Terror in the Name of Faith: Religion and Political Violence 9781618110596

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TERROR IN THE NAME OF FAITH Religion and Polit ical Violence

Инс т и т у т в о с токов е дени я Ро сс ийс кой ак а демии нау к

T he Ins t i t u te o f O r ient al St u d ie s of t h e Ru s sian Ac ad emy o f S c ience s

The “Civilizations Interaction” Foundation

TERROR in the name of

FAITH:

Religion and Political Violence Rakhamim Em a nuilov Andrey Yashlavsky Translated from Russian by Michael Sig a l

boston / 2011

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data: A catalog record for this title is available from the Library of Congress.

ISBN 978-1-936235-80-3 Copyright © R. Emanuilov, A. Yashlavsky, 2011 All rights reserved Book design by I v a n G r a v e

Published by Academic Studies Press in 2011. This translation of “Террор во имя веры” is based on the second edition, revised and supplemented, published by Bridges of Culture / Gesharim, 2011.

Academic Studies Press 28 Montfern Avenue Brighton, MA 02135, USA [email protected] www.academicstudiespress.com

Ta b l e

of

Contents

Introduction

7

Chapter 1 Islamist Terrorism: A Perversion or the Norm?

23

Chapter 2 The Ideological Roots of Religious Terrorism: Salafism and Jihadism

63

Chapter 3 Palestine: From Left-Wing Nationalism to Islamism

105

Chapter 4 The Islamic Revolution: The Export Version

130

Chapter 5 Al-Qaeda: Terrorist Franchising

155

Chapter 6 Afghanistan: From Mujahideen to Taliban

171

Chapter 7 Jihadism in the Post-Soviet Landscape

198

As a conclusion Resisting Religious Extremism and Terrorism: What should be done?

232

Bibliography

244

Links

256

Index

257

About the Authors

262

7

I n t r o d u cti o n

On the list of global challenges facing the modern world, international terrorism can probably be the first item. The terrorist threat cannot be considered as an exception for any country in the world—whether a tiny country or a superpower, a dictatorship or a state with virtually unlimited democracy. Together with other challenges facing human civilization—the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the drug trade, ecological problems, famine and poverty in Third World countries, and others—terrorism entails far-reaching consequences for various spheres of human life, in addition to the immediate threat posed by its specific manifestations. While largely accepting the claim that terrorism is the weapon of the weak, we must nevertheless admit that it is a powerful weapon that poses an enormous threat. Let us agree with the notion that “the power of small is biggest when it is destructive. Small numbers have always been able to pull off assassinations that changed the course of history, but never have so few been able to upset so much as in the modern world.”1 As a manifestation of asymmetrical violence coming from the bottom up, terrorism in the late twentieth—early twenty-first century is qualitatively different from terrorism in earlier times. Against a backdrop of globalization, the spread of new forms of mass communication, and the threat of uncontrolled proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the problem of extremism and terrorism acquires a totally new meaning, becoming an important factor not only in the foreign and domestic policy of most countries, but also in the everyday life of billions of people all over the world. 1

  Mark Penn and E. Kinney Zalesne, Microtrends: The Small Forces behind Tomorrow’s Big Changes (New York: Twelve, 2009), 488.

8

Introduction

What is modern terrorism? Is it a creature of our times, or simply a modernized form of political violence, which is as old as humanity itself? Is there a genetic connection between the followers of Osama bin Laden and the left-wing fighters of the German Red Army Faction, or between the Shiite guerillas of the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Russian revolutionaries of the late nineteenth century? Or is the explanation for the Al-Qaeda phenomenon to be found in the tenets of Islam? Without a clear understanding of the roots of terrorism, it is extremely difficult (if not completely impossible) to comprehend this phenomenon, which has become the major threat to world security in recent decades. And without such an understanding, we cannot effectively combat the terrorist threat. The question of exactly when and where the phenomenon of terrorism first emerged is a very difficult and controversial one. One thing is clear: its birthplace is neither in the sands of Arabia, nor in the oases of the Maghreb, nor within the walls of Central Asian madrasas… We shall consider this question later, but for now, let us ask another one. Generally, when discussing terrorism, we should clearly understand: what, exactly, is terrorism? At first glance, no special difficulties arise here. Terrorism (from the Latin terror—“fear” or “terror”) is either the illegal use of violence (killings, bombings, hijacking aircraft, capturing buildings, taking hostages, etc.) or the threat of violence on a non-governmental level against persons or property, with the intent of sowing fear or changing the policy of governments, civilian populations, or any part thereof, in order to attain political or social goals. This seems like a clear and unambiguous definition. However, it also raises quite a few questions. Few words are more frequently used by hundreds of media outlets every day than the terms “terror,” “terrorism,” “terrorist attack,” or “terrorists.” Is it possible that the true meaning of these terms tends to become obscured by their frequent use? Many different definitions of terrorism can be found in dictionaries, reference books and scientific publications. Some of them manage to get close to the core of the phenomenon, while others completely miss the mark. This question is not limited to purely academic interests. Rather, the search for a clear definition of this term is of pragmatic and practical importance to various spheres of life—from international relations to the penal code. Here we must agree with those authors who claim that, among other things, “There is no criminological concept of terrorism, and its definition

Introduction

in the Russian penal code raises serious doubts. The phenomenology of terrorism has not been completely described; its specific manifestations have not been singled out, and its typology is generally lacking, despite the fact that certain varieties of terrorist acts possess some very specific features which are absent in other types of acts. This underdevelopment of the typological questions is an impediment to an adequate understanding of the nature and mechanisms of this phenomenon as well as the social and psychological mechanisms of its realization.”2 Accordingly, without a clear definition of the phenomenon of terrorism, it becomes much more difficult to combat it on the national, international and legal levels. This lack of a clear definition of the concept of terrorism is nicely illustrated by the example of the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (better known as Hamas). This movement has been put on the list of terrorist organizations in Israel, the US, the countries of the EU, etc.— and, apparently, there are good reasons for doing this. However, by virtue of being a legitimate political force in the Palestinian Authority, and, moreover, by having won a democratic parliamentary election, Hamas ceased to be considered a terrorist organization by Russia, which started to regard the movement as a potential participant in the Middle East peace talks. This decision by Russia was sharply criticized by Israel and Western countries. At the same time, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (on February 14, 2003) outlawed the activities of such movements as Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Muslim Brotherhood in Russia, defining them as terrorist organizations,3 even though these organizations are not defined as terrorist in many other countries. If we could arrive at a clear and universally accepted definition of the terms “terrorism” and “terrorist,” then the specific question of the proper attitude towards Hamas, Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Muslim Brotherhood would also be clarified. The concept of “terrorism” is far from neutral—rather, it is colored by emotions and political considerations. And this leads to the nebulousness in the definition of this phenomenon. There are tens, if not hundreds, of definitions of the word “terrorism.” It would be highly presumptuous on 2

  Антонян Ю. М. Терроризм: криминологическое и уголовно-правовое исследование. М., 1998. С.5.

3

  See: Силантьев Р. А. Ислам в современной России. Энциклопедия. М., 2008. С. 141-146.

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Introduction

our part to try to seek some universal definition. Nevertheless, we would like to emphasize certain points which, in our opinion, enable us to better comprehend this phenomenon. Ultimately, the only indisputable facts are the realization that terrorism is evil and the necessity to fight this evil. However, we still need to clearly understand what terrorism really is. In this regard, we may recall the article by former British Foreign Minister David Milliband which was published in The Guardian in January 2009. In this article, entitled “‘War on Terror’ was Wrong,” the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs admitted that the American concept of the War on Terror as a struggle against a single enemy (a concept which had previously been supported by the United Kingdom) had been a mistake: “The idea of a ‘War on Terror’ gave the impression of a unified, transnational enemy, embodied in the figure of Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda. The reality is that the motivations and identities of terrorist groups are disparate. Lashkare-Taiba has roots in Pakistan and says its cause is Kashmir. Hezbollah says it stands for resistance to occupation of the Golan Heights. The Shia and Sunni insurgent groups in Iraq have myriad demands. They are as diverse as the 1970s European movements of the IRA, Baader-Meinhof, and ETA. All used terrorism, and sometimes they supported each other, but their causes were not unified and their cooperation was opportunistic. So it is today.”4 This statement makes quite a bit of sense. Ultimately, in order to be able to wage a war correctly, it is necessary to have a clear concept of who or what the enemy is. And because of this, the nebulous concept of a War on Terror does nothing to clarify the issue. Frequently, the problem of defining terrorism arises because of the conflation of two closely related, but still distinct, terms—“terrorism” and “terror.” The situation is only exacerbated by the adjective “terrorist,” which can be applied to both of these related-yet-distinct concepts. The following seems to be a sufficiently concise definition of terrorism: the systematic, socially or politically motivated, ideologically-based use of violence or the threat thereof, by means of which, through causing feelings of fear and terror in physical persons, the actions of these persons can be 4

  David Miliband, “‘War on Terror’ Was Wrong,” The Guardian, January 15, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jan/15/david-miliband-warterror.

Introduction

controlled and manipulated by the terrorists in a desired direction, and the terrorists’ goals can be achieved.5 However, it should be noted that an important and essential characteristic of terrorism is its directionality, coming from the bottom up. In other words, the perpetrators of terrorism are persons or organizations who lack sufficient legitimacy to commit acts of political violence. In this respect, it seems to be wrong to talk about terrorism when discussing acts of terror committed by states (we should recall Lenin’s famous definition of the state as an “institution of violence”). At this point, we should note that, when classifying varieties of terrorism, it is legitimate to discuss the concept of state terrorism (in those cases when the state practices violence against opposition groups, organizations, or entire classes of people, and when these acts of violence are directly inspired by the state itself and are carried out by state institutions under the pretext of protecting governmental, social, or national interests. Alternatively, it can refer to cases when terrorism is one of the methods through which the foreign policy of the state is carried out, and cases when these methods are employed by secret services or by terrorist centers and organizations which are funded by the state). Nevertheless, we should note that this remains a controversial subject that requires further detailed study and discussion. Can the term “terrorism” be applied to Operation Wrath of God, which was carried out by the Israeli secret service in order to eliminate the organizers of the terrorist attack on Israeli sportsmen during the 1972 Olympics in Munich? Can we apply the “terrorism” label to the assassination of Mahmoud al-Mabhouh, one of the leaders of the Palestinian Hamas, in Dubai in January 2010 (an operation that was apparently carried out by Israeli agents)? From a formal point of view, the modus operandi of the secret service in those cases may be classified as terrorism. However, by virtue of them being sanctioned and legitimized by the state, these acts are unlikely to be considered terrorism. At the same time, another question arises: how should we classify acts of terrorism against innocent civilians which are carried out abroad by the secret services of other countries (or, at least, are ascribed to them)? Among such acts, we may recall the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 above Lockerbie (in December 1986), which was blamed by the West on Libyan intelligence agencies, or the bombing of a discotheque in West Berlin in 1986, which 5

  Петрищев В.Е. Заметки о терроризме. М., 2001. С.11.

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Introduction

was also blamed on those same agencies. If we assume (since Libya’s involvement in these acts has not been proven) that these crimes were indeed committed by the secret services of the Jamahiriya, then it becomes very difficult to classify these acts of violence, which meet all the criteria for terrorism—except for the single most crucial characteristic of this phenomenon, namely it being directed from the bottom up. The problem of equating the phenomenon of terrorism with the actions of various states is further complicated by the concept of “State Sponsors of Terrorism,” which is widely used in the West, and especially in the US. It is obvious that quite a few states, driven by a variety of motives, do indeed provide all kinds of support (financial aid, material aid, training, logistics, ideological support, etc.) to various extremist groups which operate in other countries. Therefore, these states bear partial responsibility for the actions of the extremists sponsored by them. At the same time, we must remember that the concept of such sponsorship is sometimes quite fuzzy, and it is most often used as a label to brand hostile countries with the goal of subjecting those countries to international pressure. Thus, for instance, the US characterizes Iran as a major source of state-sponsored terrorism (with Iran being accused of sponsoring such groups as the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Palestinian Hamas, etc.). At the same time, Iran blames the US for supporting extremists who act against the Iranian regime (for instance, the Mujahideen-e Khalq organization and the Sunni Jundallah faction). Similarly, the question of the relationship between terrorism and partisan (guerilla) warfare is also controversial, especially since these two phenomena are not only closely related, but also frequently transform into each other. Can the term “terrorism” be applied to partisan (guerilla) activities? Despite the fact that guerilla fighters frequently use terrorist tactics against enemy troops, security personnel and police forces, the answer to this question should probably be negative. Nevertheless, the line separating terrorist activity from guerilla warfare can frequently be so blurry that it is impossible to define. Some researchers doubt the very applicability of the terms “terrorism” and “terrorists” to the modern situation: this is motivated by the extreme fuzziness and indeterminacy of these concepts. Some authors propose completely abolishing the word “terrorist” and replacing it with the term “Violent Non-State Actor.” However, even this term is not completely adequate in describing the phenomenon of terrorism. This definition

Introduction

applies both to subjects that justify their violent activities on an ideological (for example: political and/or religious) basis and to those individuals/ organizations that commit violent acts primarily out of desire for material gain (organized criminal gangs). On the other hand, can we apply the label of terrorism to extremist youth gangs such as skinheads, whose activities can easily fall under the umbrella of “Violent Non-State Actor”? Furthermore, acts of violence committed by skinheads have an ideological motivation (racial supremacism, etc.). Nonetheless, the inclusion of skinheads in the ranks of terrorists remains highly questionable. Therefore, the concept of a violent non-state actor appears to be too broad, and it lacks a full appreciation of the specific features of terrorism as a phenomenon. As American researcher Robert P. Barnidge correctly notes, another stumbling block to a thorough understanding of the terrorist threat is the problem of the correlation between the terms “terrorist” and “freedom fighter”—“One person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter.”6 This author proposes the following question as a starting point for distinguishing the two concepts: is it possible to characterize the violent non-state actors at issue as freedom fighters? “If they do [consider themselves freedom fighters], then they must comply with international humanitarian law. This would clearly not be met if they did not attempt to distinguish between military and civilian targets. As International Court of Justice Judge Pieter Hendrik Kooijmans has noted: ‘deliberate and indiscriminate attacks against civilians with the intention to kill are the core element of terrorism.’”7 Another concept which is no less controversial and difficult to define is “political extremism,” which is undoubtedly a much broader phenomenon than terrorism, with terrorism “growing out of political extremism […], essentially, terrorism is a part of extremism. Out of the many manifestations of extremism (insurgency, the creation of parallel governmental structures, the issuing of ultimatums, acts of civil disobedience, armed resistance to constitutional structures, etc.), terrorism has absorbed the harshest methods of achieving political goals, which sanction both the physical elimination of governmental, political and social activists and the killing of 6

  Robert P. Barnidge, Jr., Non-State Actors and Terrorism: Applying the Law of State Responsibility and the Due Diligence Principle (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2008), 41.

7

  Ibid., 42.

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14

Introduction

ordinary civilians, as well as the destruction of various material objects.”8 Notably, extremism can be defined through its aggressive behavior, “whose most important features are: (1) intolerance towards the opponents’ views, which are rooted in the commonly accepted norms and values of the society in question; (2) a tendency to adopt extreme (violent) methods of solving problems; (3) refusing to accept the consensus as a value and a practical tool for everyday life; and (4) rejecting the concept of human rights and the intrinsic value of the individual.”9 All these features are also characteristic of terrorism, which represents one form of political extremism. So, after all this discussion, what are we left with? Terrorism is the use of premeditated, politically and ideologically motivated violence, or the threat of using such violence; this type of violence can only be committed by a non-state actor, and it is committed in the absence of a state of war (especially in the absence of conventional warfare). The manifestations of terrorism are extremely varied in terms of their scope, actors, goals, forms, methods, nature, etc. Acts of terrorism are committed for the purpose of coercing, intimidating, or transmitting a certain message to the public or to the authorities (and this distinguishes terrorism from organized criminal activities for personal gain). The term “terrorism” itself is relatively new—it entered the lexicon during the years of the French Revolution. However, at that time (in the late eighteenth century), it was defined by dictionaries as “A system, or a regime, of terror.” In other words, it referred to terror from the top down—in that particular case, the Jacobin Terror. However, when discussing terrorism today, we mean terrorism from the bottom up. Modern-day terrorists have quite a few predecessors that can be found in distant historical periods. Among them, we can mention the Greek philosophers, who tried to find justifications for tyrranicide; the Sicarii, an extremist Jewish sect in the first century CE that assassinated members of the Jewish elite who collaborated with the Romans; the medieval Ismaili sect of the Assassins (Hashashin), which struck terror into the hearts of crusaders and Muslim leaders alike; the many regicides in European history (from the legendary Brutus to the gunman in Sarajevo in 1914), who used daggers, bullets, 8

  Петрищев В.Е. Заметки о терроризме. М., 2001. С.11.

9

  Quoted from: Верховский А., Папп А., Прибыловский В. Политический экстремизм в России. М.: Ин-т экспериментальной социологии, 1996. С.12.

Introduction

or poison in order to eliminate undesirable monarchs. Even the famous Boston Tea Party of 1773, which marked the beginning of the uprising of the American colonists against British rule, can, in principle, be analyzed as a terrorist act—the destruction of property as a means of achieving political goals. Nevertheless, the abovementioned acts can hardly be considered as direct precursors of modern terrorism (although they undoubtedly were an indirect influence). Numerous researchers claim that terrorism, as a systematic phenomenon, first emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century. At that time, there was a surge in terrorist activity in Russia (Narodnaya Volya and its followers), Ireland, Macedonia, Serbia, the Turkish part of Armenia, France, Italy, Spain, and the US. This flourishing of terrorism was related to the growth of democratic and nationalist ideas. The old methods of repression employed by the ruling elites were becoming more and more intolerable. Radical fighters against the prevailing social order were searching for the most effective means of waging their struggle (from their point of view). The German radical Karl Heinzen, addressing his potential followers in 1848, wrote the following: “If you have to blow up half a continent and cause a bloodbath to destroy the party of barbarism, you should have no scruples of conscience.” (Many modern ideologues of terrorism would wholeheartedly subscribe to these words.) Heinzen thought that, in order to combat the power of the ruling classes, one should use weapons which would enable a small group of people to cause the maximum amount of chaos. This idea is also quite similar to the tactics used by modern practitioners of terrorism. Johann Most, another radical, claimed that revolutionaries should use barbaric methods in order to fight a barbaric system. His declaration that the killing of police officers is not murder, because they are not human, is also remarkably consistent with the logic of early-twenty-first-century terrorists. Possibly the most iconic terrorist organization of the second half of the nineteenth century was the Russian Narodnaya Volya. Their greatest success was the assassination of Czar Alexander II on March 1st, 1881— following that incident, the terrorist activity of Narodnaya Volya declined sharply, but it was revived in the early twentieth century under the banner of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. Outside the borders of the Russian Empire, the major driving ideals of terrorism were anarchism (which became particularly widespread in Spain

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Introduction

and Italy) and nationalism (Irish terrorism against British rule, Armenian terrorism against the Ottoman Empire, Macedonian nationalism against the Turks, and—following that—against Yugoslavia, etc.). In the late nineteenth—early twentieth century, anarchist terrorists assassinated several prominent European rulers, such as Empress Elizabeth of Austria (in 1898); President Carnot of France (in 1894); and King Umberto I of Italy (in 1900). In addition to targeted terrorism against specific persons, this period was also marked by acts of violence against random, innocent people. One of the first such acts was the bombing of Café Terminus, a coffeehouse in Paris, which was carried out by Émile Henry and led to the deaths of 20 people. The terrorist himself justified his actions by saying that “there were no innocents” among his victims. This type of reasoning is reminiscent of the logic that motivates modern-day extremists who are inspired by Islamist ideology. The second half of the nineteenth century witnessed a surge in nationalism in various countries—specifically, a separatist type of nationalism. Even today, terrorist groups acting under the banner of ethnic separatism (the IRA, the National Liberation Front of Corsica, the Basque ETA, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, etc.) constitute a significant segment of modern terrorism. Ethnic-nationalist terrorist organizations can be divided into two categories. The first category consists of groups that wage an anticolonial struggle (for instance, the struggle against French colonialism in Algeria). In these cases, terrorist violence is frequently part of a larger system of guerilla (partisan) warfare. The second category includes those organizations that are fighting for independence or autonomy for specific ethnic groups within the boundaries of a single country (or, less often, two or more countries): for example, the Basques in Spain, the Palestinians in Israel, etc. In some cases, such a struggle can reach the level of civil or separatist war, but in most cases terrorism remains the primary means of waging the struggle.10 There was a drastic increase in terrorist activity after World War II. On the one hand, this was related to the beginning of the post-colonial era. While some colonies managed to achieve independence relatively peacefully and painlessly, in other cases violent struggles erupted between the colonial power and the advocates of national sovereignty. 10

  Randall David Law, Terrorism: A History (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), 179-180.

Introduction

Ethnic-nationalist terrorism, as practiced by separatist movements, became an important factor in postwar Palestine, Cyprus, Algeria and Kenya. The Jewish Irgun was one of the groups that resorted to terrorism as part of their struggle against the British Mandate of Palestine. One of their most famous acts was the bombing of the King David hotel in Jerusalem (in 1946). The widespread use of terrorist methods of anti-colonial struggle by Jewish fighters has led some authors to claim that “The state of Israel was born out of terrorism against Great Britain and the people of Palestine.”11 The Jewish experience of anti-British struggle was also used by members of the National Organization of Cypriot Struggle (EOKA), who were fighting for the de-colonization of Cyprus (which was also controlled by Great Britain at that time). In this variety of extremism, which is motivated by ethnic-nationalist and separatist concerns, we can also find a prototype of religiouslymotivated extremism—depending on the importance of the role played by various religious beliefs in the national identity of a certain ethnic group. For instance, the combination of Arab nationalism and Islamic elements has resulted in the creation of factions such as Hamas in Palestine; the Irish nationalism of the IRA is accompanied by loyalty to the Catholic Church (whereas the extremists from the Loyalist faction emphasize their Protestant identity); the nationalism of Jewish extremists was (quite logically) strongly influenced by Judaism; the Chechen nationalist separatism has transformed into a Salafi-jihadist movement in the North Caucasus. We could mention many more examples, although, obviously, ethnic-nationalist and secessionist extremism does not always possess a religious dimension (for instance, such a dimension is obviously lacking in the case of the Basque ETA or the Kurdish separatists). At the same time, there are several cases in which the activity of separatist extremists is based primarily on a religious foundation. Such is, for instance, the struggle of Sikh extremists to establish the Sikh state of Khalistan on the territory of the present-day Indian states of Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, and others. On the other hand, the growth of left-wing (and, moreover, far-left) ideologies among youth and students in the Western academic and cultural 11

  Jawad I. Barghothi, “International Terrorism in Historical Perspective,” in Comparative Criminal Justice: Traditional and Non-Traditional Systems of Law and Control, ed. Charles B. Fields and Richter H. Moore, Jr. (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1996), 84.

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Introduction

milieu (especially beginning in the late 1960s) led to the establishment of leftism as the major ideological component of terrorism, both of the national (Ulster, Basque, Palestinian) and the international (transnational) variety. Although terrorist methods were also employed (albeit to a much lesser extent) by extreme right-wing activists, a characteristic feature of that time period was the declared sympathy towards left-wing terrorists among large segments of the leftist intellectual elite. Two important ideas that attained great popularity in the West during the 1960s were the concept of rural partisan warfare (which was developed by Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh, and Ernesto “Che” Guevara) and urban guerilla (whose classical version was developed by the far-left terrorist Carlos Marighella, author of the Minimanual of the Urban Guerilla). These theoretical constructs exerted considerable influence on both the theories and the practices of extremist far-left groups (particularly in Western Europe). At the same time, terrorist groups began to appear both in developed, industrialized countries (the Red Army Faction in West Germany, the Red Brigades in Italy, the Japanese Red Army in Japan, etc.) and in Third World countries (the Tupamaros in Uruguay, the Montoneros in Argentina, the Maoist Shining Path organization in Peru, leftist-nationalist Palestinian groups, etc.). Coincidentally (or not?), the most powerful left-wing terrorist groups in the West in the 1960s–1980s emerged in the countries which had constituted the Axis powers during World War II—Germany, Italy, and Japan. It was precisely at that time period—from the 1960s to the 1980s— that terrorism began to acquire an international, transnational character. This was manifested not only in the ease with which terrorists could move from one country to another, but also in the links that began to be forged between terrorist groups in various countries. This particular development made it possible to talk about the birth of an international terrorist movement. In this sense, secular terrorist groups with a far-left and/or nationalist ideology can be seen as precursors to the transnational activity of the proponents of global jihad in the 1990s–2000s. United groups of German and Palestinian terrorists were involved in the kidnapping of the participants of the OPEC summit in Vienna in 1975 and in the hijacking of Air France Flight 139 in Entebbe (Uganda) in 1976. Japanese far-leftist terrorists cooperating with Arabs from the PFLP perpetrated a bloody massacre at the Lod Airport. These are just the

Introduction

most notable examples of the practical manifestations of international terrorism. It should be noted that such cooperation was not limited to alliances within the same political spectrum (it is no accident that the West German terrorists from the Baader-Meinhof group, founded by Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof called themselves “The Red Army Faction”—implying the existence of a global Red Army, which contained other factions, such as the fighters of the Japanese Red Army, who were notable for their exceptional brutality), and there was also cooperation between groups with different ideological orientations. Politically motivated assassinations and killings (of both specific targets and random people), kidnappings, hostage-taking, bombings of public places, hijacking of vehicles (from trains to aircrafts), and even suicide attacks (see, for instance, the shooting attack perpetrated by three terrorists from the Japanese Red Army at the Lod Airport in Israel, which resulted in the deaths of 26 people—most of them pilgrims from Puerto-Rico. Before the attack, the “Red Kamikazes” swore to each other that they would die, and they deliberately tried to kill each other during the shooting)—all of these manifestations were emblematic of that period. And, jumping forward in time, we should note that, from this point of view, the Islamist terrorists of the late twentieth—early twenty-first century have introduced very few innovations into these practices. They have inherited their complete arsenal of terrorist tactics in a virtually unchanged form from their predecessors—the secular terrorist groups of the previous decades. Paradoxically, even from the point of view of their theories and ideological constructs, there are many structural similarities between the secular (and even atheist) far-leftist terrorists and the devout and Godfearing proponents of global jihad of the late twentieth—early twentyfirst century. The same burning hatred and intolerance towards dissenting views; the same Manichean worldview, dividing everything into clearlydefined “good” and “evil”; the same rejection of Western institutions; and the same teleological thinking (in the case of totalitarian leftist ideologies, the struggle is waged in order to bring about a classless society; in the second case, it is waged in order to establish the ideal caliphate). Another—and possibly the most important—factor which characterizes the peculiar development of terrorism in the 1960s–1980s is the relationship between terrorism and the unprecedented growth and proliferation of mass media. Back in 1978, the American researcher

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J. B. Bell noted that, “Essentially, a symbiotic relationship has emerged between terrorism and its coverage. Through a method of ‘trial and error,’ terrorists have learned to stage such ideal ‘newsworthy’ events for the mass media that the media cannot resist the temptation of immediate coverage.”12 Whether willingly or unwillingly, the media have become the terrorists’ mouthpiece, through which they are spreading their message all over the world. Whereas the terrorists of the past undoubtedly hoped to achieve public resonance through their actions, the terrorists of today, with the omnipresent radio and television (and, most recently, the Internet) at their disposal, are fully exploiting the new possibilities provided by the mass-media, loudly proclaiming and advertising themselves, familiarizing large audiences with their ideology and practical demands, and—most dangerously—recruiting new supporters, especially from the ranks of the young generation. With the constant growth of information technology, terrorist activity is becoming more and more similar to a PR project, and the ability of extremists to propagate their ideology and to spread information and misinformation favorable to their goals is becoming virtually limitless. We can readily agree with the authors who claim that terrorism is not a discovery of the twentieth century. However, “in the ‘new wave’ of terrorism, we can see a totally different approach, which would have been unthinkable in the nineteenth century or in the first half of the twentieth century. This new type of terror is not directed at specific politicians (who are, to a greater or lesser extent, responsible for their country’s policies), but at innocent civilians. This change has been caused by the gradual disappearance of all authoritarian forms of government in the West following World War II. Democracy has made politicians much more dependent on the people, and therefore, the shedding of innocent blood by this very people carries a much higher price tag than it used to.” 13 Indeed, the goal of most modern terrorist actions is not the physical elimination of specific individuals (although terror is also used against certain politicians—see, for instance, the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat in 1981, the assassinations of Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi, 12

  Терроризм в современном капиталистическом обществе. Вып. 1. М., 1980. С. 57.

13

  Жаккар Р. Именем Усамы бен Ладена. М., 2002. С. 13.

Introduction

the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, the assassination of Chechen President Akhmad Kadyrov, the assassination attempt against Y. Yevkurov, the President of Ingushetia, in 2009, and others), or even the infliction of the greatest possible damage on ordinary people, but rather the creation of an atmosphere of fear, uncertainty, and discontent with the ruling elites among different communities (ranging from limited social groupings to global mass society). Traditionally, terrorism has been classified on the basis of its influence on international relations—as well as the national identity of its perpetrators— into internal terrorism (where the acts are carried out by citizens of the country, and the damage and consequences of those acts do not spread beyond the borders) and international terrorism, in which acts of terror are committed by citizens of one or multiple countries, and their goal is either undermining the constitutional structure of other states or damaging the entire fabric of international law and international relations. This distinction, in one form or another, has survived into the present day. However, one of the defining characteristics of modern terrorism is the progressive blurring of the boundaries between internal and international terrorism. Let us agree with the claim that “Even among the groups that pursue local goals (Tamil, Kurdish, Kashmiri, Palestinian, Central Asian, or North Caucasian terrorists), a growing number are starting to internationalize multiple aspects of their activity.”14 This tendency is even more pronounced in those groups that pursue universal goals. “The major form of modern global terrorism is the activity of individual cells of the transnational jihadist movement,”15 which is an extremely complex phenomenon. Islamist terrorism—the primary manifestation of terrorism in the modern world—is, on the one hand, a qualitatively new phenomenon (both in terms of the motivation for its extremist acts and in terms of the unprecedented opportunities accorded to the terrorists by globalization and technological developments); on the other hand, it has not introduced any essentially new elements into global terrorist practices, focusing instead on developing the tendencies which had been established by the ideological 14

  Степанова Е. Транснациональное джихадистское движения и локальнорегиональный исламистский терроризм в 2005–2006 гг. // Год планеты: ежегодник. Вып. 2006 г. М., 2007. С.65.

15

  Ibid.

21

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Introduction

and ethnic-nationalist terrorists of previous decades. This applies both to the transnational, universal character of their general activity and to the nature of the specific acts committed by them (even the practice of suicide bombing, which is commonly believed to be a unique feature of Islamists, has not been invented by them), as well as to their skillful manipulation of opportunities provided by the mass media, etc. “The ‘new’ terrorism has crossed national boundaries and declared war on the entire Western world. Its attacks are no longer aimed exclusively at kings and presidents: any tourist, passerby, passenger, or shopper in any country may become its victim.”16 These words are fully applicable to the militant proponents of global jihad in the twenty-first century, even though they originally referred to a different category of terrorists—those who operated in the 1960s-1970s, without any adherents of Islamism or jihadism in their ranks.

16

  Терроризм в современном капиталистическом обществе. Вып. 1. М., 1980. С. 58-59.

23

Chapter 1

Islamist Terrorism: A Perversion or the Norm?

The late twentieth—early twenty-first century marked the beginning of a new era in the history of terrorism. Now, the major purveyors of terror are extremist groups whose actions and ideology are inspired by religion. Such groups have a tendency to dominate the global terrorist stage. According to calculations made by the researcher Bruce Hoffman, during the 1990s the growth in the number of religious terrorist groups as a proportion of all active international terrorist organizations not only continued, but increased appreciably. “In 1994, for example, a third (sixteen) of the fortynine identifiable international terrorist groups active that year could be classified as religious in character and/or motivation; and in 1995, their number grew yet again, to account for nearly half (twenty-six, or 46 percent) of the fifty-six known active international terrorist groups.”1 It is remarkable that the vast majority of the studies done on terrorism in the 1960s–1980s do not even mention the subject of religiously motivated terrorism, let alone terrorism based on an Islamist worldview. Nevertheless, the theoretical basis of Islamism was developed in the late 1960s by such ideologues as Mawdudi in Pakistan, Sayyid Qutb in Egypt, and Khomeini in Iran. Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb influenced Sunni Muslims, whereas Ayatollah Khomeini’s ideology had a major impact primarily on the Shiites. However, all three of them shared the same view of Islam as a political movement and called for the establishment of an Islamic state. Taking a stand against secular nationalism, these ideologues were also opposed to those representatives of traditional Islam who considered political 1

  Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 86.

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Chapter 1

struggle to be unimportant.2 However, many years were to pass before these theoretical constructs could be put into practice. The situation began to change dramatically beginning in the 1980s. This process was only partially related to the Middle-Eastern conflict (although the Arab-Israeli confrontation has played a major role— and is certainly still an important factor—in the birth of a new phase of terrorism). Undoubtedly, at a certain point the Middle East became a hub of terrorist activity by various groups—especially those groups whose declared goal is a life-and-death struggle against Israel for the creation of a Palestinian state. In a certain sense, we can say that the national liberation movements which acted in the name of the Arab people of Palestine ultimately led to the growth of Islamist terrorist organizations in the region (foremost among them are Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon). However, even the terrorist activity of various Palestinian groups in the 1960s–1980s was largely inspired by ideas of national liberation, with Islamist concepts playing a secondary role (if they were there at all). Obviously, even in earlier periods there were radical and extremist organizations in the Islamic world, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. But the Islamic stage of Palestinian resistance truly began only with the creation of Hamas in 1987, following the outbreak of the First Intifada. Undoubtedly, there were several factors that had a critical influence on the emergence of the new phenomenon of Islamist terrorism. Those factors were: the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the war in Afghanistan, and the collapse of the bipolar world order (when old ideological constructs gave way to religion as the primary motivation for terrorist activity). In the late 1980s—early 1990s, Islamic extremism was almost completely purified of all extraneous ideological layers (such as left-wing or right-wing political views). This process was closely connected to the collapse of the bipolar world order that was taking place in those years. Before that, the existence of such a world order had prevented the ideology of Islamist terrorism (which had already existed at that time, albeit in an embryonic form) from sticking out, forcing it instead to conform to the ideological framework of the Cold War. The most common example of this is Osama bin Laden, who fought in 2

  Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, trans. Anthony F. Roberts (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 5.

Islamist Terrorism: A Per version or the Norm?

Afghanistan against the Soviets on the side of the mujahideen, and received indirect support from American intelligence agencies. It would be more correct to say that the abovementioned factors are merely landmarks in the process of the emergence of global Islamist terrorism. However, it would be wrong to reduce this phenomenon only to those factors. In reality, it is the combination of multiple causes of both religious and secular nature, and it represents the outcome of numerous long-term and short-term processes, both in the Islamic world and outside its borders. Therefore, the movements that endorse global jihad should be considered in the context of the processes of globalization, which have both positive and negative effects. “The informational revolution and the enormous technological changes that accompany globalization have enabled non-state actors to play a much bigger role in international politics. In many cases, the emergence of these new actors does not fit the paradigm of the formation of ‘global civil society.’ The proliferation of transnational terrorist organizations can be seen as the dark side of the ‘non-governmental order.’”3We must keep in mind that, although the takeover of the global terrorist scene by adepts of Islam was a surprise to many, it was preceded by numerous events and processes which had ultimately paved the way for this takeover. There are many approaches that explain the emergence of extremists and terrorists who are driven by religion (in this case: Islam) as actors in international politics. These explanations are economic (the most frequent—though not uncontroversial—claim is that Islamic extremism arises out of poverty and the low socio-economic standards of living in Muslim countries, etc.), political (the domination of repressive regimes, corruption, tribalism, the impossibility of political participation in public life, etc.), ideological (the spread of Salafist ideas of intolerance), behavioral (as a specific type of behavior, which is based on exclusion and intolerance towards dissidents), psychological, functionalist (religion as a tool for achieving political goals), etc.4 Obviously, some of these explanations may 3

  Соловьев Э.Г. Террористические сети и оружие массового поражения // Современные политические процессы и имидж России. М.: ИМЭМО РАН, 2007. С. 87.

4

  For more information on these approaches and explanations, see Наумкин В.В. Исламский радикализм в зеркале новых концепций и подходов // Наумкин

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be erroneous or highly exaggerated. We must agree with the claim that a combination of several explanations will turn out to be productive. In addition to the abovementioned processes, we must certainly mention the process of religious revival—in this case, in the Muslim world. Numerous researchers place it in the context of the global revival of religion that took place in the second half of the twentieth century against a backdrop of economic and social modernization. “This revival, la revanche de Dieu, Gilles Kepel termed it, has pervaded every continent, every civilization, and virtually every country. In the mid-1970s, as Kepel observes, the trend to secularization and toward the accommodation of religion with secularism ‘went into reverse. A new religious approach took shape, aimed no longer at adapting to secular values, but at recovering a sacred foundation for the organization of society—by changing society if necessary. Expressed in a multitude of ways, this approach advocated moving on from a modernism that had failed, attributing its setbacks and dead ends to separation from God.’”5 These processes were partially related to the profound crisis of the formerly-dominant secular ideologies, particularly after the end of the Cold War. This general tendency was also reflected in the changing ideological priorities of extremist groups. As B. Hoffman notes: “It is perhaps not surprising that religion…should become a far more popular motivation for terrorism in the post-cold war era as old ideologies lie discredited by the collapse of the Soviet Union and communist ideology, while the promise of munificent benefits from the liberal-democratic, capitalist state, apparently triumphant at what Francis Fukuyama in his famous aphorism has termed the ‘end of history,’ fails to materialize in many countries throughout the world.”6 There were active Islamist groups (with some of them being extremely active) in the 1950s and 1960s, and even more so in the 1970s, but their activity was more local. The events which took place in the Middle East in 1945–1967 demonstrated time and again the failures of secular Arab nationalism, and these failures greatly aided the growing В.В. Ислам и мусульмане: культура и политика. Статьи, очерки, доклады разных лет. М.—Н. Новгород, 2008. С.459-471. 5

  Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Touchstone, 1998), 95.

6

  Hoffman, 86.

Islamist Terrorism: A Per version or the Norm?

popularity of alternative projects—particularly in the form of radical Islamism. The ideology of Pan-Arabism, which started to develop in the late nineteenth century—when Arab nationalists demanded the secession of Arab countries from the Ottoman Empire—was strengthened after World War I. The general goal of Pan-Arab ideologues was the establishment of a unified Arab state over the entire territory of the Arabian Peninsula and the Middle East. As is well known, the Pan-Arab dream of the establishment of such a state failed to materialize: the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement, which was signed between Britain and France in 1916, violated British promises made to Arabs about the creation of an independent Arab state after the defeat of the Turks. The division of Arab lands by European powers in the years following World War I sowed the seeds of discord for many decades to come. In lieu of the independent and unified Arab state that Arab nationalists dreamed of, several smaller states were created, and they fell into the Western sphere of influence. Pan-Arabism received a second chance due to the spread of leftistnationalist ideas in the Arab world in the mid-twentieth century. The development of the Pan-Arab movement was greatly influenced by the Palestinian problem and the establishment of the Jewish state of Israel. In several countries, Pan-Arabism was made into the official state ideology, and the influence of the Pan-Arab Ba’ath party (The Arab Socialist Revival Party) grew considerably. Despite this, the efforts of Pan-Arab forces to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict and to provide at least a semblance of Arab brotherhood and unity ended in failure. As a result, the popularity of Islamism in the Arab world began to grow. Some of the factors that clearly contributed to the growth and coalescence of modern Islamism were: the Six-Day War, which resulted in the humiliating defeat of the Arab armies; the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, whose outcome was hardly favorable to the Arabs; and the global oil crisis. However, the most important landmarks in this process were the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. There were some other events in the late 1970s— early 1980s that contributed to the emergence of Islamism as a powerful force on both the local and the international level (we may recall the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by Islamist fanatics who proclaimed one of their leaders—Abdullah Hamid Mohammed Al-Qahtani—as the Mahdi,

27

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the redeemer of Islam; the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar ElSadat in 1981; the Islamist uprising in Syria in 1982). The events that transpired in the late 1980s—early 1990s appear to have finally cemented the success of Islamism—and militant Islamism in particular—as a new actor on the global political stage. A critical role in this process was played by the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, which was perceived as a humiliating defeat inflicted by the mujahideen upon a superpower. For this reason, the Gulf War, which involved the presence of foreign armed forces in the sacred Muslim land of Saudi Arabia, led to much discontent in the Islamic world, particularly among numerous foreign veterans of the Afghan Jihad. Their anger was exacerbated by the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, which was perceived as surrender on the part of the Palestine Liberation Organization—increasing the popularity of the Islamists of Hamas. Largely as a consequence of these events, Islamism became the dominant force on the global terrorist stage. Religion is one of the most important sources of group identity which can enhance social cohesion within the group. Religion also provides one of the oldest motivations for political violence in the world. “Religious wars and crusades have been among the most devastating and costly conflicts in history…In some religious wars the clear intent was to eliminate the other religious group. Conquest or conversion were not seen as real options.”7 Nowadays, in the late twentieth—early twenty-first century, we witness the process by which “Terrorism in the name of religion has become the predominant form of political violence in the modern world. This is not to suggest that it is the only model because nationalism and ideology remain as potent catalysts for extremist behavior. However, religious extremism has become a central issue for the global community.”8 The most significant (both in terms of their political premises and consequences and in terms of number of victims) terrorist attacks of the 1990s–2000s had a significant religious subtext and/or motivation, which confirms the special role of religion as the major driving force of 7

  Brenda J. Lutz and James M. Lutz, Global Terrorism (Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2008), 69.

8

  Gus Martin, Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives, and Issues (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2006), 183.

Islamist Terrorism: A Per version or the Norm?

international terrorism in our time period. Among these attacks, we can mention the following: the sarin gas attack in the Tokyo Subway, which was carried out by the Japanese religious cult Aum Shinrikyo (in March 1995); the Oklahoma City bombing (April 1995), carried out by “Christian patriots”; the World Trade Center bombings (in 1993), committed by radical Islamist terrorists; the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (November 1995) by a Jewish religious fanatic; the Khobar Towers bombing (in 1996), in which a truck bomb was detonated near a building housing US Air Force personnel in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; a series of anti-Israeli suicide bombings, which were carried out by the Palestinian Hamas (February—March 1996); an Islamist attack against foreign tourists in Egypt (April 1996) near the Cairo hotel; the killing of 58 foreign tourists and 4 Egyptians by terrorists from the Egyptian Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya group near the Temple of Hatshepsut in Luxor; a series of car bombings in Mumbai (February 1993), in which 250 people were killed; the bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (August 1998), which killed 224 people; and the bombing of US Navy destroyer Cole in the Yemeni port of Aden (October 2000). Religious extremism reached its apex in the 9/11 attacks (September 11, 2001), which led to the deaths of several thousand people and which were blamed on the Islamist Al-Qaeda network. Massive terrorist attacks with a (more-or-less prominent) religious motivation continued even in the post-9/11 era. The most notable among them are: the bombings at a tourist resort on the island of Bali, Indonesia (October 2002), which killed 200 people; the terrorist attacks in Casablanca (Morocco), which were carried out by the Salafia Jihadia group; a series of train bombings in Madrid (on March 11, 2004), which led to the deaths of 191 people; the Beslan school hostage crisis (September 2004) in Northern Ossetia; the assassination of Dutch film director Theo van Gogh by a jihadist in Amsterdam; the 2005 London suicide bombings (July 2005), which caused the deaths of more than 50 people; the bombings at the Sharm el-Sheikh resort in Egypt (July 2005), which led to multiple casualties; the bombings in Mumbai (India) in July 2006, which killed more than 200 people; and a series of terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November 2008. The above listing of terrorist attacks is far from exhaustive. Nevertheless, it effectively illustrates the opinion of those experts who claim “Terrorism motivated in whole or in part by religious imperatives has often led to more

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intense acts of violence that have produced considerably higher levels of fatalities than the relatively more discriminating and less lethal incidents of violence perpetrated by secular terrorist organizations.”9 Indeed, the situation in which political violence becomes intertwined with religious faith appears to be extremely dangerous. Religiouslymotivated terrorism is more destructive and deadly than traditional (secular) terrorism—not least because of the differences in their value systems and means of legitimization. Terrorism in the name of religion is, in the words of M. Ranstorp, “unprecedented, not only in its scope and the selection of the targets, but also in its lethality and indiscriminate character.”10 In B. Hoffman’s opinion, “Whereas secular terrorists regard violence either as a way of instigating the correction of a flaw in a system that is basically good or as a means to foment the creation of a new system, religious terrorists see themselves not as components of a system worth preserving but as ‘outsiders’ seeking fundamental changes in the existing order. This sense of alienation also enables the religious terrorist to contemplate far more destructive and deadly types of terrorist operations than secular terrorists, indeed to embrace a far more open-ended category of ‘enemies’ to attack—that is, anyone who is not a member of the terrorists’ religion or religious sect. This explains the rhetoric common to ‘holy terror’ manifestoes describing those outside of the terrorists’ religious community in denigrating and dehumanizing terms.”11 For religious terrorists, violence (or terrorism) is a divine duty sanctioned by their holy scripture (whether the Bible or the Qur’an). Violence which is legitimized by religion becomes self-sustaining, as the violent acts themselves are seen as sanctioned by God. Furthermore, religiously-motivated terrorist organizations seem to be far more tenacious when compared to terrorist structures that have a different ideology (farleft, far-right, nationalist, separatist, etc.). There are available data which indicate that, out of all the terrorist groups that were active around the world in the time period from 1968 to 2006, approximately 62% ceased to exist, whereas among religious terrorist groups, this figure stands at 9

  Hoffman, 88.

10

  Quoted from: Aref M. Al-Khattar, Religion and Terrorism: An Interfaith Perspective (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 26.

11

  Hoffman, 89.

Islamist Terrorism: A Per version or the Norm?

only 32%. In practice, however, not a single religious terrorist group has managed to achieve complete victory in the time period since 1968.12 Adepts of a radical interpretation of Islam are not the only group in history that has justified its violence on the basis of religion. It is claimed that one of the first religious terrorist organizations was the Jewish sect of the Sicarii (Zealots), which fought against the Roman occupation of Palestine in the first century CE and committed many acts of terror in the name of Judaism. This sect waged a campaign of targeted assassinations and massacres, poisoning wells that were used by Romans and disrupting the water supply to Jerusalem. Although their violence was to a large extent a struggle for national liberation from foreign occupation, it was also religiously motivated.13 According to researcher David Rapoport, the nature of the messianic doctrine of the Sicarii was such that it simultaneously provided a goal for their terrorism and justified the means that were necessary to achieve that goal. As a result of this, the acts of Jewish terrorism committed by this group had two identifiable objectives: making the repressions so unbearable that a rebellion would be inevitable, and foiling any attempt at reconciliation between the warring parties.14 Some authors point out that the Sicarii have become “a role model for many modern Jewish terrorist groups.” Modern terrorism with a religious Jewish motivation emerged in the first half of the twentieth century in Palestine, where several Jewish groups used terrorist tactics in their struggle against the British (although it is difficult to draw a precise line between their anticolonial struggle for national liberation and their religious motivation). Acts of political violence in the name of Judaism continued to take place after the foundation of the State of Israel. In the 1990s, there was a series of religiously-motivated terrorist attacks, which were aimed not only at adherents of different faiths (in particular, Arab Muslims), but also at the secular character of modern Israel. For example, on January 1, 1997, a Jewish soldier perpetrated a shooting attack against Arab shoppers at the bustling Hebron market, claiming that he had received “a mission from 12

  Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, summary to How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al Qa’ida (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), xiv.

13

  Al-Khattar, р.26.

14

  David C. Rapoport, “Fear and Trembling: Terror in Three Religious Traditions,” American Political Science Review 78, no. 3 (1984): 669.

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God.” A similar motivation was used to justify the attack against Arab worshippers at the Ibrahim Mosque in Hebron, which was carried out by the Jewish fanatic Baruch Goldstein in 1994, and the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (in 1995) by an extremist who used his faith and religious views as a justification for his act of terror. All these violent acts were, from the point of view of their perpetrators, religious missions with the goal of establishing a “new religious kingdom on earth.” The bombing of Air India Flight 182 above Ireland in 1985, which was considered to be the deadliest aircraft-related terrorist incident before the 9/11 attacks (329 people were killed), is attributed to extremist Sikhs from the separatist Babbar Khalsa organization, which advocates the creation of the state of Khalistan. Earlier, in 1984, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was assassinated by Sikh extremists. In the modern world, there are numerous extremist groups acting under the banner of various Christian denominations (see, for instance, the struggle between Catholic and Protestant groups in Ulster, as well as the multiple far-right fundamentalist Christian extremists in the US), Judaism (for instance, the extremist Jewish organization Kahane Chai), the syncretistic Japanese Aum Shinrikyo sect, or the syncretistic Lord’s Resistance Army that terrorizes Uganda (the ideology of this group is a blend of Christianity and traditional African beliefs). There are several racist and far-rightist churches and groups active in the US, which are united under the banner of Christian Identity. Some of their followers are members of organizations that are classified as terrorist. “Many of the right-wing groups active in the United States…have elements of religious fervor that help to explain their activities. Christian groups in the United States and other countries have been concerned about the dangers that are represented by the concept of secular humanism, which denies the validity of any Supreme Being. Christian religious beliefs have been used to justify racism, anti-gay attitudes and violence, and xenophobia in a number of countries.”15 Unfortunately, expressions of xenophobia, extremism, and political violence that are motivated by religious views are also common among Orthodox Christians in Russia. Although “the Patriarchate has never endorsed violence towards other religions or denominations in any way, 15

  Lutz, 71.

Islamist Terrorism: A Per version or the Norm?

shape, or form…many other would-be fighters for the Orthodox Christian cause do not show such restraint.”16 For example, in the 1990s (and even later) there were recorded attacks on Krishna followers, members of various Protestant sects, etc. Nevertheless, one cannot avoid the impression that the manifestations of extremism and terrorism that are motivated by Judaism, Christianity, Hinduism, or various non-traditional religious sects are usually confined to unsystematic, isolated incidents. Furthermore, while the religious motivation is often present in the ideology of various groups, it is not their unique or dominant motive, but is usually combined with nationalism and xenophobia (thus, despite Prof. Steve Bruce’s claim that, “The Northern Ireland conflict is a religious conflict” and that, although socio-economic problems also play an important role, “It was the fact that the competing populations in Ireland adhered and still adhere to competing religious traditions which has given the conflict its enduring and intractable quality,”17 it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the confrontation between Irish Catholics and Protestants is primarily a conflict between two communities, rather than between two religions). All this cannot be said about terrorism which is committed under the banner of Islam. For many reasons (both subjective and objective), it is the Muslim religion that is most commonly considered in the context of the problems of terrorism and extremism that plague the modern world, and, by the same token, terrorism is commonly put in an Islamic context. These subjects are widely discussed (often in a biased and dishonest fashion) by various experts, official spokesmen, and—most commonly—by the mass media. What is really behind this connection? Is it an accident or a repeating pattern? A mutation or a genetic predisposition, so to speak? And does this connection really exist, or is it just made up, as some authors claim? It is difficult to deny the following statement, made by Abdel Rahman al-Rashed, the general manager of the Al-Arabiya news channel: “It is 16

  Верховский А.М., Михайловская Е.В., Прибыловский В.В. Политическая ксенофобия. Радикальные группы. Представления политиков. Роль Церкви. М., 1999. С.113.

17

  Steve Bruce, God Save Ulster: The Religion and Politics of Paisleyism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 249.

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a certain fact that not all Muslims are terrorists, but it is equally certain, and exceptionally painful, that almost all terrorists are Muslims.”18 This does not in any way imply that terrorism stems from the essence of Islam, which is a great world religion with a centuries-old history. Even a short historical overview of the development of terrorism shows that it is, in all likelihood, a Western product that has been adopted by Islamist extremists in the last decades. Because of this, the term “Islamic terrorism” appears to be inappropriate; a better term to describe this phenomenon is “Islamist terrorism.” “Is modern-day Jihadi terrorism caused by or inherent in Islam?”—asks the American researcher David Aaron. His answer is: “No more so than the Aryan Nations19 are the inevitable product of Christianity. While it is true that all Jihadis consider themselves Muslim fundamentalists, few Muslims, or even fundamentalists, are Jihadis. Fanaticism and violence are not unique to Islam or even to religion.”20 We should keep in mind that the members of the modern jihadist movement have been greatly influenced by the ideas of the so-called Islamic Resurgence, which began in the Middle East in the second half of the twentieth century. “The origins of this Arab-led resurgence can be seen in part as a reaction to the decline of the Ottoman Empire and to colonial rule by the British and French starting in the nineteenth century and, subsequently, under League of Nations mandates following World War I. In addition, the establishment of Israel in 1948, encompassing part of the former Ottoman province of Palestine, and the support that Israel has enjoyed from Western nations, particularly the United States, is also a key ingredient.”21 18

  Quoted from: Madeleine Albright, The Mighty and the Almighty: Reflections on America, God, and World Affairs (New York: Harper Perenial, 2007), 210.

19

  Aryan Nations is a far-right Neo-Nazi group, which was founded in the USA in the 1970s as an arm of the Christian Identity organization. It is considered to be the first nationwide terrorist network in the US.

20

  David Aaron, ed., In Their Own Words: Voices of Jihad (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), 8.

21

  Devin R. Springer, James L. Regens and David N. Edger, Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009), 19.

Islamist Terrorism: A Per version or the Norm?

We can isolate several clusters of claims from among the mass of notions regarding the connection (or lack thereof) between Islam and modern terrorism. The first cluster consists of claims that agree on one thing: Islam has nothing to do with terrorism, and these two concepts should not be juxtaposed. Proponents of this view usually quote the following words by the Prophet Muhammad: “He is not one of us who calls for intolerance, who fights driven by intolerance, and who died in his intolerance.” “Could it be possible that Islam, whose light ended the Dark Ages in Europe, now propounds the advent of an age of terror? Could a faith that has over 1.2 billion followers the world over…actually advocate the killing and maiming of innocent people? Could Islam, whose name itself stands for ‘peace’ and ‘submission to God,’ encourage its adherents to work for death and destruction?”22 These rhetorical questions, posed by an Islamic website, are not mere figures of speech. They really do need to be answered, and such an answer appears to be quite hard to find. A widespread misconception among the Western mass media and popular consciousness is that Muslim leaders and religious authorities do not condemn acts of terror. There are, in fact, a large number of fatwas and proclamations that condemn terrorism against innocent people, but they usually pass unnoticed by the media. A large number of prominent Muslim scholars (such as Fethullah Gülen, Ahmet Akgunduz, Harun Yahya, and others) have declared that a real Muslim who understands all the aspects of the Islamic religion cannot be a terrorist.23 The influential Pakistan-born Muslim preacher and theologian Tahir-ul-Qadri, who resides in the UK and holds a doctorate in law, has said the following while commenting on the suicide attacks that took place in Rawalpindi in December 2009: “Suicide attacks are not allowed in Islam, these actions are un-Islamic… the slaughter of human beings in any religion or country, and terrorism in all its manifestations, are totally in contradiction with the teachings of 22

  “What Does Islam Say about Terrorism?,” http://www.whyislam.org/index.php/brochure-islam-on-terrorism.

23

  Fethullah Gülen, “A Real Muslim cannot be a Terrorist,” http://www.fethullahgulen.org/press-room/nuriye-akmans-interview/ 1727-a-real-muslim-cannot-be-a-terrorist.html.

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Islam.”24 In March 2010, Tahir-ul-Qadri issued a 600-page-long fatwa with an “absolute” condemnation of terrorism without “any excuses or pretexts.” In particular, the theologian claims that “terrorism is terrorism, violence is violence and it has no place in Islamic teaching and no justification can be provided for it, or any kind of excuses or ifs or buts.” Qadri’s fatwa declares terrorists and suicide bombers to be unbelievers. From the point of view of those who deny the connection between the Islamic religion and political violence, the application of the terms “jihad,” “shahid,” or “Mujahid” to terrorists is completely inappropriate, and Islam is a religion of peace and love. This point of view is held by proponents of the secular, official, mainstream Islam, both in Russia and in other countries. For example, the Grand Mufti of Russia, Rawil Gaynetdin, rejects the application of Islamic terms to terrorists. According to him, “The use of such religious terms as ‘shahid’, ‘mujahid’, ‘warrior of Allah’, and others when referring to terrorists is fundamentally wrong, and it is done primarily in order to discredit Islam. The words ‘shahid’ and ‘mujahid’ signify a true believer, a God-fearing person, for whom the murder of fellow human beings (whether Muslims or adherents of other faiths) is the greatest sin imaginable.” In the Mufti’s opinion, the use of these terms in a different, negative, context (especially when referring to the explosiveladen belts worn by suicide bombers as shahid belts), distorts the truth and creates confusion in the public consciousness. In Rawil Gaynetdin’s words: “Regrettably, there are journalists, politicians, and policemen who use these terms while being completely ignorant of the morality, principles, and ideas of the Islamic religion. Because of this, the public regards the entire religion of Islam as a virtual threat to the whole civilized world. This is a very dangerous tendency that should be stopped immediately.”25 Broadly similar views are expressed by Harun Yahya (Adnan Oktar), a Turkish Muslim author who has written more than 200 works on religious, scientific, and political subjects: “The fact that the perpetrators of various 24

  Quoted from: “In Pakistan, Anguish and Questions,” The Washington Post, December 6, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ article/2009/12/05/AR2009120503001.html.

25

  From the Russian website РИА “Новости”. 11.08.2003. www.rian.ru (Translator’s Note: the publication dates in the references are left in the European mode: day-month-year.)

Islamist Terrorism: A Per version or the Norm?

terrorist acts carry Christian, Muslim or Jewish identities causes some people to put forward claims which do not concur with divine religions. The truth is that even if terrorists have Muslim identities, the terror they perpetrate cannot be labeled ‘Islamic terror.’”26 In this Turkish scholar’s opinion, “Terror…is the opposite of religion; it is cruel, merciless and demands bloodshed and misery. This being the case, the origins of a terrorist act should be sought in disbelief rather than in religion. People with a fascist, communist, racist or materialist outlook on life should be suspected as potential perpetrators. The name or the identity of the triggerman is not important. If he can kill innocent people without blinking an eye, then he is a nonbeliever, not a believer.”27 We can partially agree with this viewpoint, although we cannot ignore the fact that a terrorist who operates under the banner of a particular religion justifies his actions on a subjective level by appealing to the interests of that religion. Nevertheless, it is impossible to disagree with the arguments put forth by those authors who point out that the moral principles of the Qur’an are founded upon love, mercy, compassion, respect, and self-sacrifice. There are Qur’anic passages that speak about the prohibition on killing innocent human beings (“Whoever slays a soul, unless it be for manslaughter or for mischief in the land, it is as though he slew all men; and whoever keeps it alive, it is as though he kept alive all men”28), and about the prohibition on ideological pressure (“There is no compulsion in religion; truly the right way has become clearly distinct from error…” ; “therefore do remind, for you are only a reminder. You are not a watcher over them”29). Bassam Tibi, a German political scientist of Syrian origin, relates the following anecdote that nicely illustrates this position: “At a high-level meeting devoted to the struggle against terror in the Egyptian city of Sharm el-Sheikh in March 1996, the leaders of Muslim states protested the attempt by their Western colleagues to insert the term ‘Islamic terrorism’ into the final memorandum, motivating their opposition by saying that 26

  Harun Yahya, Islam Denounces Terrorism (Istanbul: Arastirma, 2002), 13-15.

