The Age of Cinna: Crucible of Late Republican Rome 3515079483, 9783515079488

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Michael Lovano

The Age of Cinna: Crucible of Late Republican Rome

Historia Einzelschriften 158

Franz Steiner Verlag Stuttgart

MICHAEL LOVANO

THE AGE OF CINNA: CRUCIBLE OF LATE REPUBLICAN ROME

HISTORIA ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ALTE GESCHICHTE REVUE D’HISTOIRE · RIVISTA ANCIENNE JOURNAL OF ANCIENT HISTORY

·

DI STORIA ANTICA

·

EINZELSCHRIFTEN HERAUSGEGEBEN VON MORTIMER CHAMBERS/LOS ANGELES HEINZ HEINEN/TRIER MARTIN JEHNE/DRESDEN FRANÇOIS PASCHOUD/GENEVE · HILDEGARD TEMPORINI/TÜBINGEN

HEFT 158

FRANZ STEINER VERLAG STUTTGART

2002

MICHAEL LOVANO

THE

AGE

OF

CINNA: OF

CRUCIBLE

LATE ROME

REPUBLICAN

FRANZ STEINER VERLAG STUTTGART

2002

Die Deutsche Bibliothek –CIP-Einheitsaufnahme Lovano, Michael: Theageof Cinna: crucible of late Republican Rome/ Michael Lovano. –Stuttgart: Steiner, 2002 (Historia: Einzelschriften; H. 158) 3 07948– 515– ISBN 3–

ISO 9706

Jede Verwertung des Werkes außerhalb der Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist unzulässig undstrafbar. Dies gilt insbesondere fürÜbersetzung, Nachdruck, Mikroverfilmung odervergleichbare Verfahren sowie fürdieSpeicherung inDatenverarbeitungsanlagen. © 2002 byFranz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH, Sitz Stuttgart. Gedruckt auf säurefreiem, alterungsbeständigem Papier. Druck: Druckerei Proff, Eurasburg. Printed inGermany

TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements

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Prologue: Cinna andModern Scholarship

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1. The Tribulations of theTribunes: Prelude to Cinna’s Coup d’État

2. Sulla’s Precedent andRome’s Peril: Cinna’s First Consulship, 87 B.C.

3. Cinnae dominatio

4. The View from Outside:

Provincial andForeign Affairs

13 25

53

in theAgeof Cinna

79

5. Sulla Redux and the Fall of the Cinnans

105

Epilogue: The Legacy of Cinna

137

Appendix: Sources for the Age of Cinna

141

Bibliography

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Index of Names Index of Special Topics Index of Sources

175 179 180

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Several individuals deserve myheartfelt thanks for helping metobring this project to fruition, especially Professor Ronald Mellor andProfessor Mortimer Chambers of U.C.L.A., and Professor Lawrence Tritle of Loyola Marymount University. RonMellor, mysagacious guide through the world of Rome and the world of academia, has always been there to bolster my resolve andaid me in numerous ways. Mort Chambers, the voice of sound counsel over the years, has shown tireless interest and determination in seeing this project reach its optimal form. Lastly, Larry Tritle, trusted friend and advisor, first introduced me to the historian’s craft and suggested the topic of Cinna. What I owethese three men–as mentors, colleagues, and friends –is beyond evaluation. The staff-members, students, andcolleagues from U.C.L.A. have been constant sources of encouragement, good sense, andsteadfast belief in me. So, I would like to express a special gratitude to Barbara Bernstein, Shela Patel, and Sue Jensen, Jason Nuesca, Philip Reiss, Benjamin Kang, and Annie Lien, Darel Engen, Stephen Chappell, Jason Moralee, Geoff Nathan, andRobert Gurval. Last of all, I amthankful for andto myfamily, Vince, Joe, Simone, and Graziella, as well as my good friend from college days, Ulises PérezFlores. They have been there for mewith love andsupport all through the long years of learning. They continue to remind meof what matters most in this life. I hope to make them proud. I dedicate this work to mymother, Biagina, without whom I could never have reached so high or achieved so much.

PROLOGUE: CINNA ANDMODERN SCHOLARSHIP Some scholars believe that interest in the Late Roman Republic has died out, others that it is aneranolonger worth studying. They needonly look at the great many books andarticles that have come outinjust the last decade or two, on the sources, literature, personalities, politics, coinage, or socioeconomic developments of the era, to see howmistaken are their assumptions and conclusions. In fact, reappraisals and fresh interpretations of

various aspects of theRoman Republic continue to beproduced. The period still holds great fascination among scholars and students. One of the periods that has been illuminated by this fairly recent explosion of research is thedecade of the 80s B.C., a critical time in Rome’s political and social development. Important changes were taking place in Rome’s relations with herItalian allies, inherpolitical structures, andin the position of military commanders vis-à-vis the central government. These changes set the stage for the great civil wars, those destructive conflicts between Caesar andPompey, Octavian andAntony, that brought an endto the Republic. The characters andcrises of the 80s B.C. continue to attract the attention andinterest of scholars. The penetrating andground-breaking work of Badian, Broughton, Gabba, andTaylor in the 1950s and 1960s forms the basis of the more recent studies. Further questions on such topics as military manpower, the courts, citizenship, andprosopography have been raised in these studies. Important books on significant figures in the 80s B.C. nowsupplement Carney’s still very useful biography of Marius, for example, Spann’s biography of Sertorius, Keaveney’s books on Sulla and Lucullus, Marshall’s and Ward’s treatments of Crassus, and Seager’s life of Pompey. Further, other scholars have provided fresh insights into the provinces of Rome during the early first century B.C. In addition, a great deal of useful research has opened up the sources themselves to better and closer investigation. Gabba’s commentary on Appian is still one of the best works in this category, butit is nowjoined by McGushin’s commentary on Sallust’s Histories, Konrad’s on Plutarch’s Sertorius, andCarney’s researches into theMarius andthe Sulla, as well as on Cicero and Valerius Maximus. There is also the plethora of source studies in the last twenty years. We should also note the new editions of

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Prologue: Cinna andModern Scholarship

certain fragmentary texts, such as Criniti’s Licinianus andZorzetti’s Exuperantius. Finally, several scholars have carefully examined the numismatic evidence for this period. None of these works makes claim to comprehensiveness; each of them opens many avenues for further inquiry. Certain aspects of the 80s B.C. still deserve closer scrutiny, andthe entire era merits a fuller treatment in light of newhistorical approaches andnewevidence. The present work hopes to fulfill that task. It investigates this pivotal decade by re-examining and re-evaluating L. Cornelius Cinna, Roman senator andconsul. Cinna is one of the most enigmatic, tragic, fascinating faction”of Rome’s ruling class that figures in all Roman history. Heleda “ was the first to dominate the state politically; he andhis supporters set a crucial precedent to be followed with varying results by Sulla, Caesar, and Octavian. Other works have been devoted to Cinna and his era. The first was a dissertation written by H.Bennett in 1923. Bennett reached some insightful and still valid conclusions, but covered only the career of Cinna himself (87– 84 B.C.), saying nothing about his surviving regime. Forty years later, C.M. Bulst produced an article on certain political issues in Cinna’s first consulship, his relations with the Senate andwith Sulla, the demise of his faction. Twenty years ago, B.R. Katz focused his articles on political and military developments in the early years of Cinna’s career, especially those preceding his first consulship, while B.W. Frier investigated the war of propaganda waged between Cinna and Sulla. Most recently, in the new edition of the Cambridge Ancient History, R. Seager haswritten a balanced summary of the Cinnan era. Most modern scholars have followed our biased ancient sources in regarding Cinna as a tyrant; even Bennett occasionally fell into this trap during his reappraisal of Cinna. Just as unfortunately, some have interpreted Cinna’s alliance with Marius as indicative of a long-standing relationship with the great general, and have thus minimized Cinna’s initiative, painting his independent goals as “ Marian”andhis followers as weak or , Marius. On the other hand, major player” unimpressive flunkies of the “ modern re-appraisals have sometimes gone too far in converting the Cinnans either into a group of principled “democrats”or manipulative, unprincipled opportunists, hungry for power. Scholars have reacted so vehemently to the ancients and to each other that they have often lost sight of the complexities of the Cinnan regime andthe manCinna himself. The present examination attempts to bring some balance back to the study of Cinna and his era, by clarifying certain historical details, by reexamining oldquestions andasking newones often ignored by scholars, in the broader context of the dynamic 80s B.C. What factors contributed to

Prologue: Cinna andModern Scholarship

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Cinna’s rise to preeminence? Howcohesive washis faction? What role did various elements in Roman society play in the regime? Was the regime beneficial or detrimental to the Roman State? How were the provinces affected? How, why, andhowsuccessfully didCinna andhis faction cope with thepressing problems that faced Rome at that time? Most importantly, this work attempts, first, to extricate Cinna from partisan labels so that he in full relief”andbe better evaluated, and, second, to can stand before us “ dominated”Rome. determine howhe andhis followers “ Cinna emerges as a competent military strategist and an astute politician who, through conviction andambition, rose to head an unusual coalidominatio”was no military despotism; his faction did not exertion. His “ cise absolute or tyrannical authority over the State. It is true that in the critical decade of the 80s B.C., the seeds of the Republic’s later fatal struggles were planted and that the Cinnan regime did contribute to this legacy of smoldering civil antagonism. It is also true, however, that Cinna andhis faction ensured the political andeconomic stability of the Roman State, preserving it during this perilous period.

THE TRIBULATIONS OF THE TRIBUNES: PRELUDE TO CINNA’S COUP D’ÉTAT What caused the violent division between theequestrians andthesenate except avarice? Hence arose the attempt of Drusus to promote citizenship for the Latins, which resulted in war with our allies. (Florus, Epitome of Roman History. 1.47.8–10)

P. Sulpicius, a tribune of the commons, instigated byC. Marius, proposed ruinous laws:

that exiles should be recalled, that new citizens and freedmen should be distributed among the tribes, andthat C. Marius should be appointed commander to oppose Mithri(Livy, Periochae. 76) dates, King of Pontus.

The rise of Cinna to dominance over the Roman State did not take place without preconditions. He took advantage of certain existing issues and conflicts as a means to political andmilitary success for himself. If he had been without such means, it is hard to imagine that the Cinnae dominatio would ever have materialized. Wemustplace Cinna’s coup d’état within its proper context through anexamination of the years preceding it. Wecanview themajor issues of those years through thecareers of two tribunes of theplebs, M. Livius Drusus theYounger andP.Sulpicius Rufus. These men were friends and had connections with the same circle of senators. Each took upon himself the task of adapting and implementing some policies out of the famous Gracchan reforms. They were both espeItalian question,”that is, how to correct the cially concerned about the “ imbalance of power between the Italian allies andthe Romans. The latter hadthe larger share of rights andprivileges in the State, while the former did the larger share of the fighting and the paying of taxes. From different motives, Drusus andSulpicius sought to fully integrate the Italians into the Roman system, to open to them all the benefits of the Roman State. When they failed, Italians and Romans came to blows in the Social War. Cinna would inherit his political platform from these tribunes, and the civil war accompanying his rise to power was in many ways an extension of the Social Warthey hadsparked.1 191; (1962a): 197– 228; (1970– background, see Badian (1958a): 167– 731; Brunt (1962a): 69; (1965b): 91– 93; (1971b): 1– 409; (1972): 668– 1971): 402– 160; Gabba (1976): 1– 83; Keaveney 43, 70– 19, 74–111; Crawford (1981): 153– 202; Nicolet (1976): 1– 48, 110– 129; Salmon 17, 37– 76, 99–113, 197– (1987): 3– 1

1 For general

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1. TheTribulations of theTribunes

I Drusus’tribunate followed onthe heels of more than a decade of rancorous fragmentation within the Roman elite; the political trials of the 90s exacerbated tensions that hadbeen growing since the Gracchi, especially tensions between hard-liners andmore reform-minded leaders. These trials served as arenas for personal combat between prominent enemies andalliances of amici. They seldom represented genuine attacks against abuses of power by senatorial officials, instead functioning as vehicles for vendetta. The trials also illustrate for usthefluid, flexible, andunpredictable nature of political alliances in Late Republican Rome. Those who found themselves opponents in one case often waged a concerted effort as allies in another, driven by a whole array of special interests. These trials revealed the senatorial aristocracy to be too absorbed in its internal strife. It was out of touch with the dangerous fallout from the military career of Marius and the deeds of Saturninus only a few years earlier: thepotential threat of a personal army of clients, the land-hunger of Rome’s veterans, andthe desire of herItalian allies for citizenship reform.2 Some nobiles were interested in reforms, devising a plan to attract Italian leaders to their camp andstrengthen the position of the Senate by incorporating the aristocracies of Italy. These senators backed Drusus as their standard-bearer; hewasanupright, dignified, competent young orator, in whom the older generation of reformists had high hopes.3 Like them, Drusus was a reformer, not a revolutionary. He planned to bring about change within the constitutional framework of the Roman State, for the benefit of Rome’s ruling class.4

2

3

4

(1969): 112– 125; (1982): 90–127, 169– 171; Sherwin-White (1973): 3– 133; (1972): 14; (1960): 3–13. On the sources for 58; Smith (1958): 2–10; Taylor (1966): 1– 23– 446. Sulpicius, see Lintott (1971b): 442– 32; Diod. 36.16.1; Livy. Per. 69; Vell. 2.15.3; Val. Max. 3.8.4, App. BC. 1.31– 457; 342; Brunt (1988): 456– 21; Badian (1957): 318– 4.1.12, 5.2.7; MRR 2.20– 59; Jones (1972): 45– 49, 52– 62, 67; (1964): 99, 110; (1966): 32– Gruen (1965): 60– 85. 4; Diod. 37.10.1; Vell. 2.13.1–3, 14.1; Cic. Mil. 7.16; De Or. 1.25; Flor. 2.17.1– Rab. Post. 7.16; ND. 3.32.81. For contrary views, see Tac. Ann. 3.27; Dio. 2.38.55, 59, 61; Luc. 6.795; Plin. NH.25.21.52. Onhisjudiciary law, see Ewins (1960): 94– 71; 3; Livy. Per. 70– 36; Diod. 37.10.1– 7. See also App. BC. 1.35– 107; Fuks, pp. 1– 7; Vell. 2.13–14; Val. Max. 3.1.2, 9.5.2; Obs. 54; Gabba (1958): 116– Oros. 5.18.1– 460; Keaveney 25; Brunt (1965b): 107; (1988): 459– 123; (1976): 219; (1956a): 13– (1987): 87– 88, 90– 91. 133. Gabba (1976): 131–

1.TheTribulations of theTribunes

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Astribune in91 B.C., Drusus managed to geta number of laws enacted, but his reform of the courts alienated equestrians andhis plans for establishing colonies made northern Italians nervous.5 Also, he continuously encountered strong opposition from afactio of personal enemies andhardline conservatives in the Senate. They attacked his bills as invalid on technical grounds, andwhenthey managed in this wayto strike downsome of his legislation, it only encouraged Drusus to promote “more radical” reforms.6 Drusus nowsought broad Italian support by putting forward a proposal for the enfranchisement of all Italian allies. This waspart of the reformist plan to bring theruling elites throughout Italy into thesenatorial fold. Many senators, however, shrank from this idea, not wanting to lose their special status andpower. Ontheother hand, many Italian leaders nowgravitated to Drusus’side, regarding himas theone Roman leader whoseriously wanted 7 to solve the “Italian question.” If we follow our sources for this period, Appian8 andVelleius Paterculus9, we see that the Italian desire for Roman citizenship was evidently widespread andhadintensified since the failed attempt of Gaius Gracchus; in fact, many Italians hadfound ways to enroll illegally as citizens! They sought clear advantages from citizenship: parity with Romans, a political voice in Rome, a chance to promote andprotect economic interests overseas, andrewards for military service. They demanded the right to vote in order to increase their power of participation in a State just as much Italian as Roman.10 The local Italian aristocrats, the so-called dominobiles, hadthegreatest interest among the Italians ingetting thefranchise. They hadthewealth and the time to travel to Rome to exercise their votes; they were quite involved in commercial operations and finance both in Italy and in the overseas empire. Indeed, these Italian leaders possessed greater influence outside Italy than they did inside; in the Greek East, for example, they were even 321; Wiseman (1971): 159, 161; Keaveney (1987): 168–169; 5 Marshall (1987): 319– 22, 582. MRR2.21– 73; Badian 36; Livy. Per. 71; Gabba (1958): 116–125; (1976): 72– 6 App. BC. 1.35– 90; Taylor (1966): 226; Brunt (1965b): 96; Keaveney (1987): 88– (1962a): 223– 145; Hardy, p. 262. 144; Staveley, pp. 143– 7 Gabba (1976): 73. 228; Keaveney 8 App. BC. 1.37; Gabba (1958): 123–125; Badian (1962a): 223– 87. (1987): 86– 9 Vell. 2.15.2. 10 Brunt (1965b): 91–104; (1971b): 74–111; Gabba (1976): 18–19, 74; Keaveney 129; Sherwin-White 378; Salmon (1982): 128– 87; Nagle, pp. 367– (1987): 86– 149. (1973): 134–

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1. The Tribulations of the Tribunes

referred to as Romaioi. So, many Italian aristocrats hadcome to recognize the financial usefulness of Roman citizenship and the need to equalize political power at home andabroad. TheItalian peoples united behind these leaders, voicing their own concerns about land distribution, taxes, trade, andmilitary service.11 Drusus would be their champion. He already hadpersonal dealings with a number of these domi nobiles. His sound and insightful policy of reform could have achieved the unity of these menbehind the Roman Senate, but treacherously”slain, in his ownhome, before his plans could Drusus was“ be implemented.12 Many senators, short-sighted, fearful, andgreedy, threw away the opportunity Drusus hadpresented to solve the problems with the Italians without resort to a military showdown.13 When his Italian supporters learned that their benefactor was dead, they realized that the fight for citizenship, or for freedom from Roman subjugation, nowpassed directly to them.14

II Following the murder of Drusus, over half of Italy rose in revolt against Rome, refusing to “play second fiddle”in matters of political rights. The Italians seceded from Rome’s dominion, setting up an anti-Rome called 87 B.C. wasin truth a Italia, sparking the Social War.The Social Warof 91– civil war between comrade andcomrade that dealt a serious blow to the fabric of the Roman State, with repercussions on the very stability of the Republic. The well-organized, concerted efforts andanti-Roman confederacy of the Italian rebels leaves little doubt that they hadprepared for their insurrection long before the outbreak of hostilities in the fall of 91. The spark that finally ignited thepowder-keg of rebellion came whena Roman praetor and his assistant stumbled upon these preparations at Asculum and were killed for their bad luck, along with the other Roman inhabitants of the area.15

3, 8–10. Diod. 37.13.1; Livy. Per. 71; Plut. Cat. Min. 2.1; 11 See sources in nn. 2– 77; Keaveney (1987): 87. Gabba (1976): 75– 12 Gabba (1976): 19. See sources in nn. 3 and 14. 13 Flor. 2.17.9. 38; Cic (?). AdHerr. 4.22.31; Mil. 7.16; Gabba (1958): 121–128; 14 App. BC. 1.36– 92, 203. Keaveney (1987): 90– 3; Obs. 54; Oros. 5.18.1; Strab. 39; Livy. Per. 72; Diod. 37.2.2– 15 App. BC. 1.38– 34; Brunt 5.4.2; Val. Max. 8.6.4; CIL I.848; Gabba (1958): 126–130; (1956a): 25– 131; 130; Letta, pp. 105– 93, 97–100; Keaveney (1987): 117–118, 121– (1965b): 92–

1. The Tribulations of the Tribunes

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Appian provides us with a list of the rebel groups; not all of Rome’s allies broke from her rule. The Latins remained loyal for the most part, probably because of their close ethnic ties with Rome and their special, privileged position within the Roman commonwealth. The Etrurians and Umbrians, although faced with social unrest anddissidents whodesired to join the rebels, nevertheless quickly accepted the legal concessions offered by Rome. Still, this left thevast majority of the Italians, some of whomhad been Rome’s bitterest enemies in the past and the best warriors in the peninsula, in opposition to Rome.16 Thewarbegan inearnest in90 B.C., with losses andfrustrations for the Roman side. The Samnites defeated oneconsular army, while theother lost its commander in thecampaign against the Marsi. Only themilitary skill of C. Marius, whotook command androuted the Marsi, saved those legions from further disaster. L. Cornelius Sulla, legate of Caesar, the surviving consul, did manage to score some successes later in the campaign season. Nevertheless, the Senate, motivated by the military debacles, supported Caesar’s lex Julia. This law granted full citizenship to Latins and other loyal allies (perhaps even to those who laid down their arms by a certain date), provided for their distribution into a small number of voting tribes, and gave commanders in the field the right to enfranchise troops virtutis causa. So, the Roman government hoped to quell the rebellion through cooptation andconcessions.17 Instead, fierce fighting characterized the following two years. Another Roman consul died in combat with the Marsi; they were, however, finally broken by twoof his legates, one of whom wasL. Cornelius Cinna. Other rebel peoples meta similar fate as, oneby one, the Roman armies defeated them. The consul Cn. Pompeius Strabo, father of Pompeius Magnus, captured the important stronghold of Asculum bysiege, while Sulla achieved a series of stunning successes against the southern rebels, eventually captur-

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372; (1982): 129–130; 368; Salmon (1962): 107–119; (1967): 336– Nagle, pp. 367– 149. Onthe relevant numismatic evidence andmoneySherwin-White (1973): 145– ers, see Cic. Verr. 2.119, 4.56; Livy. 26.23.3; MRR 2.33, 542, 3.48; Crawford (1974): 75, 340; Mattingly (1982): 45; Campana, pp. 34, 89, 96. 7; Fam. 13.30; Gabba (1958): App.BC. 1.49; Livy. Per. 74; Cic. Balb. 21; Arch. 5– 85, 119–120; Salmon (1982): 129–131; (1969): 148; Keaveney (1987): 84– 146– 97; Ruoff-Väänänen, pp. 74– 63; Brunt (1965b): 94, 96– 125; Tibiletti, pp. 45– 123– 77; Biscardi, p. 241.

49; Livy. Per. 73; Gell. 4.4.3; Cic. Balb. 21; Fam. 13.30; Obs. 55; 17 App. BC. 1.40– 32; Brunt (1965b): 94, 33; Vell. 2.16.4,20.2; ILS 8888; MRR 2.25– Plut. Mar. 32– 94; (1958): 130–148; Keaveney 437; Gabba (1976): 89– 108; (1971a): 435– 107– 219; Salmon (1982): 204, 207– 171, 203– 150, 170– (1982b): 500– 505; (1987): 131– 153; (1956b): 4. 179; Valgiglio (1956a): 145– 135; (1958): 159– 129, 133–

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ing their capital, Bovianum. Marius is conspicuously absent from the fighting; this was the year he retired from service, probably as a result of poor health andold age. Even without Marius though, the Romans forced the unconditional surrender of most of the insurgents, with theexception of the Samnites andLucanians.18 each body of allies was enrolled in a tribe of its Appian informs us that “ own so that they might not, by being mingled with the old citizens, vote them down in elections by force of numbers.”This phrase alludes to the mechanism of the lex Julia, and these new citizens (or at least some of them) must have been those wholater supported Sulpicius andCinna. The Romans presented the appearance of generosity and mercy to their conquered allies and could hope for the imminent and full resolution of the Social War.19 This conflict hadserious consequences for thefuture of Rome’s Republic. Warfare on such a scale hadnot taken place in the peninsula since the time of Hannibal. Wecanimagine some of theresults: theloss of leadership with the death of so many prominent andexperienced men on both sides; the losses in manpower, which must have hadsignificant demographic and economic repercussions; and the loss of property, material goods, crops, livestock, andbuildings in town andcountryside. In return, the waroffered no loot or land grants or rewards of any traditional kind for the common soldier, except the cause of total victory andtheruins of a country in agony. Just as important were the psychological effects of the war. It conditioned and desensitized citizen-soldiers to the brutal necessities of civil strife, such as regarding former comrades, even relatives, as enemies and doing whatever it took to destroy them. Such strife must have engendered anunderlying resentment between rebels andconquerors, a deep animosity that weseerearing its uglyheadinlater civil wars. Thebitterness left bythe Social Warwasa fundamental obstacle to the true unity of Rome andItaly until the reign

of Augustus.20

24; Oros. 76; Cic. Arch. 7; Diod. 37.2.9, 37.13– 53; Livy. Per. 74– 18 App. BC. 1.50– 39; Gabba 30; Plut. Mar. 33; Vell. 2.16.4; Val. Max. 5.4ext7; MRR 2.32– 5.18.8– 439; Keaveney (1987): 151– 96; (1971a): 437– (1958): 148–158; Brunt (1965b): 95– 51; Letta, pp. 105–108; Salmon (1967): 370– 161, 171; and Madden (1983): 47– 372; Valgiglio (1956a): 149–153; (1956b): 4. 76, 79; Cic. Arch. 11; Vell. 2.17; Brunt (1965b): 108– 19 App. BC. 1.53; Livy. Per. 75– 231; Salmon (1958): 94; Harris (1971): 230– 91; Gabba (1976): 89– 109; (1971a): 89– 157; Taylor (1960): 103; Biscardi, pp. 242– 184; Sherwin-White (1973): 150– 179– 249. 243, 246– 204; 89; Keaveney (1987): 189–190, 203– 20 Sall. Hist. 1.20 McG; McGushin, pp. 85– 160. 139, 143– Salmon (1982): 135–

1.TheTribulations of theTribunes

19

III The year 88 B.C. should have witnessed the end of the Social War, hut instead it sawthe civil strife of Italy enter the ranks of the Roman nobility andthe city of Rome. The Samnites andLucanians still resisted surrender; operations continued in Campania against the rebel stronghold of Nola; the newly-enfranchised citizens under the lex Julia were dissatisfied with the proposed enrollment in only a fewvoting tribes.21 Besides all this, andeven more ominous, Mithridates VI, King of Pontus, hadinvaded the territories of his neighbors and even the Roman province of Asia. The command against Mithridates fell by lot to one of the consuls of 88, L. Cornelius Sulla, whohadbeen elected primarily onhis merits as a commander in the Social War.22 Sulla had competed with and won out over a number of qualified candidates for the eastern command, among them C. Marius. Before Sulla could leave on this expedition, however, he faced another obstacle. Oneof the plebeian tribunes, P. Sulpicius Rufus, proposed “ruinous laws.”of which the most controversial called for the fair distribution, throughout all the voting tribes, of the new Italian citizens. The consuls, Sulla and Q. Pompeius Rufus, represented the conservative interests of the oldcitizens, notto mention the senators whomight lose considerable influence over the tribal votes; the consuls opposed Sulpicius’ measures and attempted to quash them by declaring the cessation of all public business.23

56; Diod. 37.2.11–14; Livy. Per. 76; Vell. 2.17.1, 18.4, 20.2; 21 App. BC. 1.53, 55– 440; Gabba (1958): 161–166; Keaveney Val. Max. 1.6.4, 6.9.6; Brunt (1971a) 439– 246; Salmon (1967): 370– (1987): 171– 172; Nicolet (1976): 226– 372; (1982): 130– 251. 83; Biscardi, pp. 249– 134; Taylor (1966): 74– 460; Valgiglio (1956b): 3–6; Woolliscroft, p. 35. 22 Keaveney (1979): 451–

23 OnSulla’s competition with other consulars for thecommand, see Ch. 4, n. 53 and above n. 22. On Marius andSulpicius, see Livy. Per. 77; Plut. Sull. 8; App. BC. 166; (1956a): 15, 87, 90; Carney (1962): 322; Keaveney 1.56; Gabba (1958): 164– 287; Valgiglio (1956b): 13– (1983c): 56– 59; VanOoteghem (1964): 278– 19; (1975): 270. Onferiae imperativae, see Michels, pp.40, 73. According to Livy Per. 76 263– and(?) AdHerr. 2.45, the proposals of Sulpicius included a provision for the recall of exiles. Who these were, and indeed whether these sources are correct, is still a 73) seems most matter of much scholarly debate. Gruen’s argument ((1965): 72– persuasive. These sources cannot refer to those exiled under the lex Varia because Metellan group,”though former friends of Sulpithose men, all members of the “ cius, in 88 could only be regarded as hostile to his plans, especially because of his alliance with Marius. Why would Sulpicius wish to recall potential adversaries? yet. Further, the references cannot be to the Marian exiles because there were none – Thus, the meagre evidence yields only speculative conclusions.

20

1. The Tribulations of the Tribunes

Sulpicius wasprepared, however, to useforce if necessary to pass these laws. He was supported in this by Marius; Sulpicius hoped that Marius would usehis influence with theequestrians andthe veterans to push for the program. An armed band of men working for the tribune threatened the consuls, who fled the Forum, and a riot ensued between old and new citizens (in which Sulla’s son-in-law, Pompeius’ son, was killed). Sulla sought refuge in Marius’house in anattempt to urge his former commander to exercise his influence over Sulpicius andstop the violence; this strategy failed. Thereafter, Sulla caved in to popular wishes, rescinding theferiae, and then hurried to Nola, where his army was stationed. Pompeius had already been deposed from office, so Sulla had reason to fear for his command. He could not leave Rome in the hands of his enemies and realized that the only weapon available to himwasthe army itself.24 With the suspension lifted, Sulpicius secured the passage of his laws; further, he included among them a newbill that called for the transfer of Sulla’s command to Marius. This was Marius’ reward for his political assistance. Two military tribunes were sent to take over the army at Nola from Sulla.25 Why did Sulpicius place himself between Marius and Sulla? Plutarch would have us believe that Sulpicius was a villain, with a bodyguard of young toughs and freedmen, but Velleius and other authors remembered him as a young aristocrat of respectable lineage whohadnever previously gotten into any trouble with the “ best people”in the State. Hehad, in fact, connections with the conservative Metelli as well as with reform-minded senators like L. Licinius Crassus andthe younger M. Livius Drusus. Yet all evil”with his proposthese sources held that Sulpicius suddenly turned to “ al to transfer the eastern command to Marius.26

24 Regarding Marius’interest in extending the franchise andthe timing of his alliance 55; cf. Sherwin-White (1973): loc. cit.; with Sulpicius, see Carney (1961a): 54– Keaveney (1987): 172. On the flight of Sulla to Marius’ house andtheir meeting, see Plut. Sull. 8 and Mar. 35.3, who says that he takes his information from the 270; Calabi, pp. 280– 163; (1975): 267– memoirs of Sulla; Valgiglio (1956a): 158– 60; Luce (1970): 192. 281; Badian (1970b): 14; Keaveney (1983c): 53–

25 Plut. Sull. 6.9, 8; Mar. 35.4; App. BC. 1.56; Vell. 2.18.4; Diod. 37.2.13; Livy. Per. 15; 58; Bennett, p. 2; Badian (1970b): 14– 77; Eut. 5.4; Keaveney (1983c): 53– 278; 88, 98; Van Ooteghem (1964): 276– 166; (1956a): 85– Gabba (1958): 164– 36. 163; (1956b): 6–15; Woolliscroft, pp. 35– Valgiglio (1956a): 158– 6; Keaveney (1983c): 54. On Sulpicius’ previous 9; Vell. 2.18.5– 26 Plut. Sull. 8– Metellan connections, including Drusus and Pompeius Rufus, see Gruen (1965): 73; Cic. Amic. 2; De Or. 1.25, 1.97, 1.99, 1.136, 2.16, 2.89, 3.11, 3.47; Brut. 65, 72– 91. 72; Hillman (1997): 90– 203; Chapman, pp. 61–

1. The Tribulations of the Tribunes

21

Clearly, these authors are hostile to Sulpicius, following their proSullan sources. What is clear from the tribune’s actions, however, is that he followed in the footsteps of his friend Drusus, indeed in the footsteps of the Gracchi, bychallenging through violent means the Senate’s stranglehold on the voting process. In his endeavor as militant tribune, Sulpicius enlisted the aid of a prominent consular, Marius, who still commanded a large following among the voters, and, in exchange for support, tried to provide the retired general with something he wanted, a newcommand. This was standard Roman politics, not the action of a traitorous monster.27 Notwithstanding these maneuvers, Sulla reached the troops at Nola long before the military tribunes sent out by Marius. Nowthat he hadlost the command, he was willing to turn on the government in Rome. Sulla conferred with the troops, convincing them of his injured dignitas, the illegality of Sulpicius’laws, andso on, andurged their complete obedience to him; he haddetermined to settle the matter by force. His menwere eager to fight Mithridates for hope of great plunder andthey feared that Marius would enlist other troops to replace them if he assumed command. So, when Marius’officers didarrive, they were stoned to death by Sulla’s men. Sulpicius and Marius retaliated by killing some of Sulla’s associates in Rome and confiscating their property, which caused a general state of confusion in the city and the Senate’s loss of control there. Meanwhile, Sulla’s army followed himin the first march on Rome by her ownforces. Significantly, allhishigh-ranking officers, withtheexception of onequaestor, deserted him.28 Envoys were sent from the Senate to ask Sulla to stop andexplain his tyactions; Sulla refused, except to say that he was freeing Rome from “ ; he also abused these envoys by having them stripped andsent back rants” to Rome with broken fasces. The Marians prepared as best they could for war. Two further embassies also failed to stop Sulla. A fourth arranged a conference between Sulla andMarius in the presence of the Senate on the Campus Martius, butthe opposing parties were both too belligerent andset on determining the issue by force, especially Sulla.29

131. See 174; Salmon (1982): 130– 27 Badian (1970b): 14; Keaveney (1987): 172– 280. 42, 624; Calabi, pp. 279– MRR2.41– 28 Plut. Sull. 9; Val. Max. 1.6.4; App. BC. 1.57; Gabba (1958): 166–169; Keaveney 67; (1987): 174; (1992): 17; Frier (1972): 590; Badian (1970b): 15; cf. (1983c): 66– 111; (1971b): 105; andLevick’s, 19; Brunt’s (1971a): 109– Gabba’s view (1976): 1– 19. 508; Van Ooteghem (1959): 18– pp. 503– 41; Badian (1964a): 79. These first envoys were the 29 Plut. Sull. 9.2; MRR 2.40– praetors M. Junius Brutus anda certain Servilius.

1. The Tribulations of the Tribunes

22

Pompeius Rufus now joined Sulla and the two men proceeded to surround Rome with their troops. Then, Sulla burst into the city, met with resistance from the people, and engaged the raw levies of Marius and Sulpicius. The latter, soon out-matched andout-numbered, fled.

Sulla hadtaken over Rome with a Roman army andnowheld the city

under martial law; Sulpicius and eleven of his associates were declared hostes and hunted down; of these, only Sulpicius was caught and executed; Marius’exile is well known. As for Sulla, he annulled Sulpicius’measures, arranged matters to his liking, andfelt able to set off for Asia immediately.30

IV

88 B.C. formed theprelude to theCinnan era in several The period from 91– ways. First, it sawthe great Marius at the nadir of his career, a bitter and dejected old general running for his life from one part of the empire to another. In 87 B.C., he andother exiles waited for anychance to reclaim a position of power at Rome andexact revenge onenemies. This chance was provided by a consul of that year, L. Cornelius Cinna, whowould receive encouragement and direct support from the exiles and their relatives and friends at home. Second, during the first decade of the first century B.C., Sulla rose to a place of prominence in the State andto the role of champion of the “ best people.”Yet he haddemonstrated howa Roman army might be turned on Rome herself, a tactical lesson that would not be lost on Cinna. At the beginning of 87 B.C., Sulla awaited hisultimate confrontation with Rome’s erstwhile friend andrebellious client-king, Mithridates VI of Pontus. This military mission would bring wealth, honor, and glory. Yet the carefree implementation of his plans faced an obstacle, L. Cornelius Cinna, who hoped to use Sulla’s reputation against him. 30 Livy. Per. 77 states that the Senate judged them hostes; Plut. Sull. 10.1 says that a death sentence wasdecreed; Vell. 2.19.1 thought they were made hostes by a lex; ο ιο λ υ εμ ςto be hunted down andkilled App. BC. 1.60 agrees that they were voted π 2 (This law may have been de aquae et ignis interdictione); Nepos. Att. 1.4, 2.1– informs usthat young Marius wasjudged a hostis andthat his contemporary, young Atticus, whowasrelated by marriage through his cousin to Sulpicius, helped fund 179; Bennett, p. 2; Keaveney young Marius’flight from Rome; Gabba (1958): 166– 285. See also App. 271, 277– (1987): 175; (1983c): 70– 71; Bauman (1973): 270– 22 McG; Dio. 30/ 40; Sull. 9–10; Sall. Hist. 1.21– 63; Plut. Mar. 35.6– BC. 1.57– 115; Mc323; Katz (1975): 100– 35.102.2; Carney (1961b): 98–121; (1962): 322– 302; 25; Van Ooteghem (1964): 288– 94; Valgiglio (1956b): 20– Gushin, pp. 93– 36. Woolliscroft, pp. 35–

1.TheTribulations of theTribunes

23

Third, Rome had endured the greatest civil conflict of its history, but the laws that the government passed andits victories in the field didnot truly endthe strife of the Social War. Rather, a different kind of civil warbroke out, in which rival Romans, each claiming legitimate authority but seeking personal satisfaction through military means, called on Roman andItalian troops alike to choose sides. One of these sides was led by L. Cornelius Cinna andhis comrades. The crisis of the Republic thus continued. Lastly, two tribunes, Drusus and Sulpicius, had tried to solve some pressing problems of the day, especially the long-lingering “ Italian question.”When their programs foundered onthe rocks of opposition, the heart of their plans devolved on the consul of 87 B.C., L. Cornelius Cinna. He became the newchampion of Italian voters andhoped to attain prominence with their backing. Thus the stage was set and the platform provided for Cinna’s coup d’état. Exile and/or resentment against Sulla would encourage some Romans to support Cinna politically andfinancially. His adoption of the goal of Drusus and Sulpicius, the full enfranchisement of the Italian allies, would gain Cinna even more assistance, especially military, anda potentially huge power-base. AndCinna wasnotafraid to use force, whether in the Forum or on the battlefield, to fulfill his ownambitions andsecure prominence in the State. These various means to power, in broad terms fashioned since the time of the Gracchi, but more specifically since 91 B.C., were pragmatically anddeliberately manipulated by Cinna. Heinherited a political and military arsenal and was not averse to using it to attain what he wanted. In this way, he is a model warlord of Rome in the Late Republic.

2

SULLA’S PRECEDENT AND ROME’S PERIL: CINNA’S FIRST CONSULSHIP, 87 B.C. [Cinna] laid down thefasces as though he were a private citizen and, shedding tears, said, “ From you, citizens, I received this office. The people voted it to me; the Senate has taken it away without your consent.... I grieve just as much for you amid myown For where will your power be...in the choice of consuls, if youfail to make troubles.... (Appian of Alexandria, The Civil Wars. 1.65) secure what youbestow...? Cinna assumed the role of (live) martyr for thenovi cives andchampion of the people’s (Katz, “ The Siege of Rome in 87 B.C.,”p. 328) rights.

Wemust nowre-examine the evidence andmodern scholarship onCinna in order to understand howhe came to preeminence in the State. For, despite Sulla’s apparent discomfiture, Cinna did manage to secure one of the consulships in 87 B.C. YetwhowasCinna? Where didhecome from? What was his background? Who supported him in his quest for the consulship? Was he an ally or an enemy of Sulla, or neither? What did he hope to achieve?

I

Wemust note from the start that almost nothing is known about Cinna’s life or career before his consulship. Hebelonged to the gens Cornelia, one of the oldest andmost distinguished of patrician houses, buthis cognomen is quite rare. Appian mentions a Cinna (in his History of the Iberian Wars) as a senatorial negotiator with the native tribes in the second century B.C.1 No definite connection with our Cinna can be established, though some have identified this envoy as Cinna’s father, whowasconsul in 127 B.C. Nothing else is known of the father or the envoy. So, one can say very little about Cinna’s family background.2

1 Sil. Pun. 10.476 2

mentions

a Cinna (otherwise

unknown) noted

for bravery during

524 n. 105. the War with Hannibal; Katz (1976b): 523– RE s.v. “Cornelius”#105; CIL I.558, X.6905; App. Iber. 81; Bennett, p. 3; Katz 525; Badian (1990): 382. (1976b): 523–

26

2. Sulla’s Precedent andRome’s Peril

Regarding his early career, the information is not much better. Cicero refers to himas having praetorian rank during the Social Waranda garbled fragment of Livy’s epitome perhaps also refers to Cinna as legate at that time, specifically in 89 B.C.3 This has long been accepted, andit is reasonable to assume that a maneligible for the consulship in 88/87 would have seen some service in theSocial Warandwould have been praetor bythen in order to stand for the higher office. Yet anything else is mere conjecture; even the year of his birth must be only a guess. Hewasprobably at least 43 in 87 B.C., so was born no later than 130 B.C. If Cinna, like most young menof the senatorial class, served outhisdecem stipendia from age 17– 27, then he would have been available for senior military service and for elective magistracies from approximately theyear 103 B.C. Aside from his praetorship, we can only estimate what political offices Cinna held and when.4 So much for Cinna’s early career. About his immediate family, we are somewhat better informed. Hiswife wasAnnia, daughter of anunidentified Annius. Sometime after Cinna’s death, she married a certain M. Piso, only to be divorced by him at Sulla’s behest. As to what happened to her afterward, we are uninformed, nor is there any information about her character or connections.5 Cinna hadat least three children (we assume byAnnia), two daughters and a son. One of these daughters married Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, a staunch supporter of Cinna’s faction right downtohis death inNorth Africa in 81 B.C.6 The other was the wife of Julius Caesar andthe mother of his daughter Julia. This Cornelia married Caesar before 84 B.C., probably in 86, anddied in 69; it wasfor herandhis aunt Julia that Caesar delivered a famous eulogy in which he also praised Marius.7 Cinna’s like-named son did not figure prominently in Roman history until after his father’s death. It is unlikely that Sulla would have allowed the son of his archenemy to survive hadCinna the Younger remained in Italy after 82 B.C.; like Marius the Younger, he was among the proscribed. Probably he fled to Spain in order to find protection with Sertorius, his father’s old comrade. Cinna the Younger returned to Italy in 78 to play an important role in the rebellion of Lepidus, andfled again to Spain on the

3

4 5 6 7

43; Livy. Per. 76; MRR 2.36, 43; Bennett, RE s.v. “Cornelius”#106; Cic. Font. 42– p. 1; Katz (1976b): 533; Cichorius, pp. 140–141. Bennett, p. 3; Katz (1976b): 533; Sumner (1973): 6. 526. RE s.v. “Annia”#101; Vell. 2.41.2; Katz (1976b): 525– RE s.v. “Cornelia”#414; Syme (1939): 19 n. 6; Katz (1976a): 335; (1976b): 527. See Ch. 4, n. 47. 21; Katz 5, 6.1; Gelzer (1968): 19– RE s.v. “Cornelia”#413; Suet. Caes. 1.1– (1976b): 527.

2. Sulla’s Precedent andRome’s Peril

27

defeat of Lepidus. Thanks to the lex Plautia of 73, which extended political amnesty to all exiles of the civil warera, Cinna the Younger was able to come home to Rome andwefind himin the coterie of the rising Caesar, his brother-in-law. Some thirty years later, in 44 B.C., Cinna held the praetorship and, surprisingly, praised Caesar’s assassins!8 A study of this Cinna would make interesting research: he married Pompey’s daughter Pompeia (the widow of Faustus Sulla, son of the Dictator); they hadat least one child, a son, called Cn. Cornelius Magnus, whofought on the side of Antony, waspardoned by Octavian, later plotted against the Emperor, waspardoned again, andhonored as suffect consul in A.D. 5 with the Emperor as colleague!9 OurCinna left quite a remarkable family tree! It illustrates very well the convulsions andconvolutions of the Roman civil wars.

II For all intents andpurposes then, Cinna’s life andcareer begin suddenly for us in 87 B.C. The sources allude to his growing political strength, but also indicate that he, like others competing for posts for that year, was not favored by Sulla. One of these other men, Sertorius, was so strongly opposed that his career washindered because of Sulla’s interference. Onthe other hand, Cinna wasvictorious at the polls. WhydidSulla not stop him? The sources make apparent that Sulla hoped to prevent anyfurther crises by securing the election of his own men. Was Sulla unable to secure the election of his preferred candidate? Did he have to settle for Cinna out of necessity? Did he have real cause to distrust or disapprove actively of Cinna?10 Exuperantius andothers say that Cinna was a follower of Marius.11 If true, or even if Sulla simply suspected this, it could have earned Cinna his

4, 85.1.3; Plut. Caes. 68.2; 8 RE s.v. “Cornelius”#107; MRR 2.54; Suet. Caes. 5.1– Zon. 10.12; Cic. Phil. 3.26; Gelzer (1968): 29, 208; Katz (1976b): 526. 9 RE s.v. “Cornelius”#108; Fasti. Cap. 758; CIL I p. 29; II.1343, VI.851, 1961, 22; Syme (1939): 269, 10294, 31701; Sen. Clem. 1.9.3; Ben. 4.30.2; Dio. 55.14– 279; Katz (1976b): 526. ; 4: “Cinna already hadsome influence of his own” 10 See nn. 17, 32. Dio. 30/35.102.3– 237; Gabba (1958): 4; Sull. 10.3; Scardigli (1971): 44; (1977): 229– Plut. Sert. 4.3– 60; Spann, 62; Konrad (1994): 58– 512; (1983): 58– 181; Katz (1976b): 507– 180– 91. 25, 161–164; Yakobson, pp. 148–152, 161; Hillman (1997): 86– pp. 23– a manof the opposite , see Exup. 22 Z; Plut. Sull. 10.3: “ 11 On Cinna as a “Marian” ; ; Sert. 4.4: “[Cinna] tried to revive the drooping faction of Marius...” faction” 33, 89; Carney (1961a): 60; cf. Katz (1976b): Bennett, loc. cit.; Gabba (1976): 32– 502 n. 19, 523, 535; Woolliscroft, p. 36.

28

2. Sulla’s Precedent andRome’s Peril

enmity, but Cinna’s later actions do not really bear out this political label. Perhaps Cinna, like other senators, had opposed Sulla’s actions against Sulpicius; it is possible that he hadvoiced sympathy for the Italian cause. Onthe other hand, both Cinna andSulla hadserved in the Social War.They mayhave hadsome kindof falling-out ordisagreement at that time. All this is conjecture andall or some of it mayhave been the case.12 Again, we know nothing about Cinna’s campaign or his electoral supporters. If we may infer backward from the aftermath of his election, we might be able to identify hispolitical power base. Wehave some indication of those whoopposed Cinna for consul: Appian tells usthat hewasresisted old citizens.”Yet one thing is obvious: Cinna must have had conby the “ siderable support among the propertied old citizens in order to secure the votes needed in the Centuriate Assembly, or at least such little opposition that it could be overcome.13 On the other hand, two special interest groups approached Cinna and encouraged him to support their causes: first, those relatives and friends whowere fighting for a recall of political exiles, especially Marius andthe allies of Sulpicius; andsecond, those Italian leaders whowanted to see their newvotes distributed among the thirty-five tribes, as Sulpicius hadpromised. Apparently, many Italians had boycotted the census of 89 B.C. to protest the unfair plan for their distribution. Still, they were regarded as newcitizens under the treaty terms that ended the Social War. Even those whodidregister musthave been disappointed with Roman legal maneuvers new citizens” to hem in their voting power. When the sources speak of “ backing Cinna, they probably refer to any Italians whohadmade peace by 87 B.C., whether fully enrolled or not.14 What did Cinna offer these groups? What interests did he represent? Some sources state, some imply, that Cinna took upthese causes because these groups bribed him. Appian reports this charge as a commonly circu, surely a piece of hostile propaganda.15 Cinna’s actions during story” lated “

5; Keaveney 12 Plut. Sull. 10.3; Mar. 41.3; Sert. 4.4; Exup. 22 Z; Bennett, pp. 3– (1983c): 78; (1987): 174– 537; Woolliscroft, p. 36. 175; Katz (1976b): 522, 536– 13 App. BC. 1.64; Exup. 22 Z; Plut. Sert. 4.4; Cic. In toga cand. 89 with Asc. p. 139 309; Badian (1970b): 16; Katz (1979): 162; 5; Bulst, pp. 308– Sq; Bennett, pp. 3– 72; (1983c): 78; Yakobson, pp. (1976a): 328; (1976b): 522; Keaveney (1982a): 70– 47. 43– 24 Z; Cic. 4; Sull. 10.3; Exup. 23– 2; Plut. Sert. 4.3– 64; Vell. 2.20.1– 14 App. BC. 1.63– 310; 6; Badian (1958a): 236; (1970b): 16; Bulst, pp. 308– Phil. 8.7; Bennett, pp. 3– 181; (1976): 90–101; Valgiglio (1956a): 191; Keaveney (1982a): Gabba (1958): 180– 72; (1982b): 500; (1987): 170–171, 175; Katz (1979): 162; (1976b): 522, 546; 71– 91; 157; Brunt (1971a): 89– 103; Sherwin-White (1973): 155– Taylor (1960): 102– 131. Salmon (1982): 130– 7; 64; Vell. 2.20.1– 2. Onthe bribery of Cinna, see Bennett, pp. 6– 15 App. BC. 1.63–

2. Sulla’s Precedent andRome’s Peril

29

his consulship suggest that his pre-election political stance wasfavorable to the friends of the exiles andthe Italian leaders. Wemaynot have information on it now, but Sulla certainly had some reason for distrusting Cinna, just as the interest groups clearly hadreason to work with him. Wecannot conclusively prove that Cinna advocated the return of exiles and reform of citizenship as his own program from the start, but some evidence to that effect maybe provided by a coin issued in 88 B.C. by one of Rome’s moneyers, C. Marcius Censorinus. He was later an important member of the Cinnan regime; his coins depict the kings Ancus Marcius and Numa Pompilius on the obverse. According to several numismatic scholars, Censorinus usedhis office to promote Cinna: the images of Numa (law-giver andsymbol of piety) andAncus (bestower of citizenship on the Old Latins) allude somehow to Cinna’s campaign promises to reorganize thetribal voting system andto enrol thenewItalian citizens inall thetribes. It is clear that the Cinnans were committed to this policy later, though the fortunes of warprevented its completion by them. But even with Censorinus’connections to Marius and Cinna, it is difficult to assign a “propagandistic value”to his coin. For, as a Marcius, he claimed descent from the two kings, and the reverse clearly refers to family history; perhaps the entire coin issue does so.16 We are left speculating, then. Perhaps Cinna was already allied with these interest groups somehow, or was viewed as sympathetic. He did garner substantial assistance from Italians, as fromequestrians; both groups largely held to his side and together eliminated mutual obstacles and enemies for several years. The reciprocal relationship is perhaps an indication of a genuine stance on Cinna’s part. Yet in 88 B.C., he might have consented to support the interest groups simply in order to winthe election. So, because of ourlimited evidence, andthe consequent need to infer from later developments, weare left wondering whether candidate Cinna wasan opportunist or a sincere heir to the programs of Drusus and Sulpicius. Given the nature of Roman Republican politics, is it not possible that he was both? 310. Most scholars have paid no Keaveney (1987): 179 n. 37; cf. Bulst, pp. 309– attention to it. Onthe use of monetary gifts inelection campaigns andthe ambiguity 310; 68; Nicolet (1976): 297– of what constituted ambitus, see Taylor (1949): 67– 43. 25; Yakobson, pp. 22– Scullard (1951): 23– 309 n. 14; but cf. Badian (1958a): 236; also 7; cf. Bulst, pp. 308– 16 Bennett, pp. 6– 499, 536 n. 149, 546–547; Keaveney (1982a): 71– Katz (1979): 162; (1976b): 498– 72; (1987): 175; Gabba (1976): 86–101. On Censorinus’ coin type, see Rowland, 416. On Censorinus, see n. 73 and Sumner (1973): 127 (111?-82 B.C., pp. 415– 5, mon. 88, tr. mil. 87). On his family, see Dion. Hal. 3.37.4; Livy. 1.19.1, 1.33.1– 5, 25.12.15; Plut. Cor. 1.1. 1.35.2–

30

2. Sulla’s Precedent andRome’s Peril

What were the circumstances in Italy in 88 B.C. when Cinna campaigned for election? Elections for 87 would have been held late in the year 88, after Sulla’s take-over of Rome. Yettheresults at thepolls demonstrated that Sulla was not fully master of the State. Even if we accept Bennett’s argument that only the tribunician elections sawsetbacks for Sulla’s men(a conclusion which is by no means certain from the evidence), we must remember that Sulla felt pressured into accepting Cinna’s candidacy. Thus, even the consular elections were affected by the discontent with Sulla. Indeed, some senators whohadsupported Sulla musthave gravitated to the campof those whodistrusted himafter almost all his officers defected from his army and he nevertheless seized Rome by force against the government’s will. No doubt Sulla had created a political atmosphere in which candidates could run with a reasonable hope of success on a platform of opposition to his recent behavior. In fact, Plutarch preserves the view that the people of Rome “hated”Sulla andrejected many of the candidates that he proposed for offices. The electoral situation in both Assemblies was anything but secure.17 In such circumstances, the support of disaffected senators andequestrians could count for a lot. The Italian leaders were in a weaker position; if they were allowed to vote, it wasonly in a handful of tribes attheendof the voting order; they could notyet dominate theAssembly as they would after the census of 70 B.C.18 So, as in the past, their aidwould take other forms, financial backing andperhaps pressure on Roman friends to favor or vote for Cinna; such means are difficult for usto pinpoint. Still, given that he did win the election against the opposition of Sulla, we must conclude that a sizable portion of the upper voting classes in Rome approved of Cinna’s candidacy enough to lend him their votes, or at least did not oppose him as Sulla would have wanted. Thereason for this mayhave been sympathy with Cinna’s cause, or personal connections with him, or, as Plutarch relates, vehement disapproval of Sulla. Cinna’s success would suggest broad disgust with Sulla among Rome’s upper echelons.19 Our sources, influenced as they are by Sulla’s version of events, try to paint a picture of Cinna alternately as a renegade crony of Sulla or as a thorn in his side. For example, Plutarch tells us that Sulla, to curry favor with the Roman people andcalm things downin the city, “placed”Cinna in 5; cf. Badian (1970b): 16–17 n. 44; Bulst, pp. 4; Bennett, pp. 3– 17 Plut. Sull. 10.3– 79; (1987): 175; Katz (1976a): 328; 310; Keaveney (1982a): 70; (1983c): 78– 308– 508 541. See MRR 2.43; Levick, pp. 503– 522, 535, 538– 498, 521– (1976b): 497– and Ch. 1, n. 27 for Sulla’s officers in 88. 291; Bulst, p. 2; Oros. 5.19.9; Lewis (1968): 273– 64; Vell. 2.20.1– 18 App. BC. 1.63– 309; Katz (1979): 162; (1976b): 546. 19 Nepos. Att. 2.2.

2. Sulla’s Precedent and Rome’s Peril

31

the consulship. According to Dio, Sulla “appointed” as his “successors” Cn. Octavius and Cinna, presumably to maintain power in Rome; Octavius was amicable, but Cinna was a “ κακὸς ἀνήρ.”20 Yet even Dio’s account, when placed alongside Appian’s matter-of-fact rendering of events and our discussion above, cannot help but betray Cinna’s growing political strength in Rome: he was regarded as a supporter of the Sulpician laws and the recall of the Marian exiles; he had backers in the Senate itself and among the equestrians and Italians. At the same time, the strength of Sulla’s position was somewhat in doubt and outright challenged by the election results in the Assemblies. Clearly, Sulla could not have “placed” Cinna in the consulship, nor could he have afforded to make an enemy of Cinna.21 Nevertheless, Sulla definitely opposed Cinna’s candidacy in principle and as presiding magistrate over the elections in 88 he had the right to reject Cinna’s bid. But he did not do so; considering Cinna’s growing popularity, such a response would have only served to increase the already widespread animosity against Sulla himself. So, Sulla acquiesced in hopes of calming Rome and of keeping Cinna in check through Octavius and through the oath of office. Sulla put his trust in the loyalty of Octavius to forestall any attack on his recent legislation while he was away in the East and assented to Cinna’s candidacy. As Dio rightly saw it, this was a great miscalculation in judgment on Sulla’s part.22

20 RE s.v. “Octavius” #21; MRR 2.45–46; App. BC. 1.64; Plut. Sull. 10.3–4; Sen. 4.4; Cic. De Or. 2.268; ND. 2.14; Brut. 176; Exup. 22, 27 Z refers to Octavius as Syllae satellitem; Val. Max. 1.6.10; Dio. 30/35.102.3–4; Eut. 5.4.7 agrees: Sulla left, “ordinatis consulibus... Cn. Octavio et L. Cornelio Cinna”; see Badian (1958a): 236; (1990): 390, 405–406 on problems with Octavius’ stemma; Sumner (1973): 105, 114– 115 gives his dates as c. 131–87 B.C. and considers him the son of cos. 128 and nephew of the tribune against Gracchus in 133; he had suffered a repulsa for the aedileship and so did not reach the consulship suo anno; Valgiglio (1956a): 193; Katz (1976a): 328; (1979): 162; (1976b): 523, 526–533, 538 n. 157. 21 Gabba (1958): 181; Katz (1976b): 518–5 2 1 , 541 n. 170; Keaveney (1982a): 72–73; (1983c): 78–79; Badian (1970b): 16– 17. 22 See sources in n. 20. Schol. Gron. p. 286 St indicates that both consuls took the oath; Gabba (1958): 181; Keaveney (1982a): 72–73; (1983c): 78–79; (1987): 175; cf. Bulst, pp. 308– 309; cf. Carney (1961a): 60 n. 266; Katz (1976b): 537–538, 542– 546; cf. Bennett, p. 7. Plutarch’s account of the oath strikes one as anachronistic in its prophetic nature, and Dio is highly improbable; Schol. Gron. is best: both nonSullan consuls were secured to respect the status quo, which was a logical precaution. On the special powers of the presiding magistrate and the usual requirement of an oath to respect the laws from new magistrates, see Taylor (1966): 7, 8 1 , 98, 104– 105; Nicolet (1976): 220–225; Staveley, pp. 145– 148, 152-153, 209–210; Brunt (1988): 454–455; Earl (1965): 325-332; Astin (1962): 252–255; Yakobson, pp. 162– 164.

