Taiwan: Nation-State or Province? [7 ed.] 9781138337756

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Taiwan

In this newly revised and updated seventh edition of Taiwan: Nation-State or Province? Copper examines Taiwan’s geography and history, society and culture, economy, political system and foreign and security politics in the context of Taiwan’s uncertain status, as either a sovereign nation or a province of the People’s Republic of China. Analyzing possible future scenarios and trends that could affect Taiwan’s status, the author argues that Taiwan’s very rapid and successful democratization suggests Taiwan should be independent and separate from China, while economic links between Taiwan and China indicate the opposite. New features to this brand-new edition include:    

The triumph of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in the 2016 elections. The impact of the Trump administration on US–Taiwan relations. The rise of populism. The shift in cross-Strait relations with China given its increased power on the world stage.

This revised and fully up-to-date textbook will be essential reading for students of Taiwan, China, US–China relations and democracy. John Franklin Copper is the Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Studies (emeritus) at Rhodes College in Memphis, Tennessee, USA.

“John F. Copper provides a comprehensive, yet succinct, analysis of Taiwan’s history, politics, economics, society, and international position that is informative, interesting, and highly readable. A major contribution of the text is the way he discusses what each facet of Taiwan’s experience implies for the central question of whether it is an independent nation-state or a province of China.” —Cal M. Clark, Professor Emeritus, Department of Political Science, Auburn University, USA “Copper, a world renowned expert on Taiwan having written a multitude of books on the subject, in Taiwan: Nation-State or Province? looks at a host of factors to answer the question whether Taiwan is or should be a nation or a province of China. This is a critical issue not only for Taiwan and China but also the United States and the world. The dispute threatens to be the trigger for a war between the U.S. and China that will have a global impact. That is why a better understanding of this issue is essential.” —Thomas J. Bellows, Professor, Department of Political Science and Geography, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA “John Copper provides readers with the field’s best-written and best-organized study of Taiwan.” —Dennis V. Hickey, Distinguished Professor and The James Morris Endowed Professor of Political Science, Missouri State University, USA “As before, Copper provides a comprehensive, in-depth examination of Taiwan’s developments with fresh insights and new perspectives. A must-have for readers who are interested in Taiwan’s recent political change.” —Wei-chin Lee, Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Wake Forest University, USA

Taiwan Nation-State or Province? Seventh edition

John Franklin Copper

Seventh edition published 2020 by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 and by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2020 John Franklin Copper The right of John Franklin Copper to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. First edition published by Westview Press 1990 Sixth edition published by Westview Press 2013 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978-1-138-33775-6 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-138-33774-9 (pbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-44219-3 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Taylor & Francis Books

To Royce Wellington Copper

Contents

Preface Acronyms

viii xi

1

The Land and the People

1

2

History

45

3

Society

95

4

Political System

144

5

The Economy

197

6

Foreign and Military Policies

246

7

Summary, Conclusions, the Future: The Situation Defined

298

Selected Bibliography Index

322 334

Preface John Franklin Copper

In a previous edition of the US Central Intelligence Agency’s often-cited World Factbook there was a list of “independent states,” “dependencies” and “areas of special sovereignty.” Taiwan alone was put in a separate category: “other.” A more recent World Factbook refers to Taiwan as an “administrative division” and notes that China considers it its 23rd province. Many international organizations, including the United Nations and its affiliate-agencies, as a policy do not mention Taiwan. Some include data on Taiwan under the heading China or the People’s Republic of China. The World Atlas and a number of other organizations list only countries that are members of the United Nations. The World Bank uses the term “Taiwan, China.” Britannica Encyclopedia does not list Taiwan as a nation; yet it has a long piece on Taiwan and cites Taiwan in a number of other contexts. Taiwan appears in lists of countries or nations of the world in other publications. Google refers to Taiwan as a “state in Asia officially known as the Republic of China.” Yahoo calls Taiwan “a state in Asia with limited recognition.” Thus whether Taiwan is to be regarded a sovereign nation-state or a province of China is unclear. Some say this is a serious problem—of the sort that causes wars. Much else about Taiwan is either unique or uncertain, or both. In the past Taiwan was called a “pariah nation”—an authoritarian country diplomatically isolated. But even before it lost that opprobrium Taiwan became widely hailed as a “model country” for its economic (rapid growth with equity) and political (quick but peaceful democratization) “miracles.” Taiwan ranks very high in almost all of the criteria used to measure globalization—trade, foreign investment, travel in and out, and so on. Yet it is the world’s most isolated nation (if it is a nation) by other criteria—ranking last in memberships in international organizations and very low in the number of foreign countries that grant it formal diplomatic recognition. Taiwan is the only important (in size or population) entity that resembles a nation that is not a member of the United Nations. Taiwan has one of the best militaries in the world. It is often listed as a country capable of building nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Yet it

Preface

ix

would likely survive but a few days or weeks if China were to attack the island and if the United States were to no longer guarantee its security. Analysts have labeled the Taiwan Strait, which separates Taiwan from China, the world’s number one “flashpoint.” The world’s only superpower, the United States, and its only rising power, China, each with nuclear weapons targeted at the other, appear prone to go to battle over Taiwan. It is said to be the only non-negotiable issue between them. In 1996, they almost went to war. Taiwan proclaimed that, being a democracy, it should decide its future and held its first-ever direct presidential election to underscore this right. Seeing this move as a sign of secession, China conducted intimidating missile tests near Taiwan’s shores. In reaction, the United States sent the biggest military force deployed since the Vietnam War to the region. For a while a full-blown U.S.–China conflict appeared imminent. A decade-plus later tension in the Taiwan Strait diminished, even though China’s claim to Taiwan has steadily grown more credible with the rapid growth of its economic and military power and the relative decline in America’s strength in both areas. Since the 2016 election that brought the Democratic Progressive Party, which advocates Taiwan’s independence from China, to power, the term flashpoint has again come into common usage. Some, especially in Taiwan, hope that global public opinion or an international organization such as the United Nations will help decide Taiwan’s future. Yet there is little reason to think that will happen. Public opinion in Taiwan favors the status quo, but that skirts the question whether Taiwan is a nation or a part of China. Some have suggested a commonwealth or union of some sort may be used to resolve the issue. But neither top officials in China nor Taiwan have advanced such ideas seriously. Two other salient facts about Taiwan need to be noted: Taiwan is more linked to China commercially than most members of the European Union are to each other. Taiwan’s economic health depends on China, and most people in Taiwan know this. Political links, however, are a different matter. Will economics or politics decide Taiwan’s future? No one seems to know for sure. In the following pages the author will examine the background, circumstances, problems and more associated with this “other” place. Specifically, this means looking at its geography, history, society, economy, political system and its foreign and defense policies with an eye on the issue of whether or not Taiwan has, or should have, nation-state status. Most of the Chinese terms used in this book have been rendered into English script using the Wade-Giles system long used in Taiwan. However, some names are spelled according to the Pinyin system developed in China that was partially adopted by Taiwan in 2008. For personal names, the author uses the spelling that person prefers. The term “Beijing” is used for the capital of China; “Peking” is used to refer to that same city during the historical period when the old spelling was in use. For clarification an alternative spelling of words is sometimes provided in parentheses.

x

Preface

Throughout this book the U.S. dollar is used in measuring Taiwan’s economy as well as in monetary transactions and expenditures involving Taiwan unless otherwise specified. Other measurements use the U.S. system, though the metric system is sometimes used along with the U.S. system. John Franklin Copper

Acronyms

ADB APEC ASEAN ARATS BCC CAL CDC CNA DPP ECFA EPZ GATT GDP GIO GNP GSP HSR JCRR KMT NHI NIC NP NPP NT PFP PLA SEF TMD TRA TSU WTO

Asian Development Bank Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Association of Southeast Asian Nations Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits Broadcasting Corporation of China China Airlines Center for Disease Control Central News Agency Democratic Progressive Party Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement export processing zone General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade gross domestic product Government Information Office gross national product Generalized System of Preferences High Speed Railway Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction Nationalist Party or Kuomintang National Health Insurance newly industrializing country New Party New Power Party New Taiwan (dollar) People First Party People’s Liberation Army Straits Exchange Foundation theater missile defense Taiwan Relations Act Taiwan Solidarity Union World Trade Organization

1

The Land and the People

In this chapter the author examines the so-called permanent features about Taiwan that give some indication, cum proof, that Taiwan is or should be a sovereign nation-state or that it is to be regarded a part of China. However, some are not as permanent as it would seem, or at least how they are interpreted has changed. Also considered in this chapter are topics that provide information about the propagation of perceptions of Taiwan that relate to its status as a nation-state versus it being a part of China, both in Taiwan and elsewhere. Geography is one of the fixed ingredients in the debate about Taiwan’s national or provincial status. Related to its geography, Taiwan’s climate, land and natural resources tell us whether it is “natural” that Taiwan be seen as different and therefore separate from China, or not. Taiwan’s population also says a lot. Ethnicity tells us even more about whether Taiwan and China should become one, more than simply looking at population data. Culture is another permanent or at least semi-permanent fixture. On the one hand, it came from China and in some respects over the years changed less in Taiwan than in China. On the other hand, Taiwan has a unique culture influenced by Taiwan’s early connections with other peoples in the region through trade and commerce. It was later impacted by Western colonization, self-rule, governance by China, Japanese colonization and ties with the United States. To many residents of Taiwan culture defines its nationhood and that helps decide if Taiwan fits the definition of a nationstate and, if so, what is its future. Finally, how the just-discussed factors help one formulate a view that Taiwan is a nation or not are transmitted and/or interpreted via its transportation and communications facilities, the media and its tourists. These are the less fixed variables, but are nevertheless important. All of these “factors” must be seen in the context of Taiwan’s history, politics, society, economics, politics and foreign relations that are assessed in the chapters that follow. China being a fast rising power with now formidable global influence is another variable; more is said about this in the last chapters of this book.

2

The Land and the People

Physical Setting Taiwan comprises most of the land area of the nation known officially as the Republic of China (also called Nationalist China, Free China, the Republic of China on Taiwan, and the Republic of Taiwan) but most often referred to as just Taiwan. Taipei is its capital. In the West, Taiwan was formerly known as Formosa. The term Formosa has fallen into disuse, though it has been revived by advocates of Taiwan’s independence looking for a non-Chinese term for the island. Some also like Formosa because of its nice meaning— beautiful in Portuguese. Aborigines call for using the word “Ketagelan” or some other native word for Taiwan.1 Chinese leaders in Beijing regard Taiwan not as a nation but rather as territory belonging to the People’s Republic of China and refer to the island of Taiwan, the Pescadores, and some other islands close to Taiwan as “Taiwan Province.” In addition to the island of Taiwan, under the Republic of China’s governance are more than a dozen smaller islands, and numerous islets that surround it that are considered geologically linked to it. Among the most important are the Pescadores (Penghu) Islands, 64 in all—19 of which are inhabited; Orchid Island (Lan Tao); Green Island (Lü Tao); and some smaller islands off Taiwan’s eastern coast. The Republic of China also claims two Offshore Island groups that lay very close to China (Quemoy and Matsu and some other small islands near them) and some islands in the South China Sea—that are not geologically part of Taiwan or China.2 The People’s Republic of China claims all of the territory under Taipei’s control. Approximately 230 miles long and 85 miles wide at the center, the surface area of the island of Taiwan is 13,814 square miles, about the size of Holland or the U.S. states of Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Connecticut combined. The Pescadores adds another 49 square miles, Quemoy about 68 square miles, and Matsu ten square miles. However, Taiwan island constitutes 99 percent of the territory of the Republic of China. If the land under the jurisdiction of the Republic of China were regarded as a province of China, it would be the People’s Republic of China’s second smallest province (the smallest before Hainan Island was made a province in 1988). Taiwan has less than 1/260th of China’s land area. Yet if Taiwan were seen as a nation, it would rank above average in population (number 56 of 233 countries listed) though just below average in land area (number 136 of 264).3 The island of Taiwan is positioned between 21˚459 and 25˚509 north latitude, which in the Western Hemisphere would be just north of Cuba. The northern part of Taiwan shares the same latitude as southern Florida. The Tropic of Cancer bisects the island just below its center. Taiwan is bordered on the east by the Pacific Ocean, on the west by the Taiwan (Formosa) Strait (95 miles from China at its closest point), on the northwest by the East China Sea and on the southwest by the South China Sea. To the north, less than 80 miles away, lie the Ryukyu Islands, Japan’s southernmost territory—the closest land area to Taiwan. The island of Kyushu (the southernmost of Japan’s

The Land and the People

3

main islands), however, is 700 miles away, and Tokyo is 1,274 miles distant. Less than 100 miles to Taiwan’s south, separated by the Bashi Channel, are the Philippine Islands, though the island of Luzon is 230 miles from Taiwan. East of Taiwan is the great expanse of the Pacific Ocean and finally Mexico.4 Of the major cities in the region, Hong Kong is the closest to Taiwan—483 miles away. Next in proximity is Guangzhou, which is 564 miles distant. Manila is 705 miles from Taiwan, Seoul is 885 miles and Beijing is 1,677 miles away. Most of the islands that are territory of the Republic of China lie close to Taiwan except Quemoy and Matsu and islands in the South China Sea. The Penghu Islands lie 25 miles off Taiwan’s west coast, slightly south of the island’s center. Orchid Island and Green Island off of Taiwan’s east coast are about the same distance from Taiwan Island. The Quemoy group west of central (six islands, two of them controlled by the People’s Republic of China) is located within shouting distance (at the closest point) of Fukien Province of the People’s Republic of China, west of central Taiwan. This island group is situated strategically near the port of Amoy. The Matsu group is located northwest of Taiwan and, like the Quemoy group, is close to the Mainland. It is near the Chinese port of Fuchou (Fuzhou). Both the Quemoy and Matsu island groups are geologically part of China.5 Islands claimed by the Republic of China in the South China Sea are further away.6 Here Taipei lays claim to some of the Pratas (Dongsha) Islands and Spratly (Nansha) Islands—in fact, the largest islands in both groups— and it maintains military forces on islands in both groups. These island groups are small but are strategically located adjacent to important sea-lanes. In addition, ownership may provide the basis for claims on some of 3.5 million square kilometers of disputed ocean territory plus undersea minerals, including oil and gas, around the islands. These claims involve Taipei in territorial disputes with the People’s Republic of China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia.7 Taipei’s position vis-à-vis the People’s Republic of China differs, however, from its disputes with the other claimants; it is not about whether or not the islands are Chinese territory but to which China they belong. Both Taipei and Beijing make claim to the islands and most, around 90 percent, of the South China Sea waters based on the “Nine Dash Line” delineation of China’s territory made in 1947 by the government of the Republic of China when it ruled both the mainland and Taiwan. Taipei also makes a claim based on Japan’s control cum jurisdiction over the area the Republic of China assumed after World War II.8 In recent years, the dispute has become more contentious owing to offshore oil drilling in disputed waters and due to military clashes between China and Vietnam and China and the Philippines there. In the last few years, the issue has turned into a hot one, even resulting in some labelling the South China Sea an international “flashpoint” as China has aggressively pursued its claims, causing blowback among other claimants (Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia,

4

The Land and the People

Brunei and Indonesia) and the United States naval vessels transiting the area thus challenging China’s presence. In July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague ruled the 1947 Chinese map was “no basis” for China’s (or Taiwan’s) claims. The United States supported the decision, as did a host of other countries. China rejected the ruling. So did Taiwan. Taiwan’s position was based more on opposition to The Hague’s interpretation of international law notably that Itu Aba (Taiping in Chinese) was not an “island” (that can support human life) but rather an islet or “rock.” China’s claim was based more on history and the Nine Dash Line.9 At the time Washington asked Taipei to play down the Nine Dash Line argument and support the Court’s ruling. The Tsai administration, while increasingly hostile toward China and while wanting to curry favor with the United States, did not comply. One reason suggested was that popular opinion in Taiwan was against giving away any of its territory or territorial claims (as witnessed when some advocates of independence earlier proposed abandoning Quemoy and Matsu in order to completely sever ties with China). In any event, Taiwan’s stance supported China’s view.10 Taipei also claims ownership of the Senkaku or Tiaoyutai (Diaoyutai)— meaning “fishing stage” in Chinese—Islands: eight tiny, uninhabited “islets” just over 100 miles northwest of Taiwan. This claim was made in 1971 after the U.S. government agreed to return the Ryukyu Islands (which included the Senkakus) seized by U.S. military forces at the end of World War II and subsequently controlled by the United States. Taipei based its claim on the fact that Taiwanese fishermen had been using the islands for some years as a stopping-off place to gather bird eggs and dry their nets. Because the islands are geologically part of China’s continental shelf and inasmuch as Taipei claimed sovereignty over all of China, it also made an argument based on geography. Finally, Taipei cited the peace agreement with Japan at the end of World War II as the basis for its claim. Beijing laid claim to the islands based on history and geography. 11 Its claims and those of China and Japan grew more heated after a 1969 U.N. report suggested the presence of undersea oil, possibly very large deposits, there. In fact, the controversy became one about resources as much or more as it was about territory. In fact, that situation persists.12 All of the claimants needed oil. When the United States turned over the islands to Japan it did so without paying heed to either Beijing or Taipei’s claims. In any event, the Japanese government promptly assumed sovereignty over the islands. Until 1989 the territorial issue remained essentially dormant. At that time the Japanese navy chased some of Taiwan’s fishermen away from the islands. The next year Japan built a lighthouse on one of the islands. Subsequently, citizens from Taiwan organized a protest and put an Olympic torch on one of the islands. In 1992, China’s legislature passed a territorial sea law that declared the islands belonged to the People’s Republic of China. In 1996, groups from

The Land and the People

5

Hong Kong and Taiwan went to the islands to support Chinese sovereignty over the islands and one protester was killed. This incident focused global attention on the dispute.13 The United States did not iterate an explicit position on the dispute, but since the islands were included in the U.S. defense treaty with Japan, Washington was ostensibly committed to support Japan on the matter. In 2012, the Japanese government purchased three of the islands from their private owner prompting protest in China. Subsequently Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou put forth a peace initiative and urged all parties to put the sovereignty issue aside and cooperate to exploit the natural resources there. He received praise for his proposal both at home and elsewhere.14 In November 2013, China established the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone that included the islands and demanded all aircraft entering the area to submit a flight plan.15 China and Japan continued aggressively to make claims to the islands. Taiwan still claimed the islands, but not aggressively so. Though not considered technically a territorial claim, Taiwan’s governance of the island groups of Quemoy and Matsu has been in dispute. They are not historically or geographically seen as part of Taiwan because they were never ruled by, or from, Taiwan and, they are so close to China. However, Chiang Kai-shek considered the islands a “stepping stone” to attacking and recovering China and was determined to keep them. Mao sought to recover the islands to weaken Chiang’s support at home and abroad (especially in the United States). Their dispute resulted in military conflicts in 1954 and 1958. Subsequently, China did not try to seize the islands, some said because Mao feared this would break a link between Taiwan and China.16 In 2001, President Chen Shui-bian supported the “three mini links” policy (advanced earlier by the KMT) that allowed direct trade, travel and postal connections between the islands and the Mainland. Contacts increased markedly, as did trade.17 To both China and advocates in Taiwan of closer ties with China the islands were seen as a “bridge” linking them. In fact, a real bridge to connect Quemoy with China is under construction.18 If these facts do not provide sufficient evidence to answer the question whether Taiwan is or should be a nation-state or a province of China, perhaps the geography, topography and plant and animal life on Taiwan do. Taiwan and the Pescadores lie on the edge of the East Asian continental shelf. Thus, to the west of Taiwan, the water (in the Taiwan Strait) is relatively shallow, its depth averaging but 300 feet. The ocean waters off Taiwan’s east coast, in the Taiwan Strait, in contrast, are deep; in fact, 30 miles offshore in the Pacific Ocean, the seabed drops precipitously to a depth of 13,000 feet—one of the deepest parts of the planet’s oceans anywhere. In view of this, some geologists say that Taiwan was originally part of the Asian mainland. The configuration of Taiwan’s coastlines and the age of rocks and their formations on Taiwan’s periphery also indicate that the time of Taiwan’s birth was not the same as that of the Ryukyu Islands to the north or the

6

The Land and the People

Philippines to the south. In addition, the soil, plants and animal life do not suggest great differences between Taiwan and China.19 Yet others contend that, because Taiwan has volcanic soil and is part of the long chain of islands extending south from the Alaskan Aleutian Islands, the island’s origins are similar to those of Japan, the Philippines and other islands off the East Asian coast that were created by volcanic activity in the Pacific Ocean. The frequency of earthquakes—an average of 160 per year—also makes Taiwan resemble Japan more than South China (though China has earthquakes, some of them very severe). In other words, there is evidence of either a more distant time connection, or none at all, to the Asian mainland.20 Mountains cover approximately two-thirds of Taiwan’s surface. The highest and most rugged are found in the eastern part of the island. In some areas, mountains or mountain cliffs extend right up to Taiwan’s eastern shore. Fifty peaks tower near or above 10,000 feet; Yu Shan (Jade Mountain), reaching 13,114 feet above sea level, is the highest. When Taiwan was part of the Japanese empire Yu Shan was labeled Japan’s highest mountain. China, of course, has high mountains including Mt. Everest, the highest mountain peak in the world (claimed by both China and Nepal), but the area of China adjacent to Taiwan is not very mountainous.21 Because the Central Mountain Range, which traverses the island from north to south as if it were Taiwan’s spine, lies close to the island’s eastern shoreline, there are few natural harbors there. Suao Bay is an exception. Keelung harbor, which serves Taipei, is located on the north coast. In contrast, the west coast has good ports—including Kaohsiung, Tainan and Taichung—and is home to most of Taiwan’s population and its large cities. Foothills surround the Central Mountain Range and account for nearly 50 percent of Taiwan’s surface area. Around the foothills are sloping tablelands, many of which are terraced for rice cultivation. Below the tablelands stretch plains and then basins. The plains constitute Taiwan’s most productive farming areas. On the west coast there are also tidal basins and, in some areas, swamps. Elsewhere there are spits and sandbars. On the east side of the island, the mountains turn into foothills and plains much more quickly than in the west, leaving less flatland to be farmed.22 The point of origin for Taiwan’s rivers is the mountainous central part of the island. Most of the island’s rivers are short and the flows are rapid. Only one, the Choushui, located in central Taiwan and flows into the Taiwan Strait, is longer than 100 miles. Because of this, Taiwan relies very little on river transport. The Tamsui River, less than 90 miles long, flows past Taipei and into the Taiwan Strait; it is considered Taiwan’s only navigable river.23 Unlike China, where water control has been a major concern for centuries and floods have caused untold human suffering and loss of life, Taiwan’s rivers do not pose a serious flood menace. They seldom overflow, except during typhoons, and farmers do not depend on them to a great extent for irrigation.

The Land and the People

7

In many respects, Taiwan’s geography and topography resemble Japan’s (where a feudal system of government evolved) more than China’s (where the need to control water and building and maintaining levees and dikes gave rise historically to a bureaucratic political system).24 Taiwan, however, is not as compartmentalized as are the Japanese islands. In summary, comparing Taiwan’s geography with China’s evokes quite complex and, in some ways, quite contentious views. On the one hand, Taiwan is not very much like most of China: it is an island; its soil is volcanic; its rivers are small; its rainfall patterns are very different. On the other hand, China is a very large nation, and differences in terrain and geography from east to west and north to south are far greater than differences between Taiwan and southeastern China.

Climate, Soil and Natural Resources Taiwan’s climate is subtropical; the very southern tip of the island is tropical. Summers are hot, humid and long, extending from April or May to September or October. Winters are short and are generally mild, lasting from December to February. During the winter, snow falls in the mountains and occasionally even at some lower elevations in the northern part of the island. Taiwan’s climate and weather patterns, however, change considerably with elevation and shifts in prevailing winds.25 The average daytime high temperature on the island is 70 degrees Fahrenheit (21 degrees Centigrade). Although the temperature rises or falls by about 1.5 degrees Fahrenheit for every degree of latitude in the winter, there is little variation in the summer: Keelung’s mean July temperature of over 81 degrees compares with 83 degrees at the island’s southernmost tip. The fact that Taipei lies in a basin makes the hot summers there similar to those of cities much farther south, such as Jakarta and Bangkok.26 Temperature fluctuations during any time of the year are minimized by the proximity of the ocean; this is only somewhat less true in the central part of the island compared with the coastal areas. The Japan Current, which flows from Southeast Asia past Taiwan and on north, also moderates Taiwan’s weather. It likewise affects the coastal areas of South China. Taiwan has abundant rainfall year-round; the mean annual precipitation is 102 inches. The east coast receives more rain than the west and the mountains more than the lowlands. Some of the mountainous areas on the windward side of the island (the east coast) often see rainfall exceeding 5 inches within a 24-hour period. One odd feature about Taiwan’s rain patterns is that the dry season at one end of the island coincides with the rainy season at the other. In the north, the heaviest rains fall between October and March; in the south, it is between April and September.27 Owing to the ample and predictable rainfall and because water for irrigation, when needed, can be obtained from small streams, lakes and reservoirs, agriculture is not much of a gamble in Taiwan compared to other places in

8

The Land and the People

the world (including much of China). The plentiful rain supply also provides Taiwan with hydroelectric power, which in the early post-World War II period was cheap and facilitated the island’s industrialization.28 The patterns of precipitation in the Pescadores resemble those of the southwest coastal part of Taiwan, except that rainfall there is not so much influenced by Taiwan’s mountains. Rainfall on the Offshore Islands (Quemoy and Matsu) resembles the coastal areas of Fukien Province in China. The islands Taiwan claims in the South China Sea have rainfall patterns like the other islands there and the adjacent Southeast Asian countries. Located near the Asian landmass but in the world’s largest ocean, Taiwan’s winds are monsoonal—or periodic—and seasonal. Taiwan experiences none of the strong continental winds, cyclones and tornadoes common in parts of China. Yet typhoons plague the island, particularly in the late summer and early fall, as they do the Philippines, Vietnam and other places to the south, the Ryukyu Islands and the main Japanese islands to the north (though they are seldom so strong there), and the coast of China. These “hurricanes of the east” are among the most severe in the world. When they hit Taiwan—usually in July, August and September—they often cause serious flooding and severe damage to buildings and crops.29 Taiwan’s lowland plains and valleys generally have rich alluvial topsoil because much of Taiwan’s land is either volcanic or partly volcanic; thus, it is quite fertile despite centuries of farming. The soil in the uplands and at higher elevations, however, is leached, acidic and infertile; it has also been subjected to considerable erosion, though it remains rich compared to that of most mountainous areas elsewhere in the world. Because of its good soil and plentiful rainfall, Taiwan’s forests have survived extensive cutting for many years and still cover nearly half the island’s land surface.30 Owing to the variations in soil quality, elevation, climate and other factors, Taiwan enjoys a diversity of flora. Of its more than 190 plant families and nearly 4,000 species, about one-third are considered indigenous. From sea level to about 6,000 feet, plants tend to be either tropical or subtropical. Mixed forests of broad-leafed deciduous trees and conifers cover the higher areas. Conifers grow primarily at the highest elevations.31 More than 60 types of mammals have been found in Taiwan, about 45 of which are native species. The largest predatory mammal is the Formosan black bear. Foxes, flying foxes, deer, wild boar, bats and squirrels are found in less populated areas. Taiwan has 330 species and subspecies of birds, just over 30 of which are indigenous. And there are more than 65 species of reptiles and amphibians. Snakes are found throughout the island; 13 species are poisonous. Many of the animals native to Taiwan are not found in China or elsewhere in the region. However, the plant and animal life on the island generally offers evidence for either (or both) Taiwan’s early birth and for the view that it was in the past connected to the Mainland. Taiwan’s farmers produce a variety of crops. Rice is the staple, and the two or three harvests each year usually produce high yields. Other grains are less

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commonly grown. Fruits—considered among the best tasting in the world— and vegetables are also important crops. Taiwan has been self-sufficient in most food commodities and in the past exported large quantities of sugar and rice, and more recently sizable quantities of fresh fruits and vegetables and canned foods; but it now imports significant amounts of meat, grains (other than rice) and animal feed.32 Taiwan has a dairy industry and its farmers raise cattle for meat, but both are new to Taiwan and remain rather small in their economic importance. The nation’s fishing industry has long been important as a source of employment and food. In recent years, though, because fishermen have had to sail much farther from Taiwan’s shores, this has changed. Taiwan’s fishermen now contract with other nations to fish off their shores. Fish farming has also become common and profitable.33 On the whole, however, agriculture has shrunk in importance because of industrialization. In addition, when Taiwan became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2002, many farmers’ livelihoods were even more seriously threatened by foreign competition.34 Taiwan is not well endowed in mineral or energy resources. Twenty minerals can be found on the island, but none in commercially significant amounts. Coal, which in Taiwan’s early history made the island a port of call for merchant ships, was once important to the economy. Although coal was mined until only recently (primarily in the northern part of the island), production was very labor-intensive because the seams are so small.35 Gold and copper have been mined in the northern part of the island for a century; however, the extraction of neither metal is currently of economic importance. Taiwan has small deposits of sulphur (in the form of pyrite), dolomite (a source of magnesium) and nickel. Marble and a low-quality jade mined in Taiwan are used for vases, jewelry and other decorative items. Some oil and natural gas have been found, both onshore and offshore, but not in the commercially meaningful quantities once thought possible.36 Unlike China, which has plentiful natural resources (though not on a per capita basis), Taiwan is resource poor, which means to some extent the two have a symbiotic relationship. But another factor has more resonance: when looking at Taiwan’s poor natural resource base, it was compelled to develop another resource—its human talent.

Population To answer the question whether Taiwan belongs to China or to itself one needs to know about its population. The essential questions are: Do Taiwan’s residents differ from China’s and in what ways? And to what extent does this matter? The Republic of China’s population numbered 23.730 million as of early 2019, equivalent to 0.31 percent of the total world’s people and ranking it number 56 in the world by that measure.37 Nearly all of its population resides

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on the island of Taiwan: 99.7 percent. The population of the Pescadores is just over 100,000; Quemoy is more than 120,000; Matsu is 12,000 plus. However, soldiers garrisoned on Quemoy and Matsu are not included in these figures.38 Islands off Taiwan’s east coast have even smaller populations; islands under Taipei’s jurisdiction in the South China Sea lack civilian populations. Given its small land area, its population makes it one of the most densely populated places on earth. In fact, the number of people per square mile in Taiwan is nearly double that of Japan and almost five times that of China. If Taiwan were a province of China, it would be its most densely populated one. Furthermore, as more than two-thirds of Taiwan’s surface is covered by mountains, the island’s real population-to-land ratio must be regarded as even higher than the numbers indicate.39 Also the population density of the lowlands surpasses the island’s average of more than 1,600 per square mile (635 per square kilometer) by a very large margin. Having said all of this Taiwan’s population density is not too different from China’s coastal provinces especially in central and south China.40 But Taiwan’s very high population density is of recent origin. In 1940, the island’s population was only 5.8 million. An influx of people fleeing the Mainland after the Communist takeover in 1949 and a very high birth rate (4.66 per 1,000 people annually, one of the highest in the world) for a decade and a half after that pushed Taiwan’s population to more than ten million by 1960.41 In response, in 1964 the government established an official birth-control program to limit population growth that had been unofficially in effect in the cities for some time.42 As a consequence Taiwan’s birth rate fell to 3.27 per 1,000 population by 1965 and by 1980 to 2.34—just about the world average. By reducing the fertility rate by more than 100 percent in 20 years, Taiwan accomplished what it took most Western countries a century to do.43 China, it might be said, did the same thing, with its one-China policy, though China acted a bit later and its methods were quite different. Anyway, the birth rate in the two became very similar—low. After 1980, the birth rate fell to a figure well below the world’s average. In 2011, it was reported Taiwan’s birth rate was the lowest in the world.44 In fact, owing to the success of Taiwan’s efforts to reduce childbirths, together with dramatic decreases in the death rate, the average age of Taiwan’s population rose markedly. In 1964, 45 percent of the population was under the age of 15; just 2.6 percent was over the age of 65. (In the United States, the relevant numbers were 30.9 percent and 9.3 percent, respectively.) In 1992, onefifth of the population was under the age of 15; 6.8 percent of the population was over 65. In 2017, 13.7 percent of residents were over 65 at which time Taiwan was said to have become an “aged society.”45 Paralleling the decline in the births, Taiwan’s death rate dropped significantly, falling from 18.2 per 1,000 people in 1952 to 5.92 in 2006. Meanwhile, the infant mortality rate dropped from 44.7 per 1,000 to 4.6 per 1,000 during that period. Hence increases in life expectancy were extremely high.

