Taking Pluralism Seriously: Complex Societies under Scrutiny 9780228013136

Citation preview

taking pluralism seriously

democracy, diversity, and citizen engagement series Series editor: Alain-G. Gagnon With the twenty-first-century world struggling to address various forms of conflict and new types of political and cultural claims, the Democracy, Diversity, and Citizen Engagement Series revitalizes research in the fields of nationalism, federalism, and cosmopolitanism, and examines the interactions between ethnicity, identity, and politics. Works published in this series are concerned with the theme of representation – of citizens and of interests – and how these ideas are defended at local and global levels that are increasingly converging. Further, the series advances and advocates new public policies and social projects with a view to creating change and accommodating diversity in its many expressions. In doing so, the series instills democratic practices in meaningful new ways by studying key subjects such as the mobilization of citizens, groups, communities, and nations, and the advancement of social justice and political stability. Under the leadership of the Interdisciplinary Research Centre on Diversity and Democracy, this series creates a forum where current research on democracy, diversity, and citizen engagement can be examined within the context of the study of nations as well as of nations divided by state frontiers. 1 The Parliaments of Autonomous Nations Edited by Guy Laforest and André Lecours 2 A Liberal Theory of Collective Rights Michel Seymour 3 The National Question and Electoral Politics in Quebec and Scotland Éric Bélanger, Richard Nadeau, Ailsa Henderson, and Eve Hepburn 4 Trust, Distrust, and Mistrust in Multinational Democracies Comparative Perspectives Edited by Dimitrios Karmis and François Rocher 5 Constitutional Politics in Multinational Democracies Edited by André Lecours, Nikola Brassard-Dion, and Guy Laforest 6 Fiscal Federalism in Multinational States Autonomy, Equality, and Diversity Edited by François Boucher and Alain Noël 7 The Symbolic State Minority Recognition, Majority Backlash, and Secession in Multinational Countries Karlo Basta 8 Taking Pluralism Seriously Complex Societies under Scrutiny Félix Mathieu

Taking Pluralism Seriously Complex Societies under Scrutiny

Félix Mathieu

McGill-Queen’s University Press Montreal & Kingston • London • Chicago

© McGill-Queen’s University Press 2022 ISB N ISB N ISB N ISB N

978-0-2280-1090-6 978-0-2280-1091-3 978-0-2280-1313-6 978-0-2280-1314-3

(cloth) (paper) (eP DF) (eP UB)

Legal deposit third quarter 2022 Bibliothèque nationale du Québec Printed in Canada on acid-free paper that is 100% ancient forest free (100% post-consumer recycled), processed chlorine free This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Canadian Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences, through the Awards to Scholarly Publications Program, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. We would also like to acknowledge the financial support of the Secrétariat du Québec aux relations canadiennes, Association internationale des études québécoises, Canada Research Chair in Québec and Canadian Studies, and the University of Winnipeg.

We acknowledge the support of the Canada Council for the Arts. Nous remercions le Conseil des arts du Canada de son soutien.

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Title: Taking pluralism seriously : complex societies under scrutiny / Félix Mathieu. Other titles: Défis du pluralisme à l’ère des sociétés complexes. English Names: Mathieu, Félix, 1992- author. Series: Democracy, diversity, and citizen engagement series ; 8. Description: English-language edition. | Series statement: Democracy, diversity, and citizen engagement series ; 8 | Translation of: Les défis du pluralisme à l’ère des sociétés complexes. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: Canadiana (print) 20220156255 | Canadiana (ebook) 20220156301 | ISB N 9780228010906 (cloth) | IS BN 9780228010913 (paper) | I SB N 9780228013136 (eP DF ) | IS BN 9780228013143 (eP U B ) Subjects: l cs h: Cultural pluralism. | l cs h: Multiculturalism. Classification: l cc hm 1271.m3713 2022 | ddc 305.8—dc23

This book was typeset in 10.5/13 Sabon.

To my mother and father, Maryse and Yves

Contents

Foreword to the English-Language Edition | ix Introduction | 3 part one: on managing immigrant diversity 1 Theories of Multiculturalism | 21 2 Multiculturalism’s Paths | 47 3 The Failure of Multiculturalism in the United Kingdom: The Facts | 68 4 The Failure of Multiculturalism? | 89 part two: on managing societal diversity 5 Fragile Nations in Multinational Democracies | 109 6 Empowering Federal Impetus in Multinational Democracies | 129 7 Rethinking Pluralism in Multinational Democracies | 169 Conclusion: Taking Pluralism Seriously | 194 Notes | 199 References | 209 Index | 245

Foreword to the English-Language Edition

The original French-language edition of this book was published in 2017 by the Presses de l’Université du Québec in the Politeia series directed by Professor Alain-G. Gagnon under the title Les Défis du pluralisme à l’ère des sociétés complexes. Again, I wish to thank Alain for his kind invitation to publish what became a revised version of the ma thesis I completed at Université Laval, under the supervision of Professor Guy Laforest, in 2014–16. I wish every graduate student could benefit from the support and mentorship Alain and Guy provided me. I owe them so much. I am very pleased at the publication of this English-language edition by the prestigious McGill-Queen’s University Press in the Democracy, Diversity, and Citizens Engagement Series, also directed by Professor Alain-G. Gagnon. I am truly grateful to Jacqueline Mason, acquisition editor at mqup , who first invited me to imagine an English edition of this book after it received in 2018 a Political Book Prize of the National Assembly of Québec, the Prix Ministère des Relations internationales et de la Francophonie du Québec / Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères. A p hd student at the Université du Québec à Montréal at the time, though, I had difficulty having access to funding opportunities to cover the fees associated with professional translation. Jacqueline Mason and Alain-G. Gagnon wrote me letters of support, and, thanks to the special care of Hugo Cyr, who back then was the Dean of the Political Science and Law Faculty at uqam , I was able to get a most generous grant from the Secrétariat du Québec aux relations canadiennes (sqrc ). I would like to thank in particular Josée Bergeron and Marianne Bonnard at the sqrc . In turn, this enabled

x

Foreword to the English-Language Edition

me to hire the professional services of Mary Baker, a remarkable translator in the field of social sciences. I am most grateful that she accepted embarking on this journey with me. It could not have been done as well as it was without her. Let me also thank all the team at mqup for their continuous support and professionalism. That being said, I take full responsibility for any factual mistakes that can still be found in this English-language edition. This editorial project could not have been realized without the financial support of the Association internationales des études québécoises (aieq ), the Canada Research Chair in Quebec and Canadian Studies (creqc ), and the University of Winnipeg – my new home. Many thanks to all of you for believing in the value of this project. I would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their thorough and thoughtful remarks on the English-language edition of the book. They provided me with critical comments that I considered as much as I could in the final revisions to the manuscript. Even though I wanted this edition to be as close as possible to its original version – after all, a monograph reflects one’s way of thinking at a precise moment and within a specific context – I added references to cope with new empirical and theoretical findings, just as I updated some of the examples I am providing to make my arguments sound. A special thank you, also, to Dave Guénette. Our friendship has led us to collaborate on so many projects over the years that I couldn’t imagine becoming the scholar I am today without his continuous inputs. I wish to thank Olivier De Champlain for all the assistance he provided me during the whole editorial process. Olivier has worked for the Centre de recherche interdisciplinaire sur la diversité et la démocratie (cridaq ) and creqc for the past fifteen years and has helped so many of us with so much kindness and passion. He is an authentic, generous human being, and I am honoured that I can call him a friend. Finally, it goes without saying that I give all my love to my family and friends and most of all to Catherine, who after more than a decade now is still supportive of my seeming capacity to always add new projects to my agenda. Félix Mathieu Winnipeg, Canada

taking pluralism seriously

Introduction

We must take pluralism seriously. Contemporary liberal democracies are all increasingly plural in their sociological composition, and it is crucial that political actors find innovative ways to manage diversity. Obviously, all polities are affected by tensions and conflicts among their members. What characterizes the complexity at work in twenty-first-century liberal democracies is formal recognition of the diversity that comprises them (or at least a quest for recognition by agents of that diversity) and the issues that arise out of such recognition. In this respect, recent decades have been theatres of great dreams but also of great disappointments and questioning, in particular with respect to achieving some kind of togetherness. Hence, several types of pluralism, that is to say, various relatively contextdependent, consistent normative theories about how to manage ethnocultural and societal diversity, have been developed and implemented. By and large, these theories of pluralism reject pure monist or unitary conceptions of the state and society. This book discusses these theories and offers critical reflections on how they impact the institutional architecture of “complex societies” such as the Canadian federation. In the seventeenth century, the foundations for this “unitary” approach were set by the terms of the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which put an end to the great wars of religion in Christian Europe by establishing the famous principle of cujus regio, eius religio (“whose realm, whose religion”) that had been developed at the Peace of Augsburg (1555). The powerful winds of change brought into the broad Christian family by the reforms of Luther and Calvin had led to major conflicts between European populations and even within

4

Taking Pluralism Seriously

those populations. In order to impose peaceful coexistence “from the top,” it was agreed that individuals living within the borders of a given state (or principality at the time) would de facto adopt their sovereign’s religion. The purpose of this was to reduce the “depth” of diversity as much as possible within each society and thereby consolidate a shared all-encompassing identity. This is one of the key elements of the unitary aspect of modern state-building (HermonBelot 2011, 335). With the advent of the great modern political revolutions (principally the French and American revolutions) and the Industrial Revolution, the national dimension came to be a driving force in consolidating the modern state system (Nootens 2016, 91). Over the long term, in the various realms, the majority religious identity that used to characterize unity evolved grosso modo into national identity, which in turn provided the cornerstone of state unity (Robertson 2007). The “normal” model of the modern nation-state was constructed and consolidated in this way (Parekh 2006, 188–9). In short, as Guy Laforest says, the “normal” nation-state is unitary in three ways: first, it concentrates sovereignty, which is single and unlimited over its territory, in a unique political identity; second, from that homogenous legal space a unitary, direct form of citizenship is derived such that the individual has a direct relationship with the state; and third, from this understanding of citizenship flows “one” unique national identity (2014, 48). Obviously, this is an ideal typical model, and most, if not all, modern states do not have such sociocultural homogeneity. The French Republic’s system inherited from the 1789 Revolution is nonetheless the archetype: a “one and indivisible” republic. Unsurprisingly, this recalls the heritage of the symbolic and normative world of the Christian, specifically the Catholic, tradition (Mathieu and Laforest 2015, 95). The normative appeal of this state model peaked in the twentieth century. Ernest Gellner (2008 [1983]), author of major works on nations and nationalism, said it was the “era of nationalism.” Nations sought to portray themselves as carrying “high culture,” which, in sum, meant the dominant culture, marked by a specific language and imbued with moral convictions and social conventions. That high culture was, according to Gellner, called upon to absorb all the particularities existing in or entering into the society. All the citizen “selves” had to form a homogenous national and cultural “whole” (Taylor 1998). To achieve this, major investments

Introduction

5

were made in state bureaucracy and administration, in other words, generally, in nation-building. In accordance with the reasoning at work in the thought of Abbé Sieyès (2002 [1788]), the goal was to put an end to all forms of “privilege.” No citizen should have more or greater rights than any other. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, emphasizes that “all members of the human family” must have the same universal, inalienable rights. This entails that “fair” treatment of all amounts to treating all individuals “equally,” which means that the state must deal with all components of its sociopolitical body in the same way. The aftermath of World War II was marked by unprecedented social mobility (Deutsch 1954). With decolonization, a great wave of immigrants came to settle in Western societies. Little by little, ethnocultural diversity became more complex in liberal democracies and led many governments to rework and reconsider the modus operandi that directed the way people lived together in their countries. At the turn of the millennium, Canadian political philosopher Will Kymlicka declared that multiculturalism – as a theoretical model and as a normative approach to managing diversity – seemed to have “won the day” (Kymlicka 1999). In other words, in the twenty-first century, the era of nationalism would be replaced by pluralism (Glazer 1997). This suggests that treating all citizens in a complex society fairly does not necessarily mean treating everyone in the exact same way but rather “equitably.” Acknowledging their inherent diversity as a given, states should take seriously the many ways of belonging that are part of their political design and, by doing so, ensure that their members do not suffer discriminatory treatment owing to their ethnocultural differences. Criticism was, of course, immediate. Brian Barry, a British political philosopher, categorically rejected Kymlicka’s claim, arguing that the reason proponents of multiculturalism believe they have won is because, in general, those who do not agree with their principles do not write on the topic (Barry 2001, 6). The least that can be said is that since then, the situation has changed dramatically (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). Barry’s formal criticism (2001) proposed that we return to the basics of egalitarian liberalism blind to ethnocultural differences. Failure to do so, he argued, would insidiously help to legitimate a normative system of racial, ethnic, and cultural discrimination. From his point of view, employing differentiated rights

6

Taking Pluralism Seriously

amounts simply to reintroducing the social “privileges” denounced by Sieyès more than 200 years ago. It goes against the thinking of the Enlightenment and the two great modern revolutions. From a more practical than theoretical point of view, let us note that liberal democracies have adopted innovative policies for managing ethnocultural and societal diversity within their borders. Countries such as Canada, Australia, and the Netherlands have adopted official multiculturalism policies. In contrast, other countries, such as France, have insisted on the preservation, or rather adaptation, of the republican model of nation-state inherited from the Enlightenment. In addition, countries such as Belgium, Canada, and Spain have adopted measures to accommodate their internal national or societal communities. Lastly, there are also states that show clear sensitivity to multicultural issues in the way their political structures and institutions are organized, even though they have never adopted an official multiculturalism policy. This is in particular the case of the United Kingdom (uk ). Canada was long widely thought of in dualist terms as being composed of French- and English-speaking populations or demoi (peoples), but in 1971 it adopted an official multiculturalism policy. Notably, this was in reaction to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (Haque 2012, 225; Lapointe-Gagnon 2018). In the 1960s, the uk , which was significantly comparable to Canada owing to its political system and growing ethnocultural and societal diversity, pulled away from all assimilation-based approaches to minorities. To avoid any conceptual ambiguity, the idea of assimilating ethnocultural minorities into a host culture can be compared with a biological mechanism. In short, assimilation consists in the modus operandi according to which a state should behave like a biological entity and absorb exogenous bodies within its space. In accordance with Gellner’s theory (2008 [1983]), the nation-state assimilates minorities into its “high culture.” This process has, however, taken different paths depending on the complexity of the society in question, such as whether there is ethnocultural diversity (minorities resulting from immigration) or societal diversity (minority nations, national minorities, minorities resulting from Indigenous Peoples) or both at once. Canada, being home to both types of diversity and having struggled to finds ways to accommodate them within its institutional architecture, represents a most interesting case study.

Introduction

7

Today, much of the Western world gives some legitimacy (although in varying degrees) to the idea that an individual or group of individuals may possess more than one identity (Kivisto 2012). The claim follows that such multiple identities give individuals permission to ask the state for differentiated or asymmetrical treatment in situations that are unfair or in which they suffer unjust discrimination on the basis of their ethnocultural or societal characteristics (Taylor 1992; 1993). It seems reasonable to argue that such legitimacy derives from the moral duty to treat all citizens justly and fairly, which is endorsed by many liberal democratic societies. However, this noble desire is sometimes distorted when it is translated into action and public policy. In this respect, thinking about or endorsing “pluralism” should not mean demonizing the system of assimilation that is attributed to the standard model of the nation-state. While the unitary and pluralist models come to completely different conclusions respecting how minorities are to be treated, their very core normative foundations are in fact not so different. On the eve of the French Revolution, Abbé Emmanuel Joseph de Sieyès wrote that “we are not made free by privileges, but by the rights of Citizens: rights that belong to all” (Sieyès 2002 [1788], 39 [translation]). The idea was thus to abolish any differential treatment – in this case, the privileges of nobility – so that all citizens would be treated in accordance with their equal status of citizen. A category of “second-class citizen” in society was thus not to be perpetuated. In the second half of the twentieth century, when the idea of differentiated rights came back into fashion, it was ultimately for the same reason: the state must treat all citizens fairly and equitably. Citizens born into the majority group – in other words, citizens able to trace their ancestry back to forebearers considered to have founded the society – should not enjoy preferential treatment in comparison with citizens whose roots are in (more) recent immigration. Put differently, there is concern for the fact that the political, legal, and cultural framework for complex societies is not, in fine, neutral with respect to all citizens – as it should be according to the liberal ideal inherited from the Enlightenment. Indeed, the “norms of a society are not determined solely as a function of abstract principles of justice: they are also determined by context” (Maclure and Taylor 2011 [2010], 68). Taking this as the key to thinking about the unitary model inherited from the Enlightenment (Todorov 2006, 17) and seeking to avoid making people belonging to minority groups into “second class citizens,” the

8

Taking Pluralism Seriously

pluralist model proposes introducing differentiated or asymmetrical treatment. In Canada, arguments for and against reasonable accommodations are based on this line of reasoning. If the French Republic is the archetype of the “normal” modern nation-state, its island neighbour, the United Kingdom, corresponds more to what is broadly understood as a pluralist state. Indeed, the way these countries’ respective empires used to function underscored these aspects. Moreover, the United Kingdom is composite in the very organization and design of its approach to citizenship, bringing to mind the symbolic and normative heritage of the ProtestantReform tradition that developed within its borders (Mathieu and Laforest 2015, 94). From a sociological point of view, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland encompasses four constitutive societal communities: England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. While the majority national community – England – obviously has a history of invasive nation-building policies against minority societal aspirations, recent decentralizing policies (devolution) over the past two decades or so have deepened the pluralist, multinational dynamic. Regarding management of diversity resulting from immigration more specifically, in 1967 Labour Party member and Home Secretary Roy Jenkins laid the normative foundations for the British turn toward pluralism and sensitivity to multiculturalism. He “defined integration, therefore, not as a flattening process of uniformity, but cultural diversity, coupled with equality of opportunity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance” (cited in Favell 2001, 104). It was in this spirit of integration that the British political and institutional framework for managing the ethnocultural diversity within its territory was established. However, the fact that the United Kingdom has never adopted an official multiculturalism policy makes analysis more complex. Instead of doing as Canada did and putting in place clear central principles leading to various programs and policies, the United Kingdom established a considerable ad hoc collection of pieces of legislation, local political programs, and regional initiatives to combat racism and discrimination on the basis of religion, ethnic origin, race, and culture and also to promote and “celebrate” Great Britain’s ethnocultural diversity (Favell 2001). In 1997, after eighteen years of Conservative rule, “New Labour,” led by Tony Blair, won a majority in the election. A resurgence in multiculturalism in the uk followed (Fleras 2009, 172; Grillo 2010, 53).

Introduction

9

Labour Party discourse was enriched with “multicultural colour” (Blair 1997; Leonard 1997; Delanty 2003), and the first years of the Blair government were unarguably infused with reaffirmation of multiculturalism in the United Kingdom (Modood 2010). Some Labour Members were even sent to Canada to study the Canadian Multiculturalism Act (Hansen 2007, 378). It was also at that time, in 2000 more precisely, that the Commission on the Future of MultiEthnic Britain (cfmeb ) was set up. It was the British equivalent of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission in Quebec in 2007–08 (Bouchard and Taylor 2008). The cfmeb ’s work was directed by political philosopher Bhikhu Parekh, who is openly in favour of a multiculturalist approach for the uk (Parekh 2006; 2008). However, as in most Western democracies, the popularity of multiculturalism in the approach and discourse of British governments changed considerably in the space of only a few years. Sociologist Christian Joppke (2004; 2014; 2017) argues that in the uk , and in the Netherlands in particular, there was a retreat in multiculturalism policy to the advantage of “thick” civic integration policies. Some major players in British political life seem to have agreed with Joppke. For instance, Labour ministers David Blunkett (2002) and Ruth Kelly (cited in the Daily Mail 2006) questioned whether multiculturalism was indeed promoting the emergence of parallel lives between the various ethnocultural communities rather than a form of “togetherness,” and when he was a member of the Opposition in Parliament in 2007, David Cameron (former leader of the Conservative Party and later prime minister from May 2010 to July 2016) said that multiculturalism is a barrier that divides society (Cameron 2007). At a major conference on national security in Munich in 2011 when he was serving as prime minister, Cameron said that state multiculturalism had failed in Britain (bbc 2011). Thus, within at most a decade, there was a shift from a governmental approach singing Cool Britannia (Blair 1997) and celebrating diversity as embodying British identity (Leonard 1997) to a government solemnly declaring the failure of state multiculturalism in the uk . That episode in the United Kingdom was, however, neither unique nor proper to British society. Statements similar to those of David Cameron resonated more or less everywhere in the West. Public debate in Quebec and Canada was also marked by severe criticism of multiculturalism and, in Quebec, of interculturalism. Clearly, pluralism generally and multiculturalism more specifically were seen

10

Taking Pluralism Seriously

by many as public enemy number one or at least as the scapegoats responsible for the main social problems in our liberal democracies. Although English-speaking Canada is sometimes an exception, for the most part, public discourse in the West aligns with criticism of multiculturalism, which is alleged to be the source of the chief problems related to living together in complex societies (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). We therefore need to understand and interpret both the scope and meaning of statements such as that of British Prime Minister David Cameron (2011). Do the allegations of the failure of multiculturalism target its theoretical and normative framework or instead the political and institutional form it has taken? Are we witnessing a real withdrawal of multiculturalism policies? In short, what reasoned judgments can we legitimately make with regard to the debates surrounding multiculturalism? In the first part of this book, we shall try to answer these questions as rigorously as possible. This requires close examination of the British debates on the matter, which cover the main points of discord in other liberal democracies. Moreover, since the head of the British government formally stated several times that multiculturalism was a failure, the United Kingdom is an extremely relevant case study. However, we also look at what is happening elsewhere in the West, in particular in Canada and the Netherlands, so that one can better appreciate both the similarities and the differences between cases. Our objectives must be made explicit. The goal here is not to make any causal inferences (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994) about what might have led to a change in attitude toward multiculturalism. Such a positivist methodological approach is certainly well equipped to answer many research questions in social sciences, but this work is instead focused on understanding and interpretation (Della Porta and Keating 2008, 24–5). In this sense, we are in line mainly with the analytical approach in political science and political philosophy (Van Parijs 1991; Maclure 2013). The pillars of that approach are concern for conceptual clarity and the desire to perform a reasoned analysis of contemporary issues. Political ideas and theories are certainly foundations in this approach, but the work is incomplete if the theoretical and normative judgments are not confronted with the findings of empirical research from social science. Like John Rawls’s conclusions in Theory of Justice (1971), a reasoned judgment resulting from study must be perceived as a point

Introduction

11

that is fixed but temporary. Our conclusions must always be balanced between, on the one hand, the most carefully nuanced theoretical and normative arguments and, on the other hand, reliable scientifically validated empirical data. In an era of so-called post-factual societies in which public discussions are undermined by biased or simply false information, it seems necessary to clarify the terms of our debates and make the underlying stakes and issues into topics of discussion. Faced with the former yet influential American President Donald J. Trump, who feels entitled to assert falsehoods under the cover of “alternative facts,” and with politicians everywhere in the West who make certain minorities into the scapegoats of all major problems, it is important that the clear light of reason and evidence-based facts be shone on public debates. For this, it is fundamental to identify sophisms and fallacious reasoning and to offer reasoned judgment drawn legitimately on the basis of conceptual, theoretical, normative, and empirical analysis. That said, it is crucial not to limit the focus of our analysis to debates surrounding “multiculturalism.” Taking pluralism seriously means also considering the ways that national diversity and Indigenous Peoples are treated within sovereign states. Again, as we already noted, immigrant diversity is not the only source of said “complexity” in our societies. Therefore, in the second part of the book we focus our attention on societal diversity. Despite the fact that the primary purpose of “national high culture” was to consolidate the “normal” paradigm of modern nation-states, many contemporary liberal democracies are indeed home to “societal” or “deep” diversity. Within the boundaries of a given state, people with many different civic and national aspirations try to shape their own institutions and gain independent or at least autonomous control over their collective political destiny. The societal minorities that are part of a multinational democracy usually have the ambition to take their places in history as legitimate “global societies” or demoi (Dumont 1962; Langlois 1991). In different ways, the majority group’s mechanisms for nation-building in such “multinational” states have generally aimed at absorbing the minority societies that attempt to develop within them (Lecours and Nootens 2007). Such societal diversity can be said to be fragile, both on the subjective level (imagery of fragility and psychology of “smallness”) and on the objective level (limited capacity to develop institutionally). “Fragile nations” living in

12

Taking Pluralism Seriously

multinational democracies are vectors of special challenges with respect to pluralism. One of the most relevant and interesting cases of such a multinational democracy is the Canadian federation, which, in 2017, celebrated the 150th anniversary of the British North America Act’s coming into force and Canada’s coming into being as a modern political entity. To the author of this book, being a Canadian citizen, a Quebecer now living in Manitoba, it seemed altogether natural to put the spotlight on Canada when reflecting on the challenges and opportunities posed by diversity. But why should this case study be of any interest to non-Canadians? Canada is not central to the unfolding of political modernity. It also evolves in the shade of the most powerful country in the world: the United States of America. Yet, when it comes to reflecting on the management of diversity, it is all but marginal. The way it dealt with its inherent and growing complexity has shown that it is possible to coexist peacefully while celebrating diversity. Over the course of its sociopolitical trajectory, it has also revealed important shortcomings in that matter. As such, one can draw fruitful lessons for many other cases from studying the debates and policies its specific context generated. What is more is that some of the most prominent scholars in the field of pluralism studies come from Canada. In the end, their ideas and conceptual framework will be at the heart of the unfolding of this book’s general goal: taking pluralism seriously by looking at both ethnocultural and societal diversity. Unarguably home to major ethnocultural diversity resulting from immigration, the Canadian federation is also the country of a number of communities that are strictly speaking societal. Indeed, the reason Canada adopted a federal rather than a unitary system of governance was this sociological reality. However, not all the Fathers of Confederation were enthusiastic about taking that political path. Two main factions squared off at the Quebec Conference in 1864 (Laforest and Mathieu 2018; Brouillet, Gagnon, and Laforest 2018) that led to the adoption of the seventy-two resolutions that form the foundations of much of Canada’s constitutional architecture. On one side, there was John A. Macdonald and his supporters, trustees of Anglophone interests faithful to the British Crown. They clearly favoured the establishment of a strongly centralized unitary political regime that would be able to guide the development of the land and

Introduction

13

also to address the threat of expansion by the United States. On the other side, there was George-Étienne Cartier and his supporters, trustees of French-Canadian interests, who entered into an alliance with Alexander T. Galt and Thomas D’Arcy McGee, representing, respectively, the interests of the English-speaking Protestant and Catholic communities in Canada East. (Cartier’s group can be seen more or less as the ancestor of today’s Quebec.) Cartier’s alliance favoured a more decentralized federal political regime that would provide significant freedom for minority communities (defined on religious lines). The resulting Canadian federation was a kind of compromise between these two visions.1 Canadian societal diversity cannot be boiled down to Frenchspeaking Quebecers and English-speaking Canadians alone. Fundamental members of the Canadian political association, but unfortunately the big losers in it, the Indigenous Peoples who live within Canada’s borders2 also face and present significant challenges. The Canadian federation has obviously changed in many ways since 1867. A century and a half has gone by: clearly, a review is welcomed (Gagnon and Poirier 2020). Future directions are also needed. How should we interpret the way the Canadian approach to managing its constitutive societal diversity has changed? Today, in the twenty-first century, what balance remains between the positions of Macdonald and Cartier in the constitutional architecture of the federation? Is the form of pluralism prevailing in Canada hospitable to the various national communities coexisting within it? What conditions would make it possible for these different national communities to become fully empowered, both politically and culturally, within the Canadian political system? Can Quebec’s interculturalism approach coexist harmoniously with Canadian multiculturalism? While the first part of the book deals with issues related to immigrant diversity and offers a comparative perspective grounded in an empirical approach, the second part of this book invites readers to explore these questions from an angle that is more normative than descriptive by looking precisely at the Canadian federation. Therefore, before undertaking such reasoning on the conditions favouring togetherness in the context of societal diversity within federations and multinational political entities, we use the first chapters

14

Taking Pluralism Seriously

to focus on a theoretical, empirical, and comparative analysis of some of the most pressing challenges complex societies are facing. Taking pluralism seriously means considering the challenges posed by the claims made by agents of both ethnocultural and societal diversity. This is what this book is all about.

a brief presentation of the chapters This book has two distinct yet interlinked parts. While the second part concentrates on a normative reflection in which we inquire into the conditions that “must” be met to establish an environment that is open to deep diversity within federations and multinational political entities, the first part has a completely different purpose. In the first four chapters, the goal is not to defend multiculturalism in general, a specific normative theory of multiculturalism, or even the political and institutional organization of any given country. Instead, we seek a reasoned judgment of, first, the state of the discussion on multiculturalism as a theoretical and normative model and, second, how multiculturalism has in fact evolved as a political-institutional means of managing diversity. Theories of Multiculturalism

In chapter 1, we have three objectives. First, we attempt to clarify key terms used in studying how people live together in complex societies. This involves examining the terms on four separate analytical levels: diversity as a sociocultural fact, political-institutional means for the management of said diversity, social imaginaries of multiculturalism, and pluralism as normative political theory. Next, we frame a broad definition of multiculturalism/interculturalism as pluralism, which is to say, on the level of normative political theory. Lastly, we describe the workings of four comprehensive theories of multiculturalism: the theoretical and normative approaches of Will Kymlicka, Bhikhu Parekh, Tariq Modood, and Anne Phillips. Multiculturalism’s Paths

In chapter 2, we start by describing the general path that led to the renaissance of differentiated rights at the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century. Then we provide a comparative

Introduction

15

analysis of the evolution of multiculturalism as public policy in three countries that can be compared in a meaningful way with respect to multiculturalism on the political and institutional levels. This puts us in a better position to understand the many subtle differences in aspects of multiculturalism as a public policy, in particular by identifying the differences between its specific institutional embodiments. The three cases to be compared – Canada, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom – have taken very different paths with respect to multiculturalism as a public policy. The goal of this chapter is to understand the nuances and distinctions involved in the ways different countries establish public policies on multiculturalism. The Failure of Multiculturalism in the United Kingdom: The Facts

Chapter 3 extends, completes, and systematizes the analysis of the preceding chapter by focusing on the case of the uk . As seen in chapter 2, when the Labour Party came to power in 1997, public policy on multiculturalism enjoyed resurgence in popularity in the country. However, by 2004, the sociologist Christian Joppke (2004; 2014; 2017) was predicting that multiculturalism policies would drop from favour in Great Britain, and in 2011 Prime Minister David Cameron stated openly that state multiculturalism had failed. This chapter provides a systematic empirical analysis of multiculturalism as public policy in the uk from 2000 to 2015. The Failure of Multiculturalism?

Chapter 4 contains a discussion on the reasoned judgment to which we are led by the first three chapters. We answer an initial series of inquiries: is multiculturalism’s declared failure a consequence of the theoretical and normative construction of multiculturalism, or is it in fact a result of the political and institutional approach taken? Have multiculturalism policies really declined, and, in particular, did this happen in the uk between 2000 and 2015? As more and more voices are being heard in complex societies concerning multiculturalism’s failure, we discuss the major divide separating the main criticisms of multiculturalism in public debate from what the predominant normative theories of multiculturalism in fact propose.

16

Taking Pluralism Seriously

Fragile Nations in Multinational Democracies

Chapter 5 is the beginning of the second part of this book, and it has three objectives. To begin with, we operationalize the concept of “fragile nation,” discussing both its subjective (myths, imaginaries) and objective (limited capacity for nation-building) aspects. We then examine the literature to identify the main understandings of the “fragility” of minority nations in relation to federalism. Finally, establishing the conceptual foundations for the discussion to follow on the state of the Canadian federation with respect to managing societal diversity, we delineate an optimal method for thinking about the conditions for a reasonable way of living together that is open to the societal diversity in a multinational democracy. Empowering Federal Impetus in Multinational Democracies

In continuity with the preceding chapter, we use Canada as a test case for the method of reasoning we delineated in chapter 5 – that is to say, we investigate the rationality of a form of liberalism open to diversity. With a view to a dynamic system that we call the “federal impetus in a multinational context,” we examine the institutional conditions that could make it possible for various (fragile) nations to become empowered, both politically and culturally, within a multinational federation. We then study in depth three sets of conditions that should guide the Canadian federation if the objective is to live together in accordance with a true federal impetus. The first set of conditions concerns Quebec, the second, the Indigenous Peoples living in the federation, and the third, the majority group in English-speaking Canada. Reconsidering Pluralism in Multinational Democracies

Finally, in the last chapter we use what we have learned about the dynamics of the federal impetus to reconsider Canada’s model of pluralism. The argument has two parts. First, we go into greater depth in the theoretical discussion begun in chapter 1, targeting points of tension and overlap between interculturalism and multiculturalism as models of pluralism and exploring the possibility of combining the normative reasoning underlying those two approaches to fashion

Introduction

17

a form of pluralism that would be better adapted to a multinational context. Second, we describe in greater detail the conditions for implementing such a model of pluralism in the Canadian federation and the major challenges that would arise.

pa rt o n e

On Managing Immigrant Diversity Taking pluralism seriously in the age of complex societies means facing many challenges. In Part 1, we address the challenges that are linked specifically with managing immigrant diversity. For this, we will take an approach that is both theoretical and empirical. To begin with, we will clarify the meaning of a few concepts to make sense of the analytical tools for carrying out a rigorous study of debates about how to manage ethnocultural diversity. As we do this, we will try to formulate a broad definition of “multiculturalism” as a normative political theory. We will also describe the main characteristics of some of the theories of multiculturalism that are most often discussed in the literature. We will then be able to see the similarities and differences between the leading theories of multiculturalism. Next, we will focus on multiculturalism as public policy promoted by certain states. It has become commonplace to hear critics in the public debate speaking about the “failure” of multiculturalism, in particular after declarations by major contemporary political figures that “multiculturalism has failed” in their countries. It therefore seems useful and informative to compare the paths multiculturalism policy has taken in a few countries. By comparing how Canada, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom have thought about and negotiated the building of their multiculturalism

20

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

policies, we will bring out the differences between the approaches that have guided these three countries. We will find that it is not reasonable to speak of multiculturalism’s failure in a general manner, for no two states have exactly the same policies on the matter. We will then examine the British case in greater detail, since former Prime Minister David Cameron remarked a number of times that multiculturalism was a failure. We will take a more systematic approach to find out whether the fact that he said multiculturalism was a “failure” in 2011 had any repercussions on the evolution of multiculturalism as a set of public policies in the United Kingdom. Lastly, we will look at the main criticisms of multiculturalism as a normative political theory. More specifically, it seems important to place the primary criticisms of multiculturalism in the public sphere in juxtaposition with what the leading theories of multiculturalism in fact propose. Thus, the first part of this book will provide the reader with a deeper critical examination of the main themes structuring the debates on how to manage immigrant diversity in liberal democracies.

1

Theories of Multiculturalism

One of the first major challenges lying in wait for every study on pluralism is conceptual clarification of the terms that will be used as analytical tools. Since multiculturalism can be interpreted in many different ways, it seems that this is how we must begin this work if indeed we are to take pluralism seriously. In this chapter, we start by differentiating the analytical tools structuring the debates on togetherness. We will then propose a broad definition of multiculturalism as pluralism – in other words, the aspects generally shared by most normative theories of multiculturalism, or at least the leading ones, which we will be exploring in the following pages. Lastly, after having pointed out a few key points of divergence that determine the different architectures of multiculturalism philosophies, we will describe the main lines of the theories of Will Kymlicka, Bhikhu Parekh, Tariq Modood, and Anne Phillips.

the four conceptual levels of “multiculturalism” Discussion of “multiculturalism” (or interculturalism) is complex in part because the term is polysemic. The wide range of meanings it is given in the literature makes dialogue between its proponents and its detractors difficult. They criticize each other without necessarily sharing the same understanding. This is certainly not specific to multiculturalism – we need think only about the many possible meanings of “democracy” (Dupuis-Déry 2013). However, it remains especially hazardous for rigorous analysis of the problems related to togetherness in complex societies. Debates on multiculturalism

22

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

obviously go far beyond academic circles, and the media sometimes use them in original, not to say twisted, ways (Wolf 2005; Weaver 2010), thereby adding misunderstandings to the discord.1 In order to avoid terminological confusion, we will provide a short clarification.

the social fact of diversity In the spirit of a ladder of conceptual abstraction (Sartori 1970), we propose a distinction between four levels of concepts. The first – the most concrete – consists in treating “diversity” as an observed social and cultural fact. This means factual observation that there is ethnocultural diversity. Using the term “multiculturalism” or “interculturalism” to designate that reality would be an epistemological error. Generally, all political communities are “plural” in that they contain more than one cultural group. This factual reality, which would be more accurately referred to as ethnocultural or societal “diversity” (Karmis 2003, 86; Nootens 2010, 56), is certainly a necessary condition for thinking about interculturalism and multiculturalism, but it is in no way sufficient for expressing either. From a sociological point of view, diversity has essentially three forms: it is the result of either an invasion or an “incomplete conquest”2 (as is the case for Quebec and the Indigenous Peoples living in Canada), or of an internal schism (as is the case in the Netherlands, for example, after the discord at the time of the Reformation), or of migration (as is the case for immigrant diversity) (Rioval 2010, 719).

multiculturalism or interculturalism as public policy The second level, which has to be distinguished from the first, is that of multiculturalism or interculturalism as “public policy.” This concerns public policies (fairly broad public programs established by a legitimate government authority for a given political community) that some states set up to manage and accommodate ethnocultural diversity. States that do this may take more or less direct inspiration from an author or philosophical approach,3 embodying the approach in legislation (laws) and public policies, which are sometimes enshrined in a constitution, as in Canada, but may also be distributed among regional, local, and sometimes municipal jurisdictions, as in the United Kingdom.

Theories of Multiculturalism

23

multiculturalism or interculturalism as a social imaginary The third level, which must also be distinguished from the preceding two, concerns multiculturalism or interculturalism as a “social imaginary”: François Rocher says multiculturalism is more of a “state ideology” (2015, 35), which would be a social imaginary of multiculturalism or interculturalism expressed through the “symbolic representation of the political vision marked [for example] by the principles of openness, tolerance and recognition of diversity” (Rocher 2015, 35 [translation ]). Multiculturalism and interculturalism thus look like intrinsic aspects of a national vision. Sometimes, as in Canada, this finds its way into social imaginaries as “added value” or even as a form of “moral superiority” that distinguishes the Canadian political community from others (Rocher 2015, 35) – for example, the myth of a fundamentally “tolerant and multicultural” Canada. In Quebec, the social imaginary of interculturalism instead consists in the idea of a dynamic relationship between ethnocultural diversity and the host society that integrates such diversity into Quebec culture, in which there is recognition of the many ways that citizens can belong (Bouchard 2012).

multiculturalism or interculturalism as pluralism Lastly, the fourth conceptual level concerns pluralism. Although the word “pluralism” is often used to speak about the social fact of ethnocultural diversity, it would be more accurate to employ it to refer to theories about multiculturalism or interculturalism. In other words, it refers to reasoned, normative, more or less consistent conceptions of togetherness and how to manage diversity in complex societies. In this respect, pluralism is a normative political program, whereas the concept of ethnocultural diversity remains on the factual level. Depending on the philosophical current and author, multiculturalism or interculturalism as pluralism can take different forms: liberal, civic, or communitarian (Maclure 2010, 40–1). The mainstream version of multiculturalism as pluralism is most certainly the liberal variant (Levey 2010), and it is found in the work of Canadian philosopher Will Kymlicka (Modood 2013, 20). Paradoxically, as we will see in chapter 4, pluralism’s detrac-

24

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

tors seem to focus their attacks most on “communitarian” multiculturalism, which is practically an orphan with nary an author to advocate for it.

* * * We therefore need to keep the difference between the four conceptual levels in mind when looking at debates on togetherness. Calling into question or criticizing a public policy on multiculturalism or interculturalism – or challenging such a policy as a social imaginary – may be perfectly reconcilable with a variant of multiculturalism or interculturalism as pluralism. For example, taking as a point of departure the form of multiculturalism as “pluralism” developed by Kymlicka (1995), in which there is great sensitivity to special rights for minority nations such as Quebec, it would be consistent to criticize multiculturalism as “public policy” and as a “social imaginary” in Canada. In Canada, the imaginary and public policies of multiculturalism presuppose that all minorities are to be considered equal and, for example, that minority nations are to be ascribed the same nature as immigrant minorities (chapter 2). However, criticism of these normative theories can remain open to certain public policies on multiculturalism or interculturalism but categorically reject others. Criticizing multiculturalism or interculturalism as pluralism, as a social imaginary, or as public policy does not mean questioning the fact that there is ethnocultural diversity. However, at this point we need to define the aspects that are central and recur in the great majority of normative theories of multiculturalism.

multiculturalism as pluralism: a first draft of a broad definition In a way, normative theories of multiculturalism embody what can be called the “age of pluralism4 and complex societies,” which has grosso modo replaced what Ernest Gellner (2008 [1983]) designated the age of nationalisms. According to Gellner, nations and nationalism are products of history generated by the surrounding social and organizational structure resulting from the shift from agricultural to industrial societies. The salient features of the social and organizational structure in question can be understood essentially by the fact that there is a social division of labour such that relative

Theories of Multiculturalism

25

social mobility is required, which in turn fundamentally requires some degree of social equality. Gellner shows that the industrial state gradually establishes and supports an educational system that is open to all. That system then promotes a standardized general education transmitted by a shared language, which finally consolidates a “high culture” internalized by all (Gellner 2008 [1983], 26). In line with the understanding proposed by Kymlicka (1995), we call this a societal culture, which is a notion that will be fundamental throughout this book. According to Will Kymlicka, it refers to “a culture which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres. These cultures tend to be territorially concentrated, and based on a linguistic community” (1995, 76). In the age of nationalisms (Gellner 2008 [1983]), for a society that builds and consolidates a societal culture that is shared and internalized by all its members, leaders and the led alike, the state becomes the guardian and protector of that culture. The state plays this role because it is the only political power apt to make such a social system effective. In order to ensure that the societal culture is shared by all, it seems imperative for it to be inextricably linked to a central state responsible for seeing that no reclusive segment of society can survive. This age of nationalism is characterized by moral (liberal) monism – in other words, the idea that only one way of doing things and one way of living seems fully just and true (Parekh 2006, 16), and that way naturally happens to be the majority’s. In short, this means the implementation and political systematization of the Westphalian cujus regio ejus religio – religious freedom for “princes” and subjects’ duty to follow their rulers. Gellner argues that when there is in consequence socio-entropic resistance – that is to say, when there is a segment of society that does not share the societal culture (whether that segment benefits too much or not enough from the social and organizational structure) – then there is the potential that significant social divisions and fractures will be created (Gellner 2008 [1983], 64). The societal culture in the age of nationalisms then becomes, within the borders of the land, an assimilating force that does not tolerate social segmentation – that is to say, minorities that try to resist it. In doing so, said “moral monism” tends to empower a “sociological monism” entailing the legitimacy of only one undifferentiated demos, only one societal culture within every sovereign state.

26

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

Over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, societal culture as an assimilating power was gradually institutionalized in the great majority of Western states as a means of managing the ethnocultural diversity that was already present within their borders or immigrating to their lands (Levey 2010, 19). Today, this is known as the Jacobin approach (Gagnon 2014) or Anglo-conformity model (Kymlicka 1995). In short, it is the ideal of a monocultural nationstate: the “normal” modern nation-state (Laforest 2014, 48; Guibernau 2007). This assimilation of segments of society into the societal culture has, however, gradually been challenged (chapter 2). Different types of pluralism – that is to say, different anti-assimilation normative approaches to managing and accommodating ethnocultural diversity – have arisen. From what Kymlicka (1995) called the age of migration, we are now moving into the age of pluralism and complex societies. Following Charles Taylor’s (1992) reasoning in this respect, we see that since the end of the eighteenth century there has been a slow process of identity individualization, culminating today in what we could call a celebration of multiple uninhibited identities – in other words, an intense version of what Jacques Beauchemin (2004) calls a “society of identities.” This very special celebration is normatively charged with a “duty of recognition”: the duty to acknowledge that, morally, others around us have specific, authentic identities, that each person’s identity is expressed in the dialogue that they have with others, and, often, that the recognition of each “self” in the dialogue must be “meaningful” (Taylor 1992; 1994). This entails that the other needs to be recognized for their identity to be fully affirmed (Seymour 2008, 170). The dialogue that establishes our identity requires recognition by others (Taylor 1992), and nonrecognition or misrecognition of that identity can cause serious moral harm. As Charles Taylor puts it, recognition is nothing less than a “vital human need” (Taylor 1994, 42). It is a “human need” because not recognizing someone is to take from them their access to the “authenticity” of their own self; it is to deny their own individual existence. In short: “[O]ur identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves” (Taylor 1994, 41). The general idea of pluralism is that it seems primordial to recognize that all must have equal human dignity (through wealth

Theories of Multiculturalism

27

redistribution policies), and the same goes for equal respect for each person’s constituting identity (through recognition policies). Thus, for multiculturalism or interculturalism as pluralism, the “progressive dilemma” – the idea that recognition policies whittle away at, or even destroy, the spirit that consolidates redistribution policies (Barry 2001; Goodhart 2004; Koopman 2010) – is a non-issue. As the pioneering theorists of pluralism (Taylor 1992, 25; Honneth 1992; Fraser 1995) argued, the two types of policies seek in fact to combat two distinct forms of social injustice, a matter we must also address. Fearing one does not necessarily prevent us from looking at the other. Redistribution is meant to correct socioeconomic inequalities so that some citizens will not be unjustly discriminated against in their life prospects. Recognition is meant to correct the moral and discriminatory harm caused by nonrecognition or misrecognition of each individual’s specific identity, in particular the identities of individuals belonging to minority groups. Just as redistribution policies vary from context to context, depending on ideological currents, the form embraced by a recognition policy will also vary. The recognition policies in the United Kingdom are different from those we find in Europe or in Canada. (The next chapter will study this in greater detail.) For example, they sometimes take the form of accommodations or groupdifferentiated rights (Kymlicka 1995) but also sometimes the form of strictly individual accommodations that seek to take distance from a “culturalist” approach that would allegedly focus too much on “group” or “community” dynamics (Phillips 2007). In short, with respect to multiculturalism or interculturalism as pluralism, it can be argued that integration – not assimilation – of ethnocultural minorities should be seen as “a two-way process – it requires the mainstream society to adapt itself to immigrants, just as immigrants must adapt to the mainstream” (Kymlicka 1995, 96). In sum, multiculturalism or interculturalism as pluralism, after assessing the ethnocultural diversity in a given democratic society, (1) rejects the Jacobin and Anglo-conformity approach of assimilating minorities into the mainstream culture, therefore supporting a normative political approach to managing such diversity that (2) favours integrating individuals into the host society in such a way as to guarantee the human dignity of all (through redistribution policies) and (3) ensure equal respect for each individual’s moral considerations (through recognition policies).5

28

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

multiculturalism as pluralism: mainstream theories In what follows, we will present the main lines of the dominant theories of multiculturalism as pluralism in the literature. These theories can be considered as mainstream for two reasons. The first is that they are among the few encompassing theories of multiculturalism: their purpose is to provide a more or less exhaustive, consistent answer to the problem of how to think about togetherness and diversity management in complex societies (Crowder 2013). The second is that they are the theories that are generally the targets of attacks and objections when aspects of multiculturalism are discussed in research (Rattansi 2011). Gaining a deeper theoretical understanding of multiculturalism is fundamental for formulating reasonable interpretations of the scope and meaning of the declared failure of multiculturalism in many Western countries (chapters 3 and 4). These are also the theoretical foundations we will use to examine the structure of normative rationality in chapters 5, 6, and 7. There are many methods for understanding multiculturalism theories: according to what is at stake (Rattansi 2011; Ivison 2010), by classification (Maclure 2010; Modood 2013; Crowder 2013), or by author (May 2016). In this chapter, we will borrow from all three methods, although the author-based approach will be given precedence. This will make it easier to differentiate the theories, even though it will inevitably hamper our ability to zero in on each specific issue, such as each theory’s proposals regarding certain cultural practices – for example, polygamy.6 Jocelyn Maclure (2010, 39–40) proposes distinguishing between theories of multiculturalism (or interculturalism) according to whether they are communitarian, liberal, or civic. This classification is useful in that it helps to situate a theory in a broader view, and we will use it for that purpose. However, it is limited by the fact that these categories are not mutually exclusive. For example, a theory can be both liberal and civic. It would be possible to add the category “deliberative” or “democratic” to this classification, as Crowder suggests (2013, 124– 45). Indeed, Iris Marion Young (1990) and Seyla Benhabib (2002) think about multiculturalism principally based on the idea that minority groups’ representation in democratic decision processes

Theories of Multiculturalism

29

must be increased (Crowder 2013, 125). However, it seems reasonable to point out that this category is in many ways linked to the objectives that are at the heart of “civic” theories of multiculturalism. This is why we have not added this category to Maclure’s system of classification (2010). A communitarian theory of multiculturalism as pluralism portrays society as a cultural mosaic in which the lives of the different parties intersect as little as possible and ideally only through members of the elite and elected representatives. Individuals are expected to live according to the rules of the cultural group to which they belong (Maclure 2010, 40). According to Maclure, criticisms of multiculturalism as pluralism generally attack this version of multiculturalism, even though practically no authors defend7 it and it has rarely been translated into public policy by democratic states.8 Communitarian multiculturalism can fairly accurately be compared to the millet system in the Ottoman Empire, in which the state gave legal protection to minority religious communities but no interaction between the majorities and the minorities was encouraged (Kymlicka 1995, 183; Erk 2015). In contrast, the main tenet of liberal multiculturalism is that there is a moral duty to recognize and, in consequence, accommodate ethnocultural diversity as long as it does not interfere with the rights and freedoms of other citizens (Maclure 2010, 40). Kymlicka’s theory, which we will soon discuss, is the archetype.9 The civic version of multiculturalism also includes respect for expression of ethnocultural diversity, but such respect translates into social and cultural interaction instead of into the groups being isolated from one another (Maclure 2010, 40). It is not clear whether Maclure believes that the liberal version of multiculturalism necessarily supposes “isolation” in its respect for diversity, but it is reasonable to suspect this. If it is the case, then we have to admit that very few theories are uniquely “liberal” because most are also “civic.” At the same time, it should be noted that many “civic” theories of multiculturalism, such as those of Parekh (2006) and Modood (2013), despite their aspiration to not have “liberal” foundations, adapt relatively well, in fine, to general liberal principles. The main recommendations of the United Kingdom’s Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (2000), chaired by Bhikhu Parekh, are good examples of this ideal reconciliation of multiculturalism’s “civic” and “liberal” aspects.

