ibid., 124–125; Adenauer to Heinemann, 23 and 28 September 1950; Briefe 1949–1951, 275–278, 283–284; meeting with the AHC, 12 October 1950, AHK I, 248; Adenauer to Präses Ernst Wilm, 30 October 1950, Briefe 1949–1951, 301. Kabinett 1950b, 31–63. See also Adenauer to Pastor Wilhelm Niesel, 30 October 1950; Briefe 1949–1951, 300. The transcript of the Fraktionsvorstand meeting on 10 October (Heidemeyer, 309) mentions this topic, but does not offer details. One of Adenauer’s strong supporters, Franz-Josef Wuermeling, did, however, write to Adenauer that same day expressing his support; Kabinett 1950b, 219–220. Gerstenmaier comments in the Fraktion, 6 September 1950; Heidemeyer, 302. Erster Parteitag der Christlich-Demokratische Union: Goslar 20–22. Oktober 1950 (Bonn [1950]), 112. Köhler, Adenauer, 636; Schwarz, Aufstieg, 753–754. Eugen Gerstenmaier, Streit und Friede hat seine Zeit: Ein Lebensbericht (Frankfurt, 1981), 324–326; Gerstenmaier to Price, 12 December 1950; ACDP NL Gerstenmaier I-210-015; Fraktionsvorstand meeting, 6 November 1950, Heidemeyer, 314; meeting between EKD representatives from the Rhineland and Westphalia and Protestant members of the Fraktion, Düsseldorf, 26 September 1950, Kabinett 1950b, 162–176, especially 174. Blankenhorn, Verständnis, 115–116 (25 October 1950). For Adenauer’s critical but cautious initial comments, see his meeting with journalists, 27 October 1950, Teegespräche 1950– 1954, 12–16; Large, Germans, 91–95; Adenauer in the AHC, 16 November 1950, AHK I, 264–273, especially 268–269, 273. See also Adenauer to Dannie Heineman, 15 November 1950, Briefe 1949–1951, 305–308. Thomas A. Schwartz, “The ‘Skeleton Key’: American Foreign Policy, European Unity, and German Rearmament, 1949–1954,” Central European History 19, no. 4 (December 1986): 369–385. Adenauer memorandum, 31 January 1951, in Adenauer, Memoirs, 323–325; Adenauer repeated these arguments at a meeting with reporters on 2 March 1951, and in the cabinet, 20 February 1951, Lenz diary, 39, 50–51 (21 February and 2 March 1951). Large, Germans, 95–107; Schwartz, America’s Germany, 210–234; Lenz diary 57–58; 60 (13 and 19 March 1951); Wilhelm Grewe, Rückblenden 1976–1951 (Frankfurt, 1976), 130–145. Blankenhorn, Verständnis, 119–121; Adenauer, Memoirs, 329–343; Schwarz, Aufstieg, 860–861. – 66 –

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54. Blankenhorn memorandum, 21 January 1952, BA NL Blankenhorn 351/9b, 161–163. 55. Lenz diary, 249 (7 February 1952); Large, Germans to the Front, 136–140. The debate is in Verhandlungen 1.WP 190–191. Sitzung, 7–8 February 1952, 8095–8248. 56. Wolfram Bickerich, Franz Josef Strauß: Die Biographie (Düsseldorf, 1996), 54–58; Wolfgang Krieger, Franz Josef Strauß: Der barocke Demokrat aus Bayern (Göttingen, 1995), 25–33; Strauß, Die Erinnerungen, paperback ed. (Berlin, 1989), 175–180. 57. On the Marbre Rose meetings, see Rupieper, Der besetzte Verbündete, 228–240; on Grotewohl, see the special cabinet meeting of 14 February 1952, Kabinett 1952, 107–109. 58. Text in FRUS 1952–1954 VII/I, 169–172. 59. Doering-Manteuffel, Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 65–73; Rolf Steininger, The German Question: The Stalin Note of 1952 and the Problem of Reunification, trans. Jane T. Hedges, ed. Mark Cioc (New York, 1990); Hermann Graml, “Die Legende von der verpaßten Gelegenheit,” VfZ 29 (1981): 307–341; Manfred Kittel, “Genesis einer Legende: Die Diskussion um die Stalin-Noten in der Bundesrepublik 1952–1958,” VfZ 41 (1994): 355–389; Wilfried Loth, “Stalin, die deutsche Frage und die DDR,” DA 28, no. 3 (1995): 290–298; Gerhard Wettig, “Stalin— Patriot und Demokrat für Deutschland?” and Wilfried Loth, “Kritik ohne Grundlagen: Erwiderung auf Gerhard Wettig,” both in DA 28, no. 7 (1995): 743–750. See also Jürgen Zarusky, ed., Die Stalin-Note vom 10. März 1952 (Munich, 2002), which uses the most recently discovered Soviet documents to continue the debate between Graml, Wettig, and Loth. 60. Steininger, German Question, 9–13, 20. See also Wilfried Loth, Stalin’s Unwanted Child, trans. Robert F. Hogg (New York, 1996). 61. Rupieper, besetzte Verbündete, 253–258; idem, “Zu den sowjetischen Deutschlandnoten 1952: Das Gespräch Stalin-Nenni,” VfZ 33 (1985): 547–557. 62. Hermann Graml, “Die Sowjetische Notenkampagne von 1952,” in Schwarz, Die Legende von der verpaßten Gelegenheit, 16–37, especially 36–37. 63. Rupieper, Verbündete, 240–300; Schwartz, America’s Germany, 260–269. Acheson to US embassy London, 14 March 1952; Acheson to McCloy, 22 March 1952; Cumming (Moscow) to State Department, 25 March 1952; “Departmental Views on Germany,” 2 April 1952, FRUS 1952–1954 VII/1, 176–177, 189–190, 191–192, 194–199. See also Hallstein to Adenauer, 11 March 1952, and conversation between Adenauer, and representatives of the Western powers, 20 March 1952, AAP 1952, 218–220, 228–232. 64. Andreas Hillgruber, “Adenauer und die Stalin-Note vom 10. März 1952,” KAZ II, 111–130. 65. Frank Schumacher, Kalter Krieg und Propaganda: Die USA, der Kampf um die Weltmeinung und die ideelle Westbindung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1945–1955 (Trier, 2000), 215–219. 66. Schwarz, Aufstieg, 906–924; Köhler, Adenauer, 681–697. 67. Blankenhorn, Verständnis, 132–133 (10 March 1952); cabinet meetings 11 and 14 March 1952, Kabinett 1952, 164–165, 173; Lenz diary, 273, 276–277 (11 and 14 March 1952). 68. AHC meetings on 11/12 and 17 March 1952, AHK II, 24, 27–28. See also Hays (Acting US High Commissioner) to the State Department, 17 March 1952, FRUS 1952–1954 VII/1, 182–183. 69. Bonsal (chargé in Paris) to the State Department, 20 March 1952, ibid., 186–187. 70. Adenauer in the Fraktion, 19 February 1951, Heidemeyer, 360–362; Ollenhauer quoted in Rupieper, Verbündete, 235; Markus Kiefer, “Die Reaktionen auf die ‘Stalin-Noten’ in der zeitgenössischen deutschen Publizistik: Zur Widerlegung einer Legende,” Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte 51 (1988): 209–237. 71. Verhandlungen, 1. WP (3 April 1952), 8743–8816; Lenz diary, 292 (3 April 1952). AHC meeting, 4 April 1952, AHK II, 34. 72. “Keine Zusammenschluß mit bolschewistischem Osten!” Siegener Zeitung, 17 March 1952, ACDP VII-005-84/2. 73. Hillgruber, “Stalin-Note,” especially 113–114 and 129 n13; Köhler, Adenauer, 693–694. 74. “Mehr Gemeinsames als Trennendes! Dr. Adenauer zur politischen Lage,” Union in Deutschland, vol 6, no. 23/24, ACDP VII-005-84/2; Köhler, Adenauer, 690–692; Ernst Müller Hermann to Brentano, 2 April 1952, copy in BA NL Kaiser 18/472, 148–149. – 67 –

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75. Discussion with William F. Casey and George Herbert Morison of the London Times, 3 June 1952, Teegespräche 1950–1954, 295–303, especially 297–298. 76. Adenauer convinced the Fraktion to accept this title at their meeting on 9 May 1952, Lenz diary, 315; Kabinett 1952, 271. The AHC rejected it, preferring the more neutral term, “conventions.” McCloy to Acheson, 16 May 1952, FRUS 1952–1954 VII/1, 72. 77. Fraktion meeting, 24 April 1952; Brentano in the Fraktion on 2 May 1952; Strauß in the Fraktionsvorstand, 8 May 1952, Heidemeyer, 538–539, 543–535, 549–550; Brentano to Adenauer, 14 May 1952, StBKAH III/38. 78. Robert Tillmanns in the Fraktionsvorstand, 25 April 1952, Heidemeyer, 539–540. 79. For the German text, dated 29 April 1952, see Kabinett 1952, 286–291, from which these quotations are drawn. 80. Blankenhorn memorandum, 7 January 1952, BA NL Blankenhorn 351/9b, 6–7; Blankenhorn diary, 10 January 1952, ibid., 131–132; “Koalitionsbesprechung beim Bundeskanzler am 23.1.52,” BA NL Brentano 239/163, 75–76. 81. Cabinet meeting, 10 May 1952, Kabinett 1952, 273–302; Lenz diary 317–322 (10 May 1952). 82. Kabinett 1952, 280. See also Fraktion meeting, 17 May 1952, Heidemeyer, 557–561. 83. Kabinett 1952, 297. 84. Brentano in the Fraktion, 13 and 17 May 1952, Heidemeyer, 552–553, 560. Daniel Kosthorst, Brentano und die deutsche Einheit (Düsseldorf, 1993), 24–29. 85. Minutes of the meeting of the foreign ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France with the chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, 25 May 1952, FRUS 1952–1954 VII/1, 104–109, especially 107n. Official text of the treaty, ibid., 112–118. 86. Robert Tillmanns in the Fraktion, 13 May 1952; Gerstenmaier and Erich Köhler in the Fraktion, 17 May 1952. Heidemeyer, 555–556, 559. 87. Baring, Außenpolitik, 161–164; quotes on 163–164. 88. Acheson to Truman, 26 May 1952, FRUS 1952–1954 V/1, 683. 89. Adenauer in the cabinet, 20 March 1953, Kabinett 1953, 229; Lenz diary, 594 (20 March 1953); Hallstein comment in Teegespräche 1950–1954, 422. 90. James G. Hershberg, James B. Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the Nuclear Age (New York, 1993), 658; Köhler, Adenauer, 767–771; Adenauer, Memoirs, 438–456, with his quote on 456; Hans-Jürgen Schröder, “Kanzler der Alliierten? Die Bedeutung der US für die Außenpolitik Adenauers,” in Foschepoth, Adenauer und die deutsche Frage, 118–145, especially 134–135; Grabbe, Unionsparteien, 192–194; and Thomas W. Maulucci, Jr., “Konrad Adenauer’s April 1953 Visit to the United States,” (unpublished paper, Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations 1996 Annual Meeting, Boulder, CO). I am grateful to Dr. Maulucci for providing me with a copy of his paper. 91. Memorandum, [illegible], Consulate in Luxembourg, 23 August 1951, mentions discussions about a possible visit to Washington; memorandum, von Lilienfeld [BPA] to AA, 4 February 1952, StBKAH 12/42, 95–97, 98. See also memorandum of conversation between Hallstein and Henry Byroade, director of the State Department’s Bureau of German Affairs, 12 March 1952, FRUS 1952–1954 VII/1, 332–333. 92. Georg Federer, consul in Washington, to the AA, 20 and 24 February 1953; and German chargé Heinz Krekeler to the AA, 12 and 28 February 1953, StBKAH 12/42. See also BPA, ed., Journey to America (Bonn [1953]). 93. Lenz diary, 606 (8 April 1953). 94. Memorandum of conversation by John McCloy, enclosed in McCloy to John Foster ulles, 16 March 1953; memorandum (Riddleberger) to the secretary of state, 29 March 1953, FRUS 1952–1954 VII/1, 405–408, 412–419. 95. Conant to Dulles, 30 March 1953, ibid., 419–423 96. Lenz diary, 604 (31 March 1953); Adenauer, Memoirs, 438–439. 97. BPA news summaries, 6, 7, and 10 April 1953, ACDP NL von Eckardt I-010-004/1; T. H. Tetens, Germany Plots with the Kremlin (New York, 1953).

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98. “Minutes of the First General Meeting of Chancellor Adenauer and Secretary Dulles … 7 April 1953,” FRUS 1952–1954 VII/1, 429–436; final communiqué, 453–456. See also the German memoranda of conversations, 7–8 April 1953, PA-AA Büro StS Band 213; “Erläuterungen zu den Gesprächsthemen” [April 1953], ibid., Band 214. 99. Federer, “Reaktionen der amerikanischen Presse auf den Besuch des Herrn Bundeskanzlers in den Vereinigten Staaten,” 17 April 1953, ibid., Band 213; memorandum, Heinz Krekeler to AA, 7 May 1953, in Krekeler to AA, 16 May 1953; and “Reaktionen der amerikanischen Öffentlichkeit auf den Besuch des Herrn Bundeskanzlers in den Vereinigten Staaten,” 22 April 1953, in AA to Bukamt, 11 May 1953, BA Bukamt B 136/3609. Sieveking (Stockholm) to AA, 13 April 1953; von Holleben (the Hague) to AA, 11 April 1953; Luxembourg to AA,13 April 1953; and Hausenstein (Paris) to AA, 13 April 1953. StBKAH 12/42, 332–333, 335–340, 342–345. 100. Dr. Helmut Siegrist memorandum, 16 April 1953, PA-AA Büro StS Band 212. 101. Bundesvorstand discussion, 18 April 1953, Vorstand I, 471–477; Lenz diary, 612–614 (18 and 19 April 1953); Kleinmann, Geschichte der CDU, 156–161; CDU-Bundesgeschäftsstelle, Deutschland: Sozialer Rechtsstaat im geeinten Europa. Vierter Bundesparteitag der Christlich-Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Hamburg, [1953]). 102. Lenz diary, 613–614 (19 and 20 April 1953); “Überall gilt der deutsche Name wieder etwas,” FAZ, 20 April 1953; Adenauer in the Bundesvorstand, 22 May 1953, Vorstand I, 520; in the cabinet, 23 April 1953, Kabinett 1953, 267; Adenauer, Memoirs, 456.

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Chapter 2

SOVEREIGNTY AND ITS DISCONTENTS, 1953–1957

A

denauer’s triumphant visit to the US was a signal achievement for Westbindung. More important than the visit itself, however, was what Adenauer and the Union did with it. In the subsequent Bundestag elections in September 1953, the Union rode Adenauer’s new international stature, and a booming economy, to a landslide victory that permanently altered West German politics. The balance of political power swung decisively in their favor, and thus the election can be seen as the actual beginning of the “Adenauer era.”1 The significance of the 1953 elections is difficult to overstate. The first Bundestag, with a narrow majority and profusion of parties, conducted its business in the shadow of postwar reconstruction. Rearmament and European integration attracted much attention, but the correlation of forces between government and opposition left the final decision unclear. Although the Bundestag ratified the Bonn and Paris treaties, the opposition still had the power, through appeals to the Federal Constitutional Court and their strong position in the Bundesrat (representing the federal states), to block final approval. The election changed all that. The Union claimed a majority of seats in the new Bundestag, and built a coalition comprising the necessary two-thirds majority to amend the Basic Law and allow the creation of German armed forces. Although bitter debates would follow, Adenauer and the Union were now in a position to put their vision of Westbindung into practice. The electoral triumph was the result of a simple two-pronged campaign strategy. The first focused on attacking the SPD, claiming that they had no practical alternative to Westbindung, and that their “opposition at any price” threatened German security. With pamphlets asking whether the SPD believed “that they can achieve the reunification of Germany in freedom without the cooperation of the democratic forces of the free world,” the Union presented itself as the “Party of Responsibility.” They also used much less subtle appeals to public fears. One of the most famous posters of 1953 depicted a series of red paths leading to the menacing Asiatic face of a Red – 70 –

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Army soldier. The caption underneath this striking image read simply: “All roads of socialism lead to Moscow—Therefore vote CDU!”2 Alongside these attacks, the Union campaign also emphasized Adenauer’s stature as the man who “connects us to the free world.” Films and pamphlets about the trip to America, as well as posters that bore simply the chancellor’s picture and the caption “Germany, vote Adenauer,” aimed at satisfying the public need for security that the more strident Union advertisements exploited. The 77-year-old Adenauer threw himself into campaigning with the vigor of a man half his age, traveling widely, sometimes giving two or three speeches a day.3 The resulting victory was primarily, if not exclusively, a personal one, and would lead to an even grander triumph in 1957, won in large part with the simple slogan: “Adenauer: No Experiments” (Keine Experimente). These landslide victories elevated Adenauer to a personal power and prestige that few democratically elected statesmen could claim, as Der Alte assumed that legendary political status now familiar to both scholars and contemporaries. The broad personal mandate for Adenauer in 1953 was even a little too clear for some nervous observers. Rudolf Augstein, publisher of the influential weekly Der Spiegel and already a critic of Adenauer’s foreign policy, speculated about the return of one-party, or even one-man, rule. “The CDU has become the party of state,” Augstein wrote in a post-election editorial. “Another victory like this, and German democracy will be lost.” Augstein was wrong. German democracy survived, but the Federal Republic would not be the same. The Union’s domination of West German politics over the following decade would force the other parties to adopt similar positions on major issues, making the Union’s conceptions of the social market economy and Westbindung the central tenets of a general political consensus.4 At the same time, however, despite the Union’s image as an Adenauerdominated “Chancellor election society” (Kanzlerwahlverein), the electoral triumphs of 1953 and 1957 also brought important changes in personnel and structure to the party. Diverse viewpoints were beginning to emerge from a new cadre of leaders, including Fraktion Chair and eventual Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano, Bundestag President Eugen Gerstenmaier, Interior Minister Gerhard Schröder, Franz Josef Strauß, and the chair of the Bundestag Foreign Relations Committee, Kurt Georg Kiesinger. These young men, born in the twentieth century, along with the older but also independently popular Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard, would shape West German politics through the Adenauer era and beyond. The emergence of this new leadership cadre reflected an important generational shift in German politics. Strongly influenced by their wartime and immediate postwar experiences, this new generation nurtured no nostalgia for traditional German nationalism, and expressed little interest in Schaukelpolitik. They embraced Westbindung and sought their political models in the West, though they emphasized different aspects of the West. – 71 –

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Their increased visibility would make their conflicts with each other and with Adenauer more politically significant, as they jockeyed for power within the “party of state.” New party structures provided platforms for these disagreements. In a departure from the ad hoc procedures of 1949–1953, the Union Bundestag Fraktion, which grew from 139 to 244 members in 1953 and up to 270 by 1957, developed formal “working groups” (Arbeitskreise or AKs) to coordinate legislative strategy. AK V, the working group for “defense and foreign policy questions,” chaired by Kiesinger, while not always as influential as its members would hope, provided a forum for foreign policy debates beyond simply following Adenauer’s lead.5 This emerging diversity was magnified by a rhetorical trap of the Union’s own devising. Adenauer and the Union won their overwhelming mandate by emphasizing stability (Stetigkeit), arguing that significant policy changes were neither wise nor necessary. At the same time they faced a world in which things were very much in motion. For Adenauer, the shape of the West and the Federal Republic’s place in it remained uncertain, even after the republic achieved formal sovereignty in 1955. Thus, the years between 1953 and 1957 were marked by cautious diplomacy. Contrary to the expectations of those who saw sovereignty as the start of new initiatives, Adenauer remained skeptical about the chances for positive change, and was determined to avoid any action that could jeopardize the Federal Republic’s place in the West. Thus, he tried to restrain the enthusiasm of both opponents and colleagues, creating tensions even within his own party that revealed the complexities beneath the apparently straightforward policy of Westbindung.6 One could argue that this same challenge confronts all conservative parties, to change enough with the times to stay in power while maintaining a rhetorical commitment to unshakable principles. For the provisional Federal Republic and its conservative leader, whose policies were based on a radical transformation of Germany’s international relations, this challenge was especially daunting. Between 1953 and 1957, it required maneuvering between allies and enemies, maintaining an image of purposeful firmness while avoiding charges of obstructionism. Union success was due in no small part to the remarkable flexibility of its octogenarian leader, but success came at a price. For the Union, Westbindung remained “the only possible German foreign policy,” but this broad statement covered a variety of actions. Rather than choose between a “European” or “Atlantic” West, Adenauer was open to either—provided it included a sovereign Federal Republic. During the 1953 campaign, that meant embracing American electoral support. When warned that excessive reliance on the Americans might alienate the Europeans, Adenauer admonished his correspondent “to remember that the Americans are right now our only friends, and that we will not give up these friends, who hold great power in their hands, just to please Britain and France.”7 When in years to come the Americans appeared less reliable, he was more likely to embrace – 72 –

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European cooperation. Each “tilt” required Adenauer to secure support from both his foreign partners and his own party. These maneuvers became increasingly complicated as generational changes within the Union changed the party’s identity. As the emerging generation of leaders became increasingly involved in formulating policy, they were less likely to follow their leader. Every new twist and turn led to greater estrangement, the effects of which would be felt in the years to come. The course of those relations will be the subject of the discussion to follow.

Evasive Action: Westbindung, the German Question, and the Post-Stalin “Thaw” Adenauer’s goal after his return from the US was to complete the ratification of the contractual agreements (which he still called the “Germany treaty”) and the EDC. His primary motivation was, however, not the European idealism of his public pronouncements, but a calculation of the Federal Republic’s interest. As he concluded in a 1953 memorandum: “The Germany Treaty prevents an agreement between the Western Allies with the Soviet Union at Germany’s, and especially at the Federal Republic’s, expense.… This foreign policy line is, even though the circumstances are very different, the same as that followed by Bismarck, who considered his greatest achievement his success after [1871] in preventing the creation of a coalition against Germany.” The treaties would perform a political exorcism: “[making] impossible the cooperation between the Western Allies and Soviet Russia that formed the basis of the Potsdam accords.”8 With the “nightmare vision” driven away, the Federal Republic would secure equality within the West. His worries about Germany being surrounded by possible enemies place Adenauer firmly in the tradition of German statesmen, as confirmed by the explicit reference to Bismarck. Westbindung may have been a departure from earlier traditions, but Adenauer’s motivation—the desire to anchor Germany in Europe—would have been intelligible to the Iron Chancellor. As long as the treaties remained unratified, a return to Potsdam was possible, and Adenauer was not willing to risk four-power talks before then. He doubted Soviet intentions (though his unwillingness to test those intentions precluded being proven wrong), and believed that neutrality was neither desirable nor practicable. Talks would endanger any chance to bind the Federal Republic to the West (and, more importantly, the West to the Federal Republic), and he opposed them despite opposition arguments that they were the best route to reunification. His suspicions caused problems for him in 1953, as Stalin’s death in March, followed in May by Winston Churchill’s call for a four-power summit, began a period of superpower “thaw.” Despite his misgivings, Adenauer had no choice but to participate. Though determined to see the treaties ratified, he could not appear to be – 73 –

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hindering the cause of peace.9 His initial stance was to avoid public debate and let the Allies work out their differences. As he told the Union leadership, echoing his warnings about the 1952 Stalin note: “[W]e Germans … should be careful not to lift a finger, lest it be smashed … [and] should understand that we really do not matter much in world history these days.” These comments speak eloquently of his concerns about German international impotence. Until the treaties were ratified, the Federal Republic still depended to an alarming degree on Allied goodwill, and Adenauer’s first impulse was to keep quiet and wait for the storm to pass.10 This pressure on Adenauer to participate in détente increased on 8 June, when the SPD announced a Bundestag resolution advocating a four-power conference. Faced with either having to support an SPD proposal or being accused of hindering peace, Adenauer chose a dramatic change in strategy, issuing a special declaration in favor of a four-power conference, “in order to get the jump on the SPD.” This about-face surprised the cabinet, hastily assembled for a special meeting on 10 June. The resolution offered a fivepoint program for reunification, based on free elections, freedom to select alliances, and a negotiated peace agreement to settle border disputes. The SPD, outmaneuvered at the last minute, had no choice but to support Adenauer’s resolution, which passed the Bundestag with the support of all parties except the Communists.11 Adenauer’s unexpected maneuver helped him escape a political bind, putting all the democratic parties in the Federal Republic on record as supporting reunification based on free elections and Westbindung. He received further political breathing space through several events in the following weeks, beginning with the 17 June uprising of the East German population against the GDR government and the subsequent Soviet military intervention. The uprising offered a stark picture of the Ulbricht regime’s failure to satisfy the needs of its people, allowing the Federal Republic to polish its image as the only democratically legitimate German government, and making discussions with the Soviets appear inopportune.12 When Churchill fell victim to a stroke less than two weeks later, summit plans were shelved indefinitely. Adenauer, however, was still concerned that the Germans could be left out of Allied decision making. As Allied foreign ministers gathered in Washington, he developed a strategy for the September elections that resulted in another surprise. Although the Germans had not been invited, Adenauer persuaded a reluctant Herbert Blankenhorn to go to Washington, carrying a message for Dulles proposing a four-power conference for the autumn (after the elections) with an agenda based on the 10 June resolution. Adenauer did not have great hopes for the success of such a conference, but was well aware of the electoral benefits that calling for one could bring.13 Despite criticisms from the foreign ministers annoyed by Blankenhorn’s arrival, this initiative helped inspire plans for a four-power foreign minister conference, which would meet in Berlin in January 1954. For Adenauer, the – 74 –

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preparatory dialogue served its most important purpose before the conference began, providing domestic cover against the charge that Westbindung had brought no progress on reunification. To the astonishment of those who remembered his earlier objections, Adenauer even bragged that his decision to send Blankenhorn to Washington had made the meeting possible. After the elections, however, Adenauer, worried about Churchill’s health and French instability, urged delay. Only when Dulles made it clear that there was no turning back did Adenauer rediscover his enthusiasm for summitry.14 The Berlin Conference, which took place from 25 January to 18 February 1954, resolved nothing, but did clarify the positions of both sides. The Allies presented the Eden Plan for German reunification through free elections, which the Soviets rejected. Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov presented a plan for German reunification and neutrality within a European security system that excluded the US, which the Allies rejected. Whether there was ever a chance for an agreement is doubtful. In West German domestic politics, as well, the conference brought clarity. Many had gone into the conference with high hopes.15 Once it became clear that these hopes were not to be fulfilled, the reactions on both sides were characteristic. SPD Chair Erich Ollenhauer, who had succeeded Kurt Schumacher after the latter’s death in August 1952, wanted to abandon the EDC, citing rearmament as the primary obstacle to reunification. Brentano, however, declared that anyone who sought reunification by abandoning the Paris and Bonn treaties “must understand that a Germany reunited under such conditions would inevitably follow the same path as the Eastern satellite states.” Brentano blamed the Soviets for the conference failure, commenting that they came to Berlin “not to unify Germany, but to divide the Western powers.”16 Adenauer used the failure of the conference to restart his foreign policy. In a post-conference speech in Berlin, he praised the Allies for their unified opposition to the Soviets, declaring: “Our challenge is … to do everything to make sure that European unity is achieved and the alliance with the United States is preserved.” At a meeting with Dulles at Cologne airport on the secretary’s return to Washington, both agreed that the time had come to make a final push toward ratification.17 This reaction reveals Adenauer’s priorities. Never believing that the Soviets would agree to reunification on Western terms, he was most concerned with maintaining the momentum of Westbindung. As long as the treaties were not ratified, Adenauer had opposed four-power talks, fearing that they would only distract the Allies. When, however, it became apparent that obstructionism was doing more harm than good, especially with an election approaching, he supported talks focused on free elections and a rejection of neutrality. After the Bundestag elections, he again lost interest in talks, dropping his opposition only when he saw he could not stop the momentum that he had helped start. Adenauer’s handling of the summit question reveals the light and shadow of his diplomacy. On the one side is the statesman committed to – 75 –

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Westbindung and equality for the Federal Republic within the West. On the other stood the unscrupulous political operator, maneuvering between available options, looking for the best deal based on the interests of the moment. Both sides are apparent in this period because they were inseparable from the beginning. With a firm commitment to his ultimate goal— ratification and implementation of the treaties—Adenauer was very flexible with regard to means. Aware of the dangers of either too much or too little enthusiasm for détente, and convinced that an agreement was unlikely, he attempted to steer between the extremes in an effort to keep the goodwill of his allies and to gain his ultimate ends. While he tacked between détente and confrontation, Adenauer also had to pull the rest of the Union behind him. His ability to hold the Union together was largely due to his success in the 1953 election; as long as his policies paid political dividends, the Union would follow him anywhere. His skill at managing the Union would be tested further as he turned next to the more daunting challenge of trying to save the European Defense Community.

Der Untergang des Abendlandes? The Failure of EDC and the Atlantic Option Even after the Berlin Conference, the EDC was on life support, and the prognosis was not good. Shunned in the land of its birth, it teetered on the brink of death. Nevertheless, the EDC continued to find support from Adenauer and the Union. To the end, Adenauer resisted entertaining alternatives, at least publicly. “This great idea must not fail,” was his oft-repeated refrain.18 Although the SPD lodged a series of complaints before the Federal Constitutional Court and used its position in the Bundesrat to delay final ratification, Adenauer constantly pushed for faster action. It was not until early 1954 that the government could use its two-thirds majority to amend the Basic Law, removing the last constitutional barrier to rearmament. Adenauer’s tenacious pursuit of the EDC earned him a great deal of criticism from those who counseled greater caution and patience. It is ironic that Adenauer, whose speeches were full of references to the need for patience when it suited his purposes, took the opposite line on the EDC. This irony is explained when one considers Adenauer’s vision of the relationship between the Federal Republic and the West. However much he believed that Germany belonged in the West, he was plagued by the idea that any slackening of German interest would invite Allied abandonment of the Germans. He summed up his views in a letter to Ollenhauer in early 1954, as the Bundestag began the debate on amending the Basic Law. Conceding that the SPD “may have a different opinion of the utility of the EDC,” Adenauer added that “it will only be possible for Germany to gain the support it needs if the Federal Republic for its part does all it can to provide – 76 –

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proof of her goodwill. No one will be able to see this goodwill if the intended measures are delayed for no good reason.” Even these comments tell only part of the story. His constant calls for rapid ratification show that Adenauer could think of no reason to delay ratification at all. No objection—practical, constitutional, or legislative—could weaken his belief that the sooner the treaties were ratified, the better things would be for Germany. Even a sympathetic observer such as Hans-Peter Schwarz has noted Adenauer’s “unscrupulous determination” to force ratification.19 Earlier treatments of the EDC have criticized Adenauer’s stubborn insistence on the ill-starred project and its negative impact on subsequent German policy. Arnulf Baring, for example, ends his classic discussion of Adenauer’s foreign policy with the collapse of the EDC, arguing that it meant the failure of Adenauer’s attempts to make Westbindung attractive to the German public by wrapping it in idealistic European rhetoric. As a result, Adenauer and the Union began after 1954 to become more “nationalistic in the traditional sense” and “disastrous traditions became stronger than [Adenauer’s] earlier, better understanding.” Baring’s criticism reveals his concerns about Adenauer’s governing style, but also reflects the limitations of his study, written to trace the origins of Union resistance to Social Democratic Ostpolitik. Subsequent research by both Henning Köhler and Hans-Peter Schwarz suggests that it is too simplistic to argue that Adenauer had no alternative conceptions to the EDC, or that the collapse of the project simply meant a return to German nationalism. Köhler especially argues that readers need to recognize “Adenauer’s typical ambivalence.” European “visions” and national interest “were not opposites for Adenauer. Both were part of his policy.”20 Köhler’s warning can be extended to remind us not to forget the broader ambivalence within the Union about the shape of the West. To appreciate the debates about the EDC, it is important to remember both the broad support it enjoyed within the Union and the general disappointment inspired by its demise. Adenauer faced multiple challenges—first to demonstrate German goodwill while the EDC remained a possibility, then, after its failure, to negotiate with the Allies about alternatives while reconciling the Union to whatever compromise would result. His behavior toward the EDC, far from being proof of inflexibility, provides instead further evidence of Adenauer’s flexibility toward the shape of the West, and of the priority he placed on finding a position of relative stability and equality for the Federal Republic. Adenauer’s impatience to see the EDC ratified reflected his worries about the unsettled international situation. The Federal Republic would not officially gain sovereignty until all six signatories ratified the EDC, and this was becoming increasingly unlikely by early 1954. France, where the EDC was born, presented the greatest problem, especially after the forced retirement of Robert Schuman from the Quai d’Orsay in early 1953. A Foreign Office memorandum in May 1953 suggested that the EDC was already dead. Opponents – 77 –

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on the Left and the Right, concerned about increasing German strength, planned to delay debate until the treaty died a natural death, and the dwindling ranks of Cédistes (French supporters of the EDC) did not have the power to turn the tide. Adenauer’s reaction to the report is characteristic. In private, he wrote to Finance Minister Fritz Schäffer that he “strongly doubt[ed] that the French want the EDC at all,” and requested funds for public relations in the US to cultivate Atlantic relations. In public, however, he did not waver. The Germans, still the objects of European mistrust, had to prove their good will and pursue the treaties to the end. If the French destroyed their own creation, he concluded, that was their problem.21 The election of Pierre Mendès-France as French prime minister in June 1954 signaled the beginning of the end. Determined to solve the crises facing France in Indochina and Tunisia, Mendès-France raised suspicions that he would sacrifice the EDC in return for Soviet help in these areas. MendèsFrance certainly had no particular love for the EDC, and wanted to revise the treaty or see it fail altogether. At a special EDC conference in Brussels in August, he presented amendments to dilute its supranational character. The other five members rejected them, and the conference broke up amid mutual recriminations and gathering Euro-gloom. Symbolic for the collapse of European ideals, the conference coincided with the death of Alcide De Gasperi, who had sent a deathbed message to Brussels not to allow the EDC to fail. One of the original members of the “Black International” was thus buried along with its creation. On 30 August, by a margin of 319 to 264, with Gaullists and Communists joining arms to sing the Marseillaise, the French National Assembly delivered the coup de grâce, voting to suspend further debate on the EDC.22 Considering the practical weaknesses of the EDC, and the situation in France, no one should have been surprised by its defeat. In the five decades since, most students of the period view the project with little more than bemused detachment. The interesting question, however, remains: Why did Adenauer and the Union support this doomed project for as long as they did? The answer can be traced to two separate arguments, including both “Atlantic” and “European” elements, which reveal much about the Union’s attitude toward the West and Adenauer’s role as party leader. One was the conviction that the EDC, for all its flaws, was the best available option for combining Western European security and German sovereignty. This was essentially the position of the Eisenhower administration, which inherited the EDC and decided to push ahead despite lingering doubts. For Adenauer, this pragmatic argument also included an element of insecurity. The EDC was not simply the best possible option; it was perhaps the only option, because there was no guarantee that the Allies could forge another agreement. If the Germans did not do all they could to realize the EDC, they might lose a chance to shape their own destiny. Only after it failed would it make sense to discuss alternatives. In the meantime, the – 78 –

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Germans should not undermine it through lack of commitment. As one German advocate of the EDC put it: “[I]t is not the responsibility of German policy to rack our brains for the sake of the French government, [or] to make things easier for Germany’s enemies.”23 Alongside this passionless pragmatic defense of the EDC, however, many within the Union supported it as a step toward the integrated Abendland at the heart of Christian Democratic foreign policy. These members preferred the EDC over NATO membership, despite the latter’s military and strategic advantages, because alongside the ECSC, the EDC symbolized the new Europe, distinct from, though allied with, Britain and the US. As early as December 1952, Eugen Gerstenmaier, speaking for the Union’s European enthusiasts, had voiced these sentiments. Writing to Adenauer about how European integration captured the imagination of voters in his district, even in the face of furious activity by the “Heinemann intellectuals,” Gerstenmaier worried that NATO membership would not gain the same public support: It would be extremely difficult for me, if not impossible, to abandon the EDC idea in favor of direct membership in NATO. I have nothing against the membership of the Federal Republic in NATO, but I believe that the European orientation of Germany, for which you have fought so heroically in the past year, would lose its point if we were in this way to give up the … politically and morally strongest argument for our policy; namely, the practical possibility of European unification. I am convinced that the German defense contribution can be immediately made a reality if it is presented not only as an unavoidable defense effort against the East, but primarily as an essential step on the road to European unification.24

In an attempt to reaffirm their vision while awaiting EDC ratification, European Christian Democrats had proposed the European Political Community (EPC), which would provide the supranational “roof” above the EDC and ECSC. The EPC would be a true “United States of Europe,” with a bicameral legislature; an executive council; a council of ministers; a European court of justice; and an economic and social council. To underline the German commitment, the chair of the committee to draft the EPC constitution was Union Fraktion Chair Heinrich von Brentano. The draft was adopted by the ECSC assembly on 9 March 1953, leading even cynical politicians to embrace it as a major step forward for Europe. EDC foreign ministers met in May and August 1953 to endorse the plan, which captured the imagination of all “Europeanists” and raised the stakes for the ratification of the EDC.25 The EDC’s demise dragged the EPC into the grave beside it, adding to the disappointment. Adenauer called it the “bitterest moment” of his political life—a “black day for Europe.” His immediate reaction was to consider resigning as chancellor. As Fraktion Assistant Chair Heinrich Krone wrote in his diary, the defeat of the EDC was a “blow to the Chancellor” because – 79 –

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the EDC had “represented the rejection of any nationalism, the creation of a supranational European world.” Brentano and others bemoaned the failure of the European ideal. Gerstenmaier asked “whether the 30th of August … means the end of the idea of European political integration in our generation,” adding that if this were true, “there is more than one of us … who would prefer to retire from politics.” That this “period of Christian European policy” was “consciously liquidated” by the “liberal” Mendès-France was a bitter fact whose significance was not lost on the Union, who blamed their partisan enemies for the destruction of their European vision.26 German and European politicians who had never been enthusiastic for the Abendland drew the same conclusions, though, of course, much more gleefully. Newly installed FDP Chair Thomas Dehler, for example, long an opponent of the Christian Democratic propensity for mixing religion and politics, welcomed the defeat of the EDC as the end of “Catholic thinking for Europe.”27 The French decision to abandon the EDC disappointed both wings of the Union. As a result, initial public responses—the product of hurried conclaves first in Bonn without the Chancellor, then at Adenauer’s vacation home at the Bühlerhöhe—were cautious. Nevertheless, Adenauer and his government made clear that they hoped to be rewarded for their faithfulness to the project. Adenauer argued that German willingness to support the EDC meant that it was the French who were isolated. In a five-point declaration, the cabinet emphasized their continuing commitment to political and military cooperation and rejected SPD calls for a four-power conference. Most significantly, they called for immediate efforts to “restore German sovereignty” and to allow “participation in Western defense without discrimination,” endorsing “immediate negotiations with the United States and Great Britain.” France was not mentioned, though the cabinet agreed that they were still committed to Franco-German reconciliation.28 The government position emphasizing sovereignty was also presented by Minister without Portfolio Franz Josef Strauß in a radio address immediately after the French vote. With the rhetorical dash for which he had become famous, Strauß characterized the defeat of the EDC as a triumph for Soviet policy, and attacked the SPD for its willingness to trust the Soviets in future talks. His conclusion summarized the government position: The Federal Republic of Germany must now demand her full sovereignty, not against Europe, but for Europe. She must demand this sovereignty in order to be able to follow the only concrete path toward German reunification in peace and freedom, in cooperation with the great powers of the West.… The coming weeks and months will prove that the foreign policy of Adenauer and his government parties, begun five years ago and which has already brought practical equality, despite the detour forced by the Paris decision, has been and will remain for the future the only correct, the only possible foreign policy for the Federal Republic of Germany.29 – 80 –

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These were brave words for public consumption, but the fact remained that in September 1954, the foreign policy Strauß praised so highly had reached a standstill. Still subject to occupation restrictions and left out of Western defense planning, the Federal Republic lay at the mercy of Allied decisions. This was the grim conclusion Adenauer and the cabinet reached when they reassembled back in Bonn. Though they wanted to go forward with Westbindung, no one could say for certain what the Germans should do next. Adenauer warned of the “threatening growth of neoisolationist tendencies in the US,” unless the Europeans got their house in order. Behind the brave public front, all they could do was wait for an Allied initiative.30 They would not have to wait long. While the Americans publicly turned to other matters (Dulles left for Manila in early September to attend the founding conference of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization), the British, with American support, took the initiative. Foreign Minister Anthony Eden proposed granting sovereignty and NATO membership to the Federal Republic by inviting Germany and Italy to join the Brussels Pact of 1948. This agreement would transform the Brussels Pact into the Western European Union (WEU), a looser organization than the EDC, but one that would provide at least the appearance of European cooperation. Adenauer expressed “complete agreement” with the British plan, adding that he had not given up hope for European integration at a later date. He also hedged his bets by informing US High Commissioner Conant that if the French refused to go along, the Germans were interested in a security treaty with Great Britain and the US, as long as it guaranteed West German sovereignty.31 Events now moved swiftly. From 28 September to 3 October, a nine-power conference (including the US, Britain, France, Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, and the Federal Republic) worked out the details of West German sovereignty and membership in the WEU and NATO. A second series of meetings in Paris, from 19–23 October 1954, finalized the agreements: the Federal Republic and the occupying powers signed a revised version of the contractual agreements; a nine-power conference signed the WEU agreement; and a fifteen-power NATO conference formally invited the Federal Republic to join the alliance. After five years of discussions and one near disaster, the Federal Republic could now claim full membership in the West. The London and Paris agreements, though the product of hurried crisis management, represented important advances over the Bonn and Paris agreements of 1952. The new agreements, for example, now specifically used the word “sovereignty” in describing the Federal Republic’s control over its own affairs. They also dropped the Bindungsklausel, agreeing that a reunified Germany should have complete freedom to decide its alliances. Willingness on both sides to strike the article was a sign of the new relationship between the Federal Republic and its allies.32 In order to reach these agreements, Adenauer had to make important concessions. His willingness to allow a referendum on the “Europeanization” of – 81 –

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the Saar territory inflamed nationalist critics, but his gamble paid off when the population of the Saar overwhelmingly rejected the plan. As a result, the French allowed the Saar to be reunited with the Federal Republic in 1957.33 Of greater long-term significance, however, was Adenauer’s other concession. As the London conference reached an impasse on the control of armaments, Adenauer pledged that the Federal Republic would not produce atomic, biological, or chemical (ABC) weapons on its soil. This dramatic declaration, combined with American and British pledges to maintain forces on the Continent, defused French fears about having a rearmed Germany as a neighbor, and helped rescue the conference from failure. The decision of the Benelux states to join the pledge made the German concession appear less discriminatory. (Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium had hoped to include all the former EDC states, but neither Italy nor France joined.) Adenauer’s “no nukes” pledge, which was repeated in the treaties leading up to German unification in 1990, marked an important step in defining the Western security community by satisfying lingering concerns about German military ambitions and effectively guaranteeing that the Federal Republic would remain in an inferior position opposite its larger nuclear allies. It would cast a long shadow over future debates on NATO planning, as we will see in subsequent chapters. Such a pledge was inevitable, since it is unlikely that anyone would have allowed the Federal Republic to produce its own nuclear weapons. Adenauer’s dramatic gesture made a virtue of necessity by offering it voluntarily instead of waiting for it to be imposed.34 Even Adenauer’s apparently generous gesture, however, reflected his ambivalence toward his allies. There is considerable evidence that he did not intend the pledge to be permanent, but viewed it as a practical expedient for short-term gain. As early as 1 September, Churchill had urged the Germans to offer a “voluntary act of self-abnegation” to secure rearmament. Adenauer agreed, as long as the declaration did not affect the “equal and honorable status” of the Federal Republic, but he did not make a direct proposal at that time. Before departing for London, he had hinted at possible “restrictions … that Germany would voluntarily accept.”35 Nevertheless, he held back his pledge until the possible collapse of talks made it necessary. Furthermore, in justifying the decision after his return from London, Adenauer emphasized neither the moral nor political benefits, citing instead the complexity of producing ABC weapons and the desire to avoid further Allied controls. When a reporter asked about “strict limitations” on armaments production, Adenauer responded: “What do you mean, strict limitations? An atom bomb costs umpteen million [zig-Millionen] dollars. Even if we wanted to, we could not make one, because we have neither the money nor the facilities.”36 Whether the renunciation of ABC weapons would continue once the Federal Republic had the money to build the facilities was a question Adenauer left open. – 82 –

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Nor was that the only ambivalence. In his memoirs, Adenauer claims that immediately after his ABC pledge, Dulles congratulated him, with the proviso that he, Dulles, understood that the German declaration was made under the condition rebus sic stantibus—that is, subject to change if circumstances changed. Dulles’s announcement, and the chancellor’s agreement were both loud enough for all to hear, Adenauer writes, and no one in the room objected. This portrayal of the events in London would serve Adenauer later when he advocated greater West German participation in NATO nuclear strategy. Horst Osterheld, Adenauer’s special assistant for foreign affairs from 1960 to 1963, personally heard the chancellor mention this exchange with Dulles “at least twenty times” in discussions with foreign leaders. As convenient as this anecdote became, however, it also appears to be false. None of the other conference participants recorded Dulles’s alleged comments. General Kielmannsegg, Adenauer’s translator, reports that Dulles congratulated Adenauer for his decision and the chancellor responded: “Tell Mr. Dulles: first let me have my twelve divisions. Then we can discuss these other things further.” Dulles smiled at this barbed comment and left the room.37 Adenauer’s historiographical sleight of hand is a reminder of the multifaceted nature of his conception of Westbindung, combining trust and compromise with caution and suspicion. Although he was prepared to make concessions to secure the Federal Republic’s membership in the West, he also resisted restrictions that would make his country less than a completely equal partner. Any concessions were considered in light of their immediate utility, subject to the proviso rebus sic stantibus, a phrase that could be considered the secret motto of Westbindung. For all his rhetorical belief in the community of interest within the West, Adenauer still wanted to maintain German freedom of action. This insight will help us to understand many of his later positions. Adenauer’s diplomacy had helped repair the breach with the Allies, but he still had to face divisions within the Union. The London and Paris agreements signaled the triumph of “Atlantic” over “European” thinking, disappointing many Union Europeanists. Although pleased by the new guarantees for German sovereignty and security, they viewed NATO membership, compared to their grand vision of a united Continent, as a poor second. AK V Chair Kiesinger, who had earlier noted that “a pure NATO solution does not correspond with the basic principles of the CDU/CSU,” presented the London agreement as a triumph for British preferences for looser European cooperation. It was the best immediate solution, but with regard to the “fundamental question” of creating a European community, “this present solution is clearly a disappointment.” Gerstenmaier echoed Kiesinger, commenting that the agreements represented real progress over Germany’s status in 1945, “but are spiritually in no way equal to the grand conception [of] 1950–1952.” Kiesinger prophesied that the West might be – 83 –

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reduced to an “Atlantic condominium” between Britain and the US. Europeans would have to work hard toward integration “so that Continental Europe does not become an unimportant backwater in this Atlantic area.” The London agreements might be practical, but Kiesinger, with the agreement of his colleagues, concluded: “Even today [I] believe, that the [EDC] solution was better.”38 Adenauer recognized—and may have shared—the doubts many Europeans had about the wisdom of creating a German national army; at least, he knew that it was expedient to say so. In a now famous midnight discussion with the foreign ministers of Luxembourg and Belgium, Joseph Bech and Paul-Henri Spaak, in Claridge’s Hotel after a session of the London Conference, Adenauer worried aloud about what his successors would do, now that the chance for an integrated European army had been lost. “That I am being forced to create a German national army is insane, Herr Bech, it is grotesque,” Adenauer sighed. He was “100 percent convinced that this German national army that Mendès-France is forcing on us will become a great danger for Germany and for Europe.” Urging his fellow foreign ministers to “use the time while I am still here” to make progress on European integration, Adenauer concluded with a sigh that became a slogan for the Adenauer era: “My God, what will become of Germany [Mein Gott, was soll aus Deutschland werden]?”39 Adenauer’s midnight confession, heard and transcribed by Lothar Rühl of Der Spiegel, who reported it in its entirety, must be viewed in the same light as his ABC pledge. His regret at the failure of the EDC was genuine, but his comments also had a more direct political purpose. Bech and Spaak were two of the foremost supporters of European integration. They also represented the smallest countries of the EDC, who had the most to fear from a rebirth of national armies. Aware of their position, Adenauer played to his audience, expressing the regret that Bech and Spaak must have felt and reinforcing his standing as a supporter of European integration, forced against his will to accept a national army, while also securing support for that army.40 Though no one should doubt the sincerity of Adenauer’s European sentiments, one should also not forget his commitment to Realpolitik. Despite his comments at Claridge’s, Adenauer’s behavior after his return from London and Paris gave little hint of any doubts about NATO or nostalgia for the EDC. Instead, he declared that the London Conference “ended a difficult five-year struggle to regain German sovereignty and to integrate Germany into the community of free nations as a partner with equal rights and responsibilities.” Touting the advantages of NATO membership, he confidently told the CDU leadership: “For us Germans, the present solution is on the whole better than the EDC.”41 NATO membership was the fastest way to sovereignty and security, and the result was: “We are free again.” Cautiously touching on the Saar, Adenauer reaffirmed the Union’s commitment to both Franco-German cooperation and German reunification, which – 84 –

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would come “as long as the free people of the West are united.” Recognizing the concerns of Europeanists, he also assured his audience that the European idea was “alive and stronger than it ever was.”42 Whether all of his listeners believed him on that last point was, as we have seen, less than obvious, but Adenauer tried to overcome any lingering European disappointment within the Union by emphasizing the general commitment to the West. In these efforts, he found an unexpected ally in the SPD. During the Bundestag debate after the London conference, SPD Chair Ollenhauer and foreign policy expert Carlo Schmid rejected NATO as vociferously as they had previously rejected the EDC, suggesting in its place an “alliance free” [bündnisloses] Germany in a European security system guaranteed by the UN. The SPD’s advocacy of Bündnislosigkeit was the product of its members’ own conflicted attitudes toward German participation in Western defense. Opposing NATO membership, they were limited by their past rejections of neutrality. Their complicated attempts to maintain the distinction between “alliance freedom” and neutrality proved to be a boon for Adenauer, allowing him to avoid discussing competing conceptions of the West within the Union, and to focus instead on the Union’s common rejection of the SPD’s alternative. The Union emphasized the “fatal similarities” between SPD and Soviet plans for European security, and passed a Bundestag resolution that glossed over internal differences, expressing its determination “to support strongly political cooperation in European-Atlantic solidarity.” The parties’ fundamental differences became even clearer as leading Social Democrats participated in the Paulskirche movement, a coalition of pacifist and neutralist groups that included Gustav Heinemann among its leadership. This group met in the historic Frankfurt church in January 1955 to issue the “German manifesto,” demanding immediate four-power talks before ratification of the treaties, and attempted to organize extraparliamentary opposition to Adenauer’s foreign policy. The resulting polarization shifted the debate away from differences within the Union.43 The Paris agreements were ratified by the Bundestag, approved by the Bundesrat, and signed by Federal President Heuss by the end of March. On 5 May 1955, with a small ceremony in the Chancellery garden (plans for a special session of the Bundestag being abandoned due to the SPD’s refusal to participate), the Federal Republic proclaimed its sovereignty. Four days later, it officially became a member of NATO. Almost six years after the founding of the Federal Republic, three years after the signing of the original contractual agreements, and only nine months after the defeat of the EDC, Adenauer could claim at least a partial victory. The Federal Republic was now accepted as an equal partner in the West.44 Adenauer’s handling of the EDC crisis reflected his pragmatic approach to Westbindung. Faced with uncertainty on all sides, Adenauer chose to be flexible regarding the shape of the West, rather than insist on an “Atlantic” – 85 –

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or “European” vision. This flexibility, in turn, helped him to guide the Federal Republic into the West, and to make sure that the rest of the Union, faced with the uncompromising opposition of the SPD, followed.

