Taliban in Pakistan: A Chronicle of Resurgence: A Chronicle of Resurgence [1 ed.] 9781621005070, 9781608762064

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Copyright © 2010. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved. Taliban in Pakistan: A Chronicle of Resurgence : A Chronicle of Resurgence, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2010. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved. Taliban in Pakistan: A Chronicle of Resurgence : A Chronicle of Resurgence, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook

TERRORISM, HOT SPOTS

AND CONFLICT-RELATED ISSUES SERIES

Copyright © 2010. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

TALIBAN IN PAKISTAN: A CHRONICLE OF RESURGENCE

No part of this digital document may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means. The publisher has taken reasonable care in the preparation of this digital document, but makes no expressed or implied warranty of any kind and assumes no responsibility for any errors or omissions. No liability is assumed for incidental or consequential damages in connection with or arising out of information contained herein. This digital document is sold with the clear understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, medical or any other professional services.

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TERRORISM, HOT SPOTS AND CONFLICT-RELATED ISSUES SERIES Wasted Lessons of 9/11 (US House of Representatives) ISBN: 978-1-60692-640-6 Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism Beatrice V. Mohoney (Editor) 2009. ISBN: 978-1-60692-835-6 Maintaining Homeland Security Alan P. Proctor and Jason T. Waleford (Editors) 2009. ISBN: 978-1-60692-990-2 National Infrastructure: Protecting. Funding and Rebuilding Frederick H. Lupul 2009. ISBN: 978-1-60692-369-6

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Wasted Lessons of 9/11 U.S. House of Representatives 2009. ISBN: 978-1-60692-640-6 Antiterrorist Emergency Ventilation: System, Strategy and Decision-Making Xianting Li, Hao Cai and Lina Zhao 2009. ISBN: 978-1-60741-041-6

Terrorism Insurance Miguel H. Palacios (Editor) 2009. ISBN: 978-1-60741-794-1 Terror and Suicide Leo Sher and Alexander Vilens (Editors) 2009. ISBN: 978-1-60876-103-6 Taliban in Pakistan: A Chronicle of Resurgence A. Manzar 2010. ISBN: 978-1-60876-206-4

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TERRORISM, HOT SPOTS

AND CONFLICT-RELATED ISSUES SERIES

TALIBAN IN PAKISTAN: A CHRONICLE OF RESURGENCE

SYED MANZAR ABBAS ZAIDI

Copyright © 2010. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

WRITING UNDER THE PEN-NAME A. MANZAR

Nova Science Publishers, Inc. New York

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All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means: electronic, electrostatic, magnetic, tape, mechanical photocopying, recording or otherwise without the written permission of the Publisher. For permission to use material from this book please contact us: Telephone 631-231-7269; Fax 631-231-8175 Web Site: http://www.novapublishers.com NOTICE TO THE READER The Publisher has taken reasonable care in the preparation of this book, but makes no expressed or implied warranty of any kind and assumes no responsibility for any errors or omissions. No liability is assumed for incidental or consequential damages in connection with or arising out of information contained in this book. The Publisher shall not be liable for any special, consequential, or exemplary damages resulting, in whole or in part, from the readers‘ use of, or reliance upon, this material.

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Independent verification should be sought for any data, advice or recommendations contained in this book. In addition, no responsibility is assumed by the publisher for any injury and/or damage to persons or property arising from any methods, products, instructions, ideas or otherwise contained in this publication. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information with regard to the subject matter covered herein. It is sold with the clear understanding that the Publisher is not engaged in rendering legal or any other professional services. If legal or any other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent person should be sought. FROM A DECLARATION OF PARTICIPANTS JOINTLY ADOPTED BY A COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND A COMMITTEE OF PUBLISHERS. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA Manzar, A. Taliban in Pakistan : a chronicle of resurgence / A. Manzar. p. cm. Includes index. ISBN:  (eBook)

1. Taliban. 2. Pakistan--Politics and government--21st century. 3. Pakistan--Social conditions-21st century. 4. Pakistan--Military policy. 5. Terrorism--Pakistan. 6. Insurgency--Pakistan. I. Title. DS389.M424 2009 954.9105'3--dc22 2009035598

Published by Nova Science Publishers, Inc.  New York

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CONTENTS Preface

vii

Introduction

ix

Chapter 1

Emergence

1

Chapter 2

Warlords and Organization

53

Chapter 3

War and Peace

99

Chapter 4

Terromodels: The Spread of Militancy

165

Chapter 5

The New Taliban and the Society

239 255

Index

261

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The Future

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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The book is a focused area study of the emergence of the Taliban in Pakistan, with consequent repercussions for regional security. The book engages in profiling the Pakistani Taliban Warlords like Baitullah Mehsud (who has been categorized as more dangerous than Osama Bin Laden), Fazlullah (who has transformed a hitherto peaceful Pakistani area into a Taliban and Al-Qaeda haven) and Mangal Bagh etc. in minutiae and bringing their organizations, personal traits, terror tactics and links with terrorist organizations under extensive scrutiny. A detailed analysis of the widespread ideology of Deobandi and Salafi thought patterns throughout Pakistan‘s tribal areas is undertaken, along with the international and Pakistani responses to rise of the same. The impact of Talibanisation on society and its aftermaths are discussed, with a view to projecting future trends. The resurgence of the Taliban in Pakistan, their organization centres, their ideological basis and seminaries from where they get their religious sanction are mapped out in meticulous detail, along with a detailed look at suicide terrorism in Pakistan, besides in depth analysis of the factors radicalizing the Pakistani society. This is the first book of its kind which engages with the phenomenon of the emergence of the Taliban in Pakistan in such minute detail, and will prove invaluable to strategists and general readers alike about the subject. Excerpts from this book have appeared as articles or a part thereof in several International Journals, the Editors of whom I would like to acknowledge as regards the republication of material contained in the Book. The Journals are: Defence against Terrorism Review, American Foreign Policy interests, Defence Studies, RUSI Journal, Internal Homeland Security, Asian Politics and Policy, South Asian Survey and Strategic Survey. I would also like to thank Mr. Frank Columbus, Editor in Chief of Nova Publications, for his invaluable help in the publication of this book.

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INTRODUCTION The dynamics of the current Taliban insurgency is not confined to a single theatre, but transcends the boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The ethnic mix of Afghanistan is skewed towards Pashtuns, which explains why the Taliban movement emerged in the Pashtun South of the country, and had a predominantly Pashtun backing. Their fanatical policies generated intense resentment from almost all the other ethnic groups, including some Pashtuns, which partially explains the routing of the Taliban in the wake of the US led campaign in 2001. The easy victory of the American forces over the Taliban in Afghanistan led them to believe that Afghanistan would be pacified quickly, since the campaign took only two months and the Americans sustained just one casualty. Hamid Karzai seemed an ideal choice as a moderate interim President, and it was believed that he would eventually be able to pacify Afghanistan. Donald Rumsfeld was explicitly not interested in `nation building': helping Afghanistan to develop a healthy infrastructure. However, despite the fact that the Americans were anticipating a smooth sailing from the comfort zone of aerial bombing campaigns, they had not studied the realities on ground. This proved to be a deadly mistake. One of the reasons why Americans paid relatively little attention to Afghanistan was that they wanted to concentrate on Iraq, which they were hoping would replicate the easy victory in Afghanistan. It seemed more tactically advantageous to spend most of the money on Iraq, as a result of which Afghanistan suffered not only logistical problems, but was largely ignored in geo-strategic terms. This short sightedness was reflected in the mistakes that the American administration made in administering Afghanistan. They had relied mainly on the Tajik and Uzbek war lords of the Northern alliance to engage the Taliban in land fighting, and after the rout of Taliban in 2001, shifted the onus of controlling these unruly war lords on Karzai. It initially made sense to use the armies of the warlords rather than attempt to build up and train an Afghan National Army. However, there was a fundamental flaw in this reasoning; Karzai, a Pashtun, had no control over the Tajik and Uzbek war-lords. They later refused to disarm or to let their men be integrated into a national army. Occasionally they fought each other to the detriment of the state; they also started collecting tolls which they utilized to further entrench their footholds in their areas and refused to hand over the money to the government. Most of all they alienated the Pashtun majority in a society which relies heavily on inter tribal and ethnic bonds. For a long time Karzai dared not confront these unscrupulous war lords for the fear of

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destabilizing a frail government. Eventually he managed to form a new government of his own without them in 2004, but he was struck by indecisiveness in trying to implement a programme of reform. Corruption reigned supreme. The opium trade was revived for lack of alternative crops, and a major drug lord was Karzai‘s own brother. There was no money coming in to revive farming, and the Americans did not stamp out the poppy cultivation due to the fear of generating tens of thousands more unemployed people. When the Americans focus shifted nearly entirely on Iraq, NATO forces were deputed to take over as the military instrument overseeing western interests in Afghanistan. However, there was a discernible central lack of command from the very beginning, with each of the 37 countries constituting this NATO force drawing up its own procedures about the rules of engagement.

Reproduced from Shahid A. Afsar, Christopher A. Samples, The evolution of the Taliban, Masters Thesis, June ,2008, Naval Postgraduate School. Produced using ArcGIS9.2 and databases from Geo Community, GIS Data Depot at http://data.geocomm.com/, Pakistan‘s Ethnic Map from Perry Castaneda Map Library, University of Texas at http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/ middle_east_and_asia/pakistan_ethnic_80.jpg and Afghanistan Ethnic Map from University of Texas Libraries at http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/afghanistan_ethno _1982.jpg Figure 1. Ethnic Layout of the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.

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Introduction

xi

Reproduced from Shahid A. Afsar, Christopher A. Samples, The evolution of the Taliban, Masters Thesis, June ,2008, Naval Postgraduate School. Derived from Caroe and Johnson, Program for Culture and Conflict Studies at NPS.

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Figure 2. Geographic Layout of Major Pashtun Tribal Groups.

Some countries concentrated their forces on reconstruction and humanitarian work; a fair number were specifically prohibited from engaging the Taliban. There were also forces which were instructed not to interfere with poppy growing; those stationed in the more peaceful north were prevented from helping the hard-pressed - and always insufficiently numerous troops in the south. In 2006, only 15,000 out Of the 45,000 troops stationed in Afghanistan, or one third, were engaged in active operations. Unsurprisingly, the Taliban in Afghanistan had been establishing themselves in large areas of the East and South from 2003 onwards. The indecisive attitude of the allied forces created another dilemma for Pakistan in the shape of transmigration of militancy to the tribal belts of Pakistan. Arguably, the tribal belts of FATA were never entirely free from radicalism, but the situation became indescribably worse when large number of Taliban started pouring in after their rout from Afghanistan. These militants were no strangers to these areas, and many were legends in this poverty stricken tribal land of Pakistan .Previously however, these tribal areas were used as staging points for forward offensives in Afghanistan, and also as training and recuperation facilities. However, the continued presence of these fighters in the tribal areas started to have their effects. These were the militants who would later become the Pakistani Taliban; this has been called a Pashtun militant movement. I tend to shy away from such a simple explanation. The Pakistani Taliban movement has become an entity in itself, with commanders like Mehsud commanding thousands of fighters, and the movement has come into its own, vying for stature with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Arguably, Afghan Taliban warlords like Dadullah

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never held the kind of centralized command assumed by Mehsud and Fazlullah in Pakistan. The presence of thousands of foreign fighters also bolsters the arguments that the fight has assumed ideological leanings, which just raises the ante for the forces combating this movement. Chapter 2 deals with this issue at some length by profiling the New Taliban Warlords and their organizations. For a long time the Americans were only interested in al Qaeda militants being captured in Pakistan. Thus, nobody realized for some time the close connections which had been developing covertly between al Qaeda and Taliban. This collaborative process was vigorously carried out between the two militant entities after 2001 in Pakistani tribal areas. There were early reports of organised militant activities after 2001, but these were largely ignored or passed off as ‗local‘ tribal disturbances. The fact that the tribal areas were taboo to the armed forces also projected the false impression that the tribal areas were going about their business as usual, or if any problems arose, these were Pashtun nationalist movements in character. However, trouble had started brewing immediately afterwards, as I illustrate with examples in chapter 1, which traces this resurgence. Jihad has become a mainstream concept in these tribal societies, and this is shaped by the Fundamentalist interpretative discourses, about which some facts are elaborated upon again in Chapter 1.

Reproduced from Shahid A. Afsar, Christopher A. Samples, The evolution of the Taliban, Masters Thesis, June ,2008, Naval Postgraduate School. The tree was developed with information from various open source documents, including Victor Korgun, "Afghanistan's Resurgent Taliban," Terrorism Focus 1, no. 4 (October 24, 2003), http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/ article.php?articleid=23404 and Rahimullah Yusufzai, "Omar Names Council to Resist Occupation," The News June 24, 2003. Figure 3. Organizational Diagram of the Taliban.

The military capacity gap between India and Pakistan has also been an eternal catalyst in the process of the militants being treated as proxy warriors for Pakistan. Proxy warriors present a cheap solution in response to logistical capacity gaps, and especially when these Taliban in Pakistan: A Chronicle of Resurgence : A Chronicle of Resurgence, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook

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Introduction

xiii

warriors are not afraid to die or embrace shahadat, they become valuable assets of inter-state or inter-agency warfare. There is a significant problem with using these warriors though; they do not know when to stop, or more realistically, do not want to. At the outset such warriors or militant organizations have tended to be useful as a countering influence in the geo-strategic power plays, but usually become a nuisance later. Thus a militant leader such as Nek Muhammad Wazir was at one time a hero in Waziristan, being later killed by a missile attack. This is the dilemma of using militants as proxy warriors; they are goaded on by ideology, which becomes such an inherent part of their psyche that it assumes control of their worldview. A person unafraid of death and interested only in imposing his own particular Islamist worldview on the world in general is a dangerously unstable concoction to manipulate, as many of the forces who have tried to do so have found out to their disadvantage. Many such warriors got training in FATA pending despatch to Afghanistan during Taliban heydays, and after the rout of the same, gravitated back to these areas as familiar abodes of residence. It is quite a debatable point that the FATA areas presented just the right mix of conditions for militancy to take over. These areas have been governed since British Raj days by a very peculiar structure consisting of a governance ‗mix‘ of a character called the "Political Agent", Maliks, and Jirgas. As a representative of the Government, the political agent's job was to make a policy by interacting with the tribal maliks, or tribal leaders. The maliks would in turn form and conduct Jirgas, which is the tribal process of consensus by which the centrally issued order of the Political Agent becomes policy. The jirga imposes a particular decision -say, for example, that it would not house certain undesirable elements –by laying down punitive consequences for violation of a policy. This process is regulated under the Frontier Crimes Regulation Act [FCR], a draconian and quite medieval set of laws, which lays down quite expansive powers of coercion. The system worked satisfactorily for the federal government until the '80s, mainly because the maliks and the political agent got along well due to financial incentives involved. However, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the infusion of Saudi money, and the deliberate use of the madrassah to prop up religious leaders, brought the mullah to the forefront as well. Contrary to popular misconceptions, before this, the mullah never really held much influence in the tribal belts. Pashtuns would derisively refer to the mullah as "the dog that lives off of table scraps," because the mullah had no independent source of power. His money, his wherewithal, his living, his prestige, his status was all at the mercy of the Malik and the tribal leadership and organization. However with the post soviet invasion geo-strategic changes foisted upon this region, the mullah came into his own as an independent player. It is important to realize that this had been gradually happening, but since the political agent acted as the source of information feeding intelligence to the central government, this fact was conveniently neglected in communiqués to the central government. Ironically, whenever the issue was raised by some conscientious civil servant, it was ignored as a panic reaction or local disturbance by the policy echelons. Earlier reports from the area scoff at any real power held by clerics, and politicians tended to dismiss any news of clerics gaining clout as alarmist talk: "I don't think that any religious scholar can incite others to kill, because it is against our faith to kill or harm anyone," said Maulana Merajuddin, a member of the National Assembly from South Waziristan in response to a

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query that tribal elders were being eliminated.1This has tended to be a typical official response to queries about militancy in the area. When the problem was realized in its context in 2004, and the army went in, it made the mistake of trying to wipe out the existing power structure and imposing a military solution to this tribal area. However, the mullah stepped up to fill in this power vacuum. The Pakistani military began operations in South Waziristan in March 2004, with the objectives of the surrender or eviction of the foreign Uzbek, Chechens and Arabs present in the area. However, the plan backfired. It caused high military casualties in Angoor Adda, Azam Warsak, Kalusha and Shakai area; the Taliban openly started executing the staff of the political agent. It is a commonly held belief in strategic circles that the incursion of the Pakistani army in tribal areas in 2004 mobilized the "neutral residents," the people resident there that were not really a party to the dispute. Because collective punishments and the FCR were indiscriminately used, the population began to be mobilized against the Pakistani state. "Before the Army came, things were very quiet in Waziristan," says Ramiullah Yousefzai, a journalist who has covered the fighting in Waziristan. "Whole villages have now been displaced. After any bombing, the whole village leaves because they know the Army will come and search and detain people. Schools are closed; there are no jobs. That's how village after village has turned against the Army. And they side with the militants - give them refuge."2 The Government‘s stand about the situation on ground tended to be ambiguous, as this quoted statement by a top military officer shows: ―There is no court, no police station [run by the Taliban]," said Maj. Gen. Shaukat Sultan, one of the military's spokesmen. "It is absolutely wrong to say that the Taliban are in control." General Sultan did concede, however, that clerics had accumulated a dangerous amount of power. "We do agree that religious clerics have certainly gained some kind of strength in the area. They have caused some targeted kinds of killing."3 In South Waziristan, the tribal sentiment was further inflamed by the incremental return of detainees of Guantanomo, who narrated harrowing tales of torture and insult to the Holy Quran, to the utmost consternation of the locals. The Islamists of Waziristan were consequently incensed and motivated to listen to the preaching of the Afghan war hardened Taliban now living amongst them. The stories of violence from the uncoordinated operation travelled to North Waziristan, where more and more tribesmen started promising support to the Taliban. This was also a good recruiting opportunity for the Taliban to co-opt the dogmatic pro-Taliban sympathizers from North Waziristan, who frequently crossed the Durand line to harass the Coalition troops in Afghanistan. The Taliban and their sympathizers follow a morphed variant of Islam, which is deconstructed to reveal its epistemological roots in Chapter 1. Pakistan apparently had underestimated the size of difficulty facing it. The military realized that it did not have the capacity to suppress the Islamists by half hearted measures, and military morale plummeted. Senior Pakistani negotiators who would previously meet the tribesmen in their villages would from now on be confined to the paramilitary manned forts;

1

Elders losing to extremists in Pakistan, The Christian http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0608/p06s01-wosc.html.html. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid.

Science

Monitor,

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June

08,2006,

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Introduction

xv

travelling by road became unsafe. Helicopter travel became the only safe mode of travel by more senior personnel both in South and North Waziristan. The militarization of Waziristan led to a domino effect by which the authority of the central government began crumbling all over the FATA areas. The weakening of political administration became obvious in the sudden weakening of the Political agent as the representative of the state. The maliks, who were the middlemen, started being executed at will by the Islamists and this trend continues even today. As matters seemed to be plummeting out of control, negotiation was deemed to be an acceptable solution. On 24th April 2004, the Shakai agreement was reached between the military and the militants of South Waziristan, legitimizing pro-Taliban militants and leading to what amounted to a demise of the civilian political system of administration. The political management as represented by the Political agent practically ceased to exist. The agreement stipulated the surrender and registration of foreigners in the area, but practically no headway was made in this regard. There have now been a number of deals struck with the militants, an issue which is dealt with in Chapter 3. It is important to comprehend the foreign presence in these areas to put this in its contextual paradigm. Besides the obvious Jihadi element, one of the explanations for this presence is that a substantial number of Arabs and Uzbeks have intermarried into the tribal area. Many different Arab and central Asian and Southeast Asians came to fight during the Soviet invasion. When many were not welcomed back in their own countries, lacking any other alternative, they made the tribal areas of Pakistan their home, married local women and learnt Pashto. They became kith and kin to the local tribesmen, whose chivalrous code of honour called Pakhtunwali forbids betrayal of kinsmen .This tended to make the tribesmen extremely recalcitrant or even aggressive when demands for surrender of foreigners were made. The cognitive dissonance created by the state forces has also had a devastating effect in the area. The locals were asked in the '80s to support militants as freedom fighters, liberators who liberated their kin in Afghanistan from the Soviets' oppressive regime, and then from subsequent errant warlords. Then they were told that these same people were terrorists. However the locals had developed bonds of kinship with these militants by then, so it was not at all easy to convince them that these militants were terrorists. Thus, the fundamental structure of the tribal society was attempted to be deconstructed in an area which has been traditionally extremely wary of any sort of change. This has resulted in an almost opposite reaction to what the state was expecting by attempting to change tribal mindsets. Also, Musharraf‘s policy of ‗enlightened moderation‘ did not really affect the militant training camps machinery, because the administration still largely considered Kashmiri militants to be freedom fighters, even though Pakistan itself had become a victim of the sectarian groups. A further problem encountered in attempting to shut down militant camps was the overlapping membership phenomena, which I have discussed in Chapter 3.This was the factor that many militant pro-Kashmiri Jihadis were members of other organizations as well, which led to quite a lot of confusion on part of the authorities attempting to control the same. One of the important aspects of the Pakistani mindset toward militancy is the fact that Pakistan has always attempted to stand at parity with India. Also, after having Afghanistan as a client state for so long, it was not a palatable morsel for Pakistani echelons to digest Afghanistan as a separate and rather hostile neighboring state. This search for parity has developed into almost an obsession with the Pakistani Governments. Even when Geo-

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strategic considerations suggested easing up of pressures due to outside tangential forces, an almost unrelenting reliance was still being placed on the Mujahideen to continue providing a steady source of proxy warriors. Thus, even when situation demanded withdrawal of patronage from the militants, there was always some part of the establishment overtly or covertly supporting one faction or the other. The teaching imposed by madrassahs also needs to be placed in context. It is pertinent to mention here a research carried out by Tariq Rehman, who conducted a survey on madrassahs in Pakistan by interviewing madrassah students, as well as students in private schools and public schools, all roughly 10th-grade equivalent students. The survey design centered around opinions towards jihad, militancy and Kashmir, outright warfare with India to take Kashmir away from India, support for minorities and for women in Pakistan, as well as attitudes towards Pakistani Christians, and Pakistani Hindus. The survey encapsulated both teachers and students. The findings disclosed madrassah students as the most inflexible and the most intolerant .They commonly advocated violent solutions, and their teachers were even more vocal in coming up with imaginatively violent solutions to problems scenarios posed to them. This is the sort of teaching imparted in madrassahs, which have proliferated particularly in the tribal belts despite half hearted official attempts to curb their activities. This does not mean in any way that all madrassahs produce terrorists, but it does imply that a madrassah educated person is likely to have an intolerant outlook. With 80% youth unemployment and abject poverty in Waziristan, it is not hard to imagine why many parents decide to send their children to these institutions, some of which provide free food and lodging. Anti Americanism has been a binding force for people in the tribal area of Pakistan, which has obviously strengthened after the intensity of unmanned ‗Predator‘ attacks has increased in Pakistan‘s tribal belts. This has been fed by the ambivalent policies of the Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan. The prognosis of US-Pakistan relations does not seem too good. They have recently been at loggerheads over the above mentioned American attacks. The U.S. does not know how to deal with Pakistan, since the carrot and stick policy sometimes seems to pay dividends and sometimes not. The Americans are used to dealing opportunistically with Pakistan, and denying that strategic considerations do not exist in a purely Pakistani referential framework has not really made life easier for people in the tribal belts. The U.S. government has done substantively very little to engage in a relationship with Pakistanis, and the average Pakistani is aware of it. For example, when President Bush wanted to talk about Pakistan, he always mentioned President Musharraf, which is in stark contrast to the way in which he talked about India's culture, India's democratic principles, India's institutions, India's people etc. This has come over as mollycoddling behavior to imposed dictators for most Pakistanis, who see in this American attitude a Pakistan oriented set of double standards. Arguably, America has never been as unpopular as it has recently become in common man‘s eye in Pakistan. Chapter 4 will go into details of how US has been trying to handle the resurgence of Taliban in Pakistan. The enemy of my enemy thus becomes my friend, particularly when he is a puny individual ostensibly standing up for the rights of the oppressed, which is how the locals tend to see militants. The media space given to Bin Laden has gone a long way in projecting him as a kind of David to the American Globalization Goliath, which is a feeling which catches on very fast in almost all of the tribal belts of Pakistan. This has made Waziristan in particular and FATA in general, a safe haven for militants of all persuasions and leanings, a kind of ‗Jihad International‘. There have been reports which have surfaced in western media which

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Introduction

xvii

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have tended to portray Waziristan as the global headquarters for al Qaeda. This fact has been bolstered by intelligence, as disclosed in a letter deemed authentic, and written by Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, a 37-year-old Libyan who joined Bin Laden in Afghanistan as a teenager during the 1980s.4

Reproduced from Shahid A. Afsar, Christopher A. Samples, The evolution of the Taliban, Masters Thesis, June ,2008, Naval Postgraduate School. Figure 4. Perceived Regional Taliban Leadership.

FATA has certainly become a Taliban hideout and transit center, but this does not mean that other more urbanized areas are immune. The Taliban and al Qaeda have spread their tentacles everywhere, as demonstrated by the fact that most high value al Qaeda arrests have tended to happen in urban centers in Pakistan. For Example, the closest arrest to tribal areas was the apprehension of Abu Faraj al-Libbi, who was arrested in a town called Mardan.5Most of the other arrests have been happening in other metropolitan cities like Lahore, Peshawar, Karachi, Rawalpindi etc. There has been another form of infiltration as well; Pakistan has not

4

Letter gives glimpse of Al-Qaeda‘s leadership, The Washington Post,2 October 2006, http://www.washingtonpost. com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/01/AR2006100101083.html 5 Confronting the Pakistan Problem, Frontline, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/pakistan/fair.html. Taliban in Pakistan: A Chronicle of Resurgence : A Chronicle of Resurgence, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook

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been able to withstand the gradual permeation of the ‗fundamentalist‘6 patterns of thought. "Talibanization" refers to the destabilizing export of Afghan-style radical political Islam, which used to be a term used in conjunction with Afghan society, but has become commonplace in Pakistan now. As political fragmentation, economic meltdown, ethnosectarian warfare, and Islamic fundamentalism tighten their grip on Pakistan, it is a commonplace reality for ordinary citizens to sit down and discuss this phenomenon which has pervaded their lives in one way or the other. Chapter 4 takes a closer look at this phenomenon.

Reproduced from Shahid A. Afsar, Christopher A. Samples, The evolution of the Taliban, Masters Thesis, June ,2008, Naval Postgraduate School. Map taken from FATA Sustainable Development Plan (2006-2015) (Peshawar, Pakistan: FATA Secretariat; Government of Pakistan, 2006), http://www.fata.gov.pk/subpages/downloads.php

Figure 5. Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Frontier Regions.

6

I am as abhorrent to the indiscriminate use of this term as many other students and observers of Islamism, but am constrained to use it since it has gained common currency and recognition. This does not mean however, that I endorse the negative connotations associated with this word.

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Introduction

xix

Reproduced from Shahid A. Afsar, Christopher A. Samples, The evolution of the Taliban, Masters Thesis, June ,2008, Naval Postgraduate School. Stumbling into Chaos: Afghanistan on the Brink (London, UK: The Senlis Council, 2007).

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Figure 6. Perceived Taliban Control in Afghanistan According to Senlis Report.

Life is as hard under the Pakistani variant of Taliban as their Afghan counterparts. The lighter sides of life such as music and television are banned, and women have to stay within the confines of their homes. Journalism has tended to be suppressed, and many casualties have been sustained by journalists in their quest to get the stories coming from the tribal belts. Civil society has all but disappeared from the affected areas, and even NGOs involved in humanitarian work have been forced to shut down under duress of terminal violence. The operations such as the one in Bajaur have tended to generate thousands of refugees, and the state is facing a mass exodus of citizens from the affected areas, who have been rendered destitute by the ongoing militancy. This phenomenon is examined in Chapter 5. The after word at the end of the book attempts to examine the trends that the militancy is following, and tries to make projections about the future, considering several scenarios and tangential forces acting on the unstable mix of militancy. It is the considered view and fervent desire of the author that the Taliban militancy in Pakistan needs to be researched continuously in its minutiae, in order to give the beleaguered state a fighting chance at curbing this menace.

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Chapter 1

EMERGENCE

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This chapter traces the resurgence and reorganization of the Taliban into a new organizational entity, the Taliban in Pakistan. The Taliban, forced to flee Afghanistan, have found a haven in Pakistan‘s tribal areas, re-organizing and recruiting anew in the process. An introduction to these tribal areas is germane to comprehending this evolution, which is discussed in this chapter. Pakistani Taliban are ideologically similar to the Taliban in Afghanistan, but are organized in distinct organizational entities. They are, in effect, the new face of Taliban. This chapter traces their evolution and entrenchment in the tribal areas of Pakistan.

The terrorism scenario in Pakistan has started posing dire threats to the regional sociopolitical stability, with impending implications on the Global War on Terror. The security environment has been dominated by a fast developing tempo of Talibanisation, which is permeating from the tribal to the urban set-up at an alarming pace. This situation is encouraging religious extremism at the roots of tribal and urban set-up, unraveling immense fissiparous tendencies hostile to a tolerant social fabric. This spill-over from the rural to the mainstream of urban is changing the complexion of the latter, in so far as it is encouraging the emergence of an extremist religious ideology, which is the main driving force for the militant Jihadist groups engaged in an endless struggle for the merger of spiritual with the temporal. Pakistani urban society has covered a long distance over the decades, and the social change brought about is fairly well-entrenched to revert to an anti-historical past. Besides, Science and Technology have also made a lot of difference, making it well-neigh impossible to counteract the influence of Western socio-political ideology, which has generally permeated the urban society. This reveals a clear paradigmatic divide between the urban educated mainstream society and a marginalized tribal one, where modern ideals are still alien to the behavioral configurations of tribalism, whence this radical ideology is not only holding out, but gaining popularity as well. FATA7 (Federally administered Tribal Areas) and one of its areas, Waziristan, have been considered one of the most dangerous areas in the World by CIA, and an al Qaeda haven in the post 9/11 scenario, which can now be a generalized definition for many of the FATA areas.8 These areas are the birthplace of the Taliban in Pakistan; this is indeed resurgence, at the same time being a revival of the Talibanised form 7

For a more detailed review of FATA ,access the Government website at http://eyconsol.com/dmo/fata/index.php Anwar Iqbal ―Taliban command structure in Fata alarms US‖, The Dawn,Dec 28,2006,access at http://www.dawn.com/2006/12/28/top1.htm.

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of extremism which has resurfaced in Pakistan from the adjacent areas of Afghanistan. The Taliban have a new face in the form of warlords like Baitullah Mehsud, who outrivals mullah Omar in charisma. They have new sanctuaries in the form of the rugged terrain of FATA, adjacent to settled cities of Pakistan which have been on the way of progressiveness. These Taliban have found new battlegrounds in the cities and tribal areas of Pakistan, where they have started wreaking havoc with their suicide bombers. The scary aspect of this resurgence is the fact that this is happening in a nuclear Islamic state, which has a considerably stronger infrastructure than Afghanistan has had for decades, and the fact that these Taliban have started destabilizing a country with one of the stronger armies in the region. This is then the pinnacle of Talibanisation; it started with them entering a war ravaged country as a militia, nearly taking over war ravaged Afghanistan, culminating in their attempts to make Pakistan a forward base for exporting their variant of extremism across the globe. In this book, I have attempted to pin down the emergence of this phenomenon as a forewarning; the Taliban are far from dead. Those who insist upon this utopian thought would do well to reconsider the jubilation expressed by many scholars toward the end of the 2001 about the Taliban movement having spent all its steam, ostensibly relieved by the defeat of Taliban in Afghanistan. ―The columnist William Pfaff writes about the defeating of the Taliban in Afghanistan and argues:

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[T]he victory . . . made wonderfully evident that the Islamic fundamentalism ... is a phantom. It was blown away by the first serious attack made upon it. ... This lesson inevitably 9 will cool the attractions of fundamentalism else-where in the Muslim world.‖

It is time to wake up to the reality of Geopolitics, which have shaped the rebirth of the Taliban movement in the Pakistani theatre. This is the irony of the prodigal son coming home to roost; Taliban were created by Pakistan at the behest of American CIA, and Taliban have resurfaced as the biggest danger to security of the nations of the same two nations .The name may have changed; ‗Tehreek-e-Taliban-Pakistan‘, but the organization is undoubtedly the Pakistani home crafted version of Taliban. The jihad is now not against the Soviet Russia, but against USA and its allies, and any other entity which stands in the way of the Talabanised version of Sharia, including the Pakistani government and any other Muslim who cares to oppose them. This, then, is a clarion call to jihad; not the pedagogical sermonizing of Bin Laden, but the rallying to arms of hordes of the same type of young men who brought Russia to its knees. It is time for strategists to wake up and smell the war paint in the air, because these militants mean business as usual. In order to contextualize the spatial and temporal groundings of this new movement in Pakistan, it is of utmost importance to have some idea of the Tribal society of FATA in Pakistan.

FATA AND TRIBALISM Islamic fundamentalism should not be equated with Islam, but equally, it is a blatant lie to deny that political Islam is a major stream within contemporary Islamic civilization. The 9

Bassam Tibi, The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002), xxiii.

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Afghan Islamists' political failure to produce realistic agendas for change10 is a widespread phenomenon in the Muslim world. It has been called many names, some unflattering; Olivier Roy for instance calling it `the failure of political Islam.' Many analysts say that the evolution of this entity is due to the fact that Muslim societies seem to have been characterized in the twentieth century by two contradictory structures. The clan, tribe and ethnic group on one hand does not seem to exist in a peaceful equilibrium with the state and religion11 on the other. Thus, it is usually the small group versus the larger faith, or the tribe versus the Ummah, or the religious clique against the state which has been the main focus of commitment, as opposed to tension against the state. This ‗dualism‘, if you will, also manifests itself in the paradigms of Islam as opposed to Islamism or fundamentalism. It is important to differentiate between the two; either all connections between them are cleanly severed, or they remain interconnected, in which case Islam gets paradigmatically linked to the latter. Of course, identifying Islam with fundamentalism (which in itself is an inadequate term for expressing this phenomenon) only adds to the intensity of the furor of Islamophobia.12It is this duality that I wish to sever for the purpose of this study; Islam as a religion of peace is being overshadowed by the Islam of politics, which vies against the state for expression of its grievances. This politicized religion is the religion of the old and the new Taliban. It is certainly not the idea of religion of the overwhelming majority of the citizens in the country they wish to bring under their version of Islam. This political variant is the struggle of the small tribal clique of the FATA tribals against the state which (they feel) has marginalized them. It is then a conjunction of traditional grievances, which have joined hands with the rebound phenomenon of radicalism ‗coming home to roost‘ as it were, from neighboring Afghanistan. Thus, an insight into the tribal mindset is just as important as understanding the religious indoctrination, which has prompted the tribal lashkars (raiding parties) to take on the form of a formidable army. Let us first take a look at the evolution of FATA into its development into the ‗most dangerous area‘ in the world. The people of FATA and NWFP, along with sizeable populations in Pakistan's Baluchistan province and Karachi city in Sindh, account for 38-40 million people. Geographically, FATA runs north to south, forming a 1,200-kilometer wedge between Afghanistan and the settled areas of the NWFP. According to the 1998 national census, close to 3.2 million people (the current estimate is 3.5 million) live in FATA, which covers an area of 27,220 square kilometers. The Durand Line divided Pashtun tribes between British India and Afghanistan in 1893, and since then this delineation has been viewed with great contempt and resentment by Pashtuns, the peoples of FATA and NWFP. After Pakistan's emergence in 1947, this line became a major source of a tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pashtuns have been subject to invasions through out history. These included the Aryans (before 500 BC), thereafter the Achaemenians, Graeco-Scythian invasions (324-320 BC), Mauryans (313-232 BC), Greco-Bactrians (185-90 BC), and Sakas from 97 BC. During the first millennium CE, Parthians, Yue-chi (i.e. Kushans), Sassanians, White Huns and Turks followed in succession. The invaders have left their marks on the area in the form of

10

Ibid., ix-xxiii. Ibid.,ix. 12 Ibid. 11

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genealogy. Many Pathans have the admixture of blood of various warriors who passed through this area, for instance, the Afridis have "an admixture of Greek blood."13 Briefly, the Mongols under Genghis khan and Timur Lane managed to subdue these areas; the region which includes "Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier of Pakistan have seen perhaps more invasions in the course of history than any other country in Asia, or indeed in the world."14 Even in the face of great armies, the Pashtuns retained their independence and fierce tribal loyalties, a source of great pride to them. If ever there was a ‗warrior race‘, this is it. FATA areas were once the arena for the ‗Great Game‘ of imperial domination in the 19th century. The British colonial administrators of India tried to control them by various methods; proxy wars, installation of ‗friendly‘ governments and direct intervention. It was vital to check the imperial Bear, the phenomenon of Russian expansionism in Central Asia. However, the first effort at direct intervention, the fabled First Afghan War, by January 1842, resulted in only one survivor, Dr Brydon, reaching jalalalabad to narrate the tragic story of the massacre of his comrades. "A large British-led army had not been wiped out so completely in living memory."15 There followed the Sandeman system, whose effect was the raising of tribal levies, or Khasadars, which institution survives till today. It consisted of ruling this unruly area by building roads and infrastructure with the help of local maliks, who could control the loyalties of the tribes. In return, Maliks got large grants and subsidies. However, it was not uncommon for the British friendly maliks to be seen as traitors and have an ‗accident‘; tribal affiliations run strong,and disloyalty is seen as a trait with sometimes fatal consequences. However, even these measures failed in large part. A ‗Masterly inactivity‘ policy was adopted in which they British administrators basically closed their eyes to the devices of the tribals, and instead concentrated on strengthening their border defenses. The British in 1901 issued a new Frontier Crimes Regulation, (FCR) replacing the older generation of laws. These were an adaptation of decision making by a Jirga, a collection of tribal leaders and notables. Judicial authority was granted to the administrative officials, which tended to be British officers and/or supporters. Thus, a typical colonial device of vesting the executive with judicial powers was introduced, so the former could be an absolutist source of power in the area. Even that did not always produce the expected results, since the political agent, a representative of the executive, frequently bought loyalties of local maliks, rather than exercising control over them. It is worth mentioning that these laws are still the law of the Tribal Areas in the form of FCR. The FCR is a mixture of executive powers and traditional customs and norms. It has been called as the book of ‗Riwaj‘ or local customs. It is a set of outdated and draconian laws more in tune with medieval times than the twenty first century. These laws were designed to keep in subjugation people believed to be incorrigible; human rights were largely ignored and basic liberties glossed over with mentioning of abstract notions of traditions. 16 ―The most notorious sections of the regulations are 21-24 that deal with the issue of collective territorial responsibility. These are particularly problematic clauses which have empowered the political 13

Olaf Caroe, The Pathans(London, Macmillan and Company Limited 1965) George L. Montagno,The Pak-Afghan Detente, Asian Survey, Vol. 3, No. 12 (Dec., 1963), pp. 616-624. 15 J.A. Norris, The First Afghan War 1838-42 (Cambridge, 1967). 16 Special Report, News on Sunday, 13 April,2008, http://jang.com.pk/thenews/apr2008-weekly/nos-13-042008/spr.htm. 14

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agent to punish an entire tribe or clan for crimes committed on its territory by imposing fines, arresting individuals, seizing and even demolishing property anywhere in the country.‖17 Under the FCR, the British installed political agents enjoyed the magisterial powers as well as the executive, a practice continued by the Pakistani Government. As a placating notion, after independence, however, there was a tendency to install Pashtun speaking army officers as agents. An agent had at his disposal un-audited wealth and unchecked exercise of powers; the institution gained notoriety for carrying corruption and financial well being with the perks of the ‗seat‘. In 2008, with the coming into power of the new government in Pakistan, the issue of repeal of FCR was raised. Old laws become habits in FATA, and old habits traditionally die hard in this area. Many ―….tribesmen are still confused over whether the FCR should be repealed or not, as they believe this would mean the extension of the Pakistani laws into the tribal society. This is not acceptable to them. Though, one thing is clear: they want an end to the unlimited powers of the political agents and support the institution of the tribal Jirga to become all powerful. They believe that Jirga is the only institution that provides for justice to the tribesmen.‖18Another tribal point of view is that the Islamic system of sharia be introduced, phasing out the FCR. There is another point of view that the Jirga should be democratically elected.19 On political and social issues, it is the Jirga (assembly of tribal elders) that define laws, regulations and policies. Pakistani courts and law enforcement have almost no jurisdiction over the area. As a substitute to democracy, unelected Jirga leaders from the region were invited to become full members of successive elected National Assemblies of Pakistan until 1997 to represent FATA. In 1996, the federal government of Pakistan decided to introduce adult franchise for the first time in the Tribal Areas for the elections held in 1997. The society is divided into tribes. An approximate system of enumerating the tribes puts the number at around 60, but the picture is complicated by the system of sub tribal affiliations. These tend to be family affiliations as well as sub-tribal entities; the number can roughly be put at around 400 if all sub-clans are counted. The largest tribes are also the ones consistently mentioned in history; the Afridis, Achakzais, Bangash, Durrani, Khattak, Mehsuds, Mohammadzai, Mohmand, Orakzai, Shinwari, Yusufzai and Waziri.It is noticeable that Mehsuds, the tribal affiliation of Baitullah Mehsud, were renowned fighters and marksmen. Some tribes loosely affiliated themselves with the British temporarily, while others never entered into any alliance worth the name. Pashtunwali is the pre-Islamic Pashtun code of conduct which regulated the intra and inert tribal dynamics. It is more of a set of principles, rather than codified laws. Honour and chivalry occupy a central theme in this tradition, along with undying loyalty to the tribe, and fierce opposition to occupation.This code consists of core elements of Nang, Badal, Melmastia, Nanawatay and Hamsaya. Nang (honour) implies the use of every conceivable means to shield and protect the tribesman‘s honor and the honor of his family. The ‗honour‘ rests upon a multitude of codes of conduct demanded of others in the community and outside, which, if infringed, are to be avenged at all costs, even one‘s life. Badal (revenge) refers to vendettas arising from a family member‘s death, or the violated honour of a woman in the 17

Ibid. Ibid. 19 Ibid. 18

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family. A ―revenge killing‖ is deemed obligatory in order to restore the violated honour, which can be immediately carried out, or occur after generations if the victim family of the perceived dishonorable act is not in a position to react immediately to the infraction. Badal is apparently a critical tool used by the Taliban to indoctrinate and recruit new fighters, alienated by counterinsurgency operations or drone attacks in the tribal areas. Melmastia (hospitality) is the offering of unconditional hospitality to all visitors, without slightest hope of remuneration or favour; protection is also to be offered unconditionally to any Pashtun by another. This also has the advantage of Taliban gaining asylum in most places within the Pashtun belts. Nanawatay (forgiveness) is the only alternative available to Badal, in which a perpetrator goes to ask the forgiveness of the victim‘s family. The Hamsaya (neighbour) device is a broadly defined concept, which implied servitude for protection from stronger tribes, which is kind of a protection status accorded to an affiliated or neighbouring tribe from a stronger enemy, from which they are incapable of protecting themselves. This can include military service in exchange for land (mlatar). The rules of engagement cannot be defined easily in terms of ‗you‘re either with us or against us,‘ alliances being in a constant state of flux in Pashtun society. Pashtun history is thus replete with heroes and legendary figures, which tended to play with both (or multiple) sides for the benefit of tribe, family, and honour.20 This code of conduct can compel a Pashtun to place all his hospitality at the door of the guest, while, ‗unwelcome guests‘ are treated with violence equally passionately. Revenge is a central theme in Pashthunwali, with honor demanding a vendetta sometimes lasting for generations, due to some perceived wrongdoing, usually related to honour. FATA is an extremely poor area by any comparison. ―There are few livelihood opportunities available to the people. The local economy is chiefly pastoral, with agriculture practised in a few fertile valleys. Most households are engaged in primary-level activities such as subsistence agriculture and livestock rearing, or small-scale business conducted locally.‖21 A telling statistic for FATA is that the population of around 3.5 million has so little arable land, that each acre of cultivable land has to be utilized for supporting at least 40 people. In the absence of viable options to earn a living, the lure of illicit activities such as smuggling (consumer goods, weapons) and drug trafficking is as difficult to resist as the call of extremist Islamist elements.22 ―No systematic quantitative data is available on poverty. What is known, however, is that poverty in the tribal areas is high compared to the rest of Pakistan. The results of a recent participatory assessment, meanwhile, reveal the existence of a nuanced system of determining social status, involving more than a dozen classifications for poverty including miskeen (meek), aajiz (needy), ghareeb (poor), faqeer (beggar), bechara (pitiable), spera (hungry or unfortunate), tabah-o-barbad (destroyed), khwaar (frustrated) and bebakht (unlucky)‖23. It is indeed an ironic state of affairs, since the preceding information is an official version of the socio-economic indicators, provided on the Government of Pakistan‘s FATA website. The Federally Administered Tribal Areas literacy rate is 17.42%, which is below the 43.92%

20

Owais Tohid and Scott Baldauf, "Pakistani Army must Go through the Pashtuns," The Christian Science Monitor, June 25, 2004, http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0625/p07s02-wosc.html 21 The Government of Pakistan‘s official website on FATA. http://www.fata.gov.pk/index.php. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. Taliban in Pakistan: A Chronicle of Resurgence : A Chronicle of Resurgence, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook

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average in Pakistan. 29.51% of the males and only 3% of females receive education.24Electricity is free and no taxes are collected. Only about 7 % land is cultivable. There is one hospital bed for every 2,179 people in the FATA, and one doctor for every 7,670 people. Only 43% of FATA citizens have access to clean drinking water.25 Now the question arises as to how and why FATA remained under complete state of isolation from the rest of the Pakistani society, to the extent that the permeation of extremism has started disturbing the settled areas of the country. The roots of this variance can easily be traced back to the period of British occupation, when a tacit agreement was arrived at between the British rulers and the tribals, for a power-sharing formula involving the representation of tribals through a congregation of their elders known as the Jirga. The British Government was represented through their state functionaries, forming a part of their wellorganized and well-trained Indian Political Service. This system was evolved in consequence of the realization that it was more or less impossible to maintain law and order in the settled districts like Peshawar, unless the tribals were paid a fixed sum for keeping the roads open and safe for travelers, with the British seldom interfering in their local customs and traditions. These arrangements were found functionally satisfactory for the maintenance of law and order through Frontier Constabulary and Khasadars (informal paramilitary forces) recruited from the tribes, and forming an integral part of the Civilian Armed Forces. Rebellion against the British and violation of law was further encouraged due to scarce agriculture and other resources for employment; hence the Government looked the other way to smuggling and establishment of weapons factories rampant as cottage industry for want of an alternative. The Durand frontier line between Pakistan and Afghanistan was also a nominal demarcation, as the tribes were spread over the entire region both on this side and on the other side of the border towards Afghanistan. The tribes were given a safe conduct for movement across the border, and powindahs i.e. nomadic tribals moved freely across the border on both sides for search of food and shelter against the onslaughts of weather. The Afghan designs on this territory are also germane to this problem; Kabul had all along been harboring on the tunes of Pakhtoonistan with designs on the Pushtu speaking area in Pakistan. Pashtunistan (Pashto, Persian) or Pakhtunistan (Pashto, Persian, Urdu), is the idea of an historic homeland that was divided in 1893 by the Durand Line, a border between British India and Afghanistan. The Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan. Pashto is the main Language spoken by 75 to 80% of people. They are concentrated mainly in the south and east. In Pakistan the Pashtuns are found in the North-West region. Whereas Pakistan had been generally respecting Afghan sovereignty beyond the Toorkham border, Afghanistan seldom spared an opportunity to interfere in Pakistan's internal affairs on the slightest possible pretext, including ethnic, linguistic, and religious motives. These clashes were not between two sovereign states of Afghanistan and Pakistan alone, as Kabul regime had all along been mobilizing Pakistani tribals against their own state. These areas have, therefore, remained a hotbed of insurgency and Pakistani Government perforce had to stop advances of Afghan Lashkars (raiding parties) more than once after the partition with India. The FATA region had all along been a source of trouble due to willful violation of law, and insurgency on the part of both Afghan and Pakistani tribals. In fact it was fairly hard to distinguish between the two, because these tribals had their families and residences both in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 24 25

Ibid. Ibid.

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Thus ,it would seem logical that with a conjunction of all these factors, FATA tribal areas would be potential hotspots for any misdirected movement to entrench itself in the semiilliterate ,economically under deprived society, whose scarce claims to affluence could be laid at the door of weapons and Drugs Smuggling . A geographical continuity and porous borders with Afghanistan, along with shared tribal and religious affiliations make these areas more akin to Afghanistan, rather than Pakistan. The existing Pak-US joint intervention in South Waziristan and Wana in the present day situation is an extension of the past, where criminals (and later terrorists) could easily find safe havens and recruiting grounds in these geographically sequestrated areas of the country. Whereas the reasons for this new development could possibly be socio-political, or ethnic, extremism catches on fastest if given a religious tinge. The masses are ripe to be exploited for want of education and economic opportunity, and hence the suicide bombers play into the hands of their masters for revenge, or exploitation of their religious feelings. The most viable educational institutions are the madrassahs since they have religious sanction behind them. These generally ‗free board and lodging‘ madrassahs and seminaries prepare militants and Jihadis for providing lead against the popular feeling of unfairness in the existing socio-political scenario. There has been a physical as well as a cognitive divide between these FATA protected areas and urban ones, ever since Pakistan gained independence in 1947. The transition into a FATA area from an urban one is abrupt, but beyond a flimsy physical barrier separating an urban centre like Peshawar from a FATA area like Darra Adam Khel, the world changes almost unrecognizably. The open display of Arms and ammunition is perhaps the most striking change, accompanied by a less than subtle appearance of socio-economic deprivation. Women disappear from public view more or less completely, and the area is marked by a noticeable absence of women‘s educational institutions, which when present, are more often poorly attended than not. The state‘s writ in the form of regular Police is represented by irregular tribal levies, and in many of these areas it was often impossible much before 9/11 to enter without the permission of the Political Agent or Military/Paramilitary escort, especially for foreigners. These areas have remained relatively isolated from the rest of the society due to a strong cultural identity. This is a classic example of what social anthropologists analyzing cultural relativism interpret as a case of a culture closing26 ranks due to the insecurity of being wiped out, but in the process, fossilizing itself to the exclusion of enlightenment. Thus, the FATA areas would seem a most logical choice for radical movements like militant extremism to take root. Is it incredible to understand that the children born and bred in poverty in extreme circumstances, are attracted towards the religious seminaries for the provision of a square meal coupled with a guarantee for eternal life in paradise for sacrificing their life, which has been extremely mundane in this material world? Is there not a possibility that a person inculcated with this extreme ideology finds all others not adherent to it as Wajib-ulQatl,27 especially when he perceives a huge class divide and inequity around him? These are questions which are beginning to demand urgent answers in the Pakistani society, with the ideology represented above presenting a clear cognitive divide between the urban and the tribal society.

26

Henry J.Steiner and Philip Alston. (2000), International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, morals, (New York: Oxford University Press), pp.376-8. 27 Liable to be killed without evoking any religiously generated legal sanction; a term commonly used by extremists to justify terrorism. Taliban in Pakistan: A Chronicle of Resurgence : A Chronicle of Resurgence, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook

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Even Pakistanis tend to generalize the entire NWFP as a conservative society by modern standards, simply by ignoring the social change brought about due to Western education, which has progressed towards creating more or less equal opportunities for either of the genders. People in Peshawar enjoy music like any other part of the country. They wear dresses of their choice, rather than going about veiled. Women move about in socio-economic sectors relatively easily, and women‘s education is a given norm even in the conservative mainstream open societies in the frontier province. This way of life is under a serious threat of fundamentalism encroaching upon their lives. Swat was till very recently a part of the mainstream society, but in my opinion has fallen prey to extremists in Pakistan. Though conservative, it was on the pace of progress from the viewpoint of education, health, and other facilities; but of late it has adopted a path of segregation from the rest of the country in as far as their violent demand for the implementation of and enforcement of Sharia Law is concerned. Similar threats are now being faced by Peshawar and Karachi. The imminent ascendancy of extremism in these cities would foreseeably not be a simple process; however Peshawar seems more prone than Karachi .These tendencies are growing at an alarming rate and nobody could have predicted a decade ago that transmigration of terrorism from FATA would spill over into the urban mainstream. This book is an introduction to the insidious creeping or permeation of this radical transmigration phenomenon.

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FATA AND RELIGIOUSITY It is important to comprehend the ideological base for the Taliban movement so as to clearly demarcate neo–theological discourse it bases its rationale upon. In Afghanistan, Afghani communists and Taliban as the pinnacle of Islamic extremism were the two dominant ideologies of the past decades. Both of them tried to impose radical change on a traditional social structure by a revolution from the top, which only resulted in an exponential increase in chaos. Their failure to account for the strong bonds of tribalism and ethnicity in the complex equation of social change, which they wanted to produce instantaneously, was a major reason for their failure. The Taliban in Pakistan are attempting the same in an even more circumscribed area, where tribalism has been the main source of inspiration for centuries. It is debatable that they would succeed; the army operations in the area, purportedly with American intelligence support, have made some headway recently28. However, the potential chaos created by this movement has less to do with the success of establishment of a Taliban/al Qaeda ‗statewithin-a-state‘, and more to do with the disorder created in the process of attempting to do so. The announcement of an umbrella body for Taliban in Pakistan has brought together a number of diverse guerilla groups together, and if the trend continues, it may very well become the penultimate headquarters of ‗Radical Jihad International‘. The Taliban had initially set out as an Islamic reform movement, and before they had started indulging in cruelties, had succeeded in gaining some popularity as well. The Taliban were acting in the spirit of jihad when they attacked the rapacious warlords around them in 28

The situation had been developing over the latter half of 2008. For an overview of the latest situation in general, browse through the three most respected Pakistani news dailies during 2008 through their online sites.The dailies are: Dawn, The news, Daily Times.

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Afghanistan. Yet, this degenerated in autocracy and ethnic killing in the name of the Taliban interpretation of jihad. This alienated the non-Pashtuns in Afghanistan, since the ethnic minorities saw them as using Islam as a cover to exterminate non-Pashtuns. The Taliban were a totally new religious phenomenon, devised piecemeal due to political exigencies. At the time they came into being, they fitted nowhere in the Islamic microcosmos; though it is debatable now that they have succeeded in creating a separate militant niche for themselves. Nevertheless, even the radical Islamicists such as Ikhwan, considered the prototypes of Islamic terrorism, pale in comparison to the Taliban. They actively favoured and allowed women's education and participation in social life29. Indeed, a large part of their political support came from women, whom they organized in organizational structures. They attempted to develop rationale for Islamic systems for regulating economy, banking system, foreign relations and an equitable distributive social model. In this respect they were much more progressive than Taliban, even though they too suffered from the same weaknesses and limitations inherent in a polarized ideology; rejection of ideological and ethnic diversity which contributes to the evolution of a culture. The Taliban mode of thinking is indeed anti historical; history evolves and progresses, societal norms become reconceptualized around the nucleus of history, religious convictions in turn orienting themselves in the directions accorded them. Where there is relative stability and socio economic opportunities, religious convictions generally settle in to the mainstream. Certainly there are margins of aberration, but these are the fringes, not the mainstream. From the protestant Catholic divide to the war ravaged Afghanistan, this does seem to hold true. When there are gross disparities of social justice, however, extreme movements emerge and take hold, such as in Afghanistan and the currently developing situation in the Northern areas of Pakistan. This maybe be somewhat of a generalization, as many extremists are demonstrably affluent ,including many so called ‗Afghan Arabs‘ who have been in Afghanistan since long, the most notable of them being of course, Osama Bin laden himself. Many of the extremists would be western educated, or indeed have been born in the Western hemisphere. However, these are definitely lesser in numbers, though not in importance; the commonly seen media images of young, armed bearded men in Toyota pickups are what constitute the substrate of terrorist indoctrination, aided by the catalyst of travesties of gross socio economic neglect. In examining the religious lineage of the New Taliban, it is worthwhile tracing the influence of Sufism on Afghanistan. Sufism was a moderating factor for Islam in Afghanistan; this being the trend of mystical Islam, which originated in Central Asia and Persia. Sufism is the mystical dimension of Islam. Classical scholars have defined it as "a science whose objective is the reparation of the heart and turning it away from all else but God."30, or "a science through which one can know how to travel into the presence of the Divine, purify one‘s inner self from filth, and beautify it with a variety of praiseworthy traits." 31 The lexical root of Sufi is variously traced to the Arabic word for wool, referring to the simple cloaks the early Muslim ascetics wore, and to the Arabic word safa, meaning purity.

29

Rashid, Ahmad, Taliban: The story of the Afghan Warlords(London: Pan Macmillan: 2001) ,p. 86. Ahmed Zarruq, Zaineb Istrabadi, Hamza Yusuf Hanson - "The Principles of Sufism." Amal Press. 2008. 31 The Autobiography (Fahrasa) of a Moroccan Soufi: Ahmad ibn 'Ajiba, translated from the Arabic by Jean-Louis Michon and David Streight, Fons Vitae, Louisville KY USA,1999. 30

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The two lexicon meanings were intertwined by al-Rudhabari: "The Sufi is the one who wears wool on top of purity".32 During the earlier Islamic period, a group of unmarried men living on their daily labour and putting up on a mud platform called Suffa in the mosque, undertook the dissemination of Islamic teachings i.e. Quran and Ahadith to the converts and their families, without any remuneration. This small group of men known and respected for their piety and selfless service were called Ashaab-e-Suffa33,and it is generally believed that Sufi cult was originally founded by them. Since they were religious visionaries and luminaries, they undertook exercises in spiritualism and philosophy in order to propagate Islam on behalf of the community as a collective religious obligation i.e. Farz-e-Kifaya. Sufism was essentially the result of Islam evolving in a more mystic direction. As the German scholar Annemarie Schimmel proposes, Sufism meant nothing but the ―interiorization of Islam.‖ It is from the Qur‘an, constantly recited, meditated, and experienced, that Sufism proceeded, in its origin and its development.34 The Sufis never preached their Sufi beliefs known as Tasawwuf as a matter of general practice. They discriminated between ordinary moderate Muslims and those aspiring for a higher place in Islamic hierarchy. To the former, they taught the basic tenets of Islam in strictly conventional terms, and they initiated the latter in the mysteries inherent in mysticism and philosophy. The Sufi later founded four different Schools of Islamic mysticism, Qaderiyah, Chishtia, Suhrwardiya, and Naqshbandiyah, providing elasticity as against rigidity for attracting non-Muslims to convert. In the process, they borrowed practices alien to the Muslim faith. For example Qawwali, which is an admixture of instrumental and vocal music borrowed from Hinduism, was successfully used for attracting non-Muslims to the fold of Islam. As a reaction to this elasticity, formalism also raised its head in the movements like the one started by Abdul Wahab in the 19th century Arabian Desert. The Sufi way of life had always been under threat form the adherents of formalism, so the evolution of Sufism and other mystical strains tended to be relegated to the back seat when puritanical movements took over. There were two main Sufi orders in Afghanistan; Naqshbandiyah and Qaderiyah. These provided a separate track of resistance to the Soviets by their network of associations and alliances outside the Mujaheddin parties and ethnic groups. These were quite influential; the Mujaddedi family were leaders of the Naqshbandiyah, their most prominent member being Sibghatullah Mujaddedi35, the head of Jabha-i Najat Milli 36Afghanistan set up in Peshawar.He was later a president of Afghanistan in 1992, as chairman of the Jihad Council from 28 Apr to 28 Jun 1992. The other important Sufi order was epitomized by Pir Sayed Ahmad Gilani37. He set up the Mahaz-e-Milli38 in Peshawar. Even though Mujaddedi and Pir Gilani were leaders of mujahideen groups and received support initially from the ISI pipeline supplying finance, arms and ammunition to resistance groups, their views were too moderate to suit the pipeline 32

Haddad, Gibril Fouad: Sufism in Islam LivingIslam.org: http://www.livingislam.org/k/si_e.html. Meaning literally, the followers of the Prophet. 34 Massignon, Louis. Essai sur les origines du lexique technique de la mystique musulmane. Paris: Vrin, 1954. p. 104. 35 (Rashid, Pan Macmillan: 2001),84. 36 National Liberation Front of Afghanistan. 37 (Rashid, Pan Macmillan: 2001),85. 38 National Islamic Front of Afghanistan 33

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managers. This was also due to the fact that they were moderate Muslims, and had their own conceptions about the conduct of warfare, which did not sit well with Jihad organizing nexus of CIA/ISI, who demanded aggressive offensives. The CIA–ISI nexus preferred the ultra Islamist viewpoints of Hikmetyar and later the Taliban, and also initially, the effective blitzkrieg techniques employed by Ahmed Shah Masud. Thus, the Taliban did not incorporate in their ideology the moderating influence of Sufism, which tends to be moderate in outlook. The Taliban are poles apart from the tolerant Sufis, and are also far removed from the traditionalists who, at least, tend to rely on interpretative discourse to justify their existence. Strictly speaking, they are neither radical Islamicists inspired by the Ikhwan, nor mystical Sufis, nor traditionalists. It can be said that all three systems of thinking had failed Afghanistan between 1979 and 1994.Thus, the Taliban neatly filled in the vacuum. Comprehension of the religious milieu of the Taliban, demands a close look at the politico-religious evolution of Islam in Afghanistan. Many commentators, particularly western ones, err in assuming that the Taliban‘s religious ideology was a distillation of the Islamic thought process in Afghanistan; history shows otherwise. Adherence to Islamic ritualism is inbred in the lifestyle of the Afghanis and the Pakistani tribals, regardless of whether they really are religious or not. The panoply of adherents includes ex-King Zahir Shah, communist pro Russian ministers, and Mujahideen warriors. That is the point, however, when the analogy breaks down; Islam in Afghanistan has historically been extremely tolerant, and not at all the ‗push it down your throat‘ type39. Minorities such as Sikhs, Hindus and Jews had enjoyed minimal persecution in Afghanistan; in fact they were quite wealthy and controlled the money markets. Even the Afghan mullah was a laissez faire variety of preacher who would admonish people for not coming to prayers regularly, but would rarely preach sectarianism and politics. The year 1992 saw a watershed; this year, not coincidentally, corresponds to the Taliban gaining strength in Afghanistan. After 1992, the brutal civil war created irreconcilable schisms within Islamic sects and ethnic groups, setting the stage for the contemporary intolerant Afghanistan. Masud‘s massacre of the Hazaras in Kabul in 1995, the Hazaras' massacre of the Taliban in Mazar in 1997, and the Taliban massacres of Hazaras and Uzbeks in 1998 mark brutal ‗Islamocide‘ perpetrated by Muslims in the name of their indigenous breed of ideology40. This was a novel phenomenon in Afghanistan‘s history, creating the present religious divides. Minority groups all but fled the country, since the ethnocide committed above, coupled with the Taliban's deliberate anti-Shia programme, transformed the fiercely independent tribalism of the Afghanis into a militant fundamentalism. Eighty per cent of people in Afghanistan belong to the Sunni Hanafi sect, which is by large considered the most liberal amongst the four Sunni schools of thought.41 The minority strains were the Shia Islam of the Hazaras in the Hazarajat, the beliefs of scattered Pashtun tribes, Tajiks and Heratis, and the Ismaelis, the followers of the Agha Khan. Even though there is no separation of politics from religion, the Sunni Hanafi creed prevalent in Afghanistan for ages admirably suited the loose Afghan confederational politics, since it was quite flexible; tribalism being the preferred state of government, state interference was kept to

39

(Rashid, Pan Macmillan: 2001),82. Ibid.,83. 41 Ibid. 40

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a minimum. The Pashtun village mullahs were the centre of village and social life, and Jirga the preferred adjudicative body. More formal education was done in small madrassahs where Students or Talibs studied the basic tenets of religious education. Herat was a central nucleus of learning in Afghanistan society, though from seventeenth century onwards, Talibs aspiring to a higher level of religious learning traveled to Central Asia, Egypt and India to study at more renowned madrassahs. Islam was also embedded in the political structure in Afghanistan because Sharia law governed the legal processes as late as 1925; a civil legal code was introduced as a symbiont to enable both systems to grow together. A Sharia Faculty was set up in Kabul University in 194642.A protégé of this eclectic mix was Mohammed Musa Shafiq, the populist last Prime Minister under the monarchy, who was later executed by the communists. Shafiq combined all tiers of education; a madrassah education, the Sharia Faculty in Kabul, followed by a degree from Columbia University in New York. As the emphasis was more on tribalism than religious inclinations, the more traditional tribal-based parties were thus preferred by the afghan ulema as opposed to radical one. At the onset of Jihad, most joined Harakat Inquilabi-Islami headed by Maulana Mohammed Nabi Mohammedi and Hizb-e-Islami led by Maulvi Younis Khalis43. Both men were maulvis who had studied for a time at the Haqqania madrassah in Pakistan, and then established their own madrassahs inside Afghanistan. After the Soviet invasion they set up organizations which were decentralized, non-ideological and non-hierarchical, but they rapidly lost out as the CIA–ISI arms pipeline supported the more radical Islamic parties. Before the Taliban, Islamic extremism never really managed to gain a foothold in Afghanistan. The Wahabi sect for example, permeated from central Asia and India, but was a movement of inconsequential importance before the ascendancy of the Taliban. However, the Saudis preferred the Wahabi warlords to give their money to; an early export was Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, who set up a Wahabi party, the Ittehad-e-Islami, Islamic Unity, in Peshawar. He can be characterized as the archetypical conservative, "anti-West," "anti-American" and hard line Islamic fundamentalist. He was a scion of Al-Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt, and a member of the afghani group Akhwan-ul-Muslimeen (Muslim Brotherhood) founded in 1969 by Gulbeddin Hikmetyar and Dr. Syed Burhanuddin Rabbani. This was defined by some as just a chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Sayyaf cultivated a close relationship with Osama bin Laden, establishing a network of training camps, bunkers and emplacements in the Jalalabad area with mutual collaboration, which were later utilized by al Qaeda personnel. The Wahabi strain of puritanical thought was further distilled in the thought process of Afghans; this strain is known by the name of Salafism. Ordinary Afghans however considered this movement with disdain, because of their inbred distrust of anything foreign, whom they traditionally view with great suspicion. Even Bin Laden, when he joined the afghan jihad, was considered as an ‗outsider‘; however, in war, finances tend to get depleted at an alarming rate and freely available money is welcome, which eventually enabled him to win a small Pashtun following. However, afghan Arabs continued to be treated as outsiders by Afghanis, who were not above

42 43

Ibid., 84. Ibid.

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murdering them at times out of disdain for their ‗arrogance‘ and what the Afghans perceived as their ‗holier than thou‘ attitudes. Pakistan had under its tutelage commanders of the caliber of Hikmetyar and Masud since 1975, before the soviet invasion, both being forced to flee Afghanistan due to failed uprisings against President Mohammed Daud .They had been cultivated by the ISI for the purpose whey they were admirably suited to, when the invasion of Afghanistan began in earnest. President Zia ul Haq was thus the supporter of both these groups. Masud however was a commander with a mind of his own (and he was also more secular minded); this caused him to drift away from the Pakistani government eventually, leaving Hikmetyar as the sole recipient of the cash flowing in. Not coincidentally, Hikmetyar was also the most radically minded of all mujahideen. The continued Pakistani support to him sometimes flew in the face of facts on ground; he was not very well accepted in Kabul, Masud having greater credibility in the eyes of ordinary Afghans. It can thus be seen that the ideological sanction for the Taliban was basically imposed by external sources, the most militant ideologies competing for the cash and ammunition. Pakistan was the main indoctrination base for the Taliban ideology; it follows naturally that the ‗New‘ Taliban have imbibed the philosophy from the infrastructure of madrassahs remaining largely intact, despite ineffectual efforts by the Pakistani authorities to regulate their curriculum. It seems that the madrassahs in the FATA area have not only largely remained intact, they have in fact prospered. Having filled in the contextual parameters, it is time to introduce the predominant influence on the thought process of the old and new Taliban. The Taliban represented nobody but themselves and they recognized no Islam except their own. But they did have an ideological base – an extreme right leaning improvised form of Deobandism, which was being preached by Pakistani Islamic parties in Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan.Deobandism, a branch of Sunni Hanafi Islam, has had a history in Afghanistan, but the Taliban's interpretation of the creed has no parallel anywhere in the Muslim world. The Deobandis arose as a religious revivalism movement designed to arrest the deterioration of Muslims in post mutiny (1857) British India; its main ideologues were Mohammed Qasim Nanautawi (1833-77) and Rashid Ahmed Gangohi (1829–1905), who founded the first madrassah in Deoband near New Delhi. The Deobandis original agenda was to train a new generation of learned Muslims involved in a revivalist Islamic movement based on intellectual learning and spiritual experience44. The interpretation of sharia was aimed to harmonize it with the current realities of the mundane as well as the spiritual world. Even though they were revivalist, they had an intrinsically orthodox outlook; a restrictive view of the role of women, an open condemnation of Shiites and vehement opposition to a hierarchical Islamic state was their forte. The Taliban were to take these beliefs to an extreme which the original Deobandis would never have recognized. The Deobandis had set up network of madrassahs all over India, and Afghan students, after the decline of Herat as an intellectual centre, began to arrive in large numbers to get higher religious education from these reputable madrassahs. By 1967, there were 9,000 Deobandi madrassahs across South Asia45. 44 45

Jm Butt,Controversy: Targeting madrassas to curb extremism?,Daily Times August 17, 2008. (Rashid, Pan Macmillan: 2001), 88.

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A few Deobandi madrassahs were established by the Afghan state, but they were not hugely popular even in the Pashtun belt. The Deobandi school of thought gained great impetus during the Afghan jihad, since much of the teaching in madrassahs was carried out by organizations, particularly JUI. It is relevant to point out that the current face of Deobandi learning has been seen as a threat by the west, even in local home bred clerics of the domestic order. For instance, in the UK, a Times policy report has mentioned that the Deobandi movement ―supports armed jihad and preaches contempt for Jews, Christians and Hindus, is in line to become the spiritual leader of the Deobandi sect in Britain. The ultra-conservative movement, which gave birth to the Taleban in Afghanistan, now runs more than 600 of Britain‘s 1,350 mosques.‖46 A commentator on religious radicalism in Pakistan, where Deobandis wield significant political influence, told The Times that ―blind ignorance‖ on the part of the Government in Britain had allowed the Deobandis to become the dominant voice of Islam in Britain‘s mosques. Khaled Ahmed says: ―The UK has been ruined by the puritanism of the Deobandis. You‘ve allowed the takeover of the mosques. You can‘t run multiculturalism like that, because that‘s a way of destroying yourself. In Britain, the Deobandi message has become even more extreme than it is in Pakistan. It‘s mind-boggling.‖ 47 However, it needs to be remembered that Deobandism in its traditionalist form is not necessarily militant, as evidenced by the staunchly anti violence Tableeghi Jamaat (party of preachers); it is the morphed variants of this strain of Islam which have tended to gravitate towards militancy. Deobandi school of thought was primarily revivalist and intellectual, though it did have puritanical sanction behind it. It is in the trajectories of Islamism that different strains of Deobandism began to emerge. Though there are both sides of the issue48, it would be closing our eyes to the reality if we do not recognize Political Islam as an entity, albeit as one opposed to the peaceful message of Islam as a religion. These topics are beyond the scope of this study, but for any person interested in the subject a multitude of works exist, with Olivier Roy and Khaled Abou El Fadl being just two of the many eminent scholars writing on the subject. After Pakistan‘s creation in 1947,two watersheds in Deobandi history occurred; madrassahs began to spring up at a greater rate, and the Deobandis set up the Jamiat Ulema Islam(JUI), an evangelical movement. In 1962 it transformed into a political party under the leadership of Maulana Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi in NWFP.There were soon schisms afterwards, and the rifts produced a distinct Pashtun dominated version of the party under the popular Maulana Mufti Mehmood(1919-80), characterized by a strong anti-American, antiimperialist stance. The JUI competed for power with the Jamaat-e-Islami, and the relationship has varied from cool hostility to wary partnerships over the years. Fazlur Rehman, Mufti Mehmood‘s son, took over from him; if any one can lie claim to be considered the spiritual mentor of Taliban, it is him, though he is now at pains to deny it. It is pertinent that the Taliban, being trained mostly in the traditions of Pashtunwali, and lacking in the ideological and academic perspective of the Deobandi School, were far behind relative accomplishment which Jamiat Ul Ulema Islam (JUI), largely considered their 46

Andrew Norfolk, Hardline takeover of British mosques, The Times, September 7, 2007. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/faith/article2402973.ece. 47 Ibid. 48 For a criticism of this report see: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/sep/07/atoxicmixoffact andnonsense Taliban in Pakistan: A Chronicle of Resurgence : A Chronicle of Resurgence, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook

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surrogate parent, had to impart at a later stage during the General Zia regime, because initially the JUI were not given official patronage. With the gradual collapse of the academic system and denial of educational facilities to the poor and the needy,people living below subsistence level in Pakistan started acquiring religious education; after all it had the semblance of education simultaneously affording food, shelter, monetary benefits for the students and their families, and necessary military training in order to prepare combatants/ militants to fight for the cause of Islam. General Zia started heavy funding for these madrassahs; there were around 900 madrassahs in 1971, which exponentially shot up to 28,000 in 1988; and according to a source, 25,000 unregistered institutions existed at the end of Zia era. According to another estimate, madrassahs in Pakistan had sharply grown from 1,745 in 1979 to around 15,000 in the year 2000. In Punjab Province alone, the number of the registered students in madrassahs was 2, 19,000.49 According to another credible source, in 1997, there were 2,512 madrassahs and 218,939 students in eight districts (Lahore, Gujranwala, Rawalpindi, Faisalabad, Sargodha, Multan, D.G. Khan, and Bahawalpur) of the Punjab province. 972 madrassahs belonged to the Deobandi sect with 100,558 students, 1,216 to the Barelvi sect with 95,190 students, 174 to the Ahle-Hadith sect with 18,880 students and 100 to Ahle Tashi sect with 4,281 students registered in them.50 Even though they were sidelined with regards to funding by the ISI earlier, JUI availed the opportunity offered by General (Retired) Farhatullah Babar during the tenure of Benazir Bhutto in 1993, when he was keen to introduce this political party to the corridors of power in order to assign it a significant role amongst Pashtuns in NWFP and Afghanistan. Simultaneously, JUI was aspiring for a peeping window to Central Asian States and their Pashtuns, Kirghis, and Uzbek residents, with the ultimate objective of reaching Chechnya and Bosnia through their access to Europe and United States. The opportunity arose quicker than they had expected; when Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman headed the special committee for foreign affairs. Now they were all powerful inasmuch as the services of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) with immense financial resources were placed at their disposal. Gradually Saudi Arabia also funneled financial aid to JUI and its religious educational madrassahs, performing the dual role of creating sympathizers for the Wahabism on one hand and preparing militants for the Soviet-Afghan armed on the other. Fazlur Rehman‘s credentials in the creation of the Afghan Taliban are so well established, that I need not dwell at length upon them. We are currently more focused on analyzing whether he is a source of ideological sanction for the New Taliban as well. ―Very few people know that during the Taliban regime's period of power, only Maulana Samiul Haq and Maulana Fazlur Rehman had authority to issue passes to Arab and other foreign mujahideen to join the Taliban forces. It was essential to have a card signed by Maulana Samiul Haq for entering Afghanistan from the Frontier Province and a card signed by Maulana Fazlur Rehman for entering Afghanistan from Baluchistan…… Only those with a card could receive training in the camps. The foreigners were supposed to have these cards for security purposes but this condition did not apply to Pakistanis and the Pushtons who could join any jihadi organisation to go to Afghanistan to receive their training.‖51 There are 49

Suba Chandran, ‗Madrassas in Pakistan: A Brief Overview‘, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 25 January 2000. http://www.ipcs.org/index.jsp. 50 Lt. Gen. (R) Kamal Matinuddin, The Taliban Phenomenon ; Oxford University Press, 1999.Also see Kamal Matinuddin, Power Struggle in Hindukush ; Wajidalis, Lahore, 1991. 51 Muhammad Amir Rana, A to Z of Jihadi organization in Pakistan(Lahore: Mashal Press, 2005),p. 200-1. Taliban in Pakistan: A Chronicle of Resurgence : A Chronicle of Resurgence, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook

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also reports on record that the Maulana was an important conduit between the ISI and the Taliban in Kabul. When ISI got news of an imminent attack upon Taliban by Ahmed Shah Masud, the Maulana was dispatched to Afghanistan in all haste to relay this information to the Taliban. The Americans reportedly got wind of this, and reportedly stepped up efforts to contain the Maulana. As with all such matters, the exact details are shrouded in secrecy. The Maulana has been a sitting member of the National assembly in Pakistan for some time now. He was a pivotal part of the alliance of religious parties going under the umbrella body of Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal. As with the Jamaat mentioned above, he seems to have adopted a ‗politically correct‘ stance: ―I think I managed to overcome this image during my 10-day visit to India. By the end of the visit, the media was saying that I was more of a politician than a Maulana. They were also writing that I was a soft-liner rather than a hardliner…. I kept telling the Indians that we surely did back the Taliban because they were a continuation of the Afghan mujahideen who fought against the Soviet occupation troops in Afghanistan. We considered the Taliban freedom fighters in the same way as the Palestinians and Chechens but at the end of the day they were Afghans and we are Pakistanis and we operate in different situations."52 This however does not seem to sit too well with the situation on the ground. ―There is a persistent allegation against Maulana Fazlur Rahman's Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam that it is still helping to get the Taliban reorganized in Chaman and Quetta and the madrasas are providing a safe haven for them in the frontier areas. The JUI leadership, however, denies this allegation. One Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam leader, Hafiz Hussain Ahmad, said that the JUI was not a properly organised political entity. He said that it had its own individual policies, madrasas and mosques in the cities and it was not mandatory that these policies conformed with any central policy.‖53 JUI has clout over large areas; for instance Chaman54 in Baluchistan,which is a border town with Afghanistan, is undoubtedly a rallying point for many of the Taliban that fled Afghanistan. Much of the reorganization of the new Taliban would purportedly have been done there. JUI holds great sway in these, and many other areas. The JUI driven madrassahs were fed with funds not only to teach Afghan refugee youngsters, but a considerable number of Pakistani homes began sending their wards to schools and madrassahs run by Islamic parties. Families in the rural areas did not have money to afford education for their children, so many families on or below the poverty line sent their children to madrassahs. Some Islamists had an incentive scheme of a sort; if a family provided one of its sons for Jihad, not only all the other siblings received a free education, but the family was also granted a subsistence allowance. The state was unable to meet this challenge in a climate of diminishing investment in public education, because funds were pre empted by defense and elitist expenditures. Thus, the politico-religious organizations like JUI made great use of this vacuum in socio-economic provision by the state to increase the number of their adherents. It is only but natural that this radicalization by the Deobandis in Khost and in Waziristan strengthened the JUI (F) and its leader Maulana Fazlur Rehman immeasurably in Waziristan.

52

The News, 3 August, 2003. (Rana, 2005), 207. 54 For a detailed discussion about this phenomenon, refer to numerous articles by Saleem Shahzad on Asia Times online. 53

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This has been used to good advantage by him, and he claims openly that if the government wishes to solve the problem in Waziristan it must speak to him.55 The JUII exercises a great following in the North and South Waziristan Agencies, Hangu, Bannu and the peripheries of Dera Ismail Khan, which stand out as economically backward areas and where conservative traditions have a hold on society. The JUI-F has a deep influence in these areas by virtue of combining Pashtunwali with religious ideologies. These are the same areas where, on December 13, 1999, a person was publicly executed for killing his cousin, after being sentenced to death by the local Taliban judicial court. This was the first such execution by a Pakistani Taliban group and the local Taliban leader, Mullah Rahim, termed it as the first step towards the enforcement of the Sharia.56 As with any organization that is doing extraordinarily well, factions had to emerge in JUI because of competing organizations, as well as for influence amongst the Afghans Mujahideen. The above referred opportunity soon emerged when Maulana Sami-ul-Haq made use of the religious institution Dar-ul-Uloom Haqqania founded by his father Abdul Aziz in 1947, who studied and worked as a teacher in Dar-ul-Uloom Deoband. This institution exists on a fairly vast piece of land in Akora Khattak on Islamabad-Peshawar Highway with boarding and lodging facilities for 1500 students, a High School for 1,000 students and buildings for 12 elementary madrassahs. It offered an eight years course for Masters Degrees, and additional two years for Doctorate. Accommodation and tuition being free, this institution attracted a lot of students after the collapse of Pakistan's national academic system, when people in general and particularly those living below subsistence level couldn't afford to pay for their studies. It shouldn't, therefore, surprise anyone that eight of their trainee Talibans were serving as Cabinet Ministers in Kabul, whereas twelve of their graduates were working as Governors on behalf of the Taliban Government in Afghanistan57. These madrassahs are reaping the harvest because of defective planning in Pakistan, making education more or less inaccessible for a common man, resulting almost in a total collapse of the existing educational system in the country. Samiul Haq has always professed deep respect for Mullah Omar. According to him, he went to see Mullah Omar in Qandhar in 1996 when he was elected Amir-ul-Momineen, despite not occupying a very high station or high pedigree; Omar was portrayed as a simple pious man, who could deliver the goods in compliance of the Islamic injunctions. Hence, he was immensely qualified for this job. ―I met Omar for the first time when I went to Kandahar in 1996 and I was proud that he was chosen as Amir-ul Momineen. He has no money, tribe or pedigree but he is revered above all others and so Allah chose him to be their leader. According to Islam the man who can bring peace can be elected the Amir. When the Islamic revolution comes to Pakistan it will not be led by the old defunct leaders like me, but by a similar unknown man who will arise from the masses.‖58 Sami-ul-Haq‘s madrassahs have been a source of strength for Taliban, 59to be relied upon in times of emergency. He remains at the beck and call of Mullah Omar and sent his entire student‘s body to Afghanistan in Mazar Sharif after closing down his madrassahs for about a month. 55

Naqvi, M.B. ―Maulana Says it‖, ―The News‖, Islamabad, 27th Dec, 2006. Ismail Khan, ‗The Talibanisation of Pakistan‘, Newsline, Karachi, January 1999, p. 44. 57 (Rashid, Pan Macmillan: 2001) ,90. 58 Ibid., 91. 59 Shafqat Jan, the Cantonment of Islam, The Nation, August 29, 1999. 56

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It is well known that Jamia Haqqania and the madrasa at Akora Khatak and had been in contact with the Taliban and al Qaida even though Maulana Samiul Haq denies this. He has gone on record to having received information regarding the Taliban, and that Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden are not only well, but are also guiding their mujahideen in the jihad against America. There is information regarding some other members of Maulana Samiul Haq's group that establishes their links with the Taliban and al Qaida. When Maulana Yusuf Shah, the General Secretary of JUI (Sami-ul-Haq group) was asked whether some al Qaida mujahideen were reportedly taking refuge in the madrasa of Maulana Abdul Aziz Hashmi, he openly wondered if there was anything wrong in that. He said: "It is not a crime for us to provide refuge or to help mujahideen.‖60 Another splinter faction of JUI was the madrassah of Maulana Yusuf Binori, at Binor near Karachi. Its name is Jamiut-Uloomi-Islamiyya, run with the financial assistance of forty five Muslim countries. A number of Taliban leaders with important portfolios in Taliban Afghanistan have studied here. This madrassah had at one time 8,000 students on its roll, and has sent 600 of them to Afghanistan to help Taliban after their appeal for help and assistance during armed skirmishes. Many of the two million Afghan refugees settled in Baluchistan or Karachi were influenced by the Binori variant of madrassah education. In 1997 Karachi saw the Taliban from this madrassah rampage on a rather wide scale, and this cosmopolitan town was exposed to Taliban style extremism for the first time. It is pertinent to mention that Karachi is currently facing a grave threat from Talibanisation of its society, much of which can be ascribed to the students from this seminary. Thus, almost all the children born in camps or in villages and cities of Pakistan, especially in NWFP, tribal areas of Pakistan, Karachi or Baluchistan were provided grounding in Islamic education of the Deobandi School, primarily by the above mentioned groups. An organization worth mentioning here for their linkages with JUI is the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), who started off as a sectarian organization notorious for ‗hitting‘ Shia targets. They set up a base in Kabul in 1998 in order to get sanctuary from Taliban, where they were imparted military training in Khost Military camp run jointly by the Taliban and Bin Laden. They have been fighting along side with Taliban ever since, and are responsible for multitudinous killings on sectarian basis both inside and outside Pakistan. When their activities went unchecked for a fairly long time causing sizeable damage to citizenry on both sides of the border, US hit their camp with a cruise missile in 1998. Taliban made a generous offer to Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, (SSP) for handing over the control of camps run by Hikmetyar, as training camps for Mujahideen of non-Afghan origin. Military Training camp at Badar-al-Khalil near Khost on Pakistan-Afghanistan border was handed over to Harkat-ul-Ansar fighting under the command of Fazal-ur-Rehman Khalil. This group was again an offshoot of JUI, which was gradually expanding its sphere of influence. This group was known for its extreme Islamic radicalism, sending its volunteers to fight in Chechnya, Bosnia, Kashmir, and Afghanistan. It might incidentally be mentioned here, that JUI represents a common linkage of faith amongst Deobandis, discarding federalism, tribalism, and the concept of a tribal chief by Pashtuns. This has become a strong religious bond of ideology,replacing tribal and kinship affiliations. Another strong bond between JUI and SSP is their hostility towards Shias and the Shia State of Iran. Hence Deobandi ideology is gaining ground amongst tribals on either side 60

(Rana, 2005), 208.

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of the border due to this common sectarian heritage. Besides, the origin of these new Deobandi brothers (i.e. the afghan and Pakistani Taliban) is from the Durrani Pashtun tribe located in Qandhar on Afghanistan side, and in Chaman on the Pakistani side of the border. It is therefore not surprising that Deobandis living in Pakistan are aspiring for a Taliban type of revolution in Pakistan. However, the brand of Deobandism they preach is entirely their own invention, utterly bereft of the scholarly pursuit by Deobandi scholars during the past. Clearly, there are undercurrents of a complicit religious culture that pervades terrorist groups and the mainstream religio-political parties in the country; for instance, the JUI (Fazalur Rahman faction) allowed SSP‘s (Sipah Sahaba Pakistan) leader Riaz Basra to contest the 1987 national elections as its candidate, and both the JUI (F) and the Jamaat-e-Islami joined SSP in an effort to prevent the death sentence awarded to SSP‘s Haq Nawaz Jhangvi for his role in murdering Iranian Consulate General Sadik Ganji. Furthermore, the extremist outfits and the mainstream religio political groups tend to look up to Bin Laden as a ―hero of Islam.‖ This is borne out by the reaction of the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) in response to government advertisements in the national print media in June 2002, vilifying Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda as ―religious terrorists.‖ In an unequivocal response to this, JUI‘s information secretary reiterated the party‘s stand that ―Osama is a hero to the Islamic world and the Musharraf government would not get any sympathy by branding him a religious terrorist.‖61 Qazi Hussain Ahmed also termed the official media campaign as part of an international conspiracy in which ―Pakistan‘s government had sided with the Zionists‘ agenda.‖62He went on to argue that ―bracketing of Islamists with terrorists [was] a Zionist conspiracy because Islam is fast spreading in Europe and America.‖63 There is even more support for such sentiments in the tribal areas; following an armed conflict between Uzbek militants and the security forces in Kohat during which the militants were killed, scuffles erupted between pro al Qaeda demonstrators and the Police over claiming the bodies of the slain terrorists. The bodies were secretly interred by the state, even as the spot where the terrorists fell was turned into a shrine by the locals. 64This is the undercurrent of religiosity that has currently started to characterize many of the FATA areas. As regards FATA, is would be an illuminating exercise to look into their contemporary religious mindset; this is not possible without considering the tribal structures in FATA in their contextual paradigms. North Waziristan is home to about 375,000 people, mostly belonging to the Wazir and Dawar tribes. Many militant tribal leaders have become legendary figures in the area. This was a largely reactionary area even from the independence of Pakistan in 1947, even though many tribesmen are enrolled in the Pakistan army. The strong Pashtun identity of these people has meant that they relate more with Afghanistan than Pakistan. South Waziristan is the largest tribal agency in size, having a population of about 425,000 tribesmen from Mehsud and Wazir tribes. Both tribes are renowned as formidable warriors, a tradition they keep alive by their frequently erupting blood feuds. According to historian Sir Olaf Caroe, the Mehsud tribe would never consider submitting to a foreign power that has entered their land. Nek Mohammad was a legendary militant leader from this agency, who was succeeded by Baitullah Mehsud .I shall dwell upon both these areas in greater detail later. 61

The Nation, 2 July 2002. Ibid. 63 Ibid. 64 The News, 12 July 2002. See also Rahimullah Yusufzai, Newsline, July 2002. 62

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Bajaur‘s prominent tribes are Tarkani and Utman Khel. The JUI has tremendous influence in this area. Over the years, there have been some unconfirmed media reports about the possibility of Osama bin Laden hiding in the area. This area is currently the main area of army operations against militancy; heavy fighting has been reported, with 300,000 residents being forced to evacuate the area due to heavy artillery shelling. This area too, will merit much greater interest when I dwell upon the operational side of the new Taliban forces. In Khyber agency, the main inhabitants are the Afridis and the Shinwaris. Afridis have been known in history as good fighters and respectful to Sufis (mystics) and their shrines, which intellectually aligns them with Barelvi Sunnis, the antidote of conservative and proTaliban Deobandi groups. The Shinwaris, who are mostly businessmen, mostly reside in the Ningrahar province of Afghanistan. Khyber Agency has been prone to develop into a prime trouble spot, known for hosting illegal radio stations supporting religious extremism and encouraging pro-Taliban activities. The influence of relatively high educational rates for Orakzai Agency has not stopped its tribes from falling under the thralls of Talibanisation. They are amongst the most conservative of the tribals, being amongst the first to ban NGO's from operating in the area, declaring them anti-Islamic. The possession of televisions was declared a punishable crime under the influence of the local Taliban. Most of the state run educational institutions have been shut down by the local Taliban. Mohmands, residing in Mohmand agency, are natural guerrilla fighters. A characteristic hallmark of these people is that they are particularly reverent to their religious leaders, to the extent of fighting their wars under leadership of local clerics. The Kurram agency is mostly inhabited mainly by the Shiite Bangash tribe, which makes it anti-Taliban by default. The other tribe, Turi (Turkic origin), has also constantly been at loggerheads with pro-Taliban, Deobandi elements in the neighboring areas. Thus, a cursory look at some of the FATA areas reveals a more conservative and inward looking society than Afghanistan considered as a whole; it seems that these areas (with few exceptions) are viable religious substrate for militant fundamentalism to take hold. It is not surprising that the emergence of Pakistan‘s Taliban has occurred in these areas.

TALIBAN AND AL QAEDA ARRIVE This emergence of Taliban in Pakistan has unfolded a complexity to the already changing socio-political, socio-cultural, and socio-economic scenario in Pakistan. I will now attempt to trace the penetration of the Taliban along with al Qaeda elements deep into tribal heartlands. It would aid in comprehension of the process of emergence of the new breed of Taliban, to divide their evolution into chronological phases. I have no intention of going into details of how the Taliban were initially born in Pakistan and their trials and tribulations in Afghanistan, and the events that led to their falling from grace; these can be found in a plethora of academic research, which traces this phenomenon aptly. I am more concerned with delving into the evolution of the resurgence and re-organization of the Taliban in Pakistan. This is a grey area for many researchers and strategists; there were early warning signs of Talibanisation of society, which tended to be dismissed by international and even local media, think tanks, and strategists as ‗local disturbances‘ in the name of ethnicity and/or

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regional separatism. Certainly, the Pakistani government was understandably not very keen to admit the presence of such potential hot-spots within the society. Then, names like Abdullah Mehsud, Baitullah Mehsud and Fazlullah began to crop up; these were still initially dismissed as ‗local‘ preachers,with the retort of the ages old adage about FATA: ‗there have always been some unruly elements in FATA, and there will always be.‘ The fact that the intelligence circles realized the importance of these ‗unrests‘ even then, is evidenced by the fact that sporadic operations against insurgency in tribal belts started as early as 2002,but these tended to be portrayed (and debatably they were ,at that that point in time) as tribal unrests. However, the time period between 2003 and 2007 is crucial, inasmuch as these hitherto localized ‗unrests‘ started gaining force; indoctrinating thousands of young men with their notions of Jihad. The movements in Swat, Bajaur and Waziristan ,all of which initially seemed to have directions of their own, started coalescing into an extremely organized guerilla movement, strikingly comparable to the birth of Taliban. That is not surprising since this movement is Taliban, only the Pakistani version of it as a separate organizational entity, but having the same ideological roots and al Qaeda connections. The formal declaration of this movement as Taliban in December 2007 may have come as a surprise to some, but for analysts attuned to the situation, it was only a logical culmination of the state of affairs. Let us take a look at the emergence of Pakistani Taliban, which can be attributed to the influx of al Qaeda and Taliban cadres into the tribal areas of Pakistan, and their subsequent alliances or subsuming into local militias headed by Pakistani militants of the Afghan Jihad persuasion. Geographical proximity has been one of the major reasons for the resurgence of the Taliban in these areas; the Durand line abuts swathes of rugged, mountainous territory which is a surveillance nightmare. The areas are replete with mountain passes and treacherous routes linking Afghanistan and Pakistan, which are in most cases, known only to the locals. It is not a coincidence that the Taliban resurgence in Pakistan has taken place in areas which adjoin Taliban‘s strongholds in Afghanistan; the remote southern plains of Helmand province is one such area where Taliban posses the capability to disrupt transport and logistical supply on the highway connecting Kandahar with Heart.65 This area is contiguous to the Pakistani territory of Noshki-Chaghai region in Baluchistan province, where the Taliban have established strongholds. Similarly, even though they have largely been prevented from taking over Kandahar city, the Taliban maintain a strong presence in the adjoining Afghan countryside, which is not far from the Pakistani city of Quetta. Quetta and its suburbs like Pashtunabad have consequently become centers of Taliban consolidation, with some sources maintaining that Mullah Omar has been hiding either in Quetta, Kandahar or Helmand.66 Similarly, Taliban are reported to use the Toba Kakar mountain pass route north of Kandahar, to penetrate into Pakistan‘s tribal areas when the Waziristan route is inaccessible due to increased vigilance by the Pakistani military during operations. South Waziristan abuts the Paktika province in Afghanistan, where the US-led forces have a large base in the Barmal region, and several outlying check posts scattered around the landscape. Similarly, North Waziristan abuts the adjoining Afghan provinces of Paktika and Khost. Reportedly there are 243 illegal passages in North Waziristan to enter Afghanistan, while there are only 5 check

65

The Afghan-Pakistan militant nexus, BBC online, south Asia section, 10 September 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7601748.stm. 66 Eric Schmitt and Mark Mazzetti, The Taliban in Pakistan are raising U.S. fears,,International Herald Tribune, online edition, February 10, 2009, http://www.iht.com/articles/2009/02/10/asia/10quetta.php Taliban in Pakistan: A Chronicle of Resurgence : A Chronicle of Resurgence, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook

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posts on the border in this area. Whenever the Pakistani army starts operation in these areas, terrorists tend to relocate to and from the Pakistani side of the border.67 It is also important to contextualize the development of an al Qaeda and Taliban relationship. Western media and analysts usually mention al Qaeda and Taliban in Pakistan in the same context, without really understanding the dynamics of their relationship. I argue that this context is to be visualized within the ambit of the Pashtun tribal code of Pashtunwali, and the relentless militant activities of the Taliban and al Qaeda remnants which entered these tribal areas. This is vital to comprehend the amorphous al Qaeda Taliban nexus that would form later. For the purpose of this study, I argue that the comprehension of Pakistani Jihadi organizational propensity, to ally itself the Taliban in Pakistan, is germane to the academic efforts to contextualize al Qaeda‘s place in the Pakistani weltanschauung. The relationship would be forged in Pakistan‘s tribal areas when both these groups were forced to relocate to FATA, particularly Waziristan. In order to survive the ongoing operations to flush them out, these groups rapidly devised a symbiotic strategy that would later characterize al Qaeda‘s ability to subsume itself within the ranks of different militant organizations in Pakistan. Al Qaeda‘s relationship with the Taliban and militant organizations in Pakistan merits a separate exhaustive study; for the purpose of staying focused on the Pakistani Taliban, it is sufficient to skim over these linkages whenever they arise in context to the Taliban. After US and its allies initiated operations in Afghanistan to flush out the Taliban and al Qaeda militants, many of these militants used their local ingenuity and knowledge of the terrain to escape from the American dragnet. The American operations ‗Anaconda‘ and ‗Snipe‘, geared to flush out the Taliban in Khost and Shahi Kot in Paktia province, only managed to push the al Qaeda and Taliban fighters further inside the FATA areas of Pakistan. This had far reaching consequences; debatably, had the operations been more successful, and the influx of these militants to Pakistan had been stemmed, things might have been better today both in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Echoes of this geo political reality resonate even in the present day, whence the Karzai regime is purportedly controlling the country in Afghanistan, but in reality, is only in control in Kabul and the previous Northern Alliance areas of the country.68 According to some reports, the Taliban have a continued presence in most of the country.69 At the same time the allies in Afghanistan seem to have fallen back to a precautionary approach towards the Taliban. The American and Allied Forces seldom seem to make large incursions into the mountains, relying mainly on consolidation and caution rather than attempt making large inroads into the territory still containing small guerilla groups of Taliban. This is evident from a reading of the following report from The Washington Times: "US commanders have turned down as too risky plans for special operations missions to attack Taliban and al-Qaida fighters in Afghanistan, according to soldiers and Bush administration officials. Military sources said that on several occasions, Army Green Beret ATeams received good intelligence on the whereabouts of former Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar, one of the United States' most sought after fugitives. In each case, soldiers said, commanders turned down the missions as too dangerous or because they believed the intelligence was shaky.……… `We had a good plan,' said one Special Forces soldier, who, like others interviewed for this story, asked not be identified for fear of retribution from 67

Ibid. Chris sands ―Afghanistan; is it too late?‖ New Statesman, 31 March 2008. 69 Ibid. 68

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superiors. We came in hard in November, December, January, February and we won,' the soldier said. `Since then, we've been floundering.'…… intelligence collected by A-Teams and US agencies, there are likely only 50 to 100 devoted Taliban leaders left in Afghanistan. Some are trying to form new guerilla groups by merging with Pakistani and Arab militants. Special Forces soldiers on the ground say that if the United States misses its chance now to kill or capture them, the hard-core Taliban leaders may be successful in reorganising their units and other militants ………..‖ The Taliban are primarily guerilla fighters, which invariably need a base to recuperate, train, and reorganize. A guerilla insurgency is characterized by the setting up of counterinstitutions in areas which are deemed or supposed to be ‗liberated‘ from the oppressors; thus the term ‗urban guerillas‘ is a misnomer since purportedly, free zones are not easy to set up in cities. The Taliban initiated their movement by guerilla activity in the tribal areas of Pakistan, where they set up small principalities run by militant commanders who administered justice and levied taxes; from there they have spread their activities to other areas of Pakistan. It would be pertinent to examine the elements of support within the Pakistani society which contributed to the rise of the ‗Pakistanized‘ version of Taliban. Even after Pakistan had officially withdrawn its support from Taliban after the initiation of American attacks,the situation on ground remained different. Prominent journalist and Afghan authority Ahmed Rashid, wrote in the Daily Times newspaper on 25 July 2003: "Afghanistan suspects the Pakistani leadership has resumed providing covert support to the radical Islamic movement. Some diplomats contend that President Musharraf, his army and the powerful security agency known as Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), are directly supporting the Taliban as a matter of state policy. Musharraf's personal denials of such claims now carry little weight with Kabul's diplomatic corps. Even a boost from President Bush, who Musharraf met with in June, has been unable to dispel diplomatic scepticism. American officials are among those calling on Musharraf to step up anti-terrorist efforts. Every effort has to be made by Pakistan not to allow its territory to be used by Taliban elements, said Zalmay Khalilzad, the American special envoy to Afghanistan at a press conference on 15 July. We need 100 per cent assurances on this from Pakistan, not 50 per cent assurances,Khalilzad added, `We know the Taliban are planning and organising in Quetta."70 Suspicions about the Pakistani establishment harboring the Taliban have always been rampant. However, post 2002, the official stance has been to decry any involvement. That official patronage of Taliban may be a fact or fiction, but it is logical to assume that at least the ISI had not lost its previous hold over the Taliban, a fact borne out by recent reports of American pressure being exerted upon the Pakistani government to rein in the ISI. It is worth mentioning that even though Pakistan's military regime arrested some five hundred members of al Qaida in Pakistan during the Musharraf era, not a single Taliban leader was apprehended in that period. The Pakistani support to the Taliban between the phases of 1994-2001 can be clearly documented and is a fait accompli. Regarding assistance to the Taliban, an eminent monthly periodical reported: "...there have been frequent reports of Pakistani military units offering training to the Taliban and other Jihadi groups in more than 10 training camps across Afghanistan…….. The frequency of such reports forced the UN Secretary General to implicitly accuse Pakistan of interfering in Afghanistan. The US government was also obliged 70

Daily times, 25 ,July 2003.

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to issue a demarche to the Pakistani government asking for assurances that Pakistan had not been involved in engineering, the fall of Taloqan‖71 The New York Times claimed that Pakistan's secret services agency, the ISI, continued supplying arms to the Taliban until 12 October 2001. Quoting Egyptian and Pakistani officials, the report said: "Pakistani border guards at a check point in the Khyber pass on 8 October and 12 allowed passage to convoys of trucks loaded with rifles, ammunition and rocket-propelled grenade launchers hidden under their tarpaulins headed into Afghanistan…...A senior Pakistani intelligence official acknowledged that the… shipment did contain arms for the Taliban. But the official also said it was the last officially sanctioned delivery and that Pakistan had since been living up to its commitment to the anti-terror war.‖72 The Herald wrote further regarding the supply of arms to the Taliban by the ISI ―The shipment of fresh weapons supplies to the Taliban from Pakistani territory continued through subsequent years. During 1994-96, these supplies passed through the Kurram Agency (a tribal area) and were delivered at various locations up to Khost in southern Afghanistan. Later, the route shifted to the main border crossing on Torkham and the deliveries were made directly to the central corps headquarters in Kabul.‖73 Till 2002, there were well documented reports of Pakistani presence in Afghanistan, a fact which seemed to have been hushed up after 2002. For example, an extract from a news report74 about an interview with a soldier covertly infiltrating Afghanistan states ―All these men (the mujahideen) had reached there with the help of the Sakhi Ehsan Mosque which is run in Karachi with assistance from the al-Rasheed Trust. In all, there were 2000 Pakistanis and 400 Arabs there.‖ Why did Pakistan want to keep on supplying Taliban even after they had failed in Afghanistan? It seems that the continued ability to exert influence in the region was important to the establishment. Confirming this view, Jessica Stern wrote in the American Foreign Affairs magazine' in December 2001: "Pakistan has two reasons to support the so-called mujahideen. First, the Pakistani military is determined to pay India back for allegedly fomenting separatism in what was once East Pakistan and which in 1971 became Bangladesh. Second, India dwarfs Pakistan in population, economic strength, and military might. In 1998 India spent about two per cent of its $469 billion GDP on defense, including an active armed force of more than 1.1 million personnel. In the same year, Pakistan spent about five per cent of its $61 billion GDP on defense, yielding an active armed force only half the size of India's. The US government estimates that India has 400,000 troops in Indian-held Kashmir – a force more than two thirds as large as Pakistan's entire active army. The Pakistani government thus supports the irregulars as a relatively cheap way to keep Indian forces tied down.‖ Another reason postulated was that the newly installed Karzai regime was largely seen by Pakistani intelligence circles as pro-India, and was also considered by many circles to be anti-Pakistan. Pakistani strategists wanted to counter his influence in the region by keeping the Taliban primed to keep the Karzai government in check. This ‗strategic depth‘ theory has been a continued factor in espousing the cause of the Taliban, by proxy or by default. The Taliban, though seemingly defeated in Afghanistan, had not entirely lost their support in the region. As will be elaborated upon later, the Pakistani state had an ambivalent 71

The Herald, November 2001. This is a monthly periodical published by the Dawn group of Newspapers. T h e N e w Y or k Ti mes , 8 December 2001. 73 (Herald, Nov. 2001) 74 The Friday Times ,Lahore, 10 December 2002. 72

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policy towards them, even though the president in 2002 had purportedly distanced himself from the extremists. According to Zarb-e-Momin75, a Jihadi periodical, the Taliban were said to have regained control of more than forty districts of Afghanistan, as early as in 2003. It is probable that Jihadi magazines sometimes tend to propagandize more than reporting facts, but, even then, it was conjectured at the time that Pakistani forces were behind this operation. Evidence of this seems to come from the fact that groups of twenty to thirty Taliban and al Qaeda at a time, were infiltrating into Pakistan from the Afghan side, even though seventy thousand Pakistani troops were guarding the border76. Most of this infiltration occurred in the tribal belts of FATA, where the indigenous tribes were sympathetic to the cause of the Taliban and other Jihadi groups. As mentioned above, the tribals have little love for strangers; the Pashthunwali code binds them in much stronger ties to the Taliban which had been permeating the borders at that time. These boys were heroes in the eyes of the tribals; they had brought down the Soviet bear, and had withstood the onslaught of the allied forces with hugely smaller resources. Besides, they were known compatriots, who had been coming and going as they pleased during the Afghan Jihad days. Most of the infiltration occurred in North and South Waziristan, Bajaur Agency, Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan. It is not surprising that the current insurgency is at its worst in Waziristan and Bajaur areas. Nidai Millat catalogues such an event: "When the Americans bombarded Tora Bora at the very beginning of their aggression on Afghanistan, the Arab Mujahideen left the place and sought refuge with the tribals in Chinar tribal areas. They had to set out again after getting back to health but just two days later, another rival tribe came to know of their refuge there, and they informed the Americans and Pakistani forces of their presence there. According to the tribals of Para Chinar, just as they got this information, the Americans started pressurising the Pakistan government to interfere into the matter. According to sources, the Pakistani officials started holding talks with the seniors in the tribe.‖77 The Washington Post in 2003 published an interview with a Pakistani tribal, showing the extent of the tribal affiliation with the Taliban: "Abdul Zahir and 14 other Pakistanis set out by bus for Afghanistan last summer, determined to join Taliban forces waging a renewed jihad against US and Afghan Government troops. It was almost too easy. Stopped by border guards in the town of Chaman, they said they were Afghan refugees returning home on various personal or business errands. Zahir said: `I said I sold a buffalo to someone in Afghanistan and I needed to collect my money.' The guards waved them through. A few days later, he and his comrades joined a Taliban unit in the mountains of Zabol province. They were issued weapons and spent the next 40 days engaged in sporadic combat ……….it's no problem to cross back and forth,' said Zahir, a 33-year-old apple grower and self-described Taliban recruiter from the remote tribal district of Qila Abdullah along the Afghan border in northern Baluchistan Province. The Americans have robbed us of the right to live, but still we have the right to die, and we are using that right.‖78

"That is more or less the picture sketched by Zahir, a father of six with a 10th grade education who makes his living off the 30-acre apple orchard he owns with relatives just a few miles from Afghanistan in Qila Abdullah. A Pushton tribesman, he said he identifies more closely with Afghans than with Pakistanis and first offered his services to the Taliban 75

Zarb-e-momin, 11 December 2003. The Daily Times,20 July 2002. 77 Nidai Millat ,Lahore, 19 September 2002. 76

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soon after the United States launched its campaign against the movement in the fall of 2001. He joined a Taliban unit in the Afghan provincial capital of Kandahar, he said, and was promptly dispatched to the city of Mazar-e-Sharif as part of a mission to deliver money and winter clothing to Taliban forces there………….After I came back I was continuously trying to go back, but the jihad had not yet resumed, he said. In February, Zahir said, he succeeded in meeting a Taliban military commander who realised I was a genuine person with ties to the movement and urged him to go back and convince other people to join the jihad. Over the next few moths, Zahir said, he rounded up 14 other men from his village and surrounding areas while he waited for further instructions…..Once he got home, Zahir said, he resumed his recruitment drive and soon lined up six more Pakistanis - four madrasa students, one farm worker and an English-speaking computer expert - between the ages of 22 and 30. He said jihad is an easy sell where he lives. We are basically anti-American, he said. So what I do is I go and tell these boys, the door for jihad is open and let us go fight Americans.‖79 This report demonstrates where the sympathies of the regional population in the Frontier Province and the tribal areas lie. But it is not just in these areas that the Taliban and Jihadi groups have support. They have sympathizers all over Pakistan among the general population, as is elaborated in depth in Chapter 4. Many tribals on the Pak-Afghan border, undoubtedly, have been engaged in helping with the reorganization of the Taliban, and much evidence is available to substantiate this. Al-Hilal (a Jihadi periodical) of a Jihadi organization Jamiat-ulAnsar wrote in its September 2003 issue: "It is not easy to have access within a difficult area like Waziristan. According to President Musharraf, we won this area where (previously) the army could not enter for a hundred and fifty years. But why couldn't this army stay on after crossing over Kargil? He may not like to answer this question because it was done on the orders of an `ally'. It is not easy for Pakistani officials to stand by the promises made. Posts were established to stop the Taliban but the area of operations remained rather limited. The doorway into Afghanistan cannot be stopped even by America, not to talk of Pakistan. On the one hand, the long stretch of this border is a cause for the impossibility to stop infiltration, while on the other, there are fighting tribals on both sides who also happen to be relatives of each other. They have a tradition of being warm to the guests and remain united against the aliens. The strength of the states of Khost and Paktia in Afghanistan is also because of their physical proximity with Waziristan. Famous Taliban commanders, Jalaluddin Haqqani and Saifullah are popular in countless households. They are not strangers for the Taliban; in fact they happen to be their kith and kin. They have a history of their own. They did not allow the British to enter their areas by waging guerilla war. The story of Russia is too fresh in memory. An army may stand in the battleground only when they have the support of the people." Even if some of the discourse above could be dismissed as rhetoric, there is certainly an element of support for the Jihadis from within the tribal belts. It would not have been otherwise possible for thousands of volunteers of the Sufi Mohammad movement, called Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-Mohammadi (TNSM), to enter Afghanistan in October 2001 to help the Taliban. When they returned home, many members of al Qaida and the Taliban returned with them to the tribal areas. In fact, some reports claim that Osama bin Laden, disguised in tribal garb, had also arrived with them in mid-November 2001. 78 79

The Washington Post ,20 October 2003. Ibid.