27

  Ibid., 15.

28

  The Qur’an. Sura Al-Ma’ida (“The Table”), 5:32 (translated by M. H. Shakir).

29

  The Qur’an. Sura Al-Baqara (“The Cow”), 256; Sura Al-Ghashiya (“the Pall’), 88: 21-22 (both translated by M. H. Shakir).

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terrorism is abhorrent to Islam, and therefore it cannot have an Islamic image.”30 The International Association of Islamic Scholars (IAMS), which is led by the prominent Islamic scholar Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, has issued a fatwa calling for resistance to the American occupation of Iraq. However, the fatwa also points out the impermissibility of killing non-combatants and civilians, even if they are citizens of the occupying countries, although an exception is made for those cases where civilians directly participate in combat. Stressing the fact that Islam forbids aggression against innocents regardless of their position and social status (this concept of aggression includes killing them or causing them bodily harm, stealing their property, or assaulting their honor), the Islamic scholars remind their audience that there are many forces in the world that seek to “tarnish the image of Islam.” The scholars claim that “There are bloody massacres committed under the slogan of resistance by groups that are likely to be connected to the Zionists or to foreign intelligence agencies.”31 In his fatwa “What is the Islamic View on Violence and Aggression?”, Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi states, “Undoubtedly, aggression against innocent people is a great sin and a monstrous crime, regardless of the victims’ religious affiliation, nationality, and citizenship. No one has the right to commit such acts, because Allah has forbidden aggression.” The theologian recalls several Islamic principles that are based upon the Qur’an and the Sunnah: Islam prohibits aggression against innocent people; according to Islam, every person is responsible only for his own actions, and not for those of others (“Therefore, it is very sad to see people who call themselves Muslims turning innocent civilians into ‘scapegoats’ for the policies carried out by their governments. What crimes have been committed by simple people? Murder is one of the greatest sins in Islam”); Islam is incompatible with the claim that “the end justifies the means” (“It is considered impermissible to strive for the good while committing acts of evil”). Based on this, the author of the fatwa concludes that “According 30

  Тиби Б. Политизация религии // Международная политика. 2000. Февраль. Вып. 2.

31

  The International Association of Muslim Scholars about the situation in Iraq, Palestine, Sudan and Afghanistan, November 29, 2004, translated from: http://www.islam.ru/pressclub/fetv/iams/.

Islamist Terrorism: A Per version or the Norm?

to all the sources of the Sharia—the Qur’an, the Sunnah, the fatwas issued by Islamic scholars—aggression and violations of human rights are strictly prohibited. Furthermore, Islamic scholars must do everything within their power to guide people on the path of righteousness in this area.”32 Similar views on the question of the connection between the Islamic religion and political extremism are expressed by many secular, nonMuslim researchers. In particular, we readily agree with the Russian expert G. Mirsky, who claims that “Islam per se is not a belief system which is characterized by an innate tendency towards extremism, let alone terrorism. In Islam, just like in any other religion, one can find postulates which can be easily interpreted as calling for intolerance, struggle against the ‘infidels’, and even violence. However, with a different goal in mind, one can just as easily find passages that are diametrically opposed to the above. ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ is not an inevitable product of Islam, but rather the outcome of a long series of historic and socio-economic factors.”33 By and large, this approach to the problem seems to be reasonable. However, we cannot completely ignore the fact that many of today’s most dangerous terrorists see themselves as warriors for the Islamic faith and the only true defenders of Muslim interests. Moreover, they consider themselves to be the true Muslims. And it is Islam, not some other religion, which guides their actions and provides them with an ideological foundation (although the accuracy of their interpretation of Islam is debatable). This brings us to two other points of view on the relationship between Islam and terrorism which come from two opposing ideological camps but which, nonetheless, essentially agree with each other. The difference between them lies in their moral evaluation of the phenomenon of terrorism—one group sees it as good, while the other sees it as bad. The first group uses a militant interpretation of the Qur’an and Islamic history to justify and legitimize their actions. The other group, whose attitude towards Islam ranges from criticism to outright Islamophobia, uses it in order to “prove” the militancy and violence which are (supposedly) inherent in 32

  Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi. “What is the Islamic View on Violence and Aggression?,” March 16, 2004, translated from: http://www.islam.ru/pressclub/fetv/agressia/.

33

  Мирский Г. Ислам и нация: Ближний Восток и Центральная Азия // Полис. 1998. № 2.

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Islam. However, both positions ultimately lead to equivalence between Islam and the actions of terrorists. The first position represents the point of view of radical Islamists. It can be summarized as follows: the things which are said about Islam by the “munafiqun” (hypocrites) are lies, and the terms “jihad,” “shahid,” and “mujahid” are, under this view, clear and accurate labels that signify uncompromising struggle and willingness to fight the infidels until the bitter end. For instance, Islamist Sheikh Abdul Qader Ibn-Abdul Aziz, one of the founders and leaders of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, declared that “Terrorism is part of Islam, and whoever denies it is an Infidel,” whereas the Iraqi Shiite cleric Muhammad Alusi promoted the idea that terrorism is an integral part of jihad.34 Based on this logic, Islam legitimizes the acts of terrorism committed by the mujahideen. This point of view is expressed by numerous pro-Islamist authors, who find justification for terrorism in the Qur’an and the Sunnah. Even a brief glance at the texts and video clips that are posted on radical Islamist websites is sufficient to convince oneself of their militancy and extremism. For example, one of the websites belonging to the Islamists of the North Caucasus has published an article (by Abdul Qader Ibn-Abdul Aziz) with the unambiguous title “Terror is a Part of Islam.” This author explicitly says that “Whoever claims that Islam has nothing to do with terror, and whoever tries to separate these two concepts, is an apostate… Today, those who proclaim that they want to fight terrorism really want to fight Islam. Fighting against terrorism means fighting against Islam. They are simply distorting the truth in order to mislead those who should know better.”35 The same author also tries to provide a theoretical foundation for terrorist attacks against civilians (“It would be incorrect to consider civilians as innocent people. Most of the men and women among them are required to serve in the armed forces. And furthermore, there have been public opinion polls which show that, after those attacks, most of the American population supported the acts of vengeance committed by George Bush in Afghanistan. This is not limited to the United States—this operation 34

  Aaron, 87.

35

  Шейх Абдуль Кадир ибн Абдуль Азиз. Террор является частью ислама. Дата публ. 04.06.2009.

Islamist Terrorism: A Per version or the Norm?

was supported by all the other Crusader countries, such as Canada, Great Britain, etc.”). Moreover, he claims, “There is no sin in the unpremeditated killing of truly innocent civilians during an operation: children or Muslims who were present there for legitimate reasons.”36 The claims of Muslim scholars that the concept of jihad refers not only to armed struggle are flatly rejected by militant extremists. One of the ideologues of jihadism in the Russian North Caucasus, Sayyid Buryatsky (Aleksandr Tikhomirov), quoting (among other sources) the hadith, “He who has not fought, and has not aroused his soul to fight, has perished for his hypocrisy” (hadith Al-Bukhari and Muslim), points out the following: “In the text of this hadith, the Messenger of God (peace be upon Him) uses the verb ‘gaza,’ which can only be translated as ‘waging war,’ so that no one would interpret it as fighting against one’s passions, the Devil, etc.”37 Sayyid Buryatsky’s article “An Inside Look at Jihad, One Year Later,” from which the above quote is taken, is largely aimed at those Muslim authorities who exhort their followers not to take part in jihad when it is interpreted as armed struggle. Similarly, Osama bin Laden, the leader of Al-Qaeda, has sharply criticized those Muslim scholars who disagree with his point of view: “The fatwa of any official scholar has no value to me. History is full of such scholars who justify usury, who justify the occupation of Palestine by the Jews, who justify the presence of American troops around the Two Sacred Mosques. These people support the infidels for their personal gain. The true scholars support the jihad against America. Tell me, if Indian forces invaded Pakistan, what would you do? The Israeli forces occupy our land, and the American troops are on our territory. We have no other option but to launch jihad.”38 The interpretation of jihad not as a defensive war (let alone an internal struggle against one’s evil passions—some Muslim scholars interpret jihad in this way) but primarily as a war of aggression was largely inspired by 36

  Ibid.

37

  Саид Бурятский: “Взгляд на Джихад изнутри, по прошествии года”. Дата публ. 18. 05. 2009. // http://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2009/05/18/65689.shtml

38

  Brad K. Berner, ed., Quotations from Osama Bin Laden (New Delhi: Peacock Books, 2007), 35.

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the father of modern revolutionary Islamism, the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb, who has had an enormous impact on the extremist Islamist movements of the late twentieth—early twenty-first century. Among other things, Qutb claimed that, “The clear and illuminating words of the Holy Qur’an; the legacy of the Prophet (may Allah bless Him and greet Him!), who called upon Muslims to wage jihad; the wars waged by Islam in the early stages of its development; moreover, the entire history of Islam, which is full of descriptions of jihad—all of this is irrefutable evidence, which fills the heart of every Muslim with contempt towards the pathetic arguments of those ‘scholars’ who have succumbed to pressure from unfavorable circumstances and accepted the fallacious propaganda of the Orientalists.” Qutb wrote about Islam: “This religion does not seek answers to practical questions in abstract theories, but, at the same time, it does not employ the same immutable methods in various life situations. Those who discuss the system of religious jihad, basing their arguments on the words of Holy Qur’an, do not consider this peculiarity. They do not realize that different stages in the development of jihad were of different natures, and they are unaware of the fact that different verses in the Qur’an refer to different stages of this movement. For this reason, these scholars construct very flimsy interpretations of the system of Islamic jihad, mixing up different stages of its development and thereby distorting the very essence of the concept of jihad.”39 Osama bin Laden, the leader of Al-Qaeda, agrees with him: “Fighting is part of our religion and our Shariah. Those who love God and the prophet and this religion may not deny a part of that religion… Whoever denies even a very minor tenet of religion would have committed the gravest sin in Islam.”40 The second cluster of similar views about the relationship between terrorist violence and Islamic teachings comes from the opposite direction—i.e. from people who hold a negative or critical attitude towards the Islamic religion and claim that Islam and terrorism are, if not synonymous, at least very closely related to each other. For instance, the modern BritishAmerican historian Bernard Lewis, who specializes in Oriental studies, 39

  Translated from: Sayyid Qutb, “War, peace and Islamic Jihad,” Otechestvennye Zapiski, no. 5-13, 2003, http://www.strana-oz.ru/?numid=14&article=677

40

  See: Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad went Global (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 4.

Islamist Terrorism: A Per version or the Norm?

claims that the term “Islamic terrorism” is legitimate, and motivates this claim by saying that Islam has had an essentially political character…from its inception to the present day.41 At the same time, it should be noted that, in his latest book Islam: The Religion and the People, Bernard Lewis points out that there is no evidence for the use of terrorism in the Islamic tradition, that “Muslims are commanded not to kill women, children, or the aged…not to torture or otherwise ill-treat prisoners,” that the phenomenon of suicide attacks, which has become so widespread in recent times, is a product of the twentieth century, and that Muslim toleration of unbelievers and misbelievers was far better than anything available in Christendom until the rise of secularism in the seventeenth century.42 According to some of these authors, the terrorists’ actions are predetermined by the entire logical structure of Islam, and what we see today is just a manifestation of the global clash between the Islamic civilization and the Judeo-Christian civilization. Such a view is held primarily by authors in the West (in the broadest sense of the term, including Russia). The most famous proponent of the concept of the Clash of Civilizations, Samuel Huntington, predicts in his book that “The dangerous clashes of the future are likely to arise from the interaction of Western arrogance, Islamic intolerance, and Sinic assertiveness.” He then goes on to say that “The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power.”43 At the same time, when discussing “the Muslim propensity toward violent conflict,” Huntington claims without a shadow of doubt that “Wherever one looks along the perimeter of Islam, Muslims have problems living peaceably with their neighbors.”44 These attempts to depict the conflict between Islamist terrorism and the international community as the manifestation of a fundamental clash of civilizations, a clash between the West and the Islamic world, are—in spite 41

  Bernard Lewis, “Islamic Terrorism?,” in Terrorism: How The West Can Win, ed. Binyamin Netanyahu (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1987), 66.

42

  Bernard Lewis, Buntzie Churchill, Islam: The Religion and the People (Philadelphia: Wharton School Publishing, 2008), 145-150.

43

  Huntington, 217.

44

  Ibid., 258, 256.

43

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of their superficial attractiveness and logic—ultimately unconvincing and unable to adequately describe the real situation. As has been said before, this subject enjoys exceptional popularity in two seemingly irreconcilable ideological camps—in the jihadist movement on the one hand, and among the (latent or outspoken) Western Islamophobes on the other. However, real world history and realpolitik are full of examples wherein clearly recognized political and economic interests take precedence over interreligious and inter-civilizational differences, even though such differences obviously exist and are frequently the cause of conflicts (albeit non-fatal ones). Thus, one of the most common motifs in modern Salafi-jihadist propaganda is the portrayal of the war in Iraq as an act of aggression by “the Crusaders and the Zionists” against an Islamic state. Undoubtedly, the actions of the US with regards to Iraq are, at the very least, questionable from a moral point of view, let alone in terms of their compliance with international law. However, these jihadist depictions completely ignore the fact that, at the time of the American invasion of 2003, Iraq was ruled by the relatively secular Saddam Hussein and the secularist pan-Arab Ba’ath party, which had originally been founded by the Christian Arab Michel Aflaq. Furthermore, those who see the Iraq War as an episode of the larger confrontation between Islam and the West fail (or refuse) to notice that a significant number of Western countries (including some traditional EuroAtlantic allies of the US) did not support the American aggression against Iraq. It is enough to recall the intense diplomatic pressure which was put on the White House not to invade Iraq by such countries as France, Germany, Belgium, and (obviously) Russia. Additionally, one cannot fail to notice the massive anti-war protest movement that took root in the countries which did participate in the invasion. Finally, we should not forget that the violent acts of terror that are committed by the jihadists in Iraq are aimed primarily not at the troops of the American-led coalition, but at Iraqi Muslims. In light of all these facts, how is it possible to talk about a war between Islam and the West in the Iraqi context? Similar things can be said about many other conflicts taking place all over the world, which involve members of different religions, cultures, and countries—but which, in reality, have very little to do with some global conflict between civilizations. Some Western authors go so far as to openly blame the entire religion of Islam for the misdeeds committed under its banner by extremists and terrorists. According to the logic of authors such as Robert Spencer, modern

Islamist Terrorism: A Per version or the Norm?

Islamists who are promoting global jihad do not distort the essence of Islam (an accusation commonly leveled at jihadists by adherents of moderate Islam), but rather exemplify it accurately.45 The subsections of Spencer’s book The Politically Incorrect Guide to Islam are titled in a provocative and peremptory way: “Muhammad: Prophet of War”; “The Qur’an: Book of War”; “Islam: Religion of War”; “Islam: Religion of Intolerance”; and other similar titles. These authors base their conclusions and theories on the following premises: the prophet Muhammad did not teach his followers to be peaceful and tolerant, but led armies and ordered his enemies to be killed—and furthermore, Muhammad taught the Muslims that there was nothing better and holier than militant jihad; the Qur’an instructs the Muslims to wage war upon the Jews and Christians (at the same time, the existence of Quranic suras that call for peace and tolerance is ignored); and that the wars waged by the Muslims in Muhammad’s time were not defensive, but offensive, and the Islamic world, as it is known today, was created as the result of a series of brutal invasions and conquests of lands that had originally been inhabited by non-Muslims. Obviously, this is a rather one-sided interpretation of both the Holy Scriptures and the historical events. It should also be noted that proponents of this view seem to ignore the relative youth of Islam compared to other world religions. After all, the age of the Islamic religion today is roughly equal to the age of Christianity at the time when, all over Europe, the Inquisition burned people at the stake in the name of God. Furthermore, we should not forget that the Holy Scriptures of the Judeo-Christian tradition also occasionally contain contradictory ideas. In the Bible, just like in the Qur’an, one can find passages which are far removed from notions of peace and love for one’s fellow-man. For instance, see the following passage from the Book of Deuteronomy 20:10-20 (from the King James Version): When thou comest nigh unto a city to fight against it, then proclaim peace unto it. And it shall be, if it make thee answer of peace, and open unto thee, then it shall be, that all the people that are found therein shall be tributaries unto thee, and they shall serve thee. And if it will make no peace with thee, but will make war against thee, then thou shalt besiege 45

  See: Robert Spencer, The Politically Incorrect Guide to Islam (and the Crusades) (Washington, DC: Regnery Publ., Inc., 2005).

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it. And when the lord thy God hath delivered it into thine hands, thou shalt smite every male thereof with the edge of the sword. But the women, and the little ones, and the cattle, and all that is in the city, even all the spoil thereof, shalt thou take unto thyself; and thou shalt eat the spoil of thine enemies, which the Lord thy God hath given thee. Thus shalt thou do unto all the cities which are very far off from thee, which are not of the cities of these nations. But of the cities of these people, which the Lord thy God doth give thee for an inheritance, thou shalt save alive nothing that breatheth. But thou shalt utterly destroy them, namely: the Hittites, and the Amorites, the Canaanites, and the Per’izzites, the Hi’vites and the Jeb’usites; as the Lord thy God hath commanded thee. That they teach you not to do after all their abominations, which they have done unto their gods; so should ye sin against the Lord your God. When thou shalt besiege a city a long time, in making war against it to take it, thou shalt not destroy the trees thereof by forcing an axe against them: for thou mayest eat of them, and thou shalt not cut them down (for the tree of the field is man’s life) to employ them in the siege. Only the trees which thou knowest that they be not trees for meat, thou shalt destroy and cut them down, and thou shalt build bulwarks against the city that maketh war with thee, until it be subdued.

It must be admitted that the point of view which claims that modern terrorism and jihadist extremism are a logical outcome of Islam is quite popular among a certain segment of Western society. According to American public opinion polls conducted by the Pew Research Center and others, the attitude of Americans towards Islam and Muslims is becoming more and more negative. In March 2002, only 25% of the respondents thought that “Islam encourages violence more than other religions,” whereas in the summer of 2003 this figure rose to 44%. This deterioration happened despite the constant assurances by the American government that “The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends.”46 Nevertheless, while in November 2001 (i.e. two months after the events of 9/11) 59% of American respondents expressed a positive attitude towards Muslim citizens of the US, this figure dropped to 54% in March 2002, and to 51% in the summer of 2003.47 The researcher Daniel Pipes attributes this 46

  From President George W. Bush’s address to a joint session of congress following the 9/11 attacks.

47

  These figures are taken from: Daniel Pipes, “Islam’s Image Problem,” New York Post, July 29, 2003.

Islamist Terrorism: A Per version or the Norm?

growing animosity largely to the “on-going reality of terrorism, hate-filled statements and other problems tied to militant Islam around the globe.” However, he also thinks that “Some of it…results from the problems concerning militant Islam’s control of the institutions of American Muslim life.”48 Polls conducted in December 2002—January 2003 (by Gallup Poll in collaboration with CNN and the newspaper USA Today) in the US and in eight Muslim countries (Lebanon, Turkey, Kuwait, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan) clearly indicated a high level of mutual hostility between the US people and the citizens of Muslim countries. Only 24% of the American respondents held a positive view of Muslim countries, while 41% of them held negative views.49 In light of all the abovementioned facts, the attempts by the US President Barack Obama to break the ice of mutual mistrust between America and the Muslim world become understandable (see, for instance, Obama’s speech in Cairo on June 4, 2009). However, the ice is unlikely to be broken as long as there is no consensus among the Americans themselves regarding their attitude towards Islam. This lack of consensus is clearly illustrated by the fierce debates which took place in 2010 between supporters and opponents of the construction of a Muslim community center near Ground Zero, where the 9/11 attacks took place. Among the harmful and aggressive acts that hinder peace and understanding between people, we can mention the actions of Terry Jones, an American pastor representing the small Christian Dove World Outreach Center in Florida, who announced in 2010 that he would burn the Qur’an on the ninth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks (Jones himself was forced to cancel this sacrilegious act, but two other pastors from Tennessee did burn the Qur’an). The attitude towards Islam in Europe is largely determined by fear— both the fear of terrorism and fear of the growing number of immigrants from Muslim countries. Some researchers tend to regard Islamophobia as a new form of racism spreading in Europe, citing the negative epithets (such as “Islamic terrorism,” “Islamic bombs,” “violent Islam,” etc.) that are frequently applied to Islam by various media outlets. In 2002, the European Monitoring Center for Racism and Xenophobia issued the “Summary 48

  Ibid.

49

  Долгополова Н.А. Правые республиканцы в Вашингтоне. М., 2003. С. 62.

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Report on Islamophobia in the EU after 11 September 2001,” which reported an increase in Islamophobic incidents. In 2008, Terry Davis, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, announced, based on the results of a poll by the Pew Research Center, that Europe had become more anti-Semitic and less tolerant towards Islam, and that, in some countries, almost half the population expressed negative attitudes towards Jews and Muslims. Such manifestations are expressed in different ways, on both the domestic and the political levels, and they can be both latent and extremist. Public opinion polls show that, in real life, interreligious relations in Western Europe are far removed from the politically correct ideal. A poll conducted in the summer of 2010 among 500 non-Muslim British citizens by the DJS Research Company for the British Academy of Islamic Education and Research showed that three-fourths of non-Muslims in Britain negatively characterize the influence of Islam on society, 63% believe that “Muslims are terrorists” and 94% said that “Muslims oppress women.” At the same time, 80% of respondents admitted that they knew almost nothing about Islam, 40% were unable to identify Allah, while 36% percent had difficulty in answering the question of who was the Prophet Muhammad. And finally, the two most alarming results of this poll: 60% of the respondents said they did not wish to receive any information about Islam, whilst 77% percent oppose proselytism by Muslims of non-Muslims.50 Another poll, which was conducted in the UK a little earlier, also demonstrated the suspicious attitude of the British society towards Islam. An online survey of 2152 adults commissioned by the Exploring Islam Foundation and conducted by the YouGov organization found out that 68% of the participants linked Islam with extremism, and 69% believed it encouraged the repression of women.51 When asked if Muslims had a positive impact on British society, 4 out of 10 respondents answered negatively. Half of the respondents linked Islam with terrorism, only 13% thought it was based on peace, and 6% associated it with justice. At the same time, the survey revealed the frequent shifts in respondents’ attitudes towards Islam as a result of personal interaction with Muslims. Approximately 60% admitted that they did not know much about Islam, but a third said they would like to know more. 50

  Taken from the Russian website Интерфакс, August 3, 2010, www.interfax.ru

51

  “Britons Link Islam with Extremism, Says Survey,” BBC News, June 7, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10251827

Islamist Terrorism: A Per version or the Norm?

In the words of Italian historian F. Cardini, “Public opinion in Europe is still very badly informed about most religious and cultural aspects of the Islamic world, and the adjectives ‘secular’ or ‘integrist’ (or other vague distinctions) seem totally inadequate. Scant information of mediocre quality, made to seem abundant by incessant mass media coverage, combines with lingering or grotesquely repeated prejudices to prevent the formation of any calm and tolerant view of Islam.”52 Many modern stereotypes about Islam that exist in the public consciousness are, on the one hand, a product of the modern era of globalization, which is characterized by frequent contacts (without mutual understanding) between members of different cultural and reli- gious groups. On the other hand, the widespread misconceptions about Islam in the West (in the broadest sense of the term) date many centuries back—and the same is true of the Muslim misconceptions and erroneous assumptions with regards to the West. Even as far back as the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, “Few problems were more vexing to the Western European consciousness than the problem of their attitude toward the Muslim faith, toward the culture and traditions of Muslims. In the imagination of Western Christians, Islam was sometimes depicted as the doctrine of the Antichrist, and sometimes—as a domain of idolatry, a realm of sins and temptations.”53 In general, all these mutual misconceptions (which are equally prominent in the West and in the Muslim world) ultimately stem from the eternal and fundamental problems of the “Self ” vs. the “Other,” “Us” vs. “Them,” and “Members of one’s own ethnic/social group” vs. “Foreigners.” The three clusters of claims described above—representing three mutually exclusive points of view on the question of the relationship between Islam and political violence—are very widespread. The adherents of each point of view try to bolster its credibility with convincing examples, Qur’anic passages and quotes from Islamic scholars. At the same time, it is obvious that while all of them are partially true, none of them can claim to be an accurate depiction of objective reality. Where, then, does the truth 52

  Franco Cardini, Europe and Islam (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 211.

53

  Лучицкая С.И. Образ Мухаммада в зеркале латинской хронистики XIIXIII вв. // Одиссей. Человек в истории. Картина мира в народном и ученом сознании. М., 1994. С.182.

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lie? It is most logical to assume that the truth (if such a single, universal truth does indeed exist) lies somewhere in the middle. The claim that terrorism is not an inherent feature of Islam is supported by the fact that terrorism carried out under the banner of this religion is a modern phenomenon, which appears to be uncharacteristic of the entire, 14-century-long history of Islam. The attempts by some researchers to point out the “Islamic” roots of terrorism by highlighting the medieval sect of the Assassins are unconvincing. After all, they were a small and marginal sect with relatively few members, and, furthermore, both Christian monarchs and Muslim rulers fought against them, occasionally in cooperation with each other. At the same time, while the arguments of those authors who try to show a direct link between modern terrorism and Islam is built on a very shaky foundation, the question of the correlation between Islam and political violence is not so simple. In contrast to the clear separation between the political and the religious spheres that prevails in Western political thought, in Islam religion and politics are considered to be parts of the same sphere. Whereas the representatives of mainstream Islam manage to maintain this dichotomy (to a greater or lesser extent), Islamist groups (of both the violent and the non-violent varieties) actively use a religious vocabulary in order to express their political ideas. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that Islam (unlike, for example, Christianity) lacks a clear central authority which could make decisions on matters of doctrine. In Islam, the interpretation of the Qur’an and the Sunnah is based on the consensus of prominent Islamic scholars (ulema). However, there are no clear criteria for determining the authority of any given scholar. At this point, we should note that, when discussing the Islamic factor in politics, the following terms tend to become conflated in the public consciousness: Islamic fundamentalists, radical Islamists, Islamist terrorists. According to Tunisian professor Zuhair Mudhaffar, “A distinction should be made between fundamentalism and so-called extremist Muslim political movements which believe that religion should be the basis for the policies of the state and call for radical changes in the existing social order and political regimes and for the creation of an Islamic state on this basis… This phenomenon is expressed in one of two forms: the first one believes that its goals should be attained through peaceful, cultural

Islamist Terrorism: A Per version or the Norm?

and social means, whereas the second one employs and justifies violence as a method of spreading its views.”54 Some researchers identify a special variety of jihad which they term “Irredentist Jihad”—a situation where the concept of jihad is contested between nationalist forces, who are less likely to view their struggle for national liberation as jihad, and Islamists, whose struggle is motivated more by religion than by nationalist considerations. Furthermore, Irredentist Jihad is also sometimes characterized by rivalry within the Islamic camp itself—between local and global elements (for example, the rivalry that exists between the Afghan mujahideen and the Afghan Arabs or between Sunni Iraqi insurgents and Al-Qaeda fighters operating in Iraq). It is necessary to draw a clear line between Muslims per se and Islamic fundamentalists. It is equally important to grasp the difference between Muslim fundamentalists and the relatively small group that advocates and commits violence in the name of religion, while acting under the banner of Islam. At the same time, we would like to reject the widespread assertion (which is promulgated largely out of misguided political correctness) that “terrorists have no religion and no nationality.” And yet, one should never agree with the claim that there is a genetic connection between the Islamic religion and terrorism. When discussing the connection between religion (per se) and terrorist violence, Prof. Mark Juergensmeyer claims that, in this respect, “religion is not innocent. But it does not ordinarily lead to violence. That happens only with the coalescence of a peculiar set of circumstances—political, social, and ideological—when religion becomes fused with violent expressions of social aspirations, personal pride, and movements for political change.”55 Even if we (provisionally) accept the claim that Islam bears a certain degree of responsibility for the actions of terrorists who use their religion to exonerate themselves, we should immediately ask the question, “What kind of Islam?” Islam is an extremely complex and heterogeneous phenomenon. This is a truism, and yet, for a variety of reasons, it tends to be “forgotten” by those authors who accuse this world religion of being the source of 54

  Quoted from: Зин эль-Абидин Бен Али. Великие перемены. Речи и выступления. М., 2003. С.411.

55

  Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004), 10.

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terrorism. In this respect, we agree completely with the claim that “Islam is perhaps, the most misunderstood religion in the world. People talk of Islam but never make an attempt to know what real Islam is.”56 Like any other world religion (or, more broadly,—like any powerful ideological system), Islam represents an extremely multifaceted phenomenon, which is amenable to different interpretations. Moreover, the contradictions that are inherent to Islam prevent us from treating it as a monolithic structure (and therefore, it is a priori impossible to link the entire religion to the actions of extremists). The differences between Sunnis and Shiites are frequently more acute and painful than, say, the differences between Muslims and Christians. In the political dimension, there are profound contradictions between moderate Islam, Islamic fundamentalism, and Islamism, as well as between revolutionary fundamentalism and conservative fundamentalism—and finally, there are contradictions within the Muslim Ummah between various nations and countries (including the traditional rivalry between the Arabs and the Persians, the opposition of Egypt and Saudi Arabia to Iranian attempts to be the leader of the Muslim world, etc.). Even within a single ideological movement, such as Wahhabism, there are significant internal contradictions. This fact enables multiple researchers to even claim that there is no direct connection between the official Wahhabism which is dominant in Saudi Arabia and Salafi-jihadist movements (such as the terrorist network of Osama bin Laden). Furthermore, the adherents of Salafi jihad themselves occasionally admit that, as proponents of pure Islam, they constitute only a tiny fraction of the total Muslim population. One Islamist website claims that, “Despite the multiplicity of those who call themselves Muslims, there are very few who observe Tawhid [the oneness of God—authors’ note].”57 As has been mentioned before, one of the foreign political factors which has played a role in the appearance of Islamist terrorism on the political stage was the Islamic revolution in Iran. To this day, there are numerous 56

  M. H. Syed, ed., Islamic Terrorism: Myth or Reality (Delhi : Kalpaz Publications, 2002), 9.

57

  Umm Ataya, “About the Islamic Nation and Ethnic Nationalism,” March 28, 2009, http://guraba.net/rus/content/view/357/44/

Islamist Terrorism: A Per version or the Norm?

countries that openly pin almost all the blame for terrorist activity in the Middle East on “the intrigues of Tehran.” The following logical chain appears to be very convincing: terrorists from the Lebanese Hezbollah or the Palestinian Hamas—Iranian mullahs—the Islamic revolution— Islamic fundamentalism—Islam in general. The fallaciousness of such logic becomes apparent if we replace Iran with another state which is also accused by the West of sponsoring terrorists in Lebanon and Palestine— namely, Syria. The secular regime in Damascus cannot be associated with Islamic terrorists, no matter how hard one tries. Undoubtedly, the Iranian authorities are interested in causing certain developments in the region and in asserting their hegemony. However, their ambitions are, in most cases, met with hostility and resistance from most regimes (both secular and conservative/fundamentalist ones) in the entire Greater Middle East. It is no accident that many authors draw our attention to the fact that the aspirations of the victorious Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979—to be the guiding light in the Islamic world and to serve as a political and social model for the entire Ummah—were almost completely crushed by the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War of 1980–1988: “The war with Iraq identified the Iranian revolution with Shiism and Iranian nationalism: the Arab masses turned away from this version. The exportation of revolution has occurred only, and partially, within the Shiite ghettos of Lebanon, Iraq, and Afghanistan.”58 The groundlessness of the attempts to blame Islam for extremism and terrorism is clearly illustrated by numerous examples where factions that are identified with terrorism in some way fight against each other in various conflicts. The Iranian fundamentalists were some of the fiercest opponents of the Afghan Taliban at the time when the Taliban ruled Afghanistan. Various groups acting under the banner of Islam—ranging from left-wing organizations (such as the People’s Mujahedin of Iran) to Salafi-jihadist ones—are fighting against the regime in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The radical Palestinian Hamas faction, which is sponsored by Tehran, engaged (in 2009) in an armed confrontation with some even more radical Islamist groups, who had declared the creation of an Islamic emirate in the Gaza Strip. 58

  Syed, 49.

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Those who are interested in stopping terrorist activity—in this case, religiously-colored manifestations of extremism and terrorism—should realize that methods involving the use of force can only defeat the symptoms of this disease, and that deeper methods are likely to be more effective. The problem of the relationship between religion and extremism needs to be studied and researched thoroughly, from both the academic and the practical points of view. The interest of researchers and mass-media outlets in Islamist movements often remains politicized, and because of this the image which they transmit is only a partial depiction of this incredibly complex and multi-layered phenomenon. As a result, Islamist groups are frequently portrayed either as individual factions and movements having little in common with each other, or as a single, monolithic movement without any internal differentiation (either theoretical or practical). There are several major points of view regarding the reasons for the growth of Islamist revival in the Middle East. One point of view considers international Islamism to be a reaction to the pro-Israeli policies pursued by the US in the Middle East. Another theory views the revivalist movement as a fundamental nucleus of the Clash of Civilizations between the Muslims and the West (this theory has been most forcefully articulated by S. Huntington). The concept of the Clash of Civilizations essentially brands the entire Islamic world as a source of hostility towards the West. Besides, this theory is unable to propose a real solution to the problem of terrorism. Another approach postulates that the Islamic revival is a cultural and psychological response to the political, social, and economic influence of the modern West which has disturbed the calm waters of the past in the Middle East and in other regions of the world. It must be admitted that the policies implemented by Western countries (in the broadest possible sense)—policies that are all-too-often misguided and poorly thought-out—play a significant role in the radicalization of Islamism. Indeed, one of the reasons for the proliferation of Islamist movements is the widespread belief among Muslims that “The West is to blame for the backwardness of Muslims, through the cultural paradigms and modes of development introduced by them. As a result, in these Muslims’ view, the West has robbed their countries and forced them into such a dire situation that they are unable to find an alternative paradigm and specific modes of development for themselves. Moreover, they consider the West to be responsible for the creation of the state of Israel in a region

Islamist Terrorism: A Per version or the Norm?

regarded as sacred by all Muslims, and for supporting it in all the wars that it wages.”59 One classification scheme of Sunni Islamist activism (in the opinion of its authors, Shiite activism remains a homogenous phenomenon) was prepared by the International Crisis Group in 2005. It presupposes the existence of three types of activism.60 The political type is exemplified by movements—such the Muslim Brotherhood, the Justice and Development Party in Turkey, etc.—whose goal is attaining political power in their countries; movements of this type operate within the constitutional framework, accept the concept of a nation-state, tend to avoid violence, etc. The missionary type consists of organizations whose goal is converting people to Islam by means of missionary work (al-da’wa)—it is exemplified by the Tablighi movement and the highly diffuse Salafiyya movement. The overriding purpose of movements of this type is not attaining political power, but defending the Muslim identity, the Islamic faith, and the moral order from the “forces of unbelief.” The third type—jihadi—exists in three main variants: internal (combating the ruling regimes in Muslim countries), irredentist (fighting to redeem land ruled or occupied by non-Muslims); and global (combating the West). Commenting on this classification, V. Naumkin notes: “While this scheme is useful for formulating a general approach to Islamic activism, it does not reflect the entire complex tapestry of Islamic structures and organizations.”61 The aforementioned scheme is broadly compatible with the attempt by the Egyptian researcher D. Rashwan to classify the various modern Islamist movements. He proposes to divide them into two main groups, united only by the fact that they link themselves to Islam, but with profound differences in the way they see and interpret their relationship to this religion. The first of these groups consists of religious Islamist movements, whereas 59

  Quoted from: Зин эль-Абидин Бен Али. Великие перемены. Речи и выступления. М., 2003. С.413.

60

  International Crisis Group, Understanding Islamism (Cairo: International Crisis Group, 2005), Middle East/North Africa Report, March 2, no. 37. See: Наумкин В. Ислам и мусульмане: культура и политика. М., 2008. С. 478-479.

61

  Наумкин В. Ислам и мусульмане: культура и политика. М., 2008. p. 480.

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the second is composed of sociopolitical movements with an Islamist platform.62 Religious Islamist movements are based on a specific reading of Islam and the Qur’an that sees members of societies and states only through the lens of doctrinal authenticity or correctness. For these movements, the main issue—perhaps the only issue—is establishing God’s true religion as they see it. As such, the faith of individuals, societies, and countries is the one theme characterizing their thought and action. For these groups, the Qur’an, the prophetic hadith, and some selected texts of the pious ancestors represent virtually the only source of ideas. The names of these groups, their terminology and organizational structures, and the conduct of their members are steeped in the time of the Prophet Muhammad and the “rightly-guided caliphs,” which is their sole historical reference. They read their contemporary societies through the lens of this past. The main objective of these groups is to re-islamicize societies and states—and, for some, individuals as well—for in the view of these movements they have all deviated from Islam to varying degrees. Religious Islamist movements differ in their comparison of the present time with the time of the Prophet. Some of them believe that we are living in a time most closely resembling the era of the early propagation of Islam in Mecca, before the flight to Medina. Another group believes that the Medinan era and what followed are closer to the contemporary situation. The difference between the Meccan and the Medinan periods was reflected, inter alia, in the writings of the prominent medieval Islamic scholar Ibn Taymiyyah, who continues to exert considerable influence on modern-day radical Islamists. Among other things, he wrote: “When Allah commanded his Prophet (may Allah bless him and greet him) to call upon people to join his religion, He did not permit him to kill or fight them for this reason, until the time when the Prophet (may Allah bless him and greet him) moved to Medina with the first Muslims. After this move, He gave him the following permission: ‘Permission to fight is given to those upon whom war is made because they are oppressed, and most surely Allah is well able to assist them. Those who have been expelled from their homes without a just cause except that they say: Our Lord is Allah. And had there not been Allah’s repelling some people by others, 62

  Diia Rashwan, The Spectrum of Islamist Movements. Vol. 1. (Berlin: Schiler, 2007), 16.

Islamist Terrorism: A Per version or the Norm?

certainly there would have been pulled down cloisters and churches and synagogues and mosques in which Allah’s name is much remembered; and surely Allah will help him who helps His cause; most surely Allah is Strong, Mighty’ (22:39-40). And He put the obligation of Jihad upon Muslims, saying: ‘Fighting is enjoined on you, and it is an object of dislike to you; and it may be that you dislike a thing while it is good for you, and it may be that you love a thing while it is evil for you, and Allah knows, while you do not know’ (2:216). Allah emphasized this command and praised jihad in many Medinan suras, and He named those who refuse to participate in jihad for no legitimate reason hypocrites, with illness in their hearts.”63 The abovementioned difference in approach divides the religious Islamist movements into two different camps: peaceful, extremist movements and violent, jihadi movements.64 Peaceful extremist movements (in D. Rashwan’s definition) consider modern societies to be similar to the pre-Isalmic society of Mecca after the Prophet began his mission but before his emigration to Medina. This means that, for them, contemporary societies, individuals, and countries around the Islamic world are unbelievers or, at best, are living in a state of total ignorance (Jahiliyya) like that which prevailed in Mecca and the Arabian Peninsula before the flight to Medina. As such, these movements believe that it is not yet time to engage in politics, build an Islamic state, or fight (for them, pursue the jihad) because none of these things were enjoined for the small, weak Muslim minority in Mecca. In turn, these movements do not engage in violence against their infidel societies or individuals, in emulation of the first Muslims in Mecca. This group includes movements which are known as Takfir and Hijra (Excommunication and Emigration). These movements believe that contemporary society is like Meccan society directly before the emigration to Medina: there is no longer any hope of guiding people to Islam, and society contains only unbelievers. In turn, the group must flee the society in some form or other. They see themselves as representing the only Muslims on the face of the earth; anyone who does not join them is an infidel. The emigration can take the form of creating a closed community 63

  Sheikh Ibn Taymiyyah, “The Religious and Ethical Concept of Jihad,” trans. from: http://www.kavkaz.tv/russ/content/2009/10/11/68493.shtml

64

  Rashwan, 17.

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in the larger society, or the group may actually set out for the desert or peripheral areas. Another subgroup includes all those movements that believe that contemporary societies are similar to Mecca shortly after the Prophet began his mission. Calling the unbelievers to God—or, more accurately, re-calling them to God—is the primary mission of these groups, as it was for the first Muslims. Informing people of the mission (tabligh) and calling them to Islam (da’wa) is the only way that these groups interact with contemporary infidel society. Al-Tabligh wa al-Da’wa is the most well-known of these groups around the world. They do not isolate themselves from society or engage in a violent conflict with it. Thus, despite the extreme militancy of their judgment of contemporary societies and individuals, they are overwhelmingly peaceful, non- violent groups. Violent jihad groups (in D. Rashwan’s classification) believe that today’s world is a mirror of the Medinan phase of early Islamic history, that point in time when faith and religion melded with the idea of a state to create politics. For these movements, contemporary societies and states have reverted to the state of ignorance that prevailed before Islam. These movements agree that governments in Muslim countries have forsaken Islam and are responsible for the state of ignorance lived in by their societies and for resisting the forces of unity, which these movements believe they represent. According to this reading of society, these groups do not think it possible to re-propagate Islam and call their societies to it. There is no place in this view for the gentle Meccan discourse of summoning people to Islam; rather, they seek to master society and re-islamicize it on the same foundations upon which the Medinan state rested. Religious violence, or jihad, is virtually the sole means adopted to achieve these objectives through constant efforts to expand the movement’s membership and organization. These movements see themselves as the believing group that will bring Islam back to their countries and repel the aggression of their foreign enemies. As a result of the differing circumstances in which violent jihadi movements have emerged, they can be classified into at least three different categories.65 The first category consists of locally-based groups, which exist solely in the Islamic world, operating on the principle that the near enemy 65

  Ibid., 18.

Islamist Terrorism: A Per version or the Norm?

(i.e. the heretical governments in Muslim countries) is more worthy of fighting than the distant enemy (primarily, the West). The primary goal of these movements is overthrowing the governments in their countries through combat. Although jihad is a duty for Muslims to defend their faith and religion from any assault by a non-Muslim external enemy from the house of war (dar al-harb), this type of violent jihadi movement turns the jihad inward to their own governments, which they try to uproot and replace with an Islamic regime. Since it has proven theoretically difficult to classify their home countries as the house of war, they have created a new concept—the mixed house in which Islam coexists with ignorance and unbelief—in order to describe and justify their religious violence as jihad. These movements’ understanding of jihad against their governments reflects their belief that these governments are infidel governments that are hostile to Islam. The most prominent examples of such locally-based, violent jihadi movements are the Gama’a al-Islamiya and the Jihad in Egypt, the Armed Islamic Group in Algeria, and the Fighting Islamic Group in Libya. The second group consists of separatist movements in areas where Muslims constitute a minority in a non-Islamic country. The most prominent examples of this type of movement are found in Indian Kashmir and Chechnya (D. Rashwan also includes Afghanistan at the time of the Soviet invasion in this category66). For these groups, the concept of jihad against the external, non-Muslim enemy who controls the areas they hope to liberate intersects with the concept of national liberation and self-determination. Like other violent, jihadi movements, separatist jihadi movements believe that their societies are living in a state of ignorance, and their first objective after achieving independence or liberation is to reislamicize them and establish an Islamic state. The third category is composed of international jihadi movements, which hold to the same basic ideas as the two foregoing types of movements, but differ somewhat in their concept of jihad and the priority they give to the imminent and distant enemy.67 This type of movement adopts the concept of jihad against what they see as the external enemies of Islam, particularly the defensive jihad to protect the house of Islam 66

  Ibid., 20.

67

  Ibid., 20.

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(dar al-Islam) against any non-Muslim foreign aggression. As such, unlike locally-based governments, they prioritize the distant enemy over the near enemy, although they agree that the near enemy (the governments of Muslim countries) are infidel governments. This type of movement has emerged in the last ten years in several areas of the world, including Bosnia and Chechnya, and, before that, Afghanistan, the cradle of international jihadi movements, born during the resistance to the Soviet invasion in 1979–1989. These movements often consist of a mixture of Islamists with jihadi tendencies from various countries in the Islamic and non-Islamic world. The second major group of Islamist movements, according to D. Rashwan’s classification, is represented by sociopolitical movements with an Islamist platform.68 This second type of movement holds to a different reading of Islam than that adopted by the religious movements. First of all, they view their societies as Islamic countries and see the individuals in them as true Muslims who are not lacking faith. Thus, the question of the trueness or authenticity of their Islam is not an issue. For these movements, the primary issue is restructuring their societies and states on Islamic foundations, which, they believe, can only be found in Islamic law, to the exclusion of other legal systems or Western political concepts. These movements adopt sociopolitical platforms based on the concept of sharia, or Islamic law. This second major type of Islamist movement does not limit its interpretation of scripture to the apparent, literal meaning, but takes into account the intent of the law, the general welfare, the context of revelation, and the independent interpretation of jurists. This makes their reading more historically and socially grounded than the literal reading of scripture favored by religious Islamist movements. In addition, the source of historical authority for these movements is not limited to the prophetic age and the era of the rightly-guided caliphs, but includes all of Islamic history and its fourteen-century legacy. For these movements, Islam is a civilization, a religion, and a history from which they derive their views on how to organize societies and states. As such, their sociopolitical platform differs from other non-Islamist social movements only in terms of their specific content. Sociopolitical Islamist movements can be divided into 68

  Ibid., 21-22.

Islamist Terrorism: A Per version or the Norm?

two types: peaceful movements seeking political power and armed national liberation movements. Peaceful movements openly aspire to political power in order to implement their Islamist sociopolitical platform, whose objective is progress and development in their states and societies. In order to achieve this objective, these movements use all the peaceful, political means available. They may alter their positions or re-forge alliances with the state or other sociopolitical forces as their interests dictate, which constitutes a profound difference from all types of religious movements, whose sole social component involves the division into believer and unbeliever. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Nahda, or Renaissance Party, in Tunisia, and the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria are the most prominent examples of this type of movement. Another group consists of sociopolitical Islamic movements which are led by the circumstances of a foreign occupation to adopt a platform of national liberation in which armed combat occupies a primary position. These movements first emerged from among the Muslim Brotherhood on the eve of the 1948 war in Palestine, followed by the Egyptian national resistance against British occupying forces in the Suez Canal zone starting in 1951. Currently, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in Palestine, as well as Hezbollah in Lebanon, are the most prominent examples of this type of movement. Unlike locally based, religious jihadi movements, these Islamist armed movements do not normally engage in any internal armed conflict with their political and ideological enemies in their own societies, despite their profound differences on many issues. The target of their armed violence is limited to the foreign forces occupying their countries, although it must be admitted that the involvement of the Palestinian Hamas in an armed confrontation with the secular Fatah faction and with ultra-radical Islamists in the Gaza Strip—as well as the participation of Hezbollah in the internal conflict in Lebanon (to varying degrees)—does not fit this scheme. If we are to accept the above classification by D. Rashwan, we must add the following provision: the various types, groups, and subgroups of modern Islamist movements do not exist in isolation, but are characterized by interaction (and, occasionally, hostile interaction), and can frequently influence each other, transform into each other, etc. This classification is not static; rather, it shows the internal dynamics of this incredibly complex phenomenon which we call Islamism.

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It seems to us that the extreme complexity of Islamism nicely illustrates the futility of all attempts—no matter by whom—to pigeonhole and apply a uniform definition not just to Islam in toto, but also to that part of it which can be termed “political Islam.”

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the ideological Roots of Religious Terrorism: Salafism and Jihadism Modern jihadist thought has been greatly influenced by the founder of the Wahhabi movement within Islam, Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792), whose own views were influenced by Ibn Taymiyyah, one of the greatest Islamic philosophers. Al-Wahhab’s ideology was constructed around two basic concepts: Tawhid (the oneness of God) and Shirk (literally: attributing partners [equals] to Allah or worshipping something other than Allah). The central tenet of Wahhabism—the oneness of God—entails a total rejection of the veneration of Muslim saints or heroes. It also rejects Dervishism, Sufi orders, innovations in Muslim religious practices, etc. Al-Wahhab condemned the widespread traditional customs and beliefs of the tribes of the Arabian Peninsula for their depravity, accusing them of returning to a state of Jahiliyyah, ignorance of divine guidance.1 Preaching a rigid form of Islam based on a literal and strict interpretation of the Qur’an, he took a stand against the idolatry which he saw in the worship of saints, shrines, sacred graves, etc. Wahhab found sanctuary in Najd (in present-day Saudi Arabia). Muhammad Ibn Saud, the ruler of Najd, made an alliance with Al-Wahhab. Wahhab created a religious and ideological basis for the quest of the Saud dynasty to unify the tribes of Arabia under the banner of struggle against Jahiliyya. 1

  Jahiliyya (“ignorance” in Arabic) is the pre-Islamic period of Arab history, before the revelation of the Qur’an to mankind. This epoch is described by Muslim historians as a time of savagery and widespread vice (idolatry, vendetta, alcoholism, internecine wars, etc.).

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After the creation of Saudi Arabia in the twentieth century, the Wahhabi version of fundamentalist Islam became the official state religion in the kingdom. For a certain period of time, the influence of Wahhabism did not spread far beyond the Arabian Peninsula. The spread of Wahhabi ideas in the Islamic world was caused to a large extent by the sharp rise in oil prices in the mid-seventies, when Saudi Arabia, having become the world’s largest oil exporter, was finally able to spend tens of billions of dollars on promoting Wahhabism. Saudi money financed the spread of books and textbooks, as well as the construction of mosques and centers of study, all over the Muslim world. An alternative version of events claims that Saudi efforts to propagate Wahhabi ideology were related to the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 and to the fear among the Saudi monarchy that militant, revolutionary Shi’a Islam would become the dominant force in the Muslim world.2 Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s major contribution to the Jihadi movement was the creation of a puritan version of Islam, which is espoused by modern-day adherents of jihad. Incidentally, there are some interesting (though not uncontroversial) parallels which can be drawn between Wahhabism in the Muslim world and the Protestant Reformation in Europe.3 In the modern world—including Russia—“Wahhabism” has become a catch-all term which is used both in political discourse and by the media to describe virtually all varieties of religious extremism which exist in the Russian Federation. Moreover, Wahhabism is essentially being equated to all radical forms of Islamism. Here, we should consider the point of view of the researcher A. Malashenko, who asserts that “Islamic radicalism did not begin with Wahhabism. Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was merely one of the links in a long chain of preachers of ‘pure Islam.’ It is incorrect to apply this term to all supporters of Islamic revival and proponents of political Islam, if only because many of them do not identify themselves with Wahhabism. For instance, neither the ‘Muslim Brotherhood’ nor the Iranian radicals consider themselves Wahhabis. In fact, most of the well2

  Thomas R. Mockaitis, The New Terrorism: Myths and Realities (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), 73.

3

  See, for instance: Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Touchstone, 1998), 136.

The Ideological Roots of Religious Terrorism

known ideologues of Islamic fundamentalism do not apply this label to themselves.”4 Proponents of Wahhabism do not use this term as a name for themselves. According to them, Wahhabism does not represent a mere movement within Islam, but rather Islam itself (and the only possible form of Islam).5 In the modern world, Wahhabism prefers to act under the banner of Salafism (from the Arabic “Salaf,” which means “ancient,” “predecessor,” “ancestor”—related to the companions of the prophet Muhammad). Al-Wahhab declared that “Our way is the way of the Salaf.”6 The ideologues of Salafism preach the revival of true Islam and reject the traditions and practices of the modern Islamic world, considering them a deviation from Allah’s way. Salafism is usually considered to have begun in the ninth century. However, it was given its broadest interpretation by Ibn Taymiyyah in the fourteenth century. In the eighteenth century, Al-Wahhab developed a variant of Salafism, calling for a return to a pristine form of Islam, free from later innovations. The term “Salafism,” in the sense of a revivalist Islamic movement, appeared in the mid-nineteenth century in Egypt, where it was first used among the intellectuals at the Al-Azhar University in Cairo (in particular, Muhammad Abduh, Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani, and Rashid Rida). These Islamic reformers were aware of the need for an Islamic renaissance. Abduh claimed that the first generations of Muslims (Salaf as-Saliheen) had created a vibrant civilization by virtue of their creative interpretation of the Qur’an and the hadith in accordance with the needs of that time. Salafism is a much broader concept than may appear at first sight. It includes various strategies, ranging from non-violent sermons to global, violent, offensive jihad. (Nonetheless, as V. Naumkin notes: “In any case, both variants of Salafism—the jihadist and the non-jihadist—share the basic doctrinal concept of Takfira—the accusation of godlessness (Kufra)—an anathema which is used to justify harsh punitive measures against apostate Muslims, even those who have committed only minor 4

  Малашенко А. Исламские ориентиры Северного Кавказа. М., 2001. С.73-74.

5

  Roger Boase, ed., Islam and Global Dialogue: Religious Pluralism and the Pursuit of Peace (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005), 184.

6

  David Aaron, ed., In Their Own Words: Voices of Jihad (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), 50.

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transgressions against Sharia practices.”7) A non-violent, personal, and a-political from of Salafism was espoused by the Society for Spreading the Faith (Jamaat Tablighi), which was created in India in 1927. Muhammad Ilyas, the founder of Jamaat Tablighi, persuaded his followers to travel through the world and promote the concept of Dawah (invitation to Islam), which calls upon Muslims to adhere to true Islam. The non-violent and a-political form of Salafism presupposed peaceful political activity, with the goal of changing society through governmental authority. The strategy of peaceful Salafi reform was met with hostility and repression by the governments in many Muslim countries, and this convinced many adepts of Salafism of the unfeasibility of the peaceful strategies of Dawah and political reform. From this point of view, it is useful to look at events in Algeria in 1991, which may have played a major (albeit indirect) role in the radicalization of Islamism all over the world. After the loss of parliamentary majority by supporters of the secular Algerian government following an election, and the great electoral gains made by the Islamic Salvation Front, the military canceled the second round of the 1991 election, which would almost certainly have resulted in a FIS victory, and outlawed the activity of religious political parties. The Islamists responded with a surge in violence, which led to a civil war. Without a doubt, the Algerian experience has been interpreted by many Islamists as proof of the impossibility of coming to power through peaceful and democratic means. The following words by the militant Jihadist Ayman al-Zawahiri, spoken in 2001, seem to be an echo of the Algerian example: “A new awareness is increasingly developing among the sons of Islam, namely: that there is no solution without Jihad. The spread of this awareness has been augmented by the failure of all other methods that tried to evade assuming the burdens of Jihad.”8 In V. Naumkin’s opinion, “Salafism” should be used as “a general term for describing all the fundamentalist movements within Islam (unlike the term ‘fundamentalism,’ this word is used to describe a phenomenon which exists only in Islam). Obviously, other, smaller distinctions can exist within 7

  Наумкин В.В. Исламский радикализм в зеркале новых концепций и подходов // Наумкин В.В. Ислам и мусульмане: культура и политика. Статьи, очерки, доклады разных лет. М.—Н. Новгород, 2008. С. 454.

8

  Aaron, 71.

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Salafism, and it is possible to identify several oppositions (jihadist—nonjihadist, conservative—reformist, etc.).”9 In the context of the Salafi reformist movement, it is necessary to examine the activities of Maulana Abul Ala Mawdudi (1903–1979), a Pakistani Islamic activist who authored more than 120 books and leaflets and created the Jamaat-e Islami in India (which was under British rule at that time), intending for it to be the vanguard of a just society, which should serve as the core of truly reborn Muslims. Mawdudi’s political activity began with his participation in the caliphate movement and his campaigning for Indian independence from Britain among Indian Muslims in the years following World War I. In accordance with this worldview, Mawdudi considered jihad a kind of war of liberation, and Islamic rule meant liberty and justice (even for non-Muslims). In Mawdudi’s view, jihad was associated with anti-colonial struggle and national liberation movements. The American researcher Douglas Streisand says: “Mawdudi’s approach paved the way for Arab resistance to Israel to be called jihad. In this spirit, the rector of Cairo’s Al-Azhar University contended in 1973 that all Egyptians, Christians included, must participate in jihad against Israel. Although Mawdudi’s conception opens the door to a secular and nationalist interpretation of Jihad, neither he nor his acolytes went through that door. Such Islamist thinkers as Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb followed Mawdudi’s emphasis on its role in establishing a truly Islamic government. For them, as for Ibn Taymiyyah, jihad includes the overthrow of the governments that fail to enforce the Sharia. Jihad here again subsumes the idea of revolution.”10 In Mawdudi’s view, the Islamic state functions as an ideological instrument, with the goal of establishing God’s sovereignty (Al-Hakimiyyah) on earth. “That was the first and most detailed theoretical description of an Islamic state. For Mawdudi, the purpose of an Islamic state is fulfilling Allah’s will, and this is achieved through the implementation of Sharia as law. In Mawdudi’s conception, democracy is subordinated to Sharia.”11 The 9

  Наумкин В.В. Исламский радикализм в зеркале новых концепций и подходов. С. 455.

10

  Douglass E. Streusand, “What Does Jihad Mean?,” Middle East Quarterly IV, no. 3 (Sept. 1997), http://www.meforum.org/357/what-does-jihad-mean

11

  Encyclopedia of Government and Politics, vol. 1, ed. Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan (London: Routledge, 1992), 275.

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Islamic state is viewed by Mawdudi as “the very antithesis of secular Western democracy.” Western democracy is founded upon the sovereignty of the people, where the people or the nation have absolute legislative power, and are therefore able to create laws which contradict religion and morality. Therefore, “Islam has no trace of Western democracy… It repudiates the philosophy of popular sovereignty and rears its policy on the foundations of the sovereignty of God and the vicegerency (Khilafah) of man.”12 Despite the fact that Mawdudi, like most Islamist ideologues, rejected Western democracy, and “his debate with Western political thought was antagonistic … [Mawdudi] also assimilated Western ideas into his interpretation of Islam and the Islamic state.”13 It was hardly a coincidence that Mawdudi used the terms “democratic caliphate” and “theodemocracy” when describing his ideal Islamic state. He used that term to differentiate the Islamic state (viewed as a “Kingdom of God”) from the Western concept of theocracy, which implies a state ruled by clerics or spiritual leaders.14 Among other things, Mawdudi rejected the existing global social model, in which human beings are dominated by other human beings, describing it as “this attempt by Man to play the role of God.” In his opinion, “tyranny, despotism, intemperance, unjust exploitation and inequality reign supreme wherever there is lordship and dominance (uluhiyyah and rububiyyah) of Man over other men.” In Mawdudi’s view, this was the sole cause of all the misfortunes and conflicts that had plagued humanity through its entire history. He claimed that “The only remedy to this terrible disease is the total rejection and repudiation by Man of all his human overlords, and the open declaration that God Almighty is his only Lord and Master.” The most salient characteristics of the Islamic state, as derived by Mawdudi from the passages of the Qur’an, are the following: “No single man or social class, nor one single group, nor even the entire population of the state, can claim supremacy: only God is the true leader, all the others are merely His subjects. God is the true lawmaker, and He is endowed with absolute legislative power. The believers can neither enact their independent legislation nor 12

  Quoted from: John L. Esposito, Islam and Politics (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1998), 153.