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From 1951 to 1991, the life span of Taiwan’s population rose from just over 55 (53.1 for males and 57.3 for females) to nearly 75 (71.5 for males and 76.9 for females). In 2017, it was 80.3—even higher than the life expectancy figures in many European countries and ten years above the world’s average.46 In 2018, the population of Taiwan was projected to stop growing by 2025 and fall to 20 million by 2035.47 A distant forecast is that Taiwan’s population will fall to 18.4 million by 2060. At this time the proportion of the population over 65 would be nearly 42 percent. That means there will be just 1.2 people in the working-age population to support one elderly individual. As a consequence residents will be paying very high costs for retirement, health and other social benefits. Owing to these trends the government is now encouraging mothers to have more children. Immigration may help resolve the problem, but its social and political ramifications are controversial.48 Also the gender ratio of Taiwan’s population has long been an issue of concern. Because more of the groups who fled to Taiwan in 1949, especially the military, were largely male, for some time the ratio of men to women was quite unbalanced. This situation subsequently improved, but in 1964 there were still 109 males for every 100 females. Even today there remains an imbalance of men over women in most age groups. Only in the population over the age of 65 are there more females than males. Further details on this issue are revealing. In recent years, after seeing the male–female ratio gap close for a number of years, it increased again for a different reason: in 1985 a law was passed allowing abortions 24 weeks into pregnancy in order to prevent the birth of babies suffering congenital defects. This resulted in sex selection and produced a jump in the proportion of male to female babies from 106.7 (versus 100 females) in 1985 to 110.3 in 1991. Very recently, however, the imbalance has diminished somewhat.49 Because of the past (and present) imbalance in the sex ratio and owing also to the fact that many men perceive Taiwan’s women to be too liberated, they seek wives from other countries. In 2003, nearly one in three marriages was with a foreign spouse—87 percent of whom were brides, mostly from China (nearly two-thirds) and Southeast Asia. During the Chen Shui-bian presidency, the government adopted various ways to limit the number of foreign spouses, especially from China. Chen observed they did not readily adopt a Taiwanese identity and did not favor the DPP over the KMT. His administration’s actions resulted in a slight decline in foreign marriages.50 President Ma Ying-jeou lifted various restrictions on marriages with foreigners, thus ending some of the discrimination against brides from other countries. In 2016, as part of President Tsai Ing-wen’s push for social reform, new rules on naturalization were put into force that reduced stiff financial requirements on foreign spouses.51 Speaking of immigration generally and its impact on the workforce, after 1949 Taiwan had almost no new residents. Taiwan did not accept refugees though it did accept asylum seekers but they were not large in numbers. In the years immediately following World War II a high birth rate and a low death

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rate caused the population to increase rapidly; thus there was no shortage of labor. In this context, immigration was seen as neither needed nor desirable. Subsequently declining birth and death rates caused the workforce to become static for a number of years during which time there was little or no change in attitudes or policies regarding immigration. More recently, with prosperity more people have stayed out of the workforce to get an advanced education. Many residents also avoid low-paying and physically taxing jobs. This has resulted in a shortage of young people to fill job vacancies in the last 15 to 20 years; Taiwan has thus looked to immigrant labor to offset a shortage of local workers.52 High wage rates in Taiwan compared to most other parts of Asia also attracted foreign workers. By the late 1990s, there were one-third of a million foreign workers in Taiwan.53 In 2000, the government perceived there were too many and moved to reduce the number of employees businesses could recruit from other countries. Still the figure increased to 424,000 in 2006. Most of these, 69 percent, were guest workers and were supposed to return to their native countries at the end of their contracts.54 Yet some sought to stay. This created controversy especially when they complained of ill treatment and, on one occasion during the Chen administration, they rioted over wages not paid, thus exposing serious government corruption. The number of foreign workers in ensuing years leveled off. During the Ma presidency the opposition parties made issue of the reported large numbers of Chinese from China residing in Taiwan as spouses but also many more reportedly in Taiwan as illegal immigrants (including spies). The number was put at 150,000 from 1962 to 2017.55 Some critics spoke of Taiwan’s “demographic unification” with China. President Tsai discouraged people from China taking up residency in Taiwan, but encouraged workers and others from Southeast Asia to come. The KMT and other conservative political parties made issue of illegals in Taiwan committing various crimes. They cited numbers from the National Immigration Agency: 1,946 were missing and 2,047 (since 2015) had violated various laws.56 Not unrelated to this issue is the number of Taiwan’s residents who have gone to China—most to do business or, since Taiwan’s economic downturn in 2001, to find jobs. Within the last few years with Taiwan’s economy doing poorly a million or more, perhaps as many as three million, people from Taiwan have taken up residence in China, mostly in the southern coastal areas. Among these, many settled semi-permanently. Many men found wives in China, some second wives, and a good proportion of these had children there.57 Beijing has encouraged residents of Taiwan to come to China to work and live as part of its unification efforts and has offered them various incentives. In 2018, the Chinese government even offered residence permits.58 Still another population issue is urbanization. In 1920, only 4 percent of the people in Taiwan lived in cities with populations of more than 100,000. The proportion changed in 1949 because of the influx of Chinese from the Mainland, who, to a large extent, became city dwellers. Then, in the middle and

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late 1950s, as a result of land reform and the enhanced productivity of the agricultural sector, rural residents began moving to the cities in large numbers. This process accelerated in the 1960s as factories proliferated in or near Taiwan’s large and medium-sized cities. By the early 1970s, Taiwan’s population was two-thirds urban.59 Urbanization was accompanied by an especially rapid growth of Taiwan’s largest cities. In 1952, just over 47 percent of the population lived in cities of more than 50,000 people. By 1980, the proportion had risen to 78 percent (compared to the world’s average of 43 percent)—ranking Taiwan 28th in the world (higher than Japan, which was 77 percent, or the United States, at 75 percent) in terms of the percentage of the urban population.60 Taipei’s population, which was less than 326,000 in 1947, grew to more than one million by 1966—an increase of 260 percent. Another one million people were added before 1974. Other large cities in Taiwan grew at a similar rate, nearly doubling or tripling in size between 1947 and the mid-1960s, while experiencing high growth even into the 1990s. Taiwan now has three cities with a population of more than one million, and ten with a population of 100,000 to one million.61 Recognizing this trend, Taiwan’s largest cities are now classified as metropolitan cities and some have been renamed. Urbanization fostered Westernization, modernization and more. In fact, it created a large gap socially and politically between rural and city Taiwan. Regarding the issue of Taiwan’s relationship with China, city residents espoused a friendlier attitude toward China while rural residents favored independence. Rapid urbanization also transpired in China, but this happened later and did not entail so much Westernization. On the other hand, since the mid-1990s, migration to most of Taiwan’s large and medium-sized cities has slowed because of urban crowding and other associated problems. Since 1978 Taipei and some other cities have experienced a population decline. Some satellite or “urban towns” near Taipei, Kaohsiung and Taichung were built to reduce population pressures there.62 However, some of these since have been absorbed with the redrawing of boundaries and the creation of metropolitan cities. Population trends in China have been similar to but have lagged behind Taiwan. Does this make the integration of the two more likely or less likely? It seems Taiwan’s rather serious need for labor and for talent means closer ties are to be expected. But Taiwan’s businesses may be able to adjust in ways other than moving people. Anyway, China is experiencing fast rising labor costs. Hence answering the question of Taiwan’s future status cannot readily be gauged by looking at information on population alone.

Ethnic Groups The ethnic makeup of Taiwan’s population, and China’s, for many observers, offers insights for answering the question whether the two should merge. It also serves as the basis for separation or for what is termed “contested

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identities.” Clearly the issue of ethnicity, and with it culture, language and local or broader nationalism, is both controversial and complex in Taiwan.63 It is also a politically sensitive matter. The details are instructive though they do not offer definitive or final conclusions. Taiwan’s population is made up of four major ethnic or sub-ethnic groups: the Aborigines, two groups of “Taiwanese” Chinese (Fukienese—or in their language Hoklo or Holo—and Hakka), and “Mainland Chinese.” The Aborigines are usually seen as ethnically distinct from Chinese. However, they may or may not belong to a single ethnic group; different tribes are sometimes considered distinct ethnic groups. The three Chinese groups are more accurately described as being different from each other according to their provincial origins and/or the time they arrived in Taiwan, as well as the language or languages (dialects) they speak, rather than according to ethnicity. All three are called “Han” Chinese, which also constitutes the majority of China’s population. The Aborigines have long been considered to have migrated from Southeast Asia or South China several millennia ago. The languages of the Aborigines resemble Bahasa (the language spoken in Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia) in structure and vocabulary. Aboriginal culture for the most part seems also to have originated in Southeast Asia, though it obviously evolved considerably in Taiwan.64 However, another theory has recently become popular: that the Aborigines populated Taiwan much earlier than it was assumed and migrated from Taiwan to other parts of Asia, rather than the other way around.65 The “out of Taiwan” theory advances the idea that people migrated from Taiwan to the south (to Southeast Asia as far as New Zealand), east (to Oceania as far as Easter Island) and west (to Madagascar). This happened 5,000 years ago. The evidence is based on archeology, comparative ethnic studies, genetics and languages. Carbon dating of cultural artifacts, the study of plants and linguistic analysis have also provided important data. This migration occurred because Taiwan developed agriculture earlier than adjacent areas, which caused population growth and overcrowding. In any case, the migration involved what is now 400 million people covering a large expanse of the planet.66 This, however, does not constitute proof that humans originated in Taiwan. Nor does it disprove a China connection. In fact, the same research suggests the Aborigines originally came from what is now China (but was not then) 8,000 years ago.67 Some anthropologists say the evidence shows Taiwan’s Aborigines came from both China and Austronesia.68 The Aborigines have long been assumed to be the original inhabitants of the island, though there is no definitive proof of this. Nonetheless, the Aborigines regard themselves as Taiwan’s first inhabitants; certainly they populated the island long before the arrival of any Chinese. In any event, the government lists 16 major Aboriginal tribes. More than one-third of the Aboriginal population is of the Ami tribe. Tribes other than the 16 can also be easily identified, but all are either small in numbers or are

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being rapidly assimilated or both. Some tribes earlier identified by the government have virtually vanished. Around a tenth of Aborigines do not identify with a tribe. In fact, quite a number do not have meaningful connections with their places of birth or their tribes. All of the Aboriginal languages are to some degree or another endangered. According to a recent poll most Aborigines say they use Chinese as their first language.69 All the Aborigines are less urban than the three Chinese groups mentioned earlier, and, with the exception of the Yami tribe that lives on Orchid Island off Taiwan’s southeast coast, most reside in the Central Mountain Range area or on the east coastal plain. Although the Aborigines vary considerably from tribe to tribe in physical appearance, they are generally short and have rugged features, with larger noses and eyes than the Chinese. Most are easily identifiable because of their looks and by tattoos, clothing and manners.70 When Chinese immigrants arrived, they identified two groups of Aborigines: sedentary ones who lived in the lowland areas and practiced agriculture, and less settled tribes who lived in the mountains and survived by hunting and fishing. The Chinese killed many of the former during frequent armed conflicts and drove many more into the mountains. Many were assimilated. Now most of the Aborigines are Mountain Aborigines.71 Although all of the Aboriginal population is said to be “acculturated”—speaking the national language and knowing Chinese customs while living amicably under the law—most still reside in the less populated areas of Taiwan.72 Many also keep their tribal ways. Some observers see many similarities between Taiwan’s Aborigines and Indigenous Americans. It is difficult to say exactly when the first Chinese arrived on the island; it is generally put at more than a thousand years ago. It is known, however, that early Chinese immigrants were few in number, and most went to Taiwan only temporarily—for seasonal work or to trade. Major migrations began in the seventeenth century. At that time and after, most of the Chinese immigrants sought to stay in Taiwan permanently.73 Early Chinese migrants to Taiwan hailed mainly from Fukien (Fujian) and Kwangtung (Guangdong) provinces, mostly the former. They are now called Taiwanese or sometimes “native Taiwanese.” They are also referred to as “early arrival Chinese.” However, there are two distinct groups of these migrants. The Fukien Taiwanese came mostly from the southern part of Fukien Province, especially the area near the city of Amoy. Hakka Taiwanese, or just Hakkas, also came from southern Fukien, but many came from Kwangtung. Some nonHakka Chinese from Kwangtung Province (Cantonese) were also among these early immigrants to Taiwan, but most of these turned out to be only temporary residents. The migration of both groups, the Fukien Taiwanese and the Hakka, was concentrated in specific spans of time; one might say they came in waves. The Hakkas were a persecuted minority in China, having been driven from their home area in northern China around 1,500 years ago. They became itinerants and took up residence in various parts of China. Some writers have likened their background to the Jews in Europe. Recent evidence from DNA

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tests and linguistic studies indicates the Hakka people might have once resided in Mongolia.74 In any event, many migrated to southern China and engaged in fishing and trading in the coastal areas and from there moved on to the Pescadores and finally on to southern Taiwan. (Many also went to Southeast Asia and elsewhere.) By about AD 1000, there were a number of Hakka settlements in southwest Taiwan. The last large-scale migration of Hakkas to Taiwan occurred in the late 1860s after the very destructive Taiping Rebellion in China. Because a Hakka led the rebellion, Hakkas incurred blame, resulting in even worse persecution than they had faced before; consequently many fled to Taiwan. Fukienese, mostly farmers and fishermen, subsequently came in such large numbers that they pushed many Hakkas inland, sometimes into enclaves. Many were forced to go to dangerous areas inhabited by Aborigines. Also the Fukienese killed many Hakka and took their land, resulting in antipathy that to some degree lasts until today.75 The Fukienese eventually inhabited most of the western plain. The Fukien Chinese later called themselves pen ti jen (natives) or ben sheng jen (local province people); they labeled the Hakkas ke chia jen (guest people, which is what Hakka literally means), and they named the Aborigines shan ti jen (mountain people) or less complimentary terms. Notwithstanding this rather long period during which Chinese migrated to Taiwan, as late as the mid-seventeenth century when the Dutch took control of Taiwan, it was estimated that there were only 25,000 Chinese on the island.76 It was not until the nineteenth century that Chinese constituted a majority of the island’s population, and even then they occupied considerably less than half of the island’s land area. The Dutch encouraged the migration of Chinese to the island, as did the local governments that ruled Taiwan after the Dutch departed. However, the government of China during long periods of time had banned emigration to Taiwan.77 In 1945, at the end of World War II, Taiwan again became part of China after a 50-year hiatus and it was again governed by officials sent from China. More important, however, in 1949, when the Communists defeated Nationalist Chinese armies and assumed political control over the mainland of China, a wave of more than 1.5 million Chinese arrived on Taiwan’s shores. Because they hailed from various parts of China, they were known simply as Mainlanders, or wai sheng jen (outside-province people). Most, though, came from China’s coastal provinces, more from the south than the north (because Chiang Kai-shek’s base of support was near Shanghai in southeast China and thus more of his army and government were composed of people from that area). Also, Mao’s armies took control of China from the north and isolated that area and much of the west, keeping the people there from escaping.78 Taiwan’s population today is listed as follows: Mainlanders, 14 percent; Taiwanese, 84 percent (the Hoklo are 70 percent; the Hakkas make up 14 percent); and Aborigines, around 2 percent.79 The birth rate is slightly higher between the two groups of Taiwanese and the Mainland Chinese mainly because the former are more rural and less educated than the Mainland

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Chinese. The rate is higher among the Aborigines. These and other population trends, however, have not significantly affected the ethnic ratios in Taiwan. The early Chinese who immigrated to Taiwan did so mostly because of difficult conditions at home and the prospects for a better life in Taiwan. Most emigrated for the same reasons Europeans left for America—except that few, if any, went to Taiwan because of religious persecution. Like the Europeans who flocked to the New World, most Chinese who settled in Taiwan severed ties with their homeland. Also, few maintained or tried to reestablish broken family ties later. Anyway, such efforts were banned during much of the Japanese period and after 1949 until the late 1980s. The Mainland Chinese who fled to Taiwan in 1949 did not generally consider the move permanent. They hoped that the Nationalist Chinese military could regroup and counterattack Mao’s armies and that the mainland of China would be liberated from the Communists, after which they would return home. After a while, however, most Mainlanders began to call Taiwan home and gave up any serious thought of going back to China. Their resignation to living permanently in Taiwan was at first more evident among younger and more successful Mainlanders, but after years of separation, Taiwan’s miracle economic growth, and lagging growth in China, most Mainlanders came to view Taiwan as their permanent home. By the mid-1980s, more than half the Mainland Chinese population of Taiwan was born on the island.80 Thus, as reflected in Taiwan’s demographics, ties between Taiwan and China were weakening fast. On the other hand, in the 1980s and after people from Taiwan began visiting China in large numbers, links grew, especially economic ones. Emigration from Taiwan was not a major issue in recent times. The number of residents leaving Taiwan before 1950 was almost nil although some Mainland Chinese who had left China in 1949 to go to Taiwan went on to the United States. The number of emigrants from Taiwan increased in the 1960s. More than half went to the United States. More were women than men. At first most were students who remained after they finished their studies. Later many went to the United States to pursue citizenship and life in the U.S. Most settled in California (about half) and New York—in the Los Angeles area (more than 60,000 according to the 2010 census) and the New York City area (more than 25,000). The total number (self-identified) in 2010 was 475,000.81 “Taiwanese Americans” (meaning any of the Han Chinese groups) soon boasted of a higher level of education than other Americans and much better than other emigrants or ethnic group; they were twice as likely to have a college degree. They also had higher incomes. A number formed high-tech companies in the United States. Some Taiwanese Americans received Nobel prizes including Steven Chu (in physics) and Lee Yuan-tse (in chemistry). Michael Chang was a top tennis player and Jeremy Lin is a well-known NBA basketball player. Henry Liu is a renounced forensic expert. Ang Lee is a famous movie director. Some attained high positions in government. Elaine

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Chao was Secretary of Labor under President George Bush and is Secretary of Labor under President Donald Trump. In general, however, Taiwanese Americans tend to be apolitical and less involved than others in civic activities. They also have a less than expected influence in national politics because they live in predominantly Democratic states and due the Electoral College system of electing the president such states are ignored during campaigns. Also the Republican Party has not made strong appeals to them even though they are conservative by culture and most earn a living in business and support capitalist ideals more than other groups. They do, however, exert political influence through monetary contributions and by forming political organizations. Some of these organizations support Taiwan independence and have had some impact on U.S. foreign policy, especially through lobbying Congress.82

Culture Culture is regarded as one of the permanent factors in the argument of whether Taiwan is a nation separate from China or not. It is the basis of nationalism, which is a necessary ingredient of nationhood. It distinguishes nations from one another and nations from “non-nations.” Finally it is the basis of national identity and ethnicity, issues that are essential to understanding Taiwan’s politics, and are assessed in Chapter 4. An analysis of Taiwan’s culture lends itself to quite disparate views about the issues just stated. One writer, focusing on cultural trends in Taiwan, argues that bentu hua (indigenization) and quanqiu hua (globalization), the former suggesting Taiwan going its separate way from China and the latter it integrating with China, are the “most compelling and ubiquitous themes” affecting the society, politics, economics and foreign policy in Taiwan today.83 Furthermore, he says, both sides of the debate recognize this. Surely the question of Taiwan’s future and how culture may guide it is a vexing one. The British magazine The Economist once carried a piece that contained the following statement: “If Taiwan were a person, Freud might well have been interested.”84 Some have even called Taiwan culturally “schizophrenic.” Chinese leaders in Beijing, of course, recognize that Taiwan has a distinct culture. But they note that all of China’s provinces do also. Addressing the question differently, if Taiwan’s culture were distinctly different, then what right did the Nationalist government have to have said it represents China? Or, in the present tense why does not the present government change its political system to reflect this? It has not done so to any meaningful degree.85 Along with these questions another more fundamental one is how to define culture. That is a complicated matter this author does not want to seriously delve into here due to space limitations. Thus he accepts as a beginning point this view: it is commonly thought that culture, along with ancestry, is the basis for ethnic and national identity and therefore it provides the basis for arguing whether Taiwan should be considered distinct from China or a part of it.86

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In any event, Taiwan’s culture, however defined, for the most part is Chinese. Early Chinese immigrants brought it to Taiwan from Fukien and Kwangtung Provinces and, following World War II, especially in 1949 and after, from various parts of China. It contains elements of both regional cultures as well as the national culture in China. Fukien and Hakka Chinese brought their cultures with them that were different from each other in many ways, though both reflected their southern coastal and Chinese rural origins.87 Aboriginal customs influenced Chinese culture in Taiwan, although the predominant influence was the other way around. In any event, the customs and cultures of many Aboriginal groups, especially those of the mountain Aborigines, remain intact. Missionaries and scholars from both China and the West, as well as merchants from throughout East Asia and later from Europe and the United States, also contributed to Taiwan’s cultural mix. Finally, Japanese culture had a strong influence during Japan’s rule of Taiwan, while the United States has had a profound cultural impact for the past 70-plus years.88 Early on, in fact soon after the arrival of Chinese immigrants, the distinction between Han (or Chinese) culture and Aboriginal culture was quite clear. In terms of the economies of each, Han culture was more capitalist while Aboriginal culture was more tribal and collective. The Chinese produced crops beyond what they could consume and sold or stored them. Certain social practices likewise separated the two groups. Aboriginal women did not practice foot binding as did Han women. Aboriginal women frequently chewed betel nut (a mildly addictive substance that stained the teeth made from a locally grown plant) and drank liquor (mainly rice wine). The Aborigines favored tattooing. The Chinese buried their dead immediately; the Aborigines did not. The Chinese communities were patrilineal. Some Aboriginal tribes were matrilineal. Marriage practices differed. Language also separated the two groups, with the Chinese communities speaking either Fukienese or Hakka (with one written language) and the Aboriginal speaking a number of tongues. The Chinese adhered to Confucian, Buddhist and Taoist religious practices; the Aborigines traditionally practiced animism.89 Han culture predominated in the Chinese communities. Also, the culture the Chinese in Taiwan espoused at an early time did not undergo as many modifications as in China, where cultural change came from many more sources. Thus it is possible to say Taiwan’s culture was more Chinese than in China. To some this undercuts the idea that Taiwanese are not Chinese.90 Western cultural influence first came to Taiwan through Western missionary activities. This grew in scope during the period of Dutch colonial rule. The period of Dutch governance of Taiwan witnessed the transplanting of their culture in a variety of ways. The Dutch promoted market-style agriculture to make their colonial enterprise profitable. Thus they brought Western capitalism to Taiwan. The Dutch gave the Aborigines a written language, converted many to Christianity and conveyed to them many Western cultural norms.

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Yet the Dutch favored dealing with the Chinese based on their colonial economic objectives. The Chinese were natural capitalists and easier to tax. Dutch cultural policies were transferred in other ways. The Dutch converted some Hans to Christianity though this was mostly temporary. The Dutch encouraged Han–Aborigine intermarriage, which produced a population of “mixed-race” people mostly the product of Chinese men searching for a wife. This left many Aborigine men without wives and led to a rise in the status of women but also the practice of kidnapping women for marriage.91 During a period of local rule (1662 to 1683) or the Cheng (Zheng) period, the government evolved into military rule wherein the Aborigines also became enemies of the Chinese. Relations between the Han and the Aborigines deteriorated for other reasons. One was that many Aborigines were made corvee laborers. Another was Cheng Cheng-kung, the leader of the local government, who brought soldiers from China to Taiwan further exacerbating the problem of a shortage of women.92 Ch’ing China, ruled by the Manchus, a non-Chinese people that resided northeast of China, invaded Taiwan and governed it from 1683 to 1895. But most of the officials sent to Taiwan were Chinese; thus the style of government and culture transferred were Chinese. At first the government aligned with the plains Aborigines, but its strategy for ruling Taiwan varied over time. So did its policy on land, taxes and intermarriage of Han and Aborigines (encouraging it at times and banning it at other times).93 “Chinese” rule was not very enlightened and the officials sent to Taiwan were not the best and the brightest. Rebellions against ruling authorities were commonplace and violence was prevalent. Today advocates of Taiwan’s independence speak of the period as one of “China’s colonization” and often say that if Taiwan were to become part of China this would be repeated. On the other hand, Taiwan became much more Sinofied during this period and Chinese culture more imbedded, including social norms, religion, language and much more. In addition, the Chinese population increased markedly and land put to use for agriculture expanded and so did the economy. Toward the end of the period Taiwan was made a province of China and infrastructure building and other forms of progress were very much in evidence.94 During the Japanese colonial period (1895–1945) that followed, Taiwan experienced profound cultural change even though it was Japan’s policy not to alter local culture. Japan’s governing policies emphasizing law and order and promoting economic development had a huge impact. Japanese policies to advance social stability, facilitate better health and improve education also had a profound impact on Taiwan’s society. Most important Japanese colonial authorities created strict but fair law enforcement. They eradicated bribery and built infrastructure, and in other ways established a modern economy that linked Taiwan to Japan and to some extent the rest of the world. They kept taxes lower than they had been. In some critical ways, the Japanese changed the culture through edicts; they punished criminals severely, banned foot binding, made nudity illegal in

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public activities and forced residents to receive vaccines and have windows in their residences. All of this had a deep impact.95 Japanese authorities treated the Aborigines with less patience than the Hans who, after a brief period of opposition, facilitated Japan’s efforts to pacify the island, promote order and build a modern economy. Japanese officials both treated the Aborigines harshly and ignored them. Thus Japan’s cultural influence was mainly with the local Chinese. In some ways Japan’s policies toward Chinese culture was liberal; in some ways it was not. Up to World War II religious groups were allowed freedom to practice, but then Shinto was propagated and other religious practices discouraged or banned.96 Japanese authorities made it illegal for Hans to marry Japanese and schools were segregated. Forming political organizations was discouraged or forbidden. Japan did not promote democracy or self-rule in Taiwan, with some exceptions. In sum, the Chinese in Taiwan experienced an honest and fair government, which they liked. They also appreciated the opportunities to prosper. Some other things they did not like included the Japanese attitude of superiority and its authoritarian rule. Japan had a lasting effect on Taiwan’s culture through the imposition of its language and educational system. Many less obvious facets of Japanese culture are still to be found in Taiwan, among them poetry, painting, music, literature, culinary skills, religion and the martial arts.97 During the Japanese period, Western influence continued to find its way to Taiwan, but it was largely filtered through Japan. As a result of war between China and Japan, which started in 1937, Tokyo restricted Taiwan’s contacts with China; thus, Chinese culture, albeit well rooted in Taiwan, was cut off from its source. Advocates of Taiwan’s independence often cite Taiwan’s economic progress and its modernization during the Japanese period that it didn’t experience during the preceding period of Chinese governance. Others, however, mention that in the 1960s and after Taiwan’s economic boom the level of modernization, including culture, surpassed what it had been under Japan. Now many note that China is a big power and Japan is not and as a consequence Chinese culture is more admired. With the transfer of political control over Taiwan to the Republic of China in 1945 came a marked increase in Chinese influence as a product of what was called a “Chinese cultural revival.” The Nationalist government, especially after moving to Taiwan in 1949, sought in a variety of ways to nurture traditional Chinese culture. In fact, the political leadership considered propagating Chinese culture a necessary process to be applied to the population in Taiwan after half a century of Japanese rule. Hence, the government sponsored cultural activities of various kinds, including efforts to eradicate Japanese cultural influence. Anti-Soviet and anti-Communist themes were advanced reflecting the government’s views and Taiwan’s international status. Yellow journalism, pessimism and defeatism were seen as bad for the society and were thus discouraged or banned. Chiang Kai-shek’s personal cultural interests, which included Chinese calligraphy, classical painting, opera and folk arts, had a strong influence.98

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The government promoted cultural change in large measure through the Ministry of Education. In the early 1950s, the ministry launched a major project to preserve the Chinese classics, and subsequently sponsored cultural organizations and various awards. The Nationalist Party supported many cultural activities while the central government financed national museums, the National Central Library, concert halls and Chinese opera theaters. The Taiwan Provincial Government budgeted funds for libraries, fine arts museums and music halls in all counties and large cities. The Ministry of National Defense took an active role in encouraging cultural pursuits in the military. Such broad government funding of cultural pursuits is explained partly by the fact the Constitution mandates that 15 percent of the national government’s budget be used for education and culture.99 Although cultural “advancement” was to a great extent mandated by the government, due mainly to American presence in the years after 1949 this did not discourage freedom of cultural expression unless it was considered subversive or in poor taste. Nor did the government’s claim that it was the preserver of Chinese culture mean that Western culture was unwelcome (except for pornographic materials and pro-Communist writings). In fact, Western—especially U.S.—cultural influence in Taiwan in the 1950s and 1960s (quite unlike in China) grew: schools of thought such as symbolism, surrealism (especially among Taiwan’s poets), existentialism, Freudianism and modernism (sometimes even nihilism) appeared in public debate and in local publications. Popular Western movements in art and literature also influenced Taiwan’s local culture. Finally, many Western words and concepts became part of the language spoken in Taiwan—a marked contrast to the situation in the People’s Republic of China.100 Western social influence increased further, especially American, in the 1950s and 60s due to U.S. economic help and thereafter as Taiwan’s economic development became more dependent on exports (that went mainly to Western countries). Meanwhile more people gained access to Western newspapers, magazines, movies and music. Taiwan’s culture also mirrored the changing nature of politics, especially as democracy flourished and it became more acceptable to expound political ideas and as political and literary writing often merged. Modern scientific thought and new trends in the West also had a growing influence on Taiwan’s culture.101 In the 1970s, cultural developments in Taiwan reflected pragmatism (generally attributed to rapid economic growth), nationalism, nativism and realism. The 1980s saw the development of informational literature, science fiction, feminism and the extensions of various trends from the 1970s. Taiwan’s growing cosmopolitanism and cultural self-confidence also became more evident. Culture, meanwhile, became less subject to government regulation and more pluralistic in nature. Official support of cultural pursuits continued, however, because the public believed tax money should be spent on advancing culture and the government still sought to maintain oversight.102 Chinese calligraphy, opera, and traditional music and dance appealed to the more educated and conservative segments of the population. Chinese

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opera was popular mostly among older people. Writing Chinese characters as a form of art was traditionally an avocation of the educated class but became more common because Chiang Kai-shek encouraged it and for some time it was included in the civil service exam. After 1967, musical education became part of the required curriculum in primary and secondary schools in Taiwan.103 Sculpture, which never became popular in China because it was associated with manual labor, had already gained favor in Taiwan. It reflected traditional Taoism and contemporary political and social themes. Although architecture during the Japanese era followed styles that were either Japanese or culturally neutral, most museums and other “cultural buildings” were, and are now, constructed in traditional Chinese or Western forms.104 In addition to these facets of culture, many cultural expressions in more recent times reflected a “people’s culture” or globalism. Folk art revealed religious themes, whereas cartoons and posters were often political or avantgarde. Photography mirrored Western influence, but puppet shows, especially the traveling type, drew on local rural culture. The decision in 1987 to allow residents of Taiwan to visit China resulted in a surge of Chinese cultural influence of various kinds from the Mainland although there was resistance to copying too much from China.105 In Taiwan, movies attracted large audiences.106 Early on Taiwan produced classical Chinese movies as well as modern dramas, romance stories and adventure movies. Taiwan’s filmmakers, although in disfavor for many years, have recently won various awards for their movies. Films made in Hong Kong and the West, and particularly American ones, became popular in Taiwan in the 1950s, the 1960s and after. Japanese films, banned for some years, were allowed and attracted fairly large audiences. Later films made in China became fashionable. Actors, regarded as low class in the past, enjoyed an elevated social reputation. Many have become famous, some have even become social models and a few have entered politics. Because local literature was discouraged during the Japanese era, for some time Taiwan’s writers were generally young and there was a higher proportion of women than elsewhere, including China. Common earlier themes among writers were poverty, the differences between the Mainland Chinese and the Taiwanese, and local culture. Now, however, romance and social problems are more common topics, as is Taiwan’s sense of identity.107 Freer expression in recent years, the growth of democracy and increased foreign travel broadened the interests and concerns of Taiwan’s writers. Western books, like foreign music and movies, became popular in Taiwan and influenced the culture. In terms of the “contest” between a Taiwan culture and a Chinese culture, the last three presidential administrations are revealing. During the Chen presidency the government encouraged the expansion of Taiwanese culture while diminishing Chinese culture notwithstanding greater contacts, especially economic ones, with China. During the Ma era the government promoted Chinese culture. The Tsai administration adopted progressivism and cultural diversity, which emphasized neither, though diversity seemed to reduce the

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weight of Chinese and Taiwanese culture. One might conclude that a dominant culture in Taiwan is still undecided.

Transportation and Communications Views of whether Taiwan is a nation-state or part of China in both Taiwan as well as in the rest of the world have been transmitted and tested through Taiwan’s transportation and communications facilities. Also relevant is the fact that without modern transportation the idea of nationhood could not have evolved; the same is true of advanced forms of communications. Hence, both deserve special attention in attempting to answer the question of Taiwan’s future—whether separate or with China. Transportation and communications facilities are also a sine qua non for economic and social development, national defense and more. Specifically they provide for the development of moving goods, developing a market economy, resource allocation, labor utilization and much more.108 Until the late 1800s, Taiwan had neither a transportation or communications network that linked various parts of the island. Contacts among people living in different places on the island were hence limited to personal letters and/or government communiqués and going to places accessible by foot, oxcart or boat. This meant residents’ views of the world and Taiwan’s place in it were not informed much by outside forces, including the concept of nationhood (a seventeenth-century European idea), and were not a subject of meaningful debate. At the end of the nineteenth century, new roads, railroads and ports and communications facilities were built, though much more was done under the Japanese. This provided the basis for discussions about selfgovernment and even democracy. However, this diminished as Japan moved toward fascism in the 1930s.109 Meanwhile inhabitants of Taiwan gradually came to depend upon roads as their main form of transportation. Roads, though improved leading up to and during World War II, were still in many ways rudimentary. There were no road networks. This changed in the 1970s with the Ten Major Construction Projects that included modern highways, railroads, harbors and more. Freeways, high-speed rail lines and city underground metro systems followed in the next two or three decades.110 Today, when it comes to road quality and their interconnectedness, Taiwan stands out. Most of Taiwan’s roads are paved and there is an extensive system of express highways throughout the island. In 1978, a national expressway, Taiwan’s first, the Sun Yat-sen Freeway (also called the North-South Freeway), was completed. Running almost the length of the island, this highway made it possible to travel between Taiwan’s two largest cities, Taipei and Kaohsiung, by car, truck or bus, in less than four hours. After it opened, traffic increased on it by around 11 percent annually for more than a decade. A parallel expressway, the Formosa Freeway, was completed in 2004. Both freeways were built on Taiwan’s western flank, the latter a bit further inland.

