Teachers and Unions: The Applicability of Collective Bargaining to Public Education [Reprint 2016 ed.] 9781512804607

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Teachers and Unions

Teachers and Unions The Applicability

of Collective

to Public

Bargaining

Education

BY

MICHAEL H. MOSKOW Assistant Drexel

Professor of Institute of

Management Technology

l i t o t i

Published by INDUSTRIAL R E S E A R C H U N I T , D E P A R T M E N T O F

INDUSTRY

Wharton School of Finance and Commerce University of Pennsylvania Produced

and Distributed

by

University of Pennsylvania Press Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104

Copyright 1966 by Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania Second Printing 1968

Library of Congress Catalog Card N u m b e r 66-26141

P R I N T E D IN T H E U N I T E D STATES O F AMERICA

9010

Table of Contents

Chapter

Page

I. I N T R O D U C T I O N Why Teacher Militancy? Purpose of the Study Description of Procedures

1 2 5 7

II. ECONOMIC S T R U C T U R E AND ADMINISTRATION OF PUBLIC EDUCATION Allocation of Resources to Public Education T h e Product of Public Education Expenditures for Education Educational Revenues Public School Enrollment Employment in Public Education State Control of Public Education Local School Systems Boards of Education Fiscal Powers of School Boards Administrative Organization Relative Powers of School Boards Community Influence Conclusions III. LEGAL ASPECTS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS General Statutory Authority of School Boards T h e Right to Bargain in the Absence of Legislation Legislation Regulating Collective Bargaining for Teachers California Connecticut Massachusetts v

9 9 10 11 13 15 16 19 20 23 25 27 28 SO 31

37 37 38 45 45 46 47

Chapter

Page

Michigan Oregon Washington Wisconsin Right of Public School Teachers to Strike Conclusions IV. T H E LABOR M A R K E T F O R P U B L I C S C H O O L TEACHERS Public School Teachers Sex Age Race Preparation Marital Status Multiple Job Holders Separation Rate Average Work Week Implications Teacher Salaries Minimum Salary Legislation Single Salary Schedules Teacher Certification T e n u r e Legislation Demand for Public School Teachers Supply of Public School Teachers Crucial Differences between Public Education and Private Employment Summary of Characteristics of Public School Teachers Conclusions V. T E A C H E R O R G A N I Z A T I O N S T h e National Education Association T h e American Federation of Teachers Changes in NEA Policy A F T Policy on Collective Bargaining Teacher Representation Elections Conclusions VI. EXCLUSIVE R E C O G N I T I O N Exclusive Recognition in Private Employment Function of Exclusive Representation vi

48 49 50 51 53 54

59 60 60 61 61 61 62 62 63 64 64 65 70 71 76 76 79 83 86 87 88 93 93 98 101 106 107 114 117 118 120

Chapter

Page

Alternative Representation Systems Exclusive Recognition in Federal Employment Exclusive Recognition in Public Education Organizational Positions on Exclusive Recognition Study Taken by the Author Dual Representation Minority Rights Under Exclusive Recognition Conclusions

121 126 127 129 131 131 134 136

VII. A P P R O P R I A T E BARGAINING U N I T Bargaining Units in Public Education Organizational Positions on Bargaining Units in Public Education Poiitions of Government Agencies on Bargaining Units in Public Education Wisconsin Minnesota Positions of School Boards on Bargaining Units in Public Education New York City New Rochelle, New York Rochester, New York Newark, New Jersey Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Other Areas Methods of Determining Representatives Conclusions

150 150 157 159 161 162 162 164 166

VIII. J O I N T DECISION MAKING Joint Decision Making in Private Employment Influence of the Environment of Public Education Joint Decision Making in Public Education Typology of Bargaining Relationships Conclusions

171 174 175 182 185 190

IX. BARGAINING POWER Determinants of Bargaining Power in Public Education Bargaining Power in Public Education Effect of Bargaining Power in Public Education Conclusions

193

vii

139 140 143 145 145 149

194 197 208 210

Chapter

g

Pa e

X . T H E SCOPE OF BARGAINING AND W R I T T E N AGREEMENTS Scope of Bargaining by Professional Employees in Private Employment Organizational Positions on the Scope of Bargaining in Public Education Scope of Bargaining in Public Education Study by the Author Problems on the Scope of Bargaining in Public Education Written Agreements Organizational Policies on Written Agreements Analysis of 15 Written Agreements in Public Education Conclusions X I . CONCLUSIONS General Conclusions Bargaining on Monetary Items State-Level vs. Local-Level Bargaining Legal Aspects of Bargaining in Public Education T h e Labor Market for Teachers Exclusive Recognition Appropriate Bargaining Unit Joint Decision Making Bargaining Power Scope of Bargaining Written Agreements Future Research Suggestions Speculations on How Collective Bargaining Will Develop in Public Education