13

  Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 85.

14

  Esposito, 153.

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change any law given by God, even if there is unanimous desire among the people to introduce such changes into the divine laws. The Islamic state must be founded in all respects upon the Law given by God through his Prophet. The government that rules such a state will require the people’s obedience by virtue of being a political organ created for the purpose of enforcing God’s laws—but only to the extent that it will act in this capacity. If the government disregards the God-given Law, its decrees will no longer be binding for the believers.”15 On the practical level, during the partition of the former British India, what Mawdudi advocated for Pakistan was not the creation of a state for Muslims (a demand that was voiced by numerous leaders of the All-India Muslim League), but rather an Islamic state. Although the ideas of Jamaat- e Islami, which had been founded by Mawdudi, were largely accepted during the creation of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Abul Ala Mawdudi himself was persecuted by the Pakistani authorities and arrested several times. Despite the fact that Mawdudi’s views were widely criticized by some Islamic scholars, and were even declared heretical, his ideas became widespread and influential in the Islamic world. In particular, he was an important influence on the worldview of the Egyptian Islamists Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb. Mawdudi’s formative influence on the ideology of many modern Islamist extremists has been vividly described by an American researcher in the following way: “Mawdudi leads us to Sayyid Qutb; Qutb leads us to Abdullah Azzam; Azzam leads us to Osama bin Laden, Osama bin Laden leads us to Ayman al-Zawahiri. Zawahiri leads us to Zarqawi in Iraq.”16 According to some authors, the concept of Jahiliyya and the necessity of creating a vanguard revolutionary Islamist movement were borrowed (and then further developed) by Qutb from Mawdudi’s writings. Mawdudi’s views also had an influence on the ideas of Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, who, in his turn, greatly influenced the worldview of the young Osama bin Laden. It is remarkable that Mawdudi’s views were also accepted to some extent by Shiite Islamists (in particular, by Ayatollah Khomeini). 15

  Сайид Абуль Аля Маудуди. Политическая теория ислама. // Отечественные записки. 2003. № 5 (13).

16

  Patrick Bascio, Defeating Islamic Terrorism: An Alternative Strategy (Wellesly, MA: Branden Books, 2007), 88.

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As A. Malashenko notes, “Today’s Salafism exists in the context of a dual confrontation—the (Muslim) East vs. the West, and ‘true Islam’ vs. ‘corrupted’ Islam. However, the dichotomy of ‘Good Muslims vs. Bad Muslims’ (or its harsher counterpart—‘Muslims vs. those who have abandoned Islam’) has once again become dominant, turning into a major division within Muslim society. Intra-religious tensions can reach a high level, surpassing inter-religious tensions.”17 *** Egyptian radicals have played a major role (possibly a crucial role) in the development of the theory and practice of global jihad. Pan-Islamism has become one of the pillars of the ideology of a transnational Sunni movement which is active in many Arab countries—and particularly in Egypt, which is “the largest traditional breeding ground for Muslim extremism.”18 This movement is the Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Ikhwān Al-Muslimūn)—the oldest and largest Islamic political group in the world. It was founded in Ismailia in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, an Egyptian schoolteacher, along with six workers of the Suez Canal Company. The credo of the new movement was: “Allah is our objective, the Qur’an is our constitution, the Prophet is our leader, jihad is our way, and death for the sake of Allah is the highest of our aspirations.” Originally, the activities of Al-Ikhwān Al-Muslimūn were aimed at the creation of a just Islamic society that would be founded upon the principles of Islam as the only source of ideology, laws, morality, and ethical norms. The declared goal of the Muslim Brotherhood was instilling the Qur’an and the Sunnah as the “sole reference point for…ordering the life of the Muslim family, individual, community…and state.” Al-Banna called for a return to the true Islam and followed in the footsteps of Islamic reformers such as Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida. According to him, contemporary Islam had lost its social dominance because most Muslims had been corrupted by Western influences. The Muslim Brotherhood 17

  Малашенко А. Исламские ориентиры Северного Кавказа. М., 2001. С. 68.

18

  Devin R. Springer, James L. Regens and David N. Edger, Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009), 21.

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claimed to want to protect Egyptian workers from the tyranny of Western monopolies. The movement founded hospitals, pharmacies, and schools. “Its structure was that of a political movement, combining traits of a sports organization, a cultural and educational union, and a commercial company.”19 Starting out as a small group, the Muslim Brotherhood quickly grew in size, gaining popularity among all sectors of Egyptian society. The Muslim Brotherhood is considered to be the central ideological organization of Sunni Islamists. The Brotherhood was deeply opposed to British control over Egypt, and it advocated independence from colonial rule. In the early 1950s, the Muslim Brotherhood received aid from the United States due to its anti-Communist orientation.20 After Hassan al-Banna’s assassination in 1949, there was a schism in the ranks of the Brotherhood, resulting in the creation of three major ideological currents within the movement: the moderate faction, the extreme rightwing faction, and the Islamic democrats, who gravitated towards Islamic socialism. The military coup d’état of 1952, which was carried out by a group of nationalist officers under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser and led to the overthrowing of the pro-Western government of King Farouk I, was initially welcomed by the Muslim Brotherhood, who regarded the monarchy as an un-Islamic regime dependent on Britain. The July Revolution was referred to by Egyptian Islamists as “our revolution.” Many members of the Brotherhood hoped that Nasser would establish an Islamic regime, but these hopes were dashed. The new government pursued a markedly secular and nationalist policy, clearly demonstrating that it had nothing in common with the Islamist worldview of the Muslim Brotherhood. The relationship between the Islamists and the authorities quickly deteriorated, and, following an attempt on Nasser’s life in 1954, the government dealt a crushing blow to the Brotherhood. Many members of the organization (with Sayyid Qutb among them) were imprisoned, and the movement itself was essentially outlawed. 19

  Добаев И.П. Неправительственные религиозно-политические организации исламского мира // Мировая экономика и международные отношения. 2002. № 4.

20

  See: Фон Эрффа В. Террористический интернационал // Международная политика. 2003. № 5.

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From the very beginning of their activity, the Muslim Brotherhood has officially opposed the use of violence to achieve its goals. For instance, they condemned the 9/11 attacks against America. However, in all fairness, it must be noted that the Brotherhood has occasionally sanctioned the use of violence—in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict in Palestine and during the Islamist uprising against the secular Ba’ath regime in Syria. The Egyptian government has accused the Muslim Brotherhood (which is the largest opposition group in Egypt) of carrying out a campaign of killings during and after World War II. In particular, the movement is alleged to have been behind the assassinations of Egyptian Prime Minister Ahmad Mahir Pasha, Prime Minister Mahmoud an-Nukrashi, several judges, etc.21 In the 1940s–1960s, certain elements within the Muslim Brotherhood who did not shy away from political violence created the so-called “secret apparatus”—a semi-military underground organization. This gave the Egyptian authorities an excuse to launch a harsh crackdown on the activities of this organization.22 In the words of Juan Zarate, who was Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism during the George W. Bush administration, “The Muslim Brotherhood is a group that worries us not because it deals with philosophical or ideological ideas but because it defends the use of violence against civilians.” All the available evidence indicates that the question of the attitude of the Muslim Brotherhood towards violence remains contradictory, not only among outside observers, but also within the movement itself. In any case, since the early 1970s the Muslim Brotherhood (which is the most powerful Islamist political movement in the Islamic world) has been moving towards the political mainstream, advocating the Islamization of society and the state through peaceful means. “The traditional Muslim Brothers preached dawa in an effort to peacefully transform civil society into a mass movement that would successfully demand and implement an Islamist state. Hasan al-Hudaybi, the Supreme Guide of the Muslim

21

  Aaron Mannes, Profiles in Terror: The Guide to Middle East Terrorist Organizations (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 78.

22

  Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 2.

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Brothers, championed this long-term strategy from below. He repudiated Qutb’s call for violence.”23 To a large extent, it was precisely the disagreement about the use of violence that caused the openly extremist groups Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya and Al-Takfir Wal Hijra to split away from the Brotherhood. Some experts think that there is little in common between the Brotherhood as a whole and the jihadist theories and actions of certain uncontrollable ultraradical members of the Brotherhood. Some claim that modern terrorism committed under the banner of Islam has its roots not in the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood, but in Wahhabi ideology. Be that as it may, even if we ignore the question of whether the Muslim Brotherhood is directly connected to political violence (let alone terrorism), we cannot ignore the fact that it was this movement that gave birth to theorists who have been a formative influence on the worldview of many practitioners of Islamist terrorism. Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) was an influential activist of the Muslim Brotherhood who authored works that have become the theoretical foundation of modern militant Islamism. Some authors, pointing out the influence of Qutb’s ideas on the ideology of Al-Qaeda, claim that “Al-Qaeda would not have existed without his writings.”24 According to Ayman al-Zawahiri, one of the key ideologues of Al-Qaeda, “Sayyid Qutb’s call for loyalty to God’s oneness and to acknowledge God’s sole authority and sovereignty was the spark that ignited the Islamic revolution against the enemies of Islam at home and abroad.”25 This man underwent a gradual transformation from a fairly secular author, well-acquainted with Western culture and influenced by it, to one of the pillars of political Islamism. Qutb joined the Muslim Brotherhood hoping to find a new ideological alternative for Egypt, an alternative that would be free of the excesses and drawbacks of capitalism and communism. 23

  Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 27.

24

  Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Knopf, 2006), 375.

25

  Laura Mansfield, ed., His Own Words: Translation and Analysis of the Writings of Dr. Ayman Al Zawahiri (Old Tappan, NJ: TLG Publications, 2006), 48.

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However, Qutb’s transformation into a truly radical Islamist took place during his incarceration in Nasser’s Egypt. Some researchers go so far as to claim that the roots of the 9/11 attacks are to be found in an Egyptian jail, and that the torture which Qutb underwent there aroused a desire for revenge both in Qutb himself and—later—in his spiritual followers, including Ayman al-Zawahiri, the second-in-command of Al-Qaeda. Qutb is credited with introducing the concepts of the far enemy and the near enemy into the radical Islamist lexicon. The near enemy refers to the existing governments and regimes in the Islamic world, whereas the far enemy signifies the entire Western world, in the broadest possible sense. Among other things, Qutb claimed that the secularization and Westernization of Turkey under Atatürk’s regime was the beginning of a worldwide struggle against the symbols of Islam.26 Qutb’s claims about the necessity of fighting the near enemy occupy a prominent place in the ideological arsenal of jihadists of the late twentieth—early twenty-first century. Some authors point out the similarities between the themes that appear in Qutb’s writings and the themes which were exploited by fascist movements in Europe in the twentieth century (the decline of Western civilization; the fruitlessness of democracy; the appeal to a Golden Age and the desire to recreate it through the establishment of a comprehensive social, political, and economic system; a tendency towards conspirology; and violent revolution as a means of ridding the country of foreign influence and establishing the dominance of a particular community). There is also some evidence of Bolshevik influence on Qutb’s thinking—in particular, his notion of the central role played by an Islamic vanguard. Sayyid Qutb’s political worldview was constructed around an interpretation of Islam as a complete system of morality, justice, and governance, where the laws and norms of the Sharia are the only legitimate basis for government and for all spheres of life. During his imprisonment, Qutb wrote his two most important works: a commentary on the Qur’an (Fi Zilal al-Qur’an, In the Shadow of the Qur’an), and a manifesto of political Islam called Milestones. In these works, he developed his anti-Western and anti-secular views, based on his interpretation of the Qur’an, Muslim history, and the sociopolitical problems facing Egypt. In Milestones, his most 26

  See: Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi’, Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996).

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famous book, which has become known as the manifesto of Salafi jihad, he calls for an Islamic renaissance through the enactment of Sharia laws and through the use of “physical force and jihad to abolish the institutions and authorities of the Jahiliyyah system.” Qutb thought it necessary to destroy the “al-Jahiliyyah society,” by which he meant the modern manifestations of the pre-Islamic polytheistic Arab society, and create an Islamic society in its place. According to Qutb’s explanations, peace is the normal state of affairs in Islam, whereas war is an exception brought about by injustice, despotism, and corruption. At the same time, it is permissible to wage war against atheism, which is, according to Qutb, one of the worst forms of injustice. From this point of view, the only justifiable war is a war that ensures the dominance of the Word of God on earth. That is, in order to propagate “the oneness of God on earth and to put an end to the power of those who, by word or deed, challenge His omnipotence, Islam permits its followers to fight.” Furthermore, Qutb claims that it is the duty of Muslims to “use force in order that the Word of God, which is absolute and complete, prevail.” According to Qutb, the struggle to establish the sovereignty of God is jihad, a kind of permanent revolution against internal and external enemies who try to usurp God’s sovereignty.27 Qutb became the first modern radical thinker who revolutionized the concept of jihad and imbued it with a new meaning (“The Islamic Jihad has no relationship to modern warfare, either in its causes or in the way in which it is conducted. The cause of Islamic Jihad should be sought in the very nature of Islam, and its [universal] role in the world”).28 Qutb was let out of prison in 1964 at the behest of the Prime Minister of Iraq, Abdul Salam Arif. However, he was rearrested 8 months later and accused of plotting to overthrow the state and assassinate the leaders of Egypt. During his trial, passages from his own books (especially Milestones) were used by the prosecution as evidence against him. Qutb and six other members of the Muslim Brotherhood were sentenced to death. Qutb’s execution in 1966 greatly enhanced his charisma in the eyes of his follo27

  Ralph H. Salmi, Cesar Adib Majul, George Kilpatrick Tanham, Islam and Conflict Resolution: Theories and Practices (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1998), 144.

28

  Quoted from: Gerges, 4.

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wers, and many of them regard him as not just an ideologue of Islamism, but as a martyr. The contradictory nature of some of the concepts used in his writings, combined with his inability to clarify these concepts because of his execution, led to a radical interpretation of his works. For this reason, Qutb’s controversial writings should not be interpreted in an absolutely literal way.29 At the same time, it is difficult to argue with the claim that “Qutb’s influence on the Salafi jihad in general was crucial” and that “Qutb’s writings later filled the ideological vacuum created when the catastrophic 1967 Arab defeat discredited imitation and pan-Arabism as strategies for catching up to the West.”30 Osama bin Laden, the leader of Al-Qaeda, admitted that, during his university studies, he had been strongly influenced by the religious and political ideas of several professors who were closely affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood—in particular, the ideas of Sayyid Qutb and his brother, Muhammad Qutb. One of the students of Muhammad Qutb, who moved from Egypt to Saudi Arabia after his release from Egyptian jail and became a professor of Islamic studies, was Ayman al-Zawahiri, a member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and one of the closest associates of Osama bin Laden. At the same time, there is some evidence indicating that bin Laden’s views differed from the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood—he considered it “reformist,” “non-violent,” “democratic,” and “primarily po- litical.” While Sayyid Qutb, with his ideological manifestoes, can be regarded as the intellectual architect of the modern jihadi movement, it was his most influential follower, the Egyptian Islamist Muhammad abd-al-Salam Faraj—one of the organizers of Anwar el-Sadat’s assassination in 1981 and the ideologue of the Tanzim al-Jihad (The Jihad Organization) group—who gave a practical interpretation to the problem of jihad. Faraj preached jihad in local mosques, recruited jihadists, and planned to overthrow the ruling regime in Egypt through methods similar to those of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Faraj’s small pamphlet, The Neglected Obligation (Al-Faridah alGhaibah), became an important influence and a source of guidance for 29

  Adnan Musallam, From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations of Radical Islamism (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005), pp. ix, 202.

30

  Sageman, 9.

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Egyptian Islamists in the 1980s–1990s. The term “neglected obligation” in the pamphlet refers to jihad, which is interpreted strictly as armed struggle against apostates from the Islamic faith. Faraj claimed that the duty of jihad was no longer observed, and was even contested and denied by many ulema. The broader interpretation of jihad as spiritual resistance to evil is denounced as a “fabricated tradition” invented to “reduce the value of fighting with the sword, so as to distract the Muslims from fighting the infidels and the hypocrites.” The pamphlet argues that Egypt is ruled by apostates and that “an apostate has to be killed.” Thus, “There is no doubt that the first battlefield for jihad is exterminating these infidel leaders and replacing them with a complete Islamic Order.” By this Faraj meant the full restoration of the Islamic caliphate. According to Faraj, in order to establish Islamic rule, the concept of jihad needs to be revived and imbued with true Islamic meaning. Whereas classic concepts of jihad require the existence of Islamic authorities for the establishment of Islamic rule, Faraj sees jihad as a way of establishing the Islamic state. In Faraj’s view, jihad is a personal, rather than collective, duty, because now the near enemy is occupying the country. Faraj asserted that present-day Muslim rulers, particularly the rulers of Egypt, had forsaken religion by not enacting Sharia laws and allying themselves with infidels. Therefore, waging jihad against these apostates, who are only formally Muslims, is the personal duty of every Muslim who is capable of fighting, until the apostates repent or are killed.31 The visit of Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat to Jerusalem to meet with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin in 1977, his involvement in the “treacherous” Camp David Accords, and his call in 1979 for the separation of religion and politics in Egypt, sealed his tragic fate. On 6 October 1981, he was assassinated by Islamist terrorists. The Islamist Jihad Organization, also known as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, took credit for the assas- sination. The Egyptian authorities’ response to the Islamists’ attempt to destabilize the country was very harsh, and many Islamist leaders were imprisoned and executed. These measures reduced the activity of Islamist radicals in Egypt to a certain extent, but by that time, the Islamists had a new goal which drew their attention away from Egypt—the war in Afghanistan. 31

  Gerges, 10.

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There was a dispute among the Egyptian followers of Sayyid Qutb about the proper course of action for jihadists: should the jihadists seek safe havens for themselves and gather strength there, or—as Muhammad abdal-Salam Faraj argued—should they stay in close proximity to the objects of their struggle and attempt to infiltrate the structure of hostile apostate governments? There was also a disagreement about whether Islamists should concentrate their attacks on the near enemy or on the far enemy. In essence, Zawahiri managed to synthesize these two contradictory points of view, pointing out the importance of a safe base of operations—such as Afghanistan—from where jihadists would be able to attack both the near enemy and the far enemy. He also attempted to resolve this doctrinal dispute by asserting that the near enemy is identical to the far enemy, since the US dominates the Middle East through its local puppet regimes, carrying out a policy of “veiled colonialism,” as he termed it. Later, following the outbreak of the Iraq War, the distinction between the far enemy and the near enemy disappeared. Thousands of Egyptian volunteers set out to fight on the side of the Afghan mujahideen against the communists. In this case, the efforts of the Muslim Brotherhood, who supported the mujahideen, were similar to the actions of the Egyptian government, which was pursuing a double goal. On the one hand, the anti-communist and pro-Western Egyptian authorities supported the efforts of the US to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan as part of the Cold War. On the other hand, the rulers of Egypt hoped to channel the destructive energy of the local Islamists into other countries, thereby reducing tensions within Egypt itself. In Afghanistan, the Egyptian volunteers underwent further radicalization, received military training, and forged links with Islamists from other countries. During the 1990s, the Egyptian members of the Jihad joined Osama bin Laden’s organization, and Ayman al-Zawahiri, one of the leaders of the Jihad, became a leading force within Al-Qaeda. In some respects, he came to symbolize the transition from Salafi jihad against the near enemy to global Salafi jihad. It was the Egyptian Islamists who played a crucial role in the creation of “the present wave of terrorism directed at the far enemy” as “an intentional strategy of a Muslim revivalist social movement.”32 In light of the events 32

  Sageman, 24.

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of the so-called “Arab Revolution” of 2011, when Hosni Mubarak’s regime was overthrown in Egypt, the likelihood of representatives of radical Islam (primarily the Muslim Brotherhood, which is regarded by many analysts as the most organized force on the Egyptian political scene) coming to power in this country has increased. Such a turn of events is likely to have serious repercussions not only for Egypt, but for the entire Middle East and beyond. *** A central aspect of modern terrorism committed in the name of Islam is the concept of jihad, which is used by terrorists to justify their actions. As a consequence of numerous dramatic and tragic historical events of the late twentieth—early twenty-first century (the 9/11 attacks in the US; bombings in Moscow, London, Madrid, etc.; the military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, the North Caucasus, etc.), this term has achieved wide currency, largely through of its use by the mass media. It is no accident that the term “jihadist” has appeared in the literature to denote the most extremist wing of radical Islamism. “Jihadism is utopian. It seeks nothing less than the creation of a worldwide fundamentalist Islamic state. Its adherents believe that this can be achieved only through violence. It targets both governments in Muslim lands and those in the West that support them. … Like Wahhabis and other fundamentalists, they [the jihadis] insist that the only true Islam is that which was practiced by Muhammad and his early followers, the Salaf, and therefore they sometimes call themselves Salafis. But jihadis go further, insisting that ‘holy war’ is the central tenet and obligation of Islam.”33 It is not hard to notice that much of the invective and rhetoric of the ideologues of jihadism is aimed not just at the governments in Muslim countries, but also at the majority of believers, who do not take part in jihad (in the sense ascribed to this term by adepts of Salafi jihadism). It is for this reason that the pamphlet authored by Faraj, the Egyptian Islamist radical, is titled The Neglected Obligation. It is also for this reason that Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, who promoted the idea of jihad during the war in Afghanistan, pointed out in his book Join the Caravan that “The greatest problem of the 33

  Aaron, 4.

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Muslim Ummah is the small number of true mujahideen and fighters who bear responsibility for the entire Ummah on their shoulders.”34 In the same work, he also asserted that “Those who refuse to take part in jihad will find no justification before Allah, except for the women, the children, those who are crippled, and those who are blind in both eyes.”35 There are few concepts in the ideological arsenal of Islamic extremism that have aroused more controversy. Does jihad refer to a form of moral self-improvement or to a form of warfare, according to Islamic teachings? There is no simple answer to this question, not even among the Muslims themselves, who have been arguing for several hundred years about the true meaning of jihad. The word jihad, which is translated as “struggle” or “striving,” generally refers to the diligent struggle to maintain faith. It is subdivided into several categories: “jihad of the heart” (struggling against one’s own imperfections), “jihad by the tongue” (commending that which is good and forbidding that which is wrong), “jihad by the hand” (punishing evildoers and criminals), and “jihad by the sword” (also known as ghazawat, armed struggle against the infidels; Muslims who are killed in this struggle attain eternal bliss).36 The concept of jihad as holy war harks back to the time when the Prophet Muhammad waged war against the idolaters who controlled Mecca and most of the Arabian Peninsula. Even Hugh Kennedy, a historian who is generally unbiased against Islam, notes that “Muhammad’s military campaigns were, in one sense, the beginning of the Muslim conquests. His example showed that armed force was going to be an acceptable and important element first in the defense of the new religion and then in its expansion. The Prophet’s example meant that there was no parallel to the tendency to pacificism so marked in early Christianity.” However, Kennedy admits that “At the same time, diplomacy was certainly more important than military conquest in the spread of Muhammad’s influence in the Arabian Peninsula. It was the network of contacts he derived from his Quraysh connections rather than the sword which led people from as far away as Yemen and Oman to swear allegiance to him. Military force had 34

  Translated from: http://islam01.narod.ru/prisoedinyaites_k_karavanu.htm

35

  Ibid.

36

  Гаврилова Ю.Б., Емельянов В.В. Ислам. Карманный словарь. СПб., 2002. С. 50.

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ensured the survival of the Ummah, but in the Prophet’s lifetime it was not the primary instrument in its expansion.”37 Jihad, or Holy War, is an important concept in Islam. It is also one that has from the beginning aroused continuing controversy among Muslims. Fundamental questions about whether jihad needs to be violent or can be simply a spiritual struggle, whether it can only be defensive or can legitimately be used to expand the frontiers of Islam, and whether it is an obligation on Muslims or a voluntary activity that may be rewarded with spiritual merit, were all open to debate.38

The most notable classical Islamic author who has had an enormous influence on modern jihadist philosophy is Sheikh Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah (1263–1328), the Islamic scholar who is probably the most oft-quoted by modern jihadists out of all the scholars of the past. Ibn Taymiyyah, who lived in the time of the Mongol invasions into Muslim territories, thought that the Islamic world was suffering from Mongol conquests because it had abandoned the commandments of Islam and the example set by the four righteous caliphs. Preaching against innovations in the interpretation of the Qur’an and the Sunnah, Ibn Taymiyyah attached great importance to the concept of takfir, through which he excommunicated certain individuals or groups of people, claiming that they were no longer Muslims—essentially, declaring them to be infidels. Ibn Taymiyyah asserted that “Jihad is the most wonderful work, both in this world and in the next world; neglecting it means losing both this world and the next one…This means choosing between victory and triumph, or martyrdom and Heaven.” It is remarkable that modern jihadists—such as those who operate in the Russian North Caucasus—widely use the slogan “Victory or Heaven.” When discussing jihad, Ibn Taymiyyah made a distinction between defensive jihad and offensive jihad: “If the struggle that is being waged is the initiative of Muslims (offensive jihad), then it is a collective obligation (fard kifaya), which must be carried out by a sufficient number of believers in order to achieve victory. Allah will elevate such believers above the passive ones, as is written in the Qur’an: ‘The holders back from among the believers, not having any injury, and those who strive hard in Allah’s way with 37

38

  Hugh Kennedy, The Great Arab Conquests: How the Spread of Islam Changed the World We Live in (Philadelphia: Da Capo, 2007), 48.

  Ibid., 48.

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their property and their persons are not equal; Allah has made the strivers with their property and their persons to excel the holders back a (high) degree, and to each class Allah has promised good; and Allah shall grant to the strivers above the holders back a mighty reward: high degrees from Him and protection and mercy, and Allah is forgiving, Merciful’ (4:95-96). But if enemies have attacked the Muslims and taken their lands, then the struggle against them becomes an individual obligation (fard al-ayn), not just for those who have been attacked, but for the entire Ummah; as Allah has said: ‘If they seek aid from you in the matter of religion, aid is incumbent on you’ (8:72).”39 Although he proclaimed that the goal of jihad was achieving a state where “the entire religion is only for Allah (2:189, 8:39), and His word is the highest (9:40)” and that “Muslims should fight against anyone and everyone who stands in the way of achieving this goal,” Ibn Taymiyyah cautioned that women, children, monks, the elderly, the blind, and the crippled “from among the infidels” “should not be killed, unless they oppose the Muslims with their words (for instance, by spreading propaganda) and/or with their deeds (for instance, espionage).” After pointing out the existence of a school of thought which claims that all these categories of people may be killed for the simple reason that they are unbelievers, the scholar wrote: “We can fight only against those who are fighting against us if we desire to achieve victory for this religion. Here is what Allah the Almighty said on this subject: ‘Fight in the way of Allah with those who fight with you, and do not exceed the limits, surely Allah does not love those who exceed the limits’ (2:190). This is confirmed by examples from the Sunnah. The Prophet, may Allah bless him and greet him, used to say the following words when sending Muslims into military expeditions: ‘Do not kill elderly people, women, and children (without necessity).’”40 Concerning the fate of those infidels against whom jihad is being waged, Ibn Taymiyyah concluded: “The treatment of vanquished foes in Islam varies depending on specific circumstances. For instance, if a male infidel is taken captive, the leader of the Muslim community may do what he thinks is the right thing: kill him, enslave him, accept a ransom for him, or release him. This is the opinion of most scholars, and it is confirmed by the Qur’an and the Sunnah. As for the 39

  Sheikh Ibn Taymiyyah, “The Religious and Ethical Concept of Jihad,” trans. from: http://www.kavkaz.tv/russ/content/2009/10/11/68493.shtml

40

  Ibid.

The Ideological Roots of Religious Terrorism

People of the Book (Christians and Jews) and the followers of Zoroaster, the Muslims should fight against them until they accept Islam, or until they pay the tribute (jizya), while being humiliated. As for idolaters, their choice is limited to only two options: accepting Islam or death.”41 Ibn Taymiyyah is frequently cited in the works of authors who espouse jihadist views. In particular, quotes by Ibn Taymiyyah on the subject of jihad can be found in the writings of Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood (“Jihad means extreme efforts in words and in deeds; within the framework of the Sharia, it is the struggle against the infidels, and it includes all possible efforts that are required to put an end to the rule of the enemies of Islam, such as: striking them down, emptying their treasuries, destroying their places of worship, and shattering their idols”). Similar themes are found in the writings of the radical Egyptian Islamist Faraj and the Palestinian Dr. Azzam, one of the architects of the theory of global jihad (“When an enemy invades Muslim lands, there is no doubt that it is the duty of those who live closest to this land to defend it, and it is also the duty of those around them…for the entire Muslim land is like one country”). The concepts developed by Ibn Taymiyyah had a great impact on the worldview of the leaders of Al-Qaeda.42 Many quotes and references to Ibn Taymiyyah’s works can be found on the websites of North Caucasian Islamists.43 Among the many interpretations of jihad, there is one that does not refer to military operations. According to this interpretation, jihad (in the sense of “struggle”) can refer to struggle which is directed either inwards (against the evil in one’s own soul) or outwards (against injustice). Within contemporary Islam, the modernists may see the concept as central to their religion, but see it as encompassing all forms of political and social action to establish justice. In this context, according to D. Streusand, jihad implies no more violence than does the term crusade in modern English.44 41

  Ibid.

42

  Alison Pargeter, The New Frontiers of Jihad: Radical Islam in Europe (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 28.

43

  Taymiyyah, http://www.kavkaz.tv/russ/content/2009/10/11/68493.shtml.

44

  Douglas E. Streusand “What Does Jihad Mean?,” Middle East Quarterly IV, no. 3

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The traditional, classical view of jihad regards it as a collective obligation of Muslims, which must be fulfilled in cases when enemies threaten or invade Muslim lands. For example, the modern Turkish Islamic scholar Harun Yahya claims that “In the Qur’an, war represents an ‘unwanted obligation’ which has to be carried out with strict observance of particular humane and moral guidelines and which must not be resorted to except when it is absolutely inevitable.”45 He also points out that “Only defensive wars are permissible in Islam.”46 Harun Yahya admits that, in addition to the idealistic and spiritual meanings of jihad, war, in the sense of physical struggle, is also considered to be jihad. “But such a war…, according to the Qur’an, can only be defensive, and it must be conducted with strict observance of the moral principles of Islam. The use of the concept of ‘jihad’ for acts of aggression against innocent people, that is for terror, is unjust and a great distortion of the true meaning of the term.”47 The problem with this position is that adepts of global terror can interpret even offensive operations as defensive war, thereby justifying their jihadist activities. Thus, the 9/11 attacks in the United States were easily explained by Al-Qaeda ideologues as a defensive action, a response to the aggressive war “waged upon Muslims by Jews and Crusaders all over the world.” It is even easier for extremists to provide a justification for their jihadist activities in other parts of the world (Iraq, Afghanistan, the North Caucasus, Palestine, etc.). Modern adherents and preachers of a radical reading of Islam make great efforts to raise the status of jihad in the Muslim consciousness and to make jihad equal to the five pillars of Islam. For example, Faraj, the Egyptian Islamist, essentially elevated jihad to the rank of a “sixth pillar of Islam.” Furthermore, the concept of jihad (especially jihad aimed at the near enemy) is being given a truly revolutionary meaning. “Before directing jihad against external enemies, Muslims must first deal with their own rulers. If leaders such as Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar el-Sadat are not true Muslims, they cannot lead jihad, not even against a legitimate target (September 1997), http://www.meforum.org/357/what-does-jihad-mean. 45

  Harun Yahya, Islam Denounces Terrorism (Istanbul: Arastirma, 2002), 47.

46

  Ibid., 52.

47

  Ibid., 53.

The Ideological Roots of Religious Terrorism

of jihad (such as Israel). Significantly, Islamists consider jihad mandatory for all Muslims, making it an individual rather than a communal duty.”48 According to Osama bin Laden, “In order to establish the Islamic state and spread the religion, there must be [five conditions]: a group, hearing, obedience, a Hijra, and a Jihad. Those who wish to elevate Islam without Hijra and without Jihad sacrifices for the sake of Allah have not understood the path of Muhammad.”49 Since the times of the Prophet Muhammad, there has been a consensus among the Muslim ulema concerning the status of jihad as a collective duty of Muslims (fard kifaya). By contrast, jihadists of all types regard jihad as a permanent and personal obligation of Muslims (fard ayn) and as one of the pillars of Islam. Osama bin Laden subscribes to this definition of jihad as an “individual duty” for every Muslim who is capable of going to war.50 The Yemenite preacher of jihad Anwar al-Awlaki proclaims that “Today the Muslim world is under occupation and the statements of our scholars are clear that it becomes fard ayn on every able Muslim to fight to free the Muslim land.”51 Jihad literally means “determined effort.” The term jihad in many contexts means “fighting” (although there are other words in Arabic that more unambiguously refer to the act of making war, such as qital or harb).52 In hadith collections, jihad frequently signifies military activity. A brief glance at the classical hadith collection Sahih al-Bukhari—specifically, the section that deals with jihad—makes it clear that the term refers specifically to military operations (for instance, the sections titled “Of Those who are Wounded in the Path of Allah the Great and Mighty,” “Performing a Righteous Deed before Battle,” “Performing a Full Ablution after War and Battle,” “An Infidel Kills a Muslim, Later he Converts to Islam and Starts Doing Good Works, then he is Killed Himself ”, etc.). 48

  Streusand.

49

  Karen J. Greenberg, ed., Al Qaeda Now: Understanding Today’s Terrorists (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 230.

50

  Gerges, 3.

51

  Anwar al-Awlaki: “A Question about the Method of Establishing Caliphate,” http://kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2009/01/13/10562.shtml.

52

  Streusand.

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The Egyptian Sayyid Qutb, one of the most notable modern preachers of jihad, based the necessity of jihad on the fact that Islam is always in conflict with Jahiliyyah, the ignorance that reigns supreme in peoples' thoughts and beliefs and shapes all aspects of their everyday life. The Pakistani Islamist philosopher Abul Ala Mawdudi thought that jihad should be waged all over the world, with the goal of putting an end to un-Islamic systems of government and replacing them with Islamic rule. Jihadists frequently reinterpret the texts and distort their original meaning. For example, the idolaters and polytheists who are the subjects of hostile references are freely translated as Jews, Christians, Americans, Westerners in general, and Muslims who disagree with the jihadists.53 Even among the most militant jihadists, there is apparently no consensus on the nature of jihad—should it be exclusively defensive? Or can it be offensive as well? Al-Qaeda, the most famous Islamist terrorist network in the world, has its origins in the so-called Services Bureau (Maktab al-Khidamat), a kind of center of logistics, which was founded in 1984 by Abdullah Azzam with the financial help of Osama bin Laden in order to support Arab volunteers going to Afghanistan to fight the Soviet armies. One of the aspects of this support was the publication of the journal Jihad, which was disseminated all over the Muslim world in order to arouse support for the ideas of jihad (primarily among young audiences). During the war in Afghanistan (1979–1989), the concept of defensive jihad with the goal of defending Muslims from aggression by infidels was successfully promoted by the preacher Sheikh Abdullah Azzam (who was of Palestinian origin), one of the first Arabs who joined the anti-Soviet struggle of the Afghan mujahideen. In the early 1980s, Dr. Azzam published and distributed a pamphlet titled Defense of the Muslim Lands. In this work, he claimed that supporting the Afghan jihad was both an individual religious obligation (fard ayn) for Muslims and an obligation for the Muslim community as a whole (fard kifaya), because the Afghans were helpless in the face of the invasion. At the same time, the concept of jihad as promoted by Azzam can hardly be considered completely defensive. The holy war in Afghanistan was envisioned by him as a step in the process of a complete reconquest of “all other lands which formerly were Muslim, (so that) Islam reigns within 53

  Aaron, 37.

The Ideological Roots of Religious Terrorism

them once again,” giving as examples such lands as Palestine, Lebanon, Chad, Eritrea, Somalia, the Philippines, Burma, South Yemen, Soviet Central Asia, and Andalusia (Spain).54 At the same time, Azzam was careful to confine this jihad to a kind of Muslim Reconquista, without advocating the overthrow of the ruling regimes in Muslim countries. According to American researcher Marc Sageman, “Azzam’s advocacy of jihad was a traditional one, albeit an aggressive one, demanding the return of formerly Muslim lands.”55 Regardless of the emphasis placed by Azzam in his calls for jihad, it is obvious that his activity has had an enormous influence on the development of the concept of global offensive jihad. In addition to aiding Arab volunteers, Maktab al-Khidamat also provided religious and political training to the new recruits, trying to indoctrinate them and initiate them into a violent Salafi-jihadist movement. This movement was based upon a strict concept of tawhid (oneness of God), a literal reading of the Qur’an, and resistance to all innovations. The Saudi Islamist Osama bin Laden split away from Abdullah Azzam in the late 1980s, joining a group of Egyptian fighters (which included bin Laden’s current second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri) in order to create Al-Qaeda. At that moment, Al-Qaeda turned its attention away from resistance to foreign invaders (as in Afghanistan) and towards the overthrow of corrupt Arab regimes. For example, in 1991 al-Zawahiri published his own pamphlet, entitled The Bitter Harvest, in which he argued that “The Islamic movements must answer the questions: are the governments in the Muslim countries true Muslims or are they kuffar [infidels]? These rulers are obviously kuffar and murtaddeen [apostates] because they rule with a law other than that of Allah. Therefore it is a fard ayn [individual duty] to wage jihad against them and remove them from their positions.”56 In Bitter Harvest, al-Zawahiri argued for an offensive jihad against what he felt were corrupt regimes in the Muslim world, in contrast to the defensive jihad articulated by Abdullah Azzam in 1984. In his later work Knights under the Prophet’s Banner (2001), Ayman al-Zawahiri advocated a global battle between the mujahideen and the “united forces of the disbelievers”: 54

  Sageman, 3.

55

  Ibid., 3.

56

  Quoted from: Kim Cragin, Understanding Terrorist Ideology (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007), 3.

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“The battle today cannot be fought on a regional level without taking into account the global hostility towards us.”57 The multiplicity of opinions among jihadist groups is even more clearly illustrated by the bitter ideological polemic between Al-Qaeda and the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). Whereas the ideologues of Al-Qaeda (primarily Ayman al-Zawahiri) denigrate Hamas for its participation in the Palestinian democratic elections, the leaders of Hamas have sharply criticized Al-Qaeda for its indiscriminate and unjustified attacks on innocent people, while recognizing the legitimacy of the war against the American enemy. All the abovementioned facts nicely illustrate the lack of consensus within Islam regarding the definition of the concept of jihad. This lack of consensus on the theoretical level has implications on the practical level as well. *** Salafi ideology is based upon the claim that the Muslim world became decadent because it strayed from the righteous path, and “Recapturing the glory and grandeur of the Golden Age requires a return to the authentic faith and practices of the ancient ones, namely the Prophet Muhammad and his companions.”58 According to the Russian researcher A. Malashenko, “Today’s Salafi movement has a well-pronounced compensatory function: the call for a return to a ‘Golden Age,’ which is an inherent part of its ideology, represents a recognition of the failures endured by the Muslim world and a search for new reference points (which are actually ‘old’ reference points, taken from the past). In order to overcome these obstacles, it is necessary first of all to restore ‘true’ Islamic values, and then take practical measures in accordance with these values.”59 The struggle of extremist, radical Islamists may be aimed at achieving one or more of the objectives listed below. Primarily, this struggle is aimed at overthrowing the ruling secular regimes in countries with a Muslim 57

  Mansfield, 21.

58

  Sageman, 4.

59

  Малашенко А. Исламские ориентиры Северного Кавказа. М., 2001. С. 69.

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majority (moreover, even theocratic and fundamentalist governments may become the target of aggression by ultra-radicals—as in the case of Saudi Arabia). A second goal of this struggle is attaining independence for Muslim minorities in countries where Islam is not the dominant religion (with the subsequent creation of independent Islamic states). Thirdly, such a struggle may be aimed at suppressing ethnic/cultural minorities seeking autonomy or independence in Muslim states. Fourthly, it is aimed at the neutralization of the influence of foreign (primarily Western) civilizations situated on the fault lines with Islamic culture.60 Militant anti-Western rhetoric occupies a prominent place in the ideological constructs of Salafi jihadists. This rhetoric exploits the following central themes: (1) The claim that the West is intrinsically hostile towards Islam and represents a mortal threat to it. In this respect, we should point out the popularity of conspiracy theories among militant jiahdists, theories that usually revolve around a global Judeo-Christian conspiracy against Islam. (2) In light of the threat posed by the West to the Islamic world, the only way of addressing this threat (and the only language that the West understands) is violent rhetoric. (3) Jihad is the only condition for combating the West. Essentially, the ideologues of jihadism pick up the motifs of the Clash of Civilizations which are very popular in the West. In particular, Osama bin Laden uses precisely this term when declaring that “The struggle is an ideological and religious struggle and the clash is a ‘Clash of Civilizations.’ They [the US and the West] are keen to destroy the Islamic identity of the entire Islamic world. This is their true position regarding us…”61 The ideological constructs of Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden’s secondin-command, also contain a well-pronounced anti-Western component as part of the global Salafi jihad, which is portrayed as a struggle between Islam and hostile global forces (the West and Russia), using a “number of tools” (the United Nations, the friendly rulers of the Muslim peoples, the multinational corporations, the international communications and data exchange systems, etc.).62 In this way, al-Zawahiri insists on the necessity 60

  David Bukay, Muhammad’s Monsters: A Comprehensive Guide to Radical Islam for Western Audiences (Green Forest, AR: Balfour Books, 2004), 63.

61

  Berner, 34.

62

  Sageman, 20.

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of waging war upon the distant enemy (“We must prepare ourselves for a battle that is not confined to a single region, one that includes the apostate domestic enemy and the Jewish-Crusader external enemy”63). In addition to short-term tactical objectives, the ideological arsenal of radical Islamists also contains long-term strategic objectives (which may be termed “ultimate goals”). An example of such a goal is the restoration of the caliphate, which is presented by Al-Qaeda and other related Islamist groups as an outcome which can be achieved through global jihad. The most radical adepts of the Salafi-jihadist worldview regard terrorism as the basis of all operations aimed at restoring the caliphate. In this context, jihad is depicted as an apocalyptic battle between the forces of Good and Evil. A notable attribute of the jihadist worldview is a permanent, unending war, whose duration is to be measured not in months or years, but in decades and centuries. “Having portrayed the jihad as a cosmic struggle between good and evil, few jihadists envision a ‘short war,’ unless the enemy’s will is broken through successful terrorist strikes involving martyrdom operations and mass-casualty attacks combined with a war of attrition. Instead, the jihadists envision a protracted and global conflict.”64 The notion that the restoration of the caliphate through jihad is a long-term struggle is exemplified by the following quote from al-Zawahiri: “If our goal is comprehensive change and if our path, as the Qur’an and our history have shown us, is a long road of jihad and sacrifices, we must not despair of repeated strikes and recurring calamities.”65 Despite the claims by jihadi ideologues that their project is unique, their desire to restore the caliphate as a just society of the future can be realistically considered within the context of the utopian and apocalyptic tradition which is inherent in the Abrahamic religions (not just in Islam, but also in Judaism and Christianity). Here we agree with D. Wilson, who claimed that “For people who are defeated or scattered, the future can be a powerful source of hope and comfort. No matter how bad their current situation is, no matter how greatly they are oppressed by events beyond their control, in the end the people will be victorious, and they will live in 63

  Quoted from: Ibid., 23.

64

  Springer, 58.

65

  Quoted from: Ibid.

The Ideological Roots of Religious Terrorism

peace, harmony, and prosperity. Such a view of the future goes back to the Jewish apocalyptical tradition…this motif of the future as hope is closely related to the view of the future as a time of retribution, when the oppressed will be exalted and the oppressors will be destroyed together with all the rival ethnic and religious groups who could be blamed for the misfortune of the oppressed group. Such a worldview also has Biblical precedents. […] The Biblical justification for retribution was used by the poor against the rich, by the Christians against the Jews, by the Catholics against the Protestants, and by the Protestants against the Catholics.”66 It is no accident that some authors have introduced the concept of an Apocalyptic Global Jihad Group.67 Furthermore, there are parallels that can be drawn between the jihadist utopia and the secular millenarian totalitarian projects of the twentieth century. Thus, a number of observers have compared the Islamist goal of establishing a global Muslim caliphate to the Bolshevik dream of worldwide communism.68 The ultimate goal of all the religious movements that are driven by the ideology of global Salafi jihad is the elimination of nation-states within the Muslim world and the restoration of the Islamic world’s former glory in the form of a single state stretching from Morocco to the Philippines without any of the current national borders. Islamist groups are characterized by the view that true Islam existed only during the Golden Age, in the days of the Islamic state established by Muhammad in Medina, which was ruled after the Prophet’s death by the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs: Abu Bakr (632–634), Umar (634–644), Uthman (644–656), and Ali (656–661). Historically, the caliph, who was frequently referred to as “Amir al-Mu’minin” (Leader of the Faithful), ruled the territory called “Dar al-Islam” (Land of Islam), which was controlled by the caliphate and subjected to Islamic laws. The caliphate was established after the Prophet’s death, when his companion, Abu Bakr, became the first 66

  David A. Wilson, The History of the Future (Toronto: McArthur, 2001), 30-31.

67

  See, for instance: David Bukay, From Muhammad to Bin Laden: Religious and Ideological Sources of the Homicide Bombers Phenomenon (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2008).

68

  See: Patrick Bascio, Defeating Islamic Terrorism: An Alternative Strategy (Wellesly, MA: Branden Books, 2007), 211.

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righteous caliph. According to Islamist logic, Muslims must rediscover the original principles of their religion, purifying them from later innovations and actively applying them in modern society. According to jihadist ideologues, one of the reasons for the current situation is the replacement of the system which existed at the time of the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs with a system of hereditary monarchy. Such a lawless (from their point of view) system of government led to the numerous intellectual, religious, and political ailments of the Islamic world—among other things, it led to the emergence of despotic rulers who created their own laws and implemented them instead of the Godgiven law-system of Sharia. The jihadists argue that these tyrants, by ruling with their own laws, actually dethroned God and set themselves up as divine in his place. The modern regimes in the Islamic world “are all the spiritual heirs of those first hereditary rulers—and are supported in their apostasy by the United States and other Western countries, which use them as their puppets to undermine Islam and destroy God’s laws on earth.”69 Other jihadists think that the troubles began in March 1924, when Atatürk abolished the Ottoman caliphate—this act, which has been referred to as “the mother of all crimes” by a key jihadist ideologue, was the end of true Islam, in their opinion. In this context, the ultimate goal of their struggle is the creation of a restored global Islamic nation (Ummah), ruled by a caliph who would never deviate from Sharia laws. A large number of Islamic political parties and extremist groups call for restoring the caliphate by unifying the Muslim nations, either through political activity (for instance, Hizb ut-Tahrir) or through violence (for instance, Al-Qaeda). According to jihadist doctrine, any government organized by human beings is regarded as heretical, because it sets up its own rules for the people. Jihadists claim that political rule is the prerogative of God, not of human beings. Therefore, they proclaim that the Islamic state will encompass the entire Ummah and be ruled in accordance with Islamic principles. Although the concept of the Ummah has existed in Islam since its inception, and the notion of the fundamental unity of all Muslims and the need to unify all of them within a single Islamic state has been present in 69

  Mary R. Habeck, Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 9-10.

The Ideological Roots of Religious Terrorism

the Muslim consciousness (in various forms) for a very long time, it was only in the second half of the nineteenth century that practical pan-Islamic proposals for the political unification of all Muslims appeared for the first time. These proposals were made by Jamal-al-Din al-Afghani (1839–1897) in his essay “Refutation of the Materialists” and in a series of articles published in his newspaper Al-Urwah al-Wuthqa (The Indissoluble Link, 1884). Al-Afghani, who can be considered the predecessor and spiritual father of several generations of Islamists of various stripes (from moderates to ultra-radicals), called upon Muslims to unite in their struggle against the European colonial powers and to create a confederation of Muslim states which would be ruled by a caliph. In the Ottoman Empire, whose sultans bore the title of Caliph (the spiritual leader of all Muslims), the ideology of pan-Islamism was actively promoted by the Sultan Abdul Hamid II and by the Young Turks, who wanted to unite the Muslims of the world (including Afghanistan, Persia, Egypt, and North Africa, as well as British colonies and territories of the Russian Empire with a Muslim majority) under the aegis of Turkey, with the resulting empire being ruled by a caliph. After the abolishing of the caliphate in Turkey in 1924, pan-Islamists raised the question of electing a new caliph who would be recognized by all. In 1926, the first international congress of caliphatists was held in Cairo (although it was attended by representatives of many Muslim countries, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan were not represented there), but no specific candidates for the title of Caliph were accepted. Nevertheless, an important aspect of the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was created in Egypt in the interwar period, was the desire to restore the Golden Age of Islam (which necessitated a massive re-Islamization of the entire Muslim society). Following the failure of the attempts to create a unified Arab state, the Brotherhood concluded that it was necessary to create an alliance of Muslim countries under the banner of one religion—in other words, to restore the caliphate. At the same time, the Muslim Brotherhood did not reject patriotism and nationalism within the confines of the “Small Homeland,” because these emotions would help to liberate it from foreign domination. By contrast, the caliphate (or the “Great Homeland” of Muslims) was envisioned by them as a federation of Muslim states with a nucleus consisting of Arabs, and with Egypt as an Islamic center, “because it was this country that spearheaded the struggle against the Crusaders and the Mongols in past ages, and

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now it must play a unique role in the rebirth of the historical religion of the Arabs.”70 The establishment of a caliphate which would unify all the countries of the Islamic world is the declared goal of the Hizb ut-Tahrir party (Party of Liberation). According to the party’s ideologues, the caliphate will ensure the stability and safety of all its inhabitants, Muslims and nonMuslims alike. Essentially, this party wants to recreate the Islamic Golden Age which existed in the time before the European colonial conquests. The most prominent theorist advocating the revival of the caliphate was the founder of Hizb ut-Tahrir, Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, who believed that, before the destruction of the caliphate by the British and the Turks, the entire Muslim world was under one rule. Critics of his views point out that “Details such as the presence of three simultaneous caliphs, the Abbasids in Baghdad, the Fatimids in Egypt, and the Ummayyads in Spain during the tenth and eleventh century, or the long wars between Muslim empires, and the presence of numerous dynasties such as the Mughals in India or the Safavids in Iran, are irrelevant to his claim that a unified caliph ruled uninterrupted from the first successor to the Prophet Muhammad until 1922.”71 The ideologues of Hizb ut-Tahrir proclaim that the establishment of the caliphate is a religious duty for Muslims. “For ‘Hizb ut-Tahrir,’ the term ‘Islamic Caliphate’ refers to a utopian form of government that ‘Hizb utTahrir’ is convinced existed from the very beginning of Islam…This is their dream and also their ambition.”72 While rejecting democracy as a Western and un-Islamic phenomenon, Hizb ut-Tahrir contends that the caliph must be elected by the Muslims and be accountable to them. This party’s political program includes the creation of an Islamist state which would be governed by Sharia laws and which would spread Islam throughout the world. Such a state, from the point of view of the ideologues of Hizb ut-Tahrir, would put an end to the “colonial foreign policy” of the West, to US interventions, to wars caused by competition for fuel and energy, and to “puppet” regimes in the Muslim world. The writings of the party’s ideologues contain hints 70

  Добаев И.П. Неправительственные религиозно-политические организации исламского мира // Мировая экономика и международные отношения. 2002. № 4.

71

  Encyclopedia of government and politics, 274.

72

  Bascio, 209.

The Ideological Roots of Religious Terrorism

that this future caliphate is likely to expand beyond the current borders of the Muslim world. In the writings of Sayyid Qutb, one of the forefathers of revolutionary jihadism, the notion of reviving the caliphate acquires millenarian, utopian connotations. What he describes is not the restoration of a caliphate ruled by a Leader of the Faithful so much as the establishment of the Kingdom of God on earth (to use a Western term). In particular, according to Qutb, “Our religion is equivalent to a complete and all-encompassing revolution against human rule in all its forms and variations, including all types and forms of state systems. It steadfastly rebels against any system based in some way upon human authority, i.e. any usurpation of rule by people. Any system of government in which ultimate authority lies with human beings, in which humans have absolute power, in reality serves only to humiliate them, because it elevates ‘someone other than God’ above them. However, by asserting that power and authority are the exclusive prerogative of God, we call upon men to give back to Allah His authority—the authority that has been taken away from Him by the creators and makers of artificial laws and regulations in order to gain the ability to lord it over others and become masters, while reducing others to the level of slaves. Simply put, by proclaiming Allah’s supreme power and authority, we arrive at the necessity to erase all human kingdoms from the face of the earth, so that the world would once again be ruled by its true, almighty Ruler.” 73 By declaring “the ultimate liberation of Man” as “the perfect realization of the Islamic idea”—which cannot be completely reduced to philosophical or ideological constructs, but which can deal with everyday reality, finding an adequate solution to any problem—Qutb claims that “the way of jihad is one of the fundamental requirements to realizing such a revolutionary idea. We must fulfill this requirement regardless of whether the Islamic homeland (or Dar al-Islam, to use a more exact Islamic term) is in a state of peace or threatened by neighboring empires. While struggling for peace, Islam does not aim at maintaining a superficial level of security for its adherents in some particular territory. Rather, its goal is establishing global peace by becoming the only religion in the entire world.”74 73

  Translated from: Кутб С. Война, мир и исламский джихад // Отечественные записки. 2003. № 5-13. http://www.strana-oz.ru/?numid=14&article=677.

74

  Ibid.

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Ayman al-Zawahiri, one of the key ideologues of Al-Qaeda, who has been greatly influenced by Qutb’s ideas, said the following when discussing the ideal for which he and his colleagues are fighting: “Our freedom is the freedom of monotheism, ethics, and virtue. Accordingly, the reform that we seek is based on three foundations. The first foundation is the rule of Shari’ah [Islamic law]. Shari’ah is the course we should follow, since it is sent from God Almighty…The second foundation: this is the foundation on which reform should be based and is a branch of the first foundation, namely, the freedom of the Muslim lands and their liberation from every aggressor, thief, and plunderer. We should not imagine that we can carry out any reform so long as we are under the yoke of the US and Jewish occupation. It is not possible for us to carry out reforms as long as our rulers, merely to achieve their own personal gains, pursue a policy of normalization with Israel and allow it to ruin our economy…The third foundation is…the liberation of the human being.”75 According to Mawdudi, one of the pillars of twentieth-century Islamist thought, Islam presupposes the establishment of an Islamic state (such an ideal state can be defined as a theodemocracy) with the strict observance of three core principles (monotheism, prophecy, and caliphate). From Mawdudi’s point of view, the Islamic state must “coexist with human life.” In such a state, which is governed by Sharia laws, no sphere of human activity can be regarded as personal or private. Mawdudi considered the sovereignty of God and the sovereignty of the people to be mutually exclusive. Essentially, he viewed Islamic democracy as a counterbalance to Western democracy, which transfers God’s sovereignty to the people. In the words of an Islamist author, “The caliphate we are working to establish cannot be compared with any known man-made political system.”76 The restoration of the caliphate as a goal is an oft-heard theme among many leaders and ideological supporters of Al-Qaeda. Osama bin Laden himself called upon Muslims to seek out a leader who would unify them and create a “just caliphate,” which would be governed by Islamic laws and subject to Islamic principles of financial and social behavior. In bin Laden’s message from July 2003, which was disseminated via the Internet, he referred to the abolishment of the caliphate in Turkey in 1924 as 75

  Aaron, 72.

76

  Ibid., 112.

The Ideological Roots of Religious Terrorism

a historic crime, and declared the restoration of the caliphate as one of the central goals of Al-Qaeda: “Since the fall of the Islamic caliphate, regimes that do not rule according to the Qur’an have arisen. If truth be told, these regimes are fighting against the law of Allah. Despite the proliferation of universities, schools, books, preachers, imams, mosques, and people who recite the Qur’an, Islam is in retreat, unfortunately, because the people are not walking in the path of Muhammad…I say that I am convinced that thanks to Allah, this nation has sufficient forces to establish the Islamic state and the Islamic caliphate, but we must tell these forces that this is their obligation.”77 Although jihadists claim that the abolishment of the caliphate by the secular Turkish government was the mother of all crimes, their ideal future society is quite unlike the old Ottoman caliphate, which is regarded by them as corrupt and decadent. It is known that Osama bin Laden called upon his followers to “erase the Crusaders’ artificial borders and establish the greater Islamic state from the ocean to the ocean.”78 The creation of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan by the Taliban in 1997 should be analyzed in the context of this desire to create a global caliphate. An ideal theocratic state or caliphate was viewed by the Taliban ideologues as a model political system for the future. The Tolu-e Afghan (Afghan Dawn) newspaper, which was published in Kandahar during the rule of the Taliban, wrote in 1996 that the Islamic state should be founded upon ideological, rather than national or geographical, unity: “Our most cherished dream is the ultimate unification of all the Muslim states of the world in a single, indivisible Islamic caliphate.”79 Some additional events which should be interpreted in this context are the establishment of the so-called “Islamic State of Iraq” and the declaration about the establishment of the Imarat Kavkaz (Caucasus Emirate) in the Russian North Caucasus by militant Islamists. The latter event also marks the parting of ways between the national-separatist ideology of the Chechen 77

  See: Assaf Moghadam, The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad, and the Diffusion of Suicide Attacks (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 40.

78

  Laura Mansfield, ed., Al Qaeda 2007 Yearbook, vol. 1. (Old Tappan, NJ: TLG Publications, 2007), 365.

79

  Quoted from: Добаев И.П. Неправительственные религиозно-политические организации исламского мира // Мировая экономика и международные отношения. 2002. № 4.

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Republic of Ichkeria and the radical Islamist project, whose goal is to tear the entire North Caucasus away from Russia. At the same time, the creation of the Caucasus Emirate can be seen as a step on the way to establishing the caliphate. For the ideologues of Al-Qaeda, restoring the caliphate is a distant, rather than immediate, goal (unlike, for example, the Hizb ut-Tahrir movement, which sees the creation of the caliphate as one of its primary objectives). The elimination of the previous caliphate is seen as one of the reasons for the current deplorable state of the Muslim world. Thus, Osama bin Laden claimed that “Since the fall of the Islamic caliphate, regimes that do not rule according to the Qur’an have arisen. If truth be told, these regimes are fighting against the law of Allah. Despite the proliferation of universities, schools, books, preachers, imams, mosques, and people who recite the Qur’an, Islam is in retreat, because the people are not walking in the path of Muhammad.”80 Nevertheless, bin Laden’s messages occasionally include references to the establishment of the caliphate as a future goal. For instance, his message from February 16, 2003, contains the following words: “The spirit of religious brotherhood among Muslims has been strengthened, which is considered a great step towards uniting the Muslims under the statement of monotheism for the purpose of establishing the rightly-guided Caliphate, God willing.” In July 2003, bin Laden stated: “I am convinced that thanks to God, this Islamic nation has sufficient forces to establish the Islamic state and the Islamic Caliphate, but we must tell these forces that this is their obligation. Similarly, we need to tell the other forces, those who [are] restricting these forces, that they are sinning by restricting these forces.”81 Ayman al-Zawahiri, one of the major ideologues of Al-Qaeda, admitted that, although the restoration of the caliphate might be artificial, it is still the ultimate goal of the organization: “The mujahid Islamic movement will not triumph against the world coalition unless it possesses a fundamentalist base in the heart of the Islamic world. All the means and plans that we have reviewed for mobilizing the nation will remain up in the air without 80

  Greenberg, 230.