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Cross border visits by the Taliban have also been the norm in these areas. For example, a high level Taliban delegation visited the Mohmand agency in FATA in 2001. ―According to one malik (chieftain) of the Khoizai tribe, the Taliban expressed anger at the Mohmand subtribes' urge to get Pakistani identity cards. ‗This is our land. We will give you the (identity) cards,‘ the malik quoted one Taliban delegation member as saying at a tea party, attended among other chieftains by Malik Fazal Manan, a former member of Pakistan's national assembly. During one of the ceremonies, the delegation also hoisted the Taliban flag at Khapakh.‖80This is the sort of bond of solidarity that the Taliban have been showing the tribes across the border as early as 2001. Taliban have also been arriving in the province of Baluchistan in strength from neighboring Afghanistan. It has even been suggested that the government policy was to capture and hand over foreign fighters including Arabs and Uzbeks to the U.S. while the Pashtun Taliban were not arrested. Reportedly, on the contrary, the Pakistani tribes in Waziristan were encouraged to provide them refuge. The Afghan Taliban were similarly welcomed and protected in Quetta. This view seems to be supported by the fact that Quetta and the neighboring city of Chaman have become new establishments for the Taliban. Syed Salim Shahzad, a Karachi based journalist and researcher wrote in Asia Times after his tour of Chaman: "Immediately after entering the centre of Chaman city, located in Pakistan's Baluchistan province in southwest Pakistan right on the border with Afghanistan, a road curves left into the dusty distance. It leads to a chain of villages scattered along the border, some in Pakistan, some in Afghanistan, some spread across both countries, and all staunchly Pushton - and tribal - before anything else. Chaman…. is a completely mullah-dominated society.‖ Shahzad elucidates the only means of education in the area. ―Islamic seminaries (madrasas) provide an ideal way out for providing education, especially when the ideology, food, facilities and education are all free, and in some cases they even pay their students a stipend for pocket money. No wonder that they are popular.‖ He also sheds light on how the emergence of Taliban has affected these areas. ―….after the emergence of the Taliban the situation changed upside down. The Taliban heavily influenced the politics of the area and the people were influenced by their Islamic ideologies. As a result, donations were showered on the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (a Pakistani organization ideologically associated with the Taliban movement) which then established a network of Islamic schools and which had funds to operate them. Now, sometimes in a single village, there are two Islamic seminaries, and I think the total number in Chaman and the villages around it comes to 200, with at least 50 students in each seminary. This is the real fuel for the Taliban (resistance) movement in Afghanistan and for the fighters of the Taliban.‖ Journalist Ahmed Rashid also wrote in The Daily Times on 28 January 2004 about this Taliban resurgence in Baluchistan: "Pakistan's Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) party now forms part of the governing coalition that rules Baluchistan. It is using its madrasas and mosques to house and mobilize thousands of a new, even younger, generation of Afghan and Pakistani Taliban to fight the Karzai government and terrorize southern Afghanistan. After prayers are over, the young Taliban many of them in their teens - flood into the tea stalls of Pushtonabad, a Quetta suburb, in their distinctive black clothes, black turbans, long beards, and unkempt hair. They talk of the progress of the Taliban offensive in Afghanistan today. Taliban fighters, I was told, are better 80

Taliban claim Mohmand Agency, 11 February,2001, The Friday Times.

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equipped than they were in 1994. They are buying Thuraya satellite telephones and hundreds of Honda motorbikes to carry out guerilla raids; they are also importing night-vision equipment from the Arab Gulf states."

Any account of the rise of Pakistan‘s Taliban will not be complete without mention of the Jihadi groups in Pakistan. Pakistani Jihadi groups and the Taliban are inextricably linked; in fact many of them have lost their separate identities and now are Taliban. This should be unsurprising to any analyst covering the Afghan conflict, since these organizations have always played an important part in the Afghan jihad. Several had safe houses in Peshawar where Mujahideen would come to take respite from the rigors of war. Similarly, many of these organizations gained their training in camps in Afghanistan such as the Sarobi and Jyora camps in Khost, the Ghazni training centre in the Shahshgoo Hills, the Mohammad training centre in Bangarbar, the Rashkor camp to the north of Kabul and the Karaga camp to the west of Kabul. At times the number of Pakistani Mujahideen at a particular front greatly outnumbered the Afghans. Shamsheer (a Jihadi periodical published from Hyderabad in Pakistan) in its April 2002 issue, quoted one Pakistani Mujahideen activist as saying: " All of us were Pakistanis. There were two Taliban fronts nearby and close to the Amu river were the fronts of the Arab mujahideen. On the Arab fronts there were no mujahideen from any other country.‖ It would be too much to expect that such close ties of the Jihadis with the Taliban would be severed after the fall of Kabul. In fact, it seemed obvious from doing a literature review of Jihadi publications, that these organizations were preparing for a ‗new‘ jihad after the fall of Kabul; this would inexorably lead to the Taliban taking centre stage at the Pakistani militant scene. Al-Irshad, a Jihadi periodical for instance, published the following message from the Emirs of Harkat-ul Jihad-ul-Islami after the fall of the Taliban: ―Victory shall be with those who are in the right (God willing). The mujahideen should work in a better manner now; they should sacrifice their lives and property to be dear to God. Harkat-ulJihad-ul-Islami is devoting all its strength on this occasion and we hope that the mujahideen and the workers too will do their best." "An activist of the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, who has been involved in Afghanistan since 1988, concurs with the contention that, ` They maintain that there are hundreds of thousands of people, particularly from Baluchistan, the Frontier Province and the tribal belt who have committed themselves to the jihad when the call comes. In fact, in many villages in the Frontier Province and Baluchistan along the Afghan border families deem it their religious duty to send a loved one to fight in the jihad."81 ―It is clear from these various reports that Pakistani Jihadi groups are taking part in the new jihad against America and the Northern Alliance alongside al Qaida and the Taliban. The prominent Pakistani groups making their contributions include: Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (Jamiat-ul-Ansar), Harkat-ul Jihad-ul-Islami, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Jamiat al-Furqan, JamiatulMujahideen, al-Badr Mujahideen and Lashkar-e-Taiba. Reliable Jihadi sources admit that the Jihadi organizations are winding up their base camps in Kashmir and moving them to the Afghan border regions. These mujahideen have moved especially to assist the Taliban.‖82

81 82

Amir Rana, The seeds of Terrorism (London: New Millennium Press, 2005), 242. Ibid., 243.

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A consistent indoctrination source has been the hitherto Kashmir jihad oriented groups. In 2006, when Gen. Pervez Ashfaq Kayani (currently the Pakistan Army chief) took over the ISI leadership, he decided to wind up the Kashmiri Jihadi camps, which were located in various parts of Hazara and Azad Kashmir. After the October 2005 earthquake in northern areas in Pakistan, these camps came into the spotlight and were easily identified by the NATO relief missions. An increasing rapprochement with India also changed the foreign policy towards an entente cordiale, as a result of which many Kashmiri Mujahideen groups were dismissed. The Kashmiri Jihadis were greatly disillusioned by this new development; for want of logistical support, they began regrouping and reviving their links with Afghani and the now easily accessible Pakistani Taliban groups in the NWFP. Subsequently, pockets of these well trained militants began to sprout up throughout NWFP, particularly in Waziristan, Darra Adam Khel and Swat. They have also been spotted in Kurram, Mohmand, Bajaur and Khyber. With the passage of time, they are being absorbed into other organizations, of which the Taliban are a major resource pool. I tend to subscribe to the viewpoint which is gaining currency in strategic circles; Pakistan, rather than Afghanistan, is the nucleus for indoctrination, training and radicalization of the Sunni brand of militant Islam, which envelops Taliban and other Deobandi entities in its fold. These entities had an inclination to be elitist; membership was granted on basis of a particular narrowly defined ideological mindset .However, the scenario seems to be changing, with the emergence of Taliban complicating an already explosive situation. These militants have joined hands under the banner of Taliban. Even the Afghan militant parties seem to be gravitating towards Pakistan. A case in point would be the ultra radical ex Prime Minster of Kabul Gulbeddin Hikmetyar. According to the Daily Times (7 December 2003), Hikmetyar and his organization has been subsumed into the larger Taliban organization. The Hizb exerted tremendous influence on the Pashtuns of the tribal belts, spurred by shared ethnicity and Islamist ideals. There are unsubstantiated reports that he is in contact with the pro-Wahabi Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. Hikmetyar‘s last public appearance in Pakistan was recorded at the annual al-Badr convention at Mansahra in February 2003; Al-Badr being a subsidiary Jihadi organization of Jamaat-e-Islami. Al-Badr had taken part in the jihad against Soviet forces along with Hizb-e-Islami. The Daily Times article continues: "Significantly, in the early 1980s, these Afghan leaders, including Hikmetyar, belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood which emerged out of the Arab world, and was the precursor to today's more extreme Islamic movements. Hikmetyar is trying to revive those connections and propagate Muslim Brotherhood ideology which is stridently anti-Western and anti-democratic. He says;All true Muslim Afghans who want an Islamic government in their country must know it is possible only when the United States and Allied soldiers are forced out.‖ "Hikmetyar is also trying to whip up the sentiments of Pushton nationalism. In cassettes sent to journalists, he accuses the United States and the Kabul government of beginning `a genocide on the Pushtons' He has a considerable network of supporters in Pakistan. After the 1979 Soviet invasion, the ISI promoted Hikmetyar ruthlessly, until he was dumped in favour of the Taliban in 1995."83 83

Ibid.

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"Anger against the army runs high among deeply conservative tribesmen in this tribal zone that both Kabul and Pakistan suspect to be safe havens for Taliban and al-Qaida elements, but tribal chieftains avoid open criticism of the army.‖ "However, younger tribesmen are more vocal about their feelings. `Everyone is sad about the operation conducted against our people,' 28-year-old taxi driver Wahidullah told a newspaper (The Daily Times 16 October 2003). `Some day our people might attack the army84 if such operations continue,' he warned.‖ Al Qaeda and Taliban have gained enormous organizational strength during the period from 2003-2007.It seems probable that they had help; the kind of military organization displayed by militants in the current insurgency in the tribal areas smacks of significant logistical and financial support. Fingers have always been pointing at the ISI, but China and Russia have been named as well; getting revenge for the Soviet rout by destabilizing the Americans purportedly prompting the previous combatants to become allies. Conspiracy theories abound at this moment in time, however, and substantiation of these allegations has not been forthcoming. Thus, it is the combination of tribal affiliations with militants pouring into Pakistan from Afghanistan which sowed the seeds of the birth of the Taliban movement in Pakistan. As mentioned above, the operations to flush out the Taliban ,particularly from the Tora Bora area were ineffective. A media report is pertinent about the escape of Taliban at this time: ―An Afghan go-between, Haji Zaman, in exchange apparently for hefty bribes from the US, negotiated a ceasefire under which Arab fighters were to surrender. During a recent interview, a Taliban commander, Mohammed Rahim, who was stranded in the Tora Bora along with 100 other Taliban, revealed that during the ceasefire more than 1,000 Arabs and the 100 Taliban fled, some to Shahi Kot and others across the border to the tribal areas. In early 2002, in a showdown in Shahi Kot, about 18 US soldiers were killed and the US mobilized heavy land troops as well as air support and bombed the hideouts of hundreds of Arabs and Chechen fighters who had made Shahi Kot their hub. As a result, the militants melted into the mountains, from where Nek (see above) helped them to settle in South Waziristan‖85. Soon after the Taliban and al Qaeda militants fleeing from the American forces found a refuge in South Waziristan, they initiated militant activities against the Americans and Karzai government. The initial strategy utilized was the kidnappings of Americans and Afghan government officials, which were used as bargaining tools. On September 5, 2002, a tribe resident in Bannu district of NWFP forced the Pakistan army to release six prisoners arrested for their alleged links with al Qaeda.86Some time later, a Waziri sub-tribe in North Waziristan helped al Qaeda fighters kidnap five US troops in July 2003, forcing the Pakistan army to launch the first major military operation against the tribes.87 This operation masqueraded under the guise of ‗routine military exercises'. American kidnappings had by then become a favorite pastime with Waziri tribesmen, reports of which started cropping up sporadically in the media. Quds Press, for example, interviewed Abu Suhaib-al-Makki, an Arab commander near the Pak- Afghan border, who mentioned that 18 Americans were detained at just one unit

84

Emphasis added by author. Syed Saleem Shahzad, Part 1: The legacy of Nek Mohammed, Asia Times online, July 20,2004, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/FG20Df05.html. 86 Amir Rana, Daily Times report, September 6, 2002. 87 Ibid. 85

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after a confrontation in Gardez.88 Similarly, many hostages were being detained in inaccessible regions of Waziristan, which necessitated the initiation of Operation ‗Mountain Lion‘ in October 2003, claiming the lives of 13 al Qaeda militants, tribesmen and Frontier Corps (FC).89 Escalating US pressure forced the Pakistani government to pressurize the local tribes into releasing the hostages, which prompted a standoff. A conjunction of American pressure and rising militancy in tribal areas forced the state to launch military operations in earnest, which immediately elicited a hostile reaction from the fiercely territorial tribes of the area. A London based Arabic magazine al-Majalla highlighted the gravity of the situation: According to the magazine, "Tribal leaders and public were observing the situation in sectarian perspective because the population of tribal area was Sunni while the army leadership deputed in the area belonged to Shia community. The area commander general, Safdar Hussain, had declared that they would make an example of tribes of South Waziristan for the rest of tribes if they failed in surrendering arms and foreign militants."90 The magazine added that the local tribesmen were extremely perturbed, at what they perceived as the violation of their territorial rights by the incursions of the Pakistani Military.91 The mountainous Shawal region of Waziristan, which abuts an even more inaccessible Afghan Shawal range came into focus at about this time, as being the potential hiding place of both Bin Laden and Zawahiri.92The area is extremely remote, with the writ of the state being nominal even before the advent of the Taliban .This can be gauged by the fact that much of the populace was involved in ‗businesses‘ like kidnapping for ransom, heroin trafficking and carjacking.93The tribals in these areas were extremely reticent to hand over the foreign fighters to the state forces. Resultantly, joint US Pakistani military operations started in these areas, though the US refuted any claims of being directly involved in anti militant activities on Pakistani soil. Daily Times on February 20, 2003 reported: "The US, Pakistani and Afghan forces would start a joint military operation in Pakistani territory along the Afghan borders against al Qaeda and Taliban fighters at the end of spring."

According to another related report, published in Daily Times on February 28, 2003, US Commissioner John Lehman admitted, "There is American presence in the area, but we can't just send in troops. If we did, we could have another Vietnam, and the United States cannot afford that right now‖. The US at about this time, was adamant about Osama‘s presence in the area, with the same being refuted by the Pakistani government.94 The military engagement in the tribal areas intensified in October 2003, when Zalikhel and Karrikhel sub tribes blatantly refused to surrender al Qaeda and Taliban ‗guests‘ to the state. During these operations, 22 alQaeda members and seven tribesmen were reportedly killed. When the army incursions

88

Reported in (Rana, Gunaratna et al,2008). (Daily times, September 6,2002). 90 (Rana, Gunaratna et al,2008). 91 Reported in (Rana, Gunaratna et al,2008). 92 Syed Saleem Shahzad, Part 1: Besieged in Shawal, Asia Times online, South Asia section, May 1, 2004 ,http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/FE01Df04.html. 93 Syed Saleem Shahzad, Part 2: The 'al-Qaeda' cleric, Asia Times online, South Asia section, May 4, 2004, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/FE04Df04.html. 94 Nida-e-Millat, Lahore, December 30-January 5, 2006. 89

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seemed relentless, tribal leaders handed over about a dozen of al Qaeda warriors to the army on the condition of a ceasefire.95 It is pertinent that a prominent political figure of the NWFP Javed Ibrahim Paracha petitioned the Peshawar High court at about this time for the release of 100 al Qaeda militants apprehended from the Waziristan area, who had fled from the Tora Bora cave complex and escaped to the Pakistan. 96They had been arrested and interred in Kohat.97 He reportedly got 300 Arabs released form Pakistani jails. There were also reports that Jalaluddin Haqqani had visited the South Waziristan region with Chechen fighters, and had stationed many of them there to motivate the locals to join the cause of Jihad98. Demands were made by the state for the surrender of these militants, but true to tribal form, the same were not accepted by the locals. Pakistani troops launched a full scale offensive at Wana in Waziristan in March 2004.Official sources later disclosed that 63 warriors, mostly Chechens and Uzbeks, were killed during operations, and 166 other fighters, including 93 Pakistani tribesmen and 73 foreigners, were captured. On the other hand, tribal warriors claimed that the state sustained over 1,000 casualties.99The Uzbek casualties were mainly militants from the IMU, which demonstrates the inroads made by this al Qaeda inspired organization into Pakistani tribal heartlands, even in this nascent phase of resurgence of Taliban and al Qaeda in Pakistan. During the operation, the state claimed to have been close to apprehending Zawahiri, but this information proved false as only twelve lower level al Qaeda intelligence officials were arrested, on suspicion of helping Zawahiri in his escape.100 The army at this time claimed to have seriously injured one of the most important alQaeda leaders, Tahir Yuldeshiv. "He was wounded and was trying to flee the region along with his friends and aides". However, Pakistani media had already reported his escape a few days back.101 Official Pakistani estimates of al Qaeda fighters present in Waziristan at this time ranged from 100-600 fighters.102 The local tribesmen, however, were estimating much higher figures: around 1,500 al-Qaeda guerrillas, mostly Chechens, Uzbeks and Arabs, were thought to be present in and around South Waziristan. Early on during the Wana operation, the militants escaped to nearby mountainous regions with the help of local woodcutters and shepherds, who are intimately acquainted with the region. These ‗guides‘ were paid handsomely according to local conditions for their services; Rs. 5,000 to 10,000 each for a safe passage to the mountains.103 US Intelligence sources estimate that: ―Pakistani military operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas have had limited effect on al-Qa‘ida.‖ This seems to have been the pattern of tactical activities by the state in the tribal areas. The Pakistani military seemingly underestimated the staunch tribal affiliations and the popularity of the ‗mujahids‘ amongst the 95

Daily Islam,February 27, 2004. Waseem Ahmad Shah, US approaches ex-MNA to act as go-between, The Dawn, internet archives, November 18, 2005, http://www.dawn.com/2005/11/18/top9.htm 97 Khaled Ahmed, Second opinion: The terminal cancer of sectarianism, The Daily Times internet archives, October 21, 2003, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_21-10-2003_pg3_6 98 Nadia Jajja, The Dummy‘s Guide to the FATA region, Herald, October 2008. 99 (Rana, Gunaratna et al,2008). 100 (Rana, Gunaratna et al,2008). 101 Fida Khattak, Monthly Ghazi, April 2004. 102 (Daily times, September 6,2002). 96

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locals. Consequently, attempts at rapprochement, and failing that,resort to operations could never yield the desired result. After sustaining heavy losses, the state concluded the Shakai agreement with the leading militant commander, Nek Muhammad Wazir, a local pro Taliban leader. It seems likely that foreign militants were still present in the area when this agreement was concluded.104 Nek Muhammad‘s role in the insurgency needs to be contextualized, in order to gain an insight into the Jihadist credentials of the Pakistani militant leaders negotiating with the government at that time. Nek Mohammed belonged to the Yargul Khai sub tribe of the Ahmed Zai Wazir clan. The son of a tribal land landowner, he did not receive formal education, engaging in running a general store in Wana's main market. At the time of Afghan Jihad, South and North Waziristan agencies constituted vital links in an ISI run supply chain extending from Paktia to Zabul in Afghanistan. Like many other youngsters in the area, Nek Muhammad was attracted to a life of militancy, which was to prove his forte. His bravery and zeal soon brought him into prominence and notice of prominent warlords like Saifullah Mansoor and Jalaluddin Haqqani. After the fall of Kabul to the Taliban, Nek succeeded Maulvi Gul as the commander of the Kargha garrison in Afghanistan, being just eighteen years old at that time. With the passage of time, he became a reputed Taliban commander in charge of 3,000 men, which included foreign fighters. Nek at this time got acquainted with Osama bin Laden at the Rash Khor training camp, and was also introduced to Aiman al-Zawahiri. Other acquaintances included Mullah Nazir, a Taliban minister, the leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Tahir Yaldushiv, and the Chinese separatist leader Hasan Mohsin105. When the Taliban and al Qaeda escaped to Waziristan in Pakistan, Nek Muhammad became even more prominent due to his Jihadist credentials and influence in his native tribal area. With foreign help, he founded a Jihadi outfit called Jaishul ‗Al-Qiba al-Jihadi al-Siri alAlami‘. This was initially associated with another group called ‗Jundullah‘, an even more staunchly radical militant organization. Both the organizations were strongly pro al Qaeda; Jundullah‘s mandate was to target Pakistan's pro-US rulers and US and British interests in the country, while its media wing is known to have worked with the al-Sahab Foundation, the media wing for al Qaeda. 106Jundullah was at some time allegedly headed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the al Qaeda operational commander of the 9/11 attacks.107 Nek Muhammad provided the Taliban and al Qaeda the logistical support and required manpower to reorganize in the tribal areas. Saleem Shahzad mentions that Nek‘s organization participated tremendously in organizing militant training camps. ―These centers mostly started operating in the middle of 2003, after the Taliban and al-Qaeda had regrouped. Initially, camps were established in Wana, Azam Warsak, Kalosha, Zareen Noor, Baghar, Dhog, Angor Ada in South Waziristan. In North Waziristan, camps were established in the border areas of Shawal, including Darey Nishtar and Mangaroti, where neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan is in control. In Afghanistan, Zawar (Khost) was the most protected place where foreign fighters established their bunkers and hideouts. The area is under the command of Jalaluddin Haqqani. In South Waziristan, the centers were under the command of Nek, and he 103

(Rana, Gunaratna et al,2008). Irfan Mughal, Wajood, May 2004. 105 (Shahzad, July 20, 2004). 106 Ibid. 107 Ibid. 104

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is known to have hosted bin Laden and al-Zawahiri on numerous occasions‖108. These are the sorts of credentials that catapulted Nek Muhammad to the top of the militant ladder in Waziristan, with the state being forced to negotiate at par with this young Taliban commander. Baitullah Mehsud also showed up around this time on the militant radar when Maulana Dadullah, along with several prominent Taliban leaders, met Nek after he concluded the Shakai agreement with the Pakistani Government. Apparently, not being satisfied with the state of affairs over the agreement concluded with the state, they had decided to replace Nek with Baitullah Mehsud as the operational commander in Waziristan; Nek, however, convinced them of his undying loyalty, and was allowed to retain his command position109.Baitullah‘s name cropped up as a natural choice because he was considered the leading commander amongst the Mehsud tribe; analysts opine that this was purely a political decision based on the exigencies of indoctrinating the hitherto slowly mobilizing Mehsud tribe into militancy, rather than being based on any warrior credentials of Baitullah Mehsud. The terms of the Shakai agreement included the registration of ‗foreigners‘ with the state, and the condition that they would not engage in militancy. Interestingly enough, the foreigners, under the terms of the accord, were to be allowed to live in Pakistan as refugees, provided that they registered their personal details with the government.127 However, the registration process from the very beginning lacked vigour, ultimately being scrapped in July 2004. This is a vital detail which seems to have been overlooked or forgotten by strategists in their projections about the area; only three years after fleeing from Afghanistan, al Qaeda and Taliban had found a solid support base amongst the locals, who were willing to give up their lives in protecting their guests. Arguably, the scorched earth tactics used by the army enraged the more militant tribals like the Mehsuds, who started joining the Taliban and al Qaeda movements en masse as a retaliatory measure. The terrain in the Mehsud dominated areas is treacherous, with steep defiles and rugged mountains. Ostensibly, this hostile terrain, along with the common bond of the Mehsud hostility towards the armed forces, motivated the locals to provide sanctuary to a large number of al Qaeda and Taliban warriors.110 The degree of zealousness of the local populace can be gauged by the fact that a tribal edict was issue by the tribal elders, exhorting the local youth to either engage the enemy (the Pakistani state machinery) in battle in Waziristan, or else emigrate to Afghanistan.131 Even more alarmingly, the state was at this time was forced (or was complicitly involved) to tacitly acknowledge the presence of foreign fighters in the area. After the Sararogha accord with Mehsud (see chapter 3), it seemed that the paradigmatic policy shift in state policies regarding foreign presence in Waziristan was complete; instead of expelling them the Pakistani state had to settle for tacit agreements from locals that these ‗foreigners‘ would not create troubles for Pakistan. This would prove to be a fallacy; a comprehensive counteroffensive initiative was lost in return for short term peace, which would ultimately prove detrimental to Pakistan. Another critical mistake committed by the Pakistani army at this juncture was the underestimation of the enormity of the task, and its unwillingness to co-opt the civilian administration into these operations wholeheartedly; there has been a certain disdain 108

Ibid. (Rana, Gunaratna et al,2008), p 93. 110 Aslam Awan, Takbeer, September 19, 2004. 109

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prevalent amongst the Pakistani army echelons for the civilian bureaucracy, which manifested itself in this theater as indifference to the role of political agent. Thus, at one go, the decades of experience that this civilian face of administration had accumulated in handling the Maliks and tribesmen was ignored; this was to prove a fatal mistake. As the army usually negotiated with the insurgents through its own channels, the political administration was often circumvented, which in turn marginalized the negotiating roles of the tribal elders. Often, when negotiations were seen to be underway, operations would suddenly commence at seemingly some random military whim, which shook the confidence of the tribals in the state to a not insignificant extent. A conjunction of these factors created a governance vacuum in the tribal areas, which gun toting militants were quick to fill. It seems that the state did not engage the FATA militants with full force at that time. One of the reasons why the FATA operation was accorded such low priority was that the Pakistani forces had been mobilized in a standoff with India, which lasted more than a year in the wake of Lashkare Taiba attacks on the Indian Parliament.111 The timings of this attack was almost perfect in its synchronization with the military operations; could al Qaeda have directed Lashkare Taiba to carry out these attacks so that Pakistan would be too militarily engaged with India to effectively carry out counterinsurgency activities in FATA region?112 Did ISI have a hand in this affair? In the absence of open source data, one can only make conjectural projections about this shadowy nexus; however, it seems a reasonable presumption that LeT has tended to be quite intimate with its handlers in ISI, and at that time was considered quite amenable to it‘s control. The Shakai accord created ripples of discontent on both sides of the Durand line. To prevent al Qaeda and Taliban militants from re-entering Afghanistan from the Pakistani side of the Durand line, the Americans deployed hundreds of their troops at the places like Birmal, Argoon and Khost areas of Paktia province at about the time the Shakai accord was signed.113 Apparently, shortly after the accord, the modalities of the same were re thought and deemed unsatisfactory; Nek Muhammad was targeted by a missile attack and killed. It seems that Nek Muhammad had nominated a successor; soon after the news of his death and the subsequent escalation of the military operations in the Mehsud areas, media reports started circulating about the presence of pro-Taliban local warriors led by Baitullah Mehsud in the Mehsud areas. After Nek Muhammad was killed, a deal was cut with what would become famous as the ‗Wana five‘. In the Wana region, inhabited by the Ahmadzai Wazir tribe, a peace deal was negotiated with five prominent former militants; Haji Omar, his brother Haji Sharif,Javed Khan Karmazkhel, Maulvi Mohammad Abbas and Maulvi Abdul Aziz. They were promised amnesty on the condition that they would cease attacking the military, desist from harbouring foreign militants and refrain from sponsoring cross-border attacks on US-led coalition troops. However, the rag tag groups of militants had started coalescing into a militant entity, with young warriors demanding a new vigourous leadership; one man was to neatly fill in the gap. Baitullah Mehsud was later designated as the militant commander who succeeded Nek

111

Bruce Riedel ,The search for Al Qaeda: Its leadership, ideology, and Future, (Lahore, 2009: vanguard Press),p.9. Ibid. 113 Takbeer, September 1, 2004. 112

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Muhammad, though he initially faced a serious challenge to his ascendency in the person of Abdullah Mehsud (see chapter 2). Another area of Pakistan which has attracted militants as a safe haven due to inaccessible terrain is the Northern Western part of Pakistan; these areas consist of high mountain ranges, many of which are covered in ice most of the year. These areas abut China and Afghanistan, with a narrow strip of Afghan land, the 'Wakhan' corridor separating them from Tajikistan. Many Taliban cadres along with al Qaeda operatives reached these areas after the US operations. Reportedly, in June and July 2002, two groups of Taliban and one of al Qaeda entered the Northern Areas, after entering the Dahrkoot Valley from Broghol in the Chitral district of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), which links through the Wakhan corridor to the Badakshan province of Afghanistan.114 These cadres apparently did not remain dormant for long; in October 5, 2003, Pakistan's security forces destroyed a training camp run by Harkat ul-Mujahideen in Diamir, in the Northern Areas of Pakistan.115 The camp was ostensibly a terrorist facility involved in training Taliban,al Qaeda and HUM militants in domestic terrorism and blockade of the Korakaram Highway.116 Besides the Harkat ul-Mujahideen camp,other camps sprang up in Ghowadi village in Skardu, Juglote near Gilgit and Konoda Gilgit. A huge training facility was also established near Mansehra in the NWFP on the Korakaram Highway.117 According to a Jihadi periodical Zerb-e-Momen118, Americans were suspecting Osama‘s presence in these areas at about this time as well; the resultant FBI search operations, however, yielded no dividends. Hazarding an empirical observation, it seems that American intelligence seem to co relate increased militant traffic in an area with the presence of the supreme leader of al Qaeda; it seems unlikely though, that he would be directing militant movements at the grass roots level in person at all theatres. The presence of Jihadi organizations like Lashkare Taiba, Tehreek-e-Khudam-e-Islam (Jaish e Muhammad) and Jamiat ul Ansar in these areas is quite well documented in these areas. Ostensibly, accessibility to central Asia is one of desirable characteristics of this region for these pro Taliban and al Qaeda organizations. This phenomenon has alarmed the Chinese government as well, which sent a list of terrorist organizations of concern to the government of Pakistan.119 Chinese agencies assert that more than 1,000 Uighurs were trained by Osama's forces in Afghanistan for fomenting separatist movements in China‘s Muslim areas.120 Many of these Uighurs became active members of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement, a group Beijing asserts is linked to Osama bin Laden and Pakistani Harkat ul-Mujahideen. China has time and time again warned the Pakistani government of the potential of these militant to enter its Xingjiang province for the purpose of terrorist activities.121The North Western areas of Pakistan provide the ideal linkage to these areas and beyond. It may be pertinent to mention here that the ‗liberation‘ of the Muslim majority province of Xingjiang is 114

An interview with Abdul Hamid Khan ,Chairman Balawaristan National Front, Staff report, Dawn, October 6,2003.Gilgit. Asia Times online, August 22,2002. 115 Staff report, Dawn, October 6,2003. 116 Ibid. 117 An interview with Abdul Hamid Khan ,Chairman Balawaristan National Front, Staff report, Dawn, October 6,2003.Gilgit. Asia Times online, August 22,2002. 118 Zarb-e-Momin, October 1,2004. 119 (Rana,2005),p.326. 120 Ibid. 121 (Rana,2005),p.327.

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part of the manifesto of many Pakistani Jihadist organizations like Harkat ul-Jihad-e-Islami, Jamat ul-Ansar and Lashkare Taiba.122

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MILITANT ORGANIZATIONS The Taliban and al Qaeda were not the only organizations which were forced to retreat to Pakistan in the wake of the US campaign; many Pakistani Jihadist outfits like Harkat e jihad e Islami (HUJI), along with Harkat ul Mujahideen and Sipah e Sahaba militants also found their way back home. Many HUJI commanders and warriors, engaged in the fighting in Kandahar and Qandooz, escaped towards Waziristan and Buner in NWFP.HUJI was one of the main Pakistani organization supporting Arab militants in Afghanistan, with its leader Qari Saifullah Akhtar being held in great esteem by Mullah Omar. HUJI‘s importance in the eyes of the Taliban was such that Mullah Omer appointed three Taliban ministers and 22 judges, belonging to the Qari's HUJI, in the Taliban‘s Government. These linkages would later ‗AlQaedaise‘ HUJI in Pakistan.123 HUJI would later cleverly blend in with the more mainstream political scenario in Pakistan, by having many of its militants drafted into Maulana Sami ulHaq‘s Jamiat ulema Islam Sami ul Haq (JUI-S) party.124This would effectively camouflage HUJI militants from scrutiny later on, in the wake of the Pakistani government‘s crackdown against warrior outfits from January 2002 to December 2002; at least 2000 militants were arrested during this operation, but very few of them belonged to HUJI.125 Rana asserts that HUJI was responsible for providing the recruiting and networking facilities for al Qaeda, with cadres being drawn from LJ (Lashkar-e-Jhangvi), Jaish-e-Muhammad (JM), Jamiat al-Ansar and Sipah-e-Sahaba for al-Qaeda's operational wings.126To bolster his argument, Rana mentions that Qari Saifullah Akhtar was arrested and extradited from Dubai in UAE on August 7, 2004, where he was living at that time. According to Rana, these details were disclosed by Qari during the interrogative process carried out by intelligence agencies; ostensibly he also disclosed that scores of HUJI militants were working with al Qaeda, with several of them actively engaged in fighting against the Pakistani troops in Waziristan.127 Even though Sipah e Sahaba Pakistan has been mentioned earlier, it merits a more detailed mention here due to being one of the main Pakistani militant organizations supporting the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan. The organization was founded in 1985 with the primary aim of elimination of Shias and Shiaism from the society. A causal loop of retribution and vendetta between the Shia militants and SSP ensued, which claimed the lives of Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, the founder of SSP and Sadiq Ganji, the counsel general of Iran in 1990.It was also active on the political scene, claiming political lineage by independently standing for elections in 1992.SSP fought with Taliban against Ahmed Shah Masood and the Shiite Hazaras in Afghanistan, and is thought to be jointly responsible with the Taliban for

122

(Rana,2005),p.326. (Rana, Gunaratna et al,2008). 124 Ibid. 125 Ibid. 126 Ibid. 127 Ibid. 123

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the massacre of Hazaras and Iranian diplomats in Afghanistan in August 1998.128. After being banned by the Pakistani government in 2002 due to American exerted pressure, SSP changed simply changed its name to Millat-e-Islamia129, while its activities went underground but continued nevertheless. This practice of adopting nom de guerres in response to bans, while continuing their activities, would characterize many Pakistani jihadist organizations in the post 2002 period. Sipah e Sahaba has diminished somewhat in importance after the assassination of Azam Tariq, its paramount leader in 2003, and also due to the formation of the more radical breakaway splinter group, Lashkare Jhangvi, from within the ranks of SSP. It is important to contextualize here the continuous evolution of terrorist groups; they are usually in a constant state of flux in terms of capabilities, sophistication and ideology. Newly emerging groups usually remain under the tutelage of more established organizations to develop the required levels of proficiency. Thus, SSP at one time consisted of two loosely allied sub groups of Lashkare Jhangvi, which acted as a kind of domestic ‗Shia elimination unit‘ and Jaish e Muhammad,the ‗externalist‘ face of SSP.130 Both these groups remained under SSP until they had developed their capabilities, after which they broke away from SSP, and emerged as more potent terrorist entities. At least six other splinter groups were formed from SSP, namely Jhangvi Tigers, Al Haq Tigers, Tanzeemul Haq, Al Farooq, Al Badr Foundation and Allah o Akbar131, though JM and LJ are the only potent organizations to emerge from the SSP schisms. A change in leadership also takes organizations on different trajectories; Masood Azhar and Riaz Basra, the new leaders of JM and LJ respectively, were more radical in their views, and subsequently formed more violence prone factions. Also, an organization may become smaller and ‗leaner and meaner‘ after splintering from its parent body, as happened in the case of LJ and JM, or larger groups can be formed by smaller factions, which is exactly what has happened in case of the Taliban in Pakistan. Lashkare Jhangvi is the epitome of what a decentralized Jihadi organization based on a modern, devolved, al Qaeda model (see below) would look like. Founded by Riaz Basra, it is ―very decentralized and compartmentalized‖132, and is the ideal template within which al Qaeda militants would be able to operate feely, as well as probably being based on an organizational model which al Qaeda itself has presumably adopted in Pakistan. The LJ militants gravitated back to Pakistan as a sanctuary after the fall of the Taliban, rather than risk on a continued existence in Afghanistan with the attendant perils of falling into the hands of the Northern Alliance leaders. LJ was taken over by the ‗internationalists‘; it became irrevocably intertwined with the radical ideologies of the Taliban and al Qaeda. The ideal organizational structure this kind of decentralized organization may adopt would be a ‗cell based‘ structure. The greatest utility of such a structure is security; if a cell is compromised, ideally it does not disclose the identity of other cells, since it does not possess this information. A cellular structure thus has the obvious utility of being impervious to penetration at the organizational level, even if compromised at the cellular one. There is a lot of evidence pointing to the cellular organization of LJ; Intelligence estimates put the number of a typical Lashkar cell at three militants, though it can consist of up to seven persons 128

Marium Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy, Islamist Networks: The Pakistan-Afghan Connection (London: Hurst and Co), P.25 129 Ibid. 130 (Zahab, Roy) ,p.30. 131 Amir Mir, The Fluttering Flag of Jihad (Lahore: Mashal Press, 2008), p. 224. 132 (Zahab, Roy),p. 26.

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according to the tactical requirements of the operation.133The cell is composed for a particular operation, and is disbanded after the objectives of the unit have been realized. Other organizations worth mentioning are Lashkare Taiba, to which I have devoted an entire section later in the book, Jaish e Muhammad, and Harkat ul Mujahideen. The Harkat ul Mujahideen (HUM) was initially formed as a splinter group of HUJI under the leadership of Fazlur Rehman Khalil. A review of the various phases of the development of these organizations is outside the purview of this study, and is any way elaborated upon by many existing laudably detailed studies in this area; it suffices to demonstrate the al Qaeda and Taliban linkages of the organization. When US bombed suspected al Qaeda camps near Khost and Jalalabad in Afghanistan in August 1998, a number of HUM militants were also killed.134 Khalil vowed vengeance for these operatives, which would concretize later in the HUM engineered 2002 suicide bombing on the US consulate in Karachi, Pakistan. Khalil took hundreds of HUM militants to Afghanistan in the wake of the American defeat of the Taliban, many of them being killed in this incident. Khalil returned to Pakistan in 2002, ostensibly to resume the struggle from within Pakistan.135 He subsequently resigned from the leadership of the organization, but his Jihadist credentials came under international scrutiny when two American born Pakistani Jihadists were arrested from California by the FBI in 2005.136These men revealed that they had received militant training under HUM auspices right in the centre of the densely populated Pakistani city of Rawalpindi; this covert training facility was purportedly being run by Khalil. The militants revealed to their interrogators that the purpose of HUM administered training was to target the British homeland. It seems that the Jihadist organizations with the most concretely demonstrated links to the Taliban and/or al Qaeda had shown up quite early on the international radar, due to their discernibly aggressive terrorist activities. These ceaseless activities by the more militant organizations resulted in escalating US pressure on the Musharraf government to ban these terrorist organizations, seize their bank accounts, and generally stop them from functioning. Resultantly, successive bans in 2002 and 2003 attempted to curb the activities of organizations like Jaish e Muhammad, Jamaat ul Dawa, Jamiat ul Ansar and Hizb Tehrir. The Pakistani establishment and Jihadi organizations at this time seem to have engaged in a comical game of musical chairs, with the state banning an organization, and the organization merely changing its name and continuing its activities unabated, with the process being repeated sometimes twice or thrice. When Jaish e Muhammad was banned, it changed its name to Khudam ul Islam, which was banned again. Similarly, Harkat ul Mujahideen changed its name to Jamiat ul Ansar, besides being known as Harkat ul Mujahideen ul Almi, and Lashkare Taiba has thrived under the nom de guerre of Jamaat ud Dawa. Another important organization whose role needs to be examined here is the banned Tehreek e Nifaz e Shariah Mohammad (TNSM). This was formed by Maulana Sufi Muhammad, a firebrand cleric in 1989, ostensibly for creating peace and harmony in the society. However, the movement soon revealed its radical colours when it initiated an armed uprising in wake of Pakistan Supreme Court‘s February 12,1994 verdict, which nullified the Provincially Administered Tribal Area (PATA) regulations, which had governed certain 133

(Mir,2008),226. Ibid.,p.105. 135 Ibid.,p.108. 136 Ibid. 134

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areas(including Swat and Malakand)since the 1970s.Ostensibly, the governance vacuum created by the cancellation of these regulations, encouraged TNSM activists to agitate for the establishment of a Sharia form of government in the Malakand areas adjoining Swat. This was a relatively scaled down precursor of things to come; at that time, the state was able to suppress the uprising by a combination of counterinsurgency operations and negotiations, though the Shariah system was introduced in the Malakand area twice in response to TNSM group pressure. However, TNSM, continued to thrive; this was amply demonstrated when Sufi Muhammad crossed over into Afghanistan, reportedly with 10,000 fighters to aid the beleaguered Taliban. His force was routed and disbanded however, and Sufi was arrested on his way back to Pakistan. However, an even more crucial variable which needs to be appreciated is that even before that time, the TNSM movement had penetrated to deep within the tribal setups of Swat, Hazara and the Bajaur agency. These cadres would later form the backbone of the Taliban in Swat and Bajaur; TNSM was the precursor of the Taliban militancy that would follow, with the Taliban effectively hijacking the TNSM movement. Two of the most prominent leaders of Pakistani Taliban, Maulana Fazlullah in Swat and Faqir Muhammad in Bajaur, have been TNSM adherents. Many of their fighters are also drawn form the ranks of TNSM, particularly in Bajaur, though they are aided by many foreigners and militants from other organizations. The effect of the devastating October 8, 2005 earthquake which hit Pakistan‘s Northern areas also needs to be contextualized as a variable which aided tremendously in solidly entrenching these militant organizations in Pakistan‘s tribal heartlands and beyond. The relief work carried out by these organizations at a time when the state was perceived to be floundering in this humanitarian disaster, greatly enhanced the prestige of Jihadi organizations like TNSM, Lashkare Taiba etc. These organizations were working ceaselessly in these regions to provide relief to the masses during the post earthquake days, while the government was still trying to mobilize itself fully. This relief activity was to provide rich dividends to the TNSM in the form of a wave of public support in the aftermath of the earthquake, with their sphere of influence extending to Swat and Bajaur areas. Faqir Muhammad consequently got solidly entrenched in Bajaur, while Fazlullah strengthened his hold on Swat.

BALUCHISTAN While tracing the emergence and the consolidation of the Taliban in Pakistan, it is critical to contextualize the trajectory of Taliban‘s entrenchment in Baluchistan; this province of Pakistan seems to have been dedicated by the Taliban as a reservoir pool of warriors. There has been very little indication of active militancy by Taliban in these areas; even though violence has been gradually on the rise in the province, it is nowhere close to the magnitude seen in NWFP. Also, the Baluchi Taliban‘s logistical patronage to Baluch nationalist militants cannot be entirely ruled out. Baluchistan has been characterized by gravitation of thousands of Taliban fighters to the area, with most of them settling down in Pashtun dominated areas, particularly in the suburbs around Quetta. They seem to have engaged in logistical consolidation, indoctrination by madrassah building and preaching, and establishing sleeper or dormant cells which can be galvanized into instant action. Reportedly, Taliban

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have rented private homes in Pashtunabad, Kachra, Nawa Kalli, Chaman, Pishin, Loralai, Gulistan, Qila Saifullah, and have set up training facilities in Zhob, Qila Saifullah, Loralai, Chowni and Pishin.137 Mullah Dadullah has been a visitor to Quetta, and according to some reports,had also engaged in fundraising activities in the area.138 It has also been reported that Mullah Omer had chosen Mullah Dadullah and Maulvi Sadiq Hameed as the main recruiters from the seminaries of the province, while another veteran Hafiz Majeed was deputed to garner the support of the tribal chieftains and elders in southern Afghanistan due to his strong tribal affiliations with the same 139. Dadullah was selected as a recruiter par excellence due to his tribal affiliations with the Kakar tribe(one of the most influential tribes in the area) and his widespread reputation for bravery in the Pashtun dominated area.140 Quetta in Baluchistan is going to be a linchpin in the war against al Qaeda and Taliban in the region. The Obama administration has alleged that Mullah Omar and senior Taliban commanders, from somewhere in or around Quetta, are engaged in fundraising and logistical supply of weapons and fighters to the Taliban in Pakistan an Afghanistan.141It has also been hypothesized that the central command structure of the Taliban, or the ‗Shura‘ is based in Quetta. However, the militants in Baluchistan have largely been ignored in the counterinsurgency operation, which has led some US intelligence analysts to cry foul play on the part of Pakistan‘s security agencies. "We've made progress going into the tribal areas and North-West Frontier Province against Al Qaeda, but we have not had a counterpart war against the Quetta shura," mentioned a senior Obama administration official.142 "The Quetta shura is extremely important," said Lieutenant General David Barno, a retired former commander of American forces in Afghanistan who is advising Petraeus on a strategic review of his region, including Pakistan and Afghanistan. "They are the intellectual and ideological underpinnings of the Taliban insurgency."143 Even if the claims of a shura in Quetta controlling the Taliban are ephemeral, some analysts opine that engaging the Taliban leadership in Quetta may lead to weakening of the command and control structure of Taliban and al Qaeda in the region, which might even open up channels for dialogue with the more moderate Taliban. "The challenge has always been to exploit some cleavages between the top leadership, which we've ruled out of bounds in terms of reconciliation, and the layers one or two layers beneath them," said Daniel Markey, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a former South Asia specialist for the State Department.144 However, Pakistani state officials have persisted that there are grave repercussions to losing public support attendant upon a policy of carrying out operations inside the metropolitan capital city of Quetta: "Pakistan will act against any individuals involved with al Qaeda or the Taliban about whom we have actionable intelligence," Husain Haqqani,

137

(Rana, Gunaratna et al, 2008). (Rana, Gunaratna et al, 2008). 139 Staff Report, Daily Azadi,Quetta, March 4, 2005. 140 Ibid. 141 Eric Schmitt and Mark Mazzetti, The Taliban in Pakistan are raising U.S. fears, International Herald Tribune, online edition, February 10, 2009, http://www.iht.com/articles/2009/02/10/asia/10quetta.php. 142 Ibid. 143 Ibid. 144 Ibid. 138

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Pakistan's ambassador to the United States, said in an interview. "The problem is we do not always get actionable intelligence in Quetta in particular. It's a very messy area."145 The FBI is active in Baluchistan, and has apprehended Pakistani citizens as well as foreign nationals on suspicions of having links with al Qaeda, with the help of local intelligence and local police.146However, it as been hesitant to infiltrate the interior of Baluchistan; the reason may very well be the fierce tribal loyalties in the interior, which makes every stranger a suspect. Also, Baluchistan is much less densely populated than NWFP, which makes any attempts at human intelligence all that more difficult. The interior of Baluchistan is also beset by a fierce anti-state Baluchi nationalist movement, with a large percentage of the local populace wary of any state incursions in the area. This may seem to be similar to the state of affairs in NWFP at the first glance; the maliks in the Frontier however, have always had better relations with the state than the Sardars in Baluchistan, who have been engaged in a nationalist struggle against the Pakistani establishment at some time or the other throughout the history of Pakistan. It is evident that Taliban are using Baluchistan for organizational purposes, but have largely desisted from carrying out terrorist attacks in the province. This seems to have been a strategic move so as to avoid opening up too many fronts. Correspondingly, the Pakistani state is spread too thin operationally in tribal areas in NWFP, and seemingly has avoided opening up new fronts in Baluchistan. Presumably, Pakistan has not initiated military operations against Taliban in Baluchistan because it is already engaged in quelling a Baluchi nationalist militant movement. Still, there have been recent successes in apprehension of some high value targets in Quetta: Mullah Obeidullah, the former Taliban defense minister, and Mullah Rahim, the Taliban's top commander in Helmand Province, were arrested in Quetta.147 Osama may be hiding out somewhere in Pakistan as well; US intelligence agencies have been searching for him in areas such as Chitral148 and Quetta, a fact which Collin Powell mentioned in an interview: "He is working hard not to be found. We don't know exactly where he is. No one has seen him in a long time, but there is certainly evidence that he is alive. If he is alive, then he is hiding in the area between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It is very difficult to find someone in that area. We are looking for him and we have been encouraging our Pakistani friends to search in their tribal areas. Our troops are also present on the border because free movement of the Taliban and al-Qaeda terrorists is not in the interests of neighbouring Pakistan and Afghanistan. These terrorists want to destabilise the region".149

AL QAEDA IN PAKISTAN The initial euphoria in the wake of the post 9/11 American operations against al Qaeda, due to which the organizations was presumed to be seriously weakened, is gradually wearing off. Al Qaeda seems to have re organized itself as to cope with heightened international 145

Ibid. Amin Fitrat, Wajood, September ,2005. 147 (Mazzetti, Schmitt February 10, 2009). 148 (Mir,2008). 149 The Rediff Interview/US Secretary of State Colin Powell, March 19, 2004, rediff.com, http://www.rediff.com/ news/2004/mar/19inter.htm. 146

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collaborative operations against it, by subsuming itself very cleverly within other militant entities. The radical Jihadist organizations in Pakistan have become one of the main hubs of al Qaeda re- entrenchment. Intelligence reports documenting this resurgence in Pakistan‘s tribal areas and its adaptive chameleon like behavior are rife: the GAO, in concert with the unclassified 2007 NIE and State and embassy documents, Defense, State and other officials found that ―al Qaeda‘s central leadership, based in the border area of Pakistan, is and will remain the most serious terrorist threat to the United States…‖ and ―…is now using the Pakistani safe haven to put the last element necessary to launch another attack against America into place…‖150 During a February 5, 2008, open hearing before the Senate Intelligence Committee, Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell said: ―…al-Qa‘ida‘s central leadership based in the border area of Pakistan is its most dangerous component. …al-Qa‘ida‘s central leadership in the past two years has been able to regenerate core operational capabilities needed to conduct attacks on the Homeland.‖151 More recently, at his May 6, 2008 confirmation hearing to be the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, Michael Leiter, then the Acting Director of the NCTC, said: ―…we have clearly not succeeded in stopping core al-Qa‘ida plotting. We're better at disrupting it, but we have not disrupted the senior leadership that exists in the FATA, and we have also not stopped the organization from promulgating a message which has successfully gained them more recruits.‖152 Pakistan is projected to have become the main organization centre for the al Qaeda globally, with the potential to become the command and control hub for al Qaeda operations as far away as Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, North Africa and parts of Europe. Even though the attacks in Pakistan against al Qaeda have been effective, killing as many as 80 al Qaeda fighters only in 2008,153 the organization is still presumed to retain a significant strike capability. The National Intelligence Estimate report, submitted to the White House by US intelligence agencies, has pointed to a possible al Qaeda attack on the US, basing it on the premise of al Qaeda finding safe havens in the tribal areas of Pakistan.‖ We assess the group has protected or regenerated key elements of its homeland attack capability, including a safe haven in the Pakistani Federally Administrated Tribal Areas, operational lieutenants and its top leadership."154 On July 12, 2007, a report by the Washington post titled "US warns of stronger al-Qaeda" said: "Six years after the Bush administration declared war on al-Qaeda, the terrorist network is gaining strength and has established a safe haven in the remote tribal areas of western Pakistan for training and planning attacks". The report, based on a five-page threat assessment 150

Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate-Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States, dated April 2006, available at http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/Declassified_NIE_ Key_Judgments.pdf. Also see ‗Spy Agencies Say Iraq War Worsens Terrorism Threat ‗, Mark Mazzetti, The New York Times, Middle East section,internet edition, September 24, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/ 2006/09/24/world/middleeast/24terror.html?_r=3andpagewanted=1andei=5094anden=22b7a0941b08007fandh pandex=1159156800andpartner=homepage. 151 Chairman Rockefeller disputes director Hayden‘s assertion in today's Washington post that al qa'ida is on the run,Senator Jay Rockefeller website, http://rockefeller.senate.gov/press/record.cfm?id=298627. 152 Ibid. 153 Attacks on Al Qaeda concentrate its threat to Pakistan, Eric Schmitt and Jane Perlez, February 25, 2009, International Herald Tribune, online edition, Asia Pacific section,http://www.iht.com/articles/2009/02/25 /asia/25drones.php. 154 Full Text: July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Al Qaeda Threat To U.S. Homeland, J.M. Berger, http://intelwire.egoplex.com/2007_07_17_exclusives.html

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compiled by the National Counterterrorism Center, titled "Al-Qaeda better positioned to strike the West," said al Qaeda has significantly rebuilt itself despite concerted US attempts to smash the network. While quoting the CIA's deputy director for intelligence, John Kringen, the report stated that al Qaeda appeared to be fairly well entrenched in Pakistan‘s tribal heartlands. "We see more training. We see more money. We see more communications," Mr. Kringen was quoted as having said.155 Many reports have questioned the counterinsurgency efforts against al Qaeda, pointing out that despite a seemingly all out offensive, the organization essentially retains its potency. On July 17, 2007, a report by the New York Times titled ‗Six Years After 9/11, the same threat‘, stated: "Nearly six years after the Sept. 11 attacks, the hundreds of billions of dollars and thousands of lives expended in the name of the war on terror pose a single, insistent question: Are we safer? After years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq and targeted killings in Yemen, Pakistan and elsewhere, the major threat to the United States has the same name and the same basic look as in 2001: Al-Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, plotting attacks from mountain hide-outs near the Afghan-Pakistani border. And if there had been progress after 9/11 in isolating ' mobilizing al-Qaeda's leaders in the tribal areas of Pakistan, some of it has come apart in the past year, with the Pakistani troops abandoning patrols in North Waziristan and allowing greater freedom of movement to al-Qaeda's core."156 Michel Haydn has gone on record, mentioning that al Qaeda‘s physical safe haven in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area provides it the physical and psychological space to meet, train, expand its networks, and prepare new attacks.157 A part of the answer why al Qaeda remains so elusive is its propensity to rapidly change its command and control structures in response to changing circumstances. Al Qaeda has stayed ahead of the game; when US presented intelligence information about 29 alleged militant camps in North and South Waziristan, these were abruptly deserted, with al Qaeda militants shifting elsewhere. "Human intelligence on both the sides suggests the militant bases have been dismantled," reported Asia Times online, on August 11, 2007.The same report suggested that a village in Bannu in NWFP had become the new hub of al Qaeda in the region. However, since the organization relocates its command centers frequently, this sort of intelligence becomes redundant quite rapidly.158 In April 2008, another report put forward by the European Police Office (EUROPOL) projected Pakistan‘s tribal areas as the command and control centre for al Qaeda‘s core leadership, which was reportedly actively engaged in planning attacks in the EU. The annual "Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2008" released by Europol is an important policy document for the EU structural framework, and is taken seriously at state and supranational levels.159The report singled out the Pashtun areas in Pakistan and Afghanistan as germane to 155

Spencer S. Hsu and Walter Pincus,U.S. Warns Of Stronger Al-Qaeda:Administration Report Cites Havens in Pakistan, July 12, 2007, The Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 2007/07/11/AR2007071102443.html 156 Scott Shane, 6 Years After 9/11, the Same Threat, The New York Times, July 18, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/18/washington/18assess.html 157 General Michael V. Hayden Director ,The Current Situation in Iraq and Afghanistan,, Central Intelligence Agency ,Statement for the Record before the, Senate Armed Services Committee, 15 November 2006, reproduced at http://cryptome.info/cia-dia-views.htm. 158 Syed Saleem Shahzad, Taliban a step ahead of US assault,South Asia section, Asia Times online, Aug 11, 2007, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IH11Df01.html 159 TE- SAT EU Terrorism situation and trend report, http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/EU_ Terrorism_Situation_and_Trend_Report_TE-SAT/TESAT2008.pdf.

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counterterrorism strategies in the EU, with the projection that terrorism was now set to expand in the EU. For terrorism analysts, it is becoming increasingly difficult to determine who exactly is running al Qaeda: Ryan Crocker, a former U.S. ambassador to Pakistan once suggested that Osama bin Laden no longer had operational control of al Qaeda. Some commentators have even surmised that nobody is controlling al Qaeda, but it has subsumed itself within the Jihadist movements around the globe.160 There have been media reports that Dr Ayman alZawahiri, has assumed command of al Qaeda, fuelled by reports that Bin Laden had not chaired any meeting of al Qaeda's ruling Shura since 2006 and 2007. Purportedly, Zawahiri was busy rebuilding the organization‘s logistical and human resource capabilities in Pakistan161. There have also been reports that the Shura meets in Pakistan162. However, ensuing analysis of these reports tended to digress from these apparently unsubstantiated opinions built up on ‗Asian intelligence‘.163 This is the current imbroglio of speculative information amidst which one has to grope for a Pakistani context to al Qaeda. It seems that terrorist organizations are increasingly adopting a ‗networked‘ structure of organization; this is more commonly seen in case of ideological or religion based groups since they can conform to a broad ideological or religious agenda in a loosely devolved network structure, without being tied up into a hierarchical command and control structure a nationalist based model with constantly evolving, specifically articulated goals may entail. Another advantage is that in this loose network, command and control can be decentralized, and may not even require intimate geographical proximity. Ostensibly, al Qaeda has adopted this sort of a networked structure in Pakistan, with the organization effectively merging itself into a network of allied militant bodies. Locally generated intelligence is pertinent in this respect: Pakistani intelligence agencies asses that al Qaeda has morphed in response to increasing pressures ―to conduct decentralized operations under small but well organized regional groups" within Pakistan and Afghanistan.164 Some analysts maintain that even though the organization is under stress, and currently not in a position to harness a major attack in the US, it is nevertheless adapting to this hostile environment by reorganizing and shifting to mobile training teams instead of designated training sites. These, Pakistani intelligence officials maintain, are still effective; consisting of a handful of bomb making or tactical experts instructing dedicated fighters in a private safe house.165 Intelligence also suggests that al Qaeda has adopted the strategy of replenishing its depleted ranks (killed or arrested) with less experienced but much more fanatical

160

The Continued Morphing and Spread of Al-Qaeda, From the ERRI/Emergency Net News Global Watchdesk, http://www.emergency.com/2005/al_qaeda_morph2005.htm. 161 Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, "Bin Laden losing control of al-Qaeda," reprinted from Newsweek in Pakistan's Daily Times, September 25, 2007, and "Zawahiri Replaces Bin Laden as al-Qaeda Chief, London Sunday Telegraph, September 16, 2007, reprinted in Ibid., September 17, 2007. 162 Al-Qaeda: Beginning of the End, or Grasping at Straws? Michael Scheuer, Terrorism Focus Volume: 4 Issue: 32, Jamestown Foundation, October 12, 2007, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews% 5Btt_news%5D=4464andtx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=240andno_cache=1 163 Ibid. 164 Eric Schmitt and Jane Perlez, Attacks on Al Qaeda concentrate its threat to Pakistan, February 25, 2009, International Herald Tribune, online edition, Asia Pacific section, http://www.iht.com/articles/ 2009/02/25/asia/25drones.php 165 Ibid..

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warriors.166This is a potentially volatile scenario, since these fighters are more ideologically motivated and less adherent to the strong tribal affiliations which are germane to the FATA society; purportedly these new fighters would be less amenable to conflict resolution at the Jirga level, which makes them even more dangerous. These fighters are being recruited in Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia, concomitant with the increase in funding and logistical support to the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan.167 The new al Qaeda militants are indoctrinated from countries like Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Somalia and Uzbekistan, entering Pakistan‗s Baluchistan province via adjoining Iran, before reporting to Waziristan for training.168This foreign presence is amply demonstrated in Swat, where Fazlullah, the leader of the Taliban in Swat, is supported by about a half dozen seasoned Arab fighters from al Qaeda169 .Seasoned al Qaeda commanders are always being found in FATA and hunted down, like Usama al-Kini, a Kenyan, who was killed in January 2009 near Wana. Kini was considered the master mind of the terrorist attack on the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad in 2008.170 According to intelligence reports emanating from Pakistan, al Qaeda has shown tremendous resilience in reinventing and reconstituting itself.171This is due to the fact that the organization has started functioning as a loose conglomerate of groups spread throughout the world, operating as a network, as mentioned above. The affiliated ‗nodes‘ include the Egyptian Islamic Jehad (EIJ), Al Jamaya-al Islamia (IJ: Islamic Group of Egypt), Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA), Islamic Party of Turkestan (IPT), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JM: Army of Mohammad) and the Abu Sayyaf Group of the Philippines (ASG).172 The constituent groups of the network maintain a distinct command, control and communication structure173, but have the inherent flexibility to subsume the al Qaeda operational philosophy in their structures. Thus, while acting as the vital Al Qaeda number two, Dr. Zawahiri also leads the EIJ in Egypt. This ingenuity of al Qaeda in being in a constant state of evolution, is due to its distinguishing ability to ―absorb ideas and operationalise them‖174. Not all observers of the scenario are unanimous about the existence of a Taliban and al Qaeda nexus; one way of looking at the conflict is that the al Qaeda and the Taliban are fighting their own separate wars, which may overlap but have distinct objectives. "There are two battles going on here," says Ikram Sehgal, a defence strategist.‖ One involves the American search for Al Qaeda operatives hiding in the tribal areas‖, he says.‖ The other is the Pakistan military's fight against the Taliban Movement of Pakistan that has taken root in the northwestern regions of the country….Though the two have ‗linkages,‘ they are ‗two separate wars,‘ says Mr. Sehgal.175. However, I tend to ascribe to the commonly held view that the Taliban and al Qaeda in Pakistan have formed a nexus; the initiation of hostilities between the state and tribals began 166

Ibid. Ibid. 168 Ibid. 169 Ibid. 170 Ibid. 171 (Mir,2008) 172 Sammy Salama and Lydia Hansell, Does intent equal capability, Nonproliferation Review, Vol 12 No. 3, November 2005. 173 (Mir,2008) 174 (Mir,2008). 175 Shahan Mufti, Pakistan tested by battles with Al Qaeda, Taliban, The Christian Science Monitor, online edition, January 13, 2009, http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0113/p04s01-wosc.html. 167

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over the demands of the former to the latter to hand over foreign militants. It should be remembered that a formally constituted Taliban umbrella body had not been formed at that time, even though the tribesmen may have been decidedly pro Taliban. Also, many of the disparate groups that would ally themselves under the banner of the Taliban had not yet forged their symbiotic relationships, even though they may have been co operating in their efforts. Thus, the beginning of the ‗Jihad‘ is marked by al Qaeda entrenchment in the tribal areas; it seems unlikely that the organization would not have participated in the ensuing alliances and consolidation that would follow. It is also unlikely that al Qaeda would not have activated its former Jihadist allies like Sipah e Sahaba and Harkat ul Jihad ul Alami, in order to ‗blend in‘ with the militant landscape. Information regarding Osama Bin Laden‘s whereabouts in Waziristan has also emerged sporadically; a letter sent from a Pakistan-based al Qaeda leader Atiyah Abd al-Rahman to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq points towards his presence in that area. In the letter ,deemed authentic by counterterrorism experts, Atiyah instructs Zarqawi in operational matters: "send messengers from your end to Waziristan so that they meet with the brothers of the leadership …I am now on a visit to them and I am writing you this letter as I am with them…"176 Musharraf,however, has maintained that bin Laden was not hiding in Pakistan, and was not on the intelligence radar. ―We are not particularly looking for him, but we are operating against terrorists and al-Qaeda and militant Taliban. And in the process, obviously, combined, maybe we are looking for him also". 177 Projections about Osama‘s death are also rife; a CIA official has been reported as saying "based on his current pharmaceutical intake we would expect that he has no more than 6-18 months to live and impending kidney failure".178 These projections however, seem largely conjectural and anecdotal, with no substantiated claims being put forward. It has been speculated that ISI has been responsible for at least some of the failures to apprehend al Qaeda operatives inside Pakistan. According to a January 24, 2008 research paper by Shaun Gregory, titled "The ISI and the War on Terrorism"179, the Pakistan's Directorate of Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) presents an interesting ‗friend of my friend‘ analogy: ISI‘s intimate relationship with the Taliban, and the Taliban‘s unerring loyalty to Al Qaeda, necessarily raises the issue of the nature of relations between the ISI and al Qaeda. It also needs to be remembered that with time the relationship between Taliban and al Qaeda has only hardened; even some pro-Pakistan warlords like Maulvi Nazir back the assertion of Taliban‘s spokesman Muslim Khan, who openly welcomed al Qaeda and its leadership to consolidate themselves in Taliban controlled areas. Muslim Khan told The Associated Press: ―Osama bin Laden can come here. Sure, like a brother they can stay anywhere they want,‖ TTP spokesman Muslim Khan said in a two-hour interview. ―Yes, we will help them (al Qaeda) and protect them,‖ he added.180 Taliban have also vowed to keep supporting Jihadi

176

Karen DeYoung, Letter Gives Glimpse of Al-Qaeda's Leadership: Letter Shows Worry Over Iraq Infighting, Washington Post, online version, October 2, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/10/01/AR2006100101083.html?nav=rss_world/mideast/iraq. 177 Musharraf: Bhutto Knew Of Risks, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf talks to Lara Logan, CBS, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/01/05/60minutes/main3678203_page3.shtml 178 Osama on death bed, claims CIA, Wednesday, 02 July,2008, http://sify.com/news/fullstory.php?id=14707378 179 Shaun Gregory, The ISI and the War on Terrorism, reproduced on http://ukdf.blogspot.com/2008/07/isi-and-waron-terrorism.html 180 Swat Taliban to welcome Osama, The News, April 22, 2009, http://www.thenews.com.pk/arc_default.asp.

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organizations such as Lashkar-e Taiba and Jaish-e Muhammad, besides the ‗foreign‘ outfits such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. With regards to ISI‘s facilitation of the Taliban Shaun Gregory states: ―It was the ISI that facilitated Laden's initial meetings with the Taliban which were successful enough to see him move to Kandahar as the winter of 1996 closed in. Under the protection of the ISI and the Taliban, Laden began to expand the activities of al Qaeda for global jehad. Focused on its regional agenda - Kashmir, the support of the Taliban, and a growing determination to stake a strong hand in the oil-rich southern Caucus - the ISI colluded with Laden to establish further training camps inside Afghanistan, and to facilitate the spread of Laden's influence in existing camps on both sides of the border, in order to host, indoctrinate and train foreign fighters for waging jehad in both Jammu and Kashmir and Afghanistan….(in the wake of American pressure after 9/11) The ISI and the Pakistan Army were asked to hunt down alQaeda operatives in Pakistan and help hunt them down in Afghanistan……..The ISI helped the US to arrest many hundreds of suspected al Qaeda and Taliban members, amongst them many leading al Qaeda figures. The ISI has also been of some help to the West in unraveling some of the details of international terrorist operations or in helping foil international terrorist operations, a large number of which actually have had their roots in Pakistan. Of particular importance in this respect have been the investigations into the 9/11 attacks, and into the 7/7 London bombings, and the ISI's role in foiling the alleged summer 2006 plot to simultaneously blow up airliners leaving London's Heathrow airport for the United States. Law enforcement and intelligence service critics in the US and UK, however, point to systematic problems with the ISI's role in these operations, in particular that the ISI tends to act on US and/or UK intelligence but not to be proactive in bringing its own intelligence to the West; the ISI is unhelpful in relation to specific investigations -most notably of 7'/7 - where the trail in Pakistan seems to have gone cold. The ISI has restricted or denied the US/UK access to many alleged terrorists as well as to many of its own operative: and assets; the ISI manipulates intelligence for its own internal and geopolitical reasons, and misdirects American and British intelligence services". The researcher believes the trajectories of ISI‘ support are linked more with Pakistan's geopolitical interests, rather than any collaborative ties with al Qaeda, though there undeniably are Pan Islamism Jihadist emotive sentiments within the ranks of ISI. Gregory concludes by projecting that as ISI‘s anti al Qaeda initiative has tended to peter out since 2003, there has been a simultaneous escalation in al Qaeda directed or aided operations emanating from Pakistan.

CONCLUSION The phenomenon of Taliban‘s entrenchment in Pakistani tribal areas, and the transmigration of radicalism beyond tribal borders, should be easier to envisage nearing the end of this chapter. The Taliban remnants from the Tora Bora and other allied campaigns took refuge in FATA areas of Pakistan, which were geographically contiguous to Afghanistan, and were easy to access due to the Pashtun Taliban‘s familiarity and cultural affiliations with the region. In these areas, particularly Waziristan, the locals were receptive to the influence of these militants, since they had been led to believe that these men were ‗heroes‘ and

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‗mujahids‘ by the state during the Soviet Jihad, and the cognitive dissonance created by the state in painting the same men as villains was not well received by the locals. The tribal code of Pashtunwali and its almost obsessive emphasis on hospitality led these tribals to shelter their erstwhile heroes, with state demands for extradition of these militants falling on deaf ears. This is not just an empirical judgment; it is echoed by some astute observers of the Taliban phenomenon. Afrasiyab Khattak, peace envoy and the president of the Awami National Party in NWFP says: ―The extremist insurgency in Swat is not an isolated phenomenon; it is connected with the militancy that has its bases in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)…..(this happened) because the Taliban and al Qaeda operatives were allowed to enter Fata and set up bases for fighting from across the border. When the pressure on insurgents increased in southern and eastern Afghanistan, they started expanding their bases to acquire depth on east of Durand line. They had a plan to Talibanise the settled districts. Now it has emerged as a type of a parallel state with Waziristan as its capital. They chose Swat because it is a district situated in the north of the province and away from Waziristan so that it may not look like an expansion of Taliban's Emirate of Waziristan……… Shangla(an area in Malakand division)… is a transit for 'Mujahideen' who want to come from Azad Kashmir to join fighting in the Kunar province of Afghanistan.‖181 The humiliating peace deals concluded by the state with militants like Nek Muhammad further emboldened these Taliban and al Qaeda remnants, who re started their activities in the form of kidnappings, which led to military operations by the state. However, the peace accords concluded between the militants and the state gave former the chance to re organize, since the army was loath to enter the imbroglio of these areas after withdrawing consequent to a peace deal. ―The problem was mishandled by the MMA government which allowed this monster of violence to grow without any hindrance. More regrettable was its refusal to recognise the existence of a developing insurgency spreading from Fata into Swat. So, there were no preparations on the counter insurgency front. There was no investment into building the civil security apparatus to meet the challenge of insurgency.‖182 Militancy was further heightened by the support of many militant organizations in Pakistan, who had been in intimate contact with Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan‘s training camps and battle grounds, and were contemptuous of the state‘s volte face regarding Jihad in the wake of the post 9/11 scenario. The cadres of organizations like TNSM and SSP provided the substrate from which the Taliban would recruit; TNSM would provide the leadership and cadres in the Frontier which would effectively become the new face of the Taliban, while SSP would splinter into more radical groups which would either swell the ranks of the Taliban or would provide ideal sanctuaries for al Qaeda, or both. As the movement would grow in magnitude, many other organizations of various sizes but similar hardliner ideologies would join the ranks of these Taliban; at the same time, independent recruitment would also continue. The state policy regarding these organizations would at best be ambivalent; they would be banned but at the same time allowed to operate covertly, either with the tacit approval of intelligence agencies,or due to the fact that they had grown too strong to be controlled any more as pliant ‗proxy warriors‘ for filling capacity gaps between India and Pakistan. Thus, these organizations would keep growing in their own capacities, 181

Tauseef-ur-Rahman, "We have reservations about the operation," Special report, The News on Sunday, 1st February ,2009, http://jang.com.pk/thenews/feb2009-weekly/nos-01-02-2009/spr.htm#7. 182 Ibid. Taliban in Pakistan: A Chronicle of Resurgence : A Chronicle of Resurgence, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook

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particularly in the NWFP province, till their trajectories would meet in the shape of a unified Taliban movement in December 2007.Incidents such as Lal Masjid would demonstrate to the Jihadis that they had to part ways with the state, and suicide bombing campaigns would start in earnest throughout Pakistan. The armed incursions by the US in the form of unmanned drone attacks would make it very unpopular, and would give the Jihadis a rallying cry, particularly in FATA.The organizations would step up recruitment, which had been going on ever since the Taliban and al Qaeda cadres found refuge in these areas. Hostility of the terrain, coupled with the inconsistent counterinsurgency policy adopted by the state, would lead to further entrenchment of these militants in their areas, which would start resembling small militant run principalities, with organizations administering justice through self appointed courts and collecting taxes, all in the name of curbing crime and meting out social distributive justice in the form of Sharia. Operations initiated in haste would meet tough resistance, and would tend to be not supported by a cohesive counterinsurgency policy.Again this is reflected in the statements of influential opinion leaders from the area; ―We have certain reservations about the military operation. The first operation that was launched in July 2007 was inconclusive. Taliban were chased out of the valley by the army and they took shelter in Peuchar and other camps in the mountains. But, their legacy - FM radio stations and heavy weapons - remained intact…. the second phase of the operation which started on July 29, 2008… has been ineffective in the sense that Taliban's activity has increased both quantitatively and qualitatively in Swat. Since most of the operation has been carried out through long-range guns and air force, the collateral damage is quite high‖.183 The counterinsurgency military operations would lead to grave humanitarian disasters in the shape of exodus of hundreds of thousands of refugees from the area, fleeing to escape persecution in the from of destruction of women‘s schools, obligatory purdah and destruction of NGOs,to name just a few perils fraught upon a distraught populace. All of these topics will be dealt with one by one in the narrative, which now follows in the succeeding chapters.

183

Ibid.

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Chapter 2

WARLORDS AND ORGANIZATION

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This chapter traces the profiles of the Pakistani Taliban warlords, their organizations, terror tactics employed by them and sources of funding, along with liaison with the Taliban in Afghanistan.

The 1978-92, Afghan war caused a regional and human rights catastrophe, and in its aftermath created a radicalization of the tribal mind set in Afghanistan and Waziristan184. In Afghanistan, it created the Taliban; in FATA, it has resulted in their reorganization in the shape of the ‗new‘ Taliban in Pakistan. When a Jihadi model was used in evicting the Soviets from Afghanistan, little thought was given to its after-effects; which have included amongst others, a severe radicalization of tribal thought in Pakistan. It may be argued that the FATA areas were conservative from the very start; however, there is a difference between the early separatism oriented tribalism of FATA, and the contemporary Islamist agenda185. This is not a war with physical targets to be achieved; it is ideological, and thus based on emotive elements. From 1978-1992, $ 66 billion worth of weaponry was introduced into the region, working out at $. 134 million per person186.A result of Pakistan‘s reliance on the Jihadist intervention model, led to the creation of a worldwide network of Afghan war veterans of all nationalities. The widespread prevalence of Radicalization prevailing in Pakistani tribal areas has created a nexus between the local Jihadist, and the ordinary unemployed youth. This has led to the rebirth of the Taliban movement in the area. The military‘s use of proxy warriors in the shape of the tribals had become common after the Afghan Jihad. These were the perfect weapons which compensated for the unbalanced military strength between India and Pakistan; ideologically motivated, ferocious, and cheap to maintain. The Pakistani military began more active proxy penetration into Kashmir and Afghanistan after the start of Jihad in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union from 1978-92, with the help of these readily available weapons. These weapons have now turned inwards against the state, and the world of the ‗unbelievers‘ in general.

184

The most troubled tribal territory of Pakistan in terms of Talibanisation. For more details see Chapter 1. 186 Coll, Steve; ―Ghost Wars, the Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and bin Laden‖, London, 2004.,p.238. 185

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In trying to pin the contextual parameters in which the Taliban in Pakistan have arisen, one can lay down some basic defining characteristics: •

• •

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•

The New Taliban is composed mainly of Pakistani tribesmen who have been radicalized by the rhetoric of Jihad, specifically due to the invasion of Afghanistan by the coalition forces. They are thus a post-afghan Taliban phenomenon, but intimately related to it. They have a natural suspicion of strangers, and a tradition of resistance, fuelled by the tribal code of Pashtunwali. They have constantly been used since the inception of Pakistan as proxy warriors, to fill a capacity gap between India and Pakistan, their natural warrior instincts having been used to the fullest in Kashmir by the ISI. During the soviet Jihad, the tribals were freely exposed to radical doctrines by the presence of committed fighters in their midst. The misfortune of the area has been due to close proximity with Afghanistan, thus it was used as a training and indoctrination base by the ISI-CIA nexus and the Islamist parties. By then, the example of Taliban had favorably captured the imagination of the people, and local parties mimicking the Taliban arose. Many of the Waziristan tribesmen took part in the Afghan Jihad against the Soviets since 1989 and later joined the Taliban in their civil war.

After the disintegration of the Taliban in 2001, a new Jihad against the allies in Afghanistan has started, but the venue is the tribal belt of Pakistan abutting Afghanistan. The writ of the state does not run here; warlords like Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan, and Sadiq Noor in North Waziristan or the Iraqi Arab Abu Kasha in Mirali have more power. At the conclusion of the Soviet-Afghan War, the militant Taliban forced to flee from Afghanistan found a safe haven in the Federally Administered Tribal Area i.e. FATA and Waziristan. It was here that they engrossed themselves in the process of reorganization and undertaking fresh recruitment directly or through madrassahs (religious seminaries), which were flourishing after the collapse of educational system provided by the state. Emotionally charged locals, the Pashtuns, had been living well below subsistence level for a long time under successive governments in Pakistan. A combination of abject poverty and an ultra orthodox religious zeal and hatred for the Western powers provided a fertile nursery for this new class of militants. These militants have become so powerful in the area that the life of more moderate residents has become unbearable. Life has become extremely hard for the tribals by denying them even the meager facilities which they were used to. Music and television are banned. This new generation of Taliban is under the influence of al Qaeda, and is supplemented by militants of different localities like Chechens, Bosnians, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Arabs, and Egyptians; who have started dictating their terms based on the conservative interpretation of Islam as per the beliefs and practices of a distorted version of Deobandi school of thought. A distinct organizational technique adopted by these New (Pakistani) Taliban is their organization district-wise which facilitates hitting their targets in settled districts like Peshawar, Dera Ismail Khan, Hazarajat, and the capital city of Islamabad etc. Amongst these terrorists, Baitullah Mehsud established his stronghold in South Waziristan, Sadiq Noor ruled North Waziristan, Iraqi Arab Abu Kasha was holding the fort

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at Mirali, and similarly Najmuddin Uzbek was also reported as being entrenched in FATA. Out of these militants, Baitullah Mehsud has had the most meteoric rise. He has fought a pitched guerilla war against Pakistani Defense and Para-military forces with alarming success . He has also set up the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP) formed on December 15, 2007, and was said to be commanding a well-organized force of 20,000-30,000 fighters. Another surprise in the hitherto peaceful district of Swat is the emergence of a militant leader known as Maulana Fazlullah, who has been working under the guidance of Baitullah Mehsud.He is son-in-law of Sufi Muhammad, Commander of Tanzeem-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-eMuhammadi (TNSM). In this chapter, I undertake and examination of the profiles and organizational strengths of the more prominent leaders of the new Taliban, which is vital to any strategic comprehension of the geo-politics in the area. This is a focused area study, which would tend to rely on locally originating reports and intelligence. The Implications of the spread of the phenomenon are however, regional and even global, since the New Taliban are in essence, the legacies of the old one in Afghanistan, arguably just as organized and dangerous.

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A PROFILE OF BAITULLAH MEHSUD I have endeavoured in this section to trace the ascent to power of Baitullah Mehsud, considered in some intelligence circles as a threat as big as, or bigger than, even Osama Bin Laden. His rise from a relatively little known entity, to the head of a full fledged Taliban movement in Pakistan, has not only grave repercussions for local security, but also for the Global war on Terror. The rise of this movement in Pakistan is not just a local disturbance, but the phenomenon of resurgence of Taliban after their setback in Afghanistan, with Mehsud as a protégé of Mullah Omar taking charge. Baitullah Mehsud has been named in Time magazine's 100 most influential people in the world. Newsweek has labeled him "more dangerous than Osama bin Laden". Certainly, he has become a household name in Pakistan, and an almost endless source of worry for the intelligence and strategic circles. His meteoric rise to infamy is coupled with an almost mysterious shroud of secrecy, which surrounded him from the very inception of his career right up till his death. It should be a worthwhile exercise to trace his ascent up the extremist ladder, to the head of the Taliban in Pakistan. Baitullah Mehsud, a Pashtun from the Broomikhel branch of the Shabikhel sub-tribe of Mehsuds, was born to late Muhammad Haroon in early 1970s in a village called Landi Dhok in the Bannu region of North Western Frontier Province at a distance from the Mehsud tribe‘s stronghold187 in South Waziristan. Geographically, the whole of Waziristan is a single unit. However for the administration convenience it has been split into two agencies i.e. North and South Waziristan. The area has been described as an inhospitable terrain, with high and difficult hills and deep and rugged defiles.

187

Daily Times Newspaper, March 31.By the time this book went to press, Baitullah had been killed by a US Predator unmanned drone attack; this does not detract in any way from the importance of chronicling this extremely important militant, since it is a study in Taliban organizational activities in Pakistan.

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Figures 7 and 8. Baitullah Mehsud.

In the family, Baitullah Mehsud had four male siblings188 by the names of Muhammad Yaqoob, Muhammad Ishaq, Yayha Khan and Zahir Shah. One of his brothers is a major in the army on active duty, and was purportedly helping the forces to capture him.189 Twelve years ago, as a young student of a local madrassah, Baitullah Mehsud was immensely inspired by Taliban ideology, and made frequent visits to Afghanistan as a volunteer to participate in the process of enforcement of Sharia by the Taliban. As a traditional tribal man, he was a skilled marksman and expert in using small arms. Baitullah called himself a Talib, and swore by Mullah Omar, despite signing a deal with the Pakistani army in February 2005190, in which

188

Sohail Abdul Nasir,"Baitullah Mehsud: South Waziristan's Unofficial Amir," Global Terrorism Analysis, Volume 3, Issue 26 (July 5, 2006) http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370054 189 Qudssia Akhlaque "Hunt launched for key ultras", The Tribune Chandigarh, online edition, December 18, 2004. http://www.tribuneindia.com/2004/20041219/world.htm#4. 190 Mohammad Shehzad "Why is the Pakistan army scared of this man?", rediff News, special report, online edition, March, 2006. http://in.rediff.com/news/2006/mar/10pspec.htm.

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Baitullah and three other tribal leaders furnished an unconditional guarantee to the government that he or his tribe would not support or shelter al Qaeda terrorists. Baitullah never went to a school or finished his religious education in any religious seminary. Mehsud, believed to be around 35 in 2008, was reportedly suffering from diabetes and was said to be permanently under treatment for his aforementioned physical handicap191. A local tribal chieftain divulged to IslamOnline.net on condition of anonymity, that ―despite his diabetes, he is a very active man and keeps changing his hideouts frequently and briskly in order to be clueless to the hostile agencies," he noted. "Personally, he is a very generous and polite man. I have met him once some six months back. I found him a good person, and felt nothing extraordinary about him".192 As a guerrilla fighter, Mehsud sharpened his skills under the guidance of legendary Pashtun commander Maulana Jalaluddin Haqqani193, who is widely believed to have helped Osama bin Laden escape the targeted bombing by the United States in the Tora Bora mountains of Afghanistan in early 2002. Known as Amir (commander) among his followers, Mehsud was an unknown figure on the tribal scene until late 2004, when he filled the vacuum left by the famous tribal militant leader, Nek Muhammad Wazir194 who was killed in a missile attack in June 2004. His name appeared for the first time in newspapers as an aide to Abdullah Mehsud, after the abduction of Chinese engineers by the latter. Abdullah, a former Guantanamo detainee who later turned played an important part as a commander of the local Taliban, was initially the mentor of Baitullah, and the two were said to be very close. Baitullah was earlier more or less in the shadow of Abdullah Mehsud, but came into his own element later. Baitullah and Abdullah, both hailing from the powerful Mehsud tribe of Pashtuns, were inseparable initially, but parted their ways soon. Abdullah 195 fought with the Taliban in Afghanistan against the Northern Alliance, and in 1996 lost a leg when he stepped over a land mine. He was taken captive by warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum who turned him over to American forces. Abdullah Mehsud was sent to Camp Delta at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba and held prisoner for two years, insisting the whole time that he was just an innocent tribesman. He was released in 2004 for reasons remaining unclear, and returned to Waziristan. Soon after his return, he orchestrated the kidnapping of two Chinese engineers working on a dam in his region, proclaiming that Beijing was guilty of killing Muslims. He also ordered an attack on Pakistan's interior minister in which 31 people perished. Abdullah, regarding whom Baitullah once had suspicions of being a double agent196, was killed in a shootout in July 2007, in Zhob district of south western Baluchistan province near the Afghan border. This happened in a clash with Pakistani military forces as they raided his residence, as a result of which he detonated a grenade and killed himself. It is worth mentioning that he was reportedly surrounded at the house belonging to an influential JUI (F) 191

Aamir Latif, ―Pakistan‘s Most Wanted,‖ Islam Online, Jan. 29, 2008, Asia and Australia section, http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_Candcid=1199280012324andpagename=Zone-EnglishNews/NWELayout. 192 Ibid. 193 ―Profile - Baitullah Mehsud ―BBC News, UK online edition, South Asia section, 28 December 2007. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7163626.stm. 194 (Nasir 2006) 195 Bill Roggio "Pakistani Taliban commander Abdullah Mehsud killed during raid", Long War Journal, July 24, 2007. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/07/pakistani_taliban_co.php. 196 (Latif 2008)

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leader. The circumstances of Abdullah Mehsud‘s death at a JUI leader‘s home was significant due to the fact that JUI was a partner in two provincial governments in NWFP and Baluchistan at the time. His death was a crucial element in catapulting Baitullah to the top leadership slot in South Waziristan and areas in its vicinity. On February 7, 2005, Baitullah Mehsud signed a deal with the federal government which the latter interpreted as his surrender; denying this claim his associates called it merely a peace agreement. It is however an undeniable fact that Baitullah Mehsud and scores of his supporters laid down arms in a tribal Jirga meeting, and also that he was wanted by the government for allegedly sheltering and assisting al Qaeda fugitives in areas dominated by the Mehsud tribe. 197 As a part of the peace agreement, Baitullah pledged that he and his associates would not provide assistance to al Qaeda and other militants, and would not launch operations against government forces. Baitullah at that time explained that the peace agreement was in the interests of the tribal regions as well as in the interest of the Government of Pakistan, since hostile forces like India, and Russian-backed former Northern Alliance fighters were benefiting from the lack of unity between the government and the tribesmen. This has been more or less a consistent theme in his communications. He has referred to the Pakistani army as a national institution which he did not want to see weakened by infighting. 198."We understand fighting against Pakistani security forces did not help the Taliban at all," he told an assembled audience of press: "Pakistan has also realized that fighting tribal people is undermining it. Pakistan's enemies are India, the Northern Alliance and Russia."199 In return for amnesty, Mehsud promised not to attack security posts or cross into Afghanistan for jihad, though he backed out of this commitment in late August 2007 following the Red Mosque military operation in Islamabad. If nothing else, this treaty tremendously raised his stature amongst his own men, and established him as a negotiating entity at par with the government, also allowing a respite to widen and further strengthen his support base. Mehsud further consolidated his hold and established his warlord credentials when the government conceded to his demand to free militant prisoners in return for releasing more than 240200 Pakistani soldiers seized by his fighters, and held hostage for two and half months. Among the released militants were presumably a number of would-be suicide bombers201. According to his aides, Mehsud took an oath of allegiance to the Taliban supreme leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar. Apart from sharing the same ideologies on sharia and jihad, Mehsud also shared with his spiritual leader an aversion to publicity and photographs202. His militants have established their bases and strongholds in the rugged terrain of the tribal belts of Waziristan and Wana, straddling the border with Afghanistan.203They have been implicated in more than 60 suicide attacks in Pakistan over 2007 alone, including the assassination of Benazir Bhutto Dec. 27, 2007. 197

The Nation Newspaper, February 8, 2005. Ibid. 199 Daily Times and Dawn Newspapers, February 7, 2005. 200 Dawn,December 31, 2007. 201 Ibid. 202 (Nasir,2006). 203 Gall, Carlotta; Ismail Khan. "In Pakistan, Doubts Over the Fight in Tribal Areas", The New York Times, online edition, Asia Pacific section, February 12, 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/12/world/asia/ 12pakistan.html?_r=1andpagewanted=1andthandemc=thandoref=slogin. 198

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The assassination of Benazir catapulted Mehsud in such mainstream terrorist ‗glitterati‘ as Mullah Omar; from a relative unknown he shot into public prominence.Baitullah was a relatively unknown entity to lay Pakistanis till an English daily in October 2007 quoted ―lowprofile tribal leaders‖ as mentioning that he had threatened to exterminate Benazir Bhutto if she ever returned to Pakistan. Bhutto was largely seen to have returned to Pakistan riding on a wave of American support.204 Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the founder of Pakistan‘s nuclear program was quoted as reporting, that upon Benazir Bhutto triumphant return to Pakistan in October 2007205, Baitullah instructed al Qaeda militants in Karachi to kill her for "three major offences against Islamists." Firstly, she stated in clear terms that the Pakistani military operation regarding ‗Lal Masjid‘ in Islamabad on July 10, 2007 as justified and proportionate. Lal Masjid is an extremely emotive issue in the Pakistani radical scene; one hundred and sixty-four Pakistani special-forces commandos stormed the mosque and madrassah, killing at least 20 and injuring over 100 radicals holed up inside. Secondly, Bhutto had engaged in a vigorous shuttle diplomacy with Washington, and probably as a corollary, had stated in unequivocal terms that if she succeeded in taking power in Pakistan, would allow an American search for Osama bin Laden inside Pakistan's borders. This is anathema to extremists. Finally, she made a preelectoral statement that she would allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to question A. Qadeer Khan. Mehsud had indicated that he considered the detention of Dr.Qadeer over alleged nuclear contraband smuggling to radical buyers as unjustified and unsubstantiated, and an American ploy. The militant commander is said to be the man who has masterminded most of the recent suicide attacks in the country. A UN report released in September 2007 blamed Mehsud for almost 80 percent of suicide bombings in Afghanistan.206 According to some reports, Mehsud had compiled his own hit list of political leaders and high-profile government officials, and had formed special squads for carrying out such terrorist acts.207 While he admitted to targeting military personnel in reprisal attacks, he usually denied attacking any political figures. In particular, he denied he had anything to do with the attack on Benazir Bhutto on 18 October, and her subsequent assassination in December. He claimed that it was against tribal custom to kill women. However, it is arguable, since Benazir was hoping to return to the Pakistani political scene as an icon of the war against terror. This is also an undeniable fact that there was a strong anti-Benazir feeling among the militants; when a BBC reporter 208 spoke to some of them in October, days before the first attack, most regarded her as an "American pawn" and some openly condemned her for belonging to the minority Muslim Shia sect209, which makes her apostate in the eyes of many of these ultra orthodox Sunnis. Many of them are of the opinion that Benazir Bhutto got what she deserved. Some investigators maintain that extremists from radical groups such as the sectarian Lashkar-e-Jhangvi could have been responsible for the October attack, and many conspiracy theories abound regarding her assassination. Be that as it may, however, the media shy 204

(Latif 2008) (BBC2007) Daily Times, September 30, 2007. 207 Daily Times, May 31, 2007. 208 (BBC2007) 209 Syed Shoaib Hassan‖ Venturing into the Taleban‘s Backyard‖, BBC News, online edition, international version, South Asia section, 11 October 2007. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7039661.stm 205 206

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Taliban 210 commander was very well poised to grab first spot as Pakistan's public enemy number one. Mehsud‘s name regularly began to emerge in daily news reports after President Pervez Musharraf imposed a state of emergency, which marked a watershed in Pakistani political history. Some have tended to portray Baitullah as merely an annoying thorn in Musharraf's shoe, while others have consistently seen him as a key figure that has disturbed the political equilibrium in Pakistan, even after his death. It is pertinent to mention here that Mehsud is the biggest belligerent tribe in South Waziristan, with 60 percent of the 700,000 population, while rival Waziris make up 35 percent. Michael V.Hayden, then director of CIA, went on record to mention the level of threat. Hayden said in a 45-minute interview with The Washington Post: "What you see is, I think, a change in the character of what's going on there," he said. "You've got this nexus now that probably was always there in latency but is now active: a nexus between al-Qaeda and various extremist and separatist groups.‖ Hayden added, "It is clear that their intention is to continue to try to do harm to the Pakistani state as it currently exists."211 This young and committed Jihadi consistently acted as a liaison and more for the Pakistani Taliban and those on the other side of the Pak-Afghan border. Mehsud‘s Taliban connections are a moot point now, but it was not always so. Earlier his Taliban connections were sometimes a point for conjecture; many believed that Mehsud had been involved in the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan by dispatching his men to fight against the U.S. led Coalition forces, a point which seems to be quite probable in hindsight. Evidence to support this view arose when a close aide of Mehsud, Hakimullah Mehsud, was captured by NATO forces in the border region while trying to cross into Afghanistan with five foreign fighters212. Mehsud was initially intensely media shy; one would suspect that he was in this respect emulating his spiritual and religious mentor Mullah Omar, but he became far less reclusive later, and was not above flaunting his power occasionally. His operations boasted of many terror training camps near the Afghan border, and the destruction of a suicide bombing ‗nursery‘ in Spinkai by Pakistani troops was flouted in the media as evidence of his operational strength. Even more intriguingly, there is evidence that he(and after him probably his successors)are in possession of state of the art intelligence monitoring equipment, which relies on encrypted information to monitor Pakistani troop movement in real time213. Pakistani intelligence circles have so far been unable to decrypt these signals. The menace of escalating militancy in the tribal belts has arisen in tandem with Mehsud‘s rise to power. Foreign hands are purportedly behind this escalating Jihad HQ, a view shared by Brigadier (retired) Mahmud Shah, ex-secretary security Fata: "Their (tribal militants‘) actual masters are these foreigners and our government should seriously work towards separating both of them. Otherwise these jirgas would have no role to play in resolving the conflict," he declared.214

210

(BBC 2007) Joby Warrick ―CIA Places Blame for Bhutto Assassination", Washington Post, online edition, World section, January, 2008. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/17/AR2008011703252.html. 212 Dawn, March 8, 2007. 213 The News,August 5,2008. 214 Outstanding disputes, News on Sunday,13 May 2008,http://jang.com.pk/thenews/apr2008-weekly/nos-13-042008/spr.htm 211

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Baitullah seemed obsessed with the concept of jihad, which is the militant hallmark. He drew his authority from verses of the Holy Quran, citing several verses to defend his stance that non-Muslim foreign forces must be evicted from Islamic countries. ―Allah on 480 occasions in the Holy Koran extols Muslims to wage jihad. We only fulfil God's orders. Only jihad can bring peace to the World," he said.215 The militant leader was active in fighting the foreign troops in Afghanistan, and apparently the traditional Pashtun aversion to invaders also ran in his blood. "We will continue our struggle until foreign troops are thrown out. Then we will attack them in the US and Britain until they either accept Islam or agree to pay jazia (a tax in Islam for non-Muslims living in an Islamic state)." Suicide bombers are a vital tool in his arsenal; he predicted that they were capable of giving a bloodier nose to foreign forces in Afghanistan ―in the years to come.‖ ―The mujahideen will carry out even more severe attacks. If they [theWest] have air power we have fidayeen [suicide bombers]... They will leave dishonoured."216 The militant leader contested an American general's claim that a Taliban leader, Jalaluddin Haqqani, was present in the tribal region and was organising attacks across the border. "This is all lies. They don't have any evidence."217 His crowning achievement has been the unification of diverse groups under an umbrella organization, the Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan.

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TEHREEK E TALIBAN-THE FACE OF THE TALIBAN IN PAKISTAN The TTP was formed on Dec 15, 2007, and launched attacks against the security forces and government installations after their demand for halting military operations in the tribal areas and Swat valley was turned down by the government. Their main demand was to end military operations in North and South Waziristan tribal agencies as well as Swat, but they also demanded the release of Maulana Abdul Aziz Ghazi, Imam of Lal Masjid, Islamabad. Even though various sources seemed to be reporting a rift between Mullah Omar and the Afghan Taliban with Baitullah Mehsud in late January 2008, it was not a stumbling block for his appointment as head of the Taliban movement. The reports seemed to suggest that the rift arose because he was focusing on attacks in Pakistan, rather than in Afghanistan; it seems probable that the rift has healed or otherwise did not exist. In December 2007, a shura, or council, of 40 senior Taliban leaders leader, formalized his appointment as head of Pakistani Taliban, which gives him centralized control of not only militant groups in Waziristan, but also Swat and adjoining areas. ―The Shura was made up of Taliban representatives from the seven tribal agencies of North and South Waziristan, Khyber, Orakzai, Bajaur, Mohmand, and Kurram, as well as the settled districts of Swat, Bannu, Tank, Lakki Marwat, Dera Ismail Khan, Kohistan, Buner, and the Malakand division‖218. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan initially has put forward a straightforward agenda; they have reiterated their stance to continuing the Jihad against coalition forces in Afghanistan as 215

―Pakistan Taleban vow more violence,‖ BBC News, online edition, international version, 29 January 2007,http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6292061.stm 216 Ibid. 217 Ibid. 218 Bill Roggio, ―Pakistani Taliban unites under Baitullah Mehsud ,The Long War Journal, December 15, 2007. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/12/pakistani_taliban_un.php.

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their main point. At the same time, they issued a warning to the Pakistani establishment, carrying out military operations against them, to desist from hostilities and release their prisoners, or face the consequences. ―The meeting participants have demanded an immediate end of the military operation being carried out in Swat, and given a 10-day ultimatum to the government to pullout its troops from the area," the Nation reported. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan also demanded "the closure of the military check posts in North and South Waziristan and release of all Taliban activists including former Lal Masjid Khateeb Maulana Abul Aziz." ―Our main aim is to target the US allies in Afghanistan but the government of Pakistan‘s ill-strategy has made us to launch a defensive Jihad in Pakistan,‖ spokesman Maulvi Omar stated. ―The government of Pakistan would be paid in the same coin now,‖ Mehsud said219. ―The consolidation of the disparate "local Taliban" movement is a logical step in the Taliban's insurgency campaign in north-western Pakistan. The Pakistani Taliban, while allied with al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, has operated as local groups. The creation of a unified Taliban movement in Pakistan will allow them a better coordination with Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda thus affording better military and political advantages inside Pakistan.‖220 Mehsud superseded some able and influential Taliban leaders in his nomination as the Amir of the Pakistani Taliban in North and South Waziristan, including Sadiq Noor, Mullah Nazir, and Noor Islam. It is unclear if Faqir Mohammed of Bajaur and the outlawed Tehrik-eNifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM - the Movement for the Implementation of Mohammad's Sharia Law) were represented at the meeting, but one cannot rule out its possibility221. A representative of Maulana Fazlullah's Swat branch of the TNSM was also in attendance. ―Abu Kasha, a key link between Al-Qaeda's Majlis-e-Shura [central organizing committee] and the Taliban, are also said to hold a senior position in the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan‖.222 This one single factor, in conjunction with others like the developments in Swat, are posing positive threats to Pakistan polity, because the movement is gaining momentum; this has certainly not gone unnoticed in intelligence circles. The director of CIA has been quoted as saying: ―The Afghan-Pakistan border region has been an area of focus for this agency since about 11 o'clock in the morning of September 11, [2001], and I really mean this," Hayden said. "We haven't done a whole lot of retooling there in the last one week, one month, three months, six months and so on. This has been up there among our very highest priorities."223 There is some sketchy evidence that even though Mr. Mehsud collected many of the splinter Jihadi groups under the auspices of the Tehrik-i-Taliban, he did not entirely succeed to keep some regional and ethnic militant groups united under him. One of the aims of the Tehrik-i-Taliban was to coordinate and take joint decisions on talks with the government. Some militants are in favour of halting attacks on the Pakistan military, in order to conserve tribal military energy for the fight against American and NATO forces across the border. This then would be a calling to the Afghanistan strain of jihad. Militants from the Ahmadzai Wazir tribe in South Waziristan are now pro-government and are staying neutral, to the extent of pushing back attempts by Mehsud fighters to fall back into their area. In North Waziristan one 219

Ibid. Ibid. 221 Ibid. 222 Ibid. 223 (Washington Post 2008) 220

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of the important militant leaders, Hafiz Gul Bahadar224, had earlier kept to a cease-fire. This may be explicable in terms of tribal affiliations, which tend to direct the ideological viewpoints of the warlords. Gul Bahadar, even although named as TTP head in North Waziristan, clashed with Mehsud over the decision to engage the Pakistani army. As Rahimullah Yusufzai explains: ―Association with the TTP and being its deputy leader did not mean much when it came to the territorial and tribal limits of each Taliban group and commander. Hafiz Gul Bahadur was particularly furious when Mehsud‘s men started firing rockets into the army‘s camp at Razmak, a town in North Waziristan, during the recent fighting between the military and the Mehsud-commanded militants. It was also evident that Hafiz Gul Bahadur and his Taliban fighters failed to abide by one of the major decisions of the TTP by refusing to coordinate attacks on the security forces in North Waziristan to help ease pressure on the Taliban fighting under Mehsud‘s command in South Waziristan. This failure defied a Taliban decision that every Taliban group was required to come to the assistance of others in its area of operation that were under attack from the Pakistan Army.‖225 Yusufzai postulates that the variance of strategic approaches between Mehsud and Gul Bahadar and his allied commanders arose due to their tribal differences, which shape their ideological approaches. Gul Bahadar and his allies belong to the Torikhel and Daur Wazir tribes, which have tended to lead an uneasy existence with Mehsud‘s tribe. Even though the rifts between Gul Bahadur and Mehsud seemed to have healed somewhat (see below), tribal affiliation and traditional animosities in FATA are much too entrenched to disappear even in the presence of the cementing bond of Talibanisation. Mehsud, for example, could not freely operate in the Ahmadzai Wazir tribe dominated Wana area. Even though the Mehsud and Ahmadzai Wazir tribes coexist in South Waziristan, a traditional history of feuds and uneasy co existence has tended to dictate the organizational structures, even though both tribes are equally radical. The Taliban among the Ahmadzai Wazir thus tended to function rather independently of commander Mehsud, though temporary alliances mediated by jirgas tended to spring up .The locals tend to sometimes refer colloquially to these loose Taliban allied groups as ‗local‘ Taliban, as opposed to the more centralized command of the Tehreek-e-Taliban. These local Taliban have had the following chronological chain of commanders; late Nek Muhammad ,Haji Omar, Noor Islam, Maulvi Muhammad Abbas, Javed Karmazkhel and Maulvi Aziz. 226In April 2007, a schism between Maulvi Muhammad Nazir and Haji Hannan resulted in the ouster of Haji Omar and his allied commanders for offering sanctuary to Uzbek militants. These commanders were also accused of getting logistical help from the Pakistani government. Nazir and Omar had different tribal affiliations, which is also another pertinent factor in their joining of different militant camps. Thus, it is obvious that the particular tribal paradigm does shape the strategy of the Taliban, regardless of the fact that they are purportedly claiming to support Jihad in its Universalist context. A point in fact would be the Wana Taliban‘s denial of assistance in their area to Uzbek militants aligned with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)227.

224

Ibid. Rahimullah Yusufzai, The Impact of Pashtun Tribal Differences on the Pakistani Taliban, Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, Volume VI, Issue 3,February 7,2008. 226 (Yusufzaid,2008). 227 The News International, Peshawar, January 26, 2008. 225

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FAQIR MUHAMMAD Farther north, in another tribal agency, Bajaur, Faqir Muhammad228, a firebrand figure second only to Mr. Mehsud, had remained quiet earlier, but has now joined the Taliban movement wholeheartedly. It should be noted that Faqir Muhammad‘s inclusion in the Taliban cause adds great strength to it. It is worthwhile tracing Faqir Muhammad‘s ascent to power, since he is now a Taliban commander second in importance only to Baitullah Mehsud and Maulana Fazlullah. Faqir Mohammed was born in Chopatra village in Bajaur Agency, just twenty kilometers away from the Afghanistan border. Bajaur, in turn, is a FATA area bordering the Kunar province in Afghanistan. He was believed to be 37 years old in 2008.He has an imposing personality, and is superbly fit physically. Faqir Mohammed belongs to the powerful local Mommand tribe, and has strong familial Jihadi affiliations; two of his sons and two first cousins, Maulvi Mohammed Karim and Maulvi John Mohammed, were staunch activists of Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) of Sufi Muhammad. Faqir Muhammad‘s cousins went to Afghanistan at the command of Sufi Muhammad, but were captured by authorities while making their way back in 2001, and are now in Dera Ismael Khan Prison. Although Faqir Mohammed is not a chief or tribal elder, he has managed to secure a powerful support base in the region and moves relatively freely, accompanied by his personal security team. Normally he is guarded by five to eight diehard followers. When undertaking journeys on foot, Mohammed is usually accompanied by 15-20 followers and guards; when traveling by jeep their number is confined to the capacity of the vehicle. The local tribal administration does not dare arrest him, and in recent years Mohammed has rarely ventured beyond Bajaur and the adjoining tribal belt. Faqir Muhammad is relatively educated by Taliban standards; his early madrassah education was at the hands of Maulana Abdus Salam, a widely respected scholar, who was believed to shun militancy and politics. Being greatly inspired by his mentor, young Faqir Muhammad concentrated mainly on his studies, and was not active in militancy earlier in his life. However, he was an avid student of Deobandi and later Salafi school of thought advocated by Maulana Abdus Salam. Faqir Muhammad, under Salam‘s guidance, obtained the Dars-e-Nizami, which is the madrassah equivalent to graduation. He also engaged in Quranic studies at Darul-Uloom Pamjpeer, one of the most influential religious schools in central Peshawar valley. The Salafi ideology of Maulana Abdus Salam and the teachings at Pamjpeer gradually convinced Faqir Mohammed to gravitate towards jihad. In 1993, Maulana Sufi Mohammad, the founder of TNSM, introduced Faqir Mohammed to militancy in Afghanistan. Sufi Mohammad started out as an activist and then became one of the prominent leaders of Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) in the 1980s, being the principal of the JI madrassah in Tamaergra in the northwestern part of NWFP. He split up with them eventually due to his uncompromising extremist ideals, and in 1992 formed Tehreek Nifaz e Sharia Mohammadi, abbreviated as TNSM. TNSM at the very outset embraced the radical forms of Sharia wholeheartedly, and with the emergence of Taliban in Afghanistan identified closely with them. Reportedly, thousands of TNSM activists (including Faqir Mohammed) were deputed by Sufi Muhammad to support the Taliban in their jihad efforts.