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III According to Dio, Cinna immediately on assuming office could think of nothing else but getting Sulla out of Italy, out of the way so that his own plans would not be interfered with. Plutarch agrees that Cinna didnot wait to “subvert the existing order”but put up a certain tribune (Verginius or Vergilius) to bring a charge against Sulla. Cicero refers to the proceedings as a symptom of lawlessness duly disregarded by Sulla.23 Underneath the loaded phrases of biased sources, we perhaps can still discern Cinna’s strategy. Perhaps Sulla wasaccused of the “ unlawful murder”of Sulpicius, a sacrosanct tribune, andthe sacrilegious violation of the city of Rome. It would certainly be easier to overturn Sulla’s recent measures if the antiSullan atmosphere were stirred up further, if Sulla were smeared in the courts on charges of sacrilege. Cinna wasthus clearing his ownpath. Around the same time, Appian informs us, the murder of Q. Pompeius Rufus at the hands of one of his ownkinsmen disquieted Sulla; he organized a bodyguard andsoon left for Capua to take his army toAsia. Perhaps Sulla genuinely worried for his safety; but he hadbeen in greater danger before and had responded by violating Rome’s most sacred laws and entering thecity at theheadof his armed legions. Asto thetrial, Sulla seems to have felt that hecould notbe bothered with such a “trivial”matter while a serious warraged in the East, andafter he himself hadbecome master of Rome. His departure, then, was not primarily a result of fear of standing trial or of being assassinated, but of arrogance andnonchalance, coupled with some legitimate military considerations.24 Cinna soon put into motion his plan to redistribute the new Italian citizens. He convened a meeting of the Tribal Assembly and encouraged a great multitude many Italian voters to attend. Velleius describes them as “ from all parts of Italy.”The issue before this meeting wasthesuffrage of the newcitizens, as Cicero makes clear, not the recall of exiles, as Florus and others allege. It is true that Cinna urged the friends of the Marian exiles to back the redistribution. But the events that followed the proposal and the position of Octavius bear witness to Cicero’s reading.25 For, according to 64; Dio. 30/35.102.1; Plut. Sull. 10.4; Cic. Dom. 83; Brut. 179; MRR 23 App. BC. 1.63– 86; Bulst, pp. 307, 2.47; Bennett, p. 7; Badian (1970b): 17; Keaveney (1983c): 85– 310; Katz (1976b): 515–518, 548–549; Weinrib, pp. 41–42. 24 Gabba (1958): 180–181; Hillman (1997): 92, 95–100. On Sulla’s motives, see 86; cf. Badian (1970b): 17; Katz (1976a): 328. Keaveney (1983c): pp. 85– 25 A few sources, drawing from part of Livy’s account, state that the recall of exiles caused Cinna’s falling-out with Octavius: Flor. 2.9.9; DVI. 69.2; Schol. Gron. p. 286 St. The following authors make clear that redistribution of Italian citizens was 24 Z; the principal issue: App. BC. 1.64; Cic. Phil. 8.7; Har. Resp. 54; Exup. 23–

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Appian, a “ majority of the tribunes,”supported by the old citizens, vetoed the proposed reform andwere then attacked by the newvoters. The degree of opposition is most certainly exaggerated by Appian and his source; according to theepitome of Livy, six tribunes were exiled along with Cinna, that is, more than half of the college. Apparently, the tribunician college of 87 B.C. (elected after Sulla’s march in summer/fall 88 B.C.) wassplit in its commitment to Sulla’s arrangements. Unfortunately, not all of these men can be cleraly identified and we cannot be sure whether some were banished at the same time as Cinna or as a result of later developments. So, we can conclude only that Cinna’s proposals incurred tribunician veto.26 According to Appian, feelings ran so high on both sides that many carried concealed weapons into theForum that day. Openhostility, physical andvocal, broke outin theAssembly. Plutarch refers to a great battle in the Forum. Cinna’s conduct andthat of his supporters on that day was not all that unusual for thepost-Gracchan era: violence in theAssembly, the useof intimidation and force to get votes passed in a certain direction, are well documented for the period from Tiberius Gracchus to Octavian. Its legality is not necessarily the issue; nor was it the cause of Octavius’ reaction. Whatever the plan or goal or position of Cinna, both he andOctavius lost control of affairs when the riot erupted in theAssembly.27 Neither Velleius nor Livy’s epitome describe the event (though the epitomator does speak of violence andforce of arms), andPlutarch notes it only briefly. Again, Appian is our sole source of detailed information. According to him, Octavius received word of the riot while at home and, incited bythis, rushed to theForum with a “very dense mass of men,”down the Via Sacra, scattering the rioters in all directions, including Cinna; the latter was driven away from the Temple of Castor and Pollux, one of the traditional sites of consular orations. Octavius’supporters, without instruc5; Mar. 41.1; Vell. 2.20.2. Other sources are vague: Livy. Per. 79; Plut. Sert. 4.4– 182; (1976): 94; the reason is lost in Amp. 42.2. Bennett, p. 7; Gabba (1958): 181– 7, 80; Bulst, p. 310; Keaveney (1987): 180. On Taylor (1960): 309; (1966): 6– 17. Cinna’s “tyranny” , see Valgiglio (1956a): 191–192; Dunkle, pp. 12– 26 App. BC. 1.64; Livy. Per. 79; perhaps also Gran. Lic. 35.2 Cr; MRR 2.47, 52; 9; Bulst, p. 310; Gabba (1958): 182, 184; (1976): 97 n. 189; Katz Bennett, pp. 8– 515; Sumner (1973): 107 on one of the tribunes, P. Magius 504, 513– (1976b): 498– ? B.C.). (115– 27 App. BC. 1.64; Livy. Per. 79; Vell. 2.20.3; Plut. Sert. 4.5; Mar. 41.1; Amp. 42.2; Cic. Sest. 77 argues that collegial rivalry and the tribunician veto produced this situation; thus, in speaking again of this incident at Leg. 3.42, he warns his readers 26 to respect vetoes; at Cat. 3.24.8. Cicero blames Octavius’aggression; Exup. 24– 73; Gabba (1958): 182; Bennett, Z; Flor. 2.9.10–11; DVI. 69.2; Lintott (1968): 67– 311; Keaveney (1987): 180; Konrad (1994): 64; Spann, pp. 8; Bulst, pp. 310– pp. 7– 30. 29–

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tion says Appian, attacked and killed many of the new citizens in this onslaught, forcing the remainder to flee to the city gates.28 Octavius’ response to the riot was not necessarily improper or excessive; that of his supporters certainly was, however, though it was also in keeping with recent Roman tradition. As for his authority in doing what he did, one scholar has suggested that Octavius had summoned the Senate before the assembly vote began and received plenary powers through a senatus consultum ultimum when word of the riot reached them. It is also possible that Octavius was operating on his own authority as consul, to keep the peace.29 Octavius’ assault, his quick and firm response, and the actions of his followers, removed Cinna’s power base for the moment; according to Appian, Cinna hadrecourse to Rome’s slaves, calling upon them for help and promising freedom in return. This sounds suspiciously like the stock demagogues”by their rivals; charge often levelled against “tyrants”and“ Appian’s statement that none of the slaves joined Cinna makes the story seem even more fictitious, like an insertion in the record by Cinna’s enemies. This probably never happened at all; Cinna simply fled the city andproceeded immediately anddirectly to his recruitment of support from outside Rome, specifically the newly enfranchised Latin andCampanian the rest”as far as Nola.30 towns of Tibur, Praeneste, and“ WhydidCinna seek aidthere? Oursources give noreason, butit seems most likely that these towns were among those whowere dissatisfied with their status vis-à-vis Rome andhoped that Cinna could dosomething about it; he probably had specific contacts there already. Appian tells us that incited them to revolt andcollected money for military purposes” Cinna “ from them.31 While doing so, sympathetic members of the Senate, includ28 See sources in nn. 27 and29; also Cic. Caec. 87.10; Gran. Lic. 35.2 Cr; Exup. 25 Z says that Octavius hadthe support of Sullan troops (?); Badian (1958a): 236; Bulst, 28 311; Konrad (1994): 64; Gabba (1958): 183; see Taylor (1966): 20, 25– pp. 310– on the aedes Castorum. 4; Exup. 25 Z; Gabba (1958): 182; 29 App. BC. 1.65; Livy. Per. 79; Vell. 2.20.3– 311. Bennett, p. 7 n. 34; Bulst, pp. 310– 502. Even Plutarch 30 Bennett, p. 8; Badian (1958a): 236 n. 3; Katz (1976b): 501– never mentions anyslaves called byCinna. These sources do: App. BC. 1.65; DVI. 69.2; Vell. 2.20.3; Flor. 2.9.10–11; Valgiglio (1956a): 191; Sartori, p. 155; Dunkle, 17; Woolliscroft, p. 36. pp. 12– 31 App. BC. 1.65. Onthe citizenship of Praeneste andTibur, see Gabba (1958): 183; 35, 108; 527; (1987): 84; Sherwin-White (1973): 30– Keaveney (1982b): 519, 526– 54; Brunt (1965b): 108. Nola wasone of the rebel 9; Cic. Balb. 53– Bennett, pp. 8– strong-holds since its capture by Papius Mutilus in 90 B.C. (App. BC. 1.42). The Nolani didnotpossess Roman citizenship andreceived it from Cinna along with the 54; 375; (1982): 41, 46, 53– 65; (1967): 358, 373– Samnites; see Salmon (1964): 64– Martin, p. 41.

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ing C. Milonius, Q. Sertorius, andM. Marius Gratidianus, joined him. Of these three men, Gratidianus, as a relative of Marius, likely hadpersonal reasons for joining Cinna; Sertorius may have served with Cinna either under Cato or Strabo during the Social War, andcertainly hadno love for Sulla or Sulla’s henchmen. Other accounts offer a different chronology of events; possibly these menhadfled Rome with Cinna.32 Meanwhile, Cinna lost ground at home, lost everything in fact, thanks to a decree of the Senate that sounds incredibly harsh. The senators ordered that Cinna “should no longer be consul or even a citizen”and should therefore be relieved of his post; they installed a suffect consul, L. Cornelius Merula, in his place. It is doubtful that a free election washeld. Rather, the Senate appointed Merula, and somehow “secured”the ratification by the Assembly, in an attempt to prevent any unscrupulous self-seeker from getting the other consulship. The reasons given for Cinna’s removal from office are interesting and telling: first, that he hadinstigated slaves to revolt (a debatable charge, if at left the city in danger while all valid); second, more importantly, that he “ 33This certainly was the serious andsomewhat legitimate charge: consul.” the Senate blamed Cinna for stirring upa riot among citizens, forendangering the State. A tribune might do so and in his special constitutional capacity claim that it was for the benefit of the plebs or the People; but a consul hadresponsibility to the entire State, a duty to protect all citizens.34 Wasit legal for the Senate to abrogate a consul’s authority in a state of crisis at Rome? Weare informed about the abrogation of imperium by the Popular Assembly in cases of military misconduct, but no such accusation could have been levelled against Cinna. Also, there is no indication in any of the sources that the Senate acted with the People; rather, it proceeded alone. Moreover, Velleius and Cicero clearly considered the abrogation this illegal actwasmore worthy of unconstitutional. Theformer stated that “ while the latter remarked privately to 35 the manthan a worthy precedent,” 503. On Milonius, see 9; Katz (1976b): 502– 52; Bennett, pp. 8– 32 MRR 2.47, 51– Gabba (1958): 184; Katz, p. 502 n. 18. On Gratidianus, see Comm. Bern. 2.174 E; 118 gives his dates as 125?-82 B.C. and Gabba, p. 184; Sumner (1973): 101, 117– 503, 507. On Sertorius, tribune in 87?, see calls him legate in 87; Katz, pp. 502– 513; Plut. Sert. 4.3; Gabba, p. 184; Keaveney (1987): 180; Katz, pp. 498, 507– 29. 236; Spann, pp. 22– 66; Scardigli (1971): 235– Konrad (1994): 60– 33 App. BC. 1.65; DVI. 69.2; MRR 2.47, 52. 311. 34 Bulst, pp. 310– 166; 9; Katz (1979): 162– 35 Vell. 2.20.3; Obs. 70 = Dio. 46.49.2; Bennett, pp. 8– 185; Valgiglio (1956a): 191; Bauman (1968): 38; (1973): 280, Gabba (1958): 184– 289. On Octavius’ ulterior motives, see Bulst, p. 312; Badian (1958a): 236; 285– Carney (1961a): 61.

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his friend Atticus that he believed Cinna hadacted “ de iure”if not “recte”in fighting for his position as consul, obviously implying that his deposition had been against the law.36 Evidently, Cinna felt that the Senate’s response wasillegal andimproper. Even though he nowhadno office or even citizen’s rights, he continued to raise support against his enemies at Rome under his self-asserted authority as consul. Eventually, he reached the region around Capua andpresented himself to the Roman army at Nola, which consisted of at least the one legion left behind by Sulla, and probably additional levies.37 There, Cinna embarked upon anelaborate demonstration of his injured honor: it is the only time that any source records a speech purported to be Cinna’s own. It is anextremely interesting scene, even if only concocted by Appian, andvery favorable toward Cinna’s character andactions. Before an assembly of troops, officers, andunidentified senators, Cinna laid downhis fasces, the very symbols of his office, andassumed the role of private citizen. Weeping andstanding onsome sort of rostra, he addressed the Romans as citizens, not soldiers, surely to stress the issue that hadbeen at the heart of his consulship and the crisis that had ensued. He credited them, that is, the People of Rome, with his authority and charged the Senate with illegal abrogation of his post, with intrusion into the rights of the Assembly. The speech focuses completely on the rights of citizens andthe sovereignty of the Popular Assemblies, while it portrays the injury done to Cinna as his sacrifice for the People’s sake.38 after exciting much pity for himself, According to Appian’s account, “ he rent hisgarments, leaped downfrom therostra, andthrew himself onthe ground before them, where he lay for a long time.”Cinna’s actions hadthe desired effect –the army at Nola, ledby its military tribunes, swore anoath to support Cinna. He now had a military force upon which to build a considerable threat against his adversaries at Rome.39 Appian gives credit to Cinna’s oratory for this turn of events; his powers of persuasion convinced the troops to side with him. Velleius and the epitome of Livy allege that Cinna bribed the army. It is a bit confusing that Appian, who probably utilized Livy as his principal source, should contrast so sharply with the Periochae on this point. Possibly he found the information onCinna’s speech in some other source andconsidered it more probable than the charge of bribery in Livy. It is also possible, andindeed 36 Cic. Att. 9.10.3.6. See Appendix, n. 14. 66; MRR2.48; Bennett, pp.7, 10; Gabba (1958): 180–181, 185, 187; 37 App. BC. 1.65– Brunt (1971a): 440; (1971b): 105; Keaveney (1982a) 170; (1987): 180. 38 Katz (1976a): 328; Bennett, p. 10. 39 Bennett, p. 10. On the army’s oath to Cinna, see Gabba (1958): 185–186; cf. Smith (1958): 29– 103. 33, 41; Nicolet (1976): 102–

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quite likely when weconsider Livy’s methods, that Livy’s original version of events recorded the charge andthe speech, leaving the reader to decide

which was the more plausible explanation. Perhaps, then, Appian and the epitome should be viewed together in order to reclaim Livy’s lost account.40 The question remains whether Cinna wonover the army by argument or by bribery. Yet what would have constituted bribery in this context? Roman politicians often used a variety of gifts, including money, to winvotes and other kinds of support; Roman generals made promises of loot in order to recruit troops. Surely, Sulla had done so in order to put together the very forces at Nola; Cinna might simply have offered them what they already expected. Such action was not always viewed as illicit, though one’s enemies could represent it as such. I would propose that this sort of bias operates in the report of bribery, especially considering that Appian’s account suggests no corruption at all. This historian was only too happy to report charges of bribery when he thought them appropriate and valid and he had no particular affection for Cinna so as to desire to protect the latter’s image. Appian would not create an elaborate version of events if simple corruption was truly involved; surely he is not just engaging here in rhetorical muscle-flexing. Rather, Appian’s silence on the bribery andhis alternative account should be taken as an indication of Cinna’s likely innocence andpowers of persuasion.41 stir them upalso,” allied cities”to “ Cinna’s next move wasto travel to “ “ alleging that it was on their account chiefly that this misfortune had happened to him,”in other words, using the same argument that he hadall along used ever since his flight from Rome.42 Appian’s account is at least consistent, then, andconsistently less biased than others. Surprisingly, not even Velleius mentions bribery in this context. Indeed, Appian states that these allies provided Cinna with money, as well as troops. Nofurther details on these travels are given in anyof the sources, however, no specifics as to which towns he visited besides those mentioned earlier, but Velleius refers to Cinna’s support base as the “enormous number of newcitizens.”43This 40 App. BC. 1.66; cf. Livy. Per. 79; Vell. 2.20.4; also Schol. Gron. p. 286 St. 41 See nn. 15and40 above. Livy states that thetroops were “corrupted,”which is quite vague butmatches Velleius’fuller allegation that they were “ corrupted bythe hope/ promise of a monetary gift (corruptis...spe largitionis).”Once again, most scholars pass over this, probably in tacit acceptance. Onthe Roman soldier’s expectation of reward, especially inthe post-Marian army, see Badian (1958a): 236; Gabba (1976): 30; Nicolet (1976): 110–148. 52; Scullard (1951): 29– 27; Smith (1958): 37, 51– 26– 42 App. BC. 1.66; Bennett, p. 10; Badian (1958a): 236. 43 Vell. 2.20.4; similarly Plut. Mar. 41.1; cf. Sert. 4.5, where Sertorius shares credit for this with Cinna; Spann, p. 30.

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implies contact with theItalian socii, at least those of Latium andCampania andtheir bordering areas. If webelieve Velleius, this number amounted to some three hundred cohorts or thirty legions totalling approximately one hundred fifty to one hundred eighty thousand men, a remarkable figure.44 Velleius alleges that Cinna’s group lacked men of “ auctoritas”; it was for this reason that Cinna recalled Marius andthe exiles.45 Yet Marius’role in these early events can be and has been exaggerated; moreover, Cinna apparently planned early in his consulship, perhaps even during his candidacy, to recall Marius, in exchange for the aidandvotes of Marius’supporters. Further, Cinna’s actions andarguments, as reported byAppian, suggest that having menof dignity on his side would not have mattered much to him. Hewasdetermined to regain his position or at least exact revenge, not by a show of prestige or the use of constitutional measures, but by armed force, with or without menof high standing beside him.46 , including some of the “dynamany others” Indeed, Appian says that “ , the Roman nobility, joined Cinna at this time. Appian is the only toi” source to record this andhe accounts for it by saying that these menchafed under stable government (a biased political judgment if ever there was powerful ones”were former supporters of one).47 More probably, these “ Cinna, some of those who had voted him into office perhaps, who decided nowwas the time, with a showdown between Cinna andhis enemies fast approaching, to definitely choose sides. They could see that Cinna was amassing a sizable force for his purposes andhad a very good chance of victory.

IV While Cinna prepared for warandassembled anarmy, theconsuls at Rome didthe same, fortifying thecity andsummoning assistance from the “towns that were still faithful”(we are not informed as to which ones), from Cisalpine Gaul, andfrom Cn. Pompeius Strabo, commander of the Roman army in the northern theater of the Social War.48 The latter, according to the 693; Bennett, pp. 10, 13; Gabba (1976): 97–101. 44 Brunt (1971a): 440, 446, 686– 2; and 45 Vell. 2.20.5; similarly Liv. Per. 79; cf. App. BC. 1.66; also Plut. Sert. 5.1– 2 indicates the biographer’s belief that the fighting force hadbeen even Mar. 41.1– raised andwas ready to engage without Marius’ return; cf. Carney (1961a): 61 n. 273. On the Cinnan conference to discuss Marius’ return, see Konrad (1994): 65– 12; Spann, p. 30; Katz 54; Bennett, pp. 11– 45, 53– 68; Scardigli (1977): 38, 44– (1976b): 511 n. 45; (1983): 62; (1976a): 335 n. 28, 336; Hillman (1997): 88, 105– 107, 110.

46 Woolliscroft, p. 36. 47 App. BC. 1.66. 48 App.BC. 1.66; Dio. 30/35.102.5 characterizes Octavius as slow inthemanagement

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consensus of thesources, wasa self-seeking, manipulative manwhoplayed a waiting game between thetwosides, trying toextort thebest deal hecould from either. Strabo cuts a poor, treacherous figure. In the end, he joined Octavius andencamped near the Colline Gate.49 Around the same time, Marius arrived in Etruria, collected a force (perhaps theequivalent of oneor twolegions), andmade his wayto Cinna, who received his assistance with pleasure.50 The bulk of the army, by all accounts, belonged to Cinna, whohadraised it from the Italians as noted above. Now, he divided the forces into several groups in order to surround andbesiege Rome. Marius took upposition to the southwest, Sertorius to thenorthwest. The sources arevague asto thelocation of Cinna’s force, and that of his senior legate, Cn. Papirius Carbo; they mayhave encamped to

of affairs; Gran. Lic. 35.16 Cr may refer to attempts on the part of Octavius to negotiate peace with Cinna before any battles took place, but the content of the 11; reference probably fits elsewhere in the sequence of events; Bennett, pp. 10– 187. Appian’s statement that Octavius received help from Gabba (1958): 186– Italian allies perhaps embraces the mention at Gran. Lic. 35.34 Cr of the citizenship granted to all Italian rebels whohadsurrendered by87; also Livy. Per. 80. This step seems to have been taken, however, only after the Cinnan siege wasfirmly in place to raise desperately-needed forces against Cinna; Brunt (1971a): 91, 440; 504. Bennett, p. 16; Gabba, p. 190; Keaveney (1987): 182; (1982b): 500– 2; cf. Livy. Per. 79; 67; Plut. Pomp. 1.1, 3.1– 4.1– 49; App. BC. 1.66– 49 MRR2.42, 48– 4; Oros. 5.19.10; andGran. Lic. 35.12–13 Cr, whoall attribute Cinna’s Vell. 2.21.1– success at least in part to Strabo’s wavering and competitiveness; Strabo was apparently unwilling to cooperate with Octavius at first, desiring to surpass Octavius in rank, andtried to gain the support of other conservative commanders, e.g. the elder Crassus (Lic. 35.22), while Metellus, Antonius, andCatulus urged himto relieve his country without any demands (35.23). Strabo also urged negotiations with Cinna andeven entered into some sort of deal with himwithout theknowledge 33); Brunt (1971a): 440; Sumner (1973): 104–105 gives his of Octavius (35.31– 11, 14; Gabba (1958): 187– 87 B.C.; Lippold, p. 432; Bennett, pp. 10– dates as 132– 313; Katz 281; similarly Bulst, pp. 312– 188; cf. Carney (1961a): 63 nn. 280– (1976a): 328– 329, 331– 332; Keaveney (1978): 240– 241; (1982d): 111– 112; Badi107. 95, 104– 240; Hillman (1997): 91– an (1958a): 239– 50 MRR 2.48, 51; Schol. Bob. p. 109 St; Amp. 42.2; Gran. Lic. 35.6 Cr states that Marius returned by wayof Telamon with about one thousand menandwasjoined by M. Junius Brutus (pr. 88) andother exiles of 88 from Spain (35.7). Plut. Mar. 4 agrees with Licinianus’ figure andadds others (slaves, farmers, andherds41.2– men), whojoined Marius from Etruria, andthe assembly of a fleet of forty ships; 3; Vell. 2.20.5; Livy. Per. 79; App.BC. 1.67 states that Marius raised over Sert. 5.1– 188; Valgiglio (1956a): 12; Gabba (1958): 187– a legion of men; Bennett, pp. 11– 525; 194; Brunt (1971a): 440; Konrad (1994): 67; Keaveney (1982b): 523– 193– 316; Katz (1976a): 328; Bulst, p. 309. See Rawson Van Ooteghem (1964): 305– (1978): 133– 134; Harris (1971): 251– 252; Ruoff-Väänänen, pp. 78– 79; Pfiffig, p. 412 onEtrurian support for Marius andCinna. 141; andSordi, pp.408–

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the west, across theTiber. Marius andSertorius could control theriver from their positions, andMarius attacked andcaptured coastal towns, especially Ostia, in order to prevent foodstuffs from reaching Rome. Themajor means of entry into andexit from the city were cut off in this fashion. Meanwhile, Cinna sent a force to take Ariminum andguard against threats from Cisalpine Gaul. Credit for these tactics maybe given to Cinna or Marius or both, or more likely to the entire general staff Cinna hadassembled, all of whom hadseen distinguished military service.51 Appian’s account makes clear theconsuls in Rome were afraid that they would not be able to defeat Cinna, even with the aid of Strabo. They needed a larger military force; as a result, they summoned Q. Caecilius Metellus, son of Numidicus, whowasin southern Italy trying to squash the Samnite rebels. Hewasinstructed to make peace anywayhe could andreturn home quickly with his army, but his own intransigence (a family trait) during negotiations led only to further difficulties for Cinna’s opponents. For Cinna took advantage of Metellus’delay by sending his own envoy, C. Flavius Fimbria, to meet with Samnite leaders andforge a deal for his side. Cinna would accede to all Samnite demands provided they fight for him. The deal was made, but it is not recorded by any source that the Samnites actually participated in the wararound Rome.52 51 MRR 2.51; Vell. 2.21.6; App. BC. 1.67 mentions four parts; also Livy. Per. 79–80; Oros. 5.19.9,17; and Flor. 2.9.13; Plut. Sert. 5.3 says only three parts; see Gabba (1958): 188 andKonrad (1988): 14– 69; Keaveney (1987): 181. Mar. 15; (1994): 68– 42.1 notsurprisingly credits Marius with all theoperations against Rome; similarly, Gran. Lic. 35.8–10 Cr credits Marius with raising an army of volunteers, dividing, and deploying it; Exuperantius’ information is curiously but clearly faulty, especially in comparison with Appian’s: he claims that Cinna wandered as far afield as Africa, where he made common cause with Marius; the latter raised an army of excons and slaves (27); this is echoed in Schol. Gron. p. 286 St; DVI. 67.6; andFlor. 2.9.9. Marius’ assault on Ostia was branded as cruel and vicious by Flor. 2.9.12; Gran. Lic. 35.13–14 Cr; Livy. Per. 79; Oros. 5.19.17; andPlut. Mar. 42.2; see also IG XIV. 1297.2; Sall. Hist. 1.25 McG perhaps refers to the blockade of the Tiber; as cut off; App. BC. 1.69 does notmention Ostia specifically, but“supplies by sea” 35; Valgiglio (1956a): 195–196; McGushin, p. 96; Lippold, p. 432; Meiggs, pp. 34– 239; (1970b): 18. OnCarbo, see Cic. cf. Carney (1961a): 63; Badian (1958a): 238– Fam. 9.21; Sumner (1973): 117 (129?-82 B.C., tr. pl. 92, pr.? 89?, leg. 87); Ch. 3, 21. nn. 20– 49; App. BC. 1.68 states that Marius went to the Samnites; Gran. Lic. 52 MRR2.42, 47– 30 Cr says it was Fimbria; Livy. Per. 80 notes the union between Cinnans 35.29– andSamnites without discussion of howit wasachieved; Plut. Mar. 42.2 does not mention Marius’ involvement, only Metellus’ return; Sall. Hist. 1.23 McG may that the warshould come to an end preserve the Senate’s instructions to Metellus: “ ; McGushin, p. 95. Note the similarity to under whatever conditions were available” Dio. 30/35.102.6–7: “[the Senate called Metellus] urging him to come to terms with

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The accounts of what happened next are confusing and difficult to reconcile fully. Livy’s epitome, Appian, Florus, Licinianus, and Tacitus (that is, the tradition following Livy’s version) record a battle at theJaniculumandall are in agreement that the consul Octavius succeeded in driving

Cinna’s army from Rome momentarily, though with serious losses. Tacitus andAppian include Pompeius Strabo in this confrontation and the latter records his death immediately afterwards. This battle maybe identical with the bloody encounter between Cinna and Strabo recorded by Velleius. Unfortunately, Livy’s epitome has very little to say about Strabo, and Florus nothing at all. Both fail to record anything about his maneuvers against Cinna. On the other hand, Orosius and Licinianus, as well as Tacitus, speak of a clash of arms between Sertorius and Strabo, which Tacitus at least placed at the Janiculum. Some scholars have explained these similar, overlapping accounts as descriptions of twodistinct battles at the Janiculum.53 Can sense really be made out of these reports? Can we determine roughly what happened? A major confrontation did take place close to Rome itself, resulting in defeat for Cinna’s army, butit wassoon followed by Strabo’s death. The totality of the evidence suggests that there wasonly one battle, at the Janiculum: Appian places both Cinna and Marius there; Livy andFlorus place all four Cinnan commanders there. Perhaps there was a massing of forces at a supposed weak point in Rome’s defenses. Such a reading most neatly accounts for the several stories.54

; Comm. Bern. 2.545 U notes Metellus’ army in the Samnites as best he might” Lucania andhis recall to Rome by legates, presumably Antonius andthe elder and younger Catulus as noted. by Gran. Lic. 35.23 Cr. Bennett, pp. 11, 16– 17; see 64 B.C.), 124 on Fimbria (115/14–85 B.C.), Sumner (1973): 112 on Metellus (128– 60s 78 on Catulus the Elder (149–87 B.C.), and 116 on the younger Catulus (121– B.C.); Brunt (1971a): 440. On the Samnites, see Badian (1958a): 239; Gabba 190; Valgiglio (1956a): 198; Katz (1976a): 330; Rawson (1987): 177– (1958): 189– 375; andKeaveney (1987): 182; (1982b): 65; (1967): 373– 178; Salmon (1964): 64– 532; cf. Martin, pp. 39– 41. 517, 528– 504, 516– 500– 53 MRR 2.49, 51; Livy. Per. 80; App. BC. 1.68; Plut. Mar. 42.2 and DVI. 69.2 note Marius’ occupation of the Janiculum –when?; Flor. 2.9.13; Tac. Hist. 3.51; Vell. 20 Cr speaks of Marius’ assault 4; Oros. 5.19.10–11,13; Gran. Lic. 35.17– 2.21.3– on the Janiculum, in which he executed his captives; the sequence of events recorded by the author suggests that Octavius received reinforcements of six cohorts from Strabo; Brunt (1971a): 440 n. 5 estimates Octavius’ army at fifteen thousand and Strabo’s at thirty thousand before the plague; Lippold, p. 432; Katz 18; (1976a): 334; Valgiglio (1956a): 197; Gabba (1958): 190; Bennett, pp. 17– 5. Seager (1979): 4– 54 What was the battle at Livy. Per. 79 involving the two brothers on opposite sides in 26 Cr)) and Strabo, also the armies of Cinna (Gran. Lic. says Sertorius (35.24– recorded by Tac. Hist. 3.51? The story was derived from Sisenna (see f. 129 P);

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The outcome of this encounter wasquite badfor Octavius: as a result of the fighting and also as a result of an illness that broke out among the troops, he lost an able commander in Strabo anda considerable number of fighting men (according to Velleius, Orosius, andAppian). His army became demoralized in consequence.55 Meanwhile, the Cinnans hadvirtually unlimited resources, surrounded the city, allowing no reinforcements or fresh supplies to enter, andlittle communication. The siege wasapparently not tightened, butit wasnot lifted either. Appian records the Senate’s fear that a prolonged siege would lead to famine andrebellion onthe part of the populace.56

The costly victory at the Janiculum must have been little comfort to Octavius andhis troops. They hadfew options. Octavius could do one of two things: he could try to hold out within the walls of Rome, which would no doubt have led to the problems feared by the Senate; or Octavius could extricate his army from the city and take the fight to Cinna, go on the offensive. Evidently, the latter washis choice. Thefull sequence of events is lost to us; somehow, Octavius managed to escape Rome andjoin forces with Metellus and the elder Crassus about fifteen miles south in the Alban hills.57 Perhaps he took advantage of the Rawson (1987): 179; Gran. Lic. 35.15 Cragain mentions some openbattle between 15 is similar; Sertorius and Strabo; Gabba (1958): 188, 190; Bennett, pp. 14– Konrad (1994): 69; Spann, p. 31; Katz (1976a): 332; (1983): 62; Bulst, p. 313; 5. 113; Seager (1979): 4– Keaveney (1982d): 111– 55 Gran. Lic. 35.17–20 Cr tells us that Octavius lost six thousand menin the battle and seventeen thousand from illness, while theenemy lost only seven thousand, including Milonius, Cinna’s magister equitum; Oros. 5.19.18 says that Strabo lost eleven thousand and Octavius six thousand in the pestilence. Plut. Pomp. 1.1, 4.1 = Obs. 56a (Strabo’s death from lightning andhis corpse abused); also Plut. Mor. Divine 38 Cr states that Strabo fell ill 45 and 35.36– Vengeance. 553C; Gran. Lic. 35.43– from plague and that lightning struck his tent; still, he survived for several days 334; Gabba 42); Bennett, p. 19; Watkins, pp. 143– (35.39– 150; Katz (1976a): 333– 145. 89; Hillard (1996): 135–138, 143– (1958): 191; Hillman (1996): 81– 5; Oros. 5.19.17,19; Gran. Lic. 80; Plut. Mar. 42.1– 56 App. BC. 1.69; Livy. Per. 79– 47 Cr informs us that Octavius joined his menwith Strabo’s; Lippold, p. 432; 35.46– Valgiglio (1956a): 196; Bennett, pp. 14, 20; Katz (1976a): 335. The reverse type of thedenarius of L. Rubrius Dossenus (otherwise unknown) hassuggested to scholars two possible interpretations: either hoped-for victory against the Samnites or, more likely, against thebesiegers of Rome. Onanother of Dossenus’coins, types of Neptune andVictory arejoined, perhaps suggesting a hoped-for success at sea against the fleet of Marius. Thetotality of Dossenus’coinage seems to place himas the last moneyer before Cinna took over Rome and his types coincide with the literary evidence which tells usof the superstitious panic gripping the city at that time; see MRR 2.612, 3.183; Crawford (1974): 78, 731; Rowland, p. 411. 57 See sources in n. 56.

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Cinnan withdrawal after the Janiculum andleft by one of Rome’s eastern gates. Weshould assume that Octavius left some defense forces to guard the city since it is unlikely that he abandoned it altogether; wedo not hear about Cinna’s forces entering Rome at that time, which they would have if it had been defenseless. Instead, we see Cinna, Carbo, Marius, and Sertorius massing forces again notfar from Octavius’newposition. The armies nowsquared off, but Octavius andhis comrades didnotwantto risk the fate of Rome ona single showdown.58 Waiting and watching their opponents was a risky strategy, though; the Cinnans could only get stronger. In fact, Marius began raiding Latin towns nearby, such asAricia, to confiscate stored grain for his side.59 Still, no engagement took place in the Alban hills. Instead, according to Appian andDiodorus, the Senate decided to send peace envoys to Cinna. These menwere notprepared or fully instructed as to howto treat with him, that is, whether to address himas consul or not. Cinna refused to negotiate as a private citizen. The episode gives us some insight into Cinna’s firm, uncompromising character and sense of dignitas, as well as his forceful diplomatic technique.60 The representatives of the Senate returned to Rome to clarify their orders. In the meantime, “ a large number of free citizens”joined Cinna from Rome, some of them to escape starvation, but others because they were favorable to Cinna. This is an interesting bit of information from Appian: it demonstrates, if true, that Cinna hada larger following in Rome than many have given him credit for; they came to his side even though the issue was still undecided. Livy’s epitome alleges bribery as their motivation, again probably a fallacious charge.61 The circumstances as described by Appian and Licinianus reveal the division within the senatorial nobility. Octavius, Metellus, and some of their supporters feared a head-on confrontation andhesitated; others, like P. Licinius Crassus, urged a fight; andstill other leaders sought some kind of peaceful resolution to the crisis.62 Meanwhile, Cinna moved close up to Rome’s walls, disgusted by his enemies’lack of nerve. The Senate dispatched a second embassy to treat with him as consul;63 Merula even abdicated his post, considering it the

58 MRR2.50; App. BC. 1.69; Bennett, p. 20; Gabba (1958): 192. ); Valgiglio 5 (Marius against “maritime cities” 59 App. BC. 1.69; Plut. Mar. 42.1– (1956a): 197; Bennett, p. 20; Carney (1960c): 27. 60 App. BC. 1.69; Diod. 38/39.1; Gran. Lic. 35.16 Cr; Bennett, p. 21. 61 See n. 60 andLivy. Per. 80; Bulst, p. 313; Valgiglio (1956a): 198. 62 App. BC. 1.69; Livy. Per. 80; Gran. Lic. 35.49–50 Cr; Valgiglio (1956a): 201; Bennett, p. 21. 63 App. BC. 1.70; Diod. 38/39.2.1; Plut. Mar. 42.3, 43.1; Carney (1960c): 27; Bulst, p.

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best course of action for the State. The envoys were apprehensive, hoping that Cinna would consent to regaining his office peacefully, without bloodshed or reprisals. Metellus wasamong these envoys, probably their leader, conferred with Cinna at length, recognizing him as consul.64 This turn of events elicited anangry, self-righteous, rather exaggerated, hypocritical reaction from Octavius, whonowre-entered Rome in order to resist Cinna one last time. After his initial firmness in the Forum and his Pyrrhic victory at the Janiculum, Octavius’actions hadnotdone himcredit as a stalwart defender of the Republic; his boldness hadturned to hesitancy and indecision. Still, Octavius had gone too far to compromise; he was frustrated with the Senate’s policy andfearful that his fellows, even Metellus, would sell himout, sacrifice himto make peace with Cinna, whowould surely never forgive what Octavius had done to him. The very similar versions of the conference in our sources reveal the complexities of the situation and the divisions among the leaders of both sides. Octavius and Metellus fell-out with each other not only on the issue of peace terms, but also the loyalty of the troops, whopreferred Metellus.65 The second embassy succeeded in securing fromCinna a promise notto willingly cause anyone’s death on reentering Rome. With this primary condition accepted as part of the terms, the Senate restored Cinna to his office, reversing the deposition they had put into effect in the first place. Withpeace apparently settled, theenvoys escorted Cinna toward thecity to reclaim his lost honor.66 Did Cinna now seize Rome militarily? Velleius, Orosius, Florus, and Livy’s epitome assert that Cinna seized Rome by force; Appian, Diodorus, andPlutarch all agree that Cinna came into the city peacefully as a conse313; Bennett, p. 21; Gabba (1958): 192–193. See Valgiglio (1956a): 201 on Plutarch’s use of Cinna’s and Marius’ reaction here as foreshadowing later events; Plutarch reduces Cinna to a figure-head, while Marius holds the reins of terror; 140. Pelling (1980): 129, 139– 48 Cr makes out that Metellus 4.1; Gran.Lic. 35.47– 64 MRR 2.52; Diod. 38/39.3– initiated the negotiations with Cinna because he feared revolt anddesertion in his ownarmy when they came upclose to enemy lines. We should note also Dio. 30/ 35.106.1 whoprobably erroneously records the defeat of Metellus by Cinna. Licinianus 35.50 Cr mentions a battle between Crassus andFimbria, butthe garbled text makes it difficult to determine whodefeated whom. Perhaps Cinna’s meeting with Metellus is also recorded by Sall. Hist. 1.24 McG; McGushin, p. 95; Bennett, pp. 22; Gabba (1958): 193; Valgiglio (1956a): 201; Konrad (1994): 70; Bulst, p. 21– 336. 313; Katz (1976a): 334– 65 Diod 38/39.2.2; App. BC. 1.70; Plut. Mar. 42.3; Katz (1976a): 335; Valgiglio 22. 199; Bennett, pp. 21– (1956a): 197– 66 Konrad (1994): 70; Valgiglio (1956a): 199; Gabba (1958): 194 andIG XIV. 1297; Bennett, pp. 25, 36.

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quence of his reinstatement by the Senate. This version is more persuasive given the circumstances; Cinna hadno reason to use or waste force.67 Of Cinna’s comrades, Marius refused to enter the city because he was officially an exile; he asked to be cleared of all charges first. This was accomplished in the Tribal Assembly, probably presided over by Cinna himself as consul, in cooperation with the plebeian tribunes andwith the consent of the Senate.68 After Marius entered Rome,69 hejoined Cinna andmet with “ the most peace” eminent leaders”of their faction to determine howto maintain “ , that is, their control of thecity. Their decision wasto eliminate theleaders of the opposition and thus free themselves to govern the State as they wished. Surely, their opponents had feared just such an outcome all along, as evidenced in the promise of amnesty they hadasked of Cinna.70

V Nowcomes anevent on which our sources are anything but silent or dull, yet where whatthey tell usmustbemost carefully considered, theso-called Marian massacre. Bennett demonstrated seventy years ago (and since then most scholars have come to agree with him) that theancient sources greatly exaggerated the extent of the executions carried out by the Cinnans when they took control of Rome.71

67 Livy. Per. 80 (Rome “received”the Cinnans); cf. Vell. 2.21.6 (They “seized” 71 (Rome ); App. BC. 1.70– entered with troops” Rome) and Oros. 5.19.19 (They “ 3; Flor. 2.9.13; Lippold, p. “ feared”the Cinnans); Diod. 38/39.3; Plut. Mar. 43.2– 432; Gabba (1958) 194; Bennett, p. 22. 68 Vell. 2.21.6 and Dio 30/35.102.8 state that Cinna put forward a law for Marius’ 4, without specifying by People were called”says Plut. Mar. 43.3– reentry; the “ whom; according to App. BC. 1.70, the tribunes voted for Marius’recall; Bennett, 203; p. 22; cf. Carney (1961a): 65 n. 282; (1960c): 27; Valgiglio (1956a): 202– Gabba (1958): 194. 68. 69 See scholars in nn. 66– 70 On Marius’ bodyguard, see Plut. Mar. 43.3 and perhaps Dio 30/35.102.8 (He ) andOrosius 5.19.19; Diod. 38/ the rest of the army andthe exiles” entered with “ 204; Gabba (1958): 39.4; App. BC. 1.71; Plut. Sert. 5.4; Valgiglio (1956a): 202– 25; Konrad (1994): 71; Carney (1961a): 195; Lippold, p. 432; cf. Bennett, pp. 24– 315, 318; cf. Spann, p. 32. 68 n. 288; Bulst, pp. 314– 318; 200; Van Ooteghem (1964): 316– 35; so Gabba (1958): 197– 71 Bennett, pp. 24– 28; Lintott Konrad (1994): 71; Spann, p. 32; Carney (1961a): 67; (1960c): 24, 26– 318; 55; Bulst, pp. 313– 73; Rawson (1979): 338; Badian (1962b): 54– (1968): 67– 209. cf. Valgiglio (1956a): 203–

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Dio is thebest example: hestates that “ noonecould escape andMarius andhis troops slewevery manthey met, making nodistinctions buttreating them all alike as enemies ... so great was [Marius’] desire and insatiable passion for slaughter” ; this carnage lasted five days andfive nights, so that the deaths were beyond count. Florus compared the unleashed fury of the Cinnans to the Roman devastation of Carthage in 146 B.C.; some of Velleius’colorful phrases are similar, as are the condemnations of Orosius. Livy’s epitome shows the Cinnans ravaging Rome as though it were a captured foreign city, while Diodorus and Plutarch talk of butchery of citizens andmonstrous crimes.72 This tradition continued through the summarizers andrhetoricians of the first four centuries of the Imperial era.73 Where didthis originate? Surely, Sulla would have recorded stories of mayhem and murder by the Cinnans in his memoirs; so would surviving witnesses, the annalists of the 70s andthehistorians of the 70s and60s. All of these played upSulla’sjust role asdestroyer of theevil Cinnan menace.74 Yet, in Cicero’s speeches, treatises, andletters, one can find something of a check on ourbiased sources. Cicero certainly condemned the Cinnans for their cruel vengeance against their enemies. Indeed, he once remarked to Atticus that Caesar would behave like Cinna and show no mercy in slaying the nobility.75 Still, nowhere does the orator indicate that Cinna’s faction threatened all the inhabitants of Rome. Rather, he makes it perfectly clear that the targets of their revenge were illustrious men, that is, opposition leaders. Cicero presented his version

of the “massacre”before the illustrious men of his day, many of whom knew what happened because they were survivors from theeraof Cinna andSulla; Cicero could nothave hidden the truth from them about the extent of the slaughter. Further, his version of events accords with the facts in Livy’s epitome, Appian, andVelleius.76 5; Oros. 5.19.20–23; Livy. 72 Dio. 30/35.102.8,10–11; Flor. 2.9.13–17; Vell. 2.22.1– 5; Bennett, p. 24; Carney 9, 44.9; Sert. 5.4– Per. 80; Diod. 38/39.6; Plut. Mar. 43.5– (1960c): 27; Lippold, pp. 432– 433. Florus dated the executions between the Kal200; Bennett, pp. 25, 29, 36; ends andIdes of January 86 B.C.; Gabba (1958): 197– 168. Rawson (1987): 167– 73 Consider Val. Max. 2.8.7, where Cinna and Marius “devoured the blood of citi); Eut. 5.7.3; savage slaughter polluted thecity” ; DVI. 67.6, 69.1; Amp.42.2 (“ zens” widespread cruelty andfrightful savagery of Cinna”whospared no Exup. 28 Z (“ 550, 4.822; Sen. Ben. 5.16.2 234, 545– one); andesp. Luc. 2.98– 74 On the origin of the accounts in sources hostile to Marius and his comrades, 77 anddiscussions in Appendix. especially Sulla’s memoirs, see nn. 71, 76– 81; Schol. Bob. p. 75 Att. 7.7.7.9, 9.10.3.6; Cat. 3.24.8; Phil. 11.1; Vat. 23; ND. 3.80– 109 St; Schol. Gron. p. 286 St. 35; Badian 76 See sources in nn. 72, 73, 75, 78. Bulst, p. 314; Bennett, pp. 29, 32– 219. (1962b): 215–

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All ancient views of the “massacre”are colored by strong personal feelings on the part of the writers and it should come as no surprise that most of them express equal hostility toward andcriticism of Sulla’s later proscriptions. Cicero madehiscomments during a time of increasing unrest andviolence in Rome; he didnot want to see a repetition of past horrors. Livy andSallust, andthe later authors whodrew from them, were equally appalled by civil war and some had lived through troubled times themselves. All of them were interested primarily in condemning such strife, no matter who committed it.77 Cinna’s purge of the aristocracy began, if wefollow Appian’s account, with confiscations of property from supposed enemies.78 How this was organized or implemented or whether it took place haphazardly, more or less on individual initiative, wehave no clues to determine. Concurrently, thehuntcommenced forthose opponents. Oral tradition probably preserved the names of the most prominent ones early on; eventually, Livy formalized the list, nowbest preserved in Appian and Florus, whose similar ordering and descriptions of the fate of these men also point to a single original source.79 The first target must have been the consul Octavius, who, despite Cinna’s vague promise to the contrary, must have incurred Cinna’s desire for vengeance.80 Indeed, Cinna wasbest remembered by later generations of Romans as the man responsible for the death of his fellow consul. Octavius, at the behest of his friends, left the city center for theJaniculum, still holding on to his authority andsetting himself upas consul in protest against Cinna. Hehadwithhimsome unnamed aristocrats anda remnant of his military forces, as well as his lictors. Octavius refused to flee when the military tribune, C. Marcius Censorinus, led a force of Cinnan cavalry against him; Octavius wasarrested andbeheaded by the tribune, whotook his trophy to Cinna and placed it on the rostra. This was the first time a consul’s head was so displayed, but unfortunately not the last.81

77 See sources in nn. 72, 75, esp. Cicero andVelleius. Rawson (1979): 338; Bulst, p.

314; Valgiglio (1956a): 204. 78 Several sources mention something like this: App. BC. 1.71; Livy. Per. 80; Dio. 30/ 35.102.9; Val. Max. 4.3.14; Amm. Marc. 30.8.9; Vell. 2.22.5. 79 Bennett, pp. 29, 30, 32, 36; Konrad (1988): 13 places Sall. Hist. 1.26 Maur. (1.24 55. McG) in this context; Badian (1962b): 54– 80 See above for Octavius’treatment of Cinna; also Cic. Phil. 13.2; Tusc. 5.54; Schol. Bob. p. 177 St; Exup. 27 Z; DVI. 69.2; Vell. 2.22.2; Val. Max. 1.6.10; Bennett, p. 25; Valgiglio (1956a): 200. 81 MRR 2.49; Only Appian explicitly mentions the role of Censorinus (BC. 1.71); Appian’s treatment of Octavius’death mayalso be his commentary on Antony and 14; other perpetrators of beheadings during Rome’s later civil strife; Flor. 2.9.13–

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Afterwards, a broader search began for enemies in the senatorial and equestrian ranks; only the former were beheaded when captured and their heads placed on the rostra in the Forum to join Octavius’.82Appian provides a list of the most eminent victims, which included M. Antonius,83 C. and L. Caesar,84 P. Crassus the Elder and the Younger,85 the elder Q. Catulus,86 L. Merula,87 Baebius, Numitorius,88 Ancharius,89 Serranus, Lentulus, andCornutus.90 Plut. Sull. 5.6; cf. Mar. 42.5 for the death of Octavius on the rostra before Marius entered Rome; IG XIV.1297.2 blames Marius alone; Gabba (1958): 195– 197; Bennett, p. 25; Badian (1962b): 54; Bulst, p. 315. 82 App. BC. 1.72; generally also Plut. Mar. 44.6; Sall. Hist. 1.67.19 McG; Oros. 5.19.23; Quad. f. 83 P on Marius’ pitiless behavior; Flor. 2.9.17; Lippold, p. 432; 145. McGushin, pp. 144– 83 MRR 2.49, 52; RE s.v. “Antonius”#28; Cic. Phil. 1.34 = Dio. 45.47.2; De Or. 3.9– 10; Tusc. 5.55; Scaur. 2.2 with Asc. p. 39 Sq; Flor. 2.9.14; Val. Max. 8.9.2; 9.2.2; App. BC. 1.72; Plut. Mar. 44.1– 4; Vell. 2.22.3; Luc. 2.121; Adn. super Luc. 2.121 E says that Antonius hadurged Metellus to destroy the Cinnans; Comm. Bern. 2.121 94 gives U says that Antonius urged mutual disarmament; Sumner (1973): 93– 87 B.C. (cos. 99); Fantham, pp. 93– 94; Rawson (1987): Antonius’ dates as 143– 168; Bulst, p. 317; cf. Badian (1957): 336; Gruen (1965): 67; Valgiglio 167– (1956a): 205– 207; Gabba (1958): 198; Bennett, p. 26. 52; RE s.v. I ulius”#135 and#142; Flor. 2.9.14; Cic. Tusc. 5.55; Scaur. 84 MRR 2.51– De Or. 3.10; Livy. Per. 80; App. BC. 1.72; Val. Max. 9.2.2; 2.2 with Asc. p. 39 Sq;“

316; Bennett, p. 25; Sumner (1973): 105–106; Gabba (1958): 197; Bulst, pp. 315– 460. These men are C. Julius Caesar 63; Keaveney (1979): 451– Katz (1977): 45– Strabo, aed. cur. 90 andhis brother L. Julius Caesar, cos. 90, cens. 89, author of the

lex Julia. 50; Plut. Crass. 4.1; App. BC. 1.72; Livy. Per. 80; Flor. 2.9.14; Cic. 85 MRR 2.49– Sest. 48; De Or. 3.8; Tusc. 5.55; Scaur. 2.1 with Asc. p. 37 Sq; Schol. Bob. p. 131 St; Luc. 2.124; Adn. super Luc. 2.124 E; Comm. Bern. 2.124 U; Fantham, p. 94; 12; Ward, pp.52– 53; Badian (1957): 169; Marshall (1976): 11– Rawson (1987): 168– 317; Gabba (1958): 197; Sumner (1973): 124; Bennett, p. 332; Bulst, pp. 316– 329– 26. OnFimbria, see n. 52 andCh. 4. 3; App. BC. 1.74; Plut. Mar. 44.5; Flor. 86 RE s.v. “Lutatius”#7; Diod. 38/39.2– 4; Val. Max. 9.12.4; Cic. Tusc. 5.56; De Or. 3.9; Sumner 2.9.15; Vell. 2.22.3– 318; Valgiglio (1956a): 208. (1973): 78; Bennett, pp. 27– 28; Bulst, pp. 317– 87 MRR2.52; Vell. 2.22.2; App. BC. 1.74; Flor. 2.9.16; Dio. 30/35.102.11a; Val. Max. 318. 28; Badian (1962b): 54: Bulst, pp. 317– 9.12.5; Bennett, pp. 27– 88 RE s.v. “Baebius”#17; App. BC. 1.72; Flor. 2.9.14; Luc. 2.119–121 (Baebius); Adn. super Luc. 2.120 E; Comm. Bern. 2.119 U; Rawson (1987): 166; Fantham, pp. 93; Bulst, p. 316 (Baebii); Gabba (1958): 197 (Gaius Numitorius); Bennett, p. 92– 25. 89 MRR 2.40; RE s.v. “Ancharius”#2; Flor. 2.9.16; App. BC. 1.73; Plut. Mar. 43.3; Luc. 2.113–114; Comm. Bern. 2.114 U; Adn. super Luc. 2.114 E calls this man a 166; Fantham, p. 95; Bennett, p. 27; Bulst, p. friend of Marius; Rawson (1987): 165– 384. 317; Gabba (1958): 199; Carney (1960b): 382– 73; Plut. 90 RE s.v. “Atilius”#64; “Cornelius”#203; “Caecilius”#44; App. BC. 1.72–

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49

Most of these mendiedwithout a hearing of anykindandtheir headless bodies were left to pollute the streets of Rome. Catulus and Merula, however, were brought before a iudicium populi on a “trumped up” charge, probably treason. Neither awaited trial; each committed suicide inmemorable fashion.91 Private murders andother acts of vengeance andcruelty also took place, perpetrated by both sides. Yet not all enemies were killed; some were deposed from office andexiled.92 Noevidence indicates the families of the executed and the exiled were harmed. Finally, Cinna declared Sulla a hostis, confiscated his property, andrazed his house.93 With thebeginning of thenewyear, 86 B.C., Rome seemed firmly in the hands of Cinna and his comrades. Cinna and Marius became consuls, perhaps by election, perhaps by self-appointment.94 Nevertheless, the vic-

91

92

93

94

29; Carney (1961a): 68; Badian (1957): Mar. 43.6 (Cornutus); Bennett, pp. 25, 28– 339; Bulst, p. 316; Gabba (1958): 197–198 identifies the three as C. Atilius Serranus, cos. 106, P. Cornelius Lentulus andM. Caecilius Cornutus, the latter two legates in the Social War. Only Cornutus escaped death. MRR 2.52; App. BC. 1.74; Diod. 38/39.4.2: Catulus wasaccused of a capital crime by a tribune before the People; Cic. De Or. 3.9–10 seems to confirm this: Catulus desired exile notacquittal; Adn.super Luc. 2.174 E; Comm. Bern. 2.174 U identifies 28; Rawson (1987): 174– 176; the tribune as Marius Gratidianus; Bennett, pp. 27– 202; Badian (1962b): 54; Gruen (1968): 233; Weinrib, p. 43; Gabba (1958): 201– 318. Bulst, pp. 317– 74; Eut. 5.7.3. Appian’s allusion to depositions and exiles could App. BC. 1.72– embrace the Cinnan prosecutions of hostile tribunes andpraetors of 87 B.C. carried out by P. Popillius Laenas (tr.pl. 86) in early January 86. See Vell. 2.42.2; Livy. Per. 80; Dio. 30/35.102.12; Plut. Mar. 45.1; Cic. Rosc. 12.33; Val. Max. 9.11.2; 29, 33, 37– 38; Gabba (1958): Comm. Bern. 2.125 U; MRR 2.57; Bennett, pp. 28– 43; Fantham, pp. 94– 95; Gruen (1968): 234– 199; Bulst, p. 318; Weinrib, pp. 42– 235. Onexecutions of soldiers andMarius’Bardyiae, seeAppian; cf. Oros. 5.19.24; 6, 44.6; Sert. 5.5. Consider the comments of Pelling similarly Plut. Mar. 43.4– 140; Gabba, p. 203; Lippold, p. 433; Valgiglio (1956a): (1980): 129, 131–135, 139– 32; Corbellini, pp. 154–156; 209; Konrad (1994): 72; Bennett, p. 30; Spann, pp. 31– 162. Sartori, pp. 159– On the hostis declaration against Sulla in late 87 or early 86 B.C. before the death of 30; Bauman (1973): 289– 291: Marius, see Gabba (1958): 200; Bennett, pp. 29– Although only noted by Appian (six times!), the decree against Sulla receives probable confirmation fromPlutarch’s andEutropius’mention of thedestruction of Sulla’s house andthe similar decrees levelled against Metellus andother Sullans in 83 (App. BC. 1.86; Exup. 46 Z); Badian (1964a): 211, 226; cf. Carney (1961a): 70; 587; so Keaveney (1982a): 85; Lintott also Bulst, p. 319; butcf. Frier (1972): 586– 37; (1968): 52– 138. On the repeal of Sulla’s laws, see Bennett, pp. 36– 57, 132– Badian (1970b): 18; (1958a): 241. MRR 2.53; Livy. Per. 80; DVI. 67.6, 69.3; Bennett, p. 37; also Gabba (1958): 203; Carney (1961a): 70; Brunt (1988): 461. App. BC. 1.75 uses a Greek term for being

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tory wasshort-lived for Marius, whodied within a matter of weeks, apparently

as a result of severe illness complicated by his recent exertions.95 VI

The arrival of L. Cornelius Cinna on the scene of Roman politics remains shrouded in mystery. We can say little about his family background, or early training andcareer, or even his stance on the important issues of the day. Evidently, Cinna didpossess considerable military skill. This he demonstrated in the Social Warandin the struggle with Octavius. Moreover, Cinna seems to have hada keen political sense, specifically the ability to recognize a political opportunity when he saw one. 88 B.C. wasa traumatic year for the Romans, whowere disrupted from within by senatorial rivalries, disturbed bytheshocking warintheEast, shaken bythe revolt of the allies, and disillusioned and angered by the invasion of their owncity byoneof their ownproconsuls. The Empire andtheCity itself had been violated and the embers of discontent continued to smolder. Many sought a champion for their causes. Cinna offered himself as such, at just the right moment. Yet before he could help others, Cinna first had to save his own position. For the defenders of the neworder would not tolerate anyfurther disruption andwould use anymeans to prevent it, even the illegal abrogation of a consul’s imperium. But Cinna proved himself to be a most determined man, one whohad learned the lessons of the Social War and Sulla’s March on Rome. Thus, Cinna brought together the massive energy of Italian manpower andchanneled it into a long andpainful siege of Rome until he achieved his goal. What was his goal: the defense of the Roman constitution or simply of his owndignitas? Through his actions, Cinna revealed some of the arcana imperii of the Late Republic. First of all, Cinna proved that Sulla’s example could be fairly easily duplicated. Though Sulla hadfirst realized the potential of the client army loyal to its general rather than the State, Cinna showed that elected; Vell. 2.23.1; Oros. 5.19.23; Amp. 42.2 echoes Quad. f. 82 P in using creare; CIL X.4669; Luc. 2.130; and Flor. 2.9.17 give no indication; Lippold, p. 433; Plut. Mar. 45.1 confirms Appian, even in the word used, which denotes legal electoral procedures; Valgiglio (1956a): 210; (1956b): 33. 46.6; App. BC. 1.75; Vell. 2.23.1; 95 Cic. ND. 3.21, 81; Plut. Sert. 6.1; Mar. 45.2– Livy. Per. 80; so Oros. 5.19.23; Flor. 2.9.17; DVI. 67.6; Diod. 37.29.4; CIL I.1505; 123; Bennett, p. 39; Valgiglio 26; (1958): 117– Carney (1961a): 70; (1960c): 24– 218; Badian (1970b): 18; Lippold, p. 433; Van Ooteghem (1964): (1956a): 211– 68. 87; Scardigli (1977): 65– 322; Hine, pp. 83– 320–

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51

even this allegiance hada price, that even one of Sulla’s legions could be stolen away by someone offering more immediate gratification to the troops. Octavius andMetellus certainly found out howundependable their ownlegionaries were, so prone to desertion anddisaffection. So, Cinna did not simply follow Sulla’s example, but furthered it, fully unveiling the danger of that loose, fickle beast that wasthe post-Marian army. Second, the Italian allies/new citizens could not be ignored. Defeat in battle andsupposed placation through legal trickery hadnotworked to keep them subject to Rome and they would not rest until they achieved parity with Romans. The State would find no peace without a just resolution to this dilemma. So, Roman leaders hada choice to make: ignore theproblem andsuffer theconsequences, or work with the Italians andgain a huge base of political andmilitary support. Cinna chose the latter, probably out of a little bit of conviction and practicality. Indeed, even the conservative Octavius andhis associates were forced by desperation to make amends with the Italians, but they realized their tactical error too late. Cinna could not claim that he hadthe support of tota Italia, buthe came very close to it. This brings us to ourfinal point. Cinna rose to preeminence in 87 B.C. because he filled a vacuum in leadership. Specifically, he took upthe cause of the discontented anddisenfranchised. The opponents of Sulla, the Marian exiles, the Italian new citizens: all these sought changes that would benefit them and some even sought revenge. They were outsiders who wanted in andpursued their goals with conviction andvehemence. It is no wonder that theCinnan victory concluded with violence inRome itself. Yet, when it was all over, L. Cornelius Cinna, their standard-bearer, was left at theheadof anunusual coalition of forces andincontrol of theRoman State.

3 CINNAE DOMINATIO

For nearly three years, the City wasfree from armed strife.

(Cicero, Brutus. 308)

Cinna wasable to assimilate diverse elements andform wide backing for a consensus to (Gruen, Criminal Courts, p. 243) challenge the backing of Sulla.