213 214 215 216 219 223 224 228 233 243 247 248 249 249 249 249 251 251 252 253 253 254 254 255

Bibliography

259

Index

275

viii

List of Tables Table

Page

1. Distribution of Local Educational Expenditures by Function or Object, 1961-62 2. Percentage Distribution of Public Employment, by Level of Government and Major Function, October 1962 3. Classroom Teachers in Regular Elementary and Secondary Day Schools, by Control and Organizational Level, Fall of 1953-73 4. Number of Public School Systems and Number of Pupils Enrolled, by Size of System, United States, Fall 1963 5. Single-Salary Schedule 6. Estimated Total Demand for Classroom Teachers in Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, Fall of 1959-73 7. Departments, Divisions, Commissions, and Committees of the National Education Association 8. Teacher Representation Elections, January 1961— September 1965 9. Comparative Analysis of 20 School Districts Studied by the Author 10. Comparative Analysis of 15 Written Agreements in Public Education

12 17 18 21 73 84 95 108 132 233

List of Figures Figure

Page

1. Salary Distribution of Public School Teachers, October 1962 2. Demand and Supply for Public School Teachers ix

68 81

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The author is deeply grateful to the many persons, too numerous to mention, who offered their support, assistance, and suggestions throughout the preparation of this study. Four persons deserve special mention: Dr. George W. Taylor, Dr. Marten Estey, Dr. Herbert R. Northrup, and Dr. Edward B. Shils. The author is particularly indebted to Dr. George W. Taylor, Hamwell Professor of Industry at the University of Pennsylvania, for his continued guidance and inspiration throughout the years of graduate work and in the preparation of this study. Dr. Taylor is largely responsible for the author's interest in both labor economics and the special problems of public school teachers. Dr. Marten Estey, Associate Professor of Industry at the University of Pennsylvania, aided the author with constructive criticism and suggestions. Dr. Herbert R. Northrup, Chairman of the Industry Department of the University of Pennsylvania, made many helpful comments and suggestions on both an early draft and on the final presentation. Dr. Edward B. Shils, Associate Professor of Industry at the University of Pennsylvania, aided by furnishing advice which converted the original draft to a readable work. The author wishes to express his appreciation to those organization leaders, public school teachers, superintendents, and school board members who supplied information for this study. The Research Division of the National Education Association deserves special thanks for their assistance with an endless list of questions. The author also wishes to thank the Labor Relations Council of the University of Pennsylvania, headed by Dr. George W. Taylor, for its assistance in financing the field work for this study. Final responsibility for the ideas expressed herein rests, of course, with the author. Finally the author would like to thank Mrs. Marjorie Denison for her editorial assistance and Miss Jane Doyle, Mrs. Verna Gardner, Miss Carole Krakover, Miss Jackie Najjar, Mrs. Estelle O'Brien and Mrs. Catherine Poch for typing the manuscript. xi

FOREWORD Dr. Michael H. Moskow's study of Teachers and Unions represents the first major study of this significant development since the rash of teacher organizing drives, strikes, and withdrawals from service began with the successful unionization of the New York City teachers in 1961. Dr. Moskow first became interested in this subject as a teacher in secondary school. He later returned to the University of Pennsylvania and wrote his Master's Thesis in this general area. Encouraged by the faculty to continue his research and study, Dr. Maskow spent three years researching the area, and an additional year revising his dissertation for publication. A study encompassing so broad an area cannot, of course, deal with all aspects. Much more must be written, for example, concerning the impact of collective negotiations on the taxpayers' traditional control of the costs of education and on the selection of teaching personnel. It is too early to determine whether collective negotiations may abrogate such taxpayer control. T h e great value of Dr. Moskow's study, and the overriding reason why the Industrial Research Unit is publishing it, is that it presents clearly and objectively the facts and issues involved in the movement for collective determination of teacher wages and working conditions. Those who might disagree with Dr. Moskow's conclusions will find, nonetheless, that in this book, they have the facts upon which they may make their own analysis. Herbert R. Northrup, Chairman Department of Industry May 1966

