The Age of Secularization 9780773552258

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THE AGE OF SECULARIZATION

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M c Gill-Queen’s Studies in the History of Ideas Series Editor: Philip J. Cercone   1 Problems of Cartesianism Edited by Thomas M. Lennon, John M. Nicholas, and John W. Davis

10 Consent, Coercion, and Limit: The Medieval Origins of Parliamentary Democracy Arthur P. Monahan

  2 The Development of the Idea of History in Antiquity Gerald A. Press

11 Scottish Common Sense in Germany, 1768–1800: A Contribution to the History of Critical Philosophy Manfred Kuehn

  3 Claude Buffier and Thomas Reid: Two Common-Sense Philosophers Louise Marcil-Lacoste   4 Schiller, Hegel, and Marx: State, Society, and the Aesthetic Ideal of Ancient Greece Philip J. Kain   5 John Case and Aristotelianism in Renaissance England Charles B. Schmitt   6 Beyond Liberty and Property: The Process of SelfRecognition in EighteenthCentury Political Thought J.A.W. Gunn   7 John Toland: His Methods, Manners, and Mind Stephen H. Daniel   8 Coleridge and the Inspired Word Anthony John Harding   9 The Jena System, 1804–5: Logic and Metaphysics G.W.F. Hegel Translation edited by John W. Burbidge and George di Giovanni Introduction and notes by H.S. Harris

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12 Paine and Cobbett: The Transatlantic Connection David A. Wilson 13 Descartes and the Enlightenment Peter A. Schouls 14 Greek Scepticism: Anti-Realist Trends in Ancient Thought Leo Groarke 15 The Irony of Theology and the Nature of Religious Thought Donald Wiebe 16 Form and Transformation: A Study in the Philosophy of Plotinus Frederic M. Schroeder 17 From Personal Duties towards Personal Rights: Late Medieval and Early Modern Political Thought, c. 1300–c. 1650 Arthur P. Monahan 18 The Main Philosophical Writings and the Novel Allwill Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi Translated and edited by George di Giovanni

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19 Kierkegaard as Humanist: Discovering My Self Arnold B. Come 20 Durkheim, Morals, and Modernity W. Watts Miller 21 The Career of Toleration: John Locke, Jonas Proast, and After Richard Vernon 22 Dialectic of Love: Platonism in Schiller’s Aesthetics David Pugh 23 History and Memory in Ancient Greece Gordon Shrimpton 24 Kierkegaard as Theologian: Recovering My Self Arnold B. Come 25 Enlightenment and Conservatism in Victorian Scotland: The Career of Sir Archibald Alison Michael Michie 26 The Road to Egdon Heath: The Aesthetics of the Great in Nature Richard Bevis 27 Jena Romanticism and Its Appropriation of Jakob Böhme: Theosophy – Hagiography – Literature Paolo Mayer

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28 Enlightenment and Community: Lessing, Abbt, Herder, and the Quest for a German Public Benjamin W. Redekop 29 Jacob Burckhardt and the Crisis of Modernity John R. Hinde 30 The Distant Relation: Time and Identity in SpanishAmerican Fiction Eoin S. Thomson 31 Mr Simson’s Knotty Case: Divinity, Politics, and Due Process in Early EighteenthCentury Scotland Anne Skoczylas 32 Orthodoxy and Enlightenment: George Campbell in the Eighteenth Century Jeffrey M. Suderman 33 Contemplation and Incarnation: The Theology of MarieDominique Chenu Christophe F. Potworowski 34 Democratic Legitimacy: Plural Values and Political Power F.M. Barnard 35 Herder on Nationality, Humanity, and History F.M. Barnard 36 Labeling People: French Scholars on Society, Race, and Empire, 1815–1849 Martin S. Staum

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37 The Subaltern Appeal to Experience: Self-Identity, Late Modernity, and the Politics of Immediacy Craig Ireland 38 The Invention of Journalism Ethics: The Path to Objectivity and Beyond, Second Edition Stephen J.A. Ward 39 The Recovery of Wonder: The New Freedom and the Asceticism of Power Kenneth L. Schmitz 40 Reason and Self-Enactment in History and Politics: Themes and Voices of Modernity F.M. Barnard 41 The More Moderate Side of Joseph de Maistre: Views on Political Liberty and Political Economy Cara Camcastle 42 Democratic Society and Human Needs Jeff Noonan 43 The Circle of Rights Expands: Modern Political Thought after the Reformation, 1521 (Luther) to 1762 (Rousseau) Arthur P. Monahan

46 When the French Tried to Be British: Party, Opposition, and the Quest for Civil Disagreement, 1814–1848 J.A.W. Gunn 47 Under Conrad’s Eyes: The Novel as Criticism Michael John DiSanto 48 Media, Memory, and the First World War David Williams 49 An Aristotelian Account of Induction: Creating Something from Nothing Louis Groarke 50 Social and Political Bonds: A Mosaic of Contrast and Convergence F.M. Barnard 51 Archives and the Event of God: The Impact of Michel Foucault on Philosophical Theology David Galston 52 Between the Queen and the Cabby: Olympe de Gouges’s Rights of Women John R. Cole

44 The Canadian Founding: John Locke and Parliament Janet Ajzenstat

53 Nature and Nurture in French Social Sciences, 1859–1914 and Beyond Martin S. Staum

45 Finding Freedom: Hegel’s Philosophy and the Emancipation of Women Sara MacDonald

54 Public Passion: Rethinking the Grounds for Political Justice Rebecca Kingston

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55 Rethinking the Political: The Sacred, Aesthetic Politics, and the Collège de Sociologie Simonetta Falasca-Zamponi 56 Materialist Ethics and Life-Value Jeff Noonan 57 Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Dialectical Justification of Philosophy’s First Principles Ardis B. Collins 58 The Social History of Ideas in Quebec, 1760–1896 Yvan Lamonde Translated by Phyllis Aronoff and Howard Scott 59 Ideas, Concepts, and Reality John W. Burbidge 60 The Enigma of Perception D.L.C. Maclachlan 61 Nietzsche’s Justice: Naturalism in Search of an Ethics Peter R. Sedgwick 62 The Idea of Liberty in Canada during the Age of Atlantic Revolutions, 1776–1838 Michel Ducharme Translated by Peter Feldstein 63 From White to Yellow: The Japanese in European Racial Thought, 1300–1735 Rotem Kowner 64 The Crisis of Modernity Augusto Del Noce Edited and translated by Carlo Lancellotti

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65 Imprinting Britain: Newspapers, Sociability, and the Shaping of British North America Michael Eamon 66 The Form of Politics: Aristotle and Plato on Friendship John von Heyking 67 War as Paradox: Clausewitz and Hegel on Fighting Doctrines and Ethics Youri Cormier 68 Network Democracy: Conservative Politics and the Violence of the Liberal Age Jared Giesbrecht 69 A Singular Case: Debating China’s Political Economy in the European Enlightenment Ashley Eva Millar 70 Not Even a God Can Save Us Now: Reading Machiavelli after Heidegger Brian Harding 71 Before Copernicus: The Cultures and Contexts of Scientific Learning in the Fifteenth Century Edited by Rivka Feldhay and F. Jamil Ragep 72 The Culturalist Challenge to Liberal Republicanism Michael Lusztig

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73 God and Government: Martin Luther’s Political Thought Jarrett A. Carty

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74 The Age of Secularization Augusto Del Noce Edited and Translated by Carlo Lancellotti

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THE AGE OF SECULARIZATION

Augusto Del Noce

Edited and Translated by Carlo Lancellotti

McGill-Queen’s University Press Montreal & Kingston • London • Chicago

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©  McGill-Queen’s University Press 2017 ISBN ISBN ISBN ISBN

978-0-7735-5090-2 (cloth) 978-0-7735-5091-9 (paper) 978-0-7735-5225-8 (ePDF) 978-0-7735-5226-5 (ePUB)

Legal deposit fourth quarter 2017 Bibliothèque nationale du Québec Printed in Canada on acid-free paper that is 100% ancient forest free (100% post-consumer recycled), processed chlorine free The translation of this work has been funded by SEPS Segretariato Europeo per le Pubblicazioni Scientifiche Via Val d’Aposa 7 – 40123 Bologna – Italy [email protected] – www.seps.it McGill-Queen’s University Press acknowledges the support of the Canada Council for the Arts for our publishing program. We also acknowledge the financial support of the Government of Canada through the Canada Book Fund for our publishing activities.

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Del Noce, Augusto, 1910–1989 [Epoca della secolarizzazione. English] The age of secularization / Augusto Del Noce; edited and translated by Carlo Lancellotti. (McGill-Queen’s studies in the history of ideas; 74) Translation of: Epoca della secolarizzazione. Includes bibliographical references and index. Issued in print and electronic formats. ISBN 978-0-7735-5090-2 (cloth). – ISBN 978-0-7735-5091-9 (paper). – ISBN 978-0-7735-5225-8 (ePDF). – ISBN 978-0-7735-5226-5 (ePUB) 1. Social history – 20th century.  I. Lancellotti, Carlo, editor, translator  II. Title.  III. Title: Epoca della secolarizzazione.  English  VI. Series: McGill-Queen’s studies in the history of ideas; 74. HN17.D4513 2017

303.48'4

C2017-904237-8 C2017-904238-6

This book was typeset by Marquis Interscript in 10 /12 New Baskerville.

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Contents

Translator’s Introduction xi Biographical Note xxix Part 1:  The Age of Secularization Preface 3 The Student Protests and Values  9 Notes for a Philosophy of Young People  19 Tradition and Innovation  35 Technological Civilization and Christianity  68 The Dialogue between the Church and Modern Culture  86 Notes towards a Historical Definition of Fascism  96 Simone Weil, Interpreter of Today’s World  118 The Common Morality of the Nineteenth Century and the Morality of Today  153 The Present Significance of Rosminian Ethics  173 At the Origins of the Concept of Ideology  190 Croce and Religious Thought  203 Part 2:  The Politics of Secularization The Political Predicament of Catholics  217 On Catholic Progressivism  236 Index 267

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Translator’s Introduction

In 1970, Augusto Del Noce collected eleven of his essays and lectures that had appeared in print between 1964 and 1969 and re-published them as a book titled The Age of Secularization.1 The time span itself of the collection is significant, not only because many of Del Noce’s reflections were prompted by the tumultuous social and cultural changes of the mid-to-late 1960s that culminated in the 1968 student protests in Europe, but also because those years had marked a turning point in his own professional life. 1964 had been the year of publication of his first book, The Problem of Atheism,2 which contained some of his most important works from the two previous decades, including his fundamental studies on Marxism.3 Then, in 1966, Del Noce had finally obtained a permanent academic position (first in Trieste, and then in Rome), which enabled him to focus more freely on his scholarship. By the end of the decade he had established his reputation as one of Italy’s foremost political thinkers and historians of ideas. Thus, The Age of Secularization documents the encounter, so to speak, between a key period of contemporary history and the full intellectual maturity of one of its most perceptive observers. This is one of the reasons why it remains surprisingly relevant and fresh almost fifty years later.4

1 Augusto Del Noce, L’epoca della secolarizzazione (Milan: Giuffrè, 1970). 2 Augusto Del Noce, Il problema dell’ateismo (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1964) 3 In particular, the 1946 essay La non-filosofia di Marx [The non-philosophy of Marx], which near the end of his life Del Noce would describe as “the essay he most cared about” in “A self-introduction” (1985), published in Quaderni della Fondazione Centro Studi Augusto Del Noce 2005–2006 (Brescia: Morcelliana, 2006). 4 The enduring relevance of what Francesco Perfetti called a “not-yet-metabolized classic” (Il Giornale, 13 August 2015: 25) was recently confirmed by the publication of a new Italian edition (Turin: Aragno, 2015).

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xii

Translator’s Introduction

The inseparability of the study of ideas and the study of history (especially contemporary history) had been a characteristic of Del Noce’s thought since his youth during the dark days of Fascism and the Second World War. Many scholars have highlighted the methodological originality of his study of philosophy through history. To him, metaphysical ideas (what he often calls essences) exist a-temporally but also manifest themselves historically; they can be observed in action, as they shape the lives of individuals and societies. Akin to an evolutionary biologist, Del Noce excelled at tracking their development, at reconstructing their genealogies, at pinpointing their phylogenetic splits and mergers. Conversely, he believed that socio-political history cannot be truly understood without ­taking into account the influence of ideas; accordingly, he often emphasized ideal causation, the power of world views to shape human affairs. It is tempting to explain Del Noce’s appreciation of the circularity of philosophy and history as a reflection of the Italian culture of his youth, which was shaped by Croce’s and Gentile’s neo-Idealist philosophies and was drenched with historicism. But, in fact, he was no Hegelian; whenever Del Noce had to describe his own philosophical orientation, he would refer to “classical metaphysics, where this term is understood in the broadest sense which includes St Augustine as well as St Thomas and Rosmini.”5 This is not the place to try and define precisely Del Noce’s brand of “existential Thomism,” a task that would be made more difficult by the fact that he never actually got to write his own metaphysical treatise – not because he was opposed in principle to such endeavor6 but precisely because his priority was always to respond to the irresistible “urge to reflect on factual reality.”7 What must be highlighted, however, is the peculiarity of an advocate of Greek and Medieval “timeless” metaphysics who also identified8 with Hegel’s dictum that “philosophy is its own time apprehended in thought.”9

5 In this volume, from now on TAS , p. 155. 6 In his final remarks to the 1979 symposium of the Gallarate Center for Philosophical Studies, published in Violenza [Violence] (Brescia: Morcelliana, 1980), 217–22, another distinguished Italian philosopher, Gustavo Bontadini, reports that Del Noce (who was then sixty-nine years old) “has confided to me, in the hallway, that he now intends to move away from politics and dedicate himself entirely to metaphysics” (221). Needless to say, that never happened. 7 His description of what moved the philosophy of Max Scheler, in this volume, p. 219. 8 See (among many other possible references) Augusto Del Noce, Autopresentazione [Self-introduction], in Quaderni della Fondazione Centro Studi Augusto Del Noce 2005–2006 (Brescia: Morcelliana, 2006), 23. 9 Georg W.F. Hegel. Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. Allan W. Wood, trans. Hugh B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 21.

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Translator’s Introduction xiii

Del Noce himself gives us the key to this apparent paradox in a key passage from the introduction to The Problem of Atheism: thinking in relation to the present historical context does not mean denying the eternity of metaphysical problems, but recognizing it in their true sense [because] it is necessary that we unburden metaphysical thought of the immobilization in formulas that makes it liable to look like the alienated image of a certain historical situation … I do not have in front of me some sort of list of problems that have already been solved, which can be collected in a treatise. On the contrary, it is in the course of the personal process of solving the metaphysical problem that I recognize my thesis as the explication of a ‘virtuality’ of an affirmation that was already made in the past. And it is precisely in this ‘explication of a virtuality’ that the metaphysical thesis becomes ‘evident’ to me, breaking free from the always contingent form that it had taken in its historical formulations. Rather than following from a hidden rejection of eternity, the recognition of the historical context is motivated by the need not to confuse the eternal and time.10

In other words, precisely because metaphysical truths are eternal (and transcend the formulations of any particular age) their discovery is necessarily historical (in the sense that each generation must find again its way to them in its own circumstances). We cannot just rely on a mechanical repetition of formulas, because what we received from our forebears is conditioned by the questions they faced, and we ourselves can only think in terms of the questions we are facing. Moreover, this “personal process” through which eternal metaphysical truths become my own always involves freedom. Incidentally, Del Noce believes that a correct understanding of this point is essential in order to rescue what he views (with Maritain) as the most positive contribution of modernity, namely its “attention to the subjective aspect of the apprehension of truth, and thus to freedom; to the form in which truth is welcomed as such.”11 From a political perspective, it is crucial “for the definition of the concept of liberalism.”12 First-time readers should keep in mind Del Noce’s habit of thinking in-history and through-history vis-à-vis his distinctive writing style. He constantly goes back and forth in a dialectic process between historical

10 Del Noce, Il problema dell’ateismo, 78. Del Noce cites Newman and the Spanish theologian Marin Sola as the authors who clarified this point. 11 Augusto Del Noce, “The Lesson of Maritain” in Maritain Studies XXXI (2016), 71–80. 12 Del Noce, Il problema dell’ateismo, 78n66.

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xiv

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situations and philosophical concepts, establishing deep and often surprising connections in a vast gallery of authors and ideas. Organizationally, his preferred format is the essay, and almost all of his books are essay collections. More than a stylistic preference, this is also a reflection of his fundamental disposition: philosophical questions arise for him in response to historical experience, and come as what he calls problems. His typical procedure is to start from a “problem” (e.g., the rise of Fascism, or the affluent society, or the student movement), then identify its philosophical core, reconstruct its origins and development, and extrapolate it to its logical conclusions (often with remarkable predictive power). Consequently, his writings are as varied, “discrete,” and apparently haphazard as history itself. All of these characteristics are well exemplified by The Age of Secularization, which collects Del Noce’s reflections about the cultural changes of the 1960s. In fact, readers accustomed to the conventions of contemporary academic book writing may at first find the organization of the book somewhat mysterious. After a preface in which he links the new book back to The Problem of Atheism, Del Noce starts with two essays about the counterculture and the student protests of 1968. In the following three essays, he discusses the progressivism of the 1960s, the nature of the technological society, and the relationship between Christianity and modern culture. He then moves back to the pre-war period with a lucid essay on Fascism and a long monographic piece on Simone Weil. Next, he goes even further into the past with two essays that compare the contemporary moral landscape with that of nineteenth-century Europe and the ethics of Rosmini. He ends with two pithy and insightful pieces whose connection with the rest of the book is not immediately obvious, one on the French ideologists of the early nineteenth century and the other on the religiosity of Benedetto Croce. An unfamiliar reader’s sense of confusion may be heightened by the fact that no essay focuses on secularization specifically – although the concept does come up at various points – and there is no formal conclusion. And yet, a closer examination reveals that there is a rigorous logic to Del Noce’s jumble of topics and apparent disorder, but the logic is completely internal. By that I mean that the essays are not selected and organized to fit in some larger scheme, but rather each essay leads to the next: the study of each “problem” opens up a new problem which is taken up in the following essay. I will now try to briefly illuminate this progression “from problem to problem,” which is itself interesting in the way it reveals Del Noce’s thought process. ***

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Translator’s Introduction xv

A good place to start is the fourth (and last) point of the summary of The Problem of Atheism that Del Noce provides at the beginning of the preface to The Age of Secularization. The first three points reflect, broadly speaking, a reconstruction of European modernity in which fully developed atheism coincides with Marxism. In fact, the characteristics that he ­attributes generically to “atheism” are exactly those that elsewhere he ­mentions in reference to Marxism: namely, it is “the endpoint of rationalism”; it “can only present itself as the outcome of an irreversible ­historical process … [and] the only practical attitude capable of truly realizing ­human universality”; and it has “defeated the philosophy of divine immanence.”13 These judgments can be traced back to Del Noce’s reflections immediately after the Second World War, or at least before 1960,14 and do not find much of an echo in The Age of Secularization. The fourth point, in contrast, summarizes the conclusions of one of the newest essays in The Problem of Atheism – “Notes about Western Irreligion,” from 1963 – and truly sets the theme for the new book. Marxism is now mentioned explicitly, but to register its defeat because it “ended up ­being a stage in the development of the technological and affluent society,” which represents “the complete success of atheism” and ­ “pushes to the extreme the dehumanization of the relationship with the other.”15 In “Notes about Western Irreligion,” Del Noce had diagnosed for the first time a new and different form of atheism, even more radical than Marxism, as the real novelty of post-war Western culture. Now, writing in 1969, he can claim that “history has confirmed these theses in a remarkable way.” That the rise of the società opulenta (affluent society16) is the fundamental historical-philosophical “problem” to be examined in The Age of  Secularization is made abundantly clear by the first two essays, “The 13 TAS , 3. 14 The years immediately after the war were the time when large parts of the European secular intellectual class had embraced Marxism and rejected the “philosophy of divine immanence” – meaning the neo-Idealist trends that had been dominant before the war, especially in France (Brunschvigc) and Italy (Croce, Gentile). 15 TAS , 3. 16 In their review of Del Noce’s The Crisis of Modernity (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2015), B. Thomassen and R. Forlenza make a good case for the literal translation “opulent society” (voegelinview.com/augusto-del-noce-on-the-societa-opulenta/, 2 July 2015). I still incline to use “affluent society” for three reasons. First, because La società opulenta was in fact the title of all post-1960 Italian editions of J.K. Galbraith’s The Affluent Society. Second, because there is little doubt that Del Noce (despite his very different theoretical outlook) drew from Galbraith the notion of “società opulenta,” also through his friend Franco Rodano; on this point see M. Musté, “Fra Del Noce e Rodano, il dibattito sulla società opulenta” [Between Del Noce and Rodano: The debate on the

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Student Protests and Values” and “Notes for a Philosophy of Young People.” Not by chance, both begin by revisiting (or even quoting verbatim) some of Del Noce’s observations in “Notes about Western Irreligion.” In particular, we find here one of his most famous theses, the idea that at the philosophical level the affluent society is the result of the “decomposition” of Marxism: Marxist revolutionary thought … effectively ended up being the occasion for the fulfillment of the bourgeois spirit in the so-called technological society. I use this expression here to indicate a society characterized not by increasing scientific and technical activity, but rather by the concept of instrumental reason, that is, by the interpretation of all human activity in terms of technical activity … I would like to propose the following definition: it is a society that accepts all of Marxism’s negations against contemplative thought, religion, and metaphysics; that accepts, therefore, the Marxist reduction of ideas to instruments of production; that, on the other hand, rejects the revolutionary-messianic aspects of Marxism, and thus what is still religious in the revolutionary idea. In this regard, it truly represents the bourgeois spirit in its pure state, the bourgeois spirit triumphant over its two traditional adversaries, transcendent religion and ­ ­revolutionary thought.17

Del Noce is well aware, of course, that the implicit philosophy of the affluent society is a form of scientistic positivism. But he is convinced that, historically speaking, the new positivism owes to Marxism what ­distinguishes it from the “romantic” forms of the nineteenth century (namely, a radical critique of all forms of authority, and the aggressive extension of materialism to all human phenomena). He also describes the affluent society as società del benessere, where benessere means “well-­ being” chiefly in the sense of material comfort. He hastens to clarify that he is not referring to economic prosperity per se, but rather to a moral attitude: that of having benessere as the supreme social goal. This fundamental option has various consequences. First of all, “philosophy abdicates in favor of science,” which is viewed as the foundation of technology and the instrument to further increase well-being. Second, this “elevation of science to absolute model of knowledge makes interiority disappear,” which to Del Noce is the philosophical premise of the sexual revolution. Third, “absolute scientism must also imply the absolute end affluent society], La Cultura 1 (1999): 95–121. Third, because, linguistically, my sense is that (at least in the US) “opulent” is being used less and less to mean “rich” or “prosperous” and more in the sense of “sumptuous” or “lavish.” 17 TAS , 12–13.

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Translator’s Introduction xvii

of religions” through a process of gradual secularization. Finally, “the society of well-being is intrinsically totalitarian in the sense that, within it, culture is entirely subordinate to politics.”18 To Del Noce, grasping these “moral characteristics” of the affluent society is essential in order to understand the dramatic developments of the mid-to-late 1960s, in particular the student protests of 1968–69. Del Noce is sympathetic to the students, precisely because in his view their rebellion was primarily against the società del benessere : “the students’ restlessness and impatience, their mistrust of their elders, are in themselves positive phenomena. Indeed, they express human nature’s rebellion against the distinctive process – of desecration and dehumanization at the same time – of the two atheistic societies, the Marxist and the affluent, of which the former is destined to merge into the latter as economic development progresses. They do not want to belong to this system as instruments, which incidentally would be unavoidable because the society of well-being knows only instruments.”19 However, he thinks that their rebellion was doomed to fail from the start, because the students confused the affluent society in which they had grown up with “tradition,” and thus rejected the very institutions (the family, the church, liberal education) that still resisted the technological mindset. This tragic misunderstanding led them to extremism, that is, to a form of revolutionary utopianism that fails to critique the society of well-being “because it supinely accepts, as a fragmentary mush, the ideal principles that started the process that led to the current system, the system it would like to oppose.”20 Chief among these principles was what Del Noce elsewhere21 calls the “progressive” or “modernist” vision of history, which attributes to modernity an “axiological value.” A truly radical criticism of the materialism and instrumentalism of the affluent society would have required affirming certain “absolute truths,” but this affirmation was blocked by “the greatest idol that opposes the reaffirmation of permanent values: the idea of modernity taken as a value,” and by “the common perception … that we are living in a new epoch, separated from the past by the sharp break of the two world wars.”22 Paradoxically, according to Del Noce, the failure of the rebellion of the 1960s against the affluent society was due to its inability to free itself from the “progressive myth.” This leads him 18 19 20 21 22

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Ibid., 22–3. Ibid., 24. Ibid., 26. See for instance The Crisis of Modernity, 99–104. TAS , 9.

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xviii

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to the next “problem”: why did a renewed progressivism become the forma mentis of so many Western intellectuals after the Second World War? This question is studied from different angles in the next three essays: “Tradition and Innovation” explores the historical origins of progressivism and its relationship with Marxism; “Technological Civilization and Christianity” discusses the scientistic and positivistic side of the progressive mindset; and “The Dialogue between the Church and Modern Culture” examines how progressivism penetrated the religious sphere, in the form of a new Modernism among Catholic intellectuals. Del Noce’s major claim in “Tradition and Innovation” is that in the 1950s and 1960s progressivism was above all the result of an interpretation of the great epochal crisis that had taken place between 1914 and 1945. In his view, “progressivism starts from a historico-political assessment or, if you like, a vision of contemporary history … it does not start from a philosophy, from a deeper theological exploration, from a new morality, from a side effect of some technical development, not even from some economic-social tension.” Therefore, one needs to reconstruct such a “vision of contemporary history” in order to “understand the various philosophical, theological or moral positions that today are presented as progressive.”23 Del Noce refers primarily to the Italian experience, but mutatis mutandis his analysis applies to the response of the whole European intellectual class to the “irrational and barbaric politics that prevailed in factual reality” during the 1930s and 1940s. Europe, which had regarded itself as the climax of civilization, had turned into “a house of demons,” and those who survived the war felt “as if a great cosmic revolution had destroyed old Europe-turned-into-Babylon with its traditions and values.” Therefore, “what had to be rediscovered as the truly modern attitude, able to gauge the destiny of mankind, was the Enlightenment as a disposition to declare a break with traditional structures and criticize them inexorably from an ethical, political, and social standpoint.”24 In this regard, Del Noce continues, “we must face a question that is crucial in order to understand today’s history: how the rebirth of the mindset of the Enlightenment and the rediscovery of Marxism have met and compenetrated each other … Whereas the older generation thought that Marxism had to be plainly and simply rejected, those who were young in 1945 came to think that Marxism had to be surpassed or sublated”25 in order to reconcile it with the spirit of the 23 Ibid., 37. 24 Ibid., 40. 25 Ibid., 42–3. Regarding the use of the verb “to sublate” to translate Del Noce’s inverare, see footnote 4 on p. 5.

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Translator’s Introduction xix

Enlightenment. However, they failed to realize that Marxism “is indeed plagued by a contradiction, but that such contradiction does not lead it to being surpassed, but rather to a form of decomposition; and that this decomposition does not conclude in a reconciliation with liberal secularism or with a religious world view, but rather to a form of atheism which is worse and more radical than the original one, and also to a fully oppressive regime.”26 Thus, reflecting about progressivism brings Del Noce back to his leitmotif: the decomposition of Marxism as the key to understanding contemporary history. Indeed, he states that “the transition from Marxism to radical positivism … presents itself as very easy and irrefutable at the same time. Is the Marxist critique of ideologies not based on the principle that everything that escapes immediate verification – everything that is, in one word, metaphysical – can be explained as the expression of the historical-social situation of a group? … then, how can one sustain a conception still as imbued with metaphysics as dialectic materialism?” Thus, “today’s history is nothing but Marxism’s contradiction made explicit. In fact, the two aspects of historical materialism (as affirmation of total relativity) and dialectic materialism (as revolutionary principle) must dissociate when taken to the extreme. And this dissociated historical materialism has invaded the Western world, where culture is marked by the hubris of human sciences.”27 Del Noce describes the resulting attitude as negativist millennialism, because it combines the Enlightenment’s notion that “we need to ‘start from scratch,’” with the Marxist idea that “every affirmation is the expression of a particular age, not of some timeless and intrinsic value. By combining these two statements, we have the precise definition of today’s situation: death of the old ideals, but simultaneously the confession that new ideals cannot be born.”28 I quote these passages at length because they constitute, so to speak, the “diagnostic core” of The Age of Secularization. But if the progressive world view reflects a particular interpretation of contemporary history, its critique must target precisely this historical reconstruction. This is the conclusion of “Technological Civilization and Christianity”: Because it is not the progress of science that leads to anti-traditionalism, to the destruction of taboos, to the disappearance of mystery, to demythologization … the opposite is true: what motivates the criticism of tradition and all its consequences is the millennialist idea of a sharp break in history leading to a radically new type of civilization. Now, there is only one weapon against millennialism: 26 TAS , 43–4. 27 Ibid., 44. 28 Ibid., 44–5.

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regaining a genuine historical awareness. If a young person of today feels so distant and alienated from tradition it is because he was inculcated with a demonological version of recent history. Therefore, he was left haunted by the myth of an absolutely happy future, a myth that cannot be explicated in practice in any other way except than by denying all the values of the past, values that actually have nothing to do with science. Establishing a truly historical view of the recent past, capable of showing how its horrors were born precisely from the myth of the new, will be the first step towards an authentic demythologization, capable of calling into question the process that erected the false idol of the technological society.29

In Italy in the 1960s the “recent past” was the Fascist period, which is the subject of the sixth essay, “Notes towards a Historical Definition of Fascism.” Del Noce clarifies right away that “there is no question whatsoever of changing the negative axiological judgment about Fascism. Instead, the question is what ideal positions have been involved in its catastrophe.”30 According to a common “progressive” interpretation, Fascism was essentially a reactionary phenomenon, which betrayed Mussolini’s youthful revolutionary aspirations to enter into an alliance with conservative forces. On the contrary, Del Noce argues that Fascism was an attempt to reform Marxism in a non-materialistic direction, while preserving its revolutionary impulse. Therefore, it meant to be a nationalist and corporatist alternative to Leninism, and Mussolini’s trajectory demonstrates what happens to “the revolutionary attitude – understood in its most rigorous sense, as replacement of religion by politics in the liberation of man … when it is separated completely from the materialistic aspect and from the utopian aspect.”31 It certainly failed, but “observing that Fascism failed as a revolution is not the same as saying that it should be considered a reactionary phenomenon.”32 In fact, according to Del Noce, Fascism was a thoroughly modern phenomenon and was already part of the age of secularization, but during its sacral stage, which was marked by “the phenomenon of secular religions,” as opposed to the profane stage characterized by the rise of the affluent society. Near the end of “Notes towards a Historical Definition of Fascism,” Del Noce wonders why the modernist and revolutionary nature of Fascism has largely been ignored. His answer is that contemporary culture finds it hard to conceive of a “bad modernity” or a “bad revolution.” 29 30 31 32

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Ibid., 85. Ibid., 96. Ibid., 103. Ibid., 115.

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In his view, “it is because of a peculiar inversion that today people think that support [for Fascism] from traditionalists of all kinds was an inner obligation, whereas support from the advocates of the spirit of modernity can be excused because it was motivated by delusions … At the basis of this inversion lies the idea that novelty is always a synonym of positivity. If we look carefully, this idea is intrinsic to the age of secularization because this latter attributes a magical significance, as a power word, to the word revolution.”33 But then, in order to overcome the tragedies of the twentieth century, one must look at the larger historical picture of modernity and critique the contradictions of revolutionary thought. Here Del Noce encounters Simone Weil, “interpreter of today’s world,” to whom he dedicates the longest piece in The Age of Secularization. Del Noce attributes exceptional importance to Simone Weil – “the incomparable teacher of my generation”34 – because he sees her as the exemplar of a critique of modernity that starts from a wholly secular outlook and rediscovers the eternal truths of the Greek and Christian tradition, not out of traditionalism but through an original personal experience. He claims that “all of Weil’s thought – and this is her peculiarity – ­consists in rediscovering the traditional ideas, starting from an initial position that is not defensive but is rather one of revolt: in rediscovering them, therefore, in their authentic character.”35 For this reason, we should not be scandalized by her sometimes extreme views and by her contradictions, which merely reflect the fact that, after she moved away from the “secular agnosticism” of her youth, her thought remained fundamentally incomplete. As Del Noce puts it, “being unfinished is a characteristic of her thought. Not in the sense that her premature death prevented her from giving it a systematic form, but in the sense that it stops at an unresolved contradiction between ancient Gnosis and Christianity. The unfinishedness is due, in part, to the fact that she interpreted her own experience within a previous form of culture.” As a result, “her thought must not be examined as a system, but as an itinerary.”36 Her radical ­religious and political experience led her to rediscover Plato “starting from the critique of a revolutionary aspiration, which shows the vanity of the idea of a self-redemption in which absolute Good is realized in the world by the work of humanity itself.” Indeed, “rediscovering Plato while ­critiquing Marx” is, Del Noce says, “a necessity inscribed in the philosophical essences. This is because in Marx we have the beginning 33 34 35 36

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Ibid., 117. Ibid., 191. Ibid., 151. Ibid., 120, 130.

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of the philosophy of the primacy of action (in which the idea is viewed as an ­instrument to change the world) … The critique of Marxism, therefore, cannot avoid rediscovering Plato as the philosopher of the primacy of contemplation.”37 Del Noce regards Weil’s return from Marx to Plato as paradigmatic for a successful “escape” from modernity at its final stage, when it gets to deny the very question of religious transcendence. The characteristic irreligiosity of the technological society, according to his view, does not deny faith directly, but rather eliminates the religious dimension itself. Scientism regards religious and metaphysical questions as meaningless, and thus reduces religion to its vitalistic aspect: “The question, however, is what religion can become if the metaphysical mediation (i.e., the Greek moment) is eliminated … [I]f by ‘technological society’ we mean that in which the scientific type of intelligence in the modern sense is regarded as the type of intelligence, then the indirect persecution that this society wages against religion turns out to be more serious than any direct persecution: because religion is equated to a drug.”38 By contrast, Weil’s youthful anarchism developed “not into a form of irrational mysticism, but rather one based on the idea of the cosmic Order, as the principle of truth, of beauty and of morality.”39 Del Noce summarizes her position as follows: If we try to condense her teaching into a formula, I think the least inadequate may be the following: the religious dimension can be rediscovered starting from the crisis of our times if the crisis is lived with absolute moral purity. But what is the relationship between the religious dimension and faith? Father Danielou writes perfectly that religion is the question and revelation is the answer. So, Weil’s teaching would boil down to a question … This may not seem much. However, let us reflect about its exceptional importance for the present age … Until recently, one could say that faith was under threat, rather than religion … What is in question today, by contrast, is the religious dimension. Official religious thought does not have a sufficiently clear awareness of this change. In fact, there are plenty of theologians who think of adapting faith to a world that they regard as permanently desacralized and made secular by scientific and technical progress. Faith, they say, must listen to the world … But how can faith be welcomed by a world that regards the religious question as meaningless? Also in this respect, we have to say that Weil went through a process that is the exact opposite

37 Ibid., 124, 122. 38 Ibid., 146–7. 39 Ibid., 121.

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of a large part of contemporary religious thought. And what matters most is that her process is the true one.40

In this quote, “a large part of contemporary religious thought” is a transparent reference to the new forms of Catholic Modernism that accompanied the rise of the affluent society after the war. Del Noce regards Simone Weil (who was politically progressive and not even baptized) as the anti-Modernist thinker par excellence, which goes to show that his critique of religious Modernism is not “traditionalist” in nature. Rather, he faults Catholic progressivism for a serious misdiagnosis of the historical situation: like his secular counterparts, a Modernist believes that “today we live in a post-Christian age”41 and therefore “religious thought should seek to adapt to a secularized world.”42 Del Noce deems this view naive, because “although from … a quantitative standpoint irreligion has never been so widespread, from the standpoint of reason it is instead so-called secular thought that faces a crisis, not Christian thought.”43 This crisis is discussed in the last four chapters of The Age of Secularization, beginning with the essays “The Common Morality of the Nineteenth Century and the Morality of Today” and “The Present Significance of Rosminian Ethics,” in which the situation of secular Western culture is examined from the standpoint of ethics because “the consideration of today’s moral reality helps us better than anything else to highlight the crisis of secular thought.”44 How could the typical secular ethical outlook of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Europe, which was essentially Kantian, give way so quickly to the “libertine” outlook of the sexual revolution? To answer this question, Del Noce reconstructs in detail the “process that leads from the affirmation of the autonomy of morality to its dissolution” and argues that its endpoint is the triumph of what he calls sociologism. ­ Sociologism postulates that “ideologies (i.e., everything that is not subject to immediate empirical verification) are expressions of the historical-­ social situation of a group, in their theoretical as well as in their practical meaning. They are spiritual superstructures of entirely non-spiritual forces, such as class interests, unconscious collective motivations, and concrete circumstances of social life.”45 In Del Noce’s view, soci­ ologism is the philosophical foundation of the moral relativism of the 40 Ibid., 139–40. 41 Ibid., 153. 42 Ibid., 155. 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid., 156. 45 Ibid., 177.

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affluent society, and by showing that Kantian morality is defenceless in front of it, he arrives at a paradoxical “inversion” of the usual interpretation of Western secularization. Whereas most authors interpret the ­advent of the affluent society and the sexual revolution as a crisis of Christianity, he emphasizes that these phenomena represent, philosophically speaking, a crisis of the attempt by nineteenth-century European culture to preserve Christian moral values and a Christian vision of man in secular form, separated from their traditional metaphysical and religious premises. According to Del Noce, there was one great nineteenth-century philosopher who grasped the intrinsic contradiction in Kantian ethics and  predicted its sociologistic and relativistic disintegration: Antonio Rosmini. Del Noce believes that Rosmini’s “prediction of the greatest crisis of values – the one right in front of us – and the fact that at the same time he provides the elements to overcome it, not only show that Rosmini’s ethics is relevant to our time but possibly make the Principles [of Ethics] the greatest work of ethics of all time, or certainly the greatest of the modern centuries … [W]hereas Kantian morality, in its ­aspect as autonomous morality, is truly subject to the sociologistic inversion, Rosminian morality instead resists it victoriously.”46 The fact that “Rosmini’s thought took shape with the Enlightenment as its essential adversary”47 leads Del Noce to investigate one of Rosmini’s primary polemical foils, the French idéologues of the Napoleonic and post-Napoleonic era, in whom Del Noce discovers the first manifestation of the sociologistic mindset. This “birth of sociologism” within the late French Enlightenment is the subject of “At the Origins of the Concept of Ideology,” the second-to-last essay in The Age of Secularization. The very last essay, “Croce and Religious Thought,” is Del Noce’s homage to the laic thinker who after the Second World War recognized most lucidly – and most dramatically, because he could not respond to it – the impending disintegration of the old European secular morality. *** As part 2 of this volume under the heading “The Politics of Secularization,” I have included a partial translation48 of a shorter and lesser-known book by Del Noce, The Political Predicament of Catholics.49 I decided to 46 Ibid., 174, 180. 47 Ibid., 156. 48 Of two essays, I translated one almost entirely and the other in part; see the footnotes at the beginning of each piece. 49 Augusto Del Noce, Il problema politico dei cattolici (Rome: UIPC, 1967).

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combine the two books not only because they were written in the same period and on closely related topics, but also because in my view they com­plement each other. While the two “political” essays in The Political Predicament of Catholics benefit from the broader context provided by The Age of Secularization, they also work well as a conclusion to a book that otherwise – especially for non-Italian readers – would end somewhat anticlimactically. In particular, the first essay, “The Political Predicament of Catholics” – which gave the title to the 1967 book, and was originally a lecture to a political audience – provides a concise but extremely lucid summary of Del Noce’s assessment of the Western cultural and political landscape at the end of the 1960s: The true clash is between two conceptions of life. One could be described in terms of the religious dimension or the presence of the divine in us; it certainly achieves its fullness in Christian thought, or in fact in Catholic thought, though per se it is not specifically Christian in the proper sense … The other is the conception that ultimately can be called sociologistic … [T]he present historical ­moment is characterized by the fact that the radical antithesis between the two conceptions of man has reached its climax, in the sense that the instrumentalist idea has not stopped at its theoretical enunciation, but has imbued of itself eval­ uations and actions, determining an absolutely new type of morals, and has reached, at least partially, the thinking of the common man … If man does not participate at all in some form of reason or absolute value, if he does not find himself united to other men by an ideal bond, then he cannot see in nature or in other men anything but obstacles to or instruments for his own realization.50

From this diagnosis Del Noce draws a general political prescription that still seems relevant half a century later: the need to defend the religious dimension, which is the foundation of the infinite value of each human individual. He believes that “what must matter to Catholics in public life today is certainly not their own power, nor the temporal power of the Church … What matters is rather the preservation of that religious dimension connatural to the human spirit which, on the one hand, is the only ground on which the action of Grace can bear fruit and, on the other hand, is the only condition to save the world from catastrophe.”51 At first glance, the second essay, “On Catholic Progressivism,” will feel more dated to today’s readers, inasmuch as it discusses the attempt by

50 TAS , 219–20, 226. 51 Ibid., 233.

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European Catholic progressives in the 1960s to forge a cultural-political alliance with Marxism. But in fact Del Noce is also diagnosing a deeper trend which is in many ways still with us. Consider his affirmation that “the general character of progressivism is to presuppose, as the soul of Marxism, an ethical principle of universal human liberation, which supposedly uses a social science in order to realize itself, and to think that Communists, secular liberals, and Catholics can come together around this ethical principle. In this way, Marxist anthropology in its specific character is set aside, and the key to understanding the root of contemporary history is lost.”52 The broader target of this observation is the idea that progressive politics can be metaphysically neutral, and appeal to generic, universal ethical values that do not require deeper philosophical or religious commitments. To Del Noce, this claim is tantamount to saying that philosophical and religious ideas are ultimately irrelevant. As he puts it, “a super-human reality is still possible, but since it is now useless in order to explain both natural and human reality, and since social science can account for its forms of expression, it is unavoidable that the idea of God will end up disappearing without leaving a trace and without leaving problems, in the manner described by Comte, the founder of sociologism, more than by Marx.”53 In Del Noce’s view, the inevitable end result of the proclaimed metaphysical neutrality of Catholic progressivism is subordination to the implicit instrumentalism and pragmatism of the technological society. *** This book follows my previous volume of Del Nocean translations, The Crisis of Modernity (2015). The two books are complementary in the sense that they cover closely related topics over two consecutive periods of Del Noce’s life (1964–69 and after 1970). Together, they provide a fairly comprehensive view of one area of Del Noce’s activity: as a cultural critic and observer of Western culture during and after the 1960s. Of course, it would be desirable to introduce English-speaking readers to other aspects of Del Noce’s scholarship, especially his seminal studies in modern political theory (Marx, Gramsci, Gentile) and in early modern French philosophy (Descartes, Malebranche, Pascal). However, the first order of business should be to translate The Problem of Atheism, Del Noce’s first and best-known book. This is a somewhat daunting task, if for no other

52 Ibid., 259. 53 Ibid., 255.

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reason than the size of the book (almost 600 pages). Chi vivrà vedrà. For now, I would like to thank again all of the scholars and friends who supported this project. A fairly long list can be found in the translator’s introduction to The Crisis of Modernity. I also would like to thank the MQUP staff – especially Philip Cercone, who served as editor – and to acknowledge the support provided by a PSC-CUNY Award, jointly funded by the Professional Staff Congress and the City University of New York. Finally, I thank my family for their constant support. In particular, I would like to remember my grandaunts, zia Pimpi (Giuseppina Cavasola, 1915–2015) and zia Bianca (Maria Bianca Penco, 1917–2015), who passed away while this book was being written. They were both born at the dawn of the age of secularization, and lived through it with intense humanity, intelligent faith, and love of learning.

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Biographical Note

Augusto Del Noce was born in Pistoia in 1910, but grew up and studied in Turin, where he completed his degree in philosophy in 1932 with a dissertation on Malebranche. For a number of years after graduation he taught philosophy in the high schools, while actively pursuing his scholarly interests and producing a substantial number of publications on the history of both French and Italian philosophy. After the Second World War, Del Noce started a systematic study of Marx, prompted by his ex­ periences first as an anti-Fascist and later as an early sympathizer of the Communist Catholic Movement. His study of Marx developed into a more general interest in the role of atheism in the history of modern philosophy. Several years of work on this topic culminated in 1964 in the publication of his first book, The Problem of Atheism. This was followed in 1965 by Catholic Reformation and Modern Philosophy: Descartes, a work on the relationship between early modern French philosophy and the Catholic Counter-Reformation. In 1966, he obtained a permanent academic position at the University of Trieste. This was followed by a position at the Sapienza University of Rome, where he spent the rest of his career. During the 1960s, Del Noce wrote numerous essays of cultural criticism, with a particular focus on progressivism (in both its secular and Catholic forms), on the sexual revolution, and on the new technocratic and affluent society that had taken shape in the West after the war. In 1970, he collected them in the volume The Age of Secularization, which was followed in 1975 by one of his most famous and controversial works, The Suicide of the Revolution, on the thought of Antonio Gramsci and the origins of Fascism. Throughout his life Del Noce was very much a “public intellectual,” writing numerous articles in newspapers and weekly magazines. In his later years, his political interests led him to serve a term in the Italian Senate. His final book, titled Giovanni Gentile, was an in-depth study of the thought of the “philosopher of Fascism.” Del Noce died on 30 December 1989.

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Pa rt O ne

The Age of Secularization

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Preface

In 1964, I published a book on the problem of atheism,1 in which I argued that: 1 Being the endpoint of rationalism, atheism reveals the option that directs it, namely the rejection without any proof of an original fall. Rejecting the status naturae lapsae is the first step in rejecting the ­supernatural, to be followed later by the rejection of every form of transcendence understood in the vertical sense. 2 Since there is no direct proof, atheism can only present itself as the outcome of an irreversible historical process, understood as a process of secularization; and, at the same time, as the only practical ­attitude capable of truly realizing human universality. 3 We must acknowledge that atheism has indeed defeated the philos­ ophy of divine immanence. However, this victory coincides with its crisis. This is because, in order to place atheism in the history of philosophy, it is necessary to call into question and abandon the view that the process of the history of thought is a process of secularization, which is supposed to be atheism’s only theoretical proof. 4 Its practical proof has turned out to be just as weak, because atheism has achieved complete success not in the historical implementation of Marxism, but rather in the affluent society, which pushes to the extreme the dehumanization of the relationship with the other. In its historical realization, Marxism has ended up being a stage in the development of the technological and affluent society, which accepts

1 Augusto Del Noce, Il problema dell’ateismo [The problem of atheism] (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1964).

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all its negations of traditional thought but at the same time eliminates its messianic and (in its own way) religious aspect.2 Five years later, history has confirmed these theses in a remarkable way, both in the so-called secular world and in the religious world (which does not mean that they have been accepted – quite to the contrary!). Indeed, what prompted the students’ rebellion, if not the recognition that, far from eliminating it, the affluent society increases alienation to the highest degree? (I must apologize for using this worn-out word, alienation, faute de mieux.) Will this not be the case even if the rebellion burns out within the confines of a return to original Marxism – that is, precisely to the initial stage of the process that led to the type of society the protesters intend to fight – and boils down to a purely destructive movement against whatever is left that is still traditional and free (two words that must be joined together)? Truly secularism has never been in a worse position, in the sense of being incapable of generating new ideals. When it tries, it can only anoint contradictorily as “new value” what by nature is unaxiological (what cannot be the foundation of values directly, even though it takes value through mediation): namely, science in its connection with technology, and primitiveness or vitality. It can only re-propose two utopias, which ran through the whole modern age after being already present at its beginning. But in the past they could bear a semblance of validity because they were associated with other values. Today, on the contrary, they manifest themselves in a pure state, and the result is the peculiar combination of the greatest perfection of means with the greatest confusion about goals, which Einstein already regarded as the defining characteristic of our age many years ago.3 But the strangest phenomenon is that secularism’s defeat is concealed by the intervention of a peculiar ally: the thought of the theologians of the “adult world.” About these theologians, let me mention briefly that what I said has been eerily verified. Already then, people in progressive religious circles were talking about adapting to mankind that has “come

2 Regarding the precise sense in which one can speak of religion in reference to Marxism, see Il problema dell’ateismo, starting on cxx. 3 [TN] Albert Einstein stated that “perfection of means and confusion of goals seems – in my opinion – to characterize our age” in his speech “The Common Language of Science,” a broadcast recording for the Science Conference in London on 28 September 1941. Originally published in The Advancement of Science 2, no. 5 (1942): 109–10, later republished in The Theory of Relativity and Other Essays (Seacaucus, NJ: Carol Publishing Group, 1996), 67.

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Preface 5

of age.” And already then, even if the supernatural was not explicitly denied, the idea of original sin was accompanied by the word “myth,” or viewed as a mystery on which we should not insist; in short, as a dogma destined to be forgotten, by preterition. Today, very consistently, we have transitioned to “theology without God.” Disguised by the ambiguous formula that God “is not, but will be,” atheism is the “result” of the new theological trend. Indeed, the new theologians did not plan, initially, to ban either the supernatural or vertical transcendence. But they had to get there by necessity, having accepted the myth of the “adult man” and having erased the “old” idea of the initial fall. This process is founded on the idea of a religious “sublation”4 of modern thought; or, more precisely, the line of modern thought that has atheism as its rigorous conclusion. This idea is already absurd as a program, because this line of modern thought is precisely the one that intended to “sublate” Christianity. By going down this road, religious thought can only absorb the ideas that used to be the secularized version of itself and, ultimately, its own negation. We know the weak sophistry on which this whole attempt is based. Supposedly, biblical metaphysics has been accompanied over the centuries by a form of thought which is its exact opposite, namely Gnostic metaphysics. Today’s historical moment is characterized by the task of dissociating biblical thought and Gnostic thought for good. Now, one must distinguish between ancient and new gnosis; in fact, the whole attempt by the theologians of secularization is based on their arbitrary unification. According to H.W. Bartsch’s precise definition, “ancient Gnosis is characterized by a radical dualism which, for the first time, is not internal to the world, but rejects the world in its entirety, both the Greek Cosmos with its gods and the Eastern world with its planets, placing them on the side of evil and separating them from the one, good, distant God. This world view is expressed in several mythologies, all of which are recognizably gnostic because of this break that separates the world from God.”5 In short, ancient gnosis is the ultimate expression of 4 [TN] Inveramento in Italian, corresponding to the verb inverare, “to make true” in the sense of fulfilling the truth-potential of a doctrine, in a new theory that simultaneously surpasses the old and preserves its elements of truth. Inverare/inveramento are akin to the Hegelian terms aufheben/aufhebung, which have traditionally been translated into English as sublate/sublation. I will use this terminology, even if it is obscure and seldom used, because it is useful to have a specific term for inveramento, which plays an important role in Del Noce’s thought. 5 In the essay “Gnostisches Gut und Gemeindetradition bei Ignatius von Antiochen” [Gnostic good and community tradition in Ignatius of Antioch] in Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie, second series, t. 44 (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1940), 6. In my work on

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the pessimism of ancient thought. Even though it is at odds with Christianity because of the idea of a form of knowledge higher than the cognitio fidei, it nevertheless constitutes – because of its pessimistic content, and because of its God-world dualism – the question to which Christianity can be the answer. One can speak of a gnosis after Christianity in the sense of a quest to sublate it rationally; however, content-wise it will be qualitatively different from ancient gnosis. Because it is post-Christian, the new gnosis must attribute to man the power to create. Therefore, the very idea of meta-Christianity, as the edification through human power of a “third kingdom” coming after Christianity, was destined to lead to radical anti-Christianity, which indeed manifests itself in its final stage; to lead to a position that does not preserve Christianity by “sublating” it but simply denies it, in its dogmas as well as in its morality. This is a consequence of the idea of self-redemption as a substitute for redemption by God, which implies a complete inversion of the religious notion of sin: the creation of the idea of God is the sin from which man must free himself. It has been remarked6 perfectly that the idea of the “superman” belongs already to Feuerbach and Marx: God is the product of a projection by the human spirit, and man will find his essence again by taking back what he “alienated” from himself. “Kingdom of God,” “super-­ humanity,” “classless society” are destined to become (or have already become) equivalent formulas for the new theologians. But what is most striking about the theoreticians of demythologization is not the weakness of their arguments, but their imperviousness to all objections. What is it based on? On their certainty about the strength of modern thought? But today it faces its greatest crisis. On the conviction that the traditional ideals – which depend on the line of classical metaphysics, from St Augustine to St Thomas to Rosmini – are now surpassed and gone forever? But the notion that they are surpassed is actually part and parcel of the rationalist direction of modern philosophy, and is tied to the way in which the age of secularization defines itself. Thus, for a Simone Weil I had a chance to point out that modern pessimism rediscovers the themes of the ancient gnosis during its developmental process, which moves in a direction of progressive reconciliation with religious thought. 6 By Eric Voegelin, in his essay “Apocalisse e rivoluzione” [Apocalypse and revolution] in the collection of lectures of the Unione Italiana per il Progresso della Cultura, 1867– 1967 un secolo di Marxismo [1867–1967 a century of Marxism] (Florence: Vallecchi, 1967). Regarding the new Gnosticism’s relationship with the idea of modernity, and thus with the myth of the ‘adult man,’ see also Voegelin’s La nuova scienza politica (Turin: Borla, 1968) [TN: published in English as The New Science of Politics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1952)].

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Preface 7

large part of today’s religious thought, the quest for aggiornamento simply means surrendering to the adversary. At bottom – and this is a theme that I have touched on in these pages, but which deserves much further development – there is the conviction that the period of the two world wars marked the irreversible end of a tradition of thought which is often called “Eurocentric,” even though in fact the forms of thought according to which people would like to rethink Christian revelation are entirely of European origin. Supposedly, the outdated and nostalgic supporters of traditional thought are “enemies of progress” and all of their theses contain, even if unwittingly, the threat of “Fascism.” Against this view of history I have tried to show that Fascism and Nazism are stages of the age of secularization, just like Communism and the affluent society. One cannot try and Christianize the age of secularization, sorting out its progressive aspects. From the standpoint of religious thought, this age can only be criticized as a whole. Certainly this critique cannot consist in opposing to this age the dream of going back to some determined historical time (this is the small grain of truth in the new trends in religious thought, against a certain type of reactionary Catholicism which, at any rate, has very few prominent advocates today). In a sense, it is true that this critique must lead to new positions, but new in the sense of being explications of virtualities of the tradition. *** The essays collected in this volume were written on various occasions and in various circumstances. I am republishing them unchanged, without any correction or addition, because I have had no time for further elaborations. I hope that they may serve to stimulate reflection as they are, in their unfinished state and with their programmatic character. In fact, they are tied together by a common thread. Examining the intrinsic contradiction of the students’ rebellion led me to consider the judgment about history that underpins it, and to show why it must be regarded as incorrect. Then, one cannot but encounter the work of Simone Weil, in which the characteristics of today’s world are understood better than anywhere else and the road to the rediscovery of tradition is also indicated. Continuing her unfinished work, and considering current developments (the unfolding, in the technological society and in the sociologistic culture that underpins it, of the thought of the Ideologists and of Saint-Simon), leads us, in my opinion, to rediscover that Rosmini’s thought is extremely relevant today. In the last essay, on “Croce and

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Religious Thought,” I have tried to illuminate a strange paradox: the work of the philosopher of absolute historicism proves the impossibility of a religious restoration in terms of immanence of the divine, and by the very nature of its contradiction seems to point to the different way in which such reaffirmation is conceivable today.

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The Student Protests and Values

The current crisis of trust in permanent values brings to mind the one  that took place at the beginning of the eighteenth century. That period, too, came after religious wars and the discovery of non-­ Mediterranean civilizations, and then also the common tradition of Greek and Christian thought was called into question along with the absolute status of values. At that time, however, the affirmation that values are historically relative seemed a challenge to common sense. Today, on the contrary, the common mentality is completely permeated by the idea that what traditionally were regarded as permanent values always reflect certain given situations, and have arisen out of specific social situations. Moreover, the people who at that time called themselves the deniaisés, those who were no longer naive because of a broader experience of reality, drew their intellectual inspiration from ancient philosophy, in the aspects that seemed incompatible with Christianity. Today, on the contrary, the common perception is that we are living in a new epoch, separated from the past by the sharp break of the two world wars. The idea that everything repeats itself has been replaced by extreme chronological acceleration, by adaptation to a present that is no longer the fulfillment of the past but rather its negation. Moreover, in the eighteenth century the critique of all forms of authority led people to seek the authority of values within conscience. Today, conscience itself is called into question. What Ricoeur calls the

This chapter originated as a presentation at the international conference on I valori permanenti nel divenire storico [Permanent values in the development of history], Rome, 3–6 October 1968. Published in Ethica 2 (1969): 107–19.

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school of suspicion1 – the decision to regard conscience in its entirety as fraudulent – has established itself with Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud as its teachers. By now, words such as demystification, demythologization, and the like are part of elementary culture. How did this change in perception come about? An extremely simple answer says that the sentiment of living in a new epoch, such that man can be said to be an “outdated reality,” should be explained as a byproduct of technical progress or the development of the human sciences. Now, I do not think that this is the case: I believe instead that this change stems from a historical judgment about the period of the two world wars and especially about the twenty years between them. Today the following idea has become common: whoever spoke (or speaks) in any sense, openly or covertly, of permanent values and absolute truths actually concealed (or conceals) behind these statements a fear of historical transcendence, even more than a defence of particular interests; fear of that moving-beyond-within-the-world that makes every position reached by man seem provisional. Nor could the various forms of Fascism have succeeded as political phenomena without this false consciousness, which in itself is a trans-political phenomenon. Not that this philosophical conservatism meant direct consensus, at least not in general; but with these advocates of tradition, the opposition to what in the 1930s was called Fascist vitalism or irrationalism had to remain confined to a purely moral dimension. Starting from this assessment, people moved easily to the idea that those permanent values no longer provide effective guidance for action. And because this attitude of attachment to the past is generically called Romanticism, it became habitual to oppose a form of historicism inspired by the Enlightenment to the traditionalist historicism of the romantic type, or even to regard liberation from Romanticism as the question that had to be faced in the realm of ideas after the war. When did this school of suspicion begin? It would be all too easy to demonstrate that its beginning coincided with the rediscovery of philosophical Marxism, which first took place in Germany around 1920, was then picked up without any direct influence in France in the 1930s, and finally exploded after 1945 (just think of the French Marxist authors around 1930, like Politzer, Gutermann, Lefebvre, or Nizan2). Unlike 1 [TN] Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: an Essay on Interpretation, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977), 32. 2 [TN] Georges Politzer (1903–1942), Norbert Gutermann (1900–1984), Henri Lefebvre (1901–1991), and Paul Nizan (1905–1940) were all French Marxist philosophers and scholars.

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what had happened at the end of the nineteenth century, Marxism was rediscovered starting precisely from this idea of denouncing “false consciousness.” In connection with this form of rediscovery, it is no wonder that Freud has recently been elevated from inventor of a therapeutic technique to great philosopher. In fact, consider the difference from the assessment of the philosophical significance of Freud’s work that was formulated in 1936 by Roland Dalbiez, in the most important work of a philosophical nature written about him up to that time.3 According to Dalbiez, the work of Freud is the exploration of what in man is not human. The fact that today all writings on Freud move in the opposite direction, of looking in his works for a method to understand man, can only be explained in terms of the theory of false consciousness, whose rediscovery’s origins I mentioned. The view that I would now like to propose is the exact opposite, namely, that since 1945 the ideas opposed to that of permanent values have self-destructed: the idea of revolution, the idea of progress – two ideas that today have completely dissociated – and finally the very idea of modernity as a value. This means that today the conditions are ripe to rediscover in its true sense the idea that values are permanent and absolute. To some extent, these last few years (and in fact I would like to say the protests of this year 1968, which has been the richest in implicit philosophy since 1945) have provided the historical occasion to overturn the idols. Suspicion has now turned precisely against the generally accepted idea that the task of contemporary thought is the liberation from the repressive taboos that hamper the free expression of human activity. Let us consider briefly the idea of revolution, understood in the strong sense, as the resolution of the mystery of history through a unique event, which will supposedly mediate the transition from the reign of necessity (i.e., of man’s dependence on things and particularly on the things he has produced, from reification, from alienation) to the reign of freedom. Liberation is viewed as man’s self-redemption. In this endeavor religion will be replaced by politics, but a politics that has absorbed religion within itself. This is why in Marxism, morality, religion, metaphysics, all other ideological aspects, and their corresponding forms of awareness no longer maintain their apparent independence. The history of the revolutionary idea in this precise sense has been reconstructed many times: its trajectory from Rousseau to Marx, its ties with millennialism and the pre-Christian nature of that millennialism (which is tied to a 3 [TN] Roland Dalbiez (1893–1976), French philosopher. Del Noce is referring to La méthode psychanalytique et la doctrine Freudienne [The psychoanalytic method and Freudian doctrine] (2 vols.) (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1936).

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form of Hebrew Messianism which has lost meaning after the coming of the Messiah), its constant convergence with heretical thought, and the process of secularization to which it is vulnerable. Now, the point that deserves to be emphasized is the following: Marxist revolutionary thought – which claimed to be the fulfillment of the unfinished French revolution, inasmuch as this latter had been the triumph of the bourgeoisie – effectively ended up being the occasion for the fulfillment of the bourgeois spirit in the so-called technological society. I use this expression here to indicate a society characterized not by increasing scientific and technical activity, but rather by the concept of instrumental reason, that is, by the interpretation of all of human activity in terms of technical activity. Here, it is important to recall briefly the opposition between revolutionary thought and the technological society, the necessary process by which the former must necessarily lead to the success of the latter, the break that takes place between the idea of revolution and the idea of progress, the contradictions of the technological society, and  the impossibility for revolutionary thought to overcome them, at least in the form in which it was defined earlier. At the same time, we must recognize the moral validity of the criticisms that revolutionary thought formulates against certain necessary aspects of the technological society. This opposition is highlighted well in Reason and Revolution 4 – which remains Marcuse’s most important work – in terms of negative or dialectic thought versus positive thought. Essentially, the opposition is between Marx and Comte. Marcuse’s diagnosis is largely correct, but must be interpreted as a sign not of a revival of revolutionary thought but of the impossibility of this revival. Indeed, how shall we define the technological society, if we do not mean a society in which the full exploitation of natural resources has made it possible to eliminate completely the distinction between free men and slaves, creating a world in which the work of machines allows men to carry out only specifically human activities? And if we mean instead a society characterized, so to speak, by the totalitarianism of technical activity, so that all human activity is interpreted as finalized to transformation and possession? I would like to propose the following definition: it is a society that accepts all of Marxism’s negations against contemplative thought, religion, and metaphysics; that accepts, therefore, the Marxist reduction of ideas to instruments of production; that, on the other hand, rejects the revolutionary-messianic aspects of Marxism, and thus what is still religious in the revolutionary idea. In this

4 [TN] Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution (New York: Humanities Press, 1968).

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regard, it truly represents the bourgeois spirit in its pure state, the bourgeois spirit triumphant over its two traditional adversaries, transcendent religion and revolutionary thought. We could perhaps go as far as to say – supporting this claim with texts from the Manifesto – that by a peculiar heterogenesis of ends Marxism led the bourgeois spirit to manifest itself in its pure state, but having achieved this is helpless to fight it. The technological society marks the surrender of Marxism to the inventors of the rational organization of industrial society, Saint-Simon and Comte, referring again to their aspect as representatives of the esprit polytechnique, apart from the bizarre religion that they wished to associate with it. I think this definition is easily acceptable, because it reflects judgments that may well be considered problematic, but that nevertheless are well established in today’s public discourse. Do we not keep hearing that Marxism, as historical materialism, must recognize that positions of thought change as forms of production change? And that today the transformation due to the advent of the technological age forces us to regard revolutionary Marxism as a position from the past, which may have been true “then” but is no longer true “now” because reality has changed? Or else, we hear another equivalent judgment: revolutionary Marxism can still exist in under-developed regions, but when development has taken place it must renew itself in order to keep its scientific character, or else it dissolves into romantic anarchism. We could go on and on listing judgments of this sort. What matters is to observe that the society of well-being, by showing that it is able to eliminate poverty, or at least that it is going to be able to do so, deprived Marxism of the revolutionary drive associated with class dialectics. It is completely evident that the so-called technological society (or society of well-being, or affluent society) has developed as a post-Marxist society, but at the same time as a completely secularized society. After the war, bourgeois society had to fend off two adversaries: one was Communism, but the danger of a religious reawakening was no less fearsome. We must grant that the invention of the technological society proved to be up to the task of solving the problem, by pushing back both Communism in the name of democracy and religious thought in the name of modernity, and by building a secular unity of liberalism and socialism in the name of the Enlightenment, and another parallel unity in the form of religious Modernism. In this way it has been able to build a society that holds together by balancing contradictions. Undoubtedly, this society’s feeling of being new corresponds to something real. Not only does it call itself new, it is new. However, novelty can mean both fulfillment and uprooting. We could say that it reflects the ambiguity of the word Hegel used so much: aufheben, to sublate, which

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can mean to preserve as well as to abolish. Hence the mixed state of mind of today’s youth, in which it’s hard to say what prevails, the pride of novelty or the fear of being uprooted, and in which destructive activism seems to express the angst of those who feel uprooted. We must observe that this society survives only by tacitly exploiting reserves of the same permanent values on whose negation it has built itself. Let us consider, for example, the current ideas about the purifying function of science for political, moral, and religious problems. Let us restrict ourselves to moral problems. We are told, for example, that human sciences enable us to understand those whom we usually regard as criminals because they broke some law. Since their deviant behavior was due to a very large extent to certain psychological-moral conditions, human sciences allow us to feel that we share in the responsibility for their crimes, and at the same time put us in the best position to help them. The opposition between the judge who represents only justice and the convicted man who personifies only guilt comes to an end. Now, this reasoning is certainly correct, but it presupposes that the permanent values that we intend to negate do exist, and that science is put at their service. When we speak of the moral significance that science can take, we always presuppose that in man there is an ideal principle that makes him an end in himself. If, conversely, we thought that every trace of permanent values had been abolished, if we thought that man had been reduced to the purely scientific and technical dimension, there is no reason why what Adorno said many years ago about de Sade’s Juliette should not apply: that she incarnates exactly the type who believes only in science; actually, that “she operates with semantics and logical syntax like the most up-to-date positivism.”5 Therefore, in the affluent society there is a glaring contradiction between the humanitarianism that is professed in theory and the de-humanizing spirit that is implemented in practice to the extent that the reserves of traditional values diminish – and they must necessarily diminish. Another contradiction is found in the stark contrast between apparent tolerance and effective totalitarianism, because a society organized along these lines can no longer admit the autonomy of cultural, religious, and political superstructures. In such a society, culture is by definition an object of consumption or, when

5 [TN] Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (New York: Continuum, 2001), 96.

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it is scientifically pursued and appreciated, another instrument for a further increase in efficiency and production.6 Thus, it seems that the positive aspect of the technological society cannot be saved without appealing to permanent values. Curiously, this is partially confirmed by the protest movements themselves. Consider: what is usually called the student’s rebellion is the critique of the technological society in the name of revolutionary thought. Now I  would like to show: 1) that the only possibility of reaffirming revolutionary thought after the technological society is actually expressed by Marcuse’s program; 2) that, on the other hand, such reaffirmation concludes in the disintegration of revolutionary thought itself; 3) that in the course of this disintegration the question of permanent values re-­emerges explicitly. A Catholic critic has correctly remarked that in Marcuse’s thought what is good is not new, and what is new is not good.7 I agree. Yet it is a fact that when Marcuse develops his criticism of the one-dimensional society, he is curiously forced to reason in terms of classical metaphysics. Indeed, from a Marxist standpoint his final criticism of the affluent society – that it is forced to undermine the private sphere of every individual, even inside the domestic walls8 – is nothing short of amazing. But what matters most is that he develops his critique of the new positivism exactly like a high-quality scholar of classical metaphysics. For example, what he says about how the reality of the universals should be interpreted, about the connection between universality and value, about re-evaluating abstract concepts, has the flavor of a rediscovery of the true meaning of the theses that underpin the idea of permanent values.9 It also raises the question of why this was bound to happen even though, of course, there is no reason to think that he relied explicitly on classical metaphysics because, in fact, when he becomes aware of these coincidences he hastens to warn the reader that his statements do not imply in any way a reminiscence of “spiritual values” or similar things, and to define his ideal of an essentially new human reality as an “existence in free time on the basis of fulfilled vital needs.”10

  6 [TN] This sentence is a quotation without attribution from an article by Umberto Segre, “Confluenza delle sinistre: sofistica e dialettica” [Convergence on the left: sophistics and dialectics] in Ideologie 1, no. 1 (1967): 29. Del Noce cites it again (with attribution) in the next essay, “Notes for a Philosophy of Young People.”   7 [TN] No reference provided in the original.   8 [TN] Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), 245.  9 [TN] Ibid., 207ff. 10 Ibid., 231.

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In fact, it is easy to spot the ultimate contradiction which is manifested by the partial contradictions of his thought. For him, there is one point that is left undisputed from the very beginning, in Reason and Revolution: that Hegel-Marxism should be interpreted as a critique of everything that was hitherto held to be objective truth,11 and at the same time as the philosophy that has subsumed the truth of all previous philosophies, and with it all the experience mankind has accumulated during its long trek towards the truth.12 And that, on the other hand, the only reason why Hegel did not come to Marx’s conclusions was that the situation of the time forced him to resignation. Therefore, because of the connection between reason and revolution, Marcuse’s thought cannot stop at a mere critique of present reality as abnormal, also because in that case he would be forced to start a process of rediscovery of a transcendent normative reality, that is, of the very idea of the Logos that he presents instead as the beginning of repressive thought.13 He cannot go back to original Marxism either, because the situation of the technological society has produced a form of mutual dependence which “is no longer the dialectical relationship between Master and Servant, which has been broken in the struggle for mutual recognition, but rather a vicious circle which encloses both the Master and the Servant.”14 Given also that civilization performs this repressive and alienating function in its productive process, it follows that the revolution cannot start from within industrial society. This is why he is forced to take an ahistorical position: since the revolution leading to freedom cannot be expected to come out of the process of history, inasmuch as this process is the history of repressive reason, the transition to freedom will only be achieved by eliminating the repression of instincts. It is here that a peculiar contamination of Marxist and Freudian themes takes place – a particular form of Freudianism, since the real Freud had maintained that repression is necessary to civilization. But then liberation can only be carried out by unleashing primitive and somewhat barbaric powers (because they are extraneous to civilization). In Marcuse, a liberation that was supposed to come from within, because of class dialectics, is replaced by a liberation coming from without. Supposedly, only these primigenial powers are

11 [TN] Del Noce is echoing a sentence by Moses Hess about Hegel, quoted by Marcuse in Reason and Revolution, 325, where a detailed bibliographic reference is also found. 12 Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, 97 [TN: Marcuse’s original text says “long trek to freedom”]. 13 [TN] See Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization (New York: Vintage Books, 1962), 99–100. 14 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 33.

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c­ apable of abolishing the modes of productive repression. Yet if all of civilization has been founded on this productive repression, its abolition would just bring back the primitiveness of underdevelopment. It is certainly not a stretch to conclude that this road can lead only to one of the forms of irrationalist collapse of the revolutionary idea. What would be important to show is that irrationalist collapse is somehow inscribed in the idea of the revolution, as its destiny. Therefore, the socalled “global” rebellion becomes an absurd revolt against what exists. It becomes a form of ahistorical activism that cannot distinguish what is positive and what is negative in the existing reality. It faces the following fork in the road: it can either seek a way to escape reality, becoming practically indistinguishable from the beat and hippie movements, or it can enter into an alliance with pre-existing forces in the system it fights against, possibly claiming the role of avant-garde and stimulus, but actually serving as a tool. Thus, the exhaustion of both Marxist revolutionary thought and the ideology of progress – from Turgot and Condorcet to Saint-Simon and Comte, to the new positivism and scientism – and at the same time the necessary rediscovery, in the course of the critique of today’s society, of themes that are essential to the system of permanent values, ought to lead to a view of contemporary history with respect to which the usual categories of traditionalist and progressive turn out to be completely inadequate. I want to dwell on this remark for a moment, because the first consequence of the rejection of permanent values has been the replacement of the dyad “true-false” with the dyad “progress-reaction.” The discussion could head in various directions: one could show that today scholars of contemporary history tend to recognize that using the usual and worn-out categories of “reaction,” “tradition,” and “conservation” is a hindrance that often makes understanding impossible. But, above all we must observe – and here I am glad to recall Eric Voegelin’s ideas – that the crisis of the ideas of revolution and progress is tied to the crisis of the greatest idol that opposes the reaffirmation of permanent values: the idea of modernity taken as a value. Because, observe the following: it is precisely because of this idea of modernity that the unity of Greek thought and Christian thought is rejected in various ways, all of which, however, agree de facto in replacing the transcendence and normativity of absolute values with the intra-worldly process of transcendence. Voegelin has shown with exemplary effectiveness15 that the idea of modernity has a neo-Gnostic character, predicated on

15 [TN] See, for example, Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1952).

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the secularization of the Joachimite view of history which gradually replaced the opposite Augustinian view. During the last few centuries this view has become so completely dominant that it has imbued religious thought itself, either directly as Modernism or in reverse as reactionary thought. He highlighted that the substance of this immanentization of the Christian eschaton is based on a practical option. May we at least wonder whether today this option is manifesting its non-rational character, at a moment that seems to be the consummation of such a long historical process? We can wonder, in short, whether in fact the unveiling of a false consciousness may not apply precisely to the forms of thought that intend to deny the idea of permanent values, inasmuch as it would show their ideological nature, the fact that they are not oriented towards the truth but towards power. The present moment is when the affirmations predicated on the idea of modernity have become realized in practice, but leading to a sequence of glaring contradictions. Despite the fact that the common opinion thinks otherwise, we must recognize that what is in crisis today is not the idea that values are permanent, but exactly the opposite principle, the one that underlies the critique of permanence. And it is in crisis not because of anti-historic or moralistic forms of resistance, but precisely because it has been refuted by the historical outcome that it had entrusted with the task of its own verification.