30

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

In the following pages, we will describe the broad lines of the mainstream theories of multiculturalism – that is to say, those of Will Kymlicka, Bhikhu Parekh, Tariq Modood, and Anne Phillips. We will provide summaries of these theories, taking care to begin by clarifying how they fit into Maclure’s classification. We will also highlight the positions each of these theories takes with respect to five key points of divergence that we will identify presently. This will show how these theories are different despite what they have in common, which is that they fit the broad definition of multiculturalism we proposed above. These key points are (a) their relationship to liberalism, (b) their position on individual autonomy, (c) their reference points, (d) their understanding of cultures and ethnocultural groups, and (e) their position on illiberal or non-liberal groups. Will Kymlicka and the Liberal Theory for Multicultural Citizenship

In Liberalism, Community and Culture (1989), Canadian philosopher Will Kymlicka laid the foundations for his seminal work, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (1995). The point of departure of Kymlicka’s normative inquiry is that he sees a problem in the fact that classical liberalism (or in fact egalitarian liberalism, promoted notably by Brian Barry [2001]) considers purely individual rights to be sufficient for dealing fairly with ethnic and national minorities (1995, 2). In other words, according to classical liberalism inherited from the Enlightenment, which can be described as procedural difference-blind liberalism (chapter 5), respecting every individual’s equal human dignity by attributing universal individual rights amounts to a just, neutral way of treating citizens because it is uniform and independent of membership in any cultural group. This vision of equality, which was promoted by Abbé de Sieyès at the time of the French Revolution, is in line with the argument that the Third Estate – that is to say, the demos – must be given the rank of citizens who are equal in every way. This vision of citizens’ equality was in reaction to the “social privileges” enjoyed, arbitrarily, by nobles and the aristocracy. Kymlicka rejects this approach, which he calls “benevolent neutrality,” as a way of thinking about citizens’ equality in the age of complex societies. As a result of that, while critics may be right in pointing out that Kymlicka’s theory contributes to a form of “moral

Theories of Multiculturalism

31

monism” since it is firmly rooted in political liberalism, it nonetheless departs considerably from what we previously identified as “sociological monism.” On the one hand, he argues that contemporary democratic states are all either multinational10 or polyethnic11 or both at once. On the other hand, he contends that “A multination state which accords universal individual rights to all its citizens, regardless of group membership, may appear to be ‘neutral’ between the various national groups. But in fact it can (and often does) systematically privilege the majority nation in certain fundamental ways – for example the drawing of internal boundaries; the language of schools, courts, and government services; the choice of public holidays; and the division of legislative power between central and local governments” (Kymlicka 1995, 51–2). It therefore seems necessary to expand the scope of liberalism by introducing differentiated rights in accordance with the kinds of minority groups in the society (Kymlicka 2001, 32). He constructs a theory of multiculturalism intended to be “liberal” (in accordance with Maclure’s classification) that supports “minority rights in so far as they are consistent with respect for the freedom or autonomy of individuals” (Kymlicka 1995, 75). What Kymlicka means by “autonomy” is very simple: it is the possibility for individuals to choose the aims of what they believe to be a good life or a life worth living but also for them to reconsider those aims. According to Kymlicka (1995, 81), all individuals have a fundamental need to enjoy individual autonomy. Rights for minorities must be guaranteed, for some minorities have a societal culture and a societal culture is what provides a “context of choice” for an individual’s full freedom and autonomy. As we pointed out above, what Kymlicka means by a societal culture is “a culture which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres. These cultures tend to be territorially concentrated, and based on a linguistic community” (1995, 76). The minorities that have such a societal culture are “national minorities” and Indigenous Peoples. They were either (incompletely) conquered or federated by a community that is dominant in their regard and have never voluntarily abandoned their societal culture. Gellner notes that dominant communities have generally implemented nation-building policies, and Kymlicka finds no legitimate argument in liberalism to justify restricting nation-building to

32

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

majorities alone. Arguments in favour of nation-building work just as well for national minorities and Indigenous Peoples (Kymlicka 2001, 2). To have sufficient context of choice to be able to exercise individual autonomy, a person must be part of a specific societal culture, whether it is majority or minority. Individual and collective rights are therefore not in opposition, and the former should not be considered as necessarily contradicting the latter.12 To begin with, we need to point out that what Kymlicka means by “national minorities” corresponds more accurately to the reality of “minority nations” – in other words, nations that are evolving within a more encompassing sovereign state and that have numerically smaller populations than that of the majority nation with which they live – Quebec within Canada, for example. In other contexts, “national minority” would refer to a minority that also evolves within the midst of a given sovereign state but that has a national belonging linked with a majority nation (often neighbouring) – the Anglophone minority in Quebec, for example. According to Kymlicka, however, the rights of minorities are not unlimited. They must always be presented and exercised as “external protections,” and it is imperative to reject anything that consists in “internal constraints” (Kymlicka 1995, 45–6). External protections are measures designed to ensure egalitarian relationships between minority groups and the majority. Power relationships must be balanced. The right to work in the minority nation’s language is a concrete example of this if, without such a measure, the members of the minority in question would be unjustly discriminated against on the job market in relation to fellow citizens belonging to the cultural and linguistic majority. The measures that must be rejected – that is to say, “internal constraints” – are the ones that, on the contrary, are designed to limit the individual autonomy of those they target. Their purpose is to counter any internal dissidence. Limiting freedom of expression would be an example of what is not permitted under a liberal theory of minority rights. However, this theoretical framework of differentiated rights does not apply to all minorities, only to minority nations and Indigenous minorities – in other words, minorities that possess and maintain a “societal culture.”13 Kymlicka gives the other minorities, those resulting from immigration,14 polyethnic rights. Contrary to the differentiated rights for minority nations and Indigenous minorities, polyethnic rights do not suppose the sustainability of a societal culture and even less a form of self-determination

Theories of Multiculturalism

33

(Kymlicka 2001, 156). They must nonetheless comply with the same rule regarding external protections and internal constraints. Kymlicka justifies this difference between types of minorities by the fact that immigrant minorities allegedly deliberately renounced their societal culture by immigrating to a new country (Kymlicka 1995, 11). While, in his theory, Kymlicka does not give precedence to the interactions between minority nations and Indigenous minorities, on the one hand, and the national or mainstream cultural group, on the other hand, at the state level, polyethnic rights must always be granted in such a way that they favour the integration of immigrant minorities into a societal culture (Kymlicka 1995, 11). Since immigrant minorities are not territorially concentrated, it is difficult for them to claim a right to self-determination. Kymlicka also notes that, to date in liberal democracies, no immigrant minority has claimed such a right (Kymlicka 2001, 159). In the end, there are two reasons that such ethnic minorities can rightfully claim polyethnic rights to favour their full integration into the societal culture (Kymlicka 2001, 30). The first is that integration is no easy process and it cannot occur overnight. It sometimes takes a generation, and this justifies, for example, special accommodations, such as public services in their language so that they can take part in shared public life more easily. The second is that, since the shared institutions of the societal culture are marked by the symbols and traditions of the majority (or of a minority nation or Indigenous minority), it is necessary to ensure that immigrant minorities are not arbitrarily discriminated against and that, if they are, (reasonable) accommodations be made. In order to avoid confusion, what we mean by accommodation is “the adaptation of a legal rule, in particular in order to attenuate or eliminate the impact that the norm can have on a constitutionally protected right or freedom, for example, freedom of conscience” (Bosset 2009, 6 [translation ]). At this stage, it is useful to list some of the differentiated rights permitted for minority nations and Indigenous minorities and then some of the polyethnic rights for ethnocultural minorities. Kymlicka considers that the former’s include the right to territorial autonomy in a federal or quasi-federal context, the right for the language commonly used by the minority to be an official language of the country, the right to special representation in government and justice institutions, and the right to public funding for educational institutions in the minority’s language (Kymlicka 2007, 71). Thus, the purpose of more or less

34

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

all such differentiated rights is to guarantee certain self-determination mechanisms for the minority or, more broadly, to favour the building and, ideally, consolidation of their societal culture. In the context of federal systems, we would speak of self-rule. Kymlicka says that the latter have the right to official, symbolic affirmation of a multiculturalism policy, to forms of accommodation when a member of a minority suffers unjust discrimination, to integration of the historical and current contributions of immigrant minorities into education curriculums, and to hold dual citizenship (Kymlicka 2007, 73). The purpose of such polyethnic rights is not a form of self-determination for such minority groups but gradual full integration into a societal culture. Lastly, despite everything, some minorities maintain illiberal cultures and practices. Kymlicka (1995, 94) suggests that, faced with the illiberal practices of certain minorities, liberals will have the moral duty to denounce them and seek to liberalize their cultures and practices. However, he does not envisage making an illiberal culture “disappear.” We therefore have to consider that, in such circumstances, Kymlicka is preaching, in a way, for liberal citizenship education, rather than coercive imposition of liberal principles – unless the practice in question directly violates basic human rights guaranteed to all by the charters and constitutions. Bhikhu Parekh and Multiculturalism as Universal Pluralism

Bhikhu Parekh offers a different general theory for thinking about multiculturalism that includes, in particular, a criticism of Kymlicka’s liberal theory. It is presented essentially in Rethinking Multiculturalism (2006 [2000])15 and A New Politics of Identity (2008). The goal of the Indian-British philosopher is to take multicultural theory beyond the liberal (Eurocentric) paradigm by moving the debate to a “higher level of philosophical abstraction” (Parekh 2006, 111). His argument is that liberalism is a comprehensive doctrine of the good life. Contemporary democratic societies are all more or less ethnoculturally diverse, and, consequently, various conceptions of the good life have to coexist peacefully. This means that it is impossible for one of them (liberalism) to establish the foundations for a form of togetherness that is accepted or, rather, reasonably acceptable to all (Parekh 2006, 14). Parekh rejects liberal theories of multiculturalism because they would reproduce a form of moral monism: the belief that only one

Theories of Multiculturalism

35

way of living one’s life is truly good and true and that all the others are, to some degree, mistaken (Parekh 2006, 16). Moral monism was traditionally the approach of the ancient Greeks, and then of Christianity, and was passed on to classical liberalism inherited from the Enlightenment. We can therefore consider that the age of nations and nationalisms, as described by Gellner, reflects this spirit of moral (and sociological) monism. Kymlicka’s theory also seems to share this lineage party, for its foundation is the postulate that individual autonomy is a universal value that every human being has a basic interest in enjoying. In contrast, according to Parekh, since the value of individual autonomy is not shared by all cultures, it cannot be described as a universal but only as a value of “liberal” universalism (Parekh 2006, 106–7). Parekh’s theory can rightly be presented as a form of “civic” multiculturalism (Maclure 2010) because it makes acceptance of “universal” values dependent on dialogue urging communities and individuals to interact and thereby “make society” (faire société; Thériault 2007) or, more accurately, “make community” (or “communities”).16 Parekh’s theory of multiculturalism as a form of universal pluralism aspires to find satisfactory ways to meet the following challenges. It must consolidate the political unity of the state while not imposing cultural uniformity; it must be inclusive while not promoting assimilation policies; it must favour a feeling of belonging while at the same time respecting, through recognition policies, cultural differences; and, lastly, it must celebrate citizens’ multiple identities without eroding the shared identity arising from shared citizenship (Parekh 2006). This is quite an ambitious program, and while we will certainly not be able to examine each of its highly nuanced facets in detail, let us begin with what Parekh means by culture, cultural group, and citizens’ multiple identities. Parekh’s principal understanding of culture is not as “societal culture” (Kymlicka 1995): he understands it as an ordered system of historically situated beliefs and practices on the basis of which human groups think about, structure, and organize their individual and collective lives (Parekh 2006, 143). Cultures, especially those that are dominant in a state context, will also have substantial influence on the rules and norms that govern social activities and will often translate into institutional practices (Parekh 2006, 144–5). Complex societies often comprise many cultures that are dominated by one, that of the majority. Multiculturalism’s objective is to find

36

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

a way of avoiding the situation in which individuals belonging to a minority culture are victims of injustice or arbitrary discrimination (Parekh 2006, 2–3). This means that culture is considered a legitimate reason for an individual to require differentiated treatment by the state (Parekh 2006, 362). Differentiated treatment and accommodations, such as anti-discrimination measures, culturally sensitive interpretation of the law, possible exemption from certain customs and practices, special representation in public institutions, and public recognition of the diversity in the official definition of national identity, are provided for in Parekh’s vision (2008, 42). However, differentiated treatment can never be justified in the name of cultural authenticity or essence. All individuals have multiple identities and cultural affiliations, and sometimes the values carried by such identities and affiliations conflict. We should therefore never lock a culture into an “essence” (Parekh 2006, 37). Even though they are inherited, we must think about and experience cultures in a dynamic manner because neither their present nor their future should be a prisoner of the past (Parekh 2006, 175). Individuals’ multiple identities result from the fact that each person has, minimally, a personal or social identity, a cultural identity, and also a human identity. Thus, no matter what cultural differences may distinguish citizens, they all enjoy the same shared “human basis” for dialoguing (Parekh 2006, 124). The twofold recognition of the universality and individuality of each requires, in exchange, that we accept the moral obligation to respect these two dimensions of identity (Parekh 2006, 124). More precisely, it is the presence of diversity that invites us to dialogue, and it is dialogue that, in return, requires cultural groups to acknowledge their own internal diversity (Parekh 2006, 168). In order to judge cultural practices and legitimize differentiated treatment, Parekh proposes cultural dialogue, which would guide the direction to be taken by universal pluralism, or, more accurately, the choice of the values universally accepted by the cultural diversity in question. The outcome of the dialogue would be an agreement or pact to be understood as identifying public operative values, which should then be written into laws, public policies, and constitutional texts (Parekh 2006, 363). These public operative values must become an integral part of the collective identity and permeate the spirit of citizens’ inter-relations. The underlying general idea is that when an individual or a representative of a minority cultural group asks for

Theories of Multiculturalism

37

differentiated treatment, that person must persuade the society that there are good grounds for the request (Parekh 2006, 136). If he or she is unable to do so, then the society must refuse the request. If, however, he or she is persuasive and the arguments appear satisfactory in the eyes of the other participants, we must in consequence change the framework of public operative values, amending those to be perceived as dynamic or as “provisional fixed points.” Parekh does not set out any special mechanism for dealing with requests from illiberal groups: they are to follow the same process of dialogue and deliberation. In the spirit of Parekh’s theory, the purpose of dialogue is to ensure that cultural affiliations are not experienced as padlocked identities. Similar to Rawls’s doctrine of “public reason” (1993), in Parekh’s argument, requests must always be presented and justified to the other citizens belonging to all the cultural groups in the society. This would encourage cultures to challenge objectives they might otherwise perceive as sacred or untouchable. At the same time, since all are called upon to participate17 and to form the underlying values constituting the shared identity, the dialogue consolidates the unity of the broad political community, considered as a “community of communities as well as a community of citizens.” In other words, from a certain republican perspective, Parekh believes that the common identity will be shared because all are parties to the “moral contract” that prescribes it. In the end, the purpose of this process, through which public operative values are expressed, is to integrate ethnocultural minorities into the society. However, Parekh (2008, 85) emphasizes that an individual can integrate in various ways: on the political, economic, social, moral, etc. levels. According to him, fair integration does not require that the individual be equally and fully integrated on all levels. Tariq Modood and Political Multiculturalism

Contrary to Kymlicka and Parekh, who approach multiculturalism from an essentially philosophical point of view, Tariq Modood offers an angle that is first and foremost sociological. This makes his approach very different from the preceding two. Tariq Modood was also instrumental in the unfolding of what is now known as the British School of Multiculturalism (Meer 2019). Modood has studied the state and evolution of public policies on multiculturalism (see Meer and Modood 2009), but his

38

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

theoretical and conceptual contribution can be found in his book Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea (2013).18 As the title of his book suggests, Modood’s theory of civic multiculturalism is consistent with Maclure’s (2010). There is also clearly a certain intellectual affinity between the conceptions of multiculturalism in the work of Modood and Parekh, since the former often draws on the work of the latter. Moreover, from a more conjectural than structural point of view, it must be noted that Tariq Modood was the external advisor chosen by the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain chaired by Bhikhu Parekh (Runnymede Trust 2002, 369). To begin with, Modood’s political multiculturalism shares a certain number of points with Parekh’s theory of multiculturalism as universal pluralism. These include, in particular, rejection of liberalism as a foundation for multiculturalism (Modood 2013, 6, 18). As we noted above, we must nonetheless recognize that the parameters of their theories are, in fine, fairly close to the broad liberal principles of freedom, equality, and individual autonomy. When reflecting on his own work, Modood is quicker to acknowledge this than is Parekh (Modood 2013, 7) and holds that multiculturalism is destined to be applied in “liberal” democracies, so we have to see him as attuned to a certain liberal sensibility. Modood proposes to think of multiculturalism not as a product of liberalism but as its “child.” He considers that it would be counterproductive to deny that multiculturalism has ties to liberalism but that making it liberalism’s child does not entail that multiculturalism must necessarily reproduce or prolong ipso facto its genitor (Modood 2013, 7). Another fundamental point shared by Parekh and Modood is their assessment of what fair integration means. Such integration must not be thought of as single or complete. Integration concerns various spheres (political, economic, moral, social, etc.), and an individual may very well be economically integrated while remaining less so on the moral level, for example (Modood 2013, 46). We should also note that, like Parekh, Modood considers Kymlicka’s liberal theory of multiculturalism to be biased in favour of multinationalism,19 since it focuses on minority nations (Modood 2013, 32).20 Thus, according to Modood, the primary reference object for multiculturalism is not minority nations but immigrant minorities. Indeed, Modood objects to the importance and preferential treatment given to minority nations and Indigenous minorities, who are accorded the right to a societal culture, unlike other types

Theories of Multiculturalism

39

of minorities (Modood 2013, 31). This said, in comparison with Parekh’s theory, Modood’s gives greater importance to minority groups that are generally recognized as resulting from “new social movements,” such as the lgbtq2s + movement (Modood 2010, 38). Lastly, like Parekh, Modood thinks about multiculturalism through the prism of “intercultural dialogue” (Modood 2005, 155). On the one hand, such dialogue requires openness to recognition of “others” (both individuals and groups), yet, on the other hand, it does not require naive tolerance of cultural practices but instead an ongoing process of moral assessment (Modood 2013, 60). In this sense, given Parekh’s notion of public operative values, both Parekh and Modood seek to establish multiculturalism policies as provisional fixed points. Contrary to what he sees in the theories of multiculturalism argued by Bhikhu Parekh and Charles Taylor, Tariq Modood does not assess and value ethnocultural diversity for epistemological reasons. His approach to “political multiculturalism” is instead a form of Rawlsian political liberalism (Rawls 1993). According to Modood, multiculturalism must value both diversity and individuals’ membership in cultural groups because such groups are important in the eyes of those individuals (Modood 2013, 61). It is such importance in relation to individual experience that justifies accommodation measures designed to consolidate social integration. By taking this approach, Modood rejects the watertight separation between the private and public spheres defended by classical liberalism. Integration must cope with the dynamic presence of multiple affiliations and identities in the public sphere (Modood 2013, 56). The narrative of the common – the social imaginary of multiculturalism – must celebrate and commit to diversity (Modood 2013, 17). For Modood, multiculturalism’s reference object is the individual, but since an individual’s identity affiliations and cultural and group memberships constitute his or her self, the justification for differentiated treatment must be in accordance with those identity, cultural, and group affiliations. Modood (2005, 141; 2013) develops an argument in favour of moderate secularism that is markedly similar to what is meant in Quebec by “open secularism”21 (Maclure and Taylor 2011 [2010]; Lévesque 2014; Lamy 2015; Mathieu and Laforest 2016). In short, Modood (2013, 72–3) suggests expanding recognition policies to religious identities, in addition to ethnic, cultural, and racial identities, which supposes blurring the division between the public

40

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

and private spheres so that the consequent institutional adjustments can be made, where such adjustments would be grosso modo similar to reasonable accommodations in Canada and Quebec. This said, recognizing the fundamental constituting importance of identities and groups to the individual must not lead to essentializing individuals according to an identity or culture (Modood 2013, 86). Membership in a group does not suppose an essence but rather a kinship that he sees as similar to that within a family (Modood 2013, 90). In other words, Modood’s political multiculturalism would never allow a policy that would imply the determination of an individual’s culture. The idea is to recognize the relative importance of identity or group affiliation to an individual to ensure that the experienced membership is not a source of arbitrary public discrimination. In this sense, the limits of any recognition or accommodation policy are set by respect for basic human rights (Modood 2013, 62). Here, Modood’s theory fits substantially with what Kymlicka (2001, 81) says about what Maclure (2010) designates as the core of “liberal” multiculturalism.22 Modood is, however, not explicit about his conception of individual autonomy. On the one hand, it cannot be the normative foundation of his theory because it is too closely associated with liberalism, but on the other hand he insists at length on the fact that we must never find ourselves essentializing an individual in a culture. Somewhat like Seyla Benhabib (2002), Modood seems to prefer to bank on being able to leave a culture (agency to exit) rather than on individual autonomy. It nonetheless seems that an individual’s possibility of finding a way out of a culture or group is substantially a form of individual autonomy. In the end, just as Rawls’s political liberalism (1993) must promote and consolidate social cohesion for “morally diverse societies,” Modood’s political multiculturalism is tasked with counterbalancing the politics of difference with discourse and practices that count on what is common – namely, citizenship (Modood 2013, 135). The idea of a shared national identity takes form with the building of a shared, inclusive narrative framework that makes space for diversity (Modood 2013, 137–9). Citizenship must employ national ceremonies and embody the spirit of certain traditions. In this sense, Modood rejects Habermas’s proposal of pure constitutional patriotism23 because that would hardly create the affective dimension necessary for “making society” – that is to say, for bringing diversity together around a perceived shared world (Modood 2005, 133; 2013, 137).

Theories of Multiculturalism

41

Anne Phillips and Multiculturalism without Culturalism

Anne Phillips’s contribution to the debate on multiculturalism as pluralism is mainly condensed in her book Multiculturalism without Culture (2007), although she also defends part of her perspective elsewhere (Phillips 2008; 2010; Phillips and Saharso 2008). While the title of her seminal work is useful for sparking interest and curiosity, it however has the disadvantage of not meaning what it seems at first sight. Phillips’s multiculturalism without culture is a civic multiculturalism (Maclure 2010) in that it counts mainly on dialogue and cultural interactions. It does not propose to rid society or individuals of any culture but instead criticizes the tendency to reify and essentialize culture. Anne Phillips approaches multiculturalism from debates that are found mainly in feminist studies. Phillips’s point of departure is Susan Okin’s famous book Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? (1999).24 According to Phillips, two trends in multiculturalism come out of the rich corpus of feminist studies. She rejects both of them, which then allows her to propose her own theory (Phillips 2007, 8). The first is celebration of a form of cultural relativism that, naturally, rejects multiculturalism because it is too deeply infused with liberal principles. The second demonizes minority cultures in the name of a circumscribed understanding of what man-woman equality means and rejects multiculturalism because it would trap women in a culture. Phillips’s theory retains liberal sensitivity, but her approach is not based on liberalism. Her theory seeks to consolidate human agency (Phillips 2007, 101), although her definition of “individual autonomy” is not the same as Kymlicka’s. For Phillips, individual autonomy is a question of degree rather than of polarity. Basing her arguments substantially on Marilyn Friedman’s (2000), Phillips defines autonomy as the circumstance-dependent ability to reflect on how we lead our lives and also the capacity to change our goals so that our choices and actions are our “own” (Phillips 2007, 101). However, the ability to exercise autonomy is not to be found within one specific culture – for example, Kymlicka’s societal culture. Phillips’s “multiculturalism without culture” attempts to meet three challenges (Phillips 2007, 72). First, it has to offer a theory of multiculturalism as pluralism that does not reify cultures. Second, it has to deconstruct cultural stereotypes. Third, it must be able to

42

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

fight against any subordination of women’s rights in the name of cultural authenticity. These challenges explain the reference object of her multiculturalism and also what she means by culture and cultural group. Phillips considers that culture must remain a concept, a tool that helps us to understand a form of social reality. She writes, “culture is a stereotype, just like gender or class, a rough generalisation that can be a useful way of condensing information, but should never be mistaken for the truth” (Phillips 2007, 98). She therefore rejects Durkheim’s view that it is a “thing” (2009 [1895]). Culture may rightly be seen as a reality that deeply and lastingly influences individual and collective human behaviour, but we must never present it as a factor that “determines” human behaviour (Phillips 2007, 10). A culture has no essence (Phillips 2007, 41). In other words, cultures are made up of individuals, and, like individuals, they change over time and with circumstances (Phillips 2007, 33). Lastly, for Phillips (2007, 45), culture is neither territorially confined to a single space nor homogenous. Different currents run through it and energize it. It is therefore not an independent thing; it is a human and social construction. Phillips’s theory defines culture in this way, and it may be more useful to describe her theory as “multiculturalism without culturalism,” where “culturalism” refers to an essentialized conception of culture (Modood 2005, 7–9). Consistent with her conception of culture, the reference object for multiculturalism policies can only be the individual. However, since culture nonetheless has an impact on individual behaviour, multiculturalism policies must take into account the fact that culture is a central attribute of the individual (Phillips 2007, 164). Understood in this way, a culturally sensitive policy must always treat the individual as an autonomous subject, not as a cultural object. Therefore, the implementation of policies or principles for managing ethnocultural diversity can, according to Phillips, take three approaches. The first is state regulation, in which a minimal norm is applied to all, independent of specific cultural affiliations (Phillips 2007, 158). Grosso modo, this would be a monist moral norm, and Phillips rejects it for that reason. The second is institution of an individual’s right to withdraw from a culture – the right to exit (Phillips 2007, 160). This approach, like Modood’s, accuses the monist approach of not being sufficiently sensitive to cultural and group membership. The emphasis is thus placed on an individual’s ability to withdraw from his or

Theories of Multiculturalism

43

her cultural community if he or she no longer embraces the cultural norm. Phillips rejects this second approach because, in the end, the right to exit leaves everything up to the individual’s own will (Phillips 2007, 160), but an individual who desires to withdraw from his or her community is already in a minority position in that culture and the accompanying cultural pressure that greatly limits the possibility of actually exercising the theoretical right to exit. In this respect, Phillips agrees with Jacob Levy (2000) when he argues that having a culture necessarily means having barriers to exit (Phillips 2007, 137). Moreover, an individual may want to challenge one aspect of his or her culture without breaking away from it entirely. Phillips then proposes a third approach: dialogue, which recalls the deliberative dimensions that we find in the work of Parekh and Modood. In Phillips’s mind, cultural dialogue should be “bottom up” and not limited to “official” representatives of cultural groups. The purpose of dialogue is to facilitate better recognition of cultural diversity than can be achieved through classical state regulation. Unlike the right to exit, it gives minorities within cultural groups a voice and the ability to express their dissidence effectively, and it also urges cultures to change their practices when participants raise objections. Lastly, as with Rawls’s public reason (1993) and Parekh’s public operative values (2008), no argument involving premises of authenticity or cultural essence should be accepted as “legitimate” because the arguments must be valid for all (Phillips 2007, 160–1). Phillips’s “multiculturalism without culturalism” promotes dialogue as a means of interfering with illiberal cultural practices. Cultures are called upon to behave dynamically and to change, rather than be deserted by their non-conforming parts – although every individual must be able to exit from a culture if he or she desires (Phillips 2007, 176).

conclusion In this chapter, we began by identifying, in accordance with four conceptual levels, the analytical tools that structure our debates on togetherness. The first level is empirical, concerning the factual assessment of ethnocultural diversity. While in the media and sometimes in the literature “multiculturalism” is used to designate this sociodemographic reality, we must reject such use of the term and employ the more accurate expression “ethnocultural diversity.” The second level concerns the implementation of multiculturalism or intercul-

44

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

turalism by “public policies.” Chapter 2 will examine this dimension in detail. The third level is that of multiculturalism or interculturalism as a “social imaginary” – that is, as an intrinsic dimension of nation-building. Lastly, the fourth conceptual level is that of normative theories of “pluralism” that propose all-encompassing philosophies for thinking about accommodating and managing ethnocultural diversity in complex societies. Although various authors propose different variants and models of pluralism, the mainstream theories share a common core of principles for thinking about “pluralism.” In short, multiculturalism or interculturalism as pluralism, after assessing the ethnocultural diversity in a given democratic society, rejects both Jacobin and Angloconformity assimilation of minorities by the dominant culture. It thus supports a normative political diversity management method that promotes citizen integration into the host society. Such integration must then ensure equal human dignity for all (redistribution) and equal respect for each person’s moral views (recognition). Beyond this shared understanding, dissimilarities, sometimes minor but sometimes major, differentiate the theories. As we have pointed out in this chapter, these theoretical and normative differences are mainly around liberalism, individual autonomy, the reference objects at the foundation of each theory, the understanding of cultures and ethnocultural groups, and the position taken regarding illiberal and non-liberal groups and practices. In the end, there are three general points where these theories differ. First, there is their relationship to liberalism. Although most theories of multiculturalism are in agreement with the major principles of liberalism, they do not all embrace liberalism as the rock on which to build their foundations. Kymlicka is the only one who explicitly says his theory is “liberal” at its very base. In contrast, Parekh completely rejects liberalism because it is marked by a form of “moral monism.” This means that as a comprehensive doctrine of the good life, liberalism cannot be used to establish the foundations of a form of multiculturalism that would be acceptable to all in a complex society. Modood and Phillips ultimately agree to acknowledge a certain filiation between liberalism and the form of multiculturalism they respectively defend, but they refuse to see the latter as a pure product of the former. Second, multiculturalism theories do not all use the same categories of analysis to make sense of the different types of minorities

Theories of Multiculturalism

45

in a complex society. For Phillips, it is crucial to avoid reifying cultures, no matter what they are. There are always many currents within every culture. Therefore, multiculturalism must never look at “minorities” through groups or communities per se but only through individuals, for it is they who carry minority cultures. In this sense, no cultural group should enjoy differentiated treatment with respect to others: “autonomous human agency” is all that matters. In contrast, Kymlicka holds that some minorities have a legitimate claim to promote and sustain a societal culture (for example, minority nations) and others do not (immigrant minorities). Thus, the same differentiated treatment is not to be given to all minorities in a complex society. For him, what is important is that the individual have access to a dynamic societal culture, which is what produces the “context of choice” on the basis of which a given individual can exercise his or her autonomy. Thus, we must consolidate the institutional foundations of minorities that have a societal culture and promote immigrant minorities’ integration into a societal culture. However, according to Parekh and Modood, Kymlicka’s approach suffers from “multinational” bias because it gives arbitrary preference to “national” minorities with respect to other types of minorities. For Modood, it is of utmost importance that the political and democratic space be reconciled with the dynamic presence of multiple affiliations and identities in the public sphere. In comparison with Kymlicka, he gives much more importance to groups and minorities stemming from “new social movements.” Third, multiculturalism theories do not agree on how we should treat minorities that have non-liberal or illiberal practices. Parekh, Modood, and Phillips examine the problem of non-liberal and illiberal practices through the prism of cultural dialogue. For Modood, an individual must always be able to withdraw from a culture that harms him or her – for example, if it comprises non-liberal or illiberal practices. Phillips suggests, however, that an individual may not necessarily want to withdraw from his or her culture, even if it promotes illiberal practices with which he or she does not agree. Phillips proposes that we must fight against such practices by promoting cultural dialogue in which the parties can express their disagreement with the practices they reject. This means that cultures are called upon to change their practices in the face of objections, and, in a way, this also means that an individual need not withdraw from a culture constitutive of his or her identity. Parekh adopts a fairly

46

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

similar stance according to which for a (liberal or illiberal) cultural practice to be tolerated or accepted in the polity, it is important for it to be accepted by the other participants in the framework of dialogue and deliberation that leads to reviewing public operative values. Kymlicka’s approach is different in that any request for a differentiated right is rejected if it is presented as an internal constraint and is therefore non-liberal or illiberal. When such cultural practices nonetheless persist, Kymlicka suggests that liberals have the moral duty to criticize them and seek to liberalize the culture and practices in question. This said, other points of view obviously persist in the extensive literature on multiculturalism theories, and many key authors would have rightly merited a place in this chapter. However, the four theories we have chosen seem to cover and include the essential aspects discussed in the theories of Seyla Benhabib, Iris Marion Young, Charles Taylor, Joseph Carens, James Tully, Monique Deveaux, and Jacob Levy. The four authors we have chosen provide the analytical tools needed to make sense of the theoretical and normative debates that are of concern to the epistemic community. Naturally, theoretical and normative issues alone do not exhaust the whole range of the debate. We will come back to this in greater detail in the second part of this work, but the next two chapters will focus on interpreting the empirical evolution of public multiculturalism policies in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands.

2

Multiculturalism’s Paths

As we said in the Introduction, the experiences of World War II led to the creation of the un and for it to adopt the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. From then on, all fellow humans were supposed to be seen in a difference-blind manner. Consistent with Abbé de Sieyès’s approach at the time of the French Revolution, the reasoning underlying this perspective was that our differences must be erased with regard to the rule of law so that no ethnocultural particularity can cast a shadow on the quality of human that subsumes each individual. Concretely, this led us to the age of nationalisms (Gellner 2008 [1983]), giving rise to policies for the assimilation of ethnocultural minorities into host cultures. In the literature, this approach is often called “Jacobin” (Gagnon 2014) or “Anglo-conformity” (Kymlicka 1995). The idea of focusing exclusively on universal rights, and not on rights specific to certain minorities, was justified in particular by the fact that the concept of differentiated rights had recently been used as grounds for the invasion of Poland and Czechoslovakia by Nazi Germany on the pretext that those countries were violating treaties guaranteeing special rights for their German minorities (Kymlicka 2007, 29). In the twentieth century, most Western countries adhered to the ideal that universal individual rights were the way to guarantee their citizens’ rights and freedoms, whether an individual belonged to the majority or to a minority. In other words, the very concept of rights for minorities was discredited after World War II, since such rights were deemed unnecessary to the effectiveness of universal individual rights.

48

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

The “renaissance of minority rights” was accompanied by the perception that a highly centralized unitary and culturally homogenous state (the “normal” modern nation-state) was anachronistic and closer to the reality of the nineteenth century than to that of the dawn of the twenty-first century (Kymlicka 2007, 42). In the 1970s, countries such as Canada and Australia adopted official policies on multiculturalism with a view to “protecting” their minorities. In the second half of the twentieth century, other states, such as the Netherlands, also adopted multiculturalism policies to manage the flow of immigrants. In other places, such as the United Kingdom, no official global policy on multiculturalism has ever been adopted, but the country clearly demonstrated what can be called “multicultural sensitivity” (Kivisto and Faist 2007). Public policies (including specific legislations) on multiculturalism take many different shapes. Generally, however, all have (or claim to have) the purpose of facilitating some form of integration of ethnocultural minorities into the host society, which means that they take distance from assimilation ambitions. Depending on the case, these policies translate into accommodation measures, delegation of more or less broad autonomy for minorities, official declarations, constitutional provisions, components of the education system, etc. Multiculturalism policies’ objects of reference may also vary. While in the second half of the twentieth century multiculturalism as an object of public policy was key to reforming immigration and integration policies in many liberal democracies, in the twenty-first century it is no longer celebrated so enthusiastically. In fact, in a number of Western states it is subject to severe criticism or even outright rejection (Joppke 2004; Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). Formally, high-ranking politicians have said that multiculturalism has been a failure in their countries: Angela Merkel in Germany (Weaver 2010), David Cameron in the United Kingdom (Cameron 2011; Slack 2013), Nicolas Sarkozy in France (Figaro [Le] 2011), Maxime Verhagen in the Netherlands (Dutch News 2011), etc. In contrast, in Canada the Liberal government that was elected in 2015 reinstated multiculturalism at the heart of its priorities (May 2015) and stated in the Throne Speech that “diversity is Canada’s strength” (Gouverneur général du Canada 2015). In civil society, an impressive number of essay writers, columnists, editorialists, and other political communication specialists put multiculturalism on trial on a daily basis (Vertovec and Wessendorf

Multiculturalism’s Paths

49

2010). Often, multiculturalism is criticized as if it had only one form that states have implemented uniformly and that has uniformly failed (Scheffer 2000; Bruckner 2006; Phillips 2006; Malik 2010; Bock-Côté 2016a). Naturally, multiculturalism is criticized not only as a public policy but, for example, also as a normative political theory. We will return to this aspect in greater detail in chapter 4. Here, our objective is to show that public policies on multiculturalism take quite different shapes and legislative forms from country to country. Our conclusions show that there is very little analytical value in criticizing or rejecting multiculturalism as public policy en bloc. It is nonetheless fair to say that, generally, the various forms of multiculturalism are designed or, more accurately, claim to facilitate some form of integration of ethnocultural minorities into the host society, therefore breaking away from the assimilation ambitions of the “normal” modern nation-state. Depending on the country and its government’s goals, multiculturalism policies translate into various types of mechanisms, such as forms of accommodation, delegation of more or less broad autonomy for some aspects of minorities’ political self-determination, official declarations, constitutional provisions, components of the education system, etc. (Mylonas 2013). Multiculturalism policies’ objects of reference also vary. In other words, the type of minority given priority varies, although this is more characteristic of multiculturalism as pluralism than of multiculturalism as public policy. In North America, it is sometimes associated (at least in theory) with policies that would concern minority nations, Indigenous Peoples, and immigrant minorities. In contrast, in Europe, multiculturalism generally concerns only immigrant minorities (Joppke 2004; Kymlicka 2007, 17). In this chapter, we will do a descriptive comparison of the establishment of public policies on multiculturalism in Canada, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. There are two reasons for this choice. The first is that the development of multiculturalism policy is rarely the work of a single country, and this means that its general spirit – in all its complexity – is easier to understand when measured against a comparative tableau. The second is that the Canadian, Dutch, and British cases can be compared in meaningful ways. For one thing, the literature on multiculturalism in the United Kingdom often takes Canada as an example of an approach that is rather different from that of the British but where multiculturalism

50

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

functions relatively well (Hansen 2007; Fleras 2009). The Dutch example is often discussed as a case fairly similar to that of the British but where there has recently been a “retreat” from multiculturalism policies (Joppke 2004; 2014; Meer et al. 2015). We have drawn our findings mainly from a critical analysis of the literature, but we have also consulted some public reports, public policies, and pieces of legislation directly. The historical period we have chosen for the analysis more or less spans the 1960s to today – that is to say, the period when a new chapter in integration of newcomers and accommodation of diversity occurred in all three of the cases studied.

the canadian experience On the international scene, Canada is famous for its multiculturalism policy. It is often referred to because it has put in place a set of public policies on multiculturalism that work and have lasted (Fleras 2009, 58; Modood 2010, 7).1 In 1988, the Canadian federation became the first country to democratically pass a federal law on multiculturalism (McRoberts 1999, 179), but in fact multiculturalism had been a Canadian policy since 1971. In Canada, multiculturalism refers mainly to measures taken by the federal government, although most of the provinces have also legislated on the matter. Looking at the political events that occurred before and after the 1970s can be useful for understanding the spirit that Canadian multiculturalism came to embrace (see Lapointe-Gagnon 2013; 2018). While Canadian multiculturalism has been adjusted in many ways over the decades, a general theme has endured: favouring the integration of (immigrant) minorities while consolidating “national” Canadian unity and cohesion. As Gagnon and Iacovino (2007) have shown, the second half of the twentieth century in Canada was characterized by two parallel forms of nation-building: one Franco-Canadian, based in Quebec; the other Anglo-Canadian, based in Ottawa. According to an editorial by André Laurendeau published in Le Devoir on 20 January 1962, this led to one of the worst social and political crises that Canada has ever experienced. Laurendeau called for a public inquiry to take stock of biculturalism and bilingualism, which, he claimed, formed the crucible of Canadian belonging (Lapointe-Gagnon 2014). John Diefenbaker, then at the head of the federal Government of Canada,

Multiculturalism’s Paths

51

rejected Laurendeau’s call, but when the Liberals under Lester B. Pearson took power in 1963, they answered it. In the Speech from the Throne, the governor general announced that Pearson’s government would set up the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (Haque 2012, 50). The commission’s proceedings lasted from July 1963 to 31 March 1971. Chaired by André Laurendeau2 and Davidson Dunton, the commission proposed in particular to institutionalize biculturalism in Canada – taking up the vision of a pact between two equal peoples that had in the past been expressed by Henri Bourassa and accepted by many French Canadians (McRoberts 1999, 170). The commissioners found that the only way individuals could participate in Canadian public life was through the intermediary of one of the two cultural communities: Franco-Canadian and Anglo-Canadian (McRoberts 1999, 167). In 1969, the government, which was then led by Pierre Trudeau, implemented the Official Languages Act, thereby addressing, in a way, the bilingualism dimension of the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission (Wong and Guo 2011). However, through the act Trudeau opened the way to cutting language off from any cultural cluster, contrary to the commissioners’ recommendations. This dislocation took on its full meaning in 1971, when Trudeau presented his multiculturalism policy, according to which participation in Canadian political life is a strictly individual right and mainstream cultural communities must not enjoy any special status in that respect (Haque 2012, 225). In other words, in the “social imaginary” that the proponents were trying to institute, no culture was to be more Canadian than any other. There was to be a cultural mosaic under one single shared “national” identity: Canadian. This political approach, “the Trudeau vision” (Laforest 2014), marked the starting point for thinking about multiculturalism as a “social imaginary” in Canada. The Laurendeau-Dunton Commission’s vision of a bicultural Canada displeased other social powers for other reasons. In opposition to the two cultures embodied by the commission, a “third force” emerged: Canadians with neither British nor French origins. They felt excluded from the bicultural vision of Canada. On numerous occasions during the commission’s hearings, they proposed relying on multiculturalism instead of on biculturalism (Gagnon and Iacovino 2007, 103; LapointeGagnon 2013, 274–6). In the end, this criticism was in line with the thought of the politically active authors of Cité Libre – of which Pierre Elliott Trudeau was one of the founding members. The argument in

52

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

the pages of Cité Libre, specifically that of Trudeau,3 was that if two cultures and two nations were officially recognized in Canada, that would be equivalent to recognizing full sovereignty for Quebec, since that is how the international and inter-state system would function (McRoberts 1999, 170). This shows the great symbolic and political power of the “normal” nation-state model that flows from the logic of the age of nationalism (chapter 1). It is clear that “Trudeau’s vision,” which was of course consolidated in 1982, was not very hospitable to any “multinational” conception of the Canadian federation. We will come back to this issue in the second part of this book. In 1969, the Government of Canada published a White Paper on Indigenous Peoples, setting out the reasoning that was to prevail in the form of Canadian multiculturalism that Trudeau announced in 1971. In the White Paper, the Government of Canada proposed to eliminate all Canadian policies on “Indian affairs” so that Indigenous Peoples would be treated only as Canadians (Cairns 2000, 52). In short, the idea was that they would be assimilated into a shared citizenship (Haque 2012, 41) that would certainly be pluralist, but mononational (Bickerton 2007, 222). The adoption of a multiculturalism policy in Canada in 1971 was consistent with the following program: (a) address the rise in Quebec nationalism; (b) follow up on, or rather “react to,” the recommendations of the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission; (c) give a voice to the “third force”; and (d) foster “national” unity and cohesion. To achieve this, Canadian identity was made fundamentally multicultural, but mononational. The national community was “imagined” in a new way (Anderson 2006). In terms of public policy in Canada, “multiculturalism refers to the management of diversity through formal initiatives in the federal, provincial, territorial and municipal domains” (Brosseau and Dewing 2018, 1).4 In 1971, Pierre Trudeau tabled a multiculturalism policy in the House of Commons. It had four objectives (Brosseau and Dewing 2018, 3): 1 2 3 4

to assist cultural groups to retain and foster their identity; to assist cultural groups to overcome barriers to their full participation in Canadian society; to promote creative exchanges among all Canadian cultural groups; to assist immigrants in acquiring at least one of the two official languages.

Multiculturalism’s Paths

53

Those who designed the 1971 multiculturalism policy “perceived barriers to social adaptation and economic success largely in linguistic or cultural terms” (Brosseau and Dewing 2018, 3). The second and third objectives seem therefore to have taken precedence over the others when the policy was implemented (Banting and Kymlicka 2010, 50). In 1972, in order to facilitate the achievement of these objectives, the federal government created the Multicultural Directorate within the Department of the Secretary of State, and then in 1973 the Ministry of Multiculturalism was set up to see that the multiculturalism policy took concrete form. In the first decade of its existence, the modest sum of $20 million per year was allocated to carry out the policy (Brosseau and Dewing 2018, 3). Subsequently, the Liberal government led by Trudeau consolidated the institutionalization of Canadian multiculturalism. In 1982, through the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, multiculturalism was enshrined in the Canadian Constitution, notably without Quebec’s consent. Section 27 is the key to this, for it is the “prism” through which judges must interpret the Constitution (Gagnon 2000). Section 27 of the 1982 Charter states: “This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.” Parliamentary proceedings, in particular the work done by the Standing Committee on Multiculturalism, resulted in the passage of the Canadian Multiculturalism Act (cma ) in Ottawa in 1988. Its purpose was to clarify the objectives and direction of multiculturalism policy (Brosseau and Dewing 2018, 5) – more specifically, “to assist in the preservation of culture and language, to reduce discrimination, to enhance cultural awareness and understanding, and to promote culturally sensitive institutional change at the federal level” (Brosseau and Dewing 2018, 5). The key to interpreting the cma is the following: “all government agencies, departments and Crown corporations ... are expected to provide leadership in advancing Canada’s multicultural mix and to take part in the design and implementation of plans, programs, procedures and decision-making strategies that enhance the full and equal participation of minorities within institutional structures” (Brosseau and Dewing 2018, 5). Next, in 1991, a Department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship was created. Its objectives remained essentially the same, but many programs were created to

54

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

support the cma , such as the Race-Relations and Cross-Cultural Understanding program, the Heritage Cultures and Languages program, and the Community Support and Participation program. However, the new department’s life was fleeting. In 1993, it was merged with the Department of Canadian Heritage. In 2002, Canada’s federal government made 27 June Canadian Multiculturalism Day. Six years later, in 2008, responsibility for multiculturalism moved to the Department of Citizenship and Immigration (Brosseau and Dewing 2018, 8). In 2010, three new objectives were added to the multiculturalism policy: 5 6 7

to build an integrated, socially cohesive society; to improve the responsiveness of institutions to meet the needs of a diverse population; to actively engage in discussions on multiculturalism and diversity at an international level (Brosseau and Dewing 2018, 9).

Since the October 2015 election that brought a Liberal government led by Justin Trudeau to power in Ottawa, responsibility for multiculturalism has been transferred back to the Department of Canadian Heritage. According to Andrew Griffith, former director general of multiculturalism in the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, this institutional shuffling showed the Liberals’ wish to put multiculturalism back at the centre of Canadian national cohesion (May 2015). In one of his first speeches as newly elected prime minister of Canada, Justin Trudeau strongly celebrated Canadian diversity, speaking of the passage of the Canadian Multiculturalism Act as one of the most “positive moments” in Canada’s history (Prime Minister of Canada 2015). Finally, on 3 September 2019, the AntiRacism Action Program was launched as part of the Department of Canadian Heritage’s program. More than ever, multiculturalism as public policy in Canada seems inspired by Quebec’s public narrative on interculturalism. The new 2019 program indeed promotes three new objectives: 8 9

building bridges to promote intercultural understanding; promoting equal opportunity for individuals of all origins; and 10 promoting citizenship, civic engagement, and a healthy democracy.

Multiculturalism’s Paths

55

Multiculturalism policy in Canada has taken many different forms and has been adapted in various ways, but its objectives have never changed significantly (Fleras 2009, 58).5 There are, of course, many interpretations of the causes and repercussions of these multiculturalism policies. According to some, multiculturalism was established above all to ensure social integration and consolidate national unity (Moodley 1983; Fleras 2009; Haque 2012). Others argue that it was mainly a means of responding to the “third force lobby” (Ng 1995; Wayland 1997), of reconciling French- and English-Canadian dualism while fostering the integration of immigrant diversity (Lupul 1982), of persuading minorities who are neither English- nor Frenchspeaking to accept bilingualism (Knowles 1997), or of building support for the Liberals outside Quebec (Wayland 1997). Another interpretive current takes a more Québécois point of view. According to Seymour (2001), Gagnon (2000), Gagnon and Iacovino (2007), Bouchard (2012), McRoberts (1999), and many others, the adoption of a multiculturalism policy in Canada was mainly a way of dealing with the rise of Quebec nationalism. By adopting bilingualism on a background of multiculturalism, the specificity of the Quebec nation was denied, and the federal principle was rebranded. In the eyes of many French Canadians at the time and many Quebecers today, the federation was based on the pact between two peoples that led, following the 1864 Québec Conference, to the Canadian Confederation in 1867 (Laforest and Mathieu 2016). In short, the multiculturalism policy, and more specifically its enshrinement in the 1982 Constitution, is seen by these authors as the “end of a Canadian dream” (Laforest 1995; 2004) or, more accurately, as the end of the vision of a binational, or even multinational, Canada. Lastly, it should be noted that multiculturalism in Canada is also legally the object of provincial policies. Quebec stands out for its more or less articulated and asserted policy of interculturalism (Québec 2015), an adaptation of multiculturalism that is intended to be more sensitive to the protection of the Franco-Québécois majority in Quebec and the sociocultural integration of minorities into that majority (Bouchard and Taylor 2008; Bouchard 2012). British Columbia, Ontario, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, and Nova Scotia have sketched out policies that are in the spirit of the Canadian Multiculturalism Act (Brosseau and Dewing 2018, 11–19).

56

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

the dutch experience The Netherlands is also known for having established multiculturalism policies to manage domestic ethnocultural diversity (Koopmans 2007; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007; Duyvendak and Scholten 2009; 2012). However, over the past two decades, the Netherlands has been seen above all as a case in which multiculturalism has allegedly failed (Carle 2006) and in which the government is said to have withdrawn its multiculturalism policies and replaced them by strong civic integration (Joppke 2004; 2017), even by assimilation of minorities (Vasta 2007). Like Canada and the United Kingdom, the Netherlands is a constitutional monarchy. Most of the executive power is in the hands of the prime minister, but there are also twelve elected provincial parliaments. It should be noted that the autonomous powers of the provincial parliaments are limited mainly to routine administrative business, unlike those of Canadian provinces or Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland since the recent devolution of powers in the United Kingdom. Historically, the Dutch see themselves as one of the most tolerant, liberal peoples on the planet (Dronker 2013, 127). This is said to be reflected in the way, beginning in the nineteenth century, the Dutch managed and dealt with tensions and conflicts among religious groups. They considered that in order to ease religious tensions between the various groups and ensure peaceful coexistence, the central government had to fund and implement a system of institutional pillars. In this system, each religious group (originally the Catholics and the Protestants) and subsequently other groups that were not religious but were ideologically oriented (liberals and, later, socialists) could establish their own institutions in accordance with their normative, linguistic, and cultural aspirations. Each group designated representatives, and those “elites” coordinated with one another without the groups necessarily having to do so. It was an early form of consociationalism (Lijphart 1979; 2004). The peaceful coexistence of groups with sometimes irreconcilable values functioned thanks to a spirit of tolerance of other groups, in which each community was considered “sovereign” in its cultural sphere (Entzinger 2006, 4). Emancipation of the groups required their sociocultural emancipation, but the groups did not necessarily have any goal of common shared political emancipation. This system prevailed until the 1980s.

Multiculturalism’s Paths

57

In the aftermath of World War II and the subsequent period of decolonization, more and more migrants came to the Netherlands, mainly from Morocco, Turkey, and Indonesia. They were not considered immigrants but temporary workers who would one day return to their country of origin (Duyvendak and Scholten 2009, 84). In the 1970s, the Dutch simply did not consider the Netherlands to be a land of immigration (Fleras 2009, 150). Faced with the constant arrival of migrants perceived as temporary workers, the Netherlands gave the new cultural groups the same rights as established groups in terms of state-funded institutional pillars. The reasoning was that since the groups were temporary, it was just as well to allow them to emancipate themselves in their own sociocultural spheres so that they would be ready and able to return “home” once their work in the Netherlands was done (Entzinger 2006, 3). However, the fact is that the temporary workers did not return to their countries of origin. On the contrary, families were increasingly reunited in the Netherlands, with the very clear intention of staying there (Entzinger 2006, 2). The Dutch authorities began recognizing this publicly toward the end of the 1970s (Van Reekum and Duyvendak 2012, 447). In the early 1980s, the Dutch government set up what Duyvendak and Scholten (2012, 272) call ad hoc multiculturalism. More specifically, in 1983 the Ethnic Minorities Policy was adopted for the purpose of fostering equality and fairness among cultural and religious groups (Fleras 2009, 154). The policy never defined multiculturalism clearly but nonetheless referred to consolidating an “open and multicultural society” (Dronker 2013, 129). This meant that “temporary workers” became, for the state, ethnic minorities (Duyvendak and Scholten 2009, 85). The argument for the policy, which, in the end, reproduced the pillar system, was that improving the sociocultural conditions of ethnic minorities would improve their socioeconomic conditions (Duyvendak and Scholten 2009, 85). The state was still fully funding the “emancipation” of ethnic minorities through their own institutional pillars (Fleras 2009, 154). As Robert Carle noted (2006, 71), the 1983 Ethnic Minorities Policy said absolutely nothing about the “integration” of minorities into Dutch society. Toward the end of the 1980s, the Netherlands suffered a major economic recession and a high rate of unemployment (Duyvendak and Scholten 2009, 87). In that context, in 1994 an Integration Policy was adopted to replace the Ethnic Minorities Policy (Fleras

58

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

2009, 157). However, as Pieter Dronker warns (2013, 129), it must be kept in mind that conflict between the secular Dutch majority and the non-secular ethnic minorities intensified during the 1990s, in particular under the influence of essays, editorials, and position-taking by historian and political militant Paul Scheffer. The Integration Policy was designed to break away from the pillar system.6 In short, the ethnic minorities were from then on designated as immigrants, and once they acquired citizenship, they were labelled “allochtones” (Duyvendak and Scholten 2012, 272). The preceding policy was intended to promote the “emancipation of minorities,” but the new policy was more in line with “integration” into “Dutch society” and “fairness” between individuals. Contrary to the Ethnic Minorities Policy, the Integration Policy was based on the idea that improving socioeconomic conditions should have priority over improving sociocultural conditions (Duyvendak and Scholten 2009, 87). Discourse referred to “active citizenship.” There was also a trend toward decentralizing policy on ethnocultural diversity management, but that never became a properly provincial competency (Duyvendak and Scholten 2009, 88). At the turn of the twenty-first century, the “multicultural tragedy” observed by Paul Scheffer seemed increasingly apparent to the general population in the Netherlands. Pim Fortuyn, a politically active “public” intellectual embraced the basic argument7 and went as far as to establish a political party and run for the position of prime minister. However, he was assassinated by an animal rights campaigner in 2002, right before the elections, for reasons completely external to this debate on multiculturalism. In 2000, the government nonetheless adopted the New Integration Policy, which was designed to adapt the 1994 Integration Policy to the “new socioeconomic realities.” It should be noted that, in 2006, 27 per cent of the Turkish minority and 21 per cent of the Moroccan minority were out of work and receiving employment insurance, compared with 9 per cent of the Dutch majority (Fleras 2009, 151). In 1994, there was talk of “active” citizenship, but the New Integration Policy refers instead to the notion of a shared “common” citizenship to consolidate national unity (Duyvendak and Scholten 2009, 88). Such unity required acquiring the majority’s language and compliance with “basic Dutch values.” In short, the new approach was focused on the majority, and the sociocultural differences that used to be celebrated by the 1983 legislation on ethnic minorities and then tolerated in the 1994 Integration Policy were

Multiculturalism’s Paths

59

portrayed as obstacles to integration (Duyvendak and Scholten 2009, 89). The Dutch state’s priority became preservation of national identity instead of minorities’ identities (Duyvendak and Scholten 2012, 274). Since then, integration mechanisms have become more severe and coercive (Entzinger 2006, 9–10). To understand why some authors speak about the Dutch case as a retreat from multiculturalism in favour of strong civic integration (Joppke 2004; 2017), even assimilation (Vasta 2007), it is useful to go back to the Dutch government’s transition from the 1984 Ethnic Minorities Policy to the New Integration Policy in 2000. However, it is not self-evident that the Netherlands has really rejected multiculturalism (Meer et al. 2015). Duyvendak and Scholten (2012, 274) argue that since the centre-right coalition led by Prime Minister Mark Rutte came to power in 2010, government discourse has indisputably tended toward measures for assimilating the minority into the majority, but this has not necessarily translated into concrete public policy. Similarly, Koopmans (2007) defends the thesis that the Dutch have internalized the “pillar reflex” – a sort of path dependency – in which the policies associated with multiculturalism in the 1980s have not always been completely abandoned.

the british experience In the United Kingdom, the notion of multiculturalism has been used as much in parliamentary debates, political party platforms, the rhetoric of ethnocultural community leaders, local government structures and policies, and social sciences research as in the media since the 1970s (Vertovec 1996, 50). According to a number of analyses, it seems undeniable that the contemporary political world in Britain is characterized by “multicultural sensitivity” (Kivisto and Faist 2007). Yet it is no easy task to try to track multiculturalism’s path as public policy in the United Kingdom (Vasta 2007). Unlike Canada, for example, the central government has never adopted a general multiculturalism policy. Instead, British multiculturalism has developed in an ad hoc manner (Favell 2001, 135), in a succession of layers (Modood 2010, 9), and through many events and issues calling for public policy (Fleras 2009, 166–7). In the United Kingdom, multiculturalism as public policy has been expressed primarily through the Race Relations Acts (rra ), the education system (especially by local education authorities), local

60

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

authorities and governments (metropolitan counties, district councils, and London boroughs) but also through some legislation and public reports on citizenship, immigration, and naturalization of citizens. To paraphrase Meer and Modood (2013), British multiculturalism has to be understood as a set of mechanisms and policies recognizing newcomers as “ethnic” and “racial” minorities – that is to say, as immigrant minorities. The state’s support is thus perceived as necessary to give individuals belonging to such minorities differentiated treatment so that they can exercise their citizenship fully without suffering unfair public discrimination. Generally, it is agreed that it was mainly in reaction to post–World War II immigration that the United Kingdom adopted a “multicultural” stance (Grillo 2010, 51; Hansen 2007). It may be useful to recall that under the 1948 British Nationality Act, a legacy of the United Kingdom’s imperial and colonial past, all individuals living in Commonwealth countries were automatically subjects of the British Crown and consequently had direct access to British citizenship if they migrated to the United Kingdom (Voicu 2009).8 The 1950s and 1960s were marked by massive immigration from Commonwealth countries, and it was in the 1960s that the United Kingdom turned its back explicitly on the assimilation approach and moved toward that of integration. The famous statement by Roy Jenkins, Labour home secretary in 1967 (cited in Fleras 2009, 181), describes it perfectly: “I define integration, therefore, not as a flattening process of assimilation but as equal opportunity, coupled with cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance.” An official in the Home Office also made a statement revealing the spirit that, over the years, would infuse the arrangements and the Race Relations Acts (rra ). Discussing the ongoing proceedings that would lead to the 1965 rra, Roy Hattersley said: “Integration without control is impossible, but control without integration is indefensible” (cited in Favell 2001, 104). Therefore, some balancing of immigration control and integration management structured the ad hoc multiculturalism policies in the United Kingdom. Policies on control seem to have been the specialty of the Conservatives when they were in power and those on integration the territory of the Labour Party when they were governing (Back et al. 2002, 445; Pitcher 2009, 31). In what follows, we will track the path of legislation relating to the rra s and then do the same with respect to the education system and the policies of local authorities.

Multiculturalism’s Paths

61

At the time that policies for managing ethnocultural diversity were being drafted in the United Kingdom, the United States was going through a key moment in struggles for civil rights. Those struggles undeniably influenced the way the United Kingdom designed its multiculturalism policies, which helps to explain the accent placed on “races” in those policies (Pitcher 2009, 20; Modood 2010, 9). The 1965 rra , which was the first, criminalized discrimination and insults based on racial, ethnic, and national affiliation in most of the United Kingdom’s public institutions (Hansen 2007, 362). However, the legislation did not have much impact on discrimination related to employment, banking services, or the housing market. This was corrected by the 1968 rra legislation (Hansen 2007, 362). In 1976, the amendment of the Race Relations Act was designed to correct the perceived weaknesses of the preceding legislation. From then on, individuals would be able to apply directly to the courts if they believed they were victims of racial discrimination, and the notion of discrimination was expanded to “indirect” and latent effects. Moreover, the amendment also created the Commission for Racial Equality to oversee application of the rra s (Hansen 2007, 363–4). Then in 2000, as a direct consequence of the Labour Party coming to power in 1997, a new law was passed on race relations, extending the 1976 act to all public bodies (including police forces, universities, and the health care system) and parapublic organizations offering public services (Hansen 2007, 366). The 2000 legislation was in response to the Macpherson Report on racial discrimination in British police forces, which was set up after the murder of Stephen Lawrence and the bungled investigation by the police (Macpherson 1999). In short, the purpose of the rra s was to eradicate direct and indirect discrimination related to race and ethnocultural identity and to favour “good race-relations” (Meer et al. 2015, 710). The education system in the United Kingdom is also an important area where multiculturalism as public policy was implemented (Modood 2010, 77; Mathieu and Laforest 2015).9 Gill (1993, 277) notes that at the beginning of the 1970s, the education system, which is highly decentralized (Mathieu and Laforest 2015, 91), tended to recognize students’ different paths and multifaceted identities, which influenced teachers’ pedagogical approaches. In 1977, the Green Paper Education in Schools: A Consultative Document recommended the preparation of a core British curriculum that would

62

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

officially recognize and take into account the ethnocultural diversity constitutive of the United Kingdom (King 1993, 4). A few years later, in 1985, the Swann Report, entitled Education for All, was published. It explicitly called for a school curriculum in which multicultural education would be at the core of the general program (King 1993, 4). In reaction to the report, which was overall well received by the public (Favell 2001, 131), the Conservative government of the time agreed to legislate, and in 1988 the Education Reform Act (era ) was passed. It was the first time a British government had taken responsibility for preparing a national curriculum. The era focused on “cultural pluralism” and equal opportunity. It required teachers to address racism and racial discrimination issues and stated that racial, linguistic, cultural, and religious diversity had to be treated with respect and dignity, in addition to being seen as enriching students’ educational experience (King 1993, 2–3). The era was thus designed to teach togetherness in a diverse community (Tulasiewicz 1993). A series of documents from the Department of Education and Science (des ) subsequently clarified the era ’s role and structure. In 1989, it was declared that the curriculum had to reflect the cultural diversity of British society (des 1989). To monitor the implementation of this idea, the School Examinations and Assessment Council was established in 1990 (King 1993, 5). In the wake of the era , the National Curriculum Council (ncc ) was also created. In 1991, the ncc decided that the principal recommendation of the 1985 Swann Report – that multicultural education should be at the core of the general program – had to be implemented (King 1993, 9; Blair and Arnot 1993). This was to be done in a manner similar to that of cross-curricular competencies in the Quebec education system. The ncc (1990, 3) stated that this would necessarily enrich young people’s education and pedagogical experience. However, it should be noted that the era also promoted teaching the values, rights, and freedoms that the British share as citizens of the uk (King 1993, 12). In parallel, the United Kingdom supported a number of programs designed to fund activities and initiatives promoting ethnocultural diversity and celebrating togetherness (Tolley 2011). The United Kingdom also includes in the mandate of media publishers and broadcasters the obligation to demonstrate representative ethnocultural diversity (Tolley 2011).

Multiculturalism’s Paths

63

Over the long term, it seems that between 1979 and 1997 the central Conservative government’s action on integration was limited to public policy, thus leaving local authorities to deal with this political sphere (Back et al. 2002, 445; Brighton 2007; Fleras 2009, 172). Meer and Modood (2013) speak about multicultural drift by default in local policy. Local authorities indeed played a major role in managing ethnocultural diversity. The legislation in effect provided them with many resources to promote racial and ethnic diversity (Singh 2005, 170), and it was they who created ethnocultural community consultation committees, set up mediation groups to attenuate racial tensions, and provided much of the funding for organizations with the mandate of celebrating multicultural diversity (Fleras 2009, 169). Not central, but local authorities, of very different sizes and spheres of influence, established citizen education programs to combat racism (Troyna 1987) and promote multicultural education (Swann 1985).10 According to Hewer (2001), these local authorities are at the heart of British multicultural sensitivity. Meer and Modood (2013) also argue that the discussions at the local level gave the tone to the 1985 Swann Report. There was thus realignment with the multiculturalism policies when the Labour Party returned to power in 1997 (Poulter 1998; Fleras 2009, 172; Grillo 2010, 53). In 1997, New Labour enriched its electoral discourse with multicultural colour, speaking of reinventing the United Kingdom and British national identity (Blair 1997 [1996]). Citizens were encouraged to vote Labour for a “Cool Britannia” (Leonard 1997) open to the world, culturally diverse and tolerant. In short, the Labour Party portrayed itself as the party for which “all colours are good colours.” During the 1997 electoral campaign, Blair claimed that choosing his party to form the next government was fundamental to save the “nation’s soul” (cited in Pitcher 2009, 42). A few months before the 1997 election, Blair (1997 [1996]) published New Britain: My Vision of a Young Country, in which he tried hard to appropriate nationalist discourse, which used to be the quasi-exclusive banner of the Conservatives. For this, Blair (1997 [1996]) made “the British nation” and “British society” interchangeable, thereby marking the necessarily diverse and plural nature of his enterprise (Delanty 2003, 87). Once the Labour Party was brought to power, the first years of their mandate were indisputably driven by reaffirmation of multiculturalism in the United Kingdom (Modood 2010). During the first

64

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

four years, the leading members of Blair’s cabinet frequently used the term “multiculturalism,” and some Labour Party members were sent to Canada to study Canada’s multiculturalism policy (Hansen 2007, 378). In short, there was clear moral support from the government for establishing the Commission on the Future of MultiEthnic Britain,11 chaired by Bhikhu Parekh and funded by the ngo Runnymede Trust. This was in addition to the adoption of the 1998 Human Rights Act, the inquiry into racial discrimination in police corps following the murder of Stephen Lawrence and Sir William Macpherson’s subsequent report, the 2000 amendment of the rra s, the public funding of non-Christian denominational schools (some of which were Muslim), the increase in representation of ethnocultural minorities in senior public service, parliamentary proceedings on specifically religious discrimination, and the introduction of a question on religious affiliation into the 2001 annual census (Modood 2010, 117). However, events on the international scene, in particular those of 11 September 2001 in the United States and the political assassination of filmmaker Théo Van Gogh in 2004 in the Netherlands, and on the domestic front, such as ethnic conflicts in three English towns (Bradford, Burnley, and Oldham) in the summer of 2001 and especially the 7 July 2005 bombings of the London Underground, limited the celebration of multiculturalism in the United Kingdom (Grillo 2010, 53; Modood 2010; 2013). The events also recalled emotional memories of the 1988–89 Rushdie controversy,12 thus amplifying Muslim minorities’ perceived difficulties in integrating (Modood 2010, 117). In 2004, Trevor Phillips, the head of the Commission for Racial Equality, said that multiculturalism in the United Kingdom was “dead” (cited in Hansen 2007, 352). In 2005, he also said that because of multiculturalism, the United Kingdom was “sleepwalking into segregation” (cited in Grillo 2010, 53). At the same time, the discourse of leading politicians seemed to be breaking away from multiculturalism and turning toward the lexical field of civic integration and social cohesion (Fleras 2009, 183). Some public policies were set up to favour cohesion and integration, notably through the 2002 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act. The purpose was to ensure that minorities and newcomers became more British, as former Home Secretary David Blunkett wished (Fleras 2009, 183). In the same vein, citizenship classes were established for newcomers,

Multiculturalism’s Paths

65

and an American-style swearing-in ceremony was created for naturalization (Meer et al. 2015). Some have seen these statements and policies as signs that the United Kingdom was returning to assimilation policies and, more broadly, to a withdrawal from multiculturalism policies (Joppke 2004; 2014; 2017).

conclusion Clearly, no one version of multiculturalism as public policy can really be presented as representative; multiculturalism policy is not a single monolithic entity. While Canada has (re)founded its political identity by building multiculturalism policies and has passed an official law on multiculturalism that is fairly specific about the objectives to be sought, both the United Kingdom and the Netherlands have taken a more ad hoc approach to multiculturalism as public policy. In other words, the institutional source of these policies varies considerably depending on the case in question, just as does the public apparatus deployed to implement them. The Canadian and Dutch paths have been essentially top-down and therefore rather centralized, but the British have taken a more decentralized path inspired by a bottom-up dynamic in which local authorities have played a key part. Moreover, the imperatives that led these three countries to adopt multiculturalism policies are not the same. In Canada, the impetus was initially the need to find a way to deal with the rise of Quebec nationalism while following up on the recommendations of the Laurendeau-Dunton commission on bilingualism and biculturalism. In the end, the idea was principally to foster Canadian unity and national cohesion. In the Netherlands, which has a strong historical tradition of tolerance, the ad hoc policies that were set up in the 1970s and 1980s were designed not to “integrate” newcomers (who were perceived as “temporary workers”) but to allow them to maintain the dynamism of what could be called their original “societal culture” (Kymlicka 1995) through legal and sociopolitical pillars. It was believed that since immigrants would remain in phase with their culture of origin, they would find it easier to return “home” once their work in the Netherlands was finished. However, the Dutch authorities finally realized that this was not in fact what was going on and that immigrants wished to remain in the Netherlands. This led to revision of public diversity integration policies in the 1990s. Finally, in the

66

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

United Kingdom, the assimilation paradigm was dropped at the end of the 1960s in order to welcome into British society a major wave of immigration of new citizens from Commonwealth countries whose cultures of origin and religious practices were significantly different from those of the host society. Nonetheless, a multicultural spirit has been flowing through the years and through the successive political, legal, and institutional configurations. This could be described as a form of institutional multiculturalism policy “path dependency” (Banting and Kymlicka 2006, 6). For example, in all three cases, there was a point when there was a propensity to ensure that immigrant minorities would be able to preserve and assert their identity. This occurred in Canada in 1971 with the multiculturalism policy, in the 1970s in the Netherlands with the institutional pillars system and in 1983 with the Ethnic Minorities Policy, and in the United Kingdom in the 1970s and 1980s with the rra interpretations and the Commission for Racial Equality. Although these trajectories did not all evolve in the same way or go in the same direction, it seems that some sensitivity in this respect has endured, despite the changes in official political directions (Koopmans 2007). However, in both the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, multiculturalism has been declared the wrong approach. In 2013, David Cameron even said that adopting multiculturalism policies had been a mistake (Slack 2013). In any case, the analyses and criticisms of multiculturalism as public policy must be given greater nuance. For example, it cannot be argued that, generally, multiculturalism (as a single, unique approach) necessarily entails ghettoization and ethnocultural segregation (Bissoondath 1995; Bruckner 2006; Bock-Côté 2016a). To begin with, such ethnocultural isolation phenomena occur, to different degrees, in the vast majority of, if not all, liberal democracies that are home to complex ethnocultural diversity, whether the country is the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, the Netherlands, France, or Australia, etc. Consequently, it is not clear that any specific public policy on multiculturalism is the causal origin of this phenomenon. Moreover, empirical studies (Bloemraad 2006; Graham and Phillips 2007; Hyman, Meinhard, and Shields 2011) show that Canada’s public policies on multiculturalism do indeed encourage the integration of immigrant diversity into the host society and that such integration is more efficient than in contexts where there are no such policies.