81

  Brad K. Berner, ed., Quotations from Osama Bin Laden, (New Delhi: Peacock Books, 2007), 31.

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a tangible gain or benefit unless they lead to the establishment of the state of caliphate in the heart of the Islamic world…The establishment of a Muslim state in the heart of the Islamic world is not an easy goal or an objective that is close at hand. But it constitutes the hope of the Muslim nation to reinstate its fallen caliphate and regain its glory.”82 In this context, Iraq has played an increasingly important role since 2003. Whereas Afghanistan under Taliban rule continues to serve as the ideal model regime for Al-Qaeda, Iraq has given Al-Qaeda an opportunity to create an Islamic state that would serve as the nucleus of the future caliphate “in the heart of the Muslim world”— and, moreover, in an Arab country. Furthermore, the importance of Iraq is increased by the fact that it used to be the seat of the Abbasid caliphate, as has been pointed out by bin Laden. Al-Zawahiri essentially repeats Sayyid Qutb’s thesis that, after the abolishment of the Turkish caliphate in 1924, there are no true Islamic states left in the world. However, Zawahiri appeals not to the caliphate which existed in the Ottoman Empire, but to the times of the four rightly-guided caliphs. The borders of the future caliphate are not clearly drawn in the jihadists’ imagination, but it is clear that they do not coincide either with the borders of the Islamic state that was ruled by the four righteous caliphs or with the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, there are good reasons to suppose that the ultimate goal of Salafi jihadists is not merely the establishment of a caliphate in all territories inhabited by Muslims (or territories that were once part of the caliphate, such as the Iberian Peninsula), but also the expansion of its rule on a global scale. For instance, an echo of such plans can be found in the words of Louis Attiya Allah, one of the most prominent Saudi ideologues of Al-Qaeda, who said the following during a call for the “reestablishment of the Muslim state”: “We will become the masters of the world, as the world’s economic fate depends on us because we have the resources the world needs and all the elements of controlling the world are in our hands.”83 For their own part, the ideologues of Hizb ut-Tahrir, which claims to be a global Islamic party acting in non-violent ways, regard the future caliphate not merely as the ideal political project, but also as an alternative to the current unipolar world order dominated 82 83

  Quoted from: Moghadam, 40.

  Brad K. Berner, ed., The World According to Al Qaeda (New Delhi: Peacock Books, 2007), 162.

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by the United States: “This will not be a state that sows terror and chaos, as the US does today, but rather a state that will put an end to the occupation and ensure stability and safety in the entire Islamic world. The economic system of this state will help to end poverty and bring calm to the entire world.”84 Even when taking into account the unique aspects of Salafi-jihadist ideology, it is difficult not to notice that its structure is reminiscent of the ideological constructs and practical actions of adherents of other ideologies that exist far outside the boundaries of the Islamic world. This has been pointed out by Samuel Huntington (among others), who found similarities between the political manifestations of the Islamic Resurgence and Marxist ideology in terms of their “scriptural texts, a vision of the perfect society, commitment to fundamental change, rejection of the powers that be and the nation state, and doctrinal diversity ranging from moderate reformist to violent revolutionary.”85 Although we realize that the frequent comparisons between militant Islamism (especially in its jihadist form) and Fascism, Nazism, or Bolshevism are colored by emotions and are usually made for propaganda purposes, we think it may be interesting to point out those similarities which do exist between the abovementioned movements. However, we should note that, despite the obvious similarities (both ideological and practical) between jihadist organizations and the totalitarian ideologies of the twentieth century, the term “Islamofascism,” which has been used by several Western authors since the early 1990s to describe extremist religious groups, seems to be misleading and oversimplified, and it does not adequately reflect the complexity of the phenomenon of militant Islamism (and furthermore, the term “fascism” itself is notoriously difficult to define, having become largely an evaluative and political term). Proponents of this term insist on the existence of “Islamic fascists, as opposed to Islamic liberals, Islamic conservatives, and Islamic democrats.”86 Russell Berman claims that 84

  Translated from: Слова Обамы не способны скрыть уродливое лицо колониализма Америки [Прокламация]. 07.06.2009. http://www.hizb.org.ua/ru/izdaniya/proklamacii/88-slova-obami-ne-zdatniprihovati-olicha.html

85

  Huntington, 111.

86

  Russell A. Berman, Freedom or Terror: Europe Faces Jihad (Stanford, CA: Hoover

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jihadism is “the new communism in its vision of a repressive social utopia, and it is a new fascism in its militarization of life and its chiliastic desire for death. The designation ‘Islamo-fascism’ names this derivation and this brutality.”87 In spite of this, it seems to us that this definition is colored by emotion and politics. Of course, it is quite risky to draw a direct parallel between totalitarian ideologies, which are frequently described as secular religions, and modern militant Salafis, whose ideology is constructed primarily upon a religious foundation. Nevertheless, we must admit that, to the extent that the secular totalitarian ideologies of the twentieth century were quasi-religious phenomena, there are clear parallels between them and the projects of jihadist ideologues (although, obviously, Salafi jihadism, Stalinist Bolshevism, and Hitlerian Nazism all stem from very different sources and are made out of very different components). The political scientist M. Habeck has analyzed the views of Mawdudi, one of the fathers of modern Islamic radicalism, on the sovereignty of God (hakimiyyat Allah). Mawdudi claimed that, since the monotheistic God is the sole lord and master of all things in the universe, nothing can be outside the direct control of God and His Law. Habeck sees in these views a prototypical “form of totalitarianism, with the state and ruler, as God’s representatives on earth, delegated to regulate all personal as well as public life. The result of this belief, shared by many jihadis as well as some Islamists, can be seen in places like the Taliban’s Afghanistan,… Iran, and the Sudan.” According to Mary Habeck, Mawdudi was affected by the political ideas current at the time (apparently, to a greater extent than al-Banna and Qutb), “For like the fascists and communists, he too thought the West bankrupt and rotting…He also thought of his party as a vanguard, which in the best Leninist tradition would lead the revolution for the mass of Muslims. He even envisioned the Islamic state that would eventually be run by a small group of Qur’anically educated and pious clergy, somewhat like the politburo of the Soviet state.”88 Like the totalitarian movements of the twentieth century, jihadism has a universal, transnational character, with the ultimate goal of conquering Institution Press, Stanford University, 2010), 37. 87

  Ibid., 8.

88

  Habeck, 39.

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the entire world. In the same way that the futuristic project of the jihadists is aimed at destroying the Jahiliyyah and establishing God’s authority on earth, twentieth-century totalitarian ideologies were also aimed primarily at destroying the old world and building a new world—a kind of kingdom of God upon the godless earth (Nazi Germany was supposed to become the Thousand Year Reich, whereas the Soviet Union was meant to be a communist utopia). This totalitarian millenarianism is closely associated with a Manichean worldview, which entails a clear-cut distinction between “us” and “them” (which is equated with the opposition between “Good” and “Evil”). Accordingly, the creation of the ideal society is possible only after the total elimination of Evil, which may be represented by Jews, plutocrats, Marxists (in Nazi ideology), or by members of the exploitative social classes (in communism). Such a scheme serves to justify permanent terror against real or imaginary enemies. It is easy to notice the resemblance between global jihadism and the totalitarian ideology that was used by dictatorships in the twentieth century as a myth of redemption and salvation.89 According to such an ideology, a certain category of people is designated as the only legitimate manifestation of humanity (true Muslims in the jihadist interpretation, the Aryan race in Nazi ideology, the proletariat in the Soviet Union). However, this human group exists in a hostile environment that is ruled by Evil, and is forced to compete with other groups. The social evil has a clear source (the far enemy and the near enemy for the jihadists; Jews, communists and plutocrats for the Nazis; the capitalist bourgeoisie for communism), and there is also a cure that will eliminate this evil (extermination, in the case of Nazism; a revolution followed by the expropriation of the exploitative classes and by terror, in the case of communism; military jihad, in the case of Salafi jihadism). The elimination of the enemies who were the source of evil leads to a golden age (for militant Islamists, it is the global caliphate, where infidels will be faced with the choice between converting to Islam, paying jizya and accepting a subservient social position, or dying; for the Nazis, it is the Thousand Year Reich, where the master race will rule a world free of “Untermenschen”; the communist ideal is manifested in a classless society, where the slogan “To each according to his needs” would be fulfilled). 89

  For more information on this aspect of totalitarianism, see, for example: JeanMarie Denquin, Introduction a la science politique (Paris: Hachette, 1992), 45.

The Ideological Roots of Religious Terrorism

Thereby, the end of History arrives. In this sense, jihadist ideology, like its secular totalitarian counterparts, is utopian. The messianic motifs that can be heard in the speeches of preachers of global jihad about the establishment of the future caliphate are also reminiscent of the messianism inherent in the totalitarian ideologies of the previous century, as has been pointed out by the French political scientist Jean Leca.90 The central thesis of his article “The Totalitarian Hypothesis” is that totalitarianism, as a kind of messianism, represents a utopia and a rejection of specific social distinctions. While isolating the major characteristics of totalitarianism, Jean Leca defines the totalitarian syndrome by the following elements. Totalitarianism is monistic. This means that all the modes of perception and ways of learning about reality are interrelated and dependent on one single “true” mode of knowledge, and any discrepancy is reduced to the opposition “Truth—Falsehood,” which later turns into “Loyalty—Betrayal.” For totalitarianism, history possesses an inherent meaning, reality is finite, and political power must ensure that it follows the right course. Totalitarianism is revolutionary, since it presupposes a complete remaking of social relations and the creation of a new type of human being.91 All these symptoms have more or less obvious parallels in the worldview of modern jihadists. An analysis of the parallels between the religiously-motivated extremism of the twenty-first century and the totalitarian ideologies of the twentieth century enables us not only to achieve a better grasp of the nature of jihadist ideology but also to realize that, at its base, Islamist terrorism is not so different from terrorism that is motivated by other ideologies. Obviously, the specific Islamic component determines the external image of jihadist extremism, but Islam is not to blame for the intolerance and fanaticism exhibited by the terrorists towards the world. The sectarian, violent nature of extremists manifests itself regardless of the ideological banners under which they operate. “Terror may stem from ‘high’ ideals, from messianic absolutes, or from a belief in the greater good. The lack of any alternative means of converting others—and not just any ‘others,’ but the majority of people—into their faith is, ultimately, the reason why believers resort 90

91

  Jean Leca, “L’hipothese totalitaire dans le Tiers Monde: les pays arabo-islamiques,” in Totalitarismes, edited by G. Hermet, 215-237 (Paris: Economia, 1984).

  Ibid., 227.

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to terrorist methods in this case.”92 These words, which were written in a different historical period about ultra-leftist terrorists, are fully applicable to those who call themselves the warriors of global jihad.

92

  Витюк В.В., Эфиров С.А. “Левый” терроризм на Западе: история и современность. М., 1987. С. 306.

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Palestine: From Left-Wing Nationalism to Islamism

One of the most frequently used themes in modern jihadist discourse is the solution of the Palestinian question. A key issue in the MiddleEast peace process is securing the right of the Arab people of Palestine to self-determination and the creation of an independent Palestinian state. The exodus of the Palestinian refugees (al-Hijra al-Filasteeniya), which is perceived both by the Palestinians and by the Arabs as a whole as a catastrophe (Nakba), has had great resonance in the entire Muslim world. “It would be naive not to recognize the Israeli-Palestinian question, which is embedded in the wider Israeli-Arab conflict, as one of the key elements of the ongoing confrontation between the West and Islamic radicalism.”1 In the ideological constructs of groups such as Al-Qaeda, the Palestinian problem serves as one of the central arguments in favor of the claim that the “Western Crusaders” and the Jews are waging war upon the Muslim Ummah. The destruction of the Ottoman Empire in World War I and the beginning of the British Mandate for Palestine paved the way for the creation of the “Zionist Entity” (i.e. the State of Israel) in Palestine, which serves as a springboard for the invasion of the lands of Islam by the crusaders. This claim has been voiced by numerous Islamists, including Al-Zawahiri, the ideologue of Al-Qaeda: “The Zionist entity is the vanguard of the US campaign to dominate the Islamic Levant. It is part of an enormous campaign against the Islamic world in which the West, 1

  Devin R. Springer, James L. Regens, and David N. Edger, Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009), 20.

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under the leadership of America, has allied with global Zionism.”2 In this way, Palestine is perceived by Islamists as a key outpost not only in the struggle between the Arab people and the Israeli occupation, but also in the wider confrontation between Islam and the West (primarily the US). In the words of bin Laden, “Attacking America helps the cause of Palestine and vice versa.”3 According to the Islamist Abu Ayman al-Hilali, bin Laden serves the Palestinian issue by attacking American interests, “since Israel is one of America’s allies in the Muslim world, and there is no distinction between America and Zionism.”4 Such an interpretation of the Palestinian problem appears to be rather oversimplified, if not downright distorted. The tangled knot of extremely complex and perplexing questions that are related to Palestine cannot be reduced to a simple opposition along the lines of Muslims/Arabs vs. Israelis/the West. The beginning of the conflict between Arabs and Jews in Palestine in the modern era can be traced back to 1917, the year when Britain issued the Balfour Declaration (written by British Foreign Secretary Lord Arthur James Balfour), which expressed support for the creation of a Jewish national home and Jewish immigration to Palestine (“His Majesty’s government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country”). The Balfour Declaration led to considerable unrest in everyday life in Palestine. In the 1920s–1930s, there was a series of anti-Zionist uprisings. The Arab Revolt of 1936 led to the establishment of the Peel Commission, which recommended partitioning Palestine. In November 1947, shortly before the end of the British Mandate that had been created after World War I, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 181, according to 2

  Bruce O. Riedel, The Search for al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology, and Future (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 129.

3

  See: bin Laden’s speech on October 21, 2001, quoted from: Brad K. Berner, ed., The World According to Al Qaeda (New Delhi: Peacock Books, 2007), 111.

4

  Ibid., 111.

Palestine: From left-Wing nationalism to islamism

which Palestine was to be partitioned into two states—a Jewish state (on 44% of the territory of Palestine) and an Arab state (on 56% of the territory). The area of Jerusalem and Bethlehem, with its numerous holy sites, was to become a separate administrative unit under a special international protection regime, administered by the United Nations. On May 14, 1948, the State of Israel was established, but the proposed Arab state never came into being. Obviously, each side in this conflict has its own point of view on who is to blame for this state of affairs. It would be presumptuous on our part to endorse either side, especially since the truth usually lies somewhere in the middle. Since the establishment of the State of Israel, several wars have been fought between the Jewish state and its Arab neighbors. The first Arab-Israeli war (May 15, 1948–January 13 / March 24, 1949) broke out when numerous Arab states (Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Iraq) launched an attack against the newly declared state. As a result of this war, most of the territory that was supposed to be part of the Arab Palestinian state (including a part of Jerusalem) was captured by Israel. Eastern Palestine (the West Bank of the Jordan River), including East Jerusalem, was occupied by Jordan, whereas the Gaza Strip was occupied by Egypt. In the autumn of 1956, a brief second Arab-Israeli war took place (October 29–November 4), in which Israel made an alliance with France and Great Britain, and all three fought together against Egypt. The Six-Day War (5–10 June ,1967)—during which Israel took over the West Bank of the Jordan River, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights—resulted in the catastrophic defeat of the Arab armies. The Arabs tried to recover from this defeat during the October War (also known as the Yom Kippur War) in October 1973. The fifth Arab-Israeli war broke out in 1982 when Israel invaded Leba- non, which had become the stronghold of the Palestinian resistance movements since 1978. Until the early 1990s, the Palestinian Arabs did not recognize the validity of the UN General Assembly resolution from 1947 about the partition of Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab state, choosing instead to wage a military and political struggle to liberate the entire territory of Palestine. This struggle took different forms—from guerilla warfare and international terrorism to a popular uprising (called the Intifada) in the territories occupied by Israel.

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In the early 1950s, small groups of Palestinians calling themselves the fedayeen started to carry out armed cross-border raids into Israeli territory from the refugee camps in which they resided. Their activity angered Israel to such a degree that it ultimately became one of the reasons for the outbreak of the Suez War in 1956. One of Israel’s goals in that war was the elimination of fedayeen camps in Egyptian territory. In May 1964, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was created during a meeting of 422 Palestinian representatives in the West Bank. The declared goal of this organization was the liberation of Palestinian lands through armed struggle. The first congress of the PLO was held in Cairo, and hundreds of Palestinians gathered there to call for “realizing the Palestinian people’s right of self-determination and defending Palestinian rights.” The Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) was assigned a special role in achieving these goals. The charter of the PLO called for the elimination of the State of Israel, the return of the Palestinian people to their homeland, and the creation of a unitary democratic state in the entire territory of Palestine. The original PLO charter (from May 28, 1964) included the following statement: “Palestine with its boundaries at the time of the British Mandate is a regional indivisible unit.” It also declared the desire to “outlaw the presence and activities” of Zionism. Article 18 of this charter claimed that “The claims of historic and spiritual ties, ties between Jews and Palestine, are not in agreement with the facts of history or with the true basis of sound statehood. Judaism, because it is a divine religion, is not a nationality with independent existence. Furthermore, the Jews are not one people with an independent personality because they are the citizens of the countries to which they belong.” This document also contained references to the right of the Palestinians to return to their land, as well as their right to self-determination. Originally, there was no mention of Palestinian statehood, but, starting from 1974, the PLO has called for the establishment of an independent state in the territory of the former British Mandate of Palestine. Initially, under the influence of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s ideology, the PLO acted under the banner of pan-Arabism and supported the unification of all Arabs in a single state. Additionally, neither Jordan nor Egypt was ready to cede the parts of Palestine controlled by them to the Palestinians—although they did support the Palestinians in their quest to take over the territories that

Palestine: From left-Wing nationalism to islamism

were part of Israel. For this reason, article 24 of the charter stated that “The Organization does not exercise any regional sovereignty over the West Bank in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, on the Gaza Strip or the Himmah Area.” The PLO has never been a single and unified entity. For its entire history, the organization has functioned more like a confederation of various groups with different—albeit usually left-wing—ideologies. It encompasses both the leftist-nationalist Fatah and the pro-communist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine; both the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (which has been influenced by Maoist ideology) and the proSyrian Ba’athist As-Sa’iqa faction, etc. The groups which make up the PLO have included Muslims, Christians, and even atheists. It is known that Dr. George Habash, the founder of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)—which is the second-largest faction within the PLO, after Arafat’s Fatah—comes from a Christian family. Furthermore, the PFLP used communist slogans, and its ideology was secular. And yet it was precisely this group that committed a series of highly publicized terrorist acts in the 1960s–1970s. One of them was the hijacking of an Israeli El Al airplane en route from Rome to Israel. The hijackers forced the pilots to land the airplane in Algeria, where the thirty passengers and crew members were held as hostages for a month. Fighters affiliated with the PFLP carried out several additional armed attacks on passengers and employees of El Al, the Israeli airline company. The group was behind the bombing of a Jerusalem supermarket (in February 1969) and the hijacking of a TWA airplane in late August 1969—an action that brought fame to the female terrorist Leila Khaled (two Israeli passengers were held as hostages for more than 40 days). Terrorists from the PFLP were also responsible for the bombing of a Swissair flight bound for Israel, which led to the deaths of 47 people. On May 30, 1972, 28 passengers were shot to death at Ben Gurion International Airport by members of the Japanese Red Army in cooperation with the PFLP. In 1977, members of the PFLP hijacked a Lufthansa airplane en route from Palma de Majorca to Frankfurt. The pilot was killed, and the plane was diverted to Somalia. The passengers were liberated through the actions of the West German Special Forces. The example of the PFLP destroys the myth of the suicidal shahids, whose sinister image has become closely associated with Islamist terrorism in the popular consciousness.

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Marxist terrorists who are not related to Islam (or to religion in general, for that matter) have been known to commit suicidal terrorist attacks—several such events were recorded in the time period from 2002 to 2004. The case of the PLO is one of the most notable examples that show how difficult it is sometimes to draw a clear line between a struggle for national liberation, partisan/guerilla warfare, and terrorism. Before the Madrid conference of 1991 (i.e. two years before the signing of the historic Oslo accords between Israel and the Palestinians), the PLO was classified as a terrorist group by the US. By that time, the Soviet Union (and later Russia) had established diplomatic relations with the State of Palestine, which existed only on paper at that time, and which was represented only by the PLO. Bruce Hoffman, an expert on terrorism, has correctly noted that “By the end of the 1970s, the PLO, a non-state actor, had formal diplomatic relations with more countries (eighty-six) than the actual established nationstate of Israel (seventy-two). It is doubtful whether the PLO could ever have achieved this success had it not resorted to international terrorism. Within four years, a handful of Palestinian terrorists had overcome a quarter century of neglect and obscurity.”5 On the one hand, the Palestine Liberation Organization was recognized as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people (ultimately, even Israel recognized it as such). On the other hand, a long list of actions committed by Palestinian “freedom fighters” should undoubtedly be classified as acts of terrorism. Such acts include a massacre inside a school bus in Avivim, which was carried out by fighters of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (which was part of the PLO). This massacre resulted in the deaths of 9 children and 3 adults, and 19 further individuals were injured. This act—in addition to numerous hijackings of airplanes that were carried out by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (one of the largest factions within the PLO)—was among the most notable acts of terrorism in the late 1960s–early 1970s. Additional terrorist acts by Palestinian groups were: the massacre of Israeli sportsmen at the 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich by members of the Black September fac- tion—an act that became widely known all over the world; the Ma’alot massacre (in 1974), in which terrorists from the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine took over an Israeli school and held the students 5

  Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 70.

Palestine: From left-Wing nationalism to islamism

hostage—as a result of which 26 students and adults were killed; the attack on the Savoy Hotel in Tel-Aviv by members of Fatah in 1975; and the massacre committed by Fatah on the coastal road between Haifa and Tel-Aviv, which led to the deaths of 37 Israeli citizens. The Palestinian Fatah group, which was founded in the late 1950s with the goal of armed resistance against Israel, soon rose to prominence within the PLO. In 1969, the head of Fatah, Abu Ammar, better known as Yasser Arafat, became the leader of the PLO. He advocated guerilla warfare and transformed the PLO into a completely independent organization. After the catastrophic defeat of the Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian armies in the Six-Day War of 1967, the Palestinians reached the bitter conclusion that they could no longer rely upon Arab countries and would have to wage their struggle on their own. The light of pan-Arabism, symbolized in the figure of the Egyptian leader Nasser, had dimmed significantly. The Palestinian movement changed greatly following the Six-Day War—it became more radical. As a result of the 1967 war, the confrontation between Palestinian guerilla fighters who were based in Jordan and the Jordanian government escalated and led to a serious crisis. By the early 1970s, there were at least seven highly active Palestinian guerilla groups in Jordan. One of the largest groups was the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which was led by George Habash. The Palestinian fedayeen, who were well armed thanks to foreign aid, created a virtual state-within-a-state in the territory of the refugee camps in Jordan. From 1969 untill September 1970, the PLO, acting with the tacit approval of Jordan, waged a war of attrition against Israel—Palestinian fighters bombarded Israeli Kibbutzim and agricultural settlements with artillery fire, and Palestinian fedayeen directly attacked Israeli citizens. Israel launched reprisal strikes against Jordanian territory. Obviously, the government in Amman was extremely dissatisfied with this state of affairs, all the more so since much of the activity of Palestinian guerillas (most of whom, as you may recall, held left-wing political views) consisted not of armed struggle against Israel, but rather of resistance to the Jordanian monarchy. On September 6, 1970, militants associated with the NFLP, with Leila Khaled among them, hijacked four airliners belonging to the Pan Am, TWA, and Swissair airlines. On September 1970, a BOAC airliner was

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hijacked en route from Bahrain to London via Beirut. Three of the hijacked aircraft were landed in Jordan (the fourth one was landed in Cairo). After the evacuation of the passengers, the airliners were destroyed by NFLP fighters through the use of explosives, and the event was covered by mass media from all over the world. This series of hijackings brought the accumulated animosity between the Jordanians and the Palestinians to a boiling point, leading to the bloody clashes of the Black September. The 10-day-long civil war between the royal army and the Palestinian guerillas brought the Middle East to the brink of a new regional conflict—Jordan was nearly invaded by Syrian and Iraqi troops, and the US and Israel also signaled their willingness to become involved in the situation. Having been defeated in an open confrontation, the Palestinian fighters continued their struggle against the Jordanian government through terrorist methods. The events which began in Jordan on September 16, 1970, when King Hussein bin Talal used military force to suppress an attempt by the Palestinian fedayeen to take control over the kingdom, gave their name to a small—but famous—group: Black September. Apparently, this group was created by members of Fatah who searched for a way to take revenge on King Hussein and the Jordanian military. These members of Fatah were joined by other militants from the PFLP, the As-Sa’iqa faction, and other organizations. On November 28, 1971, Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi Tel was shot to death near the Sheraton Hotel in Cairo—this was an act of revenge for the expulsion of the Palestinians from Jordan. The four young Palestinians arrested after the assassination declared themselves to be members of the Black September. In December 1971, the Black September made a failed attempt on the life of Zeid al-Rifai, Jordan’s ambassador to London and former chief of the Jordanian royal court. Following the events of the Black September, the PLO and its branches launched an international campaign against Israel. In May 1972, a Belgian airliner was hijacked en route from Vienna to Israel. In the autumn of 1972, tens of letter bombs were mailed from Amsterdam to various Israeli diplomats. One such letter killed an Israeli agricultural counselor in Britain. In March 1973, the Saudi embassy in Khartoum (Sudan) was attacked, leading to the deaths of the American Chief of Mission to Sudan, his deputy, and the Belgian chargé d’affaires to Sudan.

Palestine: From left-Wing nationalism to islamism

However, the most notorious act of terror by the Black September was the attack on Israeli athletes during the 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich. Two years after the tragedy in Munich, ideologues from the German terrorist Red Army Faction issued a pamphlet titled The Black September in Munich, in which they tried to justify the massacre, calling it an “antiFascist action” that was supposed to be a reminder of the 1936 Olympics, which took place in Nazi Germany.6 The question of how closely the Black September was connected to Fatah—and to Yasser Arafat personally—has baffled many researchers, and remains unanswered to this day. Abu Iyad (Salah Khalaf), one of the founders of Fatah, wrote in his book My Home, My Land: “Black September was never a terrorist organization. It acted as an auxiliary of the Resistance, when the Resistance was no longer in a position to fully assume its military and political tasks. Its members always insisted that they had no organic tie with Fatah or the PLO.” However, Abu Daoud (Mohammed Daoud Oudeh), a Black Semptember operative and former senior PLO member, claimed in 1972 that “There is no such organization as Black September. Fatah announces its own operations under this name so that Fatah will not appear as the direct executor of the operation.” Yasser Arafat described the strategy of the Black September as “responsible violence,” while consistently distancing the PLO from this group. Some claim that the Black September as a faction was created in order to mitigate the psychological consequences of the crippling defeat of the Palestinian fedayeen at the hands of the Jordanian army. Moreover, the events of the Black September convinced many Palestinian fighters of the necessity to continue their struggle through clandestine means. Members of the Black September did not describe their own activities as terrorism, but rather as revolutionary violence. According to them, terrorism “is dictated by subjective motives and only claims to take the place of armed struggle.” After the 1973 ArabIsraeli war, the Black September ceased its activities. Following the expulsion of the Palestinian fighters from Jordan, many of them settled in Lebanon—including PLO Chief Yasser Arafat. The Palestinian refugees in Lebanon became a “fermenting agent” of strife and discontent—much as they had done in Jordan. Their presence was a key 6

  Der Schwarze September in Muenchen. Frankf.-a-M., 1974.

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reason for the outbreak of a major civil war in this multi-denominational country, a war which has not completely died down to this day. As a terrorist group, the PLO is considered to be a unique phenome- non—because of its consistent internationalist orientation. The activities of the various terrorist groups which were part of the PLO spread far beyond the borders of the Holy Land. “Some accounts suggest that by the early 1980s at least forty different terrorist groups—from Asia, Africa, North America, Europe, and the Middle East—had been trained by the PLO at its camps in Jordan, Lebanon, and Yemen, among other places… The PLO was…one of the first terrorist groups actively to pursue the accumulation of capital and wealth as an organization priority.”7 The Palestine Liberation Organization became a classical example in another respect as well: an example of how an organization which is regarded by many as a terrorist group enters the political mainstream. In 1993, Arafat recognized the State of Israel in an official letter to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. In response, Israel recognized the PLO as the official representative of the Palestinian people. The ideology and practices of the PLO left very little room for radical Islamism. In general, the religious component in the Palestinian struggle was quite marginal until the early 1980s. Nevertheless, the Islamist factor has managed to penetrate into the Palestinian Resistance (the influence of the Islamic Revolution in Iran was a significant factor in this process), and today it plays an important role in the political processes in the Middle East. Among the Palestinian students in Egypt, a group of activists who had grown dissatisfied with the “complacency” of the Muslim Brotherhood and the “godlessness” of the PLO rejoiced at the news about the Islamic Revolution and eagerly adopted the Iranian model. Their leader, Dr. Fathi Shaqaqi, published a pamphlet titled Khomeini: The Islamic Solution and the Alternative. Alluding to the Iranian example, Shaqaqi and his colleagues criticized the nationalism of the PLO and the overly cautious nature of the Muslim Brotherhood, who rejected the struggle against Israel in favor of religious sermons and charity. They claimed that the path to liberating Palestine lay in the unification of armed struggle and the struggle for Islamization into one single great jihad. Fathi Shaqaqi and his colleague 7

  Hoffman, 78-79.

Palestine: From left-Wing nationalism to islamism

Abd Al Aziz Awda were forced to leave Egypt following the assassination of Anwar el-Sadat in 1981. In 1983, Shaqaqi, riding the crest of the Iranian Revolution wave, created the Islamic Jihad (Harakat al-Jihād al-Islāmi fi Filastīn) in Gaza—this group was supposed to be a branch of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad was created following the realization by numerous members of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood that their organization had become far too moderate, and that it had not done enough to support the Palestinian struggle. Unlike most other Palestinian groups, this small organization was aimed not only at destroying the State of Israel, but also at creating a Palestinian Islamic state in its place. Jihad was interpreted by the ideologues of the group to include acts of armed struggle against Israel. Furthermore, the Islamic Jihad criticized the majority of the regimes in the Arab world for being insufficiently Islamic and too pro-Western. The armed wing of the Islamic Jihad—the Al-Quds Brigades—has taken credit for numerous acts of terror in Israel, including suicide bombings. The Islamic Jihad is much smaller than Hamas, and it lacks the broad social network of the latter. Nevertheless, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad have much in common: both are Islamist groups that originated from branches of the Muslim Brotherhood; both advocate the destruction of the State of Israel and the revival of the true faith in the Muslim world. The difference between them lies in their priorities—the Jihadists tend to interpret jihad as a general obligation for all Muslims, and their primary objective is the establishment of pure Islam all over the Muslim world; after attaining this goal, jihad should be turned against Israel. By contrast, Hamas tends to regard jihad primarily as a means for the liberation of Palestine; only after the liberation is complete should Muslims turn their attention to reestablishing the true faith in the entire Islamic world. It should be noted that, although the vast majority of Islamist groups of all kinds stress the importance of liberating Palestine in their rhetoric (this issue occupies a prominent place in the confrontation between Islam and the “Crusaders” depicted by them, with recent events in the Holy Land being extrapolated into the time of the Crusades), the actual struggle in the occupied territories is waged almost exclusively by Palestinian groups (Hamas, Islamic Jihad). Furthermore, despite the fact that the Palestinian question is declared to be a key issue by the majority of Islamist groups all over the world, there is virtually no influx of foreign mujahideen into

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Palestinian territory (unlike the cases of Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya, Bosnia, etc.). This is partially the result of Hamas’s policy of zealously guarding its independence from foreign interventions (although it uses the support provided by Iran and Syria). At the same time, more radical groups, which promote the concept of global jihad, are highly critical of the activities of the major Palestinian factions—both Fatah (which is regarded by them as capitulatory) and Hamas. *** One can easily note the similarity between the Shiite Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Sunni Hamas movement in Palestine. This is no accident. However, there are also significant differences between these two movements, both of which have managed to become independent actors on the regional (and even the global) political stage. Whereas the creation of Hezbollah was largely caused by the peculiar multi-faith structure of Lebanon in combination with the legacy of the civil war and of foreign intervention, the Islamic Resistance Movement (ῌarakat al-Muqāwamat al-Islāmiyyah8) emerged in a different ethno-religious environment, and the circumstances of its creation were very different. When compared to Lebanon, the religious and ethnic structure of Palestine appears far more homogenous. The Gaza Strip, which was the birthplace of Hamas in the late 1980s and which passed under the direct control of Hamas in 2007, is the lesser of the two parts of the Palestinian Authority. In terms of population density (3823 per km²), it is the most densely populated territory in the world. The population of the Strip is quickly growing—the total fertility rate is more than 5 children per woman (in terms of fertility rate, Gaza is ranked 19th in the world). Although the Gaza Strip is the only part of the territory transferred into the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority with access to the Mediterranean Sea, Israel controls access to the Strip by sea (it also maintains control over the Strip’s airspace). The high population density, the limited land resources, the harsh security measures (both internal and external), an embargo on foreign economic aid (imposed after the victory of Hamas in 8

  This is the source of the acronym “HAMAS”. The word hamas also means “devotion” or “zeal in the path of Allah” in Arabic.

Palestine: From left-Wing nationalism to islamism

the 2006 legislative election)—all these factors contribute to the low level of economic development in the Strip, even in comparison with the more developed West Bank. According to the CIA World Factbook, 60% of the population of the Gaza Strip lives below the poverty line. Unlike the West Bank, which has been left under the control of Fatah, Israel has no military bases or Jewish settlements within the Strip (since September 2005). The unilateral Israeli evacuation of all Jewish settlers from the Gaza Strip in 2005 has improved the image of Hamas in the eyes of the Palestinians. Hamas ascribed this evacuation to the success of its violent attacks on Israeli targets. The creation of Hamas in 1987, at the beginning of the first Palestinian Intifada, is closely connected to Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the leader of the Palestinian wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, and to the Islamic Center (Al-Mujama Al-Islami) created by him. It was a charity network of religious, educational, and social institutions, which were sponsored by donors from the countries of the Persian Gulf. The Al-Mujama Al-Islami organization, created by the head of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza (and the future leader of Hamas), was registered by the Israeli authorities as a non-profit religious organization. There are rumors—which seem to have some basis in reality—that the Israeli intelligence agencies played an important role in the creation of Hamas.9 In any case, during the initial stages of its existence, the young Islamist movement established on the basis of Al-Mujama encountered little resistance from Israel. The Palestinian Islamists were regarded as a counterbalance to the influence of the PLO. This tolerance may also have been partially caused by the opposition of Hamas to an international conference that would adjudicate the problem of Palestine, which coincided with the policies of the Begin and Shamir governments.10 Be that as it may, Hamas was created and acquired its power by virtue of being a counterweight to Yasser Arafat’s Fatah (which has been led by Mahmoud Abbas since Arafat’s death).

9

  Концельман Г. Ясир Арафат. Ростов-на-Д., 1997. С. 467.

10

  Ami Isseroff, “The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). Introduction,” MidEast Web Historical Documents, http://www.mideastweb.org/hamas.htm.

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In spite of being a relatively new and primarily Palestinian movement, Hamas tends to see itself in a wider temporal and spatial context. In particular, the charter of Hamas says that “the Islamic resistance Movement is one of the wings of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine.” At the same time, it claims that “The Muslim Brotherhood Movement is a universal organization which constitutes the largest Islamic movement in modern times.”11 After its emergence against the backdrop of the First Intifada, Hamas managed to attract the sympathy and support of many Palestinians (both in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank area) who were dissatisfied with the policies of the PLO, which was perceived by them as corrupt and unable to provide a solution to the “Palestinian Question.” Like the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Palestinian Hamas cannot be reduced to the image of an odious terrorist group. Rather, it is a fairly complex phenomenon, whose activities cover various spheres of life—from charity, social, and educational institutions to military operations and acts of terrorism. Hamas employs both political and violent methods to achieve its goals. Like many other similar movements, Hamas includes both military and civilian wings. The political wing, which was represented by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin’s close companions, published propaganda literature and was responsible for the recruitment of new members. The military wing of Hamas is known as the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades (named after Sheikh Izz ad-Din al-Qassam, who died in 1935 while fighting the British). Outside the Palestinian territories, Hamas is known primarily for its attacks against Israel (including suicide bombings). In terms of number of suicidal terrorist attacks, Hamas is ranked third in the world after the Sri-Lankan Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Lebanese Hezbollah. According to calculations made by the German military expert Udo Ulfkotte, in the time period between 1980 and February 2000, there were 168 suicide attacks committed by the Tamil Tigers, 52 by Hezbollah, and 22 by Hamas in Israel. In response to the terrorist activities of Hamas, the Israeli security forces launched a series of targeted attacks on both the fighters and the political leadership of the Islamic Resistance Movement. However, the deaths of the 11

  “The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas),” MidEast Web Historical Documents, http://www.mideastweb.org/hamas.htm.

Palestine: From left-Wing nationalism to islamism

two leaders of Hamas (Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi) in Israeli strikes have not weakened the Islamist movement. Furthermore, Hamas has managed to become a leading faction on the Palestinian political stage. After the death of Yasser Arafat, the political wing of Hamas won the local elections in Gaza, Nablus, and Qalqilya. In January 2006, Hamas, acting under the label of the “List for Change and Reform,” achieved an unexpected victory in the Palestinian legislative election, winning 76 out of 132 seats (by contrast, the ruling Fatah won only 43 seats). The success of Hamas in a democratic election was an unpleasant surprise for many in the West. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced shortly before the election: “Holding free and fair Palestinian Legislative Council elections on January 25 represents a key step in the process of building a peaceful, democratic Palestinian state.”12 However, after the unexpected victory of Hamas, the tone of the American administration became less optimistic. President George W. Bush declared that the US would not negotiate with Hamas if the group continued to deny Israel’s right to exist. The success of Hamas in the 2006 election can be seen as evidence of the failure of the American policy of bringing democracy to the “Greater Middle East”—at the very least, it dealt a sharp blow to this policy. American efforts aimed at creating, through democratic means, a Palestinian government which would be willing to engage in dialogue with Israel and which would enjoy the support and goodwill of the West ultimately backfired, leading instead to the emergence—through the very same democratic means—of a radical Islamist government that holds harsh anti-Israeli and anti-Western positions. This failure was exacerbated by the attitude adopted by the US and the West towards Hamas (among others). Essentially, the West renounced the principles of democracy that it usually preaches, choosing instead to ignore the will of the majority of Palestinian voters. Obviously, such a clear expression of double standards does not contribute to the popularity of the ideas of Western democracy in Middle Eastern countries. The geopolitical ambitions of Hamas are based upon the goal stated in the charter of the movement (from 1988)—namely, the elimination of the State of Israel and the establishment of an Islamic state in the territory that it currently occupies in addition to the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. 12

  From: ИТАР-ТАСС—Планета. 12.01.2006.

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The Hamas charter calls for replacing Israel with an Islamic republic, and this goal is interpreted as an Islamic religious duty and a prophecy which stems from the hadith. Since the moment of its creation, Hamas has not recognized Israel as a sovereign state—unlike the PLO, which recognized Israel in 1988—and calls it the “Zionist Entity”. Although Hamas did not directly call for the destruction of Israel during the 2006 election campaign, several candidates from the movement noted in their speeches that the Hamas charter was still valid, and there were calls to erase Israel from the map. It should be noted that some individual Hamas leaders have used less categorical formulations in their speeches (apparently, out of tactical necessity). For instance, Khaled Mashal stated in February 2005 that Hamas may stop the armed struggle against Israel, on condition that Israel recognizes the 1967 borders, completely withdraws from all Palestinian territories, and recognizes the Palestinian “right of return.” In general, the position of Hamas is characterized by its sharp rejection of any partial solution to the “Palestinian problem” and of the very fact of the existence of a Jewish state in Palestine. Most of the ideologues of the movement also reject the negotiation process as a means of advancing the cause of Palestinian independence. “There is no solution for the Palestinian question except through jihad”—says the Hamas charter. It is also wellknown that Hamas actively opposed the Israeli-Palestinian Oslo Accords of 1993. “A return to Islam and to an Islamic identity, which we consider to be a unifying factor not only for the Palestinian people, but also for the entire Arab-Islamic Ummah”—this was declared by the “List for Change and Reform” (Hamas) in January 2006 to be one of the basic principles of the movement.13 At the same time, its platform also stressed “loyalty to the Palestinian national values.” Hamas (like the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah) is primarily a fundamentalist religious organization, but it is also inspired by ethnic nationalism.14 The problem of reconciling religious and nationalist values is explained in the Hamas charter in the following way: 13

  The platform of the “List for Change and Reform (Hamas),” trans. from: http://www.palestine-info.ru/code/AFF/aff.php?id=8447&categuorie=3.

14

  R. Gunaratna, “Suicide Terrorism: A Global Threat,” Janes Intelligence Review 12, pt. 4 (October 20, 2000), http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/ news/usscole/jir001020_1_n.shtm.

Palestine: From left-Wing nationalism to islamism

Nationalism, from the point of view of the Islamic Resistance Movement, is part of the religious creed. Nothing in nationalism is more significant and deeper than in the case when an enemy should tread Muslim land. Resisting and quelling the enemy becomes the individual duty of every Muslim, male or female. […] If other nationalist movements are connected with materialistic, human or regional causes, the nationalism of the Islamic Resistance Movement has all these elements as well as the more important elements that give it soul and life.15

Although the concept of the “Ummah” does appear in the rhetoric of Hamas, it is clearly not one of the key concepts in the ideology of this movement (unlike, say, the Islamist groups that preach “global jihad”). According to numerous researchers, the ideology of Hamas represents “a synthesis of pan-Arab Islamic religious ideals and Palestinian nationalism,”16 and Hamas “should be described under the concept of religious nationalism. The primary difference between fundamentalism and religious nationalism is that followers of fundamentalist movements often remove themselves from state political participation, aspire to a golden past, and seek to create a global religious movement.”17 In contrast to them, religious nationalists, despite occasional references to a golden age and symbolic associations between their ideology and some global religious movement, are limited to their own territory (in terms of both their political activity and their military operations). In the case of Hamas, this territory is Palestine. At the same time, if we take into account the specific nature of Hamas as a religiously-oriented movement (in addition to the prominent place occupied by Palestine—and Jerusalem in particular—in the history of the emergence of Islam), the Palestinian question acquires a religious Islamic meaning. In the case of Palestine, the disputed territory is not just a piece of land, but rather a place regarded as sacred by many millions of Muslims (not to mention the sacredness of the Holy Land for Christians and Jews). 15

  “The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas),” http://www. mideastweb.org/hamas.htm.

16

  Charles E. Schumer, “Hamas: The Organizations, Goals and Tactics of a Militant Palestinian Organization,” Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/ irp/crs/931014-hamas.htm.

17

  Elliot Nicolas, “The Future Geopolitical Legitimacy of Islamism: The Case of Hamas,” http://ecommons.txstate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1039&context= honorprog.

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“Abusing any part of Palestine is abuse directed against part of religion. Nationalism of the Islamic Resistance movement is part of its religion”— reads the Hamas charter.18 Hamas regards Palestine (from their point of view, this term refers to the entire territory of modern-day Israel, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank) as an inalienable Islamic waqf, which cannot belong to non-Muslims. The struggle for reestablishing control over Palestinian lands and wrenching them away from Israel is declared to be the religious duty of every Muslim.19 Conspiracy theories play an important role in the ideological constructs of Hamas, which include references to the notorious Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Here is one quote from the charter that clearly illustrates the organization’s views on the “global Zionist conspiracy”: With their money, they [the enemies] took control of the world media, news agencies, the press, publishing houses, broadcasting stations, and others. With their money they stirred revolutions in various parts of the world with the purpose of achieving their interests and reaping the fruit therein. They were behind the French Revolution, the Communist Revolution and most of the revolutions we heard and hear about, here and there. With their money they formed secret societies, such as Freemasons, Rotary Clubs, the Lions and others in different parts of the world for the purpose of sabotaging societies and achieving Zionist interests. With their money they were able to control imperialistic countries and instigate them to colonize many countries in order to enable them to exploit their resources and spread corruption there.20

The ideologues of Hamas also blame this global conspiracy for instigating World War I, destroying the Islamic Caliphate, and issuing the Balfour Declaration, which ultimately led to the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. Unlike the Shiite Lebanese Hezbollah movement, which was created with the active involvement of Iran, the dependence of Hamas on foreign powers for its creation and activities is far less obvious. Nevertheless, 18

 

“

The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas),” http://www.mideastweb.org/hamas.htm.

19

  Ibid.

20

  “Hamas Charter,” http://www.mideastweb.org/hamas.htm.

Palestine: From left-Wing nationalism to islamism

there are frequent claims that Hamas is a client of Tehran and Damascus, and that it plays a certain role in the realization of their geopolitical aspirations. To what extent is Hamas dependent on Iran and Syria? Obviously, it cannot be denied that Hamas does receive a certain amount of support from these two countries, which position themselves as Israel’s major opponents in the region. However, they are not the only source of support. According to the US State Department, Hamas is financed by Iran, as well as by Palestinian émigrés and private charity foundations from Saudi Arabia and other countries. However, it would be wrong to exaggerate the degree of support provided to the Palestinian Islamists by Tehran. “Although the Shiite Muslim clerical establishment in Iran had once been reluctant to sponsor authentic Sunni Muslim fundamentalist movements, the revival of the Middle East peace process after the 1991 Gulf War generated a willingness to back virtually any group that had demonstrated a measure of success in striking at Israel.”21 Following a visit to Tehran by a Hamas delegation led by Abu Marzook (one of the leaders of the movement) in October 1992, Iran began to provide Hamas with financial subsidies (an annual sum of 30 million dollars) and to train its operatives at Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) camps.22 Iranian aid to Hamas has continued after the victory of the movement in the Palestinian election. One of Ismail Haniyeh’s first official visits in his capacity as the Hamas Prime Minister was to Iran. According to Mahmoud az-Zahar, the Foreign Minister of the Palestinian Authority (and a member of Hamas), in 2006 the Hamas-led Palestinian government received 120 million dollars from Iran in foreign aid. We can agree with those who claim that the Iranian foreign policy is characterized by a special Shiite dimension: “Iran must defend the rights and interests of Shiite minorities in other countries.”23 This policy is the 21

  Gary C. Gambill, “Sponsoring Terrorism: Syria and Hamas,” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin 4, no. 10 (October 2002), http://www.meib.org/articles/0210_s1.htm.

22

  Aaron Mannes, “Dangerous Liaisons: Hamas after the Assassination of Yassin,” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin 6, no. 4 (April 2004), http://www.meib.org/articles/0404_pal1.htm.

23

  Пертес Ф. Гордость и недоверие. Иранский взгляд на конфликт с Западом // Internationale Politik. 2005. № 1. Январь-февраль. С. 111.

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reason for Tehran’s active support of Hezbollah, which represents the interests of the Lebanese Shiite community. By contrast, Iran’s support of the Sunni Hamas, which cannot aid Iran’s geopolitical project of creating a “Shiite belt” stretching from Iran to Lebanon, has a different rationale, being motivated primarily by the principle “the enemy of my enemy [i.e. Israel] is my friend.” From this point of view, the extreme anti-Israeli stance of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadenijad, who has repeatedly declared that Israel must be “wiped off the map,” coincides with the principled refusal of Hamas to recognize Israel. Hamas also receives a certain amount of support from Syria, part of whose territory is occupied by Israel. Objectively, Syria is quite right in regarding Hamas as another weapon to use in the war against its historical enemy. However, the harsh measures used by the Syrian government in the early 1980s against the Muslim Brotherhood were met with sharp condemnation among Palestinian Islamists. It is notable that, in 1983, the chairman of the Higher Islamic Council, Saad al-Din al-Alami, held mass rallies at Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem and declared that killing Assad was “a duty of all Muslims.”24 The relationship between Hamas and the Syrian regime may also be strained by another factor: the orthodox Sunnis of Hamas are unlikely to feel true sympathy for the Alawites, who comprise the top echelons of the Syrian political system and are regarded as a heretical sect by other Muslims. In the past, Syria tried to make Hamas part of the Palestinian National Salvation Front—a political coalition with a left-wing orientation, created under the aegis of Syria with the goal of opposing Arafat. However, this attempt failed. Hamas activists declared: “the People of the Book [i.e. Jews and Christians] are closer to us than the Reds.” The willingness of Damascus to damage its relationship with Hamas for diplomatic gain is proven by the letter sent by Syrian President Bashar Assad to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in December 2006, in which the Syrian leader promised to take measures against Hamas and the Lebanese Hezbollah in exchange for the resumption of peace talks (primarily, about the return of the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights to Syria). In particular, the letter spoke of Syria’s willingness to cut the channels of communication between the leaders of Hamas residing 24

  Gambill, http://www.meib.org/articles/0210_s1.htm.

Palestine: From left-Wing nationalism to islamism

in Damascus and the members of the movement in the Palestinian territories.25 The question of the relationship between Hamas and Salafi-jihadist groups operating on the global level (primarily Al-Qaeda) appears quite complex. On the one hand, one cannot fail to notice the similarity between some of their goals (not to mention the similar use of terrorist methods in order to achieve those goals), which enables many observers to place Hamas and Al-Qaeda in the same category. This similarity is strengthened by expressions of support for Hamas on the part of Al-Qaeda leaders (for instance, during the armed conflict between Fatah and Hamas in summer 2007, Ayman al-Zawahiri declared: “We must support the mujahideen of Hamas despite all the mistakes made by its leadership”26). In all fairness, it should be noted that, a few months earlier, the same Al-Zawahiri criticized Hamas for reaching an agreement on the creation of a Palestinian unity government in Saudi Arabia in February 2007, proclaiming that the movement had “become mired in the swamp of capitulation.” On the other hand, Hamas is an organization aimed at solving regional, Palestinian problems, in contrast to the global jihad preached by Al-Qaeda. This difference is nicely illustrated by the following comment, made by Osama Hamdan, the official representative of Hamas in Beirut, in response to a claim by Mahmoud Abbas (head of the Palestinian National Authority) that Hamas had granted asylum to Al-Qaeda supporters after taking power in Gaza: “Mahmoud Abbas knows very well that ‘Hamas’ has always acted in the best interests of the Palestinian people, resisting the Israeli occupation and thereby defending Palestinians’ legitimate rights, in addition to supporting internal reforms in Palestine; therefore, drawing a parallel between it and ‘Al-Qaeda’ is, at the very least, inaccurate.”27 The events of August 2009 cast further doubt on the purported connection between the Palestinian Islamists and Al-Qaeda. In that month, there was an attempt by the militant Salafi-jihadist group Jund Ansar Allah (which is ideologically connected to Al-Qaeda) to seize control over the Gaza Strip. Sheikh Abdel Latif Moussa, the spiritual leader of this group, declared the creation of an Islamic Emirate in the Palestinian territories, while condemning the ruling 25

  From: РИА “Новости”. 19.12.2006.

26

  From: РИА “Новости”. 25.06.2007.

27

  From: РИА “Новости”. 10.07.2007.

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Hamas for its alleged failure to implement Sharia law and for acting almost like a secular government. Following armed clashes, Hamas managed to neutralize the activity of the jihadists, and their spiritual leader Sheikh Moussa was killed. Hamas is classified as a terrorist organization by Canada, the European Union, Israel, Japan, and the United States. The organization is banned in Jordan, Australia, and the United Kingdom. At the same time, numerous countries have maintained diplomatic ties with Hamas in various forms. Whereas most Western countries were dissatisfied with the victory of Hamas in the Palestinian legislative election, Russia announced its willingness to establish contact with it, explaining this decision with the fact that the movement had come to power through democratic means, and stressing the desire of the Russian government to cooperate with all the structures that are working towards establishing peace in the region. The US, which considers Hamas to be a terrorist organization, reacted rather coldly to Russia’s overtures, while expressing its hope that Moscow would send Hamas a clear signal about the necessity of recognizing Israel and halting violence. Among Western countries, it was France which expressed the strongest support for Russia’s policy towards Hamas. French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin said that he hoped the Russian contacts with Hamas would “lead to evolution in the positions of ‘Hamas’ and promote progress in the Middle East.” Incidentally, the website of Hamas reacted in a similar way to Russia’s willingness to engage in dialogue: “On the international political stage, Russia’s important move is comparable to the time when the West opened its doors to the Palestine Liberation Organization, which had previously been considered ‘terrorist.’”28 The visit to Moscow by a Hamas delegation in 2006 failed to achieve the desired results. However, it would be wrong to call Russia’s attempt to establish contact with the winners of the Palestinian election a complete failure. We should keep in mind that no one actually expected the talks in Moscow to bear immediate fruit. Regardless of the outcome of the negotiations, this initiative was meant to cement Russia’s role as a player in the Middle East peace process. It showed Moscow’s willingness not to back Hamas into a corner and not 28

  Translated from: http://www.palestine-info.ru/code/AFF/aff.php?id=8479&categuorie=3.

Palestine: From left-Wing nationalism to islamism

to exacerbate its international isolation (which would only radicalize it further), trying instead to turn it into a participant in the peace process and to aid “the gradual transformation of ‘Hamas’ into a political party that is oriented towards the development of democratic civil institutions and towards enforcing the rule of law in the Palestinian territories.” Furthermore, this policy confirmed Russia’s unique position as a cosponsor of the Middle East peace process, taking into consideration its diplomatic ties with virtually all the participants in the conflict (Israel on the one hand; Syria, Iran, and, in this case, Hamas—on the other). Despite its lack of leverage over Hamas, Russia created an opportunity to become a mediator between this Palestinian movement and other interested parties. To a certain extent, Russia was competing for this role with Turkey, whose Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, did not deny the possibility that, after the victory of Hamas in the Palestinian election, Turkey would assume the role of mediator between Israel and Hamas. However, Russia appears better suited to the role of an equidistant mediator, due to Turkey’s governing Islamist political party. The contacts with Hamas were also supposed to improve Russia’s image in the Islamic world, and it must be said that this outcome was achieved to a certain extent. We can agree with the claim that “Putin’s practical offers to become a mediator in the dialogue between ‘Hamas’ (Palestine) or ‘Hezbollah’ (Lebanon) and the international community that calls itself the ‘anti-terror coalition’—would turn Russia into a convenient geopolitical ally of those Islamic states that have traditionally avoided relying on US support. […] It is quite probable that the sympathy of the Islamic world will not bring any tangible benefit, and yet it cannot be doubted that this ‘friendship’ strengthens Russia’s position.” 29 As for the practical benefit of Russia’s ties with Hamas, we can safely claim that, among other things, they played a positive role during the evacuation of Russian citizens (as well as citizens of other CIS states) from the Gaza Strip after the outbreak of the armed conflict between Fatah and Hamas in the summer of 2007. The complete rift between Hamas and the followers of Mahmoud Abbas was a net gain for the head of the Palestinian National Authority, since it allowed him to break out of the international isolation that had been imposed on the Palestinian government after the victory of Hamas. Abbas 29

  Мухин А.А. Тайный правитель. М.: ЦПИ, 2007. С. 42.

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managed to enlist the moral and material support of foreign countries, including Israel, which were willing to engage in dialogue with a Palestinian Authority that did not include Hamas members. However, this approach entails great danger for the pro-Fatah Palestinian Authority, lending it a collaborationist and capitulationist image in the eyes of the Arab and Muslim street—especially in contrast to the principled, “patriotic” stance of Hamas. Following the success of Hamas in the 2006 election, numerous analysts predicted the softening of the movement’s radical positions and its gradual transition from a marginal organization to the political mainstream (this was also the intent behind Russia’s diplomatic overtures, which were aimed at keeping Hamas within the limits of the Middle East dialogue). These predictions were inspired by the example of the PLO—an organization that originally refused to recognize Israel’s right to exist and was willing to engage in terrorism, yet ultimately managed to transform into a participant in the peace process. In the case of Hamas, such a transformation has not yet happened. And, according to numerous politicians and observers, it cannot happen by definition—at least, not in the foreseeable future. Moreover, the uncompromising attitude toward Hamas (which is, in its turn, justified by the uncompromising nature of Hamas itself) on the part of Israel and the West serves only to radicalize and marginalize the movement, while also cementing the reputation of Hamas as a principled enemy of the “Zionist Entity” in certain segments of the Arab and Muslim world. The summer of 2007 was marked not only by an intra-Palestinian crisis which brought the territories to the brink of civil war, but also by a virtual schism within the Palestinian Authority, splitting it into the Gaza Strip, where Hamas took power, and the West Bank, which remained under the control of Fatah. The old rivalry between the two major Palestinian factions acquired a territorial expression, leading not only to the secession of part of the Palestinian Authority and the de-facto existence of two governments (both of which claim to be the rightful rulers of the Palestinians), but also to an attempt to create a virtual Islamist mini-state within the Gaza Strip, dubbed “Hamastan” by the world media.30 (Although the Hamas Prime 30

  The term “Hamastan” was first used in 2005 during an interview with Mahmoud az-Zahar, one of the founders of Hamas, who declared the creation of such a state

Palestine: From left-Wing nationalism to islamism

Minister Ismail Haniyeh claimed that Hamas was not interested in creating its own state in the Gaza Strip: “We shall not create a state separate from the other Palestinian territories. We will not accept a Palestinian state that will not include the Gaza Strip, but at the same time we will not create a state that will not include the West Bank.”31) Regardless of how future events play out, it is obvious that the consequences of the Palestinian “civil war” of 2007 will have a lasting impact on the situation in the entire region. The reconciliation agreement signed between Hamas and Fatah in 2011 is unlikely to radically change the situation in the near future, and the difference between the two largest Palestinian factions in terms of their approach to the Middle East settlement makes this reconciliation highly unstable.

to be the goal of his movement. See: http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/html/final/eng/eng_n/ hamastan_e.htm. 31

  Translated from: http://www.newsru.com/world/19aug2007/xamas.html.

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The Islamic Revolution: The Export Version

One of the events of the last quarter of the twentieth century that managed to transform Islamic fundamentalism into a powerful political force all over the Muslim world, from Morocco to Malaysia, was the Islamic Revolution in Iran. “Especially after the 444-day seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran by supporters of the new regime, coupled with the Carter Administration’s failed rescue attempt, the first successful Islamic revolution in modern times became an inspiration for radicals and invoked fear among Sunni rulers throughout the Muslim world. Suddenly, a group of believers were able to take the reins of their country, oust the secularized government, and build an Islamic state with the clerical class as the leadership. Although the new Iranian regime was Shiite, this demonstrated to the Sunni jihadists that a religiously based political leadership could gain power.”1 In January 1978, the first major anti-Shah demonstrations took place in Iran. Strikes and political protests virtually paralyzed the country during the second half of 1978. In mid-January 1979, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi left the country, and two weeks later Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini made his triumphant return to Tehran from exile to the cheers of millions of Iranians. Following the defeat of the Shah loyalists by supporters of the revolution, a national referendum was held, as a result of which Iran was officially declared an Islamic Republic on April 1, 1979. Ayatollah Khomeini characterized the first transitional government that was set up after the overthrow of the monarchy in the following way: “This is not an 1

  Devin R. Springer, James L. Regens, and David N. Edger, Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009), 22.