Wesimply donotpossess anything close to a complete account forevents at Rome under Cinna. Although Appian wrote a continuous narrative on the 82 B.C., it focuses onnegotiations with andmilitary preparations years 85– hetells usrelatively little about other contemporary events or Sulla; against issues at Rome. More valuable areCicero, Plutarch’s biographies of Pompey andCrassus, andLivy’s epitome for providing glimpses into the workings of thegovernment andcourts during Cinna’s regime. Numismatic evidence is also available anduseful inidentifying theminor officials of thetime and

in analyzing the state of theeconomy. This state of the evidence is the clearest testimony to the influence of Sulla on the history of his era, for his own version of the War against Mithridates andhis dealings with the government at home is the basis of most of our extant sources. Whether they follow Sulla’s themes or modify his version, oursources lose sight of much of what took place in Rome and 82 B.C. Italy from 86– This chapter re-examines the evidence for the “Cinnae dominatio” through a thematic approach. It will consider the composition of Cinna’s faction, his relationship with the Senate, equestrian order, andItalian new citizens, his influence over the courts andAssemblies, andhis handling of the economic crisis of the time. Most importantly, this chapter will redominatio”anddetermine to whatextent it applies to assess theconcept of “ Cinna’s regime. I One of the major problems confronting the historian of this period is the silence of our sources on senatorial support for Cinna. Several pieces of evidence indicate that the Senate continued to hold authority andto function normally, sometimes even taking actions contrary to the wishes of

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Cinna and his comrades. In fact, several senators constituted a “ peace party”that sought reconciliation with Sulla.1 A number of ancient authors insist (no doubt following Sulla’s memoirs) that Sulla had the greater support of the Senate.2 Unfortunately, Livy’s epitome andAppian (our most complete andmost reliable source) are both vague on this subject.3 Yet Dio, probably drawing from Livy or an abridgement of Livy, tells us something that is perhaps nearer to the truth: “ not a fewof those whowere opposed to Sulla’s policy”joined Sulla in imitation of Metellus Pius in 83 B.C.4 In other words, when it became clear that Sulla wasreturning to Italy andhada goodchance of emerging victorious, then a large number of senators abandoned Cinnan Rome for the camp of Sulla. The lists of Sulla’s supporters from the Senate are far from complete. Where are the other one or two hundred senators and what did they think about the situation? Who were the men added to or removed from the 85 B.C.? Did Senate in the lectio Senatus conducted by the censors of 86– this lectio “pack”theSenate with supporters of Cinna, orfill it with neutrals andmoderates? Did the censors remove sympathizers with Sulla? Weare left wondering about the majority of senators whoperhaps were notyet on either side. The ancient authors were only concerned with those senators whotook sides, whowere important in later times, or whowere prominent but caught in the middle. We can suppose that some senators privately agreed with Sulla but stayed at home outof a sense of duty, conscience, or fear, while some disapproved of both sides butremained silent. Badian has argued that many whowere later prominent in Sulla’s new Senate (such as Catulus the Younger, Antonius Creticus, Hortensius, and Lepidus) stayed peacefully in Rome, even though their relatives had perMarian massacre.”Hisassignment of certain senators to Rome ished inthe“ is persuasive, though not foolproof, as Keaveney has shown. The identity andpolitical affiliation of many other senators remain a mystery.5

1 2

3 4

5

58; Gabba (1958): 324; Badian (1962b): 56– 66; cf. Bulst, pp. 322– Bennett, pp. 65– 123. 247 andKeaveney (1982a): 120– 205; (1976): 139; so also Gruen (1968): 239– what amounted to a maior pars nobilitatis”); Plut. Sull. 22.1 (“ Vell. 2.23.3 (“ residui sena); Oros. 5.20.1 (“ ); Eut. 5.7.4 (“ universus reliquus senatus” senate” ); Lippold, p. 433; Bennett, pp. 33, 51; cf. Gabba (1958): 205; (1976): Appentum” 59; Gruen (1968): 236, 250– 54, 58– dix. 3; Bulst, p. 326; Badian (1962b): 51, 53– 254; Frier (1972): 591 n. 37; butcf. Keaveney (1982a): 121; Balsdon (1965): 229– 230. App. BC. 1.77; Livy. Per. 84. Dio. 30/35.106.1; consider also Nepos. Att. 2.2; Brunt (1988): 461; Woolliscroft, p. 57. 37; Ward, pp. 54– Cic. Dom. 84 informs us that one of the censors hadto remove his ownuncle (who hadalready been exiled by the Cinnans) from the rolls. Schol. Bob. p. 176 St states

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55

Bennett long ago suggested as part of his debunking of the “ Marian massacre”that “there must have been a considerable group [of senators], including even menof high importance, whowere granted complete immu6 Who were these men? As Cicero nity and continued in their honors.” informs us, several senators, including L. Marcius Philippus, Q. Mucius Scaevola, and L. Valerius Flaccus, decided to serve time under Cinna’s “ tyranny”rather than wage waragainst their owncountry andthus destroy it; we should add to this group L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, who is noted by Appian. Apparently, these mendidnot believe they would be destroying the State by cooperating with Cinna. Cinna could not lay claim to complete constitutional legitimacy (neither could Sulla). Nevertheless, several exconsuls, themost respected leaders andthedirectors of policy intheRoman State, cooperated with the Cinnan government, most especially the still active and very proper Scaevola. His presence alone must have given the Cinnan regime an air of respectability andof legitimacy. In contrast, Sulla 83 B.C.7 completely lacked consular partisans in his camp from 86– Despite such information, wemust often turn to theproscription lists to gain greater insight into thebreadth anddepth of Cinna’s following beyond the major leaders in his regime.8 Yet the ancient accounts of the proscriptions vary greatly in scope andcontent andoften conflict with each other on the extent of the bloodshed. For example, Livy’s epitome is vague, noting only the horrendous death of Marius Gratidianus and the enormities of Sulla’s slaughter. Diodorus andVelleius aresimilarly imprecise. Notenough of Sallust survives.9 Ontheother hand, Appian gives byfartheclearest andfullest treatment of the event. He informs us that several lists of the proscribed were published. The first had the names of forty senators and sixteen hundred equestrians. This was just among Romans; similar lists were circulated throughout Italy to punish Cinna’s supporters everywhere. Appian later says that Sulla destroyed a total of ninety senators, fifteen consulars, and

6 7

8 9

that young Catulus was“proscribed”andAdn. super Luc. 2.174 E that he returned 143; Sumner 59; Keaveney (1984): 126– with Sulla from Asia. Badian (1962b): 47– (1973): 116 on Q. Lutatius Catulus Q.f. (121– 60s B.C.). Bennett, p. 33; Frier (1972): 588. App. BC. 1.88; Cic. Att. 8.3.6; Bennett, p. 34; Badian (1962b): 51, 55; (1970b): 18– 589; Van Oote19; Gabba (1972): 797; Keaveney (1982a): 120; Frier (1972): 588– ghem (1961): 134– 83 on L. Flaccus pr. sen. (143–80 140; Sumner (1973): 81– ? B.C.), andLucius (136/5–85 B.C.), 97 on Scaevola B.C.), his cousins Gaius (138– 82 B.C.), and 102 on Philippus (136– (140– 70s B.C.). 66. 26 below: Brunt (1988): 461; Hinard (1985b): 52– See sources in nn. 13– 43, 48.12 McG; 19; Vell. 2.28.3– Livy. Per. 88; Diod. 38.6, 18– 4; Sall. Hist. 1.35– 119. See sources in nn. 10– 12. 108, 118– McGushin, pp. 103–

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twenty-six hundred equestrians, including exiles. In theend, the Senate was so depleted that Sulla hadto addthree hundred equestrians to bring it upto strength.10 Plutarch confirms much of this, except that he records eighty names on the first list (he does not specify senators or equestrians), to which twohundred more names were added thefollowing day, andanequal number the day after that.11 Whatever the actual figures, Sulla clearly inflicted enormous losses on the Senate. Obviously, the numbers of slain donotlend much credibility to the assertion that Sulla hadthe majority of the Senate on his side. Perhaps he didhave a “semblance”of a Senate, butnotthe majority. Even when he assumed the dictatorship in 81 B.C., he had perhaps half the “ normal” number of senators under him, and this included probably a majority of former collaborators, neutrals, andmoderates, menwhowould have been in Cinnan Rome previously. To these, Sulla added a number of newsenators. Thus, after an examination of the proscription lists, we should conclude that Cinna’s loyal following among senators either equalled or exceeded Sulla’s before the latter’s return to Italy.12

II From what little evidence we have, we see a fragmented Senate, not one neatly divided into twoor even three camps. Cinna presided over a Senate composed of Marians, Metellans, anti-Metellans, former officers of Pompeius Strabo, and new men.13 We will examine further, in their proper context, 96, 100, 103; cf. Flor. 2.9.25 (two thousand senators andequestrians 10 App. BC. 1.95– were proscribed); and Val. Max. 9.2.1 (forty-seven hundred men proscribed, including some below equestrian rank); Keaveney (1982a): 151; Badian (1970b): 23– 39. 24; Woolliscroft, pp. 38– 4, 22.4 closely matches Plutarch: the first list 5; Oros. 5.21.3– 11 Plut. Sull. 31.3– contained eighty names, including Carbo, Norbanus, Marius, Scipio, andSertorius, to which five hundred more names were added later. Healso says that in the Social andCivil wars twenty-four consulars, six praetorians, sixty aedilicians, andabout 436; Bennett, p. 35; Keaveney two hundred senators perished. Lippold, pp. 434– 135. 120, 125– 133; Hinard (1985b): 116– (1982a): 121; Develin, pp. 130– 324; Badian (1962b): 51, 53; Gabba (1958): 210; 12 Bennett, p. 66; Bulst, pp. 319– Gruen (1968): 241; Woolliscroft, p. 36; cf. Keaveney (1982a): 121; Frier (1972): 588 n. 22. 130, 243, 247; Keaveney (1984): 126– 54; Gruen (1968): 239– 13 Badian (1962b): 52– 143. L. Valerius Flaccus, suffect consul in 86, is a good example from a 138– distinguished family that worked with Cinna: MRR 2.51, 53 suggests he had betrayed Ostia to Marius in 87; according to Cic. Flac. 32, 77, he hadbeen curule aedile andpraetor (in 93?); Gruen, p. 240; Bennett, pp.40, 64; Woolliscroft, p. 36.

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57

those senators whoworked andsympathized with Cinna; for the purposes of this study, those criteria will define Cinna’s “faction” . A brief overview here will serve to illustrate some significant points. Of those whohadsupported andsided with Cinna in the year 87, some disappear from the historical record completely afterward,14 while others only until the return of Sulla, when they reappear on his side.15 Among those whosurvived the civil strife andcontinued to work with Cinna were Q. Sertorius, Cn. Papirius Carbo, M. Marius Gratidianus, C. Marcius Censorinus, andC. Flavius Fimbria. As noted earlier, Sertorius seems to have had personal reasons, especially his bitter animosity toward Sulla, for joining Cinna in 87. As the enemy of Sulla, Cinna gained Sertorius’ very firm support.16 On the other hand, the only visible link between Cinna andGratidianus andFimbria is their connection with Marius. Scholars have suggested that Cinna inherited some of Marius’ adherents, including these two men, in his role as colleague of Marius andopponent of Sulla.17 Weshould include in this group M. Junius Brutus, who hadreturned from exile with Marius in 87, and C. Marius the Younger, who had probably served with his father in 87.18

14 See Ch. 2, n. 23 onM. Vergilius, the tribune whohadaccused Sulla; andn. 83 on P. Annius, tr. mil., whohadexecuted Antonius the Orator; he is not heard from again. Remember Milonius: Ch. 2, nn. 32 and55. 15 OnP. Cornelius Cethegus (131?-70s B.C.), whohadbeen exiled in 88 as a Marian, had returned in 87, and switched sides in 83, see Cic. Brut. 178; Plut. Mar. 40.3; 62, 80; Sall. Hist. 1.77.20 McG; Val. Max. 9.2.1; Sumner (1973): App. BC. 1.60– 106; and Ch. 5, n. 80. On Q. Lucretius Ofella/Afella (124?-81 B.C.), who is Marian”andwas probably praetor in 83 or 82, see Cic. Brut. 178; described as a “ 107; andCh. 5, n. 60. Vell. 2.27.6; Sumner, pp. 106– 65; Sumner (1973): 108. 76; Katz (1983): 63– 16 Spann, p. 34; Konrad (1994): 73– 17 On Gratidianus, see Cic. Brut. 223; Off. 3.81, who characterizes him as an ambitious manwith designs ontheconsulship; Val.Max. 9.2.1; andSen. Ira. 3.18.1, who 119 believes that he wasexcessively loved by the populace. Sumner (1973): 118– dates his two praetorships to 85 and 82; MRR 2.52, 60 places them in 85 and 84; Gruen (1968): 240. On Fimbria, see Cic. Brut. 233, who calls him aequalis of M. 86, 124 calls himquaestor in 86, legate in 85. Fimbria Crassus; Sumner, pp.76, 85– wasthe sonof C. Flavius Fimbria, cos. 104, newman, andperhaps friend of Marius. Cicero speaks highly of the father, whohadyet suffered defeats in his career, partly at the hand of some Metellans. In fact, he was prosecuted for repetundae by Gratidianus’ father! (Brut. 129; Planc. 52; 2 Verr. 5.181; Leg. 3.36; cf. on his son, Brut. 233; Off. 3.77); Evans (1987): 121; Badian (1962b): 55. For Fimbria’s brother, whoprobably also joined Cinna early on, see Ch. 4, n. 25. 18 This Brutus is not to be identified with the tribune of the plebs in 83 B.C., but probably with the legate of Carbo whocommitted suicide rather than be captured by Pompey. See MRR 2.40, 63; Gruen (1968): 242. On Young Marius, see Konrad (1994): 77.

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Censorinus mayhave used his position as moneyer in 88 B.C. to advertise candidate Cinna’s support for the Italian newcitizens. In the next year, he certainly proved his loyalty to Cinna by executing the consul Octavius. Still, his motive for backing Cinna remains obscure.19 Each of these menplayed an important part in the Cinnan regime. Cn. Carbo overshadowed all of them. Heserved twice asCinna’s co-consul, and afterwards as pro-consul andconsul for a third time; only death at thehands of Pompey ended Carbo’s resistance to Sulla. Cinna musthave placed great trust in this man. Yet we know very little about Carbo’s political background.20 His father had been consul in 113 B.C. and Carbo seems to have had some connection with L. Marcius Philippus, censor of 86, and with Pompey. Carbo served as tribune of the plebs; as praetor in 89 or 88, he conducted operations in Lucania. Perhaps Carbo and Cinna had some relationship before 87 B.C.; perhaps senators whocooperated with Cinna recommended Carbo. Though ourhistorical record gives us fewclues as to his prior connection with Cinna, Carbo’s actions classify him as a loyal Cinnan.21 Carbo was Cinna’s second-in-command and took over as head of his faction after thelatter’s death. Yethisreasons forjoining Cinna areobscure. Similar mystery shrouds therelationship between Cinna andhis other longtime supporters, not to mention later, loyal officials in his government. For several, we lack sufficient political background.22 Some may have served with him in the Social Warandjoined him out of a sense of comradery. 23 19 On C. Censorinus, see Cic. Brut. 237; Sumner (1973): 127; David, pp. 768– 769. On his brother Lucius, see Ch. 5, n. 54. 20 App. BC. 1.75; Konrad (1994): 78. 21 RE s.v. “Papirius”#38; Cic. Leg. 3.19, 42; Fam. 9.21; CIL I.717; VIII.473; Flor. 65; Badian 2.6.13; Livy. Per. 76 fails to mention him. MRR2.18, 33, 39, 57, 60, 64– (1962b): 56. The evidence of Cicero De Legibus, in which Carbo is accused of seditious behavior, mayupset Badian’s assessment. Onthis Carbo as the tribune of 92 B.C. whocarried the lex Papiria to reduce the as to half an ounce andauthorize 78; Niccolini (1934): 220– 221; minting of silver sestertii, see Konrad (1994): 77– 82 B.C.; andBennett, p. 64 n. 17; 118 gives his dates as 129– Sumner (1973): 117– 31, 34), whoidentifies the brother of Carbo, C. Papirius cf. Broughton (MRR 2.30– (pr. 81), as this tribune. Cinna’s colleague was probably the Carbo who held the rank of praetor in the Social War. 22 For example, P. Popillius Laenas: Ch. 2, n. 92; C. Fabius Hadrianus: Ch. 4, nn.46– 48; T. Clouilius: Ch. 5, n. 50; Q. Antonius Balbus: Ch. 4, n. 38; C. Coelius Antipater: Ch. 4, n. 25; MRR 2.71; Cic. Brut. 102; and? Quinctius: Ch. 4, n. 24; MRR 2.72. 23 For example, Hirtuleius: MRR 2.54; Gabba (1976): 112; Q. Minucius Thermus: MRR 2.56; Gruen (1968): 242; L. Junius Brutus Damasippus: Gruen (1968): 242; Gabba (1958): 234; Sumner (1973): 74; L. Scipio Asiagenes: Ch. 4, n. 58; Ch. 5, loc. cit. See Cichorius, loc. cit.

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Others apparently adhered to his faction because of their ethnic origin.24 Twoothers hadmarital ties with Cinna.25 This very brief review unveils the paucity of ourknowledge regarding Cinna’s closest supporters. Oursources, even Cicero, simply did not concern themselves with the real motivations and character of the men who

implemented Cinna’s policies. To a certain extent, Sulla could claim a great deal of credit for this gap in our knowledge. Still, we may reasonably conclude that the members of Cinna’s faction, like others in the Senate at that time, followed him out of a variety of personal andpolitical motives, not necessarily because of one, over-arching ideology. What Syme said of The most varied motives, ideals, and Caesar can equally be said of Cinna: “ 26 loyalties combined in his party.”

III Scholars have good reason to believe that Cinna received support from a considerable number of equestrians. First, wehave theexplicit testimony of Cicero, who had wide dealings with and a good understanding of this group. In his In toga candida, he castigated Catiline for his treatment of equestrians in 82/81 B.C., whom the latter slaughtered because they had ; consequently, none of the equestrians would pro Cinnanis partibus” been “ support Catiline’s runfor the consulship.27 A second piece of evidence, the casualty lists of Sulla’s proscriptions, confirm Cicero’s view. According to Appian, Sulla placed the names of sixteen hundred equestrians on his first list; more were added later. The total figure was one thousand higher.28 Florus’ and Valerius Maximus’ 24 Especially Etrurians, such as C. Carrinas: Harris (1971): 252; Rawson (1978): 135, 149; Gabba (1958): 230; (1976): 97 n. 190; M. Perperna Veiento?: MRR 2.67; Gruen (1968): 240; Rawson, pp. 135, 149; Badian (1962b): 55; cf. Harris, p. 252; P. Burrienus: Harris, p. 252; Badian (1958a): 245; cf. Gabba (1976): 97 n. 190. 25 These were Cinna’s two sons-in-law, Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus and C. Julius Caesar. On Domitius, son of the consul of 94, the enemy of M. Scaurus and L. Crassus, see Cic. Mil. 22; Asc. p. 39 St; Schol. Bob. p. 119 St; Comm. Bern. 2.151 U indicates that his brother Lucius received estates after the war; also Dio. 41.11.2; Syme (1939): 19 n. 6; Badian (1962b): 53; Rawson (1987): 174; Sumner (1973): 140. Onhisfather’s execution bytheCinnans, seeCh.5, n. 61. OnC. Julius Caesar, see MRR2.52; Gruen (1968): 240; Syme (1939): 25, 65; Carney (1961a): 70 n. 292; 21, 29, 208; Taylor (1940–41): 113–132; Sumner (1973): 134– Gelzer (1968): 19– 138.

65. 26 Syme (1939): 63– 219. 27 Asc. p. 139 Sq; Gabba (1972): 797; Frier (1972): 588; Meier, pp. 218– 28 App. BC. 1.95, 103.

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bigger figures must contain a much larger proportion of equestrians than senators.29 Third, wemaylogically deduce that some at least of Marius’equestrian connections were inherited by Cinna, who did not abandon the MarianSulpician plan to send another Roman commander to the East against Mithridates. If Fimbria’s military successes inAsia hadsecured victory for the Cinnans, they probably would have dictated terms in the interests of the equestrians (that is, of their leaders, the publicani, the most politically aware and active members of that order). Sulla, on the other hand, had moved in the circle of Drusus, Rutilius, Crassus, Scaurus, andothers, who had sought to limit the publicani in Asia.30 Moreover, other members of Cinna’s group hadequestrian connections or were equestrian leaders themselves, for example, Vergilius andGargonius.31 Fourth, Sulla’s political background would have made the equestrians suspect that he would eliminate them from the courts as well as Asia; in fact, they were removed from the courts as part of his dictatorial reforms. Interested equestrians would surely have favored his opponents.32 Fifth, many equestrians probably supported Cinna’s economic measures designed to secure “sound money” . The reforms under his regime would have helped the businessmen among the equestrians to recoup at least some of their financial losses in those troubled years.33 Lastly, the considerable upper-class backing which hadled to Cinna’s victory as consul suggests that some equestrians had voted for him; they mayhave continued to back himin later years.34 So, for a variety of reasons, primarily political and economic, many equestrians hadgood cause to stand behind Cinna andhis comrades. When Sulla returned, they surely suffered for their choice, though their activities under Cinna are nowobscured.

29 Flor. 2.9.25; Val. Max. 9.2.1; Badian (1970b): 23; Woolliscroft, p. 39. 126, 129; Gruen (1968): 226; 148; Brunt (1962b): 117– 89, 146– 30 Gabba (1976): 83– 146, 150. Hill (1952): 140– 31 See nn. 14, 53. 99; Bennett, pp. 34, 36; 24; Balsdon in Seager (1969): 98– 32 Badian (1970b): 23– Carney (1961a): 70 n. 293; cf. Gruen (1968): 236. 246; Carney (1961a): 60 n. 265, 126, 129; Gruen (1968): 245– 33 Brunt (1962b): 117– 68 n. 288; Hill (1952): 144–148. 34 Gruen (1968): 226; Hill (1952): 142; Carney (1961a): 68 n. 288.

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IV Cinna had risen to dominance, indeed had scored military victory over Octavius, in no small part thanks to his alliance with the new Italian citizens. He hadbeen involved in their cause from early on in his consulship (if not before) andtheir financial support andmanpower provided the very foundation of his army.35 Nowthat he had succeeded, surely it was time to fulfill his end of the bargain by securing the redistribution of the Italians throughout all the voting tribes of Rome. According to a variety of ancient sources, the Cinnans did institute a census, under the direction of M. Perperna and L. Marcius Philippus,36 probably starting in 86 B.C.37 Only the Christian scholar Jerome records the number of adult male citizens (463,000) registered in this census. He probably derived his information from some abridgment of Livy’s history. Yet Jerome’s figure shows a strangely low increase (only seventeen percent) from Livy’s census figure (394,000) for 115 B.C.38 How could this reflect a full redistribution of the newItalian citizens? Some scholars argue that the censors registered only a limited number of newcitizens, especially those whowere considered most loyal andmost financially valuable to the Cinnan regime. Registration in the census was primarily beneficial for the wealthier classes, for it gave them access to the higher, most influential levels of the Centuriate Assembly. The Cinnans might have tried to guarantee the loyalty and support of domi nobiles in this way. This is possible, but there is no sure evidence to corroborate it.39 Ontheother hand, others believe Jerome’s figure is corrupt andmust be emended to indicate a larger number of registered citizens.40 This theory is 590; Harris 35 Keaveney (1987): 183, 205; Gabba (1976): 98–102; Frier (1972): 589– (1971): 251– 255; Rawson (1978): 133; Salmon (1964): 65; (1967): 376; Badian (1958a): 240– 243; Woolliscroft, p. 36. 252. 44 n. 44; cf. Harris (1971): 236, 251– 36 Taylor (1960): 105; Bennett, pp. 43– 21 andCh.2, nn. 14– 18onthecensus of 89 andnewItalian voters 37 See Ch. 1, nn. 19– 377; (1982): 128–142 in 88. Taylor (1960): 105; Salmon (1964): 65; (1967): 376– 6469) is an enabling act suggests that the lex Cornelia of Bruttian Petelia (ILS 6468–

of the Tribal Assembly under Cinna (134); Sherwin-White (1973): 156; Harris (1971): 231– 232; Bennett, pp.43– 44. 38 MRR 2.54; Jerome Chr. ad ann. 85; Livy. Per. 63 (115 B.C) is close to Per. 60 (125 B.C). Sherwin-White (1973): 156.

39 Onthequestion of whowasregistered, seeKeaveney (1982b): 505; Badian (1958a): 70 n. 293; cf. Wiseman (1969): 243; Frier (1972): 589; cf. Carney (1961a): 69– 242– 377; but cf. Harris (1971): 106; Salmon (1967): 376– 75; Taylor (1960): 105– 59– 41. 235; Martin, pp.40– 234– 40 Brunt (1971a): 92 argues that the censors utilized local census records andfollows not notunplausible”number though “ Beloch’s emendation of Jerome to 963,000, a “

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most attractive since it portrays the Cinnans as fully redeeming their promise to all their Italian allies. Still, possible emendations are endless. We cannot be sure which one is most accurate. Thus, the uncertainty regarding Jerome’s figure does not help us determine what the Cinnan 85 B.C. accomplished, aside from the registration of at least census of 86–

some newcitizens.

Without a rating in the census, those Italians who had been granted citizenship thanks to the Social War and Civil War of 87 could not have participated in the Centuriate Assembly. Were they enrolled in the Tribal Assembly? The evidence from Livy’s epitome and the research of Taylor into the voting districts of the Roman Republic strongly suggest that the Cinnans did fulfill their promise to redistribute the new Italian citizens through the tribes.41 The epitomator of Livy records that the vote (suffragium) wasgranted to the new Italian citizens by senatus consultum in 84 B.C. (which perhaps should be dated to 85).42 Scholars have argued over the exact, legal meaningof this statement. TheItalians already possessed theright to vote, which wasinherent inthegranting of citizenship; theepitome mustbe referring to some change in that right vis-à-vis the newcitizens. Possibly, this change wastheassignment of newcitizens to voting tribes, aspertheprovisions of the citizenship laws, butwithout theearlier, severe tribal restrictions.43 82 B.C. mayalso support this Evidence for the waragainst Sulla in 83– view. As indicated by both Livy’s epitomator andCicero, Sulla promised ius sufthose Italians who would join him that he would respect their “ fragii, and the epitomator calls it “nuper datum.”44This is not a reference ” of their citizenship; both sources clearly differentiate beto a guarantee tween civitas andsuffragium. Furthermore, the Italians hadreceived citinuper datum”suggests a much zenship at least four years earlier, whereas “

41 42 43

44

45 postulates a corruption of the text, rather ; Bennett, pp.44– necessarily correct” than thedropping outof the first letter inthe number: it should read 863,000, which, 81 B.C., is when wecalculate offsets caused bythe loss andreturn of citizens in 82– closer to the figure of 70 B.C. (900,000). 253. Livy. Per. 84; Taylor (1966): 68; Biscardi, pp. 252– See nn. 41, 43, 44. 156; Meier, p. 230; Frier Taylor (1960): 106, 118; Sherwin-White (1973): 155– (1972): 589; cf. Salmon (1982): 131; (1967): 377; Bennett, p. 44; Gabba (1976): 95; 507; Badian 185; (1982b): 506– (1958): 200; Keaveney (1982a): 121; (1987): 184– 236; cf. Ruoff242; Gruen (1968): 246, 252; cf. Harris (1971): 232– (1958a): 240– 81. Livy. Per. 77, 84 also tells usthat freedmen were redistributVäänänen, pp.80– ed among the voting tribes at the same time, which hadbeen part of the Sulpician 144; cf. 242; Taylor, pp. 143– program of 88 B.C.; Asc. p. 64 St; Badian, pp. 240– 230. 51; also Nicolet (1976): 229– Treggiari, pp. 37– ); Cic. Phil. 12.27. nuper datum” Livy. Per. 86 (“

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more recent development. More importantly, Sulla’s pledge would nothave persuaded theItalian citizens if they hadlong before received some guarantee of their vote from the Cinnan government. Rather, Sulla was fighting fire with fire by offering what his enemies had recently offered. The efficacy of the vote is at issue here, andthis depended onthe redistribution of the newcitizens throughout the thirty-one rural voting tribes. This redistribution andregistration, with its consequent legal andpolitical reorganization of communities into municipia, “remade post-Social 45This process wasneither even nor consistent. Distribution of WarItaly.” Umbrians andEtrurians reveals no particular pattern.46 The Latin municipia (for example, Arretium, Praeneste, andTibur) were divided among some sixteen tribes.47 On the other hand, less urbanized Italian peoples of the south were treated differently: each ethnic group, such as Samnites, was assigned to a single tribe; in the end, only seven tribes contained all the southern Italian peoples. Still, in this way, long-standing ethnic and religious groupings could serve as the foundation for newmunicipia. So, these peoples were notpenalized asonemight conclude, butguaranteed cohesion andeven a certain cultural independence.48 So, the Cinnans apparently dideffect the redistribution of their Italian allies, which meant the division of each voting tribe into five or six sections spread out over the whole peninsula, a rather ridiculous stretching of the city-state mechanism. It yet seems that the censors or the Senate tried to achieve some balance of power byconsidering therelative size of tribes and their distances from Rome. Great inequalities in numbers remained, perhaps unavoidable given thespeed of registration. Still, overall, it wasa wise effort, anda lasting one. Wehear nomore from oursources about proposals or agitation for tribal redistribution. Except in the case of punished towns, even Sulla didnot alter the Cinnan arrangements.49

V

The 90s B.C., as mentioned above, sawa plethora of cases in the quaes-

tiones, the law courts of Roman high society. Political and personal battles were often played outthere. Wecan see something similar in the 60s, when

45 Taylor (1960): 106. 250, 252; cf. Ruoff-Väänänen, pp. 81– 46 Taylor (1960): 114, 118; Harris (1971): 236– 82. 109, 118; Harris (1971): 237. 47 Taylor (1960): 106– 48 Taylor (1960): 109–114; Harris (1971): 236 n. 5; Salmon (1967): 376. 315; so also Bennett, p.44; Badian (1958a): 246; 49 Taylor (1960): 108, 116–118, 312– 246. 49, 228– 173; Nicolet (1976): 37– (1970b): 22– 23; Sherwin-White (1973): 157–

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the speeches andactivity of Cicero bring this aspect of Roman society once again before oureyes. But the 80s display a striking emptiness, except for the maiestas trials under the lex Varia during the Social War. For trials during the Cinnan era, wehave little evidence. Most of ourevidence comes from Cicero, whofocuses onthe orators of the period rather than specific cases. Still, weare grateful for the information and Cicero’s assessments. His Brutus is the most interesting source. In just a couple of passages, Cicero sums upthe state of oratory andthecourts during Cinna’s regime. First of all, death, exile, and“ absence”(whatever that means) hadremoved a certain number of oratorical competitors from the field. This left Q. Hortensius in the first place among advocates in court.50 P. Antistius apparently held second place in Cicero’s estimation.51 His nearest rival, L. Cornelius Sisenna, scholar and later historian of the period, came from the younger generation.52 Other orators active under Cinna included C. Carbo Arvina, Q. Pomponius, L. Marcius Philippus, M. Vergilius, Q. Mucius Scaevola Pontifex, C. Marcius Censorinus, L. Scipio Asiagenes, C. Licinius Macer, C. Gargonius, andQ. Sertorius.53 Cicero’s testimony indicates that several senators were active orators during Cinna’s regime. Take as anexample Antistius. Cicero does not give him unqualified praise, but he does state that Antistius made “full and penetrating”arguments, that his reputation increased daily. Such capable menwere surely demonstrating their talents often enough, both before the Senate and at the bar, to gain a reputation worth noting by Cicero many years later. They were not silenced under some restrictive government 50 Cic. Brut. 308; Hortensius wasa protégé of L. Crassus andson-in-law of Q. Catulus the Elder. In the late 90s, he had prosecuted one of Catulus’ inimici, L. Marcius

Philippus, for repetundae, but had apparently lost; Gruen (1968): 198, 243; Badian

(1962b): 52.

51 Cic. Brut. 227, 308: Antistius received manycases after his successful prosecution of C. Caesar Strabo in 88 B.C.; at the time, Antistius wascolleague of Sulpicius as tribune of the plebs. See Gruen (1968): 242; n. 56 below. ; 52 Cic. Brut. 228, 259: even Sisenna had“yielded to Sulpicius as anorator at the bar”

431; cf. Frier (1972): 588 n. 22; Rawson (1979): 337. Badian (1964b): 422– 53 On Carbo and Pomponius, who were among the few orators of Antistius’ generabothof whomheeasily surpassed,”seeCic. Brut. 227, 304; Gruen (1968): tion, yet“ 241 identifies Cn. Pomponius as a prosecutor under the lex Varia andaedile in 82 B.C. OnPhilippus, whospoke “once ortwice,”see Brut. 308; Gruen, p. 241; Badian (1962b): 51, 55. An inimicus of Catulus and probably also of Metellus, Philippus

wasdefeated in 94 for the consulship by M. Herennius andin 93 by Perperna. On Scaevola, see Brut. 311; Gruen, p. 243 considers himvery active. OnVergilius, a not much of a speaker,”see Brut. 179. On near contemporary of Antistius and “ Censorinus, see Brut. 237. On Scipio (Asiagenes?), see Brut. 175. OnMacer, see Brut. 238. OnSertorius andGargonius, see Brut. 180; David, p. 738.

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policy. Howmanyothers were there whomCicero didnothave theopportunity or desire to mention?54 Unfortunately, wecannot answer that question. In fact, ourevidence is so limited that we can point to only two recorded cases. One involved P. Quinctius, a Roman aristocrat whohadinherited properties in Transalpine Gaul and debts (along with a rather rapacious partner name of Naevius) from his brother. According to Cicero, Naevius was a supporter of the “ Marian”faction, but later deserted to Sulla’s side. In 83 B.C., a dispute arose between Naevius and Quinctius and on February 20 of that year, Naevius brought their case before the urban praetor P. Burrienus and demanded that he be allowed to foreclose on Quinctius’property. Burrie, in nus, evidently taking Naevius’ side, rendered an “unfair decision” Cicero’s view. But Quinctius soon appealed to a plebeian tribune, M.Junius Brutus, who, though hefavored Quinctius, encouraged both parties to delay proceedings, which they did. In fact, not until 81 B.C. did the trial actually begin, when Cicero defended Quinctius and Hortensius and Philippus represented Naevius.55 We do not know enough about Burrienus to determine whether his actions were motivated by factional rather than personal interests, despite Cicero’s attempt to blame the“unfair decision”onthetroubled times andto paint his client as a victim of theCinnan faction. Ontheother hand, wemay explain the delay in proceedings as the result of unsettled military conditions in Italy from spring 83 onward. Whatever the mitigating circumstances, the workings of this dispute suggest that legal processes andchannels, as well as recourse to Roman officials, functioned rather normally in 83 B.C. under theCinnan regime. In retrospect, themost celebrated case of theerawasthat against young Pompey in 86 or 85 B.C.; Antistius presided as iudex quaestionis and Pompey wasdefended by,of all people, hisfuture enemy Cn.Carbo, aswell as Philippus and Hortensius. The charge waspeculatio: Pompey was accused of having in his possession loot from his father’s capture of Asculum that should have been turned over to theRoman government long before; it wasalso alleged that Pompey himself hadtaken part in the embezzlement. No prosecutor’s name has been preserved by the sources; Plutarch does note Pompey’s confrontation with his accuser during thepreliminary investigation. It would be most interesting to know whothat was and it might help us ascertain if or to what extent the trial waspolitically motivated. In theend, Pompey proved his innocence byshifting theblame onto oneof his

83, 85. 54 Mitchell (1979): 82– 69; Brut. 222; Sumner (1973): 114 63; Cic. Quinct. 17, 21, 25, 30, 68– 55 MRR2.62– 77 B.C.) as tribune of the plebs in 83; David, pp. identifies this Brutus (dates 117?–

231, 732, 788, 803. 230–

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father’s freedmen as well as Cinna’s reckless bodyguard during their confiscation of hisfather’s goods inlate 87. Theyoung mancomported himself well and thereby endeared himself to Antistius, whose daughter Pompey married shortly after his acquittal by the jury. Many suspected judicial corruption from conflict of interest.56 Scholars have recognized various motives behind Pompey’s trial. Some argue that the Cinnans were not only trying to prosecute a criminal act,57 but also to retrieve badly needed wealth for the depleted treasury.58 Others consider the trial a stage-managed farce,59 or have seen the acquittal as a private affair onAntistius’part.60 These scholars have overlooked or chosen to ignore a rather simple answer. The beginning of the year 86 before (and probably after) the death of Marius saw several prosecutions of men who had probably opposed Cinna in the previous year. Several of these men were executed, others exiled. Wemay characterize these proceedings as “tying up loose ends.” Could not the action taken against Pompey fall in this same category? His father, after all, hadbeen one of Cinna’s leading adversaries in the field, and the son hadserved with the father against Cinna. Indeed, rumor circulated that an assassination plot against both father andson hadbeen devised by Cinna during thewar.Asmuchasthis story serves to unduly exaggerate the importance of young Pompey at thetime, it mayyetcontain a grain of truth. So, in 86 B.C., with Pompey’s father dead, Cinna may have thought it a wise precaution to remove the son, another potentially dangerous enemy, as well. Weshould notconclude from Carbo’s support for Pompey that Cinna trusted the young man.61 Yetprominent mencame to Pompey’s rescue, such asPhilippus, Hortensius, andeven Carbo, as well as thejudge himself. In such circumstances, Cinna did the prudent thing: he accepted the acquittal of his enemy’s son rather than disturb his relations with prominent menin the State, including one of the topmenin his ownfaction. After all, Cinna’s “coalition”didnot have cohesion founded on long-standing familial or military loyalty. As a 3; MRR 2.54; Keaveney 56 Cic. Brut. 230; Val. Max. 5.3.5, 6.2.8; Plut. Pomp. 4.1– 601, 741; 598, 600– 52; David, pp. 597– (1982d): 113; Van Ooteghem (1954): 50– 185. Pompey was later forced, by Sulla presumably, to diHillman (1998): 180– vorce Antistia. Yet Antistius himself was executed by the Cinnans in 82 B.C., presumably because he was suspected of complicity with his son-in-law. Perhaps Antistius hadno clear partisan stance andcould not be trusted by either side. 89. 57 Bennett, p. 43; so Seager (1979): 7; cf. Hillman (1996): 81– 58 Bennett, p. 42; also Barlow (1980): 211; andKeaveney (1982d): 113. 59 Gruen (1968): 244. 60 Bulst, p. 328. 89. 113; Seager (1979): 7; Hillman (1996): 81– 61 Keaveney (1982d): 111–

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result, Cinna could notafford to alienate anysenators whocooperated with him; some might not have done so if he had refused to compromise regarding Pompey’s case.62 One scholar believes that the evidence on orators andtrials during the anenforced policy of Cinnan era reflects tranquility at the bar, which was“ 63 In other words, he argues that Cinna and his the [Cinnan] regime.” comrades, in their attempt to control thesprings of power in Rome, restricted andmanaged the courts. Another scholar points to Cicero’s Pro Roscio Amerino: the orator speaks of a large number of professional accusers who lost their lives during Sulla’s proscriptions because personal scores from theprevious fewyears were settled under thecover of political punishment. This indicates perhaps that there was in fact considerable activity in the courts under Cinna.64 Control of thecourts would have contributed to Cinnan dominance over theState. Cinna andhiscomrades could have directed theworkof the urban praetor andexerted pressure within theSenate. In this way, they might have reduced the number andkinds of cases brought to trial andinfluenced their outcome. Yet no evidence of such methods exists. The paltry extant evidence only seems to suggest tranquility at the bar. Rather, the testimony of Cicero andPlutarch indicates that more washappening in the courts under Cinna than either of these authors wanted to admit. Indeed, Cicero often tries to hide the truth: he wants to demonstrate that oratory was virtually dead during Cinna’s regime, but then goes on to discuss more than half a dozen prominent orators in the courts andin the Senate, whose reputations, like that of Antistius, were increasing daily. Howcould this be if theCinnan regime were so oppressive in its restriction of the courts? We must recall that several orators, especially several of Cicero’s mentors andmodels, died during the civil strife of the Cinnan era. Naturally, Cicero, deeply affected by the loss of these men, would not want to portray theCinnan period asa goodtime fororatory. Still, evenhecould not ignore certain realities. These come through in several of his works andare corroborated by evidence from Plutarch andValerius Maximus. They reveal not a restrictive, coercive, or partisan treatment of the courts by the Cinnan regime, but rather the normal functioning of the Roman judicial 167, 749, 796. 149, 166– 240; David, pp. 148– 62 Gruen (1968): 239– 63 Gruen (1968): 236, 239; so also Frier (1972): 589 n. 23. Yet, aside fromthe cases in late 87 and early 86 B.C., following Cinna’s reentry into Rome, we have no evidence of trials before the Popular Assembly during his regime. The dearth of trials in our sources does not automatically mean a dearth of trials in reality nor a shifting of cases from quaestiones to the Popular Assembly. sescenta” 91, esp. 90 (“ , i.e., a large 64 Kinsey (1987): 502 cites Cic. Rosc. Amer. 89– number, of accusers in the murder courts alone).

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system without the atypical fervor and animosity

B.C.

so prevalent in the 90s

VI There are few references in our sources to the electoral and legislative activity of the Popular Assemblies during the Cinnan regime. This might lead one to conclude that theCinnans deliberately bypassed these organs of government andsimply appointed individuals to office andenacted laws on their ownauthority, quite against the tenets of the Republican constitution. Certainly, many of ourancient authors hoped to give this impression of the lawless Cinnans. Yet a closer examination of the evidence sufficiently illustrates that this wasnot the case. In their narratives, Livy’s epitomator andAppian consistently employ particular terms (creare andἀ ε μ ω or ἀ εο ιρ α ι, respectively) to describe ιρ the constitutionally legitimate election of individuals to the office of consul. These sources use those same verbs when recording the election of consuls during the Cinnan regime. This suggests that elections, at least of the highest officials, did take place.65 Nevertheless, enough ambiguity remains in their overall descriptions of the multiple elections of Cinna andCarbo to suggest that some irregularities occurred. The number of consecutive re-elections to the consulship was, of course, unusual in itself, though notunprecedented; like Marius two decades before, Cinna andCarbo could justify their continuatio in office as a military necessity. Also like that great general, they hadthestrange task of proclaiming their own electoral victories, over which they presided. Perhaps with the aid of their clients and supporters among the senators and equestrians, Cinna andCarbo stifled anypotential rival candidates as well. Surely that would not have been an innovation in the politics of the Republic. Livy’s epitomator does explicitly state that young Marius’elecper vim,”but this phrase, in the Roman political tion in 82 B.C. took place “ vocabulary, could connote notonly the useof force or intimidation, butalso corruption of electors, or simply the violation of the leges annales. Especially in the Late Republic, butapparently also in earlier periods of Rome’s history, manipulation of the Popular Assemblies by office-seekers andtheir associates was a widespread practice. None of this proves that the Popular Assemblies hadceased to function during the Cinnan regime.66

97; Ch. 5, nn. 8, 19, 53; Cic. Leg. agr. 21, 79; Ch. 2, nn. 95– 65 See sources in nn. 20– 68; Just. Dig. 49.1.21.2. 2.92; ND. 2.10; Livy. 10.47.5; Per. 67– 8072; Brunt (1988): 461; Yakobson, pp. 48– 66 See sources in nn. 65, 79. CIL I.8070– 64. 54, 59–

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Wehave only discussed, andour sources are only concerned with, the election of consuls from 86 to 82 B.C. What about the election of other magistrates? Welack sufficient evidence to fill thelists, butjust about each office is represented in Broughton’s summary for those years. Themenwho held those offices were notall loyal Cinnans (as the testimony of Appian on the plebeian tribunes in 84 and of Cicero on the quaestors in 84 and 83 makes clear), definitely not all hand-picked appointees of the Cinnan leaders. Rather, the lower magistrates exercised independence of action and sometimes pursued goals contrary to thepolicy of Cinna; perhaps the fairly normal operation of elections accounts for this.67 Lastly, we need to consider the legislative activity of the Popular Assemblies. Unfortunately, there areonly tworecorded examples. Onewas the bill put through by M. Brutus, tribune of the plebs in 83 B.C., to establish a colonia at Capua; Cicero provides some details of its implementation. The other wasthe lex Valeria of 86 B.C. Cicero andVelleius (despite his negative appraisal of the measure) explicitly identify it as a law. Certainly, neither would have done so, andespecially notCicero with his keen concern for legality, had Valerius’ bill not been voted into law by the Popular Assembly. Moreover Cicero would never have used that lawas part of his defense of Fonteius if his opponents could have simply replied that it was an unconstitutional measure. So, the evidence strongly suggests that the Popular Assemblies were active in passing at least two laws. Carbo’s hostis decree against Sulla’s senatorial partisans mayhave also been passed byanAssembly. Wecanonly speculate, however, onwhether they conducted further legislative business.68 In conclusion, there are indications that the Popular Assemblies continued to operate rather normally under the Cinnans. Indeed, Cinna and his comrades had probably won the goodwill of the voters by implementing badly-needed economic reforms, by continuing free grain doles to the urban plebs, by cooperating with distinguished members of the Senate and equestrian order, by adding newcitizens (that is, clients) to the voting rolls, andby defending the State against another march onRome by Sulla. Cinna andhis comrades probably hadnoreason to refrain from holding electoral andlegislative assemblies.

67 See sources in Ch. 4, n. 21; Ch. 5, n. 15. Badian (1962b): 57. 81; Bennett, p. 66; Ch. 5, nn. 31, 46. 68 See nn. 79–

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VII

The ravages of the Social Warandthe Mithridatic Warbrought ruin to the Italian economy inthe 80s. Losses in manpower (in other words, free labor) totalled perhaps two hundred thousand from the Social War (if we accept Appian’s figures).69 Wecannot calculate damage to property on both sides. Not surprisingly, agriculture suffered because of these losses andbecause of thedepredations andexactions of wartime armies. All this meant a significant decrease in agricultural output, the mainstay of the Italian economy at that time; theprice of basic commodities, such as grain, rose greatly. The decline of agriculture had ripple effects throughout all private and public transactions.70 Furthermore, the activity of some twenty or more legions andanequal number of Italian forces drained thetreasuries of both sides; Cicero informs usthat theRoman aerarium wasexhausted bytheoutlay of perhaps forty to 88 B.C.. Literary and numismatic fifty million denarii over the years 90– evidence show that government expenses rose rapidly during the War and that Rome drew from a variety sources (Campania, Sicily, overseas provinces) to meet pressing demands. According to Orosius, even various priesthoods sold their land onthe Capitol to buygrain, andthe government used booty instead of coinage to pay troops. Moreover, Rome maintained forces in the provinces (including Sulla’s expedition to the East) and suffered from civil war in 87.71 Lastly, we must add the loss of Asian taxes, the deaths of tens of thousands of Italian negotiatores in the Mithridatic vespers of 88, and the collapse of Italian businesses in the East. Rome lost perhaps one-third to one-half of its tax revenues with the loss of Asia after 89 B.C.72 The clearest indicator of Italy’s economic crisis was the disruption in the credit structure. Roman andItalian businessmen relied heavily on the

58; Barlow (1980): 294; (1933a): 54– 69 App. BC. 1.39, 102–103; Frank (1933b): 291– 638; Bennett, p. 40; Bulst, 213; (1977): 299; Crawford (1974): 634– 207, 212– 204– 337. pp. 330– 285; Bulst, p. 331. 70 Cic. Leg. agr. 2.80; 2 Verr. 2.5; Frank (1933b): 283– 71 App. BC. 1.39, 42; Mith. 22; Livy. Per. 72; Cic. Leg. agr. 2.80; Plin. NH. 33.17.55 records the bullion andcoins in the treasury in 91, but not afterward; Plut. Sull. 12; 224; Bulst, p. 331; Barlow 27. Frank (1933b): 222– Diod. 38.7.1; Oros. 5.18.26– 440; Crawford (1974): 634– 205; (1977): 299; Brunt (1971a): 435– (1980): 204– 692; (1985): 185–187. On expenses during the war in 87 B.C., see App. 637, 642– 441; Crawford (1964): BC. 1.66; Barlow (1980): 207, 209; Brunt (1971a): 440– 572. 145; (1974): 569– 141– 280; Bulst, pp. 301– 35; Frank (1933b): 274– 72 Cic. Leg. Man. 19; Jonkers, pp. 34– 88. 216; Bennett, p. 41; Gabba (1976): 84– 318, 331; Barlow (1980): 215–

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revenues fromAsia inorder to contract profitable loans to each other andto private individuals. The loss of that income to thepublicani caused serious problems at home.73 Creditors cracked down on their debtors, demanding immediate and full repayment of loans with interest. The debtors legitimately attempted to stall because of their own losses from war and civil strife, not to mention other difficulties.74 When in 89 B.C. the urban praetor, Asellio, failed in his attempt at peaceful arbitration between the twogroups, each increasingly hostile, hedirected theindividual cases to the civil law courts in Rome.75 Yet Asellio’s hopes for resolution of the crisis were dashed by some of the lenders, whoattacked andmurdered himin the Forum not far from the Temples of the Dioscuri and Vesta. Despite attempts on the part of the Senate to find theoffenders forprosecution, there wasnosuccess. Tensions between lenders andborrowers simply continued andworsened.76 Cinna and his faction inherited this economic chaos, a depleted treasury, anda debt crisis. Yet as bleak as conditions mayhave appeared, they provided the Cinnans with a means to gain the goodwill and support of many in the peninsula, which could in turn be a means to dominate Italian affairs. Unfortunately, we have no figures for the treasury in our period, only Cicero’s testimony as noted above. Things looked bad, but in 86 the treasury had the chance to bounce back, if the tax revenues from the western provinces continued to flow into Rome uninterrupted andif Rome expended a much smaller amount of money, especially on military expenses. Wehave noreason to believe that taxes from theWest stopped coming in to Rome, except, perhaps, in the case of Africa, where Metellus Pius, Cinna’s former enemy, was raising an army. Further, the Cinnans in the years 86 and 85 committed to less significant military enterprises in Italy andoverseas. Their major expense at home wasthe census. Thus, they did attempt to reduce governmental outlays. Still, the recovery of the treasury would take time, a luxury that the Cinnans didnothave.77 333; Barlow 35; Bulst, pp. 331– 273; Jonkers, pp. 34– 232, 263– 73 Frank (1933b): 231– 216; (1977): 299; Bennett, pp.40– (1980): 212– 41; Verboven, p. 117. 74 Livy. Per. 74: “Cumaere alieno oppressa esset civitas...”; Sall. Cat. 33.2: “novis; Hill (1952): 138–139. sume memoria nostra propter magnitudinem aeris alieni...” 75 Livy. Per. 74: the praetor A. Sempronius Asellio “decided cases in favor of 269; (1933a): ; Val. Max. 8.7.4 calls himurban praetor. Frank (1933b): 263– debtors” 333. 56; Barlow (1980): 213; cf. Bulst, pp. 331– 55– 76 Livy andValerius agree onthecause of Asellio’s death; cf. App. BC. 1.54, followed 214; Bulst, pp. in my text. Frank (1933a): 56; Barlow (1977): 299; (1980): 213– 334. 331– 441; Crawford (1974): 77 Barlow (1980): 207, 209; (1977): 300; Brunt (1971a): 440–

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Meanwhile, the very detrimental debt crisis hadto be dealt with. Asel87 had only overshadlio’s death had not ended it and the civil crisis of 88– owed it temporarily, and probably had exacerbated it. Some equestrians (appropriately dubbed saccularii) may have tried to recoup their losses from the wars and from Asia by confiscating the property of political enemies at the time during thecivil strife. What would the newgovernment

of Cinna do about this?78

Relatively early in 86 B.C., perhaps in February, the suffect consul Valerius Flaccus took action. Velleius characterized his solution as “ turpissima” , butSallust, whose testimony is probably a more accurate reflection of affairs, stated that Valerius acted “volentibus omnibus bonis,”with the approval of the whole upper class, because the suffering of the Roman People wasso great under their burden of debt.79 Evidently, the consul saw the need for extremely drastic measures under the circumstances. He put through a lawthat authorized the repayment of debts at only one-fourth the amount due.AsSallust putit, people were allowed topaynotin silver butin copper; for every sestertius (four asses) that they owed, they had to repay only one as.80

703 estimates a coinage output of fifteen million denarii, rather high when 702– compared with Brunt’s estimate of military forces paid by the Cinnans in 86 (at a cost calculated byCrawford of seven anda half million denarii). Crawford suggests that the surplus was used to pay troops from 87 and the censorial expenses of Perperna andPhilippus. Barlow would include Flaccus’ legions in Gaul. 78 Cic. Caec. 4.11; Asc. p. 89 St. According to a fragment of Festus (516L), Sulla and Pompeius Rufus put through a law in late 88 B.C. that partly annulled debts and 215; Bulst, p. 58; Barlow (1980): 214– limited interest rates. Frank (1933a): 54, 57– 334; Bennett, p. 41. 273; 2; Frank (1933b): 270– 41; cf. Sall. Cat. 33.1– 79 Vell. 2.23.2; Bennett, pp. 40– 146. (1933a): 57; Barlow (1980): 216; Bulst, p. 334; Hill (1952): 145– 273; Barlow (1980): 211, 216; (1977): 299; see 80 MRR2.53, 128; Frank (1933b): 270– 335. Badian (1967): 178, 182– 41; Bulst, pp. 334– CIL I.1505 and Bennett, pp. 40– 189, 192 argues that the will of Ptolemy Alexander I of Cyrene (through which he bequeathed his kingdom to Rome in an attempt to gain financial aid from negotiatores andpolitical support to reclaim his throne from a usurper) wasbrought before the Roman Senate probably after the conclusion of the bellum Octavianum in late 87 or early 86 B.C. (This date is suggested bythe fact that Philippus, censor in 86, later vouched for the authenticity of the document.) The matter had political urgency in a domestic sense because the Cinnan government needed money. Yet they could dolittle in86 to take control of Cyrene because Lucullus’fleet hadputin at Cyrene, where Ptolemy’s successor welcomed the envoy of Sulla. Still, according to Schol. Bob. p. 92 St, some money that Ptolemy had deposited in Tyre did arrive safely in Rome, andBadian suggests a connection between this newfund and 42; Barlow (1977): Valerius’ law for remission of debts; see Cic. Leg. agr. 2.38– 298; (1980): 216 n. 77; cf. Crawford (1974): 637; (1985): 187.

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Cicero provides evidence for the functioning of this lex Valeria in the speeches Pro Fonteio andPro Quinctio. Hetells usthat a certain Hirtuleius, quaestor in 86, under the terms of Valerius’ law, established registers for payment of governmental debts, inwhich herecorded theone-fourth that he would pay out as well as the three-fourths that he would subtract from the original amount due.According toCicero, thequaestors inRome continued this method of record-keeping andrepayment down to the time of Crispinus, quaestor in 70 B.C.81 Cicero also informs usthat whena private citizen wanted to determine the extent of his debts, “ it wasnotenough to examine one’s account books; one also had to make inquiries near the temple of Castor and Pollux.”Presumably, officials there would assist you in calculating the proper proportion of your original debt for youto pay.82 The lex Valeria, then, provided a mechanism for private citizens andthe government of Rome itself to payoff at least a portion of their unmanageable debts. It applied, presumably, only to obligations incurred before the year of its passage, 86 B.C. Still, the repayment of these debts took many years, as Cicero’s testimony makes clear. We would like to know exactly howbeneficial or detrimental wasthis radical reduction of debts. Unfortunately, wedo not have the sorts of evidence through which to examine the longterm effects of this law. We can only assume that, although many lenders suffered heavy losses, they could at least receive some recompense where they might nothave received anybefore Valerius’law. Moreover, all those who owed money could breathe somewhat more easily since the larger portion of their burden of debt hadbeen liquidated. Cinnan economic measures didnot stop at debt relief. In the same year as Valerius’law (or perhaps the next), the college of praetors andthe college of plebeian tribunes metto work outa solution to the State’s currency problems. Ourevidence is meagre andimprecise, butit would appear from the testimony of Cicero that people were not sure about the value or authenticity of the currency in circulation at that time. Most scholars believe that a glut of silver-plated, copper coins, mainly (if not all) forger87. ies, had flooded the market, especially during the crisis years of 91– These fakes in large numbers were being passed off as genuine silver denarii at a time when credit and commerce were trying to recover from wartime devastation.83

2, 5; 81 Cic. Font. 1.1– 146.

Quinct.

17. Frank (1933b): 272; (1933a): 57; Hill (1952): 145–

Quinctius had inherited a debt from before 86 B.C. and needed to aerarium rationem”before he could pay it off. Bennett, p. 41. determine the “ 83 MRR 2.57, 59; Cic. Off. 3.20.80–81; Quinct. 17; Plin. NH. 33.46, 33.132, 34.27; 55; CIL I.889–895 may be tesserae used to Frank (1933b): 254, 272; (1933a): 54– 42; Bulst, 218; Bennett, pp. 41– seal bags of inspected coins; Barlow (1980): 217–

82 MRR 2.54.

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Having little else to trust in a time of economic upheaval, people in Italy needed to be able to trust the currency. This cooperative effort of the praetors andtribunes, though unprecedented in the annals of Roman history, hada certain urgency andsignificant purpose. They proposed to establish testing stations, primarily in the Forum, to which people could bring suspect coins, have them checked for authenticity, probably through some sort of punch or incision, andthereby eliminate the fakes.84 Oneof the praetors realized the popular goodwill he could garner from assuming full credit for themeasure. Apparently that is whythis praetor, M. Marius Gratidianus, formerly tribune of the plebs in 87 and long-time member of Cinna’s faction, upstaged his colleagues by announcing the edict oncoinage as his own. Great popularity didaccrue to Gratidianus as a result, even to the point where the grateful Roman populace set upstatues of him in all the wards of the city. He became a sort of popular hero for a while, and apparently, was remembered as such even down to Cicero’s time.85 The estimates of several scholars indicate that the expenses, especially military, of theCinnan government increased at a rate far beyond its income level, despite attempts to bolster the treasury and strengthen the Italian economy.86 Revenues were still too scarce. As noted above, the year 86 had probably seen the usual taxes and fees from the western provinces. We cannot be certain, however. Metellus Pius in North Africa andM. Licinius Crassus in Further Spain mayhave intercepted these revenues for their own overseas efforts at disturbing the Cinnan regime; governor Flaccus of Transalpine Gaul probably could notbe counted onfor taxes after the death of his brother in Asia in 85. These unfriendly activities could have cut in half the wealth coming in to the Cinnan treasury by 84 B.C.87

331; cf. Crawford’s theory onexchange rates, (1968a) and(1968b); butcf. pp.330– (1985): 190; Burnett (1982): 136. On? Papirius Carbo’s currency legislation (quickly withdrawn) in 92 or 91 to relieve a shortage of small change andon the possible debasement of coinage under Octavius, see Barlow, pp. 203, 207, 217; 597; Mattingly 572, 596– 4; (1974): 569– 145; (1968a): 2– Crawford (1964): 141– 21. (1982): 20– 84 Frank (1933a): 55; Hill (1952): 145–146; cf. Verboven, pp. 120–124, 127, 130–131. 85 See sources in n. 83; Ch. 5, n. 82. 211; Frank (1933b): 224– 334; Barlow (1980): 202– 86 App. BC. 1.102; Bulst, pp. 331– 704; 697, 702– 442; Crawford (1969): 76; (1974): 696– 231; Brunt (1971a): 440– 46 estimates the annual income of Rome at fifty million denarii Badian (1968a): 45– by 123, half of which came from Asia. All calculations are based on the estimated annual wage of a legionary at the time, which runs from 120 denarii (Brunt) to 180 (Nicolet) to almost 300 (Crawford). According to App. BC. 4.33, the Cinnans, despite their financial problems, did not levy new or oppressive taxes on the populace.