Multiculturalism’s Paths

67

Yet we must not conclude from this that all criticism of multiculturalism policy is in vain; it must simply be focused on precise, contextualized angles (chapter 4). For example, it seems perfectly reasonable and appropriate to criticize Canadian multiculturalism policy because it promotes Canada as “One Nation” (Burelle 1995), consequently preventing Canada from fully acknowledging its constitutive societal diversity (Laforest 2014, 143–64). The second part of this book will be devoted to this issue in particular. A similar observation can be made of the United Kingdom, where the accent placed by the central authorities on Britishness as membership in a multicultural society does not seem to leave enough space for the uk’s constitutive nations to be able to see themselves as full members (Andrews and Mycock 2008, 146). It is also relevant to examine the way that in the Netherlands components of ad hoc multiculturalism policies from the 1970s and the 1983 Ethnic Minorities Policy are still present in the public architecture. This could provide insight into how they can be perceived as factors that do or do not limit newcomers’ integration. In this chapter, we have shown that the Canadian, Dutch, and British paths in multiculturalism have many points in common but remain deeply different. They have all evolved over the decades in their respective contexts (Mouritsen 2013). While there may be a “failure of multiculturalism” in relation to the public policies flowing from it, this diagnosis cannot be generalized to all states with multiculturalism policies, given the many different experiences and contexts. In the next chapter, we will explore in greater depth the British path of multiculturalism as public policy by studying empirical events and performing a systematic analysis of the state and evolution of multiculturalism policy between 2000 and 2015. For this, we will use the methodological structure of the Multiculturalism Policy Index proposed by Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka. It provides a valid, reliable standardized index for assessing the British path in terms of its political, legal, and institutional mechanisms with respect to multiculturalism. We will thus be in a legitimate position to corroborate or rebut the thesis that there was a retreat from multiculturalism policy in the United Kingdom (Joppke 2004; 2014; 2017) and also to verify whether the clear depreciation of multiculturalism in government discourse in the United Kingdom (Cameron 2011; Daily Mail 2013) had significant repercussions on the status of multiculturalism as public policy.

3

The Failure of Multiculturalism in the United Kingdom: The Facts

As we have seen, the United Kingdom’s experience with multiculturalism has been neither coherent nor linear, and this is also what is usually seen in most liberal democracies when it comes to their integration and naturalization citizenship policies (Freeman 2004, 946).1 Nonetheless, it is clear that since the late 1960s British multiculturalism has taken the form of various local and national institutional mechanisms that aim to “recognize” newcomers as racial and ethnic minorities, which in the United Kingdom means immigrant minorities. This recognition enjoins the state to support such minorities in various ways, such as by giving them differential treatment so that they can “fully” exercise their citizenship (Meer and Modood 2009). The energy that has been put into setting up such institutional and political arrangements has varied, as have the locations where they have been implemented (by the central government or by local governments), and the United Kingdom’s multicultural policies tend to always be conveyed through the discourse of citizenship. Newfound interest in British multiculturalism was sparked when the Labour Party returned to power in 1997 after nearly twenty years of Conservative governance (Poulter 1998; Fleras 2009, 172; Grillo 2010, 53). During the 1990s, New Labour worked relentlessly to celebrate diverse citizenship and the dynamic character of Britishness. This enabled them to win a majority in Parliament in 1997 (Blair 1997 [1996]; Leonard 1997). Again, it was the time of “Cool Britannia” (Leonard 1997). Leading British political figures were extolling diversity. For example, in an interview, Labour Foreign Secretary Robin Cook said in all seriousness that chicken

The Failure of Multiculturalism in the UK

69

tikka massala, a typically Indian dish, would henceforth be competing with fish and chips for the title of Britain’s national dish (Modood 2013, 9). Years have gone by, and a number of now sadly infamous events have occurred. As in many liberal democracies, public and especially political discourse on multiculturalism has changed a lot. Sociologist Christian Joppke (2004; 2014; 2017) argues that actions taken by the British government represent a significant move away from multiculturalism and a shift toward strong “civic integration.” These actions include introducing a citizenship test, requiring an oath of allegiance to the United Kingdom during naturalization ceremonies, and even demanding that newcomers have basic mastery of the English language. A priori, this aligns with former British Prime Minister David Cameron’s position that multiculturalism has failed (bbc 2011). But is this really the case? In other words, is Joppke (2004; 2014; 2017) right that the United Kingdom’s multicultural policies have changed? Theoretically, in the British parliamentary system where, as in Canada, the executive and legislative branches are separated only by a fairly porous boundary, the prime minister has the power to make substantial changes to policies perceived as wrongheaded or obsolete. So, from that perspective, Joppke’s interpretation is plausible. Nonetheless, Uberoi and Modood (2013, 36) have skilfully demonstrated that a country can be critical of some schemes tied to multiculturalism but at the same time continue to implement a variety of policies that avail themselves of that philosophy. They then point out that the only reliable and valid way to determine whether a country’s public policies have moved away from multiculturalism is to perform a systematic analysis over a given period of time. Using the United Kingdom as a test case, we will take up Uberoi and Modood’s suggestion and examine the changes in implementation of multiculturalism as public policy between 2000 and 2015. We will begin by defining the problem more precisely, and then we will determine the theoretical and methodological framework that will permit us to answer the question empirically. Lastly, we will present the findings of this empirical inquiry, which will tell us whether or not the United Kingdom has actually moved away from multiculturalism policy.

70

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

from devaluing multiculturalism to condemning tt The declaration “multiculturalism is dead” appeared on the front page of British newspaper The Daily Mail on 7 July 2006, exactly one year after the bombings in the London Underground (Chapman 2006). In the past, cabinet members, such as Robin Cook, used to call for celebration of ethnocultural diversity, but by the turn of the twenty-first century, such calls seemed to have gradually disappeared from British political life. The position that became more common seems to be the one expressed in Ted Cantle’s 2001 report entitled Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review Team, which argued that British multiculturalism drives cultural and ethnic communities to live “parallel lives” in society (Home Office 2001, 9). Such discourse and positions have often appeared in the literature (Modood 2010; 2013; Vertovec & Wessendorf 2010; Grillo 2010). For example, in 2002, in reaction to the Cantle Report, Labour member and Home Secretary David Blunkett reflected on multiculturalism, wondering whether it favoured difference at the expense of social cohesion (Blunkett 2002, 6). In 2004, Trevor Phillips, head of the Commission for Racial Equality, declared that the United Kingdom should abandon multiculturalism, and in 2005 he argued in a speech that the British people were “sleepwalking” toward racial and community segregation (cited in Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010, 5). In 2006, Ruth Kelly, secretary of state for communities and local government, wondered whether multiculturalism was encouraging “separateness” rather than togetherness (Chapman 2006). By 2007, it seemed clear to David Cameron, leader of the Conservative Party and of the Official Opposition, that the United Kingdom should formally reject multiculturalism. He stated that it was weakening British collective identity (Economist [The] 2007). He went on to say in 2008 that multiculturalism had led to “cultural apartheid” and that as a result it would inevitably lead to the implementation of Sharia law in the United Kingdom (Daily Mail 2008). The future prime minister (from 2010 until his resignation in 2016 following the outcome of the Brexit referendum) did not voice his criticisms of multiculturalism in the media alone. In Westminster in 2007, he warned that multiculturalism constituted a barrier that divided British society (Cameron 2007). In February 2011, after coming to power as prime minister, he declared that state multiculturalism had

The Failure of Multiculturalism in the UK

71

failed in the United Kingdom (bbc 2011). These comments were echoed in his 2011 speech at the Munich Security Conference, where he strongly asserted that the United Kingdom’s state multiculturalism had failed because, allegedly, it “encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and the mainstream” (Cameron 2011). In his speech, Cameron also implied that the best way to combat radicalization and Islamic extremism was to reject multiculturalism (Cameron 2011; Crowder 2013, 4). More recently, in response to the death of a British soldier at the hands of Islamic extremists, Cameron proclaimed that British multicultural policies had been a mistake (Slack 2013). To summarize, the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government that took power in 2010 believed that multiculturalism had first divided British society and then weakened its social cohesion and that such policy would even lead to “cultural apartheid.” At the international conference in Munich in 2011, then–Prime Minister David Cameron, standing next to German Chancellor Angela Merkel, addressed the entire world, solemnly declaring the failure of state multiculturalism. This makes it reasonable to wonder what effect the different British governments’ public comments regarding multiculturalism have had on multiculturalism as public policy. Did the Cameron government’s public devaluing of multiculturalism have significant impact on multiculturalism as public policy in the United Kingdom? More broadly, is Christian Joppke’s analysis (2004; 2014; 2017) correct? To answer these questions, we will look at multiculturalism as public policy in the United Kingdom in 2000, 2010, and 2015. The period we will be analyzing coincides approximately with the 53rd, 54th, and 55th parliaments of the United Kingdom, which had, respectively, a Labour majority (led by Tony Blair, then Gordon Brown), a Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition (led by David Cameron and Nick Clegg), and a Conservative majority (led by David Cameron). The Labour Party formed the government from 1997 to 2010. That period was followed by the Conservative– Liberal Democrat coalition government led by David Cameron from 2010 to 2015. Following the general election of 7 May 2015, David Cameron’s Conservative Party was able to obtain a majority of seats in Parliament and thus was called to form the 56th Parliament, but that parliament will not be part of the temporal sample used in our empirical analysis.2

72

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

The answers to our questions will clarify the debates on integration and naturalization policies in the United Kingdom. These are policies that are also found in most European and North American countries. It is pertinent to look at the state of multiculturalism as public policy because David Cameron’s 2011 assertion about the failure of state multiculturalism still resonates today and because multiculturalism has been declared a failure by, among others, Angela Merkel in Germany, Maxime Verhagen in the Netherlands, and Nicolas Sarkozy in France. Simply put, by answering these questions we will be well placed to prove or disprove Christian Joppke’s thesis (2004; 2014; 2017) that the United Kingdom has taken a substantial step back from multiculturalism as public policy. This will also put us in a legitimate position to formulate a reasoned judgment on the impact and meaning of David Cameron’s famous comments (bbc 2011).

adapting the methodological framework of the multiculturalism policy index The goal of this empirical analysis is not to make causal inferences. Instead, we will take an interpretivist approach (Della Porta and Keating 2008, 24–5) with the goal of collecting empirical data in addition to theoretical, conceptual, and contextual knowledge so as to understand and interpret in the most rigorous way possible a phenomenon that is both social and political. In the first two chapters, we used an analytical approach that drew from both political science and political philosophy to clarify the concept of multiculturalism as pluralism. We also employed comparative profiling to understand how multiculturalism is expressed as public policy. The analysis sought to clarify concepts and identify themes while examining the debates and social issues, with the purpose of constructing a reasoned judgment that strikes a balance between theoretical conceptualization and empirical observation (Van Parijs 1991; Maclure 2013). The aim of the present chapter will be to build foundations for this reasoned judgment by ascertaining the meaning and the impact to be attributed to the statement that multiculturalism has failed in the United Kingdom. For this, the content analysis approach seems well adapted to elucidating the more or less explicit meanings found in discourse, legal documents, and public policies (Krippendorff 2013, 27–30).

The Failure of Multiculturalism in the UK

73

For this empirical analysis, we will use the Multiculturalism Policy Index (mpi ) proposed by Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka (mpi 2015). The mpi is a composite index based on Will Kymlicka’s theorization (chapter 1) and serves as a standardized framework for periodically monitoring the state of multiculturalism policy in twenty-one Western countries (including the United Kingdom). The index categorizes policies in their relation to (a) immigrant groups, (b) national minorities, and (c) Indigenous Peoples. We will use this analytical framework only “partly” because our analysis will be limited to multicultural policies as they relate to immigrant groups. The United Kingdom does not count Indigenous Peoples, and it would be dishonest to evaluate multiculturalism as public policy by combining policies targeting immigrant groups and those targeting national minorities, since we know that the term “multiculturalism” is only ever used in the United Kingdom when talking about immigrant minorities (Joppke 2004; Modood 2013). The United Kingdom’s devolution policies respecting Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales are also not included in the understanding of “multiculturalism.” These are rather policies related to “multinationalism” – that is, the management of societal diversity – which will be the focus of the second part of this book. The decision to use Banting and Kymlicka’s analytical framework is reasonable, since it is a standardized, valid,3 reliable tool (mpi 2015) that has been employed by many researchers (Soroka et al. 2015; Banting 2014; Meer et al. 2015: Bloemraad and Wright 2014; Brady and Finnigan 2014; Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel 2012). To measure the state and evolution of multiculturalism policies targeting immigrant minorities, the mpi uses eight indicators as the basis for a composite index. We will apply these indicators, as they are mobilized in the mpi , to implemented public policies and the laws that have been passed by the British Parliament, which are available on the Government of the United Kingdom’s website (Government of the uk 2015a; 2015b; 2015c).4 Academic sources will also be used and, lastly, some of the information will come directly from organizations that are relevant to our study (e.g., the website of an elementary school in the United Kingdom). The mpi has compiled data about the state of multiculturalism as public policy in the United Kingdom from 1980, 2000, and 2010. In our empirical analysis (covering the years 2000 to 2015), we will begin by ascertaining the index’s reliability by double-checking the

74

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

mpi’s data for 2000 and 2010. We will then add to this by updating the mpi ’s data for the United Kingdom as it relates to multiculturalism policies that targeted immigrant minorities in 2015. The period covered by the analysis spans the period from the time when there was a resurgence of multicultural policies after the Labour Party came to power in 1997 to some four years after the then–British Prime Minister and head of the Executive declared that state multiculturalism had failed in the United Kingdom. The mpi ’s eight indicators have three “qualitative” values5: “Yes” (1 point), “Partially/Limited” (0.5 points), and “No” (0 points). Depending on the criteria used to evaluate each indicator, the policies and institutional mechanisms are rated: “Yes,” “Partially/ Limited,” or “No.” The results of the composite index are based on the total “quantitative” sum of the indicators. This is represented by a point value, for a maximum of 8 points. If a country scores 6 or more points, it is considered to have “strongly multicultural” policies; a score between 3 and 5.5 points means the country is considered to have “modestly multicultural” policies; and a score of 3 or less points means the country’s policies are “not multicultural” (Kymlicka 2007, 74). Each indicator’s criteria for qualitative assessment are as follows.6 1. Affirmation. The constitutional, legislative, or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism at some level of government and the existence of a government body (ministry, secretariat, or advisory board) to implement multiculturalism policy. To get “Yes” (1 point), a country needs to have affirmed multiculturalism and have a government body that implements multicultural policies. To get “Partially” (0.5 points), a country might not explicitly affirm multiculturalism but nonetheless have a government body that implements multiculturalism policies. A country can also get “Partially” (0.5 points) by having adopted multiculturalism at some local or municipal government levels but not at the national level. To get “No” (0 points), a country must not have adopted multiculturalism and must have no government body that implements multiculturalism policies. 2. School Curriculum. The adoption of multiculturalism in the public school curriculum. To get “Yes” (1 point), a country needs to officially include multiculturalism in its curriculum. To get “Partially” (0.5 points), a country must not have adopted multiculturalism in

The Failure of Multiculturalism in the UK

75

its curriculum officially or consistently across the entire country, but it must use inclusive language, cultural dialogue, and anti-racist education in its curriculum. To get “No” (0 points), a country must not include multiculturalism in its curriculum. 3. Media. The representation of ethnic diversity as part of the media’s mandate. To get “Yes” (1 point), a country’s media outlets must have a mandate to include and represent ethnic diversity. To get “No” (0 points), such representation and inclusion must not be part of media outlets’ mandate. There is no partial value for this indicator. 4. Accommodations. Legal accommodations for religious reasons. To get “Yes” (1 point), the country needs to accommodate or grant exemptions on religious grounds. To get “Partially” (0.5 points), the country needs to have accommodations for some religious reasons but to have explicitly rejected others that are nonetheless similar. To get “No” (0 points), the country must not grant any accommodations for religious reasons. 5. Dual citizenship. The permission to have dual citizenship. To get “Yes” (1 point), obtaining the country’s citizenship does not require renouncing any previous citizenship. To get “Partially” (0.5 points), the country may officially reject dual citizenship but tolerate it in practice. To get “No” (0 points), dual citizenship is not tolerated: obtaining the country’s citizenship requires giving up any other citizenship. 6. Funding ethnic groups. The funding of ethnic public organizations or associated activities. To get “Yes” (1 point), the country needs to publicly fund ethnic group projects and activities. To get “Partially” (0.5 points), the country needs to publicly fund some ethnic group projects and activities without doing so consistently. To get “No” (0 points), the country must not give public funding to ethnic groups. 7. Bilingual education. Public funding for bilingual education or immigrant mother-tongue instruction. To get “Yes” (1 point), the country needs to fund either bilingual education or immigrant mother-tongue instruction. To get “Partially” (0.5 points), funding must be available in some cities or areas but not consistently across the whole country. To get “No” (0 points), the country must not fund bilingual education or immigrant mother-tongue instruction.

76

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

8 Affirmative action. Affirmative action policy designed to help immigrant minorities and/or disadvantaged immigrant groups. To get “Yes” (1 point), the country needs to have implemented a system of affirmative action designed to help immigrant minorities and/or disadvantaged immigrant groups. To get “No” (0 points), the country must not have such a system of affirmative action in place. There is no partial value for this indicator. A “system of affirmative action” means official mechanisms that, in addition to identifying the disadvantage an immigrant might unfairly suffer, also include a means for remedying the situation.

our findings In the following pages, we will examine the United Kingdom’s public policies using the Multiculturalism Policy Index’s eight indicators. Based on each indicator’s criteria, we will then look at the state of multiculturalism as public policy in the United Kingdom in 2000, 2010, and 2015. In this way, we will be able to verify the mpi researchers’ findings for the United Kingdom in 2000 and 2010 and then add new data for 2015. 1. Affirmation. The constitutional, legislative or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism at some level of government and the existence of a government body (ministry, secretariat, or advisory board) to implement multiculturalism policy. 2000: No (0 points) 2010: No (0 points) 2015: No (0 points) Summary: In 2000, 2010, and 2015, there was no constitutional, legislative, or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism whatsoever at any level of government in the United Kingdom. There was also no government body for implementing multiculturalism policy. As we saw in chapter 2, unlike Canada, for example, the United Kingdom has no central or official multiculturalism policy. That said, the Parekh report (Runnymede Trust 2002, 277) strongly recommended that the United Kingdom officially affirm multiculturalism, and it invited legislators to be inspired by Canada’s

The Failure of Multiculturalism in the UK

77

approach. Furthermore, as Tolley (2011) notes in the mpi report, between 2005 and 2009 the British government implemented the Improving Opportunity, Strengthening Society Program that aimed to strengthen community cohesion and improve ethnic and racial relations (Department for Communities and Local Government 2009). In 2010, in the wake of that program, the government published a report entitled Tackling Race Inequality (Department for Communities and Local Government 2010). The only significant new promise contained in the report was to create a fund to reduce racial inequalities, with the goal of supporting local and regional initiatives. Even though there may in fact be bodies for implementing multiculturalism policy at local and regional levels (see also Indicator 6, Funding Ethnic Groups), none of them are the direct result of an official multiculturalism initiative. This means that, even though the goal of reducing racial inequalities demonstrates sensitivity to multiculturalism in a certain sense, no multiculturalism policy has been affirmed per se. A similar assessment can be made of the mandates of the Equality and Human Rights Commission and the Equality Act 2010. 2. School Curriculum. The adoption of multiculturalism in the school curriculum. 2000: Yes (1 point) 2010: Partially (0.5 points) 2015: Partially (0.5 points) Summary: In the wake of the Swann Report (1985) and the Education Reform Act 1988, the concept of multiculturalism was added to the school curriculum. However, in the official document outlining the curriculum’s new aims, the Children’s Plan of 2007, the concept had disappeared. Since then, a certain degree of sensitivity to multiculturalism has nonetheless remained, as can be seen in the fact that the vocabulary of inclusion, cultural dialogue, and anti-racist education are part of the curriculum. As we saw in chapter 2, the Education Reform Act 1988 gave the United Kingdom a national curriculum (which remained overall rather flexible and multiform) set by the central government (Mathieu and Laforest 2015). It is important to note, however, that

78

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

Scottish, Welsh, and Northern Irish authorities also have jurisdiction over education. Furthermore, as noted by Erik Bleich (1998), during the 1990s local education authorities officially incorporated multiculturalism into the curriculum. During the 2000s, however, multiculturalism was not always an official part of the curriculum. For example, when the Department for Children, School and Families (which became the Department for Education in 2010) implemented the Children’s Plan in 2007, “multiculturalism” was not mentioned anywhere. This plan of action did, however, require that primary and secondary schools strengthen community cohesion as well as promote racial and ethnic diversity (Department for Children, School and Families 2007, 73). Additionally, a research group (Collective 2009) demonstrated that the United Kingdom and Scotland mainly take a “pluralist approach” to citizenship education. This same assessment can also be made of Wales and Northern Ireland (Kerr, Smith, and Twine 2008; Kisby and Sloam 2012). It is also important to remember that the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 required that local education authorities promote equality of opportunity and eliminate ethnic and racial discrimination. Since 2010, the Department for Education has updated its curriculum, especially in terms of citizenship education, but it has not officially adopted multiculturalism. The United Kingdom’s national curricula have nonetheless been strongly influenced by sensitivity to multiculturalism, as much with respect to pedagogical approach as to subject matter (Mathieu and Laforest 2015, 91). Respect for and tolerance of cultural, ethnic, and social diversity remain foundations (Ross 2000, 10; Hayden 2013, 9). 3. The Media. Representation of ethnic diversity as part of the media’s mandate. 2000: Yes (1 point) 2010: Yes (1 point) 2015: Yes (1 point) Summary: Since the 1983 report entitled Ethnic Minority Broadcasting, concern to represent ethnic diversity has been part of the mandate of the United Kingdom’s media. This mandate was consolidated in the Communications Act 2003.

The Failure of Multiculturalism in the UK

79

As noted in Tolley’s mpi report (2011), in 1983, after the report by the Commission for Racial Equality’s Ethnic Minority Broadcasting, British media became more careful to represent ethnic and racial diversity (Zolf 1989). The report asked the media to represent the “multi-racial” face of society, and this passed into law in the Communications Act 2003, which has since been amended but only in technical ways that have no impact on our analysis. The 2003 law applies specifically to the Office of Communications, which determines and regulates the mandate of the United Kingdom’s media (Office of Communications 2015). In paragraph l, subsection (4) of section 1.3 of the Communications Act 2003, the Office of Communications is required to consider the interests of the United Kingdom’s diverse ethnic communities. We also find in section 2.1.4 of the Equality Act 2010 that all the public sectors, including public broadcasters, are required to eliminate discrimination and harassment related to race, religion, and beliefs. Furthermore, the bbc public broadcaster mentions in one of its public purposes that its programs aim to reflect the United Kingdom’s ethnic and cultural diversity (bbc 2010; 2014). 4. Accommodations. Legal accommodations for religious symbols. 2000: Yes (1 point) 2010: Yes (1 point) 2015: Yes (1 point) Summary: The Race Relations Act’s legal accommodations and also, particularly, the Motor Cycle Crash Helmets (Religious Exemption) Act 1976 mean that the United Kingdom accommodates and grants exemptions for religious reasons. As we saw in chapter 2, prohibiting discrimination on ethnic, racial, and religious grounds is part of the Race Relations Acts (rra ). After this legislation was amended in 1976, it prohibited all indirect discrimination, including the latent discriminatory “effects” of laws, even if the legislator’s intent was not a priori discriminatory. The Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 then expanded the scope of the law to cover all public and private bodies, including police forces, universities, and the National Health Service.

80

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

As Tolley’s mpi report (2011) also showed, the Employment Act was amended in 1989 to follow the logic of the 1976 rra . Legal precedent was used as the basis for amending section 3 to establish accommodations for religious symbols. The Employment Act 1989 explicitly deemed requiring Sikhs to remove their turbans and forcing them to wear safety helmets on construction sites and motorcycles to be religious discrimination. It granted legal accommodations in such situations. It is equally important to highlight the fact that this 1989 law consolidated the accommodations granted by the Motor Cycle Crash Helmets (Religious Exemption) Act 1976, which had already made Sikhs exempt, for religious reasons, from having to wear helmets on motorcycles and allowing them to wear Sikh turbans instead. More recently, the Metropolitan Police Service has granted accommodations to practising Muslim women since 2001, enabling them to wear the hijab at work (Hopkins 2001; Tolley 2011). Moreover, section 3 of the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 consolidated the Motor Cycle Crash Helmets (Religious Exemption) Act 1976. In doing so, the legislator specified, in sections 1.3.1 to 3, a framework for identifying discrimination on grounds of religion or belief. 5. Dual citizenship. The permission to have dual citizenship. 2000: Yes (1 point) 2010: Yes (1 point) 2015: Yes (1 point) Summary: The United Kingdom permits dual citizenship. As we saw in chapter 2, under the British Nationality Act 1948, all individuals living in a Commonwealth country automatically became subjects of the British Crown. This gave them direct access to British citizenship if they migrated to the United Kingdom without necessarily forcing them to give up the citizenship of their original country (Voicu 2009). Some restrictions have since been added, but dual citizenship has never been prohibited (Tolley 2011). The Home Office website specifically states that “Dual citizenship (also known as dual nationality) is allowed in the uk . This means you can be a British citizen and also a citizen of other countries” (Home Office 2015).

The Failure of Multiculturalism in the UK

81

6. Funding ethnic groups. The funding of ethnic public organizations and associated activities. 2000: Yes (1 point) 2010: Yes (1 point) 2015: Yes (1 point) Summary: During the 1980s and 1990s, the Arts Council of Britain and the Ethnic Minority Grant Program were in charge of providing public funding to ethnic group projects and activities. Starting in 2006, the Big Lottery Fund and the Awards for All community programs mainly took charge of this. During the 1980s and 1990s, the United Kingdom set up the Arts Council of Britain (1985) and the Ethnic Minority Grant Program (1992). As noted in Tolley’s mpi report (2011), a considerable part of these programs aimed to encourage sociocultural activities that would celebrate ethnic communities. During the 2000s, the Commission for Racial Equality (cre ) also budgeted funds to support activities organized by ethnic groups and communities (cre 2009, 71–2). In 2007, however, after the cre merged with the Equality and Human Rights Commission (ehrc ), these funds disappeared from their budget (ehrc 2015). It is nonetheless important to note that the British government implemented a twoyear program entitled the Tackling Race Inequality Funds in 2009 to fund ethnic group projects. The program did not favour any particular ethnic group and was intended to promote “good race relations” (Department for Communities and Local Government 2010, 12). Another permanent public funding scheme for ethnic groups is the Big Lottery Fund’s Awards for All programs created in 2006. These funds, constituted out of 40 per cent of the National Lottery’s yearly revenue, go toward running projects and initiatives designed to improve the living conditions of the diverse communities that make up United Kingdom (Big Lottery Fund 2015a). A central committee and subcommittees for England, Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales decide which projects and initiatives receive funding. The funded initiatives are required to actively promote ethnic and cultural diversity and ethnic community participation and inclusion and to combat all forms of exclusion (Big Lottery Fund 2015b).

82

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

7. Bilingual education. Public funding for bilingual education and immigrant mother-tongue instruction. 2000: No (0 points) 2010: No (0 points) 2015: Partially (0.5 points) Summary: For the most part, the United Kingdom’s educational system is monolingual (Wales has some English-Welsh programs, but that relates to national minorities and not to immigrant minorities). Nonetheless, some state-funded bilingual Free Schools began appearing in the United Kingdom in 2012. Such bilingual schools are not, however, consistently available everywhere. As Li Wei (2006, 82) showed, historically, the British education system has been monolingual. Local education authorities have generally made provisions to temporarily accommodate students in regular classes by funding bilingual classroom assistants (Department for Children, Schools and Families 2007, 89; Tolley 2011). It should be noted that such “accommodation” is temporary and its goal is to have young students with learning difficulties due to language join the main school system. In other words, there is no plan to add a bilingual system operating in parallel with the main monolingual school system (Tolley 2011). That said, since the end of the 1990s, “complementary schools” have offered bilingual education and education in languages other than English (Tolley 2011). The fact that these schools are “complementary” means that their classes take place outside normal school time and are in addition to the normal national curriculum (Wei 2006, 78.) Furthermore, complementary schools are usually not funded by the British state (Creese et al. 2006; Bonacina and Gafaranga 2011, 322). There has nonetheless been a change to this state of affairs since the Conservative–Liberal coalition government came to power in 2010. In 2012, the British government added bilingual schools to its Free Schools. Free Schools are state-funded schools that do not answer to local education authorities (Government of the United Kingdom 2015d). They are more autonomous and, with some restrictions, have some freedom to determine how the curriculum is taught. Notably, since 2012 English-Spanish (Bilingual Primary

The Failure of Multiculturalism in the UK

83

School 2015), English-German (Judith Kerr Primary School 2015), and English-French (École de Wix 2015) bilingual Free Schools have been established. However, these bilingual Free Schools are still not available across the entire country and are mostly concentrated in London and some other urban centres. 8. Affirmative action. Affirmative action policy designed to help immigrant minorities and/or disadvantaged immigrant groups. 2000: Yes (1 point)7 2010: Yes (1 point) 2015: Yes (1 point) Summary: With the legal accommodations subsequent to the amendment of the Race Relations Act in 2000 and the Equality Act 2010, it is clear that the United Kingdom has set up affirmative action policy designed to help immigrant minorities and disadvantaged immigrant groups. Affirmative action for immigrant minorities and disadvantaged immigrant groups is an integral part of British law. As we have seen several times already, with the Race Relations Acts and amendments, notably with the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, all direct and indirect discrimination on grounds of race, ethnicity, belief, or religion is prohibited. Additionally, the United Kingdom’s law establishes affirmative action measures to provide for the basic needs of the most disadvantaged groups, such as refugees (Tolley 2011). As well, as stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 71.1 of the rras amendment in 2000, local authorities have a duty to eliminate all racial discrimination and to promote equality of opportunity and good relations with individuals from immigrant groups. Furthermore, subsection 2.2 of the Equality Act 2010 consolidated the prohibition of all forms of discrimination under British law, and subsection 2.1 put in place legal measures for affirmative action, notably “to reduce the inequalities of outcome which result from socio-economic disadvantage.” Finally, a report by the Government Equalities Office (2009, 5) affirmed that the British government was actively working to increase the proportion of civil servants originating from under-represented ethnic minorities.

84

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

interpreting the findings At the beginning of this chapter, we looked briefly at the evolution of how multiculturalism was seen by key members of government in the United Kingdom between 2000 and 2015. It appears that the idea of multiculturalism as public policy stopped being popular somewhere around 2002. Some even refer to the concept as an “M-Word” that politicians refuse to utter except when they want to criticize it (Vertovec 2010, 92; Kymlicka 2012). The concept has been receiving progressively harsher criticism. If we look first at the notion of togetherness, we find that the coalition government that took power in 2010 believed that multiculturalism was dividing British society, weakening social cohesion, and even creating “cultural apartheid.” Moreover, during an international conference in Munich where he was addressing the entire world, former Prime Minister David Cameron solemnly declared the failure of state multiculturalism. As early as 2004, sociologist Christian Joppke (2004) observed that the United Kingdom was moving away from multiculturalism policy, and he predicted that this trend would continue to grow in the years to come. While Joppke’s (2008) position softened in 2008, he returned to his long-lasting thesis in a 2014 article in the journal Constellations entitled “The Retreat Is Real – But What Is the Alternative?” (2014). Joppke’s thesis appeared to have been proven true each of the numerous times that British Prime Minister David Cameron said that state multiculturalism had failed, for, after all, he was the head of the Executive at the time. In 2013, Cameron even reiterated that the implementation of multiculturalism policy had been a “mistake” (Slack 2013). Instead of speculating about whether or not Joppke’s assessment was fair, we have decided to follow Uberoi and Modood’s (2013) recommendations and perform an empirical analysis of the evolution of multiculturalism as public policy in the United Kingdom. Now that we have done so for the period between 2000 and 2015, what is our “reasoned judgment”? Did multiculturalism as public policy in the United Kingdom change in the way that Joppke (2004; 2014; 2017) argued? Did the explicit devaluing of multiculturalism by the Cameron government have a significant impact on British multiculturalism policy? Our analysis – theoretical and conceptual on one hand and descriptive and empirical on the other – leads to a reasoned judgment that,

The Failure of Multiculturalism in the UK

85

Table 3.1 Multiculturalism as public policy in the United Kingdom in 2000, 2010, and 2015 Indicators

2000

2010

2015

1. Affirmation

0

0

0

2. School curriculum

1

0.5

0.5

3. Media

1

1

1

4. Accommodations

1

1

1

5. Dual citizenship

1

1

1

6. Funding ethnic groups

1

1

1

7. Bilingual education

0

0

0.5

8. Affirmative action

1

1

1

Total

6

5.5

6

between 2000 and 2015, multiculturalism as public policy did not significantly change in the United Kingdom. We have even seen that, according the mpi ’s methodological framework, the total score for multiculturalism in the United Kingdom was slightly higher in 2015 than it was in 2010, returning to its 2000 score. The table above is a summary of the results of the mpi ’s eight indicators for 2000, 2010, and 2015. According to the mpi criteria and their interpretation by Will Kymlicka (2007, 74), the United Kingdom went from having “modestly multicultural” policies (a score between 3 and 5.5 out of 8) to having “strongly multicultural” policies (a score between 6 and 8 out of 8). Moreover, from 2000 to 2015, British multiculturalism policy did not change according to indicators 1. Affirmation, 3. Media, 4. Accommodations, 5. Dual citizenship, 6. Funding ethnic groups, and 8. Affirmative action. As we saw in the previous section, the fact that the values for these six indicators did not change does not mean that there were no relevant legislative or political changes between 2000 and 2015. In fact, for these six relatively stable indicators, the United Kingdom generally consolidated its multiculturalism practices through legislative amendments, new laws, and new public programs.

86

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

Regarding indicator 2 (school curriculum), we saw that the terms “multiculturalism” and “multicultural education” disappeared from the British school curriculum between 2000 and 2010, but the vocabulary used in the British school curriculum and its stated goals clearly show sensitivity to multiculturalism. It was also in the education system that we saw another change, a positive one, with respect to British multiculturalism policy between 2000 and 2015. Indicator 7 (bilingual education) revealed that the United Kingdom had been funding bilingual schools in its education system since 2012, even though they were not consistently available everywhere. This empirical evidence regarding the evolution of multiculturalism as public policy in the United Kingdom disproves Joppke’s thesis. In fact, instead of finding that the United Kingdom moved away from multiculturalism as public policy as Joppke argued (2004; 2014; 2017), we found that it remained relatively unchanged between 2000 and 2015. To be fair, Joppke’s thesis is more nuanced and includes the conjecture that multiculturalism is abandoned as “integration policies” are adopted. Examples Joppke (2004, 252) gives of integration policies include introducing a citizenship test, requiring an oath of allegiance to the United Kingdom during naturalization ceremonies, and demanding that newcomers have a basic mastery of English. However, none of these examples pertain to the mpi indicators, which opens the door to two possible interpretations. The first interpretation is that the mpi indicators are not representative of multiculturalism policy. In other words, it calls into question the validity of the index’s indicators. It is important to note that the mpi is a composite index and, like all such indexes, it remains a general analytical tool for studying specific cases. Thus, it is not unreasonable to question its validity (see, for instance, Duyvendak et al. 2013, 601). If we look at the United Kingdom, we can question the validity of indicator 2 (school curriculum) owing to the fact that education has largely been the responsibility of the United Kingdom’s constituent counties and it was only recently, in 1988, that the United Kingdom adopted a national curriculum (which is nonetheless flexible and multiform). This means that before 1988 the United Kingdom could never be assigned the “Yes” value in accordance with this indicator even if, hypothetically, all local education authorities had affirmed multiculturalism as a cornerstone of their pedagogical approaches. The mpi has, however, been used and tested in numerous scientific studies and, at the very least, seems to

The Failure of Multiculturalism in the UK

87

be satisfactory for the twenty-one cases it systematically analyzes. For these reasons, we will dismiss the first interpretation. The second possible interpretation is that Joppke represents the relationship between multiculturalism policies and integration policies as a zero-sum game. This would mean that introducing a citizenship test, requiring an oath of allegiance to the United Kingdom during naturalization ceremonies, and demanding that newcomers have basic mastery of English necessarily entails moving away from multiculturalism. Based on the empirical evidence we have seen in this chapter, the second interpretation seems more useful for understanding Joppke’s thesis,8 even though it is rather disconnected from the main theories of multiculturalism as pluralism.9 In any case, the reasoned judgment we have arrived at disproves Joppke’s thesis (2004; 2014; 2017). Lastly, when it comes to determining whether the explicit devaluing of multiculturalism by the Cameron government has had a significant impact on British multiculturalism policy, we must conclude that it has not. In fact, whether or not the adoption of multiculturalism policy was a “mistake” (Slack 2013), and even though the British prime minister declared the failure of state multiculturalism in 2011 (Cameron 2011), multiculturalism as public policy has remained relatively stable. Furthermore, based on the mpi findings, it was during the mandate of the Conservative–Liberal coalition government led by David Cameron that the United Kingdom made a slight shift towards “strongly multicultural” policies. Thus, multiculturalism might be presented as an “M-word” that should only be uttered in criticism, but this has not had significant impacts on British multiculturalism policy.

conclusion We have seen that between 2000 and 2015, multiculturalism was devalued in British government discourse. David Cameron, the head of the Executive of the Liberal–Conservative coalition government went as far as to say publicly at a major international conference in Munich that state multiculturalism had failed. From the early 2000s, some analysts (Joppke 2004; 2014; 2017) were suggesting that the United Kingdom would take a significant step back from multiculturalism and instead favour strong integration policies. We decided to test this hypothesis, specifically by asking whether we could

88

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

observe a significant change in British multiculturalism policy from 2000 to 2015. We also wondered whether the obvious devaluing of multiculturalism in the discourse of the Liberal–Conservative coalition government led by Cameron (2010–15) had repercussions on the state of multiculturalism as public policy in the United Kingdom. Adapting the methodological framework of the Multiculturalism Policy Index (mpi ) proposed by Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka, we used eight specific indicators to examine how multiculturalism as public policy changed in the United Kingdom between 2000 and 2015. Since the mpi data for 2000 and 2010 were already available, our contribution was to update the index for 2015 in the United Kingdom with regard to immigrant minorities. We found, in short, that multiculturalism as public policy remained relatively stable in the United Kingdom from 2000 to 2015. In particular, we saw that in 2015 the United Kingdom fell into the “strongly multicultural” category, whereas it had been “modestly multicultural” in 2010. This means that the devaluing of multiculturalism by the Cameron government (2010–15) did not have significant repercussions on the state of multiculturalism as public policy in the United Kingdom. In the next chapter, we will continue the inquiry around our reasoned judgment. In particular, we will propose an interpretation of the scope and meaning that we can legitimately give to David Cameron’s comments about multiculturalism’s failure. This will involve re-examining the debates that tend to portray the situation as a zero-sum game between multiculturalism policies and integration policies. In this respect, we agree with Meer and Modood’s point of view (2009; 2013) that we are witnessing civic thickening of multiculturalism policies in the United Kingdom, notably in relation to integration and social cohesion measures. However, we have found no formal disengagement from multiculturalism. To support the position that multiculturalism as public policy has remained relatively stable in the United Kingdom even though the prime minister said it was a failure in 2011, we will also look at the Canadian and Dutch approaches to multiculturalism.

4

The Failure of Multiculturalism?

In 2011, David Cameron said state multiculturalism had failed in the United Kingdom. Such statements have also been made by influential politicians in most liberal democracies (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). They must be understood as referring to multiculturalism as public policy, since “state” limits the multiculturalism in question to how it is implemented through public mechanisms (Laborde 2011). Moreover, when Cameron, at the time Leader of the Official Opposition in the House of Commons, said that the “doctrine” of state multiculturalism had been discredited (Daily Mail 2008), it was not the first time that the man who was to be prime minister of the United Kingdom from 2010 to 2016 had attacked multiculturalism as pluralism. In this chapter, we will begin by trying to interpret the scope and meaning that can legitimately be attributed to Cameron’s harsh criticism of multiculturalism. We will explore a few interpretive angles that could explain why multiculturalism policy has remained essentially stable in the British political-institutional system despite a growing number of voices alleging that it has failed (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010) and that there has been a retreat from policies inspired by multiculturalism (Joppke 2004; 2014; 2017). We will attempt to enrich the discussion by looking at Canadian and Dutch experiences. Lastly, we will analyze the often huge gap between the main criticisms of multiculturalism in the public debate in complex societies and what is really suggested by mainstream multiculturalism theories. In short, the goal of this chapter is to clarify the reasoned judgment to which theoretical and empirical analysis lead us.1

90

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

on the alleged failure of multiculturalism Before diving into the interpretation that we can legitimately make of David Cameron’s claims about multiculturalism in the United Kingdom (Daily Mail 2008; Cameron 2011; Slack 2013), let us first quickly review the meanings that cannot be attributed to them. Upon hearing the prime minister of the United Kingdom announce the failure of state multiculturalism at a major international conference, a “foreign spectator” could easily – incorrectly – conclude that the United Kingdom officially distances itself from multiculturalism policy. The foreign spectator could legitimately suppose that the United Kingdom is actively withdrawing from, or already has withdrawn from, multiculturalism policies, since that is “normally” what happens when a head of state or government declares a public policy’s failure (Jacob 2010, 257–65). However, based on the empirical analysis we provided in chapter 3, we have good reasons to think that this was not the case. Our systematic analysis of the state of British multiculturalism policy, which we did in accordance with the methodology and indicators of the Multiculturalism Policy Index (mpi ), shows that the institutional apparatus of multiculturalism in the United Kingdom was in fact consolidated between 2000 and 2015. Based on the mpi , the British political-institutional system went from “moderately multicultural” in 2010 to “highly multicultural” in 2015, the same characterization it received in 2000. There are therefore strong reasons to consider that Cameron’s claims in 2011 about the failure of state multiculturalism cannot be interpreted as resulting in the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from multiculturalism policies, at least not during the 55th Parliament (2010–15). Otherwise, we would have seen a rollback of such policies between the time Cameron made his claims in Munich (2011) and the end of the 55th Parliament, during which the government was formed by the Conservative-Liberal coalition he led (May 2015). That said, while there may not have been a withdrawal from multiculturalism policies (contrary to the claims of sociologist Christian Joppke [2004; 2014; 2017]), civic integration policies were nonetheless implemented (see Squire 2005). Notably, citizenship, language, and integration tests were instituted by the 2002 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act, and a citizenship ceremony was

The Failure of Multiculturalism?

91

introduced in which newcomers must swear allegiance to the United Kingdom (Kostakopoulou 2010, 832–3). In fact, these integration policies are what led Joppke (2004; 2014) to say that there had been a withdrawal from multiculturalism policies. As we noted in chapter 3, such an interpretation views integration policies and multicultural policies as part of a zero-sum game (Meer and Modood 2009; Kymlicka 2012, 20; Meer and Modood 2013, 79). Joppke (2004; 2014) is nevertheless not alone in adopting such a binary view of multiculturalism and integration. This same logic is also found in Joanna Fomina (2006, 421), again in Joppke (2009, 466–70), and to a certain extent in Dora Kostakopoulou (2010, 837). From a theoretical perspective, if we look at the idea that there is a zero-sum game dynamic between multiculturalism and integration policies, we have to acknowledge that integration is actually a central vector of multiculturalism as pluralism.2 In chapter 1, we argued that multiculturalism is a normative political approach to managing diversity and that it favours integration into the host society. None of the theoreticians we discussed in chapter 1 proposes excluding language or citizenship tests as parts of communal life. On the contrary, Kymlicka (2001, 275–89) emphatically states, pointing to the example of Quebec within Canada, that no matter what a society’s multicultural (or intercultural) aspirations, a common language is needed so that a dynamic public life can be maintained through a societal culture. It seems more than a little strange that citizenship ceremonies and the obligation to swear allegiance would be used as arguments that there has been a withdrawal from multiculturalism policies. It was, after all, the Commission for the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (one would be hard-pressed to find a body with more multiculturalist sensitivity) that recommended the institution of citizenship ceremonies (Runnymede Trust 2002, 48). According to Bhikhu Parekh and the other commissioners, such an “American-style” ceremony would consolidate the emotional and symbolic weight of becoming a citizen and make it easier for newcomers to embrace the common values of the host country. Instead of being depicted as having the dynamic of a zero-sum game, multiculturalism and integration policies should be seen as complementary and not necessarily in conflict. Even if integration policies “thicken” the normative content of citizenship, they remain consistent with multiculturalism policies as long as they are more in line with pluralism than “assimilationism” (see Koopmans

92

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

et al. 2005, 51–4; Goodman 2010, 757–8). In other words, as long as integration policies maintain a “liberal” spirit by avoiding coercive and prohibitive strategies – for example, prohibition of dual citizenship – there is no reason to see an opposition between integration and multiculturalism policies (Kymlicka 2012, 20). Offering this interpretation is nevertheless not the same as denying that integration policies have had any repercussions on the United Kingdom’s politico-institutional multiculturalism measures. From this perspective, the analysis by Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood (2009; 2013) seems fair and nuanced. They also reject Joppke’s thesis (2004) that we are witnessing a withdrawal from multiculturalism policies and the view that the dynamic between multiculturalism and integration is a zero-sum game. Meer and Modood (2013, 80) suggest instead seeing the establishment of integration policies as additional measures to the United Kingdom’s multiculturalism policies. In other words, rather than impeding multiculturalism policies, integration policies add to the politico-institutional framework of multiculturalism, thereby generating what could be called a higher “civic integration coefficient” in multiculturalism as public policy. Rigorous analysis of such a coefficient would, however, require establishing a theoretical and methodological index similar to the mpi (see Goodman 2010). In our view, the mpi indicators have to be considered valid, reliable, empirical measures of multiculturalism as public policy, and the use of a greater or smaller civic integration coefficient could in some sense “tweak” the politico-institutional measures in specific cases. That said, it remains fair to criticize the weighting of the various indicators. According to the mpi , each indicator ultimately has the same value. However, the first indicator – whether or not there is an official multiculturalism policy and a political body to put it into operation – seems to carry substantially more importance in the general philosophy in question than, for example, the seventh indicator – whether or not there are bilingual options in the educational system. It is therefore legitimate to keep the United Kingdom’s 2015 mpi score in perspective. We have to remember that, despite its “highly multicultural” characterization with respect to political institutions, the United Kingdom has never adopted an official multiculturalism policy. In chapter 2, we saw that there is official Dutch discourse on withdrawal from multiculturalism (Vasta 2007), but it is unclear that

The Failure of Multiculturalism?

93

we can really say that the Netherlands has rejected such politico-institutional measures (Meer et al. 2015). In this regard, Koopmans (2007, 4) maintains that the Dutch have internalized a “pillar reflex” in that public authorities continue to work de facto according to multiculturalism policies set in place in the 1980s – despite the fact that many other more recent policies have since been added. This is consistent with Banting and Kymlicka’s thesis (2006, 6) that multiculturalism is now an integral part of the legislation, jurisprudence, and political institutions of many Western democracies. Even though more voices are claiming that multiculturalism has failed (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010) and that there is a withdrawal from multiculturalism policy (Joppke 2004; 2014), it seems that a number of countries have developed a form of path dependency with regard to multiculturalism as public policy. In addition, national and state experiences with managing ethnocultural diversity are still strongly influenced by each nation’s trajectories and self-image (Mouritsen 2013; Meer et al. 2015, 706). At least, this seems characteristic of the British, Canadian, and Dutch experiences. Owing to its colonial past, the United Kingdom’s identity is fundamentally and intrinsically diverse, which is also the case with respect to the identity imaginaries of the English, Scottish, Northern Irish, and Welsh (Kumar 2003). As we saw in chapters 2 and 3, since the 1960s multiculturalism as public policy in the United Kingdom has taken the form of a plethora of legislative and policy measures. Thus, not to say that Cameron’s (2011) claims about multiculturalism’s failure are utterly meaningless, but it seems unlikely that they have translated into a draconian withdrawal from multiculturalism policies because such policies are woven into a wide array of legal texts and political programs.

the alleged failure vs multiculturalism’s theorists: a dialogue of the deaf Following the analysis by Vertovec, Wessendorf, and their collaborators, in Western political discourse it is now common to hear claims about the “failure of multiculturalism” (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010; Lentin and Titley 2011). Similarly, many intellectuals, essay writers, columnists, editorial writers, and other political commentators regularly put multiculturalism on trial. However, there is far from consensus on its declared failure and the meaning

94

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

of the criticism. Just as we previously tested the thesis of withdrawal from multiculturalism in the United Kingdom against the facts, we will now confront the primary criticisms levelled at multiculturalism as pluralism in public debates with what its foremost theorists have to say about it (chapter 1). In the public sphere (in Quebec, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Australia, etc.), an impressive number of social and political actors voice harsh criticism of multiculturalism. Among the most frequent general criticisms (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010, 6–12; Boucher 2016a, 64–7) are accusations that multiculturalism: (a) is a dogmatic doctrine,3 (b) is committed to ethnocultural fragmentation and to reducing each individual to a single cultural identity,4 (c) rejects common and universal values,5 and (d) carries moral and cultural relativism.6 Over the past fifteen years, these criticisms have been repeated by many high-ranking politicians across the Western world, including Angela Merkel (Weaver 2010), David Cameron (2007; 2011), Nicholas Sarkozy (Figaro [Le] 2011), and Maxine Verhagen (Dutch News 2011). Obviously, these criticisms are all equally legitimate.7 Multiculturalism has deeply penetrated the political culture of the vast majority of liberal democracies (Banting and Kymlicka 2006, 6). It is not surprising that, at the turn of the twenty-first century, it was declared that “we are all multiculturalist now” (Glazer 1997) and that multiculturalism had “won the day” (Kymlicka 1999), so it is not surprising that there would be some pushback (Barry 2001). That said, the same formulas and criticisms of multiculturalism as pluralism are used from context to context (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010) without taking into account the opinions of multiculturalism’s primary theorists. In addition, the criticisms often seem to neglect, more or less consciously, the prevailing theories on multiculturalism, despite fiercely denouncing it as a concept. According to Maclure (2016, 253–6), this makes the primary criticisms of multiculturalism in the public sphere into “desperate caricatures” very loosely based on pluralist ideas. In the next pages, we will examine the four main criticisms of multiculturalism identified above by seeing how they apply to the writings of some of the most discussed theorists of multiculturalism – Will Kymlicka, Bhikhu Parekh, Tariq Modood, and Anne Phillips (chapter 1). In short, we find that multiculturalism as pluralism

The Failure of Multiculturalism?

95

provides answers to precisely these criticisms and seems equipped to face them. We acknowledge that multiculturalism is criticized on many more levels than those we have sketched out and that the four authors whose works comprise the corpus of theoretical works cannot alone cover the whole universe of multiculturalism as pluralism. However, this examination leads to conclusions that will be instructive for the public debate on togetherness. Lastly, while we will deconstruct sophisms and logical fallacies around the main criticisms of multiculturalism conveyed in political discourse, it must be pointed out that we are not trying to discredit every criticism of pluralism. On the contrary, the objective is to attack the weak points and blind spots of these criticisms and confront them with the nuances of political theory. It would therefore be useful and helpful to advancing public debate if the critics of multiculturalism replied seriously to what follows. Multiculturalism Is a Dogmatic Doctrine

In Vertovec and Wessendorf’s book (2010), the state of the debate on multiculturalism is explored in a number of European countries. In Europe, and to a lesser but nonetheless significant degree in North America, a reigning “fantasy” seems to be that multiculturalism is limited to its communitarian expression (Giddens 2006; Maclure 2010). Multiculturalism is presented as a “religion” or “secular religion” (Poupart 2015) that recycles the dogmatic logic of Marxism (Bock-Côté 2016a) and is necessarily “communitarian” (Bruckner 2006, 175; Blanchet-Gravel 2013, 28; Bock-Côté 2016b, 209). This point of view likens communitarian multiculturalism to the Ottoman millet system, in which different groups had ethnocultural pillars and their own institutions and lived together more or less peacefully within a land without any provision or encouragement for interaction between the members of the pillars. As we saw in chapter 2, in the 1970s and 1980s, Dutch ethnocultural diversity management policies were also marked by a form of communitarianism. However, communitarian multiculturalism is practically an orphan in theoretical work. Almost no authors promote it (Ivison 2010; Rattansi 2011; Crowder 2013). Frankly, it is very difficult to find a researcher who argues for it. The fantasy that multiculturalism is a dogmatic doctrine – in other words, the description

96

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

of it as strictly an ideological current based on unchallenged and unchallengeable truths about how to manage diversity and as communitarian to boot – therefore overlooks all of the highly diverse theoretical discussions. The merciless critics of the “dogma” dogmatically ignore the theory of what they attack. We will limit our analysis to the four multiculturalism theorists selected in chapter 1, but we have to note that there are considerable differences among them. For example, Parekh’s book Rethinking Multiculturalism (2006 [2000]) was meant partly as a response to Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (1995). Parekh (2006 [2000], 99–108) reproached Kymlicka for choosing a properly “liberal” theory when thinking about multiculturalism. Kymlicka responded immediately and at length (2001). It is interesting to note that between the initial publication of Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship (1995) and that of Parekh’s Rethinking Multiculturalism (2000) and then Kymlicka’s Politics in the Vernacular (2001) and the second, revised edition of Parekh’s book (2006), both authors re-evaluated their own theories and adjusted them in accordance with each other’s criticisms. This can be seen with respect to the relationship between liberalism and Parekh’s multiculturalism as universal pluralism. Parekh ultimately acknowledged: “Since it has a strong commitment to important liberal values, the theory I propose is liberal in its orientation” (2006, 370). Similarly, Kymlicka reacted to Parekh’s criticism by recognizing that founding his theory of multiculturalism on liberalism limits some ethnocultural groups’ power to request differentiated treatment, confining their requests to treatment that would be “acceptable” or “admissible” in the framework of his theory (Kymlicka 2001, 56–66). However, Kymlicka considers this to be a reasonable constraint (2001, 57), and it does not seem to be a target of critics of multiculturalism. Lastly, the criticism of multiculturalism as a dogmatic doctrine can be disarmed by recalling the three currents running through multiculturalism: liberal, civic, and communitarian (Maclure 2010). The normative and conceptual systems that form the bases of the liberal and communitarian currents are just as distant from each other as are liberal multiculturalism (Kymlicka 1995) and “Frenchstyle” secular republicanism (Peña-Ruiz 2005). One cannot call multiculturalism as pluralism a dogmatic doctrine without first engaging in dogmatism.

The Failure of Multiculturalism?