The Radford Plan, the Suez Crisis and the Birth of the EEC Having achieved sovereignty, the Federal Republic and its chancellor had to decide what to do with it. Their first steps, taken in response to the superpower summits held in Geneva in 1955, were characteristically cautious. In harmony with Adenauer’s strategy since 1949, he and Foreign Minister Brentano (who, finally appointed in June 1955 after a long and patient wait, joked to Federal President Theodor Heuss: “Do you think the old man thought this over long enough?”)45 used the opportunity to participate in planning Western strategy to ensure that nothing was done to jeopardize Westbindung, while making enough constructive suggestions to avoid appearing to be the only obstacle to détente. The Geneva conferences brought few concrete advances, but the “spirit of Geneva” rekindled hopes for an end to the Cold War, even though neither the summit in July nor the foreign ministers’ conference in October brought breakthroughs on reunification or disarmament. Adenauer even contributed to détente by accepting a Soviet invitation to Moscow in September 1955. He was prepared to make conciliatory gestures in what he considered to be German interests, but he also set clear limits. Thus, he agreed to open formal diplomatic relations with the Soviets in return for a promise to release the last ten thousand German POWs held in the USSR, a decision that a generation of German voters considered his single greatest accomplishment in office.46 On the way back to Bonn, however, he and his staff agreed that diplomatic relations with the Soviets would not affect their policy that the Federal Republic was the sole legitimate representative of Germany or their refusal to enter into relations with any other state that recognized the GDR. This policy, which came to be known as the Hallstein Doctrine, would restrict policy toward Eastern Europe for the next fifteen years.47 Despite his caution, Adenauer’s unexpected decision to open diplomatic relations with the USSR led to conflict with the Americans. The American ambassador in Moscow, Charles “Chip” Bohlen, denounced this German “betrayal,” accusing Adenauer of seeking a secret deal with the Soviets.48 Of course, Adenauer planned no such thing, and the brief crisis quickly faded. This episode, however, along with his response to the Geneva conferences, are examples of how Adenauer viewed the Federal Republic’s position. His top priority was the preservation of sovereignty. This meant rejecting plans that would trade sovereignty or NATO membership for reunification, and emphasizing the democratic legitimacy of the Federal Republic. Adenauer still considered the Federal Republic’s position within – 86 –

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the West weak, and thus would not tolerate initiatives that might further weaken that position. This did not mean that Adenauer had complete faith in his allies, or that he considered their interests identical to German interests. He saw, for example, an immediate practical interest in diplomatic relations with the Soviets, even if he did not intend to reawaken the ghosts of Rapallo. The goal was to make maximum use of opportunities without jeopardizing German membership in the West. This conservative approach to sovereignty, however, led to domestic political difficulties. Conflict in February 1956 with the more nationalminded FDP led most of the party, including Chairman Thomas Dehler, into the opposition. Then, the FDP joined the SPD in toppling the government of the CDU’s Karl Arnold in the vital state of North Rhine-Westphalia. This setback in one of the cradles of the CDU shook the Union, raising the specter of a national SPD-FDP coalition based on their opposition to Adenauer’s cautious policy. Adenauer and Brentano denounced this opposition, warning: “If certain circles believe that they can negotiate with Moscow against the West, they have to realize that it would be much easier for the Western powers to negotiate with Moscow and reach an agreement to Germany’s disadvantage.”49 If the Union hoped to hold onto power, however, it would have to satisfy public demands for new initiatives while protecting that which had already been gained. Thus, domestic and international politics were closely intertwined as Adenauer and the Union dealt with two especially complicated problems in 1956: the future of Western security policy, and the nature of European integration. Trying to resolve these issues within a changing international and domestic context would reveal just how heavy the burden of sovereignty could be, and would expose the deep differences beneath the Union’s surface agreement on Westbindung. Concerns about Western security policy sprang from West German criticism of political coordination within NATO. Almost from the moment of their admission, the Germans debated ways to “activate” NATO politically and increase European influence on policy, but were frustrated by the lack of American interest. If NATO was not the proper forum, some hoped the West European Union would serve the purpose. AK V also discussed plans for a “European-Atlantic Society,” which would encourage nonmilitary cooperation, while avoiding a “purely Atlantic accent.” Such political coordination remained an elusive goal. Instead, there existed a “superficial unanimity and growing deep differences,” worsened by an inefficient system of consultation, which the Americans seemed unwilling to improve.50 The absence of effective political coordination fed German fears that the Americans might alter their European commitments, fears intensified by a series of worrisome signals coming from Washington. Confidential sources spread rumors that Ambassador Conant wanted Eisenhower to distance himself from Adenauer and the Union. At the same time, American negotiators, led by Harold Stassen, traveled to London for talks with the Soviets – 87 –

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that threatened to decouple disarmament from German reunification. Eisenhower did not help things with a comment to the press that a belt of neutral states through Central Europe might advance the cause of peace. He had made the same suggestion a year earlier, upon the completion of the Austrian State treaty, only to withdraw it after energetic protests from Bonn. Its resurrection and the support it received in the American media were considered bad omens for the future. The State Department hastened to assert that Eisenhower’s “improvised and therefore misunderstood” comments in no way signaled a change in American policy, but by then the damage had been done.51 It is against this background that one should examine German reactions to the so-called Radford Plan. On 13 July 1956, the New York Times reported that Admiral Arthur Radford, chairman of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, favored troop reductions in Europe and a greater reliance on nuclear weapons as means to reduce both American commitments abroad and the defense budget. To Adenauer, this sounded like the American withdrawal from Europe that he had long feared. As he told a group of reporters, he did not like the idea “that America is a fortress for itself, because that would mean that we would be outside that fortress.” Adenauer was particularly disturbed because Dulles had only vaguely mentioned the need for defense budget cuts during a June meeting in Washington, and his failure to offer advance warning of the Radford Plan smacked of betrayal, especially since Adenauer was trying to convince a reluctant parliamentary opposition to speed up the creation of German armed forces. German officials wasted no time expressing their concerns. Defense Minister Theodore Blank declared that troop reductions were “out of the question,” while Ambassador to Washington Heinz Krekeler lobbied against the proposed reductions. Dulles tried to end the crisis with a press conference and in a personal letter to Adenauer, written “as friend to friend.” Claiming that Radford had spoken without informing either the State Department or the White House, Dulles and Ambassador Conant disavowed Radford’s “irresponsible” comments and promised that the Americans would make no policy changes without consulting their allies.52 That could have been the end of it, but it was not because the entire controversy had reawakened Adenauer’s worries about the Federal Republic’s place in the West. He would later write that the plan “had to open the eyes of all Germans to the fact that, despite the economic successes of the past years … we should not rest on a false sense of security. The ground upon which we stood was very thin.” The reports from a delegation of Union parliamentarians led by his close confidante, new Fraktion Chair Heinrich Krone, who made an eight-week tour of the US, offered short-term reassurance, but also raised questions for the future. Though convinced that the Americans would not abandon Europe, Krone believed that the issues raised by the Radford controversy would not go away. Developments in – 88 –

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weapons technology and the growing American sense of vulnerability, he wrote privately to Adenauer, “can lead to a strengthening of isolationist considerations and actions.” In his report to the Bundesvorstand, Krone concluded: “[T]he Americans live far from Germany, and one should not rest comfortably in the thought that they have to stand with Europe forever.” The Americans had great respect for Adenauer, but they also had other global concerns that could draw them away from Europe.53 Krone’s evaluation, with its balance of relief and pessimism, fit with Adenauer’s personal worries. The mixed signals about American strategy reminded the Germans of the potential impermanence of the Western alliance. Comforting words from Dulles and others helped avoid a larger public crisis, but could not erase the image of the Americans undercutting the Adenauer government in the middle of a bitter debate over rearmament. Nor could they suppress the fear that the Americans might someday withdraw from Europe. As Adenauer commented in response to Krone’s report: “The thesis … [that] America will never abandon Europe is false. We must always consider the possibility that the further development of nuclear weapons will lead to an American withdrawal [and] must never forget the possibility of ‘fortress America.’”54 The Radford Plan crisis, which raised questions about the relationship between Europe and the US, was especially significant because it coincided with renewed debate over the future shape of Europe. The June 1955 Messina Conference and the Spaak Report of March 1956 had reinvigorated the European movement after the collapse of the EDC. Focusing on partial integration rather than supranationality, the ECSC states began intense negotiations in Brussels on the creation of a European Economic Community and an Atomic Energy Community. The negotiations were complicated by broader talks over the possible inclusion of Great Britain and other states in a European free trade zone. Though intended to complement each other, these parallel negotiations exposed old divisions among Europeans and within the Union about the relationship between Continental Europe and its neighbors. Brentano and the Foreign Office, supported by Adenauer, favored Continental integration, and were unwilling to compromise on the EEC to create the free trade zone. Erhard and the Economics Ministry, however, preferred to accommodate British reservations about integration with the goal of creating the largest possible community.55 This disagreement led to conflict between Adenauer and Erhard. In an early 1956 letter citing Article 65 of the Basic Law, which gave the chancellor control over the main lines of policy, Adenauer had instructed the entire cabinet that “a clear, positive attitude toward European integration,” in the sense of maximum integration among the six members of the ECSC, was official policy, and that they were expected to act accordingly. Erhard, fearing that Adenauer intended to abandon the free trade zone, rebelled against this “integration order” in a long letter. Although he would follow – 89 –

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the chancellor “through thick and thin” in the general commitment to Westbindung, Erhard rejected “monomania” regarding Continental integration. Plans that did not include all of Europe or the Atlantic world would splinter the West and hinder real economic cooperation, he wrote, warning that “economic mistakes and economic sins are not erased when someone proclaims them European.” Citing continual problems with the French, who had been dragging their heels in Brussels and flirting with the Soviets, Erhard argued: “[It] is becoming ever clearer that we can achieve our most important objectives only through the closest cooperation with the United States and Great Britain.” Although willing to accept “serious and honest” plans for European integration, he preferred to work with the “Anglo-Saxons.”56 Erhard’s challenge to the process of European integration was a clear expression of Atlanticism. By appealing to the practical advantages of free trade and cooperation with the US and Britain, Erhard rejected European integration as an end in itself. Erhard’s distaste for the French reflected his belief that the Continental nations were weak and his preference for closer cooperation with the stronger and more reliable US. Adenauer himself was not immune to such feelings. Earlier in 1956, he had confided to Krone that continued instability in Europe had led him to consider a bilateral alliance with the Americans. Nevertheless, the chancellor was disturbed by Erhard’s open protest. His response reflected both his desire to put Erhard in his place and his ambivalence about the future shape of the West. Adenauer expressed disappointment that Erhard had chosen such extreme language, and tried to strike a reasonable tone to deflect Erhard’s criticism. European integration was perhaps not an end in itself, he wrote, but was nonetheless the key to West German foreign policy, “the essential springboard for us to become active in foreign policy at all.” He even turned Erhard’s own arguments to his advantage by claiming that European integration was essential because “the United States views it as the key to its entire European policy, and because I, as you, consider the help of the United States to be absolutely vital for us.”57 Adenauer’s conclusions indicate his flexible conception of the West, but also the priority he placed on European integration. Since the US was interested in European economic and political stability, he claimed that there need be no immediate competition between European unity and Atlantic solidarity, defusing Erhard’s charge that focusing on the EEC meant a move away from the US. Adenauer also believed, however, that there should be no delay in developing integrated European structures, both to demonstrate European willingness to cooperate and to provide insurance against a possible future American withdrawal. Thus, he did not want the EEC delayed by free trade zone negotiations. It was never easy to balance these two conceptions of Europe, and in the latter half of 1956, under the influence of the Radford crisis and the free trade zone discussions, Adenauer “tilted” more to the European side. In an address to the Grandes Conférences Catholiques in Brussels in late September 1956, – 90 –

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for example, Adenauer called on his audience to draw on the traditions of the Abendland to push forward with European integration. Expressing frustration at the funereal pace of the EEC negotiations, Adenauer used idealistic rhetoric to build the practical argument that Europe needed to reduce its dependence on American “patronage” to play an active role in the world. Departing from the supranational ideals of the EDC and EPC, Adenauer encouraged practical European cooperation as soon as possible, rather than waiting for ideal structures. The key was to recognize and represent their unique interests through international as well as federal channels—an anti-supranational but pro-European image that in years to come would be labeled “Gaullism.”58 Union observers correctly saw in Adenauer’s Brussels speech a “tendency … to allow Atlantic solidarity to fade into the background or to weaken the close tie to America.” Adenauer’s comment that the brewing crisis over the Suez Canal, which revealed the extent of Europe’s dependence on the US, was “a good time to make a new start for Europe” only added to this impression. Adenauer admitted that he wanted Europe to be a “third force” in world politics, though he innocently claimed only to be repeating plans that John Foster Dulles and others had advanced as early as 1948. At the urging of his Foreign Office, which feared that he had gone too far, he spontaneously told a group of American journalists that the Germans would never forget their “debt of gratitude” to the US for their help in reconstructing German democracy.59 Nevertheless, German-American relations remained cool, leading to a crisis in November 1956 when conflict broke out simultaneously in Hungary and along the Suez Canal. The Suez crisis led to serious disagreements within NATO. British and French paratroopers, hoping to topple the Nasser regime and reestablish Anglo-French control of the Suez Canal, attacked Egyptian positions at the end of October. As the US joined the USSR in the UN’s condemnation of this neocolonial adventure, the Adenauer government had to decide where it stood. Although Brentano “regretted” American policy, he tried to play a mediating role. Weeks earlier, he and Adenauer had planned a state visit to Paris on 6 November to discuss the Brussels negotiations. Now he counseled canceling the visit, fearing that it would be seen as an endorsement of Anglo-French policy, unnecessarily alienating the Americans and the UN.60 Although he argued strongly against American cooperation with the Soviets in Egypt while Soviet tanks crushed the uprising in Hungary, and criticized “irresponsible” American broadcasts that encouraged the Hungarians to rebel, Brentano did not want the Germans to take sides openly against the Americans. He also criticized the British and French for beginning their action while the Soviets were invading Hungary, thus weakening the West’s moral advantage.61 Adenauer, however, had fewer scruples about upsetting the Americans. He instructed NATO Ambassador Herbert Blankenhorn to offer encouragement – 91 –

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to his British and French colleagues. The real danger, Adenauer said through Blankenhorn, was the extension of Soviet influence into the Eastern Mediterranean. He overrode Brentano’s concerns and was determined to make the scheduled trip to Paris. On the eve of his departure, he used a discussion with selected journalists to emphasize his conviction that the Europeans needed to use institutions such as the WEU more effectively to advance European interests. He also criticized American lack of respect for Europe. The nations of Europe had separate identities; they were not states in the US, and they had the right to defend their own interests.62 These comments before his departure help explain Adenauer’s actions in Paris. By the time the German delegation arrived in the Gare de l’Est on the morning of 6 November, the French government was nearing the end of its rope. American pressure for withdrawal from Egypt had been mounting, and the Soviets threatened nuclear retaliation against Paris and London. The French cabinet had been in session until five o’clock in the morning. When the Germans arrived at the Hotel Matignon, the meeting room had not yet been cleaned, and the cabinet looked as disheveled as their surroundings. A more complete picture of European impotence in the face of superpower pressure would be difficult to imagine. Instead of considering the Anglo-French post-imperial adventure the end of an independent Europe, however, Adenauer chose solidarity with the imperial powers. In Paris, he encouraged the French to resist American pressure. After leaving Paris, he sent new instructions to the German delegation in Brussels, removing German opposition to French demands. According to one participant, Adenauer’s intervention broke the logjam in the negotiations, encouraging the French to compromise and leading directly to the conclusion of the Treaty of Rome the following March, creating the EEC.63 The Suez crisis acted as a catalyst for Adenauer’s new initiative for European integration. Despite, or perhaps because of, Europe’s weakness, Adenauer sought to guarantee the creation of a new Europe. With the Radford Plan, the US had already revealed itself as an outsider with separate interests from Europe. The Suez crisis added the disturbing possibility that this outsider could impose its will upon the weaker European states. As a Foreign Office memo concluded, in light of the Suez and Hungarian crises, “[Europeans] have discovered that there are many political problems that affect the European nations in different ways than … the United States or the other NATO nations.” Brentano, abandoning his earlier reservations, echoed these sentiments when he spoke of the “shame and humiliation” of the European position in the world.64 In both Brussels and in Paris, Adenauer drew a clear conclusion: Europe needed to take the initiative and order its own affairs. Although he did not believe that this new Europe must necessarily be anti-American, he emphasized that Europe had different interests and should become strong enough to stand alone, if necessary. The French would draw similar conclusions from the Suez experience, – 92 –

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while the British would seek closer cooperation with the US, increasing the distance between Continental and British conceptions of Europe and creating problems in the years to come. The following weeks saw a gradual calming of the emotions. Concerned about German security after the Soviet subjugation of Hungary, Adenauer retreated, advocating cooperation within NATO because Europeans “can only preserve their freedom when we are in NATO and through NATO enjoy the protection of the United States.” By the end of November, Union members were even trying to blame the opposition’s flirtation with neutralism for the coolness of European-American relations.65 This rhetorical retreat, however, could not hide Adenauer’s ambivalence toward the US and the dilemmas that came with official sovereignty. On one side lay the desire to create a stronger Europe that could better withstand fluctuations in American policy, the inspiration for Adenauer’s show of solidarity in Paris. On the other side, however, stood the lack of acceptable alternatives to NATO. The SPD and FDP had been discussing such alternatives since Geneva, but their plans for a reunified Germany in a European security system would require repudiating the basic tenets of Westbindung, which neither Adenauer nor the Union could accept. Until the distant day when a (Western) European community could defend itself, only the American nuclear umbrella could provide the security they considered necessary to preserve the West. All efforts thus had to be directed at preserving those commitments while strengthening European institutions and European participation within NATO to prepare for any possible changes in American policy.66 Thus, domestic politics placed a check on the policy alternatives facing Adenauer and the Union. They had spent seven years promising their constituents that membership in the American-led West would bring “freedom, peace, and reunification.” With elections approaching in September 1957, the political risks in changing that position were too great. Whatever their reservations about American policy, Adenauer and the Union had to keep their concerns to themselves. This would result in a strangely bifurcated consciousness within the Union as it entered the 1957 campaign. Fearing possible changes in American attitudes toward Germany and Europe, Adenauer and his party boldly declared that they would accept or offer “No Experiments.”

No Experiments? The Election of 1957 and the Problem of Disengagement Union strategy going into the 1957 elections was simple and direct. The Union was the party of security, peace, and prosperity; the SPD/FDP opposition was irresponsible, willing to risk the benefits of Westbindung in favor of an illusory promise of reunification through neutrality. Embodied in simple – 93 –

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posters emblazoned with the pictures of leading figures (especially Adenauer himself) and the ubiquitous slogan “No Experiments” (Keine Experimente), the Union campaign projected an image of a party and a government that were absolutely sure of where they intended to take the nation. Presenting this picture required minimizing the differences within the Union. The 1956 convention in Stuttgart, for example, produced a platform that was at the same time direct and evasive. Declaring that the ultimate goal was “reunification in peace and freedom,” the platform concluded: “It is the unanimous opinion of the Delegates that the continuation of the policy of European unification and Atlantic solidarity is an important requirement to reach this goal.” The CDU wanted to reduce East-West tensions, but rejected “all experiments that would endanger the peace and security of the entire German people.” By framing the debate as a choice between Westbindung and risky experimentation, the Union used attacks on the opposition to avoid confronting any contradictions between “European unification” and “Atlantic solidarity.” This strategy, which, with apologies to Hans-Ulrich Wehler, could be called a form of “negative integration,” set the tone for the campaign ahead.67 The SPD did try to escape the usual categories of debate. In a move indicating how much West German politics had changed since the days of Kurt Schumacher, SPD Chair Erich Ollenhauer borrowed a page from Adenauer and made his own trip to Washington in February 1957. He had his chance to be photographed with Eisenhower and Dulles, and to present his party’s conceptions for European security. In retrospect, the SPD decision to travel to Washington was an important early step on the party’s path to governmental responsibility and reconciliation with Westbindung, but this was not immediately apparent in 1957. The Union observed this foray into their territory with sarcastic skepticism. Adenauer joked that he hoped Ollenhauer would “hear and see a lot over there, and maybe bring some of it back with him.”68 Adenauer could afford to be glib. His sources told him that there was little chance Ollenhauer would win over the Americans. He also sent Brentano to Washington shortly thereafter. Brentano sent back a glowing report, but more importantly, as Der Spiegel cynically remarked, he received from Eisenhower “a long-desired American invitation … so that Konrad Adenauer … can make his contribution to the West German election on American soil.” AK V chair Kiesinger, who also visited the US in March, seconded Brentano, reporting that American policy had become “more realistic” in its support for European integration and that Dulles and Eisenhower had found Ollenhauer’s proposals “shocking.” Dulles reinforced American ties to Adenauer by sending the chancellor a personal message affirming American commitments to NATO and German reunification.69 Publicly, the stage appeared set for another triumphant visit to America, just in time for the election. – 94 –

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In the background, however, these American reassurances competed with less comforting news for Adenauer’s attention, coloring the planning for his visit and requiring careful stage management. In the London disarmament talks, American chief negotiator Harold Stassen spoke of “decoupling” disarmament from the German question, creating a neutral zone in Europe that would include both German states. Stassen’s enthusiasm for arms control, possibly at the expense of pledges to the Federal Republic, even concerned some Americans. Adenauer publicly reiterated his support for disarmament and mutual inspection zones, but privately worried about the implications of the American negotiating strategy. The press hinted at possible differences between Washington and Bonn on the eve of Adenauer’s arrival, with even the optimistic Brentano strongly reasserting the connection between reunification and disarmament.70 Adenauer’s trip, which included a symbolic visit to CARE headquarters in New York, provided a chance for both Germans and Americans to smooth over their differences. Adenauer expressed the appropriate gratitude, and the Eisenhower administration responded with a declaration linking disarmament and reunification. The press responded favorably, and everyone could go home happy. At a press conference after his return, Adenauer denied that there had ever been any disagreements between him and his friend Dulles, even if he did not completely forget the reasons for his earlier concerns.71 This spin on the trip reflected Union electoral strategy. By downplaying differences about disarmament and emphasizing the contrast between NATO and a European security system, the Union presented itself as the party of stability and realism, as opposed to the dangerous dilettantism of the opposition. As “Fritz” and “Karl,” two characters in a CDU campaign ad, concluded: “We want to see the successful foreign policy of the last eight years carried on by those who began it.” Adenauer, of course, led the way, at one point making the famous comment in Nuremberg that the Union opposed the SPD because “we know that a victory for the Social Democratic Party would mean the downfall of Germany.” At his speech in Dortmund officially opening the campaign, he went even further, claiming that the election would determine “if Germany will remain Christian or become communist.”72 When challenged that these comments were unnecessarily inflammatory, Adenauer countered that he drew the logical conclusion from the SPD’s stated desire to leave NATO and their personal attacks on him. (He also added sarcastically that the SPD certainly could not expect him to say that he hoped they would win.) SPD policies and leaders were also held up for public ridicule. One of Adenauer’s favorite tropes, for example, was comparing Ollenhauer to Little Red Riding Hood, going to the Big Bad Soviet Wolf with his plan for a neutral Germany and asking the Wolf to “live and let live.”73 The positive side of this election strategy was to extol the virtues of NATO and ties to the US, and to emphasize how the Union had advocated – 95 –

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them from the beginning. As Adenauer told the Young Union: “I was ridiculed by the Social Democratic Party and its press when I said that we wanted close ties to the United States because they are the only power that can save the free world from Soviet Russia, a position to which I will always be faithful.” In every speech, Adenauer and other Union leaders repeated these arguments, constructing a linear narrative from the Petersberg Agreement in November 1949 to the Treaty of Rome in 1957, contrasting the Union commitment to the West with the SPD’s irresponsible opposition.74 The point is not merely to illustrate Adenauer’s gift for demagoguery, but to highlight the degree to which the Union strategy revolved around a defense of the close relationship with the US as the basis of German security. Differences with the Americans were ignored, and the Union was touted as the champion of Atlantic cooperation. America and Europe were united in an “indissoluble community of fate,” Brentano told one interviewer. If anything, Adenauer and his government had to deflect charges that they were too close to the Americans. Both the FDP and SPD attacked the government for hiring an American public relations firm, and the FDP published an “open letter” to John Foster Dulles protesting American support for Adenauer.75 Despite this emphasis on the Atlantic Alliance, however, the campaign also revealed a subtle awareness of the differences between Western Europe and its superpower patron. “We Europeans should not give in to the illusion that Europe plays a great role in the world today,” Adenauer told a crowd in Mainz. “There are no European great powers anymore, there are only two great powers, the Soviet Union and the United States.” They should realize that “if Europe wants to exercise cultural and political influence in the future, it must come together.” The nature of this influence was unclear, but Adenauer indicated his own ambivalence about the future relationship between this new Europe and the rest of the world, echoing his Brussels speech from 1956. Europe needed the US “so that we Europeans can again have a large economic area, can have influence in the world, and so that we can preserve our European culture … [and] can share it with other peoples, including the Americans.” Or, as he put it in Braunschweig, “if we want to share our ancient Christian culture with the other nations of the world, we Europeans must stand together….” Europe would thus have an independent role in the world, in cooperation with but not under the dominance of the US. Even his attacks on the SPD’s security system and invocations of the vital importance of NATO betray his ambivalence about American ties to Europe. He urged one audience to consider “if based on some such construction the Europeans were to say to the Americans, ‘You can go home now,’ whether they would ever come back,” and declared: “I will never believe this.”76 Change was dangerous because it would reopen all questions, and the Americans would not necessarily provide the same answers again. – 96 –

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The 1957 campaign ended with a resounding victory for the Union. By gaining 50.2 percent of the popular vote, the Union became the first, and still the only, party in German history to win an absolute majority of votes cast in a free national election. The coalition problems of 1956 were but a memory; the Union and Adenauer now had even more freedom to make policy. What they would do with that freedom, however, was still unclear. In explaining the roots of the landslide victory, Adenauer cited the Union’s clear support of Westbindung and the German public’s desire to maintain the alliance with the US. American representatives, such as Ambassador David Bruce, who won the embassy betting pool on the election, shared Adenauer’s sense of triumph. Internally, however, Adenauer and his advisers remained concerned about the lack of political coordination within the West.77 Adenauer’s position on the political role of NATO contained many contradictions. He accepted American leadership, but only if that leadership promoted political consultation with Europe and avoided moves toward either officially recognizing or seriously changing the European status quo. The linkage between disarmament and the German question exacerbated Adenauer’s fears. Here, the Americans were given to unsettling discussions of “experimental” neutral zones in Central Europe and the withdrawal of Allied forces from Germany. Dulles tried to assure Adenauer that the Americans did not advocate such an arrangement, but Adenauer remained suspicious. In discussions with friendly journalists, he ridiculed Harold Stassen as “the new peace Pope,” but combined the barbs with serious pleas for keeping American troops in Europe.78 The problem of arms control was related to the ongoing difficulties of meeting the Federal Republic’s rearmament targets. Preparations for the creation of a Bundeswehr force of five hundred thousand, foreseen in the London and Paris agreements of 1955, proceeded with painful slowness, held up by political wrangling, logistical problems, and a series of training mishaps. Frustrated American official and public opinion demanded that the Germans move faster, even suggesting that the Americans should stop relying solely on Adenauer. Brentano warned that the uncertainty surrounding the Bundeswehr was hurting the Federal Republic’s image with its allies. “We are … about to waste the political capital that has taken us long years to accumulate,” he wrote, “… and it will be difficult to ever win that position back again.”79 Although he knew that the original target of twelve divisions within three years was unreasonable, Adenauer feared that modifying the timetable would damage the Federal Republic’s position with its allies. He would not allow the Defense Ministry to entertain alternatives, and stood by his original defense minister, Theodore Blank, for as long as he could. By the summer of 1956, however, rumors began to circulate that Blank, an earnest but colorless former Catholic labor union official, was unfit for his job. Speculation about a replacement centered on Franz Josef Strauß, whose speeches – 97 –

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in favor of rearmament and whose activities as minister for atomic affairs (a post he had held since 1955) had given him a high profile in defense matters. As early as 1953, then-CSU Chair Hans Ehard had informed Adenauer, with Strauß in mind, that the CSU intended “that Bavaria will participate in the leadership for the eventual creation of a Defense Ministry through a qualified person.” Thus, when new CSU Chair Hanns Seidel declared in 1956 that Blank was “used up” politically, there was little doubt about his preferred replacement. Adenauer upbraided Seidel, though he also realized that Blank was becoming a liability.80 Strauß was the most prominent voice calling for a reorganization of the Bundeswehr. He proposed a smaller army of about 350,000 men, placing greater emphasis on technology, including eventually nuclear arms, and warning that “we must not reach the point when people say that the colonial peoples will be the infantry that has to fight the conventional fights.” Such suggestions were particularly unwelcome to Adenauer in the aftermath of the Radford Plan crisis, as he feared that they would encourage the Allies to abandon the idea of a Bundeswehr altogether. He was determined that the Federal Republic would have an army. “You know that I am no militarist,” he told the CDU Bundesvorstand, repeating an argument he had made since 1950 “but I have to say one thing; a state without an army [Wehrmacht] is not a state.” The army was a symbol of sovereignty, and while he had few scruples against nuclear weapons per se, Adenauer would not allow changes in technology to eliminate that symbol. Brentano was also quick to respond when allies spoke of alternatives to the Bundeswehr, such as a Canadian suggestion that the Germans contribute funds to NATO rather than troops.81 The Bundeswehr’s significance was more symbolic than strategic; Adenauer’s reluctance to tamper with that symbol reflected the insecurity of the Federal Republic’s political position within the West. The crisis in the Bundeswehr also offered an indication of generational change within the Union. Adenauer became increasingly irritated at the murmuring within his party, especially when he heard rumors that Strauß, whose tipsy tirades were becoming infamous in both Bonn and Munich, had been criticizing him in secret. His reluctance to promote Strauß reflected both his concerns about the Bavarian’s personality and his worry that such an independent and ambitious young politician would not be as easy to control as Blank. In late summer 1956, when a CSU delegation, including Strauß and Seidel, repeated their concerns about the Bundeswehr, Adenauer turned on Strauß, charging that his supposedly objective complaints were a fig leaf for his personal ambitions. “As long as I am chancellor, Herr Strauß,” Adenauer thundered, “you will never be defense minister.” When Press Secretary Felix von Eckardt later suggested nevertheless that Blank should retire, Adenauer’s response was simply: “Do you know what that means? That means Franz Josef Strauß as defense minister!” That alone was enough to keep him from acting. As the 1956 NATO annual – 98 –

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review approached, however, Adenauer was forced to admit that his government “has not always told our NATO allies the truth” about the progress of rearmament. The only way to save face would be to introduce a new minister and a new plan. In the end, he had to turn to the same Franz Josef Strauß whom he had rejected three months before. When Strauß reminded Adenauer of his earlier outburst, the chancellor responded with a smile: “Herr Strauß, do you really want to deny an old man the right to change his mind?”82 Adenauer’s joke was an attempt to hide the reality that he had backed himself into a corner, and that Strauß’s strong position in the CSU made it impossible to hinder his rise any longer. Adenauer tried to place the blame for Blank’s difficult position on a lack of support from Union members of the Bundestag Defense Committee. In reality, however, Adenauer himself bore primary responsibility. Immobilized by worries that any alterations in German plans would encourage changes from Washington, he had paradoxically eroded confidence in the Germans’ ability to meet their targets. In an effort to avoid inspiring Allied criticism, Adenauer continued to deny that he and Strauß differed on the size and shape of the Bundeswehr, calling reports “newspaper fantasies.” The Federal Republic planned “to stick with our original plan.” His new defense minister knew differently, however. At the 1956 NATO review, Strauß, who had bragged that he would put German defense preparations on a “realistic basis” even if it meant “dropping his pants” in front of his allies, had to break the bad news.83 He presented a revised plan for raising 350,000 men within five years, and Adenauer’s denials came to an end. The reorganization of the Bundeswehr raised the question of German or European access to nuclear weapons, which in turn explains why Western disarmament plans received such close German scrutiny. Adenauer himself had told the cabinet in September 1956 that “Germany cannot remain a nuclear protectorate,” and Strauß had also spoken of how the new European Atomic Community (Euratom) would give the Germans “the possibility of reaching nuclear weapons by normal means.” As the Radford Plan had shown, however, an emphasis on nuclear weapons could lead to a weakening of American and British ties to Continental Europe, to save on the expense of stationing troops. Thus, the size and shape of the Bundeswehr related directly to the place of the Federal Republic in NATO strategy.84 The nuclear question also had a domestic component. Nuclear issues had attracted the attention of the West German public during the 1957 campaign, and when prominent German physicists announced their refusal to participate in nuclear weapons research, it became a campaign issue as well. The SPD embraced the physicists, prompting Strauß to note wryly that the physicists feared not the atom, but Adenauer’s reelection. Adenauer and the Union responded by highlighting their support for disarmament to allay public fears. In the end, while the West German public certainly feared nuclear war, the SPD was unable to dent Adenauer’s popularity, and the – 99 –

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nuclear issue failed to bring electoral benefits. After the election, Adenauer resumed his cautious rhetoric. When asked directly whether he wanted the Bundeswehr to have nuclear arms, he responded evasively, commenting that the German army should have “the best weapons,” equal to those of any possible attacker. He was also quick to mention that the Federal Republic had no plans to build its own nuclear weapons, citing both treaty commitments and the Nazi past as reasons for the Germans to show great “tact” in these matters. He preferred to save these issues for the December 1957 NATO conference in Paris, and encouraged Strauß to show restraint in his public statements until then.85 International developments raised the stakes as the NATO meeting approached. In a speech to the UN General Assembly on 2 October 1957, Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki proposed the creation of a nuclearfree zone in Central Europe, to include Poland, Czechoslovakia, and both German states. Adenauer, Brentano, and the Union leadership denounced the proposal as a Soviet-inspired attempt to separate the Federal Republic from the West, but public opinion and opposition politicians embraced it as a step toward peace. Furthermore, the Soviets launched the first Sputnik that November, exposing the US to possible nuclear attack and encouraging voices that demanded reconsideration of American nuclear strategy. The most famous of these voices belonged to George Kennan, who used the BBC’s Reith lectures in late 1957 to endorse disengagement and a nuclear-free neutral zone in Central Europe. This was precisely the policy Adenauer feared and had long struggled against. When rumors circulated that Kennan planned to deliver similar lectures in the Federal Republic, the highest political circles in West Germany took note and expressed their opposition.86 However influential Kennan may have been, it was clear to most observers, such as AK V Chair Kiesinger, that he did not speak for the Eisenhower administration—or for anyone but himself, for that matter. Adenauer, however, did not treat Kennan as a maverick voice. Rather, he considered Kennan’s lectures as part of a coordinated campaign to reduce the American commitment to Europe. That the lectures were broadcast by the BBC was for him further proof of a possible conspiracy. He believed that the British, now in possession of their own nuclear deterrent, wanted to withdraw from Europe, and hoped to encourage the Americans to follow. Kiesinger echoed these concerns that British policy “tend[ed] toward disengagement,” and would leave the Federal Republic defenseless. Adenauer became so concerned that Kennan’s ideas would gain ground that even the most innocuous references were cause for concern. When President Theodor Heuss made a passing reference to Kennan in his 1958 New Year’s address, for example, Adenauer responded immediately with a critical letter. Conversely, the government encouraged pro-German voices in the United States. After Christopher Emmett of the American Council on Germany – 100 –

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organized an early 1958 newspaper declaration criticizing Kennan, he was rewarded with the Grand Cross of the Federal Service Cross.87 Adenauer thus remained suspicious of the Americans and the British, and worried that their desire for a lighter defense burden would pull them away from the Continent. This helps to explain another action that the Adenauer government took in late 1957. While more Atlanticist members of the Union saw Sputnik as a chance to develop new strategies with the US, Adenauer pursued a Continental strategy of reinsurance. Upon an invitation from the government of Felix Gaillard in France, he approved an agreement between France, Italy, and the Federal Republic (known as the FIG Agreement) to produce nuclear weapons for their joint use. Strauß was entrusted with secretly working out the details of funding and organization. Talks would continue until the collapse of the French Fourth Republic in 1958.88 These plans for Continental nuclear cooperation could not remain completely secret for long, and the West German response when the Americans became aware of them further reflects Adenauer’s balancing act on nuclear issues. Not wanting to burn all bridges with the Americans while waiting to see how FIG would work out, Adenauer and Brentano denied that FIG challenged existing NATO relationships, arguing that research coordination among NATO members would strengthen the alliance. Adenauer also tried to soften the anti-American/anti-British edge of the agreement by arguing that it was open to other NATO members.89 The purpose of this two-faced game was to prepare the Federal Republic for all contingencies. Ever the calculating tactician, Adenauer was not above using FIG to extort concessions from the Americans. If Sputnik and calls for disengagement reduced American commitment to Europe, he would find other partners. If, however, the Americans developed new programs for European defense, then Adenauer would return to the Atlantic fold. If European nuclear cooperation could move the Americans to consider such new programs, so much the better. The December 1957 meeting of the NATO Council in Paris provided a satisfactory conclusion for all sides. Responding to a letter from Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin, Adenauer attempted to deflect criticism that his government stood in the way of détente by exhorting the Atlantic Alliance to pursue all opportunities for negotiations with the Soviets. This apparent change of heart surprised his political opponents and alarmed some of his own allies. Later, in January 1958, Adenauer would respond to discouraging proposals from the Kremlin with a radio address retreating from the hopeful tones he had struck in Paris, but by then his NATO speech had served its purpose, which was to defuse plans to seek détente through disengagement.90 The NATO Council responded, as Adenauer had hoped, by reaffirming its desire for greater political coordination and by approving plans to station short- and medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe to signal stronger transatlantic integration. The Federal Republic was an unlikely site for such – 101 –

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missiles, but Adenauer declined to follow the lead of Denmark and Norway, who formally refused to accept them. One writer, with an eye to later debates, has compared the December 1957 NATO decisions to the “twotrack policy” of the late 1970s, as NATO tried to balance rearmament with continued interest in détente. The conference satisfied the German desire for stronger NATO political coordination, and provided international support for “the best weapons” for the Bundeswehr, while rejecting disengagement, leading Brentano to call it an “indisputable success” for the Germans.91

Conclusion: Running in Place? The tactical victory in Paris, however, masked strategic weakness. Instead of capitalizing on sovereignty, as many had hoped, Adenauer and the Union had spent the intervening years defending the status quo. Insecure about the ultimate intentions of his allies, Adenauer tried to preserve the structures of 1955 while intensifying cooperation among the Continental states as insurance against Anglo-American withdrawal. Thus years of intense activity achieved the dubious success of leaving the Federal Republic essentially where it stood in May 1955. This is not to say that West German foreign policy from 1953 to 1957 was a failure. Achieving relative sovereignty and equality within the West was, after all, no mean feat, and in the absence of any tangible loosening of Soviet control of Eastern Europe—the 1956 events in Hungary being enough to dispel dreams of “rollback”—there was certainly much to recommend a policy of avoiding risky experiments. The question remained, however, whether holding the line would continue to be a sensible policy for the future. Brentano did not see any reason to worry, writing Adenauer after the NATO conference that he looked forward to the Bundestag debate scheduled for the end of January. “I have no doubt that public opinion is still ready to trust your policy, if we present it correctly,” he asserted.92 Events would show that this policy was more vulnerable than either believed.

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Notes 1. Klaus Skibowski, “Abschied vom Neubeginn: Mit dem Wahlkampf 1953 begann die Ära Adenauer,” in Pörtner, Kinderjahre der Bundesrepublik, 478–491. 2. CDU Bundesvorstand communiqué, 31 July 1953, Vorstand I, 656–657. See also Blankenhorn memorandum for the BPA, 13 June 1953, PA-AA Büro StS Band 159; “Die CDU— Partei der Verantwortung,” draft speech for candidates, ACDP CDU Election Files 1953, VII-003-002/1; Gerd Langguth, ed., Politik und Plakat: 50 Jahre Plakatgeschichte am Beispiel der CDU (Bonn, 1995), 92. 3. Skibowski, Abschied, 481; Langguth, Politik, 89–91. See also Wolfgang Hirsch-Weber and Klaus Schütz, Wähler und Gewählte: Eine Untersuchung der Bundestagswahlen 1953 (Berlin, 1957), especially 97–148. Wolfgang Stump, “Konrad Adenauer: Reden und Interviews 1945–1953,” in Rudolf Morsey and Konrad Repgen, eds., Adenauer Studien III: Untersuchungen und Dokumente zur Ostpolitik und Biographie (Mainz, 1974), 243–268. 4. Jens Daniel [Rudolf Augstein], “Gott schütze Sie, mein Kanzler,” Der Spiegel, 16 September 1953, 4. For the importance of consensus building in the political structure of the Federal Republic, see Peter J. Katzenstein, Policy and Politics in West Germany: The Growth of a Semi-Sovereign State (Philadelphia, 1987). 5. Heinrich Krone to Fraktion, 17 September 1953, ACDP NL Gerstenmaier, I-210-014/1. For the original members of AK V, see ACDP AK V Files VIII-006-004/3. Hans-Albrecht Schwarz-Liebermann von Wahlendorf (AK V staff) interview, July 1994. 6. Adenauer in the cabinet, 23 April 1953, Kabinett 1953, 268. Hans-Peter Schwarz, ed., Entspannung und Wiedervereinigung: Deutschlandpolitische Vorstellungen Konrad Adenauers, 1955–1958 [Rhöndorfer Gespräch 2] (Stuttgart, 1979). 7. Adenauer to Hans Ehard, 30 April 1953; Adenauer to Erik Blumenfeld, 4 August 1953. Briefe 1951–1953, 360–361, 419–420. See also Blumenfeld to Adenauer, 3 August 1953, StBKAH 11/05, 140–141. 8. “Gedanken über ein Wahl-Programm” [Summer 1953], StBKAH 11/05, 46–49. 9. Adenauer to Ollenhauer, 16 January 1953, Briefe 1951–1953, 321–324; Josef Foschepoth, “Churchill, Adenauer und die Neutralisierung Deutschlands,” DA 12 (1984): 1286–1301; Rolf Steininger, “Ein vereinigtes, unabhängiges Deutschland? Winston Churchill, der Kalte Krieg und die deutsche Frage im Jahre 1953,” Militärgeschichte 36 (1984): 105–144; Steininger, German Question, 100–112; Blankenhorn, Verständnis, 148–149 (12 May 1953); Draper to State, on a meeting with Adenauer, 13 May 1953, FRUS 1952–1954 VII/1, 456–457. 10. Adenauer in the Bundesvorstand, 22 May 1953, Vorstand I, 518–520; Lenz diary, 628–629 (22 May 1953); and David Bruce (US representative to the ECSC) to Conant, 29 May 1953, FRUS 1952–1954 VII/1, 457–459; Adenauer to Brentano, 21 May 1953, Briefe 1951–1953, 368; Brentano to Adenauer, 30 May 1953, Arnulf Baring, ed., Sehr verehrter Herr Bundeskanzler! Heinrich von Brentano im Briefwechsel mit Konrad Adenauer, 1949–1964 (Hamburg, 1974), 128–130. 11. Adenauer in the cabinet, 2 and 9 June 1953, Kabinett 1953, 326, 333–334; Lenz diary, 636–637, 642–646 (2, 9, and 10 June 1953). On the “jump,” see the notes of Transportation Minister Hans-Christoph Seebohm at the special cabinet meeting on 10 June, Kabinett 1953, 340–342. 12. Arnulf Baring, Uprising in East Germany: June 17, 1953 (Ithaca, 1972). See also Christian F. Ostermann, “The United States, the East German Uprising of 1953, and the Limits of Rollback,” Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 11, December 1994. 13. KAE II, 220–224. Blankenhorn, Verständnis, 159–160 (8 July 1953); Schwarz, Staatsmann, 86–90; Köhler, Adenauer, 812–816; Rupieper, Verbündete, 320–326; extract from the diary of David K. E. Bruce, Thursday, 9 July 1953, FRUS 1952–1954 VII/1, 484–485.

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14. Adenauer in the Bundesvorstand, 31 July 1953, Vorstand I, 656; Lenz diary, 674–675 (31 July 1953); Conant to Dulles, 30 November and 5 December 1953, FRUS 1952–1954 VII/1, 683–686. 15. Hermann-Josef Rupieper, “Der Berliner Außenministerkonferenz 1954: Ein Höhepunkt der Ost-West-Propaganda oder die letzte Möglichkeit zur Schaffung der deutschen Einheit?” VfZ 34 (1986): 427–453. See also the appeals of the Exile-CDU, 20 January 1954, and the SPD Vorstand, 22 January 1954, along with newspaper clippings, in ACDP VII005-080/1. 16. “Ollenhauer fordert Aufgabe der EVG,” and “Erregung in Bonn über Ollenhauer,” Die Welt, 3 February 1954; “Es war kein Deutschland-Konferenz,” DUD (17 February 1954); “Die West-CDU zur Berliner Konferenz: Moskaus Unaufrichtigkeit restlos enthüllt!” pamphlet published by the Berlin CDU, all in ACDP VII-005-080/1; Brentano to Adenauer, 5 February 1954, StBKAH III/38. 17. Adenauer speech in the Ostpreußenhalle in Berlin, 23 February 1954, Becker, 85–96, quote on 92; Blankenhorn, Verständnis, 187–189 (19 February 1954); Adenauer in the cabinet, 4 February 1954, and cabinet meetings, 17, 19, and 24 February 1954, Kabinett 1954, 55–56, 61–63, 71, 76. See also Adenauer to Ollenhauer, 19 February 1954, and Ollenhauer to Adenauer, 20 February 1954, StBKAH 12/27, 79–80; conversation between Dulles and Adenauer, 18 February 1954, FRUS 1952–1954 VII/1, 1208–1215. 18. Krone diary, 138 (25 May 1954); see also Large, Germans, 154–175. 19. Adenauer to Ollenhauer, 7 January 1954, Briefe 1953–1955, 68–69; Schwarz, Staatsmann, 33–44, especially 43; Köhler, Adenauer, 757–767. 20. Baring, Außenpolitik, 329–334; Gero von Gersdorff, Adenauers Außenpolitik gegenüber den Siegermächten 1954 (Munich, 1994) and Paul Noack, Das Scheitern der Europäischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft: Entscheidungsprozesse vor und nach dem 30. August 1954 (Düsseldorf, 1977). Schwarz, Staatsmann, 121–143; Köhler, Adenauer, 820–838. 21. “Die weltpolitische Lage aus dem Blickwinkel von NATO und EVG,” 4 May 1953, PA-AA Büro StS Band 159; Adolf Süsterhenn to Adenauer, 7 October 1953, StBKAH 11/06, 306–308; Adenauer to Schäffer, 11 November 1953, Briefe 1953–1955, 43–44. 22. On Mendès-France, see Adenauer in the cabinet, 25 May 1954, Kabinett 1954, 211–223; Schwarz, Staatsmann, 136–140; Köhler, Adenauer, 832–834. On the Brussels Conference, see “Frankreichs historische Schuld in Europa: Brüssel ist gescheitert!” Bild, 23 August 1954; Blankenhorn, Verständnis, 192–193 (23 August 1954) and KAE II, 266–285. “Staatsbegräbnis für de Gasperi in Rom,” Frankfurter Neue Presse, 21 August 1954. On the French vote, see “Post-Mortem on the Rejection of the EDC Treaty,” 16 September 1954, FRUS 1952–1954 V/1, 1094–1113; and Daniel Lerner and Raymond Aron, France Defeats EDC (New York, 1957). 23. Brian Duchin, “The ‘Agonizing Reappraisal’: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the European Defense Community,” DH 16, no. 2 (spring 1992): 201–222; Gerstenmaier to Grund, 8 July 1954, ACDP NL Gerstenmaier I-210-015; see also the discussion in AK V, 23 June 1954, ACDP VIII-006-001/1. 24. Gerstenmaier to Adenauer, 17 December 1952. StBKAH 11/04, 192–193; Gerstenmaier to Herbert Blankenhorn on 17 December, 1952, PA-AA Büro StS Band 26; Gerstenmaier to Adenauer, 25 June 1954, ACDP NL Gerstenmaier I-210-015. 25. Maria Stirz, Heinrich von Brentano di Tremezzo (Darmstadt, 1970), 159–163. See also Brentano [Paris] to Adenauer, 27 February 1953 and Adenauer to Brentano, 2 March 1953, StBKAH III/38; Lenz diary, 580 (10 March 1953); the comments by Brentano and Franz Josef Strauß in the Fraktion, 3 March 1953, Heidemeyer, 682–683; the discussion in the cabinet, 10 March, 8 May, 20 May, 28 July, and 1 December 1953, Kabinett 1953, 213–214, 280–282, 300–301, 414, and 534; and Blankenhorn, Verständnis, 149–150 (13 May 1953) and 164 (7 August 1953). For background on the plans for the EPC, see the memoranda by Hans-Albrecht Schwarz-Liebermann von Wahlendorf, 20 October and 11 December 1952, and the memorandum of conversation between German and French members of the Council of Europe, 20 October 1952, AAP 1952, 662–676, 748–751. – 104 –

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26. For the “bitterest moment,” see Poppinga, Meine Erinnerungen, 117; for “black day,” see KAE II, 285; Krone diary, 142 (30 August 1954) and 143 (26 September 1954); Köhler, Adenauer, 821–823; Brentano to Pierre-Henri Teitgen, 5 October and 17 December 1954, BA NL Brentano 239/164, 388–394; AK V meeting, 8 September 1954, ACDP VIII-006-001/1. 27. Dehler first made such comments in a speech in Bensheim on 30 October 1954, Brentano to Adenauer, 4 November 1954, BA NL Brentano 239/155, 36–37. He repeated them in an interview with the Yugoslav magazine Politica, Hans Kroll [Ambassador in Belgrade] to the Foreign Office, 20 November 1954, and Adenauer to Dehler, 22 November 1954, both in StBKAH, 12/32, 108–115; Adenauer to Dehler, 27 November 1954, Briefe 1953– 55, 189–190. 28. Special cabinet meetings in Bonn, 31 August 1954, and at the Bühlerhöhe, 1 September 1954, Kabinett 1954, 345–348, 350–354; KAE II, 294–295; “Erklärung der Bundesregierung: Konsequente Fortsetzung der bisherigen Linie der deutschen Außenpolitik— Fünf Ziele,” Bulletin, 2 September 1954, 1449; Maier/Thoß, 147. 29. “Auch das Ergebnis von Paris kann uns nicht irremachen,” speech by Strauß on Southwest German Radio, 31 August 1954. Text in Bulletin, 2 September 1954, 1449–1451. 30. Cabinet meeting on 8 September 1954, Kabinett 1954, 363–372, especially 372. 31. Rolf Steininger, “John Foster Dulles, the European Defense Community, and the German Question,” in Immerman, John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War, 79–108. Adenauer to Churchill, 13 September 1954, Briefe 1953–1955, 152. See also Conant to Dulles, 13 September 1954; and Conant to Dulles, two messages, 14 September 1954, FRUS 1952–1954 V/2, 1181–1188, 1190–1191. 32. Wilhelm Grewe, “Der neue Deutschland-Vertrag,” Bulletin, 10 November 1954, 1917–1922. 33. Bruno Thoß, “Die Lösung der Saarfrage 1954/55,” VfZ 38 (1990): 225–288. 34. “Telegraphic Summary of the US Delegation,” 3 October 1954, FRUS 1952–1954 V/2, 1324–1325. KAE II, 343–345; Schwarz, Staatsmann, 154–160; and Köhler, Adenauer, 842–845; Hans-Jürgen Küsters, “Souveränität und ABC-Waffen-Verzicht: Deutsche Diplomatie auf der Londoner Neunmächte-Konferenz 1954,” VfZ 42 (October 1994): 499–536. 35. Churchill to Adenauer, 1 September 1954, StBKAH III/1; Adenauer to Churchill, 3 September 1954, Briefe 1953–1955, 143; Kiesinger in AK V, 8 September 1954, reporting Adenauer’s comments from the previous day, ACDP VIII-006-001/1. 36. Adenauer in the Bundesvorstand, 11 October 1954, Vorstand II, 255–256; Adenauer, discussion with journalists, 5 October 1954, Teegespräche 1950–1954, 543. 37. KAE II, 344; Osterheld I, 284–285 n71; see, for example, Adenauer’s meeting with de Gaulle, 4 July 1962, KAE IV 167; Köhler, Adenauer, 844–845; Schwarz, Staatsmann, 156–159. 38. Minutes of AK V meeting, 14 September 1954; Kiesinger and Gerstenmaier in AK V, 5 October 1954. See also the comments from Brentano and Hermann Pünder on 5 October, and Kiesinger’s further comments on 1 December 1954, ACDP VIII-006-001/1. 39. Schwarz, Staatsmann, 151–153. See also Walter Henkels, ed., “Mein Gott, was soll aus Deutschland werden?” Die besten Adenauer-Anekdoten (Düsseldorf, 1993). 40. Köhler, Adenauer, 837–838. 41. See the discussion in the cabinet, 5 October 1954, Kabinett 1954, 417–422. Adenauer to Theodore Blank, 3 October 1954, and to Winston Churchill, 4 October 1954, Briefe 1953– 1955, 163–165. Adenauer in the Bundesvorstand, 11 October 1954, Vorstand II, 256–257. 42. “Stets im Interesse ganz Deutschlands gehandelt,” Adenauer speech on Northwest German Radio, 25 October 1954, Bulletin, 27 October 1954, 1805–1806. See also his interview with United Press, ibid., 1805. For Adenauer’s statement in Paris, see “Tag der Aussöhnung mit Frankreich,” Bulletin, 26 October 1954, 1781–1782. 43. Drummond, German Social Democrats, 128–139; CDU-Bundesgeschäftsstelle, Rednerdienst 25, “Die Konferenzen von London und Paris” (autumn 1954), ACDP VII-005-082/1; “Merkwürdige Parallelen zwischen Molotov und Ollenhauer,” CDU Fraktion Files, ACDP VIII-006-004/3; “Einheit und Bewaffnung im Streit der Parteien,” Die Welt, 8 October 1954; “Der Bundestag billigt die Politik der Regierung,” Bulletin, 9 October 1954, 1693. See also the discussion in the Bundesvorstand, 11 October 1954, Vorstand II, 465–492. – 105 –

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44. For Adenauer’s statement at the Chancellery, see KAE II, 431–432; for his address to the NATO Council, see Becker, 97–99. 45. Henkels, Adenauer-Anekdoten, 68. 46. Rupieper, Verbündete, 404–469; KAE II, 487–556; Schwarz, Staatsmann, 207–222; and Köhler, Adenauer, 872–890. See also Adenauer’s comments to the cabinet, 31 August 1955, Kabinett 1955, 476–496. On the return of the POWs, see Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, “Die Verklärung: Adenauer und die öffentliche Meinung 1949 bis 1976.” KAZ II, 523–554, especially 552. 47. Schwarz, Ära Adenauer, 1949–1957, 279–282. 48. Schwarz, Staatsmann, 216–218. See also Adenauer and Brentano’s conversation with selected journalists, 20 September 1955, Teegespräche 1955–1958, 24–28. 49. Schwarz, Ära Adenauer 1949–1957, 303–312. Adenauer to Karl Arnold, 9 July 1954, Briefe 1953–1955, 116–118. See also Adenauer to Wilhelm Johnen, 28 July 1954, StBKAH 11/06, 97; Adenauer in the Bundesvorstand, 24 February 1956, Vorstand II, 781–835, especially 785–786; and Brentano in AK V, 8 May 1956, ACDP VIII-006-001/1. 50. “Aktivierung der Nordatlantischen Gemeinschaft auf nichtmilitärischem Gebiet,” [1956] and Brentano, speech to the WEU, 24 April 1956, PA-AA MB Band 62; AK V meeting, 17 January 1956, ACDP VIII-006-001/1; Blankenhorn (ambassador to NATO) memo, 15 May 1956, in Blankenhorn to Brentano, 15 May 1956, BA NL Brentano 239/165, 28–35; Lilienfeld, “Übersicht über die wichtigsten politischen Ereignisse im April 1956,” PA-AA Referat 305 Band 18. 51. Notiz Kilb, 5 March 1956, ACDP NL Globke I-070-031/1; Brentano to Adenauer, 28 March 1956, BA NL Brentano 239/156, 220–230; KAE III, 113–120. See also Ivone Kirkpatrick to Adenauer, 13 April 1956, BA NL Brentano 239/165, 36–37. On German reactions to the breakthrough in Austria and Eisenhower’s comments, see Krone diary, 171 (15 April 1955); and KAE II, 441–446; Lilienfeld memo “Überblick über die Situation in den Vereinigten Staaten,” June 1956, and Kessel to AA, 9 June 1956, PA-AA Referat 305 Band 18. 52. KAE III, 197–207; Adenauer, discussion with journalists, 18 July 1956, Teegespräche 1955– 1958, 102–117. Blank to Adenauer, 23 July 1956, StBKAH III/22; Krekeler to AA, 9 and 16 August 1956 PA-AA Referat 305 Band 45. Krekeler to AA, 18 July 1956, including a translation of Dulles’s remarks, PA-AA MB Band 62. Baudissin, memo for AA, 31 July 1956; Lilienfeld memo, 12 September 1956; Heinz Weber, translator’s memorandum of conversation of 23 August between Dulles and Brentano, 27 August 1956, PA-AA Referat 305 Band 45. For selections of Dulles to Adenauer, 11 August 1956, see KAE III, 207–211. 53. Ibid., 197. Kessel to AA, 30 August 1956, PA-AA Referat 305 Band 18. See also Krone to Adenauer, 6 and 31 August 1956, StBKAH 11/06; Krone, “Fruchtbarer Gedankenaustausch,” DUD 10, no. 181 (18 September 1956): 1–3; Krone in the Bundesvorstand, 20 September 1956, Vorstand II, 1033–1036 especially 1034; Krone diary, 224–225 (30 August and 5 September 1956). 54. Adenauer in the Bundesvorstand, 20 September 1956, Vorstand II, 1030. 55. Gabrielle Brenke, “Europakonzeptionen im Widerstreit: Die Freihandelszonen Verhandlungen, 1956–1958,” VfZ 42, no. 4 (October 1994): 595–633. See also F. Roy Willis, France, Germany, and the New Europe, 1945–1967 (New York, 1968), 227–272. 56. Adenauer to cabinet, 19 January 1956, full text in KAE III 253–255; Erhard to Adenauer, 11 April 1956, StBKAH III/23. 57. Krone diary, 202 (15 February 1956); Adenauer to Erhard, 13 April 1956, StBKAH III/23. 58. Adenauer speech, “Europa muß sich einigen,” 25 September 1956, KAR, 327–333. See also his interview with Charles Thayer, 18 October 1956, Teegespräche, 1955–1958, 134–143, especially 139–140. 59. AK V discussion, 2 October 1956, ACDP VIII-006-001/1; Adenauer, interview with Newsweek editor Harry Kern, 28 September 1956, and with American journalists, 18 October 1956, Teegespräche 1955–1958, 130–131, 148–149; press conference in Berlin,

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60.

61.

62.

63. 64.

65. 66. 67.

68.

69.

70.

71. 72.

12 October 1956, ACDP NL Eckardt I-010-002/1; Lilienfeld memo, 5 October 1956, PAAA Referat 305 Band 18. Brentano in AK V, 11 September 1956, ACDP VIII-006-001/1; Brentano to Adenauer, 31 October and 4 November 1956, BA NL Brentano 239/156, 303–304, and 306–307. See also Cole Kingseed, Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis (Baton Rouge, 1996). Brentano to Adenauer, 2 November 1956, BA NL Brentano 239/156, 305. Heinz Weber, translator’s memorandum of conversation between Brentano and American chargé Trimble, 5 November 1956, PA-AA Referat 305 Band 18. See also Brentano’s 1964 comments in his John Foster Dulles Oral History Project interview, 22–31, copy in BA NL Brentano 239/164; and Brentano in AK V, 13 November 1956, ACDP VIII-006-001/1. Blankenhorn to Adenauer, 3 November 1956, copy in Blankenhorn to Brentano, 3 November 1956, BA NL Brentano 239/165, 24–27; Schwarz, Staatsmann, 300–302; Schwarz-Liebermann, “Orientierungsvermerk zur außenpolitischen Lage,” 4 November 1956, ACDP VIII-006-004/3. Adenauer interview, 5 November 1956, Teegespräche 1955– 1958, 156–173. Schwarz, Staatsmann, 301–307; Karl Carstens, “Das Eingreifen Adenauers in die EuropaVerhandlungen im November 1956,” KAZ I, 591–602. “Aufzeichnung,” 19 October 1956, in Limbourg to Carstens, 10 November 1956. The embassy in Paris had sent this memo to Brentano in late October, but he had put it aside until recent events convinced him to reconsider its arguments, PA-AA MB Band 62; Brentano in AK V, 13 November 1956, ACDP VIII-006-001/1. Adenauer, speech to the Union Presseverein on 17 November 1956, ACDP NL Eckardt, I010-001/1; AK V discussion, 27 November 1956, ACDP VIII-006-001/1. Adenauer in the Bundesvorstand, 23 November 1956, Vorstand II, 1114–1117. Langguth, Politik und Plakat, 101–106. The Foreign Office compiled quotations from SPD leaders in this effort. Memo, Grütnzer (AA) to Globke, 25 May 1956. BA Bukamt B 136/ 6560. Stuttgart Declaration, April 1956. Copy in StBKAH 11/05, 19. Schwarz-Liebermann, “Orientierungsvermerk zur internationalen Lage,” October 1956, AK V files, ACDP VIII006-004/3. “Das Außenpolitische Streitgespräch in Bonn,” NZZ, 2 February 1957; “Das große Bonner Welttheater,” SZ, 1 February 1957. Clippings in ACDP VII-005-069/1. Conant to State Department, 25 January 1957; and memorandum of conversation between Ollenhauer and Eisenhower at the White House, 28 February 1957, FRUS 1955– 1957 XXVI, 192–198, 201–202. Adenauer, press conference in Berlin, 2 February 1957, ACDP NL Eckardt I-010-002/1. See also the discussion in AK V, 26 February 1957, ibid., VIII-006-001/1. German mission in Tripoli to AA, 1 March 1957, PA-AA Referat 305 Band 19; Adenauer, remarks at reception for the foreign press, 15 February 1957, ACDP NL Eckardt I-010002/1. “Wo läuft die Front?” Der Spiegel, 18 March 1957; Brentano to Adenauer, 9 March 1957, StBKAH III/24; Kiesinger in AK V, 12 March 1957, ACDP VIII-006-001/1; Hallstein, memorandum of conversation with Trimble, 3 April 1957; and Krekeler to AA, 14 May 1957, PA-AA Referat 305 Band 19. Welck, memorandum for Hallstein on a conversation with Trimble, 13 June 1957; Krekeler to AA, 25 May 1957, ibid. Krone diary, 253–254 (15 May 1957); KAE III, 281–284; Brentano to Adenauer, 16 and 20 May 1957, BA NL Brentano 239/156, 349–355. Report by Referat 305, 5 June 1957, PA-AA Referat 305 Band 72; Adenauer, press conference in Bonn, 31 May 1957, ACDP NL Eckardt I-010-002/1. “Der schwächste Punkt,” CDU election flyer from Karlsruhe; and “Wissenswertes 18: Reden und Tatsachen,” from Recklinghausen, ACDP 1957 election files VII-003-003/1. Adenauer, speech at the closing ceremonies of the CSU party conference, Nuremberg, 7 July 1957, KAR, 364–372. Konrad Repgen, “Finis Germaniae: Untergang Deutschlands durch einen SPD-Wahlsieg 1957?” KAZ II, 294–315. Adenauer, speech in Dortmund, Westfalenhalle, 30 June 1957, ACDP NL Eckardt I-010-001/1.

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73. Adenauer press conference, 12 July 1957, ACDP NL Eckardt I-010-002/1. Adenauer speeches at Pirmasens on 3 August 1957, in Salzgitter on 8 August, in Wuppertal on 15 August, and in Recklinghausen on 1 September, ibid., I-010-001/1. 74. Adenauer, speech to the Junge Union, 19 January, 1957, ibid. Adenauer’s schedule, in which he made twenty-six speeches between 1 August and 15 September (election day), is in Bruno Heck to Globke, 26 June 1957, ACDP 1957 election files VII-003-003/2. SchwarzLiebermann of AK V also provided a historical sketch for Union speakers, listing specific agreements, in Schwarz-Liebermann to the Fraktion, 9 July 1957, ACDP VIII-006-004/3. 75. Adenauer, speech in Gelsenkirchen, 16 August 1957, and in Bonn, 6 August 1957, ACDP NL Eckardt I-010-001/1. Brentano, interview with the Rhein-Zeitung, included in memo, Referat 305 to the Pressereferat, 1 August 1957; Marchthaler, memo with copies of the SPD and FDP articles, 24 August 1957, PA-AA Referat 305 Band 19. 76. The quotations are drawn in order from speeches in Mainz, 1 August 1957; before the Evangelical Academy of Westphalia, 13 July 1957; in Kaiserslautern, 2 August 1957; in Braunschweig, 9 August 1957; and in Salzgitter, 8 August 1957, ACDP NL Eckardt I-010-001/1. 77. Adenauer, interview with CBS, 18 September 1957, remarks at a reception for the foreign press, 27 September 1957; interviews with Christopher Emmet, 6 August 1957, and Marguerite Higgins, 7 November 1957, ibid., I-010-002/1. Adenauer discussion with the Bonn correspondent of the Economist, Tyreman, 13 November 1957, Teegespräche 1955–1958, 244–249. Hallstein, memorandum of discussion with Bruce, 17 September 1957, PA-AA Referat 305 Band 19. 78. Dulles to Adenauer, 1 August 1957, BA NL Brentano 239/156, 362–363; for the “peace Pope,” see the interview with Higgins, 7 November 1957, above. 79. Hallstein memorandum of conversation with American chargé Walter Dowling, 3 January 1956; memorandum, Lilienthal for Brentano, 8 February 1956; Brentano, memorandum of conversation with Conant, 13 April 1956 [dated 14 April]; Krekeler, memo for AA, 14 March 1956, PA-AA Referat 305 Band 18. See also, Krekeler to Brentano, 2 February 1956, and Adenauer to Krone, 11 February 1956, ACDP NL Krone I-028-007/4. See also Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Section IV/4 Report, 18 May 1956; Hofmann [AA] to Washington, 24 May 1956, and Krekeler to AA, 7 June 1956; and memo, Washington embassy to AA, 10 July 1956, PA-AA Referat 305 Band 18. Brentano to Adenauer, 8 October 1956, BA NL Brentano 239/156, 282–285. 80. Hans Ehard to Adenauer, 1 October 1953, StBKAH 11/05; Adenauer to Seidel, 2 August 1956, StBKAH 11/06; and Adenauer to Blank, 13 August 1956, StBKAH III/22. 81. Strauß and Adenauer in the Bundesvorstand, 20 September 1956, Vorstand II, 1077– 1083, especially 1079 and 1081. Brentano memo for Jaenecke, 18 July 1956; Grewe conversation with Stevens (Canadian embassy), 20 July 1956, PA-AA MB Band 62. In general, see Per Fischer, “Die Reaktion der Bundesregierung auf die Nuklearisierung der westlichen Verteidigung (1952–1958),” Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 52 (1993): 105–132. 82. Globke, note for Adenauer, [28 June 1956], ACDP NL Globke I-070-001/1; Krone diary, 230 (27 September 1956); Bickerich, Strauß, 92–93; Strauß, Erinnerungen 300–303; Köhler, Adenauer, 935–937; Blank to Adenauer, 15 October 1956, and Adenauer to Blank, 19 October 1956, StBKAH III/22. 83. Richard Jaeger to Adenauer, 17 October 1956; Adenauer to Jaeger, 19 October 1956, StBKAH 11/06. Adenauer, conversation with American journalists, 18 October 1956, Teegespräche 1955–1958, 144–149, quote on 144; Strauß quoted in Large, Germans, 262. 84. Hans-Joachim von Merkatz, notes on cabinet meetings, 19 September and 5 October 1956, ACDP NL Merkatz I-148-041/1; Schwarz, Staatsmann, 299–300; Adenauer to Brentano, 4 December 1956, BA NL Brentano 239/156, 313–314. See also Adenauer’s discussion with Joseph Alsop, 13 August 1957, Teegespräche 1955–1958, 220–226, especially 222–224. 85. Strauß to Adenauer, 14 May 1957, StBKAH III/24; Cioc, Pax Atomica, 38–60. Adenauer, CBS television interview, 18 September 1957, ACDP NL Eckardt I-010-002/1; conversation with – 108 –

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86.

87.

88.

89.

90. 91.

92.