xiii

Chapter I Introduction

decisions affecting the salaries and working conditions of public school teachers are made at both the state and local levels. T h e great diversity existing among the states in laws and procedures at both levels causes the decision-making processes to be extremely varied and complex. In addition, the rapid changes now taking place in public education as well as the fluid and dynamic nature of the industry further add to the difficulty of making generalizations. Many states have passed legislation establishing minimum salaries for beginning and experienced teachers. Other states have passed laws requiring duty free lunch periods and even grievance procedures. Administrative rulings from state departments of education further affect the working conditions of teachers. Efforts by teacher organizations to influence the outcome of state level decisions have usually been limited to lobbying activities. On the school district level, salary schedules and conditions of employment of teachers have usually been determined unilaterally by boards of education. Since individual bargaining by teachers is rare, teachers must react to school board decisions by changing jobs or by moonlighting. Recently, however, teachers have begun to show interest in participating in the decision making that affects them through the organizations to which they belong. Their efforts have not been limited I N THE UNITED STATES,

1

to the determination of salaries and working conditions, as is usually the case in private employment. Instead, teachers have included in the scope of jointly determined subjects decisions on educational policy, as well as decisions affecting conditions of employment. W H Y T E A C H E R MILITANCY? Obviously, the reasons for this recent phenomenon are varied and complex. Basically, there are three different areas of potential conflict in any school system. First, there is a possible conflict over the allocation of funds to public education. Teachers usually want higher salaries and in some cases they want more funds allocated to education in general. T h e attitude of the community, on the other hand, may vary from a willingness to spend more on public education to a strong resistance to any further increases in the funds allocated. In any community, at any given time, there are always some groups of citizens who are attempting to keep education costs as low as possible. T h e position of the school board will vary among different communities. In some cases, the board will side with those who want to minimize expenditures on education, and in other cases the board will side with the teachers and other groups that want to increase expenditures. Their position will depend on a number of different variables, but in large part it will depend on the pressures placed on the board by the community at large and by various groups of citizens. Second, there is a potential conflict over the rules that govern the employment relationship of the teacher. On matters such as class size, number of teaching assignments, class schedules, seniority, and transfer plans, the superintendent often wants to maintain a degree of flexibility. Teachers, on the other hand, usually want protection from any arbitrary or discriminatory application of the rules. A third area of potential conflict occurs over the professional function of the teacher. In public education there is a large group of professionals working for a common employer. Since professional workers are often confronted with a wide variety of problems which require the application of a high degree of intelligence and specialized training, it is essential that they have a broad range of autonomy. 2

Thus, professional employees will seek greater control over their jobs and a share in the decision making that affects them. Our system of lay control of public education almost necessitates a conflict between professionally trained teachers and lay boards of education on matters such as curricula, textbooks, homework, teaching machines, and audio-visual aids. Even though the above three areas of potential conflict have existed in public education for many years, teachers have recently displayed greater militancy and they have attempted to persuade school boards to negotiate with them on a wide variety of topics. Several factors which explain in part this recent change can be identified. First, as part of its attempts to organize white-collar workers, the labor movement has given active support to the American Federation of Teachers 1 in its drive to unionize teachers. It is no secret that the changing composition of the labor force has caused union leaders to look toward white-collar and professional workers who have traditionally been difficult to organize. As a result public school teachers have been chosen as a group which, if successfully organized, could improve the image of unions in the eyes of other white-collar workers. Most of the labor support for organizing teachers has come from Walter Reuther, head of the Industrial Union Department 2 of the AFL-CIO. In 1963, Reuther revealed that two IUD organizers had been assigned to the American Federation of Teachers and three full-time organizers were being subsidized by the IUD. In addition, financial support was being furnished to the AFT for twenty-three part-time organizers.? In addressing the 1964 AFT convention, Nicholas Zonarich, Director of Organization of the IUD said: I have not come here to dictate the policies of the AFT, nor has the Industrial Union Department ever indicated at any time that this was our aim, because it is not. All we say is this—that I have come here to tell you we are with you—and we are here to support you—and we are going to continue that support.4 In a later part of his speech, Zonarich pledged that the IUD would match, dollar for dollar, any funds the AFT spent for organizing. T h e AFT used the IUD support to initiate their "Co-Org" plan, 3