228

(Washington Post,2008)

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Faqir Mohammed continued to fight in Afghanistan until the fall of the Taliban in late 2001.Reports put Faqir Mohammed mainly in the area of the Bagram front, (north of Kabul) and areas bordering the Panjshir valley, staying for most of the time in the Afghan province of Kunar. There were a lot of Arab militants in the area, and Faqir quickly developed a rapport with them by virtue of his madrassah honed Arabic language skills. Faqir Mohammed never really aspired for any special position as a commander among the Taliban. His modesty and status as a trained religious scholar, along with bravery and expertise at guerrilla warfare, made him quite a popular figure with the locals. In Afghanistan, he became proficient in using all small arms, rocket launchers and anti-aircraft weapons. All of these factors, along with his ideological intimacy with the afghan Arabs, (which tended to be mostly al Qaeda operatives) proved invaluable to al Qaeda and other radical militants, who looked to him as a strong source of support in the tribal areas of Pakistan after the fall of Taliban in Afghanistan. Initially, the Bajaur area was ideologically inclined towards the jamaat-e-Islami teachings. After the fall of Taliban in Afghanistan, however, the masses have become staunch followers of the Taliban, not least because of strong feelings of Pashtun ethnic kinship and the proximity of the region to Afghanistan, which has resulted in mass Taliban transmigration to these areas.229It is important to always keep in mind that before the Tehreek e Taliban umbrella body incorporated the militants in Bajaur, the dominant militant leadership, including Faqir Muhammad, and the militant cadres in Bajaur belonged to TNSM. After agreeing to be voluntarily subsumed under the overarching Taliban umbrella body, most of the Taliban cadres in Bajaur are presumably former TNSM activists. Security agencies believed that Faqir‘s house in Chopatra village had been used as a winter headquarters by al Qaeda, which prompted them to raid it in May 2005. Fingers have been pointing at him all along as a key facilitator for al Qaeda and Taliban activities, and a recipient of cash and logistical help by the same in return for providing sanctuary to them. This, fact, along with his greatly heightened tribal following after the afghan jihad, made him a natural choice as a TTP leader. His ideology is simple: since all the infidels have(according to him) united to capture the resources of the Muslim world, therefore, it was imperative for the Muslims to get united and support the "Mujahideen" in their war against the US-led foreign occupation forces in Afghanistan. He has claimed on record to have prepared thousands of suicide bombers waiting for his call to attack the US-led troops in Afghanistan. He has long been considered the link between al Qaeda and Taliban in Pakistan. For example, CIA sources accused him of hosting a dinner at his Damadola village in Bajaur Agency on January 13, 2006, for al Qaeda's deputy leader and Osama bin Laden's right-hand man, Dr al-Zawahiri and other foreign militants. 230 The Bajaur area has been ripe with reports of Zawahiri sightings, which may or may not be speculation fuelled by the fact that al Qaeda influence in Bajaur needed to increase because of a serious insurgency situation in adjoining Kunar in Afghanistan. Al Zawahiri‘s second marriage to a Bajaur lady belonging to the Mamun tribe has just added to the speculation of his close association to the area. Even though Faqir Muhammad has vehemently denied presence of any al Qaeda or Taliban leadership in the area, he is openly supportive of them. Paying tribute to world's most-wanted man, Faqir Mohammad remarked:

229

The Daily Mashriq, July 26, 2004. Maulana Faqir, govt may ink peace deal after Eid, The News,October 22, 2006

230

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"Sheikh Osama has become an ideology now and America's $50 million bounty for his head is not even worthy for his turban."231 "According to Pashtun tradition we will definitely exact revenge on America. Ayman alZawahiri never came here but if he wanted to come, we will welcome him, and it will be a great pleasure for us to be his host" . Reports emerged that he had been killed in August 2008,when Pakistan Army Gunship helicopters targeted two vehicles in Inayat Kali, Bajaur Agency; eight to ten militants were killed, including ostensibly, Maulvi Faqir Muhammad. However, that later proved to be untrue, as he emerged safe and sound to make a statement to the contrary.

MAULANA FAZLULLAH

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Once considered a haven for tourists from all over the country as well as the globe, Swat,232 has long depended heavily on the revenue generated through the tourism industry233. A rough estimate puts the dependence of more than 60 per cent of the region's inhabitants upon the hospitality industry, which has ground to a complete halt in the wake of violent clashes between militants and security forces, leaving almost 1200 hotels and thousands of people unemployed and suffering from an identity crisis of faith.

Figure 9. Maulana Fazlullah.

The advent of this pervasive movement can be traced back to July 2006, when Maulana Fazlullah came into limelight. His religious lineage can be traced to Maulana Sufi Muhammad of Tehreek-e-Nifaze-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM), who is the father in Law of Fazlullah. It is again worth mentioning here that Sufi Muhammad passed a decree declaring 231

Bajaur militants offer sanctuary to Osama, The News, Omar,April 19, 2008.Also Daily Jang,January 23,2008. Population: 1,257,602, Area: 5,337 sq kms,Sub-divisions: Matta and Swat, Population density: 235.6 persons per sq km,Urban ratio: 13.8 per cent, Main clans: Yousafzai Pathans, Mians, Kohistanis, Gujars and Pirachas ,Religion: Muslims 99.7 per cent, Christian 0.02 per cent; Hindu 0.01 per cent; Ahmadi 0.25 per cent ,Literacy rate: 28.75 per cent 233 Tauseef-ur-Rahman, Swat hotel industry on verge of collapse, The News, May 14, 2008. 232

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military training as compulsory for every Muslim. Hundreds of TNSM workers, paying heed to this call, reportedly went for military training in Afghanistan. Sufi was imprisoned for leading an 'army' of 10,000 men to Afghanistan to fight alongside the Taliban against the USled coalition forces and the Northern Alliance. He had been in the Dera Ismail Khan jail for more than six years but has recently been released into the custody of Fazlullah under the auspices of an agreement reached between the militants and the Government.234 Fazlullah was born by the birth name of Fazl Hayat in 1975. He was born in the home of Biladar Khan, a Babukarkhel clansmen of the Yousufzai tribe. He passed his intermediate exam from government degree college Saidu Sharif, and subsequently joined the seminary run by Sufi Muhammad, who became his mentor, and renamed him as Fazlullah. He later married Sufi‘s daughter. Fazlullah, like many other TNSM activists, was arrested after crossing over to Afghanistan in 2001.He was however, subsequently released, and took over the organization of his father in law, due to the latter‘s detention by Pakistani authorities. It seems that he was much more successful than Sufi in concretizing the organization, with the numbers of recruits swelling rapidly. Maulana Fazlullah devised a novel strategy of radical preaching; he installed an FM radio channel in 2004, which is now being clandestinely operated. His message was simple; anti US and anti-Government rhetoric, interspersed with call for support of Taliban235 in Afghanistan and the establishment of an Islamic state. The title of ‗Radio Mulla‘ given to him is apt; according to an estimate there are about 30 FM Radio channels being operated in Swat churning out an indigenous mix of Jihadi propaganda.236The Government has tried to counter this by stepping up the frequencies of the local channels to block this transmission, but these propaganda machines have proved quite effective at covert relocation and transmission. News reports coming out of the Swat have gauged his meteoric rise to popularity by the fact that when he gave a call for establishment of a madrassah on banks of the Swat River, Rs. 3.8 million were collected reportedly within 24 hours, and the amount rose to Rs 35 million.237 The Mulla preaches an essentially fundamentalist and Talabanised ideology. This has prompted attacks on CD shops, mandatory shaving of beards, and threats to girl's education, all purportedly based on Shariah .The threats have also materialized in the form of destruction of women‘s colleges in Swat. 238This has dealt a crippling blow to the educational prospects of women in that area. It may be worthwhile mentioning here that this area of the country had achieved the highest literacy rate for women as compared to neighboring districts.239 Even the religious class was tolerant of women‘s education, music, movies, internet etc. which have become taboo under the new religious leadership. I see in this process the emergence of self coined Terromodels (see chapter 4 for a detailed discussion), which implies transmigration of

234

Riaz Khan, ―Cease Fire in Pakistan‘s Swat Valley‖, May 9 2008, Associated press Of Pakistan. The Mulla has conceded that he had thrice crossed over to Afghanistan in order to fight alongside the Taliban; the last campaign was to accompany Maulana Sufi Mohammad and his 10,000 followers, in November 2001, to fight the US-led coalition forces and the Northern Alliance. 236 Reportedly Maulana Masood Azhar formed the militant Jaish-i-Muhammad in Swat after being released from prison in India due to a deal being brokered between the two countries. This organization later imparted jihadi training to the TNSM activists. 237 Mushtaq Yusufzai,SWAT analysis, The News, can be accessed at http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2007weekly/nos-04-11-2007/spr.htm. 238 Militants razed to the ground Government Girls High School in Charbagh using a combination of explosives and incendiary materials, The News, Monday, May 05, 2008. 239 Javed Afridi, ‗Without sustenance,’ http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2007-weekly/nos-04-11-2007/spr.htm 235

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radical fundamentalist tendencies from the tribal to the urban areas, where it becomes much harder to detect and consequently, that much harder to eliminate. A Pakistani Terromodel is just an abbreviation of something gone very wrong in a society, in which that very thing should logically not have occurred. The model considered in Swat implies an area which is relatively affluent, has a comparatively higher literacy rate, women were not marginalized, and people were involved quite heavily in commerce and agriculture. These are all factors, the lack of which is traditionally considered to be the substrate of terrorism. Thus, the Pakistani Terromodel is somewhat of a contradiction in terms; a radical widespread militant movement should ideally not be able to gain populist footholds in progressive areas such as Swat. However, the very fact that a movement like the one being considered below does so, gives rise to my theory that something is very wrong in the Pakistani society. I have come up with the term ‗Terromodel‘ to encapsulate the structural imbalances in the entity being considered, which implies a form of ‗slithering‘ Talibanisation which comes in though the back door. This book is just an introduction to the insidious inception of Terromodels; a detailed discussion is beyond the scope of the book as it would take the discourse on Sociological, Socio Economic and cultural trajectories, which would detract from chronicling the Talibanisation of Pakistan. Suffice it for now that I firmly believe this phenomenon has to be studied in much greater depth, to provide a strategic insight as to how geographically sequestrated radical movements like the ones in FATA are starting to permeate into the Pakistani urban mainstream, which is an extremely worrying trend. Coming back to Swat, the Laissez faire‘ ideology of the traditional maulvi had been quite acceptable to the society at large, but seems to have been replaced by the firebrand preacher .Herein lies the fallacy of not recognizing a Terromodel in time; even there was an active operation going in Waziristan, Government troops were not mobilized quickly enough to halt the spread of this contagious movement in Swat, because conventional Law and Order controlling measures were considered adequate. It was only after some time that it was realized by the Policy echelons of Government that a FATA type situation was developing in a hitherto Open society, which is unprecedented in Pakistan. The measures taken by the Mulla echo images of Taliban whipping women in Afghanistan, which had been a media report for most Pakistanis until now, but seems to have become reality; the Swat Taliban released a video in 2009 in which a young woman was shown as being whipped, which stirred up huge anti Taliban sentiment in Pakistan. Talibanisation has assumed cataclysmic proportions in a major commercially thriving city of Mingora in Swat, which had a robust hospitality culture. Curfew was finally imposed when gun battles between Maulana Fazlullah and security forces failed to resolve the issues in four subdivisions of Swat district, namely Matta, Kabal, Charbagh and Khwaza Khela. A state of curfew is now a regular feature in this once peaceful area. The situation took an ominous turn when the Fazlullah-led militants joined Tehrik-eTaliban Pakistan (TTP) formed by top Pakistani militant Baitullah Mehsud in December 2007, in a bid to provide an umbrella to all insurgent movements operating in several tribal agencies and settled areas of NWFP. With this, the movement fell into the hands of tribalareas-based Taliban and Maulana Fazlullah lost his authority to make decisions independently. The Swat-based Taliban were previously insisting only on the promulgation of Sharia, but they have started making increasingly strident demands from the government; it seems that they now they want the government to kowtow to Baitullah's tough conditions, or else they are not going to end the insurgency, being an integral part of TTP. The first peace

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deal of the Swat chapter of Taliban after being subsumed in TTP was negotiated on May 31, 2008, which immediately fell to pieces, with both sides blaming each other for the failure of the negotiation process. Fazlullah seems to have hardened his stance from then onwards, with directions apparently emanating form a more centralized Taliban command and control. Given this situation, in the ongoing insurgency ―Baitullah Mehsud has the last word on the agreement, and until his permission we cannot resume talks aimed at the enforcement of the accord," spokesman for the Swat Taliban Muslim Khan told TNS.240 In fact, Swat's problem has become more complicated, with little chances of its lasting solution, whether military or peaceful, since the success of any peace deal is now re-conditioned to the situation in the tribal agencies. According to Swati Taliban, in case of any action in tribal areas, the pact would automatically stand terminated. The NWFP government and Swati Taliban have their own compulsions, and could not implement any deal despite occasionally displayed shows of sincerity from both sides. It seems that the state would now have to negotiate directly with TTP leadership for an effective peace accord in Swat, since Fazlullah is no more the person calling the shots; if negotiations are deemed unacceptable, the state needs to devise another strategy to eliminate militancy.241 ―Though Swat was the epicenter of the Maulana Fazlullah-led militancy and suffered heavily due to acts of violence by militants and as a consequence of military operations, others parts of Malakand region too faced fallout of the volatile situation in the valley. Taliban fighters affiliated to the faction of Tanzim Nifaz e Shariat-i-Mohammad (TNSM) headed by Fazlullah also briefly occupied Alpuri, headquarters of adjoining Shangla district, and received reinforcements and support from Upper Dir, Lower Dir and Buner districts and Bajaur and Malakand agencies. The original TNSM, banned by the government after its founder and Fazlullah's father-in-law Maulana Sufi Mohammad took several thousand fighters on a misguided adventure to fight alongside the Afghan Taliban against the US military and its Northern Alliance allies, still has pockets of support in these places, particularly in Bajaur where Maulana Faqir Mohammad remains defiant and ready to battle the government. Thus it would be wise to form a jirga with representatives from all of Malakand region even though the immediate focus would be to defuse the situation in Swat, where more than 20,000 troops are still deployed after having launched military operations last winter.‖242 ―The provincial government's writ runs in Swat and other districts in the so-called settled area while the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata), which includes Bajaur and six other tribal agencies, are managed and controlled by the federal government through the Governor of NWFP. It is, therefore, obvious that the ANP-PPP coalition government would be required to first resolve the problems in Swat before contributing to a solution of the more serious and hitherto intractable conflicts in tribal agencies such as South Waziristan, North Waziristan, Bajaur and Darra Adamkhel. Swat valley doesn't border Afghanistan and this single factor has resulted in reduced US interest in the conflict there. The Americans are more concerned about the situation in the two Waziristans and rest of the tribal region as they believe the al-Qaeda leaders including Osama bin Laden are hiding there and Taliban militants based in the area are easily able to cross the border to attack soldiers from the US, 240

Special Report, News on Sunday,6 July,2008, http://jang.com.pk/thenews/jul2008-weekly/nos-06-072008/spr.htm. 241 Ibid. 242 New frontier, News,13 April,2008,http://jang.com.pk/thenews/apr2008-weekly/nos-13-04-2008/spr.htm. Taliban in Pakistan: A Chronicle of Resurgence : A Chronicle of Resurgence, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook

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Nato and Afghan armies. Any negotiated political solution in Swat would not alarm the US and its allies and they are unlikely to object to such a move. But it would be an altogether different story if the new, democratically elected PPP-led coalition government at the centre attempted a similar political settlement of the conflict in tribal areas over the objections of the US.‖243

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TERROR TACTICS The tactics used by these militants need to be considered in order to comprehend how they have entrenched their holds in the areas controlled by them. I shall discuss the suicide tactics in much greater detail in a succeeding section; for the moment it is vital to understand how the Taliban are consolidating their hold in FATA by using a combination of cajoling and the cudgel, and Baitullah Mehsud is the archetypical Taliban leader for examining the Taliban methods of administration in Pakistan. He ran a tight ship, and has left a legacy of ruthlessness which is emulated by TTP leadership; deserters are summarily executed and even Taliban not following a tightly regulated code of conduct are summarily dealt with. Similarly, he did not tolerate opposition; according to reliable Intelligence sources at least 100 Waziri 244tribal leaders have been purged on his orders. His methods may be questionable, but his leader ship was never in doubt; as above, in late 2007, a Taliban shura, a 40-member consultative council, chose him to unify its operations in Pakistan. The methodology of the Pakistani variant is equally violent as their Afghani counterpart‘s, not allowing civil liberties and fundamental human rights to flourish; they are asking for strict conformity to their code of conduct i.e. banning music and burning all music and video shops, confiscating the vehicles if equipped with stereo, and stopping barbers from shaving beards.All of these activities have been regarded by them as haraam i.e. sacrilegious. Baitullah Mehsud established his own parallel Government, and set up his own judicial system wherein Pashtuns tribals approached him for delivery of justice, rather than resorting to judicial courts set up by the Government. According to a tribal barber, all hair cutting saloons in the area had been ordered by Baitullah Mehsud to display warning signs to the effect that since shaving the beard has been forbidden, hence that service is not offered. Not only so, those violating this order are punished with their saloons being reduced to ashes whereas some have been put to death for undertaking this sacrilegious act. In the words of Hayatullah,245 a barber in Makeen 'Earlier I would shave my customers, but now I don't. Because if I do, my shop will be torched and I will be punished to death by Baitullah Mehsud". Hayatullah further mentioned that some time earlier, Baitullah ordered a couple, who had committed adultery, to be stoned to death. TTP‘s leadership receives money from al Qaeda and the Taliban to run the affairs of their newly founded ‗parallel State', and Mehsud epitomized this leadership. ―People dance to his tune. On his command, they can sacrifice their lives," says the editor of a Peshawari 243

Ibid. ―Baitullah Mehsud‖,The New York Times, online edition, People section.http://topics.nytimes.com/top /reference/timestopics/people/m/baitullah_mehsud/index.html?inline=nyt-per 245 (Shehzad 2006) 244

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newspaper on the condition of anonymity. Evidently, differences of opinion exist; some are of the opinion that not much has changed in the tribal areas. An officer of Frontier Constabulary holding the rank of an Army Major emphasizes: ―It is a question of how you look at things. Jirga has along been a part of tribal tradition and cannot be equated with a parallel government. People in tribal areas were already keeping beards. The women were already in purdah. So, you can't say that a Taliban-like Shariat has been imposed‖. In my opinion, it is imperative to contrast the rather laissez faire variety of tribal religiosity which existed before the emergence of this phenomenon. Admittedly, the tribals did keep beards and women were in purdah, but this was more or less done out of a spirit of long standing tribal tradition, rather than any intense religious fervor. As any one having some knowledge of the Pathan way of life would know, the Pathan is a delightfully confusing mix of contradictions. He can be a lifelong friend and a deadly enemy, a paradox of honesty and a shameless cheat; a jovial person who would watch Pashto movies, while taking a break to say his prayers. I quote from Rashid Ahmed: ―Anyone who has been touched by an Afghan or visited the country in peace or in war will understand when I say the country and the people are amongst the most extraordinary on earth. The Afghans have also been affected by one of the greatest tragedies of this century – the longest running civil war in this era which has brought untold misery. Their story and their character involve immense contradictions. Brave, magnificent, honourable, generous, hospitable, gracious, handsome, Afghan men and women can also be devious, mean and bloody-minded.‖246 In essence, the pre Taliban tribal scenario was as quite different; an evidence in point being the number of educational institutions for women in FATA previously, which even though not well attended to, is dwindling to zero. Thus, a moot point would be the Talibanized consolidation of areas, which do not have even the vaguest semblances to the writ of the state. This formation of an al Qaeda and Taliban run ‗state within a state‘ is an alarming development, and certainly cannot be written off as if ‗nothing much‘ has changed. The locals‘ opinions tend to mirror the above portrayed situation. Gul Zameen, a local trucker, told Islam Online, "Playing music and watching videos are against the law here." 247 Baitullah's camp followers give him credit for bringing peace, but detractors argue that this semblance of peace was a creation of Baitullah's Mafia; an analogy is possible with his lieutenants whose Godfather was Baitullah himself, squeezing the local population of their entire financial and other resources. M I Khan, a journalist with the Nida-i-Millat248 describes how Mehsud killed pro-government tribal leaders. "First, he would confirm that the guy is an informer and then he would send him a Rs. 1,000 note along with a thread and a needle, telling the person to buy and have his kafan(shroud) stitched within 24 hours," Khan says. "And the guy is murdered within 24 hours." He also regularly ordered the murder of adulterers by stoning. There are few judicial courts in the region run by Pakistan government, but their services have seldom been availed by the Waziristanis who prefer approaching TTP for the dispensation of primeval form of justice in South Waziristan and parts of North Waziristan. In these areas, these men are the law.

246

Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: The story of the Afghan Warlords(London: Pan Macmillan Ltd,2001),xiii. (Latif 2008). 248 Ibid. 247

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The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan has built up on its current legacy by intimidating members of the public services. For example, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan Darra Adamkhel chapter, in September 2008, threatened to kill nine police recruits it had kidnapped, one by one, if the government did not accept their demands. The spokesman for the local Taliban Amjad said they had kidnapped nine police recruits from the Khyber Agency when they were on their way to the Police Training Centre, Hangu. "If the government does not fulfill our demands, including enforcement of Shariah, end to military operations in Fata and other settled areas, we will kill the recruits one by one," 249the spokesman said, adding that they would soon present them before the media to confirm their status as hostages. The demoralizing effects of this sort of strategy are evident; sources at the police academy mentioned that about 250 policemen and police recruits did not return to the Police Training Centre, Hangu, after they went to their homes on leave. Presumably, the thought of a paltry subsistence level government salary is no consolation, as opposed to the consequences if they tangled with the Tehreek-e-Taliban. The organization of Mehsud has international designs as well; it would be naïve to think otherwise. In a first-ever television interview aired on January 28, 2008, Baitullah told Al Jazeera‘s television network‘s bureau chief in Islamabad, Admad Zaidan, from an undisclosed location: ―Our main aim is to finish Britain, the US and to crush the pride of the non-Muslims. We pray to God to give us the ability to destroy the White House, New York and London. And we have trust in God. Very soon, we will be witnessing jehad‘s miracles‖.

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250

The normally reclusive Baitullah Mehsud in the 25 min Al-Jazeera interview described the goals and the details of the network of militants responsible for the most violent time in Pakistan in 60 years as a defensive Jihad, with the goal to destroy the White House, New York and London. Commenting on the ex-Pakistani President, Musharraf, Baitullah said: ―Musharraf is no more than a slave to Bush and the non-believers. Musharraf is no more than a follower to his masters. He started attacking mosques, killing women, children, the elderly inside the mosques. What was pushing him to do all this was his will to satisfy Bush. But now we are saying Musharraf has committed crimes against Muslims and he has destroyed mosques — and our response will be much harder than his acts. We will be teaching him a lesson which history will write with gold and God willing, Musharraf will be in severe pain. And all those who assisted him will also be in pain‖.251 This is not just empty Jihadi rhetoric; it would hardly make sense if a Jihadi umbrella organization of this magnitude is not able to make international inroads into attracting an international following, whilst much smaller organizations have been able to do so. An example would be a foiled Pakistani Taliban plan to cause a terrorist incident in Spain, in which Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) ―claimed responsibility for the terrorist massacre planned in public transports in Barcelona at the beginning of the year (2008)‖, wrote Fernando Reinares, from the Madrid-based Royal Elcano Institute, in El Pais.252 According to Reinares, the movement claimed in a video interview aired at the end of August, 2008, that 12 of its men had been planning the attack. In the video, a spokesman for the Taliban movement named Omar said the attack was planned due to Spain‘s military presence in Afghanistan.‖ It 249

Taliban threaten to kill kidnapped recruits,The News, Wednesday, September 10, 2008. Amir Mir,Battling Baitullah, The Post, Saturday, September 20, 2008. 251 Ibid. 252 TTP claims responsibility for foiled terror plan in Barcelona, Dawn, September 19,2008. 250

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is also worth mentioning in this regard that on January 19, 2008, a group of Islamist radicals, suspected of planning attacks in Barcelona, was arrested by Spanish intelligence services. Spain‘s anti-terrorist court on June 5 charged 11 South Asians, most of them Pakistanis, with belonging to a terrorist group. During the Barcelona raids, police recovered bomb-making equipment, but it was said it was not enough for an attack.253 Fazlullah also operates by implementing an almost fascist terror regime; after consolidating control of the area, Fazlullah has tried to enact his own brand of the Sharia Law within the area controlled by him. The extent of his control can be assessed by the fact that he has set up his own parallel system of administration of justice, a claim which he has been quick to deny in his self contradictory statements254. ―This is not true. We did arrest some killers, drunkards and other criminals and would have delivered them over to the police had the cops been doing their duty instead of locking themselves inside police stations for fear of an attack. The murderers are still in our custody and the seven young students who were caught drinking were released after they sought forgiveness from Allah. We gave them Rs. 100 each so that they could pay for the transport and reach their homes," he said. Public lashings in Mamdheray255 resonate to the media images emanating from Afghanistan during the Taliban heydays.256 "They were bringing a bad name to my organization. People were complaining that my men were involved in criminal activities. I believe the lashing would serve as a deterrent to others." There has been a large-scale destruction of girls‘ schools in Swat since Fazlullah has taken over. This is due to the fact that the Taliban are firmly opposed to women‘s education, considering it un- Islamic. Till September 2008, the total number of destroyed schools was 105257, including 71 girls‘ schools in the district. The destruction of large number of schools in the scenic valley has deprived more than 30,000 students of education. It might be worth mentioning that Swat tended to be quite progressive in terms of education as opposed to neighboring districts, particularly in context of women‘s education, which was widely prevalent. It has become common in most parts of the Frontier and FATA to see refusals by the security forces personnel to be posted in turbulent towns, even when incentives in forms of better salaries are offered. Large-scale desertions have also been witnessed in the Frontier Police and Constabulary ranks, since they are in the forefront of the counterinsurgency operations. In Swat it has gotten to the point where a large number of policemen quit their jobs, and then take out adverts in local newspapers to signify to the militants, that they are no longer involved in operations against them. This is also reflected in the extremely poor turn up in Police recruitment drives in Swat; the repeated relaxation of criteria for these jobs by the state seemingly does not provide the reassurances needed. This was reflected by the en bloc refusal of a contingent of about 600 specially trained commandos of the Elite Police Force (EPF), who refused service in Swat after being placed at the disposal of the head of police there; this contingent later found employment in Peshawar, Dera Ismail Khan, Kohat and Hangu.

253

Ibid. Rahimullah Yusufzai, Inside Fazlullah's headquarters, The News on Sunday, Special report, 4 November, 2007. 255 Fazlullah‘s religious headquarters on the banks of Swat River. 256 (Yusufzai, 4 November 2007). 257 Seven more killed in Swat violence, The News, September 10, 2008. 254

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"It is not (that) ……..I am scared of death, but we cannot be (expected) to stand against this militancy alone with our very poor resources….we need more logistical backup.‖ opined a young commando to me, requesting anonymity. It needs to be remembered that the militants seldom attack large groups of security officers,but tend to capture them from markets or bus stands; this spreads fear of going about their daily lives,or moving alone in their private capacity. ―We cannot be expected to be armed and ready to fight all the time (in off hours) and we cannot be in large groups (particularly) when we are going about our daily lives. I do not want to be hanged for going to the market‖ the same commando added.Public hangings of policemen are apparently a norm in Swat.

Figures 10 and 11. Pakistani Taliban fighters.

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ORGANIZATION The Taliban organization is an incredibly fluid,yet a very co coordinated organization; the juxtaposition of a myriad conglomeration of cultural, religious and social environments in which this organization operates has ensured its evolution as an entity which has a centralized command and control system or Shura, commanding an almost ephemeral informal organizational network. The pre 9/11, rigidly defined central structure commanded by Mullah Omar has almost disappeared. After the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001, the organization has become a much more ‗flat‘ entity258, with local commanders becoming extremely important and independent; they are in fact, the linchpin of the New Taliban organization in Afghanistan and Pakistan. A projected model built up from open source is given below; it should not be taken to be the final word in contextualizing the hierarchy of the Taliban, since it keeps evolving rapidly, with much of the data not being available in the open source. However, the model will suffice as an empirical projection of the greater Taliban organization. The larger Taliban body is headed by Mullah Omar, who is assisted by the Shura, which presumably consists of twelve members and three advisors.259However, Shura members tend to get rotating jobs as military commanders or troubleshooters in different arenas, so the Shura‘s number cannot be taken to be fixed in perpetuity like a rigidly defined hierarchical network. Deaths and capture of Shura members also tends to change the composition of the Shura. In 2003, the members of the original Shura included Jalaluddin Haqqani, Saifur Rahman Mansoor, Mullah Dadullah (deceased, reportedly replaced by Mullah Bakht260), Akhtar Osmani, Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor, Mullah Obaidullah, Hafiz Abdul Majeed, Mullah Mohammad Rasul, Mullah Berader and Mullah Abdur Razzaq Akhundzada.261 It is important to note that even in this projection of a centralized core pool of specialized departments and fighting forces, regional commanders play a critical part, and the groups may morph or exist in different forms according to the whims and environmental conditions of different commanders. Ostensibly, in some areas, the commanders may have a very simple organizational model, structured around fighters and sub commanders and not much more, though it should always be remembered that the Taliban have the ability to send reinforcements and logistics from one theater to another (vis-à-vis Afghanistan and Pakistan).The functional departments also tend to provide an ‗on call‘ function to regional commanders which require their services (need for suicide bombers and so forth). Some regional commanders are more self-sufficient, being able to maintain a structure loosely reminiscent of the model projected above; Fazlullah and Baitullah both are projected to have such capabilities in Pakistan. There are also some liaison management mechanism in place to coordinate with sub organizations or other militant entities; the Taliban in Afghanistan tend to

258

Shahid A. Afsar, Christopher A. Samples, The evolution of the Taliban, Masters Thesis, June ,2008, Naval Postgraduate School. Matt DuPee and Haroon Azizpour, "Blood in the Snow: The Taliban‘s ‗Winter Offensive‘,"Afgha: Afghanistan News, December 7, 2006, http://www.afgha.com/?q=node/1589 260 Matt Dupee, "Analysis: Taliban Replace Dadullah, the State of the Insurgency," Afgha: Afghanistan News, May 15, 2007, http://www.afgha.com/?q=node/2947. 261 Yusufzai, Omar Names Council to Resist Occupation. 259

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keep close liaison with al Qaeda and Baitullah Mehsud‘s organization in Pakistan, while some contact is also maintained with Gulbeddin Hekmatyar‘s Hezb-i-Islami (HiG).262 Similarly, the Pakistani Taliban maintain close liaison with their parent organization and al Qaeda and its affiliates. The organizational structure of the Pakistani Taliban is interesting as an illustrative example of the fluid nature of the organization. Traditionally, the Pakistani Taliban have never been an integral part of the larger Afghan Taliban organization,and have tended to maintain distinct personal identities ,despite sharing ideological affiliations263 This can best be comprehended in terms of the Pakistani enterprises being a ‗network of franchises.‘ Small militant bands which have tended to spring up in the tribal areas of Pakistan, ally themselves ideologically with the Afghan Taliban if they share a sufficient commonality of ideological and territorial interests, which include the establishment of a Pashtun homeland. In return for using the symbolism of the Taliban, they have tended to ally themselves with the Taliban; using this franchise ‗branding‘ to ‗market‘ themselves, which also ensures Taliban support. In return they have to follow the organization‘s strategic objectives. However, the Taliban organization has not just accepted any rag tag group of gun toting militants as legitimate contenders for Taliban membership; the candidate group needs to display a marked degree of affinity for the Taliban ideology to qualify. A group may range from ten to fifty dedicated fighters who share the same Talibanized ideology264; they may prefer to give themselves a distinct identity by naming themselves(for example Karvaan e Naimatullah) or may simply be known as maqami(local) Taliban by the populace. These groups tend to have their own locally generated human intelligence networks, along with varying degrees of logistical capability. These groups tend to coordinate with other local neighbouring groups, which sequentially forms a logistical backup chain for these Taliban. It should at all times be remembered that these groups have the backing of TTP vast infrastructure, and can call for reinforcements, suicide bombers or other human and material resource when required from the umbrella group. It should also be kept in mind that these commanders attain prominence in ― a manner typical of Pashtun tribal history—rise of charismatic persons within a social network who are able to exercise some clout and then get affiliated with the Taliban for further advancement.‖265 This should be evident by tracing the careers of the top three Pakistani Taliban leaders discussed above. Amongst the larger groups, the organization of Mehsud is the ‗purest‘ form of Talibs; as discussed in chapter 1, this organization came into existence due to the influx of a large number of foreign militants, particularly Uzbeks to the FATA areas, Waziristan in particular. Here, they gravitated towards Mehsud‘s tribal band of warriors, which got increasingly radicalized due to their influence; ostensibly, these ‗international‘ linkages brought Mehsud into intimate contact with al Qaeda and Taliban. The other large group was the TNSM militants headed first by Sufi Muhammad, and later by Fazlullah; in the wake of their disparaging rout in 2001, TNSM was looking for a revivalist stimulus. This was ostensibly provided by Mehsud‘s umbrella body of Taliban, with Fazlullah gradually being given all kinds of assistance by Mehsud. This would of course, metamorphosize TNSM in Swat into 262

Daan Van Der Schriek, "Weaker but Not Wiser: The Taliban Today," Terrorism Monitor 3, no. 1 (January 13, 2005), http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369093. 263 Hasan Abbas, "A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan," CTC Sentinel 1, no. 2 (January 2008), 1, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/. 264 ( Afsar, Samples,2008). 265 Ibid.

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the Taliban, effectively subsuming the more militant cadres into what was perceived by them as a more effective organization. In Bajaur, Faqir Muhammad had consistently kept in touch with the Taliban and al Qaeda command as discussed; it is easy to conceptualize his band of warriors being attracted towards the Taliban. As regards numbers, Baitullah reportedly commanded a force of 20,000 to 30,000 fighters266 in the tribal areas of Northwest Pakistan. Without discriminating between Muslims and non-Muslims, he has dispatched suicide-bombers to kill Pakistani police and soldiers in Swat, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, and Peshawar. A particularly embarrassing incident for the state was the capture of more than 200 Pakistani soldiers; they were held hostage for two months until Mehsud‘s demands were met. Consequently, General Musharraf reached a settlement with Baitullah, exchanging 25 militants in government custody for the captured troops. Musharraf later admitted that these men were trained suicide bombers, and one of them was under indictment for participating in a suicide bombing. As part of the deal, Baitullah agreed to expel foreign militants from his territories and stop attacking the army; but Baitullah as usual flouted this commitment. This can be seen as part of the wider strategy to further entrench his foothold in the area of control. As an analogy with Swat, whenever there is a peace treaty with the militants, they use the time available to consolidate their stronghold in the area. This is done by giving attempts to give a sense of security to the locals. This attitude can be examined in light of a local‘s statement: ―Baitullah succeeded in establishing peace in the area. Thus, the local people started trusting him.‖ Unfortunately, the Pakistan army failed to take action against Baitullah's private army taking up the self-assumed responsibility without any governmental mandate for establishing law and order in the area. Pro-government and pro-US tribal people are being killed in Waziristan, sometime on the basis of hearsay and in the absence of any formal evidence; which is really alarming in any civilized country. As regards organizational skills, "Baitullah's lashkar (army) is well organised. He has divided it into various units and assigned particular tasks to each unit….. One of the units been tasked to kill people who are pro-government and pro-US and support the US occupation of Afghanistan," says a source in the Frontier Constabulary267. The number of fighters he has had at his command has remained open to conjecture: some sources claim 25-30,000.Some have quoted a figure of nearer to 20,000.However, a local tribal chief has put the number between 8,000 and 10,000 well-trained fighters. "He is no doubt the most influential and powerful person of South and North Waziristan areas," he said.268 "His state stretches from South Waziristan to Bajur and from North Waziristan to Kurram agency (approximately 2700 Sq Kilometers)."Around 2500 to 3000 foreign fighters, mostly of central Asian origin, are thought to be the forte of his force. Baitullah was recently elected as Amir (commander) of Taliban Tehrik (movement) Pakistan. "He is now the head of all the tribes harbouring sympathies for Taliban. Tribesmen (local Taliban) from South Waziristan to Bajur agency have gathered under his flag, making him the most powerful and influential person in the tribal belt," reported a local journalist269.Baitullah has a long list of major victories to his credit till the start of 2008; the capture of two 266

(Latif 2008). ( Shehzad 2006). 268 (Latif 2008). 269 Ibid 267

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important military forts in South Waziristan on January 16 and 17, 270and the much flouted capture of Pakistani army men being just two of the many ‗accomplishments.‘ This has been a major irritant for some Pakistani policy makers; Lt General Ali Mohammad Jan Orakzai, the governor of the North Western Frontier Province and a former corps commander of Peshawar resigned in December 2007, ostensibly because of the central government‘s inept handling of the Waziristan situation. There abound many opinions about the exact role of Mehsud within the overall Pakistani paradigm; Lt General (rtd.) Hameed Gul, a security analyst and a former head of the powerful Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) believes Baitullah was not at war with the army as an institution. ―He is acting against only those who have been there (in tribal area) at the behest of America. Otherwise, if not his brother, I am sure his many cousins would be in Pakistan army.‖ He insists that the military interventions in the tribal area and last year's fiasco of Red Mosque onslaught have boosted Baitullah's popularity.271 ―His only strength is a tribal system, which has given him so much power. In tribal system, everyone is your brother or cousin. So it's very hard for a tribesman to sit idle if his brother, cousin or even fellow tribesman is fighting. "Gul also maintains that there was no personal animosity towards slain Bhutto. ―Taliban came into being during her stint. Her government fully supported Taliban and they too never considered her an enemy," said the former ISI chief." She was personally conveyed [a message] by Mehsud that he was not her enemy. She accepted that clarification that is why her party men reject the government claims about Mehsud's involvement in her assassination." The veteran expert contends that the issue of Baitullah is being played for political reason "This is just a hype being created by the US intelligence agencies about him to provide an excuse to their force to enter Pakistan and attack," he told IOL." There is no comparison between Mehsud, and Bin Laden or Ayman Zuwahiri. He is a simple reaction or retaliation to the bombings and killings of his fellow tribesmen by Pakistan Bomb. The militants say they don't wish to fight Pakistani security forces because it only benefits the Americans.‖ He argues that Baitullah is not the first "victim" of such a hype campaign. "He is not the first one who is being presented as a big fish. Before him, there were Nek Muhammad, Abul Firaj Al-Libbi, Amjad Farooqi and Abdullah Mehsud," said Gul, naming local Al-Qaeda chiefs killed by security forces in recent years. "It has become a trend here to make villains and then kill them."272

Meanwhile, the fundamentalist movement of Fazlullah in Swat has continued to expand at a rapid pace. "Fazlullah has become a spiritual figure now. A multitude of foreign elements, including Arabs, Uzbeks and Chechens moved out from Mirali, Darra Adam Khel and Bajaur, and reached there. "They are in full control of the region and are directly involved in carrying out actions against our security forces," was reportedly disclosed by a senior security to the media.273 "Maulana Fazlullah has a fighting strength of 4600, with an added

270

Ibid. Ibid. 272 Ibid. 273 The News, November 4,2007. 271

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400-member Shaheen274 Commando Force that patrol the streets of Swat with guns placed on their vehicles. The Maulana's stronghold remains the 59 villages of Matta sub division," opined the Home Secretary (the senior most official in charge of law and order for the NWFP province) to the media in 2007.275 Even the Mulla‘s zeal has paled in comparison with some of his followers who have reportedly joined him from Mirali in North Waziristan, Darra Adam Khel, Bajaur and other tribal areas to fight the security forces. Some sources have claimed that he has lost control over some of his more overzealous fighters. The ruthless beheadings of captured security personnel are being ascribed to these fighters, which reportedly have a large foreign element within them. It was also reported that militants from the South Waziristan Agency as well as foreign militants belonging to Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) had arrived in Swat to support Fazlullah‘s attempt to Talibanise Swat and establish his fiefdom in the region. It is reminiscent of Jihadi fighters joining the conflicts in Bosnia, Chechnya and Kashmir. This suggests that there is an inherent power vacuum in a Terromodel, where a positive tactic stimulus for Jihad attracts fractionalization of militant ideologies, complicating the circle of violence. This facet of the Terromodel in Swat merits further research and in-depth strategic analysis. At the same time, the TTP leaders have seemed to make sure that in the event of their demise or removal, there will always be a fresh supply of leaders to fill in the gaps. ―The intelligence reports from the tribal areas suggest that it‘s not only the threat of Baitullah Mehsud that we have to cope with but there is a large group of little known but diehard commanders who could launch attacks on security forces when they feel it is necessary for the survival of Taliban movement,‖ mentioned a senior official requesting anonymity. ―He said that at the most the people had heard of Maulvi Faqir Muhammad, Baitullah‘s deputy in Bajaur, Fazlullah in Swat and Omar Khalid in Mohmand agency but there were still many others like them who could show their skills in case of need.‖276

THE NEW TALIBAN AND SOCIAL JUSTICE As espoused by Maudoodi, Jihad is a binding duty of all Muslims, but they must begin this Jihad first by correcting themselves (Amar bil-ma`ruf ), and then go on to correcting others through instructions (Nahi `an al-munkar), entering into a war only if the conditions set for the justification of Jihad make it necessary. It was demonstrable by the almost obsessive zeal of the Taliban in Afghanistan to start implementing penal laws and controlling unruly elements in the society; they were presumably justifying the device of jihad by correcting their society first. The newer Pakistani Taliban has done the same; even when Pakistani military operations were proceeding against them, they have been engaged in

274

The word means eagle. The symbolism used connotes a sense of urgency and a sharp eye on affairs, which is not wholly undeserved. Reports coming in categorize the mulla‘s forces to be arranged with an almost military precision and discipline. 275 Javed Aziz Khan, No operation yet: A compilation of official versions even as senior officers refuse to talk to the media, November 4,2007. 276 Shaiq Hussain, New breed of Taliban commanders lined up, The Nation on web, July 26, 2008. http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Politics/26-Jul-2008/New-breed-ofTaliban-commanders-lined-up.

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organizing penal punishments against offenders. Certainly, Baitullah Mehsud has engaged in these tactics, and so has Fazlullah. It does seem that the inherent structural imbalances in distributive social justice in FATA have left gaping wounds, which the extremist project is quick to exploit. The NWFP province as a whole and FATA in particular, have tended to feel left out of Pakistani development processes. For instance NWFP received more funds from the federation as its constitutional share from net profits of hydro-electric power generation in 1991 than in 2007, which is surprising since it is the hub of such production. A World Bank report277 on NWFP clearly documented wide spread poverty, a provincial GDP which was only 60 % of the national GDP, and achievement in the education and health sectors well below the national average. It had the highest infant mortality rate in Pakistan of 56 deaths per 1000 live births. Only 58% of the total households received clean drinking water. The NWFP seemingly does not get its fair share even in the judicially determined shares of the governmental gross net profits.278 The FATA areas fare even worse. One of the reasons for militancy in tribal areas may very well be the legitimacy deficit both on the political and economic fronts; for instance the unemployment rate for the age group 15-25 years in Waziristan is above 80%.With such abysmal statistics, it hardly needs a huge stretch of imagination to conceptualize that the unemployed youths may be attracted towards militancy as a way of venting their grievances. Real life examples illustrate how the militants try to fill in the socio-economic vacuum. Hussein Khan, who owns a pharmacy in Wana, the capital of South Waziristan, says local tribesmen like Baitullah for some of his ‗good‘ acts. ―He has restored law and order in the area. Dacoits and thieves have left the area fearing harsh punishments,‖ he told a media person. According to him, ―Some people also believe that there are many bad people in his militia", citing the killing of 13 family members of the federal government's political agent in Khyber agency, an adjacent tribal area, in an armed attack by Baitullah's militia about four months.‖ He (Baitullah) publicly apologized for the incident," Khan said. "The Taliban involved in the attack have been languishing in (his) jail for the last four months. They would have been punished if anti-security sentiments against military action had not been aroused279and military option had not been exercised." ―Mehsud is gaining the advantage of indiscriminate bombing and killing of common tribesmen. Sympathies are increasing for him with every passing day. I am not a literate person, or a security expert, but I know that no military operation will succeed against him," he added280. ―Those who are not supporters of Osama [bin laden] or Baitullah, even they have been forced by the indiscriminate military operation to harbour sympathies". Aslam Awan, a journalist working with the Jihadi publication Weekly Takbeer, mentions setting up of a ‗special task force‘ in June last year to crack purportedly crack down on criminals in South Waziristan. "This force launched a number of crackdowns and made a feared kidnapper Abdul Rashid Bakakhel free some of his hostages. Baitullah also collected donations from the local people to establish peace. It was a kind of protection money," Awan continues.281 277

World Bank. ―Pakistan: NWFP Economic Report,‖ 2005. Govt of NWFP. ―Arbitration on Net Hydel Profit Between NWFP and WAPDA,‖ Finance Department, 9th Oct 2006. 279 (Latif 2008). 280 Ibid. 281 (Shehzad 2006). 278

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Similarly, Fazlullah seems to be playing out the Robin Hood theme, mentioned above. 282 Again, as mentioned above, public lashings in Mamdheray resonate to the media images emanating from Afghanistan during the Taliban heydays.283 It is pertinent to mention here that many of these acts are endorsed by the local populace, since these are seen as nondiscriminatory acts aimed at punishing criminals masquerading as Taliban and committing acts of robbery. In an area where the locals have traditionally complained of ineffective governance by successive governments, which allegedly indulged in nepotism and inadequate resource allocation, a heightened local sense of security may be a driving factor swelling the ranks of his followers. A Terromodel hypothesis does seem to suggest a governance imbalance. In a ‗closed‘ society(like Waziristan) which is sequestrated from the mainstream society at large, it is easier to comprehend the negative spiral effects of ineffective governance, but in an area which is relatively affluent by FATA standards, there is a complex interplay of different centrifugal forces which need to be researched in their context. The amount of aid and Government resource allocation also needs to be accounted for to appreciate the dynamics of the process. Marc Sagemen284 suggests that the commonplace stereotypical conception of penniless, opportunity denied Muslim youths turning to violence is not necessarily true. Instead, the desire to reconstruct, or put more suitably, deconstruct the existing society for a more egalitarian one drives some of them to acts such as suicide bombing. Thus, in a Terromodel, existing socio-economic variables would have to interpolated with psycho-social and other juxtaposing factors.

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FUNDING There is evidence to support the hypothesis that since the state sponsorship of terrorism has declined dramatically since the Cold War; militant entities have turned to other alternative sources of funding, including wealthy Arab benefactors in the Middle East, UAE, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Conventionally, it has been a widely held belief the Taliban get their funding from a global network of informal funders and sympathizers, as well as sympathetic state players in the Muslim world. This has always tended to be a very shadowy affair, with very little information coming out into the open source. It is reasonable to assume, however, that state patronage cannot be ruled out in this area replete with proxy wars. However, such a picture is not at all complete without the interpolation of Taliban funding generated by utilizing charities, covert ‗feeder‘ fronts, drug trade, taxation, crime, and natural resources like gemstones, timber and marble. In order to facilitate money transfers from donors, many businesses and banks are used as "fronts", enabling militant organizations to receive money in the name of income transfers. In the mid-1990s, the CIA estimated that fifty Islamic charities "support terrorist groups or employ individuals who are suspected of having terrorist connections." 285The militant organizations are extremely careful about their financial matters; in its famous military 282

(Yusufzai, November 4 ,2007). Ibid. 284 Sageman, Marc. Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century( Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007) 285 Gunaratna, Rohan, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (Lahore, 2002: Vanguard Press). 283

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manual, ‗Declaration of Jihad against the Country's Tyrants,‘ al Qaeda instructs its cadres about handling money; the same principles have ostensibly been used by the militant organizations in Pakistan, including presumably the Taliban. ―The group follows five financial security principles: funds should be divided between those invested for financial return and the balance — operational funds — that should be saved and spent only on operations; operational funds should not all be put in one place; only a few of the organization‘s members should know the location of its funds; while carrying large amounts of money precautions should be taken; and money should be left with non-members and spent only when needed.‖286 Militant organizations in Pakistan have tended to depend heavily on the hawala informal banking system, whereby funds are transferred on a personal guarantee of the sender, therefore bypassing governmental scrutiny or accountability. Pakistani bankers have estimated that the hawala system accounted for $2.5 to $3 billion entering the country each year till 2002, compared to only $1 billion via the formal banking system. For instance, in Pakistan alone there were over a 1,000 hawaladars in 2002, some dealing in amounts as large as $10 million.287 Even though the hawala system has tended to decrease in importance in the wake of the Pakistani government‘s crackdown on this informal money transfer industry, it cannot be ruled out as a source of income transfer, particularly in context of charity money raised overseas by expatriate Pakistanis, and sent home on the personal guarantee of a hawaladar. Trust funds and charities become all important in this context. At least two major funds have been utilized by al Qaeda and its affiliates in Pakistan; Al Rasheed and Al Akhtar trusts. When Pakistani intelligence agencies retrieved al-Akhtar's trust deeds from at least two banks where the group had accounts, they found out that between 1999 and 2002, al-Akhtar received about 100 million dollars in its two bank accounts at the Habib Bank Limited's foreign exchange branch in Karachi. This amount was transferred in 38 transactions from all over the Western hemisphere, from cities like New York, Switzerland and the UK.288 In 2002, the State Bank of Pakistan froze the accounts of Al Akhtar and Al Rasheed trusts under an al Qaeda-specific resolution (1333) of the UN General Assembly. Al Rasheed trust is one of the most important sources of money for al Qaeda in Asia; set up in 1996 by Deobandi scholar Maulana Mufti Rasheed Ahmed, the trust‘s primary goal was to ostensibly promote welfare programmes in Pakistan. However, it became famous for its Afghan focus; its trustee in chief Mufti Abdul Raheem was reputed to have close ties with 'Jihadi' and sectarian Deobandi groups, and was accorded special official protocol by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The trust has maintained its strong Jihadist connections; the trust and Jaish e Muhammad reportedly share office space across Pakistan, along with a certain overlapping of cadre strength. Maulana Masood Azhar, the chief of JM was a regular contributor in an Al Rasheed‘s publication, Zarb-e-Momin. The trust reportedly holds the foreign funds of JM in trust, with Masood Azhar being projected as the Emir of Taliban in Jammu and Kashmir by Al Rasheed office holders. Al Rasheed trust has been postulated to be one of the main financial conduits for funds supplied to al Qaeda, Taliban and the Jaish e Muhammad. The trust was also initially linked with the Harkat-ul-Ansar before the formation

286

(Gunaratna, 2002) p.63. Ibid. 288 Maqbool Ahmed, ‗Saving for a rainy day,‘ Herald, October 2008. 287

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of JM, and is also said to be connected with Lashkar Taiba. Thus, the trust funds a wide spectrum of the biggest militant organizations in Pakistan. In 2003, the US Treasury outlawed both Al-Akhtar and Al-Rasheed. Even after their accounts were frozen, Al-Akhtar and Al-Rasheed trusts received 10 million dollars each in 2006; this was ostensibly collected from sacrificial skins by a UK based organization, which also reportedly transferred 20 million dollars to its own account at a Quetta branch of the Metropolitan Bank. Half of the sum was sent to various accounts of each of the two trusts. Reportedly, from 2004 onwards, Al-Rasheed trustees changed their tactics and started transferring funds to some individuals and to two sub-organizations, Al-Ameen Trust and Islam Welfare Foundation, which are actually nom de guerres for the Al Rasheed trust. AlAkhtar also invested heavily in real estate; it purchased property; this method of investment was also followed by several militant organizations like the Lashkar-e-Taiba,which bought land worth 25.5 million rupees and invested upwards of 20 million rupees in education, publishing, health, farming and transportation.289 Al-Rasheed has seemingly diversified its portfolio to confuse efforts at tracking funds; two institutions which were run directly under the fund, Darul Afta Wai Irshad and Jamaatur Rasheed,are now administered by an affiliate organization called Majlis-e-Ilmi, which also manages the Karachi Institute of Management Sciences, a Shariah department at Jamaatur Rasheed postgraduate diploma in Shariah law, al-Bairooni Model School and al-Bairooni Inter College. The Truth International, a monthly magazine of Al Rasheed trusts, has also started publication after a ban of several years.290 Pakistan does not have laws in place which suffice as anti terror financing legislation; the closest laws are the Anti money Laundering ordinance 2007, promulgated by Musharraf. This is still inadequate since it does not cover terrorism financing, though it does have provisions for a Financial monitoring Unit (FMU) to be established within the State Bank; this is largely a placebo, since this unit has not actively started functioning yet. Terrorist money laundering is recognized as a non cognizable offence, not allowing the police or agencies to launch a case or carry out arrests of their own accord. All these legal lacunae have only added to the difficulties in tracing money flows generated and channeled by the militant organizations, including the Taliban. Raising money from criminal activities has also been a forte of the militant organizations in Pakistan; the Taliban are not loath to utilize this method either. Ostensibly, such activities in a Dar ul Harb (house of war) are perceived to be legal. This is the distorted ideology, which goes into legitimizing many of the far from legal actives carried out by the Taliban and allied Jihadi organizations in Pakistan. Funds raised for their campaign have been projected to be in excess of one billion rupees over the past two years, according to figures from Karachi alone.291 In the wake of Pakistani government‘s clampdown on Jihadi organizations in the post 9/11 scenario, Jihadi assets were frozen, and a lot of fund raising infrastructure was demolished under American pressure. Ineffective fund raising meant that the outfits had invested in agricultural and commercial real state speculative investments as alternatives, which had tended to produce huge profits. However, enforced bans meant that these properties could not be purchased in the names of the organizations; members deputed to be 289

(Maqbool Ahmed,Herald October 2008). Ibid. 291 Maqbool Ahmed, In the name of God, Herald, October ,2008. 290

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‗trustees‘ inasmuch that property was purchased in their names, tended to abscond with the same. A severe economic crunch and the bursting of the property ‗bubble‘ meant that these sources of money dried up as well. For want of an alternative, many of these groups turned to crime, since it did not carry any perceivable stigma, ostensibly being committed for ‗higher‘ causes. This is not just speculation; Badshah Deen Mehsud, a close aide of Baitullah Mehsud, has been arrested in Karachi on charges of masterminding kidnappings for ransom, dacoities and hijackings.292 All the money from these activities tended to end in the militants‘ kitty; Badshah ran a huge organization in Karachi which was organized more like a top down mafia organization, with squads operating in specially targeted areas. Badshah‘s son Meharban Mehsud was supposedly heading a large organization, which is allegedly involved in raising funds through criminal activities for the Taliban movement. The story of Muhammad Farhan Qasim293 is also instructive; he was arrested in connection with several high profile kidnappings for ransom involving millions of rupees. Farhan confessed to Karachi police that he had carried out these crimes at the behest of Baitullah Mehsud, for the purpose of Taliban‘s ‗Jihad.‘ Not just money is in demand; interestingly, several members of Tehreek-e-Islami, Sirajuddin Haqqani‘s organization, were arrested stealing walkie talkies and laptops from electronic shops in Karachi in December 2006.294These were reportedly passed on to Mullah Dadullah through intermediaries. A criminal-militant nexus has also been hypothesized, with Jundullah operating in Karachi city tied in with the groups in FATA, while Tehreek-e-Islami is obviously allied with Afghan groups; both these organizations tended to maintain overlapping links with organized criminal mafias. As during the Taliban heydays, opium has become a major source of Taliban financing in Afghanistan; with improvements in the irrigation system, Afghanistan virtually has the monopoly on the World‘s production of opium.295 The 2006 harvest alone was estimated at over $3 billion.296 The revenues in succeeding years have been projected to be in excess of these figures, with Afghanistan currently producing 93 percent of the world‘s opium;297 it is estimated that almost a half of Afghanistan‘s GDP is generated from the opium trade. The Taliban in Pakistan differ from their Afghan variant by methods of drug financing; opium growing does not figure prominently into the state of affairs, as Pakistan is a small level producer of the narcotic substance. However, opium ‗transit‘ is certainly big Taliban business; some estimates put about 90 percent of the Afghan opium produce to pass through North and South Waziristan and Bajaur agency.298 A military officer posted in the counterinsurgency operation told me in a interview: ― (It) seems that the these areas have become the charas(a colloquial name for drugs) silk route….(probably) the Taliban are controlling this lucrative trade through the help of their counterparts across the border….(it is hard) to estimate the amount …(perhaps) millions of dollars worth(of produce).‖ 292

Maqbol Ahmed, Wanted; threat perception, Herald, May 2009. (Maqbool Ahmed, October ,2008). 294 (Maqbool Ahmed, October ,2008). 295 House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing on Afghanistan, Afghanistan: The Rise of the NarcoTaliban: Testimony of Congressman Mark Kirk, 2007, 1, www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/kir021507.pdf (accessed November 29, 2007). 296 Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [2007]), www.unodc.org/pdf/research/AFG07_ExSum_web.pdf (accessed October 1, 2007). 297 Ibid. 298 Zahir Shah, ‗Hostage to Jihad,‘ Herald, October 2008. 293

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The Taliban had a lot of opportunity to boost their funds with the sale of marble, after taking over the Ziarat marble quarry in Mohmand Agency in April 2008. FATA is a major producer of marble, with around a million tons of marble a year being mined every year. A substantial amount of government input had been projected to increase marble and granite exports to $500m by 2013299; this lucrative mining business was taken over almost completely by the militants in Mohmand agency. The Taliban next took control of the lucrative government controlled emerald mines in Mingora, Swat. Reportedly, these mines had been occupied by the militants during the Sufi Muhammad (see chapter 3) brokered peace deal. The nearby Shamozai and Gujjar Killi mines were also occupied, and a lucrative militant controlled gem trade ensued, with reportedly a third of the profits being shared by the Taliban with the local populace. The lucrative timber trade in Swat and Dir areas was also taken over by the Taliban. It is hard to calculate exactly how much they are gaining from the timber trade, but it is estimated that the government of Pakistan is losing out 65 billion rupees annually from the illegal timber trade, and the Taliban seem to be getting a large chunk of this illegally gained money at the government‘s expense. Jizya is an important source of Taliban revenue, which is a poll tax levied on non-Muslim minorities living under Islamic rule, and sanctioned by the Sharia law, in this case the Taliban‘s version of it. The Sikhs living in Orakzai Agency have faced the brunt of this ruthlessly collected tax; resultantly, many of them have emigrated to other areas, in which case their property and houses have been appropriated by the Taliban. Sikhs have been resident in Orakzai agency for decades, and were well integrated into the tribal society. All this ended when the Taliban under Hakeemullah Mehsud descended on Orakzai; the Sikhs were subsequently forced to pay Jizya at gunpoint, with forcible conversion as the only other alternative given. The Jizya amounts demanded were exorbitant; initially a hundred million rupees were demanded, which were scaled down to half that amount after negotiations with Sikh elders. The Sikhs were warned that any non compliance with the terms of the ‗agreement‘ would result in the men being killed and the women and children being converted.300 As above, foreign funding cannot be ruled out,though the Taliban have vehemently denied getting any help from outside the country. Even though the government has been quick to point fingers at foreign hands, the militants themselves have been vocal about their movement having indigenous roots; they have tended to characteristically display ownership of their movement as a home grown movement, rather than a ‗foreigner‘ directed unrest. However, their claims of the movement as being plentifully supplied via theft from NATO convoys and arms captured from Pakistani forces seems too simplistic an assertion in a region which has always been a part of one ‗great game‘ or the other.

MANGAL BAGH The tribal areas of Pakistan are currently replete with the emergence of new warlords, who are setting up formidable militias and are gradually taking over control of the FATA areas from the state.Some of them claim to be distinct from the Taliban, but are as 299 300

The News, May 11,2009. http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=176843. The Sikhs of Orakzai, The News, May 03, 2009, http://www.thenews.com.pk/arc_news.asp?id=8.

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ideologically motivated as the most die hard Taliban groups, and are thus potential Taliban constituent groups. Mangal Bagh Afridi is the most prominent name amongst them. He is the head of the Lashkar-e-Islami(the army of Islam),which is poised to become the dominant force in the Khyber agency area of the FATA .The agency is adjacent to the urban centre of Peshawar, and separated form it by just a flimsy barrier. Beyond the barrier, and apparently even before it, the writ of the Pakistani government all but disappears; Mangal Bagh has become the law here. Even though he is as zealous in the fundamentalist interpretation and implementation of his form of Shariah, he presents an interesting contrast from rest of the warlords in FATA like Baitullah Mehsud and Fazlullah. This is due to the fact that he has consistently aligned himself ideologically with the state (at the same time defying it) and has vehemently denied terrorism tactics, and has also not joined the Taliban movement in Pakistan. His mission statement is almost Robin Hood like in character, claiming to mete out egalitarian social justice, and rooting out crime, which to some extent is true. However, he does this with an iron hand; any resistance is swiftly and permanently quelled. He has visibly reduced the criminal activities in the area, while also having a huge impact on drug trafficking. At the same time he is engaged in a bitter ideological and sectarian struggle with a rival faction, a feud which has claimed many lives, and has blatantly and forcefully defied the state. It is worthwhile tracing his ascent up the warlord ladder to the head of Lashkar-e-Islam. He comes from the least prestigious of the eight clans of Afridis settled in Khyber Agency i.e. Malik-Khel, Qambar Khel, Adamkhel, ZakaKhel, Qamar-Khel, Akakhel, Kukkikhel, and Sepah. The 35 years old Bagh, belongs to the last. He is not educated, having never attended any school, but has studied for some years at a madrassah, though not attaining any religious qualifications worth the mention. Born and brought up in humble circumstances, his father died early, and his mother raised him almost single-handedly. Thus, initially, he was constrained to holding the unenviable position of a truck-cleaner plying on the smuggling route of Bara-Peshawar. Though most of the reports put him in the position of a bus cleaner cum conductor, he has gone on record as saying that his family owned one or two buses, which he operated. In any case, he comes from a humble background. This has definitely shaped his worldview. ―His humble origins have made him anti-feudal and pro-people. He loses no opportunity to criticise the Maliks, the hereditary tribal elders who are traditionally pro-establishment and receive all the benefits doled out by the government. He is keen to highlight the plight of the ordinary tribesmen and motivated to solve the problems confronting the common man. If he has his way, he would like to rob the rich to pay the poor like a modern-day Robin Hood. That explains the reason for young men, mostly jobless, to flock to his banner and make up bulk of his Lashkar-i-Islam outfit.‖301 Mangal Bagh has led a strange existence, drifting between two differing ideologies: as a young man he fought with the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviets. After returning home, he remained a member of the secular and nationalist ANP, an anti-thesis of fundamentalist parties. Not being too fastidious in his religious approach, he used the ladder of Awami National Party (ANP) to become Secretary of Bara Transport Association in the Year-2001. His first religious exposure came when he joined Taleeghi Jamaat (an evangelical Islamic organization) and started his trips for the propagation of Islamic principles as dictated by the Jamaat. Innumerable opportunities were opened for him through this organization, and soon 301

The News on Sunday, 11 May 2008.

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thereafter he was seen in the company of Mufti Shakir. Shakir hailed from Karbogha village in District Hangu, and was engaged in leading a hardliner religious movement under the aegis of Harkat-ul-Islam. Shakir was active in making announcements on a FM radio station and denouncing Pir Saif-ur-Rehman, representing the Barelvi School of thought, and in turn heading his own movement of Ansar-ul-Islam.It would be appropriate to dwell briefly on the history of both these clerics to put the Mangal Bagh narrative in its paradigmatic perspective. Neither Mufti Shakir nor Pir Rahman were indigenous to the FATA region; the former belongs to Hangu, while the latter is a legacy of the Afghan influence upon the region. Pir Saifur Rahman arrived from Afghanistan in the 1970s, and settled in the Soordand area of the Bara Tehsil, Khyber Agency. He preached the Barelvi school of thought, which is one of the more tolerant and flexible strain of Islam .Before long, he had built up a significant following in the region. Mufti Shakir, a more radical traveling evangelist,showed up in the Khyber Agency much later, but built up a following much quicker due to the comparatively laissez faire preaching of Rahman. Shakir‘s initiation, in turn, had come about in late 2003 at the hands of a local cleric, Haji Naamdar, who launched the Amar Bil Maroof Wa Nahianalmunkir (Promotion of virtue and prevention of vice) and commissioned the fiery orator Mufti Muneer Shakir to preach to the followers. Shakir‘s oratory soon galvanized locals, the majority of whom had been disillusioned by the existing social conditions in FATA. Socio-economic deprivations played a critical role in catapulting Amar Bil Maroof Wa Nahianalmunkir into an acceptable organization which was seen as delivering justice. Lashkar-e-Islam has continued and built up on that legacy. In late 2004, Haji Naamdar gradually went in the background, thereby leaving the field to Shakir, who came into his own, and thus the ideological foundations for the formation of the Lashkar –e-Islam were laid, though Mangal Bagh was to later concretize the organization. Shakir, aptly named ‗Shola Bayan‘ (fiery speaker) was a proponent of the stricter, traditionalist, Deobandi school of Islam. He ingenuously set up a makeshift radio operation in his courtyard, and began to preach his particular brand of Jihadist and sectarian preaching (the Deobandi school of thought is opposed to the Shiite tenets of faith in Islam). It may be relevant to note that Shakir had earlier been thrown out of the Kurram Agency by tribal elders there for fanning sectarian hatred. Shakir‘s ‗radio ministry‘ quickly gained popularity. Since this was the time when Jihad was in vogue, his sermons attracted hundreds of supporters, many of them formerly from Rahman‘s faction. As retaliation, and to recapture his target audience, Pir Rahman launched his own radio operation in 2005. A huge paradox about the FM Mullahs (in general) is that they are, at least initially, extremely popular in the class they tend to oppress the most; women. Locals mention that women have a lot to do with their success in gaining their followers. This may strange to western analysts particularly, since these mullahs tend to convert women under their influence into black walking tents, but perhaps the answer lies in the traditional role of the woman as the matriarchic influence in the tribal society. The women in FATA tend to stay inside homes, where they exact an indiscernible but definite influence on shaping the mindset of the children, particularly since the males tend to stay outdoors for sometimes protracted periods in search of employment. Shakir and Rahman aired religion-based question-andanswer programs (often about social issues such as marriage and duty) which tended to appeal to the conservative, isolated women in these tribal villages. These clerics convinced the women (Shakir more than Rahman) that it was their bounden religious duty to ensure that their husbands, brothers, and sons observe Islam properly, dress properly, grow beards etc.

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Debatably, this has shaped the worldview of many youngsters growing up under the tutelage of their mothers. Villagers in the region are very poor, but FATA society is an emotive one; they tend to follow local movements which catch on with great zeal. They collectively finance such popular clerical operations by carrying out donation campaigns, which ends up by locals donating even the meager valuables that they have. Women have a large role to play in shaping this outlook by their almost invisible, but significant domestic influence on children and men. Both Shakir and Rahman discovered that they were competing for the same target audience, and the same finite resources. Consequently, their tussle degenerated into all out war. In December 2005, tribal elders in the Bara area denounced and exiled both of them for the charge of fomenting sectarian hatred. But the Pandora‘s box had been opened; both rival camps now consisted of hundreds of armed warriors intent on eradicating the other because of their purportedly un -Islamic views. Hence, otherwise avoidable skirmishes resulted between Harkat-ul-Islam and Ansar-ul-Islam. Both of these Evangelists cum War-lords were made to leave the area after 21 men lost their lives in consequence of armed conflicts, as per the announcement of the Tribal Jirga. In response, both Rahman and Shakir went into hiding, but not before Shakir had appointed a deputy as a successor — a man named Mangal Bagh. This journey from a cleaner to a commander only took four to five years. Mangal Bagh presided over the movement as Amir-e-Lashkar-e-Islam; whereas Qazi Mehboob took over the leadership of Ansar-ul-Islam. Mangal took Shakir‘s organization to heights he could have only dreamed of; he built up the Lashkar-e-Islam (Army of Islam), and the rest, as they say, is history. The power politics of the two rival camps did not abate though; the bloodshed though originally stopped by the Jirga, continued till it had taken the toll of about 400-500 human lives. A ceasefire brokered by Afghan Taliban leader Ustad Yasir ended the fighting in Bara and Tirah, but by then Lashkar-i-Islam had emerged stronger than Ansar ul Islam. The latter is now confined to Tirah valley, with Mehboob and his top lieutenants shifting to the mountainous Tirah valley to survive. The Ansar ul Islam is believed to be stronger than the Lashkar-i-Islam in Tirah, but the remoteness of the valley and absence of government control means the group doesn't have much political and military clout, and is unable to get the attention of the media. In the wake of the disturbance that shed so much blood, Pakistan Government sent 8,000 troops from its Frontier Corps paramilitary unit to enforce the writ of the state. Shakir‘s headquarters were shelled and Mangal Bagh was also told to leave. Bagh went undercover for a while, but very soon resurfaced to assume the undisputed command of Lashkar-e-Islam. . There were some reports that Shakir was arrested at the Karachi airport, and has been in Jail since late 2007. Pir Saifur Rahman seems to have dropped of the strategic radar of important warlords in the area. 302 Some reports mention him as fleeing into Punjab. According to a famous Urdu proverb," two swords cannot be put in the same scabbard". This proverb seems to apply ipso facto and mutatis mutandis to radical Muslim clerics as well. Meanwhile, Mangal Bagh has not only taken military command of the organization, but has developed into quite an eloquent orator. To quote from Rahimullah Yusufzai ―He confessed being illiterate even though he is able to read Urdu newspapers and applications 302

Sonya fatah, FM Mullahs, Columbia journalism 2006,http://cjrarchives.org/issues/2006/4/fatah.asp.

review,

issue

4

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made by people seeking his intervention and help in almost every matter. He did study for some years in a madrassah and is, therefore, able to quote from the Quran and Ahadith to make his point. He is articulate and his nightly 9 pm speeches on his illegal FM radio channel are eagerly listened to by people in Bara to keep themselves abreast about his decisions and policies. Listeners pointed out that he speaks like a learned man and can go on for long.‖303 There is strong suspicion that Bagh is fighting a proxy battle for some agencies in Pakistan. He is undoubtedly a political opportunist inasmuch as he throws his entire weight about for a tribe fighting against another faction, thus managing to enlarge to broaden his own sphere of influence in the area. ―Mangal Bagh‘s fiefdom is the Bara tehsil of Khyber Agency. He has been gradually extending his influence to other areas such as Jamrud, Landikotal and the remote Tirah valley. His attempt to set up base in Jamrud was thwarted by sections of the Kukikhel Afridi subtribe dwelling there. But his armed intervention prompted some tribal elders to seek his forgiveness and forced traders selling liquor and drugs to give up their business, at least for the time-being. It is another matter that this clandestine business cannot be halted owing to the huge demand for heroin, opium and liquor from buyers in neighbouring Peshawar and beyond. Mangal Bagh even made his presence felt in some villages located on the edge of Khyber Agency in Peshawar district by sending his fighters there to intimidate fearful villagers into submission. Villagers in Sheikhan area tried to resist but they were no match for the heavilyarmed fighters from Lashkar-i-Islam, or Army of Islam, the tribal militia commanded by Mangal Bagh.‖304 Asked to explain Lashkar-i-Islam‘s objectives, Mangal Bagh said: ―Ours is a reformist organisation trying to promote virtue and prevent vice. We rid Bara of drug-traffickers, gamblers, kidnappers, car-snatchers and other criminals and we want to cleanse Jamrud and all of Peshawar of those selling drugs and liquor and running gambling dens.‖ However, he considers only himself capable enough of carrying out his lofty ideals, considering the governments as incapable of doing the same due to its previous track record.305His mission statement is not just vigilante crime fighting, as some analysts and media reports have tended to portray him. He has openly challenged the writ of the state, and this is as worrying a trend as the TTP presence in Pakistan, since at any time his organization may morph into the more mainstream militant groups. To his credit though, he has so far distanced himself from the Taliban, and has not vigorously resisted the military operations, but all that may just be a part of strategy. As military operations to enforce the writ of the state unfold over time, so will the true face of Mangal Bagh. Afridi has been dispensing vigilante justice from time to time, and has also administered public punishments to people he declared as criminals. Besides, his illegal FM radio station keeps delivering sermons and urging people to take to the right path i.e. join the LI for serving God and Islam. In the absence of effective government control, Mangal Bagh Afridi has grown enormously in his strength. Some locals suggest that depending on the situation, the

303

News on Sunday, 11 May, 2008. Ibid. 305 Ibid. 304

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government some times ignores Afridi‘s militant activities, and indirectly supports him whenever state machinery is unable to fix a problem He enjoys considerable support of people because of his daring, though religious, decrees against vagabonds. When the government fails, Afridi steps in to maintain law and order. In the process he has gained formidable clout among local tribes. That is why he at times comes across as ―an independent and high-handed cleric‖. This also causes ripples in his covert relations with the political administration every now and then. For instance, in June 2006 LI ran into trouble with the administration after the political administration disagreed with the peace committees that Afridi set up for maintaining law and order in the area. The disagreement also led to tensions and resulted in the closure of local markets for a few weeks. Under the leadership of Mangal Bagh Afridi, the LI has occasionally picked battles with some of the local sub-tribes. The incident referred to above is the occurrence on March 3, 2008, when LI militants attacked the Bara Sheikhan village in Peshawar district (not a tribal area) and killed 10 tribesmen and injured about a dozen over a religious issue. This is the again the dilemma of the FATA areas; the transmigration of fundamentalist tendencies has started spreading from the rural to the urban mainstream in Pakistan, which is an extremely worrying trend and belies structural imbalances within the society. The writ of the state has eroded so much, and the militant groups have become so strong in the area, that they can flaunt their power openly without any serious restraint, as this extract from a report highlights: ―After forcing his opponents to surrender in Jamrud area of the Khyber Agency, head of the militant organisation Lashkar-e-Islam turned his guns towards the political administration (PA) compelling it to close down its Bara headquarters. Announcing the development at his illegal FM radio station, the defiant LI head said he exercised maximum restraints in taking action against the political administration, which he claimed, tried to stop his drive against anti-social elements in the tribal agency. But following Wednesday‘s incident, when Khasadar( government sponsored tribal levies) force impeded our efforts to stop immoral, illegal and un-Islamic activities in Jamrud, the role of the authorities is no more acceptable to us, he declared. Mangal Bagh …. announced, I will no longer protect security forces from anti-social elements in the tribal territory(sic) which I have been doing since the launch of the Lashkar-eIslam. The LI chief in his address warned personnel of Khasadar force of Bara tehsil against performance of their duties, failing which, their houses would be razed to the ground besides imposition of a fine of rupees one million. The personnel of Khasadar Force immediately vacated the Bara tehsil headquarters. The khasadars from Bara serving in the Khyber House, Peshawar, also left their place of duty after the threat by Mangal Bagh. All the offices and checkpoints manned by the Khasadar Force in Khyber Agency were also abandoned. Eyewitnesses said Khasadar men were seen vacating the facility along with their personal belongings before the LI volunteers sealed the same.‖306Thus, it is immediately obvious how tenuous is the government‘s control over tribal affairs. ―He even forced almost all candidates for the National Assembly seat from Bara including the eventual winner and now federal minister Hamidullah Jan Afridi to pay for a grand feast for voters, makes speeches at a joint public meeting, agree to a code of conduct for electioneering and pledge to honestly spend all development funds upon election as MNA

306

The News, Sunday, August 31, 2008.

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(Member of national assembly) in consultation with Lashkar-i-Islam.‖307 The scenario referred to above, is the occasion when Mangal Bagh addressed a mammoth public gathering of more than 65,000 people at Mandi Kas Ground, in Khyber Agency on Jan 3, 2008 .He administered an oath on the holy Quran to nominated candidates for NA-46(the tribal constituency for election to Pakistan‘s National Assembly) belonging to Khyber agency .The candidates swore not to sign any un-Islamic bill in the National Assembly or support anticountry strategies if they were elected. Mangal Bagh also promulgated an improvised election code forbidding public processions, use of vehicles or display of party flags. This was later modified to use of the party flag atop houses, if the LI flag was also flown alongside. Mangal Bagh Afridi warned that the respective tribes of any of the candidates would be taken to task for violating this oath. As many as 13 out of the 23 candidates contesting the National Assembly seat for Khyber agency delivered speeches to the audiences in the well-guarded venue. Those candidates who participated in the gathering included, Amir Shah, Muhammad Saeed, Dr Niaz Badshah, Haji Faizullah, Maulana Nasrat Amin, Dr Muhammad Hanif, Barrister Hasham Khan, Senator Hamidullah Jan, Malikzada Zafar Khan, Yar Asghar, Suliman Shah Afridi, Haji Sohail Ahmed and Dr Haji Habib Shakir. It may be pointed out that this gathering was held hardly 10 kilometers from the provincial capital of Peshawar. Each of the candidates had to deposit a sum of Rs50, 000 for the arrangements of the public gathering and lunch for all the participants with Lashkar-e-Islami. This shows the extent of public support and pervasion of politics by this ostensibly crime fighting organization, which shows all the tenacity of a political organization in its outlook. In promulgating his code of conduct for the election, Mangal Bagh again used his oft repeated theme of basing all LI ideologies on egalitarian social justice. "I administered oath to the candidates after their election in order to provide platform to the poor people as well," he argued308. He added that the holding of a collectively public meeting for the candidates' campaign was aimed to put brakes on the colossal expenses that could have heralded unrest in the area. He conveniently seems to have neglected mention of the fact that the public gathering was a huge propaganda success for the LI, by showing to the masses who actually called the shots in the area behind the scenes. Bagh has considered himself justified in adopting coercive attitude towards the enforcement of Shariah in his own way by ordering women to wear shuttlecock Burqas and men to don religious caps. The shuttlecock Burqa is a black veil which envelops the entire female form in a heavy covering, leaving barely discernible outlets for the eyes. This is the prevalent form of women‘s garb in FATA under Mangal Bagh. In the second week of June 2005, Lashkar-e-Islam forced markets to close down, announced formation of an Islamic government, banned interest banking and warned of strict punishment for infractions. It was reportedly announced that a murderer would pay a fine of Rs, 500,000; Rs 50,000 for having a dish antennae; and Rs 500 for not offering prayers five times a day. No woman would be allowed in market areas without one of her blood relatives. CD shops have been closed down, and music of any kind is not tolerated. Television is ordained by the LI radio transmissions as un Islamic. Beards are to be grown compulsorily, and amputation of hands as a punishment of theft is being practiced. There have been reports of beheadings.

307 308

(News,11 May 2008). Unpublished statement given to Asad Jan, a local journalist covering the public meeting.

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As regards organizational strength, if one goes by what Mangal Bagh says, Lashkar-iIslam has a force of 120,000 fighting men under arms who ,under his command, control almost all of Khyber Agency except parts of Jamrud tehsil and a two-kilometer stretch of territory in Maidan area of Tirah valley, which is Ansar territory. How long it remains with the Ansar remains to be seen, since LI is involved in operations in Tirah valley as well .Mangal Bagh Afridi‘s claim of having 120,000 fighters is not substantiated by any credible report; many sources have put down his fighting strength to slightly above 10,000. As against Bagh's claim, Pakistan Government does not endorse the number of Jihadis exceeding a total strength of 400-600 militants. It is reasonable to assume that both the exaggerated and underrated claims are not too accurate. Regardless, he is a force to be reckoned with in the area. He insists that his mission is to wring Tirah valley out of the clutches of Ansar-ul Islam, and his men are at his beck and call. ―All I have to do is to make an announcement on our FM radio channel and my mujahideen volunteers would be ready to fight for the Lashkar-i-Islam. We have about 70 pick-up trucks donated by pious and wealthy tribesmen for use of our men, he explained. Mangal Bagh is forever surrounded by scores of heavily-armed bodyguards. Young men with long hair give him cover as he walks or sits in a small room that serves as his headquarters. Armed volunteers seated in vehicles escort him wherever he goes. A long convoy of vehicles could be seen when he is on the move. It creates awe and instills fear among the people. Lashkar-i-Islam volunteers patrol Bara area in their sturdy…. Bara shopkeepers now pay Lashkar-i-Islam a monthly fee that they previously gave to a bazaar(market) committee for providing security to the large markets in the town that years ago sold foreign smuggled goods….. the political administration had abandoned and locked the government premises in the town and the security was being handled by armed Lashkar-iIslam men…… the government writ no longer ran in Bara and in its place Mangal Bagh‘s Lashkar-i-Islam(controlled the area).‖309 He has setup Qazi courts for the dispensation of justice and lived in the safety of his Sepah Centre guarded by a number of his devout followers. Slowly and gradually Bagh has risen to establish his own regional authority. The people come to him for ready and speedily granted justice, unfortunately a rare commodity in this area. ―….. an offspring of a Pashtun diaspora family settled in Britain, while vacationing in Pakistan, got kidnapped…… Mangal Bagh was approached who had Ali recovered within two days…...Just outside Hayatabad……a dozen kiosks have long been openly selling grade A heroin for Rs180 per gram and grade B for Rs150 per gram. Hayatabad's youth have been getting their daily fix for just Rs90, or $1.25….. The police (was) on the take- Hayatabad's elders turned to Mangal Bagh. Latest reports have it that Mangal Bagh's men have shut down all kiosks except for two and the two that are left continue pushing their lethal black tar but covertly.‖310 Thus, it is obvious by cursorily examining even a few of plethora of reports emanating from the Khyber agency, that Mangal Bagh has taken control of the area. His ambitious plans were thwarted somewhat, when he kidnapped and took back to his area 16 Christians from the Academy town residential quarter of Peshawar. This was allegedly done for indulging in vices and occupying a property that was once part of a madrassah. The abductees were subsequently freed in Bara, but not before the ANP (the ruling political party of the province) 309 310

(News,11 May 2008). The Newsline,July 2008.

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led coalition government in the NWFP, claimed the abductions were part of a conspiracy to bring down the provincial government. The insecurity on part of the government also arose due to the fact that armed groups had been active in blowing up music shops and attacking civil and military installations at will in the neighboring areas of Peshawar like Matani, Mashokhel, Mashogagar, Badaber, Sheikhan, Michni etc. Police parties were attacked twice in Matani, with four policemen killed both times. The total number of Police causalities only in Matani, a town located 20 kilometres from Peshawar city. Rocket barrages were being carried out at will, the targets being sensitive installations. The visits of armed men in double-cabin pickups to certain parts of the Peshawar cantonment to warn the CD shop owners against their 'un-Islamic' business also spread terror in the general public. This raised alarm bells with the establishment, and media reports began springing up that Peshawar was no longer safe and was about to be taken over by militants. Though Mangal Bagh vehemently denied any such intentions, a military operation called Sirat-e-Mustaqqim (the right path) was started on June 28, 2008, to ostensibly restore the government‘s writ in the Khyber agency. ―About 700 FC soldiers were initially sent to Bara to secure the town and to beef up the defences of Peshawar following unsubstantiated and rather mysterious reports that Mangal Bagh and other militant commanders were planning to attack the city. Mangal Bagh, in earlier interviews, had refuted the reports that he was drawing plans to assault Peshawar. The TTP also announced that it had no intention of attacking Peshawar. It accused the government of spreading rumours about an attack on the city to hide its own plans to start fresh military operations against the Pakistani Taliban in the tribal areas and districts such as Swat. Baitullah Mehsud even described Peshawar as a ‗beloved city that represented the identity of the Frontier‘ and would not be harmed despite the Taliban's capacity to take it if they ever wished to do so. He remarked that Peshawar wasn't Srinagar and so the Taliban wouldn't want to capture it.‖311 The Islamist sections of the political leadership of the country also decried the operations. "There is no imminent threat to Peshawar from militants but the government is spreading rumours to provide an opportunity to the US-led NATO forces so they could attack Fata," opined Jamaat-e-Islami chief, Qazi Hussain Ahmad.―I am sure the militants cannot capture Peshawar or any other town as they don't have the weapons and the resources to take over big towns."312 Even though the operation in Bara was started with much fanfare, eyewitness accounts emanating from the area revealed that more media hype was created as opposed to real action on ground. Mangal Bagh had not actively engaged the security forces at all; he withdrew to the Tirah Valley, reiterating his stance not to fight national security forces. ―Misri Khan, deputy leader of the Lashkar-e-Islam, told reporters from his organization‘s stronghold in Bara, that their members had never attacked the security forces or any government installations. He claimed that the Lashkar-e-Islam did not resist the recent military operation in Bara as it was against fighting the country‘s security forces. He added that the Lashkar-e-

311

312

Rahimullah Yusufzai, ‗The Price of Peace,‘ Newsline, July 2008, http://www.newsline.com.pk/NewsJuly 2008/cover2july2008.htm. Special Report, News on Sunday, 6 July ,2008,http://jang.com.pk/thenews/jul2008-weekly/nos-06-072008/spr.htm.

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Islam was primarily a reformist organisation operating under Mangal Bagh‘s leadership to combat crime.‖313 During the operation, security forces were actively engaged in blowing up LI vacated bases; this was more of eyewash than anything, since brick structures can be rebuilt easily by affluent groups such as LI. In Bara, the residence of Mufti Muneer Shakir, a leader of Lashkar-e-Islam, was razed to ground in Naala Khajuri, while another building owned by the rival Ansar ul Islam was bulldozed on the fourth day of the offensive launched by the paramilitary Frontier Corps. A number of base-camps of the three target militant outfits, namely Lashkar-e-Islam, Amar Bil Maroof Wa Nahianalmunkir and Ansar-ul-Islam were destroyed during the operation. Militant movement was being seen in the area, even as security forces stepped up their operations; giving rise to the surmise that the operation had been pre-meditated between the forces and the LI as a face saver for the establishment. Mangal Bagh had meanwhile been carrying out operations in Tirah valley against the Ansar-ul-Islam, even as the FC(Frontier Constabulary) were beefing up security in the Bara Area, which displays the almost nonchalant attitude of this warlord to the Government‗s efforts at retaking his ‗territory‘. The operation culminated in 13 days, with an agreement reached between the LI chief and the Government. The Government declared it to be an unmitigated success; Rahman Malik, advisor to the Prime Minister on Interior was quite optimistic that Peshawar has been secured from any threat from militants. "The objectives of the operation have been achieved to a great extent. Now there is no threat to the capital city," remarked the top security official of the country. Malik made it clear that security forces had been directed to take care of women, children and elderly tribesmen and take action only when somebody challenged them, avoiding civilian collateral damage.. That is why, he added, no mishap had occurred during the course of the operation. "This is purely a civilian action led by Governor NWFP. The political authorities have taken control of the areas cleared by the Frontier Corps."314 As happens with any warlord in Pakistan, the ISI has been surmised to have a hand in the sponsoring of Mangal There are a variety of opinions about the Mangal Bagh tie-in with ISI; some analysts opine that as he was never a part of the ISI Jihadist-funding nexus, he is therefore behaving rather independently .Other contend that he is being wooed as a Taliban counter check by the intelligence agencies. ―A local politician, who declined to be identified, said: If we finish Mangal Bagh, the Taliban will come in. He‘s a better alternative. At least he will never pick up his gun against Pakistan.‖315 Thus, the operation (Sirat-e-Mustaqqim) which resulted in the arrests of quite a few criminals by the police in the Bara area, but few militants, is also being explained in terms of a placatory response to the American pressure, rather than a serious effort at bringing the LI under control. US assistant secretary of state Richard Boucher was due to visit Pakistan when the operation was started.316 ―It soon became apparent that the military operation in Bara was primarily aimed at pushing the armed tribal militants back so that they no longer threatened Peshawar and kept the Khyber Pass, linking Peshawar with Landikotal and Torkham and 313

TTP refuses to comment on Islamabad blast ,The News, July 07, 2008. (News, 6 July,2008). 315 The Pakistan Times, Tue, Apr 29, 2008, http://www.pak-times.com/2008/04/29/who-is-mangal-bagh-nowcommanding-khyber/. 316 Mohammad Malick, Operation Sirat-e-Mustaqeem: as straight as a coil!, The News, July 02, 2008. 314

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beyond with Jalalabad and Kabul, open to traffic, including the huge oil tankers and containers, to serve as a lifeline of all kinds of supplies to the NATO forces operating in Afghanistan.‖317 The security operation has hardly seemed to affect Mangal Bagh; his writ runs as usual in the Bara area, and he has just recently reappeared in the Landikotal area of the Khyber agency, vowing to enforce his codes of conduct there as well.318His Tanzeems‘(organization) workers are seen as usual in the Bara area collecting ‗donations‘ for the LI,and things seem to be back to normal in the area, if commercial activity in a sovereign state being controlled by an armed militant group can be called normal. It is hard to deduce that he is sending men to fight for the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. He has consistently refused to join Baitullah Mehsud, Taliban or al Qaeda. Unlike Haji Naamdar and Qazi Mehboob ul Haq, he is vehemently opposed to allowing any foreigner like Uzbeks or Chechens into ‗his territory‘. While the other two are said to operate on the Taliban pattern of co-opting foreign militants and thereby even al Qaeda cadres (though both groups deny it), Mangal Bagh essentially remains a Pashtun nationalist at least in terms of the ethnic identity of his Lashkar and his own ‗governance policies‘. ―Mangal Bagh said even the harshest of his critics never accused him of carrying out terrorist activities or of having shown any intention of the same…..I refused to join the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) for the reason that I did not want to do anything that could harm the country."319Surprisingly, he was accused at one point by the Prime minister of Pakistan by trying to blow up the Parliament with the help of suicide bombers, an allegation which Mangal Bagh shrugged off as childish. Some connection with the Taliban movement in Afghanistan cannot be ruled out though. As mentioned above, according to some reports, Taliban leaders from Afghanistan mediated a dispute between LI and their rivals Ansar ul Islam (AI) in November 2007. Moreover, even if Mangal Bagh is not sending his men for fighting in Afghanistan, his state within the state does provide another safe haven for like-minded Taliban with whom he can always find mutually complementary interests and aspirations.320 It is feared that Mangal Bagh, who was till recently enjoying the support of the government due to his actions against the criminals, will become a dilemma like Maulana Fazlullah and many other Taliban leaders in Waziristan areas, who have established their own states, challenging the government‘s writ and issuing their decrees. Finally, government had to take strict actions against them to control them and even on many occasions use the army. Only the future can tell the future propensities of this warlord, which are much too hazy to be predicted at this stage.

317

Rahimullah Yusufzai, The Price of Peace, Newsline, July 2008, http://www.newsline.com.pk/NewsJuly2008/ cover2july2008.htm. 318 Ashrafuddin Pirzada, Landikotal elders asked to expel Mangal Bagh ,The News, August 30, 2008. 319 Bagh terms PM‘s allegations childish ,The News, Wednesday, July 09, 2008. 320 Imtiaz Gul ,Talibanisation of Khyber Agency, The Islamabad pulse, weekly, July 03, 2008, http://www.weeklypulse.org/pulse/article/2101.

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TALIBAN COLLABORATION At the outset, it needs to be remembered that the Taliban in Pakistan., even though operating more or less independently as a centralized body(the TTP) controlling a system of cellular entities and ‗franchises‘, are an integral part of the greater Taliban organization in Afghanistan. It is important to grasp a few nuances of the Haqqani networks in Afghanistan to contextualize the Pak-Afghan Taliban nexus. A quarter of a century ago, Maulvi Jajaluluddin Haqqani was the favorite protégé of American and Pakistani intelligence agencies and Arab benefactors, because of his organizational skills in running the Afghan Jihad. Jalaluddin Haqqani surrendered to the Taliban voluntarily when they reached Khost and Paktia, Haqqani's home base. His status is evident by the fact that he was once considered as a substitute to Mullah Omar', but politely refused the position, and retired to the mountains of Paktia, Paktika and Khost to organize a guerrilla war against the Americans. Now, ostensibly based in Miranshah in Northwestern Pakistan, the aging Haqqani has reputedly maintained old associations with Bin Laden and his group. His son Sirajuddin Haqqani has become an even more reputed warrior than his father; he is thought to be in actual control of operations against American forces and NATO, while his aging father provides overall guidance and support. ―Siraj, also known as Khalifa, has been described by US military officials as ‗one of the most influential insurgent commanders in eastern Afghanistan‘ who has eclipsed his father in power and influence and is said to rival Mullah Omar for the Taliban leadership.The network is based out of a Taliban bastion in neighboring Pakistan; using the village of Dande Darpa Khel near Miramshah (North Waziristan) as its main headquarters, while Zambar village in the northern Sabari district in Khost province, serves as the group‘s major operations hub. The Haqqani family owned and operated an extremist madrassah in the Dande Darpa Khel village before the Pakistani military launched a raid and shut it down in September 2005. A massive weapons and ammunition cache was discovered and confiscated following the assault on the compound. The Haqqanis belong to the eastern Zadran tribe, as does the commander of the Taliban‘s ‗eastern zone,‘ Maulvi Abdul Kabir, a veteran Taliban official and military commander closely associated with Mullah Omar. The Haqqanis hold major clout on both sides of the border; and through Siraj‘s leadership, the group provides a ‗critical bridge‘ to Pakistani Taliban groups and al Qaeda linked foreign fighters.‖321 The Haqqani run establishments in North and South Waziristan are thought to provide protection for foreign fighters and terrorist groups, including al Qaeda, besides providing logistical support and intelligence for attacks in Afghanistan. US suspect the Haqqanis of bringing foreign fighters from Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Chechnya, Turkey and Middle Eastern countries into Afghanistan. The Haqqani network is suspected of a multi pronged attack on the Serena Hotel in Kabul, as well as the assassination attempt on Mr. Karzai. The network is active in the Afghan provinces of Khost, Paktia, Paktika, Ghazni, Logar, Wardak, and Kabul, and provides support to Taliban networks in Kunar, Nangarhar, Helmand, and Kandahar provinces. The Haqqanis have been largely left alone by Pakistan since they do not attack the Pakistani establishment; the last Pakistani raid against him was on a mosque owned by 321

Matt Dupee, The Haqqani Network: Reign of terror, The Long War Journal, August 2, 2008, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/08/the_haqqani_network.php.

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Maulvi Haqqani while security forces were searching for him in North Waziristan in 2002. He has since been largely left alone, though the Americans have been trying to target him with the help of drones. The Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan seem to co ordinate by seemingly utilizing the Haqqani networks; for instance, when a ceasefire was negotiated in South Waziristan after four days of fighting, the peace Jirga was attended by senior Taliban commanders from Afghanistan and Pakistan. Baitullah Mehsud, Sirajuddin Haqqani, son of senior Taliban commander Jalaluddin Haqqani, and an unnamed Taliban commander from across the Afghan border reportedly attended the ceasefire negotiations. "They are all monitoring the situation and discussing with key local militant commanders how things can be cooled down,‖ tribal sources told the a Pakistani newspaper. The Nation reported that Mullah Dadullah, the Taliban's senior military commander himself, attended the Jirga. Asia Times claimed that Baitullah Mehsud himself traveled from Helmand province. "He immediately rushed to South Waziristan on the orders of Taliban commander Mullah Dadullah. He put his foot down, and the fighting has now eased." It is also obvious that the Taliban in Pakistan re evaluate their policies in response to strategic changes in Afghanistan; in March 2009, three rival Pakistani Taliban factions agreed to forget their differences, and come together to form a united front against international forces in Afghanistan. It seems that the Taliban across Afghanistan ad Pakistan had decided that it was time to forge a united front against Obama‘s extra deployment of troops in Afghanistan. The new Taliban alliance is called the Shura of Ittihad-ul-Mujahideen, or Council of United Holy Warriors.322 This alliance has raised fears that it will significantly increase the cross-border influx of fighters and suicide bombers to Afghanistan, which could undermine the American strategy in the region even as it is being implemented; it is also a clear cut indictor of the cross border linkages that exist between the Taliban in Pakistan, and the Taliban on the other side of the Durand line. It has been reported that the call for uniting against the common enemy (the US) was initiated by the spiritual mentor of the Afghani and Pakistani Taliban, Mullah Omar. He has reportedly asked the Pakistani militants to stop fighting at home in order to join the battle to "liberate Afghanistan from the occupation forces".323 The Pakistani Taliban movement faced a serious split between the main faction led by Baitullah Mehsud, and rival factions headed by Maulvi Nazir and Gul Bahadur. Mehsud had concentrated on targeting Pakistan, while Nazir and Bahadur had sent men to fight alongside other militants in Afghanistan; after Omar‘s clarion call, it remains to be seen whether TTP will divert his attentions to Afghanistan. There is an indication of this trend; the Taliban in Swat under Fazlullah(and ultimately under Baitullah, since Fazlullah has professed allegiance to Baitullah) had agreed to a Sufi Muhammad brokered ceasefire, which seemed to have come in the wake of Obama‘s move to put more ‗boots on the ground‘ in Afghanistan. The ceasefire in Bajaur can also be viewed in the same context. This has brought into relief the primacy of Jihad in Afghanistan as the primary objective of the Taliban: "If anybody really wants to wage jihad, he must fight the occupation forces inside Afghanistan," Mullah Omar told Pakistani militants in a letter. "Attacks on the Pakistani security forces and killing of 322

Saeed Shah, Taliban rivals unite to fight US troop surge, The Guardian, online edition, 3 March 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/mar/03/taliban-pakistan-afghanistan-us-surge. 323 Ibid. Taliban in Pakistan: A Chronicle of Resurgence : A Chronicle of Resurgence, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook

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fellow Muslims by the militants in the tribal areas and elsewhere in Pakistan is bringing a bad name to mujahideen and harming the war against the US and Nato forces in Afghanistan."324

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CONCLUSION With the collapse of the institutional structure in Waziristan, the districts of NWFP are rapidly succumbing to the ruthless onslaught of Talibanisation. Taliban pockets have appeared with impunity in the southern districts of Tank and Bannu, as well as Hangu. Police posts from Tank to Jandola have adopted a tendency to be abandoned, the police being out gunned and outnumbered. The commercial hub of the Indus highway connecting Karachi with Peshawar is no longer safe. Even convoys of trailers are being hi-jacked at will. Suicide bombers have repeatedly struck Peshawar, killing the head of city police along with fourteen other senior police officers in January 2007. It is most probable that the suicide attacks are emanating out of Waziristan, at the behest of TTP. The insurgency is particularly dangerous because it has sparked an identity crisis throughout the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan. The local population, although at varying levels of development ranging from the contemporary to the conservative, maintains a common heritage in Pashtunwali or the Pathan way of life. Depending on the perspective from which the problem is approached, the Pashtun way of life is under threat from extreme radicalism for modern Pashtuns, and from the satanic forces of modernism in case of the conservative ones. Either way, a battle has commenced for cultural identity. Many analysts would argue that the Taliban only succeeded in Afghanistan because the country had been in a state of anarchy for more than a decade and a half .The local populace was willing wholeheartedly to support any entity that could provide security under such circumstances. There is little doubt that the Taliban initially emerged as a stabilizing force who took on rapacious warlords. Some of the same analysts would argue that in Pakistan, the situation is totally different. Despite increasing sectarianism and socio-economic problems, there exists a strong, organised, and a functioning institutional set up, despite all its lapses and shortcomings. Thus, according to these analysts, there is no Islamist peril in the long run.325 I argue differently. The danger is not from the creation of a Taliban state in Pakistan, but the disorder and chaos resulting in the attempts by Taliban to do so. The state may be able to withstand the separatism or regional autonomy of the Taliban in the long run, but at the huge cost of geopolitical stability in the region. The Taliban in Pakistan have become a populist movement in Pakistan, otherwise they would not have blossomed in the incremental manner that they have. There is a grave peril, and it has to be recognized in its context.

324 325

Ibid. Grare, Frederic. ―Pakistan: The Myth of an Islamic Peril‖, Policy Brief no 45 Feb 2006, Carnegie Endowment, Washington.

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Chapter 3

WAR AND PEACE

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This Chapter deals with the efforts at peacemaking between the militants and the Pakistani Government. It delineates these efforts in terms of interruption of trend lines and tactical terms, and outlines the various stalled peace efforts and the renewal of military operations against the militants. An analytical analysis is also conducted of manner in which suicide terrorism has been used as a potent organizational tool by the militants to gain tactical leverage. Training methods of suicide bombers are also touched upon in the contextual parameters of instilling compliance. The American reaction to the Taliban phenomenon is also examined in the context of the prevailing scenarios.

The Pakistani government‘s recently negotiated peace agreement with Taliban militants in the embattled Swat district326, with the treaty establishing Sharia courts and an Islamist alternative system of governance in the area, has raised a cacophony of voices in domestic and foreign media that this area will become a Taliban and al Qaeda militant haven; with fighters gravitating to these areas as their natural training, recruitment and recuperation abodes. This may seriously endanger stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan‘s tribal areas, simultaneously lending tremendous strength to the Taliban and al Qaeda movements. The US has raised serious reservations about this peace process, which it sees as a beacon for militants to re-group, with renewed insurgency and terror attacks being the result in Afghanistan and the Western hemisphere in general. This agreement called the Nizam e Adal was turned into law, when President Zardari signed the bill for the Nizam-e-Adal Regulations 2009. This system ostensibly set up a speedy Qazi courts system in seven districts in the Malakand division, whereby a time limit for courts to meet while prosecuting any legal appeal was envisaged, with the maximum time limit set at 6 months. An appellate court known as Dar ul Qaza was also to be set up. In the legal system envisaged, having a lawyer was not deemed necessary, with applications submitted directly to the Qazi (judge) of the court. The official policy line used as a rationale for the signing of this bill was that it only fulfilled a long standing demand of the people of Swat, besides taking the steam out of the Taliban‘s movement by implementing Sharia. However, what was not widely publicized were the other stipulations of the Nizam e Adal; reports of these tended to surface in media reports rather than official communiqués. Some of the conditions as reported by Newsline were: 326

Qudssia Akhlaque, FO rejects world concern over Swat peace deal,The News online archives, February 20, 2009, http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=20452.

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1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

Action against drug dealers. Campaign against obscenity and vulgarity. Ban on music centres and vulgar CDs. Closure of markets during prayer timings. Ouster of women involved in immoral activities from Malakand division. Action against profiteers, hoarders. Creating awareness among people against social evils. Quick disposal of public complaints. Setting up rehabilitation centres for drug addicts. Making arrangements for Quranic teachings and reforms in jails. Campaign against bribery. Uniting ulema from all schools of thought to work against sectarianism. Taking steps to restore the public's confidence in the police. Looking after the rights of employees and employers. Expulsion of corrupt and immoral police officials from Malakand division. Installation of complaint boxes outside the offices of administrative officials. Giving the right of inheritance of property to women.

Notwithstanding the obvious social utility of some of these conditions, the system envisaged a rather open ended methodology for ‗correcting‘ the evils of the society, which had underlying overtones reminiscent of Talibanisation. The Bill was signed by the Pakistani President, after 46 days of truce had elapsed the between the NWFP government and TNSM, after the signing of a peace deal struck on 16th Feb, 2009. Concomitant with the peace deal, footage of a video showing the Taliban in Swat allegedly flogging a 17 year old girl surfaced, which caused a domestic and international uproar; the Taliban and the NWFP government attempted to control the damage by labeling this as an attempt to derail the peace process in Swat. Even as the Bill was coming into effect, the Taliban in Swat seemed to step up activities in the region by encroaching on Buner, an area adjacent to Swat. Though the Taliban later ‗staged‘ a withdrawal, these moves by the militia only served to expose the fallacies inherent in the peace deal, which was anxiously being watched as a peaceful solution to the Swat issue by circles in Islamabad. Sufi Muhammad, presumably released under a deal brokered with the government and being hailed as the government‘s man,also dashed expectations to the ground when he seemed to backtrack by declaring democracy as ‗un Islamic,‘ not withstanding that he himself had been elected as a lower level government representative under the same democratic system in the past. With the inevitable escalation of Taliban militant activity taking on catastrophic proportions, and the media raising alarms that the Taliban were close to marching on the Federal capital of Islamabad, military operations dubbed ‗Rah e Haq‘ 4 were initiated. The series of events exposed what is an inherent flaw in the rationale of dealing with the Taliban; they are ideological warriors, and are amenable to peace deals only to gain strategic advantages. However, this is not the first time that negotiations with militants have resulted in peace accords in Pakistan; many have been negotiated, with all of them inexorably failing in their purpose of curbing militancy. This part of the study attempts to contextualize both the peace processes negotiated by the Pakistani government with the militants over the years, and the

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policy of US regarding the same, with projections for a successful counterinsurgency policy being articulated at the empirical level.