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Taiwan’s freeways were, and are, toll roads, the tolls being adjusted upward at times in order to reduce heavy traffic flows.111 Today there are more than 12,000 miles of highways in Taiwan, including three north–south expressways and 12 east–west expressways.112 Motor vehicles of any type were not seen much in Taiwan in the past. As automobiles came into greater use in the 1960s most were employed as taxis or were company cars. This changed dramatically in the 1970s and 1980s, and by 1999 there were more than 16.3 million motor vehicles in Taiwan (around ten million of which were motorcycles), up from five million in 1980.113 Many were individual-use vehicles. This rapid increase in private ownership of vehicles mirrored both Taiwan’s prosperity and the reduction of tariffs on imported cars. In fact, the number of autos per capita in Taiwan now compares to that of most developed nations; however, as is the case in other nations, the downside of this are nettlesome traffic jams in Taiwan’s largest cities. Still many citizens in Taiwan’s cities rely on buses for transportation. City buses abound. In addition there are highway buses and tour buses. Many city streets in Taiwan have dedicated bus lanes. In addition to buses Taiwan has a huge number of taxis. There are also rental car companies in Taiwan.114 In recent times, railroads were one of Taiwan’s most important means of carrying goods and transporting people. The Japanese built a network of narrow-gauge tracks that served the island well. More and better lines were built during the 1950s. During the 1960s and 1970s, usage increased at a rate of 5 to10 percent annually. By the mid-1970s, railroads accounted for nearly half of the freight moved and passengers carried over more than a short distance.115 After that, usage fell because of competition from other means of transport, especially trucks and buses using Taiwan’s new expressways. More recently, however, because of highway congestion and the greater comfort and safety that trains provide to passengers, together with better services brought by more trains and double tracks, there has been another increase in rail travel. In 2006, the rails carried 463,000 passengers. In 2007, a high-speed train that runs at a speed of 186 miles per hour (300 km/h), making the trip from Taipei to Kaohsiung in around 90 minutes (two hours if stopping at all stations), was completed at a cost of $15 billion. It was the first such infrastructure project undertaken by the private sector in Taiwan.116 In 2010, Taiwan’s high-speed trains made 64 trips daily and served 37 million passengers, an increase of 14.2 percent from the previous year. The on-time rate (less than five-minute delay) was 99.2 percent.117 Now there is a highspeed line on Taiwan’s west coast and a round-the-island train that reaches 95 miles per hour.118 Taiwan has major seaports that accommodate ocean-going vessels. Most were modernized and improved during the 1970s. In 2008, an agreement was reached with China on opening direct shipping links. Freight shipments increased markedly as a result.119 For a while, Kaohsiung, Taiwan’s largest port, had the distinction of being the world’s third-largest container port

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(after Hong Kong and Singapore). However, this peaked in 2016 and then decreased slightly due to slower economic growth in Taiwan.120 Taiwan now has three major container ports: Keelung, Taichung and Kaohsiung, plus large ports in Hualien, Suao, Anping, Tainan and the Pescadores.121 Taiwan’s trade by ship was, and is, enhanced by export processing zones and free trade zones. Taiwan’s merchant marine is one of the world’s largest and is still growing in size and importance. Evergreen Marine Corporation, a private company founded in Taiwan, is one of the largest container forwarders in the world.122 Taiwan’s merchant marine is large not only because Taiwan is a major trading entity but also because the government fears China might try to blockade or quarantine the island and is concerned over a possible cut-off in oil shipments. Thus the government has encouraged ocean shipping to grow for security reasons. Taiwan has three international airports. The largest of these is Taoyuan International Airport (called Chiang Kai-shek International Airport before 2006), located outside of Taipei. The other two are Kaohsiung International Airport located near Kaohsiung and Taichung International Airport in Taichung. In 2015, they served 74 airlines—50 foreign, 16 from China and eight domestic.123 Taiwan also has a number of domestic airports, including Taipei Airport that is large (handling almost six million passengers in 2017) and which accepts some international flights. Taiwan’s flag carrier, China Airlines (CAL), and the privately owned EVA Airways (Taiwan’s largest) are the most prominent air carriers. Both international and domestic air travel have been growing rapidly—over 5 percent annually.124 As a result of a 2009 agreement, flights between Taiwan and China increased markedly to 209 scheduled flights per week. By 2016 the number had grown to 890 per week involving 61 airports in China and ten in Taiwan.125 There grew a demand for subways in the 1980s as traffic on the roads in Taiwan’s large cities became congested because of the proliferation of cars and other vehicles. In the case of Taipei, building was begun on a subway system in 1988 that was completed in 1996. Construction was delayed for some time because of the high cost of such a system in a city that lies in a basin and is gradually sinking. At a final cost of $18 billion, it was one of the most expensive systems in the world.126 A link to Taoyuan International Airport opened in 2017. Kaohsiung had a similar, though less serious, traffic problem, and in early 2001 work began on a subway system there. It was plagued by construction problems, accidents and scandals involving political kickbacks, not to mention riots by foreign workers helping to build the project; as a result, its opening date was delayed. It began operations in 2008. In 2009, Taichung City began building a system. Postal services, Taiwan’s traditional form of communications, have continued to grow in size and efficiency. There are six or more pickups a day in

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most of Taiwan’s large cities, and this, together with the efficiency of Chunghwa Post—a state-owned company that operates postal services— makes it possible to get a letter to another party in the same city within a few hours and to most cities throughout the island the next day. In 2010, Chunghwa Post handled 2.7 billion letters, 6.2 million pieces of express mail and 26.4 million parcels. That year direct postal services to and from the Mainland were established, after which the company handled cross-Strait services including 8.3 million letters, 95,000 parcels and 395,500 pieces of express mail annually. In 2018, Chunghwa Post announced its first “Digital Post Office” in Taipei as part of the effort to make Taipei a “smart city.” This included services provided by the robot “Pepper” such as banking services, digital registration of packages and more.127 Both UPS and Federal Express serve Taiwan with express deliveries around the world. In 2015, FedEx announced services through more than 5,000 7Eleven stores in Taiwan.128 Telephones came into popular use in Taiwan in the 1960s. During the 1970s the number of telephones increased eightfold to more than 2.5 million. Pagers soon became popular and then cellular telephones. In 2007, the number of mobile telephones exceeded landline phones. Chunghwa Telecom and several private companies provided mobile phone services and soon saturated the market. Smart phones have recently grabbed much of the market.129 Internet usage has grown very fast in Taiwan in recent years. Residents use the Internet for research, sending and receiving e-mail messages, entertainment, and for other purposes. Visitors to Taiwan find online computers easily accessible in hotels and cafes. Household penetration reached 82.8 percent in 2010. Various business rating services give Taiwan high marks for Internet and related services.130 As of December 2018, user penetration was 87.9 percent, one of the highest in Asia.131 In summation, Taiwan is now very advanced in both transportation and communications facilities. This has made the island in many ways a single unit, giving rise to views favoring it being a nation-state. Meanwhile, however, as developments in these areas proceeded apace they connected Taiwan with the world, including China. This created new impediments to unifying with China while erasing many old ones. Clearly residents of Taiwan know much more about China now and interact with Chinese from China more widely. Yet it remains to be seen exactly what the long-term effects of this will be.

The Media The media in Taiwan plays a special role in interpreting and advocating Taiwan’s status as a nation or it being part of China. Some, in fact, say whether Taiwan becomes one or the other will be mainly influenced by what people think of each choice, and the media determines that. In any event it is quite apparent that many media outlets take a stand one way or the other on the issue and this encourages controversy and debate.

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In the distant past, the common mode of public communications was to paste written bulletins that amounted to news flashes on walls in public places. During the Japanese period, radio and newspapers became common. Early on five radio stations operated in Taiwan and companies and residents began to purchase newspapers. There were nearly 100,000 radio receivers in use by the mid-1940s. Both newspapers and radios continued to proliferate in the 1950s and after. In the 1960s, television came to Taiwan. Soon Taiwan had numerous different styles of newspapers, magazines, radio stations, television stations, cable TV and movies.132 After the Nationalists moved to Taiwan, the government and the KMT took control of the media. The Government Information Office (GIO), which was part of the executive branch of government, carried the burden of making and enforcing regulations. The GIO prohibited publications that advocated independence or other “radical” ideas. It also sponsored magazines and other printed materials, and even published books.133 The state-controlled media for a number of years functioned as an instrument of information and persuasion regarding Taiwan’s status and its relationship with China. It advanced the view that Taiwan represented “Free China” as opposed to the People’s Republic being “unfree.” It condemned the idea of Taiwan independence. With economic development and democratization Taiwan’s media fast became open, free and competitive. Many of Taiwan’s leaders felt democracy required government transparency and media should reflect that. To a considerable degree it did. Beginning in the 1980s and 1990s, Freedom House gave Taiwan the designation “free” in assessing its freedom of the press, according it also high marks in legal, political and economic environments.134 This is still true. In 2018, Taiwan was ranked the highest among Asian countries evaluated in terms of press freedom by World Press Freedom, and 42nd in the world.135 However, there is another side to the coin: many in Taiwan, especially government officials, think the press is too free and is often a hindrance to the effective working of democratic government. Certainly there have been an excess of slander cases and law suits as a result of media reporting. The media also operated lines of communications with China since there were no formal conduits for that or the informal ones did not work well. For example, after the Koo-Wang talks were suspended in 1995 the media filled the gap. At that time a number of President Lee Teng-hui’s speeches and statements of policy vis-à-vis China were published in the media in Taiwan, after which China responded through its news agency Xinhua. 136 Back to the question of Taiwan’s status, a better knowledge of Taiwan’s media and the profound changes it has undergone is vital to addressing its role vis-à-vis answering this question. Economic modernization and its side effects, such as affluence, increasing literacy, urbanization, a growing middle class and mass education, have been the driving forces behind the transition to a new and forceful media in Taiwan. So has Taiwan’s political development,

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including the end of martial law, the growth of political parties, and elections. The media has encouraged and interpreted these changes.137 Not only did the government regulate cum control the media, early on the Central Daily News, operated by the KMT, was the island’s major newspaper. Subsequently Taiwan’s two largest independent Chinese newspapers were the China Times founded in 1950 and the United Daily News founded in 1951. Both favored the KMT. Both claimed to be the biggest paper in Taiwan; it is uncertain which actually was. China Times was said to be a bit more liberal and United Daily News a bit more conservative. Both published other papers, including economic and foreign editions. United Daily News published the United Evening News; the World Journal, which was the most popular Chinese newspaper in North America; and the Economic Daily News. China Times published the Commercial Times, China Times Weekly and Want Daily. 138 Subsequently the pro-DPP Liberty Times, founded in 1980, became Taiwan’s largest newspaper, with a ranking of number 35 in the world by hardcopy circulation. United Daily News, however, claimed the largest readership online. Apple Daily, founded in 2003, became a popular newspaper that leaned toward simplifying and/or sensationalizing its news coverage. It soon ranked in the top 100 in the world and was one of Taiwan’s top papers. It is neither pro-KMT nor pro-DPP. This paper, which started in Hong Kong, says its ranking would be much higher if newsstand sales, rather than just subscriptions, are counted.139 Clearly the KMT monopoly over newspaper publications was over and Taiwan had diversity in newspapers. Also the newspapers had to operate in a free market environment; competition for readers was severe. Three English dailies also operated in Taiwan—China Post, Taipei Times and Taiwan News—though Taiwan News went to an online version only in 2010 and China Post did the same in 2017. China Post is pro-KMT; Taipei Times and Taiwan News are pro-DPP. Of the three, Taipei Times is the largest in terms of news coverage and commentary.140 Meanwhile the Central News Agency (CNA), Taiwan’s largest news agency, disseminated news worldwide. In 1990, it became fully computerized and in 1997 added a website. In 2010, CNA expanded into video news. By this time it had placed correspondents in all of Taiwan’s major cities and in cities in more than 30 foreign countries. It offered coverage in Chinese, English and Spanish. Focus Taiwan is CNA’s English-language website. Though there were nearly 2,000 other news agencies in Taiwan, they were much smaller and, except for some that disseminate economic news, none was very important. The China Economic News Service operated by the United Daily News was one exception.141 The trend in Taiwan has been toward larger papers, and as a result many small and local papers have suffered from declining circulation and many have gone out of business. Some commercial papers and religious papers have survived. Also many of Taiwan’s residents now read news online. In fact, relying on online news has resulted in a big decline in hardcopy newspapers.

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Surveys show that online sources are cited by 88 percent of respondents as a source of news, compared to 77 percent for television, 41 percent for print sources and 23 percent for radio.142 Naturally, whether in traditional print form or in online coverage, the news and news analysis are affected by various “outside” forces. It is generally known that some rich businessmen from China and their counterparts in Taiwan with China connections influence local newspapers to carry stories favoring a China point of view or unification. On the other side, Liberty Times, which promotes a Taiwan identity, is subsidized (as are many media enterprises). Liberty Times is also known for providing print editions free or at below cost prices to people in rural Taiwan.143 Magazine publishing in Taiwan has an even more interesting history than newspapers and other forms of media. In 1960, Lei Chen published the Free China Fortnightly for a brief time and also formed the China Democratic Party (which was an illegal act at the time) and was arrested and jailed. His publication died with him. The founding of Taiwan Political Review in 1975 by Kang Ning-hsiang, some say, marked the beginning of a real political opposition in Taiwan even though the magazine was closed soon after it started publishing. Eighties, another magazine published by Kang and his associates, was more moderate and it lasted for a longer time.144 In 1979, opposition politicians associated with Formosa magazine formed the “Formosa Group” and organized a protest demonstration in Kaohsiung late that year. The gathering turned violent and led to the arrest and imprisonment of several of its leaders, who incidentally later became DPP leaders, including former Vice President Annette Lu and two former heads of the DPP. In 1989, the editor of Freedom Era Weekly published a proposed new Constitution; when an arrest warrant was issued, he set fire to the building and died in the blaze.145 Government moves to ban and/or close magazines did not end when the DPP became the ruling party in 2000. In 2002, police seized the current issue of Next magazine after it published a story about government corruption.146 Also the Chen administration was widely known to show favortism toward pro-DPP magazines in buying advertisements. Currently Taiwan has a large number of magazines, some of them published by newspapers, some by book companies and some by individuals. Many of them fail, but generally more start than close. There are a number of both general interest and specialized magazines. Many magazines focus on social and political conditions, business and fashion. China Times Weekly is well known for news and inside stories, respectively. CommonWealth is a popular financial magazine. Various other magazines deal with health issues, computers and the English language. Because of a better-educated population in the north, magazine sales are much larger there: 60–65 percent of the total.147 Book publishing is also a big industry in Taiwan. Foreign books, mostly in English, used to be pirated in Taiwan, but this is now a thing of the past. A

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number of publishers now have agreements with foreign publishers to copublish English-language books. Books written in Chinese in Taiwan are sold both locally and in other Chinese-speaking areas in East Asia. China, South Korea, Singapore and Japan have been major purchasers of publication rights of books published in Taiwan. Books are marketed through bookstores and newsstands, while online bookstores have seen a growing business in recent years. In addition to these means of marketing and distribution, Taipei also holds frequent international book exhibits. E publishing has also become common with around a third of publishers. In 2010, BenQ, a leading Taiwan computer manufacturer, launched its nReader, the first multilingual e-reader sold. The government considered digital publishing very promising and provided funds and other help to promote it.148 Radio stations have proliferated in recent decades. Before 1993 there were only 33 stations; in 2011, there were more than 150 under construction. Currently Taiwan has 601 radio stations.149 In the past, radio was devoted to dramatic, cultural, educational and children’s programs. Now radio broadcasts concentrate more on news, traffic, market reports and financial analysis, and talk programs, though music stations are the most popular.150 Broadcasts are mainly in Mandarin Chinese, Taiwanese, Hakka and English. Taiwan has both private and government-owned stations; the most well-known governmentowned service is the Broadcasting Corporation of China (BCC). Taiwan also has an English-language station, an educational station and a police radio station. Recently stations have also broadcast in Aboriginal languages as well as in Thai, Indonesian and Vietnamese. Radio Taiwan International, funded by the government, broadcasts in 13 languages. Those stations with music and phone-in debate programs have become more popular.151 Television began broadcasting in 1962 with the opening of the National Educational Television station. Taiwan Television Enterprise followed that same year, and China Television Company in 1969. Chinese Television System started operating in 1971. For some time, opposition politicians complained that the Nationalist Party controlled the television media. To counter this they established broadcasting platforms on ships anchored offshore. Formosa Television began broadcasting in 1997; it represented opposition politicians. Public Television Service followed the next year. In 2017, there were 29 television stations operating in Taiwan.152 Meanwhile, a large number of cable operators started doing business, many of them illegally, including those set up by individual cable projects to serve a large apartment building or a square city block. The practice was brought under control to some extent when the Cable Television Law was passed in 1993. Subsequently 62 cable companies competed for customers; around 65 percent of households subscribed. The rate was typically less than $20 per month for 90 channels. As of 2010, 70 percent of cable systems offered digital programming.153 Cyberspace has in recent years become a major avenue for propagating news and political views. Internet users began discussing politics in the 1990s.

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This expanded as many supporters of a Taiwanese identity and independence viewed the Internet as a means to overcome the fact the KMT controlled much of the media and celebrities generally supported the government and the KMT. Some resorted to hate speech using such terms as “Chinese pigs,” “Chinese second-class animals,” “KMT dogs” and “Taiwan betrayers” in making their points.154 As Taiwan’s Internet usage became more global and included China, and with China’s rise becoming an issue of discussion, messages about Taiwan’s status as a nation or not became more balanced. Other social media also grew in usage. In 2017, a survey done in Taiwan showed that 82 percent of residents had a Facebook account. Taiwan’s use rate was said to be the highest in the world.155 Made in Taiwan movies have had an up and down history. Some movies were made during the Japanese colonial period though they were primarily aimed at Japanese audiences. Most were documentaries and/or were aimed a portraying Japan’s rule of Taiwan in a favorable light. Taiwan’s return to China after World War II, however, did not result in a new movie industry in Taiwan. In fact, in the 1950s most Chinese movies shown in Taiwan came from Hong Kong or Shanghai. Most English movies viewed in Taiwan were made in the United States.156 In 1958, the government got behind the development of a local movie industry; the largest movie producer was the Central Motion Picture Corporation owned by the KMT. In 1963, its picture Oyster Girl won the Best of the Year Award at the annual Asian Film Festival. In 1965, another of its movies, Beautiful Duckling, won the best award at the Mandarin Film Festival.157 New companies entered the field in the 1970s. A number of movies portrayed Taiwan’s colonial past and its uncertain relationship with China both past and present, and also its search for identity.158 Many of its films were love stories. Quite a few of them became popular in Southeast Asia. Taiwan’s movie industry then encountered difficult times in part caused by strong foreign competition. The industry also encountered internal problems and government policies did not help. Hence fewer movies were produced. The 1980s saw a revival of Taiwan’s movie making with a number of movies focusing on life in Taiwan. Taiwanese identity became a popular theme. Hou Hsiao-hsien’s City of Sadness, Chen Kunhou’s Growing Up and Edward Yang’s Taipei Story and A Confucian Confusion were among the most successful. However, the impact beyond Taiwan was not large because most of the movies made at this time were in the Taiwanese dialect that is not widely understood outside of Taiwan. There was a “second wave” of movies made in Taiwan or by Taiwan directors beginning in 1990 with Tsai Ming-liang’s Vive L’Amour and Stan Lai’s The Peace Blossom Land. Even more important were Ang Lee’s The Wedding Banquet, Eat Drink Man Woman and Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon. Taiwan’s movies at this time began to deal with controversial social and political themes. Some films produced in Taiwan were viewed in China and Chinese-made films were shown in Taiwan.159

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In 2008, Wei Te-sheng’s Cape No. 7 set an all-time box receipts record. His Seediq Bale (the first part The Sun Flag) in 2011 recorded the second highest income ever from ticket sales. In 2015, Yu Shan Chen’s Our Times, starring Vivian Sung, was a big success. Ang Lee’s Lust, Caution also scored well. So did Café Waiting; Love Monga; The Wonderful Wedding; and Beyond Beauty: Taiwan From Above. However, there were definite barriers to increasing viewership and income from Taiwan-produced movies due to restrictions in China and Beijing blacklisting movies with certain themes such as Taiwan’s independence and homosexuality. Taiwan also restricted movies made in China from being shown in Taiwan for fear they might dominate the market while seeing them as propaganda. The growth of Taiwan’s movie industry was thus limited by government oversight but also changing policies with shifts in ruling parties and other factors.160 In early 2018, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office announced as part of its “31 policy initiatives” the China market would be opened further to Taiwan television productions and movies.161 Movie producers, like actors and others in the business in Taiwan, hoped for better cross-Strait relations so they could compete in China’s huge marketplace. However, given Taiwan’s cool response to the initiatives and the increased tension between the two sides after Tsai Inwen was elected president and the DPP won a majority in the legislature, this has not gone very far. Singers from both sides have crossed the Taiwan Strait to perform. Both governments controlled the themes of the songs and the types of performances for political content thereby limiting their political impact. A number of Taiwan singers had hoped, and still do, to break into the China market as it offers great monetary rewards. One singer has been able to succeed in becoming successful in both places, Theresa Teng (Teng Li-chun or Deng Lijun). Her father was in the Nationalist Army and the family fled to Taiwan in 1949. She was born in 1953 and in the late 1960s and 1970s after first performing before the troops in Taiwan she became well known throughout the island. Her fame quickly spread to Japan, South Korea, China and Southeast Asia and to some extent South Asia. She sang folk songs, ballads and love songs. Two of her most popular songs were “When will You Return” and “The Moon Represents my Heart.” She sang in Mandarin, Taiwanese, Cantonese and even Indonesian.162 She died of an asthma attack in 1995 at the age of 42 when performing in northern Thailand, but not before she had become a huge hit throughout Asia and according to some was the most heard singer in the world ever. Western singers had not gained many listeners in China as no one before her transcended the barriers between the West and China. Her songs are still heard today.

Tourism Taiwan’s status in the world, especially whether a nation or not, connects to its attracting visitors to Taiwan from abroad but also to Taiwan residents

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visiting elsewhere. Foreign tourists learn of Taiwan’s economic development and its political freedoms that to some degree are the targets of Taiwan’s propaganda of both a soft and hard type, though it is much more the former. Tourists from China are expected to learn about how life in Taiwan is free and pleasant and about other positive aspects of its democracy.163 Tourists from Taiwan going to China find out that it is a different place from what they were taught in school in the past and about China’s economic boom and its new and its increasingly important place in the world. Where did this start? During the period of China’s rule of Taiwan Chinese literati visited the island and wrote travelogues. During the Japanese colonial rule of Taiwan there were organized cultural tours to Taiwan that used guidebooks published on Taiwan. Some scholars in Taiwan wrote literary and other books for tourists.164 At the end of World War II, Taiwan did not welcome foreign tourists to visit the island because of the war in progress between Chiang Kai-shek’s armies and Mao’s Communist forces on the Mainland. After 1949, tourism was still discouraged. Tourists, the government thought, would create a security problem. There was little realization that considerable money could be made from tourists and that this revenue would help resolve Taiwan’s foreign exchange shortage. But this soon changed. In 1956, Chiang Kai-shek established a new policy regarding tourism. The year prior fewer than 15,000 tourists had visited Taiwan. Then the tourist industry took off, experiencing a growth rate of more than 23 percent annually for the next two decades. In 1976, more than one million tourists visited the island. Visitors provided Taiwan with considerable foreign currency and were a significant source of employment. They found Taiwan a place of beauty, with friendly people and cheap prices.165 In the mid-1980s, however, the rate of growth fell in part as a result of competition from China as a place foreigners wanted to visit and due to the fact that Taiwan had become expensive. Still, the number of tourists visiting Taiwan continued to grow, at about 10 percent a year. Almost two million visited Taiwan in 1988, and in 2006 Taiwan hosted an estimated 3.75 million tourists. In 2010, the number was 5.6 million.166 Early on by far the largest number of visitors to Taiwan was from Japan— more than one-third. Hong Kong was second; the United States was third. Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines followed in that order. Australia and several European countries trailed. This list did not change much in ensuing years except that the number of visitors from Hong Kong increased significantly. One important change, though, was that more of Taiwan’s citizens visited other countries, and in the 1980s outward tourism exceeded the number of visitors from abroad to Taiwan.167 Meanwhile, beginning in the early 1970s as a result of the rapprochement between the United States and China following President Nixon’s trip to China in 1972, Beijing launched an effort to attract visitors from Taiwan. It was, however, not until the end of the decade after Mao died and Deng

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Xiaoping took over the reins of political power and set new priorities on economic development and opening up that visitors from Taiwan went to China in meaningful numbers. At first the government in Taiwan did not sanction the visits. In fact, they were illegal; but the government did not enforce the law. Taiwan residents thus visited China informally. Most were Mainland Chinese who wanted to see their relatives. By 1987 there grew public pressure on the government in Taiwan to legalize the visits and President Chiang Ching-kuo did so that year. He perceived that banning visits played into the hands of advocates of independence. He also calculated that Taiwan’s prosperity and the fact China was still poor at this time would make residents of Taiwan realize that communism had failed and that the KMT had made Taiwan a different and better place than China.168 Almost immediately following President Chiang’s decision 10,000 people applied to visit China. Under Lee Teng-hui, who became president in late 1988 following Chiang’s death, Chiang’s policies were expanded and formalized. In 1992, it was estimated that three million people from Taiwan had visited China. The number included many Taiwanese who sought to learn about their family roots, singers, sports teams and, of course, many business people. Government employees were not allowed to visit China; but this changed in 1990. The DPP opposed the visits; but that did not last. Pressure then grew to allow direct travel to China rather than through another country or Hong Kong, and that happened.169 Notwithstanding the fact the pro-independence candidate of the opposition DPP, Chen Shui-bian, won the election in March 2000 and became president in May, and Chinese leaders castigated him, often in very strong language, for his views, cross-Strait crossings did not end. In fact, they increased. Many high officials that were KMT members visited China now that the party was out of power. Media representatives from the two sides established a more robust presence in each other’s big cities. High officials from China visited Taiwan. Business people made numerous trips. As a result investment from Taiwan into China doubled in 2000 and continued to grow fast after that.170 In late 2000, President Chen called for ending the ban on direct links and ordered Tsai Ing-wen, then head of the Mainland Affairs Council, to work out plans for mini-links (communications, travel and shipping) between Quemoy and Matsu and China. Symbiotic economic connections kept relations on track and human contacts became more frequent. In his New Year’s address in January 2001, President Chen spoke of the amalgamation of the two economies as the basis for a “new framework of permanent peace and political integration.” This gave rise to talk of a “cross-Strait common market.” China and Taiwan joining the WTO respectively in 2001 and 2002 furthered cross-Strait economic relations. At this time many observers saw the acceleration of economic ties leading to eventual political integration though the DPP saw this happening at a slow pace, if at all.”171

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In 2008, after Ma Ying-jeou was elected president, there was a significant increase in contacts with China, notably through tourism. This was partly the product of the government aggressively helping the tourist industry.172 Meanwhile there was a change in origin of the tourists visiting Taiwan—a marked increase in the number of visitors from East Asia, notably China. In 2010, of the 5.6 million tourists Taiwan received, four million came from East Asian countries and China accounted for the largest portion. That year 1.6 million Chinese tourists visited Taiwan adding $3 billion or 0.72 percent to Taiwan’s gross domestic product (GDP).173 Not only was the number of Chinese tourists the largest, they stayed longer and spent more, an average of eight days and between $230 and $300 per person per day.174 In 2011, the number of tourists from China visiting Taiwan increased further with a change in rules allowing them to visit as individuals or as families rather than in groups. In 2015, more than 2.5 million Chinese tourists visited Taiwan—55 percent of the island’s total. They were a major factor in Taiwan’s economic health especially through job creation.175 Chinese tourism facilitated various other ties and improved mutual understanding between Taiwan and China after years of separation. However, it also caused some feeling that Taiwan was over-dependent on China economically. Much poignancy was given to this latter argument when Beijing threatened to cut the number of its tourists by 95 percent during the 2016 election campaign (its leaders assuming Tsai and the DPP were going to win). Airlines, hotels, restaurants and other tourist-related industries promptly expressed fear of losing customers. In the wake of Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP’s election victories, Beijing warned of a reduction of one-third in the number of Chinese tourists going to Taiwan, suggesting this would seriously impact Taiwan’s economy.176 However, China did not cut the number of its tourist going to Taiwan as much as it suggested it might. Still it had a stinging effect on Taiwan’s economy, especially certain segments of it.177 Taiwan adjusted to some extent by increasing tourists from Southeast Asia and elsewhere; but they were not the big spenders the Chinese were.178 Given the interactions of Chinese tourists and residents of Taiwan, the responses of each about the other are revealing. The visiting Chinese note Taiwan has beautiful scenery, that its people are friendly and humble. They observe that residents of Taiwan are honest, candid, willing to talk about politics and they follow rules. They report that they notice they recycle, many are vegetarians and many are accepting of gays and lesbians.179 They also observe that Taiwan’s students are politically active, but are less focused on their studies. They comment that Taiwan’s population is homogeneous (it is 97 percent plus Han whereas China is 91 to 92 percent Han), Taiwan’s buildings and infrastructure are old, TV shows exaggerate events and life in China and are often naïve, Taiwanese have a much more favorable perception of Japan and Japanese than they thought. Some comment they see political ads everywhere. They mention that north and south Taiwan are very different.

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Reacting to Chinese tourists, Taiwan’s residents observe they are richer than they expected and spend more freely, they are fashionable, they are more normal and less radical or dogmatic than they thought they would be, they have a different view of history (though not ancient history), they are interested in Taiwan, and they are curious about Taiwan’s democracy (but do feel it will or should be copied by China). They are also confident and like their leaders and they feel China will ultimately be a dominant world power.180 Tourists visiting Taipei typically visit the National Palace Museum near Taipei to see the world’s largest collection of Chinese artifacts, antiques, jade, paintings and other historical objects. On display are many items the Nationalists took with them in 1949 that were treasures taken from the best museums in China. In fact, the government in China frequently accused Chiang Kai-shek of “stealing” China’s precious possessions. Ironically, many in Taiwan and elsewhere see this as a good thing as they would likely have been destroyed during Mao’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s and early 1970s had the treasures remained in China. Incidentally, returning the treasures was mentioned by the Chen Shui-bian administration if the KMT were made to dispose of its assets accumulated when it left China. But there was no public support for this. The Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall (renamed the National Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall during the Chen presidency but changed back to its original name later) is also very popular. Located in downtown Taipei, it is devoted to Chinese history and contains the National Theater and the National Concert Hall. Taiwan’s museums underscore the connections between Taiwan and China and increase respect in Taiwan for Chinese culture and learning. Another attraction is Taipei 101—from 2004 to 2010 the tallest building in the world.181 Taipei’s night markets are among the places most frequently visited by tourists. Both department stores and small shops are favorite places for travellers to purchase local goods. Taipei is often said to have the best restaurants and most varied cuisine anyplace in the world because famous chefs from all over China fled to Taiwan in 1949. Eating places in Taipei, in fact, serve food representing cuisine from nearly all areas of China. There are also many very good Japanese, Korean and Western restaurants in Taipei. One of the more exotic places in Taipei is Lungshan Temple; it is also one of Taiwan’s oldest. Nearby is “snake alley,” where one can see local showmen play with poisonous snakes and offer the daring observer the snake’s blood to drink (which is said to be an aphrodisiac). Visitors can also see habu-mongoose fights (the habu is a poisonous snake similar to the rattlesnake). (The mongoose usually wins.) In earlier days there were restaurants in the area that served dog, cat, snake, turtle and other unusual things; some of these eateries can still be found.182 North of Taipei is Yangmingshan Park, where there are hot springs, volcanic craters and waterfalls, as well as a good view of Taipei. South of Taipei, in Wulai, visitors can see waterfalls, mountains and Aboriginal entertainment provided by the Atayal tribe. In Yehliu, north of Taipei, one can view unusual

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rock formations made by the wind and the ocean, many of which look like gigantic mushrooms.183 Central Taiwan is famous for Sun Moon Lake, one of the most serene places anywhere, according to its many visitors. There is also Ali Shan (Mount Ali), Yu Shan (Jade Mountain) and a giant Buddha statue near Changhua. In the south is Tainan, the island’s oldest city, which has preserved forts from the Dutch period and has other interesting sights. Further south is Kaohsiung, Taiwan’s second-largest city, and nearby are the island’s largest Buddha, Moon World (where the landscape resembles the moon) and some beautiful beaches further south. In eastern Taiwan are Taroko Gorge, a marble-walled cliff, and other spectacular scenery.184 Visiting Taiwan at the time of national holidays is more interesting than at other times. The most important one is the Chinese New Year, also called Lunar New Year. It comes early in the year, but not on the same date each year, as it is determined by the lunar calendar. The Dragon Boat Festival is held in the summer, followed by Mid-Autumn Festival (or Moon Festival, again according to the lunar calendar) and Double Ten Day (or National Day) on October 10.

Notes 1 Ketagelan is the name of a tribe of Aborigines that once lived south of what is now Taipei. It is also the name of their language. 2 For details on Taiwan’s geography and the territorial claims made by the government of the Republic of China, see The Republic of China Yearbook 1994 (Taipei: Government Information Office, 1994), chapter 1. 3 See Worldometers (online at worldometers.info) viewed May 18, 2018. 4 The Republic of China Yearbook 1995, chapter 2. 5 The Republic of China Yearbook 2011, p. 23. 6 The Republic of China Yearbook 2016 (Taipei: Executive Yuan, 2016), p. 42 (online at english.ey.gov.tw). 7 For details, see Michael Hindley and James Bridge, “Disputed Islands,” Free China Review (August 1994), pp. 42–47. 8 Steven Lee Myers, “Island or Rock? Taiwan Defends its Claim in South China Sea,” New York Times, May 29, 2018 (online at nyt.com). 9 See Bill Hayton, The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014) for details. 10 Shang-su Wu, “South China Sea Ruling: A Boost for Cross-Strait Relations?” The Diplomat, July 16, 2016 (online at thediplomat.com). 11 For early details on this controversy, see John F. Copper, “The Fishing Islands Controversy,” Asia Quarterly (1972/1973), pp. 217–27. Also see “In Taiwan, a More Assertive Stance over the Disputed Islands” Stratfor, October 11, 2012 (online at worldview.stratfor.com). 12 “Unresolved territorial and maritime claims continue to hinder exploration and development in the East China Sea,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, September 17, 2014 (online at eia.com). 13 Tadashi Ikeda, “Getting Senkaku History Right,” The Diplomat, November 26, 2013 (online at thediplomat.com). 14 James R. Holmes, “Taiwan’s East China Sea Peace Plan,” The Diplomat, December 21, 2012 (online at thediplomat.com).

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15 Tom Miller, China’s Asia Dream: Empire Building Along the New Silk Road (London: Zed Books, 2017), p. 208. 16 Thomas E. Stolper, China, Taiwan and the Offshore Islands (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1985), p. 122. According to the author Premier Chou En-lai actually said this. 17 Lijun Sheng, China and Taiwan: Cross-Strait Relations Under Chen Shui-bian (London: Zed Books, 2002), pp. 80–83. 18 Nick Aspinwall, “6Km From China, Taiwan’s Kinmen Charts its Own Path,” The Diplomat, September 4, 2018 (online at thediplomat.com). 19 See Chiao-min Hsieh, Taiwan—Ilha Formosa: A Geography in Perspective (Washington, DC: Butterworths, 1964), pp. 2–4. 20 The Republic of China Yearbook, Taiwan 2002 (Taipei: Government Information Office, 2002), p. 17. Also see Hsieh, Taiwan—Ilha Formosa, chapter 6, for further details. 21 The Republic of China Yearbook, Taiwan 2002, p. 12 22 See W. G. Goddard, Formosa: A Study in Chinese History (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1966), pp. x–xi. 23 For a list of Taiwan’s rivers and their lengths and watersheds, see Taiwan Yearbook 2007 (Taipei: Government Information Office, 2007), p. 14. 24 See Karl Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Study in Total Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963). The author argues that China was a “hydraulic culture” wherein political power evolved into the hands of the government bureaucracy. 25 See Area Handbook for the Republic of China (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 9–12. 26 Daniel P. Reid, Taiwan (Hong Kong: APA, 1984), p. 24. 27 For details see Goddard, Formosa, chapter 4. 28 The Republic of China Yearbook, Taiwan 2002, p. 50. 29 The Republic of China Yearbook 2016, p. 41. 30 Area Handbook for the Republic of China, p. 13. 31 Ibid. 32 Taiwan Yearbook 2007, pp. 138–39. 33 Ibid., p. 137. 34 Area Handbook for the Republic of China, p. 13. 35 The Republic of China Yearbook 1995, p. 221. 36 See “Taiwan,” Wikipedia (online at http://wikipedia.com, viewed March 2008). 37 “Taiwan Population retrieving data…” World Ometers (online at worldometers. info), viewed January 2019. 38 At one time the number of troops stationed on Quemoy and Matsu was estimated to be more than the civilian populations. Now it is much smaller—perhaps 5,000 on the Matsu islands and a larger number on Quemoy. See A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia: A Challenge to American Policy (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), p. 413 and Thomas Vien “A Letter from Taiwan’s Cold War Runs,” Stratrfor, November 15, 2015 (online at stratfor.com). 39 Taiwan ranks number five in the world in the percentage of its surface covered by forest. See Asiaweek, December 7, 1994, p. 17. 40 China’s Yangtze River Delta and the Pearl River Delta, both in coastal southwest China, are very densely populated, as is Taiwan. See “Population Density,” Britannica Encyclopedia (online at britannica.com), viewed January 2019. 41 Area Handbook for the Republic of China, p. 14. 42 Ibid., p. 17. 43 Ibid. 44 “Taiwan’s Birth Rate Falls to the World’s Lowest,” Voice of America, August 16, 2011 (online at voanews.com).