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Notes for a Philosophy of Young People

The students’ “revolution” has caught both intellectuals and politicians by surprise. It was a sudden and unexpected “revelation” of the sentiments of young people. We must have the courage to say that we found ourselves facing the moral outcome of the last twenty years and we did not expect it to be like this, neither in the good aspects nor in the bad. The response has been amazement more than evaluations, either positive or negative. Therefore, the question of the demands coming from the universities cannot be separated from a much broader question, nor did the students separate it. The youth rejects the moral results of the last twenty years and despises the intellectuals of the now mature generation, even more so when they try to seem young and up to date. This means: what we young people feel, the uneasiness we want to overcome, is not answered even by the most advanced models that the generation of intellectuals that was formed around 1940 would like to propose to us. The reason is that we face a new moral situation, which they did not predict and now cannot understand. Even the most extremist among them belong to the system we protest against. I am speaking of a generational conflict; some will object that the ­concept of generation is ill-defined and ambiguous. I certainly know that, but I think it must be used in this case as a best approximation, even without fully analyzing it. Indeed, consider recent Italian history: the generation that was young between 1943 and 1945 “protested” against what had been done by those who had been young between 1919 and 1922. Today, the work of those protesters is protested against by the

This chapter was originally published in Vita e Pensiero 5 (1968): 399–413.

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young people of 1967–68. The timing could not be more precise, twentyfour years: since 1919 in Italy every generation “protests against the system.” This mathematical regularity would have made Giuseppe Ferrari1 happy. Definitely, I have no inclination to endorse the ideological exaltation of youth,2 as we shall see. Nonetheless, the dissatisfaction of the young with respect to the old is a fact that needs to be explained. And despite the negative aspects it may have, and the harmful manifestations it may have produced, it may also have some good aspects. This analysis that avoids generalized condemnation as well as attempts at indiscriminate justification is made necessary by a situation that turned out to be more fraught with dangers than “experienced” people could imagine (because, no matter how mature and thoughtful they may have become, they still imagine youthful rebellion in the form it took at the time of their own youth). This situation, however, can also give rise to a glimmer of hope. 1. The Protest It is a revolt against the society of well-being,3 or technological or technocratic or affluent society, depending on one’s chosen definition. But it must be understood that by society of well-being we mean a society that makes well-being its end. This specification is necessary because very often it is viewed as a society that seeks to spread well-being as much as possible among the poor and the underdeveloped, motivated by the moral and religious awareness of the unity of mankind, or even simply by the goal of defusing revolutionary tensions (these two goals can well agree). Thus understood, who could disapprove of it? The only end of the society of well-being would be to achieve the final elimination of slavery. Therefore, traditional moral values would demand it, even if, in their new implementation, they would face different hurdles from those of the past. In truth, we must distinguish these two meanings clearly, because today’s society, even if it is far from having completely won, is a society of well-being in the first sense. This warning is not superfluous at all, because the failure to make this distinction is the reason why most Catholic 1 Giuseppe Ferrari (1811–1876), Italian philosopher and politician who believed that, after the French Revolution, mankind finally entered “the age of the revolution,” marked by social equality and the primacy of science. 2 [TN] Giovanilismo in the original, from giovane (young). I am not aware of any analogous English word. 3 [TN] Benessere in the original, meaning material or psycho-physical well-being.

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intellectuals have hardly been aware of the novelty of the situation, and have failed to explain adequately the constant decay of the moral and religious values sanctioned by tradition, even though it is right in front of their eyes according to the most elementary experience. The protests are directed against the postwar “Western” system in its “globality,” in the form it took as an alternative to Communism. Yet the alternative is such that Russian revisionism itself tends to join it as one of the hegemonic poles. To be brief: leftist intellectuals generally hailed Russia’s new direction as a process of democratization. In this way they renewed the judgment of those (among us Salvemini,4 first of all) who in 1917 had hailed Kerensky’s action as an attempt to bring Russia into the sphere of influence of the democratic powers, thus endorsing the ideological interpretation of the First World War as a struggle of democracies against authoritarian powers. At that time history made a mockery of this judgment. Today, young people mock an exactly symmetric judgment. But let us move on to the moral characteristics of the affluent society, understood in the first sense. To simplify the discussion, I will start from some perfect remarks by Felice Balbo: when society’s goal is no longer the ‘good life’ but ‘well-being,’ that is, the greatest possible satisfaction of tastes and appetites – it does not matter whether ­elementary and necessary or refined and alternative – philosophy becomes effectively superfluous … When the habitual words that philosophers use to discuss their work and to assess philosophies are no longer primarily ‘true’ and ‘false’ but ‘important’ and ‘insignificant,’ ‘original’ and ‘banal,’ ‘heretic’ and ‘dogmatic,’ ‘sincere’ and ‘rhetoric,’ ‘progressive’ and ‘reactionary,’ and so on, we can say that trust in philosophizing as such, and not just in this or that philosophy, has been shaken to its roots.5

If we read this carefully we find three essential truths: (1) when wellbeing becomes the goal of society, philosophy as such must be abolished. What is left is science, and philosophy will, at most, study its methodology. As a result, all the worst sediments from the late nineteenth century take a new life: the myth of Science and that of Evolution. Indeed science 4 [TN] Gaetano Salvemini (1873–1957), Italian historian and anti-Fascist politician. 5 Felice Balbo, Opere [Works] (Turin: Boringhieri, 1963), 366 and 364 [TN: my translation. Balbo (1914–1964) was an Italian writer and philosopher. As one of the best thinkers of the so-called “Christian left,” and a protagonist of important intellectual debates in the 1950s (involving, among others, Del Noce, Franco Rodano, and Norberto Bobbio), he had a significant influence on Italian culture after the Second World War].

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or, to put it better, modern science can study man only as an animal, of a higher species and degree. This is its limitation, not its fault, but when philosophy abdicates in favor of science and becomes its servant the qualitative difference between man and animal is lost. The elevation of science to absolute model of knowledge makes interiority disappear (today’s loss of modesty is simply the visible manifestation of this fact; what room is left for modesty if science objectivizes everything?) and absolute scientism must also imply the absolute end of religions (the theology of the “death of God” and so forth). Such reduction of man to an animal6 is the reason why people think that all aggressive instincts will vanish as soon as man’s material needs are abundantly satisfied: the typical utopia of the society of well-being. (2) It has often been pointed out how widespread insincerity is nowadays, especially among intellectuals. However, the link between this phenomenon and the development of the society of well-being has not been sufficiently highlighted. As a matter of fact, when a society stops judging in terms of true and false it cannot but grant the right to mendacity, to insincerity, which will be regarded as licit whenever they produce a positive outcome. This judgment is, in fact, a variation on Nietzsche’s famous sentence about the history of morality as the history of the justification of successful crimes.7 (3) The society of well-being cannot be opposed from a reactionary position, simply because the opposition between progressive and reactionary is internal to its language. A reactionary is somebody who opposes the progressive, being convinced, deep down, that he has already lost. A real critique of the affluent society means going beyond the opposition between progressive and reactionary. 6 This statement must be taken literally. Max Scheler, in definitive texts, illustrated the traditional thesis that there is a qualitative distinction between man and animal, showing that it is not at all the result of empirical observation but rather a consequence of the idea of God and of the doctrine that shows His image in man. Therefore, the primary thesis, or initial presupposition, of evolutionist, positivist, pragmatist thought is the abolition of the qualitative nature of this difference, to replace it with a mere difference of degree: man is an animal that uses signs (language) and so on (L’homme et l’histoire (Paris: Dupuy, 1955), 29ff). [TN: Max Scheler, “Man and History,” in Philosophical Perspectives, trans. Oscar A Haac (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958), 65–93]. This point is extremely important in order to understand the contemporary world. Since the society of well-being is characterized by the goal of preserving and incrementing man’s animal aspect, it is essentially linked with positivist and evolutionist culture. Being irreligious by essence, it can tolerate religion only to the extent that this latter tries to conform to these conceptions through various compromises. Otherwise it fights it and slowly extinguishes it, even without having to resort to direct persecutions. 7 [TN] Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 59.

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I must add two more remarks about the relationship between Marxism and the society of well-being and about the fact that this latter is new and anti-traditional. The implicit philosophy in the society of well-being is the radical development of one aspect of Marxism, the one that makes it a form of “absolute relativism” (as a consequence of historical materialism). This development is so rigorous that in the end it eliminates Marxism’s other aspect, that of being a form of dialectical thought and a revolutionary doctrine. In short, it marks the victory of positivism and sociologism over Marxism; the victory of a form of positivism that has shed the romantic aspects that characterized its nineteenth-century versions. But in this way it has reached a form of impiety greater than Marxism. Because Marxism, even if it is rigorously atheistic and denies every revelation and every supernatural reality, in its Communist version is actually a religion, in which the Future replaces the Eternal and the Totality replaces the Absolute and the City of God. On the contrary, the society of well-being is the only one in world history that does not originate from a religion, but arises essentially against a religion, even though, paradoxically, this religion is Marxism (but afterward the criticism extends to every other form of religion). Not by chance, the position of its intellectuals can be summarized in the following two affirmations: accepting the death of God and criticizing Marxism because it is still religious in its own way. Its anti-traditionalism is a consequence of this novelty. Its historical perspective is, essentially, the following: in history there has been a permanent break coinciding with the Second World War; what was defeated was not just Fascism and Nazism, but the whole old European tradition; and Fascism and Nazism must be interpreted as phenomena caused by fear of historical progress or, as people say today, of transcendence, where this word is used in an intra-worldly sense. As a consequence of this judgment, those who draw inspiration from tradition are always “reactionaries” or “Fascists” (two terms that are stupidly equated), whether they know it or not. On top of that, the society of well-being is intrinsically totalitarian in the sense that, within it, culture is entirely subordinate to politics. I quote a very remarkable recent piece by Umberto Segre: under these terms, however, the pact between the state and the great corporations makes efficiency and growing productivity the only criterion, to which everything must be sacrificed. Galbraith is honest enough to say8 ‘that technology is always good; that economic growth is always good; that firms must always

  8 [TN] John K. Galbraith, “Liberty, Happiness … and the Economy.” The Atlantic 219, no. 6 (June 1967): 61–7.

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e­ xpand; that consumption of goods is the principal source of happiness; … and that nothing should interfere with the priority we accord to technology, growth, and increased consumption.’ A society organized along these lines no longer grants any autonomy to cultural, religious, and political superstructures … Culture is by definition an object of consumption or, when it is scientifically pursued and appreciated, another instrument to further increase efficiency and production.9

Someone will point out that this society respects the formalities of democracy. However, this is quite a weak argument, because every form of power respects these formalities when it possesses truly effective tools to exercise control and effective oppression. It may seem that in this way I have drifted away from the topic of the student protests. On the contrary, I think I have traced my way back to what is minimally necessary in order to understand them. Two consequences are already clear from what I said: (1) the students’ restlessness and impatience, their mistrust of their elders, are in themselves positive phenomena. Indeed, they express human nature’s rebellion against the distinctive process – of desecration and dehumanization at the same time – of the two atheistic societies, the Marxist and the affluent, of which the former is destined to merge into the latter as economic development progresses. They do not want to belong to this system as instruments, which incidentally would be unavoidable because the society of well-being knows only instruments. And they are perfectly right to reaffirm their humanity. The problem is that extremism intervenes and leads them astray, as we shall discuss. (2) The students have at least glimpsed, and they have done it through their own work, the connection between the schools’ situation and the social system that is being established. For instance, I read in one of their pamphlets10 that scholarly research in the humanities has the sole purpose “of bringing greater prestige to the faculty who conduct it, and the research institutes of the scientific schools have practically become a branch of the public relations departments of the industries that fund and control the research,” and also that the university is a feudal structure with “research” as its insignia. Let us leave aside the obvious youthful exaggeration; we must acknowledge, however, that they have spotted a trend. Because, if we put aside the criterion of truth, as a lived criterion, and we replace it by the criteria of being original, important, novel,   9 [TN] Umberto Segre, “Conflinenza delle sinistre: sofistica e dialettica” [Convergence on the left: sophistry and dialectics] in Ideologie 1, no. 1 (1967): 29. 10 [TN] No reference provided in the original.

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sincere, authentic, heretical, progressive, etcetera, it is inevitable that the only thing that matters will be self-affirmation. Thus, in the case of the schools – in which the moral atmosphere of society is necessarily reflected even if it meets some resistance that will nonetheless be overcome in the long run – the professor’s prestige will be paramount. And a research program whose only goal is to increase this prestige must necessarily end up being, regardless of how accurate it may be, precious and academic. So much so that it is useless, the same pamphlet says, and these young people are correct if by useless they mean unable to shed any light on the choices that they will have to make in real life. It is all too easy to derive from this first characteristic all the flaws that will define the essence of university education in the society of well-being. The humanities will be dominated by extrinsic philologism and hermeticism; the sciences by technicism at the service of large industrial fiefdoms. A small group of vassals-to-be will surround each professor; others will be excluded. I read, although I hardly believe it, that in a university six hundred students took an exam in some discipline in two days. Therefore, the meeting between the professor and most of the students lasted exactly five minutes, in which the professor played the part of the judge, and the student played that of the accused more than that of the examinee! I will not linger any further on other aspects of a situation that by now is known to all. What I cared about was to trace back its flaws to the nature of a system, which certainly has not yet been perfectly implemented, which can still be resisted, but which is nonetheless in the process of being realized. At the end of the war, and facing the Communist threat, two roads were possible: either a religious reawakening or the society of wellbeing. This is not the place to explain why the second was chosen. From a certain point of view, it was unlikely that it would not happen, barring the appearance of very great religious personalities.11 Still, this development could have been at least resisted and kept in check, if the intellectuals had been aware of what is implied by the replacement of the ideal 11 In his splendid recent book, Cordula [The Moment of Christian Witness, trans. Richard Beckley (San Franscisco: Ignatius Press, 1994)], Hans Urs von Balthasar wrote that in order to bear the superhuman effort required by today’s situation the Church would need not just theologians but saints, “saintly figures to serve as beacons” [154]. It is intriguing to observe that Benedetto Croce already formulated the same thought, shortly after the end of the Second World War. Secular as he was, he felt very deeply the religious nature of a crisis that has become deeper and deeper: “But here I come back to a thought of mine which, having been repeated many times, may start looking like a fixation. The thought is that the world’s present crisis is the crisis of a religion that needs to be restored or revived or reformed, and that, in order to rescue it, politicians and warriors alone are not enough, but religious and apostolic geniuses are needed. We do not see their presence, but we do

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of a good life by the ideal of “well-being,” and if they had not betrayed their task, for the most part, by seeking a general “demythologization” which actually meant criticism of every “authority” of values. This criticism accompanies, as a cultural justification, the process of abolition of the sacred that is essential to the affluent society. Hence the propagation, which met only limited resistance, of the renewed Saint-Simonism that must be identified as the ideology that unifies Catholic and secular people in the society of well-being (Saint-Simon is the true inventor of the technocratic mindset), and the huge devastation it produced; even among Catholics because, in my view, the new Catholic Modernism must necessarily meet in the course of its development Saint-Simon’s “new Christianity” and be absorbed by it, until the process from Saint-Simon to Comte is repeated and Christianity melts away into a vague religion of humanity. This is the “new Christianity” against which we should pick up again today the decisive critique formulated by Rosmini in an almost unknown essay.12 2. Extremism We must keep this devastation in mind in order to explain the way in which the uneasiness of the young – which is very real and positive in itself – has taken shape. It it such that it turns our initial optimism into most bitter pessimism. Indeed, a type of extremism has appeared which is a purely passive product (in ideal terms) of the society of well-being. It seems to be intransigent and consequential, but it actually serves precisely, even if unawares, the purpose of an extreme radicalization of the evils of the existing order. And it is not enough to reply that very few people share in this extremism, because the minority that embraces it has been able to prevail in several major universities. Why is it purely a product? Because it supinely accepts, as a fragmentary mush, the ideal principles that started the process that led to the current system, the system it would like to oppose.

not feel any less in our hearts, more or less obscurely, like a tacit invocation, that we need them” [Pagine Sparse, Vol. III: Postille. Osservazioni su libri nuovi. Varia (Naples: Ricciardi, 1942), 9; my translation]. 12 I Sansimoniani [The Saintsimonians] was written around 1830, published in 1840, and has now been reprinted – together with other essays that are fundamental in order to help us understand the formative process of Rosmini’s thought – in the little volume Storia dell’empietà [History of impiousness] (Domodossola: Sodalitas, 1957).

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Let us consider its premise, the myth of youth. Young people are always right because they express the sense of history as it unfolds, and intellectuals have the task of interpreting them. This myth was born within the Hegelian left and is tied to all of its philosophical themes. I do not know if young Catholics still credit St Thomas with any authority. Assuming that he still counts for something, let us notice that he thought otherwise: to him the age of metaphysical wisdom was normally the senectus between fifty and seventy.13 It is baffling to observe that the theme of “youth,” which was initially philosophical, is linked with the process that ultimately leads precisely to the denial of metaphysics and theology. Thus, that curious passage by St Thomas was truly not written by chance! It is true that the protesters appeal to two teachers, Mao and Marcuse. But, let us take a look. Little is known with certainty about Maoism. Only one thing is absolutely sure, that in China, Marxism is vitalized by a very strong nationalistic spirit. In the thought and praxis of the Marxist revolution, the Chinese have sought an instrument to free themselves from nameless humiliations, which lasted since the time when Fr Matteo Ricci’s great plan had been interrupted. In fact, their version of Marxism is elastic and entirely subordinated to national liberation. The point is to escape from subjection also with respect to Russia. When orthodox Marxism ruled in Russia, the Chinese formulated the “hundred flowers” ideology. When Russia went down the so-called revisionist route, they proclaimed the intransigent doctrine that dominates today. Maoist formulas may even agree with authentic Marxism, but it remains true that, paradoxically, they have been rediscovered not via the classist route but via the national one. In short, one cannot be a Maoist without being Chinese by nationality. One may think that young people miss the spirit of original Marxism-Leninism, which was religious in its own way. But today Marxism can keep that aspect only in underdeveloped countries, and to actively seek underdevelopment is impossible. It is just as absurd as trying to impose ignorance. How is an agreement to that effect between students and workers conceivable? Let us move on to the other teacher, Marcuse. About his thought we must remark that he understood very well, many years ago,14 the relationship between philosophy and revolution in Marx. More recently he

13 In the commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard: IV Sententia, dist. 40. 14 See Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1941).

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has highlighted why Marxism must necessarily surrender to the technological society:15 •

•

In One-Dimensional Man,16 he formulated a rigorous critique of the technological society, which, however, is a mere confirmation of the predictions by traditionalist and reactionary writers, like Guénon, for example. But, on the other hand, he takes as an axiom that the metaphysical and theological negations stated by Feuerbach and Marx can no longer be called into question. Hence, the way out he is forced to take is a vague utopia about rehabilitating the instincts and reconciling reason and the senses. Even if it is much more elegantly stated, it is ­destined not to be very different, when popularized, from Reich’s theories about the sexual revolution. Thus, what he is able to propose is an anti-Puritan revolution, which is a true wooden iron for an intrinsic historical reason: Puritan politics was the first model of revolutionary action, and the Puritan theme is essential to every serious revolutionary position – historical examples are certainly not hard to find. Therefore, Marcuse can be defined as the philosopher of the decomposition of the revolution. By going from Mao to Marcuse as their teacher (two authors that, in any case, cannot be reconciled), the revolutionaries in the students’ movement reach a complete contradiction.

It is undeniable that Marcuse’s thought is of real interest, but for ­exactly opposite reasons from those that motivate his followers today: •

•

It goes to show the nihilism – barely concealed literarily by the use of Schillerian themes about freedom and play – that must be reached by a philosophy that, on the one hand, accepts Feuerbach’s and Marx’s negations, and, on the other hand, rigorously extends its criticism to the statements of Marxism and those of the thought that underlies the technological society. It also illustrates how revolutionary thought always derives its strength by appropriating themes from counter-revolutionary criticism. Saint-Simon and Marx had already done that. Marcuse does it again a century later, and in different social circumstances. But this also goes to show that the critique of revolutionary thought cannot

15 In Herbert Marcuse, Soviet Marxism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958). 16 [TN] Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968).

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be conducted starting from a reactionary outlook (of going back to the past). When it becomes associated with this position, it cannot avoid being re-absorbed by revolutionary thought. Moreover, it is also true that if one wants to merge together Marx, Freud, and Heidegger – the three idols of the older generation – there is apparently no other way but that proposed by Marcuse. This is another manifestation of how much the new rebels depend on their fathers.

It has been said that the extremists are unwittingly rediscovering Fascism at its birth, in its initial negative and anarchic stage. This observation deserves a deeper examination. As a matter of fact, there is not a single theme of student extremism that is not a rediscovery of motifs of early Fascism. The undetermined “I want”; the youth’s right to seize power because it represents life; the search for dialectic leverage in youth and in generational change instead of social class; the claim of surpassing, as a revolutionary position, the bourgeoisie and Communism; the idea of a revolution started by students; negativism and activism (remember that initially Fascism presented itself as an anti-party); anti-­ intellectualism in the sense of aversion to bookish culture; the myth of novelty at all costs. However, the analogies should not be pushed too far. After all, originary Fascism did have a content, in the idea of the nation. After the negation of every possible authority of values, all that is left is pure total negativism, and the will for something so indeterminate that it is close to “nothing.” The recent “student movement” has dissociated the two aspects of original Fascism, anarchism and nationalism. What is left is anarchism of the Fascist type, which differs from pure anarchism because this latter is characterized by love and will of the impossible, which lends it a certain moral flair, even in the eyes of its opponents. Conversely, Fascist anarchism is a will to power, and as such it takes a totalitarian orientation. Traces of a totalitarian mindset are clearly visible in the new extremism – although in the sense of a totalitarianism of destruction. Indeed, let us consider some of the themes it has most emphasized. What about contrasting the example of Mao’s schools to the Soviet schools? That is to say, affirming that education must come from below, because the students communicate directly with the will of the new state embodied in one person; in short, the cult of personality. At least Russia, by abolishing the cult of personality, intended to free itself from the aspects that Stalin’s Communism had in common with Nazism. What about the idea that sovereignty belongs to the students’ assembly, so that every professor must be periodically examined by committees

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of students, it order to assess his degree of ideological and cultural conformity? Let us leave aside the cultural exam: obviously the students can only conduct it based on the opinions of some other professor whom they like better. The ideological test is more important. How will it take place? Perhaps we can find testing material in an article that I chanced to read in a magazine of the “new left,” in which a discussion of the figure of Don Milani17 became the occasion to offend and insult Pius XII most vulgarly. Thus, an example could be the following. The professor will have to make the argument that Pius XII was to old Catholicism what Julian the Apostate was to paganism;18 or that he was a Nazi Pope. In other words, the result of the investigation will be decided in advance, and the professor’s task will be to document theses established a priori for political reasons. To speak clearly, this ought to be called schooling in the falsification of culture. You will say that these excesses only involve a minority of a minority. Still, it is the consistent outcome of today’s absolute negativism, which is destined to end up negating culture. Extremism does not at all constitute an intransigent and consequential reaction against the feudal transformation of the university. On the contrary, it is the position of those who can only conceive of the university as a fiefdom, and who want to replace the “research” insignia with another: the subordination of culture to politics. They re-propose the old theme – which the Communists no longer dare to defend – that philosophy and culture in general are necessarily partisan. Within a society that hopefully will keep protecting freedom, they want to establish a model of “totalitarian state of the university.” Ultra-democratic statements matter little. Do we need to recall that every budding totalitarianism always claims to seek the fullness of democracy? There is no doubt that the extremists perceive themselves as the most radical and integral anti-Fascists. But there are different kinds of antiFascism, and theirs is the result of negating the nationalist and traditionalist side of Fascism. They carried out a dissociation, and this is their originality, so that what is kept of Fascism is the purely anarchic side. On the other hand we should not be too harsh on the extremists, lest we ignore the faults of the elders. It was they who failed to give the new generation a balanced historical judgment about Fascism. And this is why the young, who did not experience it and have heard it described as an almost criminal phenomenon, rediscovered its worst aspect, while 17 Don Lorenzo Milani (1923–1967), Italian priest and educator. 18 [TN] A thesis due to F.A. Viallet in Le dépassement [Going beyond] (Paris: Fischbacher, 1961), 112.

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believing themselves to be the most radical anti-Fascists. Only authentic and non-politicized historical scholarship can immunize against certain diseases; at the bottom of the generational conflict lies a historiographical deficiency. How to explain it? Complex as the reasons may be, I already pointed out the crucial one: the affluent society has an interest in maintaining the apocalyptic-demonological interpretation of Fascism, and we must observe that it is by starting from it that the form taken by the students’ rebellion can be explained. Indeed, what else can this interpretation produce in the young if not an attitude of millennialist expectation for the absolutely new (scientific progress does not at all destroy the millennialist archetype), and consequently a destructive attitude towards every tradition? In this way, the society of well-being defeats the revolution by forcing it to take the form of pure negativism. Here we should reflect about a question that, in my opinion, is extremely important. Given that the students’ rebellion is a world-wide phenomenon (even though, of course, one must distinguish carefully between the events taking place in so-called Western society and those in Communist countries; these latter, clearly, would require a very different discussion), and given the philosophical character of contemporary history, which I have often emphasized, one might wonder whether the form taken by the rebellion may not reveal the end of an essence, namely, the revolution as the replacement of religion by politics for the sake of man’s liberation. The final act of this essence was Marxism, which by realizing itself in history gave rise to its opposite: the society of well-being, which cannot be surpassed through a revolution, but only by restoring the religious dimension and the moral authority of values. On the other hand, by now another essence has also reached a terminal crisis, the idea of utopia. Utopia and revolution are radically different indeed. The former is the dream of a world where conflicts have been eliminated; the latter has a realistic character, and aims at achieving the society of the free and the equal by exacerbating conflicts as much as possible. The Western world has tried to show that the content of utopia, which after all is just ensuring material well-being to everybody, can be achieved (and has already been partially achieved, with the Scandinavian countries as “models”). But, by doing so, it has deprived utopia of its content without satisfying the deep need that generates it: “the human being’s deep sentiment of having been thrown into life without true necessity.”19 Having been deprived of its content, utopia has become conjoined with a purely subversive and destructive revolution.

19 Jean Servier [TN: from Histoire de l’utopie [History of utopia] (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), 323].

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Hence the enormous ideal significance of the current turmoil in the universities: like a flash of lightning, it illuminated for a brief moment (because soon it fell back into the usual categories20) the actual moral situation, and showed that today’s dominant culture is inadequate to ­reality. From the point of view of ideas, it confirmed the theses about utopian and revolutionary thought (whose dissolution it documents) advanced by the great tradition of Catholic thought (for example, among our contemporaries, let us cite Gilson and Maritain, Journet and von Balthasar). At the same time, it showed the inadequacy of the traditionalist and reactionary critique of the present, which is doomed to be co-opted by revolutionary thought or to turn into Modernism. In practice, however, it lends itself to being used because of its lack of content. By whom? 3 . P o l i t i c a l E x p l o i tat i o n The extremists want to go beyond the bourgeoisified Communist party and refuse to be used. Their slogan is “against all parties because against the system.” Then, how did it happen that the Communists’ attitude has been basically benevolent, if they consider it essential to have a monopoly on the revolutionary cause and certainly cannot be accused of being soft on heretics? Evidently, because they have judged the extremists to be recoverable.21 This confirms my previous diagnosis. From the Communist standpoint, pure anarchists are absolutely irrecoverable. Fascists are recoverable after a journey that may be long or very short. If the movement had been only Maoist in nature, it would undoubtedly have been condemned. This did not happen because of the participation of the left-wing Catholics. This term is certainly vague, but here I mean the Catholics who dissent from the Christian Democrats and at the same time embrace neo-Modernist positions. What I said already shows well enough that not only can the extremists live with contradiction, but they actually turn it into a principle: those who contradict themselves the most are the most right. Now, in this category of contradiction, there is no doubt that left-wing Catholics deserve the grand prize. For, on the

20 Initially the protest movement did indeed break free from the usual opposition between Fascism and anti-Fascism, inasmuch as its target was the type of society that developed after the Second World War, which nobody could ever call “Fascist.” But extremism brought the movement back into the usual scheme, precisely because it is a form of Fascism in reverse, and this reversal was then mistaken for the most radical anti-Fascism. 21 This article had already been written when this interpretation was confirmed by a statement by the Central Committee of the PCI [Italian Communist Party].

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one side, they would like to give the revolution a religious character, but in Communism such religious character is tied to total atheism; on the other side, they want to separate Communism from atheism, but how can they do so except by separating historical materialism and dialectic materialism, that is, by embracing the theoretical premise of Communist revisionism and its inclusion in the society of well-being? For over twenty years they have been facing this contradiction, which is actually insuperable. So, they finally forgot it, but without giving up on “witnessing” it. Therefore, they keep one foot in the fieriest revolution and the other in softened Soviet-style Communism – an excellent position to act as mediators for the recovery of the students. Thus, there is no need to insist too much on the predicament in which the movement is trapped: like the early Fascists, the rebels have no other political possibility but to join one of the political forces in the system, not as leaders but as tools. They will perform the task of storm troopers and saboteurs in the leftist block. Truly the Communist party could not have a better opportunity: it can let others do the work of subversion, support them, then present itself as the defender of order and take control. 4. Conclusion Regarding the relationships between generations, the situation is thus uncertain. We should not underestimate the dangers, which are very serious, but neither should we neglect the positive opportunities. The difference between the extremist minority and the rest of the students is not about the necessity of the protest, with which, after all, everybody agrees. It lies in the fact that the most serious students view the protest as a problem whereas the extremists view it as a solution, whose nature I have described. Why did the majority accept or passively tolerate the position of a few activists on so many occasions (but not everywhere)? For a simple reason: it had no alternative solutions and therefore, in practice, it did not make its voice much heard. This was due to a fact that must be spelled out as clearly as possible: during the last twenty years, the culture that undermines tradition has taken over the field of the present without facing a strongly engaged opposition. On the contrary, the culture that should have mediated between novelty and tradition too often has taken refuge in the study of the past and in specialization, as if what was happening in the political and social world, and even in the moral evaluations, did not concern it. Therefore, a dispassionate assessment of the situation yields the following lesson: the new generation was vulnerable to basically childish

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arguments because a really serious culture, capable of guiding them in their choices, was lacking. Certainly, we must grant that generating such culture is not easy, given the enormous complexity of today’s world, and that it is not a matter of ordinary work and not even of a committed will. All possible work and the greatest commitment of the will are not enough to find ideas that will break the impasse. However, the opposite is also true: without this commitment and this attention those ideas can never come up. Therefore, intellectuals must become aware that the “student revolution” was not a freak show, but a providential sign to call them back to awareness of their responsibilities. And whereas we must steadfastly oppose prevarications and proposals that reflect only the totalitarian temptation, we must keep a different attitude towards genuine, even if confused, moral unease.

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Tradition and Innovation

1. Progressivism as a Unitary Phenomenon Traditionalists and progressives. Once upon a time, these words were used as adjectives. For instance, a radical – who presented himself as the exclusive owner of the idea of progress, and as the custodian of the values of the French revolution and of the “affirmations of modern awareness” – would call himself progressive with respect to his Catholic opponent. Similarly, a socialist – who viewed the political philosophy of the radical as the expression of satisfied economic interests and social ambitions – would claim to himself from the bourgeois the right to be called progressive. Today, these same words tend to be used as substantives. In every area, a dividing line has been established between traditionalists and progressives, and a progressive of any stripe feels closer to a fellow progressive than to a traditionalist from his own group. For instance, nowadays a secular progressive is certainly closer to a Catholic progressive than a Catholic traditionalist is to a Catholic progressive.1 Catholic and secular progressives think less about their metaphysical differences than about their agreement in formulating evaluations about the contemporary world. Thus, I happened to read on the jacket of a recent book – which for all practical purposes proposed an alliance between Catholics and Communists – the following line: “militant theism, militant atheism, heads or tails of the same coin.” We shall see that this This chapter originated as a presentation at the scholarly conference of the Comitato Cattolico Docenti Universitari, Autorità e libertà nel divenire della storia [Authority and freedom in the flow of history], 23–5 May 1969 (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1971). 1 The argument, so common today, about “anonymous” or “implicit” Christianity cannot be truly understood – even if it is advanced by very distinguished theologians and often disguised in hermetic language – if it is not linked back to its historical roots, which lie precisely in this unitary character of the progressivist phenomenon.

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sentence is more significant than one might think for the philosophical definition of the nature of progressivism. Thus, according to the extreme fringes of the dissenting Catholic groups there is no atheistic or blasphemous statement that cannot be justified as a reaction to the conservative or traditionalist deformations of religion. But, in fact, do we really need to think of the extreme fringes? Esprit and Témoignage Chrétien were born2 when the words witness and presence became fashionable among Catholics, as opposed to words like conquest or defence or bulwark. Now, it would be easy to collect from their pages an anthology of favourable (sometimes enthusiastic) reviews of writers who are not just openly anti-Catholic, but openly immoral according to the criteria of old secular morality. This dividing line has become established within all groups, Communists included: within Communism itself today we hear that some people are dogmatic and closed, and others are progressive, open, and capable of dialogue. Traditionalism and progressivism have taken meaning as substantives, just like liberalism and socialism in the last century. This simple observation leads us to two remarks. The opposition has become diametrical, which means that the crisis of values that we are facing is unprecedented in the history of civilization. In addition, progressivism declares that the old ideals are dead, but at the same time is unable to define new ones, going beyond the negations. It says that they are being formed, but it cannot announce their birth yet. Perhaps the most novel feature of today’s situation is precisely this: in the past, the appearance of a new ideal would push existing ideals into a crisis, discriminating among them, saving some, rejecting others. Today, the point of departure is total negation, and the new ideal remains undetermined precisely because the negation is total. 2. Searching for Its Genesis Today’s progressive phenomenon is thus something new. Let us try and reach an overall definition, before discussing the turbulence it stirs up in the Catholic world. In my judgment, the enduring strength of the traditional position, and also the way in which traditional truths can be reproposed, will emerge through the definition of the progressive position, which at the same time is also its criticism. This definition must be reached based on the genesis of the phenomenon. Where should we search for it? I will state my fundamental thesis

2 [TN] In 1932 and 1941, respectively.

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right away: progressivism starts from a historico-political assessment or, if you like, a vision of contemporary history. This statement implies discarding various other interpretations: it does not start from a philosophy, from a deeper theological exploration, from a new morality, from a side-effect of some technical development, or even from some economic-social tension. Instead, it is by starting from such historico-political assessment (which I will try to pinpoint) that one can understand the various philosophical, theological, or moral positions that today are presented as progressive. My attempt will be, then, to re-deduce them, in their essential features, from this historico-political judgment. Here a warning may help avoid misunderstandings (which are not always disinterested): I am speaking of historico-political judgment, prior to political will. I am far from thinking, for example, that one should see in Catholic progressivism a political movement that uses a certain ideology for its purposes. The root of its error is deeper and lies in a theoretical error about contemporary history, whose consequences (because of the particular character of such history) are not just political, but extend to morality and philosophy and end up touching the ultimate theological truths. But this judgment had a process of development. Where can we find its first seeds? We must go some way back in history, but then again not too far back. Indeed, it would be too much to directly link today’s progressivism, in its Catholic version, to the Modernism that was defeated around 1910. I say this even though the continuity of ideas is clear, and even though the encyclical Pascendi, if we re-read it today, looks like a prophetic historical document, in the sense that it was able to go beyond the documents of its time and capture their essence. It would be too little to find its origins in the years after the Second World War, or even at the time of the Council. We must instead go back to the years between 1930 and 1940. Everything has changed so profoundly since then that it is difficult for a young person to grasp a reality that he does not know either by experience or by history. Today it is hard to imagine a world in which Italy could aspire to be a world power; in which Communism was thought to belong on the other side of the planet and, in both France and Italy, theoretical Marxism was considered unworthy of appearing in the histories of philosophy, but not in the least for political reasons;3 in which the human sciences, psychology, sociology, ethnology, pedagogy 3 The complete scholarly neglect of theoretical Marxism in Italy in the years around 1930 was due only to a small extent to Fascist censorship (at that time the Italian academy had professors who were very determined to protect the rights of culture). A much more important reason was the persuasion that Croce’s critique was definitive.

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in ­today’s sense, were utterly neglected; in which Catholic philosophical orthodoxy was equated with rigid Thomism. Recently I picked up again a book by a great Thomist who was very famous at that time, Dieu, son existence et sa nature,4 by Fr Garrigou-Lagrange. It opens with a chapter devoted to the definitions by the First Vatican Council about the existence and nature of God. Its upshot is that, for all practical purposes, the only truly orthodox position on this matter is Thomism as interpreted by the author. In that same period, a substantial fraction of Catholics thought in good faith that Fascism was a sort of Leviathan destined to destroy the two great modern political errors, liberalism and socialism. The year 1932 saw the publication of Croce’s History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century,5 which remained for many years the spiritual breviary of secular anti-Fascists. It is appropriate to refer to it as the first expression of a rigorously anti-Fascist assessment of the history of the time. There is a presupposition on which – according to Croce – no shadow of doubt can be cast; it is the judgment sanctioned by all the philosophies of history of the 1800s, defined by Hegel and shared also by Marx, namely that Europe is the point of arrival of the process of world history, which had started in Asia. As for theoretical Marxism, it is just one among many abnormal fruits of the dissolution of Hegelianism, an aberration whose fate had already been sealed by Croce himself. Regarding Russia, the revolution and Soviet power should be explained not by Marx’s theories, but by the continuity of Russian history: this backward country, which had never known the Renaissance and the modern era, had passed from one autocracy to another without any resistance by the people, whom ancient custom made passive in front of despotism. Croce does not mention America, but clearly to him it only seemed to offer a pragmatist and rather crude translation of European civilization. And his judgment was not isolated: it expressed the common opinion of the intellectuals who had come of age between the final years of the nineteenth century and the First World War. Not by chance, the book is dedicated to Thomas Mann, with Dante’s verse as epigraph: pur mo venian li tuoi pensier fra i miei.6 So, the spiritual primacy of Europe was unquestioned; moreover, the most beautiful blossoming of European civilization was identified with the liberal age 1870–1914, and more particularly with the first decade of 4 [TN] Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, God, His Existence and His Nature, trans. Dom Bede Rose, OSB (St Louis, MO: Herder, 1934). 5 [TN] ] Benedetto Croce, History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century, trans. Henry Furst (New York: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1933). 6 [TN] “Just now your thoughts came in among my own,” Inferno, XXIII, 28.

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our century. What was happening now was that this same Europe, the endpoint of the process of history, politically seemed to be on the way to becoming the house of demons: no country was resisting the offensive of the various forms of Fascism, even though they were different from country to country. How to explain their success? How to explain the rebellion of vitality ex lege against reason (and it is precisely because of his reflection on political history that Croce would later replace the economic moment with the category of vitality)? The origins lie, Croce said, in “morbid romanticism.” But then, what was this morbid romanticism? It was that form of romanticism that in the past had found its pseudoartistic expression in Decadentism, and that later had overflown into politics. But how could countries of high culture have fallen victim to this disease? After the end of the war, the old sages proposed an interpretation according to which the evils that had ravaged Europe – Nazism, Fascism – had been just a parenthesis, a bad dream. This is the classical interpretation of Fascism as a “moral disease.”7 It insisted on the fact that people like Mussolini and Hitler had been able to seize power only because of various contingent circumstances – a combination of fortuitous causes, in which chance had played the role of an anti-miracle. As for Communism, one should insist on the explanation in terms of Russian history, and in any case highlight why Russia’s example could not be extended to Europe. After the end of the war, the struggle against the Fascisms had to become struggle against all forms of totalitarianism. One had to be anti-Communist to the same extent, and for the same reasons, one had been anti-Fascist. Catholics shared this perspective by a large majority, abandoning all medievalistic nostalgia and accepting the principle of freedom. What other idea sustained the age of De Gasperi8 if not that the Catholic party was entering an alliance (the so-called quadripartito) with the classic political forces of post-Risorgimento Italy, on the basis of common defence and the very will to rebuild? It is also appropriate to emphasize the peculiar convergence Croce-De Gasperi. Today it is fashionable to criticize Croce’s essay “Why We Cannot Not Call Ourselves Christians.”9 And yet, its meaning is becoming perfectly 7 To be precise, we must add that such interpretation is broader than just the idea of a “parenthesis,” a word that was used only by Croce. It is no less true that the men of “yesterday’s world” perceived Fascism as an “irrationalist parenthesis,” just like Croce. 8 [TN] Alcide De Gasperi (1881–1954) was an Italian politician and statesman. He led the Christian Democratic Party and served as prime minister eight times from 1945 to 1953, leading the reconstruction efforts after the Second World War. He is also remembered as one of the founding fathers of the European Union. 9 [TN] Benedetto Croce, “Perchè non possiamo non dirci ‘cristiani,’” in La critica 55 (1942): 289–97.

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clear now, when even theologians commonly speak of a post-Christian age. Old Croce’s antennae were still sensitive enough to perceive that this type of proposal might be coming, and to reject it. As secular as his thought was, it did not belong any less to what was normally called “Christian civilization.” By restoring the divine in a new form, he intended to save tradition and continuity with the past. Now let us ask ourselves how this interpretation underwent a crisis, observing also that Croce’s death and the crisis of De Gasperism coincided almost perfectly in time. Its weak spot is easy to find. During that decade, a break had taken place in Europe between a culture unable to go beyond moral condemnation and the irrational and barbaric politics that prevailed in factual reality. On the basis of that culture it was impossible to make the transition from ideal condemnation to effective practical action. War and Nazi occupation had happened, and Europe had been unable to free itself by its own means. 3. The Rediscovery of the Enlightenment and Its Characteristics Therefore, it was extremely easy to shift to a completely different view. The fires that had engulfed the cities of Italy and Germany had also consumed old Europe’s pride. The end had come not only for “morbid Romanticism,” but also for “Romanticism as an attitude of continuity with tradition.” And what had to be rediscovered as the truly modern attitude – able to gauge the destiny of mankind – was the Enlightenment as a disposition to declare a break with traditional structures and criticize them inexorably from an ethical, political, and social standpoint. The elimination of the roots of the Fascisms was bound to affect the forms of culture that, despite being rigorously opposed to the Fascisms, had been incapable of taking any stance towards them except moral condemnation. An easy example to document this shift is the progressive abandonment of Crocian culture in favor of the Enlightenment’s disposition by people coming from Azionismo.10 A parallel process has taken place in Catholic culture via a progressive abandonment of Thomism – the philosophy that had been rediscovered at the conclusion of the nineteenth-century Catholic critique of modernity – in

10 [TN] The Partito d’Azione was a post-Second World War liberal-socialist political party that advocated radical social change while rejecting Communism. The party disbanded after being defeated in the 1946 election, but its ideas were deeply influential on postwar Italian culture and politics.

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favour of forms of thought that can easily be shown to be Catholic disguises of positions of the Enlightenment. Some people talk about an acceleration in the pace of history. Certainly this has not been the case for ethico-political awareness during the last quarter of a century. Specific judgments and even emotional reactions are determined by an underlying disposition that is extremely confused, but also extremely widespread, to the point of affecting everybody without distinction of social class. This disposition is a mixture of a millennialist element – as if a great cosmic revolution had destroyed old Europe-turned-into-Babylon with its traditions and values – and an Enlightenment element pointing to the only philosophical road that can still be followed. A sign of the rebirth of the Enlightenment is found in the image that underlies all the clichés of contemporary public discourse: mankind is entering adulthood. In this respect, we can say that today’s literature and journalism popularize the definition of the Enlightenment that was already proposed by Kant: “Enlightenment is the human being’s emergence from his self-incurred minority. Minority is inability to make use of one’s own understanding without direction from another. This minority is self-incurred when its cause lies not in lack of understanding but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. Sapere Aude! Have courage to make use of your own understanding! is thus the motto of enlightenment.”11 Now, what is today’s normal understanding of contemporary history if not that the crisis marked by the two world wars and by what happened in the twenty years between them was precisely the break that accompanied mankind’s transition to adulthood? This transition was hampered by people’s attachment (it does not matter whether sentimental or economic) to an old world that is now doomed. This is  why the conformists, the bien pensants (words coming from the Enlightenment) were so scared, and resorted, and would still resort, to authoritarian solutions, to Fascisms of various kinds in order to defend what history has already condemned. So, what took place was the ascent of the peoples to adulthood, and a desperate attempt to stop them, especially by the petit-bourgeois (the class most exposed to “fear of historical transcendence”12). What accounts for the spread of this interpretation is the fact that it seemed obligatory after the collapse of the (indefensible) interpretation in terms of parenthesis and moral disease. Therefore, we 11 [TN] Immanuel Kant, “What is Enlightenment?” in Practical Philosophy, ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 17. 12 [TN] Del Noce is quoting a formula by German historian Ernst Nolte; see reference below.

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must not be surprised when we find it also in the only scholar who, so far, has attempted a philosophical history of our age, Nolte. It is contained in a book13 rich with deep analysis, and determined to go against today’s common preconceptions, but which nonetheless ends up interpreting the age of Fascisms as an age characterized by “fear of transcendence,” a word by which he does not mean religious transcendence but rather historical transformation. In this conclusion, he is bound to meet the ideas of many (certainly not too bright) psychologists and sociologists, like Fromm, for example. This explains both the diffusion and the power of this interpretation. There is no idol of the Enlightenment that has not been rediscovered and made an object of worship (i.e., capitalized): science, progress, technology. The result has been a new Ballo Excelsior 14 of the intellectuals, with the participation of many priests as a new feature. The show would have delighted Flaubert; yet what happened is that nowadays it is rather Flaubert who has been relegated into literary Purgatory – which is a sign of how deep run the roots of this interpretation. Now we need to discuss, however, in what form the Enlightenment’s disposition has been rediscovered and embraced. At this point we must face a question that is crucial in order to understand today’s history: how the rebirth of the mindset of the Enlightenment and the rediscovery of Marxism have met and compenetrated each other. As we have seen, the Enlightenment was rediscovered in a millennialist disposition (a new world had to replace another that had become a Babylon). This millennialism facilitated the encounter with Marxism, which meanwhile was being rediscovered in Europe. I cannot discuss now the reasons why this rediscovery was bound to happen in both Italian and French culture. However, a brief comment is necessary regarding the form in which the temptation of Marxism has risen and keeps acting (in fact, acts most strongly) in Catholic milieus today. This happens to the exact extent that they had been exposed earlier to the reactionary temptation, in an anti-bourgeois sense. The fight against the bourgeois spirit had been unsuccessful when it had been waged from a reactionary perspective; the classical reactionary movements had

13 [TN] E. Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism, trans. Leila Vennewitz (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966). 14 [TN] The Ballo Excelsior (“Excelsior Ballet”) was a large choreographic production which premiered in Milan in 1881 and was then performed all over Europe until the eve of the First World War. It consisted of a sequence of historic and allegorical scenes celebrating the progress of science and the triumph of modern civilization over obscurantism. It became a symbol of late nineteenth-century optimism and theatrical extravagance.

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become subordinate, at least partially, to the Fascist movements. The transition, in the context of that same fight, to the revolutionary position was painless, like a natural development. In order to understand how easy this process was, we can draw an analogy with the transition in the 1800s from the first to the second stage of Lamennais’s thought. However, neither did secular people with a generically liberal or liberalsocialist background want to give up their liberalism, nor did Catholics tempted by Marxism want to renounce their Catholicism. Here we come to a very important, truly crucial point. Whereas the older generation thought that Marxism had to be plainly and simply rejected, those who were young in 1945 came to think that Marxism had to be surpassed or sublated. If we can explain the danger hidden in these simple expressions, ‘surpassing’ or ‘sublating’ Marxism, we will hold the key to the so-called progressive cultural and moral phenomena (in every field) that have been taking place in a continuous crescendo from 1945 until now; the key to that transformation of values, to that novelty that some people exalt and others deplore but which is certainly bewildering, and bewilders the progressives themselves. They feel like they have been caught in a machine they no longer control, the same feeling that their ancestors from the age of Enlightenment experienced during the French revolution. Starting from these words, we will be able to define in general the essence of today’s progressivism, in both its secular and religious (protestant or Catholic) versions. Allow me to recall a sentence that Lenin used in “What Is to Be Done?” in reference to the theoretical discussions taking place in the socialist movement at that time: “a nuance may determine the future of the social-democratic party for many, very many years.”15 In close analogy I think we can say today: a nuance (i.e., that definition of the relationship with Marxism as sublation) may determine the future of civilization for many, very many years. But what do I mean by saying that Marxism cannot be surpassed? Evidently, I mean neither that it should not be an object of philosophical study nor that it is invincible because it is unsurpassable. I mean, instead, that it is indeed plagued by a contradiction, but that such contradiction does not lead it to being surpassed, but rather to a form of decomposition; and that this decomposition does not conclude in a reconciliation with liberal secularism or with a religious world view, but rather to a form of atheism which is worse and more 15 [TN] My translation from the Italian version quoted by Del Noce. An English translation of “What Is to Be Done?” can be found in Lenin’s Collected Works, Vol. 5 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), 347–530. However, the translation of this particular sentence (in Section I.D) is rather awkward and does not convey very effectively the point Del Noce is trying to make.

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radical than the original one, and also to a fully oppressive regime, even though the democratic institutions may be kept formally alive. Because, as strange as it may appear, and as I will mention later, atheism is precisely the religious phase of Marxism; the messianic aspect that led some people to glimpse in Marx the last Jewish prophet is tied precisely to his explicit profession of atheism. Regarding the contradiction, let us reflect about the fact that both historical materialism and dialectic materialism are essential to Marxist revolutionary thought. Indeed, without historical materialism there could be no critique of the opposite philosophies, their reduction to ideologies, which makes possible the revolutionary affirmation. Yet, on the other hand, historical materialism taken by itself concludes only to the form of total relativism that is the premise of sociologism, the form of thought that today is the philosophical justification for the most a-­ religious and also most conservative society that ever existed, the socalled affluent or consumerist society, or society of well-being. By saying this, I am also affirming that today’s history is nothing but Marxism’s contradiction made explicit. In fact, the two aspects of historical materialism (as affirmation of total relativity) and dialectic materialism (as revolutionary principle) must dissociate when taken to the extreme. And this dissociated historical materialism has invaded the Western world, where culture is marked by the hubris of human sciences, hubris in the sense that they want to replace philosophy: sociology, psychoanalysis and, particularly today, structuralism. The attempt to surpass Marxism can only take place, in secular and religious thought alike, in the form of historical materialism dissociated from dialectical materialism. At this point we can attempt a definition of today’s progressivism: I would submit that it is a negativist millennialism, where I am putting together two clearly contradictory terms. Indeed, all forms of millennialism known so far contained some “promise.” Conversely, every age that lost trust in its ideals produced skeptical or pessimistic attitudes, that is, forms of thought completely at odds with the millennialist mindset. And yet, the peculiar feature of the present age is the rise of an attitude in which these two aspects are strangely combined. To convince ourselves that this attitude exists and dominates, we only need to think of two statements that are common today. The first is that we need to “start from scratch,” thus rejecting the old ideals without any nostalgia. The second is that the mutation that is supposedly taking place today, unprecedented in the history of civilization, should be accompanied by the awareness that every affirmation is the expression of a particular age, not of some timeless and intrinsic value. By combining these two statements, we have the precise definition of today’s situation:

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death of the old ideals, but simultaneously the confession that new ideals cannot be born. Because, certainly, an ideal may be erroneous; but it cannot be perceived as an ideal without attributing to it, even mistakenly, an absolute value. Therefore, emancipation from authority and traditions in the spirit of the Enlightenment had to take place according to the aspect of the Enlightenment that makes negation its dominant character. The pars destruens came to the forefront, and people acted as if the positive values, those of the new man, were destined to emerge by themselves, from the bottom of the negations. This was undoubtedly a return to one aspect of the Enlightenment. Hazard16 has correctly pointed out that what is striking in the novels of the Enlightenment is “the passion for destruction that runs through them all. Not a tradition which escapes challenge, not an idea, however familiar, which is not assailed; not an authority that is allowed to stand. Institutions of every kind are demolished, and negation is the order of the day.”17 This was the attitude of the old Enlightenment. And today, what else is the criterion of appreciation of a literary or philosophical work if not how strongly it negates some values that had the flaw of belonging to tradition? But, whereas what prevailed in the old Enlightenment was, by and large, the line of thought that criticized, yes, the superstitions of the past, but in the name of a reason shared by all men (the line from Locke to Kant, to be clear), what prevails today is the sharply destructive and immoralistic direction, from Lamettrie to Sade. This is explained by the reasons given above: if the Enlightenment was rediscovered in a negativist disposition, consistency required that its most negative direction would enjoy the greater success. Hence, the struggle against repressive ethics, in the name of instinctual freedom; the affirmation of the collapse of every absolute value; intolerance in the name of tolerance; the negation of any qualitative difference between man and beast following in the wake of Lamettrie (curiously elevated today to the rank of great thinker), while allowing for an evolutionary process that will lead to a new man, as superior to the one we know as today’s man is superior to the lowest animal species. And accordingly, immoralism, so that Sade is taking the place that once was occupied by Rousseau and Kant in the history of morals. The phenomenon of widespread pornography might even seem irrelevant, or explainable merely 16 [TN] Paul Hazard (1878–1944), French scholar of comparative literature and historian of ideas. 17 [TN] Paul Hazard, The Crisis of the European Mind, 1680–1715, trans. J. Lewis May (New York: NYRB Classics, 2013), 26. I tightened Del Noce’s loose quotation (which he probably made from memory).

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in terms of market forces, if today women’s liberation were not taking place under its banner. Apollinaire wrote: “Justine is the old woman, enslaved, miserable, who is not even regarded as a human being; Juliette, on the contrary, represents the new woman who [Sade] foresees, a being of whom we still have no concept, who wrenches herself free from humanity, who will have wings and will renew the universe.”18 Now we have arrived there. The extreme outcome that can be reached along this postMarxist Enlightenment line is the “death of man” announced by the structuralist philosopher Foucault, in parallel to Nietzsche’s “death of God.” Supposedly, structuralism as a philosophy will be able to dissolve man by reducing him to a purely natural reality: after having been analyzed by structuralism, the spirit will reveal its nature as a thing among other things. This point is interesting in two respects. First, structuralism is inspired, in some ways, by Engels, but it is a form of Engelsism separated from Marxism, so to speak, which wants to solve Kant’s problem of categories through anthropology, eliminating the transcendental subject altogether. But above all, in my opinion, it represents the extreme point that must be reached by re-thinking Marxism along Enlightenment lines. In its rejection of historicism and its interest in ethnography, structuralism calls to mind the atheistic naturalism of the early 1600s. A study of it may help elucidate an important and (as far as I know) new thesis: that modern atheism follows a cyclical historical process. After going around a circle it must come back to its origins, eliminating in the process the pessimistic aspect which was the route to go back to religious thought. This is why I consider mistaken a benevolent interpretation, which is widespread today in Catholic circles, that says that atheism represents a process of purification of religious thought, and could even be assimilated to negative theology. This idea is expressed in the thesis, which is common today, of the co-truthfulness of theism and atheism: everybody is an atheist with respect to some idea of God, and atheism merely expresses the need for a more adequate idea of God. When people want to delude themselves in the name of “dialogue” they always find a way; but, real atheism is something else entirely, and it is the atheist who wants to warp the idea of God in order to live in his atheism. This was secular progressivism. We must now consider religious progressivism, and you may think that the analysis would not apply, that the contradictions of secular progressivism would be solved by the religious version. Now, I will state right away my thinking on this point: all the

18 [TN] Guillaume Apollinaire, L’oeuvre du Marquis De Sade (Paris: Bibliothèque des Curieux, 1909), 18. My translation.

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fermentation of religious progressivism can conclude only in the annihilation of religious thought into secular progressivism. In fact, the annihilation of religious thought can only take place by turning it into the type of secular progressivism that has been discussed until now. Let us consider the delusion of the religious progressivism of what in Italy used to be called the Catholic Left, in the years around and after the end of the Second World War. Its positions are being rediscovered today, so many years later, by certain theologians who specialize in “dialogue.” Marxism had to shed the metaphysical skin of dialectic materialism and recognize itself as social science, not philosophy. In the course of this recognition of being a science of history, it certainly had to break with the Idealist philosophies of history and their descendants, but it could reconcile itself with transcendent religious thought, especially in its aspect of negative theology, of God thought of as totally other. Purification of religious thought, moral engagement as an effort of liberation from alienation, the rigor of science and its extension to the human world: they all seemed to coincide. But now let us reflect: negative theology cannot coexist with scientistic and revolutionary optimism. Given such optimism, the meaning of the “totally other” shifts from negative theology to agnosticism. Furthermore, both revolutionary thought and scientism reject the idea of the initial fall. It is no longer man who brought disorder into an Edenic situation by his free choice. On the contrary, it is man who constitutes a principle of order in a world that by itself has no meaning. It is certainly not by chance that Garaudy – the Marxist author most open to dialogue, or the official delegate for dialogue – in many discussions has set only one precondition to Catholic thought: silence about the theme of sin, which he regards as Gnostic. It is not by chance that in that masterpiece of confusion, The Death of God by Vahanian, we find possibly only this one clear idea: “The post-Christian ethic here diverges from the Christian to the point of opposing it radically. In the Christian view, Adam’s fall simultaneously precipitated the corruption of the whole world. The solidarity of mankind, on this account, is a corollary of its common sinfulness. Responsibility surges from the realization of guilt and its forgiveness by a divine intervention. By contrast, the post-Christian ethic establishes solidarity on the basis of man’s innocence of the absurdity of the world. The great difference lies in this: the Christian ethic is an ethic of forgiveness; the post-Christian is an ethic of innocence.”19

19 [TN] G. Vahanian, The Death of God (New York: Braziller, 1967), 185.

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Today people talk a lot about the theology of the death of God, and indeed this is the necessary outcome of religious progressivism. Notice that this death of God announced by the theologians is atheism born of agnosticism, the declaration that the problem of God has disappeared, as a problem of no interest. In fact, through the progressivist demythologization religious society is destined to merge into secular society, as was said (but in a different sense from mine) by Ugo Spirito.20 It is extremely interesting to consider the process that goes from Karl Barth’s dialectic theology to the theology of the death of God. Extremely interesting because it confirms the decisive role played by a historicopolitical judgment in the development of progressivism. And because it shows how Marxism is able to throw into a crisis the restoration of Protestant theology, which Barth had brought back to its origins and dissociated from the liberal theology that reconciled Protestantism with modern philosophy. Dietrich Bonhoeffer is an exceptionally important transitional figure in this connection, precisely because he demonstrates the decisive role of an attitude towards contemporary history in setting the new direction in theological thought. His letters from prison21 illustrate well the stages of the process of conversion to a world that has now come of age – it is in Bonhoeffer that this formula appears for the first time, a phrase that today has such evocative (I daresay, almost kerygmatic) power for the theologians of the aggiornamento. The letters illustrate both the ethico-political motivation associated with it, and the acceptance of the interpretation of the history of modern thought as an irreversible process of secularization. Indeed, we cannot understand Bonhoeffer apart from his role in the resistance, his collaboration in the resistance with men without religion, his rejection of the typical Lutheran relationship between religion and politics (relinquishing the whole exterior aspect of human life to the state), and also his critique of religious interiorism and existentialism. As has been correctly pointed out, there is a judgment behind his whole ethico-religious thought: that Nazism is not an incidental and accidental episode of returning barbarism, but an outcome that drags into its catastrophe a whole tradition and a whole civilization. This is precisely the vision that I identified as the soul of progressivism. And his process of thought is the most consistent illustration of the consequences that must be reached in the theological realm starting from this vision. 20 [TN] Ugo Spirito (1896–1979), Italian political thinker and philosopher. Del Noce is probably referring to various statements found in Spirito’s essay “Ideali che tramontano e ideali che sorgono” (see footnote 32). 21 [TN] Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison (New York: Touchstone, 1997).

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Therefore, let us highlight a few crucial passages from his letters. The theology of the death of God begins to appear in the 30 April 1944 letter to his friend Bethge: You would be surprised, and perhaps even worried, by my theological thoughts and the conclusions that they lead to … The time when people could be told everything by means of words, whether theological or pious, is over, and so is the time of inwardness and conscience – and that means the time of religion in general. We are moving towards a completely irreligious time; people as they are now simply cannot be religious any more … Our whole nineteen-hundred-yearold Christian preaching and theology rests on the ‘religious a priori’ of mankind. ‘Christianity’ has always been a form – perhaps the true form – of ‘religion.’ But if one day it becomes clear that this a priori does not exist at all, but was a historically conditioned and transient form of human self-expression, and if therefore man becomes radically irreligious – and I think that that is already more or less the case (else how is it, for example, that this war, in contrast to all previous ones, is not calling forth any ‘religious’ reaction?) – what does that mean for ‘Christianity’? It means that the foundation is taken away from the whole of what has up until now been our ‘Christianity’ and that there remain only a few ‘last survivors of the age of chivalry,’ or a few intellectually dishonest people … if our final judgment must be that the western form of Christianity, too, was only a preliminary stage to a complete absence of religion, what kind of situation emerges for us, for the church? How can Christ become the Lord of the religionless as well? Are there religionless Christians? If religion is only a garment of Christianity – and even this garment has looked very different at different times – then what is religionless Christianity?22

And further on: I often ask myself why a ‘Christian instinct’ often draws me more to the religionless people than to the religious, by which I don’t in the least mean with any evangelizing intention, but, I might almost say, ‘in brotherhood’… Religious people speak of God when human knowledge … has come to an end, or when human resources fail – in fact it is always the deus ex machina, that they bring onto the scene, either for the apparent solution of insoluble problems, or as strength in human failure – always, that is to say, exploiting human weakness or human boundaries. Of necessity, that can go on only till people can by their own strength push these boundaries somewhat further out, so that God becomes superfluous as deus ex machina … It always seems to me that we are trying anxiously in this way

22 [TN] Ibid., 279–80.

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to reserve some space for God; I should like to speak of God not on the boundaries but at the center, not in weakness but in strength; and therefore not in death and guilt but in man’s life and goodness. As to the boundaries, it seems to me better to be silent and leave the insoluble unsolved … God’s ‘beyond’ is not the beyond of our cognitive faculties. The transcendence of epistemological theory has nothing to do with the transcendence of God. God is beyond in the midst of our life. The church stands, not at the boundaries where human powers give out, but in the middle of the village. That is how it is in the Old Testament, and in this sense we still read the New Testament far too little in the light of the Old.23

In a letter in May: Our church, which has been fighting in these years only for its self-preservation, as though that were an end in itself, is incapable of taking the word of reconciliation and redemption to mankind and to the world. Our earlier words are therefore bound to lose their force and cease, and our being Christian today will be limited to two things: prayer and righteous action among men … the day will come when men will once more be called to utter the word of God so that the world will be changed and renewed by it. It will be a new language, perhaps quite non-religious, but liberating and redeeming.24

In the letter of 29 May: It has again brought home to me quite clearly how wrong it is to use God as a stop-gap for the incompleteness of our knowledge. If in fact the frontiers of knowledge are being pushed further and further back (and that is bound to be the case), then God is being pushed back with them, and is therefore continually in retreat.25

In the 8 June letter we find the complete acceptance of the secularist vision of history: The movement that began about the thirteenth century … towards the autonomy of man (in which I should include the discovery of the laws by which the world lives and deals with itself in science, social and political matters, art, ethics, and religion) has in our time reached an undoubted completion. Man has learned to deal with himself in all questions of importance without recourse to the ‘working hypothesis’ called ‘God.’ In questions of science, art, and ethics this 23 [TN] Ibid., 281–2. 24 [TN] Ibid., 300. 25 [TN] Ibid., 311.

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has become an understood thing at which one now hardly dares to tilt. But for the last hundred years or so it has also become increasingly true of religious questions; it is becoming evident that everything gets along without ‘God’ – and, in fact, just as well as before. As in the scientific field, so in human affairs generally, ‘God’ is being pushed more and more out of life, losing more and more ground … Christian apologetic has taken the most varied forms of opposition to this self-assurance. Efforts are made to prove to a world thus come of age that it cannot live without the tutelage of ‘God.’ Even though there has been surrender on all secular problems, there still remain the so-called ‘ultimate questions’ – death, guilt – to which only ‘God’ can give an answer, and because of which we need God and the Church and the pastor. So we live, to some degree, on these so-called ultimate questions of humanity. But what if one day they will no longer exist as such, if they too can be answered ‘without God’? Of course, we now have the secularized offshoots of Christian theology, namely existentialist philosophy and the psychotherapists, who demonstrate to secure, contented, and happy mankind that it is really unhappy and desperate and simply unwilling to admit that it is in a predicament about which it knows nothing, and from which only they can rescue it. Wherever there is health, strength, security, simplicity, they scent luscious fruit to gnaw at or to lay their pernicious eggs in.26

I quoted these long passages because they contain all the essential elements of death of God theology, and because from them we can decipher its genetic process. Bonhoeffer is a Protestant theologian who participates in the Resistance. In this Resistance, he fights side-by-side with non-religious men, and does not get any support from the official position of the Lutheran church for his decision to join the Resistance, which he perceives as an absolute commitment. Hence he cannot give a religious interpretation of the world war, which in some respects seems to him a war between Christianity and barbarism, but not a war of religion since irreligious men also fight on the right side. By the very fact that religion no longer acts as a guide in the most crucial decisions, he is led to interpret the war as a crisis of growth: there is a world that has come of age, and reactionary forces that want to keep it under tutelage. In a sense he truly is the theologian of the Resistance, and his moral stature is superior. However, his judgment as a fighter is not necessarily a rigorous historical judgment. In a way, his experience is the exact opposite of that of Simone Weil, and this parallelism would deserve a study. On one side, the Protestant theologian who arrives at a religionless Christianity; on the other, the anarchist who comes to the religious

26 [TN] Ibid., 325–6.

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dimension. I am about to say that Weil starts where Bonhoeffer ends, and that her guidance is much more reliable in order to interpret today’s world. But, in a peculiar inversion, today Bonhoeffer is popular to the exact same extent that Weil has been forgotten. I will grant that this interpretation may seem simplistic, and even annoying: because it is a fact that Bonhoeffer died a Christian martyr and that his criticism of “religion” is conducted in the name of “faith”: “the ‘religious act’ is always something partial; ‘faith’ is something whole, involving the whole of one’s life.”27 I am inclined to see in this sentence from the letter of 18 July 1944 the core of his thought. And certainly I have no intention to put him in the same category as today’s theologians of the death of God, if for no other reason than his thought was born from the refusal to compromise in any way with the historical world around him, whereas recent positions arose, or at least spread, very differently. But I think that one should not exaggerate in the opposite direction either, to the point of reducing his position to a polemic against ecclesiastic triumphalism and any kind of compromise, in the name of an integrally lived faith; a polemic in which his language went occasionally beyond his actual thought. It is undeniable that his thought develops towards an atheistic theology, because he felt obliged to acknowledge that atheism is an indisputable aspect of the world that has come of age. The question to be asked is how such an ardently religious spirit was led – because he wanted to be such all the way to the ultimate consequences – to encounter atheism, in the given historical circumstances. Here, I think a reference to Marxism is indispensable. Of course I am not thinking of any direct influence by Marxist doctrine, of which I have found no trace. I am thinking of Marxism become history. Let us go back to the sentence on the “partiality” of religion and the “totality and vitality of faith” and let us relate, for instance, Bohoeffer’s thought to that of Ernst Bloch, whose Marxism, while still atheistic, is nonetheless so totally imbued with religiosity that it presents itself as the religious form that corresponds to the authentic religious need of man who has come of age. This type of Marxism would recognize in Bohoeffer’s conversion to the theology of the death of God the decisive proof of its truth: today the Christianity of religious transcendence is so completely surpassed by history that the will to live integrally as a Christian leads to atheistic theology. The transition from Christianity to Marxism is possible today because “religious” Christianity cannot be lived with complete intellectual honesty. Whereas crudely scientistic and economicistic

27 [TN] Ibid., 362.

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Marxism simply rejects Christianity, Marxism that recognizes the eschatological dimension (which is, in fact, part of its essence) sublates Christianity by making it adequate to the adult age of the world. Thus, the problem of the relationship with Marxism is intrinsic to Bohoeffer’s thought – not Marxism mellowed down into a neutral science of society, but Marxism recognized in its atheistic character, wherein lies also its religious aspect, as I already mentioned. In the heat of the resistance against Nazism, he ignored this problem, but it would have become unavoidable if he had survived. What would have been his answer? We cannot say, but if I can venture a hypothesis (backed by nothing, however) I believe that he would not have accepted the Marxism route, but would have been forced to radically revise his thought, calling into deeper question his protestant presuppositions. At any rate, his work is interrupted precisely at the crucial point. Therefore, taking it today not as a document – and I think I have stressed enough its exceptional importance in this respect – but as a guide seems to me, before anything else, disrespectful. I do not know if more recent theologians of the death of God deserve much attention, even if we had time. What must be observed is that the scheme is always the same: bringing Christianity into line with a world that has come of age, where this maturity of the world is always seen as a process towards atheism. I believe that few secular people are as certain as these theologians that the historical process of thought must be interpreted as an irreversible process of secularization. What is curious is the return to religious positions that were already affirmed by positivism in the nineteenth century. We should not be surprised: once metaphysics is gone, what is left are science and religion. What then happens is that the room for religion seems to shrink the more the sciences extend into the human sphere. So, it is not by chance that in Bonhoeffer we find already the core thesis of positivism: the room for God decreases to the same extent that the domain of the unknown decreases. If we then consider Cox’s The Secular City,28 it is curious how this Baptist pastor is unaware that he is repeating (except for a complete lack of philosophical rigor) what was said in the last century by a thinker of great stature, Auguste Comte. Consider the distinction (highly prized by its proponents) between secularization and secularism, where the former is the outcome of the process of history and the latter is a closed ideology that threatens the openness and freedom brought about by secularization. Now, we

28 [TN] Harvey Cox, The Secular City (New York: Macmillan, 1965).

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only need to pick up A General View of Positivism,29 which Comte wrote as a preface to his System of Positive Polity, in order to find the same distinction. With great energy, Comte distinguishes positivism, the modern stage of thought, from atheism, a position that originated during the metaphysical stage and bears its mark. If we recall what Comte means by metaphysical stage, we see that the words used by Cox about secularism – a closed ideology functionally very similar to a new religion – match it exactly. What Comte says is in no way a mellowing of atheism: it simply means that in the positive age God has disappeared without leaving a trace, because the very question has disappeared. Atheists who raise the question of God to answer it negatively are merely inconsistent theologians. As for Van Buren,30 his insistence on the humanity of Christ, setting aside the theology of theologians, is a vague reminder of the thought of Stuart Mill. In sum, what characterizes the progressivism of the protestant theologians of the death of God is their conformity to secular progressivism. Nor could it be different, given the common background. As for Catholic progressivism, today it shows a tendency to conform to the protestant version. The fast decline in the fortunes of Teilhard de Chardin is proof. Let us read what a super progressive theologian from Malaga, González-Ruiz, writes about him: Even the last Christian attempt by Teilhard de Chardin is exposed to an immanentist interpretation of God’s active presence in the world … A scientific consideration of the world has no need to include the problem of God among its intrinsic and immanent presuppositions, as if this were a key to explain its enigmas. Therefore, a biblical believer not only can, but must exclude from the horizon of his faith the danger of falling and remaining in a religious ideology, and must fight against it as a source of alienation and a drag on cosmic and human autonomy.31

In brief, even though Teilhard replaced the static conception of cosmos with the dynamic one, he was guilty of religious ideology, a threat of

29 [TN] Auguste Comte, System of Positive Polity, First Volume, trans. John H. Bridges (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1875). 30 [TN] Paul M. van Buren (1924–1998), Christian theologian and professor of religion at Temple University. 31 [TN] José María González-Ruiz, Dios es gratuito pero no superfluo [God is gratuituous but not superfluous] (Madrid: Ediciones Marova, 1970), 120, 122; my translation from the Spanish original.

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alienation. Marxists such as Garaudy are definitely more indulgent to him than the latest trends in Catholic progressivism! Of course, the “biblical believer” keeps coming up in Gonzalez Ruiz’s works. What is being affirmed is the opposition of biblical thought and Greek thought, which is the primary identifier of a Modernist, and the link between early twentieth-century Modernism and today’s. To summarize this first part, I will say that secular, Protestant, and Catholic progressivisms no longer exist as such. What exists is just one progressivism characterized by an irreligious form of atheism. Therefore, this progressivism is different from Marxism, which is atheism as a secular religion. Whereas it presumes to surpass Marxism, in reality it just expresses its decomposition, although it must also be said that this decomposition is inevitable. At this point, we can already reach a first definition of the meaning of traditionalism and progressivism today. European tradition was characterized by the idea, albeit expressed in many forms, of the presence in man of a divine element that distinguishes him qualitatively from other beings in our experience. In yesterday’s world practical judgments may have differed, but they all moved in the framework of this conception. But today’s renewed Enlightenment is forced into a negativism that must go through all the stages of the affirmation that in man there is nothing that possesses an independent metaphysical origin, and that therefore ideas do not reveal anything, but are mere tools to transform reality. We saw how this negativism cannot formulate new ideals, or if it pretends to formulate them it is only as negations of the ideals of the past. At the same time, the pessimistic and the revolutionary avenues are also closed. Then, what is left except pure self-­affirmation in the most strictly individualistic and egotistic sense? Naturally, this is not stated: never has altruism been flaunted like today, never has it it been affirmed more forcefully that the greatest and first commandment of the Gospel, the love of God, boils down to the second, the love of neighbor – adding that we do not love others because we recognize in them the image of God, but on the contrary we see them as children of God because we love them. It is enough to experience today’s world in its most common aspects in order to find confirmation of what was already written by the philosopher who measured exactly the significance of the death of God, Nietzsche. Love of neighbor is replaced by love of what is distant, and love for what is distant is actually used to justify all kinds of exploitation of our neighbor. The death of God is followed by the will to power, unabated under the masks of altruism, humanitarianism, and philanthropy.

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4 . P r o g r e s s i v i s m M o v i n g T o wa r d s the Fullness of Totalitarianism We talked about progressivism as a kind of Enlightenment after Marxism, and Marx can help us define the necessary outcome of this progressivism. In fact, what is the Enlightenment according to orthodox Marxism, if not the typical bourgeois ideology? And what characterizes the bourgeois spirit, again according to Marxism, if not competition pushed to the extreme? Extreme Enlightenment coincides with extreme competition, and this is right in front of us. The process that leads to the formation of small hegemonic groups is essentially symmetrical to that of the royal courts during the absolutist age; these groups are the more oppressive the more they “do not represent” – people who do not belong to the ruling classes cannot feel represented by the new elites precisely to the extent that there is no ideal bond. I am not happy to use the words alienation and reification, which are worn out and, above all, have been so unpleasantly misused. And yet, what can be the fate of most people in this system? To be totally uprooted, reduced to mere instruments. And even if I would rather not bring back Marcuse, it is undeniable that the outcome of this type of society is the creation of one-dimensional men. Can we then speak of a revolutionary situation? Actually, we can speak only of revolutionary ferments that express themselves in spasmodically and vainly destructive agitations. The revolutionary generation may well say that the Communist party has become bourgeois, part of the system, and so on. In fact, its restlessness is just proof of its powerlessness. And it will be easy for the Communist party, or for its Catholic or socialist allies, to recover this new generation. Through this process of forming and constantly co-opting nihilist movements (after their acts of destruction), the Communist party will position itself as the strongest amongst the hegemonic groups, and the others will be able to rule only to the extent that they come to an agreement with it. But this neo-Communism will come after the process of ideal decomposition to which Marxism is vulnerable, and thus it will be devoid of the revolutionary aspect. In other words, Communism will be a component of broader progressivism. The immediate prospect, if progressivism succeeds, is the most despotic conservatism that ever appeared in history, because its premise is the absolute obliteration of the idea of another reality, either earthly or heavenly. There would be no lack of agreement – in fact, agreement would be necessary, based on my previous remarks – with the new theologians of the post-Christian age, who proclaim the end of all myths and all transcendent illusions. But a regime that puts an end to hope is the very definition of the greatest degree that an oppressive system can reach.