87 See nn. 77, 86.

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Nonetheless, tremendous outlays were necessary after 85 B.C. for the defense of Italy against Sulla, not to mention the costs of Fimbria’s two legions in Asia and the equal number under Scipio Asiagenes in Thrace. Military expenses probably consumed the year’s revenue. In the next year, 84 B.C., the same thing occurred, with probably an added decrease in revenue thanks to Crassus in Spain, perhaps offset by Hadrianus’capture of Africa for Cinna. Still, anysurplus in the treasury must have been tapped. Then, the huge number of troops in 83 and82, combined with the loss of revenue from Transalpine Gaul and probably Spain, make calculation of income andexpenditure very difficult.88 Onething is reasonably certain: thetreasury must have been exhausted again by the end of 82 B.C.; it could not have supported the enormous Cinnan army andstill have maintained a surplus whentheCinnans were cut off from all provinces save Sicily andSardinia. Therefore, weshould notbe surprised that Cinna and Carbo and their successors desperately sought financial aid from their Italian allies or that young Marius with the agreement of the Senate melted downtemple treasures in order to make gold and silver coins to pay his troops.89 262; Crawford (1964): 141–145, 148–152; (1974): 232, 256– 88 Frank (1933b): 224– 295; 696. Note the cautions of Frier (1976): 375– 382; (1981): 285– 641, 694– 636– 29. Brunt 209; (1982): 24– 183; and Mattingly (1977): 203– Burnett (1987): 177– (1971a): 441– 444 suggests about twelve legions were raised byCinna andCarbo in 85 and 84 B.C. plus Scipio’s two, that is, fourteen legions by 84, which cost over 703 estimates that the Cineight million denarii annually; Crawford (1974): 702– nans coined thirty-one million denarii in those two years, which would have paid for these legions at a cost of about twenty-one million denarii (by his calculation), thus leaving a small surplus. By Sulla’s arrival in 83, with the addition of Scipio’s andNorbanus’levies, Cinnan forces numbered about twenty legions, a cost of about twelve million denarii peryear. Crawford gives noestimate of military expenses for that year butplaces coinage output at fifteen million denarii, clearly enough to pay Brunt’s number of legions at his estimated cost, only half enough by Crawford’s. Then in 82, perhaps the Cinnans hadone anda half to twotimes as many men, or almost double the cost. Crawford’s (704) estimated output of nineteen and a half million denarii falls far short. If weconsider small surpluses andcarry-overs from earlier to later years, the figures work outeven by Crawford’s high cost estimates, butjust barely. Barlow (1980): 207 reminds us about the cost of Sertorius’expedition to Spain andAntonius Balbus’to Sardinia. The latter’s coins marked SC seem to advertise the legitimacy of the Cinnan regime and were emergency issues for needed expenses. In fact, Balbus’ coinage accounted for over half the year’s production; Crawford (1974): 606– 609; Mattingly (1982): 16. 89 App. BC. 1.76; at 1.102 he tells us that Sulla levied newtaxes in Italy and the provinces in order to fill the empty treasury after the war; Plin. NH.33.16 (Marius melted down fourteen thousand pounds of gold and six thousand of silver); Val. Max. 7.6.4 (authorized by SC). It would appear that Sulla seized this treasury as

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All these calculations assume that the Cinnans spent nomoney on other projects. Surely this was not the case. For example, the issue of five hundred thousand denarii by the plebeian aediles L. Critonius and M. Fannius mayhave paid for distribution of free grain to the populace at the time of minting, which would be in keeping with Cinna’s other measures for economic relief. Unfortunately, wedo not have enough evidence from which to estimate other, non-military expenditures.90 Still, this brief survey of economic issues demonstrates that thegovernment of Rome under Cinna was always working with a depleted treasury and an ever-decreasing tax-base, both of which contributed to military weakness. At the same time, the Cinnans made genuine efforts to stabilize the currency andhalt the mounting debt crisis. They hadmuchjustification for their adoption of radical economic measures, measures that evidently worked andwere never rescinded by Sulla’s “ restored Republic.”Through its economic reforms, which sought to ease the burdens of rich and poor alike, Cinna’s government gained the support of senators, equestrians, and especially the urban populace, which deeply appreciated the efforts of Marius Gratidianus andValerius. Surely, all this served to strengthen Cinnanpredominance in the State. VIII Cinna andhis partisans held a dominant position in Rome for several years before Sulla’s return. How was this possible? Certainly, not everyone favored Cinna or approved of whathehaddone in 87. From late 85 onward, wehave clear evidence of differences of opinion between prominent members of the Senate and Cinna. Yet there is no evidence that Cinna had a bodyguard, aside from the usual number of lictors, nor that he used military intimidation. In fact, he evidently demobilized his army in 87, for he had to raise a newone in 85/84 to defend himself andItaly against Sulla’s return. Even Sulla in 88 had been threatened with assassination attempts 232; Crawford (1974): bullion when he captured Praeneste. Frank (1933b): 231– 300. 212; (1977): 299– 637; Barlow (1980): 207– 228, 255– 90 On non-military expenses, see Barlow (1980): 207; Frank (1933b): 224– 288; Mattingly (1977): 209. Whether Fannius and Critonius favored the 256, 286– Cinnan regime or not, they reflect ontheir coin anofficial action of State no doubt sanctioned enthusiastically bythe administration. See MRR2.63 places them in 83, though he suggests also 85 B.C.; Crawford (1974): 78, 367 dates the issue to 86; Rowland, p. 412; Luce (1968): 34; Syme (1964): 116. On the outcome of Cinnan 85 with Asc. pp. 131–135, 139 Sq; Frier economic policy, see Cic. In toga cand. 84– (1972): 590; Bulst, p. 334.

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and, despite his take-over of Rome, could not command the hearts and minds of her citizens. They rebelled against him in the Senate and the Assembly andeventually overturned whathe hadinstituted within a matter of months. Howwas it that Cinna survived until 84 B.C. and fell victim only to an unplanned mutiny? How was it that he himself remained in power

for three years and his successors for another two years without

much fear of adverse consequences? How did Cinna and his comrades achieve andmaintain their dominant position in Rome? A secure answer is hard to find because of our scattered and scanty evidence. Wewish wecould know more fully those whosupported Cinna, for it is inconceivable that he could have held his place in the State without the help of others in Rome and Italy. Surely, as we have suggested, he did receive assistance from members of the equestrian order andthe Senate, as well as from leaders of the Italian communities, especially in wartime. The urban plebs probably also supported his regime, which sought to alleviate some of their economic suffering. Self-interest, we suspect, motivated the choices of those whobacked Cinna (and those whoopposed him). Yet Cinna andhis comrades followed a policy of conciliation with each of these groups in Roman society and did not stifle or trod on their institutions and privileges, at least not too much. In 87 B.C., Cinna had already revealed himself to be an astute politician with an ability to ferret out supporters from among the discontented andleaderless. Once in Rome again, he held thedisparate interests of Roman society together, andheld on

to power for himself andthose hetrusted, notby creating newmechanisms of State or implementing unneeded programs, but by working within the existing system to give to those interest groups what they wanted andto the State what it needed. So, the Senate, courts, andAssemblies continued to function fairly normally; the Italians were further integrated with Rome; andan economic crisis washandled. Modern scholars, and their ancient predecessors, have granted Cinna andhis comrades far too little credit for preserving the Roman State andits political system in a time of great changes and great suffering. Even so, Cicero calls our attention to this achievement when he characterizes the .91 triennium sine armis” Cinnan era as a “

243; Brunt (1988): 462; cf. Cic. 91 Cic. Brut. 308; Bulst, p. 324; Badian (1958a): 240– Phil. 1.14.34; 2.42; Vell. 2.23.3; Val. Max. 9.6; Tac. Ann. 1.1; DVI. 67.6; Bennett, 69; Gelzer (1968): 17. pp. 62–

4

THE VIEW FROM OUTSIDE: PROVINCIAL ANDFOREIGN AFFAIRS IN THE AGE OF CINNA What a fine thing it is to rule over foreign nations. (Cicero, Second Verrine Oration. 2.1.2)

It is not until the Civil War that began in 88 that we find the military and political importance of the provinces decisively demonstrated. All types of foreign connections... suddenly acquired a newimportance as reservoirs of military power that could be used by ambitious individuals against the Roman State. (Badian, Foreign Clientelae, pp. 265 and 272)

Most ancient authors chose to concentrate attention on military events in Italy during the Age of Cinna, while largely ignoring contemporaneous conditions in the provinces. Appian could afford to do this because he devoted other works to provincial andforeign issues. The relevant biographies by Plutarch afford us a fewglimpses into the provinces, yet with an understandable over-emphasis onGreece. There is really nowaytotell how the accounts of Livy and others, such as Sisenna and Sallust, addressed foreign affairs for this time period, because their works survive only in

or fragments. Scholarly monographs on aspects of the Cinnan era generally have not incorporated anyassessment of Cinnan relations with the provinces; those few that have do not present a sufficiently comprehensive analysis. How did the Cinnan government administer the Roman Empire while the City andItaly suffered the convulsions of civil war? Howdid events at home affect the provinces? What influence didthe Cinnans have outside Italy? summaries

I Evidence for the provinces of Nearer andFarther Spain suggest that they were administered together by one governor in the 90s B.C., a time of further uprisings andRoman suppression;1 C. Valerius Flaccus (brother of 1

60 on the history of Spain from Cic. 2 Verr. 3.12–14, 27, 192; see App. Iber. 1–

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thecos. suff. 86 B.C.) governed both provinces from 92– 83 B.C.2 Developments in Italy apparently hadlittle affect on Spain. Wedo hear of Iberian cavalry auxiliaries in the Social War. For example, a fragmentary bronze plaque records thenames of thirty Iberian cavalrymen towhomCn.Pompeius Strabo, with the consent of his consilium, granted Roman citizenship virtutis causa (under the terms of the lex Julia of 90); they came mainly from Salduba (later Caesaraugusta) on the Ebro. These must have been dispatched with the approval of Flaccus, who probably stayed so long in Spain because of Rome’s understandable inability to replace himin the middle of the War.3 During the next two years, we hear nothing from Spain.4 Then, in 88 B.C., the Spanish provinces showed themselves to be goodplaces of refuge for political exiles from Rome. After Sulla’s march on Rome, M. Junius Brutus (praetor in 88 andally of Sulpicius andMarius), as oneof thetwelve declared hostes by Sulla, fled Sulla’s axe andmanaged to escape to Spain, where heremained until thenext year. Atthat time, hereturned to Italy and joined Marius and Cinna in their war against Octavius.5 Similarly, M. Licinius Crassus, the future triumvir, fled to Farther Spain in 87 B.C. after ; hehadserved thedeaths of hisfather andbrother inthe“Marian massacre” in Spain during his father’s praetorship there andwas given shelter by his

2

3 4 5

98 on the continual revolts Punic colonization through the Numantine War, 39– there, and especially 38, 43, and 99 on provincial organization. Note that Appian consistently mentions the poverty and land-hunger of the natives as the principal causes for the revolts. Onconditions in Roman Spain, see VanNostrand, pp. 121– 42; Mommsen andBroughton, pp. 65, 70, 76; Roldán-Hervás, 144; Spann, pp. 40– 97; Lintott (1993): 20– 48, 54– 29, 46– 94, 96– 165; Konrad (1994): 85, 90– pp. 157– 99; Curchin, p.42. Theonly governors of Ulterior known for the90s 73, 93– 57, 72– 94 B.C. (he celebrated a triumph in 93), are P. Licinius Crassus, probably from 97– and P. Scipio Nasica, his apparent successor. Howlong he remained there is not known forcertain, buthewasprobably nolonger inSpain in 82; heis notmentioned as opposing or contacting Sertorius in that year. Otherwise, then, we have no evidence on the administration of Ulterior down to the Sertorian War. 92 B.C., see App. Iber. 99–100; Sall. Hist. 1.77 On Didius, governor in Spain 97– 43; McGushin, 21, 42– 51; Spann, pp. 19– 4; Konrad (1994): 48– McG; Plut. Sert. 3– p. 155; Badian (1958a): 269; Curchin, p. 41. OnFlaccus, see MRR2.14, 19, 77, 269, 167; Craw90, 96, nn. 163– 3.211; App. Iber. 100; BC. 1.89; Badian (1964a): 89– ford (1974): 379, #365; Birks, loc. cit.; Richardson (1983) and (1986): loc. cit.; 86; Curchin, p. 42. 83; Konrad, pp.85– Sumner (1973): 82– ILS 8888; Cic Balb. 8.21 andPlin. NH.3.24; CIL VI.37045. See also Spann, pp.79– 168, 195 nn. 33, 46; Sherwin-White (1973): 150; Criniti (1970): loc. cit.; 80, 167– Konrad, see n. 1. See n. 3. Roldán-Hervás, pp. 164–171. On Brutus as a Marian andhis Spanish exile, see App. BC. 1.60; Gran. Lic. 35.7 Cr; MRR 2.40; Gabba (1958): 174–175; Roldán-Hervás, see n. 4; Badian (1958a): 266.

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father’s friends and clients (especially the “ well-established”Vibius Paciaecus). Plutarch vividly describes howCrassus hidin a cavern near the seashore andcharacterizes theconditions in theprovince as “ a general state of 6 panic, with everyone terrified of the cruelty of Marius....” Certainly we see here Plutarch exaggerating to heighten the emotional effect of his story, to evoke sympathy for Crassus’plight and make Marius appear a world-wide monster. In fact, Marius andthe Cinnans could pose no threat to the inhabitants of Spain at that time. Perhaps Plutarch does, however, express the feelings of those in the province who feared for friends and relatives back home in Italy; surely, conditions were unstable and risky for many. Yet Crassus’ own case confirms the main point: he remained in hiding only perhaps eight months, andwasnotharassed in any way by the Cinnans for over two years. Then, after news reached him of (which volunteers” Cinna’s death, Crassus began to raise a private army of “ went around to Plutarch numbers at around twenty-five hundred men) and“ , to raise more men, money, and supplies. He also the various towns” attacked towns sympathetic to the Cinnan cause, or at least hostile to his own. Certainly, Crassus wasthe threat, not the Cinnans. After these minor operations in Farther Spain, Crassus turned to is real objective, anassault of revenge against thefaction of Cinna. Toaccomplish this, he sailed first toAfrica andthen to Greece, where hejoined Sulla in 83 B.C. and became one of his most important lieutenants. Crassus gained from his exile in Spain the means to doall this, a concrete indication of the role the provinces could play in civil war. To return to Flaccus, he voiced no opposition to (nor, it must be admitted, favor for) Cinna andwasindeed the brother of Cinna’s colleague in office in 86. Cinna andhis associates likely assumed Flaccus’loyalty, at least for the moment. Besides, Flaccus was still very busy fighting those troublesome Iberians, surely a task that would keep him pre-occupied, while the Cinnans were trying to hammer things back together at home. After the winter of 86/85, however, when his brother, then commander of the Cinnan expedition in the East, was murdered by his ownmenandthe Cinnan government did nothing to punish the culprits, Flaccus’continued loyalty must have fallen into doubt. His brother’s son did indeed flee to Flaccus for safety. Howwould Flaccus react? Would he seek vengeance?7 6

7

6. See Marshall (1976): 11–12; Ward, pp. OnCrassus, see MRR2.50; Plut. Crass. 4– 61; Spann, pp. 33, 35, 51, 188 n. 69. OnCrassus’allies andarmy in Spain, see 54– 267, 308, 316; and(1964a): 104 n. 163; Roldán-Hervás, see n. Badian (1958a): 266– 134; Konrad (1994): 85. 4; Pelling (1979): 85 n. 80; Russell, pp. 133– 90. Flaccus’ son served as propraetor of Asia in 62 See n. 2. Badian (1964a): 89– B.C. andwascharged withextortion andtried in 59 B.C. Cicero defended himand, in his speech, tells us that the young Flaccus served as a soldier and as military

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Still noreplacement for Flaccus wassent from Rome. All eyes in Rome focused on the East and the outcome of the conflict between Sulla and Mithridates. After the assassination of Cinna in 84 andthe return of Sulla the next year, the government in Rome could no longer afford to sit by and hope that Flaccus would remain loyal to them. He mayhave already been leaning in Sulla’s direction outof a desire to survive onthe winning side. In order to ensure that anarmy from Spain would notjoin Sulla’s in Italy, the Cinnans dispatched Q. Sertorius with a relatively small holding force to the Iberian peninsula in late 83 or early 82 B.C. These troops came from some forty cohorts of Etrurian recruits, most of whom stayed in Italy to fight against Sulla. According to Plutarch, Sertorius left for Spain because he was upset with the incompetence of his superiors in the regime and hoped that “ he would be able to offer a refuge to his friends”by taking over the province. The former reason is probable, andother sources echo it; the latter, unless wecredit Sertorius with a certain gifted insight, is unlikely as a motive for leaving andprobably reflects Plutarch’s hindsight. Sertorius wasin fact the logical choice for this mission. Hehadserved a fewyears earlier in Spain and learned first-hand the weaknesses of the Roman forces there andthe strengths of the natives; among them, he had developed a fearsome and respected reputation. In other words, of the Cinnan commanders, Sertorius was the only one with intimate military and topographical knowledge of Spain. He had also been a firm member of the Cinnan faction from the beginning, so his loyalty was virtually unimpeachable.8

8

quaestor at Massilia (Flac. 63). Schol. Bob. p. 96 St confirms that young Flaccus undertook these posts as a member of his uncle’s staff, i.e., in the mid-80s. Onhis 86. father’s death, see n. 66 below; Konrad (1994): 85– 98; Gabba (1958): 42; Konrad (1994): 86– See n. 2 on Sertorius; Spann, pp. 37– 43. According 64; Curchin, pp.42– 23; Katz (1983): 63– 228; Luce (1961): 21– 227– α ) left for Spain with an σ τρ τ ό εγ ” as praetor”(“ ς to Appian BC. 1.86, Sertorius “ army from Italy. Appian’s use of this term varies; here it probably refers to the fact that he hadrecently served as praetor in Rome. InBC. 1.108 andIber. 101, Appian ια ερ ρ χ ειν σ α .”Ontheother hand, Plut. Ιβ simply states that Sertorius waschosen “ θ ν υ π α τ ο ”(proconsul). These texts can be reconciled if we Sert. 6.3 calls him “α ς assume that his rank waspraetorius cumimperio proconsule, like previous governors of Spain. Asfar as whenheset off, the sources cited inthis note make a date in February/March 82 most likely, since he encountered severe winter storms in the passes through the Pyrenees andhada falling-out with the consuls of that year. See 51 Z. Brunt (1971a): 470– 2; Eut. 6.2; Gran. Lic. 35.9 Cr; Exup. 49– Plut. Sert. 6.1– 6 argues for a 471 suggests that onelegion went withSertorius; Spann, p. 185 nn.2– “ respectable force.”See Exup. 46– 48 Z; Ch. 5, n. 48. Descriptions of Sertorius’ later army andthe senate that hecreated in Spain demonstrate that the province did serve as a safe haven for ex-Cinnans (Sert. 22), indeed for many enemies of Sulla’s neworder.

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Sertorius’experiences in Spain form a tangled, confusing image in our sources. According to Plutarch andExuperantius, his mission was in large part to pacify the Iberians; Sertorius found the natives angry and on the verge of rebellion. Appian, on the other hand, thought that Sertorius’ purpose was to wrest the region from Sullan control: the f ormer praetors in order to favor Sulla”and failed to recognize his authority”in Spain “ “ Sertorius drove them out with his combined Italian-Celtiberian army. Yet Appian here perhaps confused the events of Sertorius’arrival with those of a year later, 81 B.C., when according to other accounts, Sertorius was forced outof Spain temporarily by praetors working for Sulla. Appian also records that a force of Celtiberian cavalry wassent to Carbo in Rome in 82 . These men must be regarded as proby the praetors in Spain” B.C. “ Cinnan, cooperating with Sertorius. Were there also pro-Sullan praetors operating in Spain at the same time? One other piece of evidence throws all this into further confusion. According to Cicero, M. Fonteius served as legate in Spain in the year when Sulla arrived in Italy (83). His task included the exaction of cavalry, money, andgrain fromtheGauls to be usedagainst Sertorius. Wemaythen assume that Fonteius remained in Spain into 82 (perhaps even later, since Cicero fails to date these events exactly). So, Fonteius may be one of those praetors”mentioned byAppian. Hiscommanding officer could have been “ Flaccus, whohadmoved his base of operations into Narbonese Gaul while still trying to hold on to some authority in Spain through legates. Could Fonteius have been one of those legates? Does this mean that Flaccus had turned against the Cinnans? The sources never call Flaccus a Sullan; Flaccus didnothing to halt Sertorius’trip to Spain through Gaul (where he definitely hadauthority at this time). Perhaps Flaccus hadnotchosen a side in the conflict and preferred to remain neutral and not interfere with Sertorius –yet. This is strongly indicated by much of the evidence.9 To sumup, we are left with about four distinct possibilities, not one of which can be definitively asserted. First, Flaccus could have held authority ), hesitated about in Gaul and Spain through legates (Appian’s “praetors” halting Sertorius in Gaul, but not about sending Fonteius after him into Spain. This seems like an erratic and certainly dangerous strategy on the part of an experienced military man, but it is possible in the unstable 9

53 Z; App. BC. 1.86, 89, 108; Cic. Font. 6, 13; Gabba 5; Exup. 50– Plut. Sert. 6.3– 96; 81; Konrad, n. 8 above; Badian (1964a): 94– 228, 297; MRR2.78– (1958): 227– 44 andhis Appendix 6. Onthe defeat of the legate Bennett, p. 64; Spann, pp. 41— Salinator in the Pyrenees by Annius and the flight of Sertorius with 3000 men, 92 McG; Plut. Sert. 7; App. BC. 1.96; including the proscribed, see Sall. Hist. 1.82– 438; 48; McGushin, pp. 162–167; Lippold, pp. 437– Oros. 5.23.2–16; Spann, pp. 44– 43, 87, 92, 162. Curchin, pp. 42–

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conditions of the time. Second, Flaccus’legates, like Fonteius, could have acted on their owninitiative against Sertorius. Third, it is equally possible, especially in light of our paltry evidence for governors in this period, that some nondescript, unnamed magistrates were sent out to the two Spains in the mid-80s by the Cinnan government; they may have turned against Rome and cooperated with Fonteius. Lastly, the problems of chronology maybe clouding ourpicture. If Sertorius arrived in Spain in spring 82 B.C., when exactly did he encounter resistance from Fonteius or anyone else? Perhaps it was not immediately, but rather after Sulla hadcaptured Rome anddefeated Carbo. By April 82, those watching from the sidelines could have hadthe impression that Sulla would win, andso threw in their lot with himagainst Sertorius. On his arrival in Spain, Sertorius may have encountered minor resistance from Roman enemies. On the other hand, the natives soon joined Sertorius because he radically altered andimproved relations between Romantroops andthe native population. Hefreed cities from Roman intervention in local affairs and indeed granted immunity from the stipendium to some of them. Moreover, heforbade thequartering of Roman troops within thetowns andestablished separate military camps. These measures relieved the natives of certain economic burdens and lessened the conflicts with Romans, thus winning Sertorius enthusiastic popular support. The natives gladly supplied him with all he asked for, including manpower. Sertorius was not even opposed by the Roman settlers there, andindeed gained the support of many; he held the province as a safe haven for Cinnan refugees andas a source of supplies andtroops for thewarin Italy until theendof the year 82. By then, the Cinnan regime in Rome hadfallen andSertorius was on his own; his enemies at home would not allow himto live peacefully in control of Spain.10

II Events in the closing decade of the second century B.C. demonstrated to Rome that the Transalpine territory could not be ignored without paying a heavy price.11 Yet, again, wehear little from oursources about the province

10 See sources in nn. 2, 7, 9. 37. Wehave norecord of anygovernor inNarbonensis until 95 11 Cic. Prov. Cons. 32– B.C., norof a lexprovincia; perhaps the best date to posit for its establishment as a province is sometime between 106 and 100 B.C. Ontaxes andRoman businessmen 60; Smith (1958): 20; 13; 2 Verr. 3.27; Rivet, pp. 54– there, see Cic. Font. 11– 26; Badian 83; Lintott (1993): 10–13, 25– Mommsen and Broughton, pp. 21, 82– (1966): 901– 906.

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after the victories of Marius there. Atthetime of the Social War, the picture clears slightly: C. Coelius Caldus (cos. 94) hadcharge of Transalpine Gaul from about 93 B.C., maintaining overland contacts with Spain, andprobably staying on in his province for the duration of the Social War. He then disappears from view.12 Our next evidence on the province comes from Cicero: the son of Valerius Flaccus, Cinna’s consular colleague, fled to southern Gaul to take refuge with his uncle, the governor of Spain. This places the latter in Gaul around the year 85 B.C. What was he doing in Gaul? Perhaps governor Flaccus took on a cumulation of provinces, the twoSpains andTransalpine Gaul. It is also possible, as pointed outearlier, that Flaccus switched over to Gaul completely, leaving Spain in the hands of independent officials sent outfrom Rome (perhaps in 86). Hisbrother wasstill alive then; hehaddone good work in Spain; and his loyalty to Cinna could still be counted on perhaps. This would mean that Flaccus succeeded Coelius in Gaul.13 Cicero provides uswith a good look at provincial conditions in Gaul. In his defense of Quinctius (delivered in 81 at a trial involving a dispute in 83 over a partnership andproperties in Gaul), the orator notes that his client appealed at the time of the dispute to C. Valerius Flaccus imperator, who . Nowthis would seem to be the same Flaccus who, was in the province” “ according to Cicero’s Pro Fiacco and the Scholia Bobiensia, had a military force in Gaul in the mid-80s; that is, he wasthe former governor of Spain. Evidence for Flaccus’ position in Gaul is also provided by Caesar, who mentions that C. Valerius Flaccus gave citizenship to a manwhose sonlater served as Caesar’s envoy to Ariovistus. Lastly, Flaccus minted coins at Massilia in 82/81 B.C. to commemorate his achievements in Spain and Gaul. Thus, Flaccus governed Gaul at least from 85 to 81 B.C.14 According to Exuperantius, Sertorius hadorders to arrange matters in Transalpine Gaul on his way to Spain (perhaps a reference to Flaccus’ doubtful loyalty to the regime at Rome), but Sertorius’ uneventful trip through the province until he reached the Pyrenees suggests that Flaccus wasnot hostile to Sertorius. Sertorius apparently didnothing to oust Flaccus from his imperium either. So, Exuperantius’vague evidence may sim39; Plut. Mar. 20– 27; Frontin. 68; Vell. 2.12; Carney (1961a): 36– 12 Livy. Per. 65– Cae2.4.6; Diod. 5.30; Valgiglio (1956a): 97–127. On Coelius, see Livy. Per. 73 (“ cilius”subdued a rebellion of Salluvii); MRR 2.25; He is perhaps connected with 908; Brunt 95; (1966): 907– the Caelius of Val. Max. 4.7.5; Badian (1964a): 91– 464; Rivet, p. 54. (1971a): 463– 9; MRR 2.58, 61, 64, 70; Bennett, p. 64; 13 On Flaccus in Gaul, see sources in nn. 7– Rivet, p. 55. 34, esp. 24, 28. See Ch. 3, n. 55; Font. 6, 13; Flac. 63; Schol. Bob. 14 Cic. Quinct. 11– 60. p. 96 St; Caesar. BG. 1.47.4; Rivet, pp. 56–

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ply allude to Sertorius’ mission to check upon conditions in Narbonensis andlet things be if nodanger wasapparent. Ontheother hand, Flaccus may have been counting on Fonteius (if indeed he wasthe governor’s legate) to move against Sertorius independently. Further, when Sertorius sent reinforcements from Spain to help his comrades in Italy, probably overland, they encountered no resistance. We may wonder, then, whether Flaccus’ imperium in Transalpine Gaul really brought much discomfort to the Cinnangovernment, or he collaborated with them until he sawthat their cause wasdoomed against Sulla. Flaccus didnotreturn to Rome until 81, whenhe celebrated

a triumph for his victories in Spain andGaul; heparticipated in

82 and, although welcomed by Sulla, was not no way in the civil war of 83– given any position of prominence or responsibility in the new order of affairs. Sulla needed distinguished menat Rome, especially after all of the executions, but he apparently could not count on Flaccus as one of his own.15

III

What role didCisalpine Gaul play in this period?16 First, Rome drew upon the towns and tribes there for military reinforcements. During the Social War, Sertorius as proquaestor raised troops and collected weapons from Cisalpina to aid the Roman armies against the Italian insurgents; Gallic troops also fought on the Italian side against the Roman army under Sulla. Yet the ancient sources preserve norecord of anyinsurrection in Cisalpina itself during this conflict, not even among the Latin colonies there. The silence of theevidence mayinthis case indicate thereality: peace prevailed in Cisalpine Gaul during the Social War. Wepresume, without evidence to the contrary, that those senior officers operating nearest to the region had the imperium there.17 15 Exup. 50 Z; Spann, p. 41. 16 See MRR 2.32; App. BC. 1.42, 50, 66, 86; Cic. 2 Verr. 1.34; Balb. 50; CIL I.864; Plut. Sert. 4.1. The usefulness of Cisalpine Gaul to Rome in the Late Republic is clear from a few references from Cicero. In Cat. 2.5, he mentions Gallic Legions, apparently a regular force of native troops from the area. In Mur. 42, he notes the presence of equestrians, doing well as moneylenders there. But Cicero is often 435; Ewins (1955): critical of the Gauls, as in Pro Fonteio. See Grenier, pp. 412– 906; Brunt (1971a): 68; Badian (1966): 901– 82; Lintott (1993): 18, 27, 53, 67– 73– 569 estimates the population of the region at over five hundred 85, 167–172, 567– thousand in the 80s. 17 On Sertorius, see Plut. Sert. 4.1; Sall. Hist. 1.77 McG (winter 91/90 B.C.); Mc57. OnGauls in the Social War, see App. 157; Konrad (1994): 52– Gushin, pp. 156– BC. 1.42, 50; Gabba (1958): 136–137, 151.

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WhenSulla received hiscommand against Mithridates in 88 B.C., what

did his colleague Pompeius Rufus receive? The sources mention nothing about this. Probably his sphere of authority was Italy itself, as the war with the allies wasstill an issue; he didattempt to assume command of Strabo’s army in the north, andthis command probably included authority over the Cisalpine region. When Rufus was assassinated, Strabo retained his command into 87 B.C., but no further operations of significance took place in the northern theater of theWar.18 Once the fighting began between Cinna and Octavius, though, the province resumed its function as a source of menandmaterials, an area of resources to be contended over by the rival claimants to the legitimate government. A certain Servilius used Ariminum as a base of operations against the Cinnans, but lost the city to M. Marius Gratidianus. Servilius’ rank and his relation to Octavius are unknown. On the other hand, P. Caelius (or Coelius) commanded the garrison at the colony of Placentia explicitly onbehalf of Octavius. TheCinnans applied strong pressure to the town andCaelius’old age andfeeble health also contributed to the Cinnan victory there. According to Valerius Maximus, when Placentia was captured, Caelius didnotwish to fall into enemy hands; instead, hecommitted suicide in order to die with dignity.19 This jockeying for possession of important towns had its most recent parallel andprecedent in the Social War, during which rebels andRomans in turn attempted to gain control of certain strategically-located, fortified towns. Examples areAsculum andAesernia, scenes of the most significant andbloodiest battles of theconflict. In 87, inCisalpine Gaul, thesame thing occurred. Holding on to towns like Placentia andAriminum hadseveral benefits. First, one could control the main route through the region, the ViaAemilia, anditsjuncture with the ViaFlaminia, which leddirectly to Rome. Access to the area could be monitored andregulated, as could the flow of supplies andtroops, not only between Rome andthe north, butbetween Rome and the western provinces. Second, as we have seen, the loyalty of the governors in Spain andTransalpine Gaul could notbe counted onin 87; incase of invasion from those provinces, Cisalpine Gaul would serve as a buffer. Lastly, it offered resources of its ownandplaces of refuge anddefense for the Cinnans if they should fail against the armies of Octavius.

77; App. BC. 1.63; Vell. 2.20.1; Val. Max. 9.7ext2; MRR 2.42; 18 Livy. Per. 75– 180. Gabba (1958): 179– 51 identifies Servilius as P. 19 On Ariminum, see Gran. Lic. 27 Cr; MRR 2.50– Servilius Vatia (cos. 79). On Placentia, see Val. Max. 4.7.5; MRR 2.51; Badian (1964a) 95 and(1966): 907– 908 links this Caelius withC. Coelius Caldus, governor of Transalpine Gaul at the time.

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In theevent, they didnot, andwith thebeginning of theCinnan regime, our sources again go silent on the subject of Cisalpine Gaul. Then, the

government assumed a defensive posture against Sulla’s return, seeking recruits and supplies throughout Italy. Plutarch, in his Life of Pompey, suggests that the activities of Cinna and Carbo in this regard centered greatly on Picenum; they likely recruited from Gallia Cisalpina as well, as previous Roman commanders haddone. Aninteresting story from Valerius Maximus perhaps provides evidence for this. Carbo, when calling for hostages from the Italian towns as security for loyalty against Sulla, didthe same for theCisalpine towns. Acertain M. Castricius held the magistracy at Placentia in 84 andrefused to comply with the decree requiring the handing over of hostages from his town. Valerius Maximus describes this Castricius as a manwell-on in years and yet not afraid of Carbo’s “many swords” . Apparently, Carbo did nothing to force Castricius to comply with the order.20 Does this suggest anything about the nature of Cinnan control over Cisalpina? Truly, a general conclusion cannot come from analyzing a piece of evidence from one town in the region. Castricius’ action does suggest a desire to retain local autonomy, but this does not indicate hostility toward Rome. Indeed, Placentia remained a center of Cinnan support well into 82 B.C. Perhaps we can conclude, then, that the Cinnans did not possess a firmly tight grip on the locals; in other words, they relied often, as we should expect, on local consent. Cicero’s second Verrine oration provides more information. Here, the orator attempted to demonstrate to his audience just how long Verres had been a corrupt anddisloyal man. Herelates howVerres, as quaestor fourteen years earlier (84 B.C.), served reluctantly under the consul Carbo, to whom he was assigned by lot. Carbo disliked Verres, considering him lazy and self-indulgent. (How much of this is Cicero’s rhetoric, let the reader decide!) At that time, Carbo wasoperating in the Picene area. Apparently, his working relationship with Verres lasted into the next year, despite his misgivings. For when Carbo assumed the post of proconsul in Cisalpina in 83, Verres was right there with him again as proquaestor. According to Cicero, Carbo’s mission was to collect troops against Sulla’s invasion force. That dastardly Verres received 2.4 million sesterces from Rome, most of which was intended to pay for the new army. He paid out 1.64 million for various poorly-recorded or unrecorded expenses. Six hundred thousand should have remained in the coffers at Ariminum, Carbo’s headquarters. This money mysteriously disappeared, however, and Cicero ac-

6; DVI. 69.4; Val. Max. 6.2.10; 78; Plut. Pomp. 5– 84; App. BC. 1.76– 20 Livy. Per. 83– 209; Carney (1962): 317. Gabba (1958): 204–

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cused Verres of embezzlement, a quite likely charge. According to the orator, Verres hoped that thebadmemory of Carbo would distract attention from his own crime; he also claimed to have acted in the interests of the nobility. So says Cicero, arguing for Verres and putting words in his mouth!21 Despite theobvious character assassination that Cicero sodeftly carried out, this account offers us a rare glimpse into the workings of provincial administration in our period. In that time of crisis, many elements of the Roman system operated normally (for example, the assignment of staff officers by lottery), while other measures were geared to the emergency (for example, a sizable outlay of cash from the central treasury). Cicero’s story also illustrates the continued value of Cisalpine Gaul to the Cinnan regime. In 83 B.C., Carbo hadto turnhis attention south toward Picenum, where the young Pompey, gathering a force from the locals, posed an ever more serious threat as anavowed ally of Sulla. Carbo went back to Rome later in the year butnever lost contact with his province, despite Pompey’s maneuvers. Both sides spent the summer of that year, andperhaps the fall as well, recruiting forces from all parts of Italy. Appian notes how the “neighboring , the Transpadani, were among the staunchest supporters Gauls on the Po” of the Cinnan consuls. Yet in 82, when the war for Italy commenced in earnest, Cinnan control of the region gradually collapsed thanks to the efforts of Metellus and Pompey.22 First, Carbo’s legate Carrinas, operating in the boundary area between Cisalpina, Umbria, andPicenum, metwith defeat at the hands of Metellus. Carbo tried to relieve Carrinas andbore down on Metellus until bad news arrived from Praeneste; Sulla had laid that important town under siege. Then, Carbo broke off the attack and retired to Ariminum in order to reconsider his strategy in light of Sulla’s action. Inhabitants of the border region described above then threw in with the Sullans.23 Similar defeats in the north continued as all the Cinnan armies concentrated their efforts on Rome and Praeneste and dwindled under the twin destroyers, death anddesertion. After Pompey’s victory at Sena Gallica in Picenum, Metellus used that town as ajumping-off point for a naval assault on Ravenna. He took control, with little apparent resistance, of the grainproducing area around the town. Carbo and proconsul Norbanus, though

40, 77, 92; Ps-Asc. pp. 206, 208, 226 and Schol. Gron. pp. 21 Cic. 2 Verr. 1.11, 34– 333 St; Barlow (1980): 211. 329, 332– 4; Sert. 6.1; Konrad 228; Plut. Pomp. 6.1– 22 App. BC. 1.86; Gabba (1958): 226– 58. (1994): 76– 79; Van Ooteghem (1954): 53– 231; Oros. 5.20.5, 21.10; Plut. Pomp. 7. 23 App. BC. 1.87; Gabba (1958): 229–

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busy trying to relieve Praeneste, led a force by night against the encampment of Metellus at Faventia, southwest of Ravenna. Tactical errors and topographical obstacles caused their surprise attack to fail miserably; they lost sixteen thousand men, including six thousand deserters. Only about a thousand men made it back alive to Ariminum, which was then still in Cinnan hands.24

It was not to remain so for long. For a former officer of Norbanus, Albinovanus, planning to desert along with his Lucanian forces to Metellus, plotted against the proconsul in order to ingratiate himself with the Sullani. He invited his comrades, the legates of Carbo andNorbanus, as well as the commanders themselves, to a meal at his camp. Though Carbo

and Norbanus failed to attend, Albinovanus still went through with his plan

by murdering his other guests andthenjoining Metellus.25 Without able lieutenants inCisalpine Gaul, control of that region bythe Cinnan high command quickly deteriorated. Theremaining troops atAriminum and “many other camps in the vicinity”now joined the Sullani. Norbanus himself fled in despair all thewayto Rhodes. Notlong after, “ the Gauls whoinhabited thecountry lying between Ravenna andtheAlps went .26 over to Metellus as a whole” IV Sicily was highly profitable to Republican Rome, especially as a grain producer. Many Romans andItalians came to Sicily seeking profits from land andmaritime trade, notalways with the best interests of the natives in mind.27 Yet the native Sicilians apparently felt no comradery with the Italian rebels anddid not take the opportunity to rebel themselves during the Social War. It hadnot been that long since the Second Slave Revolt in Sicily hadbeen crushed by Roman troops; perhaps there wasno desire to see the horrors of rebellion again. Instead, much of the supplies and the 237; Plut. Pomp. 7.3; 24 On Sena Gallica, see App. BC. 1.89; Gabba (1958): 235– 91; Gabba, p. 237; Vell. Oros. 5.20.5. OnRavenna andFaventia, see App. BC. 1.89– 2.28.1; Oros. 5.20.7 gives the figure lost as nine thousand; Livy. Per. 88. On the defeat of Norbanus or more probably Quinctius by Lucullus at Fidentia, see Livy. Per. 88; App. BC. 1.92; Oros. 5.20.8; Plut. Sull. 27.7; CIL I.719; MRR2.72; Gabba, p. 245.

243. 25 App. BC. 1.91; Ps-Asc. p. 234 St; Gabba (1958): 242– 92; Dio. 30/35.106.1; Plut. Pomp. 8. 26 App. BC. 1.91– 23; 40, 3.12–13, 5.50,53,56; Planc. 2.66; Diod. 35.2.20– 27 Cic. 2 Verr. 2.13–14, 32– 144; Scramuzza, pp. 234, 236, 134, 137– Livy. 26.21.17, 26.40.13; Finley, pp. 124– 94. 85, 93– 76, 80– 60, 70– 49, 59– 39, 45– 29, 38– 9, 20, 28– 328; Lintott (1993): 8–

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grain used to feed Roman armies during theWarcame from Sicily. Indeed, thepropraetor of Sicily, C. Norbanus, later a member of theCinnan faction, crossed the straits of Messana andused his forces to prevent Italian rebels from seizing Rhegium. Hisadministration of Sicily wasremembered as fair andscrupulous.28 After the Social War, Norbanus apparently retained thegovernorship of theisland province, andwasstill there whentheconflict between Cinna and Octavius took place. Perhaps we can speculate that he even supplied badlyneeded grain to the Cinnan army, if his later loyalty to the regime is any indication of his stance. Hereturned to Rome to stand for the consulship of 83 without anyrecorded difficulty.29 A replacement for Norbanus as governor of the island must have soon been sent out; the Cinnan government could not very well have left such a rich and strategically-located province without administration or protection. It seems more than likely that M. Perperna, whowould be incharge of Sicily in 82, hadbeen sent outimmediately to replace Norbanus. Hewasan appropriate choice: his grandfather hadwonrenown against the rebels of the First Slave Revolt there; the family had various connections on the island. Perperna’s tenure, however, didnot last long. Pompey invaded Sicily in 82, sent by Sulla with a large force to prevent Sicily from remaining in enemy hands. Heseized the island almost without a blow, according to our sources. The accounts maybe biased in Pompey’s favor, butit does appear that Perperna put up no resistance to Pompey, instead fleeing to parts unknown.30 Perperna was not the only Cinnan operating in the area. The consul Carbo, having suffered several defeats at the hands of Pompey and Metellus, decided to flee Italy, leaving his army behind. With a small group of friends, Carbo managed to escape by ship to Africa, and then landed on Sicily late in 82. He had with him now a small force, probably collected from supporters in Africa as well as refugees from Italy and elsewhere.

28 Diod. 37.2.13–14; Cic. 2 Verr. 2.5. Onpeaceful conditions there after 100 B.C., see 8. On business and landed interests there from Italy, see 2.6, 3.27. 3.117, 5.5– 86. Badian (1964a): 84– 29 MRR2.41, 45, 48, 62, 67, 73; Finley, pp. 144–148; Wilson (1988): 93; Scramuzza, 176; Bennett, p. 64. p. 343; Sherwin-White (1972): 175– 68 on Perperna; also Diod. 38.14; 37.22a; Vell. 2.30.1; Val. Max. 30 See MRR2.67– 2; Badian (1958a): 269; Keaveney (1982d): 125–127; 6.2.8; Plut. Pomp. 10.1– Seager (1979): 9; McGushin, p. 109; Spann, pp. 46, 83. This Perperna, probably praetor in 82 B.C. at the latest, is called ex-praetor by Velleius, Diodorus, and making the island a base for survivors of Valerius. According to Plutarch, he was“ the opposite (Cinnan) party.”Thebiographer’s opinion of Perperna is notvery high, and this probably resulted from the use of pro-Pompeian sources from the Late Republic.

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Carbo sent M. Brutus, a long-time Cinnan, to Lilybaeum to reconnoitre Pompey’s position. This was probably around the time of the battle at the Colline Gate andthe fall of Praeneste; Pompey didnot participate in either event, apparently because he wasaway in Sicily.31 Pompey had a fleet at his disposal, which he used against Brutus; the latter committed suicide to avoid capture. Carbo did not fare as well. He wascaptured by Pompey’s troops andexecuted, meeting his death “weep, said Livy; this is not a very flattering end for a ing like a woman” distinguished Roman consul, even if it only reflects the bias of the source. Indeed, other authors were far more critical of Pompey’s conduct toward Carbo. Appian tells us that the “many persons of distinction”with Carbo (probably leading members of the Cinnan faction) were killed at Pompey’s orders without even being brought into his presence. Carbo “ he caused to be brought before his feet in chains and, after making a public harangue at him, murdered him and sent his head to Sulla” . The brutality of civil war makes itself quite apparent here.32 Pompey never lived down this execution: it waspreserved in the works of several ancient writers as a prime exemplum of cruelty. Earliest among them, Cicero, in a letter toAtticus, says that Julius Caesar threw the deaths of Carbo andBrutus in Pompey’s face as proof of his cruelty andclaimed to be avenging them. In the Sallustian Speech to Caesar, the author cries: C arbo and Brutus ... were slain not in arms nor in battle according to the “ laws of war, but with utmost barbarity while begging for mercy...!”T hen, Plutarch over a century later added his opinion that the disgraceful way in which Pompey led a Roman consul in chains rather than grant him an . Lastly, honorable wayto die demonstrated “ a lack of common humanity” Valerius Maximus, thegreat collector of famous sayings anddeeds, dubbed adulescentulus carnifex”for the brutal murder of a manwhowas Pompey “ notonly a senator, a consul, andPompey’s superior in social status, butalso his former advocate in court! Pompey’s inexcusable conduct in Sicily has been rendered infamously immortal.33

31 Livy. Per. 88–89 (after Fidentia); DVI. 75.8; Plut. Sull. 28.8, 29.4; Pomp. 10.1–4 (The proscribed were gathering forces anda fleet in the area of Sicily); App. BC. 1.92 (Carbo hoped to gain support for the cause from Africa); Exup. 53 Z; Badian 128; Van 247; Keaveney (1982d): 122– 270; Gabba (1958): 244– (1958a): 269– 61. Ooteghem (1954): 59– 96; Flor. 2.9.26; Luc. 2.548; Comm. Bern. p. 83 U; 32 Livy. Per. 89; App. BC. 1.95– 262; LipCic. Fam. 9.21.3; Oros. 5.21.11, 24.16; Eut. 5.8.2; Gabba (1958): 253– pold, pp. 435, 440; Seager (1979): 9. 4; 33 Cic. Att. 9.14.2; Ps-Sall. Ad Caes. 4.1; Sall. Hist. 1.44 McG; Plut. Pomp. 10.1– 262; McGushin, p. 109; Seager Val. Max. 6.2.8, 5.3.5, 9.13.2; Gabba (1958): 260– (1979); 9; VanOoteghem, (1954): 59– 61.

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After these executions, the Cinnans lost control of Sicily and Pompey began reorganizing the province. Yet the Sicilians did not all acquiesce. There were several flash-points of resistance. For example, the people of Messana, who had supported the Cinnans, rejected Pompey’s authority “ claiming that it wascontrary to theancient lawof theRomans” . The sonof Strabo silenced them with a threat of total destruction. Himera, led by its popular leader Sthenis, hadalso sided with theCinnans; the latter’s bravery, frankness, andeloquence nowsaved the town from Pompey’s wrath. These incidents illustrate further how provincials did take a consciously active anddeliberate part in the civil warandhowthey might do so again in the future.34

What of the other island provinces, Corsica andSardinia?35 Webasically have no evidence on the former in this period; what little evidence we have on the latter suggests minor rebellions took place there.36 Again, we may speculate that the Cinnan government did not neglect Sardinia any more than it didSicily; that would have been tactically risky. Yet we have no evidence for the early years.37 Wedoknow for certain that Q. Antonius Balbus, praetor in 83, served as propraetor in Sardinia the following year, defending the island against Sulla’s legate L. Philippus. As a Cinnan, Antonius coined money with the approval of the Senate to finance his defensive efforts. Hiscoin type appears to predict or assert victory for his side, or at least for himself. Unfortunately, Antonius was killed as a result of his

efforts. Sardinia, and probably Corsica as well, fell into Sullan hands.38

V

A sizable population of Romans and Italians considered North Africa home,39 but in the Social War, these expatriates apparently played no military role; Numidian andMauretanian cavalry, however, didserve under 6; Mor. 203C-204E. 34 Plut. Pomp. 10.1– 44; Meloni, pp. 458– 35 Cic. Scaur. 42– 461; Lintott (1993): 6–8, 23, 46–49, 70–72. 36 Cic. 2 Verr. 3.27, 3.192 on grain andstipendium from Sardinia; Meloni, pp. 462– 466. 84; Katz (1976b): 522. 37 Badian (1964a): 82– 38 OnAntonius Balbus, see Livy. Per. 86; MRR2.67, 3.20; Val. Max. 7.6.4; Crawford (1974): 78, 375; Luce (1968): 28; Rowland, p. 414; Badian (1964a): 100 n. 79; 64. Bennett, pp. 63– 31; Arnold, p. 236; Lintott 39 See sources cited and discussion by Haywood, pp. 3– 19, 26, 47, 52, 64, 65, 80; (1993): 30, 32, 37, 42, 47, 49, 74, 83; also Sall. lug. 17– Cic. 2 Verr. 3.27, 192; Scaur. 44; DVI. 73; Vell. 1.15; Plin. NH. 3.80; Sen. Cons ad 31. 280; Poma, pp. 29– 580; (1988): 278– Helv. 7.9; Brunt (1971a): 577–

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Roman commanders in theconflict, though notwith distinction. The clientkings of the region, rather than the governor of Africa, surely sent these forces to aid Rome, as wascustomary.40 In 88 B.C., Marius arrived in North Africa, fleeing for his life, a hostis, as we have seen. Along with a few fellow exiles, andpreceded by his son and other refugees, Marius sought asylum there. Marius the Younger had almost been handed over to his enemies by King Hiempsal of Numidia, who betrayed him to win favor with Sulla.41 The two groups of refugees, the father and son, eventually reunited, but received no warm welcome from the Roman governor of Africa, P. Sextilius. He refused to grant asylum to Marius and apparently used force to push the exiles out of the territory;42 Sextilius was apparently only following his orders from Rome, having no commitment to either side. Bocchus of Mauretania andHiempsal, as wehave seen, could notbe relied upon for help either. The one-time savior of Rome andhis little bandof refugees found a safe haven finally on the island of Cercina off thecoast, where they were welcomed by a colony of Marius’veterans.43 When affairs in Rome brought him the opportunity, Marius began preparations to join Cinna against their common enemies. Marius raised a force from Cercina, andperhaps from the mainland as well; he did have contacts there, especially among wealthy equestrians in Utica, Vaga, and elsewhere.44 North Africa soon became a theater for the Roman civil war as well. Metellus Pius late in 87 landed there andseized control. Hewasthe sonof Metellus Numidicus after all, andhadserved there with his father against Jugurtha twenty years before; healso hada variety of valuable connections and contacts in the region. Metellus managed to raise a private army of clients, claiming it as his right as proconsul andin the interests of Rome. 137, 151. 40 App. BC. 1.42, 50; Gabba (1958): 136– 41 See Ch. 1, n. 30. Oros. 5.19.8 suggests that young Marius wasbeing held incustody at Utica andwasrescued fromthere byMarius. This seems unlikely in light of other 432. accounts; cf. Lippold, pp. 431– 42 On Sextilius and Marius’ landing, see MRR 2.41, 49; App. BC. 1.62, 80; Gabba 5; Varro. Rust. 1.1.10; Poma, pp. 29– 216; Plut. Mar. 40.2– (1958): 177–178, 215– 31; Valgiglio (1956a): 184–186. 42. 43 See nn. 41– 44 App. BC. 1.62 (Marius spent the winter of 88/87 B.C. onCercina), 1.67 (Marius left 178, 187; Livy. Per. 79 only Africa with only his fellow exiles); Gabba (1958): 177– mentions exiles, not veterans; also Vell. 2.19.4, 2.20.5; Eut. 7.3; DVI. 67.6 (Marius returned with an army of convicts); cf. Exup. 27 Z; Plut. Mar. 41.2 (Marius assembled Moorish cavalry and refugees from Italy, all together not more than a thousand men); Valgiglio (1956a): 193; Gran. Lic. 35.6 Cr agrees. The events of the bellum Octavianum seem to confirm Plutarch.

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Cinna must have considered this anintolerable situation: Metellus hadbeen oneof hisprincipal opponents inItaly andnowhehadAfrica, a vital source of grain, a jumping-off point for attacking Sicily or Italy, a safe haven for Cinna’s enemies.45 Apparently, there was no one to send against Metellus at first. Then in 85 or 84, C. Fabius Hadrianus wasappointed as praetor of Africa. Whenhe arrived, he compelled Metellus to flee, the latter crossing into Numidia; Hiempsal gave him refuge. Fabius nowallied with a pretender to the Numidian throne, Hiarbas, encouraging his intrigues against Hiempsal. They were successful in ousting Hiempsal temporarily; the king, along with Metellus andtheir comrades, nowhidoutwith Bocchus in Mauretania. Fabius stayed on as propraetor of Africa through 82 B.C., holding on to the province andthe kingdom of Numidia for the Cinnans. It was not an easy task: our sources indicate that Fabius had enemies among the upper classes there, perhaps supporters of Sulla, especially at Utica. This animosity, whatever its origin, eventually led to Fabius’ murder; his enemies trapped him inside his ownpraetorium andburned himalive within it!46 At this point, Africa wasnot abandoned by the Cinnans altogether, but this was not the result of any well-conceived plan. As Sulla’s armies scattered the Cinnan forces in Italy, some leaders and troops managed to escape. Wehave already seen howCarbo left forAfrica before returning to Sicily andhis death. Africa became a place of refuge for those proscribed enemies of Sulla whocould get away. Most notable of the Cinnans in these parts was Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, Cinna’s son-in-law. He was one of the proscribed and stirred up trouble in Africa with the help of King Hiarbas. Together, they gathered a force of about twenty thousand men, a testimony to the continued loyalty of the Numidian ruler to the Cinnan faction.47

49, 54, 58; Livy. Per. 84; Plut. Crass. 6.2 implies that Crassus left Spain 45 MRR2.47– with his army of clients after Cinna’s death (84 B.C.), crossed to Africa where he hadraised a considerable army,”but left because of a personal metMetellus, who“ quarrel; App.BC. 1.80 places Metellus back in Italy in 83 B.C. at the latest; Badian 32. 216; Poma, pp. 30– (1958a): 267; Gabba (1958): 215– 61, 64, 69; Diod. 38.11; Livy. Per. 84, 86; Oros. 5.20.3, 5.21.14; Cic. 46 MRR 2.60– Sull. 56; Ps-Asc. p. 241 St; Bennett, p. 63; Brunt (1971a): 451; Broughton (1953): 34. On Fabius’death, see MRR 45; Poma, pp. 32– 211; Keaveney (1982a): 43– 210– 2.69; Orosius says that heproposed to rule Africa with a maniple of slaves andwas killed along with his entire family by theowners of those slaves; Diodorus andLivy wickedness,”while Cic. 2 Verr. 1.70, 5.94 charges Fabius with greed; blame his “ Val. Max. 9.10.2 is telling, however: [Sullan] Senate andPeople were unanimous in stood firm at Utica...and vengeance”against Hadrianus, whohad“ support of the “ 29. for that reason”waskilled. See the excellent analysis byPoma, pp.21– 270. 47 MRR2.66; Livy. Per. 89; Plut. Pomp. 10.1; Badian (1958a): 269–

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Sulla would not tolerate this situation. He sent Pompey a letter and a to drive out the party of Carbo andto decree of the Senate ordering him “ . Pompey landed with 120 warships and restore Hiempsal to his kingdom” 800 transports fully laden with supplies, even siege engines, andanarmy of six legions at full strength. His two-pronged attack centered on Utica. Plutarch gives a detailed, highly descriptive account of the battle there, where Pompey’s army killed over sixteen thousand of the enemy, including Domitius. Afterwards, thetowns of Africa “ either submitted at once or were . Then, Sulla’s protégé forced Hiarbas to flee from Numidia taken by storm” to the border of Mauretania, where the latter sought refuge in the fortified town of Bulla Regia. Pompey laid siege, drove Hiarbas out, andexecuted him. As a show of force to remind the natives whowasreally in charge in North Africa, the Roman victor leisurely marched through Numidia and then reinstalled Hiempsal. The entire campaign, from start to finish, lasted only about forty days, but, in that short space of time, Pompey apparently erased all that the Cinnans haddone in the region over the previous three years.48

VI

By 90 B.C., Anatolia hadbecome a powder-keg just awaiting the strike of a match.49 Theclient-kings there constantly competed over their expansionist dreams; the population in Roman-controlled territory suffered under heavy economic pressure from Roman tax collectors. Resentment toward Rome grew.50 The explosion came when the army of Mithridates VI of Pontus, taking advantage of Rome’s distraction in the Social War, invaded Asia Minor, sweeping through the client-states there, into the province of Asia, andthenjumped across to Greece. Mithridates washailed bythousands as a “ god and savior” , releasing the people of the Aegean world from Roman domination.51 12;Mor. 204E; Oros. 5.21.13– Hist. 1.45 McG; Plut. Pomp. 11– 16; Cic. Leg. Man. 30; Schol. Bob. p. 138 andSchol. Gron. p. 320 St; Livy. Per. 89; Eut. 5.9.1. Pompey probably landed in Africa in spring 81 B.C., after settling a few things in Sicily during the previous winter. The campaign then ended before the 216; Keaveney (1982d): 128– summer of 81. See MRR 2.70; Gabba (1958): 215– 436; Seager (1979): 9– 35; Lippold, pp. 435– 131; McGushin, p. 110; Poma, pp. 34– 65. 10; Van Ooteghem (1954): 62– 70; Mommsen and Broughton, pp. 49 Sherwin-White (1984): 88–131; (1977): 62– 64, 48, 62– 31, 46– 35; Lintott (1993): 28– 5, 25– 578; Jonkers, pp. 1– 512, 519– 503– 96; Magie, loc. cit. 90, 95– 83, 89– 79, 81– 74– 62; Sherwin-White 123; (1968a): 31– 23; Badian (1956): 109– 50 Jonkers, pp. 12– 252. 249; Delplace, pp. 233– (1984): 235– 51 Onthe rise of Mithridates VI to the throne, see Glew’s analysis of Justin. 38.1.1 and

48 App.BC. 1.80; Sall.

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When knowledge of this invasion reached Rome, the government declared waragainst the king, andSulla received the command.52 Heretained that command and went to the East despite the efforts of Sulpicius and Marius against him,53 but Sulla wasdeclared hostis when Cinna took over Rome, supplies andfunds for his army were cut off, andthe command was once again transferred to Marius.54 Sulla ignored all this and proceeded against Mithridates, who had gained control of the entire Aegean region through occupation, intimidation, or cooptation.55 Sulla used whatever means necessary to win the Greeks back to the Roman side,56 capturing rebellious Athens, for example, after

a long, painful siege. Heeventually challenged Mithridates’forces in

387; also Strab. 10.4.10. Onthe origins andearly phase of the 38.5.3, (1977): 382– 2; Livy. Per. 77; Memnon 22, 49; Dio. 30/35.99.1– War, see App. Mith. 10, 17– 2; 8; Plut. Sull. 15; Flor. 1.40.3– 6; DVI. 76; Eut. 5.4– 5.1– FGH 3B #434 f. 22.5– 398; 389, 393– 189; Glew (1977): 380– 381, 387– Luce (1970): 162, 167–173, 186– 516; Bulst, p. 333; Sherwin-White 132; (1993): 503, 512– McGing (1986): 108– 23; Braund, pp. 131–153; Kallett-Marx, pp. 261– 75; Jonkers, pp. 15– (1977): 72–

262. 52 Vell. 2.18.1; App. BC. 1.55; Dio. 30/35.99.1a. On the date, see Luce (1970): 190; 163; Valgiglio (1956b): 3– 6; Bulst, p. Badian (1958a): 231; Gabba (1958): 161– 219. 331; Barlow (1980): 207, 212– 7; Diod. 29.1– 2; 37.2.12–13; Plut. Mar. 53 App. BC. 1.55; Mith. 50, 70; Flor. 2.9.6– 460; 4; Sull. 5.3, 6.9, 7.1; Dio. 30/35.102.2; Eut. 5.4; Keaveney (1979): 451– 34.1– 77; (1961a): 53; Gabba (1958): 161– 193; Carney (1959b): 72– Luce (1970): 190– 155; (1975): 271– 278; Valgiglio (1956a): 153– 163; Van Ooteghem (1964): 276– 274; McGing (1993): 515. 20; Paus. 9.7.5; Eut. 5.4.1; 54 App. BC. 1.73, 1.77, 1.81; Mith. 51, 54, 60; Flor. 2.9.9– 208; Valgiglio 17; Gabba (1958): 198– 200, 206– Bennett, p. 7; Badian (1970b): 16– 34. (1956b): 7– 48, 54; Plut. Sull. 11–17, 19, 22; Mar. 41; Flor. 1.40.7–8, 10– 29, 31– 55 App. Mith. 28– 12; Livy. Per. 81; Memnon f. 22.9–11; Strab. 9.1.15, 13.1.54; Vell.2.23.3; Eut. 5.5– 7; DVI. 76; Lintott (1993): 7– 6; Paus. 9.7.4–6, 9.33.6; Frontin. 2.3.17; Gell. 15.1.4– 587; Keav74; Frier (1972): 586– 11; Sherwin-White (1984): 132–142; (1977b): 73– 90; Badian (1976): 110, 114–116; Bennett, p. 45; Calabi, p. 282; eney (1982a): 83– 195; (1956b): 34; Woolliscroft, 514; Valgiglio (1956a): 191– McGing (1993): 512– p. 36.