" a new, massive cooperative organization program utilizing the resources of the national, state and local A F T Federations along with aid from the Industrial Union Department (IUD) . . . . " James Mundy, Director of Organization for the A F T , has stated that: Within three years . . . we will be able to shoulder complete responsibility for our operations, but without the interest and the aid for the rest of the labor movement we would not be able to get started.® T h e consolidation of school districts has been identified as a further cause of the rapid development of negotiation procedures. In 1962 there were only 34,678 school districts in the United States, representing a decline of almost 50 percent in the previous 10-year period and nearly 70 percent in the previous 20-year period. 8 Apparently the merging of small school districts in order to obtain economies of scale has the added result of further separating the classroom teacher from the decision makers in the district. T h e additional layers of supervision necessitated by the increase in the size of the district most likely add to the need and to the desire of the teacher for protection by an organization specifically devoted to his interests. In addition, large districts will be more subject to organizing activities by teacher associations and unions because of the economies of scale in organizational activities. Because of the highly publicized teaching conditions in large city slum schools, teachers can easily become frightened when they see the size of their school district increasing. For those who teach in the large city schools, the fears are no longer imaginary, and the need for effective teacher organizations is emphasized in their daily teaching assignment. A further reason for the increased movement to collective negotiations is found in the rising percentage of our labor force working as government employees. This change has caused an over-all drive for negotiation procedures for this burgeoning group of employees. No doubt pressure for negotiation procedures from other government employees has stimulated teacher organizations to request similar practices. Finally, some commentators claim that the increasing percentage of male teachers and the decreasing turnover rate indicates that a 4

greater career commitment is resulting among teachers. Consequently, more teachers are anxious to have a voice in the determination of their salaries and working conditions.7 PURPOSE OF T H E STUDY Assuming that it is desirable for teachers to have a larger share in the making of some of the above decisions, several methods such as advisory councils or intensified lobbying could be used to accomplish this end. Because of the great variety in size and in decision-making authority of local school districts, the number of different possible approaches is increased even more. In order to obtain greater decision-making power, however, some teachers have recently increased their attempts to use the institution of collective bargaining which was developed in the private sector of our economy. T h e strongest advocate of collective bargaining for public school teachers is the 110,000-member American Federation of Teachers, affiliated with the AFL-CIO. On the other hand, the 950,000-member National Education Association8 objects to collective bargaining and instead advocates "professional negotiations." As will be discussed later, however, the similarities between the approaches of the NEA and the AFT are much greater than the differences. Since they both favor a system of local level co-determination which includes most of the elements of private sector collective bargaining, no distinction between their approaches will be made in the early chapters of this study. With the development of negotiation procedures already taking place, it is essential to examine the applicability of collective bargaining in this new environment. A crucial quetsion is: Is collective bargaining viable in the environment of public education? If so, what modifications must be made in the institution before it can be used to determine the wages and conditions of employment of teach ers? What reasons, if any, would preclude the use of collective bargaining in public education? It should be emphasized that this study will be confined to collective bargaining at the local school district level. With the large number of decisions in public education made at the state level, no doubt some kind of co-determination process may develop at that 5

level as well. A thorough examination of decision m a k i n g at the state level including legislative and state agency processes, however, w o u l d b e beyond the scope of this study. A l t h o u g h the study will be confined to the decisions over which local school boards still have authority, it should be kept in mind that negotiations at the local level w o u l d only be part of the total decision-making process in public education. T h e above questions will form the basic orientation of this study. In order to provide background information, the first four chapters will be devoted exclusively to the environment of public education and to the implications of this u n i q u e environment for the development of collective bargaining. In a pluralistic economy with decentralized decision m a k i n g collective bargaining is characterized by its diversity. It is still possible, however, to enunciate certain " c o m m o n features" of collective bargaining. T h e " c o m m o n features" of collective barg a i n i n g w h i c h are examined in this study are exclusive recognition, appropriate bargaining unit, j o i n t decision making, bargaining power, scope of bargaining and the written agreement. Each of these aspects of collective bargaining is studied in a separate chapter in which, first, a reason or reasons for the development of the " f e a t u r e " in collective bargaining in private employment will be ascertained. Second, on the basis of the u n i q u e environment of public education, the following questions will be posed: Does the " f e a t u r e " still fulfill its intended function; does the need no longer exist because of the changed environment; or is the new environment such that the " f e a t u r e " is no longer satisfactory to fulfill the need? T h i r d , on the basis of a study of a sample of school districts in which bargaining is taking place, the " f e a t u r e " will be studied in terms of its current utilization in p u b l i c education. Fourth, a conclusion will be drawn on the applicability and viability of the " f e a t u r e " in the new environment and the degree of modification necessary. O n the basis of the above study, it should be possible to determine w h e t h e r collective bargaining as developed in private employment can be used in the environment of public education, and if so, what modifications are necessary. In addition, it should be possible to determine how collective bargaining is currently b e i n g used in a sample of school districts. 6