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Here the discussion should be broadened: the endpoint that must be reached by progressivism is the destruction of the three theological virtues – faith, hope, and charity – and their inadequate secular translations. The most precise definition of totalitarianism is perhaps as a political regime in which these three virtues have been destroyed. At this point two questions arise. First, whether the change in evaluations that we have witnessed for a quarter of a century, in a steady progress which cannot be anything but shocking, might be given a different or even opposite interpretation from the one I have outlined. Second, whether the view of contemporary history that has propelled the success of progressivism might be essentially mistaken. If we could prove it, it would be a decisive step, since the discussion of progressivism in its entirety necessarily reduces to the interpretation of history that informs it. 5 . P o s s i b i l i t y o f a D i f f e r e n t I n t e r p r e tat i o n o f   t h e P r e s e n t S i t uat i o n Regarding the first question, no matter how hard we look there is only one possible alternative: the interpretation that explains the present crisis of values as a developmental crisis due to scientific and technological progress. We can be summarize it in the following sentences by Ugo Spirito: “in barely over twenty years a change has taken place that has no precedent in human history and seems almost incomprehensible to those who cannot look forward into the future. A new world has established itself, to which yesterday’s criteria of evaluation do not apply. Those who have opened their eyes to this transformation cannot think and act according to the faith of a world that is finished.”32 This view could be called neo-Comtian: mankind has moved from the theological and metaphysical stage to the scientific and technical stage. Neither Hegel nor Marx nor Nietzsche were the prophets of the present situation, but rather the scarcely read philosophical interpreter of the École

32 [TN] Ugo Spirito. “Ideali che tramontano e ideali che sorgono” [Ideals that wane and ideals that rise], in Futuribili 2, no. 6 (January 1969): 9–26. It was republished in two parts in L’Europa 3, no. 15–16 (19 April 1969): 20–7, and no. 17 (26 April 1969): 54–9, and then again in a joint volume by Spirito and Del Noce, Tramonto o eclissi dei valori tradizionali? [Sunset or eclipse of traditional values?] (Milan: Rusconi, 1971), 15–58. An English translation by Anthony G. Constantini appeared in Italian Quarterly no. 177–8 (2008): 59–82. Del Noce is actually quoting a “breakout” in L’Europa of 19 April 1969 (22), that is, a separate block of text that highlights a few key sentences from the article; my translation.

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Polytechnique. And the letter he wrote to the General of the Jesuits33 to persuade him to embrace the new positivist religion was truly prophetic. Even if for a century it was judged bizarre or insane, that letter now takes its full meaning, and some Jesuits have answered (it would be easy to depict Teilhard’s thought as the answer to Comte’s letter). The arguments in support of this thesis are extremely easy:34 the spatial and temporal dimensions of life have changed through cybernetics, automation, television, astronautics, the development of nuclear energy. This technical progress has unified the world, and yesterday’s criteria of evaluation cannot apply any longer to this new world. This unification process, by homogenizing the ways of life of every country, cannot but lead to the establishment of common ideals for all mankind, so that the rising values are precisely those of a universal character, and the fading values those that belong to more or less limited areas, and so are only of particular interest. But what are these rising universal values, and what are the fading particular values? Spirito answers that since values become universal when they prove capable of creating a general consensus, the knowledge that is promoting world unification is scientific knowledge, whereas religions, philosophies, and political ideologies are the forms of knowledge that are limited to specific regions and specific social groups. The essential difference between the two types of knowledge lies in the fact that particular knowledge is characterized by the presumption of possessing the truth and the will to fight against different and opposite presumptions. Conversely, scientific knowledge is characterized by the recognition of its own hypothetical nature, which opposes the simple will to search to the delusional possession of the truth, calling for universal collaboration. It is then easy to see which values are destined to fade away (religious, metaphysical, and ideological-political ones), whereas the values of the future will be scientific and technical; they are destined to address the needs expressed by the old values, raising them to the level of universality that they lack. All that Spirito says is an exact rediscovery of what Comte said. I say this not to diminish its importance, but because it is an example of the return to the origins that characterizes the contemporary world, from the time when Lenin started the return to the early Marx. This return to the origins is also the positive aspect of our age, as a rejection of every 33 [TN] Regarding this episode in Comte’s life, see M. Pickering, Auguste Comte, An Intellectual Biography, Vol. 3 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 421–3 and references therein. 34 [TN] What follows is a synopsis of the first few pages of Spirito’s “Ideali che tramontano e ideali che sorgono.”

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eclecticism. Now, my view is exactly the opposite: the scientific spirit and its practical consequences did not produce the eclipse of traditional values. On the contrary, it is the eclipse of traditional values that led to the hubris of science as the new ideal that rises and replaces the others as primary value. 6 . R e l e va n c e o f A u g u s t i n e ’ s I d e a o f W i s d o m to the Rediscovery of Traditional Values I spoke deliberately of a return to the sources in order to interpret today’s situation. Why not go back to the Christian sources as well? A few days ago, I happened to read for the first time with open eyes book XII, De Scientia et Sapientia, of St Augustine’s De Trinitate.35 I will confess my shock and my surprise: I found in the pages written by this saint, so ­distant from the spatial and temporal coordinates of our age, the most perfect description of the age in which we are living. I don’t think it is naive or paradoxical at all to say that the many books about the crisis that have piled up, from Spengler to the present, lead us back to read this Augustinian text. I said at the start that I did not intend to discuss the concepts of traditionalism and progressivism in the abstract, but in the sense that they take today, inserted in the current historical context. Now, after we have examined the progressive view of tradition, De Trinitate offers us the criterion to look at the present situation from the standpoint of traditional values. What traditionalism may have meant in other epochs is a question that I am not going to consider now. Instead, what I am saying is that we have to look at book XII of De Trinitate to find the most precise definition of what it means today to recover tradition. What does St Augustine say? He distinguishes between the exterior man, who essentially is the subject of the human sciences, and the interior man, who is in contact with the eternal truths, which direct judgment and action. Left to its own devices, thought would just turn to seek the intelligible realities, pure contemplation. We have here the meaning of the primacy of contemplation, which is the core thesis of traditional thought. And let progressives feel free to understand traditionalism as exterior transmission of pre-cooked formulas and behaviors dictated by mere conformism. Why be polemical, after all? A characteristic of progressivism is that it cannot account for history, and this to the precise extent that it claims to speak in history’s name.

35 [TN] Augustine, On the Trinity, Books 8–15, ed. Gareth B. Matthews, trans. Steven McKenna (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

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According to St Augustine, thought left to itself would just turn to seek the intelligible realities, pure contemplation. But, on the other hand, the human soul is made to rule the body, and thus to live and act, and man in his earthly state finds himself directed towards ends that are not those of contemplation. Thus, reason, which per se is one, has two functions, and therefore two virtues, the active and the contemplative, Rachel and Leah, Martha and Mary. The pragmatic function of science was not unknown to St Augustine. But it is important to observe something else: higher and lower reason are just functions of the same reason. Forgetting this leads to the sanction of slavery, more or less hidden. These Augustinian passages would immediately lose meaning if they were used to embellish a colonial system, and unfortunately they have been used to that effect. Hence the diffidence that we see today – so common even among Catholics – against the term contemplation, almost as if it were the ideological basis for the distinction between freemen and slaves. It shows how much the habits of sociologistic thought have penetrated the common opinion. Let us just say that “primacy of contemplation” means that there is a necessary, unchangeable, eternal truth shared by all spirits, superior to man and guiding his action. As such, it is the basis not for separation among social classes, but rather for spiritual unity. Two necessary functions for man. But man faces a choice regarding their hierarchic relationship. He can opt for the primacy of wisdom, for contemplation, for the divine ideas according to which he judges everything, and to which he submits himself in order to judge everything else by their standard. He can opt for lower reason, for sensible things, for domination above them, for exploitation of them, and this is the option for the primacy of science. Hence, the difference between science and wisdom depends on the nature of their objects. The object of wisdom is such that, because of its very intelligibility, any bad use is impossible; that of science is such that, because of its very materiality, it is constantly exposed to the danger of being prey to what St Augustine calls avaritia and cupiditas, giving these words roughly the same meaning. Indeed, science can be used well or badly. It can be subordinated to wisdom, or it can be subordinated to cupiditas. Let us translate this in modern terms: it is the question that judgments of value cannot be derived from the judgments of fact at which science has to stop. It is completely delusional to regard science as the rising value, for the simple reason that science cannot give values. “Now, science, any science, establishes relationships, does not give values. Relationships may well lead us to give value to some object, if they establish the conditional and causal dependence of a value from what becomes in turn a mediated value, precisely because of this connecmust be already given, posited, recognized as tion. But the

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value in order to make possible any axiological judgment about what is in relationship with it.”36 Who said these words? An Italian moral philosopher from a now-remote generation, of great value and yet not well known, Erminio Juvalta. He was close to positivism and initially keen on affirming a form of morality completely autonomous from metaphysics and from religion; and yet, he moved away from positivism exactly because of the affirmation that judgments of value are absolutely not derivable from science. But in this book St Augustine describes also the characteristics of the option to subordinate wisdom to science. So, it is not surprising that, in order to describe the dynamic by which the spirit gets attached to things to treat them as its end, he resorts to scripture, and that in this book philosophy and theology meet, and meet precisely in the discussion of original sin. The disposition by which the spirit gets attached to things to treat them as its end is the essence of cupiditas, and cupiditas is the opposite of charitas. Subordinating wisdom to science leads to the use of the whole for the sake of the individual; the domination of pure science, of science not subordinated to wisdom, leads to the pure anarchism that has been identified as one feature of today’s situation. Thus, the historical situation characterized by the primacy of science is perfectly predicted by St Augustine. It is a possible situation, but it cannot be interpreted as the rise of new ideals. Rather, it defines the sunset of ideals that is being demonstrated by the current process of dehumanization and that St Augustine describes as the victory of cupiditas over charitas. It is because a historical-political judgment branded the traditional ideals as dis-values that the idol of science established itself, bringing along its twin, the idol of progress. At most, one can reflect about science’s power as divertissement, in the sense that today its progress distracts from the pessimistic reflection that would be prompted by the negativist side of today’s millennialism. 7 . T h e C r i s i s o f t h e C at h o l i c C h u rc h S t e m s from an Incorrect Judgment about the Philosophical Significance of Marxism Let us summarize what we have seen so far: a historical judgment that took shape as a reaction to an imperfect totalitarianism is now at risk of leading to full totalitarianism, a fullness which is possible only via the

36 [TN] Erminio Juvalta, Il vecchio e il nuovo problema della morale [The old and the new moral problem] (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1914), 11.

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combination of a nearly total eclipse of religion with scientific progress so great that the most hidden and private recesses of individual life can be controlled. I say risk, but not as a mere probability. This possibility is actually a certainty unless a new factor intervenes, and this new factor can be indicated exactly: that the Catholic Church overcome its crisis. I mentioned already the element of crisis in the Catholic Church: it is the progressivist and Modernist invasion, which must fatally lead to death of God theology and must fatally lead to the demythologization whereby religious society melts away into secular society. But I also described the roots of the progressivist crisis. Hence the question: is the vision of contemporary history that lies at the root of progressivism the only possible one? I do not need to emphasize again the fundamental importance of this question. Depending on the answer, we will have to speak either of sunset or instead of mere eclipse of traditional values. In the answer that I can sketch now, I will take up again the thesis that I already advanced in my book The Problem of Atheism:37 contemporary history cannot be explained exhaustively unless one sees that the philosophy of Marx has, at the same time, become reality and been defeated. Forgive me for insisting for a moment on this formula which, in fact, isolates me. The first part of the thesis aims at explaining contemporary history through the potency of Marx’s philosophy as interpreted by Lenin, first of all as a theoretician – and this is where I part ways with almost all non-­Communist philosophers and historians. In the second part I obviously part ways, instead, with Marxist-Leninist philosophers and historians, or in fact with every form of Marxism, since in my opinion Marx-Leninism is the only rigorous continuation of Marxism. To speak simultaneously of the potency and defeat of Marxism is to  say that its work has been essentially dissolutive. To show that Protestantism and Catholic Modernism are involved in this work of dissolution is the negative introduction to the definition of the tradition that can be recovered. Certainly this is an extremely vast program, but I will try at least to state a few essential propositions. The first concerns how non-Marxist thought should relate to Marxism. There are two erroneous ways, which have also manifested themselves in the interpretation of contemporary history: pure and simple rejection and sublation. Are they the only possible ones? To show that they are not, I will refer to an example that some may find peculiar and others archaic: the birth of Croce’s philosophy. It is certainly not a question of

37 [TN] Augusto Del Noce, Il problema dell’ateismo (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1964).

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going back to his position; still, we cannot help recalling it, because it was the only philosophy that took shape with Marxism as its primary and essential opponent. Saying why his attempt failed is not important now; in my judgment this failure goes to show that Marxism cannot be beaten from within historicism and immanentism. However, there is an aspect of his initial position that must be kept in mind. After Marx, he encountered Herbart’s thought, whence he drew the idea of the philosophy of distincts.38 Regarding Marxism, he did not think at all of sublating/surpassing it in the Hegelian manner. This point carries a lesson. In order for non-Marxist culture to establish a line of resistance against Marxism, the model to follow is not dialectic sublation but rather those acts of selfpreservation through which, according to Herbart, the Reals defend themselves from perturbations, the threats of destruction coming from other Reals.39 Let us abandon Herbart’s language in favour of that of traditional Christian thought: we shall say that the line of resistance cannot be the attempted sublation that we have observed in various forms of progressivism, with the outcome we know, but rather the explication of a virtuality of tradition. The word “virtuality” evokes the words inclusion, ulteriority, growth. But I would like to separate it from all possible evolutionary misunderstandings: if we can speak of growth, it is only in reference to our knowledge, since the formulas we use are always inadequate to express the fullness of the content. The explication of the virtualities of tradition is, thus, purification from the deviations that took place over time, called for by the fact of these very deviations. Therefore, one cannot speak of a truth of Modernism to be included in a reaffirmation of Catholic thought, like one cannot speak of a truth of Marxism and atheism. Instead, we must speak of Modernism, Marxism, and atheism as occasions and stimuli so that the truth of tradition may shine in a better light. The second proposition is that contemporary history is a philoso­ phical history, as history of philosophy that becomes world. This thesis 38 [TN] I translated as “distincts” the Italian “distinti.” The use of this adjective as a noun (instead of “distinzioni” which means “distinctions”) was originally introduced by Croce in the course of his reform of Hegelian philosophy. He argued that Hegel was mistaken in thinking that dialectics works only by opposition, whereas the four forms of the life of the Spirit (aesthetic, logical, economic, and ethical, the four “distinti”) are distinct, not opposed, and the dialectics of opposition operates only within each one of them. For a recent discussion in English of Croce’s ideas, see B. Copenhaver and R. Copenhaver, “How Croce Became a Philosopher: to Logic from History by Way of Art,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 25, no. 1 (2008): 75–94. 39 [TN] J. F. Herbart, Allgemeine Metaphysik [General Metaphysics] (Königsberg: Unzer, 1828), §329.

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should not meet any resistance if we reflect about the distinctive character of Marx’s philosophy, that of being a philosophy ante factum, not a philosophy post factum like Hegel’s or (according to Marx) every other. That is, it is a philosophy that does not present itself as awareness of a world, but that explicates itself in the creation of a world. This is what is affirmed, after all, by the last thesis on Feuerbach,40 which is as often repeated as it is little understood. This is the meaning of the Marxist critiques of speculative philosophy and interpretative philosophy. The third is that this is precisely the focus of Lenin’s thought. It is all about searching for a philosophical practice; not for a new philosophy of praxis, but a new practice of philosophy. In order to understand what Lenin represented, I think that what Lukács wrote in the introduction to History and Class Consciousness in December 1922 is still decisive: it is essential that we remind ourselves constantly of Lenin’s importance as a theoretician for the development of Marxism … he is only so effective in practice because of his greatness, profundity and fertility as a theoretician. His effectiveness rests on the fact that he has developed the practical essence of Marxism to a pitch of clarity and concreteness never achieved before. He has rescued this aspect of Marxism from an almost total oblivion and by virtue of this theoretical action he has once again placed in our hands the key to a right understanding of Marxist method.41

It cannot be said with greater clarity that at the beginning of contemporary history there is an ideal causality. Lenin the politician can only be explained by Lenin the theoretician, who insisted like nobody else on the inseparability of philosophy and politics in Marxism and on the essentiality of atheism in Marxism, to the point that for him true atheism and true Communism actually coincided. For Lenin, atheism is not in the least a polemical stance against the conservative attitudes of the Church. On the contrary, in his judgment there is no aspect of Communist praxis whose consistent justification is not atheism, and no other form of thought can provide such justification besides atheism. In this respect, if we consider that all the positions (ideal as well as practical) that have come to the fore in the years from 1917 to today refer somehow to the Russian revolution, we can say that the primary characteristic that must 40 [TN] “The philosophers have interpreted the world in various ways; the point however is to change it,” as stated in F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy (New York: International Publishers, 1941), 84. 41 [TN] György Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Boston: MIT Press, 1972), xlii.

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be attributed to contemporary history is that of being a “history of the expansion of atheism.” This judgment is confirmed if we look at both the moral and the religious aspects of today’s crisis. The fourth is that if we look at the result of the Marxist “becoming world of philosophy” half a century later, we must recognize that it failed according to the two criteria of truth on which it relied. The first was practical verification, namely the destruction of the bourgeois world and the creation of a universal classless society, somehow the modern analogue of medieval Christendom. But who can fail to notice that the Marxist revolution stopped precisely in front of the reality of nations, the reality that had taken shape during the development of the bourgeoisie? Today we can only remember with irony the thesis that Lenin’s special contribution to Marxist theory was the definition of imperialism as the ultimate form of capitalism. However, this practical criterion is not decisive per se, and one can invoke a passage by Lenin himself that says that “of course, we must not forget that the criterion of practice can never, in  the nature of things, either confirm or refute any human idea completely.”42 The other criterion is therefore more important: Marx’s thought wants to present itself as surpassing in a higher synthesis everything positive that had been affirmed in the history of philosophy. Indeed, his thought was underpinned by the certainty that Hegel summarizes the whole history of philosophy, and that the only valid position after Hegel was his. Now, Hegel’s history of philosophy was characterized by the idea of a unitary and irreversible process towards immanence, a  process that supposedly had become completely explicit in so-called modern thought. We touch here a point of the greatest importance. We must observe that this view of the history of philosophy had a precondition: the conviction that materialism and atheism were primitive and inadequate forms of immanentistic thought, valid in the polemics against theological supernaturalism, but destined to be surpassed in a restoration of the divine in immanent form (think of the major role played by this historiographic scheme in Italian Idealist culture, not so long ago). Now Marxism has shown precisely that atheism, not immanent divinity, is the result of rationalism. But this truth of Marxism forces on us the problem of placing atheism in the history of philosophy, no longer as a crude and naive form but as the ultimate outcome of rationalism. It forces us to turn our attention to the forms of atheism that stand at the conclusion of the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, and classical German

42 [TN] V.I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (New York: Progress Publishers, 1970), 142.

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philosophy, in its direction from Hegel to Marx and from Schopenhauer to Nietzsche. Not by chance, these forms of thought were pushed to the side in the history of philosophy of the Idealist kind, simply because they could not be included. I cannot discuss at length here what I have tried to illustrate elsewhere.43 If atheism is placed in the history of philosophy, the idea of a unitary process of modern philosophy crumbles, and the criterion itself of modernity as a value crumbles; in the history of the philosophy of so-called modern times two irreducible lines emerge: one from Descartes to Marx and Nietzsche, and one from Descartes to Rosmini, which is oriented towards an encounter with classical metaphysics and its reformulation to address new problems. But in light of this, we see that Marxism’s defeat brings with it the defeat of Modernism. Because we have seen that in Bonhoeffer, Cox, van Buren, Altizer, and Teilhard there is only one idea that is never doubted: precisely the idea that modernity represents a definitive step forward against which the new Christianity must be measured; the idea of an irreversible historical process towards adulthood, which is variously called post-Christian or post-religious. Placing atheism in the history of philosophy implies, in my judgment, depriving the word modernity of its axiological character and giving it only a problematic character. The modern age is characterized not by atheism as an endpoint, but merely by the rise of atheism as a problem. Certainly some people may not like the term traditionalism, because it reminds them of a certain line of Catholic thought in the nineteenth century, going from De Maistre to the early Lamennais – which today is criticized too severely anyway. But here I mean something else entirely: that today’s situation makes us encounter the Christian tradition as expressed by St Augustine in De Trinitate. Now, we must also observe the following: after commenting on book XII of De Trinitate, right at the beginning of the second part of his book on St Augustine44 – dedicated to the search for God through the will – Gilson writes that “in point of fact Augustine never tried to construct this edifice of Christian wisdom systematically, nor did he attempt to realize the synthesis of contemplation and science, although he often voiced the need for it. He set down the basic elements involved in the problem and left to the Middle Ages the 43 [TN] Del Noce, Il problema dell’ateismo. See also “The Idea of Modernity” in Augusto Del Noce, The Crisis of Modernity (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2015), 3–18. 44 [TN] Étienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, trans. L.E.M. Lynch (New York: Random House, 1960), 123. In what follows I turned Del Noce’s loose quotation of Gilson’s text into an exact quote from the book.

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task of working out a solution.” In other words, more than a thesis developed in complete detail, this book contains a program, in whose framework traditional Christian knowledge took shape. Thus, we can say that the present situation leads us to encounter the whole tradition of Christian thought from the angle of the thesis of De Trinitate. The St Augustine who speaks of the idea of wisdom is also the St Augustine who professes to continue Greek thought according to the fundamental passage that will inspire the Middle Ages: “philosophi autem qui vocantur, si qua forte vera et fidei nostrae accomodata dixerunt, maxime platonici, non solum formidanda non sunt, sed ab eis etiam tamquam iniustis possessoribus in usum nostrum vindicanda.”45

45 Augustine, De doctrina Christiana [On Christian teaching] Book II, Ch. 40, §60 [TN: “Moreover, if those who are called philosophers, and especially the Platonists, have said aught that is true and in harmony with our faith, we are not only not to shrink from it, but to claim it for our own use from those who have unlawful possession of it.” Translation by James F. Shaw from Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 2, ed. Philip Schaff (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887), 554].

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1. The Problem If there is an urgent problem today, it is that political parties must be brought up to date with respect to the new cultural and social circumstances, first of all by developing a clear judgment of what they are. Tackling this problem is now an unpostponable task. Therefore, I will begin with a reflection about the new features of the present situation. Twenty years ago the discussion about threats and hopes focused on Marxism. Today the problem has completely shifted, through a quiet process of development. Nowadays few people think of Marxism, in its messianic aspect, as what may come in the near future. They think instead of the technological society, regardless of what parties may be the interpreters of its advent. Certainly, nothing today rules out a Communist victory, or Russia’s domination of Europe. In fact, in my opinion that possibility has increased somewhat, but it presents itself in forms completely different from those of 1917 or 1947. Even a Communist party in power will be forced to deal with a technological world that it did not create, and which now seems to enjoy the privilege of being a “novelty.” Communism, in its old version, is no longer perceived as the “vanguard.” We must acknowledge that among Christians, and not only Catholics, there is great disorientation about how to assess this technological civilization. Some lean towards a catastrophic view: in this new society evaluations have severed the last constraint that tied morality, even when it called itself secular, to Christianity. Therefore, the only road left to a Christian is to take refuge into the “moral catacombs” and trust and hope in Providence, that is, in an action of “conversion of hearts” that This chapter was first published in Ethica 3 (1969): 169–92.

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cannot be human. The only intellectual task for a Catholic is, at present, to describe how distant this world is from the Christian ideal; his moral task is not to share at all in the evaluations it proposes, which are destined to spread among the masses without effective resistance by purely human powers; his political task is to follow the principle of the lesser evil, which certainly will not solve the problem, but at least will make it possible to delay. Others think, instead, that the new situation demands that Christian truth – which of itself transcends every civilization – be presented again in a new form; that is, religion’s forms change with the development of history. This is an extremely dangerous principle, which was already criticized by Rosmini in some little known but stupendously beautiful pages, where he discussed the religious theories of Benjamin Constant.1 In the end, it leads to the degenerations of a certain type of contemporary neo-Modernism. Others still say that the technological society, or society of well-being, or affluent society (clearly these terms are used, as synonyms, in a pejorative sense) is hostile to Marxism as much as to Christianity. Therefore, is this not the true time for dialogue? There are also two other approaches. The first was worked out, with as much clarity as rigor, by Sergio Cotta.2 The second is what I will try to develop, in broad strokes, in this article. It is not meant to be opposed to the first, but complementary. 2. Sergio Cotta’s Thesis3 According to Cotta, the Church and Catholic awareness have been able to take some undeniable steps forward during the last few years: the recognition of the positive value of the transformation in a democratic ­direction of the political system, and the awareness that in a regime of 1 See Frammenti di una storia dell’empietà [Fragments of a history of impiousness], which have just been reprinted with an important introductory essay by A. Cattabiani (Turin: Borla, 1968), in the series “Documents of Modern Culture.” 2 In his talk at the conference of the D.C. [Christian Democratic Party] in Lucca (whose Proceedings have been published by Editrice Cinque Lune) and in his recent book La sfida tecnologica [The technological challenge] (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1968) [TN: the talk mentioned by Del Noce is: Sergio Cotta, “La responsibilità politica dei cattolici nel rinnovamento odierno della società” [“The political responsibility of Catholics in the current renewal of society”] in I cattolici italiani nei tempi nuovi della cristianità [Italian Catholics in the new epoch of Christianity] (Rome: Editrice Cinque Lune, 1967), 71–121]. 3 [TN] This whole section is a summary of part 3 of Cotta’s “La responsibilità politica dei cattolici,” 100ff.

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freedom the Church’s message is not suffocated, but finds greater opportunities to be heard, in the free conscience of free citizens. However, something essential is still lacking, because the great majority of Catholics have failed to realize that today’s world has undergone a radical change; they persist in an old habit which was typical of the prevalent attitude of nineteenth-century Catholicism: the refusal to recognize the positive values of the modern world. Therefore, they oscillate between the ideal of an impossible restoration of pre-modernity and that of a reconciliation with revolutionary thought, which is atheistic and anti-Christian by essence. Let us reflect, instead: today’s technological development is nothing but the full realization of what had already been prepared since the beginning of the modern world. Man has risen from the ground, has disintegrated matter, has mastered the secrets of nature, subverts it and shapes it waiting to dominate it in its most hidden secrets. Man feels that he is the creator and redeemer of the world, and cannot help being it, since he has risen above his own limitations and the automatic mechanisms of nature. Is it humanistic pride? Or is it rather the affirmation of what distinguishes Christianity from other religious forms, the idea that man transcends nature? As a matter of fact, this was the perception of its first proponents, Bacon and Descartes; regnum hominis, but as the full explication of the vocation given by God to men. What might have seemed a utopia in the early 1600s is being fully realized today. But faced with this major development, which marks the transition from the past centuries to tomorrow’s world, Catholics, and above all Italian Catholics, behave in an appallingly simplistic way. They repeat the usual moralistic condemnation, either in the old traditionalist form or in the updated progressive version. Hence their designations of the new world in terms that carry a depreciative and pejorative connotation: affluent society, society of well-being, consumer society – whereas we should insist that the true designation, as technological society or civilization, is irreplaceable, and should recognize in it the most positive element of the modern age. The result is a devaluation of intelligence, which explains why intellectuals and scientists distrust Catholics. Now, what are the origins of this depreciative judgment, such that terms like well-being or affluence replace the expression technological society, as if this society focused only on the lower, animal side of man? For Cotta, this judgment reflects an intrusion into the Catholic world of evaluations coming from Marxism, and especially from early and “romantic” Marxism, with the curious result that they get linked with the Romanticism of Catholic reactionary thought. When the moralistic reaction is translated into a theoretical formulation, this negative judgment is expressed by regarding the technological society

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as an answer to Marxism and thus as a phenomenon subordinate to it, when the exact opposite is true. It is the technological society as a fact that pushes Marxism into a crisis, or at least pushes it in the direction of Engels, of its positivistic and scientistic soul. And it brings new vigor to Social Democracy, as happened in Germany and in the Scandinavian countries. This explains the harsh polemical response by Communist Marxism. Having been beaten at the level of science and the values of pure intelligence, it tries to return to Marx’s early philosophy in order to find revolutionary energy on a humanist, and no longer scientific, basis. Scientific Communism turns into romantic and anarchical Communism, a process which is unavoidable, because scientific progress confirms what yesterday’s Marxist-Leninists and some of today’s intellectuals contemptuously call the revisionist and Social Democratic view. Regarding the intellectuals, this polemic shows that they had embraced Communism in an anarchical disposition, because of the aesthetic appeal of its destructive aspect. If the revolutionary form endures in under-developed countries, it is because there Communism gets confused with a nationalist revolution against the domination by more technically and economically developed societies. It is not coincidental (and it is only an apparent paradox) that the formulas of early Marxism are being rediscovered in China for national reasons rather than reasons of class, and that in Russia it survives because of the competition with China. Hence the very peculiar reactionary unity against “tomorrow’s world” between integral, anti-revisionist Marxists and Catholic progressives. The former’s appeal to young Marx is matched exactly by the latter’s appeal to a social interpretation of the message of the ancient Fathers of the Church. At the bottom of this there is frightful ignorance and a serious moral deficiency, because “well-being” is the transition from a sub-­ human to a human life, and because delivering well-being is the form in which Christian love can find its full expression today. Earlier, it had been reduced to forms of consolatory discourse about the “trials” that God sends to the Christian and that he must accept – certainly not because of ill will on the part of the clerics, but by necessity, due to insufficient technical development. Technological development frees the Church from having to rely on “edification,” which was one of the major sources of irreligion. It is under the impetus of the scientific spirit, the spearhead of technological energy, and not under that of politico-revolutionary ideologies, that the world is transformed, fulfilling young Marx’s still romantic idea but in a completely different sense. Nor does the technological society find its theoretical awareness in neo-Enlightenment or in neo-positivism, whose representatives must be

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regarded, on the contrary, “as the fly that claims to be driving the coach (of progress), clueless bystanders who nevertheless demand to direct the work from the heights of a culture estranged from the true problems of development.”4 Given this, it is easy for Cotta to argue that the technological society does not in the least put Christianity into a crisis, that Christians’ present task is to bring their theocentric stance to bear on the building of tomorrow’s world, and that their most serious mistake would be to persist in their usual criticisms, thus leaving the field open to those whose only criterion of action is an anthropocentric scientific spirit. In fact, it will be precisely this Christian intervention that will prevent the technological society from leading to a technocratic oligarchy. 3. A Few Questions Anybody who wished to interpret Cotta’s thesis as a form of eclecticism, in the sense of seeking an agreement with the evaluations of those who in the 1600s were called “the worldly,” would be completely mistaken. On the contrary, his thesis is motivated by a deep religious faith. Indeed, does not the “catastrophic” view hide, deep down, regret for the passing of something worldly, a certain “Christian world” that cannot be identified with Christianity? And what about the pro-Communist progressivism of some Catholics, which resists a rigorous conceptual definition and must always use allusive language? Is it not just a periodic resurfacing of a state of mind that was common during the war and the Resistance, and that some of those who experienced it refuse to criticize, whereas a Christian attitude requires constant self-criticism? Furthermore, I think that Cotta’s vision is motivated by the will to avoid neo-Modernism in the only possible way, by accepting that there is something positive about the modern world. But now, precisely because I respect his deep seriousness, I have the obligation to be completely sincere and state as clearly as I can the reasons why I disagree, although I share Cotta’s criticism of the other positions. Let us begin by setting aside the obvious: there is no doubt that increasing the well-being of those who have less is a Christian duty and, in fact, a generically human duty. Likewise, there is no doubt that hunger can only be eliminated from the world (keeping into account also demographic growth) through greater technical activity nourished by science.

4 [TN] Cotta, “La responsibilità politica dei cattolici,” 117 (my translation).

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Therefore, the problem must be formulated in different terms, as of course Cotta does: is it true that modern science is the expression of pure intelligence, and must be regarded as the ideal type of intelligence? This seems to be his opinion, even though, of course, for him intelligence does not exhaust spirituality. If man were only intelligent, the technological civilization would be ruled by the oligarchy of those who best know how to interpret and organize a rationally planned system to satisfy the social needs, understood in a generically material sense. In order to avoid this outcome a “bigger soul”5 is required, to use a common catchphrase, which only religion can provide. We can now list the questions that arise about his thesis as follows. We wonder: 1 What are the moral characteristics of the technological society. 2 By what ideal process does the technological society surpass Marxism and throw it into a crisis. Depending on the answer to this question we will also be able to understand whether or not irreligion is essential and intrinsic to this type of civilization, and to define the task of Catholics with respect to it. 3 Whether the technological civilization is separable or not from positivism, in terms of the essential attitude it implies and, above all, of the historical tradition it rediscovers. 4 Whether the type of intelligence that underlies science linked with technology is the ideal type of intelligence as such. Or whether instead this type requires that we give up the metaphysical mindset, so that, as a first consequence, we could no longer speak of metaphysics but only of science and religion. It would be, however, a provisional and time-limited solution, because after a period of time that cannot be calculated exactly, but would be relatively short according to all indications, science would completely eliminate religion by eliminating the very dimension through which the sacred can ­become accessible to man. 5 Whether this type of intelligence is completely extraneous to judgments of value, so that, when it is turned into an absolute, it must necessarily destroy the authority of values. Whether, then, the transition to the technological civilization is destined to accomplish the 5 [TN] “Supplemento d’anima” in Italian, which refers to Henri Bergson’s famous “supplément d’âme” in Les Deux Sources de la morale et de la religion (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1932), 330; “bigger soul” is the translation used in The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, trans. R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesley Brereton with the assistance of W. Horsfall Carter (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963), 310.

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ultimate destruction of spiritual authority, and is therefore a spirit of disintegration. Whether, as a consequence, we must also regard as utopian the idea that the spirit that informs it will perform a ­pacifying function. 6 Whether the technocratic society, far from being a liberal civilization, represents the extreme type of conservative despotism in its Western and no longer Eastern form – that is, completely freed from the idea of a spiritual authority. 7 Whether the transition to a despotic oligarchy of scientists and technicians is absolutely inevitable and necessary in the technological ­civilization; so that the Catholics’ task would be to denounce from the start the irreligion that is essentially intrinsic to it, and the utopian illusion that we can infuse it with religiosity from within. 8 Whether the advent of the technological civilization must be ­regarded as necessary, given the irrevocability of scientific progress, or whether instead the transition from science to the idea of the technological civilization happened for reasons unrelated to ­science itself. 4. The Primacy of Doing In response to these questions, one can answer that the technological civilization can only be defined in terms of the suppression of a dimension, the religious dimension. In fact, the theses by the authors of the so-called Frankfurt school, from Adorno to Marcuse, have great resonance today. They do not speak of religion in the proper sense, it is true; however, they agree that the advent of the technological civilization marks the end of the transcendent dimension, albeit in the sense of transcendence within the world. It is important at this point to define in the simplest terms what I mean by religious dimension. I mean just the following: that there is an eternal and unchangeable order of truths and values, which we can come in contact with through intellectual intuition. In short, that there is a super-human reality, no matter how diverse may be the ways of signifying it. Before the advent of the technological mindset that has reached today the climax of its explication, all peoples agreed to this. And, on the other hand, how could man receive the light of the true faith if nothing had been left in him of this primitive revelation, even after sin? Now, it is precisely this religious dimension that is undermined and denied by the distinctive form of thought of the technological civilization, inasmuch as it presents itself as a new civilization. Let us use the

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terminology that was dear to Rosmini:6 in this form, the light of reason – the organ that perceives the absolute, the necessary, the objective and eternal – is replaced by man’s reason – individual and subjective, contingent and changeable. In other words, in the traditional view primacy belongs to the contemplation of an ideal order to which our action must conform. The technological civilization replaces it by the primacy of action, in the sense that human knowledge takes value only to the extent that it can serve practical purposes: transforming matter so that sensitive man may use it and exercise dominion over things. Of course, this attitude towards knowledge also affects practical values. From the thesis that knowledge is limited to the sensible world, it follows that the only reality that counts for man is material reality. And because matter is a principle of multiplicity and division, the consequence for man as a practical attitude will be a form of individualism which will imply the negation of every principle higher than the individual. The “creation” of values will be set in opposition to their authority, but since the word creation is meaningless in reference to man, this formula will take the meaning of negation and radical destruction of tradition. We only have to open our eyes: nobody can fail to observe that the progressive diffusion of the technological mentality has been accompanied by the disappearance of the words true and false, good and bad, even beautiful and ugly – also, or above all, in common language. They have been replaced by the words “original,” “authentic,” “fruitful,” “efficient,” “meaningful,” “work in progress,” and so on. This is, in fact, perfectly consistent. Affirming the primacy of action, understood along the lines that we have described, means that there is nothing beyond the human. And if the truth is not something higher than man, it is destined to grow old, and in this situation an old truth will have no more power to attract attention than, for example, an old woman. Hence the worship of the “new” and the correlative spirit of destruction. 5. Truth and Efficiency Let us consider further: what must happen when men are no longer united by ideals or by supra-empirical values? The quest for well-being will replace that for a good life. And there can be no well-being – a notion completely different from happiness – without, precisely, “new” sensations. Therefore, intellectuals will serve the public not in order to elevate it but to satisfy this need for novelty. 6 [TN] For Rosmini’s discussion of the idea of being, which he identifies as the “the light of reason” (il lume di ragione), see A Short Sketch of Modern Philosophies and of His Own System, trans. W. Lockhart (London: Burns and Oates, 1882), 37ff.

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An individual will not feel united to another except to the extent that he needs it for his ever-greater perceptible realization. Therefore, everything must become an object of trade. Often people talk about a loss of modesty, and on this subject some people, even prominent figures, of course repeat the usual phrases about fighting taboos, searching for authenticity, struggling against every kind of mystery. Let us simply say that this loss has a symbolic significance, namely the reduction of everything to an object of trade. I will add that I am not in the least inclined to embellish reality in the usual way of certain Catholics, who view this situation as a phenomenon of despair due to the dimming of the truth. Always late, these Catholics rediscover today an attitude that was real, but in the Romantic age. The technological mentality knows no despair, precisely to the extent that such an end of the truth and the ideals is not perceived as a tragedy, but is instead presented (or better, “mystified,” in the true sense that the word “mystification” ought to take today) as a liberation. Someone might counter that technological development is not guilty, as such, for these attitudes. This is perfectly correct, but when we speak of technological civilization we do not have in mind technical activity as such, but its absolutization. We are in the domain of -isms, the perversion that turns a human activity, taking place in the sensible world, into an idol. Art as aestheticism, love as eroticism, politics as totalitarianism. Then, the inseparability between technological civilization and positivism becomes clear. To find the clearest definition of this link, one only needs to read a beautiful book by Friedrich von Hayek,7 one of the most rigorous indictments ever written of the technological mentality or, as the author says, the “engineering” mentality, which produces the type of the “social engineer,” the intentional manipulator of a planned society, or gets to the point of thinking in engineering terms even of the activities that seem farthest removed – for example, artistic activity itself. 6 . L ’ E s p r i t P o ly t e c h n i q u e 8 Where did this scientistic mentality first arise? At the École Polytechnique in Paris, and all of its elements can be found already in the works of

7 [TN] Del Noce is referring to The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies on the Abuse of Reason (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1952). The Italian translation of von Hayek’s book had been published two years before the writing of Technological Civilization and Christianity, as L’abuso della ragione, trans. R. Pavetto (Florence: Vallecchi, 1967). 8 [TN] This section is an outline of von Hayek’s discussion of Henri de Saint-Simon’s works in The Counter-Revolution of Science part 2, chapter 2, 117ff, where precise bibliographic references can be found.

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Henri de Saint-Simon. Let us recall a few features of his thought. His baffling first pamphlet, “Lettres d’un habitant de Genève à ses contemporaines” of 1803, formulates the idea of a “council of Newton” comprised of twenty-one members elected by all of mankind and presided over by a mathematician. This council is destined to replace the Pope and the College of Cardinals, whose members are accused of not understanding the nature and the finality of science, which is destined to turn earth into paradise. His program cuts curiously across social classes, but in the typical way of today’s sociologism. In fact, only the plans formulated by the members of this council will be suitable to establish the scientific means to prevent “that struggle which, from the nature of things, necessarily always exists” between the two classes of the owners and the non-owners. All men will work as labourers in one and the same factory, directed by Newton’s supreme council, the central organism that alone has the right to issue orders; whoever disobeys will be treated by the others “as a quadruped.” Let us move on to the next work, the “Introduction aux travaux scientifiques du XIX siècle” of 1810, a plan for a great new Encyclopedia. Its task is to systematize and unify all knowledge, re-examined from top to bottom and organized from the point of view of physicism. We find here a perfect anticipation of the features of what today is called “physicalism”: reduction of morals and politics to science, rejection of theological reasonings as anthropomorphic, and so on. Hayek is quite accurate when he writes9 that, while reading the “Introduction,” one has the impression of holding in hand a contemporary work, for instance by H.G. Wells or Otto Neurath. The same themes appear in Saint-Simon’s later works, so amplified that the prefiguration of today’s technological ideas becomes more and more apparent. There is the idea of a scientific and positive power entrusted with the task of leading and transforming the world; of the unity of all men as partners in the common enterprise of working on nature to transform it; of the social function of art in order to influence the masses and force them to move in the direction indicated by those who are their natural leaders in the task of bringing about this great cooperation; of the level of prosperity that man can reach by using the knowledge acquired in the field of science; of the pacifist function of the previous theses because, by entrusting the new leadership to the power of science, the governmental and military structure will be replaced by a managerial and industrial structure. Finally, in Nouveau Christianisme of 1825 he

9 [TN] von Hayek, The Counter-Revolution of Science, 123.

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states that the scientific-industrial organization will, in turn, make possible the fastest improvement in the moral and physical conditions of the poorest classes, thus realizing on earth the new process that requires men to act as brothers. But this new Christianity requires a reformulation of theology, the necessity of which is obvious after science has opened up new horizons to man’s earthly possibilities. 7. Technology as Anti-Traditionalism Thus, I do not understand how, historically speaking, one can say that positivism is just a fly that claims to be driving the coach of the technocratic civilization, if precisely all its ideas are already prefigured in the works of Saint-Simon and Comte. However, for both of them positivism included a romantic strand, expressed in the idea of a religion of humanity, meant to replace the religions of the past but also to preserve them in their positive aspects. In the new forms of positivism and pragmatism, this religious element has vanished completely. Today’s science presents itself as “neutral” with respect to all values. This claimed neutrality has led many Catholics to some peculiar delusions. The following one in particular: that the development of the scientific spirit destroys secular religions, but does not at all undermine the Catholic conception, which is anchored in the eternal. Therefore, the technological civilization and Christianity are compatible. Or, from a broader perspective, they say: a typical feature of Christianity is the desacralization of the world, which is a condition for the existence of the technological civilization. Because of this origin, this civilization is destined, in turn, to influence Christianity for the better by fostering, albeit only as an occasion, its liberation from traces of previous traditions in which it had inserted itself. The truth is exactly the opposite. Scientism’s break with all religious claims takes place as the logical, final, necessary stage of that “primacy of action” whose anthropological premise has already been discussed. Indeed, let us separate this position most completely from all contemplative elements. Matter itself will be defined – in the words of a famous physicist10 – as an object of possible human manipulations. It follows 10 [TN] C.F. von Weizsäcker, The History of Nature (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949). The quote Del Noce refers to is: “In atomic physics matter is defined by its possible reactions to human experiments … We are defining matter as a possible object of man’s manipulation” (142). Cited by Herbert Marcuse in One-Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), 155.

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that what traditionally used to be called absolute values – truth, goodness, beauty – will be deprived of any universal validity, and will express nothing but subjective preferences. But why will a subject have certain preferences and not others? The explanation will be provided by the “human sciences,” which will also gauge the degree of usefulness or dangerousness of various ideas for the sake of peaceful co-existence. The diagnosis is already clear: the dangerous claim is that of those who still want to speak of Absolute Values, binding for all. Thus, we understand the total anti-traditionalism of the technological civilization. If the opposition is to be formulated in terms of revolution and reaction, we may well say that the technological revolution is more radical than any political revolution. This because it alone would succeed in truly achieving what used to be one of the goals of the political revolutions that meant to “change man,” namely the suppression of the transcendent dimension. It is now a fact that the idea of the technological revolution has prevailed over the Marxist revolutionary position, and tends to prevail more and more. How did this happen? 8. Marxism and Technology If we consider the problem in its greatest theoretical generality, we should answer that the civilization of well-being (we saw already that technological civilization, civilization of well-being, and affluent society are synonyms) is the only possible bourgeois and secular answer to Marxism, and that it arises because of an intrinsic contradiction within Marxism itself. Therefore, the technological civilization defeats Marxism in the sense that it appropriates all its negations of transcendent values, by pushing to the limit the very source of negation, namely the aspect of Marxism that makes it a form of absolute relativism. This has the result of turning Marxism upside down into an absolute individualism, which serves the purpose of giving the technological civilization the false appearance of being a “democracy” and the continuation of the spirit of liberalism. In order to illuminate the breakdown of Marxism, we only need to observe that the mystique of the revolution is subjected to the passing of time, because it can last only as long as the fight to the death against a historical (not eternal) enemy – thus, normally no longer than one generation. After the “mystical” period is over, one part of those who led the fight associate with those who sided with the winners after their success, and form a new class, eliminating as “anarchical” the part formed by the pure revolutionaries. The survivors will wander around the world, and

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will keep repeating until their death that the revolution was betrayed, left unfinished, disowned, but without ever fulfilling the requirements to constitute a political force. Note that here lies one of the capital differences between the Christian and the Marxist religions. Because of the absence of utopia, in Christianity the struggle between the city of God and the earthly city is eternal, and optimism about a permanent success of the “city of God” is radically banished from the earth, or in fact such optimism is regarded as the essence of heresy. In Marxism the practical transition to a total revolution, which implies a huge amount of sacrifices and risks, necessitates the idea of an absolute. In order to fully justify the revolutionary action one needs an “ideal formula.” This formula can only be dialectic materialism. Materialism is necessary in order to deprive the previous forms of any sacred character and to highlight historical relativity. The dialectical aspect is equally necessary in order to show the historical necessity of the revolution. But between the denial of all eternal principles and the practical pursuit of the absolute there is a glaring contradiction. Therefore, the transition from Marxism to radical positivism – which in reference to the human sciences manifests itself as sociologism or absolute relativism – presents itself as very easy and irrefutable at the same time. Is the Marxist critique of ideologies not based on the principle that everything that escapes immediate verification – everything that is, in one word, metaphysical – can be explained as the expression of the ­historical-social situation of a group, and so in terms of what is perceptible by the senses, as long as the domain of the perceptible is given the greatest extension, to the point of including the human sphere itself? Does Marxism not profess the expressivist and instrumentalist conception of thought, that is, the exact opposite of any form of metaphysical thought? And then, how can one sustain a conception still as imbued with metaphysics as dialectic materialism? Therefore, it is conceivable that the true theoretical conclusion of Marxism should be the abolition of philosophy, in the sense that today the circumstances are ripe for the extension of scientific discourse from the natural world to the reality of history. Sociologism, as the critique of philosophy in the name of sociology, would be the condition for a true historical science, inasmuch as it would free history from every trace of philosophy of history by explaining the origin of ideas “from below,” and would thus create the conditions for history to be a real science. Indeed, this explanation would extend historical materialism to the point of abolishing its transition into dialectic materialism.

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9. “Esprit Bourgeois” and Marxism The relation between the empiricism of the technological society and Marxism is similar to the relation between the empiricism of Marxism and Hegel. Like Marx separated Hegelianism from its Platonic aspects, so does the pragmatism that underpins the technological civilization separate Marxism from its Hegelian aspects and push Marxist anti-­ Platonism to the extreme. By denying that values have any reality beyond the individual, it rules out completely any revolutionary spirit. It replaces the collectivism of the “generic man”11 with the most absolute individualism. Therefore, it accepts progress within and for the preservation of the bourgeois social order. Thus, it is simultaneously the most rigorous preservation and the most complete negation of Marxism, because all of Marxism’s anti-religious and anti-traditional aspects from the moral and aesthetic standpoint are pushed to the limit. Marxism is a quest for humanization and radical de-sacralization, and this is its true outcome. It is Marxism reformulated along empiricist lines, I said; but which agrees perfectly with the individualism of the bourgeois spirit, which through it finally finds the way to rid itself entirely of every subordination to tradition. In fact, one could easily show that the technological society realizes the pure bourgeois type that was described by Marx in the Manifesto, making it universal by suppressing class antagonism. But, is this surprising? As Vico said,12 during the infancy of mankind the action of Providence manifested itself as civilizing, using the particular goals that men pursued in order to achieve universal goals. Then, is it not natural that in the age of the expansion of atheism the process turns around and the heterogenesis of ends works in reverse? If the ultimate outcome of the Marxist revolution were the realization of the pure bourgeois type, it would be a confirmation of the truth of Vico’s statement, applied to the development of atheism and de-sacralization.

11 [TN] One possible translation of Marx’s Gattungwesen, another being “species-essence.” 12 [TN] See the conclusion of The New Science [trans. Thomas G. Bergin and Max H. Fisch (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1948)]: “It is true that men have themselves made this world of nations … but this world without doubt has issued from a mind often diverse, at times quite contrary, and always superior to the particular ends that men had proposed to themselves; which narrow ends, made means to serve wider ends, it has always employed to preserve the human race upon this earth” (382).

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This hint is certainly too brief. However, we can glimpse in it an important consequence: from the fact that the technological civilization is just as incompatible with Christianity as it is with true Marxism it does not follow at all that there is a possibility of agreement between Catholics and Communists. On the contrary, we must state the opposite: if this has been the final outcome of Marxism – in the defensive reaction it provoked in the secular-bourgeois world which is its antithesis – then for a true Marxist there is a possibility of self-criticism. 10. A Developmental Crisis? Some people will certainly object that in the technological society there is no direct religious persecution, and freedom and democracy are respected. Then they will add that the technological civilization is an irreversible reality, and that the only route is to try and spiritualize it from within. This is the lazy route, the one normally taken. If one wants to follow the way of the majority, which is to conform to the new order of things, he will try and deflect the attention from the most threatening aspects of the present society. There is always room for clichés like “adolescent crisis” or “developmental crisis” as “phenomena that necessarily accompany a faster rate of development.” Die-hard optimists will interpret today’s history as a process of liberation from slavery. This real process may well carry some costs … And, anyway, were the morality and religion that are in crisis today anything but hypocritical and phony? I do not know how many times I read these phrases or others along similar lines. I would recommend that someone collect them in a critical dictionary of platitudes. I certainly expect the following objection: if in the technological society there is no religious persecution, and freedom and democracy are respected and if, furthermore, the process towards the affirmation of this type of civilization is irreversible, then those who say that it is essentially anti-Christian are forced by logic to acknowledge that Christianity is destined to die. Therefore, real Christians must think that, as strong as these objections may seem, they are not insurmountable. And they must hold that the technological society can be spiritualized from within, even though it may be hard to see exactly how, and even though the task is certainly arduous. A Catholic finds in his faith strength against desperation, no matter how strong the temptations to despair may be. Just a century ago, Catholicism and the principle of freedom, Catholicism and democracy, appeared to be irreconcilable. And the reactionary arguments of that time appeared no less powerful than those of the critics of today’s reality.

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11. Technology and Religion But, consider: apparently the technological civilization leaves a space open to religion, in the sense that it distinguishes between what is verifiable and what is unverifiable. The profane sphere on one side, the sacred sphere on the other. And somebody will add that this implies a purification of the sacred, in the sense that any contamination with the profane is eliminated. But – be careful! – in effect in the shared awareness of the technological civilization what is verifiable will be real, and what is unverifiable will be a subjective delusion. Even assuming a more moderate position, religion will be reduced to its vitalizing purpose. As such, it will be placed at the same level as drugs, and in that respect it is far from certain that it will be the most effective. Personally, I regard this subordination of religion’s aspect as truth to its aspect as a vitalizing ­power as the essence of blasphemy. Among other things, it implies that its metaphysical statements and its dogmas should be regarded only as symbols, and judged not according to their truth but according to their capacity to perform this stimulatory function. Radical opposition, without possibility of mediation, will cause a complete breakdown of communications between those who still recognize the old values and the proponents of the “new.” Those who remain faithful to the former will be social outcasts, to the extent that they will want to rigorously shape their judgments and their lives according to the truths they believe in. This well-educated society will be characterized by an absolute refusal to be scandalized and, in the most moderate individuals, by a false compassion towards sinners – false compassion, because it will no longer be compassion for those who are aware of their sin and of their miserable condition. On the contrary! Thus, these last faithful will be regarded as members of an inferior moral race, destined to disappear. It is not an exaggeration to say that because of this rejection they will be the “poor” of tomorrow, when opulence will have erased poverty. In truth, there will be neither freedom nor democracy; in that respect “mystification” – we may well use the Marxist word – will truly reach its extreme degree. Because, if there is no ideal communication between individuals, and if every individual is seen by others only as an instrument for their own realization, what order will be possible except that of mutual slavery, of slavery made truly universal? It is not very important whether slaves enjoy material well-being. It will be the end of religion, of freedom, and of democracy. It will also be the end of Europe: because European civilization rose on the principle of a world of universal and eternal truths, in which all men

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participate – on the principle of the Logos, in other words, whose exact antithesis is the reduction of ideas to instruments of production and organization. Dig deep in any of today’s great political problems and in all of them you will find the same opposition between the primacy of truth and the primacy of life. 12. The Technological Heresy This chain of destruction would present a frightful view of the near ­future, if the process towards the technological civilization were truly irreversible. But is that true, after all? Here, we must go back to the distinction between technological development and the technological society. In spite of all the appearances to the contrary, the roots of the technological mentality do not lie at all in technical development, but rather in a religious deviation. And in my judgment it can never be stressed enough that the nature of the crisis of our age is first of all religious. In my judgment, the ideal of the technological civilization is nothing but the latest form of the millennialist heresy, by now completely secularized. What is, indeed, the essence of this heresy? Just the following: the idea that the city of peace and universal happiness will supercede in time a degenerate city that has reached the ultimate degree of injustice and barbarism. When does it awake? At the tragic moments of history. Think, as a distant precedent, of Thomas Münzer and the Anabaptists at the time of the Protestant reformation, or of the social prophetism that accompanied the French revolution. History attests that every heresy is marked by a process of secularization and a progressive loss of the original religious spirit. At any rate, the idea of the absolutely new and the destruction of all that preceded it (regarding moral attitudes) belongs to millennialism. It is a common idea that the Russian revolution was a child of the First World War; that is, that the First World War gave rise to a rebirth of millennialism in Communism. The Second World War and the decade that preceded it gave rise to another rebirth of millennialism – whose connection with the first I already explained – as faith in the liberating power of technology. The horrors of the Second World War created the impression that demonic forces had been unleashed, and that a whole civilization, the European one, was being consumed with Nazism and Fascism, after it had turned into a new Babylon. The absolutely new could no longer present itself as Communism either, since Communism maintained ­aspects still linked, even if in opposition, to a civilization whose well-­ deserved destruction had been sealed by the war.

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13. Conclusion But, if this is true, our thinking about the present situation has to change completely. Because it is not the progress of science that leads to antitraditionalism, to the destruction of taboos, to the disappearance of ­mystery, to demythologization; in short, to all its forms of reflective justification, from the most elementary to the most sophisticated. Rather, the opposite is true: what motivates the criticism of tradition and all its consequences is the millennialist idea of a sharp break in history leading to a radically new type of civilization. Now, there is only one weapon against millennialism: regaining a genuine historical awareness. If a young person of today feels so distant and alienated from tradition it is because he was inculcated with a demonological version of recent history. Therefore, he was left haunted by the myth of an absolutely happy future, a myth that cannot be explicated in practice in any other way except than by denying all the values of the past, values that actually have nothing to do with science. Establishing a truly historical view of the recent past, capable of showing how its horrors were born precisely from the myth of the new, will be the first step towards an authentic demythologization, capable of calling into question the process that erected the false idol of the technological society.

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The Dialogue between the Church and Modern Culture

I will try to outline two typical Catholic positions with respect to the modern world – the position of condemnation and the position of openness – in terms of the ultimate consequences to which they can lead. Subsequently, I will raise the question of whether a third position is possible, and whether we find in it the necessary conditions for a nonModernist dialogue. 1 . C o n d e m n at i o n According to the first position, the world that followed the break-up of Christendom in the 1500s and then the Enlightenment and the revolutions is certainly headed for catastrophe: perhaps cosmic suicide, with moral suicide as the only possible alternative. The Protestant reformation, the deviation of humanism into the naturalism of the Renaissance, Cartesianism, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, German pantheism, scientism, atheism, the Communist revolution, today’s disappearance of modesty, are all stages in a process of disintegration. The modern world can be characterized as a progression in the awareness of a process directed at destroying in us the “moindre parcelle de la divi­ nité.” This sentence by Lautréamont,1 the most blasphemous among the “cursed poets,” illuminates modern Prometheism, as a quest to reconcile man and nature by rejecting God. The unsurpassed author in this line of thought, which criticizes the catastrophic dynamics of the modern world

This chapter was originally published in Studi cattolici, no. 45 (1964): 45–50. 1 [TN] Pseudonym of French poet Isidore-Lucien Ducasse (1846–1870). The sentence is from the poetic novel Maldoror (Les Chants de Maldoror), trans. Guy Vernham (New York: New Directions Publishing, 1965), 192.

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resulting from its atheism, is Donoso Cortès2 – who, in fact, deserves the most serious reflection. Thus, the modern world can only be resisted. But how? Until 1914, traces of a Christian world still existed. The Austrian empire was still the heir to the Holy Roman Empire, and although it was in decline it could be reformed. After the First World War, new forces appeared which had been produced by the modern world itself but rebelled against the ­masonic and atheistic powers, albeit for non-Catholic reasons. Many Catholics deluded themselves that these forces could be used, especially the first among them, Fascism, because of the common enemies. There is no need to beg for excuses, after all, because those who believed in a Catholic evolution of Fascism between 1929 and 1935 – and sought common ground, for example, in corporatist doctrine – were certainly wrong, but were no more reckless in their judgment than those who today trust in the evolution of Communism. Anyway, today one thing has become clear: for those who assert this position, a chasm opens up between life and thought. Their thought is pure awareness of the catastrophic aspect; in order to live they must strike a compromise with the lesser evil, and the domain of the lesser evil keeps shrinking. 2. Openness Then, also among Catholics, we have the directly opposite position. The division between two Catholic positions has certainly been a constant of the modern age, but today it has become sharp like never before. The Modernist (let us call him this because it is the correct term, which he in fact accepts today, although he rejects the accusation of heresy) says: “during the modern age man has grown up. An unfortunate misunderstanding arose between this history of development and Catholic thought; the Counter-Reformation ignored this growth, and wished to keep the world in the state of minority. Thus, Catholics ended up identifying evil with novelty. Thus, the association between Christianity and one of its historical incarnations became the Christian world, where the adjective is interchangeable with ‘Latin,’ ‘Western,’ ‘European.’ Thus, being Catholic and being historically right-wing seemed to become synonyms. Consistently, the Catholic world became allied in practice with its former enemies, just when they had lost the initiative of history: first the absolute monarchies, then the bourgeoisie. Today, Christianity must recognize that, since it transcends all cultures, it can adapt all of them to

2 [TN] See his Essays on Catholicism, Liberalism and Socialism (Dublin: W.B. Kelly, 1874).

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itself. What was done once upon a time for Aristotelianism has to be done today for evolutionism and Marxism.” When one sets off in a certain direction, going all the way becomes inevitable; stopping halfway is impossible. Let us examine the endpoint that must be reached.3 There is a “Latin” God which arose “in the milieu of pagan Italy” (it is curious how many French thinkers still hold the judgment about “Italian irreligion” that was formed in the late 1500s), a replacement for Jupiter, regarded sometimes as a benefactor, sometimes as a judge, but always extraneous to man. It is the God of “cataphatic” theology, which applied to God the rational categories developed in relation to the world of objects. And then there is the God of “apophatic” theology, of Plotinus rather than Aristotle, who later on in Christian thought will be the God of the Greek fathers, of the Pseudo-Dionysius, of Eckhart, of Cusanus: the One, the unattainable. The Church’s traditional thought tried to merge the unattainable God with God as pure Being, juridical person, where the principle of analogy served the purpose of realizing his anthropomorphic image. Now, erasing this idea of God has been the work of modern thought, which destroyed the classical proofs of his existence at first, and then, through evolutionism, the myths of Genesis and original sin, and the very idea of redemption as a juridical expiatory act. Hence the sense of liberation that atheism brings today, which is qualitatively similar, people think, to what the pagans who converted to Christianity experienced with respect to their former gods. Therefore, contemporary atheism is very positive, but its liberating work must be regarded as valid only with respect to “that image of God.” Then, the attitude of Catholics is measured by their stance toward today’s atheism: complete negation or sublation. Those who stop at complete negation are standing on the last line of defence of paganism. Hence the comparison, which I have heard often, between Pius XII and Julian the Apostate as the two figures who symbolize the very last defence of a world whose fate has been sealed.4 Let us notice that this judgment is inevitable for people in this position, even though the Catholics who hold it may speak it softly for prudential reasons. Let us also acknowledge the new Modernism’s attractive element. It makes it possible to sacralize again the activities of the secular world; to leave behind the unlivable dualism between radical theoretical 3 [TN] What follows is a collage of loose quotations from a book on Teilhard de Chardin by F.A. Viallet, Le dépassement [Going beyond] (Paris: Fischbacher, 1961), 66, 103–4. Viallet was a close friend, disciple, and biographer of Teilhard who became a Buddhist monk. 4 [TN] Viallet, Le dépassement, 112.

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condemnation and practical compromise accepted out of necessity, without any illusion that it is provisional; to take again the initiative in the historical world in the name of Christianity. And yet, there are too many reasons that persuade us that it is unsustainable. This Modernism, I said, does not intend to be heretical. Indeed, it has nothing in common with Modernism à la Loisy’s,5 which envisioned a peaceful transition from the Catholic religion to a religion of humanity without mysteries and without miracles. Instead, it is an effort to write an imitation of Christ for the use of modern man, in the words of one of Teilhard’s admirers,6 who did justice to his intentions. Let us also grant that we cannot speak of a direct continuation of the Modernism of the early years of this century. But, having said that, we must acknowledge that it is just as true that the new Modernism does go back to the ideas of the old, through the mediation of a process of thought prompted by political history. This brings us to examine the new Catholic position starting from its genesis, which is actually the best way to define its significance and value. It arose in France in the darkest years of the Second World War, as a rediscovery of hope when everything seemed to justify despair. It is natural that at that time Nazism was, so to speak, abstracted from the historical context in which it was born, becoming the sum total of all the evils that had threatened the journey of civilization, and that from this perspective Communism tended, instead, to change from being an ally de facto, due to the historical circumstances, to being an ally de jure. We have to wonder whether the rediscovery of Modernism does not accept from the start an interpretation of contemporary history in terms of historical materialism. In the wake of the Russian revolution – which supposedly in spite of all its limitations and flaws marks the fact that mankind is now completing the transition to the “socialization stage” – the social classes under threat call to their defence the Jupiter-God who protects order rather than promoting progress. But the cult of this God is so pagan that the “defenders of the West” end up becoming subordinate to the partisans of Race, who by necessity are inclined to wage the most oppressive 5 [TN] Alfred Loisy (1857–1940) was a French scripture scholar and theologian who became one of the most well-known representatives of biblical Modernism in the Roman Catholic Church in the early twentieth century. 6 [TN] Étienne Borne (1907–1993), French philosopher. The statement “Le Milieu Divin est une Imitation de Jésus-Christ à l’usage de l’homme moderne” was attributed to Borne by Jean Farran in “Ce Jesuite qui inquiéte le Vatican,” Paris Match 696 (11 August 1962), 68–74. It was then quoted in R.T. Calmel’s book, written with G. Frénaud and L. Jugnet, Gli errori di Teilhard de Chardin [The Errors of Teilhard de Chardin] (Turin: Dell’Albero, 1964), 161. The latter is cited by Del Noce in note 11 and it was likely his source for Borne’s sentence.

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of all wars. Supposedly, this outcome of our century’s counter-revolution goes to show how artificial was the opposition of Christianity and Marxism as two irreducible enemies. Hence the manifest consequence: Marxism must be Christianized. But how? The most elementary idea is to think of accepting one part, its sociology, and rejecting another, its philosophy. But clearly this route is completely unsatisfactory. There is another, to reduce all of Marxism to a science. Here I am forced to be brief, and I will state that the only possible way to proceed in this direction is by universalizing evolutionism, until we reach a form of pan-biologism in which the transition to socialization appears to be a stage required by evolution itself. I do not want to assess here Fr Teilhard’s thought. However, today there is a cultural phenomenon with well-defined features, Teilhardism, which has replaced Maritainism and Mounierism among so-called left-wing Catholics. It is permissible to assess it, abstracting temporarily from the question whether it betrays or not the deepest essence of the thought of the author from whom it draws inspiration. In order to understand the development and the dangerousness of the latest positions of left-wing Catholic thought, let me first point out that Teilhardism annuls Maritain’s crucial argument against contemporary atheism. Because for Maritain this atheism harbors a contradiction: having been born as a moral rebellion against a philosophical God, used to justify the world’s evils, it ended up submitting to the worst of all false gods, history, and to its immanent progress, which is entitled to sweep everything away.7 And, now, it is precisely this morality of the “direction of history” that is embraced by today’s Teilhardism, while the distinction between cooperation with God and cooperation with history, which is essential for Maritain, disappears. About this position, I will only mention three points that serve to illustrate its difficulties. First, secular admirers of Teilhard’s work did not feel challenged at all in their atheism or in their pantheism. Communist philosopher Garaudy essentially considered it the consistent formula for Catholic fellow travellers. It is well-known that for Marxism atheism is a result: a Communist can walk with a Christian as long as the latter shares his judgment about the movement of history, without directly entering into controversy about religious questions. Professing his admiration for Teilhard, the famous writer Huxley, essentially a pantheist, declared that “Evolutionary truth frees us from subservient fear of the unknown and supernatural … The only way in which the present split between religion

7 [TN] Jacques Maritain, “On the Meaning of Contemporary Atheism,” The Review of Politics 11, no. 3 (July 1949): 267–80.

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and science could be mended would be through the acceptance by science of the fact and value of religion as an organ of evolving man, and the acceptance by religion that religions must evolve.”8 So, the story of Modernism repeats itself: it was born to speak to modern men, but in fact it never converted anybody. Nor can one escape the impression that in Teilhardism “Christic faith” is merely juxtaposed to faith in an evolutionary process that will lead to the divinization of man, without being directly required by it. Is the following passage not amazing? – “If, as the result of some interior revolution, I were to lose in succession my faith in Christ, my faith in a personal God, and my faith in the Spirit, I feel that I should continue to believe invincibly in the world. The world (its value, its infallibility and its goodness) – that, when all is said and done, is the first, the last and the only thing in which I believe.”9 If we had to take this passage literally, it would seem that Christian faith is reduced to a superfluous addition to faith in history, which is sufficient by itself to provide a foundation for all my practical attitudes. You will say that this is just an imprudent sentence; it is still true that the transition from immanence to transcendence does not seem justified, just like it was not justified in the forms of Modernism of the early twentieth century. I certainly do not need to say this myself, since I only have to quote a passage by an extreme and intransigent Teilhardian, F.A. Viallet: “The core of T.’s thought: an immanent God who in creation, as Spinoza thought of him, reached the limits of his power. ‘God can only create organically’ T. also says. But for him this vision pairs up with another which would be that of divine transcendence, but he does not give us a logical connection between the two visions.”10 Moreover, all critics of Teilhardism have remarked how the theme of sin is extremely watered down. At most one can say that Adam sinned because he was still a child, and that through sin he reached greater awareness.11

  8 [TN] Julian Huxley, The Humanist Frame (London: Allen and Unwin, 1961), 26, 22, reprinted in Essays of a Humanist (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), 88, 84. Del Noce was likely thinking of his brother, Aldous Huxley, when he described him as a “famous writer” and “essentially a pantheist.” Del Noce’s quotation includes the extra words “an organ susceptible to several modifications” (talking about religion) which I could not find in the original.  9 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Comment je crois (Paris: Seuil, 1969), 120 [TN: Christianity and Evolution, trans. René Hague (New York: Harcourt, 1969), 99]. 10 Viallet, Le dépassement, 195. 11 See the volume of essays by G. Frénaud OSB, L. Jugnet, R.T. Calmel OP, titled Gli errori di Teilhard de Chardin, trans. Giovanni Cantoni (Turin: Dell’Albero, 1964), 145.

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Starting from the study of the phenomenology of atheism from a purely theoretical standpoint,12 I had to reach the following conclusion: it is not science and it is not morality per se, nor is it even scandal for the historical infidelities of the Christian world (i.e., the process leading to heresy) that can explain atheism; instead, atheism is the endpoint of the process of rationalism, after its metaphysical stage. Being itself postulatory, it reveals the original postulate at the basis of rationalism. The negation of the supernatural that initially expresses itself does not lie in the negation of God, but in the inversion of the meaning of sin (in Bruno, for example, who regards the Fall as salvific, because man’s morality is not innocence, but knowledge of good and evil; and in Hegel’s “God who confirms the words of the serpent”13). As the dialectics leading to atheism unfolds further, God is viewed as sin, as the wound of man, who can be reborn only by re-acquiring (or conquering) the powers he “alienated” or had to alienate in the creation of God during the process of history. This is why words like “surreality,” “total man,” “superman” are essential to atheism. They denote a new stage that will be reached through a “qualitative jump,” generally called “revolution.” This accounts for the mystical character, of restoration of a “sacred” in reverse, that is intrinsic to atheism in the proper sense, and that makes it possible for religious thinkers to misunderstand it, insofar as they confuse atheism with a form of crude naturalistic materialism, and so are led to see in genuine atheism a contradiction which actually is not there. I certainly do not intend to accuse the various forms of Modernism of being part of a process that concludes by logical necessity to atheism. Still, I think it is undeniable that they find themselves in a situation of relative inferiority when they engage an atheist in dialogue. In fact, is the attenuation of the theme of sin not linked with the idea of the transition to a higher state of humanity? And are not these two themes, in their most consistent and strongest form, typical of atheism? This is why I was struck by several remarks by Calmel,14 addressed now explicitly to Teilhard’s thought. Like this one, for instance: “even after he is divinized, man’s constitution remains the same; he does not transition to the ultra-human.”15 I also think that the critique of the Modernist

12 I conducted it in my recent book Il problema dell’ateismo [The problem of atheism] (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1964). 13 [TN] G.F.W. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree (London: Bohn, 1861), 334. 14 Which I read after my research had been completed. 15 Calmel, “Riposta al Teilhardismo” [Response to Teilhardism], in Gli errori di Teilhard de Chardin, 120. See also the development in the following pages.

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­ nderstanding of dialogue must focus above all on its root, which is the u interpretation of contemporary history that I mentioned before. In this connection Teilhard’s thought becomes “Teilhardism.” In my view, Fascism and Nazism cannot be abstracted from the general context of contemporary history to fuse them together and turn them into the quintessential enemy. In actuality, what characterizes contemporary history is the expansion of atheism, because it is part of atheism’s essence to go beyond the purely theoretical position to “become world,” according to Marx’s famous sentence,16 and to seek its criterion of truth in the total transformation of the relationship between man and reality. Hence the trans-political character of contemporary history: its distinctive character is that of being philosophical history, the unfolding of a spiritual essence, namely atheism and its defeat – which in my view has already happened. Fascism and Nazism can be explained precisely in terms of the failure of Marxist atheism as a world revolution, as forms of opposition to Marxism which however are subordinate to it. Thus, the necessary Stalinist involution of Communism and Nazism are two sides of the same phenomenon. Or perhaps we can also say that Communism and Nazism are two aspects of the drama in which classical German philosophy consumes itself as it comes into practice.17 3. Non-Modernist Dialogue When it is understood in the Modernist fashion, the dialogue between Catholic thought and modern thought takes place from a position of inferiority. For example, dialogue with Marxism may highlight some ­superficial consonances, but never the contradiction that should push Marxism to shed the atheistic aspect … which is its essence. However, our discussion shows the possibility of a dialogue in a totally different form. I mean the form that highlights contemporary history’s verification of the defeat of all forms of what is usually called secularist thought; 16 [TN] Del Noce is probably referring to the sentence “Die Philosophie hat sich verweltlicht” in Marx’s letter to Arnold Ruge of September 1843, published in the DeutschFranzösische Jahrbücher of February 1844. In Italian this sentence is usually translated as “La filosofia si è fatta mondo” which means both “has become world” and “has made itself world.” This is meant to convey Marx’s idea (made clear in the rest of the letter) that philosophy is no longer the theoretical contemplation of truths outside history, but rather the completely immanent awareness of the ongoing revolutionary transformation of the world. Therefore, its criterion of truth is practical-political implementation. In English ‘verweltlicht’ has been variously translated as ‘mundane,’ ‘wordly,’ or ‘secularized.’ 17 For a better clarification of this aspect, I take the liberty to refer to my book Il problema dell’ateismo, in the introduction, cxxviii ff.