James Reston, 14 October 1957, and with Tyreman of the Economist, 13 November 1957, Teegespräche 1955–1958, 237–243, 244–249; Adenauer to Strauß, 16 November 1957, StBKAH 11/02. On the Rapacki Plan, see the discussion in the Bundesvorstand, 17 January 1958, Vorstand III, 90–101 and KAE III, 361–365; George Kennan, Russia, the Atom, and the West (London, 1958); see also KAE III, 284–292, with the terse but descriptive subtitle, “Gefährliche Ideen”; and memo, Hans von Herwarth (ambassador in London), 12 December 1957, with marginalia from Brentano, Globke, and Adenauer, PA-AA Referat 305 Band 78. Kiesinger in AK V, 27 November 1957 and 21 January 1958, ACDP VIII-006-001/1; Krone diary, 285 (21 January 1958); Adenauer to Heuss, 2 January 1958, and Heuss to Adenauer, 3 January 1958, Unserem Vaterland, 285–287; see also their conversation on 9 January 1958, Unter vier Augen, 259–261. On Emmett, see Thomas memorandum, 9 June 1958, suggesting that Emmett receive the highest award possible, and unsigned memorandum, 4 July 1958, reporting that Emmett would receive the Grand Cross, along with George Schuster, PA-AA Referat 305 Band 79. Kurt Birrenbach to Brentano, 21 December 1957. BA NL Brentano 239/166, 462–463. On Adenauer, Strauß, and FIG, see Schwarz, Staatsmann, 385–401; Köhler, Adenauer, 982–985; Bickerich, Strauß, 113–117; and Per Fischer, “Das Projekt einer trilateralen Nuklearkooperation: Französische-deutsche-italienische Geheimverhandlungen 1957/1958,” Historisches Jahrbuch 112 (1992): 143–156. Brentano in AK V, 10 December 1957, ACDP VIII-006-001/1; Gerstenmaier to Adenauer, 6 November 1957, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-104/2; Adenauer discussion with Joseph Alsop, 24 January 1958, ACDP NL Eckardt I-010-002/1. KAE III, 337–346; Krone diary, 277–278, 281–283 (16, 17, 18, and 23 December 1957; 6 14, 16 and 17 January 1958). Karl J. Brandstetter, Allianz des Mißtrauens: Sicherheitspolitik und deutsch-amerikanische Beziehungen in der Nachkriegszeit (Cologne, 1989), 139–156; Brentano and Strauß, interviews with Southwest German Radio, 21 December 1957, BA NL Brentano 239/164, 115– 117; Brentano to Adenauer, 22 December 1957; Adenauer to Brentano, 28 December 1957, StBKAH 11/02, 56–65. Brentano to Adenauer, 22 December 1957, StBKAH 11/02, 56–65.

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ADRIFT IN A WIDER WORLD, 1958–1961

In the spring of 1960, Konrad Adenauer embarked on an around-the-world tour, with stops in New York (including a historic meeting with Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion at the Waldorf Astoria), Washington, Princeton, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Tokyo. He returned humbled by the size and military might of the US, and determined to “think beyond the narrow confines of Europe.” The extent of American power was both impressive and terrifying; the security of being shielded by such staggering global might was mixed with the fear that a superpower with such vast commitments could lose sight of its allies’ concerns. Though it was unlikely that the Americans would ignore Europe completely, Europeans could not simply assume that they stood in the center of American strategy. Adenauer was convinced “that American power is in fact the only force that can preserve freedom in the world, and that we must do all in our power in order to bind America to Europe….”1 How to accomplish this, however, was an open question. Complicating this question was a new uncertainty about the German position in the West. In a radio address after his return, Adenauer reminded his listeners that despite friendly relations with their neighbors: “Germany remains in their eyes the land that is most responsible for the present terrible world situation.” This sense of German responsibility, however unconscious, could lead to an East-West agreement at German expense. Thus, it was vital “that we continue to earn the trust of our allies, and do all we can to promote and strengthen Atlantic and European solidarity.” The best way to preserve this solidarity was for Europeans to understand the larger context of world affairs, while at the same time convincing Americans “that what happens here in the heart of Europe, in Germany and Berlin, is important to them as well.”2 Adenauer’s world tour, coming at a key moment in German and world politics, was a personal watershed, a recognition that comfortable Eurocentric conceptions were retreating before global changes, and that the place of – 110 –

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German interests in that changed world was disturbingly unclear. As a man from the generation that still viewed Europe as the center of world affairs, the leader of a state at the heart of a divided Europe, Adenauer was unsettled by what he learned. Close relations with the US were supposed to guarantee West German stability and security. After more than ten years, however, that stability seemed as far off as ever. The world had gotten bigger, and the Americans appeared to be losing interest in German concerns. That formerly firm foundation now felt increasingly wobbly. Reminders of Germany’s terrible past, the defacing of synagogues and Jewish cemeteries in early 1960 and the sensational arrest of Adolf Eichmann in Buenos Aires the same year, only made the search for stability more difficult. The problem was to find the proper strategy to secure the Federal Republic’s place in Europe, as well as Europe’s place in the West. Two options presented themselves: either the Europeans could behave as loyal vassals and push for more seamless cooperation with the US, or they could seek a more independent European community with the long-term goal of cooperating with the Americans as equals. The ensuing debates highlighted the divisions within the Union over the shape of the West against the background of domestic and international political upheaval. Internationally, the superpowers confronted each other over Berlin. At home, political realignment challenged the Union’s electoral dominance. The years between 1958 and 1961 would therefore become especially difficult for the Union and its chancellor. Exercising the supremacy suggested by the 1957 landslide proved much more difficult than attaining it. Events in Bonn, Paris, Washington, and Berlin would each take their toll on the consensus within the Union, magnifying conflicts among its leadership, and heralding even greater conflicts to come.

1958: From Crisis to Crisis After the December 1957 NATO meeting, which had temporarily banished the specter of disengagement, Adenauer could have looked to the coming year with hopeful anticipation. For once, however, his legendary pessimism was justified, for 1958 proved to be one of the most trying years of his chancellorship. Instead of a period of consolidation, the year brought challenges to his leadership from both the Union and the opposition. By November, with a new Soviet ultimatum on Berlin, the security promised by Westbindung had faded, forcing a reconsideration of the Federal Republic’s international and domestic political orientation. A sign of the problems ahead came during the 23 January Bundestag debate on the NATO conference and on disengagement. Intended to allow the Union to use its absolute majority to shine before a national television and radio audience, the debate turned into a public embarrassment for both – 111 –

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the Union and Adenauer. As the debate stretched into the evening, two former cabinet members, Thomas Dehler (FDP) and Gustav Heinemann (SPD), both of whom had once been Adenauer’s political allies, mounted the speaker’s rostrum to attack the man and the party that they felt had led the nation astray. The “No Experiments” mantra that Adenauer rode to victory the previous September was now turned against its author, as both Dehler and Heinemann, citing especially the March 1952 Stalin note, charged that Adenauer’s refusal to consider alternative foreign policies amounted to a betrayal of Germany. Dehler, who exactly six years before had praised Adenauer’s willingness “to carry out these great foreign policy tasks, against the parliamentary opposition, if necessary” and had pledged “to travel this road with you,” now delivered a long, blistering attack on his former hero, charging that Adenauer had actively hindered reunification. Heinemann, whose political odyssey had led him from the CDU through the failed neutralist All-German People’s Party (GVP) to the SPD, scored especially heavily with his reasoned but passionate moralism, recalling their conflict from 1950. “Jesus Christ,” Heinemann declared, “died not against Karl Marx, but for us all.” As a dramatic final gesture, Heinemann called on Adenauer to recognize the bankruptcy of his “policy of strength” and to resign.3 Instead of reaffirming government policy, the debate ended with the government embarrassed and the opposition triumphant. Adenauer and the Union could take cold comfort from the promise of a rematch in March. The Union’s initial responses were worried and defensive. Heinrich Krone complained in his diary that by attacking Adenauer in this way, the opposition was building a “stab-in-the-back legend” similar to that which followed World War I. As one who had begun his political career in the 1920s, Krone gloomily feared a nationalist resurgence. With key state elections approaching, the Union rushed to reassert the connection between reunification and Westbindung while aggressively justifying past policies. Wilhelm Grewe of the Foreign Office held a press conference the day after the debate, detailing efforts toward reunification since 1949. Interior Minister Gerhard Schröder also gave a radio and television speech denying that the 1952 Stalin note was a real chance for reunification, and denouncing Dehler and Heinemann for “hateful” attacks that played into the hands of the Communist rulers of the GDR.4 Despite these public defenses, however, the debacle of 23 January exposed latent differences within the Union over the direction of governmental policy. Though acknowledging the subsequent hectic activity, Adenauer and others complained that none of the younger leaders of the Union rose to defend the chancellor during the debate.5 This was due in part to surprise, but it also indicated that even within the Union there were those who believed that the time had come for a more active policy toward the East. Westbindung had given the Federal Republic a secure place in the West, advocates of new initiatives argued; now the Federal Republic had to do its – 112 –

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part to reduce world tensions by contributing to détente. This argument had a logical consistency, and would become Willy Brandt’s justification of his Ostpolitik in the 1960s. The argument depended, however, on whether one accepted that the Federal Republic’s place in the West was secure. Adenauer did not, and his insecurity colored his attitude toward EastWest dialogue. Adenauer believed that Western unity had been deteriorating since 1956, the success of the NATO meeting notwithstanding. He was especially concerned that the Americans, shaped by a different culture, did not understand the Soviet threat. Eisenhower, “an honorable, simple, direct character,” did not appreciate that “Khruschev is a liar, a thief, a man who recognizes no moral limits,” a miscalculation that could have dire results. The Americans were too focused on the practical side of the security debates. Europeans, on the other hand, realized that even after détente, there would have to be a “spiritual struggle” with communism. As Adenauer concluded in a telling phrase, communism was diametrically opposed to the beliefs of “we Abendländler, we Europeans.” This struggle would “last at least ten to twenty years,” and would determine “if Western [abendländische] Christianity” or dictatorship would rule Europe.6 From his perspective, this was no time to pursue détente, and if the Americans did not understand that, it was because they did not share the cultural perspective of the Abendland. It would be easy to attribute Adenauer’s reservations about his allies to the paranoia of an old man. He was not alone, however, in his assessments in early 1958. Even a Foreign Office report tracing the positive development of postwar German-American relations concluded that the German image in the United States stood “on thin ice.” Although the American government and large segments of the public admired West Germany’s democracy and “economic miracle,” German developments were “more carefully and critically examined” than those in Britain and France. Ironically, considering Adenauer’s growing reservations about the Americans, the positive American image of the Federal Republic depended more on their admiration for Adenauer than on “their belief in the security or stability of the new German state.”7 Adenauer’s reservations about the Federal Republic’s place in the West exacerbated differences within the Union about the best way to respond to the calls for détente, especially when faced with the possibility of a superpower summit in 1958. Adenauer feared that the summit the Soviets wanted, focusing on disarmament and leaving the German question to the two German states, would disengage the Federal Republic from the West.8 Brentano shared Adenauer’s concerns, complaining of the “public hysteria” about détente, even within the Union. Brentano was “shocked” at the variety of dangerous ideas floating around, citing especially Rapacki-style plans proposed separately by both Gerstenmaier and Defense Minister Strauß. It seemed, Brentano complained to Adenauer, that “every adult – 113 –

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German has a plan,” mostly based on “unrealistic wishes or dangerous experiments.” If one criticized these plans, however, Brentano (who had suffered from unfavorable comparisons with the more energetic Strauß) concluded bitterly, one faced the charge that one lacked “imagination.”9 Adenauer urged his ministers to avoid airing their differences, even cabling Strauß on the eve of the latter’s trip to the US to “urgently request that you exercise extreme caution in discussing all political questions.” Strauß responded politely and promised to behave, no doubt as puzzled by receiving the message as future historians would be by reading it.10 As discussions continued on the possible summit, Adenauer’s opposition almost led to a public break with both the Americans and his own foreign minister. Though he continued to oppose the Rapacki Plan, Brentano decided that a summit offered more opportunity than danger. Even if the Soviets were unlikely to agree to reunification, he believed a Western proposal would put them at a diplomatic disadvantage. Confident that the Allies would oppose disengagement, he lobbied for a summit. Adenauer, however, was not so sure. Reunification was unlikely, he reasoned, and any interim agreements would solidify German division and grant new prestige to the Ulbricht regime. Comments from Americans such as Senator Mike Mansfield that questioned the old formula of reunification through free elections, and Pravda’s use of these comments “to give the impression that influential political circles in the US are beginning to approach the Soviet position,” further fueled Adenauer’s fears. Sensing that any discussion of Germany would include disengagement, he reversed course, urging that the summit concentrate solely on disarmament. This abandonment of the traditional linkage between disarmament and reunification embarrassed Brentano, and led Dulles to exclaim in exasperation that he was apparently more interested in reunification than Adenauer.11 Indeed, Adenauer was careful to avoid any discussion of reunification during this period. In secret discussions with Soviet Ambassador Andrei Smirnov and Vice Premier Anastas Mikoyan in the spring of 1958, he was prepared to talk about changes that would allow the people of East Germany to have greater freedom.12 He rejected, however, any plans that would create a reunified Germany separated from the West, because they “would not liberate the seventeen million Germans in the Zone, but rather would send the fifty-two million who now live in freedom into the same slavery.”13 Does this mean that Adenauer was uninterested in unification, as critics, from Dehler and Heinemann to the present have charged? Not necessarily, though Adenauer’s comments do indicate the central role that membership in the West played in his political conception. Adenauer saw the German question as a long-term issue. Continued ties to the West, however, which were both essential and fragile, would become endangered if the Americans lost interest. Public initiatives on reunification were, by this logic, unlikely to overcome the division of Germany but very likely to provoke an American – 114 –

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withdrawal from Europe. The Federal Republic could not risk disengagement from the West, because it was essentially a “poor land,” despite the “economic miracle,” having neither the financial nor the political capital of England and France.14 Thus, Adenauer’s alleged lack of imagination on the German question should be attributed not to excessive faith in the West, but rather to a dearth of it. Conversely, the willingness of Brentano, Strauß, and others to experiment reflected their belief that ties to the West were secure, making German initiatives possible—even desirable. They saw the Federal Republic’s place in the West as a springboard to more lasting security; Adenauer considered it a narrow ledge over the abyss of neutralization. Adenauer’s worries moved him to take refuge in reaffirming “No Experiments” and attacking his critics. He rejected pleas from colleagues to seek bipartisan consensus, calling such sentiments “politically unwise” because they “confuse[d] the fronts.”15 When the CDU won an absolute majority in the crucial state of North Rhine-Westphalia in July 1958, taking the steam out of the SPD-sponsored antinuclear movement, this approach appeared correct. It was therefore not surprising that Adenauer’s keynote address to the CDU national convention in Kiel that September, and the so-called “Kiel Manifesto” outlining the Union’s basic principles, concluded that freedom and security could “only be secured through determined continuation of the federal government’s successful foreign policy.”16 The reaffirmation of old verities offered a secure diversion from the growing differences of opinion within the West and the Union. Plans for a superpower summit were eventually shelved, rendering the preceding controversies moot. Through the summer of 1958, however, the West was in disarray, allowing no chance to relax. American attention was stretched by crises from Iraq and Lebanon to Quemoy and Matsu. Britain, under the pressure of budget difficulties, openly discussed withdrawing all or part of its forces from Germany. Perhaps worst of all, France, divided by the crisis in Algeria, teetered on the brink of chaos. Charles de Gaulle’s return from self-imposed internal exile added to the concern. Adenauer initially feared that de Gaulle’s return could mean a return to the anti-German policy of the 1944 Franco-Soviet treaty. De Gaulle’s subsequent proposal for a Franco-Anglo-American directorate in NATO, leaving the Federal Republic on the outside, added to the reservations. When the Americans rejected this proposal, Adenauer feared a French withdrawal from European cooperation, and European estrangement from the US.17 Adenauer’s immediate fears lifted after a meeting at de Gaulle’s home in Colombey in September, where de Gaulle reaffirmed his commitment both to the Franco-German relationship and to European cooperation. As would happen often over the next decade, however, even this positive development had its thorny side for the Union. Although de Gaulle reaffirmed French commitments to the EEC, he opposed further negotiations with the British about a European free trade zone. The two-year-long negotiations, under the – 115 –

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chairmanship of Reginald Maudling, had stalled, rekindling the debate over European integration that had flared between Adenauer and Erhard in the spring of 1956. Erhard and the Economics Ministry harshly criticized French policy, while the Foreign Office, and Adenauer himself, wanted to avoid conflict with de Gaulle. Adenauer went so far as to forbid Erhard to travel to Paris for the last round of negotiations in November, virtually guaranteeing their collapse, to avoid alienating de Gaulle. At a subsequent meeting in Bad Kreuznach, Adenauer and de Gaulle essentially agreed to kill the free trade zone. As a result, Britain and its partners would develop the seven-member European Free Trade Association (EFTA), separate from the EEC, which would leave Western Europe “at sixes and sevens” for the next decade.18 Adenauer defended this policy by emphasizing the historical importance of European integration and Franco-German reconciliation. Criticizing unnamed but easily identifiable “economists” for their lack of political understanding, Adenauer declared that he and de Gaulle “[did] not want to sacrifice the European market of the Six for the sake of some free trade area, because this core that we have created, this community of the Six, must under all circumstances be preserved.”19 For Adenauer, the EEC remained primarily a political/ideological entity rather than an economic construction, which was designed to enhance the Continental role in world affairs. Any dilution of this Continental character, whatever the economic advantages, was to be rejected. This defense of “Little Europe” cheered “Europeanists” in the Union, but grated on the ears of Erhard, his fellow “economists,” and their supporters in German industry. The Europeanists won this round, but the conflict was far from resolved, either for Europe or for the Union. The significance of these European developments and their impact on the Union was initially overshadowed as the world’s attention turned to the Soviet Berlin ultimatum in November 1958. The weeks to come, however, would reveal how much the renewed Berlin crisis, by emphasizing the Federal Republic’s dependence on its allies, highlighted divisions within the Union about the shape of the West. From Adenauer’s perspective, the Berlin ultimatum had both positive and negative consequences. The positive result was a temporary end to talk of détente. Bipartisanship took on a different, and for Adenauer more congenial, tone, emphasizing united opposition to Soviet demands. Adenauer signaled the new strategy with a stern speech in Berlin. Declaring that serious negotiations could begin only after the Soviets withdrew their ultimatum, he received strong domestic acclaim. When the December 1958 West Berlin elections resulted in an SPD victory, Adenauer congratulated the new mayor, Willy Brandt, on the convincing win “against the SED and communism.” Brandt also accompanied the German delegation to the Paris foreign minister conference that December, a gesture of anticommunist unity.20 On the negative side, however, was the possibility that the crisis would lead to more pressure for new initiatives on the Berlin and German questions. – 116 –

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John Foster Dulles, for example, surprised Adenauer with a comment in a November 1958 press conference that the Allies might accept GDR control of access to Berlin by treating East German border guards as “agents” of the Soviets. Dulles would later retreat, calling these speculations merely hypothetical, but they reawakened Adenauer’s fears of a change in American policy on Germany. When the Soviets followed their ultimatum with a note on 10 January 1959 including a draft peace treaty for Germany, the debate over alternatives intensified. Brentano rejected Soviet demands for recognition of two German states but nevertheless wanted to offer a counter-proposal. He was convinced that German and Allied interests were “largely identical,” and that the West could develop a plan for reunification, even including disengagement, to defuse the crisis. Members of AK V tended to agree with him.21 Adenauer, however, was much less certain about the consonance between West German and Allied interests. When he looked around, he saw dangers on all sides. Eisenhower was growing weaker, John Foster Dulles was ill with the cancer that would eventually take his life, and the future of American policy appeared unclear. Through January 1959, Adenauer called for greater Western unity, but was increasingly worried about the “crumbling” support for German positions. His confidante Krone expressed similar concerns in his diary, noting that the “West wants to be left alone.… We will not survive this struggle without losses.” The Americans, Adenauer complained, were too willing to make concessions to avoid war. They did not realize that the Soviets were not interested in a war either; they simply wanted to profit from Western willingness to negotiate away its legal position in Berlin and Germany.22 Adenauer’s anxiety about the possible weakening of Western positions made him reluctant to propose any alternatives to the existing four-power arrangement on Berlin. When Adenauer and Dulles met for the last time in early February 1959, their words of mutual admiration and respect were clouded by a sense of impending doom. Dulles offered reassuring rhetoric and a five-point American plan for defending Allied rights to Berlin, but Adenauer came away from the talks depressed, noting “we cannot count on him much longer.” Reports of “appalling” statements from American politicians on alternatives to free elections on the way to reunification and their prominent citation in the Soviet press made things worse. Even the widely viewed broadcast of “Judgment at Nuremberg” on the popular American television program Playhouse 90 was a cause for concern. The German embassy complained that the play made no distinction between “Nazis and Germans,” and worried that it would make the Americans less interested in defending Germans against Soviet demands.23 Added to these growing concerns about American policy was the news in February that British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan planned to travel to Moscow for direct talks with Khruschev. Rumors spread that the British – 117 –

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planned to recognize the East German regime officially. Adenauer saw this impromptu visit as an insult, and remained upset at British perfidy for months thereafter. He even became suspicious of his foreign minister, complaining that Brentano, whose reports were full of praise for Dulles’s successor Christian Herter and British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, was too willing to compromise with the “Anglo-Saxons.” With the British and Americans appearing ever more unreliable in their search for détente, Adenauer increasingly leaned on de Gaulle, who also opposed any changes in the Western position on Berlin.24 Adenauer’s turn toward France, coming so soon after the collapse of the free trade zone initiative, alarmed the more Atlanticist members of the Union. Even before de Gaulle had returned to power, influential members of the Union beyond Erhard had warned against relying on France and advocated closer relations with Britain. A key figure in the internal Union debate was Bundestag deputy and prominent businessman Kurt Birrenbach, who lobbied through the spring of 1959 against an “exclusive and ostentatious” reliance on France. Arguing that Britain was America’s closest ally in Europe, Birrenbach concluded it would be foolish to alienate the British, despite concerns about their policies on Berlin. Many Union leaders, including Brentano, Schröder, and Erhard, agreed on the need for repairing relations with London, Birrenbach reported, but not Adenauer or Defense Minister Strauß. In his brief talks with Adenauer, Birrenbach especially ran up against a “wall … that could not be overcome.”25 Thus, the year of crises ended even less auspiciously than it had begun. The Berlin ultimatum made Western unity a necessity, but conflicting Western responses made that unity more difficult than ever to achieve, deepening preexisting divisions within the Union, with serious domestic repercussions.

Party Politics and International Relations: The Presidential Crisis of 1959 A proper understanding of this unsettled situation can help clarify one of the strangest episodes in postwar German politics, the presidential crisis of 1959.26 In April 1959, Adenauer surprised observers at home and abroad by announcing his intention to retire as chancellor and become the Union’s candidate for the ceremonial position of federal president. He accepted the candidacy in the name of preserving political continuity, and hoped that the Union would elect a successor of his choosing as chancellor. Within the Union, however, a vocal group that came to be known as the “Erhard Brigade” agitated for Erhard. Citing his high name recognition and broad popularity as father of the “economic miracle,” the “Brigade” argued that only Erhard had the stature to lead the party in future campaigns. Adenauer had deep reservations about Erhard, however, and when it became clear that – 118 –

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he could not force a different choice, he withdrew his presidential candidacy, remaining chancellor despite intense controversy. Erhard, publicly humiliated, threatened to resign but did not, pacified by the knowledge that he would eventually succeed Adenauer with the support of a growing majority within the Union who were unhappy with the chancellor’s behavior. Adenauer’s flirtation with the presidency has been the subject of much discussion in the German historical literature, though it is virtually unknown outside of the Federal Republic. Contemporaries thought that the crisis exposed the immaturity of West German political institutions, and criticized Adenauer for casually manipulating the highest offices in the land.27 Adenauer’s recent biographers, however, have developed less dramatic interpretations. Hans-Peter Schwarz dismisses the affair as the “Presidency Farce” [Präsidentschaftsposse], marked by poor planning and impulsive decisions, and minimizes any damage inflicted on German democracy. Henning Köhler also rejects dramatic criticism, but argues that the presidency crisis was nonetheless important. By highlighting differences within the Union, the crisis indicated that Adenauer’s power had begun to wane.28 Though Schwarz does have a point in downplaying any long-term damage to German democracy, Köhler’s more critical interpretation offers an important corrective. Within the context of this study, the presidential crisis is a key example of the complete penetration of West German politics by international considerations, and of the political difficulties that flowed from Adenauer’s continued ambivalence toward his Western allies. To understand the relationship between domestic and international politics in this affair, one must understand the implications of the presidential election. Theodor Heuss, originally chair of the FDP, had become federal president as a result of the original CDU/CSU-FDP coalition in 1949. Even after the FDP left the government in 1956, Heuss had remained a supporter of Adenauer and of Westbindung. With his urbane sense of humor, intellectual depth, and strong moral voice, he had acquitted himself admirably as ceremonial head of state, and as he approached the end of his second and final five-year term, the consensus was that he should be succeeded only by a leader of equal stature.29 The SPD recognized this when they nominated Carlo Schmid as their candidate in February 1959. Schmid also possessed an impressive academic pedigree, had been one of the architects of the Basic Law, and, with the jovial reputation that earned him the nickname “Monte Carlo,” embodied the same combination of intellectualism and joie de vivre as Heuss. On these grounds, Schmid even received initial support from within the Union. As an SPD foreign policy spokesman, however, Schmid had also been a vocal critic of Westbindung and an advocate of West German withdrawal from NATO. Thus, his candidacy put the Union in a political bind. As much as they respected Schmid, Union leaders feared that his election would send the wrong message about the future of West German politics, and they were determined to find a candidate of their own. – 119 –

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Since no single party held the majority in the Federal Assembly, which elects the president, the candidate would need broad appeal.30 After failing to convince Heuss to support a constitutional amendment allowing him to run again, the Union faced the unpleasant fact that it had only two potential candidates with the stature to compete against Carlo Schmid: Adenauer and Erhard. In late February, Interior Minister Gerhard Schröder, himself hoping to succeed Adenauer and anxious to see Erhard “kicked upstairs,” nominated the economics minister. Erhard, on vacation in Austria, reluctantly accepted the nomination over the telephone. The Fraktion, however, protested. They worried that losing Erhard, their “Electoral Locomotive,” would leave only Adenauer, who would be 85 years old in 1961, to lead them in the next election. They suggested that Adenauer gracefully move down the street to the president’s residence, the Villa Hammerschmidt, where he could end his public life as a symbol of continuity while the Union learned to live without him.31 Adenauer was not interested in being president, and was more interested in removing Erhard from active politics. Despite Adenauer’s hard lobbying, however, and encouraged by the “Brigade” to believe that he should be the next chancellor, Erhard withdrew his presidential candidacy on 4 March.32 With the election scheduled for 1 July, time was running out to find a replacement, and Adenauer agreed to reconsider. On 4 April, Heinrich Krone, visiting Berlin, received a breathless phone call from Chief of Staff Hans Globke, announcing that “He was also a possible candidate….” When Krone asked whom Globke meant, the usually staid civil servant could only repeat “Him … him.” Adenauer had changed his mind. Reflecting on the powers available to de Gaulle (who had recently become president in the Fifth Republic), Adenauer ordered memoranda on the constitutional powers of the federal presidency. His subsequent remarks that these powers were “greater than people realized” led to a brief conflict with an insulted Heuss, but also reflected his political calculation. Concluding that the presidency would help him maintain control of policy, Adenauer accepted the nomination on 7 April.33 The next day, Adenauer left for a four-week vacation “to study the Basic Law eagerly,” as Krone put it, touching off a wave of speculation. Opinion within the Union was at first divided, with some arguing that this was no time for Adenauer to change jobs, while others saw it as the best way to guarantee political continuity. Nevertheless, all shared a sense of relief that a solution had been found.34 All, that is, except the candidate himself. In response to both optimists and pessimists, he emphasized the lack of options. He had decided to run, he wrote, because there was no other acceptable candidate.35 Unfortunately for Adenauer, and for the Union, however, he also saw no acceptable alternative to himself as chancellor, and this led to the crisis that would shake his credibility and the unity of his party. Despite their successful collaboration, Adenauer and Erhard’s differences had deep roots. Part of – 120 –

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this was a difference in style. Adenauer, the distant and efficient administrator whose governing style was more “Prussian” than he would ever admit, criticized Erhard’s “professorial” work habits. Erhard preferred long discussions over terse memoranda, cared little for administrative details, and generally avoided confrontation, earning him the nickname “The Rubber Lion.” Adenauer and his closest associates felt that Erhard “understood nothing about politics,” and should not become chancellor.36 Overshadowing these stylistic differences was their conflict over the future of Europe. Erhard had never hidden his reservations about de Gaulle. On the eve of de Gaulle’s return, Erhard’s “crude and unfriendly” warning that France could not expect continued economic support if de Gaulle made radical changes in French policy had raised Adenauer’s ire. In late March 1959, with memories of Macmillan’s surprise visit to Moscow still fresh, Erhard had repeated his preference for a free trade zone that included Britain and his skepticism about a “Europeanism” that contradicted economic realities. Adenauer responded bitterly: “At precisely this moment, in which Great Britain … has seriously harmed us and we are dependent on France’s help, it is unacceptable that you could give such a speech, which insults France and endorses Great Britain’s policy.”37 Erhard tried to counter the charge that he was insufficiently “European” by arguing that his broader vision aimed toward a more prosperous and optimistic European future. In a late April 1959 speech before the Council of Europe, he outlined a vision of European cooperation beyond the Six.38 Nevertheless, many in the Union condemned Erhard’s Atlanticism. Globke, for example, charged that Erhard “would destroy Franco-German reconciliation and … the European organizations, replacing them with a free trade zone that will perhaps bring us economic advantages but will dissolve Europe politically.” Adenauer also worried that Erhard would not be able to stand up to possible British and American demands for concessions on Berlin. These weaknesses made Erhard unacceptable as chancellor.39 In his search for an alternative, Adenauer suggested Finance Minister Franz Etzel, who had close ties to German industry and had served in the High Authority of the ECSC. Etzel’s lack of a strong political base and his relative anonymity among the general public, however, made him an unacceptable candidate.40 As the debate over Adenauer’s successor intensified, it fell to Fraktion Chair Krone to find a solution. Despite his own reservations about Erhard, Krone recognized Erhard’s broad popularity within the Union and among the electorate, and was prepared to support him to avoid a messy political fight. He urged Adenauer to stand by his decision to run for president.41 Adenauer, however, was wavering. Two pieces of news finally sealed his decision. On 24 May, Brentano reported on the Geneva foreign minister discussions, which were going badly. On 25 May came the news of John Foster Dulles’s death. Adenauer traveled to Washington for the funeral (ironically enough, on 27 May, the deadline for Khruschev’s original six-month – 121 –

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ultimatum on Berlin). By his return on 30 May, he had made up his mind. In letters on 4 June to Krone and CSU Landesgruppe leader Hermann Höcherl, he renounced his candidacy, informing the Fraktion on 5 June. Despite considerable upheaval, the Union was able to choose a compromise presidential candidate, the colorless Minister of Agriculture Heinrich Lübke, who was elected on the second ballot (thanks to support from smaller conservative parties) on 1 July. Adenauer’s leadership within the Union, however, received a serious blow.42 Lübke’s election did not end the conflict between Adenauer and Erhard. Stung by criticism of his high-handed turnabout, Adenauer went on the offensive. He attacked the Economics Ministry’s handling of European policy, claiming that Erhard and his deputy, Alfred Müller-Armack, were responsible for declining German influence in European institutions, which Erhard vigorously denied. Adenauer’s subsequent comments to Flora Lewis of the New York Times that Erhard was a good economics minister, but did not have the political skills to be chancellor led to a new round of recriminations, forcing Adenauer to write an apologetic letter to Erhard, which Krone read to the Fraktion, to calm things down again.43 In his memoirs, Adenauer would write of his decision to remain chancellor: “I reached the conclusion that it would be better to deal with some embarrassment now than to recognize my mistake later.”44 His laconic presentation, not surprisingly, aims at minimizing the entire affair. Such an obviously self-serving interpretation, however, obscures a larger point. Whether Adenauer was wrong to accept the candidacy in the first place or wrong to change his mind is academic. More significant is the degree to which the crisis was the product of political insecurity from beginning to end, reflecting continuing concerns within the Union about its own future and the future shape of the West. Insecurity about the future of the Union led the party to push Adenauer to run for president in the first place; insecurity about how his successor would manage German affairs led Adenauer to stay in office. Most interesting of all is that Adenauer, who had built his career on his sense of the politically possible, failed to anticipate just how harmful his actions could be to his image and his party. His insecurity about the Federal Republic’s place in the West proved stronger than his pragmatism, which indicates how strong that insecurity was. The Union as well, which had ridden to success on Erhard’s and Adenauer’s popularity, faced a future of further division. The Fraktion’s defense of Erhard indicated that Adenauer’s control was weakening, but the entire crisis offered a sobering reminder that the party was still distressingly dependent on the whims of an increasingly willful octogenarian. From this point, the succession question would hover over all discussions within the Union, increasing the tension not only between Adenauer and Erhard, but also among other pretenders to the throne, especially Interior Minister Schröder, Defense Minister Strauß, and Bundestag President Gerstenmaier.45 – 122 –

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Erhard’s European policies, which had earned him support in Washington and London but led many in France to believe he was “no friend of European integration,” ensured that the succession issue would coincide with the continuing conflict over the shape of the West.46 The Union was entering a difficult period in which it would have to sort out its competing conceptions in a world that was becoming more complicated with each passing day.

The Road to Rambouillet: Berlin, Europe, and the Atlantic Alliance The summer and autumn of 1959 provided ample reminders of just how complex the world was becoming. At the marathon Geneva conference of foreign ministers, American Secretary of State Christian Herter spoke of new initiatives on the German question, including possible neutral zones in Central Europe. To make matters worse from Bonn’s perspective, Nikita Khruschev arrived in the US to great fanfare in September 1959, touring the country and meeting privately with Eisenhower. The resulting “Spirit of Camp David,” including plans for a four-power summit in Paris in May 1960 and an invitation for Eisenhower to visit the USSR, raised international hopes while fanning German fears of détente. Krone worried that “the danger of illusions is rising,” and Adenauer complained bitterly, “I don’t understand anything anymore” about American policy. Eisenhower, abetted by the British, appeared too willing to compromise, to end his presidency as a man of peace, and only de Gaulle’s France rejected compromises.47 Eisenhower sought to dispel these fears with a lightning visit to London, Paris, and Bonn in late August, before Khruschev arrived in Washington. Greeted by enthusiastic crowds, Eisenhower assured Adenauer that the US remained committed to a strong NATO and to partnership with an integrated Europe. Adenauer was willing to believe that Eisenhower was sincere, but remained concerned that circles in Washington and London were more interested in détente than in standing by their commitments.48 Without Dulles, the Eisenhower administration appeared to have lost direction. When journalist Gaston Coblentz asked whether the main force behind American policy was Eisenhower or Herter, Adenauer responded sarcastically: “That is hard to say. You could have added ‘or Milton Eisenhower’ … but that is off the record!”49 A December meeting of Western heads of government in Paris, where Eisenhower and Macmillan advocated a compromise on Berlin, only deepened these fears. By New Year’s Day 1960, Krone summed up German fears in a few short sentences: “Moscow is on the march [and] the West is on the defensive. Dulles is dead. Coexistence is the watchword.… Poor Germany.”50 Under the influence of these events, Adenauer vented his concerns in a “lengthy, animated, and sometimes heated discussion” at the German – 123 –

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embassy in Washington during a visit in March 1960. To the consternation of his dinner companions—including Foreign Minister Brentano, Allen Dulles, Lucius Clay, and John McCloy—Adenauer contrasted Soviet expansionism with Western passivity and gave his pessimism free rein. When McCloy argued that the EEC offered opportunities to extend Western strength and influence, Adenauer, repeating comments he had made earlier about Erhard and other “economists,” retorted that he was “surprised at the vehemence and near unanimity with which German industry seemed to oppose [the EEC’s] development while favoring a larger free trade area.” Adenauer’s pessimistic outburst so embarrassed Brentano that afterward he hurried to Martin Hillenbrand of the State Department, who recorded the meeting, to offer a clarification and look for sympathy. Now the Americans could understand “what a problem he had,” Brentano said. Adenauer was stubborn “like an old goat,” and Brentano thanked his American counterparts for “refrain[ing] from making public statements of a polemical nature despite a certain amount of provocation.”51 As the Paris summit approached, however, Eisenhower and Macmillan’s advocacy of an interim solution for Berlin in preparatory discussions worried even Brentano.52 Adenauer tried to stiffen American resolve in interviews by claiming that a compromise with the Soviets on Berlin “would be a serious blow to German trust in the West” and to “the image of the United States,” but could not hide his fear that the summit would turn out badly.53 Ultimately, help arrived from an unexpected quarter. Protesting American U-2 spy flights over the USSR, Khruschev abruptly left Paris shortly after he had arrived. As a disappointed Harold Macmillan scrambled to salvage the talks, which he saw as the product of his conciliatory diplomacy, Adenauer could barely contain his relief. “Wir haben nochmals fies Jlück jehabt [We were damn lucky]!” he whispered in Kölsch dialect to Felix von Eckardt when informed of Khruschev’s departure.54 Adenauer used the collapse of the summit to renew his calls for Western unity and the need to be “on guard like never before.” At the same time, he sought reassurance within the West. Criticizing Anglo-American “flaccidity” (Schlappheit) in Paris, Adenauer reported that the “depressing” experience confirmed his “intention to strengthen the bonds with France even further.”55 De Gaulle had requested German support for his plans to reorganize both the EEC and NATO. Adenauer’s main advisers, especially his NATO and French ambassador, Herbert Blankenhorn, had been skeptical of the general’s vision, but in the immediate aftermath of the summit, they were at least willing to listen. Despite warnings from French friends not to trust de Gaulle, Adenauer accepted an invitation to meet in Rambouillet at the end of July.56 As often happened when the two old gentlemen were alone together, Adenauer and de Gaulle quickly reached agreement during their two-day meeting at Rambouillet. Criticizing American dominance of NATO, de Gaulle – 124 –

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also denounced European cooperation that disregarded national sovereignty in the search for an illusory supranationality. De Gaulle suggested that France and Germany work together to create an independent Europe of nation-states, cooperating with but not subservient to the US. He did not want Europe to cut all ties to the Americans—indeed, he argued that the US would be interested in a strong and independent Europe—but he made no secret of his desire for radical changes in the structure of the West. If the other European states were not prepared to go along, the French and Germans should take the first steps together, their partnership forming the core of a new Europe. To the dismay of many in his entourage, Adenauer endorsed de Gaulle’s suggestions, and de Gaulle instructed Foreign Minister Couve de Murville to formulate concrete proposals.57 Adenauer’s support for de Gaulle’s ideas sprang from both his vision of Europe and the fallout from the Paris summit, and should not have surprised anyone. The idea of European states cooperating on an international level until supranational structures were possible had, after all, been the theme of his 1956 speech to the Grandes Conferences Catholiques. The nations of Europe, he had implied then and said directly now, were “not yet ready” for complete supranationality. Until they were ready, deeper international cooperation would strengthen Europe’s role in the West. The urgency of forming a Continental bloc was increased by Adenauer’s suspicion of Anglo-American behavior. His willingness to depart from “pure” Christian Democratic supranationalism highlights his flexibility in pursuit of greater European autonomy to balance Anglo-Saxon unpredictability in the West. Upon Adenauer’s return to Bonn, however, differences over Rambouillet emerged. Though all greeted harmonious relations with France, many were disturbed at the price the chancellor had apparently paid. Brentano, strongly committed to both NATO and supranationalism, warned against an “abandonment of our European policy,” and was joined by a mixed bag of Union worthies spanning internal divisions, including Krone, Strauß, Gerstenmaier, Schröder, and, of course, Erhard. The key issue uniting the opposition to Rambouillet was the future of NATO. Krone worried that de Gaulle wanted to reduce it to a mere coalition, allowing the French to pursue national nuclear ambitions, which had begun with their successful atomic test in February 1960. “Here is where our paths divide,” he wrote, citing German needs for a more cohesive alliance during the Berlin crisis. He also noted with prescient understatement that a German policy that tried to balance a strong NATO with close relations with France “has no easy assignment before it.”58 This internal opposition and a subsequent positive meeting with Macmillan in Bonn encouraged Adenauer to back away from Rambouillet. By late August, he still advocated reforming both NATO and the EEC, but, citing the need for further discussions with the Americans, planned no immediate changes. At a September meeting with NATO Supreme Commander – 125 –

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Lauris Norstad at NATO Secretary-General Dirk Stikker’s Italian villa on Lake Como, the Americans rekindled Adenauer’s Atlanticism with plans for NATO reform. In early October, Eisenhower expressed willingness to discuss nuclear cooperation, but also warned that only military integration would guarantee an American presence in Europe. Influenced by these developments, Adenauer “tilted” back toward the Atlantic.59 Final proof of Adenauer’s retreat from Rambouillet came in his talks with French Prime Minister Michel Debré on 7 October 1960. After trying to convince Debré that the French should accept Norstad’s proposals, Adenauer dismissed de Gaulle’s fear of integration. Debré, unsurprisingly, did not agree. To punctuate their disagreement, the discussion was interrupted by telegrams reporting on a speech by de Gaulle in Grenoble reaffirming his opposition to NATO military and political integration. Irritated that he had not been warned about the speech, Adenauer sternly informed Debré that Germany “could not follow France on this path.” Debré tried to assuage Adenauer, but it was clear that the idea of Franco-German cooperation presented at Rambouillet was, for the moment, dead.60 Years later, Adenauer wrote in his memoirs with typical dryness: “It unfortunately became apparent in the weeks after our meeting in Rambouillet that we did not completely agree on several points, and apparent misunderstandings resulted.”61 This brief assessment hides as much as it reveals. The flirtation with Gaullist institutional reforms in the summer of 1960 was not the product of misunderstandings. At the time that Adenauer went to Rambouillet, the Paris summit had shaken his faith in his allies. The purpose of Westbindung was to create a framework guaranteeing not only German security but also stability regarding the German question and, at a minimum, a defense of existing arrangements. Ideally, it would result in moves toward reunification on the West German model. The US and Great Britain, considering their commitments outside Europe, had reinterpreted the bargain, and were prepared to make concessions on Germany to avoid a larger global conflict. The French, on the other hand, with an agenda of their own, appeared to support the old vision of the Western bargain, earning Adenauer’s gratitude and trust. The trip to Rambouillet was part of a search for reassurance and renewed commitments within the West. De Gaulle appeared to offer what Adenauer wanted—a self-assured and unified Europe, strong enough to oppose Anglo-Saxon experiments. Even when their discussions revealed that de Gaulle’s vision included institutional reforms that threatened the old bargain in their own way, Adenauer offered at least tacit support. In the absence of reassurances from Washington and London, Continental solidarity compared favorably against an uncertain role in a larger Atlantic community. The reactions to Rambouillet within the Union and among the Allies indicated, however, that the Gaullist option was neither politically nor practically defensible in 1960. Politically, Union advocates of European integration – 126 –

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and NATO were not willing to abandon them, so there was no support for such a radical departure. Practically, with the Berlin situation still unsettled, this was no time for experimentation in alliance politics. The US offered further inducement by suggesting NATO reforms. Whether American policy would change after the coming US presidential elections was unclear, but the lack of alternatives meant Adenauer could not afford to ignore American offers. Though a false start, the Rambouillet conference was nevertheless significant. Adenauer’s anxieties about the German role in the West and the relationship between European concerns and American global interests remained very real. Although the circumstances of autumn 1960 made Atlanticism preferable, there was no guarantee that changing circumstances would not encourage further reconsideration. The upcoming American presidential elections, which raised new questions, would therefore present another test for Adenauer and the Union.

New Partner, New Partnership? JFK and German-American Relations With the Federal Republic back in the Atlantic fold, at least conditionally, attention in Bonn turned to the American presidential elections. Change was the main theme in the campaign, as two young politicians, Richard M. Nixon and John F. Kennedy, vied for the right to succeed Eisenhower, the old Cold Warrior. Kennedy had especially emphasized the need for change, which was not completely unwelcome in Bonn, but there was concern about what exactly would change. Frustration at alleged American passivity made the prospect of a more vigorous president attractive. At the same time, however, Adenauer and the Union did not want change to be interpreted as a retreat from traditional positions on German and European security. Adenauer made no secret of his preference. He held Vice President Nixon in high regard, and felt that he would make enough changes to improve on Eisenhower’s late record while not losing sight of the things that should remain the same.62 This was not a universally endorsed choice, however. Horst Osterheld, head of the Foreign Affairs staff in the Chancellery from 1960 to 1969, suggests that Adenauer’s preference for Nixon was more the result of choosing “the devil you know,” a desire for the security of familiar faces. This insight is reinforced by Adenauer’s wistful comment to an American reporter that his ideal candidate would be Harry Truman. Most Germans had doubts about both candidates, contributing to the insecurity surrounding the election.63 Kennedy himself was something of an unknown quantity in Bonn, though his associations made him suspect. He had drawn attention to himself in 1957 with an article in the journal Foreign Affairs, declaring that the – 127 –

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Adenauer era was at an end and the US should prepare to deal with his successor. He had also been linked to other controversial Senate Democrats such as Mike Mansfield, whose speeches advocating disengagement from Europe and German neutralization always aroused concern in Bonn. Adenauer was also upset by reports that Adlai Stevenson was one of Kennedy’s advisers, because of Stevenson’s calls for negotiations with the Soviets on Berlin. Conventional wisdom in Bonn believed that Nixon would win anyway, but as the election drew near, the lack of information about Kennedy’s intentions precipitated a scramble among government officials to develop a clearer picture.64 Contributing to uncertainty about the future were reports of a growing American coolness toward Germany. German consulates reported nervously about television appearances by William Shirer and others who warned against trusting the Germans. Many feared that the younger generation of US politicians, increasingly focused on other global crises, would not be as committed to Germany and Europe as the Eisenhower team had been. With the trial of Adolf Eichmann looming, reminding the world about the terrible crimes perpetrated by Germans, the German consul in New York, Georg Federer, feared that the Federal Republic “could be especially dependent on American public sympathy,” especially if the Soviets took dramatic steps in Berlin, and that sympathy was far from secure.65 After Kennedy’s election, initial assessments of the new president focused on the positive. Osterheld, who had impressed Adenauer in his job interview in the summer of 1960 by predicting that Kennedy would win, hastened to dispel fears of any fundamental change in policy. He emphasized Kennedy’s tenacity, calling him “a man who has a strong conception of the American mission in the world and who will fight bitterly for it.” Downplaying the Foreign Affairs article, Osterheld also argued that Kennedy would be especially interested in a close relationship with Adenauer as he learned the ropes in office. A character sketch from the Defense Ministry also emphasized Kennedy’s youth, vitality, and “ruthlessness,” claiming he would be less dependent on his advisers than Eisenhower. (This report, however, which Adenauer considered very incisive, also noted that Kennedy’s family life was “exemplary,” and that there were “no affairs in his past,” indicating the deficiencies of long-distance character analysis.)66 The comforting message of these reports, and of widely publicized speeches by new AK V Chair Ernst Majonica and Bundestag Deputy Kurt Birrenbach, was that Kennedy would stir the US from its late-Eisenhower-era torpor, but would not change anything that mattered to the Germans. There was nothing to fear.67 Or was there? The Defense Ministry also examined Kennedy’s speeches throughout both the campaign and his early career, and assembled a followup to their earlier character sketch that Defense Minister Strauß found “not very comforting.” The report asserted that Kennedy was more interested in negotiations with the Soviets than in defending Western legal positions. He – 128 –

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had little interest in a NATO nuclear force and even less sympathy for ideas of European self-reliance represented by de Gaulle. Kennedy’s interest in the Third World emerged from this report as a symbol not of a new dynamism but rather of an inclination to accept the European status quo and turn his attention elsewhere.68 These conflicting reports reflected the double nature of the Kennedy image. In both their appearance and their rhetoric, Kennedy and his young, eager staff symbolized vitality in contrast to the stodgy Eisenhower team, as both the hopeful and the fearful agreed. Divergences appeared over the question as to how far change would extend. Although Strauß and the authors of the second Defense Ministry report could be faulted for pessimism, they could at least claim to be following Kennedy’s calls for change to their logical conclusions. Optimists such as Birrenbach and Majonica, on the other hand, were in the difficult position of arguing that while Kennedy represented change and vitality, he was not planning to change policy—at least not as it affected the Germans. That the truth might lie somewhere between these two positions was little comfort to German officials, who were not sure how much change they could handle. The pessimists argued that change, wherever and whenever it might come, would bring disaster; the optimists, through their repeated emphasis on continuity, also implied that major changes in American policy could be dangerous. In light of the common perception that Kennedy and his team harbored no sentimental attachment to Germany, the growing consensus was that the Germans would have to make “sacrifices” or be left behind.69 The atmosphere of early 1961 was dominated by these concerns about the future of American policy. Despite the numerous long-distance evaluations, then as now there was no substitute for field research, which led to a transatlantic parade of German statesmen whose mission was to examine the new American leadership up close. Brentano visited New York and Washington in February to advocate the political reorganization of NATO. Brentano’s trip coincided with a German-American parliamentarian meeting in New York, and the Union sent Erik Blumenfeld and Baron Theodor zu Guttenberg to offer German perspectives on economic questions, Eichmann, and Berlin.70 Brentano returned relieved, telling the Fraktion and Adenauer that the Federal Republic had “every reason to trust the new American government,” and that “no one is thinking of avoiding, disputing, or in any way limiting” the American commitments to Berlin, Germany, or NATO. While admitting that Kennedy and his team intended to reevaluate American positions, he believed that German willingness to cooperate with the Americans would be rewarded.71 Brentano’s calm reassurance was not enough to satisfy everyone, however. Pessimists within the Union remained suspicious, and were not willing to keep their concerns private. A pro-Union newsletter, for example, saw parallels between Kennedy’s domestic policies and those of the SPD. – 129 –

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The same issue compiled a catalogue of unattributed quotations from European capitals harshly criticizing the Kennedy administration for ignoring European opinion in its pursuit of “naive anticolonialism.” They traced this American arrogance to a “lack of experience on the one hand, and on the other hand to a missionary peacemaking mania that will not let itself be disturbed by the annoying concerns of smaller nations.” This attitude in Washington was a sign that General de Gaulle might be right in his call for a unified European policy to balance the Americans, reported one anonymous source. Suspicion of Kennedy and his team culminated in a final rhetorical question: “Will [Kennedy’s] policies—which the liberal wing of the Democratic Party clearly wants—lead to a renaissance of Rooseveltian illusions?” These “primitive, one-sided, and downright nasty” criticisms led Brentano, who had been confidentially approached by American embassy staff, to write an enraged letter to Krone, asking whether it was necessary to attack Kennedy in such an “unusually unfriendly and tactless way,” and demanding that the Fraktion publicly distance the Union from these sentiments.72 Brentano’s attempt to keep critical voices in line could not, however, obscure the fact that the Union was not unanimous in its assessment of Kennedy. Pessimists had many reasons to worry. Secretary of State Dean Rusk raised eyebrows with a declaration that the United States did not consider itself bound by Eisenhower’s policies on Berlin. German Defense Ministry spokesmen then created a stir by claiming that the Americans planned to withdraw their troops from Europe. This reflection of Defense Minister Strauß’s mistrust of American defense experts also drew a rebuttal from Brentano. Certainly the Germans should protect their interests, he wrote to Adenauer, but if “we continue … to accuse the American government of harboring such plans and intentions,” the atmosphere would be poisoned before serious discussions on NATO reform could begin.73 In light of the continuing differences of opinion within both the party and the cabinet, it remained for the chancellor himself to visit Washington. Preparations for Adenauer’s visit had been underway since early March. The agenda was crowded, ranging from obvious issues such as Berlin and NATO to transfer payments, confiscated German property, and clemency for prisoners at Spandau prison. Originally set for two days, it expanded to seven, including a visit to Vice President Lyndon Johnson’s ranch in Texas. The New York consulate wanted Adenauer to address a Jewish group and confront the Eichmann controversy, but Adenauer and the Foreign Office rejected that plan, arguing that the trip should focus on meeting the Kennedy team and keep side trips to a minimum.74 Despite the worried voices around him, Adenauer adopted a tone of cautious optimism about the Americans. In an interview directly after the election, he praised Kennedy’s firm statements on Berlin, paying him the ultimate compliment of saying that they “reminded one of Dulles.” He repeated this optimism to de Gaulle, noting, however, that Kennedy’s entourage was full – 130 –

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of “prima donnas,” a criticism with which de Gaulle (who certainly knew prima donnas when he saw them), agreed.75 Internal preparations reflected this cautious confidence; the final communiqué for the meeting, drafted weeks before the visit, emphasized continuity in German-American relations and a common desire to reform NATO. The Americans also sent Dean Acheson to Bonn to encourage hopes for political consultation within NATO, including the possible sharing of nuclear weapons, leading Adenauer to tell Brentano, Strauß, and Krone the next day that Acheson had helped dispel his concerns.76 The visit itself, coming at the end of this long period of mixed emotions, was a success. Two days of talks in the White House were devoted to NATO and Berlin, and Adenauer came away convinced of Kennedy’s commitment to both. Then followed a luncheon in Congress and a trip to Johnson’s ranch in Texas, where Adenauer and his entourage were greeted by enthusiastic crowds and were guests of honor at a barbecue, each receiving an authentic ten-gallon hat. Kennedy sent Adenauer a telegram declaring that the reception in Texas showed that German-American relations were as strong as ever, which Adenauer had the Foreign Office circulate widely, contributing to the positive press reactions.77 Like Brentano, Adenauer returned from Washington relieved. In his report to the Fraktion, he admitted his earlier worries, but concluded that despite the palpable change in style, there would be no dangerous changes in political substance. He noted ironically that he was especially pleased to see that Kennedy in person did not look as he did in the picture often used by the German press, noting that “a president of the United States with a permanent wave … would have been a cause of great concern for me.” He also contradicted critical news reports in the SPD newspaper Vorwärts, adding with relish that in all the conversations in Washington “one name, which now is on the tip of my tongue, was not even mentioned.” (In this context Adenauer could only be referring to Willy Brandt, who had visited Washington in March.) Adenauer ended his remarks with truly high praise: “Both personally and politically, I have returned from only one other trip with the same warm feeling, and that was my first visit, in 1953.” Even after eight years, Adenauer sensed “a community of feeling, which one would have considered impossible back then,” and concluded: “Especially now, when every day can bring uncomfortable surprises,… I am convinced that this tie we have with the United States will improve our influence and our image in the rest of the world.”78 Krone summarized the Fraktion’s response: events had proven the doomsayers wrong; German-American relations were as strong as ever. He ended with a paean to the party leader: “These are impressive results, but what would they have been without the Chancellor? We are proud of you [and] we are happy that you have survived the rigors of the last weeks so well. We will fight with you in the coming campaign and we will win together.”79 – 131 –

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Krone’s final comment reveals the real concern lurking behind the worries about the Kennedy administration. In September 1961 the Union faced another Bundestag election, a campaign that would be waged under lingering doubts about the future of a party and government controlled by an 85-year-old. The Union had needed good news from Washington as it prepared for the campaign. Now that they had it, they had to make the most of it, in a dramatically altered domestic political context.