97

Multiculturalism Is Committed to Ethnocultural Fragmentation and to Reducing Each Individual to a Single Cultural Identity

There is a recurring criticism that multiculturalism is committed to fragmenting society and reducing individuals to a single cultural essence. Pascal Bruckner (2006, 145) suggests that “under the cover of respecting cultural or religious differences (the basic credo of multiculturalism), individuals are locked into an ethnic or racial definition.” Similarly, according to Jérôme Blanchet-Gravel, multiculturalism is committed to integral preservation of cultures and leads directly to community fragmentation (2013, 23) in that it inevitably favours ghettoization (2013, 27). Kenan Malik (2010) and Neil Bissoondath (1995) consider that multiculturalism imprisons individuals in cultural and ethnic “boxes.” As we saw in chapter 1, the purpose of Phillips’s book Multiculturalism without Culture (2007) was to face this criticism and refute it. She proposes a theory of multiculturalism that is based expressly on the fact that we must not reify cultures, since they can never legitimately be described as carrying an “essence” that would “determine” human behaviour. Culture has an effect on individual behaviour, so multiculturalism policy must remember that culture is a fundamental attribute of the individual (Phillips 2007, 164), but culturally sensitive policy must always treat the individual as an independent subject and not as an object determined by culture. Phillips therefore proposes a cultural dialogue in which the individual, no matter what his or her cultural belonging, can publicly display his or her disagreement with certain currents in his or her culture. This would give the individual the potential to transform his or her culture “from the inside” (Phillips 2007, 176). Using fairly similar logic, Modood (2013) proposes mechanisms to give individuals “agency to exit” if that is what they want. Parekh (2006) says that cultural dialogue generates a form of cohesion and national unity that all individuals in a society are called upon to participate in. In the forms of cultural dialogue proposed by Phillips, Modood, and Parekh, it is not legitimate or reasonable to appeal to cultural authenticity as grounds for reasonable accommodation or for changes to “public operative values.” As with Rawls’s public reason, only arguments that are accepted as reasonable and legitimate by all can establish a moral claim to special or different treatment.

98

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

This can be given greater nuance by recalling that while Kymlicka’s theory (1995) provides for self-determination rights for minority nations and Indigenous minorities, it also provides for “polyethnic rights” for immigrant minorities. The purpose of polyethnic rights is to foster the integration of immigrant minorities into a societal culture. Therefore, while theorists of multiculturalism do indeed propose special or differentiated rights, they never provide for legislative or political measures that would favour ethnocultural fragmentation and the emergence of “parallel lives” in a society. We should recall the distinction, which is fundamental to Kymlicka, between external protection measures (measures that ensure an egalitarian relationship between minority groups and the majority) and internal constraints (mechanisms for limiting the individual freedom of the members of a given group in the name, specifically, of cultural “essence” or “authenticity”). The purpose of the external protection measures that Kymlicka envisages for each of the three types of minorities (national, immigrant, and Indigenous) is to balance the power relationships in society and, with respect to immigrant minorities especially, to foster integration into a societal culture. However, Kymlicka rejects any form of “internal constraint” that would limit individual freedom in the name of preserving cultural “purity.” The four theorists suggest that, whether through dialogue-based measures or through the integration of immigrant minorities into a given societal culture, multiculturalism aims to limit ethnocultural fragmentation in society. On the empirical level, studies by Graham and Phillips (2007, 160–5) rebut the (nonetheless legitimate) criticisms by showing that in Canada, a country that has adopted official multiculturalism policies (chapter 2), no city has a population made up of “one” ethnocultural immigrant group (Boucher 2016a, 70; Manaï 2015). Therefore, if there is ghettoization, it does not seem to have the amplitude the critics suggest. Moreover, whether on the basis of a liberal premise or as a modus operandi for thinking about cultural dialogue, the four approaches we have discussed categorically reject the idea of reducing individuals to an essential cultural identity when thinking about togetherness.

The Failure of Multiculturalism?

99

Multiculturalism Rejects Common and Universal Values

According to Mathieu Bock-Côté (2016a), multiculturalism is based on the prior obliteration of national culture and aims to neutralize and even deconstruct the very notion of “a convergence culture” (191). Multiculturalism would thus deny its filiation with the universalism of the Western world (Phillips 2013; Poupart 2015). In short, according to many, universalism is the polar opposite of multiculturalism (Blanchet-Gravel 2015, 131). However, the four theories of multiculturalism that form our corpus all claim universality or universalism in their theoretical frameworks. They also all aim to foster the consolidation of common values. To begin with, Kymlicka’s various rights for the three types of minorities are all designed to make the universal values of liberalism operational. The differentiated rights for minority nations and Indigenous minorities are meant to consolidate a societal culture, which is presented as a “context of choice” that is necessary for an individual to fully exercise his or her freedom and individual autonomy (that is to say, broadly, universal liberal values). In other words, the purpose of a societal culture is to generate common values. For immigrant minorities, Kymlicka reserves not differentiated rights, properly speaking, which would lead to such minorities consolidating their own societal cultures, but “polyethnic” rights that are intended to foster integration into a given societal culture. The goal of polyethnic rights is thus to favour social cohesion within a societal culture, which takes the form of a convergence culture. In Parekh’s theory (2006), the ultimate objective of cultural dialogue (owing to the fact that he proposes including all members of society in it) is to lead to the foundation of a common (or shared, as Modood [2013] would say) identity. Parekh suggests that cultural dialogue shapes, revises, and consolidates what he calls public operational values – that is to say, universal values free of direct or consequential ties to a “comprehensive doctrine,” such as liberalism. Complementing Parekh on this point, Modood (2013) proposes that the fundamental role of cultural dialogue is to counterbalance the particularities of a society by the common citizenship that all share. The dialogue must consolidate a conception of inclusive national identity shared by all. Moreover, Modood expressly provides for the contribution of symbolic mechanisms

100

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

(such as citizenship ceremonies) to favour the affective dimension of citizenship so as to foster national cohesion and “transcend” individual differences, yet without denying or diminishing them. This idea was also central to Parekh’s approach when he was leading the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (Runnymede Trust 2002). Lastly, Phillips’s theory of multiculturalism establishes a form of pluralism specifically on universal bases by firmly rejecting moral and cultural relativism. Multiculturalism Carries Moral and Cultural Relativism

The fourth criticism is often linked with one of the other three and is certainly the most common. Since multiculturalism allegedly makes diversity sacred, it would systematically refuse to establish a norm that applies to all (Bock-Côté 2016a, 117). From this, some (cf. Blanchet-Gravel 2013, 59) conclude that multiculturalism would therefore lead directly to relativism, in which all values are morally equal. In Multiculturalism without Culture, Anne Phillips takes Susan Okin’s 1999 book as a starting point. Okin asks: Is multiculturalism bad for women? She suggests that since multiculturalism celebrates cultural diversity, in the end it opens the way to reproduction of non-liberal cultures that “imprison” women in patriarchal cultural practices. Phillips’s central argument is that we should engage in cultural dialogue in which women, and any other individual in a minority position, can express disagreement with any cultural practice whatsoever and bring it before what could be called the deliberative tribunal of cultural dialogue. In short, from Phillips’s perspective, multiculturalism must establish mechanisms and institutions that enable people to exercise their full individual autonomy, which supposes first and foremost the possibility of criticizing certain cultural practices and certain moral precepts of cultural attachments. In a similar manner, Modood (2013) proposes that cultural dialogue be perceived as a continuous moral evaluation process, and Parekh (2006) suggests that the purpose of such dialogue is to challenge the moral principles that some people consider untouchable. Critics who see multiculturalism as carrying a form of moral or cultural relativism generally focus on the idea that multiculturalism is not equipped to criticize or reject religious and cultural practices, including polygamy and physical “mutilation” such as

The Failure of Multiculturalism?

101

clitoridectomy. However, the four authors we discuss all criticize such practices (Parekh 2006, 351). Whether they argue for a societal culture that would generate common values or for establishing a dynamic of public operational values, the fact that these authors reject the idea of a transcendental (moral) truth does not mean that they adhere to relativism. On the contrary, as we have just pointed out, they reject all arguments that are based on the idea of cultural essence or authenticity. They seek instead moral principles that are universally valid and reasonably acceptable to all. In short, respecting moral and human dignity and acknowledging individuals’ more or less strong and singular cultural belonging does not mean tolerating the expression of cultural practices that seek to imprison individuals in a culture and consequently limit their freedom (Maclure and Taylor 2011 [2010], 79–140).

conclusion In his book Enlightenment 2.0, Canadian political philosopher Joseph Heath (2014) provides a deep analysis of the tensions between “reason” and “passion” in contemporary politics. Drawing on analytical philosophy, social anthropology, and social psychology, Heath argues that the political world in which we live in the West is driven by “unreason.” One of the main lines of his argument consists in identifying the discursive logic and arguments of politicians, political parties, and political commentators. He uses examples from the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom to support his theoretical and conceptual analysis (Heath 2014, 9). Heath, who is a philosophy professor at the University of Toronto, says that our political world is feeding on “unreason,” which means it is abandoning scientific theories and reason and constantly appealing to “common sense” to justify courses of action (Heath 2014, 9). The appeal to the unfailing moral authority of common sense would lead to people accepting as legitimate declarations and position-taking that may be false but appear sincere (Heath 2014, 237).8 According to Heath, what is becoming more important in public debates is not the truth of what politicians say but how they present it publicly. In other words, politicians now seek ways to make words resonate with voters on the emotional level and have an impact on their gut feelings (Heath 2014, 238).9 This would be characteristic of the “post-fact era” and “post-factual societies.”

102

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

The political world has simply reproduced a long-standing strategy used in the advertising industry. The idea consists in finding talking points that will speak to people’s intuitions and generate strong emotions (Heath 2014, 242). Once such a talking point has been found, one need only repeat it constantly. Whether or not it is true, it will eventually find a place in the social imaginary. Heath (2014, 240) also insists on the importance of news streaming on television, which makes it possible for skillful politicians to simply place their slogans and statements at the right place and time and leave the media to repeat the message on all their platforms. Social media function in a very similar way. Heath (2014, 6) gives the example of the Canadian federal election campaign in 2008, in which the Conservative Party aggressively criticized the New Democratic Party (ndp ) for supporting a carbon tax even though the ndp had never expressed approval for such a measure at the time. Conservative Party members of Parliament, by repeating ad nauseum on all sorts of platforms that the ndp was in favour of the “job-killing carbon tax,” largely succeeded in associating the carbon tax with the ndp in the social imaginary, even though the ndp ’s political platform officially took distance from it (Heath 2014, 7). It seems legitimate to apply, at least partially, Heath’s analytical framework to political statements about multiculturalism’s failure. To begin with, such statements generally take the form of appeals to “common sense.” British politicians, for example, criticize multiculturalism in this way, and a number of specialists (Giddens 2006; Laborde 2011) have spoken out about the fact that such politicians consciously avoid theoretical discussion of multiculturalism. These politicians present their statements as self-evident and as based on common sense. Heath (2014, 8) says that if a statement requires a long, detailed explanation, then it is not based on common sense. Some statements strongly challenging multiculturalism, such as those of British ministers David Blunkett (2002) and Ruth Kelly, quoted in the Daily Mail (Chapman 2006) (chapter 3), have been made in response to social trauma. Blunkett’s statement looked back on the 2001 riots in three English cities, and his statement that “multiculturalism has the uk sleepwalking into segregation” was copiously quoted in the media (bbc 2005) and seems to have been inspired by the observation by Ted Cantle (author of the Cantle Report on the 2001 riots: Community Cohesion: Report of the Independent

The Failure of Multiculturalism?

103

Review Team, Home Office 2001) that “parallel lives” were emerging in British society. However, Cantle’s analysis is much more finely nuanced, and it does not insinuate that multiculturalism is the direct cause but that the problem lies more in the lack of social interaction between ethnocultural groups (Modood 2010, 120). Cantle (2012) is also the author of a major theoretical work on interculturalism (see chapter 7), in which he proposes mechanisms for thinking about cultural dialogue in major European cities. Ruth Kelly’s response (quoted in the Daily Mail [Chapman 2006]) to the 2005 bomb attacks in the London Underground was based on thinking similar to Blunkett’s. This seems to indicate that Heath’s analysis (2014) is quite accurate. Rather than elaborating at length on the object of their criticism, such politicians focus on a striking catchphrase that draws much more on common sense than on rigorous scientific explanation. The talking point is then repeated in various ways, and the (social) media naturally relay it in the news. It seems that this analysis is also applicable to Cameron’s famous statement (2011) concerning state multiculturalism’s failure in the United Kingdom, which he made at a conference on international security in Munich. A few weeks prior, German Chancellor Angela Merkel had declared in front of members of her political party that state multiculturalism had utterly failed in Germany (Weaver 2010). Cameron was standing beside her when he made his statement. In the days that followed, similar statements were made by Nicolas Sarkozy in France (Figaro [Le] 2011) and by Maxime Verhagen in the Netherlands (Dutch News 2011). Since neither Germany nor France have formally implemented policies based on multiculturalism, these politicians’ statements were therefore at least partly motivated by the goal of playing to people’s gut instincts and strong emotions. In the end, these statements helped to make “the failure of multiculturalism” common sense knowledge that is accepted without question. In line with Heath’s thesis (2014), scientific “corrections” and theoretical explanations seem superficial to many, since “common sense knowledge” on the issue has already been established and shared. Should we conclude that rigorous, in-depth analysis is futile? Has not common sense already won the social imaginary? Not necessarily. After coming this far in our work, it would be truly discouraging to draw such a conclusion! On one hand, as Heath (2014) strongly argues, our instincts are insufficient to deal with social and political

104

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

problems, in particular those related to togetherness. We therefore have to insist on “reason” to point out instinct’s weaknesses and dead ends. In the present work, we must therefore also repeat the importance of distinguishing, in debates on multiculturalism and interculturalism, between (a) factual assessment of ethnocultural diversity, (b) institutional embodiment of public multiculturalism or interculturalism policy, (c) the ideological conception or social imaginary of multiculturalism or interculturalism in some countries, and (d) theoretical and normative constructions that propose ways of managing such ethnocultural diversity. By contributing in this way to identifying the themes in the debates and by clarifying the underlying concepts, we can hope to bring our political debates back to health (Heath 2014) and bring reason back to consideration of the stakes involved in togetherness (Maclure 2016). It is also by systematically and empirically observing the state and evolution of public policy on multiculturalism that we will be in a legitimate position to counter false statements (even though they may, we suppose, be sincere) by politicians about the failure of or withdrawal from multiculturalism policies. Chapters 1 to 3 provide insight into the emotional weight of the term “multiculturalism” in European imaginaries. In Europe, it seems to be reduced to its communitarian dimension and to apply only to immigrant minorities. Interestingly, there seems to be a proposal that integration policies would be able to succeed where multiculturalism policies have failed, even though such policies ultimately refer to theoretical and normative systems that can just as easily be complementary as contradictory. In the end, perhaps it is the discursive expression of multiculturalism that has failed and not its underlying normative logic (Kymlicka 2016). We have to go back briefly to the main criticisms of multiculturalism as pluralism in public debate. It seems that the repeated, widespread expression of these criticisms of multiculturalism belongs, in a way, to a form of political unreason. In-depth theoretical examination of the subject matter is more or less systematically eliminated and replaced by catchphrases that resonate on the emotional level and claim to be common sense: “multiculturalism is based on the inversion of the duty to integrate” (Bock-Côté 2014 [translation]); “multiculturalism is self-hate” (Blanchet-Gravel 2013, 20 [translation ]); “multiculturalism is racism that thinks it is antiracist” (Provencher 2012 [translation ]); “multiculturalism is a

The Failure of Multiculturalism?

105

tragedy” (Scheffer 2000 [translation ]); etc. Naturally, this does not mean that criticizing multiculturalism is in vain. On the contrary, without critical examination, there will be no advances in dealing with the challenges of pluralism in the era of complex societies. To contribute to these debates in an insightful and constructive manner, we must demonstrate hermeneutic generosity with respect to our opponents. This means taking seriously alignment between statements and facts, rhetorical rigor and logical consistency (Maclure 2016, 253). Similarly, while criticism of multiculturalism focuses not on the theoretical and normative construction of pluralism but on its political impact, it is nonetheless necessary to base one’s arguments on rigorous, empirical studies before hastily jumping to alarming conclusions. In this sense, the fact that theorists of multiculturalism provide answers to the four criticisms does not mean that those criticisms are not legitimate in themselves. If the feared political impact occurs, the theorists of pluralism must review and update their theories. Lastly, in coming years, the debates around togetherness will certainly be at the heart of the concerns of liberal democratic societies as they become more diverse. The challenges of pluralism in the time of complex societies are likely to leave a deep mark on the political landscape in the twenty-first century. The first part of this book has been limited to discussing the challenges involved in managing diversity resulting from immigration. In the second part, we will look at a dimension that is equally fundamental: challenges in managing societal diversity, which are mainly related to the cohabitation of different partners in a political association. One major difficulty consists in thinking about means of living together that are fair and reasonable to all in the sociopolitical context of a minority nation that is a minority partner in a multinational state but is also a majority with respect to its own internal diversity. The analytical categories and literature used in the first part will provide theoretical and conceptual foundations for deepening our thought on the challenge of pluralism in the time of complex societies. Political authorities must adopt policies to manage ethnocultural diversity as it constantly becomes more complex. In this context, common sense has its limits, as does theoretical and scientific reflection. However, experts must not speak to an “empty chair” in the social debates on this issue (Maclure 2016, 27). There is considerable social polarization, and political scientists and analytical

106

On Managing Immigrant Diversity

political philosophers have a responsibility to take part in the debate, although their role is not to replace legislators. As humble as it may be, their function, which is fundamental to healthy political life, is to inform debate and point out sophistry and logical fallacies. Their role is also to propose solutions to political deadlocks and provide new avenues of thought when faced with the indignation we feel when we see social injustice. The polarization of opinion on how to live together is not a problem in itself. It would be much more worrisome if there were none. We would be wise to remember the teachings of philosopher Karl Popper, according to whom we advance knowledge by testing ideas. The only way for us to move ahead together is if we continue to “make society,” with all the debates and stakes that inevitably entails.

pa rt t wo

On Managing Societal Diversity In part two, we will look at how one should take pluralism seriously but from an angle that is slightly different from the one we have taken so far. While the first four chapters focus mainly on the challenges of managing diversity resulting from immigration in host societies, the chapters that follow explore the concepts and theories of managing “societal” diversity in multinational democracies. This will lead us to an argument about the appropriate normative rationale for achieving togetherness in a multinational federation – or in a multinational state that internalized some kind of a federal dynamic. In other words, we will look in particular at the conditions for the aspirations of several nations to coexist harmoniously within a single sovereign state. For this, our main case study will be the Canadian federation, which celebrated its 150th anniversary as a modern federal body in 2017 – that is to say, 150 years after the passage of the British North America Act: Canada’s Constitution Act, 1867. Not only is the Canadian federation the country where I live and of which I am a citizen, but it is also a textbook example of a “complex society” (Gagnon and Tully 2001). From a sociological perspective, Canada is indeed a case of “strange multiplicity,” as James Tully points out. Canada’s territory is divided into ten provinces and three territories, but it also contains a Englishspeaking majority nation, a Quebec minority nation concentrated in the Province of Quebec, more than 600 Indigenous communities that can be grouped into some sixty national communities

108

On Managing Societal Diversity

scattered across the whole country, an English-speaking national minority located in the Province of Quebec, a (national) Acadian population concentrated mainly in the Province of New Brunswick, and a French-speaking community scattered throughout a number of provinces. In addition, according to Vézina (2014; 2018), there is another minority nation located on the island of Newfoundland. To varying degrees, all these minorities have, or seek to have, a (more or less developed) societal culture so that they can “make society” (Thériault 2007) through their own institutions and enjoy a form of self-government and self-determination. This is precisely what characterizes these groups as subjects of societal diversity: they aspire to “make society” and not to integrate into one that encompasses them. In this sense, this kind of diversity creates challenges for pluralism that are different from those generated by diversity resulting from immigration. Our goal will be to identify legitimate, reasonable conditions that make it possible for deep societal diversity to coexist harmoniously within a single state. Naturally, these few pages are insufficient to cover all the challenges raised by societal diversity in a satisfactory manner, if only because we are limiting our investigation to the Canadian federation. In the chapters that follow, we will therefore restrict ourselves to the challenges facing harmonious coexistence of minority nations and Indigenous Peoples in a multinational federation. The focus will be on Quebec, the Indigenous nations, and the broader Canadian federation. However, our reflections and conclusions are intended to be instructive and pertinent to other similar cases.

5

Fragile Nations in Multinational Democracies

A little over twenty-five years ago, in 1995, Anthony D. Smith established the scientific journal Nations and Nationalism (Smith et al. 1995). Its pages have since been filled largely with discussions by modernists, primordialists, and ethnosymbolists aiming to better understand and explain nationalism, and the vast majority of the leading theories of nations and nationalism were presented, discussed, and criticized in the journal. Notably, discussions concerned the works of Tom Nairn (1977), John Breuilly (1982), Eric J. Hobsbawm (1990), Ernest Gellner (2008 [1983]), Benedict Anderson (2006), Miroslav Hroch (1996), Anthony D. Smith (1995), Michael Billig (1995), Craig Calhoun (1997), and Rogers Brubaker (2004a), along with many others. Primordialism, modernism, and ethnosymbolism are the three main schools of thought that were developed in the twentieth century to make sense of nations and forms of nationalism. Primordialism, which has largely been abandoned by contemporary researchers, is the point of view that nations are natural, transhistorical, universal unities dividing the human species (Özkirimli 2010, 49). Of course, those who hold primordialism recognize that nations have not always been as they are now, but they reject the idea that modernity and industrialization are what gave birth to nations. Peter van den Berghe (1987) is clearly a proponent of this approach, but, to different degrees, so are Edward Shils (1957) and Clifford Geertz (1973). In contrast, modernism, which strongly rejects the primordialist approach, especially Berghe’s sociobiological approach (1987), argues that nations and nationalism are the by-products of modernity or, more precisely, the consequences of

110

On Managing Societal Diversity

uniquely modern social phenomena such as capitalism, industrialization, urbanization, secularization of societies, and implementation of sophisticated bureaucratic mechanisms (Özkirimli 2010, 72). According to Ernest Gellner’s theory (2008 [1983], 1), nationalism “is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent” so that the nation’s “high culture” can encompass all ethnocultural variations within its territory. Other than Gellner, the most influential modernist authors are without a doubt Benedict Anderson (2006) and Miroslav Hroch (1996). Lastly, a third general theory has been proposed by Anthony D. Smith (1995), and it is known broadly as ethnosymbolism. Smith’s theory is intended as a critical response to what he perceives as the inadequacies and blind spots of both the primordialist and the modernist paradigms. Ethnosymbolism is characterized essentially as the idea that the study of nations and nationalism has to be done over the longue durée (long term) in order to understand and explain both the historical continuity and the symbolism, a form of continuity that starts in “ethnies”1 and ends in the modern era with nations and nationalism (Özkirimli 2010, 143). Smith suggests that institutions and objective data are not the only explanatory variables that should be considered when studying nations and nationalism. More subjective aspects should also be examined, such as traditions, values, myths, and political imaginaries. In Quebec, Gérard Bouchard’s work (1999; 2000; 2012; 2013; 2016; 2019) suggests that he is a proponent of this school of thought. In this rich literature, states that do not aim, or no longer aim, to have their borders match a nation’s boundaries are generally seen as accidents of modern history (Anderson 2006; Gellner 2008 [1983]). Minority nationalisms in complex sovereign states are often seen as backward expressions of ethnic communities that aspire to make the nation’s boundaries congruent with those of a new state (Trudeau 1967; Hobsbawm 1990; Ignatieff 1993; Kedourie 1994 [1960]). This interpretation is above all characteristic of rigid application of the modernist theoretical framework and is therefore not very hospitable to the aspirations of minority national communities (see Mathieu and Bodet 2019). However, when compared with other approaches, ethnosymbolism seems to offer a more encompassing analytical framework. Before going further and exploring “fragile nations” (the concept at the heart of this chapter), we shall first define what we mean by

Fragile Nations in Multinational Democracies

111

the “nation” and “nationalism.” While this is a perilous task due to the sheer number of definitions that appear in the literature (see Guénette and Mathieu 2018), Université Laval Emeritus Professor Louis Balthazar has come up with some broad, relevant definitions. In Nouveau bilan du nationalism au Québec, Balthazar proposes that a nation is “a group of people who, beyond basic units such as family, clan or tribe, agree to live together within a specific territory and share a certain number of values, habits, memories and aspirations, speak the same language (usually) and are governed by a political organization” (2013, 23 [translation ]). He also proposes that nationalism is “a movement that prioritizes belonging to the nation and fighting for better recognition of the nation to which one belongs” (2013, 22 [translation ]). This means that nations need not be sovereign or majoritarian to be legitimate and, equally, that nationalism can flourish in the heart of a multinational state. These definitions are useful because they make it easy to understand that nationalism is not necessarily in opposition to liberalism – although, obviously, it can be. In the following pages, we will be exploring mainly the idea of a form of liberal nationalism (Tamir 1995; Kymlicka 1995; Gagnon 2008; Kennedy 2013). Echoing in a way Johann Gottfried von Herder’s philosophy, national liberalism or liberal nationalism2 can be understood as an adaptation of the individualistic and rationalistic promises of the Enlightenment, taking into account the necessary particular anchorage (the societal or national attachment) of individuals in the attainment of the ideals of liberalism and political modernity. That is why some authors refer to it as “liberalism II” (Requejo 2009; see also Mathieu 2021). In the 1990s, Yael Tamir published a landmark book with the evocative title Liberal Nationalism. According to her, liberal nationalism is based on two assumptions: (1) first, that nationalism is indeed the source of action of the most devastating political regimes of the twentieth century but that it has also inspired some of the most glorious and blissful moments of humanity. It is therefore not an “evil” in itself. Moreover, (2) to recognize and ensure the effectiveness of individual rights and freedoms, it appears necessary to affirm the equal consideration of all and to limit the power of the state, controlled by a national community, in imposing a conception of the good life on all its members (Tamir 1995, 5–6). Otherwise put, within the theoretical construction of liberal nationalism, “individuals no longer

112

On Managing Societal Diversity

disappear behind [national] mobilization; they keep their choices, control the extent of their loyalty and reject any assertion of social and cultural homogenization that involves the disappearance of strong protective pluralism in favour of a unique culture with which the entire nation would identify” (Hermet et al. 2015, 203 [translation]). The nation is nonetheless an important structuring element because it allows the individual to enjoy democratic rights and freedoms by providing the political and institutional framework – a societal culture – that gives an individual a true “context of choice” (Kymlicka 1995, 82–4). In the words of Yael Tamir: “Outside such communities they [the individuals] cannot develop a language and a culture, or set themselves aims. Their lives become meaningless; there is no substance to their reflection, no set of norms and values in light of which they can make choices and become the free, autonomous persons that liberals assume them to be” (1995, 7). The arguments that will be presented in this chapter and the following are grounded in this theoretical and normative approach. That said, a rich, diverse body of literature on nations and nationalism has developed over the course of the past three decades. Some of it pays special attention to minority nations, which, in the context of multinational democracies, have been defined as “small nations” (Kundera 2005; Cardinal and Papillon 2011), “small peoples” (Abulof 2009), “stateless nations” (Keating 1997a; Guibernau 1999), and even “region states” (Ohmae 1993; 1995). Each of these concepts is pertinent in some ways and limited in others. For example, the small nation/small people pair allows a precise understanding of the “psychology” (Kundera 2005) and “morality” (Abulof 2009; 2015) of the “small” when they are compared with the historical narratives of “Great” or “powerful” nations (Greenfeld 1993). In other words, these concepts provide a theoretical and conceptual framework for exploring the subjective elements that interested Anthony D. Smith. That said, the concept of “small nation” is limited in its capacity to account for the nature of the political system in which such national “smallness” occurs, putting sovereign countries (for example, Poland and Israel) on an equal footing with minority nations (for example, Quebec and Catalonia) and even national minorities (for example, Afrikaners and AngloQuebecers) (Abulof 2015). When it comes to the concept of “stateless nations,” while the difference between nations that are sovereign and those that are not is clearly delineated, there is a tendency to

Fragile Nations in Multinational Democracies

113

hide the fact that a minority nation such as Quebec has considerable state and institutional mechanisms – despite the fact that it shares its sovereignty with the other partners constituting the Canadian federal system. Finally, the concept of “region state” harkens back to Kenichi Ohmae’s discussion (1995), since it refers to a system of autonomous economic institutions that are more or less developed and that maintain links with other (infra- and supranational) circles of governance. This would expand the investigation to vastly different communities that do not necessarily consider themselves nations (Ohmae 1993; Cardinal and Papillon 2011). In this chapter, we suggest defining minority nations in multinational democracies as “fragile nations.” Indigenous nations may not be consolidated territorially and are organized differently, but it seems necessary to consider them as fragile nations, especially those that are now are living in the Canadian federation. We should nonetheless distinguish Quebec as a fragile minority nation (we will sometimes refer to it simply as a fragile nation) from Indigenous peoples, which form “fragile Indigenous nations.” Our postulate is that the concept of fragile nation can both reconcile and go beyond the concepts in the literature that we discussed above. More precisely, it allows us to understand the complex reality of minority nations with respect to both their subjective dimensions (sociopolitical myths and the psychology of the small) and their objective dimensions (limited ability to develop institutions to self-govern). Naturally, when a concept has both practical/ subjective and analytical/objective dimensions, there can be a certain amount of terminological ambiguity (Brubaker and Cooper 2000), but this concept still allows us to understand a social phenomenon with characteristics that manifest in different ways (Dufour 2015, 362–3). Also, the “fragile nation” conceptual framework is easier to use in empirical studies than the notion more often employed in the literature – that of “small nation.” Finally, we recognize, of course, that a majority nation holding its own sovereign state can also feel a certain existential “fragility” (Bibo 1993; Abulof 2015). This is particularly what Milan Kundera (2005) means when he discusses cases of “small nations” (see also Zubrzycki 2006; 2016). This fragility can also affect well-established sovereign nations that evolve, for example, within a supranational organization such as the European Union. While this other form of national fragility deserves further research, their study is beyond the scope of this book. Readers

114

On Managing Societal Diversity

interested in the issues surrounding small nations – both sovereign and non-sovereign – are encouraged to read the recent edited volume of Laniel and Thériault (2020). In this chapter, we will use Quebec as a test case of a fragile nation, and in the next chapter, we will return in greater detail to the experience of Indigenous nations in Canada. We should also note that the conclusions we will arrive at can be useful when comparing nations with significantly similar experiences – for example, the Scottish, Welsh, Catalan, Basque, Corsican, Flemish, South Tyrolean, PuertoRican, etc. national communities. These are fragile nations – that is, minority nations evolving in multinational democracies. We will begin by exploring the relevance of the subjective dimension of the fragile nation concept. This will allow us to interpret the meaning of the sociopolitical myths that guide the actions and reflections of social actors who claim to belong to a minority nation in a multinational context – specifically with respect to Quebec. We will then briefly present the analytical framework that will permit us to operationalize and interpret the relative institutional fragility of minority nations. This analytical framework will be further developed in the next chapter. The next step will be a brief discussion of the different understandings of fragile nations in relation to federations and federalism in the literature. Finally, after rejecting the territorial and unitary conception of federalism in favour of a properly multinational approach, we will take the writings of philosopher Bhikhu Parekh (chapter 1) as a foundation for determining the optimal method for analyzing what the Canadian federation is and what it should become or, in other words, what we call “federal impetus” in a multinational democracy.

the subjective dimension of fragile nations Furthering the work of Pierre Bourdieu, Brubaker and Cooper (2005, 62) argue that when the “practical” or “subjective” dimension of a concept is used, reference is being made to its “spoken” form and that this is usually found in the ordinary everyday language of social agents. Political actors also generally use the practical dimension of concepts. However, when a concept is a practical or subjective category, it is often difficult to operationalize (Brubaker 2004b, 16): its contours are porous, even changeable, its scope is more or less defined, and its manifestations are irregular. For this

Fragile Nations in Multinational Democracies

115

reason, Brubaker (2004b, 22; Brubaker and Cooper 2005) suggests that researchers avoid studying the practical expression of a social phenomenon and instead focus on its analytical categories. In this way, they can avoid “reproducing” or even “reinforcing” the object of the study when they are analyzing it. While Brubaker’s arguments need to be kept in mind, we suggest that, on the contrary, analysis in the social sciences can be reconciled very well with normative understanding by examining questions of equity and social justice through the intermediary of a theoretical and analytical framework (Van Parijs 1991; Maclure 2013; Gagnon 2014). While the study of a social phenomenon has proper analytical foundations, there is no real drawback in it being accompanied by normative reasoning, nearing a “practical” or “subjective” category. At the very least, this belief guides our current analysis. We will begin by looking at the fragility of nations from the perspective of what Alain-G. Gagnon calls the “age of uncertainties” with respect to the development and emancipation of minority nations. According to Gagnon (2014), this age (characterized primarily by the creation of a global economic market and by the Americanization of cultures, the decline of civic engagement, and the social atomization of the individual) is a real threat to the survival of the cultures and identities of minority nations. The concept of “fragile nation” thus refers to minority nations that, while being in a majority position in a given territory or context, are seen as minorities by social and political actors when compared with other social and political forces – generally the dominant and majority national community that controls state power (Rocher 2012a; Mylonas 2013). To paraphrase Milan Kundera, social actors who claim membership in a fragile nation do not see the existence of their nation as “a self-evident certainty but always a question, a wager, a risk” (Kundera 2007, 28). On the contrary, Kundera (2007, 29) points out that when citizens of “Great nations” think symbolically about the political community they belong to, they have only ideas of “grandeur” and “eternity.” The subjective dimension of a nation’s fragility is expressed through the everyday language of social actors, which is used to frame an existential fear of possible and potential disappearance of that national community. In short, social and political actors who feel they belong to a fragile nation have the impression that very little of their specific national experience will make its way into the pages of history and, consequently, they fear it will not last.

116

On Managing Societal Diversity

In this regard, the ordinary language of social and political actors in Quebec reveals special sensitivity to the practical dimension of the fragile nation concept (cf. Létourneau 2014). In his extensive study of the dynamics of collective imaginaries, with the goal of determining the symbolic landmarks that collectivities use to situate themselves in time and space, Gérard Bouchard (2013; 2014) performs an informed and well-supported analysis of the founding social and national myths of Quebecers, which he says take shape precisely in the ordinary language of social actors (Bouchard 2013, 2) – in the individual and collective consciousness of Quebecers, as Marcel Rioux (1968) would say. These myths and imaginaries seem to correspond fairly closely to the “subjective” aspect of the concept of fragile nation in Quebec’s case. It is pertinent to take a second look at what Bouchard calls the two “master myths” of the Quebec imaginary. The first is the myth of the “colonized.” Its lexical field includes “collective oppression,” “humiliation,” “exploitation,” and, more broadly, expressions of the feeling of being in a “state of dependency” (Bouchard 2013, 7). Whether it takes the form of the expressive “a people born for second best”3 or even Pierre Vallières’s “white n****** of America,” this myth has its roots in the image of a nation that has been colonized and dominated by sociopolitical forces, as much external (first the French Empire, then the British Empire, followed by English Canada, and even “American capitalism” [Bouchard 2013, 7]) as internal (the Catholic Church in Quebec before 1960 [Bouchard 2013, 7; Mathieu and Laforest 2016]). In contrast, from Louis Cyr and Maurice “Rocket” Richard to Alexis le Trotteur and Céline Dion, social actors in Quebec have used the first master myth as a springboard to celebrate many stories, tales, and legends in which there is a Quebecer able to overcome this fragility (Ouellette and Vézina 2009). Nonetheless, it is still the case that the narrative driving this self-representation involves a feeling of existential fragility. The second master myth identified by Bouchard refers more directly to the state of a fragile cultural minority threatened with disappearance (Bouchard 2013, 10). This is the myth of “survival.” It is the symbolic expression of the “demographic miracle” of a small French Catholic community in the middle of an Anglo-Saxon sea. It is the incarnation of the Belles histoires des pays d’en haut – that is to say, the idea of a people who must rely on themselves, their traditions, and the land of their ancestors to survive. To borrow again

Fragile Nations in Multinational Democracies

117

from Marcel Rioux, the myth of survival in the Quebec imaginary corresponds to the collective duty to preserve the “sacred heritage” – the Catholic religion, the French language, traditions, and customs – passed down by their ancestors so that they can in turn pass it on “intact” to their descendants (Rioux 1968). In fact, the emergence of ethnology as a discipline in Frenchspeaking North America, which the Université Laval helped to pioneer, was motivated by such nationalism and the myth of survival (Bergeron 2005, 29). It was when he heard the alarm bell of danger to the speaking of French and in a context of fear, linked to gaining awareness of French fragility in North America, that Luc Lacourcière started drawing the blueprint for a chair in folklore and archives, which saw the light of day in 1944 at Université Laval (Bricault, Desdouits, and Sarny 2004, 28). It can even be argued that the museums that emerged in Quebec during the twentieth century were part of the national symbolic storyline in which, facing an uncertain future, action was taken to reappropriate and document cultural traditions (Bergeron 2005, 17; see also Bricault et al. 2004, 26). It was also “this desire for survival that, in 1973, drove the Quebec government, and more specifically Esdras Minville, technical adviser for the Ministry of Municipal Affairs, Industry and Commerce, to establish ‘a team of researchers tasked with travelling throughout Quebec documenting cultural and industrial riches’” (Bergeron 2005, 19 [translation ]; see also Genest 2002, 50). To summarize, it can be argued that the subjective dimension of the concept of fragile nation manifests through the medium of awareness of a fragile, or, rather, uncertain, national destiny (Carlà 2007; Gagnon 2014). At the end of an important empirical study on Quebec imaginaries, Jocelyn Létourneau states that when “young people are building their first systematic vision and version of their society’s past, a sort of historical bible they will potentially rely on throughout their entire lives, between forty and fifty percent of them think of Quebec’s experience as a path that is broken, impeded, damaged or shortened, and in any case disturbed and frustrated” (Létourneau 2014, 52 [translation ]). Nonetheless, the ordinary – banal or mundane (Billig 1995) – sense of fragility felt by a national minority community must not be seen as inevitably fatal but more as a major hurdle that complex democracies must learn to manage and overcome. While we do not test empirically this analytical framework of the subjective dimension

118

On Managing Societal Diversity

of national fragility in this chapter, it should be apparent that the framework can apply just as easily to the cases of Indigenous nations and cases significantly similar to that of Quebec, such as, notably, Scotland, Catalonia, and South Tyrol (Mathieu and Guénette 2017; 2018). When we look at the Gradual Enfranchisement Act, 1869, the Indian Act, 1876, the Indian Act 1880, the Indian Advancement Act, 1884, and the Indian Act that was consolidated over the course of the twentieth century and, more broadly, the residential school system with the purpose of assimilation, Indigenous Peoples have suffered major historical traumas that have created what is without question an imaginary of fragility (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada 2015). Jean-Olivier Roy’s doctoral thesis (2015) provides a very thorough analysis of this. In continuity with theoretical work by Kymlicka (1995) and Bouchard (2012), it nonetheless seems possible to limit the characteristic effects of the “psychology of the small” felt by actors in the political contexts of fragile nations by stabilizing the institutional and symbolic foundations of their local national citizenship aspirations. The concept of fragile nation also has a dimension that is properly “analytical” and “objective,” and it concerns the relative power that minority and Indigenous nations in multinational democracies have to institutionalize their societal cultures autonomously.

the objective dimension of fragile nations As we mentioned earlier, we are using “fragile nations” here to refer to minority nations in multinational democracies. We are also using the term more broadly when discussing Indigenous nations. While the “practical” category of the fragile nation concept concerns the subjective dimensions (myths, imaginaries, social representations) of fragility, its “analytical” category (Brubaker (2005, 18) instead deals more with the objective dimensions (institutions, jurisdictions established under a specific constitutional order). Minority nations are more fragile than sovereign or majority nations because they usually lack some of the legal and constitutional anchorage needed to protect and consolidate their distinct societal cultures. Again, the societal culture of a political community comprises the social, political, and legal institutions that allow it to “make society,” which means to foster fair, democratic civic life and to make it possible to live together peacefully. Will Kymlicka (1995, 34) suggests that a

Fragile Nations in Multinational Democracies

119

societal culture is generally expressed in a specific language, since it is territorially concentrated in a precise, defined space. These two characteristics are aspects of minority nations, but most often they nowadays partly escape Indigenous Peoples. Indigenous Peoples have their own specific vernacular languages and territory-based institutional focal points (“Indian reserves”4 and municipalities) where many First Nations, Inuit, and Métis people live in Canada. Nonetheless, these Indigenous communities and reserves are usually too small in terms of both area and population to be able to establish a societal culture with a level of institutional development similar to that of Quebec, for example. Furthermore, the population of a given national Indigenous community is often fragmented across multiple reserves and/or municipalities that can be distant from one another. Consequently, generally, it seems difficult to describe societal cultures on “reserves” – or, in the case of the Inuit, in municipalities – in terms of “global societies” (Dumont 1962) or, in other words, as societal cultures that have the institutions necessary for self-government of their own society, culture, and politics (Langlois 1991). A promising approach to adapt and to being able to do just this could be to establish common institutions shared by Indigenous communities that, while they may be distant from one another, could work together toward this goal while remaining independent. In the next chapter, we will explore this idea in greater detail by developing the concept of “multiscalar societal cultures” in relationship to Indigenous Peoples. Returning to the case of minority nations like Quebec, is there a minimal level of institutionalization that a fragile nation needs to maintain with respect to its societal culture so that, in a multinational democracy, it is possible to foster an authentic “context of choice” for its members and, consequently, a context that is hospitable to the coexistence of different national aspirations? Answering this question would require an in-depth, comparative study that goes beyond the scope of this book (see Mathieu 2021). Furthermore, it is far from clear that there is only “one” minimal level of societal culture institutionalization universally valid for all minority nations to overcome and manage their relative fragility. The context is crucial. Nonetheless, it seems possible, for now, to identify the significant institutional foundations that would allow a territorially concentrated minority nation to develop an autonomous, dynamic societal culture, hence giving it the necessary tools to deal with its relative sense of fragility. With regard to this, the institutional foundations

120

On Managing Societal Diversity

for the emancipation of fragile Indigenous nations will be different because their societal cultures may be better understood as being “multiscalar” – i.e., they are not territorially concentrated within one single delineated space. We will discuss this in greater depth in the next chapter.5 To understand the combination of institutional foundations that would allow the societal culture of a fragile nation to develop, I suggest we model our analysis on the capability approach to real social justice for individuals (Sen 2012, 52–74; Nussbaum 2011). Sen (2012, 254–63) and Nussbaum (2011) criticize the theories that are built upon an ideal set of principles of justice (Rawls 1971). They instead propose a list of “capabilities” – such as having access to basic hygiene and personal freedom (Nussbaum 2011, 17–46). According to them, such capabilities allow us think about the nonideal conditions that an individual would require to be able to live in dignity. The list of capabilities, which Nussbaum (2011, 17) claims averages ten in number, is not organized in a numerical or hierarchical manner. Each element is intrinsically complementary and interconnected with the others. Similarly, the most significant institutional foundations for the development of the societal culture of a territorially concentrated fragile nation that we are identifying in the following pages – and will develop further in the next chapter – are meant to be complementary. These foundations form a “whole” that takes different forms depending on the context. Usually, minority nations demand to have access to these institutional pillars, since they are rightfully perceived as key tools for their national collective empowerment. The underlying purpose of this approach is to recognize institutional arrangements that would foster greater democratic autonomy for the societal culture of a minority nation, expressly taking into account the context in which said fragile national community evolves. We believe these foundations are also the point of departure for thinking about the conditions for legitimate, fair togetherness in a multinational democracy. The objective dimension of the concept of fragile nation corresponds to the analytical framework that we will establish to measure and then compare the legal and constitutional capacity of fragile nations to develop their societal cultures autonomously. The identification and justification of the variables relevant to this is based a priori on a coherent set of normative principles grounded in liberal

Fragile Nations in Multinational Democracies

121

nationalism that aim to encourage legitimate, fair togetherness that is acceptable to all in a multinational context. More broadly, this analytical framework corresponds to the conceptual and methodological underpinnings of the Societal Culture Index (sci ).6 According to Ronald Watts (1996, 2), comparison based on this type of standardized index can identify existing stable arrangements that seem reasonable for all members of a multinational state. Furthermore, it can help to identify recurring issues that seem to lead to impasse or domination rather than cohabitation of a majority nation with one or more minority national communities. A pluralist dynamic that is hospitable to deep societal diversity must necessarily reject domination (Tully 1996, 17; Taylor 1992; Gagnon and Mathieu 2020). While we will not perform a comparative study of various minority nations here, understanding the theoretical foundations of such an analytical framework is needed to study the Quebec–Canada relationship and Quebec’s capacity to develop its institutions within the Canadian federal system. Following the analytical framework of the Societal Culture Index, the concept of fragile nation reveals six legal-constitutional foundations or conditions (chapter 6) that seem fundamental (a) for a territorially concentrated minority nation to develop a dynamic, autonomous societal culture in a multinational democracy and (b) for the multinational state to truly welcome and embrace its internal societal diversity. These legal-constitutional conditions are (1) national recognition, (2) language rights, (3) immigration and integration powers, (4) fiscal autonomy, (5) internal self-determination, and (6) external self-determination. Based on similar, though different, institutional considerations, the Indigenous variant of the concept of fragile nation makes it possible to propose a reconfiguration of the Canadian federation’s constitutional order so that it can evolve in a manner that allows multiscalar Indigenous societal cultures to develop and consolidate. Following this normative rationale, reforming Canada’s constitutional order would involve (1) introducing a new or “third” order of government, (2) enshrining the treaties signed with Indigenous groups in the Constitution of Canada (treaty federalism), (3) developing deeper asymmetric federalism tied to the “personal principle” benefitting Indigenous groups (Bauer 2000 [1924]; Renner 2005) and (4) reconfiguring, in consequence, the role of the Assembly of First Nations.7

122

On Managing Societal Diversity

These are institutional arrangements, and the first draft of a proposal to reconfigure the constitutional order that multinational federations like Canada – and multinational states that have a federal or federalizing dynamic (Palermo 2008, 43) – should offer minority nations within their borders if they wish to live up to the principles of pluralistic cohabitation rather than those of monist domination (Gagnon and Tully 2001; Gagnon and Mathieu 2020). At the very least, this would amount to a constitutional architecture that can alleviate minority nations’ relative fragility. In the next chapter, we will make these legal-constitutional conditions operational and make clear the extent of the proposed reconfiguration of Canada’s constitutional order. For now, we need to go back over the different approaches in the literature in order to grasp the complexity of federalism and federations. We will then use the writings of philosopher Bhikhu Parekh as a springboard for identifying an optimal line of reasoning about the present and future of the Canadian federation – namely, a line of reasoning we describe as the “federal impetus” that should guide multinational democracies.

federation and federalism: territorial and multinational logic As our world and societies constantly become more complex, federalism seems like a promising avenue for the future (Gagnon 2008, 17; 2014). As Wayne Norman (2006, 74) has noted, for example, there are at least four times more territorially based nations driven by a more or less strong desire for a form of self-government than there are sovereign states. The fact that each of these national communities could have its own state seems simply impracticable, and such a proposal seems to have the support of practically no serious researchers. Nonetheless, while “federal culture” (Gagnon 2008, 159–60), or what we will refer to as “federal impetus,” is promising as a means of living together harmoniously and in a way that is hospitable to all others in multinational states, federalism per se is not necessarily so. In the imaginaries and in literature, the flagship model of a federation – which reflects and projects the idea of federalism throughout the whole world – is the United States (Kymlicka 2009, 28; Requejo 2009; Hueglin 2013, 187): a territorially based federation. In short, a territorial federation generally consists of a mononational political community that, to “make society” and in the spirit

Fragile Nations in Multinational Democracies

123

of effectiveness and efficient governance, divides its territory into various administrative parts responsible for organizing local and regional affairs. Naturally, this leads the territorial federation to develop a conception of federal culture that treats all components of the federation in the same way, under the assumption that more or less substantial exercise of local citizenship will have no significant repercussions on individuals’ actualization and dignity as citizens (Gagnon 2008, 16). In Daniel Elazar’s (1987, 66) terms, territorial federalism promotes a “consolidated” conception of political unity, in which an attempt is made to depoliticize and minimize the political impact of diversity. Since the demos is “one,” citizenship is ultimately, and hierarchically, expressed at the level of the central or federal state apparatus. Applying such unitary territorial “federal culture” to a multinational state, which is in fact composed of demoi and not a single demos, thus amounts, to put it in terms that have the merit of being very clear, to applying the logic of “might makes right” (Gagnon 2008; Burgess and Gagnon 2014). Such a dynamic was at work during the patriation of the Canadian Constitution in 1982 (Bernard 2013, 11), and it is for precisely this reason that Guy Laforest summarizes the “spirit” of 1982 with the shock phrase: “Trudeau and the end of a Canadian dream.” That said, it was an American, William Livingston (1956, 310–14), who, very early in the development of federal studies, pointed out that federalism must be understood as, by its very nature, “antimajoritarian.” According to him, federated entities must have a constitutional guarantee that their areas of jurisdiction will not be infringed on by other orders of government. Daniel Elazar uses a similar formulation when he suggests that a federation must reject the consolidated conception of political unity and adopt a “federal” conception of such unity. In short, a federal conception of political unity embraces the spirit of non-domination (Pettit 1997) in the sense that not only is it compatible with political expression of diversity, but its de facto and de jure purpose is to make such expression legitimate (Elazar 1987, 66). According to Philip Pettit (1997, 271), the notion of non-domination refers to the idea that individuals and collectivities have freedom to act and to express themselves without suffering arbitrary interference from different persons or parties. A federal conception of political unity must ensure that the various components of the societal diversity constituting the political association can be empowered independently, through their own

124

On Managing Societal Diversity

institutions, without having to suffer unilateral interference in the process from the majority group or others (Larmore 2001, 229). The scope of this is necessarily amplified when we look at “multinational” federations. Faced with deep diversity, territorial federalism has limited capacity to be completely receptive or welcoming regarding the dignity of the different national aspirations. Such “political associations” too often exist through the prism of political and symbolic domination of minorities by the majority nation (Webber 1994, 26). Rather, we need to (re)think about federalism in a multinational context using the concept of non-domination (Pettit 1997). In the next section, we propose to do this through the intermediary of the “federal impetus” dynamic in multinational contexts. According to Gagnon (2008, 16), multinational federalism is the optimal approach to affirming and structuring space for diverse collective identities, and it provides expressly for fair measures making it possible to offer the members of each of the national communities cohabiting in a federation the same possibilities for self-fulfilment. Multinational federations must be understood as political societies composed of many national communities that nonetheless wish to share a common destiny (Pierré-Caps 1995, 9). However, the common or shared destiny must be balanced with the requirement to accommodate the diverse national communities, and first and foremost those that are indeed minorities, so that they can develop a satisfactory level of self-government to attenuate their relative sense of fragility (Norman 2006, 87–8). In short, a multinational federation must live in accordance with a “federal impetus” dynamic that allows and fosters the constitutional empowerment of minority nations within the multinational democracy (Resnick 1994; Webber 1994; Kymlicka 2001; Blindenbacher and Watts 2003; Parent 2011; Gagnon 2014; Seymour and Gagnon 2012). Inversely, too many multinational federations are multinational only in terms of sociological composition (McRoberts 2001, 711) in the sense that their concrete operation generates a greater or lesser “federal deficit” with respect to (multinational) federalism (Caron, Laforest, and Vallières-Roland 2009; Mathieu and Guénette 2021). As Gagnon (2014, 160) and Rocher (2012, 82) observe, the vast majority of studies on federalism avoid discussing the properly normative angle that should guide the principles of “federal impetus.” Instead, they simply observe and compare the institutional mechanisms at work. While such study is necessary to build a pool of empirical knowledge,

Fragile Nations in Multinational Democracies

125

it does not replace the normative inquiry that, alone, makes it possible to face the line of questioning sketched out here – that is to say, to determine the conditions on the basis of which it is reasonable and legitimate to think about ways to live together and ways to live apart in multinational contexts (LaSelva 1996; 2018; Norman 2001). As Jeremy Webber skillfully suggested (1994, 22), it does not seem reasonable to require partners in a federation to declare “unconditional” loyalty to the federal state. History’s lessons being all too familiar, minority nations in multinational contexts cannot give a blank cheque to the majority group to design and establish the way they will live together (Karmis and Rocher 2012). With this postulate in mind, the next section of this chapter will examine the framework of (liberal) reasoning that we can use, in the next chapter, to assess the “conditions” that would guarantee the empowerment of the components of the Canadian federation’s internal societal diversity, the emergence or consolidation of a feeling of trust and mutual recognition between the partners in the political association, and, in consequence, a federal conception of political unity.

conclusion As Alain-G. Gagnon (1993; 2009) rightly points out, the liberal political theory that has developed in the Western world over the past centuries has demonstrated a clear prejudice in favour of difference-blind procedural liberalism (see also Gagnon and Mathieu 2020). Political and philosophical thinking on social justice in the twentieth century, reinvigorated by John Rawls’s publication of A Theory of Justice in 1971, has played a role in this. According to Gagnon’s analysis, the writings of Chandran Kukathas (1992; 2003) contain a systematization of this understanding of difference-blind procedural liberalism: 1. liberal theory is individualistic because it affirms or presumes the individual’s moral primacy in relation to the claims of any social group; 2. It is egalitarian because it gives the same moral status to all individuals and denies the worth of a legal or political regime that differentiates between moral values; 2. It is universalist because it postulates the moral unity of the human race, thus overlooking the role of any other form of cultural expression (Gagnon 2009, 32).

126

On Managing Societal Diversity

Naturally, criticizing this understanding of liberalism does not amount to rejecting its principles wholesale or denying that it has any merit. However, in contexts of deep societal and ethnocultural diversity, we need to go beyond it and move toward a form of liberalism that is more hospitable to differences (Taylor 1993; Gagnon and Laforest 1993). Moreover, in multinational contexts, it is important to avoid the prism of “moral monism” (Parekh 2006, 124–5) that procedural liberalism uses as a basis for justifying the “normal” modern nation-state (Laforest 2014, 48). Iris Marion Young (1990), Charles Taylor (1994), Will Kymlicka (1995), James Tully (1995), Ferran Requejo (2009), Bhikhu Parekh (2006), and Tariq Modood (2013) have made considerable contributions paving the way. For the purposes of the argument we will defend in the following pages, we will consider that a line of reasoning conducive to thinking about the “federal impetus” dynamic in multinational democracies must allow the “national groups concerned to make mutual concessions and to demonstrate tolerance and respect for diversity so that they will maintain and strengthen ties of trust among the partners while adhering to shared values” (Gagnon 2014, 163 [translation ]; Karmis and Rocher 2012). Alain-G. Gagnon and I have defended the idea that the system for achieving togetherness in complex societies should operate under the aegis of the “hospitable action” dynamic (Gagnon and Mathieu 2020). In continuation with some of the ideas of philosopher Daniel Innerarity (2009), we argue that, in its simplest form, the concept of hospitable action means seeking provisional points of equilibrium between two dispositions that can sometimes come into conflict. In short, the “action” consists in the capacity of a given person or institution to take action with respect to the surrounding social and political environment and how “hospitable” that action is. (“Hospitable” comes from medieval Latin’s hospitalarius, referring to the propensity to welcome others.) Acting hospitably means accepting uncertainty and the unexpected that comes with the contingencies generated by (societal) diversity. In short, what is in question is a combination of Montesquieu’s principle of moderation, Hume’s principle of dignity, and Rawls’s principle of justice (Gagnon 2011, 178–86, see also Gagnon 2021). In these pages, what we call the “federal impetus” dynamic in multinational contexts claims affiliation with a similar normative rationale. Federal impetus in multinational democracies also means

Fragile Nations in Multinational Democracies

127

accepting the fact of not being able to control the social and political environment unilaterally and seeking compromises and balance to manage the conflicts inherent in multiple demoi sharing one single sovereign state. Specifically, in multinational democracies, for the majority nation, this means not trying to unilaterally control the social and political environment, and, for minority nations, this means dealing with one or more “significant others” as they legitimately pursue national empowerment. To coordinate the dynamics of federal impetus with a line of reasoning that makes it possible to guide, accordingly, the actions of institutions that govern complex societies, it seems useful to draw on the mechanisms that Bhikhu Parekh (2006) proposes for building public operative values. As we said in chapter 1, Parekh proposes an original scheme for (inter)cultural dialogue for reconciling identity and cultural particularities with a global normative objective while going beyond the limitations of the moral monism that is part of difference-blind procedural liberalism. Ultimately, public operative values are supposed to emerge from such a dialogue, along with a “moral contract,” which must be understood as stating the public operative values. The values must then be incorporated into laws, public policies, and constitutional texts (Parekh 2006, 363), and they must also become an integral part of both our collective identity and the political imaginary of our shared life, thereby guiding the spirit of interactions among citizens and, we may add, national communities. The general idea behind Parekh’s notion of dialogue can be understand in this way: when an individual or the representative of an ethnocultural group or minority nation asks for some form of special or differentiated treatment (for a certain asymmetric norm), then it has to persuade the broader political community of the grounds for its demand, and the broader community must receive the arguments in good faith (Parekh 2006, 136). If the applicant is unable to establish the merits of said demand, the political community must reject the application. However, if it is successful and its argument persuades the other participants, the system of public operative values must be changed accordingly, whereby those values are understood as dynamic or, more specifically, as “provisional fixed points” (Rawls 1971; 1993). In the spirit of Parekh’s theory, the purpose of the dialogue is to ensure that cultural, and societal, affiliations are not experienced as locked-in identities. Similar to Rawls’s “public reason” (1993),

128

On Managing Societal Diversity

applications must always be presented and justified before all the other citizens and groups concerned. This would encourage cultures to question purposes that they might otherwise see as sacred or untouchable (Phillips 2007). At the same time, since all are called upon to participate in the dialogue8 and in establishing the values constituting the common – or federal – identity, it consolidates the unity of the broader political community (Tully 1995). This is one of the keys to thinking about a political association as a “community of communities and of individuals” (Parekh 2006). In relation to the Canadian federation, this can be reformulated more accurately as an aspiration for there to be a multinational federation. In other words, we hold, like Parekh, that the federal identity will be shared because all participate in the “moral contract” that shapes it and also because the line of reasoning that leads to the federation favours the emergence and consolidation of ties of trust among the different partners in the political association (Karmis and Rocher 2012; Russell 2012). It therefore seems promising and above all legitimate to require political representatives in multinational democracies to breathe new life into togetherness norms by recognizing at least two identities that are fixed points and primary centres of integration – the majority nation and the minority nation – while providing suitable recognition of ethnocultural minorities. In the next chapter, we will use this line of reasoning as a starting point for identifying three sets of conditions – for the fragile Quebec nation, for fragile Indigenous nations, and for the majority nation in Englishspeaking Canada – that a multinational federation must incorporate into its constitutional order in order to live in accordance with “federal impetus” principles.