DESCRIPTION OF PROCEDURES For purposes of this study, "teachers" were defined as public school teachers on either the elementary or secondary level. Thus, teachers in private schools and teachers in public schools providing education on the college level were excluded from the study. After a study of collective bargaining in private employment to answer the questions posed above, the following procedures were followed in order to choose an appropriate sample of school districts to study: First, letters were sent to the AFT and to the NEA requesting a list of their local affiliates engaging in collective bargaining or professional negotiations. At first neither organization cooperated fully, but eventually both organizations supplied the lists required. Both organizations emphasized that the lists were complete only to the extent of the knowledge of the national organizations. Letters were also sent to the American Association of School Administrators and the National School Boards Association requesting help in compiling the above list, but neither organization was able to provide assistance. Second, letters were sent to the executive secretaries of all state affiliates of both the NEA and the AFT requesting the names of their local affiliates which were engaging in professional negotiations or collective bargaining. In this way, it was hoped that the lists supplied by the national organizations could be as complete as possible. Utilizing the final list, composed of 108 districts, a letter was sent to the superintendent of schools in each district asking whether negotiations were being conducted and requesting a copy of any written agreement or policy statement which may have been issued. Eighty-three percent of the superintendents replied to the first letter, and the remaining 17 percent replied to a second request. On the basis of the response received, a sample of 20 districts thought to be engaging in collective bargaining was chosen. Four districts which were known to have non-exclusive recognition were included in the sample. In each of the 20 districts either a personal or telephone interview was conducted with the superintendent of schools or his representative, and a representative of the teacher organization or organizations. On the basis of this investigation it was found that 16 of the 20 districts were engaging in effective collective bargaining. T h e 7

criteria used in this determination were joint decision making, bargaining power, and a reasonably wide scope of negotiable issues. Chapters II through V include a study of the environment of public education; Chapters VI through X investigate the "common features" of collective bargaining; and Chapter XI presents the conclusions of the complete study. 1 H e r e i n a f t e r referred to as A F T . 2 H e r e i n a f t e r referred to as I U D . 3 W a l t e r R e u t h e r , " R e p o r t s to t h e I n d u s t r i a l U n i o n D e p a r t m e n t of the AFL-CIO," Proceedings of Fifth Constitutional Convention, Washington, D C , November 7-8, 1963. * American Federation of Teachers, Convention Proceedings (abridged), Forty-eighth Annual Convention (Chicago, 1964) , p p . 8, 96. s A m e r i c a n Teacher, XI, No. 2 (November 1964), I, 2. « U.S. B u r e a u of the Census, Census of Governments, Governmental Organization, 1962, I , 6. 7 Wesley A. W i l d m a n , " I m p l i c a t i o n s of T e a c h e r B a r g a i n i n g for School Administration," Phi Delta Kappan, X L V I , No. 4 (December 1964) , 154. 8 H e r e i n a f t e r referred to as NEA.

8

Chapter II Economic Structure and Administration of Public Education

A L L O C A T I O N OF RESOURCES PUBLIC EDUCATION

TO

relies on the market mechanism te allocate resources for the production of goods and services. T h e r e are, however, some situations where allocation by the market will not achieve optimum results and other cases where the market mechanism will completely fail. Richard Musgrave has separated the latter category into social wants and merit wants. 1 "Social wants (or social goods) are those wants satisfied by services that must be consumed in equal amounts by all." 2 In other words, part or all of the benefits of goods in this category will be received regardless of whether a particular consumer pays for them or not. Therefore, rational consumers will have no reason to buy social goods and there will be no incentive for businessmen to supply goods in this category. It is generally felt that the government is then justified in providing for this good or service. B A S I C A L L Y OUR ECONOMY