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and that draws from this defeat the conditions for a process of self-­ criticism which must take place within secular thought itself and which Catholic thought must stimulate and help. Indeed, let us consider world history after 1870, that is, after the at least provisional victory of the secular spirit over the Catholic restoration. In it we can distinguish three stages: the period from 1870 to 1914, characterized by the secularization of Christianity, attempted in various forms; the time of the atheist revolution, attempted through politics (Communism) or through art (Surrealism being the most significant phenomenon in this respect); and the prevalence of natural irreligion, getting stronger and stronger after the Second World War. The attempt to secularize Christianity did characterize the period 1870–1914, sometimes in the form of preserving Christian morality, as humanitarianism; other times in the form of religion within the limits of reason, which preserves the beliefs in God and in the immortality of the soul as necessary postulates for moral life; other times yet in the form of the Idealist philosophies of immanent divinity. Undoubtedly, the atheist revolution destroyed this world, but without achieving at all the superhumanity that was its goal. It acted as a mediator for the transition from the Christian-secular world to that of natural irreligion, characterized by the loss of the sense of the sacred. What do I mean by “natural irreligion?” It is a position completely different from atheism, because it rejects its appeal to a further stage of humanity. It is characterized by the refusal even to pose the problem in terms of theism versus atheism, because it is not interesting, and by a relativism so absolute that all ideas are viewed as relative to the psychological and social situation of those who affirm them, and so can be evaluated from a utilitarian standpoint, as life stimulants. As a consequence, everything becomes purely an object of commerce. This is symbolized by the disappearance of modesty; in the most elementary forms everything is reduced to “water, sleep, sex,” falling, in short, into pure animalism. By now the expression “eclipse of the sacred” has become so common that I would rather avoid it. But what must be pointed out is that the usual explanation that traces it back to technical development is utterly superficial. In fact, the very form in which this eclipse presents itself culturally – which is sociologism, or Marxism objectivized and turned into absolute relativism – shows that the reason is much deeper and of an ideal nature. Atheism has attained historical reality, but in the process it turned into something very different from its premises. In fact, observe that every form of atheistic thought – that of the “cosmic rebellion,” from Sade to Surrealism, as well as Marx’s atheism, as well as Nietzsche’s – fights three common enemies: transcendent religion, the

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philosophy of immanent divinity, and the bourgeois spirit. By “bourgeois” I mean a man whose life is completely determined by the category of usefulness, so that he desecrates everything he thinks about. Now, without a doubt, the present situation can be described as the ultimate stage that the bourgeois spirit must reach in the process of desecration. But then, does Marxist atheism have an effective ability to surpass it, or has its historical potency been exhausted, paradoxically, in managing to push the bourgeois spirit to this final stage? There seems to be no doubt about the answer, if we look at the most recent situation of Communism. Khrushchevism18 has been rightly described as a “second Social Democratic crisis” of Communism, but now be careful! The first Social Democratic crisis took place with respect to the world of secularized Christianity; the second is happening in the context of having accepted a world from which the sacred has disappeared. Old Social Democracy could refer to universal values; today’s Communism tries to position itself as a particularly powerful force in a world where values have disappeared, effectively abandoning all ideas of messianic transfiguration. It does not matter much whether at this stage – which others will regard as progress but which I think is instead a regression – it may achieve some successes, since they will be obtained by surrendering completely to the bourgeois spirit, and precisely in the worst aspect of its decadence. Clearly, here I can only make a statement, without being able to argue this point really adequately. However, what I just said are not at all paradoxical claims, but common criticisms of Khrushchevism. Now, if this is true, if a real change of human nature is essential for atheism, so that the community may become the true I, and the world of selfishness be overcome, who does not see that today its enterprise manifests its failure? Nor can an intellectual who sincerely embraced Marxism fail to realize this. Now, it is precisely starting from the persuasion (on the Catholic side) of this twofold catastrophe of the modern world, both as secularized Christianity and as radical atheism, that the dialogue between Catholic thought and so-called modern thought, in the sense of thought characterized by the negation of religious transcendence, can start.

18 [TN] N. Khrushchev was in power in the USSR at the time when Del Noce was writing this essay. He was deposed by a group of conspirators led by L. Brezhnev in October 1964.

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Notes towards a Historical Definition of Fascism

The previous essays led to the following thesis: progressivism, in its form as secular Enlightenment as well as its form as religious Modernism, is founded upon a judgment about contemporary history. More precisely, this is a judgment about one area of contemporary history: Europe between the two world wars. We have already seen what judgment.1 Now, the contradictory attitude generated by this judgment– which I designated with the formula negativist millennialism – raises the problem of its revision. Please understand well: there is no question whatsoever of changing the negative axiological judgment about Fascism. Instead, the question is what ideal positions have been involved in its catastrophe. The first book that attempted an exhaustive historico-philosophical understanding of Fascism as an “age-defining phenomenon,” that by Ernst Nolte,2 dates back to 1963. Essentially, we can say that it gave rigorous expression to the idea that informs today’s dominant opinion: Fascist phenomena should be classified under the general label of ­counter-revolution. According to Nolte, Fascism in its deepest aspect, as a trans-political phenomenon, is a disposition of “resistance against transcendence,” a word that for him does not mean religious transcendence but what today is often called “horizontal transcendence” – historical transformation, basically. From the perspective of Fascism, in any of its forms, the enemy must be “seen to be ‘freedom towards the infinite’ which, intrinsic in the individual and a reality in evolution, threatens to This chapter originated as a lecture given on 19 April 1969 to the Milan chapter of the Italian Union for the Progress of Culture. 1 “Tradition and Innovation” in this volume. 2 Ernst Nolte, Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche (Munich: Piper, 1963) [TN: Translated into English as Three Faces of Fascism, trans. Leila Vennewitz (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1966)].

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destroy the familiar and the beloved.”3 On the more strictly political level, this “resistance against transcendence” will establish itself as a fight to the death against the movements that represent it and that express the quest to move beyond the existing order, towards a broader social reality. Therefore, we should speak of a common essence, which took different forms in various European countries according to their different political, economic, and cultural situations. The main forms supposedly represented as many different degrees of the phenomenon; accordingly, Nolte sketches a unitary line of development, whose first degree is represented by the Action Française, the second by Italian Fascism, the third by Nazism. As is easily observed, this interpretation reflects the current view, according to which the two poles that ultimately define all of today’s conflicts are traditionalists versus progressives, and all positive values reside with the progressive cause. According to this opinion, every traditionalist attitude contains a Fascist possibility, even if  most unaware and at a germinal stage. However, what distinguishes Nolte’s work is that this judgment does not shape his research a priori, as a polemical presupposition, but rather seems to be the result of a real effort of historical understanding. Hence its importance, because giving rigorous form to a common judgment also has the result of bringing to light its questionable aspects. First of all, what motivates him to speak of an “age of Fascism?” The following: there was a time, after the peripheral powers took a step back and closed into themselves (United States, Soviet Union; American isolationism, socialism in one country so that Russia “became once more an  unknown country on the periphery of the world”4), when Europe could regard itself again as the center of the world, and claim to be the main stage of world events, even after that year 1917 when the First World War had ceased to be a conflict among national states. Now, “if we are to name an era marked by political conflicts after the most novel phenomenon in the center of events, we cannot do otherwise than call the era of the World Wars an era of Fascism”; a word which “has the advantage of being without concrete content and of not, like German National Socialism, implying an unjustifiable claim.”5 By defining the age in these terms, Nolte makes no claim of originality. On the contrary, he carefully emphasizes that this definition had already been established by people representing the most diverse currents of thought. The prediction that within a few brief years the whole of Europe 3 Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism, 430. 4 [TN] Ibid., 5. 5 Ibid., 6.

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would be Fascist had been made by Mussolini, who repeated it often in the years of his greatest power, from 1930 to 1935. But some fierce adversaries had agreed on this point, albeit with the opposite judgment of value. Thus, in 1938 Thomas Mann had defined Fascism as “a disease of the times which is at home everywhere, and from which no country is free.” Thus, in his well-known work The Destruction of Reason, Lukàcs regarded “the evolution in Germany’s intellectual and political life merely as the most prominent manifestation of an international process within the capitalistic world.”6 These quotations are already sufficient to illustrate the place occupied by Nolte’s work among the interpretations of Fascism.7 It comes after that as a “moral disease,” which we can broadly call “liberal,” and after the Marxist. Lukàcs had written about a unitary line of development towards irrationalism “from Schelling to Hitler,” including in it all relevant German thinkers after the death of Hegel. Nolte disagrees with this thesis – in which he acknowledges, however, an aspect of truth – above all regarding Max Weber’s pre-Fascism, and of course the disagreement about this thinker has decisive repercussions on the whole line drawn by Lukàcs. Perhaps – I have not verified this idea – his book could be described as a remake for the whole of Europe of what Lukàcs wrote about German reactionary thought, but by a writer who has been strongly influenced by Weber.8 Now, in the same time frame when Nolte was writing his book, I had been pondering his same problem – of a definition of Fascism at a transcendental level – but I had arrived at different conclusions. Indeed, in 1964 in my book The Problem of Atheism 9 I identified as the peculiar ­character of modern history that of being a philosophical history. My view, which I hold unchanged today, was simple: if we recognize the genuinely philosophical character of Marx’s work, we must take literally his

6 Ibid., 7 [TN: Nolte’s book is the source for the statements by Mussolini, Thomas Mann, and Lukàcs, and provides detailed references for all three]. 7 A very valuable contribution in order to understand the characteristics and the history of these interpretations can be found in the recent book by Renzo De Felice Le interpretazioni del fascismo (Bari: Laterza, 1969) [TN: Interpretations of Fascism, trans. Brenda Huff Everett (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977)]. 8 See Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism, 446–50, and in particular: “Thus Max Weber is concerned with bourgeois society within the framework of the world-historical process, exactly like Kant, Hegel and Marx. But he discards some dogmatic premises which are typically Marxist (447) … As a result he expresses himself quite favorably concerning the great Western revolutions, including the French (449).” These statements seem also to express Nolte’s own philosophical and political orientation. 9 [TN] Augusto Del Noce, Il problema dell’ateismo (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1964).

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statement that his conception is that of a philosophy that becomes world (that surpasses itself into political realization and seeks in this latter its verification), as opposed to that of a world that becomes philosophy within self-awareness. If, then, contemporary history cannot be understood except in connection with the Communist revolution, it takes a new character, different from all previous history, especially from the Renaissance onwards. It is not just history that can be understood by the philosopher; it is history made by the philosopher, because according to Marx the value of thought is to create the conditions for an effective action to transform society and the world. And in reference to the distinctive character of Marx’s philosophy, I thought I had to define it as the age of the expansion of atheism. Today, in order to indicate the same thing, I would rather speak of “age of secularization,” using a word that has now become common. Secularization and atheism are certainly two sides of the same coin. But since the word secularization expresses what this age intends to be – a process towards a situation in which it can be said that God disappeared without leaving any trace – and since we are attempting an analysis of this age from the inside, rather than a judgment of value, here is the reason for my preference. Now, if the contemporary age must be defined, in my view, as the age  of secularization, we can only find its beginning in Lenin’s work. Therefore, facing a revolution that is meant to be worldwide, I do not think it is possible to cut out the idea of a purely European epoch and speak of an “age of Fascism.” We must speak instead of the “Fascist stage” of the age of secularization. I also believe that a further specification is necessary. Within the age of secularization we can distinguish a period that can be called sacral (in connection with the phenomenon of secular religions, which unites Communism, Nazism, and Fascism) and a profane period. Roughly, and with the approximation that is necessary for dates, we can say that the former came to a close with the death of Stalin. Fascism and Nazism belong entirely to the “sacral” period. The new phenomenon that characterizes specifically the “profane” period is the affluent society. Again risking a conjecture, it seems to me that Nolte has been led off track by the analogy between the position of the Action Française with respect to radicalism and the position of Nazism with respect to Communism.10 I will not deny that there is a symmetry, but it is precisely that, just a symmetry. Indeed, it is just as impossible to see in National Socialism the continuation and development of the Action Française as

10 See Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism, 29–30.

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it is to see in Communism the development of radicalism. Furthermore, it seems to me that Nolte himself is embarrassed when he has to deal with the middle term between Action Française and Nazism, that is, Fascism in the proper sense. In fact, when he discusses it he emphasizes very correctly the features that display an enduring Marxist influence, and the curious affinities between Mussolini and Lenin. Thus, the middle stage would include an element which is completely absent in the initial stage (the Action Française) and which disappears again in the conclusive National Socialist stage. And then, is it not peculiar, to say the least, to use the word Fascism to define the entire epoch? We have now reached the truly crucial issue: whether it is possible to subsume under the same concept of counter-revolution (or reaction, or resistance against transcendence, and so on) both the traditionalist/nationalist movements, all of which more or less go back to the doctrinal inspiration of the Action Française, and Fascism and Nazism, so that we can speak of one and the same essence, which explicated itself differently depending on the cultural and economic circumstances of the countries where it became realized; or, whether one should put more emphasis on the differences. If one takes this second road, then two different interpretations seem possible: (1) Should we make a qualitative distinction between the nationalist movements on the one hand and Fascism and Nazism on the other, but recognize a common essence in these latter two phenomena? (2) Should we, on the contrary, speak of Fascism and Nazism as essentially different phenomena? As you can see, the most delicate point, which I will now try to address, is precisely a correct assessment of Italian Fascism, which some people associate with Nazism, but which other people are inclined to regard as a mere variation of the authoritarian regimes.11 11 As an example of association with Nazism, see the little-known but very intelligent little book by Henri Lemâitre, Les fascismes dans l’histoire [Fascisms in History] (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1959), which reaches that conclusion precisely by making the correct distinction from nationalism. The opposite view is generally held by the scholars who start by studying the phenomenon of totalitarianism. For example, according to Hanna Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, 1985), Fascism was not a totalitarian regime at least until 1938, but rather a common nationalistic dictatorship, born from a crisis of multi-party democracy. Another example of this view is the book by Fr G. Fessard SJ, De l’actualité historique, t. I [On current history, vol. 1] (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1960). Discussing the opposition and, at the same time, the kinship between Communism and Nazism, in connection with Hegel’s discussion of the master-slave relationship, he would rather use the word totalitarianism only for Communism and Nazism, since he, too, categorizes Fascism as a common authoritarian dictatorship. The truth is that Fascism occupies its own place, as we shall see, and cannot be identified either with the nationalist dictatorships or with Nazism.

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The distinction of both Fascism and Nazism from nationalism in the proper sense can be easily established. Nationalism, in fact, presents itself as traditionalism, as an effort to perpetuate a heritage, such heritage being legitimated in most cases by referring to transcendent values, even though then there is the tendency to regard them only as functional to the legitimation of a heritage (which is why nationalism can be viewed as  the final outcome of an incorrect idea of tradition).12 Conversely, Fascism conceives of the nation no longer as a heritage of values, but as an unfolding of power. Unlike nationalism, Fascism does not think of history as faithfulness but as continuous creation which is entitled to overturn everything standing in its way as it moves on. This is, by the way, a distinction which Hitler and Goebbels insisted upon often; they recognized the originality of Fascism in the fact that it had been the first movement that fought Marxism and Communism from a non-reactionary standpoint.13 This is the reason for the undoubtedly sincere devotion that Hitler always maintained towards Mussolini. However, the differences matter much more than the commonalities. In that same book, I argued that Fascism must be defined historically as the full realization and the complete defeat of the type of revolutionary socialism that accepted the Idealist critique of naturalistic materialism and of scientism, without supposing Marx’s true position (or regarding it as a contradictory combination of revolutionary spirit and materialism). I also argued that Mussolini’s life is the best document for a study of the idea of total revolution disjoined from Marxist materialism and linked, instead, to the dominant intellectual climate in Europe during the initial decades of the twentieth century.14 It seems to me that this was confirmed by the subsequent biography by De Felice,15 which was written in complete independence from the ideas that I had outlined at that time. In order to characterize Fascism, I think we must focus our attention on three essential facts: (1) that it was founded by the man who can be justly regarded as the beginner of European Communism before the First World War; (2) that Mussolini’s rise coincided chronologically with the rise of Idealist culture, that the advent of Fascism coincided with the 12 Regarding the separation I mentioned between Fascism and nationalism, see Lemâitre, Les fascismes, 25–6. It is curious that Lemâitre rediscovers the separation between nationalism and Fascism exactly in the same terms that had already been used by Gentile, apparently without knowing it and based on a mere consideration of its historical characteristics. 13 Regarding Hitler’s and Goebbels’s statements on this matter see Nolte, The Three Faces of Fascism, 275. 14 Del Noce, Il problema dell’ateismo, cli ff. 15 [TN] Renzo De Felice, Mussolini, 7 vols. (Turin: Einaudi, 1965–97).

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time of complete success of such culture, and that there is a chronological correspondence between the declines of both of them; (3) that this Italian Idealist culture had its beginning in the great first dispute about theoretical Marxism, from 1895 to 1900, which marked the Europeanization of Italian culture. Mussolini cannot be understood, in short, apart from “the mysterious proximity and distance between Mussolini and Lenin,”16 a point well-noticed, but not sufficiently developed, by Nolte. In fact, the mystery of the distance dissipates if we recall the distinction between “what is alive and what is dead in Marx”17 that Italian Idealist culture had posited, that Mussolini had effectively accepted, and that Lenin had rejected by reaffirming the unbreakable unity between radical materialism and revolutionary action. The proximity to Lenin has been illustrated very well by Nolte: “If Communism is described as the splitting off of the intransigent wing from the reformist wing of the Socialist Party which is willing to cooperate, Mussolini may with good reason be called the first and from one standpoint, the only European Communist of that age; for in all other European countries the rift occurred under the influence of Russian Bolshevism, which formed in 1902 as well as in 1914 in entirely different circumstances. In any case, at that time Mussolini laid the foundations not only for Italian postwar Communism … but also for the impotence of the embryonic Social Democracy led by Turati, and this impotence was perhaps was the most immediate cause of the Fascist victory. His ‘voluntarism,’ which some have mistakenly tried to play off against his Marxist orthodoxy, is only the theoretical expression of his intransigence. For this voluntarism is directed polemically against the evolution theory of the time and corresponds precisely to Lenin’s battle against the doctrine of ‘automatism.’”18 Here it is correct to speak of analogy, not of Marxist orthodoxy. Mussolini’s “voluntarism” is not Lenin’s “dialectic.” It is the rejection of Marxist materialism, in connection with the general criticism of naturalistic materialism and evolutionist positivism that was common in that period.

16 [TN] Nolte, The Three Faces of Fascism, 240 and passim. 17 It is certainly not insignificant that Mussolini gave the title “Ciò che v’ha di vivo e di morto nel marxismo” [What is dead and what is alive in Marxism] to his 1 May 1911 speech in Cesena – which contains the theoretical foundations of the revolutionary faction of the Socialist Party that he led to victory in the national convention in Reggio Emilia (July 1912) – paraphrasing the title of Croce’s 1906 monographic essay “Ciò che c’é di vivo e di morto nella filosofia di Hegel” [What is dead and what is alive in Hegel’s philosophy] (Bari: Laterza 1907). 18 Nolte, The Three Faces of Fascism, 154.

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But now we must ask ourselves: what does the revolutionary attitude – understood in its most rigorous sense, as the replacement of religion by politics in the liberation of man – become when it is separated completely from the materialistic aspect and from the utopian aspect? Today it is very clear to what extent materialism is essential to what has been correctly described as Lenin’s “not new philosophy of praxis, but new praxis of philosophy”19 – on this point, he gave the authentic interpretation of the meaning of Marxist thought. In one respect, the materialistic aspect means the de-sacralization of the order that must be overturned. In a second, much more important respect – which implies the preservation, and not just the simple negation, of utopian thought within revolutionary thought – materialism is intrinsic to the revolutionary goal itself. Indeed, the revolution aims at affirming a new idea of man, which is materialistic in the sense that it excludes every trace of the divine because human thought is praxis, sensitive human activity, expressive and not revelative thought, which has no existence apart from its perceivable expression. Communism itself is unthinkable apart from this new and radical materialism.20 If the revolutionary spirit is separated from materialism, it turns into a kind of mystique of action, into what is usually called “activism,” a word that has been worn out by the habits of common speech. It is tension towards action willed per se, as mere transformation of reality, and not directed towards an order; consequently, values are demoted, since they are thought to have value only as tools that can promote action, instead of giving it meaning. But there is more: the intrinsic logic of activism leads it also to deny other people’s personality, to reduce them to objects. Given that value is attributed to pure action, other subjects cease to be ends in themselves and become mere instruments and obstacles. However, this dis-recognition21 is different from a mere moral dis-recognition. In the case of moral dis-recognition we have a practical refusal to execute what the moral law commands. In the case of activism, instead, we have a totalizing outlook in which others are reduced to objects, so that to speak of moral duties towards them no longer makes sense.

19 [TN] This formula is due to Louis Althusser. See Lenin and Philosophy, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), 68: “Marxism is not a (new) philosophy of praxis but a (new) practice of philosophy.” 20 Regarding such inseparability, see my book Il problema dell’ateismo, 35ff. 21 [TN] “Disconoscimento” in Italian, meaning refusal/failure to recognize other people. It is an implicit reference to Rosmini’s ethics, which are based on the concept of “practical recognition,” see footnote 13 on page 227.

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How shall we define this attitude? I would like to propose the term solipsism, and personally I am inclined to think that this is the only precise meaning that can be attributed to the concept of solipsism. Whereas it cannot be sustained as a theoretical position, it is possible as a lived attitude. The total de-personalization that is part of activism has the effect of depriving reality of the aspect of autonomous existence; it seems that reality exists only within my action, as an obstacle that I project in front of myself in order to overcome it. This choice of word is open to discussion, but in any case it is certain that Mussolini’s action cannot be properly described as anarchic (because in the end anarchism seeks to abolish power whereas Mussolini wanted to seize it), nor as reactionary (because it is impossible to detect any tradition that Mussolini reaffirmed and defended), nor, obviously, as Jacobin or Communist. It seems to me that, starting from a phenomenology of activism, one can understand the contradictory aspects that make it so hard, as De Felice correctly pointed out, to sketch a portrait of Mussolini.22 De Felice has written perfectly about a mix of personalism, skepticism, diffidence, self-confidence, and at the same time mistrust in the intrinsic value of any act, and thus in the possibility that action be given any moral meaning, any value that is not provisional, instrumental, tactical. Let us begin from the first aspect, personalism. It was well described by Cantimori in 1935: this sense of power, this will to dominate that makes him identify himself spontaneously with his fatherland, this extreme political protagonism becomes, in the moments of most intense struggle to affirm his will, an awareness and affirmation of his individuality… and this awareness of himself, this being constantly present, aware of his will and of his individuality, will last forever: through this awareness, the spontaneous identification with his own people articulates itself more and more as order, as command, as primacy, as domination, as satisfaction for the discipline and obedience that have been obtained.23

By itself, self-identification with the cause of one’s own people characterizes every politician, and is his source of strength. But in Mussolini it climaxes into a will to dominate, a form of political protagonism that is awareness and affirmation of his own personality. What else can this mean, if not that the identification works in reverse with respect to 22 See Renzo De Felice, Mussolini il fascista, I. La conquista del potere [Mussolini the Fascist, I. The conquest of power] (Turin: Einaudi, 1966), 472. 23 See Renzo De Felice, Mussolini il fascista, II. L’organizzazione dello Stato fascista [Mussolini the Fascist, II. The organization of the Fascist state] (Turin: Einaudi, 1966), 358.

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great politicians, through a kind of absorption, so to speak, of the people into oneself? Hence those aspects that baffled the men of the older political generation who came in contact with him: the exclusive and fierce self-worship, the exceptional willpower, the absence of any distinction between good and evil, the lack of any hint of a sense of the law. About this we must add: even if Mussolini’s personality could be reduced to this simple immoralism, that would not be enough to explain his success. Actually, in the activist disposition we find a peculiar coincidence of moralism and immoralism. Moralism, in the sense of transcendence of oneself into action; immoralism, in the dis-­recognition of the moral personality of others. Here is found also the deepest root of Fascist anti-liberalism, if liberalism is defined in terms of respect for the other’s person. This also explains the aspect that was especially emphasized by Gobetti, his tacticism and transformism: indeed, the lack of an ultimate goal for his action afforded him the greatest openness to all forms of tacticism and transformism, but at the same time forbade him from giving his action any value that was not, precisely, provisional and tactical. Hence another contradiction: he could only think of himself as a creator, while in fact his action could only end up being destructive. To understand how radical this destructive action was, just think of the place that he will occupy, in a few decades, in history textbooks: there was a new historical reality, the Kingdom of Italy founded in 1861, and Mussolini was the man who exhausted and destroyed it; in this respect, he is truly the anti-Cavour. We thus also understand Gramsci’s acute remark that Mussolini could not be a “leader.”24 However, this was true not because he represented what Gramsci thought, namely “the condensed type of the Italian petit bourgeois,”25 but precisely because of his activist disposition. Since it compelled him to treat others as forces, he was in turn viewed by others as a force to be used. This was also the source of the constant threat of becoming a prisoner of the forces he allied himself to, and the constant need to balance those forces with others. This resulted in his constant politics of weights and counter-weights, even if he pretended not to compromise. Hence what De Felice perfectly wrote: “he thus believed himself to be the arbiter of everything, and he did not realize that, compromise after compromise, his room for autonomy was becoming smaller and smaller and the logic of things, of the fundamental problems left

24 [TN] Antonio Gramsci, “Capo” [Leader], Ordine Nuovo, 1 March 1924. 25 [TN] Ibid.

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unsolved, was progressively suffocating him, and reducing him to a little Laocoon who seemed strong only because he could flex his muscles, but was irreparably tied up in a tangle of snakes that would slowly suffocate him.”26 We also understand his mistrust of men, his inability to communicate at the human level and to form friendships, and thus his recourse to Macchiavelli’s pessimism in order to perceive this solitude as strength. In this respect, his “Prelude to Macchiavelli”27 of 1924 is one of the works that shed most light on his personality. Nor is it hard to understand why he had both an extraordinary ability to speak to the people and lead them along as a mass, and an inability to talk to men as individuals and to judge them. This is why reading Le Bon’s Psychology of Crowds28 made such a big impression on him: it revealed to him the mechanisms that shape collective behavior, and instructed him about the techniques he had to use in his speeches and public appearances.29 His inability to form an elite and to choose truly valid collaborators also becomes understandable: because the men who consented to be his tools, in order to make Mussolini their own tool in return, certainly could not be the most upright characters. These are just examples, which I have presented in order to propose a theme: typologically, one can discern in Mussolini the solipsist personality in its pure state. This comes with the caveat, however, that it is not meant to outline some psychological features or to try and explain Fascism through Mussolini’s psychology. These features actually derive from his initial option for the revolutionary attitude, thought of as contradictory to materialism; they derive from the irrationalization, so to speak, of the revolutionary position. It is at this point that we must raise the question of the relationship between Fascism and the culture of its time. However, we must avoid an excessively narrow and academic idea of culture, which leads to the usual analysis about Mussolini’s superficiality and ignorance. This analysis then boils down to the standard portrait as a mere demagogue – albeit endowed with uncommon qualities for his kind – or to the other view 26 De Felice, Mussolini il fascista, I, 475. 27 [TN] Benito Mussolini, Preludio al Machiavelli in Gerarchia, April 1924 (also in Scritti e discorsi, vol. IV (Milan: Hoepli, 1934), 109). 28 [TN] Gustave Le Bon, Psychology of Crowds (Southampton, UK: Sparkling Books, 2009). 29 Speaking precisely of Le Bon’s influence, De Felice points out correctly in Mussolini il fascista, II, 369 that, against the common opinion, a careful study of Mussolini’s writings and speeches would show that in them almost nothing was left to improvisation, and that his interventions reflected a carefully studied technique.

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that he was the exemplar of the opportunist adventurer, willing to undergo every possible transformation in order to succeed. A specification of this second view is that of Mussolini the traitor or the turncoat, with respect to either socialism or democratic interventionism.30 For sure, he could only become aware of cultural problems as a politician; he thought against certain ideas that he met in their political incarnations, and he subscribed to certain cultural views rather than others in connection with this political polemic. Having said that, we must determine with what thinkers he had to find common ground, and we must wonder whether he put any lines of thought to the test of practice, and thus made them share in his defeat. His polemical target is clear: reformist socialism and the culture that accompanied it, Marxism re-thought in the positivist culture of the late nineteenth century, and turned into a counsel of prudence to the revolutionaries.31 Therefore “he, too, was called and was happy to call himself an ‘idealist’” because “being open to the contemporary currents of thought as the young man that he was, he succeeded in infusing socialism with a new soul, using Sorel’s theory of violence, Bergson’s idea of intuition, pragmatism, the mysticism of action, all the voluntarism that had been in the intellectual atmosphere for several years and that seemed idealism to many.” This is Croce’s well-known judgment,32 which is not incorrect but nevertheless generic, and by being generic is at risk of being misleading. Greater significance must be given to the unusually instructive recollection by Mussolini himself when in October 1939 he explained to De Begnac the process that had led him to found the Fasci di Combattimento over twenty years earlier: For us who had suffered through the experience of the long trench warfare, the spiritual guides had fallen behind a thousand years. In forty months Croce had not given us one word of hope. Del Vecchio had gathered the best of his noble heart in a book for us fighters, but very few were culturally capable of understanding his discourse. The economists re-opened our soul to some kind of 30 [TN] Interventismo was the movement advocating that Italy enter the First World War. Mussolini was expelled from the Italian Socialist Party for being an interventista, starting the process that would lead to the birth of Fascism. 31 In this respect, the polemic by Claudio Treves against “revolutionary idealism,” already on the eve of the Reggio Emilia convention, is interesting because it nicely illustrates the position Mussolini was fighting against. See Renzo De Felice, Mussolini il rivoluzionario [Mussolini the revolutionary] (Turin: Einaudi, 1965), 116–17. 32 Benedetto Croce, Storia d’Italia dal 1871 al 1915 (Bari: Laterza, 1942), 279 [TN: History of Italy from 1871 to 1915, trans. Cecilia M. Ady (New York: Russel and Russel, 1963), 266–7; I used my own translation].

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interest in life: De Viti, De Marco, Einaudi, Ricci and, above all, Pantaleoni and Pareto. By then, Sorel seemed to belong to a different age. Gentile was preparing the road for those – like me – who wished to walk on it.33

Certainly, this is a retrospective view: it is hard to think that in the initial months of 1919 Mussolini was looking at Gentile, even if this latter had staked out a position as a political writer, especially after Caporetto. Nevertheless, it suggests an important perspective, first of all by indicating the proper limits of Sorel’s influence on Mussolini. At the time when Mussolini “the Fascist” was succeeding Mussolini the revolutionary, two of the protagonists of the Italian dispute about theoretical Marxism, Croce and Sorel, did not appeal to him any longer, whereas his view of the historical moment agreed with that of Gentile. Now, Gentile’s vision as a political writer is completely inseparable from his philosophy; in turn, his philosophy must be viewed historically as the most rigorous epilogue of that same debate (here I state a thesis that I cannot prove now with sufficient precision,34 but which nonetheless I think can be broadly accepted). Therefore, we must now define the meaning of the encounter between Gentile and Mussolini. It surely presents some peculiar features: Mussolini had been interested in Marx as a revolutionary and in Nietzsche, while Gentile had only been interested in Marx as a philosopher, and there is no trace in his works of influences by Nietzsche, nor by other authors who may have influenced Mussolini: Sorel, Pareto, Le Bon. Generically speaking, we can say that they met through negations. On the one hand, Gentile’s Actualism was restless with desire for action, while on the other hand it was utterly impotent to outline and propose, let alone to form, a political movement. On top of that, it pronounced the same negations as Fascism about the existing political forms, whereas Fascism during its consolidation phase needed cultural legitimacy. Therefore, it is easy to think that there was a delusion on the part of the philosopher, of which the politician shrewdly took advantage. But the premise of this interpretation is insufficient and its conclusion is incorrect. Indeed, let us observe that the fashion in which both Mussolini and Gentile can be said to be heretics of Marxism is strictly similar. By now, most scholars would agree that the book that Gentile wrote about Marx’s

33 Yvon De Begnac, Palazzo Venezia, Storia di un regime [Palazzo Venezia, History of a regime] (Rome: La Rocca, 1950), 157. 34 [TN] See Augusto Del Noce, Giovanni Gentile (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1990), chapter 1.

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philosophy35 – the first in the entire world – is not at all a marginal episode in his work. In fact, Actualism can be described as Marxism separated from materialism. It is starting from this point that we can define the meaning of Gentile’s embrace of Fascism. His position must be recognized as unique, because it cannot be found among the many other supporters of various kinds (the idea that Gentile joined Fascism in the name of the ideals of the old Destra Storica36 is completely wrong), and is found even less, clearly, among the intransigents of 1919. He was the only one who recognized in Mussolini not a force that could be used either to strengthen the existing order or to build a new order starting from squadrismo,37 but rather the only man capable of bringing to completion the work of the Risorgimento. I think that the words he pronounced after the meeting with Mussolini in November 1943 which sealed his support for the Social Republic,38 “either Italy saves itself with him, or it is lost for several centuries,”39 must be taken most literally, as the ultimate confirmation that this was his interpretation. Even when everything indicated that Fascism was about to end in a catastrophe, Gentile could not break away from it, out of intellectual consistency even more than out of a commitment to remain faithful in bad times to the cause he had joined at the time of its triumph. In order to understand the nature of his support, it is useful to start from the August 1927 essay “The Origins and Doctrine of Fascism.”40 The date is very important. It appeared after Fascism had definitively 35 [TN] Giovanni Gentile, La filosofia di Marx [The philosophy of Marx] (Florence: Sansoni, 1899). 36 [TN] The “destra storica” (historic right) and the “sinistra storica” (historic left) were the two dominant Italian political parties from unification (1861) to the First World War. The destra storica governed Italy during the first fifteen years after unification, but lost power after 1876. It advocated lassez-faire economic policies, a strong national government, and fiscal rigor at the cost of high taxes. 37 [TN] The word “squadrismo” (from “squadra,” a squad of fighters) refers to the early Fascist practice of forming “squadre d’azione” (action squads) of militants to carry out violent political actions. 38 [TN] The Repubblica Sociale Italiana (Italian Social Republic) was the puppet state that Nazi Germany set up in Northern Italy, with Mussolini as president, during the later part of the Second World War. 39 [TN] As quoted by the Fascist Minister of Education Carlo Alberto Biggini in his eulogy of Gentile published in L’Illustrazione Italiana, 30 April 1944. Biggini (1902–1945) had arranged Gentile’s meeting with Mussolini on 17 November 1943. Gentile was assassinated by Communist partisans in Florence on 15 April 1944. 40 [TN] Giovanni Gentile, Origini e dottrina del fascismo (Rome: Libreria del Littorio, 1929), 5–54. It is available in English in the volume Origins and Doctrine of Fascism: With Selections from Other Works, ed. and trans. A. James Gregor (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 1–42.

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broken with pre-Fascist Liberalism and after Croce not only had joined the opposition, but had elaborated his motivations in A History of Italy, 1871 to 1915 that same year. The first section is titled “The Divided Spirit of the Italian People before the First World War,” and contains an extremely significant interpretation of interventionism and of Italy’s participation in the First World War. Right before and after the war there was no harmony of minds because “there were in the nation’s soul two distinct currents, representing essentially two irreducible souls. They had struggled for two decades, doggedly contesting the field, in the effort to achieve that reconciliation that seems to always require a war fought and a final victory – for the triumph of one. In such a contest, only the victors can conserve that which is salvageable from the vanquished.”41 The Italian participation in the First World War is perceived essentially as a revolution; the war is the instrument that will enable the party of the Risorgimento to triumph over the party not-of-the-Risorgimento: To enter the war, to throw the nation, willing or unwilling, into the conflict – not for Trento, Trieste or Dalmatia, and certainly not for the specific political, military or economic advantages that those annexations might provide … entry into the war was necessary in order to finally unite the nation through the shedding of blood. The nation had been formed more through good fortune than through the valor of its sons … to cement the nation as only war can, creating a single thought for all citizens, a single feeling, a single passion, and a common hope … to bring the nation together – in order to render it a true nation, real, alive, capable of acting, and ready to make itself valued and of consequence in the world – to enter into history with its own personality, with its own form, with its own character, with its own originality, never again to live on the borrowed culture of others and in the shadow of those great people who make history. To create, therefore, a true nation, in the only way the creation of every spiritual reality is undertaken: with effort and through sacrifice.42

We have here the transition from the democratic interpretation of the First World War, as a fight for the freedom of nations, to the Fascist interpretation,43 and the essay as a whole is very interesting in order to 41 [TN] Gentile, Origins and Doctrine, 1. 42 [TN] Ibid., 2. 43 When he discusses Mussolini’s creation of the myth of the revolutionary war, De Felice makes a perfect remark: “Paraphrasing and completing a well-known statement by Croce, we can say that whereas the motto of the nationalists was ‘for war and not for Italy’ and the motto of the republicans and of the followers of Bissolati was ‘for democracy and

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understand the break between democratic interventionism and Fascist interventionism or, in short, between Fascism and what later will take a new form in the Partito d’Azione.44 How were these two Italies defined? “The neutralists calculated, and interventionists committed themselves to the war for an intangible, impalpable, nonmeasurable moral concern.”45 For Gentile, the first side was Giolitti’s Italy, the second Mazzini’s; and according to Gentile the continuation of Mazzini is precisely where he meets Mussolini: “He was a Mazzinian with the sincerity that Mazzinianism always found in Romagna. He had already transcended the ideology of socialism – first by instinct and then by reflection. Having passed through a painful and troubled youth, rich with experiences and meditation, he had nurtured himself with the most recent culture of Italy.”46 What is said about the difference between nationalism and Fascism is especially important: it lies in the fact that, according to nationalism, the nation is: an entity that transcends the will and the personality of the individual because it is conceived as objectively pre-existent, independent of the consciousness of individuals; something that exists even when they do not work to make it exist, to create it … In Nationalism the individual becomes an outcome, something that has the state as his antecedent, which binds him suppressing his freedom, and not for Italy,’ the motto of Mussolini was ‘for the revolution and not for Italy’” (De Felice, Mussolini il rivoluzionario, 284). But what could be the content of this revolution? We will never emphasize enough the fact that the “concept of class” and the idea of its revolutionary function had been discovered by Marx through a purely philosophical process, even though afterward he had intended to verify them in the experience of history. There is a necessity in philosophical essences, and after he abandoned Marx’s philosophy Mussolini also had to abandon the thesis of the revolutionary function of the proletariat. This happened right after Caporetto. De Felice has effectively shown that he started at that time “to move further and further away from Socialism, to ‘surpass’ it … into ‘the myth of the trenches’ and the formula of a new society of fighters and producers … Having thus lost irremediably the possibility of influencing the proletarian masses, the only group that could be relied on in order to create a new politics were the men of the trenches, the fighters” (394). Thus, having started from the “revolution,” Mussolini met “Italy” through combattentismo [TN: political movement of former fighters in the First World War, which Mussolini joined and used as a springboard to start Fascism]. Gentile also came to embrace the revolution and the fight, starting from the exact opposite point of view – from Italy and the philosophical primacy that Italy, in his opinion, had achieved. 44 [TN] Post-Second World War political party that promoted radical social change while rejecting Communism. It disbanded after losing the 1946 election, but its ideas remained deeply influential in Italian culture and politics. 45 [TN] Gentile, Origins and Doctrine, 3. 46 [TN] Ibid., 17.

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which condemns him to the land where he is born, must live and must die. For Fascism, on the other hand, the state and the individual are one, or better, perhaps, are terms that are inseparable in a necessary synthesis.47

In short, according to Gentile what is distinctive about Fascism, and makes it different from nationalism, is the rejection of the naturalistic character which is the source of the bigoted, illiberal, conservative aspects of nationalism. In a way, here Gentile is inserting himself in the development of Fascism in order to claim it from conservatives, nationalists, and traditionalists.48 He takes the same attitude regarding the monarchy; for nationalism it was a given, since it was part of the process of historical formation of the Italian nation. Conversely, for Gentile “all that seemed to pre-exist – and to be almost a hereditary legacy – is transfigured into our own personal conquest, which would vanish if we, who are are its authors, ceased to pay attention.”49 It would be utterly wrong to view this essay just as a purely formal exercise, because the view of the Risorgimento affirmed by Gentile is the direct prolongation of the one he had outlined even in his very first writings. He expressed it already in the preface to Rosmini and Gioberti,50 and Rosmini and Gioberti and The Philosophy of Marx are two inseparable books.51 Gentile was obsessed with the word “reform” in the same way as Marx had been with the word revolution. Reform of dialectics, reform of the

47 [TN] Ibid., 25–6 (I modified the translation). 48 De Felice’s book highlights nicely the constant friction between Mussolini and the nationalists, even though, of course, Mussolini could never do without nationalist support. Regarding Gentile’s position, his speech in Florence on “La tradizione italiana” [The Italian tradition] (25 April 1936) is also very important. It was directed against the two rhetorical forms of imperial Rome and Christian Rome; and although the main target is the “new incarnation of the old Guelphism” that had taken place after the Conciliazione [TN: the Lateran Pacts of 1929], his argument is nonetheless based on the same concept of tradition that had been the starting point for his critique of nationalism in the essay “Origini e Dottrina” which I mentioned earlier. 49 [TN] Gentile, Origins and Doctrine, 28 (I modified the translation). 50 [TN] Giovanni Gentile, Rosmini e Gioberti (Pisa: Nistri, 1898). 51 I take the liberty of citing some of my works on Gentile: “Appunti sul primo Gentile e la genesi dell’attualismo” [Notes on young Gentile and the birth of Actualism], Giornale critico della filosofia italiana 43, no. 4 (1964): 508–56; “L’idea di Risorgimento come categoria filosofica in Giovanni Gentile” [The idea of Risorgimento as a philosophical category in Giovanni Gentile], Giornale critico della filosofia italiana 47, no. 22 (1968): 163–215; “Gentile e la poligonia Giobertiana” [Gentile and Gioberti’s poligony], Giornale critico della filosofia italiana 48, no. 2 (1969): 222–85 [TN: all included in the book Giovanni Gentile (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1990)].

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schools, reform of the state, and so on. But to him, the word “reform” did not mean rectifying an existing order, but a new form through which the past must be restored to new life. As such, it is closer to the word “revolution” than to the word “reform” as it is commonly understood. And his philosophy is truly inseparable from the idea of a religious-­ political reform; it is the continuation, in a sense, of the Catholic reform proposed by Gioberti, which contained already all the themes of Modernism. Nor was his philosophy meaningful to him as a purely speculative system, independently of this reform. He was the last of the Italian religious-political reformers, in a line that goes from Bruno to Gioberti; nor, in fact, did he ever present his philosophy otherwise. And in a sense he can also be said to be the last representative of the Risorgimento. Curiously, Gentile had rediscovered the type of the political philosopher during his youthful studies of Rosmini and Gioberti, and of Marx. The overall meaning of these studies can be expressed in the following formula: Marxism separated from materialism and Giobertism separated from Platonism, and thus made immanent, coincide. This had led him to an interpretation of the Risorgimento that was related to that of Gioberti in the sense of continuing and deepening it. It was a particular form of Giobertism, however, such that the opposition to Mazzini disappeared, and it was possible to affirm Mazzini’s relevance after Marx. This also established a curious analogy between Gentile and Marx; we can say that like Marx thinks of the French revolution as an unfinished revolution, so Gentile thinks of the Italian Risorgimento as an unfinished Risorgimento. The consequence of Gentile’s Mazzinianism-Giobertism, and thus of the unity of religion and politics, was a sequence of negations that involved, besides Giolitti’s whole system, also nationalism itself. Very briefly, it is important to observe how shaken he was by the First World War, and particularly by the defeat of Caporetto, which to him seemed to mark the collapse of post-Risorgimento Italy, and by what followed, in which he saw a rebirth of the spirit of the Risorgimento. He then had the impression that things were coming his way, confirming his philosophical vision and allowing its realization. This explains his various political works from the period between Caporetto and the March on Rome – the articles collected in Guerra e fede and in Dopo la vittoria, the essays on Mazzini and Gioberti, the Discorsi di religione, in which the emphasis is on how to formulate a religious form of politics.52 52 [TN] The works mentioned here are Guerra e fede [War and faith] (Naples: Ricciardi, 1919); Dopo la vittoria [After victory] (Rome: La Voce, 1920); I profeti del Risorgimento italiano [The prophets of the Italian Risorgimento] (Florence: Vallecchi, 1923); Discorsi di religione [Discourses on religion] (Florence: Vallecchi, 1920).

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Thus, we can understand why an encounter was necessary. It was natural for Gentile to think that like he had encountered the philosophy of the Risorgimento starting from the theoretical critique of Marx, the same had to happen for Mussolini starting from the political-practical critique of Marxism.53 We see then that in the context of a historical, and not moralistic or polemical, assessment of Fascism the question whether Gentile was a victim of delusions is pointless. And that Fascism was a much more complex phenomenon than it is usually presented in the literature, since it led the most important Italian philosopher of the period to adhere to it, out of obligation to be intellectually consistent. Then again, it cannot be coincidental that the same fundamental criticisms that are brought to bear against Actualism – those of being activistic and solipsistic – are also the essential historical criteria for understanding the nature of Fascism. You may ask: if it is easy to reconstruct Gentile’s idea of Mussolini, what was Mussolini’s idea of Gentile? As far as I know, this is a topic that nobody has studied, yet. Certainly we can imagine that Mussolini was not too happy about being considered the instrument of a political-religious reform conceived of by somebody else, whose terms he did not even grasp well; and I already mentioned his incapacity for true friendships. However, he felt that he could not push Gentile aside completely. Thus, he enlisted his help to write La dottrina del Fascismo54 and I think that his comment in the conversation with De Begnac is very significant, at a time when Gentile was certainly not too much in fashion. If what I have said so far is true, it could not be otherwise. ***

53 Although he argues against a necessary relationship between Actualism and Fascism, in The Social Philosophy of Giovanni Gentile (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1960), 219, H.S. Harris observes very correctly of Gentile’s attitude that “He was not simply loyal to the Nation as a purely ideal entity. He was personally loyal to Mussolini … In Hegelian terms, Gentile was certain that the Weltgeist possessed him and spoke through him,” and that this explains why he remained faithful to the “regime” despite the fact that he recognized that the Party was making mistakes. This peculiar attitude becomes understandable if what I said is true: for him Mussolini was the Man, the “cosmic individual” through whom his religious-political reform had to take place. 54 [TN] The ideological-political manifesto La Dottrina del Fascismo was first published as the entry Fascismo in the 1932 edition of the Enciclopedia Italiana, 847–51, with Mussolini as the only author; in fact, Gentile had written the first part, Idee fondamentali [Fundamental ideas]. It was published in English as Fascism: Doctrines and Institutions (Rome: Ardita, 1935) and more recently as The Doctrine of Fascism (New York: Howard Fertig, 2006).

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Can we now attempt an overall definition? According to what I said, Fascism is what the revolutionary position, born from Marxism, was bound to become after having accepted the results of the critique of theoretical Marxism that had been carried out in Italy at the end of last century, of which Actualism can be considered the philosophical conclusion. Of course, this definition only concerns its form, which by itself is not enough to explain its practical realization. This latter, obviously, would not have happened without a sequence of historical circumstances: the World War, the way Italy entered it, Caporetto, the transfiguration of the battle of Vittorio Veneto into the myth of the mutilated victory, the Russian revolution, the Red Biennium, etcetera. How does it fit in what I earlier called the age of secularization? In this respect it must be defined as an alternative to Leninism (to Leninism, mind you, not to Stalinism; even though Stalinism and the closing of Russia into itself could seem to confirm the validity of the Fascist solution). But the word alternative (“either they or we”) can be understood in two ways: either as absolute opposition or as sublation in a form adequate to a country of higher civilization and culture than Russia; not only Italy, actually, since around 1930 Mussolini could think that the world would soon become Fascist. In my judgment, Mussolini thought of Fascism in the second sense, and here is the difference between Fascism and Nazism. Around 1920, in the world two men vied for the claim to incarnate the true image of the revolutionary, Lenin and Mussolini. And we must acknowledge that in this claim Mussolini was really sincere. It was a failed revolution, therefore, which found its historical justification – in the sense of the condition that made it possible – in the fact that MarxLeninism could not realize itself as a world revolution, but had to stop in front of the reality of the nations. However, observing that Fascism failed as a revolution is not the same as saying that it should be considered a reactionary phenomenon, nor does it justify saying that Mussolini purposely deceived from the beginning, using revolutionary language as a cover. But assessing the outcome is not a criterion to define the beginning. For example, those who say that Communism failed because it led to a new “class,”55 more oppressive than ever, certainly do not mean to say that Communism was born with a reactionary intention. Therefore, if speaking of Fascisms is incorrect, so is the judgment that their catastrophe involves the catastrophe of the traditional ideals in which old Europe had grown up – which is a judgment laden with the

55 Milovan Ðilas, The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System (New York: Praeger, 1957).

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most serious practical consequences. As I see it, what is involved in the collapse of Fascism in the proper sense is the line of the Italian religiouspolitical reformers, a unitary line which is simultaneously anti-Protestant and in a heretical position with respect to Catholicism. In its final act, with Gentile, it attempted an Idealist sublation of Marxism. As usual, some people will respond that nobody really claims that the fall of Fascism coincides with the collapse of traditional ideals. But this just means that nobody could seriously prove that the affirmation of those ideals is tied directly to Fascist politics. It does not disprove the fact that in today’s public discourse, both at the higher and at the lower level, everybody thinks as if the new age that has established itself after the fall of Fascism implies such collapse. In the language of the new profession of taboo-destroyers, a proponent of those ideals is always regarded as a Fascist, more or less aware, or almost always unconscious. And “Fascism” is used as a synonym of “repressiveness.” I certainly will not compare a scholar as serious as Nolte to such people, and I am positive that his intentions are very different, but in fact the formula “resistance against transcendence” easily mutates to a lower level, becoming “repressive spirit.” An example will illustrate the meaning of what I’ve said. It is commonly believed that Fascism found valid support in the section of the Catholic world that was most opposed to Modernism. And actually we may well grant that many of its members were victims of a delusion. They followed the “anti-modern” Catholic perspective that condemned in bulk every aspect of modernity, and by doing so went beyond the criticism of Modernism. This view was indeed prevalent between 1920 and 1930 (how to forget that it was also the title of a book by Maritain?56): they believed that Fascism was fighting the great modern heresies, liberalism and socialism, and was destined to burn out in this struggle, leaving the field open to a Catholic restoration. While this is true, we need to add that, in their case, it was a delusion. Too many people were victims of delusions about Fascism (think of Croce during the early years), so that a complete history of Fascism would largely be their history. However, this can be easily explained: the lack of content about Fascism’s ultimate goal – which was tied to Mussolini’s tacticism, as we discussed – explains why almost no important Italian historical figure of our century was not deluded about him, at least for a moment (even Salvemini and Gramsci, at the time of the intervention!). Here I wanted to show that Gentile’s adhesion, on the contrary, was intellectually obligatory – he who from

56 [TN] Jacques Maritain, Antimoderne (Paris: Éditions de la Revue des Jeunes, 1922).

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the religious standpoint can be considered the most consistent Modernist (in a polemic with other Modernists because of his consistency).57 It is because of a peculiar inversion that today people think that support from traditionalists of all kinds was an inner obligation, whereas support from the advocates of the spirit of modernity can be excused because it was motivated by delusions. The present discussion is directed precisely against this idea, which by now has solidified into a mental habit. At the basis of this inversion lies the idea that novelty is always a synonym of positivity. If we look carefully, this idea is intrinsic to the age of secularization because this latter attributes a magical significance, as a power word, to the word revolution. As Monnerot perfectly remarks, today almost always “the word ‘revolution’ is taken en bonne part; when it will be no longer, we will have entered a different age.”58

57 I tried to clarify this point in my essay “Gentile e la poligonia Giobertiana.” 58 Jules Monnerot, Sociologie de la Révolution [Sociology of revolution] (Paris: Fayard, 1969), 7–8.

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Simone Weil, Interpreter of Today’s World

In order to identify the criteria of interpretation for Weil’s work, we must raise the question of the real meaning of her process of thought, regardless of what she may have thought it was. Only one aspect is beyond dispute, that she wanted to be always on the side of the oppressed, because victory dulls one’s sense of justice. But the fact that she can be read in very different (or actually opposite) ways is very clear based on the variety of reactions: •

•

Is she an anarchist, meaning a “lover of the impossible,” who therefore must break with every order that takes the form of a society, first Communism and then the Catholic Church? Does she express, instead, the necessary conditions for the Church’s renewal, and by doing so does she embody the spirit of the Resistance in the purest sense, which demands that the Catholic Church shed all those aspects that made possible the impression that it was the model of the totalitarian states?1 From this perspective, her thought would belong in the context of neo-Modernism, even though the path she chose, the Greek one, is incorrect.

This chapter was first published as the introduction to Simone Weil, L’amore di Dio [The love of God] (Turin: Borla, 1968), 9–64. 1 In fact, that is what she writes in order to justify in front of Fr Perrin her decision to remain outside the church (Weil, Attente de Dieu (Paris: La Colombe, 1950), 88 [Waiting for God, trans. Emma Craufurd (New York: Putnam, 1951), 82]). It is hard to imagine a greater historical error than confusing medieval theocracy with totalitarianism. We could say that the latter – inasmuch as it subordinates every spiritual activity to politics, and in fact to the judgment of the politicians – affirms the “primacy of the temporal,” which is the complete negation of what justified the former, at least in theory. But Weil could not think otherwise, as we shall see, because her original formation reflected Alain’s anti-clericalism. From that perspective it was unavoidable that the theocratic ideal would seem to her to be an expression of the church’s will to power.

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Or, on the contrary, does her thought process meet traditionalism, and does her work end up today giving protective cover to the ­reemergence of reactionary spasms? In the end, in this case, her thought would corroborate the Communist critique of anarchism; namely, in its final stage anarchism is bound to go down the irrationalist route, in the sense of critiquing modern rationalism, coming close along this trajectory to reactionary Catholicism, but without ­being able to join it. Therefore, the defeat of her experience is due to its very peculiarity, which prevents it from anchoring itself to any tradition, be it anarchical, irrationalist, or Catholic. Does she represent the exemplary type of religious conversion, as is possible with full intellectual honesty today, so that its incompleteness shows the problems that religious thought must face at this time? So that her work should be regarded as a starting point? Or is her thought, instead, completely Gnostic, in the sense that it represents the most complete absorption of Christianity into Greek thought? Should her writings be read mystically or rather aesthetically? In ­other words, do they inspire religious conversion or do they provoke instead aesthetic admiration, so that the religious aspect is totally ­absorbed into the aesthetic? Are they the mystical fulfillment of Valery’s “Greek miracle,” or of Proust’s search of lost time?

Besides L’Enracinement,2 she wrote articles, letters, fragments. Undeniably, every one of these interpretations may seem legitimate based on this or that passage read in isolation. It is a matter, however, of putting in context and ranking, so to speak, their partial truths, and of accounting for the aspects that may have suggested incorrect interpretations. In this regard, it seems indispensable to me to establish two criteria: (a) Weil’s position must be described as a form of negative thought, through which the ideas of Order as metaphysical principle and of obedience to God as the essential virtue, and the link between Platonism and Christianity, are revealed (in the strong sense of the word revelation: “as if by grace”). Negative thought is to be understood as total rejection of “vitalistic lies” and false idols. In this book,3 notice the sentences: “To 2 [TN] Simone Weil, The Need for Roots, trans. Arthur Wills (New York: Routledge, 2002). 3 [TN] Weil, L’amore di Dio, the Italian translation of Pensées sans ordre concernant l’amour de Dieu (Paris: Gallimard, 1962). Some of these essays were translated into English by Richard Rees and published in the volume On Science, Necessity and the Love of God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968).

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believe in God is not a decision we can make. All we can do is to decide not to give our love to false gods.”4 “It is not for man to seek, or even to believe in, God. He has only to refuse his love to everything which is not God. This refusal does not presuppose any belief.”5 It is within this attitude – in which the claim that our exigencies should be the measure of being has been absolutely eliminated, and the greatest mortification of the “I” has been reached – that truth can reveal itself. One cannot go any farther in anti-pragmatism, anti-subjectivism, and anti-historicism; let us even say, in being anti-modern. It is Platonism rediscovered, I daresay, Platonically, or through a process of reminiscence. So that the Platonic theses become manifested in their aspect as eternal truths, not truths of a certain age. The occasion for this reminiscence is today’s world, if attention is exercised in the sense in which it can be called prayer.6 I think that for Weil the relationship between Platonism and modern thought resembles that between the intelligible and the sensible worlds. The modern world – that is, the product of the secular spirit, which to Weil is characterized by the idol of human self-redemption and by the refusal of grace – can be thought of as the world of oblivion in which we find ourselves cast; as the Platonic cave. But like the prisoners in the cave can be freed, so the truth of the past can be rediscovered. Chronology and degree of perfection are completely different things. (b) Being unfinished is a characteristic of her thought. Not in the sense that her premature death prevented her from giving it a systematic form, but in the sense that it stops at an unresolved contradiction between ancient Gnosis and Christianity. The unfinishedness is due, in part, to the fact that she interpreted her own experience within a previous form of culture. She bears the suffering of this contradiction, torn as she is between what she calls “intellectual honesty” (understood as

4 [TN] Weil, On Science, 148. 5 [TN] Ibid., 158. 6 “The only extreme attention is religious” (Weil, La pesanteur et la grâce (Paris: Plon, 1951), 153) [Gravity and Grace, trans. Emma Crawford and Mario von der Ruhr (London: Routledge, 2002), 116]. The essential texts about attention are found in La pesanteur et la grâce, 153–62 [Gravity and Grace, 116–22]; Attente de Dieu, 114–23, 154–58 [Waiting for God, 105–16, 149–53] ; La connaissance surnaturelle (Paris: Gallimard, 1950), 92 [First and Last Notebooks, trans. Richard Rees (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), 141]. We are allowed to think that this theme was explored more and more deeply in Weil’s experience, leading to the sentence in La connaissance surnaturelle, 92: “God is attention without distraction” [First and Last Notebooks, 141].

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subordination of subjective religious needs to obedience to God), which prevents her from assenting to baptism, and desire for the sacraments.7 Having come to this point, we can already make a judgment about two of the images that I listed. An anarchist? In a sense yes, but as a rebel against any form of deification of man (and anarchism, in its authentic sense, includes this aspect). Hence, a type of anarchism that must develop into mysticism; and not into a form of irrational mysticism, but rather one based on the idea of the cosmic Order, as the principle of truth, of beauty, and of morality. We may add that the anarchist interpretation has an element of truth, in the sense that we must recognize the continuity between her political experience, which was anarchic in nature rather than Communist,8 and the subsequent religious experience. In any case, the second experience makes manifest the Platonism – as primacy of the idea of the Good – that was already implicit in the first. Weil broke up with academia and dedicated herself to revolutionary action and, for a while, to factory life because she judged that the ideal of a philosophical life required her to enter in contact with those who were in the position to desire justice, because they had been denied it. In her next stage she realized that this rebellion, motivated by the Platonism that is innate to the human spirit, could only take shape as a rebellion against the “modern” world. A Modernist? We must say that around 1950 her work enjoyed some success precisely in this sense; it attracted interest chiefly because of the themes of thought expressed in Weil’s “Last Pages.”9 However, it was a misunderstanding: some of her criticisms might look formally similar to those of progressive Catholicism, but the principle that animated them, Gnosticism, was absolutely different, in fact opposite. At any rate, that relevance has now faded completely. This does not mean that no traces are left and that they do not hinder the dissemination of her thought. Consider, for example, the widespread opinion that her thought exhausted itself in the quest to replace the journey of Israel to Christ with that of Greece to Christ, and is the proof that this program is an illusion. Also, Teilhard’s huge success is based – at least de jure – on the following, conscious or unconscious, premise: that within the neo-Modernist position, imposed by the Zeitgeist, Weil represents the defeated line, because her thought goes back to Gnostic views; and this defeat supposedly 7 About this point one should read carefully the letters to Father Perrin, in Weil, Attente de Dieu, 47ff [Waiting for God, 43ff]. 8 Indeed she always opposed Stalinism, even during her revolutionary period. 9 [TN] “Dernier texte,” in Weil, Pensées sans ordre concernant l’amour de Dieu, 149.

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c­ onfirms the validity of Teilhardism. The truth is, instead, that Weil’s significance resides precisely in her critique of this obligation by the Zeitgeist. We realize how influential the Modernist image remains today also if we observe that even Teilhard’s critics hesitate to use Weil’s thought, which in fact is his exact opposite.10 And yet, highlighting this opposition would strike at the main argument that Teilhardian thought can bring up in its favor, namely that it is the form of apologetics valid for the people of our time. Because the ideal itinerary of today’s man towards faith is represented by Weil’s experience, by virtue of both her lived knowledge of the modern world and her absolute purity. This brings us to the question of her Hellenism. It is no wonder that she came across Plato’s thought, almost without looking for it, during the transition to the metaphysical-mystical stage of her thought. Rediscovering Plato while critiquing Marx is, I would say, a necessity inscribed in the philosophical essences. This is because in Marx we have the beginning of the philosophy of the primacy of action (in which the idea is viewed as an instrument to change the world): the eleventh thesis on Feuerbach11 is its clearest and best known statement, as affirmation that the type of the philosopher is surpassed in that of the revolutionary. The critique of Marxism, therefore, cannot but rediscover Plato as the philosopher of the primacy of contemplation. Weil’s criticisms of Marx could not be clearer in this regard. Let us recall: “Marx purely and simply attributed to social matter this movement towards good through contradictions which Plato described as being that of the thinking creature drawn upwards by the supernatural operation of grace.”12 Hence, he views matter as a machine capable of producing goodness.13 But here lies his delusion: therefore Marxism is nothing but “a system according to which the relationships of force that define the social structure entirely determine both man’s destiny and his thoughts. Such a system is

10 In fact, the historical perspective of Teilhardism, to the extent that it wishes to remain within orthodoxy, is a rediscovery of Jewish thought, regarded as irreconcilable with Greek thought. The various works by Claude Tresmontant are interesting in this respect; he has tried to anchor Teilhard’s thought in the biblical-Christian tradition, even though in his latest writings he seems to be moving towards a more critical position. 11 [TN] “The philosophers have interpreted the world in various ways; the point however is to change it,” in Frederick Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy (New York: International Publishers, 1941), 84. 12 Simone Weil, Oppression et libertè (Paris: Gallimard, 1955), 249 [Oppression and Liberty (London: Routledge, 2001), 180.] 13 [TN] In the original this sentence is included in the quote that precedes it, but it does not exist in Weil’s French text (nor in the English translation). I believe it is a comment by Del Noce that ended up inside the quotation marks due to a typographical error.

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ruthless. Force counts for everything there; it leaves no hope for justice. It does not even leave the hope of conceiving justice in its truth, since all that thoughts do is to reflect the relationships of force.”14 “Marxism, insofar as it is true, is entirely contained in Plato’s page on the subject of the large beast, and its refutation is also contained there.”15 Since Marxism is the best proof that it is impossible for power to turn into justice, revolutionary thought – and not religion – is the true opium of the people. This radical opposition between justice and power leads her to explain that it is absurd to have faith in a “mechanism, inherent in the very structure of the social matter, which will automatically bring men justice.”16 It also accounts for Weil’s usage of the word “supernatural”: “Materialism accounts for everything, with the exception of the supernatural … if one leaves the supernatural out of account, one is right to be a materialist. This universe, minus the supernatural, is only matter.”17 A passage in the essay on “God in Plato”18 is extremely significant in this regard, because it gives us the ultimate reason for her break with revolutionary thought: “in the domain of the spirit evil produces only evil and good produces only good.”19 This also goes to explain her constant insistence on the Gospel parable of the tree and its fruit. These texts contain the criticism, as a lived experience, of Marxian dialectics, of the Marxian process towards good through evil, that is, of the replacement of ethics by the philosophy of history.20 I speak of a lived criticism having in mind 14 Weil, Oppression et libertè, 226 [Oppression and Liberty, 162–3]. 15 Simone Weil, Cahiers II (Paris: Plon, 1951), 315 [Notebooks, Vol. 1, trans. Arthur Wills (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956), 328]. Plato’s passage about the “large beast” as a social obstacle to man’s ascent to God – because the false intellectual, the sophist, wants to please the tastes of the crowd – is found in Republic, 6, 493 a–d. Weil recalls it several times. See especially La Grecia e le intuizioni precristiane, in the series “Documenti di cultura moderna” directed by Augusto Del Noce and Elémire Zolla, (Turin: Borla, 1967), 57–60 [TN: Italian translation of Les intuitions pré-chrétiennes (Paris: La Colombe, 1951) and parts of La source grecque (Paris: Gallimard, 1951). Some of these texts can be found in English in Intimations of Christianity among the Ancient Greeks, ed. and trans. Elizabeth Chase Geissbuhler (London: Routledge, 1998). The passages about the large beast come from the essay God in Plato, whose first twelve pages are included in Intimations of Christianity. A complete translation of God in Plato is found in On Science, 89–137. The pages cited by Del Noce are 99–101]. 16 Weil, Oppression et libertè, 251 [Oppression and Liberty, 182. In the original Del Noce refers incorrectly to the Cahiers, while providing the page numbers in Oppression et libertè]. 17 Weil, Oppression et libertè, 232 [Oppression and Liberty, 167]. 18 [TN] Weil, On Science, 89–137. 19 Weil, La Grecia, 50 [On Science, 93]. 20 Regarding the essential role of Marxism in this replacement, and the way in which ethics is surpassed in revolutionary thought, see my book Il problema dell’ateismo (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1964), cviii ff, 40ff.

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the decisive role that the experience of the Spanish War – in which she volunteered for two months on the red side – played in the development of her thought. Her moral rebellion against violence is extremely similar to that of Bernanos, who also volunteered in that war, but on the opposite side. One of her letters of 1938,21 addressed to “Drumont’s disciple” after reading Les grands cimitiéres sous la lune,22 is symbolic in this respect because it marks the moment when revolutionary thought gets to break away (in Weil) from Marxism, and reactionary thought (in Bernanos) from Fascism. This leads to Weil’s transition, in the years 1937–39, to pacifism and the idea of non-violence, and to the mystical contemplation of beauty as the only possible way to overcome the malheur. I will remark briefly that, if we fully developed this Weilian critique of Marxism, we would probably also get to define the opposition between the Platonist Vico and Hegel and Marx, and the sense in which Vichian thought is relevant now. The thesis that atheism obeys a law of heterogenesis of ends so that it realizes the exact opposite of what it intends – which has not yet been elaborated philosophically, but is suggested by the present situation – would be in fact an extension of Vico’s thought. But let us consider the form in which Platonism is reached. This happens starting from the critique of a revolutionary aspiration, which shows the vanity of the idea of a self-redemption in which the absolute Good is realized in the world at the hands of humanity itself, through the dialectics of historical reality. Hence, if we wanted to place Weil’s thought in

21 We do not know the precise date. It contains, among others things, the following sentences: “The point is the attitude towards murder. Never once, either among the Spaniards or even among the French who were in Spain as combatants or as visitors (pour se promener) – the latter being usually dim and harmless intellectuals – never once did I hear anyone express, even in private intimacy, any repulsion or disgust or even disapproval of useless bloodshed … My own feeling was that once a certain class of people has been placed by the temporal and spiritual authorities outside the ranks of those whose life has value, then nothing comes more naturally to men than murder. As soon as men know that they can kill without fear of punishment or blame, they kill; or at least they encourage killers with approving smiles … I met peaceable Frenchmen, for whom I had never before felt contempt and who would never have dreamed of doing any killing themselves, but who savored that blood-polluted atmosphere with visible pleasure. For them I shall never again be able to feel any esteem” (Weil, Écrits historiques et politiques (Paris: Gallimard, 1960), 223 [Selected Essays 1934–1943, trans. Richard Rees (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), 174–5]. I translated this long passage in order to illustrate the chasm between Weil and ordinary intellectuals, both of the “engaged” and of the academic variety. The experience of civil war and revolutionary violence was what led her to criticize the idea of revolution and to rediscover the Platonic tradition. 22 Georges Bernanos, A Diary of My Times, trans. Pamela Morris (New York: McMillan, 1938).

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the history of philosophy, we should probably view it as the endpoint of the process of pessimism, when it reaches the stage at which it must turn into mysticism – because of the correlation between human misery and divine perfection, which is essential to pessimism even though it remains hidden during its early stages. However, in this final stage pessimism has to choose between Christianity and the ancient Gnosis. This fork in the road is somehow necessary, because the form of religious thought that pessimism encounters is the Platonic one before the biblical one. This fact is so well attested by history that there is no need for references. Thus, it is not by chance that she writes that “No people has expressed as they [the Greeks] did the bitterness of human misery,” adding immediately that “the whole of Greek civilization is a search for bridges to relate human misery with the divine perfection.”23 Moreover, it is a Plato who looks eastward.24 However, we must emphasize the particular character of this pessimism, in the aspect that separates it from the classic line of modern pessimism. I believe the best way to define it is by understanding it as pessimism after Marx, and no longer after Hegel. This is because of the very intensity with which Weil lived the revolutionary experience. Unlike many intellectuals, she did not want to direct a movement from outside, dictating strategy and tactics, but she wanted to really live that climax of malheur that was supposed to lead to the dialectical overturning. Here lies the essential difference between ordinary pessimism and hers. Whereas the former has an explanatory character and generally leads one to escape sorrow, for Weil instead the fundamental experience is contact with the malheur as a universal reality, and accepting to be possessed by it; “contact” being immediate knowledge that has nothing to do with scholarship. If we take Schopenhauer’s thought as the paradigm of pessimist thought, we then see how Weil’s position escapes the criticisms formulated by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche against Schopenhauer. At this point one could really start discussing the philosophical significance of her work post-Kierkegaard and post-Nietzsche.25

23 Weil, La Grecia, 46 [On Science, 89–90]. 24 Weil says this much; see La Grecia, 47–8 [On Science, 91]. 25 We must observe the following: (1) Modern pessimism arises in correlation with revolutionary thought, of which it is the antithesis. (2) It goes through a developmental process in which it progressively moves away from the atheistic aspect. At the endpoint, which is where I would like to situate Weil, it reconciles with religious thought. (3) It is characterized by a specific historical perspective, which includes Kant, Plato, Eastern thought; and, regarding Christian thought, the mystical tradition, to the exclusion of theologians and doctors. This was already true of Schopenhauer, but this perspective also applies to Weil. About the difference between her position and ordinary pessimism, we can

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Having said this, we cannot be surprised by the fact that her reminiscence, or knowledge by connaturality, of Plato matches exactly that of the Church Fathers, and that certainly this happened unintentionally. Plato’s God is personal;26 he is creator;27 in Plato there is a prefiguration of the Trinity as unity of Good, Being, and Truth;28 the martyrdom of the righteous man described in the second book of the Republic prefigures the sacrifice of Christ;29 Platonic ideas are the thoughts or the attributes of God;30 “man cannot exert his intelligence to the full without charity, because the only source of light is God. Therefore, the faculty of supernatural love is higher than the intelligence and is its condition.”31 However, it is no less true that in her thought the Gnostic element goes much deeper than one might suppose. It has strictly intellectual roots: it cannot be explained in terms of practical attitudes, love for the Cathars and the Albigensians, deploration of positions taken historically by the Church, etcetera. Nor is it enough to invoke the practical and affective character of the language of mystics, or the distinction between it and the speculative character of metaphysical language. In his analysis of Lettre à un religieux, Fr Danielou has clearly highlighted the reasons why Weil could not convert, although she lived “in the religious dimension.” Her Hellenism led her to transpose the Christian fact to the atemporal level of essences, and thus to not recognize its unique and irreversible character. As a consequence, for her it is more a question of reaching the eternal archetypes by stepping out of time – and Christ is the most perfect of these archetypes – than of believing in an act of God who comes to take back time in order to give it meaning and save it. Here we touch the bottom of Simone Weil’s Hellenism. In fact, we stand at the point of separation between mythical religion and biblical religion. For mythical religion, every perfection already exists in a pre-cosmic, exemplary world. Time cannot but degrade this original perfection. Hence, perfection means reaching this pre-cosmic world. It is nostalgia of a purity that has been

also use a sentence from her Cahiers II, 369 [Notebooks, Vol. 2, trans. Arthur Wills (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956), 387]: it is not a matter of seeking a “remedy” against suffering, but of making “a supernatural use” of it. 26 Weil, La Grecia, 64 [On Science, 104]. It is true that there are some uncertainties about this point, because in several other passages she insists on God’s impersonality; see, for instance, Attente de Dieu, 136 [Waiting for God, 179]. 27 Weil, La Grecia, 98 [On Science, 131–2]. 28 Ibid., 65 [On Science, 105]. 29 Ibid., 50–1 [On Science, 93–4]. 30 Ibid., 50 [On Science, 93]. 31 Ibid., 64 [On Science, 104].

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irreparably compromised by the adventure of time. On the contrary, for biblical religion what God promised to the prophets was greater than everything that had existed in the past. For them innocence was a future, which God’s power was capable of bringing about. And what Christ fulfilled, in the fullness of time, was this decisive action by God. The importance of this event is linked here to what constitutes the core of biblical faith: God’s absolute transcendence. Indeed, this transcendence separates Him from man across an unbridgeable chasm. But the Son of Man can cross this abyss that man cannot cross, and he can come and seek out man in order to bring him close to the Father. Conversion to Christianity is not a change of religion. It is the transition from religion to revelation, that is, from question to answer.32

For Weil, the recognition of the value of non-Christian religions, which in itself is quite right, translates into a sort of Eastern syncretism,33 in which Greece’s contribution to the preparation of Christianity is the greatest – as revelation of human misery, of God’s transcendence, of the infinite distance between God and man – and that of Israel is the smallest, because it did affirm the idea of the unity of God, to the point of obsession, but this idea in itself is not original, since all peoples in all ages have been monotheistic.34 Moreover, historical Christianity lies at the origin of the modern world, having been perverted by the Jewish and Roman influences. It created the notion of history as direct continuity, which contains the germ of Hegel and Marx. Supposedly, the idea of progress can be explained through the idea, already present in primitive Christianity, of a divine pedagogy that forms men to make them capable of receiving Christ’s message.35 We have to say that Weil is right on this point, if she thinks that the first seeds of progressive thought lie in the millennialist idea, which anyway is not exactly Christian in its origins, ­although it lingered in early Christianity. But why does she forget that St  Augustine’s De civitate Dei represents the most rigorous critique of 32 Jean Daniélou, “Hellénisme, Judäisme, Christianisme,” in the collective volume Réponses aux questions de Simone Weil [Answers to Simone Weil’s questions] (Paris: Aubier, 1964), 35–6 and 26 [TN: my translation]. 33 See for instance Écrits historiques et politiques, 76, 373 [TN: the first reference is to the essay “En quoi consiste l’inspiration occitanienne” [“In What Consists the Occitanian Inspiration”] which as far as I know is not available in English. The second page number points to “A propos de la question coloniale,” which has been translated as “East and West – Thoughts on the Colonial Problem” and published in Weil, Selected Essays, 195–210. The passages Del Noce is referring to are on pages 204–5]. 34 On this point Weil’s thesis agrees with the one that was subsequently advanced by Mircea Eliade. 35 See Weil, La pesanteur et la grâce, 192–3 [Gravity and Grace, 162–3].