No Experiments, No Alternatives: The 1961 Elections and the Berlin Crisis The 1961 Bundestag elections, which would occur in the midst of the escalating Berlin crisis, presented a difficult strategic challenge for the Union. For years, Union speakers had berated the SPD for their opposition to Westbindung, calling on them to “give a very clear and unreserved endorsement of our foreign policy.”80 These challenges drew a clear line between government and opposition, neutralizing differences within the Union. For more than a decade, culminating in their “Germany Plan” of 1959, the SPD had actually helped Adenauer by advocating reunification through disengagement from the West. On 30 June 1960, Herbert Wehner, former Communist and the “grand old man” of the SPD, dramatically turned the tables. Responding in the Bundestag to Defense Minister Strauß, who had listed the specific requirements for a common foreign policy, Wehner delivered a point-by-point endorsement of NATO, the European community, and homeland defense, agreeing with all of the requirements, while suggesting that the SPD would offer new insights into them.81 Coming between the SPD’s historic Bad Godesberg conference in 1959 and its “Hanover appeal” of 1960, as the party adapted to the domestic and foreign policy consensus forged by the Union, Wehner’s speech was a key moment in the SPD’s painful transition from neutralist bogeyman to possible governing party. By defusing a political conflict that had polarized West German politics for over a decade, these decisions represented a surrender to the logic of Westbindung. At the same time, however, the SPD’s “conversion” also allowed it to go on the offensive, presenting itself as the party best able to carry Westbindung to the next level. In the person of leaders such as Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt, the SPD began to play a constructive role in defense debates, and to establish warmer ties to Americans, especially in the Kennedy administration. This growing affinity with the Americans, impossible in the days of Kurt Schumacher, helped the SPD acquire the image of the party of the future.82 Brandt’s travels to America and the positive press he received were a constant irritation to Union politicians. Though Adenauer would claim that “if the Social Democratic foreign policy had been pursued for these twelve years, Berlin would have been lost – 132 –

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long ago, and Herr Brandt would not be mayor,” this message no longer resonated with voters.83 What should have been seen as a triumph for the Union was therefore no cause for celebration. The SPD’s adaptation to Westbindung forced the Union to redefine itself. Full of suspicion about Social Democratic sincerity, the Union nonetheless had to combat a public perception, both at home and abroad, that the SPD had become politically acceptable. Old nightmare visions of the SPD driving Germany into a suffocating Soviet embrace were no longer politically viable. Although differences remained, it would be difficult to find any that were both clear enough and positive enough to translate into electoral success. The search for plainly defined differences with the opposition would reveal the conflicts within the Union that were motivated by competing conceptions of the West. The Union’s immediate response to Wehner’s speech can only be defined as shocked surprise, though Union leaders tried to minimize its significance. Krone, who just weeks earlier had discounted the notion of a common foreign policy, called the speech a “masterpiece,” and concluded: “The SPD is giving in.” Publicly, however, Union politicians tried to neutralize its effects by denying its sincerity. One of the first speakers to follow Wehner on 30 June, Baron Guttenberg, charged that it was nothing but a smoke screen to win votes. Adenauer admitted that Wehner had spoken well, but told the Bundesvorstand that he believed not a word, dismissing it as opportunism from a consummate politician, and citing polls noting that two-thirds of the SPD membership still opposed NATO membership. Upset about the positive press Wehner received compared to the scant attention paid to Guttenberg’s response, he sighed that there is more joy in heaven over one converted sinner than over 99 just men.84 At a rally in Dortmund, Adenauer tried to reassert the differences between the two parties. Attacking the SPD for twelve years of opposition in which they “did every stupid thing that could have been done,” he warned the sympathetic crowd not to be fooled by their conversion, comparing the change to a snake shedding its skin. As in nature, he declared, “one sees that the new skin has exactly the same spots and stripes as the old! And, which is also important, this new skin covers the same old animal!”85 A roar from the crowd greeted this joke. Humor alone would not be enough to deal with this new challenge, however. A study commissioned in preparation for the 1961 campaign noted that only 9 percent of the electorate believed that an SPD government would be completely bad for the country. As many as 42 percent of Union voters felt that the SPD would not make major policy changes if they came to power, while 14 percent expected major, but generally positive, changes.86 In response, Union strategy emphasized the stability and continuity of Union policy, “meet[ing] the SPD attack with references to its past” and “warning against an ‘adventure’ with a new ‘hero.’” This strategy also tried to minimize the age difference between the patriarchal Adenauer and the – 133 –

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much younger Brandt by departing from past practices. In contrast to previous posters that had pictured Adenauer alone, advertisements now showed Adenauer with Erhard and other Union leaders with the slogan: “Adenauer, Erhard, and the team.” An industrious member of Adenauer’s staff even calculated, based on the total ages of the existing cabinet and the SPD’s shadow cabinet, that Adenauer’s government was, on average, a year younger than the SPD alternative.87 Within the Union, however, there were signs of growing disunity. Bundestag President Gerstenmaier angered the party in late June when, in his speech marking the end of the legislative term, he called for negotiations on Berlin, including a discussion of Germany’s future status. Especially controversial was Gerstenmaier’s declaration that no fundamental differences existed between the major parties, making a common policy possible. Adenauer and Brentano both criticized Gerstenmaier for playing into the hands of the SPD. Such calls for negotiations would only encourage the Allies to explore disengagement, they claimed. In early July, Gerstenmaier’s comments led to a heated debate in the CDU Bundesvorstand. He and Adenauer engaged in a shouting match over whether Gerstenmaier had overstepped his constitutional rights, with Gerstenmaier threatening to call the Bundestag into session to debate whether he had done so. Unable to cow Gerstenmaier, Adenauer concluded the discussion with a plea for quiet that revealed the true source of his worry. “Believe me,” he concluded, “as soon as we awaken even the suspicion that we agree with the Social Democrats, we will be written off….”88 The dispute over Gerstenmaier’s speech revealed the internal tensions within the Union. The world was changing, and many were not content with a strategy emphasizing continuity. Facing a world in which Great Britain and the US flirted with accepting the status quo, it did not seem worthwhile to stick to the old rhetoric. Instead, Gerstenmaier sought new thinking on the German question, even if it meant including the SPD. He may not have found many friends in the Bundesvorstand, but his efforts did not go unnoticed. Conservative publishing magnate Axel Springer congratulated him, noting that the Germans could no longer rely on the Anglo-Saxons, who were more interested in access to Berlin than in reunification. Gerstenmaier thanked Springer, writing that he wanted to avoid “falling back on technically justifiable but unproductive formulas” in the German question.89 Thus, the Union’s confident rhetoric masked deeper concerns, especially over Berlin. “Naturally we do not know today what could happen,” Brentano wrote to Krone in March. “I am personally convinced that the Soviet Union will not let the coming months go by without taking new serious and dangerous steps.” Majonica believed that Khruschev would act before the end of 1961, probably in October, to coincide with the Communist Party conference. But, he admitted: “It could come sooner.”90 – 134 –

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As the summer wore on, April’s optimism faded. Kennedy’s June 1961 meeting with Khruschev in Vienna provided no breakthrough. That Kennedy visited Paris before and London after Vienna, without stopping in Bonn, while not surprising under the circumstances, nonetheless offered an uncomfortable reminder of the Federal Republic’s dependent status. German insecurity was fed further by hints from Washington that the Americans viewed Berlin as separate from the German question. Kennedy’s 25 July national television address explaining the “three essentials” of American Berlin policy disturbed many with its reference to “West Berlin” and the implication of a demilitarized zone in Central Europe. Brentano was encouraged by Kennedy’s rhetorical firmness in defending Western rights, but Adenauer feared American acceptance of German division. Adenauer’s fears appeared confirmed when William Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a Kennedy ally, said in a 30 July television interview: “I do not understand why the East Germans don’t close their border, because they have the right to …,” touching off a flurry of clarifications and retractions.91 Two weeks later, on 13 August 1961, the East Germans, facing an unstoppable “brain drain,” began to do what Fulbright had suggested, sealing off the border between East and West Berlin. The news from Berlin reached Bonn in the middle of the election campaign, and threatened to disrupt the Union’s entire strategy. It would be difficult, to say the least, to argue that staying the course was the best strategy when that course had run into a brick—or concrete—wall. Adenauer, however, tried to carry on, foregoing a trip to Berlin in favor of further electioneering, leading to the largest political blunder of his career. In a 14 August speech in Regensburg, Adenauer responded to SPD attacks by impugning the character and background of Willy Brandt, highlighting Brandt’s illegitimate birth with his famous reference to “Herr Brandt alias Frahm.” Adenauer tried to defend this statement by pointing out that it came as he responded to personal attacks on him in Brandt’s speech in Nuremberg a few days earlier.92 Nevertheless, the public responded to this slur on the mayor of the beleaguered city and to Adenauer’s failure to go to Berlin immediately with unanimous disgust. A later comment in Hagen that Soviet actions constituted “campaign help for the SPD” did little to improve the chancellor’s image. One Berlin newspaper noted a week later: “We have waited for seven days for news of Adenauer’s arrival in Berlin. In vain. But there has been other news of this man’s behavior, and it has made us blush with shame.” The general sense that neither the government nor the Allies had done enough to prevent or react to the wall led to a rapid decrease in support for the Union (from 49 to 35 percent) in favor of the SPD (which rose to 46 percent). In a famous headline, Axel Springer’s Bild summarized the public mood: “The East has acted. What is the West doing? The West is doing nothing! Kennedy is silent, Macmillan goes hunting, and Adenauer insults Willy Brandt!”93 – 135 –

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The history of the Berlin Wall crisis is well known, and will not be repeated here. It would take more than a year of tension before the Americans and Soviets adjusted to the new realities.94 What is interesting for our purposes is the effect of the crisis on the Union and its political identity. After Regensburg, the campaign came to a temporary halt as the government tried to respond to the changed circumstances. A group of parliamentarians traveled to Berlin, and the Bundestag assembled to express its opposition. Adenauer, however, did not go to Berlin. He returned to Bonn for a weak television conversation with Brentano, which was designed to calm public fears but instead convinced many that the government had no clue as to how to respond. Adenauer made things worse when he received the Soviet Ambassador and issued a communiqué stressing that the Germans would do nothing to disturb the peace. The government appeared as confused and unsure as it was.95 The Berlin crisis showed starkly the limits of Westbindung. Faced with the drastic but limited action of a wall along the sectoral border, the West could offer nothing but paper protests, lest it provoke a war that no one wanted. This opinion, also dominant in Bonn, influenced Adenauer’s decision on whether to go to Berlin, which has been debated by his former associates and by historians ever since. Some say Adenauer feared provoking an uprising, such as in 1953, and more pointless suffering. Others see it as another sign of Adenauer’s lack of concern for either Berlin or reunification. Horst Osterheld makes the most convincing argument—that Adenauer, usually so politically astute, miscalculated. Recognizing that he could proffer no tangible aid to Berlin, he chose to wait, thinking that he could weather the political storm.96 The Allies, however, offered no help. Recent scholarship suggests that this was primarily because Britain and the US, over French objections, preferred to see Berlin stabilized and wanted to force even further concessions out of the West Germans.97 Kennedy tried to counter charges of inactivity by sending Vice President Johnson and General Lucius Clay to Bonn and Berlin, but not to help Adenauer. Chancellery staff, hoping to rescue something from a rapidly deteriorating political situation, suggested that Adenauer accompany Johnson to Berlin, to symbolize continued German-American cooperation and to give Adenauer a desperately needed photo opportunity. The Americans demurred, arguing that they did not want to get involved in the election campaign. That Johnson would then tour Berlin with Willy Brandt, the SPD’s chancellor candidate, was not discussed, though it would rankle in the memories of Union officials for a long time thereafter.98 Should Adenauer have gone to Berlin sooner? Probably. Should the Americans have done more to help their old friend? Perhaps. But what could anyone have done? This was the central problem. The Allies were not prepared to make any dramatic gestures to preserve open borders in Berlin. Adenauer knew that little could be done to tear down the wall short of war, – 136 –

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and was unwilling to make pronouncements that would have meant little. As Hans-Peter Schwarz argued in an essay on the crisis: “The greatness and the limitation of this bourgeois statesman are revealed in that he had little sense for Romantic politics.” In essence, the decision had already been made during contingency planning before the wall went up, in which Defense Minister Strauß argued against massive military action for fear of exposing the Federal Republic to nuclear devastation. Adenauer and the Union had built their success on the rejection of experiments, and now the choice was between a most dangerous experiment or nothing at all. Brandt could afford to write an open letter criticizing Kennedy, Adenauer could not.99 What had been the Union’s security blanket, its uncompromising commitment to cooperation with the West, now threatened to become a straitjacket, inhibiting any new initiatives. Recognizing the Union’s dilemma makes an analysis of its further election strategy even more revealing. After finally visiting Berlin on 22 August, Adenauer restarted the campaign with a vengeance, giving more than a dozen speeches in the last two weeks. During every speech he faced heavy criticism. A speech in Göttingen on 31 August, for example, was delayed by boos and whistles. Though Adenauer tried vainly to make light of the heckling by claiming that he had always wanted to learn to whistle when he was a child, it was clear that his audiences were much less responsive than in 1957. Facing such palpable hostility, he attempted to recapture the electoral momentum through continued emphasis on the need to maintain the close alliance with the West. The wall was a Soviet attempt to disrupt Western unity, and this temptation should be resisted. Holding up the critical Bild headlines, Adenauer told a crowd in Hanover: “You see … this is exactly what Khruschev wanted—and the fools have fallen for it!” Despite popular disappointment with American inactivity, Adenauer did not criticize US policy. Instead, he said that the crisis required an end to criticism. “The interests of the United States demand that Western Europe be protected from world communism,” he announced in Wiesbaden, “… and Western Europe cannot be protected … if we … do not remain firm and true to our allies.” The SPD had attacked him for these positions, he continued, citing Schumacher’s “Chancellor of the Allies” smear as proof.100 Instead of running from the Allies, Adenauer embraced them, trying to use a successful formula from the past. When his son asked why he did not publicly criticize the US, he responded simply: “Don’t you understand? We cannot allow ourselves to upset the Americans. We need them desperately.” The rest of the Union followed Adenauer’s lead. Responding to critical letters from constituents, CSU Landesgruppe Chair Hermann Höcherl wrote: “We are also not pleased with some things about our allies, but [we] should not forget that we are dependent on them, for better or worse.” Höcherl noted sadly that “there are not just friends of Germany in the West. There are even people who would prefer to make an agreement with – 137 –

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Mr. Khruschev….”101 This emphasis on continuity was the product of that combination of pragmatism and insecurity that had always marked Union policy. It made sense to avoid public criticism, since Adenauer and the Union had little to gain from further dissension. Also important, however, was the realization that they had little choice. The SPD and the FDP had put the Union on the defensive, accepting the basic tenets of Westbindung while at the same time claiming that Adenauer was defending them incorrectly. It would do no good to make dramatic changes; they would have been interpreted as admissions of failure. The only solution was to make a virtue of necessity and embrace the Allies further. Unable to retreat from past positions or move forward to embrace new ones, Adenauer and the Union had no choice but to stand fast and hope for the best. Though not terribly bold, this strategy did help stave off complete electoral disaster. In the weeks between the Berlin Wall and the election, many voters who had tilted toward the opposition gradually returned. Though the absolute majority was lost, the Union won more than 45 percent of the vote, maintaining its status as the largest party in the Bundestag. One SPD analyst has argued that the emphasis on continuity may have convinced the public not to make any radical changes. While the Union could content itself with the idea that things could have been worse, Adenauer had to see that his star was waning. As more than one historian has noted, the Union may have won the election, but Adenauer himself had lost it. Many voters signaled their endorsement of Westbindung but repudiation of its author by choosing the FDP in 1961, with its proclaimed goal of a coalition “with the Union but without Adenauer.”102 There is a clear irony here. Adenauer and the Union suffered electoral losses in 1961 doing the same things that they had done in winning previous elections by ever wider margins. The old policy now needed modification—and perhaps the old leadership, as well. Even influential Union members expressed doubts about Adenauer’s fitness for further service. Gerd Bucerius, CDU deputy and publisher of the influential weeklies Die Zeit and Stern, declared that he was “shocked” by Adenauer’s hesitation to go to Berlin and his attacks on Brandt, asking Adenauer to “respect Nature’s limitations,” and step down, lest he devalue his own historical achievements.103 Bucerius and other members of the “Erhard Brigade,” along with the CSU, supported by their putative coalition partner the FDP, all claimed that this was the time for Adenauer to give way to Erhard. According to Hans-Peter Schwarz, Adenauer left for his office on the morning after the election whistling an old Reichsmarine fleet hymn, which was usually sung when ships went down. But Adenauer was not going down quietly, and he moved quickly to secure his place as chancellor. In a stormy Bundesvorstand meeting on 19 September, the battle was joined. Citing the international situation, Adenauer informed the party that it would be dangerous for him to retire, though he disarmed his critics by promising to step – 138 –

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down before the next election. Although some criticized Adenauer’s handling of Berlin, the meeting ended with Adenauer being asked to chair coalition negotiations with the FDP. During the subsequent negotiations, which lasted more than a month, Adenauer was able to outmaneuver his opponents, none of whom were willing, in the words of Eugen Gerstenmaier, one of the pretenders to the throne, “to go into history as the ‘Conny-killer.’” Erhard himself proved unwilling to challenge Adenauer directly, leading even his closest supporters to wonder if Adenauer was right about the weakness of “the Rubber Lion.” Even the FDP was brought into line by Adenauer’s surprising flirtation with a grand coalition with the SPD. Erich Mende, who had declared that his FDP would never accept Adenauer, had to give in, saving some dignity by refusing to serve in Adenauer’s cabinet.104 The foreign minister was not so lucky. After failing to remove the chancellor, the FDP focused its ire on Brentano as a surrogate. Mende argued that Brentano had to go because he was too inflexible, and the FDP wanted fresh ideas. As the coalition talks dragged on, Brentano, who had written that he was prepared “to accept the consequences [of the election] if necessary,” removed himself from consideration on 30 October. His replacement would be Interior Minister Gerhard Schröder, a North German Protestant with ties to Ruhr industry and a strong advocate of Atlantic cooperation. Despite his former membership in the NSDAP and complaints from advocates of a more aggressive stance in Berlin (within both the media and the Union), Schröder’s youth, ability, and geographic and religious background made him an appealing choice for both the FDP and the Union. Schröder’s appointment would have a profound impact on the Union in the months to come, as he demonstrated a degree of public independence from Adenauer that Brentano had never approached.105 Adenauer emerged from the election with his office, but not his stature, intact. His position in the party was weakened by the long negotiations, and his cabinet, dependent on a resentful FDP, was unstable. He was determined to make the most of his remaining time in office, but a course of action was not clear. The Berlin crisis continued as the coalition talks dragged on, leading to the frightening sight of American and Soviet tanks facing each other at “Checkpoint Charlie.” Disturbing rumors hinted at a possible SovietAmerican agreement at German expense behind the rhetoric of trust and solidarity. Krone wrote that he and Adenauer considered these plans “impossible,” adding cryptically: “We can only think of Weimar and the fate of Erzberger.” Franz Josef Strauß criticized the American willingness to make concessions, calling the Soviet demands a “swindle,” but adding, in a dig against the Kennedy administration, “one can … do nothing about certain Harvard professors.” Before his resignation, Brentano counseled trust in the Americans, but admitted that “there are circles … imploring the American government to make concessions beyond that which we would consider acceptable….”106 – 139 –

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Although isolated voices embraced the idea of creating a free city that included both East and West Berlin, in general, the Union opposed such thinking. 107 Union backbenchers Bruno Heck and Baron Guttenberg argued that negotiations could come only after resisting both Soviet threats and the “appeasement policy of the Anglo-Saxons,” favoring Dulles’s old concept of “going to the brink.” Krone was not willing to adopt such an anti-American tone, but was convinced of the need for “open discussions.” In an October memorandum, Krone recognized the danger of concessions, but argued that the Allied positions were not yet fixed and that the Germans could turn things around through a mixture of compromise and energetic advocacy.108 The autumn of 1961 thus became a period of intense German lobbying to convince the Americans not to expect radical initiatives and to dissuade the Americans from new experiments.109 One mission in particular sheds light on the developing attitudes on both sides of the Atlantic. At Adenauer’s and Brentano’s urging, Kurt Birrenbach traveled to the US in October, using his connections in business and government to measure and influence American opinion. The report he presented in early November reflected the delicate state of German-American relations.110 Although Kennedy was committed to defending the Allied presence in West Berlin, Birrenbach reported that the Americans sought an “honorable accommodation” to defuse world tensions, and would like French and German support for wide-ranging negotiations with the Soviets. Birrenbach was optimistic that German willingness to cooperate would be rewarded. Most striking, however, is Birrenbach’s bald assertion: “In all discussions it became clear that German unity is not a goal for which the Americans would be prepared to make substantial sacrifices, least of all to take military steps.” One episode during Birrenbach’s trip illustrated the prevailing American mood. At a cocktail party at the New York apartment of corporate lawyer George Baker, Birrenbach was introduced to Kennedy intimate and Ambassador to India John Kenneth Galbraith. As the discussion turned to Berlin, Galbraith declared that the whole Berlin problem could be reduced to keeping the access routes to the city open. When Birrenbach interjected that Kennedy’s three essentials included provisions for the continued freedom and survival of West Berlin, and stressed the importance of Berlin’s ties to the Federal Republic, Galbraith called such legalistic arguments “a sign of the well-known German arrogance, based on a falsely understood romanticism … which now wants to drag the other peoples of the world into war for the third time.” The discussion became increasingly heated until the host intervened and asked Galbraith to either apologize or leave. He left. Writing to Ambassador Georg Duckwitz, Galbraith’s German colleague in New Delhi, Birrenbach reported that this was “the first time … since the end of the war, that I had such an unpleasant discussion with a foreigner.” Duckwitz was not surprised, noting that while Galbraith was an impressive academic and fine writer, his opinions on the Cold War were problematic, – 140 –

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and hoped “that the practical politicians who have understood international affairs for years will over time gain more influence, and that their opinion will carry more weight with the President than that of this professor from Harvard.”111 Attitudes such as Galbraith’s were not designed to calm German fears of an American deal at their expense, and German suspicions were running quite high. When James Reston in the New York Times chided Birrenbach and the Germans for worrying that Kennedy planned to make any major concessions, one German newspaper remarked with barely disguised scorn: “Reduced to its core, [Reston’s] philippic means nothing other than: Don’t take the New York Times seriously! On the same page of the paper as Reston’s article is an editorial in which one can read that while the Americans should of course remain firm in Berlin, there were many things about which one could talk to the Soviets—about reunification, Oder-Neiße, neutral zones….”112 In this atmosphere of suspicion and concern, one’s analysis of the situation depended on one’s preconceptions. Thus, despite his confrontation with Galbraith, Birrenbach, a strong advocate of German-American cooperation, concluded that the best way to deal with uncertainty was to become more involved in discussions. Honest participation in talks would be rewarded, because the Americans were fundamentally sympathetic to German interests. Krone tentatively endorsed this line, though with considerably less enthusiasm than Birrenbach. Heck and Guttenberg, on the other hand, advocated a more independent European policy, and were resolutely opposed to negotiations with the Soviets, following the example of de Gaulle. For them, it was by no means clear that the “Anglo-Saxons” were sympathetic to German concerns. Rather, they feared that the British and Americans were more interested in defusing the crisis than in defending traditional positions. It was thus with a familiar mixture of hope and fear that Adenauer traveled to Washington on 19 November 1961. As he would admit later to Reston, he arrived “very concerned about whether America was a truly reliable ally.” Foreign Office memoranda emphasized the need to reassure the Americans that the Germans were prepared to accept their responsibilities, in the hopes of preventing an abandonment of Western positions in Berlin, but no one knew what to expect.113 As in April, Adenauer and his team returned from Washington pleased and relieved. The discussions were serious but friendly, the communiqué emphasized both countries’ commitment to German-American cooperation, and the trust between the two governments was “renewed.” Adenauer may even have succeeded in altering Anglo-American policy. Macmillan had spoken with Kennedy on 9 November, urging him to push Adenauer to accept major concessions decoupling West Berlin from the Federal Republic, but Adenauer convinced Kennedy to withdraw this request.114 Schröder reported to the Fraktion that Adenauer “returned from – 141 –

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America in a much more positive mood than he had left,” and that concerns about American disengagement plans were misplaced. Adenauer echoed these sentiments before the Bundesvorstand, admitting that though there had been good reason to fear possible changes in American attitudes, his talks with Kennedy had laid these fears to rest.115 For the second time in seven months, Adenauer and the Union emitted a sigh of relief that GermanAmerican equilibrium was restored.

Conclusion: Adrift in a Wider World Though it was comforting to know that American and German policies could be brought into harmony, at least publicly, the events of 1958 to 1961 revealed a deeper crisis within both the West and the Union. The primary justification for Westbindung had been that it would allow the Federal Republic to determine its international fate, to be an independent subject rather than merely an object of superpower policy. If the recurrent crises of this period proved anything, however, it was that the Federal Republic still fell short of this goal. Each new crisis rekindled fears of returning to subject status. One could perhaps argue that Adenauer’s success in defusing the crises through personal intervention justified staying the course. A relationship based on repeated emergency maintenance, however, was not particularly appealing to anyone. Westbindung was intended to create a stable community based on common interests between the Federal Republic and its allies, but as those allies themselves differed on future policy, the Federal Republic, and especially the Union, now faced a choice: whether to follow the Anglo-American lead and work from within to safeguard West German interests, or to join with de Gaulle in challenging the Kennedy administration’s leadership of the West. The 1961 election demonstrated that the Union had reached the limits of its refusal to discuss alternatives. Different factions within the Union would now begin to offer their own solutions to this dilemma, each claiming to represent the best interests of the West. Adrift in the wider world that he had glimpsed on his 1960 world tour, and facing the inevitable decline of his own influence within his party and government, Adenauer would devote his last years in office to the search for that elusive stable community, a search that would paradoxically lead to even more instability in the world and within the Union.

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Notes 1. “… aus der Enge und Kleinheit Europas herausdenken!” KAE IV, 31–32; Adenauer speech to the German press club, 12 April 1960, ACDP NL Eckardt, I-010-001/2. 2. Adenauer, speech in Bayerischer Rundfunk, [10] April 1960; and in Düsseldorf before the Kuratorium Unteilbares Deutschland, May 9, 1960, ibid. 3. Dehler to Adenauer, 23 January 1952, StBKAH III/23. For the complete text of these speeches, see Verhandlungen, 3 WP vol. 39, 384–406; Cioc, Pax Atomica, 46–50; Schwarz, Ära Adenauer: Epochenwechsel, 57–60; Doering-Manteuffel, Ära Adenauer, 96–97. 4. Krone diary, 286, 288 (25 January and 1 February 1958); see also the debate in AK V on 11 February 1958, ACDP VIII-006-001/1; “Aufruhr in Bonn um die Einheit: Aktenfeldzug gegen Dehler,” Bild, 26 January 1958; Grewe, Rückblenden, 317–329. On plans for a Foreign Office report responding point by point to Dehler, see draft Adenauer to Brentano, 27 January 1958, BA Bukamt, B136/6203; text of Schröder’s speech on 6 February 1958, ACDP NL Globke I-070-059/5. 5. Adenauer to Gerstenmaier, 24 and 30 January 1958, StBKAH III/24; Krone diary, 286 (23 January 1958); and Gerstenmaier’s comments in Schwarz, Entspannung, 57. 6. Adenauer, discussions with Joseph Alsop, 24 January 1958, Teegespräche 1955–1958, 250–257; on the Abendland quotes, see his interview with Messrs. Fréquin and Wintraeken, 13 May 1958, ACDP NL Eckardt I-010-002/1. 7. Herbst memo “Deutsch-Amerikanische Beziehungen,” 14 January 1958; Kessel to AA, 3 February 1958, PA-AA Referat 305 Band 68. See also Ambassador Grewe’s instructions upon taking over the embassy in Washington, in Brentano to Grewe, 10 April 1958, PAAA Referat 305 Band 103. 8. Krone diary, 286, 294–295, 297 (27 January, 7 and 18 March 1958). 9. Brentano to Adenauer, 15 and 26 February 1958, BA NL Brentano 239/157, 35–41, 50–57. See also Strauß and Brentano in AK V, 27 February 1958, ACDP VIII-006-001/1; and Krone diary, 292–293 (26 and 27 February 1958). 10. See Adenauer [Vence] to Erhard, 25 February 1958; to Strauß, 27 February 1958; as well as Strauß to Adenauer, 1 March 1958, StBKAH III/43. 11. Brentano to Adenauer, 10 March and 14 April 1958, BA NL Brentano 239/157, 57–64, 81–88. Brentano’s comments in AK V, 10 March and 10 June 1958, ACDP VIII-006-001/1; Kosthorst, Brentano, 234–239. On Mansfield, see Baudissin [AA] to Washington, 20 May 1958 and Grewe to AA, 20 and 21 May 1958, PA-AA Referat 305 Band 69. For the quote, see, Hans Kroll [Moscow] to AA, 22 May 1958; for Dulles, Grewe to AA, 4 June 1958; both PA-AA Referat 305 Band 68. 12. KAE III, 369–395; Krone diary, 297, 301 (18 March and 26 April 1958). See also Köhler, Adenauer, 991–999; Schwarz, Staatsmann, 402–439; Adenauer, conversation with Hearst, Considine, and Conniff, 24 April 1958, ACDP NL Eckardt I-010-002/1; and with John Midgely of the Economist, 20 May 1958, Teegespräche 1955–1958, 281–282. 13. Reflecting on the spring crises, Adenauer made this comment in a discussion with Flora and Sidney Gruson, 16 December 1958, ibid., 322. 14. Adenauer [Cadenabbia] to Erhard, 28 August 1958, StBKAH III/24. 15. Johann Baptist Gradl to Heinrich Krone, 17 October 1958, ACDP NL Krone I-028-031/1. See also comments of Kiesinger, Gradl, and Guttenberg in AK V, 7 October 1958, ACDP VIII-006-001/1; Adenauer to Strauß, 14 October 1958, “Strauß wünscht Gespräch mit der SPD,” FAZ, 14 October 1958, StBKAH III/24; Krone diary, 319 (26 November 1958). 16. CDU, ed., 8. Bundesparteitag: Kiel 18.–21.9.1958 (Hamburg, [1958]), 21–30, 224–225. See also Kleinmann, CDU, 169–173 and Cioc, Pax Atomica, 129–131. 17. Adenauer talk with Midgely, 20 May 1958; and with Flora and Sydney Gruson, 16 December 1958, Teegespräche 1955–1958, 287–288; 313–324; Hans-Joachim von Merkatz, memorandum for Adenauer, 23 June 1958, StBKAH III/43; Brentano to Adenauer, 27 May and

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18.

19. 20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27. 28.

8 July 1958, BA NL Brentano 239/157, 96–97, 115–116; F. Roy Willis, France, Germany and the New Europe, 1945–1967 (New York, 1968), 273–280 Brenke, “Europakonzeptionen,” 622–625; Alfred Müller-Armack to Erhard, 3 October 1958; Jansen [Paris] to AA, 24 October 1958. Both ACDP NL Müller-Armack I-236-033/1; Conze, Herausforderung, 72–87; Koerfer, Kampf, 208–226; John Gunther, Inside Europe Today (New York, 1961), 260–272. Adenauer speech to the CDU-Bundesparteiausschuß, 28 November 1958, KAR, 390–391. Krone diary, 320–321 (28 November and 5, 14, and 15 December 1958); discussion in AK V, 12 December 1958, ACDP VIII-006-001/1; Adenauer to Brandt, 12 December 1958, StBKAH 12/28, 171; Brentano interview with Hessian Radio, 18 December 1958, BA NL Brentano 239/164, 119–123. Blankenhorn to AA, 27 November 1958, reporting on the reactions to Dulles’s comments; Adenauer’s handwritten comment for Brentano, dated 28 November, and Brentano to Adenauer, 8 December 1958, BA Bukamt B 136/6203. Brentano to Adenauer, 12 January 1959, BA NL Brentano 239/157, 156–157. See also Brentano to Schröder, 8 January 1959, with a copy of a letter to Adenauer on the same day, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-096/2; Brentano in AK V, 13 and 23 January 1959, ACDP VIII-006-001/1; and Krone diary, 325 (16 and 17 January 1959). Krone diary, 325–328 (16, 22–26 January 1959); Kosthorst, Brentano 255–268. See also Herbst memorandum, 12 January 1959, on Eisenhower’s State of the Union address, and a Press Office memorandum sending Adenauer the translation of a Walter Lippmann column entitled “Dulles is needed,” NYHT, 13 February 1959, BA Bukamt B136/3611; and Adenauer to Dulles, 30 January 1959, KAE III, 462–468. See Krone’s notes of a meeting on 6 February 1959, ACDP NL Krone I-028-031/1; Krone diary, 330–332 (7, 8, and 11 February 1959). Etzdorf [AA] memorandum for Brentano and Adenauer, 13 February 1959, BA Bukamt B136/6204. See also Grewe to AA, 13 and 16 February 1959, PA-AA Referat 305 Band 70; Blankenhorn to AA, 14 February 1959. PAAA Referat 305 Band 69; Krapf [Washington] to AA, 21 April 1959, BA Bukamt B136/3611; and a report from an unnamed consulate summarizing the program, 20 April 1959, PAAA Referat 305 Band 78. Krone memorandum of meeting with Adenauer, Brentano, and others, 6 February 1959, ACDP NL Krone I-028-031/1; Krone diary, 330–331, 339, 341, 343–344, 346 (7 February, 10, 16, 24, and 31 March 1959); Brentano to Adenauer, 19 May 1959, and Adenauer to Brentano, 29 March 1959, BA NL Brentano 239/157, 173, 182–185. See also Rolf Steininger, Der Mauerbau: Die Westmächte und Adenauer in der Berlinkrise 1958–1963 (Munich, 2001), 75–82. Globke to Adenauer, 5 February 1958, ACDP NL Globke I-070-052/2; Birrenbach to Pferdmenges, 6 March 1959, ACDP NL Birrenbach I-433-002/1; also Birrenbach to Brentano, 9 March 1959, and Birrenbach to Krone, 13 April 1959, ACDP NL Birrenbach I-433-001/2. Birrenbach advocated improved Anglo-German relations in a report to AK V on 23 June 1959, enclosed in Ernst Majonica [AK V chair] to Fraktion, 30 October, 1959, ACDP AK V Files VIII-006-047/2. Wolfgang Wagner, Die Bundespräsidentenwahl 1959, vol. 2 of Rudolf Morsey and Konrad Repgen, eds. Adenauer Studien (Mainz, 1972). Wagner prepared this study in 1960 after interviews with the participants, but withheld publication for a decade. Hans-Peter Schwarz drew heavily from this study in his account of the crisis. See also Adenauer’s summary, which includes direct citations from documents, KAE III, 483–551; and Koerfer, Kampf, 233–382. See Fritz Rene Alleman, Zwischen Stabilität und Krise: Etappen der deutschen Politik, 1955– 1963 (Munich, 1963), 57–80; and Doering-Manteuffel, Bundesrepublik, 225–232. Schwarz, Staatsmann, 502–526; Köhler, Adenauer, 1025–1049. See also Conze, Herausforderung, 130–140.

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29. Eberhard Pikart, Theodor Heuss und Konrad Adenauer: Die Rolle des Bundespräsident in der Kanzlerdemokratie (Stuttgart/Zurich, 1976). 30. Krone diary, 338 (7 March 1959); KAE III, 491. 31. Krone diary, 334–335 (24–28 February 1959); Wagner, Bundespräsidentenwahl, 17–23. See also Hermann Höcherl’s comments to the CSU Landesgruppe, 2 March 1959, ACSP LG. 32. Krone diary, 337 (4 March 1959). 33. Krone diary, 347 (4 April 1959) [emphasis in original]. See also 348–349 (5–9 April 1959); memoranda dated 4 April 1959 and Heuss to Globke, 12 April 1959, ACDP NL Globke I-070-003/1; Heuss to Adenauer, 9 and 14 April 1959, and Adenauer to Heuss, 13 April 1959, Unserem Vaterland, 314–328. 34. On foreign reactions, see Grewe [Washington] to AA, 9 April 1959, PA-AA Referat 305 Band 68; Brentano to Adenauer, 7 April 1959, BA NL Brentano 239/157, 178–179; Paul Lücke to Adenauer, 11 April 1959, StBKAH III/43. See also the discussion in the CSU Landesgruppe, 9 April 1959, ACSP LG. 35. Adenauer to Brentano, 8 April 1959, BA NL Brentano 239/157, 180; to Paul Lücke, 15 April, 1959, Briefe 1957–1959, 249; Krone diary, 349 and 351 (9 and 20 April 1959). 36. Ibid., 319, 321, 323–324 (21 November and 19 December 1958 and 6 January 1959). 37. Adenauer to Erhard, 24 March 1959, Briefe 1957–1959, 226. 38. Ernst Friedländer, “Erhard als Europäer,” Hamburger Abendblatt, 25/26 April 1959, in ACDP NL Globke I-070-058/2. See also Ulrich Lappenküpper, “‘Ich bin wirklich ein guter Europäer’ Ludwig Erhards Europapolitik, 1949–1966,” Francia 18 no. 3 (1991): 85–121. 39. Globke to Krone, 21 and 22 May 1959; and Globke to Adenauer, 22 May 1959, ACDP NL Krone I-028-011/3. See also Adenauer to Globke, 15 April 1959, Briefe 1957–1959, 248–249. 40. CSU Landesgruppe discussion, 28 April 1959, ACSP LG. 41. On Krone’s initial reservations, see Krone diary, 323 (3 January 1959). For his lobbying of Adenauer, see ibid., 352–356 (17 and 27 April and 2, 15, 20, and 21 May 1959); and Krone to Adenauer, 16 May 1959, KAE III, 528. See also Brentano to Krone, 20 May 1959, PA-AA MinBüro Band 120 42. Adenauer to Krone, 4 June 1959, Briefe 1957–1959, 284–286. See also Höcherl’s report to the CSU Landesgruppe and the ensuing debate, 4 and 9 June 1959, ACSP LG. 43. Erhard to Brentano, with two memoranda by Müller-Armack, 20 June 1959, referring to Adenauer’s comments of 10 June; Brentano to Erhard, 9 July 1959. Both ACDP NL MüllerArmack I-236-031/3; Globke to Erhard, 19 June 1959, with the transcript of Adenauer’s comments to Lewis, and Erhard to Adenauer, 23 June 1959, ACDP NL Globke I-070003/1; Krone diary, 364–366 (19–23 June 1959); Koerfer, Kampf, 362–382. 44. KAE III, 541. 45. Strauß to Adenauer, 8 June 1959, ACDP NL Globke I-070-003/1; Strauß in the CSU Landesgruppe, 8 June 1959, ACSP LG; memorandum, Schröder for Adenauer, 5 June 1959, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-288/1; Krone diary, 363–364, 366–367 (15, 23, and 29 June 1959). See also “Zur Popularität von Adenauer und Erhard nach der Präsidentschaftswahl,” August 1959, ACDP NL Globke I-070-052/2. 46. Globke, note on discussion between Adenauer and Krone, 8 July 1959, ACDP NL Globke I-070-031/1; Jansen (Paris) to Globke, 31 July 1959, ibid., I-070-036/3; Jansen to AA, 7 August 1959, in Bach (Bukamt) to Schröder, 8 October 1959, ACDP NL Schröder I-483288/1. 47. Krone diary, 354–355, 372 (15 May and 8 August 1959); Adenauer to Globke, 15 August 1959, ACDP NL Globke I-070-052/2. 48. Adenauer in the Bundesvorstand, 16 September 1959, Vorstand III, 389–392. See also Martin Hillenbrand, “Memorandum of Conversation” with Shepard Stone and Secretary of State Herter, 13 November 1959, FRUS 1958–1960 IX, 107–111; and Christopher Emmet to Globke, 9 October 1959, ACDP NL Globke I-070-031/1. 49. Meeting with Gaston Coblentz of the New York Herald Tribune, 15 January 1960, ACDP NL Eckardt I-010-002/2. – 145 –

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50. Krone diary, 393 (1 January 1960). See also ibid., 389–390 (23 December 1959). 51. Martin Hillenbrand, “Memorandum of Conversation,” 15 March 1960, FRUS 1958–1960 IX, 676–677. On private American complaints about German criticism, see von Jordans [BPA] memorandum: “Amerikanische Haltung zur Berlin Frage,” 22 January 1960, PA-AA Referat 305 Band 102. 52. Kosthorst, Brentano, 317–334. Krone diary, 408 (5 March 1960). For discussions in Paris, see KAE IV, 42–51. 53. Adenauer, interview with John Rich (NBC), 25 April 1960, and with Messrs. Andrew and Stind (NBC), 6 May 1960, ACDP NL Eckardt I-010-002/2. 54. Brentano to Adenauer, 17 May 1960, BA NL Brentano, 239/158, 74–76; Schwarz, Staatsmann, 559–560; see also Krone diary, 427–428 (19 June 1960). 55. Adenauer, speech on the fifteenth anniversary of the CDU in Cologne, 21 May 1960, ACDP NL Eckardt I-010-001/2; Krone diary, 419 (17 May 1960); KAE IV, 51; Adenauer to Globke, 28 May 1960, ACDP NL Globke I-070-052/2. 56. Krone diary, 438 (28 July 1960); Köhler, Adenauer, 1069–1072; Schwarz, Staatsmann, 562– 564; Kosthorst, Brentano, 334–336; KAE IV, 54–58. See also Globke to Adenauer, 8 June 1960 and Adenauer to Brentano, 10 June 1960, ACDP NL Globke I-070-052/2. 57. KAE IV, 59–67; Krone diary, 438 (31 July 1960); Schwarz, Staatsmann, 569–575; Köhler, Adenauer, 1072–1081; Kosthorst, Brentano, 336–340; Willis, France, 294–295. 58. Krone diary, 440–442 (13, 24, and 30 August 1960). See also Krone to Adenauer, 2 August 1960, ACDP NL Krone I-028-006/1; and 1 September 1960, ACDP NL Globke I-070-052/2. 59. Adenauer in the Bundesvorstand, 23 August 1960, Vorstand III, 743; Adenauer to Globke, 9 September 1960, ACDP NL Globke I-070-052/2; Schwarz, Staatsmann, 577–590; Köhler, Adenauer, 1077–1081; Kosthorst, Brentano, 339–340; and Blankenhorn, Verständnis, 384 (6 August 1960). 60. KAE IV, 70–76. See also Schwarz, Staatsmann, 586–588, and the introduction to this volume. 61. KAE IV, 67. 62. One of Adenauer’s former secretaries reports that she saw Adenauer embrace Nixon during Nixon’s 1966 visit to Bonn, the only time she can recall Adenauer receiving a guest so warmly. Interview with the author, Rhöndorf, 23 April 1994. 63. Horst Osterheld, interview with the author, 21 May 1994; Adenauer interview with Helitzer (McGraw-Hill World News), 26 July 1960, ACDP NL Eckardt I-010-002/2; Kurt Birrenbach to Erich Strätling [Washington], 5 January 1960, ACDP NL Birrenbach I-433003/1. Birrenbach actually preferred Nelson Rockefeller. 64. John F. Kennedy, “A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 36, no. 1 (1957); Frank Mayer, Adenauer and Kennedy: A Study in German-American Relations, 1961–1963 (New York, 1996), 1–10. On Mansfield and Kennedy, see memorandum, AA to Bach [Bukamt], 13 February 1959, BA Bukamt B 136/6204; Etzdorf [AA] to Washington, 3 January 1961; and Grewe to AA, 4 January 1961, PA-AA, Referat 305 Band 128; Adenauer in the Bundesvorstand, 23 August 1960, Vorstand III, 745; Osterheld I, 5–9 (28 July 1960). 65. Motz [Chicago] to AA, 14 November 1960, reporting on a television program entitled “At Random,” broadcast on 12 November, in which Shirer, seconded by Bruno Bettelheim and Louis Untermeyer, warned of growing neo-Nazism in Germany; “Rückblick auf das zu Ende gehende Jahr,” Georg Federer to AA, 23 December 1960, PA-AA Referat 305 Band 102. See also Heinrich Knappstein to Brentano, 22 November 1960; and Wolfgang Pohle to Brentano, 16 March 1961, PA-AA MinBüro Band 69. 66. Osterheld, memos for Globke and Adenauer, 31 October, 3 November, and 8 November 1960, BA Bukamt B 136/3611. See also Grewe to AA, 15 June 1960, PA-AA Referat 305 Band 102. The report from the Defense Ministry can be found in Adenauer to von Eckardt, 19 December 1960, ACDP NL Eckardt I-010-023/1. See also Martin Liebes to Globke, 19 November 1960; and Osterheld’s summary of Time and Newsweek profiles of Dean Rusk, 28 December 1960, BA Bukamt B 136/3611.

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67. Majonica to the Fraktion, with draft speech on John F. Kennedy, 3 February 1961, ACDP VIII-006-047/2. Birrenbach’s speech, which he delivered on several occasions, is included in Birrenbach to Globke, 11 January 1961; Globke thanked Birrenbach on 6 February, saying he read the speech “with great interest.” Both in BA Bukamt B136/3612 Heft 1. See also CSU-Korrespondenz, 9 November 1960, ACSP CSU-LG 3. WP Folder 104. 68. Strauß to Adenauer with report, 14 February 1961; Osterheld summary, 15 February 1961, BA Bukamt B 136/3612 Heft 1. 69. Report by Klaus Mehnert, 18 March 1961, on his meetings with members of the new administration; memo, Borchardt for Ambassador Grewe, 14 February 1961; and Wolfgang Pohle to Brentano, 16 March 1961, PA-AA MinBüro Band 69. 70. See Vermerk, Limbourg [AA] for Globke, 4 February 1961, detailing the preparations for Brentano’s trip, which included a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, PA-AA, MinBüro Band 69. Brentano’s speech, “Die Zukunft der atlantischen Gemeinschaft,” is in Heinrich von Brentano, Deutschland, Europa und die Welt: Reden zur deutschen Außenpolitik (Bonn, 1962), 364–375. See also Kosthorst, Brentano, 360–362. On Blumenfeld and Guttenberg, see Federer [NY] to AA, 2 March 1961, PA-AA, MinBüro Band 69. 71. Brentano in Fraktion, 21 February 1961, ACDP VIII-001-1008/3, 126–129. Brentano, memo to director, Abteilung 3, 1 March 1961, PA-AA MinBüro Band 63; Brentano [Badenweiler] to Adenauer, 23 March 1961, BA NL Brentano 239/158. 72. “SPD: Kennedy-Politik entspricht dem Godesberg-Plan” and “Fragen in den Hauptstädten,” Bonner Informationen aus Erster Hand, 412 (1 March 1961): 1, 4–5; and Brentano to Krone, 2 March 1961, ACDP NL Krone I-028-056/2. 73. Grewe to AA, 10 March 1961, PA-AA Referat 305 Band 128; Strauß, Erinnerungen, 392– 394; Brentano to Adenauer, 4 March 1961, PA-AA MinBüro Band 63. 74. Scherpenberg to Brentano, 1 March 1961; Federer to AA, 3 March 1961; Brentano to New York consulate, 9 March 1961; Aufzeichnung Raab, 4 March 1961, PA-AA Referat 305 Band 132; Osterheld to AA, 6 March 1961, PA-AA, MinBüro Band 69. 75. Blankenhorn, Verständnis, 398–399 (20 January 1961); interview with George Bailey, 14 November 1960, ACDP NL Eckardt I-010-002/2; meeting with de Gaulle, 9 February 1961, KAE IV, 80. 76. Draft communiqué in Ritzel to Carstens, 29 March 1961, included with briefing books, PAAA Referat 305 Band 132; memo, [illegible] for Carstens, 12 April 1961, and Acheson to Adenauer, 10 March 1961, ibid., Band 128; Krone diary, 482 (9 and 10 April 1961). 77. KAE IV, 91–100. Hoffmann memorandum, 24 April 1961; Schnippenkoetter [Washington] to AA, 17 April 1961, with Kennedy’s telegram and Adenauer’s instructions; BPA North American press summary, 28 April 1961. See also the cable from Broich [Ankara] to AA, 2 May 1961, noting that at a CENTO, meeting Rusk made a point of telling the German ambassador what a success the visit was. All in PA-AA Referat 305 Band 132. 78. Adenauer in the Fraktion, 19 April 1961, ACDP VIII-001-1008/3, 163–170. 79. Ibid., 170–171. See also Krone diary, 484 (18 April 1961). 80. Adenauer, speech on the fifteenth anniversary of the founding of the CDU in Cologne, 21 May 1960, ACDP NL Eckardt I-010-001/2. 81. Verhandlungen, 3rd WP, vol. 46, 7052–7061. The major points are reproduced in Sontheimer, Adenauer Ära, 212–214. 82. Hans-Jürgen Grabbe, Unionsparteien; Beatrix W. Bouvier, Zwischen Godesberg und Großer Koalition: Der Weg der SPD in die Regierungsverantwortung, 1960–1966 (Berlin/Bonn, 1990); Kurt Klotzbach, Der Weg zur Staatspartei: Programmatik, praktische Politik und Organisation der deutschen Sozialdemokratie 1945 bis 1965 (Berlin/Bonn, 1982); Drummond, German Social Democrats; and Dietrich Orlow, “Ambivalence and Attraction,” in Pommerin, The American Impact on Postwar Germany, 35–51. 83. Brentano to Adenauer, 13 May 1960, BA NL Brentano 239/158, 73; Heinrich Knappstein to Brentano, 22 November 1960, PA-AA, MinBüro Band 69; Adenauer, speech to the Junge Union in Frankfurt, 2 July 1961, ACDP NL Eckardt I-010-001/2. – 147 –

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84. Krone diary, 422 and 430 (1 and 30 June 1960). For Guttenberg’s speech, see Verhandlungen, 3. WP, vol. 46, 7076–7085. See also Hermann Höcherl, “Nach der außenpolitischen Debatte,” 2 July 1960, ACSP CSU-LG 3. WP Folder 161; and Adenauer in the Bundesvorstand, 6 July 1960, Vorstand III, 704–705. 85. Adenauer, speech in Dortmund, 16 July 1961, ACDP NL Eckardt I-001-001/2. 86. “Hauptergebnisse der EMNID-Studie: ‘Die Ausgangslage zur Bundestagswahl 1961,’” CDU election files, ACDP VII-003-085/4. 87. Memo by Elschner, “Zur Auswertung der EMNID-Untersuchungen,” ibid. See also SchwarzLiebermann, “Die Aussen- und verteidigungspolitische Auseinandersetzung mit der Opposition,” [spring/summer 1961], ACDP NL Richard Jaeger I-108-006; Koerfer, Kampf, 519–552; Langguth, Politik und Plakat, 113. On the age comparison, see unsigned memorandum, 29 November 1960, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-016/2. 88. Gerstenmaier’s original remarks are in Verhandlungen 3. WP, vol. 49, 9762–9766. Adenauer to Gerstenmaier, and Brentano to Gerstenmaier, 8 July 1961; Paul Collmer to Gerstenmaier, 9 July 1961, ACDP NL Gerstenmaier, I-210-017/1; Bundesvorstand meeting, 11 July 1961, Vorstand III, 941–978. 89. Springer to Gerstenmaier, 10 July 1961; Gerstenmaier to Springer, 14 July 1961, ACDP NL Gerstenmaier I-210-017/1. 90. Brentano to Krone, 23 March 1961, ACDP NL Krone I-028-056/2; Majonica to Krone, 26 June 1961, ACDP NL Krone I-028-016/1. 91. Conze, Herausforderung, 203–211. For German reactions to the Vienna summit, see the ambassadors’ reports in PA-AA Referat 305 Band 146, especially Herwarth [London] to AA, 16 June 1961, and Grewe to AA, 19 June 1961. On the “Three Essentials,” see Brentano to Adenauer, 27 July 1961, and Adenauer’s response, 30 July 1961, ACDP NL Krone I-028-008/7. See also Adenauer to Brentano, 27 July 1961, ACDP NL Globke I-070052/3. A German translation of Fulbright’s remarks is in StBKAH, 12/66, 516–517. For Adenauer’s response, see Osterheld to AA, 1 August 1961; BPA to Osterheld, 2 August 1961, BA Bukamt B136/3612 Heft 1. See also Grewe to AA, 1 and 4 August 1961, PA-AA Referat 305 Band 129. Memorandum of conversation between Adenauer, Carstens, and Strauß, 3 August 1961, ACDP NL Globke I-070-027/2. 92. Adenauer to Brandt, 31 August 1961, StBKAH 12/28. Adenauer’s loyal former secretary, Anneliese Poppinga, repeated this argument in Hans-Peter Schwarz, ed., Berlinkrise und Mauerbau [Rhöndorfer Gespräch 6] (Bonn, 1985), 94. 93. “Wir haben uns für ihn geschämt,” Berliner Stimme, 19 August 1961. See also Andreas Hermes and Theodor Steltzer to Adenauer, 31 August 1961, ACDP NL Globke I-070-008/2; Schwarz, Berlinkrise, 31; Bild, 16 August 1961. 94. See most recently Steininger, Mauerbau; Michael Lemke, Die Berlinkrise 1958 bis 1963: Interessen und Handlungsspielraum der SED im Ost-West Konflikt (Berlin, 1995); Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, especially 251–351; and John C. Ausland, Kennedy, Khruschev, and the Berlin-Cuba Crisis 1961–1964 (Cambridge, MA, 1996). 95. See especially Köhler, Adenauer, 1108–1111. 96. Blankenhorn diary, 17 August 1961, BA NL Blankenhorn 351/118; Osterheld I, 64–66, and interview with the author. 97. Steininger, Mauerbau, passim. 98. Osterheld I, 62–63 (24 August 1961), and interview with the author. 99. Schwarz, Berlinkrise, 34; Köhler, Adenauer, 1104–1105; Brandt to Kennedy, 16 August 1961, Maier/Thoß, 295–296. 100. On Adenauer in Berlin, see Krone diary, 526 (22 August 1961). Adenauer’s campaign schedule is in ACDP VII-003-002/2. Adenauer, speeches in Göttingen and Goslar, 31 August, 1961; in Hanover, 31 August 1961; in Koblenz and Wiesbaden, 5 September 1961, ACDP NL Eckardt I-010-001/2. 101. Georg Adenauer, quoted in Schwarz, Berlinkrise, 83; Höcherl to Josef Schätzer, 11 September 1961, ACSP CSU-LG 3. WP Folder 125. – 148 –

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102. Franz Barsig, “Der Bau der Berliner Mauer und der Wahlkampf der SPD 1961,” in Schwarz, Berlinkrise, 105–116; Doering-Manteuffel, Ära Adenauer, 232–236; Cioc, Pax Atomica, 151. 103. Bucerius to Adenauer, 13 September 1961, ACDP NL Gerstenmaier, I-210-017/1. 104. Schwarz, Staatsmann, 671–672; Bundesvorstand meeting, 19 September 1961, Vorstand IV, 1–61; Koerfer, Kampf, 579–637, Gerstenmaier quote on 580; Krone diary, 547–548 (4 November 1961); Erich Mende, interview with the author, 20 July 1994. 105. Brentano to Adenauer, 20 September 1961, ACDP NL Krone I-028-008/7. See also Krone diary, 546–547, 549–550 (21 October and 12 November 1961), and Kosthorst, Brentano, 397–398. Erich Mende, interview with the author. For press reactions, see “Schröder— ausgerechnet Schröder!” Bild, 6 November 1961, and “What Price Glory?” Newsweek, 13 November 1961, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-016/2. 106. Krone diary, 532–533 (25 September 1961); Strauß and Brentano in the Bundesvorstand, 19 September 1961, Vorstand IV, 30–34, 53–57, especially 55; Brentano in the Fraktion, 27 September 1961, ACDP VIII-001-1009/1. 107. See, for example, Georg Federer to Gerstenmaier, 20 September 1961, ACDP NL Gerstenmaier, I-210-017/1. 108. Heck and Guttenberg to Adenauer, 18 October 1961; Krone memorandum, 11 October 1961, ACDP NL Krone I-028-031/1; Brentano to Carstens, 30 October 1961, PA-AA MinBüro Band 69. 109. See, for example, the draft letter to John McCloy prepared by the AA for Cologne banker, CDU politician, and Adenauer confidant Robert Pferdmenges, included in Karl Carstens to Pferdmenges, 21 September 1961, PA-AA MinBüro Band 69; Krone to Hubert Humphrey, 20 October 1961, ACDP NL Krone I-028-041/4. 110. Brentano to Birrenbach, 22 September 1961, ACDP NL Birrenbach I-433-007/1. Kurt Birrenbach, Meine Sondermissionen: Rückblick auf zwei Jahrzehnte bundesdeutscher Außenpolitik (Düsseldorf: 1984), 15–82. Birrenbach report, 3 November 1961, ACDP NL Richard Jaeger I-108-001. For transcripts of Birrenbach’s discussions with McCloy, Acheson, Herter, and others, see ACDP NL Birrenbach I-433-159/1. See also Osterheld’s summary of the report for Adenauer, 10 November 1961, BA Bukamt B136/3612 Heft 2. 111. Birrenbach to Duckwitz, 4 December 1961, including memo “Abendessen bei George Baker”; Duckwitz to Birrenbach, 8 December 1961; Birrenbach to Grewe, 4 November 1961, ACDP NL Birrenbach, I-433-159/1. Birrenbach, Sondermissionen, 60–63. 112. “Der Umschau: Rat für Leser,” Deutsche Zeitung, 30 October 1961. 113. Osterheld I, 85–87 (18 and 26 November 1961). See also BPA memo, “US-Presse zum bevorstehenden Besuch des Herrn Bundeskanzlers in den US,” 14 November 1961; and memo, “Die deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen,” [November 1961], PA-AA Referat 305 Band 133; Adenauer, interview with James Reston, 16 December 1961, ACDP NL Eckardt I-010-002/2; Krone, undated memo, “Hauptpunkte, in denen Meinungsverschiedenheiten bestehen,” ACDP NL Krone, I-028-031/1. 114. “Die Amerikareise des Bundeskanzlers,” [late November 1961], PA-AA Referat 305 Band 133; Osterheld I, 86–87 (26 November 1961). See also BPA, “US-Presse zum Bundeskanzlerbesuch,” 27 November 1961; and Hofmann [AA], Aufzeichnung, 1 December 1961, PA-AA Referat 305 Band 133. Steininger, Mauerbau, 298–305. 115. Schröder in the Fraktion, 24 November 1961, ACDP VIII-001-1009/1; Adenauer in the Bundesvorstand, 11 December 1961, Vorstand IV, 70–76.

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Adenauer, the Union, and Westbindung Reflected in CDU Campaign Posters

The 1953 election was the real beginning of the “Adenauer era.” Posters such as this emphasized the personality of Adenauer as the symbol of stability and encouraged Germany to “elect Adenauer.”

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Also from 1953, this poster emphasized Adenauer’s role as the statesman who “makes the connection to the free world.”

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The image of Adenauer as statesman was reinforced by images of the threat facing the Federal Republic. This 1953 poster warns voters that “All roads of Marxism lead to Moscow!” which is why they should reject the SPD and vote for the CDU.

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By 1957, the Union placed even more emphasis on Adenauer’s image as the embodiment of stability, with the simple slogan: “No Experiments!”

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In 1961, however, the Union had become concerned that Adenauer’s prestige was waning. Now they paired Adenauer and Erhard, reminding the voters of the “Success and Experience” of the two leaders.

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Despite their personal differences, Adenauer and Erhard tried to present a public image of unity for the 1965 elections. Here Adenauer promises voters that Erhard will continue his “struggle for the peace, freedom, and security” of the German people. Note, however, that they do not appear together.

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Chapter 4

A PARIS-BONN AXIS? 1961–1963

It has become one of the mythic symbols of the Cold War: the young and handsome American president, standing before a cheering crowd in the center of a divided city, declaring his solidarity with them and his commitment to their protection. John F. Kennedy told the people of Berlin that he was one of them—and for one day, at least, he was. The unusual passion of the moment, exemplified by the crowd’s boisterous reaction to his declaration, “Ich bin ein Berliner,” underscored the importance of Kennedy’s June 1963 visit to Germany as an expression of German-American friendship. Kennedy was so impressed by the enthusiasm of the crowds, especially in Berlin, that he remarked to Theodore Sorensen: “We’ll never have another day like this one as long as we live.”1 For the Germans as well, the memory would linger, forging a bond with Kennedy that would become even more heartfelt after the tragedy in Dallas that November.2 Whether speaking his carefully scripted (and phonetically spelled) German or Latin lines, or heralding the new Atlantic community, Kennedy employed a powerful rhetoric that moved his audiences and helped shape the image that has endured beyond his death. Kennedy’s rhetoric reinforced the American commitment to Germany, and cast aside doubts about the Federal Republic’s place in the West. Once pariahs, the Germans were now welcome members, worthy of direct wooing by the American president. Kennedy’s visit presents a mirror image to Adenauer’s April 1953 visit to the US. Ten years had brought a subtle shift in the dynamics of the West, allowing the Germans to be the hosts and to play a role in their allies’ domestic political mythmaking. The comparison with Adenauer in 1953 is important because it reminds us of the political nature of Kennedy’s visit. It is one of the paradoxes of public diplomacy that the most ostentatious representations of unity spring from concerns about subterranean fissures in that unity. Insecure about his foreign and domestic position, Adenauer used his American trip to consolidate both the Federal Republic’s place in the West and his own power at home. Kennedy’s visit similarly reflected – 150 –

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conscious policy decisions, an aspect often overlooked. Especially revealing is the timing of the trip. If one were to rely on popular memory, enshrined in many hagiographic studies of JFK, one would think that the visit came soon after the construction of the Berlin Wall, an immediate sign of support for the divided city. Less widely known or understood is that the trip took place almost two years after the construction of the wall, two years during which the German-American relationship had often been strained, while Adenauer aligned himself increasingly with de Gaulle’s France. With de Gaulle’s triumphal German tour in July 1962 and his impending visit to Bonn in July 1963, much on their minds, Kennedy and his staff designed their visit as a counterdemonstration in favor of Atlantic partnership. The decision to visit Berlin specifically was an important part of American strategy. De Gaulle had never visited Berlin, and the French could not draw on the same reservoir of goodwill there as the Americans. The backdrop of the divided city and the memory of American help going back to the 1948–1949 airlift increased the visit’s dramatic impact. Kennedy’s tour was thus not solely an expression of solidarity with the people of Berlin; it was also a calculated attempt to recapture the imagination of a German public that had deliriously welcomed de Gaulle.3 Recent scholarship has also suggested a further dimension behind the Kennedy visit. In his study of postwar superpower relations, Marc Trachtenberg sees the Kennedy years as the period in which the US and the USSR reached a “settlement” based on mutual recognition of the German and European status quo. For Trachtenberg, the Berlin crisis was driven by the Soviets’ desire to keep nuclear arms out of German hands and to preserve the balance of power in Europe, desires shared by the Americans. Willingness to respect each other’s security and a common fear of nuclear war encouraged the superpowers to pursue détente. Kennedy’s visit can thus be seen as an attempt to guarantee German loyalty to the US, which would give the Americans the freedom to reach an accommodation with the Soviets in Europe.4 This is a provocative thesis, even if one agrees with critics who note its excessive focus on nuclear weapons and its reductionist view of peace as the absence of conflict.5 It certainly helps reconcile the paradoxical combination of Kennedy’s passive détente policy in Europe with his more aggressive actions in the Third World, where the Americans still thought the Cold War could be “won.” Its utility for this study, however, lies mainly in the questions it raises rather than those it purports to answer. Trachtenberg’s focus on the superpowers offers useful insights into the decisions made in Washington and Moscow, but touches only lightly upon European responses. Understanding those reactions is important, however, when one remembers that the notion of a Soviet-American settlement in Europe, so forcefully advocated by Trachtenberg, corresponds exactly to criticisms made by Europeans such as Adenauer and de Gaulle, which a parade of – 151 –

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American representatives and their European supporters spent the better part of the 1960s heatedly denying. The “settlement” thesis should therefore encourage scholars to reexamine the conflict within the West during the early 1960s, recognizing that the ensuing debates reflected the difficult European adaptation to international changes. A revision of the heroic popular image should not lead anyone to view Kennedy’s visit to Berlin as less important in the history of either Westbindung or German-American relations. If anything, understanding the context makes it even more significant. Kennedy’s visit captures the combination of solidarity and conflict that marked the relationship between the US, Europe, and the Federal Republic in 1963. Kennedy and his advisers, seeing their vision of Atlantic cooperation threatened by Gaullists in Paris and Bonn, arrived in Germany determined to restore American leadership in Europe. The German side was just as complicated. Within the government and the Union, the visit came at a time when Adenauer’s hold on power was slipping, and internal conflicts were becoming even more explosive. As Kennedy and de Gaulle courted German public opinion, they also courted distinct constituencies within the West German political elite, and the architects of Westbindung intensified their dispute over the future of the West. Kennedy’s visit, therefore, is the pivot around which the political conflicts of Adenauer’s last years in office turned. Those conflicts will be the basis of the chapter to follow.