The Islamic Revolution: The Export Version

ordinary government. It is a government based on the Sharia. Opposing this government means opposing the Sharia of Islam...Revolt against God’s government is a revolt against God. Revolt against God is blasphemy.”2 In December 1979, the country adopted a theocratic constitution, which installed Khomeini as the Supreme Leader of Iran. This turn of events took many uninformed people (especially those living outside Iran) completely by surprise. In the West, Iran had a reputation for being an “island of stability” in the turbulent Middle East. There were no external signs of a revolutionary situation brewing in Iran—i.e. there was no military defeat of Iran, no financial crisis, no peasant revolts or protests by disgruntled military officers. At the moment of the revolution, the ruling regime possessed well-equipped military and professional security services. And yet, the revolutionary flood swept them all away. One possible explanation for the success of the revolution lies in the fact that the Shah’s regime was anticipating danger from the wrong direction. Khomeini’s Islamist movement was perceived as a lesser threat in comparison to Marxists and Islamic socialists (such as the procommunist Tudeh Party, the Fadā’iyān guerilla fighters, the People’s Muja- hedin, etc.). The Islamic Revolution was the logical outcome of a lengthy historical process whose roots lie deep in the national and religious traditions of Iran. The Shiite clergy had considerable influence on many religious and traditionally-minded Iranians—those who were opposed to the process of westernization. As a result of Shiite traditions, religion in Iran always slipped away from government control. The role of the Iranian Islamic clergy in the confrontation with the monarchy became apparent long before Khomeini’s rise to prominence. The clergy were deeply involved in the so-called Tobacco Protest (1891), which resulted in the cancellation of an unpopular concession granted by the Shah’s government to a British company, giving it a monopoly over the tobacco trade in Persia. During that protest, the cleric Sayyid Mohammed Hassan Shirazi gained great popularity, becoming virtually the first Iranian religious leader to take a stand against a royal policy which was perceived as harmful to the Persian people. It was Shirazi who led the Tobacco Protest, issuing a fatwa that 2

  Quoted from: Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye Nur, vol.5, p.31, trans. Baqer Moin, in Moin B. Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2000), 204.

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forbade the consumption of tobacco in any form—forcing the Shah to cancel the concession in January 1892. Discontent with the Shah’s government among the Muslim clergy grew in the 1930s, when Shah Pahlavi’s father, Reza Shah (who was a former military general), replaced Islamic laws with Western laws and prohibited the wearing of traditional Islamic garments, sex segregation, and the wearing of the hijab by women. Police officers forcefully removed the veils from women who refused to comply with the prohibition on wearing the hijab in public places. In 1935, tens of people were killed and hundreds were injured when Reza Shah ordered his troops to suppress an uprising by angry Shiites at the holiest Shiite shrine in Iran. In 1941, Reza Shah was forced to abdicate in favor of his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, as a result of the invasion of Iran by Soviet and British forces. In 1953, foreign powers (Britain and the US) came to the Shah’s aid once again. After the Shah fled the country, the CIA (with the help of the British MI6) orchestrated a coup which resulted in the overthrow of the democratically elected government of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh. Shah Pahlavi kept a close relationship with the US government. Like his father’s regime, Shah Pahlavi’s rule was characterized by autocracy, an emphasis on modernization and westernization, and scorn for religion. Even the American advisors urged the Shah to be more cautious and pay more attention to religious matters. But, in the words of the well-known international Arab journalist Mohamed Heikal, the Shah gradually came to believe that he had “a mission to civilize the Iranian people.”3 Former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright wrote that “The Shah proved himself both rigidly autocratic and an enthusiastic modernizer.”4 This peculiar combination of traits aroused sharp criticism of the Shah from both the right and the left. Opposition groups from all over the political spect- rum—left-wing, nationalist, and Islamist—criticized the Shah’s government for violating Iran’s constitution, political corruption, and repression by the SAVAK. The lack of democratic institutions in Iran led to the radicalization of opposition sentiments in different segments of society, including 3

  Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, The Return of the Ayatollah: The Iranian Revolution from Mossadeq to Khomeini (London: Deutsch, 1981), 41.

4

  Madeleine Albright, The Mighty and the Almighty: Reflections on America, God, and World Affairs (New York: Harper Perenial, 2007), 38.

The Islamic Revolution: The Export Version

among university students. “Student radicalism in Iran drew on two main ideological sources: Marxism in its various forms, and a movement within Islam that came to be called socialist Shiism.”5. For most of the population, the students’ radical discourse remained alien and incomprehensible. Because of this intellectual rift, several young Iranian Marxists began to project all the messianic expectations of communists and Third World nations onto revolutionary Shiism. One of the most notable representatives of this movement was Ali Shariati, whose fame and influence among Shiites had no equivalent in the Sunni world. Socialist Shiites regarded the death of Imam Hussein at the hands of the Umayyad Sunni caliph in the seventh century as analogous to the repression of the Iranian people by the Shah in the twentieth century. In 1963, the future leader of the Iranian revolution Ruhollah Khomeini began his ascension to fame. At that time, he led the opposition to the Shah’s White Revolution. This name refers to a series of reforms aimed at limiting large landholdings (including those belonging to religious institutions), extending the right to vote to women and granting women equality in marriage, in addition to allowing members of religious minorities to serve in government positions. Khomeini was arrested after denouncing the Shah as a “wretched, miserable man” who had “embarked on the destruction of Islam in Iran.” His arrest led to three days of riots all over Iran, with multiple casualties among the demonstrators. Khomeini was released after eight months of house arrest and continued his propaganda, condemning the close cooperation between the Tehran regime and Israel and the extension of diplomatic immunity to American government personnel in Iran. In November 1964, Khomeini was re-arrested and sent into exile, where he remained for 14 years until the revolution. During his exile, Ruhollah Khomeini managed to establish a permanent channel of communication with his Iranian audience, distributing propaganda tapes and videocassettes—and this propaganda turned out to be far more effective than all the attempts by the Shah’s government to stabilize the situation in Iran. In his sermons, the rebellious Ayatollah called upon the army and the people to “forge Islamic solidarity” and encouraged soldiers to desert. Khomeini developed his ideology of 5

  Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, trans. Anthony F. Roberts (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 107.

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velayat-e faqih (which he had previously formulated during his stay in the Iraqi city of Najaf), in which the Islamic state is ruled by authoritative Islamic scholars and jurists (faqihs). This system of government by Islamic jurists was popularized among the Khomeinist student network, former students, and traditional business leaders in Iran, who became exposed to Khomeini’s ideas by reading his book Islamic Government (Hokumat-i Islami), attending sermons in mosques, and listening to his speeches on audiocassettes. According to Khomeini’s theory, Islamic government takes the form of a republic under the rule of a faqih, whose authority is enshrined in the constitution in the form of the “velayat-e faqih” principle and other Islamic tenets. The Vali-ye faqih is the supreme interpreter of the divine laws. At the same time, he has ultimate control over the secular government, the army, and the security forces. Only God and the “Hidden Imam” (the Mahdi) are placed above him. The anti-Shah revolution in Iran was an ambiguous and multifaceted phenomenon. It was partially populist and nationalist, and later ShiiteIslamist. To a certain extent, it was a conservative reaction against the Shah’s attempts at secularization and westernization, in addition to being a reaction against the prevailing social injustice and other flaws of the repressive and corrupt old regime. Khomeini worked on unifying the various anti-Shah opposition groups under his banner (except for the undesirable “godless” Marxists), focusing the people’s attention on the socio-economic problems of the Shah’s regime (corruption, income inequality, etc.), while avoiding specific issues which might have fragmented the opposition into numerous camps (in particular, questions related to his project of clerical rule). We agree with the claim that “This Islamist victory was made possible by Khomeini’s extraordinary ability to unify the various components, religious and secular, of a movement whose single point of departure was hatred of the Shah and his government.”6. According to one researcher, “The Iranian revolution is the only Islamist movement in which the clergy played a decisive role, but it was also the most apparently ideological one: a Third World revolutionary movement generated by an extraordinary alliance between a radical intelligentsia and a fundamentalist clergy.”7 6

  Ibid., 112.

7

  M. H. Syed, Islamic Terrorism: Myth or Reality, vol. 2 (Dehli: Kalpaz Publications, 2002), 111.

The Islamic Revolution: The Export Version

Nevertheless, there was an anticlerical trend in Iranian Islamism that contested the clergy’s religious monopoly; this tendency was embodied in the thinker Ali Shariati and in extremist factions such as the People’s Mujahidin (Mujahidin-e Khalq), but it was rejected by the opposition as soon as revolutionary institutions were set up.8 The Iranian revolution resulted in the establishment of theocratic rule in the country—in other words, Khomeini’s concept of “velayat-e faqih” became a practical reality. The fact that the monarchy of the Shah was replaced by Islamist forces led by Khomeini, rather than by other ideologies and leaders, can be partially explained by the popularity of the Shiite version of the Islamic Renaissance, which is opposed to westernization. On the other hand, part of the explanation for this victory may lie in the fact that Khomeini’s Islamist movement was underestimated—not only by the Shah (who regarded it as a lesser threat than the Marxists and the Islamic socialists), but also by the secular opponents of the Shah’s regime, who thought that the Khomeinists could be sidelined after the downfall of the monarchy. The victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 had an enormous impact—not only on the internal life of Iranian society and on the balance of power in the region, but, rather, it had global repercussions, impacting the entire Islamic world, as well as the non-Islamic one. It was precisely this revolution that transformed the concept of political Islam into a real player on the global stage. The Iranian revolution expanded beyond the boundaries of a local and regional event. It did not signify a mere change in the form of government in one particular country. The Islamic Revolution turned into a model of global importance. This transformation was largely aided by the fact that Ruhollah Khomeini had never been a leader with local ambitions—he addressed his audience not as a Shiite Ayatollah, nor as an Iranian, but as an Islamic leader speaking to all the Muslim faithful. “We must strive to export our revolution throughout the world, and must abandon all idea of not doing so, for not only does Islam refuse to recognize any difference between Muslim countries, it is the champion of all oppressed people… We must make plain our stance toward the powers and superpowers and demonstrate to them despite the arduous problems that burden us. Our 8

  Ibid., 112.

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attitude to the world is dictated by our beliefs,” as Ayatollah Khomeini said in a speech in March 1980.9 Khomeini regarded Islam as something whole and indivisible, stressing the impossibility of separating religion from politics, and spoke about Islam as an international force. The Ayatollah condemned any government in the Muslim world that abandoned the tenets of the Qur’an. Khomeini claimed that the concept of the separation between religion and political activity was being promoted by imperialists, who wanted to make people think that religion was just a matter of ideology. The Islamic Republic’s claim to be an example for all the Muslims of the world to return to the basic principles of their faith and to confront the West largely reflects the peculiar traits of Shiism. “Starting with the notion that, many centuries ago, the Shiites were a minority within Islam, persecuted for the unique knowledge that was available only to them, they later branded all secular governments as illegitimate. For this reason, legitimacy can be obtained only through accepting the Islamic law…according to this doctrine, as soon as Iran has begun the process of expiating its sins before God by creating a truly Islamic state, this state must become the defender of oppressed and persecuted peoples all over the world.” At the same time, R. Sikoyev claims that Khomeini’s doctrine of “exporting the Islamic revolution” was based upon Jamal al-Din al-Afghani’s classical ideological formulation of pan-Islamism. Khomeini, like al-Afghani before him, drew his ideas from the Qur’anic suras that declare all Muslims to be brothers [the Qur’an, 49:10 (10); 3:98-103]. For this reason, Khomeini constantly repeated that “the invitation to Islam is equivalent to a call for unity” and that “all the Muslims in the world are brothers by Qur’anic decree, and brothers are equal to each other.”10 At its initial stage, the Islamic revolution in Iran, being a truly dynamic and revolutionary Islamic movement, aroused great sympathy among opponents of authoritarian regimes all over the Muslim world, since it demonstrated the ability of a movement consisting of various segments of society to overthrow a powerful regime that was supported by the world’s major superpower (the US). In the words of Gilles Kepel, “Through 9

  Quoted from: Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 89-90.

10

  Сикоев Р.Р. Панисламизм: История и современность. М., 2010. С. 155-156.

The Islamic Revolution: The Export Version

Khomeini, the example of the Iranian revolution convinced many observers that Islam had supplanted nationalism as the principal factor in the political, social, and cultural identity of certain countries.”11 Khomeini preached that rebellion—and, especially, martyrdom—against injustice and tyranny was an integral part of Shiite Islam, and that Muslims must reject the influence of both liberal capitalism and communism. (This is the origin of the slogan “Neither East nor West: Islamic Republic!”) The Islamic revolution was also notable in the way it helped many politically active Muslims to overcome their feelings of inferiority before the West (such feelings were a common legacy of colonialism) by giving them an example of a mass movement of Muslims fighting against imperialist influence. Despite the enormous resonance of the Iranian Islamic revolution all over the Muslim world, the hopes of the Iranian ayatollahs and mullahs about instigating a global Islamic revolution did not come true. The period immediately following the Islamic revolution was marked by obvious attempts by Tehran to export the revolution into Middle Eastern countries. The influence of the Iranian revolution “was felt most strongly among the Shi’a of neighboring countries: Iraq, the Gulf States, Afghanistan, and Lebanon.”12 For a certain period of time, radical Shiite groups inspired by the Iranian example (such as the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, the Organization of the Islamic Revolution in the Arabian Peninsula, and the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq) were indeed a major source of worry for the governments of neighboring Arab states. The influence of Khomeinist ideas was not limited to Shiite organizations: for instance, the anti-imperialist and anti-Western rhetoric of the ideologues of the Islamic republic found an enthusiastic audience among the Sunni radicals of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. In the Arab Middle East, the Khomeinist revolutionary enthusiasm was a major factor in the Islamization of the conflicts in Palestine and Lebanon. As R. Sikoyev notes, “The example of Iran—where mosques became bastions of the opposition to the Shah’s regime, and the mullahs managed to become leaders of the revolutionary masses—became very attractive 11

  Kepel, 118.

12

  Vanessa Martin, Creating an Islamic State: Khomeini and the Making of a New Iran (New York: Taurus, 2000), 188.

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to radical segments of the Islamic clergy. It led to the intensification of their activity in the Muslim world, opening up new possibilities for the realization of their old dream—the unification of religion and politics (in other words, ultimate political power).”13 Undoubtedly, echoes of the Iranian revolution managed to reach the Muslim population of the Soviet Union and influence it to some de- gree—particularly the Muslim communities of the Caucasus and Central Asia. According to several Western authors, “Several aspects of the Iranian revolution arouse particularly strong sympathy in the younger generation of Muslim intellectuals and in the numerous ‘religious fanatics’ of the Caucasian region [this term refers both to the Soviet South Caucasus and the North Caucasus—authors’ note] (i.e. members of the Sufi orders). The ‘antiimperialist’ aspect of the Iranian Revolution is one of them. It is easy to draw a parallel between the ‘foreign imperialism’ of the Americans in Iran and the ‘imperialism’ of the Russians in the Caucasus and in Central Asia.”14 At the same time, the Iranian revolutionary model met with resistance on the part of the ruling elites in most Muslim countries. The widespread fear of the Iranian model among the governments of Arab states led them to intensify the religious rhetoric and increase the role of the Islamic clergy in everyday life in their countries. Tehran’s attempts to become a key player in the Muslim world aroused strong opposition, especially on the part of Saudi Arabia, which had been the dominant religious force in the Muslim world since the early 1970s (after the founding of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the oil boom caused by the Arab-Israeli war in October 1973). “But after 1979, the new masters in Iran considered themselves the true standard-bearers of Islam, despite their minority status as Shiites. As far as they were concerned, the leaders in Riyadh were usurpers who sold oil to the West in exchange for military protection—a retrograde, conservative monarchy with a façade of ostentatious piety.”15 The battle for supremacy in the Muslim world between the revolutionary Iran and the Wahhabi Saudi Arabia did not go in Tehran’s favor, with Iran’s opponents constantly emphasizing the Shiite and Persian character of the 13

  Сикоев Р.Р. Панисламизм: История и современность. М., 2010. С. 162.

14

  Alexandre Bennigsen, and Marie Broxup, The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State (London: Croom Helm, 1983), 115.

15

  Kepel, 119.

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Islamic Revolution. The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), in which Saddam Hussein’s secular regime received massive aid from conservative regimes, signaled the end of Iran’s attempts to become a dominant force in the Sunni Arab world. Moreover, this war showed the folly of Iran’s hopes to start a revolution among the Shiite majority in Iraq, who were ruled by a Sunni (and, moreover, secular) minority. Even before Khomeini’s death, it became apparent that the Islamic and universal message of the Iranian revolution was being eroded by nationalism. The death of Ayatollah Khomeini—an incredibly charismatic leader— was a great blow to Tehran’s ambitions to propagate the Iranian model as an example for the entire Islamic world. “The pan-Shiite aspirations of the Iranian leadership—even when hidden under the guise of pan- Islamism—not only failed to elicit the hoped-for enthusiasm from the majority of the Muslim community, but also encountered resistance.”16 Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, the Iranian government has been blamed by many states for supporting terrorism, including financial support, supplying weapons, training, and granting asylum to extremist groups. In particular, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard is suspected of maintaining ties with various clandestine organizations active in the Middle East. The US State Department claims that this organization is supporting Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, in addition to training terrorists who support the Palestinian Resistance. Furthermore, the Pasdarans are suspected of aiding the Shiite rebels in southern Iraq. In September 2007, the US Senate voted to include the Iranian Revolutionary Guard in the list of terrorist organizations. From the point of view of the US State Department, Iran continues to be “the world’s most active state sponsor of terrorism.” According to Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of State in George W. Bush’s administration (2006), “Iran has been the country that has been in many ways a kind of central banker for terrorism in important regions like Lebanon through Hezbollah in the Middle East, in the Palestinian Territories, and we have deep concerns about what Iran is doing in the south of Iraq.”17

16

  Сикоев Р.Р. Панисламизм: История и современность. М., 2010. С. 163.

17

  Greg Bruno, “State Sponsors: Iran,”Council on Foreign Relations, October 7, 2010, http://www.cfr.org/publication/9362/.

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Despite the frequent portrayal of Iran as virtually the greatest sponsor of international terrorism, the degree of its influence (primarily ideological influence) on Islamist radicals is relatively small, being limited mostly to Shiite groups, the most important of which is the Lebanese Hezbollah. The Palestinian Sunni Islamist Hamas is also influenced by Iran to a certain extent (however, this influence appears to be quite limited from an ideological point of view). It would not be an exaggeration to say that the aid provided by Iran to various extremist groups is motivated largely by geopolitical and foreign policy considerations, rather than by religion or ideology. Although we admit that Iran is sponsoring several radical groups in the Middle East, we cannot ignore the fact that Iran itself has been the victim of Islamic terrorism. In particular, the Sunni group Jundallah (Soldiers of Allah) has been waging an anti-Iranian guerilla campaign in the Balochi regions. According to some reports, it has ties to Al-Qaeda. *** The Middle Eastern country most strongly affected by the Iranian revolution was not Palestine (although the events in Iran were a source of inspiration for Palestinian proponents of jihad), but rather Lebanon, where the revolution was a major factor in the rise of a local political group. This group was Hezbollah. In August 2006, a conflict broke out in the Middle East—a conflict which some experts hastened to describe as “the sixth Arab-Israeli war.” The Israel Defense Forces launched strikes on Lebanese territory, while rockets were fired from Lebanon on Israeli cities. At that time, all the official representatives of Israel insisted that Israel was waging war not against Lebanon, but only against the Hezbollah movement. In a short period of time, Hezbollah grew from a small and weak Shiite movement whose influence had been limited to local Lebanese politics into an actor on the global stage, while remaining a major political force within Lebanon. The specific character of Hezbollah as a regional actor is determined by the geopolitical features of Lebanon—in particular, its close proximity to Syria and Israel. One of the slogans used by Hezbollah to justify its attacks on Israel since 2000 is the liberation of a small Israeli-occupied area which is disputed between Lebanon and Syria (the so-called Shebaa farms).

The Islamic Revolution: The Export Version

Another factor that determines the role of Hezbollah (both in Lebanese politics and in geopolitical processes in the entire Middle East) is the specific demographic structure of Lebanon, its religious make-up, and the peculiar features of its political system. Lebanon occupies a unique place in the Middle East and in the Arab world by virtue of its multi-denominational character and the high percentage of Christians in its population (although the Christian population is gradually decreasing in comparison with the Muslim population). In the census of 1932, Christians constituted 55% of the population (with the Maronites constituting 29% of that). Currently, according to the CIA World Factbook, Muslims comprise the majority of Lebanon’s population (approximately 60%). In the 1990s, approximately 35% of the population was Shiite, and by now they have become Lebanon’s largest denomination. However, the country continues to maintain the old system of allocating senior government posts, which no longer corresponds to the current religious make-up of Lebanese society: the post of president may be held only by a Maronite Christian, the post of Prime Minister may be held only by a Sunni Muslim, whereas a Shiite may only be the Speaker of the parliament. Such a system is unlikely to satisfy the desires of the growing Shiite population of Lebanon, which is slowly transforming from a religious minority into the largest religious community in the country. The Shiites have traditionally been the poorest community in Lebanon, not counting the Palestinian refugees. Furthermore, compared to the other large religious denominations, the Shiites have fewer options when it comes to immigration (whereas the Christian Lebanese have extensive ties with Europe, the US, and Latin America; and the Sunnis, who constitute the majority in the Arab world, can easily immigrate to virtually any Arab country). Traditionally, the Shiite community in Lebanon has been characterized by a low level of political organization. The political awakening of the Lebanese Shiites was related to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the Islamic Revolution in Iran. However, it should be noted that the roots of Shiite Islamism in Lebanon lie not in Iran, but in Iraq, where a Shiite religious and political revival took place in the 1960s in the circles of learning (hawzat al-’ilmiya) in An-Najaf, which were led by the charismatic Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir as-Sadr. These circles became the epicenter of Shiite activism and the home base of the Party of Islamic Call (Hizb ad-Da’wa al-Islamiya), which propagated a revivalist message calling for

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a revolutionary transformation of society among Shiite communities in Iraq, Iran, the Persian Gulf, and Lebanon.18 The victory of the Islamists in Iran became a model for emulation among radicals in other countries with significant Shiite populations—particularly in Iraq and Lebanon. The thinking of Lebanese Shiites (especially those who were members of militarized groups) was particularly influenced by the traditional Shiite concept of victory in defeat, in addition to the notion that rule and domination can come only through “the messengers of Allah.”19 The Israeli occupation of South Lebanon led to an exodus of Shiites to the north and enabled the rise of militarized groups like Amal and Hezbollah. The existence of these militias increased the importance of the role played by the Shiite community in the central regions of Lebanon, especially by the end of the Lebanese Civil War. The Shiites were traditionally concentrated in the rural southern regions, but large numbers of them also lived in the southern suburbs of Beirut (until recently, those suburbs were known as the “poverty belt”), which were controlled by Hezbollah and by the Amal movement. Therefore, some of the major factors in the emergence of Hezbollah as a political actor on the Middle Eastern stage were: the legacy of the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1991), the Israeli intervention and the entry of a multinational force into Lebanon (in 1982), and the export of the Iranian model of the Islamic Revolution. Hezbollah is an extremely multifaceted phenomenon. It is not merely a terrorist organization or a guerilla group. Rather, it is a complex mixture, “a terrorist group, a guerilla movement, a proxy for Iran and Syria to use against Israel, the champion of Lebanon’s Shi'a Muslim community, a leading Lebanese political force, and even a builder of hospitals and schools.”20 Currently, Hezbollah is one of the two major organizations representing the interests of the Lebanese Shiite community, and the only 18

  A. Nizar Hamzeh, “Islamism in Lebanon: A Guide,” The Middle East Review of International Affairs 1, no. 3, (September 1997).

19

  Фон Эрффа В. Террористический Интернационал // Международная политика. 15.05.2003 . № 5.

20

  Daniel Byman, “Hezbollah’s Dilemma,” Foreignaffairs.org, author update, April 13, 2005, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050413faupdate84277/daniel-byman/ hezbollah-s-dilemma.html

The Islamic Revolution: The Export Version

militarized Shiite organization. It is represented in the Lebanese parliament (more than 10% of the seats in the parliament belong to Hezbollah members, and the Resistance and Development bloc, created by Hezbollah in coalition with other organizations, holds 27.3% of the seats). Despite the opposition of the Cedar Revolution, Hezbollah won 23 parliament seats in the 2005 election (instead of the 8 seats which it had held previously). Two ministers in the Lebanese government are Hezbollah members; another minister is supported by the movement. Hezbollah implements large-scale social programs and is responsible for many projects which develop the economy and infrastructure of Lebanon. The major source of funding for these programs is, presumably, Iran. It should be noted that the Lebanese Shiites originally regarded the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 as an opportunity to be rid of Arafat’s Palestine Liberation Organization. However, they soon turned against the invaders—this happened when Israel started to prevent the Shiites from accessing the markets in the north of Lebanon and in neighboring countries. This lack of access had a very negative impact on the social situation and on local economic interests.21 In July 1982, a group of Iranian Revolutionary Guards (the so-called pasdarans) traveled from Iran to the Beqaa valley in Lebanon. They joined Hussein Musawi’s radical Islamic Amal group. This organization had split from Amal—the largest Lebanese Shiite organization at the time. Within a few months, Musawi’s group—together with some other organizations, including a group of the Islamic Jihad which was based in the region of Baalbek—formed the pro-Iranian Hezbollah party—the Party of Allah. This name was taken from the fifth sura of the Qur’an (Al-Ma’ida): “Whoever takes Allah and His apostle and those who believe for a guardian, then surely the party of Allah are they that shall be triumphant.”22 The spiritual leader of the movement was the pro-Iranian Shiite cleric, poet, and writer Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, whose 1976 book Islam and the Logic of Force has become one of the seminal texts of radical Shiite thought. Fadlallah, being a spiritual leader, was outside the command 21

  Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 3rd ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 284.

22

  Tranlated by M. H. Shakir.

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structure of Hezbollah. Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah became the movement’s secretary general. Hezbollah was officially formed on February 16, 1985, when the spokesman of the organization, Sheikh Ibrahim al-Amin, read the group’s manifesto in the Al-Ouzai mosque in West Beirut. This manifesto detailed the goals and political program of Hezbollah. Afterwards, it was published as an “open letter to all the oppressed in Lebanon and the World.” According to this political program, the best way to solve Lebanon’s problems is the establishment of an Islamic republic, since it is the only type of regime that can guarantee justice and equality for all the citizens of Lebanon. “We are an ummah which adheres to the message of Islam. We want all the oppressed to be able to study the divine message in order to bring justice, peace and tranquility to the world. This is why we don’t want to impose Islam upon anybody…We don’t want Islam to reign in Lebanon by force as is the case with the Maronites today”—reads the Hezbollah manifesto.23 Later, the theses of staging an Islamic revolution in Lebanon and transforming a multi-denominational country into an Islamic state of the Iranian type were pushed into the background. In accordance with the concepts of the “big Satan” and the “small Satan” (referring, respectively, to the US and the Soviet Union) that were used by the ideologues of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hezbollah declared in its manifesto that “We reject both the USSR and the US, both Capitalism and Communism, for both are incapable of laying the foundations for a just society.”24 The typical ideological constructs of Hezbollah divide the world into oppressors and oppressed. Obviously, the first category includes the members of the Islamic Ummah (without stressing the Shia-Sunni divide, but emphasizing the leadership of Iran). The category of oppressor consists of the countries of the Western world (primarily the US and its outpost in the Middle East—Israel). The conflict with Israel was accorded a central role in the ideology of the Party of Allah, and this conflict was not limited to the presence of the Israel Defense Forces in Lebanon. The movement’s declared goal is the destruction of the State of Israel and the establishment of Muslim rule 23

  “An Open Letter: The Hizballah Program,” International Institute for CounterTerrorism, http://www.ict.org.il/articles/Hiz_letter.htm.

24

  Ibid.

The Islamic Revolution: The Export Version

over Jerusalem.25 This anti-Israeli ideology has remained relevant for the entire history of the movement. To this day, Hezbollah regards Israel as an illegitimate state and continues to call for the destruction of the “Zionist Entity.” Here are some illustrative quotes by the Hezbollah secretary general, Sheikh Nasrallah: “Israel is an illegitimate, usurping entity, based on falsehood, murder, and illusions”; “There is no other solution to the conflict in this region except the disappearance of Israel.” In an interview with the Washington Post in 2000, Sheikh Nasrallah declared: “I am against any reconciliation with Israel. I do not even recognize the presence of a state that is called ‘Israel.’ I consider its presence both unjust and unlawful. That is why if Lebanon concludes a peace agreement with Israel and brings that accord to the Parliament our deputies will reject it; Hezbollah refuses any conciliation with Israel in principle.”26 The occupation of the Shebaa farms by Israel (as well as the fact that several Lebanese prisoners are held in Israeli jails) is the most common formal pretext used by Hezbollah fighters to justify their attacks against Israel. However, Hassan Ezzedin, an official spokesman for Hezbollah, clearly expressed the movement’s point of view on Israel in the following words: “if they go from Shebaa, we won’t stop fighting them. Our goal is to liberate the 1948 borders of Palestine…[the Jews]…can go back to Germany or wherever they came from.”27 Soon after its creation, Hezbollah gained notoriety through a series of massive terrorist attacks, which led to a noticeable shift in the balance of power in the Middle Eastern (and Lebanese) conflict. A week after an incident in which two Shiites were killed in a confrontation between Israeli troops and a Shiite crowd (this happened during the Shiite Day of Ashurah celebration in the city of Nabatieh in south Lebanon on October 16, 1983), a massive terrorist attack took place in Beirut on October 23, in which a suicide bomber detonated a truck bomb near the American Marine 25

  Ibid.

26

  Quoted from: “Said Hassan Nasrallah Q&A: What Hezbollah Will Do,” The Washington Post, February 20, 2000, http://www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/hzblhnsr.htm.

27

  Quoted from: Jeffery Goldberg, “In The Party Of God. Are Terrorists in Lebanon Preparing for a Larger War?,” The New Yorker, October 14, 2002, http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/021014fa_fact4.

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barracks (killing 241 people). At about the same time, a building housing French paratroopers from the Multinational Force in Lebanon was bombed (killing 58 soldiers). Ten days later, a car bomb was detonated at the Israel Defense Forces headquarters in Tyre (killing 29 Israeli soldiers). These massive suicide attacks led not only to the withdrawal of the multinational peacekeeping force from Lebanon, they also made an indelible impression both on world public opinion and on terrorist groups all over the world (primarily in Islamic countries). Lebanon witnessed about 50 suicide attacks in the time period between 1983 and 1999. The Shiite Hezbollah and “Amal” movements were responsible for approximately half of them. Impressed by the effectiveness of the Hezbollah attacks that led to the withdrawal of Western forces from Lebanon, other extremist groups (whose ideology was nationalist rather than religious) decided to adopt similar tactics. However, the most important consequence of these terrorist acts by Hezbollah was the transformation of suicide bombing into a new trend for terrorist groups in the region—the typical Shiite concept of martyrdom and sacrifice resonated well among Sunni Islamists. After the withdrawal of Western forces from Lebanon, Hezbollah aimed its suicide attacks against Israeli troops and the “South Lebanon Army.” Ultimately, these attacks played an important role in the withdrawal of Israeli forces from most of the occupied Lebanese territory in February 1985 (the occupation zone was limited to a narrow strip of land in the south of Lebanon termed the Israeli Security Zone). Although the number of suicide attacks by Hezbollah decreased over time (down to an average frequency of less than one attack per year), these acts of terror spread beyond the borders of Lebanon, the Middle East, and even the Eastern hemisphere. In 1992, to avenge the death of Hezbollah leader Abbas al-Musawi in an Israeli air strike, the organization carried out a suicide attack on the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires (which killed 29 people); in 1994, Hezbollah carried out another such attack against the building of the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association (in retaliation for an Israeli air strike on a Hezbollah training camp in Lebanon). Hezbollah has an influence on many terrorist organizations in other countries. Occasionally, this influence goes beyond providing a role model. For instance, Hezbollah has been accused of organizing two suicide attacks in Kuwait in 1983 and 1985 (which were attributed to El-Dawa, a Kuwaiti Shiite fundamentalist group). Mustafa Bader-el-Din, a prominent member

The Islamic Revolution: The Export Version

of Hezbollah’s external terror apparatus, was among those arrested and convicted in connection to these bombings.28 In February 1985, because of the hostile global reaction to its policies in Lebanon, Israel withdrew most of its forces from South Lebanon and created a 15-kilometer wide occupation zone. However, the continuing Israeli presence achieved the opposite effect: the attacks on Israeli troops became more frequent, only now they were perpetrated not by PLO guerillas, but by Hezbollah. The attacks carried out by Hezbollah fighters have been described by researchers as “innovative, radically violent. [They] had significant results in the regional and international arenas. They resulted in the departure of the multi-national forces from Beirut, the retreat of the IDF to the Security Zone and Western governments’ ‘surrender’ to Iranian demands in the negotiations for the release of hostages.”29 Changes that took place on the local, regional, and international levels in the late 1980s—early 1990s created several challenges for Hezbollah: the end of the civil war and the strengthening of the Lebanese government, the establishment of Syrian hegemony in Lebanon, and the peace process in the Middle East. The Taif Agreement, which was signed in Taif (Saudi Arabia) in October 1989 and put a formal end to the Lebanese Civil War, was originally rejected by Hezbollah because it guaranteed an equal division of parliament seats between Christians and Muslims, while preventing Shiites from holding the posts of President and Prime Minister of Lebanon. The fact that the military wing of Hezbollah remained armed was a direct violation of the Taif Agreement. The demand to “disband all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias,” as well as the demand that the government “deploy the Lebanese army in the border zone near Israel,” were not fulfilled. The Lebanese government did not even try to disarm Hezbollah, motivating their inaction by the claim that Hezbollah was waging a struggle to liberate the Israeli-occupied areas of South Lebanon. 28

  Yoram Schweitzer, “Suicide Terrorism: Development & Characteristics,” International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=112.

29

  Eitan Azani, “Hizballah: From Revolutionary and Pan-Islamism to Pragmatism and Lebanonization,” International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=563.

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Hezbollah continued its war of attrition against Israel, claiming that it was not a terrorist group, but a “volunteer militia.” When Israel withdrew its forces from the security zone in South Lebanon, Hezbollah troops flooded into the area. To a large extent, it was this event that inspired the Palestinians to launch the Al-Aqsa Intifada. The withdrawal of Israeli troops from South Lebanon in May 2000 was regarded by Hezbollah as a victory. This victory boosted the movement’s popularity—both in the Shiite community and in Lebanese society in general. This popular sentiment was expressed by Emile Lahoud, the President of Lebanon: “For us Lebanese, and I can tell you a majority of Lebanese, Hezbollah is a national resistance movement. If it wasn’t for them, we couldn’t have liberated our land. And because of that, we have big esteem for the Hezbollah movement.”30 However, it should be noted that numerous important Lebanese politicians did not share the enthusiasm for Hezbollah. In particular, many members of Lebanon’s Christian community criticized the movement as extremist and destructive. Saad Hariri and his Sunni bloc spoke in favor of disarming Hezbollah (with certain reservations). In any case, the demand to disarm Hezbollah, which had been voiced repeatedly by the international community, could not be met out of fear that the Lebanese army might not be able to accomplish this task without the consent of Hezbollah itself. In the new conditions that were created following the formal end of the civil war, the movement turned its attention to modifying its own policies in order to be more pragmatic. Hezbollah decided to transform itself from a revolutionary group with universal ambitions (pan-Islamism) into an integral part of the Lebanese political system, aimed at solving the specific problems facing Lebanon. However, this transformation has not affected the willingness of Hezbollah to use violence as the primary means of achieving its political goals. Experts claim that “The Hezbollah movement of 2005 is a pragmatic terror movement far more dangerous than the revolutionary Hezbollah of the 1980’s.”31 30

  Rebecca Leung, “Hezbollah: ‘A-Team of Terrorists,’” CBS News, April 18, 2003, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/04/18/60minutes/main550000.shtml.

31

  Eitan, http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=563.

The Islamic Revolution: The Export Version

The activities of Hezbollah affect not only the immediate participants in the Israeli-Lebanese conflict (i.e. Israel and Lebanon), but also numerous other countries, both in the Middle East and outside the region. Hezbollah plays an important role in realizing the geopolitical aspirations of Iran and (to a lesser extent) Syria. It is these two states that are most commonly accused of sponsoring and supporting Hezbollah by Israel and the West. Nevertheless, the relationship between Hezbollah and Iran is very different from the relationship between it and Syria. In the first case, it is a true strategic partnership; in the second case, it is more of a tactical cooperation. For Iran, Hezbollah serves not only as a virtual outpost in the struggle against the “Zionist regime” of Israel, but also as a tool for expanding Iranian influence in the Shiite (and, more broadly, Islamic) world, and for exporting Tehran’s version of the Islamic Revolution. Thanks to Hezbollah, Iran receives an opportunity to create a kind of Shiite belt of resistance to the West (primarily the US) and Israel— stretching from the borders of the Islamic Republic of Iran with Central Asia—through the Shiite majority in Iraq, which occasionally resists the occupation forces just as fiercely as do the Iraqi Sunnis—to the Eastern Mediterranean, where Hezbollah resists Israel directly. There are many obstacles on the path to Iranian supremacy in the Muslim world. The Shiite Persians have a hard time staking out their claims for leadership in a region where the majority of the population and the ruling elites are Arab Sunnis—their traditional enemies. Iran’s influence is limited primarily to those regions where Shi'a Islam has a significant presence, and where the Shiites are pursuing specific goals— Iraq and South Lebanon, in addition to Iran. Therefore, Iran’s leaders place great importance on emphasizing their country’s status as Israel’s major opponent. Being a pro-Iranian force, Hezbollah plays a major role in these efforts. Tehran’s successes and failures in its quest to become the dominant force in the Islamic world are dependent to a large extent on the successes and failures of Hezbollah. Hezbollah was formed in the early 1980s with the help of Khomeini’s followers, whose goal was spreading the Islamic Revolution, while following the version of Shiite ideology (“Willayat Al-Faqih”) that had been developed by Ayatollah Khomeini. An Iranian delegation consisting of religious and military instructors recruited a large number of militant young Shiite

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clerics who were connected to the Lebanese branch of the radical Iraqi Shiite El-Dawa organization and to the Islamic Amal (a group that had split away from the Amal movement, which had been moving toward greater secularization). Most of the radical clerics who formed the core of the Hezbollah leadership had been trained in Shiite seminaries in southern Iraq (particularly in An-Najaf), where Ayatollah Khomeini had spent many years in exile. The manifesto of Hezbollah (1985) declared openly that “We are the sons of the Ummah—the party of God, the vanguard of which was made victorious by God in Iran. There the vanguard succeeded to lay down the basis of a Muslim state which plays a central role in the world. We obey the orders of one leader, wise and just, that of our tutor and faqih (jurist) who fulfills all the necessary conditions: Ruhollah Musawi Khomeini.”32 Mohsen Rezaee, the Secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council and former Chief Commander of the Revolutionary Guard, declared in August 2006: “Iran is a model and example for Hezbollah. The Iranian faith, tactics and experience are being put to practice in Lebanon... Hezbollah looks to Iran for tactics and moral support, and we are proud that our experience serves other Muslim countries.” Researchers have correctly noted that “Hezbollah is both a creation and client of Iran and, more specifically, of its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Its ideology mimics the twin pillars of religious rule and export of revolution that is the basis of the Iranian theocracy. The Iranian government may consider the Hezbollah arsenal as a forward deployment of its own capability, just as the Soviet Union once stationed its missiles in Cuba.”33 According to Israeli terrorism expert Yoram Schweitzer, “Iran turned Hezbollah into an armed Iranian brigade posted on sovereign Lebanese soil.”34 The leadership of Hezbollah maintains close ties (both formal and informal) with Iran’s leadership. The religious leaders of Hezbollah (such as 32

  “An Open Letter: The Hizballah Program,” International Institute for CounterTerrorism, http://www.ict.org.il/articles/Hiz_letter.htm.

33

  Patrick Devenny, “Hezbollah’s Strategic Threat to Israel,” Middle East Quarterly XIII, no. 1 (Winter 2006), http://www.meforum.org/article/806.

34

  Yoram Schweitzer, “Iran—Terror by Proxy,” International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Jan. 5, 2002, http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=421.

The Islamic Revolution: The Export Version

Ayatollah Fadlallah) have received training in Iranian seminaries and are in close contact with the ruling mullahs in Iran. The material aid provided to Hezbollah by Iran is no less important than its moral and ideological support. According to some estimates, the Iranian material and financial aid has increased since the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon in 2000, and currently stands at $100 million per year. The financing of Hezbollah by Iran is regarded as one of the manifestations of the struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia (one of Lebanon’s major international sponsors) for dominance in the region. The relationship between Syria and Hezbollah is much more complicated. Syria’s ambitions do not stretch as far as Iran’s geopolitical aspirations— Damascus does not aspire to a leadership role either in the Muslim world or among Arab countries (at least, not for the last several decades). However, we should keep in mind the special Syrian attitude towards Lebanon. “Syrian politicians never forgot the plan of reuniting Lebanon with Syria. Lebanon was created as the result of a decision by France (a colonial empire) to create a homeland for the Christians living in the region. Damascus always complained that the territory of Lebanon had been stolen by the French from the Syrians.”35 Syria became intimately involved in the internal Lebanese conflict for several decades. A Syrian military contingent, which had originally been sent to Lebanon as an Arab peacekeeping force, was stationed in the country from 1976 untill 2005, and it participated directly in the Lebanese Civil War, fighting for different sides according to the circumstances. On the one hand, Damascus intended to establish control over Lebanon. On the other hand, it wanted to undermine Israel’s control of the occupied territories (including the Golan Heights, which had belonged to Syria before being captured by Israel during the 1967 War). Because of these considerations, Syria provided a certain amount of aid to Hezbollah. The creation of Hezbollah was connected to Syria’s decision to allow several hundred Iranian Revolutionary Guards into the Beqaa Valley in east Lebanon—a region that was occupied by Syrian forces. Before that, Syria had been opposed to a direct intervention by the Iranian clerical regime into Lebanese affairs; however, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 convinced the Syrian leadership that Iranian involvement might be able to 35

  Концельман Г. Ясир Арафат. Ростов-на-Д., 1997. С. 260.

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weaken the Israeli influence in Lebanon. Another factor in that decision was Iran’s offer to supply oil to Syria at lower prices. The aid provided by Iranian finances and instructors led to the quick growth of the military wing of Hezbollah, whose primary goal was to drive the American and European troops out of the multinational peacekeeping force in Beirut and to fight the Israeli occupation forces—these goals were consistent with both Iranian and Syrian interests. The relationship between Damascus and Hezbollah began to deteriorate after the withdrawal of the multinational force and the Israeli troops, which strengthened Syria’s positions in Lebanon. The existence of a revolutionary religious movement on Lebanese soil—a movement that professed loyalty to the Iranian government and advocated changing the Lebanese political system—began to be seen as a potential threat. Attacks by Shiite fundamentalists aimed at representatives of left-wing and proSyrian forces in Lebanon (for instance, the attacks on the offices of the Lebanese Communist Party and the Syrian Socialist-National Party, as well as the kidnapping of four Soviet diplomats) did not help to improve the relationship between Syria and Hezbollah. Furthermore, starting in the mid-1980s, the military and socio-economic presence of Hezbollah began to spread from the Beqaa Valley into the region of south Lebanon and the southern Shiite suburbs of Beirut—which was a direct threat to their rivals from the Amal movement, the closest ally of Syria in Lebanon. Iranian funds allowed Hezbollah to pay its fighters’ salaries and offer social services to the local population. By contrast, the Amal movement did not receive significant foreign funding, and was forced to rely on contributions from the population which it controlled. Another factor that deepened the rift with Hezbollah after the pullout of the multinational and Israeli forces from Lebanon was Syria’s desire to weaken the Palestinian groups based in Lebanon. Syria’s efforts to eliminate the Sunni Islamist groups in Tripoli further strained its relationship with Hezbollah, since both Iran and Hezbollah were forging ties with those groups. While Iran undoubtedly remains the group’s supreme ideological mentor, Syria has always tried to establish control over various aspects of the movement’s activities—ranging from its choice of political allies in the electoral process to the timing of its periodic attacks on Israeli forces. However, there has never been complete mutual understanding between the Shiites of Hezbollah and the primarily Sunni Syria (which is, moreover,

The Islamic Revolution: The Export Version

ruled by members of the Alawi sect). Although Hezbollah received patronage from Damascus for many years, Syria simultaneously tried to stem the increasing influence of the Party of God in Beirut. Nevertheless, following the assassination of Rafik Hariri, Hezbollah came out in favor of keeping the Syrian presence in Lebanon by organizing massive pro-Syrian demonstrations. By maintaining its ties with Syria and demonstrating against the Syrian pullout from Lebanon, Hezbollah found itself in a tough predicament—its excessive support for the Syrian presence risked undermining its image as a national movement and reducing its popular support. The pullout of Syrian forces from Lebanon in April 2005 caused many observers to worry that the situation in South Lebanon might deteriorate and endanger Israel’s security (this worry was confirmed in July 2006). Damascus long exerted a brake on the actions of Hezbollah for fear that Israel would hold it responsible for terrorism emanating from Lebanon. After the destruction of Syrian radar installations in Lebanon by Israeli warplanes in retaliation for a rocket attack by Hezbollah, Syria restricted further Hezbollah attacks.36 Following the withdrawal of Syrian troops from South Lebanon and the Beqaa valley, Damascus no longer needs to restrain Hezbollah. The actions of Hezbollah meet with a mixed response in the Arab world. Several Arab states (Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia) have condemned the behavior of Hezbollah during the conflict with Israel as harmful to Arab interests. The current geopolitical reality in the Middle East has clearly demonstrated the lack of pan-Arab unity, the weakness and ineffectiveness of inter-Arab structures (such as the Arab League), and the tendency of each country to focus on its own problems. Saudi representatives issued proclamations about the inadmissibility of using oil as an instrument of pressure against the West to pacify Israel (as was done in 1973). Saudi Arabia made it clear that it would not embark on such an adventure, since an oil war would be particularly harmful to the oil-exporting countries themselves. After the outbreak of the conflict, the Saudi king called upon other Sunni leaders to condemn Hezbollah, and one of the most authoritative Islamic jurists in Saudi Arabia issued a fatwa

36

  Devenny, http://www.meforum.org/article/806

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prohibiting Sunnis from aiding the Shiite movement.37 At the same time, Hezbollah is widely regarded as a legitimate resistance movement in the Arab and Muslim world. Many Sunnis expressed support for Hezbollah, including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan. The Saudi cleric Salman al-Awda condemned his government’s anti-Hezbollah position: “This is not the time to express our differences with the Shiites because we are all confronted by our greater enemy, the criminal Jews and Zionists.”38 Outside the boundaries of the Arab-Islamic world, there is even less agreement on the proper evaluation of the actions of Hezbollah. Whereas several nations (the US, Israel, Canada, and the Netherlands) unambiguously classify Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, others (such as the United Kingdom and Australia) make a distinction between the terrorist acts of this organization and its social activities. A third group of countries (including Russia, China, India, Brazil, South Africa, Mexico, Malaysia, and Indonesia) do not consider Hezbollah to be a terrorist organization at all. The European Union originally classified the external security wing of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. However, in March 2005, the European Parliament passed a resolution (with a great majority of votes) classifying Hezbollah as a whole as a terrorist organization. The UN has not included Hezbollah in its list of terrorist organizations; however, through its Security Council Resolution 1559, it has called for the disarmament of the movement’s military wing. The events of July-August 2006, which were provoked by a Hezbollah raid on an Israeli military post and the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers, had a great influence on the balance of power in the region. The new situation in the Middle East is marked by doubts about Israel’s position as some kind of “absolute force” or a “regional policeman.” For the first time, Israel’s armed forces were unable to achieve victory in a full-scale war— and, moreover, a war with a non-state armed movement.

37

  Israel Elad Altman, “Some Regional Implications of the Hizbullah-Israel War,” (August 4, 2006), http://www.e-prism.org/images/Some_regional_effecs_of_the_ Hizbullah-Israel_war_-_4-8-06.pdf

38

  Quoted from: Bernard Haykel, “Middle East: Al-Qaeda takes a back seat,” The New York Times, July 26, 2006.

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Al-Qaeda: Terrorist Franchising

While radical Islamist groups such as Hamas or Hezbollah are focused primarily on a regional type of jihad against Israel, the most famous international group acting under the banner of global jihad is, of course, the Al-Qaeda network, a multi-national militant fundamentalist Sunni movement. This group, personified in the image of one of its creators and leaders, Osama bin Laden, has become a real boogeyman, commonly used by politicians and the mass media—especially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US. At the same time, it would be no exaggeration to say that Al-Qaeda represents the vanguard of the Salafi-jihadist movement. The creation of the mujahideen network that would later become known as Al-Qaeda is closely related to events in Afghanistan. During the confrontation between the Soviet forces and the Afghan mujahideen (1979– 1989), the phenomenon of “Afghan Arabs” (numerous volunteers from all over the Islamic-Arab world who came to help the Afghan mujahideen) was born in Afghanistan and in neighboring Pakistan. The Palestinian Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, who is known as the spiritual mentor of the “terrorist number one,” Osama bin Laden, opened the Services Bureau in Peshawar with the goal of aiding the mujahideen. According to many experts, it was Sheikh Azzam who created a theoretical foundation for the concept of global jihad. Undoubtedly, Azzam made an important contribution to the conversion of the war in Afghanistan into the problem of global jihad, a symbol of the Islamic struggle against foreign cultures. He also helped to turn jihad into the primary way of dealing with enemies in the minds of Muslims. “His actions and concepts influenced the development of numerous phenomena and processes in radical Islam: the

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establishment of an Islamic ‘international’ organization on the basis of the recruitment of volunteers from all over the Islamic world on behalf of the jihad in Afghanistan; the creation of an international network of Islamic terror cells supported by radical Islamic movements throughout the world. The triumph of the mujahideen in Afghanistan created an aura and ethos of bravery around the Muslim fighters and serves as a source of inspiration for Muslims all over the world; the creation of an extensive cadre of Islamic fighters imbued with a sense of mission and combat experience was created. These fighters became the vanguard in struggles between radical Islam and its enemies.”1 It was during the war of the mujahideen against the Soviet military contingent in Afghanistan that the Islamist network that would later be known as Al-Qaeda was born. This Maktab al-Khadamat network was not only one of the major manpower agencies for Muslim volunteers from various countries who were going to help the Afghan mujahideen, but also a kind of fund that provided the necessary resources, financial aid and logistical support to the anti-Soviet resistance. The end of the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan in 1989 made the foreign volunteers doubt the legitimacy of jihad in its traditional sense, and there was a need to determine their course of action for the future. “The consensus among the hardcore leaders of the expatriate muhahideen was to establish a base (al-qaeda), or a social movement, to carry out worldwide jihad.”2 The first reference to something called “Al-Qaeda” appeared in a CIA report compiled in 1996, which mentions that “by 1985 bin Laden had… organized an Islamic Salvation Front, or ‘Al-Qaeda,’ to support mujahideen in Afghanistan.”3 The Saudi Osama bin Laden played a major role in the activities of Maktab al-Khadamat, together with the famous Palestinian Islamist   Yoram Schweitzer and Shaul Shay, The Globalization of Terror: The Challenge of Al-Qaida and the Response of the International Community (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2008), 23.

1

2

  Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 36.   Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2006), 5.

3

Al-Qaeda: Terrorist Franchising

Abdullah Yusuf Azzam (who had once been bin Laden’s university teacher in the city of Jeddah). While bin Laden played a more practical role in this duo, Dr. Azzam, who called upon Muslims of all countries to come and aid in the defensive jihad waged by the Afghan mujahideen against foreign armies, was the ideologue of the “Afghan Arabs.” (Osama bin Laden’s colleague Ayman al-Zawahiri tried to dispute the accuracy of this term by claiming that “the name ‘Afghan Arabs’ is a tendentious description because these mujahideen have never been solely Arab, but mujahideen from all parts of the Islamic world,” although he did admit that Arabs had been “a distinctive element in this group.”4) Abdullah Azzam’s ideas undoubtedly influenced many mujahideen who decided to take part in the Afghan war. Indeed, one of those fighters, Abdullah Anas, testified in his autobiographical book Birth of the Afghani Arabs that Azzam’s religious argument for defensive jihad had played a significant role in his own decision to travel to Afghanistan.5 While Sheikh Azzam advocated the participation of Arab volunteers in the war under the command of Afghan mujahideen, Osama bin Laden designated a special role for the “Afghan Arabs.” In 1989, Sheikh Azzam was assassinated in Pakistan (the circumstances of this assassination remain unclear to this day), and this led to a schism in the Islamist network. Most of the members of Maktab al-Khadamat joined Osama bin Laden. Maktab al-Khadamat was supported by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the US. Osama bin Laden created the Islamic Salvation Foundation and financed the activity of the House of Followers in Peshawar, whose members were involved in smuggling Islamic volunteers into Afghanistan and supplying them with weapons and other equipment. Bin Laden was particularly sympathetic towards Afghani adepts of Wahhabism—especially towards Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf, leader of the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan, who was actually known as a relatively moderate commander compared to other mujahideen leaders. Osama personally took part in   Laura Mansfield, ed., His Own Words: Translation and Analysis of the

4

Writings of Dr. Ayman Al Zawahiri (Old Tappan, NJ: TLG Publications, 2006), 22.

5

  Kim Craigin, Understanding Terrorist Ideology (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007), 2.

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battles, leading a team of Arab fighters. He lost an eye to a shrapnel wound in one of these operations. The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan (1989), the overthrow of the Najibullah regime and the rise of the mujahideen (1992), and—more importantly—the Gulf War (1991) caused Osama bin Laden to change his course and become an uncompromising opponent of the West and the pro-Western regimes in the Islamic world. Even the struggle against Najibullah’s Kabul government during the Soviet pullout from Afghanistan was interpreted by militant jihadists as part of the confrontation with the near enemy. The Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri later wrote that “The Afghan arena, especially after the Russians withdrew, became a practical example of jihad against the renegade rulers who allied themselves with the foreign enemies of Islam. Najibullah in Afghanistan was an example that we had seen before. He prayed, fasted, and performed pilgrimage. At the same time, he prohibited government by Islam and allied himself with the enemies of Islam, allowed them to enter his country, and brutally oppressed the Muslims and the mujahideen.”6 Essentially, the jihadists equated the leaders of the conservative and anti-communist regimes in the Muslim world with the “godless communist” Najibullah, categorizing both types of regimes as the near enemy. Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, when there was a threat of an Iraqi invasion into Saudi Arabia, Osama bin Laden (who had by that time returned to his homeland from Afghanistan) offered the services of his 12,000 armed mujahideen, who had had combat experience in Afghanistan, for the defense of Saudi Arabia from Iraq. However, King Fahd preferred to rely upon the defense provided by the US Army and the American-led antiSaddam coalition. From bin Laden’s point of view, the invitation of “infidel” forces into the Land of the Two Mosques was a betrayal, and he leveled scathing criticism at the House of Saud. According to M. Sageman, if not for the presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia “The movement that became the global Salafi jihad might have faded…the Salafi mujahideen interpreted this [American] presence as an infidel invasion of the Land of the Two Holy Places. It became the focus of Salafi resentment against the West and breathed new life into the movement.”7 6

  Mansfield, 37.

7

  Sageman, 47.

Al-Qaeda: Terrorist Franchising

In addition to that, we should keep in mind that Osama bin Laden was greatly influenced by the Egyptian Islamist Muhammad abd-al-Salam Faraj, author of The Neglected Obligation (1979), which says, among other things: “The rulers of our time are apostates from Islam. They are the lapdogs of the imperialists, regardless of whether those imperialists are Crusaders, Communists, or Zionists. There is nothing Islamic left in them except for the name, even if they pray, and fast, and swear that they are Muslims.” For his attacks on the Saudi government, Osama’s citizenship was revoked, and he was banished from the country. However, it is clear that the phenomenon of Al-Qaeda would still have appeared even without bin Laden’s resentment against the House of Saud for refusing his services and choosing to invite “infidel” armies into their land. The volunteers from Muslim countries who had fought against the communists and the Shuravi (Soviets) in Afghanistan acquired not only battle experience, but also a more global vision of their struggle, a sense of community. The intoxicating feeling of victory shared by the mujahideen, who had, as they thought, forced the Soviets out of Afghanistan (some of them even took credit for the collapse of the Soviet Union), was dampened by the sudden realization that the veterans of the Afghan jihad would not receive a hero’s welcome upon returning home. Au contraire, the governments in Arab countries regarded the religious fervor of the combatants returning from Afghanistan with suspicion, considering them a potential political threat. After becoming isolated in their own homelands, many of these “Afghan Arabs” became willing recruits for new jihadist campaigns—all the more so since various global situations at the time were conductive to such campaigns: the Gulf War, which involved the deployment of American forces in the Muslim holy land of Saudi Arabia; the continuing repression of Islamists by the ruling regimes in Muslim countries; the armed struggles in Algeria, Kashmir, the Philippines, Bosnia, and in several republics of the former Soviet Union, and the never-ending civil war in Afghanistan. The Philippine Islamist and Afghan veteran Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani returned to the Philippines, where he founded the separatist Abu Sayyaf organization, which fought against the central government for the creation of an independent Muslim state in the south of the country; Indonesian mujahideen created the Jemaah Islamiyah; Egyptian Islamist groups intensified their terrorist activity. M. Sageman notes that, at this

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point, the militant Islamist movement was not a coordinated global jihad but a collection of local jihads, receiving training and financial and logistical support from the vanguard of the movement, Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda now became a formal organization consisting of a cluster of terrorists, the central staff supporting the global Salafi jihad, and the religious social movement.8 Essentially, this time period marks the birth of Al-Qaeda in its current form, which has gained so much notoriety all over the world for having become the most effective modern terrorist network. According to Brian Michael Jenkins, a notable expert on modern terrorism, “Al-Qaeda is more than just an organization; it is also a process, and its principal resource is its human capital. Al-Qaeda’s future ability to grow and continue operations depends most strongly on its ability to gather new recruits.”9 For the ideologues of Al-Qaeda, the most important future goal is the unification of all the Muslims in the world in a single caliphate. Global political events are interpreted by Al-Qaeda as a brutal conflict between two civilizations and two fundamentally different worldviews—true Islam vs. the corrupt and godless West. The major enemies of Al-Qaeda are the US and its European allies (especially the UK, which is actively supporting the Americans), as well as Russia, Israel, and the secular regimes in Muslim countries. Al-Qaeda is particularly enraged at the occupation of Jerusalem by Israel and the presence of American troops in the holy Muslim land of Saudi Arabia, near Mecca and Medina. The deployment of American forces in Saudi Arabia is perceived by Al-Qaeda as a modern version of the medieval Crusades undertaken by the Christian West against the Muslim East—this is the origin of the group’s second name, the World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders. (This name appeared in 1998, when Osama and other Islamist extremists from Egypt, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Bangladesh managed to reach an agreement to coordinate their struggle.) In 1992, bin Laden’s operatives carried out an attack on American tourists in Yemen. That same year, there was an attack on American military personnel in Somalia, who were stationed there as part of Operation 8

  Ibid., 38.