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45 Sophie Tsou, “The Aging Population Needs to be Planned For,” Taipei Times, January 1, 2018 (online at taipeitimes.com). 46 “Life Expectancy in Taiwan Hit New High in 2017,” China News Agency, September 21, 2018 (online at roc-taiwan.org). The numbers were 77.3 for men and 83.7 for women. 47 “Editorial: Foreign Talent Not the Only Solution,” Taipei Times, August 13, 2018 (online at taipeitimes.com). 48 Ibid. 49 “Boy Trouble,” The Economist, January 21, 2017, p. 50. 50 Hungfu Hsieh, “Foreign Spouses Seen Taking up 18% of Marriages in ’07,” Taiwan News, January 21, 2008 (online at taiwannews.com.tw). 51 “Taiwan Eases Rules on Naturalization of Foreign Spouses,” Focus Taiwan, December 9, 2016 (online at focustaiwan.tw). 52 The Republic of China Yearbook, Taiwan 2002, p. 347. 53 Ibid. 54 See Taiwan Yearbook 2007, p. 28, for data on the number of foreign workers. 55 “Facts About Refugees in Taiwan,” Borgen Project, June 2018 (online at bor genproject.org). 56 Stacy Hsu, “KMT Blames Tsai Policy for Illegal Immigrants,” Taipei Times, December 27, 2018 (online at taipeitimes.com). 57 Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “China Wages ‘Big Bucks Diplomacy,’” CNN, June 19, 2002. 58 Lawrence Chung, “Is Beijing Offer of Residence Permits to Taiwan a Trick or a Treat?” South China Morning Post, September 29, 2018 (online at scmp.com). 59 “Urbanization at Full Speed,” Free China Journal, February 17, 1995, p. 4. 60 Wikipedia, citing CIA World Factbook, accessed March 2012. 61 “Population of Cities in Taiwan (2018),” World Population Review (online at worldpopulationreview.com), viewed in May 2018. 62 Wen-hui Tsai, In Making China Modernized: Comparative Modernization Between Mainland China and Taiwan (Baltimore, MD: University of Maryland School of Law, 1993), p. 129. 63 Hsin-yi Lu, The Politics of Locality: Making a Nation of Communities in Taiwan (New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 2. 64 The Republic of China Yearbook 1995, p. 34. 65 John Nobel Welford, “Pacific Islands’ Ancestry Emerges in Genetic Study,” New York Times, January 12, 2008 (online at http://lexisnexis.com). 66 “Austronesian Roots,” Taiwan Review, April 1, 2016. 67 Ibid. 68 The Republic of China Yearbook 1995, p. 34. 69 Oscar Chung, “Lasting Legacy,” Taiwan Review, May 1, 2018 (online at taiwa ntoday.tw). 70 The Republic of China Yearbook 1995, p. 34. 71 The Republic of China Yearbook, Taiwan 2002, p. 27. 72 The Republic of China Yearbook 1995, p. 36. See map. 73 Denny Roy, Taiwan: A Political History (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 12. 74 See Eugenia Yen, “Still Guests After All These (Fifteen Hundred) Years,” Free China Review (October 1993), p. 12. 75 Harry J. Lamley, “Subethnic Rivalry in the Ch’ing Period,” in Emily Martin Ahern and Hill Gates (eds.), The Anthropology of Taiwanese Society (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1981), pp. 28–318. 76 James W. Davidson, The Island of Formosa: Past and Present (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 561.

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77 This point is discussed in further detail in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. 78 See A. Doak Barnett, China on the Eve of Communist Takeover (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1963), especially Chapter 22. 79 “Ethnic Groups in Taiwan,” World Atlas (online at worldatlas.com), viewed May 2019. 80 Wen-lang Li, “Social Change in Taiwan and the Solution to Ethnic Problems,” United Monthly (May 19, 1987), cited in Hung-mao Tien, The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the Republic of China (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1989), p. 36. 81 Serena Yi-ying Lin, “Taiwanese Immigrants in the United States,” Migration Policy Institute, July 22, 2010 (online at migrationpolicy.org) and “Taiwanese Americans,” Wikipedia (viewed June 1, 2018). 82 Ibid. 83 Lu, The Politics of Locality, p. 15. 84 The Economist, June 2, 1990, p. 35, cited in ibid, p. 2. 85 Thomas B. Gold, “Civil Society and Taiwan’s Quest for Identity,” in Steven Harrell and Huang Chun-chieh (eds.), Cultural Change in Postwar Taiwan (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), p. 47. 86 Melissa J. Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese? The Impact of Culture, Power, and Migration on Changing Identities (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004), p. 2. The author provides a discussion of how to define culture and how that issue relates to Taiwan’s culture. See Chapter 6. 87 Area Handbook for the Republic of China, p. 2. 88 For further details, see James C. Hsiung (ed.), Contemporary Republic of China: The Taiwan Experience, 1950–1980 (New York: Praeger, 1981), part 1. Also see The Story of Taiwan (Taipei: Government Information Office, 2000). A very different view, namely that foreign cultures had very little impact on Taiwan, is presented in Area Handbook for the Republic of China. 89 Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese?, Chapter 3. 90 Ibid., p. 133. 91 Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese?, pp. 36–40. 92 Ibid., pp. 40–42. 93 John R. Shepherd, “The Island Frontier of the Ch’ing,” in Murray R. Rubinstein (ed.), Taiwan: A New History (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2007), pp. 107–13. 94 Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese?, pp. 43–53. 95 Ralph N. Clough, Island China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 175. 96 Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese?, pp. 53–56. 97 In fact, some writers suggest Japan’s influence on poetry and painting was large and encouraged a “Taiwan sentiment” and perhaps a revolutionary spirit. See Michelle Yeh, “Modern Poetry in Taiwan: Continuities and Innovations,” and Jason C. Kuo, “Painters of the Postwar Generation in Taiwan,” both in Harrell and Huang (eds.), Cultural Change in Postwar Taiwan, pp. 230 and 247. 98 The Republic of China Yearbook 2011, chapter 17. 99 See Edwin A. Winkler, “Cultural Policies in Post-War Taiwan,” in Harrell and Huang (eds.), Cultural Change in Postwar Taiwan, pp. 22–46. 100 Ibid. 101 Ibid. 102 See The Republic of China Yearbook 1988: A Reference Book (Taipei: Hilt, 1988), chapter 39. 103 The Republic of China Yearbook 2011, pp. 240–42. 104 Ibid., pp. 28–29.

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105 Syaru Shirley Lin, Taiwan’s China Dilemma: Contested Identities and Multiple Interests in Taiwan’s Cross-Strait Economic Policy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016), p. 27. 106 In 1983, Taiwan ranked 11th in the world in per capita movie attendance. Its rank dropped in subsequent years, however, as videotapes and other forms of entertainment became popular. See Asiaweek, December 14, 1994, p. 18. 107 For details about this and some of the changes in culture mentioned previously, see Thomas B. Gold, State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1986), pp. 130–134. 108 Han Lih-wu, Taiwan Today (Taipei: Cheng Chung Book Company, 1980), p. 185. 109 Ronald G Knapp, “The Shaping of Taiwan’s Landscapes,” in Rubinstein (ed.), Taiwan: A New History, p. 23. 110 The Republic of China Yearbook, Taiwan 2002, chapter 14. 111 Ibid., pp. 223–26. 112 “Highways,” Ministry of Transportation and Communications (online at motc. gov.tw), viewed May 2018. 113 Ibid. 114 Ibid. 115 For information on the development and status of Taiwan’s railroads, see Loren Aandahl, The Taiwan Railway: 1966–70 (Taipei, 2011), and Loren Aandahl, The Taiwan Railway: 1971–2011 (Taipei: 2012). Both were published by the author. 116 “Taiwan High Speed Rail,” Wikipedia (online at wikipedia.org), viewed January 25, 2008. 117 The Republic of China Yearbook 2011, p. 167. 118 “Taiwan Trains,” China Travel Grades (online at travelchina.com), viewed May 2018. 119 The Republic of China Yearbook 2011, p. 169. 120 “Taiwan Ports,” International Ports Corporation, Ltd., (online at internationalp orts.com), viewed June 2018. 121 “Sea Routes,” (online at searoutes.com), viewed June 2–18, 2016 122 Ibid., p. 168. 123 The Republic of China Yearbook, Taiwan 2016, (online at ws.ey.gov), chapter 10. 124 Ibid. 125 Ibid. 126 Ibid. 127 Duncan DeAeth, “Chunghwa Post Revealed Taiwan’s First ‘Digital Post Office’ with ‘Smart’ Assistant,” Taiwan News, April 16, 2018 (online at taiwannews.com.tw). 128 “FedEx Expands Service to More than 5,000 7-Eleven Stores Around Taiwan,” FedEx Newsroom, June 3, 2015 (online at about.vanex.com). 129 “Smartphones Take 62% of Taiwan’s Mobile Phone Market,” Want China Times, March 9, 2012 (online at http://wantchinatimes.com). 130 Ibid., p. 173. 131 “Internet World Stats,” (online at internetworldstats.com), viewed June 2018. 132 Tien, The Great Transition, pp. 196–97. 133 Area Handbook for the Republic of China, p. 221. 134 “Taiwan,” Freedom House (online at freedomhouse.org), viewed June 2018. 135 “Taiwan’s Press Freedom Best in Asia,” Focus Taiwan, April 25, 2018 (online at focustaiwan.tw). 136 See Gary D. Rawnsley, Taiwan’s Informal Diplomacy and Propaganda (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), pp. 106–07. 137 Tien, The Great Transition, pp. 196–97. 138 Ibid., pp. 197–200. 139 “World’s 100 Largest Newspapers,” World Association of Newspapers (online at wan-press.org), viewed June 15, 2012.

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140 The Republic of China Yearbook 2011, pp. 208–11. 141 Ibid., p. 208. 142 Lihyun Lin, “Taiwan,” Digital News Report 2017 (online at digitalnewsreport. org), viewed June 2018. 143 Tien, The Great Transition, pp. 197–201. 144 Ibid., pp. 201–04. 145 Ibid., pp. 97–98. 146 Taiwan Country Report on Human Rights, U.S., Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, March 8, 2006 (online at lexis-nexus.com). 147 The Republic of China Yearbook 2011, p. 211. 148 Ibid., pp. 214–15. 149 Ibid. 150 “Taiwan,” Press Reference (online at pressreference.com), viewed June 2018. 151 “Taiwan profile—Media,” BBC News, October 3, 2017 (online at bbc.com). 152 Ibid. 153 The Republic of China Yearbook 2011, pp. 216–18. 154 Chien-Jung Hsu, The Construction of National Identity in Taiwan’s Media, 1896– 2012 (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2014), pp. 210–11. 155 “Taiwan profile—Media,” BBC News, October 3, 2017 (online at bbc.com). 156 Harold Chang, Steve Chang, Daniel Cheng, George Chou, Paul Denlinger, Jessica Huang and Andy Unger, Republic of China: A Reference Book (Taipei: United Pacific International, 1983), pp. 251–52. 157 Area Handbook for the Republic of China, p. 137. 158 Sheng-mei Ma, The Last Isle: Contemporary Film, Culture and Trauma in Global Taiwan (London: Rowman and Littlefield International, 2015), pp. 1–2. 159 Ibid., pp. 248–50. 160 Olivia Yang, “Taiwan Knows What’s Wrong with Its Film Industry. So Why Isn’t It Changing?” The News Lens (LCLC Resource Center, Ohio State University), September 22, 2016 (online at u.osu.edu). 161 Patrick Frater, “Mainland China Opens its Door to Taiwan Films,” Variety, March 1, 2018 (online at variety.com). 162 Kylie Knott, “Theresa Teng: Five Things You May Not Know About Taiwanese Singer Remembered by Google Doodle to Mark her 65th Birthday,” South China Morning Post, July 20, 2018 (online at scmp.com). 163 This balances to some extent the negative views espoused in Taiwan about immigrants from China. See Lin, Taiwan’s China Dilemma, p. 51. 164 Lu, The Politics of Locality, p. 136. 165 Republic of China: A Reference Book, p. 197. 166 The Republic of China Yearbook 1989, p. 459. 167 The Republic of China Yearbook 2011, p. 260. 168 Ralph N. Clough, Reaching Across the Taiwan Strait: People-to-People Diplomacy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 23–24. 169 Ibid., pp. 24–32. 170 Ralph N. Clough, “Growing Cross-Strait Cooperation Despite Political Impasse,” in Donald S. Zagoria (ed.), Breaking the China-Taiwan Impasse (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), pp. 118–21. 171 Ibid., pp. 116–17 and pp. 123–25. 172 “Presidential Election: 2008,” Taipei Times, March 21, 2008 (online at taipeitimes.com). 173 Andrew Jacobs, “As Chinese Visit Taiwan, the Cultural Influence is Subdued,” New York Times, August 10, 1011 (online at http://nyt.com). 174 The Republic of China Yearbook 2011, p. 261. 175 John F. Copper, Taiwan at a Tipping Point: The Democratic Progressive Party’s Return to Power (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2018), p. 125.

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176 Ibid., pp. 151 and 156. 177 Nicola Smith, “China is Using Tourism to Hit Taiwan Where it Really Hurts,” Time, November 16, 2016 (online at time.com). 178 “Taiwan Woos Muslim Tourists as Numbers From Mainland China Fall,” South China Morning Post, February 18, 2018 (online at scmp.com). 179 “What Things Do Mainland Chinese People Find Surprising When They Visit Taiwan,” Quora, June 17, 2015 (online at quora.com). 180 Ibid. Many of these perceptions were offered to me when I queried people in the tourist business in Taiwan, and Chinese people who had visited Taiwan. 181 “History of the World’s Tallest Skyscrapers,” Emporis (online at emporis.com), viewed March 2009. 182 Insight Guides Taiwan (Hong Kong: Insight Guides, 2017), pp. 123–292. 183 Ibid. 184 Ibid.

2

History

Taiwan’s past, in other words its history, is often cited as giving evidence for both those who advocate that it is part of China, or should be, and those who argue otherwise and promote independence. In a number of ways both have a case. As noted in Chapter 1, studies of Taiwan’s prehistory based on the work of anthropologists and archeologists suggest there was human life on Taiwan thousands of years ago. However, the Aborigines are the first known inhabitants. Their origins were long thought to be Southeast Asia and/or some other parts of Asia including China. What is new is the view that the Aborigines migrated out of Taiwan to populate other areas in the world. Perhaps both are true in that sequence In any case, much later, in historical times, the Aborigines had contacts with China and other peoples in Asia and engaged in “foreign commerce.” For a brief period in the seventeenth century, Taiwan was a Western colony. It subsequently enjoyed a short span of self-rule before it was governed by China for more than 200 years and then by Japan for 50 years. At the end of World War II, Taiwan was returned to Nationalist China, but just four years later that government was deposed by the Communists and it fled to Taiwan, at which time Taiwan became the home of the Republic of China and, to many people, coterminous with it. For more than 20 years, until 1971 when Beijing obtained the China seat in the United Nations, Taipei represented China in international affairs. Since then, Taiwan has been diplomatically—though not in most other ways—isolated as a result of this and Beijing’s efforts to undermine its claim to sovereignty. During this time and for some time after, there were few contacts across the Taiwan Strait. Meanwhile, from the 1960s on, Taiwan’s economic success, followed by its rapid democratization and the growth of a local identity, made Taiwan a quite different place from China. Most of its residents perceived that separation was desirable; many believed it would be lasting. But, during the past three-plus decades, economic ties with China have proliferated, and, with China becoming a formidable economic and military power, this view has changed.

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One might say Taiwan now is separate from China politically as a result of democratization, yet booming commercial ties and, to a lesser degree, peopleto-people contacts in recent years, have made the two closer. With the decline of the United States, Europe and Japan, and China’s impressive rise, Taiwan’s future likely involves even more extensive contacts with China. What this means is still elusive.

Prehistory and Early History Evidence of human life on Taiwan dates back to the Paleolithic Age, 20–30,000 and possibly even 50,000 years ago. There is also proof that during the Neolithic period Taiwan possessed agriculture and nautical technology.1 This is before the Taiwan’s Aborigines were known to inhabit Taiwan. In any event, the Aborigines are the first people proven by historical records to reside on the island. Anthropologists long believed they hailed from Southeast Asia, perhaps via the Philippines, and are kin to the presentday Malay people who inhabit Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia. There are remarkable cultural similarities, and as many as two-thirds of the words in several of the Aboriginal languages are similar to Malay, even though the two peoples have had little or no direct contact in recorded history. There are also similarities in physical characteristics, social organizations and crafts.2 However, some scholars say the Aborigines migrated to Taiwan from China, having originally lived in what is now northern Myanmar, and are likely related to the Miao people in South China. They base this argument on the many linguistic and cultural similarities between the two groups and the fact that in the past crossing the Taiwan Strait was easier than it is today.3 An alternative view is that the Aborigines have several origins and some of their ancestors, perhaps two tribes, migrated from the north, from either Japan or northern China. Some myths seem to link them to one or two minority nationality groups in North China, and there are some cultural similarities with the Ainus, the original inhabitants of Japan. When the Japanese governed Taiwan, they advanced the theory that the Aborigines were of Japanese origin, and some Western anthropologists agreed. Some Mainland Chinese scholars say the Aborigines of Taiwan, or at least some of them, migrated from southeast China sometime around 1700 BC in search of better land.4 Still other scholars have suggested connections elsewhere, such as with India.5 Very recently, researchers, using DNA tests, have connected the Aborigines to the native populations in Australia, to New Zealand’s Maoris and to some inhabitants of the South Pacific islands, and advance the theory that Taiwan’s Aborigines are Australasians. Related to this view is the “out of Taiwan” theory, cited in Chapter 1, which holds that the Aborigines migrated from Taiwan to these places, not the other way around.6 This view has become much more popular in recent years, though it does not help resolve the question of who owns Taiwan: China or Taiwan’s residents?

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In any event, an examination of fossils, pottery and other artifacts in Taiwan has established some generally accepted information: that the Aboriginal population early on was fairly evenly distributed throughout the island; that their livelihood came from fishing, hunting and some shifting agriculture; that land was usually owned in common; and that the political and social systems were tribal. Also most Aboriginal groups were patriarchal and patrilineal; some, however, were matriarchal and matrilineal. The Aborigines had contacts several centuries ago with other peoples in East Asia. Nevertheless, some say genuine historical information about Taiwan’s Aborigines does not begin until the seventeenth century when the Dutch rendered some of their languages into a written form.7 There is mention of Taiwan in local Chinese records, which is quite natural inasmuch as the island is visible from Fukien Province on a clear day and travel to Taiwan by boat was possible more than two millennia ago. However, Taiwan was not often cited in the official Chinese historical writings that were essentially chronicles of each ruler or dynasty. When mentioned, early court records seem to indicate that Taiwan was not regarded as part of China.8 This view, of course, was to be expected, because early in its history China occupied only what is today part of North China, and the seat of the Chinese government was, throughout the centuries, usually in the north—a great distance from the part of China now adjacent to Taiwan. Furthermore, throughout most of its history and even in modern times, “China” was defined more by culture than by territory. Clearly Chinese governments did not propound the concept of territorial sovereignty or boundaries, as nation-states did in the West. Before the Han Dynasty (206 BC–AD 222), Taiwan was known in China as the land of Yangchow. During the Han and the Three Kingdoms period that followed, it was called Yinchow. The first official contact mentioned in Chinese historical records occurred in AD 239: the Chinese emperor at that time sent a 10,000-member expeditionary force to Taiwan, apparently to explore the island. This, Chinese leaders in Beijing now say, constitutes grounds for a legal claim to the island based on discovery.9 But no territorial claim was mentioned in Chinese court records, though this was to be expected, and no follow-up missions were sent. Moreover, at that time Taiwan was consistently referred to as an area “outside the pale of Chinese civilization.”10 Almost four centuries later, in AD 605, the Sui Dynasty emperor sent a second expedition to Taiwan. The leader of the mission brought back several Aborigines, who were taught Chinese. A more serious follow-up expedition sent six years later, accompanied by an interpreter, brought back considerably more information about Taiwan. Though there were no follow-up visits this mission has also been cited as the basis of a Chinese claim to Taiwan.11 After this, China sent no official expeditions or missions to Taiwan for some time. Some say this was because China did not seek colonies or the expansion of its territory across the seas. Taiwan’s Aborigines, meanwhile, having ceased to be seafaring, initiated few contacts with China. Outsiders

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visiting the island in ensuing years were mainly pirates from the Ryukyu Islands and areas on the China coast adjacent to Taiwan.12 If China’s historical visits to Taiwan were infrequent and established neither Chinese civilization on the island nor serious grounds for a territorial claim, the early migration of Chinese to Taiwan afforded a meaningful Chinese presence there and provides a strong basis for a legal claim by China based on history. On the other hand, records of Chinese moving to Taiwan were not thorough. For example, it is not certain when the earliest migration of Chinese occurred, whether they were Hakka or Fukienese, or even whether Chinese migrants preceded Japanese settlers on the island.13 It is thought Chinese farmers and fishermen resided on the Pescadores as early as the seventh century AD; anyway they were to be found on Taiwan before the twelfth century.14 By the thirteenth century, there were a significant number of permanent Chinese settlements on Taiwan, and Fukien Chinese were displacing Hakka from choice land.15 There were no Japanese or other settlers on the island. If Japanese had migrated to Taiwan earlier to settle there—as seems to have been the case—there was no evidence of them at this time. Also, notwithstanding the number of Chinese communities on the island, the Chinese government apparently did not know much about their emigration to Taiwan or did not consider it important; in any event, no records are to be found of it. As was noted in Chapter 1, throughout much of Chinese history, going to Taiwan was a violation of Chinese law. As a result, most who went there did not plan to return to China and did not contemplate claiming the island for China; they simply sought land and a better life in Taiwan. During the Yuan Dynasty (1263–1368), when the Mongols ruled China, Peking’s interest in the “eastern and southeastern seas” areas grew. The Pescadores were brought under China’s control, though Taiwan remained outside of Chinese (or, more accurately, Mongol) jurisdiction. Moreover, court records indicate that there was still confusion about whether Taiwan was part of the Ryukyu Islands to the north. Be that as it may, no mention was made of Taiwan’s being Chinese territory or a part of China. The main reason for this confusion was that the Mongols sought to conquer Japan, an ambition that prompted their expeditions to the Taiwan area. But failing in their invasions of Japan they lost interest in Taiwan.16 Meanwhile, Chinese and Japanese pirates and Chinese farmers wrested control of some parts of the western coastal plain areas of Taiwan from the Aborigines. Chinese also occupied some of the southwestern parts of the island. Japanese settlers, who had meanwhile reappeared on the island, held some northern coastal areas.17 In 1430, during the Ming Dynasty, the explorer Cheng Ho landed on Taiwan’s west coast and made contact with the Aborigines. His visit, however, was inadvertent: he had been shipwrecked there while returning to China from Southeast Asia. He obtained supplies from the Aborigines as well as herbal medicines that were said to have “miracle powers.” When he returned to China, Cheng provided the emperor with a written account of his experiences. Thus Cheng Ho’s visit is cited as proof positive for China’s claim to

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Taiwan. But there were no subsequent visits. Furthermore, Chinese historical records do not mention that Cheng Ho, other explorers or other visitors to Taiwan had contact with Chinese residing there. In ensuing years, Chinese court chronicles described Taiwan as a “base for pirates.”18 Having said all this, one must bear in mind that no other country has made a claim on Taiwan based on historical ties, and if one were to do so its claim could not seriously compete with China’s. Thus, if history is to serve as the basis for a territorial claim, China has the best case to make. Finally, it is important to note that there was no central political authority on the island historically to justify an argument that Taiwan was self-governing or that it had the attributes of a nation-state or even something that might have evolved easily into that.

Western and Chinese Rule In 1517, the captain of a Portuguese vessel sailing through the Taiwan Strait en route to Japan sighted Taiwan and wrote in the ship’s log the words “Ilha Formosa,” or beautiful island.19 This was the first Westerner’s encounter with Taiwan. But the Portuguese ship did not stop. Just over a century later, in 1622, Dutch forces landed on the Pescadores Islands and established a military presence there. They subsequently used the Pescadores as a base for monitoring ship traffic in the Taiwan Strait and harassing Portuguese trading vessels sailing to and from ports to the north and south. The next year, a local Chinese official signed a treaty with Dutch representatives granting Holland a post on Taiwan and other privileges in exchange for their withdrawal from the Pescadores. Chinese officials at this time suggested that China had jurisdiction over Taiwan but presented no real evidence to support this claim.20 In 1626, Spanish forces occupied Keelung and subsequently expanded their control to Tamsui on the northwest coast of Taiwan. Spanish colonial efforts were facilitated by an isolationist policy adopted by the Tokugawa Shogunate that led to the departure of Japanese settlers on Taiwan in 1628. Spanish settlers arrived, but Dutch forces drove them out in 1642. Shortly thereafter, the Dutch quelled Chinese opposition to their presence with the help of the Aborigines and established jurisdiction over the entire island.21 Taiwan economically and politically became a Dutch colony. It was governed by the Dutch East India Company, which claimed sovereignty over the island for Holland. The company rented land and farm implements to Chinese settlers and introduced oxen to till the fields, enabling the peasants to grow sugarcane and some other cash crops. Dutch East India Company rule led to an expansion of commerce on the island that included trade with merchants from China, Japan, and elsewhere in the region. The Company built castles, dug wells, conducted land surveys, created a writing system for the Aboriginal languages, and converted some of the population to Christianity. Though the East India Company exploited the island for profits, Taiwan experienced noteworthy modernization.22

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History

At the beginning of the Dutch rule, the Chinese population was small; the Aboriginal population was several times larger. Chinese immigration increased, however, and more Chinese became permanent inhabitants rather than seasonal workers. Most Chinese settlers on the island, however, did not willingly or readily submit to Dutch rule; in fact, they rebelled against Dutch authority in 1640 and again in 1652. Most of the Chinese inhabitants preferred to be governed by China or wanted self-rule.23 Another interpretation is offered by a Western scholar of Taiwan’s history. He suggests that the Dutch colonists worked with the “Chinese colonists” at this time. How so? Dutch officials had tried to bring in settlers from the home country and failed. So they established policies to attract Chinese, including offering tax breaks, free land and protection from the Aborigines. They did more. They prohibited guns; regulated weights, measures and exchange rates; enforced contracts and adjudicated disputes; and built hospitals and orphanages. In short, they created an environment attractive to Chinese who wanted to move to and invest in Taiwan.24 Meanwhile, China’s Ming Dynasty came under threat from the Manchus (a non-Chinese people who inhabited Manchuria northeast of China). In a lastditch effort to protect China from an invasion, Emperor Sze Tsung appointed Cheng Chih-lung, a pirate operating from a base in Taiwan, to command remnant Ming naval forces. Though successful in winning some important battles, Cheng Chih-lung failed to prevent a Ming defeat, and the Manchus established a new dynasty in 1644, the Ch’ing (Qing), which ruled China until 1911. Subsequently Cheng Chih-lung’s son, Cheng Ch’eng-kung (also known as Koxinga), born in Japan to a Japanese mother, inherited his father’s military forces. The Dutch at first saw him as a pirate of little consequence and allowed him to operate in areas of northern Taiwan. They even let him bring large numbers of Chinese, mostly refugees fleeing Manchu rule, to Taiwan to become his soldiers or to settle, or both. Cheng was thus able to raise an army of 100,000 men and an armada of 3,000 junks to fight the Manchus for more than a decade (from 1646 to 1658), at one point nearly capturing the city of Nanking. However, after repeated failures to oust China’s Manchu rulers, he was forced to limit his military activities to the coast of southern China.25 In 1661, having finally abandoned his efforts to re-establish the Ming Dynasty, Cheng Ch’eng-kung launched an attack on the Dutch stronghold of Zeelandia, near what is now the city of Tainan. With 30,000 men, he besieged forts that were defended by but 2,000 Dutch soldiers. After two years of fighting, the Dutch conceded defeat and reached an agreement with Cheng whereby they were allowed to peacefully evacuate. This brought an end to a generation of Dutch colonial rule of the island.26 Cheng Ch’eng-kung established a Ming-style government on Taiwan complete with a Chinese legal system, a court, scholars and advisers. Some say he established the first Chinese government on Taiwan.27 Cheng also promoted

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Chinese culture and religion. His rule, however, depended on the support of powerful local Chinese families; in this and other ways, his government resembled a feudal system more than it did the Chinese scholar-bureaucratic system. Moreover, because Cheng continued to regard the Manchu government as his enemy, he never established official ties with China. Cheng successfully encouraged the growth of the Chinese population in Taiwan, and in that way he made the island more Chinese. The Manchus inadvertently helped him in this effort. For a number of years, the government in China, fearing that Cheng might land forces on the China coast and seeking to preclude local support for him and his armies, ordered the evacuation of the coastal areas of China adjacent to Taiwan. This caused severe deprivation to numerous villages there forcing many inhabitants of coastal Fukien Province, bereft of their former livelihood from farming and fishing, to flee to Taiwan.28 Cheng promoted trade with Japan, the Philippines, Indochina, Siam and the East Indies. Because Taiwan had several of the busiest commercial ports in East Asia at this time, the island absorbed cultural influences from these contacts and, unlike most of China, became quite cosmopolitan. Still Cheng dreamed of restoring the Ming Dynasty, which he regarded as genuinely Chinese, and making Taiwan part of it. (Some historians saw history repeating itself in Chiang Kai-shek’s return to the mainland policy three centuries later.) Cheng’s undying desire to drive the Manchus out of China and restore the Ming involved a plan to establish control over the Philippines. On several occasions he sent representatives to Manila to meet with leaders of the Chinese population there. Worried about a rebellion, in 1661 the Spanish rulers massacred 10,000 Chinese inhabitants after which they sent a messenger to Cheng telling him they had killed all Chinese residing in the Philippines. A livid Cheng wanted revenge, but he died two years later, at age 38—some say of a heart attack precipitated by the news of the slaughter of the Chinese in the Philippines.29 Cheng no doubt would have accomplished much more, including possibly defeating Spanish forces in the Philippines, had he lived longer. In any event, for his accomplishments Cheng is acclaimed a hero in Taiwan. Historians in China regard him highly as well for his liberating Taiwan from Western colonial rule—the earliest instance of this in Asia.30 After Cheng Ch’eng-kung’s death, his son Cheng Ching, whose power base was in Fukien Province, vied with his uncle in Taiwan for the right of succession. The son, with superior military forces, coerced the armies of his father’s brother to surrender. A link between Taiwan and the adjacent area of China was formally established as a result. Cheng Ching, like his father, led several expeditions against the Manchus in his efforts to realize his, like his father’s, dream of restoring the Ming Dynasty. But, this came to naught. He then retreated to Taiwan, where he, too, died at a relatively young age.31 Following Cheng Ching’s death, the Cheng house was plagued by palace intrigue and internal dissension. Sensing an opportunity, the Manchu

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government sent a naval expedition to the Pescadores, where it destroyed the Cheng government’s fleet and set the stage for an assault on Taiwan. When its troops landed on the island, local military forces promptly surrendered, ending just over 20 years of Cheng family rule of Taiwan. During that time Cheng Ching had overseen agricultural, commercial and other developments in Taiwan but his attempt to make his son by a concubine his successor prompted a family feud and proved to be a mistake that finally ended the Cheng Dynasty.32 From 1683 to 1895, China governed Taiwan. For most of this time—until 1886—the island was administratively part of Fukien Province. Officials assigned to Taiwan, who were mostly Chinese rather than Manchus, were generally lazy, inefficient, and corrupt. They enforced laws and edicts with cruelty and generally disregarded the welfare of the population, prompting numerous uprisings and such political and social instability that Taiwan became known as “the land of rebellion and unrest.” From 1683 to 1843, there were fifteen major rebellions against the government.33 Official Chinese records during this period called Taiwan a “frontier area.” Nevertheless, Chinese, primarily from Fukien, continued to emigrate to Taiwan—even though during much of this period, specifically until 1732, the government officially prohibited it. Citing China’s general neglect of the island, not to mention the numerous revolts against Chinese authority, some scholars argue that China did not consider Taiwan to be part of China.34 One must keep in mind, however, that the Manchus ruled China at this time, and they, to some degree, feared the “Chineseness” of Taiwan, especially because it had been a base of anti-Manchu military operations under Cheng Ch’eng-kung and his son Cheng Ching. Also, in spite of poor governance, Chinese culture flourished on the island and the Chinese population increased quite rapidly. After 1800, a rapid increase in Western commerce in the area and Taiwan’s expanding exports and imports again prompted the Western powers to take an interest in the island. Another reason for the attraction to Taiwan was that, through the publication of several books about Taiwan by European authors, Westerners had learned much more about the island and its presence on the world stage.35 Finally, at that time ships became propelled by steam engines that burned coal, and Taiwan had coal. But it was not until the Opium War (that started in 1839) that the foreign powers’ desires to control Taiwan became seen as a serious matter in Peking, at which time Chinese forces on Taiwan were mobilized to defend the island against Western countries’ incursions. Subsequently, for strategic reasons stemming from Taiwan’s possible role as a base of operations in a broader war, the government of China paid greater heed to the island. Though concern over Taiwan on the part of Chinese leaders subsequently faded, events had generated an opinion among some Chinese officials that the island had strategic value to China, a view that was to be revived later with considerable consequence.36

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In ensuing years, Peking punished officials in Taiwan for mistreating British sailors who ran into trouble with local authorities, fearing London might use such incidences as a pretext for seizing and colonizing the island. In 1854, Commodore Matthew C. Perry urged the U.S. government to establish a presence on Taiwan. A few years later, Townsend Harris, the U.S. representative in Japan, suggested that Washington negotiate with officials in Peking for the purchase of the island. Because Peking consistently refused to accept accountability for difficulties foreign powers encountered in Taiwan, both British and U.S. officials concluded that China did not claim sovereignty over Taiwan or the Pescadores.37 Nevertheless, neither London nor Washington made a decision to colonize Taiwan. In the late 1850s, Keelung and Tamsui became important ports of call for Western ships. Accordingly, several European countries and the United States set up trading posts and consulates on Taiwan. Japan’s contacts with Taiwan increased, particularly after Tokyo made the nearby Ryukyu Islands part of Japan in 1879. On several occasions, the Japanese government protested the abuse of Japanese sailors shipwrecked on the coast of Taiwan; Peking’s authorities, as usual, denied responsibility. Again demonstrating China’s lack of attention to Taiwan, in 1869 the heads of several Aboriginal tribes signed treaties with the United States.38 China’s neglect of Taiwan, however, ended in the 1880s. When widespread rebellion broke out in southern China, the threat to Manchu rule there prompted officials in Peking to recognize anew that Taiwan was geopolitically important. Even the Imperial Court accepted this view after French forces blockaded and bombarded forts on the island during Sino-French hostilities over Indochina. Thus, in 1884, the government reorganized its political administration of Taiwan and appointed a capable official, Liu Ming-ch’uan, governor. Two years later Taiwan was elevated to the status of a province.39 Chinese rule under Liu Ming-ch’uan was efficient and enlightened. Liu built roads, railroads and harbors. He improved and modernized Taiwan’s economy and strengthened the island’s defenses. Taiwan prospered and its population developed better feelings toward China. Liu would have accomplished much more had it not been for jealous colleagues who saw him as a threat and had not the Chinese government recalled him precipitously.40 Still, historians in both China and Taiwan regard Liu Ming-ch’uan highly; today, he is one of Taiwan’s most renowned historical figures.