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A HISTORY OF WAR AND PEACE The Pakistani Government seems to be in two minds about the negotiation and peace process; the pattern is marked by initiation of a military operation, then negotiations, followed by a cease fire. The intermittent cease fire has tended to be violated by the warlords, the intervening period ostensibly being used to either strengthen their position, or violating the terms of the peace treaty by capturing security personnel and imposing their radical laws on the local populace. It would perhaps be worthwhile to have a bird‘s eye view of these peace deals with the militants. The government forces first entered the tribal areas in 2001-2327 in response to reports of militancy, subsequently discarding military operations (which sustained high casualties) in favour for negotiated peace. Pakistan entered into an agreement, one of the first of its kind, with the militant Commander, Nek Muhammad Wazir328, in South Waziristan along the provincial border of Baluchistan. This agreement was known as the Shakai accord329. The agreement lasted for hardly a month, and broke down due to Wazir's death in consequence of a missile hitting him in June, 2004 330. Between March and July 2004, 331the government imposed a blockade of the Mehsud area of South Waziristan with extreme difficulty and protracted resistance, only to enter hasty negotiations in February 2005. The military at that time vacated these areas with a specific undertaking not to carry out similar operations in future. This Agreement is known as the Sararogha Accord 332. Though it brought a semblance of peace in South Waziristan, the bloodshed continued unabated in North Waziristan. One bewildered senior government official at the time recalls having asked his bosses, "Whose compulsion is it to strike a deal, ours or the militants?"333 Attacks on security forces were resumed in July 2005, which led to talks, resulting in turn in another inglorious peace deal 334.This particular peace deal was followed by yet another one which was signed in North Waziristan in September, 2006, for avoiding insurgents‘ attacks on Army convoys and checkpoints. This also fell apart in the

327

Rahimullah Yusufzai, Analysis: Pakistan's army in the tribal areas, BBC News, South Asia, internet edition, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3020552.stm. 328 Nek Muhammad was a pro-Taliban tribal leader, who had shot to prominence in the wake of Shakai accord between Pak Army and the Wazir Tribes under which amnesty was granted to tribesmen and foreign militants were supposed to surrender and register with the Political Agent, the administrative representative of the state. 329 Hamid Rao, The Death of Nek, Mumtaz Media monitors network website, June 24, 2004, http://usa.mediamonitors.net/Headlines/The-Death-of-Nek 330 Ibid. 331 Gall, Carlotta; Ismail Khan. "In Pakistan, Doubts Over the Fight in Tribal Areas", The New York Times, online edition, Asia Pacific section, February 12, 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/12/world/asia/ 12pakistan.html?_r=1andpagewanted=1andthandemc=thandoref=slogin. 332 Amir Mir, War and peace in Waziristan,Asia Times, South Asia section, internet edition, May 4 2005, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GE04Df03.html 333 (Carlotta, Khan 2008). 334 Ibid

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face of renewed militant insurgence335. After the agreement, there seemed to be persistent reports of increase in Taliban attacks on coalition forces in Afghanistan near the border with Waziristan. U.S commanders tended to show their concern and criticism over the policy of the Pakistani Government reaching agreements with the Taliban, as according to them, it compromised the war effort in Afghanistan. Media reported U.S commanders as mentioning that after the accord ,there was more than a three fold increase in attacks on coalition troops336 in the Afghan districts of Khost and Paktia which border Waziristan, compared with the situation prior to the North Waziristan accord. The above mentioned deal was the precursor to the capture of 242 soldiers by Mehsud‘s men in August 2007,337 one of the most humiliating moments for the Pakistani Army in recent years. Though their release was procured, this was at the cost of 24 militants being surrendered by the government to the Taliban as a part of an exchange process. "This was a bitter pill that we had to swallow," one senior military officer said later. 338 Followed by the Government operation conducted on Lal Masjid at Islamabad, this accord was also unilaterally revoked by the militants. Simultaneously, a peace treaty was signed in March, 2007339 between the Government of Pakistan with Maulvi Faqir Muhammad, who had close liaison with Maulana Sufi Muhammad, head of Tanzeem-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi i.e. TNSM. Faqir Muhammad is presently working as the Ameer of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan in Bajaur Agency. As a token of goodwill, the Government released three militants, namely Maulana Gul Muhammad (Brother of Maulvi Faqir Muhammad), Maulana Inayat-ur-Rehman and Dr. Ismael, along with six other militants of the same group340. The peace deal, however, turned sour when 80 students and Maulana Liaquat341, heading a religious seminary at Chenagai, lost their lives in an aerial attack, supposedly carried out by a US unmanned drone ,with the subsequent responsibility being accepted by the Pakistani Government. Pakistani Government also signed a deal in Khyber Agency after the Bara operation ―Sirat-e-Mustaqqim‖342, but the fate of this deal also was not very different from the ones already concluded and violated; it was also set aside in a short while. Despite troops being withdrawn and militants being released as a token of forgiveness, efforts failed to bear fruit, and Mangal Bagh heading the Lashkar-e-Islam in Khyber Agency was initially routed, but reappeared in Landi Kotal in September 2008, and his writ seems to run as always in the Bara area ever since343. 335

Muhammad Amir Rana, Another Deal with Militants for Peace in Tribal Areas, Pakistan institute of peace studies website, Southasianet-Pakistan section, http://san-pips.com/PIPS-SAN-Files/SAN-Pakistan/SANPAK-Article36/San-Pak-Main-A36-D.asp 336 David cloud, U.S. Says Attacks Are Surging in Afghanistan, Asia Pacific, The New York Times, internet edition, January 16,2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/16/world/asia/16cnd-gates.html. 337 (Carlotta, Khan 2008). 338 Ibid. 339 Bill Roggio, Pakistan signs the Bajaur Accord, The Long War Journal, March 17, 2007, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/03/pakistan_signs_the_b.php. 340 Mushtaq Yusufzai, Maulana Faqir, govt may ink peace deal after Eid, The News, internet edition, http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=3803 341 80 die in air attack on Bajaur seminary ,The News, internet edition, Tuesday, October 31, 2006, http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=3945 342 Mohammad Malick, Operation Sirat-e-Mustaqeem: as straight as a coil!, The news, internet edition, Wednesday, July 02, 2008, http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=15696. 343 Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi, A Profile of Mangal Bagh,,The Long War Journal, November 11, 2008, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/11/a_profile_of_mangal.php.

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There was also a sizeable military operation going on in Swat during the last half of 2008.Awami National Party (ANP) currently represents Government as a party to this conflict in NWFP. ANP is a secular political party forming the provincial Government in the NWFP, which struck a deal with Sufi Muhammad, Chief of TNSM and Maulana Fazlullah, his sonin-law in Swat for avoiding attacks on Government installations. There was a lull before the storm for a very brief spell before Fazlullah sought allegiance with the TTP; and the attacks were resumed. Whereas Government was carrying on its mission in the form of the military operations known as ―Rah-e-Haq‖, the insurgents were busy attacking and kidnapping Government officials indiscriminately, while ceaselessly exterminating all resistance to their enforced system of Talibanized Sharia. The civilian government in Swat, a coalition of rival political parties Pakistan People‘s Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League -N (PMLN), remained embroiled in a power struggle in 2008,which resulted in a review of President Pervez Musharraf‘s decision to launch a military offensive against Fazlullah in November 2007, code named ‗Operation Rahe-Haq I‘344. The subsequent negotiations came to naught. In April-May 2008, the influential Taliban ideologue, Maulana Sufi Muhammad, head of the outlawed TNSM was released, and Shariah was introduced in the Provincially Administrated Tribal Areas (PATA) of Swat and Malakand as a pre condition of peace345. According to the terms of the peace agreement in May 2008, Fazlullah had agreed to cease attacks on Pakistan security forces and other government installations in the area, deny shelter to foreign militants in the Swat region, dismantle his militia and terrorist infrastructure; and bring an end to anti-Pakistan and anti-government propaganda in the region. The Pakistani government agreed in turn to release Swati militants from the jail, implement Islamic Shariah in the entire region, establish an Islamic university in Imam Dehri346, and implement the withdrawal of troops from the Swat region once situation returned to some semblance of normalcy. Between June-July 2008, there prevailed relative calm in the Swat region, although attacks on government installations, girls‘ schools and tourism infrastructure continued to take place. In June 2008, Fazlullah started complaining about the slow pace of the implementation of the peace agreement, and asked for the release of his remaining militants and withdrawal of troops from the region, as well as implementation of Shariah in the region. The government while considering implementation of this peace agreement, faced legal and political hurdles, which was not deemed acceptable by Fazlullah. Simultaneously, the government stated that militants‘ attacks against security forces and girls‘ schools had not ceased, and Fazlullah had continued to run terrorist training camps in the region and was also training suicide bombers in various parts of Swat. With a growing number of attacks in Hangu, Swat, and Bajaur and Mohmand agencies, the NWFP government finally requested the Pakistani armed forces to come to the aid of the provincial government. At the same times, the Swat militants increased their attacks on government installations, girls‘ schools while threatening the NWFP government of suicide attacks.

344

For officially communicated details of this operation, see Operation in Swat wrapped up: DGMO, The News, internet archives, January 17, 2008, http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=12355. 345 Kaustav Dhar Chakrabarti, Swat slipping from Pakistan‘s hands, Observer Research Foundation,, http://www.observerindia.com/cms/export/orfonline/modules/analysis/attachments/Swat_1233894953953.pdf. 346 The headquarters of Maulana Fazlullah in Swat. Taliban in Pakistan: A Chronicle of Resurgence : A Chronicle of Resurgence, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook

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Fazlullah finally forced the state‘s hands when he abducted 38 Frontier Corps soldiers and killed three ISI personnel in July 2008. Resultantly the Pakistani Army launched Operation ‗Rah-e-Haq II‘ in July 2008347, relying on air power and artillery, again without much success against the guerilla tactics of the Taliban. Meanwhile the Taliban in Bajaur (led by Mullah Faqir Ahmed, another Sufi Mohammad protégé) opened another front; the Army was forced to withdraw substantial number of troops from Swat to concentrate on the area contiguous to Durand Line (Operation Sherdill348). Fazlullah utilized this time effectively in re organizing his forces. As negotiations again involving Sufi Muhammad made no headway, Operation ‗Rah -e-Haq III‘ was launched in January 2009 to secure the main supply lines to the district capital Mingora in Swat. Formidable forces were utilized; the offensive utilized four brigade strengths, supported by the paramilitary FC, almost 15,000 troops in total, covered heavily by aerial and artillery support.349 At about the same time, the government‘s peace talks with Baitullah Mehsud hit a snag, since both sides could not reach a consensus on arriving at a peace agreement. The resulting military operations by the Pakistani government in Khyber Agency of FATA, as well as arrests of leading TTP militants in Hangu district of NWFP, led the TTP to issue threats to the NWFP government of violence and suicide attacks. At the same time, Fazlullah, now being a prominent member of TTP, also issued statements saying that any future military operation in any part of FATA and NWFP would lead him to cancel the Swat peace agreement. In July 2008, the TTP leader, Baitullah Mehsud, asked the provincial government of NWFP to resign350, otherwise threatening suicide attacks throughout Pakistan. The ANP-led NWFP government refused to the demand of the TTP, reiterating that they would not be blackmailed by Baitullah Mehsud351. I have reviewed these ‗peace‘ deals rather cursorily as to enable the readers to gain a bird‘s eye view of the constant ‗diplomacy‘ going on between the state and the militants; even a superficial glance should suffice to reveal a consistent pattern of militant acquiescence to peace, which is followed up by breaches of the accord, tending to re perpetuate a causal circle of violence. Pragmatically speaking, the recalcitrance of the militants is re enforced due to them possessing a tactical ‗high ground.‘ There is evidence that the army operations tend to get bogged down in the difficult terrain, and the extreme methods used by the militants certainly seem to send wrong messages to the soldiers. In October 2007, for instance, 50 troops went missing during an operation352, and the army later confirmed 25 casualties. However, local sources quoted by a BBC correspondent mentioned that all 50 had been killed and their bodies burnt. It is apparently pretty usual to have beheaded corpse of Pakistani soldiers turning up. Admittedly, the difficult terrain and the militants‘ knowledge of it plays into their hands; it is certainly not an easy area to fight a guerrilla insurgency, as even the CIA‗s chief at that time admitted: "This looks simpler the further away you get from it," he

347

Supra note 20. Pakistan Timeline: 2008, Observer Research Foundation, http://www.observerindia.com/cms/ sites/orfonline/html/assessment/timeline.html. 349 Supra note 20. 350 Akhtar Amin, NWFP govt refuses to budge as Taliban deadline lapses, Daily Times, internet archives, July 22, 2008, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C07%5C22%5Cstory_22-7-2008_pg7_5. 351 Ibid. 352 Manzar Zaidi, ‗A Profile of Baitullah Mehsud,‘ The Paksitani Taliban pages, September 2008,The longWar Journal, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/09/pakistans_taliban_wa.php . 348

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said. "And the closer you get to it, geography, history, culture all begin to intertwine and make it more complex."353 United States has repeatedly been voicing reservations about any further deal-making, since ostensibly, this has led to the current scenario where the militants seem to be in a position of power. The chorus of American voices calling for action against militants in Pakistan continues to grow. In separate interviews with the Houston Chronicle, three US Congressmen revealed that American commandos were poised to stage ‗hot pursuit‘ raids inside Fata to ―stem mounting Taliban attacks against US troops in Afghanistan and to disrupt resurgent al Qaeda operatives‘ efforts to map strikes against the US homeland.354‖ The New York Times, meanwhile, reported that foreign fighters were converging on Pakistan‘s tribal areas to join with militants already there. Alarmingly, the Times noted: ―The flow may reflect a change that is making Pakistan, not Iraq, the preferred destination for some Sunni extremists from the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia who are seeking to take up arms against the West.‖355 This had come on the back of the news that the US aircraft carrier, Abraham Lincoln, had moved from the Persian Gulf to the Arabian Sea to support US operations inside Afghanistan, where the number of attacks were up in the east of the country by forty per cent in 2008, from a year ago in 2007. Clearly, the mounting violence in Afghanistan had been ratcheting up the pressure on the Bush administration at that time, which had just few months left in office.356 US Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs, Richard A Boucher, reiterated the American stance in response to peace initiatives taken by the Pakistan government: he repeatedly went on record to state that the United States did not support making concessions to violent people like Baitullah Mehsud. He also said that the United States also did not support releasing terrorists, which gives them the chance to strike again. ―However, we support the government‘s initiatives of reaching out to tribes to get those on its side and restore peace in the area,‖ Boucher said.357 Owais Ahmed Ghani, the embattled governor of the North-West Frontier Province, has also repeatedly warned of the inability of local government of settled districts abutting the tribal areas to combat the growing menace of militancy. "The government system in settled districts and the political system in tribal regions are heading toward a state of collapse," he told a number of journalists358. Regional concerns have been voiced as well. Afghan Foreign Minister Rangin Dadfar Spanta told the UN Security Council in July 2008, that a key factor behind the worsening security in his country was ―the de facto truce‖ in Pakistan‘s tribal areas. ―One of the main factors contributing to the deterioration of the security situation in the country is the de facto truce in the tribal areas beyond the border,‖ he said during a council debate on Afghanistan. ―Terrorist sanctuaries and an elaborate system of financing, recruiting, arming and systematic training of suicide bombers are at work outside our borders, to keep the terrorist threat alive,‖ Spanta claimed. Warning that terrorism ―could not be defeated 353

Joby Warrick,CIA Places Blame for Bhutto Assassination, Washington Post, online edition, World section, January, 2008. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/17/AR2008011703252.html. 354 Pakistan not to allow foreign troops to operate on its soil: Qureshi, The Nation, internet edition, July 11 2008, http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Politics/11-Jul-2008/Pakistan-notto-allow-foreign-troops-to-operate-on-its-soil-Qureshi. 355 Eric Schmitt, Militant Gains in Pakistan Said to Draw Fighters, Asia Pacific, The New York Times, internet edition, July 10,2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/10/world/asia/10terror.html. 356 The Dawn, July 11 2008, http://www.dawn.com/2008/07/11/top10.htm. 357 Musharraf is a non-issue: Boucher,The News, Thursday, July 03, 2008. 358 (Carlotta, Khan 2008)

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unless its root causes were addressed,‖ he said success would be achieved ―only by a coherent, integrated, regional and global approach.‖359 There is some sketchy evidence that even though Mr. Mehsud had collected many of the splinter jihadi groups under the auspices of the Tehrik-i-Taliban, he has not entirely succeeded to keep some regional and ethnic militant groups united under him. One of the aims of the Tehrik-i-Taliban was to coordinate and take joint decisions on talks with the government. Some militants are in favour of halting attacks on the Pakistan military, in order to conserve tribal military energy for the fight against American and NATO forces across the border. Militants from the Ahmadzai Wazir tribe in South Waziristan are purportedly progovernment and have generally stayed neutral, to the extent of pushing back attempts by Mehsud‘s fighters to fall back into their area. In North Waziristan, one of the important militant leaders, Hafiz Gul Bahadar360, had earlier kept to a cease-fire. Farther north, in another tribal agency, Bajaur, Faqir Muhammad361, a firebrand figure second only to Mr. Mehsud, had also remained dormant earlier, but has now joined the movement wholeheartedly. It should be noted that Faqir Muhammad‘s inclusion in the Taliban cause adds great strength to it, as he is the most prominent commander in Bajaur. Bajaur deserves special mention, since the state forces are facing several opponents there. Apart from Faqir Mohammad‘s Taliban, ―there are four other major militant groups in Bajaur: Jaishul Islami run by the militant commander Wali Rahman; Karwan-e-Naimatullah, headed by Maulvi Naimatullah operating from Salarzai tehsil; Qari Ziaur Rahman group headed by an Afghan Taliban commander Qari Ziaur Rahman, based in Charmang; and Dr Ismail group, led by Dr Ismail, leader of defunct Tanzim Nifaz Shariat-i-Mohammadi (TNSM), based in Damadola, Mamond subdivision‖362. One of them, Qari Ziaur Rahman, is an Afghan Taliban commander fighting US-led NATO forces in Afghanistan's Kunar and Nuristan provinces363. He was apprehended in Peshawar by Pakistani the law-enforcement agencies some time back, but like several other dreaded militants, he too was released in exchange for Pakistan's former ambassador to Afghanistan, Tariq Azizuddin364. The ambassador was abducted in Khyber agency, and was reportedly set free when a deal was struck between militants and the Pakistani government, as a result of which many militants were set free. The state denied this, but media reports about this deal were rife. Interestingly, after his release, Qari Ziaur Rahman set up a separate militant group in Bajaur with (reportedly) support from Arab fighters, and has been giving a tough time to the Pakistani security forces engaged in the fight against the Taliban militants. He even claimed responsibility for ambushing the FC convoy in an infamous action in Loisam in Bajaur,and causing heavy losses to the soldiers.365

359

The Dawn, July 11 2008, http://www.dawn.com/2008/07/11/top10.htm. Ibid. 361 Ibid. 362 Mushtaq Yusufzai, A different kind of homecoming,The News on Sunday, Special Report, 31 August ,2008, http://jang.com.pk/thenews/aug2008-weekly/nos-31-08-2008/spr.htm. 363 Ibid. 364 See Pak envoy to Afghanistan goes missing Believed to have been abducted in Khyber Agency, Pak Tribune online, February 12, 2008,http://www.paktribune.com/news/index.shtml?197285. Also see Pakistani ambassador goes missing, BBC News, online edition, 11 February 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7239555.stm. For this deal being allegedly with Baitullah Mehsud, see Syed Saleem Shahzad, Pakistani militants savor a sweet deal,Asia Times online, South Asia, May 20,2008, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JE20Df01.html. 365 Supra note 37. 360

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It was about five years ago that militants surfaced in Bajaur and started challenging the writ of the government by kidnapping and killing paramilitary security personnel, government servants, attacking government and NGO offices and capturing and torching of girls' schools and hospitals and blowing up music and barber shops. The initial policy of the government was usually of negotiations, so that the problem could sort itself out. However, the patience of the government ran out as it seemed that the Taliban would not desist from their activities. This escalation of engagement was precipitated to a great extent, when a multitude of armed Taliban fighters ambushed a paramilitary Frontier Corps (FC) convoy near Loisam, killing 22 soldiers366. It is pertinent to mention here that Loisam is a strategically important point for militants‘ movement between Bajaur and rest of the tribal regions, and also for gaining easy access into neighboring Afghanistan to attack the US-led Nato forces. The convoy was being sent for the reinforcement of the soldiers deputed to defend Nawagai town, which had been besieged by the Taliban. The Taliban also took away ten vehicles of the convoy including jeeps, pick-up trucks, and even a tank and artillery. Consequently, a full-scale military operation was launched against the militants; one of the biggest yet in the series of operations, with Pakistan Air Force jetfighters and military gunship helicopters heavily pounding the militants' positions in their strongholds - Mamond, Salarzai, Charmang and Nawagai tehsils of Bajaur Agency, bordering Afghanistan's restive Kunar province367. Tribal sources at the time observed that if the security forces had succeeded in capturing Loisam and Nawagai towns, it would have physically restricted the militants to their mountainous hideouts in Charmang and Mamond subdivisions; this did not happen,due to stiff resistance offered by the militants. The Bajaur operation was pursued much more vigorously than previous ones; the realization had perhaps dawned in government circles that the negotiation process had not yielded much dividends. There was also evidence to prove the existence of the link between the situation in Afghanistan and the operation in Bajaur. Dawn reported ―…. the Bajaur battleground has attracted militants from other tribal regions and from across the border, from Afghanistan‘s eastern Kunar province. It has long been known that there are foreign militants in Bajaur, but their numbers have always been thought to be small. Now, their ranks are swelling, catching by surprise many veterans in the civil-military establishment. This supply line from Kunar to Bajaur has, however, eased the pressure in Afghanistan. Western diplomatic sources acknowledge that the level of violence in Kunar has dropped appreciably since the launch of the operation in Bajaur, indicating a planning and operational linkage that overlaps the Durand Line.‖368 Ostensibly, the saturation point of the Government‘s patience had been reached, and the unrelenting pressure by the Americans continued to act as a catalyst in ensuring that the operations were conducted in earnest. Even though negotiations had earlier seemed an attractive alternative to armed operations, 369these tended to peter out in face of escalating militant intransigence. It was in this backdrop that it seemed that the patience of the Pakistani government had started running out, by the end of August 2008.The constant peace deals and their unilateral revocation by the militants sapped the negotiating will of the government, 366

Ibid. Ibid. 368 Ismail Khan, Battle to be won or lost in Bajaur, Dawn, September 21, 2008. 369 Haroun Mir, Taliban talk offer bodes well, Asia times online, South Asia section, 14 September 2007, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/II14Df02.html. 367

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which banned the Tehreek-e-Taliban. The move, though largely symbolic, heralded the beginning of the process of realization that it was not really possible to negotiate with the militants. A discernible hardening of the government stance became evident when Rahman Malik, the advisor for the ministry of interior, announced that the government was considering placing head-money on top Taliban commanders in Pakistan. He also insisted that the militants had to surrender before any negotiation could be held with them. The operations which were started had much more military muscle behind them than the previous ones, particularly in Bajaur370. This was a reversal of the policy that was firmed up when the four-party ruling alliance of PPP, PML-N, ANP and JUI-F and the military leadership interacted at security briefings, arranged by the Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani for the heads of these parties. In these meetings the decision to pursue negotiations and peaceful means to resolve the situation in the NWFP and FATA was taken, and military action was to be considered as a last resort. However, the government was presumably forced to change its policy by the US pressure, and on account of the devastating spate of suicide bombings carried out by the TTP in Dera Ismail Khan, Wah, Lahore, Islamabad and other places. In the Wah ordinance factory suicide bombing alone, at least sixty people were killed and over 80 others were injured in two suicide bomb blasts outside Pakistan‘s main military arms factory in Wah Cantonment371 . Similarly, on Sept 20,2008,an explosive-laden truck rammed into the front gate of Marriott, the premier hotel in a high-security zone of Islamabad, setting off what police called the most devastating suicide attack in the capital that killed at least 53 people and wounded more than 260372. Places as far away as 30kms from the hotel reverberated with the thunder of the explosion. Almost all the 290 rooms of the hotel, which was occupied by both local and foreign guests, were gutted. Czechoslovakian envoy to Pakistan Ivo Zdarek was also killed in the suicide blast. As regards US pressure shaping the peace negotiations, a multitude of reports have originated in this context, documenting the hardening American stance on this issue. For instance, a senior military official confirmed rumors of this pressure in context of the Bajaur operation, started on 6 August, 2008. A key Pakistani military commander overlooking the Bajaur operation admitted the US threat. ―If we had not done it, the forces from across the border would have come to do this,‖ Peshawar Corps Commander Lt Gen Muhammad Masood Aslam told Daily Times.373 Consequently, large scale operations were started against the different strongholds of the militants. Military operations in these areas are not easy. The ideological and physical proximity, coupled with the porous nature of the Afghan-Pakistan border means that the Taliban on both sides of the Durand line have the ability to maintain internal lines of communication, entrench kinship bonds, exploit the terrain and gain sympathy of local populations; this implies that the operational bases in the mountain redoubts are actually bases in a theatre much further afield. The Pakistani Taliban has a fluid state of internal lines of communication, coupled with a combination of territorial control and flexible guerrilla tactics. This implies that the Taliban can not only hold a swathe of a particular territory, but can also send roving groups of guerilla 370

Iqbal Khattak, Bajaur operation ‗25 to 35% intense‘, Daily Times,Tuesday, September 02, 2008. Augustine Anthony, Suicide bombs kill 59 outside Pakistani arms plant,,Reuters online, Aug 21, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSISL7137320080821. 372 Dozens killed in Pakistan attack, BBC News UK, online edition, 20 September 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7627135.stm. 373 Supra note 45. 371

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fighters beyond that area to prepare the stage for a subsequent Taliban entrenchment. A shared language, kinship, tribal bonds and loyalties allow them the leeway of carrying out operational activities in familiar environments; this is counterproductive for their adversary, the Pakistani security forces, who have to fight for every inch of ground gained. They also have the liberty to use ruthless tactics, which the Pakistani army obviously cannot emulate. The Taliban in Pakistan have not been loath to plant mines amongst the civilian populated areas and use women and children as human shields, which was evident during the May 2009 Swat operation. The ISPR reported the Taliban as using 2,000 citizens as human shields in a bid to ward off a full military offensive in Buner, when it was retaken from militants in an offensive launched to restore the writ of the state. The state forces are thus confronting an adversary that is both entrenched and flexible; this preludes the capture of territory by a few skirmishes or gun battles. The operation involves mortars, direct fire from tanks, artillery, gun ships and fighter jets. The battles tend to be thus trade offs in built up areas where the Taliban are solidly entrenched (and sometimes indistinguishable)within the local populace; loss of soldiers in an infantry action, or aerial bombardment which causes collateral damage, are the two equally tough choices facing the army in most of the embattled areas. Collateral loss generates resentment against use of force, which de legitimizes the utility of force, besides helping the militants to indoctrinate cannon fodder for their guns. This is a causal loop which repeats vicariously despite the fact that without the insurgents‘ terrorist activities, there would have been no need for escalation of conflict in these areas. The Taliban network, though not as ―interconnected‖ with the afghan variant as some analysts would like to believe, is more ―intra-connected‖; this implies the ability and the will to send reinforcements from one area to another, with local Taliban militias raised from a growing population of supporters converted through fear and violence. It is an operation that smacks of sound financial backing, logistical capability and fluidity of command and control, with experienced military planning as the linchpin of the Taliban campaign. This is evident in the general progression of events; as a prelude, swathes of FATA territory were used as forward bases, with the Taliban establishing a system of governance based on a system of speedy justice, provision of livelihood for the poor and impoverished,and a systematic procedure for indoctrination and military training. With time, the Taliban permeated to some of the settled areas of the NWFP, Swat being an illustrative example. Simultaneously, guerrilla terrorist activity commenced on hard and soft targets in major cities, with the objective to undermine the confidence of the citizens in the ability of the state to protect their lives. These urban centres in Karachi, Peshawar, Multan and Quetta became terrorist strongholds, with specialization of some of these centers as indoctrination bases, operational nodes or simply, sanctuaries and safe havens for militants. Suicide bombing also became a potent tool in the hands of the militants. Though the TTP justified bombings such as the Wah bombing as reprisal for the military operations in Bajaur and Swat, the extremely high number of civilian casualties in the suicide attacks outraged the people, and seemingly, had turned the tide of public opinion against them. However, suicide terrorism is still a potent tool which is being used by terrorist organizations to gain strategic objectives; the Taliban are no exception, and have been using the suicide tactic for good measure in Pakistan. I now turn to a discussion of this extremely important topic; the following discourse engages both with the academic and conceptual

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literature on suicide terrorism, in order to co relate them with the prevailing scenario in Pakistan.

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SUICIDE TERRORISM The main reason that the use of suicide terrorism is growing is that terrorists have learned that it works. Even more troubling, the encouraging lessons that terrorists have learned from the experience of 1980s and 1990s are not, for the most part, products of wild-eyed interpretations or wishful thinking. They are, rather, quite reasonable assessments of the outcomes of suicide terrorist campaigns during this period(Pape,2003). Suicide terrorists tend to have at least some initial confidence in the efficacy of suicide attack to generate a concessionary attitude on part of the affected government, or else they would not resort to it. Since they have carried out such an attack/s, they do not have too many options on falling back upon less violent tools, since carrying out such attacks gives them an interest in justifying that choice. Thus, whenever targets of suicide terrorism make a real or apparent concession,and it is a plausible interpretation that it was due to the coercive pressure of the suicide campaign, one would expect terrorists to favour that interpretation even if other interpretations were also relevant .In this respect, it is extremely important for the Pakistani Government facing such devastating attacks as the Marriott blast in Islamabad to resist making concessions in the immediate aftermath of such attacks, as this will only reinforce the terrorist interpretation that solely suicide bombing was responsible for the concessions, which may have not been the case at all. Thus, suicide bombing which is followed by concessions (for whatever reason) will be perceived as a potent political tool for gaining further concessions in the future. As regards the process of negotiation with the militant groups, particularly in the context of Pakistan, it is a moot point that negotiation or dialogue is essential even at the height of conflict, if for nothing else than its intelligence value for analyzing the future projections about the particular group‘s motives. Concessions made as a result of negotiations are not such a simple problem. As widely found in the literature on terrorism, the(Pape,Ami,Stern) author has found that concessions to nationalist grievances that are widely held in the terrorists' community can reduce popular support for further terrorism, making it more difficult to recruit new suicide attackers, and improving the standing of more moderate nationalist elites who are in competition with the terrorists. Such benefits can be realized, however, only if the concessions really do substantially satisfy the nationalist or selfdetermination aspirations of a large fraction of the community. However, there has been an essentially incremental approach towards concessions by the Pakistani Government. Partial, incremental, or deliberately staggered concessions that are dragged out over a substantial period of time, are likely to become the worst of both worlds. Incremental compromise may appear or easily be portrayed to the terrorists' community as simply delaying tactics and, thus, may fail to reduce, or actually increase, their distrust that their main concerns will ever be met. Further incrementalism provides time and opportunities for the terrorists to intentionally provoke the target state in hopes of derailing the smooth progress of negotiated compromise in the short term, so that they can re-radicalize their own community and actually escalate their efforts toward even greater gains in the long term.

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Thus, it is advisable that states which are willing to make concessions, should do so in a single step if at all possible, after long drawn out protracted negotiations. One of the most important indicators of the strategic orientation of suicide terrorists is the timing of the suspension of campaigns. The dynamics of suspension of regimes of suicide terror normally operate on a strategic decision by leaders of the terrorist organizations, that further attacks would be counterproductive to their coercive purposes; for instance, in response to full or partial concessions by the target state to the terrorists' political goals. Such suspensions are often accompanied by public explanations that justify the decision to opt for a "cease-fire." Baitullah Mehsud has for instance, publicly announced several times that he was entering into a cease fire with the government because he considered the Pakistan Army an national institution, and he is not in favour of damaging such national institutional structures. This has ostensibly tended to give him time to re-orient his strategic directions, while signalling to his own ranks and command structure of his patriotic credentials. This is important because the terrorist leaders never want to be seen negotiating from a position of weakness. Further, even though there are exceptions, the terrorist organizations' discipline is quite exemplary. When such cease-fires are announced, they usually do tend to stick for a period of some time at least, normally until the terrorist leaders take a new strategic decision to resume attacks in pursuit of goals not achieved. This also indicates the centralized command and control structure of the Taliban and other organizations to the same tune in Pakistan. Decisions regarding cease fire are presumably taken at a higher command level, but they are adhered to by the rank and file, till new strategic orientations crop for the leadership. There is none of the ‗going it alone‘ fanaticism exhibited by the some members angered by the leaders‘ decision of having a cease fire with the ‗infidels‘. This then indicates strict discipline, which ostensibly is strong enough to overcome feelings of religiosity of the ranks. This is another very strong indicator of the organizational dynamics of the Politics of suicide terrorism. If suicide terrorism were mainly irrational or even disorganized, a more incoherent pattern would tend to come up in which either political goals are not properly articulated, or the stated goals varied considerably even within the same conflict. This is not what we are currently seeing in Pakistan, where goals are stated (in the form of for example, enforcement of sharia courts) and timelines for repercussions are laid down if goals are not met. During that time, pending breakdown of talks or initiation of military action, ‘ceasefires‘ are generally adhered to. If the issue of concessions and peace deals was not accepted across the rank and file of the negotiating organization like the TTP, we would also expect to see the timing of suicide attacks to be either random or, perhaps, event-driven in response to perceived provocative or infuriating actions by the other side, but little if at all related to the progress of negotiations over issues in dispute that the terrorists want to influence(Pape).The very fact that the suicide attacks tend to happen during a breakdown in negotiating or concessionary processes, establishes the credentials of the suicide tactic as a tool used by the organizations in a highly controlled manner. An analogy with Hamas, which used the suicide tactic in a highly controlled manner might be illuminating. In April 1994, as its first suicide campaign was beginning, Hamas leaders explained that "martyrdom operations" would be used to achieve intermediate objectives, such as Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza, while the final objective of creating an Islamic state from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean may require other forms of armed resistance (Shiqaqi 2002; Hroub 2000; Nusse 1998).This is an

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articulation of a specific target driven use of suicide tactics. Hamas leaders were probably aware of the enormity of the task of creating an all Arab state in the middle of the Israeli heartland, and were therefore mentioning ‗other‘ abstract notions of an armed struggle, about which they presumably did not have too many strategic directions laid out at hand. However, suicide tactic was a tangible tool to be used for the realistic goal of evacuation of Israel from west bank and Gaza. This then, is the evaluative thought process that goes into planning suicide attacks at the organizational levels, which is a far cry from the conception of fanatical extremists driven into a suicidal frenzy, just for the sake of sacrificing themselves for a divine cause. A common factor shared by suicide terrorism is the fact that there have been relatively fewer ‗isolated incidents‘, in which a ‗lone wolf‘ has decided to go his own way in blowing himself up for some perceived cause. In majority of the cases, incidents are part of a series of such events, and the fact that their intensity waxes and wanes in response to perceived political gains by the extremist organizations lends credence to the hypothesis of this form of terrorism being used as a political tool.374 Proponents of the issue of concessions should also be aware that even if the affected government is successful in undermining the terrorist leaders' base of support by making concession, almost any concession at all will tend to encourage the terrorist leaders further about their own coercive effectiveness. Thus, even when a really effective settlement has been made with the opposing community (such as pro state Jirga or Tribal lashkars being raised by locals in return for some concession), the terrorists will tend to remain motivated to continue attacks, and, for the medium term, may be able to do so by utilizing sleeper or dormant cells within the community or by infiltration, which in turn places a premium on relying on concessions alone. Any concessionary benefits granted should be ideally combined with other solutions; otherwise concessions may play into the hands of the militants by setting an ‗expectation threshold‘ after a suicide bombing campaign, which would tend to keep getting raised with each concessionary gain being granted. It is also worthwhile remembering that there are many more countries that have faced much more devastation of innocent human life over longer periods, but have not ceded to the terrorist demands. Sri Lanka has suffered more casualties from more suicide attacks than Pakistan and Iraq put together, but has not acceded to demands that it surrender part of its national territory. Thus, the logic of punishment and the record of suicide terrorism suggest that unless suicide terrorists acquire far more destructive technologies, suicide attacks for more ambitious goals are likely to fail and will continue to provoke more aggressive military responses. Another commonality amongst organizations practicing their violent trade across a broad spectrum of diverse ideologies is their emphasis on territoriality; this has held true for the Hezbollah struggle against foreign presence in Lebanon to the Palestinian resistance towards Israeli presence in Gaza and West bank, to the Tamil struggle in Tamil dominated areas to wrest control from Sinhalese majority in Sri Lanka. It also holds true for the suicide missions directed at the American military presence in Saudi Arabia375, as well as the attacks carried out on allied forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. Ostensibly, it also holds true in the context of Pakistan‘s case under consideration. 374 375

Ami Pedahzur, ‗Suicide terrorism‘ (Manchester: Polity Press, 2005),p.13. Mia M Bloom Dying to Kill: The Global Phenomenon of suicide terror, 2004, ch.4 (website), New York, Columbia University Press, 2005.

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SUICIDE TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN After 9/11, Pakistan became a key player in the US-led alliance against the GWOT; this was a complete volte face from the previous decade, when Pakistan had attempted to influence Afghan politics through the Taliban. This paradigmatic shift in policy brought the state into conflict with the Jihadi groups active in Afghanistan and Indian occupied Kashmir. These groups had for years been mobilized, ideologically motivated and trained in Pakistan, to serve as proxy warriors filling the capacity gap between India and Pakistan by ISI, the all powerful intelligence agency of Pakistan. . Another militancy promoting factor was the entrenchment of al Qaeda and the Taliban Networks; these militants were forced to vacate their bases in Afghanistan in the wake of the war on terror launched by the US-led coalition of forces in October 2001. They found new safe havens in Pakistan‘s tribal areas. Thus, the phenomenon of suicide bombings in Pakistan needs to be contextualized within the ambit of Islamabad's alliance with the US, re organization of the Taliban and al Qaeda's entrenchment within Pakistan. Musharraf and his army's unwillingness to cede power, and the lack of democratic progress, were amongst the main reasons why no headway was made in countering Islamic extremism. The Musharraf government failed to build independent state and political institutions, or establish free and fair elections, thereby providing a conducive environment for extremism to flourish376. Any steps Musharraf took to introduce a semblance of democracy were offset by measures to increase the military's power, even though in the US war on terror, few world leaders have produced results like President Musharraf. His security forces have captured and delivered to the USA several of the most wanted al Qaeda terrorists, including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Ramzi bin al-Shibh, the masterminds of the 11 September attacks. There is, however, little evidence of him showing the same kind of resolve when it comes to dealing with Islamic militancy at home. In fact, within Pakistan his performance in the fight against Islamic extremism was abysmal, since most of his actions lacked commitment and strategic direction. This is the sort of charged political atmosphere and ambivalent handling of the Jihadist groups which has caused extremism and suicide terrorism to flourish in Pakistan377. The first suicide attack in Pakistan occurred during the Afghan Jihad, when Abdullah Roomi, an Arab belonging to Gulbeddin Hikmetyar's Hizb-e-Islami, shot himself to death after assassinating Sheikh Jameel-ur-Rehman378 in his camp at Chamarkand in Bajaur Agency of Federally Administered Tribal Area. 379 The suicide attack on the Egyptian embassy in 1995, by the newly formed Islamic jihad-al Qaeda nexus, was a message to the

376

Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The struggle with militant Islam(Lahore :Vanguard Press,2007),p.191 This paper relates to the phenomenon of suicide terrorism in Pakistan, not with the exported variant of the same to the Afghanistan and Kashmir, like the Lashkare Taiba endorsed Fidayin attacks, which deserves a separate study in its own rights. 378 Sheikh Jameel-ur-Rehman was heading the Wahabi organization known by the name of Jamaat-ud-Daawa-tulTauheed-e-wal-Sunnah.He was successful in capturing and establishing a Mujahedeen‘s Government in Kunhar Province of Afghanistan in 1984, but was unwilling to share political power with Gulbeddin Hikmetyar despite armed conflict continuing between the two for three long years. This scuffle finally ended, but after the assassination of Sheikh Jameel-ur-Rehman at the hands of a suicide assassin. 379 Muhammad Amir Rana, How the suicide attackers operate in Pakistan, 26 June 2007,Pak institute of peace studies, online version,http://san-pips.com/PIPS-RandD-%20Files/Reports/RandD-Report-Article2/RandDReport-A2-D.asp. 377

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Egyptian establishment, who in Zawahiri‘s views, had aligned itself with the axis of evil380. Even though a perpetrator had been identified and interred, the ISI were complicit in spiriting him away to Afghanistan and handing him over to Taliban381. This was the pattern that would dominate subsequent investigations into suicide bombings; ISI would be involved directly or indirectly into the investigations into incidents, and very little open source information would be allowed to emerge into the open. For a long time after this however, suicide actions were virtually non existent in Pakistan, with most of the terrorist incidents being sectarian or ethnic in nature. However, Jaish e Muhammad had initiated suicide activities in Kashmir by then. The spate of suicide bombings started in earnest within Pakistan in 2002, with two major suicide attacks perpetrated that year. On March 17, Sarfraz Ahmed attacked an Islamabad Sunday church service in the Pakistani capital city‘s diplomatic enclave, killing five people, including an American diplomat's wife and his daughter. This attack coincided chronologically with operation Anaconda, which was being led in eastern Afghanistan against Taliban and al Qaeda insurgents by US and its allies.382 Lashkare Taiba was named by some circles as the perpetrator of this attack, since this was earlier postulated to be similar to a Fidayin (high risk commando) style attack.383However, Sarfraz was later discovered to be a member of Jamaat ul Furqan, a breakaway splinter group of Jaish e Muhammad384. A possible ‗trigger‘ for this attack could have been Ahmed Omar Sheikh, who was awaiting extradition to US, after tremendous pressure exerted by the Americans upon the Pakistani government to do the same.385The May 8 car bombing outside Karachi‘s Sheraton Hotel, which killed 14 people including 11 French engineers, was the second such attack. The first two suicide attacks specifically targeted foreigners, though attacks directed specifically at foreigners and civilians account for only 10 per cent of the total (see table at the end of book for a comprehensive account of all suicide bombings in Pakistan from 2002 to January 2009). Many civilians have, however, been collateral victims of suicide bombings, which were ostensibly aimed at higher value targets. 25 human bombs exploded themselves across Pakistan between 2002 and 2006; it seems that the organizations had started assessing the use of the suicide tactic favourably. This was inextricably linked with contemporaneous politics and public opinion; MMA (Muttahida Majlis e Amal) had come into power as a government partner; this being a loose alliance of Islamist parties, with the pre dominant players being the ideologue Jamaat e Islami and the radical Jamia-ul-ulema386 Pakistan. For the fist time since the political process was initiated in Pakistan, the Islamists felt empowered; they nearly managed to get away by passing a parliamentary bill in the NWFP assembly which would have imposed laws mimicking the Taliban in the province. 380

Jewish virtual Library, Biography of Zawahiri: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/ biography/Zawahiri.html. 381 Tim Mcgirk, Rogues No More?, Time, internet edition, April 29,2002, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/ article/0,9171,501020506-233999,00.html. 382 Al Qaeda casualties not known: US, Dawn,17 March 2002,internet edition, http://www.dawn.com/2002/ 03/17/top9.htm. 383 Islamic Extremist Terrorist Operations, Suspected al-Qaeda Operations, Global security website, http://www.dawn.com/2002/03/17/top9.htm. 384 Amir Mir, Manufacturing Martyrs, September 2005,Newsline, http://www.newsline.com.pk/ NewsSep2005/sprepsep2005.htm 385 Yet another act of terror, Dawn, Editorial section, March 19, 2002, internet edition, http://www.dawn.com/ 2002/03/19/ed.htm. Also see table at the end. 386 JUI is led by Fazlur Rehman, widely considered as the surrogate father of Taliban.

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To the superficial observer of Pakistani politics, there seemed an inexplicable contradiction between the state patronage of religious parties at the political arena, and the state‘s crackdown on Jihadist groups, many of which were banned in the post 9/11 phase. However, the bans were at best what could be called superfluous; banned groups like Lashkare Taiba simply changed their names, diverted their organizational facilities elsewhere and continued operating as before, with ISI patronage continuing unabated. However, an unhealable rift had developed between the Jihadists and their handlers; an ex-militant put it succinctly: ―..we felt happy that an Islami nizam(Islamic system of governance) would come about…(but) the government did ghaddari(treason)…they let all our sacrifices go waste by making (an) alliance with the Maloun(a colloquial derogatory word signifying US)‖.387While there was an officially enforced policy of suppression and banning of these groups, there was an undercurrent of official sympathy and patronage towards them. Even Musharraf, who passed himself off as a die- hard liberal, had been complicit in supporting the Taliban, when he was Director General of operations at the army general head quarters, overseeing ISI assistance to Taliban.388The empathy with Jihadists within the army, and the Geo-Strategic perceived need of maintaining the militants as proxy warrior assets, generated an ambivalent policy towards the militant organizations. Whilst many of them were publicly banned and persecuted, their leaders like Saifullah Akhtar (HUJI), Hafiz Muhammad Saeed (LeT) and Masud Azhar (JM) roamed free in armed cavalcades and addressed public processions .Whenever US pressure was exerted, they would be put under house internment or short arrest, and subsequently released on one pretext or the other. However, these ISI assets had ‗gone bad‘; the decision of the Musharraf government to engage in dialogue with India and the alliance with US were perceived across the board by Jihadis as the parting of ways with the establishment389. The public opinion also had shifted inexorably towards a widespread condemnation of the US led ‗invasions‘ of Iraq and Afghanistan, which ,coupled with the unpopularity of the military operation initiated in Pakistan‘s tribal areas in response to Taliban and al Qaeda cross border infiltration from Afghanistan, meant that they were not short of recruits. Public opinion about the types of targets was also important; since most of the initial attacks were on high value (and publicly unpopular) targets, there was none of the widespread condemnation that was to follow later when the attacks shifted towards civilian targets. In succeeding attacks, many high ranking government officials were targeted, including General Pervez Musharraf 390 and Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz 391. Investigations into the December 25 twin suicide attacks on Pervez Musharraf showed the involvement of the Jaishe-Mohammad 392 and the Harkat-ul Jihadul Islami 393. The Jaish e Muhammad, formed by 387

Author interview with a Harkat ul Mujahideen district leader, who had abandoned militancy .He had requested anonymity. 388 Amir Mir, ― The fluttering flag of Jehad‖ (Lahore, Mashal PressMir,2008),297 389 Though not necessarily with the ISI, which continued support to many groups. ISI has been dubbed by many commentators as a ‗state within a state.‘ 390 Two suicide bombers rammed their explosive-laden cars into the presidential convoy of Musharraf on 25th December, 2003 at a petrol station two kilometers from his army residence in Rawalpindi, adjoining Islamabad, killing 16 people and injuring 54 others. The General, however, had a narrow escape. 391 Shaukat Aziz was targeted in June 2004, weeks before he took office as the prime minister, when he was getting into his vehicle. 392 (Mir,2008),p.134. 393 Jameel Suddhan and Khalique Ahmed, the two suicide bombers who rammed their explosives-laden cars into General Pervez Musharraf's cavalcade on December 25, 2003, were active members of the Jaish-e-Mohammad

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Maulana Masood Azhar has always been suspected of having strong al Qaeda links.It seems logical that al Qaeda directed groups would want to retaliate against Musharraf, for what they perceived as his treachery by acquiescing to US demands .Similarly, within 24 hours of the attack on the Pakistani prime Minister designate, a statement was posted on a website known for carrying propaganda material from several Islamic militant groups. "One of our blessed battalions tried to hunt the head of one of America's infidels in Pakistan while he was returning from Fateh Jang, but God wanted him to survive," said the statement that was sent to the website in Arabic. The hitherto unknown group identified itself as the "Islambouli Brigade of al-Qaeda." 394 However, later investigations revealed Lashkar e Jhangvi as the perpetrator of the attacks.395 The figures show that Pakistan witnessed a ten-fold increase in the incidents of suicide bombings in 2007 as compared to 2006396. The year 2007 witnessed 56 suicide attacks, killing 472 law enforcement personnel and injuring 230 civilians; an average of a blast per week claimed more than 1,100 lives. There was a marked escalation of suicide activities in the aftermath of the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) operation. This is a highly emotive issue in Pakistani Jihadist scenario, whence Special services commandos stormed seminaries in the heart of the capital city of Islamabad, where thousands of gun brandishing militants had entrenched themselves. These seminaries were being run by hard line clerics Maulana Abdul Aziz and Abdul Rasheed Ghazi, who had strong ISI links397. More important were Maulana Abdul Rasheed Ghazi‘s links with al Qaeda, which came to the surface in 2004, when Osama bin Laden‘s driver Usman was arrested in Islamabad in connection with alleged sabotage activities in the capital. He was Maulana Abdul Rasheed‘s guest, and was travelling in his car when arrested on August 11, 2005.398 The militants became so strong that they started challenging the government‘s writ in the federal capital; resultantly a commando operation codenamed ‗Operation silence‘ was launched in order to break this stalemate. It is estimated that at least more than a hundred students of these seminaries died as a result of this operation; foreign media reported higher figures as opposed to the official news communiqués,with the BBC reporting the number of casualties as 173.399 This was apparently the definitive rift between Jihadi groups and the and Harkatul Jihadul Islami. Twenty-six years of age, Suddhan was a staunch follower of the Jaish chief, Maulana Masood Azhar, and had spent most of his youth in religious seminaries. He was a resident of the Rawalkot area in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Khalique Ahmed, the second bomber, was 25-years old and considered close to the Harkatul Jihadul Islami chief, Qari Saifullah Akhtar, while the latter was serving as special advisor to the Taliban Ameer Mullah Mohammad Omar. 394 An apparent reference to Lt. Khalid Islambouli, who had led the group of soldiers in the 1981 assassination of the Egyptian president Anwar Sadat. 395 Mohammad Irfan, a suicide bomber who blew himself up during an abortive assassination attempt on Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz in Fateh Jang on July 30, 2004, was an unemployed youth with an eighth grade education. The 23-year-old suicide bomber had been identified as the son of a tailor, Mohammed Mukhtar. Irfan, a tall, well-built youth, received his religious education from a local madrassah and later became a member of the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan's splinter group, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. 396 (Mir,2008),p.69. 397 There is a large amount of literature on the topic of the Lal Masjid‘s radical links with ISI. Many ISI officials said their jumma(Friday) prayers in the Masjid, and the seminary has a long history of collusion with the islamist establishment; whence Maulana Abdullah, Abdul Aziz and Rasheed ghazi‘s father maintained cordial links with President Zia and the Taliban. After his assassination, Lal Masjid establishment was in intimate contact with the Taliban, JM chief Masood Azhar and HUM. 398 Pakistan institute of peace studies database,http://san-pips.com/PIPS-SAN-Files/SAN-Pakistan/SAN-PAKArticle22/San-Pak-Main-A22-D.asp 399 Musharraf vows war on militants, BBC online, South Asia, 12 July 2007.

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establishment. It seems that a great deal of organizational brain storming was done at this particular time; most of the organizations seemed to have decided that they could not rely on the Pakistani establishment or even their former ISI handlers, and had to go their own ways. Suicide bombing as a tactic was by now firmly established as a viable strategic tool, and it seemed only natural that it would be put to god use against an ‗unrepentant‘ state. The figures support this argument:Before the operation, there had been 12 attacks in Pakistan between January 1 and July 3, 2007, killing 75 people. The remaining 44 suicide attacks took place after the Lal Masjid action, between July 4 and December 27, 2007, spreading to Karachi, Quetta, Peshawar, Lahore, Rawalpindi, Islamabad and other urban centres, killing 567 people, mostly the members of the military and Para-military forces, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and the police. As soon as the Operation Silence was launched on July 3 by the SSG400 commandos of the Pakistan Army, the first retaliatory suicide bombing took place on July 4, killing at least 11 people in a suicide attack on a military convoy in North Waziristan. In the absence of open source information linking the Lal Masjid to the ISI and their subsequent rift, one is left with anecdotal and conjectural evidence401. However, the fact that suicide bombers, in an unprecedented move, twice attacked ISI buses in the highly sensitive garrison city of Rawalpindi, shortly after the operation silence seems significant. Both buses were ferrying ISI employees;20 of them were killed in the first incident on September 4, 2007402 and 15 more in the second attack on November 24, 2007403. As soon as the Operation Silence came to an end, the intelligence agencies issued a warning to the government that more than 500 potential suicide bombers had been issued a standby by a combined fatwa of the major militant organizations in Pakistan.404 One such suicide bomber killed 22 highly trained commandos of the Special Services Group (SSG) of Pakistan Army by targeting their Tarbela Ghazi mess, 100 km south of Islamabad on September 13, 2007. He was the brother of a girl who was killed during the Operation Silence, carried out by the Karar Company of the SSG Brigade. Two months earlier, the elite SSG had lost 10 of its commandos, including a colonel, during the week-long gun battle with the fanatic clerics and students of the Lal Masjid Jamia Hafsa religious seminary. The Tarbela Ghazi suicide attack is the biggest human loss suffered by the SSG due to terrorism in the unit‘s history. The PPP (Pakistan people‘s party) chairperson Benazir Bhutto's December 27, 2007 assassination in Rawalpindi was the most high-profile suicide attack of the year 2007. The previous attempt to kill the moderate chairperson of the PPP on October 18, 2007, was also perpetrated by a suicide bomber who blew himself up near a procession welcoming her home after eight years in self-exile. The suicide bomber could not target Bhutto, but did kill over 140 other people, mostly PPP supporters. This became the deadliest attack in the world at that time; before the October 18 attack, the deadliest suicide attack carried out anywhere in the 400

The SSG is the same elite unit of the Army to which General Musharraf himself belonged, and which was specially trained by the US Special Forces for carrying out covert operations and counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations across Pakistan, especially in the trouble-ridden tribal belt of Pakistan. 401 The Pakistani media and the intelligentsia overwhelmingly supports this hypothesis. See Zaffar Abbas, Pindi attacks deliver chilling message, Dawn, internet edition, September 6,2007.Also see DAWN and THE NEWS online archives for a plethora of news opinion in this regard. 402 Syed Irfan Raza and Mohammad Asghar, 27 die as suicide bombers hit high security areas, Dawn, internet edition,5 September 2007, http://www.dawn.com/2007/09/05/top1.htm. 403 Dawn, internet edition, 25 November, 2007. 404 (Mir,2008),p.76.

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world was the one that killed 133 people in the Iraqi capital of Baghdad on February 3, 2007 when a bomber had detonated an explosive-laden truck at a busy market place. Responsibility was placed on Baitullah Mehsud, the appointed head of Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan, even though he vehemently denied the charges.405 Mehsud has caused the government to concede to several humiliating terms like his demand to free militant prisoners in return for releasing more than 240406 Pakistani soldiers seized by his fighters, and held hostage for two and half months. Among the released militants were presumably a number of would-be suicide bombers407. In 2008, Pakistan hardly fared any better. Pakistan topped the list of those countries suffering from the menace of suicide bombings that year, leaving Afghanistan and Iraq behind during the first eight months of 2008 (January 1 to August 31). According to figures, Pakistan suffered 28 suicide attacks408 during the first eight months of the year 2008, killing over 471 people and wounding 713 others, including innocent civilians and the armed forces personnel. On the other hand, the war-ridden Afghanistan and Iraq, despite facing a higher digit of suicide attacks during the same period, underwent lesser number of human losses. Figures show a total of 42 incidents of suicide attacks in Iraq between January 1 and August 31, 2008, claiming 463 lives besides wounding 527 others. In contrast, 436 people were killed and 394 injured in 36 suicide attacks that took place in Afghanistan during the same period. There were 59 suicide incidents in 2008 in total (see table) The two most prominent attacks that year in Pakistan 409 were the August 22 attack on Pakistan's main army munitions factory near Rawalpindi - Wah Ordnance Factory — killing 80 workers in the deadliest attack on a military installation in the country's history, and the September 20 suicide attack on the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad. The Marriott blast was touted as Pakistan‘s 9/11, killing as many as 80 people and injuring over 200. Subsequent investigations revealed that the Marriott attack was actually aimed at the parliament house building. The attack also killed at least two American marines staying at the hotel. An intelligence agency study of the bombings between 2002 and 2006 showed that this proliferation of suicide bombings was spurned on by Musharraf‘s pro America stance after 9/11410.This is an indication of the dynamic of politics shaping the suicide tactic. Results of the study indicated that out of the 25 bombers,16 belonged to the lower middle class while the remaining nine belonged to the middle class families, with all of them belonging to organizations, rather than being ‗lone wolves‘. Thus, the decision to use the suicide tactic seems to have been taken at the organizational level. Illiteracy was demonstrated to be the main commonality, besides poverty, unemployment and a Jihadi mindset spurned on by anti US sentiments411. It showed most of the attackers belonged to the splinter groups of Jihadi or sectarian organizations launched in the wake of the crackdown on militants after the 9/11 terror attacks. Of the 25 attackers, 15 were aged 15-25, seven 25-30, and the remaining three 405

Supra note 27. Dawn, December 31, 2007. 407 Ibid. 408 Serial review of Dawn and other news sources. 409 Some other spectacular attacks were the February 25 killing of Lt-Gen Mushtaq Baig, the director general of Army‘s Medical Services in a suicide attack in Rawalpindi, the March 4 twin suicide attacks on the Naval War College in Lahore,the March 11 attack on the provincial headquarters of the Federal Investigation Agency in Lahore ,the 2nd June attack on the Denmark embassy in Islamabad, and the 6th July attack on the conference being held to commemorate the Lal Masjid incident by it‘s students. 410 (Mir,2008),p.70-71. 406

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above 30. Their sectarian and militant connections were demonstrated to be with Lashkar-eJhangvi (LJ), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JM), Harkat-ul Mujahideen (HUM) and Harkat-ul Jihadul Islami (HUJI).It is extremely important to contextualize the organizational schisms and developments in these organizations to put the escalation of the suicide tactic in perspective in Pakistan. Jaish e Muhammad was formed by Masud Azhar in 2000,by what many observers see as a move at the behest of the ISI to sideline Harkat-ul Mujahideen412.JM therefore had to ‗outbid‘ HUM from its very inception; it did that by importing the suicide tactic from al Qaeda. The ensuing Jaish linkages which developed with other organizations like LJ (see below) meant that both these organizations went into a causal loop of outbidding each other in turn, in order to appear more formidable to their internal audience (their own ranks and cadres and the state) and the external audience (US and its allies).Another highly significant factor is the schisms in JM, wherein a faction split off under Maulana Abdul Jabbar, who renamed the faction as Jamaat ul Furqan. Reportedly, Azhar was so alarmed at the formation of this even more violent faction, that he disowned these radicals to his ISI contacts.413When one of the perpetrators of the attack on Musharraf was shown to be from Jaish, Azhar reacted vehemently that Muhammad Jameel belonged to the break-away splinter faction of Jaish renamed as Jamaat ul Furqan.414 In the absence of open source information, it is difficult to corroborate or refute his viewpoint; the competition between the two organization to gain dominance within the same target audience, by an escalation of violence, is however quite obvious. Similarly, the Lashkare Jhangvi was formed by a breakaway faction of Sunni Deobandi hardliners from the Sipah Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). The newly formed LJ faction under Riaz Basra accused the SSP of betraying the original manifesto of the party set by Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, the founder of SSP. It seems that LJ attempted to outshine the SSP by stepping up the violence, gradually becoming a more prominent group, even though it remained loosely allied with the SSP. The LJ has further split into two factions; the breakaway faction is headed by the equally radical Qari Abdul Hai.415The target audience for both the organizations is the hardliner Sunni sectarian minded population, which is a huge market share for which both the factions compete. After Basra‘s extra judicial killing by the state on May, 14, 2002, the LJ Basra led faction has been headed by Muhammad Ajmal alias Akram Lahori. LJ has been implicated in a large number of suicide attacks in Pakistan. The Harkat ul Mujahideen is a splinter faction of Harkat ul jihad ul Islami (HUJI)416.Due to the insistence of influential Deobandi clerics, a merger of three groups consisting HUJI, HUM and Jamiat ul Mujahideen was attempted in 1993 under the auspices of Harkat ul Ansar417; it never materialized in the form envisaged, and HUM has also existed under the nom de guerre of Harkat ul Jihad al Alami418,under the leadership of Fazlur Rehman Khalil. The most significant attack to date has been the June 14, 2002 attack on the American consulate in Karachi. 411

The study did not comment about the psychological propensities of these subjects. (Rana,2006),p.259 413 (Mir,2008),p.134. 414 Ibid. 415 (Mir,2008),p.227. 416 (Rana,2006),p.264. 417 (Mir,2008),p.103. 418 (Mir,2008),p.107. 412

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Perhaps the most internationalized group is the Harkat ul jihad ul Islami (HUJI), with Jihadist connections in Myanmar, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Chechnya, Kashmir and Afghanistan, besides linkages with Taliban and al Qaeda. 419Established on the prerogative of Jamiat ul ulema Islam (JUI) and Tableeghi Jamaat (TJ),it was set up mainly to coordinate relief camps for afghan Mujahideen. The ISI later approached the founding Ameer of the organization, Maulana Irshad Ahmed, to start recruitment and training of Mujahideen for the Afghan war. HUJI remained in intimate contact with the afghan Hizb-e-Islami, under Yunus Khalis and also with Jalal ud din Haqqani.420 After Irshad‘s death, Qari Saifullah Akhtar emerged as the leader of HUJI; he was very close to Mullah Omar and served as his special advisor during the Taliban yeydays. Thus, an empirical analysis of the breakaway factions of Jihadi groups shows that the schisms either occurred in the wake of the post 9/11 crackdown on militants, or were spurned on by what the militants saw as treachery on part of the government; they had been ‗raised‘ by the state, and were now being cut adrift at the behest of America. The schisms generated more violent organizations, like JM from HUM, LJ from SSP, Jamaat ul Furqan from JM. It seemed like the moderates had become unpopular, and the cadres demanded more ‗affirmative‘ actions form the leadership, aggravating the loop of violence. As regards the area wise breakup of the suicide attacks, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), which have been the main battlegrounds between the militants and the Pakistan Army, account for 60 per cent of all suicide attacks since 2002 (see table ). Punjab's 20 per cent includes the attacks on the Army‘s main establishment, the General Headquarters (GHQ), which falls within the province. The city of Rawalpindi is the seat of the GHQ, which alone accounts for nearly 10 percent of the total attacks. This is more than the share of Sindh421, Baluchistan and Islamabad, respectively. Examining the total suicide attacks that have taken place in different areas at any given point in time between January 2002 and September 2002,an interesting picture emerges;suicide attacks first started in Islamabad, Sindh and Baluchistan, the very areas that account for the least number of attacks at present. Till 2006, the Punjab and Sindh account for nearly 70% of the suicide attacks while there are none in NWFP and FATA in the same temporal parameters. It is only in the first half of 2006 that attacks began in these areas. This corresponds with escalating unpopularity and widespread condemnation of these attacks in Punjab and Sindh, with large demonstrations against suicide terror perhaps indicating to the terrorist organizations that they were losing public support of these actions. The simultaneous rise in NWFP corresponds temporally with the cross border strikes by US and its allied forces from Afghanistan into Pakistan for ‗taking out strategic targets.‘ These Israeli style target assassinations have made Americans and the Pakistani state forces supporting them hugely unpopular amongst the tribals. Making an empirical observation, it seems probable that the Taliban organization became correspondingly popular with the locals, since it was seen to be ‗doing something‘ against these homeland incursions. 419

(Rana,2006),p.265. (Rana,2006),p.244-5. 421 Pakistan has four provinces ;Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and NWFP. Punjab is the largest in terms of population ,while Baluchistan possesses the largest land area. NWFP and Baluchistan have been the seats of their nationalist movements, while Sind harbours an ethnic divide on the lines of indigenous Sindhis and Muhajirs, which immigrated to Pakistan after the partition of India in 1947. 420

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The sharpest increase in FATA and NWFP took place in July 2007, the month in which the military operation against the Lai Masjid in Islamabad was carried out. Around this time, there is also a dramatic increase in the attacks in the Punjab. After March 2008, however, attacks have abated somewhat in Fata and Punjab, though they continue ceaselessly in NWFP. At the same time, suicide attacks on religious targets - which till 2007 comprised the majority of the hits, nearly ceased altogether, indicating a marked shift in targets towards the military as the conflict in tribal areas intensified. This is a significant development inasmuch it seems that even the diehard sectarian parties (like LJ) have somehow reached the conclusion that the state is the main enemy to be tackled at the moment, rather than other sects . There are also indications that alliances seem to have been forged between the sectarian parties to the extent that they have decided to work together against the common enemy; the state. There are reports that Abu Ali Tunisi,422 an al Qaeda-linked Jihadi hailing from Tunis, has managed to bring the rebels of four militant groups - Harkat-ul Jihadul Islami, Harkat-ul Mujahideen, Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi - under the folds of al-Qaeda. Overwhelmingly, suicide attacks have targeted military and police personnel and buildings (see table), with military installations being targeted after the military started operations in Bajaur Agency. Interestingly enough, no suicide attacks are carried out on military or police targets till 2006, even though the military operation against militants began in South Waziristan in July 2002. The first attack on a military target took place on May 28, 2006 in North Waziristan, which killed three soldiers, though the attacks really escalated after the Pakistani army started attacking the militant bases in earnest. The first such state forces attack took place in January 2006. The second was carried out on October 30, 2006, when the Pakistani government, allegedly in cooperation with the US, conducted an air strike on a madrassah in Bajaur, killing over 80 people. This incident, in particular, seems to have changed the militants' approach: within days they carried out a devastating suicide attack on a military base in Dargai, killing 42 soldiers to avenge the October strike. Thereafter, suicide attacks on military and police targets have become frequent. As mentioned above, a common factor across a broad range of terrorist organizations is their emphasis on territoriality.423 Ostensibly, it also holds true in the context of Pakistan‘s case study under consideration. Suicide bombing has often been associated with territoriality; even though the discourse is coloured by religion, the attacks tend to become stronger in intensity when a state‘s forces move in on the terrorist bases. The withdrawal of the target state's military forces from what the terrorists see as national homeland becomes a primary issue aggravating the intensity of the attacks (Pape,2003).Thus, a plausible explanation for the aggravation of the suicide attacks can be contextualized in the light of Pakistani Army‘s initiated actions in the tribal areas. Interestingly, the timings of the attacks corresponded with the rise in the unpopularity of the state forces in the tribal Ares. The FATA tribes have never been particularly fond of state intervention; in the wake of the military operations which have in turn tended to generate a large number of collateral civilian losses, the state has lost much of its remaining credibility in these areas. The increase in intensity of the unmanned drone attacks by US has made the 422

According to interviews with investigating officials of Special Investigative Group(special task force investigating terrorism) of the Federal Investigation agency(FIA),who requested anonymity. 423 Bloom Dying to Kill,ch 4. Taliban in Pakistan: A Chronicle of Resurgence : A Chronicle of Resurgence, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook

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state hugely unpopular in tribal areas, where the support for the Taliban seemed to be rising at one time, along with a simultaneous decrease in the popularity of the state apparatus. There are however limitations to reaching any certifiable conclusions about the scenario in Pakistan, due to most of the information being kept under official wraps. There are a number of unresolved puzzles; for example, if the militant attacks have shifted to military targets due to the operations initiated by the Pakistani military apparatus against the militants, why was Baitullah Mehsud being allowed to run virtually unchecked? Why are Taliban in Baluchistan not being targeted with the same ferocity as in NWFP by state forces? A possible explanation could be ISI complicity;TTP is in possession of state of the art equipment424 which monitors troop movement, it seems unlikely he could have come in to possession of it by himself. The ISI‘s dogged determination of cultivating proxy warriors for regional geo strategic considerations could be at the crux of the ambivalence of the establishment‘s response in tackling militancy selectively and ineffectually. Training and indoctrination are also critical elements in instilling a suicidal ideology. Robert J.Lifton has studied Nazis and other violent, fanatical cults to come up with the theory that such cults or organization have at their core training and indoctrination strategies some methods which tend to disengage the previous personality of the potential candidate with the morally disengaged killer or suicidal bomber he will become.425This account then again comes back to placing stress upon the organizational structure, as many other studies to document this phenomenon tend to do so. Of course many individuals will tend to be much more susceptible to such brainwashing, such as a person reeling from the trauma of the loss of loved ones as collateral damage in FATA operations and US attacks in Pakistan, but it will be the organization which will cater to concretizing of these ideas. A comprehensive analysis of the methods of such indoctrination is vital to countering the deadly effects of the recruiting and training strategies of these organizations. As has been mentioned earlier, a society undergoing constant deprivation, along with a perceived pessimism of things improving will be a prime substrate for organization seeking to indoctrinate suicide bombers. The organization will seek these areas out, and then would tend to provide heroes and symbols which would provide inspiration a social group in a hopeless situation. 426The tribal belts of Pakistan are replete with tales of martyred heroes from the afghan Jihad, and more recently, from operations in these areas; Nek Muhammad Wazir and Abdullah Mehsud being just two amongst many of these worth mention. The organization offers a ‗wining strategy‘ in the shape of suicide terrorism that causes much pain to the common ‗enemy‘. Any successful suicide campaign is presented as an accomplishment leading to concessions to the spectator community. If the enemy acts with great force which results in collateral civilian casualties, then the legitimacy of such actions within the spectator community will only increase. This is happening right now in the FATA region. A more sophisticated approach would be to give concessions to the spectator community without making any concessions to the organization itself. In effect, this would translate into negotiating with tribal jirgas instead of with TTP, which the Pakistani government has been doing with some success. 424

(Zaidi, September 2008,The Long War Journal),p.15. Albert Bandura, ‗Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement‘ in Walter Reich ed, ‗Origins of terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of mind(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1990),161-91. 426 Ghassan Hage `Comes a Time We Are All Enthusiasm: Understanding Palestinian Suicide Bombers in Times of Exighophobia', Public Culture (2003), 15(1): 79-80. 425

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It is worthwhile briefly capitulating on the methods of Taliban‘s propaganda during its struggle against the US, since these methods have largely tended to be replicated by the Taliban in Pakistan. When US and allied forces were pushing the Taliban to a defensive stance in 2001, the tone of shabnamahs (night letters) and publications in the early years was largely defensive, focusing largely on American ―atrocities‖. The Afghani Taliban later pragmatically abandoned earlier strictures against pictures of living images – although still blurring those of women – and used graphic pictures of Afghan casualties and the destruction of property allegedly by foreign forces. ―Images from the Iraq war also began to appear. In 2005-2006, as the insurgency grew in Afghanistan, the propaganda projected an increasing air of confidence and assertiveness, depicting images of the bodies of international troops and Afghan security forces, along with their destroyed vehicles and captured supplies, as well as Taliban weapons caches and operations.‖427The same tactics have ostensibly been utilized by the Taliban in Pakistan, who employ images of civilian collateral casualties quite effectively. As many as 20 illegal FM channels are present in Baitullah Mehsud‘s controlled Waziristan alone, with at least 4 in Fazlullah‘s controlled Swat areas. These have proved to be quite adept at covert relocation and transmission in response to government blockade of such radio signals. It is quite usual to see young militants carrying a radio as part of their standard gear. One of the standard ways in which the Taliban have recruited suicide bombers is by the use of ‗persuaders,‘; these are Jihadists drawn from local mosques and madrassahs, which have been trained in the ideology of the particular group, along with some religious tenets pertaining to martyrdom and Jihad. These persuaders spread to madrassahs and mosques in the tribal areas and beyond, to find suitable candidates. The ideal person they are looking for is a person exposed to the half baked religious ideology in some madrassah, or a person reeling form the death of a loved one, ideally in the wake of a military operation or a drone attack .The persuader initiates the indoctrination process by inviting such a person to a dars (a religious lecture) which focuses on life in the hereafter, and the joys of Jihad and fighting in the cause of God. From here onwards, the indoctrinators are trained to recognize signs of interest, and how to build up on emotional needs of individuals by manipulating them with religious doctrine. IDPs (internally displaced persons, see chapter 5) are also ideal candidates; hundreds of thousands of people have been rendered homeless and have fled the militancy stricken areas in Pakistan.These IDPs tend to gravitate towards makeshift refugee camps, which are breeding grounds for radicalization due to the general air of disillusionments and despondency hanging over the homeless and the destitute. The suicide purveying Jihadists also seek out Swatis,Southern Punjabis and people displaced from the FATA areas in big cities like Karachi; people from these areas tend to have a more inward looking religious worldview, which may kinder into extremism due to poor socio economic-conditions which many of these ethnic populations suffer from in these areas. For the recruits who ‗bite,‘ the first step of the training process is usually isolation from the society; recruits are exalted to the level of ghazis and shahids,and are told that they are now mujahideen in the name of Allah, and need not bother with the physical world any more. It is imperative that the influence of friends and family is neutralized,since they may dissuade the recruit from his suicidal mission. A troublesome family which gets whiff of the persuader‘s mission is branded as ‗bad‘ Muslims ; the brainwashing involved in indoctrination stresses strongly on the superiority of the religious doctrines above all ties of 427

Taliban propaganda: Winning the war of words? International Crisis Group, Asia Report no.158 – 24 July 2008.

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family,friends and relatives. Further action is dependant upon the persuader‘s assessment of the recruit‘s state of readiness; the recruit may be ready for dispatch of a suicide mission, which requires relatively little training, or may be selected for further training which is carried out in training facilities. Very few credible research surveys have been carried out in such war zones as FATA to illuminate why the spectator community supports such extremism, due to the obvious hazards involved for the researchers. One form of such research was attempted by Mia Bloom in Sri Lanka in LTTE controlled areas, which illustrated a high degree of acceptability for suicide terrorism by LTTE against military targets, and a correspondingly low level of support for civilian ones.428 Interpolating these projections in to FATA paradigms, it is debatable how much support exists for TTP generating civilian casualties in Pakistani population. Judging from the media reports, there has been increasing antagonism by the general population of Pakistan against these attacks, but that is insignificant in real terms to strategists trying to stop or prevent suicide terrorism. This is because the ethos of the spectator community is important in this context(in this case the FATA population) as being the substrate and stronghold of terrorism, and research clearly shows that people in war zones have different perceptions about these matters, particularly towards the Government and the rest of the society. A complicating factor is the juxtaposition of the Islamist mindset about shahadat, about which so much has already been written that there is hardly any need to say more. Contextualizing the process further, suicide terrorism can be considered as a result of a rational process by which leaders of an organization come to the conclusion that it is a viable tactic. However, the execution of such a tactic requires a social condition conducive to carrying out this strategy.429 Documenting this mindset in a book called ‗Tareekh-e-Islam ke Fidayee dastay‘430, it was the Lashkare Taiba (LeT) amongst Pakistani militants who took the lead in suicide bombing for the first time in Occupied Kashmir431. According to an inner source of Jamaat-ud-Daawa432,there was initially an uproar against LeT undertaking suicidal attacks in Occupied Kashmir, and even the Deobandi-Salafi school of thought decreed against it; however, gradually the tables turned, and the tactic adopted by the Lashkar was owned by the Deobandi-Salafi jurists as an act of supreme sacrifice for a noble spiritual cause433. The second group of militants adopting this technique early on was Jaish-e-Muhammad. Claiming their lineage initially from the Binori madrassah,Karachi,the organization became a major player at the local Jihadi scene. With times to come, it has tended to be subsumed within the larger Jihadi umbrella. With the decrease in emphasis on the Kashmir front, the formerly Kashmir oriented Jihadi organizations like the Jaish have tended to focus inward upon the state, and the Taliban re-organization in Pakistan owes a lot of its present impetus to these Kashmiri mujahideen. Thus, suicide terrorism in Pakistan has tended to be one of the strategies carried over by the Afghan and Kashmiri mujahideen. Once the ideology of suicide as martyrdom is unleashed, it is well-neigh impossible to forestall the directions these ideological permeations ultimately tend to take in an ever428

Bloom 'Tamil Attitudes Toward Terrorism'. Richard Gorman `Tracking the World's Suicide Bombers',Rutgers Focus, 18 November 2003. http://ur.rutgers.edu/focus/index.phtml?Article ID=1214. 429 (Pedahzur,2005),25. 430 Muhammad Amir Rana, How the suicide attackers operate in Pakistan, 26 June 2007,Pak institute of peace studies. 431 Ibid. 432 Ibid. 433 Ibid.

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changing socio-cultural, socio-ethnic, socio-political, and socio-religious milieu; the same happened in the case of these local Jihadi Organizations. Initially their attention was focussed outwards towards Western powers, especially the US, but after 9/11 they turned inwards, giving rise to insurgency against the local infrastructure thereby involving the Government of Pakistan. A cursory look back at the Jihadist linkage with Taliban and al Qaeda may be helpful in illustrating the trends. In 2002, Abdul Jabbar, commander of Jaish-e-Muhammad initiated attacks in earnest on churches and Western interests in Pakistan, and considerable harassment was caused to the minorities in Taxila, Islamabad, and Bahawalpur.434 Hafiz Muhammad Yunus of Dera Ghazi Khan who blew himself up on February, 2007 after an unsuccessful attempt on Islamabad Airport, also belonged to a cell affiliated with Taliban and al Qaeda, with widespread links in the tribal territory in Pakistan435. Similarly, an Uzbek Commander was held responsible for the attack on the base of security forces in South Waziristan on August 4, 2006, because he was allegedly unhappy with the peace accord signed by Baitullah Mehsud with the Government of Pakistan436. Later, Baitullah Mehsud also revoked this accord, because some of his tribesmen were killed by Pakistan army, allegedly on the pretext of having connections with al Qaeda and Taliban. These are just a few of the attacks with al Qaeda inspired overtones; presumably, the organization has a hand directly or indirectly in many of the attacks carried out in Pakistan by its proxy organizations like the TTP, JM,LJ and SSP. There is a well thought out system of indoctrination and training which precedes a suicide attack. In order to analyze training methods, one needs to look at the organizational perspective. Keeping in mind the organizational structure of the suicide tactic, it becomes easier to analyze the phenomenon. Starting with the most important aspect of indoctrination437, the training takes on the form of brainwashing. Though the pre-conditions are changing, the potential suicide bomber usually has to satisfy certain pre-conditions before enlistment; such as the fact that he is unmarried and has no marital liabilities, and is not the only son to look after his family. Other male siblings should be available to take over his responsibilities in the event of his shahadat; or else he has obtained a lifelong commitment from a close associate that he would be under obligation to fulfill the Jihadi‘s familial responsibility after his demise. Exact curricula of suicide tactic instillation vary, but this much is documented from at least one instance of life at a particular training camp; the ‗recruits‘ at that particular camp were given a set of three books to read, namely ‗Rehbar ki talaash438‘, ‗Fidayee hamley439‘, and a book relating to belief and practices of a particular sect440. They were also shown the text of wills left by comrades having departed from this world at the conclusion of their missions. These 'will letters' and their videos are available in abundance in Waziristan. For example, Aminullah who blew himself up in Afghanistan on June 6, 2006 wrote in his will, 'Don't shed tears for me. It was my lifelong dream to fight jihad and embrace shahadat. I am leaving for suicide mission by my own free will. You may not see my 434

Ibid. Ibid. 436 Ibid. 437 Edgar H. Shein `The Chinese Indoctrination Program for Prisoners of War: A Study of Attempted "Brainwashing"',Psychiatry (1956), 19(2): 149-72; Robert J. Lifton Thought Reform and Psychology of Totalism, New York: W W. Norton,1961. 438 This translates into ‗Looking for a leader‘ 439 This loosely translate into ‗suicide attacks‘, which was purportedly a manual of suicide tactic training. 440 Supra note 105. 435

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body but don't be sad'.441 Similarly Yunus was eulogized for his performance, distributed pamphlets mentioning 'Yunus embraced martyrdom for the glory of Islam‘442. These will letters are the fundamentalist substitute for the LTTE photographs of would be suicide bombers with Vallabhai Prabahkaran, the head of the LTTE. The LTTE has used the extremely effective method of having a final send-off for bombers about to be dispatched for missions. Photographs of the bombers would be taken with the legendary head of the LTTE, which would adorn a portion of Prabahkarans‘s wall containing pictures of suicide ‗heroes‘ who had accomplished their suicidal missions. This tended to create a form of peer pressure on the potential suicide bombers. If they failed to deliver their suicidal pay loads, they would have to live with the shame of having failed their comrades. It is debatable, but perhaps such diverse organizations as the Taliban in Pakistan, have picked up on the group pressure tactic so successfully employed by the LTTE. The Islamic fundamentalists substitute the ‗will letters‘ of glorified suicide martyrs as the Islamic substitute, imagery being frowned upon by Islamists. It is documented that very few suicide bombers go back on their resolve after writing such a will letter, as this would tend to bring condemnation upon them by their friends or peers in the organization, or even the community in which a family has been exalted to the level of a shaheed‘s family.443 Another training method used by Hamas and LTTE has been the use of suicide ‗cells‘, which are closely knit cohesive groupings of would be suicide bombers, called ‗haliya istishhadia‘ by Hamas and Islamic Jihad and ‗Black Tigers‘ by LTTE. This method in all probability has permeated to the Taliban in Pakistan. The suicide nursery destroyed by the army in Spinkai demonstrated an almost class room type atmosphere of indoctrination, which may have been undertaken in the shape of smaller subunits of Fidayin.444Such nurseries would tend to range from a ‗fast track‘ for candidates who have volunteered themselves, to the mainstream curricula for candidates which need further ideological strengthening. The creation of these cells within a suicide camp would cater exactly to enhancing this cohesive atmosphere, where participants enhance each others‘ ideological leanings and contribute to concretizing of the suicide mission ideals. This is an attempt to replicate the group dynamic which operates to greatly increase camaraderie in army units445 allowing them to meet the enemy head on, and is a sensible organisational policy which has been followed by suicide trainers all over the world. A large amount of indoctrination propaganda for the largely rural and illiterate population places great reliance on conveying preaching and battle reports via DVDs, audio cassettes, shabnamahs (night letters –pamphlets or leaflets usually containing threats) and traditional nationalist songs and poems. The vast majority of the material is in Pashtu, and some of it is in Urdu and Dari. The strategy for eliminating television and enhancing radio broadcasts is a carry over tactic from the Afghanistan Taliban, as mentioned by the foreign minister under the Taliban, Maulvi Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil,: ―Taliban suspended all TV and

441

Muhammad Amir Rana ,How the Suicide Attackers Operate in Pakistan,, February 12, 2008,Paktribune website, http://www.paktribune.com/news/index.shtml?197334 .This is a slightly modified version of the seminal article by Rana mentioned in Supra note 105. 442 Ibid. 443 Atran `Genesis of Suicide Terrorism' 1537. 444 Ibid. 445 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.

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cinematographic shows but conversely enhanced radio programs and other state print media‖446. As regards training periods, these may vary, but they definitely have to be long enough to gauge the suitability of the potential suicide bombers for carrying out the given tasks. There is evidence in literature to indicate that these tend to be relatively shorter in case of volunteers who present themselves to the organization, since their ideological roots are taken as solidly entrenched. In case of willingness, this training period might be decreased from a number of weeks or days to even hours.447 The suicide camp requires strict discipline. As regards the environment at such camps, it has been mentioned by captured Taliban and al Qaeda operatives to be an atmosphere of immense psychological pressure, reinforced by torture of persons who did not adhere to the code of violence being indoctrinated.448 This is vital for the organization, since improperly indoctrinated individuals may change their minds at the last moment, signifying significant amounts of lost efforts for the organization. Captured would be suicide bombers in Pakistan have yielded valuable information about the training process. However, a note of caution needs to be exercised when delving too much into the profiling of these operatives as typical of suicide terrorist. These people are in effect are the losers, the ones who could not carry out the required attack successfully. However, they can be used a source for contextualizing the processes in a suicide training camp. One such failed bomber was Muhammad Suhail Zeb, whose organizational name was Waheedullah; he told the interrogation team that he was inclined towards preaching while he was studying, and during that he met a person named Abid who took him from Tank to AzamWarsek in Wana Region. He was taken to Kenza Pengaa training camp449. The trainees were allowed to return home once their training was complete. The alleged suicide attacker told that he spent two months and twenty days at the camp and afterwards he was permitted to go home. After a few days, Abid called him up and asked him to collect two bags from a car with tinted glasses, parked in the Tank station. He was told to keep one of those bags with him and to hand over the other bag to a local man whom he was to meet in the mosque. Dera police captured Sohail while he was taking the bag to his contact. Suhail disclosed the sad reality that under-training boys in the camp were between 18 to 25 years of age. The sources from tribal areas have related that initially the Taliban had rather strict criteria for enlistment of suicide attackers, but the conditions were relaxed subsequently due to paucity of recruits for suicide missions. Initially special emphasis was laid on the fact that a prospective suicide bomber should fulfill the essential condition of being unmarried, but the pre condition has subsequently been relaxed. The strategies adopted by the terrorist organizations also improved inasmuch as they were in a position to issue detailed instructions of pragmatic value from their own viewpoint. Law enforcement Agencies gained insight into these terrorist precautions, when they recovered a so called ‗Guide to Mujahideen‘ during a raid in Karachi in 2005450. This manual is written for Urdu and Arabic readers, and the 446

Mawlawi Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil, ―Afghanistan and the Taliban‖, published in Pashtu in 1384 (equivalent to 20March 2005-20 March 2006). The quote was taken from p.32 of an unpublished English version, translated and edited by Mohammad Suhail Shaheen. 447 (Pedahzur,2005),40. 448 Desmond Butler and Don Van Natta, ‗A Qaeda informer helps investigators trace group‘s trail‘, New York Times 17 February 2003. 449 Supra note 105. 450 Ibid.

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militants have been advised to keep their mouth shut in the event of arrest, strictly avoiding seeing one's family members despite emotional urges to do the same. They are instructed to always remember that they were committed to a higher spiritual cause for attaining martyrdom, and seeing the family members could put them into jeopardy. Family contact is to be avoided since it provides an opportunity for these militants to be blackmailed. Apart from it, they were advised to desist from carrying their companion's name and addresses while travelling, or to discuss their family affairs or organizational matters relating to their activities with their companions, or else letting their families know about their friends and activities. They were also advised against prolonging their stay at a particular place unnecessarily, and to keep their travel documents such as driving license etc. handy. Unnecessary arguments with Police at their check-points were also advised against. In the event of any family member falling in the hands of Police, they were required to leave the matter to God, who was capable of protecting them under all set of circumstances; as they were to show absolute commitment to their religious cause without putting it in jeopardy. Thus, the commonly carried out practice of Pakistan Police to hold in detention relatives of the accused, in order to coerce them to come forward may not be very successful in the case of suspected suicide bombers. The Arab and Afghan terrorists were given a working principle in this manual to the effect that: ‗Don‘t rely on Punjabis if you are on a mission or moving away from one place to another, because most of the intelligence officials are from Punjab‘451. This advice would presumably continue to be in currency for the Taliban recruits. The terrorists have also been warned that they shouldn't be taken in if the investigating agencies tell them that they know everything about them and their organization, because they don't know a single thing; and that the terrorists should be careful against falling in their trap. Similarly the militants shouldn't succumb to pressure, if their male and female family members are being insulted in their presence; and instead leave their protection to God.452 There seems to be a steady supply of suicide bombers available to the organizations wishing to use the same. How do organizations ensure that potential candidates stick to the originally envisaged plan of carrying out attacks, since what may have been just a fantasy seems to be concretizing into an imminent reality? The social networks become all important in this context. It has been mentioned in many studies involving social group pressure; the group becomes stronger than family, or indeed anything else.453Forlorn young men, drifting form the madrassah to the mosque, find solace in common activities, which re-aligns even the moderates amongst them to the more radical ones. The next step might very well be a training camp.454Organizations using the suicide tactic tend to become experts at generating peer group pressure, particularly when Islamism is used as a potent binding force. Suicide terrorist organizations also commonly cultivate "sacrificial myths"455 that elaborately utilize sets of symbols and rituals to mark an individual attacker's death as a contribution to the nation or the community. The suicide attacker families‘ often receive material rewards from the indoctrinating terrorist organization and also from other supporters from the community. In this respect for example, FATA tribal based human intelligence may 451

Ibid. Ibid. 453 Supra note 120. 454 Moghadam `Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada' 72-3; Bloom Dying to Kill, ch. 4. 455 Pape, ‗The strategic logic of suicide terrorism.‘ 452

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elicit responses, where a certain household may tend to become the centre of the village grapevine, due to being raised to the venerable position of a ‗chosen‘ family. Furthermore, the organizations tend to employ some methodology for eliciting popular support from the terrorists' community, reducing the moral backlash that suicide attacks might otherwise produce, and so establishes the foundation for credible signals of more attacks to come. The ‗links‘ establishing this liaison may range from the village Imam, small visiting parties of militants distributing pamphlets or circulars or holding local Jirgas, to an established centre managing the propaganda activities. Where purely coercive indoctrination has been used by the militants in FATA, such as Buner, tribal lashkars opposing the militants have arisen, which lends credence to the hypothesis that far sighted long term indoctrination activities by the militants for getting suicide bombing candidates requires some form of liaison management mechanisms on ground. Globalization and the diffusion of technologies have also affected suicide terrorist organizations. There exists evidence that there has been a sharing of information, methods and technologies amongst organizations which have diverse ideological backgrounds, besides the diffusion of knowledge amongst organizations acting under an umbrella body. There exists early literature which points out that the suicide tactic was passed to Hezbollah by members of the Iranian Revolutionary guard.456Hezbollah command in turn allegedly shared their knowledge about maximizing this strategy with the LTTE (Liberation tigers of the Tamil Elam in Sri Lanka), and LTTE and Hezbollah reportedly collaborated in coaching al Qaeda operatives about how this strategy could be most effectively utilized. 457Thus, this triangle of cooperation encapsulates within it an ideological organization with a focus on territoriality(Hezbollah),one with a strongly territorial focus and a Marxist-Leninist ideology(LTTE) and al Qaeda with its strongly ideological leanings and weak territorial focus(unless all the non-Muslim world is taken as a territory to be conquered).It is thus obvious that extremist organizations will engage in knowledge transfer to maximize their efficiency, even disregarding religious focus when expedient. It is easier of course to share knowledge when two organizations share the same ideological base, evidence of which can be seen even in the earlier days of evolution of this phenomenon by the cooperation between Hezbollah and Hamas. Perhaps it is a confluence of globalisation of terrorist tactics, coupled with domestic circumstances, that a signature pattern of various terrorist organizations has evolved over the years .It is unclear why that is so; perhaps the availability and ease of transportation, handling and processing of certain materials necessary for these actions, along with the availability of human resources geared to a certain kind of action drives this process. Another explanation of this may be the fact, that after initial experimentation, organizations tend to adapt their suicide bombing techniques to the specific dynamics of the environment in which they operate. 458 Whatever may be the case, there is definitely a pattern which can be analyzed. After the first suicide bomb was detonated in front of the Iraqi embassy in Beirut in December 1981, 456

Hameuchad, 2000, pp. 164-9 [Hebrew]. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), p. 74. 458 Bloom Dying to Kill, ch. 4; Martha Crenshaw `The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behaviour as a Product of Strategic Choice' in Walter Reich (ed.) Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, State of Mind, New York: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 7-24. 34. 457

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459

most of the subsequent attacks were carried out by means of explosive laden vehicles in the area. Thus, 70.6% of all attacks carried out by Hezbollah used car and truck bombs.460 Similarly, al Qaeda used booby trapped cars in 62.5% of its operations.46158.6 % of operations carried out by Sunni organizations in Iraq also preferred to use cars. 462Vehicle laden bombs for larger targets and suicide jackets are the weapons of choice for the terrorists in Pakistan. However, the process of identification of groups is not easy by their modus operandi, particularly so in Pakistan where many Kashmiri-jihad and sectarian organizations have merged into each other and the Taliban and al Qaeda sponsored elements. ‗Shadow groups‘ such as the ‗Fadayeen-e-Islam‘s entry into this mess of would-be-responsible terrorist pool has only increased the complexity of the situation inasmuch as no such group of the name existed in Pakistan earlier, but was present in Iran. Thus, relatively new entities or more established organizations with morphed variants or pseudonyms are entering the arena of suicide terrorism. The acceptance of responsibility by some unknown entity is not a new phenomenon. Echoes of this pattern resonate to an event earlier in 2008, when an unknown entity called ―Lashkar-e-Abdullah‖ accepted the responsibility for a targeted attack on Police in Islamabad in July 2008. However, all subsequently covered evidence seemed to point towards some Deobandi organizations. Similarly, ―Al-Saiqa‖ tried to accept the credit for attacking Churches in Islamabad in 2002.Subesquent investigations seemed to point out towards other organizations463. The use of pseudonyms like Lashkar-e-Omer, Lashkar-e-Taliban and Fidayeen Omer by more mainstream organizations has been used as a smoke screen to withdraw attention form the more visible entities. Conversely, relatively smaller groups have tended to exploit the names of bigger entities to ostensibly attract more attention to their cause. Thus, in Quetta, the name of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam was used as a cover after the terrorist attack on Ashura procession in 2003, while in Karachi, the sectarian militant groups took cover of JI affiliated al-Bader. However, there is absolutely no need to discount the possibility of the emergence of new groups. An organization which was much flouted by the agencies and media as being responsible for the Marriot blast was the Harkat ul-Mujahideen al-Almi(HUJI),which was a ‗conglomerate‘ formed by many splinter Deobandi groups, and achieved notoriety after the consecutive terrorist attacks in Karachi in 2002-3. Once the biggest militant group in Pakistan, it has almost entirely splintered in Pakistan, with its militants joining other sectarian, militant and Taliban groups. One of the HUJI factions led by Commander Illyas Kashmiri has merged itself in the TTP464. The problem is not just identifying the signature patterns of the suicide tactic as bearing HUJI imprints, but tracing which of the splinter groups was responsible. Ostensibly, even the Taliban in the shape of the HUJI Ilyas faction could be responsible. The banned Jaish-e-Muhammad has also splintered into four major groups. All are involved in FATA to varying degrees. Recently it was reported in media that

459

Atran `Genesis of Suicide Terrorism' 1535. (Pedahzur, 2005),15. 461 Ibid. 462 Ibid, 16. 463 Muhammad Amir Rana, Marriott Blast: How to Single out Culprit Group from a Pool of Terrorists? SUTHASIANET, 24 September,2008, Pakistan institute of peace studies website, http://san-pips.com/PIPSRandD-%20Files/Reports/RandD-Report-Article29/RandD-Report-A29-D.asp. 464 Ibid. 460

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Jaish‘s Qari Asmmatullah group had prepared a squad of 150 suicide attackers in South Waziristan Agency. Harkat ul-Mujahideen has also split up into three factions. The sectarian group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi has perhaps morphed most of all, with strong Taliban overtones. LJ has tended to be used quite commonly for Taliban and al Qaeda directed operations in Pakistan. Amjad Farooqi and Osama Nazir, for example, who masterminded many terrorist acts inside Pakistan including the assassination attempts on General Musharraf, were operating on the behalf of al Qaeda465. A further complication is the blurring of the boundaries within militant organizations. There exists an air of mistrust between the senior cadres and ranks of militancy due to infiltration of the latter by agencies. This is supplemented by an extreme distrust between different organizations, which are constantly competing against each other by manipulation of the others‘ ranks by hate literature. Thus, members of these organizations tend to keep changing ranks as well, with some cadres also keeping dual memberships. In order to make any head or tail of the scenarios being presented, the law enforcement agencies need to change their perspective of investigation; bare individual or psychosocial profiling is not useful. The organizational study of this phenomenon is all important in this context. However, a simple empirical analysis of the modus operandi used by organizations over previous timelines is not enough; a more sophisticated approach using research to elaborate the broad spectrum of the affiliations, motives and networks of the militants is needed.

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THE NEW TALIBAN AND USA The initial euphoria in US strategic circles over the rout in Afghanistan seems to be fading. There seems to be this insecurity that beyond Kabul, the area has become too unstable, as is evidenced by the pulling out of NGO personnel and security advisories for travel outside Kabul. The NATO command, responding to repeated Pentagon warnings, has gone on record to say that the Taliban would not be allowed to recapture any new areas, with the implied acknowledgement that militants were starting to boost their presence in the north and west of the country. ―Undoubtedly, the Taliban would like to expand their influence,‖ Mark Laity a civilian spokesman for the NATO forces in Afghanistan said, adding: ―But so far this year we assess that we have contained the insurgency to just about the same areas as in 2007 and 2006. They would like to expand but that does not mean they would succeed‖. In the first six months of 2008, 109 international soldiers had been killed; 43 in the month of June alone. There has been a tacit acknowledgement of the fact that the Taliban-led violence, though mainly focused in southern and eastern Afghanistan has spiked. ―There has been an increase in incidents but in broad-terms they have been happening in the same areas as before,‖ Laity further added.466 The statement came after the Pentagon said the rebels were likely to boost their presence in the north and south, areas where they have been relatively quiet in the past. ―The Taliban will challenge the control of the Afghan government in rural areas, especially in the south and 465

Ibid Taliban unable to expand insurgency in Afghanistan, The News, June 30, 2008.

466

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east, while it will also attempt to increase presence in the west and north,‖ the Pentagon said in its first report to Congress on security in the country.467 The opinions about the re-consolidation of Taliban in Afghanistan remain divided; General Carlos Branco, the chief military spokesman for Nato‘s ISAF, has gone on record to say that the Taliban were unlikely to expand into new areas. Referring to an operation in Arghandab near Kandahar by Afghan and ISAF forces against Taliban, he said: ―The operation proved Taliban are unable to hold ground and to face us toe to toe. They are not expanding their zone of influence.‖468However, the bolstering of the troops in Afghanistan by relocation of the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, from the Gulf to the Gulf of Oman, was an indication that precautions were being taken for any eventualities. The implication of this relocation is that it shortens the time that the carrier‘s strike planes must fly to support combat in Afghanistan. In a more candid review of the situation, the United States military later conceded in September 2008, that it was not winning the battle against an increasingly deadly insurgency in Afghanistan. The tie-in with Pakistan was readily apparent, as a statement was issued that the US needed to revise its strategy for the region to include militant safe havens in Pakistan.469 ―I‘m not convinced we are winning in Afghanistan. I am convinced we can,‖ Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Navy Admiral Mike Mullen said in a testimony before the US House of Representatives Armed Services Committee. Mullen said he was already ―looking at a new, more comprehensive strategy for the region‖ that would cover both sides of the AfghanistanPakistan border. ―We can hunt down and kill extremists as they cross over the border from Pakistan, but until we work more closely with the Pakistani government to eliminate the safe havens from where they operate, the enemy will only keep coming,‖ he said.470 He also warned that time was running out for the West‘s ability to provide Afghanistan with vital non-military assistance for Afghanistan, including roads, schools, alternative crops for farmers and the rule of law. ―We cannot kill our way to victory,‖ said Mullen.471 At the same time while Taliban are again starting to be a source of concern for the US, with 35,000 troops in militants‘ crosshairs regionally, Pakistan‘s tribal areas are being considered a likely source of the next 9/11.The fact that Pakistan has nuclear weapons can hardly be an encouraging factor in this scenario. The American concern for the militants‘ action in these areas has escalated exponentially, with repeated demands being made from the Pakistani establishment for firm and conclusive action against militants inside Pakistan. Meanwhile, it seems that the US has been thinking about, and preparing for an eventuality when it might have to interfere directly into the situation in FATA. The New York Times has reported that Top Bush administration officials drafted a secret plan in late 2007, to facilitate the US Special Operations forces to operate inside the tribal areas in Pakistan, but Washington turf battles and the diversion of resources to Iraq had held up the effort. The Times quoted a senior Defence Department official as saying there was "mounting frustration" in the Pentagon at the continued delay in the deployment of special operations teams into the tribal regions, where senior al Qaeda operatives are thought to be hiding. The 467

Ibid. Ibid. 469 The Daily Times, September 11, 2008. 470 Ibid. 471 Ibid. 468

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Times report, based on more than four-dozen interviews in Washington and Pakistan, said the new safe haven of al Qaeda in Pakistan was in part due to the accommodation of the administration to (ex) President Pervez Musharraf, whose advisers have long played down the terrorist threat. It was also a story, the report concluded, of infighting between the US intelligence agencies and a shifting in the White House priorities from the counter-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan to the war in Iraq. The Times quoted a retired CIA officer as estimating that the al Qaeda training compounds in Pakistan now host as many as 2,000 local and foreign militants, up from several hundred three years ago472. Infighting within the CIA included battles between field officers in Kabul and Islamabad, and the counter-terrorism centre at the CIA headquarters in Virginia whose preference for carrying out raids remotely, via Predator missiles strikes, was derided by the field officers as the work of "boys with toys,‖ the Times reported473. Turf battles between the CIA officials in Afghanistan and others in Pakistan have also impeded progress, the Times reported. The officers in Kabul are expressing alarm at what they see as a growing threat from the tribal areas and those in Islamabad.The level of expertise among the CIA officers in the region was also a drag on operations, the report said. "We had to put people out in the field who had less than ideal levels of experience,‖ it quoted a former senior CIA official as saying474. One reason for that, two former intelligence officials told the Times, was that the Iraq war had drained away most of the CIA officers with field experience in the Islamic world475. Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of the US joint chief of staff and the deputy director of the CIA, Stephen Kappes visited Pakistan on July 12, 2008 before the Pakistani prime minister‘s Washington visit476. They reportedly brought proof of ISI‘s complicity with Jalaludin Haqqani‘s network. In the wake of this, the Pakistani prime minister before his departure for Washington ordered the issuance of a notification bringing the ISI under the control of the interior ministry477. The notification however, was ineffectual; the prime minister‘s notification was rescinded in his absence the very next day478, reaffirming ISI‘s status as the ‗state within a state.‘ It was in this backdrop, that the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen issued a statement that the United States had the right to take military action in Pakistan, if it got reliable and concrete intelligence about the presence of top leadership of Taliban and al Qaeda, including Osama bin Laden. There was an immediate response from the foreign office in Pakistan, retorting that Pakistan‘s sovereignty would not be allowed to be compromised, and any action taken against militants would be by Pakistan itself.479

472

Secret US military plan for Pakistan on hold: report,The News, internet archives, July 01 2008, http://thenews.jang.com.pk/print3.asp?id=15683 473 Ibid. 474 Ibid. 475 Ibid. 476 Qudssia Akhlaque, Mullen‘s unannounced visit fuels speculation, The News online archives, Sunday, July 13, 2008, http://www.thenews.com.pk/arc_default.asp. 477 Syed Irfan Raza, ISI, IB put under interior division‘s control, Dawn, internet edition, July 27, 2008, http://www.dawn.com/2008/07/27/top1.htm. 478 Ibid. Also see Pakistan flip-flop over ISI creates confusion, The Indian News, online version, July 27, 2008, http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/politics/pakistan-flip-flop-on-isi-creates-confusion_10076557.html. 479 Nobody has right to take action inside Pakistan‘, The News, Friday, July 04, 2008.

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There were more than a dozen unilateral US military strikes in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) till September 2008, compared to three only in the whole year of 2007. Four took place in one month, i.e. August 2008. It seemed like the US and its allies, being critical of Pakistan in failing to stop infiltration of fighters across the Pak-Afghan border, had decided to carry out an ‗interventionist tactic‘ into the tribal territory. One of the infamous interventions was carried out by US On May 14, 2008, when an unmanned predator struck Damadola in Bajaur, known as a centre of militant activity. The target was ostensibly Maulvi Obaidullah, a Taliban defense minister prior to 9/11, whose house was destroyed; Abu Sulayman Jazairi, a senior Algerian operative for al Qaeda‘s central organization, was killed in the attack 480. The scale of these interventions has gradually been stepped up. For example, on Sep 4, 2008 the US and, reportedly, the Afghan National Army troops, crossed the Durand Line to conduct a military operation in the Pakistani village, Zolalai, near the border towns of Musa Neeka and Angoor Adda in South Waziristan. Gun ships covered the troops as they fired at three houses, killing 17 civilians, among them five women and four children. This was the first large scale incursion of US ground forces on Pakistani soil. In an earlier attack, about two years ago, a small number of US troops had landed near the Pakistani border village of Saidgi in North Waziristan, attacking a house to abduct a couple of Pakistani suspects and fly them to Afghanistan. The US has consistently justified its‘ drone piloted and manned attacks in the FATA region by claiming that someone important in the al Qaeda hierarchy was the target; alZawahiri has been quoted as the sought after target several times. However, it is debatable what the policy of unilateral incursion into the Pakistani soil would yield. This is particularly important in the context that Asif Ali Zardari, the husband of Benazir, took over as the president of Pakistan, holding quite a tenuous political position. He has time and time gain reiterated the sovereign nature of Pakistan, at the same time mentioning that he is aware of the danger posed by terrorism to Pakistan and the region. Presumably, he was unwilling to criticise the US so soon after taking office as Pakistan's 12th President. He has come to power riding a wave of popular support after the assassination of his wife Benazir Bhutto, and the US actions may potentially catalyze the disenchantment of an already disgruntled populace. The situation showed a potential of confrontation between the US and Pakistani army, which is indeed what happened during an operation in Angoor Adda481. The situation had long been brewing into a stand off. In August 2008, general Kayani, and Mike Mullen met on board the US aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln to discuss the security situation in the region482. General Kayani was adamant at asserting the territorial sovereignty of Pakistan, which seemed to set the limits of the cooperation between the armies of the two countries. General Kayani also reiterated his stand of mustering public support to find a solution to the conflict in winning the war against extremism. The strategic circles had

480

481

Bill Roggio, Six killed in strike in South Waziristan, The Long War Journal, July 28, 2008, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/07/six_killed_in_strike.php. Syed Saleem Shahzad, Pakistan: FBI rules the roost, Asia Times online, Oct 4, 2003, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/EJ04Df04.html. Also see Upper, lower houses denounce US action in Angoor Adda,Geo website, Thursday, September 04, 2008,http://www.geo.tv/9-4-2008/24177.htm. For the potential of the situation to to develop into a standoff see Pakistan retaliates to Nato shelling on Angoor Adda,Irfan Burki and Mushtaq Yusufzai, October 29, 2008, http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_ story_detail.asp?Id=18062.