7, quoting Quad. f. 81 P; Livy. Per. 81; 39; Gell. 15.1.4– 35, 38– 56 App. Mith. 31, 33– Flor. 1.40.10; Memnon f. 22.11; Strab. 9.1.15, 13.1.54; Paus. 9.33.6; Obs. 56b; Eut. 3, 4.2 reminds us that 15; IG XIV.1297.2; Nepos. Att. 2.2– 2; Plut. Sull. 12– 5.6.1– Atticus was in Athens at the time and, after the city fell, refused to return to Rome 284; 116; Calabi, pp. 282– 318; Badian (1976): 114– with Sulla; Dowling, pp. 316– 511, 516; Valgiglio (1956b): 35. 90; McGing (1993): 510– Keaveney (1982a): 83– 441 estimates Sulla hada force of approximately thirty thouBrunt (1971a): 439– sand from Italy, plus about tenthousand local auxiliaries; Frier (1972): 586; so also Plut. Sull. 11.5.

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Greece at Chaeronea and Orchomenos, defeating them both times (86 B.C.).57 Despite Sulla’s successes and the unexpected death of Marius, Cinna determined to send his own men to the East to destroy Mithridates and restore Roman control. While Sulla was still besieging Athens, Cinna dispatched L. Scipio Asiagenes to replace the governor of Greece, C. Sentius, and quell unrest among the Thracian and Illyrian tribes;58 by 85 B.C., Scipio hadaccomplished his mission. Cinna also dispatched his colleague, L. Valerius Flaccus, to Asia in order to take charge of the province andthe war. The Cinnan government, however, could only afford to provide two legions apiece for Scipio andFlaccus.59 Oursources tendto be biased toward Flaccus. Still, beyond their critical rhetoric, they reveal him to have been a strong disciplinarian, an experienced commander, well-acquainted withAsia through family contacts, and well-connected intheCinnan regime. Hewaswell-qualified for theEastern mission.60 Further, he was accompanied by C. Flavius Fimbria, the most prominent member of his staff, considered by most ancient authors to have , that is, a very loyal one of the fiercest of Cinna’s accomplices” been “ member of Cinna’s faction. As Flaccus’quaestor andchief legate, Fimbria would play a critical role in the war against Mithridates.61 What were Flaccus’orders regarding Sulla? Washe to attack him? If so, Flaccus would have been greatly outnumbered. Washe to cooperate with him? Sulla wasstill a public enemy. Washeto assume command from Sulla peacefully? It is unlikely Sulla would have complied. Most probably, Cinna 45, 49–50; Flor. 1.40.11– 57 Plut. Sull. 15–17, 19, 21, 22.4; Mar. 41.1; App. Mith. 41– 4; Livy. Per. 82; Eut. 5.6.3; Memnon f. 12; Frontin. 2.3.17, 2.8.12; Vell. 2.23.3– 290; McGing (1986): 5; Bennett, p. 45; Calabi, pp. 285– 22.12–13; Paus. 9.7.4– 131; (1993): 511. On the dating, see Valgiglio (1956a): 36, 191; (1956b): 34– 122– 81; VanOoteghem (1959): 22– 29. 35 andBennett, p. 45; cf. Keaveney (1982a): 80– 58 App. Mith. 51; BC. 1.75; Dio. 30/35.99.1a; Livy. Per. 82; Memnon f. 24.1; Plut. Sull. 20.1; Gabba (1958): 203; Valgiglio (1956b): 34; Woolliscroft, p. 36. On 74; Brunt (1971a): 428, 434– 16; Badian (1964a): 73– Sentius, see MRR. 2.12, 14– 56; 59, 61; Bennett, pp. 53– 435. OnScipio Asiagenes, see App.Illyr. 5; MRR2.58– 364. Kallett-Marx, pp. 361– 211; Valgiglio 441; Barlow (1980): 207– 59 See sources in n. 58. Brunt (1971a): 440– (1956b): 35. Note: the legions inGaul andSpain maystill have been paid byRome, even though they were of dubious loyalty to the regime. 39; Bennett, p. 46; see Badian (1964a): 87 on Flaccus’ 60 Livy. Per. 82; Diod. 38– earlier career; Bulst, p. 320 onfamilial connections. According to Cic. Flac. 52, 55– 94 B.C. and was very popular 59, Flaccus governed Asia as propraetor from 95– with the provincials, especially the people of Tralles; McGing (1993): 516. 61 DVI. 70; Dio. 30/35.104.1–2; Vell. 2.24.1; Strab. 13.1.27; Livy. Per. 80, 82; Flor. 701; Valgiglio (1956b): 35. 2.9.14; Lintott (1971): 696–

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sent Flaccus toAsia to anticipate Sulla’s arrival there, to steal theglory and the victory before Sulla could free his hands of affairs in Greece.62 The expeditionary force under Flaccus probably left Italy in the late winter of 87/86, Scipio’s a bit later. Though his forces hada very difficult crossing, and once in Greece became mutinous (some even deserted to Sulla63), Flaccus andespecially Fimbria kept the army together, avoiding a confrontation with Sulla,64 and eventually arrived at Byzantium. All the while, tensions between Fimbria andFlaccus developed over treatment of provincials anddiscipline within the army; Fimbria often undermined his commander’s authority and disobeyed orders, winning supporters among the troops. At Byzantium, Fimbria fomented a full-scale mutiny. Flaccus wascompelled to flee into Asia, eventually hiding at Nicomedia, where he wasdiscovered andexecuted byFimbria’s men. Fimbria, nowincommand, camped at Nicaea and, inhis typically high-handed manner, demanded confirmation of hisnewstatus from Rome; this wasreluctantly granted near the

endof the year.65

Fimbria “ vigorously prosecuted”his strategy against the Pontic forces inAsia Minor, routing several enemy generals, even theking’s ownson. He eventually drove Mithridates himself to seek refuge inPergamum. Theking managed to escape by sea, primarily because Sulla’s naval commander, L. Lucullus, refused to help Fimbria; partisan concerns interfered in the destruction of a clear enemy of Rome.66 Even without Lucullus’ help, Fim-

62 Vell. 2.30.1; Memnon f. 24.1 states that Flaccus hadorders to cooperate with Sulla, 19; Barlow (1980): 207; Frier but this is highly improbable; Badian (1970b): 18– (1972): 588– 589; Bennett, pp.40, 45– 46; so also Keaveney (1982a): 123; Valgiglio 35; Calabi, p. 287; Meier, pp. 233– 234. (1956b): 34– 63 Livy. Per. 82; Eut. 5.6.3; Plut. Sull. 20.1; App. Mith. 51; MRR2.53; Bennett, p. 45; 36; Woolliscroft, p. 36. Lintott (1971): 697; Valgiglio (1956b): 35– 64 App. Mith. 46– 48; Memnon f. 23.1–2; McGing (1993): 513. 65 Diod. 38.8; App. Mith. 52; Plut. Sull. 12.23; DVI. 70; Dio. 30/35.104.1–5; Vell. 3 states that the quarrel took place 2.24.1; Strab. 12.4.7, 13.1.27; Memnon f. 24.2– after the force hadcrossed the Bosphorus, at Nicaea, andtwosoldiers killed Flaccus at a contio; this cannot be reconciled with Appian, whois preferable; Lintott (1971): 50. The officer Thermus is probably to be identified as 700; Bennett, pp.48– 699– the Q. Minucius Thermus whoserved on the consilium of Cn. Pompeius Strabo at Asculum (either as legate orquaestor) in 89 B.C. along with L. Cornelius Cinna. He mayalso be the moneyer of 103 B.C., whose denarius appears to celebrate Marius’ suc-cesses against the Cimbri and Teutones, a connection which might suggest sympathy with Marius andhis associates andexplain Thermus’ role in the Cinnan 102; Matexpedition against Mithridates; Cichorius, p. 143; Criniti (1970): 101– 266; ILS 8888=CIL I.709, VI.37045; Valgiglio (1956b): 36–40. tingly (1975): 262– 66 App. Mith. 52; Livy. Per. 83; Frontin. 3.17.5; Memnon f. 24.4; IG XIV.1297.3; 52; Bulst, p. 321; Calabi, p. 287; 137; Bennett, pp. 51– McGing (1986): 130– 34. Other engagements also 27; Van Ooteghem (1959): 30– Keaveney (1992): 21–

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bria, anexcellent strategist, recovered the larger part of Anatolia for Rome, punishing Mithridatic sympathizers anddestroying hostile towns.67 By this time, Sulla had finished off Mithridates’ forces in Greece and hadwelcomed refugees from Cinnan Rome, whoencouraged himto return home at once.68 Fortunately for Sulla, Mithridates wasquite ready to make peace. They met face to face, andafter long discussion andargument, the king yielded to Sulla’s rather lenient peace terms.69 Sulla nowturned against Fimbria, moving his entire army to the latter’s position andsurrounding him. They exchanged taunts about the legitimacy of their respective commands, but Sulla clearly outnumbered Fimbria despite questions of legitimacy. Fimbria refused to surrender, despite the desertions from his forces to Sulla’s side and the refusal of his army to fight against fellow Romans. According to Appian, P.Rutilius Rufus, whonegotiated for Sulla, even promised Fimbria safe conduct if he would leave the province. Fimbria still refused to give up his legitimate command and instead took refuge in Pergamum. There, realizing that his military situation washopeless, he committed suicide.70 Sulla now reaped the rewards of both armies and could turn them against Cinna; the Fimbrian army joined Sulla and made pledges to him.

67 68 69

70

85 B.C. Lucullus hadbeen dispatched by Sulla took place during the winter of 86– secretly to arrange for Alexandrian andSyrian ships, as well as Rhodian; this was made difficult by Mithridates’ control of the sea. The legate Munatius near Chalcis wounded Neoptolemus, one of Mithridates’ generals, killed fifteen hundred of the enemy, and captured a large number of prisoners. Arathius, one of Mithridates’ sons, invaded Macedonia andovercame the small Roman force there, took over the whole province, andeven appointed satraps; he then advanced southward butdied of illness at Tisaeum. Perhaps Sentius still led the Romans in Macedonia at this time; it wasnot Scipio Asiagenes, whooperated primarily in Thrace andIllyria. 7; Diod. 38.2– App.Mith. 53; Livy. Per. 83; DVI. 70; Dio. 30/35.104.6– 4; Memnon 53; Valgiglio 137; Bennett, pp. 52– 62; McGing (1986): 130– f. 24.5; Porph. 3.3.61– (1956b): 41. 7.1. Vell. 2.23.2; Plut. Sull. 22.1; Eut. 5.6.3– 6, 5, 23.1– 2; Plut. Sull. 22.1– 83; Memnon f. 25.1– 58; Livy. Per. 82– App. Mith. 54– 24.1–4; Sall. Hist. 1.27 McG; Vell. 2.23.6; Strab. 13.1.28; Flor. 1.40.12; Eut. 5.6.3– 7.3; DVI. 75.7, 76; Gran. Lic. 28F. Mithridates minted coins in August 85 B.C. commemorating peace; this places the Dardanus conference at the beginning of the last year of the 173rd Olympiad, i.e., in summer 85, which matches with CIG IV.6855d andthe length of the waras given in App. BC. 1.76; Badian (1970b): 19; 293; Katz (1981): 4816; Calabi, pp. 291– (1958a): 241, 272; Buckler, pp. 4815– 131; (1993): 515; 105; McGing (1986): 129– 340; Keaveney (1982a): 102– 332– 99; Valgiglio (1956b): 41; Woolliscroft, p. 36. McGushin, pp. 98– 60; Plut. Sull. 25.1; DVI. 70; Sen. Prov. 3.7; Livy. Per. 83; IG App. Mith. 59– 57; Calabi, p. 294; Lintott (1971): 700 suggests that P. XIV.1297.3; Bennett, pp.56– Rutilius Rufus mayhave been one of Appian’s sources on this period, anda biased 42. one (see Appendix, n. 3); Bulst, p. 321; Valgiglio (1956b): 41–

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Sulla made various arrangements to restore order inAnatolia, including the exaction of a huge war indemnity from those who had supported Mithridates, but he would delay only as long as absolutely necessary. Sulla wanted to get home as quickly as possible.71 Sulla sent to andreceived from the Senate several despatches regarding his victories in the East and his return home. When he learned about the murder of Cinna, Sulla determined not to await the Senate’s response to his grievances; instead, he crossed to Italy with forty thousand troops, loaded with fifteen thousand pounds of gold andone hundred fifteen thousand of silver. The Eastern war would provide Sulla with the manpower and the wealth to take over Rome once andfor all.72

VII

To a certain extent, the command against Mithridates held center stage both in Rome’s foreign policy andin Rome’s domestic political arena during our period. Marius risked his life andchallenged the authority of the dominant faction to gain that command; Cinna allied with Marius and earned the enmity of Sulla by depriving himof that command; Sulla marched on Rome to retain that command and returned from the East poised to destroy his enemies and conquer Rome. The struggle for the command against the Pontic menace must surely rank as oneof the most significant causes of the civil strife in that generation. Yet the East should not command all our attention. The western provinces of Rome also deserve due consideration, for several reasons. First, both sides in these years of civil unrest considered the western provinces important for the potential resources they could supply. These resources (troops, weapons, foodstuffs, ships, and so on) had been drawn upon by Rome in former times of crisis. Civil warproved noexception. Second, certain provinces (Spain, Sicily, Africa) served as places of refuge for friend or foe, as bulwarks for the defense of Italy (Sardinia, Sicily, Cisalpine Gaul), or as jumping-off points for the invasion of Italy (Spain, Africa). Thus, they were of strategic concern. 2; Plut. Sull. 23.6; Livy. Per. 83; 63; Memnon f. 25.1– 71 App. Mith. 51, 59, 61– 21; Keaveney (1982a): 113– 18, 20– Bennett, p. 57; Bulst, p. 321; Sherk, nos. 17– 183; Valgiglio (1956b): 42. 114; Sherwin-White (1977): 173– 79; Livy. Per. 83; Memnon f. 25.3; Plut. Sull. 27.5–34; Dio. 30/ 72 App. BC. 1.78– 35.109.8; Sall. Hist. 1.28 McG. OnSulla’s propaganda effort through coins, see the 158; 39; Crawford (1964): 141– following: Barlow (1980): 211; Luce (1968): 25– 212; McGushin, p. 99; Ramage, pp. 88; Gabba (1958): 208– Carney (1959a): 79– 603; Martin, 599, 602– 51; Frier (1972): 585, 598– 106; Valgiglio (1956b): 42– 102– 44; Woolliscroft, p. 37. 35, 42– pp. 22–

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Third, the provincials could not be counted upon to give unfailing loyalty to either side, especially because neither could claim unquestioned legitimacy. Unless the Roman officials or settlers in a province, or the natives themselves, felt that they hada stake in theoutcome of thefighting, they remained neutral and avoided entangling themselves in the conflict. Until 85 B.C., we find two provinces remained neutral (Transalpina and Spain), three were favorable to Cinna (Cisalpina, Sardinia, andSicily), and one was unmistakably hostile (Africa). Afterward, the Cinnans made a concerted effort for more than twoyears to gain andholdAfrica andSpain as well. Provincial reactions to Sulla’s return had to be monitored and controlled, if possible, by direct military presence. We also note some exceptional cases of native loyalty to the Cinnans: Himera andMessana in Sicily, Hiarbas in Numidia, the Celtiberians in Spain, the Transpadane Gauls. These remained active supporters of Cinna’s faction right down to theend. Perhaps these extraordinary examples hint at a much larger Cinnan following that our sources (or rather their sources) have chosen to forget. Still, even these long-term supporters acted outof self-interest; they wanted something, andthe Cinnans apparently gave them what they wanted. The support of most Italians for the regime differed little from this, as did the support Sulla garnered. Fourth, the Cinnan regime did not completely control the western empire. It is true that normalcy, business as usual, characterized relations between Rome and this region as far as we can tell. Only Africa was actively hostile, thanks to the presence of Metellus Pius and the fearful caution of Hiempsal and Bocchus. But this normalcy was precarious, dependant partly on the Cinnans not demanding too much in the way of open support, partly onthepreoccupation of Sulla’s army, andpartly onthe overall quiescence of the hostile exiles. The perimeter of Italy (Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, and Cisalpine Gaul) was secure mainly because the Cinnans controlled it directly. As for the rest of the West, anything was possible. So, didCinna, or his faction, construct a definite set of politico-military objectives for the provinces? Most scholars would doubt so, mainly because we have so little evidence for decision-making under Cinna. But the evidence wedohave points to a different conclusion. First, the Cinnans did not simply ignore the provinces in any sense. They were careful to secure quickly Italy’s perimeter and to keep contact open and friendly with the administrators of Spain and Transalpine Gaul. The testimony of Cicero especially shows howroutine travel andlegal, economic, andadministrative business, even in the most private of matters (as in the case of Quinctius), continued relatively uninterrupted by the civil strife or partisan feelings.

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Moreover, I would argue that the Cinnans in fact formulated an offensive policy as well as a defensive one. When Cinna and Carbo began military preparations for the return of Sulla, transporting troops across the Adriatic to Illyria, Scipio Asiagenes was still operating there, and had secured a temporary peace with the warring tribes; Fabius Hadrianus was dispatched toAfrica where hemade short work of Metellus andCrassus and allied with Hiarbas of Numidia. These maneuvers should not be dismissed as mere temporal coincidences. What we have here are the tracings of a concerted, connected effort to remove the forces most hostile to the Cinnans, those inAfrica, andtojoin together twoarmies in the East in order to present a formidable obstacle to Sulla. Carbo would have remained behind in Italy with control of the entire peninsula and the defensive perimeter, while Fabius would hold North Africa andmake all its resources available to the Cinnans. Much of this picture relies on conjecture from our paltry evidence, but it is a plausible and likely interpretation. Cinna’s sudden death, or rather the growing unwillingness of his army to carry the fight to Sulla, cut short part of this plan, perhaps the pivotal part for the plan’s overall success. Carbo wasforced to regroup andadopt a purely defensive posture. In the final analysis, we should not ignore Rome’s provinces when studying the Cinnan era, if for no other reason than this: the Cinnans themselves, andall their adversaries besides, didnot ignore them. Though our evidence is fragmentary and incomplete, a careful examination of it reveals the vital involvement andthe strategic importance of the provinces in this era of civil war; such investigation also suggests the acceptance, by andlarge, of the Cinnan regime as the legitimate government of Rome on the part of the provincials andRomans abroad.

5

SULLA REDUX ANDTHE FALL OF THE CINNANS Sulla, after conquering Mithridates, returned to the City andfound nearly all of Italy in arms against himunder young Marius, son of Marius. (Ampelius, Liber Memorialis. 42.3)

In this contest, Sulla hadtoo manyadvantages; hewascaptain of a close-knit, intensely

loyal force, while the Cinnani coped...with the clumsy tools of an enlightened dominatio. Andyet, of course, it is a pity that their conception of government could notprevail. (Frier, “ Sulla’s Propaganda,”p. 604)

By the fall of 85 B.C., Sulla had made peace with Mithridates of Pontus. Though still technically a hostis, he made a report of eastern affairs to the Senate as any legitimate commander would do. Having thus learned that Sulla hadnearly completed his mission in the East, Cinna andhis comrades at Rome must have realized that Sulla would return andattempt to destroy them as he had done Sulpicius three short years before.1 Still, settling affairs inAsia andGreece might take Sulla some time. This gave Cinna and his colleague Carbo time to prepare their defense against him.2

I Noteveryone in Rome favored confrontation. There were those, ledby the princeps senatus L. Valerius Flaccus, who hoped to arrive at a peaceful settlement of differences. In fact, Flaccus delivered a speech in the Senate to that effect, urging con-cordia. Heandhis “peace party” , with thegeneral consent of the Senate andthe tacit consent of theconsuls, initiated negotiations by dispatching envoys to Sulla.3 1

App. BC. 1.76; Mith. 60; Gabba (1958): 204; Bennett, p. 57; Frier (1972): 590– 591.

2

Livy. Per. 83; DVI. 69.4; App. BC. 1.76. Gabba (1958): 205; Brunt (1971a): 441; Badian (1962b): 57; Bennett, p. 57; Keaveney (1982b): 508; Frier (1972): 586, 268. 592; Kallett-Marx, pp. 264– 590– Livy. Per. 83; cf. App. BC. 1.77 whohas Sulla begin the negotiations with a letter. Interestingly, though not surprisingly, Plutarch’s biography of Sulla, which derives much of its information from Sulla’s memoirs, completely ignores any attempts at

3

8. See Appendix, nn. 4–

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The consuls, nonetheless, putlittle trust in such overtures of peace and didnot desist in their ownefforts to prepare for war.According to Appian, Cinna and Carbo sent messengers to “ all parts of Italy”to gather money, troops, and supplies. They appealed to the most prominent leaders of the peninsula, especially among the new cititzens, to support them in the forthcoming struggle against Sulla, who, the consuls argued, threatened the newcitizenship of the Italians andputall their lives in danger. In addition, Cinna and Carbo arranged for the collection of ships as a guard for the Adriatic coast, including a squadron from Sicily. They made haste in all things.4 Sulla soon replied to the Senate through its emissaries. Two different versions of this reply have come down to us. According to Livy, Sulla proposed very moderate peace terms: only thereinstatement of those refugees whofled from Cinnan Rome andhadsought his protection. Presumably, he also demanded his ownreinstatement. Appian, however, paints a far different picture. Indeed, it would seem thatAppian, whorelies onLivy as we have seen, either used an entirely different source for this letter or here records a part of Livy not preserved by the epitomator. The latter possibility is likely, especially because Sulla’s response in the epitome closely resembles in tone andcontent a later reply of Sulla’s recorded in Appian. Here we should follow Appian’s version.5 ρ ο ν έμ α τ with a tone of superioriο ”(“ ς According to Appian, Sulla, ϕ ), began his letter by recalling“ to the memory of the Senate his great ty” achievements in North Africa, Gaul, Cilicia, the Social War, even in his consulship, and, of course, against Mithridates. He had recovered many nations for the Romans andhadtaken in fugitives from Rome. Hedwelt at length on the issue of these refugees, portraying himself as a benefactor whohadbeen rewarded for his benevolence with a decree of infamy, the loss of his property andfriends, andthe exile of his wife andchildren.6

4

5 6

peace from either side. In other words, Sulla himself tried to portray events, in retrospect, as a “struggle against tyrants”from the start. In myownview, Sulla’s first letter, his military report, triggered the moves toward peace. Badian (1962b): 206; Candiloro, p. 225; Bennett, p. 59; Bulst, p. 322; 51, 56, 60; Gabba (1958): 205– 141; Frier (1972): 591– Brunt (1988): 462; Keaveney (1982a): 123; (1984): 138– 63. 56, 62– 194. See Appendix, nn. 28, 53– 592; Woolliscroft, p. 36; Ryan, pp. 191– 206; see Cic. 2 Verr. 5.5 on the Sicilian fleet; App. BC. 1.76; Gabba (1958): 205– 58; Keaveney (1982b): Brunt (1971a): 441; Badian (1962b): 57; Bennett, pp. 57– 234; Frier (1972): 592; Harris (1971): 254; 508; (1987): 185; Meier, pp. 233– 381; Bulst, p. 323. 72; (1967): 380– Salmon (1964): 66– Livy. Per. 84. This probably reflects Sulla’s later response to senatorial envoys. App. BC. 1.77; Vell. 2.24.4 considered it one of Sulla’s best qualities that he never hid his hatred of Cinna and Marius nor his desire to destroy them. His duty had

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107

None of this is particularly surprising coming from such a proud Roman noble, nor is the next section of the letter, in which Sulla vowed to return soon andexact vengeance onbehalf of thepersecuted innocents andthecity of Rome itself. Yet herein lay the cornerstone of his propaganda. Upon Rome andItaly as a whole he hadno desire for vengeance, he said, andhe promised that only the guilty would pay; old and new citizens alike, if blameless, would not suffer at his hands. This is what we should expect from a man who prided himself on harming his enemies, but it was also politically and militarily expedient. Sulla, who had disrupted earlier plans to grant parity to theItalians, nowaccepted thepolitical arrangements made under Cinna’s regime inorder to helphisowncause. Obviously, through his mixed message of mercy andmalice, Sulla hoped to gain sympathizers in Italy and strike fear into the hearts of his opponents. In fact, this blatant

propaganda maneuver succeeded in driving a wedge between the Cinnans andtheir luke-warm supporters in Rome andacross Italy. Apparently, many believed this propaganda. Further, Sulla would return with a well-disciplined, enthusiastic, devoted army, with a lot of equipment, money, and ships. Howcould he notbe “ ?7 anobject of terror to his enemies” Cinna andCarbo andtheir comrades must have understood already the dangers inherent in Sulla’s return. Others panicked at the news from Sulla andwanted to continue striving for peace. Many in the Senate sawthemselves as arbiters in this situation and, against the wishes of Cinna andhis faction, dispatched a second embassy to Sulla to ask for reconciliation. At the same time, in order to lessen tensions anddemonstrate good faith, they ordered Cinna and Carbo to cease recruiting troops until Sulla’s answer should arrive. Though both consuls promised the Senate that they would halt military preparations, they remained a long time inthefield. Moreover, their appeals to theItalian peoples nowpaidoff, as troops from all over the peninsula came tojoin the army of Cinna. Further, Cinna and Carbo proclaimed themselves consuls for the following year, 84 B.C. Appian contends, and Livy’s epitome implies, that they did so without holding any electoral assembly. Judging from the pressures later brought to bear onCarbo to hold elections for Cinna’s replace-

7

dictated thedefeat of Mithridates as first priority. This probably comes from Sulla’s memoirs, as does the similar treatment in Plutarch Sull. 22.2, where the general is 96; 207; (1976): 95– mentally divided as to what course to take. Gabba (1958): 206– 591 sees Sulla’s peace overtures as genuine; Badian (1962b): 57; Frier (1972): 590– also Bulst, p. 322; Bennett, p. 59; also Keaveney (1982b): 508; Salmon (1982): 131. 64. 56, 62– 28, 38, 53– See Appendix, nn. 27– 590; 77; Mith. 60; Frier (1972): 585, 588– 3; App. BC. 1.76– Plut. Sull. 25.2, 27.1– 322, 324; Gabba (1958): 207; Keaveney (1987): 186; (1982a): 121; Bulst, pp. 321–

136. (1984) 135–

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ment, andthe absence of anysimilar evidence of such pressure in this case, it is likely that anelectoral assembly indeed wascalled, butin which Cinna andCarbo hadvery little, if any, competition. After all, they could reasonably portray the danger of Sulla’s return as a threat to the State, as an emergency requiring the continuance of both consuls. They even had a precedent for their self-proclamation in office: thegreat Marius; andappar-

peace party”at Rome did not do anything to hinder the Cinnans.8 ently, the “ Some time later, the Senate’s envoys reached Sulla in Greece and delivered their message. Sulla responded that he would never make peace with his adversaries, but that he would not violate any amnesty that the Senate would extend to the Cinnans. Further, in reply to the Senate’s warning regarding his safety, he assured the emmissaries that the Senate could not protect him and those with him as well as he could himself with his ownformidable andloyal army. Thus, Sulla conveyed his message: he would return to Italy with his forces behind himone wayor the other. Sulla concluded the meetings by selecting representatives of his ownwhowould travel to Rome with the senatorial legation. Before they departed, he offered hisownpeace terms: thereturn of his property andwhatever honors and posts of which he had been deprived, even to the restoration of his ἀ ις σ ίω ξ , his dignitas! Again, Appian’s Sulla is not so submissive and cooperative as the epitomator’s.9 By thetime theenvoys began their return journey, Cinna andCarbo had amassed a considerable army. Some of their menhadprobably seen action in the Social War or even in 87 B.C. Among these we should note Cn. Pompey, theyoung sonof Pompeius Strabo, whoapparently hadnoqualms about joining Cinna’s army, despite his father’s actions in 87 or the legal problems he hadfaced himself in 86.10 Yet many of these soldiers were no doubt very rawrecruits whowould not be able to stand upagainst Sulla’s experienced troops without further training. It has been suggested by Badian, against the explicit testimony of Appian and Livy, that this training was the real purpose of the Illyrian expedition. As Carbo continued raising forces throughout Italy, Cinna 60; Frier 8 App. BC. 1.77; Livy. Per. 83; Badian (1962b): 57; also Bennett, pp. 59– (1972): 592 sees the Cinnan side as deliberately belligerent; similarly Bulst, pp. 323; cf. Barlow, pp. 207, 209, 212; Gabba (1958): 208; Brunt (1971a): 441 322– proposes Cinna andCarbo raised eight legions, perhaps excluding Scipio’s. 211; Keaveney 9 App. BC. 1.79; Livy. Per. 84; Bulst, p. 322; Gabba (1958): 210– 593. (1984): 136; Frier (1972): 592– 10 Plut. Pomp. 5.1. Unfortunately, the sources never comment on the abilities of Cinna’s men. Gabba (1958): 209; Badian (1962b): 57; Bennett, p. 61; also Keaveney (1982a): 130; (1982d): 114, 116; Frier (1972): 593; Van Ooteghem (1954): 53. 52–

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began sending detachments by ship across the Adriatic to Liburnia on the northern coast of Illyria. There, Badian presumes, they were to engage in military exercises and battle troublesome natives. Not all scholars accept Badian’s argument, as they recognize the dangerous loss of time, and potentially of men, involved in such anexercise. In theprevious chapter, we considered the possibility that Cinna’s actions were rather a prelude to a military link-up with Scipio Asiagenes in the Balkans, as part of an offensive against Sulla. Whatever theplan, Cinna initiated this operation in early 84, during the winter months, in order to utilize time in thebest waypossible. Atfirst, this proved satisfactory, for theinitial group of soldiers hada safe voyage across the sea. A late winter storm hit the following group, however, and only some of that force reached the other side alive. These troops mutinied, fleeing homeward any way they could. The difficult voyage apparently frightened the rawrecruits.11 This mutinous spirit soon spread throughout therest of theCinnan army then encamped at Ancona;12 they nowrefused to make the crossing at all. Cinna did not brook this insubordination and so summoned the troops to assembly in order to severely reprimand them and restore discipline. A distinctly tense atmosphere pervaded this meeting, for the menwere equally angry with their commander. Perhaps some of them had succumbed to Sulla’s insidious message, others to the subversions of Pompey; most were probably afraid of anyhard soldiering andlacked the discipline to comply with Cinna’s plans. To attribute the incident to Cinna’s military inexperience anduninspiring leadership (as some scholars have done) is notacceptable in light of Cinna’s previous career. To accept Plutarch’s view that the , would also miss the mark; thewicked tyrant” army hadlong hated Cinna, “ one would be falling in with the frequent hostile labelling Plutarch uses to describe Cinna. The presence of fomenters of rebellion, like Pompey, and the army’s refusal to fight Sulla, andfear are quite plausible causes of the mutiny.13

11 App. BC. 1.77; Livy. Per. 83; Badian (1962b): 57; Konrad (1994): 76 agrees; also Frier (1972): 593; cf. Balsdon (1965): 232; also Brunt (1971a): 441; Bennett, p. 60; and Keaveney (1982b): 508; (1982d): 115 n. 17; Gabba (1958): 206. 12 See sources in n. 13. Only DVI. 69.4 names the place. 2 says that Cinna was killed by a centurion with 13 App. BC. 1.78; Plut. Pomp. 5.1– noble purpose (!) andhe believed that Pompey’s disappearance from the army and the suspicion that Cinna was responsible spurred on the rebellion; Exup. 29 Z implies that Cinna’s cruelty motivated the episode. Gabba (1958): 209; similarly, Bulst, p. 324; so Badian (1958a): 242; (1970b): 19; (1962b): 58; Bennett, p. 60; cf. 117; cf. Frier (1972): 593. See Keaveney (1982b): 508; (1987): 185; (1982d): 115– 60. Appendix, nn. 23, 49–

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As Cinna approached his tribunal,

walking amidst the troops andguided by his lictors, one of the soldiers got in the way. A lictor struck the man andwashimself struck in return. Cinna promptly ordered the arrest of the soldier, which aroused more mutinous behavior. Stones were cast at Cinna and his lictors and daggers drawn in the ensuing melée. According to the ancient sources, Cinna tried to escape butwasstopped andstabbed to death by some of his men.14 So ended the meteoric career of Cinna. In a moment, amidst rash, hotheaded, young fighters, the coalition of forces which he had put together lost its leader. No political goal was behind this, no strategy. It was, indeed, a senseless murder. Moreover, what happened to Cinna surely disturbed Carbo. In order to hold on to the troops and avoid further incident, he ordered the recall of the force in Liburnia, thus cancelling the expedition. Still, Carbo didnotwant to return to Rome andstop or delay therecruiting, but the tribunes demanded his presence in order to hold elections for a suffect consul to replace Cinna.15 This little piece of evidence demonstrates howthe Roman system continued to function despite all the crises of those years. It also reveals howdivided the government wasregarding its immediate goals andstrategic needs. Whenhe wascompelled to return, Carbo didall he could to hamper the peace negotiations, says Livy. His survival and the survival of the other followers of Cinna demanded this course of action. First, though the Senate deterred him from securing hostages from all over Italy in an attempt to guarantee loyalty against Sulla, they could not stop Carbo from continuing recruitment drives. A large army, not a vague peace settlement with Sulla, would afford the best protection for the Cinnans. Second, Carbo and his associates even went so far as to propose thedisbanding of all armies (theirs andSulla’s) in order to secure peace. As a matter of fact, Carbo persuaded the Senate to ratify this proposal. He undoubtedly realized that certain senators would not give uptheir efforts at peace andthat Sulla would not disarm. His proposal, then, would have had the two-fold effect of pleasing the senatorial “peace party”and of revealing Sulla’s intentions for what they truly were. So, we see not panick in Carbo’s actions after Cinna’s death, but a strategy to unite Italy against Sulla, build up a larger, more loyal army, andcounter Sulla’s propaganda.16

2; Crass. 6.1; Sert. 6.1; Vell. 2.24.5; Exup. 29 Z; 14 App. BC. 1.78; Plut. Pomp. 5.1– DVI. 69.4; Oros. 5.19.24; Lippold, p. 433; Gabba (1958): 209; Frier (1972): 593– 594; and Konrad (1994): 76. 15 App. BC. 1.78; Gabba (1958): 209, 211; cf. Keaveney (1982b): 508; (1987): 185; Brunt (1971a): 441 suggests Scipio’s army of two legions was also recalled and 595, 598; cf. absorbed into Carbo’s; Badian (1962b): 58, 60; Frier (1972): 594– 324. Bulst, pp. 322– 16 Livy. Per. 84; Gabba (1958): 210; cf. Badian (1958a): 243; (1962b): 58; cf. Bulst,

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II

Of course, by this time, Sulla hadreceived news from his envoys at Brundisium that Cinna was dead; they basically broke off negotiations, with Sulla’s full approval. Henowmadeready to embark his sizable army for the voyage of vengeance, hoping to take advantage of the unsettled political scene in Italy.17 In the meantime, the augurs, because of bad omens, repeatedly prorogued the electoral assembly for Carbo’s suffect colleague until they finally set the date after the summer solstice (June 21/22, 84 B.C.). Yet we must conclude that no election wasever held to fill Cinna’s place, because the preponderance of our evidence indicates that Carbo remained consul sine collega.18 Carbo disappears fromAppian’s narrative at this time, to reappear early in the next year, 83, as proconsul in Cisalpine Gaul; he hadprobably left Rome to continue building uphis forces. Wemaypresume that he hadreturned to Rome, though, perhaps in the fall of 84, to preside over the election of consuls for the following year. We may speculate endlessly as to whyCarbo didnot try immediately for a third consulship himself, but as proconsul he did maintain his military position andauthority as leader of the Cinnans; the sources nowspeak of Carbo’s faction. Norbanus andScipio Asiagenes wonthe consular elections. According to Appian, these two menwere driven by a passionate hatred for Sulla as great as Carbo’s. Despite this testimony, some scholars have insisted that other motives were at work. They argue that Carbo hadlost his grip on the government; that the people elected these menas “moderates” .19 Yetthechoice of thenewconsuls should notsurprise. C. Norbanus may , as Konrad suggests, buthecertainly hadmilitary have been a “non-entity” experience andqualifications for consular office. Born c. 129/128, a new man(perhaps from Latin Norba), perhaps even a newcitizen, Norbanus had served as tribune of theplebs in 103, whenhebrought thefamous maiestas charge against Caepio for his blunders atArausio. Asquaestor in 101or 99, he assisted M. Antonius the Orator in his governorship of Cilicia. Norba596; Salmon (1964): 72; 323; Keaveney (1984): 137; Frier (1972): 594– pp. 322– (1967): 380. 596. 17 App. BC. 1.79; Gabba (1958): 211; Frier (1972): 594– 18 App. BC. 1.78; Gabba (1958): 209; Bulst, p. 324; Frier (1972): 596. Sulla probably didnotrecord inhismemoirs anyof whatAppian describes here. Appian’s information must come through Livy from Sisenna or an annalist who consulted and preserved official records from Rome. 244; (1962b): 19 App. BC. 1.82. Gabba (1958): 134, 213, 218; Badian (1958a): 243– 59; cf. Bulst, p. 324; cf. Frier (1972): 598.

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nus’praetorship andpropraetorship in Sicily during the Social Wardidhim credit as well. It has been suggested that he remained governor there with the full approval of the Cinnans. Norbanus had proved himself an able

military man and a strong politician of the popularis persuasion. His previous career andhis later actions showhima staunch opponent of Sulla and a firm supporter of the Cinnan regime; indeed, Norbanus went into voluntary exile rather than compromise or surrender long before his name even appeared on the proscription lists.20 Hiscolleague, Scipio Asiagenes, wasthe great-grandson of the general who had defeated Antiochus III at Magnesia. Certainly, he came from distinguished patrician lineage. Scipio mayhave served as legate during the Social War, andhe fought as a pro-magistrate in Macedonia, Illyria, and Thrace after 85 B.C., sent by Cinna. Like Norbanus, Scipio was also prepared to fight Sulla andwasonly forced to negotiate because of his troops. Appian even suspected that he colluded with Sertorius in an attempt to wreck the negotiations, though they seem genuine enough. According to Plutarch, the desertion of his army at Teanum didnotdissuade Scipio from raising newforces andbriefly resuming theconflict. Hisname appeared on the first proscription list along with the other top Cinnans, andSulla used the defeat of Scipio as the point of noreturn after which resisters would be severely punished. No where is it attested that Scipio had anypopularis leanings or radical political ideas or connections. So, why would he cooperate with Carbo’s government? It hasbeen suggested that Scipio sought simply to defend the Republic against Sulla. Wemust note well that Scipio raised a new army in order to continue fighting, despite his release from Sulla ongoodterms. Hecould have fled or deserted to Sulla. Perhaps hefelt such action wasfruitless anddangerous orthat warwith Sulla wasunavoidable. Perhaps he acted outof a sense of duty to State andoath. Whatever his reason, Scipio’s loyalty was long-lasting, as was Norbanus’, and the evi.21 dence does not suggest that either of them were “ moderates”

29; RE s.v. “Norbanus”#5; Cic. De Or. 2.197; Off. 20 See below; Ch. 4, nn. 28– 86, 343– 599; Badian (1964a): 84– 2.14.49; Konrad (1994): 78; Frier (1972): 598– 47; cf. Evans 344; (1957): loc. cit.; Wiseman (1971): 158; Gruen (1966): 43– 527. 128; David, pp. 525– (1987): 121– The denarius of C. Norbanus, the sonof theconsul in 83 B.C., contains symbols that most clearly refer to imperium on land andsea (thefasces andship’s prow), health and prosperity (the caduceus), and abundance (the ear of grain). Perhaps these reflect a combination of wishful thinking onthepart of theCinnans andanassertion of will anddetermination against the menacing Sullan army. See Crawford (1974): 78, 731; Luce (1968): 37; Rowland, p. 412. 21 See Ch. 4, n. 71; RE s.v. “Cornelius”#338; MRR 2.54, 58, 61; Konrad (1994): 79; 85; Cic. Quinct. 24; Sest. 7; Brut. 175; Phil. 13.2; Att. 9.15.2; App. BC. 1.41, 82–

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Although Velleius praised Sulla for never hiding his hatred of the Cinnans, Appian believed that Sulla concealed his true feelings as he returned to Italy. Perhaps this was also part of the general’s propaganda campaign. Yet, as Appian notes, this secret vengeance was no secret to the people inRome, who, realizing full well that Sulla’s victory would be more destructive than his first march on Rome, now united behind the con-suls Scipio and Norbanus.22 The peaceful solution so long sought no longer appeared feasible: Sulla hadbroken off negotiations, washeading to Italy with a fearsome army, andCarbo andhis comrades prepared for a major peace party”at Rome, struggle. Not surprisingly, we hear no more of a “ even though its leaders, such as L. Valerius Flaccus, were probably still around. Instead, the Senate, fearing the anger of Sulla andthe dangers that would arise from theoutbreak of hostilities, decreed that theconsuls should take care lest the State come to anyharm. This is theformal language of the senatus consultum ultimum, which oursource, Exuperantius, must be quoting straight from Sallust’s account, whoin turn would have done so from official records.23 The decree of the Senate spurred the consuls into action in the winter andspring of 83. All means were employed to counter thethreat from Sulla, including the summoning of menandfinancial support from the peoples of proper”subordinate commanders, those Italy as well as the selection of “ who had demonstrated diligence in military matters; among these was Q. Sertorius, who was probably Scipio’s legate.24 Norbanus and Scipio, together with Carbo, levied an army from the City itself, joined it with the forces from Italy (primarily northern and central), and divided it among themselves. About one hundred thousand mencomprised the army at first, which was “ considerably augmented”later, says Appian. This meant they had a two to one superiority in numbers over Sulla, who yet had the

3; Sert. 6.1; Rab. Perd. 21; Diod. 38.16; Livy. Per. 85; Flor. 2.9.18; Plut. Sull. 28.1– 81; Sumner (1973): 104 Pomp. 7.3; Vell. 2.25.2.; CIL I p. 60a; Badian (1964a): 80– gives his dates as 130?– ? B.C., pr. 86; Frier (1972): 600; Keaveney (1984): 144 n. 204. Fragments of the augural lists at Rome tell us that Scipio wasdisplaced from this office (which he held from 88), perhaps by Sulla himself, in the late 80s. See ILS 9338; Sumner above; Badian (1968b): 31,38; Martin, p. 43; cf. Frier (1969): 191–192. 509 22 App. BC. 1.81; Bulst, p. 324; Harris (1971): 255; Keaveney (1982b): 508– displays a positive relationship between Sulla andtheItalians; cf. Frier (1972): 598; 382. 74; (1967): 380– Salmon (1964): 70– 23 Exup. 43 Z; Gabba (1958): 217; Badian (1968b): 40; Bulst, p. 324; Keaveney (1987): 187; (1982a): 131; Frier (1972): 586 dates to late 83. 79; Sumner (1973): 108; Spann, pp. 24 App. BC. 1.81; Exup. 44 Z; Konrad (1994): 77– 228; Badian (1962b): 58. 64; Gabba (1958): 227– 33; Katz (1983): 63– 32–

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of a more experienced, battle-hardened force. Still, the goodwill (ε ὔ ν ο ια , says Appian) of people in Italy lay for the most part with Carbo’s side; manyfeared andhated Sulla for again marching onhisownhomeland, realized what harm he wascapable of, andexpected nothing good from his victory. More importantly, Appian recognized that a variety of motives, partisanship, self-interest and self-preservation, guilt, and defense of the Respublica, impelled Romans andItalians to oppose Sulla. Even Plutarch, whose portrait of the hero can be overly favorable at times, acknowledged the goodwill and enormous Italian resources available to the Cinnans as well as Sulla’s quite understandable apprehension at theprospect of having to fight against so much of Italy.25 advantage

III During the last months of 84 andthe beginning of 83, most of Sulla’s land army passed through Thessaly and Macedonia to Dyracchium, while he travelled there by ship around the southern coast of Greece; he now had over a thousand ships. Hismenvoluntarily swore anoath to remain faithful

25 App. BC. 1.82; Plut. Sull. 27.4, 28.1; Amp. 42.3; Flor. 2.9.18; Vell. 2.24.3. Calabi, 222. 275; and Gabba (1958): 213, 221– 300; also Valgiglio (1975): 274– pp. 295– Theclear similarities insubstance inthe accounts of Plutarch, Livy, Appian, Florus, and Velleius suggest that the memoirs of Sulla underlie all their military narratives

of 83 B.C. Yet there is a discrepancy in tone between the Livian and Velleian versions, on the one hand, andthose of Plutarch, Appian, andFlorus, on the other; the latter all seem to have hadsuspicions about Sulla’s real intentions, methods, and goals. Some of this mayhave come from a source other than the memoirs; some of their ownobservations mayappear here. Asto the strength of Cinnan forces, Appian gives thefigure of twohundred cohorts, or one hundred thousand men, while Plutarch, citing Sulla’s own memoirs, says fifteen commanders with four hundred fifty cohorts (i.e., 225,000 menor forty-five legions); Florus records the outrageous figure of fifty-eight legions (eight legions and five hundred cohorts) on the Cinnan side; Velleius says Sulla faced a Cinnan army of over two hundred thousand, or about forty legions; Gabba (1958): 212; 382; Badian (1962b): 73; (1967): 380– 599; Salmon (1964): 72– Frier (1972): 598– 59. I follow Brunt (1971a): 442–443, whointerprets Florus’figures as meaning two consular armies of four legions each (= eight legions), plus additional Cinnan forces, all amounting to a total of five hundred cohorts. Sulla’s memoirs, as recorded by Plutarch and Velleius, hadnoted some such number, which could not be accurate for 83 B.C., but possibly for the years 83 and 82 combined. We should compare these figures with Appian’s two hundred cohorts, which includes the armies of Scipio andNorbanus andthe levies of Carbo (perhaps anadditional eight to ten legions). Thus, the figures of Plutarch, Florus, and Velleius, all of which derive ultimately from Sulla’s memoirs, reflect Cinnan forces by 82, while Appi-

an’s thearmy in 83.

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to him, no matter what should occur.26 Sulla landed at Brundisium in 83, where the townspeople warmly welcomed him.27 Marching toward Rome along the Via Appia, Sulla was met first by Metellus Pius,28 later by young Pompey. Each of these menbrought fresh forces with them.29 Appian mentions nothing about the attitude of the locals (other than the Brundisians) toward Sulla, but he apparently met no resistance in south-

26 Plut. Sull. 27.1; cf. App. BC. 1.79; see also Sall. Hist. 1.28 McG with McGushin, p. 99; Plut. Sull. 27.3 records the oath of Sulla’s men as well as their financial contributions to Sulla, which he refused to accept. All this seems odd considering thewealth hehadreceived fromMithridates. Plutarch also notes Sulla’s fear that his menmight desert once back in Italy; perhaps this motivated the oath. According to Vell. 2.24.3, Sulla brought thirty thousand men, or about five legions. According to Appian, Sulla hadfive legions andsix thousand cavalry, plus forces from Greece,

442 agrees with Appian; Gabba i.e., about forty thousand men. Brunt (1971a): 441– (1958): 210, 212; Keaveney (1982a): 125; Frier (1972): 598. 27 For the date, see Livy. Per. 85; Diod. 38.6; Vell. 2.24.3 and App. BC. 1.79, 1.84 name Brundisium; the latter dates his arrival to the 174th Olympiad; Plut. Sull. 27.4 mentions Tarentum, perhaps his first major stop on the Via Appia; Gabba (1958): 509; (1987): 187; Frier 212, 222; Konrad (1994): 75; Keaveney (1982b): 508– (1972): 585, 598; Harris (1971): 254. 28 On Metellus, see Dio. 30/35.106.1; Plut. Mor. 806D; App. BC. 1.80 says he still had 59; (1970b): 19; Spann, p. 35; Gabba the rank of proconsul; Badian (1962b): 58– (1958): 214, 216; Keaveney (1982a): 131; Frier (1972): 597. Another refugee, M. Licinius Crassus, hadprobably joined Sulla before the latter’s crossing from Greece. This is what Plutarch implies when speaking of Crassus as one of the “young men with Sulla,”presumably on the trip over. See Plut. Crass. 6.2.3; MRR 2.65; Ward, p. 61; Marshall (1976): 13; Badian (1962b): 53; Brunt (1971a): 442 suggests that Metellus and Crassus contributed two or three legions altogether.

29 On Pompey, see Diod. 38.9. According to App. BC. 1.80, Pompey, because of his family’s influence in Picenum, successfully recruited at first one legion, then two more, from that area; so also Livy. Per. 85, reporting his capture of Asculum; Dio. 30/35.107.1 explains that Pompey left the Cinnan side out of anger andgathered a small band from Picenum; Plut. Pomp. 6 more fully discusses Pompey’s connecbest” elements among thePicentines were tions andmotives andalso notes that the“ joining Sulla already. Many rejected the recruiting agents of Carbo andjoined the twenty-three year old agitator. Hetook over Auximum from the duoviri there, two brothers named Ventidius whowere partisans of Carbo, andraised a regular army of three legions. He repeated this in other Picentine towns, driving out the Cinnans from the area. Then, slowly and with as much destruction to the enemy side as possible, Pompey marched tojoin Sulla. Pomp. 7 and8 make outthat he metSulla after defeating other forces, but this better belongs in 82 B.C. See Brunt (1971a): 8; Keav55; Seager (1979): 7– 442; Gabba (1958): 215; VanOoteghem (1954): 52– 597; Rawson 119; Frier (1972): 593, 596– 144; (1982d): 118– eney (1984): 138– (1978): 133, 148. Others deserted Rome to join Sulla at this time, including Cornelius Cethegus; see Sumner (1973): 106, who says Cethegus switched in 83; Gabba andFrier above.

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eastern Italy. It is especially surprising that the old allies of Cinna, the fearsome Samnites, through whose territory Sulla hadto march, didnothing to hinder his progress. Perhaps we can explain this as the fruit born by Sulla’s propaganda, especially his famous letter in which he assured the newcitizens that they hadnothing to fear from his return. For a while, many Italians would sit back andwatch to see howin fact Sulla would behave.30 In the meantime, the Cinnan commanders hadtaken uptheir respective positions: Carbo in charge of Cisalpine Gaul andnorthern Italy, Norbanus andScipio in Campania (the former on the ViaAppia, the latter on the Via Latina). Clearly, their overall strategy wasto hold northern andcentral Italy against Sulla, while, more specifically, the consuls planned to catch Sulla in a pincer movement centering on the loyal town of Capua.31 According to Livy’s epitomator, Sulla sent envoys to discuss peace with the consul Norbanus, who“violated”these messengers. Perhaps herefused to speak to them; perhaps he hadthem stripped andflogged outof camp as Sulla haddone to Sulpicius’envoys five years before. Atanyrate, theresult was an open battle between the consul’s army and Sulla’s; the former was defeated. Plutarch and Velleius place this encounter near Capua at Mt. Tifata.32 Norbanus lost about a legion of menwhile Sulla lost only seventy, though he had many wounded. Howmuch these figures can be trusted is

30 Vell. 2.25.1 records howSulla seemed to be a bringer of peace because he marched

31

32

through Calabria and Apulia without incident or resistance and without inflicting punitive measures on the local inhabitants. He regarded this as the outcome of Sulla’s just intentions, especially in comparison with the “wicked”men in Rome; 509; (1987): 186–187; Gabba (1958): 222; Keaveney (1982a): 130; (1982b): 508– 598; cf. Harris (1971): 255, who is not so positive (1976): 96; Frier (1972): 597– 382. 74; (1967): 381– about Sulla; Salmon (1964): 73– 81; Gabba (1958): 218, 222. Note that Frier (1972): 600 n. 76; Konrad (1994): 80– Capua waspromoted to the status of Roman colony in this same year by a bill of M. Brutus (tr. pl. 83) withtheduoviri L. Considius andSex. Saltius. Capua wassingled out because many “pro-Marian”families came from there, such as the Granii, Laetorii, Magii, Guttae, Rubrii Varrones, andInsteii. See Cic. Leg. agr. 2.89, 92– 129. 93, 98; MRR 2.63; Gabba (1976): 56; Frederiksen, pp. 107– Vell. 2.25.2,4; Plut. Sull. 27.5; see Keaveney (1982a): 131; Spann, p. 35; App. BC. 1.84 apparently thought that the battle took place at Casilinum (corrupted in the text to Canusium in Apulia); see Gabba (1958): 223. Perhaps Appian’s “corruption”has some evidentiary value because it is widely believed that Metellus met Sulla in Apulia, so perhaps at Canusium. In this case, Appian simply conflated the battle between Sulla and Norbanus and the meeting of Sulla and Metellus; Flor. 2.9.19 places the battle at the river Volturnus, which runs through Casilinum andnorth of ; so IG XIV.1297.4; non longe a Capua” Mt. Tifata; Eut. 5.7.4 places the battle “ Oros. 5.20.2; Plut. Sull. 27.6, Obs. 57, and App. BC. 1.83; Lippold, p. 433; Brunt 443 estimates that Norbanus hadthe same number of menas Scipio; (1971a): 442–

Frier (1972): 599. See n. 34.

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debatable as they almost definitely come from Sulla’s biased memoirs. Apparently, Norbanus hadno choice but to withdraw to Capua, where he was temporarily placed under siege by Sulla.33 After the defeat of Norbanus, the other consul, Scipio Asiagenes, continued to advance south along theViaLatina against Sulla andMetellus, his army in lowspirits, probably because of thenewsfromCapua, anddesirous of peace. No doubt they feared what had happened to Norbanus’ army would also happen to them. On the other hand, according to Plutarch, Sulla’s victory encouraged andindeed completely convinced hisowntroops to remain loyal to their general rather than return to their homes; they refused to desert him. Sulla himself recognized the significance of the battle at Tifata in his memoirs; from that success onward, he hadfull confidence in his men.34 Meanwhile, Sulla had somehow learned of the enemy army’s demoralized state andhoped to take advantage of it; so, he made peace overtures to Scipio in anattempt to remove the consul andhis army without bloodshed; the armies were encamped in the territory between Cales andTeanum.35 Appian tells us that hostages were exchanged as security of good faith and that only three representatives from each side participated in the conference, presumably Sulla and Scipio themselves and probably Metellus and Sertorius.36 According to Exuperantius, Sertorius recognized the dangers inherent in fraternization among the troops during the truce and wholeheartedly disapproved of these discussions. Wecan understand whywhen weconsider their outcome.37

33 App. BC. 1.84 says six thousand menwere killed andMetellus wasinvolved also;

cf. Plut. Sull. 27.5 (seven thousand killed); so Eut. 5.7.4 and Oros. 5.20.2, who further record six thousand captured, but one hundred twenty-four lost by Sulla; Lippold, p. 433; Gabba (1958): 223; also Brunt (1971a): 442; Frier (1972): 599. 34 App. BC. 1.85; Livy. Per. 85; Vell. 2.25.2; Plut. Sull. 27.6 on the aftermath of 3 reports that Scipio had forty cohorts, i.e. four legions; Sert. 6.3; Tifata; 28.1– 443 proposes Scipio hadtwo Bulst, p. 326; Konrad (1994): 83; Brunt (1971a): 442– Roman andtwoItalian legions; Keaveney (1982a): 131; Frier (1972): 599. 33. Appian places Sulla and Metellus near Teanum, while 35 See sources in nn. 32– Cic. Phil. 12.27 between Cales andTeanum; Konrad (1994): 80. Teanum Sidicinum

is about nineteen miles northwest of Capua, Cales eleven miles northwest of Capua

224; Bulst, p. 325; Keaveney andseven miles south of Teanum; Gabba (1958): 223– 600. (1982a): 132; Frier (1972): 599– 36 App. BC. 1.85; Konrad (1994): 83; Frier (1972): 600. 37 Exup. 45 Z; also Dio. 30/35.107.2–3 records what appears to be Sertorius’speech to the troops against Sulla andScipio’s negotiations with him; Plut. Sert. 6.3 reports that Sertorius warned Scipio about the dangers with Sulla, but was unable to convince him, a familiar motif in this Life; Sall. Hist. 1.81 McG must also refer to ; McGushin, pp. 161–162; the fraternization of forces “against his [Sertorius’] will”

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Cicero characterized theconference asa discussion of laws, citizenship, and the authority of the Senate and People of Rome.38 In other words, the major issues of the recent civil war period were being considered. Scipio probably wanted to know whether Sulla would truly respect the rights of citizenship recently acquired by the Italians as well as the instructions of the present Senate, or simply disregard all that in an effort to regain his position at Rome. On the other hand, Sulla no doubt expressed the same concerns that he had in his letter to the Senate, especially his belief that the present administration in Rome lacked anylegitimacy. Under such circumstances, it should not surprise us that more than one conference took place, as Plutarch informs us, or that the negotiations dragged on.39 Although Cicero asserted that the meetings were not marked by violence or the threat of violence, he believed Sulla acted in bad faith. For peace with Scipio Sulla only pretended to make” “ .40Sulla purposely dragged outthe discussions so that his mencould fraternize with theenemy andwin many of them over to Sulla by a variety of methods. Like Cicero, Appian, Plutarch, Diodorus, and Exuperantius consistently portrayed Sulla’s attempt at peace with Scipio as merely a pretext for gaining control of the enemy army by treachery. There is no reason to doubt this view.41 Scipio apparently knew nothing of Sulla’s scheme, for which Appian severely castigates him, and while the armistice continued under false pretences, Scipio dispatched Sertorius to Norbanus, who was apparently still at or near Capua. It is difficult to tell whether any agreement hadyet been reached, though Sulla later proclamed as much for his propaganda purposes. Sertorius probably had orders to inform the other consul about the progress of the negotiations.42 Instead of heading directly to Capua along the Via Latina, however, Sertorius proceeded westward with his small force about ten miles to the

38 39 40

41 42

37, 44; Rawson (1979): 337; Konrad (1994): 80, 82; Scardigli Spann, pp. 36– (1971): 46– 58. We can only assume that Sallust 47. See Appendix, nn. 23, 57– found a pro-Sertorian source for the episode. 7; Bulst, p. 325; Keaveney (1982a): 133–134; Frier Cic. Phil. 12.27, 13.2; Font. 6– 256. Cicero probably acquired his understanding of (1972): 600; Biscardi, pp.254– the talks either from Metellus or some sort of oral tradition. Plut. Sull. 28.3. Cic. Phil. 13.2; Schol. Bob. p. 126 St on Sest. 7: “conloquiam fraudulentem”; Gabba (1958): 224. 300; See App. BC. 1.85; Exup. 45 Z; Diod. 38.16; Plut. Sull. 28.3; Calabi, pp. 295– ; cf. even Flor. 2.9.20 is critical: Scipio was “overwhelmed after hopes of peace” Frier (1972): 601; Dowling, p. 321. App. BC. 1.85; if. 1.95; Konrad (1994): 81; Gabba (1958): 224 and (1976): 137; Frier (1972): 600.

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town of Suessa, which hadrecently voiced favor for Sulla. Possibly, Sulla had instigated the incident in an effort to surround Scipio. Still, when Sertorius captured the town, it constituted a breach of the truce with Sulla, whobrandished this act as a sign of Scipio’s badfaith. The consul respondedby returning the hostages Sulla hadsent to him, and, in this way, called off the negotiations. Appian gives as possible reasons for Scipio’s reaction either mental confusion or complicity with Sertorius. More probably, the consul, having been compelled by his mento negotiate in the first place, nowfound himself equally compelled by Sulla’s accusation to endthe talks. But theconsul’s armyreacted against whatthey sawastheblatant treachery of Scipio andSertorius andsecretly conspired with Sulla to desert, which they did. Scipio was captured in his owncommand tent. Perhaps out of respect for theconsul’s ancient anddistinguished lineage, Sulla ordered his cavalry to escort Scipio andhis sonsafely outof their camp andto set them free.43 According to Appian, following his absorption of Scipio’s army, Sulla turned once again toward Capua andNorbanus. Yet the latter hadsomehow escaped Sulla’s small besieging force with the remnants of his army. Sulla tried to open negotiations through messengers but they received no response whatsoever from the consul. Appian records two possible reasons for Sulla’s continued attempts at peace: either he feared the rising upof Italy against him if he destroyed Norbanus or he hoped to dupe the consul as he had Scipio. The latter is well-taken. Norbanus, however, had learned much about Sulla’s tactics from the demise of his colleague andso firmly refused to communicate with Sulla or allow his troops to come into close contact with Sulla’s men. Sulla retaliated by laying waste the territory held by the enemy in the vicinity of Capua, andNorbanus for his part left that area andemployed similar tactics along the route he thought Sulla might follow to Rome.44

43 See Appian (most detailed), Plutarch, andExuperantius onthedesertion of Scipio’s army; Eut. 5.7.4 states that Sulla accepted in surrender Scipio’s army before any battle andwithout bloodshed; Sall. Hist. 1.29 McGconfirms Appian regarding the actions of Scipio’s troops and provides evidence on their discussion of terms for

joining Sulla; Brunt (1971a): 442; Frier (1972): 601; Keaveney (1982b): 509; (1982a): 134. Only App. BC. 1.85– 86 reports the Suessa incident and notes that Scipio’s son Lucius was with his father; see Diod. 38.16 on cavalry escort; Vell. 2.25.4 records also the capture andrelease of Sertorius; see Konrad (1994): 81; but 37, who does not believe this story. On Sertorius’ sabotage, cf. Spann, pp. 36– 162; Keaveney (1982a): 134; cf. Konrad does not accept McGushin, pp. 99, 161– 47. this; similarly, Gabba (1958): 224; but Frier, p. 600; Scardigli (1971): 46– 44 App. BC. 1.86; Keaveney (1982a): 135; Gabba (1958): 225; cf. Frier (1972): 600– 601. Sulla wintered near Teanum andlater continued onthe Via Latina.