Part of the Japanese Empire In 1894, China and Japan went to war over their conflicting interests in Korea. Surprisingly to most observers, Japan won and won handily. Thus the Treaty of Shimonoseki that ended the war in 1895 contained, among various provisions, a phrase declaring that China ceded Taiwan and the Pescadores to Japan “in perpetuity.” Western powers viewed the treaty as legally binding and thus regarded Taiwan’s transfer to Japanese rule as legitimate.41

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When news of the treaty reached Taiwan, local leaders proclaimed independence and established the “Republic of Taiwan”—Asia’s first republic. But the effort was ill fated, and the new republic lasted but a short time. Part of the reason was that Taiwan had no central government to organize a meaningful effort to challenge Japan’s colonization plans. Similarly, there was no island-wide support for any of the several contending political or military leaders, as the island’s population was divided by ethnic and clan differences. Also of some consequence, many residents of Taiwan at the time despised the warlordism and banditry that plagued the island and felt that Japanese rule might bring an end to these problems. Finally, most residents felt that opposing Japan was futile. Still 150,000 men fought for what was a lost cause and many of them perished.42 The Chinese government did nothing to aid the resistance. China offered no support—not even recognition. In fact, during a formal ceremony in Keelung shortly after China signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki an official sent from Peking formally transferred governance over Taiwan to Japanese authorities. Most of the Chinese population in Taiwan thus gave up hope of help from China; many expressed bitterness about China’s “betrayal.”43 Within three years, the Japanese military was no longer needed to keep order in Taiwan. The international community was somewhat apprehensive about Japan’s colonizing effort because other countries wanted to continue to use Taiwan as a port of call. Not yet powerful enough to challenge the Western powers, even in Asia, Japan allowed foreign ships to stop in Taiwan and left Taiwan’s ports open to trade and other contacts. Coincidently many foreigners favored Japanese rule of Taiwan thinking Japan would modernize Taiwan and would reduce piracy in the area.44 As Japan’s first colonial effort, its rule of Taiwan was an experiment and its policies were often inconsistent. Some were contradictory. Partly explaining this, Japan’s Meiji constitution that launched its modernization efforts had been in effect for only six years when Japan acquired Taiwan. Also Tokyo was still in the process of negotiating an end to unequal treaties with the West. Finally, in terms of a philosophy of ruling Taiwan, Japan’s leaders had difficulty deciding between the French model of colonization, meaning assimilation, and the British model, that allowed its colonial subjects to retain their own culture.45 Even though Japanese leaders complained about population pressures at home and later rationalized Japan’s expansionist imperial policies by claims that Japan needed more space, they made no real effort to populate the island with Japanese people. Japanese leaders regarded Japan (in contrast to its empire) as sacred ground and the Japanese people as descendants of the gods; transplanting them to areas already populated with non-Japanese conflicted with these notions.46 Japanese colonial policy may be described as beneficial and progressive on the one hand yet discriminatory and predatory on the other. It was efficient and in many ways enlightened, but it did not lay the groundwork for self-rule,

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much less democracy. Some observers have described Japan’s intent as expansionist and militaristic from the outset, but such claims are difficult to substantiate.47 It seems more accurate to say these aims developed later in anticipation of World War II. In any event, Tokyo’s first objectives after it acquired Taiwan were to establish order and promote economic development. Both were seen as enhancing the power and prestige of Japan. Warlordism was eradicated, and law and order were established quickly, at first by the military and then an efficient police system. Decrees issued by Japanese colonial authorities amounted to criminal law and were applied retroactively, sometimes without legal precedent. Tribunals were used rather than civil courts, and capital punishment was employed frequently.48 In the economic realm, Japan’s first priority was to increase Taiwan’s agricultural productivity. Tokyo encouraged the cultivation of rice in the northern part of the island and sugar in the south. Rice was considered a staple, sugar a cash crop. Using new strains of rice and more efficient farming techniques, yields increased rapidly. By the 1930s, Taiwan produced twice as much rice as the population consumed. Nearly a million tons were exported to Japan annually, as well as about the same amount of sugar—or two-thirds of Taiwan’s crop. Food production increased to such a level that the consumption of meat, vegetables and fruits in Taiwan was higher than that of any province in China and even higher than in some parts of Japan.49 Meanwhile Japan expended considerable effort to upgrade Taiwan’s economic infrastructure. Before 1895, Taiwan had 30 miles of railroad; by 1905 it had 300, and 7,000 more were either planned or under construction.50 The Japanese constructed new roads and harbors, while communications facilities were built or upgraded. In 1903, hydroelectric generators went into service near Taipei, making Taiwan the first place to use electricity in Asia outside of Japan. Electrification spawned small industries, such as glass factories and paper mills, and made possible the mechanization of harbors. Tokyo standardized the monetary system, established banks and promoted uniform commercial practices, thereby transforming commerce from a barter system to one based on money.51 At the onset of World War I, Taiwan’s economy received a stimulant when Tokyo banned foreign enterprises from the island. New industries financed by Japan such as textiles, chemicals and machinery sprang up quickly. Then, in the 1930s, as a result of Tokyo’s expansionist policies, the Japanese government began promoting the development of heavy industries in Taiwan. In consequence, Taiwan’s foreign trade increased markedly. Taiwan’s enviable economic growth and its modernization not only helped Taiwan’s population, but it also served Japan’s interests. The island’s economy was linked to Japan’s, just as European nations tied their colonies to the metropolis. Before World War II, 90 percent of Taiwan’s exports went to Japan. For Tokyo, Taiwan’s economic growth was proof of Japan’s enlightened colonial policies; for Taiwan, it was very beneficial, including a

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favorable balance of trade with Japan, though it increased the island’s economic dependency on Japan.52 Early on the Japanese set about to improve public hygiene in Taiwan. The island, which had been known as the pesthole of Asia, became second only to Japan in the region in terms of sanitation. By the early twentieth century, bubonic plague had been eradicated, cholera was rare and smallpox was much less widespread. Incidences of dysentery and malaria were drastically reduced. All these diseases remained rampant in China.53 By 1925, the average resident of Taiwan lived 13 years longer than 15 years earlier.54 Japanese rule also brought social change. Taiwan’s educational system was improved markedly. The island’s literacy rate, technological skills and knowledge of world affairs soon exceeded that of any part of China or, for that matter, any other part of Asia outside Japan. Laws and customs that kept lower socioeconomic groups perpetually in debt were banned. Political governance was less enlightened but efficient. Japanese colonial governance was facilitated by pao chia, a system of common responsibility which divided the Chinese population into groups of 100 households each and made the head of each group accountable for the behavior of those families under his authority. This person in turn held each family head accountable for the conduct of that family. Informants and severe punishments ensured effective Japanese control. Social policies were somewhat more democratic before the 1930s when the military grasped control of the Japanese government, though there was still little evidence that Taiwan was heading toward self-rule or democracy.55 The Aborigines were outliers to most of the changes the Japanese brought and proved difficult to control and incorporate into Taiwan’s society. In October 1930, on one occasion they openly rebelled against Japanese authority and killed the governor and 196 other Japanese. Subsequently the colonial government was generally successful in disarming them and forcing them to give up headhunting, though even as late as the 1940s many Aborigines were not completely “pacified” because the Japanese could not effectively police all of the mountainous areas in Taiwan. In fact, strong resistance by the Aborigines to Japanese rule led to Japanese colonial authorities simply ignoring parts of central Taiwan.56 Japanese policies had other drawbacks. Japan’s social reform policies, although generally progressive, were carried out with little thought or understanding of Taiwanese customs or feelings. Educational policies forced Taiwanese to learn Japanese; neither standard Chinese nor the Taiwan dialect of Chinese was taught in school. Taiwanese students were encouraged to study medicine, engineering, science and technology-related subjects, but not law, politics or any of the social sciences.57 Regarding Taiwan’s status, Japan’s governance of Taiwan brought positive change to the island such that the question of whether Taiwan was historically or legally part of China did not occur to most people. To the majority of residents, unification with China was not desirable and anyway was not going to happen.

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World War II Most historians mark 1931 as the starting point of World War II in Asia. Following the Mukden Incident (a crisis orchestrated by the Japanese Army) Japan seized the area of northeast China known as Manchuria and made it part of the Japanese empire the following year, naming it Manchukuo. This alienated China but also America, which sympathized with China. In fact, it was said to be the prelude to growing ill feeling toward Japan on the part of both, and war that eventually followed.58 If that event was not enough, Japan’s invasion of “China proper” in July 1937 following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, whereupon Chinese and Japanese troops clashed, led to fullscale war between Japan and China. As a result of the war with China, Japanese policies vis-à-vis Taiwan underwent considerable rethinking. The colonial government faced a serious dilemma regarding its philosophy and its style of ruling Taiwan. Many Japanese officials advocated tough policies, thinking that the population of Taiwan opposed Japanese rule. Many assumed the island should remain a colony of Japan indefinitely. Others considered Taiwan’s colonial status to be temporary and pushed for a different approach, called the Formosa Home Rule Formula. Still others proffered a policy called kominka, or “assimilation.” Kominka had official support, but, because most Japanese opposed granting equality to Taiwan’s population, an absorption policy was carried out only half-heartedly.59 In Taiwan, the Chinese population meanwhile formed some organizations that advanced local political participation. In 1935, after Lin Hsien-t’ang and his Home Rule Association had for several years advocated the transfer of political power to a locally elected assembly, Tokyo announced establishing an elected government in Taiwan. But this applied only to local units of government, and Japanese colonial officials retained veto power over important decisions. Still, an election was held, and some democratic change was in evidence. Progress toward democratic rule, however, was reversed a year or two later when Japanese politics became dominated by the military and as Japan headed for all out war with China.60 In 1936, in the lead-up to war with China, Japan’s colonial governors in Taiwan once again became military officers. The next year, when war broke out with China, martial law was put into effect in Taiwan. The Japanese navy referred to Taiwan as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” and began to use it as a military staging area. Large numbers of Japanese troops were stationed in Taiwan and trained there. There was a relevant context to what transpired at this time: the global economic depression of 1929 hit Japan very hard, it being a nation dependent upon trade, including it importing many critical natural resources. In fact, this was one of the main reasons for it seizing Manchuria. Japan also had to respond to protectionist tariffs in Europe and the United States and because of this redirected its trade to Asia, especially to its empire. Taiwan was, of

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course, impacted by the depression, but it also benefited from Japan’s new trade policies. By the mid-1930s, for Taiwan the economic travails had passed and the growth of many sectors of the economy was setting new records. Also, new industries were started and prospered.61 Meanwhile, well before 1937, the Chinese population of Taiwan for the most part had forsaken their ties with China and saw little reason to reestablish them. Most supported Japanese rule or at least had accommodated to it. There had been no meaningful protest in Taiwan to Japan’s taking and colonizing Manchuria in 1931 or to its open warfare with China in 1937. Those for whom Japan’s invasion of China was a problem or those who felt strong ties to China were allowed to return to China. Few did so.62 Many Taiwanese worked in war-related industries or in other ways abetted the Japanese war effort.63 Many Taiwanese volunteered for military service. Their defection rate was low, and there was little or no protest against military life. According to one source, 207,183 Taiwanese were conscripted into the Japanese military; 30,304 were casualties during the war.64 A large number of Taiwanese fought in combat in China (including in Nanking, where they participated in atrocities against Chinese civilians). In 1941, Taiwan was the site from which Japanese forces launched the invasion of the Philippines and other offshore countries to the south. On the economic front the early days of the Pacific War were good for Taiwan economically. Many of Taiwan’s newly created industries prospered as a result of their vital role in supplying the Japanese war machine. The downside of the war was more strict social and political controls. Many Chinese were forced to take Japanese names. Christian churches saw many of their activities supressed. Taiwan was put on a wartime footing in many ways.65 In 1944, as Japanese forces retreated in the Pacific, Japan’s colonial authorities readied the population of Taiwan for U.S. attacks and, eventually, an invasion. Taiwanese served in units that prepared to defend the island. As it turned out, U.S. forces limited their military actions to the bombing of oil storage depots in addition to some infrastructure and military targets. There was no saturation bombing or targeting of population centers. In fact, Taiwan was spared the war damage that Japan and many other parts of East Asia suffered. There were shortages of many goods, but Taiwan was much more fortunate than other parts of East Asia.66 The U.S. Navy had discussed plans for invading Taiwan but soon abandoned the idea. U.S. military strategists possessed few good maps of the island and, more important, realized that the Taiwanese were unlikely to rebel against their Japanese colonial rulers and would instead battle U.S. forces to help defend the island.67 To avoid the possible embarrassment of fighting local Chinese, the United States instead invaded Okinawa, the largest of Japan’s Ryukyu Islands, leaving Taiwan generally unscathed. As the war drew to a close, inasmuch as Chiang Kai-shek’s forces played a special role as a wartime ally of the United States, Chiang was afforded the opportunity to request that “territories occupied by enemy forces since 1937

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or 1939,” as stated in the Atlantic Charter and as suggested by Winston Churchill, be returned to China. But Chiang also included lands taken from China by Japan during the Sino-Japanese War, which included Taiwan. Before this Chiang had not made a serious effort to claim that Taiwan belonged to China, as witnessed by the fact that the constitutions written in 1925, 1934 and 1936 did not list Taiwan as a province of China. Moreover, “lost territories” cited in Sun Yat-sen’s Three People’s Principles included all or parts of Korea, Vietnam, Burma, the Ryukyu Islands, Bhutan and Nepal. Taiwan was cited but was accorded no special status.68 In any event, it was the policy of the United States and its allies formulated during the war that Japan could not keep its empire, and that policy covered Taiwan. At the Cairo Conference in December 1943, the United States and the United Kingdom reached an agreement with Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek to the effect that Taiwan would be put in the category of territories “stolen” by Japan and that Taiwan “shall be restored to the Republic of China.” This agreement was reaffirmed in the Potsdam Declaration in July 1945 when Japan’s defeat was imminent and again in September when Japan surrendered. Yet Taiwan’s legal status remained undecided pending the signing of a formal peace treaty.69 In the fall of 1945, Japanese—one-eighteenth of Taiwan’s population— departed the island. This large contingent of Japanese included most officials of the colonial government, the military, the police, businessmen, many professional people and some farmers. Chiang Kai-shek sent military forces to keep order and officials from the government of the Republic of China to replace the Japanese colonial administration. Thus Japan surrendered Taiwan to Chiang’s forces and the island was returned to China. Indeed, there was no other feasible choice. The Cairo agreement said this and it was confirmed in the Potsdam Declaration (even though both were wartime declarations; neither was a formal treaty). At this time Mao’s forces were capable of little more than launching guerrilla operations in the interior of China.70 Not unhappy that Japan was defeated, or at least fully accepting it as reality, Taiwan’s population welcomed the arrival of Nationalist Chinese officials. More important, most of the population was tired of war and looked forward to peace. They were obviously also pleased to see the end of colonial rule. A large number of citizens wanted democracy and self-rule. Some wanted to restore family ties in China.71 Nevertheless, many residents of Taiwan were apprehensive about the future. A small minority in Taiwan advocated independence. A few suggested that Taiwan should become a United Nations trust territory. Some proposed that Taiwan should be a territory governed by the United States.72 Others wanted guarantees about the island’s future status should it become part of China again. In fact, Taiwanese who participated in the surrender ceremony asked for a provision giving “special status” to Taiwan because the island had been a Japanese colony for 50 years and, therefore, was dissimilar from China in

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many ways.73 The United States was in control of the situation; but the American public wanted its troops to come home while the government focused more on problems in Europe than in Asia. Taiwan was thus destined to share in China’s turmoil and civil war. If asked what Taiwan’s population wanted, they were divided, or better put, confused. Some wanted independence (though most were not sure what this involved). It seemed an ideal more than a real choice. Many thought of becoming a province of China; but they did not know what this entailed. Many thought about democracy, but Taiwan was not ready for that. Chiang Kai-shek and his people wanted to make the island’s population loyal to the Republic of China yet also sought to limit their political activities to local politics.74

Part of China Again On October 25, 1945, subsequently celebrated as Retrocession Day, Taiwan officially became a part of the Republic of China. But it was not made a province of China as residents had expected. Similarly, no efforts were made to establish a democratic government. Chiang Kai-shek appointed a friend, Ch’en Yi, governor of Taiwan and gave him the same kind of near-absolute power the Japanese colonial governors had enjoyed.75 Making matters worse, Ch’en, along with many of the Mainland Chinese soldiers sent to Taiwan at the time of the Japanese evacuation, regarded Taiwanese as traitors for not having opposed Japanese rule. Ch’en and his Mainland Chinese administration, as well as the military, also perceived that the Taiwanese had been tainted for 50 years by what they considered inferior Japanese culture. Finally, few Mainland Chinese soldiers or officials spoke Taiwanese, and few Taiwanese spoke Mandarin Chinese, China’s national language. Although some Nationalist soldiers and administrators hailed from Fukien Province and spoke the dialect from which Taiwanese was derived, even that did not guarantee good communications. In any event, Ch’en wanted Taiwan to forthwith “become Chinese.”76 The Nationalist Chinese government and the Nationalist Party soon came to be seen by many Taiwanese as a carpetbag regime, much the same way that the South in the United States viewed the harsh post-Civil War rule imposed on it. Disappointed that they had little voice in the political decisionmaking process and finding the Mainland Chinese by no means fair or likable, the Taiwanese came to see the Nationalist government as no better than its predecessor and, in many important ways, much worse. They had expected better.77 More important to what transpired than the political and cultural factors were Taiwan’s economic well-being, public health standards and social order, all of which deteriorated badly. Nationalist Chinese leaders were preoccupied with civil war in China and did not regard Taiwan’s problems as critical. Thus public and even private buildings were stripped of machines, tools and

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sometimes plumbing—anything metallic—to send to the Mainland. Food shortages developed when large quantities of grain were commandeered to feed Nationalist armies fighting the Communists. Public health services almost ceased to function, causing outbreaks of cholera and bubonic plague. Rumors then spread that Nationalist soldiers had brought these diseases to Taiwan. Public works were allowed to fall into disrepair, and the education system declined badly.78 Just as the Mainland Chinese perceived the Taiwanese as traitors lacking Chinese culture, the Taiwanese perceived the Mainlanders as dirty, dishonest and technologically backward. Stories circulated about Mainland Chinese who stole bicycles and did not know what they were and about others who spent hours staring at elevators they had never seen before. Plainly, Mainland Chinese officials were unable to maintain basic public services, including power plants, trains and buses, largely because of their lack of technological expertise. The Taiwanese also had to adjust to a new legal system. Nationalist soldiers often claimed ownership of houses and land based on forced occupation; the Taiwanese considered this theft. Many laws were not enforced or were done so unfairly.79 The ill feelings between the two groups came to a head on February 28, 1947, when plainclothes police officers killed a Taiwanese woman who had been selling black-market cigarettes to make a living. An angry mob formed and threatened the police, whereupon they fired into the crowd, killing four people. Widespread civil disobedience, and what seemed to some to be a rebellion, erupted, an event now known as er er ba (or 2-2-8, for the second month, 28th day).80 Most historians blame “evil” Governor-General Ch’en Yi for the incident. But that is too easy. Although Ch’en could speak Japanese and Taiwanese, he refused to use either language in conducting affairs of state. He expected Taiwanese to learn Mandarin Chinese, which older Taiwanese could not do easily. He also ruled as a traditional Chinese official—by example rather than by contact with the people. Trying to govern in a moral way, Ch’en sought to maintain social order with only a fraction of the police and troops Japan had employed. And, though he was generally hardworking and principled, many of his subordinates were lazy, corrupt and incompetent.81 Another factor was that Ch’en’s agenda for Taiwan included creating a socialist economy with considerable state control, which the local population opposed and was clearly a mistake.82 Finally, instead of taking action to defuse social unrest in early 1947, he temporized. Worst of all, he treated complaints and protest as pro-Communist, even though Taiwanese had virtually no connections with (or even much knowledge of) the Communists on the Mainland or anywhere else.83 During the protest or rebellion (there being disagreement about which it was), Taiwanese killed or injured a large number of Mainland Chinese, including many unarmed, innocent civilians. In some instances, they beat or killed anyone who did not speak Taiwanese, including Hakkas. The killing

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and the virulent opposition to the government looked like a rebellion to Nationalist authorities in China, even though what was happening in Taiwan was by no means well organized. In any case, on March 8, 1947, a large contingent of Nationalist Chinese troops arrived and used their weapons with little restraint against unarmed Taiwanese. Whether the uprising and the killing of Mainland Chinese was the reason or if Chiang Kai-shek was already thinking he may need Taiwan as a safe refuge, in any case he lost the war in China to Mao.84 Though official reports of this incident don’t mention this, it seems that the troops acted out of vengeance for the killing of their fellow Mainland Chinese. In any event, the Nationalist government felt what happened in Taiwan was an unwanted distraction, one that helped the Communists in China with whom they were engaged in a life-and-death struggle. By the end of March order was restored, but not before thousands of Taiwanese had been killed, including many of Taiwan’s potential political leaders.85 Chiang Kai-shek briefly turned his attention from events on the Mainland to Taiwan after the February 28 incident. He removed Ch’en Yi from his post, along with a number of other high officials. He made Taiwan a province, rescinded military rule and appointed some Taiwanese to top positions in the government. Various government monopoly enterprises were sold, and efforts were made to alleviate unemployment. However, serious damage had already been done to the Nationalist government’s credibility and Taiwanese hatred of both the government and Mainland Chinese would not soon subside. The event also made many Taiwanese think more highly of Japanese rule than they would have otherwise.86 In ensuing years, seldom was there mention of what happened in February and March 1947. The government’s policy was to erase the incident from public memory. However, with democratization in the 1970s and 1980s, and particularly with the end of martial law, opposition politicians began using er er ba as a rallying call. The government subsequently changed its stance and, with the help of scholars, launched an investigation into what happened and why. In 1992, a detailed report was published on the incident.87 Yet many politicians would not let the issue die and frequently sought to exploit it. On the other hand, Taiwan’s new political parties and even their factions differed sharply over whether February 28 should be made a holiday and/or a day of mourning and whether statues or buildings should be built in remembrance. Finally, in 1995, on the 48th anniversary of er er ba, President Lee Teng-hui, following the erection of a monument in Taipei’s New Park, issued a formal apology on behalf of the government to the families of victims. Taipei’s mayor, Chen Shui-bian, representing the opposition party, subsequently announced that the park would be renamed “2-2-8 Peace Park” and that February 28 should be “peace day.” Lawmakers meanwhile passed a bill to provide compensation to victims’ relatives and made February 28 National Memorial Day. In 1997, February 28 was made a national holiday.88

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After Chen Shui-bian became president in 2000, he and the DPP used the event in election campaigns and on other occasions to unite supporters against the KMT. At times this worked well, but often the DPP seemed to overreach while it sometimes appeared their leaders were unaware that Taiwan’s youth did not know of er er ba from direct experience and didn’t care about it as much as their parents.89 As president, Ma Ying-jeou visited the 228 Peace Memorial Park every year on February 28. He honoured the victims in other ways. However, many DPP supporters considered this less than sincere. Tsai Ing-wen referred frequently to 2-2-8 during the election campaign of 2016 as did DPP candidates. In fact, 2-28 was a prop in the DPP’s campaign to unify its voters and get them to the polls while bringing up an issue the KMT found difficult to deal with.90 Chinese leaders at the time the event occurred hailed it as a revolutionary movement that was anti-KMT. For some time China’s position was that the incident was inspired by Mao’s call for a “high tide” in the Chinese revolution. Chinese officials also sought to use it as a background to call for peace talks, convince residents of Taiwan that they could not depend on the United States, and that the Taiwan Strait was not an obstacle to China liberating Taiwan.91 But that view changed at the time Lee Teng-hui was president; Beijing then began seeing it as anti-China and pro-independence in spirit. China’s top officials have pretty much espoused this view since.

Taiwan as the Republic of China By late 1949, Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist forces had been defeated in most of China by Mao Tse-tung’s (now spelled Mao Zedong) Communist armies. Chiang and a portion of his military and government fled to Taiwan, where they hoped to regroup and counterattack. With that Taiwan had to absorb more than 1.5 million people at a time when the economy was in dire straits and social conditions were going from bad to worse. The influx of people thus aggravated an already stressed economic infrastructure as well as relations between the Taiwanese and the Mainland Chinese. Chiang ordered Ch’en Yi to be executed in public and purged the government and the Nationalist Party of the most corrupt and incompetent officials. But these actions, while sincere and in some ways effective, had but a marginal effect toward improving relations with the local population.92 However, in spite of their dislike of the Mainland Chinese and the government, and the fact that Chiang Kai-shek had little credibility internationally, most Taiwanese saw no choice but to accept Nationalist rule. The likely alternative was worse. Few Taiwanese wanted to be governed by the People’s Republic of China: communism was in no way attractive, philosophically or otherwise. Moreover, Mao had no organization or base of support in Taiwan, and consequently he had no means of launching an effective movement against Nationalist rule. To “liberate” Taiwan, Mao would have to invade the island.93

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Mao’s People’s Republic of China laid legal claim to the island after the Nationalists were defeated (based on the argument that it was a successor government to the Republic of China), though the Chinese Communist Party had earlier spoken of Taiwan as destined to be part of Nationalist China after Roosevelt, Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek had declared at the Cairo Conference that once Japan is defeated Taiwan would be returned to China.94 This, however, contradicted Mao’s earlier statements about Taiwan as if it were not part of China. In fact, Mao had put Taiwan in the same category as Korea and other would-be “friendly territories” on China’s periphery. Even in the late 1940s, Mao expressed no interest in Taiwan and made no effort to launch a Communist insurgency movement there. He apparently believed that the success of his revolution would eventually persuade all of Asia—particularly areas or countries near China—to adopt communism, and in this context territorial issues did not matter.95 Meanwhile, in 1928 the Taiwan Communist Party was formed in Shanghai affiliated with the Japan Communist Party. In its “political program” there were references to a “Taiwan nationality,” a “Taiwan revolution” and “Taiwan’s independence.” One Chinese writer said this was part of the Chinese Communist Party’s platform from 1928 to 1943.96 Yet conclusions about Taiwan’s legal status at the end of World War II seemed academic; the island’s future would be determined by military might. Accordingly, in the spring of 1950, Mao formulated plans for an invasion of Taiwan. However, because the Nationalists had taken with them much of the Chinese navy as well as the large ships of the merchant marine, this required using thousands of small boats. So, in water holes in Fukien Province, Mao trained his soldiers to swim well because they would have to reach Taiwan’s shore after being dropped from boats a mile out. But many of Mao’s troops became infected with a liver fluke found locally in the soil, forcing a delay of the invasion plans by a few weeks.97 In the meantime, war broke out in Korea. The United States, having abandoned Chiang Kai-shek in January, now reversed course and President Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait to shield Taiwan from an invasion. Thus Mao’s plan to seize the island was put on hold.98 Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT quickly took advantage of the respite from war. With the United States guaranteeing the island’s security, Chiang implemented various kinds of political reform to create a more honest and efficient government. In particular, he took steps to rid the government and the ruling party of corrupt, lazy and incompetent officials. Chiang also organized elections and made other efforts to democratize Taiwan’s political system at the local level.99 Because of the Korean War and China’s role in it, and owing to Chiang Kai-shek’s adamant stance against communism (not to mention the considerable support Chiang and the Nationalists once had, and again enjoyed, in the United States), Taiwan became a valued member of the Western bloc. With the polarization of the world into two camps and because the Republic

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of China continued to represent China in the United Nations and most other international organizations (which regarded the government of China with hostility and vice versa), Taipei occupied a center stage role in the East–West struggle.100 In the ensuing months and years, however, the Nationalists’ hopes of reconquering the Mainland faded and Nationalist leaders began to think of Taiwan as a permanent home. Furthermore, they felt they were needed in Taiwan, where political leadership and administrative talents were lacking. Finally, they saw they had a chance to redeem themselves and prove that their ideology was superior to communism. Meanwhile, many Taiwanese began to realize that their animosity toward the KMT and the government had to be put aside if Taiwan was to survive and prosper. As time passed, this attitude became more and more prevalent.101 With the benefit of a period of peace for the first time in two decades and with the help of U.S. economic and military assistance, Chiang Kai-shek instituted new plans aimed at promoting economic development. The first, and one of the most important, was land reform. It was a resounding success—so much so that it still provides a model for other countries to study and emulate. It and Taiwan’s overall successful economic development plans, both of which were overseen by U.S. aid advisers, made Taiwan a showcase of U.S. foreign aid and improved Taiwan’s economic situation as well as the Nationalist government’s image in the international community.102 Although the U.S. military shielded Taiwan from an invasion by Mao’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), U.S. policy makers also sought to prevent the Nationalist Chinese from trying to destabilize Mao’s government on the Mainland and thereby starting a conflict that might drag the United States into a war with China or the Soviet Union, or both. Keeping the two sides apart was not easy. Two crises erupted, in 1954 and 1958, over the Offshore Islands (the island groups of Quemoy and Matsu, which Communist forces had failed to take in 1949 and which had remained in Nationalist hands). Mao apparently saw an opportunity to test U.S. resolve. In response, Washington demonstrated its mettle by supplying Nationalist forces on the islands and even threatening to use nuclear weapons against China.103 Chiang Kai-shek took the position, not unlike that espoused by the United States, that China was “captive” of the Soviet Union. Within the U.S. government, this attitude persisted until the Nixon administration, even though relations between Moscow and Beijing showed clear signs of strain during the Kennedy and Johnson presidencies and China’s external policies changed such that Chinese leaders were more accommodating to the West and the world order. Neither Kennedy nor Johnson heeded these signs.104 President Nixon, realizing he had to get the United States out of the Vietnam War and cognizant of the fact that America was losing an arms race with the Soviet Union, pursued a rapprochement with China. Mao was receptive. Nixon thus succeeded in adopting a new U.S. relationship with China. For Taiwan this was traumatic.105 The details are instructive.

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By most accounts Chiang Kai-shek’s government failed to adjust to Nixon’s new China policy and this partial thaw in the Cold War. Some historians in Taiwan, however, contended that changing course at that juncture would have separated Taiwan from China permanently. Others said that adopting a policy of separation, or a one-China, one-Taiwan stance, would have stimulated premature demands for democracy, which would have evoked political instability and ethnic conflict. Those who advocated an independent, sovereign Taiwan say it was an opportunity missed.106 In any case, the People’s Republic of China won the struggle to represent China in world affairs in the 1970s. Taiwan, however, in one respect was made ready for change. By the mid1960s, after successful land reform and the beginning of its industrialization, Taiwan was poised for an economic take-off. In 1964, U.S. aid to Taiwan stopped. Almost simultaneously, Taiwan’s economic growth further accelerated. Over the next two decades, Taiwan could boast of the world’s fastestgrowing economy. Economists since have observed that U.S. aid helped Taiwan’s economic growth get started and that its termination forced Taiwan to stand alone, which it did very successfully. Little more than two decades of Nationalist rule had made Taiwan far more prosperous than it had ever been.107 In the meantime, economic development fostered social progress in manifold ways. Taiwan also became permeated by foreign influence and culture, especially as trade increased and the population and government came to realize that economic prosperity depended on exports. Taiwan, as a consequence, became much more open and cosmopolitan; this happened at a time when China was becoming more inward-looking and increasingly hostile toward the rest of the world.108 Also with economic growth, democracy began to bud. The Nationalist government had for some time encouraged democracy only at the local level where the Nationalist Party operated as an intermediary among hostile Taiwanese factions. Now Nationalist Party leaders believed they could institutionalize democratic politics and apply it to the central government in the future—though gradually and when Taiwan was ready for it. Many Taiwanese felt that democracy at the local level would eventually work its way to the top. These opposing views did not cause conflict; rather they provided two paths to democratization that could be reconciled.109 With economic and political change as well as a better understanding of the world, the myth that the Nationalists represented the people of China and that Mao’s government was a temporary outlaw regime could not be sustained, even though Mao persistently threatening Taiwan reinforced the Nationalists’ unwillingness to deal with China. Earlier Chiang Kai-shek said publicly that realizing the goal of returning to the Mainland “would be 70 percent political.” This statement and the Nationalists’ inability to oust Mao from power (and they made no serious efforts to do so after the early 1960s) told many observers that the government, tacitly at least, accepted the reality of two Chinas.110

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The U.S. escalation of the Vietnam War after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in August 1964 resuscitated the bipolar structure of world politics in Asia and increased U.S. support for Taiwan. Also, in 1965 Mao launched the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which turned politics in China quickly leftward and resulted in the self-imposed isolation of the People’s Republic of China for several years. Both played into the hands of those in Taipei who resisted change and new policies.111 But the events that gave the KMT a respite from pressures to reform were not to last. In 1969, relations between the governments in Washington and Peking (by now written Beijing) changed course as a result of U.S. efforts to disengage from Vietnam and an escalation of Sino-Soviet border hostilities. A rapprochement between Washington and Beijing, former archenemies, was mutually advantageous and was soon on the agendas of both governments. In 1971, National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger visited Beijing and arranged for President Nixon to go there the next year in what was to become a watershed shift in U.S.–China relations.112 That same year, largely as a result of the thaw in U.S.–China relations, the People’s Republic of China was admitted to the United Nations and the Republic of China expelled. Taipei was to no longer represent China in international affairs. Subsequently, Taiwan’s government suffered the loss of diplomatic ties with most of the nations with which it had formal relations, including almost all of the important nations of the world.113 From that juncture on Taiwan was isolated internationally at the formal diplomatic level. It managed to compensate for that to some extent by expanding informal relations and pragmatic diplomacy while it made efforts to present itself as a democracy that provided for its population and treated them well and thus deserved to determine its own future. In February 1972, President Nixon visited the People’s Republic of China, where he signed the Shanghai Communiqué and engaged in talks that anticipated an epoch making rapprochement between the two countries while anticipating the establishment of diplomatic relations soon. This historic breakthrough in U.S.–China relations was a shock to Taiwan, but it was not as ominous as many in Taiwan had anticipated. Nixon treated the “Taiwan issue” with deliberate ambiguity. The United States did not abandon Taiwan. While the credibility of the government and the ruling Nationalist Party were hurt, it could have been much worse. Leaders in Taipei did not seriously lose public support at home because they had, after all, engineered Taiwan’s miracle economic development. In addition, most observers in and outside of Taiwan took the view that little could have been done to prevent what happened.114 Across the Strait it was evident Chairman Mao’s health was declining and soon it would be learned that Zhou En-lai, Mao’s trusted right hand man and China’s top diplomat, had incurable cancer. Moreover, at the time Chinese leaders were more seriously at odds with the Soviet Union and worried about that relationship. The situation in China may explain what Mao said. According to

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Secretary of State Kissinger, he declared he did not want Taiwan, at least at the moment. Kissinger even reported that Mao had told him that “its better to have Taiwan under the care of the United States.” Mao also said that “a hundred years hence we will want it.”115 In April 1975, Chiang Kai-shek passed away. His death symbolized the end of the Nationalists’ hope of ruling China—if anyone still espoused any optimism about this. The next year, Mao died, putting an end to the personal duel between two leaders that had been so much a part of China’s modern history.