6

Empowering Federal Impetus in Multinational Democracies

In the preceding chapter, we began by defining what we mean by “fragile nations,” including both their subjective dimensions and their more objective and institutional aspects. The relative fragility of a national community must be understood as part of a continuum of degrees and not in binary all-or-nothing terms. Moreover, it should be noted that the relative fragility of a nation, in both subjective and objective terms, is not inevitable or something a national community cannot overcome. It is a reality that complex liberal democracies must learn to cope with if they truly wish to advance peaceful, respectful, and responsible schemes of cohabitation. In other words, it is both possible for multinational democracies, in particular those that are multinational federations, to learn to accommodate their deep, constituting societal diversity (Taylor 1994; Resnick 2012) and necessary that they do so, from the normative perspective of liberal nationalism. If we follow the line of reasoning in chapter 5, which rejects difference-blind procedural liberalism in favour of a form of liberalism that welcomes diversity, multinational states have the moral and political duty to accommodate the desire of minority and Indigenous nations to become politically and culturally empowered. This means that there has to be a consolidation of a legal and political space that allows minority societal cultures to develop their own institutions. Recognizing the traumatic events that have occurred and, more broadly, the imaginaries of fragility that plague the political representations of internal societal minorities, we now need to think, taking into consideration the dynamics of federal impetus, about the conditions on the basis of which a multinational democracy can truly empower such minorities. However, since the constituting

130

On Managing Societal Diversity

fragility of a minority nation like Quebec does not have exactly the same kind of dynamics as that of the Indigenous Peoples living in Canada, there will be no one-size-fits-all solution or policy. In this chapter, we will explore the vectors of constitutional asymmetry that could and should be at work in a multinational federation such as Canada. Moreover, as theorists of federalism (Watts 1966; Elazar 1987, 64) have rightly pointed out, while the conditions favourable to internal societal minorities are generally in the realm of self-rule, we must also think about the conditions favourable to shared-rule, unity, political stability, and federal solidarity. Identifying as accurately as possible this diverse, asymmetrical set of “conditions” for a form of togetherness friendly to the deep societal diversity constitutive of a multinational federation is the purpose of this chapter. We will use the Canadian federation as a concrete example for thinking about these conditions. That said, the larger goal here is to reveal the logic of a multinational federal impetus that would show a possible, responsible political avenue for states that are comparable to Canada. Borrowing James Tully’s characterization (1995), we can say that the Canadian federation is a case of “strange multiplicity.” The societal diversity constituting Canada includes, at least, an English-speaking majority nation (which itself encompasses impressive ethnocultural diversity), a minority nation territorially concentrated in the province of Quebec (which is also extremely ethnoculturally diverse, with a national minority with ties to English Canada, Indigenous Peoples, and immigrant minorities), and some sixty Indigenous groups in more than 600 communities scattered all across Canada. These three distinct components of society are a major challenge when it comes to thinking about and applying “federal impetus” conditions to the Canadian federation (Gagnon and Laforest 1993). This chapter is divided into three parts. First, approaching multinational federalism through a form of liberalism that is hospitable to societal diversity (chapter 5) – that is, liberal nationalism – we look at the challenges facing a fragile minority nation. More specifically, taking the point of view of Quebec, we identify the conditions that must be fulfilled for the federal impetus to lead to the minority nation’s empowerment in the framework of the Canadian federation. Second, in the wake of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (2015), we focus on the challenges facing the Indigenous Peoples of Canada. Their constitutive fragility is the result of a dynamic that

Empowering Federal Impetus in Multinational Democracies

131

is somewhat different from that of “a” territorially concentrated minority nation such as Quebec, so we have to think about the conditions for empowering them in a different way. Specifically, we ask how fair recognition of the identity and claims of Indigenous Peoples can be reconciled with the Canadian political and constitutional order, which leads us to point out that the legitimacy of that order is not unconditional; it depends on its ability to establish an environment in which all the partners in the political association are treated as “equals in principle.” Third, having discussed the conditions for the diverse minority components of the societal diversity constituting the Canadian federation to be empowered in the legal and political order, we turn to the conditions for the majority nation. That group, which harbours major ethnocultural diversity, may reasonably and legitimately claim that a political system that embodies federal impetus must take into account the unity and stability of the political association, as well as federal solidarity (Norman 2001, 107). Therefore, in the last part of this chapter, we examine the elements that would allow a multinational federation such as Canada, if it recognizes and establishes the conditions for the empowerment of Indigenous Peoples and the minority Quebec nation, to consolidate federal unity and the stability of its overall political vision.

empowerment conditions for the minority quebec nation According to the analytical framework Dave Guénette and I have established with the Societal Culture Index (sci ) (Mathieu and Guénette 2018), Quebec’s relative fragility as a minority nation that evolves in a (multinational) federation can be appraised by looking at six institutional pillars or variables. In fact, more accurately, the sci enables us to better appreciate a minority nation’s relative capacity to empower its societal culture, which is a way, we argue, to alleviate said fragility. As we said in chapter 5, national communities in this category are “fragile” from an institutional or objective point of view because they do not necessarily have all the legal, constitutional, and political leverage needed to develop and, ideally, consolidate their societal culture. Again, note that a societal culture requires a set of social, political, and legal institutions that generally make it possible for the political community to “make society” – that is to say, to foster fair

132

On Managing Societal Diversity

civic and democratic life and peaceful togetherness (Kymlicka 1995; Thériault 2007). In accordance with Kymlicka’s theorization, we will also consider that a societal culture is generally expressed through a specific language, which is also territorially concentrated in a given location. These are two characteristics that minority nations have but that too often escape Indigenous Peoples nowadays. Many of the institutions that Indigenous Peoples could realistically use to develop and consolidate their societal cultures are beyond communities living on reserves and in Indigenous municipalities. For this reason, we will speak of multiscalar Indigenous societal cultures – that is, societal cultures that will be built and energized through more than one singular delineated territorial environment, such as an Indian reserve or municipality. It therefore seems difficult to analyze the fragility of minority nations and that of Indigenous nations from the exact same angle. The conditions that would make possible a form of self-government that would permit Indigenous nations to develop their local community citizenship and allow it to thrive are not the same as those we will identify for Quebec. Generally, minority nations do not have complete freedom to realize their desire to consolidate the institutional and symbolic foundations that allow them to “make society.” Their surrounding political and constitutional order is both beyond them and encompasses them at the same time. As such, the vast majority, if not all, multinational federations and other similar democracies remain marked by a certain dynamic of majority nation domination of societal minorities (Gagnon 2008; Resnick 2012, 73–4). That is why, we believe, federal impetus in multinational contexts must necessarily deploy in a manner that ensures that the constitutional order in force unambiguously allows the fragile Indigenous nation or minority nations concerned to develop and consolidate their societal cultures on their own (Nootens 2016, 141). If this is not in motion, then the sovereign state will contribute to societal minorities’ relative fragility rather than promote fairness and equity between partners in a political association. Concretely, the sci makes it possible to observe and compare different sets of multinational states according to minority nations’ ability to develop their societal cultures through their own independent institutions (Mathieu and Guénette 2018). In line with the work done by Ronald Watts (1996, 2), comparing different federations and multinational entities using the sci in this way makes it possible to identify and track the causes and elements that guarantee

Empowering Federal Impetus in Multinational Democracies

133

fairness in the operation of multinational federations and, inversely, what in particular seems to raise problems. In what follows, we will return to the six legal-constitutional conditions that we have identified as the constituting variables of the sci: (1) national recognition, (2) language rights, (3) immigration and integration powers, (4) fiscal autonomy, (5) internal self-determination, and (6) external self-determination. From a theoretical point of view, these can all be situated within the normative realm of liberal nationalism (Kymlicka 1995; Tamir 1995; Gagnon and Mathieu 2020). All of these variables relate to the constitutional order of a sovereign state. This seems reasonable because, despite the fact that the dynamism of a societal culture can only be measured using the tools of political sociology, the institutional foundations that, a priori, are conditions for such dynamic energy are necessarily part of the distribution of legislative and executive powers among a federation’s various orders of government (Watts 2007, 234; Burgess and Gagnon 2014), which in the case of the Canadian federation is set out in sections 91 to 95 of the Constitution Act, 1867. Following the line of reasoning we described in the preceding chapter on a version of liberalism – liberal nationalism – willing to accommodate societal diversity, we will argue, from a normative point of view, why the other partners in the Canadian federation should agree to enshrine in the constitutional order a set of conditions that come from the perspective of the relatively fragile Quebec national community. This is the only way that federal impetus will be able to provide the constitutional groundwork for full accommodation of minority nations in multinational contexts, hence limiting as much as possible their relative fragility. The elements that will be described below are intended to strengthen an asymmetrical dynamic between the (federal and provincial) orders of government in Canada. It should be noted that the sought asymmetry is not meant to create two or more “unequal” political communities within the Canadian federation but rather to make it possible to create an institutional space for cultural and political freedom, autonomy, and empowerment for all the societal diversity constituting the political association. In the words of Jeremy Webber: In fact, much of the resistance to asymmetry seems to be prompted, not by a concern with material inequality or constraints on the liberty of individuals as such, but by a much more visceral opposition to differences in treatment – a feeling that any

134

On Managing Societal Diversity

difference among provinces or individuals, is inherently unequal, and is perhaps the product of special privilege. There is a continuing belief that in a nation all citizens are treated the same, the same rules apply to all, perhaps even that citizens themselves should be, in some important respect, the same. This belief is fundamentally incompatible with the spirit of accommodation underlying federalism, a spirit that has long recognized that when people are different in relevant ways, treating them equally may require treating them differently (Webber 1994, 315). We should also point out the fact that the six conditions – and this is also the case for the conditions regarding Indigenous Peoples and the majority group – are consistent with the four principles that the Supreme Court of Canada identified as the foundations of the Canadian political system in Reference re Secession of Québec (1998; see Mathieu and Guénette 2019). These principles are federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and respect for minorities. Of course, the conditions we will propose would require changes to the Canadian constitutional order, even a restructuring that some would consider major. However, the changes are meant to be consistent with the natural evolution of a constitutional order. In line with the metaphor of the Constitution as a “living tree” that has clearly taken root in history and is part of a specific ecosystem, we consider that new branches may always appear, grow distant, interlace, and even overlap in places (Brouillet and Gagnon 2017). Naturally, in practice, we have to accept that constitutional arrangements may meet only part of the conditions we describe below. We will then have to persuade our “significant others” to take action and make a greater investment in this direction. However, it would be counterproductive to take an all-or-nothing approach to this analytical framework. After all, there is no such thing as a perfect federation (Laforest 2014, 132). Our approach here should instead be understood as a way of engaging the dynamic energy of federal impetus while always keeping the present context in mind. National Recognition

The first condition, national recognition, is both symbolic and political. Taking inspiration from philosopher Charles Taylor (1992; 1994, 42), we argue that a national identity is expressed and maintained

Empowering Federal Impetus in Multinational Democracies

135

through dialogue and that if a significant other does not recognize or poorly recognizes one’s distinct identity, serious moral harm occurs. The seriousness of the wrong, which may be experienced as a lack of recognition (Seymour 2010) or internal exile (Laforest 2014), can have major consequences on minority nations’ ability to manage and to handle their own minorities reasonably and fairly (Wimmer 1997). We will come back to this in chapter 7. In short, when a minority’s specificity as a singular demos is not recognized by its significant others – that is to say, first of all, the other partners in the federation – a minority nation may come to the conclusion that recognizing the components of its own internal diversity would undermine its very symbolic foundations. This is, at least, the impression we retain of the “reasonable accommodation” crisis in Quebec in 2007–08 (Bouchard and Taylor 2008; Mathieu and Laforest 2016; Gagnon and St-Louis 2016). But most importantly, such a non- or misrecognition of a minority nation necessarily limits its capacity to be treated as an “equal partner” within the political association and one that is legitimate in asking specific accommodation. Concretely, we thus argue that a fragile nation can legitimately demand that its partners recognize it in the constitutional order as being somehow distinct, and it can also pressure them to obtain certain special powers (such as some form of constitutional asymmetry) within the state so as to foster and empower said national distinctiveness. Language Rights

The second condition is language rights, where language is understood as a “mindset” that reflects, or is meant to reflect, a certain cultural identity (Carlà 2007). It is ultimately through a standardized shared language that a societal culture can be promoted and shared (Gellner 2008 [1983], 26) and a national community can come to see itself as such (Anderson 2006, 44–5). It is also through a specific language that a national community becomes institutionalized and educates its youth, its future citizens (Anderson 2006, 115-–16). In short, for a fragile minority nation, the ability to “make society” and to function collectively through the intermediary of a societal culture depends largely on there being legal protection with regard to language1 (Gagnon 2000; Kymlicka 1995; Thériault 2007). On this, José Woehrling and Pierre Noreau have noted that “for a minority language to be maintained and transmitted, it must be taught,

136

On Managing Societal Diversity

or, even better, used as the language of teaching” (Woehrling and Noreau 2005, 127–8 [translation ]). Concretely, a fragile nation can legitimately require that its partners give it the possibility to choose its official language on its own territory and to make that language predominant in its education system. Immigration and Integration Powers

The third condition concerns immigration and integration powers. To begin with, a minority nation must be able to exercise control over the number of immigrants arriving in its territory so that the national community is able to integrate newcomers in a reasonable, fair way (McGarry 1998; Kymlicka 2001, 285). This seems to go without saying for a majority or sovereign national community, and it is reasonable to require that a minority nation be able to exercise similar control over the flow of immigrants who will participate in the dynamics of its societal culture and shared political life. Equally important, the minority nation ought to be able to exercise control over integration terms; otherwise, new arrivals may a fortiori integrate only into the societal culture of the majority nation (Carens 1995; Kymlicka 2001, 285–6; Boucher 2016b, 28), which would fragilize the institutions of the minority nation’s societal culture. For example, considering Quebec’s situation in Canada, it seems fundamental that Quebec be able to require newcomers to integrate into “its” societal culture and not only into the Anglo-Canadian societal culture. Otherwise, it seems clear that the symbolic foundations of the minority nation will not be able to remain dynamic and penetrate, in some way, the imaginaries of all citizens who come to live in Quebec. Concretely, a fragile minority nation can legitimately require its partners to allow it to establish its own immigration and integration policies and to exercise a power to select immigrants. We will make a more detailed proposal in this sense in chapter 7. Fiscal Autonomy

The fourth condition is related to fiscal autonomy. This is fundamental for a minority nation to have its own means to fund its public programs and consolidate its societal culture (Watts 1996, 39; McEwen 2006, 252; Gagnon 2011, 139). More generally, for a minority nation, fiscal autonomy is a necessary condition for it

Empowering Federal Impetus in Multinational Democracies

137

to be able to reach its full potential as a distinct national entity, in particular with respect to the welfare state’s social safety net. (Béland and Lecours 2004; 2006; Benedikter 2008, 108; Noël 2009, 276). Concretely, taking inspiration in particular from Claude Ryan’s attitude to interactions between Quebec and the federal government (Ryan 1999), it is reasonable to argue that a minority nation can legitimately claim from its partners the power to collect its own taxes and also the right to be part of a system of internal redistribution of federal taxes within the federation – such as Canada’s equalization payment system. Internal Self-Determination

The fifth condition concerns internal self-determination. Since a minority nation is part of a multinational whole, it should be empowered to engage in negotiations and discussions on the constitutional order in force, just as it should be able to influence the constitutional process in accordance with its need for internal self-determination. As parties to the “constituent power,” the other member-partners of the multinational whole then have the duty to take into account the legitimate demands of the minority nation (Woehrling 1999, 19; Nootens 2016, 137). If this is not done, then the minority nation’s fragility will be amplified by a domination structure or constitutional “straitjacket” (Tully 1996, 16; Pettit 1997). Concretely, and not unrelated to the Supreme Court of Canada’s conclusions in Reference re Secession of Québec (1998), it is reasonable to hold that a minority nation can legitimately claim from its partners the ability to begin revising the Constitution but also to have a veto in the constitutional process, at least with regard to all issues that directly concern it. External Self-Determination

Lastly, the sixth condition is external self-determination. As Alain Dieckhoff points out, societal diversity in a multinational state creates instability and political tension (Dieckhoff 2001, 348; Tully 2001, 2–3). However, such uncertainty must be seen as inherent to living in a multinational democracy (Kymlicka 1995, 78–9; Burgess 2006; 2009; Gagnon 2008). Ultimately, when a minority nation is lacking recognition and seems to have insufficient legal access to the

138

On Managing Societal Diversity

foundations it needs to consolidate its societal culture, it seems reasonable to give it the legitimate right to begin a democratic process possibly leading to secession in the general spirit of a people’s right to self-determination (Weinstock 2001; Parent 2011; Gagnon 2011, 5; Sanjaume-Calvet 2020). The sixth and last legal-constitutional condition is thus the ultimate option, to be used when faced with a sterile constitutional situation (Norman 2006, 77). Concretely, a minority nation can therefore legitimately demand from its partners the right to hold a referendum on its territory and then require that the constitutional order recognize its right to secede, whether or not conditions would be imposed.

* * * The reader has certainly understood that to a certain degree the Canadian federation has proven able to accommodate the relatively fragile minority nation of Quebec (Mathieu and Guénette 2018). However, it cannot be denied that majority domination nonetheless marks some of its political and constitutional mechanisms. National recognition could be described as partial. There are some elements of recognition of Quebec as a distinct society in the Canadian constitutional order – for example, in sections 93, 94, and 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867 – and there is a certain de facto, but not de jure, asymmetry in favour of Quebec – for instance, section 41(d) of the Constitution Act, 1982, which guarantees that three of the judges on the Supreme Court must be from Quebec. Quebec has also been recognized twice in the House of Commons – once as a distinct society and once as a nation2 – but this has not been formalized de jure by the constituent power. With regard to language rights, Canada has been relatively hospitable to the Quebec national community. In 1977, the Quebec National Assembly indeed passed Bill 101, the Charter of the French Language, which proclaims in section 1 that “French is the official language of Québec,” but the changes made through the constitutional revision attenuated the expression of the Quebec legislature’s intention (Poirier 2016). In practice, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms has significantly regulated and “limited the Quebec government’s leeway with respect to language policy” (Rocher 2013, 123 [translation ]) and more generally with respect to social policies for Quebec. Bill 101 nonetheless made French the language

Empowering Federal Impetus in Multinational Democracies

139

of justice, administration, work, business, and education. French is thus undeniably the dominant language in Quebec. With regard to immigration and integration powers, we should speak of partial accommodation3 (Brun and Brouillet 2002, 55–66). We will come back to this in greater detail in chapter 7, but we can already note that in this area, the image borrowed by Laforest (2014) according to which the provinces are perceived grosso modo as “junior” governments with respect to the “senior” federal government is quite appropriate. Indeed, Henri Brun and Eugénie Brouillet describe Quebec’s constitutional powers over immigration as absolutely precarious and say, rightly, that the Constitution of Canada “is designed to permit the federal Parliament and the Government of Canada to exercise, if they wish, complete state jurisdiction over immigration” (2002, 86 [translation ]). With regard to the legal-constitutional instrument of fiscal autonomy, Quebec’s difference has been accommodated to some degree (s. 92(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867 and s. 36 of the Constitution Act, 1982). Quebec can collect its own taxes through its autonomous institutions for its “Provincial Purposes.” Moreover, unlike other constitutional competencies shared by different orders of government (for example, immigration and integration), the prevailing jurisprudence implies that “federal and provincial tax laws in a given field cannot be incompatible in practice” (Brun, Tremblay, and Brouillet 2014, 485 [translation]). It should also be noted that Quebec benefits from the Canadian system of internal redistribution of tax revenues (the equalization program) according to which the central government commits to making payments “to ensure that provincial governments have sufficient revenues to provide reasonably comparable levels of public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation” (s. 36(2), Constitution Act, 1982). According to political scientist Alain Noël, we nonetheless have to acknowledge that there is a degree of fiscal imbalance between Ottawa and the provinces. This is allegedly amplified by federal “spending power,” which is possible “only because the federal government has more resources than it needs to carry out the responsibilities associated with its own competencies” (Noël 2008, 23 [translation]). In fact, it has to be admitted that Quebec comes out rather well from this fiscal imbalance. In 2017–18, Quebec received $11,081 million in equalization payments from the federal government out of a total equalization budget of $18,254 million

140

On Managing Societal Diversity

to be divided among all the provinces (Ministère des Finances du Canada 2017). With regard to internal self-determination, Quebec enjoys considerable anchoring (s. 46(1), Constitution Act, 1982) even though Quebec’s right to veto constitutional amendments does not cover all matters that concern it directly (s. 38 and 42, Constitution Act, 1982). In fact, in the cases of amendments (a) concerning matters that require the unanimity of the provinces and the federal Parliament4 or (b) concerning matters specific to Quebec,5 it has a de facto veto. All other matters (for example, distribution of powers and human rights and freedoms) fall under the normal procedure set out in section 38 of the Constitution Act, 1982, according to which Quebec’s agreement is not necessary. On another level, as Dave Guénette (2016, 46) has shown, Quebec nonetheless has a formal right of initiative within the Constitution revision process, just as do the Senate, the House of Commons, and the other provincial legislatures. Lastly, with regard to external self-determination, people all around the world look at Quebec–Canada dynamics as leading the way (Brie 2016). The Supreme Court of Canada’s Reference re Secession of Québec is seen as relatively balanced and accommodating toward Quebec (Tully 2001, 7; Mathieu and Guénette 2019). To make a long story short, in 1998, in response to the 1995 referendum on Quebec sovereignty, the Canadian government asked the Supreme Court if Quebec could, under Canadian constitutional law and international law, secede from the rest of Canada. The Court said: “The clear repudiation by the people of Quebec of the existing constitutional order would confer legitimacy on demands for secession, and place an obligation on the other provinces and the federal government to acknowledge and respect that expression of democratic will by entering into negotiations” (2 S.C.R. 217, para. 88). The Reference not only recognizes Quebec’s right to secede but also identifies the three elements that would be required: a clear question, a clear answer, and the holding of negotiations among the partners with regard to the secession process. However, it is difficult to see anything other than bad faith and domination dynamics in the Clarity Act that the federal legislature rushed to pass immediately after the Supreme Court’s Reference (Gagnon and Mathieu 2021). The spirit of that act, which in the end gives the Parliament of the central government alone the right to judge whether the three requirements have been met, is that of a straitjacket (see Tully 1996).

Empowering Federal Impetus in Multinational Democracies

141

The set of federal impetus conditions for which we are advocating so that Quebec can be empowered within the Canadian political association – in order to correct the “federal deficits” with regard to multinational federalism that we have described in the preceding paragraphs – could very well be part of an asymmetrical revision of the powers given to the federal and provincial orders of government. Moreover, these conditions are in line with a federal, democratic spirit that would recognize constitutionalism and rule of law and aspire to the greatest respect for the dignity of minorities. This is a federal culture that many political thinkers and actors in Canada have tried to promote – for example, the trio of George-Étienne Cartier, Alexander T. Galt, and Thomas D’Arcy McGee at the 1864 Quebec Conference and also Benoît Pelletier (2010, 26), Claude Ryan (1999), Henri Bourassa, and André Laurendeau (LaSelva 1996; Lapointe-Gagnon 2013; Laforest 2014; Laforest and Mathieu 2016). Now that we have described the conditions for the relatively fragile Quebec nation, let us turn to the conditions for Indigenous Peoples. However, since we have only skimmed over specifically Indigenous concerns, let us begin the second section with a brief sociological, political, legal, and historical review of the situation of the Indigenous Nations living in Canada.

empowerment conditions for indigenous peoples According to the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (rcap ), which published its final report in 1996, Canada has about sixty Indigenous nations that can be broken down into some 600 Indigenous communities located more or less all across its vast territory. The Assembly of First Nations (afn ) says there are precisely 663 such communities (afn 2016). Although some challenge this idea (Flanagan 2000), it is conventional wisdom to speak about the Indigenous nations in Canada as “First Peoples” in the sense that they were already living on the continent when the European empires “discovered” it. In America as elsewhere, the fate reserved for the Indigenous Peoples varied from one country to another. However, the reader will not be surprised to hear that the vast majority of the time, they were treated unfairly. In its Final Report, Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (trc ) called the treatment of Indigenous Peoples, particularly with respect to the institution

142

On Managing Societal Diversity

of residential schools for Indigenous children, “cultural genocide” (trc 2015, 1). This has also been documented thoroughly in other public reports and scholarly research (Daschuk 2013; Roy 2015; National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls 2019). Contrary to the dynamic at work in the United States, some rights specific to Indigenous Peoples are written into the Canadian constitutional order, and this gives them a fundamental status that a simple ordinary law passed by a legislative assembly cannot alter (Leclair 2013; Coyle 2014). However, this has been the case only since the Constitution Act, 1982 came into force. Prior to this stage in the relationship between Indigenous Peoples and government authorities in Canada, there were three other distinct stages or periods (rcap 1996, 39–41; Roy 2015, 1–2), which the rcap says “overlap and occur at different times in different regions” (rcap 1996, 41). The first stage would be that of “separate worlds” during which the European powers gradually established themselves in North America and started to come into contact with the Indigenous population. Champlain’s Dream (2008) by David Hackett Fischer is remarkable in the way it plunges us into the world of relationships that were sought and maintained between Samuel de Champlain and the Indigenous people living on the banks of the St Lawrence River at the dawn of the seventeenth century. The second stage is that of “interaction and cooperation,” in which the European settlers maintained many alliances with the “savages,” and those alliances were made formal through many “nation-to-nation” treaties. For example, in King George III’s 1763 Royal Proclamation, he said he was “connected” with Indigenous nations and promised in particular that he would not allow his officials to “grant Warrants of Survey, or pass Patents for any Lands which ... are reserved to the said Indians” (inac 2016). This is the sort of treaty that makes legal expert and political scientist Peter H. Russell (1993; 2012) say that Canada never “conquered” the First Peoples. Generally, Indigenous people who live in Canada also share the idea that they were never conquered by Canada or any other foreign power (Aatami 2002, 243). The rcap labelled the second phase “contact and cooperation.” At about the same time as the Royal Proclamation, under the directives of Sir William Johnson, Indigenous Peoples and the British authorities signed what is recognized today as the Treaty

Empowering Federal Impetus in Multinational Democracies

143

of Niagara (Borrows 1997, 155). Russell points out: “In 1764, Sir Willian Johnson, the British Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Northern District, met approximately 2000 chiefs representing 24 nations at Fort Niagara. Johnson’s mandate was to persuade the Indigenous leaders to maintain relations with the British on the basis of this promise in the Royal Proclamation. Over the course of a very long, very elaborate ceremony, Johnson, on behalf of the British Crown, and the Indigenous chiefs, on behalf of their nations, consented to this agreement [the Treaty of Niagara] on peaceful coexistence” (Russell 2012, 117 [translation ]). Thus, in a way similar to the Quebec Act, 1774 for the French Canadians, the Treaty of Niagara seems to play the role, for Indigenous Peoples, of the legal and symbolic foundation for thinking about Canada through the lens of a multinational federation. Indeed, as these words written by the British Commander-in-Chief in North America, Thomas Gage, testify, Sir William Johnson clearly had accommodating intentions with respect to societal diversity when the Treaty of Niagara was signed: “You may be assured that none of the Six Nations or Western Indians ever declared themselves subjects, or will ever consider themselves in that light, while they have any men or an open country to retire to. The very idea of subjugation would fill them with horror” (cited in Stone, 1865, 121). That said, this period of cooperation faded as the majority took a multitude of dominating actions (Coyle 2011; Daschuk 2013). The rcap calls the third stage “displacement and assimilation,” marked by gradual marginalization of Indigenous people during colonization (Roy 2015, 2). The displacement was both in the physical sense of the term and in the cultural sense. In the Enfranchisement Act of 1869, the Indian Acts of 1876 and 1880, the Indian Advancement Act of 1884, and even the Indian Act as it was consolidated over the course of the twentieth century, the prevailing presupposition was that Indigenous people had a civilization that was morally, politically, legally, etc. inferior to European Christian culture (Coyle 2011, 618). Like Lord Durham’s recommendations with respect to the French Canadians following the Patriot uprisings in 1837 and 1838, the Indigenous policies were intended to emancipate Indigenous Peoples and eliminate their “backward cultural crutches.” This was the mission of the residential schools for Indigenous children. It seems clear that the Liberal federal government’s 1969 White Paper on “Indian” policy was based on the same

144

On Managing Societal Diversity

logic with regard to Indigenous Peoples as the 1839 Durham Report with regard to French Canadians. However, Indigenous Peoples’ – legitimate – reactions to the White Paper were so strong that they forced the federal government to review its strategy for its relationships with them (Turner 2006, 13). This leads us to the fourth and present stage in the relationship between government authorities in Canada and Indigenous Peoples, which the rcap calls “negotiation and renewal.” Jean-Olivier Roy describes it as follows: It is a true resurgence, marked by gains on many levels. To begin with, there was the right to vote federally in 1960 and provincially a little before or after. Next, there were favourable court decisions, in particular the Malouf decision, in the context of the James Bay hydroelectric development, and the Calder, Sparrow, Van Der Peet and Powley cases, which clarified the notion of ancestral rights, and the Delgamuukw and Tsilhqot’in judgments, which clarified Indigenous title. The various self-government agreements in Québec should be noted, such as the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement and the Paix des Braves, and also the various self-government agreements elsewhere in Canada, such as the agreement with the Nisga’a in British Columbia, not to mention the creation of Nunavut. The negotiations, in Québec and the rest of Canada that these agreements required should also be noted. Recognition of Indigenous peoples and of their ancestral rights in the Constitution Act, 1982 was also a pivotal moment, as was the recognition of Indigenous peoples in 1985 by René Lévesque’s government. Lastly, at the international level, we have to mention the actions taken by the un, the most obvious outcome of which is the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which the General Assembly adopted in 2007 and which Canada signed in 2010 (Roy 2015, 8 [translation ]). Since 1982, the ancestral rights of Indigenous Peoples have been recognized in the Canadian Constitution. Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 contains the following: “The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed ... ‘treaty rights’ includes rights that now exist by way of land claims agreements or may be so acquired ...”

Empowering Federal Impetus in Multinational Democracies

145

Since these rights are enshrined in the Constitution, they are situated above ordinary laws that could be passed by an elected legislature, but this also circumscribes the way these rights can be put into action – as is the case, on a different scale, with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and Quebec’s leeway with regard to language protection (Rocher 2013). For example, it may prove difficult or even impossible in some circumstances (such as with regard to nomadic Indigenous Peoples) to recognize in law the authenticity of an Indigenous practice so that it can be considered an ancestral right (Ladner 2005; Leclair 2013, 307). More broadly, the special rights we recognize Indigenous people as having in Canada are negotiated and established through agreements and treaties between government authorities (usually federal but sometimes also provincial [Gagnon and Rocher 2002]) and Indigenous communities (Motard 2013; Otis 2014). Political scientist Martin Papillon points out that these “modern treaties” are extremely important in relationships with the Indigenous Peoples. Nonetheless, Papillon notes that the procedures leading to these treaties are often much more marked by the dynamics of domination than those of hospitable action (Papillon 2002; Papillon and Lord 2013). Indigenous Peoples may hope that these treaties will allow them to increase their autonomy – to develop their societal cultures – and to engage in a new relationship and negotiate as equals with the government (Moses 2002), but “still today governments see these agreements primarily as land ownership transactions that clarify, and above all limit, the scope of ancestral rights over land” (Papillon and Lord 2013, 345 [translation ]; Ross-Tremblay and Hamidi 2013; Coyle 2014, 286). It is useful to look at the path these treaties have taken over the long term, all the way back at least to the efforts of Sir William Johnson with regard to the 1764 Treaty of Niagara. This will allow us to see the “negotiation and renewal” dynamic of today through the lens of “treaty federalism” (Henderson 1994). As Alan Cairns has pointed out (2000, 181), treaty federalism would make it possible to transform and adapt the federal culture in Canada in the direction of what we have associated with federal impetus in multinational contexts. This would make it possible to strengthen the asymmetrical nature of multinational federalism (Hueglin 1993, 11). In the end, though, it must be recalled that Indigenous Peoples alone will decide if this is acceptable, reasonable, and responsible.

146

On Managing Societal Diversity

That said, we hope that the following suggestions will be of interest for reimagining Canada on more hospitable and pluralist foundations. Even if we do not live up to the fourth aspect expressed by Dale Turner (2006) in This Is Not a Peace Pipe: Towards a Critical Indigenous Philosophy, the present reflection was designed to cope with the spirit of the first three conditions he expressed: 1 2

3 4

One must address adequately the legacy of colonialism. One must “respect the sui generis nature of indigenous rights as a class of political rights that flow out of indigenous nationhood and that are not bestowed by the Canadian state.” One must “question the legitimacy of the Canadian state’s unilateral claim of sovereignty over Aboriginal lands and peoples.” One must “recognize that a meaningful theory of Aboriginal rights in Canada is impossible without Aboriginal participation” (Turner 2006, 7).

Hence, coming back to Indigenous Peoples and their desire to be treated as equal partners in the Canadian federation and to be politically and culturally empowered by their autonomous institutions, it seems fundamental to identify specific conditions. Ultimately, we are unlikely to be mistaken if we say that federal impetus in a multinational context, as should be the case in Canada, must recognize a new, “third”6 order of government: that of Indigenous Peoples. This would be in addition to the federal and provincial orders. The third order of government would be a building block for the sustainability of autonomous multiscalar Indigenous societal cultures. The conditions for Indigenous Peoples that we will discuss here must be understood in continuity with or as an extension of the proposals made in the 1992 Charlottetown Accord (1992) and the 1996 rcap recommendations (Courchene 1993). Now, how can we justify a deep reform of the nature of Canadian federalism with the establishment of a third order of government through the line of reason based on Bhikhu Parekh’s teachings (chapter 5)? The work of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (rcap 1996) is extremely useful for understanding the foundations for interpreting the ancestral rights of Indigenous Peoples in the Canadian legal architecture. As the rcap pointed out, these ancestral rights are not a recent modern invention of the courts to get Canadians to repent the clearly unjust treatment of the first inhabitants. In fact:

Empowering Federal Impetus in Multinational Democracies

147

It is one of the most ancient and enduring doctrines of Canadian law. It is reflected in the numerous treaties of peace and friendship concluded in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries between Aboriginal peoples and the French and British Crowns, in the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and other instruments of the same period, in the treaties signed in Ontario, the West, and the North-West during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in the many statutes dealing with Aboriginal matters from earliest times, and not least in a series of judicial decisions extending over nearly two centuries (rcap 1996, 9–10). It seems fundamental that we should consider this seriously in order to think about and rethink duties and obligations to Indigenous Peoples and the manner in which the Canadian constitutional order could foster Indigenous self-government. However, we will not be able to apply the same reasoning as that we proposed for fragile minority nations in order to consider the federal impetus conditions for Indigenous Peoples. The fragile Indigenous nations in Canada are not concentrated territorially in “a” location – as is the case for Quebec, for example – so it is difficult for them to have societal cultures with highly developed institutions (Courchene 1993). Certainly, some Indigenous nations enjoy societal cultures and a developed, concentrated institutional network. For example, there is the institutional development of the Cree Nation, which, following the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement, was recognized as having “a series of specific rights, enforceable by the courts, concerning the maintenance and development of their culture and communities while giving them an important role to play in natural resource development on the land” (Gourdeau 2002, 25 [translation ]). However, many Indigenous nations are too scattered territorially for their communities to be sufficiently populous for “societal cultures” in Kymlicka’s sense to fully develop. In other words, like Indigenous Peoples, their societal cultures are not territorially concentrated in “a” province or “a” single territory, and this necessarily excludes them from the category defined by Kymlicka (1995). In this respect, the fact that the constitution of their societal cultures does not correspond to the criteria established by Kymlicka does not make them “inferior” to those that are territorially concentrated – they are simply different. It thus seems difficult to consider minority nations and Indigenous nations as “significantly comparable” with regard to this specific

148

On Managing Societal Diversity

issue (Laforest 2016). Imagination and resilience are required to think about the conditions for self-government that would allow Indigenous nations to experience local community citizenship through the development of autonomous societal cultures. The proposal we will favour is to interpret the development of these Indigenous societal cultures on the basis of a multiscalar dynamic. Like Althusius’s principle of subsidiarity (Norman and Karmis 2005, 27–8), this dynamic underlies the idea that institutions will be developed on different levels, and some may be shared or common among Indigenous communities but also among different Indigenous nations. In other words, Indigenous societal cultures could develop institutionally through many different levels of governance: reserves, municipalities, national Indigenous communities, and, for instance, the Assembly of First Nations. We must also think about the existing and possible relationships between members of Indigenous communities who do not live on reserves and Indigenous societal cultures, since many members of Indigenous communities have chosen to live in urban settings. We have to find a way to reconcile Indigenous Peoples’ legitimate desire for political and cultural autonomy with the Canadian constitutional order, two things that are not a priori disconnected or incommensurable (Tully 2007, 312). To do this, we have to begin by looking at this quest for freedom from the standpoint of Indigenous Peoples’ right to self-determination. The rcap states this in a key passage: To summarize, the Aboriginal right of self-government has a substantial basis in existing Canadian law, even in the absence of explicit constitutional clauses of the kind proposed in the Charlottetown Accord of 1992. The original basis for this right was the autonomous status of Aboriginal nations at the time they entered into association with the French and British Crowns. The right of Aboriginal nations to govern their own affairs was acknowledged in inter-societal practice and formed a tacit premise of many treaties. The right became part of the common law doctrine of Aboriginal rights, which emerged during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as a body of fundamental law governing relations between Aboriginal peoples and incoming European nations. There are persuasive grounds for concluding that the right of self-government continues to exist today as a matter of constitutional common law and qualifies as an existing

Empowering Federal Impetus in Multinational Democracies

149

Aboriginal or treaty-protected right under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. The right is organic in nature and may be implemented by Aboriginal initiatives within the core areas of Aboriginal jurisdiction. However, implementation in the outlying areas of this jurisdiction likely requires agreements with other relevant orders of government (rcap 1996, 40–1 [our italics]). Instead of setting out a set of conditions as specific as those we prescribed for fragile minority nations, we will suggest more broadly (1) pursuing the idea of a third order of government in the architecture of Canadian federalism, which would (2) be rooted in the principle of treaty federalism; next, (3) taking inspiration from Austro-Hungarian thinkers Karl Renner and Otto Bauer, examining how the magnetism of Indigenous Peoples’ societal cultures could go beyond and consolidate the territorial space of their reserves and municipalities; and, lastly, (4) rethinking, in these terms, the role of the Assembly of First Nations. Again, our objective is not to prescribe what Indigenous Peoples must do to be empowered – they alone can assert that. We hope instead to propose a theoretical and normative avenue that we believe could foster the establishment of an institutional foundation for their struggles. In other words, the idea is to accompany them in “their emancipation by reinstating their status as free peoples and establishing a non-colonial relationship between them and the surrounding society” ([translation ] Tully 2007, 310). A Third Order of Government

Based on section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, concerning Indigenous Peoples’ inherent right to self-determination, the Charlottetown Accord, which was rejected by a majority of Canadians in the referendums held on 26 October 1992, provided for the introduction of a third order of government in Canada for the benefit of Indigenous Peoples. Indigenous Peoples would have had their own constitutional jurisdictions, and other jurisdictions would have been shared with the federal and provincial orders of government (Cairns 2000, 81–2). Since the Indigenous Peoples were never formally “conquered” by Canada (Russell 2012), it seems reasonable to endorse the idea of an Indigenous order of government that would be distinct and non-subordinated to the two others. If the rcap saw “persuasive

150

On Managing Societal Diversity

grounds for concluding that the right of self-government continues to exist today as a matter of constitutional common law and qualifies as an existing Aboriginal or treaty-protected right under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982” (rcap 1996, 40–1), it seems that there are just as good reasons to argue that a third order of government would be an adequate way to fully empower it. Moreover, as we saw in the preceding section and in the first chapter, Indigenous Peoples are a type of minority that must be distinguished from immigrant minorities and minority nations. We therefore have to think about how to meet their needs and expectations, which, necessarily, supposes treatment that is different – asymmetrical – with regard to other types of minorities. In this respect, two-order Canadian federalism has limitations because it would not be reasonable to suggest that the sixty Indigenous nations move into one specific area so that they would form a numerical majority in a “province.” Not only would that be difficult logistically (to begin with, what would we do with the people already living there?), but it would do fundamental violence to the relationship that Indigenous Peoples have with the land and the earth in accordance with their conceptions of the good life and their identity (Roy 2015, 106). In any case, the third order of government should have its own powers and/or shared powers in a range of jurisdictions similar to those set out in sections 91 to 95 of the Constitution Act, 1867 for the provincial and federal governments. Naturally, we would also have to rework at least the framework of application of these provisions to the provinces – we will discuss this later. In short, this proposal means thinking about a third order of government for the benefit of Indigenous Peoples that would ensure for them (a) the sustainability and dynamic strength of their symbolic and cultural foundations, (b) access to efficient, autonomous social and welfare services, (c) economic development in connection with their regional and national interests, (d) equalto-equal negotiations when an enterprise or another government wants to exploit a natural resource located on their land or on neighbouring land, and (e) some development of Indigenous law bringing it closer to civil law (Franks 1987, 35–6; Borrows 2010). Without this third order of government, it seems more difficult to imagine a scenario in which Indigenous nations will be emancipated from third-party legal and political management by another government. In order to invest in, legitimize, and ultimately carry

Empowering Federal Impetus in Multinational Democracies

151

out such a proposal, we need to look to the treaty approach. We are not advocating for the establishment of a third order of government for Indigenous Peoples simply out of a concern for consistency with the principle of occupation prior to European contact but because of the many treaties signed by Indigenous representatives and the British Crown and then Canada. Treaty Federalism

From the beginning, when the first settlers arrived in North America, the way they and the Indigenous Peoples were to coexist was negotiated through treaties (Barsh and Henderson 1982). The cardinal rule for understanding treaty federalism in Canada requires seeing the treaties signed in the course of building Canadian federalism, in particular with the Indigenous Peoples, as an integral part of the constitutional order (White 2002, 89). The treaties with the Indigenous nations can be seen as entries in the ledger of their existence in the constitutional order and of their status as equal partners in the Canadian political association (Alcantara 2013; Fenge and Aldridge 2015; Borrows and Coyle 2017; Dabin 2020). Thus, from the point of view of Professor Andrew Bear Robe, treaty federalism identifies historical anchors over the long term, recalling the relationships between Indigenous Peoples and the Crown in the early days of the colonization of North America (Bear Robe 1992, 6–8). Similarly, according to James Youngblood Henderson (1994, 326), treaty federalism should be understood as a constitutional concept that allows Indigenous Peoples to (re)take control of their destinies and political lives and as a notion that is also essential in order to counteract the perverse effects of colonialism with regard to Indigenous nations. The legitimacy and legality required to establish a third order of government in Canada can flow from treaty federalism (White 2002, 93). Moreover, while treaty federalism invites us to begin by thinking about the conditions for Indigenous nations’ autonomous governance – it is clear that Indigenous Peoples see this as an opportunity to enshrine their right to self-government in law (Moses 2002, 247) – the agreement that flows from these very treaties is also related to federalism in the broader sense. White (2020, 92) points out: “Treaty federalism thus not only legitimizes an Aboriginal order of government, it also requires the development of relationships specifying

152

On Managing Societal Diversity

just how the ‘shared responsibilities’ take form.” Treaty federalism involves both self-governance and shared governance. It has to be noted that treaty federalism and even the introduction of a third order of government for Indigenous Peoples would not solve the problem of the somewhat limited representation of Indigenous Peoples and their interests in the Parliament of the Canadian federation. However, their active participation in other aspects of shared governance could be increased considerably. Depending on the political will of the federal government, appointing independent Indigenous senators to the Upper Chamber could help to reverse the tendency toward limited representation – and this is in the realm of possibility if the way senators are appointed is reformed (Pratte 2017). Similarly, in accordance with the rcap ’s recommendation, it would always be possible to introduce into the Canadian federation’s constitutional architecture an “Indigenous Peoples’ Chamber,” which would become part of Parliament on the same basis as the House of Commons and the Senate (inac 2010). That said, the introduction of a third order of government for Indigenous Peoples would above all be an opportunity to formally establish in the Canadian constitutional order the roles of (a) the Council of the Federation and (b) the First Ministers’ Conference. In short, the idea would be to strengthen what Laforest (2014, 150) calls the “Charest-Pelletier approach.” In 2003, under the leadership of Jean Charest, newly elected premier of Quebec, and Benoît Pelletier, Quebec’s minister of intergovernmental affairs, [the] Premiers agreed to create a Council of the Federation, as part of their plan to play a leadership role in revitalizing the Canadian federation and building a more constructive and cooperative federal system ... Under the Constitution, Canada’s two orders of government are of equal status, neither subordinate to the other, sovereign within their own areas of jurisdiction and accordingly, they should have adequate resources to meet their responsibilities ... There is a need to institute a new era of intergovernmental collaboration by promoting a constructive dialogue between the partners of the federation ... and to demonstrate their commitment to leadership through institutional innovation (Preamble to the Founding Agreement, Council of the Federation 2003).

Empowering Federal Impetus in Multinational Democracies

153

The Council of the Federation’s role is thus to ensure that the central government is not and does not consider itself the only guardian of the common good in the federal system (Laforest 2014, 135). Integrating Indigenous Peoples into the Council of the Federation would entail adding at least one designated seat to the table of partners in the political association. This would require amending the Founding Agreement so as to recognize three orders of government. It is not too difficult to imagine how the Assembly of First Nations could democratically choose the person to play the role of premier-equivalent (see subsection “Reconsidering the Assembly of First Nations” below7). Next, we need to review the role of the First Ministers’ Conference, an institution with extraordinary federalizing power but nonetheless the weak link in Canada’s federal culture according to Martin Papillon and Richard Simeon (2004). The conference is a key institution for cooperation among the governments of the provinces and the central government. Its historical roots date back to the emergence of the modern Canadian federation in 1867, although we had to wait forty years for the first conference to be held (Papillon and Simeon 2004, 116). Owing to some judicial activism on the part of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (the Supreme Court of Canada’s ancestor) but especially because of the creation of the Canadian welfare system, the First Ministers’ Conference grew in importance between the World Wars and in the period following World War II. The expansion of Canada’s social safety net required greater collaboration and cooperation between the orders of government because the competencies related to social issues belonged mainly to the provinces but the means for executing anything in those areas were still largely monopolized by the central government. However, for many reasons – including the desire expressed by Pierre Trudeau’s government to not give too much political leeway to the provinces with regard to Canada’s future and the conference’s failure to formally establish Quebec’s place in Canada’s constitutional order during the Meech and Charlottetown rounds (Gagnon 1994) – since the 1990s, the First Ministers’ Conference has failed to bring about healthy cooperation among the partners in the federation (Laforest and Montigny 2009, 134; Laforest 2014, 152). According to Papillon and Simeon (2004, 114), this institution has four principal inter-related problems: (1) the ad hoc, sporadic

154

On Managing Societal Diversity

meeting schedule, (2) the federal prime minister’s omnipotent power to decide whether or not to hold meetings, (3) a lack of clear rules and procedures for the institution’s operation, and (4) the absence of a bureaucratic system to ensure continuity and institutional memory. The introduction of a third order of government for Indigenous Peoples could be used as a springboard to enshrine this institution – and the Council of the Federation – in the constitutional order and then to create formal procedures and a regular or annual calendar of meetings. Since the First Ministers’ Conference and the Council of the Federation are complementary, these meetings could be key institutions to foster shared governance in the Canadian federation where tensions and conflicts related to the implementation of policies in areas under provincial or shared jurisdiction would be negotiated and adjusted regularly and systematically. In short, in addition to decolonizing the Canadian political system with regard to Indigenous Peoples, this would be an opportunity to strengthen collaboration and cooperation mechanisms among the partners in Canadian federal governance (Laforest and Montigny 2009; Asch 2014). In the spirit of “federal impetus” in multinational democracies, the notion of treaty federalism is useful for formulating and applying, through the institution of a third order of government, the legitimate principle of Indigenous Peoples’ self-determination (Henderson 1994). Moreover, it would also make it possible to reflect on the kinds of institutions that should structure such political self-determination and the relationships with the other orders of government, in particular with respect to shared powers. Looking at history in terms of treaty federalism, it seems promising for Indigenous Nations to propose a third order of government as a means of conveying their political demands (Hoehn 2012). However, Indigenous Peoples are not concentrated within a single area where they form a majority – for example, within a province; their lands are superposed, in a way, on the provinces. This means that achieving such a third order of government will require imagination and resilience. The “Personal Principle” and the Autonomy of Indigenous Nations

Political theorists have imagined many different analytical approaches and normative proposals for thinking about and managing societal diversity in the context of plural, divided, even fragmented societies. At the turn of the twentieth century, thinkers and politicians Karl

Empowering Federal Impetus in Multinational Democracies

155

Renner and Otto Bauer proposed a way of managing societal diversity that seems promising – at least in part – for Indigenous Peoples in Canada. Formally rejecting the centralizing-autonomist model (which we have called above the “normal” modern nation-state) because it does violence to the national diversity that constitutes many states, Renner and Bauer reflected on sustainable ways for a plurality of nations or demoi to live together within the same state without any of them formally dominating the others (Renner 2005 [1899]; Bauer 2000 [1924]). The joint work by Renner and Bauer seems relevant to the next part of our discussion because they promoted a conception of the nation that seems consistent with many Indigenous Peoples’ understanding of the notion (Patten 2005; Kymlicka 2005). Moreover, Renner and Bauer’s approach provides a way of thinking about how the multiscalar aspect of Indigenous societal cultures can evolve. Of course, Renner and Bauer, who were both influential members of Austria’s Social Democratic Workers’ Party at the time, were seeking a way of doing things that would prevent the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. They had this context in mind, and their primary goal was to find a way that would allow the Austrian and Hungarian peoples (both of which were more numerous than Indigenous nations in Canada) to coexist peacefully in a single state (Nimni 2005). We are not suggesting applying their proposals ipso facto but rather using their basic principles. In A Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy, Bauer defines the nation as “the totality of human beings bound together by a community of fate into a community of character” (Bauer 2000 [1924], 117). Bauer did not mean that the fact of belonging to a nation amounted to being subject to a destiny over which one has no control; instead, he suggested that the members of a nation experience a shared fate and that this is because of the relationships and “character” that they develop together. According to Bauer, it is the communality of the experience that differentiates the national community from other types of communities. Consequently, as Ephraim Nimni notes, individual existence is intimately related to one’s experience of cultural and national phenomena (Nimni 1994, 163–4). Renner is in substantial agreement with Bauer on this point (Renner 2005 [1899], 24–5), considering that a nation is a cultural and spiritual community (McGarry and Moore 2005, 65). Like Bauer – and influenced by German historian Friedrich Meinecke (Nimni 1999, 226) – Renner suggests that the very personality of a member of a

156

On Managing Societal Diversity

national community translates and always produces a certain image of his or her national culture (Patten 2005, 135). While it is somewhat “primordialist” in its approach to the concept of nation (Bauböck 2005, 84), Renner and Bauer’s reasoning seems relatively close to the understanding of most nationalist Indigenous authors, who, according to Roy, have a clearly primordialist take on the issue (Roy 2015, 97). For example, according to Taiaiake Alfred (1995, 190; 2005) and Leanne Simpson (2008), while Indigenous nations are not frozen in time, they seem to share a cultural and spiritual core that is well rooted in history, if not in time immemorial (Roy 2015, 96–8). This short theoretical discussion on the notion of nation shows that, for Indigenous Peoples, while the national community may have important symbolic ties with land and the earth, it can “be” and exist even if it is dispersed across many reserves and municipalities more or less distant from one another. Moreover, those who leave a reserve and move to an urban area or simply off-reserve, do not necessarily have the intention to cut themselves off from the national community, which they carry culturally and spiritually in their “personality” or character, as Renner and Bauer suggest. We will call this phenomenon the “personal principle.” Indigenous societal cultures that seek to institutionalize national pillars do not necessarily have to be located on a single “reserve.” They should be able to establish their institutions through various networks and levels of governance – thus in a multiscalar way. The approach advocated by Renner (2005 [1899], 26) and Bauer (2000 [1924], 259) with regard to the ties that may be maintained by individuals who have been exiled or expelled from their national homelands in a multinational state consists in considering the nation as a “corporation.”8 In a nutshell, a corporation is characterized by four dimensions: (1) control over its development, (2) internal autonomy, (3) recognition of its legal personality by public authorities, and (4) a seal for authenticating its acts (Verger 1999, 34–5). Therefore, in accordance with the personal principle, a nation as a corporation can develop in parallel with and within a (minority) national community without necessarily coming into conflict with that community in order to exist, and it can grow freely and autonomously. The example frequently given by Renner (2005 [1899]) is of the diversity of religious communities within a given political space. Public authorities can recognize many of them within a single territory

Empowering Federal Impetus in Multinational Democracies

157

because such communities control all aspects of their development and enjoy “internal autonomy.” Religious communities in this context can develop their own parallel institutions in a space that is more or less broad and well-defined. Owing to the personal principle, according to which an individual’s affiliation is a consequence of his or her membership in a cultural and spiritual community, there is no reason why different institutional networks cannot exist together, even intersect, potentially. Necessarily, focal points and territorial spaces may emerge where the density of the members in an area is sufficient. However, a given religious community can have institutional structures beyond a single territory, and it can coexist with other religious communities that also function in this way. We consider it reasonable that there could be similar personal principle dynamics for the third order of government for Indigenous Peoples in Canada. Naturally, this does not mean rejecting any territorial bases – and this was not in question in the work of Bauer and Renner either (Kymlicka 2005, 122). What it instead means is embracing the multiscalar nature of Indigenous societal cultures, which are necessarily organized from reserves and Indigenous municipalities. As autonomous corporations formally recognized by the political and legal system, each national community could make decisions on the distribution of its institutions between reserves and municipalities, and then a group or all of the Indigenous nations could work together to create common or shared institutions – for example, a university, which the individual nations would have difficulty setting up alone. Moreover, with regard to Indigenous people living off-reserve, the personal principle is revealing. We could imagine a method whereby Indigenous members wanting to remain affiliated with their nation could contribute (in)directly to taxes – for example, through agreements between Indigenous nations and the governments of the various provinces, if taxation were to become a competency of the third order of government. However, such agreements could make formal the terms for how the distribution of jurisdiction among the various orders of government would work. Here, the Council of the Federation and the First Ministers’ Conference could both play major roles. Powers over education, cultural and linguistic policy, religion, the social safety net and social programs, civil law, health care, taxation, the media – in short, everything that concerns the institutional development of a societal culture – can be shared asymmetrically

158

On Managing Societal Diversity

between, for example, a minority nation concentrated territorially in a province, let us say Quebec, and the eleven Indigenous nations that are also in that same territory. However, this would require formal spaces of discussion, negotiation, and cooperation in the political and institutional architecture of the federation. Lastly, in the spirit of the rcap ’s main recommendations, incorporating the personal principle and treaty federalism through the establishment of a third order of government in Canada would contribute to eliminating the residual elements of the colonial regime and of the Canadian state’s domination of Indigenous Peoples. In line with the definition of a nation as a corporation, Indigenous Peoples would be empowered to define and operationalize, by themselves and for themselves, their own criteria for membership in their nations and to choose their own political representatives democratically. In other words, this “possibility for Indigenous nations to self-identify would in consequence play a symbolic role in the spirit of decolonization of Canadian law, and also a strong, concrete, real role in that process” (Motard 2013, 504 [translation ]). Reconsidering the Assembly of First Nations

The Assembly of First Nations (afn ) is a “national advocacy organization representing First Nation citizens in Canada” (afn 2016). It has a confederal structure, and the leaders and chiefs of First Nations from across Canada direct the afn ’s work together, including “through resolutions passed at Chiefs Assemblies held at least twice a year” (afn 2016). The way the afn works is, grosso modo, that every three years, a national chief, ten regional chiefs, and the chairs of the three Elders’, Women’s, and Youth councils are elected. Its purpose is, in short: “The role of the National Chief and the afn is to advocate on behalf of First Nations as directed by Chiefs-in-Assembly.  This includes facilitation and coordination of national and regional discussions and dialogue, advocacy efforts and campaigns, legal and policy analysis, communicating with governments, including facilitating relationship building between First Nations and the Crown as well as public and private sectors and general public” (afn 2016). This makes it seem reasonable to propose to Indigenous Peoples that they re-examine the role they have given the Assembly of First Nations from the perspective of a third order of government in

Empowering Federal Impetus in Multinational Democracies

159

Canada. Among other things, the afn or rather a similar organization inclusive of First Nations, Inuit, and Métis people could be the central hub for the participation of Indigenous Peoples in the institutions of shared governance. The afn ’s mission would remain essentially the same, but Indigenous Peoples would have much more power and a major autonomous institution for developing and consolidating their societal cultures in a multiscalar way. Each Indigenous national community would autonomously control the growth of its societal culture to the maximum of its capacities, and then the afn would manage common or shared regional institutions to complete the picture. For example, a concerted effort by Indigenous Peoples could give birth to a university governed by Indigenous Peoples. In the long term, such a common institution could train citizens so that they would be even more apt to ensure that the afn worked well. There is every reason to think that by reconfiguring their confederal institutional apparatus, the 663 Indigenous communities, through the sixty Indigenous nations in Canada, could have a say with respect to significant political and cultural autonomy. However, this should not lead to a homogenization of Indigenous Peoples’ claims in Canada. This new institutional apparatus must be a springboard for the many Indigenous voices to be heard and for the differences between the peoples in Canada’s east, west, north, and south to be amplified, not muzzled. In the spirit of federal unity (Elazar 1987), which is at the heart of the multinational federal impetus, the different perspectives and many identities must be completely legitimate within the Canadian federation. This would also be a way to reinvest in and energize the federation’s shared governance institutions. More fundamentally, it would strengthen institutional asymmetry in Canada’s multinational federalism (Webber 1994, 259), creating a form of federalism that truly welcomes the deep societal diversity constitutive of and united in the political association. We know that Indigenous national aspirations are driven by a desire to take distance from the Western model of the nation, but it cannot be denied that these same aspirations are based in part on an imaginary that is consistent with the Western model (Roy 2015, 88). Whether it is because of intercultural contact or the hegemony of discourse on modernity in the world of symbolism surrounding Indigenous Peoples in Canada, Indigenous Peoples are necessarily

160

On Managing Societal Diversity

influenced by the West. In this respect, the proposals we are discussing here recognize the clear influence of modernity and the West on Indigenous Peoples’ national aspirations, but they take substantial distance from the moral and sociological monism inherited from difference-blind procedural liberalism, and it is our hope this makes it possible that these proposals may be seen as reasonable and legitimate in the eyes of Indigenous people. Ultimately, these are simply proposals that Indigenous people could discuss. We will now examine the conditions that the majority group could establish to design and achieve such a multinational federation.

empowerment conditions for the majority group At Queen’s University in Kingston, Ontario, political scientist Ronald L. Watts has undoubtedly made one of the greatest contributions to the advancement of knowledge on federalism and federations. In his seminal work published in 1966, New Federations: Experiments in the Commonwealth, Watts discusses at length the elements of autonomous governance – in other words, political autonomy, for provinces and sub-state entities. According to Watts (1966; 1996), it is just as important to think about the elements of shared governance – that is to say, what rallies and unifies the diversity constitutive of the federation. That is why, he argues, the purpose of a federation, and all the more so of a multinational federation, is to reconcile – in a manner that is harmonious and willing to accommodate diversity – both its centrifugal dynamics and its centripetal dynamics. This is precisely what underlies Daniel Elazar’s (1987, 64) discussion on federal unity: how can we promote and achieve unity without impeding or minimizing the expression of diversity? The sine qua non condition for the majority nation in a multinational federation to embrace federal impetus is for the unity of the state as a whole to be favoured as much as possible. The majority national community will also generally be interested in setting up conditions to ensure stability and efficient governance. At least, these are the elements that many English-speaking Canadian researchers insist on most in their work on federalism (Banting 1987; Banting and Simeon 1983; Cairns 2000; Flanagan 2000; Bakvis and Skogstad 2002). Before discussing the conditions for the majority nation in greater detail, we need to recall that in the dynamics of federal impetus,