T h e traditional examples of social goods are national defense, lighthouses, and our national judiciary system. Other goods which are considered to a lesser degree social goods are parks, fire and police protection, and education. Since the market mechanism fails to register the preferences of 9

consumers for social goods, a political process is substituted, and individuals must be made to adhere to the group decision. This is the only way in which consumers can be forced to reveal their preferences for social goods.3 T h e second category of wants which Musgrave classifies as requiring an interference with the market mechanism are "merit wants." He defines them as ". . . considered so meritorious that their satisfaction is provided for through the public budget, over and above what is provided for through the market and paid for by private buyers." 4 With merit wants, there is no problem of obtaining the true preferences of consumers since by definition, consumer sovereignty is inapplicable. In fact, the purpose of merit wants may be one of interference by some (probably the majority) into the want patterns of others. Public education is often considered a merit want since the better educated are more aware of the value of education, and thus interference with the preference patterns of consumers is justified.® T h u s a distinctive characteristic of public education is that instead of relying on the market mechanism, governmental decisions are necessary in order to allocate resources. Obviously this difference in the way allocative decisions are made will have direct implications on any transfer of the collective bargaining process from the private sector. T H E P R O D U C T OF PUBLIC E D U C A T I O N T h e product of public education has many unique characteristics. First, since education presumably increases consumer satisfaction as well as the earning power of an individual, it can be classified as both a consumption-good and an investment-good. Second, a tangible product is not part of the output of the schools and therefore the output must be described in terms of services. In addition, there is wide disagreement on the fundamental goals of education. Among the various goals attributed to public education are transmitting a body of knowledge to the student, strengthening the capacity of the student to use the knowledge, and developing the "whole man" including the character of the student. Thus, measuring the output 10

of the schools or evaluating the transmission of the services becomes exceedingly difficult. It is generally recognized that education benefits the individual in three major ways. Education increases the total earnings of the individual; it increases the number of vocational alternatives open to the individual; and, it enriches human life by increasing the variety and depth of intellectual pursuits.6 Recently, economists have shown great interest in measuring both the individual and the social benefits of education in order to achieve a "better" allocation of resources to education. Since human capital is recognized as an important element in economic growth, the benefits of education are of importance to both underdeveloped and advanced counties.7 EXPENDITURES FOR EDUCATION Education ranks second to "national defense and international relations" in terms of economic importance as a governmental function. Of $ 176 billion spent by all levels of government in 1962, $53 billion or 35.7 percent was spent on national defense and $22.8 billion or 15.3 percent was spent on education.8 Obviously all levels of government did not share equally in their expenditures for public education. For the federal government, the major function was national defense which received 55 percent of all direct federal expenditures; for state and local governments, the most important function was education which received 34.3 percent and 44.8 percent of all direct expenditures.® If intergovernmental expenditures (i.e. grants of money to some other administrative unit) are added to direct government expenditures, education received the largest percentage of both state and local expenditures, 34.3 percent and 44.8 percent respectively in 1962; but only 1.8 percent of all expenditures by the federal government. 10 In the academic year 1963-1964 a total of $32.6 billion, 11 or approximately 5 percent of our Gross National Product, was spent for education in the United States. Of the $32.6 billion, approximately $9.3 billion was allocated to public and nonpublic institutions of higher learning. Approximately $2.7 billion of the remaining $23.3 11

billion was spent for nonpublic elementary and secondary schools. The remaining $20.3 billion, or about 3.3 percent of our gross national product, was allocated to public elementary and secondary education. 12 The figure of $2.7 billion spent on nonpublic elementary and secondary schools is only an estimate since comparable expenditure data for these schools is not available. Even if data on actual expenditures were collected, it would be extremely difficult to arrive at a universally accepted method for determining the value of donated services which make up a substantial part of the revenue of nonpublic schools.18 Included in the $20.3 billion spent on public schools are $16.9 billion for current expenditures on elementary and secondary schools, Table

1

DISTRIBUTION OF LOCAL EDUCATIONAL B Y FUNCTION OR O B J E C T ,

Distribution

(f

T o t a l expenditures in local school districts Current expenditures Administration Instruction Salaries of instructional staff Other expenditures Plant operation Plant maintenance Fixed charges Other school services Pupil transportation Food services Health services Attendance services Miscellaneous school services Summer schools Adult education Community colleges Community services Capital outlay Interest o n school debt S*URCE:

U.S.

EXPENDITURES

1961-62

Amount Thousands) 18,388,487 14,694,418 648,372 10,016,280 9,191,353 824,927 1,283,085 477,346 1,077,278 1,192,057 576,361 400,636 129,007 35,584 50,469 21,326 29,536 71,252 71,979 2,862,153 587,823

Office of Education, Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare,

of State

School

Systems

1961-62,

1963, p. 15.