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millennialism that has ever been formulated? The effects of a rigorously secular education remained always quite strong in her, in the sense of the type of secularism that marked the radicalism of the Third Republic: reading her, it seems that there is only one form of thought that cannot be regarded as worthy of being studied, that of orthodox Catholic theologians, making an exception for (some) mystics. The following conclusion seems hard to avoid: Weil separated Christ from historical Christianity and incorporated him into Hellenism, thus arriving at the most complete re-proposal of the Gnostic archetype in modern times. Let us try to discern the initial motivation for this process. It is not hard to find, because it emerges in several passages of Connaissance surnaturelle and the Cahiers. For instance: God himself cannot prevent what has happened from having happened. What better proof that creation is an abdication? … Creation and original sin are only two aspects, which are different for us, of a single act of abdication by God. And the Incarnation, the Passion are also aspects of this act. God emptied himself of his divinity and filled us with a false divinity. Let us empty ourselves of it. This act is the purpose of the act by which we were created. At this very moment God, by his creative will, is maintaining me in existence, in order that I may renounce it.36 If we are born in sin, it is evident that birth constitutes a sin.37 “Give me my portion,” that is the original sin. Give me free will, the choice between good and evil. Is not this gift of free will the creation itself? What is creation from the point of view of God is sin from the point of view of the creature. God asked us: “do you want to be created?” and we answered yes … and at every moment we answer yes. Except for a few whose soul is split in two; while nearly their whole soul answers yes, there is one point in it which wears itself out in beseeching: no, no, no! This point grows larger as it cries, and becomes a patch which eventually spreads throughout the soul.38

So, let us understand: as a consequence of her absolute rejection of the Old Testament, Weil replaced the conception of sin, as contained in  Genesis, with the absolutely opposite one of the fragment of

36 Weil, La connaissance surnaturelle, 90–1 [First and Last Notebooks, 140]. 37 Ibid., 271 [First and Last Notebooks, 303]. 38 Ibid., 168 [First and Last Notebooks, 211]. I quoted a few significant passages, but the whole Connaissance surnaturelle would be worthy of comment.

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Anaximander.39 She replaced the conception in which evil entered the world – created by the overflowing goodness of God, by St Thomas’s plenitudo divinae bonitatis – because of a free act of the creature, with the conception in which finite existence is intrinsically evil, and creation ­itself is viewed as a fall. It is easy to derive from this first point all the aspects in which she moves away from Christian thought. If there is a necessary connection between creation and sin, it is clear indeed that the process of perfection must be viewed as a return to an exemplary precosmic world, through the absolute negation of the “I” (the idea of decreation40), and that the biblical notions of time and future are involved in the critique of their secularized deformation. But now, let us ask ourselves: does not the conception of evil proposed by Anaximander’s myth also underlie modern rationalism – which, by the opposite process to Weil’s, has eliminated the supernatural, making creation immanent and simultaneously pushing the theme of the naturality of death to its extreme limit?41 In this respect, Weil’s Platonic 39 Which, in fact, she mentions several times, showing that she agrees with it. See, for instance, Weil, La Grecia, 211 [Intimations of Christianity, 158]. 40 The idea of “de-creation” is defined in Weil, Cahiers III, 91 [Notebooks, Vol. 2, 471], as “annihilation in God which confers the fullness of being upon the creature so annihilated, a fullness which is denied it so long as it goes on existing.” Starting from this idea we understand why for Weil science, understood in its ancient sense, has a purifying value: it serves to to make us think about ourselves “from the standpoint of being,” and therefore to lead us to indifference to ourselves. It is hard not to hear a Spinozian tone in these statements, at least the Spinoza of the fifth book of Ethics, brought back, through acosmism, to ancient thought, and thus separated from the aspects that continue in Hegelian philosophy. To be more precise, it is a form of Spinozism rediscovered through quietism. The affinities between a certain interpretation of Spinoza and quietism have been pointed out many times. See, for instance, the essay on Fenelon by Léon Brunschvigc in Spinoza et ses contemporains 3rd ed. (Paris: Alcan, 1923), 360ff. 41 Since Marx and Plato are the thinkers on which Weil’s reflection focused the most, it is worth recalling that Engels himself, who was no mystic, in his famous essay on Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German philosophy evokes the interpretation of evil affirmed in the myth of Anaximander, when he writes: “In accordance with all the rules of the Hegelian method of thought, the proposition of the rationality of everything which is real resolves itself into the other proposition: All that exists deserves to perish” (11). In other words, dialectics means that the mortality of the finite is extended to the truths that were said to be eternal. Returning to the conception of the mortality of the finite, after the transition from the ancient cosmological conception to the Christian anthropological conception, means accepting the naturality of death – in the sense that any reference to an original fall is forbidden – and affirming human creativity. In short, it leads to the idea of self-­ redemption. In order to highlight the difference between this view and the Christian one, let us contrast it with these words of Pascal: “Socrates and Seneca …” (and ancient philosophers in general) “have been in the error that has blinded all men in the beginning: they have all taken death as natural to man” (“Letter to his sister Mme Perrier” of October 17,

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r­ ethinking of Christianity is just the reverse of modern rationalism, rather than the critique of its principle. And, in this sense, it seems legitimate to ask whether her work has aesthetic rather than philosophical value. Her mystical experience, albeit real, would have resulted in the creation of a work of art. Instead of implicit philosophy, we should speak of mysticism resulting in poetry.42 Undoubtedly, if we wished to reconstruct Weil’s “system” we should stop at this judgment. But is this the best way of listening to her? Her thought must not be examined as a system, but as an itinerary, emphasizing that what guides and sustains it is the idea of morality (the idea of justice inscribed in the human heart). Then, its uniqueness becomes apparent. Consider the common process of thought from 1930 until today: during the years between 1930 and 1940 the issues under discussion were, at least in Western Europe, still basically theological, regardless of the answers. Next came the rediscovery of revolutionary thought, followed by the transition to a sort of “natural irreligion.” This is a very common position today: answering the question of God is irrelevant to the problems we really have to face. In fact, it is both an embarrassing and an unsolvable problem, embarrassing because unsolvable. At most, it can be answered in the private sphere of our existence, which does not interfere with the public sphere. Weil’s itinerary is exactly the opposite. In her spiritual autobiography she describes her starting position as a form of agnosticism very similar to the one we are experiencing: “I neither affirmed nor denied anything. It seemed to me useless to solve the problem, for I thought that, being in this world, our business was to adopt the best attitude with respect to the problems of this world, and that such an attitude did not depend upon the solution of the problem

1651, in Blaise Pascal, Pensées, ed. L. Brunschvigc (Paris: Hachette: 1909), 97 [TN: Thoughts, Letters and Minor Works, Harvard Classics vol. 48, ed. Charles W. Eliot, trans. Mary L. Booth (Boston: P.F. Collier and Son, 1910), 337]). On the presence of the conception of evil affirmed in Anaximander’s fragment in modern rationalism and in its development towards atheism, see my book Il problema dell’ateismo, xxiv ff. 42 Indeed, she writes: “the past is the best image of the eternal, supernatural realities (The joy and the beauty of remembering is perhaps connected with this). Proust had a glimpse of it” (Weil, La Grecia, 86) [On Science, 121]. Inverting this proposition, one could say that what makes her works fascinating is the beauty of recollection, regardless of her intentions. Of course, I do not subscribe at all to this interpretation. However, it is not just a possible interpretation, it is actually a very common one, even if, to my knowledge, no scholar has explicitly advocated it. Otherwise, how to explain the very limited interest in Weil’s work among philosophers? I should point out that it is not by chance that among the poets of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries she considers worthy of this name only those with a Gnostic accent: Vigny, Lamartine, Nerval, Mallarmé, Valéry.

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of God.”43 Compared to this attitude, her atheism during her revolutionary stage was already a sort of greater religiosity.44 Then, precisely at the time when the intellectuals of her generation started to rediscover Marxism, her mystical period began. If we consider the absolute secularism that marked her starting point, we realize that the Platonic-gnostic stage was to some extent necessary because Plato was, as we have seen, the author who offered himself to her after she abandoned Marxism, while her initial opposition to biblical thought remained intact. We must distinguish between her mystical experience and her subsequent reflection. These are the facts: she experienced an encounter with Christ, which is recounted in the opening text of Connaissance surnaturelle.45 On the other hand, she did not consent to baptism, and her Intuitions pré-chrétiennes are an ambiguous text, which can be interpreted in the sense of Platonism foretelling Christianity as well as in the sense of Christianity absorbed into Platonism. At any rate, it is not too big a stretch to say that her religious experience surpassed the cultural tools she possessed to interpret it. The very affirmation that there was a divine creation makes it impossible to speak of rigorous Gnosticism. In her case, the point is not to affirm two metaphysical principles, of good and evil, but rather to clarify the choice between two interpretations of reality, one which recognizes the supernatural and another which excludes it, and the necessity that the latter end in materialism. Unless we want to give her thought an unduly rigid interpretation, we must speak of a simultaneous presence of two aspects, the Christian and the Gnostic, and of the possibility of developing her thought in a Christian sense. Was a new stage of her reflection about to start at the time of her death? This is what I believe can be demonstrated. I will now sketch an initial outline of this demonstration. It is possible to show that the Gnostic solution cannot be considered her final word. A conclusive answer can be obtained by examining the arguments of two interpreters who, with opposite criteria of evaluation, 43 Weil, Attente de Dieu (La Colombe, Paris 1950), 70–1 [Waiting for God, 62]. 44 Actually, she does not mention this atheistic period in her “spiritual autobiography.” But undoubtedly there was one, see Jacques Cabaud, L’expérience vécue de Simone Weil (Paris: Plon, 1957), 97. 45 Without attempting to interpret now the meaning of this experience, I will only remark that it contradicts – in a fruitful contradiction because it demonstrates that Weil’s experience transcends the rational forms through which she tried to understand it – the thesis of divine impersonalism, which says that speaking of Christ’s “person” means diminishing him. Actually, her quietism, if logically developed, should have led her to a form of Spinozism, and thus to a renewed negation of the supernatural. A detailed discussion of this point would show that Gnosticism must be regarded as only one stage of her thought.

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judged that it was the final word – her friend Simone Pétrement (also a pupil of Alain and a well-known scholar of Gnosticism) and Catholic theologian Charles Moeller.46 Pétrement is interested in establishing a continuous line LagneauAlain-Weil.47 Therefore, she maintains that although Alain’s opposition between a rational form of religion and traditional religions leads him to stand against the brouillard catholique, it does not place him outside Christianity. Starting from this thesis, it is really not hard for her to reach the conclusion that the difference between Weil and Alain does not properly concern the question of God’s existence, but rather that of grace and freedom. Mostly, there is a difference in attitudes: Alain, being concerned with morality, judged that he had to insist above all on human freedom. If man is not free, he has no duties. Belief in duty implies belief in freedom. Hence, he must believe, at least in a sense, that he does not need God. The idea of God in general, or at least the idea that He exists, risks destroying morality, making it almost impossible to do one’s duty only for duty’s sake. Weil, on the contrary, feels deeply the necessity of grace. Hence, God occupies a much larger space in her thoughts, and consequently she reaches a full understanding of Christianity. Thus, the two positions are not opposed but rather complementary: We must keep together Alain’s and Weil’s thoughts. Even if we must set them in opposition on one point, they do not exclude each other because this point is where the contradictory positions are true together. In fact, Alain and Simone Weil have both accepted the two sides of the contradiction, although one of them preferred to look at the power of human freedom and of will, the other at the effacement of the human side and at grace … Although the road is different

46 Simone Pétrement, “Sur la religion de Alain avec quelques remarques concernant celle de Simone Weil” [On Alain’s religion, with some remarks on that of Simone Weil] in Revue de Métaphisique et de Morale 60, no. 3 (1955): 306–30; Charles Moeller, “Simone Weil et l’incroyance des croyants” [Simone Weil and the disbelief of believers] in Littérature du XXe siècle et christianisme t. 1 (Paris: Casterman, 1953), 220ff. 47 Jules Lagneau was Alain’s teacher, and Alain Weil’s teacher at the Lycée Henry-IV (1925–1928). Besides Lagneau’s influence, which was theoretically the most decisive, regarding Alain we must remember that of Renouvier. According to Renouvier – motivated also by suggestions by philologist Louis Ménard – we should speak of only two authentic civilizations, the Greek and the modern, starting with the Renaissance. Alain essentially agreed. We see that the idea of the “Greek miracle” takes shape around the myth of the Renaissance, in the form Michelet had given it. Certainly, in Weil the idea of the “Greek miracle” takes a pessimistic form: nonetheless, she keeps moving within a context that reflects, in its origins, nineteenth-century anti-clericalism.

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… one can see that Weil almost always found again her teacher’s thought, in an original form, and precisely because she had moved away from it. The farther away she moves, the more she finds again the essential.48

In actuality, what Pétrement herself recognizes, but without adequately highlighting it, shows that it is impossible to deny that the break between the two thoughts is radical. Like Kant, Alain thinks that moral certainty does not need a metaphysical foundation: “Thus, he is very far from thinking like Nietzsche that, if Christian metaphysics is denied, Christian morality must fail at the same time. Christian morality is morality (the man who lives the Gospel, he says, is the honest man), and morality is immediately certain. To him morality is, without a doubt, the truth of religion.”49 This is exactly the point I highlighted earlier: the reason why Weil’s thought is contemporary to us is because it is post-­Nietzschean, since today being critical means “after Nietzsche” and no longer “after Kant.” As noble and significant as Alain’s experience may have been, by now it belongs irreversibly to the past, precisely because it moves within a Kantian horizon. What clearer proof of such a break, in fact, than what she writes about secularized Christianity, meaning Christianity without the supernatural.50 We only have to think how startled Alain would have been, just at hearing about the supernatural! We must try and define Alain’s religious position, albeit in a necessarily synthetic form. It is not in the least a religious thought blocked by anti-clericalism, but rather a religious thought which is, so to speak, internal to anti-clericalism itself. Elsewhere51 I stressed the importance of distinguishing anti-clericalism – understood as an essence and not as an adjective that describes a feature of this or that philosophical or political position – from irreligion, and I reached the following definition: “after the philosophy of history, anti-clericalism, which originally was a moral reaction of the individual against the worldly power of the Church, becomes an antithesis, in the name of ethics, to the spirit of reconciliation with the reality of this world. This spirit of reconciliation hides a will to power which in order to fulfill itself must create an organization, whose authority needs to take a sacral character as the custodian of the deposit

48 Pétrement, “Sur la religion de Alain,” 329. 49 Ibid., 319. 50 “The errors of our time come from Christianity without the supernatural. Secularism is the cause – and above all humanism” (Weil, La pesanteur et la grâce, 91) [Gravity and Grace, 115]. 51 [TN] See section 2 of “Il concetto di ateismo” [The concept of atheism], the introductory essay to Il problema dell’ateismo (Bologna: Il Mulino 1964), xlviii–lxv.

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of a supernatural Revelation, or as the representative of Progress, Evolution, Science, History, Humanity, the Nation etcetera.”52 Therefore, one goes from rejecting the Catholic Church to rejecting the new forms of false idols, in the name of a moralism, underlain by a (more or less intense) pessimistic disposition. “But it is pessimism in the name of morality, which leads to the idea of morality as the revelation of an objective transcendent order, and historically to the opposition of Kant to Hegel. Thus, it is a form of thought that is a commentary on Kant’s religious philosophy, using Kantian thought to absolutely distinguish Christianity from Catholicism, keeping the former.”53 Alain’s thought expresses perfectly the antinomies of anti-clerical thought. On the one hand, the need to safeguard moral autonomy leads him very close to atheism. But on the other hand, he must reject atheism as well, because it threatens to lead irrevocably to worshiping worldly powers. Therefore, the route he takes is a program to free the idea of God from any attribute of power. Hence: “All said and done, our theologians have drawn a fairly beautiful portrait of God, following after the saints and the righteous. But they spoiled everything by adding power to the mix … It is important that our God be worthy of man. Perhaps He is all-powerful; but praising Him too much for this attribute belongs to outdated religions.”54 “Power dishonors even God … the attribute of power … must be taken as the shameful part of the religion of the spirit.”55 This is the reason for his totally negative assessment of the Bible,56 and the consequent judgment that Christianity was perverted by accepting the biblical perspective: “There is much inhumanity in the Bible, and Christianity, considered as merely human thought, wants to put an end to the horrors of the Bible and to the terrible reign of the God of hosts.”57 However, it naively kept the biblical idea of God, as creator and ruler of the world, an idea that, at bottom, contradicts its morality. Therefore, it is unsurprising that Christianity has been so “easily digested by the armed order,”58 “the powers that be have been able to appropriate the new doctrine” and “to establish an alliance

52 Del Noce, Il problema dell’ateismo, li. [TN: In the original, here and in the next paragraph, there are no quotation marks, but in fact Del Noce is quoting himself verbatim]. 53 Ibid. 54 Alain, Propos sur la religion (Rieder: Paris, 1937), 141. 55 Alain, Les dieux (Paris: Gallimard, 1934), 363, 328 [The Gods, trans. Richard Pevear (New York: New Directions, 1974), 165, 151]. 56 See for instance Alain, Les saisons de l’esprit (Paris: Gallimard, 1937), 284–5. 57 Alain, Politique (Paris: Presse Universitaires de France, 1951), 292. 58 Alain, Les saisons de l’esprit, 123.

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between religion and the order of force; the political history of the Church tells us nothing else.”59 The upshot is anti-theologism, and finally repetitions and variations on the theme of the “theological virus” that threatens morality. But does this critique of the attribute of power also end up depriving God of existence, reducing him to the mere category of the ideal? On this point Alain’s thought fluctuates. The term “transcendence” is used in the sense of surpassing, and so it would seem that his thought cannot but move in an immanentist direction. But on the other hand, for him what is higher cannot be produced by what is lower, because by thinking in that way we would fall back into the naturalism of power and strength. Therefore, the perfect, the endpoint of the act of surpassing, must somehow exist in itself, preceding and affecting our thought and our will, which depend on it and could not produce it. But, even then, Alain does not overcome the limitations of moralism. On top of being averse to theology, he mistrusts mysticism, which must ultimately lead to quietism; thus, theology and mysticism are allied with Catholicism to lead to the spirit of conservation of all that exists, of injustices, and of wars. By now we are ready to define precisely the relationship between Weil  and Alain. The latter always moves in the context of secularized Christianity, without the supernatural. Now, Weil’s transition from moralism to mysticism, and to the affirmation of the supernatural, constitutes a break that could not be any sharper. However, even after the break, and because of its form (as we discussed), Alainian themes remain, which are fundamentally of a rationalistic character and contradict the affirmation of the supernatural. They represent, so to speak, a blockage, which is what leads her to think that the history of Christianity has been led astray by the twofold Jewish and Roman influence. The devaluation of the Bible, the radical condemnation of the Roman tradition, the misunderstanding of the tradition of Catholic thought (the great fault of the Catholic Church is that it canonized St Augustine; St Thomas is viewed as the theoretician of the Inquisition and of the justification of the persecution against the Albigensians) are closely connected themes in Weil’s work, precisely because of this origin. Everybody can see how much they lack originality and depth. What to make, for example, of the definition of the Romans as the “Nazis of antiquity?”60 Only that the use of analogy in history is very dangerous, and that Weil is ­falling into the worst scheme of the philosophy of history, which is to 59 Alain, Préliminaires à la mythologie (Paris: Hartmann, 1942), 145. 60 [TN] For Weil’s comparison of Nazi Germany to Rome see “The Great Beast” in Selected Essays, 101ff.

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personify the spirit of peoples. It is curious, and also a very good sign, that whereas she personifies the spirit of ancient peoples, she rigorously abstains from personifying the spirit of modern peoples. That is, closeness enables her to see how much the tendency that leads to such personification is both arbitrary and extraneous to morality. By all of this I do not intend to deny that Pétrement’s thesis has a valid aspect. We must see also the positive element in Alain’s influence. Weil derived from her teacher not only anti-clericalism, but also anti-­ sociologism developed to its most genuine meaning: truth is defined precisely by not being reducible to the spirit of power. Here lies the reason, theoretical as well as moral, for her will to be constantly on the side of the defeated. Her sentence, so often repeated, that “we must be ever ready to change sides to follow justice, that eternal fugitive from the camp of conquerors”61 takes its full meaning in this context. She also learned that “the essential thing for religion is that we must set out to realize it … without expecting, because we have no right to expect. Without despairing because we have no right to despair. Such is the revolutionary spirit, which does not differ at all from the religious spirit.”62 By going from the bourgeois-agnostic position to the revolutionary one, Weil simply put this teaching into practice. And Alain’s words serve well to clarify the religious character that was already inherent in her first option. In a sense, we may well say that she starts where her teacher’s thought ends, as long as we realize that all positive elements of such thought passed on to her, and that in her experience they were transfigured. Thus, it is pointless to try and go back to Alain after Weil, or to try and produce a synthesis of the two. Unfortunately, some debris from Alain’s discourse blocked the development of the disciple’s thought. The most important, and yet decisive, point that we can draw from this comparison is that whatever is Gnostic and incompatible with Catholicism in Weil’s thought is due to lingering rationalistic modules that she had accepted initially, which are contradictory to her mystical experience. As has already been mentioned, anti-clericalism, taken as an essence, is tied up with religious rationalism, with the Kantian idea of religion within the limits of pure reason. Consequently, the rationalist perspective survives in Weil in the form of historical judgments about the Bible and about Catholic Christianity. These judgments lead her to the Gnostic interpretation of the initial Fall.

61 [TN] Weil, Gravity and Grace, 171. Del Noce’s quotation is somewhat loose. 62 Alain, Propos sur la religion, 24.

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Actually, we find confirmation of this conclusion in Moeller’s essay, if we set aside the regrettable harshness of his judgments: like the statement that “in Weil’s tragically inhuman story … almost everything is dead wood because the fundamental intuitions are false”; and the statement that the enthusiasm of some Catholic readers is evidence of what has been called “the unbelief of believers”; and, even worse, the attempt to explain her work in terms of a morbid psychology. The same harshness that leads this Catholic critic to reduce Weil’s thought only to her Cathar-Manichean-quietist statements, curiously also leads him to recognize that there are elements that elude this interpretation, even though in his judgment they are not properly philosophical. Indeed, he writes: in one word, all of the above leads to quietism. It would logically follow that nothing ought to be done to improve political and social conditions, because by being what they are, a blind mechanism, they destroy the flesh and thus ensure automatically union with the divine. From this perspective, Simone Weil’s writings on factory work gain an eerie clarity. In this sense, her political and social book, L’Enracinement, is a stillborn book: social reforms are useless, and it would be better never to carry them out. Here what saved Simone Weil was her charity, larger than her rationalist elucubrations: a felicitous inconsistency.63

He adds in a footnote that “this inconsistency makes L’Enracinement a book dominated by galimatias, in between some very beautiful pages.”64 Let us observe that – if we set aside his personal aversion – what Moeller wrote can be interpreted as follows: (1) The Gnostic-Cathar side of Weil’s thought should lead her to rigorous quietism. (2) In effect, such quietism expresses her dependence on Alain’s thought, turned upside-down from the moralistic to the mystic form; a more extensive study would easily show that for Alain religion can find its pure form only in quietism, given his critique of God’s power. Then, we would face the paradox that Weil’s thought is a variation on Alain’s, whose categories it obeys faithfully! (3) However, the presence of the London writings and of her final work, L’Enracinement, suffices to show that Weil’s thought as a whole is not exhausted by the Gnostic-Manichean-Cathar position. That is to say, the process of conversion of those who faced the crisis of the years after 1930, starting from agnostic secularism, and determined to “take the best attitude with respect to the problems of this world,” had perforce to encounter, on the way to Christianity, two necessary ideal

63 Moeller, “Simone Weil,” 251–2. 64 Ibid., 252n38.

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stages, the revolutionary and the pessimistic, in the form possible today – just like St Augustine had met Manicheism, then skepticism, then neoPlatonism. Let us go even further: Weil would have necessarily had to undergo the temptation of these two stages even if she had converted very young; in fact, even if she had always been Catholic. Let us further observe that this sequence of stages is clearly visible in the development of her thought. Indeed, nothing in Condition ouvrière65 makes it possible to predict the mystical-gnostic stage. Little in Connaissance surnaturelle makes it possible to see the next stage, which was real even if did not come to completion and was cut short by death. We should give very little weight to Moeller’s remark about L’Enracinement being full of galimatias. Certainly, it does not display the same formal perfection as her other writings, but simply because “it is a book,” whereas the natural expression of a tragic awareness, such as Weil’s, is the aphoristic form. Or, again: Weil’s thought always proceeds from politics to religion. The first formulation of her political will ends up turning into the process from pessimism to Gnosticism, in Manichean-Cathar form, and to quietism. The second formulation should lead to the idea that man is God’s collaborator in history, a classical thesis of Catholic thought and a keystone of Thomism.66 But above all we must observe that the ideal stages I have identified are not characteristic only of Weil’s experience. They are the necessary stages today not only in a process of conversion, but also of reaffirmation of religious faith (the two processes, rigorously speaking, are not qualitatively distinct), because today religious faith is impossible without criticizing the “perfectism” (to use a term dear to Rosmini) that is intrinsic to the revolutionary temptation in the various forms it can take (political revolution, or scientific and technological revolution). A further question could be, to which one of the great Christian philosophies does Weil’s thought come closest? The answer is not in doubt: that of Malebranche.67 The consonances are significant, and peculiar, 65 [TN] Simone Weil, Condition ouvrière [The condition of workers] (Paris: Gallimard, 1951). 66 See Etienne Gilson, Le thomisme (Paris: Vrin, 1927), 177–80 [TN: The Christian Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas, trans. L.K. Shook (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 183–6]. Also, Problemi d’oggi [Problems of today] (Turin: Borla, 1967), 157–8 [TN: originally Les Tribulations de Sophie (Paris: Vrin, 1967), 133–4]. 67 Of course, because of the necessity of philosophical essences, this closeness to Malebranche is echoed by antipathy towards Pascal (see, for instance, Weil, L’Enracinement, 314 [The Need for Roots, 247], or the fourth letter to Father Perrin in Attente de Dieu [Waiting for God, 70]). This is understandable, since all of Pascal’s thought centers around the biblical idea of the Fall.

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because he is a philosopher she never cited, as far as I can tell, and perhaps did not even read. And yet, consider the very close similarities: in the theme of attention as “natural prayer” and, consequently, in the relationship between humility and intelligence; in how pessimism is overcome in an aesthetic vision of the world’s order; in the theory of providence and in the particular focus on impersonal providence (hence the diffidence towards miracles); in the association between science, contemplation, and spiritual purification; in the fact that both use the term “Eternal wisdom” to indicate the aspect of God that particularly strikes a chord with them; in the very formula used by Malebranche to summarize his philosophy, “It is impossible to see God and live.”68 This is certainly not surprising, since Malebranche is the most anti-vitalist among Christian thinkers. But what makes the comparison especially important is the historical locus of Malebranche’s philosophy, which marks a crossroad whence one can go back to Catharism or move on towards Rosmini.69 The consonances I pointed out in Weil’s thought are brought into prominence by the crossroad at which she stands. It is a hypothesis that cannot be possibly verified: this will be the objection to the idea of a further, and yet necessary development of her thought. We must reply that Weil could not have stopped at what she said, since the reaffirmation of the supernatural was her core theme, rediscovered in her lived experience. And this reaffirmation implied the critique of the rationalism she had learned at school. But let us restrict ourselves to what she wrote. If we try to condense her teaching into a

68 [TN] See Malebranche’s The Search After Truth, ed. Thomas M. Lennon, trans. Paul J. Olscamp (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 630–2; also his Treatise on Ethics (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993), 120ff. 69 In the 1930s many people were attracted to Cathar dualism. This reflected an intra-European view of the crisis, so to speak. The apparently irresistible advance of Fascism and Nazism seemed to be an insurrection of “vitality” as an irreducible power and principle of evil, a seismic rebellion against spiritual values. Today, the works of essayist Julien Benda – who was also part, like Alain, of the “Dreyfus” generation – are totally forgotten, in the deepest sense that not only people do not find the time to read them, but they would not read them even if they had time. Nonetheless, his major philosophical book, Essai d’un discours cohérent sur le rapport de Dieu et du monde (Paris: Gallimard, 1931) is interesting as a rediscovery of the Cathar position through the mediation of Malebranche, regarded as “a teacher I never tire to invoke” (as he says in the book that came immediately before and somehow serves as introduction, La fin de l’éternel (Paris: Gallimard, 1929), 196). If we then compare Benda’s thesis with Weil’s Cathar statements we do not find much difference except for the accent. But in this case precisely the accent is essential. Benda formulated his ideas while defending “yesterday’s world.” Weil rediscovered religious thought starting from the lived experience of revolutionary thought. And a reader’s attention is drawn naturally not so much to what is “Cathar” as to the “rediscovered religion.”

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formula, I think the least inadequate may be the following: the religious dimension can be rediscovered starting from the crisis of our times if the crisis is lived with absolute moral purity. But what is the relationship between the religious dimension and faith? Father Danielou writes perfectly70 that religion is the question and revelation is the answer. So, Weil’s teaching would boil down to a question … This may not seem much. However, let us reflect about its exceptional importance for the present time; a present whose first signs could be perceived in the 1930s, but only by someone with an exceptionally sharp sensitivity. Until recently, one could say that faith was under threat, rather than religion. Idealist philosophies claimed to sublate the truths of faith into a higher form of religiosity. Marxism itself, in its own way, wanted to satisfy the need for the other reality, although it projected this reality within time. What is in question today, by contrast, is the religious dimension. Official religious thought does not have a sufficiently clear awareness of this change. In fact, there is plenty of theologians who think of adapting faith to a world that they regard as permanently desacralized and made secular by scientific and technical progress. Faith, they say, must listen to the world … But how can faith be welcomed by a world that regards the religious question as meaningless? Also in this respect, we have to say that Weil went through a process that is the exact opposite of a large part of contemporary religious thought. And what matters most is that her process is the true one. But she died in 1943. Have the times not radically changed since then? We have to show that in L’Enracinement 71 Weil predicted with perfect clarity the future development of the Zeitgeist after the end of the war, and that she was the only one to do so. She wrote this book, finishing it a few months before her death, at the invitation of André Philip, who at that time served as interior minister in the De Gaulle government, and of the commissary for action in France, Closon. In it, she was supposed to discuss the theoretical questions that 70 [TN] Réponses aux questions de Simone Weil, 26 71 The definition of enracinement is as follows: “A human being has roots by virtue of his real, active and natural participation in the existence of a community, which preserves in living shape certain particular treasures from the past and certain particular expectations for the future” (Weil, L’Enracinement, 161 [The Need for Roots, 43]). “Being rooted” is completely different from belonging to the “collective,” a principle of idolatry (“Idolatry is the name of the error which attributes a sacred character to the collectivity,” Weil, Écrits de Londres (Paris: Gallimard, 1957), 18 [Selected Essays, 14]). The process of the last two decades has been a progress in uprooting. In this respect, one could say that Weil predicted also the beat phenomenon, as acceptance of being uprooted.

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would be relevant to political action after liberation and victory, but her conclusions scared her superiors in the hierarchy, who very clearly could not use them for official purposes. The manuscript was then published in 1949, and naturally received much praise, but had almost no impact. And, in fact, after being politically out of its time in 1943 and barely of its time – or hard to understand in its ideal principle – in 1949, its theses can be truly understood only today because time has verified them. Writing it fit the essential exigency that had prompted her to move from America to London. Since Europe was being liberated by America and Russia, it was inevitably going to fall back into a form of servitude which, albeit different, could only be equivalent to the one it was suffering then. She thought that Europe’s only remaining fortune was that it could not resort to an idolatry in opposition to that of the winners, “because it is impossible for enslaved nations to be turned into idols. The conquered peoples can only oppose the conqueror with a religion.” There would be opportunities for religious reawakening because “affliction is not in itself a school of spiritual poverty; but it offers almost the only opportunity of learning it. And although affliction is much less fleeting than happiness, it does pass away; so we need to make haste. Are we going to take this opportunity?”72 Needless to say, the opportunity was, instead, entirely wasted; but it is important to add that its being wasted explains today’s European situation. In her view, mankind would face a definitive choice only after victory against Hitler, which appeared, if not certain, at least extremely likely at the time she was writing these last pages of hers. She wrote: “Either we must perceive at work in the universe, alongside force, a principle of a different kind, or else we must recognize force as being the unique and sovereign ruler over human relations also.”73 If we keep in mind the sequences of her thought – on one side supernatural-grace-God’s justice, on the other force-gravity-large animal – we can say that the decisive choice will be between a religious awakening and radical atheism. It is a choice, because we know experimentally that justice is real in the depths of men’s heart, and the structure of the human heart is a reality among the realities of the universe; therefore, if justice cannot be erased, it is science, or better scientism, that is in error.74 But why would this choice take place after Hitler? Let us try and recall those years. Older people viewed the end of the fascisms as an awakening from a bad dream; after that “parenthesis,” they expected to return to 72 Weil, Écrits de Londres, 107–8 [Selected Essays, 218]. 73 Weil, L’Enracinement, 304 [The Need for Roots, 239]. 74 [TN] Weil, The Need for Roots, 240–1.

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the path marked by the “religion of freedom” of the nineteenth century. Young people thought that it would be a matter of continuing the process of the Resistance until it reached the deepest roots of Nazism and pulled them out. Thus, the spirit of the Resistance was also marked by that same trust in a wondrous mechanism by which force, entering the domain of human actions, automatically produces justice; the same defect that Weil attributed both to Marxism and to economic liberalism.75 Moreover, the ideology that the coalition against Nazism necessarily had to adopt made it easy to equate “value” with the spirit of modernity; in short, a return to the mindset of the Enlightenment. Being the extreme expression of colonialism, as Weil had already perfectly defined it,76 Nazism had essentially declared war against the whole world, and this total war had taken on the appearance of a world revolution. But under those circumstances, what principle could unify all the forces of the resistance? The only name that could be found for it was democracy. And because Russia and Communism were also among the forces of resistance, and they could not be easily associated with democracy in the usual sense, it was necessary to add the word progress. Having done that, it became almost unavoidable to move from the affirmation of the political value of democracy to the mythologization of a “spirit of democracy” that supposedly had to be introduced into all human activities, in order to radically reform them. Thus, do not people speak today of a democratic theory of knowledge, according to which being true coincides with being verifiable by everybody, independently of their spiritual dispositions? But this coincides with the very negation of metaphysics. In fact, metaphysical truth simultaneously reveals and hides itself in the perceptible formula that expresses it, which is simply an occasion for anamnesis. In Weil’s terms, all of Plato is an ontological proof, a mysterious reasoning that makes sense only from the standpoint of love – and to her love is supernatural. When neo-positivism looks at the perceptible formula, it has every right to declare it meaningless. Nobody can deny that this mechanism has swung into action. If we browse the majority of recent philosophy books, we see that the most frequent categories are progressive and reactionary, and that most of these books invoke no other criterion of truth than declaring their ideas to be the most authentically progressive. Nor can they do otherwise, because appealing to evidence means recalling the eternal truths, and according to the mindset of the new Enlightenment the eternal is a disguise of the past.

75 Weil, L’Enracinement, 305 [The Need for Roots, 239–40]. 76 [TN] See Weil, Selected Essays, 199.

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Weil’s interpretation is the absolute opposite: Nazism is just a stage, even if decisive, of modernity’s struggle against Platonism. It is decisive because Hitler did truly understand one truth, no matter how wickedly he used it: Hitler has clearly perceived the absurdity of the eighteenth century conception, still in favor today … For the last two or three centuries, people have believed that force rules supreme over all natural phenomena, and at the same time that men can and should base their mutual relations upon justice, recognized as such through the application of reason. This is a flagrant absurdity. It is inconceivable that everything in the universe should be entirely subjected to the rule of force and that Man should be able to escape the effects of this, seeing that he is made of flesh and blood and that his mind wanders here and there at the mercy of sensory impressions.77

That is, contemporary history marks the end of secularized Christianity, of Christianity without the supernatural, the end of the unity between the scientistic mindset and a post-Renaissance type of humanism, characterized by the refusal to recognize religious transcendence. One can wonder whether Weil, when she was writing these lines, had in mind the philosopher who had defined the spirit of civilization as this encounter between the scientific spirit in its modern form and Platonism: Léon Brunschvicg, her professor at the École Normale and the dictator of philosophy teaching in the French universities around 1930. In those same months, in his retirement in Provence, he was writing, but in a form so different from Weil’s, his philosophical testament: L’Esprit européen,78 a true declaration of having nothing to bequeath. Besides him, probably she also had in mind her beloved Alain.79 But clearly her critique goes much farther, and affects all forms of immanentistic Idealism, or Hegelism, as a philosophy in which force expresses the Logos. Having 77 Weil, L’Enracinement, 303 [The Need for Roots, 238]. 78 [TN] Léon Brunschvicg, L’Esprit européen [The European spirit] (Neuchâtel: La Baconnière, 1947). 79 Weil cared little for Brunschvigc, just as much as she had sympathized with Alain. It is easy to understand why: Alain was the philosophers of the étages, and therefore no historical form appeared to him to be permanently defeated or surpassed. On the contrary, Brunschvigc was the philosoper of the étapes, and not by chance Condorcet was one of his idols. Hence the differences between their forms of radicalism. Alain’s is characterized by “the individual’s resistance against the powers that be,” by the perception of the constant threat against the individual coming from “the social.” See Eléments d’une doctrine radicale (Paris: Gallimard, 1925). Certainly Alain’s idea of the étages contains the premise of Weil’s radical anti-historicism.

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entered the line of the philosophy of the Logos, in order to eliminate its deviations Weil traces its forms back in time, until she gets back to Plato. We may have some misgivings about her assessment of Hitler’s “lucidity” and, somehow, his philosophical importance. But let us consider history from 1917 to the present in its unitary character, as the failure of the Marxist revolution, with respect to the utopia of achieving good by force. And let us add the observation that Nazism arose in relation to this failure, taking its form – of ending up as a mere hegemonic force – as its own principle. Then we must recognize that her judgment is correct. Recent historians who have highlighted the correlation between Communism and Nazism have confirmed it. The totalitarian outcome of Marxism and Nazi totalitarianism are the two faces of Germany’s philosophical drama, at the moment when it achieves reality.80 Thus, the spiritual situation of the post-war years and of today is characterized by two opposite possibilities: pushing the scientistic spirit to its extreme consequences, or returning to Platonism and Christianity. It is important to become aware that they are irreconcilable, tearing off the many masks that have been deployed to cover up their opposition. There is indeed an essential opposition between the spirit of Greek science, oriented towards contemplation, and the secular spirit of modern science, directed at dominating the world through technology, and thus informed by the spirit of domination and power.81 If we elevate the scientific type of intelligence, in the modern sense, to intelligence tout court, we have a form of scientism which is absolutely incompatible with both religion and morals. This is why, Weil writes, “religion is nowadays something we relegate to Sunday morning. The rest of the week is dominated by the spirit of science. Unbelievers, who give their entire week up to it, have a triumphant feeling of inward unity. But they are mistaken,

80 See, for instance, Ernst Nolte, Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche (Munich: Piper, 1963), 521–35 [TN: Three Faces of Fascism, trans. Leila Vennewitz (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), 434–46]. The book by Fr Gaston Fessard, De l’actualité historique t. 1 (Paris: Desclée, 1960), is still worthy of the greatest attention. But, actually, we must say that we reach the same conclusion if we read from a non-Marxist standpoint Lukàcs’s well-known book The Destruction of Reason, trans. Peter R. Plamer (London: Merlin Press, 1980). It is certainly not a coincidence that this book was not very successful above all in progressive or Marxist cultural circles. In fact, even though it was written with the intention of following the most rigorous Marxist orthodoxy, it actually suggests a non-Marxist view, namely that not only the philosophies that opposed Marxism within a Kantian or Hegelian framework are impotent in history, but so is Marxism itself as a revolutionary historical force. The nature of this work prevents me from developing this brief comment any further. 81 Weil, L’Enracinement, 307ff [The Need for Roots, 241ff].

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for their moral attitude is no less in contradiction with science than is the religion of the others.”82 So: (1) the process from secularism to scientism is irreversible; (2) but scientism cannot recognize any other principle but force, and must interpret everything according to this principle; (3) its seduction can also work on religious thought, and in that context it will generate the greatest deviation and confusion ever; (4) due to the absolute nature of the alternative, the success of scientism will determine the most complete break with tradition, the “uprooting.” There is no doubt that this process is ongoing, and the twenty year period since the war can only be described as its progressive extension. People commonly speak, for instance, of a “technological civilization,” as if a civilization could be characterized not by its relationship with God but by its means of production. However, unlike, say, ten years ago, the number of those who understand its negative character and its dangers has certainly increased. The process has taken place exactly as Weil predicted: the forms of immanentistic Idealism have collapsed under the shock of Marxism; but, on the other hand, the Enlightenment, which has been rediscovered together with the idea of progress, has acted back on Marxism, re-thinking it in such a way as to free it from every residue of a “theological” mindset.83 What has been left is science, the only faith of modern man, viewed in its connection with technology. The transition from science to scientism is inevitable once the metaphysical-religious dimension has been abolished. The establishment of the human sciences leads to sociologism, the replacement of metaphysics by sociology for the sake of understanding human nature. Certainly, I do not mean to deny the usefulness of sociology as such. Weil herself writes that “contemporary attempts to create a social science would also lead to a successful issue as the result of a little more precision. It should be founded upon the Platonic notion of the enormous animal, or the apocalyptic notion of the Beast. Social science is the study of the enormous animal and should undertake a minute description of its anatomy, physiology, natural and conditional reflexes.”84 In fact, only a sociological type of reasoning makes it possible to identify the servants of the large animal, and also to verify the thesis that there is an invincible contradiction between restricting the recognition of existence only to human realities and affirming absolute principles. But, if the study of the 82 Ibid., 310 [The Need for Roots, 243]. 83 The popularity of structuralism today, and the fact that even Marxist writers like Althusser embrace it, are signs of the irreversible crisis of Marxism as revolutionary thought. 84 Weil, L’Enracinement, 370 [The Need for Roots, 291].

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relations between ideas and social facts is conducted under the presupposition that the only type of intelligence is the scientific one, the correlation will be interpreted in terms of dependence. That is to say, thought will be reduced to mere expression of a historical situation, against all metaphysical theories of thought as “revelative” and all their remnants, which are found even in Marxism. This expressivist theory is formulated by reducing metaphysical theories to ideologies, expressions of the historico-social situation of a group, spiritual superstructures of completely un-spiritual forces such as class interests, unconscious collective motivations, and concrete circumstances of social life. Thus, the progress of the human sciences is supposed to lead to the social sciences, which, by being the full extension of scientific reason to the human world, will finally achieve the complete replacement of philosophical discourse by scientific discourse, clarifying the worldly, social, and historical origin of metaphysical thought. This coincides with teaching people to look at reality through the eyes of the large animal. In fact, the similarities between sophistic thought and the recent proponents of “absolute relativism” or “relationism” are clear. Seeking an agreement with the new scientific spirit is the essence of religious neo-Modernism. Its new proponents show how many neo-­ Modernist temptations lingered on after the encyclical Pascendi. In any case, it is certain that the germs of the revival appeared in the years around 1935, and were occasioned by the question of Christian-Marxist dialogue; old Loisy did not fail to notice it in a book of 1937.85 Indeed, it may seem that science makes room for a possible “demythologized” affirmation of a super-human reality, by limiting its attention to this world and by setting aside all claims to establish immanentistic metaphysical systems. The question, however, is what religion can become if the metaphysical mediation (i.e., the Greek moment) is eliminated. I believe that nobody perceived as precisely as Weil, who was not baptized, that a phenomenon was taking shape which would manifest itself macroscopically only in the last few years. Let us read carefully what she writes: The fact of the existence of science gives Christians a bad conscience. Few of them dare to be quite certain that if they started from scratch and examined every problem, leaving out all personal preference, in an absolutely impartial critical spirit, the Christian dogma would seem to them manifestly and totally the 85 [TN] Del Noce is almost certainly referring to Alfred Loisy, La crise morale du temps présent et l’éducation humaine [The moral crisis of the present time and human education] (Paris: Nourry, 1937); see, for instance, 162–9.

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truth. This uncertainty might be expected to loosen their ties with religion; this doesn’t happen, and the reason why it doesn’t happen is because religious life provides them with something of which they stand in need. They themselves feel more or less confusedly that it is a need which attaches them to religion. But need is not a legitimate bond between Man and God … Christ said, ‘I am the truth.’ He also said that he was bread and wine; but He added: ‘I am the true bread, the true wine,’ that is to say the bread which is nothing but truth, the wine which is nothing but truth. They must first of all be desired as truth, only afterwards as food. It is clear that all these things must have been completely forgotten, since people have been able to take Bergson for a Christian – the man who thought he saw in the spiritual energy displayed by the mystics the perfect expression of that élan vital which he turned for himself into an idol. Whereas what is really marvelous, in the case of the mystics and the saints, is not that they have more life … but that in them truth should have become life. In this world of ours life, the élan vital so dear to Bergson, is but a lie; only death is true. For life constrains one to believe what one requires to believe in order to live; this servitude has been raised to the rank of a doctrine under the name of pragmatism … But those beings who have, in spite of flesh and blood, spiritually crossed a boundary equivalent to death, receive on the farther side another life, which is not primarily life, which is primarily truth; truth which has become living; … One can say without fear of exaggeration that today the spirit of truth is almost absent from religious life. This is observable among other things in the nature of the arguments adduced in favor of Christianity. Many of them are of the publicity type associated with ‘pink pills.’ It is the case with Bergson and all that draws its inspiration from him. In Bergson, religious faith appears after the manner of a ‘pink pill’ of superior kind, which imparts an astonishing amount of vitality.86

Truth and life are certainly linked in the religious spirit, but to give life priority over truth is the essence of blasphemy.87 Now, if by “technological society” we mean that in which the scientific type of intelligence in the modern sense is regarded as the type of intelligence, then the indirect persecution that this society wages against religion turns out to be more serious than any direct persecution, because religion is equated to a drug. Marx said “opium.” Apparently many new apologists share his same viewpoint, and only try to argue that, rather than opium, it is a stimulant. Does a dogma seem unfit for this task, from the perspective of “transforming terrestrial realities?” Let us set it aside, trusting in a very Modernist fashion that history will mark the end of certain dogmas – or

86 Weil, L’Enracinement, 313–16 [The Need for Roots, 245–8]. 87 Ibid., 313 [The Need for Roots, 246].

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of all dogmas. Too many “dialogues between Christians and Marxists” resemble discussions on the quality of this or that drug. Clearly, Weil must regard this extension whereby ideas, viewed as tools of human domination over the world, are assimilated to the principle of force as yet another occurrence of sin, meaning the principle of the affirmation of the I: “Give me my share.” She calls this position “materialism.” If we look carefully, the term is perfectly accurate. The transition from metaphysical materialism to scientific materialism takes place within materialism itself, in the form of such an adoption of nominalism that it excludes the hypostasis of a universal being called matter. Here, Weil’s analysis could be developed into a question that, to my knowledge, historians of philosophy have not yet studied: whether Comte’s law of three stages may be completely valid, but within materialism. If by revolution we mean complete break with tradition, and if this break is defined in terms of liberation from religious myths, then sociologism represents the ultimate conclusion of revolutionary thought, in which the political revolution is replaced by the scientific revolution. Hence, we may well say about today’s situation that Comte has become relevant after Marx, in the sense of a more radical process of atheization. In fact, if we define the metaphysical type of thought as the idea of the other reality, in Marxism man is transfigured into another reality projected in time, whereas in positivism the “new man” is achieved by abolishing the idea of the other reality. But let us reflect on the form in which Comte is relevant today, considering the spirit of Comtism and setting aside, of course, the methodological differences that may exist between his vision of sociological research and the recent ones. Recent sociologism sheds all the elements that led Comte to the “religion of humanity.” The Comtian position is pushed back to that of his first teachers, the ideologists who created the École Polytechnique and also created the term “ideology” in a sense basically very similar to the one we use today.88 They were disciples of Condorcet and representatives of the extreme trend of the Enlightenment, inasmuch as they reaffirmed its spirit, after Rousseau’s critique of the line of the philosophes from Diderot to Holbach and its two outcomes, Robespierre’s Jacobinism and Catholic romanticism. It would be interesting to study how today’s Enlightenment

88 On this topic, which has been studied very little, see the outline of how to pose the problem in my work “Intorno alle origini del concetto di ideologia” in the volume Ideologia e filosofia [Ideology and philosophy] (Brescia: Morcelliana, 1967) [TN: Also included in L’epoca della secolarizzazione and translated as “At the origins of the concept of ideology” in the present volume].

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connects with the old Enlightenment precisely at the point where it declared itself a sociologistic form of thought, albeit in an archaic form.89 The word conservatism has often been used in reference to both Comte and sociologism. It is impossible to deny that the scientific, and no longer political, form of revolution90 represents an irreversible final stage in the process of the secular spirit, and that it is based on well-­established interests (the selfishness of successful nations, successful cultures, successful elites). In the final analysis, it is based on economic interests. This is why today’s characteristic phenomenon, which is truly unprecedented, is the terminal crisis of the revolutionary position, at least interpreted as universal human liberation. Crisis in the sense that the most radical break with tradition is at the same time necessarily linked with the largest coalition of conservative interests that ever appeared in history. It is the largest because it reconciles all the interests that constituted themselves on the basis or in the name of the spirit of modernity. Of course, today’s sociologism repeats the philanthropic language of its predecessors – freedom, justice, welfare, tolerance – in the form of “declarations of rights.” But, on the other hand, how could we not notice that these declarations of rights accompany a constant process of dehumanization? We find here a new verification of Weil’s process of thought, in reference to her insistence that what is needed is a declaration of duties towards the human being, not of rights: The notion of obligations comes before that of rights, which is subordinate and relative to the former … It makes no sense to say that men have, on the one hand, rights, and on the other hand, obligations. Such words only express differences in point of view. The actual relationship between the two is as between object and subject. A man, considered in isolation, only has duties, among which are certain duties towards himself. Other men, seen from his point of view, only have rights. He, in his turn, has rights, when seen from the point of view of other men, who recognize that they have obligations toward him … Obligations alone remain independent of conditions. They belong to a realm situated above all conditions, because it is situated above this world. The men of 1789 did not recognize the existence of such a realm. All they recognized was the one on the human plane. That is why they started off with the idea of rights. But at the same

89 [TN] Del Noce discusses this very question in the essay “At the Origins of the Concept of Ideology” in this volume. 90 Because this was Comte’s purpose: to start from a reformation of the system of ideas, which is more radical than political revolution inasmuch as it erases its residual religious aspects, eschatologism, and so on. [TN: In the original, this footnote was a parenthetical statement in the main text.]

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time they wanted to postulate absolute principles. This contradiction caused them to tumble into a confusion of language and ideas which is largely responsible for the present political and social confusion. The realm of what is eternal, universal, unconditioned is other than the one conditioned by facts, and different ideas hold sway there, ones which are related to the most secret recesses of the human soul … This obligation is an eternal one. It is coextensive with the eternal destiny of human beings.91

In the Écrits de Londres – which were contemporaneous with L’Enracinement and formally more incisive, for the reason I already said, that her style is most effective in short pieces and fragments – Weil brings together in her critique the notions of right, person, and democracy, recalling the statement by Bernanos that democracy offers no defence against domination by oppressive oligarchies.92 She particularly criticizes one of ­today’s most common truisms, the self-realization of the person. The famous épanouissement93 of the human person, adopted so superficially today as the ultimate criterion of evaluation (do we not hear that even the affirmation of God is a condition for the human person to realize itself?), leads to “attitudes towards life like that, so common in our century, expressed by Blake’s horrible saying: ‘Sooner murder an infant in its cradle than nurse unacted desires’”;94 “when the notion of the supernatural is lost … materialism … forces us to despise man. By placing goodness in matter it leads us to treat man like matter – or worse.”95 In the Écrits there is a critique of the contradiction inherent in the idea of the society of well-being – well-being being the only end that sociologism can recognize. Such well-being can only be perceived as individual well-being, and the other person appears to each subject just as an instrument for his own affirmation. When he describes in the Republic the process of spiritual degeneration, Plato distinguishes the democratic type, which is dominated by the quest for pleasures that are unnecessary but can be satisfied without flagrantly violating the moral law, from the tyrannical type, in which pleasures of all kinds are sought and satisfied without any ethical restrain. Now, a democracy based on sociologism is

91 Weil, L’Enracinement, 9–11 [The Need for Roots, 3–5]. 92 Weil, Écrits de Londres, 24 [Selected Essays, 19]. 93 [TN] Flourishing, in the sense of self-actualization. 94 Weil, Écrits de Londres, 16 [Selected Essays, 13; I modified the translation]. Needless to say, thinking of God as “a condition for the self-realization of the human person” is viewed by Weil as an aspect of the subordination of truth to life. In this sense, her uneasiness with words that Catholics use so much today like “personalism” and “humanism” is justified. 95 Weil, Écrits de Londres, 169 [my translation].

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exactly a democracy formed by men of the tyrannical type. Tyranny is not abolished but, so to speak, infinitely multiplied, and the dialectics of the tyrant applies to every man. On one side, in fact, when the human aspiration for the infinite is redirected to the worldly level, and freed from any transposition of eschatology to this level, it leads to worshiping the I; desire can only take the form of seeking universal domination. But this desire can be fulfilled only by appearing to others as indispensable, by virtue of being the most adept at providing the instruments to increase their vitality. Hence the search for means towards this instrumentalization by others and, consequently, the total loss of modesty. Everything becomes an object of trade. He who can sell the most is by right the sovereign: pure mercantilism, another aspect of the overturning of Platonism.96 But let us return for a moment to the priority of the notion of obligation. Does not Weil thereby rediscover the meaning of the classical idea of natural law, against the version of the Enlightenment? That is, the precedence of the aspect as objective law over that as subjective right, whence the inseparability of natural law from metaphysics? All of Weil’s thought – and this is her peculiarity – consists in rediscovering the traditional ideas, starting from an initial position that is not defensive but is rather one of revolt: in rediscovering them, therefore, in their authentic character. Now, regardless of what one wants to choose – the principle of Logos or that of force – one thing remains undeniable: the prophetic character of her views, regarding Europe’s destiny,97 the irreversible process of 96 Weil’s criticism of “the part of the soul that says ‘we’” is particularly harsh [TN: Weil, Selected Essays, 14]. Going from the person to the “impersonal” (the truth) is possible; but going from “we” to the truth is impossible. Now, today’s technological civilization is precisely the civilization of the “we,” if we define it in terms not of the possession of certain instruments but of the exclusive value it attributes to a certain kind of intelligence, scientific intelligence. Therefore, the danger of totalitarianism, which can only be defined as this absolutization of the “we,” has not disappeared at all, even if it cannot come back in the Stalinist or Nazi forms. 97 It seems to me that a dispassionate observation of the present situation can only lead to the following conclusion: without a rediscovery of tradition, resulting from a religious revival, Europe’s destiny is sealed: it must go from a democracy separated from freedom (through the formation of feudal oligarchies) to a new Middle Age without faith, and thus to a pagan age without Greece. I tried to highlight this in my work Il problema politico dei cattolici [The political problem of Catholics] (Rome: UIPC, 1967) [TN: Del Noce is referring to a passage on 104–5, in section 7 of the essay “Il progressismo cattolico” [On Catholic progressivism]. Sections 2, 3, 8 and 9 are included in the present volume, 236ff. Regarding the other sections, see footnote 30 on p. 255]. But this outcome is just the full explication of the “uprooting” that Weil defined.

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secularism towards scientism and sociologism, neo-Modernism, the current moral situation. We have seen that her critique of Marxism is not simply negative. In her critique of the declarations of rights we can see the continuation of the Marxist critique of the “natural rights” of the French revolution, as a superstructure in philanthropic terms of the “right to selfishness”; the continuation of the Marxist critique of the jusnaturalism of the Enlightenment. We can go further and say that she formulated in the exact terms the possible dialogue between religious thought and Marxism. This latter must consist in necessitating the Marxist thinker to self-­ criticize, by showing him that the failure of the revolution, and the undeniable surrender of Marxist philosophy to sociologism, demonstrate that his initial option about the self-redemptive power of man was mistaken. Conversely, the dialogue is completely absurd when it is formulated in the usual terms, in which Christian thought and Marxism depotentiate each other, and both positions are altered substantially in order to seek a fictitious agreement. There has been much talk about the role that lay people must play today in speaking to the Church. Now, Weil’s process of conversion, albeit unfinished, illuminates the conditions for a religious rebirth, and demonstrates that the greatest obstacle it faces is represented precisely by the Modernist will to conform to the present world.

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The Common Morality of the Nineteenth Century and the Morality of Today

To start right away from what later on I will show must be the starting point, let us focus our attention on the most widely accepted definitory assessment of the current moral situation. It can be stated as follows: in the nineteenth century, Christianity made its last stand, on the trench lines of morality. Practical judgments kept conforming to Christian morality even though, generally speaking, cultivated people were convinced that claims about the truth of dogmas should be dismissed, and were, at best, agnostic about suprasensible realities. The most recent decades of our century marked the final collapse of this last bastion. Supposedly, today we live in a post-Christian age: anti-Christianity itself has vanished, because its adversary disappeared. The question about the truth of the Christian God has vanished, just like people no longer raise the question about the truth or untruth of the ancient gods. It may seem that all aspects of today’s experience confirm this, to the point of lending credibility to a judgment that is no longer just empirical: our time marks the historical end of Christianity. To support this judgment, people point to the fact that today we are no longer able even to say what Christian teaching is. Is Christianity theistic or atheistic? Yesterday such a question would have sounded insane. Today, the thesis of the death of God, which has no precedents in tradition, is taught in Protestant theological schools, but also in Catholic ones, albeit more discreetly. Is the individual soul immortal or not, according to Christianity? The silence of many theologians on this matter is embarrassing, to say the least. In Catholic thought, these theses spread through the assertion that atheists are unconscious Christians, a sentence that can be easily This chapter was originally published in Il problema morale oggi [The moral problem today], the proceedings of the study conference of the Catholic Committee of University Professors, Rome, 31 May–2 June 1968 (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1969), 81–105.

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turned around into the statement that Christians are unconscious atheists. Fundamental documents like the anti-Modernist oath and the encyclical Pascendi are completely ignored. I tried to show elsewhere1 that the encyclical Pascendi contains, in the most rigorous form, the definition of the essence of Modernism. It is so organic that none of its theses can be left out: the assertion that it strikes at the old Modernism but not at the new is entirely baseless. Therefore, forgetting its teaching even for one instant is equivalent to recognizing that Modernism is true. But the outcome of Modernism is necessarily atheistic, as was shown already in those distant years, confirming the judgment of the encyclical, by two philosophers who certainly were not concerned about Catholic orthodoxy, Giovanni Gentile and René Berthelot.2 Of course, the eyes of faith make us see things very differently: they make us certain that Christianity cannot perish, even if it may fall on very hard times. If we compare the two judgments, that coming from the data of experience and that coming from the eyes of faith, we can give a precise meaning to the word “crisis.” Certainly, this word has lost all its ­allure, having been repeated for forty years (but why should the monotonous be false? We must be wary of falsehood, not of what may sound banal). Therefore, those who think that the sunset of the sacred is irreversible have good reasons to exorcise it. But – be careful! – from a Christian standpoint we have no right to do that; how could we not say that this is truly the greatest time of crisis, when a “serious” Christian suffers the greatest of persecutions, namely complete disinterest in the truth and values he believes in (regarding this present situation of the Christian, see the recent very beautiful book by Urs von Balthasar,

1 [TN] No reference provided in the original. Some comments by Del Noce about Pascendi are found in the essay “On Catholic Progressivism” in this volume, 243. 2 Gentile’s essay Il modernismo e l’enciclica Pascendi [Modernism and the encyclical Pascendi] of 1908, susequently included in the book Il Modernismo e i rapporti tra religione e filosofia [Modernism and the relationship between religion and philosophy] (Bari: Laterza, 1909), looks eerily relevant if we re-read it today. It is not a marginal work within Gentile’s opus, as one might think, because it marks the agreement between the philosopher of “immanent divinity” and Catholic theologians in the same critical judgment about the form of atheism to which Modernism must necessarily conclude. This agreement attests to the rational character of the criticisms formulated by Pascendi, against the talking done at that time and repeated so often today about the “conservative habits” that supposedly held captive the theologians who prepared it. The book in old-rationalist style by René Berthelot Un romantisme utilitaire, 3 vols. (Paris: Alcan, 1911–22), takes on Modernism in the context of its polemic against pragmatism, and effectively shows that the pragmatist aspect, which is essential to Modernism, is the root source of its irreparable break with tradition.

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Cordula3). Now, I will state right away what I intend to argue today: that although from, let us say, a quantitative standpoint irreligion has never been so widespread, from the standpoint of reason it is instead so-called secular thought that faces a crisis, not Christian thought. Secular thought has perhaps reached today its decisive crisis, the stage when its contradiction becomes manifest. Conversely, today it is becoming clear that traditional religious thought – that is, theological thought linked to classical metaphysics, where this term is understood in the broadest sense that includes St Augustine as well as St Thomas and Rosmini – is not undermined at all by criticism and, actually, is able to explain the nature of the present errors and deviations. I inclined to propose the following proposition, without being able to illustrate it adequately: the traditional theses of Christian thought can be rediscovered today in their authentic meaning, starting from the insuperable contradictions into which the philosophy that claims to have surpassed them must necessarily fall. It is against the backdrop of these unsolvable contradictions that the truths of classical metaphysics4 appear in their true light. Therefore, anti-Modernism, intransigent and absolute anti-Modernism, if Modernism means that religious thought should seek to adapt to a secularized world – even if it is hard for today’s man to pay attention to those truths because of many intellectual habits and, let us add, many practical stimulations to divertissement. I talked about a starting point. In fact, what can be the first task of those who today intend to keep calling themselves Christians, if not to free themselves from the judgment I just presented, and from the ensuing sense of inferiority? Because, let us be frank: who among us never doubted, at least for an instant, that such judgment suggested by history may contain an element of truth, and that therefore today Christianity must be presented in a “new” form? Many people, whose sincerity and whose faith cannot be doubted, undertook this task. And the result is in front of our eyes: updated Christianity, “adapted to modern man,” has no longer anything in common with traditional Christianity. Stopping halfway is impossible: “demythologized Christianity” can only be Christianity for which the truths of faith have become “myths”: no more sin, no more heaven, no more hell, etcetera, all the way to the unavoidable conclusion, “the death of God.” 3 [TN] Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Moment of Christian Witness, trans. Richard Beckley (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994). 4 Regarding the definition of “classical metaphysics” see the recent, extremely suggestive book by Michele Federico Sciacca, Filosofia e Antifilosofia [Philosophy and antiphilosophy] (Milan: Marzorati, 1968), whose theses seem to be in perfect agreement with my argument.

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Now, I believe that the consideration of today’s moral reality helps us better than anything else to highlight the crisis of secular thought, and the relevance to the present situation of traditional Catholic thought, precisely in its non-modernized form. Therefore, I will start by sketching the general features of traditional morality, of the autonomous morality that was prevalent in the nineteenth century, and of the ideal type of behavior that generally underlies today’s practical evaluations. I will take as a model of traditional ethics Rosmini’s version, both because of its rigor and because Rosmini’s thought took shape with the Enlightenment as its essential adversary; and now, the prevalent form of thought in the West from 1950 to today is a renewed Enlightenment, that is, a form of Enlightenment separated from all the elements that caused it to yield, in effect, to what today is usually called the romantic reaction. Rosmini formulates the moral command as follows: “love being, wherever you know it, in the order … in which it presents itself to your intelligence.”5 We must emphasize above all the notion of order. According to Rosmini, in keeping with the whole Greek and Christian tradition, there is an order of being, and human will is moral to the extent that it conforms to it. An order of being, that is, what St Augustine calls “dispositio plurium secundum inferius et superius”6 – that is, the hierarchy according to preferability. In classical morality, the primacy of order, the primacy of the immutable, and the primacy of intellectual intuition form a necessary sequence. Let us recall yet another passage by Rosmini about the distinction between intelligent and non-intelligent beings. The former, or the intelligent ones, “have as their end, according to the nature of intelligence, the fullness of being, union with Absolute Being. The others, devoid of intelligence, cannot have such an end, inasmuch as they cannot participate in Being in itself. However, they are ordered at the service of intelligent beings, and they only have an end relative to them. Hence, we can say that intelligent beings have an absolute end, because they have absolute being as their end, and they must be considered from this standpoint

5 Antonio Rosmini, Principi di scienza morale, chapter 4, articles 5 and 7 [TN: Principles of Ethics (Durham, UK: Rosmini House, 1989), 56]. 6 [TN] As quoted by Louis Lavelle in Traité des valeurs, vol. 1 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1951), 614. Since an online search (at www.augustinus.it) cannot locate this sentence in St Augustine’s opera omnia, I suspect that it is not a direct quotation but rather Lavelle’s own encapsulation of St Augustine’s notion of order.

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when we evaluate them. Non-intelligent beings, on the contrary, have no other value except as pure means.”7 This passage inserts morality into the general system of classical philosophy centered around the idea of participation. Intelligent beings have value as ends in themselves only because of their participation in the absolute. Moreover, the idea of the instrumentality of non-intelligent beings serves the purpose of defining the justification of technical activity according to traditional thought. Allow me to linger for a moment on this point, which I deem extremely important. What characterizes today’s world is the hubris of technological activity. This is perhaps the only factual reality about which all agree. Now, how can we prevent this hubris while acknowledging what cannot be denied, the progress of technological activity? I do not know any other way besides the one Rosmini formulated. At the same time, this truth of classical metaphysics has the effect of breaking down a prejudice that today is very common: the idea that the progress of technological activity and the eclipse of the sacred are necessarily linked phenomena. It is true that pantheistic and acosmistic world views constitute an obstacle to the development of technological activity. Conversely, theistic thought promotes it, but at the same time places it within the order and prevents it from getting out of proportion. If we consider Eastern thought, and the ideal of submerging oneself in a Whole in which the distinction between human and infra-human reality is lost, we see that in those civilizations there was an opposition between religious thought and technical activity which was hard to overcome. This changes radically with Christianity; in fact, with the conception of man as master of nature, as affirmed already at the beginning of Genesis. Certainly, it may seem that in these formulas by Rosmini there is nothing inspiring or agreeable to contemporary taste. It seems that, today, Catholic discourse must always emphasize man’s creativity and free self-realization. Today, the contrast between a new and activist Christianity and an old and passivist Christianity is found in newsstands, newspapers, and magazines. Intellectuals look for formulas about man as God’s cooperator in the Church fathers, and add that the new Christianity rediscovers the authentic meaning of Christianity against the deformation that lasted I don’t know how many centuries – their number can change depending on taste and the occasions in which various commentators speak. 7 Antonio Rosmini, Storia comparativa e critica dei sistemi intorno al principio della morale, chapter. 1, article 3 [Comparative and critical history of the systems about the foundation of morals] (Naples: Batelli, 1842), 90 [TN: my translation].

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Now, for sure Rosmini does not intend to deny man’s cooperation with creation, the cooperation that St Thomas defines as follows: “Quum igitur per multa tendat res creata in divinam similitudinem, hoc ultimum ei restat ut divinam similitudinem quaerat per hoc quod sit aliorum causa,”8 referring to the words of Pseudo-Dionysius, “Omnium divinium est Dei cooperatores fieri,”9 and to the famous passage in the letter to the Corinthians, “Dei sumus adiutores.”10 However, this idea, which is essential for Christian thought, can be understood in two different ways. Perhaps we can be more specific: how we understand it depends on whether analogy is regarded as the form of equivocity or rather of univocity. But this would mean entering difficult terrain. Indeed, it may mean: insofar as I conform my action to an uncreated order, which guides divine creation, I participate in creation and I am somehow a co-creator; and the surplus of vitality that is my full realization follows from the relative mortification of conforming to an order that transcends me. It is a mortification in the sense that it seems a sacrifice with respect to the level I have left behind, not with respect to the one I have reached. To me this seems the correct meaning. But I can also bend its meaning as follows: affirming God is a condition for my full realization, and I can feel that I am a creator only insofar as I feel that my action is supported by God’s collaboration.11 By understanding it thus, one introduces into Christian thought an element of pragmatism and vitalism. All in all, I incline to think that the distinction between the two meanings is that between the position that I would like to call ontologism and the one that presented itself as Christian existentialism. Personally, I am in favour of the former as much as I oppose the latter, which I consider a position that truly deserved to be beaten, as it was, by atheistic existentialism. Still, it is undeniable that recent Catholic thought has emphasized the second sense rather than the first: I believe that, at bottom, the germ of the current rebirth of Modernism lies in the existentialism and personalism of the years between 1930 and 1940. I also think that in Rosmini we find the clear distinction between the two meanings,  8 Contra Gentiles, 3, 21 [TN: “While then a creature tends by many ways to the likeness of God, the last way left open to it is to seek the divine likeness by being the cause of other things,” trans. J. Rickaby (London: Burns and Oates, 1905)].  9 [TN] De Coelesti Hierarchia, chapter 3, section 2: “the most divine thing of all is to become God’s cooperators” (my translation). 10 [TN] “We are God’s fellow workers,” 1 Corinthian 3:9. 11 One could give a thousand examples of this inversion of meaning. In order to illustrate it with all its consequences, it is helpful to read the book The Secular City (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965) by Baptist minister Harvey Cox.

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in the passage of the Principles of Ethics where he establishes the sharp distinction between ethics and eudemonology: The obligation we have of conforming to the requirements of uprightness and justice is simple, immediate and absolute; it is independent of any consideration about the effects of such conformity in the person who acts; it is an authority whose very presence reveals the rule of uprightness. Of itself, this rule requires the highest reverence that cannot be gainsaid whatever the outcome. We have to conclude therefore (to our surprise, perhaps) that what can be taught about human perfection as the effect of virtue, differs from moral teaching. The latter is authoritative and powerful in its own right, and strictly independent of human perfection to which it communicates its own splendor. Hence the origin of two distinct, but closely related sciences: ethics, and the science of human perfection.12

Let us now consider the moral judgments that were common in the secular world during the last century, especially in the second half (of course, here I am speaking in terms of prevalence, because in fact not only did the the 1800s carry the germs of all the positions in the field of morals that emerged in our century, but we could even describe the first two thirds of our century as the age of the neo’s – neo-Hegelianism, neoMarxism, neo-positivism, etcetera – meaning a time in which no new idea appeared regarding the conception of man, but in which the germs of the previous century just reached full maturation). They were inspired by the following principle: moral values are undeducible and independent from all moral and religious conceptions of life. They are subject to an intrinsic evaluation, and, in fact, morality is the starting point in order to explain metaphysical and religious conceptions, as expressions of the hope that Being and values agree. But what values? Normally, it seemed unquestionable that moral values were identical according to all consciences, and essentially corresponded to those of Christian morality. The formalism of Kantian morality ensured, on one hand, the autonomy of morals with respect to metaphysics and religion; on the other hand, by freeing people’s consciences from all subjective considerations, it led to the affirmation of a content that was valid for everyone and matched the prescriptions of Christianity as morality. Consider now how different this view is from the judgment that is extremely widespread today and that here, for the sake of exposition, can be reduced to the simplest terms: the repression of instincts is what leads

12 Antonio Rosmini, Principles of Ethics, trans. T. Watson and D. Cleary (Leominster, UK: Fowler Right, 1988), x.

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to aggressiveness. When this repression ends, we will move to the stage, so to speak, of “happy consciousness,” to reverse Hegel’s sentence about “unhappy consciousness.” Now, we need to briefly discuss how this transformation – which is, actually, a true and complete inversion – took place. In the 1800s people hoped for a moral unity of mankind after the idea of a metaphysical-­ religious unity had dissolved. Today, instead, we witness the fading away of this idea of moral unity. Two forms of morality present themselves as opposed and irreconcilable. Here, we should go back to the discussion of the term “post-Christianity.” Let us not be deceived. Post-Christianity seems to hint to a form of preservation; supposedly, what was positive in Christianity is preserved in today’s secular morality and raised to a higher level, just like Christianity had preserved the moral values of classical antiquity, purifying them. In actuality, the practical evaluations of today’s non-religious world stand in radical opposition to those that depended on Christian anthropology; thus, one could say that they are influenced by them precisely because of the opposition. I will now set aside any discussion of the political consequences of this opposition: one may wonder whether today it is possible to speak of a society in the proper sense, when its members lack any principle of unity. If we discussed this topic we could also explain the current dissatisfaction towards all political positions, towards all political parties. It is a consequence of a crisis which is actually moral, whose effect is that the principle of the common good has been replaced in practice by that of the lesser evil. We have moved, in other words, from the objective (common good) to the subjective (lesser evil). Next we must consider how this inversion within secular morality itself came about. It happened through a very long process, whose essential steps we must quickly determine. The process of development of autonomous morality coincides with that of the secular spirit. Here I state the following proposition without fully justifying it: the secular spirit in a proper sense begins when morality is called to judge religion, as the highest court. This is why I said earlier that the terrain of morality seems to me the best ground on which to discuss and critique secularism. Therefore, I believe that the beginnings of the secular spirit should be dated later than commonly thought, and that their first expression should be found in Bayle’s Dictionnaire.13 This thesis is certainly debatable, but I would like to distinguish sharply the

13 [TN] P. Bayle, Historical and Critical Dictionary: Selections, trans. Richard H. Popkin and Craig Brush (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1991).

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secular spirit from the heresies or the attempts to go back to classical antiquity,14 even if in later philosophies these three trends may have become intertwined. What characterizes Bayle’s thought is the universal and absolute value that he attributes to the moral law. According to him, we are endowed with an idea of Order, which underpins the notions that make us capable of judging the essence and the characteristics of the goodness we find in any subject we come across, be it creator or creature. His critique starts from the postulate that in any universe worthy of its Author, goodness is the essential divine attribute, which must be principally preserved; conversely, all theological-metaphysical systems are forced, in his opinion, to weaken and sacrifice it. Thus, what takes hold in Bayle is the idea of the full autonomy of the moral law, independently of a divine legislator. However, this primacy of morality is still effectively linked with the desirability of the existence of God, even though in another respect he highlights the objection about the presence of evil; this is why he goes back and forth between a dualistic-Manichean temptation and a form of nonconfessional Christian faith. Already in Bayle we find all the exigencies that later will find a formulation in Kant’s religious philosophy and in its continuations. Although Bayle’s work cannot be rigorously said to be part of the Enlightenment, it lies at its beginning. Kant’s work, on the contrary, lies at its end. Let us touch on the enormous success that Kantian morality enjoyed in the 1800s. One can say that, from the moral standpoint, the nineteenth century was the century of Rousseau (meaning Rousseau in The Creed of a Savoyard Priest 15) and Kant. The trust that animates Kantian morality – in the unity of moral conscience, based on the conviction that form can legitimate only one content – derives from the duality of the themes that are co-present in it. There is a Platonic undercurrent: the idea that man is called to give witness to reason, that is to say, to the divine principle present in him against the temptations posed by sensitivity and by passion, that is, against the arguments of what Kant calls “moral sophistry.” In this sense, autonomy of morality means that it does not depend on sensitive inclinations and interests. 14 The line of thought that goes from Averroism to libertine thought defines this attempt to return to classical thought separated from the aspects that make it seem an introduction to Christian thought. But this line differs from secularism in a proper sense, precisely in connection with the absence of the affirmation of the primacy of moral conscience. 15 [TN] The Creed is found in Rousseau’s Emile: Or, On Education, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979), 266ff.