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While Norbanus and Scipio had the task of stopping Sulla’s advance, the proconsul Carbo operated in Gallia Cisalpina with the primary mission of raising troops for Rome’s defense.45 No doubt he was responsible for guaranteeing the northern front against any possible Sullan sympathizers (perhaps C. Valerius Flaccus from Gaul). Carbo’s presence innorthern Italy explains Appian’s statement: Carbo was not in Rome when he heard the news from Campania and quickly returned to Rome to arrange for the declaration as hostes of Metellus Pius, Pompey, and other Roman aristocrats who hadjoined Sulla; this took place in July of 83 B.C.46 It seems that by mid-summer, both sides hadbroken off hostilities and begun a considerable recruiting drive that consumed the rest of the year. The Cinnan leaders gathered more forces from towns andpeoples loyal to , while Sulla and them, which Appian refers to as the “ major part of Italy” his legates tried various means to increase their manpower as well. Diodorusdescribes theplight of many places in Italy that were subjected to agents from both sides and “harsh tests”of loyalty. Eventually, this repeated pressure revealed the allegiance of many Italian communities andthe fear andindecision of many more.47 Generally, the Latins, Etrurians, Umbrians, Cisalpine Gauls, Campanians, Lucanians, andSamnites contributed to the Cinnan army, while Apulians and Calabrians sent troops to Sulla, with whom they made a treaty to guarantee their citizenship.48 Many Picentines

45 Cic. 2 Verr. 1.34– 35; App. BC. 1.82; Gabba (1958): 226. Appian records no precise notices of Carbo’s activities as a prorogued magistrate at this time; Brunt (1971a): 443 assumes that Carbo retained theeight to tenlegions raised byhimself andCinna in 84. 46 Plut. Sull. 27.6; also Obs. 57. Only App. BC. 1.86 mentions this decree anddates it to summer; Gabba (1958): 227; Frier (1972): 586. The date of the fire may come from Sulla himself or from religious archives at Rome. 443 suggests that Sulla’s army 47 App.BC. 1.86; Diod. 38/39.13; Brunt (1971a): 442– numbered about fifteen legions bythe winter of 83/82, while theCinnans hadabout 228. twenty; Gabba (1958): 227– 48 Z, dux Sertorius raised forty cohorts from the loyal 48 According to Exup. 46– Etrurians in late 83 B.C., some of whom he later took to Spain; Gabba (1958): 227; 150; Konrad (1994): 84; Spann, p. 135, 148– (1976): 97–102; Rawson (1978): 134– 532; (1987): 513, 516– 136; (1982b): 512– 35; Bulst, p. 326; Keaveney (1982a): 135– 70; (1967): 256; Salmon (1964): 68– 187; Frier (1972): 602; Harris (1971): 254– 247. Assigned the task of raising 380, 389; (1982): 131; Badian (1958a): 242– 378– an army from among the Marsi for Sulla, Crassus “forced his way resolutely 3; MRR 2.65; through the enemy”and accomplished his objective: Plut. Crass.6.2– 14; Ward, p. 62; Letta, pp. Gabba (1958): 228; (1976): 96; Marshall (1976): 13– 296. Here fits thereference inLivy. Per. 86 to the 108; Keaveney (1981): 292– 107– foedus that Sulla concluded with some Italian peoples. See McGushin, p. 99 on Apulia andthe treaty andp. 100 on Etruria andCisalpine Gaul; Harris (1971): 233, 602; Bulst, p. 327; Keaveney (1982b): 514; Pfiffig, pp. 141– 255; Frier, pp. 601–

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also contributed to Sulla’s cause, especially after Pompey raised a personal army of clients from the region in defiance of Carbo’s recruiters andlocal

leaders well-disposed to Carbo’s government.49 Carbo’s legates did not sit idly by while young Pompey did this. Instead, three of them, C. Carrinas, T. Clouilius, andL. Junius Brutus Damasippus, set out to surround Pompey’s forces with an equal, or probably greater, number of their own. But the young manrevealed himself to be superior as a strategist anda boldcommander. Hiscavalry routed Damasippus’force, which in turn led to the general collapse of the enemy army. Unable to agree ontactics, Carrinas andClouilius withdrew, andeven more Picentines threw in their lot with Pompey.50 Yet Pompey’s position was not yet free and clear. Scipio, while still consul, attempted to prevent Pompey’s march tojoin Sulla; Scipio’s legate Sertorius had raised a newforce of four legions from Etruria. We are not informed as to where the battle took place. Plutarch only tells us that the armies were about to engage when Scipio’s troops deserted to the enemy. History indeed repeated itself, though this time the reason goes unrecorded. Twice abandoned and humiliated, Scipio fled Italy for southern Gaul. Pompey continued his maneuvers.51

IV

The Cinnan defense hadweakened in 83 B.C. Norbanus hadbeen defeated in battle; Scipio hadbeen abandoned by his army; Pompey hadwrenched Picenum from Carbo’s grasp as the latter’s legates andtheir forces proved themselves disunited andweak-willed. Even Sertorius, disgusted with the newleadership for 82 andwhat he sawas the incompetent fumbling of the 384 and see Strab. 5.4.11; App. BC. 77 and (1967): 382– 142; Salmon (1964): 74– 41. See Frier (1972): 602– 42, esp. 40– 94; Plut. Sull. 29.1; Martin, pp.37– 1.87, 93– 106. 603 on Sulla’s use of coins for propaganda in this war; also Ramage, pp. 102– Perhaps late in 83 orearly in 82 B.C., some Romans whohadpreviously cooperated with the Cinnans deserted to Sulla’s side, suchas Philippus, Verres, andOfella. See 38; Vell. 2.27.6; App. BC. 1.88; Plut. Sert. 6.2; Livy. Per. 86; Cic. 2 Verr. 1.34– 72; Konrad (1994): 79; Keaveney (1984): 139–143; Badian (1962b): MRR 2.67, 70– 107. 233; Sumner (1973): 102, 106– 59; Gabba (1958): 232– 58– 6; Gabba (1958): 226, 230; McGushin, p. 99; Brunt (1971a): 443; 49 Plut. Pomp. 6.3– 120; Rawson (1978): 133; Seager 529; (1982d): 117– Keaveney (1982b): 512, 528– 58. (1979): 7– 9; Van Ooteghem (1954): 53– 2; Diod. 38/39.9 informs us that the Senate sent Brutus 50 MRR 2.65; Plut. Pomp. 7.1– 9; against Pompey; Gabba (1958): 226; Brunt (1971a): 443; Seager (1979): 8– 264. 120; Crawford (1974): 332; Wiseman (1967): 263– Keaveney (1982d): 118– 51 Plut. Pomp. 7.3; MRR 2.63, 65; Gabba (1958): 225; Keaveney (1982d): 119–120.

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previous year’s commanders, left Italy for his province of Spain in the winter of 83/82. Yet the Cinnan superiority in numbers remained as did, apparently, their control of most of northern andcentral Italy.52 Theconsular elections of fall 83 hadreturned Cn.Papirius Carbo for his third term in the high office and, as his colleague, young C. Marius, sonof the “seven-times consul” . WhyCarbo resumed this office is unclear. After all, he hadremained very involved in the cause as a proconsul. Moreover, as consul in 82, he didnot alter his activities andsphere of operation. Perhaps he hoped to reassure Cinna’s old supporters with a symbolic display of continuity in the supreme magistracy or reestablish a firm grip on military strategy. Perhaps he merely sought the prestige of the consulship. On the other hand, Marius the Younger did not even fulfill any of the requisite qualifications for the office: he wastoo young (only twenty-six or twentyseven) and had held neither the praetorship nor any other magistracy. Marius’ election was unconstitutional and probably an attempt to rally support andenergy with the famous family name.53 The severe winter of 83/82 prevented open conflict between the two sides; with the coming of spring, civil war promptly resumed. Sulla had enormous financial resources fromAsia andGreece with which to fund his military objectives, but the Cinnans, short of financial resources as usual, could not rely simply on contributions from their supporters. Instead, in order to payandequip his forces, young Marius, with the authorization of a senatus consultum, removed andmelted down treasure from the temples (wedonotknowwhich) to the amount of fourteen thousand pounds of gold andsix thousand of silver. As Valerius Maximus putit, “military necessity . Then, Marius andCarbo divided their forced the despoliation of the gods” military duties into two spheres of operation; the former took the southern front in Latium andCampania, while the latter continued in charge of the northern front of Cisalpine Gaul, Umbria, andEtruria.54

79, 87; Gabba 2; Konrad (1994): 77– 50 Z; Plut. Sert. 6.1– 52 See above andExup. 49– (1958): 226; Rawson (1979): 337; Spann, p. 35. 66; Appian (27), DVI, andcf. Velleius (26) give Marius’age; App. BC. 53 MRR 2.65– by violence”; Vell. 1.87; Plut. Sert. 6.1; Livy. Per. 86 says they assumed office “ 2.26.1 gives a good character sketch of young Marius; also Plut. Mar. 46.5; DVI. 68.1 matches Appian, but like Sall. Hist. 1.30 McG mentions his mother Julia’s opposition; so also Adn. super Luc. 2.134 E andComm. Bern. 2.134 U, whorefer to 7,11; Phil. 8.7, Marius as adulescentem; Eut. 5.8.1; Flor. 2.9.21; Cic. Leg agr. 3.6– 13.1; Amp.42.3 andDiod. 38/39.12 indicate that the loyalty of Italy to the Cinnans increased thanks to Marius; even retired soldiers came out to join him; Konrad 326; Gabba (1958): 245; similarly, Bulst, pp. 325– (1994): 77; Badian (1958a): 243– 79; Rawson (1979): 337; 229; Harris (1971): 254; cf. Ruoff-Väänänen, pp.78– 226– (1987): 170; McGushin, p. 100; Spann, p. 35. 54 On Sulla’s warchest, see n. 25; Ch. 4, n. 74. OnCinnan resources, see Plin. NH.

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Three broad military maneuvers dominated thestrategy of thenext nine months: first, young Marius’drive against Sulla in Latium, which concluded with the lengthy siege of Praeneste; second, Carbo’s attempt to hold on to northern and central Italy against Sulla’s legates, especially Metellus Pius and Pompey; and third, the struggle for Rome itself, ending in the Battle at the Colline Gate. Oursources identify a great battle between young Marius andSulla as thebeginning of this phase of thecivil war.Thebattle occurred at Sacriportus, whose location remains a mystery because of thevagueness andconfusion of the ancient evidence. Even the events leading upto the confrontation areunclear, andscholars, depending onwhich they find more credible, follow either the version of Appian or that of Plutarch. Appian tells us that Sulla took over the town of Setia in Latium, just north of the Via Appia. Young Marius, with about eight legions, hadbeen monitoring the area but withdrew northward to the Via Latina anda place called Sacriportus. Plutarch, on the other hand, places Sulla’s maneuvers only along the Via Latina, near Signia. Of course, Signia maybe simply a 232; Ch. 3, nn. 33.16; Val. Max. 7.6.4; Crawford (1974): 637; Frank (1933b): 231– 89. The Cinnan State still possessed enough silver in its coffers to put out a 85– considerable volume of coinage, primarily to pay its troops, butalso to promote its cause. In this connection, wemayexamine the type onthe denarius of L. Marcius Censorinus, younger brother of C. Marcius Censorinus. It hasbeendated to 82 B.C. and seems to refer mainly to family history; it also plays on the name of the moneyer. The obverse and reverse images are linked by the mythical story of Marsyas. By Late Republican times, a statue of Marsyas, probably the model for this coin type, stood in the forum Romanum next to the tribunal of the praetor peregrinus. Why it was placed there is unknown, but it seems to have become associated with the proceedings of the praetor, that is, the cases in defense of foreigners’rights; during the Empire, Marsyas came to symbolize rights of citizenship, freedom, andliberty for Roman colonies andnewcitizens. Some have argued back from this to explain the presence of Marsyas on the coin of Censorinus. Though Crawford has dismissed it as simply another Apolline story related to the Marcii, other scholars have explained the type as an assertion of arrogant defiance onthepart of theCinnan government intheface of overwhelming oddsanda call to those Italic peoples, like the Marsi, whohadlong revered Marsyas. This fits best with what weknowof theCinnan government in 82 B.C. See Hor. Sat. 1.6.120; Ov. 9; Sen. Ben. 6.32; Met. 6.382; Paus. 10.30.9; Plin. NH. 3.12.108, 15.78, 21.6.8– MRR 2.588, 3.138; Crawford, pp. 375, 710; Luce (1968): 38; Rowland, pp. 413, 417; Letta, pp. 107–108. 78; Gabba (1958): 229; On the war fronts, see App. BC. 1.87; Konrad (1994): 77– 444 regarding evidence McGushin, p. 100. Note thecautions of Brunt (1971a): 443– on 82. Heestimates a southern army of at most twenty-three legions under Marius andSamnite leaders anda northern army of about twenty-two under Carbo at the beginning of the year; Salmon (1964): 77; (1967): 385.

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textual error or the author’s confusion for Setia, or vice versa. Sulla had spent the winter of 83/82 recruiting support in southern Italy from a base of operations probably onthe Via Latina, andMarius’prime objective wasno doubt to stop Sulla’s advance along that route to Rome. We may then incline toward Plutarch’s version rather thanAppian’s. It is hard to believe, however, that Sulla himself or his legates would have done nothing to take control of the Via Appia in that region as well. Perhaps a division of his force did indeed operate near the Via Appia and seize Setia, as Appian relates. The scholiasts to Lucan suggest that some sort of fighting didtake place in that area, and Plutarch does tell us that the Cinnans tried to dominate the roads in Latium andthat Sulla could notreceive assistance from his legate, Dolabella, whowas “some distance away” , perhaps on the Via Appia.55 Both Appian and Plutarch agree that, wherever these maneuvers had begun, Sulla discovered Marius’position, the latter withdrew, and Sulla gladly pursued him. Yet Marius prevented Dolabella from joining his commander and used his men and the natural terrain to hem in Sulla’s troops. Meanwhile, Sulla’s military tribunes, speaking for their exhausted men, persuaded their commander to pitch camp and give them time to recover from the chase.56 At this point, however, Marius turned and attacked Sulla’s encampment. Both Plutarch and Appian praise Marius for his bravery in this engagement. Yet the left wing of his army collapsed under pressure from Sulla’s enraged troops andabout seven cohorts, almost a full legion, deserted to Sulla. Marius decided to break off the attack andretreated with Sulla

nowin hot pursuit.57

55 App.BC. 1.87; cf. Plut. Sull. 28.4 places the battle near Signia andgives the number of Marius’ forces as eighty-five cohorts; Sall. Hist. 1.30 McG like Appian names Sacriportus; also Livy. Per. 87; Vell. 2.26.1; Flor. 2.9.23; Eut. 5.8.1; Amp. 42.2; DVI. 68.3, 75.8; Oros. 5.20.6; Luc. 2.134; and Diod. 37.29.4; and 38/39.12; Lip231; Lewis (1971): 32; cf. Rawson (1987): 171– pold, p. 433; Gabba (1958): 230– 172 and see Adn. super Luc. 2.134 E and Comm. Bern. 2.134 U, who both speak of Sacriportus as in the ager Laurens between Lavinium andCirceii (i.e., along the Via Appia, rather than the valley of the Trerus on the Via Latina); Schur, p. 168; 101; Salmon Keaveney (1982a): 137; Konrad (1994): 98; McGushin, pp. 100– (1964): 77; Brunt (1971a): 443 estimates originally nine legions under Marius, five cohorts having deserted (Plut. Sull. 28.4). 5; MRR 2.71. 56 App. BC. 1.87; Plut. Sull. 28.4– ρ ο ”on α ς οβ 7 calls Marius “σ 57 Sall. Hist. 1.30 McG; Diod. 38/39.15; Plut. Sull. 28.6– horseback at the front of his men in his attempt to scatter Sulla’s; Fenestella and others, says Plutarch, hadrecorded that Marius slept through thebattle andwasonly awakened with difficulty in time to flee (f. 16 P); Gabba (1958): 231; McGushin, 101. pp. 100–

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Some of Marius’menmade it safely to thenearby townof Praeneste, a long-time stronghold of the Cinnans; Marius himself hadto be hoisted up by cables over the walls because the inhabitants, having seen Sulla enter their territory, hadby then sealed the gates of their city.58 This left a large number of Marius’menoutside andhelpless against Sulla, whotook them captive, except for the Samnites among them, whom he executed. If we believe Plutarch’s figures, which he claims to have taken from Sulla’s memoirs, Marius lost more than half of his army in this battle and its aftermath.59

Sulla could not simply leave such an important citadel in enemy hands norallow Marius to escape andcome upfrom therear. So, he laid Praeneste under siege, intending to starve Marius into surrender. Instead of positioning his menclose under the walls, he formed a ring of circumvallation at a distance from the town to block off supplies and monitor any enemy movements. Q. Lucretius Ofella, a former praetor under the Cinnan regime and now one of Sulla’s prefects, was placed in charge of the operation, while Sulla himself proceeded along theVia Latina to Rome, nowvirtually unguarded.60

recovered”the city of Rome According to Livy’s epitomator, Sulla “ after the Battle at Sacriportus and before his victories in Etruria against Carbo. Appian’s fuller account tells us that at the time, the remnants of Marius’army were locked upat Praeneste; Carbo’s, under various legates andhimself, were occupied in a desperate attempt to counter the forces of

58 Plut. Sull. 28.7; Vell. 2.26.1 says Marius already hada garrison there; see Plin. NH. 34; Harvey, p. 38. 33.16; Val. Max. 7.6.4; Gabba (1958): 231; Lewis (1971): 32– 59 Only App. BC. 1.87 mentions the Samnites in Marius’army, though others do note the presence of young Telesinus; Plut. Sull. 28.8 says that Sulla killed twenty thousand of the enemy, captured eight thousand, but lost only twenty-three of his own; Plutarch claims to be quoting from Sulla’s memoirs; Diod. 38/39.15 says fifteen thousand were with Marius at Praeneste; Flor. 2.9.4 is nothelpful, as he only records the total of seventy thousand dead at Sacriportus and Colline; Eut. 5.8.1 says Sulla lost four hundred fifty menwhile Marius fifteen thousand; Oros. 5.20.6 quotes Quadrigarius on Marius’ loss of twenty-five thousand. This is quite close to !; Sen. how many thousands of corpses” Plutarch’s figure; Luc. 2.134 bemoans “ 434; Gabba (1958): 231; Brunt (1971a): 433; 3; Lippold, pp. 433– Ben. 5.16.2– Salmon (1964): 78; (1967): 385. 88; Sall. 60 MRR 2.72; App. BC. 1.88; Plut. Mar. 46.6; Sull. 29.2,8; Livy. Per. 87– Hist. 1.32 McG; Diod. 38/39.15; IG XIV.1297.4; Vell. 2.27.6 calls Ofella ex2; DVI. 68.4; Oros. praetor; Strab. 5.3.11; Val. Max. 6.8.2; Dio. 30/35.108.1– 5.21.8; Comm. Bern. 2.134 U; Frontin. 2.9.3; Lippold, p. 435; Gabba (1958): 233; Rawson (1987): 172; Sumner (1973): 107 gives Ofella’s dates as 124?-81 B.C. and suggests praetor in 83 or 82; Konrad (1994): 79; McGushin, p. 102; Keaveney (1982a): 138; Salmon (1964): 78; (1967): 385; Lewis (1971): 32, 34 n. 16, 36.

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in northern Italy; and the Cinnan leaders who had been in the city fled to Carbo just before Sulla’s army arrived. Before leaving, the urban praetor Damasippus received orders from young Marius to execute all of his “ personal enemies”in the Senate. Damasippus Pompey, Crassus, and Metellus

convened that body on a pretext and brought in the assassins, who killed P. Antistius and C. Papirius Carbo Arvina. Two other targets, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus andQ. Mucius Scaevola Pontifex, tried to escape; the assassins caught andcutdowntheformer at thedoor of the Senate House, while the latter made it into thevestibule of theTemple of Vesta before hetoo was killed. The bodies of the slain were cast into the Tiber. Though some sources make outthat thekilling wasmuchmore widespread, these executions probably constituted a purge of only certain individuals who were suspected of collusion with Sulla or obstruction of thegovernment’s plans. The testimony of Cicero, Diodorus, andPlutarch supports this.61 Meanwhile, Sulla haddispatched several cohorts to Rome by different routes; hehimself circled around tothenorthwest andoccupied theCampus Martius. His orders were basically to surround the city by occupying positions at each of its gates. The population of Rome, without Cinnan leadership andweakened by famine (presumably most grain supplies had either been diverted to the field troops or cut off by Sulla’s men), had little protection against Sulla’s considerable forces. So, it is not surprising that the urban populace did nothing to resist Sulla, as Appian informs us. Instead, they freely opened the gates, preferring to surrender rather than fight or starve to death.62 Sulla entered thecity rather peacefully at this time, confiscated andauctioned off the property of Cinnan leaders, and summoned the Roman people to an informal assembly. There, he defended his own position and actions and tried to soothe their fears about him and about what might happen next. Then, heleft for Etruria, having setupsome of hisownmenincharge of the city with a garrison.63

235. On the “second Marian 89; Gabba (1958): 234– 61 Livy. Per. 87; App. BC. 1.88– 3; Cic. , see App. BC. 1.88; Livy. Per. 86; Oros. 5.20.4; Vell. 2.26.2– massacre” Brut. 311; Fam. 9.21.2; De Or. 3.10; ND. 3.80; Aug. CD. 3.28. Other sources are 3; Val. Max. 9.2.3; Diod. Cic. Rosc. 33, 90; Att. 9.15.2; Plut. Mar. 46.6; Pomp. 9.2– 462; Gabba 37.29.5, 38/39.17; Flor. 2.9.21; Luc. 2.126–129. Brunt (1988): 461– 328; Gruen 96; Bennett, p. 33; Bulst, pp. 327– (1958): 233– 234; Fantham, pp. 95– 141; Rawson (1987): 170; Sumner (1968): 241, 243– 244; Keaveney (1984): 140– (1973): 111, 113.

235; Konrad (1994): 98; Keaveney (1982a) 89. Gabba (1958): 234– 62 App. BC. 1.88– 141.

63 Gabba (1958): 235; Lewis (1971): 32 n. 6.

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In the meantime, Marius did all he could to break Ofella’s hold on Praeneste, but to no avail. As noted in the previous chapter, Carbo made

several attempts through his legates, especially Censorinus andDamasippus, to relieve Marius; all failed.64 Then, the leaders of the major southern Italian contingents in the Cinnan army, M. Lamponius of Lucania, P. Telesinus of Samnium, and Gutta of Capua, joined forces and rushed to Praeneste with a large army of men. But Ofella, perhaps with assistance from Sulla, blocked all means of approach, and their continued, resolute attempts to break through this blockade tied down the Italian forces for quite

a while.65

V chapter, after the siege of Praeneste began, Pompey seized Sena Gallica in northern Picenum and Metellus attacked Ravenna. In between these two assaults, a force of Celtiberian cavalry arrived in Italy sent by Sertorius, and encountered Sulla’s cavalry on the Via Cassia near the Etrurian town of Clusium. Sulla’s force prevailed, which induced desertions from the Celtiberians. Meanwhile, Carbo left Ariminum to assist the horsemen and, whenhe arrived, a severe battle took place between his army andSulla’s, lasting all dayandresulting in stalemate; darkness putanendto the fighting.66 At the same time, according to Appian, Metellus attacked Ravenna. Presumably, Carbo quickly withdrew to Ariminum, for his next moves were against Metellus. Then, Sulla proceeded about forty miles southwest of Clusium to Saturnia, where he defeated another of Carbo’s divisions under an unidentified commander.67

As noted in the previous

mentions Perperna’s threatened attempt to relieve Marius from Sicily; Sall. Hist. 1.31 McG; Livy. Per. 87; Plut. Mar. 46.6; Sull. 29.1; 444 on DamaGabba (1958): 239, 244; McGushin, p. 101; see Brunt (1971a): 443– sippus’ legions; Censorinus lost eight legions except for seven cohorts; Keaveney (1982d): 122; Lewis (1971): 32– 33. 65 App. BC. 1.90,92 gives a figure of seventy thousand men; Plut. Sull. 29.1; Gabba 444 estimates about (1958): 240– 241; McGushin, p. 101; Brunt (1971a): 443– 37); fourteen legions; similarly, Keaveney (1982a): 141; cf. Lewis (1971): 33– Salmon (1964): 78; (1967): 385. 66 App. BC. 1.89; Livy. Per. 88 calls it a rout and dates it to before Colline; Vell. 2.28.1 erroneously dates it before Sacriportus, but notes the involvement of two Servilii as Sulla’s legates; Plut. Sull. 28.8 mentions the victory of a Servilius before Colline; MRR 2.72, 74 considers them M. Servilius C.f. and P. Servilius Vatia Isauricus; Gabba (1958): 236, 238; McGushin, p. 102; Brunt (1971a): 443; Harris

64 App. BC. 1.90; Diod. 38/39.14

24. (1971): 257. See Ch. 4, nn. 22– 67 App. BC. 1.89; Gabba (1958): 236; McGushin, p. 102; Brunt (1971a): 443; Harris (1971): 257.

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Pompey and Crassus in the meantime inflicted yet another defeat on Carbo’s legate Carrinas at Spoletium in Umbria; the latter lost some three thousand menandwasplaced under siege at the town. Considerable reinforcements sent by Carbo from Etruria never reached Spoletium; Sulla ambushed andkilled twothousand of them. YetCarrinas managed to escape under cover of night in a severe rainstorm.68 These references, in combination with Etrurian andUmbrian loyalty to theCinnans, andAppian’s estimation of Carbo’s troop strength, indicate the Cinnan use of towns like Clusium on the Via Cassia andSpoletium on the Via Flaminia as garrison points from which to control entry into and passage through northern Italy. Even Saturnia was strategically located near the Via Aurelia, an important route to the western Alpine passes and Rome’s western provinces. Apparently, Sulla’s legates had orders to dislodge Carbo’s forces from these strategic points.69 After his failure to relieve Marius at Praeneste, his repeated defeats in Etruria and Umbria, andespecially his loss of Cisalpine Gaul, Carbo fled Italy, leaving behind his subordinate commanders to pick up the pieces.70 Though surely demoralized, these were still able anddetermined men, who retained about forty thousand troops and persisted in resisting the Sullan advance at strategic sites in northern Italy.71 With Carbo’s departure for Africa, three of these legates, Carrinas, Censorinus, andDamasippus, assumed joint command of theCinnan northern army, or what was left of it, and marched to join the huge mass of Samnite andLucanian forces, which hadremained basically intact, despite their failed attempts to relieve Praeneste. The combined forces tried one final, massive push to free Praeneste. Even then, they simply could not make headway against Sulla. When his army attempted to surround them, the Cinnans, led apparently by the Samnite Telesinus, decided to break camp by night and recapture Rome. The city lay virtually unguarded, despite those whom Sulla hadleft there to look after affairs.72

68 App. BC. 1.90; Gabba (1958): 238. See further, Plut. Crass. 6; McGushin, p. 102; 63; Marshall (1976): Brunt (1971a): 443; Keaveney (1982b): 513; Ward, pp. 62– 9. 14; Harris (1971): 257; Seager (1979): 8– 13– 236; Konrad (1994): 98; Harris (1971): 69 App. BC. 1.92; Gabba (1958): 232, 235– 257; Brunt (1971a): 443. 256– 70 App. BC. 1.92; Sall. Hist. 1.33 McG; Adn. super Luc. 2.548 E; Livy. Per. 88; Val. 6; Exup. 53 Z; Gabba (1958): 242, 245; Konrad Max. 6.2.10; Plut. Pomp. 7.3, 8.4– 103; Brunt (1971a): 444; Bulst, p. 326. (1994): 98; McGushin, pp. 102– 71 App. BC. 1.90; Gabba (1958): 242; Brunt (1971a): 444 suggests that a large force of Cinnans hadcome from Fidentia andretired to Clusium; Censorinus andCarrinas hadthree to four legions, Damasippus two; thetotal remaining force amounted to at most eleven legions; Lewis (1971): 39 n. 29; Keaveney (1982d): 122; Seager 9. (1979): 8– 72 Flor. 2.9.22 erroneously says that Telesinus andLamponius laid waste Etruria and

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VI

The Cinnan-Samnite army proceeded by night along the Via Latina to the

Alban area. Their movement elicited a reaction from Sulla almost immediately; perhaps that was part of the Cinnan strategy. Having dispatched seven hundred cavalry under Octavius Balbus inanattempt toovertake and block the Cinnan advance, Sulla himself raced to Rome with his “whole , says Appian. Yet by the time he arrived (late in the afternoon), his army” enemies had already encircled the city and defeated two cavalry contingents, onefrom theRoman garrison, theother Sulla’s advance force. The date was November 1, 82 B.C.73 The evidence for the ensuing battle is the most complete of any in this period, probably because the ancient accounts derive ultimately from Sulla’s own military record of the victory. According to Plutarch, several of Sulla’s officers, most notably Torquatus andDolabella, urged himto make camp for a while and allow his weary troops to rest before engaging the fearsome Samnites and Lucanians, but Sulla refused. He ordered battle readiness at about four o’clock that afternoon.74 Whenthetwoarmies engaged each other, notfar fromtheColline Gate, Sulla’s left wing under his own command collapsed and broke under pressure from the Cinnan right; Sulla’s troops retreated toward the Colline Gate pursued bytheir enemies, buttheportal hadalready been sealed. Now

Campania, butonly places theformer at Colline; Vell. 2.27.1 names only Telesinus with forty thousand men; Oros. 5.20.9 names Carrinas with Camponius, duxof the Samnites, while Eut. 5.8.1 says Carrinas and Lamponius with seventy thousand; DVI. 75.8 only names Telesinus; Livy. Per. 88 only mentions the Samnites; Amp. 42.3 is vague; Plut. Sull. 29.2; App. BC. 1.92 is the fullest and seems the most accurate account; Lippold, p. 434; Gabba (1958): 239, 246; see Rawson (1987): 173 445 considers Velleius’figure more on Comm. Bern. 2.137 U; Brunt (1971a): 444– realistic than Appian’s (that is, Livy’s) seventy thousand. Again, these numbers reflect paper strength not real men, since each legion probably contained only three or four thousand men. Brunt suggests rightly that the Livian tradition’s higher figures include both northern and southern armies. Thus, from the original four hundred fifty cohorts, two hundred forty remained against about the same number 36, 39; Keaveney on Sulla’s side; Martin, pp. 35, 37, 42; Lewis (1971): 33, 35– 79; (1967): 386. (1982d): 122; Salmon (1964): 78– 73 App. BC. 1.93; Plut. Sull. 29.3; Vell. 2.27.1 gives the date as the Kalends of November; Adn. super Luc. 2.137 E and Comm. Bern. 2.136 U seem to agree with Velleius’characterization of Telesinus’motives; Gabba (1958): 247; Lewis (1971): 39; Salmon (1964): 79; (1967): 386; Rawson (1987): 173; Valgiglio (1975): 275. 74 Plut. Sull. 29.4 places the battle at the tenth hour of the day (about four in the afternoon); Oros. 5.20.9 at the ninth hour; and App. BC. 1.93 says late in the afternoon; Lippold, p. 434; Gabba (1958): 248.

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in a much more confined space, both sides

rushed at each other and the fighting continued in such disarray past nightfall. Plutarch reports that many Romans believed their city doomed, while some fugitives from Sulla’s army fled to Praeneste in order to seek aidfrom Ofella, andtold him that Sulla was dead!75 Then, in the middle of the night, messengers with news from Crassus altered theentire situation. Asyet unknown to Sulla because of the severity andchaos of thecombat, hisright wing, under Crassus’command, hadlong before succeeded in routing the Cinnan left (where the majority of their troops were positioned) andforcing the fugitives to the town of Antemnae. This victory so inspired Sulla’s forces that the tide of battle at the Colline Gate nowdefinitively shifted in their favor. Carrinas, Censorinus, Lamponius, and other Cinnan commanders fled as Sulla’s victory seemed imminent.76 Both armies hadlost a great deal, buttheCinnans most of all; estimated deaths range from fifty to eighty thousand, exclusive of the thousands of unarmed prisoners whom Sulla executed.77 Not even the Cinnan leaders

8; Frontin. 1.11; Sall. Hist. 1.34 McG; Adn. super 75 App. BC. 1.93; Plut. Sull. 29.6– Luc. 2.135 E wrongly calls Damasippus “Samnitium dux,”but as urban praetor he 173; wasperhaps supreme commander of the army; Rawson suggests (1987): 172– Comm. Bern. 2.136 U speaks of a three-part Cinnan assault; Gabba (1958): 247, 249; see Konrad (1988): 14 on Sall. Hist. 1.34; cf. McGushin, p. 103; Keaveney (1982a): 144; Salmon (1964): 79. 76 Vell. 2.29.3 places the arrival of this news after the first hour of the night; Plut. Crass. 6.6; Sull. 30.1; App. BC. 1.93; Gabba (1958): 249; Keaveney (1982a): 144; 14. It is hard to believe 64; Marshall (1976): 13– Salmon (1967): 386; Ward, pp. 63– that Sulla in his memoirs would have given credit for the victory at Colline to Crassus rather than himself; only Plutarch in his biography of Crassus records it, though other detailed accounts depict Sulla’s early discomfiture andlater success. Most probably, theChaeronean found theinformation onCrassus’decisive role ina source other than Sulla, perhaps Fenestella. See Appendix, n. 59. 77 App. BC. 1.93 (fifty thousand dead on both sides, eight thousand executed by Sulla); Livy. Per. 88 (eight thousand prisoners executed in the Villa Publica); also 25 (seventy thousand andfour thousand); Oros. named by Amp. 42.3; Flor. 2.9.24– 5.20.9 (eighty thousand and twelve thousand); Eut. 5.8.1 (twelve thousand executed); Val. Max. 9.2.1 (four legions executed in the Campus Martius); Sen. Ben. 2 (six thousand from Antemnae 3 (two legions executed); Plut. Sull. 30.1– 5.16.2– ; Adn. executed in the Circus Flaminius); Luc. 2.135 speaks of the “heaps of slain” super Luc. 7.306 E and Comm. Bern. 2.197 and7.306 U name the Ovilia or Saepta intheCampus Martius as theplace where six legions “Marianas”(mostly Samnites suggests Rawson) were executed; Strab. 5.4.11 says only three or four thousand; 249; Brunt (1971a): 445; Rawson (1987): 177; Lippold, p. 434; Gabba (1958): 248– Salmon (1967): 386 n. 2; (1982): 131; Valgiglio (1975): 275; Keaveney (1982a): 39; Mackay, p. 194. 151; Martin, pp. 38– 148–

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could escape hisvengeance. Onthefollowing day, theremarkable Samnite general Telesinus wasfound half deadamong thecorpses onthebattlefield; he wasthen beheaded. Agents of Sulla soon discovered the whereabouts of Carrinas andCensorinus. The latter hadfled to Praeneste with a remnant of his force in order to assist young Marius. Censorinus hadbeheaded consul Octavius in 87 B.C.; thefavor wasnowrepaid inkindwhenCensorinus was captured at Praeneste andbeheaded byLucretius Ofella. Carrinas suffered a similar fate.78 So, newsof theCinnan defeat attheColline Gate soonreached Praeneste. Sulla provided graphic illustration of his victory by displaying the severed heads of the Cinnan leaders around the walls of the town, a warning to its defenders of what could, or rather would, happen to them if they continued to resist Sulla. Theinhabitants, including young Marius’army, decided then to surrender to Ofella. Marius must have realized that if he were captured alive, like his comrades hadbeen, he would receive no more mercy from Sulla than they had. So, along with the brother of Telesinus, one of his legates, young Marius attempted to escape through the underground drainagetunnels of thetown. Even these were blocked bySulla’s men; there was no escape. Marius andhis comrade committed suicide to avoid capture.79 Afterwards, the Sullan commander rounded upthe Roman leaders who hadaided andserved under Marius, executed some, imprisoned others. Yet even these latter did not escape death when Sulla arrived. Further, Sulla ordered theevacuation of theentire townandtheseparation of theprisoners into groups of Romans, Samnites, and Praenestines. While his own men looted the place, heextended pardon to theremaining Romans andordered the deaths of all the Samnite and Praenestine men, leaving only their women andchildren.80 78 App. BC. 1.93; cf. Vell. 2.29.3; Frontin. 2.9.3; Adn. super Luc. 2.135 E states that Damasippus died inthebattle; Comm. Bern. 2.136 U thought Telesinus hadbeen hit bya stone from a slinger; Gabba (1958): 250; Valgiglio (1975): 225; McGushin, p. 42. 103; Salmon (1967): 386; Hinard (1985b): 40– 79 Strab. 5.3.11 describes the tunnels of Praeneste; Cic. Rosc. 90; App. BC. 1.94 and Plut. Mar. 46.6 andSull. 32.1 say suicide; Diod. 37.29.4, 38/39.15 has Marius killed by a slave; Livy. Per. 88 has Telesinus killed by Marius, Marius by a slave; Eut. 5.8.1; DVI. 68.4 (Marius with Telesinus), 75.9 (Sulla called himself Felix after5, who informs us that different 9; similarly, Vell. 2.27.4– ward); so Oros. 5.21.8– versions of Marius’ death circulated (e.g., suicide or assisted suicide); Val. Max. 6.8.2 says that the slave killed Marius out of self-interest; he also places Telesinus Pontio Tullo”and Adn. there; Comm. Bern. 2.134 and 2.149 U calls Telesinus “ super Luc. 2.149 E agrees with Diodorus; Exup. 52 Z has Marius die in battle; IG 252; Rawson (1987): 170, 172, XIV.1297.4; Lippold, p. 435; Gabba (1958): 251– 173; McGushin, p. 103; Salmon (1967): 386. 80 App. BC. 1.94; Flor. 2.9.27 describes the plundering of the town; Plin. NH. 33.16

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Scholars have tried to find reasons for Sulla’s extreme punishment of so many Italians from Sacriportus to thefall of Praeneste. They have discussed especially the issue of Sulla’s attitude toward the Samnites, who were perhaps thegreatest victims of his vengeance. Some ancient sources inform us of Sulla’s deep hatred for the Samnites and his desire to exterminate them; most scholars accept this, andperhaps Sulla didfeel this way. Yet this scholarly debate, focusing as it has on Sulla’s slaughter of Samnite prisoners, hasoverlooked a more significant point: Sulla meted out very similar punishment to other captives as well. The best example of this

is his massacre of all Praenestine menafter their surrender. Surely no one has argued that Sulla hada deep, long-lingering animosity for the Praenestines. They merely suffered the fate of all those who defied Sulla so intransigently, even among Roman senators andequestrians. We should also remember the marked change in Sulla’s tactics in 82 B.C. Though he still might accept deserters, like Verres, into his camp, he no longer extended a peaceful gesture to his enemies before fighting them. Apparently, they had defied him too much. In the final analysis, Sulla’s character holds the key: according to his ownepitaph, as Plutarch relates, Sulla prided himself on harming his enemies and would brook no serious resistance to his military will. Such resistance deserved from him the severest “ , as he later told the Senate (during the execution of correction” prisoners in the Campus Martius).81 informs us that Sulla captured Marius’warchest; Livy. Per. 88 speaks of the death of all unarmed Praenestines; Plut. Sull. 32.1, no doubt from Sulla or a sympathetic source, claims that Sulla began by giving the prisoners a fair trial before execution, but, whenthis process consumed too muchtime, hegathered the remaining prisoners, twelve thousand of them, andhadthem executed by his troops; in Mor. 816A,

Plutarch simply states that Sulla slaughtered the Praenestines; Dio. 33.109.4 says 210 agrees; Val. that all Praenestines whohadsurrendered were killed; Luc. 2.195– Max. 9.2.1 says that Cethegus, therenegade Marian, cutdownfive thousand as they tried to flee through the fields; Oros. 5.21.10 informs us that Sulla executed all

Marius’ legates, quaestors, prefects, andmilitary tribunes; Lippold, p. 435; Gabba (1958): 252; Valgiglio (1975): 275; McGushin, p. 103; Keaveney (1982a): 149; 46 discusses the survival of twelve old 387; Harvey, pp. 43– Salmon (1967): 386– leading families of Praeneste virtually destroyed by Sulla; they resurfaced with the victory of Julius Caesar. Also, the archaeological record of the town reveals the Sullan destruction andrebuilding efforts afterward. 81 Plut. Sull. 30.4 ontheexecution inRome of Samnites fromAntemnae: “Some of the criminals are receiving correction by myorders.”See references to Salmon, Keaveney, Martin, andothers, including primary sources, in nn. 48 and77 above. Sulla had given his most notable foreign opponent, Mithridates, the opportunity to negotiate peace and thereby retain his power and position; he gave his fellow Romans and all Italians a similar chance on his return to Italy. Hadhis negotiations been fully successful, Sulla probably would have only eliminated the most undoubted Cinnans, such as Carbo andGratidianus.

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VII

In the spring of 83 B.C., Sulla hadlanded in Italy; though Cinna andMarius were already dead, the remainder of their faction engaged Sulla in protract-

edwarfare for control of thepeninsula. Foralmost twoyears, hehadto face the armies raised originally byCinna, later byCarbo andhis associates. The Cinnans possessed certain advantages. First, they could portray themselves as defenders of Rome and Italy, and Sulla as an invader and destroyer. Cinna and Carbo maintained that their cause wasjustified, that they were the true supporters andpromoters of Italian rights andthe security of the Senate andPeople of Rome. Sulla, ontheother hand, hadalready shown in 88 how he might behave if he captured Rome andalso what his position was regarding the enfranchisement of the Italians andthe authority of the Senate. Second, Cinna, Carbo, andtheir associates hadat their disposal the enormous resources, especially manpower, of Italy; they could mobilize huge armies in a very short time. Third, the Cinnans controlled Cisalpine Gaul, Sardinia, Sicily, and North Africa, provinces that could serve as sources for menandsupplies, refuges, or bases of operation against Sulla. Lastly, they hadthe loyalty of many in the Senate, theequestrian order, and the urban plebs as well. Unfortunately, the obstacles facing Cinna and his comrades proved greater than they could overcome. First, Sulla employed an extensive campaign of propaganda by way of letters to the Senate, promises to the Italians, andmessages of divine favor oncoinage to convince the undecided, the fearful, andthe vacillating in Italy tojoin himandto regard himas the protector of their rights andthe defender of the Respublica. Many succumbed to this propaganda or delayed because of it until it wastoo late to stop Sulla. Second, the Roman aristocracy itself wasdivided into too many camps; it could not maintain a solid front against Sulla, despite the SCU that branded himandhis associates hostes. Defections anddesertions to his side weakened the Cinnan wareffort. Lastly, Sulla hadan intensely loyal, well-treated, very well-paid, battle-hardened army behind him, while the inexperience andunwillingness to fight hardagainst Sulla onthepart of the Cinnan troops cost their side. So, the Cinnans, despite their actions (whatever the motivation) for the benefit of Rome and Italy and their appeals throughout the land, could not count on the loyalty of those they were defending. Without sufficient allegiance from the inhabitants of Italy, they could not defeat the formidable force with which they competed for control of Italy. Yet they kept onfighting, though they suffered numerous setbacks, and they were never completely abandoned by aristocrats in Rome or Italian leaders and soldiers. The remarkable growth of the Cinnan army in winter

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83/82, the entry of the Samnites and Lucanians into the fight against Sulla, the persistence with which the Cinnans struggled to hold northern Italy and free young Marius from Praeneste all demonstrate this. Most of all, the proscription lists (wherein is displayed the loyalty of hundreds of senators and equestrians) and the executions of prisoners from Sacriportus to Praeneste reveal the continued, tenacious support for Cinna’s successors. Sulla found that he had many enemies to eliminate. Scholars have often castigated Cinna’s faction for their defeat, arguing that it was the inevitable result of weak-willed leadership, loss of nerve, poor strategy, and inability to captivate Italian allegiance. Rather, other factors contributed to the demise of the Cinnan regime. The Cinnans put up a valiant effort against a formidable foe for nearly two years; they often came close to beating him. So, the outcome of the civil war was neither predictable, nor inevitable, nor the result of Cinnan clumsiness or ineptitude. In fact, the contest for Italy was a very close and painful one for both sides. When Sulla emerged victorious, the result was disastrous not only for the Cinnans but for much of Italy as well. For the struggle had been one of survival; only one side could survive. Sulla and those Roman nobles with him sought the reestablishment of their power throughout Italy. The only means of achieving this was the fullest possible destruction of their enemies. So, most of Cinna’s successors were killed: Carbo, Marius the Younger, Gratidianus, Carrinas, Damasippus, Censorinus, Telesinus, the list goes ever onward. Those who managed to escape faced a precarious future. Scipio Asiagenes somehow managed to stay alive at Massilia until his death in the 70s or 60s B.C., but his colleague Norbanus, who had fled to Rhodes, committed suicide after learning that Sulla had proscribed him. The fate of Sertorius needs no discussion here.82 82 On the proscription lists and fate of Cinnans, see Sall. Hist. 1.35–43, 48.12 McG; Cat. 11, 51; Exup. 32-34 Z; Aug. CD. 3.28-29; Livy. Per. 90; Oros. 5.21.1-10; Amp. 42.3; Eut. 5.8.1–2; Val. Max. 7.3.6, 8.6.2, 9.7.3; Flor. 2.9.25-28, 2.10.2; Dion. Hal. 5.77; DVI. 75.10– 11; Luc. 2.210-234; Sen. Ben. 5.16.2-3; Ira. 2.34.3; Prov. 3.8; Clem. 1.12.1-2; Cic. Leg. agr. and Rosc. loc. cit.; Clu. 161; 2 Verr. 2.1.38; 2.3.81; Asc. pp. 131– 135, 139 Sq; Schol. Gron. pp. 305, 317.6 St; Plut. Sull. 31.1–5; Caes. 1,5; Pomp. 10; App. BC. 1.95–97; Vell. 2.28; Diod. 38.6, 18– 19; Ch. 4, loc. cit.; Badian (1958a): 245–249; (1970b): 20–24; Mitchell (1979): 86–87; Hinard (1985b): 42–49. On Scipio, see Cic. Sest. 6–7; Att. 9.15.2; Schol. Bob. 126.18–22 St; Adn. super Luc. 2.139 E (“Sulla ultor”); Konrad (1994): 79; cf. Mackay, pp. 201–202. On Sertorius, who was proscribed in the first list on November 3, see Konrad, pp. 98–99; Lippold, p. 434; McGushin, pp. 103– 109, 118– 119; Badian (1970b): 20; (1962b): 59; (1968b): 38; Ch. 4, n. 9; Hinard (1985b): 155– 160. On Gratidianus, whose murder was by far

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135

Again, these are only the leaders. Wemust not forget the hundreds of proscribed senators andequestrians whofell to Sulla’s henchmen andthe hundreds of local leaders, domi nobiles as Cicero called them, who also perished. Nor must we forget those who, though allowed to live, had many rights ripped away from them. The economic anddemographic effects of Sulla’s confiscations andcolonies upanddown the peninsula should also come to mind. Clearly, thedefeat of Cinna’s government wasalso a defeat

for Italy.83

the most gruesome, see Adn. super Luc. 2.174 E; Comm. Bern. 2.174 U; Cic. Brut. 223; Leg. 3.36; Asc. pp. 131, 139 Sq; Sen. Ira. 3.18; and other sources above; 133. On 176; Marshall (1985b): 124– 260; Rawson (1987): 173– Gabba (1958): 254– Sulla’s scattering of Marius’ashes, see Cic. Leg. 2.56; Val. Max. 9.2.1. 83 On the devastating economic and social impact of Sulla’s actions and continued resistance to himin Italy, see above andCic. Leg. agr. 2.78; Sall. Hist. 1.46 McG; 375, 445 estimates 312, 344– 287, 300– Schol. Gron. p. 305 St; Brunt (1971a): 285– that almost three hundred thousand men fought in this civil war; Keaveney (1982b): 150; see Salmon 159; (1987): 187; Hill (1952): 146– 544; and (1982a): 152– 534– (1964): 79; (1967): 387– 389 on the resistance of Aesernia and Nola until 80; 131 on Etruria, southern Italy; see Harris (1971): (1982): 131– 132; (1969): 130– 267 on Etrurian resistance to Sulla (from archaeological and numismatic as 257– 152; Syme (1939): 87 n. 136, 148– well as literary evidence); Rawson (1978): 134– 74, 87–100; 52, 67– 39; Hinard (1985b): 51– 3; Badian, n. 82; Woolliscroft, pp. 37– 148. Pfiffig, pp. 143–

EPILOGUE: THE LEGACY OF CINNA [Cinna] wasa manwhodeserved

to die bythe sentence of his victorious enemies rather

than from the rage of his soldiers. Of himone can truly say that he dared what no good man would dare, that he accomplished what none but a resolute man could have accomplished, andthat he wasrash in making decisions butmanly in carrying them out. (Velleius Paterculus, Compendium. 2.24.5)

The ancient tradition is generally hostile toward Cinna andhis comrades, in part because of the enormous influence of Sulla’s version of events, in part because of the perspectives later authors brought to their accounts of the era. These writers held to moral, political, andphilosophical precepts and principles that could not but condemn Cinna: some regarded him as an enemy of the senatorial oligarchy; others as a manof weak or degenerate moral character; still others as a willing bringer of civil strife for his own selfish ambitions. These views, which together vilify Cinna andhis associates as tyrannical, do not necessarily reflect the historical realities of the Cinnan regime. In fact, a careful analysis of oursources reveals a different picture. L. Cornelius Cinna emerged onthe Roman political scene in 87 B.C. at a most opportune moment. Years of tension between Romans andItalians over socio-political rights andprivileges hadexploded into armed conflict. In theend, certain Roman leaders devised themeans to obstruct theintegration of the Italians into the Roman State, while others championed the Italian cause for reasons of conviction and ambition. Now civil strife erupted among the Romans themselves; andone Roman aristocrat, Sulla, defending his own honor and position, though ostensibly the Senate and People of Rome, gained the upper hand in this contest by turning a Roman army against Rome. Instead of settling the crisis, Sulla succeeded only in sowing the seeds of future discord. Cinna, a successful and competent military commander in the Social Warandan astute judge of the political climate in Italy, soon espoused the causes of the disgruntled Italians andthose alienated by Sulla. Cinna was opposed by a group in the Senate whorevealed themselves unable to cope with constitutional crises without resort to unconstitutional methods and force. They would not tolerate any further disruption of the established order andwould useanymeans toprevent it. These senators removed Cinna from office in order to quell reform, butin so doing created a martyr for the cause; they drove Cinna to strike back rather than lose everything.

138

Epilogue:

TheLegacy of Cinna

Cinna had learned the lessons of the Social War and Sulla’s March on Rome; he followed Sulla’s example, with a force not only of Romans but also Italians. Inthis, Cinna demonstrated that hewould notignore the views andobjectives of theItalians, andthat theItalians could serve asformidable military allies for competing Roman aristocrats. Though his victory ended in urban violence, Cinna soon found himself in control of a peaceful Rome andat the head of an unusual coalition of interest groups. The ancients regarded this time as a dominatio, a term which technically denoted the power of a paterfamilias as well as the absolute andarbitrary rule of a tyrant. Augustus’useof this wordin hisRes Gestae to denounce thefaction of Antony gives clear proof of thepropagandistic value of this label.1 Yet, certainly, Cinna andhiscomrades didnothave thepower to control all aspects of Roman society or to coerce the Roman senators, or equestrians, or urban plebs, or even the Italian newcitizens into following them at every turn. Although Cicero often andexplicitly compared Cinna with his son-in-law, Julius Caesar, the latter’s authority extended far wider and deeper in the Roman world than Cinna’s. Our re-examination of the Cinnae dominatio suggests that, in fact, Cinna andhis comrades maintained their position of prominence because they received support from many senators, equestrians, and Italians. The coercive, intimidating methods of a tyrannical ruling clique arenotevident. Rather, conciliation, persuasion by argument and appeal, and the fairly normal operation of the organs of State characterize the Cinnan regime. Cinna andhis successors held together the disparate elements in Italy by working within the established system, by encouraging cooperation and stability, by solving pressing problems of State through needed reforms. Further, theCinnans didnotneglect provincial affairs. Despite financial andstrategic difficulties, they tried tomaintain a Roman administrative and military presence throughout theempire; they secured theperimeter of Italy through loyal governors and loyal provincials. As soon as he could muster the menandthe funds, Cinna dispatched military forces to the Greek East andto North Africa; his successors sent a force to Spain. These moves had their defensive purposes, but were also part of a strategic offensive designed to remove or neutralize Cinna’s enemies in the provinces. The Cinnan era reveals the potential of the provinces in the event of Roman civil strife, as well as the fragmented loyalty of the provincials themselves. More importantly, examination of the provinces during the dominate”the empire of Cinnan regime shows that the Cinnans did not “

Rome anymore than they didRome itself. 1

Aug. RG. 1.2; Sall. Hist. 1.12, 1.35 McG; Cic. Brut. 45; Lég. agr. 1.21; Tac. Ann. 2.51; McGushin, pp. 82, 104.

Epilogue: The Legacy of Cinna

139

For those, like Cicero, whodefended the values of the Roman nobility, the fact that the Cinnans executed prominent members of the Senate and that Cinna andCarbo held repeatedly the desperately-competed-over contyrannisulship were sufficient grounds for labelling the Cinnan regime “ . Cinna’s nemesis, Sulla, hada little better reputation, even though his cal” character andmethods were criticized, because he restored the moral and political traditions of theRepublic to its most conservative leaders. For this, the ancient writers forgave Sulla much. Cinna they did not. The political

and economic work of his administration for the benefit of the whole State did not earn him or his fellows any reprieve from a sort of damnatio memoriae. For notlong after, as Sallust informs us, the name of Cinna was synonymous in political propaganda with tyrant; centuries later, Dio Cassius putinto the mouth of the Emperor Otho this statement: “ ForI certainly should prefer to be a Mucius, Decius, Curtius, or Regulus, rather than a 2 So, Cinna lived on as a stock-figure in politiMarius, Sulla, or Cinna....” cal symbology as the arbitrary autocrat, no matter how inaccurate the label.3

This was not Cinna’s only legacy. The ambitions andcompetitiveness of the Roman aristocracy intensified after Sulla’s victory, even though the heart of the newSenate consisted of menwhohadsupported Sulla. Indeed,

by eliminating or limiting so many of their

Cinnan foes, these Sullan senators largely removed the cause that had given them cohesion and a purpose for working together in spite of their ambitions. Many of them had already demonstrated during the fighting that they were loyal only to their own version of the Republic, that the “legitimacy”of Cinna or Sulla depended not on ius or mos maiorum but on what could be gained by joining one side or the other.4 Meanwhile, survivors from the enemy side in Rome and across Italy wanted restitution. Cinna was survived by sympathizers, such as the sons andgrandsons of the proscribed, whointently strove to reclaim lost rights and privileges, and by others, such as Sertorius and Lepidus, who challenged Sulla’s restored Republic for their ownreasons. Disgruntled former Cinnans would play a key role in Lepidus’revolt of 78, in Sertorius’ war against Metellus and Pompey in Spain, and especially in the civil war between Pompey andCaesar nearly forty years later. Memories of Cinna

2

3

4

Sall. Hist. 1.56 McG; McGushin, p. 128; Dio. 63.13.2; also 52.13.2 where Agrippa (i.e., Dio) warns Augustus notto follow Cinna in seeking absolute power. 39; Mitchell (1979): 58; Gruen (1974): 8–12; Woolliscroft, pp. 36– Earl (1967): 7– 87. 86– 604; Brunt (1971b): 107; Konrad (1988): 14 Badian (1970b): 32; Frier (1972): 603– 150. n. 17; Keaveney (1984): 146–

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could help or hurt one’s cause even then, as the propaganda of Pompey and Caesar demonstrates.5 So, Cinna left behind him the seeds of further civil strife, but he also bequeathed an example to follow: the example of a leader whocould conciliate the Senate, win the support of the equestrians andthe urban plebs, andintegrate the Italians into theRoman political equation. Heattempted to neutralize rivalries notonly to maintain his ownposition butalso to ensure peace andstability throughout Italy after years of discord andwarfare. No other figure in Rome’s history hadever done that; not until the endof the Republic would a similarly broad policy be observed. Cicero recognized the parallels between Cinna’s coaltion andJulius Caesar’s; some scholars have suggested that the latter took his father-in-law as a model. I would suggest that Augustus perfected Cinna’s approach, thanks to his own personality and the powers at his disposal. Tota Italia began to form under Cinna’s guidance, to achieve a firmer reality under the Princeps.6 Military weaknesses, treachery, propaganda, andother factors contributed to the defeat of Cinna’s faction, but that should not diminish his importance. Cinna inherited a Roman State damaged by civil war, thepersonal rivalries of powerful men, andeconomic crisis. Yethe managed to preserve that State and to help in its transformation in various ways. We may call Cinna an opportunist, but so were most Roman politicians about whom we know very much, whether optimates orpopulares or anything else. Cinna didattain power with the use of an army; one cannot dispute that fact. Nevertheless, heretained power bygaining andcultivating the support of various elements within the State. Hiswasnomilitary despotism andby no means didhe exercise absolute or tyrannical authority over the State.7 Acareful examination of theAgeof Cinna demonstrates Cinna’s statesmanship, as well as his vindictiveness, his military abilities, as well as the weaknesses of his regime, his achievements, as well as his errors. We should not follow blindly the hostile accounts of ancient sources nor whitewash Cinna or hiscomrades either. Rather, weshould strive to understand what they faced and accomplished and recognize that they were driven by principle as well as opportunistic ambition.8

5 6

7 8

65; 540; Syme (1939): 17, 65, 86, 89; Badian (1968a): 60– Keaveney (1982b): 536– 148; (1988): 72, 472. Brunt (1971b): 108– Gelzer (1968): 20 long ago believed that Caesar followed his father-in-law in some respects; Bennett, pp. 65, 69 vaguely suggested that Cinna was a forerunner or perhaps even a model for Augustus. 63. 604; Bennett, pp. 62– Frier (1972): 603– 329; Katz (1976b): 547 n. 190; Gruen (1968): 239, 247. Bulst, pp. 328–

APPENDIX: SOURCES FOR THE AGE OF CINNA Thecontradictory andfragmentary nature of thesources mustever leave thetrue history of Cinna andhis contemporaries in the twilight of doubt andcontroversy. (Bennett, Cinna and His Times, p. iv)

In the end, of course, the value of anyancient author, whatever his bias, depends on whether or not, in a given instance, all things considered, onebelieves him.

simply

(Spann, Quintus Sertorius, p. 157)

As far as weknow, notoneof Cinna’s partisans wrote about their ownlife, let alone Cinna’s. There is noevidence that anyancient author ever wrote a biography of Cinna; theonly thing that comes close to oneis a sketch byan anonymous compiler in the late antique work De viris illustribus. Consequently, wemust glean the details of Cinna’s life andcareer from a variety of sources, notoneof which focuses onhimas its major subject. There was indeed considerable interest in Cinna on the part of many ancient authors spanning several centuries; hewasnotsoobscure to them as hemaynowbe to some students of Roman history. But these writers drew for their material, and even biases, upon the information provided by Cinna’s enemies. Cinna, like so many historical figures on the losing end of a struggle, received a lot of “ bad press”because his victorious opponents wrote the history. This fact has important ramifications for this study. We must approach our sources with a healthy dose of circumspection andattempt to answer the central question: howdoweknow what wedo about Cinna? To begin, most of our evidence is literary. Though some numismatic and epigraphic evidence is extant, it must be even more cautiously inter-

preted. Much first-hand evidence has been lost.1 This has often tempted modern scholars todangerous circular arguments andconclusions about the origin and transmission of the information in the late sources we do pos-

sess. Though there are broad essays that treat the main literary traditions for the early first century B.C., no scholar has puttogether a specific analysis of sources for Cinna’s political ascendancy andcareer in Rome. Here we 1

51; VanOoteghem (1964): 5–10; Brunt Carney (1961a): 2 n. 2; Badian (1962b): 48– (1980b): 477– 494; Bennett, p. iv; Ramage, pp. 116–121; Dowling, pp. 305–306.