Atlantic Partnership? Berlin, Europe, and de Gaulle The situation in 1963 had its roots in the aftermath of the 1961 election. The loss of the absolute majority in the Bundestag forced the Union into a coalition with the FDP, and with it a change of political focus. The FDP had long advocated new initiatives toward reunification and opposed the “Little Europe” represented by the EEC, positions that had brought them into conflict with Adenauer after they left the government in 1956. Their role in forcing Brentano’s resignation indicated that they would advocate a more Atlanticist and flexible foreign policy. The FDP had also made no secret of their desire for a new chancellor, limiting Adenauer’s freedom of action and intensifying the discussion over the succession. Erhard, the heir apparent, enjoyed the firm support of the FDP, meaning that the succession question would be conflated with the larger issue of West German relations to Europe and the Atlantic world, and the visions of those relations that the two men had come to represent. During the last years of Adenauer’s tenure, the policy debate revolved around two interrelated questions. One was the future of NATO, especially the degree of consultation between the US and Europe on Berlin. The other was the shape of European integration, which was approaching a crisis as – 152 –

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a conflict loomed between “widening” the EEC to include the British (who had applied for membership in 1961) and “deepening” political cooperation among the original Six. Both matters raised the same complicated issue— the proper shape of the West—and threatened to expose divisions within the Union. Before his resignation, Brentano had prepared a foreign policy memorandum that was intended to be authoritative, but often had to resort to ambiguities to paper over those divisions. It emphasized the importance of both NATO and European integration, but fudged on the question of “widening” or “deepening.” The British application was proof of the correctness of the Treaty of Rome, but Brentano cautioned, “the federal government, along with its partners among the Six, must guarantee that the European treaties are not made hollow, and that we especially maintain their internal dynamic in the direction of a European political federation.” Most of the phrases and ideas from this memo reappeared in the final coalition agreement, even though Brentano was replaced by the allegedly more flexible Schröder. This historic document, the first written coalition agreement in West German history, echoed Brentano’s calls for more political consultation in NATO and European participation in NATO nuclear policy. The section on Europe included a more specific endorsement of EEC expansion, but also a commitment to deeper political integration, which the British opposed.6 The meaning of many passages remained in the eye of the beholder. Who was to determine, for example, whether British membership in the EEC would make the Treaty of Rome “hollow”? As had been true for twelve years, the language of policy was open to many interpretations. It did not take long for this rhetorical ambivalence to lead to disagreements. In preparation for a January 1962 visit to the US, Erhard told an interviewer from Die Zeit, in a direct jab at de Gaulle, that he favored European integration “that does not limit itself to … a continuation of conventional national policies with better international cooperation.” Although the EEC was an important first step, it was only the means to the ultimate goal, which was to create an Atlantic community, binding Europe to Great Britain and North America. The future lay in expanding the circle of partners rather than erecting new trade barriers, and Erhard was frustrated by the funereal pace of the negotiations on British admission to the EEC. Erhard was joined in his opinion by other prominent Union members, including Foreign Minister Schröder and Kurt Birrenbach, whose political manifesto, The Future of the Atlantic Community, endorsed free trade as the key to a new era of Atlantic cooperation.7 Adenauer took the opposite view, telling Erhard: “[W]e must first solidify the European economic and political community before we can even consider the question of an Atlantic community.” A month later, he rejected the idea of an Atlantic community altogether in comments before the Bundesvorstand. Citing Kennedy’s calls for free trade between the US and the EEC, Adenauer complained that “the cheers from our press in response to – 153 –

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these statements and the speeches discussing an Atlantic Union completely baffle me.” Expressing a very different economic outlook from Erhard, characteristic of Gaullist preferences for a more regulated economy, Adenauer asserted that increased American exports to Europe would harm the export-driven German economy. These warnings about an American economic threat were combined with a stern warning to avoid illusions about international affairs. “Whoever believes that we Germans are beloved in the world, that others are absolutely committed to us, is pretty damn misguided,” he declared with unusual vehemence. The Americans had every right to try to expand their trade, but the Europeans also had the right to consider their own interests “and not simply to say that we should immediately form an Atlantic Union.” In Adenauer’s opinion “now [was] the time to make progress on European political cooperation, to guarantee that everything will not be lost in some giant … mishmash [Brei].” European integration was crucial, and the Germans “should work closely with France to make sure that continued progress is made.” Talks with Britain would continue, but only if the goal remained “a European economic and political area that must enter into a partnership with the United States, but not as part of some general spectacular thing that will do no one any good.”8 Adenauer’s hard-nosed comments should remind us that while he distanced himself from traditional nationalism, he was still very much a German statesman, acting in what he considered German and European best interests. His assessment of those interests was colored by his philosophical concerns about American leadership. Citing American conflicts with European colonial powers, Adenauer told American journalists: “[I]n order to win new friends, you should not slap your old ones in the face. That’s not leadership.” The Germans were especially unhappy after the Berlin Wall, Adenauer argued, warning “one must not forget that the events of August 13—I won’t say whether it is justified or not—have brought forth a reaction against the United States.” While proclaiming his friendship for the US and his gratitude for postwar American reconstruction aid, he saw these recent developments as part of a general ebbing of American support since the death of John Foster Dulles. The key to this growing distance between the Americans and Europeans lay in a deep cultural divide: “We Europeans have an ideology, the ideology of Christian humanism, which forms the foundation for the freedom of the individual and the state as a whole…. But the Anglo-Saxons … make the same mistake; they have no ideology, no supporting idea driving resistance and the struggle against the totalitarian atheism of Russia and … Red China….”9 The contrast could not be more stark. While Erhard and others advocated faster development of an Atlantic community to keep up with changes in American policy, Adenauer was becoming more convinced of fundamental differences that cast doubt on long-term Atlantic cooperation. Despite the common struggle against communism, differences in outlook suggested a – 154 –

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looser alliance that would allow greater autonomy, avoiding a “mishmash” that would swamp distinct European economic and cultural interests. Adenauer’s suspicion of an Atlantic community manifested itself in an increasing distance toward British membership in the EEC. He and de Gaulle feared that British membership would dilute the Continental character of the community. Nevertheless, he was also aware that not only the Americans but other EEC members supported British admission, a reflection of the smaller nations’ fear of Franco-German hegemony. Even Foreign Minister Schröder called British membership in the EEC a “political necessity” in a March 1962 press conference.10 Neither Adenauer nor de Gaulle wanted to come out directly against British membership, preferring instead to allow negotiations to continue and delay any final decision. This strategy succeeded in forestalling an immediate crisis, but would sow the seeds of even larger problems in the future. Those problems flared up in April 1962, when the EEC states met to discuss plans for European Political Union (EPU). De Gaulle had angered advocates of supranational integration by rejecting a plan (dubbed “Fouchet I” after Christian Fouchet, who chaired the drafting commission) that he felt infringed on national sovereignty. The revised plan (Fouchet II), which both de Gaulle and Adenauer championed, placed power instead in member governments pledged to regular consultations. At a meeting of EEC foreign ministers on 17 April 1962, the representatives of Belgium and Holland, Paul-Henri Spaak and Joseph Luns, who preferred supranational integration but also feared that the British would not accept EPU at all, requested that further consideration be delayed until British admission to the EEC. Accusing Luns and Spaak of inconsistency, because they advocated both British EEC membership and supranational integration (which the British opposed), de Gaulle and Adenauer were both infuriated. Adenauer’s inner circle called it a “Black Tuesday for Europe,” a missed opportunity on a par with the defeat of the EDC. Adenauer, whose suspicions of both the British and the Americans were growing, drew a characteristic conclusion, writing to Brentano: “Now that the British have encouraged the Belgians and Dutch to scuttle the European Political Union, which had from the beginning been the goal of all our European policy, all that is left is the Franco-German bloc, hopefully with the eventual cooperation of Italy and Luxembourg.” Adenauer wanted to “bind France tightly to Germany, so it could not ally with the Russians against us.” Although the Foreign Office, the BDI, and even German agriculture favored British EEC membership, he did not think the time was right. Adenauer presented himself as a pragmatic but consistent supporter of Franco-German reconciliation and European integration, contrasting himself with the allegedly unreliable opponents of Fouchet II. There were three types of politicians, he said, “Hyper-Europeans, Europeans, and antiEuropeans.” He was a “European.”11 – 155 –

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This distinction offers a vital insight into Adenauer’s view of European integration. Although he had encouraged and profited from the idealistic supranational vision that entranced European youth and had become an integral part of Christian Democratic ideology, Adenauer remained at heart a calculating pragmatist. As we have already seen in his shift away from the EDC toward NATO in 1954, he would not allow idealistic conceptions to interfere with German sovereignty and security. His commitment to Europe was not driven by idealism, but by a desire to see the Federal Republic integrated into a strong West where Europeans could defend their own interests. As he had indicated in his 1956 speech to the Grandes Conférences Catholiques, in the conflict over the free trade zone, or even at Rambouillet in 1960, he supported European cooperation because it would allow Europe to regain the importance in world affairs that it had lost since World War II. European self-assertion was the only acceptable vehicle for German national interest. An internal Chancellery memorandum prepared at the end of May 1962 concluded that the “political unification of Europe” was based on two principles: Franco-German reconciliation and “the necessity of developing Europe into a unified whole, so that it does not fall hopelessly behind the US and the [Soviet Union] politically or economically.”12 The shape of Europe was less significant, as long as it avoided compromises that would weaken its “Europeanness.” Adenauer’s embrace of de Gaulle reflected their vision for Europe. Though many supporters and subsequent historians viewed it as a betrayal of his principles, Adenauer’s cooperation with de Gaulle, for good or ill, was consistent with his search for security and partnership in Europe. This search became more acute in light of continuing disputes over Berlin. The US, with British support, began talks in Geneva with the Soviets over an interim arrangement on Berlin, while de Gaulle refused to participate. Adenauer bemoaned this division. Believing “if the West is ever to hold itself together, it needs strong and constant leadership, which can only come from the United States,” he clearly preferred that the Americans would not lead in this direction. Adenauer’s deep distrust of American détente policies added to his distaste for Atlantic arrangements. He feared that the talks with the Soviets would “give everything away without getting anything in return,” and felt that they should be stopped.13 This dispute over Berlin strategy was a continuation of the difficulties between Adenauer and the Americans that had existed since 1958. After years of being criticized for missing chances at reunification, Adenauer and the Union were in a difficult situation. They had argued that a strong alliance with the West would move the Soviets to compromise, and that none of the agreements reached with the Allies prejudiced the German legal claim to reunification. Now it appeared that the Allies, trying to defuse the Berlin situation, wanted to push the Germans into compromises that might prejudice the Federal Republic’s legal position, and that the superpowers – 156 –

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were rediscovering their common interest in containing Germany. Kennedy added to these fears in an Isvestia interview with Khruschev’s son-in-law Alexei Adjubei shortly after his talks with Adenauer in November 1961. Kennedy spoke of a common desire to hinder German access to nuclear weapons, implying a US-Soviet front against German expansionism, which caused great consternation in Bonn.14 The Union was thus placed before a particularly unappetizing choice. To remain true to the spirit of Westbindung, Adenauer and the Union needed to follow the American lead; to remain true to their public claim that Westbindung did not mean compromises on the German question, they had to convince the Allies to change direction. This dilemma, made starkly apparent during the 1961 campaign, plagued the Union throughout 1962. It was made even more acute by the growing perception in Bonn of an “anti-German wave” in American public opinion, with the popularity of William Shirer’s book The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich cited as proof. Shirer’s book, so influential in shaping the American public perception of Nazi Germany, upset many Germans with its assertion of a direct connection between Nazism and the German character.15 In late February 1962, Attorney General Robert Kennedy assured Adenauer that the Americans would defend traditional Western positions in Berlin. This visit, and the decision in the following weeks to establish a direct “hot line” between Washington and Bonn, appeared to signal a reestablishment of close Atlantic relations, but doubts remained about the youth and “excessive naïveté” of the Kennedy team, even among Atlanticists.16 Adenauer’s concerns about the Geneva talks did not, however, lead to public criticism. Indeed, he suppressed a Union proposal for a Bundestag resolution on Berlin, arguing that it would be better to wait and see how the American position developed. Discussing the issue in the Bundestag would, he feared, only damage Western unity.17 Shortly thereafter, however, this calm atmosphere disappeared. On 11 April the government received an American memorandum containing “Draft Principles” for a Berlin agreement, along with an unusual request for a response within twenty-four hours, so that Secretary of State Dean Rusk could present it in Geneva. The principles included a council to control access to Berlin, which would include representatives of the West, the East, and the nonaligned world. Adenauer viewed this unwieldy body as a retreat from four-power control of Berlin, signaling the end of the American guarantee for the city’s security. Even more disturbing, the committees proposed for discussing Berlin issues would include members from both the Federal Republic and GDR as equal representatives of equal states, meaning the abandonment of one of the most sacred positions in West German diplomacy—its claim to be the sole legitimate representative of Germany.18 These proposals loosed a storm of controversy. “The Americans are no longer the same Americans they were years ago,” Krone gloomily wrote in – 157 –

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his diary. “They want to compromise, and that means a deal at our expense.” Private complaints soon became public. After the government discussed the memo on 13 April, details of the plan and of the negative German reaction found their way into the press, much to the irritation of the Kennedy administration. A fruitless search for the leak was undertaken at the Americans’ behest, though speculation centered on Adenauer and Brentano.19 The crisis exposed tensions both in the German-American relationship and within the Union. In a meeting of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs committee on 19 April, Schröder was grilled by members of his own party over his handling of the American proposals. Schröder claimed to have criticized the Draft Principles when he met with Rusk in Lausanne in March, but had a hard time explaining how the Americans could nevertheless present a plan that contradicted West German interests. Schröder argued that the plan had to be viewed in its entirety, and repeated his “absolute faith” in the Americans. Nevertheless, he was in the difficult position of having to admit that he agreed with the Draft Principles, or that he did not protest with sufficient vigor, or that his protests had no effect in Washington. None of these possibilities pleased Schröder’s Union critics, led by Heck and Guttenberg, who had been agitating against the Americans since the Berlin Wall was built and now castigated both Schröder and the “unacceptable” American plan.20 Adenauer tried to slow the momentum for an agreement with the Soviets. In a letter to Kennedy, he asked for a “pause” in the negotiations while the Allies ironed out their differences. From his vacation home in Cadenabbia on Lake Como, he summarized his criticisms of the style and content of American policy in two memoranda. Quoting John McCloy that the intellectuals in Washington had no practical experience in diplomacy, Adenauer complained that they seemed more interested in finding agreement with the Soviets than with their own allies, raising the danger that Berlin would become a bargaining chip between the superpowers. They had ignored French objections, had accused the Germans of leaking information “without a shred of evidence,” and had begun to speak of “West Germany,” reflecting their abandonment of the Federal Republic’s rights as Germany’s sole legitimate representative. He even blamed the Americans for encouraging the British to undermine Fouchet II. In short, Adenauer believed that the Americans were determined to sell out the Federal Republic (or at least the Adenauer government) and to hinder European cooperation, and that Schröder, who spent too much time “playing the faithful servant,” was not doing enough to stop them.21 Adenauer sent Brentano to Washington to plead the German case. Brentano returned reassured, telling the Fraktion that there was no reason to fear changes in American policy. Adenauer, however, would not let things settle down. On his return from vacation, he traveled to Berlin and, in press conferences on 7 and 8 May, expressed deep skepticism about the – 158 –

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Berlin control commission, calling for a pause in the Geneva talks. These comments would lead to another flare-up against the Americans. Both sides would eventually defuse the crisis, arguing that any healthy relationship should allow the members to have differing opinions. The only victim was West German Ambassador Wilhelm Grewe, whom the Kennedy team considered a symbol of German legalist obstructionism and had increasingly bypassed over the previous months. Grewe protested that he did not receive sufficient support from Bonn, but could not save his position. He became ambassador to NATO, and all sides attempted to return to business as usual.22 The friction between Washington and Bonn sharpened divisions within the Union, as Adenauer and Schröder drifted further apart. Adenauer criticized the Americans in Berlin, telling his staff that the Germans “might have to be prepared to live with tensions in the German-American relationship for a few years,” and that they should “place more emphasis on the FrancoGerman and European” elements of their foreign policy. Meanwhile, Schröder, in Athens for the NATO foreign minister conference and then before the Fraktion on 8 May, expressed support for the American plans. Noting that de Gaulle was refusing to participate in the Geneva negotiations, Schröder doubted that obstructionism was helpful. “In the final analysis,” he told the Fraktion, “the most important thing is that the United States remain involved in Berlin.” It was fine for the Allies to discuss their differences freely, Schröder argued, “but if anyone believes that they can combine French and German policy and create a new and separate factor in diplomacy, they are simply wrong….”23 Battle lines were being drawn, not between government and opposition, but within the governing party itself. The intraparty chasm grew during the following weeks. At a meeting of Union deputies later in May, Schröder denounced Adenauer’s tactics, and hinted that he would make more use of the constitutional latitude of cabinet members to modify policy, a direct assault on “Chancellor Democracy.” At the same meeting, Defense Minister (and, since 1961, CSU Chair) Franz Josef Strauß criticized the Americans for failing to understand the communist threat and praised French opposition to the Geneva talks. Division within the West was better than unity in making the wrong choices, Strauß asserted. Schröder and Strauß, and the approaches they represented, were on a collision course, and these differences were visible to all. Heinrich Knappstein, who replaced Grewe in Washington, complained to Schröder that there were “too many foreign policies” in Bonn, though he promised that he would represent only “the policy … that the foreign minister instructs me to present.” Blankenhorn shared these concerns, writing that he did not see “how an ambassador abroad can even come close to fulfilling his duties when there is such a mess back home.” The press viewed these personal differences as indications that both the Federal Republic and the Union were torn between Anglo-American flexibility and French intransigence.24 – 159 –

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Adenauer characteristically blamed not the French but the British for the strife within the West. Citing the close relationship between Kennedy and Macmillan, he disputed the implication that there was a “Paris-Bonn axis” threatening the Atlantic Alliance. “When Macmillan came back from Washington and told the press that the Anglo-Saxon states had taken the protection of the free world into their hands,” he told two American reporters, “I did not scream ‘Washington-London axis!’”25 Despite these protestations, Adenauer was still angry over Anglo-American policy, and decided to pursue closer ties with France, sending Osterheld to de Gaulle with a personal letter expressing his hope that France could take the position in Europe “to which it is entitled [die Rolle in einem geeinten Europa … die ihm zukommt].”26 Warnings from close friends were of little avail. Blankenhorn, his longtime adviser and ambassador in Paris, warned in an early June conversation that Germany had too often made the mistake of choosing weak allies. The French were subject to delusions of grandeur, and Blankenhorn implored Adenauer to use his influence with de Gaulle to advance the cause of Europe as a whole, not to settle for “the littlest Europe” of a Franco-German agreement. Adenauer was unmoved, arguing that Germany needed firm allies, and de Gaulle offered an opportunity to cement Franco-German cooperation for all time. Brentano, Schröder, and the Foreign Office also warned that Franco-German reconciliation, however important, should not harm Atlantic cooperation. These warnings led Adenauer to the sarcastic comment: “Why do we always have to be good and obedient? De Gaulle has come a long way through his stubbornness and refusals.”27 With this attitude, Adenauer arrived in Paris on 2 July 1962 for a state visit. Contrary to protocol, de Gaulle greeted the chancellor personally at Orly Airport. Both men were aware of the symbolism of their meeting, placing heavy emphasis on their roles as representatives of long-time “archenemies” and the historic nature of their reconciliation. The symbolic climax was a High Mass in Rheims Cathedral. The picture of the two statesmen standing before the high altar in such Gothic surroundings symbolized their commitment to the Abendland: continental, Catholic Europe. Adenauer wanted to send a clear message, even forbidding the use of the NATO flag by the German honor guard, citing de Gaulle’s hostility to NATO integration, despite objections from Schröder, Blankenhorn, and the Foreign Office. In their private discussions, de Gaulle and Adenauer shared their skepticism about the “Anglo-Saxons” and agreed that France and the Federal Republic should take the lead in forging closer political bonds, while inviting other EEC members to follow.28 Contrary to Adenauer’s denials, the Bonn-Paris axis had begun to take shape. The historic exchange of meetings was completed in early September 1962 when de Gaulle traveled across the Federal Republic, addressing cheering crowds wherever he went. The general spoke in German to the “great – 160 –

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German people” with unexpected affection. His rhetorical brilliance and the Germans’ enthusiastic responses increased the momentum for Franco-German partnership. The result was an agreement to formalize Franco-German cooperation through regular governmental consultation along the lines of Fouchet II. First conceived as an executive agreement, these plans coalesced into a formal treaty, which would be initialed by the two foreign ministers in December and eventually signed in January 1963.29 The year 1962 had developed into a pivotal year for both the Federal Republic and the Union. For more than a year, West German foreign policy had been balanced between different concepts of the West. Adenauer and his inner circle viewed the Kennedy administration with increasing mistrust, and found de Gaulle’s conception of an independent Europe attractive, culminating in the exchange of visits. On the other side, the US remained the most important member of the West, which meant that the Germans could not afford to break completely with Washington. The growing group of Atlanticists around Erhard and Schröder argued that the Federal Republic should intensify strategic and economic cooperation with Washington and London. To informed observers in 1962, the political atmosphere was in flux, with both American and European leaders arguing that the time had come for historic changes in the European-American relationship. When pressed, both Adenauer and de Gaulle claimed to respect American leadership and considered themselves loyal members of the West. At the same time, however, they were critical of the shape of the West, which they considered a relic of immediate postwar American omnipotence. The image of Franco-German cooperation presented at Rheims was an expression of their desire to draw political consequences from these ideas. Two interconnected factors lent urgency to the debate. One was the Kennedy administration’s new initiatives designed to counter de Gaulle’s plans for Europe. Even before Adenauer left for Paris in July, he received a long report from Kurt Birrenbach on his recent visit to Washington and New York. Birrenbach reported that he had “never before sensed such an intense American interest in the acceleration of Western integration.” The Americans wanted to include Great Britain in a new Europe that could be part of an American-led “Atlantic partnership.”30 Furthermore, while de Gaulle and Adenauer were sharing misgivings about EEC expansion in Paris, Kennedy was using a speech in Philadelphia on 4 July 1962, to issue a “Declaration of Interdependence,” with an expanded EEC as part of his “Grand Design.” For the Americans, British entry into the EEC was the acid test of European commitment to Atlantic partnership, and their German supporters did not miss an opportunity to refer to such statements from Kennedy and others.31 The other factor was the erosion of Adenauer’s control over the Union. The disappointment of 1961 and the continuing conflict between Adenauer and Erhard added to a public consciousness that the old man was ready for retirement. At the 1962 CDU convention in Dortmund, these impressions – 161 –

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received more fodder when the Union named Hermann Josef Dufhues as executive chair, to relieve Adenauer of the day-to-day management responsibilities. Although members of the Bundesvorstand complained that the press made too much of this change, it was obvious that the wind was shifting. Krone called for more solidarity and less emphasis on the differences in “nuance” between Adenauer and Schröder, but in private, even Krone recognized that Adenauer would soon retire, and that Erhard and Schröder would shape future policy. After the convention, Adenauer also emphasized the need for unity, but his authority was clearly waning.32 Sensing this, Adenauer increasingly abandoned moderation. British demands for EEC concessions respecting their relations with the Commonwealth, combined with their resistance to increased German participation in NATO nuclear planning, contributed to the chancellor’s skepticism about the British. He became frustrated with Schröder and considered a wholesale reorganization of the cabinet, but had to dismiss the plan as politically impossible. Although neither the French nor the Germans could publicly oppose British EEC membership, de Gaulle had assured him that he would “see it as a betrayal” if the Germans did not help him stop the British. Thus, Adenauer bitterly resented the Fraktion’s endorsement of British accession, linking this lack of party discipline to the “disgusting struggle over my successor.” Considering all of these issues from the relative peace of Cadenabbia in late September, Adenauer composed a memorandum listing the “decisive questions for the future of Germany and world peace.” First and foremost was the need to “shape our relations with France” based on his meetings with de Gaulle. Other issues, including the reorganization of NATO and relations with the US, followed only at a distance. Recognizing the limits of his political capital and personal energy, Adenauer decided to focus on solidifying closer relations with France, and asked his loyal allies for help.33 Adenauer’s decision to tilt further toward France would lead to renewed conflict with Washington. Three days after sending his memorandum to Globke and Krone, Adenauer met with Kennedy’s national security adviser, McGeorge Bundy. In talks at Cadenabbia and on the flight back to Bonn, they discussed NATO and the future of the EEC. Bundy advocated an integrated Europe, including Britain, while Adenauer pointed out the differences between Britain and France, and asked Bundy to understand their rivalry for European leadership. At that, Bundy noted quietly but firmly: “For at least the next 15 years, the leader of Europe will be neither Britain nor France nor Germany, but the US.”34 Bundy’s statements, which confirmed Adenauer’s suspicions about American arrogance toward Europe, hardened his determination to spend his remaining time in office concentrating on cooperation with de Gaulle. Events in late October 1962, however, would make that plan difficult to realize, shifting the political balance to his further disadvantage. The first would be the Spiegel Affair, which led to the resignation of Defense Minister Strauß, – 162 –

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who was accused of constitutional violations in the arrest of journalists responsible for a series of articles critical of the Defense Ministry. The loss of Strauß and his replacement with former Minister-President of SchleswigHolstein Kai-Uwe von Hassel cost Adenauer a pro-French partner. After a lengthy political crisis, Adenauer was able to resume the coalition with the FDP, but the price was his formal promise to retire after the 1963 summer vacation, putting to rest rumors that he hoped to stay in office longer. The clock began running on his last months in office, with both German and foreign analysts viewing the latest cabinet as a temporary caretaker.35 If the Spiegel crisis eroded Adenauer’s domestic base, the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 delivered a foreign blow. Part of the Gaullist criticism of the Americans had been that the Americans were too soft on the Soviets. This position became less tenable in the face of Kennedy’s resolute stance against Soviet missiles in the Caribbean. Both Adenauer and de Gaulle recognized this, and despite some criticism of Kennedy’s diplomacy, they rallied around the nominal leader of the West. After his eleventh and final visit to the US in late November, Adenauer told the Bundesvorstand that the Cuban crisis had finally forced the Americans to “wake up” to the dangers of Soviet aggression. As a result, he considered the talks as warm and friendly as any with Eisenhower and Dulles, making this “one of the best” of his trips to America.36 These cosmetic improvements, however, could not hide the underlying disagreement. Adenauer’s satisfaction at American actions in Cuba did not lead him to change his position on the future of the Europe, just as Kennedy’s promise to consider NATO reform did not mean a willingness to make serious concessions. As 1962 drew to a close, questions about the shape of the West remained, and conflicts within the Union grew. A weakened Adenauer, determined to use his remaining term to formalize FrancoGerman cooperation, faced strengthened internal opposition. The first months of 1963 would bring the climax of this crisis, with both the formalization of Franco-German cooperation and the continuation of the Brussels negotiations scheduled for the final weeks of January.

The Storm Breaks: The Elysée Treaty and the Atlantic Alliance Adenauer was scheduled to travel to Paris at the end of January 1963. As he prepared for the trip, supporters of different conceptions of Europe tried to influence his decisions. In an impassioned letter, Birrenbach warned of the “unusually serious” consequences if Britain did not join the EEC, calling on Adenauer to convince de Gaulle that Europe needed Britain in order to become “one of the pillars of an Atlantic partnership.” At the same time, French Ambassador Roland de Margerie was telling Adenauer that de Gaulle would not depend on the Americans because he believed that they – 163 –

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“would one day depart from Europe.” Adenauer rejected Birrenbach’s argument in a terse response; his actions in the weeks to come reflected his basic agreement with de Gaulle.37 The debate became more intense after the December 1962 Anglo-American meeting at Nassau, where Kennedy compensated Macmillan for the cancellation of the Skybolt nuclear missile program by offering Polaris missile technology, provided that the British integrate their nuclear forces into a Multilateral Force (MLF) under NATO control. This plan reflected the American goal of limiting European access to nuclear weapons, though Kennedy preferred to argue that the MLF increased NATO nuclear cooperation. He made the same offer to France, but de Gaulle, disturbed by the US’s willingness to force policies on its allies, was skeptical. He was especially disturbed that he received no prior warning, despite meeting Macmillan only days before the latter left for the Bahamas.38 Nassau intensified Adenauer’s doubts about the future of NATO. If France were to accept the American offer, the result would be the long-feared Anglo-French-American triumvirate, with the Germans a “third-class power.” If the French rejected it, the Federal Republic could face a difficult choice between Paris and Washington. In conversations with his advisers, Adenauer expressed growing concern about the Americans. They do not intend to deceive, he argued, but “[o]ne doesn’t know what they might think tomorrow.” Their attempts to negotiate with the Soviets showed that they were not interested reunification, nor were the British. Only de Gaulle was reliable, but even he could change his mind if it was in his interest to do so. The Federal Republic thus needed to institutionalize Franco-German cooperation. Others shared Adenauer’s concerns. The Defense Ministry criticized American plans for maintaining their monopoly on nuclear decisionmaking. Krone saw Nassau as the first in a series of compromises aimed at a disarmament agreement with the Soviets, “for which we will have to pay.”39 In a 14 January press conference, de Gaulle brought the crisis to a head, rejecting both the MLF and British entry into the EEC. Citing Britain’s continued commitment to the Commonwealth and its special relationship with the US, de Gaulle questioned Britain’s commitment to Europe, concluding that the time was not right for the British to join the EEC. De Gaulle’s comments struck a damaging blow at Kennedy’s “Grand Design,” and also placed the Germans, preparing for Adenauer’s visit to Paris, in a difficult bind. Rhetorically committed to British membership, but also looking to formalize relations with France, Adenauer’s government was expected to convince de Gaulle to change his mind while also seeking to work with de Gaulle.40 The January crisis exposed the contradictions of Adenauer’s policy and the disagreements within his government. On the same day that de Gaulle brusquely rejected the MLF, Adenauer informed Assistant Secretary of State George Ball of his willingness to cooperate, in order to secure at least partial West German influence on NATO nuclear strategy, but he remained – 164 –

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suspicious of the British and Americans. He also became worried about Schröder’s close relations with the Anglo-Saxons. He criticized Schröder’s decision to meet with Macmillan after Nassau, claiming that he had failed to secure the proper permission. Though Adenauer did not publicly attack his foreign minister, Fraktion members did, leading Schröder’s defenders to charge that the critics had been “ordered” to do so by unnamed high-ranking opponents, as the “beginning of a campaign” to discredit Schröder.41 In Brussels, representatives from both the Foreign and Economics Ministries sharply criticized de Gaulle. Alfred Müller-Armack, Erhard’s representative in Brussels, refuted de Gaulle’s claims that the British had failed to show good faith, offering a point-by-point defense of British behavior. Similar criticisms from the Foreign Office led Adenauer to write a letter reminding Schröder that the chancellor set policy, and that he wanted relations with France handled “with special care.”42 Adenauer’s anger at the German delegation in Brussels reflected his unshakable desire to conclude his agreement with France. His fixation on a successful trip to Paris was such that he failed to understand the consternation of many allies over de Gaulle’s veto on British membership in the EEC. Instead, he complained that the issue was “being used by enemies of the merger [Gegnern des Zusammenschlusses] between France and Germany to sabotage it.” Rumors collected by Globke heightened these suspicions, suggesting that Schröder was working with the SPD against Adenauer. In discussions with his closest confidantes, Adenauer even considered rejecting the MLF in favor of direct Franco-German nuclear cooperation. In light of the public mood, however, and his weakened position within the party and government (not to mention the question of whether de Gaulle was interested in sharing French nuclear forces with anyone), he was convinced to drop the idea.43 Recognizing the need to avoid further controversy to secure his visit to Paris, Adenauer chose a conciliatory public strategy. At the cabinet meeting on 16 January, he did not mention his differences with Schröder. Instead, he emphasized the historical importance of Franco-German reconciliation, both to prove that Germany could live in peace with its former “archenemy” and to guarantee German security against future “encirclement” by the French and Soviets. By focusing the discussion on the general issue of good Franco-German relations, which the Union and most of the German public supported, Adenauer gained Schröder’s support. He pursued this same strategy in the Fraktion, overcoming a threatened SPD Bundestag resolution to delay the visit. In a meeting with the heads of the Union, FDP, and SPD Fraktions, he offered vague reassurances that he would speak with de Gaulle about the Brussels negotiations, which were scheduled to resume on 28 January. This was enough for Brentano, who told the Union Fraktion that Adenauer departed for Paris with a “mandate from the entire Bundestag.” This optimism, however, hid underlying disagreements. During the meeting – 165 –

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with the party leaders, Adenauer’s arguments were riddled with contradictions. He assured his critics that the Federal Republic could never oppose British membership in the EEC because they needed London’s support in Berlin, but coupled this flat and passionless endorsement with a disquisition detailing how Britain had consistently avoided European commitments since 1950. An exasperated Fritz Erler of the SPD responded that although Adenauer said he favored British admission, his most impassioned arguments spoke against it.44 If Brentano was guilty of wishful thinking, however, one can understand his reasons. It was in West German interest to avoid a painful choice between Franco-German reconciliation and Atlantic solidarity. Brentano reflected a widely shared desire, which Adenauer consciously manipulated, to believe that both could be had. Even Schröder, wanting to avoid a complete breakdown of Franco-German relations, was willing to follow this line. He emphasized the importance of Franco-German consultation, though, with an eye toward his own vision of that cooperation, he added that “even between friends there can be differences of opinion.”45 Continued ambiguity had its price, however. Adenauer’s vague reassurances and Brentano’s cautious optimism did not dispel opposition to the trip to Paris, either among opinion leaders or within the government. Indeed, by indicating that the Federal Republic still supported British membership, Adenauer encouraged his critics to attack de Gaulle. Speaking for Erhard, Alfred Müller-Armack publicly expressed contempt for the “illusionary” French demand that Britain divest itself of its other commitments in order to be admitted to Europe. Arguing that economic and political necessity made British membership the only logical position, MüllerArmack was joined by representatives of the German business elite such as the BDI and the Deutscher Industrie- und Handelstag in denouncing French obstructionism. Even close political friends, from Dean Acheson and John McCloy to Herbert Blankenhorn, urged Adenauer to recognize that de Gaulle’s actions threatened to destroy European integration.46 Adenauer was unmoved. Once in Paris, he dropped his moderate pose, endorsing French autonomy as insurance against future shifts in American policy and making only vague reference to British EEC membership. Instead of following the advice of Brentano, Erhard, and Schröder, Adenauer merely proposed creating a committee to study the long-term effects of EEC enlargement. De Gaulle agreed, but the transcript leaves little impression that this report would make any difference. Although Adenauer’s supporters cited this concession as a “great triumph,” it left unanswered the basic question of whether Britain would ever be allowed into the EEC, and did not require any change in French policy. These concerns were momentarily overshadowed by the official treaty signing on 22 January in the Elysée Palace, where the grandeur of the scene and the heartfelt declarations of friendship between Adenauer and de Gaulle impressed all observers. After – 166 –

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the two statesmen affixed their signatures, de Gaulle embraced and kissed Adenauer, who, contrary to his cold public image, returned the embrace. De Gaulle then turned to Schröder and shook his hand. “I do not kiss you yet,” was the general’s playful but pointed remark.47 Adenauer’s shadow compromise was enough to guarantee the signing of the treaty, but not enough to satisfy his critics. Although they did not deny the historic significance of Franco-German reconciliation, many charged that the treaty’s timing threatened to divide the West into Continental and Atlantic blocs. Some called it a betrayal of Westbindung. This argument has merit, but it rests on a false assumption—that Westbindung, for Adenauer, meant an identity of interests between Europe and the Atlantic world. As the previous chapters have shown, this was by no means the case. For all the charges that can be leveled at it, the Elysée Treaty was the ultimate expression of the ambivalence at the heart of Adenauer’s attitude toward the US, an ambivalence reinforced by conflicts since 1960, but which had much deeper roots. Adenauer did not want to lose American protection, but he also did not believe that an Atlantic community was attainable or desirable. America was too big, too distant, too different. Europe had a separate identity within the West, and the treaty’s provisions for consultation and coordination—and its open invitation for other (Continental) states to join—were designed to preserve and maintain this separation. Far from betraying his earlier vision, Adenauer’s policy in 1963 exposed the contradictions that he had spent more than a decade trying to hide. In refusing to see the danger of dividing the West, even in the face of immediate negative responses in Washington and London, Adenauer intensified disputes within the Union, and had to watch while even loyal allies distanced themselves from him. Brentano warned his mentor about the difficulties ahead. Despite his endorsement of Franco-German reconciliation, he urged Adenauer “to overcome the false impression that we have created a Franco-German alliance that someday might stand in opposition to a common European or Atlantic policy.” The US was and would remain the leader of the free world, Brentano concluded, adding “you have succeeded in convincing … the Germans, including the opposition, of this fact….” Now, he hinted, Adenauer should remind de Gaulle as well.48 Brentano’s constructive criticism paled in comparison to other assessments. Martin Liebes of the Industrial Circle for Foreign Relations expressed German industry’s deep reservations about the treaty in two letters to Herbert Blankenhorn. Liebes was especially disturbed by Adenauer’s rejection of Atlantic economic cooperation. Citing unnamed “experts,” Adenauer had declared such a concept unworkable. Liebes commented ironically: “Here, we know of no expert who makes this argument,” adding that Erhard, who “normally is supposed to advise the chancellor on such issues,” believed the opposite. Liebes and his colleagues feared “a loosening of our relationship with the United States and a drastic reduction of American interest in – 167 –

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West Germany,” and, accusing Adenauer of living in a “dream world,” Liebes concluded: “We have lived through enough crises in the last ten years … but this crisis that de Gaulle has caused … must be described as nothing less than a catastrophe.”49 The loyal Blankenhorn, who had tried to warn Adenauer, confided to his diary that he observed the treaty with “mixed emotions.” He recognized the historic importance of Franco-German reconciliation, but feared that de Gaulle intended to “separate and isolate the Federal Republic from its partners” and “drag her along in [France’s] political wake.” The Germans had betrayed their European ideals, had ruined relations with Britain, and had “released in the United States such mistrust and hostile feeling … that will only increase if the talks in Brussels fail.” His final statements display the depths of his disappointment. “History,” he wrote, “will evaluate this period of German foreign policy … as the flawed accomplishment of a man who, because of his age, is simply no longer able to appreciate the complex and nuanced course for the Federal Republic in foreign affairs and draw the proper conclusions. This is simply bad foreign policy …, and the future … will make that even clearer.”50 The first consequences came in Brussels on 28 January, when, despite de Gaulle’s vague promises, the French torpedoed further negotiations with Britain. Although Erhard and Schröder both advocated continuing talks and proposed a conference on the implications of expansion, the French delegation requested an adjournment sine die. The Foreign Office tried to put the best face on things, declaring that the Federal Republic remained committed to both British EEC membership and Franco-German reconciliation, but Erhard left no doubt that he felt betrayed by de Gaulle and Adenauer. The German press called on Adenauer to reconsider his policy, and the FDP declared that it would not vote to ratify the treaty.51 International pressure also increased, much to the irritation of Adenauer loyalists. Krone complained that Kennedy wrote an “arrogant … schoolmasterish” letter to Adenauer, warning the Germans that they would have to choose between de Gaulle and the US. Krone rejected the notion of a choice, arguing that participation in the MLF proved German loyalty to American strategy, but noted darkly “there are poisonous forces at work in Washington.” Adenauer shared the impression that it was the Americans who were causing the crisis, complaining to Ambassador Dowling that John Foster Dulles would have “embraced him joyously” if he had heard of the cementing of Franco-German cooperation.52 Bravado was not, however, going to be enough to deflect mounting domestic opposition. When Adenauer faced the Fraktion on 5 February, the critics were ready. As he did in the cabinet, Adenauer argued that the coincidence of de Gaulle’s press conference and the treaty signing should not detract from its historic importance, citing Rusk’s 1962 comment that the Americans welcomed Franco-German reconciliation. Brentano refrained – 168 –

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from open criticism, reaffirming his and the Fraktion’s commitment to NATO and to British EEC membership, concluding that “only a fool would think that any state in the free world could loosen its ties with the United States.” He gently urged that the Germans distance themselves from de Gaulle’s policy, because “there should be no shadow over our relationship [with] the United States,” but hastened to add that here he and the chancellor agreed.53 This general but uneasy agreement between Brentano and Adenauer was echoed by some, but there were notable exceptions. Erhard refused to retract his harsh criticism of French behavior in Brussels, declaring that his statement was made out of “conscience … and because it had to be said.” Erhard’s comments caused murmuring among the backbenchers, followed by a frontal assault. Kurt Birrenbach challenged Adenauer’s bland assertion that de Gaulle’s press conference was a surprise, and asked how the chancellor could expect future cooperation with France when Paris ignored the German compromise proposals in Brussels. Adenauer tried to respond with the comment that no one could expect that he and de Gaulle would discuss every press conference beforehand, and added the following challenge: “I’ll tell you something: you can think what you want of de Gaulle, but believe me, he is not stupid. He knows just as well as you do, Mr. Birrenbach, and I do, that even France would be lost against Russia without the United States. Do you really think he is that stupid? How can anyone believe that? I don’t understand!” Birrenbach, however, did not back down, challenging Adenauer to reconcile cooperation with both the US and de Gaulle’s France. Adenauer lost his temper, asking Birrenbach if he had even read the treaty, and arguing that the pact did not bind Germany to France, but only provided for consultation. Thus, the Federal Republic had decided to participate in the MLF even though France had not. (What General de Gaulle would say about this interpretation only two weeks after the dramatic signing ceremony was not mentioned.) Birrenbach’s criticism was so unusual that he felt moved to write to Brentano and Krone shortly afterward to apologize, though he argued that Adenauer’s “irresponsible” refusal to admit his mistakes had set him off. He was especially disgusted that many colleagues who criticized Adenauer in private did not have the nerve to speak up in front of him.54 Even if many chose to be silent, however, this unusually lively meeting displayed the very real differences of opinion within the Union on the treaty, and caused a final break between Adenauer and Birrenbach.55 Later, speakers such as Ernst Majonica and Defense Minister von Hassel tried to reduce tensions by emphasizing foreign policy continuity, combining Franco-German reconciliation with a commitment to NATO and the MLF. Others remained concerned. Erik Blumenfeld, the CDU chief in Hamburg and a member of the board of the Atlantik-Brücke, warned that excessive reliance on France would spark a revival of isolationism in the US. Birrenbach added a warning that Europe was not an end in itself, but rather “part of a larger community, for without the United States, Europe cannot – 169 –

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survive.”56 Brentano, trying to provide at least a patina of unity before the formal debate in the Bundestag, closed the meeting with a general statement that all agreed on the need for Atlantic cooperation. Adenauer’s defense of the treaty reflected the contradictions in his policy. On the one hand, he portrayed it as a historic document that would cement Franco-German cooperation. When confronted by Birrenbach with the reality of French policy that threatened to separate the Federal Republic from the US, however, Adenauer retreated to the argument that the treaty was but a vehicle for further debate. Although it is difficult to determine if Adenauer believed both of these arguments, his statements to de Gaulle indicate that he did want a close relationship with France and expected the Americans and British to accept that. He wanted to balance his European vision with Atlantic ties, on his own terms. This was never an easy balancing act, and it had become virtually impossible by 1963. Adenauer was a master political tactician, but his optimism clearly contradicted the public mood. Rumors of Anglo-American plots to force his early retirement were joined by formal criticisms from both the Americans and former colleagues such as EEC Chair Walter Hallstein. A summary of opinion compiled by Krone on the same day as the stormy Fraktion meeting indicated that, despite Adenauer’s denials, the Americans considered the treaty an endorsement of de Gaulle’s policy, and that de Gaulle himself had told his cabinet that he intended to create an independent Europe before the scheduled renewal of the NATO treaty in 1969. De Gaulle’s comments about the British, mounting criticism in the French press of American investment in French industry, and an early February visit to Washington by Foreign Office Undersecretary Karl Carstens all indicated increasing Franco-American tension.57 Long-time American friends of Germany such as John McCloy and Dean Acheson, whom Birrenbach had enlisted to persuade Adenauer to influence de Gaulle, were also clear in their disapproval. “What Germany has to choose between is not France and the United States,” McCloy wrote after the debacle in Brussels, “but between an adequate concept or an inadequate one for the overall security of the Free World.” McCloy also suspected Adenauer’s motives, arguing that he was “too old a fox” to be duped by de Gaulle and that “the surprise expressed at the perfectly natural reactions of the United States … is not convincing.” Acheson was even more critical, writing that Adenauer “has never understood General de Gaulle’s design nor the undignified role designed for him or for Germany.” Acheson objected to the implication that British ties to the US would unduly involve the EEC with the American economy, wryly noting that economic relations between Europe and the US had “been on the whole the relations of anemia patients with a blood bank.” While “happy that our friends are feeling so invigorated and confident,” Acheson wondered “whether General de Gaulle really expresses a view which Germans want the Chancellor to accept?” The best – 170 –

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solution, Acheson and McCloy both suggested, would be for the Bundestag to attach a resolution to the treaty reasserting their commitment to NATO and to EEC expansion. “If, as all my German friends insist,” Acheson wrote presciently, “these policies are as firmly rooted in German opinion as rapprochement with France, it can do no harm to assert them at the same time, and it could be a helpful reminder to both the Chancellor and the General. If either of them takes umbrage, that in itself would be interesting.”58 Birrenbach would take up this suggestion, with profound implications for the future of the Union.

The Atlanticists Strike Back: The Elysée Preamble and Adenauer’s Retirement Even as Acheson and McCloy were making their suggestions, German Atlanticists were developing their response to Adenauer and de Gaulle. At the February 1963 meeting of the Atlantik-Brücke in Bonn, delegates approved making a public declaration of Atlantic unity, “of high literary and stylistic quality” which would be signed by Germans “whose names have influence in America” and placed in major American newspapers. Birrenbach was chosen to organize the declaration, along with Marion Gräfin Dönhoff, publisher of Die Zeit. They would coordinate with Christopher Emmett of the American Council on Germany, who urged Germans to dispel American concerns by clearly stating their commitment to NATO and emphasizing that relations with France were a “two-way street” which would allow them to influence de Gaulle.59 The collaborators worked furiously, approving the final text on 1 March. The declaration included an introduction by General Lucius Clay and was signed by representatives from across the German political spectrum, including Birrenbach, Social Democrats Willy Brandt and Fritz Erler, FDP Chair Erich Mende, and even Adenauer’s erstwhile ally Brentano as Union Fraktion chair. The list also included representatives of German industry (Hermann Abs of the Deutsche Bank and Fritz Berg of the BDI), labor (Ludwig Rosenberg and Bernhard Tacke of the DGB); and leading intellectuals such as Theodor Heuss and Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker. The declaration appeared in the Christian Science Monitor on 20 March, then in the Washington Post and New York Herald Tribune European edition on 21 March. The major New York papers, in the midst of a strike, did not publish the declaration immediately, but Emmett arranged for it to be sent directly to influential Americans.60 Its text was simple, calling on all Europeans to realize that the EEC must include Britain, and that European freedom and prosperity would not have been possible without the help of the US. The concluding paragraph read: Europe’s renewed feeling of self-confidence today must not tempt any European nation to forget this truth. Certainly, the vast majority of the German people know that the values of freedom, which our brothers beyond the Elbe yearn for – 171 –

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even more than for our material prosperity, can neither be preserved nor extended without the United States. The alliance with America has, therefore, become an axiom in the postwar political philosophy of Germany. Nobody, and certainly no responsible German politician, would dare to weaken this cornerstone of our safety. We are too well aware of the appropriateness of the famous words of your countryman, Benjamin Franklin, when he said: “We must all hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang separately.”61

The “Atlanticist Appeal” was a direct challenge to Adenauer and de Gaulle. Adenauer, however, was still unmoved. As this declaration was being prepared, he was seeking ammunition against the Atlantic community. Frustrated by the profusion of “Atlantic” terms, he asked the Foreign Office for clarification. The European desk offered the following definitions: Atlantic Alliance = NATO alliance according to the NATO treaty. Atlantic community = Totality of the NATO states, which are bound by common military, political, economic, and cultural interests and principles. (This expression indicates nothing about the organizational form of the alliance, but many understand it in the sense of a future official integration of all NATO states, much like the EEC.) Atlantic partnership = Atlantic community in the form that Kennedy seeks, namely, an equal relationship between the North American and European NATO states, in which the members maintain their legal independence in interdependence. The concept includes the sharing of burdens in the defense of the West’s freedom and in help for developing countries.

The first and third of these terms earned no objections. The concept of an “Atlantic Community,” however, endorsed by Birrenbach and the other signers of the “Appeal,” received the marginal comment: “This expression should be avoided.”62 Far from inspiring Adenauer to seek accommodation, the “Atlanticist Appeal” only provoked him to defend himself more aggressively. He claimed that the treaty reinforced rather than weakened the West, commenting that the real encouragement for the Soviets came from the American decision to reopen talks on Berlin. It was idiocy (Unsinn) to think that de Gaulle wanted to drive the Americans out of Europe; he knew that the Americans were necessary for the defense of the Continent, but Franco-German reconciliation was the key to a strong European partner in NATO. Adenauer and his staff saw little attraction in an Atlantic community, writing that the Americans “are only concerned with worldwide trade liberalization, so they can make big profits,… and with remaining the unchallenged leader of the West.” The Americans did not want equality, but rather for “junior partner Europe to do everything the senior partner says.” As the discussion over the treaty heated up through February and March, defenders of closer ties with France developed a broader critique of American leadership, praising de Gaulle for his – 172 –

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opposition to the Berlin arrangements and widening the divisions within the government and the Union.63 These divisions were exacerbated by the steady erosion of Adenauer’s authority. Upset by the collapse of the Brussels talks, Erhard was emboldened by the mounting criticism of the treaty to speak out in an interview against de Gaulle’s vision of Europe. As in the earlier days of their relationship, Adenauer admonished Erhard to avoid straying into international politics, and even demanded that State Secretary Müller-Armack, who had been especially vocal, be replaced forthwith. This letter went too far, however, betraying Adenauer’s desire to shift the blame for the Brussels debacle, as he charged (incorrectly) that Britain wanted no further talks until after their next Parliamentary elections. Erhard responded defiantly, rejecting both the charge that he had strayed out of bounds and the implication that Britain had lost interest in further talks. “May I remind you,” Erhard noted acidly, “that Great Britain has not canceled its application to the Common Market, but that, on the contrary, comments by French statesmen have made it almost impossible for the British government to continue talks….” Erhard also defended Müller-Armack, noting that he had no intention of forcing his removal. Flinging the gauntlet before his long-time chief, he ostentatiously refused to attend the cabinet meeting on 28 February. Adenauer tried to make light of the situation, telling Globke: “Erhard feels insulted and won’t be coming today….” Beneath the surface, however, Adenauer was so upset by Erhard’s rebellion that he considered firing him, though Globke and Krone managed to dissuade him. An attempt to discredit Erhard by publishing their exchange in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung backfired, and Adenauer looked like a bitter old man clinging to power.64 German missions abroad reported with alarm that these actions reduced Adenauer’s prestige.65 The growing sense of crisis intensified concern about the future of the Union—specifically, the question of who would succeed Adenauer. Erhard remained the most likely candidate, and his public stance against de Gaulle added to the urgency surrounding the succession. The Union would not be able to hold itself together if it could not resolve these two crises. Partial resolutions would come in April and May 1963, though larger questions would linger. First came the problem of ratifying the Elysée Treaty. Although the Bundestag had signaled general support, representatives of both the SPD and the FDP, as well as many within the Union, agitated with increasing vigor for a declaration reaffirming the Federal Republic’s commitment to Atlantic cooperation, and that became the key to ratification. The Americans pressed Brentano on this point during his February visit to Washington, but he had demurred, preferring a separate declaration. Schröder, despite his Atlantic sympathies, was reluctant for legal reasons to attach an official preamble to the treaty, and left the decision to Adenauer. On 4 April, – 173 –

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therefore, representatives of the Union and the FDP journeyed to Adenauer’s vacation home in Cadenabbia for a conference. Although the chancellor defended the treaty as the birth of a new power center in Europe, which “we have always wanted,” it was clear that a preamble would guarantee broad nonpartisan support, and so he agreed.66 From there, ratification went very smoothly. The preamble, based on a draft from Birrenbach, allowed both the government and opposition to express their concerns about French policy without appearing to torpedo Franco-German reconciliation. On 16 May, the Bundestag ratified the treaty with only four negative votes and four abstentions, and Adenauer, who asserted that he never intended to contradict the Federal Republic’s Atlantic commitments, received a standing ovation.67 The preamble was greeted with sighs of relief. Heinz Krekeler, the former ambassador to Washington called it “the best solution” to the crisis. The Union Fraktion applauded its members for hammering out the compromise text. One member gave special credit to Schröder, calling him the “true winner of the day” for managing negotiations between the parliamentarians and the Foreign Office. Those who welcomed the preamble, however, also realized that it represented a departure from the original spirit of the treaty. Foreign Office State Secretary Rolf Lahr, a long-time participant in making policy toward Europe and NATO, called the preamble a “personal defeat” for Adenauer and a “bitter disappointment” for de Gaulle, who saw his plans for a Franco-German special relationship die stillborn.68 If Adenauer thought so, however, he gave no sign. Although one scholar states that the chancellor “reacted with rage” to the original talk of a preamble, and describes his “decisive resistance” to it, Adenauer’s actions in April and May do not reflect it. He stunned Ernst Majonica, chairman of AK V, at the beginning of the Cadenabbia meeting by declaring: “Why not? Better a treaty with a preamble than no treaty at all.” In a later letter to his son, Adenauer wrote: “The proposed preamble does no harm, and will actually help us to gain votes….”69 The preamble was a tactical retreat. Adenauer wanted the treaty ratified by any means necessary, and simple arithmetic indicated that it would not pass without modification. Years later, the retired chancellor would muse “half questioningly” whether he should have tried to force ratification without the preamble—only to admit that there had been no other way. By accepting it as quickly as he did, Adenauer made a virtue of necessity, avoiding a debilitating intraparty squabble he might not have been able to win. Once the treaty was in place, time would tell whether it was interpreted “properly.”70 This is where the second crisis of 1963 came into play. Ever since Adenauer had declared his intention to resign in time for his successor to lead the Union into the 1965 elections, the succession question had been unavoidable. Most thought he would retire after the 1963 summer vacation, but he deflected specific questions for more than a year. This delicate – 174 –

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political minuet became increasingly burdensome for the Union. A crushing defeat in the February Berlin elections, in which Willy Brandt and the SPD garnered nearly two-thirds of the vote, was an unpleasant reminder of Adenauer’s missteps in August 1961. The succession question was weakening the party at the worst possible time. Facing the challenge posed by the SPD’s new centrist strategy, and concerned about growing conflict between the pretenders to the throne, the leadership decided to take concrete steps to resolve the issue. In early March the Union formed a committee, chaired by Brentano, to select an official successor.71 The result of the search was no surprise. Although Adenauer tried to delay the outcome by encouraging Krone and even Schröder to run, the Fraktion made the same choice that it wanted to make in 1959. At the Fraktionsvorstand meeting on 22 April, the committee presented a single nominee. At the full Fraktion meeting the next day, despite a final impassioned appeal from their aging leader, in a vote of 159 to 47, with 19 abstentions, the Union formally selected Ludwig Erhard as their next chancellor. Bowing at last to the inevitable, Adenauer pledged cooperation with his successor, and the two partners/rivals shook hands to general applause, a gesture repeated before the Bundesvorstand three days later.72 Adenauer’s surrender ended the succession debate. Had the basic question of the Union’s attitude toward the future of Europe been decided? That depended on the point of view of the observer. In a letter to US Assistant Secretary of State William Tyler, Birrenbach saw the preamble, “which neutralize[d] this treaty,” as part of a plan to “clarify” the German position and to “strengthen …the Atlantic links to your country.” Erhard’s succession was the culmination of this process, for “by solving the problem of succession we have made quite clear to General de Gaulle that we do not want an inward-looking Europe.” Adenauer, however, saw things differently. In early June he assured French Ambassador Roland de Margerie that he still believed France and the Federal Republic could accomplish much together, “even in their relationship with the United States,” and pledged to do his utmost to carry on “their common interest,” so that “an entirely new power center could emerge in Europe.”73 Much still remained to be decided.

A Tale of Two Visits The summer of 1963 would offer many occasions to highlight the continuing differences within the Union, beginning with state visits from Kennedy and de Gaulle, which would follow within days of each other in June and July. Adenauer and his closest advisers, reacting to press reports, tried to paint Kennedy’s visit as a vindication of the Elysée Treaty. Close FrancoGerman cooperation, so the argument went, had raised the Federal Republic’s value in the West, forcing the Americans to undertake greater efforts to – 175 –

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“keep us away from de Gaulle.” Franz Josef Strauß, who had returned from his post-Spiegel Affair exile to active political life as the chair of the CSU Landesgruppe, noted rumors in the press that Kennedy hoped to “isolate Paris politically.” De Gaulle’s decision to withdraw the French Atlantic fleet from NATO command, made public only days before Kennedy arrived in Bonn, added to the significance of the trip. Adenauer hoped to gain concessions from the US by raising the possibility of moving closer to de Gaulle if the Americans did not pay sufficient attention to Bonn’s concerns. In a speech to the German Society for Foreign Affairs (DGAP) on the eve of Kennedy’s arrival, Adenauer advocated good relations with both the US and France, with the Federal Republic in the middle holding the West together.74 If Adenauer welcomed Kennedy’s visit as a chance to renew his intraWestern Schaukelpolitik, however, he underestimated American intentions of tipping the balance in their favor. Kennedy’s schedule showed he was more interested in swaying German public opinion than in engaging Adenauer in detailed debate over the shape of the West. Though full of impressive public moments, beginning with the motorcade from Wahn airport to Cologne Cathedral for Sunday Mass upon arrival, and including major speeches in Frankfurt and Berlin, the three-day visit included little substantive political discussion. Kennedy spoke alone with Adenauer for about ninety minutes on 24 June, with most of the time taken up by Adenauer’s vain attempt to win Kennedy over to his ideas for relations with the Soviets. Kennedy listened politely, but remained noncommittal. Adenauer also tried to convince Kennedy that the US had nothing to fear from closer Franco-German cooperation. Citing the danger of French communism, Adenauer urged Kennedy to allow de Gaulle to shore up his domestic support. Kennedy was unsurprisingly unsympathetic, and cited American critics of European “ingratitude.” The discussion ended pleasantly, but without any breakthroughs.75 The atmosphere in the larger conference, including Rusk, Schröder, Erhard, and Defense Minister von Hassel, was also routine. Kennedy revealed his attitude toward the by-now-familiar discussions of the MLF, tariff reductions, and Atlantic partnership by cutting the planned two-hour discussion short after a little more than an hour, citing the need to prepare for his afternoon press conference. Schröder and Erhard, who had hoped to speak in greater detail with their American counterparts, were disappointed. Horst Osterheld noted sourly that even though the agenda had been proposed by the Americans, Kennedy “did not give the impression that he was particularly interested … [the press conference] was clearly more important to him.”76 Though his Gaullist sympathies made him a far from neutral observer, Osterheld was more correct than he supposed. Kennedy’s goal was to reestablish American preeminence in the struggle for leadership in Europe. That was the point of the public spectacles, culminating in the triumphant speech in Berlin. Critics like Osterheld complained that the speeches were – 176 –

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“a little long and, for our taste, too emotional and too flattering, so much so that more critical listeners sometimes doubted his sincerity,” and even Kennedy worried that the exuberant crowds reflected a disturbing German tendency toward irrationality. Such concerns were secondary, however, because the public was enchanted. The rest was up to Kennedy’s German supporters, who drew the necessary conclusions. The Foreign Office, under Schröder’s direction, read great meaning into Kennedy’s speeches in Berlin and Frankfurt. “The United States have once and for all recognized their world political responsibilities,” according to one memorandum. “A return to isolationism is impossible, now and forever.”77 Using his popularity to move West German opinion, Kennedy had succeeded in transmitting his message. Kennedy’s visit provided new impetus for Union Atlanticists to complete the work that had begun with the preamble to the Elysée Treaty and Erhard’s selection as Adenauer’s successor. Schröder made this explicit in his first public address after Kennedy’s departure. Speaking before representatives of the iron and steel industry in Düsseldorf, Schröder made an impassioned plea for Atlantic cooperation, with European integration as but the first step. “We are all perfectly aware,” Schröder declared, “that the political unification of Europe is necessary, not least of all in order to create and stabilize a partnership of equals with the United States of America.” Europe should not worry about American deals at its expense, nor should Germans view European integration as a way to prepare for an American withdrawal. “We need to ensure that our vital interests correspond to those of the US,” he concluded. The Germans should “create circumstances that will bind us and our interests indissolubly with [the] Americans. This mutual dependence and close partnership,” Schröder concluded, would be “our surest protection.”78 Schröder’s credo, given before an audience that shared his distrust of de Gaulle, left little doubt where he stood. Building on Kennedy’s triumph and preparing for Adenauer’s retirement, Schröder set the tone for future policy. Equal parts declaration and exhortation, Schröder’s speech was meant to indicate that there would be no European “third way” between Washington and Moscow. He did not reject reconciliation with France, but, unlike Adenauer, he avoided formulas placing France and the US on an equal level, instead situating Franco-German cooperation within a larger Atlantic context. This message was received loud and clear in Paris, where de Gaulle, already disappointed by the preamble and Kennedy’s enthusiastic reception, prepared for his 4 July visit to Bonn. With Adenauer on the way out, and Schröder determined to stay, Franco-German cooperation as the core of an independent Europe appeared dead. The general greeted this development philosophically. At a meeting with French parliamentarians on 2 July, he commented that treaties were like roses and young maidens: they bloom and quickly fade. He would still go to Bonn, but with limited expectations.79 – 177 –

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Adenauer, however, was not so quick to give up. He continued to believe that even with the preamble the Elysée Treaty could lead to the cooperation that he and de Gaulle had envisioned. At the gala banquet for the French delegation in Bonn on 4 July, he played on de Gaulle’s comments about roses and young maidens. In his toast, Adenauer, whose home in Rhöndorf was surrounded by the most famous rose garden in Germany, reminded his guests that “the rose … is the hardiest plant there is … it survives every winter.”80 He preferred to see future Franco-German relations as a matter of will, dependent on the ingenuity of the “gardeners” in both capitals to secure the blooms through seasons of frost. Whether as a result of political calculation or the stubbornness that comes with advancing age, Adenauer, supported by advisers in the Chancellery and allies in the Bundestag, was determined to advance his version of European cooperation. This determination, combined with de Gaulle’s pessimism and Schröder and Erhard’s strong Atlanticism, added to the tension of the meetings. Only a year after the grand successes in Paris and Rheims, these talks reflected how far short of their original plans Adenauer and de Gaulle had fallen. De Gaulle’s visit provides a counterpoint to Kennedy’s triumphal tour. Realizing he could not match Kennedy’s public spectacles, and unwilling to embarrass himself by appearing to try, de Gaulle focused on business. This decision proved unfortunate. Where Kennedy had avoided details, speaking in general phrases with which no one could disagree, de Gaulle’s focus on policy discussions only magnified the differences between Paris and Bonn— and between the factions within the Union. Beyond the creation of the Franco-German Youth Organization, the meetings produced few tangible results. Adenauer and de Gaulle devoted much of their time to private discussions, accompanied only by an interpreter. De Gaulle predicted that even the Germans would eventually find American dominance of NATO “difficult to bear,” and looked to the day when a reorganized West would allow Europe greater strategic independence. Their discussion became somber when they mentioned Adenauer’s imminent retirement. Though claiming no interest in interfering with German domestic politics, de Gaulle admitted that future German policy remained a “question mark” for him. Neither left any doubt of their misgivings.81 The larger discussions were even less encouraging. Adenauer and de Gaulle spoke of the European future and Franco-German initiatives, while Erhard and Schröder advocated continuing contact between the EEC and Great Britain. When both Couve de Murville and Adenauer tried to deflect the discussion from this issue, neither Schröder nor Erhard backed down. Osterheld noted in his diary that Adenauer’s casual dismissal of the need to consult the British so irritated Schröder that he “had to make an effort to control himself.” De Gaulle tried to defuse the situation by remarking that he “admired” Erhard’s “tenacity” in advocating British EEC membership. A visibly annoyed Erhard responded that, considering the general’s – 178 –

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reputation for stubbornness, he hoped de Gaulle meant this as a compliment. For a moment, the participants sat in embarrassed silence. Then came quiet chuckles at Erhard’s riposte, until even de Gaulle joined in a general round of laughter.82 Erhard came away from his meetings with de Gaulle hopeful that he could develop a good relationship with the French, but unwilling to abandon his Atlanticism. De Gaulle professed to be pleased at their open discussions, and hoped that the free exchange of ideas would continue. Back in Paris, however, he admitted that he would not have an easy time with the “new team.” In stark contrast to their enthusiastic descriptions of the Kennedy visit, the “anti-Gaullist” media, much to Adenauer’s dismay, emphasized the lack of concrete accomplishments, while Schröder assured Rusk that the Germans had no intention of embracing French plans for NATO reorganization.83 Despite the summer sun, the Franco-German rose continued to wither.