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But, even though this is probably the truest sense that he wanted to give it, it is also true that, especially in the second half of the 1800s, the secular-radical mindset expressed itself by adopting Kantian morality as a type of morality autonomous from metaphysics and religion. That is, autonomy was given a different meaning from the one that is prevalent in Kant: it meant the independence of the moral principle from any power that transcends the will itself, and thus also from God. Now, if we understand Kantian morality in these terms, it is impossible to escape the consequences that the theoreticians of secularism as autonomous morality themselves had to draw, when they undertook a philosophical reflection: the recognition that there is a plurality of criteria of moral evaluation, which present themselves to different consciences with the same authority as moral evaluations, that is, with the same form.16 Thus, already in the decades before the First World War, the criticism that already Hegel had formulated against Kant was rediscovered. Those who rediscovered it did so reluctantly: having started out seeking the self-validation17 of moral values, they found themselves facing the spectre of skepticism. This is not the place to go over the history of the various, but always fruitless, attempts that were made to fend it off. The fact is this: in the twentieth century the common awareness went through the process “from Hegel to Nietzsche”18 that leads to the destruction of ethics. Nietzsche said that in the 1800s Christianity had made its last stand on the ground of morality, but that it would become clear that this resistance did not have a leg to stand on. The idea of truth, like that of Absolute Good, was an idol that was now coming to an end after the death of God. The decades of our century have punctually fulfilled his prophecy. Nietzsche’s judgment matches – but in reverse – the one, also very well known, of Dostoevsky: if there is no God, everything is permitted.19 But 16 Regarding the recognition of such plurality, the work of an Italian moral philosopher, Erminio Juvalta, is of great interest. He is not well known, but he deserves to be because of the extreme rigor with which he tries to define the idea of a rigorously autonomous morality with respect to religion and metaphysics. See, by him, Il vecchio e il nuovo problema della morale [The new and the old problem of morality] of 1915, now in I limiti del razionalismo etico [The limitations of ethical rationalism] (Turin: Einaudi, 1945). About the question of the plurality of the criteria of evaluations, see 297ff. 17 [TN] Autassia in Italian, a rarely used term derived from the Greek (self) and (value). 18 [TN] From Hegel to Nietzsche is a well-known book by Karl Löwith (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964). 19 [TN] The Brothers Karamazov, part 4, book 11, chapter 4, “ .”

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let us also observe that it matches an essential thesis of Rosmini. He contrasts his moral philosophy with two erroneous systems: the first was, in his words, the system of those who attributed to the subject what belongs to the object. I have indicated how the object (which for me is the supreme moral law) is endowed with divine characteristics such as immutability, eternity, universality, necessity. All these characteristics were mistakenly attributed to the human subject, who was thus divinised. Those who uphold this system speak enthusiastically of what is divine in the human being, and make the human creature a law unto himself. Kant named the system autonomy, that is, ‘law unto oneself.’ The second erroneous system goes to the other extreme, attributing to the object, that is, to the moral law, what belongs to the subject. The human being is changeable, temporal, limited, contingent, and every effort is made to ascribe these characteristics to the moral law.20

We could develop Rosmini’s judgment into a perfect description of the process that leads from the affirmation of the autonomy of morality to its dissolution. In fact, what is the form of its current dissolution? To be brief, we can find its formula in a sentence by Mannheim – which was written, it’s true, about forty years ago, but which has for sociologism the same importance that the famous statement that the task of philosophy is not to understand the world but to change it21 has for Marxism. “Deeper insight into the problem,” Mannheim says, “is reached if we are able to show that morality and ethics themselves are conditioned by certain definite situations, and that such fundamental concepts as duty, transgression, and sin have not always existed but have made their appearance as correlatives of distinct social situations.”22 This is exactly the second type of ethics mentioned by Rosmini. Mannheim does not just affirm the value, which per se is quite remarkable, of the sociology of knowledge, but views the advent of the sociology of knowledge as the definitive critique of faith in absolute values. To summarize this first part, nineteenth-century secularism wanted to save Christianity as a morality. The form of secularism that is prevalent today somehow appropriates the judgment of its adversaries concerning the impossibility of talking about Christianity as a morality 20 Rosmini, Principle of Ethics, chapter 1, article 4, 15–16. 21 [TN] The eleventh “Thesis on Feuerbach,” in Frederick Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy (New York: International Publishers, 1941), 84. 22 [TN] Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: Collected Works Vol. 1 (London: Psychology Press, 1991), 72.

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once its metaphysical and religious foundation has been abandoned. But it wants to go further, affirming that Christianity has been surpassed even in its aspect as practical awareness. Let us consider the outline of this process from the time when Marxism-Leninism appeared in history. I would distinguish four stages, at least for Europe: Marxism-Leninism, the “engaged” leftist culture after 1945, what I already called the technological hubris, and finally the rebirth of anarchism after Marxism and the technological society. I see a positive aspect in this fourth stage, as the beginning of a possible awareness of the process of self-destruction of secularism. Whereas socialism between 1890 and 1915 was generally marked by the quest to find a foundation in Kantian ethics, Marxism-Leninism radically rejects this association. This rejection coincides with a return to Hegelianism completely cut off from all residual Platonic elements. On another occasion23 I happened to define the unique feature that distinguishes Marxism in the entire history of thought with the following formula: it is modern philosophy in the aspect in which it presents itself as definitively surpassing thought in terms of transcendence (or at least in terms of religious transcendence), which becomes religion.24 In fact, because of this religious character, Marxism is lived as a total attitude that spans in an organic unity the knowledge of social reality, the value that judges it, and the action that transforms it. The only suitable word to describe this total attitude is “faith,” as was emphasized very well by Bloch, for example. No other word expresses so precisely the foundation of values in reality, and the differentiated and hierarchical character of every reality with respect to values. For sure, the object of such faith no longer has any supernatural and supra-historical character. It is merely supra-individual, in the sense that it is faith in a historical future that we must create through our action. If we wish to draw an analogy with Augustinism, we ought to say that values are founded on an objective reality that cannot be known absolutely but only relatively: God for St Augustine, History for Marx. And 23 [TN] In section 8 of the introduction to Il problema dell’ateismo (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1964), especially 118ff. 24 Please excuse me for saying that I am very fond of this formula, which, as far I know, was not stated by anybody else. Because it shows that every attempt to baptize Marxism is in vain. There is not a part of Marxism that can be assimilated by Christian thought. All of Marxism can be understood in terms of two different forms, immanent eschatologism and absolute relativism. To say it better, it is a form of immanent eschatologism that in the course of its realization must turn into absolute relativism, which is the philosophy that underlies the so-called technological society. Catholic criticism must highlight how this heterogenesis of ends is inscribed in the very essence of Marxism.

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man must recognize this transcendent, supra-individual reality as the supreme value in order to attain the most objective possible knowledge of any historical fact. But in this form of religion the future replaces the eternal. Thus, there is a complete inversion of the entire tradition, Platonic as well as Christian. In order to get a sense of such inversion, let us recall the remark by Rosmini I quoted at the beginning, which says that intelligent beings participate in Absolute Being, and in this regard are worthy of respect as ends in themselves. Conversely, according to Marxism, human universality is not something “eternal” to which the present must measure up, but rather it is a “future” that present humanity must serve. From the standpoint of morality, this means that the subordination of politics to morals is replaced by the total subsumption of ethics into politics. Moving on now to the characteristics of post-Marxist secularism since 1945, we could say that it marks the abandonment of the religious aspect of Marxism, keeping, however, its negations of Platonism and Christianity. This abandonment takes place in two positions that are somehow complementary: the atheistic existentialism of the engagé leftist culture, and renewed positivism. Their common feature is the radical rejection of every theme linked with the theory of the Logos and of participation; in brief, of every trace of the Platonic and Christian tradition. Regarding the engagé leftist culture, I will only recall an essay by Sartre,25 published in 1946, in which he affirmed that we must attribute to man the freedom to create the eternal truths that Descartes had attributed to God. Now, I consider the expression “creation” of values to be absolutely meaningless in reference to man. Certainly, one can say that we participate in the divine attributes and therefore also, as free causes, in creative power. But, according to tradition, this power of man and this cooperation of man with God unfold by realizing an order that, anyway, is certainly not created by man, even granting that it is freely established by God – a thesis that, by the way, has often bordered on heterodoxy, even if it has not been explicitly condemned. If we attribute to man absolute creative power, at least in the order of values, it seems to me that it can only manifest itself in the form of negative and destructive power, as a nullifying force. In fact, if we look carefully, in what else has this leftist culture become realized if not in the destruction of every authority of values? It is not coincidental that it went 25 [TN] Jean-Paul Sartre, “La liberté cartésienne” in Situations I (Paris: Gallimard, 1947), 314–27, translated as “Cartesian Freedom” in Literary and Philosophical Essays (New York: Collier Books, 1962), 181–97.

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hand in hand with the fortune of the works of the Marquis de Sade, who on this occasion has been elevated to the rank of great moralist. When every objective order is denied, in what else can the will find a content except in the idea of destroying this order? Such outcome was formulated at first as the opposition between the greatness of the personal “I” and an absurd universe. Then, it was necessarily banalized into the negation of every form of repression. Curiously (but not too much!) the nihilistic outcome of the theory of the human creation of values seems to provide an exact verification of the theory of free will that is classical in Christian metaphysics. This topic is crucially important, I believe, but here I must limit myself to a brief comment. In the traditional theory of human freedom, two elements are linked together: the aspect of negativity, as the capacity to break away from finite goods; and the aspect of the capacity to embrace the true good. Human will is free with respect to finite goods precisely because it is necessarily drawn towards the infinite Good. Now, let us try and set aside the idea of the infinite Good; the aspect of negativity that is intrinsic to human freedom will necessarily take the appearance of creativity. But this creativity cannot manifest itself in any other way but as power of destruction … that is, precisely as the aspect of negativity that classical theory recognizes, but made absolute. But let us now focus above all on the technological society or civilization, viewed as the Western response to Communism. The recent book by my friend Cotta, La sfida tecnologica,26 is stimulating and important. I will say that I do not think that my ideas contradict his, but rather that they are complementary. In particular, I agree with him on the point that we need to go beyond, not against science and technological development, and that in order to go beyond we need to have recourse to revelative thought, which offers science what truly is: being, the absolute, the divine. After all, I started by quoting that passage by Rosmini, which seems extremely important to me, precisely to define technical activity in its own order. This agreement is not meaningless, because a certain kind of literature against “consumer society” – whose benefits the authors want to enjoy abundantly anyway – seems designed precisely to satisfy the vanity of a new bourgeoisie which is voracious for everything, including the literary productions that oppose it. Here, however, it is important to highlight the point of possible disagreement: how to judge the type of civilization that has taken shape in the West over the last twenty 26 [TN] Sergio Cotta, La sfida tecnologica [The technological challenge] (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1968). Cotta’s ideas are discussed at length in the essay “Technological Civilization and Christianity” in this volume, 68–85.

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years, and which is often designated as “technological.” The choice of name is significant, too. In this regard Cotta distinguishes three homogeneous sequences.27 The first calls this new world the affluent, consumerist society, or society of well-being. The second, reformist and social-democratic society. The third, technological civilization or industrial civilization or atomic civilization. Cotta thinks that the terminology in the third sequence is correct. However, speaking of today’s society – which in any case is not yet fully realized, and, moreover, is currently going through a crisis – I think it should rather be defined, using an accurate formula by Felice Balbo, in terms of the replacement of the idea of a “good life” with that of “wellbeing,” that is, the greatest satisfaction of the appetites. Hence the replacement of the terms “true” and “false” by “‘important’ and ‘irrelevant,’ ‘original’ and ‘banal,’ ‘heretic’ and ‘dogmatic,’ ‘sincere’ and ‘rhetorical,’ ‘progressive’ and ‘reactionary.’”28 It seems to me that this description does not reflect a moralistic perspective, but rather proposes the definition of a civilization according to the existential attitude proper to it, which implies necessarily a corresponding philosophical position. That is, translating Balbo’s terminology into my own: it was not technological progress per se that generated this type of civilization, but it was instead the eclipse of the sacred – which is explained by ideal, philosophical, and moral reasons – that caused every human activity to be viewed from the standpoint of the competition man versus nature. Consider, in fact, the collapse of the idea of a normative order of values that had been affirmed by traditional moral thought, and that in some way the secular morality of the nineteenth century also wanted to preserve. Consider, as well, the collapse of the religious-revolutionary aspect of Marxism. The only remaining value will be the increment of perceptible life; in short, well-being, and every human activity, and religion itself, will be viewed as a vitalizing tool. It was Simone Weil’s great merit that she grasped the core of a crisis that today has unfolded completely in the form of life’s preeminence over truth. Such preeminence is what leads one to interpret every affirmation as an instrument for the affirmation of life itself. Her critique of Bergson’s religious thought is a critique in advance of today’s new Modernism. To her, Bergson had made a mistake bordering on 27 [TN] Cotta, La sfida tecnologica, 26–7. 28 Felice Balbo, Opere [Works] (Turin: Boringhieri, 1966), 364, 366. His remarks about the form of empiricism that underlies the society of well-being as its implicit philosophy are extremely important.

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blasphemy (in fact, she thought he had definitely blasphemed – the weaker wording is mine) when he identified the energy of the mystics with the fullness of the élan vital. On the contrary, to her a mystic is somebody who has freed himself from the servitude of truth to life, and by having crossed such a boundary receives another life, which is not primarily life, but truth that has become life.29 From the standpoint of the existential attitude that implies the philosophy, I would say that the formation of the society of well-being must not be associated, at least primarily, with the progress of technological activity, but with an idea of man diametrically opposed to and irreconcilable with the one that lies at the foundation not only of Christian and Greek thought, but of every possible religion. In fact, every possible religion presupposes that man carries in himself an invisible principle, an essence of a divine nature, and affirms, besides, that this invisible principle is the foundation of human society itself, of political society itself, also when it takes a democratic form. I recently read the following sentence by Jules Lachelier: “The general will, which is the only law-maker, is not by any means the sum total of the individual wills … It is, instead, what is not individual at all in the will of every single citizen but represents, in brief, the ideal and impersonal will for goodness and justice. It is in this sense that people understood, and perhaps still understand, the will of God … Thus understood, democracy is actually, and in the etymological sense of the word, a veritable theocracy.”30 Indeed, in Christian thought we find countless statements to the effect that a spiritual society is possible only if it is founded on the idea of God. And today, in Vico’s centenary year, let us not forget that Vico’s work aims precisely at showing the impossibility of the city of atheists, whose possibility Bayle had conjectured, as is manifested by the conclusion to the Scienza Nuova.31 Also, how could we forget that nineteenth-century atheistic thought itself, when faced with the question of the city, always sought a surrogate for religion? This is the case for Saint-Simon’s Christianity, Comte’s religion of humanity, Marx’s future and his classless society. Now, the new positivism, more or less explicitly declared, that lies at the root of the society of well-being is characterized precisely by the rejection of this surrogate. I would like to say, using a somewhat 29 [TN] Simone Weil, The Need for Roots, trans. Arthur Wills (New York: Routledge, 2002), 246. 30 [TN] Jules Lachelier, La nature, l’esprit, Dieu [Nature, spirit, God] (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1955), 99–100, my translation. 31 [TN] The New Science of Giambattista Vico, trans. Thomas G. Bergin and Max H. Fisch (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1948), 419ff.

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approximate expression, that it is Comtism separated from all the elements that made it present itself as the religion of humanity. Here we should address the following question: given such a rejection, is it still possible to speak of a society? Is it still possible to speak of the authority of the state? Or will the regime that will prevail be necessarily oppressive, even if it declares the broadest possible tolerance – to the extent, of course, that this tolerance does not pose any dangers? Here is an inescapable question: do we really think that the age of the totalitarian systems is over? Or is there a threat of more dangerous forms of oppression, of somehow new forms of oppression, which do not resemble at all the traditional images of Stalinism, Hitlerism, and so on? If we frame the problem in these terms, the primary question will be whether we should view the very idea of the technological society not as a way to surpass Marxism, but as an aspect of its dissolution. I mean “technological society” in the sense in which it manifests itself, morally and existentially, as a society of well-being. (Note that I am not saying at all that there is a necessary relationship between technological activity and the society of well-being; I am saying that there is a factual relationship between the two in the society of well-being understood as it has come about today). I already said that in true Marxism, and in its Leninist affirmation, philosophy and revolution are inseparable, not in the sense that a moral command to be revolutionaries derives from philosophy, but in the sense that Marxism presents itself as a philosophy that becomes world, and takes this “becoming world,” and nothing else, as its criterion of truth. If we take this statement seriously, as we must, then we see the tight unity between the history of contemporary philosophy and contemporary history. On the one hand, contemporary history is a philosophical history; on the other hand, we cannot discuss contemporary philosophy without including in it the study of contemporary political reality. Now, in what sense does Marxism, on the one hand, surrender (ideally as well as factually) to the technological society, and, on the other, reaffirm itself in the romantic-anarchic aspect, so to speak? Let us refer, for the sake of brevity, to the formula that is commonly used to describe Marxist philosophy: dialectic materialism. Both materialism – so radical that it accounts also for history – and dialectics are necessary to Marxism as a revolutionary doctrine. This is because revolutionary thought has two aspects: on the one side, it desecrates the existing order, and in this respect is materialistic; on the other side, it affirms the power of negativity, and thus is dialectical. Mere historical materialism would lead to a doctrine of complete relativism, to a reduction of all world views to expressions and instruments of the power of social groups,

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without making an exception for the Marxist conception itself, which instead claims to be true and cannot act as a revolutionary force without being perceived as true. Now, these two aspects tend to break apart from each other when they reach their most radical form. The first must turn into sociologism. As for the most complete extension of the dialectic aspect of Marxism, separated from materialism, I believe it already happened, and it manifested itself in philosophical form in Actualism.32 But this is a question that we cannot discuss now. This sociologistic annihilation of truth, via a complete replacement of philosophical discourse with scientific discourse, is the philosophy that underlies the technological society in its aspect as the society of well-­ being. In terms of effects, it is the society that removes the dialectic tension towards the revolution. According to Marx in his most mature phase, the revolution is made unavoidable not so much by the alienation that so many people talk about – a term that in Capital disappears – but by growing poverty. This is required by consistency with the very principle of Marxism, which says that the revolution is necessary not for moral reasons but because of immanent laws of historical evolution. However, the price to pay for the elimination of the dialectic tension is the reduction of man to a “one-dimensional being,” to quote the title of a book that is famous today.33 What does it mean to lose the other dimension? It means to lose the thought of the “other reality,” to lose the dimension of transcendence, whether we understand it in the sense of religious thought, or, like the author of the book I mentioned, as transcendence within history. Therefore, I cannot but agree with Marcuse when he writes, for instance: The slaves of developed industrial civilization are sublimated slaves, but they are slaves, for slavery is determined ‘neither by obedience nor by hardness of labor but by the status of being a mere instrument, and the reduction of man to the state of a thing.’ This is the pure form of servitude: to exist as an instrument, as a thing. And this mode of existence is not abrogated if the thing is animated and chooses its material and intellectual food, if it does not feel its being-a-thing, if it is a pretty, clean, mobile thing. Conversely, as reification tends to become totalitarian by virtue of its technological form, the organizers and administrators themselves become increasingly dependent on the machinery which they organize and administer. And this mutual dependence is no longer the dialectical 32 [TN] In Italian “Attualismo,” referring to “actual Idealism,” the philosophy of Giovanni Gentile (1875–1944). 33 [TN] Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968).

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relationship between Master and Servant, which has been broken in the struggle for mutual recognition, but rather a vicious circle which encloses both the Master and the Servant.34

This idea of the “vicious circle” immanent in the technological society is a very important idea, which actually Marcuse developed very well, and his critique of the new positivism is extremely pertinent. I just think that he then wrestles with an unsolvable contradiction. Hence the weak conclusion, which in this book – and even more visibly in his other books, I think, up to the latest one on The End of Utopia 35 – stands in contrast with the diagnosis, whose rigor cannot be denied. Current events make this contradiction clearly visible, if we acknowledge the relationship between contemporary philosophy and contemporary history. The contradiction posed by the new anarchism is supposed to be global because the Communist world, having moved past the stage of underdevelopment, has come closer to the capitalist world, and the two of them collaborate in the same system of repression. But, in fact, these anarchic rebellions, which are supposed to oppose both sides, act only as instruments for the affirmation of one part of the system. In other words, they do not express a real critique or negation of the system, but are criticisms within the system. This happens because of an inherent contradiction: a lack of content that leads them to exercise a purely destructive action, combined with a political-realistic need for power that forbids them from pushing this nihilism to the point of selfdestruction, at least in the political sphere. The practical contradiction only reflects a theoretical contradiction: Marcuse thinks that it is impossible to go back past the negations formulated by Feuerbach and Marx, but at the same time the originality of his position is that it confirms a diagnosis of the contemporary world that had already been developed, for the most part, by authors of a religious orientation. In any case, the anarchism of young people is a cause for reflection, because it is a new refutation of the wretched idea of progress. Through all civilizations, including the age when the technological spirit has unfolded, the human condition remains unchanged in its unity of greatness and misery. In my judgment, there is no metaphysical thought, nor 34 Ibid., 32–3. 35 [TN] A lecture delivered by Marcuse in Berlin in 1967, which gave the title to a volume published in Italy, La fine dell’utopia (Bari: Laterza, 1968). An English translation is found in Five Lectures: Psychoanalysis, Politics and Utopia (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books, 1970), 62–82.

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any religious thought, unless we recognize this immutability of the human condition. At least, the “global protesters” have perceived this presence of human misery in the technological society. But their rebellion is destined to remain sterile, or to decay into mere sexual license, as long as their critique is not brought to bear on the ideal process on which the society they protest against established itself. The many questions I have touched are so tightly interconnected that it was not possible to isolate them. Therefore, this presentation has necessarily become a mere index of topics that could be adequately discussed in one or more books. However, I think the point I brought up at the beginning has been clarified. The standard judgment, also taken for granted by too many Catholics, that religious thought and life should adapt to a radically changed world in order to survive, has turned out to be much less obvious than commonly thought. And the unusual opposing judgment has appeared to be, at least, a “possible thought”: the crisis actually affects the secular spirit, which as a form of thought has now reached its final contradiction. I say this even though nobody can predict to what extent the practical forms inspired by it may still have the power to spread and to conquer. Of course, such possibility is for me a conviction. This is the reason why I am against all forms of Modernism, and I think that only a return to classical metaphysics and its essential theses – primacy of being, primacy of the immutable, intellectual intuition – can truly be the salvation of the positive elements present in today’s world, and of technological activity itself, brought back, however, to its order.

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The Present Significance of Rosminian Ethics

This work is based on the premise that all contemporary conflicts, be they philosophical-religious or political, boil down to the opposition between the Platonic-Christian idea of man as image of God and the instrumentalist conception. According to the former the human mind thinks by participation (however understood) in the divine truth, so that Truth and Goodness remain absolutely the same for all peoples and all social classes by virtue of this participation. The latter regards man as an animal that uses signs (language) and makes use of instruments in order to transform the world – signs, words, and concepts being precisely just instruments for this purpose. From the practical standpoint, the second conception takes the form of sociologism, in the sense that sociology replaces “old,” “constrictive,” and “individualistic” ethics. My exposition intends to be a commentary on one of Rosmini’s most famous passages, namely article 4 of the first chapter of the Principles of Ethics.1 There, he sets his thesis in contrast with those who, by identifying the moral law (in itself an object) with the subject, end up attributing to the subject the divine characteristics (eternity, necessity, universality) of the supreme moral law, thereby making man a law to himself. Here, Rosmini explicitly has Kantian morality in his sights, and also predicts in some respect Gentile’s development of Kant’s position. The fact that this prediction is somehow immanent in all of Rosmini’s work should be the subject of a specific investigation, aimed at illuminating this essential point: Rosmini’s surprising relevance after Gentile. He also sets his thesis in contrast with those who take the opposite route, attributing to the This chapter was first published in Problemi del pluralismo filosofico, morale e teologico [Questions of philosophical, moral, and theological pluralism] (Milan: Marzorati, 1968), 3–24. 1 [TN] Antonio Rosmini, Principles of Ethics, trans. Terence Watson and Denis Cleary (Leominster, UK: Fowler Right Books, 1988), 12–15.

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moral law the variability, temporariness, and contingency that are proper to the subject, and thus end up annihilating it. My goal is to advance two theses on this subject: 1 This passages anticipates all the criticisms that have been levelled against Kantian morality, and in particular foresees its inadequate ­resistance to sociologism. 2 It also describes perfectly the contemporary moral situation, in the aspect in which morals are lived today. This prediction of the greatest crisis of values – the one right in front of us – and the fact that at the same time he provides the elements to overcome it, not only show that Rosmini’s ethics is relevant to our time, but possibly make the Principles the greatest work of ethics of all time, or certainly the greatest of the modern centuries. Rosmini writes that “between these two systems, however, which fail because of deficient observation, there is a third, founded on complete, unbiased observation.”2 A remark, though obvious in and of itself, may be helpful: it is clear indeed that nobody can think that Rosmini’s moral approach intends to be a synthesis of Kantism and moral empiricism. Still, I take the liberty to point this out as an instance of a general principle: nothing is further from the process of Rosmini’s thought than synthesizing opposite solutions. If people had kept this in mind, they would have realized immediately how absurd is the interpretation that sees in Rosmini an Italian Kant. Something else is true: according to Rosmini, Kant’s critique of empiricism is inadequate; therefore, Kant’s thought must turn into empiricism. This chapter critiquing Kantian morality is then part of Rosmini’s general critique of German philosophy from Kant to Hegel. Now, whoever looks at the landscape of contemporary philosophy realizes the ­extraordinary superiority of Rosmini’s historical vision, compared to that found in all other histories of philosophy. Usually, people say that Rosmini’s thought lacks historicity; on the contrary, I think that writing a history of philosophy in the spirit of Rosmini is perhaps the primary task of history of philosophy today. Once upon a time, when I was a student, people used to speak condescendingly of the distinction in the New Essay between thinkers who

2 [TN] Ibid., 15.

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erred by excess and those who erred by defect,3 which is also the distinction on which the chapter I am now discussing is based. They said that it was an extrinsic classification, which did not take into account the real problems that philosophers were facing, which introduced a quantitative criterion, so that the “soul” of each individual philosophy was lost, and so forth. We now realize that this is not the case, and that at the bottom of this distinction there is a dialectic principle, or perhaps the germ of the discussion of dialectics that Rosmini presented later in his Theosophy.4 Error by excess must turn into error by defect. Is this not precisely the history of German classical Idealism – of its turning upside down, with Marxism, into materialism, and the subsequent process from Marxism to the new forms of positivism? I mentioned Rosmini’s prediction of our current situation. Here, however, a comment is in order. Rosmini writes that the second erroneous system, namely the one that attributes to the object or moral law that which belongs to man as a subject, and that annihilates every moral legislation, “has always been rejected and opposed not so much by the writings of learned men, but rather by the infallible instinct that Christian peoples can never lose, which enables them to reject every harmful teaching, even when it is not scientifically refuted and rejected and it is embellished with sophisms and illusory attractiveness.”5 We must say that here Rosmini was speaking according to the experience of his time, when it was still possible to speak of a “Christian people,” and when irreligion had not yet reached the masses – or, to speak more precisely, when irreligion had not yet transformed the people into a mass. In other words, when irreligion was still the domain of “secret societies,” and I am not using these words casually. Indeed, already in reference to the libertines of the 1600s we can speak of “secret writings,” and somehow of the first formation of a secret society aimed at uprooting religion from the ruling classes. The democratization of the secret societies has progressively taken place since the time of the French Revolution, by blandishing people with evaluations separated from their premises. Already in the 1800s the word “democracy,” usually accompanied by the adjective “radical,” meant democratization of irreligion, at least for secular thought. And if we consider today’s situation, I am inclined to say that 3 [TN] Antonio Rosmini, A New Essay Concerning the Origin of Ideas, trans. Robert A. Murphy (Durham, UK: Rosmini House, 2001), §29. 4 [TN] Antonio Rosmini, Theosophy, trans. Terence Watson and Denis Cleary (Durham, UK: Rosmini House, 2007–11). 5 [TN] Rosmini, Principles of Ethics, 15. I corrected some inaccuracies in the English translation.

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this meaning has remained. The mechanism through which irreligion is transmitted to the people is described in one of the greatest and most unknown historical works of the 1800s, by Crétineau-Joly,6 which would have remained unknown to me if I had not been made aware of it by that admirable discoverer of works that have been willingly pushed into oblivion, my friend Zolla.7 This work really enables us to distinguish true history from partial history, of the kind elaborated in many history departments. I must add that Rosmini was writing during the Restoration, which was marked precisely by the rebellion of the common sense of the Christian people against the deviations by the intellectuals of the Enlightenment. *** Having put forward this premise, now I would like to quickly describe the process through which today the second system, the one I would like to call the libertine system – in the sense of the negation of all absolute ethical norms – has triumphed over Kantian morality. When I call it the libertine system, I refer to a thesis that has not been yet adequately developed: in the modern age irreligious thought went through a cyclical process which led it to rediscover libertine thought, but freed of the impediments that prevented it from communicating with the masses. Consider, for instance, today’s peculiar popularity of Montaigne interpreted in a libertine sense, that is, separated from all the aspects that could make him a teacher of Pascal, or that made him such that his thought was continued in Pascal. On this topic, one should consult above all the recent American critical literature on Montaigne and the skeptical thinkers of the 1600s – possibly the lowest point ever reached by philosophical historiography. The final stage of this cyclical process is taking place today and consists in the transition of Marxism to sociologism.

6 Jacques Crétineau-Joly, L’eglise romaine en face de la révolution [The Roman Church facing the revolution] (Paris: Plon, 1859), 2 vols. Today there is much talk, imposed very evidently by the historical situation, about “hidden persuaders.” If somebody wrote a history of the works that study these processes of persuasion, Crétineau-Joly’s book would occupy a most prominent place. It certainly belongs to reactionary literature, and shares its limitations. But, on the other hand, how does revolutionary thought nourish itself if not by assimilating the reactionary critiques of the modern world, transposing them? 7 [TN] Elémire Zolla (1926–2002), Italian essayist and historian of religion. In the late 1960s he and Del Noce co-directed a book series published by Borla, Documenti di Cultura Moderna [Documents of Modern Culture].

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On another occasion, talking about Rensi,8 I spoke of the cyclical process of negative and pessimistic atheism, which in its last stage opens up to religion, in the form of Pascal’s thought. Now, the same cyclical process occurs for positive, optimistic, or melioristic atheism, directed at transforming the world, except that it is able to avoid Pascal’s criticism.9 And perhaps here I should add: the best line, not only of ­defence, but also to prepare a counter-attack, can be found only in Rosmini’s philosophy. Let us start now from the most elementary definition of sociologism. According to sociologism, ideologies (i.e., everything that is not subject to immediate empirical verification) are expressions of the historical-­ social situation of a group, in their theoretical as well as in their practical meaning. They are spiritual superstructures of entirely non-spiritual forces, such as class interests, unconscious collective motivations, and concrete circumstances of social life. In other words, sociologism professes the expressivist and instrumentalist conception of thought, the exact opposite of Platonism. In yet other words, modernity supposedly is science, and today the conditions are ripe to extend scientific discourse from the natural world to historical reality. And sociologism, as critique of philosophy in the name of sociology, supposedly creates the conditions for true historical science, inasmuch as – by explaining the origin of ideas from below, through an extension of historical materialism so radical that its transition to dialectic materialism is eliminated – it frees history10 from all traces of the philosophy of history, and thereby establishes the conditions for history to really be history as a science. Here, historical materialism needs to be mentioned for a specific reason: we can say that when it reaches its greatest extension – such as is   8 [TN] Giuseppe Rensi (1871–1941), Italian philosopher and writer.   9 Nobody has studied, yet, the cyclical nature of every form of atheism, which seems to me a most important topic. The fact that post-Marxism – understood as acceptance of all the negations of Marxism and elimination of its remaining religious element (in its own way) – must end up in a form of neo-libertinism is attested to both by the consideration of today’s situation and by the phenomenological study of the structure of the libertine spirit. For this study I take the liberty to refer to my article “La crisi libertina e la Ragione di Stato” [The libertine crisis and the Raison d’État] in Cristianesimo e ragion di stato [Christianity and Raison d’État], the Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on the Humanities, ed. Enrico Castelli (Rome: Bocca, 1953), later republished in Riforma cattolica e filosofia moderna [Catholic reformation and modern philosophy] (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1965), 433ff. In that work, starting from the very same materials that Pintard had collected in his famous work on Le libertinage érudit (Paris: Boivin, 1943), I believe I proved that their examination must lead to very different conclusions from those proposed by that distinguished historian. 10 [TN] In this sentence the Italian “storia” means “the study of history,” or history as a field of scholarship.

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found precisely in sociologistic thought, or sociology that claims to replace metaphysics – morality disappears completely and melts away into economics, in the sense that values are whatever enables various people to fulfill their potential. Therefore, values change from individual to individual, within the same given historical society. In this demythologization or de-sacralization (how strong is the Enlightenment today!), values are destined to become mere tools or techniques for what is called man’s self-realization. Today this expression is also commonly used by Catholic authors, but in itself it would deserve the “grand prize for ambiguity.” Indeed, it can be given a correct meaning, namely that man realizes himself only by abiding by the divine law. But it is also true that in today’s common use this meaning is radically distorted. It ends up meaning that all laws are nothing but technical norms, instruments so that man may realize himself. Thus, the expression “man’s self-realization” marks an inversion of the relationship between truth and life. It is certainly not by chance that today so many Catholics have a predilection for it precisely because of this ambiguity; namely, because it takes two completely different meanings depending on whether it is part of what we can call the “participationist” conception, from Plato onwards, or part of the instrumentalist one. Clearly, nowadays many Catholics think that by using this phrase they can escape what used to be called the ascetic character of ethics. Now people prefer to call it the mortifying character, in order to suggest that these new times demand the abolition of every ascetic element of Christian ethics. In order to express this, they use the usual formulas about the growth of being, the expansion of life, and similar suggestive phrases. Well, given the diametrical opposition that I mentioned at the beginning, it is perfectly clear that the current thesis that religion has a vitalistic character, or the blasphemy that gives life priority over truth, fits perfectly within the framework of contemporary sociologism. And we understand why the diffusion of Catholic neo-Modernism invariably accompanies that of sociologism. It is precisely in this connection that the distinction that Rosmini ­established so rigorously between ethics and eudemonology becomes crucially important: The obligation we have of conforming to the requirements of uprightness and justice is simple, immediate and absolute; it is independent of any consideration about the effects of such conformity in the person who acts; it is an authority that manifests itself to us by the very fact that the rule of uprightness presents itself to the mind. Of itself this rule requires the highest reverence that cannot be gainsaid whatever the outcome. Here something new comes to light: that what can be taught about human perfection, about the effect of virtuous action, differs from

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moral teaching. The latter is authoritative and powerful in its right and strictly independent of the human perfection that follows from it. It does not derive from it any of its splendor, but rather it communicates to it its own splendor. Hence the origin of two completely distinct sciences: ethics, and the science of human perfection. The sciences of human perfection and eudemonology (the science of human happiness) are practically speaking the same thing. When analyzed, human happiness and human perfection more or less coincide. It will not be necessary for me to distinguish them. In fact, I intend to speak of them indifferently.11

Undoubtedly, we have here a point of contact between Rosmini and Kant, and a step forward, at least in the sense of a clarification, with respect to the traditional formulations of the great Christian moral philosophers. Because it is undeniable that, at least until almost the entire seventeenth century, Christian thought was hardly aware of the distinction between eudemonology and ethics. In this regard, Pascal is a clear example: what the tradition’s classical moralists emphasized was a different point, the desperation of man without God. I think that we have to look at the dispute on pure love12 to find the first important sign that this distinction is necessary. Not that Madame Guyon and Fénelon were right, but they do deserve credit for raising the question. And we find the first hint of a distinction between ethics and eudemonology, if I am not wrong, in Malebranche’s clarifications of the sense in which the love of God must be regarded as disinterested, when he intervened in the polemic to which this question had given rise.13 In any case, this distinction reflects the spirit of the Platonic-Christian philosophical conception, affirming man’s subordination to a universal reason in which he participates but which transcends him. And it is extremely important with regard to the two historical periods that followed Rosmini’s work: the first from 1870 to 1914, which was dominated by the  ethical hypocrisy of autonomous morality; and the next, in which ethics collapsed because of the absolute prevalence of a now completely ­secularized eudemonology (instrumentalist thought applied to ethics = secularization of eudemonology).

11 [TN] Rosmini, Principles of Ethics, x; I slightly modified the translation. 12 [TN] For a concise history of the dispute on pure love see Henri Martin, Martin’s History of France: The Age of Louis XIV, vol. 2, trans. Mary L. Booth (Boston: Walker, Wise, and Company, 1865), 273–9. 13 [TN] Del Noce is probably referring to Malebranche’s Traité de l’amour de Dieu [Treaty on the Love of God] and Trois lettres et réponse générale au R.P. Lamy [Three Letters and a General Reply to Fr Lamy], which can be found in a single volume in French (Paris: Vrin, 1978) but apparently are not available in English.

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We must recognize a continuity between these two phenomena. But, now, this is the thing: whereas Kantian morality, in its aspect as autonomous morality, is truly subject to the sociologistic inversion, Rosminian morality instead resists it victoriously. Kantian morality dominated as autonomous morality during the great age of the secular bourgeoisie between 1870 and 1915, when the question was how to save traditional moral values, at least in their essential aspects, but separating them from religion, or at least from every positive religion. It dominated in Italy and also in France, and Barrés perfectly described the standard type of the professor of Kantian morality in one of his novels.14 It was considered the form of morality that affirmed most rigorously the independence and irreducibility of moral values with respect to all metaphysical or religious speculations. At times it was presented as a form of secular spiritualism because it was linked with postulatory theism, the last form of religion within the limits of reason. At times it was presented in a rather positivistic sense, that is, separated from such metaphysical extension, which did not seem logically inevitable, although it was a possible consequence. Therefore, in the form of positivism separated from naturalism and characterized by the recognition of the autonomy of different spheres; in short, in the form of a “humanism” close to certain forms of pragmatism. The attractive element of Kantian morality was that moral values were presented as superior and foreign to all selfish interests, and thus were appreciated regardless of any consideration about outcomes. But the reason for its success also lies somewhere else. Even though I would rather not insist too much on a motivation that seems to bring us outside of philosophy (although only in the particular sense of philosophy academically understood), it is quite clear that, at that time, the adoption of Kantian morality was very well suited to the interests of the up-and-­coming bourgeoisie. The reason was that it banned the attitude of looking for what is deepest in what is lowest – the rejection of which is definitely part of the bourgeois spirit at a certain stage of its development – and it made it possible to accept anti-clericalism while at the same time limiting its impact. Consider that in Italy the essor of the bourgeoisie took place precisely by taking advantage of the conflict between the state and the church. When it met political reality, Kantian morality became the morality of radicalism separated from socialism, in the name of the person. Let us now end this digression. Certainly Kantian morality is sustained and enlivened by a firm and unshakable trust that, while formalism

14 [TN] Maurice Barrés, Les Déracinés (Paris: Bibliotèque Charpentier, 1901).

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cleanses and purifies morality of all material goals and the danger of all selfish and subjective considerations, one must also recognize or one can demonstrate that form legitimates and can legitimate only one content; that behind the law, one will unfailingly find the ends that moral conscience recognizes as good, and no others. Historically, we can say that this conviction constituted the Rousseauian undercurrent of Kantian morality, the way in which its formation had been decisively influenced by the Savoyard Vicar’s appeal to conscience: the moral conscience which, in its simplicity and immediacy, recognizes the right ends and the wrong ends without possibility of error. This was also its Platonic undercurrent, the idea of man, who is called to give witness to Reason (the ­divine principle within him) against the temptations of sensitivity and passion, against the arguments of what indeed Kant calls moral sophistry. In fact, the two themes converge, since Rousseau rediscovered Platonic elements in his polemics against the philosophes, and also since he was undeniably influenced, in a peculiar way, by Malebranche. Thus, in Kantian morality we find two different themes conjoined: the one coming from the Enlightenment, which is especially clear in the affirmation of autonomy, and the Platonic one. It is because of this duality of contradictory themes that Kantian morality is liable to surrender to sociologistic morality. Or again, this morality can develop in two possible ways; it can find its truth in Rosminianism or it can turn into sociologism. The proof that autonomous morality cannot resist sociologism could be developed in two different ways. One would be the classical route, so to speak: it would consist in showing that Kantian morality cannot withstand the Hegelian critique, and that this latter cannot withstand the Marxist critique, and finally that Marxism cannot prevent its economicistic and historical-materialistic aspect from turning completely into sociologism. Here I will prefer to follow another route, narrowing my discussion to Italian philosophical culture, for two reasons. The first is that Italian philosophy had to deal with Rosmini’s ethics, for better or for worse. The second is a very little-known truth, which is that in Italy we had the most rigorous theoretician of autonomous morality, or of the development of Kantian morality in terms of autonomous morality: Erminio Juvalta. Indeed, it is in this thinker – who strove to isolate the moral value in its purity, separating it from all the elements with which it can become combined accidentally – that autonomous morality no longer presents itself as the hybrid combination of interests that I described, but instead with a truly noble meaning: the absolute separation between value and force. To be moral means to give up the criterion of siding with the strong – which in philosophical terms disguises itself, in his judgment, as the

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quest to give morality a foundation, be it metaphysical or religious, scientific or sociological – and the attempt to rationalize success in any way. Of course, sometimes the winning cause is also the right cause, although the link between victory and justice can hold only for a very short time, I daresay just for the instant of victory. But victory does not add anything to justice, and moral value is never revealed with more purity than when it is unaccompanied by fortune. As far as the perceptible world is concerned, this is proved by immediate experience. Now, due to a sort of extrapolation, the exponents of this kind of humanism (before Juvalta, but in a much less precise form, I will mention Renouvier) thought that the quest for a metaphysical and religious foundation of ethics still concealed the desire to have reality on one’s side. To them, metaphysics was the search for such an axiological interpretation of reality, so that at its deepest level the distinction between value and force had to disappear. This exigency may even be legitimate in its own way, but nevertheless it is extra-moral or para-moral. Of course, this position implied placing the greatest emphasis on individualism, understood as the distinction between personal conscience, the organ of moral values, and social conscience. Now, my task will be to show that precisely in this reformation of Kantianism, in which anti-­ sociologism is carried to the extreme, the inversion into sociologism necessarily takes place. *** However, before I deal with this issue, let us briefly discuss the fortunes of Rosminian ethics from the last decade of the nineteenth century to the present. We can distinguish four periods. The first goes from 1890 to the years when Actualism15 became successful, between 1915 and 1922. It is characterized by the nearly undisputed affirmation that Kant’s moral doctrine has greater value than Rosmini’s.16 In the final analysis, this misrecognition of the significance of Rosmini’s ethics reflected the idea that, because of the principle of conformity to

15 [TN] I translate as Actualism the Italian Attualismo, which refers to the particular form of Idealist philosophy that was first developed by Giovanni Gentile at the beginning of the twentieth century. In English it is sometimes called actual Idealism and should not be confused with actualism in the sense used in analytic philosophy. 16 This thesis was particularly developed by Cantoni’s school. Carlo Cantoni (1840– 1906), an old pupil of Giovanni Maria Bertini, thought that Italian philosophy could not really withstand Kant’s critique; and, given the spiritualist intention of his thought, he and his disciples focused their attention above all on Kantian ethics.

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being, such ethics meant not man’s salvation, but a mortification of his creative activity. In this respect, one should consider how the decline in Rosmini’s fortunes coincided with the success enjoyed at that time by Guyau’s17 ethics, without obligation and without sanction – especially in Piedmontese culture, which is more sensitive than others to the influence of French philosophy. Today Guyau has been forgotten, but that does not mean that some of the ideas he formulated are not currently very widespread. In fact, Guyau was viewed as a sort of humanitarian Nietzsche. We have to wonder how much of Nietzsche circulates today, in a hypocritically humanitarian-Enlightened version. Subsequently, the period until 1935 was dominated by Gentile’s interpretation, which was the moral corollary of the interpretation of the theory of knowledge that he had developed in Rosmini and Gioberti, possibly his most beautiful work.18 The abandonment of the theory of intuition19 leads Gentile to the thesis that the “I” is transcendental and creator. Therefore, it is impossible to conceive the moral world without conceiving the human spirit as creative activity. So the theory that the freedom of the will includes its own law – and cannot but conform to it if it realizes itself – is set in opposition to Rosmini’s theory of freedom, which is also the one sanctioned by the whole Christian philosophical tradition. Hence, since the distinction between knowledge and will in Rosmini cannot be maintained after the theory of intuition has been eliminated, we should recognize even in his thought a tendency towards this identification, so that “the practical recognition of being, which to a superficial observer seems an intellectualistic principle of morals, is actually based on an anti-intellectualistic conception of knowledge.”20 I said that Gentile’s Remarks on Rosmini’s ethics continue the theses of Rosmini and Gioberti. From the standpoint of the development of Gentile’s thought, it is curious that just as the strictly theoretical period of his reflection, which led him to the formulation of Actualism (1911), started 17 [TN] Jean-Marie Guyau (1854–1888), French philosopher and poet. 18 [TN] Rosmini e Gioberti (Pisa: Nistri, 1898). 19 [TN] Intuito in Italian, which is used in philosophy to indicate the mind’s power to “look at” reality, which implies the notion that knowledge is a type of “vision.” It is different from intuizione, which corresponds to the standard meaning of “intuition” in English. Regarding Gentile’s critique of intuito and its foundational role in the development of his philosophy, see Augusto Del Noce, Giovanni Gentile (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1990), 17–27. 20 From the Osservazioni [Remarks] that Gentile published as a critical appendix to his edition of Antonio Rosmini, Il principio della morale [Principles of ethics] (Bari: Laterza, 1914). In 1937, they were used as an introduction to the third edition of the Fondamenti della filosofia del diritto [Foundations of the philosophy of law] (Florence: Sansoni, 1937). The quotation refers to Opere [Works], Vol. 4 (Florence: Sansoni, 1961), 28–9.

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from his studies of Rosmini, likewise he went back to Rosmini at the beginning of the period in which he placed his emphasis above all on the unity of theory and practice. From the philosophical standpoint, what is curious is that Gentile’s distinction between pre-Kantian and Kantian/ post-Kantian ethics means that the former recognizes the libertas minor and the latter does not. Now, Dostoevsky’s thought shows exactly that the tragic and the reality of human existence are tied to the acknowledgment of the libertas minor. What Gentile says about the superiority of Kantian freedom instead becomes the demonstration of one of the biggest gaps in his philosophy: the absence (which is necessary to it) of the meaning of the tragic. Here is the deep reason why Actualism could not hold its ground against the philosophies of existence. The real rediscovery of the significance of Rosmini’s ethics took place in 1938, in Sciacca’s book The Moral Philosophy of Antonio Rosmini.21 What was needed for this rediscovery was the consideration of Rosmini’s ethics in relation to his metaphysics, namely the triplicity of the forms of being and the doctrine of moral being. Then, the appearance of mere subordination, of human quasi-slavery to an order whose origins seem unknown, is stripped away. Rosmini’s ethics is, instead, one of the most perfect definitions of the fundamental truth of Christian thought: that man truly is co-creator without being creator. In my opinion, today’s task is to continue this investigation by showing that in Rosminian ethics, and only in it, we can find the elements for a development thereof that will lead to a truly rigorous critique of contemporary amoralism. Of course, I emphasize “only in it” because I think that none of the forms of French spiritualism that had a certain freshness in the 1930s, and no longer have it now, are up to this task. In my judgment, it is perfectly hopeless to try and modernize Rosmini using the ideas of some representative of the philosophie de l’esprit. Going down this road we may certainly find more suggestive formulas – not least because, admittedly, Rosmini was a really bad writer. But by doing so, we will fulfill at most an oratorical task, which has very little to do with the philosophical and moral task. *** But let us now go back to the overall thesis I proposed before: not only does Kantian ethics find itself ill-equipped to resist sociologism, but it is

21 [TN] Michele Federico Sciacca, La filosofia morale di Antonio Rosmini (Rome: Perrella, 1938).

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actually liable to turn into it, and this precisely to the extent that it would like to break away from it. We cannot undertake a study that should examine, in addition to the doctrines of moral philosophers, today’s common evaluations. For example, why was the greatest blasphemer of the classical idea of philosophy who ever existed, Dewey, so widely successful fifteen or so years ago? For sure, Rosminianism will have to address this question, but not now. At this time, let us restrict ourselves to Juvalta, an unknown but authentic philosopher. Another reason for doing so is that he originally belonged to Cantoni’s school, whose work amounted essentially to replacing Rosmini’s ethics with Kant’s. He also had close ties with the Italian pragmatists, Vailati22 and Calderoni,23 and strictly speaking must be regarded as the most authentic thinker of that group. I already mentioned his idea that the moral content cannot be deduced from the moral form. Let us note in passing that this had already been recognized by Rosmini. Speaking of the first of the two erroneous systems, the one that attributes to the subject what belongs to the object, he wrote that it is fruitless to “try and deduce everything from this one principle.”24 Rosmini added that after the failure of the first erroneous system there is no alternative, and one must attribute to the object, that is, to the moral law, what belongs to man as a subject. Now, Juvalta, despite all his efforts, and despite the fact that this problem tormented him all his life, at the end of the day could only confirm Rosmini’s judgment, even if he did not acknowledge it explicitly. Indeed, consider the following: he writes that there is not one moral conscience, but there are, rigorously speaking, as many moral consciences as the personal consciences in which certain values are recognized as supreme, normative and valid independently of the momentary and changeable flow of transient and accidental evaluations; and [in which] the exigency is recognized that the corresponding criterion of evaluation may hold not only as the constant norm of our own judging and willing, but also as the constant norm of other people’s judging and willing; that is, as the universal norm of every person’s judging and willing.25

22 [TN] Giovani Vailati (1863–1909), Italian philosopher, historian of science, and mathematician 23 [TN] Mario Calderoni (1879–1914), Italian philosopher. 24 [TN] Rosmini, Principles of Ethics, article 4, 15; I modified the translation. 25 [TN] Erminio Juvalta, Il vecchio e il nuovo problema della morale [The old and the new moral problem] (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1914), 91.

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Apparently, this assertion is meant to refute Rosmini’s claim that a­ ttributing to the object what belongs to the human subject ends up annihilating ethics, since humans are variable, temporary, limited, contingent. But let us look closer: when we admit that there are as many moral consciences as there are personal consciences, we already move from normative ethics to descriptive ethics. We certainly say that the acknowledgement of a plurality of moral consciences that disagree to various extents is associated with a plurality of criteria of evaluation that present themselves to different consciences with the same authority as moral evaluations, that is, with the same form. But the mere exigency that the criterion of evaluation corresponding to certain values hold not only as the constant norm of our own judging and willing, but also as the constant norm of other people’s judging and willing, is perfectly useless in order to discriminate between moral and non-moral conscience. Take, in fact, the case of a libertine, understood here as a man who denies absolute values. He too uses a criterion of evaluation as the constant norm to judge his own will and the wills of others. So much so that he regards himself as a déniaisé, a man who has broken free from the naïveté that marks the awareness of vulgar people, those who mistake the mores of a particular age for absolute values. Nor can one appeal to so-called intrinsic evaluations, meaning that values are willed per se independently of any strictly subjective interest. This happens because whoever lives a purely worldly existence must replace the love of God with the love of some finite reality, whatever it may be – honor, strength, wealth, beauty, revolution, etc. – which he loves unselfishly, and for whose sake he is willing to sacrifice. Essentially, pure selfishness is impossible, because it would coincide with the complete disintegration of the “I.” Man needs to make idols for himself, in order to redirect towards them the movement that would lead him to God. On the other hand, inasmuch as these intrinsic evaluations come out of personal conscience, and do not have the character of universal obligations, they are in fact chosen as instruments to realize the “I.” In other words, they are expressions of each individual’s psychology and of the social situation in which he lives. “Human sciences” replace ethics. But this unselfish love for some reality raised to the status of value is effectively viewed as a condition for full self-realization. Thus, the value is no longer an end and becomes an instrument. Once it occurred to me that in today’s world a practical universal is  ­accepted, but that this universal is a sort of optimistic version of Schopenhauerism: we bless the thirst for life, the will to expand – or, as people also say today, to grow – our own being. To use the words of times past, this is nothing but the practical, appetitive, amoral, and utilitarian

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reason in which everyone universally shares. People also say that this optimistic inversion of Schopenhauerism marks the transition from ­absolutism to democracy. But let us consider again some statements by Juvalta: For an order of values to be recognized by a conscience as supreme and normative, two conditions are absolutely required: 1 such ideal reality must be a criterion of evaluation apt to subordinate all ­other values, to give evaluations a consistent unity and to point the will in a constant direction. 2 The will must effectively affirm it as supreme and recognize it as worthy of ­directing it. Therefore, its actualization, and the rejection of every act that denies it, must be perceived as an unconditional exigency (the exigency that volition not belie the will, that the act not belie the evaluation). Subordinating to it every other value, and denying any interest that conflicts with it, must be perceived or ideally affirmed as a duty.26

But these two conditions are the very conditions that turn the temporary, fragmented and non-unified “I” into a unity, into a conscious and consistent will, a character, a person. In one word, they are the conditions for personality. Thus, the value becomes the condition for personality. But then this personality is characterized only by consistency, that is, by overcoming the tendency towards the disintegration of the temporal “I”; and not in the least characterized by participation in a value or an absolute reason. Now, let us try and turn the argument around. If personality is defined in this way, we understand why we can no longer speak of a single, preeminent value, but rather of a plurality of values. Precisely because values are reduced to instruments that enable a given man, who lives in a particular society and has a particular psychology (determined by heredity, education, and so on), to be himself. In other words, the moral law loses its unconditional character, and becomes a mere obligation to be consistent with the value freely affirmed by the individual conscience in its role as the source and creator of values. But at this point we see that Juvalta’s position cannot withstand the criticism that sociologism makes against Kantianism. Indeed, let us consider what are the arguments of the sociologistic critique. The first point is this: a sociologistic thinker has in mind that the only consistent philosophy of absolute obligation is that of Kant, but that it

26 [TN] Juvalta, Il vecchio e il nuovo, 110.

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can present itself as such only on the condition of completely separating itself from the consideration of the social world. Second: now, this separation from the consideration of the social world has the effect that the law does indeed present itself as supra-­ temporal, but at the same time as devoid of any content. Third: in order to account for the contents of the law it is necessary to consider social phenomena. Thus, values cease to be valid in themselves, but become valid in connection with a totality, namely a given society whose “biological” exigencies they express (once again, life and strength replace the Good). Fourth: whereas theoretically the science of morality cannot claim to be normative – inasmuch as it is a science that, as such, cannot formulate judgments of value – in practice in matters of “morals”27 it does present itself as normative. Then, it will necessarily go on to say that judgments of value are experimentally verifiable, just like the other judgments of the sciences of phenomena; that is, based on the result. Therefore, we must paradoxically conclude that the development of Kantian ethics, in the aspect in which it presents itself as autonomous, results in the dissolution of ethics into eudemonology. But it is eudemonology separated from the idea of an ultimate end, which was one of its core themes when it was associated with metaphysics. On the other hand, even if sociologism annihilates all absolute values and reduces them to technical rules, it cannot help nonetheless affirming an imperative, which boils down to the principle of “being oneself” within the temporality, contingency, and limitedness that are proper to man. This “being oneself” implies, if nothing else, a victory over the scruples coming from the old taboos of a universal moral order, since social and historical reality is always new. So that moral value boils down to the mere fact of success, apart from any consideration of whether this fact is the manifestation and the sign of a divine will or a universal rationality (in short, Americanism separated from Calvinism).28 27 [TN] In the original, Del Noce writes (in quotes) “la morale,” which in Italian is different from moralità (morality) and is used colloquially to indicate “socially accepted rules of behavior” and “common morals.” 28 Here we should discuss how Rosmini’s relevance today could become completely clear if we went on to consider the genesis of his thought. Indeed, it took shape having as its essential adversaries the ideologists – the disciples of Condorcet who founded sociologism! - and the Saint-Simonians – Saint-Simon, the importance of the American experience, and the re-affirmation of Condorcet after De Maistre! A crucially important opening to understand this genesis is provided by the youthful essays collected in the small volume Storia dell’empietà [History of impiousness] (Domodossola: Sodalitas, 1967), which was as

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We can easily see how much this conception has prevailed by observing what today constitutes the entry pass into the world of the “enlightened bourgeoisie.” Access is granted to whoever has conformed, in his finite individuality, to this principle of “self-realization,” as a principle separated from any respect for a universal moral order. We have here a perversion of another fundamental moral notion, that of freedom. The recognition of the freedom of the other person – as long as he conforms to the rule “be yourself” – presents itself as correlative with the non-­recognition of the universal order. The characters who were not accepted in this world as recently as a few decades ago, and who now have excluded others, are the speculator, the courtesan, the homosexual, the priest who embraces the notion of man’s self-realization. If others are tolerated, they are those who apologize for obeying the order to some degree, for their emotional attachment to traditional morality.29 We can define it as the world of the new bourgeoisie, which at the same time can proclaim its non-bourgeois character with respect to the old bourgeoisie, by virtue of being open and not closed. The intellectual figures in this world are the psychologist who monitors various individuals’ chances of success, in order to make predictions approximating the outcomes almost to the point of certainty; the sociologist who makes it possible to defuse the revolution at the lowest cost, by establishing the rules and techniques of coexistence; and the novelist who exemplifies with fictional characters the doctrines of the psychologist and the sociologist. In this respect, we have to say that the new bourgeoisie has actually been able to achieve complete success over Marxism. But it is quite doubtful that the form taken by this success should be regarded as something positive.

precious as it was ignored. Regarding the historical importance of the thought of the ideologues, which is generally not recognized in the textbooks of history of philosophy, see the research program that I outlined in my essay “Intorno alle origini del concetto di ideologia” [“On the origins of the concept of ideology”] in the volume Ideologia e filosofia [Ideology and philosophy] (Brescia: Morcelliana, 1967) [TN: the next essay in the present volume]. 29 While I am correcting these proofs, I am reading in the final pages of the very recent book by Elémire Zolla, Le potenze dell’anima [The powers of the soul] (Milan: Bompiani, 1968), 234, the singularly vigorous formulation with which he has been able to describe the demonic nature of today’s “passionate vocation to forgiveness and to human understanding” which manifests itself in reality as tolerance of every vice: “Devil means Separator … The demonic divides … feeling from intellect, faith from the providential crystallizations of doctrine and ritual, content from form, trying to play them against each other.”

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When I geared up for an investigation about the origins and meaning of the term ideology at the end of the 1700s, at first I believed that there was very little to say in reference to the meaning it has today. Indeed, the sententia communis is the following: the term ideology was introduced by a minor philosopher, Destutt de Tracy, but in his work it concerns the psycho-gnoseological question of the origin of ideas, a question that apparently seems very far removed from social and political questions. Later this term was picked up by Marx, and then it took the meaning that still endures today – with some differences, however. Because for Marx ideology means abstract philosophy, philosophy of pure ideas, speculative philosophy that takes part in historical reality as a justification for a given historical order. Therefore, it is distinct from true philosophy which is, indeed, practical philosophy, but realizes human universality. In contrast, for contemporary sociologism ideology means a group’s historical-social expression, as a spiritual superstructure of forces that are not spiritual at all, like class interests, unconscious collective motives, and concrete conditions of social existence. Accordingly, the progress of the human sciences will lead to social science, which, as the full extension of scientific reason to the human world, will finally achieve the complete replacement of philosophical discourse by scientific discourse, clarifying the worldly, social, and historical origin of metaphysical thought. At least according to the statements by some representatives of this mental attitude, this will not imply affirming that superhuman beings are impossible, but only that the word of God should be demythologized, which would mark the complete end of every form of scholastic theology. Everyone can see the connection between sociologism, This chapter was first published in Ideologia e filosofia [Ideology and philosophy] (Brescia: Morcelliana, 1967): 75–86.

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demythologized religious thought, and psychoanalysis understood as the science of liberation from masks. To be clear, by this I do not intend to say anything against sociology. On the contrary, my judgment is exactly the same as that of the incomparable teacher of my generation, Simone Weil: “Contemporary attempts to create a social science would also lead to a successful issue as the result of a little more precision. It should be founded upon the Platonic notion of the enormous animal, or the apocalyptic notion of the Beast. Social science is the study of the enormous animal and should undertake a minute description of its anatomy, physiology, natural and conditional reflexes.”1 In fact, the impression we get by reading the truly great sociologists, Pareto for example, is precisely that they are Platonists, even unintentionally, in the sense of having described the large animal. What matters is that the human individual himself not be understood, then, as an abstraction that is real only in the large animal. Such is, instead, the stance of sociologism, which is to sociology what scientism is to science. Curiously, over the last ten years the adversary of religious thought has changed. In a sense, it is still revolutionary thought, founded on the idea of a “second birth” that replaces the “second birth” of the Gospel; how can it replace it, if not by replacing complete theism with complete atheism? But in Marxism’s case the idea was that of a secular religion, of the secular transcription of a messianic theme (according to a popular formula Marx was the last “Jewish prophet”). With sociologism, by contrast, the revolution is deeper, precisely because it is a “quiet” revolution. A very beautiful passage by Henri Gouhier, written when nobody foresaw this new epoch, expresses most perfectly the singularity and greater atheistic radicality of sociologism: By founding positive philosophy, the father of sociology deserves the mission that the revolutionaries had claimed for themselves. The cult of Reason presupposed that God and the soul be excluded from the universe; it was just an anticipation, as long as our ignorance about the human sphere allowed God and the soul to take refuge in it. Creating sociology precisely means discovering a man without any trace of God. Acknowledging that philosophy is positive means being entitled to no longer deal with theological or metaphysical ideas. A first crucial difference sets Comte’s work in contrast with previous attempts inspired by the same ambition: before starting a form of worship and ordaining a priesthood, one needs to know what is to be taught; theory comes before practice, philosophy

1 [TN] Simone Weil, L’Enracinement (Paris: Gallimard, 1962), 370 [The Need for Roots, trans. Arthur Wills (New York: Routledge, 2002), 291].

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before morality, truth before the institution. This is why the enterprise takes so long, and also why it is so serene: success is assured, every attempt at resurrection is impossible, and every effort to the contrary is perfectly in vain. The revolutionaries were fierce destroyers; Comte does not even care to establish that God does not exist. One does not prove the existence or non-existence of a being. One acknowledges its presence or its absence: just like Minerva and Apollo, God departed without leaving behind any questions.2

In a footnote, Gouhier adds this precious quote from the Discours sur l’esprit positif: “No one has ever logically demonstrated the non-existence of Apollo, Minerva, and the rest, or of the fairies of Eastern tales, or of the various creations of poetry. But none the less has the human mind irrevocably abandoned ancient dogmas when they at length ceased to be in keeping with the mental situation as a whole.”3 Perhaps the least predictable development, twenty years ago, was Comte’s curious new relevance. It fits into a conceptual framework that has been touched upon occasionally, but certainly never adequately, let alone studied exhaustively: the repetition in our century of the figures of thought of the nineteenth century. However, it is also true that this relevance of Comte needs some qualifications. The first concerns a curious remark by the philosopher’s sister, Alice Comte: “The cult of Humanity undermines the prospects of political positivism. The masses believe: attacking their faith means losing everything, ‘whereas if your system relied on Catholicism it would have many more supporters.’ Here is a presentment of a positivist Catholicism or of a Catholic positivism! The humble demoiselle did not predict Brunetière nor Ch. Maurras. But she proposed, already in 1849, a formula that would be rediscovered in the future.”4 Let us put it this way: Comtian positivism could not, in its own form, reach the awareness of the people. In order to reach it, it needed to be mediated by something else, by a form of thought that apparently was extremely distant from Comtism, which was precisely Marxism, with its extraordinary capacity to appeal to the masses. Moreover, Comte’s thought had to divest itself of the aspects by which it presented itself as

2 Henri Gouhier, La jeunesse de Auguste Comte et la formation du positivisme, tome I, Sous le signe de la liberté [The youth of Auguste Comte and the formation of positivism, vol. I, Under the banner of freedom] (Paris: Vrin, 1933), 23; my italics [TN: my translation from Del Noce’s Italian]. 3 [TN] Auguste Comte, A Discourse on the Positive Spirit, trans. E.S. Beesly (London: Reeves, 1903), 69. 4 Gouhier, La jeunesse de Auguste Comte, 49–50.

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a new religion. At this point we must come across the question of the present relevance of the forma mentis of the ideologists. The investigation I mentioned has just started, and I will only provide, so to speak, its skeleton. Therefore, I will briefly present seven historical themes that it should discuss: (1) The fundamental mistake that people have made about the place in history of the ideologists has been regarding them in the first place as disciples of Condillac. Instead, they must be viewed first of all as disciples of Condorcet, even if, in order to complete Condorcet’s ideas, they used Condillac’s theory of knowledge. Due to this false perspective they have been completely absorbed within the study of the philosophical formation of either Maine de Biran or Comte.5 If we assess them in connection with Condorcet, the fact that he started his specifically philosophical activity with an edition of the works of Pascal preceded by an Éloge which is

5 The ideologists’ relations with Maine de Biran and Comte have been masterfully studied in the renowned works by Henri Gouhier, La jeunesse d’Auguste Comte et la formation du positivisme, t. I, Sous le signe de la liberté (Paris: Vrin 1933); t. II, Saint-Simon, jusqu’à la Restauration (Paris: Vrin, 1936); t. III, Auguste Comte et Saint-Simon (Paris: Vrin, 1941); for the topic under consideration, the first volume is particularly important, where it is shown that the influence of the ideologists preceded that of Saint-Simon, and shaped the formation of Comte’s thought; Les conversions des Maine de Biran (Paris: Vrin, 1947). These books are so important that they may well be said to be the absolutely indispensable point of departure to study the ideologists. Regarding the genesis of positivism, their unique importance is due to the fact that they clarify the religious origins of positivism, due to the religious character of the idea of revolution. Now, however, the topicality of sociologism leads us to orient the study of the ideologists in a different direction, albeit under Gouhier’s indispensable guidance. A point that Gouhier illustrates splendidly, and that must be kept always in mind about the history of the sociological mindset, as replacement of philosophy by sociology, is that Comte represents, in a certain sense, the reaffirmation of Destutt de Tracy after de Biran. Because, in order to truly get rid of the perspective of interiority, it was necessary to go beyond the ideology coming from Condillac, and its individualistic perspective (see Les conversions, 12ff). Thus, it was necessary to reach the viewpoint that the individual is nothing but an abstraction detached from collective existence. It remains true, however, that while contemporary sociologism follows in this regard Comte’s anti-Biranianism and rejects Condillacianism, nonetheless, by rejecting the spirit of the Restoration and the philosophy of history it comes closer to de Tracy’s vision, even if it is imprecise. Despite its philosophical weakness, the old book by François Picavet, Les idéologues (Paris: Alcan, 1891) may still be of some use. It was born out of a return, during the Third Republic, to the educational ideal of the ideologists, against the remnants of the educational ideal of the Restoration. It is very rich of materials, which have still to be evaluated philosophically. We now have the addition of a very notable Italian book: Sergio Moravia, Il tramonto dell’illuminismo [The sunset of the Enlightenment] (Bari: Laterza, 1968).

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actually the endpoint of the Enlightenment’s anti-Pascal6 – so that Voltaire could write that it was the anti-Pascal of a man vastly superior to Pascal, and D’Alembert that he was convinced that Pascal-Condorcet was much worthier than the Jansenist Pascal – acquires a symbolic character. (2) There is a perfect correspondence, on the one hand, between the failure of the French Revolution in its Jacobin form – that is, in the line from Robespierre to Babeuf – and the rise of ideologism, and, on the other hand, between the failure of the Marxist revolution and the progressive spread of sociologism over the last fifteen years, especially after de-Stalinization, until thinking in sociologistic terms today has become the standard and almost natural form of thought. This assertion will no longer sound strange if we consider that today’s sociologism presents itself as the replacement of political revolution by scientific revolution. In Rousseau as well as in Marx there is the idea of replacing religion with politics for the sake of human liberation, which is why both of them elevate politics to religion. Sociologism intends to be the replacement of the metaphysical form of thought with the scientific form, and relies much more on instruments of cultural diffusion and on pedagogy than on political revolution. Therefore, in order to understand the cultural significance of the ideologists, we need to look, much more than at their writings, at the cultural institutions that they promoted: the Institut de France, conceived as the living Encyclopedia, and the École Polytechnique.7 (3) The ideologists represent the intransigent defence of the essence of the Enlightenment after the crisis of revolutionary thought, and also after the crisis of Enlightenment thought represented by Rousseauism, in its two outcomes: the Jacobin spirit and Catholic Romanticism. By ­dissociating themselves explicitly from every metaphysics, they today

6 [TN] “Anti-Pascal” is a shorthand for the polemical writings against Pascal at the time of the Enlightenment, especially by Voltaire. It dates back to J.R. Carré, Réflexions sur l’anti-Pascal de Voltaire (Paris: Alcan, 1935). 7 Already in 1798, Destutt de Tracy had advanced the idea of a polytechnic school “for the moral and political sciences” (see Gouhier, Comte, 42; Maine de Biran, 11). What else does this mean if not the replacement of metaphysics by the sciences of the human world, by sociology, even if the term sociology is not yet used? And the sciences of the human world are embedded in a school in which theoretical research is tightly joined with practical finality, so that the criterion of revealing eternal truths is replaced by that of political and social usefulness. These origins of a revolution based on science had as a repercussion the appearance in the history of French thought of the “côté de polytechniciens” that Albert Thibaudet once mentioned, referring to Comte and Renouvier “who dared to create a religion just like one learns in school to build a bridge or a road” (Gouhier, Comte, t. I, 146). This line of social reformers continues all the way to Sorel and beyond.

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represent the precise point where the new Enlightenment can meet the ancient Enlightenment. (4) Despite the different language, we have to say that, especially in de Tracy, we find already present the fundamental idea of today’s sociologism: namely, the replacement of metaphysics by sociology, by the sciences of the human world that dissolve their metaphysical origins in their worldly and terrestrial origins. Thus, we face a new type of materialism: a materialism that, in order to be consistent, no longer presents itself as metaphysical materialism; that, therefore, can remain impervious to the critique developed by Rousseau – albeit from within the Enlightenment’s rehabilitation of human nature – against the Enlightenment’s materialistic line from Diderot to Holback and, implicitly, to Sade.8 (5) Having said this, it is appropriate to distinguish most rigorously the ideologists not only from the theocratic thinkers (De Maistre, De

8 At this point one should examine the antithesis between the “spirit of Condorcet” and the “spirit of Rousseau.” If we restrict ourselves here to the antithesis between i­deologism and the continuation of Rousseau in Catholic Romanticism, Chauteaubriand’s Génie du Christianisme takes its true significance. This work can be correctly appreciated only by keeping in mind: 1) that its adversary is the thought of the ideologists, 2) that it must be viewed as the answer to Les Ruines by the ideologist Volney [TN: ConstantinFrançois Chasseboeuf, Marquis de Volney, The Ruins: or a Survey of the Revolutions of Empires (London: J. Johnson, 1796)] – a work based on the idea of the pernicious effects of religion on civilization – and 3) that it finds therein its primary meaning and its non-negligible value, as well as in the idea that the thought of the ideologists is artistically sterile. A very important statement about the anti-Rousseauian spirit of the ideologists is due to Stendhal, who wrote in a passage of his Journal in 1804 that Tracy was the man who enabled him to “dérousseauniser son jugement” [TN: Journal de Stendhal (Paris: Charpentier 1888), 96]. Notice that Stendhal views Tracy as “the man whom I have most admired because of his writings, the only one who operated in me a revolution” [TN: Souvenirs d’égotisme (Paris: Charpentier, 1893), 26]. He considers him the greatest French philosopher or, to say it better, the only philosopher the French have [TN: Correspondance de Stendhal II (Paris: Bosse, 1908), 238]. His Logic is a sublime piece of work; he is deeper than Helvétius; in fact, he makes all other philosophers superfluous [TN: Correspondance de Stendhal I (Paris: Bosse, 1908), 206, 208, 263]. In the same Journal, in a passage from 1805, he writes that Ideology is the study that will give him Shakespeare’s talent [TN: Journal de Stendhal, 227]. And he recalls with great emotion meeting him on 4 October 1817, between 1:30 and 2:40 PM [TN: Souvenirs d’égotisme, 26; Mélanges intimes et marginalia I (Paris: Le Divan, 1936), 381]. But this suggestion, or this artistic sterility of the thought of the ideologists, should be the subject of a lengthy discussion. Certainly, one can say that the ideologists influenced Leopardi, Manzoni, and Stendhal. However, Leopardi abandoned the optimism of the ideologists to embrace pessimism; the Promessi Sposi (in which I can hardly detect any influence by Rosmini) is the book that marks the conversion of the ideologist Manzoni; and Stendhal abandoned the ideologists’ humanitarianism in order to move towards egotism and towards Nietzsche. These abandonments can be interpreted as a confirmation of Chateaubriand’s assessment.