Empowering Federal Impetus in Multinational Democracies

161

respect for political ethics that welcomes societal diversity cannot be sacrificed to pragmatic aesthetics that would serve, at any cost, the unity and stability of the country. It therefore seems legitimate and reasonable to note here that deep societal diversity in a state automatically generates conflict and political tension (Dieckhoff 2001, 248). This means that a degree of instability, in particular for identity-related reasons (Noël 2013, 176), has to be accepted as a “normal” part of the political landscape of a multinational federation (Gagnon 1993, 20). The majority national community will not be able to establish, in the name of political unity, major limitations on the conditions for minority components of societal diversity to take their places. Such limitations would amount to imposing a dynamic of domination (Pettit 1997) instead of instilling the conditions for peaceful cohabitation. That said, we should also not advocate diversity at the expense of any form of federal unity. In what follows, we will defend the argument that the conditions for Quebec and those for Indigenous Peoples strengthen democracy and the sustainability of the Canadian federation (1) because they favour the development and consolidation of political trust, (2) because significantly restricting the achievement of these conditions would not help to consolidate or even favour political unity, and (3) because embracing certain forms of asymmetrical federalism would not only meet the conditions for domestic societal minorities, but the majority group would find it desirable too. Political Trust and Federal Unity

In 2012, in the context of research conducted by the Groupe de recherche sur les sociétés plurinationales, political scientists Dimitrios Karmis and François Rocher published a collective work entitled La dynamique confiance/méfiance dans les démocracies multinationales. It was then translated into English for publication in 2018 by McGillQueen’s University Press, under the title Trust, Distrust and Mistrust in Multinational Democracies: Comparative Perspectives. As they put it in the introduction, the purpose of their study is trust, a notion that came to the forefront in the social sciences in the 1990s (Fukuyama 1995; Putnam 2000; Rothstein 2005). However, at that time the focus was essentially on the “cognitive” dimension of trust at the interpersonal level. According to those studies, it is generally accepted that trust between two individuals is important to supporting a healthy,

162

On Managing Societal Diversity

stable relationship. The two parties thereby develop a cognitive mechanism that leads them each to believe that the other will keep promises and not try to harm them. In game theory, this makes it possible to posit multiple rounds such that when two or more parties play, it will not be a zero-sum game. However, this type of relationship can be observed at levels other than the uniquely interpersonal. It is also part of the world of politics. In politics, the trust-distrust dynamic can be measured according to the balance prevailing between majority and minority national groups. In a context where power relations are asymmetrical, the expectations of reciprocity in relation to trust must also be asymmetrical. In other words, given its political weight, the more influential group does not have to trust its minority partners because its interests are preserved by the simple fact of exercising power ... It does not necessarily need to count on minority stakeholders’ trust to govern. Trust facilitates relationships and governance, but it is not a prior condition. In contrast, for minority groups, it is a completely different story. Political stability requires establishing a trusting relationship based on the conviction that the decisions the majority takes will not harm the minority. For the minority to endorse the proposed changes, it has to have reasons, based on experience, leading it to believe that its interests have been and will continue to be taken into account (Rocher 2012b, 141–2 [translation ]). Thus, in addition to pursuing political ethics willing to accommodate deep societal diversity, from a pragmatic point of view it becomes useful to the majority group to grant the type of conditions that we described above concerning the fragile Quebec nation and fragile Indigenous nations. Indeed, the consequences of categorically refusing to do so could engender greater instability than accepting it (Norman 2006, 192). We will come back to this in the next subsection. In any case, in a multinational federation, the political relationship of trust between the partners must be studied as a dynamic “in that it changes over time and is built through accumulation of experiences” (Rocher 2012b, 143 [translation ]). In a multinational context, we think it is useful to follow in Peter Russell’s footsteps and capture the meaning of the trust-distrust dynamic between partners using Russell Hardin’s formulation: “encapsulated interests”

Empowering Federal Impetus in Multinational Democracies

163

(Russell 2012, 118). In short, what Hardin (2006, 6) means by “encapsulated interests” is the idea that I think you are trustworthy because I think it is in your interest to take my interest seriously: you encapsulate my interests in your own interests. However, independent of this dynamic, the majority group might consider that any formal recognition of societal diversity, as we propose in this chapter, is corrosive to political unity because it strengthens what differentiates citizens from one another in the political association (Cairns 2000, 7–8). It is precisely for this reason that many refuse to use the term “nations” when speaking about Quebec and the Indigenous Peoples in Canada (Cairns 2000, 93; Flanagan 2000, 6; Jedwab 2004). This looks like a consequence of the internalization, in contemporary societies, of the myth of the “normal” modern nation-state (Parekh 2006, 188–9; Laforest 2014, 48) – that is to say, it is a consequence of what Elazar (1987, 66) refers to as “consolidated unity.” Such a vision is counterproductive to the development of encapsulated interests by partners in a multinational federation. In contrast, according to James Tully (1995, 197–8), mutual recognition between partners in a multinational whole creates unity and develops a feeling of trust. Tully points out that if an individual’s aspiration to experience local community citizenship is not officially recognized by the other partners, then that individual may feel excluded or unwanted in the political association. Inversely, being recognized as having a distinct identity can give the individual a feeling of membership in and identification with the whole, if and only if the group to which the individual belongs has its word to say about the principles that guide the political enterprise of togetherness, since the individual’s distinct cultural identity is recognized and affirmed through political institutions. Similarly, the majority group may argue that such recognition of deep societal diversity will create ethnocultural ghettos that will divide the political association instead of helping toward its unity (Cairns 2000, 212). On one hand, in line with Anne Phillips’s multiculturalism without culture (chapter 1), “a Constitutional association which recognises and accommodates cultural diversity ... provides the social basis for critical reflection on and dissent from one’s own cultural institutions and traditions of interpretation” (Tully 1995, 207; Parekh 2006). Moreover, a third order of government for Indigenous Peoples and renewed asymmetrical federalism for Quebec – and Indigenous Peoples – require sustainable,

164

On Managing Societal Diversity

long-term intergovernmental relationships with the central government. On the other hand, we should not confuse “consolidated” unity with “federal” unity. As Peter Russell points out, the idea of trust built on encapsulated interests in a multinational federation “is very far from trust based on the fact that the members of the political community share a common vision of citizenship” (Russell 2012, 136 [translation ]). Of course, recognizing societal diversity in a multinational federation potentially generates some kind of political instability. However, recognizing it does not mean renouncing unity if we adopt a non-holistic conception of federal political unity – at the same time, it must be stated that refusing altogether to recognize diversity is not necessarily a way to guarantee political stability. Political Distrust and Federal Instability

Political trust is a dynamic, and that dynamic can also wear the face of distrust between the partners in a multinational federation. If the majority nation desires unity and political stability at any cost, it is possible that political actors may take a difference-blind procedural liberalism approach and adopt pro-assimilation discourse, claiming that democracy will be healthier if everyone exclusively commits to a form of citizenship that is “one and indivisible.” Over the long term, if assimilation is total, this might generate stability and political unity, but it would be the embodiment of domination by the majority, as discussed in Alain-G. Gagnon’s 2008 essay La Raison du plus fort (“Might Makes Right”), and it would be completely incompatible with federal impetus. From an ethical point of view of politics rooted in liberal nationalism (chapter 5), we absolutely must reject such an undertaking. However, what about when we take the pragmatic perspective? Russell Hardin’s expression “encapsulated interests” implies that I trust you because I believe that it is in your interest to take my interests seriously. However, is it in the majority nation’s interest to take societal minorities’ interests seriously or, more precisely, to see establishment of the conditions for minority groups’ empowerment as in their interest? The empirical work of Réjean Pelletier and Jérôme Couture (2012) and of Adam Holesch (2016) is very informative in this regard. Comparing the Quebec–Canada relationship

Empowering Federal Impetus in Multinational Democracies

165

with the Catalonia–Spain relationship, Pelletier and Couture show that trust in institutions is fundamental to the proper functioning of a multinational democracy because it both creates and constrains political leaders’ ability to act. Beyond unity and political stability, high political trust increases governments’ leeway to manage problems that come up (Pelletier and Couture 2012, 292). Trust between the partners in a multinational federation thus has an important role to play in ensuring efficient and, especially, legitimate governance. Moreover, we can question the validity of Alan Cairns’s premise that official, constitutionalized recognition of societal diversity necessarily has a corrosive effect on unity and political stability (Cairns 2000, 155). If we accept the idea that strong trust in a multinational federation’s central political institutions and government is a guarantee of greater unity and political stability than strong distrust, then we have to reject Cairns’s position. As Pelletier and Couture explain: “With regard to the level of trust placed in central political institutions, there is little difference between those who have dual identity and those who identify only with the majority nation ... Those who identify only with the minority nation are more different from the other two groups in that they have much less trust in central political institutions” (Pelletier and Couture 2012, 310 [translation ]). This means that the majority nation’s objective should be to foster the emergence of at least some feeling of belonging to the encompassing state but not to limit individuals’ more or less strong attachment to their local or regional community. Moreover, as we have pointed out, recognition of diversity is in itself a driving symbolic force for creating identification with a broader political undertaking because it ensures that no one feels excluded. In other words, “the political authorities of a multinational central state should accept and recognize, not oppose or ignore, dual identity for it is a source of trust” (Pelletier and Couture 2012, 316; Holesch 2016, 249 [translation]). Inversely, a feeling that there is a “recognition deficit” (Seymour 2010) or of being in “internal exile” in one’s own country (Laforest 2014) can generate an identity-related backlash in which individuals who feel they belong to a minority community will reject the encompassing political identity because it will seem to them to be part of domination dynamics that oppose the dignity of their aspirations for their primary community citizenship.

166

On Managing Societal Diversity

Asymmetry and the Interests of the Majority Group

For the majority group in Canada, accepting to work toward a multinational federation would require substantially revisiting the foundational myths that largely support their vision of the Canadian state as one nation in which all the provinces must be treated the same way (McRoberts 1999; Bouchard 2013; 2014; 2019). We will look at this aspect in greater depth in the next chapter. However, embracing the spirit of multinational federalism would give the majority group a better understanding of its interests as a distinct national political community or at least as a specific linguistic political community. That the majority group in Canada self-identifies as a nation or, more generally, as a linguistic community is not very relevant to the rest of the discussion (Resnick 1994; Kymlicka 1998), since the idea is to study the interests specific to English-speaking Canadians as a majority national community in the federation (Kymlicka 1998, 159). Identifying those interests will both increase their desire for asymmetrical multinational federalism – for that type of federalism would meet their needs better and be in their interest – and increase their understanding of the empowerment conditions proposed for Indigenous Peoples and Quebecers. The idea is to expand Hardin’s notion of encapsulated interests. What are the interests of the majority group? In a way, they overlap with the conditions we have pointed out: unity and political stability and also efficient governance. Let us add to this what Kymlicka (1998, 163) describes as English-speaking Canadians’ desire to not be constrained by an excessively rigid distribution of powers and competencies between the central and provincial orders of government. Having acquired and strongly internalized the idea of a pan-Canadian national community, the majority nation in Canada does not want a distribution of powers and competencies between the central and provincial orders of government to limit or delay the achievement of certain political and social goals (Kymlicka 2001, 254–5). We agree with Kymlicka that renewed asymmetrical federalism would make it possible for Canada’s English-speaking provinces to form broader, more comprehensive alliances in which they could agree to limit the roles of their provincial governments to allow greater, but delimited, intervention by the central government in their jurisdictions. Not only would that make it possible for the majority nation (or at least for some provinces) to make English Canadian culture more dynamic,

Empowering Federal Impetus in Multinational Democracies

167

but it would in itself be a form of lifelong education on the value and importance of asymmetrical federal institutions for societal minorities. In other words, if such were their desire, a group of English-speaking provinces could legitimize revigorated federal spending power in some of their provincial jurisdictions. In the end, adopting such a stance would make it possible for the majority group to be more faithful to its conception of “consolidated” unity in the English-speaking community without preventing the development of a form of federal unity properly speaking. Moreover, this would favour the acceptance of asymmetry toward internal societal minorities because it would no longer be perceived as a mechanism uniquely in service to members of societal minorities. Lastly, by strengthening federal impetus in a multinational context, it would facilitate adding specific conditions into the Canadian constitutional order that would be conducive to togetherness in accordance with political trust based on encapsulated interests.

conclusion In view of the above, liberalism that welcomes diversity – that is, liberal nationalism – has no legitimate reasons or arguments to dismiss the empowerment conditions proposed in this chapter. In a spirit similar to that of Laforest (1998), we advocate three sets of empowerment conditions in line with the dynamics of federal impetus. In all three cases, the purpose is to favour the constitutional empowerment of the partners within the political association and, more precisely, to enable them to develop and consolidate their societal cultures autonomously. In the first set, we considered the conditions for Quebec. Quebec is a minority nation territorially concentrated in the province of Québec. The conditions for Quebec – (1) national recognition, (2) language rights, (3) immigration and integration powers, (4) fiscal autonomy, (5) internal self-determination, and (6) external self-determination – could be written into the Canadian constitutional order by reconfiguring the distribution of central and provincial powers asymmetrically. The second set of conditions, that of Indigenous Peoples, would require rethinking in greater depth the nature of Canadian multinational federalism. However, these conditions are all in the direction of greater institutional asymmetry in the design and application of equitable, accommodating treatment of the deep societal diversity that

168

On Managing Societal Diversity

constitutes a multinational federation. In short, to structure and facilitate the consolidation of multiscalar societal cultures of Indigenous Peoples, we suggested (1) pursuing the idea of a third order of government in the edifice of Canadian federalism, which would (2) be rooted in the principle of treaty federalism; next, (3) taking inspiration from “personal principle” and the notion of the nation as a “corporation,” examining how the magnetism of Indigenous Peoples’ societal cultures could go beyond and consolidate the territorial space of their reserves and municipalities, and, lastly, (4) rethinking, in these terms, the role of the Assembly of First Nations. Finally, the third set of conditions concerns the expectations of the majority nation for which the conditions in line with federal impetus in multinational contexts must not be to the detriment of unity and political stability or an obstacle to efficient political governance. These legitimate conditions can be met in a way that is consistent with federal impetus and the conditions for internal societal minorities. This would contribute to the unity and stability of the Canadian federation because (1) it would favour the development and consolidation of political “trust” between the partners in the political association, (2) the fact of significantly attenuating the achievement of these conditions would, in addition to creating greater political distrust, not help to consolidate or even favour unity and political stability, and, lastly, (3) with regard to efficient political governance, embracing asymmetrical federal dynamics is desirable for both societal minorities and the majority group. In the next chapter, we bring together the subjective (chapter 5) and objective (chapter 6) dimensions of national fragility by focusing on the case of Quebec in relation to the model of accommodating (ethno)cultural diversity that we have judged optimal for minority nations that may themselves be majorities in relation to their own internal ethnocultural diversity. This will lead us to discuss in greater detail some of the changes that need to be made to Canada’s constitutional order for its dynamics to be closer to those of federal impetus in multinational contexts.

7

Rethinking Pluralism in Multinational Democracies

In chapter 5, we defended a conception of “federal impetus” – which flows from the spirit of multinational federalism and liberal nationalism – and proposed a line of reasoning that could allow us to progress in that direction. Next, in chapter 6, we identified three sets of conditions for empowering federal impetus in multinational democracies that would be hospitable to societal diversity constitutive of a complex society such as Canada’s. In this chapter, we will revisit and re-evaluate the Canadian model of pluralism. We will suggest that it is possible and useful, for strengthening federal impetus, to combine the dynamics of multiculturalism with those of interculturalism (contra Parekh 2016) in the spirit of greater constitutional asymmetry with respect to managing deep societal diversity. We will focus mainly on Quebec as a minority nation that is part of the Canadian multinational democracy. This chapter is divided into two parts. First, we examine in greater detail the theoretical discussion on pluralism that we began in chapter 1. We will review the differences and especially the similarities and complementary features of the multicultural and intercultural models of pluralism. After distinguishing these two models of pluralism on the theoretical and normative levels, we will explore the reasonable and legitimate limits to be imposed on interculturalism’s (Bouchard 2012) ad hoc preferential treatment of the majority group – which is in fact a minority nation in the multinational whole. This will also make it possible to address the “negative conditions” for the English-speaking national minority in Quebec to align with the empowerment of federal impetus in a multinational context. Second, taking an approach similar to that of the Pepin-Robarts

170

On Managing Societal Diversity

Task Force on Canadian Unity, we will propose an asymmetrical reconfiguration of the Canadian model for managing ethnocultural and societal diversity. We will begin by investigating the forms that could be taken by a combination of interculturalism for the relatively fragile Quebec nation and multiculturalism for the English-speaking majority nation. In line with the conditions for empowering internal societal minorities (chapter 6), we will discuss the political and symbolic repercussions of some key changes to be made to the Canadian constitutional order if we wish to live in Canada in a way that respects and energizes federal impetus in multinational democracy. In short, we will look at the challenge involved in a major overhaul of the political imaginaries of the majority group to be able to think of Canada as a properly multinational federal democracy.

interculturalism as a model of pluralism for fragile nations In this chapter, we are arguing in favour of the idea that interculturalism is the best model for managing ethnocultural diversity in the context of fragile minority nations. Owing to both subjective and objective aspects of the fragility of minority nations in multinational democracies,1 interculturalism seems to be the model that is universally valid as an approach to togetherness that is respectful to the majority – itself a minority – and the minorities that coexist with it. We will start by discussing the broad literature on interculturalism. First, “interculturalism” as understood here is limited to a theoretical and normative model of pluralism. It should thus be distinguished from “interculturality” and “intercultural cities” as proposed, among others, by the Council of Europe (2015), Ted Cantle (2012; 2016), Richard Zapata-Barrero (2016), and Bob White (2016).2 The literature of interculturality focuses more specifically on dialogue and cultural exchanges in (big) contemporary cities. There seems to be a desire to eliminate, or at least minimize, through the lens of interculturality, the political impact of power relations in society such that each individual would participate in the intercultural dialogue as a “minority” owing to his or her specific personal life experiences. Interculturality seems useful for imagining many intercultural dialogue initiatives in major urban centres that are home to “super diversity” (Vertovec 2010). In such places, the national majority no longer has the cultural and symbolic weight that it usually exercises,

Rethinking Pluralism in Multinational Democracies

171

and there is reason to hope, for the proponents of this approach, that a dialogue “between minorities” would occur – ideally free of any form of domination and even of any power relations. However, interculturality cannot avoid the problem of the relationship between such large cities and the rest of the society in which they are located (Carpentier 2020). In other words, although said big cities are in and of themselves small complex societies, they also create challenges at the level of the encompassing society. The form of interculturalism we will be discussing here is different from interculturality, but it is not necessarily opposed or contrary to interculturality in (big) cities (see Gagnon and Jouve 2009). In Quebec as elsewhere, for the past fifteen years or so, interculturalism has been a growing topic of discussion and debate with regard to the model of pluralism that could solve the problems facing multiculturalism (Meer, Modood, and Zapata-Barrero 2016; Kymlicka 2016). Charles Taylor (2016, viii) nonetheless argues that we have still not managed to come up with a theoretical framework that would, on one hand, do justice to the differences between interculturalism and multiculturalism and, on the other hand, clearly identify the contexts where interculturalism should be considered and those where multiculturalism would be more appropriate. We hope to contribute to this discussion by proposing a theoretical framework that deals with this problem. As we have just seen, Cantle (2012; 2016) and Zapata-Barrero (2016) argue that interculturalism, or in fact the idea of interculturality, offers a completely original theoretical framework with respect to multiculturalism. According to these authors, interculturality focuses more on social cohesion and managing ethnocultural diversity at the level of the city, contrary to multiculturalism, which would operate at the state and societal levels. In contrast, Meer and Modood (2016) and Kymlicka (2016) hold that interculturalism does not provide a normative and theoretical framework that is different from multiculturalism. At best, interculturalism could be perceived as complementary to multiculturalism (Meer, Modood, and ZapataBarrero 2016) or simply as a rhetorical strategy promoted by critics who attack multiculturalism (Kymlicka 2016). From a Quebec perspective, Bouchard (2012), Gagnon (2000), Gagnon and Iacovino (2007; 2016), Rocher (2015), and Rocher and White (2014) suggest that interculturalism is an alternative to Canadian multiculturalism for managing ethnocultural diversity. In other words, for these

172

On Managing Societal Diversity

authors, interculturalism is “a Quebec point of view” on pluralism. Lastly, according to Patrick Loobuyck (2016), interculturalism has to be understood as an original normative proposal that is closely aligned with liberal nationalism, constitutional patriotism, and multiculturalism. Parekh (2016, 279) holds, however, that we cannot combine interculturalism and multiculturalism into a single “superior” theory of pluralism. Similarly, according to François Boucher, “attempts to distinguish interculturalism from multiculturalism end in failure” (2016b, 37 [translation ]). We hope to show that there is reason to be more optimistic about this. In short, interculturalism as a theoretical and normative model of pluralism focuses on social and institutional management of ethnocultural diversity (Gagnon 2000). As we said in chapter 1, pluralism brings together different theoretical models (principally multiculturalism and interculturalism) that can in turn be oriented in accordance with liberal, civic, or communitarian thinking (Maclure 2010, 40–1). We suggest that, generally, all models of pluralism offer more or less balanced arrangements designed to meet three imperatives3: (1) they reject attempts to “assimilate” minorities, (2) they implement differentiated or special rights for different types of minorities through the lens of “recognition,” and (3) they favour the “integration” of immigrant minorities into the host society. Both interculturalism and multiculturalism embrace these three principles (Weinstock 2013, 107). Their main difference does not lie so much in the nature of the principles they are meant to defend but in their interpretations of these principles. More precisely, what differentiates them is the “social imaginary” that forms the basis for thinking about pluralism (chapter 1), and, in consequence, this influences the weighting that is the basis for their representations of, or what they say to themselves about, their obligations to minorities. Both interculturalism and multiculturalism clearly begin with the first principle, which rejects the assimilation of ethnocultural minorities into the host society (Kymlicka 1995; Parekh 2006; Bouchard 2012; Gagnon and Iacovino 2016). The major difference comes from the fact that interculturalism seeks to give precedence to the third principle – namely, integration of immigrant minorities into the host society. Afterwards, it concerns itself with recognizing minorities through the granting of differentiated rights, since this appears to be the most responsible and efficient way to encourage their integration within the host society (Gagnon 2000; Bouchard 2012, 39).

Rethinking Pluralism in Multinational Democracies

173

Multiculturalism embraces a slightly different dynamic, seeking to concentrate first on applying the second principle – recognition of differentiated or special rights for minorities – whereby integrating minorities into the host society is not stressed with the same energy but is rather seen as a natural effect of providing politics of recognition (Modood 2014; Gagnon et al. 2014, 19–20). However, we should note that while insisting first on integrating ethnocultural minorities into the host society, interculturalism does so through the lens of differentiated rights and mechanisms for recognizing immigrant minorities. Likewise, when multiculturalism insists first on mechanisms for recognizing differentiated rights for immigrant minorities, the ultimate goal is to integrate them into the host society. Therefore, the primary distinction between interculturalism and multiculturalism lies in the “imaginary” – that is, the broad narrative on the basis of which these models take the path of pluralism. The symbolic aspect of this distinction between the two models should not be minimized: it concerns the social imaginary on the basis of which the society views and understands pluralism. For example, a national community that is in the majority at the level of the state and does not have any deep existential concerns about its sustainability may find it reasonable to insist first on recognition of minorities in the broader process of their integration into the host society. Since it is a majority nation, the symbolic foundations that allow it to “make society” seem and in fact are well protected on both the political and legal levels (Rocher 2012b, 141). In contrast, for a relatively fragile minority nation that is worried and uncertain about its future as a national community, it is much more appropriate and reasonable to take the integration of ethnocultural minorities as a first step toward embracing pluralism and differentiated rights. This tempers the imaginary of national fragility in that recognition of ethnocultural minorities is presented first in the context of their integration into the host society. In other words, from the point of view of a fragile minority nation and of interculturalism, integration of ethnocultural minorities into the host society is the foundation for recognition obligations. It appears as the very basis of the “moral contract” between the host society and its internal ethnocultural minorities. Discussing the value of said “moral contract,” Gagnon and Iacovino go on by stressing the idea that interculturalism promotes active citizenship participation and public deliberation as preferred ways to manage conflicts, hence favouring

174

On Managing Societal Diversity

“mediation, compromise and negotiation” over legal proceedings, even though these might be necessary as an option of last resort (Gagnon and Iacovino 2007, 133). In a slightly different way, from the point of view of the majority nation and multiculturalism, duties with regard to recognizing ethnocultural minorities are the foundation for integration into the host society, not the other way around. Also, it could be said that multiculturalism favours more promptly than interculturalism legal proceedings to manage conflicts. According to Gérard Bouchard (2012, 30–40), interculturalism is based on a duality paradigm in which there is recognition of a cultural majority that is more or less well defined and also recognition of ethnocultural minorities that must be integrated into the cultural majority. In contrast, multiculturalism begins with the diversity paradigm, in which, a little like the dynamics of interculturality, it supposes that in society there are only “minorities” or minority groups that must find a way of living together. The latter approach was characteristic of Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s multiculturalism plan for Canada – the Official Languages Act (1969), the Canadian Multiculturalism Policy (1971), section 27 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982), the consolidation of all of the above in the Canadian Multiculturalism Act (1988), and his reaction to the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission (chapter 2). Since the majority nation usually does not fear, or even imagine, that it could disappear, it is ready to tell itself a story about pluralism as if it did not exist, as if there were no power relations in society – even though, of course, power relations are indeed involved (Maclure and Taylor 2011 [2010], 86). This is something that is generally seen in majority nationalisms, which are often hesitant to recognize that they themselves are a form of nationalism (Lecours and Nootens 2007). Owing to the fragility – on both the subjective (myths and imaginaries) and objective (limited institutions) levels – of minority nations in multinational contexts, interculturalism seems more appropriate in cases like that of Quebec. In the imaginary of interculturalism, priority is placed on integrating newcomers into the societal culture while not neglecting the society’s duties with respect to recognition (Modood 2014, 11). Therefore, and contrary to the literature we associated with “interculturality,” we believe that interculturalism (a) should be conceptualized not through the intermediary of the framework of the nation-state but through that of multinationality, (b) is therefore not the opposite of or opposed to multiculturalism

Rethinking Pluralism in Multinational Democracies

175

but is complementary to it in that a multinational state may very well adopt an asymmetrical model with respect to pluralism and support interculturalism for the fragile minority nation or nations it encompasses and multiculturalism for the majority nation, and (c) is no longer limited to being a “Quebecers’ point of view” (Bouchard 2012) but is the model of pluralism universally valid for fragile minority nations. That said, we will now take another look at the architecture of public policy on diversity management in Canada by imaging how we could combine interculturalism and multiculturalism into a single sovereign state. Although this undertaking may look difficult according to some, such as Parekh (2016, 279), it simply seems like the natural extension of Kymlicka’s theoretical development (1995). In other words, the theoretical rationale proposed by Kymlicka (1995) appears useful for imagining this “superior theory” of pluralism, which combines the dynamics of interculturalism and multiculturalism in the framework of a single complex society. As we saw in chapter 1, Kymlicka distinguishes the types of special or differentiated rights that the majority group must grant minorities depending on their type – that is, depending on whether what is in question is an immigrant minority, an Indigenous people, or a minority nation. Put simply, we do not see any major incompatibility in incorporating into Kymlicka’s overall theory of pluralism (1995), and more specifically into his understanding of rights for “national minorities,” a form of interculturalism such as that defended by Bouchard (2012; 2016), Gagnon (2000), Gagnon and Iacovino (2007; 2016) and Rocher (2015). Interculturalism and the Rights of Minority Nations in Will Kymlicka’s Work

If we look at the principal aspects of interculturalism according to a key figure in the literature on pluralism, Gérard Bouchard (2012), we find significant convergence with what Kymlicka provides in terms of rights for “national minorities.” We believe that stressing the connection between both theories makes it possible to explore the expression of such differentiated or asymmetrical rights in greater depth. Note once again that what Kymlicka means by “national minority” refers to what we have defined as minority nations (chapter 1). According to Bouchard (2012), seven aspects mainly characterize interculturalism as an expression of pluralism. First, interculturalism

176

On Managing Societal Diversity

guarantees equal respect for the rights of all through rule of law. In accordance with the principle of recognition – that is to say, giving equal respect or equal dignity to all individuals – interculturalism advocates fair, responsible use of reasonable accommodation (Bouchard 2012, 54), which is also the case in Kymlicka’s theory (2001, 30). Such accommodations must be understood as ways of attenuating migration shock that take into account the sociocultural capital of new arrivals. By creating bridges between the different cultures and the host society, such cushioning is meant to facilitate social integration. Second, interculturalism proposes to the fragile minority nation that its commonly used language be institutionalized as the main language of civic life and common culture. In Quebec, for example, the French language, perceived as the common denominator of all Quebecers, would be a vector for social integration. The language embodies the idea of “cultural and national convergence” for all Quebecers (Rocher 2015, 40). Likewise, in addition to creating some feeling of belonging, language provides access to public debates, educational content, the media, politics, national history and, more broadly, the job market and cultural life (Rocher, Rocher, and Labelle 1995; Gagnon 2000). Third, in accordance with Kymlicka’s theory (1995), interculturalism recognizes ethnocultural diversity as an intrinsic component of the present and future of the national community. The idea is to constantly expand the field of an “inclusive us” (Bouchard 2012, 58). With regard to Quebec’s experience, Joseph Carens provides a good summary of the spirit of interculturalism when he says: “In integrating immigrants, Quebec is transforming not only their identity but its own as well” (Carens 2000, 133). Fourth, interculturalism sees integration as a two-way process. It means helping immigrants to adapt to the host society, but they must in return accept the host society’s legal system and governing institutions (Bouchard 2012, 65). This corresponds to the sphere of “polyethnic rights” that Kymlicka recommends for immigrant minorities. In this sense, interculturalism completes this dimension of the special rights for protecting immigrant minorities by introducing ad hoc preferential treatment measures for the majority (Meer, Modood, and Zapata-Barrero 2016, 18) where the majority is itself a minority with respect to other groups in the encompassing state. A fragile nation sometimes benefits from “reasonable

Rethinking Pluralism in Multinational Democracies

177

accommodations” to protect its “symbolic foundations” (Bouchard 2012; 2016) or, more broadly, its societal culture. Such “external protection” measures, to use Kymlicka’s term, must not, however cause major injury to other ethnocultural minorities with respect to exercising their basic rights. Nonetheless, this normative authorization for ad hoc preferential treatment for the fragile minority nation can sometimes translate into “internal constraints” (chapter 1). Now, how can we legitimate and accurately distinguish reasonable measures from those that are not? The literature seems to be suffering from a serious deficiency in answers to this important line of questioning. It will be the subject of the next subsection. Fifth, interculturalism promotes closer ties and interactions between cultural groups to support integration. Taking the form of a dialogue, these exchanges must help to “bring not only minorities closer to each other, but also members of the majority closer to members of minorities” (Bouchard 2012, 66 [translation ]). Kymlicka (1995) aims at a similar process when he addresses the integration of new arrivals into a societal culture. Sixth, interculturalism insists on the development of a common culture as a way of meeting with diversity. For this, it proposes constructing a common culture based on two broad components. To begin with, it calls for prescriptive elements – the language of civic and public life, the charters and laws that apply to all citizens (equality, justice, freedom, democracy, respect for human life, non-violence, autonomy of the state and of religions) (Bouchard 2012, 68). Next, it calls for “norms and models corresponding to broadly shared, but not codified, values (solidarity, personal autonomy, mutual respect, a sense of common good, respect for the past, citizenship)” (Bouchard 2012, 69 [translation ]). These two components are fairly close to a conception of liberal nationalism (Tamir 1995; Kennedy 2013, 32; Loobuyck 2016) that Kymlicka seems to be perfectly comfortable with (Kymlicka 1995, 1–2). Lastly, seventh, interculturalism promotes the notion of a national societal culture as the dynamic embodiment of common culture. In other words, we must understand the societal culture of a fragile minority nation as one that embodies “public operative values” (Parekh 2006), as we discussed in chapter 5. Such a national societal culture as the dynamic embodiment of common culture is thus meant to promote active citizenship and national belonging that are

178

On Managing Societal Diversity

equal to the vivacity of its members’ multiple, uninhibited identities. Interculturalism seems to embrace the conditions that are necessary for experiencing “multicultural citizenship” in Kymlicka’s sense (1995), just as it fits in naturally with empowering federal impetus in multinational contexts. In addition, owing to the ad hoc preferential treatment that interculturalism proposes, this model of pluralism makes it possible to symbolically and politically attenuate the subjective and objective fragility of a minority nation such as Quebec. It remains that it would be unreasonable to fail to provide a structure for such ad hoc preferential treatment measures. Otherwise, the protection for the symbolic foundations and the societal culture of the fragile minority nation could be detrimental to the recognition policies that must be put in place for Quebec’s internal minorities. Reasonable Limits on Ad Hoc Preferential Treatment Measures

Bouchard suggests (2011, 413) that (like other fragile minority nations) Quebec, as a liberal political community in its own right, can legitimately benefit from an ad hoc margin of manoeuvre or ad hoc preferential treatment4 to protect and consolidate its distinct societal culture in the logic of interculturalism. He says that all societies incorporate such ad hoc margins of manoeuvre, which means that this mechanism is not specific to interculturalism (Bouchard 2011, 452). Partly right, this reasoning poses a problem because Bouchard thinks about interculturalism through the lens of the nation-state. In the framework of a nation-state, the majority – owing to its status as a majority (Rocher 2012b, 141) – inevitably ends up exercising power similar to what we are presenting here as an ad hoc margin of manoeuvre. Nonetheless, as we are suggesting, systematically structuring it into a theory of interculturalism for fragile minority nations becomes meaningful when the constitutional framework in which it operates is that of a multinational democracy, not a nation-state. However, some authors (Buchanan 1997; Weinstock 1999; Patten 1999; Moore 1999; Benhabib 2002, 66) challenge the appropriateness of such an approach, which would aim to cultivate and preserve one specific cultural identity rather than another or all at the same time. It therefore seems necessary to explore in greater depth whether, in a pluralist liberal democracy, ad hoc preferential treatment in favour of a fragile minority nation is reasonable and fair to all.

Rethinking Pluralism in Multinational Democracies

179

In order to answer this question, we have to begin by circumscribing more precisely what is meant by “ad hoc margin of manoeuvre” or “ad hoc preferential treatment” for the majority group, which, we must not forget, is itself a minority nation. A bit like David Miller (1995) and Margaret Canovan (1996), Gérard Bouchard (2012, 121) argues that it is essential for a pluralist society to maintain a degree of “cultural capital,” a sort of “symbolic foundation” that serves as a reference point for collective action and togetherness (see Banfield 1958; Putnam 2000). In other words, “every society needs a symbolic foundation (identity, memory, etc.) to ensure its balance” (Bouchard 2011, 417 [translation ]). We can also argue with Maclure and Taylor (2011 [2010], 68) that, even from a fundamentally liberal perspective, “it is only natural that certain public norms should be rooted in the attributes and interests of the majority.” This is also what Kymlicka (1995, 51–2) and Spinner-Halev (1994, 12) argue when they say that no liberal democracy is truly neutral from a cultural point of view. If we accept Kymlicka’s reasoning according to which a “just” liberal society must at least provide a social and institutional framework – a societal culture – that allows everyone to be autonomous and enjoy individual rights and freedoms (Kymlicka 1995, 92–3), there is no fundamental reason in liberalism that requires us to refuse for minority nations what we accept or tolerate for majority nations. In other words, if a minority nation has a dynamic societal culture, it offers the same guarantees of equal opportunity and self-development for individuals as does the societal culture of a majority nation (Spinner-Halev 1994, 140–66; Carens 2000, 123–5). However, for the societal culture of minority nations to be dynamic, it seems a priori reasonable to support the legitimacy of some ad hoc margin of manoeuvre that would, in turn, make it possible to consolidate, if necessary, the symbolic foundations that are the conditions of possibility for any political collectivity to “make society.” Such an ad hoc margin of manoeuvre thus appears as a useful lever to alleviate minority nations’ relative sense of fragility. That said, how can the limits of such an ad hoc margin of manoeuvre be established, and where should they be? Bouchard’s answer seems unsatisfactory. He considers that accommodations in the form of an ad hoc margin of manoeuvre would be legitimate only if they “pass the test of the courts” (Bouchard 2012, 136 [translation ]). Out of hermeneutic generosity, we will

180

On Managing Societal Diversity

nonetheless say that what matters to Bouchard is that the margin of manoeuvre or preferential treatment remain in accordance with the fundamental rights and freedoms protected by the charters and constitutions. Similarly, we could say with Kymlicka (1995, 36–7) that these accommodations should be in line with “external protection measures” designed to balance the power relations between the majority and minority groups and that we should reject “internal constraint” measures – in other words, preferential treatment that supposes limiting the freedom of members of a given group in the name of preserving that group’s cultural authenticity. Typically, it is important that ad hoc preferential treatment should pass the test of the courts, but we would be limiting ourselves too much to a legalistic framework when we should in fact be considering a normative order. Kymlicka’s distinction also leaves room for major blind spots. According to Bouchard (2011, 452), a typical case of such ad hoc preferential accommodation is Bill 101, Quebec’s Charter of the French Language.5 With that in mind, if we look at Catalonia, which is one of Quebec’s significant comparables as a fragile minority nation, we have to conclude, paradoxically, that a policy similar to Bill 101 would not be acceptable for Catalonia because it could not pass the test of the courts. This example of a measure that seems to be clearly legitimate in the ad hoc margin of manoeuvre also raises the veil on a blind spot in Kymlicka’s theory – a problem he in fact recognizes (Kymlicka 2001, 287). Bill 101, the Charter of the French Language, is indisputably an external protection measure. However, it nonetheless supposes that both French-speaking Quebecers and newcomers have lost some freedom, in particular with respect to their children’s language of education. In a way, this makes the legislation an internal constraint. We need a more refined normative analytical framework that does not give in so easily to a somewhat tautological form of legalistic rationality. Coming back to the problem raised by Bouchard’s reasoning on the framework for applying ad hoc preferential treatment, let us examine why it is found wanting when we expand the logic of interculturalism to other cases of minority nations. In other words, would a measure similar to the Quebec Charter of the French Language pass the test of the courts in the context of Catalonia? Since Spain is constitutionally “one and indivisible” and Castilian is the official language (Spanish Constitution, 1978, Section 3, subsection 1), the Constitutional Court of Spain has held that it would

Rethinking Pluralism in Multinational Democracies

181

be unconstitutional to restrict the right to education in Castilian to one group of Spaniards (stc 31/2020, subsection 29), which is something that the Catalonian equivalent of Bill 101 would necessarily have included. To solve some of the problems in Bouchard’s argument, which we consider unsatisfactory in terms of normative reasoning on this issue, we propose assessing the legitimacy of such ad hoc margin of manoeuvre measures according to whether or not they pass the “test of pluralism.” Taking inspiration directly from the work of University of Ottawa political scientist Dimitrios Karmis (2003, 89–90), we will present three criteria that make it possible to judge the “pluralism” of a policy according to whether or not it permits plural, differentiated citizenship. For the next part of the discussion, we will use Karmis’s criteria, reformulating them slightly and calling them the “test of pluralism.” First, there is the “possible inclusion” criterion: does the ad hoc margin of manoeuvre measure make it possible to include all citizens? Second, there is the “symbolic inclusion” criterion: is the ad hoc margin of manoeuvre measure inclusive in that it permits the representation and affirmation of the practices, institutions, and memory of all of the ethnocultural communities in the society? Third, there is the “deep inclusion” criterion: is the ad hoc margin of manoeuvre measure inclusive in that it is compatible with the plurality of ways of citizens’ belonging, including other minority national identities? This form of analytical framework seems to be a reasonable way to test the legitimacy of an ad hoc margin of manoeuvre measure. We will therefore analyze the admissibility of a case of what Bouchard calls an ad hoc margin of manoeuvre measure: Bill 101, Quebec’s Charter of the French Language. Does it meet the possible inclusion criterion? Bill 101 makes French “the language of Government and the Law, as well as the normal and everyday language of work, instruction, communication, commerce and business” (Preamble). This means that not having some minimum knowledge of French is a significant limitation on possible inclusion. However, Quebec offers its citizens and new arrivals part-time, full-time, online, and workplace French language courses (Quebec 2016a). Moreover, financial assistance (transportation and child care allocations and financial assistance for participation) is available (Quebec 2016b). Given these provisions, which are not exhaustive with regard to support for French-language training, we have to recognize that Bill 101 meets the possible inclusion criterion.

182

On Managing Societal Diversity

Next, does Bill 101 meet the symbolic inclusion criterion? The purpose of adopting French as the shared language in Quebec is precisely to favour exchange and dialogue between cultures (Carens 1995), as shown in the Quebec government’s many official initiatives and policies, such as Autant de façons d’être Québécois (1981, “Québécois – Each and Every One”); Au Québec pour bâtir ensemble (1990, “Let’s Build Québec Together”); Forum national sur la citoyenneté et l’intégration (2000, “National Forum on Citizenship and Integration”); La Diversité: une valeur ajoutée (2008, “Diversity: An Added Value”); Politique québécoise en matière d’immigration, de participation et d’inclusion (2016, “Québec Policy on Immigration, Participation and Inclusion”). We also have to recognize that Quebec’s history, citizenship, and ethics and religious culture educational programs make considerable reference to the contributions of different ethnocultural minorities (Mathieu and Laforest 2015, 91–2). The imposition of a specific common language – namely, French – is not an obstacle to making inclusion accessible to all citizens. The case in question therefore meets the symbolic inclusion criterion. Lastly, does Bill 101 meet the deep inclusion criterion? The very text of the act specifies that “the National Assembly of Quebec recognizes the right of the Amerinds and the Inuit of Québec, the first inhabitants of this land, to preserve and develop their original language and culture” (Preamble). Similarly, in section 73, the legislator recognizes that the children of Quebec citizens who belong to the English-speaking minority in Quebec have the right to receive instruction in English. Thus, Bill 101 contains a provision that is expressly designed to meet the deep inclusion criterion, making it compatible with the plurality of citizens’ ways of belonging, including with the way of belonging of other minority nations. In sum, the argument here is that relying on the test of the courts does not ensure that the fundamental normative criteria of pluralism and togetherness will be met. It therefore seems wiser to test the legitimacy of ad hoc margin of manoeuvre measures using a normative analytical framework – namely, the test of pluralism that we have drawn up on the basis of Karmis’s work (2003). In other words, we cannot necessarily argue, generally, that ad hoc margin of manoeuvre measures and preferential treatment for a fragile minority nation are reasonable and fair to all. It seems that the test of pluralism can also act as a bulwark for a national minority that, as is the case of Quebec English-speakers, wishes to continue living in dignity in

Rethinking Pluralism in Multinational Democracies

183

accordance with its national aspirations without being dominated arbitrarily by the majority, which is French-speaking in this case. The test of pluralism for ad hoc preferential treatment opens the way to thinking about the “negative conditions” for a national minority that is located within a minority nation in a multinational context. We do not think that it is necessary to guarantee a set of positive conditions – such as those we described in chapter 6 for Quebec and Indigenous Peoples – to ensure that the national minority’s societal culture will develop. The societal culture of the English-speaking national minority in Quebec is structurally and institutionally tied to the societal culture of the Canadian majority nation, so its dynamic strength is ensured by the fact that the majority can “impose its choices by legal norms or control of institutions” (Rocher 2012b, 141 [translation ]). So, what kind of ad hoc margin of manoeuvre measure or preferential treatment would not pass the test of pluralism or would not be reasonable and legitimate with respect to all? We think that Bill 60, the Quebec Charter of Values,6 introduced by the Parti Québécois in 2013–14 is a relevant case study. Bill 60 is an important piece of proposed legislation in the contemporary political landscape of Quebec, and it was the bill that drew the most attention from the media and the public during Pauline Marois’s Parti Québécois government’s mandate in 2013–14 (Mathieu and Laforest 2016). Moreover, even though it relates to another piece of legislation promoted by another government, the following reflections and conclusions basically apply to the Coalition Avenir Québec’s Bill 21, An Act Respecting the Laicity of the State sanctioned on 16 June 2019. Bill 60 was introduced in the National Assembly by Bernard Drainville, minister responsible for democratic institutions and active citizenship, on 7 November 2013, during the first session of the 40th Legislature. The Charter of Values was not passed, but one of its purposes was “to specify, in the [Quebec] Charter of human rights and freedoms, that the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by that Charter are to be exercised in a manner consistent with the values of equality between women and men and the primacy of the French language as well as the separation of religions and State and the religious neutrality and secular nature of the State, while making allowance for the emblematic and toponymic elements of Québec’s cultural heritage that testify to its history” (Bill 60 2013, 40th Legislature, Explanatory Notes).

184

On Managing Societal Diversity

In the Charter of Values, the objectives are explicitly presented as ad hoc preferential treatment measures for the majority – itself a minority – so that it can consolidate its symbolic foundations and societal culture. A priori, there does not seem to be any reason the objectives would not pass the test of pluralism. However, problems seem to have arisen around the means employed to achieve the objectives. In other words, it goes without saying that gender equality, the primacy of the French language, separation of religion and state, the religious neutrality and secular nature of the state, and sensitivity to the emblematic and toponymic elements of Quebec’s cultural heritage are, in themselves, not in contradiction with the three criteria of the test of pluralism. To achieve these objectives, though, the Charter proposed to amend the Act Respecting the National Assembly, the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, and the Educational Childcare Act.7 The goal was to officially and institutionally affirm that “equality between women and men and the primacy of the French language as well as the separation of religions and State and the religious neutrality and secular nature of the State are fundamental values of the Québec nation” (Bill 60 2013, s. 40). More specifically, the purposes of the Charter were articulated around five broad lines: (1) provide a framework for accommodations under the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms and incorporate the state’s religious neutrality into that Charter, (2) provide for public servants’ duty of reserve and religious neutrality during work hours, (3) prohibit the wearing of religious objects by public servants during work hours,8 (4) make it compulsory to have one’s face uncovered when receiving government services, and (5) establish an implementation policy to manage accommodation requests and ensure state neutrality (Quebec 2013). It seems legitimate to argue that Bill 60, the Charter of Values, introduced by the Parti Québécois in 2013–14 – as did the 2019 Bill 21, An Act Respecting the Laicity of the State – went beyond the bounds of pluralism, which is why it became reasonably impossible to accept it as falling into the legitimate ad hoc margin of manoeuvre for protecting the symbolic foundations of the relatively fragile Quebec nation. Indeed, if we accept the reasoning according to which wearing a conspicuous religious symbol, such as a headscarf in the case of a Muslim woman, can be fundamentally important

Rethinking Pluralism in Multinational Democracies

185

for a person to be able to live in dignity in accordance with his or her conception of the good life and according to which wearing the symbol is not a simple preference or “expensive taste” (Maclure and Taylor 2011 [2010], 69), then the limits imposed by the bill would have prevented real “possible inclusion” of all members of Quebec society (Côté and Mathieu 2016, 394–7). The “duty of religious neutrality” that is provided for in the Charter of Values would have required such a person to exercise “a superior faculty of abstraction, distance-taking and individual judgment because they maintain specific opinions and beliefs ‘in religious matters’” (Côté and Mathieu 2016, 396 [translation ]). Moreover, “given that under section 13 [of the Charter of Values], the provisions of ‘Sections 3 to 69 are deemed to constitute an integral part of the employment conditions of the persons to whom they apply,’ the duty to demonstrate religious neutrality is difficult to distinguish from an additional obligation imposed on a person who is otherwise recognized as competent” (Côté and Mathieu 2016, 396 [translation ]). Thus, on the level of “symbolic inclusion,” the Charter of Values de facto imposed a significantly stronger limitation on public expression of religious identity on those who practise certain religions (especially Sikhs, Jews, and Muslims) than on Christians and non-believers – in other words, the vast majority of the members of the host society. The effect of that provision was not to represent and affirm the practices, institutions, and memories of all cultural communities in the society but to limit them. Moreover, it goes without saying that keeping the crucifix10 on the wall behind the chair of the president of the Quebec National Assembly, purportedly because it was reasonable according to the intent of the Charter of Values, was a significant limitation on the “symbolic inclusion” of all with respect to the Assembly, which is the institution that must be the fundamental place where all Quebecers are welcome. For precisely the same reasons, the Parti Québécois’s Bill 60 considerably limited “deep inclusion.” We suggest that the Charter of Values proposed by the Parti Québécois in 2013–14 was not within a margin of manoeuvre that was reasonable and legitimate with respect to all. However, this does not mean we should demonize the Parti Québécois’s intentions – nor those of the Coalition Avenir Québec – for it was seeking to

186

On Managing Societal Diversity

introduce a bill that would have protected and consolidated the symbolic foundations and societal culture of the relatively fragile Quebec nation. Rather, it seems more reasonable to consider an interpretation according to which the Parti Québécois and the Coalition Avenir Québec have a “republican-conservative” reading or narrative of the nation (Mathieu and Laforest 2016). In principle, republican-conservative logic or reasoning is structured basically around five lines: (1) a conservative critique of modernity, (2) militancy for strict secularism (laïcité), (3) rejection of multiculturalism and interculturalism (which are both associated with the same scenario), (4) rejection of reasonable accommodation measures (at least for religious reasons), and (5) affirmation of the nation’s aspirations as fundamental to the future of the historical French-speaking majority (Mathieu and Laforest 2016, 381–2). Borrowing Liah Greenfeld’s typology (1993), a republican-conservative scheme sees the nation through the lens of “collectivistic-civic” nationalism, which is historically associated with France. For those who hold this form of nationalism, the nation is a Whole – it is “one and indivisible,” as the French would say – and the national aspiration must be seen as an end in itself, in other words, as having its own will. In Quebec, this group, which is sometimes recognized as having “new historical sensitivity,” affirms the historical weight and preponderant role of the French-Catholic majority in Quebec (Beauchemin 2002; 2004; 2015; Bock-Côté 2008; 2012). The republican-conservative vision is certainly legitimate in itself, for it has a logical, consistent vision of the common good (Dumont 1993; Thériault 2005). However, its founding principles necessarily require it to embrace difference-blind procedural liberalism, which naturally leads to a “consolidated” vision of political unity (Elazar, 1987). This is contrary to empowering federal impetus in multinational contexts (chapter 5), and this is the reason that a Charter of Values based on republican-conservative logic does not pass the “test of pluralism” and does not appear reasonable and legitimate with respect to all in a complex society. Now that we have shown that interculturalism and multiculturalism can theoretically coexist in an asymmetrical form of pluralism in which interculturalism can very well be part of the extension of special rights for minority nations, how can we reconcile interculturalism and multiculturalism from the point of view of public policy?