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intend to remedy that deficiency regarding the Age of Cinna.

for the Ageof Cinna

by re-examining the ancient tradition

I The memoirs written by theenemies of Cinna andMarius lie at the heart of much of the literary tradition. If theRes Gestae of Augustus is anyindication, Roman memoirs contained very fewfacts about political andmilitary opponents. Instead, understandably, they focused onthemilitary exploits of the author, sometimes in great detail, while reducing those opponents to highly-charged labels. Complex political maneuvers played very little role in such accounts, as is evident even from Caesar’s Commentaries. Roman autobiography always operated from a practical, political purpose: to defend one’s actions while molding public opinion, contemporary andfuture.2 The five memoirs known to have survived (as fragments used by later authors in the form of quoted excerpts or reworked paraphrases) from figures in the early first century B.C. recorded a very one-sided version of events andpersonalities. Indeed, most of these memoirs probably said little about Cinna andhis regime. This is surely true of M. Aemilius Scaurus’ memoirs, for he died c. 89 B.C. According to various testimonia, Q. Lutatius Catulus, in opposition to Marius, wrote of his deeds as consul and proconsul against the Cimbri andTeutones, not of his last days in a Rome under siege by Cinna. L. Licinius Lucullus andP. Rutilius Rufus are each attested as having composed a history of his times in Greek and an autobiography; these works mayhave included a record of events at Rome in the 80s, butsuch a record would not have been based on first-hand experience andappraisal, for neither of these men was present in Italy during the civil strife. For events in the East during the Mithridatic conflict, both mayhave provided details for Appian andPlutarch, among others: Lucullus served as one of Sulla’s officers at the time, while Rutilius lived in exile at Smyrna then.3 This leaves Sulla’s memoirs, anunprecedented career history intwentytwo books heavily concerned with defending his military and diplomatic achievements and attributing his success to Fortune’s favor and divine portents. If Sulla included anything about theyear 87, this maybe reflected

2 3

102. 285; Ramage, pp.95– 268, 276– 241, 259– 236, 238– Misch, pp.233– 16, 40; RE s.v. “Rutilius”#34; See n. 2. OnRutilius, see VanOoteghem (1964): 10– 4; Plut. Pomp. 37.3; Calabi, p. 249; HRF, pp. Cic. Rab. Post. 27; Dio. 30/35.95.3– 125. OnLucullus’competition with Sisenna andHortensius, see Plut. Luc. 1; 118– HRF, p. 135; Syme (1964): 206.

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143

in the account of his prosecution by M. Vergilius and the respectively hostile andamicable images of Cinna andOctavius that have come downin Plutarch andothers. But knowledge of events at Rome after Sulla left for theEast, except asthey mayhave affected himdirectly, would have come to him second-hand from family, friends, and allies. Perhaps he recorded these, but again, Sulla was not an eyewitness to or participant in affairs at 83. Ontheother hand, hisowndescription of military Rome for mostof 87– anddiplomatic maneuvers against Mithridates surely forms the basis of the pro-Sullan Livian tradition and echoes through the accounts of Appian, Plutarch, Diodorus, and others, who apparently used local records of the war as well. Sulla’s first-hand account of Roman affairs would have re82 when he returned in bloody vengeance to Italy. sumed for the years 83– The generally favorable attitude to Sulla’s acts at that time inAppian, as in

Plutarch, matches the Livian traditon andprobably derives ultimately from thememoirs; there are, however, anti-Sullan comments in these accounts as well, perhaps indicating other, conflicting sources.4 In conclusion, Sulla’s memoirs were probably the best of the five for later authors to utilize in their accounts of the 80s. Nonetheless, his memoirs would be most reliabe for only certain parts of the decade, intentional bias notwithstanding. And what information would one gain from such memoirs regarding the enemies of the author?: probably very little in detail andhighly polemical in tone.

II

An extensive annalistic literature developed in the post-Sullan period, most notably the works of Q. Claudius Quadrigarius, Valerius Antias, C. Licinius Macer, andQ. Aelius Tubero. Aside from Macer, an avid popularis, these menare regarded as “Sullan”annalists; their works expressed a conservative andpro-Sullan viewpoint. More importantly, however, nothing survives of their annals ontheperiod under investigation here, with the exception of four fragments of Quadrigarius’ Book 19. This one book 4

5, 9.27, 19.5, 23.2; Luc. 1.3; Suet. Gram. RE s.v. “Cornelius”#392; Plut. Sull. 6.3– 237, 19; Misch, pp. 236– 134, esp. ff. 11– 11.3.5; Cic. Div. 1.33, 72; HRF, pp. 127– 248; Ramage, pp. 95–102; Van Ooteghem (1964): 17–18; Konrad (1994): xlii; 244– 205; Wool256; Keaveney (1982a): 204– 218; (1975): 245– Valgiglio (1956b): 209– 251, 302. For 39. On the structure of the work, see Calabi, pp. 247– liscroft, pp. 35– 519; Calabi, pp. discussion of scope and years covered, see Lewis (1991): 509– 301 and Val270 (88 B.C.); Calabi, pp. 295– 281 and Valgiglio (1975): 263– 279– 274 82 B.C.); Calabi, pp. 282– 294 andValgiglio, pp. 271– giglio, pp. 274– 275 (83– (Mithridatic War).

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apparently covered all the years from 87 to 80 and it is likely that Quadrigarius focused on the military details of the period, especially the Mithridatic War, and gave short shrift to Cinna’s regime. The four fragments merely confirm what we already know from other sources; their greatest usefulness is in fixing thedate for certain strands of thehistorical tradition.5 Alongside these, more complex histories of recent events were also produced. Among these were the Histories of L. Cornelius Sisenna, a contemporary of Quadrigarius with connections to Sulla’s faction (especially Lucullus andVerres). Sallust andCicero praised this author andhis work, though not without qualification. The latter criticized Sisenna on stylistic grounds, while the former disapproved of his apparent pro-Sullan bias.6 According to Velleius, Sisenna’s Histories covered the era of civil wars 78 B.C.); theextant fragments inandthe foreign wars of Sulla (that is, 91– dicate anextent of at least twelve books. These remnants, preserved largely by the late antique grammarian Nonius Marcellus, have offered scholars a battleground onwhich to debate Sisenna’s political attitudes andviewpoint. Yetdefinitive conclusions to these debates cannot be arrived at from what is left of theHistories. Onefragment in particular hasbeen a primary focus of scholars: it flies in the face of all the rest of the tradition by stating that Sulla’s dictatorship waswidely andfavorably embraced in Italy. Some have taken this as a clear indication of Sisenna’s pro-Sullan sympathies; others accept it as clear proof of Italian support for Sulla’s restoration of the Republic. It seems presumptuous to assume so muchfrom onefragment of his work, especially because it mayhave beeneither supported orrefuted byits narrative context. Unfortunately, the half-dozen extant fragments of Sisenna’s history that apparently deal with Cinna’s time are of exactly the same vague nature. Weare left assuming a conservative viewpoint from Sisenna because he moved in conservative circles and was labeled as such by Sallust.7

5

6

7

38. On QuadGenerally, see Badian, “ The Early Historians,”in Dorey (1966): 1– 84; HRR 1.cclxxxv, 205; Badian (1962b): 151esp. ff. 81– rigarius, see HRF, pp. 136– 197; HRR 1.cccl, 298; Candiloro, pp. 223– 50. On Macer, see HRF, pp. 190– 49– 224; VanOoteghem (1964): 40. OnAntias, see HRF, pp. 151–175; HRR 1.ccv, 238. 202; HRR 1.ccclxvi, 308. On Tubero, see HRF, pp. 199– Cic. Brut. 228, 259; 2 Verr. 15.33, 20.43; Leg. 1.7: Cicero regarded Sisenna’s imitation of Cleitarchos as unrefined and childish, yet he surpassed all other historians of Rome. Sisenna was a scholar of the liberal arts and well versed in 5 McG; lug. 95.2: Sisenna was the best and most affairs of state; Sall. Hist. 1.4– careful of recent historians, but not sufficiently frank; Rawson (1979): 336; Plut. 217; Konrad (1994): xlii; Luc. 1.2; Van Ooteghem (1964): 21; Candiloro, pp. 212– 431; Balsdon (1965): 230. 51; (1964b): 422– Badian (1962b): 50– On the structure and extent of Sisenna’s work, see Vell. 2.9.6; Tac. Hist. 3.51;

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As to Sisenna’s sources, it hasbeen suggested that he hadaccess to oral accounts from various participants andprobably to archival records, as well as Sulla’s memoirs. Sisenna’s history became a respected standard for future generations, in part no doubt because he hadused the best available sources. Yet, given thecondition of thefragments, thestudent of theCinnan era can dolittle more than mourn the loss of Sisenna’s complete narrative.8 III

M. Tullius Cicero almost single-handedly represents the positive tradition toward Marius; he regarded that great general, his compatriot from Arpinum, as much like himself, a political outsider, and so tended to forgive Marius’ pragmatic means in his rise to prominence.9 Cicero had a very Roman tendency to view historical figures in very personal terms, often idealized and simplified. And yet most scholars believe that his historical information is largely reliable.10 From where did Cicero obtain his facts about Marius and especially about Cinna? First, from his ownexperience. Cicero grew up in Arpinum with relatives and supporters of Marius, like the Gratidii. In fact, Marius Graditianus, one of Cinna’s staunch supporters and Marius’nephew, was also Cicero’s second cousin on his father’s side. At Rome, Cicero learned oratory from L. Crassus and M. Antonius and moved in the circles of dignitas and auctoritas; he served in the contubernium of Pompeius Strabo during the Social War andprobably met Cinna, who was one of Strabo’s legates. Cicero also served under Sulla inthewar, andheard theunpolished, though effective, oratory of Sertorius.11 During thecivil warof the 80s, Cicero took noactive part oneither side, instead focusing onhislegal training. Unlike manyothers, hedidnotflee to 220; Badian (1962b): 50; Rawson (1979): 336. Onits tone, see Candiloro, pp. 217– 51; Rawson, p. 337; so also, 225; Badian, pp. 50– n. 6 above; Candiloro, pp. 220– 132. 189, esp. ff. 125– Badian (1969): 447. See HRF, pp. 175– 8 On Sisenna’s sources, see Candiloro, p. 221; Rawson (1979): 336; Badian (1962b): 50; n. 6 above. 86, 112, 121–122; 20; 2 Verr. 2.5.181; Carney (1960a): 84– 9 Cic. Quinct. 8.19– 326; Werner, pp. 105–110, 28, 325– 15; Van Ooteghem (1964): 23– (1967): 5– 7, 14–

196. 163– 28; Badian (1962b): 48; Ram88; Van Ooteghem (1964): 23– 10 Carney (1960a): 87– 45; Brunt (1980a): 312–318, 25, 36– 40, 99–100; Rawson (1972): 33– baud, pp. 18– 340. 339– 137, 142; Red. Sen. 228, 308; Rosc. 136– 11 Cic. Leg. 3.36; Phil. 5.17; Brut. 180, 227– 39 Sq; Badian (1962b): 49; Carney (1960a): 89; Stockton (1976): 4.9; Asc. pp. 37– 17; Marshall (1985a): 127; Gruen (1968): 242; Konrad (1994): xliv; Mitchell 1– (1979): 84.

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Sulla butremained theentire time under the Cinnan regime. Indeed, he saw many of his friends andrelatives proscribed by Sulla. Moreover, his first bigcase, thedefense of Roscius ofAmeria, putCicero squarely atoddswith Sulla’s record. In later writings, Cicero rarely relied onthe Sullan annalists for information either. So, it would be hardto argue that young Cicero was a friend of Sulla, even though he didsupport the latter’s reconstitution of the Republic.12 Cicero’s view of Cinna is unfavorable, though notcompletely. Hestates that Cinna wascomparable to Sulla as a military leader in the Social War.13 Cinna hadfought with Octavius as a defender of the rights of newcitizens recte,”or at least andof the dignity of the consulship; in this, Cinna acted “ “ de iure,” C icero later toldAtticus.14 Nevertheless, Cicero does not absolve Cinna of all guilt. Indeed, his judgment falls heavily on Cinna, a man unwilling to compromize with his colleague, and on Octavius, the violent provocator of Cinna. Both brought strife andsuffering to the State that, as consuls, they were duty-bound to protect.15 Further, victory brought excessively cruel vengeance: Cicero holds Cinna primarily responsible for the execution of principes in 87 and always regards Cinna as the dominant partner andmotivator of his faction.16 As far as the orator wasconcerned, Cinna andOctavius, Sulla andMarius, were all tyrants andhostes.17 Cicero regarded Cinna’s dominatio as arbitrary andcontrary to Roman traditions andthe dignity of the aristocracy. Nevertheless, overall, Cinna’s “regnum”wasno military despotism, or reign of terror, according to Cicero, and especially when compared with Sulla’s return. Indeed, Cicero is practically the only author that provides evidence for the Cinnae dominatio, triennium sine armis”.18 Despite his disapproval, he which he termed “ portrays society andthe legal procedures of government as basically functioning as usual and without much interference from the Cinnans. The orator admits the cooperation with Cinna of time-serving but illustrious 113; Div. 1.33, 72, 2.30, 65; 12 Cic. Rosc. loc. cit.; Quinct. loc. cit.; Brut. 29, 35, 112– 29; Asc. pp. 131– Arch. loc. cit.; Att. 9.7c; Verr. loc. cit.; Off. 1.49, 51, 109, 2.27– 87; Kinsey 139 Sq; Badian (1962b): 49; Carney (1960a): 88; Rambaud, pp. 63– 313. 67; cf. Dowling, pp. 306– (1967): 61– 13 Cic. Font. 42– 43; Carney (1960a): 108; (1967): 7; cf. Mitchell (1979): 82–90. 117. 14 Cic. Att. 9.10.3.6; Phil. 8.2.7; Cat. 3.24.8; Caec. 87.10; Carney (1960a): 114– 2, 14.23; Har. 54; Cat. 3.24.8; Sest. 77. 15 Cic. Phil. 13.1– 56; De 16 Phil. 11.1.1, 14.34; Att. 7.7.7.9, 9.10.3.6; Vat. 23; ND. 3.80–81; Tusc. 5.54– Or. 3.8–10. 17 Phil. 13.1, 14.23, ND.2.14; Div. 1.4; Sest. 36; Cat. 3.10.24; Att. 7.7.7, 9.10.3; Har. 54. 228, 308; cf. Mitchell 18 Both are phrases of Cicero’s: Phil. 1.34 and Brut. 227– 84. (1979): 83–

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statesmen, such as L. Valerius Flaccus andQ. Mucius Scaevola Pontifex; Cicero himself did not sympathize with “that party”of Cinna, but never openly defied them either. Moreover, theplebs, Italian towns, andequestriansgave Cinna broad support.19 Ontheother hand, Sulla, as anopponent of these groups and their interests, punished them all too viciously on his return.20

Cicero passed many of hisjudgments on the Cinnan era in speeches he made during the civil unrest of his ownday, especially the Philippics. Thus, the deeds of Cinna andhis contemporaries served as examples for Cicero’s contemporaries; he hoped that the civil war of the previous generation would teach lessons against vengeance and cruelty to his own. Cicero regarded the later conflict as a repetition of the former, another contest for self andfaction, andhoped to persuade his fellows not to make the errors their predecessors had. In the event, he condemned his contemporaries as more vicious anddestructive. Cinna andSulla hadbeenmildincomparison

to the Triumvirs.21 The emphasis in modern analyses of Cicero’s sources on his factual accuracy fails to give sufficient weight to his oratorical techniques, such as overstatement, understatement, omission, selectivity, andso on. Cicero, as an advocate, was not in the business of providing information, but of tailoring that information in order to achieve a certain result in the courtroom. He, therefore, could not be completely frank about the subject at hand, but had to consider the perspective of thejury and the interests of his client, andtreat the facts accordingly. Most of Cicero’s references to Cinna andthe Cinnan era can be found in such legal speeches. So, wemust take into account thecourtroom context andits dynamics whenanalyzing Cice. facts” ro’s “ IV Unfortunately, Sallust’s Histories survive only in fragments. This work covered the era of Pompey’s rise, from 78 to 67 B.C., apparently starting where Sisenna left off, intending to augment andcorrect the latter’s overly 228, 81; Phil. 2.108.3, 5.6.17; Dom. 83; Att. 8.3.6.2; Brut. 227– 19 Cic. ND. 3.32, 80– 308; Rosc. 137, 142; Font. loc. cit.; Quinct. loc. cit.; Flac. loc. cit.; Asc. p. 139 Sq; Carney (1960a): 120. 38, 81; Off. 1.49, 51, 2; Leg. 2.56; 2 Verr. 2.1.34– 20 Cic. Phil. 8.2.7, 9.13, 12.27, 13.1– 109, 2.29, 3.80; Cat. 2.20, 3.14; Leg. agr. 2.78, 3.3–13; Att. 9.7c, 9.14, 9.15.2; Rosc. loc. cit.; Dom. 79; Font. 6; Fam. 9.21; Dio. 44.28.1, 45.37.4; Carney (1960a): 118– 87. 119; cf. Mitchell (1979): 86– 84, 90. 21 Mitchell (1979): 81, 83–

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biased account, which hadfailed to present thecrimes of Sulla in their full light. Several scholars have convincingly argued that Sallust wrote substantially on the 80s in his introduction to the Histories (in imitation of Thucydides’Pentakontaetia). Sallust in all his writings is firmly critical of Sulla, a manwhose naked lust for power set a terrible example for leaders of Sallust’s generation. But Sallust is not in favor of the Cinnans either; they too lacked virtue and revealed the corruption of Rome by the forces of uncontrolled power and greed. As in the Bellum Catilinae and the Bellum lugurthinum, Sallust’s theme in the Histories is the moral disintegration and socio-political turmoil of the Late Republic, a pessimistic theme that condemns all participants in civil war.22 The language of theextant fragments bears this out, asdotheremains of the epitome of Sallust written by Julius Exuperantius in the fourth or fifth century A.D. The latter preserves bits of a considerable account of the civil warfrom Sulla’s March on Rome to the death of Sertorius. The two main scholia to Lucan’s version of these events mayalso derive ultimately from Sallust. Certainly, Augustine of Hippo usedSallust for those passages in his City of Godthat mention thecivil wars of theCinnan era.23 Thanks to these various sources, some very useful circumstantial detail for this period, as well as traces of political and moral commentary, survive from the Histo-

ries.

V Later compilers preserved the relevant portion of Diodorus Siculus’Bibliotheca, but in a fragmentary, chronologically-confused form. Diodorus’ extant account, like Plutarch’s, tells us little about Cinna’s career andwhat

43 McG; McGushin, pp. 1– 18, 64– 38, 42– 22, 34– 22 See lug. 95.2; Hist. 1.10–15, 20– 184; Rawson (1979) 336– 91; Syme (1964): 122– 85, 90– 124, 180– 82, 84– 66, 70– 15; (1994): xliv; see also García-Moreno, 338; (1987): 178–180; Konrad (1988): 12– 160; Van Ooteghem (1964): 29– 157; Usher, pp. 125– pp. 141–152; Spann, pp. 156– 232 219 (Sulla’s return), 219– 210 (Cinnans), 210– 34; La Penna (1963a): 207– 315. For Sallust’s sources, see Konrad (1994): (Sertorian War); Dowling, pp. 313– 30; Badian (1962b): 51; Syme, pp. 205–207; xlii-xliv; Van Ooteghem, pp. 29– 82. Anderson, pp. 57– 53 Z andZorzet23 OnExuperantius, see Rawson (1987): 178; (1979): 337; Exup. 22– ti, pp. xiv-xx. On the Scholia to Lucan, see Adn. super Luc. 2.76, 79, 88, 114, 119– 140, 149, 160, 174, 548, 7.306 E; Comm. Bern. 121, 124, 126, 134–135, 137, 139– 151, 174, 192, 197, 545, 7.306 U; McGushin, pp. 137, 149– 126, 136– 2.114, 121– 92, 96. On Augustine, 92; Rawson (1987): 163–164, 178; Fantham (1987): 89– 91– see Fantham, p. 91; McGushin, loc. cit.; Rawson, p. 179; CD. 2.18 (quotes Hist. 28. 23, 3.27– 1.10, 13 McG), 2.21–

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he says about the man is completely negative: Cinna was the wicked, impious enemy of his owncountry andsuffered a deserved punishment at the hand of Fate. There are scattered details about Cinna’s victory over

Octavius and the purge of the aristocracy that followed, the deeds of Sulla andFimbria in the East, andSulla’s “divine”triumph over young Marius. Otherwise, the extant fragments of Diodorus’account appear to be charactersketches: theabdication of Merula, conscientious Roman statesman; the death of noble Catulus, victim of Marius’ bloodlust; or the treachery of greedy Fimbria. Thus, what we have is not a complete account by any means.24 Still, Diodorus’version matches with Plutarch’s andAppian’s in certain particulars andso perhaps shares some similar basis, butwhat? Livy is not possible because Diodorus predates Livy. The universal history of Posidonius of Apamea has long been suggested as the principal source andmodel for Diodorus’ account of the Late Republic. This disciple of the Stoic Panaetius and friend of prominent Roman aristocrats, like Metellus Pius, Pompey, and Cicero, wrote fifty-two books of history covering the years 145 to 80 B.C. Only fragments survive today; they seem to have a conservative bias anda theme of constant moral decay in Rome. Further, according to Plutarch, thephilosopher metMarius in Rome notlong before the latter’s death; his opinion of the great general was not favorable. With his firsthand experience and connections, Posidonius could well have had access to much primary evidence for his work.25 Diodorus’descriptions reveal a vehement dislike of Marius andequally clear favor for the conservative aristocrats around Sulla, which perhaps echoes Posidonius’ feelings. Nonetheless, when weconsider the fragmentary state of both Diodorus’andPosidonius’works, attribution of particular bits of evidence from the former to the latter is difficult if not futile. In the last analysis, what matters most is that the similarities between Diodorus’ episodes andother, fuller accounts indicate anearly tradition of events and the continuation of that tradition in the works of Imperial authors.

20, 40; Cassola (1982): 724– 3, 38/39.1–19; Van Ooteghem (1964): 19– 24 Diod. 1.2– 237; Valgiglio (1956a): 238; Konrad (1994): xlv; 770; Usher, pp. 235– 728, 763– 386; Sacks, 388; García-Moreno, pp. 136–137; Drews, pp. 383– Fornara, pp. 387–

pp. 23–82 (philosophical principles), 83–116 (view and method of history), 117– 322. 127 (attitude to Rome in Late Republic); Dowling, pp. 319– 38 and 2C pp. 154–161, 185–189 (ff. 36 and 38 = 25 Jacoby FGH 2A #87 ff. 36– 86 B.C., f. 37 = Plut. Mar. 45.7); Konrad (1994): xlii; Malitz, pp. Mithridates in 88– 408; Momigliano (1972): 280; (1978): 15; Ruschen228, 394– 74, 96–134, 198– 70– 41 (life), 42 (influence on Diodorus and 76; Strasburger, pp. 40– busch, pp. 70– 269. 29, 237– Plutarch), 44, 47 (moral decline of Rome); Desideri (1973): 3–

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VI

The books of T. Livius in which he dealt with the 80s B.C. are lost. The extant epitomes or summaries of these books (dating to the fourth century A.D. andstemming from a long tradition of Livian abridgments), are really only bare skeletal outlines noting the major personalities andevents in any

given year; they must be handled carefully. Scholars agree as to their general reliability but recognize some inaccuracies and problems with order andchronology. Incomparison with the earlier sections of Livy’s his90 apparently contained a remarkable wealth of informatory, books 79– tion, covering as they did about one year of history per book, that is, from 78 B.C.26 88– Where did Livy, writing generations after the fact, obtain his information on this period? Without the complete account, this is impossible to determine. He probably had available to him the annalists as well as the more complex histories noted above. But if he followed his usual technique of relying primarily on one source for a section and appending to his version extra bits of evidence from others, then which didhechoose for that one source? Sisenna seems the most likely possibility because his account was the recognized authority on the era of Sulla andreflected a conservative viewpoint with which Livy might sympathize. Since the epitomes preserve moralistic condemnation of Sulla as well as Marius, Livy perhaps adapted Sisenna’s version in light of evidence andcommentary from other sources, as well as his ownopinions.27 The extant summaries provide us with details and only glimpses of Livy’s further discussion or explanation. These details andcomments are welcome and useful, but consider how much of what Livy said and the opinions he expressed about Cinna andhis regime is lost to us!28 Anentire tradition of literature grew outof the adaptation andabridgement of Livy’s history.29 Lucan has a brief description of the 80s in his

26 On the structure and reliability of the epitomes of Livy, see Badian (1962b): 48; 338; 334, 337– 198; Begbie, pp. 332– Van Ooteghem (1964): 40; Usher, pp. 161– 8; (1974): 8–10, 22; Luce (1977): 10– 296; Walsh (1961): 7– Stadter (1972): 294– 55; (1982): 1238, 1248–1252, 1259–1263; Konrad (1994): 24; Bessone (1984): 50– xlviii.

172; 81, 110– 27 On Livy’s sources, method, and viewpoint, see Walsh (1961): 20– 51; 33; Luce (1977): 147–158, 165–176; Badian (1962b): 48– 16, 23– (1974): 11– 226; Konrad (1994): 87; Valgiglio (1956a): 237; Candiloro, pp. 223– Hine, pp. 83– xlvi-xlvii; Syme (1964): 206; Spann, p. xi; García-Moreno, p. 141; Dowling, pp. 329. 324– 90, esp. 79, 80, 89. 28 Livy. Per. 79– 29 This tradition included the Liber prodigiorum of Julius Obsequens (4th C. A.D.), 3rd Cs. A.D.), the Breviarium ab urbe the Liber memorialis of L. Ampelius (2nd–

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Pharsalia; he clearly derived his facts and their arrangement from Livy. The poem does not contain any information wedo nototherwise possess,

butit is of interest to usinits dramatic presentation of thevictims of Marius andCinna in 87 andof Sulla in 82; Lucan vehemently condemned civil war, andstressed the personal rivalry of Marius andSulla (to the virtual exclusion of Cinna’s role) for the sake of his stark moral message.30 The Antonine author L. Annaeus Florus composed a substantial epitome of Livy, one of the best sources wepossess for the lost books of that monumental work. Florus mayhave used the full text or relied on a later abridgement for easy access. It is also believed that Florus wasinfluenced by the writings of Cato the Younger, Sallust, andSeneca the Younger and interjected evidence from them when appropriate to his theme.31 Overall, Florus regarded the civil wars of the 80s as little more than personal contests between talented but immoral leaders; they exemplified the moral dilemmas of the dying Republic. In Florus’view, there was no difference between Sulla andMarius, andhe didnoteven bother to discuss Cinna’s motives andplans. Instead, Florus tried to convey the pessimistic spirit of thetimes byemphasizing military events andinternecine atrocities in summary, though often sensationalized, fashion. Though overly rhetorical, Florus, in his way,helps usto confirm thePeriochae of Livy as well as other accounts.32

Only bits andpieces survive of the history written by Granius Licinianus; we do not even have a preserved title by which to call it. Scholars believe that it was composed in the Antonine era andcovered the earliest times of Rome down to 44 B.C. in about forty books; the remains of book thirty-five deal with the 80s. The text of Livy or an epitome of it probably formed thebasis for Licinianus’account; his information often matches that 4th C. A.D.), and the Roman History of Dio Cassius condita of Eutropius (mid– 3rd Cs. A.D.). Obsequens made three entries (56a– (2nd– b, 57) on interesting phenomena in ourperiod (i.e., in 87, 86, and83 B.C.). Ampelius condensed Livy’s 3 with Assman iii-xxvi). narrative of the 80s into twenty lines of brief scope (42.1– xvi) focuses almost exclusively 9.2 with Ruehl v– Eutropius’ longer account (4.1– onSulla’s military operations. Lastly, Dio’s account (30/35.102.1–109.14) survives in a half-dozen lengthy fragments. These can be characterized as highly rhetorical in style andmoralistic in tone –Cinna andSulla come off very badly andDiodoes his best to exaggerate the slaughter andevils of the civil war. Aside from a fewbits of information, most of these sources confirm what is found in other Livian 1263; xlviii; Bessone (1982): 1238, 1253– material. See n. 26; Konrad (1994): xlvii– 78; Usher, pp. 249– 253. 38, 73– 4, 28– Millar, pp. 1–

205. 796, 9.204– 550, 4.822–824, 6.793– 234, 545– 583, 2.74– 30 See n. 23. Luc. 1.581– 31 Baldwin (1988): 134–139, 149–152; Badian (1962b): 48; Walsh (1974): 22; Bes107. sone (1982): 1235, 1258; (1993): 97– 12, 21, 25, 28. 6, 10– 32 See n. 31 andFlor. 2.9.1–

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found in thePeriochae andFlorus. It hasbeen suggested that he used other antiquarian sources as well; there are references to Sallust and Rutilius Rufus andsome indications of Sulla’s influence, perhaps through Sisenna. Most importantly, Licinianus’record of the military maneuvers in Cinna’s siege of Rome andSulla’s campaign against Mithridates provides us with welcome circumstantial detail.33 Paulus Orosius of Bracara Augusta, the pupil of Augustine, used a late epitome of Livy to compose a universal history from a Christian perspective. Heemphasized the stark contrast between the internecine warfare and strife of the pagan past and the promise of the Christian future.34 So it should notsurprise usthat Orosius wrote three chapters onthecivil strife of the 80s B.C., in which he combined the facts he found in Livy with his own lengthy commentaries and moral condemnations. Orosius’ account does help us confirm the Livian evidence if wepaycareful attention anddistinguish his strong bias andmoral purpose from his facts.35 Lastly, the anonymous De viris illustribus consists of eighty-six biographical sketches. Composed around the first half of the fourth century A.D., it also ultimately derives from a Livian epitome. Notonly are Marius and Sulla included among these brief summaries, but also Marius the Younger, Fimbria, Mithridates, and even Cinna. Moreover, though the author recorded only the most “ memorable”details, he still included his own moral disapproval of his subjects through colorful and charged labels.36

VII Velleius Paterculus wrote a compendium of Roman history during the reign of Tiberius, a unique work combining annalistic and biographical techniques; it revealed Rome’s past through a gallery of individuals. His main interests were military and diplomatic maneuvers and public virtus; Velleius was influenced perhaps by Sallust. Velleius’evidence often matches that of his contemporary Valerius Maximus and the epitomator Florus, indicating the use of material from Livy, but he evidently also consulted other works from the Late Republican andAugustan eras.37 xiii; Konrad (1994): 33 Gran. Lic. 35.1–50 Cr and Criniti (1993): 151–181; (1981): v– 10; Walsh (1974): 22. lii; Scardigli (1983): 3– xlix; Badian (1962b): 48. 34 See n. 26. Konrad (1994): xlviii– 7; Lippold, pp. 431– 2, 5.22.2– 22, 5.20.1, 9, 5.21.1– 4, 8, 12–16, 20– 35 Oros. 5.19.1– 436. 36 Konrad (1994): xlix; Bessone (1982): 1257–1263; Sherwin, pp. 298–301; DVI. 67– 77. 70, 74– 244; Konrad 167; Usher, pp. 241– 427; Starr, pp. 162– 37 Hellegouarc’h, pp. 412–

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Velleius’account of Cinna’s time begins bycondemning Cinna butends with words of thinly-veiled praise, almost a sort of admiration. His treatment of other participants is similar. Perhaps only an experienced military mancould see other warriors in quite this way. Overall, Velleius’rhetorical style andinterest in the human side of civil strife bring the personalities of the era to life.38 As in the vase of other Roman writers of the Imperial period, Valerius Maximus hada passion for comparing the declining morals, violence, and turmoil of the Late Republic with the relative happiness andtranquility of his owntime. Hiscollection of memorable words anddeeds clearly reveals this perspective. Valerius apparently made little effort to form consistent or accurate images of the historical figures whowere his subjects. Hesimply recorded prime examples without attention to rigorous chronological or archival precision; he must have used a variety of sources. Thus, Valerius provides us with much circumstantial detail relatively free of his own opinions andinterpretations.39 As a moralist andan Italian, Valerius shows concern for the tragic civil warof the 80s. Heportrays it in personal terms, as caused by the rivalry of Marius and Sulla. He says little about Cinna, except in regards to the conflict with Octavius. Even here, Valerius is more concerned with Cinna’s enemies andvictims than with Cinna himself. But he does include exempla involving lesser-known persons in the civil war, allowing us to learn more about Cinna’s faction andhis enemies.40

VIII

TheParallel Lives byPlutarch of Chaeronea provide another type of source for us to consider. Plutarch, a learned, well-travelled man, spent some time in Rome andhadaccess to a variety of archives there andin Greece.41 Yet one of the major difficulties in working with Plutarch is that he does not consistently identify his main sources, andwhen he does name a source, it is often as anaberration from therest of his account or because thepiece of information has some special significance or interest to him. He does cite 9; Sumner (1970): 257–279 (1994): xlix; Woodman, pp. 785–799; Gabba (1962): 1– ). 284 (“ mini-universal history” (family, career), 279–

38 Vell. 2.19.2, 22.1,5, 23.1, 24.2,5, 28.2–4. 461, 489–496; Carney (1962): 289– 39 Val. Max. 8.13pr, 9.11 ext4; Maslakov, pp.450– 337 (attitude 324, 333– 316, 323– 291 (sources: Augustan collection andLivy), 289– 294 (technique); Kempf, pp. iii– 323, 326, 329 (to Sulla), and292– to Marius), 318– xxx.

498. 9; Maslakov, pp. 496– 333; (1967): 7– 40 Carney (1962): 324–

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Sulla’s memoirs (more often than anyother Latin source he consulted), for example, but does that mean that Sulla was a main source or an ancillary

one? Long-standing tradition has identified portions of Plutarch’s Lives as fragments of Sulla’s memoirs. Further, Plutarch’s works, when they provide facts rather than political labels, do sometimes match the accounts of

others, which suggests a common source.42 At first glance, it appears that Plutarch joined his sources into a narrative without critical appraisal and accorded his preference to the more accessible accounts.43 Yet, to usetheMarius as anexample, several passages reflect pro-Marian sayings, probably fromsome Marian propaganda, and definitely not from the anti-Marian memoirists. Further, there are various layers of attitudes, judgments, andfacts in the Marius, too complex a construction to have come from a single, biased source. Indeed, it hasbecome widely accepted that Plutarch used a variety of sources for each of his works.44 As a biographer and philosopher, Plutarch sought episodes in the lives of his heroes that could be knitted together into a sort of character sketch, but these heroes were severely flawed and deserved careful scrutiny by anyone whomight admire or deride them. This wasPlutarch’s perspective andpurpose in writing biographies of great men.45 Thus, Marius became for Plutarch a victim of Fortune as well as a man destroyed by his own ambition.46 Plutarch organized around this theme whatever details he had about Marius, most of them military. A distorted ,47 and the structure of the ο ς image emerged to conform to the moral τελ

64, 81– xxvi; Jones (1971): 8– 41 On Plutarch’s background, see Konrad (1994): xxv– 86; Russell, pp. 1–17.

134 on the Roman Lives andthe nature of Plutarch’s 57, 130– 42 See Russell, pp.42– 102. On Plutarch’s sources for Marius and research; so also, Jones (1971): 99– 4830; Valgiglio (1956a): v– 4801, 4806–4816, 4821– Sulla, see Buckler, pp. 4788–

43 44 45

46

47

38; Carney 281; Van Ooteghem (1964): 35– ix; (1956b): 235; and (1975): 256– 299, 302; Konrad (1994): (1960c): 28 and (1967): 10; Calabi, pp. 248, 280, 282– lvi. On his use of Catulus and Rutilius and parallels with Appian and Livy liii– 3; and indicating some, though indefinite, connections, see Scardigli (1977): 1– 96. Pelling (1979): 74– 5; (1960c): 24. 13, esp. 11 n. 14; (1960a): 83; (1961a): 3– Carney (1967): 10– 69; Pelling (1980): 127–140. 38; Scardigli (1977): 68– Van Ooteghem (1964): 35– 26, 37– 139; Wardman (1974): 1– xii; Pelling (1980): 135– Valgiglio (1956a): v, ix– 2; Scardigli (1971): 62– 245; Stadter (1992): 1– 178, 197– 72, 97–131, 155– 42, 69– 217; De 109; Tracy, pp. 214– 98, 103– 63; Russell, pp. 101–116; Jones (1971): 88– 4545, 4566– 65; Desideri (1992): 4536– 4615; Swain (1989): 62– Blois, pp. 4610– 99, 104; Konrad (1994): xxix. 4567; Geiger, pp. 95– 140; Wardman 134; Swain (1990): 137– Carney (1967): 10, 12; Russell, pp. 132– 69. 188; Scardigli (1977): 64, 68– (1974): 36, 41– 98, 136, 179– 44, 52, 97– 352. See Carney andScardigli in n. 46; Werner, pp.341–

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on the height of Marius’career (twenty chapters out of forty-six) and the nadir (fifteen chapters), creates a woefully imbalanced portrait of an entire life.48 What canwelearn about Cinna from Plutarch’s Marius? Hesays almost nothing about the reasons for Cinna’s election or the causes of his deposition from the consulship, noting only briefly the bare events of 87. He simply brands Cinna with a variety of charged political labels, such as , without “ dictator” , “enemy of the established order” , “opponent of Sulla” anyfurther explanation.49 Plutarch’s purpose is to focus onMarius’decline; Cinna is simply associated with this, and quickly fades into the background.50 Onepositive benefit of this is that Cinna incurs no blame for the , which is laidfully onMarius’shoulders asa manifestaMarian massacre” “ tion of the general’s festering dark side.51 Despite the fact that Plutarch used sources favorable to Sulla in his Life of Sulla, the tone of the work is hostile to Sulla’s character, methods, and achievements. Though Sulla the general possessed great military skill, he turned his abilities against his owncountrymen andindeed the State, and also against Rome’s Greek subjects; to Plutarch, ruinous ambition, selfgratification, and ever-increasing violence and mercilessness marred Sulla’s very character.52 The account of Cinna’s rise in the Sulla is so brief as to be almost negligible; Sulla was forced to accept Cinna as his successor in office because of popular and senatorial pressure. Cinna’s attempt through the tribune Verginius to blacken Sulla’s reputation is mentioned along with Cinna’s basic desire to undermine the existing order of things.53 Twelve chapters follow before wehear of Cinna again; by this time, it is the year 84. Cinna is “lawless andviolent”andmany prominent Romans have fled Rome to join Sulla. Polemical language and rhetoric are designed to enhance the greatness of the Life’s main character without giving dueattention to Cinna. Cinna’s death that same year goes unnoticed.54 Plutarch generously alloted the next six chapters to the military maneuvers and proscriptions in this last stage of the conflict; and though he biography, its concentration

31 (Plutarch’s skillfully crafted but overly contrasted portrait 48 Carney (1960c): 28– 27 (his use of flanking scenes); Pelling (1980): 133; Scardigli andtechniques), 24– 69. (1977): 64– 49 Mar. 41; Scardigli (1977): 68. 140; Scardigli (1977): 64. 50 Mar. 42; Pelling (1980): 129, 139– 44; Pelling (1980): 127–129, 139–140. See n. 57. 51 Mar. 43– 68; Wardman (1974): 52, 57, 62, 49; Swain (1989): 66– 52 Sull. 10; Stadter (1992): 41– 97, 132, 185. 53 Sull. 10; Pelling (1980): 131–135, 139–140. 140. 129, 133, 139– 54 Sull. 22; Pelling (1980): 127–

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criticized Sulla’s cruelty and had some positive words for the Cinnans, he no doubt derived his information primarily from Sulla’s ownacount. Plutarch’s Sulla, then, full of political polemic, tells us next to nothing about Cinna as consul.55 Plutarch didmention Cinna in other Lives. Heplaced a different spin on his characters inhisLife of Sertorius, where hefully intended to counter the adverse information to be found in other accounts of his hero. Plutarch attempts to reveal andplay upSertorius’military andhuman virtues in contrast to the other characters in the Life, while keeping silent on the hero’s involvement in the civil war. Cinna becomes an outright revolutionary, while Octavius is a manof little initiative undeserving of Sertorius’ support. Sertorius plays a very conspicuous role as a leader in Cinna’s camp and in his gathering of an army, andPlutarch focuses on the strength and independence of these partners apart from Marius; he contradicts his own account in the Marius by stating here that Cinna hadcalled Marius to join them!56 Further, Cinna indulges incruelty here andseems easily influenced, while Sertorius, carefully distanced from Marius’ vengeance, is the one whostops Cinna andMarius from slaughtering all prominent Romans, who takes action for the common good rather than outof self-interest.57 Sertorius is, after all, the hero! they” Other Lives contain briefer notices. In Crassus, Plutarch states “ (Cinna andhis faction) destroyed the noble party including Crassus’family.58 He records the suspicion that Cinna plotted the assassination of Pompeius Strabo in his Life of Pompey. This account also records the death .59 the wicked andlawless tyrant” of Cinna, “ Cinna remains throughout Plutarch’s Lives a dangerous, subversive character andenemy of Sulla; buthis actions andcooperation with others, andPlutarch’s evaluation of them, seem to shift according to the “star”of the biography. Nevertheless, the manCinna remains a mystery; whether he was honest or treacherous, cruel or permissive remains a question open to debate on very weak evidentiary grounds. Clearly, Plutarch used what little he knew about Cinna to create a foil for his main characters. Exploring the policies or even character of Cinna wasnot of interest to him. 55

Sull. 27.

xli. On the 5; Pelling (1980): 131–135, 139–140; Konrad (1994): xxxv– 56 Sert. 4– 152; so also Russell, p. 116; sources for Sertorius, see García-Moreno, pp. 134– 54 with suggestion of Pelling (1979): 85 n. 78, 88 n. 104; cf. Scardigli (1971): 45– lvi, favors Sallust; Jones (1966): Livy also or a Livian source; but Konrad, pp. liii– 113. 68; Hillman (1997): 111– 68. 57 Sert. 5; Swain (1989): 66– 140; 58 Crass. 4; Russell, p. 134; cf. Pelling (1979): 85 n. 80; (1980): 131–135, 139– Badian (1962b): 53. 5. 59 Pomp. 3–

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IX Appian of Alexandria belonged to a circle of highly literate and wellconnected menin the Rome of theGoodEmperors. Hecomposed a work in twenty-four books organized geographically and ethnographically, a work intended toportray theinexorable growth of Rome’s empire. Thesection on Rome’s civil wars is theonly continuous narrative wepossess ontheperiod 133 to 36 B.C.60 Various scholars have attempted to identify the source for Appian’s chapters on the Cinnan era. Gabba’s argument for Livy as the principal source is cogent andmost widely accepted. This view most neatly explains how Appian and others share parallel information and even outline that cannot be coincidental. Even if weaccept Gabba’s theory, however, it helps us to evaluate the evidence inAppian only to a limited degree because we donotpossess thefull Livy forcomparison. HowmuchdidAppian manipulate that information to suit hisownstated scheme? Further, Appian records evidence absent from anyother sources, as well as opinions andcommentary which should be identified as his own. Where didhe obtain the unique evidence?61 Finally, scholars recognize the independence of Appian from his sources, as implied in his ownPreface; he crafted his narrative around his owngoals, interpreting notjust transcribing his evidence.62 Appian’s focus, though often military, still provides insight into the most important political andsocio-economic issues of the 80s. Heis also a fairly neutral source for events in Cinna’s era. From the start, he portrays Cinna as an active politician who incites the friends of the exiles to ally with the supporters of the Sulpician program for mutual advantage. The other Cinnans also come off fairly well in Appian’s view.

60 On Appian’s background, see App. Pref. 15; Brodersen, pp. 352– 363; Gabba xiv; Hahn, pp.383– (1958): v– 395. Onthestructure andpurpose of his Ρ μ α ο ικ α , see xiv. 14; Gabba, pp. xii– App. Pref. 12– xxix; Valgiglio xx, xxii– 114, esp. 91– 92; (1958): xvi– 92, 108– 61 Gabba (1956a): 79– 465; Bessone (1982): (1956a): 236; Konrad (1994): xlii, li– lii; Ennslin, pp. 415– 549; 246; Magnino, pp. 546– 1235; Van Ooteghem (1964): 39; Usher, pp. 244– 501; Rawson (1979): 339; Candiloro, pp. 222– 223, 499, 500– McGing (1993): 496– 170; cf. Badian (1958c) and(1959c). 226; Luce (1977): 168– 6 argued that the ὁμ ο ν ο ια and ευ α τ χ ια of his 7, 11, 14–15; BC. 1.1– 62 App. Pref. 6– ownage arose from the civil strife of the Late Republic; from a series of struggles, onestasiarch wonout. Further, hisemphasis onthecruelty, injustice, anddishonesty of the civil warriors served to heighten the contrast between their military power and the Emperor’s peace andmercy, andthe necessity of the latter. So, Appian’s 115, 95, 114– 8, 93– view is naturally against thetyrant Sulla. See Gabba (1956a): 3– 543; Cuff (1983): 528, 540– 221; (1958): xv, xxi, 3–10; Magnino, pp. 525– 220– 501, 507; VanOoteghem (1964): 39; Konrad (1994): 156; McGing (1993): 500– 148– 371. 219, 367– li; Werner, pp. 215–

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Why is this? Perhaps Appian used a source (in addition to Livy) that wasfavorable to Cinna or the Italian cause. Perhaps his portrayal of Cinna was tempered by his obvious distaste for Sulla; Sulla’s cruelty, violence, and unrestrained abuses of power resulted from selfish ambition andevil character. Hewas a tyrant, andhis age is well gone in Appian’s opinion.63 Despite such biases, Appian is an enormously valuable source for our study; his is the only continuous account available to us andhe preserves much of Livy’s history.

X Wecannot conclude oursurvey of primary sources without considering the epigraphic andnumismatic remains from the Cinnan era. Little epigraphic evidence is extant for our period and it reaffirms what we already know from our literary sources. Such records include the various fasti as well as commemorative inscriptions of onekind or another from central Italy. Perhaps the most interesting epigraphic pieces touching on the Cinnan era are the bronze tablets from Asculum in northern Italy andfrom Contrebia in northeastern Spain. Yet even these shed only dimlight onthe main figures and events of this study.64 Ontheother hand, abundant numismatic evidence survives fromtheera of Cinna. Statistical, typological, andphysical analyses have been conducted on this coinage. The statistical studies provide approximate indicators andestimates of howmuch, when, andespecially whycoinage wasissued. Typological studies have provided insight into thepolitical symbolism used by the moneyers of the time, buthave their limitations as well considering howlittle weknow about those moneyers. Lastly, analyses of the physical substance of the coins have increased ourunderstanding of their monetary value at the time and the impact of this on Cinnan economic policy. All these methods of numismatic research are useful andhave played a part in this study.65 98. 84, 95– 78, 83– 95; BC. 1.64, 77– 63 Gabba (1956a): 93– 672; CIL I.717, 1505, VI.37045 = ILS 8888, X.4669, 8070, 8072; 64 Fasti. Cap. 667– 829. See IG XIV. 1297 = FGH 2B #252 with Jacoby’s commentary at 3B pp. 827– also Ch. 1, nn. 17–18 and Ch. 4, n. 3. 697, 653, 672, 696– 20. Onstatistics, see Crawford (1974): 650– 65 Grierson, pp. 3, 17– 293. On types 97; Frier (1981): 285– 81; Lo Cascio, pp. 84– 705; (1969): 76– 702– 158; Luce (1968): 731; (1964): 141– andprosopography, see Crawford (1974): 725– 604; 88; Frier (1972): 585– 419; Carney (1959a): 79– 39; Rowland, pp. 407– 25– 212. On metallurgical analysis andeconomics, see Crawford Barlow (1980): 203– 302; 58; Barlow (1977): 290– 59; Frank (1933a): 54– 4; (1968b): 57– (1968a): 1– 219. (1980): 212–

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XI

Wepossess a great variety of sources to work with in a study of the Cinnan Yet much of this material has its origin in Sulla’s version of events, andthe lion’s share of the sources arehostile to Cinna andhis faction. Also, most of them come from the Imperial era andcandemonstrate a poor grasp of Republican labels and politics; the authors often misunderstand the complex dynamics of factional andpersonal strife intheRepublic. Moralistic commentary takes the place of fact. Yet all this holds its ownintrinsic interest for the historian, aside from the goals of source criticism. None of oursources is free from inaccuracy andnone offers a complete account of theera. Therefore, each is important for whatit reveals about the Age of Cinna. The student of this time period must be cognizant of the sources’perspectives andcareful of their biases andmusttryto extract from each source the greatest possible amount of reliable information. era.66

66 Some sources for the Mithridatic Wars deserve brief mention. The geographical studies of Pausanias of Lydia (2nd C. A.D.) andStrabo of Amasea Pontica (1st C. B.C. –1st C. A.D.) mention the campaigns of Sulla and Fimbria; Pausanias was primarily interested in Sulla’s art thefts from Greece and extortionate funding drives; Strabo described Sulla’s siege of Athens andnegotiations with Mithridates, as well as Fimbria’s infamous assault on Ilium. Their topographical information is reliable andbased on actual observation of battle sites, monuments, etc. Frontinus’ manual of strategies for Imperial officers (1st C. A.D.) contains examples of Sulla’s maneuvers in Boeotia and Fimbria’s in Asia Minor; he probably derived this directly or indirectly from Sulla’s memoirs. The work reflects the author’s knowledge and expertise as a career military officer and governor. For events in Asia Minor, wealso have fragments of a history byMemnon of Heraclea Pontica (1st C. A.D.), which preserve local, somewhat independent, versions of the Mithridatic Wars. Straight-forward andfairly free of bias toward Rome, Memnon provides a neat check onourRoman sources. Lastly, most importantly, Appian wrote a history of the Mithridatic Wars as part of his ethnographic studies. It is the only continuous account of theconflicts andso is as valuable as his Civil Wars is for Roman affairs; it mayhave its basis in Sulla’s memoirs, in Livy, or more probably in Posidonius. See Harris (1979): 273; Dowling, pp. 330.

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INDEX OF NAMES Aesernia: resistance to Sulla, 135 n. 83. 96, Africa: Cinnan influence in, 91, 93– 103, 133. 101–

C. Julius (cos. 69): related to Cin27; “another Cinna” na,26– , 46, 59 n. 25, 92, 138, 140, 142. Albinovanus, ?: 90 Caesar, L. Julius: 48, 48 n. 84. Ancharius, ?: 48, 48 n. 89. Caesar Strabo, C. Julius: 48, 48 n. 84, 64 Annia: wife of Cinna, 26. n. 51. Annius, P.: 57 n. 14. Calabria/Calabrians: 116 n. 30, 120. Antemnae: loyalty to Cinnans, 130 n. 77, Cales: 117 n. 35. 132 n. 81. Campania/Campanians: 120, 129 n, 72. Antistius, P.: prominent orator, 64; judge Canusium: 116 n. 32. 67. 119. at Pompey’s trial, 65– Capua: 116– Antonius the Orator, M. (cos. 99): 39 n. Carbo, C. Papirius (tr. pl. 92): 58 n. 21. 49, 48, 57 n. 14. 84, 82): battle Carbo, Cn.Papirius (cos. 85– Antonius Balbus, Q.: 58 n. 22, 93. for Rome, 39, 43; prominent Cinnan, 58, 68; advocate at Pom56 n. 11, 57– Antonius Creticus, M.: 54. pey’s trial, 65– 66; defensive efforts Antony, M.: 27, 47 n. 81. 90, 103, 106– Apulia/Apulians: 116 n. 30, 120. against Sulla, 75, 88– Arathius: 100 n. 66. 108, 113–114, 116, 120–123, 125, 128; Cinna’s successor, 110– Ariminum: importance as base for the 127– 111; 90, 127. 92, 95, 134. Cinnans, 87– flight anddeath, 91– Asculum: resistance to Pompey, 115 n. Carbo Arvina, C.: 64. 29. Carrinas, C.: background, 59 n. 24; resi72, Asellio, A. Sempronius (pr. 89): 71– stance to Sulla, 89, 121, 128, 130– 76. 131, 134. 71 nn. 75– Athens: falls to Sulla, 97. Casilinum: 116 n. 32. Atticus, T. Pomponius: 36, 46, 97 n. 56. Castricius, M.: 88. Augustus/Octavian: 27, 138, 139 n. 2, 140, Catiline, L. Sergius: 59. 142. Catulus the Elder, Q. Lutatius: 48, 48 n.86, Auximum: resistance to Sulla, 115 n. 29. 154 n. 42. Catulus the Younger, Q. Lutatius: 39 n. Baebius, ?: 48, 48 n. 88. 49, 41 n. 52, 49 n. 91, 54, 55 n. 5. Bocchus I of Mauretania: antagonistic to- Censorinus, C. Marcius: battle for Rome, 95, 58; orator, 64; ward Marians and Cinnans, 94– 29, 47; background, 57– resistance to Sulla, 123 n. 54, 127– 102. 131, 134. 128, 130– Brutus, M. Junius (pr. 88): 21 n. 29, 39 n. Censorinus, L. Marcius: 123 n. 54. 50, 57, 80, 92. Brutus, M. Junius (tr.pl. 83): 65, 69, 116 Cethegus, P. Cornelius: 57 n. 15, 115 n. 29, 132 n. 80. n. 31. Chaeronea: 98. Burrienus, P. (pr. 83): 59 n. 24, 65. Cinna, L? Cornelius (cos. 127): 25. Byzantium: 99. 84): biased Cinna, L. Cornelius (cos. 87– andinadequate treatment by scholars, Caelius/Coelius, P: 87. Caesar,

176

Index

of Names

9–11; in the Social War, 17; bases of Didius, T.: 80 n. 2. 23; family and back- Domitius Ahenobarbus, Cn.: 26, 59 n. 25, his rise, 22– ground, 25– 27; consular candidacy, 95, 96. 31; and Domitius Ahenobarbus, L.: 55. motives and supporters, 27– Italian citizenship, 32; conflict with Dossenus, L. Rubrius: 42 n. 56. Octavius and loss of consulship, 32– Drusus, M. Livius (tr.pl. 91): background, 45; not a “ Ma36; warfor Rome, 36– 14, 20 n. 26; reforms 15– 16; Cinna 13– rian” , 38; and“Marian massacre” , 45– as heir to, 23, 29. 51; evidence for 50; consulship, 50– “ dominatio” , 53; senatorial support Etruria/Etrurians: 17, 39, 63, 82, 120–121, 59; equestrian support for, 59– for, 53– 128 n.72, 135 n.83. 60; and census of newcitizens, 61– 68; and as- Fabius Hadrianus, M.: 75, 95, 103. 63; andcourt system, 63– 69; and economic re- Fannius, M.: 76. semblies, 68– 76; assessment of his “ forms, 70– do- Faventia: 90. , 76– minatio” 77; provincial matters Fidentia: 92 n. 31, 128 n. 71. and, 79–103; opposed to peace with Fimbria, C. Flavius: battle for Rome, 40, 110; assassination of, 110. 44 n. 64; background, 57; war against Sulla, 105– See Epilogue for overall assessment 100, 149, 152. Mithridates, 60, 75, 98– 84, 86. andAppendix for image inthesources. Fonteius, M.: 83– Cinna the Younger, L. Cornelius: 26. Gargonius, C.: 60, 64. Circeii: 124 n. 55. Circus Flaminius: 130 n. 77. Gutta: 127. Cisalpine Gaul: Cinnan control in, 38, 40, 90, 101–102, 116, 120; lost to Hiarbas of Numidia: ally of Cinnans, 95– 86– Sullans, 128, 133. 96, 103. Hiempsal of Numidia: enemy of Cinnans Clouilius, T.: 58 n. 22, 121. 96, 102. Clusium: 127, 128 n. 71. andMarians, 94– Himera: resistance to Pompey, 93. Coelius Caldus, C.: 58 n. 22, 85. Colline Gate, Battle of: 123, 125 n. 59, Hirtuleius, ? (q. 86): 58 n. 23, 73. 66. Hortensius, Q.: 54, 64– 129–131. Considius, L. 116 n. 31. Janiculum Hill, Battle for: 41 n. 53. Cornelia (wife of Cn. Domitius): 26. Cornelia (wife of Julius Caesar): 26. Laenas, P. Popillius: 49 n. 92, 58 n. 22. Cornelius Magnus, Cn.: 27. Lamponius, M.: 127, 128 n. 72, 130. Cornutus, M. Caecilius: 48, 49 n. 90. Crassus, M. Licinius (cos. 70): 57 n. 17, Latium/Latins: 17, 34, 38, 63, 120. efforts against Cinnans in Spain, 74– Lavinium: 124 n. 55. 81, 103; in Italy, 120 n. 48, Lentulus, P. Cornelius: 48, 49 n. 90. 75, 80– 27, 54, 139. Lepidus, M. (cos. 78): 26– 126, 128, 130; 156. Crassus the Elder, P. Licinius: 43, 44 n. Lucania/Lucanians: 90, 120. Lucullus, L. Licinius (cos. 74): 72 n. 80, 64, 48, 80 n. 1. 90 n. 24, 99, 142 n. 3, 144. Crassus the Younger, P. Licinius: 48. Critonius, L.: 76. Macer, C. Licinius: 64, 143, 144 n. 5 Magius, P.: 33 n. 26. Damasippus, L. Junius Brutus: background, 100, 86): 68, 58 n. 23; efforts against Sulla, 121, Marius, C. (cos. 107, 104– 18; 135 n. 82; in the Social War, 17– 127, 128, 130 n. 75, 131 n. 78, 134; “ Second Marian massacre” 22; connection to , 126. warwith Sulla, 19–

Index

of Names

29, 57; battle for Rome, Cinna, 26–

41, 42 n. 56, 43, 44 n. 63, 94; 38– 46, 48 n. 82, , 45– “ Marian massacre” 50; 68, 135 n. 82; image of in the 49– 153, 156. 146, 149, 151– sources, 145– Marius the Younger, C. (cos. 82 B.C.):

of Sulla, 22 n. 30, 26, 56 n. 11, 57, 94, 152; election, 68, 122; efforts 127; against Sulla, 75, 94, 105, 122–

enemy

death, 131, 134, 149, 152. Marius Gratidianus, M. (pr. 86/85): connection to Cinna, 35, 49 n. 91, 57, 87, 145; monetary reform, 74, 76; tragic death, 55, 134. Merula, L. Cornelius (cos. suff. 87): 35,

43, 48–49.

177

Ostia: 40 n. 51, 56 n. 13. Pergamum: 99, 100. Perperna, M. (cens. 86):

127 n. 64.

59 n. 24, 61, 91,

Philippus, L. Marcius (cens. 86): under Cinnan regime, 55, 58, 61, 72 n. 80; 66; on Sulla’s advocate of Pompey, 64– side, 93, 121 n. 48.