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projected earlier that the Mr. Zardari-Musharraf nexus, and after Musharraf, Kayani, his successor would second American plans. Those projections proved not to be too accurate. The issue is now the maintenance of the delicate balance between national sovereignty and combating terrorism. ―The Americans are probably right in claiming that al Qaeda and the Taleban have regrouped and using bases in Pakistan to launch cross-border raids into Afghanistan,‖ said Saudi-based Arab News483. ―They are certainly right in thinking that there will be no peace in Afghanistan while that remains the case. But they have to let the Pakistanis deal with this. If they continue the raids, they risk not merely losing what dwindling support they have in Pakistan but, far worse, alienating the country so thoroughly than no government even vaguely sympathetic to the US and the West can survive there.484‖ Pakistan‘s Daily Times takes this argument further by suggesting that if public opinion turns even more against the United States, ―the country will become more vulnerable to al Qaeda and we will face unpredictable odds. According to nuclear theory, Pakistan is a nuclear power and cannot be attacked. If the US attacks Pakistani territory, battles with the Pakistan army, stops military assistance to Pakistan, and thus ends up making al Qaeda supreme in Pakistan, the nuclear theory might then apply to al Qaeda.485‖ In the Huffington Post, Shuja Nawaz writes that ―the next time the US physically invades Pakistani territory to take out suspected militants, it may meet the Pakistan army head on. Or it may face a complete cut-off of war supplies and fuel in Afghanistan via Pakistan. With only two weeks supply of fuel available to its forces inside Afghanistan and no alternative route currently available, the war in Afghanistan may come to a screeching halt.486‖ Nawaz adds that both Pakistan and the United States need to rethink their actions. ‖Otherwise, the US will not only lose an ally in Pakistan but ignite a conflagration inside that huge and nuclear-armed country that will make the war in Afghanistan seem like a Sunday hike in the Hindu Kush.‖487 There is also an opinion prevalent amongst the strategic circles, that the US policy about the region lacks integration. There are three forces operating in Afghanistan :the NATO forces, operation endurance being carried out by the US, and the CIA directed operations, reportedly headed by the US vice president Dick Chaney at the time when the Bush administration was in power. It is rumoured that the three operations lack an integrative approach; the CIA in particular seems to run with a mind of its own. It is important to understand that the Predator strikes are usually co-ordinated by the CIA. This tends to create enemies on the ground, instead of eliminating them. For instance, Maulvi Nazir in Wana was a commander firmly allied with the Government forces, but he was disillusioned by predator strikes on his establishment. This tended to drive him away from the Pakistani government,

482

Suicide Bomber Killed Trying To Attack Pakistan Camp, Reuters report reproduced in Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty website, August 29,2008, http://www.rferl.org/content/Suicide_Bomber_Killed_ Trying_To_Attack_Pakistan_Camp/1194760.html . 483 Editorial: Losing a war and a sincere ally, Arab News, 13 September 2008, http://www.arabnews.com/?page=7 andsection=0andarticle=114256andd=13andm=9andy=2008 . 484 Ibid. 485 Editorial: US strategy: excessive and unnecessary, Daily Times, internet edition, September 13, 2008, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C09%5C13%5Cstory_13-9-2008_pg3_1. 486 Pakistan: Now or Never, Perspectives on Pakistan, Reuters Blogs, September 14,2008, http://blogs.reuters.com/pakistan/2008/09/14/facing-up-to-the-war-in-pakistan/. 487 Ibid

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because of the commonly held perception that the Pakistani government is hand in glove with the Americans, and thus complicit in these drone attacks. Whatever the case, the stance of the American leadership is hawkish with respect to Pakistan‘s tribal areas. Even when the US Presidential elections were about to take place, the candidates Obama and McCain had FATA firmly in the cross hairs.Obama has gone or record to say that he will go on the offensive against the al Qaeda, his strategy seemingly being to pull some troops from Iraq, and bolster the forces in Afghanistan.This has been a very clear cut policy from the Presidential elections to the present. "I have consistently stated that one of (the) other reasons for us to begin a careful phased deployment out of Iraq is that we are under-manned in Afghanistan," the Illinois senator said during his presidential campaign in St Louis, Missouri. "And as president of the United States I will do everything that we can to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan and go on the offensive against the al Qaeda, who have reconstituted themselves," he added.488 He also added: "We must recognise that the central front in the war on terror is not in Iraq, and it never was. The central front is Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is unacceptable that almost seven years after 9/11, those responsible for the attacks remain at large. If another attack on our homeland occurs, it will likely come from the same region where 9/11 was planned... We should condition some assistance to Pakistan on their action to take the fight to the terrorists in their borders. And if we have actionable intelligence about high-level alQaeda targets, we must act if Pakistan will not or cannot."489It seems that Obama is all set to pursue this counter terrorism policy as President of USA, with the deployment of an additional 17,000 American forces to Afghanistan490, and the executive order for increasing drone attacks in Pakistan491,as significant steps towards a Afghanistan- Pakistan oriented counterinsurgency policy. The appointment of Richard Holbrooke492, a veteran of South Asian diplomacy, as Obama‘s point-man in the region is also indicative of a more focused Afghanistan- Pakistan anti-militant policy by the Obama administration. Holbrooke seemed to have been given the agenda of unifying consensus on how to fight extremism in the country; it seemed that Washington had started realizing that it needed to bolster the Pakistani state in order to fight terrorism. As Holbrooke put it: ―We must support and strengthen the democratic government of Pakistan in order to eliminate once and for all the extremist threat from al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups.‖ 493The special representative further noted that ―relations between the US and Pakistan have been inconsistent over the years. In Pakistan, many believe that we are not a reliable long-term partner and that we will abandon them after achieving our counterterrorism objectives.‖494 A progressive realization seemed to be dawning in US policy circles that it needed legitimacy amongst the Pakistani public too,rather than solely relying upon the leadership. ― This engagement must be conducted in a way that 488

Obama sees worsening security situation in Afghanistan, The News, July 09, 2008. News on Sunday, 2 August, 2008. 490 Barack Obama will deploy an additional 17,000 American soldiers to Afghanistan, The Economist, Asia section, online edition, February 18,2009, http://www.economist.com/world/asia/74displaystory.cfm?story_ id=13136344. 491 President Obama 'orders Pakistan drone attacks, Times online, January 23, 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article5575883.ece. 492 Ibid. 493 Holbrooke pressures Pakistan to take on militants, The News, May 06, 2009, http://www.thenews.com.pk/arc_default.asp. 489

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respects and enhances democratic civilian authority while also engaging the Pakistani people in our commitment to help them pursue a prosperous economy, a stronger democracy, and a vibrant civil society,‖ said Holbrooke.495 Many different policy initiatives to tackle the militancy in Pakistan have been put forward by the US. A carrot and stick policy has also been tried; the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee had discussed new legislation under which non-security aid to Pakistan would have been tripled to $15 billion over a period of 10 years. 496However security assistance was supposed to be tied in to the performance in the war on terror. The BidenLugar package requires Pakistan to meet three specific conditions before it can qualify for aid related to its defence needs. The US Secretary of State must certify that Pakistan is working hard to shut down al Qaeda (condition 1), cut off the Taliban's indoctrination and support in Pakistan (condition 2), and terminate its military's involvement in political and judicial affairs (condition 3). The Bill also requires the Pakistani security forces to demonstrate that they are ―making concerted efforts to prevent al Qaeda and associated terrorist groups from operating in the territory of Pakistan‖.497 They must also show they are ―making concerted efforts to prevent the Taliban from using the territory of Pakistan as a sanctuary from which to launch attacks within Afghanistan; and are not materially interfering in the political or judicial processes of Pakistan‖.498 The legislation is modeled in such a way that the inbuilt ―benchmarks for measuring the effectiveness of US assistance‖ 499 are monitored by the US Senate; US Secretary of Hillary Clinton,Defence Secretary Robert Gates and Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair are responsible for drafting annual reports on Pakistani security forces‘ compliance upon these conditions. Senator Joseph Biden, who tabled the proposal, hoped to set in place the foundation for a more stable relationship with Pakistan. He has said that the new aid package would signal America‘s long-term commitment to Pakistan. A ‗democracy dividend‘ of US $ 150 million to Pakistan had already been approved by the House committee, with money being allocated for development, for the building of schools, hospitals and infrastructure. There were also suggestions that non-security aid to Pakistan should have been increased follows the same line of thinking. The US has also welcomed the increased powers given to the Pakistan military to tackle terrorism, and repeated statements were issued, stating the hope that it would set in place the basis for a strong military-civilian partnership against terror. The Pakistani military was also appeased by approving the sale of F-16 aircraft. An important report released by Daniel Markey, a leading expert on the region, has also contributed to raising awareness that it is not possible to eradicating militancy without engaging the population of FATA on social and economic fronts. The report is titled, ―Securing Pakistan‘s Tribal Belt,‖ and is indicative of a positive direction of reform proposed for the troubled tribal areas. The main thrust of the study is that Pakistan cannot adequately meet the political, bureaucratic, development and security challenges in the tribal areas on its own and needs to be assisted.

494

Ibid. Ibid. 496 New US tactics, The News, June 30, 2008 497 US senators move Pak aid bill, The News, May 05, 2009, http://www.thenews.com.pk/arc_default.asp. 498 Ibid. 499 Ibid. 495

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The US has reiterated its strategic and long term partnership with Pakistan by putting into the legislative pipeline the $7.5 billion ―Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2008.‖ However, any aid package which is given will probably be tightly regulated by stringent conditions, since traditionally, Pakistan‘s use of the American aid provided for the GWOT has also been used for ambivalent purposes. One of the most serious American complaints against Pakistan concerns the use of aid. For example, America‘s Government Accountability Office came up with a report that there was no proof that the aid meant for fighting terrorism had been used for this purpose. For instance, it claimed that $200m for air defence radars and another $45m for bunker construction had not been used for that particular purpose. This prompted a Congressman to wonder why Pakistan was being reimbursed for its expenses on air defence because al Qaeda had no air force! One of the problems faced by the American in pinning down a Pakistani paradigm of thought is due to the fact that there is a paucity of experts on Pakistan in the administration. Many of the so called analysts‘ were actually trained in India or the Middle East; few have ever visited Pakistan, and most cannot read and write Urdu. In the words of a US government official: ―it‘s really difficult to find people who know anything about Pakistan in the government...and Ambassador Holbrooke is too busy to attend every briefing.‖500 Zakaria offers an analogy with Iraq; even though the post-Cold War US State Department had a number of experts assigned to desks on post-Soviet states, Eastern Europe and Russia, many had little or no expertise on the Middle East.501 This vacuum was subsequently filled with many college graduates, sometimes having two or three years experience of communicating in Arabic .This has increased the demand for courses on Middle East Politics at American universities, with newly fangled ‗ experts‘ waiting to fill in arising vacancies at US State and other departments. Comparably, only a few research universities in the United States offer Urdu as a language, or offer courses in Pakistani politics. In fact, there are only three committed Pakistan Studies programmes in the country.502 Most of the research on Pakistan is bundled into studies on South Asia, which are in very few cases have Pakistani presence. This lack of empathy with the Pakistani state of mind (and affairs) has been superimposed by a very ‗American‘ referential state of mind about the GWOT. In a report issued in the context of terrorism, counter-terrorism and human rights, a panel convened by the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) has explained how the United States government has confused Counterinsurgency activities and anti terrorism initiatives with a ―war paradigm.‖ War is a state of conflict between nations, in which the laws of war such as Jus ad bello and Jus ad bellum503 apply. This has been confused by the usage of terms such as the ―war on terror,‖ the ―war on drugs‖ or the ―war on obesity,‖ which not only obscures a legal basis for definition and consequent contextualization in terms of policy frameworks, but also belittles desperately needed counter terrorist activities by exposing inherent flaws and flouting of international law, such as the Guantanamo prison fiasco. The ICJ panel found that, ―The US‘s war paradigm has created fundamental problems. Among the most serious is that the US has applied war rules to persons not involved in 500

Rafia Zakaria, Reported in comment: Counting the miles to Islamabad,, Daily Times, April 25, 2009, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\04\25\story_25-4-2009_pg3_2. 501 Ibid. 502 Ibid. 503 Jus ad bellum is sometimes considered a part of the laws of war, although the term "laws of war" can also be considered to refer to jus in bello, which concerns whether a war is conducted justly.

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situations of armed conflict, and in genuine situations of warfare, it has distorted, selectively applied and ignored otherwise binding rules, including fundamental guarantees of human rights laws.‖504 The ―binding rules‖ and ―fundamental guarantees‖ which have tended to be violated with impunity during the ‗Global War on Terror‘ are the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the U.S. War Crimes Act and Uniform Code of Military Justice, and the almost the entire body of international law governing war and human rights.505 The ICJ panel concluded that, contrary to the claims of the U.S. government, the established principles of international law ―were intended to withstand crises, and they provide a robust and effective framework from within which to tackle terrorism.‖ 506This is a far cry from the condoning of torture as a ‗necessary‘ tool as postulated by even reputable opinion leaders like Dershowitz, which has tended to have a minimalist impact on gaining support for anti terrorism activities in developing countries like Pakistan. Contextualizing, it seems obvious that Americans have really been at sea when it comes to tackling the Pakistani militancy problem. Previously, they endorsed the capture of al Qaeda personnel while totally disregarding the activities of other groups, notably Taliban. Then ,they chided the government for not doing enough and targeted the ISI, trying to woo Musharraf at the same time while utterly disregarding the populist public opinion against the ex president. Then, while seeming to engage in negotiations with the newly elected government, they started attacking the tribal belts with the aid of unmanned drones, further alienating the society at large. The doctrine of Rumsfeld and the ‗Neoconservatives‘ in Bush administration has seemed to carry over; this is a doctrine akin to imperialism in which the Neoconservatives thought to reshape the world in the American mould .However, this has not happened; the situation in Iraq does not seem to be letting up ,and Afghanistan has worsened exponentially. A sincere US effort at containing militancy in Pakistan needs to go beyond monolithic, empirical perceptions of Pakistan as simply being a territorial extension of the ‗Af-Pak‘ doctrine. In contextualizing the solutions, the diversity and complexity of Pakistan in its particular historical and political background needs to be acknowledged. A counterinsurgency policy would need to be constructed on the basis of knowledge rather than conjecture, barring which the Pakistani US divide at the grass roots would continue to widen. The Obama administration needs to engage in a dialogue with the Pakistani public and study the area it is trying to engage, before starting off on new misadventures.

DRONE ATTACKS Predator unmanned drone attacks have become routine in the tribal areas of Pakistan; it has become one of the most emotive issues in Pakistani politics, with a large proportion of the populace clamoring for remedial measures against what they see as a breach of territorial sovereignty by the United states. As mentioned earlier, there are indications that the drone attacks have been carried out with the blessing of the state authorities to begin with, but the 504

Nicolas J S Davies, The ‗Caroline‘ incident: ―rooting out safe havens for terrorists‖ in the United States and Pakistan, The online Journal, Feb 24, 2009, http://onlinejournal.com/artman/publish/printer_4404.shtml. 505 Ibid. 506 Ibid. Taliban in Pakistan: A Chronicle of Resurgence : A Chronicle of Resurgence, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook

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Pakistani politicians are constrained to oppose them publicly in order to assuage the feelings of a mortified electorate. At the same time, America has become increasingly vocal in its defense of violation of national territories in the name of combating terrorism; for instance, while defending US attacks inside Syria,American Homeland Security chief Michael Chertoff described the US raids as "measures of self-defense that demand international acceptances for warding off possible threats abroad.International law must begin to recognise that a part of the responsibility of sovereignty is the responsibility to make sure that your own country does not become a platform for attacking other countries," Chertoff was quoted as saying. "There are areas of the world that are ungoverned or ungovernable but nevertheless technically within the sovereignty of boundaries. Does that mean we simply have to allow terrorists to operate there, in a kind of badlands, where they can plan, they can set up laboratories, they can experiment with chemical weapons and with biological weapons?"507 US justifies drone attacks by claiming that someone important in the al Qaeda or Taliban hierarchy was a target or had been killed; information about collateral damage is usually not volunteered, and the organizations like Taliban and al Qaeda are not too forthcoming about their casualties, causing an information deficit about these attacks which fuels speculation on either side of opposing viewpoints. This does not detract from the fact that there have been a number of high value targets ‗hits‘ in Pakistan‘s tribal belts; Haitham al Yamani,Abu Hamza Rabia, Midhat Mursi,Khalid Habib and Abu Laith Al Libi are just some of the high value Al Qaeda commanders killed by drone attacks. However, initial euphoric claims of targeting wanted militants in a pinpoint manner are now being viewed with skepticism, since many of these ‗targeted‘ persons turn out to be alive and well later. However, not all intelligence goes awry; even Hakimullah Mehsud in his news conference in Orakzai Agency admitted that the US had upgraded and expanded its intelligence operations in the tribal areas of Pakistan and also increased the number of its missile strikes. He also claimed to have beheaded 10-12 men for spying for the US, which indicated that the US intelligence is widening its noose in the tribal areas. The escalating use of drone by the US is an indication that the Americans are convinced of its effectiveness and accuracy; some introduction to this flying ‗miracle‘ might be in order. The General Atomics MQ-1 Predator is categorized as an unmanned MALE(mediumaltitude, long-endurance) aerial vehicle (UAV),which is described by the United States Air Force as a MALE UAV system. The 4.5 million dollar, 27 foot long drone has the ability to serve in reconnaissance and aggression roles, since it is mounted with state of the art cameras as well as two AGM-114 Hellfire missiles. The drone has seen combat over Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bosnia, Serbia, Iraq, and Yemen since 1995. It is remotely controlled, and is an integrated system, rather than a standalone unit. When fully operational, a tactical unit consists of four air vehicles (with sensors), a ground control station (GCS), a Predator primary satellite link communication suite, and up to 55 people operating the whole system. As of 2009 the US Air Force‘s fleet stands at 195 Predators and 28 Reapers, 508 which are advanced tactical models of predators, capable of carrying more fire power. The precision weapons have undergone testing, and have not been conclusively proved to be a 100 percent accurate. During the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Rob Hewson, editor of the arms trade journal 507

508

Nadeem Iqbal, ‗Bilaterally, diplomatically or militarily,‘ Special Report, News on Sunday, 30 November 2008. http://jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2008-weekly/nos-30-11-2008/spr.htm. Christopher Drew, Drones Are Weapons of Choice in Fighting Qaeda, The New York Times, March 16, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/17/business/17uav.html?hp.

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Jane‘s Air-Launched Weapons, put the accuracy of U.S. ―precision‖ weapons at around 75-80 percent, meaning thereby that 20-25 percent of the launched ‗smart‘ weapons miss the target by at least 30 feet. The popular myth that these weapons can just ‗zap‘ a target to oblivion with pinpoint accuracy just does not hold up to evidence. For years, CIA operated the missions over Pakistan, but under a new partnership program to be launched in the near future, a separate fleet of U.S. drones will venture beyond the Afghan border under the direction of Pakistani military officials. These officials would purportedly be working alongside American counterparts at a command center in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The center is an intelligence ―fusion cell‖, which collates American surveillance with human intelligence collected by Pakistani and Afghanistan agencies to come up with targets projections. "This is about building trust," said a senior U.S. military official, speaking on condition of anonymity because the program has not been publicly acknowledged. "This is about giving them capabilities they do not currently have to help them defeat this radical extreme element that is in their country."509 Even though the drone attacks have come under scathing criticism from political parties and media for igniting the causal loop of militant indoctrination by collateral damage and the ensuing radicalization of affected persons, there has been evidence that they are not all that widely unpopular in the affected areas, particularly if they took out the militants while causing minimum collateral damage. The Aryana Institute for Regional Research and Advocacy (AIRRA) published the results of a survey510 during which research teams visited Wana (South Waziristan), Ladda (South Waziristan), Miranshah (North Waziristan), Razmak (North Waziristan) and Parachinar (Kurram Agency) ; the findings were surprising inasmuch that the victim population was not wholly opposed to drone attacks. The AIRRA conducted the survey with the help of 650 structured questionnaires; 550 persons replied, with 100 declining to respond. The questions were as under: (1) Do you see drone attacks bringing about fear and terror in the common people? (Yes 45%, No 55%). (2) Do you think the drones are accurate in their strikes? (Yes 52%, No 48%). (3) Do you think anti-American feelings in the area increased due to drone attacks recently? (Yes 42%, No 58%). (4) Should the Pakistani military carry out targeted strikes at the militant organizations? (Yes 70%, No 30%). (5) Do the militant organizations get damaged due to drone attacks? (Yes 60%, No 40%). Thus, even though there are widespread expressions vented to the contrary by the media and politicians, the victim population does not seem too unhappy about the drones taking out Taliban leadership, especially if the state is perceived as being unable to do so. In the future, observers of the conflict may be surprised to find jointly controlled drone operations carried

509

Julian E. Barnes and Greg Miller, ‗Pakistan gets a say in drone attacks on militants,‘ Los Angeles Times, May 13, 2009, http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-predator13-2009may13,0,1748949.story. 510 The News, March 5, 2009 Taliban in Pakistan: A Chronicle of Resurgence : A Chronicle of Resurgence, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook

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out by Pakistanis and Americans, since the state of affairs seems to be foreseeably moving in that direction, despite violent opposition to the concept widespread in Pakistani society.

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REGIONAL STATE ACTORS The relatively articulate sections of Pakistani population in Pakistan are characterized by an Indo-centric foreign policy and an inherent suspicion of the West, with the unresolved Kashmir Conflict keeping Indo-Pakistan relations always at the edge of a precipice. The decades after the Afghan Jihad diverted the attentions of the burgeoning Jihadi culture toward the resolution of the Kashmir conflict. This Islamist movement was inspired by its new found confidence in the wake of the Soviet expulsion from Afghanistan by the mujahideen. It was conveniently ignored by the Islamists that the Soviet engagement was in fact a proxy war between warring superpowers, aided by the arming of militias deemed as pawns in this new great game. US pulled out of the Afghan conflict as soon as the Soviets had left the soil, which left the Pakistani Jihadist theatre wide open and looking for new avenues to explore; the movements found that theatre in Kashmir, Bosnia and Chechnya. This also spawned a variety of militant organizations, some affiliated with Islamic parties in Pakistan, such as Hizbe-ul Mujahideen with Jamaat e Islami, and Lashkar Tauheed and Salafi Group for Call and Combat with JAH. Some others had a pan nationalist and an Arabic focus, allied with the ideology of ‗international‘ groups such as the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, Al-Jihad in Egypt, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, al Qaeda, Taliban and the Harkat-i-Islami. Similarly, al-Badr, Jamiat al-Mujahideen, Harkatul Ansar (renamed Harkatul Mujahideen) and Jaish-e-Muhammad (renamed al-Furqan) evolved extreme ideologies based on this internationalized discourse. New entities like Al-Usman, al-Omar and al-Saiqa also emerged to add to this imbroglio, some being barely more than rag tag groups of poorly armed militants. Islamist charity organizations were also quick to find their place in this newly developing ‗Jihad Central,‘ with Wafa Humanitarian Organization and al-Rashid Trust being prominent names, besides controversial entities like Ummat Tameer Nau. At the lower end of the Jihadi ‗market‘ one could find smaller groups like Karwan-i-Khalid, Zarb-Momin and Zarb-Islami. An undercurrent of marginalization and a desperate search for a lost identity of Islam drives these organizations, with militants in Pakistan, UK and Indian occupied Kashmir looking up to their counterparts in Hezbollah of Lebanon, Islamic Jehad of Egypt and Hamas of Palestine. They have also developed a particular discourse, which legitimizes terrorism as a form of mandatory war against the unjust global society dominated by the United States, and jihad in a world filled with infidels like the Hindus. The latter ,in particular, is the linchpin upon which the discourses of these diverse organizations tends to converge, which is not surprising given the nationalist trajectories of the Indo Pakistan dispute, which has morphed into a politico religious conflict. Pakistan was formed as an ideological state, notwithstanding that its founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah wanted it to move towards secularization. It was a state that was envisaged as a pan islamist visionary entity, and somewhere in the process of moving away from Hindudominated Indian civilization post 1947,and the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971, got sidetracked into Islamist trajectories, notably during the Zia era. The Afghan Jihad era and

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afterwards was marked by a huge influx of Saudi capital and exported Wahabi ideology, which led to a marked radicalization. As Dr. Hoodbhoy explains:

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―To understand Pakistan's collective masochism, one needs to study the drastic social and cultural transformations that have made this country so utterly different from what it was in earlier times. For three decades, deep tectonic forces have been silently tearing Pakistan away from the Indian subcontinent and driving it towards the Arabian peninsula …This continental drift is not physical but cultural, driven by a belief that Pakistan must exchange its South Asian identity for an Arab-Muslim one. Grain by grain, the desert sands of Saudi Arabia are replacing the rich soil that had nurtured a rich Muslim culture in India for a thousand years…….. Now a stern, unyielding version of Islam - Wahabism - is replacing the kinder, gentler Islam of the sufis and saints who had walked on this land for hundreds of years…..This change is by design. Twenty-five years ago, under the approving gaze of Ronald Reagan's America,the Pakistani state pushed Islam onto its people. Prayers in government departments were deemed compulsory, floggings were carried out publicly, punishments were meted out to those who did not fast in Ramadan, selection for university academic posts required that the candidate demonstrate knowledge of Islamic teachings, and jehad was declared essential for every Muslim.‖511

This mindset has produced an almost schizoid Pakistani worldview towards India; I do not at all argue that India can be absolved of sponsoring state terrorism, or has not been or is currently not involved in Pakistan‘s domestic matters by utilizing willing hands.However, the Pakistani perception of India also has to be contextualized in its almost uncompromising rigidity. Undeniably India has been a major player on the Afghan scene, and has utilized Afghanistan as a theatre for playing out the traditional Indo-Pak hostility. India has always viewed Pakistan‘s influence in Afghanistan with apprehension, and has tended to align itself with any anti Pakistan group in the region.512 This was the overarching context to India‘s relationship with the Taliban, ever since India came out with unequivocal support for the Northern Alliance. India has also invested heavily into rebuilding post Taliban infrastructure in Afghanistan, which could be a move construed as a strategic measure designed to concretize the fall of the Taliban, since this may ostensibly strengthen Afghanistan as a strategic Indian ally against Pakistan .513 On the other hand, Pakistan has repeatedly accused India of fostering militancy in FATA and Balochistan in an effort to undermine Pakistan.514 India is deemed responsible for almost all of Pakistan‘s evils even in relatively cultured, educated Pakistani circles ; there may well be ( or not)be an Indian hand behind Pakistan‘s troubled areas and terrorist acts in cities, but it does seem an oversimplification when foreign hands are blamed for everything ranging from lost Cricket matches to poor economic policies to corruption. Even though there are intervening détentes amongst times of escalating hostility, India and Pakistan seem to have constantly engaged in an (almost) love (mostly) hate relationship. ―The fact is that both countries remain deeply divided over each other -- something which is both a circumstantial and a chronic issue. Depending on the situation between the two, both 511

Pervez Hoodbhoy, An SOS from Pakistan, March 16, 2009, Frontline. Khalid Hasan, "U.S. should Respect Pakistan‘s Need for Political Space: CSIS," Daily Times, April 5, 2008, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C04%5C05%5Cstory_5-4-2008_pg7_9. 513 Ibid. 514 Amin Tarzi, "Afghanistan: Kabul's India Ties Worry Pakistan," Radio Free Europe (April 16, 2006), http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/04/B5BFE0BE-ED5D-43DE-A768-99A6AB1E6C5C.html. 512

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countries can embrace with open arms or tighten a noose around each other's neck. Similarly, though both countries call for unity based on their cultural vindication, there remains an element of extreme mistrust between the two, which has been deeply marred by events in history. Time is the best healer of such wounds, and it seems that 65 years are still not enough.‖515 This mindset is reflected by the ambivalent opinions prevalent in the Pakistani society towards India, which are also reflected in perceptions about regional security. There are diametrically opposing viewpoints existing in Pakistani society regarding India; some are in the favour for a negotiated peace with India regarding the Kashmir issue in order to better tackle the Taliban crisis. Mr.Nawaz Sharif, one of the premier politicians of Pakistan, is a prominent proponent of this idea. Another camp is vehemently opposed to normalizing relations with India at any costs, which is the viewpoint expressed by Jamaat-e Islami .The US tends to tread cautiously where the relations between India and Pakistan are concerned; a statement by Obama‘s Secretary of State, Ms Hilary Clinton exemplifies this viewpoint; as she expressed satisfaction over ―good news‖ about Pakistan withdrawing troops from the border with India to re-redirect them towards the tribal theater, she also mentioned the advisability of India and Pakistan normalizing their relations with each other. This has been a typical ‗middle ground‘ American approach for some years now, since it has gotten sensitized to the emotive Kashmir issue which has caused a rift between the two countries. The Americans have tended to work behind the scenes for normalizing relations between the two countries, since overt support will only add to further ‗Americanization‘ of the anti India sentiment, making it only harder to build bridges of trust between the two countries. As for the theory why India purportedly wants to foment terrorism in Pakistan, the answer seems simple: ―to destabilize Pakistan‖. Most Pakistanis perceive terrorism in the tribal areas and Balochistan as being fomented by India, although concrete proof is sometimes not forthcoming in the open source. This is not just alarmist talk by disgruntled, ill educated Pakistani masses; intelligentsia has also joined this debate, with scholars of the caliber of Juan Cole, distinguished professor of history at the University of Michigan, suspecting ―US policy makers of secretly desiring to find some pretext for removing Pakistan‘s nuclear capacity‖.516 Cole argues that Taliban threat was overblown to suit vested interests in Pakistan; from Musharraf, who ―wants to make another military coup‖ to ―civilian politicians in Islamabad who want to extract more money from the US to fight the Taliban that they are also secretly bribing to attack Afghanistan‖.517 This schizoid state of mind about India has been an obstruction in the paving the way to an all out offensive against the Taliban by being an obstruction in diversion of military resources from the Pakistani border with India. However, it seems that the realization is dawning that the threat perception from India is comparably smaller than the Taliban, which in essence has become a more of an immediate and existential threat. Any long-term solution of militant troubles within the country is contingent upon a radical improvement in Indo-Pakistan relations. This will enable Pakistan to concentrate on internal security by evolving a more inclusive Muslim identity rooted in the Indo-Persian 515

Usman Zafar, ‗It's not cricket!‘ Special Report, News on Sunday, 7 December 2008. http://jang.com.pk/thenews/dec2008-weekly/nos-07-12-2008/spr.htm. 516 Juan Cole,‗Pakistan Crisis and Social Statistics,‘ Informed consent section on Juan Cole‘s website,accessible at http://www.juancole.com/2009/04/readers-have-written-me-asking-what-i.html. 517 Ibid. Taliban in Pakistan: A Chronicle of Resurgence : A Chronicle of Resurgence, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook

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culture. This is foreseeably not going to be an easy process, given the tensions and mistrust between India and Pakistan; the Kashmir issue is germane to solution of these problems. Multilateral cooperative mechanisms within the UN on the issues of education, development and culture for promoting and preserving peace and security over the long haul also need to be initiated; ‗Track Two‘(informal, alternative dispute resolution )diplomatic initiatives tend to get stalled between the two countries due to rapidly changing political scenarios, unless augmented by international assistance. India is not the only neighbour with stakes in Pakistan‘s militancy situation. Iran is pensively regarding the activities of Jundullah(also known as Iranian People‘s resistance movement, abbreviated as IPRM), a Sunni militant organization that has been involved in several attacks in Iran‘s Sistan-va-Baluchestan province, with the city of Saravan being targeted repeatedly. Jundullah is believed to have 1,000 fighters and claims to have killed 400 Iranian soldiers.518 Its name translates into the ―Army of God", "Allah's Soldiers", or "God's Brigade‖; it is primarily a Sunni "Pakistani tribal militant group responsible for a series of deadly guerrilla raids inside Iran."519 It is "made up of members of the Baluchi tribe and operates out of the Baluchistan province in Pakistan, just across the border from Iran." 520 The group "has taken responsibility for the deaths and kidnappings of more than a dozen Iranian soldiers and officials",521 and "has been (purportedly)secretly encouraged and advised by American officials since 2005,(and by) U.S. and Pakistani intelligence sources(since then)…"522 Following a devastating bomb attack on Zahedan in February 2007,Iranian sources have tended to make "renewed Iranian accusations that Jundullah was receiving support from British and US forces in neighboring Afghanistan for its campaign of violence in Sistan-Baluchistan."523 A not uncommonly held viewpoint is that the "CIA is supporting Iranian ethnic groups like sunni Balochs and Kurds inside Iran. Iranian relation with pakistan are becoming tense. Pakistan is playing role of surrogate for americans even though they hate this role. Jundullah a sunni militant group is getting full support of CIA." 524 This support is ostensibly being funneled to Jundullah‘s youthful leader, Abd el Malik Regi,mainly through Iranian exiles having connections with European and Gulf states. According to Rigi, Jundullah‘s goal is to improve the life of Iranian Baloch and Sunnis and not to separate from Iran or even demand autonomy. In an October 17, 2008 interview aired on Al-Arabiya TV, Regi stated, "the only thing we ask of the Iranian government is to be citizens. We want to have the same rights as the Iranian Shiite people. That's it."525 He described his group as an Islamic revivalist movement, but decried any al Qaeda or Taliban linkages. He also told the interviewer that despite the fact that "many of us have been martyred ... we are prepared to reach an understanding"526 with the Iranian government. 518

Massoud, Ansari, Sunni Muslim group vows to behead Iranians, Washington Times, January 16, 2006. ABC News Exclusive: The Secret War Against Iran, Abc News website, April 03, 2007, http://blogs.abcnews.com/theblotter/2007/04/abc_news_exclus.html. 520 Ibid. 521 Ibid 522 Ibid. 523 David Eshel, Ethnic Opposition on the rise in Iran, Defence Update, http://www.defenseupdate.com/newscast/0307/analysis/analysis-070307.htm. 524 Operation Iranian Freedom, ‗My World as I see it‘ website, February 25, 2007, http://drsanghar.wordpress.com/ 2007/02/25/operation-iranian-freedom/. 525 The Middle East Media Research Institute, Clip no. 1897, October 17, 2008, Media archives, http://www.memritv.org/clip_transcript/en/1897.htm. 526 Ibid. 519

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Regi "used to fight with the Taliban" and is "part drug smuggler, part Taliban, part Sunni activist," according to Alexis Debat, a "senior fellow on counterterrorism at the Nixon Center and an ABC News consultant who recently met with Pakistani officials and tribal members." 527 A possible US-Pakistan nexus supporting the Jundullah against Iran has been hypothesized: ―Pakistani government sources say the secret campaign against Iran by Jundullah was on the agenda when Vice President Dick Cheney met with Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf in February."528 The American motivations of supporting his groups have been contextualized in the context of the groups anti Iranian stance and al Qaeda stance: "A senior U.S. government official said groups such as Jundullah have been helpful in tracking al Qaeda figures and that it was appropriate for the U.S. to deal with such groups in that context."529 "Some former CIA officers say the arrangement is reminiscent of how the U.S. government used proxy armies, funded by other countries including Saudi Arabia, to destabilize the government of Nicaragua in the 1980s."530 Despite repeated assurances by Pakistan to contain Jundullah, Iran remains apprehensive. This is not as much a result of doubt regarding Pakistan‘s sincerity, inasmuch as it is a tacit acknowledgement of the state‘s inability to control militant groups, which casts aspersions on Pakistani claims of being in control of the militancy situation. Following the explosions in Tehran and Zahedan, the Iranian Foreign Minister summoned the Pakistani ambassador in Tehran for an explanation. And soon after these incidents Mohammad Khatami, the former President of Iran sent out a warning, "although Pakistan is our neighbor it has become a sanctuary for terrorists who killed the innocent people in Zahidan. Pakistan should be careful not to fall into the US trap since it will be the loser".531 Iran has not only shut down the border at Tehran, but is also raising a concrete wall with a fence stretching as far as 700 km along the border with Pakistan. China has also started a balancing act between India and Pakistan in the wake of Sino Indian rapprochement; the days of boundless friendship for Pakistan are almost gone. This is in part explained by a potential link between Pakistani terrorism and the restive Chinese Xinjiang province. China is most concerned about the Jihadist East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM),a group which has demonstrably entrenched itself and operated out of Pakistan. Even though Chinese fears were allayed somewhat when Hasan Mahsum, the leader of ETIM, was killed in an operation conducted by Pakistan Army in South Waziristan in October 2003, fears justifiably linger. ETIM is a militant Muslim separatist group with its headquarters based in western Xinjiang province of China, a region sharing borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan. The ETIM is manned almost exclusively by the Uighurs, the Turkic-speaking ethnic majority in Xinjiang, who seek to impose a nationalist state by the name of East Turkestan upon the Chinese government, which fears the opening of a separatist Pandora‘s Box if the movement were to gain momentum. In the wake of September 11, the Chinese government has repeatedly warned the American administration about ETIM‘s linkages with al Qaeda. The 527

(Abc News, April 03, 2007). Ibid. 529 Ibid. 530 Ibid. 531 Musarrat Jabeen,Zahid Ali Khan, US-Iran Nuclear Tension: Implication on Pakistan, Defence Journal, December 2008,p,41. 528

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group‘s US assets were consequently frozen by Bush in August 2002. These al Qaeda linkages were elucidated by a Chinese funded study in January 2002, wherein it was reported that ETIM had received finance, logistics and training from al Qaeda. 532 Even though there is general unanimity on the fact that hundreds of Uighurs left China to join al Qaeda and its Taliban hosts in Afghanistan, some China focused strategists and academics currently doubt ETIM‘s continuing ties to Bin Laden‘s network.533 The same set of observers tend to mention that Beijing has a tendency to exaggerate these terrorist linkages in order to ―paint their own campaign against Uighur separatists in Xinjiang as a flank of the U.S.-led war on terrorism— and to get Washington to drop its long-standing protests over Chinese human rights abuses in its crackdowns in Xinjiang.‖534However, the Jihadist threat cannot be downplayed; as elaborated upon in chapter 1, many Pakistani Jihadist organizations like the LeT have made the liberation of Xinjiang a part of their manifestoes, which further fuels Chinese apprehension about the escalating militancy in Pakistan.

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CONCLUSION Organizations undertaking the suicide tactic in Pakistan have tended to compete for market shares by outbidding other organizations by escalation of the suicide tactic, and have also tended to change their use of the tactic in response to a backlash of public opinion in the context of shifting to military targets from civilian ones. Even though they could hardly be described as in-depth studies, the empirical analysis carried out to date points to suicide tactic in Pakistan as mainly organizational undertakings ,with different organizations pursuing their sectarian and ‗foreigner‘ targeted agendas till 2005-6,after which the focus seems to have shifted towards attacking the military personnel and installations in Pakistan‘s tribal areas, perhaps as a response to the Pakistani army‘s operations against militants being conducted in those areas. However, the very fact that the sectarian and religious focus of suicide attacks has diverted nearly exclusively to the tribal areas, is at the same time troubling and heartening; it is encouraging in the sense that it seems to indicate that the public opinion in the settled areas of Pakistan has shifted against suicide violence, perhaps forcing the organizations to take stock of the public response indicators vis-à-vis news reports, opinion pieces, public rallies etc. In the absence of open source information it is hard to say with absolute certainty, but the lull in the attacks in major cities seems to suggest that major organizations have focused their energies on the tribal areas. This is also distinctly troubling; it suggests an agreement or a nexus of some kind between the major sectarian organizations and the umbrella organization of the Tehreek e Taliban, which is the only major unified movement engaging the armed forces in Swat, Bajaur and Waziristan agencies. The very fact that the sectarian organizations like Jaish have considerably decreased their sectarian attacks, gives rise to the troubling empirical observation that the political objectives of these organizations have perhaps converged with that of TTP; the vacation of the tribal homeland by the Pakistani army, followed by the imposition of an alternative system of sharia 532

Holly Fletcher, Jayshree Bajoria, The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), A Council on Foreign relations publication, July 31, 2008, accessible on http://www.cfr.org/publication/9179/. 533 Ibid. 534 Ibid. Taliban in Pakistan: A Chronicle of Resurgence : A Chronicle of Resurgence, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook

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governance in the tribal heartlands. This would also seems to point towards the theoretical observation that perhaps these organizations have come to some form of an agreement; suspending their own different agendas in order to pool their resources to provide stiff resistance to the state forces. Arguably, this is a pointer towards the increasing organizational strength of the Taliban in Pakistan Most in-depth analysis535 has found little evidence of a direct link between poverty and terrorism in Pakistan, arguing instead that terrorism and the use of the suicide tactic should be seen as a response to political conditions and long-standing feelings of indignity, and frustration at lack of opportunity(see next chapter for a more detailed discussion). Other commentators, however, argue that while this may explain the motivations of the Islamist leadership or elite, poverty and illiteracy may still be important motivating factors for recruits at the lower levels of radical organizations536. In any event the situation is likely to vary greatly between countries and these hypotheses needs to be at the country and, sub-national level before affirmation. Thus, profiling the organizations in strife ridden countries like Pakistan may reveal further fault lines, which could generate valuable projections about the future trajectory of suicide terrorism as an organizational phenomenon. Another heartening development in Pakistan‘s tribal areas is the development of resentment against terrorism in FATA. A recent study by Community Appraisal and Motivation Programme (CAMP)537 has demonstrated that only 17.2 percent of people in FATA perceive armed resistance as jihad, while for an overwhelming majority of 57.4 percent, it is learning the Holy Quran and modern sciences. 24.1 percent perceive jihad as peaceful resistance to oppression, while 21.9 percent respondents held bad governance responsible for the current extremism. 24.4 percent respondents mentioned poverty as the main driver for extremism, while 44.8 percent blamed illiteracy for escalating religious extremism. 26.4 percent respondents accused the Afghan conflict as being responsible for the situation in FATA while 88.58 respondents said that firearms proliferated from Afghanistan, with only 1.52 percent perceiving that the weapons supply routes passed through Dara Adam Khel. A majority of 54 percent respondents expressed dissatisfaction with living conditions in FATA in general, while the number of satisfied people stood at 18.15 percent.538Provision of justice was perceived as the most pressing need (73.25 percent), followed by education (64.6 percent), health (52.1 percent) and tackling terrorism (47 percent).A meager 2.95 percent respondents perceived the US as a ―very favourable‖ country, compared with 66.2 percent who called it ―very unfavourable‖. Labeling FATA as a uniformly radical society would thus 535

536

537

538

Safiya Aftab, Poverty and militancy, Conflict and peace studies (A Pakistan instate of peace studies) Journal, issue 1, 2008.Other works which focus specifically on the Pakistani Jihadist issue are Abbas,Sohail, Probing the Jihadi mindset(Silamabd,2007:National book foundation).For a more ‗macro‘ level approach, see Fair,C, Christine, Militant recruitment in Pakistan: A new look at the military madrassah connection in Asia Policy,No.4,July 2007. Husain Haqqani,Poverty Fuels Extremism, August 2, 2007, Gulf News. Also, International Herald Tribune, ―Experts: Poverty, culture of violence contribute to growing child militancy in Pakistan‖, December 13,2007. http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/12/13/asia/AS-GEN-Pakistan-Child-Militants.php. and Bhutto, B., ―Without a war on poverty, we will never defeat terror‖, The Guardian, August 9,2004. http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,1278931,00.html. 57% in FATA think jihad is learning Quran and sciences: survey, Daily Times, April 29, 2009, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\04\29\story_29-4-2009_pg1_4. 56% in FATA see Afghan Taliban as ‗heroes‘: survey, Daily Times, April 28, 2009, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\04\28\story_28-4-2009_pg1_5.

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be a misleading conclusion, though I am not at all suggesting that it is devoid of radical elements either. Perhaps some other factors are at work which has led to the current trajectories of the militant Taliban movement in Pakistan; superimposition of a Jihadist mindset (imported and/or otherwise) on an already disgruntled populace may be relevant. What many conspiracy theories overlook is that the present insurgency falls within the ambit of global jihad, as theorized by al Qaeda ideologues Ayman Al Zawahiri and Abu Mu‘sab Al Suri. Al Suri theorized in his online treatise, ―The Global Islamic Resistance Call‖ 539 that suicide bombings and blowing up of schools corresponded with what he called ‗the first stage‘ in the global jihad against ―the crusaders, Zionists and apostate (Muslim) regimes‖. This entailed ―limited terrorist warfare‖, including ―assassinations, ambushes, and selective bomb attacks to confuse the enemy, as well as laying out a staged program of a terrorism based Islamist take over. The ultimate aim of such guerilla activities was postulated to bring about ―a state of security exhaustion, political confusion and economic failures‖. This is reflected in the Pakistani scenario by civilian masses thankfully accepting peace deals between the state and the Taliban militants in Pakistan, which brings the militants that much closer to negotiating at par as an equal entity with the state; TTP‘s tactics resonate closely with Suri‘s doctrine. The Taliban‘s ‗excursions‘ to urban centres mirror the next strategic ‗second stage‘ in Al Suri‘s Jihadi paradigm: ―large strategic attacks‖ compelling the enemy ―to enter decisive battles‖540, which engages the monolithic state military apparatus against small, fluidly operational tactical Taliban units. According to Al Suri, eventual disbanding of army units into smaller mobile guerilla squads is germane to Jihadist warfare, with some officers and soldiers previously loyal to the state ―joining the guerrilla forces‖.541 The ‗liberation stage‖ thus ensues when army units ―have joined the revolutionaries, and the guerrilla fighters have attained a sufficient level of armaments to enter into open battles‖.542 It seems likely that Suri modeled this part of his doctrine on the Iranian model, which becomes flawed in respect to Pakistan since the Pakistani army does not seem prone to such tendencies in the medium to longer term. It is imperative to contextualize the Taliban in Pakistan as the forerunners of a global Jihadist movement, which as is noted by even Al Suri himself, took root in the Jihadist nurturing environment of Afghanistan. 543 Al Suri‘s worldview is clearly reflected by the Taliban in Pakistan, which is marked by disdain for ―the plague of democracy and Parliament‖ on one hand, and all out support for an ‗Islam‘ where ―terrorism is a religious duty and assassination a prophetic tradition‖.544

539

Jim Lacey, ‗A terrorist's call to global jihad; deciphering Abu Musab al-Suri's Islamic jihad manifesto,‘(Naval Institute Press, 2008). 540 Ibid. 541 Ibid. 542 Ibid. 543 Li,Brynjar, ‗Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus'ab Al-Suri,‘(Columbia University Press, 2008). 544 Ibid,pp-384-385.

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A. Manzar Table Showing All Suicide Attacks in Pakistan between 2002 and January 2009 2002 DATE

INCIDENT

1

March 17

Five persons were killed and more than 40 injured, including the High Commissioner of Sri Lanka to Pakistan, in a grenade attack on a church in Islamabad.

2

May 8

Nine French nationals and five Pakistanis, including a suspected suicide bomber, are killed and 34 more injured in a bomb explosion inside a bus opposite Sheraton Hotel, Karachi.

2003 DATE

INCIDENT

July 4

53 persons are killed and 57 others injured as three armed terrorists, including a suspected suicide bomber, attack a Shiite Muslim mosque in Quetta, capital of the Southwestern Baluchistan province, during the Friday prayers. 14 persons were killed and 46 others injured during a second assassination attempt on President Pervez Musharraf in the Jhanda Chichi area of Rawalpindi. The President narrowly escaped the suicide assassination attempt when his motorcade was hit by two explosive laden vehicles.

1 December 25 2

2004

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1

DATE

INCIDENT

February 28

A suicide bomber is killed and four worshippers sustain injuries in an attack on an mosque in the Satellite Town area of Rawalpindi. 15 Shia worshippers and a suspected suicide bomber are killed and over 200 persons sustain injuries when a powerful bomb exploded at Hyderi Mosque, situated within the premises of the seminary Sindh Madrasa-tul-Islam, in the Mithadar area of Karachi. 24 worshippers are killed and 34 others sustain injuries when a high-intensity bomb explodes during the evening prayers at a Shia mosque situated on the MA Jinnah Road in Karachi

May 7 2 May 31 3 June 3

A suspected Uzbek operative of the Al Qaeda and a soldier of Shawal Scouts are killed in a suspected suicide attack, while two soldiers sustain injuries at a check-post in the North Waziristan agency, close to the Afghanistan border.

July 30

Seven persons, including the attacker, are killed in a suicide bomb attack on the car of Finance Minister and Prime Minister-designate, Shaukat Aziz, at village Jaffar in Fateh Jang.

October 1

At least 31 people are killed and 75 others sustain injuries in a suspected suicide bombing at a Shia mosque at Sialkot in the Punjab province during the Friday prayers.

October 10

A suspected suicide bomber reportedly blew himself up at a Shia mosque in the Mochi Gate area of Lahore, killing at least five people, including two children, and injuring six others.

4

5

6

7

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2005 DATE

INCIDENT

March 19

At least 50 people are killed and over 100 others sustain injuries during a suicide bombing at a crowded gathering near the shrine of a Shia saint at Fatehpur village in the Jhal Magsi district of Balochistan province.

April 28

Two suspected terrorists blow themselves up while planting a bomb in the in the Baidara village of Swat Valley in North West Frontier Province.

May 27

At least 25 people, including a suspected suicide bomber, are killed and approximately 100 others sustain injuries during a powerful explosion at the Bari Imam shrine of the Shia sect located in vicinity of the diplomatic enclave in capital Islamabad.

May 30

Six people, including two of the three assailants, among them a suicide bomber, are killed and 19 persons sustain injuries during an explosion in the courtyard of a Shia mosque at Gulshan-e-Iqbal in Karachi.

1

2

3

4

2006 DATE

INCIDENT

February 9

At least 40 people are killed and 50 others wounded in a suspected suicide attack on a Muharram procession of Shia Muslims in the Hangu town of North West Frontier Province. A US diplomat, identified as David Fyfe, his Pakistani driver and a Rangers official were killed and 54 persons injured in a suicide car bombing near the US consulate in Karachi.

1 March 2

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2 April 11

At least 57 people, including prominent Islamist clerics, are killed and more than 200 people sustained injuries in a suicide bomb attack at Nishtar Park in Karachi.

June 2

At least five soldiers and two suicide bombers were killed and seven soldiers sustained injuries when a car laden with explosives rammed into a military vehicle in the Bakakhel area of Bannu in NWFP.

June 26

Six security force personnel are killed when a suicide bomber rammed his explosives-laden car at Aisha checkpoint, 10 kilometers east of Miranshah in North Waziristan.

November 8

A suicide bomber blew himself up at an army training centre at Dargai in the North West Frontier Province, killing 42 and injuring 39 recruits of the Punjab Regiment Centre and their instructor.

November 17

A suicide bomber killed himself and injured two police personnel when he targeted a police van in Peshawar in the North West Frontier Province. The bomber, identified as Nadeem Khan, blew himself up near the police patrol van parked beside a temporary police post at the Bara intersection on the Ring Road at around 7:15am.

3

4

5

6

7

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A. Manzar 2007 DATE

INCIDENT

January 22

A suicide bomber rammed his explosives-laden car into a military convoy near Mirali in North Waziristan, killing four security force (SF) personnel and a woman, and injuring 23 persons, including 20 soldiers.Eye-witnesses said that three military vehicles and a passenger coach were also damaged in the first attack since the Government and Taliban-backed militants signed a peace agreement on September 5, 2006. A suicide bomber blew himself up outside Hotel Marriott in the capital Islamabad, killing a guard, Tariq Mehmood, and wounding five persons. The unidentified man detonated explosives strapped to his body after the security guard tried to stop him from entering the hotel through a side entrance. The suicide bombing occurred hours before a Republic Day function at the hotel hosted by India's High Commission. The function, however, went ahead after the explosion. 15 people, including six police officials, were killed and 60 others injured in a suicide attack targeting a Muharram procession near Qasim Ali Khan Mosque in the Dilgaran area of Qissa Khawani Bazaar in Peshawar, capital of North Western Frontier Province (NWFP). A suicide bomber killed three people, including two police personnel, at Dera Ismail Khan in the North West Frontier Province.

1

January 26

2

January 27 3

4

January 29 February 3

A suicide bomber drove his explosives-laden jeep into a military convoy, killing two soldiers and injuring seven others in the Barakhel area of Tank district in North West Frontier Province (NWFP).

February 3

A suspected militant blew himself up while planting a bomb outside a video and music shop in southern Lakki Marwat district of NWFP. The blast damaged a dozen nearby shops in the town, a settled area near Bannu district.

February 6

A suicide attacker blew himself up in the car park of Islamabad airport, killing himself and injuring 10 people, mostly security force personnel. s.

February 17

At least 17 people, including a senior civil judge, were killed and 30 persons injured in a suicide bombing in the District Courts compound of Quetta, capital of Balochistan province.

April 28

31 people, including five police personnel, were killed and Federal Interior Minister Sherpao and his young son Sikandar Sherpao Khan were among several people wounded in a suicide attack, moments after the minister finished a speech at a public rally in his hometown Charsadda in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). Twenty-five people were killed and at least 35 others wounded when a suicide bomber blew himself up on the ground floor of the Marhaba Hotel in Peshawar, capital of the North West Frontier Province. Witnesses and police said that restaurant owner Sadruddin was an Uzbek of Afghan origin and he was a supporter of former Uzbek warlord Abdur Rashid Dostum. A suicide bomber rammed his explosive-laden Land Cruiser into a Frontier Corps (FC) vehicle in the Boltonabad area of Bannu district in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), killing two FC personnel, Fareed Hussain and Nametullah, and injuring another, identified as Masood Afsar.

5

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7

8

9

10

May 15 11

May 28 12

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War and Peace July 4

11 people, including six security force (SF) personnel, died in a suicide attack on a caravan of SFs in North Waziristan. A suicide attacker rammed his explosive-laden car with the caravan near Mir Ali.

July 12

A suicide bomber blew himself up in front of the Political Agent's office in the Miranshah area of North Waziristan, killing four people and injuring three others. Political agent Pirzada Khan, who was in the office at the time, is reported to have escaped unhurt. A suicide bomber killed three police personnel, Sub-Inspector Taj Maluk and constables Riaz and Islam Gul, by detonating the explosives wrapped around his waist in the Swat district of North West Frontier Province. The suicide attack came moments after a military convoy passed through the area,. At least 24 Frontier Corps (FC) personnel were killed and 27 others injured when a suicide bomber rammed an explosives-packed car into their convoy.

13

14 July 12 15 July 14 16 July 15

At least 13 security force personnel and six civilians, including three children, were killed and more than 50 people sustained injuries at Matta in the Swat district of North West Frontier Province (NWFP) when two suicide bombers rammed two cars packed with explosives into an army convoy early in the morning.

18

July 15

19

July 17

A suicide bomber blew himself up at the Dera Ismail Khan Police Lines in NWFP as candidates took police entrance exams. 26 people were killed, including 12 police personnel and the suicide bomber, and 61 others were wounded. Approximately 16 people died and more than 63 were wounded in a suicide bomber attack outside the venue of a lawyers rally in Islamabad. The blast occurred shortly before reinstated Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry was to pass through the site to give a speech to lawyers of the Islamabad District Bar Association. The blast occurred within the Pakistan People‘s Party (PPP) camp and many of the dead, including three women, were activists of the party.

20

July 17

21

July 19

22

July 19

23

July 19

24

July 20

25

July 27

17

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153

Four persons, including three soldiers, were killed in a suicide attack at the Kajhri security check-post in North Waziristan. At least 22 civilians and seven police officers were killed and approximately 50 people injured in a suicide car bomb attack at the Gadani Bus Stop in the industrial town of Hub in Balochistan. 15 persons, including a prayer leader and two children, were killed and several people injured when a suicide bomber blew himself up during night prayers at a mosque at Pathan Lines Centre in the Kohat Cantonment area of NWFP. Most of the victims were reportedly army officials. Interior Minister Sherpao said, "Indirectly these attacks are a backlash reaction against the Red Mosque." Five civilians and two policemen were killed and 35 people injured when a suicide bomber set off his explosives-packed car at the Hangu Police Training College in the NWFP. Four persons, including two civilians, were killed and five others injured when a suicide bomber rammed his explosives-laden car into a security check post at Boya near Miranshah in North Waziristan. At least 15 people, including eight police personnel, were killed and 53 others wounded, when a suicide bomber struck a group of police personnel in a restaurant following a clash between the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) activists and the police after Friday prayers in Islamabad. The bomber reportedly blew himself up at the Muzaffargarh Nihari House and the Pakwan Centre, some 500 yards away from the Lal Masjid in a busy business centre in a thickly populated area of the capital, at about 5.20 pm. Around 20 personnel of the Punjab Police

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A. Manzar

26

August 3

27

August 4

28

August 17

29

August 18

30

August 18

31

August 20

32

August 24

33

August 24

34

August 26

35

September 1

36

September 1

37

September 4

38

September 4

39

September 11

40

September 22

41

October 1

were sitting in and outside the restaurant at that time. The dead included eight Punjab Police personnel with 16 others injured. A suicide blast targeting the family of a government official killed two persons and injured six members of the family in the Gora village of Swat district in the North West Frontier Province. Nine persons, including a ten-year old girl, were killed and 43 others wounded when a suicide car bomber triggered an explosion at a busy bus stop near the entry point of Parachinar city in the Kurram Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. A suicide bomber rammed an explosive-laden jeep into a military vehicle near Jandola in South Waziristan, killing himself and wounding five soldiers. Two soldiers were killed and two others injured when a suicide bomber rammed his explosive-laden car into the Tharkhobi check post in North Waziristan. A suicide bomber blew himself up after being cornered by police, injuring a police personnel and a civilian at Bannu in the NWFP. Six security force (SF) personnel were killed and 18 persons, including a civilian, were wounded when a suicide bomber rammed an explosives-laden car into a checkpoint on Kurram Road in the Hangu district of NWFP. A woman is reported to have died when SFs opened indiscriminate fire after the incident. A suicide bomber rammed his explosives-laden vehicle into the military convoy near the Qamar Picket built on a roadside hill near the Mir Ali town in North Waziristan, killing five soldiers and injuring 10 others. The same convoy, which had come from Bannu in the North West Frontier Province and was on its way to Razmak, was attacked once more when it proceeded further. Another suicide bomber riding a vehicle struck the convoy near Asadkhel village on the road to Razmak, killing two soldiers and injuring two others. Four police personnel were killed and two others sustained injuries in a suicide attack on a police van in the mountainous Shangla district of North West Frontier Province. Five people, including three security force (SF) personnel, were killed and nine others injured when two suicide bombers rammed their explosives-laden car into a truck of the SFs in the Mamond area of Bajaur Agency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Six soldiers were injured when a suicide bomber targeted a check-post of the troops in the Jandola area of South Waziristan. At least 30 people were killed and 70 others wounded in two suicide attacks at Qasim Market and RA Bazaar in the garrison city of Rawalpindi. The first suicide bomber targeted a bus that was carrying about 35 employees of a defence agency to their office near the Qasim Market, killing at least 20 people. Soon after, another blast occurred near the RA Bazaar police station, killing 10 more people. 19 people were killed and 15 others wounded when a teenage suicide bomber blew himself up near a thickly-populated area of Bannu Choongi in the Dera Ismail Khan district of NWFP. A suicide bomber rammed his explosives-laden jeep into a military truck near Tank in the NWFP, killing himself and wounding three soldiers. Eyewitnesses said a military convoy was going from Tank to Jandola in Waziristan when the jeep hit one of the vehicles carrying soldiers near a customs check post. A suicide bomber disguised in a woman's burqa (veil) blew himself up at a busy police check-post in Bannu in the North West Frontier Province killing at least 16 people, including four police personnel, and wounding 29 people.

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War and Peace 42

October 18

43

October 25

44

October 30

45

November 1

46

November 9

47

November 24

48

December 4

49

December 9

50

December 10

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A suicide bombing in a crowd welcoming former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto killed 143 persons and injured approximately 550 others in Karachi. Two explosions struck near a truck carrying Benazir, but she was not injured and was hurried to her house. The two explosions occurred a minute apart shortly after midnight near Karsaz bridge close to the vehicle Benazir Bhutto was traveling in, at the head of a procession of hundreds of thousands of PPP supporters who had flooded the streets of Karachi to welcome their leader on her return from eight years in self-imposed exile. 18 soldiers and two civilians died and 35 others, including nine civilians, were injured in a bomb blast aimed at a vehicle carrying Frontier Constabulary personnel at Nawan Killi in the Swat district of the North West Frontier Province. A suicide bomber killed eight people, including three police personnel, and injured at least 18 others, including 14 police personnel, when he blew himself up at a police picket near district courts in the cantonment area of Rawalpindi. President Pervez Musharraf had reportedly been meeting governors and chief ministers at Camp Office less than a kilometer away from the incident site. A suicide bomber rammed his motorcycle into a Pakistan Air Force (PAF) bus, killing seven officers of the PAF and three civilians on the Faisalabad Road in Sargodha in Punjab province. At least 28 people were wounded in the attack. The bus was reportedly carrying PAF staff from the Mushaf Mir Airbase to Kirana Ammunition Depot when the bomber targeted the bus at approximately 6.45a.m. Three persons are killed and two others, including a former provincial minister, are injured when a suicide bomber blows himself up in the house of Federal Minister for Political Affairs Amir Muqam in Peshawar, capital of the NWFP. Two suicide bombers simultaneously targeted military personnel and installations at two different places in Rawalpindi, claiming over 32 lives and wounding 55 others. In the first attack that occurred at 7.55 am (PST), the suicide bomber while trying to enter the Hamza Camp, the main office of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), from the out-gate hit the staff bus of the agency. The blast, which occurred 200 metres from Faizabad at the Murree Road, killed over 30 personnel on the bus and among the guards standing at the main gate. At the same time near the GHQ, another suicide bomber blew up his car after hitting an Army check-post when he was intercepted while trying to infiltrate into the high security zone. Two Army personnel were killed while one was injured in the second attack. In the first such attack of its kind, a female suicide bomber blew herself up in a high security zone in Peshawar, capital of the North West Frontier Province. Except for the suicide bomber, who was said to be in her mid-30s, no other casualty was reported in the blast. The offices of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) are located in the maximum-security Peshawar Cantonment area. Three police personnel and seven civilians, including two children, were killed and a child was wounded in a car bombing in the Swat district of NWFP. The suicide bomber detonated his explosive-laden jeep when he was stopped at the Ningolai check-post in Kabal sub-division at around 11.15am. Eight persons, including five schoolchildren, were injured when a suicide bomber exploded his car targeting a Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) bus carrying air force employees‘ children at a military base at Kamra about 50 kilometers northwest of Islamabad. "A suicide bomber exploded his white car on the outskirts of the PAC factories on the Qutba-Attock Road on Monday at 7.30am near a PAC school bus carrying children to schools in Attock City," said

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the Pakistan Air Force, adding that the bomber was alone in the car and he died immediately after the explosion. Two suicide bombings near an army check-post in Quetta, capital of Balochistan, killed seven people, including three personnel of the Pakistan Army, military spokesman Major General Waheed Arshad said. An official at the Inter-Services Public Relations said three of the dead were soldiers, while the remaining four were civilians. A suicide bomber rammed his explosives-laden bicycle into a military checkpost, killing five persons and injuring 11 others in Nowshera in the North West Frontier Province. At least 12 army recruits were killed and two wounded in a suicide attack near the Army Public College in the heart of the Kohat cantonment area in North West Frontier Province. The recruits were returning to their barracks after the morning exercise when a boy aged 15 to 17 years rushed towards them and blew himself up. Ten recruits were killed on the spot and two others died later in hospital. At least 60 persons were killed and more than 100 others injured when a suicide bomber blew himself up in the midst of worshippers offering Id-ul-Adha (festival of sacrifice) prayers at the Markazi Jamia Masjid Sherpao in Charsadda, 20-km from Peshawar in the NWFP. The apparent target was Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao, the Interior Minister in the just-dissolved government, who was among the worshippers. Nine civilians and four security force personnel were killed and more than 25 persons wounded in a suicide attack on a military convoy in Mingora in the Swat district of NWFP. The convoy was returning after carrying out counterinsurgency operations in the various areas of Khwazakhela and Charbagh in Swat district when it was attacked. Benazir Bhutto, the former Prime Minister and Pakistan People's Party (PPP) Chairperson, was assassinated in a gun and suicide attack as she drove away from a campaign rally just minutes after addressing thousands of supporters at Liaquat Bagh in Rawalpindi. 30 more people were killed and over 100 others wounded when a suicide attacker riding on a motorbike blew himself up after firing at Benazir who was waving to her supporters from her vehicle's sun roof. Witnesses said three gun shots were heard before the suicide blast near her Black Lexus bullet-proof vehicle.

2008 DATE 1

January 7

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January 10

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January 17

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January 23

INCIDENT A suicide bomber blew himself up in an explosive-laden vehicle near a military base camp at Kabal in the Swat district of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), injuring 10 people, including eight soldiers. At least 24 people, including 17 policemen, were killed and 80 others injured in a suicide bomb blast outside the Lahore High Court, minutes before the arrival of an anti-government lawyers' procession. The blast ripped through GPO Chowk in front of the Lahore High Court as the suicide bomber walked up to the about 60 riot police - who had gathered there ahead of a protest by lawyers against President Pervez Musharraf's government - and blew himself up. At least 12 persons were killed and 25 others wounded when a suicide bomber blew himself up in an imambargah (congregation hall for Shia rituals) in Peshawar, capital of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). A man was killed and another injured after a suicide bomber blew himself up near

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a police check-post at the confluence of Khyber Agency and Peshawar. Assistant Political Agent Jamrud Rasool Khan told reporters that the attacker was apparently targeting the police check-post near the Karkhano market. However the explosion occurred before he got closer to the check-post. At least six persons, including five security personnel, were killed and eight others were injured when a suicide bomber rammed an explosives-laden car into a security check post at Kajhori near Miranshah in North Waziristan. At least ten persons were killed and about 10 others were wounded when a suicide bomber crashed his bike into an armed forces bus carrying students and officials of Army Medical College, near the General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi. 27 people were killed and over 30 injured in a suicide attack on an election rally at Nakai near Charsadda town in the NWFP. Senior Awami National Party leader Afrasiab Khattak, who was addressing the gathering, escaped unhurt. At least 10 people were killed and 13 others sustained injuries when a teenaged suicide bomber blew himself up amidst a gathering of the Awami National Party (ANP) and tribal Lashkar (force) at Mirali in North Waziristan. President of the North Waziristan chapter of the ANP, Haji Anwar Shah, was among the dead. A suicide bomber rammed his explosives-laden car into the election office of an independent candidate in Parachinar city of FATA, killing at least 47 persons, including six children, and injuring 109 others. According to eyewitness, the bomber hit the election office of independent candidate for NA-37 Kurram Agency, Syed Riaz Hussain Shah, where a large number of people had gathered. A suicide bomber killed eight people, including the Pakistan Army's surgeon general, in Rawalpindi - the highest-ranking military official killed since the country joined the US-led war on terror. Lieutenant General Mushtaq Baig, surgeon general and Director-General of the army's Medical Services, died after a teenage suicide bomber blew himself up next to a military convoy on a busy road in Rawalpindi. Five civilians were also killed, while 25 others were injured, an army statement said. 40 people were killed and more than 75 others sustained injuries when a suicide bomber blew himself up at the funeral prayers of the slain Deputy Superintendent of Police (Lakki Marwat), Javed Iqbal Khan, in the Mingora city of Swat district in NWFP. Among the dead were a son of the deceased police officer, Ghazan Khan, and the Station House Officer of Mingora police station Habib Jamal. Deputy Superintendent of Police Javed Iqbal had earlier died in a bomb blast in the morning along with three other policemen in the southern Lakki Marwat district.

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February 9

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February 11

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February 16

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February 25

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February 29

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March 1

Two persons were killed and 23 others, including eight security force personnel, injured when a suicide bomber rammed his explosives-laden car into a security forces vehicle in the Jardar area of Bajaur Agency in FATA. The dead included a civilian and a Bajaur Levies trooper.

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March 4

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March 11

42 people were killed and at least 58 others were wounded in a suicide bombing at a tribal peace jirga (council) near the Zarghunkhel check-post in Darra Adam Khel in NWFP. The council of Zarghunkhel, Akhurwal, Sheraki, Bostikhel and Toor Chapper tribes had been convened to discuss the formation of a Lashkar (army) to drive militants out of the area. Eight persons were killed and 24 others sustained injuries when two suicide bombers blew themselves up in the parking area of the Pakistan Navy War College in Lahore. The incident occurred at around 1:10 pm (PST) when classes in the Pakistan Navy War College were in progress. At least 30 people were killed and more than 200 sustained injuries in suicide blasts at the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) headquarters and an advertising

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A. Manzar agency office in Lahore. The first attack was carried out at the FIA regional headquarters on Temple Road, severely damaging the eight-storey establishment and adjacent buildings. The building also housed the offices of a special UStrained unit created to counter terrorism. The second attack was carried out on Bungalow No 83/F in Model Town – the office of an advertising agency. Two children and a gardener died in the bombing and about 12 people were injured. The advertising agency is located near Bilawal House, office of the Pakistan People‘s Party. Two policemen, Toor Gul and Aanayatur Rehman, were killed and five others sustained injuries when a suicide bomber blew himself in the police barracks in Mingora in the Swat district of NWFP. District Police Officer Waqif Khan said that a young man posing as a recruit and holding a police uniform entered the barracks at Mingora Police Line and subsequently approached the wireless room and blew himself up. A suicide bomber rammed an explosives-laden car into a military vehicle in front of the brigade headquarters at Zari Noor in South Waziristan, killing five soldiers and injuring 11 others. A suicide bomber blew himself up in a madrassa (seminary) in the Khyber Agency of FATA injuring at least 18 people in an apparent attempt to assassinate Haji Namdar, the head of a religio-militant organisation Amar Bil Maroof Wa Nahi Anil Munkar (Promotion of Virtue and Suppression of Vice). A suicide bomber blew himself up at a checkpoint in Bannu in the NWFP, killing a police constable and two civilians and injuring 12 persons, including four army soldiers and four policemen.

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March 20

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Three policemen were injured after a suicide bomber rammed his explosive-laden car into Mingora Police Station in the Swat district of NWFP.

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13 persons, including five soldiers, were killed and 23 others, including 11 soldiers, sustained injuries in a suicide attack at the Punjab Regiment Centre market in the Cantonment area of Mardan in the NWFP. A suspected suicide bomber blew up his car outside the Danish embassy in Islamabad, killing at least eight persons and injuring 30 others. . 20 persons, including 15 policemen, were killed and more than 40 persons wounded in a suicide attack near the Melody Market area of capital Islamabad. The suicide bomber targeted policemen deployed at a rally observing the first year anniversary of an army raid on the Lal Masjid (Red mosque) in Islamabad. Four persons were injured when a suicide bomber blew himself up soon after the concluding session of the Shuhada-e-Islam Conference in Dera Ismail Khan in the NWFP. A suicide blast in Lahore killed at least nine persons and injured more than 35, targeting policemen standing guard on the eve of the Independence Day. . 32 persons, including seven policemen, were killed and 55 others injured when a suicide bomber blew himself up near the emergency ward of the District Headquarters Hospital in Dera Ismail Khan in the NWFP. The attack was carried out when a large number of people had gathered there to protest against the murder of the local Shia leader Basit Ali earlier in the day.

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August 21

Two suicide bombers blew themselves up at the gates of the Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) in the high security cantonment town of Wah, around 30 kilometers from capital Islamabad, killing at least 70 persons in what was described as the deadliest attack on a military installation in the country‘s history. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan claimed responsibility for the attack. The POF at Wah is a cluster of about 20 industrial units producing artillery, tank and anti-

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aircraft ammunition for the Pakistani armed forces. It employs around 25,000 to 30,000 workers. A suicide bomber rammed an explosives-laden jeep into the Charbagh police station of the NWFP at 7.45am (PST), killing four policemen and three civilians. 20 others were wounded. About 100kg of explosives were reportedly used in the attack. Five persons were killed and 44 others, including 35 SF personnel, were wounded when an explosives-laden vehicle blew up after its driver was shot dead by the paramilitary Frontier Corps soldiers in the Darra Adamkhel town. . At least 39 persons, including seven policemen, were killed and more than 70 injured when a suicide bomber rammed an explosives-laden vehicle into a security checkpoint in the outskirts of Peshawar. A suicide bomber and Taliban militants attacked a security check post in the Kabal tehsil of Swat in the NWFP killing three soldiers.

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September 18

Two suspected suicide bombers blew themselves up in the Upper Dir town of NWFP after residents foiled their attempt to take 300 schoolchildren hostage.

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September 20

A suicide bomber detonated a truck packed with explosives at the Marriott Hotel in capital Islamabad, killing at least 60 people. At least 200 people, including a Pakistan Peoples Party legislator, were injured in the explosion, which ruptured a gas pipeline and triggered a huge blaze. A US national was killed and several foreigners were injured Malik. Police arrested a 14-year-old suspect outside the hotel. A group calling itself Fedayeen-i-Islam claimed responsibility for the suicide attack on the Marriott hotel in Islamabad. According to TV channels, a spokesman for the group told Al Arabiya TV in Islamabad on phone about its involvement in September 20 bomb blast. It could not be ascertained if the group had any link with al Qaeda or Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

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October 2

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October 6

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October 9

Nine security force personnel were killed and two other injured in a suicide carbomb attack on a check post in Swat in the NWFP. A suspected Taliban militant rammed his explosives-laden car into a small roadside check post in Madyan town in Swat. A teenaged female student, Shahida, was killed and 22 others were injured in a suicide blast targeting a Frontier Corps (FC) convoy in the Quetta cantonment area of the Balochistan. . Three would-be suicide bombers, suspected to be cadres of the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), were killed along with a handcuffed hostage when one of the bombers blew himself up following a police raid on a house in Karachi. A suicide bomber blew himself up as he tried to enter a house owned by the Awami National Party (ANP) chief, Asfandyar Wali Khan, in the NWFP, killing four. Khan, the chairman of the Pakistani parliament's foreign relations committee, however, escaped unhurt in the attack. A suicide bomber blew himself up in a crowd of people at the house of Rashid Akbar Niwani, a Shia Member of National Assembly from the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), in Bhakkar, 260-km southwest of Islamabad in Punjab, killing 25 people and wounding 60 others, including Niwani. A suspected suicide car bombing destroyed part of an Anti-Terror Squad building and wounded at least six policemen in the heavily guarded Police Lines area in Islamabad. Security officials found a letter from the TTP at the explosion site, signed by its commander Waliur Rehman on a Jaish-e-Islami letter pad. Written in Pashto language, the letter seeks permission from an undisclosed authority to launch an attack on the Anti-Terror Squad saying the plan of action had been

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A. Manzar finalised. A suspected suicide attacker missed his target of approaching oil tankers that ostensibly supply to the international forces in Afghanistan, near the Michni post in Landi Kotal. Nearby trucks, however, were damaged. At least 85 persons were killed and around 200 others wounded when a suicide bomber in an explosives-laden vehicle set off an explosion in an anti-Taliban jirga of the Ali Khel tribe in the Khadezai area of Upper Orakzai Agency in the FATA. A suicide bomber rammed a vehicle packed with explosives into the Mingora Police Station in Swat in the NWFP, killing four security personnel and destroying the building. . At least 11 people, seven of them Frontier Corps personnel and three Khasadars, were killed and five injured in a suicide attack in the Mohmand Agency of FATA. . Nine soldiers and five civilians were injured when a suicide bomber exploded his explosives-laden Land Cruiser jeep at a military check post in the Cantonment area of Bannu district in the NWFP. A suicide bomber killed nine persons and injured 21 in an attack on police in Mardan of NWFP. The suicide bomber attacked the police squad of Mardan DIG Akhtar Ali Shah outside his office at 1:30 pm, police said, adding that five among the dead and three among the injured were policemen. A suicide car bomber rammed his vehicle into a checkpoint near the main gate of the Zalai Fort in South Waziristan FATA, killing eight paramilitary troopers. Four persons were also wounded in the attack. . At least seven persons, including three SF officials, were killed and six others injured in a suicide attack on a SF check post in the Hangu district of NWFP. The Hangu DSP told that the attack took place in the Doaba area of the district when a suicide bomber rammed his explosives-laden car into a military check post at around 9:30am (PST). Police officials said that head of the suicide bomber, aged between 20 and 22 years, has been recovered. They said around 40-kilogrammes of explosives were used in the blast. 22 tribesmen were killed and 45 others injured when a suicide bomber blew himself up at a Salarzai jirga in the Bajaur Agency of FATA. The blast targeted a lashkar in the Batmalani, about 40-kilometres northeast of agency headquarters Khar. "Two to three hundred members of the lashkar were finalising their strategy after demolishing houses of Taliban when the blast occurred," said local police official Fazal-e-Rabi. . Later previously unheard-of 'Karwan-e-Nematullah' claimed responsibility for the attack.

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October 16

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October 26

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October 29

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October 31

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November 2

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November 6

Two FC personnel were killed when a suicide bomber ploughed his explosivesladen car into a FC camp in the Mingora area of NWFP. The bodies of two dead and 11 wounded have arrived at the hospital. The dead are Frontier Corps soldiers, Khaista Rehman, a local police official in Mingora. The police said earlier the attacker infiltrated the gathering of several hundred FC soldiers, which was followed by an assault by Taliban fighters.

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November 11

A suicide bomber blew himself up at a packed Qayyum Stadium in Peshawar on November 11, killing four people, including a policeman and three civilians.

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November 12

Five persons including four SF personnel were killed as a suicide bomber rammed an explosives-filled bus into the gates of the Subhan Khaur village school in NWFP's Charsadda district. Two other civilians were killed as troops opened retaliatory fire. The school was being used by the SFs for carrying out operations against the Taliban and hence, there were no children in the school. Fifteen people including soldiers and civilians were injured. Subhan Khaur borders the restive Mohmand Agency.

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November 17

Ten persons, including four soldiers, were killed and 17 others were wounded in a suicide blast in the Khawazakhela area of Swat in the NWFP. A military statement said the suicide bomber struck the security forces'' check post in an explosivespacked vehicle at 11:15 a.m. near Gashkor. The bomber is believed to be a teenager. Swat Taliban spokesman Muslim Khan claimed responsibility for the attack, adding attacks against SFs would continue if the military operation in Swat continued.

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November 20

The chief of a tribal Lashkar (militia) and eight other persons were killed when a suicide bomber blew himself up in a mosque in the Badan village of Bajaur Agency of FATA. Eyewitnesses said the bomber succeeded in entering the mosque on the premises of the house of one Malak Rehmatullah during Maghrib prayers. Rehmatullah, a tribal chieftain and head of the Mamond militia, and eight of his close relatives, including a nephew, were killed.

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November 28

At least seven people, including a policeman, were killed and 16 others, including four policemen, sustained injuries when a suicide bomber targeted a police patrol vehicle in Bannu district. Local sources told that a suicide bomber rammed an explosives-laden vehicle into a police car patrolling the streets near Tarezi Chowk on the main Bannu-Kohat road.

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December 1

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11 civilians were killed and 66 persons, including two soldiers, injured when a suicide bomber rammed his explosives-laden mini-truck into the Sangota checkpoint in the Swat valley of NWFP. The suicide blast brought the roof of a nearby house down, leaving a woman dead. All the dead were civilians waiting at the checkpoint. December 3 Five people, including three SF personnel, were killed and six others sustained injuries when a suicide bomber rammed his auto rickshaw into a vehicle of the SFs at Pir Qala area of Shabqadar tehsil (revenue division) in the Charsadda district of NWFP. December 5 Six persons were killed and eight others sustained injuries when an explosivesladen vehicle blew up in the Kalaia area of Lower Orakzai Agency. Officials said the suicide bomber was attempting to target a local fair, but the vehicle blew up before reaching the site when a petrol station‘s guards started firing at it. Orakzai Political Agent Kamran Zaib told that six people were killed and eight injured in the explosion, but local sources put the death toll at 10, and said 15 people were injured. December 9 A child was killed and four others were injured in a premature suicide blast in the Nari Oba area of Buner District in NWFP. Sources said a congregation of Eid prayers, to be performed at 9 am, in Dagger village was the apparent target of the attack, but the suicide jacket exploded 25 meters away from the Eidgah (open-air mosque), killing a child, Zahid Hussain, and the suicide bomber. Four others Shakeela (6), Stooria (9), Saifullah (8) and Muhammad Hussain (7) were wounded. December 28 43 persons were killed when a suicide bomber detonated his explosives-laden car near a polling station in a Government school in the Buner District of NWFP. 16 persons were injured in the blast believed to have been carried out to disrupt the by-election for a National Assembly seat. .

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INCIDENT

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January 4

2

January 4

3

January 23

Ten persons, including four Policemen, were killed and 27 others injured in two bomb blasts near the Polytechnic College in Dera Ismail Khan in the NWFP. Sources said an explosive device, planted by militants near the main gate of the Polytechnic College, went off at 7:07 pm, injuring four persons. As people gathered at the site, a 16-year-old suicide bomber forced his entry into the crowd and blew himself up, killing 10 persons, including four Policemen, and injuring 21 others. A suicide bomber was killed while two people sustained injuries near a checkpost in Officers‘ Colony in Bannu in the NWFP. The suicide bomber blew himself up in an attempt to target a check-post but could not succeed as the bomb exploded before he could reach his target. Two SF personnel were killed in a suicide attack near Mingora town in the Swat District of NWFP. A car laden with explosives blew up near the Fizagat checkpost, killing two SF personnel and injuring 22 others.

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REFERENCES Amir Mir, 2008.― The fluttering flag of Jehad‖, Lahore, Mashal Press. Bloom, Mia. 2002. "Rational Interpretations of Palestinian Suicide Bombing.‖ Paper presented at the Program on International Security Policy, University of Chicago. Bloom, Mia, 2007. ―Dying to kill: the allure of suicide terror‖. New York, Columbia University Press. Crenshaw, Martha.1981."The Causes of Terrorism.‖Comparative Politics 13 (July): 397-99. Department of State. 1983-2001. Patterns of Global Terrorism. Washington, DC: DOS. Hoffman, Bruce. 1998. Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press. Hroub, Khaled. 2000. Hamas: Political Thought and Practice. Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies. Huntington, Samuel P 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Kaufmann, Chaim D. 1998." When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century. "International Security 23 (Fall):1 20-56. Kramer, Martin.1990. "The Moral Logic of Hizballah.‖In Origins of Terrorism, ed . Walter Reich. New York: Cambridge University Press. Kramer, Martin.1996. "Fundamentalist Islam at Large: Drive for Power." Middle East Quarterly 3 (June): 37-49. Laqueur, Walter.1 987.The Age of Terrorism. Boston: Little, Brown. Merari, Ariel. 1990. "The Readiness to Kill and Die: Suicidal Terrorism in the Middle East.‖In Origins of Terrorism, ed. Walter Reich. New York: Cambridge University Press. Muhammad Amir Rana, 2006.― A to Z of Jehadi organizations in Pakistan‖, Lahore, Mashal Press, 2006. Nusse, Andrea. 1998. Muslim Palestine: The Ideology of Hamas. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic.

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Pape, Robert A. 1996. Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Pape, Robert A. 1997. "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work." International Security 22 (Fall): 90-136. Pape, Robert A. 2002. "The Universe of Suicide Terrorist Attacks Worldwide, 19802001."University of Chicago. Typescript. Pape, Robert A,2003. ―The strategic logic of suicide terrorism,‖ASPR 97, no.3. Schmid, Alex P, and Albert J. Jongman. 1988. Political Terrorism. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books. Shiqaqi, Khalil, et al. 2002. The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process. Portland, OR: Sussex Academic Press. Sprinzak,Ehud. 2000. "Rational Fanatics.‖Foreign Policy, No. 120 (September/October):66 73.

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Chapter 4

TERROMODELS: THE SPREAD OF MILITANCY

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This chapter is an in depth insight into the phenomenon of permeation of militancy in Pakistan. Many areas of Pakistan are slowly, but surely, starting to be permeated by radical tendencies. These tendencies are most pronounced in tribal areas, but have also surfaced in highly urbanized centers such as Peshawar and Karachi. Peshawar is a city whose steady advance towards liberalism has been stifled by the advent of such extremism, while relatively prosperous settled districts like Swat have fallen prey to the worst forms of militant violence. Trends are analyzed by examining the militancy in Waziristan, and its tendency to spread to other tribal agencies. The concept of Terromodels is touched upon, along with the impact of the Lal Masjid acting as a rallying cry of militants. Lashkare Taiba is profiled in detail as the epitome of Jihadist organization and the link between poverty and radicalization is examined in the Pakistani context with the aid of a survey.

MILITANT TRENDS Even though the initiation of military operations was largely hailed as a step in the right direction, much needs to be done regarding the situation in other areas of Pakistan as well, which are slowly, but surely, starting to be permeated by radical tendencies. These tendencies are most pronounced in tribal areas, but have also surfaced in highly urbanized centers such as Lahore and Karachi. Peshawar is a city whose steady advance towards liberalism has been stifled by the advent of such extremism, while relatively prosperous settled districts like Swat have fallen prey to the worst forms of militant violence. One of the ways that militancy was suddenly grafted into the domestic scenario was due to it being imported from Afghanistan. The physical proximity of Waziristan to Afghanistan has been disastrous for the whole country. This physical continuity has made Waziristan a conduit for fighters fleeing from Afghanistan in the wake of American operations there, which though initially effective, broke into disorganized shambles subsequently. If the American operation had continued at least adequately in 2001, many, if not most Taliban commanders would have perished or been captured in the operations, leaving a huge, debatably irreplaceable leadership vacuum. As a result of inadequately enforced long term policies, many medium to high level commanders escaped, some having been helped by logistics reportedly from the Pakistani side of the afghan border. For instance, when the Kunduz operation was going on in November 2001 in

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Afghanistan against the Taliban, Northern Alliance commanders outside Kunduz reported that Pakistani planes were flying into Kunduz ostensibly to rescue Pakistani personnel trapped there. 545The New York Times reported the landing of up to five such large planes. Seymour Hersh at that time reported that ―..the Pakistanis were indeed flown to safety…(after approval of) the Bush administration.‖ 546 Reportedly thousands of important Taliban along with IMU and other militants were airlifted .One can only surmise about the exact numbers, but other conclusions can be drawn from the numbers of the Taliban that surrendered to Northern Alliance in Kunduz. Out of the 5,000 to 7,000 believed to be present there, only 3,300 came out. 547As regards the survivors of the entire campaign, many are thought to have escaped to Pakistan. The Northern Alliance warlords are also on record as accepting heavy bribes to release the Taliban captured during the campaign. When some of the Taliban remnants sought refuge in the arid Tora Bora Mountains, the allies carried out a campaign to eliminate the same in this area by heavy bombing. However, many, if not most of the Arabs (Osama Bin Laden reportedly with them) had escaped the area by paying Pashtun guides from Pakistan an average of $1,200 each548. Bin Laden is reported to have sought refuge with Jalaluddin Haqqani in Miransha in North Waziristan549. Most of the militant escapes occurred in a ‗corridor‘ in North and South Waziristan, because army troops were sealing off the Pakistani side of the Durand line further north in the Kurram agency, leaving only the rugged Waziristan belts open to permeation. Some infiltration happened in the Dir and Chitral areas as well. The area of Waziristan was thus a logical choice to become al Qaeda‘s new global headquarter. Protection to leaders such as Hikmetyar was also accorded in the Shamshatoo camp for afghan refuges near Peshawar, which became a Hizb-e-Islami base550. Reportedly, Jalaluddin Haqqani was given sanctuary in North Waziristan, and Uzbek groups such as the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan also were reported to have settled in South Waziristan551. A report to the UN Security Council documented that ―…new volunteers are making their way to these camps, increasing the number of would-be terrorists and the long-term capabilities of the network‖. Many al Qaeda personnel escaped from Afghanistan by boarding ships bound for the Arab Gulf States in Karachi. Just one Saudi vessel was said to have transported 150 al Qaeda and Taliban to the Bangladeshi port of Chittagong552. Some quite senior personnel were also redeployed in Punjab by their command structures to carry out recruitment and training for the new Taliban, as well as undertake further reorganization of militant entities like Jaish, who in turn gave sanctuary to these personnel. Reportedly, a list was given by Karzai to President Musharraf on a state visit in April 2003 about Taliban commanders living more or les openly in Quetta. The diversion of American resources from Afghanistan to Iraq also had long lasting detrimental effects. Two main resources were drained away which were of prime strategic value; human intelligence resources and lack of satellite observation capabilities in southern Afghanistan bordering Pakistan‘s tribal areas. The absence of ―look down‖ satellites in the 545

Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: How the war against Islamic extremism is being lost in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia(London, Allen Lane,2008),91. 546 Seymour Hersh,‖The Gateway,‖ The New Yorker, January 28, 2002. 547 (Rashid, 2008), 92. 548 Ibid,98. 549 Ibid,99. 550 Ibid,221. 551 Ibid. 552 Deadly Cargo, Time 21 October 2002.

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southern parts of Afghanistan was detrimental to the efforts of Americans in maintaining effective signal intelligence in tribal belts of Pakistan, where heavy militant activity was being generated, particularly in Waziristan and the province of Baluchistan. This provided a chance to Mullah Omar and his commanders to recruit train and deploy forces in Baluchistan without being hindered in any way. This tunnel vision was also reflected in the American insistence on capturing al Qaeda personnel without emphasizing at all on Taliban commanders, as has been mentioned earlier in Chapters 1 and 3 .This obsession of the Americans on insisting upon the arrests of al Qaeda rank and file led to the arrests of hundreds of al Qaeda personnel in Pakistan, without even a single simultaneous arrest of any Taliban commander worth the name553. As long as there were Arabs and foreigners being captured in Pakistan, the Americans considered things to be in order. This was a short sighted policy; thousands of pro- Taliban militants were spared ―black sites‖, which are American controlled holding areas scattered around the world, where concepts such as human rights cease to matter. This gave considerable time for these militants to organize and re-structure themselves accordingly, with the consequent effect of giving impetus to al Qaeda proliferation as well, since the organization very cleverly subsumed itself within various other militant organizations. Thus, in retrospect, it seems likely that the New Taliban movement was born in Waziristan, further indoctrination and ideological alignment took place in Baluchistan, particularly Chaman and Pashtunabad suburb of Quetta, and Quetta city probably served as a major sanctuary for top leadership. From here, the permeation of extremism took place to the urban centers of Karachi, Rawalpindi, etc. Peshawar was a logical choice to be involved due to its proximity with the tribal agencies. Perhaps the biggest surprise has been Swat, due to the fact that it has been almost completely taken over by militancy even though it is not a FATA tribal area, and was relatively progressive according to tribal standards. Waziristan has been dwelt upon at some length. It might also be worthwhile tracing the advent of this fundamentalist trend patterns by first examining the infiltration of militant trends to tribal areas adjoining Waziristan, and then illustrating the permeation of these trends into the relatively urbanized centers.

TRIBAL AGENCIES Kurram Agency has been suffering from a debilitating Shia-Sunni sectarian conflict that has paralyzed life in this tribal agency. It does seem that the insurgency in Waziristan has tended to correspond with a flaring up of the clashes in Kurram. Till 1977, the Shias were a preponderant majority in the Kurram Agency in Pakistan's Federally-Administered Tribal Areas.This agency shares borders with Afghanistan and the Pakistani Northern Areas of Gilgit and Baltistan. After the advent of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in February, 1979, the Shias of these areas, probably motivated by the ascendancy of the Shiite strain of Islam, started a separatism movement.They were calling for the creation of a separate Shia majority province called the Karakoram Province, consisting of the Kurram Agency, the Northern Areas and other contiguous Shia majority areas. The staunchly Shia Turi tribe of the Kurram Agency predominantly led this movement, allegedly funded by the Iranian intelligence. 553

(Rashid,2008),147.

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As a measure to control this, the Islamist ruler of Pakistan, Gen. Zia-ul-Haq started a policy of re-settling the Sunnis in these areas as a measure to dilute their preponderant majority. Mainly the Afghan Sunni refugees, fleeing from the conflict in Afghanistan, were re-settled in the Kurram Agency. The Shias, as a consequence, started getting resentful against the Government as well as the Sunni settlers, who were being allegedly funded by the Iraqi intelligence of Saddam Hussain. There were serious Shia –Sunni riots in Gilgit in 1988, which were ruthlessly suppressed by Zia. One of the unsubstantiated conspiracy theories abounding at the time when Zia was assassinated in a plane crash was that a Shia crew member, as reprisal for Gilgit operations, had been instrumental in this plot. There have been three major Shia-Sunni clashes in the Kurram Agency in 1983, 1988 and 1996, which have resulted in a total death toll of about 1,200 persons belonging to both the sects. The most recent clashes were sparked off in April, 2007, when Shias allegedly fired on a procession being taken out by Sunnis at the eve of Eid-Milad-un-Nabi (the birth of the Holy Prophet). For nearly three weeks from April 6, 2007, there raged a fierce sectarian battle between Shias and Sunnis in Kurram Agency, involving small arms and ammunition, mortars and rocket-launchers. The capital Parachinar was the epicenter, with the battles spreading into the interior areas. A curfew and operations by the Pakistani authorities, which used helicopter gunships, restored some semblance of an uneasy normalcy. While the official death toll figures quoted by the Pakistani authorities were around 50, non-Governmental sources put it at a more credible figure of at least 80 casualties. Mast Gul, a local Sunni Jihadi leader, used the situation as a rallying point for Sunnis. Warning the government and Shias, he reportedly announced that unless the situation was rectified to the satisfaction of the Sunnis, he was issuing a clarion call to Jihad to all Sunni Muslims, which purportedly referred to the Taliban. It is worth mentioning that Mast Gul was a former member of the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), which is a founding member of Osama bin Laden's International Islamic Front (IIF) formed in 1998. Heavily-armed combatants tended to fire indiscriminately, and the Taliban, infiltrating from nearby regions, joined the anti-Shia elements to burn their houses and carry out assassinations. The local Taliban from adjacent Agency North Waziristan were reported as infiltrating Kurram and setting fire to Shia houses. On April 12, 2007, for example, the Pakistani Taliban attacked across the town of Jalmey, in which 12 Shias were killed, and 22 injured. Attackers were reportedly wearing uniforms of Pakistani Militia. According to sources, earlier they had attacked Char Diwar and left 30 persons dead behind them. 554 The single road that links Kurram Agency to Peshawar has been blockaded by the Taliban since April 2007, and other land routes linking the confined area from other parts of the country are either not available, or are unsafe for travel purposes. This blockade has caused numerous humanitarian problems, like shortage of food, oil, and medicines. The spate of violence has been continuing intermittently. The areas mostly affected from the current war include Khalachi, Ziran, Balash Khel, Mali Khel, Kirman, Piwaar, Alizai, Ibrahim Zai, Lukman Khel, Banood, Kunj Ali Zai, Shingak, Ugra, Bourki, Badama and several others. The formation of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan in December 2007 has seen an increase in the ferocity of such events. A newspaper reported: "It is worth mentioning that the recent clashes started when a group of local Taliban militants attacked and opened fire on security forces (FC) at Sada. Plus they also attacked the nearby Balishkhel village where Turi 554

"Jalmey Attacked by Taliban", Nawa-e-Islam (2007-04-12). Retrieved on 2007-04-12.

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tribe is living. As the Sada is the strongest base of Taliban militants therefore the government writ is nil; that is why due to lack of monitoring and writ of government, clashes spread throughout the Kurram Agency and now its control is quiet difficult due to invasion of Taliban militants."555 During these clashes, the Shias and the Sunnis used mortars, rocket launchers etc against each other's places of worship and schools, with over 150 fatalities reported in intermittent clashes spread over a month. There has been violent retaliation from the Shia side as well, with the conflict escalating to indiscriminate attacks, which resulted in the army declaring curfew .This has been just one incident amongst a string of such, which provides an ideal breeding ground for Taliban. The Post, an influential Pakistani newspaper, reported556 a local Kurram leader as saying that the residents had been fighting the Taliban infiltrating from Afghanistan, North and South Waziristan and al Qaeda operatives in the area, who were thousands in number. The opening of so many fronts thins out the military presence, which is forced to respond to developing situations at many fronts in the tribal agencies. This would obviously work to the advantage of the militants. There is evidence to back up this claim of the thinness of distribution of the Pakistani army on ground. The Pakistan Army was heavily preoccupied with the operations against the Tehreek-e-Nifaze-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM) in the Swat Valley of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) during December, 2007, when clashes broke out in the wake of the formation of the umbrella Taliban body in Pakistan. It was not in a position to send reinforcements to the Kurram Agency, and matters were left in the hands of the paramilitary, who had inadequate firepower to counter the militancy. The fact that the security forces cannot show an effective presence in every tribal agency became apparent again in 2008, when Rahman Malik, minister and adviser to Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani for interior affairs, gave a 72-hour ultimatum to the warring sides in Kurram to stop fighting, but troops were not provided to back up this threat. Even after the expiry of that deadline, fighting continued in Kurram and there was little evidence of enough troops being sent in as reinforcements. Even though domestic calls for bringing normalcy to Kurram have been growing, there has surprisingly not been a simultaneous increase in international pressure on Pakistan to resolve the militancy in Kurram. Kurram hardly finds mention in testimonies and press statements emanating from US, or other international sources. Some analysts believe that this is due to the fact that this is a sectarian clash, in which Sunnis tended (at least earlier) to be killed in large numbers. It is a fact that an increased number of Sunni militants being killed tactically benefits Pakistan, the US and Afghanistan in Bajaur and the two Waziristans, and also Iran in its Sunni-majority Baloch areas. It benefits Iran in the sense that it suspects the so-called Jundullahs (Soldiers of Allah), who are engaged in attacking, kidnapping and killing Iranian National Guards in its Baloch areas, are believed to be operating from sanctuaries in Kurram. An irony of the conflict is that it even benefits the al Qaeda and Taliban, who suspect many of the new informants of the CIA in the Pashtun tribal belt to come from the anti-Sunni, anti-Taliban Shia community. An explosive combination would be the tactic stimulus for the militant Shias in Pakistan to go and join the conflict, which would increase the number of casualties, but would hardly affect the tactical advantages accruing to the 555 556

The Frontier Post, Peshawar, December 27,2007. The Post, Daily, December 31, 2007.

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Governments. Meanwhile, the current situation is that millions of people are reportedly trapped in isolated Kurram Agency because of ongoing fighting. 557The militancy in Kurram thus truly has the potential of becoming an orphan conflict. Another tribal agency, Mohmand, too, is restive in view of growing activities of the militants. Mohmand Agency derives its name from the Mohmand tribe that inhabits the rugged mountainous region; Mohmand Agency was administratively a part of Khyber Agency until 1951, when it attained its own identity in the FATA region. It was divided into upper and lower areas for administrative purposes. Mohmand agency abuts Afghanistan to the west, Malakand, Charsadda and Peshawar districts of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) to the east, Khyber Agency to the south and Bajaur Agency to the north. Mohmand Agency had long been known as the calmest and most religiously moderate region in FATA, with the only criminals being car thieves and common criminals hiding from the Law, due to absence of conventional policing. A measure of progressiveness of this area is the fact that women were not oppressed as in other FATA areas, even being allowed to work in the fields alongside men. Mohmand, at least on the surface, tended to remain a relatively peaceful part of the troubled tribal areas until 2006558 However, even though the area was progressive according to FATA standards, it is extremely difficult to contain the conservative movements which have gained currency in FATA generally. Militant organizations, which had ostensibly been banned by the government, had been active in the nearby Charsadda district town of Shabqadar. It was relatively easy for their ideology to permeate to Mohmand. Shabqadar first gained notoriety when two of its‘ residents, Bahar Ali and Aminullah, carried out suicide bombings on U.S. and Canadian NATO forces in Afghanistan in 2006 .The phenomenon seems to be pervasive in that particular area; a young boy, 12-13 years old, killed only himself in a futile attack on a FC post at Kapakh Kandao in Mohmand Agency on January 15 ,2008559.Two days later a teenage suicide bomber killed twelve in a blast at a Shiite mosque in Peshawar.560Like other FATA agencies, Mohmand was off-limits to the Pakistan army, till reports started coming in that the Taliban had actively started permeating from Afghanistan after their rout in 2001.Troops had to be deployed for the first time in June 2003, when reports of al Qaeda incursions into Pakistani territory started pouring in.561 The Mohmand chapter of the Taliban started exerting their influence early in 2007, when they started enforcing their radical version of Shariah. Local reports mention that even though the threat of permeation of militancy from nearby Bajaur and Waziristan was clear, the Government largely ignored the phenomenon. Since there was no option for the locals, they negotiated an agreement with the Taliban.562 Even though negotiations seemed inevitable for the locals, the uncomprisingly aggressive nature of the Taliban movement in the area soon communicated itself. In June 2007, a jirga of local elders was bombed. A note found at the site warned the tribesmen against any efforts of collaboration with the government. The note, addressed to the tribal elders, read: "You people

557

The News. September 16, 2008. Newsline, August 2007. 559 Pakistan Times, January 15,2008; Daily Times, January 16,2008. 560 Daily Times, January 19,2008. 561 Dawn, July 1, 2004. 562 ANI, May 20, 2007. 558

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are infidels and hypocrites. If you don't stop negotiations with the government and meetings against the Taliban, then explosion(s) will occur in your homes‖563 In late July 2007, the militants in Mohmand agency expressed their solidarity with ‗martyrs‘ of the Lal Masjid operation. More than 200 heavily armed militants rose to the occasion by taking over the shrine of famous anti-British freedom fighter Haji Sahib Turangzai .They also took over a mosque in Ghazi Abad village, barely 25 miles from the capital city of Mohmand, Ghalanai. The mosque was renamed as Lal Masjid in a show of solidarity with the victims of the Lal Masjid operation. This was the time that Umar Khalid, a hitherto unknown local Taliban leader, rose to prominence. Umar declared: "We want to take forward the missions of Haji Turangzai and the Red Mosque's slain khateeb (preacher), Ghazi Abdul Rashid" 564 Umar Khalid belongs to the Qandharo sub-tribe of the Safi, a Mohmand Agency tribe closely related to the Mohmand tribe. As with most of the Taliban leaders, he does not have any formal education. Now in his early thirties, he has a considerable experience of Jihad. He received his indoctrination with the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), after which he participated in the Kashmir variant of jihad. As with many HUM leaders, he tends to be more aligned towards Kashmiri Jihadi groups than with the Taliban leadership in Afghanistan, though as a veteran, he did take an active part against the US invasion there. This is a facet of the worrying trend of the simultaneous resurgence of Pakistan‘s proxy warriors – the Kashmiri Mujahideen, who are inclined to either form loose alliances with the TTP, or get subsumed within the umbrella organization. Their cadres have been fighting with the Taliban in South Waziristan, Swat, Kohat and other areas of NWFP and Fata in the recent past. The Harkat ul Majahideen, al-Badr, Harkat e Islam, Jaish and Hizbul Mujahideen are relocating in Karachi and Rawalpindi as well as other parts of NWFP. Apparently, the deescalation of the Kashmiri militancy has promoted militants like Khalid to find new battlegrounds. This has also contributed to the transmigration of radical fundamentalist tendencies from the rural to the urban mainstream. Khalid is quite media-friendly, unlike Mehsud or Mulla Omar. He has a permanent spokesman, one Abu Nauman Asakar, who handles his media affairs. Like other Taliban leaders, his message is clear; the implementation of the Taliban version of Sharia.565 Khalid represents the Mohmand chapter of the Taliban in the banned Tehreek-e-Taliban-Pakistan, and thus takes his orders from the TTP leadership. Khalid has laid claims to having more than 3,000 fighters, mostly young locals or more seasoned fighters from the Kashmiri Jihad front. The figures may be accurate, but this is largely conjectural; Taliban warlords have tended to exaggerate their troop strength in order to appear more formidable. One of the reasons provided for emergence of Taliban is that they fill in the vacuum of distributive social justice in the FATA areas, since locals seem to initially welcome the reduction in crime and security provided by the Taliban; the disillusionment comes later when the Taliban flex their muscles. In tune with this theme,the Mohmand Taliban have also tried to stick to form. ―It is reported that Taliban in Mohmand agency have settled a long lasting dispute amid Masud and Gurbaz, the sub-tribes of this agency. The dispute was over the distribution of mining rights of Ziarat marble ….(which) had caused billion of rupees loss to the local contractors and the government….(which) had failed to settle the conflict but with 563

Dawn, June 14, 2007. Daily Times, July 29, 2007; BBC Urdu Online, July 31, 2007. 565 BBC Urdu Online, July 1, 2007. 564

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the mediation of local Taliban, the issue was resolved….Another contractor said it is a positive step taken by the local Taliban to resolve a long lasting dispute, which not only revived the local business but also benefited the government.‖566 The steady march of proTaliban militants in Mohmand Agency could easily spill over into the heart of the NWFP. For this reason there are growing concerns that Taliban activities in Mohmand Agency might only be the early symptoms of yet another serious threat to the internal security of Pakistan. Another tribal agency which was initially peaceful, but has fallen prey to militant activities is Darra. Darra Adam Khel has been the hub of Taliban activities since 2007. The local militants used to call these militants as ‗Islami Taliban‘ as opposed to Tehreek-eTaliban (the movement of Taliban) led by Baitullah Mehsud. However, the difference is superfluous. In fact, Darra Adam Khel is just a part of the territory controlled by the Tehreeke-Taliban leadership. Darra is situated between Peshawar and Kohat, and a sub clan of the Afridi tribe, known as Adam Khel are resident here, thus the name. This is the hub of the tribal gun making industry; over 3500 expert arms manufacturers, five large arms factories and more than 2500 weapons shops ply their trade here. One can expect to get weapons ranging from pen-guns to large weapons here. Above 10,000 people earn their livelihood directly or indirectly from this trade in the area. For years, Darra Adam Khel has been a major source of supplying arms to Pakistan‘s settled areas; there are organized networks that supply weapons to the people in other parts of the country for a handsome price. This arms market has been one major reason of spreading violence in the country. In the 1980s, the Afghan mujahideen used to buy weapons from this bazaar. At that time, the government had patronized the arms manufacturers to improve their technology to fight war against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Despite government‘s tall claims to cleanse the country of illegal arms and ammunition, it has never tried to stop this illegal business thriving in Dara Adam Khel. The Darra is just a stone‘s throw from Peshawar, and thus is a nodal point for militants coming in and out of FATA to settled areas. Since 2005, Darra had become a militant staging point, with Harkatul Mujahideen, Lashkare-Taiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, the ‗Muslim United Army International‘ and the local Taliban just some of the groups operating from there. In 2007, however, the Taliban started enforcing their writ in the area. The militants stepped up their operations in the region and have been attacking shops selling CDs, barbers that would shave beards. They would send warning letters to get the girls‘ schools to shut down and established their own courts to dispense justice. Some time back,the militants had taken action against an alleged criminal gang that resulted in the death of 27 people. The heavily armed Taliban could be seen roaming in their jeeps all over the area before large scale operations were started by the army. The militants had set up around several training camps in the area where foreign militants were imparting training to members of local Taliban. In Darra, basic military training is imparted, potential suicide bombers are sent to South Waziristan for further advanced training. The militants are using Darra Adam Khel as their staging ground to carry out attacks and explosions elsewhere in the country such as Karachi, Islamabad and Peshawar. They tended to be closely connected with the Waziristan‘s militants who frequently visit the area. 566

Ambreen Kazmi, Taliban resolving a Dispute in Mohmand Agency, August 8th, 2008,Chowrangi, http://www.chowrangi.com/taliban-resolving-a-dispute-in-mohmand-agency.html.

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Darra‘s Taliban are known for being staunchly anti-Shia. Locals say in Darra Adam Khel, there is a complete ban on the sale of weapons to Shia people. In recent days, when there was sectarian tension in the Kurram Agency, Darra‘s Taliban killed three people on the suspicion of being Shia. BBC correspondent Abdul Hayee Hakar ,visiting Kohat tunnel at the time of Taliban‘s occupation of it, said in his eyewitness report that Taliban had destroyed a control room built there and on the walls graffiti read: ‗Long Live Sipah-i-Sahaba‘ and ‗Long Live Lashkar-i-Jhangvi.‘ Militant groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad (Kashmiri-oriented Jihadi group) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (anti-Shia sectarian militant organization), are very active around Peshawar and Kohat district, especially in areas close to the Kohat-Rawalpindi Highway. The leaders of Taliban of Darra, including Mufti Ilyas, Khalid Khan and Tariq Khan, are reputed to have close connections with anti-Shia militant organization, Lashkar-iJhangvi. Qari Zafar, one of the paramount commanders of the Lashkar, is said to be residing in South Waziristan, though substantiated information has not been forthcoming. Largely, the government remained a silent spectator to all these happenings in Darra Adam Khel until the second half of 2008, when the militants abducted four military vehicles carrying arms and ammunitions. In the wake of this operations were started. The initiation of operations did not really prove to be a panacea to the malady of this area; the significance of operations is dependant upon the length and depth of this engagement in an area like Darra . Only a long-term operation and intervention in Dara Adam Khel to shut down the arms‘ business and provide local people alternative means of living may yield positive results. The Taliban were driven back in Darra Adam Khel after the military operations, but their return is manifest in the kidnap of Government officials which are being abducted at will, and those defying the Taliban are under attack in the Darra Adam Khel valley and its surroundings both on the Kohat and Peshawar sides. Nearer Peshawar, the Mangal Bagh-led Lashkar-e-Islam has regained control of Bara in Khyber Agency because it didn't suffer any real damage at the hands of the paramilitary Frontier Corps, which had moved against the non-Taliban militant groups there to strengthen Peshawar's defenses and reassure the worried residents of the capital of NWFP. The other main militant group in Bara named Amr bil Maruf wa Nahi Anil Munkar (Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice) is angry and in a revengeful mood after the recent murder of its head, Haji Namdar Khan.