Rethinking Pluralism in Multinational Democracies

187

an asymmetrical model of pluralism for the canadian federation In these concluding remarks, I will address you, dear readers, in the first person because, as this study on the challenges facing pluralism in the time of complex societies comes to a close, what is in question is not only the conclusions I am drawing following a reasoned normative reflection but also the message that I wish to convey as a citizen actively involved in public debates. In short, I am suggesting that interculturalism, as both an institutional and a symbolic dynamic of constitutional asymmetry de jure in favour of Quebec, should be integrated into Canadian pluralism. This would contribute not only to increasing the degree of autonomy permitting Quebec to develop its distinct societal culture (Rocher 2013, 123) but, moreover, enshrine in the constitutional order a dimension that would formally recognize the Canadian federation as “multinational.” In turn, it would contribute to alleviating Quebec’s relative sense of fragility. This seems to me to be a significant step Canada could take to empower federal impetus in a multinational context. Some of the provisions of the Constitution Act, 1982 and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms would have to be amended. As Guy Laforest has observed (2014, 147), to begin with, section 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982 should refer to the Canadian political association not as a “free and democratic society” but as a “free and democratic multinational federation.” Once that change has been made, section 27 would have to be amended. It now reads: “This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.” I propose it be amended to read as follows: “This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the pluralist heritage of Canadians. To give effect to Indigenous Peoples’ and minority nations’ right to self-determination, this shall take place by the coordination of the Canadian multicultural model and the Quebec intercultural model, each based on the empowerment of distinct host societies.” If we understand interculturalism and multiculturalism as two complementary, but slightly distinct, models of pluralism – in that they share the same objectives but interpret or imagine them differently – I do not see what argument a form of liberalism open to

188

On Managing Societal Diversity

diversity could have against such an approach. Naturally, it would be legitimate for the other partners in the Canadian federation to demand reasonable limits on the exercise of ad hoc preferential treatment for Quebec. In this regard, it seems to me that the test of pluralism would be satisfactory. Moreover, in line with Canadian case law, the exercise of ad hoc preferential treatment would be necessarily structured by a proportionality test (R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 scr 103).11 These few changes to the constitutional order should be understood as a platform from which the Canadian federation’s constitutional architecture can be grown in the direction of conditions that will make it possible to empower all of the societal diversity constituting the political association (chapter 6). However, we must not neglect the scope and repercussions of this paradigm shift – from a territorial or unitary conception of federalism to a properly “multinational” conception – on the “One Nation” conception of Canada that is held by many within the majority national community. As subtly interpreted by political scientist Kenneth McRoberts (1999, 10), the building of modern Canada took a major turn at the end of the 1960s (or at least from 1960 to 1968), and with André Laurendeau’s structuring efforts, it might have seemed that Canada would turn clearly toward accepting its dualistic composition (Lapointe-Gagnon 2013, 310–20). Since then, the federation has been founded on the myth of a “One Nation” Canada (Burelle 2005). The “Trudeau vision” has won out over the “Laurendeau vision” (Laforest 2004, 48), which was also the vision held, and is the vision still held, by many French-speaking thinkers in Canada, from George-Étienne Cartier to Henri Bourassa, including his modern successor, political scientist Guy Laforest (2014). The proposal I have defended in these pages follows this path. For it to gain substantial support in English-speaking Canada, we will have to reshape the guiding myths that drive our imaginaries of what we share (cf. Bouchard 2014), and this will unavoidably be a slow, laborious process that will necessarily require ongoing citizenship education on federal impetus principles. That said, I believe there is reason to be optimistic – without being naive. Difference-blind procedural liberalism may be strongly rooted in the conception that many Canadians have of deep societal diversity (which supports the notion of the provinces’ equality), but it has however been significantly rejected in Canadians’ conception of their relationship to diversity resulting from immigration (Rocher

Rethinking Pluralism in Multinational Democracies

189

2015). The logic of Canadian multiculturalism is based on a form of liberalism that is friendly to diversity, recognizing in the letter of Canadian law (the Canadian Multiculturalism Act, 1988) the fact that ensuring equal treatment for all does not mean treating all individuals the same way. Equality is seen through the lens of equity. In the end, the proposal defended in these pages is not very far from this conception of social justice; it simply supposes deepening the logic involved, recognizing that social justice in a multinational context requires equitable and sometimes asymmetrical treatment of the societal components of the political association – equality of results rather than of opportunity, as Gagnon says (2008, 64). In other words, arguing that the Canadian framework is now founded on territorial federalism and that this could provide fair treatment for all societal minorities (Flanagan 2000) because it is allegedly neutral from a cultural point of view amounts to institutionalizing domination by the majority group of the minority groups (Webber 1994, 26). The conception of equality between the provinces is nonetheless strongly anchored in mentalities. Referring in particular to Henri Bourassa’s dream of national duality in Canada, political scientist Arthur Isaac Silver notes: “Such a conception had little chance of general acceptance. Canada’s parliamentary institutions and practices of responsible government were suited to majority decisions, as were the liberal ideals which prevailed among all mainstream political figures. What’s more, biculturalism flew in the face of a strengthening conviction in English Canada that Canadians formed – or ought to form – a single people or nationality” (Silver 1997, 249). François Rocher (2012b) shares this pessimism about a “multinational” revision of the imaginaries of the federation in Canada. Not only were Indigenous Peoples victims of “state deceit” for many centuries (Fumoleau 1975), but the Quebecers feel they were betrayed by their partners in 1982 (Smiley 1983, 76). According to Rocher, given the patriation of the Constitution and enshrining of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms without Quebec’s consent in 1982, as well as the failures of the Meech and Charlottetown constitutional negotiations in the 1990s, it was “the principle of dualism, which is in fact at the heart of the Quebec understanding of the Confederation, which was scrapped” (2012b, 159 [translation ]). Thus, the “Trudeau vision,” which overshadowed the “Laurendeau vision,” denied “the historical foundations of French Canadians’ membership in Canada, opening a breach between federalists that is very

190

On Managing Societal Diversity

far from being closed today” (McRoberts 1999, 15 [translation ]). Indeed, the Canadian constitutional order that was refurbished in 1982 reduces, in fact and in law, Quebec’s political and symbolic power by turning it into one province like the others in the unitary Canadian federation (Burelle 1995; Rocher 2013). The “range of expectations” of Quebec and Indigenous Peoples is in the direction of a multinational federation – or of secession, if the political association is little or not hospitable to them – but the “Trudeau vision” is the “range of expectations” of a large part of the majority group. This is what led Guy Laforest to say, at the beginning of the 2000s, that “The populations of the English Canadian provinces define their range of expectations through a constitutional reform and a charter of rights and freedoms that have done much more than change institutions: they have deeply altered the political culture and even the identity of Canada’s citizens. This is what makes me think that, despite the best intentions of the federal civil service and members of the English Canadian elite, Canadian federalism will not succeed in meeting Quebec’s expectations and in giving duality back a significant role in the functioning of the political system” (Laforest 2004, 41 [translation ]). This conclusion is shared by Michel Seymour (2012), according to whom the Canadian federation will be a failure as long as it has not recognized the deep societal diversity that is constitutive of its political association – and it does not seem about to do so. This is also the conclusion that I believe is reasonable to support if the majority nation embraces the “Trudeau vision” and its corollary, which is to perceive Canada’s pre-1982 history as belonging to “another country” (LaSelva 2009, 5). Conversely, reconnecting with our history, reinvesting in the diversity-friendly visions that have been deployed throughout the whole Canadian odyssey – the visions of Sir William Johnson, George-Étienne Cartier, Henri Bourassa, and André Laurendeau, for example – would make it possible to live up to the key principles for empowering federal impetus in multinational contexts. This was also Guy Laforest’s reasoning in 2014 when, while he was not naive, he was much more optimistic than he had been a decade earlier: And if nothing happens on this front for many years to come, should we give up hope? I do not think so. In our individual lives, in our communities, in our cities and in everything that we control in our distinct national society, whether we belong

Rethinking Pluralism in Multinational Democracies

191

to Quebec’s majority with French-Canadian heritage or to a minority, as Quebecers, with our partners in Canada and our interlocutors around the world, we must continue working towards the edification of a better society, a better world and a fairer international order. Individuals’ and peoples’ political happiness comes in different shades, progress is possible and setbacks can be overcome. So many things have been achieved in Quebec in only a few centuries! We must continue working on these fronts and, when the opportunity to put an end to our exile within Canada presents itself, we must take advantage of it (Laforest 2014, 31 [translation]). Of course, there is a risk that members of the majority nation will reproach me for the fact that the proposals constituting “federal impetus” (chapter 6) appear to them, in fact, conditions for breaking up the Canadian federation. That argument, which I would describe as pragmatic, is essentially speculative. As Wayne Norman has pointed out (2006, 74), we do not have enough empirical examples of the establishment of asymmetrical measures for minority nations or even of a recognized right to secede, for example, to reasonably draw the conclusion that there is a causal connection between asymmetrical measures and the break-up of multinational federations (see Mathieu 2021). Thus, such a pragmatic argument is aesthetic in nature, whereas empowerment of federal impetus requires the use of a high level of philosophical and ethical abstraction to take seriously the conditions for social justice – conditions that are not ideal and that take into account the surrounding sociopolitical and constitutional environment – so that togetherness in multinational contexts will be truly hospitable to societal diversity. Moreover, we have to remember that empowering federal impetus contributes not only to achieving stability and political unity that is respectful of societal diversity but also makes it possible for there to be a form of asymmetrical federal governance that will also favour the consolidation of the majority nation’s societal interests.

conclusion I think that Canadians are generally happy that an activist such as Bono of the band U2 sings the praises of their political system. Bono has said many times that “the world needs more Canada,” that

192

On Managing Societal Diversity

Canada is a pioneer in togetherness and diversity management, and that it has empowered everyone in an environment of tolerance and mutual respect (cbc 2016; see also Choudhry 2008). Embracing the empowerment of federal impetus is, in the end, simply representative of the means we must adopt to live in accordance with this “Canadian dream,” if that dream corresponds to a federation in which all societal partners in the political association are empowered both politically and culturally. Not only does empowering federal impetus in multinational contexts give Canadians a good reason to highlight what fundamentally distinguishes them from the American federation – and I think this is one of the driving forces underlying the Canadian odyssey – but it would make Canada’s approach a truly inspiring example for multinational democracies. If it is presented in this way, I hope that the Canadians of today and tomorrow will demonstrate moderation and balance as they (re)think the conditions for social justice in multinational contexts. While it is full of optimism, proposing to empower federal impetus is not, however, naive. Meeting the conditions that contribute to such empowerment is uncertain in the near future to say the least, and the acceptance of these conditions by our partners in Canada, principally in English-speaking circles, will require substantial changes to our imaginaries of Canada. Nonetheless, in 2017 we celebrated the 150th anniversary of Canada’s odyssey, and I believe it is high time we reinvested seriously in the heritage of figures such as George-Étienne Cartier, Alexandre T. Galt, and Thomas D’Arcy McGee (Laforest and Mathieu 2016) and also that we temper our support for the views of John A. Macdonald and the like. In short, we should recognize the significance of the “Laurendeau vision” and, in consequence, reject the “Trudeau vision.” Lastly, I would like to say that I belong to a generation that did not participate in the Quiet Revolution or in the referendums on Quebec’s independence. My generation does not necessarily have vivid, painful memories of the 1982 patriation of the Constitution without Quebec’s consent. Members of my generation were still babies (at best!) during the Meech Lake and Charlottetown constitutional rounds. Of course, we must remember (“je me souviens” is after all Quebec’s official motto), for it is our duty as conscious beings, as German philosopher Husserl argued. I am nonetheless gambling that my generation, in Quebec as elsewhere in the Canadian federation, will be able to – or at least should be persuaded

Rethinking Pluralism in Multinational Democracies

193

to – avoid falling into melancholia or nostalgia or into the blind, insensitive optimism of the “majority” opinion. I, and many others, will adopt the mission of convincing our partners in Quebec, as elsewhere in Canada, of the moral and political importance of authentic multinational federalism. My English-speaking fellow citizens of the Canadian federation seem largely to want to live in the glow of being part of a federation that, owing to its forward thinking, is the way of the future. However, there is still a long way to go to live up to Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s boast that Canada has “a form of federalism that belongs to tomorrow’s world” (Trudeau 1967). The path will be winding, full of obstacles, and it is obviously not sure that this will be achieved in my lifetime – and I have good reasons to believe that I will live for many more decades! However, I refuse to extinguish the light of these hopes.

conclusion

Taking Pluralism Seriously

There are many challenges facing pluralism in this era of complex societies. In this book, we took them seriously as we identified tools for analyzing them, and we then used those tools to see what form the issues and debates related to togetherness take in the political spaces of contemporary liberal democracies. After performing a theoretical and empirical analysis of “what is,” we turned to “what should be,” specifically in the context of the Canadian federation, which we used as a case study of a multinational democracy. The two parts of the book are therefore distinct but complementary in that they provide an overview of the debates and discussions found in works and studies on multiculturalism and interculturalism and on nationalism and federalism. Of course, this is not an exhaustive study of the subject matter. Nevertheless, the purpose of Taking Pluralism Seriously: Complex Societies under Scrutiny is to contribute to the literature in five ways. The first concerns developing better analytical frameworks for studying how to manage ethnocultural and societal diversity in complex societies. As such, we began by determining four levels of analysis: the social fact of ethnocultural diversity, public policies on multiculturalism and interculturalism, the imaginaries of multiculturalism and interculturalism, and, lastly, multiculturalism and interculturalism as pluralism. We insisted on the fact that it is essential to clearly identify which analytical dimension we are considering when studying debates on togetherness and to use the conceptual tools appropriate to that dimension (chapter 1). In relation to this first contribution, we also filled a gap in the literature by developing an analytical framework that can be used to engage in reasonable

Conclusion

195

assessment of ad hoc preferential treatment measures in the framework of interculturalism as pluralism (chapter 7). More precisely, we appropriated certain analytical categories initially proposed by Dimitrios Karmis (2003), and we developed a “test of pluralism” to circumscribe the legitimate scope of ad hoc margin of manoeuvre measures flowing from the interculturalism model. The second contribution is theoretical and conceptual. We began by suggesting a broad definition of pluralism that we used to identify the reasoning underlying the main theories of multiculturalism while also pinpointing what differentiates them (chapter 1). This led us to propose an original interpretation in order to differentiate interculturalism from multiculturalism in theories of pluralism (chapter 7), and we thereby suggested that what primarily distinguishes interculturalism from multiculturalism is not the nature of the objectives they promote and defend but the imaginaries underlying their representations of the duties and obligations toward different types of minorities in society. In relation to this, in chapters 5 and 6 we introduced the concept of fragile nation to analyze minority nations and Indigenous nations in multinational democracies. In short, the concept of fragile nation makes it possible to encompass and even go beyond the analytical categories specific to the alternative concepts. This opens up a promising perspective for studying both the subjective and the objective dimensions of the “fragility” that plagues minority nations. Following this theoretical and conceptual contribution, we also suggested a set of proposals to make complex societies more hospitable to their constituting societal diversity. Our third contribution is thus in the form of a normative investigation of the conditions a multinational state must meet to provide a political and institutional framework that is fair and reasonable for all partners in the political association. Taking the case of the Canadian federation as an example, in chapter 6 we identified three sets of conditions: one concerning Quebec and, more broadly, minority nations, one concerning Indigenous Peoples in Canada, and one concerning the English-speaking majority nation. Developing the principles that should guide the federal undertaking led us to propose a way of engaging the dynamism of federal impetus in multicultural contexts. The fourth contribution of Taking Pluralism Seriously: Complex Societies under Scrutiny is empirical. While it is regularly reported in the media and the public sphere more or less everywhere in the

196

Taking Pluralism Seriously

West that multiculturalism is a “failure,” we had to take stock of the situation. In order to differentiate between the many paths states have taken with regard to public policies on multiculturalism, we compared the Canadian, British, and Dutch cases (chapter 2). In chapter 3, we looked more closely at the political and institutional landscape in the United Kingdom between 2000 and 2015 to show that, despite the fact that a government leader may have said repeatedly that multiculturalism was a failure in his country, there was not necessarily any withdrawal from public policy on multiculturalism. Our inquiry involved updating Multiculturalism Policy Index data on the United Kingdom’s multiculturalism policies on diversity resulting from immigration. In the age of “post-factual” public and media environments, it seemed necessary also to examine logical fallacies, sophisms, and other intellectual shortcuts that are often used in connection with multiculturalism. Therefore, this book’s fifth contribution is to have compared the main criticisms of multiculturalism in the public sphere with what multiculturalism theories really say and propose. It is fundamental to always view multiculturalism theories with a critical eye, but it is equally important to be rigorous when analyzing and criticizing them. More specifically, in chapter 4 we saw that, in the public space, criticisms of multiculturalism may be vigorous, but they often attack a caricature of multiculturalism and generally fail to consider its deep theoretical and normative aspects. Democratic liberal states are home to diversity that is constantly becoming more complex, and most minorities are struggling for recognition of their specificity. Rigorous study of the stakes involved in togetherness is one of the most stimulating and important research undertakings for democracies of the twenty-first century, and the analytical and normative approaches taken by political scientists, sociologists, legal experts, and political philosophers are fundamental. For citizen actions in liberal democracies to be driven by critical rationality, it is crucial to identify the issues involved in social and political debates and then clarify the concepts that can be used to analyze them. As citizens, it is therefore important that those working in the world of education get involved and invest in public debates and that they suggest possible solutions and reflections in the face of the indignation that we feel when confronted with social injustices. At a time when influential political actors feel free to tell lies every day under the cover of “alternative facts,” when leading

Conclusion

197

voices everywhere in the West target certain minorities in order to gain political advantages, when a young Quebecer – Alexandre Bissonnette – murdered six Muslim fellow citizens at a Quebec mosque on the evening of 29 January 2017 for the sole reason that they practised a minority religion, it is more important than ever that the light of reason calm passions and overcome disinformation. In the era of complex societies, we must think reflexively, use our imagination, and be resilient to find responsible, fair ways to manage ethnocultural and societal diversity. It is therefore fundamental for liberal democracies to create and consolidate spaces for significant freedoms for individuals to become empowered, just as it is necessary for host societies’ legitimate integration measures to be welcoming toward newcomers.

Notes

i nt roduct i o n 1 That said, Robert Vipond (1991) points out the importance in the debate at the time of a third group, organized mainly around Oliver Mowat and George Brown. It also opposed the centralizing goals of Macdonald and his supporters and argued the importance of the provinces’ role in reconciling freedom and membership in a local political community. 2 It is important to stress that not all Indigenous Peoples recognize Canada’s sovereignty as valid or legitimate.

c ha p t e r o n e 1 The reasonable accommodation “crisis” and the aftermath of the Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences (the Bouchard-Taylor Commission), especially the commission’s public hearings, are a good example of social confusion about the stakes involved in togetherness and amplification of the confusion by the media (Bouchard and Taylor 2008, 38). 2 This formula comes from Peter H. Russell’s work (Russell 2017). 3 This said, theories of pluralism are often “ideal,” and public policies are implemented in a necessarily non-ideal context in which unwieldy variables have to be taken into consideration. This is why it is not unusual for public policy on the matter to be less consistent than the theory (Freeman 2004, 946). 4 Although some have declared multiculturalism’s victory over other theories (Glazer 1997; Kymlicka 1999; Kivisto 2012), speaking of an “age of pluralism” is not intended as a ruling on whether or not that approach has

200

5 6 7

8

9

10 11 12 13

14 15

16

17 18

Notes to pages 27–38

“won.” It is intended to refer to the pervasiveness of pluralism, and its imaginary, in the West. In chapter 7, we will come back to the differences between interculturalism and multiculturalism. However, the analysis that follows should provide the analytical tools needed to interpret a given theory’s position on such specific issues. Since the original French edition of this book (in 2017), the “woke” movement and philosophy has entered public debates by defending a form of communitarian multiculturalism. Even though it lacks theoretical coherence, the New York Times best-selling book White Fragility: Why It’s So Hard for White People to Talk about Racism by Robin DiAngelo (2018) has come to symbolize this ideological trend. As we will see in chapter 2, the Netherlands had a communitarian version of multiculturalism. However, it had been led to this in an ad hoc manner, and this type of policy for immigrant minorities was adopted by default as part of the history of mutual toleration between the Catholic and Protestant social segments in the Netherlands. However, Kymlicka’s liberal theory includes many aspects of the “civic” multiculturalism of Maclure (2010). This said, while Kymlicka provides for interactions “within” societal cultures, he does not necessarily provide for them “between” societal cultures. Two or more nations within the same state. Several ethnocultural immigrant groups within a single state. This is discussed in greater detail in chapter 7. It is legitimate to wonder whether Indigenous Peoples do indeed maintain “societal cultures” in Kymlicka’s sense. We will discuss this in greater detail in chapter 6. Kymlicka uses the expressions “immigrant minorities” and “ethnic minorities” interchangeably. The second edition of the book, dating from 2006, is preferable to the first. The theory remains the same, but Parekh has added a final chapter in which he responds to his critics. He also provides more information on his notion of public operative values. As we will discuss in chapter 2, Parekh was called upon to chair the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (2000). The final report proposed that the British rethink the United Kingdom as a “community of communities as well as a community of citizens.” Minimally, through the intermediary of a representative. The first edition was published in 2007.

Notes to pages 38–52

201

19 Modood also criticizes Kymlicka, and multiculturalism theorists in general, for suffering from secular bias, which minimizes the importance of religion in the identity formation of individuals, particularly immigrants. Such bias would favour thinking about multiculturalism in terms of a strict separation between the private and public spheres, which Modood holds is operational only for a (secular) fringe of the population (Modood 2005, 133–4). 20 This criticism is also made by Joseph Carens (1997) and Iris Marion Young (1997). 21 Like proponents of open secularism, Modood believes that we must accept the presence and visibility of (minority) cultural and religious features in the public sphere and not confine them to the private sphere. 22 We pointed out above that liberal multiculturalism is inspired mainly by the moral obligation to recognize and accommodate ethnocultural diversity as long as doing so does not violate the rights and freedoms of other citizens (Maclure 2010, 40). 23 For Habermas, constitutional patriotism means separating citizenship from national identity. Citizenship is then based on universal civic principles that can be found in a constitution and that must be free of any properly cultural dimension (Habermas 1996; 2000). 24 In that book, Okin (1999) answers in the affirmative. In short, her reasoning is that since the vast majority of cultures are patriarchal, multiculturalism policies that make it possible to keep such cultures alive enclose women in cultural practices that are contrary to their emancipation from the patriarchy.

c h a p t e r t wo 1 This does not mean that no serious criticisms have been made of it. One of the leading critiques is that of Neil Bissoondath (1995), who argues that Canadian multiculturalism does not so much celebrate diversity in unity and cohesion as it does folklorize cultures and isolate cultural groups from one another. 2 André Laurendeau died in 1968, but the commission continued in the spirit he had given it (Lapointe-Gagnon 2013, 267). 3 When speaking about this episode, historians usually refer to the criticism of the commission’s preliminary report by the “Comité pour une politique fonctionnelle” published in Cité Libre. Although Trudeau was not the author of the article, he was closely involved in writing it. He did not sign

202

4

5

6

7

8

9

10 11

12

Notes to pages 52–64

it, allegedly because he considered it would be better not to do so if he was going to go into politics, as he did a few months later (McRoberts 1999, 169). Laurence Brosseau and Michael Dewing 2018. Canadian Multiculturalism, Background Paper. Ottawa: Library of Parliament. Publication No. 2009-20-E. https://lop.parl.ca/sites/PublicWebsite/default/en_CA/ ResearchPublications/200920E?. However, on the lexical level, some authors (Fleras 2009) distinguish three phases in Canadian multiculturalism. The first (the 1970s) was characterized by emphasis on ethnicity to promote multiculturalism. The second (the 1980s) involved discourse on fairness among minorities. The last (1990 to today) focuses on the civic dimension of multiculturalism and its mechanisms for integration into the Canadian national sphere. Duyvendak and Scholten (2012, 277) show, however, that the policies established in the 1980s endured even after the Ethnic Minorities Policy was replaced by the Integration Policy. In short, Scheffer’s criticism is quite similar to Neil Bissoondath’s regarding Canada (1995) – namely, that the multiculturalism policy would lead to ghettoization of cultural groups and turn their practices into (essentialized) folklore. British citizenship law has changed in many respects since 1948, setting greater limits on access to British citizenship. Discussing the evolution of the legislation is beyond the scope of this chapter, but a systematic analysis of it and its consequences can be found in Voicu (2009). Owing to the devolution of powers to Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales in the late 1990s, school curricula differ from one context to the next. As in England, however, in Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales there is multicultural sensitivity (Kisby and Sloam 2012). See Vertovec (1996) for a case study of the observed “benefits” of the multicultural approach in the city of Leicester. The commission made more than 140 recommendations, the vast majority of which were inspired by multiculturalism. The recommendations included adopting an official declaration on diversity’s constitutive role in the United Kingdom, which should be inspired by the Canadian experience (Runnymede Trust 2002, 277). In 1988, British author and novelist Salman Rushdie published The Satanic Verses, in which he portrayed the Prophet Mohammed in a manner judged blasphemous by many Muslim communities. In 1989, the Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran declared a fatwa, demanding Rushdie be

Notes to pages 68–87

203

executed. In the United Kingdom, some Muslim organizations asked the book to be removed from bookstores. This led to many social conflicts, in which Muslims seemed to be perceived by British people as necessarily against freedom of expression (Parekh 2006, 295–7).

c h a p t e r t h re e 1 An extended version of the argument presented in this chapter has been published in the journal Ethnicities: see Mathieu (2018). 2 From then on, public and legislative debates departed significantly from the “failure of multiculturalism” per se and rather focused on Brexit and then covid -19. As a consequence, and after preliminary observation, it appears the results would be essentially the same if one were to update systematically the data up to 2020. Mainly for that reason, but also because of space limitation, the focus remains on the years 2000–15. 3 That said, the analytical framework is not without its flaws. It will be criticized at the end of the chapter when the findings are interpreted. 4 Please note that even though we are examining the evolution of the United Kingdom’s laws and jurisprudence, we have relied heavily on the work of the eudo Citizenship Observatory and, more specifically, on the Country Report: United Kingdom by Caroline Sawyer and Helena Wray (2014). 5 Two of the eight indicators in Banting and Kymlicka’s theoretical framework do not have a “Partially” value. 6 What follows is an adapted version of the mpi ’s (2015) methodological framework. 7 Tolley’s mpi report (2011) noted that in 2000 the United Kingdom had only partially implemented affirmative action policy for disadvantaged immigrant groups and that it was only after the Race Relations Amendment Act 2000 came into effect that the policy applied to all government bodies. The mpi methodological framework’s (2015; Tolley 2011) eighth indicator (“affirmative action”) has only “Yes” and “No” values. Accordingly, we have corrected Tolley’s mpi report (mpi ) by indicating “Yes” for the eighth indicator, “affirmative action.” 8 In the next chapter, we will spend more time analyzing this zero-sum game interpretation between multiculturalism policies and integration policies. 9 In this regard, let us stress that the Parekh report (Runnymede Trust 2002, 55) was openly in favour of multiculturalism but, notably, also recommended that the British government adopt naturalization ceremonies inspired by practices in the United States.

204

Notes to pages 89–101

c ha p t e r f o u r 1 That said, it should be noted that an empirical study of the policy outcomes of multiculturalism policies would be necessary to obtain a more holistic understanding of this phenomenon. 2 Communitarian versions of multiculturalism (Maclure 2010) could certainly reject any form of integration designed to ensure that the “community” would remain “pure” of any outside individuals. However, this kind of position is unusual in the literature. Aspects of this kind of thinking can be seen in Maffesoli (2007), for example, but he never uses the term “multiculturalism” to describe his position. 3 Among others, see Bissoondath (1995), Phillips (2006), Gerard (2006), Wheatcroft (2006), Rioux (2014), Bock-Côté (2016a), Poupart (2015), and Martineau (2016). 4 Among others, see Bissoondath (1995), Scheffer (2000), Bruckner (2006), O’Sullivan (2007), Malik (2010), Provencher (2012), Blanchet-Gravel (2013), Guirous (2016), and Bock-Côté (cited in Sévilla 2016). 5 Among others, see Blunkett (2002), Wolf (2005), O’Sullivan (2007), Phillips (2013), Blanchet-Gravel (2014), Bauman (cited in Della Serra 2015), Bock-Côté (2016a), and Albrechtsen (2015). 6 Among others, see Bissoondath (1995), Phillips (2005; 2006), Bock-Côté (2007; 2012), Blanchet-Gravel (2015), Bauman (cited in Della Serra 2015), and Martineau (2015). 7 In what follows, we will attack these criticisms in particular. However, we will not examine in detail all of the elements that may be more or less relevant in the rest of their arguments on related topics. For example, we will severely criticize Bock-Côté’s “multiculturalism as a political religion” (2016a) when he says that multiculturalism is essentially communitarian in its conceptualization, but we will not discuss his insightful reading of the group that has come to defend multiculturalism in the public sphere – in other words, grosso modo, his theory that the post-1968 Left has replaced “proletariat” by “minority” in its revolutionary discourse. 8 There could be no better example of this than Donald J. Trump in the United States during the Republican leadership campaign and the 2016 presidential campaign, which he won against Hillary Clinton and the Democratic Party, and then again during the entire four years of his presidency. 9 This line of analysis seems useful for understanding and analyzing Justin Trudeau’s idea about “doing politics differently” since 2015.

Notes to pages 110–35

205

c ha p t e r f i ve 1 Smith (1986) uses the French expression to refer to pre-existing ethnic groups and writes it in italics. 2 We use both expressions as synonyms. 3 Functional translation of “un peuple né pour un petit pain.” 4 “Indian reserves” is an official legal term in Canada, but it can be considered by some as pejorative. In these pages, we will use the term only in reference to its legal definition: “Indian reserves are lands under federal jurisdiction reserved for the exclusive use and benefit of the Indians; a band council may pass resolutions to control the use of the reserve. Settlements are parcels of land having no specific status on which Indian bands have settled. A band council cannot pass resolutions to regulate their use, because these settlements have never been officially set aside for use by the Indians. The Federal Government administers the lands of Indian reserves and offers services to the communities that reside on the reserve and that live in the settlements. In the case of the Inuit, the system is of the municipal type and falls entirely under Québec’s jurisdiction” (Secrétariat aux affaires autochtones 2009). In the following pages, we will therefore refer to Indigenous “reserves and municipalities.” 5 This is an attempt to bring greater theoretical and normative depth to characteristics that Dave Guénette and I identified in the context of a comparative analysis of “fragile nations” in constitutional law (Mathieu and Guénette 2017; Guénette and Mathieu 2018). 6 For a detailed discussion of the Societal Culture Index’s methodological framework and how to fully operationalize it, see Mathieu and Guénette (2018). 7 The Assembly of First Nations is being used solely as an example; to achieve the goal we are describing – that is, if and only if Indigenous communities believe the following recommendations to be of any assistance for realizing their quest to emancipation – it would need to make room for certain communities that it does not currently represent, such as the Métis, Inuit, Cree, and Naskapi. 8 Minimally, through the intermediary of a representative.

chapter six 1 As with any general rule, there are exceptions. For example, Scotland can be called a fragile minority nation, but the language issue does not play such a big role.

206

Notes to pages 138–70

2 On 27 November 2006, the House of Commons in Ottawa recognized that “Québécois form a nation within a united Canada.” 3 According to André Burelle (1995; 2005), who was present at the negotiations on renewing the Constitution at the time of patriation of the Constitution in 1982, Quebec, like the other provinces, enjoys sufficient latitude in this matter. From a practical point of view, his interpretation is reasonable. However, on the level of constitutional law in abstracto, it seems to lack analytical depth. 4 See s. 41, The Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. 5 See s. 43, The Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. 6 In the language of multinational federalism, when we advance the idea of a “third” order of government for Indigenous nations in Canada, we are obviously not insinuating that “First Peoples” (more accurately, the Indigenous Peoples) would have an order of government subordinate to the other two. The qualifier “third” is not a rank. It follows only from the fact that there are already two orders of government in Canada’s constitutional architecture, and we are suggesting introducing another one. 7 As we have indicated above, the Assembly of First Nations is used as an example, not a prescription. In order to carry out the mission associated with the role, it would be necessary for it find a way to include certain communities that are left outside it – for example, the Métis, the Inuit, the Cree, and the Naskapi. Likewise, it should be noted that there is some democratic deficit in the afn in that its representatives are not elected by popular vote but indirectly through the intermediary of other representatives. 8 Today, the word “corporation” is symbolically loaded owing to its association with capitalism. However, we are not using it in that sense.

c h a p t e r se ve n 1 Ultimately, we have no serious objection to interculturalism as a way of managing diversity for Indigenous Peoples. However, Indigenous Peoples are not generally constituted as host societies and do not receive immigrant ethnocultural diversity comparable to that of minority nations such as Quebec, Catalonia, Scotland, etc. This is why this discussion focuses on minority nations. That said, we think that, with a few adjustments, the normative logic of interculturalism could appeal to Indigenous Peoples if they choose to examine it.

Notes to pages 170–85

207

2 François Boucher (2016a, 65) makes a distinction between “interactionist” interculturalism and “majoritarist” interculturalism, in which the former is grosso modo what we are calling “interculturality” and the latter is essentially what we are calling “interculturalism.” See also Karmis (2003). 3 Note that the models on which we are basing our argument are mainly those of Taylor (1992; 1994), Maclure and Taylor (2011 [2010]), Kymlicka (1995), Parekh (2006), Phillips (2007), Modood (2013), Meer, Modood, and Zapata-Barrero (2016), Benhabib (2002), Bouchard (2012), Gagnon (2000), and Gagnon and Iacovino (2016). We have also been inspired by May (2016), Crowder (2013), Rattansi (2011), Levey (2010), and Maclure (2010). 4 We will use the terms “ad hoc margin of manoeuvre” and “ad hoc preferential treatment” interchangeably. 5 In a few paragraphs, we will come back to the elements characterizing the Charter of the French Language in greater detail. 6 Charter affirming the values of State secularism and religious neutrality and of equality between women and men, and providing a framework for accommodation requests, hereinafter the Charter of Values. Online: http:// www.assnat.qc.ca/en/travaux-parlementaires/projets-loi/projet-loi-60-40-1. html. 7 See chapter XI of the Charter of Values for the specific amendments proposed. 8 A one-year adaptation period was provided with respect to government departments, government corporations, public primary and secondary schools, publicly funded early childhood education and private daycare centres, judges, police officers, and correctional services officers. A transition period of up to five years was possible for health care institutions, cégeps , universities, municipalities, and borough administrations. 9 Sections 3 to 6 of the Charter of Values are as follows: “3. In the exercise of their functions, personnel members of public bodies must maintain religious neutrality. 4. In the exercise of their functions, personnel members of public bodies must exercise reserve with regard to expressing their religious beliefs ... 5. In the exercise of their functions, personnel members of public bodies must not wear objects such as headgear, clothing, jewelry or other adornments which, by their conspicuous nature, overtly indicate a religious affiliation ... 6. Personnel members of public bodies must exercise their functions with their face uncovered, unless they have to cover their face in particular because of their working conditions or because of occupational or task-related requirements.”

208

Notes to pages 185–8

10 It was since removed by the government of the Coalition Avenir Québec, on 9 June 2019. 11 In short, in R. v. Oakes, the Supreme Court identified certain criteria that must be met under section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, according to which human rights and freedoms must be “subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” The first criterion is that “the objective to be served by the measures limiting a Charter right must be sufficiently important to warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right or freedom” (R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 scr 103). The second condition identified by the Court was “the party invoking s. 1 must show the means to be reasonable and demonstrably justified. This involves a form of proportionality test involving three important components. To begin, the measures must be fair and not arbitrary, carefully designed to achieve the objective in question, and rationally connected to that objective. In addition, the means should impair the right in question as little as possible. Lastly, there must be a proportionality between the effects of the limiting measure and the objective – the more severe the deleterious effects of a measure, the more important the objective must be” (R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 scr 103).

References

Aatami, Pita. 2002. “Notes pour une allocution.” In Regard sur la Convention de la Baie-James et du Nord québécois, edited by Alain-G. Gagnon and Guy Rocher, 239–43. Montreal: Québec Amérique. Abulof, Uriel. 2009. “‘Small Peoples’: The Existential Uncertainty of Ethnonational Communities.” International Studies Quarterly 53 no. 1: 227–48. – 2015. The Morality and Mortality of Nations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. afn (Assembly of First Nations). 2016. “Description of the afn.” Accessed 20 October 2021. http://www.afn.ca/description-of-the-afn. Albrechtsen, Janet. 2015. “Multiculturalism Has Proven Divisive, Not Coalescent, so Let’s Ditch It.” In The Australian. Accessed 6 June 2016. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/columnists/janet-albrechtsen/ multiculturalism-has-proven-divisive-not-coalescent-so-lets-ditch-it/ news-story/f29ed6f5fa55a20c90972af13e7d8589. Alcantara, Christopher. 2013. Negotiating the Deal: Comprehensive Land Claims Agreements in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Alfred, Taiaiake. 1995. Heading the Voices of Our Ancestors. Kahnawake Mohawk Politics and the Rise of Native Nationalism. Don Mills, on: Oxford University Press. – 2005. Wasase: Indigenous Pathways of Action and Freedom. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Anderson, Benedict. 2006. Imagined Communities. London: Verso. Andrews, Rhys, and Andrew Mycock. 2008. “Dilemmas of Devolution: The ‘Politics of Britishness’ and Citizenship Education.” British Politics 3, no. 2: 139–55.

210

References

Asch, Michael. 2014. On Being Here to Stay: Treaties and Aboriginal Rights in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Assemblée nationale, Quarantième législature. 2013. Bill 60 Charter affirming the values of State secularism and religious neutrality and of equality between women and men, and providing a framework for accommodation requests, Bill presented by Mr Bernard Drainville. Québec: Éditeur officiel du Québec. Back, Les, Michael Keith, Azra Khan, Kalbir Shukra, and John Solomos. 2002. “New Labour’s White Heart: Politics, Multiculturalism and the Return of Assimilation.” The Political Quarterly 73, no. 4: 445–54. Bakvis, Herman, and Grace Skogstad, eds. 2002. Canadian Federalism: Performance, Effectiveness and Legitimacy. Toronto: Oxford University Press. Balthazar, Louis. 2013. Nouveau bilan du nationalisme au Québec. Montreal: vlb Éditeur. Banfield, Edward C. 1958. The Moral Basis of a Backward Society. New York: The Free Press. Banting, Keith. 1987. Welfare State and Canadian Federalism. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press. – 2014. “Transatlantic Convergence? The Archaeology of Immigrant Integration in Canada and Europe.” International Journal 69, no. 1: 66–84. Banting, Keith, and Will Kymlicka. 2006. “Introduction: Multiculturalism and the Welfare State: Setting the Context.” In Multiculturalism and the Welfare State. Recognition and Redistribution in Contemporary Democracies, edited by Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka, 1–45. New York: Oxford University Press. – 2010. “Canadian Multiculturalism: Global Anxieties and Local Debates.” British Journal of Canadian Studies 23, no. 1: 43–72. Banting, Keith, and Richard Simeon, eds. 1983. And No One Cheered: Federalism, Democracy, and the Constitution Act. Toronto: Methuen Publications. Barry, Brian. 2001. Culture and Equality. An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism. Cambridge, ma : Harvard University Press. Barsh, Russel Lawrence, and James Youngblood Henderson. 1982. The Road: Indian Tribes and Political Liberty. Los Angeles: University of California Press. Bauböck, Rainer. 2005. “Political Autonomy or Cultural Minority Rights? A Conceptual Critique of Renner’s Model.” In National Cultural Autonomy and Its Contemporary Critics, edited by Ephraim Nimni, 83–95. London: Routledge.

References

211

Bauer, Otto. 2000 [1924]. The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. bbc. 2005. “Analysis: Segregated Britain?” Accessed 29 March 2017. http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4270010.stm. – 2010. “Representing the uk , its Nations, Regions and Communities: Purpose Plan.” Accessed 29 March 2017. http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/ aboutthebbc/insidethebbc/whoweare/publicpurposes/pdf/purpose_plan_ communities.pdf. – 2011. “State Multiculturalism Has Failed, Says David Cameron.” Accessed 29 March 2017. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12371994. – 2014. “Equality and Diversity at the bbc – 2014/15.” Accessed 29 March 2017. http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/diversity/pdf/equality-report-2014-15final.pdf. Bear Robe, Andrew. 1992. “Treaty Federalism.” Constitutional Forum/Forum constitutionnel 4, no. 1–4: 6–11. Beauchemin, Jacques. 2002. L’Histoire en trop: la mauvaise conscience des souverainistes québécois. Montreal: vlb Éditeur. – 2004. La Société des identités. Éthique et politique dans le monde contemporain. Montreal: Athéna. – 2015. La Souveraineté en héritage. Montreal: Boréal. Béland, Daniel, and André Lecours. 2004. “Nationalisme et protection sociale: une approche comparative.” Canadian Public Policy/Analyse de politiques 30 no. 3: 319–31. – 2006. “Sub-state Nationalism and Welfare State: Québec and Canadian Federalism.” Nations and Nationalism 12, no. 1: 77–96. Benedikter, Thomas. 2008. “The Financial System of the Autonomous Province of Bolzano/Bozen.” In Tolerance through Law: Self Governance and Group Rights in South Tyrol, edited by Jens Woelk, Francesco Palermo, and Joseph Marko, 105–19. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Benhabib, Seyla. 2002. The Claims of Culture. Equality and Diversity in the Global Era. Princeton, nj : Princeton University Press. Bergeron, Yves. 2005. “Naissance de l’ethnologie et émergence de la muséologie au Québec (1936–1945). De l’‘autre’ au ‘soi’.” Rabaska: revue d’ethnologie de l’Amérique française 3: 7–30. Berghe, Peter van den. 1987. The Ethnic Phenomenon. New York: Elsevier. Bernard, Louis. 2013. “Le Jour où le Canada s’est fractionné.” In Le Nouvel ordre constitutionnel, edited by François Rocher and Benoît Pelletier, 11–18. Montreal: Presses de l’Université du Québec. Bibo, Istvan. 1993. Misère des petits États d’Europe de l’Est. Paris: Albin Michel.

212

References

Bickerton, James. 2007. “La question du nationalisme majoritaire au Canada.” In Les Nationalismes majoritaires contemporains: identité, mémoire, pouvoir, edited by Alain-G. Gagnon, André Lecours, and Geneviève Nootens, 217–70. Montreal: Québec Amérique. Big Lottery Fund. 2015a. “About the Big Lottery Fund.” Accessed 29 March 2017. https://www.biglotteryfund.org.uk/about-big/our-approach/ about-big-lottery-fund. – 2015b. “Equality. Our Equality Principles.” Accessed 29 March 2017. https:// www.biglotteryfund.org.uk/about-big/our-approach/equalities. Bilingual Primary School. 2015. “School Information.” Accessed 29 March 2017. https://bilingualprimaryschool.org.uk/brighton-hove/primary/ bilingualprimaryschool/site/pages/schoolinformation. Billig, Michael. 1995. Banal Nationalism. London: sage . Bissoondath, Neil. 1995. Le Marché aux illusions: la méprise du multiculturalisme. Montreal: Boréal. Blair, Maud, and Madelaine Arnot. 1993. “Black and Anti-racist Perspectives on the National Curriculum and Government Educational Policy.” In The Multicultural Dimension of the National Curriculum, edited by Anna S. King and Michael J. Reiss, 259–74. London: The Falmer Press. Blair, Tony. 1997 [1996]. New Britain: My Vision for a Young Country. London: Westview Press. Blanchet-Gravel, Jérôme. 2013. Le Nouveau triangle amoureux: gauche, islam et multiculturalisme. Montreal: Accent Grave. – 2014. “L’Extrême droite en miroir du multiculturalisme.” Le Huffington Post Québec. Accessed 6 June 2016. http://quebec.huffingtonpost.ca/jeromeblanchet-gravel/extreme-droite-en-miroir-du-multiculturalisme_b_5469512. html. – 2015. Le Retour du bon sauvage. La matrice religieuse de l’écologisme. Montreal: Boréal. Bleich, Erik. 1998. “From International Ideas to Domestic Policies: Educational Multiculturalism in England and France.” Comparative Politics 31, no. 10: 81–100. Blindenbacher, Raoul, and Ronald L. Watts. 2003. “Federalism in a Changing World – A Conceptual Framework.” In Federalism in a Changing World: Learning from Each Other, edited by Raoul Blindenbacher and Arnold Koller, 7–25. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Bloemraad, Irene. 2006. Becoming Citizens. Incorporating Immigrants and Refugees in the United States. Berkeley: University of California Press. Bloemraad, Irene, and Matthew Wright. 2014. “‘Utter Failure’ or Unity out of Diversity? Debating and Evaluating Policies of Multiculturalism.” International Migration Review 48, no. 1: 292–334.

References

213

Blunkett, David. 2002. Integration with Diversity: Globalization and the Renewal of Democracy and Civil Society. London: Foreign Policy Centre. Bock-Côté, Mathieu. 2007. La Dénationalisation tranquille: mémoire, identité et multiculturalisme. Montreal: Boréal. – 2012. Fin de cycle. Aux origines du malaise politique québécois. Montreal: Boréal. – 2014. “Pourquoi le Québec veut en finir avec le multiculturalisme.” Le Figaro. Accessed 29 March 2017. http://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/monde/ 2014/04/04/31002-20140404ARTFIG00101-le-quebec-veut-en-finir-avecle-multiculturalisme.php. – 2016a. Le Multiculturalisme comme religion politique. Paris: Cerf. – 2016b. “Raciste, raciste, raciste!” Journal de Montréal. Accessed 6 June 2016. http://www.journaldemontreal.com/2016/04/20/raciste-racisteraciste. Bonacina, Florence, and Joseph Gafaranga. 2011. “‘Medium of Instruction’ vs. ‘Medium of Classroom Interaction’: Language Choice in a French Complementary School Classroom in Scotland.” International Journal of Bilingual Education and Bilingualism 14, no. 3: 319–34. Borrows, John. 1997. “Wampum at Niagara: The Royal Proclamation, Canadian Legal History and Self-Government.” In Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada, edited by Michael Asch, 155–72. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. – 2010. Canada’s Indigenous Constitution. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Borrows, John, and Michael Coyle, eds. 2017. The Right Relationship: Reimagining the Implementation of Historical Treaties. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Bosset, Pierre. 2009. “Droits de la personne et accommodements raisonnables: le droit est-il mondialisé?” Revue internationale d’études juridiques 1, no. 1: 1–32. Bouchard, Gérard. 1999. La Nation québécoise au futur et au passé. Montreal: vlb Éditeur. – 2000. Genèse des nations et cultures du nouveau monde. Montreal: Boréal. – 2011. “Qu’est-ce que l’interculturalism ? / What Is Interculturalism?” McGill Law Journal/Revue de droit de McGill 56, no. 2: 395–468. – 2012. L’Interculturalisme. Un point de vue québécois. Montreal: Boréal. – 2013. “The Small Nation with a Big Dream.” In National Myths: Constructed Pasts, Contested Presents, edited by Gérard Bouchard, 1–23. New York: Routledge. – 2014. Raison et déraison du mythe. Au cœur des imaginaires collectifs. Montreal: Boréal.

214

References

– 2016. “Quebec Interculturalism and Canadian Multiculturalism.” In Multiculturalism and Interculturalism. Debating the Dividing Lines, edited by Nasar Meer, Tariq Modood, and Ricard Zapata-Barrero, 77–103. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. – 2019. Les Nations savent-elles encore rêver? Les mythes nationaux à l’ère de la mondialisation. Montreal: Boréal. Bouchard, Gérard, and Charles Taylor. 2008. Fonder l’avenir, le temps de la conciliation. Final Report. Québec: Bibliothèque et Archives nationales du Québec. Boucher, François. 2016a. “Le Multiculturalisme dans la ville: aménagement de l’espace urbain et l’intégration sociale.” Les ateliers de l’éthique/The Ethics Forum 11, no. 1: 55–79. – 2016b. “Le Multiculturalisme dans les sociétés plurinationales.” In Repenser l’autodétermination interne, edited by Michel Seymour, 21–52. Montreal: Thémis. Brady, David, and Ryan Finnigan. 2014. “Does Immigration Undermine Public Support for Social Policy?” American Sociological Review 79, no. 1: 17–42. Breuilly, John. 1982. Nationalism and the State. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Bricault, Christine, Anne-Marie Desdouits, and Dominique Sarny. 2004. “Rétrospective de la discipline: la conception du folklore de trois pionniers. Marius Barbeau, Luc Lacourcière et Carmen Roy.” Ethnologies 26, no. 2: 21–56. Brie, Evelyne. 2016. Diplomatie référendaire: transmission et interprétation de l’exigence de clarté référendaire au Royaume-Uni (2011–2014). ma thesis, Department of Political Science, Université Laval. Brighton, Shane. 2007. “British Muslims, Multiculturalism, and uk Foreign Policy.” International Affairs 83, no. 1: 1–17. Brosseau, Laurence, and Michael Dewing. 2018. Canadian Multiculturalism, Background Paper. Ottawa: Library of Parliament. Publication No. 2009-20E. https://lop.parl.ca/sites/PublicWebsite/default/en_CA/ResearchPublications/ 200920E?. Brouillet, Eugénie, and Alain-G. Gagnon. 2017. “La Constitution canadienne et la métaphore de l’arbre vivant: quelques réflexions politologiques et juridiques.” In Constitutionnalisme, droit et diversité. Mélanges en l’honneur de José Woehrling, edited by Alain-G. Gagnon and Pierre Noreau, 79–108. Montreal: Thémis. Brouillet, Eugénie, Alain-G. Gagnon, and Guy Laforest, eds. 2018. The Quebec Conference of 1864. Understanding the Emergence of the Canadian Federation. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press.

References

215

Brubaker, Rogers. 2004a. Ethnicity without Groups. Cambridge, ma : Harvard University Press. – 2004b. Nationalism Reframed. Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brubaker, Rogers, and Frederick Cooper. 2000. “Beyond ‘Identity’.” Theory and Society 29, no. 1: 1–47. – 2005. “Identity.” In Colonialism in Question. Theory, Knowledge, History, by Frederick Cooper, 59–90. Berkeley: University of California Press. Bruckner, Pascal. 2006. La Tyrannie de la pénitence. Essai sur le masochisme occidental. Paris: Grasset. Brun, Henri, and Eugénie Brouillet. 2002. “Le Partage des pouvoirs en matière d’immigration: une perspective québécoise.” In Les Mélanges Gérald-A. Beaudoin. Les défis du constitutionnalisme, edited by Pierre Thibault, Benoît Pelletier, and Louis Perret, 55–87. Cowansville, qc : Éditions Yvon Blais. Brun, Henri, Guy Tremblay, and Eugénie Brouillet. 2014. Droit constitutionnel, 6th ed. Cowanswille, qc : Éditions Yvon Blais. Buchanan, Allan. 1997. “What’s So Special about Nations?” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26, no. 1: 283–309. Burelle, André. 1995. Le Mal canadien. Essai de diagnostic et esquisse d’une thérapie. Montreal: Fides. – 2005. Pierre Elliott Trudeau: l’intellectuel et le politique. Montreal: Fides. Burgess, Michael. 2006. Comparative Federalism: Theory and Practice. London: Routledge. – 2009. “The Paradox of Diversity – Asymmetrical Federalism in Comparative Perspective.” In Asymmetries in Constitutional Law. Recent Development in Federal and Regional Systems, edited by Francesco Palermo, Carolin Swilling, and Karl Kössler, 21–35. Bolzano/Bozen: Eurac Research. Burgess, Michael, and Alain-G. Gagnon. 2014. “Le Fédéralisme et la démocratie.” In La Politique québécoise et canadienne. Une approche pluraliste, edited by Alain-G. Gagnon, 323–36. Montreal: Presses de l’Université du Québec. Cairns, Alan C. 2000. Citizens Plus: Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian State. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. Calhoun, Craig. 1997. Nationalism. Buckingham, uk : Open University Press. Cameron, David. 2007. “Cameron Speech in Full. Here Is the Full Text from Conservative Leader David Cameron’s Speech to the Party’s 2007 Conference.” bbc . Accessed 29 March 2017. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ hi/7026435.stm. – 2011. “pm ’s Speech at Munich Security Conference.” Accessed 29 March 2017. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130109092234/http:// number10.gov.uk/news/pms-speech-at-munich-security-conference.

216

References

Canada, Constitution Act, 1867. Canada, Constitution Act, 1982. Canovan, Margaret. 1996. Nationhood and Political Theory. New York: Blackwell. Cantle, Ted. 2012. Interculturalism: The New Era of Cohesion and Diversity. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. – 2016. “The Case for Interculturalism, Plural Identities and Cohesion.” In Multiculturalism and Interculturalism. Debating the Dividing Lines, edited by Nasar Meer, Tariq Modood, and Ricard Zapata-Barrer, 133–57. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Cardinal, Linda, and Martin Papillon. 2011. “Le Québec et l’étude des petites nations.” Politique et Sociétés 30 no. 1: 75–93. Carens, Joseph H. 1995. Is Quebec Nationalism Just? Montreal: McGillQueen’s University Press. – 1997. “Liberalism and Culture.” Constellations 4, no. 1: 35–47. – 2000. Culture, Citizenship, and Community. A Contextual Exploration of Justice as Evenhandedness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Carlà, Andrea. 2007. “Living Apart in the Same Room: Analysis of the Management of Linguistic Diversity in Bolzano.” Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global Review of Ethnopolitics 6, no. 2: 285–313. Carle, Robert. 2006. “Demise of Dutch Multiculturalism.” Society 43, no. 3: 68–74. Caron, Jean-François, Guy Laforest, and Catherine Vallières-Roland. 2009. “Canada’s Federative Deficit.” In Contemporary Canadian Federalism. Foundations, Traditions, Institutions, edited by Alain-G. Gagnon, 132–62. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Carpentier, David. 2020. La Métropole contre la nation? La politique montréalaise d’intégration des personnes immigrante et le modèle québécois d’interculturalisme. ma thesis, Department of Political Science, Université du Québec à Montréal. cbc. 2016. “‘The World Needs More Canada,’ Bono tells Global Fund Conference.” Accessed 29 March 2017. http://www.cbc.ca/news/ the-world-needs-more-canada-bono-tells-global-fund-conference-1.3767394. Chapman, James. 2006. “Kelly Condemns Multiculturalism.” Daily Mail. Accessed 29 March 2017. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-402150/ Kelly-condemns-multiculturalism.html. Choudhry, Sujit. 2008. “Does the World Need More Canada? The Politics of the Canadian Model in Constitutional Politics and Political Theory.” In Constitutional Design for Divided Societies, edited by Sujit Choudhry, 141–72. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

References

217

Collective. 2009. “Éducation à la citoyenneté et aux comportements responsables en Angleterre, en Écosse et en France. Étude comparative.” Accessed 29 March 2017. http://media.education.gouv.fr/file/Europe_et_international/54/7/citoyennete_Angleterre_Ecosse_France_114547.pdf. Côté, Pauline, and Félix Mathieu. 2016. “Laïcité et valeurs dans l’économie du projet de loi 60 Charte des valeurs.” Recherches sociographiques 57, no. 2–3: 379–425. Council of Europe. 2015. “Intercultural Dialogue.” Accessed 20 October 2021. https://pjp-eu.coe.int/en/web/youth-partnership/intercultural-dialogue. Council of the Federation. “Founding Agreement.” Accessed 20 October 2021. https://www.canadaspremiers.ca/founding-agreement. Courchene, Thomas J. 1993. “Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada.” In Parliament and the Constitution: Some Issues of Interest. Papers on Parliament No. 21. Parliament of Australia, Department of the Senate. Coyle, Michael. 2011. “Transcending Colonialism? Power and the Resolution of Indigenous Treaty Claims in Canada and New Zealand.” New Zealand Universities Law Review 24, no. 4: 596–620. – 2014. “Negotiating Indigenous Peoples’ Exit from Colonialism: The Case for an Integrative Approach.” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 27, no. 1: 283–303. cre (Commission for Racial Equality). 2009. Annual Report and Accounts 2006/7. London: The Stationery Office. Creese, Angela, Arvind Bhatt, Nirmala Bhojani, and Peter Martin. 2006. “Multicultural, Heritage and Learner Identities in Complementary Schools.” Language and Education 20, no. 1: 23–43. Crowder, George. 2013. Theories of Multiculturalism. An Introduction. Cambridge: Polity Press. Dabin, Simon. 2020. “Les Fédéralismes par traités et les peuples autochtones au Canada: une voie vers la réconciliation ou une utopie philosophique?” In Cinquante déclinaisons de fédéralisme: théorie, enjeux et études de cas, edited by Félix Mathieu, Dave Guénette, and Alain-G. Gagnon, 295–310. Québec: Presses de l’Université du Québec, Polietia Series. Daily Mail. 2006. “Kelly Condemns Multiculturalism.” Accessed 8 November 2015. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-402150/Kelly-condemnsmulticulturalism.html. – 2008. “‘Sharia Law Will Undermine British Society,’ warns Cameron in Attack on Multiculturalism.” Accessed 29 March 2017. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-519090/Sharia-law-undermine-British-societywarns-Cameron-attack-multiculturalism.html.

218

References

– 2013. “Mistake of Multiculturalism Aided Extremists, says pm .” Accessed 8 November 2015. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2518504/DavidCameron-Mistake-multiculturalism-aided-extremists.html. Daschuk, James. 2013. Clearing the Plains. Disease, Politics of Starvation, and the Loss of Indigenous Life. Regina: University of Regina Press. Delanty, Gerard. 2003. Community. London: Routledge. Della Porta, Donatella, and Michael Keating, eds. 2008. Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Della Serra, Corriere. 2015. “Zygmunt Bauman: nos sociétés refoulent des populations entières hors du corps social.” Courrier international. Accessed 6 June 2016. http://www.courrierinternational.com/article/2015/01/14/ zygmunt-bauman-nos-societes-refoulent-des-populations-entiereshors-du-corps-soci. Department for Children, Schools and Families. 2007. The Children’s Plan: Building Brighter Futures. Norwich: The Stationary Office. Department for Communities and Local Government. 2009. Improving Opportunity, Strengthening Society: A Third Progress Report on the Government’s Strategy for Race Equality and Community Cohesion. London: Department for Communities and Local Government. – 2010. Tackling Race Inequality. A Statement on Race. London: Communities and Local Government Publications. des (Department of Education and Science). 1989. Circular No. 5/89, The Education Reform Act 1988: The School Curriculum and Assessment. London: hmso . Deutsch, Karl W. 1954. Political Community at the International Level: Problems of Definition and Measurement. Garden City, ny : Doubleday. Dewing, Michael. 2013. “Étude générale. Le multiculturalisme canadien.” Publication no. 2009-20-F. Ottawa: Library of Parliament. DiAngelo, Robin. 2018. White Fragility. Why It’s so Hard for White People to Talk about Racism. Boston: Beacon Press. Dieckhoff, Alain. 2001. “L’État face au défi de la multinationalité.” In Repères en mutation: identité et citoyenneté dans le Québec contemporain, edited by Jocelyn Maclure and Alain-G. Gagnon, 321–56. Montreal: Québec Amérique. Dronker, Peter. 2013. “Interpreting Multiculturalism in the Netherlands: Nation-Building, Civic Allegiance and Multiple Belonging.” In Liberal Multiculturalism and the Fair Terms of Integration, edited by Peter J. Balint and Sophie Guérard de Latour, 126–39. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Dufour, Frédérick Guillaume. 2015. La Sociologie historique. Québec: Presses de l’Université du Québec.

References

219

Dumont, Fernand. 1962. “L’Étude systématique de la société globale canadienne-française.” Recherches sociographiques 3, no. 1–2: 277–92. – 1993. Genèse de la société québécoise. Montreal: Boréal. Dupuis-Déry, Francis. 2013. Démocratie. L’histoire politique d’un mot: aux États-Unis et en France. Montreal: Lux Éditeur. Durkheim, Émile. 2009 [1895]. Les Règles de la méthode sociologique. Paris: Pavot. Dutch News. 2011. “Multiculturalism Has Failed: Verhagen.” Accessed 29 March 2017. http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2011/02/ multiculturalism_has_failed_ve. Duyvendak, Jan Willem, and Peter Scholten. 2009. “Le ‘Modèle multiculturel’ d’intégration néerlandais en question.” Migrations et société 21, no. 122: 77–105. – 2012. “Deconstructing the Dutch Multicultural Model: A Frame Perspective on Dutch Immigrant Integration Policymaking.” Comparative European Politics 10, no. 3: 266–82. Duyvendak, Jan Willem, Robert van Reekum, Fatiha El-Hajjari, and Charles Bertossi. 2013. “Mysterious Multiculturalism: The Risk of Using ModelBased Indices for Making Meaningful Comparisons.” Comparative European Politics 11, no. 5: 599–620. École de Wix. 2015. “École de Wix.” Accessed 29 March 2017. http://www. ecolewix.org.uk. Economist (The). 2007. “Bagehot: In Praise of Multiculturalism.” Accessed 29 March 2017. http://www.economist.com/node/9337695. ehrc (Equality and Human Rights Commission). 2015. “Our Vision and Mission.” Accessed 29 March 2017. http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/ about-us/about-commission/our-vision-and-mission. Elazar, Daniel J. 1987. Exploring Federalism. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press. Entzinger, Han. 2006. “Changing the Rules While the Game Is On: From Multiculturalism to Assimilation in the Netherlands.” In Migration, Citizenship, Ethnos, edited by Y. Michael Bodemann and Gökçe Yurdakul, 121–44. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Erk, Jan. 2015. “Non-territorial Millets in Ottoman History.” In Minority Accommodation through Territorial and Non-territorial Autonomy, edited by Tove H. Malloy and Francesco Palermo, 119–32. New York: Oxford University Press. Favell, Adrian. 2001. Philosophies of Integration. Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Fenge, Terry, and Jim Aldridge, eds. 2015. Keeping Promises: The Royal Proclamation of 1763, Aboriginal Rights, and Treaties in Canada. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press.

220

References

Figaro (Le). 2011. “Sarkozy: le multiculturalisme, ‘un échec’.” Accessed 29 March 2017. http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2011/02/10/9700120110210FILWWW00731-sarkozy-le-multiculturalisme-un-echec.php. Fischer, David Hackett. 2008. Champlain’s Dream. New York: Simon & Schuster. Flanagan, Tom. 2000. First Nations? Second Thoughts. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Fleras, Augie. 2009. The Politics of Multiculturalism. Multicultural Governance in Comparative Perspective. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Fomina, Joanna. 2006. “The Failure of British Multiculturalism: Lessons for Europe.” Polish Sociological Review no. 156: 409–24. Franks, Ned. 1987. Public Administration Questions Relating to Aboriginal Self-Government. Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations. Fraser, Nancy. 1995. “From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a ‘Post-Socialist’ Age.” New Left Review 1, no. 212. Accessed 29 March 2017. http://newleftreview.org/I/212/nancy-fraser-fromredistribution-to-recognition-dilemmas-of-justice-in-a-post-socialist-age. Freeman, Gary. 2004. “Immigrant Incorporation in Western Democracies.” International Migration Review 38, no. 3: 945–69. Friedman, Marilyn. 2000. “Autonomy, Social Disruption, and Women.” In Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Left, edited by Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar, 35–51. New York: Oxford University Press. Fukuyama, Francis. 1995. Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New York: Free Press. Fumoleau, René. 1975. As Long as This Land Shall Last: A History of Treaty 8 and Treaty 11, 1870–1939. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart. Gagnon, Alain-G. 1993. “The Political Uses of Federalism.” In Comparative Federalism and Federation: Competing Traditions and Future Directions, edited by Michael Burgess and Alain-G. Gagnon, 15–44. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. – 2000. “Plaidoyer pour l’interculturalisme.” Possibles 24, no. 1: 11–25. – ed. 2004. Québec: État et société, Tome II. Montreal: Québec Amérique. – 2008. La Raison du plus fort: plaidoyer pour le fédéralisme multinational. Montreal: Québec Amérique. – 2009. The Case for Multinational Federalism. Beyond the All-Encompassing State. London: Routledge. – 2014. Minority Nations in the Age of Uncertainty. New Paths to National Emancipation and Empowerment. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. – 2021. Le Choc des légitimités. Québec: Presses de l’Université Laval.

References

221

Gagnon, Alain-G., and Raffaele Iacovino. 2007. Citizenship, Federalism and Quebec: Debating Multinationalism. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. – 2016. “Interculturalism and Multiculturalism: Similarities and Differences.” In Multiculturalism and Interculturalism. Debating the Dividing Lines, edited by Nasar Meer, Tariq Modood, and Ricard Zapata-Barrero, 104–32. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Gagnon, Alain-G., and Bernard Jouve, eds. 2009. Facing Cultural Diversities. Cities under Stress. Lyon: Presses universitaires de Lyon. Gagnon, Alain-G., and Guy Laforest. 1993. “The Future of Federalism: Lessons from Canada and Quebec.” International Journal 48, no. 3: 470–91. Gagnon, Alain-G., and Félix Mathieu. 2020. “La Richesse des (petites) nations et l’agir hospitalier.” In La Question des petites nations. Culture, politique et universalité, edited by Jean-François Laniel and Joseph Yvon Thériault, 261–80. Paris: Classiques Garnier. – 2021. “(Still) in Search of the Federal Spirit: Autonomy and SelfDetermination in Multinational Federations.” In Beyond Autonomy. Federalism and Democracy in the 21st Century, edited by Tracy Beck Fenwick and Andrew C. Banfield, 67–87. Leiden: Brill Publications. Gagnon, Alain-G., Micheline Milot, F. Leslie Seidle, and François Boucher. 2014. Rapport présenté au ministère de l’Immigration, de la Diversité et de l’Inclusion en vue d’élaborer un nouvel énoncé de politique. Accessed 29 March 2017. http://www.midi.gouv.qc.ca/publications/fr/recherchesstatistiques/ETU_AmenagDiversite_GagnonMilotSeidleBoucher.pdf. Gagnon, Alain-G., and Johanne Poirier. 2020. Canadian Federalism and Its Future. Actors and Institutions. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Gagnon, Alain-G., and Guy Rocher, eds. 2002. Regard sur la Convention de la Baie-James et du Nord québécois. Montreal: Québec Amérique. Gagnon, Alain-G., and Jean-Charles St-Louis. 2016. “Les Conditions du dialogue au Québec.” In Les Conditions du dialogue au Québec. Laïcité, réciprocité, pluralisme, edited by Alain-G. Gagnon and Jean-Charles St-Louis, 11–25. Montreal: Québec Amérique. Gagnon, Alain-G., and James Tully, eds. 2001. Multinational Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Geertz, Clifford. 1973. The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays. London: Fontana. Gellner, Ernest. 2008 [1983]. Nations and Nationalism. New York: Cornell University Press. Genest, Bernard. 2002. “La Tradition orale et les savoirs artisanaux.” In Traité de la culture, edited by Denise Lemieux, 47–64. Québec: Presses de l’Université Laval.