12

% of Total 100.0 80.1 3.5 54.6 50.1 4.5 7.0 2.6 5.9 6.5 3.1 2.2 .7 .2 .3 .1 .2 .4 .4 15.6 3.2 StatisticI

community services, summer schools, community colleges operated by local school districts, and adult education; $3 billion for capital outlay; and $0.4 billion for interest on public school debt. 14 As shown in Table 1, when public school expenditures are broken down by function, 81.2 percent was for current expenditures, 15.6 percent for capital outlay, and 3.2 percent for interest on the school debt. Expenditures for "instruction" represented 54.6 percent of all expenditures for public schools, and this can be further divided into 50.1 percent for "salaries of instructional staff" and 4.5 percent for "other expenditures for instruction" including textbooks and teaching supplies. Mainly as a result of increases in salaries of instructional personnel, the proportion of expenditures for "instruction" increased from 51.5 percent in 1951-1952 to 54.6 percent in 1961-1962. T h e percentage of total expenditures for "fixed charges" (payments to teacher retirement funds, social security, and insurance premiums) advanced from 4.1 percent in 1951-1952 to 5.9 percent in 1961-1962, which can mainly be attributed to larger retirement contributions necessitated by the rise in salaries.15 EDUCATIONAL REVENUES Public school districts have three major sources of revenue: taxes, intergovernmental revenues, and borrowing. In 1961-1962, 56.9 percent of public school revenues came from local tax sources, 38.7 percent was received as grants (i.e. intergovernmental revenue) from state governments, and 4.3 percent was received in grants from the federal government. This distribution has changed drastically since 1919-1920 and 1945-1946 when local tax sources constituted 83.2 percent and 63.8 percent of public school revenues respectively. No doubt, the Public Elementary and Secondary Education Act and the impacted areas legislation passed in 1965 will increase the percentage of revenues received from the federal government. 18 Approximately 53 percent of all expenditures for public education are financed by the general property tax, which represented 13 percent of all tax revenues in 1957 as compared to 54 percent in 1902. T h e property tax is usually thought of as being less flexible than the personal income tax and the corporation tax, which represent 38 percent and 22 percent of total tax revenues respectively. 13

Since 72 percent of the revenue of the federal government is derived f r o m income and corporation taxes, compared to 8 percent of the revenues of state and local governments, expanding tax revenues for education is a more difficult process than for other governmental functions. 1 7 In order to relieve the financial bind of the state governments, proposals have recently been made for the federal government to supply the states with unspecified block grants. These would enable the states to take advantage of the more flexible sources of revenue of the federal government. Assuming that local level collective bargaining places added pressure on school boards to increase educational expenditures, the result may be to hasten the movement to block grants and to more direct support for public education by the federal government. Great variety exists in the revenue programs of the various states. For example, Delaware, North Carolina, New Mexico, and Hawaii derive over 70 percent of their public school revenues from state sources, while for New Hampshire, Iowa, and South Dakota the figure is less than 20 percent. Iowa, Nebraska, and New Hampshire derive over 80 percent of public school revenue from property taxes, while Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, New Mexico, and North Carolina obtain less than 20 percent of their public school revenues f r o m property taxes. For all states, the average figure is 52.6 percent. 1 8 Alabama, Alaska, Hawaii, Nevada, New Mexico, Virginia, and the District of Columbia obtain over 10 percent of their public school revenues from federal funds, while the national average is only 4.7 percent. Until 1965 the majority of federal funds for education had been used for vocational education, school assistance in federally affected areas, school lunch programs, and the education of dep e n d e n t children of military personnel overseas. 19 T h e above variety in revenue programs for the various states will in part determine whether meaningful collective bargaining on monetary items can be conducted at the local level. Obviously, if the state is supplying a large percentage of the funds for education, then meaningful bargaining on the absolute size of the budget of the local district will be severely limited; in fact it will be possible only to the extent of local tax revenues. 14