Taiwan Ruled by Chiang Ching-kuo Following President Chiang Kai-shek’s death, Vice President Yen Chia-kan became president in accordance with provisions in the Republic of China’s Constitution. But Chiang Kai-shek’s eldest son, Chiang Ching-kuo, premier since 1972 and head of the Nationalist Party, and who enjoyed the support of the military and the police, became Taiwan’s de facto ruler.116 (Taiwan’s political system that divided power between the president and the premier was vague on this point, and Yen’s acceptance of Chiang Ching-kuo’s leading role and Yen being a “temporary president” made this arrangement work.) In 1978, at the end of Yen’s term, he declined to seek re-election and Chiang Ching-kuo was nominated and elected president.117 Chiang Ching-kuo was not schooled in democratic traditions or representative government. In his youth, his father had sent him to the Soviet Union, where he joined the Communist Party, supported Leon Trotsky and married a Russian woman. Nor had he championed political reform during most of his political career in Taiwan. However, he clearly realized the need for Taiwan to shed its authoritarian political system if it were to sustain its rapid economic growth and maintain important political ties with the democratic West. He also understood that only through political change—meaning democratization—could Taiwan heal the wounds of ethnic ill will, parry Beijing’s overtures to negotiate unification and win support from the international community.118 Chiang Ching-kuo lived by his convictions. In the early and mid-1970s, he recruited younger and better educated Taiwanese into the party and the government and implemented various important reforms. As president, he quickly launched an anti-corruption campaign that was taken seriously by those both in and out of government, especially after he jailed a number of high government officials for corrupt practices—including some of his own relatives. Ordering government offices to publish their telephone numbers and answer citizens’ requests, Chiang compelled officials to be responsive to the public and act as true “servants of the people.” Most applauded his actions and supported his efforts to build good government.119 CCK, as Chiang was called fondly by many, made frequent visits to the countryside to talk to farmers and ordinary citizens. Privately, he maintained

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an austere lifestyle, eschewing publicity and praise from his officials. His demeanor won him broad respect at home and good press abroad. He became a truly people’s president.120 But oftentimes CCK had to force political change upon the ruling party and government by edict. In short, he brought democracy to Taiwan by quite disparate means. Many people felt the change CCK implemented was long overdue, democracy having been envisioned by Sun Yat-sen and set forth in the Constitution. But some thought he moved too quickly. Nevertheless, in retrospect most perceived that no one else could have modernized Taiwan’s politics as effectively as CCK did.121 On the economic front, CCK kept Taiwan GDP growing at a rapid rate. He launched a number of massive infrastructure projects to ensure that Taiwan’s impressive economic development would be sustained. The cost was $50 billion over a period of nine years. The projects included a shipyard in Kaohsiung, a freeway, a railroad network and a seaport at Suao. A new airport at Taoyuan, an integrated steel mill, a petrochemical project, a nuclear power plant and more followed this.122 Notwithstanding a spate of good news Taiwan was dealt a diplomatic shock that set back progress in its democratization in December 1978. President Jimmy Carter, without warning, announced that the United States would sever diplomatic ties with Taipei effective January 1, 1979, and end their defense treaty a year later. President Carter also acknowledged (in negotiations with Beijing) that there was only one China—the People’s Republic of China. These actions mirrored a major change in U.S.–China/Taiwan policy.123 Although Taiwan was inured to difficult situations, loss of official ties with its only important friend and a defense pact with its protector constituted a severe blow. Some observers at the time said the events were portentous: Taiwan was now illegitimate and isolated in the international community and would be compelled to become part of China. Others, however, said that President Carter’s actions had been anticipated.124 But, President Carter did not handle the events adroitly, even saying when he announced the decision, thinking the microphone was off, that he anticipated “massive applause” for what he had done (which was not the case). Plus members of Congress were upset that there were no prior consultations about a major shift in U.S. policy. So Congress acted and in April 1979 reversed Carter’s China/Taiwan policy in some important ways through a law called the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). The TRA restored relations with Taiwan to a near-official level. Most important, it included provisions that provided Taiwan with credible U.S. security and economic guarantees.125 Beijing, preoccupied by a war with Vietnam while the TRA was being debated and reluctant to disturb China’s new and valuable relationship with the United States, reacted to Congress’s action with only token protest. Later, however, Deng Xiaoping made calculated efforts to undermine the legislation. He also declared that he would not renounce the use of force against Taiwan— a position still held by the Beijing government today.126

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Losing diplomatic relations with the United States on the other hand made CCK even more determined to press ahead with democratization. Meanwhile, opposition forces became more active when they realized how grim Taiwan’s diplomatic situation had become. They perceived that only profound political change, meaning rapid democratization, would save Taiwan from being isolated and absorbed by the People’s Republic of China. The opposition’s efforts throughout 1979 climaxed in December with a protest demonstration in the southern city of Kaohsiung that resulted in widely publicized violence. At that point, public opinion, which had previously supported the activists’ proposed reforms, turned in favor of the government as most residents feared chaos. The government jailed some of the demonstrations’ leaders but negotiated further democratic change with others. Reforms discussed included revising Taiwan’s election law and reaching some gentlemen’s agreements between the government and the opposition so that a competitive and democratic national election could be rescheduled.127 In 1980, Taiwan held an unprecedented election. Some observers said it was CCK’s creation. Some also noted Taiwan was rebuffing Beijing’s overtures to negotiate reunification by pushing democratization. In any event, it was the most open and exciting election Taiwan’s voters had seen.128 In 1983, Taiwan held its second national democratic election. Again the KMT performed well. Some critics said it should have, given its advantages in talent, money and control of the media. Others said the opposition was too radical and, furthermore, had not learned the art of campaign politics. As a consequence of this second democratic national election, CCK and the Nationalist Party became more confident and more willing to continue implementing democratic reforms.129 In 1984, CCK was re-elected president of the Republic of China, even though there were questions about his health. He picked a new vice president, Lee Teng-hui, who was seen as highly competent, loyal to CCK and the Nationalist Party, and also committed to democratic reform. Lee was soon considered CCK’s heir. Because Lee was Taiwanese (though Hakka), his rise seemed to mark the beginning of the power transition from Mainland Chinese to Taiwanese.130 Seen in retrospect, it was. In early 1986, at a Nationalist Party’s Central Committee meeting, CCK called for several major reforms in government. These included restructuring the parliament, getting rid of martial law and allowing new political parties to form. In October, in a widely heralded interview with Katharine Graham, owner of the Washington Post, President Chiang repeated—some say formalized—these promises.131 This paved the way for the first two-party election ever held in Taiwan. In December of that year, the newly formed Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) vied with the ruling Nationalist Party for seats in the Legislative Yuan (the law-making body of government) and the National Assembly. Performing well in spite of genuine competition, while nominating mostly Taiwanese candidates, the Nationalist Party again burnished its image and expanded its

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mandate to rule Taiwan. It was clear that the days of a one-party dictatorship in Taiwan were over and that the Nationalist Party would lead a democratic Taiwan. Meanwhile, President Chiang announced that none of his relatives would hold a position of political prominence after his death. He also took steps to ensure that the military would not play a significant political role in Taiwan after his demise. Also Vice President Lee Teng-hui was being groomed to become president. In July 1987, Chiang Ching-kuo seemed to put the final touches on political modernization by abolishing martial law. At the same time, trying to ameliorate ethnic differences, CCK noted that he had lived in Taiwan for 40 years and should, therefore, be counted as Taiwanese.133 At the time President Chiang terminated martial law, the public did not strongly believe that it should end. Many felt it contributed to social stability and economic growth and should be kept. However, the Western media gave this decision more applause than it had given to anything else President Chiang had done. Thus it markedly improved both CCK’s and Taiwan’s global image. Also the termination of martial law subsequently had a salutary effect on the exercise of civil and political rights and made Taiwan’s media free from military oversight and censorship. A few months later, CCK ended the ban on travel to China by Taiwan’s citizens, thus paving the way for economic and other contacts between Taiwan and China that would grow and have a deep and lasting impact on Taiwan.134 In retrospect, one of the most salient questions about the Chiang Chingkuo era is: Did CCK engineer the separation, or further split, of Taiwan from China? He had always advocated a one-China policy. His roots were in China. Yet he brought democracy to Taiwan and that furthered separation. Some say he sought to create a model for China and saw democratization in China as the key to bringing the two together again.135 CCK’s biographers treat him as a great leader who understood the times and who acted with integrity and with the interests of the citizens of Taiwan at heart.136 Future historians will no doubt see him as the leader who launched Taiwan’s “political miracle” and kept Taiwan’s “economic miracle”— launched by his father—on track. Public opinion surveys indicate he is the most highly regarded among Taiwan’s presidents.137

Taiwan Under Lee Teng-hui When Chiang Ching-kuo died in January 1988, Vice President Lee Teng-hui succeeded him as president according to the Constitution and CCK’s wishes. Lee was born in Taiwan in 1923 when it was a colony of Japan. He attended Kyoto University in Japan but returned to Taiwan after the war and graduated from National Taiwan University in 1948. In 1953, he enrolled in graduate study at Iowa State University and in 1968 was awarded a PhD in agricultural economics from Cornell University.138

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He returned to Taiwan and was hired by the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction that oversaw Taiwan’s land reform. In 1978, he was appointed mayor of Taipei and in 1981 governor of Taiwan. In 1984, President Chiang Ching-kuo made him his vice president and heir apparent. He became Taiwan’s eighth president in 1988—Taiwan’s first “Taiwanese president.” However, “old guard” members of the party aligned against Lee to block him from assuming too much power. At an emergency meeting of the Nationalist Party, Lee was made temporary head of the ruling party. Top party leaders feared that Lee, who was locally born, would advance Taiwanization too fast and would threaten the status of Mainland Chinese who ruled Taiwan. On the other hand, they could not dispute Lee’s competence or the fact that he was CCK’s chosen successor. A motion to have a rotating party head was voted down, and Lee became the party’s undisputed leader.139 Lee indeed symbolized an end of the Mainland Chinese minority’s hold on political authority. Lee also concerned Chinese leaders in Beijing that feared negotiating Taiwan’s reunification would be much more difficult as a result of democratization and a Taiwanese president.140 Meanwhile the opposition, in particular the DPP, perceived that the speed of democratization was still too slow. Interest groups and new political parties were also seeking a bigger role in the political processes. So, too, protest had become part of Taiwan’s political process. In May 1988, farmers took to the streets to demonstrate, as other groups had been doing at the rate of about 150 per month. Seventeen hours of riots resulted in extensive property damage and injuries to more than 500 people. This reflected the new political climate in which Lee Teng-hui had to function.141 A few months later, the Nationalist Party held its Thirteenth Party Congress. Lee was officially elected chairman of the party, enabling him to further consolidate power. Lee was popular and the democratization of party rules accomplished at the meeting worked in his favor.142 Yet these changes also meant that he did not have the kind of control over the party that CCK had and that party infighting and factional struggles were going to become serious problems for Lee. After the party congress, President Lee picked a new cabinet. For the first time, most were Taiwanese. Lee, however, chose the popular Lee Huan, a Mainland Chinese, to be his premier, thereby keeping a balance of Mainlanders and Taiwanese at the top.143 In March 1990, although challenged briefly by the duo of a popular Taiwanese politician, Lin Yang-kang, and Chiang Wei-kuo (Chiang Kai-shek’s second son and CCK’s half brother), Lee Teng-hui was elected to a new sixyear term.144 Those who opposed him did so for a variety of reasons, saying that he was dictatorial, that he was advancing democracy and Taiwanization too fast, and that he had difficulty filling CCK’s shoes. His supporters said his detractors were simply opponents of democracy. In any case, Lee’s popularity remained high.145 In May 1989, Taipei supported (though not with money, weapons or material help) the student-led democracy movement in China. Soldiers killing

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students and others in or near Tiananmen Square that followed in June damaged China’s global image severely. President Lee met and talked with students in an open forum to signal Taiwan was different—and democratic. Yet Taiwan did not cut its ties with China, realizing that trying to isolate China was neither feasible nor in consonance with the New World Order. Many perceived Taiwan and China alike were members of a “Greater China,” or Pacific Rim bloc, in an era of global economic blocs.146 In the summer of 1990, President Lee called a large “constitutional style” meeting named the National Affairs Conference to discuss various political reforms, including the direct election of the president and the mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung, the reorganization of the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan, fixing the relationship between the president, the premier and the cabinet and a host of other issues. More than 13,000 political figures attended. Most of the suggestions broached at the meeting were realized including terminating the temporary provisions, pressuring the retirement of the senior parliamentarians and amending the Constitution.147 The following March, the National Assembly met to amend the Constitution. Delegates to the National Assembly would henceforth serve for four years, the Control Yuan would become a semi-judicial body, and the provincial governor and the mayors of Taiwan’s two metropolitan areas would become elected officials. Other reforms followed, including the abolition of the Taiwan Garrison Command, which had been responsible for censorship and tight control of the population and was a symbol of a past repressive government.148 In 1991, Taiwan also embarked on a new Six-Year Development Plan, which its leaders hoped would catapult Taiwan into the top 20 nations in the world in per capita income by the end of the century. In April, Lee lifted restrictions on civil and political rights, and in so doing, positioned Taiwan to democratize even faster. In December, after the elder politicians agreed to retire, the electorate picked delegates to a new National Assembly. This was Taiwan’s first non-supplementary—or plenary—election. The Nationalist Party performed well, receiving, according to some observers, a democratic mandate it had never before enjoyed. The scope of the victory also aided President Lee and his party in their efforts to make further constitutional changes and extend reforms into the realm of systemic change.149 Its push for reform notwithstanding, the Nationalist Party did not perform well in the Legislative Yuan election in December 1992. The party was divided along ethnic lines and over the issue of relations with China. Some said the KMT’s problems were President Lee’s fault. Yet his popularity did not suffer. Lee subsequently formed a new cabinet and replaced his Mainland Chinese premier, Hau Pei-tsun (who had succeeded Lee Huan and with whom Lee had been in considerable disagreement), with Taiwanese Lien Chan.150 Meanwhile, a political rapprochement between Taipei and Beijing appeared increasingly likely. President Lee had formally ended the state of war with China and investment funds from Taiwan were pouring into China (surpassing

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even those from Japan and the United States). Also people from Taiwan were crossing the Strait in large numbers to visit and to do business. In April 1993, Taiwan and China held preliminary but official talks to normalize relations. Called the Koo-Wang talks, these negotiations resolved some problems that were part of the five decades of hostility between the two sides.151 In August, the Nationalist Party held its Fourteenth Congress amid party infighting and concern about future election defeats. Factionalism had become a serious problem for the KMT; in fact, several members of the nonmainstream faction of the party, a group made up mostly of Mainland Chinese who perceived that President Lee supported an independent Taiwan, left the party to form the New Chinese Party (later renamed the New Party). As a result, President Lee’s party lost members, but he increased his control over the KMT. Then party rules had been changed so as to give increased authority to members of the party who were elected to high office, notably legislators; some competed with Lee for influence in the party.152 In 1994, the Republic of China’s Constitution was amended again. One amendment provided for the direct election of the president and vice president (instead of election by the National Assembly). Following this, in early 1995 President Lee announced that he again would be a candidate for president. Shortly after that, in June 1995, as part of Taiwan’s (created by Lee) “pragmatic diplomacy,” Lee made a controversial trip to the United States at the invitation of his alma mater, Cornell University. The visit incensed Chinese leaders in Beijing who then ordered missile tests in the Taiwan Strait. Beijing conducted even more provocative tests, including firing missiles armed with live warheads close to Taiwan’s two biggest ports during the run-up to Taiwan’s 1996 presidential election. In response, President Clinton dispatched two aircraft carriers, each with accompanying ships, to the area, thereby placing Washington in a face-off stance with Beijing.153 Needless to say, on-going talks between leaders in Beijing and Taipei were put on hold. Thus the first campaign for a direct election of Taiwan’s president and vice president took place amidst a crisis: the possibility of a conflict between the United States and China. The tension no doubt worked in President Lee’s favor. In March 1996, the electorate gave Lee another term. The event was widely acclaimed by the media both in Taiwan and abroad as the first real election of a chief executive in 5,000 years of Chinese history. Also it was a big victory for Lee and Lien Chan (Lee’s vice presidential running mate), the ruling Nationalist Party and democratization American-style in Taiwan.154 But Taiwan’s political system remained under considerable stress. To resolve systemic political problems that resulted from multiparty politics and an increasingly pluralistic society, President Lee convoked another grand meeting in December 1996, this one called the National Development Conference, to fix some of these problems. Delegates recommended more constitutional changes, some of which were made in mid-1997. One of them, the virtual elimination of the provincial government, was the most debated. James Soong, Taiwan’s first elected governor (in 1994), tendered his resignation in displeasure

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after the conference. Lee and Soong became enemies, and this, together with crime and corruption worsening, meant that Lee’s image suffered.155 The United Kingdom’s transfer of Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China in July 1997 created another problem for President Lee. According to Chinese leaders in Beijing, Taiwan was next. President Lee rejected Beijing’s reunification proposals and its “one country, two systems” formula for uniting China. He asserted that Taiwan was not a colony and could, moreover, defend itself.156 That same year Taiwan weathered the storm of the so-called Asian economic meltdown and experienced quite normal economic growth in 1998, though its currency floated downward a bit. In the meantime economic problems elsewhere provided Taiwan with better opportunities for investment in the region. Economic stability, among other factors, explained the Nationalist Party’s good performance in the December 1998 election. The ruling party made gains in the law-making body of government, and Ma Ying-jeou recaptured the Taipei mayorship for the KMT from the opposition DPP’s Chen Shui-bian.157 In 1999, President Lee, during an interview with a German radio station, stated that relations with China must be considered as state-to-state or “special state-to-state relations.” Some observers said that Lee was in essence declaring Taiwan legally independent, although others said he was simply clarifying what was obvious. Alternatively, Lee may have been responding to President Bill Clinton’s “three no’s” (no two Chinas; no one China, one Taiwan; no to Taiwan’s joining international organizations that assume statehood for membership) statement made when he visited China in 1998. In any event, leaders in Beijing were incensed at Lee’s proclamation and harshly criticized him. Some said China–Taiwan relations were deeply and perhaps permanently scarred as a result.158 Lee left office in 2000 having been president for 12 years. It was a period in Taiwan’s history chocked full of important cum historic events in terms of internal politics, relations with China and the United States, and much more. Lee clearly left his mark. He departed a controversial figure; yet most felt he showed competence in dealing with difficult problems at a time of transition in Taiwan.

Chen Shui-bian’s Taiwan The year 2000 marked the beginning of not only a new century but also a new millennium and events that followed in Taiwan were accordingly big and historic. There was a rotation of ruling parties for the first time. Taiwan acquired a new and very different president. Taiwan was affected socially, economically and politically very profoundly and in many ways permanently. It was certainly a turning point.159 The backdrop is instructive. In March 2000, Taiwan held its second direct presidential election. President Lee Teng-hui was in his mid-70s and decided

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not to run again. Chen Shui-bian of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party won the election and was inaugurated as the fifth president of the Republic of China in May. Chen was made from a different mold than past presidents—young, poor, having little experience in the national politics and possessing no foreign experience to boast about. He also espoused a radical stance on Taiwan’s status—independence.160 Chen Shui-bian was born in 1951 in Tainan in southern Taiwan of a very humble family. He excelled in middle school and high school and attended Taiwan National University, graduating first in his class from its law school. He rose in politics after serving as a member of the Taipei City Council from 1981 to 1984 and the legislature from 1989 to 1994. In 1994, he was elected mayor of Taipei. In 1998, Ma Ying-jeou defeated him when he ran for another term. However, this turned out to be fortuitous as it gave Chen time to prepare to run for president in 2000.161 Meanwhile Chen defended Annette Lu in court when she was charged with helping to organize the Kaohsiung Incident of 1979. He was subsequently convicted of slander and served a short stint in jail—which as an opposition politician was a badge of honor. In 1986, he was a founding member of the DPP. In 1991, he founded the Justice Alliance “faction” in the party although he endeavored to avoid factionalism and worked to end such differences in the party.162 How Chen won the election was telling. President Lee supported his vice president, Lien Chan, for the ruling Nationalist Party’s nomination. Lien was eminently qualified; indeed, his experience easily exceeded that of the other candidates. Born into a famous local family, Lien had earned a PhD in political science at the University of Chicago. He returned to Taiwan and, a few years later, became the youngest minister in Taiwan’s history. He subsequently served in several cabinet positions, was governor of Taiwan, premier and vice president. Lien was Fukien Taiwanese by virtue of his father’s ethnicity (though his mother was Mainland Chinese). He had close contacts with both Taiwanese and Mainland Chinese in the party and the government. Notwithstanding the many factors that favored Lien’s candidacy, Taiwan by this time had evolved into a popular mass democracy, and Lien was not so much a man of the people.163 James Soong was, and his popularity ratings were much higher than Lien’s (or Chen’s). Soong was also highly qualified: a PhD from Georgetown University, name recognition from several years of heading the Government Information Office and experience as the party’s secretary-general. He was also the first-ever elected governor of Taiwan. Soong wanted the nomination and, like many others in the party, felt he should get it. But President Lee opposed it. Some said that Lee didn’t want a non-Taiwanese president; others cited different reasons. In any case, Lee prevailed, the KMT nominated Lien and Soong ran as an independent. This divided the conservative, or the KMT, vote.164 During the early months of the campaign, Soong’s poll numbers were better by a large margin than those of either Chen Shui-bian or Lien Chan.

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But, as the election approached, a KMT legislator released information (many thought upon Lee’s order, though Lee denied this) indicating Soong had diverted party money into his own bank accounts and to those of his relatives when he was party secretary-general. Though he was later exonerated, the charges hurt Soong, who had a reputation for honesty. Soong was further handicapped by lack of a party, a good campaign organization and money.165 A divided KMT played into Chen Shui-bian’s hands. The DPP was not split: Chen won the nomination of his party without difficulty and his party was more unified than usual. Chen also ran a masterful campaign. He handled controversial issues deftly. Most important, he played down his previously strong stand for independence while his party and his campaign team exploited ethnic divisions, the KMT’s corrupt image and the split between Lien and Soong. Finally, Chen convinced many voters that a change in ruling parties would bolster Taiwan’s democratization.166 Down the stretch, some noted business leaders announced their support for Chen as did Nobel Prize winner Lee Yuan-tseh, who headed Taiwan’s most famous think tank, Academia Sinica. Chinese leaders in Beijing, including the premier, Zhu Rongji, publicly attacked Chen and warned Taiwan’s voters not to vote for the “independence candidate”—meaning Chen. His effort backfired and that also helped Chen win.167 Chen won by a very slim margin. Soong earned just over 2 percent less of the popular vote. Lien was a distant third. Had the KMT not damaged Soong’s campaign, Soong would have won. Had there been a runoff election (a provision in the constitutions of many nations, but not Taiwan’s), Chen would likely not have been elected. Soong won a majority of votes from all of Taiwan’s minority ethnic groups (Aborigines, Hakka and Mainland Chinese). He won the female vote. He won in almost every part of Taiwan except the south. Chen won big among the Fukien Taiwanese voters and, by a large margin, voters in the south. After the election, many questioned Chen’s mandate.168 Not only did Chen not have a strong mandate, his party, the DPP, had never ruled Taiwan and was by its history and makeup not well prepared for that task. After the election, Soong formed a new political party called the People First Party (PFP). Its members felt Soong should have been president. Despite the fact the KMT leadership had denied Soong the win and there were hard feelings among Soong’s supporters toward the KMT, the PFP aligned with the KMT to form a strong opposition bloc. Meanwhile Chen’s party, with only a third of the seats in the Legislative Yuan, faced a divided government.169 Making matters worse, Taiwan’s political system was a mixed one—presidential, parliamentary and cabinet. Consequently, the role of each branch of the government vis-à-vis the other was not clear. Nor were the powers of each well defined. So Chen decided to build a coalition government and made moves in that direction. He gave up his positions in the DPP and appointed members of the KMT to cabinet positions—even his premier, Tang Fei. But

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Chen didn’t consult with opposition party leaders and in not doing so showed a lack of leadership. He also seriously underestimated the opposition. Alternatively, he feared the legislature would usurp his powers and saw playing ethnic politics as his way out. In any case, coalition government was soon forgotten.170 Chen’s differences with the opposition parties worsened. In fact, their mutual hostility came to a head less than six months into Chen’s presidency over the issue of building Taiwan’s fourth nuclear plant. Chen’s party had long opposed nuclear power and had campaigned fervently against it. The problem was that the plant had already been approved by a previous legislature. In response to Chen’s decision to nix the plant, the opposition initiated an impeachment motion against him but then withdrew it. Chen was embarrassed and his poll numbers dropped precipitously. His saving grace was that the impeachment effort also hurt the opposition. The final result was even more intense political polarization and gridlock.171 The economy promptly went into a tailspin. The country witnessed negative economic growth (almost 2 percent for 2001) and unemployment figures that were higher than most citizens had ever seen. Chen blamed the opposition. He also attributed the downturn to the weak global economy. But many saw Chen’s poor management of the economy as the main cause. Meanwhile, businesses, including many of Taiwan’s “best and brightest” companies (especially computer and semiconductor enterprises), started moving all or part of their operations to China. They sought to take advantage of cheaper labor costs, lower taxes and fewer regulations, and to be closer to a gigantic booming market. Chen and his supporters were conflicted about whether to try to stop the exodus.172 President Chen proclaimed that he would be able to accomplish more and could resolve many of the country’s travails if his party could win the legislative election in December 2001. At this time former president Lee Teng-hui, who had become estranged from the KMT and was at odds with Lien and Soong, was expelled from the KMT. He then became the driver behind the formation of a new political party, the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), to help Chen. Chen’s DPP and the TSU were labeled the green bloc, or pangreen. Both played on local nationalist sentiments and labeled the opposition parties loyal to China and not Taiwan. The DPP increased the number of seats it held in the legislature by a sizable margin while the TSU performed well for a new party. The KMT performed very badly, but most of its losses were gains for Soong’s PFP, which made a bigger percentage gain than the DPP. Independents and other parties all but vanished. Critical to Chen, the opposition (the KMT and the PFP) held a legislative majority.173 Chen and his vice president, Annette Lu, won re-election in 2004, but under quite questionable circumstances. Both were shot, though their wounds were superficial, the day before the voting. President Chen ordered the police and the military to remain at their posts, depriving them of the opportunity

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to vote. Their vote would likely have been for Lien and Soong, who had joined forces to make a strong opposition ticket. The sympathy vote for Chen and Lu gave them the victory; the opinion polls, the stock market and the gamblers’ odds had predicted otherwise. The opposition refused to accept the election results and organized public protest demonstrations while challenging the election in court. As a result, political polarization got even worse.174 Even before this, President Chen had become unpopular in the United States for playing ethnic politics and provoking China at a time when the Bush administration was preoccupied with the war on terrorism. U.S. leaders retaliated by repeating America’s one-China policy while warning Chen about provoking China. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell even questioned Taiwan’s sovereignty (though he explained this away later). Chen was not allowed transit stops in major U.S. cities when traveling to Latin America and elsewhere, as had been the case early on in his presidency. U.S. State Department personnel generally refused to talk to Chen or anyone in his administration.175 Meanwhile, corruption had infected the Chen administration and the DPP. This and an economy that remained in the doldrums, together with President Chen’s reputation for poor governance, his stoking ethnic ill will and his ruining relations with the United States and China, caused the DPP to lose public confidence. Worse, as legislative and presidential elections approached in 2008, a host of Chen administration officials and Chen family members were under indictment or were in jail for corruption. Chen’s wife, the First Lady, was indicted for perjury, falsifying documents and stealing government funds. Chen’s son-in-law was convicted of insider trading. The prosecutor said President Chen would have been indicted except that he was protected by presidential immunity.176 Shih Ming-teh, a former DPP chairman and a party hero (having served longer in jail during the period of authoritarian rule in Taiwan than any other member of the DPP) but also considered a party moderate, launched a mass anti-corruption movement to pressure Chen to resign.177 A million or more turned out at some of his rallies. Chen somehow managed to resist the efforts to force him to step down and survived the rest of his term, but his poll numbers fell into the teens, sometimes even to single digits.178 Clearly, he could not repair his sullied reputation or the hurt he had caused to his party. Chen’s presidency ended ignominiously. Out of office, in 2009, Chen was convicted of corruption among a number of other charges and was sentenced to life in prison and a fine of NT$200 million ($6.2 million). This was the first time a Taiwan president was imprisoned. His sentence was later reduced to 19 years and in 2010 he was put in a special medical zone. He was subsequently released to return to his home. In the interim he went on a hunger strike and tried to commit suicide.179

The KMT Returns to Power Under Ma Ying-jeou The year 2008 witnessed a second change of ruling parties in Taiwan’s legislature and the KMT presidential candidate win election. This inaugurated the

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“era of Ma Ying-jeou.” Under Ma, Taiwan was a different place from what it had been. In some ways it represented a return to the days before Chen Shuibian. But in many respects it was more than that and in some ways it was something quite new.180 It started in January when the KMT defeated the DPP handily in Taiwan’s quadrennial national legislative election. President Chen assumed blame and forthwith resigned as chairman of the DPP. Frank Hsieh, a former mayor of Kaohsiung and premier for a short time under Chen, assumed the chairmanship of the party. Shortly after that, Hsieh won the party’s nomination to run for president in March. He picked Su Tseng-chang as his vice presidential running mate. Both distanced themselves from former president Chen and even criticized him publicly. Two months later, in the presidential/vice presidential election, Ma Yingjeou, the KMT’s candidate, with the affable and popular Taiwanese official (and running mate), Vincent Siew, soundly defeated the DPP’s candidates; they received more votes than any presidential election ticket since the direct election of these offices beginning in 1996. The KMT and its pan-blue allied parties were unified and ran a professional campaign focusing on ridding Taiwan of Chen administration corruption and its exacerbating ethnic strains while promising better economic times and improved relations with the United States and China. Ma’s stellar academic credentials (a law degree from Harvard University), good looks and reputation for strict honesty also helped.181 Ma is Mainland Chinese. He was born in Hong Kong in 1950 though his parents permanently moved to Taiwan shortly after. He graduated from National Taiwan University and in 1976 received an LL.M degree from New York University and in 1981 a doctorate in judicial science from Harvard University. He returned to Taiwan and became director of the First Bureau of the Office of the President and served as head interpreter for President Chiang Ching-kuo. In 1988, he became head of the Research, Development and Evaluation Commission. Subsequently he served as vice chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council and Minister of Justice from 1993 to 1996, respectively, and then minister without portfolio for one year. He taught at Cheng Chi University for a year before he ran for mayor of Taipei in 1998. He was elected and was re-elected in 1992.182 Ma began his presidency with a clear mandate from the electorate and a solid majority in the legislature. However, soon after this the world fell into recession. Being very global and dependent upon exports, Taiwan was adversely affected. Thus, although Taiwan’s economic downturn was not his fault, Ma’s campaign promises to resurrect the economy went noticeably unfulfilled. The fourth quarter witnessed negative growth of 8.36 percent, and the year ended with the gross national product (GNP) having expanded by only 2 percent. The next year, 2009, was even worse. The economy contracted through three quarters, and the year ended with growth in negative territory by 1.9 percent.183