Conclusion: The Test Ban Treaty and the Shape of Things to Come After de Gaulle’s departure, most observers of West German politics expected a quiet few months before the Bundestag reassembled in the autumn. Parliamentarians planned vacations and journalists prepared for the fallow summer news season by writing features on the imminent end of the “Adenauer era,” scheduled for the middle of October. These plans were disrupted, however, by a conflict that almost hastened the end of Adenauer’s tenure and highlighted the conflicts within the Union about the future of the West. The crisis would center around the conclusion of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban treaty in Moscow in July, and the American request that the Federal Republic sign the treaty. It would offer a glimpse of the shape of things to come in West German politics. The test ban is generally considered one of John F. Kennedy’s great foreign policy triumphs, a major step toward détente with the Soviets and European “settlement.” Even his critics consider it “one of the few successes in the diplomatic record of the Kennedy administration.” Despite or (one could cynically assert) because of the treaty’s importance as a milestone in détente, however, many Germans greeted it with considerably less enthusiasm. American negotiating tactics and the pressure they exerted on the Germans to accept the treaty rekindled old questions about the ultimate relationship between the US and Europe.84 The test ban proved so controversial in part because it was so unexpected. The controversy began with mixed messages from Kennedy during the summer of 1963. He had sounded like a true Cold Warrior when he challenged anyone who believed that there were no real differences between communism and the West to “come to Berlin.” Such turns of phrase, reinforced by – 179 –

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pessimistic comments in private discussions with Adenauer, did not encourage hopes for East-West negotiations. Only two weeks earlier, however, in a famous commencement address at American University, Kennedy had cited the presence of the nuclear “sword of Damocles” over the heads of all nations as justification for negotiating with the Soviets. This mixed message led most Germans to assume that Kennedy, while interested in détente, did not expect any immediate agreements with the Soviets, when in retrospect it is clear that arms control had become one of Kennedy’s highest priorities.85 It was therefore a surprise for the Germans on 25 July when the Americans, British, and Soviets announced an agreement to ban all nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in space, and under water, an agreement that the Americans wanted their allies to sign as soon as possible. Certainly, all wanted to “put an end to experiments with the Devil’s weapons.” The wording of the treaty, however, was problematic for the Germans. In their quest to include as many other states in the agreement as possible (especially France and the People’s Republic of China), the Americans and British had agreed to a broad admission clause that would allow the GDR to be included as a separate state. Krone and many other Germans saw this as part of a larger Communist strategy. “Through this agreement,” he wrote in his diary, “[GDR Premier Walter] Ulbricht gets a place at the table.” Fearing that the treaty would constitute legal recognition of the East German regime, the West German government hesitated to endorse it.86 Concern about the possible recognition of the GDR was tied to the larger question of the Federal Republic’s role in the West. That the Americans and British had kept the negotiations secret, implying that nonnuclear powers within the West were excluded from important negotiations, was worrisome. Especially problematic, however, was what the treaty revealed about the Anglo-American commitment to reunification. As part of Westbindung, Adenauer had endured withering attacks from critics who charged that he did not care about reunification. In return, the Allies promised not to compromise the West German legal position by recognizing the separate existence of the GDR. In the spring of 1962, plans for an international access authority for Berlin had raised this question; the test ban now raised it anew. “Our reunification policy has never been as endangered as it is now by this treaty,” Adenauer complained. “We don’t need to talk about reunification every day, but we should never give it up….” Adenauer had been willing to go a long way to guarantee the Federal Republic’s ties to the West, but he would not recognize the GDR. “It was so important to me,” he told his cabinet, “that I, who was labeled ‘Chancellor of the Allies’ at the beginning of my career, would have been ready to resign as ‘Chancellor against the Allies.’”87 In the end, it did not come to that drastic pass. However lax they may have been in anticipating German objections—and however annoyed they were by German complaints (McGeorge Bundy angrily called it “unthinkable” that the Federal Republic might not sign)—the Americans were anxious to avoid – 180 –

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prolonged controversy. Never believing that signing the treaty implied diplomatic recognition of any of the other signatories, both Kennedy and Rusk made official announcements to that effect, and the crisis was put to rest. The cabinet approved the Treaty on 16 August, and Federal Republic representatives in Washington, London and Moscow signed on 19 August. The signatures were low key, without any comment to the local press, while in Bonn the Foreign Office issued a statement that the West German signature in no way represented a recognition of the GDR.88 What had briefly appeared a life-or-death crisis quickly retreated from view. Nevertheless, the crisis exposed the conflicts within the Union. For Atlanticists such as Schröder, the test ban posed a serious but solvable problem. He was annoyed that he had to learn of the treaty’s wording in the newspaper, but made his point lightly, teasing Bundy that while he “had a good sense of humor … that was a bit much.” After initial legal objections, Schröder focused his energy upon securing Anglo-American declarations that would allow the Germans to sign. Schröder’s businesslike approach revealed his basic faith in the harmony of American and German interests, leading a critical Heinrich Krone to note in his diary shortly after the treaty was made public that, despite his legal concerns, “Schröder has already said yes.”89 For those who already doubted long-term Atlantic cooperation, however, the test ban assumed quite a different cast. Led by Adenauer, these skeptics were more willing to criticize American policy publicly, and much less mollified by American concessions. Through July and early August, Adenauer poured out his scorn on everyone from Kennedy to Rusk to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. The secret talks with the Soviets and the disregard for German interests justified every dark suspicion he had harbored about the Anglo-Saxons. These suspicions had led him to conclude the Elysée Treaty in the first place. Now the Americans and British appeared to be reneging on their rhetorical commitments to German unification, and because de Gaulle had for its own reasons refused to sign the test ban, Adenauer considered “French help … absolutely indispensable for us in the coming twelve months.”90 Even Brentano urged the cabinet to reject the treaty and “to work together as closely as possible with the French.” As a former foreign minister, Brentano was as unwilling as Adenauer to abandon the policy of nonrecognition of the GDR. He also considered a German signature of the treaty unnecessary in the first place, citing Adenauer’s 1954 renunciation of ABC weapons.91 Bitterness over the alleged betrayal of German interests led to some major flights of rhetorical fancy. Both Strauß and Krone compared the test ban to Versailles. Krone, who admitted that it would be impossible to avoid signing, nonetheless came to the pessimistic conclusion that “[w]e are the victims of the American détente policy,” and concluded that the Germans needed to “activate” relations with France as insurance against future American demands. This sentiment was endorsed by a Bavarian – 181 –

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branch of the Junge Union, in a special discussion with the provocative title “De Gaulle or Kennedy? German Foreign Policy at a Turning Point.”92 In retrospect, it is difficult to understand the vehemence of West German reactions to the test ban. The Federal Republic’s claim to be the sole legitimate representative of Germany has always seemed surreal to non-Germans, as it appeared to contradict the practical existence of and regular contact and trade between the two German states. Until reunification, this problem was surrounded by layers of convoluted legalese. This question alone, however, was not enough to justify the vehement German reactions. Henning Köhler also cites personal factors, ascribing Adenauer’s overreaction, even as the Foreign Office negotiated the necessary compromises, to the instability of an old man no longer emotionally capable of managing foreign affairs.93 Köhler may be correct in his assessment of Adenauer’s state of mind, but that does not explain why others within the Union also reacted so strongly to the test ban. Ultimately, it is impossible to find that explanation in a close analysis of the treaty provisions. The problem lay more in the symbolism than the substance. The test ban was a political Rorschach test upon which German politicians imposed their visions of European-American relations. For Schröder and his supporters, the lack of consultation was a concern, but their general faith in the British and Americans allowed them to overcome their reservations. The crisis proved that consultation within the Atlantic community needed to be improved, but only through closer cooperation with the Anglo-Saxons. For Adenauer and his supporters, however, the treaty confirmed their concerns about Anglo-Saxon perfidy and the need to work with de Gaulle. It also raised the possibility that the Germans would be placed in a permanent position of nuclear inferiority (which, of course, is exactly what the Soviets and the Americans intended). Strauß complained to the CSU Landesgruppe that “as long as Russia and the Anglo-Saxons conclude treaties over [the heads of] Continental Europe, that is a continuation of Yalta with kid gloves.” Schröder came increasingly under suspicion. As Strauß concluded: “Either it is the way [Schröder] says, that he first read the treaty in the newspaper, which means he should resign due to incompetence; or it is not, in which case he must have been conspiring behind Adenauer’s back.”94 This conflict reflected more than an old man’s pique. Throughout the summer, those divisions only hardened. While visiting the US in September to confer with the Kennedy administration and to serve as grand marshal of New York’s Steuben German-American parade, Schröder left no doubt of his confidence in the Americans. He assured Bundy and Rusk of West German commitment to NATO, and shared their concerns about French obstructionism. Rejecting the “grotesque” and “silly” argument that Bonn had to choose between Paris and Washington, Schröder advocated greater consultation within NATO—not to balance France and the US, but to encourage the French to accept American leadership. The Kennedy team was very pleased. Complaining about the generation gap that – 182 –

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separated Kennedy from Adenauer and de Gaulle, Theodore Sorensen told Schröder that he was much easier to work with, adding: “The President likes you.” Schröder echoed the sentiment, and ensured that this comment found its way into the official transcript. One correspondent summarized Schröder’s policy, much to Adenauer’s annoyance, as “Hold on as tightly as possible to Kennedy.”95 Adenauer himself showed how his circle of allies had narrowed in planning his farewell tour as chancellor. The last weeks of September were set aside for visits to Rome and Paris. A trip to Washington had been postponed in favor of Kennedy’s trip to Europe, then, after the test ban crisis, quietly dropped. London had never been considered. After spending fourteen years building a community within which the Federal Republic could enjoy security and stability, Adenauer left office with his world reduced again to the core of the Abendland: Bonn, Rome, and Paris. In a final revealing irony, while his foreign minister was in Washington, Adenauer went to Rambouillet one more time to speak with de Gaulle. This trip signaled Adenauer’s further distance from Schröder; planning rested with the Chancellery, and neither the Foreign Office nor the embassy in Paris was informed of the agenda. Adenauer promised de Gaulle that he would continue to agitate for closer Franco-German relations after his retirement, calling their common work “the most important accomplishment” of his career. In phrases either hopeful or ominous, depending on one’s perspective, Adenauer emphasized that he would remain CDU chair and a member of the Bundestag, and would have many opportunities to influence policy. Nor did he leave any doubt about where he hoped German policy might go, dismissing talk of an Atlantic community as “utopian” and assuring de Gaulle that he had only agreed to participate in the MLF to “nail the Americans down” in their commitment to Europe. He hoped that Schröder would be “cured” of his Anglophilia, and that close Franco-German cooperation would endure.96 Such hopes for harmony would be disappointed. In his report to the Cabinet on his trip, Adenauer urged closer cooperation with France. He described his “embarrassing half-hour” as de Gaulle criticized the lack of consultation on the German decision to sign the test ban. This was too much for Schröder. Reading a memorandum on the meeting after his own return from Washington, he responded to Adenauer’s comments with the angry marginal note: “And what does de Gaulle do? Has he ever consulted us?”97 For those who hoped, through the preamble to the Elysée Treaty and Erhard’s election, to put an end to the conflict within the Union, the years to come would be a disappointment. The divisions that had become apparent from 1961 to 1963 did not disappear. Rather, the conflict left scars that could no longer be papered over with bland language. Though all endorsed continued ties to the West, the practical meaning of the West within the party of Westbindung in October 1963 was as clear as it ever was—which is to say, not very clear at all. – 183 –

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Notes 1. Frank Costigliola, “The Pursuit of Atlantic Community: Nuclear Arms, Dollars, and Berlin,” in Thomas G. Paterson, ed., Kennedy’s Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961–1963 (New York, 1989), 24–56, quote on 54; Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy (New York, 1965), 601. 2. Shortly before his assassination, Kennedy’s approval rating in West Germany had reached 83 percent, ibid., 24, 55–56. See also Thomas Alan Schwartz, “Victories and Defeats in the Long Twilight Struggle: The United States and Western Europe in the 1960s,” in Diane B. Kunz, ed., The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade: American Foreign Relations During the 1960s (New York, 1994), 115–148, especially 132–133; and Frank Costigliola, “‘Like Children in the Darkness’: The Impact on Europe of the Assassination of John F. Kennedy,” Journal of Popular Culture 20 (winter 1987), 115–124. 3. In addition to Schwartz and Costigliola above, see Conze, Die Gaullistische Herausforderung, 280–283; and Adrian W. Schertz, Die Deutschlandpolitik Kennedys und Johnsons (Cologne, 1992), 218–221. 4. Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963 (Princeton, 1999). See also Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton, 1991), 169–234; and Andreas Wenger, “Der lange Weg zur Stabilität: Kennedy, Chruschtschow und das gemeinsame Interesse der Supermächte am Status Quo in Europa,” VfZ 46 (1998): 69–99. 5. Eckart Conze, “Konfrontation und détente: Überlegungen zur historischen Analyse des Ost-West Konflikts,” VfZ 46 (1998): 269–282, written in response to Wenger, above. 6. Brentano memorandum, 30 September 1961, in Brentano to Adenauer, 30 September 1961, copy in ACDP NL Krone I-028-031/1; the agreement was sent to the Union Fraktion by Brentano, 10 January 1962, copy in ACDP NL Birrenbach I-433-007/1. 7. Koerfer, Kampf, 646–647; Kurt Birrenbach, The Future of the Atlantic Community: Toward European-American Partnership (New York, 1963), originally published in German in 1962; Schröder comments, 5 January 1962, in Gerhard Schröder, Wir Brauchen eine heile Welt (Düsseldorf, 1963), 206–207; and Hans van der Groeben to Schröder, 24 January 1962, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-099/3. 8. Adenauer to Erhard, 31 December 1961, StBKAH III/43; Adenauer in the executive committee of the Bundesvorstand, 7 February 1962, and in the Bundesvorstand, 7 February 1962, Vorstand IV, 108, 137–138. See also Adenauer to Schröder, 21 May 1962, ACDP NL Globke I-070-052/3. 9. Adenauer, discussion with Sidney and Flora Gruson of the New York Times, 20 February 1962; see also his discussion with Gaston Coblentz, 12 June 1962, ACDP NL Eckardt I010-002/2. 10. Memorandum of conversation, Adenauer with George Ball, 23 May 1961, ACDP NL Globke I-070-031/1; Brentano to Adenauer, 2 March 1961, BA NL Brentano 239/158; memoranda compiled for Adenauer’s visit to Washington, 6 and 7 November 1961, PAAA Referat 305 Band 133; Schröder, Heile Welt, 207–208. 11. On “Black Tuesday,” see Osterheld I, 115–117; for the final quotes, ibid., 125–127 (14 June 1962); Willis, France, 292–299; Globke to Brentano, 27 April 1962, with a memorandum from Adenauer, BA NL Brentano 239/185. On Britain, see Wolfram Kaiser, Using Europe, Abusing the Europeans: Britain and European Integration 1945–1963 (New York, 1996). 12. Osterheld memorandum, 30 May 1962, ACDP NL Globke I-070-027/2. 13. Osterheld I, 99–100 (3 February 1962); Adenauer’s comments in the Bundesvorstand, 7 March 1962, Vorstand IV, 162–164. Here and below, see also Steininger, Mauerbau, 325–358. 14. Osterheld I, 96; Trachtenberg, Peace, 341; Conze Herausforderung, 220–221; Schertz, Deutschlandpolitik, 140–150.

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15. Jakob Altmeier to Adenauer, 18 January 1962; Osterheld memos for Globke and Adenauer, 24 January and 4 May 1962, BA Bukamt B 136/3612 Heft 1. On Shirer’s book, see the reports from the Washington embassy, 27 June and 13 July 1962, on plans to base a film on it. Handwritten comments from Carstens, Globke, and Adenauer on the need to encourage equal coverage for both German resistance to Hitler and the success of German democracy since 1945, through pressure on the State Department if necessary, show the importance attributed to American public opinion; BA Bukamt B 136/3612 Heft 2. See also Altmeier to Schröder, 18 January 1962 and Ferdinand Friedensburg to Schröder, 4 May 1962, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-099/3. 16. Osterheld I, 102–104 (25 February and 10 March 1962); Schröder to Adenauer, 26 February 1962, ACDP NL Globke I-070-052/3; Marion Gräfin Dönhoff to Birrenbach, 28 February 1962, ACDP NL Birrenbach I-433-007/1. 17. Adenauer to Brentano, 27 March 1962, in response to Brentano to Adenauer, 23 March 1962, BA NL Brentano 239/159. 18. Trachtenberg, Peace, 344–347; Steininger, Mauerbau, 334–349. 19. Brentano to Schröder, 13 and 25 April 1962; Schröder denied that he had failed to inform Brentano in a telegram from Paris, 14 April 1962, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-287/2; Krone Aufzeichnungen, 169 (14 April 1962); Karl Carstens to Krone, 18 April 1962, ACDP NL Krone I-028-056/2; Steininger, Mauerbau, 342–350. 20. “Vermerk über die Sitzung des Außenpolitischen Ausschusses am 19.4.1962,” in Heck to Krone, [April 1962], ACDP NL Krone I-028-031/1; “Schröder: Absolutes Vertrauen,” Die Welt, 21 April 1962, clipping in ACDP NL Schröder I-483-025/1; Guttenberg comments in the CSU Landesgruppe, 7 May 1962, ACSP LG. 21. Adenauer to Kennedy, 14 April 1962; Adenauer memoranda, 24 and 25 April, included in Globke to Brentano, 27 April 1962, BA NL Brentano 239/185. 22. Brentano discussions with Kennedy, 30 April, and with Bundy, 2 May 1962, BA NL Brentano 239/185; Brentano in the Fraktion, 8 May 1962, ACDP VIII-001-1009/1, 264–265. Adenauer press conferences, ACDP NL von Eckardt I-010-002/2; Adenauer, discussion with Joseph Alsop, 11 May 1962, ibid.; Adenauer in the Bundesvorstand, 10 May 1962, Vorstand IV, 201–203; Adenauer in the Fraktion, 15 May 1962, ACDP VIII-0011009/1, 275; Osterheld I, 113–114 (14 May 1962); Grewe to Schröder, 7 May 1962, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-285/1; “Grewes Abgang,” Die Zeit, 8 June 1962, clipping in ibid., I483-285/2. 23. Osterheld I, 111–112 (9 May 1962); Köhler, Adenauer, 1130–1157; Schwarz, Staatsmann, 740–750; Schröder, speech in Athens, 4 May 1962, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-025/1; Schröder, Guttenberg, and Seffrin in the Fraktion, 8 May 1962, ACDP VIII-001-1009/1, 265–271. See also Krone to Adenauer, 11 May 1962; and Johann Baptist Gradl to Adenauer, 21 May 1962, ACDP NL Krone I-028-031/1; as well as Adenauer to Schröder, 11 May 1962, ACDP NL Globke I-070052/3. 24. Guttenberg to Krone, 18 May 1962; Georg Schröder, “Das Memorandum,” Die Welt, 23 May 1962; and Anthony Terry, “Threat to Adenauer as Party Splits over Berlin Talks Policy,” London Sunday Times, 20 May 1962, in ACDP NL Krone I-028-031/1; Knappstein to Schröder, 22 June 1962, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-285/2; Blankenhorn to Schröder, 9 May 1962, ibid., I-483-100/1. 25. Adenauer, discussion with Merkel (New York Times), 12 May 1962; and with Bartholomew and Curren (UPI), 8 June 1962, ACDP NL Eckardt I-010-002/2. 26. Here and below, see Osterheld I, 122–125 (9 June 1962), quote on 125. 27. Osterheld I, 127 (14 June 1962); Schwarz, Staatsmann, 753–757, referring to Blankenhorn’s confidential diary; Blankenhorn to Schröder, 9 May 1962, ACDP NL Schröder I483-100/1; Brentano [Vienna] to Adenauer, 22 June 1962, BA NL Brentano 239/159. Final quote in Osterheld I, 130 (1 July 1962). 28. Summary of the de Gaulle-Adenauer talks, 3–5 July 1962, KAE IV, 159–174. Osterheld I, 130–132 (1 and 15 July 1962). – 185 –

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29. Per Fischer, “Der diplomatische Prozess der Entstehung des deutsch-französischen Vertrages von 1963,” VfZ 41 (1993): 101–116; Osterheld I, 139–144 (17 September 1962); Conze, Herausforderung, 238–250. 30. Report included in Birrenbach to Adenauer, 19 June 1962, copy in ACDP NL Krone I-028009/3. See also Birrenbach to Globke, 22 June 1962, BA Bukamt B136/3612 Heft 2. 31. See Birrenbach to Krone, 14 July 1962, on Kennedy’s speech and its similarities to Birrenbach’s The Future of the Atlantic Community; and Birrenbach to Krone, 26 May 1962, reporting on a dinner conversation with Monnet, ACDP NL Krone I-028-009/3. Birrenbach, “Äußerungen amerikanischer Politiker zum Begriff der ‘Atlantischen Gemeinschaft’” [1962], copy in ACDP NL Birrenbach I-433-198/2; Conze, Herausforderung, 227–238. 32. Kleinmann, Geschichte der CDU, 185–200; Krone in the Bundesvorstand, 2 June 1962, Vorstand IV, 276; Osterheld I, 120–121 (1 June 1962). Memorandum, Hoffmann [AA] to Osterheld, 4 August 1962, summarizing articles on the erosion of Adenauer’s influence, BA Bukamt B136/3612 Heft 2; Adenauer to Brentano, 9 June 1962, BA NL Brentano 239/159. 33. Globke, memo on comments by Labour Party leader George Brown, 17 July 1962, ACDP NL Globke I-070-027/4. Globke to Krone, 27 July, 4 and 8 August 1962, ACDP NL Krone I-028-011/3. Globke asked at the end of the last letter that Krone “destroy it immediately after reading it.” See also Adenauer to Schröder, 17 and 28 August 1962, with Schröder’s responses on 27 and 30 August, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-287/6. Adenauer to Brentano, 24 August 1962, complaining about “CDU für Beitritt Londons zur EWG,” Die Welt, 22 August 1962, BA NL Brentano 239/159; Adenauer memorandum in Adenauer to Globke and Krone, 28 September 1962, ACDP NL Krone I-028-008/1. 34. Osterheld I, 147–148 (2 October 1962), see also ibid., 179, 217, 220 (14 January, 3 June, and 14 June 1963); and the introduction to this volume. 35. Memorandum, Ritzel [AA] to Osterheld, 22 January 1963, summarizing Terence Prittie, “Twilight of the Adenauer Era,” The New Republic, 29 December 1962, BA Bukamt B136/3612 Heft 2; Schwarz, Staatsmann, 769–809; Koerfer, Kampf, 707–740; David Schoenbaum, The Spiegel Affair (New York, 1968). 36. Krone Aufzeichnungen, 172 (18 November 1962); Adenauer in the Bundesvorstand, 22 November 1962, Vorstand IV, 316–322, especially 318. See also CSU memorandum “Betr.: Cuba-Krise,” 30 October 1962, CSU-LG 4. WP. Folder 114. 37. Birrenbach to Adenauer, 7 December 1962, copy in Birrenbach to Krone, 7 December 1962, ACDP NL Krone I-028-009/3; Globke note on de Margerie, 20 December 1962, ACDP NL Globke I-070-027/1. On Adenauer’s reaction, see Richard Balken, memorandum for Schröder on a conversation with Birrenbach, 8 January 1963, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-287/1. 38. On the Skybolt program, see Trachtenberg, Peace, 359–367. Adenauer meeting with de Gaulle, 21 January 1963, KAE IV, 201–202. 39. Osterheld I, 168–170, 176 (28 December 1962; 14 January 1963); Defense Ministry memorandum, “Die dringendsten Aufgaben der Verteidigungspolitik,” in Gumbel to Krone, 4 January 1963, ACDP NL Krone I-028-033/2; Krone Aufzeichnungen, 172 (1 January 1963). 40. Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle: The Leader, 1945–1970, trans. Patrick O’Brian (New York, 1991), 354–360; “Die Reaktion auf die Erklärungen de Gaulles: Hoffnung Washingtons auf Frankreichs europäische Partner,” NZZ, 17 January 1963. For American reactions, see Joseph Alsop “The French Mystery,” and Walter Lippmann, “De Gaulle’s Little Europe,” both NYHT, 18 January 1963, BA NL Blankenhorn 351/152. 41. Osterheld I, 179–182 (14 January 1963); Adenauer to Schröder, 31 December 1962, ACDP NL Globke I-070-052/3; Balken memorandum on Fraktionsvorstand meeting, quoting Schröder supporter Erik Blumenfeld, 8 January 1963, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-287/1. 42. Müller-Armack, “Erklärung des Sprechers der deutschen Delegation in Brüssel,” 15 January 1963, and “Bemerkungen zur Rede des Präsidenten de Gaulle vom 14. Januar 1963,” ACDP NL Müller-Armack I-236-037/5; Adenauer to Schröder, 15 January 1963, ACDP NL Globke I-070-052/3. – 186 –

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43. Adenauer to Globke, 20 January 1963, ACDP NL Globke I-070-052/2; Globke note, 23 January 1963, ACDP NL Globke I-070-001/1; Schwarz, Staatsmann, 819, with reference to Krone’s unpublished diary, 15 January 1963. 44. Osterheld I, 183–185 (27 January 1963). Brentano in the Fraktion, 22 January 1963, ACDP VIII-001-1009/2. See also Brentano to Adenauer, 21 January 1963, BA NL Brentano 239/159; and the meeting communiqué, 16 January 1963, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-273/1. 45. Schröder, “Schaffung einer Basis für gemeinsame Auffassungen,” an interview with West German Radio from 20 January, published in Bulletin (22 January 1963) 102; see also his comments on the German Tagesschau, 22 January 1963, both in ACDP NL Schröder I483-117/1. 46. “Die Krise in den Brüsseler Verhandlungen: Pessimistische Stellungnahme Müller-Armacks,” NZZ, 21 January 1963. Georg Schröder, “Ein gefährlicher Besuch,” Die Welt, 21 January 1963, which used Blankenhorn as an unnamed source. See also the separate telegrams, Dean Acheson and John McCloy to Adenauer, 19 January 1963, ACDP NL Globke I-070-031/1. Osterheld lists the organizations that sent appeals to Adenauer in Osterheld I, 185. 47. KAE IV, 200–205, 208; Osterheld I, 191 (22 January 1963). 48. Brentano to Adenauer, 23 January 1963, BA NL Brentano 239/159. 49. Liebes to Blankenhorn, 24 January 1963, BA NL Blankenhorn 351/151b; Liebes to Blankenhorn, 28 January 1963, ibid., 351/152. 50. Blankenhorn to Liebes, 29 January 1963, confirming that he was the source in Georg Schröder’s story in Die Welt from 21 January; Blankenhorn diary, 28 January 1963, BA NL Blankenhorn 351/152. 51. Schröder to all embassies, 31 January 1963; Jürgen Tern, “Das Fiasko in Brüssel,” FAZ, 30 January 1963; Kurt Becker, “Bonn muß Farbe bekennen,” Die Welt, 30 January 1963, BA NL Blankenhorn 351/152. 52. Krone Aufzeichnungen, 173 (25 January 1963); Adenauer quoted in Schwarz, Staatsmann, 823. 53. Adenauer and Brentano in the Fraktion, 5 February 1963, ACDP VIII-001-1009/2, 239– 255, 258. 54. Erhard, Birrenbach, and Adenauer in the Fraktion, 5 February 1963, ibid., 256–260. Birrenbach to Krone and Brentano, 7 February 1963, ACDP NL Krone I-028-009/3; Brentano to Birrenbach, 7 February 1963, calling an apology unnecessary, because he shared Birrenbach’s criticism, ACDP NL Birrenbach I-433-010/1. 55. After Adenauer’s retirement, Birrenbach noted to Globke that he had not met with either Globke or Adenauer since the collapse of the Brussels negotiations. Birrenbach to Globke, 30 December 1963, ACDP NL Birrenbach I-433-012/1. Even at this late date, Birrenbach was still trying to convince Globke—and through him, Adenauer—that “leaving aside the events of 1961, the American administration has been misunderstood in 1962 and 1963.” 56. ACDP VIII-001-1009/2, 260–264. 57. Osterheld I, 199–200; Conze, Herausforderung, 266–276; Krone, “Notizen, die ich auf Grund von Meldungen und Informationen niederschreiben ließ,” 5 February 1963, ACDP NL Krone I-028-033/2; Berger [Copenhagen] to AA, 4 February 1963, sent to all missions, 5 February 1963. See also memo for Blankenhorn, 12 February 1963; Blankenhorn to Rolf Lahr, 12 February 1963. Blankenhorn reported that French politicians did not expect a resumption of negotiations with Great Britain for several years, Carstens to all missions, 9 February 1963, BA NL Blankenhorn 351/152. 58. McCloy to Birrenbach, 8 February 1963; Acheson to Birrenbach, 19 February 1963; Birrenbach to Hajo Holborn, 5 February 1963, and to Henry Kissinger, 15 February 1963. Birrenbach sent copies of the letters from Acheson and McCloy to Brentano on 11 March 1963, ACDP NL Birrenbach I-433-186/2. Birrenbach to Acheson, and Birrenbach to McCloy, both 31 January 1963, ibid., I-433-010/1. 59. “Kurzprotokoll der Jahresversammlung der Atlantik-Brücke am 20. Februar 1963 im Hotel Königshof, Bonn”; Dr. Walter Stahl [president of Atlantik-Brücke] to Birrenbach, – 187 –

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60.

61.

62. 63.

64.

65.

66.

67.

68.

69.

70. 71.

22 February 1963; Stahl to Christopher Emmett, 22 February 1963; and Emmett to Birrenbach, 27 February 1963, including Emmett’s article for America, “The Common Market Crisis,” ACDP NL Birrenbach I-433-010/1. On the preparation of the text, see the numerous telegrams between Dönhoff, Birrenbach, and Gotthard von Falkenhausen from 25 February to 1 March. On the search for newspapers to run it, see Günther Drechsler to Birrenbach, 20 and 26 March 1963, and Birrenbach’s response on 27 March, with the hope that the other papers would publish it after the strike; ibid., I-433-186/2. For a German report, see Die Welt, 22 March 1963. Text in Birrenbach to Krone, 14 March 1963, ACDP NL Krone I-028-009/3. Identical letters were sent on the same day to Brentano, Schröder, and others. Earlier drafts attributed the final quotation to John Hancock, until Emmett corrected it. Birrenbach to Dönhoff, 12 March 1963, ACDP NL Birrenbach I-433-186/2. See also Birrenbach to Brentano, 27 February 1963, with an early draft, BA NL Brentano 239/166. Osterheld to Simon [AA], 20 February 1963; Vermerk, Abteilung II, 1 March 1963, with handwritten comments from Carstens, BA Bukamt B136/6205. Schröder, notes on Adenauer’s meeting with Assistant Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-273/1; Osterheld I, 202–203 (17 and 25 February 1963); CSU-Korrespondenz, 30 January and 6 February 1963, ACSP CSU-LG 4. WP Folder 146; “Kritik amerikanischer Senatoren an Europa,” FAZ, 28 January 1963, clipping in ibid., Folder 114 Adenauer to Erhard, 26 February 1963; Erhard to Adenauer, 27 February 1963, StBKAH III/43. Osterheld I, 206; Koerfer, Kampf, 758–762; Schwarz, Staatsmann, 827–828; and “Die CDU-Krise,” 5 March 1963, ACSP CSU-LG 4. WP Folder 91. “Die Politische Oeffentlichkeitsarbeit [sic] in den Vereinigten Staaten,” German Information Center New York, 6 March 1963, PA-AA Referat 305 Band 131; “Das amerikanischsowjetische Verhältnis,” memorandum from Washington embassy, 27 February 1963, in Hoffmann [AA] to Osterheld, 13 March 1963, BA Bukamt B 136/3612 Heft 2. Osterheld I, 208–209 (4 April 1963); Lahr memorandum, 9 April 1963, summarizing Brentano’s 19–24 March visit to Washington and New York, BA Bukamt B 136/3612 Band 2. Brentano to E. N. van Kleffens, 4 March 1963, in which he worried that a preamble would be unconstitutional, BA NL Brentano 239/27; Brentano in the Fraktion, 26 March 1963, ACDP VIII-001-1009/2; Conze, Herausforderung, 268–275; Willis, France, 314–316. Schröder, handwritten notes on Bundestag Foreign Relations Committee meeting, 3 May 1963, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-025/1. For the preamble, see Herbst, Option für den Westen, 233–234 and Verhandlungen, 4 WP, Vol. 84, 10. For the final debate, see Verhandlungen, 4. WP, 77. Sitzung, 3742–3755, with Adenauer’s comment on 3753A. Krekeler to Brentano, 3 May 1963; Brentano to Krekeler, 10 May 1963, BA NL Brentano 239/27; Kopf in the Fraktion, 14 May 1963, VIII-001-1009/2; Hans Dichgans to Schröder, 17 May 1963, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-099/3; Lahr to his sister, 10 April 1963, Maier/Thoß, 317–318; Serge Berstein, The Republic of de Gaulle, 1958–1969, trans. Peter Morris (Cambridge, 1993), 175–177; Lacouture, Leader, 342–343. On “rage” quote, see Willis, France, 315; see also Grabbe, Unionsparteien, 339; and Höcherl memo, “Adenauers Paris-Reise,” 24 January 1963, which predicted a conflict between Adenauer and Schröder, ACSP CSU-LG 4. WP Folder 118. Schwarz, Staatsmann, 833–834, includes the later quote and is followed by Conze, Herausforderung, 272–274. Osterheld, interview with the author. See also Osterheld I, 218–225 (14 June 1963); the musing quotation is on page 224 (23 December 1965). Schwarz, Staatsmann,825–826, 833. See the discussion in the Bundesvorstand, 14 March 1963, Vorstand IV, 410–437; Peter Altmaier to Adolf Süsterhenn, 19 February 1963, and Süsterhenn to Altmaier, 26 February 1963, enclosed in Süsterhenn to Globke, 9 March 1963, ACDP NL Globke I-070-003/4. Altmaier, CDU chair in Rhineland-Palatinate, reprimanded Süsterhenn for anti-Erhard statements, leading Süsterhenn to respond with a vigorous attack on the “Erhard brigade.”

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72. For Adenauer’s support for Schröder, see his discussion with Brentano in Cadenabbia, 14 and 15 April 1963, ACDP NL Globke I-070-003/4; Fraktion meeting, 23 April 1963, ACDP VIII-001-1009/2, 355–367; Bundesvorstand meeting, 26 April 1963, Vorstand IV, 441–484. See also Koerfer, Kampf, 760–782, and Schwarz, Staatsmann, 826–839. 73. Birrenbach to Tyler, 21 May 1963, ACDP NL Birrenbach I-433-186/2; Erhard to Birrenbach, 18 May 1963, ibid., I-433-012/1; conversation between Adenauer and de Margerie, 11 June 1963, AAP 1963, 617–629, especially 622–623; Osterheld I, 219–220 (14 June 1963). 74. Ibid., 224–228 (30 June 1963), quote on 225; Strauß to Adenauer, 14 June 1963, ACSP CSU-LG 4. WP Folder 90; “Vor dem Deutschlandbesuch Kennedys,” 14 June 1963, ibid., Folder 114; Carstens memorandum, 15 June 1963; and Carstens to Washington et al., 22 June 1963, AAP 1963, 631–632, 654–656. Adenauer, speech to the DGAP, 21 June 1963, BA Bukamt B 136/6205. 75. Transcript of Kennedy-Adenauer discussion, 24 June 1963, AAP 1963, 661–670. 76. Osterheld I, 230 (24 June 1963). See also Carstens to Washington et al., 24 June 1963, AAP 1963, 671–676. Conze, Herausforderung, 283–284. The briefing book for Kennedy’s visit is in ACDP NL Globke I-070-047/5. 77. Osterheld I, 228 (30 June 1963); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (Boston, 1965), 884–885; “Kennedys Reden in Deutschland,” 29 June 1963, in Schröder to Krone, 5 July 1963, ACDP NL Krone I-028-056/2; Brentano in the Fraktion, 26 June 1963, ACDP VIII-001-1009/2, 399. 78. Schröder, speech to the Mitgliedsversammlung der Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen- und Stahlindustrie, Düsseldorf, 28 June 1963; “Dr. Schröder empfiehlt engste Bindung Europas an die US,” Bonner Rundschau, 29 June 1963, BA Bukamt B136/6205. 79. Lacouture, Leader, 343; “Da fehlte nur noch das Kaminfeuer…” Rheinische Post, 13 April 1963, in ACDP NL Schröder I-483-104/1. 80. KAR, 450–452, quote on 451; Osterheld I, 237; Osterheld memo, 4 July 1963, collecting de Gaulle quotations for Adenauer’s speech, ACDP NL Globke I-070-048/1. 81. Discussion between Adenauer and de Gaulle, 4 July 1963, AAP 1963, 689–705, especially 690–692; see also KAE IV, 221–230. 82. Discussions on 4 and 5 July 1963, AAP 1963, 706–728, especially 725–727. Osterheld I, 236 (7 July 1963). Osterheld criticizes Erhard’s “childish” remark, but the official transcript offers no details on individual responses. 83. Erhard memorandum on discussion with de Gaulle, 4 July 1963, ibid., 702–705. On de Gaulle’s reactions, see Blankenhorn to Schröder, 10 July 1963, ibid., 735–737. Adenauer criticized the BBC and the New York Times for spreading “incorrect information.” Adenauer to Kennedy, 8 July 1963, ibid., 728–729; “De Gaulle-Adenauer Talks Fail to Resolve Big Issues,” New York Times, 6 July 1963, 1. Schröder to Rusk, 8 July 1963, AAP 1963, 730–731. For a more diplomatic statement of differences with de Gaulle, see Schröder interview with West German Radio, 7 July 1963, Bulletin, 9 July 1963, 1059–1060. 84. Thomas Paterson, in idem, Kennedy’s Quest for Victory, 152; Trachtenberg, Peace, 379–402. For an excellent discussion of the test ban, using recently available German sources, see Ilse Dorothee Pautsch, “Im Sog der Entspannungspolitik: Die US, die Teststoppabkommen und die Deutschland-Frage,” in Rainer Blasius, ed., Von Adenauer zu Erhard: Studien zur auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1963 (Munich, 1994), 118–153, upon which much of the following is based. 85. For this juxtaposition I am indebted to Professor Frank Mayer. See his comments in Klaus Schwabe, ed., Adenauer und die USA [Rhöndorfer Gespräche 14] (Bonn, 1994), 236–238; Mayer, “Adenauer und Amerika: Eine Betrachtung aus zeitgenössischer amerikanischer Sicht,” ibid., 181–220; and idem, Adenauer and Kennedy, passim; Knappstein to Schröder, 18 June 1963; memorandum of conversation, Kennedy-Adenauer, 24 June 1963; Carstens to Washington et al., 24 June 1963, AAP 1963, 638–639, 665–666, 674–676. “Fortsetzung der Teststopp Verhandlungen in Moskau,” memorandum in preparation for Kennedy’s visit to Bonn, ACDP NL Globke I-070-047/5. – 189 –

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86. Kennedy had signaled to Adenauer that conclusion of the negotiations was imminent in a letter on 23 July 1963; Adenauer responded cautiously on 24 July, AAP 1963, 776–777; Krone Aufzeichnungen, 176 (27 July 1963). Hans Buchheim, Deutschlandpolitik 1949– 1972: Der politisch-diplomatische Prozeß (Stuttgart, 1984), 129–133; Kelleher, Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons (New York, 1975), 242–243. 87. Osterheld I, 247–248; 252 (8 and 12 August 1963); Krone Aufzeichnungen, 179 (13 August 1963). 88. Lilienfeld (Washington) to Schröder, 27 July 1963; Carstens memorandum, 12 August 1963; Carstens to Schröder, 14 August 1963; Schröder to Rusk, 17 August 1963, AAP 1963, 802–804, 989, 1024–1026, 1039–1041. “Bonn hat Atomvertrag unterzeichnet,” Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 20 August 1963, in StBKAH III/43. 89. Memorandum of conversation, Schröder-Bundy, 20 September 1963, AAP 1963, 1151. Carstens to Washington et al., 26 July 1963; Schröder to Rusk, 29 July 1963; ibid., 789–792, 809–810. Schröder radio address, 12 August 1963, ACDP NL Schröder I-493140/2; Krone Aufzeichnungen, 177 (29 and 31 July 1963). 90. Osterheld I, 243 (31 July 1963); Osterheld, “Zeittafel,” 15 August 1963, outlining Adenauer’s conversations on the test ban; Osterheld memorandum for Globke on American commitments to German unification, 6 August 1963, ACDP NL Globke I-070-031/1. 91. Brentano to Schröder, 30 July 1963, BA NL Brentano 239/180, 19–21; Brentano to Adenauer, 28 July 1963, AAP 1963, 806–808; Pautsch, Sog, 130. Brentano published an article in the DUD on 6 August repeating these arguments, Krone Aufzeichnungen, 178 (6 August 1963). For Schröder’s delayed defense, see Schröder to Brentano, 10 September 1963, and an earlier draft dated August 1963, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-287/2. 92. Krone Aufzeichnungen, 177–178 (31 July, 5 and 6 August 1963); “victim” quote is from 5 August, “I am reminded of Versailles,” from 6 August. Fritz von Haniel-Niethammer to Strauß, 8 August 1963, included in von Haniel-Niethammer to the Fraktion, 17 August 1963, ACDP NL Birrenbach I-433-012/1. Krone, “Die Trugschüsse von Kennedys Appeasement-Politik,” [summer 1963], ACDP NL Krone I-028-033/2; Krone Aufzeichnungen, 180–181 (18 and 27 August 1963); resolutions from the meeting of the Junge Union of Lower Franconia, 21 September 1963, BA Bukamt B 136/6205. 93. Buchheim, Deutschlandpolitik; A. James McAdams, Germany Divided: From the Wall to Reunification (Princeton, 1993); Köhler, Adenauer, 1217–1218. 94. Strauß in the CSU Landesgruppe, 28 September 1963, ACSP CSU-LG. See also Leo Wagner, “CSU und Moskauer Abkommen,” CSU-Korrespondenz (3 September 1963) and “Kennedys Entspannungspolitik und die deutsche Frage: Ein Gespräch mit Karl Theodor Freiherr zu Guttenberg, MdB,” Rheinischer Merkur, 13 September 1963, ACSP CSU-LG 4. WP Folder 214. Brandstetter, Allianz des Mißtrauens, 353–357. 95. Memoranda of conversation, Schröder-Rusk, and Schröder-Bundy, 20 September 1963; Schröder-Kennedy, and Schröder-Rusk-Sorensen, 24 September 1963, AAP 1963, 1150–1173, 1214–1223. Schröder added the comment from Sorensen in the margin of the original document, ibid., 1227n. Hans Ulrich Kempski, “Der Minister marschiert im Rhythmus der Zeit,” SZ, 23 September 1963; “Das deutsche Volk und die US,” Bulletin, 26 September 1963, 1481; Schröder interview with South West German Radio, 25 September 1963; and with Second German Television, 26 September 1963, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-140/2. Adenauer to Schröder, 30 September 1963, with clippings, ACDP NL Globke I-070-052/3 96. Osterheld I, 255; Schwarz, Staatsmann, 855–856. Memoranda of conversation, Adenauerde Gaulle, 21 and 22 September 1963, AAP 1963, 1185–1187, 1192–1210, especially 1203; Conze, Herausforderung, 287–289. 97. Carstens, memorandum for Schröder, 25 September 1963, AAP 1963, 1228–1229.

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THE END OF THE ADENAUER ERA, 1963–1966

Ludwig Erhard deserved better. Enormously popular as the rotund, cigarsmoking father of the “economic miracle,” he was the logical choice to succeed Konrad Adenauer as chancellor. Both men showed foresight and skill in organizing West Germany’s postwar recovery. As one sympathetic biographer argues, “the Adenauer era was also the Erhard era.”1 Based on this success, Erhard could have expected the same respect and deference accorded his senior colleague. It was, however, not to be. During the long and successful years laboring in Adenauer’s cabinet, Erhard had earned not the respect and support of his boss, but his scorn and jealousy, and their personal conflict exacerbated programmatic disputes within the Union. Adenauer’s bitter determination to keep Erhard out of the Chancellery had left scars that endured beyond Adenauer’s official retirement in October 1963. These differences would haunt Erhard, obscuring his triumphs. His three years in power, which deserve a book-length study of their own, would see some notable international achievements, from the opening of formal diplomatic relations with Israel to new initiative in relations with Eastern Europe.2 International and domestic success led to a stunning landslide electoral victory in September 1965. Ironically, economic difficulties dealt a fatal blow to his chancellorship. A mild recession in 1966 disturbed the electorate, robbing Erhard of the popularity that had insulated him against his internal critics. Within little more than a year of his victory, he was a broken man, forced to watch the Union select his successor and build a new coalition without him. Erhard suffered the worst of all political fates—the legend in his own time outlived his legend. Erhard’s story is all the more tragic when one considers that the problems that destroyed his political career were bound up with his strengths. As an optimistic, intellectually curious man who enjoyed long discussions and had an ambivalent relationship with power, he represented a more open society, in harmony with the emerging “liberal era” of the 1960s. Once in office, Erhard cultivated a different style from the distant, autocratic Adenauer. – 191 –

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Disdaining the rough-and-tumble of backroom politics, Erhard wanted to be a “people’s chancellor” (Volkskanzler) basing his power on his popularity and his ability to reach the people directly. He also avoided nationalism, preferring a foreign and domestic policy based on his hopes for “Prosperity for All.” This broadly liberal perspective earned him credit from many colleagues, especially overseas. Joseph Luns of the Netherlands, for example, paid Erhard an accurate and ironic compliment by writing that, based on his rejection of authoritarianism and preference for consensus, Erhard “could have been Dutch.”3 As the leader of a German government built on the heterogeneous Union, Erhard would find that such an aversion to power was a recipe for disaster, especially in foreign policy. The fragmentation that had been noticeable since 1960 accelerated now that Adenauer ceased to play his balancing role and instead aided the centripetal forces pulling the Union apart. Erhard was neither willing nor able to hold his increasingly unruly party together. The result would be both a personal and political crisis that would drive him from office and signal the beginning of the end for the Union’s political dominance. This chapter will chart this crisis against the backdrop of a dramatically changing international situation, demonstrating how the Union’s ambivalence about the shape of the West undermined the party’s political future.

Civil War or Political Mirage? Atlanticists vs. Gaullists No one disagrees that the Union had become increasingly fragmented by 1963. In the first weeks after the signing of the Elysée Treaty, Horst Osterheld noted in his diary that “there are two camps developing in our land, dividing not just government and opposition, but throughout the coalition and the Union. Erhard and his supporters are against ratification of the treaty, and even want to delay intensifying relations within the EEC until the British are in. On the other side the chancellor and others … consider the integration of the Continent to be more important.”4 This simple statement sketched the conflict between Atlanticists and Gaullists. Such labels have their limitations, and do not always account for the subtleties of group identity. Neither Atlanticists nor Gaullists would allow themselves to be described as advocating a choice between Washington and Paris; their differences lay in the emphasis they preferred to place on the one or the other relationship. Nevertheless, the most violent disputes were now no longer between advocates and opponents of Westbindung, but among the advocates of Westbindung themselves. Behind the Union’s solid support for the West, there were more than enough “Wests” to provide the basis for controversy. While the Federal Republic remained outside of the West, these questions could be safely ignored or underplayed. By 1963, – 192 –

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however, the Federal Republic was part of the West, and it was clear that the division of Europe was going to endure for years, as the superpowers groped toward détente. This raised serious questions about the internal organization of the West, which now had to be answered. Whether or not one accepted the labels, the public had a clear idea of who the Atlanticists and Gaullists were. Erhard and Foreign Minister Schröder made their Atlantic sympathies clear, as had their CDU and cabinet colleague, Defense Minister Kai-Uwe von Hassel. In their support for the closest possible relations with the US and Britain, they were joined by the majority of the CDU, especially members from the northern, largely Protestant areas. The other parties were uniformly Atlanticist. In a departure from the bitter debates of the early Adenauer years, Erhard could count on support not only from his coalition partner, the FDP, where Chair Erich Mende firmly endorsed Atlanticism, but also from the newly moderate SPD.5 It was within the Union that Erhard faced his strongest Gaullist critics, led by Adenauer and Franz Josef Strauß. Structural politics in the Union created problems for Erhard by offering his critics secure positions from which they could make, if not policy, certainly trouble. Adenauer, for example, profiting from Erhard’s desire to keep the party and political leadership separate, remained chair of the CDU until March 1966. No longer the center of power, Adenauer still wielded considerable clout, and was free to criticize Erhard using the prestige of both his former and present offices. Similarly, Strauß could use his dual position as chair of the CSU and its Bundestag Landesgruppe as the foundation for independent political action. Gaullists dominated the Union in the south and west, especially among Catholics. Led by both Strauß and the prominent Bundestag deputy Baron Karl Theodor zu Guttenberg, the CSU, which prided itself on its south German, predominantly Catholic heritage, was overwhelmingly Gaullist.6 The motivations of the German Gaullists—indeed the connection between Gaullist ideas and the development of West German foreign policy through the later 1960s and beyond—deserve further detailed examination beyond the bounds of this study. For our purposes, it is, however, necessary to offer a brief sketch. A member of Schröder’s staff, who surveyed the Fraktion after the test ban crisis, saw a combination of political and personal factors motivating the Gaullists. German Gaullists shared a deep distrust of the Kennedy administration, which de Gaulle nourished. Domestic politics also played a role. Strauß, for example, felt that key parts of the electorate wanted a more nationalistic foreign policy, and believed that calls for greater European independence would satisfy those elements and help the Union distinguish itself from the Atlanticist SPD. These critics opposed Schröder’s attempts to join the Americans in a more flexible policy toward Eastern Europe, which they considered part of a general American desire to accept the status quo.7 Personal differences also played a role, especially with Adenauer and Strauß. As Hans-Peter Schwarz and others have argued, Adenauer’s bitterness – 193 –

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over the way he was replaced intensified his desire to work with de Gaulle. Was it not, after all, the Americans and the British and their German friends who had forced Erhard upon him? Adenauer would later confide to Eugen Gerstenmaier that he had been fired three times in his life: as mayor of Cologne by the Nazis in March 1933, again by the British in October 1945, and now as chancellor by his own party. Of these experiences, he told Gerstenmaier: “[T]he third firing was the worst.” Adenauer saw in Erhard and Schröder the embodiment of those “liberal” elements of the Union that had hastened his departure. Strauß, whose return to the cabinet was blocked by the FDP because of the Spiegel Affair, also had his personal reasons for opposing Erhard’s government and especially Schröder, his most serious rival for the future leadership of the Union. The role of internal political rivalries in the Atlanticist/Gaullist dispute is reinforced by the fact that, most of the time, even the most vocal Gaullists avoided direct criticism of Erhard. Instead, they concentrated their fire on Schröder as part of the struggle for the position as the next leader of the party. This reflected a wide belief that Schröder was a stronger personality than Erhard, whose hands-off management style, combined with Schröder’s calculating reputation, fed the impression that the foreign minister was making policy on his own. Recognizing Erhard’s personal popularity, Union Gaullists also wanted to avoid the charge that they were undermining their own chancellor. Instead, they couched their attacks on Schröder as a defense of Erhard. The difficulties of this strategy were made clear by a caricature from July 1964. Erhard is driving a car toward the 1965 election; Schröder is next to him, while Adenauer and Strauß sit in the back. Adenauer waves a club, preparing to strike at the riders in front of him, while Strauß barks: “Don’t hit the driver yet!”8 The paradoxical position of the Gaullists within their own party, combined with the Atlanticism of both the SPD and FDP, gave the Atlanticists an advantage within the population as a whole. Despite Gaullist complaints about the test ban treaty, for example, opinion polls indicated great public support for it and for cooperation with the Americans in general. Schröder embodied this public mood, cultivating a close relationship with American leaders. His letters to his American counterpart, Dean Rusk, for example, were invariably addressed to “Dear Dean,” a sharp contrast to the colder “Dear Colleague” letters he addressed to French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville.9 Furthermore, although his advocacy of a “policy of movement” and détente implied a new direction, Schröder continually emphasized continuity in West German priorities: European integration, Franco-German reconciliation, a strong Atlantic Alliance. In an interview shortly after Adenauer’s retirement, Schröder admitted differences with France, but concluded that “we can render our French allies and all our other allies the best service when we express our opinions clearly,” through regular consultations. Years – 194 –

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later, Schröder still attempted to prove this basic continuity. Though admitting that some had “bitterly” criticized Erhard for departing from Adenauer’s foreign policy, Schröder believed that the facts revealed these criticisms as unjust and politically motivated.10 Schröder’s self-defense has merit, but it underplayed significant differences between him and his opponents. Certainly the major goals of both Atlanticists and Gaullists were similar; both groups were advocates of Westbindung. All members wanted a sovereign Federal Republic within a unified Europe allied with the US. This broad agreement, however, left many questions to answer. How sovereign should the Federal Republic be? What was its role in Europe? What was this more unified Europe going to look like? An integrated superstate? A “Europe of the Fatherlands” built on consultation between sovereign governments? Most of all, how would this Europe relate to the US? As an equal partner, responsible for its own defense and able to conduct independent foreign policies? Or rather as an adjunct of the US, united in an “Atlantic partnership” within which the Americans would play a dominant role? These abstract questions related to specific debates over the EEC, the MLF, and political consultation in NATO. These debates in turn were especially bitter in the early 1960s, intensified by de Gaulle’s challenges to American leadership. For Atlanticists, the proper course was obvious. In a long report to the Union Fraktion, prominent Atlanticist Kurt Birrenbach warned that the Germans should be careful that they not let themselves be led astray by the French. “The United States [is] prepared to allow the Federal Republic to play the role of ‘senior partner’ among the European members of the Alliance,” Birrenbach wrote, quoting a speech from Walt Rostow. It could only play this role, however, “if [it] agrees at least in basic terms with American policy.” The Federal Republic had won the respect of its allies through its willingness to abandon obsolete conceptions of national interest in favor of European integration. Close relations with France were not bad—indeed, the Americans welcomed European cooperation—but this cooperation had to remain within the bounds of the Atlantic community. American resistance would result only, Birrenbach concluded dramatically, “if the Federal Republic were to betray her principles.”11 The Gaullists saw the same situation, but drew different conclusions. In both speeches and published writings, Strauß and Guttenberg especially called for a more autonomous Europe within the West and rejected American calls for détente.12 Strauß warned that both the US and the Soviet Union wanted “peace and quiet” in Europe. This desire for peace led both to oppose the creation of strong European defense forces, for such forces would be outside their control. At the same time however, he considered it “necessary for Europe to develop its own independent atomic protection, because American defense policy [depends] on the domestic political situation,” which could mean “that one day the limits of the American willingness to defend – 195 –

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Europe” would be reached. The goal was to use the Elysée Treaty as “the instrument for a common policy for Continental Europe.” This common policy would “clarify” the British and American positions, and make Europe “a political factor with equal rights.” Guttenberg agreed with the “demand for strengthening Franco-German cooperation” and warned against “changing the clear foreign policy line of Konrad Adenauer.” Shortly after Erhard formally took office, Strauß made this position even more clear. “The goal of [the] political unification of Europe in the sense of a sovereign federal state can only be realized with France,” he told the CSU Landesgruppe. The Elysée Treaty was the tool to advance this cooperation. In response to a question from a skeptical colleague, Strauß “reemphasized that the goal of the CSU’s foreign policy … aimed at reaching the point where the Soviets, in all agreements with the West, would have to negotiate with America and with Europe.”13 The differences between Atlanticists and Gaullists were therefore real, if by real we mean that they had a serious impact on West German politics in general and the Union in particular. The battle lines were already drawn when Erhard took office in October 1963. Although the rise of Erhard and Schröder should have given the Atlanticists a commanding position, the Gaullists, despite their virtual exclusion from the government (outside of Adenauer’s old friend Heinrich Krone, who remained in the cabinet and on the National Security Council, Gaullists were relegated to the back benches), proved adept at taking their case to the public. They carried out a two-front war, attacking the SPD and FDP while sniping at the Union Atlanticists through interviews, speeches, and articles in reliable journals, such as the CSU’s own Bayernkurier and the pro-French Catholic newspaper, the Rheinischer Merkur. This was a struggle for the hearts and minds of the Union and the electorate, and would be fought with merciless intensity. Schröder’s own staff urged him to match the Gaullists blow for blow, concluding: “The majority of the Fraktion will most likely follow the side they consider stronger.”14 The ensuing struggle would eventually weaken the Union as a whole.