89, 115 n. 29, Picenum/Picentines: 88– 121. 120– 88. Placentia: 87– Pompeia: 27. Pompeius Rufus, Q. (cos. 88): against Sul20, 22; murdered, 32; as picius, 19– consul, 72 n. 78, 87. Pompeius Strabo, Cn. (cos. 89): battle for 56; in the 39, 41, 42 nn. 55– Rome, 38– Social War, 80, 87; image of in sources, 145, 156. Pompey, Cn. (cos. 70, 55, 52): Cinnan 67, 108– connections andtrial, 58, 65– 109; victorious on Sulla’s side, 89, 93, 96, 115, 120–121, 123, 126, 91–

Messana: loyalty to Cinnans, 93. Metellus Pius, Q. Caecilius: 139, 149; batt44, 48 n. le for Rome, 39 n. 49, 40, 42– 83, 49 n. 93, 51; efforts in Africa against Cinnan regime, 54, 71, 74, 89– 103; in Italy, 115, 117, 95, 102– 90, 94– 118 n. 38, 120, 123, 126–127. Milonius, C.: 35, 42 n. 55. 128. Minucius Thermus, Q.: 58 n. 23, 99 n. 65. 101, 107 n. 6, 115 n. Pomponius, Q.: 64. Mithridates VI: 96– Ptolemy Alexander I: 72 n. 80. 26, 132 n. 81, 143, 144, 152. Praeneste: joins Cinna, 34, 63; besieged Munatius, ?: 100 n. 66. by Sulla, 76 n. 89, 89, 123, 125, 127– 128, 131, 134. Naevius, ?: 65. Neoptolemus: 100 n. 66. Quinctius, P.: 65, 73 n. 82, 85, 102. Nicaea: 99. Nicomedia: 99. Quinctius, ?: 58 n. 22, 90 n. 24. Nola: in the Social War, 21, 34, 34 n. 31; 90, 127. joins Cinna, 36, 37, 135 n. 83. Ravenna: 89– Norbanus, C. (cos. 83): background, 56 n. Rutilius Rufus, P. 100 n. 70, 142 n. 3, 154 n. 42. 11, 89, 90, 91; efforts against Sulla, 119; demise, 134. 111–114, 116– Norbanus the Younger, C.: 112 n. 20. Sacriportus, Battle of: 123, 124 n. 55, 125 Numitorius, C?: 48, 48 n. 88. n. 59. Salinator, Julius: 83 n. 9. Octavius, Cn. (cos. 87): opponent of Cin- Saltius, Sex.: 116 n. 31. 18, 34 n. 31, 40, 35; battle for Rome, 38 n. 48, Samnium/Samnites: 17– na, 31– 51; demise in “Marian 41 nn. 53, 63, 42 n. 56, 116, 120, 123 44, 50– 39, 41– 48, 58; image of in n. 54, 125, 129, 131–132, 134. , 47– massacre” Sardinia-Corsica: Cinnan control of, 93, sources, 143, 146, 149, 153, 156. 103. 101– Ofella, Q. Lucretius: 57 n. 15, 121 n. 48, Saturnia: 127. 128, 131. 125, 127– Scaevola Pontifex, Q. Mucius: 55, 64, 147. Orchomenos: 98.

178

Index

of Names

Scipio Asiagenes, L. Cornelius (cos. 83): connection to Cinna, 58 n. 23; orator, 64; Balkan operations, 75, 98, 100 n. 66, 103, 109; against Sulla in Italy, 119, 121; 114, 116– 110 n. 15, 111– proscribed, 56 n. 11, 134. Scipio Asiagenes the Younger, L.: 119 n.

43.

Scipio Nasica, P.: 80 n. 1. Sena Gallica: 89. Sentius, C.: 100 n. 66.

Serranus, C. Atilius: 48, 48 n. 90. Sertorius, Q.: connection to Cinna, 26– 27, 35, 57; battle for Rome, 37 n. 43, 39– 40, 41 n. 54, 43; orator, 64; efforts in 86, 127; efforts in Italy Spain, 82– 119, 121; 113, 117– against Sulla, 112– proscribed, 56 n. 11, 134, 139; image in the sources, 145, 148, 156. Servilius, M.: 127 n. 66. Servilius Vatia, P.: 87 n. 19, 127 n. 66.

Setia: 124. Sextilius, P.: 94. 93, 101– Sicily: Cinnan influence in, 90– 102, 106, 112, 133. Signia: 124 n. 55. Sisenna, L. Cornelius: 64. Spain: battleground for Roman factions, 102, 122. 84, 101– 79– Spoletium: 128. Suessa: 119. Sulla, Faustus Cornelius: 27. Sulla, L. Cornelius (cos. 88): against Sul22; relations picius and Marius, 17– 33, 35, 46; de27, 30– with Cinna, 26– 51; senatorial supclared hostis, 49– 57; equestrian antipathy, 59– port, 53– 63; against 60; and the Italians, 62–

101; propaganda, Mithridates, 97– 108; return anddefeat of Cinnans, 105–

135. 111–

Sulpicius Rufus, P. (tr. pl. 88): reforms and conflict with Sulla, 13, 14 n. 1, 23; Cinna as heir to, 28– 19– 29, 32; 52. background, 64 nn. 51– Teanum: 117, 119 n. 44. Telesinus the Elder, P.: against Sulla’s 128, 129 n. 73; death, 131, forces, 127–

134.

Telesinus the Younger, P.: 125 n. 59, 131. 102. 86, 101– Transalpine Gaul: 83– Tubero, Q. Aelius: 143, 144 n. 5. Umbria/Umbrians:

96. Utica: 94–

17, 39, 63, 120.

Valerius Antias: 143, 144 n. 5. Valerius Flaccus, C.: relations with Cin81, 120; and nans, 55 n. 7, 74, 79– 86. Sertorius, 83– Valerius Flaccus, L. (pr. sen.): 55, 105,

113, 147.

Valerius Flaccus, L. (cos. suff. 86): 55 n. 7, 56 n. 13; fiscal legislation, 69, 72– 73, 76; expedition against Mithrida-

99. tes, 98–

Valerius Flaccus the Younger,

85.

L.: 81 n. 7,

M. (tr. pl. 87): 32, 57 n. 14, 60, 64, 143, 155. 89, 121 n. 48, 132, 144. Verres, C.: 88– Via Aemilia: 87. 116, 123, 124 n. 55. Via Appia: 115– Via Aurelia: 128. Via Cassia: 127. Via Flaminia: 87, 128. 125, 118, 119 n. 44, 123– Via Latina: 116– 129. Villa Publica: 130 n. 77. Vergilius/Verginius,

INDEX OF SPECIAL TOPICS 44. 36, 43– Lex Cornelia: 61 n. 37. Abrogatio imperii: 35– 144. Annals and Memoirs: 142– Lex Julia: 17–19, 80. 36, 45, 61– Lex Plautia: 27. 33, 35– Assemblies: 28, 30, 32– 69, 77, 111, 122. 73. 62, 67 n. 63, 68– Lex Valeria: 69, 72– Lex Varia: 19 n. 23, 64. Bribery: in politics, 28; of the army, 36– “ Marian Massacre” 37. , First: 45–49. “ Marian Massacre” , Second: 126. 68. 71, 96–101. Courts: 63– Mithridatic War: 19, 22, 70– 76. Economy andfiscal policy: 70– 60, 68, 72, 56, 59– 31, 55– Equestrians: 29–

77. 76– 29. Exiles, Marian: 28–

135. Proscription lists: 56 n. 11, 112, 134– 103. Provincial policy: 101– 108, 110, 113, 122, 126, Senate: 93, 105–

133, 139.

28, 35, 49, 97, 105– SCU: 34, 113, 133. 18, 26, 28, 58, 70, 80, 85– Social War: 16– 106, 120, 133. 94. 91, 93– 87, 90– ludicium populi: 49. 34, 29, 32– 16, 28– Italian citizenship: 14– 63, 77, 107, 116, 120. 51, 61–

Hostis decrees: 22,

INDEX OF SOURCES Abbreviations conform to the standard set inthe OCD. References

are indicated in bold-face.

Adn. super Luc. (Endt) 2.76, 79, 88, 119,

126, 140, 160: 148 n. 23; 2.114: 48 n. 89, 148 n. 23; 2.120: 48 n. 88, 148 n. 23; 2.121: 48 n. 83, 148 n. 23; 2.124: 48 n. 85, 148 n. 23; 2.134: 122 n. 53, 124 n. 55, 148 n. 23; 2.135: 130 n. 75, 131 n. 78, 148 n. 23; 2.137: 129 n. 73, 148 n. 23; 2.139: 134 n. 82, 148 n. 23; 2.149: 131 n. 79, 148 n. 23; 2.174: 49 n. 91, 55 n. 5, 135 n. 82, 148 n. 23; 2.548: 128 n. 70, 148 n. 23; 7.306: 130 n. 77, 148 n. 23.

Ammianus Marcellinus. 30.8.9:

47 n. 78.

Ampelius. 105, 151 n. 29.

42.1: 151 n. 29; 42.2: 33 nn. 25, 27, 39 n. 50, 46 n. 73, 50 n. 94, 124 n. 55, 151 n. 29; 42.3: 105, 114 n. 25, 122 n. 53, 129 n. 72, 130 n. 77, 134 n. 82.

38, 34, 36– 18, 25, 28, 33– Appian. 15, 17–

55, 59, 68– 48, 53– 70, 79, 44, 46– 40– 83, 89, 92, 100, 106–108, 111–115, 129, 142– 117–120, 123–124, 125– 158, 159 n. 143, 149, 154 n. 42, 157– 66. 13: 157 BC. Pref. 6– 7, 11: 157 n. 62; 12– 62. 15: 157 nn. 60– n. 60; 14– 32: 14 n. 2; 6: 157 n. 62; 1.31– BC. 1.1– 1.35: 14 n. 3, 15 n. 6; 1.36: 14 n. 3, 15 n. 6, 16 n. 14; 1.37: 15 n. 8, 16 n. 14; 15; 1.39: 16 n. 15, 70 1.38: 16 nn. 14– n. 69, 70 n. 71; 1.40: 17 n. 17; 1.41: 17 n. 17, 112 n. 21; 1.42: 17 n. 17,34 17, 94 n. 40; n. 31, 70 n. 71, 86 nn. 16– 17; 48: 17 n. 17; 1.49: 17nn. 16– 1.43– 17, 94 n. 40; 1.50: 18 n. 18, 86 nn. 16– 17, 94 n. 52: 18 n. 18, 86 nn. 16– 1.51–

to sections of sources

40; 1.53: 18 nn. 18–19, 19 n. 21, 86 17, 94 n. 40; 1.54: 71 n.76; nn. 16– 53; 1.56: 19 1.55: 19 n. 21, 97 nn. 52– nn. 21, 23, 20 n. 25, 97 nn. 52– 53; 59: 22 1.57: 21 n. 28, 22 n. 30; 1.58– n. 30; 1.60: 22 n. 30, 57 n. 15, 80 n. 5; 1.61: 22 n. 30, 57 n. 15; 1.62: 22 n. 30, 57 n. 15, 94 n. 42, 94 n. 4; 1.63: 22 n. 30, 28 n. 14, 28 n. 15, 30 n. 18, 32 n. 15, 30 n. 23, 87 n. 18; 1.64: 28 nn. 13– 18, 31 n. 20, 32 nn. 23, 25, 33 nn. 26– 31, 35 n. 33, 27; 1.65: 25, 34 nn. 29– 36 n. 37; 1.66: 36 n. 37, 37 nn. 40, 42, 48, 39 n. 49, 86 n. 16; 38 nn. 45, 47– 50, 40 n. 51, 94 n. 44; 1.67: 39 nn. 49– 1.68: 40 n. 52, 41 n. 53; 1.69: 40 n. 51, 60, 62; 1.70: 43 n. 42 n. 56, 43 nn. 58– 68, 70, 47 nn. 63, 44 n. 65, 45 nn. 67– 78, 81; 1.71: 45 n. 67, 45 n. 70, 47 nn. 85, 88, 90, 49 78, 81; 1.72: 48 nn. 82– 90, 97 n. 54; n. 92; 1.73: 48 nn. 89– 87, 49 nn.91– 92; 1.75: 1.74: 48 nn.86– 49 n. 94, 50 n. 95, 58 n. 20, 98 n. 58; 1.76: 75 n. 89, 88 n. 20, 100 n. 69, 105 2, 106 n. 4, 107 n. 7; 1.77: 54 n. nn. 1– 3, 88 n. 20, 97 n. 54, 105 n. 3, 106 n. 6, 107 n. 7, 108 n. 8, 109 n. 11; 1.78: 15, 88 n. 20, 101 n. 72, 110 nn. 14– 109 n. 13, 111 n. 18; 1.79: 101 n. 72, 108 n. 9, 111 n. 17, 115 n. 26, 115 n. 27; 1.80: 57 n. 15, 94 n. 42, 95 n. 45, 29; 1.81: 97 n. 96 n. 48, 115 nn. 28– 54113 nn. 22, 24; 1.82: 111 n. 19, 112 n. 21, 114 n. 25, 120 n. 45; 1.83: 112 n. 21, 116 n. 32; 1.84: 112 n. 21, 115 n. 27, 116 n. 32, 117 n. 33; 1.85: 112 n. 21, 117 nn. 34, 36, 118 nn. 41– 42, 119 n. 43; 1.86: 49 n. 93, 82 n. 8, 83 n. 9, 86 n. 16, 89 n. 22, 119 nn. 43– 44,

Index

of Sources

181

47; 1.87: 89 n. 23, 121 Cicero. 26, 32, 35, 46– 120 nn. 46– 47, 53, 55, 59, 62, 65, 67, 69– 71, 73, 77, 79, 83, 85, n.48, 122 n. 53,123 n. 54, 124 nn. 55– 64– 89, 92, 102, 118, 126, 135, 138– 56, 125 n. 59; 1.88: 55 n. 7, 121 n. 48, 88– 62; 1.89: 80 n. 147, 149. 125 n. 60, 126 nn. 61– 140, 144, 145– 62, 2, 83 n. 9, 90 n. 24, 126 nn. 61– ?. AdHerr. 2.45: 19 n. 23; 4.22.31: 16 n. 67; 1.90: 90 n. 24, 127 nn. 127 nn. 66– 14. 65, 128 n. 68, 128 n. 71; 1.91: 90 64– Amic. 2: 20 n. 26. 26; 1.92: 90 nn. 24, 26, 92 n. 6: 17 n. 16; 7: 17 n. 16, 18 n. 18; nn. 24– Arch. 5– 70, 129 n. 31 127 n. 65, 128 nn. 69– 11: 18 n. 19. 74, 17; Att. 7.7.7.9: 46 n. 75, 146 nn. 16– 72; 1.93: 121 n. 48, 129 nn. 73– 77, 131 n. 78; 1.94: 121n. 8.3.6: 55 n. 7, 147 n. 19: 9.7c: 146 n. 130 nn. 75– 80; 1.95: 56 n. 10, 59 48, 131 nn. 79– 12, 147 n. 20; 9.10.3.6: 36 n. 36, 46 n. n. 28, 92 n. 32, 118 n. 42, 134 n. 82; 75, 146 nn. 14, 16–17; 9.14: 92 n. 33, 147 n. 20; 9.15.2: 112 n. 21, 126 n. 61, 1.96: 56 n. 10, 83 n. 9, 92 n. 32, 134 n. 82; 1.97: 134 n. 82; 1.100: 56 n. 10; 134 n. 82, 147 n. 20. 1.102: 70 n. 69, 74 n. 86, 75 n. 89; 17; 50: Balb. 8.21: 80 n. 3; 21: 17 nn. 16– 54: 34 n. 31. 1.103: 56 n.10, 59 n. 28, 70 n. 69; 86 n. 16; 53– 113: 146 n. 12; 45: 1.108: 82 n. 8, 83 n. 9; 4.33: 74 n. 86. Brut. 29, 35, 112– 60: 79 n. 1; 81: 25 n. 2; 99–100: Iber. 1– 138 n. 1; 102: 58 n. 22; 129: 57 n. 17; 80 n. 2; 101: 82 n. 8. 175: 64 n. 53, 112 n. 21; 178: 57 n. 15; Illyr. 5: 98 n. 58. 179: 32 n. 23, 64 n. 53; 180: 64 n. 53, 29, 32, 22: 97 n. 51; 28– 145 n. 11; 203: 20 n. 26; 222: 65 n. Mith. 10, 17– 48: 97 n. 55; 31, 33– 37, 40, 46– 55; 223: 57 n. 17; 135 n. 82; 227: 64 36– 45: 97 n. 56; 41– 39: 97 nn. 55– nn. 51, 53, 145 n. 11, 146 n. 18, 147 n. 35, 38– 55, 98 n. 57; 49: 97 n. 51, 98 n. 57; 50: 19; 228: 64 n. 52, 144 n. 66, 145 n. 11, 98 n. 57; 51: 97 n. 54, 98 n. 58, 99 n. 146 n. 18, 147 n. 19; 230: 66 n. 56; 66; 53: 63, 101 n. 71; 52: 99 nn. 65– 233: 57 n. 17; 237: 58 n. 19; 238: 64 55, 100 n. 100 n. 67; 54: 97 nn. 54– n. 53; 259: 64 n. 52, 144 n. 6; 304: 64 58: 100 n. 69; 59: 100 n. 70, 51, 53, 77 n. 69; 55– n. 53; 308: 53, 64 nn. 50– 101 n. 71; 60: 97 n. 54, 100 n. 70, 107 91, 145 n. 11, 146 n. 18, 147 n. 19; 63: 101 n. 71. n. 7, 159 n. 66; 61– 311: 64 n. 53, 126 n. 61. Caec. 4.11: 72 n. 78; 87.10: 34 n. 28, 38: 48 n. 85, Asconius. (Squires) pp. 37– 146 n. 14. 84, 59 n. 134 n. 82; p. 39: 48 nn. 83– Cat. 2.5: 86 n. 16; 2.20, 3.14: 147 n. 20; 25, 134 n. 82; p. 89: 72 n. 78; pp. 3.10.24: 146 n. 17; 3.24.8: 33 n. 27, 135: 76 n. 90, 135 n. 82, 146 n. 15. 131– 46 n. 75, 146 nn. 14– 138: 146 n. 12; p. 139: 12; pp. 136– Clu. 161: 134 n. 82. 51 n. 27, 76 n. 90, 135 n. 82, 156 n. De Or. 1.25: 14 n. 3, 20 n. 26; 1.97, 99, 12, 147 n. 19. 136: 20 n. 26; 2.16, 89: 20 n. 26; 2. 268: 31 n. 20; 2.197: 112 n. 20; 3.8: Augustine. 148, 152. 48 n. 85, 146 n. 16; 3.9: 48 nn. 83, 86, 23, 3.27: 148 n. 23; 3.28: CD. 2.18, 21– 49 n. 91, 146 n. 16; 3.10: 48 nn. 83– 84, 49 n. 91, 126 n. 61, 146 n. 16; 126 n. 61, 134 n. 82, 148 n. 23; 3.29: 3.11,47: 20 n.6. 134 n. 82. Div. 1.4: 146 n. 17; 1.33, 72, 2.30, 65: Augustus. RG. 1.2: 138 n. 1. 146 n. 12. Dom. 79: 147 n. 20; 83: 32 n. 23, 147 n. Caesar. 85. 19; 84: 54 n. 5. BG. 1.47.4: 85 n. 14. Farn. 9.21: 40 n. 51, 58 n. 21, 92 n. 32,

182

Index

of Sources

126 n. 61, 147 n. 20; 13.30: 17 nn. 16– Rab. Perd. 21: 113 n.21. 17. Rab. Post. 7.16: 14 n.3; 27: 142 n. 3. 59: 98 n. Flac. 32, 77: 56 n. 13; 53, 55– Red. Sen. 4.9: 145 n. 11. 60; 63: 85 n. 14. Rosc. 12.33: 49 n. 92; 33: 126 n. 61; 88– 2, 5: 73 n. 81; 6: 83 n. 9, 85 n. Font. 1.1– 89, 91: 67 n. 64; 90: 67 n. 64, 126 n. 14, 118 n. 38, 147 n. 20; 7: 118 n. 38; 61, 131 n. 79; 136: 145 n. 11; 137, 12: 84 n. 11; 13: 83 n. 9, 84 n. 11, 11– 142: 145 n. 11, 147 n. 19. 43: 26 n. 3, 146 n. 13. 85 n. 14; 42– Scaur. 2.1: 48 n. 85; 2.2: 48 n. 83; 42– Har. Resp. 54: 32 n. 25, 146 nn. 15, 17. 43: 93 n. 35; 44: 93 nn. 35, 39. 85: 76 n. 90; 89: 28 n. In toga cand. 84– Sest. 6: 134 n. 82; 7: 112 n. 21, 118 n. 13. 40, 134 n.82; 36: 146 n.17; 48: 48 n. Leg. 1.7: 144 n. 6; 2.56: 135 n. 82, 147 85; 77: 33 n. 21, 146 n.15. n. 20; 3.19: 58 n. 21; 3.36: 57 n. 17, Sull. 56: 95 n. 46. 135 n. 82, 145 n. 11; 3.42: 33 n. 27, 58 Tusc. 5.54: 47 n. 80, 146 n. 16; 5.55: 48 85, 146 n. 16; 5.56: 48 n. 86, n. 21. nn. 83– 42: 72 n. Leg. agr. 1.21: 138 n. 1; 2.38– 146 n. 16. 80; 2.78: 135 n. 83, 147 n. 20; 2.80: Vat. 23: 46 n. 75, 146 n. 16. 71; 2.89, 93, 98: 116 n. 31; 40, 77, 92: 89 n. 21; 70 nn. 70– 2 Verr. 1.11, 39– 13: 147 2.92: 68 n. 65, 116 n. 31; 3.3– 1.34: 86 n. 16, 89 n. 21, 121 n. 48; 7, 11: 122 n. 53. 38: 89 n. 21, 121 n. 48; 1.70: 95 n. 20; 3.6– 1.35– 37, 81: 147 n. Leg. Man. 19: 70 n. 72; 30: 96 n. 48. n. 46; 2.1.2: 79; 2.1.34– Mil. 7.16: 14 n. 3, 16 n.14; 22: 59 n. 25. 20; 2.1.38: 134n. 82, 147n. 20; 2.3.81: Mur. 42: 86 n. 16. 134 n. 82; 2.5: 70 n. 70, 91 n. 38; 2.6: 40: 90 n. 27; ND. 2.5.181: 145 n. 9; 2.10: 68 n. 65; 91 n. 28; 2.13–14, 32– 14, 192: 79 n. 1, 90 n. 27; 3.15: 2.14: 31 n. 20, 146 n. 17; 3.21: 50 n. 3.12– 95; 3.32.81: 14 n.3, 147 n. 19; 3.80: 90 n. 27; 3.27: 84 n.11, 90 n. 27, 91 n. 46 n. 75, 126 n. 61, 146 n. 16, 147 n. 28, 93 nn. 36, 39; 3.117: 91 n. 28; 8: 91 n. 28; 5.50, 53, 56: 90 n. 27; 19; 3.81: 46 n. 75, 50 n. 95, 146 n. 16, 5.5– 147 n. 19. 5.94: 95 n. 46; 5.181: 57 n. 17; 15.33, 28: 146 n. 12, Off. 1.49, 51, 109, 2.27– 20, 43: 144 n.6. 147 n. 20; 2.14.49: 112 n. 120; 2.29, 81: 73 n. 83; CIG IV.6855d: 100 n.69. 3.80: 147 n. 20; 3.20.80– 81: 57 n. 17. 3.77– Phil. 1.34: 48 n. 83, 146 n. 18; 2.42: 77 CIL I p.60a: 113 n. 21; I.558: 25 n. 2; n. 91; 2.108.3: 147 n. 19; 3.26: 27 n. I.709: 99 n. 65; I.717: 58 n. 21, 158 n. 8; 5.6.17: 147 n. 19; 5.17: 145 n. 11; 64; I.719: 90 n. 24; I.848: 16 n. 15; 895: 73 n. 83; I.1505: 50 n. 95, 8.2.7: 146 n. 14, 147 n. 20; 8.7: 28 n. I.889– 8072: 68 72 n. 80, 158 n. 64; I. 8070– 14, 32 n. 25, 122 n. 53; 9.13: 147 n. 20; 11.1: 46 n. 75, 146 n. 16; 12.27: n. 66; II.1343: 27 n. 9; VI.851: 27 n. 9; VI.1961: 27 n. 9; VI.10294: 27 n. 62 n. 44, 117 n. 35, 118 n. 38, 147 n. 9; VI.31701: 27 n. 9; VI.37045=ILS 20; 13.1: 122 n. 53, 146 n. 17, 147 n. 8888: 17 n. 17, 80 n. 3, 99 n. 65, 158 20; 13.2: 47 n. 80, 112 n. 21, 118 nn. 38, 40, 147 n. 20; 14.23: 146 nn. 15, n. 64; X.4669: 158 n. 64; X.6905: 25 n. 2; X.8070, 8072: 158 n. 64. 17; 14.34: 77 n. 91, 146 n. 16. Planc. 2.66: 90 n. 27; 52: 57 n. 17. 37: 84 n. 11. Prov. Cons. 32– Comm. Bern. (Usener) p. 83: 92 n. 32; 34: 85 n. 123, 126, 150, 192: 148 n. 23; 20: 145 n. 9; 11– 2.122– Quinct. 8.19– 82; 21, 25, 14; 17: 65 n. 55, 73 nn. 81– 2.114: 48 n. 89, 148 n. 23; 2.119: 48 69: 65 n. 55; 24: 112 n. 21. 30, 68– n. 88; 2.121: 48 n. 83, 148 n. 23; 2.124:

Index

of Sources

48 n. 85, 148 n. 23; 2.125: 49 n. 92, 148 n. 23; 2.134: 122 n. 53, 124 n. 55, 125 n. 60, 131 n. 79; 2.136: 129 n. 73, 130 n. 75, 131 n. 78, 148 n. 23; 2.137: 129 n. 72, 148 n. 23; 2.149: 131 n. 79, 148 n. 23; 2.151: 59 n. 25, 148 n. 23; 2.197: 130 n. 77, 148 n. 23; 2.545: 41 n. 52, 148 n. 23; (Endt) 2.174: 35 n. 32, 49 n. 91, 135 n. 82, 148 n. 23; 7.306: 130 n. 77, 148 n. 23.

183

119 n.43; 38.18–19: 55 n. 9, 134 n. 82; 38/39.1: 43 n. 60; 38/39.2.1: 43 n. 63; 38/39.2.2: 44 n. 65, 48 n. 86; 38/ 39.3: 44 n. 64, 45 n. 67, 48 n. 86; 38/ 39.4: 44 n. 64, 45 n. 70, 49 n. 91; 38/ 39.6: 46 n. 72; 38/39.9: 121 n.50; 38/ 39.12: 122 n. 53, 124 n. 55; 38/39.13: 120 n. 47; 38/39.14: 127 n. 64; 38/ 60, 131 39.15: 124 n. 57, 125 nn. 59– n. 79; 38/39.17: 126 n. 61.

Dionysius of Halicarnassos. 3.37.4: 29 n. 32, 46, 54, 139, 151 n. 29. Dio. 31– 4: 16; 5.77: 134 n.82. 2.38.55, 59, 61: 14 n. 3; 30/35.95.3– 52, 2: 97 nn. 51– 142 n. 3; 30/35.99.1– 98 n. 58; 30/35.102.1: 32 n. 23; 30/35. DVI. 141, 152. 67.6: 40 n. 51, 46 n. 73, 49 n. 94, 50 n. 102.2: 22 n. 30, 97 n. 52; 30/35.102.3– 95, 77 n. 91, 94 n. 44; 68.1: 122 n.53; 4: 27 n. 10, 31 n. 20; 30/35.102.5: 38 7: 40 n. 52; 30/ 68.3: 124 n. 55; 68.4: 125 n. 60, 131 n. 48; 30/35.102.6– 35.102.8: 45 nn. 68, 70, 46 n. 72; 30/ n. 79; 69.1: 46 n. 73; 69.2: 32 n. 25, 33 n. 27, 34 n. 30, 35 n. 33, 41 n. 53, 35.102.9: 47 n. 78; 30/35.102.10–11: 47 n. 80; 69.3: 49 n. 94; 69.4: 88 n. 46 n. 72; 30/35. 102.11a: 48 n. 87; 30/ 2: 20, 105 n.2, 109 n. 12, 110 n. 14; 70: 35.102.12: 49 n. 92; 30/35.104.1– 98 n. 61, 99 n. 65, 100 nn. 67, 70, 152 98 n. 61, 99 n. 65; 30/35.104.3–5: 99 77: 152 n. 36; n. 36; 73: 93 n. 39; 74– n. 65; 30/35.104.6–7: 100 n. 67; 30/ 75.7: 100 n. 69; 75.8: 92 n. 31, 124 n. 35.106.1: 44 n. 64, 54 n. 4, 90 n. 26, 55, 129 n. 72; 75.9: 131 n.79; 75.10– 115 n. 28; 30/35.107.1: 115 n. 29; 30/ 3: 117 n. 37; 30/35. 108.1– 11: 134 n. 82; 76: 97 nn. 51, 55. 100 n. 35.107.2– 69. 2: 125 n. 60; 30/35.109.8: 101 n. 72; 33.109.4: 132 n. 80; 41.11.2: 59 n. 25; 44.28.1: 147 n. 20; 45.37.4: 147 n. 20; Eutropius. 151 n.29. 5.4: 20 n. 25, 97 nn. 51, 53; 5.4.1: 97 45.47.2: 48 n. 83; 46.49.2: 35 n. 35; 22: 27 n. 9; 52.13.2: 139 n. 2; 55.14– n. 54; 5.4.7: 31 n. 20; 5.5: 97 nn. 51, 56, 100 n. 69; 5.6.3: 63.13.2: 139 n. 2. 55; 5.6: 97 nn. 55– 69; 97 n. 57, 99 n. 63, 100 nn. 68– 44, 46, 55, 118, 120, 126, 5.7.3: 46 n. 73, 49 n. 92, 100 n. 69; Diodorus. 43– 149. 143, 148– 5.7.4: 54 n. 2, 116 n. 32, 117 n. 33, 2: 97 n. 53; 3: 149 n. 24; 29.1– 1.2– 119 n. 43; 5.8.1: 122 n. 53, 124 n.55, 23: 90 n. 27; 36.16.1: 14 n. 2; 35.2.20– 125 n.59, 129 n. 72, 130 n.77, 131 n. 3: 16 n. 15; 37.2.9: 18 n. 18; 37.2.2– 79, 134 n. 82; 5.8.2: 92 n. 32, 134 n. 82; 5.9.1: 96 n. 48; 6.2: 82 n. 8; 7.1: 14: 19n. 21, 97 n. 53; 37.2.13: 37.2.11– 20 n. 25, 91 n. 28; 37.2.14: 91 n. 28; 100 n.68; 7.3: 94 n. 44. 3: 14 n. 3; 37.13: 16 n. 11, 18 37.10.1– 24: 18 n. 18; 37.22a: 91 Exuperantius. (Zorzetti) 27, 83, 85, 113, n. 18; 37.14– 118, 148. 117– n. 30; 37.29.4: 50 n. 95, 124 n. 55, 22: 27 n. 11, 28 nn. 12–13, 31 n. 20, 131 n. 79; 37.29.5: 126 n. 61; 38.2–4: 100 n. 67; 38.6: 55 n. 9, 115 n. 27, 134 148 n. 23; 23: 28 n. 14, 32 n. 25, 148 n. 82; 38.7.1: 70 n. 71; 38.8: 99 n. 65; n. 23; 24: 28 n. 14, 32 n. 25, 33 n. 27, 29, 38.9: 115 n. 29; 38.11: 95 n. 46; 38.14: 148 n. 23; 25: 33 n. 27, 34 nn. 28– 91 n. 30; 38.16: 113 n. 21, 118 n. 41, 148 n. 23; 26: 33 n. 27, 148 n. 23; 27:

184

Index

of Sources

31 n. 20, 47 n. 80, 94 n. 44, 148 n. 23; 28: 46 n. 73; 29: 109 n. 13, 110 n. 114, 34: 134 n. 82, 148 n. 148 n. 23; 32– 23; 43: 113 n. 23, 148 n. 23; 45: 117 n. 48: 49 n. 37, 118 n. 41, 148 n. 23; 46– 93, 82 n. 8, 120 n. 48, 148 n. 23; 49: 82 n. 8, 122 n. 52, 148 n. 23; 50: 82 n. 8, 83 n. 9, 86 n. 15, 122 n. 52, 148 n. 23; 51: 82 n. 8, 83 n. 9, 148 n. 23; 52: 83 n. 9, 131n. 79, 148 n. 23; 53: 83 n. 9, 128 n. 70, 148 n. 23. 672: 158 n. 64; 758: 27 n. Fasti Cap. 667–

9.

Fenestella. f. 16 P: 124 n. 57. Festus. 516L: 72 n. 78.

47, 59, Florus. 13, 14 n. 3, 32, 41, 44, 46– 151, 152. 8: 97 n. 55; 6: 97 n. 51; 1.40.7– 1.40.3– 56; 1.40.11: 97 nn. 1.40.10: 97 nn. 55– 55, 98 n. 57; 1.40.12: 97 n. 55, 98 n. 10: 13; 2.6.13: 57, 100 n. 69; 1.47.8– 3: 151 n. 32; 2.9.4: 58 n. 21; 2.9.1– 125 n. 59, 151 n. 32; 2.9.5: 60 n. 29, 130 n. 77, 134 n. 82, 151 n. 32; 2.9.6: 97 n 53, 151 n. 32; 2.9.7: 7: 97 n. 53; 2.9.9: 32 n. 25, 40 n. 51, 97 n. 54; 11: 33 n. 27, 34 n. 30, 97 n. 54, 2.9.10– 151 n. 32; 2.9.12: 40 n. 51, 97 n. 54, 151 n. 32; 2.9.13: 40 n. 51, 41 n. 53, 45 n. 67, 46 n. 72, 47 n. 81, 97 n. 54; 2.9.14: 46 n. 72, 47 n. 81, 48 nn. 83– 85, 88, 97 n. 54, 98 n. 61; 2.9.15: 46 n. 72, 48 n. 86, 97 n. 54; 2.9.16: 46 n. 72, 48 nn. 87, 89, 97 n. 54; 2.9.17: 46 n. 95, 97 n. 54; 72, 48 n. 82, 50 nn. 94– 2.9.18: 97 n. 54, 113 n. 21, 114 n. 25; 2.9.19: 97 n. 54, 116 n. 32; 2.9.20: 97 n. 54, 118 n. 41; 2.9.21: 126 n. 61, 151 n. 32; 2.9.22: 128 n. 72; 2.9.23: 124 n. 55; 2.9.24: 130 n. 77; 2.9.25: 56 n. 10; 2.9.26: 92 n. 32, 134 n. 82; 2.9.27: 131 n. 80, 134 n. 82; 2.9.28: 134 n. 82, 151 n32; 2.10.2: 134 n. 82; 4: 14 n. 3. 2.17.1–

Frontinus. 159 n. 66.

1.11: 130 n. 75; 2.3.17: 97 n. 55, 98 n. 57; 2.4.6: 85 n. 12; 2.8.12: 98 n. 57; 2.9.3: 125 n. 60, 131 n. 78; 3.17.5: 99 n. 66.

7: 97 nn. Gellius. 4.4.3: 17 n. 17; 15.1.4– 56. 55–

Granius Licinianus. (Criniti)

41, 43, 151–

152.

50: 27: 87 n. 19; 28F: 100 n. 69; 35.1– 152 n. 33; 35.2: 33 n. 26, 34 n. 28; 35.6: 39 n. 50, 94 n. 44; 35.7: 39 n. 50, 80 n. 5; 35.8, 10: 40 n. 51; 35.9: 40 n. 51, 82 n. 8; 35.12, 35.22: 39 n. 49; 35.13: 39 n. 49, 40 n. 51; 35.14: 40 n. 51; 35.15: 42 n. 54; 35.16: 39 n. 48, 20: 41 n. 53, 42 n. 55; 43 n. 60; 35.17– 26: 35.23: 39 n. 49, 41 n. 52; 35.24– 30: 40 n. 52; 35.31– 41 n. 54; 35.29– 33: 39 n. 49; 35.34: 39 n. 48; 35.36– 45: 42 n. 55; 35.46: 42 n. 56; 38, 43– 35.47: 42 n. 56, 44 n. 64; 35.48: 44 n. 64; 35.49: 43 n. 62; 35.50: 43 n. 62, 44 n. 64; 44.28.1, 45.37.4: 147 n. 20. Horace. Sat. 1.6.120: 123 n. 54.

IG XIV.1297=FGH 2B #252: 40 n. 51, 44 n. 65, 48 n. 81, 97 n. 56, 99 n. 66, 100 n. 70, 116 n. 32, 125 n. 60, 131 n. 79, 158 n. 64. Jerome. 61– 62. Chron ad ann. 85: 61 n. 38.

Justin. Epit. 38.1.1, 38.5.3: 96– 97 n. 51. Justinian. Dig. 49.1.21.2: 68 n. 65.

37, 41, 43, Livy. 13, 14 n. 2, 26, 33, 36– 62, 68, 79, 92, 55, 61– 47, 53– 44, 46– 108, 110, 116, 125, 143, 149, 106– 152, 157, 158. 150– 5, 25.12.15: 5, 1.35.2– 1.19.1, 1.33.1– 29 n. 16; 10.47.5: 68 n. 65; 26.21.17:

90 n. 27; 26.40.13: 90 n. 27. 68: 85 n. 12; Per. 60, 63: 61 n. 38; 65–

Index

of Sources

68: 68 n. 65; 69: 14 n. 2; 70– 71: 67– 14 n. 3; 71: 15 n. 6, 16 n. 11; 72: 16 n. 15,70 n. 71; 73: 17 n. 17,85 n. 12; 74: 75; 75: 17 n. 16, 18 n. 18, 71 nn. 74– 19, 87 n. 18; 76: 18 nn. 18– 18 nn. 18– 19, 19 nn. 21, 23, 26 n. 3, 87 n. 18; 77: 19 n. 23, 22 n. 30, 58 n. 21, 62 n. 43, 87 n. 18, 97 n. 51; 79: 18 n. 18, 33 nn. 27, 34 n. 29, 37 n. 40, 38 n. 45, 39 25– 50, 40 n. 51, 41 n. 54, 42 n. 56, nn.49– 94 n. 44, 150 n. 28; 80: 39 n. 48, 40 52, 41 n. 53, 42 n. 56, 43 n. 62, nn. 51– 45 n. 67, 46 n. 72, 47 n. 78, 48 nn. 84– 85, 49 nn. 92, 94, 50 n. 95, 98 n. 61, 56, 150 n. 150 n. 28; 81: 97 nn. 55– 58, 60, 61, 99 n. 63, 28; 82: 98 nn. 57– 100 n. 69, 150 n. 28; 83: 88 n. 20, 99 70, 101 nn. 71– n. 66, 100 nn. 67, 69– 3, 109 n. 11, 150 n. 28; 72, 105 nn. 2– 84: 54 n. 3, 62 nn. 41, 43, 88 n. 20, 95 46, 106 n. 5, 108 n. 9, 110 n. nn. 45– 16, 150 n. 28; 85: 113 n. 21, 115 nn. 27, 29, 117 n. 34; 86: 62 n. 44, 93 n. 38, 95 n. 46, 121 n. 48, 122 n. 53, 126 n. 61, 150 n. 28; 87: 124 n. 55, 125 n. 60,126 n. 61, 127 n. 64, 150 n. 28; 88: 55 n. 9, 92 n. 31, 125 n. 60, 127 n. 66, 128 n. 70, 129 n. 72, 130 n. 77, 131n. 79, 132 n. 80, 150 n. 28; 89: 92 nn. 32, 95 n. 47, 96 n. 48, 150 n. 28; 31– 90: 134 n. 82, 150 n. 28. 151. Lucan. 124, 148, 150–

185

Nepos. Att. 1.4: 22 n. 30; 2.1– 2: 22 n. 30;

2.2: 30 n. 19, 54 n. 4, 97 n. 56; 2.4.2: 97 n. 56.

Nonius Marcellinus. 144.

Obsequens. 151 n. 29.

54: 14 n. 3, 16 n. 15; 55: 17 n. 17; 56a: 42 n. 55; 56b: 97 n. 56; 57: 116 n. 32, 120 n. 46; 70: 35 n. 35.

Orosius. 41, 42, 44, 46, 70, 152.

7: 14 n. 3, 16 5.9.19: 42 n. 56; 5.18.1– 30: 18 n. 18; 5.18.26– n. 15; 5.18.8– 4: 152 n. 35; 27: 70 n. 71; 5.19.1– 5.19.8: 94 n. 41, 152 n. 35; 5.19.9: 30 n. 18, 40 n. 51; 5.19.10: 39 n. 49; 5.19.12–16: 152 n. 35; 5.19.17: 40 n. 51, 42 n. 56; 5.19.18: 42 n. 55; 5.19.19: 22: 46 n. 72, 45 nn. 67, 70; 5.19.20– 152 n. 35; 5.19.23: 46 n. 72, 48 n. 82, 95; 5.19.24: 110 n. 14, 49 50 nn. 94– n. 92; 5.20.1: 54 n. 2, 152 n. 35; 5.20.2: 116 n. 32, 117 n. 33; 5.20.3: 95 n. 46; 5.20.4: 126 n. 61; 5.20.5: 89 n. 23, 90 n. 24; 5.20.6: 124 n. 55, 125 n. 59; 8: 90 n. 24; 5.20.9: 129 nn. 72, 5.20.7– 2: 74, 130 n. 77, 152 n. 35; 5.21.1– 4: 56 n. 134 n. 82, 152 n. 35; 5.21.3– 7: 134 n. 82; 11, 134 n. 82; 5.21.5– 5.21.8: 125 n. 60, 131n. 79, 134 n. 82; 5.21.9: 131 n. 79, 134 n. 82; 5.21.10: 89 n. 23, 132 n. 80, 134 n. 82; 5.21.11: 16: 96 n. 46; 92 n. 32; 5.21.13, 15– 7: 152 n. 96 n. 46; 5.22.2– 5.21.14: 95– 35; 5.22.4: 56 n. 11; 5.23.2–16: 83 n. 9; 5.24.16: 92 n. 32.

550: 46 n. 73; 2.113– 234, 545– 2.98– 114: 48 n. 89; 2.119–121: 48 n. 88; 2.121: 48 n. 83; 2.124: 48 n. 85; 2.126– 129: 126 n. 61; 2.130: 50 n. 94; 2.134: 124 n. 55, 125 n. 59; 2.135: 130 n. 77; 234: 134 Ovid. Met. 6.382: 123 n. 54. 210: 132 n. 80; 2.210– 2.195– n. 82; 2.548: 92 n. 32; 6.795: 14 n. 3. Pausanias. 159 n. 66.

6: 97 n. 55, 98 n. 57; 9.7.5: 97 9.7.4– 56; 10.30.9: 10: 97 n. n. 54; 9.33.6: 97 nn. 55– 8: 97 n. 51; f. 22.9– f. 22.5– 56; f. 22.12– 123 n. 54. 55; f. 22.11: 97 nn. 55– 2: 99 n. 64; f. 13: 98 n. 57; f. 23.1– 3: 99 Pliny. NH.3.12.108: 123 n. 54; 3.24: 80 n. 24.1: 98 n. 58, 99 n. 62; f. 24.2– 9: 123 3; 3.80: 93 n. 39; 15.78, 21.6.8– n. 65; f. 24.4: 99 n. 66; f. 24.5: 100 n. n. 54; 25.21.52: 14 n. 3; 33.16: 123 n. 2: 100 n. 69, 101 n. 71; f. 67; f. 25.1– 54, 125 n. 58, 131 n. 80; 33.17.55: 70 25.3: 101 n. 72.

Memnon. (Jacoby) 159 n. 66.

186

Index

of Sources

n. 71; 33.27, 46, 132: 73 n. 83. 33, 44, 46, 53, 65, 67, Plutarch. 20, 30, 32–

83, 88, 92, 96, 109, 112, 114, 79, 81– 116–118, 121, 123–124, 125–126, 129–130, 132, 142–143, 148–149, 153–156. 204E: 93 n. 34, 96 n. 48; Mor. 203C– 553C: 42 n. 55; 806D: 115 n. 28; 816A: 132 n. 80. Caes. 1, 5: 134 n. 82; 68.2: 27 n. 8. Cat. Min. 2.1: 16 n. 11. Cor. 1.1: 29 n. 16. 6: 81 n. 6, 156 n. 58; 4.1: 48 n. Crass. 4– 85; 6: 128 n. 68; 6.1: 110 n. 14; 6.2: 95 n. 45, 115 n. 28, 120 n. 48; 6.3: 120 n. 48; 6.6: 130 n. 76. Luc. 1: 142 n. 3; 1.2: 144 n. 6; 1.3: 143 n. 4; 5.1: 108 n. 10, 109 n. 13, 110 n. 14; 5.2: 109 n. 13, 110 n. 14. 33: 17 n. 17; 27: 85 n. 12; 32– Mar. 20– 4: 97 n. 53; 35.3: 33: 18 n. 18; 34.1– 40: 22 20 n. 24; 35.4: 20 n. 25; 35.6– 5: 94 n. 42; 40.3: 57 n. 15; n. 30; 40.2– 41: 97 n. 55, 155 n. 49; 41.1: 33 nn. 25, 27, 37 n. 43, 38 n. 45, 98 n. 57; 41.2: 38 n. 45, 39 n. 50, 94 n. 44; 41.3: 28 n. 12, 39 n. 50; 41.4: 39 n. 50; 42: 5: 42 n. 56, 43 n. 59; 155 n. 50; 42.1– 42.1: 40 n. 51; 42.2: 40 nn. 5152,41 n. 53; 42.3: 43 n. 63, 44 n. 65; 42.5: 44: 155 n. 51; 43.1: 43 n. 48 n. 81; 43– 63; 43. 2: 45 n. 67; 43.3: 45 nn. 67– 9: 6: 49 n. 92; 43.5– 68, 48 n. 89; 43.4– 4: 48 n. 46 n. 72; 43.6: 49 n. 90; 44.1– 83; 44.5: 48 n. 86; 44.6: 48 n. 82, 49 n. 92; 44.9: 46 n. 72; 45.1: 49 n. 92, 46.6: 50 n. 95; 45.7: 50 n. 94; 45.2– 149 n. 25; 46.5: 122 n. 53; 46.6: 125 n. 60, 126 n. 61, 127 n. 64, 131 n. 79. 4.1– Pomp. 1.1: 39 n. 49, 42 n. 55; 1.3.1– 5: 156 n. 59; 4.1: 42 n. 2: 39 n. 49; 3– 3: 66 n. 56; 5: 88 n. 55, 66 n. 56; 4.2– 4: 89 n. 20; 6: 88 n. 20, 115 n. 29; 6.1– 6: 121 n. 49; 7: 89 n. 23, 115 22; 6.3– 2: 121 n. 50; 7.3: 90 n. 24, n. 29; 7.1– 113 n. 21, 121 n. 51, 128 n. 70; 8: 90 6: 128 n. 70; n. 26, 115 n. 29; 8.4– 10.1: 91 n. 30, 92 nn. 31, 33, 93 n. 34,

95 n. 47; 10.2: 91 n. 30, 92 nn. 31, 33, 93 n. 34, 126 n. 61; 10.3: 92 nn. 31, 33, 93 n. 34, 126 n. 61; 10.4: 92 nn.

6: 93 n. 34; 11– 31, 33, 93 n. 34; 10.5– 12: 96 n. 48; 37.3: 142 n. 3. 4: 80 n. 2; 4.1: 86 nn. 16, 17, 156 Sert. 3– 11, 28 nn. 12– n. 56; 4.3: 27 nn. 10– 11, 28 nn. 14, 35 n. 32; 4.4: 27 nn. 10– 14, 31 n. 20, 33 n. 25; 4.5: 33 nn. 12– 2: 38 n. 45; 25, 27, 37 n. 43; 4.5.1– 57; 5.3: 3: 39 n. 50, 156 nn. 56– 5.1– 40 n. 51; 5.4: 45 n. 70, 46 n. 72; 5.5: 46 n. 72, 49 n. 92; 6.1: 50 n. 95, 89 n. 22, 110 n. 114, 113 n. 21, 122 nn. 52– 53; 6.2: 121 n. 48, 122 n. 52; 6.3: 82 n. 8, 83 n. 9, 117 nn. 33, 37, 143 n. 4; 5: 83 n. 9, 143 n. 4; 7: 83 n. 9; 22: 6.4–

82 n. 8.

Sull. 5.3: 97 n. 52; 5.6: 48 n. 81; 6.9: 20

n. 25, 97 n. 52; 7.1: 97 n. 52; 8: 19 n. 26; 9: 20 n. 26, 23, 20 n. 24, 20 nn. 25– 21 n. 28, 22 n. 30; 9.2: 21 n. 29; 10: 53; 10.1: 22 n. 30; 10.3: 155 nn. 52– 27 nn. 10–11, 28 nn. 12–14, 30 n. 17, 31 n. 20; 10.4: 30 n. 17, 31 n. 20, 32 n. 17: 97 n. 55; 11.5: 97 n. 56; 23; 11– 12: 70 n. 71, 97 n. 56; 12.23: 99 n. 65; 14: 97 n. 56; 15: 97 nn. 51, 56, 97 13– 17: 98 n. 57; 19: 97 n. 55, 98 n. 57; 16– n. 57; 19.5: 143 n. 4; 20.1: 98 n. 58, 99 n. 63; 21: 98 n. 57; 22: 97 n. 55, 98 n. 57, 155 n. 54; 22.1: 54 n. 2, 100 nn. 69; 22.2: 100 n. 69, 107 n. 6; 22.3– 68– 5: 100 n. 69; 5: 100 n. 69; 23.1,3– 23.2: 100 n. 69, 143 n. 4; 23.6: 100 n. 4: 100 n. 69; 25.1: 69, 101n. 71; 24.1– 100 n. 70; 27: 156 n. 55; 27.1: 107 n. 7, 115 n. 26; 27.2: 107 n. 7; 27.3: 107 n. 7, 115 n. 26; 27.4: 114 n. 25, 115 n. 27; 27.5: 101 n. 72, 116 n. 32, 117 n. 3; 27.6: 116 n. 32, 117 n. 33, 120 n. 46; 27.7: 90 n. 24; 28.1: 113 n. 21, 114 n. 25, 117 n. 23; 28.2: 113 n. 21, 117 n. 23; 28.3: 113 n. 21, 117 n. 23, 56; 118 nn. 39, 41; 28.4: 124 nn. 55– 28.5: 124 n. 56; 28.6: 124 n. 57; 28.7: 124 n. 57, 125 n. 58; 28.8: 92 n. 31, 125 n. 59, 127 n. 66; 29.1: 121 n. 48, 65; 29.2: 129 n. 72; 29.3: 127 nn. 64–

Index of Sources

187

129 n.73; 29.4: 92 n. 31, 129 n. 74; Schol. Gron. (Stangl) p. 286: 31 n. 22, 32 8: 130 n. 75; 30.1: 130 nn. 76– 29.6– n. 25, 37 n. 40, 40 n. 51; p. 305: 134 n. 77; 30.2: 130 n. 77; 30.4: 132 n. 81; 82, 135 n. 83; p. 317: 134 n. 82; pp. 5: 56 n. 11, 134 n. 82; 32.1: 131 31.1– 333: 89 n. 21. 329, 332– n. 78, 132 n.80. 3: 46 Seneca. Ben. 4.30.2: 27 n. 9; 5.16.2– 62: 100 n. 67. Porphyry. 3.3.61– n. 73, 125 n. 59, 130 n. 77, 134 n. 82; 6.32: 123 n. 54. 38: 149 n. 25. Posidonius. (Jacoby) ff. 36– 2: 134 n. 82. Clem. 1.9.3: 27 n. 9; 1.12.1– Cons. AdHelv. 7.9: 93 n. 39. Ps.-Asconius. (Squires) pp. 206, 208, 226: Ira. 2.34.3: 134 n. 82; 3.18: 57 n. 17, 89 n. 21; p. 234: 90 n. 25; p. 241: 95 135 n. 82. n. 46. Prov. 3.7: 100 n. 70; 3.8: 134 n. 82. Quadrigarius. (Peter) f. 81: 97 n. 56, 144

84: 144 n. 5; f. 82: 50 n. n. 5; ff. 82– 94; f. 83: 48 n. 82.

Silius. Pun. 10.476: 25 n. 1.

145, Sisenna. (Peter) 79, 111 n. 18, 144–

147, 150, 152.

Sallust. 47, 55, 72, 79, 92, 113, 139, 144, 152. 148, 151– 147– ? AdCaes. 4.1: 92 n. 33.

Cat. 11, 51: 134 n. 82; 33.1: 72 n. 79; 33.2: 71 n. 74, 72 n. 79. 5: 144 n. 6; 1.10, Hist. (McGushin) 1.4– 23; 1.11, 14– 15: 148 13: 148 nn. 22– n. 22; 1.12: 138 n. 1, 148 n. 22; 1.20: 22: 22 n. 30, 18 n. 20, 148 n. 22; 1.21– 148 n. 22; 1.23: 40 n. 52; 1.24: 44 n. 64, 47 n. 79; 1.25: 40 n. 51; 1.27: 100 n. 69; 1.28: 101 n. 72, 115 n. 26; 1.29: 119 n. 43; 1.30: 122 n. 53, 124 nn. 55, 57; 1.31: 127 n. 64; 1.32: 125 n. 60; 1.33: 128 n. 70; 1.34: 130 n. 75, 148 n. 22; 1.35: 55 n. 9, 134 n. 82, 138 n. 43: 55 n. 9, 134 n. 1, 148 n. 22; 1.36– 82, 148 n. 22; 1.44: 92 n. 33; 1.45: 96 n. 48; 1.46: 135 n. 83; 1.48.12: 55 n. 9, 134 n. 82; 1.56: 139 n. 2; 1.67: 48 n. 82; 1.77: 57 n. 15, 80 n. 2, 86 n. 17; 92: 83 n. 9. 1.81: 117 n. 37; 1.82– 19, 26, 47, 52, 64, 65, 80: 93 n. lug. 17– 39; 95.2: 144 n. 6, 148 n. 22.

Schol. Bob. (Stangl) 85.

p. 92: 72 n. 80; p. 96: 82 n. 7, 85 n. 14; p. 109: 39 n. 50, 46 n. 75; p. 119: 59 n. 25; p. 126: 118 n. 40, 134 n. 82; p.131: 48 n. 85; p. 138: 96 n. 48; p. 176: 54 n. 5; p. 177: 47 n. 80.

132: 145 n. 7; f. 129: 41 n. 54. ff. 125– Strabo. 159 n. 66.

5.3.11: 125 n. 60, 131 n. 78; 5.4.2: 16 n. 15; 5.4.11: 121 n. 48, 130 n. 77; 9.1.15: 97 nn. 55– 56; 10.4.10: 97 n. 51; 12.4.7: 99 n. 65; 13.1.27: 98 n. 61, 99 n. 65; 13.1.28: 100 n. 69; 13.1.54: 56. 97 nn. 55–

Suetonius. 4; 27 n. 8; 6.1: 5: 26 n. 7; 5.1– Caes. 1.1–

26 n. 7; 85.1.3: 27 n. 8.

Gram. 11.3.5: 143 n. 4.

Tacitus. 41. Ann. 1.1: 77 n. 91; 2.51: 138 n. 1; 3.27:

14 n. 3.

54, 144 n. 7. Hist. 3.51: 41 nn. 53– 88, 92, 122, Valerius Maximus. 59, 67, 87–

153. 152– 1.6.4: 21 n. 28; 1.6.10: 31 n. 20, 47 n. 80; 2.8.7: 46 n. 73; 3.1.2: 14 n. 3; 3.8.4: 14 n. 2; 4.1.12: 14 n. 2; 4.3.14: 47 n. 78; 4.7.5: 85 n. 12, 87 n. 19; 5.2.7: 14 n. 2; 5.3.5: 66 n. 56, 92 n. 53; 5.4ext7: 18 n. 18; 6.2.8: 66 n. 56, 91 n. 30, 92 n. 33; 6.2.10: 88 n. 20, 128 n. 70; 6.8.2: 125 n. 60, 131 n. 79; 7.3.6: 134 n. 82; 7.6.4: 75 n. 89, 93 n.

188

Index of Sources

38, 123 n. 54, 125 n. 58; 8.6.2: 134 n. 82; 8.6.4: 16 n. 15; 8.7.4: 71 n. 75; 8.9.2: 48 n. 83; 8.13pr: 153 n. 39; 9.2.1: 56 n. 10, 57 nn. 15, 17, 60 n. 29, 130 n. 7, 132 n. 80, 135 n. 82; 9.2.2: 84; 9.2.3: 126 n. 61; 9.5.2: 48 nn. 83– 14 n. 3; 9.6: 77 n. 91; 9.7ext2: 87 n. 18; 9.7.3: 134 n. 82; 9.10.2: 95 n. 46; 9.11.2: 49 n. 92; 9.11ext4: 153 n. 39; 9.12.4: 48 n. 86; 9.12.5: 48 n. 87; 9.13.2: 92 n. 33. Varro. Rust. 1.1.10: 94 n. 42.

42, 44, 38, 41– 33, 35– Velleius. 15, 20, 32– 46, 55, 69, 72, 113, 116, 137, 144, 153. 152–

n. 35; 2.20.4: 34 n. 29, 37 nn. 40, 43; 2.20.5: 39 n. 50, 94 n. 44; 2.21.1– 4: 4: 41 n. 53; 39 n. 49, 46 n. 72; 2.21.3– 2.21.5: 46 n. 72; 2.21.6: 40 n. 51, 45 68; 2.22.2: 48 n. 87; 2.22.3: 48 nn.67– nn.83, 86; 2.22.4: 48 n. 86; 2.22.5: 47 95, 153 n. 38; n. 78; 2.23.1: 50 nn. 94– 2.23.2: 72 n. 79; 2.23.3: 54 n. 2, 77 n. 91, 97 n. 55, 98 n. 57; 2.23.4: 98 n. 57; 2.23.6: 100 n. 69; 2.24.1: 98 n. 61, 99 n. 65; 2.24.2: 153 n. 38; 2.24.3: 114 n. 25, 115 n. 26, 116 n. 27; 2.24.4: 106 n. 6; 2.24.5: 110 n. 114, 137, 153 n. 38; 2.25.1: 116 n. 30; 2.25.2: 113 n. 21, 116 n. 32, 117 n. 33; 2.25.4: 116 n. 32, 118 n. 43; 2.26.1: 122 n. 53, 124 n. 3: 126 n. 61; 55, 125 n. 58; 2.26.2– 73; 2.27.4– 5: 131 2.27.1: 129 nn. 72– n. 79; 2.27.6: 57 n. 15, 121 n. 48, 125 n. 60; 2.28.1: 90 n. 24, 127 n. 66, 134 n. 82; 2.28.2: 153 n. 38; 2.28.3: 55 n. 9; 2.28.4: 55 n. 9, 153 n. 38; 2.29.3: 130 n. 76, 131 n. 78; 2.30.1: 91 n. 30, 99 n. 62; 2.41.2: 26 n. 5; 2.42.2: 49 n. 92.

1.15: 93 n. 39; 2.9.6: 144 n. 7; 2.12: 3: 14 n. 3; 2.14.1: 14 85 n. 12; 2.13.1– n. 3; 2.15.3: 14 n. 2; 2.16.4: 17 n. 17, 18 n. 18; 2.17: 18 n. 19, 19 n. 21; 2.18.1: 97 n. 52; 2.18.4: 19 n. 21, 20 6: 20 n. 26; 2.19.1: 22 n. n. 25; 2.18.5– 30; 2.19.2: 153 n. 38; 2.19.4: 94 n. 44; 2: 28 nn. 14–15, 30 n. 18, 33 2.20.1– n. 25, 87 n. 18; 2.20.2: 17 n. 17, 19 n. 30, 35 Zonaras. 10.12: 27 n. 8. 21; 2.20.3: 33 n. 27, 34 nn. 29–

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FRANZ STEINER VERLAG STUTTGART

Contents: Acknowledgements Prologue: Cinna and Modern Scholarship 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

The Tribulations of the Tribunes: Prelude to Cinna’s Coup d’Etat Sulla’s Precedent and Rome’s Peril: Cinna’s First Consulship, 87 B.C. Cinnae dominatio The View from Outside: Provincial and Foreign Affairs in the Age of Cinna Sulla Redux and the Fall of the Cinnans

Epilogue: The Legacy of Cinna Appendix: Sources for the Age of Cinna Bibliography Index of Names Index of Special Topics Index of Sources

Franz Steiner Verlag Stuttgart