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Further denting President Ma’s reputation, in August 2009 Typhoon Morakot struck Taiwan with a fury. It was the worst typhoon in the island’s recorded history and did tremendous damage to life and property. Ma took the position that local governments should deal with the catastrophe. While perhaps a good idea in theory, the public perceived him as uncaring while the opposition chided him for a feeble response to the disaster. Ma’s credibility suffered, as did his approval ratings as a host of opinion surveys showed.184 However, in late 2009, Taiwan’s economy turned around and continued in a rapid growth mode during 2010. In fact, growth in the gross domestic product (GDP) was better than China’s. Unemployment declined and residents’ incomes increased. The stock market soared. It appeared that Ma and the KMT had made astute choices in fixing the economy.185 From the beginning, in managing foreign relations, President Ma was regarded as doing a yeoman’s job. Tension with China diminished sharply, and there was no longer talk of war as there had been during the Chen era. In fact, the Taiwan Strait was dropped from being ranked the number one flashpoint in the world by many observers. In addition, as a product of cordial relations with Beijing, Taiwan was able to gain representation in the World Health Organization and ceased losing its diplomatic partners. Relations with the United States were also fine.186 In 2010, President Ma negotiated an agreement called the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) to expand commercial ties with China. This included reducing a number of tariffs and loosening restrictions on investments, tourism and other economic ties. The public approved of the deal, which seemed a sensible agreement in view of the fact that otherwise Taiwan would be shut out of trade with Southeast Asian countries because of an economic bloc linking China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) concluded early in the year, plus the fact Taiwan had been exporting more to China than anywhere else and this would increase. Finally, Taiwan’s other main trading partners, the United States, Europe and Japan, were experiencing slow economic growth.187 Meanwhile, however, the DPP, which had recovered partially from the Chen years or at least was organized and energized, led protests against the agreement, even assaulting Chinese representatives who visited Taiwan. DPP leaders argued the agreement would make Taiwan dependent upon China and lead to political agreements that would ultimately “surrender” Taiwan’s sovereignty. The DPP’s charges had resonance and ECFA became a hard issue for the KMT.188 In January 2012, Ma stood for re-election. His vice president Vincent Siew had contracted cancer and considered himself too old to run again. Anyway, he declined to do so. Ma selected Premier Wu Den-yih to be his running mate. Tsai Ing-wen, running with Su Jia-chyuan, challenged Ma as the DPP’s candidates. Ma and Wu won the election easily. In fact, they got more votes than Tsai and Su from all ethnic groups, all categories of residents by level of education, both women and men, and voters in both north and central

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Taiwan. The KMT meanwhile won handily in the concurrent legislative election (the first time the two elections were held together).189 The big wins for Ma and the KMT generated talk that the KMT (after winning the two previous important elections) was back in power permanently. The DPP admitted it faced some fundamental problems it needed to fix. The party, its leaders admitted, had not convinced voters it could deal with Taiwan’s economic problems. The DPP had a good reputation for governance in local politics but could not convert this to winning leadership nationally. It also lost badly on foreign policy, especially its dealing with China and the United States. Finally, because of Taiwan’s maturing democracy, independence was ostensibly no longer a good issue for the DPP and to many people neither was playing ethnic politics, even though the party’s base did not agree. In fact, there was a serious disconnect between forward-looking DPP leaders and the party’s faithful on this issue and some others.190 But, after the 2012 election, Ma and the KMT soon began to show signs of what some called his “second term curse.” Clearly Ma’s elitist style of governance was losing its shine while the DPP was gaining voter appeal with its populist politics. The Ma administration fared poorly in public opinion surveys, but didn’t think this mattered. Ma and his advisors didn’t seem to realize they needed to adjust to new circumstances and different problems. In consequences, President Ma and the KMT were soon on a downward trajectory. Part of the problem was the economy, which in 2008 Ma promised to fix after eight years of President Chen’s poor performance. It was soon seen by many as one of Ma’s false promises. At first it could be attributed to the global downturn. Then the economy turned around; but that was short lived. Growth was again anemic; it was even negative during Ma’s final months in office. GDP growth for Ma’s eight years ended up below Chen’s.191 Not only was the GDP not expanding, but there were worse problems. Wages were stagnant. Income and net worth inequities grew. This created the impression that Ma and his government served only the rich. The youth fared especially badly due to the lack of job opportunities and poor pay for entrylevel jobs. Government workers and pensioners fared much better. Reflecting these problems, a group known as the Sunflowers organized to rectify this situation. They got attention via spirited public protest.192 Clearly Ma’s aloof, Mandarin style of leadership was no longer in vogue. Specifically, his efforts to win the hearts and minds of voters waned as he followed dictums of moral leadership and enlightened government rather than popular rule. Ma ignored public opinion. He downplayed the importance of the populism employed by his opposition to influence residents’ views, which hurt the public image of his administration with voters. This was a fatal mistake.193 Even Ma’s vaunted ability to maintain cordial relations with China diminished in importance to the public. In fact, Ma’s opposition adroitly turned ties with China into worries cum fear about economic connections leading to sticky political ties. DPP leaders spoke of reckless commitments that

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endangered Taiwan’s sovereignty. They and the pro-DPP media quite successfully depicted China as a villain and Ma and the KMT as China’s accomplices.194 The United States, which had up to this point taken a dim view of the DPP, seeing it as a party that provoked China for its own benefit and didn’t care if there were a U.S.–China conflict and maybe even wanted it, modified its views. Washington was unhappy with Ma’s unfulfilled promises to spend more on defense and was cognizant of his administration’s falling popularity. Some also felt the United States should not “lean” toward the KMT during election campaigns as it had in the past.195 In this milieu KMT candidates competing in the 2014 “mid-term” election did poorly. In fact, they were trounced by the DPP. DPP candidates, together with one pro-DPP independent, won all but one of the six metropolitan city mayorships (the most important contests in the election). The DPP also performed well in other races, taking the lion’s share of local executive and legislative positions. Many observers thought the results of the election were a portent signalling that the KMT would not perform well in the national presidential and legislative election less than two years away.196 There were other reasons for the DPP’s win at the polls. Many citizens had become alarmed at the profits businesses were making during these bad times, especially those using their China connections. The government’s actions on pensions caused even KMT members to feel they had been betrayed. Negative growth of the GDP was especially damaging to Ma and his party during the last months of his presidency. The KMT even lost its shine with the business community. Businesses leaders perceived taxes were too high, there were too many regulations and the government lacked the ability to respond quickly to commercial issues; this hurt both Ma and his party.197 Following the 2014 election Ma and his administration appeared even more hapless as problems multiplied in gravity at least as gauged by numerous public opinion polls. Old KMT solutions did not seem to be relevant. This was the milieu leading up to the 2016 election. Meanwhile Tsai Ing-wen’s leadership gave her party promise and hope. Also, the Chen Shui-bian “issue” gradually wore thinner while Tsai and most other top DPP leaders avoided talking about Chen and focused on the future instead.198 On another front, Ma, endeavoring to curry favor with the United Nations and its connected agencies, started to be seen as making himself look like the DPP in terms of his being an advocate of social justice and progressivism. Worse it was seen as a waste of time since what he did was utterly ineffective. It also made Ma look weak, as had long been the way the DPP tried depicted him (as not fit to handle the rough and tumble of Taiwan politics).199 Ma’s feud with legislative speaker Wang Jin-pyng throughout his time in office was another problem. It was a serious impediment to Ma getting legislation passed. This came to a head in 2013 and dogged Ma through the rest of his time as president. Wang, being Taiwanese, drew attention to the fact

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Ma was a Mainland Chinese and made his administration appear to be like those of times long past that employed ethnic favoritism in picking top advisors and even in governing.200 Public safety also became a matter that undermined Ma and his party’s reputations. Lax handling of food oversight and some infrastructure failures turned into scandals that further engendered a loss of public trust and hurt the Ma administration just as handling Hurricane Morakot had during their first term. Neither Ma nor his party handled these matters skillfully.201 Likewise, Ma and the party did not deal with the rise of Hung Hsiu-chu, a contender for leadership of the KMT in the coming post-Ma era, with the kind of aplomb needed. Hung, an outlier in the party, took a very hard position on the matter of one-China and on unification. Public opinion polls provided proof that her views were too extreme. This hurt her popularity and that of the party. The KMT leadership then took action to deny her the party’s nomination for its candidate for president in 2016 and did so at a late date. This made the KMT look clumsy and indecisive.202 Finally, the KMT’s crisis drew attention to the fact that President Ma had not cultivated a successor. The natural choice arguable should have been Vice President Wu Den-yih. But Ma’s relationship with him was not close and Wu had not played a very active role in decision-making or in party affairs under Ma. He was not Ma’s heir and, in fact, avoided any impression he was.

Taiwan Under President Tsai Ing-wen Early in 2016, Taiwan saw a third change of ruling parties in the legislature and a new president, Tsai Ing-wen. It was a third rotation of ruling parties. As a result, the DPP was back in power again. The KMT was out. But there were questions to ask at this juncture. Was the KMT out of touch in terms of understanding Taiwan’s lively mass democracy and much more? Had the DPP learned from the failures of the Chen administration? How would president Tsai deal with China in view of the fact that her party’s base viewed her stance as weak? Did her election really answer the question of Taiwan’s future—whether it would be an independent country. Taiwan’s economic dependence on China seemed to say otherwise, as did China’s continuing rise as a world power. There were many more imponderables.203 First, the basics. Tsai Ing-wen is Hakka. She was born in southern Taiwan into a wealthy business family, but the family moved to Taipei when she was young. Tsai graduated from Taiwan National University after which she received a LL.M degree from Cornell University in the United States and then a PhD degree from London School of Economics. She returned to Taiwan and served on the Fair Trade Commission and the Copyright Commission under President Lee Teng-hui. She was also a consultant to the Mainland Affairs Council and the National Security Council. She shined as an expert on trade issues and seemed to have some learned thoughts on the issue of divided nations.204

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In 2000, President Chen appointed her chairwoman of the Mainland Affairs Council even though she was not a member of his party. In 2004, she joined the DPP and became an at-large member of the legislature. In 2006, she was appointed vice premier.205 In 2008, Tsai was elected chairwoman of the DPP. Since she had not been close to former president Chen she was not tainted by his corruption; in fact, Tsai was seen as a clean politician. She was also very different from previous DPP leaders, being a scholar, a newcomer to the party and female (the DPP having a reputation for male chauvinism) and unmarried. Subsequently she went a long way to rehabilitating the DPP, including helping it win some replacement and minor elections.206 In 2010, Tsai was a candidate in the “mid-term” elections for Taiwan’s metropolitan mayors, city councils, borough chiefs and other local government positions. She ran for mayor of the newly constituted New Taipei City, one of Taiwan’s metropolitan cities. She was handicapped because the district had more KMT than DPP voters. She lost; but the election was close. Though defeated, this did not trash her reputation or weaken her leadership of the opposition party. Anyway, in this election the KMT won three of five of the mayorships and was proclaimed overall the easy winner.207 In 2011, she was nominated by the DPP to run for president the next year. She was the first female to win such an honor by a major party. However, she was at a disadvantage because of the memory of the Chen presidency and his imprisonment was still on the minds of voters. The party’s China policy was also a problem as was its advocacy of independence. And the United States favored the KMT. She lost the election and took responsibility for the defeat. Yet she remained popular with her party and with voters.208 In May, Tsai was re-elected chairwoman of the DPP. In 2014, her party won a big victory in the collection of local elections. She was given credit for the wins. This paved the way for her to get the nomination to run for president again. This time she organized an effective campaign. The KMT was in chaos and proved easy for her to beat. On Saturday January 16, 2016, voters in Taiwan went to their polling stations to cast votes for their choice of president and vice president and their picks for representatives to the Legislative Yuan (law-making branch of government). Tsai Ing-wen and her vice presidential running mate won. In fact, they received more votes than the KMT’s candidate, Chu Li-lun, and his vice presidential candidate, and James Soong running as an independent and his confederate, combined. Tsai won by a bigger margin than any presidential candidate since Taiwan adopted a direct election system for selecting the president—bigger than Ma Ying-jeou’s win in 2008. It was a decisive victory in other ways. But most important the DPP won a majority in the legislature; it had never done this before.209 The vibrancy of the celebrations on and after Election Day reflected the broad and enthusiastic public support for Tsai and the DPP. Supporters were elated. This was the mood in Taiwan for some time. Few could deny it was a

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turning point, an epochal event. Expectations were high for positive changes under a new government. Many talked of a “new” Taiwan.210 In 2016, Tsai and her party had unprecedented mandates. They thus would have the fortune (though it was not by chance they won) of being able to govern with ease and the opportunity to change Taiwan profoundly politically and in a host of other ways. Naysayers, however, said that Tsai and the DPP had not won the election; rather the KMT’s presidential standard-bearer and most of its other candidates lost. There, of course, was some truth to that; as noted in the previous section the KMT was not in good shape to perform well in this election. Its mood was down. Events hurt. But this notion of one party losing rather than the other winning may be said of many elections. Anyway, this did not distract from the feeling of optimism about what the new administration and the DPP as the now ruling party could do and would do together. There was, however, a more serious matter at hand. Campaigning and wining an election were different from governing. Tsai and her party had craved to win to the degree that they had not given much thought to this. After the post-election euphoria wore off they had to shift gears.211 They did not do this well. During ensuing months, it became painfully evident that during the campaign both President Tsai and her party had enunciated plans to accomplish too much and had not prioritized their goals very well. Also, many of their plans were vague and operationalizing them proved difficult. This was especially true of the reforms. Finally, there were two countries that mattered: China and the United States. China was hostile toward the new administration and was quick to say so and to act accordingly. The United States was in a campaign mode to elect a new president and eventually chose one that did not have experience in government or in making foreign policy. Taiwan’s relations with the United States were difficult to predict. The popular support Tsai and the DPP enjoyed during the 2016 election campaign and briefly in its wake faded. President Tsai and her party’s poll numbers declined steadily. Many of their reforms were not turned into legislation. President Tsai’s progressive agenda became less popular. The economy bounced back, but growth was slow. President Tsai wanted to ignore the independence versus unification issues, but could not. The results of the Taiwan National Security Survey done in early 2019 are instructive. It compared results with similar (the same or nearly exact) questions conducted every year for more than a decade. (Most opinion polls done in Taiwan do not do this and many are notoriously inaccurate.) This poll showed the following: President Tsai’s popularity was fluctuating around 24 percent; residents who identified exclusively as Taiwanese, though high (50 percent) fell slightly; support for the DPP dropped slightly; most respondents did not identify with either major party (45 percent); a majority supported the ’92 Consensus (which President Tsai opposed). There was more. Few supported either independence or unification—single digits. Most supported the status quo. A surprising 70 percent said there is no

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need to declare independence (since Taiwan is already independent). More than half believe China will attack Taiwan if it declares independence—up from 42 percent in 2017. Quite startlingly almost three-fourths said Taiwan cannot win a war with China notwithstanding government officials often declaring Taiwan’s military can perform well in defending the island. Surprisingly, a high (and higher than in the past) number of residents believe the United States will defend Taiwan notwithstanding President Trump’s statements that he will avoid wars and U.S. polls indicating that most citizens do not favor committing soldiers to defend Taiwan. Finally, most respondents believe unification with China will eventually occur.212 In late 2018, Taiwan held its “mid-term” collection of local elections. KMT candidates beat DPP candidates badly. The DPP’s referendums (supposed to be an accurate expression of public opinion) failed badly. Most observers blamed President Tsai.213 After the election President Tsai assumed blame for the defeat and switched gears from a moderate China policy to one of condemnation of China and supportive of independence. Given the Trump administration was at odds with China over trade but also other matters, this worked to improve her popularity. She won her party’s nomination to run for another term for president in 2020.

Notes 1 See John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman, China: A New History (Cambridge, MA: Belkemp Press, 1998), p. 35. Also see Chen-wen Tsung, “Clues to a Distant Past,” Free China Review (April 1991), p. 61. 2 Goddard, Formosa, pp. 3–5. 3 See Area Handbook for the Republic of China, p. 22, for a discussion of this topic. 4 Goddard, Formosa, pp. 16, 20. Also see Davidson, The Island of Formosa, p. 3. 5 Chen-wen Tsung, “Building on the Past,” Free China Review (June 1992), p. 85. 6 David Barber, “DNA Shows Maoris Came from Taiwan, Says Scientist,” South China Morning Post, August 11, 1998 (online at scmp.com). 7 See Hsieh, Taiwan—Ilha Formosa, pp. 131–38. 8 Taiwan was regarded as an “uncivilized” area, in contrast to China, which was civilized. See John K. Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968). 9 This claim was detailed in a 24-page pamphlet titled “The Taiwan Question and the Reunification of China” (Beijing: Taiwan Affairs Office and Information Office, State Council, 1993), referred to hereafter as China’s White Paper on Taiwan. 10 See John K. Fairbank, The United States and China (New York: Viking Press, 1967), p. 13. 11 See China’s White Paper on Taiwan. The different viewpoints espoused by China and Taiwan are discussed in John F. Copper, “The Origins of Conflict Across the Taiwan Strait: The Problem of Differences in Perceptions,” Journal of Contemporary China (June 1997), pp. 199–227. 12 See Davidson, Island of Formosa, pp. 3–4. Also see Simon Long, Taiwan: China’s Last Frontier (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), p. 5.

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13 Some Japanese writers have suggested that the Japanese may have been the first settlers. See Shinkichi Ito, “An Outline of Formosan History,” in Mark Mancall (ed.), Formosa Today (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 44. Also see Davidson, Island of Formosa, p. 6. 14 See Area Handbook for the Republic of China, p. 22. 15 Ibid. 16 See Davidson, Island of Formosa, p. 4. 17 Ibid., p. 5. 18 See Long, Taiwan, p. 4. 19 For details on the period of Western colonial influence, see Goddard, Formosa, chapters 3 and 4. See also Hsieh, Taiwan—Ilha Formosa, chapter 11. 20 See Goddard, Formosa, p. 51. 21 Roy, Taiwan: A Political History, p. 16. 22 See George M. Beckman, “Brief Episodes—Dutch and Spanish Rule,” in Paul K. T. Sih (ed.), Taiwan in Modern Times (New York: St. John’s University Press, 1973). 23 Long, Taiwan, pp. 10–11. 24 Tonio Andrade, How Taiwan Became Chinese: Dutch, Spanish and Han Colonization in the Seventeenth Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), Introduction. 25 For details about Cheng Ch’eng-kung’s life and accomplishments from quite different perspectives, see Cheng Cheng I-chou, Cheng Cheng-kung Chuan [biography of Cheng Cheng-kung], reprinted in Taiwan in Wen-hsien Ts’ung K’an, Collection of Works on Taiwan Series (Taipei: Office of Economic Research, 1960); Ch’u Ch’i, Cheng Cheng-kung (Wuhan: People’s Press, 1956); and George Phillips, “The Life of Cheng Cheng-kung,” China Review 13, nos. 2 and 3 (1985). 26 John E. Wills, Jr., “The Seventeenth-Century Transformation: Taiwan Under the Dutch and Chen Regime,” in Murray A. Rubinstein (ed.), Taiwan: A New History (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), p. 95. 27 See Parris H. Chang, “Cheng Cheng-kung (Koxinga): A Patriot, Nationalist and Nation-Builder,” in Sih (ed.), Taiwan in Modern Times, p. 25. 28 Roy, Taiwan: A Political History, p. 17. 29 See Davidson, The Island of Formosa, p. 52. 30 See Ralph C. Crosier, “Zheng Chenggong,” Britannica Encyclopedia (online at britannica.com), viewed January 2019. 31 Wills, “The Seventeenth-Century Transformation,” in Rubinstein (ed.), Taiwan: A New History, pp. 100–01. 32 Jonathan Manthorpe, Forbidden Nation: A History of Taiwan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 99. 33 See Goddard, Formosa, p. 99. 34 See, for example, Wen-hsiung Hsu, “Frontier Social Organization and Social Disorder in Ch’ing Taiwan,” Ronald G. Knapp (ed.), China’s Island Frontier: Studies in the Historical Geography of Taiwan (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1980). Hsu notes that there was, on average, an incidence of communal strife every 2.7 years during the 212 years of Ch’ing rule. 35 See Chan Lien, “Taiwan in China’s External Relations,” in Sih (ed.), Taiwan in Modern Times, pp. 88–89. 36 Roy, Taiwan: A Political History, p. 27. 37 Joseph W. Ballantine, Formosa: A Problem for United States Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1952), p. 17. It should be noted that the Chinese government at this time still did not completely understand the concept of sovereignty. 38 Ibid.

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39 Robert Gardella, “From Treaty Ports to Provincial Status,” in Rubinstein (ed.), Taiwan: A New History, pp. 193–94. 40 William M. Speidel, “The Administration and Fiscal Reforms of Liu Mingch’uan in Taiwan 1884–1891—Foundation for Self-Strengthening,” Journal of Asian Studies (May 1976), pp. 441–59. 41 See George H. Kerr, Formosa: Licensed Revolution and the Home Rule Movement, 1895–1945 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1974), p. 27. 42 Hung Chien-chao, A History of Taiwan (Rimini, Italy: Il Cerchio, 2000), pp. 186–87. 43 Kerr, Formosa, p. 14 44 Roy, Taiwan: A Political History, p. 33. 45 Harry J. Lamley, “Taiwan Under Japanese Rule, 1895–1945,” in Rubinstein (ed.), Taiwan: A New History, p. 204. 46 Roy, Taiwan: A Political History, pp. 40–44. 47 George H. Kerr, Formosa Betrayed (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), pp. 17–20. 48 Hung, A History of Taiwan, pp. 194–96. 49 Ibid., pp. 197–98. Also see Samuel P. Ho, Economic Development of Taiwan, 1860–1970 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1978), for an analysis of Taiwan’s economic development under the Japanese. 50 Kerr, Formosa, pp. 88–89. 51 Ibid., p. 91. See pp. 89–91 for additional data on railroad and other infrastructure building. 52 Hung, A History of Taiwan, pp. 229–30. 53 See Ming-min Peng, A Taste of Freedom (New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1972), p. 7. Peng notes that Tokyo was not very concerned about public health problems but, because so many Japanese soldiers died in Taiwan in 1895, sanitation became a priority for Japan. 54 Hung, A History of Taiwan, p. 209. 55 See Kerr, Formosa, pp. 59–61. 56 Roy, Taiwan: A Political History, pp. 49–51. 57 Tien, The Great Transition, p. 33. 58 Suisheng Zhao, Power and Competition in East Asia (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1977), pp. 68 and 70. 59 See Lamley, “Taiwan Under Japanese Rule, 1895–1945,” in Rubinstein (ed), Taiwan: A New History, pp. 240–42. 60 Hung, A History of Taiwan, p. 228. 61 Ibid., p. 229. 62 Roy, Taiwan: A Political History, pp. 34 and 52. Japan had allowed Taiwanese to leave and go to China after it made Taiwan a colony. It did so again after 1937; 46,000 did so. 63 Ibid., pp. 52–53 and Tse-han Lai, Ramon H. Myers, and Wou Wei, A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 38. 64 Christopher Hughes, Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: National Identity and Status in International Society (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 22. 65 Hung, A History of Taiwan, pp. 233–35. 66 Ibid., pp. 236–37. 67 See Kerr, Formosa Betrayed, chapter 2. Another factor was that President Roosevelt promised General MacArthur an invasion of the Philippines. See Hung, A History of Taiwan, p. 236. 68 See Alan M. Wachman, Why Taiwan? Geostrategic Rationales for China’s Territorial Integrity (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), pp. 70–76 and Hughes, Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism, p. 5.

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69 The peace treaty was finally signed in 1952 in San Francisco. In the meantime Mao’s forces won the civil war against Chiang Kai-shek’s military and the latter fled to Taiwan. Neither was represented at San Francisco. For details, see Barnett, Communist China and Asia, pp. 410–11. 70 Wachman, Why Taiwan?, pp. 81–83. 71 Hung, A History of Taiwan, pp. 245–46. 72 See Kerr, Formosa Betrayed, chapter 3. 73 Ibid. 74 Steven E. Phillips, Between Assimilation and Independence: The Taiwanese Encounter with Nationalist China, 1945–1950 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 141. 75 Roy, Taiwan: A Political History, pp. 60–61. 76 Ibid., pp. 61–64. 77 Ibid., chapter 5. 78 Ibid., pp. 173–82. 79 Ibid., p. 65. 80 For a thorough account of this situation, see Lai et al., A Tragic Beginning. Also see Phillips, Between Assimilation and Independence, chapter 4. 81 Ibid. 82 Phillips, Between Assimilation and Independence, p. 65. 83 Historians sympathetic to both the Nationalist government and Taiwanese independence proponents blame Ch’en Yi for the difficulties in Taiwan in the late 1940s—even problems that occurred after he was removed from office—because many of his supporters and appointees remained. For example, see Fred W. Riggs, Formosa Under Chinese Nationalist Rule (New York: Macmillan, 1952; reprint, New York: Octagon Books, 1972), pp. 45–48. Also see Kerr, Formosa Betrayed, chapter 6. For a less harsh treatment of Ch’en, see Lai et al., A Tragic Beginning, chapters 3 and 4, especially pages 97–98. 84 See Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), pp. 370–71. 85 The number of Taiwanese killed at this time is a matter of guesswork. Kerr (in Formosa Betrayed) puts the number at 20,000. Lai, Myers and Wei say it is at most 10,000. For some years, government documents indicated that only several hundred were killed. In 1992, the government released a detailed report on the incident and put the number killed at between 18,000 and 28,000. 86 Clough, Island China, p. 175. 87 Roy, Taiwan: A Political History, p. 185. 88 See Murray A. Rubinstein, “Postscript and Conclusion,” in Rubinstein (ed.), Taiwan: A New History, p. 495. 89 In 2008, when Ma Ying-jeou ran for president he made note of the fact he was not born when 2-2-8 occurred. He also asserted that President Chen had made issue of it to foster ethnic ill will that had become a stain on his presidency. See John F. Copper, The KMT Returns to Power: Elections in Taiwan 2008 to 2012 (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2013), p. 86. 90 Copper, Taiwan at a Tipping Point, pp. 110–11. 91 See King Chen, “Taiwan in Peking’s Strategy,” in Hungdah Chiu (ed.), China and the Taiwan Issue (New York: Praeger, 1979), p. 134. 92 See Hung, A History of Taiwan, pp. 257–59 and Roy, Taiwan: A Political History, chapter 4, for different accounts. 93 Phillips, Between Assimilation and Independence, pp. 86–87. 94 Ross Terrill, The New Chinese Empire (New York: Basic Books, 2003), p. 210. 95 See Edgar Snow, Red Star over China (New York: Random House, 1938), pp. 33–89. 96 Terrill, The New Chinese Empire, p. 209.

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97 See Frank A. Kiernan, The Fluke That Saved Formosa (Cambridge: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1954). 98 Prior to this President Truman stated he did not have any intention of using U.S. forces to “interfere in the present situation.” Many observers felt this meant that China would soon make Taiwan Chinese territory. Subsequently, Truman said that Taiwan’s future status must await a peace settlement with Japan or consideration by the United Nations. See Barnett, Communist China and Asia, pp. 389–90. 99 See Chapter 4 for further details. 100 Zhao, Power and Competition in East Asia, pp. 102–03. 101 See Riggs, Formosa Under Chinese Nationalist Rule, chapter 4, for an early account of this process. 102 See Chapter 5. Also see Neil H. Jacoby, U.S. Aid to Taiwan: A Study of Foreign Aid, Self-Help and Development (New York: Praeger, 1966), chapter 17. 103 See Barnett, Communist China and Asia, p. 415. 104 Margaret Macmillan, Nixon and Mao: The Week that Changed the World (New York: Random House, 2008), pp. 110–13. 105 Roy, Taiwan: A Political History, p. 131. 106 Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, Foreign Policy Making in Taiwan: From Principle to Pragmatism (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 11. 107 See Chapter 5 on Taiwan’s economy. 108 Ibid. 109 See Chapter 4 for details on this point. 110 Chiang Kai-shek had long spoken of the “liberation” of the Mainland as partly political. In the late 1950s, after the United States made it clear that it did not want to get involved in a war with China over the Offshore Islands, Chiang began to speak more of the political nature of the task. Some in Taiwan interpreted this to mean that the mission was being given up or at least de-emphasized. In about 1958, Taiwan began making plans for economic growth and diverting its attention from invasion of the Mainland to the development of the island. 111 See Chapter 6. 112 Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: Penguin, 2011), pp. 229–31. 113 Technically, the Republic of China withdrew from the United Nations, as it said it would do if Beijing received a majority of support from the U.N. members for its bid to membership. It is generally believed that the United States opposed Beijing’s joining the United Nations at Taipei’s expense, but, given the situation and the rules of U.N. membership, there was no alternative. Many U.S. allies voted for Beijing, an indication that Washington had not asked its friends for votes of support for Taipei. 114 For details, see John F. Copper, China Diplomacy: The Washington-Taipei-Beijing Triangle (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 38–39. 115 Kissinger, On China, chapter 11, especially p. 307. 116 See Ray S. Cline, Chiang Ching-kuo Remembered: The Man and His Political Legacy (Washington, DC: US Global Strategy Center, 1989), for details on Chiang Ching-kuo’s life. 117 Tien, The Great Transition, p. 117. 118 Jaushieh Joseph Wu, Taiwan’s Democratization: Forces Behind the New Momentum (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1995), chapter 2. Also see Peter R. Moody Jr., Political Change on Taiwan: A Study of Ruling Party Adaptability (New York: Praeger, 1992), pp. 186–87. 119 For details on Chiang Ching-kuo’s leadership and his contributions to Taiwan’s political and economic development, see various chapters in Shao-chuan Leng (ed.), Chiang Ching-kuo’s Leadership in the Development of the Republic of China on Taiwan (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993). 120 Ibid.

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121 Ibid. 122 Hung, A History of Taiwan, pp. 295–97. 123 In a sense, this represented a reversal in U.S. policy inasmuch as previous U.S. presidents had not declared that Taiwan was part of China. President Nixon simply stated this was the view of both sides (Taipei and Beijing). See Copper, China Diplomacy, chapter 5. 124 Macmillan, Nixon and Mao, pp. 297–99. 125 David Tawei Lee, The Taiwan Relations Act: Twenty Years in Retrospect (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 134 and 179. 126 For details, see Copper, China Diplomacy, pp. 67–75. 127 Ibid., p. 108. 128 See Chapter 4, section on elections. 129 Ibid. 130 Shih-shan Henry Tsai, Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan’s Quest for Identity (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), chapter 6. 131 Wu, Taiwan’s Democratization, p. 37 132 See Chapter 4, section on elections. 133 Wu, Taiwan’s Democratization, p. 39. 134 See Chapter 2, section on tourism, for further details. 135 See John F. Copper, Historical Dictionary of Taiwan (Republic of China) fourth edition (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015), pp. 20–23. 136 See, for example, Cline, Chiang Ching-kuo Remembered and Leng, Chiang Ching-Kuo’s Leadership. 137 See “Majority of Public Recognize Chiang’s Contributions,” Taipei Times, April 4, 2016 (online at taipeitimes.com) and “Reevaluating the Legacy of Chiang Ching-kuo,” The News Lens, April 26, 2017 (online at international.thenewslens.com). 138 Copper, Historical Dictionary of Taiwan, p. 174. 139 See Tsai, Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan’s Quest for Identity, chapter 8. For information on Lee’s presidency in his own words, see Lee Teng-hui, Creating the Future: Towards a New Era for the Chinese People (Taipei: Government Information Office, 1993). For a critical assessment of the Lee era, see Wei-chin Lee and T. Y. Wang (eds.), Sayonara to the Lee Teng-hui Era: Politics in Taiwan, 1988–2000 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2003). 140 Hung, A History of Taiwan, p. 305. 141 See Roy, Taiwan: A Political History, p. 178. 142 See John F. Copper, “The KMT’s 13th Party Congress: Reform, Democratization, New Blood,” in Cynthia Chenault (ed.), Modernizing East Asia: Economic and Cultural Dimensions of Political Change (Jamaica, NY: St. John’s University Press, 1989). 143 Tsai, Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan’s Quest for Identity, p. 164 144 Chiang Wei-kuo later declared publicly he was not Chiang Kai-shek’s son, explaining that when the elder Chiang was in Japan his close friend made a Japanese woman pregnant and since he was married this presented for him a serious problem. Chiang Kai-shek agreed to take his place as the father of the child and raise him. 145 For details on the 1990 election and Lee’s image, see footnote 143, p. 177. 146 John F. Copper, Playing with Fire: Looming War with China Over Taiwan (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), pp. 32–35. 147 For details, see Linda Chao and Ramon H. Myers, The First Chinese Democracy: Political Life in the Republic of China on Taiwan (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), chapters 10 and 11. 148 Ibid. 149 See Chapter 6 for further details on this topic.

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150 Tsai, Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan’s Quest for Identity, p. 188. 151 See Hungdah Chiu, Koo-Wang Talks and the Prospect of Building Constructive and Stable Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (Baltimore, MD: University of Maryland School of Law, 1993). 152 See John F. Copper, “The KMT’s 14th Party Congress: Toward Unity or Disunity,” American Journal of Chinese Studies (October 1994), pp. 59–83. 153 For details, see Copper, Playing with Fire and John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan’s Democratization (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997). 154 Shih-shan Henry Tsai, Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan’s Quest for Identity, p. 205. Also see Copper, Historical Dictionary of Taiwan, pp. 29–30. 155 Ibid., p. 208. 156 See Lee Teng-hui, The Road to Democracy: Taiwan’s Pursuit of Identity (Tokyo: PHP Institute, 1999), pp. 120–21 for full statements. 157 See Chapter 4. 158 See Lijun, China and Taiwan, chapter 3. 159 For a brief synopsis of the Chen era, see Copper, Historical Dictionary of Taiwan, pp. 31–38. 160 For details see Chen’s autobiography: Chen Shui-bian, The Son of Taiwan: The Life of Chen Shui-bian and His Dreams for Taiwan (Taipei: Taiwan, 2002). 161 Ibid, p. 78. 162 Ibid. 163 See Chapter 4 for further details. 164 See Chapter 4 for further details. 165 See John F. Copper, Taiwan’s 2000 Presidential and Vice-Presidential Election: Consolidating Democracy and Creating a New Era of Politics (Baltimore, MD: University of Maryland School of Law, 2000). 166 Ibid. 167 Ibid. 168 Ibid. 169 Ibid. 170 For details, see John F. Copper, “Taiwan in Gridlock,” in John F. Copper (ed.), Taiwan in Troubled Times: Essays on the Chen Shui-bian Presidency (Singapore: World Scientific, 2002), pp. 19–52. 171 Ibid. 172 See Suzanne Berger and Richard K. Lester, “Globalization and the Future of the Taiwan Miracle,” in Suzanne Berger and Richard K. Lester (eds.), Global Taiwan: Building Competitive Strengths in a New International Economy (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2005), p. 4. The authors ask the question: “How in a world of open borders, can rewarding jobs, innovative activities and a good society be created at home?” 173 See John F. Copper, Taiwan’s 2001 Legislative Magistrates and Mayors Election, East Asian Institute (EAI) Contemporary China Series 33 (Singapore: World Scientific, 2002). 174 John F. Copper, Taiwan’s 2004 Presidential and Vice Presidential Election: Democracy’s Consolidation or Devolution (Baltimore, MD: University of Maryland School of Law, 2004). 175 See John F. Copper, “Why the Bush Administration Soured on Taiwan,” in Suisheng Zhao (ed.), U.S.-China Relations: Cooperation and Competition in Northeast Asia (London: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2008). 176 John F. Copper, Taiwan’s Democracy on Trial: Political Change During the Chen Shui-bian Era and Beyond (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2010), pp. 93–96

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177 Shih organized moderate campaigns when he was party chairman. He even worked with the New Party. See Dafydd Fell, Government and Politics in Taiwan, 2nd edition (London: Routledge), pp. 112, 126 and 240. 178 For details see John F. Copper, The Blight of Corruption in the Chen Administration in Taiwan, Background Brief, East Asian Institute, December 2007. 179 “Taiwan Says Former President Chen Shui-bian Attempted Suicide with a Towel,” South China Morning Post, June 3, 2013 (online at scmp.com). 180 For a synopsis of the “Ma era” see Copper, Historical Dictionary of Taiwan, pp. 38–41. 181 John F. Copper, Taiwan’s 2008 Presidential and Vice Presidential Election: Maturing Democracy (Baltimore, MD: University of Maryland School of Law, 2008). 182 See Copper, Historical Dictionary of Taiwan, pp. 187–88. 183 See Chapter 5 for further details. 184 Thomas B. Gold, “Taiwan in 2009: Eroding Landslide,” Asian Survey (January/ February 2010), p. 74. 185 See Chapter 5. 186 Steven M. Goldstein, China and Taiwan (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2015), pp. 137–40. 187 See Lin, Taiwan’s China Dilemma, pp. 177–81. 188 Ibid. 189 John F. Copper, Taiwan’s 2012 Presidential/Vice Presidential and Legislative Elections (Baltimore, MD: University of Maryland School of Law, 2012). 190 John F. Copper, The KMT Returns to Power: Taiwan’s Elections 2008–2012 (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2013), chapter 5. 191 See Chapter 5 for details. 192 Fell, Government and Politics in Taiwan, pp. 276–78. 193 Copper, Taiwan at a Tipping Point, p. 121. 194 Ibid., p. 81. 195 Ibid., pp. 130–36. 196 Ibid., p. 77. 197 Ibid., p. 24. 198 Ibid., p. 41. 199 Ibid., pp. 75–76. 200 Ibid., p. 48. 201 Fell, Government and Politics in Taiwan, p. 270. 202 Ibid. 203 Copper, Taiwan at a Tipping Point, p. 26. 204 Copper, Historical Dictionary of Taiwan, pp. 290–91. 205 Ibid., p. 291. 206 Ibid. 207 Ibid. 208 See Chapter 4 for further details. 209 Copper, Taiwan at a Tipping Point, pp. 144–45. 210 Ibid., p. 145. 211 Ibid., p. 159. 212 Dennis V. Hickey, “What the Latest Opinion Polls Say About Taiwan,” The National Interest, March 5, 2019 (online at thenationalinterest.org). 213 John F. Copper, “Explaining the Results of Taiwan’s Mid-Term Election,” IPP Review, November 27, 2018 (online at ippreview.com).