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Bonald, and so on, whose position is the exact opposite) and from the theoreticians of liberalism (Constant and Tocqueville), but also from the Saint-Simonians and Comtians themselves. It is appropriate because Comtism accepted the Maistrian and Bonaldian critique of the French Revolution, albeit turning it upside down. Because, in fact, the origins of Comte’s reflection lie in De Maistre and De Bonald (“The immortal retrograde school,” he writes, “under the noble presidency of De Maistre, completed by De Bonald, of which I appropriated from the beginning all the essential principles, which today find no appreciation except in the Positivist school”9). And while it is true that, as he says, the idea of progress and of social dynamics derives from Condorcet, it is also true that for Comte order dominates progress and the counter-revolution dominates the revolution. So that his thought has legitimately been described as a restoration of Catholicism without Christianity, and we know how successful this position has been from the political standpoint as well. It is curious that the political extension of Comtism that had the broadest impact was the Action Française, whereas the anti-clerical radicalism of the French “party of intellectuals” was shaped by the ideas of its adversary Renouvier, who later ended up embracing a form of “Christian philosophy,” although very heretical. This is also why Comte’s sociology takes a religious character as religion of humanity, and looks for a model in medieval theocracy, of which sociocracy is supposed to be the modern analogue. This belonging to the atmosphere of the Restoration makes Comtism essentially Romantic, whereas ideologism is the Enlightenment separated from all the aspects that can continue into Romanticism. Consequently, Comte regards the epoch from Protestantism to the French Revolution as an age of disintegration, whereas what specifies ideological thought is that it never looks back at the Middle Ages. In other words, Comte is concerned about continuity with the past, and therefore his thought develops within the secularized Joachimite vision of the philosophy of history. Conversely, according to the ideologists, the transition to the scientific mindset wipes away the superstitious form of thought that was typical of the past. 9 Auguste Comte, Système de politique positive, t. III (Paris, 1853), 605. [TN: Del Noce must have quoted from memory because he combined into one sentence passages from two different works of Comte. In the System of Positive Polity, vol. 3, trans. E.S. Beesly et al. (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1876), 518–19 we find the description of the “retrograde school” as “the immortal school which arose … under the noble presidency of De Maistre, and was worthily completed by Bonald …” However, the statement that “I appropriated all the essential principles of De Maistre, which now find no adequate appreciation except in the Positive school” is from the preface to The Catechism of Positive Religion, trans. Richard Congreve (London: Chapman, 1858), 7.

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(6) The consideration of the ideologists’ place in history, as the Enlightenment freed from any aspect that could continue into Romanticism, is decisive in defining the nature of the opposition between the continuation of classical German philosophy and the Italian philosophy of the Risorgimento. German philosophy does meet, with Marxism, eighteenth-century materialism; but it is curious to observe that, in the very important sketch of the history of modern materialism that is contained in the Holy Family, Marx fails completely to notice the specific character of the position of the ideologists. Indeed, Marx writes that “Mechanical French materialism followed Descartes’ physics in opposition to his metaphysics … The school begins with the physician Leroy (Regius), reaches its zenith with the physician Cabanis, and the physician Lamettrie is its center … At the end of the eighteenth century Cabanis perfected Cartesian materialism in his treatise: Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme.”10 Here it should be noticed that Marx does not realize at all the novelty of Cabanis’s position, in which we have a form of materialism that is no longer metaphysical, and the first outline of what will be called positivism. This is also why Marxism utterly failed to predict positivism, and constantly gave way to positivism. Conversely, the Italian thought of the Risorgimento must be viewed in terms of its total opposition to the thought of the ideologists. Now, the failure to place this form of thought in history has contributed to the belief that the Italian thought of the Risorgimento represents, when all is said and done, a provincial episode. This opinion is destined to evaporate when we realize that, today, the new positivism tends to reconnect with the mindset of the ideologists, to the extent that it re-thinks nineteenth-­ century positivism from the standpoint of the Enlightenment – that is, freeing it from the aspects that make it a romanticization of science. The usual historical interpretation that reduces the ideologists to mere epigons of Sensualism is laden with consequences, because it leads to the habitual judgment: Kant faced “the genius of empiricism” in Hume, whereas Rosmini faced much less important adversaries like Condillac and the Sensualists. Therefore, Italian philosophy in the age of the Risorgimento has a provincial character in comparison with German philosophy. The next step is: whatever is valid in Rosmini has been said better by Kant, and so on. Even when people want to oppose the immanentism of classical German philosophy, they must make recourse to Schelling, to the extensions of Schellingism, today to Heidegger and so

10 [TN] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Holy Family (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956), 169.

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on. Supposedly, the voice of metaphysics still speaks to us against the hubris of sociologism through Schelling, through Heidegger, but not through Rosmini. I think that a correct placement of the ideologists would be a way to change this judgment completely. If today the terms of the philosophical antithesis are the revelative versus the expressivist conception of thought, the road to reaffirm the former must be sought in Italian philosophy rather than in German philosophy. (7) In fact, the entire tradition of Italian philosophy is directed against the tradition of ideological thought, and it is worth highlighting the origins of Gentile’s thought, and the extremely significant and important first chapter of his book Rosmini e Gioberti of 1898.11 At this point the question arises of how sociologism has been able to penetrate Italy over the last twenty years, Italy much more than France, in spite of being completely extraneous to the tradition of Italian thought. This question has never been studied and deserves careful consideration. Now, I will just outline, in broad strokes, an investigation aimed at establishing that the term ideology was born in a context in which true revolution was identified with the replacement of metaphysical knowledge by scientific knowledge. The latter is capable of uniting mankind and bringing about peace and the progress of human happiness, whereas metaphysical knowledge not only bears no such fruit, but in fact divides men and leads to tyrannical governments, because of the unsolvable controversies it generates. Thus, the term was born already loaded with all the meanings that later forms of sociologism would highlight. The relationship with the French Revolution is clearly visible in the fact that the ideologists wanted to be its theoreticians, even though in fact they were influential only during the period of the Directory and the early years of the Consulate. The two best known names in this trend are Cabanis and Destutt de Tracy. The first belongs to the history of medicine and the history of sociology, and grasped the connection between these two disciplines. Indeed, he was one of the founders of social medicine and of what today is called the study of professional orientation. The anti-metaphysical character of his thought is apparent in his main work, On the Relations between the Physical and the Moral in Man,12 which indeed intends to be an anthropology in which every connection with metaphysics is rigorously set aside. The point where he parts ways with Condillac is precisely when he specifies that he wants to discuss the soul as a “faculty” and not as a “being,” abandoning the nearly meaningless 11 [TN] Giovanni Gentile, Rosmini e Gioberti (Pisa: Nistri, 1898). 12 [TN] Pierre Jean Georges Cabanis, Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme (Paris: Caille et Ravier, 1815).

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terms theism, atheism, spiritualism, materialism. In practice, though, this psycho-physiology illustrates how corporeal states condition mental states. Now, Destutt de Tracy created the term ideology precisely to sanction this break with metaphysics. Condillac had described psychology as the science of the soul, but by doing so he seemed to incline towards a knowledge of it as a being distinct from the body, creating the impression that his research was still oriented towards first causes, not towards the knowledge of psychical facts, their connections, and their practical consequences. Conversely, for de Tracy the word ideology has the following merit: it does not evoke any idea of cause, it does not intend in any way to go back to metaphysics as consideration of the nature of beings, of different orders of reality, of their first cause. If we look at what the elements of ideology13 really are, we find these essential theses: metaphysics, or the discipline whose subject is to determine the principle and end of all things, falls under the arts of imagination, which can satisfy us but not instruct us. Sensitivity and memory result from an organization that we cannot penetrate. We ignore the nature of the motion occurring in the nerves and followed by perception. The only useful thing is to study what exists, as it presents itself factually, in order to know it and draw practical advantages from this knowledge. In this respect, de Tracy can say that for him ideology is a part of zoology and its study consists entirely in observations, and that there is nothing in it more mysterious or more nebulous than in other parts of natural history. What needs to be carried out also about ideas is the transition, from the quest for causes to the quest for laws, that has characterized the new science. Perhaps a summary of his overall vision can be expressed in the words we find in a page of the Zibaldone by Leopardi, who, as is well known, was strongly influenced by the thought of the ideologists: I see bodies that think and feel. I mean bodies, that is, men and animals which I do not see, do not feel, do not know, nor cannot know, as being other than bodies. Therefore I say: matter can think and feel; it does think and feel. – ‘No, Sir, rather you should say: matter can never think or feel in any way.’ – Oh, but why? – ‘Because we do not understand how it can.’ – That’s fine! Do we understand how matter attracts bodies, how it makes those wonderful effects of electricity, how air makes sound? Indeed, do we perhaps understand at all what is the force of attraction, of gravity, of elasticity? Do we actually understand what electricity is, what force of matter is? And if we do not understand it, and never shall, do we

13 [TN] Del Noce is referring to de Tracy’s treatise Éléments d’idéologie, 4 vols. (Paris: Courcier, 1801–15).

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therefore deny that matter is capable of doing these things, when we see that it is? – ‘Prove to me that matter can think and feel.’ – Why should I have to prove it? It is proven by fact. We see bodies that think and feel; and you, who are a body, think and feel.14

Thus, we are facing here a very peculiar inversion of occasionalism completely separated from ontologism: from the inadequacy of the cause with respect to the effect it is deduced that we must merely stop at the facts, without going back to the “why.” It is certainly a mysterious fact that matter thinks or feels; but no more mysterious than the fact that matter attracts, that matter is elastic, that matter displays electrical phenomena. In this respect, we can say that in the ideologists we find positivism in its pure state, before it was re-thought in terms of philosophy of history by Comte. Already Brunschvicg and later Gouhier highlighted the role of occasionalism in the formation of positivism, inasmuch as it is a replacement of the idea of cause with the idea of law.15 We easily realize that the social analysis of ideologies merely replicates this position, applying it to society. Indeed, what does the word “expression” mean in the assertion that an ideology is the expression of the historical-social situation of a group? It means merely the extension of this materialism, moving from an atomistic to a social conception, in which each real individual is immersed in a situation of life in society. But, again, let us try and pinpoint better the materialistic character of de Tracy’s thought. At first sight, it may seem that the program of ideology has an almost phenomenological character: analysis of ideas and decomposition of thought in its first elements, independently of any reference to reality. But we soon realize that this is not the case: de Tracy wants to move beyond Condillac’s conscientialism by considering the idea of exteriority. How do we refer our sensations, which are given to us as pure modifications of our consciousness, to external reality? This is the question. De Tracy, unlike Condillac, thinks that it is not the mere sense of touch that shows us that bodies cause our sensations, but rather the ability to move, and the awareness of movement; and this faculty of mobility is the only connection between the self and other beings. In this respect, his dissertation on the notion

14 [TN] Giacomo Leopardi, Zibaldone, ed. Michael Caesar and Franco D’Intino, trans. Kathleen Baldwin et al. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2013), 1885. 15 See Léon Brunschvicg, L’espérience humaine et la causalité physique [Human experience and physical causality], part 1, vol. 1, chapter 1 and §114 (Paris: Alcan, 1922); Gouhier, Comte, t. III, Introduction, and Maine de Biran, 133–84.

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of existence and the conjectures of Malebranche and Berkeley16 is particularly important. De Tracy accepts Berkeley’s nominalism and rejects his immaterialism. There is no being that can be called matter. Speaking of matter as a single reality means hypostatizing an abstraction. Only individual bodies exist. But conversely he rejects immaterialism because without the reality of my body I would not even have the idea of external reality. I can affirm the existence of something only inasmuch as this something resists my voluntary movements. I can recognize that a thing is only because it resists me, and from this primitive fact I move on to other ideas. A body resists me in a continuous fashion, and here is the genesis of the idea of extension. It resists me along a certain direction, and here is the genesis of the ideas of figure and movement. It is true that in this way we are moving along the line of de Biran’s problem, who was indeed a student of de Tracy. And yet, de Biran’s thesis is a complete inversion of de Tracy’s, in a form that this latter did not predict at all. De Tracy emphasized the term movement, rather than will. Thus, from the thesis that “to exist is to resist” he deduces the idea that our sensations are the result of the impact of corporeal beings against our sense organs, which are also corporeal beings. That is to say, knowledge is just a particular case of the external relation between two objects, of the action of one thing on another. And what the subject knows is the “modification” produced in him by the object, a modification which is the representation of the object. This is why ideology as analysis and decomposition of ideas seems to him (even if he does not use these exact words) to be a demythologization of higher ideas, and to be necessarily linked with democracy, also understood in this sense. This is apparent above all in his Commentary on Montesquieu,17 which greatly influenced Jefferson, an influence which was a decisive moment in the penetration into America of the ideas of the Enlightenment. If we browse the fragments of investigations on morals that de Tracy conducted between 1812 and 1817,18 we can already see how, in the 16 [TN] Antoine Destutt de Tracy, “Dissertation sur l’existence, les hypothèses de Malebranche et de Berkeley à ce suject …” (17 July 1800) in Mémoires de l’Institut National, vol. 3 (Paris, 1801): 515–34. 17 [TN] Antoine Destutt de Tracy, Commentaire sur l’Esprit de Lois de Montesquieu (Paris: Fayard, 1994). 18 [TN] I believe Del Noce is referring to texts that de Tracy wrote for part 5 of his Éléments d’idéologie, which he never finished. In the 1815 edition he included as part 5 an introductory chapter (Idées Préliminaires) and a few pages from an incomplete treatise on love (De l’Amour). In the next few years, de Tracy completed De l’Amour but never published it in France, leaving part 5 out of all post-1815 editions. He did publish both texts in Italian, as Elementi di ideologia, parte quinta (Milan: Sonzogno 1819). The first French

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course of this replacement of metaphysics by ideology, the notion of wellbeing is born. At that time the spiritualist critique was already looming, and the ideologists faced the objection that a science of man reduced to the study of the psycho-physiological mechanism is morally destructive, because from its perspective mankind seems to be dominated by an invincible necessity, and therefore its actions are devoid of merit and demerit. De Tracy answers this criticism19 by saying that science per se is absolutely foreign to all judgments of value, and therefore cannot be said to be either moral or immoral. It can only be evaluated based on its effects inasmuch as it provides instruments of technical progress. In this sense, unlike religion, it must be deemed virtuous, because it tends to the good of humanity. But this good, once every metaphysical definition of morality has been abolished, cannot be anything else but well-being. Thus, ideologism meets utilitarianism and the problem of reconciling individual well-being and general well-being – a theme that sociologism never abandons. A further investigation should concern de Tracy’s interpretation of Kant. As philologically inadequate as it may appear, it contains a suggestion that should not be neglected. In fact, it stands at the beginning of a line of development that, by abandoning the Critique of Practical Reason and Kant’s metaphysical side, arrives consistently at a materialistic interpretation of Kantianism. This line has found supporters even recently.20

edition of De l’Amour appeared over a century later when Gilbert Chinard translated it back from the Italian (Paris: Les Belles-Lettres, 1926). De Tracy’s original was only published (Paris: Vrin, 2006) after a copy was found in 2003 in the General Archives of Argentine, where it had laid since de Tracy himself had sent it to Bernardino Rivadavia. 19 [TN] Destutt De Tracy, Éléments d’idéologie, IV et V parties (Paris: Courcier 1815), 546–52. 20 See the interesting, and much more important than people generally think, book by Giuseppe Rensi, Il materialismo critico [Critical materialism] (Rome: Casa del Libro, 1934).

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If I were asked to summarize the program of Croce’s entire opus in one overall formula, I would propose that it is: “to live without transcendent religion, but injecting the sense of the divine into man’s historical action, so that all his acts acquire a religious meaning and there is not a profane side of his life distinct from the religious side.” But which of the two parts of this proposition should be emphasized? Normally the first has been the focus of attention, by Croce’s advocates as well as his adversaries, by rationalist as well as Catholic scholars. Thus, by absolutizing some of his statements, he was said to be the most intransigent foe of all remnants of theologically-oriented philosophy, wherever he found them, both in the philosophers who can be called his auttori – Marx, Hegel, and Vico – and in his philosophical brother-enemy, Gentile. Thus, he was often considered – especially after the Storia d’Europa1 of 1932 – the teacher of a new spirit of Enlightenment, or even a new Feuerbach, a definition due to Troeltsch.2 Oftentimes people talked about his historical positivism, at first critically and later approvingly, as the program for a rigorous form of positivism able to account also for history. Now, I would like to briefly propose three ideas. The first is that emphasis should be given above all to the second part of the formula I just put forth. That is, Croce’s work cannot be understood unless we view him as an essentially religious thinker, within the

This chapter originated as a text of a speech given on the occasion of the commemoration of Croce by the Italian Union for the Progress of Culture at the Capitol in Rome, 29 April 1966; published in Il Veltro 4 (1966): 3–10. 1 [TN] Benedetto Croce, History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century, trans. Henry Furst (New York: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1933). 2 [TN] See Ernst Troeltsch, Der Historismus und seine Probleme [Historicism and its problems] (Tubingen: Mohr, 1922), 629–30.

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bounds of a presupposition that is never called into question: that by now the age of religious transcendence has ended. The second is that, if this interpretation is not accepted, one is forced to leave Croce out of the history of philosophy in the proper sense, as an eclectic thinker. The third is that in his thought there is a dynamic contradiction which must lead to the problematization of the immanentism that he accepts as a presupposition. *** This interpretation of Croce’s philosophy – as directed toward the restoration of the divine in a world where the development of the critical spirit supposedly has made the transcendent God disappear – forces itself upon us if we focus our attention on his last works, meaning the last period in a broad sense, from the beginning of the Second World War to his death. I think that the following passage from his 1941 book The Character of Modern Philosophy is extremely significant: Absolute historicism does not deny the divine, because it does not deny philosophical thought. It only denies the transcendence of the divine and the corresponding metaphysics, unlike positivism, empiricism, and pragmatism which, in order to get rid of transcendence and of metaphysics, suppress philosophy itself … Therefore, how can there be any affinity, let alone identity, between them? If anything, historicism feels a greater affinity for religions and for the old metaphysics it fought against and it surpassed – which in its own way welcomed and thought the divine, – than for dry positivism, empiricism, and pragmatism.3

This passage deserves to be analyzed line by line because it is the most apt, in my opinion, to provide the criteria of interpretation for his entire thought. If philosophical thought is always thought of the divine, then Croce’s so often repeated sentence – that every philosophical proposition is always the solution to a particular historical problem – must be interpreted in a different sense than usual. Thought as thought of the ­divine is always a struggle against false gods, so that the divine may be represented less and less inadequately; hence, its historicity lies in the fact that it is prompted by some historical occasion. That is, the divine cannot be grasped directly, but it manifests itself in different aspects,

3 [TN] Benedetto Croce, Il carattere della filosofia moderna (Bari: Laterza, 1941), 195–6, my translation.

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depending on the various forms of irreligiosity that man as God’s servant happens to be fighting historically: “Thus the mind roams every region of reality as its own dominion, and yet it cannot attain the One except as this journey itself, in which it moves in a constant embrace with the One. What cannot be attained is unity disjoined from this embrace.” This expression, found in a text from 1947,4 is certainly not accidental. It seems to say that the difference between a philosopher of history and a historicist – where I mean historicism in the sense that specifies Croce’s position and makes it different from all others – is the following: the former claims to grasp the “sense of history” and thereby to “pinpoint” God, whereas the latter feels a sense of humility in front of the divine, which forbids him from making this claim. This observation could open the way to a peculiar characterization of Croce’s philosophy as the attempt to transcribe negative theology into the philosophy of immanent divinity, where the transition itself from transcendence to immanence is required by the negativity of the theology. The specific character of his historicism must be interpreted from this perspective, and also the thesis that philosophy is never definitive, inasmuch as this thesis is radically different from sociologism, that is, the assertion that philosophies are completely reducible to the historical context to which they belong. This should also be the starting point to understand his criticisms of the other philosophers of immanent divinity, of Hegel and Gentile, for having failed to realize such immanence, so that their followers split between a right wing (which was Platonic among the Hegelians and Augustinian among the spiritualistic epigons of Gentile) and a left wing (atheistic among the Hegelians, empiricist or positivist among the Gentilians). In this respect, his position in history could be described as a “Vichian after Hegel,” that is, after having accepted Hegelian immanentism. To realize the philosophy of divine immanence one must leave Hegelianism, while preserving its truth; this is why he refused to be called neo-Hegelian. As for the greater affinity that Croce says there is between his philosophy and the old metaphysics, compared to the positions he calls positivism, empiricism, and pragmatism, I think it can be clarified by recalling the opposition that Max Scheler established5 between two types of vision of life: that inspired by the idea of homo sapiens, and that inspired by the 4 [TN] Benedetto Croce, “Ricerche di metodologia storica” [Studies in historical methodology], which actually appeared in the November 1948 issue of Quaderni della “Critica,” 4, no. 12, 83–8. The sentence quoted by Del Noce is on p. 84. 5 [TN] In the essay “Man in History” in the volume Philosophical Perspectives, trans. Oscar A. Haac (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958), 65–93. In the rest of this paragraph Del Noce quotes loosely several passages by Scheler found on p. 72–4.

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idea of homo faber. The former, which historically was discovered by the Greeks, incurred the greatest misfortune that can befall an idea: it became an unquestionably evident truth, something taken for granted. According to Scheler – and Croce did not understand this, which is the aspect that makes him passé – Nietzsche’s great merit was precisely that he understood that the traditional idea of truth is logically linked to the notion of God and vanishes along with it, and that thereby he posed the radical question of the meaning and value of the very notion of truth. Since the term homo sapiens is used above all in the anthropological disciplines, it may be preferable to define this world view in terms of the theory of participation that dominated unchallenged from Plato until Hegel, without being called into question even by the antithesis of theism and pantheism. Let us briefly linger on some of its features. Man possesses in himself an agent whose essence is divine, and this agent and the power that eternally shapes and organizes the world are ontologically, or at least in their principle, one and the same; hence reason’s aptitude at knowing the world. However, Platonism and Hegelianism diverge in another respect. According to Platonism and Christian thought, this agent remains absolutely the same throughout history, whereas according to Hegelianism, man must attain, through a process of becoming, a growing awareness of what he is from eternity according to his idea; it is in this process that the eternal godhead becomes aware of itself in man. Now, in my judgment, Marx’s philosophical work consists in transitioning from this negation to the negation of the other feature that specifies the idea of homo sapiens. He thus arrives at the anthropology of homo faber, whose first premise is the negation of the independent metaphysical origin of spirit and reason, from which follows the reduction of thought to an instrument of production, to technical intelligence. This thesis was then gradually embraced, albeit with different justifications, by the new brand of positivism and by pragmatism. Croce’s thought belongs completely to the first world view, so much so that it cannot even conceive of the second and needs, in order to fight its form, to re-translate it into the language of the first. Thus, it does represent the affirmation of the most radical anti-transcendence, but within the world view marked by the idea of homo sapiens. His thought was often described as the greatest struggle of reason against irrationalism in our century. I would rather say that it is the defence of the idea of homo sapiens – together with its theological implications, even if made immanent – against the rise of the idea of homo faber. Therefore, the starting point to conduct a critical analysis of Croce’s philosophy should be the definition of its adversary, which we just saw, and at the same time the consideration of a presupposition, namely the

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rejection of the transcendent – a rejection which is no longer problematic because, supposedly, the affirmation of transcendence was condemned by history. *** If we consider the cultural panorama of our time, we easily understand why it is necessary to recognize this priority of the religious aspect if we want to really give Croce a place in the history of philosophy. What are today’s prevalent trends in secular culture? Marxism, neo-­positivism, pragmatism, sociologism, psychoanalysis, left-wing existentialism, a new Enlightenment: exactly the forms of thought that Croce fought against. Can we at least say that these trends, in their new formulation, continue his teaching, in the sense that they surpass it, that is, they preserve it by sublating it? No. The new positivism, for example, does not intend in the least to be a synthesis between old-fashioned positivist thought and Croce’s philosophy, but rather the reassertion of positivism, freed from all the elements that caused its defeat by the Idealist critique. And the new Enlightenment is not in the least a synthesis between the old Enlightenment and romantic themes, but rather intends to mark the complete liberation from Romanticism. And the new exposition of Marxism intends to free it from the revisionist aspects that Croce’s critique had considered. Today there is a new flourishing of the sociologistic spirit, that is, the explanation of all forms of spiritual life in terms of social situations. The formula that history is the sociology of the past – which would make Croce turn over in his grave – is common. Croce used to say that regarding Marxism we cannot speak, in a strict sense, of sublation, because there is no truth in it to be preserved. But he added that this did not excuse him from his debt of gratitude to Marxism, because he had drawn from it the suggestion for the definition of the economic aspect, the recognition of whose autonomy had been extremely useful for constructing his “philosophy of the spirit.” We can say that today the situation is exactly reversed. For the great majority of today’s secular thinkers, Croce’s philosophical thought has died for good, even though many, not all, of them remember him with the utmost devotion and gratitude. But this gratitude does not go to the Philosopher but rather, so to speak, to the Pedagogist, who taught them to mistrust thought that is not born from the study of concrete problems; who, between 1900 and 1925, was the master scholar who promoted the “risorgimento” of Italian cultural life, in the sense of circulating Italian and European culture and

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transcending the regional cultures. He was the true heir and the last great figure of the secular liberalism of the Risorgimento, in the sense that he embodied its theoretical awareness and continued at the cultural level the work of unification that the liberalism of the Risorgimento had carried out at the level of factual reality; who, between 1925 and 1943, was the teacher of moral and political life whom the young people of the time recognized as the symbol of the condemnation of irrationalism penetrated into politics, in the name of culture, and of the condemnation of Fascism, in the name of the spirit of the Risorgimento. But if this is the case, Croce would belong, whatever his merits, to the history of culture and moral life, rather than that of philosophy proper, in the sense that his work would be tied up too tightly to a specific historical period, the liberal age between 1871 and 1914. In fact, that age is often described as the age of distincts,6 as the age when culture and practical and political life presented themselves as distinct and coordinated activities, in the sense that politics seemingly gave up on the ­attempt to mould historical reality according to the ultimate and definitive ideal, and sought to solve the concrete problems posed by historical experience. Conversely, the task of a thinker seemed to be the preservation of the purity of cognitive activity from any pollution by schemes and exigencies deriving from practical activity. In brief, a thinker must distinguish. That age began with the defeat of the Revolution in the Paris Commune and the fall of the temporal power of the Popes, and lived under the impression of two definitive collapses, that of revolutionary utopia and that of Catholicism. Now, the acceptance of these two exclusions, of revolutionary thought and of transcendent religion, is precisely what characterizes Croce’s thought. He is the philosopher of an epoch convinced that in history “nothing has been lost”7 and no wrong turns have been taken, and that something has been permanently surpassed, without any possibility of restoration or return, namely what modern philosophy fought against: transcendence, and the most accomplished expression of the religion of transcendence, Catholicism. He is the philosopher of a world that remained, in a certain way, Christian, but which thought that Christianity had moved beyond its “medieval” Catholic form through the 6 [TN] I translate as “distincts” the Italian distinti, a term that played an important role in Croce’s neo-Idealist philosophy; see footnote 38 on p. 63. 7 [TN] The conclusion of Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy: “To this point the World-spirit has come, and each stage has its own form in the true system of Philosophy; nothing is lost, all principles are preserved, since Philosophy in its final aspect is the totality of forms” (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1896), 546.

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Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, Romanticism, and Historicism, until it had found its modern expression in an immanentistic “religion of freedom.” We must also observe that this historical period could justify itself to itself only through a form of thought that preserved, against revolutionary thought, the idea of continuity with tradition, even if it abolished transcendence. Therefore, it could only seek its self-justification in a philosophy that replaced the transcendent God with the divine, in an eclecticism in which the secular and Enlightenment aspect is kept in check by an enduring theological-romantic theme and, vice versa, the religious aspect is kept in check by the worldly aspect. Viewed from this perspective, Croce’s philosophy is at risk of looking like the self-justification that a historical period gives to itself. That is, self-justification rather than true self-awareness, because he cannot grasp the ferments that were already undermining this world. Is it not typical that his History of Europe ignores Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, and Nietzsche, who are precisely the thinkers of the crisis? For sure, one could remark that Croce’s philosophy’s very own fundamental canon – that we must think in response to the new questions raised by historical experience – requires that it be surpassed. However, in today’s immanentistic philosophies, such surpassing looks like an annihilation. Their distinction between what is alive and what is dead in Croce’s philosophy leads them to declare alive the adversary against which Croce had formulated his critique. And this happens for Marxism as well as for the new positivism and for atheistic existentialism. *** The question is different for religious thought. I already said that in Croce the negation of transcendence is a presupposition. In itself, this is not a criticism but a mere observation of fact. There is no philosophy that does not start from some presupposition. Thus, medieval thinkers started from the presupposition of an unquestioned divine revelation, which included a theology of human history (the drama of the Fall and Redemption, of sin and grace). The philosophers who are usually called modern, in the sense of rationalist, differ from medieval theologians only in the fact that they start from a new sacred history, which rejects the supernatural and revelation; that is, from a philosophy and no longer a theology of history. Perhaps we could say, and here I propose the idea without exploring it, that every philosophy is always a theology, because the “philosophy of history” is merely a heterodox development of Joachimite thought. Croce himself cannot but refer to it when he

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concludes the chapter dedicated to the “religion of freedom” in History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century: “the ‘third age,’ the age of the Spirit, which Gioacchino da Fiore had prophesied in the thirteenth century, and which now opened out before the human society that had prepared for it and waited for it.”8 The question that has to be asked, instead, is whether the development of the critical aspect of a philosophy must not lead one to call into question the very initial presupposition in whose context that philosophy took shape. In Croce’s case, this question takes the following form: can his attempt to separate, through immanentism, religion from mythology be considered successful, or continuable? We must note right away that for him this was not a passively accepted presupposition, which could be discarded without changing the meaning of his methodological studies. It was, on the contrary, a principle that he consciously asserted and developed to its ultimate consequences, and that conditioned the meaning of all his partial affirmations. The last period of Croce’s philosophy, in which the central question is the definition of evil, provides a decisive answer about the definition of this presupposition. Evil, negativity, is represented by the vital element; and “vitality” means egotism and individuality. “The form of vitality,” he writes in Philosophy and Historiography, “is easily designated metaphorically as materiality and animality, whereas it should be defined for what it really is: the form of mere individuality.”9 One may ask if in this way a dualistic and pessimistic element enters Croce’s thought, that is, if the initial pessimism which he thought he had vanquished does not come back, undefeated. This is hard to answer, and what can be said is that Croce makes every effort not to fall into dualism and pessimism. Hence his new invocation of Hegel in those final years, and the definition of the meaning of the discovery of dialectics: “To those who ask me what Hegel did, I reply that he redeemed the world from evil, because he justified it in its task as a vital element.”10 *** At this point we understand the reason why Croce must avoid raising the question of the immortality of the individual soul: because, as a consequence of his conception of individuality, it seems to him a reflection of   8 [TN] Croce, History of Europe, 19.  9 [TN] Benedetto Croce, Filosofia e storiografia (Bari: Laterza, 1949), 18 (my translation). 10 [TN] Benedetto Croce, Indagini su Hegel, e schiarimenti filosofici [Investigations on Hegel, and philosophical clarifications] (Bari: Laterza, 1952), 36–7 (my translation).

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human selfishness. Thus, he frequently mocks the “world above” and the “ultimate questions” not out of deafness to religion, as was often said, but out of a specifically religious motivation. Indeed, this determination of the principle of evil as individuality is perfectly consistent with religious rationalism, in the sense of exclusion of the supernatural. In fact, when religious rationalism poses the question of evil after having denied the mystery of divine creation, it can only find its principle in the very individuality and finiteness of man, which, according to Croce, are redeemed in our works11 (which is why his philosophy has been described, correctly, as a “philosophy of works”). Notice that through the category of vitality, original sin is brought back. It is from this perspective that Croce’s critique of utopian and revolutionary thought – that is to say, of the form of thought that promises a permanent liberation of the world from evil through politics – takes its ultimate form. Emphasizing, or better declaring explicitly, the primacy of the religious aspect leads Croce to an interpretation of contemporary history in political-religious, not political-economic terms. In fact, among the interpretations of this kind, his is the most resolute: But here I come back to a thought of mine which, having been repeated many times, may start looking like a fixation. The thought is that the world’s present crisis is the crisis of a religion that needs to be restored or revived or reformed, and that in order to rescue it, politicians and warriors alone are not enough, but religious and apostolic geniuses are needed. We do not see their presence, but we do not feel any less in our hearts, more or less obscurely, like a silent invocation, that we need them.12

In this passage, this expression should be highlighted: “a religion that needs to be restored or revived or reformed.” Thus, it is not a matter of a new religion, but of purifying the religion that already exists. Therefore, by embracing the “religion of freedom” we do not exit Christianity but present it in its purest form, and modern philosophy did not mark its negation, but its purification. Hence the vision of history that he outlined in the well-known essay “Why We Cannot Not Call Ourselves

11 [TN] I translate as “works” (in the plural) the Italian opera (in the singular), which indicates the product of work (e.g., a “work of art”) more than the action of working. 12 [TN] Benedetto Croce, Pagine Sparse, vol. 3: Postille. Osservazioni su libri nuovi. Varia [Scattered Pages, vol. 3: Postils. Remarks on new books. Varia] (Naples: Ricciardi, 1942), 9 (my translation).

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Christian”;13 hence his appeal, at the end of the Second World War, for a “Christian re-awakening.”14 But, precisely because he thought he had clarified the truest form of religion in the religion of freedom, it is not easy to understand the need and the invocation for religious and apostolic geniuses whose presence we do not see. Did he sense that his immanentistic religion of freedom was insufficient? In this regard, if we stick to the texts we only find, I believe, this passage: “The redeeming, non-dogmatic religion of freedom that had awakened fervors, apostles, martyrs, sacrifices and enthusiasms, almost past the mid nineteenth century, was too aristocratic and refined, and too elevated in nature, and could not be translated, and actually refused to be translated, into the ideologies that the masses demand.”15 Still, I think I can glimpse, in the passage I quoted earlier, the lived feeling that his thought, because it had arisen in a different historical situation, no longer felt completely adequate and needed to be picked up again, but after a break, and to be continued, but after a negation. Therefore, I would link it to the final lines of An Unknown Episode from the Last Months of the Life of Hegel,16 which have an implied autobiographical meaning, as has already been been pointed out more than once, and express this disposition. *** But in order to have a break and a continuation, a dynamic contradiction is required. Now, the fundamental contradiction that Croce’s system incurs is the following: on the one hand, his historicism is the “affirmation 13 [TN] Benedetto Croce, “Perchè non possiamo non dirci cristiani,” in La Critica, 55 (1942): 289–97. 14 [TN] Del Noce is probably referring to the conclusion of Croce’s letter to The Times of 7 April 1945: “whereas many empires and many political hegemonies have come and gone in history, Christianity has not fallen and will not fall, a perpetual source of redemption and renewal, and the modern world needs above all a newly-burning enthusiasm, a moral faith, a re-awakening of the Christian spirit” (my translation). It was republished as L’Italia e la conferenza di San Francisco [Italy and the San Francisco conference] (Bari: Laterza, 1945) and later included in Scritti e discorsi politici [Political writings and speeches], vol. 2 (Bari: Laterza, 1963), 256–9. 15 [TN] Croce, Indagini su Hegel, 158. 16 [TN] Benedetto Croce, “Una pagina sconosciuta degli ultimi mesi della vita di Hegel,” in Quaderni della “Critica” 5, no. 13 (1949): 1–19, later republished in a booklet with the same title (Bari: Laterza, 1950). The final sentence reads: “Be that as it may, now Hegel belongs to us. And the fact that he is not enough for us is an obvious effect of his belonging to us and of our possession of him, because possessing a thought has value only inasmuch as it prepares new life and new thought” (my translation).

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that life and reality are history and history alone,”17 which implies “that the ideas or the values which have been taken as the measure and the models of history are not universal ideas and values, but are themselves particular and historical facts clumsily elevated to the rank of universals.”18 But, on the other hand, his negation of both transcendent religious thought and revolutionary thought leads, indirectly, to the elevation to a model of a particular historical period, the liberal-bourgeois age of 1871–1914. However, this marks the failure of the proposed purification of religion from its mythical aspect through the philosophy of immanent divinity. It is precisely this philosophy which falls into myth, that is, into turning something empirical into an absolute. The teaching that can be drawn from Croce is that religious thought can assert itself only by emphasizing, not denying, the aspect of transcendence. This is, in fact, the trend of most recent religious philosophy. This idea can also be expressed in the following, slightly different terms: his critique of the philosophy of history, as secularization of the Joachimite theological orientation, did not go all the way, so much so that the vision of historical periodization that follows from it is still there, unchanged; namely, the identification of the character and thought of modern civilization with a progressive liberation from transcendence. Thus, a decisive break with Croce’s thought. But, still, a break within a  continuity, given that nobody defended against the sirens of pan-­ technicism the vision of life that centers around the idea of homo sapiens as much as Croce, and given that today the process of renewal of religious thought is, first of all, a rediscovery of this vision.

17 [TN] Benedetto Croce, History as the Story of Liberty, trans. Sylvia Sprigge (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1941), 65. 18 [TN] Ibid.

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Three topics dominate the debate among Italian Catholics: the society of well-being,1 the political unity of Catholics, and the idea, as is conceivable today, of the autonomy of the Catholic party. Space limitations force me to express myself in synthetic, disjointed sentences, in the form of a summary. I. Premise I start from the premise that in order to address the topics I mentioned we must seek a definition of the ultimate terms that describe contemporary ethico-political conflicts. Are such conflicts primarily about a class struggle? No, because the Marxist thesis that has been most thoroughly disproved is the law of increasing misery, which predicted that as capitalist production developed the poor would become ever poorer, to the point of being forced by the very weight of circumstances to a revolutionary and violent explosion, bringing about the dialectical reversal. On the contrary, in the more economically developed countries, mass consumer economy has become This chapter consists of the first three parts (out of four) of “Il problema politico dei cattolici” from the volume of the same title (Rome: UIPC, 1967), 7–44. In the fourth part which I did not translate, Del Noce briefly discusses Catholic progressivism and the possibility of a Marxist-Catholic dialogue (these two topics are discussed at greater length in the next essay, “On Catholic Progressivism”). The whole text is a re-edited version of a speech given at the cultural conference of the Christian Democratic party in Lucca in April 1967, and published in the proceedings I cattolici italiani nei tempi nuovi della cristianità [Italian Catholics in the new epoch of Christendom] (Rome: Editrice Cinque Lune, 1967), 289–320. 1 [TN] Benessere in the original, which in Italian has a more specific meaning than the English “well-being,” since it refers strictly to material and psycho-physical well-being.

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realized without a violent revolution, and today Marxism does not give priority to the economistic aspect. Are they about a struggle among nations? Chinese propaganda has reproposed the interpretation that the next fight will be between poor nations and rich nations. It will be the great revolt of poor and desperate peoples against the white hegemony, involving Russia itself, since it has abandoned the revolutionary camp through a process that leads it to an understanding with America. But, in my opinion, this interpretation is inadequate too, even though we can glimpse an element of truth in it. Are they about the clash between democracy and totalitarianism? At the very least, this clash does not exhaust today’s ideal struggle, because within democracy itself there is an ineliminable conflict, which is not only about the most suitable means to implement values generally recognized by all democratic people, but rather is a conflict about essential values. For example, the Christian Democratic conception of democracy cannot but be in irreconcilable conflict with the one that says, instead, that democracy implies as a philosophical presupposition (which, however, has practical effects) the negation of the view that values are absolute. One can also say, with Simone Weil, that there are two absolutely antithetical and irreconcilable conceptions of democracy. One is founded on the primacy of the idea of obligation and the other is founded on the primacy of the notion of rights. The second conception leads inevitably to the victory of the principle of force over that of justice. Or, in essentially equivalent terms, one can point out with Bernanos that pure democracy is defenceless against tyranny and domination by powerful groups. Are they about the struggle between West and East, between the Western tradition of freedom founded on Christianity and Oriental despotism, in whose tradition totalitarianism supposedly inserted itself as the latest form? Let us even consider this opposition at its highest level, as it was affirmed and lived by the great Adenauer as the guiding principle of his politics. Even in these more civilized terms, however, it is not rigorous, because we Westerners need values that come to us from the Eastern tradition and that we have forgotten. World unification, the only alternative to total catastrophe, needs the conciliation between Eastern and Western thought, which broke down in the course of history. West and East, according to the meaning that these notions have today, signify two deficiencies, not the opposition of a positivity to a negativity. Are they about the struggle between Christianity and Marxism? These terms are not appropriate either, because today in the Western, nonMarxist world, there are forms of irreligion more serious than Marxism itself. Fifteen years ago it was possible to conceive of a resistance against

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Communism with Christianity as its soul. In actual fact, the resistance has been organized by decomposing two aspects of Marxism: the mystical (in its own way) and the sociologistic, eliminating the former by fully developing the latter. The true clash is between two conceptions of life. One could be described in terms of the religious dimension or the presence of the divine in  us; it certainly achieves its fullness in Christian thought, or in fact in Catholic thought, though per se it is not specifically Christian in the proper sense. Rather, it is the precondition that makes it possible for the act of faith to germinate in man, inasmuch as it is man’s natural aptitude to apprehend the sacred (I cannot linger here on the definition of this dimension and I must refer to the very beautiful pages by Fr Danielou2). The other is the conception that ultimately can be called sociologistic, in the sense that contemporary sociologism reduces all conceptions of the world to ideologies, as expressions of the historical-social situation of some groups, as spiritual superstructures of forces that are not spiritual at all, such as class interests, unconscious collective motivations, and concrete circumstances of social life. So that the progress of the human sciences is supposed to lead to social science as the full extension of scientific reason to the human world, achieving a complete replacement of philosophical discourse by scientific discourse and thus clarifying the worldly, social, and historical origin of metaphysical thought. When talking about these two opposed and absolutely irreconcilable conceptions, justice demands that we refer to how this irreconcilability was defined by the philosopher of the years after the First World War who felt the strongest urge to reflect about factual reality, namely Max Scheler, and to what he says about the two ideas of man currently in force.3 Regarding the first, the traditional one, I mention three characteristics: (a) man possesses in himself an agent whose essence is divine, which every nature does not contain subjectively; (b) this agent and the power that eternally shapes and organizes the world are in their principle one and the same – hence reason’s aptitude at knowing the world; (c) as Logos and human reason, this agent is capable of exercising power and realizing its own ideal content, without any intervention by the inclinations and sensations that men and animals share in common – that is, in history itself there is a priority of ideal causality.

2 [TN] See for instance Jean Danielou, Prayer as a Political Problem, trans. J.R. Kirwan (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1967). 3 [TN] See Scheler’s essay “Man in History” in the volume Philosophical Perspectives, trans. Oscar A. Haac (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958), 65–93.

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According to the second conception – the instrumentalist one, found in positivism, pragmatism, Marxism, and evolutionism in general, in its philosophic extension – there is nothing in spirit or in reason that possesses an independent metaphysical origin. Furthermore, what we call knowledge is merely a set of spontaneous signs indicating things, or conventional links between these signs, and these links we call true or false if they lead to biologically advantageous responses or not; for the same reason, we call good or bad the actions that depend on them. Writing in 1926, Scheler used the formula homo sapiens to denote the first conception, and homo faber to denote the second. Today these two expressions may lead to some misunderstanding, but we can use them after having specified their content. I think – and here we touch on a point of absolutely crucial importance – that we must speak of an opposition between two ideas of man, and not, as is commonly done today, of a sequence of two ages, the rural and the technological, where the first is characterized by the primacy of contemplation and the second by the primacy of action. Because, if we replace the irreconcilability of the two ideas of man with the sequence of the ages, we already make a concession (whose dangers will become clear later) to sociologistic thought, and to the study of ideas as instruments of production or expressions of a determined social situation. Now, we must observe the following: the present historical moment is characterized by the fact that the radical antithesis between the two conceptions of man has reached its climax, in the sense that the instrumentalist idea has not stopped at its theoretical enunciation, but has imbued of itself evaluations and actions, determining an absolutely new type of morals, and has reached, at least partially, the thinking of the common man. Furthermore, and this is very important, it has gone beyond the Marxist position itself, because, in spite of everything, and no matter how strange this may sound, in Marx there is still a Platonic element. Plato described the situation of the thinking creature, drawn upwards by the supra-­ sensitive action of the idea of the Good, which prefigures what in Christianity is the supernatural action of grace. Marx materialized this idea and attributed to social matter the movement towards the good through dialectical contradictions. But this still presupposes an absolute ideal, whereas the form of sociologism or instrumentalism that many view as the only position capable of building an ideal bridge between Russia and America – and as the only one that is globally significant, or democratic in character, or relevant world-wide – cannot recognize any absolute values because, supposedly, the hypostatization of values as eternal, when they are instead historical answers to historical situations, is a characteristic of metaphysical thought. But since it is impossible to really

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speak of values without conferring on them the character of absoluteness, it follows that this replacement of metaphysics by sociology actually makes all values understood as ideals disappear. What is left is, precisely, only the quest for well-being – which is a value, if you wish, in a certain sense, as a principle of preference and orientation, but a value as distinct from an ideal. Let us even call it a value, but in an improper sense. Let us also say in passing, but touching on a theme of extreme importance, that this surpassing of Marxism by sociologism within the instrumentalist position is  the only condition for a possible dialogue between Christians and Marxists. Because this being surpassed, in a way that negates the ethicalreligious aspect (in its own way) of Marxism, should logically induce a Marxist thinker to criticize his own position in a way that will call into question the instrumentalist conception itself, and open him up to the possible truth of the other (Platonic/Christian) idea of man. I I . A N e w C u lt u r a l P r o b l e m : C at h o l i c T h o u g h t in Front of the Society of Well-Being Now let us move on to the position of Catholic thought regarding the so-called society of well-being, also known as the affluent society. Let us say right away that the presence, somehow unexpected, of this society, as  the new development after the war, is the reason why the Christian Democratic party cannot delay a deeper reflection about principles. Indeed, in De Gasperi’s time this reflection was not so urgent, because the threat was Communist totalitarianism and the Christian Democratic party had become, in the quadripartito,4 the core of a resistance that united the traditional parties born during and after the Risorgimento. Today, the new data force on us the problem of bringing the party into line with the spiritual situation that, by now, has finally become explicit and open, and which it is culture’s task to define. The goal, as was said very well in an “open letter” by a group of Catholic intellectuals,5 is to bring about an authentic ideal vocation to civic engagement, without which the party 4 [TN] “Four-party alliance,” indicating the coalition of parties (Christian Democrats, Republicans, Liberals, and Social Democrats) that supported De Gasperi’s governments from 1947 to 1951. 5 Open letter about “Politics and Culture” signed by Vittore Branca, Sergio Cotta, Gabriele De Rosa, Cornelio Fabro, Vittorino Veronese. [TN: Prominent Catholic intellectuals who in 1967 wrote the public statement “Ai cattolici che operano nella politica e nella cultura” (To Catholics who operate in politics and culture), asking the Christian Democratic party for a deeper cultural reflection in front of the challenges posed by the affluent society. It prompted the Lucca conference where Del Noce gave the present lecture, and was published at the beginning of the book of proceedings, I cattolici italiani, vii–x].

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risks being distorted into a mere machine to manage political, ideological, and economic power, into a family of consorts jealous of their prerogatives and fighting to protect them. If we accept the point of view that I presented, we see the urgency of rising to the task of this spiritual situation This urgency reflects a question posed by the simplest believers, a truly “popular”6 question because it is prompted by the most undeniable fact: Catholics have been in government for twenty-two years and this position of power has coincided, yes, with strong economic development, but at the same time with the greatest decline in the observance of traditional Christian moral values. The salient fact of the last twenty years has not even been the advancement of Marxist ways of thinking, but the spreading of eroticism and the hedonistic mentality. Whereas the previous two decades had been characterized by the growth of totalitarianism as a secular religion, the following two have been characterized, instead, by the diffusion of eroticism. And by eroticism I do not mean at all a change in the number of violations of the sixth commandment, but a very precise spiritual disposition which I cannot discuss in detail here, because it is a topic that would require a whole course.7 I will define it in a formula: it is the decline of modesty to the point of almost complete disappearance. But in the book of Genesis the birth of modesty is associated with the transition from animal to man. Therefore, it is quite natural that modesty will decline when one replaces the traditional conception of homo sapiens with the conception of homo faber, which recognizes only a difference of degree between man and animal. Indeed, the idea of a qualitative difference between them is dependent on the traditional thesis that sees in man the image of God. Hence the inevitable questions that arise in simple minds: does democracy correspond to the extenuation of the authority of values and, as its most visible feature, to hedonism and eroticism? And is the correction of being “Christian” helpless with respect to this decadence? Or, in slightly different terms, does the society of well-being inevitably imply desacralization? ***

6 [TN] “Popolare” (in quotes) in the original, which means “of the common people” but is also a pun on the name of the Catholic party in Italy before Fascism, the Partito Popolare Italiano [Italian People’s Party]. 7 [TN] On this topic, see “The Ascendance of Eroticism” in Del Noce, The Crisis of Modernity, 157–86.

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It is precisely in reference to these questions that today we can distinguish the various stances that Catholics take on politics. I will begin by defining four views that are, in my judgment, inadequate. Some say: the new orientation of society is irreparably in conflict with Christian values. And since these latter have absolute value, their absoluteness requires that political authority enforce respect for them, at least exteriorly. This is the traditionalist position. Politically, it leads Catholics to enter into an alliance with conservative forces. Others, on the contrary, reject the appeal to any political authority, because truth cannot be imposed from outside: supposedly, the worst temptation for a Christian today is to appeal to the secular arm. Christians must acknowledge their status as a minority: focus on their own interior purification and on apostolic work, which is the only way to bring about the conversion of their adversaries. Today, Christians are missionaries in a world that is no longer Christian. It is the position of the “Church of the catacombs.” Let us not be captivated by the false “tragic” aspect of this position. First of all, there is in it a completely undue exaggeration of the Catholics’ “faults” vis-à-vis the modern world. Catholics have made mistakes, there is no doubt; for example, to limit ourselves to recent Italian history, there were certain delusions, albeit sincere, about the ­historical role of Fascism. But how can we forget that, at least since the French Revolution, Catholics determined to be really Catholic have been, generally, de facto, persecuted? The current insistence on faults actually derives from a more serious and more substantial mistake: thinking that we face an essentially practical phenomenon, instead of grasping that the drift of the masses away from Christian truths and morals depends precisely on the new idea of man that I talked about. Thus, from the catacombal position one moves easily to the ideal of the church that “listens” and “opens herself” to the needs of the contemporary world. The transition to progressivism, starting from an apparently opposite view, is actually easy. Then, there is the position of those who uphold a sharp distinction between the political level and the spiritual level. They argue that only this distinction makes possible authentically democratic politics – that is, politics effectively free from ideology – and at the same time restores to the church all her efficacy at the spiritual level. Supposedly, this distinction between the temporal and ecclesial dimensions frees the church from the compromises of politics and the moral dangers associated with the temporalization of the church. But on the other side it also implies that democracy is a de-ideologized political regime. According to yet others, the transition to the technological age ­imposes an altogether new presentation of the Christian truths, and of

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man’s very image as Christianity appropriates the contributions of modern science, just as in the past it appropriated those of ancient philosophy. This is the position of out-and-out Catholic progressivism, when it declares itself at the theoretical level, like the type of neo-Modernism that Maritain criticized in such a lively fashion in the Paysan de la Garonne.8 In my judgment, the insuperable expression of this type of neo-Modernism is the thought of Teilhard de Chardin. *** Addressing now the idea of well-being, I begin by observing that it takes a completely different meaning depending on whether we consider it from the perspective of one or the other of the conceptions of man that I mentioned. From the standpoint of the first conception, well-being is indeed recognized, but as a subordinate value. Condemning technical activity9 is so foreign to Christian thought that somebody (already, long ago, Fr Laberthonnière,10 who on this point was right) could write quite correctly that we do not see that, outside of the intellectual atmosphere created and maintained by Christianity, man has distinguished himself enough from the order of things, [we do not see] that he has set himself enough apart from this order as forming a radically different order, to turn towards things and boldly undertake … to exploit them to his advantage … Therefore, this leads us to say that … modern physics, the science of exploiting things, has a Christian origin, because of the conception that gave birth to it, and that keeps sustaining and animating it.11

Technical activity’s correlation with Christianity is visible in the fact that it alone opens up the possibility of giving everyone the same rights

 8 [TN] Jacques Maritain, The Peasant of the Garonne, trans. Michael Cuddihy and Elizabeth Hughes (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1968).   9 [TN] I translate tecnica as “technical activity.” Later I also use “technology,” which strictly speaking should be reserved for tecnologia (which Del Noce never uses as a noun here, although he does speak of “technological revolution”). Although the two are almost interchangeable, tecnologia has a more abstract and general flavour.. English only uses “technology” while “technique” is not used like tecnica to indicate technical activity in a generic sense. 10 [TN] Fr Lucien Laberthonnière (1860–1932), French priest, theologian, and philosopher. He was controversial in his time because of his Modernist leanings and hostility to Thomism, attitudes that Del Noce did not share. 11 [TN] Lucien Laberthonnière, Études sur Descartes II, in Oeuvres de Laberthonnière, ed. Louis Canet (Paris: Vrin 1935), 316–17 (my translation).

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and the same powers over things, bringing [all] human individuals to the same level, side by side. As an overall formula we can say that technology is the replacement of the exploitation of men by the exploitation of things, and thus the restitution to man of his specifically human activity, the restoration of the situation established by the Bible, in which God created man in His own image, giving him lordship over all the earth. The real abolition of the distinction between free men and slaves is what requires technical activity. And full automatization is what allows man to focus his attention on what is truly human, freeing him from engaging in servile activities. Since the principle that legitimates technical activity is found already in the first of the two world views as a consequence of the qualitative distinction between man and animal, I feel extremely perplexed when I hear people talk about a technological revolution which is supposed to be, in and of itself, the greatest revolution of all time, and which renders outdated and anachronistic not just the ideologies that until today were considered the most advanced, but even the traditional image of man in his relationship with society and with nature itself. In my judgment, what must be left behind is not the image of man and the image of his relationship with nature affirmed in the traditional vision, but the crisis of that vision that gave rise to the heresy of the instrumentalist conception. The instrumentalist conception has strictly philosophical motivations, and does not derive at all from technological development, although, of course, it aspires to present itself as its interpretation and legitimation de jure. If a census were taken, it would show that this conception – that ideas have a purely human character – is rather more common among men of letters, who know effectively nothing about scientific and technical matters, than it is among pure technicians and engineers; or, that it  has indeed come to influence the minds of some technicians, but through the mediation of men who are not themselves technicians. In brief, technology differs from a vision of the world and of history marked by the affirmation of the instrumental character of ideas – that is, pantechnicism, the reduction of human activity to technical activity – in the same way that science differs from scientism. *** Let us now consider the opposite alternative, namely the idea of wellbeing as absolute value, or even just the primary value in the political order. It generates a series of completely different practical attitudes. I ask the reader to pay attention to the following point, which is crucially important and is already contained in the most vigorous work of moral

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philosophy of the modern age, namely, Rosmini’s ethics. If man does not participate at all in some form of reason or absolute value, if he does not find himself united to other men by an ideal bond, then he cannot see in nature or in other men anything but obstacles to or instruments for his own realization. Just recall the ancient idea that human love is infinite and cannot be satiated by any finite good. Now, the idea of well-­ being, in the instrumentalist conception, is nothing but the transposition of Augustine’s beatitude from the vertical dimension to the horizontal plane. The ascent to God is replaced by the idea of conquering the world, of the individual subject’s right to [possess] the world. This right has no bounds because, having been called into the world without his will, the subject feels that he has the right to infinite satisfaction in the world itself, almost as a compensation for this call. But, of course, a single man cannot achieve this conquest entirely. He can make others his instruments, but by making himself their instrument in turn; and this mutual instrumentalization, this collaboration without any ideal goals, is what today is called “sociality” (the exact opposite of Simone Weil’s enracinement!). The man of well-being experiences a surrogate of freedom, no longer in liberation from the lower and perceptible needs and interests, but in the reciprocity of the erotic process. Somehow, voluptas becomes the degraded surrogate for contemplation. Why should we be surprised, then, that libertine or pornographic literature and evaluations are now extremely widespread? Why should we be surprised by the eroticism and hedonism that dominate today, or, in reverse, by the indulgence in ostentatious solitude or ostentatious angst? In brief, whereas technical thought means the exploitation of things, pan-technicism can only mean the exploitation of men. That is to say, the totalization of technical activity, just like any unwarranted totalization of a human activity, results in negating humanity, instead of freeing it from servitude. It may be superfluous to point out that what I have said completely contradicts a view that is as common nowadays as it is superficial. According to it, today’s particular forms of hedonism and eroticism are transitory and secondary phenomena due to an accelerated pace of development, the famous transition to the technological “age.” Every period of transition implies a degree of disorder, and this is particularly true of a period whose positivity resides in the fact that what nobody can morally not wish for anyway – universally widespread well-being – is becoming real. We must emphasize this contradiction because elements of the current mentality often insinuate themselves into the arguments of those who actually care about defending and re-establishing Christian moral values. For example, how many times have I heard it repeated that, in

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order to face the new era victoriously, we need a “bigger soul”!12 Those who reason in this way think, at bottom, that today’s hedonism and eroticism are merely moral phenomena, rather than necessary consequences of a philosophical idea of man. In other words: if Ovid’s video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor still applied to the great majority of our contemporaries, there would not be serious reasons for concern. The reality is that the perception and obligatoriness of the meliora (of the objective moral order) have vanished from many consciences, and this is a new and much more serious phenomenon. And we must also pay attention to another point: in history, libertine invasions have constantly preceded great catastrophes. Recall the “aristocratic libertinism” of the French nobility before the revolution. At that time, the catastrophe concerned one class. But of what catastrophe can generalized “mass libertinism” be the prodrome? I leave the prediction, which is all too easy, to the reader. *** It is true that the proponents of the idea of well-being speak the most humanitarian and philanthropic language possible, talking about a universalization and generalization of well-being. But, look at what they do, and see whether in this professed love for others there is a practical recognition of the theoretical recognition.13 It is precisely to them that the distinction between expressed thought and real thought applies. This distinction is necessary in order to assess this position, and it refers to the way in which its advocates must use philanthropic rhetoric in order to affirm the ideology of well-being. We have known another rhetoric14 that spoke in the name of the nation and the motherland, but did not mean service to the nation and the motherland at all, because it actually originated from a will to power that, as pure will to power, could only be individual. Therefore, sociologizing thought must be measured by its reduction of metaphysics to ideology, as expression of the will to power of individuals or groups. Indeed, when ideas are regarded only as instruments of self-love – when the self, and others, and nature in general are

12 [TN] “Supplemento d’anima” in the original; see footnote 5, p. 73. 13 [TN] Del Noce is using Rosmini’s terminology. See, for instance, the Storia comparativa e critica de’ sistemi intorno al principio della morale [Comparative and critical history of the systems on the origin of morals] (Milan: Pogliani, 1837), 18, where Rosmini defines the “supreme principle of morals” as “the practical recognition of beings” and distinguishes it from mere theoretical (or “speculative”) recognition. 14 [TN] Del Noce is clearly referring to Fascism.

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set in mutual opposition – moral affirmations stop being affirmations for and become affirmations against. Let us listen to the man who described unsurpassably – at least from a phenomenological standpoint – the will to power, Nietzsche: in philanthropic thought, love for the distant serves to dissimulate indifference or hostility towards the neighbor. Or, going back to Rosmini: the moral good lies in the practical recognition of the theoretical recognition, in the conformity of what we do and what we say. But when the distinction between doing and saying is suppressed, when every assertion of principles is viewed only as a form of doing, the moral order that must be theoretically recognized also disappears. Then, moral activity is absorbed into what Croce used to call economic activity, and later, in more appropriate terms, vitality. The practical enunciations of instrumentalist thought can only be understood in connection with this utilitarian form. This is why all the talking we hear today about the underdeveloped and distant peoples is ambivalent. On the one hand, we hear declarations of boundless love, the affirmation that their traditions must be respected, the exaltation of their art. On the other hand, these statements go together with the statement that we have to “chasten European pride,” and with the declared intention to destroy the tradition of values that developed around the idea of the primacy of the Logos. It is in this respect that the position of many of those who want to destroy every trace of colonialism – a thesis that in itself is perfectly right – is radically different from that of Dr Schweitzer. And, naturally, one starts wondering whether the will to destroy the tradition of thought around which Europe took form does not prevail in them over the love for disadvantaged peoples. I believe that this prevalence is necessary in people whose way of thinking is really dominated by the pure instrumentalist conception. In fact, how else can we explain the well-known phenomenon of the double standard, whereby some progressives regard attention to certain horrors and certain massacres as the primary sign of genuine morality and humanity, whereas they view attention to others as morally reprehensible and a sign, if not of Fascism, at least of a reactionary spirit? Allow me to refer to Simone Weil’s thought, because of its perfect agreement with the ideas that I have presented so far. She was the one who, alone, already in 1943, foresaw exactly the possibility of today’s situation, and did not take the final step in her conversion to Catholicism precisely because she was held back by the thought that Catholicism was about to surrender to the form of Modernism that she already felt in the air. Her thought is the exact opposite of that of Teilhard de Chardin, an anti-Teilhard ante litteram. We must refer to her as the one in whom the irreconcilable opposition of the two ideas of man that I mentioned

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(which Scheler had studied phenomenologically) became life: the instrumentalist conception of the mere humanness of ideas versus the tradition of the participation in the Logos. According to Weil, “there is a reality outside the world, that is to say, outside space and time … outside any sphere whatsoever that is accessible to human faculties.” And only because of man’s “power of turning his attention and love towards it” is he able to hold “every human being, without any exception as something sacred to which he is bound to show respect.”15 What is sacred is the presence “at the bottom of the heart of every human being” of “something that goes on indomitably expecting … that good and not evil will be done to him.”16 So that “the good is the only source of the sacred. There is nothing sacred except the good and what pertains to it.”17 On this foundation one moves beyond respect for the person in a purely formal sense, and arrives at a political position that promotes active help and social development, extended to all men. And “this is the only possible motive for universal respect towards all human beings,” so that he whose “heart inclines him to feel this respect … in fact also recognizes a reality other than this world’s reality. Whoever in fact does not feel this respect is alien to that other reality also.”18 From this opposition followed, for Weil, the primacy of the idea of obligation over the idea of right. If this principle is forgotten, catastrophe becomes necessary, and progressively becomes real. That is to say, complete catastrophe is necessary if one destroys the Platonism and the religious dimension that I mentioned earlier, which are not the thoughts of learned people, but are inherent in the simplest human soul. And we can already easily discern the first signs of a catastrophe which is not necessary but is possible, due to the ambivalence of history that Maritain highlighted so well: there is progress in good as well as in evil.19 Because instrumentalist thought, when it is reflected in international politics, cannot lead to world unification, but at most to an American-Russian hegemony, which is correlated with a demotion of the European nations; and the demotion of nations must necessarily take the form of disintegration and moral anarchy. But this possible hegemony, in turn, does not guarantee peace at all, because it is going to face an encirclement by poor and

15 Simone Weil, Écrits de Londres (Paris: Gallimard, 1957), 74–5 [TN: Selected Essays 1934–43, trans. Richard Rees (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 219–20]. 16 Weil, Écrits de Londres, 13 [TN: Selected Essays 1934-43, 10]. 17 Ibid. 18 Weil, Écrits de Londres, 75–6 [TN: Selected Essays 1934–43, 220]. 19 [TN] See Jacques Maritain, On the Philosophy of History, ed. J. W. Evans (New York: Scribner’s, 1957), chapter 2.

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desperate peoples, under Chinese leadership; so that the torch of the revolution will no longer be carried by the class-based [socialist] International, but by the poor nations. In the Russian-Chinese controversy there is, on the Chinese side, at least this correct insight: sociologizing and instrumentalist thought is just Marxism without Marx, or, if you wish, its practical acceptance is the sign of the bourgeois involution of Russian Communism. Thus, the prevalence and diffusion of evaluations that depend on instrumentalist thought, both among the leadership of cultural and political organizations and in public opinion, would lead to this necessary outcome: not a world revolution ending all wars, but the revolution’s conclusion in a full world war, whose catastrophic outcome can be easily predicted, but which cannot be kept from happening by mere technological considerations, as serious as they may be. Elsewhere,20 I argued that contemporary history can only be interpreted, from the ideal standpoint, as the expansion of atheism, since it is characteristic of atheistic thought not to remain enclosed in a theoretical formulation but to surpass itself into practice, in a manner analogous to the way in which medieval thought surpassed itself into mysticism. I also argued that this history has gone through two stages, that of secular religion – the period between the two wars – and that of natural irreligion – the period after the war. The peculiarity of this second form of atheism is that it does not call itself explicitly atheistic, because it limits itself to what is verifiable, making no pronunciations about the unverifiable. In this way, it has been able to generate in some Catholics the delusion that it can be reconciled with a demythologized form of religion, which through this demythologization becomes “really pure.” But I also clarified that this is a delusion, because the form of thought that we can call, interchangeably, pan-technicistic or sociologistic or neo-positivistic or neo-pragmatistic (in the sense of pragmatism rigorously separated from spiritualism), due to its professed relativism about values and the concrete evaluations it leads to, replaces a direct struggle against religion with an indirect one and thereby endangers religion even more, because it erodes the religious dimension until it erases from consciousness all traces of the question of God. Well, the present situation – year of grace 1967 – seems to me that in which the opposition between the two conceptions I discussed has truly reached its climax. Note: it is not possible to say, yet, that one 20 [TN] Augusto Del Noce, Il problema dell ateismo [The problem of atheism] (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1964). See in particular the essay “Appunti sulla religione occidentale” [Notes on Western irreligion].

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or the other has effectively prevailed – and obviously I mean not from the standpoint of truth, but from that of history, in which also evil can provisionally win. III. The Question of the Political Unity o f   C at h o l i c s This definition of the present spiritual situation has consequences which are very relevant, in my judgment, to two topics that today are urgent and especially debated: the unity of the party of the Catholics, and its autonomy, in the sense that such autonomy can take today. Regarding the first topic, I will recall Hon. Longo’s21 opinion: “the statement of principle by the Council about the necessity of the Church’s total independence from any political system is extremely important because of its possible political developments. This affirmation implies a critique of the principle of the political unity of Catholics and of the very concept of a ‘Catholic party.’”22 Let us acknowledge that this has also been the affirmation of many Catholics who call themselves post-­ conciliar, with the accentuation that we well know. In their view, the very idea of a Catholic party, and the subsequent question of the political unity of Catholics, have been buried for good by the council. Indeed, in Gaudium et Spes23 we read that “no one is allowed … to appropriate the Church’s authority for his opinion”;24 that Christians “must recognize the legitimacy of different opinions with regard to temporal solutions”;25 and that “the Church, by reason of her role and competence, is not identified in any way with the political community nor bound to any political system. She is at once a sign and a safeguard of the transcendent character of the human person.”26 This certainly means that no dogmatic principle requires a unitary party of Catholics, and that one cannot start from the dogmas and deduce this or that political position, viewing it as the ideal position regardless of the variety of historical situations. But

21 [TN] Luigi Longo (1900–1980), Italian politician and secretary of the Communist party from 1964 to 1972. 22 From a speech at the 11th National Congress of the PCI [Italian Communist Party], 25–31 January 1966. 23 [TN] The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World Gaudium et Spes is available online www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents 24 Gaudium et Spes §43. 25 Ibid., §75. 26 Ibid., §76.

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this also implies that the question of the convenience (or not) of the political unity of Catholics results from a reading of the historical situation that is not within the direct competence of theologians, but rather of historians, philosophers, politicians. Of course, they cannot speak with any other authority than that of reason, but this does not mean that from the standpoint of reason we can only express multiple subjective opinions of equal value. Or, in other words: it is only in relation to an interpretation of contemporary history that we can discuss the convenience (or not) of the political unity of Catholics. I speak of convenience and not of reality, because, factually, I do not think that this unity was ever realized – simply because it never came to pass that all Catholics agreed on the same interpretation of contemporary history. This does not change the  fact that today, in spite of the current appearances to the contrary, this possibility is both greater and more urgent, given the extreme radicalization of the two opposite theses that I discussed earlier. Let us imagine a society in which everybody was Catholic. Different parties would still be possible, because of the multiplicity of temporal options, but obviously it would make no sense to speak of a unitary party of Catholics. Let us further think of a society in which everybody agreed on moral principles, despite different religious creeds: in such a situation, a unitary party of Catholics would only make sense if there were political forces that linked the defence of those moral principles with that of the national interest, taking a polemical stance that would lead to the persecution, albeit bloodless, of Catholicism. This happened historically, and we can recall France in its most secularist period, the years of Combes,27 when radicalism did not just intend to affirm that moral values are autonomous from religion, but used this autonomy to fight the church, which it viewed as the greatest form of opposition to progress, keen on restoring the medieval hierocracy and ready to enter into alliances with all reactionary forces in the pursuit of this goal. Otherwise, [a unitary party] would certainly be superfluous, as is illustrated by the examples of America and England. Leaving aside other possible situations, if one thinks that what I said about the contemporary spiritual situation is true, then the unity of Catholics becomes necessary (it is, clearly, a necessity de jure, with respect to this interpretation). Somebody might ask: unity, but unity around what? The answer is fairly simple: around [the judgment] that defending and fostering what I called the “religious dimension,” and the evaluations and practical actions that derive from it, 27 [TN] Émile Combes (1835–1921), French prime minister from 1902 to 1905. He is remembered for his fiercely anti-clerical positions, which led to the draconian laws of 1905 on the separation of church and state.

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is the only possible way to save the world from catastrophe. The church transcends every culture and every civilization: this is the argument that is dear to Catholic critics of the political unity of Catholics. I agree, but this does not mean at all that Christianity can be reconciled with every civilization and every culture. How this leap from transcendence to the possibility of reconciliation takes place in Catholic progressivism could be understood only by explaining its genesis, but that is not the topic of this lecture.28 *** Formulating the question of the political unity of Catholics in the terms I have described means declaring at the same time the autonomy and non-confessional nature of the party. Because what must matter to Catholics in public life today is certainly not their own power, nor the temporal power of the church, and not even – as far as politics and the party are concerned – the work of apostolate. What matters is rather the preservation of that religious dimension connatural to the human spirit which, on the one hand, is the only ground on which the action of Grace can bear fruit and, on the other hand, is the only condition to save the world from catastrophe. I carefully distinguish “religious dimension” from “natural religion” or “religion within the limits of reason,” because this latter historically resulted from the watering down of the mystical side of religious faiths, and became the ideology for the rise of a particular class, the bourgeoisie, through a process of decay analogous to that suffered by the idea of natural law in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Am I returning, in my conception of autonomy, to the ideal of the Partito Popolare?29 Only to a point: first, because our friend De Rosa30 was correct when he recognized31 that the Partito Popolare was unable to completely grasp the novelty of the period after the First World War, and therefore moved “like an earthen vessel thrown amidst iron jars.”32 And second, because whereas 28 [TN] It is the subject of the next essay, “On Catholic Progressivism.” 29 [TN] The predecessor of the Italian Christian Democratic party, founded in 1919 by Fr Luigi Sturzo. 30 [TN] Gabriele De Rosa (1917–2009) was a distinguished Italian historian and politician. 31 See the speech by Gabriele De Rosa at the Lucca conference of the Christian Democratic party, April 1967 [TN: “L’esperienza politica dei cattolici e i tempi nuovi della cristianità” [The Catholic political experience and the new epoch of Christendom], in I cattolici italiani, 19–70]. 32 [TN] A famous simile from the opening pages of Alessandro Manzoni’s novel The Betrothed.

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the Partito Popolare rightly insisted on the distinction between the temporal and ecclesial aspects, it did not insist in the same fashion on the religious dimension. By saying this, I have also distinguished my position from another one, which is quite specious but nevertheless today seems to meet with the approval of many Catholics. They reason as follows: the lack of democracy in the European countries is due to the fact that in them political formations have always presented themselves as linked with general conceptions of life. The political superiority of Anglo-Saxon countries lies in the fact that their parties have always taken positions on concrete questions, without demanding in any way that their followers take positions on ultimate questions. The political task of European countries today is a rationalizing process to make possible – through de-­ideologization – the transition of our political life to a level of critical awareness. That means that when we speak of a Christian Democratic party, the adjective indicates that it is somehow a provisional party, which has a reason to exist only to the extent that other parties still present themselves not as shaped by their answers to concrete problems, but still somehow as theocratic parties, in the sense of practical projections of general conceptions of life. A more advanced conception should lead, instead, to a true two-party system: on one side, the democratic proponents of a prudent form of reformism, and on the other side, the democratic proponent of a faster form of reformism (left-wing Catholics, Socialist and so-called reformist Communists). The debate between the prudent and the impatient supposedly would create the best conditions for serious reform policies. In order to discuss this position, we must first ask ourselves the meaning of the word “Christian” when it is added to the word “democracy.” It seems to me that the following meanings are being bandied around: •

•

•

It is a democratic party formed by Catholics, in which the word “Christian” has the only meaning of determining the type of membership. In short, it is the party that brings Catholics, who in previous times were reactionary and theocratic, into democracy. Or a democratic party bound to respect the principles of the church, and tasked with guaranteeing that democratic development takes place respecting those principles. This, then, gives its adversaries cause to criticize it as insufficiently democratic, because by nature it is inclined not to fully respect the pluralism that it does affirm ­verbally (see, e.g., the question of divorce). Or a democratic party that protects the interests of the church.

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•

•

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Or else, a democratic party that ensures the domination by certain power groups formed by men chosen, or at least approved, by the church. Or, in another version, a party that views democracy – since it is inspired by the principle of popular sovereignty – as the true expression of the message of the Gospel in the political field.

In my judgment, none of these definitions expresses exactly the meaning that the words Christian Democracy must signify. Indeed, in all of them I think I can detect a common flaw, namely that of confusing a factual situation with a principle of value. Democracy is, certainly, a fact and an irreversible fact, like technical progress. But, apparently, it seems to contradict the principle of political justice: that every human being, inasmuch as he participates in the sacred, must be held as the end of the entire social order. Because, in fact, democracy as such is governed by the principle of quantity, and thus by force. Therefore, we must not look for the true definition of Christian Democracy in the idea – whose origin is clearly Modernist – that democracy is the expression at the political level of the ferment of the Gospel; rather, we must look in the idea that the religious principle alone can prevent democracy from turning into oppressive power, be it open or concealed. Therefore, the concept of Christian Democracy means something very different from that of pure democracy, in the sense of democracy elevated to a value. In my judgment, people do not reflect enough about the fact that elevating democracy to a value is equivalent to denying the authority of values. And I think that on this point Kelsen is perfectly correct, when he says that the idea of pure democracy implies the negation of absolute values.33 Now I will just offer the following thought for your reflection: if democracy is elevated to a value, we must conclude that we cannot be consistently democratic unless we profess the democratic theory of knowledge, the one that says that we can hold up as true only what is verifiable by everybody. But on this road we would have to conclude that democracy is incompatible with mysticism. And I will not spend time here looking for quotations by the people who have affirmed this judgment, sometime opposing the West to the East, which is theocratic because it is mystic. It was already an opinion held by nineteenth-century radicals; but, if one looks closely, how many traces has it left (albeit expressed in a different literary style) in modern judgments by historians and sociologists! 33 [TN] Regarding the connection between democracy and relativism, see, for instance, Hans Kelsen’s essay “Absolutism and Relativism” in What is Justice? (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1971), 198–208.