222

References

Gerard, Jasper. 2006. “Be Clear, This Is Asian Apartheid.” Sunday Times. Accessed 29 March 2017. http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/ article165842.ece. Giddens, Anthony. 2006. “Misunderstanding Multiculturalism.” Guardian. Accessed 29 March 2017. http://www.theguardian.com/ commentisfree/2006/oct/14/tonygiddens. Gill, Bruce A.G. 1993. “Pedagogy and Assessment: School Processes.” In The Multicultural Dimension of the National Curriculum, edited by Anna S. King and Michael J. Reiss, 275–85. London: The Falmer Press. Glazer, Nathan. 1997. We Are All Multiculturalists Now. Cambridge, ma : Harvard University Press. Goodhart, David. 2004. “Too Diverse?” Prospect (February): 30–7. Goodman, Sara Wallace. 2010. “Integration Requirements for Integration’s Sake? Identification, Categorising, and Comparing Civic Integration Policies.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 36, no. 5: 753–72. Gourdeau, Éric. 2002. “Synthèse de la Convention de la Baie-James et du Nord québécois.” In Regard sur la Convention de la Baie-James et du Nord Québécois, edited by Alain-G. Gagnon and Guy Rocher, 25–39. Montreal: Québec Amérique. Gouverneur général du Canada. 2015. Réaliser le vrai changement. Discours du Trône ouvrant la première session de la quarante-deuxième législature du Canada. 4 December. Ottawa: Government of Canada. Government Equalities Office. 2009. Annual Report and Resource Account 2008–09. Putting Equality at the Heart of Government. London: The Stationery Office. Government of the United Kingdom. 2015a. “Legislations.” The National Archives. Accessed 29 March 2017. http://www.legislation.gov.uk. – 2015b. “Policies.” Accessed 29 March 2017. https://www.gov.uk/government/ policies. – 2015c. “Publications.” Accessed 29 March 2017. https://www.gov.uk/ government/publications. – 2015d. “Types of Schools.” Accessed 29 March 2017. https://www.gov.uk/ types-of-school/free-schools. Graham, Katherine H., and Susan D. Phillips. 2007. “Another Fine Balance: Managing Diversity in Canadian Cities.” In Belonging? Diversity, Recognition and Shared Citizenship in Canada, edited by Keith Banting, Thomas J. Courchene, and F. Leslie Seidle, 155–94. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Greenfeld, Liah. 1993. Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

References

223

Grillo, Ralph. 2010. “British and Others: From ‘Race’ to ‘Faith’.” In The Multiculturalism Backlash. European Discourses, Policies and Practices, edited by Steven Vertovec and Susanne Wessendorf, 50–71. New York: Routledge. Guénette, Dave. 2016. “La Cour suprême du Canada et la pluralité démotique de l’État canadien: des traces de consociationalisme dans la jurisprudence constitutionnelle.” Revue générale de droit 46, no. 1: 215–52. Guénette, Dave, and Félix Mathieu. 2018. “Nations et nations fragiles.” Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique 51, no. 4: 881–905. Guibernau, Montserrat. 1999. Nations without States. Political Communities in a Global Age. Cambridge: Polity Press. – 2007. The Identity of Nations. Cambridge: Polity Press. Guirous, Lydia. 2016. “Assimilation: la dernière chance avant la désintégration de l’identité française.” Valeurs actuelles. Accessed 6 June 2016. http://www. valeursactuelles.com/politique/assimilation-la-derniere-chance-avant-ladesintegration-de-lidentite-francaise-62140. Habermas, Jürgen. 1996. “The European Nation-State: Its Achievements and Its Limits. On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship.” Ratio Juris 9, no. 2: 125–37. – 2000. Après l’État-nation. Une nouvelle constellation politique. Paris: Fayard. Hansen, Randall. 2007. “Diversity, Integration and the Turn from Multiculturalism in the United Kingdom.” In Belonging? Diversity, Recognition and Shared Citizenship in Canada, edited by Keith Banting, Thomas J. Courchene, and F. Leslie Seidel, 351–86. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Haque, Eve. 2012. Multiculturalism within a Bilingual Framework. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Hardin, Russell. 2006. “The Street-Level Epistemology of Trust.” In Organizational Trust: A Reader, edited by Roderick Moreland Kramer, 21–47. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hayden, Mary. 2013. “A Review of Curriculum in the UK: Internationalising in a Changing Context.” Curriculum Journal 24, no. 1: 8–26. Heath, Joseph. 2014. Enlightenment 2.0. Restoring Sanity to Our Politics, Our Economy, and Our Lives. Toronto: Harper Collins. Henderson, James Youngblood. 1994. “Empowering Treaty Federalism.” Saskatchewan Law Review 58, no. 2: 241–329. Hermet, Guy, Bertrand Badie, Pierre Birnbaum, and Philippe Braud. 2015. Dictionnaire de la science politique et des institutions politiques, 8th ed. Paris: Armand Colin.

224

References

Hermon-Belot, Rita. 2011. “État.” In Dictionnaire des faits religieux, edited by Régine Azria and Danièle Hervieu-Léger, 332–40. Paris: Presses universitaires de France. Hewer, Chris. 2001. “Schools for Muslims.” Oxford Review of Education 27, no. 4: 515–27. Hobsbawm, Eric J. 1990. Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hoehn, Felix 2012. Reconciling Sovereignties: Aboriginal Nations and Canada. Saskatoon: Native Law Centre. Holesch, Adam. 2016. What Holds a Multinational State Together? – The Political Stability of the Spanish “State of Autonomies.” p hd thesis, Department of Political and Social Sciences, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Home Office. 2001. Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review Team (the Cantle Report). London: Home Office. – 2015. “Dual Citizenship.” Accessed 29 March 2017. https://www.gov.uk/ dual-citizenship. Honneth, Axel. 1992. “Integrity and Disrespect: Principles of a Conception of Morality Based on the Theory of Recognition.” Political Theory 20, no. 2: 187–201. Hopkins, Nick. 2001. “Met Lets Muslim Policewomen Don Headscarves.” Guardian. Accessed 29 March 2017. http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2001/ apr/25/ukcrime.religion. Hroch, Miroslav. 1996. “Nationalism and National Movements: Comparing the Past and the Present of Central and Eastern Europe.” Nations and Nationalism 2, no. 1: 35–44. Hueglin, Thomas. 1993. “Exploring Concepts of Treaty Federalism: A Comparative Perspective.” In Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1–88. Ottawa: Government of Canada. – 2013. “Treaty Federalism as a Model of Policy Making: Comparing Canada and the European Union.” Canadian Public Administration 56, no. 2: 185–202. Hyman, Ilene, Agnes Meinhard, and John Sields. 2011. The Role of Multiculturalism Policy in Addressing Social Inclusion Processes in Canada. Edmonton: Centre for Voluntary Sector Studies/Canadian Multicultural Education Foundation. Ignatieff, Michael. 1993. Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism. New York: Macmillan. inac (Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada). 2010. “Address for the Launch of the Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples.” Accessed 20 October 2021. https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/110010001 4639/1572549038231.

References

225

– 2016. “250th Anniversary of the Royal Proclamation of 1763.” Accessed 20 October 2021. https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1370355181092/160 7905122267. Innerarity, Daniel. 2009. Éthique de l’hospitalité. Québec: Presses de l’Université Laval. Ivison, Duncan, ed. 2010. The Ashgate Companion to Multiculturalism. Burlington, vt : Ashgate Publishing. Jacob, Steve. 2010. “Évaluation.” In Dictionnaire des politiques publiques, edited by Laurie Boussaguet, Sophie Jacquot, and Pauline Ravinet, 257–65. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po. Jedwab, Jack. 2004. “The Myth of Canada as a Multinational Federation.” Canadian Diversity 3, no. 2: 19–22. Joppke, Christian. 2004. “The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy.” British Journal of Sociology 55, no. 2: 237–57. – 2008. “Immigration and the Identity of Citizenship: The Paradox of Universalism.” Citizenship Studies 12, no. 6: 533–46. – 2009. “Limits of Integration Policy: Britain and Her Muslims.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 35, no. 3: 453–72. – 2014. “The Retreat Is Real – but What Is the Alternative? Multiculturalism, Muscular Liberalism, and Islam.” Constellations 21, no. 2: 286–95. – 2017. Is Multiculturalism Dead? Crisis and Persistence in the Constitutional State. London: Polity Press. Judith Kerr Primary School. 2015. “About the School.” Accessed 29 March 2017. http://www.jkps-cfbt.org/school. Karmis, Dimitrios. 2003. “Pluralisme et identité(s) nationale(s) dans le Québec contemporain: clarifications conceptuelles, typologie et analyse du discours.” In Québec: État et société, Tome 2, edited by Alain-G. Gagnon, 85–116. Montreal: Québec Amérique. Karmis, Dimitrios, and François Rocher, eds. 2012. La Dynamique confiance/ méfiance dans les démocraties multinationales: le Canada sous l’angle comparatif. Québec: Presses de l’Université Laval. Keating, Michael. 1997. “Stateless Nation-Building: Québec, Catalonia and Scotland in the Changing State System.” Nations and Nationalism 3, no. 4: 689–717. Kedourie, Elie. 1994 [1960]. Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell. Kennedy, James. 2013. Liberal Nationalisms: Empire, State and Civil Society in Scotland and Quebec. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Kerr, David, Adam Smith, and Christine Twine. 2008. “Citizenship Education in the United Kingdom.” In The sage Handbook of Education for

226

References

Citizenship and Democracy, edited by James Arthur, Ian Davies, and Carole Hahn, 252–62. Los Angeles: sage Publications. King, Anna S. 1993. “Introduction.” In The Multicultural Dimension of the National Curriculum, edited by Anna S. King and Michael J. Reiss, 2–20. London: The Falmer Press. King, Gary, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. Designing Social Inquiry. Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton, nj : Princeton University Press. Kisby, Ben, and James Sloam. 2012. “Citizenship, Democracy and Education in the uk : Towards a Common Framework for Citizenship Lessons in the Four Home Nations.” Parliamentary Affairs 65, no. 1: 68–89. Kivisto, Peter. 2012. “We Really Are All Multiculturalists Now.” The Sociological Quarterly 53, no. 1: 1–24. Kivisto, Peter, and Thomas Faist. 2007. Citizenship: Discourse, Theory, and Transnational Prospects. London: Blackwell. Knowles, Valerie. 1997. Strangers at Our Gates: Canadian Immigration and Immigration Policy, 1540–1997. Toronto: Dundurn Press. Koopmans, Ruud. 2007. “Good Intentions Sometimes Make Bad Policy: A Comparison of Dutch and German Integration Policies.” In The Challenge of Diversity: European Social Democracy Facing Migration, Integration, and Multiculturalism, edited by René Cuperus, Karl Duffek, and Johannes Kandel, 163–8. Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. – 2010. “Trade-offs between Equality and Difference: Immigrant Integration, Multiculturalism and the Welfare State in Cross-National Perspective.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 36, no. 1: 1–26. Koopmans, Ruud, Ines Michalowski, and Stine Waibel. 2012. “Citizenship Rights for Immigrants: National Political Processes and Cross-National Convergence in Western Europe 1980–2008.” American Journal of Sociology 117, no. 4: 1202–45. Koopmans, Ruud, Paul Statham, Marco Giugni, and Florence Passy. 2005. Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Kostakopoulou, Dora. 2010. “Matters of Control: Integration Tests, Naturalisation Reform and Probationary Citizenship in the United Kingdom.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 36, no. 5: 829–46. Krippendorff, Klaus. 2013. Content Analysis. An Introduction to Its Methodology. London: sage Publications. Kukathas, Chandran. 1992. “Are There Any Cultural Rights?” Political Theory 20, no. 1: 105–39. – 2003. The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

References

227

Kumar, Krishan. 2003. The Making of English National Identity. New York: Cambridge University Press. Kundera, Milan. 2005. Le Rideau: essai en sept parties. Paris: Gallimard. Kymlicka, Will. 1989. Liberalism, Community, and Culture. Oxford: Clarendon Press. – 1995. Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. – 1998. Finding Our Way. Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada. Oxford: Oxford University Press. – 1999. “Comments on Shachar and Spinner-Halev: An Update from the Multiculturalism Wars.” In Multicultural Questions, edited by Christian Joppke and Steven Lukes, 112–29. New York: Oxford University Press. – 2001. Politics in the Vernacular. New York: Oxford University Press. – 2005. “Renner and the Accommodation of Sub-state Nationalisms.” In National Cultural Autonomy and Its Contemporary Critics, edited by Ephraim Nimni, 117–27. London: Routledge. – 2007. Multicultural Odysseys. New York: Oxford University Press. – 2009. “Citizenship, Communities, and Identity in Canada.” In Canadian Politics, 5th ed., edited by James Bickerton and Alain-G. Gagnon, 23–44. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. – 2012. Multiculturalism: Success, Failure, and the Future. Washington, dc : Immigration Policy Institute. – 2016. “Defending Diversity in an Era of Pluralism: Multiculturalism and Interculturalism Compared.” In Multiculturalism and Interculturalism. Debating the Dividing Lines, edited by Nasar Meer, Tariq Modood, and Ricard Zapata-Barrero, 158–77. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Laborde, Cécile. 2011. “Which ‘Multiculturalism’ Has Failed, David Cameron?” Open Democracy. Accessed 29 March 2017. https://www. opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/cecile-laborde/which-multiculturalism-hasfailed-david-cameron. Ladner, Kiera. 2005. “Up the Creek: Fishing for a New Constitutional Order.” Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique 38, no. 4: 923–53. Laforest, Guy. 1995. Trudeau and the End of a Canadian Dream. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press. – 1998. “Se placer dans les souliers des autres partenaires dans l’union canadienne.” In Sortir de l’impasse, edited by Guy Laforest and Roger Gibbins, 55–84. Montreal: Institut de recherche sur les politiques publiques. – 2004. Pour la liberté d’une société distincte. Québec: Presses de l’Université Laval.

228

References

– 2014. Un Québec exilé dans la fédération. Essai d’histoire intellectuelle et de pensée politique. Montreal: Québec Amérique. – 2016. “Comparer les pommes avec les pommes: les autres significatifs du Québec.” Accessed 29 March 2017. https://guylaforest.com/2016/05/01/ comparer-les-pommes-avec-les-pommes-les-autres-significatifs-du-quebec. Laforest, Guy, and Félix Mathieu. 2016. “Le Fiduciaire, le financier et le poète: Cartier, Galt et D’Arcy McGee.” In La Conférence de Québec de 1864. 150 ans plus tard, edited by Eugénie Brouillet, Alain-G. Gagnon, and Guy Laforest, 123–48. Québec: Presses de l’Université Laval. Laforest, Guy, and Éric Montigny. 2009. “Le Fédéralisme exécutif: problèmes et actualités.” In Le Parlementarisme canadien, 4th edn, edited by Réjean Pelletier and Manon Tremblay, 129–62. Québec: Presses de l’Université Laval. Lamy, Guillaume. 2015. Laïcité et valeurs québécoises. Les sources d’une controverse. Québec: Québec Amérique. Langlois, Simon. 1991. “Le Choc de deux sociétés globales.” In Le Québec et la restructuration du Canada 1980–1992. Enjeux et perspectives, edited by Louis Balthazar, Guy Laforest, and Vincent Lemieux, 93–108. Montreal: Septentrion. Laniel, Jean-François, and Joseph Yvon Thériault, eds. 2020. La Question des petites nations. Culture, politique et universalité. Paris: Garnier. Lapointe-Gagnon, Valérie. 2013. Penser et “panser” les plaies du Canada: le moment Laurendeau-Dunton, 1963–1971. p hd thesis, Department of History, Université Laval. – 2014. “Les Origines intellectuelles de la commission Laurendeau-Dunton: de la présence d’une volonté de dialogue entre les deux peuples fondateurs du Canada au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, 1945–1965.” Mens: Revue d’histoire intellectuelle et culturelle 14, no. 1–2: 131–73. – 2018. Panser le Canada: une histoire intellectuelle de la Commission Laurendeau-Dunton. Montreal: Boréal. Larmore, Charles. 2001. “A Critique of Philip Pettit’s Republicanism.” Philosophical Issues 11: 229–43. LaSelva, Samuel V. 1996. The Moral Foundations of Canadian Federalism. Paradoxes, Achievements, and Tragedies of Nationhood. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press. – 2009. “Understanding Canada’s Origins: Federalism, Multiculturalism, and the Will to Live Together.” In Canadian Politics, 5th edn, edited by James Bickerton and Alain-G. Gagnon, 3–22. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. – 2018. Canada and the Ethics of Constitutionalism. Identity, Destiny and Constitutional Faith. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press.

References

229

Leclair, Jean. 2013. “Les Droits ancestraux en droit constitutionnel canadien: quand l’identitaire chasse le politique.” In Les Autochtones et le Québec: des premiers contacts au Plan Nord, edited by Alain Beaulieu, Stéphan Gervais, and Martin Papillon, 299–321. Montreal: Presses de l’Université de Montréal. Lecours, André, and Geneviève Nootens. 2007. “Comprendre le nationalisme majoritaire.” In Les Nationalismes majoritaires contemporains: identité, mémoire, pouvoir, edited by André Lecours and Geneviève Nootens, 19–45. Montreal: Québec Amérique. Lentin, Alana, and Gavin Titley. 2011. The Crisis of Multiculturalism. Racism in a Neoliberal Age. London: Zed Books. Leonard, Mark. 1997. BritainTM: Renewing Our Identity. London: Demos. Létourneau, Jocelyn. 2014. Je me souviens? Le passé du Québec dans la conscience de sa jeunesse. Montreal: Fides. Lévesque, Sébastien, ed. 2014. Penser la laïcité québécoise. Fondements et défense d’une laïcité ouverte au Québec. Québec: Presses de l’Université Laval. Levey, George B. 2010. “Liberal Multiculturalism.” In The Ashgate Companion to Multiculturalism, edited by Duncan Ivison, 19–37. Burlington, vt : Ashgate Publishing. Levy, Jacob T. 2000. The Multiculturalism of Fear. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lijphart, Arend. 1979. “Consociation and Federation: Conceptual and Empirical Links.” Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique 12, no. 3: 499–515. – 2004. “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies.” Journal of Democracy 15, no. 2: 96–109. Livingston, William S. 1956. Federalism and Constitutional Change. Oxford: The Clarendon Press. Loobuyck, Patrick. 2016. “Towards an Intercultural Sense of Belonging Together: Reflections on the Theoretical and Political Level.” In Multiculturalism and Interculturalism. Debating the Dividing Lines, edited by Nasar Meer, Tariq Modood, and Ricard Zapata-Barrero, 225–45. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Lupul, Manoly R. 1982. “The Political Implementation of Multiculturalism.” Journal of Canadian Studies 17, no. 1: 93–102. Maclure, Jocelyn. 2010. “Multiculturalism and Political Morality.” In The Ashgate Companion to Multiculturalism, edited by Duncan Ivison, 39–55. Burlington, vt : Ashgate Publishing. – 2013. “La Philosophie politique analytique et ses critiques.” In Ceci n’est pas une idée politique, edited by Dalie Giroux and Dimitrios Karmis, 261–88. Québec: Presses de l’Université Laval.

230

References

– 2016. Retrouver la raison. Essais de philosophie publique. Montreal: Québec Amérique. Maclure, Jocelyn, and Charles Taylor. 2011 [2010]. Laïcité et liberté de conscience. Montreal: Boréal. Macpherson, Sir William. 1999. The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry. Report of an Inquiry by Sir William Macpherson of Cluny. Accessed 29 March 2017. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ file/277111/4262.pdf. Maffesoli, Michel. 2007. Le Réenchantement du monde: une éthique pour notre temps. Paris: Les Éditions de la Table Ronde. Malik, Kenan. 2010. “The Failures of Multiculturalism.” Foreign Affairs. Accessed 6 June 2016. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/westerneurope/failure-multiculturalism. Manaï, Bochra. 2015. “La Ville inclusive: évidence ou légende urbaine?” In Penser la laïcité québécoise: fondements et défense d’une laïcité ouverte au Québec, edited by Sébastien Lévesque, 129–40. Québec: Presses de l’Université Laval. Martineau, Richard. 2015. “L’Antiracisme raciste.” Journal de Montréal. Accessed 6 June 2016. http://www.journaldemontreal.com/2015/07/18/ lantiracisme-raciste. – 2016. “L’Ouverture, oui, mais jusqu’où?” Journal de Montréal. Accessed 6 June 2016. http://www.journaldemontreal.com/2016/02/29/ louverture-oui-mais-jusquou. Mathieu, Félix. 2018. “The Failure of State Multiculturalism in the uk ? An Analysis of the uk ’s Multicultural Policy for 2000–2015.” Ethnicités 18, no. 1: 43–69. – 2021. Les Nations fragiles. Trajectoires sociopolitiques compares. p hd thesis, Department of Political Science, Université du Québec à Montréal. Mathieu, Félix, and Marc A. Bodet. 2019. “Interpreting National Trajectories with Gellner, Anderson and Smith: The Case of Quebec.” Revista d’Estudis Autonòmics i Federals – Journal of Self-Government no. 29: 17–50. Mathieu, Félix, and Dave Guénette. 2017. “Nations minoritaires et culture sociétale: de la création d’un index pour étudier la fragilité des nations en droit constitutionnel compare.” In Constitutionnalisme, droit et diversité. Mélanges en l’honneur de José Woehrling, edited by Alain-G. Gagnon and Pierre Noreau, 583–623. Montreal: Thémis. – 2018. “Introducing a Societal Culture Index to Compare Minority Nations.” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 48, no. 2: 217–43. – 2019. Ré-imaginer le Canada: vers un État multinational? Québec: Presses de l’Université Laval.

References

231

– 2021. “Empowering Minorities’ Societal Culture within Multinational Federations.” In The Value of Comparative Federalism. The Legacy of Ronald L. Watts, edited by Nico Steytler, Balveer Arora, and Rekha Saxena, 102–22. New York and New Delhi: Routledge. Mathieu, Félix, and Guy Laforest. 2015. “Traditions religieuses et modèles d’éducation à la citoyenneté: l’héritage d’un univers normatif.” Politique et sociétés 34, no. 2: 87–103. – 2016. “Uncovering National Nexus’s Representations: The Case of Québec.” Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 16, no. 3: 378–400. May, Katheryn. 2015. “Liberal Changes Will Strengthen Multiculturalism: Expert.” Ottawa Citizen. Accessed 29 March 2017. http://ottawacitizen. com/news/national/liberal-changes-will-strengthen-multiculturalism-expert. May, Paul. 2016. Philosophies du multiculturalisme. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po. McEwen, Nicola. 2006. “Does the Recognition of National Minorities Undermine the Welfare State?” In Multiculturalism and the Welfare State. Recognition and Redistribution in Contemporary Democracies, edited by Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka, 247–71. New York: Oxford University Press. McGarry, John. 1998. “Political Settlements in Northern Ireland and South Africa.” Political Studies 46, no. 5: 853–70. McGarry, John, and Margaret Moore. 2005. “Karl Renner, Power Sharing and Non-territorial Autonomy.” In National Cultural Autonomy and Its Contemporary Critics, edited by Ephraim Nimni, 64–81. London: Routledge. McRoberts, Kenneth, 1999. Un pays à refaire: l’échec des politiques constitutionnelles canadiennes. Montreal: Boréal. – 2001. “Canada and the Multinational State.” Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique 34, no. 4: 683–713. Meer, Nasar. 2019. “The Bristol School of Multiculturalism, and the Political Sociology of Identity.” Ethnicities 19, no. 6: 991–8. Meer, Nasar, and Tariq Modood. 2009. “The Multicultural State We’re In: Muslims, ‘Multiculture’ and the ‘Civic Re-balancing’ of British Multiculturalism.” Political Studies 57, no. 3: 473–97. – 2013. “The ‘Civic Re-balancing’ of British Multiculturalism, and beyond ...” In Challenging Multiculturalism. European Models of Diversity, edited by Raymond Taras, 75–96. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Meer, Nasar, Tariq Modood, and Ricard Zapata-Barrero, eds. 2016. Multiculturalism and Interculturalism. Debating the Dividing Lines. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

232

References

Meer, Nasar, Per Mouritsen, Daniel Faas, and Nynke de Witte. 2015. “Examining ‘Postmulticultural’ and Civic Turns in the Netherlands, Britain, Germany, and Denmark.” American Behavioral Scientist 59, no. 6: 702–26. Miller, David. 1995. On Nationality. New York: Oxford University Press. Ministère des Finances du Canada. 2017. “Soutien fédéral aux provinces et aux territoires.” Accessed 29 March 2017. https://www.fin.gc.ca/fedprov/ mtp-fra.asp. Modood, Tariq. 2005. Multicultural Politics. Racism, Ethnicity, and Muslims in Britain. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. – 2010. Still Not Easy Being British. Struggles for a Multicultural Citizenship. Oakhill, uk : Trentham Books. – 2013. Multiculturalism. Cambridge: Polity Press. – 2014. “Multiculturalism, Interculturalism and the Majority.” Journal of Moral Education 43, no. 3: 302–15. Moodley, Kogila. 1983. “Canadian Multiculturalism as Ideology.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 6, no. 3: 320–31. Moore, Margaret. 1999. “Nationalisme libéral, nation-building et autodétermination nationale.” In Nationalité, citoyenneté et solidarité, edited by Michel Seymour, 41–66. Montreal: Liber. Moses, Ted. 2002. “Notes pour une allocution.” In Regard sur la Convention de la Baie-James et du Nord québécois, edited by Alain-G. Gagnon and Guy Rocher, 245–50. Montreal: Québec Amérique. Motard, Geneviève. 2013. “Identité et gouvernance autochtones dans les ententes d’autonomie et de revendication territoriales globales au Canada.” Revue générale de droit 43: 501–30. Mouritsen, Per. 2013. “The Resilience of Citizenship Traditions: Civic Integration in Germany, Great Britain and Denmark.” Ethnicities 13, no. 1: 86–109. mpi (Multiculturalism Policy Index). 2015. “Immigrant Minorities: Decision Rules.” Accessed 29 March 2017. http://www.queensu.ca/mcp/ immigrant-minorities/decision-rules. Mylonas, Harris. 2013. The Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-nationals, Refugees, and Minorities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nairn, Tom. 1977. The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism. Melbourne: Common Ground Publishing. National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls. 2019. Reclaiming Power and Place: The Final Report of the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls. Volume A and Volume B. Accessed 12 May 2021. https://www.mmiwg-ffada.ca/ final-report.

References

233

ncc (National Curriculum Council). 1990. Curriculum Guidance 3: The Whole Curriculum. York: National Curriculum Council. Ng, Roxana. 1995. “Multiculturalism as Ideology: A Textual Analysis.” In Knowledge, Experience and Ruling Relations, edited by Marie Campbell and Ann Manicom, 35–48. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Nimni, Ephraim. 1994. Marxism and Nationalism. Theoretical Origins of a Crisis. London: Pluto Press. – 1999. “Nationalist Multiculturalism in Late Imperial Austria as a Critique of Contemporary Liberalism: The Case of Bauer and Renner.” Journal of Political Ideologies 4, no. 3: 289–314. – 2005. “Introduction: The National Cultural Autonomy Model Revisited.” In National Cultural Autonomy and Its Contemporary Critics, edited by Ephraim Nimni, 1–12. London: Routledge. Noël, Alain. 2008. “Fédéralisme d’ouverture et pouvoir de dépenser au Canada.” Revista d’estudis autonòmics i federals – Journal of SelfGovernment no. 7: 10–36. – 2013. “Ideology, Identity, Majoritarianism: On the Politics of Federalism.” In The Global Promise of Federalism, edited by Grace Skogstad, David Cameron, Martin Papillon, and Keith Banting, 166–87. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Nootens, Geneviève. 2010. “Penser la diversité: entre monisme et dualisme.” In La Diversité québécoise en débat. Bouchard, Taylor et les autres, edited by Bernard Gagnon, 56–73. Montreal: Québec Amérique. – 2016. La Souveraineté populaire en Occident. Communautés politiques, contestations et idées. Québec: Les Presses de l’Université Laval. Norman, Wayne. 2001. “Justice and Stability in Multinational Democracies.” In Multinational Democracies, edited by Alain-G. Gagnon and James Tully, 90–109. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. – 2006. Negotiating Nationalism: Nation-Building, Federalism, and Secession in the Multinational State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Norman, Wayne, and Dimitrios Karmis. 2005. Theories of Federalism: A Reader. New York: Springer. Nussbaum, Martha C. 2011. Creating Capabilities. The Human Development Approach. Cambridge, ma : The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Office of Communications (Ofcom). 2015. “About Ofcom.” Accessed 29 March 2017. https://www.ofcom.org.uk/about-ofcom. Ohmae, Kenichi. 1993. “The Rise of the Regional State.” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 2: 78–87. – 1995. The End of the Nation-State: The Rise of Regional Economies. New York: Simon & Schuster.

234

References

Okin, Susan M. 1999. Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? Princeton, nj : Princeton University Press. O’Sullivan, John. 2007. “Social Acid Has Burnt the Heart of Britain.” Daily Telegraph. Accessed 29 March 2017. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ comment/personal-view/3642241/Social-acid-has-burnt-the-heart-of-Britain. html. Otis, Ghislain. 2014. “L’Autonomie gouvernementale autochtone et l’option de loi en matière de statut personnel.” Les Cahiers de droit 55: 583–618. Ouellette, Annik-Corona, and Alain Vézina. 2009. Contes et légendes du Québec. Montreal: Beauchemin. Özkirimli, Umut. 2010. Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Palermo, Francesco. 2008. “South Tyrol’s Special Status within the Italian Constitution.” In Tolerance through Law: Self Governance and Group Rights in South Tyrol, edited by Jens Woelk, Francesco Palermo, and Joseph Marko, 33–52. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Papillon, Martin. 2012. “The (Re)Emergence of Aboriginal Governments.” In Canadian Politics, 5th edn, edited by James Bickerton and Alain-G. Gagnon, 179–96. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Papillon, Martin, and Audrey Lord. 2013. “Les Traités modernes: vers une nouvelle relation?” In Les Autochtones et le Québec: des premiers contacts au Plan Nord, edited by Alain Beaulieu, Stéphan Gervais, and Martin Papillon, 343–62. Montreal: Presses de l’Université de Montréal. Papillon, Martin, and Richard Simeon. 2004. “The Weakest Link? First Ministers’ Conferences in Canadian Intergovernmental Relations.” In Canada: The State of the Federation 2002. Reconsidering the Institutions of Canadian Federalism, edited by J. Peter Meekison, Hamish Telford, and Harvey Lazar, 113–40. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Parekh, Bhikhu. 2006 [2000]. Rethinking Multiculturalism. Cultural Diversity and Political Theory. Cambridge, ma : Harvard University Press. – 2008. A New Politics of Identity. Political Principles for an Interdependent World. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. – 2016. “Afterword: Multiculturalism and Interculturalism – A Critical Dialogue.” In Multiculturalism and Interculturalism. Debating the Dividing Lines, edited by Nasar Meer, Tariq Modood, and Ricard Zapata-Barrero, 266–80. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Parent, Christophe. 2011. Le Concept d’État fédéral multinational: essai sur l’union des peoples. Brussel: P.I.E. Peter Lang. Patten, Alan. 1999. “The Autonomy Argument for Liberal Nationalism.” Nations and Nationalism 5, no. 1: 1–17.

References

235

– 2005. “National Autonomy and Indigenous Sovereignty.” In National Cultural Autonomy and Its Contemporary Critics, edited by Ephraim Nimni, 96–105. London: Routledge. Pelletier, Benoît. 2010. Une certaine idée du Québec. Parcours d’un fédéraliste de la réflexion à l’action. Québec: Presses de l’Université Laval. Pelletier, Réjean, and Jérôme Couture. 2012. “Identité et confiance politique dans les démocraties plurinationales: les cas du Québec et de la Catalogne.” In La Dynamique confiance/méfiance dans les démocraties multinationales. Le Canada sous l’angle comparatif, edited by Dimitrios Karmis and François Rocher, 291–320. Québec: Presses de l’Université Laval. Peña-Ruiz, Henri. 2005. Dieu et Marianne: philosophie de la laïcité. Paris: Presses universitaires de France. Pettit, Philip. 1997. Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Phillips, Anne. 2007. Multiculturalism without Culture. Princeton, nj : Princeton University Press. – 2008. “More on Culture and Representation.” Social and Legal Studies 17, no. 4: 555–8. – 2010. Gender and Culture. Cambridge: Polity Press. Phillips, Anne, and Sawitri Saharso. 2008. “The Rights of Women and the Crisis of Multiculturalism.” Ethnicities 8, no. 3: 2–12. Phillips, Melanie. 2005. “This Lethal Moral Madness.” Daily Mail. Accessed 29 March 2017. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/columnists/article-355770/ This-lethal-moral-madness.html. – 2006. Londonistan: How Britain Is Creating a Terror State Within. London: Gibson Square Books. – 2013. “My Immigrant Family Were Proud to Assimilate. I Despair That Too Many Today Expect Britain to Adopt their Culture.” Daily Mail. Accessed 6 June 2016. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2320940/MELANIEPHILLIPS-Too-immigrants-today-expect-Britain-adopt-their -culture.html. Pierré-Caps, Stéphane. 1995. La Multination: l’avenir des minorités en Europe centrale et orientale. Paris: Odile Jacob. Pitcher, Ben. 2009. The Politics of Multiculturalism. Race and Racism in Contemporary Britain. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Poirier, Éric. 2016. La Charte de la langue française. Ce qu’il reste de la Loi 101 quarante ans après son adoption. Québec: Septentrion. Poulter, Sebastian. 1998. Ethnicity, Law, and Human Rights: The English Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Poupart, Robert. 2015. “Briser le dogme du multiculturalisme.” Le Devoir. Accessed 8 June 2016. http://www.ledevoir.com/politique/canada/456584/ briser-le-dogme-du-multiculturalisme.

236

References

Pratte, André. 2017. “Réussir le Sénat moderne.” Le Devoir. Accessed 29 March 2017. http://www.ledevoir.com/politique/canada/489091/ reussir-le-senat-moderne. Prime Minister of Canada. 2015. “La Diversité, force du Canada. Allocution prononcée par le très honorable Justin Trudeau, Premier ministre du Canada.” Accessed 29 March 2017. http://pm.gc.ca/fra/nouvelles/2015/11/26/la-diversite-force-du-Canada. Provencher, Marc. 2012. Le Multiculturalisme est un racisme qui se prend pour un antiracisme. Montreal: Leméac. Putnam, Robert D. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Capital in Contemporary Society. New York: Simon & Schuster. Québec. 2013. Parce que nos valeurs, on y croit. Document d’orientation. Orientations gouvernementales en matière d’encadrement des demandes d’accommodement religieux, d’affirmation des valeurs de la société québécoise ainsi que du caractère laïque des institutions de l’État québécois. Québec: Éditeur officiel du Québec. – 2015. Ensemble, nous sommes le Québec. Politique québécoise en matière d’immigration, de participation, et d’inclusion. Québec: Bibliothèque et Archives nationales du Québec. – 2016a. “Apprendre le français au Québec.” Ministère de l’immigration, diversité, et inclusion du Québec. Accessed 8 November 2016. http://www. immigration-quebec.gouv.qc.ca/fr/langue-francaise/apprendre-quebec. – 2016b. “Aide financière.” Ministère de l’immigration, diversité, et inclusion du Québec. Accessed 8 November 2016. https://www.immigration-quebec. gouv.qc.ca/fr/langue-francaise/apprendre-quebec/temps-complet/ aide-financiere.html. Rattansi, Ali. 2011. Multiculturalism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, ma : The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. – 1993. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. – 2001. Justice as Fairness. Cambridge, ma : The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. rcap (Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples). 1993. Partenaires au sein de la Confédération. Les peuples autochtones, l’autonomie gouvernementale et la Constitution. Ottawa: Édition Groupe Communication Canada. – 1996. Rapport de la Commission royale sur les peuples autochtones. Volume 1: Un passé, un avenir. Ottawa: Édition Groupe Communication Canada. Renner, Karl. 2005 [1899]. “State and Nation.” In National Cultural Autonomy and Its Contemporary Critics, edited by Ephraim Nimni, 13–40. London: Routledge.

References

237

Requejo, Ferran. 2009. Fédéralisme multinational et pluralisme des valeurs. Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang. Resnick, Philip. 1994. “Toward a Multinational Federalism: Asymmetrical and Confederal Alternatives.” In Seeking a New Canadian Partnership: Asymmetrical and Confederal Options, edited by F. Leslie Seidle, 71–90. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press. – 2012. “What Theorists of Nationalism Have to Learn from Multinational States.” In Multinational Federalism. Problems and Prospects, edited by Michel Seymour and Alain-G. Gagnon, 63–81. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Rioux, Christian. 2014. “L’Injonction multiculturelle.” Le Devoir. Accessed 6 June 2016. http://www.ledevoir.com/societe/actualites-en-societe/405972/ l-injonction-multiculturelle. Rioux, Marcel. 1968. “Sur l’évolution des idéologies au Québec.” Revue de l’Institut de Sociologie 1: 95–124. Rioval, Isabelle. 2010. “Minorités religieuses.” In Dictionnaire des faits religieux, edited by Régine Azria and Danièle Hervieu-Léger, 718–25. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Robertson, Susan L. 2007. “Globalisation, Rescaling and Citizenship Regimes.” In Changing Notions of Citizenship Education in Contemporary Nation-States, edited by Klas Roth and Nicholas C. Burbules, 136–50. Rotterdam: Sense Publisher. Rocher, François. 2012a. “The Quebec-Canada Dynamic or the Negation of the Ideal of Federalism.” In Contemporary Canadian Federalism. Foundations, Traditions, Institutions, edited by Alain-G. Gagnon, 81–131. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. – 2012b. “La Construction du Canada en perspective historique: de la méfiance comme élément consubstantiel des débats constitutionnels?” In La Dynamique confiance/méfiance dans les démocraties multinationales. Le Canada sous l’angle comparatif, edited by Dimitrios Karmis and François Rocher, 137–64. Québec: Presses de l’Université Laval. – 2013. “La Mémoire de 1982: amnésie, confusion, acceptation, désillusion ou contestation?” In Le Nouvel ordre constitutionnel canadien. Du rapatriement de 1982 à nos jours, edited by François Rocher and Benoît Pelletier, 111–36. Montreal: Presses de l’Université du Québec. – 2015. “Multi et interculturalisme. Les cas canadien et québécois.” Le Débat 4: 33–43. Rocher, François, Guy Rocher, and Micheline Labelle. 1995. “Pluriethnicité, citoyenneté et intégration: de la souveraineté pour lever les obstacles et les ambiguïtés.” Cahiers de recherche sociologique 25: 213–45.

238

References

Rocher, François, and Bob White. 2014. “L’Interculturalisme québécois dans le contexte du multiculturalisme canadien.” Étude irpp , no. 49 (November). Ross, Alistair. 2000. Curriculum Construction and Critique. London: Routledge. Ross-Tremblay, Pierrot, and Nawel Hamidi. 2013. “Les Premiers peuples, les négociations territoriales et l’esquisse d’une ère postcoloniale.” Recherches amérindiennes au Québec 43, no. 1: 51–7. Rothstein, Bo. 2005. Social Traps and the Problem of Trust. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Roy, Jean-Olivier. 2015. Une compréhension critique des nations et du nationalisme autochtones au Canada. Traditionalisme et modernité politique et étude de cas sur les Innus du Québec. p hd thesis, Department of Political Science, Université Laval. Runnymede Trust. 2002. The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain: The Parekh Report. London: Profile Books. Russell, Peter H. 1993. Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadians Become a Sovereign People? Toronto: University of Toronto Press. – 2012. “La nature déterminante de la notion de confiance dans la politique multinationale du Canada.” In La Dynamique confiance/méfiance dans les démocraties multinationales. Le Canada sous l’angle comparatif, edited by Dimitrios Karmis and François Rocher, 115–36. Québec: Presses de l’Université Laval. – 2017. Canada’s Odyssey. A Country Based on Incomplete Conquests. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Ryan, Claude. 1999. “Agreement on the Canadian Social Union as Seen by a Quebec Federalist.” Inroads 8: 27–43. Sanjaume-Calvet, Marc. 2020. “Le Clair-obscur de la sécession et du fédéralisme.” In Cinquante déclinaisons de fédéralisme: théorie, enjeux et étude de cas, edited by Félix Mathieu, Dave Guénette, and Alain-G. Gagnon, 151–64. Québec: Presses de l’Université du Québec. Sartori, Giovanni. 1970. “Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics.” American Political Science Review 64, no. 4: 1,033–53. Sawyer, Caroline, and Helena Wray. 2014. eudo -Citizenship Observatory. Country Report: United Kingdom. Accessed 29 March 2017. http://cadmus. eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/33839/EUDO-CIT_2014_01_UK.pdf? sequence=1. Scheffer, Paul. 2000. “Het multiculturele drama.” nrc . Accessed 6 June 2016. http://retro.nrc.nl/W2/Lab/Multicultureel/scheffer.html. Secrétariat aux affaires autochtones du Québec. 2009. “Où vivent les Autochtones?” Accessed 29 March 2017. http://www.autochtones.gouv. qc.ca/relations_autochtones/profils_nations/ou_vivent_ils.ht.

References

239

Sen, Amartya. 2012. L’Idée de justice. Paris: Flammarion. Sévilla, Jacques. 2016. “Mathieu Bock-Côté: ‘Le multiculturalisme fragmente la société: c’est le contraire du prétendu vivre-ensemble’.” Le Figaro Magazine, no. 22331: 34. Seymour, Michel. 2001. Le Pari de la démesure: l’intransigeance canadienne face au Québec. Montreal: L’Hexagone. – 2008. De la tolérance à la reconnaissance. Montreal: Boréal. – 2010. “Une Constitution interne comme remède au malaise identitaire québécois.” In La Diversité québécoise en débats, edited by Bernard Gagnon, 223–46. Montreal: Québec Amérique. – 2012. “On Not Finding Our Way: The Illusory Reform of the Canadian Federation.” In Contemporary Canadian Federalism. Foundations, Traditions, Institutions, edited by Alain-G. Gagnon, 187–212. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Seymour, Michel, and Alain-G. Gagnon, eds. 2012. Multinational Federalism. Problems and Prospects. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Shils, Edward. 1957. “Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties.” British Journal of Sociology 8, no. 2: 130–45. Sieyès, Abbé Emmanuel Joseph de. 2002 [1788]. Qu’est-ce que le Tiers-État? Paris: Éditions du Boucher. Silver, Arthur Isaac. 1997. The French Canadian Idea of Confederation – 1864–1900. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Simpson, Leanne. 2008. “Oshkimaadiziig, the New People.” In Lighting the Eighth Fire. The Liberation, Resurgence, and Protection of Indigenous Nations, edited by Leanne Simpson, 13–21. Winnipeg: Arbeiter Ring Publishing. Singh, Gurharpal. 2005. “British Multiculturalism and Sikhs.” Sikhs Formations 1, no. 2: 157–73. Slack, James. 2013. “Mistake of Multiculturalism Aided Extremists, says pm .” Daily Mail. Accessed 29 March 2017. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/ article-2518504/David-Cameron-Mistake-multiculturalism-aided-extremists.html. Smiley, Donald. 1983. “A Dangerous Deed: The Constitution Act, 1982.” In And No One Cheered. Federalism, Democracy, and the Constitution Act, edited by Keith Banting and Richard Simeon, 74–95. Agincourt, on : Methuen Publication. Smith, Anthony D. 1986. The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers. Smith, Anthony D., Obi Igwara, Anthena Leoussi, and Terry Muhall. 1995. “Editorial.” Nations and Nationalism 1, no. 1: 1–2. Sniderman, Paul M., and Louk Hagendoorn. 2007. When Ways of Life Collide: Multiculturalism and Its Discontents in the Netherlands. Princeton, nj: Princeton University Press.

240

References

Soroka, Stuart, Richard Johnston, Anthony Kevins, Keith Banting, and Will Kymlicka. 2015. “Migration and Welfare State Spending.” European Political Science Review. Accessed 29 March 2017. https://www.cambridge. org/core/journals/european-political-science-review/article/divclasstitlemigration-and-welfare-state-spendingdiv/C7F780856502704 EDB8ED59CA82E01EF. Spain. The Spanish Constitution Act, 1978. Spain, stc . 2010. Tribunal Constitucional, stc 31/2010. Spinner-Halev, Jeff. 1994. The Boundaries of Citizenship: Race, Ethnicity, and Nationality in the Liberal State. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Squire, Vicki. 2005. “Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain: New Labour on Nationality, Immigration and Asylum.” Journal of Political Ideologies 10, no. 1: 51–74. Stone, William L. 1865. The Life and Times of Sir William Johnson. Albany: J. Munsell. Swann, Michael. 1985. Education for All: The Report of the Inquiry into the Education of Pupils of Children from Ethnic Minority Groups. London: hmso. Tamir, Yael. 1995. Liberal Nationalism. Princeton, nj : Princeton University Press. Taylor, Charles. 1992. “The Politics of Recognition.” In Multiculturalism and “The Politics of Recognition”: An Essay, edited by Amy Gutmann, 25–74. Princeton, nj : Princeton University Press. – 1993. Reconciling the Solitudes. Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press. – 1994. Multiculturalisme. Différence et démocratie. Paris: Flammarion. – 1998. Les Sources du moi. La formation de l’identité moderne. Paris: Seuil. – 2016. “Foreword.” In Multiculturalism and Interculturalism. Debating the Dividing Lines, edited by Nasar Meer, Tariq Modood, and Ricard ZapataBarrero, vii–ix. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Thériault, Joseph Yvon. 2005. Critique de l’Américanité. Montreal: Québec Amérique. – 2007. Faire société: société civile et espaces francophones. Sudbury: Éditions Prise de parole. Todorov, Tzvetan. 2006. L’Esprit des Lumières. Paris: Robert Laffont. Tolley, Erin. 2011. Multiculturalism Policy Index: Immigrant Minority Policies. Accessed 29 March 2017. http://www.queensu.ca/mcp/sites/webpublish. queensu.ca.mcpwww/files/files/immigrantminorities/evidence/ ImmigrantMinoritiesApr12.pdf.

References

241

Troyna, Barry. 1987. “Beyond Multiculturalism: Towards the Enactment of Anti-racist Education in Policy, Provision and Pedagogy.” Oxford Review of Education 13, no. 3: 307–20. Trudeau, Pierre Elliott. 1967. Le Fédéralisme et la société canadienne-française. Montreal: hmh . Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada. 2015. Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future. Ottawa: Library and Archives Canada. Tulasiewicz, Witold. 1993. “The European Dimension and the National Curriculum.” In The Multicultural Dimension of the National Curriculum, edited by Anna S. King and Michael J. Reiss, 240–58. London: The Falmer Press. Tully, James. 1995. A Strange Multiplicity. Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. – 1996. “Liberté et dévoilement dans les sociétés multinationals.” Globe. Revue internationale d’études québécoises 2, no. 2: 13–36. – 2001. “Introduction.” In Multinational Democracies, edited by Alain-G. Gagnon and James Tully, 1–34. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. – 2007. “Défi constitutionnel et art de la résistance: la question des peuples autochtones au Canada.” In Pluralisme et démocratie. Entre culture, droit et politique, edited by Stéphane Vibert, 309–53. Montreal: Québec Amérique. Turner, Dale. 2006. This Is Not a Peace Pipe. Towards a Critical Indigenous Philosophy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Uberoi, Varun, and Tariq Modood. 2013. “Inclusive Britishness: A Multicultural Advance.” Political Studies 61, no. 1: 23–41. United Kingdom. British Nationality Act 1948. – Communications Act 2003. – Education Reform Act 1988. – Employment Act 1989. – Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003. – Equality Act 2010. – Motor Cycle Crash Helmets (Religious Exemption) Act 1976. – Race Relations Act 1976. – Race Relations Amendment Act 2000. Van Parijs, Philippe. 1991. Qu’est-ce qu’une société juste? Paris: Seuil. Van Reekum, Rogier, and Jan Willem Duyvendak. 2012. “Running from our Shadows: The Performative Impact of Policy Diagnoses in Dutch Debates on Immigrant Integration.” Patterns of Prejudice 46, no. 5: 445–66. Vasta, Ellie. 2007. “From Ethnic Minorities to Ethnic Majority Policy: Multiculturalism and the Shift to Assimilationism in the Netherlands.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 30, no. 5: 713–40.

242

References

Verger, Jacques. 1999. L’Université au Moyen-Âge. Paris: Presses universitaires de France. Vertovec, Steven. 1996. “Multiculturalism, Culturalism and Public Incorporation.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 19, no. 1: 49–69. – 2010. “Towards Post-multiculturalism? Changing Communities, Conditions and Contexts of Diversity.” International Social Science Journal 61, no. 199: 83–95. Vertovec, Steven, and Susanne Wessendorf. 2010. “Introduction: Assessing the Backlash against Multiculturalism.” In The Multiculturalism Backlash. European Discourses, Policies and Practices, edited by Steven Vertovec and Susanne Wessendorf, 1–31. New York: Routledge. Vézina, Valérie. 2014. “The Role of the Political System in Shaping Island Nationalism: A Comparative Examination of Puerto Rico and Newfoundland.” Island Studies Journal 9, no. 1: 103–22. – 2018. Une île, une nation? Le Nationalisme insulaire à la lumière des cas de Terre-Neuve et Porto Rico. Québec: Presses de l’Université du Québec. Vipond, Robert C. 1991. Liberty and Community: Canadian Federalism and the Failure of the Constitution. Albany: State University of New York Press. Voicu, Anca. 2009. “Immigration and Integration Policies in uk .” Romanian Journal of European Affairs 9, no. 2: 71–97. Watts, Ronald L. 1966. New Federations: Experiments in the Commonwealth. Oxford: Clarendon. – 1996. Comparing Federal Systems. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press. – 2007. “Multinational Federations in Comparative Perspective.” In Multinational Federations, edited by Michael Burgess and John Pinder, 225–47. London: Routledge. Wayland, Sarah V. 1997. “Immigration, Multiculturalism and National Identity in Canada.” International Journal on Group Rights 5, no. 1: 33–58. Weaver, Matthew. 2010. “Angela Merkel: German multiculturalism has ‘utterly failed’.” Guardian. Accessed 29 March 2017. http://www.theguardian.com/ world/2010/oct/17/angela-merkel-german-multiculturalism-failed. Webber, Jeremy. 1994. Reimagining Canada. Language, Culture, Community and the Canadian Constitution. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Wei, Li. 2006. “Complementary Schools, Past, Present and Future.” Language and Education 20, no. 1: 76–83. Weinstock, Daniel. 1999. “Le Problème de la boîte de Pandore.” In Nationalité, citoyenneté et solidarité, edited by Michel Seymour, 17–40. Montreal: Liber. – 2001. “Vers une théorie normative du fédéralisme.” Revue internationale de sciences sociales 1: 79–87.

References

243

– 2013. “Interculturalism and Multiculturalism in Canada and Québec: Situating the Debate.” In Liberal Multiculturalism and the Fair Terms of Integration, edited by Peter Balint and Sophie Guérard de Latour, 91–108. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Wheatcroft, Patience. 2006. “Multiculturalism Hasn’t Worked: Let’s Rediscover Britishness.” Daily Telegraph. Accessed 29 March 2017. http:// www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3632983/Multiculturalismhasnt-worked-lets-rediscover-Britishness.html. White, Bob. 2016. “Le Vivre-ensemble comme scénario de l’interculturel au Québec.” In Pluralité et vivre-ensemble, edited by Francine Saillant, 39–62. Québec: Presses de l’Université Laval. White, Graham. 2002. “Treaty Federalism in Northern Canada: Aboriginal Government Land Claims Boards.” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 32, no. 3: 89–114. Wimmer, Andreas. 1997. “Explaining Xenophobia and Racism: A Critical Review of Current Research Approaches.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 20, no. 1: 17–41. Woehrling, José. 1999. “L’Avis de la Cour suprême du Canada sur l’éventuelle sécession du Québec.” Revue française de droit constitutionnel 37: 3–27. Woehrling, José, and Pierre Noreau, eds. 2005. Appartenances, institutions, et citoyenneté. Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur Wolf, Martin. 2005. “When Multiculturalism Is a Nonsense.” Financial Times. Accessed 29 March 2017. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4c751acc-19bc11da-804e-00000e2511c8.html?ft_site=falcon&desktop=true#axzz4cp D3U2Wx. Wong, Lloyd L., and Shibao Guo. 2011. “Multiculturalism Turns 40: Reflections on the Canadian policy.” Canadian Ethnic Studies 43, no. 1: 1–3. Young, Iris Marion. 1990. Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton, nj : Princeton University Press. – 1997. “A Multicultural Continuum: A Critique of Will Kymlicka’s EthnicNation Dichotomy.” Constellations 4, no. 1: 48–53. Zapata-Barrero, Ricard. 2016. “Theorizing Intercultural Citizenship.” In Multiculturalism and Interculturalism. Debating the Dividing Lines, edited by Nasar Meer, Tariq Modood, and Ricard Zapata-Barrero, 53–76. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Zolf, Dorothy. 1989. “Comparisons of Multicultural Broadcasting in Canada and Four Other Countries.” Canadian Ethnic Studies 21, no. 2: 13–26. Zubrzycki, Geneviève. 2006. The Crosses of Auschwitz: Nationalism and Religion in Post-communist Poland. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. – 2016. Beheading the Saint: Nationalism, Religion, and Secularism in Quebec. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Index

agency to exit, 40, 97. See also Phillips, Anne Anderson, Benedict, 52, 109–10, 135 Anglo-conformity, 26–7, 47 Assembly of First Nations (afn ), 141, 158–60 assimilation policies, 6–7, 47; in Canada, 118, 143; in the Netherlands, 56; in the United Kingdom, 60, 65 Barry, Brian, 5, 27, 30, 94 Bauer, Otto, 155–6 Benhabib, Seyla, 28, 40, 46 Bill 101, 138, 180–2. See also Charter of the French Language Blair, Tony, 8–9, 63–4, 71 Blunkett, David, 9, 64, 80, 102–3 Bock-Côté, Mathieu, 95, 99–100, 104, 186 Bouchard, Gérard, 55, 110, 116, 174–80 Bourassa, Henri, 51, 141, 189 Cameron, David, 66, 69–72, 89 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom, 138, 145, 187

Canadian Multiculturalism Act (cma ), 53–4 Cantle, Ted, 70, 102–3, 170–1 Cartier, George-Étienne, 13, 141, 188 Catalonia, 180–1 Charter of the French Language, 138, 180–2 Charter of Values, 183–6 Cité Libre, 51–2 Commission for Racial Equality, 61, 64, 81 Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, 9, 29, 38, 64, 100 Commonwealth, 60, 66, 80 comprehensive doctrine (of the good life), 34, 44, 99 consociationalism, 56 constituent power, 137–8 Constitution Act, 1867, 107, 138–9, 150 Constitution Act, 1982, 138–40, 142, 149, 187 constitutional patriotism, 40, 172 corporation (nation as a), 156–8, 168 Council of the Federation, 152–4, 157

246

Index

cultural authenticity, 36, 42–3, 97–8 cultural dialogue (and intercultural dialogue), 97–100, 170 cultural essence. See Cultural authenticity cultural relativism, 94, 100–1 decolonization, 5, 57, 158 devolution, 8, 56, 73 difference-blind procedural liberalism, 30, 125–9, 160, 164, 186–8 differentiated rights, 31–4, 47, 99 Education Reform Act (era ), 62, 77 Elazar, Daniel, 123, 130, 159–60, 163 ethnosymbolism, 109–10 external protection (measures of), 32–3, 98, 177, 180 external self-determination, 137–8, 140 federal deficit, 124, 141 federal impetus, 129–31 First Ministers’ Conference, 152–4, 157 fiscal autonomy, 121, 136–7, 139 fragile nation, 113–14; as an objective dimension, 118–21; as a subjective dimension, 114–18 Gagnon, Alain-G., 115, 125–6 Gellner, Ernest, 4, 24–5, 110 ghettoization, 66, 97–8 high culture, 4, 6, 11, 25, 110. See also Gellner, Ernest hospitable action, 126, 145

illiberal practices, 34, 37, 43–6 immigration and integration powers, 136, 139 Indigenous Peoples (in Canada), 141–9 interculturalism, 170–5 internal constraint (measures of), 32–3, 46, 98, 177, 180 internal self-determination, 137, 140 Jacobin. See assimilation policies Joppke, Christian, 69, 84, 86–7, 91 Kelly, Ruth, 9, 70, 102–3 Kundera, Milan, 112–13, 115 Kymlicka, Will, 30–4 Laforest, Guy, 123, 187, 190 language rights, 135–6, 138 Laurendeau, André, 50–1, 141, 188–90, 192 Laurendeau-Dunton Commission, 51–2, 65, 174 liberal nationalism, 111, 129, 133, 177 Macdonald, John A., 12–13, Maclure, Jocelyn, 28 majority nation (definition of a), 31–2, 160–7 Merkel, Angela, 48, 71–2, 94, 103 minority nation (definition of a), 113–14 Modood, Tariq, 37–40 moral monism, 25, 34–5, 44, 126–7 multinational federalism, 124–5, 159, 166 Multiculturalism Policy Index (mpi ), 72–6

Index national minority (definition of a), 32 national recognition, 134–5, 138 nation-building, 5, 11, 31–2, 50 normal modern nation-state, 4, 8, 11, 26, 52 Norman, Wayne, 122, 191 Netherlands, the, 56–9 Okin, Susan, 41, 100 Parekh, Bhikhu, 34–7 Peace of Augsburg, 3 Peace of Westphalia, 3, 25 personal principle, the, 154–8 Pettit, Philip, 123–4 Phillips, Anne, 41–3 political liberalism, 31, 39–40 public operative values, 127, 178. See also Parekh, Bhikhu Race Relations Acts (rras ), 59–61, 79, 83 Rawls, John, 10, 39–40, 125 reasonable accommodation, 8, 33, 40, 97, 186; reasonable accommodation crisis, 136 redistribution policies, 27, 44 Reference re Secession of Québec, 134, 137, 140 Renner, Karl, 154–6 residential schools (for Indigenous children), 142–3 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (rcap ), 141, 146. See also Indigenous Peoples (in Canada) Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, 6, 51. See also Laurendeau-Dunton Commission Russell, Peter, 162, 164

247

Sarkozy, Nicolas, 48, 72, 94, 103 Sieyès, Abbé de, 5–7, 30, 47 Smith, Anthony D., 109–10 societal culture, 25–6, 31–5, 45, 99; multiscalar societal culture, 119– 21, 132, 146, 168 Societal Culture Index, 121, 131 subsidiarity, 148 Supreme Court of Canada. See Reference re Secession of Québec Tamir, Yael. See liberal nationalism Taylor, Charles, 7, 26, 134 territorial federalism, 123–4, 189 third order of government (for Indigenous Peoples), 149–51 treaty federalism, 151–4 Trudeau, Justin, 54 Trudeau, Pierre Elliott, 51–3, 110, 153, 174, 188–93 Truth and Reconciliation Commission (trc ), 118, 130, 141 Tully, James, 107, 130, 163 universal pluralism. See Parekh, Bhikhu Verhagen, Maxime, 48, 72, 94, 103 veto right. See internal self-determination Webber, Jeremy, 125, 133–4 World War II, 5, 47, 57, 60, 153