9

  Brian Michael Jenkins, Countering Al Qaida: An Appreciation of the Situation and Suggestions for Strategy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 4.

Al-Qaeda: Terrorist Franchising

Restore Hope. A team of Islamist volunteers under the command of the Egyptian Ali al-Rashidi (Abu-Ubaydah al-Banshiri) was sent to Somalia in 1993 to fight the Americans there. Eventually, they forced the US troops to withdraw from the country. This operation is sometimes considered to be the first success of Al-Qaeda after the war in Afghanistan.10 In the early 1990s, Salafi jihadists (primarily “Afghan Arabs”) failed to transform the civil war between the former Yugoslavia’s Serbian Christians and Bosnian Muslims into jihad, despite the arrival of as many as four thousand veterans of the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan into Bosnia.11 Images of “Afghan Arabs”posing before the cameras with the severed heads of Serbian soldiers were detrimental to Bosnian efforts to secure Western support for their cause. Furthermore, very few members of the highly secularized Bosnian community were receptive to the militant Islamist rhetoric of the mujahideen. The hopes of many jihadists to spread the war against jahiliyyah into Europe were dashed by the preference of the Bosnian Muslim leadership for cooperating with the US and Europe. In Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, Osama managed to gather several hundred Afghan veterans who became members of the Al-Qaeda organization, which had been created by him together with the famous Arab fighter Mohammed al-Massari. However, by May 1996 the Sudanese government forced Osama bin Laden to leave the country due to American pressure. In June 1996, Osama bin Laden moved to Afghanistan and joined the Taliban—his comrades from the anti-Soviet jihad movement. In Afghanistan, where the civil war was still raging—only this time it was a war between the mujahideen themselves—Osama met his old acquaintance Sayyaf, and was in contact with Yunus Khalis, leader of Hezbi Islami (Party of Islam), and Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, leader of the Islamic and National Revolution Movement of Afghanistan. Ultimately, Osama chose to join the Taliban, who were fighting for pure Islam. At the same time, bin Laden forged ties with the uncompromising wing of the Tajik opposition that was waging an armed struggle against 10

  David Bukay, From Muhammad to Bin Laden: Religious and Ideological Sources of the Homicide Bombers Phenomenon (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2008), 236.

11

  Randall David Law, Terrorism: A History (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), 311.

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Dushanbe. In October 1996, he even received an invitation to tour several regions of Tajikistan that were under Islamist control, in order to familiarize himself with the situation on the ground, determine the extent of the supplies required by the Tajik mujahideen, and figure out the best ways of transporting those supplies to them. After establishing a terrorist training camp in the Afghan province of Nangarhar, Osama turned his attention to Al-Badr I and Al-Badr II—two fortified camps in the Khost area with a well-developed infrastructure. In earlier periods of the war, those camps had been used to train operatives specializing in explosives, landmines, reconnaissance and communications, as well as commanders and propagandists. Upon arriving in Afghanistan, Osama originally settled in Jalalabad. However, when Ahmad Shah Massoud’s forces approached the region—and, moreover, after witnessing the unpredictable political maneuvers of his host, Kari Kader (head of the Nangarhar local coun- cil)—bin Laden moved to a village near Kandahar. Osama renewed his ties with the chiefs of several large Pashtun tribes from the south and southwest of Afghanistan, the leaders of the Taliban, some of whom were former commanders of the mujahideen and therefore knew him personally from his days as a soldier in the war against the Soviet army. In Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden had several active terrorist training camps, which were used to hone the skills of Muslim combatants waging jihad in Chechnya, Tajikistan, Kashmir, Kosovo, Xinjiang, and the Philippines. Bin Laden was the one responsible for the American rocket and bomb strikes of 1998—in retaliation for the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Three years later, in 2001, this “Afghan War veteran” brought a new, much more devastating, series of retaliatory strikes upon his host country. On February 23, 1998, the leaders of Al-Qaeda—Sheikh Osama bin Muhammad bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri (amir of the Jihad Group in Egypt), Abu-Yasir Rifa’i Ahmad Taha (the Egyptian Islamic Group), Sheikh Mir Hamzah (secretary of the Jamiat ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan), and Fazlur Rahman (amir of the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh)—issued a fatwa mandating the killing of Americans, titled “World Islamic Front Statement: Jihad against Jews and Crusaders.” Here are some excerpts from it: “The Arabian Peninsula has never—since Allah made it flat, created its desert, and encircled it with seas—been stormed by any forces like the crusader armies spreading in it like locusts, eating its riches and wiping

Al-Qaeda: Terrorist Franchising

out its plantations. All this is happening at a time in which nations are attacking Muslims like people fighting over a plate of food…The United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples… Despite the great devastation inflicted on the Iraqi people by the crusaderZionist alliance, and despite the huge number of those killed, which has exceeded 1 million…despite all this, the Americans are once again trying to repeat the horrific massacres, as though they are not content with the protracted blockade imposed after the ferocious war or the fragmentation and devastation. So here they come to annihilate what is left of this people and to humiliate their Muslim neighbors…If the Americans’ aims behind these wars are religious and economic, the aim is also to serve the Jews’ petty state and divert attention from its occupation of Jerusalem and murder of Muslims there. The best proof of this is their eagerness to destroy Iraq…In compliance with Allah’s order, we issue the following fatwa to all Muslims: the ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military— is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim.” This fatwa has been characterized by the American researcher Marc Sageman as “the manifesto of the full-fledged global Salafi jihad.” In this document, bin Laden extended his previous concept of jihad from a defensive to an offensive one.12 It is difficult to say how large Al-Qaeda is, since this organization operates in a decentralized manner. According to various estimates, it has anywhere from several hundred to several thousand members. According to analysts from the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St. Andrews (Scotland), Al-Qaeda lost many members in 2002; however, it still possesses significant resources and continues to recruit new members. Before the September 2001 attacks in the US, Al-Qaeda had approximately 3-4 thousand members worldwide, whereas by the end of 2002 this number dropped to 1500. The investigation begun 12

  Sageman, 19.

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after the 9/11 attacks confirms the high level of secrecy surrounding bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda network and other related movements. The Le Monde newspaper wrote: “Aside from Germany, which turned out to be a key country in this international network, other European connections have been exposed. The most prominent members of the network are: Belgium, with Islamists of Tunisian origin; Italy, where the liquidation of an Islamist network in Milan in April 2001 has had grave consequences; Spain, which has witnessed a surge in the activity of a ‘network that facilitates the criminal activities of Al-Qaeda’; France, where young Arabs with French citizenship have traveled to fight in Afghanistan; and, finally, the UK, in which Abu Qatada, who is considered to be the uncontested spiritual leader of the group, is supposedly hiding.” Al-Qaeda is blamed for a long series of terrorist attacks committed before September 11, 2001. These are: the detonation of a car bomb near the building of the Saudi National Guard in Riyadh, which led to the deaths of 5 Americans (among others); similar car bomb attacks at the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, in which more than 200 people were killed; and the suicide attack on the USS Cole in Yemen, which killed 17 crewmembers. In 1995, Al-Qaeda was planning a series of bombings of American aircraft above the Pacific Ocean and an aerial attack on the CIA headquarters. However, these plans were discovered and canceled before they could be carried out. The Al-Qaeda brand is used by various extreme Islamist groups operating in different regions. However, in many cases they are not directly connected to Osama bin Laden’s actual network—the relationship between them is more nominal than operational. For instance, extremists operating in Algeria and in neighboring countries call themselves the “Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb” (previously known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat)—and yet, according to most experts, there is no direct link between them and Osama. Al-Qaeda affiliates operate in Saudi Arabia, Yemen (Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which was formed in 2009 from a merger of the Yemeni and Saudi branches of Al-Qaeda), and in Iraq (Al-Qaeda in the Country of the Two Rivers). The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 turned this country into a hotspot of jihadist activity. Despite the extremely heterogeneous character of the resistance to the occupation forces and to the new government in Bagh- dad—from the very beginning, this resistance has included supporters

Al-Qaeda: Terrorist Franchising

of the overthrown secular Ba’ath party, Shiite rebels (the Mahdi Army), and Sunni rebels—the primary motivation of the insurgents is rooted in patriotic and religious feelings. The initial rapprochement between the Shiite and Sunni rebels on the basis of their common struggle against the invaders turned out to be shortlived. From late 2004, the resistance movement was primarily Sunni in character; the armed opposition was formed on a Salafi ideological basis; and interdenominational tensions between the Shiites and the Sunnis were exacerbated and reached a boiling point. It was during this time period that the Al-Qaeda in Iraq organization, led by the Jordanian Salafi Abu Musab al-Zarqawi until his death in an American air strike in 2006, rose to prominence. Al-Zarqawi had once attempted to join the struggle against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan; however, by the time he arrived in the region, the Soviet Union had already withdrawn its forces from Afghan territory. After the American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, Zarqawi traveled to Iraq, where he established contact with the Kurdish Islamist Ansar al-Islam group. Following the American invasion of Iraq (2003), a group operating under the name Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (Group of Monotheism and Jihad) began to evolve into a militant network that consisted partially of foreign mujahideen arriving in Iraq, as well as members of Ansar al-Islam. In May 2004, this group merged with Salafiah al-Mujahidiah, another Islamist group. In October 2004, Zarqawi’s group officially declared allegiance to the Al-Qaeda network. The role played by foreign Salafi mujahideen in Iraq remains controversial (according to some estimates, foreign fighters taken as a whole constitute 4-10% of the total number of insurgents in Iraq).13 The group’s declared goals were to force a withdrawal of US-led forces from Iraq, to topple the Iraqi “puppet” government, to assassinate “collaborators” with the occupation, to fight the Shiite groups, and— ultimately—to establish a “pure Islamic state” in Iraq. In a July 2005 letter addressed to Ayman al-Zawahiri, one of the leaders of the Al-Qaeda network, al-Zarqawi outlined a four-stage plan to expand the Iraq War 13

  Степанова Е. Транснациональное джихадистское движение и локальнорегиональный исламистский терроризм в 2005–2006 гг. // Год планеты. Вып. 2006 г. М.: Наука, 2007. С. 74.

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(including expelling US forces from the country, establishing an Islamic authority, a caliphate, spreading the conflict to neighboring secular countries, and engaging in struggle against Israel). Combining guerilla tactics with outright terrorism, the group led by alZarqawi actively employed suicide bombers and took numerous hostages, some of whom were beheaded (video clips depicting the executions were posted by the terrorists on the Internet). Al-Zarqawi’s group was blamed for numerous terrorist attacks on Iraqi Shiites. In January 2006, Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia created an umbrella organization, the Islamic World Council, in an attempt to unify the Sunni insurgents in Iraq. However, this attempt failed, since many potential members were repelled by the cruelty of the religious extremists and their rigid and fundamentalist doctrine. Disagreements between Al-Qaeda in Iraq and some other Sunni groups (such as the Islamic Army in Iraq, among others) have occasionally resulted in armed clashes between them. The most peculiar feature of Al-Qaeda is its structure, which has been drifting away from a clearly-defined organization towards a decentralized, dispersing network. Some experts have even called it “McDonald’s terrorism.” There are separate cells in various countries, which share the Al-Qaeda ideology and act under its “trademark” name without having any organizational ties to the movement. Some experts have compared Al-Qaeda to a multinational corporation (“A modern management style, flexible structures, representatives from various countries, franchising in more than 40 states, a diversified assortment of products, joint ventures: Osama bin Laden, being a former student of economics, manages his empire of terror like a skilled businessman.”14). The structure of Al-Qaeda comprises several distinct layers. The first layer is the “core vanguard” organization, which consisted of Osama bin Laden and his small circle of close, trusted associates—such as Ayman al-Zawahiri. Presumably, this group is relatively small in number, especially after the losses sustained in the war against the US and its allies. The second layer of the Al-Qaeda network consists of local or regional terrorist or insurgent groups that have adopted jihadist ideology. Some of these groups have publicly proclaimed allegiance to Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, 14

  Jodi M. Vittori, “The Business of Terror,” Internationale Politik 6, no. 2. (Summer 2005): 54.

Al-Qaeda: Terrorist Franchising

and are acting in accordance with the franchising principle (for instance, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula). Other groups may adopt some or all of the jihadist ideology promoted by Al-Qaeda and cooperate with the core group, but they will maintain their independence (for instance, the Pakistani Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Harkat-ul-Jihad e-Islami). The third and broadest layer of the network is the grassroots jihadist movement, that is, people inspired by the Al-Qaeda core and the franchise groups, but who may have little or no actual connection to these groups.15 During the last years, there has been some evidence that Al-Qaeda is weakening. For instance, it is known that bin Laden’s network has been in serious financial trouble. Nevertheless, it still remains one of the major threats to the security of many countries in the world. The group is very active in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, the Maghreb countries, and in the Horn of Africa (particularly in Somalia and Yemen). Al-Qaeda and related groups retain the capability to carry out acts of terror on as massive a scale as the 9/11 attacks. The liquidation of Osama bin Laden, which took place in Abbottabad (Pakistan) on May 2, 2011 in an operation carried out by US Special Forces, is, undoubtedly, a major success in the war against terror, demonstrating the inevitability of retribution for crimes against humanity. It is clear that the elimination of such a charismatic figure as bin Laden is intended to weaken the terrorist network that was led by him. However, there are good reasons to suppose that Osama bin Laden’s death will not significantly decrease the terrorist activity of this jihadist network—especially since Al-Qaeda possesses a sufficient number of qualified personnel who can replace the dead leaders. One such potential candidate for leadership is the Libyan Abu Yahya al-Libi—an Islamic scholar and a member of the radical leadership who preaches the concept of global jihad. Jarret Brachman, a former CIA analyst, has described alLibi in the following way: “He’s a warrior. He’s a poet. He’s a scholar. He’s a pundit. He’s a military commander. And he’s a very charismatic, young, brash rising star within Al-Qaeda.” Al-Libi possesses excellent theoretical 15

  See: Stewart Scott, “Jihadism in 2010: The Threat Continues,” Strat for Global Intelligence, January 6, 2010, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100106_jihadism_2010_threat_continues

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knowledge in combination with practical battle experience, which he has acquired through participating in the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan, and later in the struggle against the Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2005, Abu Yahya al-Libi managed to escape from an American jail in the Bagram Airbase (Afghanistan). In addition to that, the terrorist network appears to be highly adaptable to changing circumstances. The loss of Afghanistan as a safe haven for Al-Qaeda after the downfall of the Taliban regime caused the extremists to try to use Yemen as a staging ground. According to the London Times, “The country’s mountainous terrain, poverty, and lawless tribal society make it, in the opinion of many analysts, a close match for Afghanistan as a new terrorist haven.”16 The Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula group, which was created through the merger of Yemeni and Saudi extremists, has managed to gain control over several regions in Yemen (particularly in the Shabwah, Ma’rib, and Abyan governorates). According to media reports, the leader of this unified organization is Nasir al-Wuhayshi, a former secretary of Osama bin Laden. The increased activity of Al-Qaedaaffiliated extremists in Yemen is partially caused by the fact that many Yemeni and Saudi citizens held at the Guantanamo Bay prison moved to Yemen after their release. In January 2010, Yemen security services arrested Sa’id Al-Shihri, who is considered to be one of the leaders of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. It is notable that Al-Shihri, who had spent six years in the Guantanamo Bay prison, was sent to Saudi Arabia in 2007 in order to participate in a rehabilitation and reintegration program for former jihadists. The Yemeni government intensified its struggle against terrorism (with US support) after an incident that took place in December 25, 2009, when Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian citizen, attempted to detonate an explosive device on board Northwest Airlines Flight 253 at Detroit Airport. According to the available information, he had received training from terrorists operating in Yemen. The United States has become actively involved in the struggle against the extremists operating in this country. Some media outlets even claim that the US “has quietly opened a third, 16

  Tom Coghlan, “Freed Guantánamo Inmates are Headed to Yemen to join alQueda Fight,” The Times, January 5, 2010, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article6975971.ece

Al-Qaeda: Terrorist Franchising

largely covert front against Al-Qaeda in Yemen.”17 It seems that the notorious jihadist Anwar al-Awlaki, who has both American and Yemeni citizenship and urges Islamists to fight against the West, is currently hiding in Yemen. Al-Awlaki, who has an excellent command of English, has acquired a reputation as a talented and extremely dangerous propagandist, actively using the Internet, the blogosphere, and YouTube to recruit new members into radical Islamist organizations. The US secret services suspect that Al-Awlaki is connected to US army officer Nidal Malik Hasan, the perpetrator of the Fort Hood shooting, since the two of them were in communication via e-mail. Al-Awlaki is also believed to be connected to the terrorist Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who tried to bomb an American airliner in December 2009. Al-Awlaki became the first US citizen ever placed on the CIA target list. From time to time, the global mass media report on new messages from Al-Qaeda (primarily from Osama bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri) that have been transmitted through the Internet (in audio or video format). In spite of this, Al-Qaeda is being perceived more and more as a boogeyman intended to terrify the Western world, rather than a real active terrorist network with a global meaning. Indeed, it is true that since the 9/11 attacks there have been no acts of terror on a similar scale committed by militants who are clearly linked to bin Laden. However, this feeling should not lead to the mistaken impression that Al-Qaeda has become just a myth that is used to justify the War on Terror. The terrorist network continues to recruit new members into its ranks—using the World Wide Web, among other methods. Extremist activity on the Internet is becoming a global threat. According to data quoted by Ronald Noble, Secretary General of Interpol, at an international conference in Paris in September 2010, in 1998 there were only 12 websites that could be characterized as extremist, whereas in 2006 their number rose to approximately 4,50018 (in reality, the number of extremist websites is much higher). The Internet, whose structure is 17

  Eric Schmitt and Robert F. Worth, “U.S. Widens Terror War to Yemen, al-Queda Bastion,” The New York Times, December 27, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/28/world/middleeast/28yemen. html?hp%C2%A0%C2%A0

18

  BBC Russia, September 22, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/ international/2010/09/100921_interpol_extremism_online.shtml

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remarkably similar to the network structure of Al-Qaeda, enables radical preachers to expand their audience: more and more frequently, jihadist websites are addressing younger people and members of the middle class.

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Afghanistan: From Mujahideen to Taliban

One of the central battlefields of the war against the Al-Qaeda extremists and other similar terrorist groups is Afghanistan and its neighboring regions. In the time period since 2001, the conflict in Afghanistan has become particularly associated with the War on Terror declared by the US. Despite several important successes achieved by the Western Coalition in Afghanistan, it is too early to talk about victory in this war. It seems necessary to us to carefully analyze the situation in Afghanistan for yet another reason. Together with the Iranian revolution and the ArabIsraeli conflict, the events in Afghanistan have played a major role in the growth of Islamist terrorism. In the minds of many Arabs (and not only Arabs), the war in Afghanistan signifies the transition from nationalism to Islam. As the American expert Marc Sageman correctly notes, “The Afghan war against the Soviet Union was a watershed in militant Muslim revivalist movements. Militants from all over the Muslim world finally met and interacted for lengthy periods of time. The common fight forged strong bonds among them.”1 Ayman al-Zawahiri, one of the most famous modern ideologues of global jihad, said the following when discussing the abovementioned phenomenon of “Afghan Arabs”: “The seriousness of the presence of Muslim, particularly Arab, young men in the arena of jihad in Afghanistan consisted of turning the Afghan cause from a local,

1

  Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 18.

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regional issue into a global Islamic issue in which the entire [Muslim] nation can participate.”2 The People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), which came to power during the Saur Revolution of 1978, had to contend with bitter opposition from its Khalq and Parcham factions, as well as the active resistance of various segments of Afghan society. The Saur Revolution led to armed resistance by the opposition (largely because of the actions of the Khalqists, who quickly implemented socialist policies), and this resistance eventually deteriorated into a full-fledged civil war in the entire country. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the extensive Western support of the mujahideen led to an enormous escalation of the Afghan conflict, turning it into a battlefield of the Cold War. None of the previous wars in Afghanistan had caused such social upheavals and such profound political polarization, tearing Afghan society apart. The Soviet invasion of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan officially began on December 25, 1979, when a mechanized infantry division moved toward Kabul, while a paratrooper division landed in Afghan territory. Another mechanized infantry division entered the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan on the night of December 28, moving toward Herat. This was the beginning of one of the most tragic periods in modern Soviet and international history—the War in Afghanistan. The opposition of the mujahideen to the “godless” Kabul regime transformed into opposition to a foreign invasion of their land. The traditional Afghan unwillingness to submit to foreign rule was bolstered in this case by the large amounts of aid coming from outside Afghanistan. Western countries, Pakistan, Iran, the Arab states, and China were aiding the Afghan mujahideen in various ways, supplying them with weapons, ammunition, military advisors, mercenaries, and funds. In the years 1980–1983, the US provided $200 million to the armed Afghan opposition; in the years 1984–1986, this figure rose to $1.1 billion; in 1987– 1988, it reached $1.7 billion; and in 1989, it amounted to $1.2 billion. Japan, Saudi Arabia, West Germany, and several international organizations allocated up to $1 billion in annual foreign aid to the mujahideen. Training   Laura Mansfield, ed., His Own Words: Translation and Analysis of the

2

Writings of Dr. Ayman Al Zawahiri (Old Tappan, NJ: TLG Publications, 2006), 42.

Afghanistan: From Mujahideen to Taliban

camps for the fighters were established in Pakistan, Iran, and China. The American support for the mujahideen in Afghanistan was part of the US plan to transform this country into the “Soviet Vietnam”—a deathtrap for the Soviet Union. The ruling elites of the oil-producing monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula had two goals in mind when supplying the Afghan mujahideen with funds and arms: on the one hand, they expressed solidarity with their coreligionists; on the other hand, they (rather cynically) turned the attention of their local radicals away from confronting the regimes in their own countries (which had close relations with the West) and towards the struggle with the “godless communists.” The anti-Soviet and anti-government resistance in Afghanistan was very heterogeneous—it included radical Islamists, monarchists, nationalists, and Maoists. Some of the mujahideen organizations appeared even before the Saur Revolution; others were formed during the civil war. One of the most famous mujahideen groups was the Islamic Party of Afghanistan (Hezbi Islami). This organization, led and founded by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, was created in 1975 as the result of a merger of Islamist groups that had been part of the international Muslim Brotherhood movement.3 The major declared goal of Hekmatyar’s party after the 1978 revolution was the overthrow of the ruling regime and the subsequent creation of an Islamic Republic in Afghanistan. The party was composed of a central ruling body, armed formations, and Islamic committees that served as local governing bodies. These Islamic committees operated in Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan, and partially in the territory of Afghanistan. By early 1988, there were up to 25,000 armed Hezbi Islami fighters active in Afghanistan. According to Soviet estimates, there were more than 80,000 supporters of Hekmatyar. The party was based in Peshawar, and it had representatives in London, Hamburg, Mashhad. Hezbi Islami was receiving financial and material aid from Pakistan, the US, and China. In 1979, following disagreements on the proper methods of conducting their struggle (and because of the leader’s persistent refusal to unite with other mujahideen groups), Muhammad Yunus Khalis’s faction, which also operated under the name of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan, split away from Hekmatyar’s group (for the most part, Khalis’s mujahideen fought   Frank Clements, Conflict in Afghanistan: A Historical Encyclopedia (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2003), 126.

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in the Nangarhar province). The Khalis faction was well-organized from a military point of view, and it was composed mostly of members of Pashtun tribes. Its military formations had up to four thousand mujahideen. Another large fundamentalist mujahideen group, the Islamic Society of Afghanistan (Jamiat-e Islami), was created on the basis of the Islamic Youth Organization, which had been active among students at the University of Kabul in the years 1969–1974. The group’s founder and leader was the future president of the country, Burhanuddin Rabbani, who authored several books on the theoretical aspects of Islam. The key figure in the military wing of this organization was Ahmad Shah Massoud. The group was active primarily in the northern, Tajik areas of Afghanistan—particularly, in the strategically important Panjshir Valley—and in the western regions of Herat province. The military formations of Jamiat-e Islami that were active in Afghan territory in the late 1980s had up to fifteen thousand members. The primary declared goal of the Islamic Society of Afghanistan was the establishment of a regime of “Islamic justice” in the country by “eliminating the dependence on Russian imperialism” and by overthrowing the regime in Kabul. The Rabbani-Massoud faction received support from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, and Pakistan. A distinctive trait of Jamiat-e Islami was its extensive propaganda activities—it operated a radio station and published a large amount of information and propaganda materials. Already during the anti-Soviet war, there were disagreements between the Rabbani-Massoud faction and Hekmatyar, who claimed to be an Islamic leader and was supported by the Pakistani secret service. Years later, these disagreements erupted into a full-scale armed struggle. In the southern and western regions of Afghanistan, the Soviet forces were resisted by mujahideen from the Islamic and National Revolution Movement (Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami), which was created in 1978 in Pakistan following the Saur Revolution and led by Mullah Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi. The core of this group consisted of orthodox Afghan clerics, “Servants of the Qur’an.” The goals of this group were fighting against the PDPA regime and creating an “Islamic republic based upon the principles of independence, national sovereignty, and guaranteeing basic social freedoms, to defend Islam and the Qur’an.” The “Islamic and National Revolution Movement” was composed largely of religious fanatics, former madrasa students. Fighters of this group were known for their exceptional brutality. By the late 1980s, the military formations of this movement had

Afghanistan: From Mujahideen to Taliban

about 26,000 mujahideen. The Revolution movement was supported by Saudi Arabia and Western countries. In June 1978, following the merger of eight Afghan émigré groups (the so-called “Zealous Muslims”), the Afghan National Liberation Front was created. Its leader was Sibghatullah Mojaddedi. Like many other muja- hideen groups, the primary objective of the Liberation Front was establishing an Islamic republic in the territory of Afghanistan. Its leaders called upon all Afghan mujahideen to unite in the struggle against the “Afghan communists and the Soviet forces.” Mojaddedi and his followers were prepared to go a long way to achieve this unity—they were even willing to ally themselves with the monarchists, although they refused to negotiate with Maoists and Islamic extremists such as Hekmatyar. The military formations of the Liberation Front had up to six thousand fighters, while the total number of supporters of this group in the entire territory of Afghanistan was about ten thousand. The group received aid from Saudi Arabia, the US, Pakistan, and the Muslim Brotherhood. Its headquarters were located in Peshawar. In 1978, the notable Afghan religious activist and leader of the Sufi minority, Sayyid Ahmed Gailani, created the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan, which advocated restoring the monarchy in the country. Compared to other anti-government organizations, Gailani’s group seemed rather moderate, and it did not support the Islamic fanaticism of the other groups. Gailani’s faction was quite influential, especially in the Kabul and Kandahar provinces. In total, the National Islamic Front had up to 15,000 supporters, of whom about eight thousand were armed fighters. The leaders of this faction had close ties with Western countries. The headquarters of the National Islamic Front were in Peshawar, and they also had a representative in Iran. In 1980–1981, the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan (Ittehad-e Islami bara-ye Azadi-ye Afghanistan) was formed. Its leader was Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf, an ethnic pashtun and a professor at a small university in Kabul. This group was supported by the Jaji and Jadran Pashtun tribes, especially in the southeastern regions of the country. The primary goal of the Islamic Union was liberating Afghanistan from atheism and the communist regime, creating a government based upon the Qur’an and the Sunnah, and cooperating with all the Islamic movements that are fighting for the liberation of Muslim lands. The military formations

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of this group had more than three thousand mujahideen. The Islamic Union was supported by Saudi Arabia and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. In addition to the Sunni anti-governmental groups, there were also some Shiite groups that fought in Afghanistan and received aid primarily from Iran. In 1980, the pro-Iranian Shiite Nasr (Victory) group was created (its leader was Sheikh Mazari). There were up to four thousand Nasraffiliated combatants active in the central provinces of Afghanistan, in the Hazarajat region. They were well-trained and well-equipped with weapons and ammunition. The militants of Nasr were in constant conflict with rival mujahideen groups—especially the pro-Pakistani ones. They were supported by Iran and China, and received aid from the US. The headquarters of this group were located in Qom. In 1988, Abdul Ali Mazari united several Shiite groups into the Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami Afghanistan). In the Western provinces of the country, there were approximately four thousand active fighters belonging to the Hizb-e Allah (the Party of Allah), which was created by Iran in 1982 in order to spread the Islamic revolution. The leader of this group, which was based in the Iranian city of Mashhad, was Qari Ahmed Yekdaste. Another mujahideen group under Iranian control was Sepohi Pasdar (Corps of the Revolutionary Guards), which was relatively small in number (less than 1000 members), and was active in the Ghor and Bamian provinces. Since Maoist views were widespread among members of this group, the Revolutionary Guards also received aid from China (there were Chinese instructors in their military formations). The Revolutionary Guards coordinated their activities with the Nasr group. In Hazarajat (central Afghanistan), the Shiite militants of the Unity Council (Shuray-e Ittefaq) were active (for the most part, they fought not against government forces, but against rival mujahideen groups). They were led by Sayyid Jagran, a wealthy landowner and a former government officer. Their primary demands were the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the country and autonomy for the Hazara people. One of the largest Shiite groups (with more than 3 thousand fighters) was the Islamic Movement of Afghanistan, which was in close cooperation with the Hazara underground in the Gazni, Kandahar, Herat, and Kabul provinces. Unlike other Shiite groups, the Islamic Movement coordinated its activities with pro-Pakistani Sunni organizations.

Afghanistan: From Mujahideen to Taliban

In addition to the abovementioned mujahideen groups, there were also numerous minor factions and local military formations active in Afghanistan in those years. The leaders of the opposition tried repeatedly to create a broad coalition of mujahideen. One particularly notable attempt at unification was the Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahideen (also known as the “Peshawar Seven”). This union included the following groups: Hezbi Islami, Jamiat-e Islami, the Khalis Faction (led by Yunus Khalis), the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan, the Afghanistan National Liberation Front, the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan, and the Islamic and National Revolution Front. The headquarters of Islamic Unity were located in the city of Peshawar in Pakistan. The post of leader of the union was rotated between the heads of the seven member factions (with the head of each faction serving as the leader for a period of three months). However, despite the oath to maintain unity (which was sworn upon the Qur’an by the organizers) the union eventually broke apart. The disagreements between the various mujahideen factions were acute, occasionally resulting in armed confrontations between them. The only factor keeping them unified—for a certain period of time—was the Soviet military presence. They were forced to fight together against the Shuravi army. The mujahideen forces evolved from local militias into a major national guerilla force, consisting of numerous groups that were held together by the presence of a common enemy, while pursuing different political, ethnic, and regional goals. The Kabul regime and the Soviet forces were opposed by millions of armed and unarmed people. Out of them, approximately 200,000 were active fighters, equipped with modern weapons, including Stinger and Blowpipe missiles, MILAN antitank systems, and surface-tosurface rockets. The total militarization of society ultimately became the basis for the Afghan Civil War, which has not ended to this day. A separate subject is the involvement of foreign volunteers in the Afghan War. Despite the widespread outrage at the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the Muslim world, and despite the large numbers of volunteers from various Muslim countries who traveled to neighboring Pakistan to fight in the Afghan Jihad, the extent of their actual participation in military activities is frequently cast into doubt. Similar doubts are raised regarding the extent of the American aid to the foreign mujahideen who came to help the armed Afghan opposition. Some authors, like Marc Sageman, claim that many foreigners “were not serious about the war. Some Saudi tourists

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came to earn their jihad credentials. Their tour was organized so that they could step inside Afghanistan, get photographed discharging a gun, and promptly return home as a hero of Afghanistan.”4 Following the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in February 1989, the Mujahideen Council in Pakistan elected Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, leader of the Afghan National Liberation Front, as head of the interim mujahideen government. Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf, leader of the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan, was appointed to the post of prime minister. In the summer of 1989, the armed opposition formed a new coalition, the Jihad Council, which was intended by its creators to provide an alternative to the interim government of the mujahideen. The Council consisted of three independent Sunni mujahideen groups and the Shiite Union of Eight, which was based in Iran. In early December 1991, the majority of the Peshawar-based mujahideen groups gathered in Islamabad (the capital of Pakistan) and signed an agreement about the creation of a Supreme Leadership Council, which would replace the existing government of the Afghan opposition. The plan was to establish a neutral government in Kabul, which would be led by Burhanuddin Rabbani, leader of the Islamic Society of Afghanistan. The neutral government would be tasked with organizing a general election in Afghanistan within one year from the day of its creation. Three mujahideen movements refused to sign the agreement: the Islamic Party of Afghanistan (led by Yunus Khalis), the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan (led by Rasul Sayyaf), and the Iran-based Party of Islamic Unity. In April 1992, armed mujahideen battalions entered Kabul—after the virtual coup carried out by General Dostum, Hero of the Republic and commander of the Uzbek troops, who decided to change his allegiance and defected to the winning side. Najibullah was removed from office and forced to seek sanctuary in the UN compound in Kabul. On April 28, 1992, control over Kabul was given to the Supreme Council led by Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, who became the interim president of the country. At the same time, an interim government was formed. These changes led to the abolishment of the old governing structures of the Republic of Afghanistan, and laws that were incompatible with the Sharia were revoked. 4

  Sageman, 58.

Afghanistan: From Mujahideen to Taliban

The overthrow of the Najibullah regime and the pullout of Soviet forces did not bring peace and quiet to the Afghan people. The inability of the mujahideen groups to rise above their narrow factional interests prevented the unification of the country and the establishment of true peace. The agreement on the division of power brokered by Pakistan did not allow the various parties to form a national government. This agreement served only to determine the distribution of government posts among rival factions. The Rabbani administration failed to expand its ethnic base, which was limited mostly to Tajiks, Uzbeks, and several national minorities. The attempt to organize a single pan-Afghan army that could aid in the unification of the country was also a failure, and this army existed only on a nominal level. The leaders of the opposition—as well as those mujahideen who formally supported the government—were reluctant to disarm their followers and join a weak government that was controlled (politically and militarily) by the Rabbani-Massoud Tajik faction. An internecine war broke out between the mujahideen groups. This new phase of the civil war led to tens of thousands of civilian casualties. The leaders of multiple armed factions tore the country apart, transforming it into a patchwork of fiefdoms, looting private and public property, and engaging in drug trade, extortion, corruption, and violence. These actions were not limited to the territory of Afghanistan. During the civil war that raged in Tajikistan in 1991–1993, the Afghan mujahideen provided military support to the Tajik opposition, engaging in armed clashes with Russian frontier guards. On July 13, 1993, Afghan mujahideen and Tajik Islamists broke through the Afghan-Tajik border and attacked the 12th Russian Frontier Post. The ferocious struggle for power in Afghanistan involved several factions. One side consisted of the presidential (Kabul) coalition, which was led by Rabbani and Massoud, and included the Islamic Society of Afghanistan (led by Rabbani and Massoud), the Islamic Society of Afghanistan (led by Ismail Khan), and the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan (led by Rasul Sayyaf). The other side in this conflict was the opposition coalition, led by G. Hekmatyar and A. R. Dostum, including: the National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (led by Abdul Rashid Dostum), the Islamic Party of Afghanistan (led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar), and the Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan (a Shiite Hazara movement led by Karim Khalili). The composition of both coalitions was highly unstable,

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as various military formations regularly switched their allegiance from one coalition to the other. For instance, Dostum and his forces deserted from the presidential coalition and joined the opposition (earlier, he had left the service of the Najibullah regime and sided with the mujahideen), whereas the Pashtun leader Rasul Sayyaf made the opposite switch—from Hekmatyar’s coalition to Rabbani and Massoud’s camp. Independent military formations represented a third side in this civil war. A new side in the internal Afghan conflict was the Islamic Taliban movement, led by Mullah Mohammed Omar, an ethnic Pashtun who received a religious education in the Pakistani border city of Quetta and took part in the war against the Soviets in the 1980s. The ideology of the Taliban has its roots in the creation of a network of thousands of madrasas that spread all over Pakistan. Following the Saur Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, multiple madrasas (religious schools) were set up in Pakistan along the Afghan border. These madrasas were funded by the oil-producing monarchies of the Persian Gulf, particularly by Saudi Arabia. In the 1980s, hundreds of Afghan refugees in Pakistan enrolled in these religious schools, which became the most attractive centers for many Afghans residing in refugee camps in Peshawar and Quetta. Studying in these madrasas was a source of income for many families, since the schools provided free food and lodgings to the students (Taliban—from the Arabic “talib,” meaning “student” or “seeker of knowledge”), in addition to paying a monthly stipend that allowed the students to provide financial aid to their relatives. Since the refugee camps were the primary source of mujahideen activity, the Afghan opposition factions were extremely active in them—in particular, G. Hekmatyar’s Hezbi Islami and B. Rabbani’s Jamiat-e Islami were actively involved with those schools. The madrasas were also controlled by two powerful Pakistani Islamic parties: Jamaat Islami Pakistan and Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islami Pakistan. The interpretation of Islam promoted by Jamaat Islami Pakistan was close to the ideology of the leaders of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, such as Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, and it had close similarities to Mawdudi’s political ideology. Jamaat Islami Pakistan had a wide range of connections with many revolutionary Islamic groups around the globe, in particular with the Egyptian organizations. By contrast, Jamaat-e-Ulemae-Islami Pakistan was a more traditional force, supported by Saudi Arabia. Most of the leaders of the Taliban graduated from schools run by Jamaat-

Afghanistan: From Mujahideen to Taliban

e-Ulema-e-Islami Pakistan.5 According to unofficial information, the Taliban received military aid from Pakistan and were supported financially by Saudi Arabia. Many graduates of these religious schools, together with their teachers, participated in the struggle against the Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the Soviet armies. “The chaotic situation inside Afghanistan created a deep gap between the political leaders and the general public…This gap was the direct result of fighting over political power by these leaders in Kabul and their failure to form a nationally based government. This absence of a nationally accepted leadership allowed the Taliban to emerge strongly and aggressively.” The Taliban’s rise to power and their popularity among various segments of Afghan society was greatly aided by the movement’s image as a force that could put an end to the lengthy internecine conflict.6 Having emerged as a popular reaction against the prevailing chaos in the fragmented state, the puritan Sunni militia of the Islamic Taliban movement enjoyed widespread support among the masses, who were weary of the endless violence and lawlessness. Being a movement that consisted mostly of Pashtuns, the Taliban were supported by Pakistan and by Pashtuns from all over the country, who hoped that the Taliban would reassert their national supremacy, which had been damaged following the takeover of Kabul by the mostly Tajik Rabbani government. The ideology and practices of the Taliban managed to reconcile anti-nationalist Islamic views with Pashtun nationalism. The extremely rigid and anti-modern ideology of the Taliban is closely related to the Deobandi interpretation of Islam, which was adhered to by the supporters of the Pakistani Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam party. Their ideology was also influenced to a certain extent by Saudi Wahhabism, as well as by the ideas of jihadism and pan-Islamism. Behind all the ideals of the Taliban—the belief in the necessity to purify Islam, the desire to put an end to the civil war and establish a truly Islamic government in Afghanistan—lurked the pragmatic interests of foreign intelligence agencies (in particular, the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence), who were pursuing their own ends. 5

  Neamatollah Nojumi, The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of the Region (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 120.

6

  Ibid., 121.

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In the autumn of 1994, the Taliban movement launched a military offensive against the government forces, with the declared goal of ousting President Burhanuddin Rabbani, who was “unable to bring peace to the land of Afghanistan,” and enacting Islamic legislation in the country. The promise of finally bringing peace to the war-torn land of Afghanistan drew the sympathy of many Afghans, and this factor (in addition to the extensive military and financial aid provided by Pakistan) was an important component in the Taliban’s victory over their opponents. The first military successes of the Islamist Taliban opposition movement were achieved in the autumn of 1994. In February 1995, the Taliban march on Kabul began. One month later, they were thrown back by forces loyal to President Rabbani, which were under the command of Ahmad Shah Massoud. In September 1995, the Taliban managed to capture Herat, the largest city in western Afghanistan. In October of the same year, the Taliban tried once again to storm Kabul. Their forces established control over the hills around the capital. In October 1995, a gathering of the Taliban leaders took place in the Pakistani city of Quetta. In this gathering, they resolved to expand the holy war against the “illegitimate and anti-Islamic” Rabbani government. In May 1996, President Rabbani and former Prime Minister Hekmatyar signed an agreement on the establishment of an interim government in Afghanistan, after which general elections would be held. This agreement was also approved by Ahmad Shah Massoud, one of the most powerful Afghan field commanders, and Rasul Sayyaf, leader of the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan. Rabbani and Hekmatyar—who had been mortal enemies only a short time before—also managed to reach an agreement on creating a new Islamic army in Afghanistan that would replace the separate mujahideen groups, which were uncoordinated and occasionally feuded with each other. It was also decided that Afghanistan must be “an Islamic state, with all that it entails.” However, these agreements could not halt the victorious march of the Taliban. By September 1996, Taliban forces were in control over approximately 70% of the territory of Afghanistan. In September 1996, the Taliban captured Kabul and declared the establishment of “truly Islamic rule” all over the country (their first decrees were enforcing mandatory prayer five times a day and prohibiting women from working). The fall of Kabul to the Taliban was an enormous blow to their opponents. It became obvious

Afghanistan: From Mujahideen to Taliban

that the Taliban had truly seized power, and that they would not give it up easily. After seizing the Afghan capital, the Taliban immediately began to eliminate their enemies. They stormed the UN compound and arrested Najibullah—who had found sanctuary there back in 1992—together with his brother. Both of them were executed in a brutal and humi- liating way. After securing the capital, the Taliban continued to reap successes. Inspired by their victories, they marched on Jabal Saraj, Gubahar, and later on Bagram. By October 1, 1996, Taliban detachments approached the Panjshir Valley, the old stronghold of the field commander Ahmad Shah Massoud. The capture of Kabul by the Taliban did not end the civil war in Afghanistan. Au contraire, the country was virtually split in two. The north was still held by forces hostile to the Taliban. In the summer of 1998, the Taliban continued their successful march northwards. In July, Mullah Omar threatened neighboring Tajikistan and Uzbekistan with “serious consequences” if they allowed the anti-Taliban coalition to use their territory as a staging ground. In August 1998, the Taliban rejected an offer by Russia and Uzbekistan to cease hostilities in Afghanistan and begin negotiations, stating that “under the current circumstances” they would not offer any concessions to the opposition. In August 1998, Taliban forces captured Mazar-i-Sharif, a strategically important city. In addition to Mazar-i-Sharif, they also managed to seize the port city of Hairatan on the Afghan-Uzbek border. In September 1998, they conquered Bamyan province, the stronghold of the Iran-backed Afghan Shiites, after subjecting the area to massive shelling and bombardment. The Taliban even tried appealing to the UN to prevent Iran from “meddling” in Afghan affairs. According to Taliban spokesmen, Tehran was supplying the Afghan Shiite militants with weapons and ammunition. This led to a marked deterioration in the relations between the Taliban and Iran— especially when there were reports that Iranian diplomats at the Iranian consulate in Mazar-i-Sharif had been murdered by the Taliban. The Taliban offered a hostage exchange to Iran: they would release 40 Iranian citizens captured by them in Afghanistan in exchange for the leaders of the antiTaliban coalition. In response, the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei called the Taliban “brutal, dogmatic, and ignorant people” who served foreign interests.

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After gaining control over most of the country (apart from the northern regions, which were controlled by the Northern Alliance), the Taliban changed the official name of the state in October 1997 to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. This was done in order to strengthen the official position of Mullah Omar, who was granted the title Amir al-Mu’minin (Commander of the Faithful)—the highest spiritual title in the Islamic cali- phate of old. The motif of the caliphate was quite prominent in the Taliban’s conceptions regarding the future political system. N. Nojumi writes that “In accordance with the Taliban, Mullah Mohammed Omar Mujahed, leader of the movement, is amir-ul-mumanin (the leader of the believers)… In Afghanistan, the amir-ul-mumanin also is the Khalifah, who rules the territory under his control in accordance with the Islamic law, Shariah. All Muslims and non-Muslims who live in such a territory are obligated to obey the Khalifah. A Khalifah is selected by a small council of leaders who have religious capacity and communal trust.”7 The leadership of the Taliban issued pan-Islamist declarations about the need to unify all the Muslims in the world. According to the Russian expert R. Sikoyev, this unification was supposed to be carried out under the aegis of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan: “Such ambitions, concealed behind pan-Islamist slogans, can be largely explained by the Taliban’s desire to prove their worth by asserting hegemony over at least some region of the Islamic world.”8 Incidentally, the Taliban emirate was cited approvingly by Islamists (even after its downfall) as a notable attempt at reviving the caliphate. The famous Islamist propagandist Anwar al-Awlaki referred to it (together with the Islamic courts in Somalia) as “the two most successful examples…of Islamic rule”: “in both countries only these Muslim fighters brought peace, security, and rule of law… Both movements reached power not through elections or debates but through war. They did not fall because they were failures but they fell because the ummah failed them. However, even though a battle here and there was lost, the war is not over.”9 7

  Ibid., 152.

8

  Сикоев Р.Р. Панисламизм: История и современность. М., 2010. С. 202.

9

  Anwar al-Awlaki, “A Question About the Method of Establishing a Caliphate,” http://www.imamtv.com/metod_ustanovleniya_halifata.htm.

Afghanistan: From Mujahideen to Taliban

In the summer of 1998, the spiritual leader of the Taliban, Mullah Mohammed Omar, announced that there would be no parties or political movements in the territories controlled by the Taliban. According to him, the citizens of Afghanistan must live and work “within the framework of the Islamic Sharia” and they have “no need of any parties or charters.” As for “some kind of liberty,” Omar claimed that this notion “would only damage Islam and patriotic feelings.” At the same time, “positive criticism” of the actions of the Taliban government was permitted. Omar claimed that he would welcome any individual or collective criticism. In all the territories controlled by them, the Taliban enacted draconian measures based on their extremely narrow interpretation of the Sharia. Music, video equipment, movies, etc., were all banned. The duty of enforcing the religious commandments was relegated to the Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice. Edicts were issued requiring men to grow beards of a certain length, and rules were formulated regarding the external appearance of women, who were required to cover their faces in public. There was also a ban on female employment (which caused immense hardship to women who had been widowed as a result of the ongoing conflict, condemning them to abject poverty).10 In the apt expression of Gilles Kepel, author of Jihad: the Expansion and Decline of Islamism, “The Taliban are a disaster for the Islamic movement, in the same way that Pol Pot and Enver Hoxha were a disaster for communism.”11 In July 1998, as part of their campaign of instilling a truly Islamic spirit in society, the Taliban ordered all the inhabitants of the territories controlled by them to destroy all television sets, videotape recorders, and satellite antennas within two weeks. The Taliban explained this move by claiming that movies and music lead to moral decay among orthodox Muslims, and that “all objects that are incompatible with Islam must be destroyed.” Even before that, all the cinemas were shut down. In August 2001, Mullah Mohammed Omar issued an edict forbidding the use of the Internet in Afghanistan. The Kabul-based Sharia Radio announced that this ban applied to all the citizens of the country and to the international charities that were operating in Afghanistan. 10

  Clements, 242.

11

  Gilles Kepel, Jihad: expansion et déclin de l’islamisme (Paris: Gallimard, 2000), 236.

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Multiple appeals to the Taliban government by the UN demanding to improve the status of human rights (particularly women’s rights) were met with sharp criticism from Mullah Omar. He referred to the UN demands concerning human rights as “atheist policy” that would “increase the incidence of adultery”: “The UN, under the influence of imperialist superpowers, misleads the Muslims, leading them away from Islam under the pretext of human rights.” Pointing out the fact that the policies of the Taliban were based on the Qur’an, Mullah Omar rejected the UN demand to revoke the ban on female employment and education in Afghanistan. According to him, acceding to the UN demands about female education “would grant the women licentious freedom that would lead to adultery and destroy Islam.” Under Taliban rule, Afghan women were allowed to study (at mosques) only until the age of 10. They were prohibited from attending middle school, let alone universities and colleges. There was also a total ban on women working outside the household, and it applied even to female teachers, engineers, and most other professions. Only a small number of female nurses and doctors were allowed to work at certain hospitals in Kabul. Furthermore, the Taliban enacted a total prohibition on all kinds of female activity outside the home, except for cases when the woman was accompanied by a mahram (a close male relative). Women who were not dressed according to Taliban norms (i.e. whose bodies were not covered), or women who ventured onto the streets without a mahram, were subjected to floggings, beatings, and verbal abuse. Those Afghan women who were found out to have engaged in pre-marital sexual activity were stoned to death (many lovers were executed by stoning in accordance with this rule). It was forbidden to celebrate the traditional New Year (Nowruz) in the spring. Preaching any religion other than Islam was regarded as one of the most heinous crimes, and converting from Islam to another religion was punishable by death. The religious intolerance of the Taliban extended even to monuments. They decided to destroy the Buddha statues in Bamyan province, which had been carved from rock more than 1500 years earlier, since these idols were incompatible with Islamic teachings. In March 2001, evidence emerged documenting the destruction of the two giant statues by religious fanatics. Furthermore, the explosions that destroyed the statues also damaged 80% of the unique frescoes that decorated the walls of the monastery that was located inside the caves in that area. It is possible that

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in destroying the statues, the Taliban were pursuing two goals: on the one hand, it was part of their declared fight against idolatry; on the other hand, they created a provocation, seeing as how Buddhists in many countries were deeply offended by this desecration and tried to take revenge upon Muslims, burning the Qur’an and organizing pogroms. This exacerbation of interreligious tensions and the resulting radicalization of Muslims were quite desirable from the Taliban point of view. Even when in control of up to 90% of the territory of Afghanistan, the Taliban did not manage to stabilize the situation in the country or create an effective government. The extensive ties of the Taliban to Pakistan (especially to the Pakistani intelligence agencies) and to foreign extremists and terrorists who figured prominently on international wanted lists (such as Osama bin Laden), combined with their extreme human rights violations, led to international isolation of the movement. The international community did not recognize the Taliban as the legitimate representatives of the Afghan people. The Taliban emirate was granted official recognition by only three states (Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates). Under the rule of the Taliban, Afghanistan became a regional and global center for groups and movements who espoused not only radical Islamism, but also extremism and even outright terrorism. Afghanistan was transformed into a training ground for volunteers who came there to gain battle experience which they would later use to wage wars in their own homelands. This factor drew dozens of foreign militants of other nationalities (including Kashmiris, Chechens, Uzbeks, Uyghurs, etc.) to Afghanistan. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan became a haven for Osama bin Laden and many of his colleagues from Al-Qaeda and other extremist organizations. During the early period after their rise to power, the Taliban were largely accepted by Russia, since the Russian government did not consider them to be a serious threat. Indeed, it seemed to be a simple case of a change in government during a civil war between various factions, and virtually all of those factions had been hostile to Russia during the anti-Soviet war. Furthermore, the anti-Taliban coalition did not arouse much sympathy in Russia because of their actions on the Tajik border. For all these reasons, the Russian government was in no hurry to become involved in the new round of the Afghan civil war. However, it should be noted that Alexander

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Lebed, who was then chairman of the Russian Security Council, declared that the Russian Federation must support the anti-Taliban forces of Ahmad Shah Massoud, General Dostum, and Afghan Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. By contrast, Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov publicly disagreed with him, saying that he was “not convinced that Moscow should be supporting the Afghan forces that resist the Taliban movement.” At the same time, Yevgeny Primakov also said that the Russian Federation should not hasten to recognize the legitimacy of the Taliban government. “We are no sympathizers of the Taliban movement, and we have condemned it repeatedly in the past. However, this is not the time to interfere in Afghan affairs, nor is it the time to recognize the new government,” said the Russian foreign minister. This semi-indifferent Russian attitude towards the Taliban gradually changed to hostility with the inexorable march of the Taliban forces towards the Russian border. An additional reason for this hostility was an incident in which the crew of an Ilyushin II-76 airplane was taken hostage. On August 3, 1995, a Taliban MIG-21 interception plane forced a Russian airplane to land at Kandahar Airport. It was a cargo plane belonging to the Aerostan company (from Tatarstan), and it was delivering 120 crates of ammunition from Albania via Sharjah (in the UAE) to Kabul, for the armies of President Rabbani. The seven Russian crewmembers were held by the Taliban as hostages. Endless negotiations by the Russian foreign ministry, the efforts of the government of Tatarstan, the mediation of international organizations—none of these yielded any results. Russian Prime Minister V. S. Chernomyrdin made repeated personal appeals to leaders of countries that had some influence over the Taliban, such as US Vice President Al Gore and the Saudi royal family. The Taliban made absurd demands, such as the demand to receive information about the fate of 60,000 Afghans who had gone missing in action during the anti-Soviet war and were supposedly being held in Russia against their will. The Russian immigration authority conducted an investigation, but could not find a single Afghan out of the list of names provided by the Taliban. This task was made difficult by the fact that, in addition to the 11,000 officially registered Afghan refugees residing in Russia, there were also 30,000 illegal refugees. Furthermore, many of those refugees had managed to illegally emigrate from Russia to European countries. In addition to this demand, the Taliban also requested an official declaration by Russia that it would not intervene in internal Afghan affairs.

Afghanistan: From Mujahideen to Taliban

Russia acceded to this demand. There was no chance to resolve this crisis through political means, however, and the Russian crewmembers managed to escape from Taliban captivity on August 16, 1996. Another factor influencing the Russian attitude towards the Taliban was their open support for the Chechen separatists. In January 2000, the Afghan Taliban officially recognized the independence of Chechnya. In January 2001, the Taliban foreign minister Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil confirmed that the Taliban were “openly proclaiming their support” for the Chechen separatists, while “many other Muslim states are providing financial and military support to Chechnya, but do so in secret.” According to the minister, support for Chechnya “will continue until the Chechens themselves declare that they have attained freedom.” Muttawakil clarified that it was “diplomatic and moral support.” The United States also originally regarded the Taliban as just one of the feuding mujahideen factions, notable only for its excessive fundamentalism (although it should be noted that, compared to other mujahideen groups—such as Hekmatyar’s Hezbi Islami—the Taliban looked quite unremarkable). Another reason for this attitude was the extensive support given to the Taliban by the Pakistani intelligence agencies. Some further interesting evidence on this subject was provided in 1996 by Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who claimed that the madrasa network in Pakistan had been created through the initiative and sponsorship of three states (the US, the United Kingdom, and Saudi Arabia). The purpose of this network was to train the Afghan Pashtun refugees who would later form the military wing of the Taliban movement. The task of managing this network was relegated to the fundamentalist Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islami party. “The US and the UK were supplying the Taliban with weapons, which were paid for by Saudi Arabia,” Bhutto claimed in an interview with a BBC reporter. The declared desire of the Taliban leaders to restore the longawaited peace and stability in Afghanistan gave the Taliban a measure of respectability. Another important factor was their declared policy of combating the drug trade—for this reason, the Clinton administration was engaged in active contacts with the Taliban government starting in 1998. The US refrained from hostile actions against the new masters of Kabul for a rather long period of time—this policy remained in effect even after it became known that Osama bin Laden was hiding in Afghanistan. The

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retaliatory strike on Afghan territory after the bombing of the US embassies in Africa in 1998 was not really aimed at the Taliban, but specifically at the leader of Al-Qaeda. However, the 9/11 attacks in the US became a casus belli for the American invasion of Afghanistan, which led to the toppling of the Taliban regime. Later in the autumn of 2001, it became known that the American administration had acquired documentary evidence that Mohamed Atta, the leader of the terrorists who had carried out the suicide attacks in America on September 11—as well as some of the other perpetrators of the attacks in New York and Washington, D.C.—had been trained in Osama bin Laden’s camps in Afghanistan and that, during their training, they had been in personal contact with bin Laden’s right-hand man, Ayman al-Zawahiri. In mid-September 2001, the Americans established contact with the Northern Alliance to organize an operation against Osama bin Laden’s camps. Earlier, the Northern Alliance had announced their willingness to provide military assistance to the US forces during the operation. At the same time, a Pakistani delegation traveled to Afghanistan to convey an American ultimatum to the Taliban—they had to extradite Osama bin Laden to the US within three days or face an American military strike. On September 18, 2001, Mullah Mohammad Hassan Akhund, First Deputy of the Taliban Council of Ministers, made a speech on the Voice of Sharia radio station, in which he denied the American allegations that the terror attacks had been committed by the Taliban or by Osama bin Laden—“However, the USA and the global imperialists, as well as the Jews, the Christians, and all those who support them, are plotting to destroy the Islamic order.” This speech was described by analysts as a declaration of jihad upon the Untied States. At the same time, according to the Peshawar-based Afghan Islamic Press agency, the Taliban leaders were just referring to the fact that the Afghan people had to be prepared to fight a “holy war against the infidels” in case of a US reprisal strike following the 9/11 attacks. The Taliban laid down their own conditions in response to the US ultimatum to extradite Osama bin Laden, who was hiding in Afghanistan. The Taliban thought that, if bin Laden were to stand trial, this trial would have to be conducted in a neutral Muslim country. The Taliban leadership also insisted on removing the international sanctions against the Kabul regime and stopping the military and financial aid to the Northern

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Alliance. The Taliban also asked to increase the amount of “international aid to the Afghan people”—i.e. aid to the Taliban themselves. In October 2001, in response to the 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., the US and its allies from the international anti-terrorist coalition launched a military operation in Afghanistan against the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda militants. Some of the goals of the US-led military coalition were: locating and arresting the leaders of terrorist organizations, including Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden; and disabling the defenses and headquarters of terrorist organizations based in Afghanistan. The Taliban quickly lost control over Afghan territory. In November 2001, they were routed from Kabul and Jalalabad, and in early December they were driven from Kandahar. However, these events did not mark the end of the war in Afghanistan or the destruction of the Taliban movement, which has managed to survive and is still a major threat to the Kabul government and the foreign forces stationed in Afghanistan, as well as to the Pakistani authorities. The Taliban have managed to regroup, turning into a powerful insurgent movement that is waging a guerilla campaign and committing acts of terror, including suicide bombings. It is obvious that the Taliban insurgency cannot be defeated by force of arms alone, and yet such a defeat is necessary in order to achieve stability in Afghanistan and in the entire region. Some politicians and experts have proposed trying to establish dialogue with the moderate wing of the Taliban, claiming that such dialogue may help to stabilize the situation. Lately, this idea has been actively promoted by Hamid Karzai, President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and by US President Barack Obama. We should note that this idea is not new. The search for moderate elements within the Taliban has been going on since the formation of the interim Afghan government. Starting in late 2001, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf lobbied for the inclusion of Taliban representatives in the new Afghan government, and in April 2003 the Karzai administration announced that it would work to reintegrate former Taliban who agreed to lay down their arms. In April 2004 in Kandahar, Hamid Karzai issued a formal invitation to members of the Taliban to participate in the election and take part in the process of rebuilding the country. In particular, President Karzai drew a distinction between those Taliban “who want to

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work and farm here” and “the top Taliban—who may number no more than 150 people—who have links with Al-Qaeda.”12 President Karzai reiterated his willingness to engage in dialogue with the moderate Taliban in 2009, when he approved the statements made by US President Barack Obama, who said in an interview with the New York Times that America was not winning any battles against the Taliban, and that he was willing to reach out to moderate elements among the opposition in order to attain a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan.13 From the point of view of the US administration, such policies are an integral part of the new approach to Afghanistan, which involves greater use of diplomacy. Undoubtedly, the choice of such a strategy was influenced by the Iraqi experience, in which the Americans had managed to neutralize a large segment of the Sunni insurgents through diplomatic means. It is also possible that the Americans had studied the Russian efforts to convert former Chechen militants to their side. At the same time, the official government in Kabul has expressed displeasure at the American attempts to bypass the Karzai administration and engage the Taliban directly. It should be noted that quite a few people (both in Afghanistan and outside the country) object to the application of the “moderate” label to any member of the Taliban, considering all members of the movement (both the leaders and their followers) to be extremists. Such feelings are particularly strong among national minorities, who perceive the attempts to bridge the gap between the official Kabul government and the moderate Taliban (i.e. members of a movement that is composed primarily of Pashtuns) as “part of a broader conspiracy to remove all representatives of non-Pashtun nationalities from positions of power all over the country.” This leads to a serious dilemma. On the one hand, it is obvious that, even after the crushing blows inflicted upon it by the US army, the Taliban continues to be an important military and political force in Afghan society, and it is highly unlikely that national reconciliation could ever be achieved without engaging this movement in dialogue. On the other hand, one may 12

  Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi, The Taliban and the crisis of Afghanistan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 238.