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II. Fifteen Theses on Contemporary History Let us begin by considering a fact beyond dispute: Catholic progressivism is a correlate of the great crisis of values that started in Europe after 1930, prepared the Second World War, and remains unresolved. Therefore, we can define it only in relation to an interpretation of contemporary history. I lay out here, without being able to develop them, a few points that I deem essential in this regard. It is starting from them that we will be able to recognize the radical error of Catholic progressivism. (1) If we identify the Russian revolution as the initial moment of contemporary world history, we must acknowledge that the radically new character of contemporary history is that of being philosophical history. This means that in order to interpret it we have to take literally Marx’s statement that his conception is a philosophy that becomes world, that is, that surpasses itself into political realization and finds there its verification, as opposed to the idea that the world becomes philosophy within self-awareness. Certainly, saying this presupposes that we must regard Marxism as a genuine philosophy, and view Marx-Leninism and what followed it as the necessary form of explication of this philosophical essence, all the

Sections II and III, VIII, and IX of the essay “Il progressismo cattolico” from the volume Il problema politico dei cattolici [The political predicament of Catholics] (Rome: UIPC, 1967), 45–125. I have not included the remaining sections both because of their length and because some parts (in which Del Noce links his argument to political events of the late 1960s) are now outdated.

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way to contradiction and defeat. But I do not think that serious scholars of Marxist thought can disagree on this point.1 (2) The unique feature that characterizes Marxism in the history of thought is this: it is modern philosophy in the aspect in which it presents itself as secular (that is, as surpassing transcendent thought), which makes itself a religion. Let us consider, indeed, the Marxist identification of philosophy and revolution. The stance of the philosopher who goes beyond the point of view of the masses is replaced by that of the philosopher who conforms to their movement – that is, to the movement of history – and explicates its meaning. He expresses the thought or corresponds to the expectation that are immanent in the masses. The previous forms of rationalism, and also many of those that came after, always presented themselves as surpassing religion – which was reduced to a representation of the truth in symbolic form, or to a purely practical position which theoretical thought must exclude – and as detaching themselves from the masses precisely on this point. Thus, in the transition from philosophy to religion, motivated by its idea of the practical nature of philosophy, Marxism inverts the orientation of modern rationalism, reaching at the same time the completely opposite position to that of Christian thought. (3) Hence we see that, for Marxism, philosophy, since it is purely rational, can make itself a religion only in the form of rigorous atheism. Indeed, if transcendent religion contained its own perennial truth expressed in the guise of “representation” or “myth,” it should be preserved within philosophy. The philosopher’s task would become, in Hegelian fashion, to look for the counterpart of the representation in terms of thought. Therefore, he would end up again surpassing religion into philosophy, and thus thought would move from religion to philosophy rather than from philosophy to religion. But the conservation of religion within philosophy also implies the detachment of the philosopher from the masses, as the detachment of the man who “knows” from the man who can only reach the truth in mythical form. This leads to a lived contradiction, because the philosopher finds himself forced into an aristocratic position which makes it impossible for him to communicate with the masses, and therefore leads him to justify an instrumentalist disposition towards them, and therefore to deny their humanity – which is the vital aspect of religion, the affirmation of human universality. In other words, the philosopher of religious rationalism, inasmuch as he feels threatened by the 1 I take the liberty to refer the reader, for a more detailed explication of these judgments, to my book Il problema dell’ateismo [The problem of atheism] (Bologna: Il Mulino 1964), starting on p. 108.

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“plebs” and extraneous to them, must de facto enter into an alliance with the ruling classes, and in this alliance become their instrument. We see, then, how in Marxism religion and atheism are so tightly linked that the awareness of the atheistic aspect coincides with that of the religious aspect, and therefore of the ethical aspect, since for Marxism there are no autonomous morals. Without atheism there cannot be any transposition of the religious “beyond” into the “future.” If we consider the initial definition of rationalism found in Rosmini’s nearly unknown and marvelously beautiful book Il Razionalismo che tenta di insinuarsi nelle scuole teologiche 2 – namely, rationalism as the position of thought that starts from the gratuitous exclusion of the supernatural – and if starting from it we go through rationalism’s process, I believe that we must acknowledge that Marxism contains the following element of truth: given the initial negation of the supernatural, religion, as life, can only reaffirm itself as radical atheism. (4) Therefore, we understand the presence in Marxism of theological modules, which can be traced back to the biblical vision, turned upside down due to the naturalization of sin (from a theological standpoint, we must recognize in this naturalization the essence of dialectics). According to scripture, the contradiction does not reside in the essence of things, but is the fruit of man’s infidelity. This is also true of international relations: in the tower of Babel, international discord is presented to us as one of the poisonous fruits of sin. As a consequence of the Marxist inversion, conflicts are not the consequence of sin, but the condition for progress. From a certain perspective, we can say that explaining the history of humanity as a reflection, essentially, of the history of class struggles means interpreting it as a general history of hatred, even if the multiplication of conflicts has the effect of leading humanity to its redemption. This complete inversion shows the futility of every attempt at a conciliation or even a synthesis between Christianity and Marxism. Marxism is the most complete negation of the initial fall, even though it maintains a function for sin within the world, wherein lies its religious aspect. The type of atheism that is current today is more radical insofar as it is tranquil, because is has set aside sin too. But Marxism is helpless to remedy this process of decadence. 2 [TN: The form of Rationalism that is trying to infiltrate the schools of theology]. Written in 1842, it was published posthumously in 1882, but remained almost completely unknown at the time. It was republished this year (1967) in the national edition of Rosmini’s works (Padova: CEDAM, 1967). The thesis that the beginning of rationalism lies in the negation of original sin is extremely important (see page 9ff and passim). I regard it as a great honour that I rediscovered Rosmini’s definition, unknowingly, in the book of mine I already mentioned.

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But, on the other hand, these theological modules in Marxism must not be interpreted as a residual or a conditioning substructure, as proposed, for instance, by Löwith. Rather, they are phases that modern secular philosophy necessarily encounters as it makes itself a religion.3 (5) Recognizing that Marxism lies at the starting point of contemporary history, and that the only way in which it could attain historical reality is precisely the way in which it did attain it, is the same as saying that contemporary history is history of the expansion of atheism. (6) Now, if contemporary history is determined by a philosophy that finds its expression in politics, it becomes clear that the present crisis of the Catholic world – as renewed Modernism, or better as Modernism that has reached its fullness – could only start from politics in the form of progressivism. The transition from progressivism to neo-Modernism seems just as necessary, because the politics that lies at the root of the crisis includes a philosophy and a religion. (7) Against this proposed interpretation of contemporary history one could raise the objection that it has a superstructural character. Here we must point out that “structure” and “superstructure” are transpositions within Marxist language of the relationship between soul and body. Therefore, the idea of the primacy of the economic-social aspect – whose correlate in today’s political struggle is essentially the contrast between reactionaries and progressives – is associated at bottom with the idea of the “primacy of the body.” In view of this, one can understand the contradictions of Catholic progressives, who can be defined first of all as the people who have accepted such structural interpretation of contemporary history, and thus also the myth of the “scientific explanation” of present social reality. On the other hand, the affirmation of the “primacy of religion” at every moment of history is hardly “reactionary,” so much so that the thesis that “at the bottom of politics there is always theology” was enunciated by Proudhon.4

3 In the sense that the Marxist philosophy of history makes itself a religion inasmuch as it presents itself as an agonistic form of thought against the justificatory form of Hegelian thought, which it regards implicitly as the final appearance taken by religion, reduced to a form of “theodicy.” We can define Marx’s thesis as a contradictory attempt to restore the sacred in terms of pure immanence. The contradiction between the religious and the relativistic aspects of his thought emerges immediately. It is this contradiction that mediates the transition to the technological society, and measures the impotence of revolutionary Marxism with respect to it. 4 [TN] In Les Confessions d’un Révolutionnaire (Paris: Bureau du journal La Voix du Peuple, 1849), 61.

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(8) An extremely important discussion should concern the following point: in the age of the expansion of atheism the heterogenesis of ends plays out in reverse in comparison with the infancy of mankind. Remember the conclusion of Vico’s Scienza Nuova, and let me highlight a few sentences: It is true that men have themselves made this world of nations … but this world without doubt has issued from a mind often diverse, at times quite contrary, and always superior to the particular ends that men had proposed to themselves; which narrow ends, made means to serve wider ends it has always employed to preserve the human race upon this earth. Men mean to gratify their bestial lust and abandon their offspring, and they inaugurate the chastity of marriage from which the families arise. The fathers mean to exercise without restraint their paternal power over their clients, and they subject them to the civil powers from which the cities arise … Let Bayle consider then whether in fact there can be nations in the world without any knowledge of God! And let Polybius weigh the truth of his statement that if the world had philosophers it would have no need of religions! For religions alone have the power to cause the peoples to do virtuous works by stimulation of the senses, which alone move men to perform them.5

What is taking place today seems a precise confirmation of this. We started from the idea of universal liberation, and it seems that the world is moving towards the organization of oligarchies and sociocratic castes like have never been seen before. The words freedom, democracy, and justice are untouchable, and rights are constantly declared, but this does not alter the fact that actual reality is marching towards a synthesis of all the forms of despotism that ever appeared in history. Moreover, if we consider the necessary process by which Marxism yields to the so-called “technological society,” we find the paradoxical feature that the process it started leads, out of necessary consistency, to the type – which at last becomes realized – of the pure bourgeois, who denies and desecrates all values. This is because of a law that was already formulated by Rosmini in 1829: “And it is remarkable, how this peculiar contrast between what man separated from God says and what he does is a universal law of ­human acting.”6

5 [TN] Giambattista Vico, The New Science of Giambattista Vico, trans. Thomas G. Bergin and Max H. Fisch (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1948), 382–3. 6 Antonio Rosmini, Storia dell’empietà [History of impiousness] (Domodossola: Sodalitas 1957), 62 (my translation).

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In the pages that follow, I will briefly outline how – regarding issues of dialogue, peace, justice, freedom – Catholic progressivism and neo-­ Modernism itself is subject to this process of heterogenesis of ends.7 (9) The opposition of the two conceptions that I discussed in the previous essay8 can also be expressed in terms of primacy of contemplation and primacy of action. Primacy of contemplation just means the superiority of the immutable over the changeable. It just expresses the essential metaphysical principle of the Catholic tradition, which says that everything that is participates necessarily in universal principles, which are the eternal and immutable essences contained in the permanent actuality of the divine intellect. So that all things – no matter how contingent they may be in themselves – translate or represent the principles in their own way and according to their order of existence, because otherwise they would just be pure nothingness. Hence we see that primacy of contemplation absolutely does not mean, as somebody may be tempted to think, inactivity. The greatest work of philosophy of the modern times, Rosmini’s Principles of Ethics9 – which contains the only expression of ethics capable of resisting the sociological critique, or the annihilation of ethics – is such precisely because it is based on the primacy of contemplation (of the ideal order which is the object of speculative esteem, to which practical esteem must conform10). The primacy of contemplation, the primacy of the immutable, and the reality of an eternal order are equivalent affirmations, which coincide with taking intellectual intuition as the definition of the model of knowledge. The recognition of this form of knowledge is inseparable from the very possibility of metaphysical thought. The history of philosophy goes to show it: every philosophy of becoming has a tendency to negate itself as metaphysics, and it is certainly not accidental that the crisis of the primacy of the Logos started with Hegelianism. Conversely, primacy of action means interpreting spiritual life as the constant surpassing of what is given. But this surpassing implies desecrating the given, and thus negating tradition. Therefore, the idea of truth is replaced by those of novelty, authenticity, originality, effectiveness, and

  7 [TN] Del Noce is referring to later sections of this essay that I have not included here.   8 [TN] “The political predicament of Catholics” (which is the previous essay also in this volume).   9 [TN] Antonio Rosmini, Principles of Ethics, trans. Terence Watson and Denis Cleary (Leominster, UK: Fowler Right Books, 1988). 10 [TN] See Rosmini, Principles of Ethics, chapter 5.

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so on. We thus arrive at the technological civilization, characterized as that in which intelligence is typified by scientific-technical knowledge. Many sociological studies have gone to great lengths to describe the myths that characterize this civilization: well-being, money, success, sex, etcetera. In other words, individualism in its purest form, in the sense of affirming the individual separated from God. But they have not been able to propose any remedy (therefore, it is idle to discuss these characteristics as “flaws of adolescence”); they only helped confirm what can be demonstrated philosophically: that Marxism – the first affirmation of the primacy of action – must yield to the technological society, precisely by shedding the features that still had a religious meaning.11 The process from Marxism to the technological society is the process from atheism to the loss of the sacred, that is, of the religious dimension itself, which Marxism in its original form meant, in its own way, to satisfy. This point is particularly important, because it lets us grasp at its root the error of Catholic progressivism. Indeed, according to it, Marxism can be reconciled with Christianity, if it is freed from the atheism and metaphysicism of dialectic materialism. On the contrary, after being so freed Marxism reaches a much deeper form of irreligiosity than atheistic negation, and in this form it allies itself with the bourgeois-secular spirit pushed to its final conclusion. (10) A complete study of this question should demonstrate that the technological civilization, the end point of the “primacy of action,” originated from the mindset of the École polytechnique, which today triumphs over Marxism. It should also illustrate the process through which this mindset extinguishes religion, that is, the new form of religious persecution found in Communism and in the technological civilization. It should also show how Catholic progressives are ultimately led to collaborate with the technological civilization and the extinction of religion. (11) Neo-Modernists constantly talk about “historical conditionings,” and say that the traditional forms of religion are historically conditioned. Their viewpoint must be turned around, showing that, instead, neo-­Modernism is totally conditioned by a vision of contemporary history that makes it historically unintelligible. Such is the interpretation in terms of the antithesis between reactionaries and progressives, which is the foundation of the new Enlightenment, as exacerbation of 11 Regarding the difference between technical activity [TN: tecnica in Italian; see footnote 9 on p. 224] and technological civilization, see pages 224–6 in the previous essay. I already pointed out that Marxism gives way to the technological civilization through the prevalence of its relativistic aspect (social science) over the dogmatic aspect (dialectic materialism).

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anti-traditionalism. This interpretation consequently leads to a reform in the spirit of the Enlightenment12 of both Communism and Catholicism, in which both shed their traditional features; but, naturally, the disfigurement of Catholicism is infinitely greater. (12) At this point we should address a most important question, and demonstrate that all the features of neo-Modernism had already been prophetically defined in the incomparably beautiful encyclical Pascendi,13 whose sixtieth anniversary (8 September 1907) went by completely unnoticed. By reading paragraph 7, we see that its intention was to critique the essence of Modernism, which at that time was not yet fully unveiled in its manifestations. Today this essence has manifested itself perfectly, confirming completely Pascendi’s definition and all the aspects of its articulation: the insertion of Christianity into a conception characterized by the primacy of life is not only the ruin of the Catholic religion, but of every religion.14 (13) But what is most peculiar is that the philosophical genesis of the Modernist errors had already been perfectly clarified ante litteram by Rosmini – hence the extraordinary relevance of this thinker today provided that we read him without separating the philosopher from the theologian. That happened because he faced the Saint-Simonian new Christianity – which is the exact prefiguration of the position reached by Modernism today – and he perfectly investigated its nature. The essays collected in his History of Impiousness15 make manifest the process through which he rediscovered the idea of intellectual intuition, and by doing so re-­ affirmed the primacy of contemplation, which had been almost completely lost in the modern age, with uniquely important ethical and political consequences. (14) Given the religious root of contemporary conflicts, our age can be described as an age of conversion. Now, Catholic progressives make apologetics the core of their thought, which is, after all, the traditional Modernist approach. But the Modernist type of apologetics happens to block religious conversions instead of helping them – unless it even leads to conversions in reverse, as is very often the case.

12 [TN] Riforma illuminista in the original. It is surprising (and a source of frustration to translators) that English apparently does not possess an adjective to indicate that something is associated with the Enlightenment. 13 [TN] Available at www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_x/encyclicals. 14 Words spoken by St Pius X at the Consistory of 16 December of the same year [TN: There are no such words in the speech published in La Civiltà Cattolica 59, no.1 (1908): 3–7. See instead Pascendi, paragraphs 37 and 39]. 15 [TN] Antonio Rosmini, Storia dell’empietà (Domodossola: Sodalitas, 1967).

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Regarding this obstacle to religious conversion represented by neoModernism, Simone Weil’s spiritual experience is incomparably important. She did not convert precisely because she already anticipated in thought the process that would lead to neo-Modernism – a process whose first germs were already visible in the final years of her life (1940–43) – and believed mistakenly that the victory of Modernism within Catholicism was inevitable. I would like to conclude here with the following sentences of hers, which perfectly describe today’s error and blasphemy, and indicate the road that will lead out of the crisis: Christ said: ‘I am the truth.’ He also said that he was bread and wine; but he added: ‘I am the true bread, the true wine,’ that is to say, the bread which is nothing but truth, the wine which is nothing but truth. They must first of all be desired as truth, only afterwards as food … what is really marvelous, in the case of the mystics and the saints, is not that they have more life, a more intense life than that of other people, but that in them truth should have become life. In this world of ours life, the élan vital so dear to Bergson, is but a lie; only death is true. For life constrains one to believe what one requires to believe in order to live; this servitude has been raised to the rank of a doctrine under the name of Pragmatism, and Bergson’s philosophy is a form of Pragmatism. But those beings who have, in spite of flesh and blood, spiritually crossed a boundary equivalent to death, receive on the farther side another life, which is not primarily life, which is primarily truth; truth which has become living; as true as death and as living as life.16

(15) If we look at his encyclicals in their unity,17 Leo XIII’s work turns out to be the program of a Catholic restoration, made necessary by the catastrophic outcome of the bourgeois-enlightened secular world. This program is characterized by an organicity analogous to that of Marxism, and is founded on the idea that democracy is necessarily bound to turn into an oppressive power system without the “common sense” that can only be preserved by Christian metaphysics; hence also the idea of a political party bringing together the two terms democracy and Christianity, which are apparently contradictory. It is true that this unity usually escaped Catholics engaged in politics, who focused their attention on the social and political encyclicals taken in isolation, a bit like old socialists had focused their attention only on 16 [TN] Simone Weil, The Need for Roots, trans. Arthur Wills (New York: Routledge, 2002), 246. 17 See Étienne Gilson, Le philosophe et la théologie, trans. Cécile Gilson (Paris: Fayard, 1960), 234ff [TN: The Philosopher and Theology (New York: Random House, 1962), 217ff].

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the social part of Marx’s work. This is the root of the current crisis of the Catholic party, which is surmountable, but only by addressing the new problems explicitly. Now, whereas Leo XIII’s program was to bring the modern world into line with the eternal principles – while recognizing its novelty – progressivism and neo-Modernism represent its exact inverse, since they seek to bring Catholicism into line with the modern world. Historically, they just represent the Catholic acknowledgement of the defeat of Leo XIII by the progressive philosophies of history of the nineteenth century, by Marxism and positivism, the latter being the prelude to today’s technological society. But this acknowledgement on their part is very far from having been proven, in terms of rational discourse. I I I . T h e E s s e n t i a l F e at u r e s o f N e o - M o d e r n i s m The thought by which a Catholic progressive is obsessed, and which therefore he insulates from any criticism, can be expressed as follows, using Tresmontant’s words: At times the Church may lose sight of some portion of the truth with which she is entrusted. Instantly an opponent is raised, a champion of the forgotten fragment, to attack the Church on that count. Thus a morbid spirituality and a distortion of evangelical ethics raised and armed Nietzsche and Freud. The fornication of Christianity with the rich, with temporal power, and with the oppressors of the poor produced Marx. Truth cannot bear that any part of her be lost. She brings back to Christianity what negligence has scattered, brings it back with the sword, the rod of Yhwh, the man who is a hammer in the hand of God.18

Thus, the task of today’s religious thought is, supposedly, to assimilate the part of truth that is found in Marxism, and which originally belonged to Christianity. I speak of an obsession because this thesis is not in the least the result of an objective study of Marxism and Communism, but rather the premise from which a progressive starts, and against which he does not accept any rational criticism. For example, the demonstration that atheism is essential to Marxism leaves him utterly indifferent. At most, he will reply that his critic’s position is “fixist” and “abstract”; that the critic identifies an ens rationis, atheism, in order to deduce from it a concrete reality, 18 Claude Tresmontant, Essai sur la pensée hébraique (Paris: Les editions du Cerf, 1953), 81 [TN: A Study of Hebrew Thought, trans. Michael F. Gibson (New York: Desclee Co., 1960), 76–7].

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which is an impossible operation; that he attributes more substance to ideas (to “formulas” and “abstractions”) than to human beings; that precisely in this “idealism” – in having forgotten that God created not “bearers of ideas” but beings of flesh and blood – his critic is not truly Christian. Note that this is why it is necessary for a Catholic progressive to bring back the old thesis of the opposition between Biblical and Greek thought – which is essential to all forms of Modernism, because it contains in a nutshell the break with Christian Platonism and Aristotelianism – and to attribute to it the function of liberating Christianity from all residues of “Gnosticism.” He will further reply that for his adversary the “human person” is an abstraction, as a stage of a pure dialectics of ideas; that when we shift to the standpoint of concrete reality we realize that Communism is not a pure essence, but a living reality in evolution. This accounts for the words that to him take an almost sacred character, and that therefore he is often fond of capitalizing: Person (and personalism) and Evolution.19 But one wonders how he can consciously ignore (clearly, I am talking about genuine intellectuals; but Catholic progressivism is a movement of intellectuals) that when we speak of Marxist atheism we are not referring at all to the fact that Marx was an atheist, or that he framed his investigations within an atheistic philosophical system; instead, we mean that atheism permeates all the workings of his system, in the way the scripture’s Ego sum qui sum permeates every articulation of the Thomist Summa. And ignore that it was Lenin who understood perfectly well the necessary link established by Marx between atheism and Communism, and founded his party on it. Consequently, in his essay on religion20 he said that the Communists must not promote a direct religious persecution, because atheism will follow as a result of adopting the Communist praxis. And ignore that, as a result, envisioning an evolution of Communism in the direction of openness to religion is absurd, even though it is conceivable that this openness may come about through a crisis of the Communist world – whatever the nature of that crisis may be, and later I will try to give some hints about what it might look like. 19 This first characterization shows us the necessity of the process that leads progressivism to encounter Modernism in the exact form in which it was defined by the encyclical Pascendi (agnosticism, anti-intellectualism, primacy of life, elimination of metaphysics, etc.). One of the most paradoxical aspects of the contemporary world lies in the fact that a position that was condemned by the church as the “synthesis of all heresies” is affirmed today by many Catholics, exactly in the form in which it was condemned, as the only way to bring back souls. 20 [TN] V.I. Lenin, “The Attitude of the Worker’s Party to Religion” in Collected Works vol. 15, trans. A. Rothstein and B. Issacs (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973), 402–13.

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The conscious neglect of essential aspects raises the question of whether the method of Catholic progressivism might be a technique of attention, aiming, however, not to sort out, à la Descartes, what is evident from what is doubtful, but rather to see only certain aspects of reality – ideal as well as practical – while taking one’s mind off other aspects. Thus, for instance, every oppressive and persecutory aspect of Communist reality is systematically underestimated, whereas every minimal non-democratic attitude on the part of non-Communists is given the maximum emphasis. Thought’s morality would reside in this technique of attention. If this is the case, the critique of Catholic progressivism must focus on its non-rational genesis (on its being conditioned by a historical situation). This has two apparently disconcerting consequences: first, Feuerbach’s form of criticism of religion – which is based precisely on illustrating its non-rational genesis, and which is not valid for religion in itself – applies instead to the forms of religious thought that intend to assimilate the positive elements found in Feuerbachism and Marxism. One wonders if we should not recognize in this kind of critique the indispensable method in order to study deviations and heresies. Already historians have been forced to face the question of how heresies are historically conditioned; however, a rigorous philosophical theorization of this aspect is still lacking. Second, and contrary to what people usually think, whereas a discussion with a rigorously Marxist intellectual is possible, it is not so with a Catholic progressive. Not because we despise him, but because he despises his critic, treating him already from the start as somebody who stops at mere formulaic intellectualism. Therefore, one does not discuss with a Catholic progressive, but in front of him, just hoping that our arguments may provide an opportunity to stimulate his critical reflection. *** By reflecting on the definition I proposed at the beginning, we can easily realize why within the vision and spiritual disposition of Catholic progressives we find statements necessarily bound together that in themselves are of a different nature, and some of which – the positive ones – are distorted from their genuine meaning because of the context in which they are framed. These include: (A) The radical negation of all residues of a Manichean mindset. Its consequences are: •

The affirmation of the spirit of “dialogue” against that of “crusade,” “anathema,” and so on.

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The affirmation that Christianity transcends all civilizations, against the false elevation of one of them (Western civilization) to an absolute model. Hence the polemics against those who sociologize or naturalize religion by making it a prop for a particular civilization and, by doing so, effectively deny the distinction between natural and supernatural. The promotion of peace, because today the Manichean spirit supposedly gives rise to the will – even if it is unconfessed or impotent – to carry out the atomic destruction of one part of the world, because if this part of the world is only irredeemable and menacing barbarity, then regarding its disappearance as desirable becomes necessary.

(B) Supposedly, this purification of the Christian attitude towards the world entails an immense doctrinal renewal within Catholic thought. I said “renewal” but the correct term should rather be “revolution.” Because it would not be a matter of making explicit in Newman’s sense, as an organic growth, what is already virtually contained in the dogmatic definitions, but rather of pushing into the shadows, or effectively forgetting, the dogmas that most strongly affirm man’s dependence on God: original sin, miracles, creation, personal immortality. This would be in order to bring Christianity into line with the scientific, technical, and political revolution of the modern world, which is said to have radically transformed the traditional image of man. (C) At first, the connection between the rejection of the Manichean spiritual disposition and the doctrinal revolution may not seem evident. It becomes evident, however, if we observe that the initial proposition of a Catholic progressive is to welcome the true part of Marxism, and his statements cannot but reflect and bear witness to the contradictory nature of this proposition. Because the Marxist conception is so organic and consistent that one cannot accept one part (e.g., Marxism as science and not as philosophy) and expect it not to reflect the first principle on which each part of Marxism depends. It is the decisive principle that Marx enunciates in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844: A being considers himself independent when he stands on his own feet; and he only stands on his own feet when he owes his existence to himself. A man who lives by the grace of another regards himself as a dependent being. But I live completely by the grace of another if I owe him not only the maintenance of my life, but if he has, moreover, created my life – if he is the source of my life.

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When it is not of my own creation, my life has necessarily a source of this kind outside of it.21

If the originality of Marxism is recognized, it is clear that every stance of Catholic progressivism cannot but be internally contradictory, and at the same time – in its attempt to take on the truth of Marxism – irreparably contradictory to tradition. In fact, this contradictory character is perfectly recognized by Marxists, except that they think, et pour cause, that it is a historically fruitful contradiction. And could we expect them to think otherwise? According to its doctors, Marxism was supposed to push Christianity to its decisive crisis, and here comes the proof, in Catholic progressivism. The new Catholics are Marxists in via, and they are making surprising progress: they have inserted Christianity into cosmogenesis, talked about meta-Christianity, and identified Christ with the Omega Point.22 They may not have reached the “death of God” yet, but they are on their way. Self-education is meaningful also in the Marxists’ pedagogy, and certainly they will not ill-treat the proof that their doctrine has been assimilated. But, likewise, one cannot expect orthodox Catholics, who agree with the Marxists on the judgment of fact, to agree also on the judgment of value. (D) In a manner that was already common in the old forms of Modernism, progressivism often presents itself – or at least presented itself until recently, namely, until the major teachers of Thomism challenged its claims – as “genuine archaism,” that is, as a return to the best tradition of Christian thought against the “novelty” of CounterReformation Catholicism. Supposedly, it takes up again the tradition of negative theology, as the true theological path; by breaking the idolatry of concepts, this makes it possible to accept that there is a truth, albeit partial, in atheism. Supposedly, it continues St Augustine, in the radical condemnation of Manicheism. And St Thomas, in the distinction between nature and super-nature. This claim is empty, at least from the standpoint of Catholic thought, because there is a point where the “modern” and “anti-traditional” character of progressivism emerges most clearly, without the possibility of any real reconnection: in its radical rejection of Greek thought and its “fixism” (this rejection is, in fact, the negation of any absolute and metahistorical order of values). The necessary continuation of this idea is the 21 [TN] Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, ed. Dirk J. Struik, trans. Martin Milligan (New York: International Publishers, 1964), 144. 22 [TN] All well-known expressions by Teilhard de Chardin.

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abandonment, more or less veiled, of scholastic theology (and thus of St Thomas) in favour of scriptural theology. This explains the tendency of progressivism, at least in some of its positions, not towards an ecumenical reconciliation with Protestantism, but towards abdication to Protestantism; and not to paleo-Protestantism, which was characterized by an extreme emphasis on the themes of sin and grace, but to a certain type of modern “demythologized” Protestantism. After all, any pretense of continuing Augustinian Platonism was set aside long ago. But recently, progressivism took a very serious hit: the three most renowned representatives of Thomism as an “open” and existential philosophy – Maritain, Gilson (who is also the historian-­ philosopher who most deeply re-thought Thomism starting from negative theology) and, for theology, Cardinal Journet – condemned it very harshly.23 Too bad: a touch of “existential” (in the sense of affirming the priority of existence over essence) and anti-Suarezian Thomism matched very well progressivism’s hostility to the Counter-Reformation. What could have been better than an ideal agreement between Gilson and Fr Teilhard? (E) Being cut off from philosophical and theological tradition, progressivism must confess its encounter with Modernism. Its work is not directed at continuing the tradition (or at least the two major theological and philosophical traditions, Augustinianism and Thomism) but only at seeking an adaptation to the modern world. Thus, we can reach the following definition: progressivism effects the continuation, pushed to the most radical conclusions, of old Modernism, which it has encountered on the occasion of the contemporary spiritual situation, and in particular in relation to the presence – which conditions this situation – of the Marxist factor. Here it should be emphasized that recent progressivism does not start at all from the results that had already been achieved by old Modernism – which around 1930 seemed permanently extinguished – but encounters it. Let me point out an extremely important historical problem: explaining how it came to pass that Marxism has been the occasion for the revitalization of Modernism, and for its radicalization to the ultimate degree. Thus, there is nothing surprising about the recent

23 On this point of the irreconcilability between the positions of the new trends and tradition, the decisive texts are, besides Maritain’s Paysan de la Garonne, the essays by Gilson that I already mentioned – which have now been collected in the volume Problemi d’oggi (Turin: Borla, 1967) – and the articles by Cardinal Journet “Pierre Teilhard de Chardin penseur religieux,” Nova et Vetera (October–December 1962), 284–313, and “La synthèse du Père Teilhard de Chardin est-elle dissociable?” Nova et Vetera (April–June 1966), 144–51.

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clash between progressivism and Thomism. It was in the order of things, considering that in the first decade of our century the Church defeated Modernism precisely by bringing back Thomism. (F) The complexity of progressivism resides in the fact that it is not in the least a mere political-social position, but inseparably an ethical-­ political-metaphysical-theological position, and that it must extend, by an intrinsic necessity, to affirmations about all questions of ethics, metaphysics, and theology, even though it undoubtedly starts from an ethico-­ political attitude.24 (G) This necessity of transitioning from a political attitude to metaphysical and theological affirmations proves the subordination of Catholic progressivism to Marx-Leninism’s character of totality. In its Hegelian origins, Marxism is a philosophy born from a theological discourse which expresses itself in political form; Catholic progressivism is a political attitude which must trace its way back to philosophical and theological affirmations. Of course, it must dissimulate this subordination – and lack of full awareness about this point may be essential to it – and present itself as an autonomous position, which finds common ground with the evolutionism of modern science and with Marxism through a spontaneous process. Highlighting this subordination is the task of the historian. (H) Thus, Catholic progressivism is forced to break with the entire tradition of the philosophers of “participation”: Plato, Aristotle, St Augustine, St Thomas, Rosmini.25 This means that it is radically new, because it transcribes the truths of Christianity within the categories that depend on the instrumentalist conception of the homo faber. It then tries in vain to confuse this transcription – into a thought whose origins are clearly postand anti-Christian – with fidelity to biblical thought.

24 [TN: In the original, the following comment is in the main text.] In order to clear all possible misunderstandings, it is important to notice that, as a result, progressivism is not directly about a mere proposal for socially advanced policies. In particular, at the political level its position is the exact opposite of that of the Italian center-left alliance as interpreted by all Christian-Democratic leaders. Because the center-left alliance aims to isolate Communism via a political action not exposed to blackmail by special interest groups, thanks to its broad popular support. It is easy to find an immediate confirmation of this opposition. In Italy today, it is precisely the progressives who lead the polemic against the “pre-conciliar” ideas of the “political unity of Catholics” and the “Catholic party”; that is, precisely against the Christian Democratic interpretation of the center-left alliance, which presupposes, certainly not the “dogma” but the current historical necessity of the unity among Catholics. 25 See “The Political Predicament of Catholics” in this volume, p. 229.

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In different, but equivalent, terms we can say that every form of neoModernism is underpinned by the expressivist conception, which holds that ideas merely express the historical situation in which thought takes place. It has two characteristics: historicity – which in purely expressive discourse exhausts the essence of thought – and pragmaticity, since “expressive thought has necessarily a pragmatic character, because its fundamental historicity by logically implying a devaluation of the theoretical aspect of thought has the counter-effect of exaggerating its practical aspect, magnifying it until it reaches an extreme pragmaticity, which expresses itself in the most outspoken instrumentalism, or in the most radical praxism [in contrast to] authentically philosophical thought, which because of its revelative character has the task of revealing the truth.”26 (I) Given these premises, it is easy to understand why Teilhard’s work must be recognized as the insuperable Summa of neo-Modernism. In the future it may be touched up here and there, people may try to establish some historical connections (vainly, in my opinion), but the substance is all there. I have often heard people speak of Teilhard as the new St Thomas. This analogy is based on a two-penny itsy-bitsy argument: supposedly, like St Thomas Christianized Aristotelian thought, so did Teilhard Christianize modern science. This implies, on top of everything else, that the history of science includes the history of metaphysics, and that Aristotle’s metaphysics is explained by his science. It is an important point, because it shows that according to a neo-Modernist there is science and there is religion, but there cannot be metaphysics. However, we must acknowledge that progressivism cannot think otherwise, because of its very starting point. We have already talked about its obligatory anti-­intellectualism, which follows from the request that Communism be viewed as a “reality in movement,” which therefore escapes every definition through formulae that would eventually pin it down. Thus, those who talk about its “essential atheism” are considering an isolated fragment, consisting of some youthful aspects of Marx’s thought, instead of the historical process. And those who talk about its essential totalitarianism are isolating a stage of its development, Stalinism, which was perhaps necessary, but provisional. If we make explicit the philosophy behind these statements, we inevitably arrive at Teilhard’s position, which from the theoretical standpoint can 26 See the admirable study by Luigi Pareyson “Filosofia e ideologia” [Philosophy and ideology] in the volume Ideologia e Filosofia [Ideology and philosophy], the Proceedings of the 21st Gallarate Conference of 1966 (Brescia: Morcelliana, 1967), 40–1. See also the very important final rejoinder, p. 366–407.

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only be defined as a form of Bergsonism separated from all neo-Platonic elements. This means that a consistent neo-Modernist must reach the astonishing and utterly false assertion that Teilhard must be considered the great victor of the council (in which case we should conclude that Vatican II was the pure negation of Vatican I, and the church’s act of contrition with respect to her past). Or else, when he realizes that what he has said is paradoxical, the neo-­Modernist must present himself as a “preconciliar” person waiting for Vatican III. (J) We understand why Teilhard’s thought has utterly vanquished Mounier’s personalism within the progressive trend. I confess that I am very diffident of the word “personalism,” which to me seems tied to the expression “man’s self-realization,” which today is so common. It can certainly be understood in a good sense, too, as saying that man can only realize himself by affirming God. But it is undeniably ambiguous because it seems to make religion an instrument and a technique for this self-­realization. In fact, a historical investigation would show easily that the word “personalism” arose in the same philosophical atmosphere as pragmatism,27 and that the transition from Mounier’s thought to Teilhard’s is easy, because of this implicit instrumentalism. The victory of the latter seems inevitable, and did happen, because it is not easy to harmonize personalism with evolutionism and Marxism (“I” with “we”), as Mounier himself found out.28 (K) But how to justify the fact that Christianity presents itself over time through conceptual formulations, and also practical models, that are mutually incompatible? This, at bottom, means: how to justify the incompatibility between the new Christianity and the traditional one? Here a somewhat farcical-looking character, I must say, shows up: the engaged religious sociologist. He declares that today society has transitioned to the technological age, and religion must change, too. Because in the agricultural age everything repeats itself, according to an iron law, on which man has no power. Man finds himself in a position of dependence, and the choice is whether his dependence ought to be interpreted as dependence on a providential God or on a cruel nature: optimism or 27 The word “personalism” was introduced, or at least made common in philosophical literature, by Renouvier. But the philosophical position that this word indicates was introduced, in its essence, by the man who was Renouvier’s true teacher, his peer and friend Jules Lequier. Regarding his process of thought and the appearance in its background of the essences of personalism and pragmatism, I refer the reader to my study “Giulio Lequier e il momento tragico della filosofia francese” [Jules Lequier and the tragic moment of French philosophy], the introduction to an Italian edition of his Works that will be published shortly (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1968). 28 Regarding Mounier’s drama, see my book Il problema dell’ateismo, 342–3.

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pessimism. Conversely, in the technological age man gradually makes himself the master of the universe. The alternative between optimism and pessimism, which was typical of a static society, is replaced by the melioristic mindset. But then the decline of the dogmas that emphasize man’s dependence on God is inevitable. They need, at any rate, a new interpretation that “demythologizes” them, or, in practice, that nullifies them – first and foremost, of course, the dogma of original sin. The antithesis is thus between a static conception and a conception inspired by the idea of progress. Some theologian “of earthly realities” will then say that Christianity’s great novelty has been the acquisition of the “ascending time-line.” This implies that the new Christianity is also the “true Christianity,” whereas the previous one (that of “rural society”) still reflects the pagan mindset, as a consequence of accepting in practice the pre-Christian cyclical conception of time. But, despite the somewhat comical appearance of this assertion, it remains true that neo-Modernism must conclude, when accounting for history, to a type of historicism that is no longer Idealist or Marxist, but rather sociologistic, as a consequence of the expressivist conception of thought. In light of this, we understand why the so-called “human sciences,” sociology and psychoanalysis, enjoy in it great success – viewed in their properly philosophical significance, which is that they postulate that “what is deeper resides in what is lower,” so that the investigation of the origins absorbs the quest for value. This is in perfect agreement, after all, with the first expression of the sociologistic mentality, the French school of the ideologists of the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries. That school insisted precisely on the “material” (that is, human and social) origin of ideas. Thus, we understand why, in neo-Modernism, Marxist elements intermingle with those of the worst kind of Americanism. Now, if religious forms change together with forms of society;29 if social science – as the full extension of scientific reason to the human world – accounts for the historical, social, and worldly origin of every statement about supra-sensitive realities; if, therefore, the objective content of religions can be explained starting from social situations, then the continuous reiteration by the neo-Modernists that the same immutable truth expresses itself in mutually incompatible forms and models, because of its “inexhaustibility,” becomes meaningless. Yes, a 29 This was also the argument of the libertine skeptics of the eighteenth century, and is an impoverishment of Montaigne’s thought. This is why today Montaigne’s thought enjoys some success in this impoverished form, that is, separated from all the aspects that made possible its continuation in Pascal. [TN: In the original this is a parenthetical comment in the main text.]

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super-human reality is still possible, but since it is now useless in order to explain both natural and human reality, and since social science can account for its forms of expression, it is unavoidable that the idea of God will end up disappearing without leaving a trace and without leaving problems, in the manner described by Comte, the founder of sociologism, more than by Marx. So, from St Thomas to Comte, to the glory of Comte, this is the process of a significant part of the latest Catholic thought! If we recall that Comte envisioned an alliance with the Jesuits, and their conversion to positivism, we may well say that, with respect to some of today’s Jesuits, he was truly a good prophet. Only his timing was off. Therefore, it is not only Catholicism that is threatened by neo-­ Modernism, but religion, or what I earlier called the religious dimension. Or, to make another historical analogy, for now a position is still possible which is essentially similar to the ancient double-truth theory: what is admissible besides science is a form of faith with very fluid boundaries. It seems that during the last twenty years, a significant part of Catholic thought has gone again through the process leading from Thomism to certain extreme forms of Occamism. But the ultimate conclusion remains the same as I described earlier, and this position is only a provisional configuration. VIII. Origins and Contradictions o f C at h o l i c P r o g r e s s i v i s m Let us summarize.30 Without a doubt, the original intention of Catholic progressivism was to fight for peace, for justice, for freedom. Today, as a participant in the process of history, it can only act in ways that favour the exact opposite outcomes. Why these contradictions? Here our study should continue by analyzing the process whereby what is supposed to be a Christian sublation of Marxism ends up in fact rediscovering Saint-Simonianism. Think of the essential Saint-Simonian

30 [TN] This summary refers to sections IV through VII which I did not translate. In section IV, Del Noce argues that by underestimating the philosophical/religious power of Marxism, and by downplaying the metaphysical claims of Christianity, Catholic progressivism makes real dialogue impossible. In section V, he affirms that by refusing to isolate Communism, progressivism keeps alive its hopes of dominating Europe, albeit though Democratic means. In section VI, he points out that, far from promoting the cause of peace, a Soviet colonization of Western Europe would greatly increase the odds of a new World War. The only alternative scenario (section VII) would be a USSR-USA “pan-­ technicistic” duopoly, which, however, would mark Europe’s civilizational sunset.

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themes: a “new Christianity,” a revolution at the level of values determined by the rise of the industrial age, the rehabilitation of the flesh, the principles of perfectibility and progress, the technocratic mindset, and so forth. Postponing a deeper study of this point to some other occasion, I will mention, also en passant, the following consideration. Instead of understanding history as the history of class struggles – a thesis that turned out to be impossible – would it not be more accurate to say that to give rise to the phenomenon of classes, in its specific sense, is the outcome of the revolutions, in the sense I explained earlier? Thus, the French revolution gave rise to the hegemony of the bourgeois class, and the Communist revolution to that of the techno-bureaucratic class. Then, is it not legitimate to wonder whether today an alliance is possible between these classes, in the oligarchic-dirigist-planning regime which is currently looming over us and whose chaplains would be the “new priests”? These contradictions make us wonder whether Catholic progressivism may not be rooted in a historically conditioned state of mind, which is elevated to an interpretive criterion of history, unduly separated from its conditions; whether, in other words, it should be regarded as a crisis phenomenon, in the sense that it suffers history instead of understanding it; and whether in this suffering history it is subordinate to the same Communism that it would like to “sublate.”31 Or, equivalently: the first question that must be raised about Catholic progressivism is its interpretation of contemporary history, because that is its starting point, even if it pretends – without fooling anybody, by the way – to rely on a consideration of the entire history of the Church and on the investigations of philologists. Its contradictions can be used to verify the erroneousness of a certain interpretation of contemporary history, the one that underpins, indeed, all forms of progressivism. We must search for the first origins of Catholic progressivism in the years between 1930 and 1940. Hence, in order to understand its genesis we must refer to the still Eurocentric vision of history that was dominant at that time. That is, Europe was still considered the center of the world: only in reference to Europe it was possible to speak of civilization. Russia was a country that had not experienced Humanism, the Renaissance, the modern age; and Communism was considered Russian history, sometimes as an involution, sometimes as effective progress, but always limited to a country that had not reached the modern level of culture. America was Europe moved across the ocean; its civilization was

31 [TN] Inverare in the original, see footnote 4 on p. 5.

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a democratic version of that of liberal England. For many years it had been customary to stress its crudeness and naïveté; conversely, in the literature by the young people of that time there was a sort of myth of American life, depicted as the life of a country not bound by tradition, forward-looking. Let us now look at the circumstances of those years, forgetting what came afterwards, and trying to adopt the Eurocentric standpoint that I described. The most striking phenomenon, and the one culturally least predictable (by the European culture of the first quarter of our century), was the advance of the forces that were generically called fascisms. Let us set aside the crucially important (and not at all straightforward) question of whether this plural form is legitimate. In my opinion, it is not: Fascism and Nazism exist as phenomenologically different positions, and then there are forms that draw inspiration from one or the other or both, but which still possess irreducible specific features. Anyway, there is no doubt that looking at the affinities rather than the differences was a characteristic of that decade, and that to use the plural form “fascisms” – as if the various anti-Communist authoritarian forms were species of one same genus – was indeed part of the outlook of that period. How to explain their appearance and their ascendance after a war that seemingly had marked the victory of democracies? Their most immediately visible character was that of being irrationalist and vitalist, of being a revolt by telluric forces (the will to life and power against reason). But, clearly, this revolt by telluric forces was not enough to explain their success. And then the following explanation seemed inevitable: these vitalist and irrationalist movements had been politically successful because they had allied themselves with the conservative forces: large-scale capitalism, the monarchy, the army, the moral traditionalism of the petty bourgeoisie, the Vatican curia (Catholic Romanism in which the Roman part prevailed over the Catholic part). They had been successful because they had married all reactionary forces with the primitivism of vitality. And speaking of Catholics in particular, people thought that those who drew their inspiration from the Catholicism of the Syllabus were necessarily inclined to enter into an alliance with Fascism, inasmuch as it was the negation of the ideals of modern civilization, Liberalism, and socialism (the “justice” and the “freedom” of the Partito d’Azione!32). Not that reactionary thought itself was the ideological background of Fascism, but – this was the thinking of the cultural elites – it could not reach historical 32 [TN] The Partito d’Azione (Action Party) was a liberal-socialist party founded in 1942. Many of its members were former militants of an anti-Fascist movement called Giustizia e Libertà (Justice and Freedom).

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reality, which condemns it, except by allying itself with irrational forces and deluding itself (having to delude itself) that it could dominate them. Marxism remained extraneous to the original formation of progressivism, for a very simple reason: Marx had nearly disappeared from European culture by the years between 1920 and 1935. This had happened not because Fascism forbade reading him and circulating his works (since in effect Fascist censorship turned out to be as inefficient as the Bourbons’) but because, in Italy, people thought that the refutation of Marx that Benedetto Croce had carried out was definitive. In France in those same years everything that descended from Hegelianism was considered a return to the pre-logical mentality, or little less. In the French radical-masonic university of that epoch, ignoring Marx was a cultural duty. This is attested, for example, by the few demolitory pages in the Progrès de la conscience 33 by Brunschvicg, the dictator for philosophy of the French university in those years. Ignorance of Marxism – I mean of its philosophical power, and therefore of the Marxian key to contemporary history – is essential to what was, originally, the “progressive state of mind,” which took among secular people the form of a return to the Enlightenment and among Catholics that of a return to Modernism. Let us now examine how the encounter between the anti-Fascist intellectual youth of the thirties and Marxism took place. It was timid at first, gained speed already during the first years of the war, and became impetuous after Russia entered the war. The reasons are actually easy to understand, also in strictly logical terms. If Fascism is made possible by the support it receives from the forces I talked about – if, in other words, it does not seem explainable in terms of the intrinsic power of an idea – one is led to rediscover historical materialism, and at the same time the Enlightenment’s concept of progress – which the Idealist culture had set aside, replacing it with that of unfolding. Furthermore, the urgency of the struggle motivated people to abandon a culture that could do nothing but “condemn” – which is what the thought of the great anti-­Fascist (but not Marxist) “clerics” of the inter-war period looked like – in favour of a culture that could “transform.” At this point, one arrived at Marx, and precisely Marx the philosopher of the Theses on Feuerbach. It was a different Marxism from the one the late nineteenth century had known, in the form of historical materialism inserted into a general positivist conception, albeit humanistic positivism. It was, instead, a form of Marxism that in European countries came after the rediscovery

33 [TN] Léon Brunschvicg, Les progrès de la conscience dans la philosophie occidentale [The progress of conscience in Western philosophy] (Paris: Alcan, 1927).

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of the themes of existential philosophy, and that seemed to represent the endpoint of the critique of old and new Hegelianism. The anti-Fascist intellectual youth educated in the 1930s rediscovered Marxism at once as historical materialism and as philosophy that surpasses itself into political action, and in connection with an interpretation of Fascism. But once they recognized what they deemed to be the aspect of truth of Marxism, two roads became possible for this generation: either to embrace Communism or to accept all its negations, but adding the negation of dialectic materialism – in the hope of rec­ onciling it, by this negation, with other positions restored to their purity, which for some could be Liberalism, in its radical form, and for others Christianity. At this point it becomes easy to define progressivism, both Catholic and secular, as the reception of Marxism within a presupposed anti-Fascism. By this, I certainly do not intend to renege anti-Fascism, but simply to say that it was a historical movement against a historical adversary, and that the eternalization of a historical adversary is precisely the source of the Manichean spirit which Catholic progressivism intends to fight, but in fact fully realizes, by the process of contradiction which is intrinsic to it and of which we have seen some examples. The general character of progressivism is to presuppose, as the soul of Marxism, an ethical principle of universal human liberation, which supposedly uses a social science in order to realize itself, and to think that Communists, secular liberals, and Catholics can come together around this ethical principle. In this way, Marxist anthropology in its specific character is set aside, and the key to understanding the root of contemporary history is lost. Just as much as it is easy to explain the rise of this perspective when the essential adversaries were Fascism and Nazism, it is also unjustified not to critique it over twenty years later. Of course, this progressivism or a-Comunism can take various forms because of its very nature, since it is a reception of Communism according to particular preexisting perspectives, ad formam recipientis. Thus, some will say that we must not consider its ideological framework, a political instrument which Communism supposedly needs in particular circumstances (this is the usual discourse about the “eclipse of ideologies,” one aspect of the general discourse about “demythologization”). Viewed in reality, Communism is essentially a technique of rapid acceleration of industrial progress in underdeveloped countries: this acceleration benefits from a mystique of sorts (the revolutionary mystique) which expresses itself in myths that justify an iron discipline and make bearable the sacrifices of the process of industrialization. The conclusion of this reasoning, if you think of it, would be the following: the more Communism

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establishes itself in certain countries and the stronger it gets, the less dangerous it becomes for democratic countries, because it is necessarily inclined towards a democratic evolution. The consolidation of its power is supposedly correlated with the loss of the mystique suitable for underdeveloped countries, and thereby the idea of expansion and world revolution. These are the ideas developed with clarity, but with just as much one-sidedness and recklessness, by the American economist and sociologist Rostow.34 They had, in my opinion, a pernicious influence on Kennedy’s policies. In this case, we have a trend which, although secular in origin, tends to unite the various forms of progressivism on the basis of the de-­ ideologization of politics, of a form of realism which is, in my judgment, utterly false. As for the basic judgment that prevails in Catholic progressivism, it is formulated as follows: what we call Communist atheism is nothing but the rejection of false gods. Therefore, Communism is labouring through a necessary process that makes it evolve. By a peculiar inversion of perspective, the term “Communist atheism” is replaced by the “atheism of Catholics.” Supposedly, Communist atheism is just the response to the practical atheism of Catholics, and has a practical and provisional meaning as well. If we now try to analyze this last sentence which is repeated so often, we realize that it is not possible to give it a precise meaning: it is literally a wooden iron. Are we trying to say, perhaps, that there are people for whom Catholicism amounts to a useful political force and nothing else? Clearly these people are not Catholic, but atheists. They differ from other atheists only because they regard religious beliefs as useful, mind you, for them, even though in order to serve this purpose they must be believed to be true by others. Or they are Catholics whose life does not conform to the faith that nonetheless they sincerely profess, in which case they are sinners but not properly atheists. Certainly, those who deny their ideas in their lives give a bad example, as the saying goes. But what their bad example produces can only be, in principle, anti-clericalism, which is a very different thing from atheism.35 Thus, this very repeated sentence raises the question of how to explain its circulation and diffusion, and of why the act of attention that would prompt people to analyze it is so rare. Why? It is curious that those who pronounce it constantly add the following comment: the “atheism of 34 [TN] Walt W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960). 35 Regarding the qualitative character of this distinction, see Il problema dell’ateismo, 126 ff.

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Catholics” manifests itself by sacralizing a particular given historical order (of truths, of values, and so on), claiming to possess the absolute, and consequently losing both the qualitative difference between the infinite and the finite, and the sense of the insuperable human incompleteness. Against this background, we understand the fortune of the rediscovery of Catholic evolutionism – of Teilhardism, in one word. This argument has the peculiar flaw that it can be turned around: does not the explanation of Marxist atheism as a “practical fact” give cover to the will to reach an agreement with Communism, because Communism is anti-Nazism, and because people think that during the war and the resistance we were able to beat Nazism only by renouncing anti-Communism? But does this not mean, at bottom, that we are identifying absolute evil, the ultimate degree of dehumanization, with Nazism? Certainly, nobody will ever be able to forget its horror, but the simplest reflection shows that no historical form exhausts for good the reality of evil, that we cannot pay Nazism the compliment of being evil itself, instead of a particular form of evil. If the law of progress applies to good as well as to evil (Maritain has the merit of clearly recognizing this36), we must recognize that new and unpredictable potential forms of dehumanization loom over today’s mankind. A certain kind of conservative Catholic thought may have been at fault by identifying the political good with a particular historical form of civilization. This may be true above all of the reactionary thought of the nineteenth century, which has no real relationship with Fascism and Nazism, besides the delusion that some of its heirs may have harboured above all about Fascism, much more rarely (and only initially) about Nazism. The progressive error of identifying evil with one particular historical form is infinitely more serious. “Manicheism,” this is the magic word that progressives use to denounce the non-Christianity of anti-Communist Catholicism; but they unwittingly carry the beam of Manicheism in their own eye. Let us see the supposed proof of this evolution of Communism, and here we touch on a truly essential point. Whereas in the years immediately after the Russian revolution the atheistic offensive of Communism was frontal, after the Second World War the attack was generally indirect. That is, it took place through historical judgments, whose adoption leads in the long run, but by a necessary process, to atheism as the disappearance of the question of God. According to the principle of historical materialism, the school of atheism can take the form of an effort to

36 [TN] See Jacques Maritain, On the Philosophy of History, ed. Joseph W. Evans (New York: Scribner’s, 1957), chapter 2.

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create the impression, through particular historical judgments, that the various religious and metaphysical ideas are nothing but techniques to preserve or renew a determined historical order. Thus, they are tied to a determined historical situation, which must stop at them. Contemplative thought becomes meaningless, and ideas are understood as an instrument of production and nothing else. Once this is established, one easily proceeds towards atheism, with no need for direct atheist propaganda, and perhaps even seeking common ground with restless clerics and theologians in condemning “the atheism of Catholics.” In this way, paradoxically, the conversion of Catholics to atheism would take place through the condemnation of the “atheism of Catholics”! This indirect propaganda has proven to be infinitely more effective than aggressive atheism. It is because of it that after 1945 the frightful spread of irreligion has taken place. Let us look around: in Italy Christian Democrats have been in government for twenty years, and yet, for a large part of the youth the word God is literally meaningless. For them, it is not even a question of taking a stance, with respect to religion, either in favour or against. Now, what causes this phenomenon? If ideas are merely technical instruments to change the world, it will no longer be possible to speak of a transcendent or even immanent Reason guiding the course of events. The process towards atheism does not start at all by saying, for example, “God is evil” like Proudhon,37 whose process had to evolve consistently towards the renunciation of atheism. It starts, instead, with an apparently innocent sentence: “Contemplation is an evasion.” IX. Conclusion Let us now attempt some recapitulatory formulas. The error that underlies progressivism must be described, curiously, as an underestimation of the philosophical power of Marxism, due to the origins that I discussed at the beginning. The first consequence of this underestimation is the distinction between two elements,38 which are thought to be dissociable, within a rigorously unitary construction such as Marxism, both from the theoretical and the practical standpoint. The immediate consequences are the encounter, in secular progressivism, with the Enlightenment, ­developed to its most radical consequences in what

37 [TN] Pierre Joseph Proudhon, “God is evil, man is free” in Le Peouple, 6 May 1849. 38 [TN] On p. 259 Del Noce argued that Catholic progressivism intends to separate Marxism as a “social science” at the service of a “principle of universal human liberation” from “Marxist anthropology” (Marxism as a philosophy).

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people call neo-Enlightenment; and the encounter, in Catholic progressivism, with Modernism. A particularly important chapter should be devoted to moral laxism, which is associated with both forms of progressivism. Limiting ourselves to a quick comment, we must observe that they share the rejection of moral traditionalism, which is a natural attitude, considering that the latter is normally viewed as sociologically linked with the petty bourgeois mindset that is usually regarded as the matrix of the “fascisms.” Hence the critique of the petty bourgeois idols: family, fatherland, sexual morality, etcetera. This is the reason for a phenomenon which is very peculiar, but actually entirely natural because of the law of contradiction to which progressivism is subjected: it appears to be, at least in practice, much less hostile to the mentality of the upper bourgeoisie, or, in its own terminology, the up-and-coming bourgeoisie. This is because the upper-bourgeois mentality is anti-traditionalist and pan-technicist, although it gets there by a different route. Would you like an example? Where do we find the greatest fans of Teilhard, if not among the “jet set”? Nor is this really surprising, if we think that secular progressivism links back to radicalism. What was written about it by the greatest among the true de-mystificators of our century, Sorel, is extremely relevant today; and Catholic progressivism is akin to it.39 *** But if things stand the way I have tried to show – using, it is true, formulas that were necessarily synthetic and in need of development, but nonetheless without omitting the necessary logical links – a conclusion imposes itself which may seem paradoxical. The only way to truly criticize progressivism and Catholic neo-Modernism is to fully recognize the philosophical power of Marxism, and its specific character, that of being a philosophy that surpasses itself into practice. It is the unique feature that makes Marxism modern philosophy in the aspect in which it presents itself as secular (that is, as surpassing transcendent thought), which becomes a religion.40 39 [TN] In the original, after this paragraph Del Noce discusses two examples of the modus operandi of progressivism: the campaign to denigrate Pope Pius XII as a champion of a dead past, and the elevation to a myth of the Resistance against Nazi-Fascism. Since both examples are not very significant for today’s readers and create a digression from the main argument, I decided to omit them. 40 Among Marxist philosophers, Bloch and Goldmann have particularly insisted on these characteristics of Marxism. One should now show that serious studies of Fascism are made possible only by an interpretation of contemporary history similar to the one I have outlined. I think that this would emerge from a careful analysis of the works by Ernst Nolte,

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This phenomenon is absolutely unique because in modern thought, even after the original formulation of Marxism, and also in today’s positivism, it is instead religion that is surpassed, or in other positions annulled, by philosophy, which precisely in this surpassing or annulling detaches itself from the masses. To really understand contemporary history, we must recognize that it centers around the expansion and then the failure (after the Second World War) of Marxism thus understood. I speak of failure because the mystic-revolutionary aspect has vanished, regardless of what the remaining possibilities for the expansion of Communism may be. It is only within this vision, I think, that phenomena that by now have become exhausted, like Fascism and Nazism, can become the object of history, whereas until today they have generally been treated with the methods of a true crime narrative. In fact, a historian cannot describe periods as exclusively criminal, but must rather explain how horrendous crimes may have been committed by normal men. Because, if we center contemporary history around the Marxist revolution, we realize that Fascism arose from an extremely important intuition, resulting from the coming to a halt, in the years immediately after the First World War, of a revolution that initially had been imagined to be world-wide: the intuition that beneath the reality of classes there is a deeper reality, the reality of nations, which Communism ignores; and that a political revolution always presents itself in terms of universal liberation, and always gives rise to the formation of a nation with hegemonic aspirations. But this intuition was re-thought by Mussolini according to the categories of the revolutionary socialism in which he had grown up, so that the affirmation of the reality of the nation became the affirmation of the struggle among nations and, let us observe, not a struggle for freedom but a struggle for power. Nazism is also subordinate to Communism in opposition, to the extent that it is a phenomenon correlated with Stalinism. Stalin, with his thesis of socialism in only one country, had to some extent nationalized Communism. He seemed to have turned it into an instrument of Russian power. That is, with Stalin, Marxism seemed to have become the instrument for the inversion of the movement of history, for the westward counter-expansion of the East. The first nation threatened by it was Germany; Nazism arose depending on this impression, as an attempt to recapture the German tradition Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche (Munich: Piper, 1963) – of which there is also a questionable Italian translation, whose title I tre volti del Fascismo [The three faces of Fascism] (Milan: Sugar, 1966) does not express adequately at all the content of the book – and the works by Renzo De Felice on Mussolini (in the first volume Mussolini il rivoluzionario [Mussolini the revolutionary] (Turin: Einaudi, 1965), 25; De Felice explicitly recalls my interpretation).

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from all that had led to Marxism. Its very antisemitism finds an explanation, in the sense that Marxism, the origin of this counter-expansion, was perceived as the corruption of this tradition, carried out by a Jew. In order to anticipate a possible criticism, I will also say that my point of view has nothing in common with the reactionary mindset, at least as is commonly understood. Indeed, the reactionary position is the radical negation of the modern world, both in its liberal and socialist aspects. For me, on the contrary, there is an essential value that has clearly affirmed itself only in the modern world and that Christianity can assume and raise to purity: the liberal aspect. The flaw of usual liberalism – or of its secularist formulation – lies in its association with perfectism, and it is this association that exposes it to the Marxist critique. Hence, from my perspective, Marxism does have a positive aspect. Its dialectical function is essential in order to lead liberalism, if it wants re-affirm itself, to break away from perfectism.41 The difference between my position and the progressive one can thus be specified as follows: to me the positive aspect of Marxism resides in its dialectical function; instead, progressives envision an impossible “Christian sublation” of its doctrine. The ultimate logical outcome of this attempt would be a conversion, which, however,

41 The rediscovery of liberalism through the critique of “perfectism,” understood as “the system which believes in the possibility of perfection in human affairs and sacrifices present benefits for some imagined future perfection” [TN: Antonio Rosmini, The Philosophy of Politics, vol. 1, trans Denis Cleary and Terence Watson (Durham UK: Rosmini House, 1994), 74], is due to Rosmini. The consequences of perfectism are the suppression of freedom – because otherwise, as Rosmini also says, “the ideal that has been achieved would be in a state of unstable perfection, exposed to all the attacks of the individuals who are averse, for one reason or another, to that ideal of perfection” [TN: this is actually a sentence about Rosmini by Italian philosopher Pietro Piovani, in La teodicea sociale di Rosmini [Rosmini’s social theodicy] (Padua: CEDAM, 1957), 370] – as well as the devaluation of past history and deification of future history, the necessity to regard original sin as an eliminable residue, and the reduction of the individual to his social relationships. We should point out that: (1) It is a form of liberalism completely different from the form which is linked at its origin with the theism of the Enlightenment, which is indeed vulnerable to the Marxist critique. (2) As is always the case with Rosmini, this apparently simple formula turns out to be very hard to interpret, taken in its implications. Personally, I have to say that I recognized its decisive significance, forced by logic, only in the last article of my discussion with Felice Balbo (“Il pensiero cristiano e comunismo: ‘superamento’ o ‘risposta a sfida’” [“Christian thought and Communism: ‘surpassing’ or ‘answering a challenge’”], Il Mulino no. 5 (1958)). This was the beginning of my rediscovery of Rosmini. (3) A crucially important topic would be to study how what is still alive in the great liberal writers of the nineteenth century is bound to merge into Rosmini’s formulation. In particular, it would be extremely interesting, I think, to study the evolution of Tocqueville’s thought as a process of progressive distancing from Constant, towards a position that must find its full philosophical awareness in Rosminian thought.

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would take the inverse form of what they intend: not a Christianization of Marxism but a conversion, no matter how disguised, to Marxism, evolutionism, and sociologism. I have often been accused of being “reactionary.” I reply that my position is extremely similar to that of Maritain, correctly interpreted.42 Humanisme intégral43 is a very well-known book, but it has generally been misinterpreted, emphasizing the communitarian aspect in the formula “communitarian personalism,” whereas priority belonged to the personalist theme.44 Progressivism and its fatal process towards neo-Modernism start – in Mounier – from this shift in emphasis. Therefore, Le Paysan de la Garonne is not a sign of regression by the author, but the indispensable complement that allows the meaning of Humanisme intégral to appear in its true light. After the rejection of integrism, two positions are possible: to give priority to the personalist aspect (or liberal aspect in the best sense) or to the communitarian aspect. The first is Maritain’s position, and also mine. The second is the position of neo-Modernist progressivism.

42 [TN] See A. Del Noce, “The Lesson of Maritain” in Études maritainiennes-Maritain Studies 31 (2016), 71–84. 43 [TN] Jacques Maritain, Integral Humanism, trans. Joseph W. Evans (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1968). 44 This is stated explicitly by Maritain in Le Paysan de la Garonne (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1966), 81–2 [TN: The Peasant of the Garonne, trans. Michael Cuddihy and Elizabeth Hughes (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1968), 51–2].

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Index

Actualism. See Gentile, Giovanni Adorno, Theodor, 14 affluent society. See technological society Alain (Émile-Auguste Chartier), 132– 6, 137, 143n79 Americanism, 188, 254 anarchism, 29, 104, 119, 121, 171 anti-clericalism, 133–4, 136, 180, 260 anti-Fascism, 32, 259 Apollinaire, Guillaume, 46 Aquinas, St Thomas, 57, 129, 158 atheism, 3, 46, 65–6, 90, 92–3, 177, 230, 260–2; Marxist, 237–9, 246 Augustine, St, 59–61, 64–6, 127–8, 156, 226 Balbo, Felice, 21, 167 Balthasar, Hans Urs von, 25n11, 154–5 Barth, Karl, 78 Bayle, Pierre, 160–1 Benda, Julien, 139n69 Bergson, Henri, 147, 167, 244 Bernanos, Georges, 124, 150, 218 Berthelot, René, 154 Bloch, Ernst, 52, 164, 263n40 Bonhoeffer, Dietrich, 48–53; and Marxism, 52–3

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bourgeois spirit, 12–13, 56, 81, 95, 180, 240, 263; new bourgeoisie, 189 Brunschvicg, Leon, 129n40, 143, 200, 258 Cabanis, Pierre, 197, 198–9 China. See Maoism Christian Democracy, 218, 221, 233–5 Communism, 56, 93, 95, 259–61. See also Lenin, Vladimir; Stalin, Joseph Comte, Auguste, 13, 53–4, 191–3, 196, 200, 255. See also sociologism; Spirito, Ugo Condorcet, Nicolas de, 193–4, 195n8 Cotta, Sergio, 69–73, 166–7 Cox, Harvey, 53–4, 158n11 Crétineau-Joly, Jacques 176 Croce, Benedetto, 25, 38–40, 62–3, 107, 203–13, 258 Dalbiez, Roland, 11 Danielou, Jean, 126–7, 140, 219 death of God (theology), 4–5. See also Bonhoeffer, Dietrich De Gasperi, Alcide, 39

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268

Index

democracy, 142, 150–1, 168, 175, 218, 244. See also Christian Democracy de Montaigne, Michel, 176 Destutt de Tracy, Antoine, 190, 194, 198–202 East-West opposition, 218, 235 Engels, Friedrich, 46, 71, 129 Enlightenment, 151–2, 207, 243, 258. See also ideologists; progressivism eroticism, 222, 226–7 ethics, 123, 156–65. See also Kant, Immanuel; Rosmini, Antonio eudemonology, 178–9 Europe, 38–40, 55, 83–4, 151, 228; Eurocentrism, 37, 139n69, 256–7 extremism, 26–32 Fascism, 23, 29–31, 32n20, 93, 96– 117, 227, 264 Foucault, Michel, 46 Frankfurt school, 74 Freud, Sigmund, 11, 16 Gaudium et Spes, 231 Gentile, Giovanni, 108–17, 154n2, 173, 183–4, 198, 205 Gilson, Étienne, 66–7, 138n66, 224n17, 250 Gnosticism, 5–6, 17, 125; See also Weil, Simone González Ruiz, José María, 54–5 Gouhier, Henri, 191–2, 193n5, 200 Gramsci, Antonio, 105 Guyau, Jean-Marie, 183 Hayek, Friedrich von, 76–7 Hegel, Georg W.F., 16, 65, 92, 162, 205–6, 241 Hitler, Adolf, 143–4 human sciences. See sociologism

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Idealism, 94, 101–2, 107, 143, 145, 175. See also Croce, Benedetto; Gentile, Giovanni; Hegel, Georg W.F. ideologists, 148, 188n28, 190–202, 254 ideology, 148, 190, 198–202, 227 immanence (of the divine). See Idealism; transcendence instrumentalism, 12, 80, 179, 220–1, 225–30, 251–3. See also sociologism intrinsic evaluations, 186 Italian philosophy of the Risorgimento, 197–8 Juvalta, Eminio, 60–1, 162n16, 181– 2, 185–8 Kant, Immanuel, 41, 202, 133–4, 161–2, 173–4. See also sociologism Kelsen, Hans, 235 Laberthonnière, Lucien, 224 Lachelier, Jules, 168 Lemâitre, Henri, 100n11, 101n12 Lenin, Vladimir, 43, 62, 64–5, 99, 103, 246; and Mussolini, 100–2, 115 Leo XIII, Pope, 244–5 Leopardi, Giacomo, 195, 199–200 Lequier, Jules, 253n27 liberal age (1870–1914), 94, 179–80, 208–9, 213 liberalism, 79, 105, 196, 208, 265 libertinism, 176, 177n9, 186, 227 Longo, Luigi, 231 Lukács, György, 64, 98, 144n80 Maine de Biran, 193n5, 201 Malebranche, Nicolas, 138–9, 179, 181 Mannheim, Karl, 163

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Index 269

Maoism, 27, 29, 32 Marcuse, Herbert, 12, 15–17, 27–9, 56, 170–1 Maritain, Jacques, 90, 116, 224, 229, 250, 261, 266 Marx, Karl, 6, 98–9, 122, 190, 197, 206, 220. See also Marxism Marxism, 10–11, 94–5, 148, 152, 164– 5, 236–9, 250–1, 262–5; decomposition of, 12–13, 23, 31, 43–4, 79–81, 169–70, 219, 242; historical materialism, 89, 103, 177; sublation of, 5, 43, 63, 207, 248–9; Christianity and, 52–3, 82, 90, 146, 221. See also atheism; Communism; Gentile, Giovanni; Lenin, Vladimir; progressivism; relativism; structuralism; Weil, Simone materialism, 148, 195, 197. See also Lenin, Vladimir; Marxism Mazzini, Giuseppe, 141, 143 metaphysics, 15, 142, 146, 155, 172, 241, 252 millennialism, 11, 31, 42, 44, 84–5, 127 Modernism, 37, 55, 63, 113, 146, 154–5, 158, 172; See also neo-­ Modernism; progressivism: Catholic; Teilhard de Chardin, Pierre; Weil, Simone modernity (idea of), 17–18, 66, 142; Catholic attitudes about, 86–95, 116 Moeller, Charles, 132, 137 Mounier, Emmanuel, 253 Mussolini, Benito, 101–8, 264. See also Fascism nationalism, 101, 111–12 natural irreligion, 94, 130 Nazism, 48, 89, 93, 100–1, 142, 261, 264. See also Hitler, Adolf

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neo-Modernism, 26, 87–93, 224, 239, 242–55, 266 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 133, 162, 183, 206, 228 Nolte, Ernst, 42, 96–102, 144, 263n39 participation, 156–7, 173, 179, 206, 226, 251 Pascal, Blaise, 129n41, 138n66, 176– 7, 179, 193–4 perfectism, 138, 265 pessimism, 5n5, 125, 138–9 Pétrement, Simone, 132–3 Picavet, François, 193n5 Platonism, 81, 120, 165, 181, 191, 220, 229. See also participation; Weil, Simone political unity of Catholics, 231–3 positivism, 23, 78, 148, 168, 197, 200, 203, 207, 258. See also Comte, Auguste; Saint-Simon, Henry de progressivism, 35–57, 96, 127, 257–9; Catholic, 4–5, 42–3, 46–55, 224, 236–66 rationalism, 3, 6, 65, 92, 129–30, 136, 237–8 reactionary thought, 22, 32, 176n6; Catholic, 196, 261, 265 relativism, 23, 44, 79, 80, 94, 164n24 religious dimension, 74, 140, 145, 219, 229, 230, 233, 242. See also natural irreligion Renouvier, Charles, 132n47, 196, 253n27 Rensi, Giuseppe, 177, 202n20 revolutionary thought, 11–13, 31–2, 79–80, 92, 103, 123, 148–9, 176n6. See also Fascism; Marcuse, Herbert; Marx, Karl; Marxism; perfectism

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270

Index

Risorgimento. See Gentile, Giovanni; Italian philosophy of the Risorgimento Romanticism, 10, 39–40, 207; Catholic, 148, 194, 195n8 Rosmini, Antonio, 7, 26, 69, 163, 238, 240, 243, 265n41; Rosminian ethics, 156–9, 173–89, 226, 241. See also Italian philosophy of the Risorgimento Rostow, Walt, 260 Russia, 21, 38, 218, 230, 256 Sade, Marquis de, 45, 94, 166 Saint-Simon, Henry de, 26, 77–8, 188n28, 243, 255 Sartre, Jean Paul, 165 Scheler, Max, 22n6, 205–6, 219–20 Sciacca, Michele Federico, 155n4, 184 scientism, 22, 47, 59–61, 78, 141, 144–6, 225 secularism, 4, 53–4, 133n50, 145, 152, 155, 160–5 secularization, 3–7, 99, 115, 117, 153–4; of heresies, 12, 84. See also atheism; natural irreligion; secularism self-realization, 76, 150, 178, 189, 226, 253 sexual revolution. See eroticism society of well-being. See technological society sociologism, 44, 136, 145, 148–52, 163, 170, 173, 177, 190–5; and Kantian morality, 181–2, 187–8. See also instrumentalism; relativism solipsism, 104 Sorel, Georges, 108 Spirito, Ugo, 48, 57–8 Stalin, Joseph, 93, 99, 264

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Stendhal (Marie-Henri Beyle), 195n8 structuralism, 46, 145 student protests of 1968, 4, 15, 19– 21, 24–34, 171–2. See also extremism technological society, 12–15, 20–4, 57–8, 150–1, 166–72, 240–2; Christianity facing, 68–85, 147, 157, 221–31. Teilhard de Chardin, Pierre, 54, 90–3, 121–22, 228, 250n23, 252–3 theology. See Barth, Karl; Bonhoeffer, Dietrich; death of God; Teilhard de Chardin, Pierre Thomism, 38, 40, 138, 249–51 totalitarianism, 14, 23–4, 56–7, 169 traditionalism, 59, 66, 223. See also nationalism transcendence, 3, 52, 127, 143, 164; historical, 10, 17, 42, 96, 116. See also Croce, Benedetto Tresmontant, Claude, 122n10, 245 utopia, 22, 31, 80, 103 Vahanian, Gabriel, 47 values (permanent), 9–18 Viallet, François-Albert, 30n11, 88, 91 Vico, Giambattista, 81, 124, 168, 240 Voegelin, Eric, 6, 17 Weber, Max, 98 Weil, Simone, 7, 51–2, 118–52, 167– 8, 191, 218, 228–9; anti-Modernist, 121, 228, 244; Gnostic, 125–31, 136–7; on Marxism, 122–4; Platonist, 119–26 Zolla, Elémire, 189n29

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