SETTLED DISTRICTS IN NWFP Tribal areas are not the only places that are causing concern to the military, government and the people. The Malakand division has become a hotbed of militancy; this is particularly unfortunate in the regard that it is the second largest administrative area in the NWFP province after FATA, which obviously is a huge setback for the Provincial as well as the Federal administrations. To the west of this division lie the FATA areas and Afghanistan, Hazara division is to the east, Northern areas to the north and Mardan to the south. The story of Swat, the premier district of the Malakand division has been already discussed, and will be dwelt upon throughout the narrative. Besides Swat, the Taliban movement is entrenched in Upper Dir, lower Dir and Shangla areas of this division. Buner has also been affected

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recently, as the Taliban started infiltrating from nearby embattled Swat. Chitral has largely escaped unscathed in the Malakand division, due to its geographical location and religious diversity. In Mardan, the Taliban have also tended to maintain low visibility, which in no way implies that they do not have their eyes set on this strategic division. In a personal interview with a local low level political leader who requested anonymity, I was informed by A. Khan (pseudonym used) that the ― Taliban have always been here…(though) much of the local populace remains oblivious to the fact. They live in mountains …(and) attack security forces, with the actions reminiscent of shabkhoons(nocturnal guerilla raids) …..there is an air of insecurity,even though the Taliban are not patrolling the Bazaars, but people understand that they are (there) like an ominous shadow which is not very far away….in fact they are here amongst us,but we do not see them openly.‖ Swabi district in Mardan division has also heard rumblings of a Taliban takeover, which has not come about; presumably this is the case because Swabi is under the influence of the Panjpiri clerics who are diehard Salafis, and are venerated or at least tolerated by the Taliban. Bannu division‘s geographical proximity with Waziristan agencies has meant that it is badly affected by militancy; in Bannu there is a confluence of interests between local Taliban and militants transmigrating from the Waziristans, particularly the southern half of it. The Local Taliban here are loosely organized into militias which are supporters of the Taliban movement, but tend to have different organizational trajectories. So far they have not started taking draconian measures like the TTP, but for the locals it is a time of escalating anxieties about the future. Muddasir told me in a telephonic interview; ― we are waiting..(it) is just a matter of time before they start taking steps like their brethren nearby…they seem to have been deterred by the recent security agencies measures…(but)these people(the security forces) will leave after one operation or the other….and they (Taliban) will be back. We will have to put up with them.‖ Lakki Marwat district in this division has been used more as an indoctrination area; when I visited this place, I was struck by the large number of pro Taliban wall chalkings and graffiti. My local guide pointed some of these out: ―Taliban are a death blow to poverty,‖ ―American domination and humiliation, or sharia and Islam‘s pride.‖ Bannu has experienced a number of terrorist attacks, one of the latest ones killing around 10 policemen and civilians and injuring many others in an August 28, 2008 car bombing. Its‘ proximity to North Waziristan and the Frontier Region Bannu, also known as Frontier Region Bakkakhel, has made it an insecure and uncertain place. Kohat district is not faring much better, with a large number of Taliban who are migrating to this area from the adjacent Khyber agency. Kohat has also been affected by a number of suicide bombings, rocketing on the city and the garrison; attacks on the cops have also taken place in its urban and rural areas. Hangu has seen a remarkable spate of violence, with Taliban fighters establishing strongholds in Zargarri, Naryab and also the city. Here, Sipah e Sahaba is also very active as an allied jihadist group of Taliban; in fact they are the main facilitator of the Taliban in the area. Not coincidentally, this has raised sectarian Shia Sunni tensions in the area, with the Kohat Parachinar road becoming virtually blockaded during the Muharram days in particular. The Taliban have also taken the fight to the Shia groups, which have raised their own small militant militias in pre emption and response. Another southern district that is bleeding from violence is Dera Ismail Khan. Dera Ismail Khan is culturally and ethically adjacent to the Saraiki speaking belts of southern Punjab; this has traditionally tended to make this division a relatively tolerant area. The transmigration of

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militancy to this area began with the infiltration of Mehsud,Dawar and Waziri tribesmen from South Waziristan to this area, who started Talibanisation of this area by their signature pattern of issuing warnings against internet cafes and CD shops. However, the Taliban have used target killings and bombings instead of an overtly demonstrable militant presence in this area, though they do have a presence in Kaluchi tehsil .Sipah e Sahaba is again present here as a Taliban host organization, with the inevitable sectarian strife being fanned by this organization. Even though DI Khan has been infiltrated by militants, its‘ biggest problem is the sectarian nature of the conflict. Such is the intensity of the conflict that even a public hospital in the city wasn't spared, and 32 people were killed when a suicide bomber struck on August 19, 2008 after placing himself in the hospital's emergency ward among mourners who had brought the body of a Shiite man assassinated earlier in the day. Hazara division has escaped largely unscathed because the Hazara people residing in Mansehra, Abbotabad and Haripur are basically moderate in nature. The Kohistan area of Hazara division is the exception; even though it is demographically and administratively a part of the Hazara areas, it has been affected by the imposition of Naizam-e-Adal in the adjacent violence stricken Malakand division. The Kohistanis are very conservative and religious by nature, which has espoused the cause of the Taliban in this area. Another area of Hazara affected by Talibanisation is the Battagram district, which shares deeply conservative overtones with the Kohistan areas. It has traditionally been a stronghold of the Jamaat e Islami, which holds sway over the electoral masses. Taliban has ostensibly set up base here, but have tended to maintain low visibility. The locals, however, are aware of their presence; Mazhar ul Haq, a local, told me in an interview while I was visiting this area: ― They (the Taliban) are definitely here…every day one(hears) of them visiting a local mosque,or one sees rented houses which are taken over by young bearded men ,living together in groups of a dozen or so men. These are not (the ) Tableeghi Jamaat…everybody knows tableeghiay ( a colloquial plural for Tableeghi Jamaat preachers) go and stay in mosques….when one looks hard enough you find men with Kalashnikovs guarding these rented houses.‖ Karak is the only southern district that is relatively peaceful and has until now been spared of the effects of militancy. But it cannot remain peaceful forever owing to the likely fallout from the violence raging in its neighborhood. Malakand region in general and Swat in particular have suffered the consequences of Taliban militancy. With the breakdown of the peace accord that the ANP-PPP provincial government and the Maulana Fazlullah-led militants signed on May 21, 2008, and the more recent breakdown of the Sufi Muhammad brokered peace accord, violence has returned to Swat and a full-fledged military action is currently underway. Though the NWFP government was at that time insisting that the peace agreement remained intact, it would be unrealistic to expect that the two sides would be able to trust each other again and cooperate to make Swat peaceful and stable. In the Peshawar valley, which forms the central NWFP and is the most agriculturally fertile and developed part of the province, the security situation has been deteriorating. Peshawar, Charsadda, Nowshera, Mardan and Swabi have been affected by militancy to varying degrees. Like in Lakki Marwat, Hangu and Buner, village elders and political and social figures in some districts in Peshawar valley are realizing the need to form defense committees, Jirgas and even local lashkars (locally raised force) to evict militants from their areas. They know that the presence of militants would prompt the security forces to take action against them, and the result would be displacement of people as witnessed in Bajaur Agency, loss of livelihoods and damage to the fragile economies of their areas. Even in the

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tribal areas in Bajaur, tribesmen in the Salarzai area picked up courage to fight the Taliban after blaming them for their sufferings. Only Hazara region in NWFP is currently relatively immune from the Taliban phenomenon. But people constantly worry that the militants could infiltrate parts of Hazara, particularly Mansehra, Battagram and Kohistan, and destabilize their peaceful existence. Such high handed terrorist activities could hardly be expected to go unnoticed by the resilient and brave tribesmen of the Frontier; consequently there have been efforts by the local people to resist the Taliban by relying on their own resources.567 It seems that the trend of communities to organize into self help militias was spurned on by the failure of the Taliban in Pakistan to win the support of the general public of the areas under their control. The people in these areas did not approve of their activities, but they could not express their views in public. They feared serious consequences. "How could we support the Taliban? They are responsible for all our miseries today. It is due to them that the military operation was started in our agency which used to be a peaceful region. Hundreds of thousands of our proud tribesmen have been rendered homeless. Scores of others have been killed by the jetfighters and gunship helicopter shelling. But I cannot say a word against them in public, as I am more concerned about myself and my family," says Noor Sher, a young man from Sewai, a village next to Damadola in the turbulent Mamoond sub-division of Bajaur Agency which houses the main camp of Taliban. Noor Sher's house was close to the Taliban main camp. His family was forced to move to other districts when the military operation took place, but he was left behind to take care of his house, crops and cattle. The daring locals of Buner initiated the trend of raising self D.I.Y. militias; this seemed to inspire other communities in the settled districts and tribal areas to rise against the Taliban, and discourage their activities in the region. On Aug 13, 2008,roughly 1200 Buner locals hounded six Taliban operatives, and killed them in Shalbandi area of the district. The militants had attacked a police station at Kingargali locality of the same district, and killed some eight policemen a few days before they faced the wrath of the people.568If the number of Buner Lashkar seems disproportionately high to the Taliban being opposed, it needs to be remembered that the Taliban do not take any rout or insult lightly; the discomfiture of six Taliban was a signal to the movement that further activities would not be tolerated. The people of Buner have formed an anti-Taliban squad with the aim to protect their district from militant activities. "We are the trendsetters. Others should follow us," announced Rauf Khan, District Nazim Buner, after the killing of militants.569 Soon after the Buner incident, Jirgas were held in other districts of the Frontier province in which the local elders vowed to resist Taliban intrusion in their areas. In Maidan town of district Dir Lower, where the militants had reportedly fled to from Bajaur Agency, a jirga held talks with the militants on Aug 15, 2008, and managed to expel them from the area. The locals also formed a force of volunteers and set up checkpoints on the roads.570 Similar jirgas were held in Mardan, Swabi and other districts of the Frontier in which 'lashkars' were formed to resist the Taliban. Another such Lashkar was raised in the Salarzai sub-division of the restive Bajaur Agency, which attacked a group of militants and killed one of them on Aug 26, 2008. Salarzai 567

Yousaf Ali, In self-defense, The News on Sunday, 31st august 2008. Ibid. 569 Ibid. 570 Ibid. 568

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is considered one of the most volatile sub-divisions of Bajaur, where the Taliban are led by Haji Naimatullah under the banner of Karwan-e-Naimatullah.571 There are reports that the anti-Taliban Lashkar was formed when the Taliban ambushed three tribal elders namely Malik Bakhtawar Khan, Malik Shah Zarin and religious scholar Maulvi Sher Wali.They were on their way home from a meeting with government officials in Khar, where they had pledged to raise a Lashkar and sought support for the purpose. The local tribesmen held the Taliban responsible for the killings. Some 200-300 volunteers have so far enlisted in the tribal lashkar.572 It has been observed that the government functionaries are assisting the volunteers' squads against Taliban everywhere. It is as if the government considers that it could combat the increasing militancy by mobilizing the general masses against them, as all efforts -- use of force, talks and agreements -- to bring about peace in the troubled areas and elsewhere in the country have so far failed to bear desired results.573However, it seems that the militants are quick to respond to the action of these ‗volunteers‘. An instance amongst many is, when the usually peaceful area of Banai in Lower Dir district was hit by tragedy as two grenades were hurled into a mosque as people offered 'Taraveeh' prayers. At least 25 were killed, 50 others injured – some of them critically. The motives for the attack, in a predominantly Sunni area that has no history of sectarian unrest, are unclear. It seemed to be a reprisal for the Jirga verdict in Lower Dir, which had decided to issue an edict for the populace rising against militancy. Consequently, militants infiltrating the area from the adjacent Bajaur tribal agency were asked to leave.574 Similarly, in Swat, the community protected the populist veteran political stalwart Afzal Khan against the militants‘ attack. In Koza Banda in Swat when Sikander Khan and Qayyum, two locals were injured by militants, the community retaliated and killed those responsible for the attack. Simultaneously, in Buner, Dir, Peshawar, Mardan and other places, the communities have tended to organize themselves to defend themselves against the militants. Where the initial euphoria at the ascendency of the radicals has worn off, it seems that local communities are challenging extremism by organizing along martial lines, with the government‘s assistance. Lashkars are springing up in areas such as Mardan, Charsadda, Hangu,Tank, Dera Ismail Khan and even in the NWFP capital city of Peshawar. The NWFP government finally decided to provide logistical assistance to these Lashkars, and also to arm them with Kalashnikovs. In a recent incident, the state decided to provide vehicles and free fuel for lashkars that were engaged in patrolling Mattani, Adezai, Kishan Ghar,Badbher areas in the suburbs of Peshawar575.

TERROMODELS The emergence of self coined Terromodels has been mentioned earlier, which implies transmigration of radical fundamentalist tendencies from the tribal to the urban areas, where it 571

Ibid. Ibid. 573 Ibid. 574 Peril at prayers,The News, September 12, 2008 575 Lashkars and their critics, Herald, November 2008. 572

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becomes much harder to detect and consequently, that much harder to eliminate. I have tended to use the terminology in order to encapsulate the entire spectrum of radicalizing tendencies in a manageable term. Swat is in essence is the prototype ‗proof of concept' that the Taliban can replicate their success outside of their Pashtun homelands. This was done by terror, which makes it a prototypical terror based model, which I have abbreviated as a ‗Terromodel.‘ A Terromodel is just an abbreviation of something gone very wrong in a society, in which that very thing should logically not have occurred. It is a story of a radicalizing trend in the society, even though countering influences like education, secularism (of a sort) and affluence are all present. The model considered in Swat implies an area which was relatively affluent, had a comparatively higher literacy rate, women were not marginalized, and people were involved quite heavily in commerce and agriculture. These are all factors, the lack of which is traditionally considered to be the substrate of terrorism. The mystery here is that since Swat shares no borders with Afghanistan; why has the Taliban presence built up so heavily in this area? I think that the presence in Swat is simply an extension of a massive build-up of Tajik militants in neighbouring Bajaur; when Bajaur was cleared of foreign militants by the army, these militants simple chose to gravitate to a nearby area with plenty of natural resources. It is only natural that they expected to establish a stronger base in this area. In time, with minimal state interference, other radicals (especially foreign militants) gravitated to Swat, and beginnings of militias were formed, which were later unified under Fazlullah. These militants looked towards TNSM as a natural choice for their leadership and to form alliances, and in many ways both movements formed a symbiotic relationship which fed into each other. When TNSM was sidelined due to Sufi Muhammad‘s arrest and its inability to reorganize itself in the wake of the disastrous journey of 10,000 warriors to Afghanistan and their subsequent routing, the militants looked to ally themselves with stronger partners. The strategic considerations are easier comprehended than the socio economic depths to which the Taliban have managed to ‗inject‘ their ideas within the Swati society; it seems unlikely that the Taliban would have gained the widespread acceptance that they have achieved simply at the point of a gun. Thus a Terromodel is somewhat of a contradiction in terms; a radical widespread militant movement should ideally not have too many chances of gaining a populist foothold in such an area being considered. However, the very fact that a movement like that takes root, gives rise to the inescapable hypothesis that something is very wrong in the society under review. I have come up with the term ‗Terromodel‘ to encapsulate the structural imbalances in the entity being considered, which implies a form of ‗slithering‘ Talibanization, which comes in though the back door. This is just an introduction to the insidious inception of Terromodels in Pakistan, which is essence is the entrenchment of a Talibanized mindset in hitherto (relatively) open societies. The author firmly believes this phenomenon has to be studied in much greater depth, to provide a strategic insight as to how geographically sequestrated radical movements like the ones in FATA, are starting to permeate into the Pakistani urban mainstream, which is an extremely worrying trend. There are some commonalities within the Pakistani Terromodels. The areas being considered, though at varying levels of development, have had relatively high standards of education and development. They tend to stand out as islands of progressiveness, which perhaps tends to provide the tactic stimulus for the negative effects of radical gravitation.

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They are commercial hubs attracting the chunk of investments in the area. Two of three models are provincial capitals, being Peshawar and Karachi, with the other being Swat, once the Jewel of the tourism industry. Radicalization in these regions has increased exponentially after 2001, which is another common feature of these areas. The Laissez faire‘ ideology of the traditional maulvi had been quite acceptable to the society at large, but seems to have been replaced by the firebrand preacher .Herein lies the fallacy of not recognizing a Terromodel in time; even there was an active operation going on intermittently in Waziristan at the time, Government troops were not mobilized quickly enough to halt the spread of this contagious movement in Swat, because conventional Law and Order controlling measures were considered adequate. It was only after some time that it was realized by the Policy echelons of Government that a FATA type situation was developing in a hitherto Open society, which is unprecedented in Pakistan. Peshawar has had a similar fate. Even though the Frontier province is conservative by western standards, Peshawar has long been an educational and cultural nucleus for the whole province. Militancy had been insidiously gaining a foothold in the area. Certain groups have been operating in Matani, Mashokhel, Mashogagar, Badaber, Sheikhan, Sarband, Landi Akhun Mohammad, Regi, Nasir Bagh, Daudzai, Khazana, Mathra, Michni and other towns, sharing boundaries with the tribal belt, for some time. These were involved in blowing up CD shops, internet cafes, video centres, barber shops and attacking security forces and sensitive installations with bombs and rockets. Peshawar was attacked from these towns numerous times, only five to 15 kilometres from the cantonment. Police parties were attacked in Matani, and policemen have been terrorist targets in Nasir Bagh. Matani is a town located just 20 kilometres from Peshawar city that shares boundaries with the troubled Darra Adam Khel. Rocket barrages were carried out to attack Peshawar on over two dozen occasions. Up to eleven rockets were fired in some of these attacks. The projectiles mostly landed in areas close to the Peshawar International Airport, residences of senior army officers around police lines, and sensitive buildings in cantonment and surrounding areas. The city has virtually become a ‗city of barricades‘, with roads leading to sensitive installations and threatened localities being barricaded. Kidnapping for ransom has also become a common crime in Peshawar, and police seems to have failed in countering these bids. Several high-profile individuals including a serving brigadier and nephew of a former governor were among those abducted from the city, many of whom could be released only after payment of huge amounts as ransom. A few actions taken by the Mangal Bagh-led Lashkar-e-Islam earned appreciation for providing speedy justice to the public, who would have to wait for years for those cases had they approached the traditional system of justice of the government. However, the abduction of 16 members of the Christian community who were taken to the nearby Bara, at 15 minutes' drive from Peshawar cantonment, and released the next day, was an embarrassing act which did not portray Lashkar-e-Islam in the best of lights. The visits of armed men in double-cabin pickups to certain parts of the cantonment, to warn the CD shop owners against their 'un-Islamic' business, have also spread terror amongst the populace. Even though offensives have been launched against rings of criminals, in Bara and rural Peshawar, not much has been done against the three main militant groups which are active in Bara; Lashkar-e-Islam, Ansarul

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Islam and Amr Bilmaroof wa Nahi Anilmunkar.576 Many have questioned the credibility of the Bara Operation in a situation when members of certain groups have already vacated the sub division. Others continue to roam the streets with AK-47 rifles, while the forces are not laying a hand on them. Mangal Bagh and his Lashkar-e-Islam are the major players in this area. Surprisingly, Mangal Bagh and his deputies have made it clear on more than one occasion that they would not fight against their 'own army'. Instead, they have pulled out their forces to Tirah valley.577 There have been various points of view opined by the political leadership of the country.‖ There is no imminent threat to Peshawar from militants but the government is spreading rumours to provide an opportunity to the US-led Nato forces so they could attack Fata," opines Jamat-e-Islami chief, Qazi Hussain Ahmad. "I am sure the militants cannot capture Peshawar or any other town as they don't have the weapons and the resources to take over big towns."578 The leaders of Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazl and Tehrik-e-Insaaf have expressed reservations over the operation. Many have also seconded the thoughts of the JI chief.579 Rahman Malik, advisor to the Prime Minister on Interior affairs is optimistic that Peshawar has been secured from any threat from militants. "The objectives of the operation have been achieved to a great extent. Now there is no threat to the capital city," remarks the top security official of the country. Malik makes it clear that security forces have been directed to take care of women, children and elderly tribesmen and take action only when somebody challenges them. That is why, he adds, no mishap has occurred during the course of the operation. "This is purely a civilian action led by Governor NWFP. The political authorities have taken control of the areas cleared by the Frontier Corps.‖580 Another city similarly affected is the sprawling metropolis of Karachi. Even though it hardly seems like a vulnerable target for hordes of bearded men in pick-up trucks imposing their version of Shariah upon the citizenry, there have been an increasing number of reports from the city about the impact of Talibanisation. The reports of the port at Karachi being used as getaway by escaping al Qaeda leaders has been mentioned earlier; many others sought refuge in the sprawling metropolis, which showed a drastic increase in terrorist attacks after 2002-3.Many madrassahs more or less openly started preaching their radical doctrines, and a significant number of top level leaders, Khalid Sheikh Muhammad and Ramzi bin al-Shibh amongst them, were amongst the scores of al Qaeda leaders personnel arrested there. It is not surprising that that reports have regularly been surfacing about the presence of Taliban in the city. There are several factors which contextualize the Talibanisation of Karachi; the initiation of operations in the tribal areas has altered the ethnic composition of the city due to a steady influx of displaced Pashtuns into Karachi. Though this effect has yet to be measured in terms of electoral support, it has decisively compounded the already tense law and order situation in the city. The 1998 census, the last one carried out in the country,put the muhajir population at 48% and the Pashtuns at 11% in the city; the Pashtun proportion may have risen dramatically 576

Special Report, News on Sunday, 6 July 2008. http://jang.com.pk/thenews/jul2008-weekly/nos-06-072008/spr.htm. 577 Ibid. 578 Ibid. 579 Ibid. 580 Ibid

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in the wake of escalating militancy in tribal areas, and the mass migration of many of these displaced persons to Karachi. It is not being suggested that all of these Pashtuns are Taliban or pro Taliban sympathizers, but the possibility of the infiltration of this vital city by at least some of these elements cannot be ignored. Out of a reported 550,000 people displaced from the Pashtun tribal areas during the latter half of 2008 and first half of 2009, some 300,000 are reported to have settled in Karachi. The absence of a refugee infrastructure has meant that they have settled in with friends and relatives mainly on the outskirts of Karachi in areas traditionally regarded as Pashtun majority population enclaves. Areas such as Sohrab Goth, Surjani Town and Pashtun dominated areas have thus become potential hubs of militancy; this has also created an ethnic divide with the Muhajirs, which are more centrally located within Karachi. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that many of these areas are nothing more than glorified shanty towns, where deterioration of socio economic infrastructure provided by the state has meant that they are relatively bereft of amenities taken for granted within the more centrally located populations in the metropolis. This adds to the potential of radicalization of these areas. Karachi holds great significance for the Taliban movement, and the Taliban purportedly aim to entrench themselves in the port city to end vulgarity in the city, the Daily Times quoted TTP spokesman Maulvi Umar as saying. Umar further said that foreign enemies were setting their sight at Karachi, as it had become the country‘s economic lifeline. According to the spokesman for the Taliban, their presence in Karachi would make it safe and bring peace to the city. Umar also said that the Taliban were present everywhere in the country and were the real heirs of Pakistan (ANI).581 Flexing the Taliban muscle, he has further mentioned that the Taliban have much strength in Karachi as well as in other parts of the country. ―We are capable of capturing any city of the country at any given time,‖ he emphatically stated.582 The leader of the main political part in Karachi, Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) chief Altaf Hussain has also gone on record to mention that more than 400,000 Afghans and foreigners equipped with weapons had entered the city and alleged that these terrorists wanted to occupy Karachi and Hyderabad and even the entire province of Sindh.583On the other hand, many political commentators have remarked that the MQM was just using this as a ploy to arm their own workers in order to spread terror in the city. ―According to Saeed Ahmed Khan, President ANP Karachi West, there is no Taliban presence in Karachi and whosoever is making such claims has 'political motives'. Considering what has happened in the last nine years, the government should ensure security arrangements any way, he says, But to create panic is wrong and it will lead to nothing. Ever since the news about Taliban presence in Karachi came out, the Pukhtoons have been specifically targeted. It is unfortunate that those people who have been living in this city for so many years are now being targeted for the wrong reasons." Most Pashtun residents of the city share Saeed Khan's view. "If you talk about Taliban, I'd like to say that they do not belong to a particular ethnic community," says Shaukat Khan, a factory worker, who lives in the Sohrab Goth area. "But it is becoming clear gradually that when certain political elements talk about Taliban, they definitely mean the Pukhtoons. All of us are not the same."

581

Reported on ‗The Indian‘ website at : http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/south-asia/now-pak-taliban-wantsto-end-vulgarity-in-karachi_10079995.html 582 Taliban capable of taking over Karachi, Daily Times, August 10,2008. 583 The News, October 13,2008. Taliban in Pakistan: A Chronicle of Resurgence : A Chronicle of Resurgence, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook

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Mufti Mohammad Naeem of Jamia Binoria vehemently rejects any claims regarding Taliban presence in Karachi: "Those spreading such rumours only mean to create panic so that the common people can be brought under their control. Why do they need to go from door to door, toting their guns and throwing words of caution (against Taliban) when the neighbourhood is all peaceful? It's ridiculous. We don't even know if the Tehrik-e-Taliban is created by the agencies or whether it is real." "This is a propaganda campaign targeting the Pukhtoons in Karachi," says Ejaz Ahmed of Karachi Committee. "By labelling them (the Pukhtoons) as Taliban, they are sure that the US support is coming their way." On the other hand, MQM's Nadeem Ehsan, member National Assembly, insists that it is absurd to suppose that Taliban are not in Karachi when the spokesman of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan has already told the media that they are "only waiting for their authorities to give them the green signal.‖ "Karachi is Pakistan's economic hub," adds Ehsan, "Our enemies know that, too. They know what to hit in order to cause a serious damage to the country. You can already find loads of wall-chalking in the city. Besides, some schools have been getting threats. Should we wait for them to strike in order to understand the gravity of the situation?"584 The situation in Karachi is exacerbated by reports of resurgence of a Taliban allied organization; the Sipah e Sahaba Pakistan, which has emerged under the nom de guerre of Jamaat Ahl e Sunnat. Nearly 5,000 workers of his ‗banned‘ organization carried out a publicly conducted rally at Masjid Sadiq e Akbar,Nagan Chowrangi,in North Karachi on March 20,2009; this should be contextualized as part of a larger resurgence of his organization, in the wake of efforts at rapprochement by the newly ushered in Sind Government. Hate literature against the Shias and Qadianis and flags depicting the Kalashnikov have started to emerge with impunity in the city; there have also been reports that Jaish e Muhammad have also started a ‗grass roots‘ propaganda campaign by wall chalkings and graffiti. Warnings at Talibanisation of Karachi cannot be ignored; during the last weeks of April 2009, local neighborhood Jizya-demanding Pashtuns beat up and wounded a number of Christians in Tiasar Town in the Surjani area in Karachi. Confrontation between the Christians and the Pashtuns took place after the town walls were splashed with graffiti, asking the Christians to embrace Islam or give Jizya. A church wall carried pro-Taliban slogans such as ―Taliban zindabad‖, ―Islam zindabad‖, ―Christians Islam qabool karo‖, etc. This had been foreseen some time earlier by Lawrence John Saldanha, Archbishop of Lahore and President Pakistan Catholic Bishops Conference, who sent a number of letters to the leaders of the country on April 16, 2009.In a letter to the Prime minister and president, reproduced in the Daily Times of April 24,2009, he stated: ―As the killing machine of terror in the name of religion continues with impunity, the small communities of Hindus, Sikhs and Christians in the NWFP are forced into unemployment, intimidation and migration. Statues of Buddha were mutilated, whereas St Mary‘s School, Convent, and Chapel at Sangota (Swat) were bombed to the ground. The Don Bosco School at Bannu has also been the target of bombing. Christian, Hindu and Sikh

584

Xari Jalil, Panic attacks, News on Sunday,7 September,2008. http://jang.com.pk/thenews/sep2008-weekly/nos07-09-2008/spr.htm#3

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.

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families in Dara Adam Khel in 2008 and recently Non-Muslims in Orakzai Agency have been forced to evacuate as jiziya was imposed on them by the Taliban‖.

Thus, even a cursory look at the scenario in Karachi is enough to raise concerns about a Talibanisation of Karachi; a takeover may be implausible, but as discussed earlier, the peril to Pakistan (and particularly to cities like Karachi and Peshawar which seem to be in the eye of the storm) is not due to the Taliban and Talibanisation by themselves, but in the process of Taliban attempts to radicalize the country. This has the potential of exhausting the already overstretched resources of the state, besides adding unpredictable trajectories to Pakistan‘s‘ implosive Jihadist scenario, which could presumably worsen the security conditions in Pakistan, having grave repercussions for security in South Asia in general. The situation in Swat has been dealt with at length in chapter 2.Swat is the epitome of a Terromodel; from a preposterous area with a thriving hospitality industry it has deteriorated into a militant haven, all in the space of a few years. An empirical analysis of the socio economic conditions does not pass muster; as with Peshawar and Karachi,Swat was till very recently a prosperous area with a Laissez faire attitude towards religion. Perhaps the absence of distributive social justice and the remnants of feudalism in the shape of the ‗Maliks‘ has had an effect on promoting militancy. Some analysts opine that the social vacuum generated by the apathy of the Maliks towards the conditions of the peasant class, and the dearth of provisions for obtaining speedy justice from courts, prompted the locals to look up to TNSM as being an organization which seemed to be at least agitating for reforms in the shape of Shariah.585 TNSM gradually became unpopular as the movement lost steam, and the Taliban neatly stepped into its shoes as an effective substitute. This analysis is bolstered by the fact that the Taliban movement initially became popular in the rural areas of Khawazakhela, Matta and Kabal; all three areas are characterized by a strong feudal system and what is widely considered to be downtrodden peasantry.586It is only after the Taliban had consolidated their hold in these relatively less affluent localities, that they started speeding in strength to other more prosperous areas like Babozai and Barikot. Thus,the Taliban seem to have started as a grass roots movement in feudal dominated areas, which is perhaps the main reason why they have not been able to gain a stronghold in the neighbouring district of Buner. Buner is characterized by an absence of the feudal system of Maliks, and paradoxically, a poorly developed system of agriculture as opposed to Swat.587If poverty alone is considered as the main variable in generating militancy in these areas, then Buner should have been the district giving birth to the phenomenon of Taliban,since it is nearly identical topographically to Swat except for being poorer. However, the distinguishing feature of absence of feudalism has perhaps saved Buner; this factor has to be contextualized in the discussion on Pakistani Terromodels. It also needs to be remembered that Swat has become a militant haven without a single drone attack being initiated by the Americans, with the militants controlling about 80 percent of the territory. This precludes the argument adopted by many amongst Pakistani policy circles and intelligentsia, that it is the foreign directed attacks which breed extremism; this does not seem to be the case in Swat at all, which has gravitated towards militancy all of its own accord. 585

Maqsood Ahmad, Disaffected peasantry and the Taliban, Herald, December 2008. Ibid. 587 Ibid. 586

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Terromodels are perhaps also negatively affected by the inability of the state to incarcerate militants for protracted periods; faulty case processing is just one of the many maladies affecting the Criminal Justice system in Pakistan. The conviction rate for the militants arrested is 10 % at best588 .The Police rely on article 164 of the Pakistan Penal code, which pertains to confessional statements made before a magistrate. They also have to rely heavily on cell phone records and conjured witnessed statements in the absence of provision of scientific means of investigations, which is a glaring lacuna in the methods of investigation used. Majority of the convictions obtained at the magistrate level are thus set aside by higher courts due to lack of concrete evidence. According to statistics compiled by the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), 121 high profile terrorists were released by the courts from the province of Sind alone during the years 2002 to 2007.58940 of these belonged to Sipah-e-Sahaba, 19 from the Lashkare Jhangvi, 15 from Jaish e Muhammad, 21 from the Harkat ul mujahideen, 15 from Harkat ul mujahideen Almi, two from Hizbul Tahrir and interestingly, only 1 from the Taliban.590The disproportionate number of Taliban released from the courts in comparison to other militants, may of course, be a reflection of the minute numbers of these militants arrested in the first place anyways. Even more intriguingly, at least a dozen of the released militants had been implicated in the attacks on President Musharraf.591 The statistics from Sind are troubling inasmuch they represent just a portion of the entire militant segment ―If you collect the list of militants from the remaining three provinces, I‘m sure the number of those who are released would exceed several hundreds‖ mentioned a senior official of CID in a media interview.592 The released militants subsequently tend to fall off the radar of security agencies593; it is highly likely they re-engage in militant activities against the state. There have been reports that the Taliban are making inroads into towns in Punjab, with at least five towns such towns in southern and western Punjab being affected; a consistent pattern of barber shops, music centres and internet cafes receiving threats has become a reliable indictor of slithering Talibanisation. Incidents like the attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore, and the Manawan Police Training School, has understandably raised fears of a Taliban take over of Punjab, which needs to be understood in its context. As discussed in chapter 1, the Taliban‘s philosophy is entrenched in hybridized forms of Deobandism, which is the anti thesis of the Barelvi sects which form a majority population in Punjab. Though the society, particularly the rural society in Punjab is undeniably stratified, it by no means bears resemblance to the much more rigid tribal structure in NWFP and Balochistan. Women are a case in point, with much more public visibility, freedom and sharing of decision making process granted to women even in Punjab‘s rural societies than even the most ‗progressive; tribal areas; women working in the fields in Punjab are a common sight, and purdah or veil and strict domestic confinement are by no means the norm in rural Punjab. The status of women is much more elevated in urban centres, with working women a common sight in Lahore, Multan, Rawalpindi etc. 588

Massoud Ansari, Catch and Release, Herald, December 2008. Ibid. 590 Ibid. 591 Ibid. 592 Ibid. 593 Ibid. 589

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A class analysis hypothesis is often used to support the argument that the Taliban are essentially sparking off a ‗revolution‘ in Pakistan against class disparity. However, as discussed in the section discussing a possible link between poverty and radicalization in Pakistan, many more factors are at play in producing a radical outlook, with an empirical analysis considering any one facet in particular not being enough. Political and religious philosophies may also take precedence over class identity; this is one of the main resistances to radicalization experienced by a Talibanized ideology which tries to overcome the Punjabi worldview. However, only the passage of time will tell whether Talibanisation hits Punjab with full force or not. It has certainly affected Islamabad, the Federal Capital of Pakistan, where the Lal Masjid incident, one of the most momentous occasions in the history of the Pakistani Jihadist insurgency took place.

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Lal Masjid The Lai Masjid (Red mosque594) movement is a strong indicator of the growing religious extremism creeping unchecked into the urban cities of Pakistan, with radical Islamist groups shaking off the mantle of proxy warriors of the Pakistan Army, as well as the ISI595. Since January 2007, these groups asserted their independence viz-a-viz the state through the Lal Masjid standoff, as the Islamists, hitherto firmly faithful to their patrons in the establishment, made a bid to violently renegotiate their worth and influence within Pakistan's equations of power. The state watched with growing apprehension and indecisiveness as how to tackle their previously pliant assets, which had evolved into defiant entities seeking to impose their Islamist ideals. This impasse was being scrutinized by militant groups as a litmus test, of whether or not the entrenchment of their Islamist agendas would be tolerated with a policy of appeasement by the state. The subsequent decision of the state to launch a military operation to impose it‘s writ in the Federal Capital city was seen as a final parting of ways; in its wake the more fanatical militant groups, particularly the Taliban in Pakistan, seem to have decided that they needed to actively engage the Pakistani government in order to impose their version of Sharia. A brief history of the encounter needs to be contextualized, in order to gain some comprehension of how it has become a symbolic beacon of the militant groups‘ departure from within the ISI/state folds. Lal Masjid,built on a piece of state encroached land in the Aab-paara locality, stands in close proximity to the Parliament House in Islamabad, at a negligible distance from the ISI Headquarters.The Lal Masjid has been running two madrassahs namely, Jamia Hafsa, an exclusively female religious seminary, and Jamia Fareedia, its male counterpart. Jamia Hafsa reportedly had more than 2,000 Burqa clad students596. It has been fed with a large input from

594

The mosque has a red exterior, which has given rise to the colloquial name for it: ‘Lal‘ pertains to the colour red in Urdu, while ‗Masjid‘ is the word for ‗mosque‘. 595 Inter Services Intelligence, the premier intelligence agency of Pakistan, which, along with the CIA ,was responsible for coordinating the activities of the mujahideen during the afghan Jihad. 596 Jannat Jalil, Pakistan's Islamic girl schools,, BBC News, South Asia,19 September 2005,internet edition, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/4258224.stm. Also see Islamabad's Lal Mosque grooming jihadis: Research scholar, February 03, 2007,Rediff News, internet edition, http://in.rediff.com/news/2007 /feb/03pak1.htm.

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Pakistan‘s impoverished tribal597 areas. The Lal Masjid establishment was being administered by two hard line clerics; Maulana Abdul Aziz was heading the Jamia Hafsa and working as the Imam of the Mosque, and his brother Maulana Abdul Rasheed Ghazi headed Jamia Fareedia. Even before the infamous Lal Masjid incident, the students, particularly the ladies, had come into prominence; in a much reported incident, they violently resisted the decision of the Government to demolish religious structures raised upon state encroached land598. As a retaliatory measure, with the help of the male student of the complex, they violently occupied the only Children's library in Islamabad, and refused to vacate the premises, despite repeated government instructions599. It was under the state patronage of General Zia-ul-Haq that the father of the above referred two brothers, Maulana Abdullah, was given a leeway to establish Lal Masjid for the propagation of Zia-ul-Haq's brand of Islam600. Maulana Abdullah enjoyed all possible privileges from the state and the ISI601, but his popularity became questionable with the passage of time due to hard line sectarian preaching; finally he was assassinated while crossing the floor of his mosque602. Maulana Abdullah had close association with Afghan Jihad leaders; Abdul Rab Sayyaf, Jalaluddin Haqqani and Ahmed Shah Masud, and later he affiliated himself with the Taliban603. During the Soviet invasion, Lal Masjid was one of the main hubs of indoctrination of Harkat ul Mujahideen (HUM) for sending fighters to Afghanistan. Lal masjid‘s linkages to HUM were probably never severed; the remonstrations of Abdul Rasheed Ghazi with the government to appoint Maulana Fazlur Rahman Khalil ,604(formerly a leader of the Harkat ul Ansar and Harkat ul Mujahideen) as a mediator on his behalf during the Lal Masjid standoff are highly significant. Maulana Abdullah was one of the Deobandi religious scholars campaigning for the release of Maulana Masood Azhar605, when he was arrested in Indian Occupied Kashmir in 1994. It is also widely believed that Maulana Abdullah was patron to several sectarian groups Copyright © 2010. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

597

Afzal Khan,Ghazi killed as troops storm Masjid:40 militants, 8 commandos gunned down, The Tribune, July 11, 2007,online edition. http://www.tribuneindia.com/2007/20070711/main1.htm. 598 Muhammad Amir Rana, Lal Mosque's Terror Link,Pakistan institute of peace studies website, Southasianet Pakistan section, 24 May 2007, http://san-pips.com/PIPS-SAN-Files/SAN-Pakistan/SAN-PAK-Article22/SanPak-Main-A22-D.asp. 599 Radical students seize four Pakistan policemen ,Gulf times, Saturday,19 May, 2007,internet edition, http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/printArticle.asp?cu_no=2anditem_no=150156andversion=1andtemplate _id=57andparent_id=56 600 Syed Shoaib Hasan, Profile: Islamabad's Red Mosque ,27 July 2007,BBC News,South Asia section, internet edition. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6503477.stm 601 Bill Van Auken Mosque massacre: Washington‘s ―war on terror‖ shakes Pakistan,,World socialist website, 11 July 2007, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2007/jul2007/paki-j11.shtml. 602 See Supra note 56. 603 Supra note 54. 604 The Harkat ul Mujahideen is a splinter faction of Harkat ul jihad ul Islami (HUJI) .Due to the insistence of influential Deobandi clerics, a merger of three groups consisting HUJI, HUM and Jamiat ul Mujahideen was attempted in 1993 under the auspices of Harkat ul Ansar ; it never materialized in the form envisaged, and HUM has also existed under the nom de guerre of Harkat ul Jihad al Alami,under the leadership of Fazlur Rehman Khalil. For further reading on the topic see Amir Rana, A to Z of Jihadi organizations in Pakistan(Lahore:Mashal Press,2006),p.264 and Amir Mir, The Fluttering Flag of jehad(Lahore:Mashal Press,2008),p.103,107. 605 Jaish e Muhammad was formed by Masud Azhar in 2000,by what many observers see as a move at the behest of the ISI to sideline Harkat-ul Mujahideen .JM therefore had to ‗outbid‘ HUM from its very inception; it did that by importing the suicide tactic from al Qaeda. For further reading on this topic see Amir Mir (Mashal,2008) and Rana(Mashal,2006) as above, both of which devote entire sections to Masood Azhar, one of the foremost militant commanders in Pakistan. Also see Mariam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy,‖ Islamist networks: the Pakistan Afghanistan connection‖(London: Hurst and Company Press,2004),pp28-32.

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such as the banned Sipah-e-Sahaba606 and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi607. Maulana Abdullah was succeeded by his sons; Maulana Abdul Aziz and Maulana Abdul Rasheed Ghazi. The two sons followed aptly in their father‘s footsteps by maintaining close liaison with Harkat ul Jihad ul Islami608 (HUJI), Jaish e Muhammad609 (JM) and the Taliban610. They were not afraid to show it either; during their occupation of Children's library, when students of their madrassah were chanting slogans, Maulana Abdul Aziz and late Maulana Abdul Rasheed Ghazi kept mentioning their close liaison with Osama Bin Laden611,Mullah Omar and the Taliban in NWFP. According to AKI, and Italian news Agency, there were close links of Lal Masjid management with the 2005 London suicide bombers.612 The two brothers also passed a fatwa (religious decree) to the effect, that Pakistan army personnel killed during clashes in South Waziristan should be denied a Muslim burial613. The clerics preached a hardliner Deobandi strain of Islam, which is unpopular amongst the Shiite minorities of the country; when riots erupted in the wake of Sipah Sahaba Pakistan‘s leader Azam Tariq‘s assassination in 2003, the Jamia Fareedia students were in the forefront in destroying a Shiite mosque614. Their sectarian stance has also alienated the more moderate Barelvi community in Pakistan. The armed military operation was not the only time that Lal Masjid made headlines; both Lal Masjid and associated Jamia Hafsa were very in the news in July 2005, when Pakistani security forces tried to raid the mosque following the London suicide bombings615. It was the Jamia Hafsa to which a British school girl, Misbah Rana, formerly Molly Campbell, was reported to have been interested in joining, after arrival in Pakistan at the centre of an international custody row616. It seems that the Lal Masjid entity has had an active ‗outreach‘ program for some time.

606

Supra note 54. The Lashkare Jhangvi was formed by a breakaway faction of Sunni Deobandi hardliners from the Sipah Sahaba Pakistan (SSP).The target audience for both the organizations is the hardliner Sunni sectarian minded population, which is a huge market share for which both the factions compete. LJ has been implicated in a large number of suicide attacks in Pakistan and Kashmir. 608 HUJI is perhaps the most internationalized group in Pakistan, with Jihadist connections in Myanmar, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Chechnya, Kashmir and Afghanistan, besides linkages with Taliban and Al Qaeda. Established on the prerogative of Jamiat ul ulema Islam (JUI) and Tableeghi Jamaat (TJ),it was set up mainly to coordinate relief camps for Afghan Mujahideen. The ISI later approached the founding Ameer(leader) of the organization, Maulana Irshad Ahmed, to start recruitment and training of Mujahideen for the Afghan war. HUJI remained in intimate contact with the afghan Hizb-e-Islami, under Yunus Khalis and also with Jalal ud din Haqqani. After Irshad‘s death, Qari Saifullah Akhtar emerged as the leader of HUJI; he was very close to Mullah Omar and served as his special advisor during the Taliban Heydays. For further reading on this topic see Rana and Mir‘s books mentioned above. 609 See foot note 61 on Masood Azhar. 610 US backs Pakistan's storming of radical mosque, July 10, 2007,The Raw Story, http://rawstory.com/news/afp/US_backs_Pakistan_s_storming_of_rad_07102007.html. Also see, amongst many other reports, Ghazi killed as troops storm Masjid:40 militants, 8 commandos gunned down, Afzal Khan, The Tribune, July 11, 2007,online edition. http://www.tribuneindia.com/2007/20070711/main1.htm. Mosque massacre: Washington‘s ―war on terror‖ shakes Pakistan, Bill Van Auken, World socialist website, 11 July 2007, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2007/jul2007/paki-j11.shtml 611 Declan Walsh, Army ready to storm mosque as conflict grows, 4 July 2007,Guardian,world News, internet edition, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jul/04/pakistan.topstories3. 612 Also see Students raid Islamabad 'brothel', 28 March 2007,BBC News, South Asia, internet edition, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6502305.stm 613 Supra note 54. 614 Supra note 54. 615 Supra note 56. 616 Islamabad's Lal Mosque grooming jihadis: Research scholar, February 03, 2007, Rediff News, internet edition, http://in.rediff.com/news/2007/feb/03pak1.htm.

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607

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More important were Maulana Abdul Rasheed Ghazi‘s links with al Qaeda, which came to the surface in 2004, when Osama bin Laden‘s driver Usman was arrested in Islamabad in connection with alleged sabotage activities in the capital. At the time of his arrest on August 11, 2005617, he was Maulana Abdul Rasheed‘s guest and travelling in his car. Calls were traced from Usman's phone to one Mustafa, an alleged al Qaeda terrorist in Karachi. After Usman‘s arrest Abdul Rasheed Ghazi disappeared, only to reappear two weeks later618. Surprisingly he was not pursued in Usman‘s case, neither were reports of any Government interrogation made public. This may have due to his potential to generate law and order disturbances; the alternative explanation is his ISI linkages, which allowed him to run free after a commission, which would have gotten incarcerated any other person of a lesser Jihadist stature. Media has reported that after the Lal Masjid operation, letters written by Osama Bin Laden‘s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, to the Ghazi brothers were discovered.619 There were also reports, that foreign fighters had instructed Lal Masjid students in the use of sophisticated weaponry some weeks ahead of the final shootout, setting up firing ranges within the madrassah compound in the process.620 The crisis which was to culminate in the infamous incident, started gaining momentum on 24th January 2007,when the Capital Development Authority621 razed Ameer Hamza Mosque for being illegally constructed on encroached state land. In response, the two Maulanas, along with 10,000 pupils622 started a strong protest movement, including the raising of a ‗baton force‘ for countering government counterinsurgency efforts. Their strategy included the coming onto the streets of hundreds of veiled female students, who ‗occupied‘ the children‘s library adjacent to the disputed mosque623. During this time, the Maulanas delivered fiery speeches against Musharraf; Maulana Masood Azhar of Jaish-e-Muhammad also showed up, and criticised Musharraf for his role in war on terror in alliance with US and demanded death for him624. Facing tremendous Islamist pressure in the course of negotiations, the Government succumbed to demands for rebuilding the destroyed mosque. However, Maulana Abdul Aziz later changed his stance, and refused to vacant the children library, simultaneously announcing the promulgation of a Shariah enforcement movement625. These activities having gone unchecked, Maulana Abdul Aziz announced the installation of his own FM radio station in Islamabad. This was limited initially to a radius of four miles, to be extended to 25 miles subsequently. Later these broadcasts were jammed, and the Lal Masjid website also closed down by the Government.626

617

Supra note 54. Ibid. 619 Dean Nelson and Ghulam Hasnain, Bin Laden‘s deputy behind the Red Mosque bloodbath, July 15, 2007, The Sunday Times, Times online, internet edition, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/ asia/article2076013.ece. 620 Ibid. 621 The administrative entity responsible for administration of land, in the capital city of Islamabad. 622 Supra note 54. 623 Khuram Iqbal, Conflict: Children Library to Enforce Shariah?, Southasianet – Pakistan, Pakistan institute of peace studies website, http://www.san-pips.com/new/index.php?action=sanandid=25. 624 Supra note 56. 625 Supra note 79. 626 Chronology of Lal Masjid clashes,10 Jul 2007,The Times of India, Pakistan section, internet edition, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/2190609.cms. 618

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Whilst in occupancy of the children‘s library, the female students of Jamia Hafsa went on a rampage through Islamabad, destroying Television and video shops, burning CDs, attacking cars driven by lady drivers, and asking people at large to report incidents involving obscenity and vulgarity contrary to the injunctions of Islam. In the process, they were informed of an alleged prostitution den being run in the area. Consequently, the female students kidnapped an elderly lady by the name of Aunty Shamim, her daughter, and daughter-in-law along with her six months old grand-daughter. They were all dragged to the premises of their madrassah. On March 27, Police was detailed for arresting the women teachers leaving the premises at the closing hours, but instead two policemen were captured and kept in wrongful confinement by the madrassah management up to March 28; they were finally released through negotiations627. On March 29, Aunty Shamim and her entourage were released, but only after being forced to confess immorality628. She retracted her statements later, mentioning that it was extracted under coercion and physical torture, when all of them (including her infant grand-daughter) were tied-up with ropes. Meanwhile the religious students were still occupying the Children‘s Library in Islamabad. One of Abdul Aziz‗s lectures, delivered to them at about this time, is highly indicative of the Jihadist mindset prevalent amongst his students. ―Implementation of Shariah in Pakistan is our collective need. And thousands of students of the Jamia Hafsa and Jamia Fareedia have started their journey on that path. Now they are waiting for the help of their Muslim brethren from all over Pakistan. Students should plead their teachers to allow them leaves to participate in this holy struggle…. now comes the time when we will have to practice the lesson of Jihad as well. And Jihad is an obligation in Islam that needs practice…..Your dignified Muslim Sisters (occupants of library) have initiated their struggle to save the religion of Allah…..A student from Lahore came to visit us. He observed and understood our way of working and the next day he came here accompanied by a group of 90 students.‖629 Maulana Abdul Aziz also threatened of using suicide bombers, if Government ventured the evacuation of the library by force. The situation kept deteriorating with the passage of time. Musharraf admitted630 that he couldn't take any action against the religious seminary because' If I take action, it would be considered a war between Islam and Kufr'. On April 6, Maulana Abdul Aziz announced the formation of ten Sharia courts, simultaneously threatening the Government that his 'tens of thousands human bombers' would blow up the area in the event of Government intervention631. While granting an interview to Daily Dawn, Maulana Abdul Aziz admitted his relations with Taliban in Afghanistan, NWFP, and in North and South Waziristan. He also admitted,‘ No doubt our students are joining Jihadis because we teach them Jihad but we have not pressurized them, rather they are doing it by their own'. The Sharia Courts set up by Maulana Abdul Aziz issued a religious fatwa against Nilofar Bakhtiar, Federal Minister for Tourism, 627

Ibid. Students raid Islamabad 'brothel', 28 March 2007,BBC News, South Asia, internet edition, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6502305.stm. 629 Speech reproduced in a Jihadi periodical, Monthly ― Aab-e-Hayat‖ Lahore, March 2007; Editor Maulana Mehmud Al-Rasheed Hadoti. 630 Supra note 67. 631 Government warned of suicide attacks in case of resistance; Qazi court to work on pattern of panchayat and jirgas, Daily times, Saturday, April 07, 2007,internet edition,http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=2007\04\07\story_7-4-2007_pg1_1. 628

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because she was shown as being hugged by her Para-gliding instructor, in a picture taken in Paris632. This Para-gliding activity was a part of her fund-raising campaign for the victims of October 8, 2005 Earthquake. In the fatwa it was decreed that 'Islam enjoins Muslim Women not to leave their homes unnecessarily'. The Minister, showing a strong resentment against this unwarranted interference, resigned from the Federal cabinet. By this time, tensions between the seminary management and the state were running high. A senator from PML(Q)633 offered his services for reconciliation between the militants and the Government, but late Maulana Abdul Rasheed Ghazi kept reiterating his stance that guns were available in the Red Mosque, which could be used in self defence if the occasion so demanded. April 13, however, brought good tidings inasmuch as late Maulana Abdul Rasheed Ghazi agreed for the first time that his doors were open for negotiation with the Government, and the theocratic courts in session in the Red Mosque were suspended634.This tenuous peace did not last long; even as negotiations were under way, Rasheed Ghazi kept bringing up new controversial issues.635It seems that the Islamists had decided to stretch the state‘s patience to the limits, in order to ascertain how much the flexibility inherent in the system of governance could be exploited for radicalizing the society. On April 14, Musharraf admitted that the Pakistan was a ―victim of terror‖ and was facing the ―menace of religious extremism, fundamentalism and extremism636. Even though the majority of Pakistani public has been critical of the militants,637 the establishment‘s Laissez Faire attitude as regards to Jihadist groups has been responsible for the entrenchment of Jihadist ideals firmly in the society. In response to pressure from the US and its allies, Pakistan cracked down on al Qaeda in wake of 9/11,but the Kashmiri jihad oriented groups were allowed to conduct their business as usual, even though many of them had been declared banned as terrorist organizations by Pakistani Government and placed on the US watch list of terrorist organizations. Besides restrictions, even the US was initially not bothered too much with the Kashmiri jihad oriented groups, which it considered to be plying their trade in theatres outside the American homeland638. However, what caught many observers unawares was the conjunction of militant groups and orientations into a singularly anti-West, al Qaeda inspired stance (see below).Arguably, Lal Masjid is a crucial link in the chain that contextualizes issues such as the establishment of Taliban in Pakistan and their ideological permeation in the society. Things came to a head when mosque students abducted seven Chinese workers they accused of running a brothel, on June 23, 2007639. They turned down all efforts at negotiation, except on terms of total amnesty, and refused to hand over any person. The supporters of Lal 632

Radical students seize four Pakistan policemen, Gulf times, Saturday,19 May, 2007,internet edition, http://www.gulftimes.com/site/topics/printArticle.asp?cu_no=2anditem_no=150156andversion=1andtemplate_id=57andparent _id=56. 633 A loyalist political party ,said to be an ally of then president Pervez Musharraf. 634 Lal Masjid rules out compromise on Shariat court, The News, internet edition, April 14, 2007 http://www.thenews.com.pk/arc_default.asp. 635 Ibid. 636 Real threat internal not external: Musharraf ,The News, internet edition, Sunday, April 15, 2007, http://www.thenews.com.pk/arc_default.asp. 637 Silent majority‘ welcomes mosque raid, July 13, 2007, Friday Times, internet edition, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007%5C07%5C13%5Cstory_13-7-2007_pg11_11. 638 See Mariam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy,‖ Islamist networks: the Pakistan Afghanistan connection‖(London: Hurst and Company Press,2004),p.57.

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Masjid reiterated that they were only attacking "Chinese girls who were prostitutes and they are destroying CD shops who sold pornography". The government meanwhile, wanted to detain "hardcore terrorists‖ holed up inside the mosque, some belonging to Jaish-eMohammad640, an outlawed radical Muslim organization which has been linked to al Qaeda and others from Harkat ul Jihad ul Islami641.Many Taliban militants were also reported to be holed up inside the compound642. ―We believe there are militants from Harkatul-Jihad-e-Islami, which was involved in the [Daniel] Pearl murder. Based on intelligence we suspect that two commanders from the group are in there,‖ one senior official told AFP. ―They have taken control and they are putting up fierce resistance.‖ The information was based on ―intercepts‖ and other intelligence, the officials said.643In the wake of this, the mosque was barricaded and security forces cordoned off the area. On July 3, 2007, the stand-off erupted in bloody gun battles, in which over twenty people were reportedly killed, and over one hundred others were injured644. The negotiations between the Lal Masjid management and the government seemed to be breaking down. In an attempt to avoid collateral losses, on July 4, 2007, an official amnesty was offered to juvenile students; on the terms of unconditional surrender over a 1,000 students came out645, but reportedly, as many as 1,800 followers remained in the mosque646.Some of them were said to be Taliban and al Qaeda militants647.There were press communiqués from the seminary administration that scores of suicide bombers had been given the ‗go ahead‘ by them to attack the ‗infidels‘648. Abdul Aziz Ghazi was arrested while in the process of meeting a senior army official disguised in a burqa649. However, the stand off seemed to be continuing, with sporadic firing from the militants, in which a number of civilians, security forces and journalists sustained injuries650. After exhausting all options 651, the tactical "Operation Silence" by 164 elite commandos of the Pakistan Army Special Services group (SSG) commenced. Government sources blamed foreign militants within the Lal Masjid compound for sabotaging the 639

Supra note 82. See Aziz Malik, Cleric Ghazi, Scores Killed: Islamabad Red Mosque Operation in Decisive Phase, Pakistan Times, internet edition, http://pakistantimes.net/2007/07/11/top.htm. 641 Ibid. 642 Day-long pitched battles leave nine dead ,The News, internet edition, Wednesday, July 04, 2007, http://www.thenews.com.pk/arc_default.asp 643 Daily Times, July 09,2007. 644 Supra note 98. 645 Syed Shoaib Hasan, Anguish of Pakistan mosque parents,4 July 2007, BBC News, South Asia, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6270962.stm. Also see Forces on alert as deadline to Lal Masjid passes,Thursday, July 05, 2007,The News, internet edition,http://thenews.jang.com.pk/updates.asp?id=25443. 646 Pakistani colonel killed in clash, 8 July 2007,BBC news, South Asia, internet edition, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6281404.stm. 647 See Supra note 96. 648 Mobarik A Virk, Suicide bombers given go-ahead, The News, internet edition, Wednesday, July 04, 2007, http://www.thenews.com.pk/arc_default.asp. 649 Burqa is an apparel which covers women form head to toe, revealing only the eyes. Pakistan cleric offers surrender, 5 July 2007,BBC News, South Asia, internet edition, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ south_asia/6274518.stm. 650 Fierce gun battles rock capital: Army troops deployed around Lal Masjid-Curfew imposed in area-Rangers man, journalist among 10 killed-Govt buildings torched, Syed Irfan Raza and Munawar Azeem, Dawn, July 04, 2007,internet edition, http://www.dawn.com/2007/07/04/top1.htm. 651 Minutes before the operation, top government negotiator Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, a former Prime minister of Pakistan who is the chief of PML (Q) political party announced that 11 hours of negotiations with Ghazi had failed. Also see Supra note 47. 640

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negotiation process, which had purportedly been inching its way towards a peaceful resolution652. A shootout commenced in which Abdul Rashid Ghazi was killed. The media reported653 that intelligence officials were astounded by the highly sophisticated and modern weaponry possessed by the militants, including bullet-proof and explosion-proof blankets, dum-dum bullets, and smoke, fire and splinter grenades. ―Bullet-and explosion-proof blankets are the latest combat gear, and even the Pakistan Army has not been equipped with this protective gear. The agencies are now investigating where these militants got such sophisticated equipment,‖ an official said.654He further mentioned that there was an ―accidental‖ suicide bombing during the operation which killed six students. ―When the commandos tried to enter a room where half a dozen militants were present, one of the militants detonated his suicide jacket killing everyone present in the room,‖ he said.655 The official number of fatalities tended to keep the figures to a minimum; the BBC reported the number of casualties as 173, 656but others have claimed casualties of more than 1000. At the reopening of Lal Masjid several human bones that were the remains of the children were found.657 The presence of foreigners in the mosque was not conclusively proved by the government, and some reports say that locals were dubbed as foreigners by the government as a pretext for the action. The debacle of Lal Masjid has far reaching implications inasmuch as it is the focus of anti-state, militant activity right in the middle of the Federal capital, getting socio-political and strategic support from the Pakistani Taliban. Their strong links with al Qaeda also pose threats and challenges for the state. It is significant that Dr.Zawahiri promptly issued a videotape after the Lal Masjid incident, in which he strongly condemned the operation. Zawahiri called the siege of the mosque a crime:‖ Your salvation is only through jihad [holy war]," a voice juxtaposed over an image of Zawahiri proclaimed,658 further adding that‖ This crime can only be washed away by repentance or blood." "If you do not revolt, [Pakistan's President Pervez] Musharraf will annihilate you," the recording warns. "Musharraf will not stop until he uproots Islam from Pakistan."659There was an immediate response to his call for militancy; on July 14, 27 soldiers were targeted when a suicide attacker struck a military convoy in northwest Pakistan near the Afghan border660. 58 persons were killed in such terrorist attacks in the fortnight succeeding the initiation of

652

Dean Nelson and Ghulam Hasnain, Bin Laden‘s deputy behind the Red Mosque bloodbath, July 15, 2007, The Sunday Times, Times online, internet edition, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/ article2076013.ece 653 Madrassa registers to clear ambiguity,18 July 2007,Afghanistan /Pakistan section, internet edition, Gulf Times. http://www.gulftimes.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2anditem_no=161602andversion=1andtemplate_id=41andparent_id= 23. 654 Ibid. 655 Ibid. 656 Musharraf vows war on militants, BBC online, South Asia,12 July 2007. 657 Daily Times, Saturday, July 28, 2007. 658 Al-Qaeda issues Pakistan threat ,BBC News, South Asia section, internet edition,11 July 2007. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6293914.stm. 659 Ibid. 660 Bin Laden‘s deputy behind the Red Mosque bloodbath, Dean Nelson and Ghulam Hasnain, July 15, 2007, The Sunday Times, Times online, internet edition, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia /article2076013.ece

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operation silence661.Even immediately after the operation, it was being surmised in strategic circles that Abdul Rasheed Ghazi had become a symbolic representation of al Qaeda‘s Islamist agendas in Pakistan.662Empirical assessments projected at the time stated that deterioration in the security situation of the Frontier and FATA areas was evident663 within a short while after the Lal Masjid event, a trend which has only worsened (see below). Besides condemnation from almost all Jihadist groups in Pakistan for the Lal Masjid event, the Taliban in Pakistan also endorsed their support for the Lal Masjid management. A senior Pakistani Taliban leader told media that the killing of young male and female students of the Jamia Hafsa and the Lal Masjid had saddened the people of Pakistan. ―The Taliban, too, were angered by the onslaught against the Jamia Hafsa and the Lal Masjid. We cannot forget what happened there,‖ the Taliban official said. 664One year later, on the eve of the first anniversary of the Lal Masjid operation, emotions of the jihadists still ran high; speakers addressing large crowds of several thousands denounced (then) President Pervez Musharraf for the bloodshed. "Pervez Musharraf, you thought you could crush the Islamic movement by attacking the Lal Masjid, but we are telling you, you have failed," Shah Abdul Aziz, a cleric and former Member of Parliament, told the crowd. 665 "It (the Lal Masjid operation) was done at the behest of America and Bush. But I want to tell America that Jihad will continue, it will never stop," he said.666Banners openly asked for retribution against the perpetrators of the operation, proclaiming that the "The killers of innocent male and female students do not deserve any mercy.‖667 Large protest demonstrations by Jihadi organizations and Lal Masjid sympathizers were held in Nowshehra and Abbotabad, whence the Jihadis vowed to take the cause of Lal Masjid further668. Similarly Maulana Fazlullah, who would later become the premier Taliban commander in Swat, vowed to avenge the Lal Masjid incident.669These were not just empty promises. The intelligentsia and media immediately noted an escalation of intensity of terrorist in the aftermath of the operation, though the observations remained empirical: ―Levels of law and order in some parts of the country have fallen... After the Red Mosque operation, attacks on security forces in tribal areas have intensified... Can the situation everywhere be brought to normal through the use of force?‖670Apprehensions about the future also started surfacing: ―... The fear that the Red Mosque episode can trigger a severe backlash is present...‖671A media

661

Ibid. Ibid. Pakistan press on mosque assault, BBC News, South Asia section, 11 July 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6290594.stm. Also see Musharraf vows war on militants, BBC News, South Asia, 12 July 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6896179.stm. 664 The News, internet edition, July 07,2008. 665 Supporters vow Jihad one year after siege, The News, internet edition, July 07, 2008. 666 Ibid. 667 Ibid. 668 Safdar Sial, Conflict: Is the Lal Masjid Saga Over? Pakistan institute of peace studies website, July 12, http://www.san-pips.com/new/index.php?action=sanandid=312007. 669 Ibid. 670 Editorial in the periodical ―Islam‖: reproduced in BBC News ,South Asia section, titled ―Press urges Red Mosque inquiry‖,12 July 2007,internet edition, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6294794.stm. 671 Editorial from Business Recorder, reproduced in BBC News ,South Asia section, titled ―Press urges Red Mosque inquiry‖,12 July 2007,internet edition, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6294794.stm 662 663

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report worried that: ―…it(Lal Masjid) has given hard-liners a rallying point, as well as new martyrs, and has prompted calls from al Qaida and Taliban for revenge attacks‖672. The problem has become compounded in view of the involvement of men like Khalid Khwaja, formerly serving in the ISI, who was arrested allegedly for inciting the students of Lal Masjid for taking up arms against Government of the day. Many important and serving members of ISI frequent the Red Mosque for offering their prayers as well, including Javed Nasir heading the ISI from 1990-93, Mehmood Ahmad673 (head of ISI at the time of 9/11, but fired a month later), Zahir-ul-Islam Abbasi674 serving as Station Chief in New Delhi in the late 1980s but removed from the post in 1988,also allegedly because of his role in espionage, and Hamid Gul,675 heading the ISI and having close links with the Taliban; he also served as advisor to Muttahidda Majlis-e-Amal i.e. MMA676.Subsequently, there has been a steadily growing perception within the intelligentsia, that the intelligence agencies needed to re evaluate the reliability of their ‗assets‘.677 The Lal Masjid represents a hub for many militant organizations. It has been reported in media time and again that Lal Mosque associates in Jihadi and Taliban groups had decide to hide out in Islamabad and its neighbouring city of Rawalpindi after the operation. Some violent banned jihadi outfits like Jaish-e-Mohammad and Jamaat ul-Furqan have also strong networks in Rawalpindi and neighbouring areas. Lal Mosque is not an isolated entity from the militant groups operating in Pakistan, but was a blatant effort to extend the influence and presence of militants in the heartland of Pakistan. Nor are the Taliban and al Qaeda ignorant of the strategic significance of the capital, when they try to force the government to give in before their agendas by consolidating their hold in and outside tribal areas. The same can be true in case of Islamabad and its vicinity.678 It is clear that the Lal Masjid operation marked a watershed in the history of militancy in the country. It is as if all the militant organizations unanimously came together to decide that from then onwards there would be a no holds barred strategy adopted towards militancy in the country679. Evidence of this can be gleaned from the fact that suicide attacks increased sharply in their frequency after July 2007, the time at which the Lal Masjid operation was initiated, and have tended to stay at these high levels afterwards. Before the operation, there had been 12 attacks in Pakistan between January 1 and July 3, 2007, killing 75 people680. The remaining 44 suicide attacks took place after the Lal Masjid 672

‗Red Mosque cleric predicts 'Islamic revolution‘, An associated press report in MSNBC online, July. 12, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19722713/. 673 (Zahab,Roy,2004), p.55. 674 Abbasi was later arrested in connection with plotting an Islamist coup to overthrow the Musharraf Government, and was court martialled. 675 For his strong links with Islamists, see (Zahab,Roy,2004), p.53. 676 A loose coalition of Islamist parties, which were elected to the Pakistan National Assembly in the Musharraf era. 677 BBC News ,South Asia section, titled ―Press urges Red Mosque inquiry‖,12 July 2007,internet edition, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6294794.stm 678 Safdar Sial, Marriott Blast: Security Implications for the Capital, Southasianet, Pakistan institute of peace studies website,26 September 2008, http://san-pips.com/PIPS-RandD-%20Files/Reports/RandD-ReportArticle30/RandD-Report-A30-D.asp. 679 Islamist militants in Pak vow to avenge Lal Masjid deaths,6 Jul 2007,The Times of India, Pakistan section, internet edition, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/2181700.cms. 680 For an overview of the location and the incident of suicide bombing, I have referred to the chronological data sheets of suicide bombings in Pakistan from 2002 to date, prepared by the South Asia Terrorism portal. This has been used by me to analyze the nature, increase in intensity and target type data, which has been analyzed in the paper regarding escalation of violence and shifting of targets from sectarian to military ones etc. The

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action, between July 4 and December 27, 2007, spreading to Karachi, Quetta, Peshawar, Lahore, Rawalpindi, Islamabad and other urban centres, killing 567 people, mostly the members of the military and Para-military forces, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and the police681. It is worthwhile remembering that Pakistan encountered 7 suicide attacks in 2006 as opposed to 56 in 2007682, when the Lal Masjid hydra raised its head. As soon as the Operation Silence was launched on July 3 by the SSG683 commandos of the Pakistan Army, the first retaliatory suicide bombing took place on July 4, killing at least 11 people in a suicide attack on a military convoy in North Waziristan. In the absence of open source information linking the Lal Masjid to the ISI and their subsequent rift, one is left with anecdotal and conjectural evidence684. However, the fact that suicide bombers, in an unprecedented move, twice attacked ISI buses in the highly sensitive garrison city of Rawalpindi, shortly after the operation silence, seems significant. Both buses were ferrying ISI employees;20 of them were killed in the first incident on September 4, 2007685 and 15 more in the second attack on November 24, 2007686. As soon as the Operation Silence came to an end, the intelligence agencies issued a warning to the government, that more than 500 potential suicide bombers had been issued a standby by a combined fatwa of the major militant organizations in Pakistan.687 One such suicide bomber killed 22 highly trained commandos of the Special Services Group (SSG) of Pakistan Army, by targeting their Tarbela Ghazi mess, 100 km south of Islamabad on September 13, 2007. He was the brother of a girl who was killed during the Operation Silence, carried out by the Karar Company of the SSG Brigade. Two months earlier, the elite SSG had lost 10 of its commandos, including a colonel688, during the week-long gun battle with the fanatic clerics and students of the Lai Masjid Jamia Hafsa religious seminary. The Tarbela Ghazi suicide attack is the biggest human loss suffered by the SSG due to terrorism in the unit‘s history. The intensity of the deadly suicide bombings in the aftermath of the Lal Masjid prompted Musharraf to publicly direct his troops on July 13, 2007 not to wear their uniforms in public, especially in the North Western Frontier Province for fear of a backlash from extremists. The Lal Masjid thus became a Jihadist symbol of state repression of Jihadis on one hand, and the treachery of a ‗westernized ‗Pakistani establishment under the leadership of a "faithless" Musharraf and his fellow generals. A target-wise breakup of attacks is also important in comprehending the direction that terror attacks in Pakistan have taken in the wake of the Lal Masjid operation. The sharpest increase in FATA and NWFP took place in July 2007, the month in which the military sample analysis utilizes the data from 2002 to September 2008.This data sheet can be accessed at http://satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/Fidayeenattack.htm. Ibid. 682 Ibid. 683 The SSG is the same elite unit of the Army to which General Musharraf himself belonged, and which was specially trained by the US Special Forces for carrying out covert operations and counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations across Pakistan, especially in the trouble-ridden tribal belt of Pakistan. 684 The Pakistani media and the intelligentsia overwhelmingly supports this hypothesis. See Pindi attacks deliver chilling message, Zaffar Abbas, Dawn, internet edition, September 6,2007.Also see DAWN and THE NEWS online archives for a plethora of news opinion in this regard. 685 Syed Irfan Raza and Mohammad Asghar, 27 die as suicide bombers hit high security areas, Dawn, internet edition,5 September 2007, http://www.dawn.com/2007/09/05/top1.htm. 686 Dawn, internet edition,25 November,2007. 687 Amir Mir, The fluttering Lag of jehad (Lahore: Mashal Press ,2008),p.76. 688 Pakistani colonel killed in clash, 8 July 2007,BBC news, South Asia, internet edition, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6281404.stm. 681

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operation against the Lai Masjid in Islamabad was carried out689. Around this time, there is also a dramatic increase in the attacks in the Punjab. After March 2008, however, attacks have abated somewhat in Fata and Punjab, though they continue ceaselessly in NWFP. At the same time, suicide attacks on religious targets - which till 2007 comprised the majority of the hits, nearly ceased altogether, indicating a marked shift in targets towards the military as the conflict in tribal areas intensified690. This is a significant development inasmuch it seems that even the diehard sectarian parties (like LJ) have somehow reached the conclusion that the state is the main enemy to be tackled at the moment, rather than other sects. There are also indications that alliances seem to have been forged between the sectarian parties to the extent that they have decided to work together against the common enemy; the state. There are reports that Abu Ali Tunisi,691 an al Qaeda-linked Jihadi hailing from Tunis, has managed to bring the rebels of four militant groups - Harkat-ul Jihadul Islami, Harkat-ul Mujahideen, Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi - under the folds of al Qaeda. Overwhelmingly, suicide attacks have targeted military and police personnel and buildings, with military installations being targeted after the military started operations in Bajaur Agency. Interestingly enough, no suicide attacks were carried out on military or police targets till 2006, even though the military operation against militants began in South Waziristan in July 2002692. The first attack on a military target took place on May 28, 2006 in North Waziristan, which killed three soldiers; though the attacks really escalated after the Pakistani army started attacking the militant bases in earnest. The first such attack on state forces took place in January 2006. The second was carried out on October 30, 2006, when the Pakistani government, allegedly in cooperation with the US, conducted an air strike on a madrassah in Bajaur, killing over 80 people. This incident, in particular, seems to have changed the militants' approach: within days they carried out a devastating suicide attack on a military base in Dargai, killing 42 soldiers to avenge the October strike. Thereafter, suicide attacks on military and police targets have become frequent. Generally ,terrorist attacks in Pakistan since 2005 have increased by a rate of about 746%693,with the biggest escalation in terrorist violence seen in 2007.Terrosim incidents have since then remained at this higher level, indicating that some variable was juxtaposed in the terrorist groups‘ tactical strategies, which led their campaigns on even more violent trajectories. This factor could very well have been the Lal Masjid incident. In the absence of open source evidence it is hard to surmise about the actual motivations of the terrorist groups, but it seems a credible hypothetical observation that suicide attacks, and terrorist attacks in general694 in Pakistan have become frequent in the wake of the Lal Masjid event. The snowballing effect of Lal Masjid on militancy, due to becoming an iconic symbol seems indisputable, but the phenomenon has many other facets. Different sectarian groups seem to have realized that unless they unite with the Taliban in FATA, they would not

689

For an overview of the location and the incident of suicide bombing, refer to the table on suicide bombing in Pakistan. The sample analysis utilizes the data from 2002 to September 2008. 690 Ibid. 691 According to interviews with investigating officials of Special Investigative Group(special task force investigating terrorism) of the Federal Investigation agency(FIA),who requested anonymity. 692 See table on suicide bombing. 693 Pakistan security report 2008,published by the Pakistan institute of peace studies on its website, accessible at : http://www.san-pips.com/new/downloads/03.pdf.

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be able to offer stiff resistance to the army operations initiated in the tribal areas. The paradigmatic shift of terror attack targets from civilian, sectarian and foreign targets, to military and security personnel and installations in late 2006-2007, also seems indicative of the fact that the militants have openly engaged the state, rather than waiting for it‘s patronage in occupying their previously held niches. Even though there are ISI loyalist leaders amongst the cadres of militant commanders like Masood Azhar695, Hafiz Saeed696 and Commander Salahuddin697, it remains to be seen how much control they can exert over their ranks, which are now much more Talibanised than in the previous decade. In the wake of the Mumbai terror attacks in 2008, even previously pliant organizations like Lashkare Taiba, which were seen to be firmly under ISI control, seem to be slipping away into relative autonomy. The ISI control over other organizations like Jaish e Muhammad is at best tenuous; this organization has al Qaeda links, and has also splintered into a Jamaat ul Furqan faction, which seems less amenable to state control. Lashkar e Jhangvi is also another sectarian organization which seems to have rethought its policy of targeting sectarian targets, and shifted its focus almost entirely towards military installations. Besides the sectarian and Jihadist organizations, the Taliban in Pakistan is perhaps the most resolute group which is virtually outside state control. There are indications that these groups have formed a jihadist nexus; the Lal Masjid debacle was perhaps the watershed in Pakistani militant history, which brought all these organizations to the viewpoint that the state could not be mollycoddled any longer, and had to be engaged in order to show the Jihadist resolve in furthering their agendas. Strategists who want to contextualize the spread of militancy in Pakistan and its global repercussions, need to factor the Lal Masjid event into their strategic projections.

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‘Army of the Pure’- Lashkare Taiba in Profile I am profiling Lashkare Taiba for two specific reasons; firstly, as the largest Jihadi organization, I believe that it needs to be contextualized in order for the reader to gain some insight into a Jihadist entity distinct from the Taliban.Thus, when Jihadist organizations affiliated with the Taliban are mentioned, it is easier to put an approximate framework of a functioning organization in perspective. Secondly, as the largest Jihadist organization in Pakistan,LeT deserves a place in any work on terrorism in Pakistan as a domestically quiescent, but an explosively aggressive organization when it come to exporting terrorism; Let demonstrated this quite capably in 2008 Mumbai attacks in India. Though detailing different Jihadist Pakistani organizations minutely would be outside the purview of this study, I have thought it necessary to exemplify Lashkare Taiba as a model of Jihadist organizational capability in Pakistan. In a Terromodel perspective, it becomes easier to envisage militant organizations purportedly set up as proxy warriors, which generate so much steam of their own that they become more or less independent of their ‗makers.‘ This has been one of the 694

It is easier to demonstrate the co variance of suicide terrorism with changing political circumstances as I have done with the help of data, than co relating the general incidents of terrorism, since militant terrorism has many different trajectories as compared to suicide terrorism, which is religiously motivated in Pakistan. 695 Masood has been variously dubbed as an ISI asset, a rogue agent, an opportunist and loose cannon. In the absence of open source information, it is hard to know the truth. 696 Leader of the Jamaat ud Dawa and Lashkare Taiba, who has usually been quite accommodative to the state authorities, while actively engaging in terrorist activities in Kashmir and India. 697 Another famous militant commander of Pakistan.

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main dilemmas when dealing with Jihadist organizations, which tend to end up in different trajectories from the ones projected, adding to the already volatile situation. The terrorist attacks in Mumbai in late 2008, which killed 170 people and lasted for 60 hours, once again brought the Pakistani Jihadist connection into the spotlight. This terrorist attack has largely been hailed as the Indian 9/11, and has caused a serious escalation of hostilities between India and Pakistan, with the armies going on battle alert status. Lashkare Taiba has around for a long time in Pakistan, but its presence has largely been overlooked or at best given a superficial treatment by western observers, till it hit the limelight in Mumbai. The Lashkare Taiba (henceforth abbreviated as LeT) has been looked at by many observers as a militant organization focused towards the Kashmiri Jihad, having for long been a thorn in India‘s side. However, after taking a detailed look at the evolutionary process of the organization of the Let, it starts becoming apparent that LeT has developed linkages with global Islamist organizations like al Qaeda and Taliban, due to the discovery of a symbolic common enemy in the shape of America and its allies. Let has demonstrated its capability to launch a devastating Fidayin attack on the scale of the Mumbai attacks, which places it on par with many better known and understood global Jihadist organizations.It is vital to comprehend the organizational structure, training methods and indoctrination strategies of Lashkare Taiba in order to understand this latest entrant onto the global terror scene.

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Markaz Daawa Wa Irshad, Jamaat Ud Daawa and Lashkare Taiba The first Pakistani Jihadist groups emerged in 1980 when thousands of volunteers, mainly students from religious seminaries, joined the anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan, causing Pakistan to become home to 24 militant groups by 2002, with disciplined paramilitary organizations operating in every neighborhood.The largest among them were Lashkare Taiba (LeT), Jaish e Muhammad (JeM), Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) and Harkatal-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI). All these paramilitary groups had similar motivations and goals, and recruited from the same kind of people, often unemployed youth from Punjab and the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan. The only difference was in patronage: HuM and HUJI were both strongly linked with the Taliban, whilst LeT had strong links with Wahabi groups in Saudi Arabia. These militant organizations did not operate clandestinely, nor were they overnight products. Their growth, if not actually sponsored, had certainly been looked upon with favour by the state.698 They did not bother to keep their activities secret; finding expression in graffiti, wall posters and pamphlets all over the country, inviting Muslims to join the cause of Jihad. They also openly carried addresses and telephone numbers to initiate contact for training. 'Jihad is the shortest route to paradise,' declared one of the many exhortations. 'A martyr ensures salvation for the entire family.‘ They also openly canvassed for funds in the form of donations, since every Jihadist organization needed funds to help the families of 'martyrs‘, even though money was not the reason of existence for the existence of these groups, but just a means to an end to sustain a Jihadist culture.699 With the state's patronage or

698 699

International Crisis Group (ICG) report, Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and the Military, July 2002. Ibid.

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at least complicity, these groups had effective fund raising mechanisms, powerful propaganda machinery and widely published and circulated publications. During the 1980s and 1990s, the primary objective of Jihadist movements in Pakistan was not, like that of Arab Salafists such as bin Laden, the establishment of a global Islamic caliphate, but their plans were of a more local nature. Their objectives were more in line with the regional strategy of the Pakistani military establishment; the liberation of Kashmir from India and the installation of a Pashtun Islamist government in Afghanistan. Almost all militant groups had been at some time or the other, part of the Pakistani army establishment‘s policy of using them as proxy warriors to fill the capacity gap between India and Pakistan. 9/11 changed all that. Pakistan's support for the American-led war on terror changed the official attitude of the establishment toward these groups, even though covert support continued unabated. This covert support was more pronounced in the case of the Wahabiinspired Let, which had the most cordial relations with ISI than any other militant outfit. After the organization was banned upon US insistence by President Musharraf in 2002, the organization became more covert and reduced public visibility in Pakistan,working instead on a 'controlled jihad' in Kashmir. However, with the advent of Talibanization in Pakistan and the emergence of Taliban in Federally administered tribal (FATA) areas of Pakistan, this truce was bound to become a strained one, as militant groups started absorbing Talibanized ideologies. As early as 2000, the founder of LeT, Hafiz Mohammed Saeed was propagating a Huntingtonian clash of civilizations; he saw the Kashmir Jihad as ‗the gateway to the liberation of Indian Muslims'. He further went to say: 'We believe in a clash of civilizations and our jihad will continue until Islam becomes the dominant religion.'700 It is worthwhile to note that Lashkare Taiba has consistently been the largest jihadi organization of Pakistan. An important organization of the Ahle Hadees sect, Jamaat ud Dawa is the alter ego of Lashkare Taiba. It has recently gained notoriety after the Mumbai terror attacks. Previously known as Markazul Dawa Wa Irshad (henceforth referred to as MDI), its name was changed to Jamaat ud Dawa in 2002 for avoiding a ban. ‗Jamaat ud Dawa‘ has always been a nom de guerre; this organization has always been known better as Lashkare Taiba, which was banned in 2002.After the ban, Jamaat ud Dawa seemingly separated the management of Lashkare Taiba and limited it to Azad Kashmir, but in reality the Lashkar and the Jamaat have been a synonymous entity, the Jamaat face being used to gain legitimacy and avoid government imposed bans. Professor Hafiz Saeed, the Head of Jamaat ud Dawa, is the spiritual mentor of both the Lashkar and the Jamaat. A former University Professor, Hafiz Saeed is not a charismatic man; with his henna dyed beard, short stature and chubby countenance, quite the anti thesis of a militant leader. His Jihadist beliefs are however quite strong; for him, killing infidels and destroying the forces of 'evil and disbelief is the obligation of every pious Muslim'.701 After migration from India at the partition of India in 1947, his family settled in the central Punjab district of Sargodha.702 Hafiz Saeed received his primary education in the village, and then gravitated to the University of Punjab. Afterwards, he joined the King Abdul Aziz Islamic University in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, where he taught for many years, developing close links with Wahabi 700

Interview with Hafiz Saeed in January 2001,reproduced in Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The struggle with militant Islam(Lahore,2007:Vanguard press) 701 (Mir,2008), pp. 107-8. 702 ibid Taliban in Pakistan: A Chronicle of Resurgence : A Chronicle of Resurgence, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook

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clerics. After returning to Pakistan, Hafiz Saeed took up a teaching job at the Department of Islamic Studies at the Lahore University of Engineering and Technology. Here Hafiz Saeed encountered some like minded faculty, which joined the movement wholeheartedly and would later become a great source of strength for the LeT. The teachers included Professor Zafar Iqbal, Hafiz Abdul Rehman Makki, Hafiz Abdul Islam bin Mohammed, Sheikh Jamiluddin and Mufti Abdul Rehman. Two of Hafiz Saeed‘s brothers are also related to academia, both in US; one was head of an Islamic centre, and the other pursued an academic career. Hafiz Saeed himself has never traveled to the USA or any other western country.703 In the early 1980s, Hafiz Saeed joined the Afghan Jihad, when he met and was inspired by Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden. Osama‘s dedication to Jihad impressed him tremendously, a fact which he has been quite forthcoming in revealing; 'Osama was a man of extraordinary qualities,' he recalled.704 Even though they later parted ways, Osama considered Azzam his mentor,since Azzam was instrumental in organizing the afghan jihad with the help of Saudi money. He was assassinated in a bomb attack in Peshawar in 1989. Azzam was the main driving force which motivated Hafiz Saeed to establish Markaz Dawa al-Irshad (MDI), an organization purportedly set up for Islamic preaching and guidance. This organization from its very inception was closely affiliated with Wahabi Ahle Hadith, and was financed by Saudi Arabia. Since the inspiration was from the Sunni orthodox reformist school of thought, the MDI aimed to purify society and Islam of 'outside influences'. It established a sprawling headquarters in Muridke on the outskirts of Lahore, which housed a university, a farm, a clothing factory and a carpentry workshop, amongst other infrastructure. The objective was to create a model Islamic environment in the purity of unadulterated Islamist reformist teaching.705 Reportedly, Bin Laden also contributed actively to the establishment of the Markaz, giving 10 million rupees to build a huge mosque and a guest house within the compound in Muridke.706 The next phase in consolidation of MDI came in 1994, when the movement established madrassahs all over Pakistan for propagating the Wahabi creed of Islam and preparing the students for jihad. The MDI‘s strict educational philosophy aimed specifically at inculcating a Jihadist culture. However, MDI differed from other militant organizations in the respect that the students were tutored not only in theology, but some emphasis was also laid on producing Jihadis adequately trained in science and technology. The teaching was aimed at producing an alternative model of governance and development in the Ahle Hadis model,707 and the teachings attracted mainly the poor and the illiterate. Consequently, many of these madrassahs gained recognition by being located in the poorer urban and rural neighborhoods. The organization was always against family planning, and espoused its supporters to have large families, so that more volunteers were available for jihad. Hafiz Saeed founded LeT in 1990, soon after the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, as a military wing of the MDI to wage jihad against Indian authorities in Kashmir. The MDI never concealed the fact ,and openly advertised Let‘s involvement in 703

ibid Amir Rana, Jihad and jihadists (Lahore: Mashal Press), p. 21. Marium Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy, Islamist Networks: The Pakistan-Afghan Connection (London: Hurst and Co), p.32. 706 Yousri Fouda, Nick Fielding, ‗Masterminds of terror: The truth behind the most devastating attack the world has ever seen‘,(New yor,2003:arcade publishing),p 45. 707 The News, 13 January 2002. 704 705

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Kashmir Jihad as the militant arm of MDI.A propaganda advertisement posted on the back page of an issue of Mujallul Daawa(the official ,now banned ,publication of MDI) says: ― …in snow clad mountains ,freezing jungles and mountains, Mujahideen Lashkare Taiba ,who are the military wing of Markaz e Daawa Irshad, are fighting the tyrannical Hindu army…sustaining 350 martyrdoms (so far)…‖708 Initially Jamaat ud Dawa (formerly known as Markazul Dawa Wa Irshad) conceived of Lashkare Taiba to send young men for Afghan jihad and set up jihadi camps in Paktia and Kantar, provinces in Afghanistan with an Ahle Hadees majority. Once the Jihadi camps were set up, Lashkare Taiba started receiving aid from the 1SI-CIA nexus and Saudi Arabia. In 1989, however, Lashkare Taiba stopped jihad in Afghanistan and focused instead on Kashmir. Hafiz Saeed,while explaining the background to this decision said, "We kept ourselves away from the internal strife between different Afghan groups and focused our attention on Occupied Kashmir‖. There is some empirical evidence to indicate that LeT was not too active in Afghanistan, since according to some Jihadist sources, it sustained only five casualties.709 Lashkare Taiba got the chance to show its real strength in Occupied Kashmir where it began its activities on January 25, 1990. According to reviewed reports by Doctor Manzoor, a prominent LeT member, this was the time when Kashmiri mujahideen began reaching the jihadi camp in Afghanistan for training, and a special camp, Muaskar Aqsa, was set up for them in the mountains near Kunhar. Arrangement was also made in Muzzaffarabad for a Baitul Mujahideen (house of mujahideen) so that fresh recruits could be found and amassed in large numbers. Kashmiri and Pakistani Mujahideen trained together in this camp.710 The first operational group of Lashkare Taiba mujahideen was launched into Occupied Kashmir in August 1992.711 Within two years Lashkare Taiba had begun to feature prominently in the newspapers. By now its requirement for manpower was very high and in view of this, as mentioned above, Markazul Dawa Wai Irshad was later re-organized and its network spread over Pakistan. However, soon the organization began to face problems. In the beginning Ahle Hadees mosques and madrassahs cooperated with it, but this cooperation started dying out due to two reasons. Firstly, most Ahle Hadees mosques in Pakistan were representative of the Markazi Jamiat Ahle Hadees and Jamiat Ghurba Ahle Hadees712 point of view. Similarly the madrassahs were registered with Wafaqul Madaris Salafia713. These people were quite wary of the increasing strength of Lashkare Taiba. Other than this, in the beginning, fresh Lashkare Taiba mujahideen had alienated the Ahle Hadees sect with their unruly and what was seen as condescending behavior towards other militant groups. Also, even though Professor Hafiz Saeed and his companions believed in the Ahle Hadees creed in principle, they held differences with the Salafis on certain issues. An example of this is the intense insistence on jihad; whereas one school of thought led by some scholars of Ahle Hadees gives particular importance to the patronage and permission of the state for jihad, LeT are prone to preach a 708

Mujallul Dawa, back page, January 1998. (Rana, 2006). Also, various issues of Mujallul ud Dawa were reviewed to find evidence of intensive engagement of LeT in Afghanistan near the end of soviet war, which was not forthcoming. 710 Mujallul ud Dawa, various issues. 711 Reported in several issues of Mujallul Daawa. Dr.Manzoor usually ran a separate article in almost every issue, detailing the exploits of the mujahideen and extolling their bravery. 712 Both are influential Ahle Hadis organizations which are non political in nature, though their militant Jihadi arms are insignificant compared to LeT. However, they carry a lot of theological clout with the Ahle Hadis sect. 713 Again a theological entity which embraces Salafist points of view. 709

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jihad unhampered by any interference. The organization consequently stopped relying solely on the Ahle Hadis sect for indoctrination ,and was even amenable to Barelvis(an opposing sect) joining it since they could be manipulated into changing their sect during training and simultaneous preaching of the Ahle Hadis sectarian teachings. Many, if not most of the persons from the opposing sects changed their sects after undergoing training in LeT camps; the few that did not relent were physically ‗disciplined‘ or were denied further admission into the ranks. Within a short span, LeT emerged as the largest and the fiercest militant organization, not only possessing thousands of well trained and highly motivated fighters, but also a huge propaganda network. Its main intellectual center is the Dar-ul-Undalus, which has produced a plethora of books and pamphlets. MDI‘s several publications in different languages had a circulation of hundreds of thousands, with its main publication, Al Mujallul ud Dawa, having more than 80,000 copies printed and sold all across the country.714The official publication disappeared from public circulation some time around 2003, and the copies that were printed were fastidious in their approach of not mentioning LeT exploits in the gory details in which they were earlier rendered. This has been part of the Let strategy to project itself as a separate entity from JD, which masquerades as purely a charitable organization to avoid official sanctions. Part of the success of the Let has been its ability to be secretive when occasion demanded, its organizational efficiency, and its propensity to circumvent government imposed bans by the mere technicality of changing its name and continuing its activities unabated under a different name. A Pakistani newspaper reported as early as 2001 that ―The Lashkar [LET] operates six private military training camps in Pakistan and Azad Kashmir where several thousands of cadre are given both military and religious education . . . With more than 2,200 unit offices across the country and over two dozen launching camps along the Line of Control, the Lashkar boasts of the biggest jihadi network in Pakistan . . . The followers of Lashkar come from all walks of life, from the defence and nuclear establishment, to industrial labourers.‖715 The earliest fighters were trained in various camps in Afghanistan. After 1992, however, the camps were shifted to remote regions of Azad Kashmir (Free Kashmir) and the mountainous tribal regions of the North West Frontier Province, close to the border with Afghanistan. The procedure of Joining LeT was simplicity itself; any Jihadist aspirant could enroll himself for training at one of hundreds of LeT centers operating openly across the country. The volunteers, most of them in their teens, were then taken to various camps for military training, conducted in two stages. At the initial level they were given basic weapons training for three weeks. This course was called the Dora A'ama716, during which it was mandatory to study the basic creed of the Ahle Hadees besides basic weapons training. The second stage of rigorous guerrilla training was restricted to those who were fully committed to jihad, and were considered good practicing Muslims. This was called Dora Khasa - a 3-month course during which advanced weapons training with further indoctrination into the Ahle Hadees sect was ingrained in the trainees. Not everyone got to do Dora Khasa; only the most committed people were indoctrinated.

714

(Zahab, Roy: Islamist networks),p 35. The News,22 April 2001. 716 The names and mode of training have been gleaned by Jihadist literature review. 715

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At the camp, volunteers began their day with the call to morning prayers, which was followed by gruelling physical and military exercise until dusk, interspersed by religious instruction, Qur'anic lessons and adherence to prayers. The camps exercised a strict code of conduct; to be in the ranks of the 'soldiers of Allah', individualism was curbed, beginning with the sharing of food and drinks from the same utensils.717Growing a beard was mandatory, Shalwar (loose trousers) had to be hiked above the ankles according to Islamist injunctions, and watching television and listening to music were banned. The extent of the change of mindset is chronicled in the currently banned JD publication Mujjalul Dawa. It narrated the accounts of trainees who had undertaken the basic 21 day course, and went back home to smash up the televisions sets, deeming them ‗Hindu agents‘718.This is just an indication of the brainwashing that occurs in the training camps. After Dora Amah, the would-be mujahid was sent back to his home town, and kept under observation by senior LeT officials for a couple of months, not unlike a system of parole. In the mean time he was engaged in carrying out routine organizational duties like collection of funds, organization of propaganda meetings and Islamic preaching (Dawa).Only the most dedicated were picked for Dora Khasa, the grueling advanced course. Those who did go through it however, found their lives transformed, not just keeping their hair long and growing beards, but also found new names modeled on the kunyah or the surnames of companions of the Holy Prophet Mohammed or of the earliest Islamic heroes.Between 10,000 and 30,000 young men were trained at LeT camps. Even the extended training did not guarantee that the mujahid would see jihad; thousands of trained guerrillas anxiously awaited their turn to cross into Kashmir, but not everyone was given the chance. 'I pray to Allah that my turn [to go to Kashmir] comes soon, 'said Abu Mohammed, a young college student who had already completed the second level training. Hafiz Saeed has often decreed in public speeches that he would not put a weapon in the hands of any young recruit who was not secure in his faith. To be a combatant one had to be a pious person.719 LeT gave a whole new dimension to the concept of Jihad by launching Fidayin raids against Indian forces and military installations. The concept as utilized by LeT was explained in an interview with a committed Jihadist:720 'A Fidayin is one who must complete his mission even in the worst circumstances,' explained Abdullah Muntazir, an LeT spokesman. He insisted that the concept of Fidayin was different from that of a suicide bomber, who blew himself up to kill others. 'We consider suicide attacks un-Islamic. Many Fidayin come back alive after completion of their missions,' said Muntazir. The Fidayin attacks have brought an unprecedented ferocity to the Kashmir jihad. A Fidayin is chosen from the most committed of guerrilla fighters, and not everyone, even the most highly trained fighter, is considered to be suitable for the job. The hallmark of a Fidayin is completion of a guerilla mission in adverse, usually suicidal circumstances. Many of these Fidayin never make it back, but losses are regarded as acceptable as long as heavy casualties are inflicted on the enemy. Lashkar commenced Fidayin activities on July 12, 1999 with an attack on BSF (the Indian border security force) Headquarters at Baramoola, Bandipura. This first man to 717

Amir Zia, "The soldiers of Islam', Newsline, February 2001. An attached excerpt from a page of Mujallul Dawa, Jan 1998 issue, mentions the use of television in derogatory terms as a ‗Hindu agent‘. 719 Zahid Hussain, 'Inside jihad', Newsline, February 2001. 720 (Zahab, Roy: Islamist networks), p. 40. 718

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sacrifice himself for the cause was Abu Suleiman Mohammed Akmal from Multan.721 There were eleven suicidal fidayeen missions in 1999 with the Indian death toll totaling 258 army men and officers, and a further 891 were killed in forty-eight suicide attacks in the year 2000.722 Lashkare Taiba's most significant operation was the attack on the Red Fort at Delhi, which took place on December 22, 2000. Two LeT gunmen sneaked inside Delhi's Red Fort, which housed an Indian military unit and a high-security interrogation cell used both by the Central Bureau of Interrogation and the army.723 Details of the mission have been proudly reported in the February 2001 issue of 'al Dawa' and are reproduced below: ―7:30 in the evening, entry from Lahori Gate......there was firing all around…. with the help of God the brothers managed to escape...according to our information 12 soldiers were killed this way.‖

This is a typical account of LeT operations as depicted in Mujjalul ud Dawa. Another highly significant attack was on Srinagar Airport on January 5, 2001. This is also described in the February 2001 issue of 'al Dawa' as follows:

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―Lashkare Taiba mujahideen appropriated a Forest Officer's green car and six fedayeen wearing police uniforms entered the gate of Sirinagar Airport…. After taking over the airport for three and a half hours the fedayeen were granted martyrdom by God one after the other. Eighteen Indian men including an officer were killed in this attack while fifteen to twenty were wounded.‖

Incidents like these brought up LeT on the US State Department's radar, and, in 2002, it was placed on the USA's list of terrorist organizations. Musharraf, having joined the GWOT, had to perforce ban it, but in reality the ban had little affect on LeT's power. Even before the ban was announced, the LeT leadership had shifted their base to Indian-controlled Kashmir, relieving some of the political pressure from Musharraf .It became more difficult to prove that the Pakistani government was behind the Fidayin attacks, when the outfit was being run in Kashmir by an entirely new leadership, who were in reality, little more than military commander working under the directions of Hafiz Saeed. In Pakistan the outfit started working under the auspices of what was previously its political wing, Jamaat-ud Dawa, with Hafiz Saeed as its head. The new organization ostensibly restricted its role to preaching, education and social welfare, but the fact of the matter was that it never ceased working in support of the Kashmiri jihad.724 On December 24, 2001 the Ameer of Markaz Dawa Wai Irshad and Lashkare Taiba, Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, addressed a press conference in which he announced the change of Markaz Dawa Wai Irshad's name and an end to his leadership of Lashkare Taiba. The same day State Bank of Pakistan sent out a circular freezing the accounts of both Lashkare Taiba and Umma Ta'ameer-e-Nau. Professor Hafiz Mohammed Saeed announced that his organization's new name would be 'Jamaat ud Dawa' and he would remain its Chief. The new Chief of Lashkare Taiba would be Maulana Abdul Wahid Kashmiri, Maulana Zakiur Rehman 721

Data gathered from Mujallul ud Dawa and militant interviews. Data collected from serial issues of Mujallul ud Dawa for the year 1999 and 2000. 723 As reported by CNN. 724 Jihad until world is rid of injustice:Saeed, The News, Rawalpindi, 21 November 2002. 722

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Lakhvi725 would be its Supreme Commander, and the organization would be limited to Kashmir. Its administration would also be moved to Azad Kashmir. Jamaat ud Dawa would provide assistance to Lashkare Taiba in Pakistan and any donations meant for the latter could be sent to the former. A new General Council was set up for Lashkare Taiba with notable commanders on the panel. LeT is not just a grass roots movement, but also draws its support from the universities and colleges, as well as from among unemployed youth. The traditional Islamic madrasas have provided only ten per cent of the volunteers, with many college and university educated youth joining the movement.726 The LeT has been more successful in its strategy to influence people by radical Islamic literature, as demonstrated by the fact that many university and college students have joined this group. Those coming from educational institutions are much more motivated and conscious of what they are doing,' said Naveed Qamar, an LeT activist and graduate of the University of Engineering and Technology, Lahore. The top leadership of the group, including Hafiz Saeed, had been on the faculty of that university. A large number of LeT activists also came from the working class or were school drop-outs. In the countryside, LeT recruits were largely from families which were influenced by Wahabi Islam.19 Lashkare Taiba‘s indoctrination is simplicity itself; it consists of basically just turning up at one of the recruitment centers prevalent throughout the country. This fact is widely publicized in publications727.This simplified procedure is in contrast with many of the elitist Islamist organizations in Pakistan, some of which have rigorous recruitment requirements. The majority of LeT recruits came from Punjab, particularly from Lahore, Gujranwala and Multan, where Ahle Hadees sect has traditionally had its strongholds. In some central Punjab district villages, LeT has exercised a dominant hold, not unlike a small feudalistic medieval estate; in Gondlawala, for instance, a small dusty village, at least one person per household has participated and/or died in the Kashmir Jihad, earning the name Pind Shaheedan (the village of martyrs) for the village in colloquial dialects. LeT reigns supreme here; the villagers accept its arbitration in local and even in domestic disputes.728 In recent years, LeT has started attracting an increasing number of volunteers from Pakistan's southern provinces of Sindh and Baluchistan where Wahabi influence has increased, not in small part by the propagation of the message of Wahabism by MDI, and later JD. By the time Jamaat ud Dawa came into being, the Markzul Dawa Wai Irshad- Lashkare Taiba nexus had already established a vast network in Pakistan. Jamaat ud Dawa paid special attention to augmenting and organizing its network in Sindh and Southern Punjab. Sindh was more responsive and the organization discovered important centers for its activities in Shahdadpur, Nawabshah, Sanghar, Larkana and Hyderabad. The number of Sindhi young men who participated in jihad with Lashkare Taiba can vouch for this. In eleven years of jihad in Occupied Kashmir, starting from 1990, Lashkare Taiba lost 1016 mujahideen, of which 365 were from Sindh. Jamaat ud Dawa also set up an influential work spread throughout the country with Quetta and Zhob in Baluchistan, and Lahore, Sheikhupura, Gujranwala, Sialkot, Multan, lodhran, 725

A revered commander, affectionately known as ‗chacha‘(paternal uncle) Lakhavi, who has been recently implicated in the Mumbai attacks. 726 (Zahab, Roy: Islamist networks), p.36. 727 Mujallul Dawa, Nov 2002,p 53,ladling sarcasm on organizations which require rigorous recruitment requirements. 728 ICG report, The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan, April 2005.

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Dera Ghazi Khan, and Bahawalpur in Punjab becoming important centers. Prior to January 13, 2002 Jamaat ud Dawa had 1150 offices in Pakistan and Azad Kashmir out of which 116 were still functioning after the official ban.729 In this context, it is important to discuss the publication of a propaganda document, named ‗Why are we waging jihad‘, as an illustrative example of the new Jihadist intellectualism. This is a thin soft cover pamphlet like book,730 not containing too many pages, but it seems to have affected LeT‘s ideological struggle greatly, as evidenced by its huge circulation and almost ubiquitous popularity with almost all militant organizations731. The publication is written lucidly and succinctly, putting down its jihadist paradigms in intellectual terms, replete with footnotes and references. This is an example of new age jihadist propaganda, which appeals to reason, instead of catering to simple retributive impulses of the targeted readers. LeT again differs from most other militant organizations in the respects that there seems to be a high intellectual capital within the ranks of LeT, which seems engaged in Neo-Jihadist scholarly research. This research is of course polemicist, rendering a highly selective Jihadist discourse, but unlike most of the Jihadist publications, is couched in scholarly language. Hazarding an empirical observation,I believe that the impact of such literature on a semi-literate person who wishes to connect to a jihadist discourse can be profound; the rationalistic, almost scholarly tone of the publication and its purportedly well researched jihadist discourse delivered in a somber, non sermonizing tone, has the potential to crate a cognitive dissonance in an immature mind. The successive bans have had some effect on LeT‘s organizational efficiency; key leaders have admitted to their operations slowing down in Kashmir, but even then, a large number of LeT militants are still based in camps in Muzaffarabad in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir. Even after the bans, Let has been ceaseless in its organizational mission; this can be gauged by a speech delivered by Hafiz Saeed on March 2004, in which he declared that more than 7,000 new volunteers had received military training at LeT camps in the previous six months. The first congregation of Jamaat ud Dawa held in November 2002 in Muridke, after the government's action against LeT, attracted more than 100,000 people. Another congregation, even better attended, was held in Muridke in Punjab shortly before the Mumbai terror attacks. Reportedly, more than 200,000 people attended this congregation in Muridke in December 2008.732 It has been quite apparent that Jamaat ud Dawa was just a cover for LeT to avoid international scrutiny; with the military and propaganda activities continuing unabated. The group continued to publish several magazines and run a website quite openly without any pressure being taken regarding the ban. The organization openly set up camps to collect donations after the earth quake affected Pakistan‘s northern areas. It also gained a certain legitimacy and popular support when it set up relief activities in these areas, where the Pakistani government‘s efforts were seen in disarray. It openly also sets up camps to collect the slaughter skins which are collected after Eid-ul-azha, when goats and other animals are sacrificed. Interestingly, even in the heated crack down on Islamic extremists, not many significant LeT activist have ever been arrested. After a few months detention, Hafiz Saeed 729

(Rana, 2006) A few pages are attached as annexures. 731 Currently a banned publication under the auspices of the publication house of JD called Dar-ul-Undalus, the author was able to gain access to it from borrowing it from a militant who requested anonymity. 732 Pakistan‘s hour of reckoning, January 2009, Newsline. 730

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was freed by a High Court order in December 2002 and then moved freely around the country, mobilizing Muslims for jihad. 'For us jihad is sacred like praying and fasting that cannot be forsaken under any condition,' he declared at the end of his detention. 'Ours is not such a cowardly Party as to bow down before the US pressure for halting support to jihad.733. The Pakistan government placed Jamaat ud Dawa on the 'terror watch list' in 2003, but the activities of the group continued unabated. Lashkare Taiba is functioning freely in Azad Kashmir, while many Jamaat ud Dawa offices in Pakistan are being used as Lashkare Taiba offices. In March 2003 the government allowed the banned LeT to organize the ‗Defense of the Ummah Conference‘ in Islamabad, in which speakers openly called for jihad against the infidels. Hafiz Saeed condoned suicide bombings, urging LeT fighters to join the jihad in Iraq, where at least seven Lashkar members had been killed in 2003. Hafiz Saeed told his followers, "The powerful Western world is terrorizing the Muslims. We are being invaded, humiliated, manipulated and looted. How else can we respond but through jihad? ... We must fight against the evil trio, America, Israel and India. Suicide missions are in accordance with Islam. In fact a suicide attack is the best form of jihad."734In this context, it is important to differentiate between a Fidayin and a suicide tactic attack; a Fidayin attacker has some chances of remaining alive after the operation, whereas suicide tactic attacks pre suppose the death of the perpetrator in order to accomplish the mission. It seems that LeT has also started condoning the use of such suicide tactics, as they have started gaining popularity amongst other militant groups, particularly the Taliban in Pakistan735. The case of LeT is indicative of Islamabad‘s flexibility towards the Kashmiri Jihadi groups; organizations which do not purportedly carry out any militancy in Pakistan and restrict their area of operations to Kashmir. Besides the desire to avoid unnecessary confrontations with heavily armed, committed militants, Islamabad's attitude towards LeT is a mirror of the Pakistani‘s army‘s desire to keep these warriors ‗on hold‘ for any contingency . Despite improvements in India Pakistan relations as a result of the peace process launched in January 2004, the Kashmir issue is no closer to resolution than it was before. There is a prevalent belief in Pakistani strategic circles, that removal of pressure on India in the shape of cessation of militancy in Kashmir would be detrimental to the Kashmir cause. A typical Pakistani stance towards such organizations is that they do not present any terrorist threat to the country's internal security, since they control their cadres strictly. However, it seems that the organizations of even the Kashmir related Mujahideen have started increasing their ambit of jihad, by extending it to armed struggle against American and the northern alliance; ―It is clear from these various reports that Pakistani Jihadi groups are taking part in the new jihad against America and the Northern Alliance alongside al Qaida and the Taliban. The prominent Pakistani groups making their contributions include: Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (Jamiat-ul-Ansar), Harkat-ul Jihad-ul-Islami, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Jamiat al-Furqan, JamiatulMujahideen, al-Badr Mujahideen and Lashkar-eTaiba. Reliable Jihadi sources admit that the Jihadi organizations are winding up their base camps in Kashmir and moving them to the Afghan border regions. These mujahideen have moved especially to assist the Taliban.‖736

733

'Jihad until world is rid of injustice: Saeed', The News, Rawalpindi, 21 November 2002. Muhammad Shehzad, ―Suicide Bombing is the best form of Jihad,‖ The Friday Times, April 17,2003. 735 See Manzar Zaidi, A profile of Baitullah Mehsud, September 2008, The Long War Journal. 736 Amir Rana, Seeds of Terrorism (London 2003: Millenium Press), 243. 734

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The Kashmir jihad oriented groups have been valuable indoctrination sources for the extremists who want a global Islamist dominance, especially the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. In 2006, when Gen. Pervez Ashfaq Kayani (currently the Pakistan Army chief) took over the ISI leadership, he decided to wind up the Kashmiri Jihadi camps which were located in various parts of Hazara and Azad Kashmir. After the October 2005 earthquake in northern areas in Pakistan, these camps came into the spotlight and were easily identified by the NATO relief missions. An increasing rapprochement with India also changed the foreign policy towards an entente cordiale, as a result of which many Kashmiri Mujahideen groups were dismissed. The Kashmiri Jihadis were greatly disillusioned by this new development; for want of logistical support, they began regrouping and reviving their links with Afghani and the now easily accessible Pakistani Taliban groups in the NWFP. Subsequently, pockets of these well trained militants began to sprout up throughout NWFP, particularly in Waziristan, Darra Adam Khel and Swat. They have also been spotted in Kurram, Mohmand, Bajaur and Khyber. With the passage of time, they are being absorbed into other organizations, of which the Taliban in Pakistan are a major human resource pool. This is evident by the change in tone of the publications, wherein the LeT organization has started identifying with global jihad,737 which is quite significant since the Lashkar had always been synonymous with the Kashmir Jihad. Earlier, there was a divergence between the views of the Taliban and Let, but not coincidentally, this divergence decreased after the Taliban started gaining footholds in the Pakistani tribal territory after 2001. Professor Zafar Iqbal told a reporter conducting an interview: "Taliban is a group of misguided people and we have a much higher standard and principles". This statement however reflected the state of affairs in 2000, when this interview was conducted; the later publications show a clear bond of affinity developing between the LeT and the Taliban.738 With the ban on publication of militant activities of LeT ,the JD became more cautious in publishing graphic accounts of mujahideen‘s exploits of murder and mayhem, but debatably, if the publications had continued unabated, one would have expected to see significant number of LeT ‗martyrs‘ in conflicts like Iraq and Afghanistan. In the current muddle of militancy that is the Pakistan‗s FATA area, the lines of demarcation between militant organizations have tended to become blurred. Al Qaeda and the Taliban have become major recruiters from the other organizations; there is evidence of LeT activists providing shelter to al Qaeda fighters fleeing from Afghanistan. Abu Zubaydah, for instance, a close associate of bin Laden, was captured in 2002 in a house in the Pakistani central city of Faisalabad rented by a LeT member. Despite the LeT‘s leadership‘s claims of not having any association with Bin Laden‘s terrorist network, complicity cannot be ruled out at all. Despite its claims to restricting its activities to Kashmir only, LeT has also gone global, with its members reportedly engaged in militant activities in India, Burma, Chechnya, and Bosnia. Reportedly, some have also been fighting against the American forces in Iraq. In April 2004, coalition forces arrested a Pakistani Islamic fighter who was identified as Danish Ahmed, who was later identified as a former LeT commander in Kashmir. After being captured by British forces in Basra, he was later handed over to the American intelligence authorities. Ahmed is believed to be among hundreds of Pakistani volunteers involved in the 737 738

Mujallul ud Dawa, April 2003,p 34,annexure 7. Feature on Lashkare Taiba, Kamal Siddiqui, May 7, 2000 issue of the daily 'Dawn'.