13

  See: Helene Cooper and Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “Obama Ponders Outreach to Elements of Taliban,” The New York Times, March 7, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/08/us/politics/08obama.html?ref=politics.

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legitimately wonder whether there are any significant moderate elements within the Taliban. The existence of moderate Taliban members is, by itself, an indisputable fact. We may recall that, during the 1990s, the future president Hamid Karzai supported the Taliban, regarding them as a force that might be able to put an end to the internecine violence in the country, but later he cut off any contact with them. This problem is exacerbated by the lack of a clear definition that would allow us to determine which members of the Taliban are moderate. However, the major obstacle to these efforts is the fact that the dominant stream within the Taliban is far from moderate. The leadership of the Taliban—and Mullah Omar in particular—have rejected all of Karzai’s proposals to engage in dialogue, demanding a complete withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Afghanistan as a first step towards possible future dialogue. Obviously, Karzai cannot accept such a demand, as it would mean certain death for his regime. Even those members of the Taliban who might be described as moderate insist on the pullout of foreign troops from Afghanistan as the major precondition to dialogue with the regime (see, for instance, the interview given to the French Le Figaro newspaper by Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil, former foreign minister in the Taliban government, 1995–2001, and one of the closest advisors of Mullah Omar14). G. Hekmatyar, leader of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan (who is also waging an armed struggle against the Kabul government, even though he is not a Taliban representative) is less categorical in his demands: his precondition for talks is the replacement of the Western coalition troops with a military contingent from Muslim countries. An additional problem is the fact that many of the leaders of the Taliban figure prominently on American wanted lists. This makes dialogue with the Taliban—even with goodwill on their part—a very unlikely possibility. According to declarations made by US President Barack Obama, the primary goal of the military campaign conducted by the Americans against the Taliban in Afghanistan is to prevent the Al-Qaeda terrorist network from reestablishing a base of operations in this country, which would then be used to carry out terrorist attacks against American citizens. However, the question of the relationship between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda is not as 14

  Wakeel Ahmed Mutawakil, “Les talibans sont prêts à négocier,” Le Figaro, April 7, 2009.

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simple as it is commonly depicted by the mass media and by propagandists. Furthermore, since the American invasion of Afghanistan, there has been a significant transformation in the relationship between Al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban who had once provided it with a safe haven. The military presence of the Americans and their allies in Afghanistan began in 2001 under the banner of the War on Terror. Although there has been a recent trend to abandon this concept (since it does not adequately reflect the current situation), the question of terrorism and extremism remains one of the major problems facing not only Afghanistan, but also neighboring countries (primarily Pakistan). Moreover, this threat is spreading beyond the boundaries of the countries that share a border with Afghanistan. The problem of the radical religious extremism emanating from Afghanistan is closely related to the threat of armed conflict and (both military and political) instability spilling over the Afghan border. It must be admitted that this is no longer a potential threat, but rather an objective reality. We are referring primarily to the situation in neighboring Pakistan. It is no coincidence that recently there have been calls to analyze the problem of Afghanistan in the context of the problem of Pakistan. One notable example of this new approach is the fact that US diplomat Richard Holbrooke has been sent to the region as special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan.15 The porous Afghan-Pakistani border allows militants from both countries to move freely between them. In the spring of 2009, following a round of talks with the representatives of the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban decided to send their troops to fight in the southeastern and eastern regions of Afghanistan. The Afghan Taliban movement, which was originally formed on Pakistani soil, has gradually become an important player in internal Pakistani politics. The ideology of the Taliban has become widespread in various parts of Pakistan, especially in the areas near the Afghan border. In December 2007, the Pakistani Taliban group Tehrik-i Taliban Pakistan (Taliban Movement of Pakistan) was officially established under the 15

  Editor’s Note: Richard Holbrooke (1941–2010) was still living and working in this capacity at the time this book was published in its original Russian edition.

Afghanistan: From Mujahideen to Taliban

leadership of Baitullah Mehsud. The stated objectives of this movement are resistance to the Pakistani army, enforcement of Sharia law, and a plan to unite against the NATO-led forces in Afghanistan. In reality, the emergence of the Pakistani Taliban took place much earlier than that, in early 2002, and it was closely related to the intrusion of Pakistani military units into tribal areas in order to combat the armed infiltrators from Afghanistan. Many of the Pakistani Taliban had previously taken part in military activities in Afghanistan. While the Pakistani army was focused on the Afghan Taliban and the foreign militants of Al-Qaeda, small armed groups, which had been resisting the authority of the federal government and acting independently of each other, began to coordinate their activities. The primary stronghold of the Taliban in Pakistan since the early 2000s has been Waziristan, where the Taliban managed to oust the traditional tribal leaders and seize power for themselves in 2004. In February 2006, the new Islamic Emirate of Waziristan (located in the territory of North Waziristan) declared its independence. By spring 2009, the Taliban had gained de facto control over several regions in Pakistan. In early April 2009, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari agreed to enact Sharia law in the Swat Valley region in exchange for an end to hostilities. This move drew sharp criticism from US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who accused Islamabad of surrendering to the demands of the Taliban terrorists. According to several experts, the Pakistani “Neo-Taliban” have a chance to grow from a local group into a transnational force. This was partially demonstrated in late 2008—early 2009, when the Afghan and the Pakistani Taliban, having overcome their differences, formed the Council of United Mujahideen (Shura Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen). The declared goal of this newly-formed alliance was fighting against the Western presence in the region. The Pakistani Taliban uses terrorist tactics, including suicide bombings. According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), a terrorism database, 2,155 civilians were killed in terrorist violence in 2008 and nearly 1800 civilians were killed in the first ten months of 2009.16 In 2009, there were approximately 60 acts of suicide bombing in Pakistan (by comparison, in 16

  Bajoria Jayshree, “Pakistan’s New Generation of Terrorists,” Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/15422/pakistans_new_generation_of_terrorists.ht ml?breadcrumb=%2Fbios%2F13611%2Fjayshree_bajoria%3Fgroupby%3D1%26hi de%3D1%26id%3D13611%26filter%3D456.

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2002 there were only 2 such acts). Several experts link this phenomenon to the growing influence of Al-Qaeda in the tribal zone. Furthermore, there are reasons to suppose that Al-Qaeda is serving as a mediator and coalition builder between the various extremist Pakistani factions. The government of Pakistan and the American intelligence agencies claim that the Pakistani Taliban were behind the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007 (although the group has denied these allegations). In August 2008, the Pakistani authorities banned the group, freezing their bank accounts and taking additional steps against them. In 2009, the army of Pakistan launched a massive ground offensive against the Taliban: military engagements took place in the Swat Valley in the northeast of the country, and in October battles broke out in South Waziristan, an area that borders Afghanistan and is considered to be a stronghold of militant Islamism. In August 2009, Baitullah Mehsud, the amir of the Pakistani Taliban, was killed in a US drone strike. However, the army met with significant resistance from the Taliban, who carried out a series of suicide attacks which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of people, including innocent civilians. Moreover, the participation of American military personnel in anti-Taliban operations is likely to lead to radicalization of the local population (especially following incidents of “friendly fire”, in which innocent civilians are accidentally killed in US missile strikes). The emergence of the Pakistani Taliban is an episode in the extremist and terrorist activity in this country, which is home to such radical religious groups as the Sunni Sipah-e Sahaba, the Shiite Tehrik-e-Jafria, anti-Indian groups (Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Harakat-ul-Mujahidin), the Afghan Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and affiliated groups. We should also note the participation of Islamist expatriates from post-Soviet countries in the conflict. In addition to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, another such movement is Jamaat Bulgar, which is based in the northwestern regions of Pakistan. This group was created in 1999 in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, and is composed primarily of Russian Tatars who have moved there, in addition to Dagestanians, Kabardians, and Russians.17 According to members of this movement, “Jamaat Bulgar is one of the military wings of the Islamic Taliban movement, and it wages jihad in the territory of the Islamic Emirate 17

  http://www.globalterroralert.com/images/documents/pdf/0410/flashpoint_ jamaatbulgaraboutus.pdf

Afghanistan: From Mujahideen to Taliban

of Afghanistan against the Crusader invaders…the Bulgar mujahideen are part of the Islamic Ummah. Therefore, the goal of the Jamaat is not the liberation of some specific territory; rather, it aspires to participate in the liberation of all Muslim lands and does not confine itself to any specific territorial, factional, or national political boundaries.”18 The tensions in Pakistan, which are caused by the activity of extremist religious groups, are an important source of the security problems in Afghanistan, which remain unsolved in spite of all the efforts undertaken by the Kabul regime and the foreign military contingents (the Coalition Forces and the ISAF). According to ISAF estimates, in 2008 the intensity of the military conflict in Afghanistan increased by 60% in comparison to the previous year. In the southern Afghan provinces (Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Zabol), there are several active Taliban groups; the east of the country falls under the sphere of influence of Al-Qaeda and the Haqqani faction; the central regions of Afghanistan are the stronghold of Hezbi Islami, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (in 2010, there were brutal clashes between Taliban forces and Hezbi Islami militants, although the two factions have traditionally fought together against the Kabul regime and the Western coalition). The situation is exacerbated by the organizational merger of the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, and by the militants infiltrating from Pakistan. Both the successes and the failures of the Taliban are likely to lead to the further spread of extremism in the region. The extensive military operations against the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan force the extremists to seek out alternative locations for their activity outside these countries. Such new locations may be found in the Central Asian countries of the former Soviet Union. In particular, some analysts worry that the militants expelled from Afghanistan may find refuge in the Fergana Valley, where, in light of the harsh socio-economic situation, the poor segments of society may come out in support of the radicals.

18

  Jamaat Bulgar, http://tawba.info/ru/index.php?do=static&page=o_nas.

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When evaluating the challenges posed by Afghanistan to the world at large and to the post-Soviet countries in particular, we should keep in mind the following fact: many adepts of a radical-extremist interpretation of Islam see the events unfolding in Afghanistan primarily in the context of the aforementioned global jihad. The events in Afghanistan have had a dramatic impact on the processes taking place in the post-Soviet republics of Central Asia. The geographical proximity of the Central Asian countries to the Afghan hotspot, in addition to the internal contradictions that exist in those countries, creates a nourishing environment for radical extremist groups with an Islamist ideology that are willing to use terrorist tactics to achieve their goals. In the late 1990s—early 2000s, the Islamist activists of this region turned their attention to the Fergana Valley, where armed clashes took place. These clashes were directly related both to the intra-Tajik clan struggle and to the war in Afghanistan. We should note that Taliban-ruled Afghanistan welcomed the militants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, one of whose leaders, Tahir Yuldashev (also known as Muhammad Tahir Farouk), used to be Osama bin Laden’s deputy in the Global Jihad Front. Another leader of the Uzbek Islamists—Jumabay Hojiev (Juma Namangani)—was trained in mujahideen camps in the Afghan provinces of Tahor and Kunduz, and became an ally of the Taliban after their rise to power. Despite the fact that the internationalization of the Islamist militants fighting in Afghanistan has decreased somewhat by 2009–2010, we should not forget that this country has become the major training ground for members of numerous extremist

Jihadism in the Post-Soviet Landscape

organizations. Following the downfall of the Taliban regime, some of the training camps for Islamist militants were relocated to neighboring Pakistan. According to the Uzbek Security Services, the terrorist who carried out a suicide attack in Andijan (May 26, 2009) had been trained in this country. During the dissolution of the Soviet Union and in the context of the process of Islamic revival, virtually all the newly-formed states in Central Asia had to deal with the problem of Islamic radicalism. Foreign forces and missionaries played a major role in the emergence of radical Islamist groups in the Central Asian republics. “On the one hand, Islam was used by the governments of the independent Central Asian republics as one of the instruments in the creation of a new identity and the construction of a new state,” “On the other hand, Islam has become the ideological banner of those forces that advocate an alternative future course for these countries, a course that involves the Islamization of the state. Moreover, Islam is being used more and more frequently as a way of expressing social protest.”1 In Tajikistan, the Islamists were one of the sides in the civil war; there have been violent incidents involving armed extremists in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Despite the fact that the governments and security services of the Central Asian states are fighting against the radical extremists, it would be too optimistic to say that nothing threatens the stability of this region. For instance, during the second half of 2010, there were several acts of terrorism in Tajikistan, which have led many analysts to discuss the possibility of a new outbreak of civil war in this country. In September 2010, there was a terrorist attack on military personnel in eastern Tajikistan which resulted in the deaths of 23 people, including several officers of the Ministry of Defense and the National Guard. This attack has been linked to the former field commanders of the armed Tajik opposition, Abdullo Rakhimov (also known as Mullo Abdullo2) and Allovidin Davlatov.3 According to 1

  Наумкин В.В. Радикальный ислам в Центральной Азии: Опыт, состояние и перспективы (Доклад на международной конференции в Алматы 3 дек. 2007 г.) // Наумкин В.В. Ислам и мусульмане: культура и политика. Статьи, очерки, доклады разных лет. М.—Н. Новгород, 2008. С. 534.

2

  Eliminated in April 2011 in an operation carried out by Tajik Special Forces.

3

  Eliminated in early 2011.

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information provided by the Tajik authorities, mercenaries from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Russian Federation (the Chechen Republic) were involved in the attack on the military personnel. The Rasht Valley, where the attack took place, used to be the stronghold of the United Tajik opposition in the years of the civil war, and many of the field commanders of the opposition had originally come from this region. Right now, the most active Islamist groups in Central Asia are Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Islamic Party of Turkestan (the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan), which operate in virtually all the countries of the Central Asian region (with the possible exception of Turkmenistan). Although the primary declared goal of these movements—the elimination of the secular regimes and the creation of an Islamic caliphate—is more or less identical, there are crucial differences between them on both the theoretical and the practical level. Hizb ut-Tahrir was created by the Islamic scholar and qadi (Sharia judge) Sheikh Taqiuddin al-Nabhani in Jerusalem in 1953. The activities of the pan-Islamist Hizb ut-Tahrir (whose name means Party of Liberation) are not limited to Central Asia, and the movement is gaining strength in European countries (primarily in the UK), in the Greater Middle East, in Southeast Asia, and in Russia. It can be regarded as a global movement, active in more than 40 countries. Boasting more than 1 million members, Hizb ut-Tahrir has a highly efficient organizational structure, and it invests heavily in propaganda campaigns in order to recruit new supporters. Claiming that Muslims today live in the Dar-al-Kufr, the ideologues of Hizb ut-Tahrir draw a parallel between the current state of affairs and the situation in Mecca at the early stages of Muhammad’s prophetic mission. In accordance with this view, the party divides its activities into three stages: a) educating individual people, making them receptive to the ideas and methods of Hizb ut-Tahrir in order to create unity within the party ranks; b) working with the entire Ummah, “so that the Muslim Ummah accepts the ideals of Islam in their entirety as the basis for its future destiny, and starts conducting its life in accordance with Islamic laws”; c) “coming to power, enacting Islamic legislation in real life, and spreading Islam all over the world.”4 Also, it is claimed that the modus operandi of Hizb ut-Tahrir 4

  “The method of Hizb-ut-Tahrir,” trans. from: http://www.hizb.org.ua/ru/o-partii/metod.html.

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combines a high level of secrecy with public activities that are compatible with the law. One of the party’s goals is attaining political legitimacy, and the movement makes full use of political lobbying and of the opportunities accorded by the mass media. According to several authors, Hizb ut-Tahrir first emerged in the Uzbek-controlled part of the Fergana Valley after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It later spread to other parts of the valley claimed by Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.5 In Central Asia, Uzbeks from the Fergana Valley make up the core of the party, although there are also Kyrgyzs, Tatars, Chechens, Kurds, and Russians among its members. Many of the members of Hizb ut-Tahrir are young people, and they are frequently educated. Many members are high school and university graduates, and, occasionally, their knowledge of the Qur’an surpasses that of some members of the clergy. The high level of Hizb ut-Tahrir activity in Central Asia is explained by the fact that, according to the ideologues of the group, this region is completely ready (from a spiritual point of view) for the creation of the great Islamic caliphate. The political program of Hizb ut-Tahrir is based on criticism of the prevailing socio-economic conditions in the Central Asian countries, corruption, etc. It is no accident that Central Asia is the region where Hizb ut-Tahrir is willing to move from theory to practice— including seizing power through violent means. According to some data, members of the organization are undergoing military training in southern Kyrgyzstan, near the Tajik and Uzbek border. Like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Hizb ut-Tahrir is advocating the creation of an Islamic caliphate. However, there are important differences between the two groups. “Judging from its political objectives, the overthrow of the present regimes [in Central Asia] and the setting up of a Sharia-based caliphate, Hizb ut-Tahrir is a revolutionary organization, like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Judging by the methods it advocates for changing society, however, Hizb ut-Tahrir is not revolutionary because it does not advocate the use of violence.” 6 Despite the fact that Hizb ut-Tahrir is banned in 5

  Patrick Bascio, Defeating Islamic Terrorism: An Alternative Strategy (Wellesly, MA: Branden Books, 2007), 209.

6

  Roger E. Kanet, The New Security Environment: The Impact on Russia, Central and

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many countries (including Russia and Germany), there are many analysts (even in the West) that regard Hizb ut-Tahrir as a group that advocates non-violence and calls for the establishment of a caliphate in countries with a Muslim majority. Other analysts consider it a secluded, rigidly homogenous group that is not opposed to violence per se, but only to violence in specific circumstances. In its open publications, Hizb ut-Tahrir claims that it adheres to the method used by the Prophet Muhammad during the creation of the first Islamic state in Medina, limiting its struggle to intellectual and spiritual work, without resorting to violence. “He worked to mobilize public opinion in favor of Islam and tried to influence the political and intellectual elites of his time. Despite the fact that they were boycotted and persecuted, Muhammad and the first Muslims never resorted to violence…Hizb utTahrir aims to change the minds of people, and we object to the use of violence or terror as a way of forcing these changes upon people or society. Therefore, Hizb ut-Tahrir does not condone violence, and is not involved in violent activities.”7 Although it is officially opposed to the use of force, Hizb ut-Tahrir adopts a confrontational approach towards the “infidels”—essentially, this label is applied to all those who disagree with the group, including Muslims. Despite its declared adherence to non-violent methods of struggle, Hizb ut-Tahrir also claims that “The avoidance of violence by the Hizb—in self-defense or against rulers—does not apply in the context of jihad. Jihad will go on until the Day of Judgment. If the Kuffaar [infidels] attack some Muslim country, the Muslim inhabitants of that country must repel the enemy. The members of Hizb ut-Tahrir, by virtue of being Muslims and citizens of that country, must also take part in the fight against the aggressors. Therefore, if there is a Muslim amir who declares jihad for the glory of Allah, the members of Hizb ut-Tahrir, being Muslims, will march in the vanguard of the Holy War.”8 Many experts suspect this organization of supporting violence in specific political situations, when such violence is deemed to be necessary, or when it is classified as self-defense. Furthermore, we should Eastern Europe (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005), 190. 7

  Hizb ut-Tahrir, “Our Method,” October 11, 2006, http://www.hizb.org.uk/hizb/who-is-ht/our-method/our-method.html.

8

  Ibid.

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keep in mind that the propaganda spread by Hizb ut-Tahrir may create a favorable ideological environment for more radical groups, paving the way for their growth. However, we also cannot ignore the fact that several militant jihadist groups have criticized this movement (with varying degrees of harshness). For instance, the Yemenite preacher of jihad Anwar al-Awlaki declares the method of establishing the caliphate advocated by Hizb ut-Tahrir to be inefficient: “They…played a role in countering the false idea that politics and political awareness have nothing to do with Islam. However, the method of HT [Hizb ut-Tahrir] to re-establish Caliphate is simply not going to work.”9 Compared to Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)—which has been acting under the name of the Islamic Party of Turkestan since 2006—is a far more odious group. It was created in 1996 with the goal of overthrowing the existing secular government and replacing it with an Islamic state. The militants of this group made use of the experience which they had acquired during the Tajik civil war in the early 1990s. Whereas the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (on whose side the future IMU militants fought during the civil war) has been moving towards the political mainstream in Tajikistan itself, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan has become more radical and extremist. It is notable that, during the settlement of the intra-Tajik conflict, the field commanders of the IMU refused to abide by the terms of the agreement signed between the government of Tajikistan and the United Tajik Opposition. It was this movement that took responsibility for the attack on Tajik military personnel in the Rasht Valley of Tajikistan on September 19, 2010. Spokesmen for the group claimed that the attack was a response to the policies of the Tajik authorities, who, according to the IMU, had recently shut down thousands of mosques all over the country, and were arresting Muslims without due cause, on spurious charges of extremism—in addition to banning women from wearing traditional Islamic clothing. Furthermore, the IMU expressed dissatisfaction at the cooperation between the Tajik authorities and the US and NATO. 10

9

  Anwar al-Awlaki, “A Question about the Method of Establishing a Caliphate,” http://www.imamtv.com/metod_ustanovleniya_halifata.htm.

10

  Translated from: Интерфакс-АВН. 23.09.2010.

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Some of the ideological characteristics of this group are: Salafist Islamic Puritanism; frequent claims to being the de facto governing authority in certain regions (i.e. before seizing power in the country); preaching ideals of social justice; and the declared goal of creating an Islamic, Sharia-based state.11 Furthermore, this movement is clearly oriented towards violent methods of struggle. In August 1999, a large group of IMU militants (up to 1000 individuals) tried to infiltrate from Tajikistan into Uzbekistan through Kyrgyz territory. However, they were pushed back by Kyrgyz security forces. The activity of this group is not limited to the territory of Uzbekistan or the other post-Soviet Central Asian republics, and it spills over into neighboring countries, primarily Afghanistan and Pakistan. Following the overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the death of IMU leader Namangani (in 2001), the group split into several factions. Some militants headed off to other countries, (Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia); another group, which is based in several regions of Pakistan near the Afghan order, specializes primarily in the drug trade and smuggling; and the third group—which is the most dangerous—maintains ties with the Taliban, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezbi Islami, Al-Qaeda, and other radical and extremist groups. This group includes the military formations of T. Yuldashev. After being forced out of Afghanistan, the IMU troops led by Yuldashev settled in the Pakistani provinces of South and North Waziristan, where they actively fought on the side of the Taliban against the army of Pakistan. In 2009, there were reports about the death of Tahir Yuldashev, which were confirmed by the official website of the IMU in 2010—the same sources reported that Usmon Odil (Abu Usman Adil) had become the new leader of the IMU.12 The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan essentially renounced the tactic of large-scale military confrontations, focusing instead on guerilla warfare and acts of sabotage, clandestine activities and organizing terrorist attacks. In the last few years, there has been a marked increase in the activity of Hizb ut-Tahrir in other post-Soviet countries outside the Central 11

  See: Наумкин В.В. Радикальный ислам в Центральной Азии: опыт, состояние и перспективы // Наумкин В.В. Ислам и мусульмане: культура и политика. М.—Н. Новгород, 2008. С. 534.

12

  http://www.furqon.com.

Jihadism in the Post-Soviet Landscape

Asian region—particularly in the Ukraine (and even more particularly in the Crimea) where, in May 2009, the Ukrainian Security Service announced the results of an operation that involved “the unmasking of an attempt by foreigners to set up a cell of the international terrorist organization Hizb ut-Tahrir, which is banned in 29 countries.” However, Hizb ut-Tahrir published an announcement on the Internet claiming that it had been operating in the Ukraine publicly and openly for more than 10 years.13 In Russia, where Hizb ut-Tahrir is classified as a terrorist organization, the group has been active in the Ural region, Tyumen Oblast, and Chelyabinsk Oblast. The Russian National Anti-Terrorist Committee also registered attempts by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan to extend its activities into Russian territory. The Russian Federation is forced to confront the problem of religiouslymotivated extremism, which frequently manifests itself in acts of terrorism. The spread of Islamic extremism in several regions of Russia has become a significant threat, causing nationwide instability, inflaming old conflicts, and possibly creating new conflicts for the future. The regions most susceptible to the spread of radical Islamist movements are the northern and central parts of the Russian North Caucasus—primarily the Chechen Republic, Ingushetia, Dagestan, and—to a lesser extent—KabardinoBalkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia. There are some radical Islamist groups active in other parts of the Russian Federation (such as the Volga region, South Ural, and South Siberia), but these groups are relatively small and far less active than their North Caucasian counterparts. The surge in Islamist and jihadist activity in the Russian North Caucasus is caused by various factors (both internal and external), including the breakup of the Soviet Union, ethnic separatism, deteriorating socioeconomic conditions, and the military conflict in the Chechen Republic, as well as the active intrusion (both financial and religious/ideological) of Wahhabi and Salafi-jihadist ideas from Middle Eastern countries. In the words of one Western author, “The penetration into Russia and Eurasia of the Egyptian Salafi revolutionary jihadism and Saudi Wahhabi fundamentalism…is a post-Soviet phenomenon, the direct result of 13

  “Критерии поступков” http://www.hizb.org.ua/ru/izdaniya/pres-relizi/81-zayavlenie-hizb-ut-tahrir.

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conscious efforts on the part of the international jihadist movement and the Saudi Arabian government.”14 Wahhabi-Salafi groups started appearing in the North Caucasus in the late 1980s—early 1990s with the active aid and financial backing of Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries. In its early stages, this Wahhabi infiltration was limited to charity and educational activities, such as publishing religious literature, creating religious institutions and centers of study, and funding the construction of mosques and madrasas. This infiltration was carried out under the banner of aiding the revival of the Muslim religion in the territory of the former Soviet Union. In the late 1980s—early 1990s, following the wave of the religious revival in the former USSR, it became obvious that there was a marked shortage of qualified clerics. In light of this, Islamic educational institutions in foreign (primarily Arab) countries opened their doors to Russian Muslims who wanted to receive a religious education. Many of those foreign coreligionists “had ulterior motives—the major sponsors of this program were Wahhabi funds, which needed emissaries in order to spread their ideology into a region that had previously been closed off to them.”15 The promoters of Wahhabism contrasted their own interpretation of pure Islam with that of other Muslim movements that had been influential among Muslims in Russia in the past (for example, the Sufi tariqat that were widespread in the North Caucasus). According to Roman Silantyev, “There were many separate Salafist groups that lacked a central coordinating authority and differed in their religious views, and yet all of their followers were nicknamed Wahhabis— a word that has entered the modern Russian lexicon. In Russia, this term usually refers to individuals who consider themselves adherents of Salafism, ‘Saf Islam’ (or ‘pure Islam’), Hanbalis, Habashis, Tablighis, Nursis, members of Islamic Jamaat, adepts of non-Mazhab Sunni Islam, militant Shiism, as well as the Hizb ut-Tahrir party and its many clones.”16 Despite the worries of the traditional Islamic clergy, the authorities did very little to stop the active infiltration of Salafi-Wahhabi ideas in the early 14

  Gordon M. Hahn, Russia’s Islamic Threat (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 25.

15

  Силантьев Р. Ислам в современной России. М., 2008. С. 97.

16

  Ibid., 129.

Jihadism in the Post-Soviet Landscape

1990s. Partially as a result of this inaction, Wahhabism managed to gain a foothold in several North Caucasian regions (especially in Dagestan, and later in Chechnya and in other republics). To a large extent, this proliferation of adepts of the Wahhabi school of Islam (particularly among the youth) was related to the deterioration of the socio-economic conditions both in the region and in the country as a whole. “Many of the young people who went to Wahhabi Jamaat (communities) did not do so under the influence of concepts of ‘pure Islam’ or out of a desire to create an ‘Arabian State.’ The most persuasive arguments in favor of radical Islam were the crushing poverty, hopelessness, and lack of employment opportunities… The calls by preachers of the new movement to fight against the ‘godless government’ and its hypocritical officials found a warm response in the hearts of young people who had despaired of ever living a decent life. Social radicalism created a breeding ground for religious and political radicalism,” writes the expert Timur Muzayev.17 Undoub- tedly, the penetration and spread of religious extremism in the North Caucasus was largely aided by inter-ethnic conflicts (the events in Chechnya, the Ossetic-Ingush conflict, the situation in Karachay-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Dagestan), which were exacerbated by the extremely harsh socio-economic conditions in the region. (However, we should not ascribe the willingness of individuals to join extremist militants groups solely to poverty and the tough socio-economic situation which they face.) Wahhabism managed to gain a foothold in Chenchnya somewhat later than in Dagestan. This happened during the First Chechen War (1994– 1996). Religious motivations played a secondary role in this war, as it was mostly a confrontation between ethnic separatists and the federal center. Although the Chechen separatism did have an Islamic component, it was not very prominent. The attempt by Chechen president Jokhar Dudayev to declare Chechnya a Muslim state and set himself up as an imam aroused anger among many of the faithful and did not succeed. Even after the outbreak of the First Chechen War in 1994, General Dudayev failed to convince the Chief Mufti of Chechnya, Hussein Alsabekov, to declare a jihad against Russia. Jihad was declared only after the appointment of Akhmad Kadyrov to the post of Chief Mufti in March 1995. Later, Mufti 17

  Музаев Т. Этнический сепаратизм в России. М., 1999. С. 217.

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Akhmad Kadyrov led the traditional Muslims in their opposition to the proponents of Wahhabism. As is well known, during the Second Chechen War Kadyrov changed his allegiance and sided with the federal government, later becoming President of the Republic of Chechnya. The growing influence of the preachers of pure Islam, which was particularly noticeable during the interwar period between the two Chechen conflicts (1996–1999), was an important factor in the rise to prominence of the religious motivation in Chechen separatism. “Essentially, the religious component of the Chechen resistance was nurtured by external forces.”18 This was largely caused by the financial aid provided by Saudi Arabia, the countries of the Persian Gulf, and international Salafi organizations, as well as the influx of mujahideen volunteers from other countries, who played a major role in imparting Afghan-style guerilla tactics to the Chechen separatists. Another factor was the flow of funds from extremist Middle Eastern charities to Islamist militants in Chechnya. “The foreign Salafites in Chechnya did not limit themselves to fighting any more than they had in Bosnia or Kashmir where they found the local Sufi customs to be similarly heretical.”19 The participation of foreign volunteers in combat on the side of the separatists “not only emphasized the religious character of the confrontation, but also introduced the principle of Islamic solidarity into the ideological and political discourse, in addition to confirming the well-known thesis of a clash between civilizations.”20 (However, there were also a limited number of Ukrainian volunteers who fought on the side of the separatists in the First Chechen War— this fact is difficult to interpret in terms of a clash between Islam and the West.) According to A. Malashenko, “Salafi ideology, which is commonly known under the label of Wahhabism, was the cause of the politicization of Islam in the North Caucasus, turning the Islamic religion into an instru18

  Малашенко А. Исламские ориентиры Северного Кавказа. М., 2001. С. 116.

19

  Brian G. Williams, “Allah’s Foot Soldiers: An Assessment of the Role of Foreign Fighters and Al-Qa’ida in Chechen insurgency,” in Ethno-Nationalism, Islam and the State in the Caucasus: Post-Soviet Disorder, ed. Moshe Gammer (New York: Routledge, 2008), 162.

20

  Малашенко А. Исламские ориентиры Северного Кавказа. М., 2001. С. 116.

Jihadism in the Post-Soviet Landscape

ment of political struggle. It was Salafist activity that raised the question of just how destabilizing the Islamic factor was, and how much influence it had on the security situation in the region and in neighboring areas. Finally, the activities of proponents of Salafism are directly connected to the problem of the internationalization of the conflict in Chechnya and the issue of international terrorism.”21 At this point, we should note that the reaction of the Islamic world to the events in Chechnya was not uniform, particularly among the political establishment. In most cases, the official reaction of Muslim countries was limited to calls for an end to violence and cessation of hostilities, urging for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. For instance, during the OIC summit in December 1995, the request of Jokhar Dudayev, leader of the separatists, to accept Chechnya as a member of the OIC was rejected, and H. Al-Ghabid, the secretary general of this organization, declared that “each Muslim country may take action against Moscow individually.”22 The position of Saudi Arabia is particularly notable in this respect, as it showed a balanced approach towards the events in Chechnya (among others things, it became obvious that the hopes of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria to gain legitimacy and official recognition in the Arab world were futile), although public opinion in the Wahhabi kingdom was clearly in favor of the separatists. Many Islamic scholars publicly characterized the war in Chechnya as a Muslim jihad, and the famous Saudi religious and political newspaper Al-Muslimun regularly published articles with titles such as “Chechnya… the Crusade goes on!”23 Obviously, the position of the ruling elites in Muslim countries towards the Chechen conflict was regarded by the Islamist opposition as further evidence of their “un-Islamic” character. The ideologues of jihadism—both in the region and outside it— analyzed the events in Chechnya in the context of the global struggle between Muslims and “infidels.” Therefore, they attached great importance to the participation of foreign volunteers in the conflict. After the storming of Grozny by Chechen militants in August 1996, Osama bin 21

  Ibid. С. 76.

22

  Ат-Турки Маджид бен Абдель Азизи. Саудовско-российские отношения в глобальных и региональных процессах (1926–2004 гг.). М., 2005. С.319.

23

  Ibid., 320.

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Laden made the following declaration (addressing the Americans): “The Sons of the Land of the Two Sacred Mosques came out to fight against the Russians in Afghanistan, the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and today they are fighting in Chechnya and, by the permission of God, they have been made victorious over your [the US’s] partner, the Russians.”24 Among the foreign mujahideen who arrived in Chechnya to fight the Russian army, there were quite a few Wahhabis (Ibn Al-Khattab, Sheikh Fathi, Abu-Darr, Abdul-Wahhab, and others), and they played an important role in disseminating this variant of Islam among the Chechen separatists. For instance, the Saudi25 Emir Khattab, who, in the words of one Western author, became the embodiment of a new wave of globetrotting “neojihadis,”26 established a military training base named Kavkaz near SerjenYurt in southeastern Chechnya, which was used to indoctrinate militants from North Caucasian Jamaat into Wahhabi and jihadist ideology, in addition to training them in military and guerilla tactics. According to a Wahhabi preacher who visited Khattab’s camp, the students there “were real mujahideen, the warriors of Islam. In his camps they got what they missed in secular life: a common goal, a sense of community, and the spirit of masculine camaraderie.”27 The available evidence indicates that Khattab was one of the “Afghan Arabs,” and that he was trained at a camp in Pakistan which was run by Sheikh Abdullah Azzam.28 He also fought as a volunteer in Nagorno-Karabakh, Tajikistan, and Bosnia. Obviously, the events unfolding in the North Caucasus did not fail to draw the attention of international extremist networks, including Al-Qaeda. It is known that Ayman al-Zawahiri, one of bin Laden’s closest associates, spent time in the North Caucasus in 1996–1997, and he was even arrested by a Russian border patrol in Dagestan in late 1996. 24

  Brad K. Berner, ed. Quotations from Osama Bin Laden (New Delhi: Peacock Books, 2007), 33.

25

  The exact origin of Ibn Al-Khattab remains a matter of some controversy; some sources claim that he was born in Jordan and had Circassian roots.

26

  Williams, 158.

27

  Paul J. Murphy, The Wolves of Islam: Russia and the Faces of Chechen Terror (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2004), 39.

28

  Ibid., 35.

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However, since he was using a false identity at the time, this leader of Al-Qaeda could not be identified, and so he was released and deported from Russia. Despite the enormous role played by external forces in the radicalization of separatist and opposition forces in the North Caucasus (reinforcing the ethno-religious motivation with religious motivation), it must be admitted that the intra-Russian, local, and regional situation was also an important factor in this process. We should note that the separatists were carrying out a campaign of Islamization in a Chechnya that had become de facto independent following the end of the First Chechen War. In February 1999, Aslan Maskhadov, leader of the separatist regime, signed a decree “enacting Sharia law in the territory of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria,” according to which all aspects of the Chechen state apparatus had to conform to Sharia norms. Several days later, Maskhadov signed a decree on the creation of a Sharia constitution. During the time period between the two Chechen wars, the Wahhabis had much success in their attempts to take over as many structures and institutions of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria as possible (some of the structures that fell under their control were: large military training centers; the command of the Sharia Guard and the Islamic special forces unit; and some Sharia courts and local administrations). These takeovers drew the anger of the separatist leadership and the President of the Chechen Republic, Aslan Maskhadov. The disagreements between the Ichkerian separatists and the Wahhabis led to a series of violent clashes in several towns and settlements in Chechnya, which ended in the temporary defeat of the Wahhabi opposition. Nevertheless, the Wahhabis continued to exert strong influence (in both the military-political and the religiousideological spheres) in Chechnya and in neighboring regions of Russia. Although the nationalist leadership of the Chechen separatist movement did call for the liberation of the region from Russian colonialism and the creation of a confederation of North Caucasian peoples (inspired by the historical example of the Caucasian Imamate of Imam Shamil), its primary goal was the establishment of the independent Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. By contrast, the Wahhabis made no secret of their far-reaching plans to extend their jihad beyond the borders of Chechnya, with the longterm goal of establishing an Islamic state in the entire North Caucasus.

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In A. Malashenko’s view, for most of the leaders of the Chechen separatists “the appeal to Islam is a way of expressing ethnic nationalism and separatism; ultimately, it is a tool they use to accomplish such practical tasks as gaining access to the Caspian Sea, establishing control over the oil pipeline, receiving more financial aid from abroad, etc. This is the diffe- rence between them and groups like the Afghan Taliban, for whom the creation of an Islamic state is the primary political goal, and who turn radical Islam (or, rather, their own interpretation thereof) into the de facto state ideology. When applying the ‘Salafi’ or ‘Wahhabi’ labels to the Chechen leadership, it would be correct to add the prefix ‘quasi-’ to these terms. Local politicians who proclaim their adherence to ‘pure Islam’ are really quasi-Salafis.”29 The Congress of the Peoples of Ichkeria and Dagestan, which was led by Shamil Basayev, played an important role in the spread of Wahhabism. Several Wahhabi leaders from neighboring countries found refuge in the territory of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Even in Dagestan itself, the Wahhabis essentially succeeded in creating individual Islamist mini-states in several regions; these states were virtually torn away from the Russian Federation. During the second half of the 1990s, Wahhabi military formations managed to take control over several villages in the mountainous areas of Dagestan— Karamakhi, Chabanmakhi, Juguntai, and other settlements of Buynaksky District. There were several attacks on Russian military personnel in the republic, and in May 1998 militants stormed the administration building in Makhachkala. The Central Front for the Liberation of Dagestan, which was created by Dagestani Wahhabis, declared that the goals of this holy jihad were: driving the Russian army out of Dagestan; overthrowing the pro-Moscow Dagestani government; and creating an Islamic state in the republic (and, potentially, in the entire North Caucasus).30 The prototype of such a state was the separate Islamic territories that were established by Wahhabis in August 1998 in the villages of Karamakhi, Chabanmakhi, and Kadar. In those villages, Islamic legislation and Sharia jurisprudence were fully enacted, and a Shura (council) of Wahhabi leaders was formed. The situation was exacerbated by the assassination of the Mufti of Dagestan, Sa’id Muhammad-Haji Abubakarov, who was known for his anti-Wahhabi 29

  Малашенко А. Исламские ориентиры Северного Кавказа. М., 2001. С.115.

30

  Музаев Т. Этнический сепаратизм в России. С. 219.

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activities. His car was blown up near the central mosque in Makhachkala on August 21, 1998. In that same year (1998), Ibn Al-Khattab and Shamil Basayev created the so-called Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade, which was composed of Dagestani and Chechen militants, in addition to foreign mujahideen. This brigade attempted to invade Dagestan in 1999, and this invasion was one of the reasons for the outbreak of the Second Chechen War. In a sense, these events marked the peak of the radicalization of Islamist separatism in the region. It must be admitted that “the ban on Wahhabism which was enacted in Dagestan in September 1999 did not change the internal situation in the republic in any perceivable way. In any case, it did nothing to alleviate the economic hardship of those segments of society who really believe that Islam is their only hope for ending the crisis.”31 The events in the North Caucasus are a clear example of how a movement that was originally based on ethnic separatism (despite the religious component that was present there from the beginning) gradually transforms into an extremist, religiously motivated ideology. One important tactic in the rhetorical arsenal of the North Caucasian Islamist propagandists is attacking the very notion of nationalism. In particular, it is claimed that, “Nationalism and patriotism are alien concepts that contradict the very essence of the religion of Allah. They are signs of idolatry and obscurantism. They are a dangerous weapon employed by Shaitan and the enemies of Allah with the goal of sowing discord among Muslims, gradually leading them away from the path of righteousness.”32 One of the ideologues of the North Caucasian jihadists, Anzor Astemirov (who is also known as Amir Seifullah), characterized nationalism as a “remnant of idolatry.”33 V. Naumkin notes that, “The jihad that was declared by the Chechen separatists in the first half of the 1990s served to mobilize the population to fight for secession. It was only later, after 1996, that the separatist 31

  Малашенко А. Исламские ориентиры Северного Кавказа. М., 2001. С. 96.

32

  U Умм Атайа. Об Исламской нации и этническом национализме. Дата публ. 28.03.2009. http://guraba.net/rus/content/view/357/44/.

33

  Амир Сейфуллах: “О гнилом запахе национализма” . Дата публ.: 29.09.2008. http://www.islamdin.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=668:l-r&catid=25:2009-02-09-17-15-12&Itemid=17

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movement mutated into a purely terrorist, Islamist, and jihadist group.”34 Following this mutation, it ceased to be a local movement that was waging jihad against an external, non-Muslim enemy in addition to struggling for independence, and became a part of the project of glo- bal jihad. The gap between nationalist separatism and jihadism is particularly well illustrated by the ruling issued by the Supreme Sharia Court of the Caucasus Emirate on the case of the former Foreign Minister of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Akhmed Zakayev, who was considered to be the emissary of the Chechen separatists in Europe. In this ruling, Zakayev was named an apostate from Islam, who was professing “the religion of democracy,” calling for secularism, and preferring “man-made laws over the Sharia of the Almighty and Great Allah.” In accordance with this, the Sharia judge Anzor Astemirov declared the killing of Zakayev to be “a duty for Muslims, unless he publicly repents his sins before falling into the jurisdiction of Muslims.”35 The abolishment of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria by the North Caucasian jihadists and the declared establishment of the Caucasus Emirate, which consists of vilayat whose borders partially coincide with the republics of the North Caucasus, is a clear illustration of this process, since the Caucasus Emirate is regarded by its proponents as a first step towards establishing the caliphate. However, it seems that the North Caucasian caliphatists lack a clear vision of this future caliphate. An article published on a Dagestani mujahideen website states that, “The most important thing for us is submission to Sharia, and the question of what this state will be like—will it be ruled by a monarch or an elected ruler? Will it be a confederacy or a centralized state?—will be solved in the future. Sheikh Abd al-Wahhab managed to reach an agreement on Sharia rule with the House of Saud, thereby creating an Islamic State.” At the same time, the claim that the creation of a global caliphate or a Caucasus emirate is unlikely under the present circumstances is countered by appealing to Muslim history: “It is a historical fact that the caliphate existed for 13 centuries—regardless of whether you call it ‘the Arab caliphate’ or ‘the Ottoman caliphate.’ Therefore 34

  Наумкин В. Ислам и мусульмане: культура и политика. М.-Н.Новг., 2008. С. 482.

35

  http://islamdin.tauhid.biz/Fatwa_fi_Zakaev.doc

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the claim that it is impossible to create a Caucasus emirate with Sharia laws is an unsubstantiated assertion.”36 In 2001, the so-called High Military Council (Majlis-ul-Shura) of the United Mujahideen Forces of the Caucasus was established in the territory of Chechnya. This organization was composed of local militants and Arab mujahideen, and its declared goal was the secession of the North Caucasus from the Russian Federation and the creation of Islamist entities in its territory, which will later become part of the Global Caliphate. According to R. Silantyev, “The second Chechen campaign completed the schism within Chechen society, splitting it into traditionalists, who sided with the federal center, and Wahhabis, a category that included all the insurgent field commanders. The ranks of the Wahhabis were reinforced by large numbers of individuals who had been harmed by Russian military activities and those who simply hated the Russians…The Wahhabis were responsible for the deaths of thousands of Chechens, including several tens of imams and the former Mufti of Chechnya, Akhmad Kadyrov.”37 The events that took place after the assassination (in March 2005) of Aslan Maskhadov, President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (who was considered a moderate nationalist), marked the ultimate Islamization of the separatists in Chechnya. Maskhadov’s successor to the post of President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was the head of the Supreme Sharia court, Abdul-Halim Sadulayev (Sheikh Abdul-Halim). Essentially, he not only transformed the separatist leadership, replacing the moderate separatists with radical Islamists, but also changed the paradigm of Chechen resistance. According to American analyst James Hughes, “In the 1990s, the struggle for a secular nationalist vision of an independent Chechnya was reflected in the idiom of the conflict, whereby the Russian forces were generally termed by ethnic criteria or by the even more secular designation ‘the federals’ and ‘occupiers,’ and Chechen collaborators were termed ‘puppets.’ From the year 2000 on, the Islamists steadily framed the war as a jihad by mujahideen and martyrs (shahids) against ‘infidels’ (kafirs) 36

  Ахтаев Ахмад-кади. Диалог с Энвером Кисриевым: жить в условиях России и оставаться мусульманином—невозможно. Дата публ. 14.09.2010. http://www.jamaatshariat.com/ru/-mainmenu-29/14facty/1264-2010-09-14-16-55-02.html

37

  Силантьев Р.А. Ислам в современной России. М., 2008. С. 136.

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and their Chechen ‘traitors to the faith (munafiqs).’”38 The concept of the near enemy from among the Muslims, who has “sided with the infidels,” is a common theme in the rhetoric of the North Caucasian jihadist ideologues. For instance, Doku Umarov, one of the rebel leaders, claims that, “The global political system is set up in such a way that the world is divided into masters and slaves. The role of slaves is relegated to the Muslims. For the last 300-400 years, Muslims have been given ‘sedatives’ in order to keep them in a constant state of hibernation. Overlords (murtads) from among the Muslims have been appointed to keep the Muslims under control, and these murtads are far worse than the kafirs who have set them up. They are further removed from Islam and the Word of Allah than the kafirs.” In this case, the role of the far enemy is relegated to the kafirs—i.e., Russia. An additional concept that appears in these rhetorical constructs can be defined as the farthest enemy (the West in the broadest sense of the term—primarily the US and Israel).39 The same Doku Umarov—the emir of the self-declared Caucasus Emirate—also said that he is “saddened by the position of those Muslims who apply the designation of ‘enemy’ only to those kafirs who have attacked them directly. At the same time, they seek the sympathy and aid of other kafirs, forgetting that all the infidels are one nation. Today our brothers are fighting in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Palestine. Anyone who attacks Muslims—regardless of where these Muslims reside—is our common enemy. Therefore, our enemy is not only Russia, but also America, Britain, Israel, and all those who wage war on Islam and Muslims.”40 In the words of Amir Supyan (Supyan Abdullayev), one of Doku Umarov’s closest associates, “We do not want to become socalled ‘subjects of international law,’ and we have no desire to play these games. We have already tried it in the past, and it turned out to be a false path, leading us astray.”41 The propaganda materials issued by the militants 38

  James Hughes, Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 106.

39

  Интервью Амира Имарата Кавказ Докку Абу-Усмана. Время публикации: 14 февраля 2010 г., http://www.kavkaz.tv/russ/content/2010/02/14/70668.shtml

40

  BBC Russian, October 31, 2007, 31, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/russia/ newsid_7071000/7071952.stm

41

  “Интервью с наибом Амира моджахедов Кавказа Супьяном”. Опубл. 13.02.2009. http://www.islamkom.org/tauhid/3150

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contain not only harsh anti-American and anti-Israeli statements, but also accusations against those secular Western intellectuals and politicians who are known as staunch defenders of Chechen independence and harsh critics of Russian policies in the Caucasus. The generalized image of the enemy which is cultivated by the ideologues of radicalism can be described as “the aggressive onslaught of the pseudo-culture of global Kufr.”42 The rejection of all things that are deemed incompatible with Islam and the Sharia is clearly expressed in the words of one of the ideologues of Anzor Astemirov’s clandestine movement: “It is forbidden to mix good with evil. There must be a clear distinction between Islam and Kufr. We want no part of the infidels’ civilization and refuse to accept their laws. We would also like to remind the people who think that we should accept those parts of international law that are compatible with the Sharia of the following fact: we accept the Sharia not because of its content, but because it is the Law given by Allah. By the same token, we reject the laws of the infidels not because of their content, but because these are not the laws of Allah. The question of which parts of those laws are compatible with the Sharia and which are not is of no concern to us. They have their own religion, and we have ours.”43 Democracy is perceived by the Islamists as an un-Isla- mic—or even anti-Islamic—phenomenon, which poses a threat to Islam. According to one Islamist author, “Our consciousness has become polluted with notions of democracy. One of the reasons for this state of affairs is the fact that many Muslims do not perceive democracy as a religion. The openly pagan character of all these democratic laws, rituals, and ceremonies is regarded as normal, and does not arouse any suspicions…All the aspects of the modern state are incompatible with Islam—its ideological basis, its legislative basis, its political configuration, its international relations, its external borders. If even one of these elements is retained as part of the Muslim strategy, it will prove to be an impediment to the restoration of the Sharia, inevitably leading to defeat and disappointment.”44

42

  http://guraba.net/rus/content/view/357/44/

43

  Quoted from: http://www.djamaattakbir.com/2010/03/blog-post_4072.html

44

  Минкаилов С. Проблемы построения Исламского Государства. Дата публ. 09.12.2008. http://www.jamaatshariat.com/ru/content/view/191/29/

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The stirring up of radical Islamist sentiments in the North Caucasus is related to internal socio-economic, political, religious, and cultural problems on the local and federal levels. To a large extent, these events are also a reaction to global processes (westernization, the spread of popular culture, the devaluation of religion, the blurring of traditional moral lines, etc.). However, we should also keep in mind the external factors that influence the events taking place in the Muslim regions of the Russian Federation. Foreign Islamists interpret the events in Chechnya in the context of the worldwide struggle against the “infidels.” For their part, the North Caucasian separatists place their own activity in the context of the global jihad. Articles posted on separatist websites combine news about the jihad with references to the victories of the Mujahideen in the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and the Islamic State of Iraq. Although there are probably no direct hierarchical links between the North Caucasian Islamist terrorist underground and the Al-Qaeda network, there is a clear ideological connection between the two. At the same time, the active involvement of foreign mujahideen in the events taking place in the North Caucasus leads us to suspect the existence of more substantial ties between the separatists and international terrorists. Abu al-Walid, who became the leader of the Arab volunteers following the death of Ibn al-Khattab in 2002 (al-Walid himself was killed in 2004), had taken part in jihad in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Bosnia. In the late 1980s, Abu al-Walid was involved with the Afghan Services Bureau (Maktab alkhidamat), which had been established by Osama bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam. Al-Walid was frequently accused of having ties to Al-Qaeda and other foreign Islamist groups. The name of the Jordanian Abu Hafs alUrduni, who succeeded Abu al-Walid as leader of the Chechen mujahideen after the latter’s death, was also mentioned in this connection. Al-Urduni was described as the emissary of Al-Qaeda in the Caucasus. It is also known that he took part in the Afghan and Tajik civil wars, together with Khattab and al-Walid. The guerilla operations and terrorist attacks of the Islamist mujahideen have long since spilled over the borders of the Republic of Chechnya. Militant activity can also be observed in Ingushetia, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Karachay-Cherkessia. For example, in October 2005, there was an armed raid by a large number of extremists, which resulted in the deaths of 35 soldiers and policemen and 14 civilians (in addition to 119 injured). There

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were large-scale terrorist attacks (including suicide bombings) with massive casualties in Beslan (the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania), in Moscow, and in other cities. The jihadist militants of the North Caucasus have long been known for their terrorist activity, which is aimed not only at federal security personnel, policemen, and members of local administrations, but also at innocent civilians who have absolutely nothing to do with the conflict in the North Caucasus. Whereas during the First Chechen War the guerilla activity of the separatists rarely spread beyond the borders of the Republic of Chechnya (although we should recall the murderous terrorist raids by Shamil Basayev’s militants into Budyonnovsk [Stavropol Krai] and by Salman Raduyev into Dagestan—both raids involved large numbers of civilians being taken hostage), the Second Chechen War saw widespread terrorist attacks which led to the deaths of tens, or even hundreds, of innocent civilians. The use of suicide bombers has become the trademark of these terrorists. These bombers have become known as “shahids” in the popular consciousness (although this term has a much broader meaning than the designation of a suicide attacker). In addition to the technological advantages that they provide from the terrorists’ point of view, these suicide attacks also have a tremendous psychological and propaganda effect, since they create the image of a heroic and selfless shahid, who is ready to give his own life for the cause. At the same time, the terrorists’ propaganda justifies these suicide attacks by the lack of the sophisticated weapons which their enemies possess. See, for instance, the following statement, made by Shamil Basayev in 2003: “Today there are frequent analogies between the explosions in Znamenskoye and Iliskhan-Yurt and the suicide bombings by shahids in Palestine and ar-Riyadh. At this opportunity, I would like to say that we are using those weapons which are available to us, considering our options. And I swear by God that, if the Russians or the Americans were to provide us with guided missiles or ICBMs, we would no longer use shahids or KAMAZ trucks laden with explosives; rather, we would launch those missiles at military, administrative, and strategic installations on enemy territory. Today we are using the weapons which we have and which we can use. However, we will not stop our struggle just because of our lack of cruise missiles and nuclear bombs.”45 In 2001, Shamil Basayev created 45

  “Абдаллах Шамиль объявил об операции ‘Бумеранг’”. Дата публ. 23.05.2003. http://www.kavkaz.tv/russ/article.php?id=7469

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the guerilla-terrorist group Riyad-us-Saliheen (which means Gardens of the Righteous in Arabic). This group, which places a special emphasis on suicide attacks, has been blamed for the majority of acts of terrorism committed by jihadists on Russian soil during the 2000s, although some experts think that, in reality, those attacks were committed by different, autonomous groups of terrorists. Following the killing of Shamil Basayev in July 2006, Riyad-us-Saliheen became inactive for several years, but later the separatist leaders proclaimed its revival. Here are some examples of acts of terror committed by proponents of religiously motivated violence (it should be noted that most of these acts were carried out by real or potential suicide attackers): the Moscow theatre hostage crisis (23–26 October, 2006); the attack by two female suicide bombers at a rock festival in Moscow (July 5, 2003); the bombing of a train in Yessentuki (December 5, 2003); the Red Square bombing, which was carried out by a female suicide bomber (December 9, 2003); the Moscow Metro bombing, which took place between the Avtozavodskaya and Paveletzkaya Metro stations (February 6, 2004); the bombing of two Russian Tu-134 and Tu-154 airliners (August 24, 2004); the bombing of the Rizhskaya Metro station in Moscow (August 31, 2004); the Beslan school hostage crisis (September 1–3, 2004); the two suicide bombings (carried out by two women) at the Lubyanka and Park Kultury Metro stations (March 29, 2010); the murderous suicide bombing that took place at the Domodedovo airport in Moscow (January 24, 2011). Despite the obvious successes of the anti-separatist and anti-extremist struggle in the Republic of Chechnya in the early 2000s, which enabled the Russian authorities to announce the official termination of the counterterrorism operation in Chechnya in 2009, we cannot ignore the spread of these dangerous phenomena all over the Russian North Caucasus. Despite the claim that the expansion of Salafism in the other republics of the North Caucasian region turned out to be less extensive than in Chechnya and Dagestan (“Adygea managed to completely avoid this problem, whereas the nascent Salafi movement in Ingushetia was quickly localized through the joint efforts of the Muslim clergy and the secular authorities. The remaining three republics—Karachay-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and North Ossetia—sustained heavy losses in the battle against the Wahhabis, yet they managed to marginalize this movement and equate its proponents

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with regular bandits”46), it must be admitted that the jihadists’ efforts to propagate their ideology in this region bear bitter fruit. According to Rashid Nurgaliyev, Russian Minister of Internal Affairs (February 2010), the situation in the republics of Ingushetia and Dagestan “remains tense and complicated.”47 During the 1990s–2000s, Islamist territorial and ethnic units began to appear in the North Caucasus. These units came to be known as “Jamaat.” Originally, the term Jamaat (from the Arabic Jama’a, which means society, community, or assembly) referred to a group of Muslims who come together for the purpose of communal study of Islam, performing religious rituals, mutual aid, regular interaction with each other, etc. However, in this case the Jamaat were established in order to wage clandestine warfare and carry out acts of terror. Some of the members of these Jamaat were veterans who had fought on the side of the Chechen separatists during the First and Second Chechen Wars and provided logistical and informational support to the rebels, in addition to aiding them in other ways. According to information disseminated by the North Caucasian jihadists, there were arguments among them on the nature of jihad (whether it is a collective or an individual duty for Muslims) and on the participation in military operations in the territory of Chechnya or other republics. These arguments are usually settled in favor of the view of jihad as an individual duty. For instance, a propaganda article that was written in 1999 and later posted on a website run by Dagestani militants claims that jihad is “the highest pillar of the Islamic religion. Waging jihad is a duty for every able-bodied Muslim. If an able man tries to evade the duty of jihad, he thereby puts himself in danger with regards to his religion. Jihad is obligatory, and each man must take part in it to the best of his abilities, using his property, his soul, and his word.”48 In the summer of 2002, a clandestine Islamic terrorist organization was established in Kabardino-Balkaria under the name Yarmuk Jamaat. (This name refers to the Battle of Yarmuk, in which the Arab Muslims defeated 46

  Силантьев Р. Ислам в современной России. М., 2008. С. 136.

47

  Taken from: РИА “Новости”. Hotline ; 18.02.2010.