Of all grants made by state governments to local school districts, 73 percent were special purpose grants which must be expended only on designated objects or functions. In terms of dollar volume, however, 82 percent of the state funds were in the form of general purpose grants with very little instruction as to the use to be made of the funds. Therefore, in most cases meaningful bargaining on the allocation of funds within the total budget of the local district will be possible.20 Since an average of 43.1 percent of total educational revenues come from non-local sources, in most cases bargaining at the local level will have to be supplemented by intensive lobbying activities at other levels of government. With the increase in support from the federal government for public education, lobbying activities at the federal level will most likely be of greater importance in future years. T h e above analysis does not apply to local level bargaining on non-montetary items. As long as decisions are made within the framework of state laws and administrative regulations, meaningful bargaining is possible at the local level on these items. PUBLIC SCHOOL E N R O L L M E N T In 1964, the school-age population, 5 through 17 years of age, was estimated at 49,396,000. This group comprised 25.8 percent of the total resident population. California and New York had over 4 million school-age children each; Pennsylvania, Texas, Ohio, Illinois, and Michigan had over 2 million school-age children each; while Alaska and Wyoming each had fewer than 100,000 persons in this category.21 Estimated total public school enrollment in 1964-1965 was 42,784,717, which represented an increase of more than 40 percent over 1954-1955. California, with the largest number of children in public schools, 4,525,000, nearly doubled its enrollment in the decade; New York had over 3 million enrolled; and 12 other states each had over 1 million students enrolled. 22 In 1964, 85.6 percent of the pupils in school were enrolled in public schools while 14.4 percent were enrolled in nonpublic schools. T h e two extremes were North Carolina with over 98 per15

cent of its pupils in public schools a n d R h o d e Island with 71.4 percent enrolled in public schools. 23 T h e large enrollment described above cause overcrowding in some schools. In 1963, 4.1 percent of the pupils enrolled in public schools were in excess of normal b u i l d i n g capacity. I n Texas and California, less than 1 percent of the students were in excess of normal b u i l d i n g capacity while in Nevada a n d Maryland the figure exceeded 10 percent. 2 4 As would be expected, student enrollment is by n o means evenly distributed among the 31,705 public school systems in the United States. Approximately 1.4 percent of the school districts enroll over 48 percent of the students, while 57.5 percent of the school districts enroll a b o u t 6.4 percent of the pupils, thus concentrating the enrollment in big city school districts. 23 In addition, there are 3,942 school systems, representing 12.4 percent of all public school systems, that do not operate schools and, therefore, have n o students. School systems in this category usually enroll their students in neighboring districts and pay tuition charges to cover the cost. 29 E M P L O Y M E N T IN PUBLIC E D U C A T I O N In 1962, 2,741,000 persons were employed in public education on a full-time-equivalent basis by federal, state, and local governments. T h i s figure represents 32.5 percent of all public employees a n d 4 percent of total employment in the U n i t e d States. 27 As shown in T a b l e 2, of the total employed in public education, 85.4 percent worked for local governments, 14.2 percent for state governments, a n d 0.4 percent for the federal government. T h e 2.2 million local government employees who worked in the field of education represented 27.8 percent of all public employees. 28 From 1957 to 1962, total public employment in the United States increased by 1.3 million persons or 18.2 percent. Nearly half of this net rise was accounted for by increases in educational employment which increased by 639 thousand or 30 percent. For all other public employment combined, there was a net increase of 656 thousand persons or 13 percent. 2 9 Employment in public education relative to population varies 16

from 94 to 172 employees per 10,000 inhabitants. T h e wide variation results from numerous factors including interstate differences in the age distribution of population; the proportion of all pupils enrolled in public, as opposed to private, schools; and the size of public school classes.30 Table

2

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF P U B L I C BY

EMPLOYMENT,

L E V E L OF G O V E R N M E N T AND M A J O R OCTOBER,

Function All functions Education National Defense and International Relations Health and Hospitals Postal Service Highways All others

FUNCTION,

1962

All Governments

Federal

State

Local

100.0 32.5

29.3 0.1

17.5 4.6

53.2 27.8

13.4 10.3 6.6 6.3 30.9

13.4 2.0 6.6 0.1 7.0

Note: Because of rounding, detail may not add to total. SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1962 Census of Governments, Public Employment, III, 1963, 1.

—

—

4.1

4.1 —

—

3.1 5.7

3.1 18.2

Compendium

of

Approximately 72 percent of all employees of local school systems are classroom teachers. Principals, consultants, librarians, guidance personnel, psychological personnel, and other non-supervisory instructional personnel account for another 6 percent of the employees. Thus, total instructional staff accounted for about 78 percent of the employment in public education at the local level. T h e only other groups of any appreciable size were custodians, cafeteria workers, and transportation personnel. 31 For 1963-1964, the total number of classroom teachers in public schools was estimated at 1,574,818, which represents a gain of 5 percent over the revised estimate of 1,512,653, for 1962-1963. From, 1953-1954 to 1963-1964, the total number of classroom teachers increased by 52.6 percent. As shown in Table 3, by 1973 it is projected that there will be 1,916,000 classroom teachers in public schools.82 17

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