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Iraq war, many of them coming from religious schools run by MDI. Lashkare Taiba sources in Muzzaffarabad have been mentioning in propaganda publications that mujahideen from all over the world come to Lashkare Taiba camps including Arabs, Bosnians and Black Africans. Virulently anti-American, the party has declared that it was mandatory for Muslims to join the mujahidin fighting against the American forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. Every year an invitation is issued for the Ijtemaa(religious gathering) at Muridke, which includes a synopsis of last year‘s military operations. An excerpt from the 1998 invitation is given below:

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―Along with thousands of Pakistanis, mujahideen from Kashmir, Bosnia, Chechnya, Philippines, Eritrea, Somalia, Africa, America, Arab and European States are forming an impenetrable wall at every front in the world after receiving their training from Muaskar Taiba in Afghanistan. …(LeT)laid the foundation of jihad in Bosnia. Today they number in thousands and entire Europe is petrified of them….(they are) crushing the infidels and 739 destroying the fortresses of the devil, God willing.‖

Although Jamaat ud Dawa has had to face the problem of cessation of organizational activities due to the ban on Lashkare Taiba, most people in Pakistan are more familiar with the name of Lashkare Taiba than they are with Jamaat ud Dawa. The bans have also not stopped Muslims from other countries, including Britain, from joining the LeT. Shamshur Rehman, an Afghan, was the chief commander of LeT when he was killed in Badgam district in Kashmir in May 1995 in an encounter with Indian security forces.740 Several foreign militants were believed to have received training at LeT camps in Pakistan; amongst them the prominent ones are Guantanamo Bay inmates David Hicks and French terrorist suspect Willie Brigitte, who were accused of planning attacks in Australia.741 The Lashkar has openly declared jihad on USA and UK, as evidenced by the fatwas (ordainments) given in favour of waging a jihad which have been published in the official publication of jamaat. The ordaining of jihad has been supported by relating the fatwas or religious decrees of the various ulema and scholars of the Ahle Hadees sect.742The Lashkar has also been openly critical of the domestic Pakistani regimes that support the American led war on terror. 'Most of our leaders are lapdogs of Americans,' declared Mujallul Dawa.. There is circumstantial evidence linking both Mohammed Siddique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer, the London bombing perpetrators, to contacts within Lashkare Taiba. Tanweer was enamored by the Jaish-e-Mohammed, having met a member of the group while attending a Deobandi mosque in Pakistan,743 but he is also believed to have been inspired by and spent some time in the indoctrination process of LeT. Similarly Khan allegedly traveled regularly to Pakistani Kashmiri Jihadi camps to get military training, amongst which LeT camps are reported to have figured prominently. These are by no means isolated reports of LeT indoctrination in Britain. In March 2006, for example, British citizen Mohammed Ajmal Khan, was sentenced to nine years for terrorism fundraising in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

739

MDI Ijtemaa,(currently banned) speeches recorded on MP3 format on CDs. Hussain, 'Inside jihad'. 741 Mir, The True Face of Jihadists. 742 ―Jihad ordained against USA and UK‖ Mujjalul ud Dawa, April 2003,p 4. 743 'Suicide bombers flew to Pakistan together', Daily Telegraph, 19 July 2005. 740

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Ajmal admitted to attending a training camp run by Lashkar-e-Taiba.744 Omar Khyam, the ringleader of the fertilizer bomb plot, allegedly went to train in Pakistan in 2000, after telling his family he was going on a visit to France; his contact with LeT cannot be ruled out either. In 2000, a young British Pakistani from Birmingham, Mohamed Bilal, perpetrated a suicide attack outside an Indian army barracks in Kashmir.745 He spent six years in Kashmir with Jihadi groups till he carried out the suicide attack. The very same year, another British Pakistani Muslim from north London, who had trained in Kashmir, told the BBC that he had been tutored in the use of making bombs, handling artillery and a Kalashnikov, and that he had returned to the UK on a mission to recruit others to the cause.746 In 2003, MI5 drew up a list of 100 terror suspects in the UK, out of which at least 45 were British Pakistanis who had been involved in the jihad in Kashmir. 747Whenever the Kashmir Jihad is mentioned, LeT‘s name crops up prominently. Amongst the other ‗terrorist elite‘ whose links have been reported with LeT are Ramzi Yousef, who helped plan the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993, and Mir Aimal Kansi, who was executed in America in November 2002, after being convicted of killing two CIA officers outside the organization‘s Langley headquarters. Both these men were reported to have used the guest house within the Muridke Markaz compound to hide out at some point in time.748 ―Lashkar-e-Taiba camps hosted the so-called ‗Virginia jihadis‘ – 11 Americans convicted of plotting against the United States between 2004 and 2006. A Frenchman was convicted of planning a terrorist attack in Australia after leaving a Lashkar-e-Taiba training camp in 2003. And Rashid Rauf, the England-born al Qaeda operative allegedly behind the plan to blow up jetliners over the Atlantic with liquid bombs in 2006, also had early connections with Lashkar-e-Taiba.It has transcended its parochial roots, says Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism expert at Georgetown University in Washington. It has ambitions to step up to the plate should al Qaeda falter.‖749 Despite being perceived as a 'tame', controllable force by the Pakistani establishment, LeT is more powerful than ever, and could have easily masterminded the Mumbai attacks. In carrying out its recruiting, fundraising and military activities, it contributes significantly to the radicalization of Pakistani society. As has been demonstrated, it has links which transgress by far the reach of a ‗local‘ Pakistani militant organization; its nexus with other global Islamist organizations like Taliban and al Qaeda cannot be ruled out either, particularly in view of the fact that both of them have entrenched themselves in Pakistan‘s tribal areas. Jamat ud Dawa is run by a Shura (Council). Prominent members include Professor Zafar Iqbal, Professor Abdul Rehman Makki750, Maulana Masoodur Rehman Janbaz, Maulana Abdul Ghaffar Raza Marani, Maulana Abdul Ghafoor Madani, Hafiz Abdus Salam bin Mohammed, Sycd Qasim Shah, Maulana Ameer Hamza, Maulana Abdul Rehman, Hafiz

744

Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, 'London Broil: Kashmir on the Thames', New Republic Online, 4 September 2006. 745 'For this college kid from UK, Mission Kashmir was suicide car bomb', Indian Express, 29 December 2000. Available at http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/archives/archives2000/kashmir20001229a.html. 746 'British Muslims Join Holy War', BBC Online, 26 June 2000. 747 'Top al-Qaeda trainer "taught suspects to use explosive"', The Times, 12 August 2006. 748 (Yousra,Feilding,2003),p 43. 749 Shahan Mufti, Pakistan tested by battles with Al Qaeda, Taliban, The Christian Science Monitor, online edition, January 13, 2009, http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0113/p04s01-wosc.html

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Masood Alam and Hafiz Saifullah Mansur751.Another extremely important member is Zaki ur Rehman Lakhvi, the LeT supreme commander for the Kashmir theater, though Saeed has been careful to differentiate this as a separate entity from the JD, even though both organizations are avatars for each other. Lakhvi fought under the tutelage of Sheikh Jamil ur Rehman, a Salafi commander who shared power with Hikmetyar‘s Hizb-e-Islami in Kunar province of Afghanistan during the Afghan Jihad. Lakhvi came back to Pakistan and joined hands with Ameer Hamza, who in turn had fought under the patronage of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, both men later joining MDI752.Lakhvi has been alleged to be the mastermind behind the Mumbai terror attacks. Jamaat ud Dawa has been divided into four provincial circles. Before the first government imposed ban in 2002, the organization had 74 district offices. Many offices were shut down after the ban on Lashkare Taiba or were converted into Jamaat ud Dawa offices. The organization functions at so many levels that even when bans are enforced, some departments are able to maintain their legitimacy. It is important to contextualize the width and the breadth of LeT by taking a look at its organizational structure, by reviewing each department individually753. The department of Dawat-o-Islah(Preaching and reformation) of LeT arranges ordinary and special courses for teaching the creed of JD, and sends delegations for tableegh (preaching). Until 1992, Bin Laden also attended such ijtemaas (rallies) at the centre in Muridke, till he was banned from traveling and staying in Pakistan.754 The students wing of LeT campaigns for jihad in schools and colleges. It also arranges various jihadi programmes for students and maintains contact with jihadi missions. According to the official publication of the JD, this wing alone accounted for the arrangement of 500 Jihadi programmes in Pakistan in 2001755. The education wing provides manpower to Lashkare Taiba. There are 500 Al Dawa Model schools, at least 11 religious madrassahs and 5 science colleges functioning under this department756. Its Central office is in Muridke and its founding Ameer and most influential leader is Professor Zafar Iqbal. The course taught at al Dawa schools is very different from the course studied by most of the students of other institutions, which operate under the auspices of other jihadi organizations in Pakistan. Arabic, Urdu and English are compulsory and most subject matter has been modified to suit Islamic interpretations. Examining the prospectus of a Jamaat ud Dawa school, the author discovered that the learning of the English language was compulsory from class one, which is almost unprecedented in most, if not all, government funded schools in Pakistan.757It is in this respect that JD differs significantly from most other militant organizations by building up a resource pool of comparably better 750

A close colleague of Hafiz Saeed, who, like Saeed also previously belonged to Jamaat-e-Islami. He runs the Political wing of LeT. 751 These prominent members figure prominently in many publications, propaganda leaflets, ijtemaas (gatherings) and reports of Mujallul Dawa. 752 See Infra note 215. 753 The data has been gathered from on spot observations of branch offices, literature review of Mujallul ud Dawa and Amir Rana‘s ‗ Jihadi organizations in Pakistan‘(2006,Mashal press) which provides a useful template upon which data has been interpolated. 754 (Fouda,Fielding,2003),p 45. 755 Data collected from serial review of Mujallul ud Dawa for the year 2001. 756 Cycle of Reincarnation, Muhammad Amir Rana and Massoud Ansari, The Herald annual, January, 2009,pp.4446. 757 JD School prospectus.

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educated mujahids from within its schools and nurseries. It is also worthwhile remembering that these schools inculcate and maintain a robust physical environment where sports and horse riding are encouraged. There is also a wing which looks after a network of religious madrassahs, namely, Jamia al Dawatul Islami, which functions under the management of Jama'atul Dawa. It has ten madrassahs in the country, with one functioning at its Centre at Muridke. Like any thriving organization, LeT administers a Finance department which sends delegates within and outside the country to collect funds, besides setting up donation boxes, charity drives and campaigns to collect sacrificial skins. The Jamaat is very active in collection of sacrificial skins, and sets up small camps to collect the same, besides actively advertising for donation of these skins via its publications.758 Saudi Arabia and other Arabian States give large grants to Jamaat ud Dawa for the religious madrassahs and schools. Units have been established in different countries that remit large sums for jihad fund every year. LeT has an important social facet, which is representative of its organizational ability to preach its powerful Jihadist message. The Wurasa Shuhda-o-Ghazian (kin of martyrs and fighters) wing is the epitome of LeT‘s ability to retain its hold on jihadists. Destitute families of martyrs receive aid from this department, with 175 homes receiving this amount by 2001759. Other than this the department looks after veterans who lose their limbs or become otherwise invalids, and arranges jobs and other means of support. To keep the families of martyrs within the religious fold, LeT local officials visiting the house of the martyr offer congratulations to the family, distributing mithai (sweets) and deliver the organization‘s praise for commitment in emotional speeches. The martyr‘s last testament is read out which often exhorts their kin to strictly observe the Islamic tenets and be prepared to give their lives in the way of Allah. One such letter reads: ― Dear Parents, when you receive this piece of paper, I would already have been martyred….when you receive the news of my martyrdom please do not cry like ordinary mothers, since you are the mother of a martyr…..please make my brothers…hafiz-e-Quran(who learn Quran by heart) and give them an Islamic environment so they can avenge me (qisas) when they grow up.‖ 760 The men are implored neither to listen to music nor to watch films. They are asked to destroy their television sets because they 'spread the Hindu culture of singing and dancing'.24 A Foreign Affairs department maintains contact with Jihadi organizations abroad, and provides them with manpower, acting as a Jihadist human resource pool. Contact with Jihadis in Bosnia, Chechnya and other countries are maintained through this department. It also contacts foreign governments and political parties in the interest of Jamaat ud Dawa and to promote it‘s point of view. From September 11, 2001 to March 2002 the department sent over 3000 letters and emails to 130 countries of the world, including Europe and America761. Equally important is the Farmers and Labour wing. This section is responsible for maintaining contacts with farmers‘ and labour organizations in order to bring them within the Jamaat ud Dawa‘s folds. The department also collects the Islamic tax Ushr and jihad funds in the form of crops etc. from farmers all over Pakistan. The members of this department are active mostly in rural Punjab and Sindh.

758

Mujallul ud Daawa,Feb. 2003,back cover. Allusions to this tended to peter out by 2002 consequent to the official bans on LeT. 760 Mujallul ud Daawa,Feb. 2003,p 50. 761 Mujjalul Dawa and Rana,2006. 759

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One of the most effective tactics of LeT has been to impart its Jihadist message through its publication house, called Darul Andalus. This important department prepares Jihadi literature and books and is a profitable venture, selling hundreds of thousands of books every year. The department printed more than a hundred booklets in 2001 in Urdu, English, Arabic, Persian and other languages. It‗s popularity can be gauged by the fact that it published its earnings as over 80 lakhs rupees that particular year. As regards Jihadist training camps762, after the closure of the camps in Afghanistan and Mansehra in NWFP, Lashkare Taiba had five functioning camps.763 Muaskar Taiba is located in Muzzaffarabad in Azad Kashmir, and had the capacity to train 500 mujahideen at a time. Muaskar Aqsa camp too is located close to Muzzaffarabad and contains logistical and training facilities for 150 mujahideen. Another camp in proximity of Muzaffarabad, Muaskar Ummul Qara was set up in 1991.Initially catering to 150 mujahideen, its logistical base was expanded to train up to five hundred men .This is one of the most important training camps of LeT. Similarly, three hundred men can be trained at a time in Muaskar Abdullah bin Masood, again located in Azad Kashmir. Markaz (Centre) Mohammed bin Qasim is at an hour's drive from Hyderabad at Maldasi in Tehsil Shahdadpur, District Sanghar, in Sindh province. It is built in the style of a fort and houses a Jihadi camp. This used to be one of the three Jihadi camps in the interior of Sindh, and the only one still functioning till recently764. The other camps, located at Sanghar and Larkana, have been shut down.

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THE POVERTY – RADICALISATION NEXUS IN PAKISTAN This part of the book traces a possible link between radicalization and poverty in Pakistan by surveying 1147 respondents, consisting of a poor sample universe compared with more affluent control groups. All the provinces of Pakistan were included in the sample universe, with the findings centered on an analytical discourse of poverty in NWFP and Balochistan provinces, which have given rise to escalating militancy. The analysis engages with relevant literature to argue for the development of sub nationally researched, fresh perspectives on linkages between poverty and Radicalization in Pakistan. Contemporary literature review has tended to suggest that that the post 9/11 presumed link between a reduction in poverty, and an increase in educational attainment and a simultaneous de escalation of international terrorism is quite tenuous. The connections between poverty, education and terrorism have been suggested to be ephemeral, inasmuch the recent profiles of terrorists suggest that they are not the stereotypical impoverished and uneducated youths as was generally presumed.They are in fact the progeny of years of frustrated political aspirations and indignity, which inculcates an acute sense of insecurity and consequent hatred against those who are ostensibly perceived to have brought about these 762

(Rana,2006) is useful for further reading on this topic. These may have been shut down for the duration or might be shut down in the imminent future due to the increasing pressure on the Pakistani government to curtail the activities of this group 764 At the time of publication, most of the known Jihadi centres have been raided by state authorities and shit down. The JD‘s propensity to resurface under pseudonyms ,however, has already been described. One of the most recent was ‗Tahreek Tahafuzz e Kibla e Awal‘ or the movement for protection of holy places in Jerusalem; this pseudonym surfaced after the latest attacks in Gaza in February 2009 by Israeli troops. This, however, should not be taken as the final manifestation of JD and LeT; as usual, the organization adopts and discards nom de guerres at will. 763

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conditions. Much scholarly ink has been spilt in the quest for answers to what produces terrorists, and many theories have been put forward. These range from Crime related theories of terrorism as a rational choice model(Becker 1968, Ehrlich, 1973,Freeman, 1996; Piehl, 1998), homicide(and violent terrorism as a manifestation of it) as being de coupled from economics (Piehl, 1998, Ruhm, 2000) and the demand and supply of hatred(Glaeser 2002).Economic models which pertain to crime have also been applied to international terrorism (Landes 1978 and Sandler, Tschirhart and Cauley,1983).However, economic theories, which interpolate terrorism as a variable which could be defined by a rational economic choice model, have all tended to stray from the point that economics by itself cannot explain away terrorism; clearly more complex variables are needed. Studies using hate crime as a determinant of economic conjugation of terrorism with poverty also tended to come up with findings which indicted a de coupling of the two factors mentioned above (Hamm, 1998; Kressell, 1996; Green, Glaser and Rich 1998). Jefferson and Pryor (1999) concluded ―[E]conomic or sociological explanations for the existence of hate groups in an area are far less important than adventitious circumstances due to history and particular conditions.‖ These projections support Lerner‘s classic hypothesis that the ―the Extremists are not simply the ‗have-nots,‘ suggesting rather that they are the wantmores.‖(Lerner 1958,p. 368). Lerner has also hypothesized that ―Poverty prevails only among the apolitical mass‖ ( Lerner 1958,p. 368).Angrist‘s research in the West Bank and Gaza strip has indicated that even significant increases in educational attainment of Palestinians in the 1980s could not alleviate the economic troubles of more highly educated Palestinians (Angrist, 1995).The shortcoming of the applicability of this study to a universalistic paradigm, was, however, pointed out. A simplistic rational choice model of terrorism for economically deprived, uneducated individuals does not even apply unambiguously to the most extreme form of terrorist – the suicide bomber. According to Nussra Hassan‘s seminal study (Nussra Hassan ,2001): ―None of them(Palestinian suicide bombers)were uneducated, desperately poor, simple minded or depressed. Many were middle class and, unless they were fugitives, held paying jobs‖(Nussra Hassan,2001). These results resonate well with Berrebi‘s econometric models of Palestinian suicide bombers; the study concluded that the suicide bombers in question tended to have a higher high school and college attendance average than the general Palestinian population, and were less likely to come from poverty stricken families( Berrebi ,2003).Studies utilizing a broad based sample representative of many different cultures and terrorist organizations have also tended to project little direct relationship between terrorism and poverty(Russell and Miller ,1983; Taylor ,1988). Krueger and Maleckova postulate that terrorism is primarily a political, rather than an economic phenomenon.765 It has been suggested that whilst linkages of poverty and militancy have not been demonstrated conclusively in the case of the Islamist leadership or elite, poverty and illiteracy may still be important factors in the motivations of the ranks and file of radical organizations. It has also been argued that militancy evolves in a conjunctional environment of many factors, which is particular to a specific region or ideology, and thus needs to be studied at sub national, rather than international levels. The definitive nuances between religious conservatism, political Islamism, and radical Islamist militancy also need to be contextualized. 765

Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection? Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 17, Number 4, Fall 2003,Pages 119–144.

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Lipset (1960, ch. IV) has pointed to several mechanisms, by which poor people with their harsh upbringing and authoritarian family patterns are prone to join militant movements. The factors he points out are a low level of education, which tends to promote a simplified world view of politics, and an uncompromising nature due to economic insecurity, which leads to a heightened state of stimulus to perceived disturbing events. This insecurity leads to a search for immediate solutions to problems, including taking up arms. Lipset also postulates that impoverished people are isolated from the activities and controversies of the society at large, which effectively cocoons them from the intricacies of political problems. This also has deleterious effects on acquiring a spirit of tolerance. Houtman has expanded upon Lipset‘s thesis by further postulating in his sociological research that authoritarianism, intolerance of nonconformity, and racial prejudice are closely related to poor education (see Houtman, 2003 for a recent survey). Thus, studying the evolution of radicalization in context of isolated variables may not be a fruitful pursuit, especially in different theaters where these variables may have different trajectories; the Pakistani scenario may very well be a case in point wherein the relationship of poverty with radicalization is concerned. As far as Radicalization is concerned, I do not want to revisit the fiat of the debate about its definition; for the purpose of this study I have chosen Flaherty‘s definition of Radicalization( Azam,2009). This implies a sense of futility evoking desperate measures, wherein destruction of the existing order is seen as a desirable goal, which precludes any compromises or power sharing. There is a sense of emergency and urgency in the radicalized population, wherein the ends justify the means. The underlying current is the prospect of violent change giving its own inherent appeal. As is evident, these concepts seem to resonate closely with Lipset‘s hypothesis about the poor. Flaherty‘s postulates can be seen to apply equally not only to the Islamist radicalization process in Pakistan, but to a large number of other Islamist movements as well. The past six years have witnessed a significant rise in incidents of terrorism in Pakistan, with the writ of the state being directly challenged by the rise of many militant groups, who have transmigrated from Pakistan‘s tribal areas and have literally assumed control of areas in Pakistan like Swat. This extremism is marked by an unprecedented alacrity, organizational capability and impunity. Scholarship about this phenomenon has not kept pace with terrorism, an is in a nascent stage in Pakistan, with little comprehension and research into the drivers of extremism among researchers, analysts and policy makers. Whenever the social issues are raised however, amongst the possible factors giving rise to terrorism in Pakistan, poverty and poor social indicators figure fairly prominently. This paper is an attempt to explore a potential nexus, utilizing the fairly limited variables available in the form of literature, news and opinion pieces, which are tested with the help of a survey. Rural poverty is a major destabilizing factor in Pakistani scenario, with approximately two-thirds766 of Pakistani people living in rural areas. Authoritative studies have documented767 higher poverty levels in Pakistan with decreased capacity to acquire and hold land, which is the main source of subsistence in the agricultural areas of Pakistan. Nearly 67% of Pakistani households are landless,768 though this in itself cannot be taken to be the

766

"Rural Poverty in Pakistan", Rural Poverty Portal (IFAD). T. Anwar, S. K. Qureshi, and H. Ali, "Landlessness and Rural Poverty in Pakistan", The Pakistan Development Review, Issue 43, #4, Winter 2004. 768 Ibid. 767

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sole denominator of poverty in Pakistan769 . The problem is thrown into sharp relief with comparison to the decline in India‗s rural poverty during 1987-2000.770 This is pertinent since both the countries inherited a nearly identical system of land holdings and feudalism after independence, which India ostensibly seems to have tackled better than Pakistan; the latter seems to have alternated between 771 monetary polices dictated by the IMF and World Bank, and its own experiments with Land reforms, which proved deleterious. The income disparity between the ‗have‘ and ‗have-nots‘ in Pakistan has also increased significantly during the same period, 772 while income disparity had largely become an urban phenomenon in the period under review.773 Since the reasons behind the rise of militancy are multifarious, an analysis utilizing any single variable would be nothing short of empirical, not to mention misleading.774However, the terrorism narrative is prominently evident in most of the discourses on terrorism, whilst the socio economic aspects are just as significantly absent.775 This debate is kindred by two competing arguments; the ‗victim‘ of terrorism perspective is usually adopted by the Pakistani government due to its political and economic instability, while the ‗perpetrator‘ or at the least a ‗relatively passive observer argument is the stance taken up by the US, which views the current scenario as a lack of Pakistani establishment‘s will to counter the insurgency; complicity of the state apparatus is also alleged. It is also quite pertinent that even the non partisan US think tanks tend to concentrate quite heavily on security scenarios, while governance and socio economic imbalance take the back seat.776 Amongst the socio economic factors, poverty, especially rural poverty figures prominently. Rural poverty was in decrease in Pakistan through the 1870s and 80s,but started increasing steadily during the 1990s. The trend of poverty increase in 1990s is alarming; an officially issued notification points out that 777 nearly 67 percent of households owned no land at the time the officially sanctioned study was conducted. 18.25 percent household owned less than 5 acres of land, and 9.66 percent household owned 5 to 12.5 acres of land, which sufficed only to provide meager levels of existence for sometimes very large extended families tending to rely on this land as the sole source of income. The pattern is dismally skewed towards a few feudal families holding large land holdings; barely 1 percent (0.64 percent plus 0.37 percent) of households owned greater than 35 acres of land. This is reinforced by the Gini coefficient778 of land holding which was very high at 0.6151 in 2001769

Ibid.Also see S. Malik, "Determinants of Rural Poverty in Pakistan: A Micro Study", The Pakistan Development Review, Issue 35, #2, Summer 1996.Another instructive treatise is R. Amjad, "Solving Pakistan‘s Poverty Puzzle: Whom Should We Believe? What Should We Do?", The Pakistan Development Review, Issue 42, #4, Winter 2003. 770 A. Panagariya, "India: The Emerging Giant", Oxford University Press, 2008. 771 (Malik,1996 and Amjad 2003) 772 (Anwar, Qureshi,2004) 773 (Panagariya,2008). 774 Eriposte, "Developing A Framework to Understand and Develop Working Solutions to Major Conflicts: The Case of Mizoram (India) - Part 4", The Left Coaster, Jan 2009.Also see Eriposte, "Language and Ethnic Conflict in South Asia", The Left Coaster, Feb 2009. 775 B. Riedel, "Pakistan and Terror: The Eye of the Storm", Annals of the AAPSS, 2008; T. Rubin, "Bruce Riedel: We need to make the war against al Qaeda Pakistan's war, not just America's war", Academy Blog, 2008; B. Gwertzman interview of B. Riedel, "Riedel: U.S. Needs to Tread Carefully in Pakistan", Council on Foreign Relations, 2008. 776 Council for Foreign Relations, Pakistan Archives. 777 (Anwar, Qureshi,2004). 778 The Gini coefficient is a measure of statistical dispersion, commonly used as a measure of inequality of income distribution or inequality of wealth distribution. It is defined as a ratio with values between 0 and 1: A low

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02. Thus, the problem is not just lower levels of land holding in Pakistan, but also highly unequal land distribution leading to a class of land have and have-nots. Strikingly, poverty levels tend to decrease in inverse proportion to land holding, with poverty virtually disappearing with holdings of 55 acres and above. This indicates that poverty and landlessness are directly related to each other in the rural areas of Pakistan. As for spatial distribution of landlessness, 86 percent households were landless in Sindh (landless plus non-agriculture), followed by 78 percent in Balochistan and 74 percent in Punjab .Evidence of income disparity rampant in Pakistani society is bolstered by statistics779, with the Lorenz curve 780 of 2001-02 for Pakistan lying below the 1984-85 levels . This indicates that income distribution patterns gradually worsened, resulting in higher income inequality in 2001-02 relative to 1984-85781. Greater changes are visible in the higher part of the income distribution curves than the middle and lower part of income brackets. This stipulates that in 2001-02, the upper income brackets registered a gain in income share to the richest 20 percent at the expense of the poorest 20 percent and middle 60 percent, which obviously increased the poverty levels in the lower and middle brackets. This projection also points out the dismal fact that the richest 1% who used to get 10 percent of total income in 1984-85, would be getting almost 20 percent of the total income in Pakistan in 2001-02. The officially collected estimates of poverty incidence consider household income and expenditure variables; the ones considered authoritative are the now dated Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) conducted in the 1990s, and the relatively recent Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSLM,2005-6)782. The former measured household income while the latter concentrated on monitoring the efficacy of the Pakistani National Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS).A gross deficiency of both these surveys with regards to this study is that they do not factor FATA areas into their calculations; however, these studies can be useful for analyzing the trend of transmigration of militancy from the FATA areas to the more settled districts of Pakistan. It is estimated that in 1998-99, 30.6 percent of Pakistanis were living below the poverty line, with the estimate standing at 23.9 percent in 2004-5.According to official projections had dropped to 22.3 percent by 2005-6 (EAW, 2008). Rural poverty was estimated at 27 percent in 2005-06, unfavorably comparing with an urban incidence of 13.1 percent. The officially estimated surveys have however been criticized for faulty methodologies and official ‗padding‘ of results. An independent World Bank survey put the figures of poverty incidence in Pakistan at 28.3 percent in 2004-05, with income distribution patterns utilizing the Gini coefficient yielding a figure of 0.3 in 2005-06 as compared to 0.27 in 200102. This indicates that there is a skewed income distribution pattern in favour of the high earners, which negates the gains made in eradication of absolute poverty by increasing income inequality. (EAW, 2008).

Gini coefficient indicates more equal income or wealth distribution, while a high Gini coefficient indicates more unequal distribution. 0 corresponds to perfect equality (everyone having exactly the same income) and 1 corresponds to perfect inequality (where one person has all the income, while everyone else has zero income).Definition by Wikkipedia. 779 (Anwar, Qureshi,2004). 780 In economics, the Lorenz curve is often used to represent income distribution, where it shows for the bottom x% of households, what percentage y% of the total income they have. It can also be used to show distribution of assets. Definition by Wikkipedia. 781 (Anwar, Qureshi,2004).

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There are few studies measuring spatial distribution of this poverty in Pakistan; one such study was commissioned by the Social Policy Development Center (SPDC,2004),which measured poverty incidence province wise for 2001-02 with data interpolated from the Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) (SPDC, 2004). The overall poverty incidence was highest in Balochistan, with almost half the population living below the poverty line, with minimal differences between poverty incidence in Sindh and NWFP. However, the Sindh data was adjusted for the skewed data patterns for rural poverty obtained by inclusion of the huge commercialized metropolis of Karachi, by comparing rural Sindh with rural NWFP. Thence, the Sind figures rose to 38 percent of the rural population living under the poverty line compared to 27 percent in NWFP. Punjab fared best, with an overall poverty incidence of 26 percent, and, anomalously, rural poverty incidence of just 24 percent. This study also implies that rural poverty was lower than average poverty both in NWFP and Punjab, which seems to militate against conventional wisdom and other studies. The Center for Research on Poverty Reduction and Income Distribution (CRPRID) considered trends in the headcount measurement of poverty incidence across all the provinces from 1992-93 to 2001-02 (Cheema, 2005);the estimates varied significantly from the SPDC study, projecting the highest incidence in poverty in Pakistan in NWFP at 41.5 percent in 2001-2. Sindh and Balochistan were almost at parity at about 35 percent, while Punjab fared best at 32 percent. Poverty incidence showed a steady increase in all provinces between 199293 to 2001-02, with poverty hitting Sindh and Balochistan drastically. This increase in poverty is indicted by both the studies mentioned above, with Punjab and urban Sindh faring much better than NWFP and Balochistan during the decade that militancy was on the rise in the latter two provinces. In the absence of conclusive, extensively conducted studies, it is conjectural to co relate the rise in militancy in both these provinces during the past six years or so, but the figures can be indicative of an income inequality gap which could have acted as one of the many catalysts in promoting the current militancy. The Literature which sheds some conceptual light on the correlation of militancy with poverty is extremely scarce in Pakistan, with the largest contributions being made to by investigative newspaper articles and opinion pieces, which however comprehensive, fall quite short of the meticulous detailing required in research . There are however, a limited number of works which asses the variables under review to some extent. Robert Kemp (Kemp, 2008) has ascribed the rise of radicalism in Afghanistan and the Pakhtun tribal areas of Pakistan to the disintegration of the mechanism of cooperation between the tribal society and the Pakistani state, with the ultra orthodox elements filling in the resulting governance vacuum. Kemp factors in poverty and unemployment as cogent factors, inextricably intertwined within the complex framework of possible drivers of escalation of extremism in the Pakistan‘s tribal society. He has,however, not demonstrated how poverty may have contributed to the influence of orthodox "foreign elements" into the area,and the linkages of poverty with militancy as he postulates. Kemp's paper is more of a social overview, whilst Sohail Abbas has utilized his experience as a psychologist for conducting profiling research of Jihadis in the treatise ‗The Jihadi mindset‘ (Abbas, 2007). Abbas‘s sample consists of 517 men, interred in Haripur and 782

The reports can be viewed at the Government of Pakistan Federal, Bureau of statistics website at http://www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/fbs/statistics/hies05_06/hies05_06.html.

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Peshawar jails in Pakistan after they had attempted re-entry into Pakistan following the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001. Abbas has attempted to profile these individuals by comparing them with a matchable "control" group of individuals of similar socio-economic and ethnic backgrounds which had not joined the Jihad. The study limits itself however, to men inclined to join the Jihad, but does not attempt to co relate drivers of violent terrorist behavior; there is no indication given in the book that the sample population attempted any terrorist acts. The study is nevertheless quite illuminating as an insight into proneness to join Jihad and militant Jihadist organizations. The sample was small but still significant; it is extremely difficult, not to mention hazardous, to interview Jihadis in Pakistan. Abbas got around this problem by gaining permission from Pakistan‘s Ministry of Interior to interview arrested militants, which were studied in two sample groups in Haripur and Peshawar Jails respectively, and labeled as such by these names in the study. Abbas tends to conclude that the Jihadis were drawn largely from mainstream Pakistani society, hailing from marginalized tribal society only to an insignificant extent. Majority were not educated in madrassahs contrary to popularly held belief, but were educated in public schools in Pakistan wherein the majority of Pakistan‘s population, particularly the rural one, obtains access to education. Surprisingly, their mean literacy level as a group was higher than the Pakistani average for education. While sampling the Haripur group for occupations,the study concluded that only 13.1 percent had been unemployed when they left for Afghanistan, while 30.3 percent worked as laborers, 18.2 percent were students, 14.1 percent worked as tenant farmers, 10.1 percent were small businessmen or shopkeepers, while the rest provided some services or worked as skilled labourers. The other sample, however, the Peshawar group, had an almost nil unemployment rate. The majority (33.8 percent) had worked as tenant farmers, 24.2 as laborers, while skilled labor and students were equally represented at about 17 percent each. Business owning was at a very low level at about 3.5 percent of the sample. This study seems to go entirely against the popular pre conceived notions of Pakistani Jihadis being totally illiterate, unemployed youth. The same study also attempted to factor poverty into the research variables, by trying to ascertain the average income level scatter pattern of the Jihadis. The Haripur sample reported a huge 35.7 percent of the respondents with no income of their own. Ninety percent of the Haripur respondents had incomes less than $1000 (or Rs. 60,000 at exchange rates for that time) a year, with 75 percent earning less than $500 (or Rs. 30,000) a year. The Peshawar sample yielded comparable results, though the respondents having no income stood at around 26.3 percent. This puts the majority of the respondents at the lowest income percentiles in Pakistan in terms of their individual earnings. However, the majority was employed in one form or the other, though the amounts of dividends of such occupation seem to have been meager. The study does not address the issue that many individuals in Pakistan are supported at home by remaining in Joint family systems, wherein income is distributed amongst the less gainfully unemployed by some family member/s, usually some elder. Similarly, the average income of the Jihadis‘ families was not factored into the calculation. This is a shortcoming is a study attempting to research a society wherein resources tend to be pooled at the household level. Christine Fair has attempted a survey of the families of 141 militants in 2004-5, most of whom had been engaged in conflicts in Kashmir and Afghanistan in the post 1990 era (Fair, 2008). The study concentrated on the NWFP, with 55 percent of respondent households being

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picked from that province. The other Pakistani areas represented were Punjab (26 %), Azad Jammu and Kashmir (13%), Balochistan (4%) and Sindh (2%). Fair's work incorporated socio-economic characteristics of the deceased militants, such as a demographic collection of data about the family of the Jihadi‘s religious convictions, and endorsement of the Jihadis decision to leave for jihad etc. Fair‘s findings in regard to militant education levels supported the above arguments about a minority of the militants being full time madrassah students( 4 percent ),with the group average education rate for the Jihadis being higher than the Pakistan average education rate as above. 94 percent of the militants had obtained some form of formal education, with 40 percent having completed education which can be regarded roughly equivalent to high school. 50 percent of the militants had been unemployed on the year that they left for Jihad, while a further 25 percent were employed part time, with the remaining 25 percent engaged full time .The variables were adjusted to account for the fact that many militants had been full time students, and so could not be gainfully employed; even then, about 25% were entirely devoid of employment during the year preceding Jihad. Fair reports ―several‖ of the full or part time workers as ‗highly skilled‘, but no data is provided as to what constituted this skilled group. The study does not incorporate statistics on the household incomes of the militants‘s families, or about the land or other assets held by them collectively or individually. Shinwari has recently conducted a sociological study on the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) (Shinwari, 2008). Shinwari postulates that about 60 percent of the population of FATA lives below the poverty line, with the Per capita expenditure being one third, compared to that of the Pakistani average. Employment and subsistence is generally in the agriculture sector, transport, (according to the study, generally illegal) cross-border trade, small businesses, and arms and drug trafficking. The study surveyed a random sample of respondents about their perception of societal change, and their vision for the region.

THE STUDY My survey was a supply side study designed to document increased incidence of the radicalized ideas amongst the impoverished in Pakistan; it can by no means be comprehended as a study of the correlation of poverty with militancy in Pakistan. The plethora of literature on studies of militant labor in Pakistan have provided vague empirical assessments between the proposed links between education, poverty and other aspects of socioeconomic status and popular support for terrorism, which although not incidental to this study, can only be used hypothetically to support observations made therein. The study was a link in this chain in an attempt to contextualize the support for radical ideas amongst the lesser privileged classes in Pakistan, which cannot be used to ascertain their proneness to join militant movements or perform terrorist acts, which needs an interpolation of different complex variables. Militancy is often an organizational phenomenon, with different organizations adopting different criteria for indoctrination of recruits. Fair has commented that sectarian terrorists in Pakistan tend to be madrassah educated youth783, while other organizations in Pakistan may

783

Christine Fair, ―The Madrassah challenge; Militancy and religious education in Pakistan,‖(Lahore, 2009: Vanguard Books),p.70.

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utilize Mesquita‘s quality ‗game‘ approach784 to indoctrinate and train their human resource. The Taliban tend to recruit persons who have had at least a brush with Deobandi Madrassah education 785,while suicide attackers in Pakistan‘s tribal belts are low quality, impoverished, madrassah educated 786, or in many cases,illiterate youth. It is not that the organizations want to use low quality suicide recruits, it‘s the fact that they are constrained to use whatever low input human material they have available. The popular support for suicide in Afghanistan and Pakistan is low787, since it is considered haram (sacrilegious); this is in striking contrast to the Palestinian and Lebanese territories, where a correspondingly higher popular support for suicide attacks means that the organizations are not supply constrained in choosing high quality suicide recruits. Thus, empirically examining just one variable other than poverty which can promote militancy and extremism, it is easy to see how different trajectories can affect the outcomes of variables in different theatres; perfectly relevant sub national studies in one theater may yield totally different results in others. How does then one empirically co relate educational attainment and poverty with a tendency to become radical? During poor economic times, relatively better qualified, bettereducated individuals may add to the ranks of the unemployed, which decreases the opportunity costs for relatively accomplished, educated individuals to participate in seeking simple solutions to complex problems (for example engaging in crime to relieve financial burdens or joining militant organizations to perform Jihad).788 While a lack of educational attainment is disruptive of economic mobility, educational attainment sans comparable employment opportunities is even more dangerous; expectations are raised, which if left unfulfilled, cause cognitive dissonance between the reality-expectation nexus. This can be a major cause of disenchantment with the society, particularly amongst the youth. Militant groups may thus become increasingly free from demand constraints in times of economic recession. It is important to remember at the outset that this study is not about predicting which of the poor samples may become militants; several layers of indoctrination and ideological permeations operate to make this a complex process, which is in any case not the aim of the study to expostulate upon. It is also not within the ambit of this survey to co relate links in education and socioeconomic status with supply of terrorist labor; the study simply aimed to explore the permeation of radical ideas amongst the poorer populations of Pakistan.

Survey Design and Methodology The data was collected over a period between October 2008 and March 2009. The survey was originally planned to cover the FATA areas along with the four provinces of Pakistan, but due to escalation of militant activities and ensuing anti militancy operations in Pakistan‘s tribal areas, the study team was unable to obtain permission to enter the tribal areas for field survey, which was an unavoidable field constraint. Four poorest districts in each province were chosen as a convenience sample, according to a Word Bank Food Program 784

Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, ― The Quality of Terror,‖ American Journal of Political Science 49, no.3 ,July 2005. (Fair,2009),p.70. 786 Ibid. 787 Pew Global Attitudes projects, Global Opinion trends 2002-2007. 788 (Mesquita,2005). 785

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study(Hussain et al,2003) mapping out poverty distribution incidence in Pakistan, along with four matchable controls of the richest four districts in the same province as per Human Development Indices (HDIs)789. It is worth mentioning that 60% of the districts which ranked amongst the top one third more affluent percentiles were from Punjab and 19 % were from NWFP. Similarly, amongst the bottom one third percentiles (the poorest) 47% were from Balochistan, with 34% from NWFP (Hussain et al, 2003). Not a single district from Punjab lay in the poorest percentiles. The data was collected with the help of structured questions laid out in a questionnaire, distributed and collected by two field researchers in each province; local researchers were picked in order to better comprehend the cultural nuances, and a similar pattern of questionnaire distribution was followed in order to reduce interviewer bias. The study was generally conducted by doing household surveys; another method utilized in lieu of ‗cold calling‘ was contacting respondents through the village headmen, or with the help of local administration (in some cases).An unavoidable sample bias was encountered when most of the questionnaires were filled in by the educated male members of the household790, or the head of the family(again almost always a male).Female representation was not accounted for; this could have been avoided by asking for the gender of the respondents. However, after intra research group brainstorming, it was decided that asking for the gender of the respondents could create hurdles in respondent compliance, since asking question from women about sensitive topics like this had the potential of offending the sensibilities of the conservative rural population. Households having a consolidated holding of 55 acres or more were discarded. However, many respondents were not forthcoming in response to questions about personal wealth and incomes, which are considered very personal topics in Pakistani rural society; this was again an unavoidable field constraint. Reluctance to answer questions was more marked in NWFP and Balochistan, with the most difficulty encountered in NWFP heartlands. This may have been due to the fact that respondents may have viewed the team as a ‗western‘ ploy or attempts by the sate to get information about these (generally) conservative areas. A random sample of villages to be surveyed had to be chosen from within the district sample groups; there is an extreme paucity of data available within the district about the rural break up of poverty village wise, which necessitated the random selection of villages within the 32 districts being surveyed. 1147 respondents were surveyed in all; the breakup province wise was as under:

789

The Human Development Index (HDI) is an index used to rank countries by level of "human development", which usually also implies whether a country is a developed, developing, or underdeveloped country. Definition by Wikkipedia. 790 This perception was subjective, since in most of the case it was hard enough to have the questionnaire completed by a household; the survey team did not have the leeway to request that female members of the household also complete the questionnaire.

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Table 1

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Sample group Punjab Control (more affluent) Punjab Sample Sindh Control Sind Sample NWFP Control NWFP Sample Balochistan Control Balochistan Sample

Number of Respondents 158 144 148 164 145 127 129 132

The typical life in a village is simple; men are usually tenant farmers who work the fields from sunrise to evening, while women stay at home to tend to the children or assist the men tin their farming activities. The gender balance is somewhat patriarchic, with gender roles skewed in favor of the males. The social life of women centers on births, deaths and anniversaries, with purdah being more strictly observed in case of NWFP and Balochistan, though it varies significantly within the same province. As for religion, Cohen notes that "most Pakistanis in rural areas remain vague about their Islam, and their religion is strongly intermixed with folk practices, Sufi beliefs, and even Hinduism and Buddhism."791 Life in small villages is difficult; some are still devoid of facilities like safe drinking water and electricity, with medical facilities situated sometimes at some distance from the more remote villages. At the least, one tenth of the rural communities do not even have access to basic facilities.792 Poverty affects family planning and parenthood, with 75 percent on average more children in poor families as opposed to the non-poor households. A disproportionately large number of households are headed by aged persons, who utilize transfer incomes, such as pensions and other forms of social support, sometimes for running the financial affairs of the whole household. The society is stratified; it is quite easy to pick out the ‗common‘ man in the village by virtue of his relatively simply constructed house, such houses typically being clumped together in the centre of the village, while the relatively affluent landlords and wealthier villagers tend to construct cemented houses, usually situated on the outskirts of the village. It is this ‗central‘ village stratum that the research team was interested in; it was easier to identify a poor rural sample universe by going to the heart of the village and conducting a survey there, though this of course constituted a convenience sample.

Religiosity The question about the state of religiosity was introduced as a dummy question; religiosity is not easy to define in relative terms in Muslim countries, and the researchers were not expecting any useful input by eliciting a close ended response (high to low). Also, 791 792

Stephen P. Cohen, ―The Idea of Pakistan,‖ (Washington, D.C.: Brookings institution Press,2004). Population Council, ―Adolescents and Youth in Pakistan 2001-02: A National Representative Survey,‖ project sponsored by UNICEF, 2002, p.130.

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religious ritualism (like praying or going to the mosque) cannot be taken as a benchmark of religiosity, or for that matter radicalization in Pakistan, since Islamic (as opposed to islamist) sensibilities run throughout the fabric of the society.This was evident in the case of the survey as well, wherein an overwhelming majority of the respondents answered in favour of higher levels of religiosity; any other response could be considered socially embarrassing. The purpose of this question was to serve as an ‗adjuster‘ and for setting the stage for the succeeding questions, which enquired about support for violence utilized by religious groups, Islam as a system of life etc. (see below) This question was relevant in the context of adjusting the following questions, which enquired about the perception of the respondents about an Islamic governance system. As elucidated below, the purportedly high levels of religiosity as a response, was at odds with respondent response to related questions. 11.81% of the Punjab sample replied in the affirmative to the question that asked for legitimacy of violence by militant groups (question 5), while the control group replied with 8.86 percent. 54.17 % in the Punjab poor sample and 56.33 % in the control group replied in the negative.11.59 % of the poor sample group in Sind responded positively to the query, while 56.71 %were against the use of militancy by the religious groups. The finding resonated with 6.08% affirmative answers and 68.92 % negative answers in the matchable control group. The situation was quite different in NWFP and Balochistan; in the NWFP poor sample, 18.90% of respondents legitimized use of violence by the militants as a political tool, while 48.82% decried it. The situation was comparable to the NWFP control group, albeit with lower percentages; 8.97% percent legitimized militant violence, with 47.59 % decrying it and 43.45 % staying undecided. Higher percentages were obtained in the case of the Balochistan poor, with 26.52 % in favour, 44.70 % against and 28.79 % undecided in the sample population, comparable to 20.93 % in favour, 51.16 % against and 27.91 % undecided in the control group. Table 2 Q. 5 : Do you support the use of Violence by Religious groups in Pakistan? Punjab Control Punjab Poor Sindh Control Sindh Poor NWFP Control NWFP Poor Balochistan Control Balochistan Poor

YES

14 17 9 19 13 24 27 35

Number of respondents NO NO OPINION EITHER WAY

89 78 102 93 69 62 66 59

55 49 37 52 63 41 36 38

YES Total

158 144 148 164 145 127 129 132

8.86% 11.81% 6.08% 11.59% 8.97% 18.90% 20.93% 26.52%

Percentage NO NO OPINION EITHER WAY 56.33% 34.81% 54.17% 34.03% 68.92% 25.00% 56.71% 31.71% 47.59% 43.45% 48.82% 32.28% 51.16% 27.91% 44.70% 28.79%

Is there something inherent in Pashtun and Baluchi cultures which are inimical to violence, and support for groups using violence as a tool? In the Pashtun culture certainly, an element of violence is ingrained in cultural paradigms. Children get weapons as rite of

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passage to adulthood in tribal societies, arms and ammunition are considered a status benchmark, and even some children‘s game contain an element of violence.793 The Balochi culture is relatively more benign; the rise of militancy in these areas has to be comprehended in ethno nationalist terms. Balochistan has been the hub of many ethnicallydriven guerilla insurgencies. Akhtar794 points out that the major insurgency in the 1970s, which was crushed by the Pakistani establishment, had a solid ethno nationalist support within Balochistan. The current insurgency is a much more amorphous Taliban entrenchment, with Baluch nationalist militancy and other elusive militant entities vying to gain hold of Balochistan‘s abundant natural resources and ―mega development‖ projects, such as the warm water port of Gwadar on the south-western tip of the province, projected to be a future linchpin of the warm water access to lucrative central Asian oil pipelines. This territorial imperative of the Pakistani government is strengthened by the fact that the Pakistani regime plans to construct military cantonments in Sui, Pakistan‘s largest natural gas reserves, Gwadar, a highly strategic coastal city, and Kohlu, reportedly containing untapped energy reserves. This policy seems consistent with the increasingly blatant resource-grabbing policy of the dominant state actor, the military, which has over the decades built up a huge corporate empire, based on acquisition of and commercialization of land, a phenomenon which Siqqiqa terms as the Military Business entity, or ‗Milbus‘. [Siddiqa 2007]. Multinational capital has also been attracted towards strategic areas; Chinese companies in particular have been very active in getting exclusive contracts to construct and develop Gwadar, in which the first phase of investment totaling $ 248 million has a Chinese contribution of $ 198 million. The nationalist discourse surrounding Gwadar reveals a deeply ingrained fear of Baluchi cultural extinction that has been a consistent theme in both Sind and Baluchistan provinces of Pakistan; nationalists in both regions have maintained that development of projects such as Gwadar precipitates an influx of other ethnicities than Balochs into the province, with the resultant dilution of Baluchi and Sindhi dominance in culture and politics. Thus the Nationalist rhetoric in both these provinces has always contained some emotive narrative of ethnic Sindhis and Balochis becoming minorities in their respective provinces. This is same type of ethno nationalist undercurrent which created Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971 .The problems are compounded by the fact that Balochistan is predominantly rural and has dismal per capita income levels.Rural poverty in Balochistan was estimated to be 42% in 2001-02, a bit lower than in Sindh and the NWFP. However, as of 2001-02, the poverty factor is superimposed by the fact that 78% of households owned no land in Balochistan and amongst the landless, Balochistan‘s rural poverty rate was the highest in Pakistan, at nearly 70 %( SPDC, 2004). It may also be worthwhile remembering that sometimes the poor and the deprived compensate for their lack of material possessions by asserting their social status; this can be done by gaining power, authority or privilege795, sometimes by using force for political ends, which in essence is the process of radicalization. Radicalized persons have a strong perception of being discriminated against, and alienation from the larger society due to socioeconomic deprivation. This is exacerbated by falling education standards, lack of economic opportunities, and unequal access to avenues for social and economic mobilization, which are 793

Muhammad Azam, Radicalization in Pakistan; Socio cultural realities, Conflict and Peace studies, Vol.2,no.1, Jan-Mar 2009,p.51. 794 A. S. Akhtar, "Balochistan versus Pakistan", Economic and Political Weekly, Nov 2007. 795 Sabeeha Hafeez, The changing Pakistan society(Karachi,1991: Royal Book Company),p.3. Taliban in Pakistan: A Chronicle of Resurgence : A Chronicle of Resurgence, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook

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a hallmark of countries facing turbulent times and paradigmatic cultural polarization.796 The powerless and the impoverished may project their aspirations onto groups which are seen to be ‗doing something‘ about the plight of the masses, as opposed to a bureaucratic, ineffective state. This may account for the rise of militant groups, particularly the Taliban, in NWFP and Balochistan. Table 3 Q.6: Should religious leaders acquire public office in Pakistan?

YES

Punjab Control Punjab Poor Sindh Control Sindh Poor NWFP Control NWFP Poor Balochistan Control Balochistan Poor

37 40 31 45 50 61 39 44

Number of respondents NO NO OPINION EITHER WAY

67 73 97 93 69 54 73 59

54 31 20 26 26 12 17 29

YES Total

158 144 148 164 145 127 129 132

23.42% 27.78% 20.95% 27.44% 34.48% 48.03% 30.23% 33.33%

Percentage NO NO OPINION EITHER WAY 42.41% 34.18% 50.69% 21.53% 65.54% 13.51% 56.71% 15.85% 47.59% 17.93% 42.52% 9.45% 56.59% 13.18% 44.70% 21.97%

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Table 4 Q.7 An Islamic state is the solution to all of Pakistan‘s problems?

YES

Punjab Control Punjab Poor Sindh Control Sindh Poor NWFP Control NWFP Poor Balochistan Control Balochistan Poor

21 36 18 35 42 55 46 39

Number of respondents NO NO OPINION EITHER WAY

96 82 75 63 63 59 53 62

41 26 55 66 40 13 30 31

YES Total

158 144 148 164 145 127 129 132

13.29% 25.00% 12.16% 21.34% 28.97% 43.31% 35.66% 29.55%

Percentage NO NO OPINION EITHER WAY 60.76% 25.95% 56.94% 18.06% 50.68% 37.16% 38.41% 40.24% 43.45% 27.59% 46.46% 10.24% 41.09% 23.26% 46.97% 23.48%

Question 6 was adjusted by Question 7, which asked whether an Islamic Sharia could be a panacea for all the evils affecting Pakistan. Even though more respondents tended to answer in the affirmative to religious leaders acquiring office, support for Sharia as a cure all for all evils in Pakistan was not as forthcoming. This support was at its highest amongst the NWFP poor, standing at 43.31%. This may be an indicator of the way the poor masses of NWFP

796

Henrik Urdal, ―The Demographics of Political Violence: Youth Bulges, Insecurity and Conflict‖ in Lael Brainard and Derek Chollet (eds), Too Poor for Peace? Global Poverty, Conflict and Security in the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2007), pp.90-100.

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think; for them religiosity may be linked inextricably with the Islamists coming to power, which might explain the rise and the entrenchment of Taliban in the province. It is significant that the Balochi population‘s support ,though higher in comparative terms to the Punjab and Sind samples, was still relatively low as compared to the NWFP samples, particularly amongst the Balochi poor(29.55%) .This tends to indicate that many conjunctional forces align to complicate the Balochi imbroglio, amongst which religion may only be one of the stimuli. This lends credence to the above mentioned ethno nationalist narrative for Balochistan. This also reveals a paradigmatic dissonance within the Pakistani society in general; for a state whose citizens purportedly have high levels of religiosity, support for religious leaders and Sharia was not very high. This may be due to the fact that there is certain ambivalence towards religious leaders and Sharia in Pakistan, which has been dwelt upon at some length by earlier surveys as well. For instance, data collected by Pew in 2002 and 2005 797indicated that even though many people believed that Islamic religiosity was very important, they did not really believe in this becoming ingrained in Pakistani politics. This is the same trend which is revealed by data from my survey; respondents replied positively to Islam being a potent force in their lives, but were not too keen on it becoming a system of governance. This may have something to do with the way the clerics have been involved in Pakistani politics, which has not been looked upon favourably by the majority of the population, as reflected by poor voter support in Pakistani elections. A WorldPublicOpinion.org poll of 907 urban Pakistanis has also revealed the inherent ambivalence in the average Pakistani citizen‘s mind, wherein a large number of Pakistanis envisage a greater role for Islam and Sharia in Pakistani society, but simultaneously want more (secular type) democracy, favouring liberalizing reforms and opposing terrorism.798 Significantly, the support for an Islamic system of governance was more deeply echoed by the poorer respondents, taken province wise and district wise. This does suggest that poorer respondents had a simpler world view of politics; even though Pakistan has had a lot of trouble synchronizing religion with politics, as demonstrated by the failure of the rightist regime of Zia and the antagonist liberal Musharraf counterpart to take the people along with them. In Pakistan the balance the state and religion does not seem to sit in comfortably with politics. However, the poorer respondents were optimistic as an Islamic state being a panacea for the troubles of Pakistan, which resonates with Lipset‘s view that the poor are relatively readier to grab at simple solutions.

WAR ON TERROR AND SUPPORT FOR JIHAD It seemed that amongst all respondents, support for the idea of a Taliban regime taking over the country was relatively higher amongst the NWFP poor samples, Balochistan poor, Balochistan controls and NWFP control, with relatively much lower percentages being yielded by Punjab and Sindh collectively. This still leaves a lot of people in Balochistan and 797 798

Pew Global Attitudes Project, accessible at http://pewglobal.org/. ‗A New Lens on Pakistan,‘ Steven Kull, World Public opinion.org website, January 18, 2008, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brasiapacificra/443.php?lb=brasandpnt=443andnid=andid=.

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NWFP opposed to a Taliban regime takeover in Pakistan, which needs to be explained in its context.

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Table 5 Q. 8 : Are you in the favour of a Taliban takeover in Pakistan?

YES

Punjab Control Punjab Poor Sindh Control Sindh Poor NWFP Control NWFP Poor Balochistan Control Balochistan Poor

12 17 9 11 23 44 24 32

Number of respondents NO NO OPINION EITHER WAY

87 75 96 82 74 81 48 68

59 52 43 71 48 2 57 32

YES Total

158 144 148 164 145 127 129 132

7.59% 11.81% 6.08% 6.71% 15.86% 34.65% 18.60% 24.24%

Percentage NO NO OPINION EITHER WAY 55.06% 37.34% 52.08% 36.11% 64.86% 29.05% 50.00% 43.29% 51.03% 33.10% 63.78% 1.57% 37.21% 44.19% 51.52% 24.24%

The Pakistani Taliban are now in control of the northern province of Waziristan, adjacent to Afghanistan, and Swat,a previously progressive district. Taliban-type militias have also gained dominance in parts of the adjacent NWFP, such as Peshawar, which used to be one of the most open and accessible areas of the province, but has fallen prey to the stealthy advance of extremism. The citizenry in Peshawar have witnessed numerous suicide attacks, while it is practically impossible for outsiders to enter other NWFP towns such as Tank, Darra Adam Khel and Dera Ismail Khan. In Dera Ismail Khan, Pakistanis from other parts of the country are considered as outsiders, who need police protection to travel here. Girls' schools have been closed, torched or bombed, while video and music shops are usually bombed. Barbers are forbidden from shaving beards on the pain of even death. Relatively innocent social campaigns such as administration of polio vaccination drops have been halted amidst claims that it is a US plot to sterilize future generations. Even though Musharraf tried to contain these elements under pressure from the Americans, his strategy was mainly to try to regulate the madrassahs in NWFP and elsewhere in Pakistan that provide recruits for the Taliban, seizing their funds and banning them from admitting foreign students. This did not prove to be enough; the army was sent in, taking heavy casualties. The operations were halted with negotiations ensuing, which just gave time for the Taliban to further entrench themselves. All of these harsh measures have prompted a public backlash; the Taliban seem to have become unpopular amongst the masses, though of course, they have their ideological support base even amongst the powerless strata in the society, as evidenced by findings from the study. Though it is beyond the scope of the study to discuss it in detail, the militants seem to have exploited lacunae in distributive social justice in some areas, particularly FATA to their advantage.799When they took over the lucrative emerald mines in Swat for example, they announced the distribution of two thirds of the

799

See ‗ A profile of Baitullah Mehsud, September 2008 and ‗A profile of Mangal Bagh‘,November 2008, in the Pakistani Taliban pages, Featured reports section, The Long War Journal.

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proceeds of the mines amongst the hitherto meagerly paid miners, which must have been an almost miraculous financial incentive for these poor Swatis800. Table 6 Q. 9 :Do you condemn or support the 9/11 Al Qaeda attacks on US homeland? Punjab Control Punjab Poor Sindh Control Sindh Poor NWFP Control NWFP Poor Balochistan Control Balochistan Poor

Number of respondents Condone Condemn No Opinion Either Way

9 22 13 29 23 47 28 44

94 87 106 68 65 55 62 51

55 35 29 67 57 25 39

Condone

Percentage Condemn

158 144 148 164 145 127

5.70% 15.28% 8.78% 17.68% 15.86% 37.01%

59.49% 60.42% 71.62% 41.46% 44.83% 43.31%

34.81% 24.31% 19.59% 40.85% 39.31% 19.69%

129

21.71%

48.06%

30.23%

132

33.33%

38.64%

28.03%

Total

No Opinion Either Way

37

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Table 7 Q. 11 : Support for future attacks against US?

Number of respondents Strongly Strongly No opinion with against either way

Punjab Control Punjab Poor Sindh Control Sindh Poor NWFP Control NWFP Poor Balochistan Control Balochistan Poor

13 11 21 17 29 43 35

89 97 92 94 68 71 61

56 36 35 53 48 13 33

46

65

21

158 144 148 164 145 127

8.23% 7.64% 14.19% 10.37% 20.00% 33.86%

Percentage NO NO OPINION EITHER WAY 56.33% 35.44% 67.36% 25.00% 62.16% 23.65% 57.32% 32.32% 46.90% 33.10% 55.91% 10.24%

129

27.13%

47.29%

25.58%

132

34.85%

49.24%

15.91%

YES Total

Similarly, the Taliban have been quick to ask for money and commodities from the large feudal families801 in areas they have entrenched themselves in; they have reportedly been distributing the same amongst the poor masses. This could have served to increase their popularity amongst the downtrodden poor, and perhaps added to their support base, even

800

801

Emerald Mines of Swat Possessed by Taliban, Ernest Dempsey, March 28,2009, http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/270005. Only Taliban can do it, Saeed Qureshi,April 24, 2009, Pakistan Observer, http://pakobserver.net/ 200904/24/Articles02.asp.

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though the harsh measures of Talibanisation have adversely affected the lives of the common citizenry. The Western preconception of the typical Pakistani mindset is depicted as being oriented to religious conservatism and militancy. With this worldview, one would expect the majority of Pakistani population as being inclined to favour 9/11, or espouse further attacks against the US. Suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks would then be contextualized as nothing more than reactions to American military presence in Afghanistan, or a legitimate (sic) revenge for American unmanned drone attacks in Pakistan‘s tribal areas. The cyclical argument would run as thus; Pakistan‘s security forces are purportedly killing the tribal people in FATA and beyond at the behest of the US, which angers the Taliban, who exact retribution by targeting Pakistani state institutions as vengeance for the state‘s complicity with the US . This worldview has been shaped not only by madrassah education, but as elucidated by Fair( Fair 2007,2008), also by the regular state education system. Zia-ul Haq‘s government provided state patronage to Islamist groups and militancy, the media was used as a state Islamist propaganda apparatus, and radicalization of young people was allowed to continue unabated. Pervez Musharraf made an ineffective effort to thwart this Islamist nexus, but his manipulation to maneuver the staunchly Islamist MMA802 diluted his efforts, and tarnished his liberal credibility. However, even then, there is indication that even the relatively conservative rural society is slowly breaking free of the Islamist spell; this is reflected by the survey response, wherein a majority of the respondents opposed terrorist attacks and 9/11. A significant characteristic observed in this case was the large number of respondents who did not answer the question about 9/11, because they were either unaware of this, or were poorly informed.803 The question about American support within society revealed an almost unequivocal response of condemnation of the policies of US in the region; even though a majority of the sample population had expressed condemnation of 9/11 and had not supported attacks against the US, this response pattern can be indicative of an almost universal disapproval of the policies of the US amongst the sample population, while remembering that the respondent samples are not characteristic of the Pakistani population as a whole. The doubling of the intensity of drone attacks in the FATA areas which has seen an escalation of innocent civilian casualties, the inclusion of Balochistan as a drone target area, the US patronage of Musharraf which the majority of the Pakistanis perceived as a dictator, and recent hardliner statements by US diplomats regarding Pakistan‘s sovereignty may be just some of the grievances which may be exacerbating patterns of mistrust of the US amongst the Pakistani masses. The blowing of the trumpet about secular values, while remaining relatively oblivious to the core culturally conservative values of the Pakistani society, has meant that the West, particularly

802

803

Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) was an Islamic alliance between religious-political parties in Pakistan. In the Pakistani parliament, the MMA became a coalition opposition, formed after Pakistan became a part of the "Global War on Terror". The coalition was forged against President Pervez Musharraf because of his support for the United States' Global War on Terror. A commonly encountered notion by the research team was; ‗Didn‘t the US perpetrate 9/11 on itself?‘ This was expressed not as a conspiracy theory, but in relatively certain terms as if it had been proved, which portrays the simplistic worldview entertained by villagers in Pakistan.

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the US, has lost credibility amongst the masses.804 This has also provided leverage to the opposite camp, the Islamists, to harp on about the ‗callousness‘ of the ‗great Satan.‘

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Table 8 Q. 10 : Intensity of grievances against US?

Number of respondents Strongly Strongly No opinion with against either way

Total

Punjab Control Punjab Poor Sindh Control Sindh Poor NWFP Control NWFP Poor Balochistan Control Balochistan Poor

13 11 21 17 15 9 12 8

158 144 148 164 145 127 129 132

89 97 92 94 88 98 89 103

56 36 35 53 42 20 28 21

WITH

8.23% 7.64% 14.19% 10.37% 10.34% 7.09% 9.30% 6.06%

Percentage AGAINST NO OPINION EITHER WAY 56.33% 35.44% 67.36% 25.00% 62.16% 23.65% 57.32% 32.32% 60.69% 28.97% 77.17% 15.75% 68.99% 21.71% 78.03% 15.91%

The US has consistently justified its‘ drone piloted and manned attacks in the FATA region by claiming that someone important in the al Qaeda hierarchy was the target; alZawahiri has been quoted as the sought after target several times. However, it is debatable what the policy of unilateral incursion into the Pakistani soil would yield. This is particularly important in the context that Asif Ali Zardari, the husband of Benazir Bhutto, has taken over as the president of Pakistan; his is a tenuous position, with the onus on him to prove his political worth. He has time and time gain reiterated the sovereign nature of Pakistan, at the same time mentioning that he is aware of the danger posed by terrorism to Pakistan and the region.He has come to power riding a wave of popular support after the assassination of his wife Benazir Bhutto, and the US actions may potentially catalyze the disenchantment of an already disgruntled populace. Even though the US has so far negotiated only with the Pakistani leadership, it may be pertinent that the leadership is not ubiquitously representative of the Pakistani masses; Pakistani politicians tend to lose their credibility, sometimes after short periods of coming into power. It is also pertinent that the masses have recently proved their ‗street power‘, indicated by a civil society movement for the restoration of the ousted Chief Justice of Supreme court of Pakistan, Iftikhar Muhammad Choudhary, which turned into a mass movement. Another more recent ‗counter coup‘ in Punjab by opposition leaders Shahbaz and Nawaz Sharif overturned the table on Zardari‘s nominated governorship of Punjab. This attitudinal sea change in Pakistani politics, whence the masses have turned activist,while they were previously regarded as pliant and flexible by policy makers and politicians alike, has to be factored into any geo strategic projections about security in the area. It is obvious that the poor samples in NWFP and Baluchistan, and to a lesser extent, the control samples, tend to display a more radical worldview than their more affluent Punjabi and Sindhi counterparts. The study does not contend that poverty alone is to blame; there are 804

A recent poll puts Pakistan as the third most anti-American nation behind Turkey and Palestine. Umit Enginsoy, ―Turkey ‗Most Anti-U.S. Country‘ in World, Poll Syas,‖ Turkish Daily News, June 29, 2007, .

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a number of factors which interact on the individual within the ambit of the society to produce a radical outlook. However, the results of the survey do suggest that poverty by itself cannot be dismissively waved off as a minor determinant variable of radicalization in the Pakistani society. As Angrist‘s research reveals, there are different trajectories to determinant variables of terrorism in different theaters, which may very well be a case in Pakistan where poverty, rather than educational attainment may be a radicalizing factor, as demonstrated by Fair and Abbas (regarding education). It is also debatable that even employed persons may be facing crippling poverty in some areas of Pakistan, particularly the tribal areas. It seems that a majority of young men from rural backgrounds can find only relatively menial jobs.805 With time, the private sector‘s already constrained capacity to accommodate the youth cohort in employment is shrinking even more. Even though there has been some improvement in the macroeconomic structure of the country, it is inadequate to maintain pace with the growth of the youth cohort806 particularly, which is one of the largest in the world, assessed by international comparison of youth, including children, as a percentage of overall population.807 This youth cohort is disproportionately skewed towards the male population808,which obviously focuses emphasis on this cohort as having the potential to radicalize, if left marginalized in the mainstream Pakistani society. This demands a fresh look at contextualizing how poverty operates to radicalize the poor (including the seemingly employed) in Pakistan; macro level sociological overviews will not produce concrete data to be acted upon. This is particularly important in the respect of providing financial assistance to the beleaguered Pakistani state, since investment by the Pakistani government in the social sectors has been less than generous, even when it has been offered soft loans and outright aid packages in the past. Judging the responses elicited from the study, it seems that even though the Taliban may not be the ubiquitously preferred choice in place of the Pakistani state, they do have a certain amount of ideological support amongst the poor, and to a lesser extent, amongst the more affluent in NWFP and Balochistan. Factoring in the support for militant religious groups and the rampant grievances against the US, it seems that the poor are readier to substitute militancy instead of an ineffective governance structure as a solution to their problems; this may become increasingly relevant as the Taliban continue to gain footholds in the Frontier districts one after the another, and Balochistan seems poised to catch attention as the new Taliban militant haven. International attention by donors and strategists needs to be focused on Pakistan‘s poverty fault lines, lest they become ruptured by extremism.

805

The CIA World Fact Book‘s caption on unemployment in Pakistan aptly captures the current situation; it states ―Unemployment Rate: 6.5 % plus substantial underemployment (2006 est.).‖ 806 Pakistan‘s Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey 2007-08, p.202. 807 Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat; World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision; World Urbanization Prospects: The 2005 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpp. 808 Official statistics for 2006 estimate the male population at approximately 81 million and the female population at 75 million. See Federal Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Statistical Yearbook 2006 (Islamabad, 2007), p.309.

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CONCLUSION There has been some tendency amongst the intelligentsia in Pakistan to portray the current Taliban militancy as a revolution in response to class inequity and elitism809; this would be an empirical reading of the conjunction of a multitude of factors which has given rise to this movement. A recurring theme in this discourse is thus: ―The turmoil in Swat and in the adjoining areas is being portrayed by some as a contest between obscurantism and enlightenment, between bigotry and tolerance and between extremism and moderation. Actually, it is more like a movement of the common man against vast disparities in wealth and the failure of the authorities to provide justice, jobs and those essential services like education and health for which governments are supposed to exist.‖810 This seems like an empirical analysis of the factors which have spawned terrorism in Pakistan, not to mention that discourses of this nature have the potential of obscuring the existential threat to the state which lie beneath the surface of this movement. Dissecting such discourse further, a revolution involving class struggles may be defined as a social revolution, which can be contextualized as postulated by Theda Skocpol: ―Social revolutions are set apart from other sorts of conflicts and transformative processes above all by the combination of two coincidences: the coincidence of societal structural change with class upheaval; and the coincidence of political with social transformation...what is unique to social revolutions is that basic changes in social structures and in political structures occur together in a mutually reinforcing fashion. And these changes occur through intense socio-political conflicts in which class struggles play a key role.‖811 It certainly cannot be denied that there is a vast class disparity in Pakistan between the have and have nots, as I discussed in the section about the co relation of poverty with radicalization. However, would this be strong enough to generate a violent movement all of its own accord, minus the conjunction of foreign interference, the influx of Taliban in Pakistan after 2001,state patronage of Jihadism etc. If this was a class struggle, why have we not observed the proletariat throughout Pakistan, or at least in some areas in Pakistan rising up in unity with their poor brothers in Swat? How does the religious fervor and extremism factor into this projection; are the poor in Pakistan in Pakistan so prone to be militarized by their class deprivations? The survey I conducted regarding the proneness of poor masses to mobilize in militancy certainly does not seem to suggest so, though there is an observable tendency to be more radical in outlook than their more affluent counterparts. The question however is this; is this tendency strong enough to spawn movement like Taliban, and if they are, shouldn‘t then they be observable all across Pakistan (as poverty is endemic all over Pakistan), or shouldn‘t such movements have started off as nodal points and later coalesced into a mass social revolution? The answers to all these questions are coloured by a state of ambivalence within the Pakistani mindset. A certain schizoid state exists amongst the Pakistani policy echelons when dealing with the Taliban phenomenon; for instance, many retired army officers who have served during the Taliban heydays in Kabul perceive the Taliban in Pakistan as fighting to 809

See for example Mr. Asif Ezdi‘s opinion piece ―Thank you, Sufi Muhammad‖, The News, April 29 ,2009. Ibid. 811 Theda Skocpol,―States and social revolutions: a comparative analysis of France, Russia, and China,‖( Cambridge University Press, 1979). 810

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avenge the post 9/11 scenario in Pakistan, and subsequent operation in Lal Masjid. What is conveniently omitted in these accounts is the ―creation‖ of Pakistani Taliban with the sole utility to help the Kabul government of Mullah Omar after 1997, to offer stiff resistance to what would later become the Northern Alliance. The dispatch of proxy warriors from different areas of Pakistan to Afghanistan to assist the beleaguered Taliban regime is also conveniently ignored; amongst them were 10,000 warriors raised by Sufi Muhammad. Another inherently contradictory assertion is that ―the Taliban were helped by us earlier, but we ended training and assistance in 1989‖; this can be seen as a failed argument by reviewing some of the activities of mujahideen after 1989 as elucidated in Chapter 1.This misplaced assertion also conveniently omits the whole range of activities involving Jihadi organizations inside Pakistan and proxy warriors used in Kashmir. Another oft evoked response is that ―the Americans are supplying the Taliban with arms and equipment.‖ This flies in the face of logic by relying on conspiracy theory only; supposing for an instance that Baitullah Mehsud was aided with American money and material. How does then rationalize drone attacks directed at him and his establishment? If India was backing him up, how does it factor into the ‗drone attack‘ argument,which some theorists maintain, is intended to provoke TTP into hitting targets inside Pakistan ? Why was Mehud killed by a US drone attack? These simplistic arguments have tended to serve the uninformed and only added to the furor over Taliban, stymieing a national consensus.

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ANNEXURE 1 QUESTIONNAIRE 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

6. 7.

8. 9. 10. 11.

Education (1 = high* to 3 = low) Occupation (1 = high to 3 = low) Income (1 = high to 3 = low) How do you describe the intensity of your religiosity? (1 = high to 3 = low) Tell us your opinion on the following statement: "I support certain religious groups' use of violence to achieve their objectives." ? (1 = strongly support 2 = strongly oppose 3=No opinion either way) Should religious leaders acquire public office? (1 = strongly support 2 = strongly oppose 3=No opinion either way) Tell us your opinion on the following statement: "An Islamic state is the solution to all of Pakistan‘s problems‖ ? (1 = strongly support 2 = strongly oppose 3=No opinion either way) How do you feel about a Taliban takeover in Pakistan? (1 = strongly support 2 = strongly oppose 3=No opinion either way) How do you feel about the 9/11 attacks? (1 = strongly condemn 2 = strongly support 3=No opinion either way) Describe the intensity of your grievances against the United States. ? (1 = strongly support 2 = strongly oppose 3=No opinion either way) Do you condone further attacks in the future against U.S. targets? ? (1 = strongly support 2 = strongly oppose 3=No opinion either way)

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ANNEXURE 2: THE MOST AFFLUENT DISTRICTS PROVINCE WISE Province Punjab

Sind

NWFP

Balochistan

District Jhelum Sheikhupura Bhakkar Kasur Karachi Dadu Hyderabad Mirpur Khas Haripur Abbotabad Kohat Peshawar Ziarat Loralai Mastung Lasbela

HDI 0.703 0.621 0.581 0.577 0.618 0.535 0.532 0.522 0.629 0.598 0.537 0.531 0.697 0.556 0.528 0.514

Ranking within country 1 4 7 8 5 21 23 31 3 6 19 24 2 13 28 33

Source : Hussain Et Al,2003.

ANNEXURE 3: THE LEAST AFFLUENT DISTRICTS PROVINCE WISE

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Province Punjab

Sind

NWFP

Balochistan

District Muzzafargarh Dera Ghazi Khan Narowal Lodhran Tharparkar Jacobabad Shikarpur Larkana Shangla Kohistan Batgram Upper Dir Dera Bugti Jhalmagsi Kharan Kohlu

HDI 0.459 0.471 0.472 0.475 0.343 0.393 0.417 0.435 0.332 0.332 0.363 0.369 0.285 0.345 0.346 0.348

Ranking within country 59 53 52 51 88 77 72 67 90 89 83 82 91 87 86 85

Source : Hussain Et Al,2003.

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REFERENCES Angrist, Joshua. 1995. ―The Economic Returns to Schooling in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.‖ American Economic Review. December, 85:5, pp. 1065–087. Abbas, Sohail. 2007. Probing the Jihadi Mindset. National Book Foundation ,Islamabad. Ayesha Siddiqa Agha, Military INC, Inside Pakistan‘s Military Economy, Pluto Press, 2007. Becker, Gary S. 1968. ―Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach.‖ Journal of Political Economy. March/April, 76:2, pp. 169 – 217. Berrebi, Claude. 2003. ―Evidence About the Link Between Education, Poverty and Terrorism Among Palestinians.‖ Mimeo, Princeton University. Black, Ian and Benny Morris. 1991. Israel’s Secret Wars: The Untold History of Israeli Intelligence. London: Hamish Hamilton. Collier, Paul and Anne Hoeffler. 2000. ―Greed and Grievance in Civil War.‖ World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2355. Combs, Cindy C. and Martin W. Slann. 1997. International Encyclopedia of Terrorism. Chicago and London: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers. Cheema, Iftikhar Ahmed. 2005. A Profile of Poverty in Pakistan. Center for Research on Poverty Reduction and Income Distribution (CRPRID), Planning Commission, Islamabad. November. Economic Advisor's Wing (EAW), Finance Division, Government of Pakistan 2008. Pakistan Economic Survey 2007-08. Ehrlich, Isaac. 1973. ―Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation.‖ Journal of Political Economy. May, 81:3, pp. 521–65. Fair, C. Christine. 2007. Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: A New Look at the Militancy-Madrassa Connection. In Asia Policy, No. 4, July. Fair, C. Christine. 2008. Who Are Pakistan's Militants and Their Families? Terrorism and Political Violence, 20:49-65. Freeman, Richard. 1996. ―Why Do So Many Young American Men Commit Crimes and What Might We Do About It?‖ Journal of Economic Perspectives, Winter, 10:1, pp. 25– 42. Friedman, Robert. 1992. Zealots for Zion: Inside Israel’s West Bank Settlement Movement. New York: Random House. Glaeser, Edward L. 2002. ―The Political Economy of Hatred.‖ Mimeo, Harvard University, August. Green, Donald P., Jack Glaser and A. Rich. 1998. ―From Lynching to Gay-Bashing: The Elusive Connection Between Economic Conditions and Hate Crime.‖ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 75:1, pp. 82–92. Green, Donald P., Laurence H. McFalls and Jennifer K. Smith. 2001. ―Hate Crime: An Emergent Research Agenda.‖ Annual Review of Sociology,27, pp. 479–504. Hamm, Mark S. 1998. ―Terrorism, Hate Crime, and Antigovernment Violence: A Review of the Research,‖ in The Future of Terrorism: Violence in the New Millennium. Harvey W. Kushner, ed. London: SAGE, pp. 59–96. Hassan, Nasra. 2001. ―An Arsenal of Believers.‖ New Yorker, November 19, pp. 36–41.

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Jefferson, Philip and Frederic L. Pryor. 1999. ―On the Geography of Hate.‖ Economics Letters. December, 65:3, pp. 389–95. Hussain, Akmal et. al. 2003. Pakistan: National Human Development Report - Poverty, Growth and Governance. UNDP. Kemp, Robert. 2008. Religious Extremism and Militancy in the Pashtun Areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. In BC Journal of International Affairs. Volume 11, Spring 2008. Kressel, Neil J. 1996. Mass Hate: The Global Rise of Genocide and Terror. New York: Plenum Press. Krueger, Alan. 2003. ―Poverty Doesn‘t Create Terrorists.‖ New York Times. May 29, Business section. Krueger, Alan and Jo¨rn-Steffen Pischke. 1997.―A Statistical Analysis of Crime Against Foreigners in Unified Germany.‖ Journal of Human Resources. Winter, 32:1, pp. 182– 209. Landes, William. 1978. ―An Economic Study of U.S. Aircraft Hijackings, 1961–1976.‖ Journal of Law and Economics. 21:1, pp. 1–31. Lerner, Daniel. 1958. The Passing of Traditional Society. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press. Azam, Muhammad ,2009. Radicalization in Pakistan; Socio cultural realities, Conflict and Peace Studies, Vol.2 ,No.1, Jan-Mar 2009. Manski, Charles and Steven Lerner. 1977. ―The Estimation of Choice Probabilities from Choice Base Samples.‖ Econometrica. November, 45:8, pp. 1977–988. Miguel, Edward. 2003. ―Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach.‖ Mimeo, U.C. Berkeley, June. Neff, Donald. 1999. ―Jewish Terrorists Try to Assassinate Three Palestinian Mayors.‖ Washington Report on Middle East Affairs. June, pp. 87–88. Piehl, Anne Morrison. 1998. ―Economic Conditions, Work, and Crime,‖ in Handbook on Crime and Punishment. Michael Tonry, ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 302– 19. Piazza, James A. 2003. ―Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic Development and Social Change.‖ Mimeo, Meredith College, Raleigh, North Carolina. Raper, Arthur. 1969 [1933]. The Tragedy of Lynching. Montclair, N.J.: Patterson Smith; Reprint series in Criminology, Law Enforcement, and Social Problems, Publication No. 25. Roy, A. D. 1951. ―Some Thoughts on the Distribution of Earnings.‖ Oxford Economic Papers. 3,pp. 135–46. Rubin, Donald. 1987. Multiple Imputation for Nonresponse in Surveys. New York: John Wiley. Ruhm, Christopher. 2000. ―Are Recessions Good for Your Health?‖ Quarterly Journal of Economics. May, 115:2, pp. 617–50. Russell, Charles and Bowman Miller. 1983.―Profile of a Terrorist,‖ in Perspectives on Terrorism. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources Inc., pp. 45–60. Sandler, Todd and Walter Enders. 2001. ―An Economic Perspective on Transnational Terrorism.‖ Mimeo, University of Southern California, December. Sandler, Todd, John T. Tschirhart and Jon Cauley. 1983. ―A Theoretical Analysis of Transnational Terrorism.‖ American Political Science Review. March, 77:1, pp. 36–54. Shinwari, Nadeem. 2008. Understanding FATA: Attitudes Towards Governance, Religion and Society in Pakistan's Federally Administrated Tribal Areas. Published

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by the Community Appraisal and Motivation Program (CAMP). Downloadable from the website: www.understandingfata.org. Social Development in Pakistan 2004: Combating Poverty: Is Growth Sufficient?, Social Policy and Development Centre, report accessible at http://www.spdcpak.com/pubs/pubdisp.asp?id=anr6. Sokolsky, Richard and Joseph McMillan. 2002. ―Foreign Aid in our Own Defense.‖ New York Times. February 12, Op-ed page. Social Policy Development Center (SPDC). 2004. Combating Poverty: Is Growth Sufficient? Annual Report, 2004. Stern, Jessica. 2000. ―Pakistan‘s Jihad Culture.‖ Foreign Affair. November/December, 79:6, pp. 115–26. Taylor, Maxwell. 1988. The Terrorist. London: Brassey‘s Defence Publishers. Tyson, Laura. 2001. ―It‘s Time to Step Up the Global War on Poverty.‖ Business Week, December 3, p. 26. 144 Journal of Economic Perspectives. World Food Program (WFP)/Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI). 2003. Food Insecurity in Rural Pakistan.

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Chapter 5

THE NEW TALIBAN AND THE SOCIETY This chapter is a look at the humanitarian disasters caused in the wake of the militancy, and the ensuing anti Taliban counterinsurgency in Pakistan. It also examines popular Pakistani sentiment about terrorism in their country and their perception of United States, elucidated with the help of authoritative surveys. Trajectories of populist opinion are highlighted, indicating that while the common Pakistani has made a rational choice to reject terrorism, there has been a simultaneously expressed resentment against America and its policies, particularly in the region.

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CIVIL SOCIETY The past eight years have seen a great deal of unrest and human suffering in the tribal region, particularly in the North and South Waziristan agencies. Pakistan's Human Rights Commission (HRCP) has put the number of people displaced by conflict in Bajaur, Swat, Waziristan and other northern areas at 700,000,while at least 2,000 civilian deaths have occurred over the past year in the conflict zones. Hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced, women‘s‘ colleges have been torched, journalism has been stifled and the journalists either persecuted or murdered. The plight of the professionals in these areas is also quite dire. One of the biggest problems is that of refugees. Unfortunately, the numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) has been rising steadily, which has given birth to one of the country‘s worst humanitarian disasters. The launching of a full-fledged military campaigns by state forces from the end of 2008 onwards, and the subsequent collateral losses of non-combatants led to a large-scale displacement of tribesmen from the violence-hit areas. Hundreds of families were forced to move to the neighboring towns, or put up at open spaces in district adjacent to tribal areas, like Tank district. Lawlessness, and the failure of the government to establish its writ in the region has also forced thousands to flee. Continuous shelling and bombing has destroyed a large number of houses besides causing several civilian casualties. Tribal elders from Wana, Mir Ali, Tank and other parts of NWFP have received hundreds of families from different parts of the troubled areas, an influx which has increased exponentially in size with time, taxing the already overstretched tribal resources to accommodate the same. The Mehsud tribesmen from Tank and Dera Ismail Khan have made most of the arrangements for the

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displaced people, but many more were left to the elements than could be sheltered. The refugee problem has also resulted in a drastic change of lifestyle for the IDPs. Some tribals living a secluded life in their hitherto mountainous homeland have been forced to flee and seek refuge in metropolitan cities like Lahore, Peshawar and Rawalpindi. The only means of sustenance for the families is doing menial jobs like polishing shoes on the roadside,sometimes for providing one square meal a day. Others are working as pawn-brokers selling small electronic gadgetry, shoes made in China, and other utilities. Their families, used to living in spacious areas in the mountains, are closeted in small dark and dingy rooms with inadequate light and sunshine. While visiting some of them on an occasion, they informed the author that their elders had long been telling them that the existing peace would be disturbed in the area, and that there would be tribal clashes of the people living on one mountain with the other. They were sure that the prediction had come true. While talking of his frequent migrations, Akramullah, a small electronic shopkeeper of Charmang-a sub-district of Bajaur Agency reported812 that his family had to undergo rigors of traveling on foot in the rugged mountains up to 30 Kilometers for reaching Mohmand Agency, and then to hire a pickup van to reach Pirpai Camp when it had already been closed in consequence of a ceasefire agreement between the Government and the militants. Finally deciding to get back to Bajaur after the announcement of ceasefire which was to last for three days only, the family again had to flee. Thousands of tribesmen have been marching along with their womenfolk and children in search of food and safety, and their lifelong savings have been consumed by transportation costs. It has also been reported on the basis of authority of none less than Mufti Mansoor Ali813, Director of Pakistan Red Cross Society, that 31 camps of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) established in Timergarah area gave a deserted look when the Bajaur ceasefire was announced, which lasted for ten days only; though there was heavier rush once bombing and shelling was resumed. The tribesmen and their families suffered tiring journeys over the rugged mountains, because roads had to be closed for tactical requirements. There are many such tales of woe reported; Shoaib ali mentioned814 that he traveled on foot without any food and water along with his female family members and children, reaching Timergarah after 12 hours. Shoaib Ali had to sell off his cattle for paying transportation charges to the van owner, for an onward journey to Kacha Garhi only to know that the camp couldn‘t accommodate him and his family. From there he had to move to Sheikh Yasin camp at Mardan by hiring a pickup van and succeeded in finding a tent and acquiring the status of an Internally displaced person at long last. Despite involvement of UN agencies like United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), local Pakistani NGOs,Pakistan Red Cross Society (PRCS) and participation of the Federal and Provincial Governments of Pakistan and NWFP respectively, the lot of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) has not improved. The Refugee camps established for the purpose are presenting a rather gloomy and grim picture, providing inadequate and insufficient living facilities; for example Abdul Qadeer, an IDP, mentioned that although these agencies have provided shelter, they have failed to provide food,drinking water, and electricity in the Kacha Garhi and Sheikh Yasin Camps. Scarcity of water in Kacha Garhi is partially taken care of by 10-15 small water tanks; whereas IDPs have to make 812

On the run,Umer Farooq,November 2008,Herlad. Ibid. 814 Ibid 813

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their own arrangements for getting potable water from residential area surrounding Sheik Yasin Camp. According to Shoaib815, situation in Palosa Camp at Charsadda and Benazir camp at Risalpur is slightly better. Palosa camp established in the premises of a Teachers Training Institute provides running water and electricity and is affording a facility of four washrooms; which of course are insufficient for the tent population of 4,000 persons who have to queue up in front of the washrooms for getting their turn. Similarly Abdul Raheem, a resident of Inayat Kallay from the Bajaur area heading a family of eight members, complains of non-provision of food in Kacha Garhi camp, and the family has to depend on the generosity of the local population of Peshawar. Ali of PRCS admits of the limited resources available for the refugee population in the 31 camps established in Timergarah; which could barely accommodate 300 families at that time. These camps were full to their respective capacity and unable to accommodate further arrivals whenever the occasion arose. Besides, these camps had to be opened and closed intermittently on the resumption and cessation of hostilities, due to the unpredictable situation and unplanned activity. Resultantly, there is no definite pattern for the shift of tribal population from Bajaur with an estimated population shift of 400,000 people, from which only 18,000 could be accommodated in the camps. According to a source from District Coordination Officer Mardan, some 50,000 are living in Mardan. Some of the better placed and financially well-off Bajauris have made their own residential arrangements at Peshawar, Rawalpindi, and Lahore; whereas others are staying with their relations as guests in different part of Pakistan. These less fortunate people have been rendered homeless in their own country for no fault of their own, and have been suffering casualties at the hands of militants. They also face death by accident, by coming in the range of cross-fire between militants and the Government troops. The UNHCR has asked for a sum of 17 million US dollars to improve the lot of the refugees. The situation in Kurram agency is also alarming, where a human rights disaster is in the making. The French news agency AFP reported on August 17,2008 that some 200 people have thus far died in the most recent bout of sectarian fighting in the remote tribal district of Kurram, including some 23 who died in fresh overnight fighting between rival Shi'ite and Sunni tribes. Some 500,000 residents of Parachinar, a Shi'ite enclave and the district headquarters of Kurram, has been in a virtual siege for the past several months, as all roads to the town have been blocked, and the Taliban have attacked aid convoys en route to the town. Media reports indicate that there is a chronic shortage of food and medicine in Parachinar. An RFE/RL correspondent in Khost reports that many Shi'ite and Sunni families from Kurram have gone across the border into Afghanistan's southeastern Khost and Paktia provinces. However, the biggest exodus of refugees is from Bajaur agency. Up to 300,000 people have had to flee fighting in Bajaur, but an ominous sign is that their resentment is directed not at the Pakistani Taliban, who took over their area, but the army, whose onslaught with jets and helicopters forced them to abandon their homes and livelihoods. These deeply conservative Islamic refugees have had to drop the strict purdah that the women observed at home, due to living conditions at the tented cities which have sprung up in refugee camps. Families are usually of the size of 8 or sometimes 12 ,who are constrained to live together in single, draughty tents, and a bitter winter seems imminent. The reports emanating from the area indicate the grimness of the situation: 815

Ibid

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―At the sprawling Kungi camp, set on a hill just outside the town of Timergara, the only toilet is a communal ditch over which the men squat. The women use the surrounding woods. 'We get little food. We don't have enough water to drink, let alone the chance to bathe,' said Gul Mohammad, 25, who arrived at Kungi with seven family members. 'We brought nothing. We just came here to save our lives.' There is no electricity. Water is trucked in and food is distributed by the government and aid agencies, but supplies are very short. Inhabitants spend much of their day foraging for wood as cooking fuel, or buy it with the little money they have. There are at least eight similar camps scattered across the North West Frontier Province, which adjoins Bajaur. Already there are outbreaks of disease, with acute diarrhoea and respiratory illnesses being treated by medical aid workers. There are 30,000 people living in official camps and there are contingencies being prepared by the United Nations to accommodate 100,000, as people continue to flood out of Bajaur. Soon Bajaur will be virtually empty. The UN believes that a further 200,000 will be put up in houses by 'host families', often relatives…..At first it was thought the army would finish the job within a month, but with no signs of the operation ending these camps are being given more permanent facilities. There are fears that the sites could be infiltrated by Taliban militants, whose wives and children are already living there. When one Western aid worker asked a group of women at prayer who they were praying for, back came the reply: 'Our men fighting the army.'…….Should Pakistan finally decide that war is the only way to deal with the extremists, the fate of the people of Bajaur could be replicated across the tribal area, home to around three million people. The armed forces attack indiscriminately, according to Mohammad Ibrahim, 15. 'Our village is completely vacant now. There was constant shelling, so we ran. They drop bombs on mosques, on schools, they don't look. We're the ones dying, but they say that terrorists have been killed.'……. 'Houses are being used by the militants as bunkers. They're firing from there. Therefore all houses from where the firing is coming are being engaged by the security forces,' said the chief army spokesman, Major-General Athar Abbas. 'To our knowledge, the civilians of this area have left.'…. The Pakistani Taliban are defending the region with help from Afghan Taliban, Arabs, Chechens and other foreigners from al-Qaeda. The movement in Bajaur is being directed by Qari Ziaur Rahman, an Afghan Taliban commander, who is also overseeing the insurgency in the neighbouring Afghan provinces of Kunar and Nooristan. 'The mujahideen have completely gained control on the ground [in Bajaur]. The American agenda to destroy the mujahideen and all the [Pakistan] government options have failed to defeat us,' Rahman said in an interview with a local journalist. On the outskirts of the provincial capital, Peshawar, an old refugee camp for Afghans, who were forced out of it only a year ago, has had to take on a grim new existence, this time for Pakistan's own people. There are already about 5,500 Bajaur refugees at the Kacha Garhi camp, a wide, flat, wind-blown expanse, and there are plans to expand it to accommodate 21,000. Even here, in a city, there is little food and water and no electricity or gas, so people gather brushwood and branches to cook. Mohammad Jan, standing outside his family's tent at Kacha Garhi, ran from Bajaur when nine people from his village were killed by the army. 'There were no Taliban in our area,' Jan insisted. 'It is ordinary people who are dying. This is some kind of game, a double game that I don't understand.' One newly arrived elderly woman died of dehydration in the long, chaotic queue to register with the authorities at Kacha Garhi, causing a mini-riot. Mohammad Zahra said he had 20 mouths to feed, his children and those of three brothers. 'But we only get a little food,' he said, displaying a handful.‖816 816

Thousands stuck in camps of no return, Saeed Shah in Timergara, Pakistan, The Observer, Sunday October 26 2008.

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In this scenario, many professionals such as doctors, teachers and journalists who opted to stay back had to accept any of the three options available to them -- leave the area, give up

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817

their profession or establish terms with the militants. The last option, which also included the provision of monetary and professional services to the militants, however, was only possible at the expense of annoying the authorities and very few dared to go for it. According to the 1998 census there were 1,257,602 people living in the Swat valley; after a decade the numbers are projected to have increased to around 1.5 million. It is estimated that no less than between one third and half of that population has fled the raging battles in Swat; contextualizing these figures in actual terms, between half and three-quarters of a million people are potential internally displaced persons, with the onus on the state to provide food, shelter, water, medical care and security for this large number of refugees. It is significant that with the number of IDPs projected to increase to three million, one of the world's poorest countries will have to host one of the world‘s largest populations of displaced persons. It should be noted that out of the 5 million Afghan refuges, only one-half have returned to Afghanistan. This is a debilitating burden on a fragile economy, which is already overburdened by the existing Afghan refugee problem regarding which commitments about resource inputs of the Pakistan government do not seem to be abating. In March 2009, the Pakistan government signed a pact with UNHCR to continue to host 1.7 million Afghan refugees until 2012; under the auspices of this multilateral pact, the UNHCR is projected to raise $140 million from the international community to finance the Refugee Affected and Hosting Areas (RAHA) programme. This is an ambitious task, with projects as diverse as boosting employment prospects, to repairing farm to market roads, and improving crop and livestock production amongst many others in the pipeline. The initial plight of the IDPs is quite pathetic before the organizational lag catches up with the influx of the homeless and the destitute. The IDPs from the Swat operation tend to flee to camps in Swabi and Mardan, which are warmer areas as compared to Swat‘s comparatively cooler climate; this has deleterious effects on these persons, who tend to be sequestrated in stuffy, crowded makeshift camps. The lack of provision of clean drinking water aggravates the plight of these people since they are not acclimatized to the much warmer weather, and thus thirst and subsequent dehydration become significant issues in these refugee camps. Lack of adequate medical facilities has aggravated the plight of the sick, particularly the children. The process of Registration is also problematic, since utilization of facilities has to be preceded by registration with the camp authorities. This implies that sometimes many hundreds of people have to line up in front of inadequately manned registration desks, which only increases the suffering of these exhausted IDPs. This is true of almost all the makeshift camps. Another predicament of makeshift camps is that if the conflict drags on, they might become semi permanent features like the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan; this has long term implications of these areas turning into dens of criminality or radicalization. The threat these camps may face from suicide bombers is also quite pertinent, especially in the medium to long term. There is a hugely disproportionate militant ‗kills‘ to IDP displacement ratio; during Rah e Haq Four in 2009, 751 Taliban in the Swat-Dir-Buner area were killed at the cost of 29 soldiers. The refugee displacement ratio was proportionately alarming; for the death of 741 817

News on Sunday,13-4-08,http://jang.com.pk/thenews/apr2008-weekly/nos-13-04-2008/spr.htm

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Taliban there was the displacement of over a million refugees.818This is also disproportionately larger compared to the Bajaur operation; for a thousand Taliban killed in Bajaur, there were nearly 200,000 refugees who fled the fighting.819 According to some estimates, up to 80 per cent IDPs are putting up outside camps, preferring to put up with host families with whom they share common kinship bonds. Such host families (predominantly)in Peshawar, Lahore and Rawalpindi have tended to accommodate up to 20 relatives on an ad hoc basis, which put great strain on their own resources. As a cultural preference, IDPs from the northern areas have seemed to prefer to be based with relatives rather than in tent villages; shared cultural bonds may be a driving factor. With the operations in full swing in response to escalating militancy, there is a threat of permanent exodus looming over the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) which are victims to the Taliban-Pakistani state conflict; this has the potential of becoming a permanent feature like the Afghan refuges. Journalists were an exception within the professional groups fleeing tribal areas mentioned as above, as these areas seemed ripe for reporting which was in high demand across the world. However, reporting about the Taliban in FATA and Swat is not easy; wherein a majority of the Journalists‘ community members opted to establish terms with the militants that meant they had to take extra care while reporting events. ―We were asked not to use terms such as 'terrorists' or 'infiltrators'," says an anonymous tribal reporter from Miramshah, the agency headquarters of North Waziristan Agency, talking to a news reporter. "Earlier, we were barred from using the word 'militants' and directed to write 'mujahideen' instead."820 To start with, the press always had a restricted role in the two Waziristans and rest of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The political agents and their minions, as well as the powerful tribal chiefs, saw to it that there was no criticism of their misdeeds. The political administration could easily implicate a reporter in cases and take him to task by using the draconian Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR). The vast powers at its disposal meant that tribal journalists were forever vulnerable and, therefore, largely unable to report freely. Deployment of Pakistan Army troops in South Waziristan, North Waziristan, and other tribal agencies for carrying out operations against local and foreign militants brought a new factor into equation as journalists now had to contend with a force that didn't like criticism and enjoyed authority overriding every other organ of the state. Initially, tribal journalists prospered reporting from strategic Waziristan towns such as Wana, Makeen, Spinkai Raghzai, Miranshah and Mir Ali. They quickly learnt the tricks of the trade, acquired reporting and technical skills and bought expensive digital cameras to make films of the military operations, militants' activities and tribal jirgas. The international focus on Waziristan, on account of its importance as a theatre of the US-led 'war on terror', brought the tribal reporters into the limelight and enabled them to earn fame and money. However, it also earned them tribal jealousy and the wrath of the parties to the Waziristan conflict. Some tribal journalists namely Allah Noor Wazir, Mir Nawab Wazir and Hayatullah Khan got killed; some were attacked and injured, and almost all others had to shift from the two 818

Editorial: Going after the terrorists in Swat, Daily Times, May 14, 2009, http://www.dailytimes. com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\05\14\story_14-5-2009_pg3_1. 819 Editorial: Going after the terrorists in Swat, Daily Times, May 14, 2009, http://www.dailytimes. com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\05\14\story_14-5-2009_pg3_1 820 Ibid. Taliban in Pakistan: A Chronicle of Resurgence : A Chronicle of Resurgence, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook

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Waziristans to relatively safer places like Tank, Dera Ismail Khan, Bannu, Peshawar and Islamabad. Very few journalists are now based in North and South Waziristan, and it is rare for those operating from outside the tribal region to venture into the area. Most of them have become extra careful while reporting the Waziristan conflict due to the risks involved in the job.Reporting is now largely confined to publicizing the claims made by the spokesmen of the military and the militants. The Pakistan Army spokesman,who is generally a Major General,who is also Director General of Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), is the most widely quoted person on the happenings in Waziristan. Whatever he says is considered an authentic government version, and no story is complete unless he is available for comment. He usually describes soldiers killed in battle as martyrs and enemy fighters as terrorists and miscreants, and the Pakistani media faithfully reports in the same manner. There is no way the information provided by him could be confirmed from independent sources such as press reporters, human rights activists, political workers and lawyers. Other government officials and security personnel who sometimes pass on selective information about acts of violence to reporters request anonymity. The militants have devised their own way of providing information about their operations to members of the media. They use satellite phones, cell phones and even land phone-lines to contact a select number of reporters to give them their version of events, including attacks by militants. Their priority is to have their news broadcast on BBC radio's Pashto and Urdu services because that is their window to the world, and the best way to reach the tribal people, including their own men and supporters. They are largely unaware of news and views that are published about them in the English and even Urdu press, since television is outlawed in their part of Waziristan. In North Waziristan, the militants during the last year or so, have used four spokesmen to tell their side of the Waziristan story to the world. Tariq Jamil was their first spokesman, followed by Abdullah Farhad and Abdul Hye Ghazi in quick succession. Apparently, all used fake names to hide their identity. Ahmadullah Ahmadi was their newest spokesman. So high is the level of interest in the Western media about Waziristan that reporters are sometimes willing to take risks, employ objectionable methods and spend any amount of money to get good stories and footage. Two Western reporters were very happy when they recently got to speak to some North Waziristanis who had brought their injured relatives to the Hayatabad Medical Complex in Peshawar recently for treatment. It was the first time that they were able to talk first-hand to tribesmen from Waziristan, and hear stories of human suffering as a result of bombing by Pakistan Air Force jet-fighters and gunship helicopters in the Mir Ali area in North Waziristan. It was a story worth telling because it is not often that foreign journalists manage to meet civilians who suffer the most during military operations in Waziristan. For them, and also for most Pakistani journalists, Waziristan has been made inaccessible by the government despite claims that there were no curbs on the media. The more radical elements among the tribal and foreign militants and common criminals have also contributed their bit to keep journalists out of Waziristan.821 The rules of reporting by locally based journalists tends to be dictated by the Taliban. One journalist revealed that during their long-winded discussions with the militants, they were warned by Taliban not to use strong words in their newspaper stories. "We told them 821

Ibid.

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we're mere employees of the organizations that we represent, and that we're not policy makers," he said. Journalists' reports from the troubled areas, therefore, tended to be harsher towards the government and at times landed them in trouble, too. Hayatullah is a case in point. A photojournalist, Hayatullah was working for the Islamabad-based Urdu daily, Ausaf, as well as for the European Press Photo Agency when he was abducted on December 5, 2005. His body was recovered in Mir Ali on June 16, 2006.According to his younger brother, Ihsanullah Khan Dawar, Hayatullah was murdered because he had reported the US planes' killing of the North Waziristan people. "He released pictures of the remnants of the US-made Hellfire missiles that had killed Al Qaeda operative Hamza Rabia in North Waziristan‖, said Insanullah. "Later, he told the journalists conducting the interview that he could be killed for releasing the pictures."822 A worrying trend has been the unwillingness of the electronic media in particular to speak out openly against the Taliban. This has underlying implications that the Taliban in Pakistan are relatively successful at suppressing the freedom of press by sheer intimidation. The establishment of the so called Qazi courts has given even more leverage to the Taliban to suppress free journalism; purportedly, those journalists publishing western ‗propaganda lies‘ would be tried in Qazi courts in areas controlled by the Taliban. This threat is backed by muscle; the assassination of Musa Khan Khel in February 2009 amply demonstrated this. Khel had arrived in the Swat town of Mingora for covering a story about a peace march to the town, led by Sufi Muhammad.. Khel's body was discovered close to the town of Matta several hours after he had suddenly disappeared; he had been shot several times in his upper body, and his throat was partly slit. In addition to the journalists in the region, doctors and teachers are two other professional communities who have stalwartly hung on to their task in these troubled areas. A lot of them wished to continue in the Waziristan agency despite all odds but a lot of them could not. People like Dr Sultan Nawaz Kundi (Physician), Dr Sadiqullah (Eyes specialist) and Dr Pukraj (gynecologist) were forced out of the areas for one reason or the other. The principal of the only government college for women in Miramshah was expelled from the area after the militants raised objections to her 'conduct'. The facility was bombed after she left, and the college remains closed ever since. A schoolteacher from the Barki tribe of South Waziristan, along with his fellow tribesmen, refused to move to a safer place when a heavy battle started between militants and the security forces early this year. The reason for his refusal was his attachment with his 80 years old mother, who was too frail to walk. It was only after the fighting intensified that he decided to leave. However, he could not save his mother who passed away while he was carrying her on his shoulders on his way to Tank district on foot.823This is just a cursory rendering of the harrowing accounts of suffering faced by people, in the wake of operations started in response to militancy. One of the primary targets of the fundamentalists has been women. Besides making them adhere to a strict form of burqa, women in these areas have tended to disappear more or less completely from the public sphere. Women‘s educational facilities have never been particularly good in the tribal agencies that make up much of Pakistan‘s frontier with Afghanistan. The female literacy rate for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, which include Waziristan and Bajaur, is believed to be as low as 3 percent.