48

  Качества моджахедов. [По материалам Исламского института “Кавказ”. Раббани-кала, 1999 год]. Дата публ. 31.05.2008. http://www.jamaatshariat.com/ ru/-mainmenu-29/14-facty/108--.html

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the Byzantine army in 636 CE.) The available information indicates that this jamaat was formed in Pankisi Gorge (Georgia) out of inhabitants of Kabardino-Balkaria who had joined the camp of Chechen warlord Ruslan Gelayev. The first emir of this jamaat was Muslim Atayev (killed in January 2005). Militants belonging to this group are responsible for armed attacks on members of local organizations and security personnel. Since 2005, the jamaat has been part of the Caucasian Front. Being a clandestine military organization, Jamaat Yarmuk is aided by the Kabardino-Balkarian Jamaat—a large religious community that has, since 1998, represented all the inhabitants of the region who adhere to pure Islam (according to the leaders of the group). Through its activities, the jamaat sets itself apart from the official religious leadership of the Muslims of the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria, the republican government, and the security services. The jamaat has a clear hierarchical structure—the leader (amir), his deputies (naibs), and the elders of individual groups, each of which has its own set of du- ties—overseeing the physical training of the regular members of the jamaat, religious education (lectures and sermons), etc. In 2009–2010, the Karadino-Balkarian Jamaat was led by Anzor Astemirov “Seifullah” (this name, which means “Sword of Allah” in Arabic, was adopted by him after the death of Muslim Atayev), who was the leader of the Wahhabi underground and one of the masterminds behind the militant raid on Nalchik on October 13, 2005. Among the militants who participated in this raid, there were many members of the KabardinoBalkarian branch of the Caucasian Front. The battle in the city lasted for two days, and it resulted in the deaths of 92 militants, 35 members of the security services, and 14 civilians. In November 2006, Astemirov declared the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria a war zone, and promised to conduct a massive terrorist campaign in its territory, beginning with a series of assassinations of high-ranking officials in the local government, members of the clergy, businessmen, and other individuals who were opposed to Wahhabism. In 2007, he was appointed to the post of Chief Sharia Judge of Ichkeria by a decree issued by the president of the self-declared ChRI, Doku Umarov. Later, he was appointed the Chief Qadi of the Caucasus emirate. He is considered to be one of the ideologues behind the declaration of the Caucasus Emirate. He was killed in March 2010. In the early 2000s, the clandestine Jamaat Shariat (Dagestan Front) was created in the territory of Dagestan. This group is a part of the so-called

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Caucasian Front, and it is responsible for multiple attacks on members of local security services, Special Forces troops, military personnel, and highranking members of the Sufi clergy (who are the official religious leaders of the Muslim population of Dagestan). Members of the extremist religious underground in Dagestan have committed numerous acts of terrorism, including the bombing of a parade in Kaspiysk on May 9, 2002, which killed 43 people and injured more than 170. This jamaat is a member of the Caucasus Emirate, which includes all the armed Muslim factions of the North Caucasus. The jamaat has been led, at different times, by Rasul Makasharipov (Muslim), Rappani Khalilov (Rabbani), Ilgar Mollachiyev (Abdul Majid), Umar Sheikhulayev (Muaz), Umalat Magomedov (AlBara), Magomedali Vagabov (Seifullah Gubdensky). Following the death of the latest leader in August 2010, Israpil Velijanov (Emir Hassan),49 who had been the head of the Derbent Jamaat, became the new leader of the group. According to reports, the Jamaat consists of several autonomous guerilla groups operating in different regions of Dagestan (the Derbent Jamaat; Jundallah (Warriors of Allah); Seifullah (Sword of Allah); the Shamilkalin Jamaat; the Gimrin Jamaat; the Kadar Jamaat, etc.). Magomedali Vagabov, one of the leaders of Jamaat Shariat (who was appointed to the post of Amir of the Dagestan Front in July 2010), is suspected of being the mastermind behind the double suicide bombing that was carried out by two women in the Moscow Metro in March 2010. Vagabov was killed in August 2010. The so-called Karachayev Jamaat, also known as Muslim Society # 3, is accused of being behind several large-scale acts of terrorism in Russia, such as: the apartment bombings in Moscow and Volgodonsk in 1999; two terrorist attacks in the Moscow Metro in 2004; attacks in Krasnodar, Voronezh, Stavropol Krai, Rostov Oblast. One of the leaders of this Jamaat was Achemez Gochiyayev, who was connected to the Arab terrorist Ibn Al-Khattab. Apparently, Gochiyayev—together with his associates Adam Dekushev, Yusuf Krymshamkhalov, Denis Saytakov, etc., and with the aid of Khattab—was behind the apartment bombings in Moscow and Volgodonsk. The members of the society had a detailed plan for overthrowing the governments of Karachay-Cherkessia and KabardinoBalkaria and creating a Muslim state in their territory. The Wahhabis were unable to carry out those plans due to the outbreak of the Second Chechen 49

  http://guraba.net/rus/content/view/899/1/

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War in late 1999, which forced them to concentrate on smaller-scale acts of terrorism. The Jamaat Galgayche (the Ingush Jamaat) is a clandestine group operating in Ingushetia since the early 2000s. It is responsible for numerous acts of terror and attacks on government representatives, military personnel, and members of the security services in Ingushetia. The Ingush Jamaat is believed to have been founded by Ilyas Gorchkhanov (who was killed in 2005). After his death, the jamaat was led by Ali Taziyev, also known as Amir Magas (captured by federal forces in June 2010), and Ilez Gardanov, known as Amir Adam (killed in August 2010). The Ossetian Jamaat, also known as Kataib al-Khoul (which means “The Battalions of Might” in Arabic), was founded in North Ossetia in 2006. The amir of Kataib al-Khoul is Emir Saad (Alan Digorsky). Following the declaration of the Caucasus Emirate by separatists, Kataib al-Khoul, which had previously come out in support of Chechen independence, declared as its goal the termination of Russian control over North Ossetia and the establishment of the Iriston Vilayat as part of the Caucasus Emirate. This jamaat took responsibility for numerous attacks on federal functionaries and soldiers in North Ossetia, the bombings of casinos and gambling houses in the center of Vladikavkaz on February 1, 2006, and multiple acts of murder and sabotage. It should be noted that the influence of this jamaat in the Republic of North Ossetia–Alania is fairly limited, since most of the religious inhabitants of Ossetia are either Christians or adherents of traditional faiths. The so-called Nogay Battalion, which is a structural branch of the Caucasian Front, operates in Stavropol Krai. The history of this group goes back to the beginning of the Second Chechen War, when it was formed under the direct command of Shamil Basayev. The declaration of the Caucasus Emirate by the separatists in October 2007 is, on the one hand, an attempt to turn the theoretical concept of an Islamic (Sharia) state into practical reality in the territory of the North Caucasus. On the other hand, this declaration expresses the separatists’ desire to unite, not under the banner of a struggle for national liberation, but under the aegis of religious war. At the same time, the organizational structure of the Emirate, whose founders “reject the names that are used by the infidels to divide the Muslims…the ethnic, territorial, and colonial areas which are called the North Caucasian republics…and other such things,”

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presupposes its division into vilayat, whose territory frequently coincides with the present-day borders of the North Caucasian republics that are part of the Russian Federation: Dagestan, Nokhciycho (Chechnya), Galgayche (Ingushetia), Iriston (North Ossetia—this vilayat was abolished in May 2009 and incorporated into the Galgayche Vilayat), Kabarda-BalkariaKarachay (Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia), and the Nogay Steppe (part of Stavropol Krai). The declaration of the Caucasus Emirate was preceded by the creation of the Caucasus Front in May 2005—“in view of the expansion of the theater of war and the incorporation of the mujahideen forces of Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, North Ossetia—in addition to the Nogay mujahideen from Stavropol Krai—into the armed forces of the ChRI.” The declaration of the Caucasus Emirate as an Islamic state was predicated upon “the unconditional duty of Muslims before Allah (s.t.) to establish the laws of Allah (s.t.)—the Sharia law—in all the territories controlled by them.” Among the preconditions and precedents for establishing a single Islamic State, the separatist ideologues cited “the legitimate continuity and historical experience of the single Islamic State that unified the peoples of the North Caucasus (the Imamate state of Sheikh Mansur—1785–1791; the imamate states of the imams Ghazi-Muhammad, Hamzat, Shamil—1830–1859; the North Caucasian Emirate—the state of Sheikh Uzun Haji—1919–1920)”, in addition to the decrees issued by the presidents of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria on turning Sharia into the legal foundation of the state; “broadening the scope of jihad and expanding the theater of war and armed resistance to the Russian occupation into Dagestan, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, KarachayCherkessia, and Stavropol Krai”; “forming armed units (military jamaat) out of the local population of the abovementioned North Caucasian regions, and using these troops to eliminate the Russian occupation of these lands and establish Sharia.”50 Back in August 2005, Abdul-Halim Sadulayev, the President of Ichkeria, made the following announcement: “We are discussing the possibility of declaring an Islamic State, and, when we decide that the time has come, we shall issue a special proclamation, without any second thoughts. We are 50

  От Чеченской Республики Ичкерия до Имарата Кавказ. // Векалат Имарата Кавказ. Дата публ. 06.09.2008. http://generalvekalat.org/content/view/31/31/

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marching in this direction. It will be either a caliphate or an imamate, but we are certainly working towards this goal.”51 The current leader of the Emirate, Doku Umarov, claims that “Our ultimate goal is the establishment of Sharia in the Caucasus, the independence of the Caucasus, and independent Islam in the Caucasus.” However, he makes it clear that the terrorists are not going to limit themselves to Caucasian territory: “The war zone will be expanded into Russian lands…The Riyad-us-Saliheen brigade has indeed been revived, and it is fully active. We can testify to the large number of special operations carried out by this group during the last year [Author’s note: 2009]. The Shahid Brigade is being constantly replenished by the best of the mujahideen, and if the Russians fail to realize that war will soon engulf their streets and their homes—so much the worse for them. Blood will no longer be spilled only in our towns and villages. War will come into their cities.”52 In his speeches, separatist leader Doku Umarov announces his plans not only for the North Caucasus, but also for other regions in Russia that have a Muslim population: “After we liberate the land of our brothers, coreligionists and Caucasian Muslims, we will, God willing, liberate other lands that are now occupied by Russia. They are Astrakhan and the Volga lands that are now under the heel of Russian infidels.”53 While we should keep in mind that such declarations are largely motivated by propaganda, we cannot ignore the very real danger posed by the spillover of religious extremism—in conjunction with ethnic separatism—into other regions of Russia. Salafi and jihadist ideas constitute the core of the ideology of the jamaat which are united under the banner of the Caucasus Emirate. The emirate is led by an amir. In early August 2010, there were reports that Doku Umarov had stepped down from his post, transferring his authority to his deputy (naib), Aslambek Vadalov. In May 2009, Amir Doku Umarov created a consultative body, Majlis ul-Shura, which is composed of the nine most prominent amirs—the heads of vilayat and large jamaat. Among other things, the Shura is given the authority to elect a new amir in case of 51

  http://www.kavkaz.tv/russ/content/2007/12/02/54723.shtml

52

  http://www.kavkaz.tv/russ/content/2010/02/14/70668.shtml

53

  Амир Имарата Кавказ Докку Абу Усман: “Мы освободим Краснодарский край, Астрахань и Поволжские земли…”. Время публикации: 8 марта 2010 г. http://www.kavkaz.tv/russ/content/2010/03/08/71087.shtml

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death of the previous leader. The Caucasus Emirate also created an official body that would represent it in foreign countries—the Vekalat. It is led by Shamsuddin Batukayev. Despite the existence of a certain hierarchy within the Caucasus Emirate, there are reasons to regard it as an organization with a network structure, which is similar to the structure of Al-Qaeda. This is admitted even by proponents of the Emirate, who regard it not as a territorial entity so much as an ideological and political network of self-governing communities. This point of view is based on the relevant Islamic tradition: “The state that existed during the life of the Prophet (s.a.s) was a mobile and militarized community of believers, whose unifying factor was Islam, rather than trivial factors like nation, blood, or land…the Prophet (s.a.s) never established a centralized political institution with executive organs or a bureaucratic apparatus, and never delineated a particular territory that would be subject to Islamic jurisdiction (which would have limited the jurisdiction of Muslims to that territory alone)…It is notable that the political system of the Prophet (s.a.s) was originally established as a network—which is essentially the same model that is being used to form the present-day Caucasus Emirate.”54 Recent events demonstrate that there are significant disagreements among the leaders of the Emirate, which may eventually lead to schisms. In August 2010, a group of Chechen militants under the leadership of field commanders Aslambek Vadalov, Hussein Gakayev, and Muhannad (leader of the Arab mujahideen, who is considered to be the emissary of Al-Qaeda in the North Caucasus) declared that they would no longer obey the orders of guerilla leader Doku Umarov. It seems that this rebellion was caused by the inconsistency of Umarov himself, who had originally announced his resignation from the post of amir, but later rescinded his decision (apparently, he did it under the pressure of the leaders of the KabardinoBalkarian wing of the Caucasus Emirate, who needed their leader to be a well-known man). By contrast, Seifullah, the leader of the Dagestani wing of the militant movement, issued a statement in which he urged all the militants to recognize Doku Umarov’s authority. The militants from Ingushetia issued a similar statement. In September 2010, Doku Umarov 54

  “Сетевой принцип Имарата Кавказ”. Дата публ. 27.07.2010. http://www.kavkazanhaamash.com/facty/18--/425-2010-07-27-22-59-44.html

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announced that the breakaway field commanders must stand trial before a Sharia court. In his video message to the Arab mujahideen, Doku Umarov blamed the Arab commander Muhannad, who had called upon the militants to terminate their subordination to the emir of the Caucasus, for instigating fitna (discord) in the ranks of the Caucasus Emirate. According to Umarov, Muhannad claimed that the jihad in Iraq and Afghanistan had reached a deadlock after the declared establishment of emirates in those countries.55 In April 2011, Muhannad (Khaled Yusef Muhammed al-Emirat) was eliminated in the Chechen Republic. Despite the discord among the North Caucasian militants, their activity continues to pose a serious threat. The situation in the North Caucasus has a tendency to escalate (in spite of the official termination of the counterterrorism operation in Chechnya in April 2009, following a decision by the National Anti-Terrorism Committee), which can be seen in the sharp increase in attacks and assassination attempts against government functionaries, employees of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, judges, and members of the security services in the North Caucasus. Members of the traditional Islamic clergy are becoming frequent targets for assassination by extremists. In 2009 alone, several North Caucasian Muslim religious leaders who were opposed to radical Islamism were assassinated. For instance, Ismail Bostanov, rector of the Islamic Institute and deputy chairman of the Spiritual Muslim Board of Karachay-Cherkessia and Stavropol, was assassinated in September in Cherkessk when he was returning home from mosque. He was known for his uncompromising stance in the fight against Wahhabism in the region. Earlier, in April 2009, Mullah Musa Esmurziyev, a well-known religious leader in Ingushetia, was killed in Nazran when his home was attacked with grenade launchers. Shortly after this incident, two other prominent religious leaders were assassinated in Ingushetia: SayidHasan Sayidibrahim and the 85-year-old Abdurahman Kartoyev. In May, Ahmed Tagayev, the deputy mufti of Dagestan, was killed in Makhachkala. In March 2009, Imam Ibragim Abakarov was shot at by unidentified individuals in the Kizilyurt district. In the summer, there was a murder attempt on Islam Medzhidov, deputy imam of the Dzhuma-mosque of Buinaksk. In October 2009, Murtazali Magomedov, a teacher at the Islamic 55

  Амира ИК: “Фитну среди моджахедов организовал Муханнад”. [Видео]. Опубл. 25.09.2010. http://hunafa.com/

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University, was shot dead in Dagestan. In November, unknown assailants killed Imam Tinamagomed Ramazanov in the Kizilyurt District and seriously injured Imam Ibragim Magomedov. Harsh verbal attacks on the official Islamic clergy are frequently posted on radical Islamist websites.56 In November 2010, Anas Pshikhachev, head of Kabardino-Balkaria’s Muslim Spiritual Department, was shot dead in Nalchik (the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria). Mufti Pshikhachev was well-known for his negative attitude towards radical forms of Islam. In June 2011, Maksud Sadikov, a well-known Dagestani social and religious activist who was rector of the Makhachkala Institute of Theology, was shot to death in Makhachkala. Despite the propagandist and highly exaggerated character of the victorious reports from the North Caucasian “battlefields of jihad,” which are regularly published on jihadist websites, the Russian security services acknowledge that the regional situation is extremely complicated, and is likely to deteriorate in the future. For example, Russian minister of Internal Affairs Rashid Nurgaliyev admits that the coordinated activities of the extremist underground have led to an escalation of the situation in the North Caucasus. According to Nurgaliyev, since the beginning of 2010 there have been 489 crimes of a terrorist nature committed in the North Caucasus Federal District (SKFO). The minister says that, “Our analysis of the manifestations of terrorism in SKFO territory—in addition to the declared intentions of the leaders of the criminal underground—leads us to believe that the extremists are trying to exacerbate tensions in the North Caucasus, primarily in Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria.” 57 The socio-economic problems that plague the Muslim-majority regions of the Russian Federation (primarily the North Caucasus), the high unemployment rate,58 the endemic corruption in all layers of society and in virtually all spheres of life, manifestations of injustice on the part of government structures, the security services and the courts, the indifference 56

  See, for instance: “Имамы—предатели Ислама” // Сайт Guraba (Дагестанское независимое информационно-аналитическое издание). Дата публ. 22.07.2008. http://guraba.net/rus/content/view/98/50/

57

  Translated from: Интерфакс-АВН. September 13 2010.

58

  According to the Russian statistics bureau, in January-February 2010 the North Caucasian Federal District had the highest unemployment rate in Russia (20.1%). See: Интерфакс. March 22 2010.

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of the authorities to the needs of the population (particularly the needs of young people)—all these factors create a fertile environment for the growth of radical sentiments, enabling the extremists to recruit some segments of the population into their ranks. The extremist ideologues place a special emphasis on recruiting young people, since they are the most mobile segment of society and are easy to influence. Therefore, young people are regularly recruited into militant and terrorist groups, and they are used to carry out the most heinous crimes: bombings, murders, hostage-taking. The extremists actively use modern systems of communication (especially the Internet) to promote their ideas, and there are dozens of radical Islamist websites on the Net. Despite the fact that the extremist propaganda is essentially a mixture of religious teachings, imitations of official government jargon, and semi-criminal slang (with heavy use of invective against the extremists’ enemies), it is frequently able to point out some real social problems and thereby arouse a warm response in the hearts of certain categories of young people. It must be admitted that the efforts of the authorities to neutralize the propaganda spread by the Islamist underground appear to have little effect. The ban on extremist literature and the shutting down of extremist websites have failed to yield the desired results. And in some cases, the seemingly unmotivated and overly harsh anti-terrorist and anti-extremist measures, coupled with the lack of a moral and ethical counterbalance to Islamist ideologues, serve only to increase the number of malcontents who are dissatisfied with the present state of affairs. As the author of an article posted on an Islamist Dagestani website writes: “We agree that the socioeconomic situation does play a certain role. However, we insist that the primary reason is religious and ethical. Yes, it is true that the economic backwardness, the high unemployment rate, the ubiquitous corruption and poverty influence the situation. Nevertheless, Islam remains the major theme. As the poet Adallo said, young people join the armed opposition for ethical reasons, and no one would submit to humiliation and the denial of basic rights and freedoms. The most important freedom for a Muslim is the freedom to practice his religion.”59 Leaving aside the highly dubious question of violations of religious rights in present-day Russia, we must note that it is absolutely essential to pay attention to the ethical aspect of 59

  http://www.jamaatshariat.com/ru/-mainmenu-29/14-facty/ 1264-2010-09-14-16-55-02.html

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the situation when trying to combat extremism and terrorism. Otherwise, all efforts to deal with this problem will be in vain. Without a systemic solution to the problems that have accumulated in the political, socio-economic, religious, international, and other spheres, it would hardly be possible to deal with the situation through the use of force alone. The problem of religious extremism poses a serious threat not only to the security of Russia, but also to the future of the Russian Federation as a single state, as well as to our entire globalized world.

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Resisting Religious Extremism and Terrorism: What Should Be Done Religiously-motivated radicalism/extremism/terrorism are complex, multifaceted phenomena which are not amenable to simple explanations. Their emergence is triggered by an entire complex of reasons and factors. We cannot fully accept the claims of those authors who adamantly deny any connection between particular religions and terrorists who justify their actions on the basis of their faith. As the Russian orientalist V. Naumkin correctly notes, “The atrocious acts of terror committed by representatives of the Islamic world inevitably cast a shadow on their coreligionists, even though the vast majority of them have nothing to do with those acts.”1 We cannot ignore the fact that religiously-motivated terrorists and extremists do not create their ideological constructs out of the blue—rather, these constructs are based on appeals to religious traditions, sacred texts, and the works of respected theologians. Another question is the degree to which the extremists distort the letter and spirit of their religion, and how representative their views are of the general community of believers. This fact does not allow us to agree with those who derive extremism and terrorism from the essence of the religion itself. Putting the responsibility for the actions of terrorists on some ethnic and/or religious group is not only fundamentally wrong, but also fallacious and extremely dangerous. Furthermore, if we peel away the external attributes and the specific religious content of the 1

  Наумкин В.В. Ислам и мусульмане: культура и политика. М.—Н. Новгород, 2008. С.474.

Resisting Religious Ex tremism and Terrorism

ideological constructs of extremists and terrorists, we are unlikely to find any elements that are dictated specifically by religion in the internal structure of their theories and practices. On the other hand, the spirit of intolerance, coupled with hatred for the “other,” is common to extremists of all stripes, regardless of whether they are secular or extremely religious and devout. Although religiously-motivated political violence (in its various forms) has existed for the entire history of the major world religions, terrorism committed in the name of faith appears to be a recent phenomenon, which became prominent in the late twetieth—early twenty-first century. When discussing Islamist terrorism specifically, we should keep in mind that the emergence of this phenomenon is related not so much to the specific features of the Islamic religion (although these features cannot be completely discounted) as to the various global, regional, and local problems in the spheres of social culture, social economy, internal and external politics, and demography. The depth of the problem posed by the spread of religiously-motivated terrorism lies in multiple factors. Undoubtedly, Islamist extremism is at least partially rooted in some traditional aspects of Islamic thought. The worldview of modern-day proponents of Salafi jihad is based, among other things, on ideas that were developed by Islamic scholars and preachers back in the Middle Ages and in the Early Modern Era (primarily Ibn Taymiyyah and Al-Wahhab). At the same time, when analyzing the factors that influence the development of the modern jihadist movement, we cannot ignore the processes taking place outside the Muslim world, as well as the external factors that interact with the Islamic world. Terrorism in all its manifestations—and religiously-colored terrorism in particular—is an extremely complex, heterogeneous, multi-dimensional, and multi-level phenomenon. Accordingly, the struggle against this phenomenon must be waged on different levels. There are no universal formulae for combating terrorism, and such formulae are unlikely to arise in the future—all the more so since terrorism, being a phenomenon without clear-cut boundaries, is in a constant state of flux, changing and adapting itself to changing circumstances. Similarly, the methods of resisting extremism need to be modified. In this respect, we should mention the analogy (made by American researcher Grenville Byford) between the war on terror and the “wars” on poverty and drugs, where “the

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enemy never surrenders.”2 This analogy seems to be correct. It may be that, as long as humanity exists, violence (including terrorist violence) will also exist. However, even if terrorism can never be completely eradicated, this does not mean that the anti-terrorist struggle is meaningless or doomed to failure. At the very least, the world cannot submit to terrorists, regardless of the banners under which they operate, the religion that they fight for, and the ideas to which they appeal. Au contraire, this struggle must be pursued with extreme vigor. In recent years, the major anti-terrorist efforts of the global community have been concentrated on combating the threat of Islamist extremism and terrorism. Although these efforts have yielded some results, the extremist groups have proven to be highly resistant, capable of surviving under harsh conditions and adapting themselves to new circumstances. Having been seriously weakened by anti-terrorist operations, networks such as Al-Qaeda shifted to franchising and spreading their ideology (primarily through the Internet) to groups and individuals who hold Salafi-jihadist views. Any effective strategy for dealing with the global jihadist movement and defeating it must include a complex array of military, intelligencegathering, financial, political, judicial, and social tools. The complex of measures aimed at weakening religiously-motivated terrorism must include the following steps. of all, it is necessary to actively combat the ideology of global 1 First jihadism. This may turn out to be the most important aspect of the

2

2

struggle against extremism and terrorism operating under religious slogans. We should try to sever the links—ideological, logistical, finan- cial, etc.—between local extremist and terrorist groups and the “global jihad” movement. Therefore, it is highly counterproductive to lump together all the groups that operate under radical Islamist slogans, since these groups frequently engage in sharp ideological polemic with each other, which occasionally leads to open armed confrontations between them.

  Quoted from: Малашенко А. Исламская альтернатива и исламистский проект. М., 2006. С. 16.

Resisting Religious Ex tremism and Terrorism

is extremely important to deprive the terrorists of “safe havens” 3 Itwhere they can recuperate, regroup their forces, and recruit and

4

train new militants. The loss of safe havens significantly reduces the terrorists’ operational capabilities. Another natural way of combating extremism is cutting the flow of funds to the jihadist movement. It is necessary to strengthen the capabilities of states in the Islamic world and empower moderate civil society groups to counter local jihadist threats in order to deprive the Al-Qaeda terrorist network of alternative sanctuaries, and, over time, to reduce the clusters that comprise the global jihadist movement. At the same time, repressive policies against the radicals must be extremely measured, since any overreaction in this area may lead to highly undesirable conse- quences.

The tactical methods of dealing with terrorism (the use of force, blocking the flow of funds and eliminating the terrorists’ logistical capabilities, destroying their organizational structures and cutting off their communication networks, etc.) have undoubtedly proven their effectiveness. However, it must be admitted that their significance is transient; although these actions manage to cause serious damage to terrorist networks, they fail to treat the underlying causes of this phenomenon. It is impossible to effectively deal with this problem through the use of force alone. Figuratively speaking, in order to be victorious in the struggle against terrorism, it is necessary to win the battle for the enemy’s rear—i.e. to win over people’s hearts and minds, depriving the terrorists of financial and human capital. It is necessary to work to prevent the conditions which allow terrorists—no matter which ideology they use—to enlist new members for their criminal cause. In the (largely correct) words of M.D. Penn and E. K. Zalesne, “The central terrorist movement of the twenty-first century… will not be defeated with washing machines. On top of military and social efforts, it will take strong intellectual and religious cohesion—perhaps an interfaith movement dedicated to defining the true path to God that wins back as many converts intellectually as the military is able to find and destroy militarily. The most fanatical militants are more likely to be found in good schools and on the Internet than in the slums. They are part of a romanticized movement justified by religious doctrine, and we will

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need to redouble our efforts to shake the intellectual foundations of that movement to stop the flow of these kinds of recruits.”3 The threat posed by religiously-motivated terrorism to all of mankind is not limited to human losses. Another, no less serious, threat is the climate of mutual fear and distrust which is created between different religious groups (as well as within those groups) as a result of terrorist activity. At this point, we can agree with the claim that “In democratic countries, terrorism deepens ethnic and religious divisions. In non-democratic countries, it bolsters the forces of authoritarianism.”4 In such cases, the terrorists may be said to have succeeded in one of their central goals—transforming the societies which resist them and manipulating those societies. It is difficult to argue with the notion that, “The global wave of terrorism requires an equally strong response from the global community. In order for this response to be effective, the phenomenon of terrorism must be thoroughly studied.”5 To facilitate such study, think tanks similar to the American RAND Corporation must be established and developed in Russia. These centers of study should be tasked with achieving a theoretical and analytical understanding of all the phenomena that are related to the problems of terrorism and extremism. They must also be tasked with formulating new practical ideas and approaches to dealing with these issues (this task must be carried out in cooperation with the relevant state structures, including the security apparatus). A correct understanding of the roots of terrorism is extremely important; in order to cure a disease, we need to diagnose it correctly and determine its origins. In particular, it is necessary to systematically study the psychology of modern terrorists, who take upon themselves the role of true defenders of Islam. If we can find out exactly how people turn into terrorists and determine the social, political, cultural, economic, and other factors that facilitate the spread of extremism and terrorism—if we can achieve a full understanding of the nature of these phenomena—then it will be possible 3

  Mark Penn and E. Kinney Zalesne, Microtrends: The Small Forces Behind Tomorrow’s Big Changes (New York: Twelve, 2009), 382.

4

  Rik Coolsaet, ed., Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalization Challenge in Europe (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008), xvi.

5

  Антонян Ю.М. Терроризм: криминологическое и уголовно-правовое исследование. М., 1998. С. 6.

Resisting Religious Ex tremism and Terrorism

to formulate a more accurate and rational approach to preventing terrorism and defeating extremism. Effective measures must be undertaken against the indoctrination and the influence of distorted ideas which nourish terrorist activity. We need to clearly realize that terrorism—no matter how destructive and dangerous it is to humanity—is ultimately just a tactic which is motivated by a certain ideology. The war on terror is, at its most fundamental level, a war of ideas. In order to successfully combat extremism on the strategic level, it is necessary to mount effective ideological resistance. Therefore, the primary goal of ideological resistance to terrorism carried out under the banner of Islam is delegitimizing jihadist ideology and its use by terrorists, as well as denying the extremists a firm footing in the Islamic political-religious discourse. Another important aspect of the anti-terrorism strategy is the work of Muslim authors who attempt to clarify the true attitude of the Islamic religion towards violence and explain the moral principles of the Islamic teachings, which are incompatible with the ideas and actions of extremists operating under the banner of Islam. In order to combat extremist Islamism, we need to study Islam. Moreover, it would be no exaggeration to say that only Islam itself can put an end to extremism that acts under its auspices. As the Egyptian theologian Fouad Zakaria has correctly noted, “Islam will be what the Muslims make of it.”6 Essentially, Islamic authors and spiritual leaders are the only ones who can determine the true nature of extremism and terrorism which are carried out in the name of the Islamic faith—whether they are a deliberate distortion of Islam, an error, or the norm for this religion. In this respect, it is interesting to take a look at the Realizing True Islam program, which has been developed by the Egyptian authorities in cooperation with Al-Azhar University with the aim of resisting religious radicalization. This program is based on the understanding that the struggle against the culture of terror, which lies at the heart of radicalism and extremism, is an important aspect of combating terrorism. One of the central objectives is denying terrorist groups the opportunity to use any religion to justify violence. Considering the high status and authority of Al-Azhar University as a center of Islamic thought and Islamic jurisprudence, the 6

  Franco Cardini, Europe and Islam (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 212.

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Egyptian authorities have decided to use the university’s influence to combat extremism. Among other things, the Egyptian initiative encompasses the training of non-Egyptian imams to resist radicalization, placing a special emphasis on: studying the foundations of religious disciplines and ways of responding to incitement by radical groups; training imams from Al-Azhar who will travel outside of Egypt to reveal the peace-loving nature of Islam, reverse radicalization, and resist extremist thought; translating the primary Islamic sources into foreign languages at Al-Azhar University in order to demonstrate the peaceful, tolerant, and moderate attitude of Islam towards both Muslims and adherents of other religions. Hopefully, this initiative will help to create a new generation of Islamic preachers and scholars who will uphold Islam as a religion founded upon moderation, tolerance, and willingness to accept the other. We have to support moderate and liberal forces within Islam. From this point of view, it would be helpful to study the history of the struggle against extremist religious movements in countries where moderate Islam is encouraged (such as Tunis). We should also study the fight against religious extremism in those Muslim countries which are dominated by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. Saudi Arabia is planning to reeducate 40,000 Islamic preachers in the hope of stopping the spread of militant Islamism. The re-education of the mullahs will be carried out by the Saudi Ministry of Religions and the Saudi Center for National Dialogue, which was established in 2003 to propagate a moderate interpretation of the Islamic traditions. During the past several years, hundreds of Saudi imams have been fired from their posts for inciting hatred against nonMuslims and calling upon the youth to take part in global jihad. However, the effectiveness of such measures remains dubious.7 An extremely important aspect of this struggle is the activity of authoritative and influential religious scholars and theologians who try to explain the immense harm done by the extremist interpretation of Islam. A nice example of such activity can be seen in the efforts of the prominent Pakistani theologian Tahir ul-Qadri, who issued a fatwa in March 2010 in order to deprive Al-Qaeda of its ideological foundations. The theological arguments constructed by Dr. Qadri enable the author of the fatwa to 7

  See: BBC Russian, March 21, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/hi/russian/ international/newsid_7308000/7308374.stm.

Resisting Religious Ex tremism and Terrorism

resist the rhetoric used by jihadists. Moreover, the fatwa is also addressed to potential suicide attackers, disabusing them of the false notion that they will be rewarded in the afterlife for their “martyrdom for faith” (as is promised by the ideologues of terrorism). At the same time, we should clearly realize that the abovementioned steps can only partially halt the spread of extremist ideas, without being able to defeat them completely. Studies of the theory and practices of religiously-motivated terrorism show that, even among jihadist groups, there is frequently no consensus on numerous tactical and strategic questions. These disagreements can be deepened—which would obviously have a deleterious effect on the extremists’ capabilities, limiting their options. A separate issue is the practice of integrating Islamist forces from the margins of political discourse into the political mainstream, on both the local and the international political scene. In this respect, the Russian diplomatic experience should not be ignored. As we may recall, Russia tried to engage the seemingly odious Palestinian Hamas faction (which had been put on the list of terrorist organizations by numerous countries) in dialogue, and make it part of the Middle East peace negotiations. Although this attempt may seem like a failure, it showed Moscow’s willingness not to back Hamas into a corner and not to exacerbate its international isolation (which would only radicalize it further), trying instead to turn it into a participant in the peace process and to aid the gradual transformation of Hamas into a political party that is oriented towards the development of democratic civil institutions and towards enforcing the rule of law in the Palestinian territories. After all, this is very similar to the transformation undergone by the Palestine Liberation Organization, which had originally been classified as a terrorist group (with good reason), but later became a part of the political process. Some additional interesting examples of this approach are the attempts to conduct negotiations with moderate Taliban in Afghanistan or with militants from Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezbi Islami. It is true that the effectiveness of such negotiations is frequently doubted. Nevertheless, if there is the slightest possibility of resolving political problems through peaceful means, these options must be explored. The marginalization of Islamist political forces serves only to radicalize them and cause them to turn to terrorism and extremism. This does not at all mean that we should surrender to Islamism. We are sympathetic to

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the worries of those who fear that democratization (in this case, in the countries of the Greater Middle East) will facilitate the Islamists’ rise to power. While acknowledging this concern, we can fully agree with the opinion expressed by former US Secretary of State M. Albright, who wrote that “Persecution is more often a cause of violence than a solution to it…Through history, many legitimate political parties had their origins outside the law; even movements once associated with terrorism should be encouraged to renounce violence and move into the mainstream.” In this context, we would like to once again mention the repeated attempts to establish contacts with moderate elements within the Islamic Taliban movement. Leaving aside the effectiveness and the tangible results of these attempts, their indispensability cannot be denied. We should make every possible effort to bring various societies closer together and teach the nations of the world to accept their differences and welcome the multiplicity of cultures which is among the most valuable achievements of civilization. It is extremely important to establish interfaith and inter-cultural dialogue. Moreover, such dialogue should not be limited to the political, religious, economic, and intellectual elites, who constitute only a narrow slice of society—rather, it should encompass large numbers of common people in various countries. Efforts should be made to involve young people in this dialogue. Interfaith, inter-cultural, and international dialogue is an inoculation of sorts against terrorism and extremism. Obviously, we should realize that such dialogue cannot completely eradicate these phenomena; however, the struggle against the ideology of hatred and violence would be inconceivable without it. Russia, by virtue of being a multinational and multi-faith country (and a country where Islam is the second-largest traditional religion), cannot and should not ignore these processes. It must be said that much has been done in recent years to improve the image of the Russian Federation in the eyes of the Muslim world. In this context, we can mention the establishment of ties (both on the state level and the societal level) between Russia and Muslim countries and the participation of the Russian Federation in the Organization of the Islamic Conference as an Observer State. During a meeting with muftis and the heads of North Caucasian Republics which took place in Sochi in August 2009, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev mentioned several measures that need to be undertaken in order to stem the tide of religious extremism in the regions of Russia.

Resisting Religious Ex tremism and Terrorism

Among other things, he spoke of “The need to secure the total support of authoritative Islamic leaders, the Muftiat, and those who serve in the Caucasus,” since “without solidifying the authority of the Islamic leaders we will be unable to deal with the problems that exist here.” At the same time, he stressed the need for strict control over those who leave Russia to study at foreign Islamic institutions, and the desire to create long-term contracts with renowned Islamic educational centers. In addition to that, he stated that it would be necessary to pursue an active policy of educating the public about the true values of Islam through the mass media and the Internet, in order to counter the information that is being spread by extremists. In order to solve the problems posed by religious extremism and terrorism, governments need to determine the factors that give rise to terrorism in different societies, in addition to exposing terrorist groups and bringing them to justice. While it may sound paradoxical, in order to effectively deal with the terrorist threat emanating from religious extremists, it is necessary to hear the truth which lies hidden beneath their hatemongering rhetoric. It is obvious that the attractiveness of extremist propaganda to potential followers of radical movements does not arise out of nowhere. Among the conditions that facilitate the spread of terrorism, we can mention conflicts, poverty, low development levels, violations of basic human rights, and the lack of supremacy of the law. The use of short-term, simplified, demagogical, and repressive methods to deal with the problems that create a nourishing environment for extremism and terrorism is not only unhelpful, but also dangerous. Extremist ideologues skillfully manipulate the very real problems that confront people by carefully emphasizing those problems, occasionally exaggerating them, and frequently distorting them. These problems usually revolve around the corrupt regimes which exist in various countries, the brutal political repression of dissidents, the policies pursued by the West (in the broadest sense of the term) in Third World countries, and the thoughtless spread of westernization (with all its virtues and vices). It must be admitted that, by exploiting these themes, extremists can, at the very least, secure the attention of many of the faithful, causing them to feel sympathy towards the extremist rhetoric. At this point, we need to stress another important factor: in order to defeat the ideology of religious extremism, we need to offer alternative ideals and moral values to the people. The existing moral vacuum and/or

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the attempts to replace it with artificial and foreign schemes will be unable to prevent the extremists from recruiting new members—rather, such attempts will only push young people into the arms of the jihadists. When formulating a strategy for combating extremism in Russia, we need to pay attention to the successes and failures of other countries— including Western ones—in this area. On the international stage (and when dealing with foreign policy in general), we need to carefully consider each move in order not to harm the struggle against terrorism. It is inadmissible to turn efforts against extremism into faith-based persecution. We need to learn from past missteps in this struggle, and strive not to repeat the mistakes that only exacerbate the terrorist threat. One such mistake was the American invasion of Iraq, which not only contravened international law, but also led to an increase in terrorist activity in this country and (in some cases) outside its borders. The war in Iraq resulted in a surge in terrorist violence between the Iraqi Sunnis and Shiites, leading to multiple casualties. Moreover, the actions of the US strengthened the hand of jihadist ideologues by giving them another argument with which to convince the Muslims that the West is inherently hostile towards the Islamic world (although a careful examination of the situation of Iraq makes it clear that this claim is false in that particular case). The ideological work carried out by the Western coalition which is engaged in the War on Terror frequently fails to achieve its goals— moreover, some aspects of this work may be perceived as anti-Islamic and anti-Arab (the cultural and historical values of Islam are cast into doubt; occasionally, all Muslims are classified as terrorists; security services practice discriminatory policies towards immigrants from Muslim countries; etc.). One notorious example of such an attitude is the famous speech by US President George Bush after the 9/11 attacks, in which he characterized the War on Terror as a “Crusade.”8 Naturally, this careless statement was exploited for maximum effect by Islamist ideologues and propagandists to confirm their notion of a global confrontation between the “CrusaderZionist alliance” and the Islamic world—in spite of all the assurances that Bush was using the concept of a crusade in a military, rather than religious, sense. 8

  The analogy between the “War on Terror” and the Crusades was made by George Bush at least twice: during a press conference at the White House on September 16,

Resisting Religious Ex tremism and Terrorism

Another negative factor is what the American economist Joseph Stiglitz has termed the “colonial mentality,” which is prevalent among certain circles in the West. “The ‘white man’s burden’ and the presumption that they knew what was best for the developing countries—persisted. America, which came to dominate the global economic scene, had much less of a colonial heritage, yet America’s credentials too had been tarred.”9 This is all the more crucial since historical factors (the legacy of colonialism, the role played by Western countries in the liquidation of the caliphate, Western support for the partition of Palestine, etc.) are an important source of Islamic extremism. The attempts to force a foreign model (more precisely, the American model) upon other countries are not taken well by Muslims, who perceive these attempts as a form of neo-colonialism, regardless of whether the model in question is political or cultural. In the words of V. Naumkin, “Many Muslims regard the American concept of the Greater Middle East as a neo-colonial project, whose goal is the creation of a social order that would be advantageous to the West.”10 Other themes that are used (with great success) by Islamist propagandists are the Western support for Israeli policies in the occupied Palestinian territories, the continuing US occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011. The passivity of organizations such as the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, coupled with the lack of a clear and active position among the leadership of Muslim countries, creates favorable conditions for the further spread of radical Islamist ideas, resulting in the transformation of aggressive anti-American sentiment into practical actions within the framework of global jihad. Regardless of the exact nature of the measures undertaken to combat religious extremism and terrorism, we should clearly realize that these measures must be systematic and long-term, without expectations of immediate results, and with a distant goal in mind. 2001, and during a speech before American troops in Alaska on February 16, 2002. 9

  Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), 24.

10

  Наумкин В.Фехтование цивилизаций // Наумкин В.В. Ислам и мусульмане: культура и политика. Статьи, очерки, доклады разных лет.— М.—Н. Новгород, 2008.С. 569.

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257

index

of

names

Aaron, David­  34 Abakarov, Ibragim  228 Abbas, Mahmoud  117, 125, 127 Abd Al Aziz Awda  115 Abduh, Muhammad  65, 70 Abdul Hamid II, sultan of Turkey  93 Abdulmutallab, Umar Farouk  168 Abdul-Wahhab  210 Abu Bakr, caliph  91 Abubakar, Abdurajak  160 Abu-Darr  210 Adallo  230 al-Afghani, Jamal al-Din  65, 93, 136 Aflaq, Michel  44 Ahmad Mahir Pasha  72 Ahmadenijad, Mahmoud  124 Akgunduz, Ahmet  35 Akhund, Mohammad Hassan  190 Albright, Madeleine  132, 240 Alexander II, tsar of Russia  15 Ali, caliph  91 Alsabekov, Hussein  207 Alusi, Muhammad  40 al-Amin, Ibrahim  144 Ammar, Abu  111 Anas, Abdullah  157 Arafat, Yasser  111, 113, 117, 119, 124, 143

Arif, Abdul Salam  75 Assad, Bashar  124 Assad, Hafez  124 Astemirov, Anzor (Amir Seifullah) 213, 214, 217, 222, 227 Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal  74, 92 Atayev, Muslim  222 Atta, Mohamed  190 al-Awda, Salman  154 al-Awlaki, Anwar  85, 169, 184, 203 Aziz, Abdul Qader Ibn-Abdul  40 Azzam, Abdullah Yusuf  69, 79, 83, 86, 87, 155, 157, 218 Baader, Andreas  19 Bader-el-Din, Mustafa  146 al-Badr I  162 al-Badr II  162 al-Banna, Hassan  67, 69, 71, 83, 101, 180 Baqir as-Sadr, Muhammad  141 Barnidge, Robert P.  13 Basayev, Shamil  213, 219, 220, 224 Batukayev, Shamsuddin  227 Begin, Menachem  77, 117 Bell, J. B.  20 Berman, Russell  100 Bhutto, Benazir  189, 196 Bostanov, Ismail  228 Brachman, Jarret  167

258

Index of Names

Bruce, Steve  33 Buryatsky, Sayyid (Aleksandr Tikhomirov)  40, Bush, George  242 Bush, George W.  72, 139 Byford, Grenville  233 Cardini, F.  49 Carnot, Lazare  16 Chernomyrdin, V. S.  188 Clinton, William J.  189 Daoud, Abu (Mohammed Daoud Oudeh)  113 Davis, Terry  48 Davlatov, Allovidin  199 Dekushev, Adam  223 Dostum, Abdul Rashid  178–180, 188 Dudayev, Jokhar  207, 208 Elizabeth, Empress of Austria  16 Erdogan, Recep Tayyip  127 Esmurziyev, Musa  228 Ezzedin, Hassan  145 Fadlallah, Muhammad Hussein 143, 151 Fahd, King of Saudi Arabia  158 Faraj, Muhammad abd-al-Salam  76–79, 83, 84, 159 Farouk I, King of Egypt  71 Fukuyama, Francis  26 Gailani, Sayyid Ahmed  175 Gakayev, Hussein  227 Gandhi, Indira  20, 32 Gandhi, Rajiv  20 Gardanov, Ilez (Amir Adam)  224 Gaynetdin, Rawil  36 Gelayev, Ruslan  222 al-Ghabid, H.  208 Ghazi-Muhammad  225

Gochiyayev, Achemez  223 van Gogh, Theo  29 Goldstein, Baruch  32 Gorchkhanov, Ilyas  224 Gore, Albert  188 Guevara, Ernesto “Che”  18 Gülen, Fethullah  35 Habash, George  109, 111 Habeck, Mary  101 Hamzah, Mir  162 Hamzat, Shamil  225 Haniyeh, Ismail  123, 129 Hariri, Rafik  153 Hariri, Saad  148 Hasan, Nidal Malik  169 Heikal, Mohamed  132 Heinzen, Karl  15 Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin  173–175, 179, 180, 182, 188, 189, 193, 197, 239 Henry, Émile  16 al-Hilali, Abu Ayman  106 Ho Chi Minh  18 Hoffman, Bruce  23, 26, 30, 110 Hojiev, Jumabay (Juma Namangani)  198 Holbrooke, Richard  194 Hoxha, Enver  185 al-Hudaybi, Hasan  72 Hughes, James  215 Huntington, Samuel  43, 54, 100 Hussein bin Talal, King of Jordan  112 Hussein, imam  133 Hussein, Saddam  44, 158 Ilyas, Muhammad  66 Iyad, Abu (Salah Khalaf)  113 Jagran, Sayyid  176

Index of Names

Jenkins, Brian Michael  160 Jones, Terry  47 Juergensmeyer, Mark  51 Kader, Kari  162 Kadyrov, Akhmad  21, 207, 208, 215 Kartoyev, Abdurahman  228 Karzai, Hamid  191, 193 Kennedy, Hugh  80 Kepel, Gilles  26, 136, 185 Khaled, Leila  109, 111 Khalili, Karim  179 Khalilov, Rappani (Rabbani)  223 Khalis, Muhammad Yunus  173, 174, 177, 178, 161 Khamenei, Ali  183 Khan, Ismail  179 Ibn Al-Khattab  210, 213, 218, 223 Khomeini, Ruhollah  23, 69, 130, 131, 133–137, 139, 149, 150 Kooijmans, Pieter Hendrik  13 Krymshamkhalov, Yusuf  223 bin Laden, Osama bin Muhammad 8, 19, 24, 40, 42, 52, 69, 76, 78, 85–87, 89, 96–98, 106, 155–162, 164, 166–169, 187, 189–191, 198, 209–210, 218 Lahoud, Emile  148 Lebed, Alexander  187–188 Leca, Jean  103 Lenin, V.  11 Lewis, Bernard  42, 43 al-Libi, Abu Yahya  167, 168 Louis Attiya Allah  99 al-Mabhouh, Mahmoud  11 Magomedov, Ibragim  229 Magomedov, Murtazali  228 Magomedov, Umalat (Al-Bara)  223

Makasharipov, Rasul (Muslim)  223 Malashenko, A.  64, 70, 208 Mansur (Sheikh Mansur)  225 Mao Zedong  18 Marighella, Carlos  18 Marzook, Abu  123 Mashal, Khaled  120 Maskhadov, Aslan  211, 215 al-Massari, Mohammed  161 Massoud, Ahmad Shah  162, 174, 179, 180, 182, 183, 188 Mawdudi, Maulana Abul Ala  23, 67–69, 86, 96, 101, 180 Mazari, Abdul Ali  176 Medvedev, Dmitri  240 Medzhidov, Islam  228 Mehsud, Baitullah  195, 196 Meinhof, Ulrike  19 Milliband, David  10 Mirsky, G.  39 Mohammadi, Mohammad Nabi 161, 174 Mojaddedi, Sibghatullah  175, 178 Mollachiyev, Ilgar (Abdul Majid)  223 Mosaddegh, Mohammad  132 Most, Johann  15 Moussa, Abdel Latif  125, 126 Mubarak, Hosni  79 Mudhaffar, Zuhair  50 Muhannad (Khaled Yusef Muhammed al-Emirat)  227, 228 al-Musawi, Abbas  146 Musawi, Hussein  143 Musharraf, Pervez  191 Muttawakil, Wakil Ahmed  189, 193 Muzayev, Timur  207 al-Nabhani, Taqiuddin  94

259

260

Index of Names

Najibullah, Mohammad  178–180, 183 Nasrallah, Hassan  144, 145 Nasser, Gamal Abdel  71, 74, 84, 108, 111 Naumkin, V.  55, 65, 66, 213, 232, 243 Noble, Ronald  169 Nojumi, N.  184 an-Nukrashi Pasha, Mahmoud  72 Nurgaliyev, Rashid  221, 229 Obama, Barack  47, 191–193 Odil, Usmon (Abu Usman Adil)  204 Olmert, Ehud  124 Omar, Mohammed  180, 184–186, 193 Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza  130, 132, 133 Penn, M. D.  235 Pipes, Daniel  46 Pol Pot  185 Primakov, Yevgeny  188 Pshikhachev, Anas  229 ul-Qadri, Tahir  36, 238 al-Qahtani, Abdullah Hamid Mohammed  27 al-Qaradawi, Yusuf  38, al-Qassam, Izz ad-Din  118 Qatada, Abu  164 Qutb, Muhammad  76 Qutb, Sayyid  23, 42, 67, 69, 71, 73–76, 78, 86, 95, 99, 101, 180 Rabbani, Burhanuddin 174, 178–182, 188 Rabin, Yitzhak  21, 29, 32, 114 Raduyev, Salman  219 Rahman, Fazlur  162 Rakhimov, Abdullo (Mullo Abdullo) 199 Ramazanov, Tinamagomed  229 Ranstorp, M.  30

al-Rantissi, Abdel Aziz  119 Rapoport, David  31 al-Rashed, Abdel Rahman  33 al-Rashidi, Ali (Abu-Ubaydah al-Banshiri)  161 Rashwan, D.  55, 57–61 Rezaee, Mohsen  150 Rice, Condoleezza  139 Rida, Rashid  70 al Rifai, Zeid  112 Saad al-Din al-Alami  124 Saad, Emir (Alan Digorsky)  224 el-Sadat, Anwar  20, 27, 76, 77, 84, 115 Sadikov, Maksud  229 Sadulayev, Abdul-Halim (Sheikh Abdul-Halim)  215, 225 Sageman, Marc  87, 158, 159, 163, 171, 177 Ibn Saud, Muhammad  63 Sayidibrahim, Sayid-Hasan  228 Saytakov, Denis  223 Sayyaf, Abdul Rab Rasul  157, 161, 175, 178 Sayyaf, Rasul  178–180, 182 Schweitzer, Yoram  150 Shamil  212 Shamir, Ichak  117 Shaqaqi, Fathi  114, 115 Shariati, Ali  133, 135 Sheikh Fathi  210 Sheikhulayev, Umar (Muaz)  223 al-Shihri, Sa’id  168 Shirazi, Sayyid Mohammed Hassan 131 Sikoyev, R.  136, 137, 184 Silantyev, Roman  206, 215 Spencer, Robert  44, 45

Index of Names

Stiglitz, Joseph  243 Streusand, D.  83 Supyan, Amir (Supyan Abdullayev)  216 Tagayev, Ahmed  228 Ibn Taymiyyah, Ahmad Sheikh  63, 65, 67, 81–83, 233 Taziyev, Ali (Amir Magas)  224 Tel, Wasfi  112 Tibi, Bassam  37 Ulfkotte, Udo  118 Umar, caliph  91 Umarov, Doku  216, 222, 226–228 Umberto I, King of Italy  16 al-Urduni, Abu Hafs  218 Uthman, caliph  91 Uzun Haji  225 Vadalov, Aslambek  226, 227 Vagabov, Magomedali (Seifullah Gubdensky)  223 Velijanov, Israpil (Emir Hassan)  223 Villepin, Dominique de  126 al-Wahhab, Muhammad Ibn Abd 63–65, 214, 233 al-Walid, Abu  218 Wilson, D.  90 al-Wuhayshi, Nasir  168 Yahya, Harun (Adnan Oktar)  35, 36, 84 Yassin, Ahmed  117–119 Yekdaste, Qari Ahmed  176 Yevkurov, Y.  21 Yuldashev, Tahir (Muhammad Tahir Farouk),  198, 204 az-Zahar, Mahmoud  123 Zakaria, Fouad  237 Zakayev, Akhmed  214

Zalesne, E. K.  235 Zarate, Juan  72 Zardari, Asif Ali  195 al-Zarqawi, Jordanian Salafi Abu Musab  69, 165, 166 al-Zawahiri, Ayman  66, 69, 73, 74, 76, 78, 87–90, 96, 98, 105, 125, 157, 158, 162, 165, 166, 169, 171, 190, 210

261

262

About

the

authors

Rakhamim Yashayevich EMANUILOV was born in 1949. He graduated from the faculty of oriental studies at the Azerbaijan State University (in 1972) and worked for many years in Iran and Afghanistan. He is the manager and president of the “Civilizations Interaction” foundation at the Institute of Oriental Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences; holds a PhD in history. Andrey Eduardovich YASHLAVSKY was born in 1972. He graduated from the Russian State University for the Humanities (in 1994). He holds a PhD in political science and is a research fellow at the political theory department of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences; a journalist; editor of the international section of the Moskovskij Komsomolets newspaper; the author of numerous scientific publications, as well as books and materials that have appeared in the media.

Al so Published

by

A c a d e m ic S t u d i e s P r e s s

in

2011

KEYS TO THE GIFT A Guide to Vladimir Nabokov’s Novel Yuri Leving 564 pages Cloth 978-1-934843-11-6 $75.00 / £47.00 Paper 978-1-934843-97-0 $39.00 / £24.50 Available in paper for classroom adoption only

Yuri Leving’s Keys to The Gift: A Guide to Vladimir Nabokov’s Novel is a new systematization of the main available data on Nabokov’s most complex Russian novel, The Gift (1934–1939). From notes in Nabokov’s private correspondence to scholarly articles accumulated during the seventy years since the novel’s first appearance in print, the work draws from a broad spectrum of existing material in a succinct and coherent way, as well as providing innovative analyses. The first part of the monograph, “The Novel,” outlines the basic properties of The Gift (plot, characters, style, and motifs) and reconstructs its internal chronology. The second part, “The Text,” describes the creation of the novel and the history of its publication, public and critical reaction, challenges of English translation, and post-Soviet reception. Along with annotations to all five chapters of The Gift, the commentary provides insight into problems of paleography, featuring unique textological analysis of the novel based on the author’s study of the archival copy of the manuscript. Yuri Leving is Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Russian Studies at Dalhousie University. He is the author of Upbringing by Optics: Book Illustration, Animation, and Text (2010) and Train Station – Garage – Hangar (V. Nabokov and Poetics of Russian Urbanism) (2004), and editor of The Goalkeeper: The Nabokov Almanac (2010).

“Yuri Leving’s meticulous dissection of Nabokov’s last Russian novel, The Gift, fully vindicates his claim for it as ‘one of the masterpieces of twentieth century modernist literature,’ fit to stand beside Joyce’s Ulysses for the allusive richness of its content and the musicality of its prose. In seven richly fact-filled chapters Leving has unearthed a wealth of historical, chronological, biographical, textological, literary critical and bibliographical material to bolster his case, and like a scrupulous archeologist, uncovers the multiple layers of Nabokov’s complex creation to illustrate and illuminate its artistic essence. In itэs masterly marshaling of evidence, Leving’s work is unlikely to be surpassed anytime soon.” —M i c h a e l S c a m m e l l , the author of Solzhenitsyn, A Biography (1984) and Koestler: The Indispensable Intellectual (2010), the translator of The Gift into English

“Keys to The Gift is a remarkably useful contribution to the understanding of one of Nabokov’s most difficult and brilliant novels.” —E l l e n d e a P r o f f e r Te a s l e y, the co-founder of the Ardis Publishers

“Prof. Yuri Leving’s book on Nabokov’s magisterial The Gift is a masterpiece in itself, the last—and definitive—word on the subject.” —A l ex a n d e r Th e ro u x, the author of Darconville’s Cat (1980) and Laura Warholic (2007), the literary critic of The Wall Street Journal

THE EUROPEAN NABOKOV WEB, CLASSICISM AND ELIOT Robin Davies 300 pages Cloth 978‐1‐936235‐65‐0 $69.00 / £47.00

Robin Davies here demonstrates that Nabokov’s Pale Fire has a classical unity and represents a direct attack on T.S.Eliot’s philosophical position, particularly as given in The Waste Land and as represented by Eliot’s later tendency for conservatism in literature, politics and religion. After Nabokov was forced into exile from Germany and then France in the 1930s with his young son and Jewish wife, Eliot’s passivism must have seemed to him the very antithesis of survival. The enigmatic Pale Fire and its surface triviality suggested that there could be self-consistent logic within the obvious commentary of Charles Kinbote and John Shade’s poem. Davies places this work in its vast European context, forming a bridge between Russian and European literature which will be appreciated by scholars of both. Robin Davies (D.Phil, Oxford University) is a senior research associate at Cardiff University. He has long studied Nabokov’s literature. “The European Nabokov Web, Classicism and Eliot is a very fine book by a person of great talent and expertise both in the humanities and sciences, a kind of work that Nabokov himself would love to read, a kind of commentary to Pale Fire, which goes to the very heart of Nabokov’s view of what literature is about.” —L a z a r Fl e i s h m a n , Professor of Slavic Languages and Literature, Stanford University

RANK AND STYLE Russians in State Service, Life, and Literature Irina Reyfman 250 pages Cloth 978-1-936235-51-3 $69.00 / £47.00

Rank and Style is a collection of essays by Irina Reyfman, a leading scholar of Russian literature and culture. Ranging from the eighteenth to the twentieth century, the essays focus on the interaction of life and literature. In the first part, Reyfman examines how obligatory state service and the Table of Ranks shaped Russian writers’ view of themselves as professionals, raising questions about whether the existence of the rank system prompted the development of specifically Russian types of literary discourse. The sections that follow bring together articles on Pushkin, writer and man, as seen by himself and others, essays on Leo Tolstoy, and other aspects of Russian literary and cultural history. In addition to examining little-studied writers and works, Rank and Style offers new approaches to well-studied literary personalities and texts. Irina Reyfman (PhD Stanford University) is a professor of Russian Literature at Columbia University. In her studies, Reyfman focuses on the interaction of literature and culture: how literature reflects cultural phenomena and how it contributes to the formation of cultural biases and forms of behavior. Reyfman is the author of Vasilii Trediakovsky: The Fool of the ‘New’ Russian Literature (Stanford, 1990) and Ritualized Violence Russian Style: The Duel in Russian Culture and Literature (Stanford, 1999; also in Russian, Moscow: NLO, 2002). She is also a co-editor (with Catherine T. Nepomnyashchy and Hilde Hoogenboom) of Mapping the Feminine: Russian Women and Cultural Difference (Bloomington, IN: Slavica, 2008).