Honeymoon’s End: From Harmony to Conflict in 1964 Despite these potential problems, Erhard enjoyed a few months of peace and good press as 1963 ended. His first trip abroad took him to Paris for a positive discussion with de Gaulle. The Union leadership was especially interested in keeping differences as quiet as possible. In a late January 1964 article for the Union’s press service, deputy Fraktion chair Rainer Barzel admitted differences of opinion but nevertheless emphasized the basic continuity of Union foreign policy, rejecting the notion of a choice between Washington and Paris. Admitting that democratic parties live “through – 196 –

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continuous, responsible reconsideration of their political course,” Barzel concluded that this should not call into question “the goals of their foreign policy or the promises they have made.”15 Schröder and his staff were wary, however, knowing that Adenauer and his compatriots were looking for an opportunity to make trouble, unless Erhard acted to keep them in check. Adenauer cautiously tested his limits, to see how he could influence policy without undermining party unity. Returning to the strategy he had used early in his chancellorship to reach a wider audience, he used strategically placed interviews with sympathetic journalists to influence the debate. On the anniversary of the Elysée Treaty, for example, he told the Rheinischer Merkur that the government needed to do more to advance European political cooperation, though he avoided direct criticism of Erhard.16 Schröder also tried to shape the Union policy consensus by selecting pro-Atlanticist articles and essays and sending copies to the Fraktion. Schröder’s problem, however, was that he was uncomfortable lobbying for support, despite the pleas of his supporters, a reflection of his basically cold and distant manner.17 This attempt to shape a consensus extended into the CDU national convention, held in Hanover in May. As the first national convention after Adenauer’s retirement, this meeting reflected the Union’s desire to present a unified front. Schröder himself, whose antennae were sensitive to any attacks on his performance, noted that the speeches from Adenauer and Erhard offered little new information, and also no differences of opinion. Within the foreign policy working group, even critics such as Guttenberg, who attended as a guest from the CSU and had previously discussed strategy with Adenauer, avoided direct criticism of Erhard or Schröder, preferring to emphasize the need for unity. The press dismissed the convention as dull, but the lack of excitement was part of this conscious avoidance of conflict.18 The honeymoon could not last, however, as spring turned to summer. As President Johnson encouraged Erhard to offer more concessions in Eastern Europe in the name of détente, General de Gaulle opened diplomatic relations with China to signal his increasing distance from the Americans. The sense that these differences forced the Germans to choose between French and American policy made advocates of both options more strident in their self-justifications. Domestic politics also played a role in sharpening internal Union conflict. The visit of an SPD delegation led by Fritz Erler to the Vatican in early March 1964, a symbol of both Pope Paul VI’s attempt to reconcile the Catholic Church with the political Left and the SPD’s desire to appeal to Catholic voters at home, made many in the Union distinctly nervous. They feared that SPD success in attracting progressive Catholics, combined with the Union’s failure to maintain a clear division between the Christian and Social Democrats, would spell political problems.19 Friction within the coalition also intensified. In their desire to gain a higher profile, FDP leaders such as Minister for All-German Affairs Erich Mende and Minister for – 197 –

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International Economic Cooperation Walter Scheel reasserted the FDP’s role as the party of a more “active” reunification policy. Scheel’s assertion that the new “Erhard-Schröder-Mende” era meant a new foreign policy especially irritated Strauß and the CSU.20 By this time, the differences had become public. An article in the Bayernkurier, inspired by Strauß (despite his denials), repeated many criticisms that the CSU Chair had made in private to Erhard, especially about Schröder’s enthusiasm for détente. The resulting uproar led Erhard to make a public defense of his foreign minister, and to invite the Union leadership—including Strauß, Schröder, and Barzel—to his vacation home in southern Bavaria for a “summit conference.” The meeting offered a paper compromise, whereby all agreed to develop trade missions in Eastern Europe but also to uphold the Hallstein Doctrine, which forbade relations with states that recognized the GDR. Nevertheless, hard-liners such as Guttenberg still did not trust either Schröder or the Anglo-Saxons, and called for a closer Franco-German union to intensify European integration and offer a common front against concessions to the Soviets. As a sign of growing divisions, some Union members met with Gaullist representatives in Paris, worrying the embattled French Christian Democrats in the MRP and, despite energetic denials, raising the possibility of closer institutional cooperation between the Union and French Gaullists.21 Despite the summit, nothing had been resolved. As General de Gaulle’s annual visit to Bonn approached, the Gaullists became even more active. In early June, Adenauer criticized Schröder in the Fraktion for being anti-French, which was leading to a reduction of German international influence. Without French help, Adenauer argued, Germany was unimportant, too suspect in the eyes of the world to act on its own. Adenauer and Guttenberg developed a “Foreign Policy Action Program for the CDU/CSU” in preparation for de Gaulle’s visit, which emphasized continuity but criticized American policy. Guttenberg emphasized that the Federal Republic “should not lapse into European or Atlantic conformity,” and should be “strong enough to say no to policies that would threaten its vital interests.” The program called for the creation of a European “partner” in the West, which would have its own nuclear forces and its own political weight in NATO.22 Adenauer also stepped up his interview activity. In an interview with the Rheinischer Merkur, he called for an “end to excuses,” and encouraged the Germans to embrace de Gaulle as their support against American détente policies. The idea was to make Europe a “world power in close alliance with the United States.” The Germans should avoid excessive criticism of de Gaulle, and should not be distracted by “pseudo-multilateral” objections. “To abuse France … will come back to haunt us,” he declared. Strauß added similar comments, both in interviews and in private. The Germans, Strauß argued, needed to stop talking about expanding Europe and start making Europe an independent partner through closer relations with France. In a – 198 –

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long letter to Erhard, which he sent to every leading member of the Union except Schröder, Strauß endorsed de Gaulle’s plans for a European Political Union and NATO reform, and concluded his plea with the argument that his own experiences in the US “have shown me that cooperation between France and Germany, despite certain American concerns, has increased the value of German policy and could raise it further….”23 Erhard went to Washington in late June, then returned to Bonn to meet de Gaulle. The stage was set for a dramatic confrontation. In the plenary meeting of 4 July, de Gaulle made a grand pitch for Franco-German cooperation in an independent Europe. It was a summary of all previous arguments and a final attempt to convince Erhard to join him. When he finished, all turned to Erhard for a response, but the chancellor had nothing to say. After a lengthy embarrassed pause, Schröder suggested that they turn to other items on the agenda. A bitter Horst Osterheld would write: “[F]or many participants, this scene remains unforgettable. They had the feeling of being witnesses to the destruction of a historic friendship.” Erhard himself tried to put the best face on the visit, promising that he would “exhaust all possibilities” to make Europe work through the Franco-German treaty, and ordering the creation of a study commission, but neither the public nor his own party was convinced. Die Welt wrote that differences between Bonn and Paris “had never been greater.” Erhard appeared trapped between Schröder and the FDP on one side and the growing Gaullist faction on the other. “Thus there remains … a general feeling of insecurity, even helplessness,” wrote one journalist, “an expression of the dilemma of not being able to choose either Washington or Paris without endangering vital German interests.” De Gaulle himself told Adenauer before his departure that the Franco-German marriage they had originally planned remained unconsummated: “[H]e returned to Paris a virgin.”24 In the background of this philosophical dispute lay a very practical question: the possibility of developing a NATO nuclear force. Erhard and Schröder continued to advocate the MLF, as the Americans had originally suggested in 1963, but this plan was viewed by other NATO members with increasing skepticism. Even the Johnson administration lost interest in the project, fearing that it would derail détente with the Soviets. The purpose of the MLF had been to keep the Germans away from the French in 1963; that had succeeded, and so the plan was much less crucial for the Americans. Johnson set a December 1964 deadline for negotiations, and it seemed unlikely that the plan would survive.25 German Gaullists disdained the MLF, preferring an independent European nuclear force based on France’s force de frappe. De Gaulle himself, recognizing that the nuclear question offered a lever to pry the Germans away from the Americans, played a double game. In discussions with other Western leaders, he indicated that he had no intention of allowing the Germans real access to nuclear weapons. He had, after all, killed the FIG plan shortly – 199 –

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after coming to power in 1958, preferring to have France develop its own weapons. Nevertheless, he was not above dangling the possibility of nuclear weapons in front of the Germans. During his July 1964 visit, he did not make any formal offers, but did approach Foreign Office State Secretary Karl Carstens at a reception and, speaking in French, broached the subject. Why were the Germans so interested in the MLF, he asked, when France could offer them so much more? De Gaulle’s vague suggestion of nuclear cooperation (which he never made official in any formal discussion with Erhard) was enough to convince Gaullists of the need for an immediate German response, but Erhard and Schröder denied that there was any real chance, and remained committed to the MLF.26 Despite attempts to avoid open confrontation, Erhard rejected exclusive cooperation with de Gaulle. In a conversation with American Ambassador George McGhee after de Gaulle’s departure, Erhard reaffirmed his commitment to NATO and criticized de Gaulle’s hopes for “French hegemony” in Europe. He dismissed the force de frappe as substituting dependence on the French for dependence on the Americans, “and I do not need to tell you under which dependence we would feel more secure….” For Erhard, the choice was clear. His passionate rejection of de Gaulle was so strong that it even appeared to embarrass McGhee, who had come by to discuss the brewing crisis over Cyprus, not NATO. Osterheld, whose Gaullist sympathies competed with his civil servant neutrality, was concerned that Erhard failed to see the advantages of cooperation with France. He tried to plead for a middle course, “practicing friendship” with France while maintaining ties to the US—working closely enough with de Gaulle to gain leverage in the West, while reserving the right to disagree on specific issues.27 Osterheld’s attempt at mediation failed in part because of his limited perspective. As a career foreign service officer, he had a vision of increasing German foreign policy maneuverability by playing the “French card.” What he did not see was that such a diplomatic balancing act was impossible. De Gaulle hoped to use the Germans to strengthen European independence from the US. It was not at all clear that he would accept German mediation; he wanted German support. Erhard and Schröder, for their part, opposed anything that would alienate the Americans, while the Americans had made clear that they were in no mood to seek an accommodation with de Gaulle. Thus, for Erhard and Schröder there were no good reasons to seek closer cooperation with France, and there were plenty of reasons against it. Furthermore, as German Gaullists such as Adenauer, Strauß, and Guttenberg tied their foreign policy criticisms to their larger party-political aims, the possibilities for any “third way” simply did not exist. Each side’s interests worked to intensify rather than ameliorate their differences, and no attempts at public unity could change that.28 De Gaulle’s visit and the ensuing press coverage reopened all of the familiar issues. At the CSU Party convention in July, Adenauer, Strauß, and – 200 –

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Guttenberg attacked Erhard’s pro-American policy. Schröder’s aide Richard Balken reported rumors that Adenauer and Strauß, using their positions as chairs of the CDU and CSU, hoped to force Erhard to cede control over foreign policy. Balken, however, disdained Gaullist arguments, and was especially critical of Strauß, whom he considered to be interested in power alone. “If Erhard were a Cold Warrior,” he noted sarcastically, “Strauß would be for détente.” Nevertheless, the conflict became increasingly bitter. One branch of the Junge Union even went so far as to inform Schröder formally that he no longer enjoyed their confidence and that they would offer him no electoral support in the future. A formal letter from the chair of the local branch was followed by more than a dozen informal letters, in which the words “Please Resign, Herr Minister” were written with green marker in large block letters.29 The pressure increased when de Gaulle, back in Paris, declared in a 23 July press conference that American dominance in Europe would not last forever, and called for a more independent Continent. Casting aside the bland agreements from Bonn, de Gaulle admitted that there were problems between his government and Erhard’s, blaming them on the German inability to imagine a truly independent Europe. German responses reflected the existing differences. Citing the preamble to the Elysée Treaty, Schröder reminded his audience that the Federal Republic was committed to close relations with the US, and did not sign the treaty just to help the French pursue their own foreign policy. He called for more give and take in FrancoGerman relations. In a coincidence that especially irritated his critics, Schröder’s comments were echoed by the Foreign Policy spokesman of the SPD, Fritz Erler, and by the FDP. In response, Adenauer declared that the Germans needed to make the Elysée Treaty the basis of a real European union, though he hastened to add that Europe and the US “must stand together.” He denied that the Germans had to choose between Washington and Paris, claiming that this was the line put out by opponents of de Gaulle in order to scare the Germans. Strauß declared that de Gaulle’s statements proved that the CSU was correct in calling for greater Franco-German cooperation, because without it Europe would go nowhere.30 The conflict continued throughout the summer. Adenauer tried to have it both ways, criticizing Schröder and then, when Schröder responded in public, complaining that he threatened party unity. In a meeting of the state chairs of the CDU in mid-October, Adenauer vented his spleen, decrying Germany’s “failed foreign policy” and claiming that Schröder had always sought to undermine the Elysée Treaty. Adenauer would not allow himself to be placated, even by old friends such as Heinrich Krone, supporting instead the recommendations of Strauß and Eugen Gerstenmaier for a Franco-German union as the core of a new Europe, and the development of a European nuclear force instead of the MLF.31 Schröder considered these criticisms irrational, noting in his diary that the German Gaullists, who opposed détente with the Soviets, were advocating a – 201 –

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policy diametrically opposed to de Gaulle, whose vision of an independent Europe included transcending the Cold War. Nevertheless, Schröder had to admit to his diary that the CSU Landesgruppe was tightly organized and disciplined, giving it an advantage within the otherwise rather loosely run Fraktion. “It is clearly high time,” he noted, “for the CDU to regain strong leadership,” if it wanted to control the CSU. He also noted that the SPD was more supportive on the MLF than much of the Union. After reading Adenauer’s comments to the party chairs, Schröder complained that it was especially disturbing to see how Gaullists were so quick to discuss the terrible things de Gaulle could do if the Germans did not go along. Such statements, which always found their way into the press, only weakened the German negotiating position and encouraged the French to make ever more extravagant demands. Schröder confided his most bitter resentments to his diary, though he could count on continued support from allies in the Union and in German industry. Berthold Beitz, managing director of Krupp, for example, wrote a supportive letter, declaring that “this old man [Adenauer] should finally understand that he should retire.”32 Adenauer, however, had no intention of retiring. Preparing for an early November visit to Paris, where he would be admitted to the Académie Française, he increased the pressure for a closer relationship with de Gaulle. When asked by an interviewer what he considered the most important event in his chancellorship, he now answered that it was the Elysée Treaty, because: “Without it there would be no European unity, without it Western Europe … would not be able over the long term to withstand the pressure from Soviet Russia.” He followed this with an even more critical interview with the Bild am Sonntag in which he attacked Erhard and Schröder for a weak foreign policy that did not distinguish the Union more clearly from the SPD. Adenauer called on Erhard to make the relationship with de Gaulle “as firm as possible.” This was “simply a matter of life and death.… German foreign policy needs to be built around it.”33 Adenauer saw himself as trying to heal the breach with France created by Schröder and Erhard, even if it meant widening the breach between himself and his party colleagues. He began to rewrite history, telling the Fraktion in early November that he agreed to participate in the MLF only “because back then I had already reached the conclusion that the most likely developments in the world would make it necessary that we somehow get close to nuclear weapons, and I did not want to let it be said that I had refused an American offer.” He even expressed doubts over the future of NATO, noting that the alliance “has been sick for quite some time,” and suggested that while the Americans and British pursued détente with the Soviets, the Federal Republic needed to get closer to France, even outside of NATO, if necessary. He tried to argue that it was possible to have close relations with both France and the US, but it was clear where his real hopes lay, and he was increasingly irritated by what he considered Schröder’s anti-French attitude.34 – 202 –

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Schröder, however, was not intimidated. On the contrary, while Adenauer was in Paris, Schröder gave an interview of his own to friendly journalists, in which he warned against “excessive softness toward France” and against being too “thoughtless [leichtfertig]” in assuming that the Federal Republic could alienate the Americans and British. Criticizing de Gaulle’s attitude toward the MLF, Schröder added a major jab at his former boss, commenting that “some people who are going public these days with interviews, declarations, and press releases on foreign policy problems seem to me to be writing checks that they have no idea how they will cash in the future.” Schröder complained that de Gaulle wanted to detach West Germany from NATO, and the support he received from unnamed Germans was “not realistic.” According to Schröder, French behavior “contradict[ed] the spirit of friendship.” Citing the damage that the constant bickering was doing to the Union, Schröder concluded the interview with direct criticism of Adenauer. “History marches on,” he declared. “We must be flexible enough to reach our goals within this changing international situation.”35 Schröder’s counterattack escalated the conflict. In a telegram from Paris, Adenauer complained to Erhard that Schröder’s statements undermined his efforts at reconciliation with France. Adenauer’s complaints reflected a developing opinion among Gaullists that the problem was not Erhard, who was at best ill informed, but rather Schröder, working behind his overly trusting chancellor’s back. Schröder was accused of having a secret proEnglish, anti-French agenda, and his 1961 “softness” on Berlin was resurrected as proof of his unreliability on national issues. Anonymous pamphlets, produced and circulated by Union Gaullists and sympathetic journalists, with titles such as “Gerhard Schröder: The Last Straw,” and “The Foreign Minister of the SPD,” pilloried Schröder, while exempting Erhard from criticism.36 Such attempts to focus criticism on Schröder reflected the Gaullists’ schizophrenic nature. Although they themselves were dividing the Union, they did not want to be accused of undermining their nominal leader. Union Gaullists also increased their support for an independent European nuclear force. Guttenberg offered a “plan for nuclear partnership” built on an expanded French force de frappe, which would be placed at the disposal of a European political union. The key was for the US to “endorse a European nuclear power,” and for Europeans to have the courage “to replace the present one-sided dependence with a cooperative system of mutual interdependence between the US and Europe.” Guttenberg wanted “to find a solution that avoids the charge that the Germans are trying to use a European atomic strike force to get their finger on the nuclear trigger” by “putting the ‘trigger’ in NATO’s hands, and the ‘safety’ in the political hands of Europe.” Strauß, who claimed that ideas for a NATO nuclear force went back to the 1950s, argued that the MLF made sense only if it created – 203 –

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an independent European nuclear force under a European political union. Europeanization might remove the objections of other Europeans to the MLF, which looked increasingly like a German-American program.37 The truth was, however, that the MLF was dead, not because it was insufficiently “European,” but because no one, outside of the Germans, was really interested in encouraging German access to nuclear weapons. As the Johnson administration’s deadline of December 1964 approached and passed, the lack of enthusiasm within NATO doomed any attempt to resuscitate it. “If Europe isn’t for it,” Johnson told his advisers, “then the hell with it.” Even de Gaulle, however much he may have profited from speculations about European nuclear cooperation, finally told German representatives in private that “no power on earth will ever be prepared to give you nuclear weapons.”38 Thus, both the Gaullists and Schröder would be disappointed, and each would blame the other for the increasing problems between the Federal Republic and its NATO allies. The intensified conflict within the Union led to an interesting family drama. In the last Bundesvorstand meeting of 1964, the young Helmut Kohl, emerging as a powerful political operator in his home state of RhinelandPalatinate, made an impassioned plea for party peace. Turning to Adenauer, he lauded the patriarch for his service to the Union, but concluded that these historic accomplishments did not give him “the right … to do the party harm.” Citing upcoming elections, Kohl urged Adenauer and Erhard to bury their differences. Kohl also expressed the wish that the CSU would more clearly support Erhard, though, noting the absence of Strauß, he concluded that he felt “like a priest who preaches to the wrong person, because the right person [was] not present.” Despite the skepticism of many colleagues, Kohl called for a special meeting of the leadership to work out their differences to prove “that in Bonn there is no joy in decline, but secure hope in a victory in the next Bundestag election.” Kohl’s attempt at mediation fell flat. Atlanticists such as Erik Blumenfeld aggressively defended Schröder, noting that it was not Schröder who had started the public row, citing especially Adenauer’s Bild interview. Blumenfeld declared that it was not as if Schröder and Erhard were “pursuing a new foreign policy … that had led to problems with France,” but rather that these differences had existed for years, even at the time of the Elysée Treaty. Adenauer also showed no interest in conciliation. Claiming that he agreed with Kohl about the need for unity, he blamed Schröder for his interview while he was in Paris. His “conscience [was] clear,” he told Kohl. A special meeting was unlikely to solve anything. A similar proposal from Barzel, who had formally taken over the chair of the Fraktion after Brentano’s death from cancer in November, went no further than Kohl’s.39 As the Union leadership prepared for another national election, the first without Adenauer at the top of the ticket, they had to realize that the greatest threat to their political future lay within themselves. – 204 –

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Defeat in Victory: The 1965 Elections Harmonizing differences within the Union in 1965 was especially difficult because it would not be able to rely upon sharp contrasts with the opposition. Just before his retirement as chancellor, Adenauer had warned that the Union would need new political themes if it wanted to stop the rise of the SPD, which had profited greatly from its turn to the right at Bad Godesberg. “Please remember,” Adenauer declared, “that our old slogan from 1949, ‘Strong Ties to the West,’ cannot help us anymore … the Social Democrats have become more American than the Americans.” The Union had won the “long and hard struggle” to forge the consensus in favor of Westbindung, but had lost the exclusive claim to political virtue that had dominated previous campaigns. This shift was already apparent in 1961, but became especially acute four years later. The similarity between the opponents’ messages had become so complete that some scholars have noted that the SPD and Union campaign posters were virtually identical, both emphasizing a generalized commitment to “security.”40 The conflict between the Atlanticists and Gaullists within the Union was more bitter than any conflict between the main parties. Union Gaullists, in an attempt to demonstrate that they were the defenders of continuity, tried to draw sharp contrasts with the opposition, but to little avail. The CSU especially attacked alleged neutralists within the SPD and FDP. After setting up such a straw man, the CSU echoed old campaign themes (and ignored its own recent rhetoric) by concluding: “The Federal Republic can afford neither to leave the Western alliance nor to seriously challenge the strongest power in the West, the United States.” As Erhard prepared for a January 1965 visit to Paris, Adenauer also tried to focus attention on the opposition. Declaring that Erhard traveled to Paris accompanied “by the good wishes of the entire CDU and … the entire German people,” and that “trustworthy cooperation with France is as vital to all Germans as European unification,” Adenauer disingenuously attacked the SPD for their criticism of de Gaulle. “If the SPD, out of obvious electoral strategy, will not grant the chancellor such success, and continues to attack the policies of the French government,” Adenauer asserted, “that is not only short-sighted domestic policy, but most of all irresponsible foreign policy.” Up to the election, Adenauer tried to shift the discussion away from internal Union problems to the alleged hypocrisy of the SPD, calling the Bad Godesberg program “nothing more than … a long-term tactical maneuver to get into the government.”41 These attempts to resurrect old specters could not, however, obscure the intense disagreements within the Union. The special meeting of the Bundesvorstand during the March 1965 CDU convention in Düsseldorf, for example, saw a heated disagreement over the possibility of a common foreign policy platform. Though he placed the blame on others, Adenauer – 205 –

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refused to pretend that the Union had a unified foreign policy. “You can be sure that if we were now to say [differences] did not exist, no one [kein Mensch] would believe us,” was his sarcastic assessment. “Outraged [entsetzt]” by Adenauer’s comments, Erhard exploded, declaring that the world “has become much more complicated” and that “we no longer live in the heyday [Hochzeit] of John Foster Dulles,” and demanding that Adenauer cease his sniping. Again, however, Adenauer combined agreement on the need for unity with a renewed attack both on US policy, which he saw as sacrificing Europe to East Asia, and on Erhard’s and Schröder’s handling of de Gaulle. Reminding the audience of the fiasco of July 1964, Adenauer claimed that de Gaulle was treated “in a way that one would not treat one’s inferiors,” and that despite Erhard’s goodwill, Schröder had “systematically undermined” European political cooperation because of hostility to de Gaulle. He warned that France would seek cooperation with the Soviets if the Germans did not do more to cultivate their friendship.42 Erhard, seconded by Barzel and Kohl, rejected these grim predictions, and expressed hope that both the EEC and the Union would find a way to work together more constructively. Adenauer was not finished, however, telling Erhard that he was wrong to believe what he heard from his foreign minister. To the shock of his listeners, he declared that “Herr Schröder swindled me in the same way that he is now swindling Herr Erhard,” accusing Schröder (who, though a member of the Bundesvorstand, was not present at this meeting) and his staff of making policy without informing the chancellor. These last comments provoked a storm of reactions. Adenauer tried to bring the meeting to a harmonious end by proclaiming that all he did he did for the good of the Union, and to protect Germany from becoming encircled by the French and the Soviets, but this exchange only showed how dangerously divided the Union had become.43 Adenauer also continued his strategy of carrying his concerns into the public through interviews. In a February 1965 interview he repeated his criticisms of American policy. “You see,” the former “Chancellor of the Allies” argued, “any people will eventually become tired of foreign wars and armaments.… [I]f the Americans suffer major losses and no success in these wars they are fighting in East Asia, isolationist ideas can resurface in America—and we Europeans would be left just sitting here.” The answer was a closer relationship with France. Though the intervention of his party colleagues convinced Adenauer to suppress publication of this interview, his ideas did not change. In a long interview with the Welt am Sonntag in July, he repeated his worries about the European future and his criticisms of the growing American commitment in Vietnam.44 Gaullists maintained an intensive anti-American and anti-Schröder campaign right up to the election, descending to the personal attacks that had characterized the letter writing campaign of July 1964. An anonymous pamphlet, “Gerhard Schröder or Germany’s Security,” published as “a working – 206 –

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paper for political opinion and cabinet building,” offered another list of Schröder’s sins against Europe and against Franco-German relations, and warned about the return of “Yalta” cooperation between the Soviets and Americans over Europe’s head. The concluding paragraph summed up the anti-Schröder position: The only security that remains to us in light of this Soviet-American cooperation in favor of the Russian status quo in Europe is the fact that France has cooperated on neither the Nuclear Test Ban treaty nor the burlesque insecurity game in Geneva. France’s respected force de frappe will therefore automatically become the security wing of German foreign policy. GERMANY HAS THEREFORE THE CHOICE BETWEEN THE DETERMINED EUROPEAN EXPANSION OF THE FRANCO-GERMAN TREATY AND TOTAL INSECURITY WITH GERHARD SCHRÖDER [sic].45

Schröder and his staff, outraged by these attacks, tried to discover their author, who proved to be the deeply conservative Catholic journalist (and Adenauer intimate) Paul Wilhelm Wenger of the Gaullist Rheinischer Merkur. Stung by the criticism from within his own party, Schröder embarked on a counteroffensive that only sharpened the differences within the Union. Bolstered by Foreign Office studies showing that the Federal Republic’s international position was basically strong, Schröder used his comments at the party conference to reiterate his confidence in the Americans and his skepticism about exclusive cooperation with de Gaulle. In his own interviews, Schröder reminded his readers that he had signed the Elysée Treaty, and he “would not take a second place to anyone” in his commitment to Franco-German reconciliation. This commitment did not, however, mean that the two states would or could be in complete agreement at all times. Citing a need for “long practice in the new forms of cooperation” which should grow “organically,” Schröder rejected a Franco-German special union. Although he conceded that NATO needed reform, he cautioned against “throwing the baby out with the bath water.” An American withdrawal from Europe was in no one’s interest, and, Schröder said, Europeans should do “everything in their power to maintain the bond that ties us to the greatest power in the free world.” The answer to any problems in the alliance was closer cooperation, not Gaullist experimentation.46 Schröder’s willingness to face his critics publicly reflected his growing confidence in Erhard’s support and his belief that the majority of Germans, both within and outside of the Union, agreed with him. Concerned that de Gaulle was “determined to build a Europe allied with the United States, but within which the United States is not present,” and that such a policy would damage German interests, Schröder rejected the notion that the Germans need follow de Gaulle blindly. He noted with light sarcasm that “the German public expects that the government, no matter how much it endorses – 207 –

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Franco-German reconciliation, will clearly represent German interests; especially because [they] have the feeling that General de Gaulle is not shy about emphasizing French interests.”47 Encouraging reports from other quarters further stiffened Schröder’s resolve. Some CSU members complained that Strauß’s faith in de Gaulle and constant warnings about the dangers of not following France’s lead were becoming stale. A new book from one of the CDU’s most respected foreign policy spokesmen, AK V Chair Ernst Majonica, also supported Schröder, and characterized a Gaullist Franco-German special relationship as “the end of Europe.” Even NATO Ambassador Wilhelm Grewe, who had personal and professional reasons to criticize US policy, expressed even greater skepticism about de Gaulle’s willingness to treat the Federal Republic as an equal partner.48 Erhard and Schröder’s Atlanticism received further support from one of the most significant social events of 1965: the visit of Queen Elizabeth II of England to the Federal Republic in late May. This very successful visit encouraged public support for closer relations with Britain and overshadowed de Gaulle’s annual visit to Bonn later in the summer. Schröder seized the opportunity to emphasize the need for closer relations with Britain as well as France, and for greater integration and cooperation within the Atlantic Alliance. Reminded of the controversy over de Gaulle’s 1964 visit and alleged missed opportunities for greater European cooperation, Schröder considered such “political legend building … either silly or malicious.” Any differences between France and the Federal Republic, Schröder asserted, were based on objective policy differences, not personal animus, a fact recognized “by all sensible Germans.”49 True to his own strong belief in the need for consensus, Erhard tried to efface the differences within the Union as the election approached. In a Bundestag speech in early September, he asserted his commitment to European integration, Franco-German cooperation, and the protection of German interests within the search for détente. Erhard’s speech even drew praise from Adenauer for its emphasis on “European integration that should not limit itself to economic cooperation, but should lead to real political cooperation,” and for Erhard’s promise to “put life back into” the Elysée Treaty.50 Such attempts to smooth over the differences within the Union were, however, largely cosmetic. Underneath, different factions looked to the election to determine the ultimate direction of both the party and German foreign policy. Erhard and Schröder hoped that a victory would provide a mandate to disarm their domestic critics. Adenauer and the Gaullists also wanted a Union victory, but not one that would allow Erhard to remain in office or that would continue the coalition with the FDP. They hoped for a closer result, which would force a grand coalition between the Union and the SPD. Although this must surely appear odd to readers of Adenauer’s attacks on the Social Democrats, many of the most conservative Union leaders, including Adenauer, Krone, and Guttenberg, considered a coalition – 208 –

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with the SPD the chance to rid themselves of Erhard. A grand coalition for a limited time could initiate important constitutional reforms, especially a new electoral law to create a two-party system and eliminate the troublesome liberals altogether. SPD leaders such as Herbert Wehner, who wanted a chance to prove the SPD’s credentials as a governing party, were only too happy to participate in these plans. For this reason, the SPD did not nominate a candidate for the federal presidency in 1964, preferring instead to vote for the CDU’s Heinrich Lübke, who supported a grand coalition. Polling data in the weeks before the election encouraged these plans, as it appeared that the Union and the SPD, with their similar public images, were running neck and neck. 51 The result of the election, the product of a late shift in public sentiment, destroyed all of these plans. The Volk gave Volkskanzler Erhard the mandate he needed; the Union won more than 47 percent of the vote, falling only three seats short of an absolute majority, a result second only to the 1957 landslide. Erhard could remain chancellor, the coalition with the FDP would continue, and German foreign policy would not turn toward France. In preparation for the coalition talks, Schröder reinforced this continuity with a memorandum for Erhard outlining the basic principles of German foreign policy. Proclaiming that a “politically and economically unified Europe that speaks with one voice in the free world remains the goal of German policy,” Schröder emphatically rejected Gaullism. He endorsed “Franco-German cooperation on the basis of equality,” but argued that the basis of this cooperation was both the Elysée Treaty and the preamble. Furthermore, he argued that policy toward Great Britain would be based on increased British interest in “cooperation with the states of the European continent, and that it together with the US and France bears a special responsibility for Germany as a whole.”52 Schröder, who received broad support from the German journalistic elite (even Spiegel publisher and Union critic Rudolf Augstein “crossed his fingers” for Schröder’s reappointment)53 was also not shy about taking the battle over foreign policy to the public. In an extensive interview shortly after the election, Schröder responded directly to questions about the relationship between the US and Europe, and the chances for Franco-German cooperation. Taking the exact opposite position from Adenauer, Schröder cited the increasing American commitment to Vietnam as proof that the US was committed to fighting communism, and he dismissed the charge that the Americans and Soviets had a joint interest in maintaining the status quo. Although he repeated his commitment to Franco-German reconciliation, Schröder rejected any notion of European independence from the US: Our conception of European policy has always been that such a policy depends on close cooperation with the United States, not least because the security umbrella under which the peaceful development of Europe can take place can be – 209 –

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maintained only by the power of the United States. There are no real interests that separate Europe and the United States. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson have both strongly emphasized that the United States is very interested in the development of Europe into a strong, unified power. Here there are no rivalries, but rather the … possibility of worldwide cooperation. We should therefore not entertain for an instant the impression that Europe should or could be a satellite or protectorate of the United States. That is the intention of neither the Americans or the Europeans. Therefore, I refuse to think in such categories, which are obsolete in light of world developments.

These comments reflected his confidence in remaining in office, leading both German and French observers to conclude that he intended, if anything, to intensify his anti-Gaullist foreign policy.54 The CSU tried to counter Schröder with a “working paper” of its own on the future of German foreign policy. This document, unsurprisingly, began with quite different principles and reached very different conclusions. Claiming that the US, caught up in its problems with China and in the global competition with communism, “has ceased to pursue an offensive strategy in Europe,” the paper asserted that the Germans could not expect from the Americans either “an active reunification policy or the necessary strengthening of the European component of Atlantic defense.” As a result, German foreign policy should build on a close relationship with France, which was proceeding “from a correct understanding of American interests,” and should seek a more independent Europe within the West. This meant, for example, that while the Federal Republic would continue to express its “political solidarity” with the US, it should also “develop plans for NATO reform that will end the one-sided dependence of the Europeans on the US and replace it with mutual dependence between the US and Europe.” Only a European political union based on the EEC could be this “European partner.” Schröder and his staff rejected the “false assumption” that the Americans had gone on the defensive, and also rejected the notion that cooperation with France on the scale suggested by the working paper would bring the benefits suggested. The differences within the Union were only becoming deeper.55 With Erhard firmly in power, and sensing that their ability to influence policy decisions was slipping, the Gaullists made a concerted effort to undermine Schröder’s position in the government by denouncing him to other leaders of the Union. In a letter to Franz Meyers, the influential minister president of North Rhine-Westphalia, Baron Guttenberg called Schröder’s foreign policy a “fiasco,” and argued that his reappointment would be a “clear affront” to France, harming the Federal Republic’s international position. Any short-term embarrassment from his firing would fade in comparison to the very real dangers of Schröder’s remaining in office. Schröder’s critics had muted their complaints in the weeks before the election, Guttenberg claimed. If, however, Schröder remained, “my friends – 210 –

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and I will no longer be able to maintain our reserve,” which would mean “that in the months to come the conflict over the foreign policy course within the CDU/CSU Fraktion will be more strongly and visibly fought than ever before.” Meyers was unmoved, however, declaring his support for Schröder, “whose goal it is to save the Atlantic Alliance from the dangers that so clearly threaten it from the French side.…” He dismissed Guttenberg’s political threats, noting that the public was already well aware of his opposition, and earned Schröder’s warm thanks for his defense.56 Strauß echoed many of Guttenberg’s arguments in a long letter to Erhard. Citing unnamed reliable French sources, Strauß predicted that the reappointment of Schröder would be a blow against Franco-German cooperation and would encourage those in France who did not trust the Germans. He criticized Schröder’s interviews, which reinforced his pro-American and anti-French image. While denying any personal ambition, Strauß made an impassioned plea for firing Schröder: “[A] foreign minister who is welcomed by the Americans but rejected by the French is not the right person to shape the German-American relationship in German interest.” In a series of meetings, Strauß and the CSU tried to force Erhard to appoint a different foreign minister.57 These Gaullist attempts to influence the course of the coalition negotiations reflected the political reality that the Union was divided against itself. They also signaled an important shift in German politics. In the election, the CSU, whose relationship with the CDU was always complex, actually received a larger share of the national vote than the FDP (9.6 vs. 9.5 percent), and the same number of Bundestag seats. Thus, although the new government was officially made up of two parties, the Union and the FDP, some writers began to refer, with only slight exaggeration, to a “three-party coalition,” citing the increasing independence of the Bavarians and their vigorous chair. Furthermore, with their clear hostility to Schröder, the CSU functioned as an internal opposition, suggesting potential danger for the new government.58 Adenauer also carried out his anti-Schröder campaign in public. In an interview with Bild he returned to his favorite themes. Citing the danger of “encirclement” that would result if France sought a closer relationship with the Soviet Union, Adenauer claimed that there were “no differences of opinion” within the Union over the need for an Atlantic community. Within that community, however, “our relationship with France is decisive, a matter of life and death.” In order to revive and care for this vital relationship, Germany needed a foreign minister “who did not have a cold relationship” with France.59 The public criticisms of Schröder by Strauß and Adenauer created an unusual spectacle: the chairs of the two parties that made up the majority of the government mounted a sustained “war of interviews” against one of their own colleagues. Critical observers were especially affronted by the spectacle of Adenauer, the author of “Chancellor Democracy,” attempting – 211 –

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to limit the power of the chancellor to select his cabinet. That these criticisms appeared in Bild, famous for its garish headlines and photographs of scantily clad nymphets, led one journalist to comment acidly: “[Adenauer] is as scrupulous about his choice of forum as he is in his choice of arguments.” The entire spectacle was “the rebellion of a minority,” who hoped to override not only the majority within their own party, but also the electorate at large, in pursuit of a political vendetta.60 As the new cabinet was on the verge of being formally appointed, the conflict reached an emotional climax. Adenauer sent an impassioned handwritten note to President Lübke, begging him not to approve Schröder’s appointment. This letter, with its staccato sentences and evident pathos, resonates with Gaullist fears about Germany’s and Europe’s future, and with the intense political antipathy that motivated Adenauer. “[The] US is determined not to change the status quo in Europe,” Adenauer wrote. “England is clearly against us…. France, i.e., de Gaulle, is quite rightly disappointed in us. We have never really put the [Elysée] treaty into action. We will eventually sink into a third-class power and fall to the Russians. De Gaulle will view Schröder’s reappointment as a slap in the face. We can only have a future with France. Schröder’s appointment would rob us of that chance. I beg you: refuse to appoint Schröder. You have the right to do so. Use it!”61 In the end, these frantic attempts to stop Schröder were for naught. Erhard appointed him, the president concurred, and the Bundestag accepted him. The CSU Landesgruppe even sent a congratulatory telegram, with the clenched teeth through which the words were spoken barely audible. Schröder could, for at least a short time, bask in the support he received from the public for having to bear the attacks of Strauß and Adenauer. Nevertheless, this would prove to be a Pyrrhic victory for both Schröder and Erhard. The new coalition, divided by competition from both within and between the parties, was unstable, and the divisions within the Union that were exposed by the coalition negotiations would be deep.62 Just how deep these divisions remained became apparent in a political minicrisis that dominated the headlines for a short time in late November 1965. The crisis had begun quietly in the spring. In the weeks before Queen Elizabeth’s visit in May, rumors circulated among Schröder’s opponents that he planned to conclude a treaty with the British similar to the Elysée Treaty, committing both sides to regular political consultation and cooperation. The rumors appeared plausible because of Schröder’s determination to rebuild Anglo-German relations and Atlanticist plans to bind the British more closely to Europe. Precisely for these reasons, Union Gaullists opposed the idea. In the words of Baron Guttenberg, an agreement with Britain would “set the work of European unification back years, if not destroy it completely,” because it would allow the British to delay further European political cooperation. Claiming to have reliable sources within the Foreign Office, Guttenberg saw this treaty as an immediate threat, and he – 212 –

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begged Strauß to denounce Schröder’s “anti-French and pro-British” position. When Strauß mentioned these rumors to Erhard, however, denials from both the chancellor and foreign minister had put the issue to rest.63 In November, however, the rumors reappeared, inspired by Schröder’s reappointment. Adenauer himself, speaking as CDU chair on information supplied by Guttenberg, formally asked Erhard’s chief of staff, Ludger Westrick, if it was true that Schröder had completed a “secret treaty” with the British. This time, neither side would be satisfied with verbal denials. Gaullists, who were willing to believe any negative stories about Schröder, were sure that he was capable of such secret diplomacy. Meanwhile, Adenauer’s claim to base his suspicions on reliable information set off a search within the Foreign Office for the leak behind the rumors. The search revealed a young diplomat at the French desk, Hans Graf Huyn, as Guttenberg’s and Adenauer’s source. Convinced that Schröder planned to destroy Franco-German relations, Huyn had hoped that spreading these rumors (for which no historian has found supporting evidence) would scotch any secret plans and embarrass Schröder personally. In the end, despite Guttenberg’s efforts to protect him, Huyn, claiming to been guided by his conscience, was forced to resign.64 Though that should have been the end of the story, the divisions within the Union were so great that the incident had a nasty political epilogue. Guttenberg and his allies within the Fraktion used the Bundestag question period in mid-November to pepper Schröder with formal inquiries about his handling of the affair, accusing him of seeking to suppress uncongenial opinions. Critics such as Osterheld complained that Schröder wanted to resurrect the bad Prussian tradition of “cadaver obedience,” an impression only strengthened by the ill-advised comment of one senior diplomat who joked that a good civil servant should feel conscience pangs only when he hears the screams of torture victims coming from the basement. The spectacle of Schröder being grilled by members of his own Fraktion, while being defended by members of the other parties; Adenauer’s demonstrative unwillingness to defend him; and the CSU Landesgruppe’s statement supporting Guttenberg and Huyn showed that many within the Union viewed Schröder as the enemy. This opinion was reinforced when Huyn, his diplomatic career over, found a position with the CSU’s Munich office.65 The crisis also had a personal side, as Schröder’s opponents tried to destroy his image with allegedly sensational revelations. News stories charged that his doctorate was illegitimate, because his dissertation, which he claimed had been destroyed during the war, could not be found (a fate also ironically shared by the almost completed dissertation of Franz Josef Strauß). A group calling itself the Action Committee of Schröder’s Opponents within the CDU threatened Schröder not only with the dissertation story, but also with charges of marital infidelity (for which they claimed to have photographic evidence), if he did not resign. Huyn became one of the – 213 –

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primary voices in this campaign, held up by Gaullists as a victim of Schröder’s unscrupulous tactics. The campaign would reach a high point a year later, when Huyn published a long book, Die Sackgasse (The Dead End). Part foreign policy analysis, part a settling of scores, this eagerly awaited book repeated the familiar criticisms of Schröder’s Atlantic policy, adding the personal attacks on his academic credentials and alleged infidelities.66 The entire unenlightening spectacle demonstrated the depths of division within the Union. Schröder attempted to stand above the fray, denying that he was pursuing a secret foreign policy and emphasizing his close cooperation with Erhard. Requesting memoranda from key ambassadors, such as Grewe at NATO, Duckwitz in Washington, and Blankenhorn in London, Schröder could be satisfied that the professionals supported his policies. He also ended the year 1965 with an article in the Union news service in which, without mentioning Huyn by name, he declared that the basis for a stable foreign policy was party unity and a “loyal foreign service,” which “stands loyally behind Ludwig Erhard and his government.” Admitting that there can be differences of opinion, “and sometimes there must be lively discussion within the Foreign Office,” he concluded that “Germany can speak reliably with one only voice in the world.”67 Schröder’s confident phrases masked what was in reality a pious wish. Though he could count on support from a broad majority within the public and among opinion makers, Schröder faced within his own party a cacophony of competing voices that even the victorious strains of electoral triumph could not obscure. Behind Schröder stood Erhard, who supported him both out of conviction and with the realization that, if Schröder were to fall, he would surely follow. The broad popular mandate, far from mollifying their opponents, only sharpened the conflict. Within a year, that internal disharmony would drive Erhard from office.

The End of an Era An especially significant year in the history of the West, 1966 was a year in which two major crises—both the direct result of de Gaulle’s campaign for an autonomous “Europe of the Fatherlands”—shook the West’s primary institutions. The first was the so-called “empty chair” crisis in the EEC, whereby France demonstrated its opposition to majority voting by refusing to attend meetings, thus paralyzing European institutions. Shortly after this crisis was defused in January 1966 by the “Luxembourg compromise,” which practically preserved each member’s veto, de Gaulle instigated another crisis with his announcement of France’s withdrawal from NATO military integration, and his demand that NATO headquarters and bases leave French soil. – 214 –

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These two conflicts represent, in retrospect, the meridian of Gaullist foreign policy, in which the general struck at the heart of both European and Atlantic integration. At the same time these dramatic actions revealed the limits of de Gaulle’s vision. By alienating both Atlanticists and advocates of supranational European cooperation, de Gaulle found that he had few real friends left. In his remaining three years in office, he was increasingly isolated, notwithstanding his rhetorical tours de force from Montreal to Phnom Penh, where he directly criticized his North American allies. Although the US, increasingly committed to Vietnam, was neither able nor willing to embark on new initiatives to take advantage of the situation, de Gaulle’s conflicts with his neighbors undermined any plans for European autonomy within the West. The conflict over French policies affected the conflict between Atlanticists and Gaullists within the Union, but not necessarily in the ways that one might have expected. French isolation weakened the appeal of Gaullism as a practical policy alternative, but did not weaken the opposition of German Gaullists to Erhard and Schröder. If anything, the continuing problems within the West only increased Gaullist frustration, as they blamed de Gaulle’s destructive actions on the German failure to seize the opportunities offered by France in previous years. Not powerful enough to reverse the general international trend, Union Gaullists, with Adenauer at their head, intensified their attacks. When domestic problems undermined Erhard, they gave him the coup de grâce, threatening to destroy the Union in the process. The intensity of the divisions within the Union was apparent as the year began. In an early January Bundestag debate on the eve of the Luxembourg meeting of the EEC, Erhard and a broad majority called for firm diplomacy to resist French demands. In a private meeting of the Fraktionsvorstand, Erhard even announced that he would endorse no further concessions. Erhard doubted a solution could be found, but believed that any failure would be France’s fault. On the same day, Strauß was expressing sympathy for the French, telling the CSU that the root of the problem lay not in de Gaulle alone, but “in the fundamental difference of political opinion over the place of Europe in the Western alliance.” Strauß also announced that he no longer believed in the “automatic nature” (Automatismus) of European integration, and that the Federal Republic should not give up any more sovereign rights without an agreement on Europe’s independent role in the West. Most of all, Strauß concluded that the German government “should not make itself the chief advocate of the opposition to France.”68 Strauß repeated many of these arguments in a long letter to Erhard after the Luxembourg compromise, as Erhard prepared for his annual visit to Paris. Noting that fundamental issues of European cooperation remained unresolved, Strauß complained that the Germans should have acted as the mediator between France and the other states, “instead of … appearing as the leader of the Five against France.” This decision would have grave – 215 –

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consequences, since, Strauß continued, the Johnson administration had clearly turned away from Europe, which along with continuing British refusal to see itself “shrink into Europe,” meant that the Continent ran the risk of sinking into insignificance. “Under these circumstances,” Strauß concluded, “a German foreign policy based exclusively on Washington and London does not serve German interests,” and the Federal Republic needed “at virtually any price to unite with de Gaulle.” If the Federal Republic worked with de Gaulle on his plans for the reform of NATO and the EEC, the French would in turn help the Germans in their pursuit of reunification; and their cooperation would become the basis for a strong and autonomous Europe.69 Strauß’s comments, which echoed that arguments he had been pressing since 1963, demonstrate that nothing de Gaulle could do would shake Gaullist support for closer Franco-German cooperation. If anything, Union Gaullists saw de Gaulle’s behavior as a foretaste of worse things to come if the Federal Republic did not change course. A similar pattern emerged in the reaction to the second crisis, de Gaulle’s rejection of NATO military integration. Despite a positive Franco-German meeting in early February, the Germans were shocked and surprised, along with the rest of the world, when de Gaulle used his press conference on 21 February to announce France’s reclamation of her “sovereignty” and the rejection of NATO military integration, effective 1 July. The other allies, and Erhard himself, harshly criticized France. Beyond the symbolism of France’s retreat from NATO, the crisis also raised legal questions about the continued presence of French troops on German soil. Resolving these questions required long and difficult negotiations. Here Erhard and Schröder proved themselves to be tenacious defenders of German interests, combining criticism of de Gaulle with a determination to preserve West German security while reaching a successful compromise.70 Gaullists, however, were not willing to criticize the general’s decision, nor would they give Schröder or Erhard credit for the negotiations that allowed French troops to remain in the Federal Republic. Adenauer (who had confidently told an interviewer before the Bundestag elections that de Gaulle “has never expressed an intention to leave NATO, but has advocated reform”) issued a press release on 16 March citing French “willingness to engage in bilateral and multilateral negotiations,” and denying that he was in any way “disappointed” with de Gaulle. He implied that the blame lay not in Paris but in the West German Foreign Office, telling an interviewer from Bild that since de Gaulle had been calling for NATO reform for years, people “should have been prepared for this earlier,” in flat contradiction of his earlier statements. The most important thing was to engage in friendly negotiations with the French, Adenauer continued, because “whoever does not negotiate with the French runs the risk of driving France into Moscow’s arms,” with terrible consequences. “German security is French security, and the security of Germany and France is the security of Europe,” he concluded, – 216 –

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still unwilling to consider that it was France, not Germany, that had called these arrangements into question.71 Other Union Gaullists also saw the main problem in Bonn rather than Paris. CSU analysts saw Schröder taking an unnecessarily hard line, forcing the French to negotiate an entirely new agreement on troop stationing. One author concluded that “Schröder appears determined … to run the risk of having both French divisions withdrawn,” and, hinting at base motives, that he “apparently has the support of the SPD.” Attacking a speech in which Schröder made his legal case, Strauß called for a compromise that would allow for common European nuclear forces. Reliance on close relations with the US made no sense in a world in which the Americans were increasingly distracted by other concerns, Strauß repeated, and would only isolate the Federal Republic in Europe. Most of all, Strauß concluded: “The foreign minister must be forced to follow the majority of the Fraktion in his attitude toward France.”72 Strauß’s comments indicate how firmly Gaullists clung to their belief in a Franco-German future—even as de Gaulle’s actions made such cooperation increasingly unlikely—as well as their conviction that a pro-French policy was the “real” Union foreign policy. Whether Strauß was correct in assuming that he spoke for the majority of the Fraktion was, however, another matter. Writing on the eve of Franco-German talks in April, former Chief of Staff Hans Globke wrote to Adenauer sadly, noting that a combination of American pressure and Schröder’s public relations successes had won over not only Erhard but also “the majority of the party and Fraktion.” Adenauer, however, maintained his opposition, writing to Globke that “one cannot be too decisive in defending our position.” France, he continued, “will always remain our neighbor, even when the present period, in which America must help us, is over.” Adenauer went so far as to downplay his earlier fears about a Franco-Soviet rapprochement, noting that “the gentleman in Paris is as convinced as I am that as neighbors we will share the same fate.”73 Strauß’s and Adenauer’s determination to stand by de Gaulle, however, had little effect on German policy in the NATO crisis. Schröder was, if anything, even firmer in his opposition to de Gaulle. He denounced the French decision to leave NATO, “which happened unilaterally without consultation with us,” admitting that it was in German interests to keep French troops in the Federal Republic, “but not at any price or under any conditions.” The French had to show goodwill by working out the legal details of their continued presence, and by recognizing that it was in German interest to negotiate an agreement that served their security. Schröder rejected the notion that his hard bargaining was unfair, concluding that “we have been much more conciliatory than de Gaulle was in his statements to us and the other allies. We have not set deadlines, as he has done; we have not made unilateral decisions, but on the contrary have clearly stated our willingness to negotiate.” Schröder received strong support from the press, from the – 217 –

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SPD, and from many diplomats, including former Ambassador to Washington Heinz Krekeler, who cited de Gaulle’s unilateralism as the real barrier to Franco-German relations, asking “How can there be a friendship that is not based on mutual respect?”74 Despite this broad public support for Erhard and Schröder, the NATO crisis sparked another round of bitter public feuding within the Union. Guttenberg and Kohl, for example, criticized Schröder’s anti-French policy, sparking a vitriolic response from Schröder’s supporters. Despairing at the constant public bickering, nearly seventy members of the Fraktion, claiming to speak for many others, wrote to Erhard with a now familiar plea, calling for a meeting of all responsible parties to work out “a common foreign policy conception.” Meanwhile, Adenauer continued to attack his successor, worrying that the Union was becoming a “national-liberal” party and was losing contact with its cultural roots. He charged that Erhard and Schröder’s “hard attitude toward France … has not paid off anywhere in the world.” Adenauer was also becoming increasingly critical of American policy in Vietnam, telling Cyrus Sulzberger the Americans should recognize that their real interests lay in Europe, and withdraw from Southeast Asia, as de Gaulle had suggested. Although neither the Johnson administration nor the Erhard government offered any comment on the old man’s arguments, they served as a further symbol of Adenauer’s alienation from his erstwhile American allies.75 This renewed conflict provided the background to an important symbolic moment for the Union. At the CDU national convention in Bonn in March 1966, the ninety-year-old Adenauer finally agreed to step down as chair, accepting the title of Honorary Chair. His replacement would be Erhard, who had reluctantly overcome his aversion to party politics. The changing of the guard was, however, less a change of course than an admission of defeat on both sides. Adenauer’s willingness to retire was a concession to the inevitable progress of age; it was also an admission that his hopes to influence policy as CDU chair could not be fulfilled after Erhard and Schröder’s victory in 1965. Adenauer had succeeded not in leading, but in dividing his party. For Erhard as well, becoming chair was an admission that his attempt to stand above politics had failed. He hoped that assuming party leadership would help him control fractious elements, but subsequent events would demonstrate that his conversion to party politician was too little, too late.76 The unsettled international situation made finding a consensus within the Union harder than ever. Atlanticist Schadenfreude at the Gaullists’ failure to explain de Gaulle’s unilateral decisions paled as the Americans reawakened old fears. The first potential problem was the progress being made in the Geneva negotiations on a nuclear nonproliferation treaty. As it became clear that the Americans, Soviets, and British were close to drafting an agreement that would freeze the nuclear status quo, all of the same questions about the – 218 –

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relationship of the Federal Republic to its nuclear patron that had been raised by the test ban resurfaced. Although the Foreign Office, as it had with the test ban, expressed support for nonproliferation and confidence that any questions about the Federal Republic’s role in NATO nuclear planning could be worked out, members of the Fraktion engaged in heated disagreements. In AK V, Guttenberg led the charge against the treaty, arguing that its language would make European nuclear cooperation impossible, and urged cooperation with France, which opposed the agreement. Kurt Birrenbach represented the Atlanticists, admitting that the treaty would make European nuclear cooperation difficult, but downplaying any negative consequences. The differences within AK V were so intense that a planned report on the treaty for the Fraktion was delayed through most of the summer, emerging in an unsatisfying watered-down version only in late September.77 By the fall of 1966, however, nonproliferation paled before a more immediate issue with both international and domestic implications. A developing recession had created a budget deficit. In the search for savings, Erhard and his government found themselves facing a new conflict with the Americans. Under a 1961 agreement, the Germans had pledged to make transfer payments to offset the costs of stationing American troops in the Federal Republic. The economic details were not well understood by the German public; nevertheless, the budget crisis put Erhard under enormous pressure to reduce Germans payments. The Johnson administration, however, had its own economic and political problems, and Defense Secretary McNamara was unwilling to reduce German obligations. Erhard hoped for a breakthrough in direct talks with Johnson, scheduled for late September in Washington. His supporters, including US Ambassador George McGhee, lobbied hard for American concessions, emphasizing Erhard’s loyalty and the potential political fallout of a failure, but it was not enough. Erhard returned from Washington empty-handed, to face almost certain political doom.78 Erhard’s Gaullist critics increased their attacks upon his return. Adenauer charged that the Americans were indifferent to European concerns, and that the pro-American policy had failed. Erhard complained that these attacks were “contradictory” and “harmful to the workings of German foreign policy,” but he was wounded by them. In a speech to a business group in late October, Strauß cited both the nonproliferation treaty and the offset costs crisis in a long attack on both the Americans and Erhard. The Americans had no interest in either European or German unification any more, Strauß charged, and their fixation on their own economic problems made an independent Europe, based on Franco-German cooperation, more essential than ever. With an uncanny sense for the blood in the water, de Gaulle joined in the feeding frenzy by using his 28 October press conference to repeat criticisms of Erhard’s handling of Franco-German relations, further encouraging Erhard’s domestic opponents.79 – 219 –

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By that time, the budget problems had spelled the end for Erhard. If it was ironic that Erhard, as the most visible exponent of close GermanAmerican relations, received his most damaging diplomatic defeat at the hands of Lyndon Johnson, it was downright tragic that Erhard, the “People’s Chancellor” and father of the “economic miracle,” lost his domestic support because of economic mistakes. The recession that loomed throughout the summer brought Erhard down in the autumn. For the first time in the history of the Federal Republic, the Bundesrat rejected the chancellor’s budget for 1967, revealing deep conflicts within the coalition. The FDP, determined to demonstrate its independence, rejected tax increases proposed by the Union. When no agreement could be reached on spending cuts, FDP Chair Mende led his colleagues out of the government at the end of October. Erhard tried a minority government, rejecting repeated calls to resign. Electoral defeats in several state elections, especially in Hesse in late October, however, eroded whatever support he had left. Under attack from his FDP allies and his critics within the Union, and worn down by charges that he had failed to hold his party together, Erhard was forced into the background as the Union moved on without him.80 By 10 November, the Union had selected a new chancellor, Baden-Württemberg’s governor, former AKV Chair Kurt Georg Kiesinger. Schröder had had some support, but remaining resentments within the party as well as his own cool personality had denied him the position. Kiesinger had the advantage of being a relative outsider (he had left the Bundestag in 1958 to take over the government of his home state, and was considered neutral in the Atlanticist/Gaullist conflict), and gathered enough support from all wings of the party to get the nod.81 Although Erhard remained “Ghost chancellor” for three more weeks, Kiesinger began coalition negotiations with the SPD. Once they were complete, Erhard formally resigned on 30 November, and the new coalition elected Kiesinger chancellor on 1 December 1966. The coalition negotiations provided one last opportunity for the Gaullist/ Atlanticist conflict to flare. Strauß as CSU chair presented a detailed foreign policy memorandum, attacking the Americans and Schröder, and advocating a more “European” policy. Schröder dismissed these comments as “a dangerous mixture of the true and the false,” and produced a countermemorandum.82 As a symbol of the Union’s attempts to bridge its differences, both men would serve in the new government—Schröder as defense minister and Strauß as finance minister—but, partially as a result of their continuing disagreements, neither would enjoy anything approaching their former foreign policy influence. The split between Atlanticists and Gaullists became less significant after the fall of Erhard. Since the Union was no longer the dominant political force it had been, its internal contradictions had less impact on national policy. The grand coalition signaled the end of an era in West German politics. After nearly two decades of sometimes brutal political competition, the – 220 –

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Union and SPD now formed one government. Analysts at the time and in the succeeding decades have tried to determine the value of the grand coalition. Some saw it as proof of the “end of ideology,” opening a new era of broad consensus. Such hopes were dashed in 1968, when critics on the Right and the Left accused it of being fundamentally undemocratic. By the time the grand coalition was replaced by the “social-liberal” coalition of SPD and FDP in 1969, the government’s record was mixed. Successes in dealing with the recession of 1966–1967 and in passing emergency legislation in 1968 mixed with the failure to reform German electoral laws, leaving the “forgotten government” as a relatively unknown period in postwar history.83 For Konrad Adenauer, the creation of the grand coalition had one overwhelming benefit. “The main thing is that he is gone [Hauptsache, et is einer wech]!” was the triumphant patriarch’s epitaph for his unloved successor. So determined was he to stop Erhard, and so divided was the Union, that any means was justified to remove him. That Adenauer—who more than anyone else had shaped the Union’s image, enforced internal unity, and molded it into the dominant political force in the Federal Republic— would end his career welcoming the collapse of a Union-led government is an ironic commentary on the end of the Adenauer era. What Adenauer would not, or could not, see was that Erhard’s defeat signaled the eclipse of the Union as a whole. In the cabinet of the grand coalition, the Union would control ten ministries, the SPD nine. Both the Economics and Foreign Ministries, however, would fall to the Social Democrats, in the persons of Karl Schiller and Willy Brandt. Economic and foreign policy, the two elements of postwar German politics most associated with the Union—with Erhard and Adenauer—had passed from Union control. Neither post has been held by the Union since. Adenauer gave his estrangement from the Anglo-Saxons one final concrete expression in February 1967. In his last public speech, in the Ateneo in Madrid, he denounced the nonproliferation treaty as a superpower attempt to control Europe, and repeated his call for deeper European political cooperation, even including Spain. “The interests of Europe and the United States are not always identical,” declared the former “Chancellor of the Allies,” “and the European states must use European integration to advance their own interests.”84 Though he never claimed that Europe and America could not work together, Adenauer remained consistent to the end in his belief that Europe should find ways and means to assert its independence. On 19 April 1967, Adenauer died. Two years later, the Union would be relegated to the opposition, and a new era, symbolized by Willy Brandt and his Ostpolitik, would begin. Brought down by its own internal divisions, the Union would require thirteen years in the political wilderness before it could return to government. In its conflicts over the shape of the West, the Union had become a victim of its own success. Where once the other major parties in the Bundestag challenged the very bases of Westbindung, now – 221 –

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Westbindung had become consensus. In fact, the unreserved support of the FDP and SPD for the Atlantic partnership, unencumbered by enthusiasm for Gaullism, placed them more in harmony with American policy than the Union, making them ideal partners in the new era of détente. The struggle over the Federal Republic’s place in the world—the defining political debate of the Adenauer era—ended in victory for the advocates of the West. Meanwhile, the principal architect of Westbindung viewed his accomplishment at the end of his life with distinctly mixed emotions. Having devoted himself to bringing the Federal Republic into the West, Adenauer learned that the West was a more complex place than he had imagined.