822 823

Ibid. Ibid.

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The Taliban in Afghanistan were strictly opposed to women‘s education, which they saw as an evil. The Taliban, born and bred in refugee camps in Quetta and Peshawar, were brought up to be wary of women as instruments of the devil, as temptations to be resisted strictly. This is the mindset that was carried by them to Afghanistan and the same which is being replicated by the Taliban in Pakistan. One of the most noticeable features of the past two years of conflict involving the Taliban in tribal Pakistan, particularly in Waziristan and Swat, has been the Islamic movement‘s response to the role of women in society. This harsh attitude is aptly reflected in the case of the Pakistani Taliban, who look upon female education as a social evil. Maulana Fazlullah of Swat declared in one of his broadcasts, 'Education of girls will deviate our generations from the right path. They must be restricted to their homes'. 824 His followers destroyed 40 girl's schools in less than a year from July, 2007 to May, 2008; which tendency was only interrupted on his ceasefire agreement with the security forces. When hostilities were resumed after the ceasefire agreement, the immediate target were 24 girls schools which were bombed or torched within a short span of twenty days. Sardar Hussain Barbak, Education Minister of NWFP ,has mentioned that 64 girls schools have been destroyed in Swat valley alone. Throwing a cursory glance on the overall scenario ,out of a total of 566 girls schools in Swat‘s different areas, 131825 have either been torched or closed; thus sending back 17,200 girl students to their homes by denying them an opportunity of exposure to education. Bajaur Agency doesn't present any happier picture either, and the same applies to North and South Waziristan, where no girl students are going to their respective schools; because all female educational institutions have been destroyed or closed down826. As the only alternative, parents of female students have admitted their daughters in private schools through their own resources, having shifted to suburban cities like Peshawar. There is continuing blackmail on the part of the militants, through handbills thrown in girls‘ houses and schools mentioning that 'we have decided to bomb the school building. If any student shows up, she will be responsible for her own death'827. Obviously, in the face of such threats, it is just not possible to resume any semblance of female education. The procedure by which female educational institutions are destroyed tends to be similar. These militants show discretion at times to the extent that they do not kill the students and take copies of the Holy Quran and other religious literature with them safely. They then tie up the watchmen and set the building on fire. There are harsher instances as well; a female teacher in Mohmand Agency was shot for not covering herself from head to toe. However, Taliban in Swat deny that they have been involved in these attacks on women‘s institutions. Mullah Noor Allam, a spokesman for the Taliban in Swat, says the militant group is not responsible for destroying the schools. ―We did not burn schools in Swat that was someone else, probably splinter groups. They certainly do not fight for Maulana Fazlullah,‖ he told a reporter. ―In fact we support women having an education, such as nurses and doctors. But there are some fields a woman should not work, like the armed forces and engineering.‖ The Pakistan Taliban movement blames ―foreign elements‖ for the school burnings which they say have been calculated to discredit them as a political movement. 824

The Ticking Bomb, Massoud Ansari, Herald, August 2008. Ibid 826 Ibid. 827 Ibid. 825

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―We don‘t oppose education for women, but (we) want a favourable environment for them. We don‘t want Western-style co-education without dupata (veil),‖ Noor Allam said. Whether or not the Taliban is responsible for all the attacks, the destruction of schools has had a deep psychological impact on women throughout Pakistan‘s tribal areas, even in regions not controlled by the Taliban. ―There are no Taliban here (but) I‘m afraid to go to school,‖ explains 10-year-old Serish, a student at Chukdar High School in the Kurz area of Dir Agency, a tribal area controlled by the government that lies a half hour drive south of Swat. ―What if they burn the classroom while we are inside?‖ Although Dir has remained relatively peaceful,it sits precariously between two regions, Bajaur and Swat, where there‘s intense fighting between the Pakistan army and pro-Taliban militias. ―Once a young man jumped into our class with his face covered. We all screamed in panic, we thought he was Taliban,‖ recalls Mrs Nizhad, who teaches fine art at Chukdar. ―In the end it was just a local boy doing some silly practical joke but he got us very worried. I‘ve been teaching for nine years and I‘ve never felt this scared,‖ she says. ―I don‘t enjoy my job very much anymore. After the school burnings (in Swat) we have all been very scared.‖ Sara, a high school student from Swat now living in Kurz Dir, says she doesn‘t know who is trying to stop girls going to school. ―The conflicts in Bajaur and Swat will only be stopped if the terrorism is eliminated. But to do that (the Pakistan authorities) need to address the root causes,‖ she adds. Sara complains that the most difficult thing about life is going outside to work ―especially because you have to wear the burka and there are strict rules (about where women can go and with whom)‖. Situation in Parachinar is comparatively happier. The female colleges set up in the year 1995 are functioning relatively well with 900 students on the rolls. Whereas militants are taking harsh measures for dissuading female students from studies, the boys are being taken by these insurgents for militancy. A tribesman from Darra Adam Khel reported the case of his 14 years old son, who was taken for insurgency by these militants and recounts the difficulties encountered in bringing him back828. A diverse range of professions are under threat in the Terromodels, with the Taliban being intolerance even of persons employed in humanitarian jobs. Threats have been received by diverse sections of the populace in Peshawar; in April 2009 a letter was allegedly received from the TTP,warning doctors in the public sector hospitals of Peshawar to stop wearing shirts and trousers or face suicide bombing. Understandably, fear gripped the large medical community, who were constrained to heed the warning. This becomes all the more relevant since the law and order promoting agencies have been perceived to be helpless against the Taliban militants.829 Thus, it seems obvious that these areas have been hit hard by militancy, and even if the militancy could be curbed, the humanitarian disasters will haunt these areas for years to come.

828

Ibid

829

Style police, The News, May 07, 2009, http://www.thenews.com.pk/arc_news.asp?id=8.

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HATING THE TALIBAN AND U.S. A recently conducted poll in Pakistan has revealed escalating unpopularity of the Taliban movement since the inception of a unified movement under Baitullah Mehsud in 2007: the unpopularity of the Taliban amongst the Taliban masses rose from 34 percent to 81 percent during the period under review.830 This survey finding was coupled with the perception of al Qaeda as a potent existential threat to Pakistan, in roughly similar proportions to the rising unpopularity of the Taliban in Pakistan. Strikingly, this unpopularity trend was shared by United States amongst the general populace of Pakistan, which viewed the American policies in the War against Terrorism in general with great skepticism, particularly regarding the American South Asian policy with extreme distrust. The significant turnaround of perception against the Taliban and al Qaeda is attributable to the typical short sighted polices of the Taliban militia ,which they demonstrated in Afghanistan and repeated in Pakistan; an almost obsessive pre occupation with establishing territorial control and then attempting to impose their violent,intolerant version of Sharia on confounded masses. Whereas in 2007, less than half of the surveyed respondents perceived them as an existential threat to Pakistan, the Taliban‘s ‗no-arguments-push-it-down-your-throat‘ literalist Islamism alienated a huge chink of the Pakistani society against them in a short time, notwithstanding the fact that there was a concurrent, simultaneous widespread perception of US as an unreliable ally in the region. Giving the devil his due, much of this anti US sentiment was directed against former GeneralPresident Pervez Musharraf, whose blustering demeanor had started to crack under the strain of American pressures and rising political unpopularity. However, even then, it is almost remarkable how the Taliban managed to be perceived as public enemy number one in just two short years, particularly by their forays in Swat, while Musharraf took longer to become unpopular. It is also singularly remarkable how the US has continued to attract the opprobrium of the Pakistani masses, rising steadily in unpopularity ratings amongst the Pakistani population, notwithstanding that US is currently supportive of Pakistan‘s economic viability, and there is general consensus across the board in Pakistan that the Taliban are the common enemy. This resentment has not appeared overnight; a combination of opportunist policies and an unstable Pakistani political scenario has tended to alienate the Pakistani masses from US, which can be readily appreciated by taking a cursory review of opinion polls undertaken through the years. More recent Surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project831 have found that a progressively larger number of Pakistani public has turned against the suicide bombing tactic as well as Osama bin Laden.832 Five years back in 2004, a worrying 41% of Pakistani Muslims had expressed endorsement of the suicide bombing tactic and 830

Editorial: Hating terrorism, hating America!, The Dawn, internet edition, July 2009, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\07\03\story_3-7-2009_pg3_1. 831 The Pew Global Attitudes Project has surveyed more than 90,000 people in 50 nations since 2002, including many Arab and majority Muslim countries. The pertinence of their research is demonstrable by the fact that they were asked to give testimony to U.S. House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, regarding their findings about anti Americanism in the Arab and Muslim World. The Pew Global Attitudes Project is accessible at http://pewglobal.org/. 832 Richard Wike and Kathleen Holzwart, Few in Pakistan Support Extremists -- But Few Favor Military Confrontation, March 12, 2009, Pew Global Attitudes Project, Pew Research Centre, Publications section, http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1148/pakistan-little-support-for-terrorists-most-favor-education-for-girls.

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terrorism as a means to protect religion.833 This ,however, seems to have been a political knee jerk reaction to the endorsement of the Pakistani establishment‘s support for the US led War on Terror; when suicide bombings and Taliban inspired terrorism increased significantly over the years, this support shrunk to a bare 5% of the respondents in 2008.834 A simultaneous decrease in support for Bin Laden was also observed, albeit in a less precipitous manner; in 2005, 51% of polled Pakistanis were hopeful for an increased role in World affairs for Bin Laden, as opposed to 34% in 2008.835 The Pakistanis as a nation seem concerned about extremism affecting their lives, with 72% decrying extremism in a survey in 2008, which was the highest response elicited across the board in eight Muslim countries surveyed at the same time (the others Islamic countries were Egypt, Jordan, Indonesia, Lebanon, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Turkey).836 Only a tiny minority of the Pakistani sample population agrees with the Taliban‗s commonly invoked tactic of preventing education for girls.837 A majority of people in Pakistan supported the government on the issue of eradication of home grown terror outfits, with 60% of respondent Pakistanis surveyed in a Gallup poll holding the view that the government needed to take a tough stance to eliminate terrorism from the country.838 These findings seem consistent with those reported in a 2006 Pew poll, wherein 74% of surveyed Pakistani respondents expressed concern about the rise of Islamic extremism in Pakistan, which was a comparatively higher level of expressed concern as compared to perceptions by respondents in other Muslim countries included in the same survey: the proportions reported for other sampled populations regarding the same question were Jordan (69%), Egypt (68%), Turkey (46%), and Indonesia (43%).839 However, results of polls measuring anti American sentiments prevalent amongst the Pakistani population have not only demonstrated a consistent pattern of mistrust for the American policies, but this resentment seems to be increasing over the years. In 2008 the Pakistani public was also quite vocal about its resentment against America. Nearly two-thirds (64%) reported distrust in the United States "to act responsibly in the world."840 A minority of 27 percent perceived that the US-Pakistan strategic alliance on security had been to the benefit of Pakistan.841 Significantly, 72 percent believed that the American presence in Afghanistan would not only worsen the situation there, but would prove detrimental to the security interests of Pakistan in the longer run.842This perception was reported even amongst the pro Musharraf ranks, which is an interesting finding inasmuch that Musharraf who was staunchly pro-US had not appreciated the extent of anti Americanism rampant in his support base.843 It is interesting to find that many respondents polled in the 833

Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. 836 Ibid. 837 Ibid. 838 6 in 10 Pakistanis support crackdown on terror outfits: Gallup poll, 18 December, 2008, Pakistan Defense website, http://www.defence.pk/forums/current-events-social-issues/17910-6-10-pakistanis-support-crackdown-terror-outfitsgallup-poll.html. 839 Richard Wike, View from Pakistan: Before Bhutto's Assassination, Public Opinion Was Increasingly Opposed to Terrorism, December 28, 2007, Pew Global Attitudes Project, http://pewresearch.org/pubs/674/view-from-pakistanbefore-bhuttos-assassination-public-opinion-was-increasingly-opposed-to-terrorism 840 Steven Kull, A New Lens on Pakistan, January 9, 2008, The Washington Post, internet edition, http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/postglobal/needtoknow/2008/01/a_new_lens_on_pakistan.html. 841 Ibid. 842 Ibid. 843 Ibid. 834 835

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survey reported hostility to the United States, since it was perceived as being hostile to their desire for a more Islamic society. An overwhelming majority of 86 percent believed that the US was out to ―weaken and divide the Islamic world".844 This anti Americanism has not appeared all of a sudden within the Pakistani populace, but has been a gradual process; debatably Anti Americanism has always been a feature of Pakistani Politics, but the widespread anti American sentiment currently prevailing amongst the civilian population is a phenomenon best explained in the context of Pakistani leadership‘s support for the U.S. led GWOT. The negative Pakistani public opinion peaked in 2003, after the U.S. invasion of Iraq.845 Gallup Pakistan polls also corroborate these findings; Musharraf started out with the support of 51% of the support of surveyed Pakistani publics in 2001, gradually losing support over the years,846 while anti Americanism remained roughly at the same high levels.847 Neither should the Pakistani attitudes towards U.S. be viewed as a rigid monolith of uncompromising stubbornness ; as evidenced during the earthquake in 2005 in Pakistan, the views grew more favourable towards America in 2006 ,due to its unconditional support for the victims848. However, they again fell to their lower levels in 2007, indicating that there is a rational choice process, which operates to drive the attitudinal change within the Pakistani publics less favorably disposed towards the U.S. As regards American foreign policy towards Muslim states, 76%Pakistani respondents endorsed a U.S. troop pull out from Iraq, while 75% believed the U.S. and NATO should recall its forces from neighbouring Afghanistan.849 In a 2007 attitudes survey, the Pew Research Project reported that only 15% Pakistanis had a positive perception of the U.S. from amongst a survey taken of different Muslim publics; only the Palestinians (13%) and Turks (9%) held a less favorable view of the Americans. Even more significantly, even though the support for Taliban had fallen dramatically during the period when militancy intensified in Pakistan, Pakistanis by an overwhelming majority still opposed the U.S. led GWOT (59%), with only 13% endorsing it.850 A majority of Pakistanis believed the U.S. to be guilty of double standards, promoting democracy only at face value, while encouraging dictators like Musharraf in third world to uphold American interests in the region (57%).851Pakistanis across the board disliked American projected ideas of democracy (72%), since the American ideals of democracy were seen to be hypocritical due to the American policy of propping up pliant dictatorships in the region.852This is notwithstanding the fact that most Pakistanis cherish democratic values and institutions, with 77% endorsing honest, multi party elections.853 A significant majority of 72% respondents perceived the U.S. as a military threat to Pakistan, while 64% named U.S. as one of the main existential threats to Pakistan, even bigger in magnitude than Pakistani arch rival in the region, India (45%). 854 844

Ibid. Richard Wike, Musharraf's Support Shrinks, Even As More Pakistanis Reject Terrorism... and the U.S., November 7, 2007, Pew Global Attitudes Project, http://pewresearch.org/pubs/561/pakistan-terrorism. 846 Gallup Poll on ‗Current Pakistan Crisis,‘ October 13, 2001, http://www.yespakistan.com/afghancrisis/gallup_survey.asp. 847 Ibid. 848 (Wike, November 2007). 849 Ibid. 850 (Wike, December 2007). 851 Ibid. 852 Ibid. 853 Ibid. 854 (Wike, November 2007). 845

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The Pew research project‘s findings are backed up by evidence collected by International Republican Institute (IRI) polls regarding Musharraf‘s decline in popularity, with the polls being conducted independently of Pew attitudes project in 2007,and coming up with roughly proportionate results.855 Musharraf was widely considered to be compliant to American policies in order to prop up his own regime, which, among other factors, gradually lost him support of the Pakistani masses over the years. While in 2002, a Pew survey found 76% of surveyed Pakistanis were more or les satisfied with Musharraf‘s influence on Pakistan, this perception seems to have steadily declined over the years to significantly low levels.856 These anti American findings are further corroborated by findings by other independent research bodies, like the Pakistan Institute for Public Opinion‘s study for the U.S. groups ‗Terror Free Tomorrow‘ and the ‗New America Foundation.‘857 The Pakistan Institute for Public Opinion poll also revealed the widespread Pakistani belief (44%) that the United States is the greatest threat to their personal safety, with India again following as a distant second at 14%, notwithstanding the fact that the Pakistani leadership has consistently maintained a pro U.S. stance over the years, while following a strong anti India policy.858 It also appears that the U.S. public is as vehemently skeptical of Pakistan as the Pakistanis are to American foreign policy; A Gallup USA poll revealed that Pakistan and Afghanistan figure prominently amongst the 10 most unpopular countries perceived by publics in the United States. 859 U.S. has mainly concentrated on helping out Pakistan by proving economic and military aid over the years; however, it is debatable how effectively this has been utilized, with rampant corruption and ineffective governance in Pakistani establishments‘ ranks diluting the effects of these bail out packages. This is reflected by the Pakistani public sentiment regarding the efficacy of American aid to relieve Pakistan‘s problems; while 59% Pakistanis believed that US aid to help Pakistan would be useful, 38% considered it detrimental to Pakistani interests.860 This anti American resentment can be contextualized in the paradigms of Pakistan‘s foreign policy against India, a hitherto discernible lack of American interest with the Pakistani masses, and preoccupation of engagement with Pakistani leadership. In attempting to resolve the Taliban picture into any semblance of rational lucidity,one encounters so many disconnects that the discourse becomes a conspiracy theorists‘ paradise; speculations abound as to Taliban being a an American sponsored phenomenon to Indian surrogate warriors. The situation is ripe to be exploited by all shades of ultra rightist, neo leftist and (just as hopelessly clueless) centrist opinions. Thus, despite convergence of anti terrorist interests between Pakistan and the US, many ‗analysts‘ in Pakistan are very fond of discussing the ―American policy‖ of patronizing India in becoming a big player in Afghanistan; ostensibly this Indian presence is conducive in orchestrating Indian ―interventions‖ in Balochistan and the Tribal Areas, with the penultimate American aim of building up India as the dominant state player in South Asia. The coup de grace is the widespread perception that America ultimately aims to deprive Pakistan of its nuclear weapons. 855

Ibid. (Wike, December 2007). Zia Mian, Pakistan‘s American problem, 14 July 2008 Alternatives International Journal, http://www.alternatives.ca/article3936.html. 858 Ibid. 859 Anwar Iqbal, Pakistan among 10 most unpopular countries in US: poll, March 9, Dawn, internet edition, http://www.dawn.com/2008/03/10/top13.htm. 860 (Gallup Poll, 2001). 856 857

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The question of American support within society reveals an almost unequivocal response of condemnation of the policies of U.S. in the region; this response pattern can be indicative of an almost universal disapproval of the policies of the U.S. amongst the sample population, while remembering that the respondent samples are not characteristic of the Pakistani population as a whole. The doubling of the intensity of drone attacks in the FATA areas which has seen an escalation of innocent civilian casualties, the proposals for inclusion of Balochistan as a drone target area, the U.S. patronage of Musharraf which the majority of the Pakistanis perceived as a dictator, and recent hardliner statements by US diplomats regarding Pakistan‘s sovereignty may be just some of the grievances exacerbating mistrust of the U.S. amongst the Pakistani masses. This has also provided leverage to the opposite camp, the Islamists, to harp on about the ‗callousness‘ of the ‗great Satan.‘ An oft ignored variable is the average Pakistani‘s religious orientation; even though religiosity is indispensable to the Pakistani way of life, the average Pakistani voter has not been very sympathetic to the Islamists. This scenario may be due to the fact that there is a certain type of ambivalence towards religious leaders and Sharia in Pakistan, which has been dwelt upon at some length by some noteworthy surveys. For instance, data collected by Pew in 2002 and 2005 861indicated that even though many people believed that Islamic religiosity was very important, they did not really believe in this becoming ingrained in Pakistani politics. This may have something to do with the way the clerics have been involved in Pakistani politics, which has not been looked upon favourably by the majority of the population, as reflected by poor voter support in Pakistani elections. A poll of 907 urban Pakistanis has also revealed the inherent ambivalence in the average Pakistani citizen‘s mind, wherein a large number of Pakistanis envisage a greater role for Islam and Sharia in Pakistani society, but simultaneously want more (secular type) democracy, favouring liberalizing reforms and opposing terrorism.862

861

See different surveys pertaining to Pakistan for 2002 and 2005 at the Pew Global Attitudes Project, accessible at http://pewglobal.org/. 862 (Kull,2008).

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THE FUTURE The Taliban in Pakistan are not just a reaction to American or Pakistani policies; this view will be empirical and simplistic, leading to all the wrong conclusions. They are political Islamists, with a definite ideological agenda, which is furthered by intolerant orthodoxy and violence. As with political Islam, the notion of primacy of power is a central theme in their philosophy; this is in direct opposition to the concept of primacy of state power, and this violence will continue to be used in opposition to the Pakistani state until one opponent overwhelms the other. This makes the Taliban in Pakistan a more serious threat than any ethnic or separatist challenge Pakistan has faced, since this movement is ideological rather than ethno nationalist, which tend to subside with healing touches of socio economic improvement and anti discrimination frameworks. In a way, the Taliban are anarchist in their disposition, since they are going all out to destroy an established state infrastructure without presenting a viable alternative. This makes counterinsurgency all the more urgent, since such guerilla movements benefit most from time lags and accommodative deals, which enable them to entrench their footholds amongst swathes of civilian territory. A new generation of Taliban has emerged in Pakistan after the US invasion of Afghanistan, which is a revolt as much against the status quo, as it is a cry against unemployment and lack of distributive social justice. These new militants are led by young mullahs who, unlike the original Taliban, are technology and media-savvy, and are also influenced by various indigenous tribal nationalisms, which gives them a greater insight into how to manipulate their environments. Their strain of jihad is aimed not just against the US; the "infidels" who are ruling Pakistan in order to guide it in a secular direction are also archenemies, as well as the liberal population, who are seen as having turned away from Islamic values. "They aim at nothing less than to cleanse Pakistan and turn it into a pure Islamic state," says Rashed Rahman, executive editor of the Lahore-based Post newspaper. The Taliban movement in Pakistan is not a class based struggle against the bourgeois in strictly Marxist terms; the tendency has not been the empowerment of the proletariat by destroying the elitists. Instead the agenda is politically oriented toward gaining enough power to become an entity at par with the state. This is borne out by their preference in targeting state officials, machinery and the local societal elite; all three elements feed into the power structure of the state, and their weakening is imperative to maintaining parity with the state. The Taliban‘s tactics to either forcibly indoctrinate the local elite or drive them out of the area is a move designed to entrench their hegemony by eliminating potential opponents; this anti elitist militancy has not perceptibly improved the lot of the people in any way. The Pakistani Taliban are now in control of the Northern province of Waziristan, adjacent to Afghanistan. Taliban-type militias have also gained dominance in parts of the adjacent

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NWFP, such as Peshawar, which used to be one of the most open and accessible areas of the province, but has fallen prey to the stealthy advance of extremism. The citizenry in Peshawar have witnessed numerous suicide attacks, while it is practically impossible for outsiders to enter other NWFP towns such as Tank, Darra Adam Khel and Dera Ismail Khan. In Dera Ismail Khan, Pakistanis from other parts of the country are considered as outsiders, who need police protection to travel here. Girls' schools have been closed, torched or bombed, while video and music shops are usually bombed. Barbers are forbidden from shaving beards on the pain of even death. Relatively innocent social campaigns such as administration of polio vaccination drops have been halted amidst claims that it is a US plot to sterilize future generations. Even though Musharraf tried to contain these elements under pressure from the Americans, his strategy was mainly to try to regulate the madrassahs in NWFP and elsewhere in Pakistan that provide recruits for the Taliban, seizing their funds and banning them from admitting foreign students. This did not prove to be enough; the army was sent in, taking heavy casualties. The operations were halted with negotiations ensuing, which just gave time for the Taliban to further entrench themselves. What then, does the coming time portend for these militancy hit areas? That future will largely be determined by Pakistan's foreign policy towards Afghanistan and India. The assumption made by the Pakistani establishment is that the NATO forces in Afghanistan will withdraw sooner rather than later, leaving Hamid Karzai's purportedly antiPakistani regime to fend for itself. However, Pakistani establishment would like to see a friendly regime in place in Kabul, who would be willing to run the oil and gas pipelines that will serve the newly established port at Gwadar through Afghanistan's provinces. One alternative would be to let the Pakistani Taliban exist as proxy warriors to take over the power vacuum which may ensue after NATO withdrawal in Afghanistan, much like the 1994 scenario. There also exists a feeling that a pro-Islamabad Taliban-type government in Afghanistan would be instrumental in establishing peace in the northern tribal regions of Pakistan, who are largely Pashtuns, and would not be amenable to any forms of persuasion by the Karzai‘s predominantly Tajik controlled government, even though Karzai himself is a Pashtun. Most of the Pakistani Taliban are also Pashtuns, who will presumably not rest until their counterparts across the border are in power in Afghanistan. As such, peace in this part of Pakistan depends on who rules Afghanistan. The practice of using proxy warriors for filling capacity gaps against India, which has bred many, if not most ,of the Jihadi organizations, also needs to be reviewed. The current problem is that the Taliban cannot be contained, since the proverbial genie has been let outside the bottle. The Lal Masjid episode is just another aspect of this facade; it was a trial run for the rest of the country. Simultaneously, there have been protest demonstrations in the country against what is seen as the rise in militancy. Huge demonstrations have been held in Lahore, Karachi and other cities throughout Pakistan. The protests, initially held to support the deposed Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry, who has become a national hero, turned into protests against militancy. The movements are just an expression of resentment against social injustice; however it is difficult to see how the militancy can be curbed. As Asma Jahangir, chairwoman of Pakistan's Human Rights Commission, makes clear, the country cannot survive its "deep-seated rot" unless the "unrepresentative organs of the state - the military, the mullahs and the all-consuming intelligence agencies - are brought under control". It is not easy to disagree with her

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assessment of the complex scenario, but it seems a Herculean task to evolve any scheme of things which will regulate the conduct of these agents. Only empirical suggestions can be put forward at his point, the first of which would be to recognize the Pashtuns as the majority population in Afghanistan, and recognize the Taliban as a party to ensuring peace in the region. Yet for this to be acceptable to the other Afghan parties, the Taliban must morph again to become a purely Afghan Pashtun movement, rather than a nationalist Pashtun based tribal insurgency with roots in Pakistan, or a radical Islamist movement with al Qaeda linkages. Any semblance of Pan Islamist nationalism on part of the Taliban, and contacts with al Qaeda will never establish their credentials as a Pashtun nationalist movement, not to mention that the US will never let alone such an entity. However, this is a catch 22 situation; the Taliban‘s fundamental condition for negotiations has persistently been the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan, especially NATO, which will not be forthcoming as long as Islamist linkages continue to be demonstrated in the region. It is important to understand that there is still a difference between al Qaeda and Taliban, though they have tended to come closer together under duress of aggression for meeting the common enemy; the US. The distinction was demarcated by none less that Taliban‘s supreme leader Mullah Omar: ―They [al Qaeda] have set jihad as their goal, while we have set the expulsion of American troops from Afghanistan as our target.‖ Thus, even though there is an Islamist element undeniably present, the Taliban were, and debatably still are, a nationalist movement, like Hamas and Hizballah, unlike al Qaeda. The plight of the refugee camps has the potential not only of eroding national consensus and consequently strengthening the Taliban, it also diverts attention from the counterinsurgency efforts, portraying them in adverse light. Some political parties in Pakistan like the Jamaat-e Islami and Tehreek-e Insaf will attempt to undermine the national consensus regarding the operation; the rationale given for this vehement opposition to military operations is that they are conducted at the behest of America and cause a grave humanitarian crisis. To counter the latter accusation, the counterinsurgency plans need to be paired with detailed plans for relocation and rehabilitation of the displaced population; this policy should have been reviewed in light of the experiences of the Afghan refuge camps and the 2005 earthquake. The depiction of the refugees peril is imperative for broadening its humanitarian appeal, but this should not deteriorate into discourses to dilute national focus for ensuring the security of the state. Previous lessons learned in dealing with such emergencies should be revisited; it seems that the Pakistani state was much better organized to deal with the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan‘s Northern areas, even though it a sudden natural calamity. The NWFP government should have (and can still) studied flaws observed in the rehabilitation and relocation policy of looking after the displaced population of Bajaur after operations conducted in that theater. The army must also mobilize at a scale commensurate with the force of the enemy being engaged, with the entrenched capacity to look after people who will be displaced by conflict; the Pakistani army will have to face this as part of a national counterinsurgency strategy, with the capacity to divert loyalties back to the state after the termination of operations. It has to be remembered at all times that the counterinsurgency should be treated as an ongoing effort to combat a whole spectrum of imperatives of an ideological, political, military, socio-economic and humanitarian nature. A national counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy has to be drafted and shared with the public, with the civil society taking an active part in the deliberations. Counterinsurgency (COIN) needs to be conducted as a conjunction of conventional military operations with

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propaganda (‗psy-ops‘), military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions to launch a comprehensive COIN regime. Boots on the ground are an essential COIN feature; they have to be supported by precise intelligence operations. This Intelligence network would feed data to small tactical squads which carry out selective high value operations. Tactically informed operations are smaller in scale than outright military operations; if properly supported by logistics and intelligence, these smaller scale tactical operations have the capacity to neutralize high value targets with minimum collateral damage. This comprehensive COIN strategy should involve educationists, who could be required to evaluate outmoded Islamist curricula and replace them with more tolerant non sectarian versions. Scientists can be involved to jam illegal FM transmissions; the media can generate public service messages and programs promoting tolerance. The COIN strategy should remain within the ambit of rule of law, or it has the potential to become a monster almost as big as the insurgents. The situation is volatile enough without being ‗nudged‘ by a US territorial intrusion in Pakistan; this would only lead to an Afghanistan and Iraq style state implosion, allowing the Islamists even greater predominance in Pakistani politics. The fallacy inherent on relying upon a purely military strategy has been an unmitigated disaster in neighbouring Afghanistan. Besides causing a huge number of civilian casualties, it has also contributed to the political strengthening of the Taliban by making them appear like freedom fighters taking on a colonial force. A purely military solution will again backfire; Islamist propaganda would then carry the power for an even greater tactic stimulus of militants from all over the world, exacerbating an already grave situation. It has to be acknowledged, that Pakistan is set to see a counterinsurgency campaign which will extend over a few years at least to pay tangible dividends. Any efforts to fast track this campaign by putting foreign boots on the ground will only aggravate the militancy. For better or worse, the Pakistani army is the only viable option to spearhead the COIN campaigns, and continuous efforts by the international polity have to be directed to re train, equip and back up this entity for a protracted anti guerilla campaign. Pakistan‘s Taliban imperative has been marked by a laissez faire attitude towards them; indecisiveness and inaction on the part of the state to tackle a festering insurgency allowed it to blossom into a widespread movement. The widely prevalent belief in policy circles that the Taliban would continue concentrating on foreign troops in Afghanistan and encircling the Kabul regime inculcated a sense of complacency; that has to be now shaken off to meet the challenges of coming years. It must also be remembered that as army operations escalate in intensity, the Taliban-al Qaeda nexus would be hard at work to chalk out a course of further terrorist tactics across Pakistan; this has the potential of opening multiple fronts for the state forces, for which a COIN regime should have adequate ‗buffer‘ logistical back up. Another way is to address the grievance of FATA, where only three percent of women receive education and there is one doctor for every 8,000 people. ―Does such a situation benefit the militants?‖ asks Muhammad Sharif, a medic from South Waziristan. ―Of course it does.‖ However, this cannot be done by operations; these are useful as initial counterinsurgency efforts, but unless they are supplemented by huge investment into the socio-economic rehabilitation of the area, peace will not return, as Afghanistan has tended to demonstrate. Rumsfelds‘ neoconservative doctrine, which preached imperialism, cannot be repeated again. FATA also need the healing touch of democracy and just laws; FCR needs to go or be at least drastically modified. ―But only a civilian government can bring this reform,‖ says Ahmed Rashid.

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With the arrival of such a civilian government in February, 2008, the situation has not perceptibly improved; some would say it has worsened. The government has faced tremendous US pressure to step up operations, and US has not hesitated in escalating the number of unmanned drone incursions into Pakistani territory, which has in turn has sparked off the resentment of ordinary Pakistanis. There is growing bitterness across the board against what the common man sees as the US administration's overbearing ways. The common man has also taken a stand against rising militancy by organizing the local forces, sine the poorly paid local police are no match for Taliban militias. In the tribal areas to the west of the Buner district, the Pakistani Army is now encouraging tribal militias, known as lashkars, as a backup force against the Taliban. Such militias have a long tradition in tribal society. The time is ripe for a counterinsurgency strategy that incorporates these local lashkars into the community defense as a local militia. They can be the first line of defense in a village. The issue of aid and development needs to be resolved as well. There is a perceptible pattern of American economic aid to Pakistan over the years; unpredictable nature, rather vague conditionalities, a bias towards military aid and the tendency to lump together military and economic aid, are just some of the maladies affecting the distribution of such aid. As Ahmed Rasheed remarks: ― The Bush Administration has essentially run USAID into the ground, even though the rot started much earlier in the Clinton administration when it was merged into the State Department, its staff and budget were drastically cut, and it ceased to house any kind of professional staff in the field of development. Today it is a bureaucracy that signs checks–usually to ―for profit‖ beltway bandits–consultancies and companies that have no essential knowledge about countries like Afghanistan or Pakistan, and sub-contract their work to others……FATA is now almost entirely controlled by the Pakistani Taliban militias who in turn provide cover, protection, and sanctuary to the Afghan Taliban and to Al Qaeda……the last few years the Army has failed to protect tribal elders, civil society professionals like teachers and doctors, and local people who were all opposed to the Taliban. As a result these people have either been killed by the Taliban or they have fled. Today there are about 400,000 refuges from FATA scattered in other parts of Pakistan and even some in neighboring Afghanistan (which ironically is considered safer than FATA.) The result is that the Pakistani Taliban is in total control and at present it is impossible to carry out any kind of development work.‖ FATA‘s laws and infrastructure needs to be normalized by infusion of a slow but comprehensive aid package dealing with development issues such as education and jobs etc. This requires transparency and a genuine commitment to this area. With the Pakistani economy in a perilous state, inflation running rampant, the currency having lost a third of its value, and Pakistan‘s foreign currency reserves at serious levels of depletion, Pakistan needs a bailout package, but this should come with strings attached so it caters only for FATA. The studies into madrassahs have pointed to the extreme debility of the public education system in Pakistan to provide quality education, which drives poor parents to send their children to madrassahs. Parents see scant sense in sending children to publicly funded government schools from which teachers are conspicuously absent, and the standards of education are dismally low. Madrassahs, in contrast, offer shelter and meals; they may become the only option for impoverished parents .Madrassah reforms should not attempt to ‗change‘ the mindset of the madaris, but instead should be directed at reviving public-sector education. Militancy will decrease, not by removing its support base from madaris (which

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produce a minority of the militants any ways), but by increasing the viability for poor parents to send their children to an improved public education system. The USAID program needs to divert some of its attention to poor student enrollment in elite private sector schools, providing need-based scholarship positions for talented poor students .Socio economic screening of students for these positions by elite schools would need to be waived off. This will give a chance for some of the ‗have-nots‘ to integrate into the society. Newer, less elitist (and less expensive) private schools are springing up over Punjab and Sind, and they could benefit from some injection of funds. The Punjab education foundation, a donor funded public sector institution which provides financial assistance to entrepreneurs in Punjab, based on pre designated efficiency benchmarks is a laudable effort; the current frameworks need to be made more effective and transparently controlled, perhaps within a public– private sector framework. The constant barrage of U.S. communiqués encouraging secularization has created a cognitive dissonance communication gap between the Pakistani public at large, and what is perceived to be a monolithic US state entity; conservative values are cherished in Pakistani society, and a barrage of reports about ‗extremism‘, ‗fundamentalism‘ and the conservative mindset of the Pakistani public in western media has connoted negative attributes to western perceived attempts at secularization of Pakistani society. All the labels mentioned above are abhorrent to a majority of the Pakistanis, who continue to live peaceful ,mundane existences, consisting of a mixture of progressiveness,conservatism and traditional Islamic values ,which is not a concept easily understood by the Western mind. Bearded men or veiled women are per-se not a sign of extremism in Pakistani society, which has to be understood by US policy makers in its particular very ‗Pakistani‘ socio cultural context. The U.S. needs to act as a reliable partner in Pakistan‘s development in its own interests; a ‗neo-con‘ style engagement after achieving tactical victories and then withdrawing as in case of Afghanistan will only present another head of the Pakistani terrorism hydra in due course. The U.S. needs to be perceived in Pakistan as a more reliable partner to instill some confidence in a waning air of U.S.-Pakistan cooperation; there are signs of public empowerment in the Pakistani society, and American policy echelons cannot just ignore them away by continuing to rely on the leadership. A multi faceted option has to be exercised, which need to move out of the ‗terrorism‘ straitjacket. A win-win scenario is when Pakistan benefits from US logistical input, while the GWOT benefits from the suppression of the worrying Taliban resurgence in Pakistan. Pakistan is a resilient nation, and will overcome these problems eventually; however the road ahead needs to be paved with the soundest of policies, failing which, one would expect to see the militancy problems continuing in the country.

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INDEX 9 9/11, ii, 1, 8, 34, 43, 45, 49, 50, 75, 83, 113, 115, 118, 120, 125, 132, 134, 136, 190, 194, 198, 199, 213, 229, 230, 234

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A ABC, 145, 146 abduction, 57, 179 academic, 15, 18, 21, 23, 109, 143, 200 academics, 147 accessibility, 37 accidental, 192 accommodation, 133 accountability, 82 accuracy, 140, 141 Achakzais, 5 achievement, 61, 80 acute, 213, 242 adaptation, 4 administration, ix, xv, 35, 42, 55, 64, 70, 73, 90, 92, 133, 136, 138, 139, 146, 188, 191, 205, 222, 228, 244, 256, 259 administrative, 4, 100, 101, 170, 173, 188 administrators, 4 adult, 5 adultery, 70 adulthood, 225 advertisement, 201 advertisements, 20 advertising, 157, 212 affiliates, 76, 82 Africa, 44, 47, 105, 209 Afridis, 4, 5, 21, 86 age, 80, 116, 127, 206 agent, xiii, xiv, xv, 4, 5, 36, 57, 80, 153, 197, 203

aggression, 26, 140, 257 aging, 96, 175 agricultural, 83, 215 agriculture, 6, 7, 68, 178, 183, 217, 220 Ahadith, 11, 89 aid, xiv, 21, 41, 43, 44, 81, 103, 105, 131, 135, 137, 138, 139, 141, 152, 165, 201, 203, 212, 232, 241, 242, 252, 259 air, 2, 31, 51, 61, 102, 104, 121, 123, 131, 138, 140, 155, 161, 174, 196, 260 Air Force, 107, 140, 155, 245 Aircraft, 237 al Qaeda, xii, xvii, 1, 9, 13, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 54, 57, 58, 59, 62, 65, 70, 71, 76, 82, 95, 96, 99, 105, 113, 114, 115, 116, 119, 120, 121, 125, 127, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 142, 145, 146, 149, 159, 166, 167, 169, 170, 180, 186, 188, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 196, 197, 198, 208, 210, 216, 231, 249, 257, 258 Al Qaeda, 21, 23, 31, 36, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 81, 114, 140, 149, 150, 187, 208, 210, 229, 246, 259 al Qaida, 19, 24, 27, 29, 194, 207 Algeria, 47 alienation, 225 aliens, 27 Al-Jazeera, 72 Allah, 18, 39, 61, 73, 123, 145, 169, 189, 203, 212, 244 allies, 2, 23, 31, 48, 54, 62, 63, 69, 70, 114, 119, 134, 166, 190, 198 alternative, x, xv, 6, 7, 81, 84, 85, 94, 99, 107, 132, 135, 145, 147, 173, 188, 200, 247, 255, 256 alternatives, 83, 252 ambiguity, 192

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ambivalence, 122, 227, 233, 253 ambivalent, xvi, 25, 50, 113, 115, 138, 144 amorphous, 23, 225 amputation, 91 Amsterdam, 162 analysts, 3, 22, 23, 35, 42, 46, 87, 89, 94, 98, 109, 138, 169, 183, 215, 252 anger, 28 animals, 206 ankles, 203 ANP, 69, 86, 92, 103, 104, 108, 157, 159, 175, 181 antagonism, 124 antagonist, 227 anti-American, 13, 15, 27, 141, 209, 231 apathy, 183 apparel, 191 appeasement, 185 Arab world, 30 Arabia, 16, 47, 81, 112, 143, 146, 198, 199, 200, 201, 212 Arabs, xiv, xv, 10, 13, 25, 28, 31, 33, 54, 65, 78, 166, 167, 209, 242 arbitration, 205 argument, 38, 117, 135, 183, 185, 216, 230, 234 arid, 166 Ariel, 162 armed conflict, 20, 88, 113, 139 armed forces, xii, 35, 103, 118, 147, 157, 158, 242, 247 Armed Forces, 7 Army, ix, xiv, 6, 23, 30, 47, 49, 63, 66, 71, 88, 89, 101, 102, 104, 108, 111, 117, 118, 120, 121, 134, 145, 146, 155, 156, 157, 169, 172, 185, 187, 191, 192, 195, 197, 208, 244, 245, 259 arrest, xvii, 14, 49, 64, 73, 115, 128, 167, 178, 188 articulation, 112 Asia, 4, 10, 13, 14, 17, 22, 28, 31, 32, 37, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 57, 58, 59, 82, 97, 101, 102, 105, 106, 107, 116, 123, 134, 136, 138, 148, 166, 183, 185, 186, 187, 189, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 216, 236, 252 Asian, vii, xv, 4, 16, 46, 77, 105, 136, 143, 225, 249 assassination, 39, 58, 59, 78, 96, 113, 116, 117, 131, 134, 149, 150, 187, 231, 246, 250 assault, 45, 93, 96, 160, 193 assertiveness, 123 assessment, 6, 44, 104, 124, 257 assets, xiii, 49, 83, 115, 147, 185, 194, 217, 220 asylum, 6 Atlantic, 210 atmosphere, 113, 126, 127

atrocities, 123 attachment, 246 attacker, 127, 128, 150, 152, 153, 156, 160, 192, 207 attitudes, xvi, 14, 251, 252 Australia, 57, 209, 210 authoritarianism, 215 Authoritative, 215 authority, xv, 4, 16, 24, 61, 68, 92, 137, 159, 225, 240, 244 autocracy, 10 autonomy, 98, 145, 197 availability, 129 aversion, 58, 61 awareness, 100, 137 axis of evil, 114

B backfire, 258 backlash, 129, 147, 153, 193, 195, 228 Badal, 5 Baghdad, 118 bail, 252 Baitullah Mehsud, vii, 2, 5, 20, 22, 35, 36, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 61, 64, 68, 70, 72, 76, 79, 80, 84, 86, 93, 95, 97, 104, 105, 106, 111, 118, 122, 123, 125, 172, 207, 228, 234, 249 Baluchistan, 3, 16, 17, 19, 22, 26, 28, 29, 41, 42, 43, 47, 57, 101, 120, 122, 145, 150, 167, 205, 225, 231 Bangash, 21 Bangladesh, 25, 142, 225 bank account, 40, 82 bankers, 82 banking, 10, 82, 91 banks, 67, 73, 81, 82 Barack Obama, 136 bargaining, 31 barrier, 8, 86 behavior, xvi, 44, 201, 219 Beijing, 37, 57, 147 beliefs, 11, 12, 14, 54, 199, 223 benchmark, 224, 225 benchmarks, 137, 260 benefits, 16, 78, 86, 110, 112, 169, 260 benign, 225 betrayal, xv bias, 222, 259 Bin Laden, vii, xvi, 2, 13, 19, 20, 32, 46, 48, 55, 78, 96, 147, 166, 187, 188, 192, 200, 208, 211, 250

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Index binding, xvi, 79, 128, 139 biological weapons, 140 birth, 15, 22, 31, 67, 168, 183, 239 blame, 231 blaming, 69, 176 bleeding, 174 blogs, 135, 145 blood, 4, 20, 61, 88, 91, 192 bloodshed, 88, 101, 193 blurring, 123, 131 bomb, 46, 73, 108, 129, 145, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 155, 156, 157, 159, 162, 200, 210, 247 bonds, ix, xv, 9, 108, 244 border crossing, 25 border security, 203 borrowing, 206 Bosnia, 16, 19, 79, 140, 142, 208, 209, 212 Bosnians, 54, 209 Boston, 162 bounds, 42 boys, 26, 27, 127, 133, 248 brain, 117 brainstorming, 222 brainwashing, 122, 123, 125, 203 breaches, 104 breakdown, 111, 175 breeding, 123, 169 bribery, 100 bribes, 31, 166 bribing, 144 Britain, 15, 61, 72, 92, 209 British Pakistani, 210 broad spectrum, 112, 131 brothers, 20, 48, 56, 87, 186, 187, 188, 200, 204, 212, 233, 242 bubble, 84 Buddha, 182 Buddhism, 223 buffalo, 26 buffer, 258 buildings, 18, 121, 157, 179, 191, 196 bureaucracy, 36, 259 Burma, 208 burn, 168, 247, 248 burning, 70, 189 buses, 86, 117, 147, 195 Bush administration, 23, 44, 105, 132, 135, 139, 166

C cache, 46, 96 caliber, 14, 144 campaigns, ix, 49, 51, 88, 110, 111, 196, 211, 212, 228, 239, 256, 258 cancer, 33 candidates, 90, 91, 123, 126, 128, 129, 136, 153 caps, 91 carjacking, 32 carrier, 105, 132, 134 case study, 121 cash flow, 14 cassettes, 30, 126 catalyst, xii, 10, 107 Catholic, 10, 182 cattle, 176, 240 cave, 33 CBS, 48 cease-fire, 63, 106, 111 cell, 39, 125, 141, 184, 204, 245 Central Asia, 4, 10, 13, 16, 47, 105, 166 central city, 208 Central Intelligence Agency, 45 centrifugal forces, 81 chain of command, 63 channels, 36, 42, 67, 123, 159 chaos, 9, 98 charities, 81, 82 Chechnya, 16, 19, 79, 96, 120, 142, 187, 208, 209, 212 chemical weapons, 140 Chief Justice, 153, 231, 256 children, xvi, 8, 17, 19, 72, 85, 87, 88, 94, 109, 134, 150, 153, 155, 157, 160, 180, 188, 189, 192, 223, 225, 232, 240, 242, 243, 259 China, 31, 37, 146, 233, 240 Chishtia, 11 Christians, xvi, 15, 92, 182 CIA, 1, 2, 12, 13, 45, 48, 53, 54, 60, 62, 65, 81, 104, 105, 133, 135, 141, 145, 146, 169, 185, 201, 210, 232 circulation, 202, 206 citizens, xviii, xix, 3, 7, 43, 109, 145, 227 civil liberties, 70 civil servant, xiii civil society, 137, 231, 257, 259 civil war, 12, 54, 71, 236

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civilian, xv, 35, 94, 103, 109, 115, 121, 122, 123, 124, 131, 137, 144, 147, 149, 154, 157, 180, 197, 230, 239, 251, 253, 255, 258, 259 class struggle, 233 classes, 157, 220 classroom, 248 cleavages, 42 Clinton administration, 259 closure, 62, 90, 213 CNN, 204 cocoons, 215 code of conduct, 5, 6, 70, 90, 91 codes, 5, 95 coercion, xiii, 189 cognitive dissonance, xv, 50, 206, 221, 260 cohort, 232 coil, 94, 102 Cold War, 81, 138 collaboration, 13, 170 Collaboration, 96 collateral, 51, 94, 109, 114, 121, 122, 123, 140, 141, 191, 239, 258 collateral damage, 51, 94, 109, 122, 140, 141, 258 college students, 205 colleges, 67, 205, 211, 239, 248 collusion, 116 Columbia, 13, 88, 112, 129, 149, 162 comfort zone, ix commerce, 68, 178 commercialization, 225 commodity, 92 communication, 47, 108, 140, 260 communities, 176, 177, 182, 246 community, 5, 11, 32, 110, 112, 122, 124, 126, 128, 169, 177, 179, 181, 187, 243, 244, 248, 259 community support, 124 competition, 110, 119 compilation, 79 complexity, 21, 130, 139 compliance, 18, 85, 99, 137, 222 composition, 75, 180 compounds, 133 comprehension, 21, 23, 55, 185, 215 compulsion, 101 conception, 81, 112 concrete, 133, 144, 146, 184, 232 conductor, 86 confidence, 36, 100, 109, 110, 123, 142, 260 confinement, 184, 189

conflict, 29, 47, 60, 69, 103, 109, 110, 111, 113, 121, 134, 138, 141, 142, 148, 167, 168, 169, 171, 175, 187, 196, 239, 243, 244, 247, 257 conflict resolution, 47 conformity, 70 confrontation, 32, 134 confusion, xv, 133, 149 Congress, 132 conjecture, 60, 77, 139 conjugation, 214 consensus, xiii, 104, 136, 234, 249, 257 consent, 144 consolidation, 22, 23, 41, 48, 62, 71, 132, 200 conspiracy, 20, 59, 93, 149, 168, 230, 234, 252 conspiracy theory, 230, 234 constituent groups, 47, 86 constraints, 221 construction, 138 consumer goods, 6 contextualization, 138 contingency, 207 continuity, 8, 165 contractors, 171 contracts, 225 control group, 213, 224 convergence, 252 conversion, 85 conviction, 184 cooking, 242 correlation, 218, 220 corridors, 16 corruption, 5, 143, 252 costs, 5, 144, 221, 240 counsel, 38 counter-terror, 117, 133, 138, 195 counterterrorism, 46, 48, 136, 146 coupling, 214 courts, 5, 51, 70, 71, 92, 99, 111, 155, 172, 183, 184, 189, 190, 246 covering, 29, 91, 246, 247 crack, 80, 206, 249 credentials, 16, 34, 35, 40, 58, 111, 257 credibility, 14, 121, 180, 230, 231 credit, 71, 77, 89, 130 creep, 9, 185 crime, 19, 21, 51, 81, 84, 86, 89, 91, 94, 171, 179, 192, 214, 221 criminality, 243 criminals, 8, 73, 80, 81, 89, 94, 95, 170, 179, 245 criticism, 15, 31, 102, 141, 244

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Index crops, x, 132, 176, 210, 212 cross-border, 36, 97, 135, 220 crossing over, 27, 67 Cuba, 57 cultivation, x cultural transformation, 143 culture, xvi, 8, 10, 20, 68, 105, 142, 143, 145, 148, 198, 200, 212, 224, 225 currency, xviii, 30, 128, 170, 259 curriculum, 14 customers, 70

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D dailies, 9 danger, 2, 98, 134, 231 database, 116, 195 death, xiii, 5, 18, 20, 36, 48, 55, 58, 60, 70, 74, 101, 113, 120, 123, 128, 161, 168, 172, 174, 187, 188, 204, 207, 228, 241, 243, 247, 256 death sentence, 20 deaths, 80, 145, 194, 223, 239 decision making, 4, 184 decisions, 62, 68, 89, 106 deep-sea, 256 defense, 17, 25, 43, 134, 140, 145, 175, 176, 259 defenses, 4, 173 deficiency, 217 deficit, 80, 140 definition, 1, 138, 215 dehydration, 242, 243 delivery, 25, 70 democracy, 5, 100, 113, 137, 149, 227, 251, 253, 258 denial, 16, 63 Denmark, 118 density, 66 Deobandism, 14, 15, 20, 184 Department of State, 162 depressed, 214 deprivation, 8, 122, 225 desert, 143 destruction, 51, 60, 67, 73, 123, 215, 248 detainees, xiv detention, 59, 67, 128, 206 developing countries, 139 diabetes, 57 diarrhoea, 242 diffusion, 129 Director of National Intelligence, 44, 137

disaster, 41, 241, 258 discipline, 79, 111, 127 discourse, 9, 12, 27, 68, 109, 121, 142, 206, 213, 225, 233, 252 discrimination, 255 discriminatory, 81 disenchantment, 134, 221, 231 disorder, 9, 98 dispersion, 216 displaced persons, 123, 181, 239, 243 displacement, 175, 239, 243 disposition, 255 disputes, 44, 60, 205 dissatisfaction, 148 distillation, 12 distribution, 169, 171, 217, 218, 222, 228, 259 distributive justice, 51 divergence, 208 diversity, 10, 139, 174 dividends, xvi, 37, 41, 107, 219, 258 division, 50, 61, 79, 99, 100, 133, 155, 161, 173, 174, 175, 176, 180 doctors, 243, 246, 247, 248, 259 dominance, 119, 208, 225, 228, 255 donations, 28, 80, 95, 198, 205, 206 donors, 81, 232, 260 doors, 190 dream, 125 drinking, 7, 73, 80, 240, 243 drinking water, 7, 80, 223, 240, 243 drug addict, 100 drug trafficking, 6, 86, 220 drugs, 84, 89, 138 dualism, 3 duality, 3 duration, 213 Durrani, 20 duties, 90, 203

E early warning, 21 earnings, 213, 219 ears, 50 earth, 35, 71, 206 earthquake, 30, 41, 208, 251, 257 Eastern Europe, 138 economic indicator, 6 Economic models, 214 economic problem, 98

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economics, 214, 217 Education, 214, 234, 236, 247 educational attainment, 213, 214, 221, 232 educational institutions, 8, 21, 71, 205, 247 educational system, 18, 54 ego, 199 Egypt, 13, 47, 142, 250 elasticity, 11 elderly, 72, 94, 180, 189, 242 elders, xiv, 5, 7, 35, 36, 42, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 92, 95, 170, 175, 176, 177, 239, 259 election, 90, 91, 157, 161 electric power, 80 electricity, 223, 240, 242 emotional, 123, 128, 212 emotions, 193 empathy, 115, 138 employees, 100, 117, 154, 155, 195, 246 employment, 7, 73, 87, 220, 221, 232, 243 empowered, 4, 114 empowerment, 255, 260 encapsulated, xvi endurance, 135, 140 energy, 62, 106, 225 engagement, x, 6, 32, 107, 136, 142, 173, 201, 252, 260 England, 210 entrepreneurs, 260 environment, 1, 46, 113, 127, 129, 149, 200, 212, 214, 248 environmental conditions, 75 epistemological, xiv equality, 217 equilibrium, 3, 60 Eritrea, 209 espionage, 194 estimating, 33, 133 ethnic background, 219 ethnic diversity, 10 ethnic groups, ix, 11, 12, 145 ethnicity, 9, 21, 30 EU, 45 euphoria, 43, 131, 177 Europe, 16, 20, 44, 135, 143, 209, 212 European Police Office, 45 evacuation, 112, 189 evaluative thought, 112 evening, 150, 204, 223 evil, 114, 199, 207, 247

evolution, x, xi, xii, xvii, xviii, xix, 1, 3, 10, 11, 12, 21, 39, 47, 75, 129, 215 evolutionary process, 198 exchange rate, 219 exclusion, 8 excuse, 78 execution, 18, 124 exercise, 5, 20, 55, 76, 156, 203 expenditures, 17 expertise, 65, 133, 138 exploitation, 8 explosions, 146, 155, 172 explosives, 67, 115, 151, 152, 153, 154, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162 exports, 85 exposure, 86, 247 expulsion, 142, 257 extinction, 225 extradition, 50, 114 extremism, 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 19, 21, 113, 123, 124, 134, 136, 148, 165, 166, 167, 177, 183, 185, 190, 215, 218, 221, 228, 232, 233, 250, 256, 260 extremists, xiv, 8, 9, 10, 59, 105, 112, 132, 208 eyes, 4, 14, 15, 26, 38, 59, 91, 174, 191

F F-16, 137 fabric, 224 failure, 3, 9, 63, 69, 176, 227, 233, 239 faith, xiii, 3, 11, 15, 19, 66, 87, 203 familial, 64, 125 family, 5, 11, 17, 56, 80, 86, 92, 96, 123, 125, 128, 129, 154, 176, 198, 199, 200, 210, 212, 215, 219, 220, 222, 223, 240, 241, 242 family members, 80, 128, 240, 242 family planning, 200, 223 family system, 219 fanaticism, 111 farmers, 132, 212, 219, 223 farming, x, 83, 223 fasting, 207 Fata, 1, 2, 9, 50, 60, 69, 72, 93, 105, 121, 171, 180, 196 FATA, xi, xiii, xv, xvi, xvii, xviii, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 28, 33, 36, 44, 47, 49, 51, 53, 54, 55, 63, 64, 68, 70, 71, 73, 76, 80, 81, 84, 85, 87, 88, 90, 91, 104, 108, 109, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 128, 130, 132, 134, 136, 137, 143, 148, 157, 158, 160, 161, 167, 170, 171, 172, 173, 178,

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Index 179, 193, 195, 196, 199, 208, 217, 220, 221, 228, 230, 231, 237, 244, 253, 258, 259 fatalities, 169, 192 fatwa, 117, 187, 189, 195 FBI, 37, 40, 43, 134 FCR, xiii, xiv, 4, 5, 244, 258 fear, ix, x, 23, 73, 74, 92, 109, 141, 193, 195, 225, 248 February, 22, 24, 27, 28, 30, 32, 33, 40, 42, 43, 44, 46, 50, 56, 58, 63, 99, 101, 106, 118, 125, 126, 127, 136, 145, 146, 150, 151, 152, 157, 167, 185, 187, 203, 204, 213, 238, 246, 259 Fedayeen, 159 federal government, 5, 58, 69, 80 federalism, 19 Federally administered Tribal Areas, 1 fee, 92 feeding, xiii feelings, 8, 31, 65, 111, 140, 141, 148 feet, 141 females, 7 fertilizer, 210 feudalism, 183, 216 fighters, xi, 5, 6, 21, 23, 28, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 41, 42, 44, 46, 47, 49, 54, 55, 58, 60, 62, 69, 74, 75, 76, 77, 79, 89, 92, 96, 97, 99, 105, 106, 107, 109, 118, 134, 145, 149, 160, 165, 171, 174, 186, 188, 202, 203, 207, 208, 212, 245 films, 212, 244 finance, 11, 88, 147, 243 financial resources, 16 financial support, 31 financing, 83, 84, 105 fines, 5 fire, 101, 109, 111, 140, 154, 160, 168, 192, 241, 247 firearms, 148 fires, 111 fish, 78 flank, 147 flex, 171 flexibility, 47, 190, 207 flood, 28, 242 flow, 105 fluid, 75, 76, 108 focusing, 61, 123 food, xvi, 7, 16, 28, 168, 203, 240, 241, 242, 243 foreign affairs, 16 foreign exchange, 82 foreign nation, 43 foreign nationals, 43

foreign policy, 30, 142, 208, 251, 252, 256 Foreign Relations Committee, 137 foreigner, 85, 95, 147 foreigners, xv, 8, 16, 33, 35, 41, 60, 114, 159, 167, 181, 192, 242 forgiveness, 6, 73, 89, 102 formal education, 13, 34, 171, 220 fragmentation, xviii France, 210, 233 franchise, 5, 76 free will, 125 freedom, xv, 17, 45, 145, 171, 184, 246, 258 freedom fighter, xv, 17, 171, 258 freezing, 201, 204 Friday, 25, 28, 116, 133, 150, 153, 190, 207 friendship, 146 frustration, 132, 148 fuel, 28, 135, 177, 242 fundamentalism, xviii, 2, 9, 12, 21, 190, 260 funding, 16, 47, 53, 81, 85, 94 fundraising, 42, 209, 210 funds, 17, 28, 80, 82, 83, 84, 85, 90, 198, 203, 212, 228, 256, 260 fusion, 141

G Gallup, 250, 251, 252 gambling, 89 gas, 159, 225, 242, 256 gauge, 127 Gaza, 111, 112, 213, 214, 236 GCS, 140 GDP, 25, 80, 84 gender, 222, 223 genealogy, 4 generalization, 10 generation, 4, 14, 28, 54, 80, 255 Geneva Convention, 139 Genghis khan, 4 genocide, 30 geography, 105 Germany, 237 Ghost, 53 GHQ, 120, 155, 157 girls, 73, 103, 107, 172, 191, 247, 248, 249, 250 GIS, x glasses, 127 Global War on Terror, 1, 139, 230 Globalization, xvi, 129

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goals, 46, 72, 111, 112, 198 God, 10, 29, 61, 72, 83, 89, 116, 123, 128, 145, 204, 209 going to school, 248 gold, 72 governance, xiii, 36, 41, 81, 95, 99, 109, 115, 148, 190, 200, 216, 218, 224, 227, 232, 252 Government Accountability Office, 138 government policy, 28 governors, 155 GPO, 156 graffiti, 173, 174, 182, 198 grain, 143 grants, 4, 212 grass, 37, 139, 182, 183, 205 gravitation, 41, 178 gravity, 32, 182 grounding, 19 growth, 198, 232 Guantanamo, 57, 138, 209 guardian, 15, 97, 148, 187 guerrilla, 21, 57, 65, 96, 104, 108, 109, 145, 149, 202, 203 guidance, 55, 57, 64, 96, 200 guilty, 57, 251 Gulf of Oman, 132 guns, 51, 79, 90, 109, 172, 182, 190 GWOT, 113, 138, 204, 251, 260 gynecologist, 246

H Hamas, 111, 126, 129, 142, 162, 257 Hamsaya, 5 handling, 36, 78, 82, 113, 129, 210 hands, 3, 8, 30, 39, 60, 64, 68, 85, 87, 91, 103, 104, 109, 112, 113, 128, 143, 169, 173, 203, 211, 241 hanging, 123 harassment, 125 harbour, 80 harm, xiii, 40, 60, 95 harmony, 40 Harvard, 236 harvest, 18, 84 hate, 131, 143, 145, 214 hate crime, 214 hazards, 124 healing, 255, 258 health, 9, 26, 80, 83, 148, 233 hearing, 44

heart, 10, 116, 156, 172, 212, 223 Hebrew, 129 hegemony, 255 height, 110 helicopters, 66, 107, 241, 245 hemisphere, 10, 82, 99 Herat, 13, 14 heroin, 32, 89, 92 Hezbollah, 112, 129, 130, 142 high risk, 114 high school, 214, 220, 248 high-level, 136 Hinduism, 11, 223 Hindus, xvi, 12, 15, 142, 182 hip, 93, 180 hiring, 240 Homeland Security, ii, vii, 140 homeless, 123, 176, 241, 243 homicide, 214 Honda, 29 honesty, 71 horse, 212 hospital, 7, 156, 160, 175 hospitality, 6, 50, 66, 68, 183 hospitals, 107, 137, 248 host, 49, 66, 133, 175, 242, 243, 244 hostage, 58, 77, 118, 159 hostile environment, 46 hostilities, 47, 62, 198, 241, 247 hostility, 15, 19, 35, 143, 251 hotels, 66 House, ii, 84, 90, 132, 137, 153, 157, 185, 236, 249 household, 55, 129, 205, 216, 217, 219, 220, 222, 223 household income, 217, 220 households, 6, 27, 80, 215, 216, 217, 219, 223, 225 hub, 31, 44, 45, 80, 96, 98, 172, 182, 194, 225 human, 4, 43, 46, 53, 70, 76, 88, 109, 112, 114, 117, 118, 128, 129, 138, 139, 141, 147, 166, 189, 192, 195, 208, 212, 221, 222, 239, 241, 245 human development, 222 Human Development Report, 237 human resources, 129 human rights, 4, 53, 70, 138, 139, 147, 167, 241, 245 humanitarian, xi, xix, 41, 51, 168, 239, 248, 257 humiliation, 174 husband, 134, 231 hydro, 80 hypothesis, 81, 112, 117, 129, 178, 185, 195, 214, 215

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I ice, 37 id, 17, 44, 48, 72, 85, 115, 133, 136, 137, 186, 190, 191, 192, 194, 203, 238, 248 identification, 130 identity, 8, 20, 28, 39, 66, 76, 93, 95, 98, 142, 143, 144, 170, 185, 245 ideology, vii, xiii, 1, 8, 10, 12, 14, 19, 28, 30, 36, 39, 56, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 76, 83, 122, 123, 124, 129, 142, 143, 170, 179, 185, 214 IDPs, 123, 239, 240, 243, 244 Illinois, 136 illiteracy, 148, 214 imagery, 126 images, 10, 68, 73, 81, 123 imagination, 54, 80 imbalances, 68, 80, 90, 178 IMF, 216 imperialism, 139, 258 implementation, 9, 86, 103, 171 in situ, 139 incendiary, 67 incentive, 17, 229 incentives, xiii, 73 incidence, 217, 218, 220, 222 Incidents, 51, 184, 204 inclusion, 64, 106, 218, 230, 253 income, 81, 82, 216, 217, 218, 219, 225 income distribution, 216, 217 income inequality, 217, 218 income transfers, 81 incomes, 219, 220, 222, 223 indecisiveness, x, 185, 258 independence, 4, 5, 8, 20, 185, 216 India, xii, xv, xvi, 3, 4, 7, 13, 14, 17, 25, 30, 36, 50, 53, 54, 58, 67, 113, 115, 120, 138, 143, 144, 145, 146, 152, 188, 194, 197, 198, 199, 207, 208, 216, 234, 251, 252, 256 Indian, 7, 25, 36, 113, 133, 142, 143, 146, 181, 186, 198, 199, 200, 203, 204, 209, 210, 252 Indians, 17 indication, 41, 97, 118, 132, 140, 203, 219, 230 indicators, 111, 147 indigenous, 12, 26, 67, 85, 87, 120, 255 individualism, 203 indoctrination, 3, 10, 14, 30, 41, 54, 109, 122, 123, 125, 126, 129, 137, 141, 167, 171, 174, 186, 198, 202, 205, 208, 209, 220, 221 Indonesia, 250

269

industrial, 153, 158, 202 industry, 7, 66, 82, 172, 179, 183 inequality, 216 inequity, 8, 233 inert, 5 infant mortality, 80 infant mortality rate, 80 inflation, 259 infrastructure, ix, 2, 4, 14, 76, 83, 103, 125, 137, 143, 181, 200, 255, 259 inheritance, 100 inherited, 216 inhospitable, 55 initiation, 24, 32, 47, 87, 101, 111, 165, 173, 180, 192 injection, 260 injuries, 150, 151, 153, 154, 157, 158, 161, 162, 191 injustice, 204, 207, 256 inmates, 209 insecurity, 8, 93, 131, 174, 213, 215 insight, 3, 34, 68, 127, 165, 178, 197, 219, 255 inspiration, 9, 122, 200 instability, 216 Institute of Peace, 16 institutions, xvi, 8, 16, 21, 71, 83, 113, 205, 211, 230, 247, 251 instruction, 203 instruments, 247 integration, 135 intellectual capital, 206 intelligence, xiii, xvii, 9, 22, 23, 25, 33, 37, 38, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 55, 60, 62, 73, 76, 78, 79, 82, 94, 96, 110, 113, 117, 118, 128, 133, 136, 140, 141, 145, 166, 167, 168, 185, 191, 192, 194, 195, 208, 256, 258 Intelligence Committee, 44 intentions, 93 interference, 12, 178, 190, 202, 233 intermediaries, 84 internally displaced person, 123, 239, 243 International Atomic Energy Agency, 59 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 139 international law, 138, 139 international terrorism, 213 internet, 33, 44, 67, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 114, 117, 133, 135, 175, 179, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 249, 250, 252 intervention, 4, 8, 53, 89, 121, 173, 189

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interview, 25, 26, 31, 37, 43, 48, 60, 72, 84, 115, 145, 174, 175, 184, 189, 203, 208, 216, 219, 242, 246 interviews, 93, 105, 121, 133, 196, 204 intimacy, 65 intimidating, 72 intimidation, 182, 246 Investigations, 115, 249 investigative, 218 investment, 17, 50, 83, 225, 232, 258 IOL, 78 Iran, 19, 38, 47, 130, 145, 146, 167, 169 Iraq, ix, x, xvi, 44, 45, 48, 105, 112, 115, 118, 123, 130, 132, 133, 136, 138, 139, 140, 166, 207, 208, 209, 251, 258 iron, 86 irrigation, 84 Islamic movements, 30 Islamic society, 251 Islamic world, 20, 133, 251 Islamism, xviii, 3, 15, 49, 128, 214, 249 Islamophobia, 3 isolation, 7, 123 Israel, 112, 207, 236

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J Jabha-i Najat Milli, 11 jails, 33, 100, 219 Jamestown, 46, 63 Jamia Haqqania, 19 Jefferson, 214, 237 Jerusalem, 213 Jews, 12, 15 JI, 64, 130, 180 jihad, xvi, 2, 9, 13, 15, 19, 26, 27, 29, 30, 38, 58, 61, 62, 64, 65, 79, 97, 113, 119, 120, 125, 130, 142, 148, 149, 171, 186, 190, 192, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 220, 255, 257 Jihad Council, 11 Jihadi, xv, 16, 23, 24, 26, 27, 29, 30, 34, 37, 39, 40, 41, 48, 53, 60, 62, 64, 67, 72, 79, 80, 82, 83, 113, 116, 118, 120, 121, 124, 125, 142, 148, 149, 168, 171, 173, 186, 189, 193, 194, 196, 197, 201, 207, 208, 209, 211, 212, 213, 218, 220, 234, 236, 256 jihadist, 39, 174, 197, 206 Jirga, 4, 5, 7, 13, 47, 58, 71, 88, 97, 112, 177 jobless, 86 jobs, xiv, 73, 75, 212, 214, 232, 233, 240, 248, 259

Joint Chiefs, 132, 133 Jordan, 111, 250 journalism, 88, 239, 246 journalists, xix, 30, 105, 191, 239, 243, 244, 245, 246 judge, 99, 152 judges, 38 judgment, 50 judicial power, 4 Jun, 11 jurisdiction, 5 justice, 5, 10, 24, 51, 70, 71, 73, 80, 86, 87, 89, 91, 92, 109, 148, 171, 172, 179, 183, 228, 233, 255 justification, 79

K Karachi, xvii, 3, 9, 18, 19, 25, 28, 40, 59, 82, 83, 84, 88, 98, 109, 114, 117, 119, 123, 124, 127, 130, 150, 151, 155, 159, 165, 166, 167, 171, 172, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 188, 195, 218, 225, 235, 256 Kashmir, xvi, 19, 25, 29, 30, 49, 50, 53, 54, 79, 82, 113, 114, 116, 120, 124, 142, 144, 145, 171, 186, 187, 197, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 213, 219, 234 Khattak, 18 kidnapping, 32, 57, 103, 107, 169 kidney, 48 kidney failure, 48 killing, xiv, 6, 10, 18, 44, 57, 59, 72, 80, 97, 98, 107, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 121, 134, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 169, 174, 176, 182, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 199, 210, 230, 246 King, 12, 199 knees, 2 knowledge transfer, 129 Kurds, 145 Kuwait, 81

L labeling, 100 labor, 219, 220, 221 labour, 11, 212 Laissez faire, 68, 179, 183 land, ix, xi, 6, 7, 18, 20, 28, 31, 34, 37, 57, 83, 120, 143, 168, 185, 188, 215, 216, 220, 225, 245 language, 65, 109, 138, 159, 206, 211 language skills, 65

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Index large-scale, 73, 239 latency, 60 laundering, 83 law, 4, 5, 7, 13, 55, 67, 69, 71, 77, 79, 80, 83, 85, 86, 90, 99, 103, 106, 116, 131, 132, 138, 139, 140, 180, 188, 189, 193, 248, 258 law enforcement, 5, 116, 131 laws, xiii, 4, 5, 79, 83, 101, 114, 138, 139, 258, 259 lawyers, 153, 156, 245 leadership, xiii, xvii, 15, 17, 21, 24, 30, 32, 36, 39, 40, 42, 44, 45, 48, 50, 58, 65, 67, 69, 70, 88, 90, 94, 96, 108, 111, 119, 120, 133, 136, 141, 148, 165, 167, 171, 172, 178, 186, 195, 204, 205, 208, 214, 231, 251, 252, 260 learning, 13, 14, 15, 148, 211 Lebanon, 112, 142, 250 legislation, 83, 137 lending, 99 lens, 250 liberal, 12, 115, 227, 230, 255 liberalism, 165 liberation, 37, 147, 149, 199 liberty, 109 lifestyle, 12, 240 limitations, 10, 122 linguistic, 7 linkage, 19, 37, 107, 125 links, vii, 19, 30, 31, 34, 37, 40, 43, 84, 116, 125, 129, 168, 187, 188, 192, 194, 197, 198, 199, 208, 210, 220, 221 liquor, 89 listening, 203 literacy, 6, 67, 68, 178, 219, 246 livestock, 6, 243 living conditions, 148, 241 local government, 105 location, 72, 82, 174, 194, 196 logistics, 75, 147, 165, 258 London, xix, 4, 10, 29, 32, 39, 46, 49, 53, 71, 72, 166, 186, 187, 190, 200, 207, 209, 210, 236, 238 lone wolf, 112 long distance, 1 Lorenz curve, 217 Los Angeles, 2, 141 losses, 34, 106, 118, 121, 191, 203, 239 love, 26, 143 loyalty, 5, 35, 48 lying, 217

M machinery, xv, 35, 90, 199, 255 machines, 67 macroeconomic, 232 madrasa, 19, 27 Madrasas, 198 madrassahs, xvi, 8, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 54, 123, 180, 185, 200, 201, 211, 212, 219, 228, 256, 259 magazines, 26, 206 mainstream, xii, 1, 9, 10, 20, 38, 59, 68, 81, 89, 90, 126, 130, 171, 178, 219, 232 mainstream society, 1, 9, 81 maintenance, 7, 135 major cities, 109, 147 major decisions, 63 males, 7, 87, 223 maliks, xiii, xv, 4, 43 management, xv, 75, 129, 187, 189, 190, 191, 193, 199, 212 manipulation, 131, 230 manpower, 34, 201, 211, 212 mantle, 185 mapping, 222 marginalization, 142 market, 34, 74, 76, 91, 92, 118, 119, 142, 147, 156, 158, 172, 187, 243 market share, 119, 147, 187 markets, 74, 90, 91, 92, 100 marriage, 65, 87 Marxist, 129, 255 MDI, 199, 200, 202, 205, 209, 211 meals, 259 meanings, 11 measurement, 218 measures, xiv, 4, 68, 113, 139, 174, 179, 215, 228, 230, 248 media, xvi, 10, 17, 20, 21, 23, 31, 33, 34, 36, 46, 59, 60, 68, 72, 73, 78, 79, 80, 81, 88, 89, 93, 99, 100, 106, 116, 117, 124, 127, 130, 141, 171, 182, 184, 192, 193, 194, 195, 230, 245, 246, 255, 258, 260 mediation, 172 medical care, 243 medicine, 241 Mediterranean, 111 Melmastia, 5 membership, xv, 30, 76 memory, 4, 27 men, ix, 2, 10, 11, 13, 22, 25, 27, 34, 40, 49, 58, 60, 63, 67, 71, 72, 73, 77, 78, 85, 86, 88, 90, 91, 92,

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93, 95, 97, 102, 128, 140, 170, 175, 179, 180, 194, 201, 203, 204, 205, 210, 211, 212, 213, 218, 223, 232, 242, 245, 260 mentor, 15, 57, 60, 64, 67, 97, 199, 200 messages, 104, 258 messengers, 48 Michael McConnell, 44 middle class, 118, 214 Middle East, 44, 47, 81, 96, 105, 138, 145, 162, 237 migration, 181, 182, 199 Militant, 38, 82, 94, 105, 148, 165, 170, 173, 221, 236 militarization, xv military aid, 252, 259 militias, 22, 85, 109, 142, 174, 176, 178, 228, 248, 255, 259 Millennium, 29, 236 mimicking, 54, 114 mines, 85, 109, 228 mining, 85, 171 minorities, xvi, 10, 85, 125, 187, 225 minority, 12, 59, 220, 250, 260 mirror, 71, 149, 207 misconceptions, xiii misleading, 149, 216 missiles, 133, 140, 246 missions, 23, 30, 112, 125, 127, 141, 171, 203, 204, 207, 208, 211 Missouri, 136 MMA, 20, 50, 114, 194, 230 MNA, 33, 90 mobility, 221 modalities, 36 models, 140, 179, 214 moderates, 120, 128 modernism, 98 modules, 103 modus operandi, 130, 131 Mohmand, 21, 28, 79, 85, 103, 160, 170, 171, 172, 240, 247 momentum, 62, 146, 188 money, ix, x, xiii, 12, 13, 17, 18, 26, 27, 28, 45, 70, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 108, 137, 144, 198, 200, 229, 234, 242, 244, 245 money laundering, 83 money markets, 12 Mongols, 4 monopoly, 84 mood, 173 morale, xiv

morals, 8 morning, 62, 153, 156, 157, 203 mortality, 80 mosque, 11, 59, 96, 127, 128, 150, 151, 153, 158, 161, 170, 171, 175, 177, 185, 186, 187, 188, 190, 191, 192, 193, 200, 209, 224 mothers, 88, 212 moths, 27 motives, 7, 110, 131, 177, 181 mountains, 23, 26, 31, 33, 35, 51, 57, 96, 174, 201, 240 mouth, 128 Mujaheddin, 11 mullah Omar, 2 multiculturalism, 15 multilateral, 243 murder, 71, 158, 173, 191, 208 muscle, 108, 181, 246 muscles, 171 music, xix, 9, 11, 67, 70, 71, 91, 93, 100, 107, 152, 184, 203, 212, 228, 256 Muslim, 2, 3, 10, 11, 13, 14, 19, 30, 37, 48, 59, 61, 65, 67, 69, 81, 85, 88, 103, 129, 143, 144, 145, 146, 149, 150, 159, 161, 162, 172, 180, 187, 189, 190, 191, 199, 210, 223, 249, 250, 251 Muslim League, 103, 159, 180 Muslims, 11, 12, 14, 57, 61, 65, 66, 72, 77, 79, 98, 123, 151, 168, 183, 198, 199, 202, 207, 209, 210, 249 mutiny, 14 Myanmar, 120, 187

N naming, 76, 78 Nanawatay, 5 Nang, 5 Naqshbandiyah, 11 narcotic, 84 nation, ix, 79, 105, 128, 231, 250, 260 nation building, ix National Counterterrorism Center, 44, 45 National Guard, 169 National Intelligence Estimate, 44 National Party, 50, 86, 103, 157, 159 national security, 93 nationalism, 30, 257 NATO, x, 30, 60, 62, 85, 93, 95, 96, 106, 131, 135, 170, 208, 251, 256, 257 natural, 17, 21, 35, 54, 65, 81, 99, 117, 178, 225, 257

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Index natural gas, 225 natural resources, 81, 178, 225 Navy, 132, 157 neck, 144 need-based, 260 neglect, 10 negotiating, 34, 36, 58, 107, 111, 122, 149 negotiation, xv, 69, 101, 107, 108, 110, 190, 192 nepotism, 81 network, 11, 13, 14, 28, 30, 44, 46, 47, 53, 72, 75, 76, 81, 96, 101, 109, 133, 147, 166, 201, 202, 205, 208, 212, 258 networking, 38 New World, 2 New York, 8, 13, 25, 44, 45, 58, 70, 72, 82, 101, 102, 105, 112, 125, 127, 129, 132, 140, 162, 166, 236, 237, 238 New York Times, 25, 44, 45, 58, 70, 101, 102, 105, 127, 132, 140, 166, 237, 238 newspapers, 57, 73, 88, 201 NGO, 21, 107, 131 NGOs, xix, 51, 240 Nicaragua, 146 NIE, 44 Nigeria, 250 Nixon, 146 nodes, 47, 109 non-Muslims, 11, 61, 72, 77 Norfolk, 15 normal, 95, 193 norms, 4, 10 North Africa, 44, 47, 105 North Carolina, 237 NPS, xi nuclear, 2, 59, 132, 135, 144, 202, 252 nuclear power, 135 nuclear program, 59 nuclear theory, 135 nuclear weapons, 132, 252 nucleus, 10, 13, 30, 179 nurses, 247 NWFP, 3, 9, 15, 16, 19, 30, 31, 33, 37, 38, 41, 43, 45, 50, 51, 58, 64, 68, 69, 79, 80, 93, 94, 98, 100, 103, 104, 108, 109, 114, 120, 121, 122, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 175, 177, 180, 182, 184, 187, 189, 195, 208, 213, 218, 219, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 231, 232, 235, 239, 240, 247, 256, 257

O obesity, 138 obligation, 11, 125, 189, 199 observations, 193, 211, 220 obstruction, 144 offenders, 80 oil, 49, 95, 160, 168, 225, 256 Oklahoma, 162 online, 9, 17, 22, 31, 32, 37, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 70, 79, 97, 99, 101, 105, 106, 107, 108, 113, 116, 117, 133, 134, 136, 139, 149, 186, 187, 188, 192, 194, 195, 210 open source information, 114, 117, 119, 147, 195, 197 open spaces, 239 opinion polls, 249 opium, x, 84, 89 opportunist, 89, 197, 249 opportunity costs, 221 opposition, 5, 14, 70, 142, 230, 231, 255, 257 oppression, 148 Orakzai, 21, 85, 140, 160, 161, 183 organ, 244 orientation, 111, 253 orthodox, 14, 54, 59, 200, 218 Osama bin Laden, 13, 19, 21, 27, 34, 37, 45, 46, 48, 55, 57, 59, 65, 69, 116, 133, 168, 188, 200, 249 Osama Bin Laden, vii, 48, 55, 166, 187, 188 ownership, 85

P Pacific, 44, 46, 58, 101, 102, 105 PAF, 155 pain, 72, 73, 122, 228, 256 Palestine, 142, 162, 231 paradox, 71, 87 paramilitary, xiv, 7, 88, 94, 104, 107, 159, 160, 169, 173, 198, 258 parenthood, 223 parents, xvi, 191, 247, 259 Paris, 11, 190 Parliament, 36, 95, 149, 185, 193 parole, 203 partition, 7, 120, 199 partnership, 137, 138, 141

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Pashtun, ix, xi, xii, 3, 5, 6, 12, 13, 15, 20, 23, 28, 41, 45, 49, 55, 57, 61, 63, 65, 66, 76, 92, 95, 98, 166, 169, 178, 180, 181, 199, 224, 237, 256, 257 Pashtunwali, 5, 15, 18, 23, 50, 54, 98 passenger, 152 passive, 216 pastoral, 6 paternal, 205 peace process, 99, 100, 101, 207 peace treaty, 77, 101, 102 pedagogical, 2 pedigree, 18 peer, 126, 128 peer group, 128 Pennsylvania, 81, 126 pensions, 223 Pentagon, 131, 132 per capita, 225 per capita income, 225 perception, 84, 136, 143, 144, 194, 220, 222, 224, 225, 239, 249, 250, 251, 252 perceptions, 124, 139, 144, 250 permeation, xviii, 7, 9, 165, 166, 167, 170, 190, 221 Persia, 10 Persian Gulf, 105 personal wealth, 222 personality, 64, 122 persuasion, 22, 256 Pervez Musharraf, 48, 60, 103, 115, 133, 146, 150, 155, 156, 190, 193, 230, 249 pessimism, 122 pharmaceutical, 48 Philadelphia, 81, 126 Philippines, 47, 209 philosophy, 11, 14, 47, 184, 200, 255 phone, 159, 184, 188, 245 photographs, 58, 126 physical environment, 212 physical world, 123 pipelines, 225, 256 placebo, 83 plague, 149 planning, 18, 24, 44, 45, 72, 93, 107, 109, 112, 200, 209, 210, 223 play, 6, 8, 42, 60, 75, 88, 112, 185, 233 pleasure, 66 polarization, 226 police, xiv, 43, 72, 73, 77, 83, 84, 92, 94, 98, 100, 108, 117, 121, 127, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156,

157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 176, 179, 195, 196, 204, 228, 248, 256, 259 policy initiative, 137 policy makers, 78, 144, 215, 231, 246, 260 polio, 228, 256 political leaders, 59, 93, 180 political parties, 20, 103, 141, 212, 230, 257 political power, 113 political stability, 1 politicians, xiii, 140, 141, 144, 231 politics, 3, 12, 28, 55, 64, 88, 91, 113, 114, 115, 118, 133, 138, 139, 215, 225, 227, 231, 253, 258 polling, 161 poor, 6, 16, 73, 74, 86, 88, 91, 109, 123, 143, 200, 213, 214, 215, 221, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 229, 231, 232, 233, 253, 259 poppy cultivation, x population, xiv, 6, 20, 25, 27, 32, 60, 71, 98, 109, 119, 120, 124, 126, 137, 141, 142, 180, 184, 187, 214, 215, 218, 219, 220, 222, 224, 227, 230, 232, 241, 243, 249, 250, 251, 253, 255, 257 pornography, 191 porous, 8, 108 porous borders, 8 portfolios, 19, 83 post-Cold War, 138 post-Soviet states, 138 poverty, xi, xvi, 6, 8, 17, 54, 80, 118, 148, 165, 174, 183, 185, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 225, 231, 232, 233 poverty line, 17, 217, 218, 220 poverty rate, 225 power, xiii, xiv, 4, 5, 7, 15, 16, 20, 54, 55, 59, 60, 61, 64, 78, 79, 80, 88, 90, 96, 103, 104, 105, 113, 114, 134, 135, 140, 185, 204, 211, 215, 225, 227, 231, 255, 256, 258 power sharing, 215 powers, xiii, 4, 5, 54, 125, 137, 244 PPP, 69, 103, 108, 117, 153, 155, 156, 175 pragmatic, 127 prayer, 100, 153, 242 predators, 140 prediction, 240 preference, 133, 244, 255 prejudice, 215 premium, 112 president, 11, 26, 50, 116, 134, 135, 136, 139, 182, 190, 231 President Bush, xvi, 24

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Index pressure, 24, 32, 39, 40, 41, 49, 50, 63, 83, 94, 105, 107, 108, 110, 114, 115, 126, 127, 128, 169, 188, 190, 204, 206, 207, 213, 228, 256, 259 prestige, xiii, 41 prevention, 87 primacy, 97, 255 prisoners, 31, 58, 62, 118 private, xvi, 42, 46, 74, 77, 202, 232, 247, 260 private sector, 232, 260 proactive, 49 probability, 126 production, 80, 84, 243 professions, 248 profit, 259 profits, 80, 83, 85 progeny, 213 prognosis, xvi program, 141, 149, 187, 260 projectiles, 179 proliferation, 118, 167 propaganda, 67, 91, 103, 116, 123, 126, 129, 182, 199, 201, 202, 203, 206, 209, 211, 230, 246, 258 propagation, 86, 186, 205 property, 5, 29, 83, 84, 85, 92, 100, 123 prostitution, 189 protected area, 8 protected areas, 8 protection, 6, 49, 80, 96, 128, 213, 228, 256, 259 protocol, 82 prototype, 178 proxy, xii, xvi, 4, 25, 50, 53, 54, 81, 89, 113, 115, 122, 125, 142, 146, 171, 185, 197, 199, 234, 256 PST, 155, 157, 159, 160 psyche, xiii psychologist, 218 public education, 17, 259 public opinion, 109, 114, 115, 135, 139, 147, 251 public schools, xvi, 219 public sector, 248, 260 public service, 72, 258 public support, 41, 42, 91, 120, 134 public view, 8 pulse, 95 punishment, 91, 112 punitive, xiii pupils, 188

Q Qaderiyah, 11

Qatar, 81 Qawwali, 11 qualifications, 86 query, xiv, 224 questionnaires, 141, 222 Quran, xiv, 11, 61, 89, 91, 148, 212, 247

R race, 4 radar, 35, 40, 48, 88, 184, 204 Radical Jihad International, 9 radicalism, xi, 3, 15, 19, 49, 98, 218 radio, 21, 51, 67, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 123, 126, 188, 245 radio station, 21, 51, 87, 89, 90, 188 radius, 188 Ramadan, 143 RandD, 113, 130, 194 random, 36, 111, 220, 222 range, 32, 51, 76, 121, 126, 129, 214, 234, 241, 248 ratings, 249 reading, 23, 186, 187, 213, 233 real estate, 83 real terms, 124 real time, 60 reality, xviii, 2, 15, 23, 68, 127, 128, 199, 204, 221 recall, 251 recession, 221 recognition, xviii, 200 reconciliation, 42, 190 reconstruction, xi recruiting, xiv, 1, 8, 38, 105, 122, 210 Red Cross, 240 reflection, 184 reforms, 100, 183, 216, 227, 253, 259 refuge, xiv, 19, 26, 28, 31, 49, 51, 166, 180, 240, 257 refugee camps, 14, 123, 241, 243, 247, 257 refugees, xix, 19, 26, 35, 51, 168, 239, 241, 242, 243, 244, 257 regenerate, 44 regional, vii, 1, 22, 27, 46, 49, 53, 55, 62, 75, 92, 98, 106, 122, 144, 157, 199 regular, 8, 68, 82, 230 regulations, 4, 5, 40 rehabilitation, 100, 257, 258 reinforcement, 107 rejection, 10 relationship, xvi, 13, 15, 23, 48, 137, 143, 178, 214, 215

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relatives, 26, 91, 124, 128, 161, 181, 242, 244, 245 relaxation, 73 reliability, 194 religion, 3, 12, 15, 46, 87, 121, 182, 183, 189, 199, 223, 227, 250 religiosity, 20, 71, 111, 223, 227, 234, 253 religious groups, 123, 224, 232, 234 reparation, 10 reporters, 93, 156, 244, 245 repression, 195 Republican, 252 reputation, 42 resentment, ix, 3, 109, 148, 190, 239, 241, 249, 250, 252, 256, 259 reserves, 225, 259 reservoir, 41 residential, 92, 241 resilience, 47 resistance, 11, 28, 51, 54, 86, 101, 103, 107, 111, 112, 145, 148, 189, 191, 197, 198, 234 resolution, 47, 82, 142, 145, 192, 207 resource allocation, 81 resources, 7, 16, 26, 65, 71, 74, 81, 88, 93, 129, 132, 144, 148, 166, 176, 178, 180, 183, 219, 225, 239, 241, 244, 247 respiratory, 242 responsibilities, 125 restaurant, 152, 153 retaliation, 78, 87, 169 retribution, 23, 38, 193, 230 revenue, 66, 85, 161 revolt, 192, 255 revolutionaries, 149 rewards, 128 rhetoric, 27, 54, 67, 72, 225 rifting, 128 right to die, 26 rigidity, 11, 143 rings, 179 risk, 39, 114, 135, 245 robbery, 81 Robert Gates, 137 routing, ix, 178 rule of law, 132, 258 rural, 1, 17, 90, 126, 131, 171, 174, 179, 183, 184, 200, 212, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 222, 223, 225, 230, 232 rural areas, 17, 131, 174, 183, 215, 217, 223 rural communities, 223 rural population, 218, 222

rural poverty, 216, 218, 225 Russia, 2, 27, 31, 58, 138, 233 Russian, 4, 12, 58

S sabotage, 116, 188 sacred, 207 safe drinking water, 223 safety, 92, 166, 240, 252 salaries, 73 salary, 72 Samiul Haq, 16, 18, 19 sample, 195, 196, 213, 214, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 230, 250, 253 sampling, 219 sanctions, 202 sanctuaries, 2, 50, 105, 109, 169 Sandeman system, 4 sarcasm, 205 satellite, 29, 140, 166, 245 satisfaction, 144, 168 saturation, 107 Saturday, 72, 186, 189, 190, 192 Saudi Arabia, 16, 47, 81, 112, 143, 146, 198, 199, 200, 201, 212 savings, 240 scatter, 219 scepticism, 24 Schmid, 163 scholarship, 260 school, xvi, 12, 15, 17, 28, 51, 54, 57, 64, 73, 86, 87, 100, 103, 107, 124, 132, 137, 149, 155, 160, 161, 169, 172, 182, 185, 187, 200, 201, 205, 209, 211, 212, 214, 219, 220, 228, 242, 247, 248, 256, 259 scores, 38, 58, 92, 180, 191 search, xiv, xv, 7, 36, 37, 43, 47, 59, 87, 142, 215, 240 searching, 43, 97 secret, 25, 132, 146, 198 Secretary General, 24 Secretary of State, 43, 137, 144 secular, 14, 86, 103, 227, 230, 253, 255 secularism, 178 secularization, 142, 260 Security Council, 105, 166 seeds, 29, 31 segregation, 9 self help, 176 senate, 44

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Index Senate, 44, 45, 137 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 137 senators, 137 sensors, 140 separate identities, 29 separation, 12 September 11, 62, 132, 146, 154, 212 Serbia, 140 series, 100, 107, 112, 145, 237 services, iv, 16, 25, 26, 33, 49, 71, 72, 73, 75, 116, 190, 219, 233, 243, 245 servitude, 6 settlers, 168 Shahid, x, xi, xii, xvii, xviii, xix, 75 shame, 126 shape, xi, 51, 53, 63, 122, 126, 130, 183, 198, 207 shaping, 87, 88, 108, 118 shares, 80, 167, 175, 178, 179 sharia, 5, 14, 58, 111, 147, 174 Sharia, 2, 9, 13, 18, 41, 51, 56, 62, 64, 68, 73, 85, 99, 103, 171, 185, 189, 226, 227, 249, 253 sharing, 7, 58, 76, 129, 146, 179, 184, 203, 215 shelter, 7, 16, 50, 51, 57, 103, 208, 240, 243, 259 Shiite, 21, 38, 87, 145, 150, 167, 170, 175, 187 Shiites, 14 Shinwari, 220 short period, 231 shortage, 168, 241 shoulders, 246 shy, xi, 59, 60 Sibghatullah Mujaddedi, 11 siblings, 17, 56, 125 sign, 91, 241, 260 signalling, 111 signals, 60, 123, 129 signs, 21, 70, 102, 123, 242, 259, 260 Sikhs, 12, 85, 182 sine, 259 sites, 9, 46, 104, 167, 242 skilled labor, 219 skills, 57, 65, 77, 79, 96, 244 small-scale business, 6 smoke, 130, 192 smuggling, 6, 7, 59, 86 social change, 1, 9 social fabric, 1 social group, 122, 128 social indicator, 215 social justice, 10, 80, 86, 91, 171, 183, 228, 255 social life, 10, 13, 223

277

social network, 76, 128 social status, 6, 225 social welfare, 204 socialist, 186, 187 socioeconomic, 220, 221 socioeconomic status, 220, 221 sociological, 214, 215, 220, 232 soft loan, 232 soil, 32, 105, 134, 142, 143, 231 solidarity, 28, 171 Somalia, 44, 47, 209 South Asia, vii, 14, 32, 42, 45, 57, 59, 73, 101, 106, 107, 116, 136, 138, 143, 183, 185, 186, 187, 189, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 216, 249, 252 Southeast Asia, xv sovereignty, 7, 133, 134, 139, 230, 253 Soviet Union, 53 Spain, 72 spatial, 2, 217, 218 specialization, 109 spectrum, 83, 112, 131, 178, 257 speculation, 65, 84, 133, 140 speech, 152, 153, 206 spiritual, 1, 14, 15, 58, 60, 78, 97, 124, 128, 199 sporadic, 22, 26, 191 sports, 212 SPR, 163 Sri Lanka, 112, 124, 129, 150, 184 stability, 1, 10, 98, 99 stabilize, 136 stages, 202 standards, xvi, 9, 64, 81, 167, 170, 178, 179, 225, 251, 259 Standards, 217 state control, 197 State Department, 42, 138, 204, 259 state intervention, 121 statistics, 80, 184, 217, 218, 220, 232 stereotypical, 81, 213 stigma, 84 stimulus, 76, 79, 169, 178, 215, 258 stock, 147 strain, 13, 15, 62, 87, 167, 187, 244, 249, 255 strains, 11, 12, 15 strategies, 46, 91, 122, 124, 127, 196, 198 strength, xiv, 12, 18, 25, 27, 28, 29, 31, 44, 53, 60, 64, 78, 82, 89, 92, 99, 106, 148, 171, 181, 183, 200, 201 stress, 46, 122 stretching, 146

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strictures, 123 strikes, 105, 120, 133, 134, 135, 140, 141 student enrollment, 260 students, xvi, xviii, 14, 16, 18, 19, 27, 28, 73, 102, 116, 117, 118, 157, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 198, 200, 205, 211, 219, 220, 228, 247, 248, 256, 260 subjective, 222 subsidies, 4 subsistence, 6, 16, 17, 18, 54, 72, 215, 220 suburban, 247 suburbs, 22, 41, 177 Suffa, 11 suffering, 57, 66, 118, 167, 239, 241, 243, 245, 246 Suhrwardiya, 11 suicidal, 112, 122, 123, 124, 126, 203, 204 suicide bombers, 2, 8, 58, 61, 65, 75, 76, 77, 95, 97, 99, 103, 105, 115, 117, 118, 122, 123, 126, 127, 128, 151, 153, 154, 155, 157, 158, 159, 172, 187, 189, 191, 195, 214, 243 summer, 26, 49 Sunday, 4, 46, 50, 60, 69, 73, 86, 89, 90, 93, 106, 114, 133, 135, 136, 140, 144, 176, 180, 182, 188, 190, 192, 242, 243 Sunni, 12, 14, 30, 32, 105, 119, 130, 145, 146, 167, 168, 169, 174, 177, 187, 200, 241 Sunnis, 21, 59, 145, 168, 169 superimposition, 149 superiority, 123 supply, 22, 25, 34, 42, 79, 104, 107, 128, 135, 148, 160, 172, 214, 220, 221 supply chain, 34 suppression, 115, 260 Supreme Court, 40 surprise, 18, 22, 55, 107, 167 surveillance, 22, 141 survival, 79 survivors, 166 suspects, 24, 134, 169, 210 suspensions, 111 sweets, 212 swelling, 67, 81, 107 Switzerland, 82 symbiont, 13 symbiotic, 23, 48, 178 symbolic, 108, 185, 193, 198 symbols, 122, 128 sympathetic, 26, 81, 135, 253 sympathy, 20, 108, 115 symptoms, 172

synchronization, 36 Syria, 140 systems, 10, 12, 13

T tactics, vii, 35, 53, 70, 80, 83, 86, 104, 108, 110, 112, 123, 129, 137, 149, 207, 213, 255, 258 Tajikistan, 37, 120, 187 takeover, 15, 174, 183, 228, 234 Talibanisation, vii, 1, 2, 18, 19, 21, 53, 63, 68, 95, 98, 100, 175, 180, 182, 183, 184, 185, 230 tangible, 112, 258 tankers, 95, 160 tanks, 21, 109, 216, 240 Tanzania, 250 tar, 92 targets, 19, 43, 53, 54, 93, 109, 110, 114, 115, 120, 121, 122, 124, 130, 136, 140, 141, 147, 179, 194, 196, 197, 234, 246, 258 Tasawwuf, 11 task force, 80, 121, 196 taxation, 81 taxes, 7, 24, 51 tea, 28 teachers, xvi, 189, 200, 243, 246, 259 teaching, xvi, 15, 72, 200, 211, 248 technology, 172, 200, 255 teens, 28, 202 Tehran, 146 telephone, 198 television, xix, 54, 72, 126, 203, 212, 245 temporal, 1, 2, 120 tension, 3, 173 tenure, 16 territorial, 4, 32, 63, 76, 108, 129, 134, 139, 225, 249, 258 territory, 5, 7, 22, 23, 25, 32, 53, 90, 92, 94, 95, 108, 109, 112, 125, 129, 134, 135, 137, 170, 172, 183, 208, 255, 259 terrorist acts, 59, 131, 143, 219, 220 terrorist attack, 43, 47, 130, 174, 180, 192, 196, 198, 210, 230 terrorist groups, 20, 39, 81, 96, 136, 137, 196 terrorist organization, vii, 37, 40, 46, 109, 111, 120, 121, 127, 128, 129, 190, 204, 214 terrorists, xv, xvi, 8, 20, 23, 43, 48, 49, 54, 57, 105, 110, 111, 112, 113, 121, 128, 129, 130, 136, 139, 140, 146, 150, 151, 166, 181, 184, 191, 213, 220, 242, 244, 245, 249

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Index testimony, 132, 249 The Economist, 136 theft, 85, 91 theology, 200 thinking, 10, 12, 110, 132, 135, 137 threat, 9, 11, 15, 19, 44, 45, 46, 55, 60, 79, 84, 90, 93, 94, 98, 105, 108, 133, 136, 144, 147, 169, 170, 172, 180, 190, 192, 207, 233, 243, 244, 246, 248, 249, 251, 252, 255 threatened, 59, 72, 94, 179, 189 threatening, 103, 104, 189 threats, 1, 9, 62, 67, 104, 126, 140, 182, 184, 192, 247, 251 threshold, 112 throat, 12, 246, 249 timber, 81, 85 time lags, 255 timing, 111 Timur Lane, 4 tin, 223 title, 67 tolerance, 215, 233, 258 tolls, ix torture, xiv, 127, 139, 189 tourism, 66, 103, 179 tracking, 83, 146 trade, x, 81, 84, 85, 109, 112, 140, 172, 190, 220, 244 tradition, 5, 20, 27, 54, 66, 71, 149, 259 traffic, 37, 95 trainees, 127, 202, 203 training, xi, xiii, xv, 13, 16, 19, 24, 29, 30, 34, 37, 40, 42, 44, 46, 47, 49, 50, 54, 60, 67, 99, 103, 105, 109, 120, 122, 123, 125, 126, 127, 128, 133, 147, 151, 166, 172, 187, 198, 201, 202, 203, 206, 209, 210, 213, 234 traits, vii, 10 trajectory, 41, 148 trans, 125, 145 transactions, 82 transcript, 145 transfer, 82, 223 transformation, 233 transition, 8 transmission, 67, 123 transparency, 259 transport, 22, 73, 220 transportation, 83, 129, 240 trauma, 122 travel, xv, 10, 128, 131, 168, 228, 256

treason, 115 Treasury, 83 trial, 256 Tribalism, 2 tribes, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 20, 21, 26, 28, 31, 32, 42, 63, 77, 90, 91, 105, 121, 157, 171, 241 troop surge, 97 trucks, 25, 92, 107, 160, 180 trust, 72, 82, 83, 141, 144, 175 tuition, 18 turbulent, 73, 176, 226 Turkey, 96, 231, 250

U U.S. military, 141 UAE, 38, 81 UK, xix, 15, 49, 57, 82, 83, 108, 142, 209, 210 UN, 24, 59, 82, 105, 145, 166, 240, 242 UN General Assembly, 82 unclassified, 44 underemployment, 232 UNDP, 237 unemployment, xvi, 80, 118, 182, 218, 219, 232, 255 UNHCR, 240, 243 UNICEF, 223 unification, 61 uniform, 158 Uniform Code of Military Justice, 139 United Nations, 232, 240, 242 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 240 United States, 16, 23, 27, 30, 32, 43, 44, 45, 49, 57, 105, 132, 133, 135, 136, 138, 139, 140, 142, 210, 230, 234, 239, 249, 250, 252 universe, 213, 223 universities, 138, 205 unmarried men, 11 urban areas, 68, 177 urban centers, xvii, 167 urban centres, 109, 117, 149, 184, 195 urbanized, xvii, 165, 167 USAID, 259, 260 Uzbekistan, 34, 47, 49, 63, 79, 96, 120, 142, 166, 187

V vacancies, 138 vacation, 147

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vaccination, 228, 256 vacuum, xiv, 12, 17, 36, 41, 57, 79, 80, 138, 165, 171, 183, 218, 256 values, 216, 230, 251, 255, 260 variables, 81, 214, 215, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 232 variance, 7, 63, 197 vehicles, 66, 70, 79, 91, 92, 107, 123, 130, 140, 150, 152, 154, 173, 177 venue, 54, 91, 153 veterans, 53, 107, 212 Vice President, 146 victims, 114, 153, 171, 190, 244, 251 videotape, 192 Vietnam, 32 vigilante, 89 village, xiv, 13, 27, 28, 37, 45, 55, 64, 65, 87, 90, 96, 129, 134, 150, 151, 154, 160, 161, 168, 171, 175, 176, 199, 205, 222, 223, 242, 259 Villagers, 88, 89 violence, xiv, xix, 6, 15, 39, 41, 50, 61, 69, 73, 79, 81, 104, 105, 107, 109, 119, 120, 127, 131, 145, 147, 148, 165, 168, 172, 174, 175, 194, 196, 224, 234, 239, 245, 255 violent, xvi, 9, 66, 70, 72, 105, 110, 112, 119, 120, 122, 142, 169, 194, 196, 214, 215, 219, 233, 249 visible, 130, 217 vision, 29, 167, 220 voice, 15, 192 voicing, 105 voters, 90

W walking, 87 war, ix, xiv, 2, 10, 13, 17, 25, 27, 29, 42, 44, 45, 48, 53, 55, 59, 65, 71, 78, 79, 83, 88, 96, 98, 102, 113, 116, 118, 120, 123, 124, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 142, 147, 148, 157, 166, 168, 172, 186, 187, 188, 189, 192, 193, 199, 201, 209, 216, 242, 244 War Crimes Act, 139 war on terror, 45, 113, 136, 137, 138, 147, 157, 186, 187, 188, 199, 209, 244 War on Terror, 1, 48, 139, 227, 230, 250 warfare, xiii, xvi, xviii, 12, 65, 139, 149 warlord, 57, 58, 86, 94, 95, 152 warlords, ix, xi, xv, 2, 9, 13, 34, 48, 53, 54, 63, 85, 88, 98, 101, 166, 171 warning letters, 172 Washington Post, xvii, 26, 27, 45, 48, 60, 62, 64, 105, 250

water, 7, 80, 225, 240, 242, 243 watershed, 12, 60, 194, 197 watersheds, 15 waxes, 112 Waziri, 5, 31, 70, 175 Waziristan, xiii, xiv, xv, xvi, 1, 8, 17, 18, 20, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 38, 45, 47, 48, 49, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 68, 69, 71, 76, 77, 79, 80, 81, 84, 95, 96, 97, 98, 101, 106, 117, 121, 123, 125, 131, 134, 141, 146, 147, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 157, 158, 160, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 179, 187, 189, 195, 196, 208, 228, 239, 244, 245, 246, 247, 255, 258 weakness, 111 wealth, 5, 216, 222, 233 wealth distribution, 216 weapons, 6, 7, 8, 25, 26, 42, 51, 53, 65, 93, 96, 123, 130, 140, 148, 172, 173, 180, 181, 202, 224 wear, 9, 91, 195, 248 web, 79, 84 welfare, 82 West Bank, 111, 214, 236 Western aid, 242 Western-style, 248 WFP, 80 White House, 44, 72, 133 wind, 17, 30, 208, 242 winter, 27, 49, 65, 69, 241 wisdom, 218 withdrawal, xvi, 100, 103, 111, 121, 200, 256, 257 witnesses, 152 wives, 242 women, xv, xvi, xix, 8, 9, 10, 14, 51, 59, 67, 68, 71, 72, 73, 85, 87, 91, 94, 100, 109, 123, 134, 153, 170, 178, 180, 184, 189, 191, 222, 223, 239, 241, 242, 246, 247, 248, 258, 260 wood, 242 wool, 10 workers, 29, 67, 95, 118, 158, 181, 182, 190, 220, 242, 245 working class, 205 working women, 184 World Bank, 80, 216, 217, 236 World Food Program (WFP), 238 World Trade Center, 210 worldview, xiii, 86, 88, 123, 143, 149, 185, 230, 231 worry, 55, 176 writing, 15, 17, 48, 126 wrongdoing, 6

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Index

Y

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Yemen, 44, 45, 47, 140

yield, 34, 134, 173, 221, 231 young men, 2, 22, 86, 128, 201, 203, 205, 232 youth unemployment, xvi Yusufzai, 5, 63, 88

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