Notes 1. Koerfer, Kampf, 795. 2. Volker Hentschel, Ludwig Erhard: Ein Politikerleben (Munich, 1996); see also Gerhard Schröder et al., eds., Ludwig Erhard: Beiträge zu seiner politischen Biographie (Frankfurt, 1971); on foreign affairs, see Hans-Dietrich Genscher, “Neue Ansätze in Gerhard Schröders Ostpolitik—Die Friedensnote vom 25. März 1966,” in Hermann Kunst et al., eds., Dem Staate verpflichtet: Festgabe für Gerhard Schröder (Stuttgart, 1980), 85–90. 3. Joseph Luns, “Ludwig Erhard—der Bundeskanzler, der ein Niederländer hätte sein können,” in Schröder et al., Erhard, 310–314 4. Osterheld I, 201 (17 February 1963). 5. Rainer Marcowitz, Option für Paris? (Munich, 1993). 6. Klaus Hildebrand, Von Erhard Zur Großen Koalition 1963–1969 [vol. 4 of Bracher et al., eds., Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland] (Stuttgart 1984), 29–64. See also Krieger, Franz Josef Strauß, 55–64; and Bickerich, Strauß, 196–215. 7. Richard Balken memorandum, 12 October 1963, in Balken to Schröder, 14 October 1963, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-287/1. See also Heinrich Knappstein (Washington) to Schröder, 12 December 1963, on Guttenberg’s visit to Washington, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-285/2; Schwarz, Staatsmann, 837–839. 8. Caricature by Hans Geisen, Westfälische Rundschau. Reprinted in Hoppla—Franz Josef Strauß (Bad Kissingen, 1966), 28. 9. Erich Peter Neumann to Schröder, 23 October 1963, with the results of an Allensbach poll; Schröder to Rusk, 7 September 1966, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-099/2; Schröder to Rusk, 29 July 1963, AAP 1963, 809–810. 10. Schröder to Theo Sommer, 12 October 1964, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-099/1. “Frankreich— Deutschland—Europa,” Schröder interview with Deutschlandfunk, 29 October 1963. See also his interview with the television program Panorama, and with Northwest German Radio, both 4 November 1963, transcripts in ibid., I-483-140/2. Schröder had the Foreign Office prepare memoranda for Erhard on 17 July and 13 September 1963, AAP 1963, 761–767, 1110–1117. See also “Dr. Schröder: Keine grundsätzlichen Unstimmigkeiten mit Dr. Adenauer,” interview in Ruhr Nachrichten, 8 October 1963, clipping in ACDP NL Schröder, I-483-143/1; and Gerhard Schröder, “Außenpolitik im Übergang AdenauerErhard,” KAZ I, 719–746. For the first full-length study of Schröder’s diplomacy, which came out too late to be included in this study, see Franz Eibl, Politik der Bewegung: Gerhard Schröder als Außenminister 1961–1966 (Munich, 2001). – 222 –

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11. Kurt Birrenbach memorandum, 10 October 1963, ACDP AK V files VIII-006-047/2. 12. Franz Josef Strauß, The Grand Design: A European Solution to German Unification (New York, 1965); Karl Theodor zu Guttenberg, Wenn der Westen Will: Plädoyer für eine mutige Politik (Stuttgart, 1964). 13. Strauß in the CSU Landesgruppe, 25 March, 28 September, and 21 October 1963 (emphasis in the original); Guttenberg in the Landesgruppe, 7 October 1963, ACSP CSU LG. See also “Kennedys Entspannungspolitik und die deutsche Frage: Ein Gespräch mit Karl Theodor Freiherr zu Guttenberg,” Rheinischer Merkur, 13 September 1963, clipping in ACSP CSU-LG 4. WP Folder 33. 14. Balken memorandum, 12 October 1963, in Balken to Schröder, 14 October 1963, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-287/1. 15. Osterheld II, 29–31 (22 November 1963); Guttenberg to Leo Wagner, 27 January 1964, ACSP CSU LG 4. WP Folder 33; Barzel, “Außenpolitik der Kontinuität,” DUD, 31 January 1964, in Barzel to Schröder, 30 January 1964, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-100/1. 16. Balken to Schröder, 24 January 1964, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-287/1; Adenauer interview [January 1964] in StBKAH 02/33; see also Rainer Marcowitz, “Wendejahre 1963/64: Die deutsch-französische Beziehungen in der Endphase der ‘Ära Adenauer’ und zu Beginn der Kanzlerschaft Erhards,” Francia 22, no. 3 (1995): 83–104. 17. Schröder to Strauß, 12 March 1964, with an article by Josef Luns, “Independence or Interdependence,” Foreign Affairs (London), January 1964, ACSP CSU LG 4. WP Folder 112; Rembert van Delden to Schröder, 25 March 1964, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-212/3; see also Göke Friedrichs to Schröder, 18 May 1964, and Hedwig Feldsieper to Schröder, 27 July 1964, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-099/3. 18. Schröder diary fragments, 14–16 March 1964, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-273/1. 19. Hilger van Scherpenberg (Vatican) to Schröder, 10 March and 24 June 1964, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-285/2; Hildebrand, Erhard, 77–79. 20. Strauß to Erhard, 16 May 1964, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-099/1; Strauß to Erhard, 29 April 1964, ACDP LG 4 WP. Folder 92. 21. Strauß in the CSU Landesgruppe, 13 April 1964; Strauß and Guttenberg on 22 May 1964, ACSP CSU LG; “Zur außenpolitischen ‘Gipfelkonferenz’ der CDU/CSU,” 12 May 1964, ACSP CSU LG 4. WP Folder 112; untitled article, 2 June 1964, ibid., Folder 118. See also Reinhard Schreiner, “Die Europapolitik der CDU im Hinblick auf Frankreich und den Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP) 1945–1966,” HPM 1 (1994): 183–196. 22. For Adenauer’s comments, see Osterheld II, 86–87 (2 June 1964). See also Guttenberg to Strauß, 13 June 1964; and Guttenberg to Adenauer, 13 June 1964, ACSP CSU LG 4. WP Folder 33. 23. Strauß to Erhard, 25 June 1964, ACSP CSU LG 4. WP Folder 92. Paul Wilhelm Wenger, “Schluß mit Ausreden: Eine Planungsgruppe muß die Politische Union Europas weiterbringen,” Rheinischer Merkur, 3 July 1964; “CSU-Chef Strauß gibt nicht nach,” Frankfurter Rundschau, 17 July 1964; “Paris verstimmt über Stillstand in Europa: Zweifel am Willen zur Union,” Die Welt, 3 July 1964; “Neue CSU-Attacken gegen Erhard,” Abendpost, 10 July 1964, clippings in ibid., Folder 139. 24. Osterheld II, 98–99 (4 July 1964); “Bonn Arbeitet an Vorschlägen für die weiteren Einigung Europas,” FAZ, 6 July 1964; “Bonner Ergebnis in Paris als Verlegenheitslösung betrachtet,” Die Welt, 6 July 1964; CSU article, “Zum de Gaulle Besuch,” 8 July 1964, ACSP CSU LG 4. WP. Folder 118; Poppinga, Meine Erinnerungen, 111–112. 25. On the MLF, see Kelleher, Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons, 228–269. 26. For an emotional discussion, based on his conversations with Carstens, see Osterheld II, 100 (13 July 1964). See also the transcript of the conversation between Erhard and de Gaulle, 3 July 1964, AAP 1964, 713–723; and Franz Eibl, “Die deutsch-französische Konsultationen vom 3./4. Juli 1964 und de Gaulles ‘Angebot’ einer nuklearen Zusammenarbeit,” in Karl G. Kick et al., eds., Wandel durch Beständigkeit: Jens Hacker zum 65. Geburtstag (Berlin, 1988), 389–408. – 223 –

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27. For Erhard’s comments and Osterheld’s memorandum of 17 July, see Osterheld II, 101– 102, 104–105n (6 July 1964). 28. On American attitudes in July 1964, see the report of German industrialist Günther Henle, in Henle to Schröder, 13 July 1964, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-100/2. For the foreign policy of the Johnson administration in general, see most recently Thomas Alan Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe: In the Shadow of Vietnam (Cambridge, MA, 2002). 29. Balken to Schröder, 9 July 1964, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-287/1. See also Birrenbach to Schröder, 10 July 1964, with a copy of his letter to Rainer Barzel from the same day, ibid., I-483-100/1. Franz Fischer (JU-Tettnang) to Schröder, 21 July 1964, and many unsigned, undated letters on the same letterhead, ibid., I-483-100/2. 30. “De Gaulle auf seiner Pressekonferenz: Die Vorherrschaft der US geht zu Ende,” SZ, 24 July 1964; “Die Forderung General de Gaulles: Europa muß unabhängig sein” and “Verärgerung in Bonn,” Die Welt, 24 July 1964, ACSP CSU LG 4. WP Folder 139; “Schröder nimmt Stellung,” Welt am Sonntag, 26 July 1964, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-143/1; Adenauer Statement, 23 July 1964, and press conference, 4 August 1964, StBKAH 02/34; Osterheld II, 105–106 (25 July 1964). 31. Adenauer to Schröder, 24 August 1964; memorandum by Erik Blumenfeld for Schröder, 20 October 1964, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-100/1. See also Grewe to Schröder, 28 July 1964, complaining that Adenauer misrepresented comments from Grewe in his attacks on the Foreign Office, ibid., I-483-285/1. 32. Schröder diary fragments, 16, 17, 21 (SPD) and 22 (EEC) October 1964, ibid., I-483273/2; Berthold Beitz to Schröder, 3 November 1964, ibid., I-483-100/1. 33. Adenauer interview with Austrian Television, 26 October 1964; and “So schafft es Erhard nicht!” Bild am Sonntag, 1 November 1964, StBKAH 02/34. 34. Adenauer in the Fraktion, 3 November 1964, ACDP VIII-001-030/2; interview with Die Zeit, 6 November 1964, StBKAH 02/34. 35. “Außenminister Schröder kritisiert Adenauer,” Allgemeine Zeitung (Mainz), 9 November 1964; “Schröder: Nicht leichtfertig sein,” Ruhr Nachrichten, 9 November 1964. Clippings in ACDP NL Schröder I-483-143/1. 36. Adenauer to Erhard, 9 November 1964, ibid., I-483-100/1; Politischer Korrespondenz Sonderdienst: “Gerhard Schröder: Der Maß ist voll,” 16 November 1964; and “Der Außenminister der SPD,” 23 December 1964, ACDP NL Globke I-070-059/5. 37. Guttenberg, “Ein Plan für nukleare Partnerschaft,” speech before the Second International Wehrkunde Begegnung, Munich, 5–6 December 1964; and “Grundgedanken einer Ausdehnung der atlantischen Partnerschaft auf das Feld der nuklearen Verteidigung,” 8 December 1964, ACSP CSU LG 4. WP Folder 33. “Franz Josef Strauß, Vorsitzender der CSU zum Projekt der MLF,” RIAS, 20 December 1964, ibid., Folder 214. 38. So spoke de Gaulle to Rainer Barzel in early 1965. See memo, Balken for Schröder on Balken’s conversation with Barzel, 12 February 1965, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-287/1. On the Johnson administration’s decision to let the MLF die, see Thomas A. Schwartz, “Victories and Defeats in the Long Twilight Struggle,” in Diane B. Kunz, ed., The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade (New York, 1994), 115–149, especially 133–136; and Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe. 39. Kohl, Blumenfeld, Barzel, and Adenauer in the Bundesvorstand, 27 November 1964, Vorstand IV, 758–766, 793–794, 801–806; Barzel to Erhard, 14 December 1964, ACSP CSU LG 4. WP Folder 92. 40. Adenauer in the Bundesvorstand, 9 July 1963, Vorstand IV, 489–490; Christoph Kleßmann, Zwei Staaten, Eine Nation: Deutsche Geschichte 1955–1970 (Bonn, 1988), 113. 41. “Geht die deutsche Politik auf nationalen Kurs?” CSU press articles, 20 January 1965, ACSP CSU LG 4. WP Folder 112; CDU press release, 18 January 1965; Adenauer, interview with the Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 2 February 1965, both in StBKAH 02/35; “Tun was Deutschland dient: Ein Gespräch mit Dr. Konrad Adenauer,” Catholic News Service, 31 August 1965, StBKAH 02/36. – 224 –

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42. Adenauer and Erhard in the Bundesvorstand, 28 March 1965, Vorstand IV, 894–899. 43. Erhard, Barzel, Kohl, and Adenauer in the Bundesvorstand, 28 March 1965, ibid., 900–905. 44. “Unser Interview, das nicht erschien,” Rheinischer Post, 20 April 1967; “Adenauer: In Europa drohen mehr Gefahren als in Süd-Vietnam,” Welt am Sonntag, 18 July 1965, StBKAH 02/38. 45. “Gerhard Schröder oder die Sicherheit Deutschlands,” included in Kastl to Schröder, 14 September 1965; see also Kastl to Schröder, 2 October 1965, which virtually confirmed Wenger as the author, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-288/3. 46. Carstens memorandum for Schröder, 1 February 1965; ACDP NL Schröder I-483-273/2. Richard Jaeger to Schröder, 31 March 1965; Schröder to Jaeger, 16 April 1965, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-100/2; Schröder interview, Bulletin, 5 May 1965, 620–621. 47. Schröder to Ludwig von Danwitz, 5 June 1965; response to Danwitz to Schröder, 21 May 1965, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-099/3. 48. Dr. Hans Küßwetter (CSU chair in Mittelfranken) to Strauß, 5 June 1965. Copy in ACDP NL Schröder I-483-099/1; memo for Schröder about Majonica, Deutsche Außenpolitik, 10 June 1965, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-099/2; Grewe to Schröder, 4 September 1965, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-285/1. 49. On Queen Elizabeth’s visit, see Osterheld II, 190–191; Hildebrand, Erhard, 150–151. For Schröder’s comments, see “Nationales Selbstverständnis in einem integrieren Bündnis,” Schröder interview with the Rhein-Zeitung, 26 June 1965, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-143/1. 50. Adenauer statement, 6 September 1965, StBKAH 02/36. 51. Hildebrand, Erhard, 142–152; Schwarz, Staatsmann, 902–910; Köhler, Adenauer, 1224–1225. 52. Schröder to Erhard, 29 September 1965. See also “Grundsätze der deutschen Auswärtigen Politik,” 1 October 1965, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-018/2. 53. Augstein to Schröder, 20 September 1965, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-100/1. 54. “Europa—Eine Frage des Vertrauens,” Schröder interview with the Rheinische Post, 6 October 1965; for French reactions, see the two telegrams, Klaiber [Paris] to AA, 10 October 1965, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-143/1. 55. CSU, “Arbeitspapier zum Regierungsprogramm,” with copious marginalia from Schröder, in Leo Wagner (CSU-LG) to Schröder, 7 October 1965; [Carstens], “Stellungnahme zu dem ‘Arbeitspapier zum Regierungsprogramm,” included in Carstens to Schröder, 10 October 1965, ibid. 56. Guttenberg to Meyers, 8 October 1965; Meyers to Guttenberg, 14 October 1965; and Schröder to Meyers, 25 October 1965, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-099/2. For other attempts to influence Union leaders to oppose Schröder, see Professor Karl Burghardt et al., to Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 10 October 1965, ACSP CSU-LG 5. WP Folder 137. 57. Strauß to Erhard, 8 October 1965, ACSP CSU-LG 5. WP, Folder 105. “Neuer Vorstoß von Strauß und Guttenberg gegen Schröder,” FAZ, October 8, 1965; “Strauß weiter gegen Außenminister Schröder,” SZ, October 8, 1965, ibid., Folder 104. 58. Hans Georg Lehmann, Deutschland Chronik 1945 bis 1995 (Bonn, 1996), 158. See also the chart in Hildebrand, Erhard, 143. Alfred Rapp, “Strauß und die Dreiparteienkoalition,” FAZ, 27 October 1965; Hans Ulrich Kempski, “Wo keinem die Bäume in den Himmel wachsen,” SZ, 22 October 1965, ACSP CSU-LG 5. WP Folder 104. 59. Adenauer interview with Bild, 8 October 1965, StBKAH 02/36. 60. Eberhard Maseberg, “Die Rebellion einer Minderheit,” Sonntagsblatt, 17 October 1965, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-018/2. 61. Adenauer to Lübke, 19 October 1965, reprinted in Schwarz, Staatsmann, 913. See also Köhler, Adenauer, 1225. 62. Telegram, Leo Wagner (LG executive director) to Schröder, 26 October 1965, ACSP CSULG 5. WP Folder 132. An excellent example of support for Schröder is Josef Sturm to Schröder, 22 October 1965, including a copy of Sturm to Strauß, 27 September 1965, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-099/1; Hildebrand, Erhard, 152–160.

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63. Guttenberg to Strauß, 12 May 1965; draft letter, Strauß to Erhard, 20 May 1965, with Strauß marginalia (dated 19 May) that a conversation with Erhard had dispelled his fears, ACSP CSU-LG 4 WP Folder 33. 64. On the “Huyn Affair,” see Hildebrand, Erhard, 183; Osterheld II, 262–263 (14 and 27 November and 13 December 1965); and Martin Schaad, “Eine ‘gaullistische Inszenierung’: Zur Affäre um den Grafen Huyn,” HPM 8 (2001): 95–112. 65. Guttenberg to Union MdBs Horten, 13 November 1965, and Edgar Jahn, 14 November 1965. See also the texts of the questions presented in the Bundestag by Guttenberg on 13 November, and by Jahn and others on 14 November, ACDP CSU-LG 5. WP Folder 45. On “cadaver obedience,” see Osterheld II, 263 (27 November 1965). For a critical discussion of Huyn’s hiring by Strauß, see Adolf Hick to Strauß and Franz Bolten to Strauß, both 18 November 1965, along with the responses from a member of Strauß’s staff, Manfred Schlager, dated 15 December and 22 November, respectively, ACDP CSU-LG 5. WP Folder 67. See also the discussion in the Landesgruppe, 25 November 1965, ACSP CSU LG. On the general attitude toward Huyn among Gaullists, especially in comparison to Schröder, see Karl Theodor zu Guttenberg, Fußnoten (Stuttgart, 1971), 117–120. 66. “Aktionskommittee der Gegner Schröders innerhalb der CDU” to Schröder, 18 October 1965, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-288/3; Hans Graf Huyn, Die Sackgasse: Deutschlands Weg in die Isolierung (Stuttgart, 1966). 67. “Schröder denkt nicht an England-Vertrag,” Allgemeine Zeitung Mainz, 25 November 1965; correspondence with the ambassadors is contained in ACDP NL Schröder I-483-290/2; Gerhard Schröder, “Stabile Außenpolitik—Loyaler Auswärtiger Dienst,” DUD, 29 December 1965, ibid., I-483-143/1. 68. “Erhard fördert Härte gegenüber Frankreich,” Die Welt, 25 January 1966, reporting on Erhard’s comments to the Fraktionsvorstand the previous day, ACSP CSU-LG 5. WP Folder 183; Strauß in the Landesgruppe, 24 January 1966, ACSP LG. 69. Strauß to Erhard, 5 February 1966, ACDP NL Globke I-070-036/3. 70. On the February visit to France, see Osterheld II, 280–286 (8 and 11 February 1966). For reactions, see Osterheld II, 290–291 (22 and 26 February 1966). See also Hildebrand, Erhard, 170–187; Osterheld II, 292–297 (9, 15–17 March and 4 April 1966). 71. Adenauer interview with the Neue Rheinzeitung, 15 September 1965, StBKAH 02/36. Adenauer press declaration, 16 March 1966; interview with Bild, 16 March 1966, and “Adenauer: Ich sehe nicht schwarz,” Bild, 21 April 1966, StBKAH 02/37. 72. “Zum Treffen Couve de Murville—Schröder in Bonn,” 20 April 1966, and “Zum Notenkrieg zwischen Bonn und Paris,” 24 May 1966. See also Strauß to Karl Heinz Weyers (JU Westphalia), 5 July 1966, responding to Weyers’s letter of 24 May 1966, ACSP CSU LG 5. WP Folder 137. Strauß in the Landesgruppe, 23 May 1966, ACSP LG. See also “Vermerk” CSU Press Office, 16 March 1966, on the split between Erhard and Schröder on one side and Strauß on negotiations with France, ACSP CSU-LG 5. WP Folder 386. 73. Globke to Adenauer, 16 April 1966, ACDP NL Globke I-070-052/1; Adenauer to Globke, 20 April 1966, ibid., I-070-052/2. 74. Schröder to Hermann Kopf, 11 May 1966; Krekeler to Carstens, 16 June 1966, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-100/2. 75. On Guttenberg and Kohl, see Wilhelm Fay (chair of CDU Hessen) to Schröder, 27 June 1966, with a copy of a press release from the Hessian CDU, ACDP NL Schröder I-483099/3. Ernst Müller-Hermann et al. to Erhard, 29 June 1966, ibid., I-483-099/2. Adenauer interview with the Bildpost, 22 August 1966, StBKAH 02/37. “Adenauer empfehlt US Rückzug aus Vietnam,” DPA, 6 August 1966; “Adenauer mahnt die Amerikaner: Überläßt Europa nicht Moskau,” Welt am Sonntag, 7 August 1966; “Bundesregierung schweigt zum Adenauer Interview,” 8 August 1966; “Washington zu den Ratschlägen Adenauers: Nichts Neues,” Die Welt, 9 August 1966, ACSP CSU LG 5. WP Folder 149.

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76. Schwarz, Staatsmann, 927–929; Osterheld II, 299–300. See also the internal CSU analysis of the various candidates for CDU chair, dated 27 January 1966, ACSP CSU-LG 5. WP Folder 386. 77. Simon to Schröder, 6 July 1966; Birrenbach to Schröder, 7 July 1966; Birrenbach to Barzel, 7 July 1966; Barzel to Erhard, Schröder, von Hassel and Krone, 25 July 1966; draft AK V memorandum, 29 June 1966; memorandum. Schnippenkötter for Schröder, 2 September 1966; “Die Stellungnahme der CDU/CSU zur Nichtweiterverbreitung atomarer Waffen,” DUD, 22 September 1966; ACDP NL Schröder I-483-290/2. On nonproliferation, see Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Question (Cambridge, 1979), 193–196. 78. Hubert Zimmermann, “Franz Josef Strauß und der deutsch-amerikanische Währungskonflikt in den sechziger Jahren,” VfZ 47 (1999): 57–86. On German preparations, see Barzel to Erhard, 19 September 1966, reporting on a discussion with Ambassador McGhee, copy in ACDP NL Schröder I-483-100/1. See also Osterheld II, 350–358 (25–26 September, 2 October 1966); Hildebrand, Erhard, 178–179; George McGhee, At the Creation of a New Germany (New Haven, 1989), 188–193; and Schwartz, “Victories and Defeats,” 138–141. 79. “Adenauer: Ich muß reden: Das Vaterland ist in Not; Harte Kritik an Lyndon B. Johnson und Ludwig Erhard,” Die Welt, 3 October 1966, ACSP CSU LG 5. WP Folder 149. “Disposition” for Strauß speech in Baden-Baden, 27 October 1966, ibid., Folder 67. On de Gaulle, see Osterheld II, 368–369. 80. Here and below, see Osterheld II, 366–370, 379–381 (26 and 28 October, 1 November, and 3 December 1966); Hildebrand, Erhard, 219–231. 81. Else Bröckelschen to Schröder, 6 October 1966, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-100/1. Schröder even received support from France; see Michel Gordey (France-Soir) to Schröder, 10 November 1966, ibid., I-483-099/3. For a disappointed supporter’s comment that Schröder would have succeeded had he worked harder to cultivate supporters, see Dietrich Rollmann MdB to Schröder, 19 November 1966, ibid., I-483-099/2. 82. “Ausführungen des Landesvorsitzenden der CSU, Franz Josef Strauß, anlässlich der Konstituierung der Verhandlungskommission am 14. November 1966 im Bundeskanzleramt,” and Schröder, handwritten note for Carstens, discussing Strauß’s comments, 18 November 1966, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-099/1. 83. Reinhard Schmoekel and Bruno Kaiser, Die vergessene Regierung: Die große Koalition 1966– 1969 und ihre langfristigen Wirkungen (Bonn, 1991); Hildebrand, Erhard, 241–460. 84. Adenauer speech in Madrid, 16 February 1967, KAE IV, 238–248, quote on 243.

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CONCLUSION: WHOSE WEST IS BEST?

In a January 1983 radio program celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the Elysée Treaty, Gerhard Schröder was asked to evaluate the treaty’s historical significance, and to comment on the subsequent controversies between Atlanticists and Gaullists. Schröder responded that the treaty was of vital historical importance, not because of any specific programs, but because it ensured a level of consultation between Paris and Bonn that had survived its original signatories. In response to the latter question, he called the distinction between Atlanticists and Gaullists “insignificant.” “Today,” he concluded, “there are really only Atlanticists—German patriots, who see the Franco-German treaty in its proper light….”1 The sense of triumph in Schröder’s comments is both unmistakable and understandable. The passage of time made it possible for him to reclaim his “parental” rights as one of the signatories of the treaty, and to assert that he had been correct all along. Schröder was not the only one who found that time could heal political wounds. Former Gaullists also found it easier to bury old disputes and blur old distinctions. A 1980 biography of Franz Josef Strauß, written to advance the Bavarian’s campaign for chancellor, approvingly quoted a description of Strauß as “a loyal supporter of the Atlantic Alliance….” Strauß himself declared in a book written for the same purpose: “In foreign policy we need again a firm position [Verankerung] in the Atlantic Alliance, and the complete fulfillment of our security commitments.”2 Schröder’s and Strauß’s common desire to gloss over the AtlanticistGaullist debate has been shared by most historians of the period. Over the years, even General de Gaulle himself ceased to be such a controversial figure. By the centenary of his birth in 1990, Americans and Europeans praised his vision of a strong Europe within the West, while his more controversial actions faded from memory.3 The end of the Cold War has only hastened this development. Since the NATO alliance held together, despite the crises of the 1960s and 1970s, and in the end “won” the Cold War, it would appear that to remind anyone of acrimonious debates within the West is to engage in scholarly hairsplitting. If the participants themselves wish to deny that their conflicts had any meaning, why dredge them up again? – 228 –

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The dismissal of possible differences within the West has become part of the conventional wisdom in the post–Cold War world. Certainly, when faced with threats from other areas of the world, such as Afghanistan, Europeans and Americans are more likely to see similarities between their industrialized, secular societies. Does this mean that we can assume there are no “fault lines” (to use one of Samuel Huntington’s key terms) within the West itself? Were the debates recorded in this book merely shadowboxing? If the preceding chapters have proven anything, it is that there were indeed serious “fault lines,” even between the most energetic advocates of German membership in the West. That these differences were not always expressed with the same vigor and divisiveness at all times is less a reflection of their insignificance than of the changing political landscape. It is worth noting, for example, that in the early 1980s harmony between Strauß and Schröder came when the Union faced a recrudescence of neutralism on the Left, embodied in the opposition of both the SPD and the Green Party to the stationing of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe. As in the early days of the Adenauer era, neutralism on the Left made it much easier to mute differences within the Union. By expressing unreserved support for NATO policy, the Union exploited divisions within the SPD-FDP coalition, hastening the Union’s return to power in 1982.4 Once in power, however, policy differences would emerge that, though less spectacular than the conflicts of the 1960s, repeated the basic questions about the future relationship between the Federal Republic, Europe, and the US.5 The end of the Cold War and the post-Maastricht course of the European Union have, if anything, reignited the debate over the proper relationship between Europe and the Atlantic world. Though there is no General de Gaulle these days, there are still discussions on the relationship between free trade and European cultural identity, whether the objects of dispute are Coca-Cola or Steven Spielberg. There are also continuing debates about a common foreign and security policy for Europe, made more acute by the crises in the former Yugoslavia and the struggle against international terrorism. Many of these discussions center around the future use of the Western European Union (WEU) as the “security arm” of the European Union, distinct from NATO, even as the WEU still awaits the prince who will rouse if from what Adenauer called its “Sleeping Beauty slumber [Dornröschenschlaf].”6 These days, when a German chancellor and a French president talk about a common European foreign policy, they can expect encouragement rather than opposition from Washington; still, the basic question of how best to organize the relationship between Germany, Europe, and the US remains as complicated as it is vital to the stability of the industrialized world. Whether one views the possibility of a more autonomous, assertive Europe with anticipation or fear, it is clear that this issue will become more significant, not less, in the new millennium.7 An appreciation of this complexity – 229 –

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should attract more attention to the origins of the postwar West and to the political conceptions of the primary actors. The purpose of this book has been to encourage such a deeper understanding of the emergence of the postwar West and Germany’s role in it. Without over- or underestimating the significance of the preceding chapters, three general conclusions can be drawn. First, we need to understand that German Westbindung was not a negation of national policy. Despite what Adenauer’s nationalist critics have argued since the 1950s, the alliance with the West was not designed to hand Germany over to foreign control, but rather to provide a secure community within which the Federal Republic could exercise maximum possible sovereignty. Once admitted, neither Adenauer nor the other Union leaders shrank from conflict with their allies as they tried to shape the community to serve their vision of German interests. This is not to say that the particular form of Westbindung that Adenauer pursued was the only alternative—or even always the best alternative, though its successes are undeniable. But neither was it a cynical betrayal of Germany to international forces, nor an impossibly idealistic hope for European unity. In conception and in practice, Westbindung was an extension of national policy by other means, working within existing political and ideological realities. Recognizing the nationalistic side of Westbindung should in turn encourage an appreciation of the significance of the disagreements within the West about the shape of the community. Although one should not assume that the division between Atlanticists and Gaullists reflected a fundamental choice between Washington and Paris, these differences were nevertheless significant. There were few “pure” examples of either camp. Adenauer, despite his strongly anti-American positions late in life, was neither completely one nor the other. But he was a German statesman, and a proud European, which meant he had little interest in being part of anyone’s empire, and that he was always looking for the best deal for Germany within Europe and within the West. The real issue centers not on whether this or that politician sought to detach the Federal Republic from the US, but rather on the nature of the European-American relationship. Questions about that relationship shaped concrete debates, from the size of the EEC to NATO nuclear strategy. It is impossible to appreciate these debates, which produced real disagreements, without recognizing the different perspectives that motivated policymakers. Such differences in perspective, however obscure they may appear over a distance of decades, were quite significant to the participants. This is not a plea for historicism, but rather a reminder that in politics, especially in a representative democracy, attitudes and political conceptions play a decisive role in policy decisions. They are decisive even if many come to regret or to change their positions, or even if one can see, with the benefit of hindsight, that some differences may have been motivated as much by personal ambition as by political – 230 –

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conviction. Those who would deny the significance of these differences need only observe the fate of Ludwig Erhard, brought down because of the divisions within his party. Recognizing these divisions within the Union should in turn encourage a closer examination of their source. They did not spring from a fundamental disagreement over whether or not Germany should join the West, but rather emerged as a consequence of Westbindung, as its advocates sought to shape the relationship of the Federal Republic to the West. Although some authors continue to posit a distinction between Westbindung and reunification8 the preceding discussion should encourage us to see that the successful integration of the Federal Republic into the West, which both guaranteed the democratic stability of the new German state and encouraged it to pursue a responsible and peaceful foreign policy, was essential to the ultimate success of reunification. Therefore, historians who study postwar Germany should spend less time documenting the conflict between Adenauer and the “nationalists” and more time examining the meaning of the West for different groups within West German society—political parties as well as business groups, cultural and intellectual elites, and other institutions. It is there that the most important battles, with the most significance for future generations in united Germany, would be fought. Historians should also devote more attention to the specific role of Christian Democratic parties like the Union in building the postwar West. As these parties encouraged the reconstruction of European politics by offering a democratic alternative to socialism, they also encouraged the development of a particular set of assumptions about the future of Europe within the West that would provide fertile soil for the kinds of differences we have seen here. ***** These observations lead us back to the man who has stood in the center of this narrative, Konrad Adenauer. Historians should be careful that his role in the development of a stable democratic German state anchored in the West, significant as it was, does not become lost in a haze of retrospective hagiography. His greatness, after all, lay not in any purity of heart, but in his political instincts, which were also the source of his less attractive qualities. Thus, he should be studied and remembered as a political actor—a statesman who tried to balance his principles with his evaluation of the state’s interests at any given moment. In a television interview one year after his retirement as chancellor, Adenauer was asked about his political methods. He replied: “The methods can change, but the most important thing is never to lose the trust of [your] friends.”9 His policies reflected this tactical flexibility, but also left an important question unanswered: How can one keep the trust of one’s friends when one does not in turn trust those friends? The relationship between the – 231 –

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Federal Republic and the West both profited and suffered from Adenauer’s ambivalent relationship with his allies. His use of the gray zone between pronouncements and policy, and his tacking between different blocs within the West and the Union, expanded the Federal Republic’s opportunities for independent action. At the same time, however, they also left open the question of the Federal Republic’s international role once it had established itself within the West. Difficult enough when the Federal Republic was still limited by the Cold War and by national division, this question is even more important now that Germany is united and the West searches for an East against which to define itself. Westbindung is a reality, but the shape of the West remains fluid. We are still living with Adenauer’s ambivalent legacy.

Notes 1. Schröder interview with RIAS, 11 January 1983; see also Hans Heckmann, “An der Seine sehen Schröder und Couve sich wieder,” DPA report from January 1988 on the twentyfifth anniversary of the Elysée Treaty, ACDP NL Schröder I-483-117/1. 2. Ulrich Zimmermann, Geliebt, Verkannt und doch geachtet: Franz Josef Strauß, der Mensch, der Politiker, der Staatsmann von A-Z (Percha, 1980), 104, quoting William S. [sic] Buckley; Franz Josef Strauß, Gebote der Freiheit (Munich, 1980), 11. 3. Theodore J. Lowi and Martin A. Schain, “Conditional Surrender: De Gaulle and American Opinion,” in Paxton and Wahl, De Gaulle and the United States, 391–411. 4. Jeffrey Herf, Politics by Other Means (New York, 1988). See also Wolfgang Jäger and Werner Link, Republik im Wandel 1974–1982: Die Ära Schmidt [vol. 5/II of Bracher et al., Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland] (Stuttgart, 1987), 211–221. 5. For example, when Strauß protested the Kohl government’s decision to join the 1987 START treaty and dismantle its short-range dual-use missiles. Strauß, Erinnerungen, 568– 573; more generally, see Bickerich, Strauß, 300–319. 6. “Bonn will Rolle der WEU stärken,” Welt-Online, 6 August 1997, and Rüdiger Moniac, “Klaus Kinkel und das unbekannte Wesen WEU,” Welt-Online, 12 August 1997. 7. “Berlin und Paris wollen europäische Verteidigung stärken,” Deutschland Nachrichten, 3 December 1999; “Will Europe Have Its Own Army?” The Economist, 20 November 1999, 51–52. 8. Karl-Ludwig Sommer, “Wollte Adenauer jemals die deutsche Wiedervereinigung? Die Welt On-Line, 12 May 2001. 9. Adenauer, interview with Austrian Television, 26 October 1964, StBKAH 02/34.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archival Collections Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Sankt Augustin bei Bonn Party Documents CDU Bundesvorstand Meeting Transcripts, VII-001 CDU/CSU Election Files, VII-003 CDU/CSU Sachthemen [clipping files, arranged by subject], VII-005 CDU/CSU Fraktion Meeting Transcripts, VIII-001 CDU/CSU Fraktion, Arbeitskreis V, VIII-006 Personal Papers NL Kurt Birrenbach I-433 NL Felix von Eckardt I-010 NL Eugen Gerstenmaier I-210 NL Hans Globke I-070 NL Richard Jaeger I-108 NL Kurt Georg Kiesinger I-226 NL Heinrich Krone I-028 NL Hans Joachim von Merkatz I-148 NL Alfred Müller-Armack I-236 NL Gerhard Schröder I-483

Archiv für Christlich-Soziale Politik der Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung, Munich Party Documents CSU Landesgruppe Files CSU Landesgruppe Meeting Transcripts Personal Papers NL Josef Müller

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Memoirs Abs, Hermann Josef. Entscheidungen 1949–1953: Die Entstehung des Londoner Schuldabkommens. 2nd ed. Mainz: Hase & Kohler, 1991. ———. Außenpolitik und Auslandschulden: Erinnerungen an das Jahr 1952. Konstanz: Universitätsverlag, 1990. Adenauer, Konrad. Erinnerungen, 1945–1953. 6th ed. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1987. ———. Erinnerungen, 1959–1963: Fragmente. 3rd ed. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1983. ———. Erinnerungen, 1955–1959. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1967. ———. Erinnerungen, 1953–1955. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1966. ———. Memoirs 1945–1953. Trans. Beate Ruhm von Oppen. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1965. Birrenbach, Kurt. Meine Sondermissionen: Rückblick auf zwei Jahrzehnte bundesdeutscher Außenpolitik. Düsseldorf: Econ Verlag, 1984.

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Newspapers and Magazines Deutschland Nachrichten Deutschland-Union-Dienst The Economist Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Neue Zürcher Zeitung New York Herald Tribune New York Times Rheinischer Merkur Der Spiegel Süddeutsche Zeitung Union in Deutschland Die Welt Die Zeit

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INDEX Abendland, 13, 15–19, 30–31, 36, 76, 79–80, 91,

113, 160, 183 Abs, Hermann, 171 Académie Française, 202 Acheson, Dean, 34, 57–58, 131, 166, 170–171 Adenauer, Konrad: advocates close relations with the US, 1–2, 4, 19–20, 30–31, 36, 72, 110–111, 126–127, 130–131, 137, 142 201; advocates close relations with France, 2, 4–5, 19, 31, 33, 36–37, 47, 155, 162, 164–165, 172, 176, 178–179, 183, 197–199, 201, 202–203, 205, 211, 216–217; ambivalence about US-European relations, 4–5, 113–115, 117–118, 121, 123–125, 131, 135, 154–155, 161–162, 165–165 167, 170, 176, 230; attitude toward the EDC, 78–79, 156; and Berlin Crisis, 116–118, 135–139, 156–159, 166, 172, 203; as CDU Chair, 20–22, 43, 45, 161–162, 173, 193, 201, 218; “chancellor of the Allies,” 35; character and historical role, 18–22, 231–232; compared to Bismarck, 20–21, 73; conflicts with Erhard, 89–90, 116, 120–121, 153–154, 161–162, 173, 191, 197, 200–202, 204, 205–206, 218, 221; conflict with Heinemann over rearmament, 42–46; criticism of SPD, 10, 12, 95–96, 132–133, 137, 205; criticizes US policy in Vietnam, 209, 218; death, 221; doubts British membership in the EEC, 2, 155, 162, 166; doubts about European free trade zone, 89–90, 115–116, 156; and Elysée Treaty, 168–170, 173–174, 197; fear of disengagement, 100–101, 114–115; fear of isolationism in the US, 46–47, 57, 81, 89, 206; as foreign minister, 31, 47; and Gaullism, 6, 37, 193–194; and German history, 19, 29–30, 47, 110–111; and German rearmament, 39–42, 98; and German reunification, 9–10, 12, 17–18, 114–115, 136, 156–157, 231; links rearmament and sovereignty, 40–42, 44, 46–47; and NATO membership, 84–85, 154, 160, 202, 216; and nuclear weapons, 82, 98–100, 165, 180–181, 201–202; and Petersberg Agreement, 34–35; plans for GDR, 114–115; “Potsdam Complex,” 20, 30, 57, 73; preference for closer European integration, 30, 33, 90–91, 116, 125–126, 154–156, 159, 167, 201, 221, 229; presidential candidacy of, 118–122; philosophy and Realpolitik, 3, 18–22, 29, 44, 84, 230–232; reaction to Cuban Missile Crisis, 163; rebus sic stantibus, 83; rejects neutrality for Germany, 6, 73; and Schaukelpolitik, 3, 11, 20, 71, 176; relationship with Willy Brandt, 116, 135; relationship with de Gaulle, 4–5, 115–116, 124–126, 156, 160–161, 166–167, 178, 183, 199; relationship with Jakob Kaiser, 17–18; relationship with John Foster Dulles, 117, 168, 206; relationship with John F. Kennedy, 127, 130–131, 141–142, 168, 176, 180; response to Soviet invasion of Hungary, 93; response to Stalin Note, 53–56; response to Suez Crisis, 91–92; role in 1965 election, 208; skepticism about American policy, 21, 87–88, 95, 113, 123–124, 135, 141, 154–156, 158–160, 163–164, 168, 172, 180–183, 194, 198, 206, 218–219; skepticism about Atlantic Community, 153–154, 167,

172–173, 183; and status of the Saar, 35–36, 47, 81–82, 84; suspicion of Great Britain, 100, 117–118, 121, 125, 160, 164, 166; suspicion of Schröder, 159, 164–165, 194, 201, 202–203, 204, 206, 208, 211–212, 216–218; use of interviews, 33, 36, 39, 40, 197–198, 202, 206, 211–212, 216, 218; use of office of Chancellor, 20, 31–32, 174–175, 211–212; viewing Europe as “third force,” 36–37, 91, 154, 175; visit to France (1962), 160; visit to France (1963), 165–167; visit to the Soviet Union (1955), 86–87; visit to the US (1953), 19–20, 59–62, 70, 150–151 Adenauer, Paul, 137 Adjubei, Alexei, 157 Allied High Commission (AHC), 31–32, 34, 37, 41–42, 44, 46, 53–54, 60 American Council on Germany, 100–101, 171 “Americanization”: of Germany, 8–9; of postwar Europe, viii, 7–8 “Anti-German Wave,” 157 Arbeitskreis V (AKV), 83, 87, 93n65, 94, 117, 219, 220 Arndt, Adolf, 35 Atlanticism, 2–4, 6, 19, 90, 101, 118, 121, 126– 127, 152, 157, 161, 171–172, 177–179, 181, 197, 204–205, 208, 212, 215; contrasted with Gaullism, 6–7, 15, 192–196, 199–201, 218–220, 230–231 Atlantik-Brücke, 169, 171 Augstein, Rudolf, 71, 209 Baker, George, 140–141 Balken, Richard, 201 Ball, George, 164 Baltimore Sun, 33 Baring, Arnulf, 77 Barzel, Rainer, 196–198, 204, 206 Bayernkurier, 196, 198 Bech, Josef, 84 Beitz, Berthold, 202 Bender, Peter, x Ben-Gurion, David, 110 Berg, Fritz, 171 Berlin Conference (1954), 74–76 Berlin Question, 1, 18, 21, 42, 110–111, 116–118, 121–125, 127–132, 134–141, 152, 156–159, 166, 172–173, 180, 203 Berlin Wall, 5, 135–136, 151, 154 Bild, 135, 202, 211–212, 216 Bindungsklausel, 56–58, 81 Birrenbach, Kurt, 118, 174, 219; advocates close relations with the US, 140–141, 153, 161, 163–164, 175, 195; confronts Adenauer on Elysée Treaty, 169–170; editor of “Atlanticist Appeal,” 170–172 Bismarck, Otto von, 20, 73 “black international,” 16 Blank, Theodor, 88 Blankenhorn, Herbert, 18, 56, 60, 74–75, 91–92, 124, 159, 214; warns Adenauer against close relations with de Gaulle, 160, 166–168 Blumenfeld, Erik, 169–170, 204 Böckler, Hans, 35 Bohlen, Charles “Chip,” 86–87

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Brandt, Willy, 10, 116, 131, 133, 135–136, 171, 175, 221 Brentano, Heinrich von, 41, 45, 55, 56–58, 71, 75, 79, 87, 91, 92, 118, 121, 131, 134, 139 155, 158, 165–167, 169, 173, 175, 181, 204; appointed foreign minister (1955), 86; and East-West détente, 114–115; defends US policy, 124, 129–130, 139, 158; views on European integration, 89, 153, 160, 169 Brussels Conference of the EDC (1954), 78 Brussels Pact, 81. See also Western European Union (WEU) Bucerius, Gerd, 138 Bundestag elections: of 1949, 14, 30–31; of 1953, 20, 70–73; of 1957, 71–72, 93–97, 99–100; of 1961, 132–139; of 1965, 205–214 Bundesverband der deutschen Industrie (BDI), 17, 155, 166, 171 Bundy, McGeorge, 1–2, 162, 180–181 Carstens, Karl, 170, 200 Catholic Church, 14, 197 Catholic People’s Party (Netherlands), 16 CDU/CSU Bundestagsfraktion, 14, 31, 36–37, 39–41, 45, 54–57, 71–72, 120–122, 129–131, 141, 158–159, 162, 165, 168–171, 174–175, 193, 195–198, 202, 204, 211, 213, 215, 217–219 Cédistes, 78 Chancellor Democracy, 20, 159, 211–212 Christian Democratic Union (CDU), 4, 30–31, 43, 46, 133; Gaullist/Atlanticist conflict within, 15–16; origins, 13–15, 17 Christian Science Monitor, 171 Christian Social Union (CSU), 4, 14, 193, 196, 200–201, 204; attacks Schröder, 210–212, 217; conflict with FDP, 205, 211; Gaullist inclinations, 210–211 Churchill, Winston, 45–46, 47–48, 73–74, 82 Clay, Lucius, 124, 136, 171 Cleveland Plain Dealer, 39 Conant, James B., 60, 81, 87–88 Confessing Church, 43 Contractual Agreements (Deutschlandvertrag), 47–48, 73, 81. See also Bindungsklausel Council of Europe, 39, 41, 45, 121 Couve de Murville, Maurice, 125, 178 Cuban Missile Crisis, 163 Debré, Michel, 1–3, 126–127 De Gasperi, Alcide, 16, 78 De Gaulle, Charles, 36, 120, 123, 131, 141–142, 163, 172, 174, 175, 228–229; European policy, 3, 115–116, 155, 164, 170, 199–201, 214–215, 228; nuclear policy, 164, 199–200, 204; rejects Test Ban Treaty, 181; returns to power in France (1958), 115; relationship with Adenauer, 4–5, 115–116, 118, 124–126, 156, 160–161, 166–167, 178, 183, 199; relationship with Erhard, 178– 179, 219; relationship with Great Britain, 155, 162, 164, 168; relationship with US, 197, 200– 201, 215, 219; views on NATO, 115, 124–126, 164, 170, 178, 199, 214–216; visit to the Federal Republic (1962), 151, 160–161; visit to the Federal Republic (1963), 177–179; visit to the Federal Republic (1964), 199–200 Dehler, Thomas, 80, 87, 112 De Margerie, Roland, 2, 163–164, 175 Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik (DGAP), 176 Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB), 35, 171 Deutsche Industrie- und Handelstag (DIHT), 166 Dietz, Maria, 39 disengagement, 93, 100–102, 111, 114–115, 117, 128, 132, 134, 142

Dönhoff, Marion Gräfin, 171 double containment, 11–12 Dowling, Walter, 168 Duckwitz, Georg, 140–141, 214 Dufhues, Hermann Josef, 162 Dulles, Allen, 124 Dulles, John Foster, 55, 59, 74–75, 81, 83, 88, 117, 121, 123, 206 Düsseldorfer Leitsätze, 16. See also Social Market Economy Eden, Anthony, 81 Eden Plan, 75 Ehard, Hans, 98 Ehlers, Hermann, 45 Eichmann, Adolf, 111, 128. See also Eichmann Trial Eichmann trial, 128 Eisenhower, Dwight, 59, 78, 87, 123, 126 Eisenhower, Milton, 123 Elizabeth II, 208, 212 Elysée Treaty, 4–5, 163, 166–167, 173–174, 177– 178, 192, 196–197, 201, 204, 207–208, 228 Emmett, Christopher, 100, 171 Erhard Brigade, 118, 120, 138 Erhard, Ludwig, 35, 57, 71, 125, 166, 176; advocates close relations with Britain, 17, 118, 121, 168, 178; advocates European free trade zone, 89–90, 116, 121, 167; Atlanticism of, 17, 90, 121, 161, 178, 192–193, 196; chair of CDU, 218; chancellorship of, 191–222; conflict with Adenauer, 121–122, 153–154, 161–162, 173, 191, 201–202, 204, 206, 221; détente policies, 198; economic policy, 16–17; European vision, 121–123, 153, 173; governing style, 121, 191–192, 194; presidential candidacy of, 118–120; relationship with France and de Gaulle, 121, 153, 173, 178–179, 199–200, 215–216, 219; relationship with German Gaullists, 194, 203, 211, 219–220; relationship with the US, 197, 200, 219; resignation as chancellor, 220–221, 231; role in CDU election campaigns, 134, 175, 204, 208–209; supports MLF, 199–200; supports Schröder, 211–214; See also Erhard Brigade, Social Market Economy Erler, Fritz, 166, 171, 197, 201 Etzel, Franz, 121 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 37, 47, 54, 78–79, 89. See also Schuman Plan European Community (EC), xi European Defense Community (EDC), 46–47, 54, 73, 76–86, 91; defeated in French National Assembly, 78 European Economic Community (EEC), 2, 89, 90–91, 92, 116–117, 124, 153, 162, 164, 195, 210, 216, 230 European Free Trade Association (EFTA), 115–116 European Political Community (EPC), 79, 91 Evangelical Church of Germany (EKD), 43, Evangelical Working Group (EAK) of the CDU, 54–55 Federer, Georg, 128 FIG Agreement, 101, 199 force de frappe, 1–2, 199, 203 Fouchet, Christian, 155. See also Fouchet I and Fouchet II Fouchet I, 155 Fouchet II, 155, 161 France, 1–3, 5–6, 16, 20, 31–33, 35–40, 42, 46–47, 52, 57, 60–61, 63, 72, 75, 77–82, 84, 90–92, 101, 113, 115–116, 118, 121, 123–126, 136, 140, 151, 154–156, 158–172, 174–183, 194–196, 198–212, 214–219, 228–229 François-Poncet, André, 53

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Franklin, Benjamin, 172 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 173 François-Poncet, André, 32, 36, Free Democratic Party (FDP), 16–17, 87, 96, 138–139, 152, 168, 173, 193, 197–199, 201, 205, 211, 220–222, 229 Friedländer, Ernst, 33, 36 Fulbright, J. William, 135 Gaillard, Felix, 101 Galbraith, John Kenneth, 140–141 Gaullism, 3–6, 15, 37, 91, 126, 152, 154, 163, 176, 198, 202, 204–219, 222; contrasted with Atlanticism, 6–7, 15, 192–196, 199–201, 218–220, 230–231 Geneva Conference: of 1955, 86; of 1959, 123 German Democratic Republic (GDR), x, 10, 39 German rearmament, 38–47 Germany Plots with the Kremlin, 61 “German Manifesto,” 85 Gerstenmaier, Eugen, 45–46, 58, 71, 79–80, 122, 125, 139, 201; conflict with Adenauer, 134; preference for EDC over NATO, 79–80, 83–84 Globke, Hans, 120–121, 162, 173, 217 Grandes Conférences Catholiques, 90–91, 125 Great Britain, viii, 1–5, 14–15, 17, 22, 43, 48, 61, 72, 79–84, 89–93, 99–101, 113, 115–118, 121, 123, 126, 134, 136, 141, 153–156, 158, 160–166, 168–171, 173, 178, 180–182, 192–194, 196, 202–203, 208–209, 212–213, 216, 218 Green Party, 229 Grewe, Wilhelm, 112, 159, 208, 214 Grotewohl, Otto, 49 Guardini, Romano, 15 Guttenberg, Theodor zu, 128, 140, 158, 193, 195–197, 200–201, 208–209, 210–211, 218; advocates European nuclear force, 203, 219; criticizes US détente policies, 198, 201, 219; role in Huyn Affair, 212–213

Kohl, Helmut, viii-ix, 10, 204–206, 218 Köhler, Erich, 35 Köhler, Henning, 52, 55, 77, 119, 182 Korean War, 40, 45 Krekeler, Heinz, 88, 174, 218 Krone, Heinrich, 79–80, 88–89, 112, 123, 125, 131, 134, 139–140, 157–158, 162, 164, 168–169, 170, 175, 180–181, 196, 201, 208; role in presidency crisis of 1959, 120–122 Lahr, Rolf, 174 Lehr, Robert, 43 Lemke, Michael, 10 Lenz, Otto, 60, 62, Lewis, Flora, 122 Liebes, Martin, 167–168 London Conference (1954), 81–82, 84 Lübke, Heinrich, 122, 209, 212 Luns, Joseph, 155, 192 Luxembourg compromise, 214, 215 Maastricht Treaty, 229 Macmillan, Harold, 117–118, 123–125, 141, 164 Majonica, Ernst, 134, 169, 174, 208 Mansfield, Mike, 114, 128 Marshall Plan, 11, 54 Maudling, Reginald, 116 McCloy, John J., 34, 41, 60, 124, 166, 170 McGhee, George, 200, 219 McNamara, Robert, 219 Mende, Erich, 139, 193, 197–198, 220 Mendes-France, Pierre, 78, 80 Messina Conference (1955), 89 Meyers, Franz, 210–211 Mikoyan, Ansastas, 114 Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP), 16, 198 Molotov, Vyacheslav, 75 Müller-Armack, Alfred, 122, 165, 166, 173 Multilateral Force (MLF), 164–165, 168, 176, 183, 195, 199–204. See also Nassau Agreement Nassau Agreement, 164 neutrality, 6, 39, 50–55, 63, 73, 75, 85, 88, 93, 95, 97, 100, 112, 115, 123, 128, 132, 141, 205 New York Conference (1950), 42 New York Herald Tribune, 171 New York Times, 40 Niemöller, Martin, 43, 45–46, Nixon, Richard M., 127 Norstad, Lauris, 126 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), ix, xi, 3, 6, 18, 38–39, 42, 47, 79, 81–87, 91–102, 111, 113, 115, 119 123–127, 129–133, 152–153, 156, 159–160, 162–164, 169–172, 174, 176, 178–179, 182 195, 198–200, 202–204, 207–208, 210, 214, 216–219, 228–203 nuclear nonproliferation treaty, 218–219, 221

Hallstein, Walter, 59, 170. See also Hallstein Doctrine Hallstein Doctrine, 86, 198 Hassell, Kai-Uwe von, 163, 169, 176, 193 Heck, Bruno, 140, 158 Heinemann, Gustav, 42–46, 85, 112–113 Herf, Jeffrey, x Herter, Christian, 118 Heuss, Theodor, 85, 86, 119–120 Hillenbrand, Martin, 124 Hillgruber, Andreas, 9, 55 Hitler, Adolf, 12 Höcherl, Hermann, 122, 137–138 Hungarian uprising of 1956, 102 Huntington, Samuel, 229 Huyn Affair, 212–214 Huyn, Hans Graf, 213–214. See also Huyn Affair Johnson, Lyndon, 130, 136, 197, 199, 204, 219–220 Junge Union, 201 Kaiser, Jakob, 17–18, 55, 58 Kaldor, Mary, 3 Kennan, George F., 100–101 Kennedy, John F., 127–128, 168; détente policies of, 157, 179–180; “Grand Design” for Europe, 2, 161, 164; visit to the Federal Republic and Berlin (1963), 150–152, 175–179, 181 Kennedy, Robert, 157 Khruschev, Nikita, 123 Kiesinger, Kurt Georg, 45, 83–84, 71, 72, 94, 220 Kingsbury-Smith, Joseph, 36 Knappstein, Heinrich, 159

Occupation Statute, 29, 32, 41–42, 46–47 offset payments, 219 Ollenhauer, Erich, 48, 54, 75, 76; visit to the US (1957), 94 Osterheld, Horst, 83, 127, 135, 160, 176–178, 192, 199, 200, 213 Ostpolitik, 10, 221 Palais Marbre Rose Conference, 49–50 Paris Conference (1954), 81 Paris Summit (1960), 123–126 Paul VI, 197 Petersberg Agreement, 34–35, 38, 96 Playhouse 90, 117 Pleven Plan, 46 Pleven, René, 46. See also Pleven Plan, EDC Poiger, Uta, x

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Radford, Arthur, 88. See also Radford Plan Radford Plan, 86, 88–90, 92, 98–99 Rambouillet Conference (1960), 4, 124–127, 156 Rapallo Treaty (1922), 11, 87 Rapacki, Adam, 100. See also Rapacki Plan Rapacki Plan, 100–101, 113–114 Reston, James, 141 Rheinischer Merkur, 196–198, 207 Robertson, Sir Brian, 33–34 Röpke, Wilhelm, 15 Rosenberg, Ludwig, 171 Rostow, Walt, 195 Rupieper, Hermann-Josef, 11 Rusk, Dean, 130, 157–158, 168, 176, 179, 181–182, 194 Saar Territory, 35–36, 47, 81–82 Schäffer, Fritz, 57, 78 Schaukelpolitik, 3, 11, 20, 71, 176 Scheel, Walter, 10, 198 Schiller, Karl, 221 Schmid, Carlo, 48, 85, 119–121 Schmidt, Helmut, 132 Schröder, Gerhard, 71, 112, 118, 120, 122, 125, 139, 160, 174–176, 229; accused of working with the SPD, 165, 201, 203, 206, 217; advocates British membership in EEC, 155, 162, 164, 168, 178, 208; Atlanticism of, 141–142, 153, 161, 173, 177–178, 181–183, 193–194, 196, 199, 228; conflict with German Gaullists, 197, 201– 204, 206–208, 210–213, 215–218, 220; conflict with Adenauer, 159, 162, 164–166, 183, 197– 198, 202–204, 206, 212; controversy over his reappointment in 1965, 211–212; defends US policy on Berlin, 158–159; personal attacks on, 207, 213–214; relations with France and de Gaulle, 166–167, 177–179, 183, 194–195, 199–200, 203, 207–209, 217–218, 228; relationship with Erhard, 214; relationship with the Kennedy administration, 176, 181–183, 194; rivalry with Strauß, 198–199, 220; supports MLF, 199–200, 203–204; and Test Ban Treaty, 181–182; views on Elysée Treaty, 173, 201, 207, 209, 228; views on European-American relations in general, 209–210, 214 Schulze, Hagen, 11 Schumacher, Kurt, 4, 9, 12, 14, 33–34, 40, 44, 46, 58, 75, 132, 137 Schuman Plan, 37–38, 41 Schuman, Robert, 16, 35, 37, 47, 77. See also Schuman Plan Schwarz, Hans-Peter, 52, 77, 119, 137, 138 Schwartz, Thomas, 46 Seidel, Hanns, 98 Shirer, William, 128, 157 Skybolt missile system, 164. See also Nassau Agreement Smirnov, Andrei, 114 Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), 4, 14, 16, 34, 80, 87, 112, 116, 129, 131, 134–136, 139, 159, 173, 193, 209, 221; adapts to Westbindung, 12–13, 94, 132–133, 138, 197, 222; attacked for neutralism, 12, 70, 80, 95, 205, 229; Bad Godesberg conference of, 12, 132, 175, 205; Germany Plan (1959), 132; opposes rearmament, 74–76, 99, 115; proposes alternatives to NATO, 85–86, 93; supports Schröder, 201, 218 Social Market Economy, 16–17 Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), x Sorensen, Theodore, 150 Soviet Union, viii, x, 1, 3, 5–6, 7, 9–13, 15, 17, 19, 39, 43, 49–55, 61, 73–75, 78, 80, 85–86, 91–93, 95–96, 100–102, 111, 113–117, 124, 133–137,

139–140, 151, 156–157, 163, 195, 202, 207, 211, 217–218 Spaak, Paul-Henri, 82, 84, 155. See also Spaak Report Spaak Report, 89 Spengler, Oswald, 15 Spiegel Affair, 162–163 Spielberg, Steven, 229 Springer, Axel, 134 Sputnik, 100–101 Stalin, Josef, 49, 51, 73. See also Stalin Note Stalin Note, 49–56, 74 Stassen, Harold, 87, 95, 97 Steininger, Rolf, 50–51 Stevenson, Adlai, 128 Stikker, Dirk, 126 Strauß, Franz Josef, 48, 56, 71, 80–81, 113–115, 122, 125, 131–132, 137, 162–163, 204, 208, 213–214, 229; advocates European nuclear force, 101, 195–196, 203–204, 217; becomes defense minister, 97–100; chair of CSU, 159, 176, 193, 200–201, 220; conflict with FDP, 194, 198; conflict with Schröder, 182, 193–194, 198–201, 211–213, 215–216, 217, 220; European vision, 195–196, 198–199, 215–216, 219–220; as Gaullist, 118, 193–194, 201, 217; and Spiegel Affair, 162–163; and Test Ban Treaty, 181–182; supports Atlantic Alliance, 228; suspicion of US policy, 128–130, 139, 159, 176, 181–182, 195–196, 201, 219–220 Suez Crisis, 91–93 Sulzberger, Cyrus, 218 Tacke, Bernhard, 171 Taylor, A. J. P., 5, 20–21 Teppichpolitik, 32–33 Test Ban Treaty, 179–182 Trachtenberg, Marc, 151 Truman, Harry S, 33, 127 Tyler, William, 175 Ulbricht, Walter, 10, 74, 180 United States of America (US), viii-ix, 1–4, 6–7, 9, 11, 15, 17, 19, 22, 31, 33, 36–38, 46, 57, 59–62, 70, 73, 75, 78–79, 81, 84, 88–97, 100–101, 110–111, 114–115, 123, 125–128, 134, 136–137, 140, 150–154, 156–157, 161–164, 167–171, 175–177, 179, 182, 193, 195, 199–203, 206, 208–210, 212, 215, 217, 219, 229–230 Vietnam, 78, 206, 209, 215, 218 Volkspolizei, 39–40 Washington Post, 171 Wehner, Herbert, 132, 209 Weizsäcker, Carl Friedrich von, 171 Welt, Die, 199 Wenger, Paul Wilhelm, 207 Westbindung, ix-xi, 4, 6–13, 22, 29–30, 32, 38, 44, 57–59, 70–77, 81, 83, 85–87, 90, 93–94, 97, 111–112, 119 132–133, 136, 138, 142, 152, 167, 183, 192, 195, 205, 221–222, 230; and German reunification, 9–13, 17–18, 47–55, 63, 126, 157, 180, 231 Western European Union (WEU), 81, 87, 92, 229 “Westernization,” contrasted with Americanization, 7 Westrick, Ludger, 213 Zeit, Die, 33 Zollverein, 36

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