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Society

Taiwan’s society and the norms, mores, customs and much more that make up its culture are basically traditional and Chinese. More specifically, they are rural southern Chinese in origin. Taiwan also has an elite culture; it is somewhat different. Both evolved considerably in Taiwan—via interactions with the Aborigines and the inputs of their culture, the population’s contacts with other peoples in the region, European and Japanese colonization, and considerable Western influence in recent years, particularly American. Rapid economic growth since the 1960s gave rise to Taiwan’s fast-paced democratization, which engendered profound social change, most of it lasting. It transformed Taiwan’s society that was divided into rich and poor classes into one dominated by a middle class that espoused new and different values. However, modernization also gave rise to many of the problems present in Western countries. The breakdown of tradition, the weakening of the family, alienation and other pains of a society in transition were, and still are, evident. Crime, youth problems, divorce and drug use are also regarded as serious matters. But Taiwan’s problems are less acute than those in most other quickly modernizing or modern countries. The strength of Chinese culture and its strong family tradition have made many social ills less serious. Social change in Taiwan is worthy of study because dealing with its ethnic diversity, the gap between rich and poor, the issues of the youth and immigrants are very salient matters. Also, some of the solutions to its worst problems—and the new society itself—are unique and are worth studying and perhaps emulating by others. Social tensions also help explain Taiwan’s colorful and at times raucous politics. Relevant to the theme of this book, Taiwan’s society and its problems connect intimately to the issue of Taiwan’s identity and whether Taiwan is essentially Chinese or is different and whether its future is with China or not. For many years, culturally Taiwan grew apart from China. Recently, with an increase in cross-Strait contacts and China becoming capitalist and to some extent returning to its traditional culture, this trend has reversed course. Whether a “unified culture” is developing as a product of economic growth, a declining admiration of the United States, Europe and Japan, and

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China’s rise to become a world power is yet to be determined. Or is Taiwan’s culture unique such that it will stand alone?

Social Structure and Order Before the twentieth century, for a number of reasons the various groups of people inhabiting Taiwan had little contact with each other and, therefore, maintained quite distinct social systems. The Aborigines’ social systems were already in place. The three groups of Chinese brought their systems from China, though they evolved in Taiwan.1 The Aborigines’ social systems were tribal, though their social orders differed markedly between two broadly defined groups: the mountain Aborigines and the lowland Aborigines. The mountain Aborigines’ social structures were more communal and less settled; the lowlanders’ social systems were more sedentary and in some important ways resembled those of Chinese agrarian society. Customs, mores and social systems varied considerably among the tribes. In terms of social hierarchy, some groups were classless, while others distinguished between the chieftains and the common people or followers. In some tribes, social status was determined largely by age. Most, but not all, were male dominant: patriarchal and patrilineal. Depending on the tribe, married couples lived with a spouse’s parents or apart. All of the Aboriginal groups were in theory at least monogamous.2 Today, the mountain Aborigines’ social systems are much more in evidence than those of the lowlanders. With the coming of Chinese migration, many lowlander Aborigines were either killed or were assimilated by the Chinese; others retreated into the mountainous areas, whereupon they adopted the mountain Aborigines’ societal patterns. The mountain Aborigines resisted change and assimilation more than the lowland Aborigines, though Chinese culture eventually prevailed among all of the original residents of the island.3 Chinese immigrants brought their customs, mores and norms to Taiwan— except they did not bring with them the ancient Chinese prejudice against physical work; or necessity forced them to abandon that facet of their culture. Nor did education become the prevailing basis of elite class status in Taiwan as it had been in China. Social position was founded more on differences in privileges between the rulers and the ruled and the possession and/or the control of land, arms, wealth and sometimes positions in secret societies.4 Taiwan was a dangerous land characterized by violence, frequent local wars and fear of the Aborigines. This and the authority and status accrued by weapons and money that followed, as noted in Chapter 2, translated into a social order and a political system similar to those in feudal Europe and Japan and quite unlike China. Social relations among the Chinese immigrants were, from the onset of their migration to Taiwan, founded on the village, which was typically controlled by one or a few powerful families. Dominant families chose village leaders who were responsible for security and maintaining order. Social

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norms and rules were established and enforced by family elders. The important families eventually controlled large sections of the flat land on the island, including most of the farmland.5 Thus, social hierarchy was to a large degree founded on land tenure. The landlord system that took root in Taiwan several centuries ago eventually evolved into a mixture of traditional feudalism and government-controlled land rights—the latter a product of Taiwan’s experience with Western colonialism. Landlords subcontracted with cultivators who then hired farm laborers. Some landlords supervised the use of land; others held official government positions, maintaining their authority and privileged status in that way. Serfdom did not become part of Taiwan’s feudal order, but indentured servitude, male and female, was common. Typically, men worked in the fields, women in the home. Female indentured servitude lasted until the Japanese colonial period when Tokyo abolished it.6 The social hierarchy of the Chinese population of Taiwan was patriarchal and patrilineal. Females were accorded an inferior social status compared to men, as was the case in China, though it was more pronounced in Fukien Province from where most of the Chinese in Taiwan immigrated.7 Only males were heirs, and as a consequence female children were seen as only temporary members of the family and thus were trained in household skills so, at the proper age, they could be married into a friendly and, if possible, a rich and powerful household. A family lacking a male child would adopt one, usually an infant, most often from a relative. Alternatively, the family would “adopt” a son-in-law, who agreed that his children would take his wife’s family name, although this practice was considered a loss of face for the man and was less common than infant adoption.8 Until the age of about 4, male and female children were raised together, with few distinctions based on gender. Typically, children were given little responsibility until about the age of 6. However, by the age of 16, children assumed many adult duties and by 18 they were usually working. Although families were large, children were generally treated with kindness and were regarded as precious possessions. The mother was mainly responsible for rearing the children, but grandparents and older siblings also played a role, as did more distant relatives at times.9 Authority within the Chinese family was to a large degree based on age, especially when the extended family lived in one house. Respect for elders based on the idea of filial piety also extended throughout society.10 Older people, even when barely able to work, often kept positions in businesses or government because of the social taboo against forced retirement. Elders served as a stabilizing influence in society, though age did not necessarily equate with authority outside the household unless combined with high social class or important business or political connections. As noted, in terms of attaining high social-class working for the government or in education conferred elite status. However, as Taiwan began to develop economically, before and under the Japanese, there was another route

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to the higher class: commerce. Some scholars thus identified two upper classes in Taiwan: the first, those with an education who constituted a scholar-official class as in China before 1949, and the second, those who found wealth through business. Though both had to adjust to unique modernizing forces in Taiwan, over time they merged to some degree with the impact of money in politics.11 In Taiwan—as in China, Japan and other Asian countries—parents or other relatives arranged marriages. These marriages bonded families, and young men and women frequently had little or no say about the selection of their mates. In fact, it was not uncommon for a couple to have had no acquaintance before marriage; sometimes they had not even seen each other. Young married women were usually subservient to their husbands and to the elders in his family, but their status was no lower and, in fact, was generally higher than that of women in most traditional societies. Married women’s status usually increased over time because of the respect for age in Chinese culture.12 As to social structure, norms and mores, among the Chinese population early on, Taiwan was not much different from China. But when the Communists took control of China in 1949, they sought to reconstruct society, and, in the process, they deliberately vitiated the family system and redirected the individual’s loyalty toward the state and the Communist Party. This had a profound impact on the society. Nothing similar happened in Taiwan, although the KMT-run government endeavored to nurture nationalism for the purpose of building the state; the central role of the family in society suffered somewhat in the process. The modernization processes, on the other hand—especially urbanization, mass education, consumerism, materialism and Westernization—profoundly affected the family system in Taiwan. These forces of change were gradual but very strong and generally engendered a weaker family structure and preference for the nuclear family over the extended family.13 In China, since the death of Mao, the family has to a considerable degree been restored to a central societal role; in this respect, there is now less difference with Taiwan. Greater contact between Taiwan and China has also fostered convergences in social views and to some extent the nature of the two societies.

Ethnic Issues As noted in Chapter 1, four ethnic or subethnic groups populate Taiwan: the Aborigines, Fukien Chinese (also called Fukienese or Hoklo or Holo), Hakka and Mainland Chinese (or Mainlanders). There is disagreement about whether the term “ethnic” accurately describes the Chinese groups; some prefer “subethnic” or “provincial.” Alternatively, they can be defined by the date they took up residence in Taiwan. The Aborigines, however, are generally considered “ethnically” different from the three Chinese groups; in fact, they are sometimes said to be a different race from the other three. If self-identification by the four groups is

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considered important, then they constitute discrete groups. The three categories of Chinese may be said to constitute groups that are distinct in culture, language and in some other ways; yet there are vast similarities in their social systems. They are all Han people that make up over 90 percent of the population of China.14 In the past, the Aborigines were severely discriminated against by the Chinese population because of their more primitive cultures and the fact the Chinese considered them uncivilized. Also, there was strife between the two groups that lasted for centuries. Most Chinese also thought of the Aborigines as savages because of their cultural/religious practice of headhunting. Prejudice against the Aborigines, based on their lifestyles and less success in education, business and more, as well as their simply not being Chinese, persists to this day.15 Under the Japanese, the Aborigines were kept separate from each other and the rest of the population. Nationalist Chinese policy, on the other hand, was to integrate them into Chinese society. It seemed that neither worked. The Aborigines were thus regarded by both as a problem group. They were, and are, afflicted with higher rates of unemployment, alcoholism, adolescent prostitution and various other social ills. At the turn of the century their incomes were but 40 percent of the average in Taiwan.16 Because of this, they have for some time received special education, job training and other benefits through provisions in the Constitution to help disadvantaged minority groups.17 In recent years, social welfare and a host of assistance programs to help the Aborigines have proliferated. Still, the Aborigines are considered underprivileged. Most do not want to be assimilated and many view their government’s social programs as conferring few real benefits while causing their further cultural breakdown. Also they view the government’s program of foreign guest workers as harmful to improving their conditions.18 The Aborigines may face an even more serious problem. According to government figures published in the 1990s, Aborigines living in special communities had a combined population of 512,000—around 2 percent of Taiwan’s total population. Now around one-sixth of Aborigines had permanently or semi-permanently migrated to the cities in search of work, compared to 5,000 who lived in cities in 1960 and 30,000 in 1980. The histories of the various Aborigine tribes, which are mainly oral, were being lost; so were their languages, arts and songs. Some opined the Aborigines are heading for assimilation and extinction.19 Democracy, on the other hand, has begun to transform the Aborigines into vocal minority groups that have become to some degree unified politically. Most Aboriginal organizations advocate policies of separateness so as to preserve their society and culture. Thus, their social integration and the obliteration of their culture are not foregone conclusions. In any case, the integration and assimilation of the Aborigines are not firm government policies. In fact, the DPP, to attract their votes, have supported their right to be on their own and avoid assimilation.20

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Early on, the KMT, based on provisions in the Constitution, provided the Aborigines with special representation in the legislature and created special organizations to guarantee their political influence, while extending other government help to them. This and the fact there was considerable animosity between them and the Taiwanese, especially the Fukien Taiwanese, the Aborigines consistently supported KMT candidates at election times. In 2008, when the size of the legislature was cut in half (from 225 to 113), the Aborigines were given six seats to represent them, which further increased their political clout.21 The 2016 election saw the DPP win more votes from the Aborigines than usual and, after she became president, Tsai Ing-wen made a public apology to them for their bad treatment in the past. She also made promises to improve relations between them and her party. However, the Aborigines continued to express hostility toward the DPP and engaged in public demonstrations against the Tsai administration.22 Thus it is uncertain whether the Aborigines will change their allegiance or not. It is also in question whether the Tsai administration’s progressive agenda will diminish their status as a disadvantaged group. The culture and social structure of the Hakkas were unique before they migrated to Taiwan. In China they had long suffered from various forms of discrimination; they were even barred from taking the imperial examination throughout various periods of Chinese history. They were in particular treated badly after the failed Taiping Rebellion in the mid-1800s since its leader, Hong Xiuquan, was Hakka. Due to their persecution, they developed a strong sense of “separateness and clannishness they took with them to Taiwan.”23 They retained a sense of unity partly due to insecurity because of the dangers of living in close proximity to the Aborigines—closer than the Fukien Chinese who forced the Hakkas from good farmland close to the shore and into hilly, less fertile areas. Hakka culture was also affected by their minority status in Taiwan vis-à-vis the Fukienese Taiwanese and the fact they frequently fought. Thus, notwithstanding the cultural homogenization Taiwan has experienced in recent years, Hakka culture remains different and many Hakkas still live apart or in Hakka communities.24 Hakka social customs and mores differ in various ways from those of the Fukien Taiwanese and the Mainland Chinese. Hakka women, for example, engage in physically taxing work such as road building, construction and agriculture. Yet they are typically more passive and self-effacing than other Chinese women. Observers also note that Hakka men favor certain professions (such as railroad jobs, police work, fishing, small business and trade) because in the past they were unable to acquire good land or lost it to the Fukien Taiwanese. Some say the Hakkas have a stronger family system because of the prejudice and ill treatment they faced both in China and in Taiwan. Westerners have observed that Hakka make better soldiers because of their aggressiveness, demonstrated in particular during the Japanese period.25 Hakkas can be identified not only by their customs but also by their ancestral records and language (or dialect, which Fukien Taiwanese and

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Mainland Chinese seldom speak or understand). Many Western authors, though, do not distinguish between the Hakkas and the Fukien Taiwanese, simply lumping them together under the term “Taiwanese.” This is odd given that their cultures are quite distinct and in 1947 during the February 28 Incident, Fukien Taiwanese killed many Hakka, thinking they would side with the Mainland Chinese in the event of a broader conflict.26 Hakkas call themselves “Taiwanese” (since they regard Taiwan as their home and have even fewer familial ties with China than the Fukienese Taiwanese). However, in many respects, they do not consider themselves Taiwanese at least in the same way the Fukien Taiwanese do. In the past they got along with the Mainlanders better than the Fukien Taiwanese did and, indeed, still do. In many respects, they see themselves as a minority group like the Mainland Chinese. Also Hakkas, some say, identify less with Taiwan than do the Fukienese Taiwanese and are more cosmopolitan because they identify with and admire Sun Yat-sen, Deng Xiaoping and Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore’s former prime minister), all Hakka. When the DPP was formed in 1986 the new party made efforts to attract Hakka followers, but one stumbling block was that Hakkas generally did not agree with DPP leaders that the KMT was undemocratic.27 During the Chen Shui-bian presidency, Hakkas were also at odds with the Fukien Taiwanese on a number of other issues. One of the serious disagreements between the two groups came from the efforts by Fukien Taiwanese to make Taiwanese the official language of the country. Another was government hiring policies that discriminated against non-Fukien Taiwanese.28 Hakkas are reported to be around 15 percent of the population. Some claim that the figure may be even higher because many Hakkas lost their identity when they stopped speaking their language or intermarried with Fukien Taiwanese. Hakkas have adjusted to modernization well, much better than have the Aborigines. Although their incomes are lower than other Chinese on average, many Hakka have done well economically. Noteworthy they have been quite successful in politics. Former president Lee Teng-hui is Hakka (though he doesn’t speak Hakka), as well as Wu Poh-hsiung and a number of other top figures in the Nationalist Party. Ma Ying-jeou claims Hakka heritage. Tsai Ing-wen is Hakka. In recent years, Hakkas have also come to comprise an important voting bloc and have thus increased their political influence at election time. Fukienese trace their ancestry to Fukien Province, though until recently few had been there. Like the Hakka, most did not plan to return to China when they left. Years of separation from the Mainland led them to identify with Taiwan and to see the island, rather than China, as their home. In fact, many have come to regard themselves as Chinese only in the limited sense that European Americans see themselves as Europeans. Some Fukien Taiwanese have even made the argument that they are not Chinese.29 They point out that because women were not allowed to migrate to

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Taiwan for long periods, many men found Aboriginal wives; thus, they are a “mixed race.” This point has been used by pro-independence advocates in the DPP in order to assert that Taiwan and China are different places and should be legally separate. The whole story, however, should include the fact that many Mainland Chinese soldiers found Aboriginal wives in 1949 and after, and that 90 percent of Fukienese and Hakka have some Vietnamese ancestry.30 In addition, some anthropologists contend the population of China is comprised of many ethnically “mixed people” since many Chinese in north China have Mongol and Manchu DNA and many in south China have Vietnamese and Thai DNA. The Fukien Taiwanese brought their social structure and organization with them from China, specifically southern Fukien Province. Their culture was Chinese but it differed from that of other parts of China. Fukienese culture, like Hakka culture, gradually changed with the separation from China, numerous contacts with foreign countries and 50 years of Japanese rule. The Fukien Taiwanese were originally mostly farmers, fishermen and traders, and, though many still are, increasing numbers of them have entered business—usually family businesses or firms owned and operated by other Fukien Taiwanese. Today, they dominate the business community, and for this reason their socioeconomic status has improved faster than any other ethnic group in Taiwan.31 The Fukien Taiwanese have also become active politically, early on joining the KMT (including former president Chen Shui-bian), running for office as independents and applying for government jobs. Many started careers in local government or in law. Their status and influence grew from the 1970s on to such a degree that they are now the dominant ethnic group in Taiwan politically. Democratization has clearly favored the Fukien Taiwanese.32 Because the Fukien Taiwanese constitute a numerical majority—around 70 percent of the population—they often regard the other ethnic groups as minority groups. As mentioned earlier, the Fukienese lived apart from and often engaged in conflict with the Aborigines and the Hakka in the past. However, this was overshadowed by ill feelings toward Mainlanders that grew following World War II, particularly after the February 1947 “massacre.” After 1949, this tension worsened because of the large influx of Mainlanders who fled to Taiwan after the defeat of the Nationalist armies on the Mainland. Mainlanders at this time not only arrogated nearly all important positions in the national government and in education, but also assumed a higher class status based on their culture and language that they imposed on Taiwan’s population. All of this caused resentment among Fukienese.33 The Fukien Taiwanese also came to espouse political and social views quite different from the Mainland Chinese. They opposed what they considered high taxes. They did not favor large expenditures on the military. They also took a dim view of government bureaucracy and corruption and saw the two as connected.34 The Mainland Chinese came to Taiwan from various provinces of China after 1945, but most arrived in 1949. The majority were either soldiers or

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government officials. They represented all parts of China, though a disproportionate number hailed from the south and central parts of China, especially the coastal provinces. Few came from the northern and western provinces. For some time, an inordinately large number of top government officials in Taiwan came from Chekiang (Zhejiang), the province where Chiang Kai-shek was born, and Shanghai, which was his base of support; indeed, for some years, Mainland Chinese from other parts of China experienced discrimination—certainly disadvantages—when seeking government jobs. Many say this bias was also apparent in education and other areas.35 After they fled to Taiwan, the Mainlanders sought to preserve Chinese traditions. They spoke Mandarin Chinese (which was the national language of China and traditionally the language of the educated) and, compared with the other Chinese groups residing in Taiwan, had greater—or at least more recent—contact with the fount of Chinese culture. As the self-designated protectors of Chinese civilization, many Mainlanders expressed condescending attitudes toward Taiwanese. They emulated their group’s elites and/or saw preserving Chinese tradition as a matter of pride and/or self-identification. In addition, Mainland Chinese made a claim of cultural superiority on the basis of the years of Japanese colonial rule of Taiwan, which “Japanized” the island’s population. Finally, because of their experiences at the hands of the Japanese military during World War II, the Mainland Chinese generally disliked or even hated Japanese. For this reason, when they arrived in Taiwan, they felt that Japanese culture, which many, especially Fukienese Taiwanese, had adopted, should be eradicated as quickly as possible.36 Taiwanese do not espouse such an attitude, and many, especially higher-class Taiwanese, speak of the period of Japanese colonization as better than the periods of “Chinese colonization” before and after that. Many perceive that Japan ruled Taiwan very well. Many admire Japanese culture. This admiration has been an ethnic “identifier”; indeed, foreigners have often observed that one can discern the difference between the Mainland Chinese and the Taiwanese by their attitudes toward the Japanese and by the presence or absence of Japanese items in their homes. Mainland Chinese are urban dwellers more than are the other groups, with more residing in Taipei proportionally than anywhere else. In fact, certain districts or suburbs of Taipei are predominantly Mainland Chinese.37 Recently, Mainlanders have developed a new type of clannishness that stems from being a minority in the context of Fukien Taiwanese gaining political power. Many, in fact, say they prefer to live in their own areas for that reason. When they came to Taiwan, many Mainlanders brought wealth with them and/or had good jobs in the government or elsewhere through family and political party (KMT) connections. They filled most of the official positions formerly occupied by the Japanese, and some took over Japanese businesses. Their education level was higher than that of the other three ethnic groups in Taiwan and that remains so today. The socioeconomic status of Mainland Chinese, however, has fallen over the years because of the success of Taiwanese

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in business and the failure of public sector salaries to keep pace with those in the private sector. The children of Mainlander families now frequently work at menial jobs; daughters are even employed as bar girls—formerly a profession for Taiwanese. Many observers of Taiwan’s current social structure regard the retired Mainlander soldiers as the most hapless of any segment of the society, having neither family roots nor economic wherewithal. It is certainly no longer accurate to say that the Mainlanders exploit Taiwanese or that Taiwanese are a disadvantaged or oppressed group. In some important ways, it is just the opposite.38 The narrative about the four ethnic groups, however, may be too simple. There are other groups that need to be considered when speaking or writing of Taiwan’s society and especially when assessing both future social issues and political leanings (including their views on independence versus unification). Such groups include Chinese spouses (which number 350,000 in Taiwan), migrant workers (mostly from Southeast Asia and which numbered more than 700,000 at the end of 2018), foreign immigrants, Taishang (or residents of Taiwan that reside in China to do business—two-thirds of whom vote for the KMT), residents of Taiwan living in the United States (many of them naturalized, but still have an interest in Taiwan).39 Finally, it is crucial to point out that ethnicity was once easily discerned from accent, physical appearance and even mannerisms; this is no longer so true. In fact, now it is often difficult to know the ethnic group of young people without asking.40 Thus, ethnic differences and prejudices have faded in recent years with amazing speed. In fact, ethnic barriers have also diminished much faster than most observers anticipated three or four decades ago owing to Taiwan’s rapid economic growth and the material culture it has created and because virtually all ethnic groups have shared in Taiwan’s prosperity. A considerable amount of Westernization has also contributed, as have urbanization and intermarriage. Similarly, government policies have helped, including policies that favored Taiwanese in government job recruitment and hiring beginning in the 1970s. Finally, almost the entire population of Taiwan—and certainly all its ethnic groups—shared a common desire to remain independent of the People’s Republic of China for as long as it was poor and Communist. Despite all this, ethnic tension increased in Taiwan after the election of Chen Shui-bian to the presidency in early 2000. He appealed to Fukienese voters on the basis of ethnicity and won the election that way.41 The majority of all other ethnic groups voted more for another candidate: James Soong. Subsequently, Chen and the DPP played the “ethnic card” in order to govern. The three minority groups complained of official bias by the government that favored Fukien Taiwanese.42 In 2008, Ma Ying-jeou, a Mainland Chinese, campaigned on a platform of healing ethnic relations and this among other factors helped him win the election by a wide margin. This indicated the electorate—even a significant number of Fukienese—had come to disapprove of the Chen government’s policies of exploiting ethnic differences. In ensuing years, under Ma, Taiwan

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experienced greater ethnic harmony. Problems remained, however, and there was some backsliding or at least less emphasis given to ethnic harmony during the later years of the Ma presidency.43 Further, Ma’s efforts to dampen tension in the Taiwan Strait was seen by many as a pro-unification policy and “caving in” to China’s efforts to extinguish Taiwan’s sovereignty. The DPP adopting populism as its strategy to rebuild the party after the Chen presidency and win future elections was successful in painting this as being dangerous and not in Taiwan’s interests. Populism thus increased ethnic consciousness. The fact Ma’s closest advisors were Mainland Chinese made this more credible. So did his running feud with Speaker of the Legislature Wang Jin-pyng (a Fukien Taiwanese) throughout his tenure, a problem that became acute during Ma’s second term.44 When Tsai Ing-wen ran for president in 2015 and early 2016, her progressive agenda included promoting diversity and multiculturalism and also ethnic harmony. She appeared clearly qualified to advance these themes. She was female. She was Hakka and naturally appealed to many Hakka. She was instrumental in rebuilding the DPP after its dark days at the end of the Chen presidency and after, and thus appealed to Fukien Taiwanese. She spoke often about the problems of the Aborigines and made helping them the centerpiece of her progressive narrative.45 But her preferred language was Mandarin and her views on independence were moderate compared to many DPP supporters. As president she made an official apology to the Aborigines. She made Hakka one of Taiwan’s official languages. In short, she kept her promises, though her critics said this was but pro forma and in many ways was superficial. Alas many of her efforts proved to be ineffective or counterproductive. However, to be fair perhaps she was dealing with intractable problems and had undertaken too many tasks. In other words, she had promised too much.46 In the way of a conclusion, democracies have certain advantages in dealing with ethnic divisions; yet in some ways democratic processes lend themselves to more not fewer problems. Certainly election campaigns in Taiwan exacerbate ethnic relations as playing the “race card” or advancing ethnic politics is too attractive to politicians who want to win. This has been true in spades of Taiwan.47

Languages and Religions The overwhelming majority of Taiwan’s Chinese (all three groups) and the Aborigines speak Mandarin Chinese, or kuo yu (meaning “national language”), which derives from the Beijing dialect in a somewhat similar way to how American English comes from British English. There are differences in accent, but this does not prevent Mandarin from being a language nearly everyone can use for at least basic communications. The two Taiwanese groups also speak their own languages or dialects (different languages in the sense that they are mutually unintelligible, though they are very similar,

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almost identical, grammatically and in the written form—Chinese not being a phonetic language but rather one that employs pictographs and ideographs). Most Mainland Chinese, with the exception of the young, know the regional dialect of the province or area that they or their parents came from. Thus, although the Chinese residents of Taiwan often do not understand what others are saying, they do have a medium of communication that enables them to talk to each other. Ease of communicating is enhanced by Taiwan’s high rate of literacy, the difficulty of written Chinese notwithstanding.48 The Aborigines speak languages that resemble Malay in structure and in some other ways. Yet the Aboriginal languages or dialects differ considerably, and the various tribes cannot communicate with others in any of their tongues. The Aboriginal languages were not written until the Dutch period, when they were rendered into an alphabetic form and taught in schools. In recent times, Aboriginal languages have been dying out with modernization, though both official and unofficial efforts have helped revive and preserve them.49 Fukien Taiwanese speak Taiwanese, or min nan hua, a derivative of the Amoy dialect of Chinese, or Amoy Fukienese, spoken in southern Fukien Province.50 Almost all also speak Mandarin Chinese. Hakkas speak the Hakka dialect, which originated in north China but was influenced over the centuries by various dialects in southern China where many Hakkas lived. Most—indeed, nearly all—of the Hakka population of Taiwan also speak Taiwanese and Mandarin. Some Hakkas do not speak Hakka, especially if they grew up in a non-Hakka community or their parents didn’t teach them. Some older Taiwanese do not speak Mandarin Chinese but rather speak Japanese. Many younger Mainlanders speak Taiwanese, especially if they have grown up outside of Taipei. Most Aborigines speak Mandarin Chinese and Taiwanese; some speak Japanese. In short, almost all the Republic of China’s residents speak two or more dialects or languages. There are regional accents in both Taiwanese and Hakka. Most Taiwanese, for example, can be identified from their speech as being from the northern or southern part of the island. Older Mainlanders have accents coming from their provincial dialects. Local accents, however, are rapidly disappearing because of social mobility and the influence of national radio and television. Some differences have evolved in the versions of Mandarin Chinese, called pu tung hua, meaning “common language,” in the People’s Republic of China and kuo yu, or “national language,” in Taiwan. These differences stem from more than four decades of almost total separation as well as from Western influence in Taiwan and the lack of it in China. Another factor was efforts by the government of the People’s Republic of China to reform the language. In China, many of the characters have been simplified (sometimes for ideological reasons), whereas the traditional ones remain mostly in use in Taiwan. Words, phrases and slogans based on Communist teachings or ideology, or used in Mao’s various campaigns, are often not understood by people in Taiwan. Some Westernized Chinese terms used in Taiwan are not understood by Chinese in China. Yet with the proliferation of contacts, the increased travel by

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people from Taiwan to China in the past three decades, more people from China visiting Taiwan, and less censorship on both sides, the number of terms and phrases unfamiliar to people on one side or the other of the Taiwan Strait has decreased rapidly. Controversies have arisen over language use and policies in Taiwan. When Taiwan reverted to China after World War II, the Nationalist government made Mandarin the official language and tried to discourage the use of all dialects. Taiwanese found it difficult to adjust to this policy because it meant essentially learning a new spoken language. Also, many felt that Mandarin was being forced upon them, as Japanese had been forced on them 50 years earlier.51 Government officials, however, perceived this policy was a necessary part of nation building and modernization. Because Mandarin Chinese boasts more speakers than any other language in the world by a significant margin and is very useful for reasons ranging from travel and commercial relations to education and research, many residents of Taiwan, including the Taiwanese and the Aborigines, have long supported its use in the education system, government and elsewhere. Opening contacts with China in the 1980s and China’s economic boom have amplified this argument. Yet there have also been movements in Taiwan to use Taiwanese and Hakka more. Three decades ago, demands for radio and television programs in Taiwanese began to emerge; demands for Hakka followed and, more recently, the Aboriginal languages.52 In counterpoint, many Fukien Taiwanese see the use of their language as an expression of ethnic pride as well as their dominance in politics, thus it is seen as mirroring the language of democratization in Taiwan. Indeed, many Taiwanese politicians make it a point to speak Taiwanese when campaigning and sometimes use it in government meetings. Some Fukien Taiwanese, especially those advocating a separate or independent Taiwan, argue that Taiwanese is a unique language, very different from Mandarin Chinese. It is true that it contains different sounds and that the system of tones is not the same; it is therefore unintelligible to Mandarin speakers. However, it is structurally much more like ancient Chinese than is Mandarin Chinese. Thus, some say Taiwanese is more Chinese than Mandarin Chinese. Despite the posturing and occasionally bitter debates about language, there have been no language riots in Taiwan as there have been in some other countries. Though continued controversy over language is likely, Taiwan will no doubt remain bilingual or multilingual. The majority of Taiwan’s population has been raised speaking more than one language or dialect, and most see an advantage in keeping a multilingual population in Taiwan. Those who have advocated making Taiwanese the sole official language of the country to accord with majority rule have not had much success because Taiwanese is not very useful outside of Taiwan, except for some Chinese communities in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, as Taiwan’s dealings with China, commercially and in other ways, continue to expand, Mandarin Chinese becomes increasingly vital.53

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In addition to Chinese, English and some other Western languages, as well as Japanese, are taught in the schools from primary grades through college and university, though among various foreign languages English predominates. In fact, English is now compulsory in most grade schools. Many English textbooks are used in Taiwan’s colleges and universities, especially in the technical fields. Chinese language texts are generally not as good or are not considered up-to-date. Also, students feel a need to know the vocabulary of their field of study in English so they can attend graduate school abroad or communicate with foreigners in their profession. Citizens who travel abroad frequently also use English in business.54 Language is not the only way Taiwan is diverse. So are its religious beliefs and practices. Westerners find it odd when they ask people in Taiwan what religion they adhere to and most mention more than one. This is because Taiwan’s religions are not exclusive as they are in the West. Nor have religion and politics become very much intertwined. Thus, religion seldom has been the basis for discrimination, ethnic enmity or social conflict. Hence observers have described Taiwan as a nation of extraordinary religious tolerance. Indeed, it might be the foremost place in the world as far as religious freedom is concerned.55 Almost all religions are practiced in Taiwan without difficulty or interference. The Aborigines of Taiwan practice animism, nature worship and various kinds of sacrifice. They also combine ancestor worship with agrarian rites. Their belief systems are polytheistic and they make no clear distinctions between gods and spirits. Except for two groups, the Aborigines do not espouse the concept of a god-creator. In the past, some tribes practiced headhunting as a source of religious prestige and to enhance their qualifications for marriage. This, of course, is no longer true. Chinese migrants brought Taoism, Confucianism and Buddhism to Taiwan, as well as some other religions. The Dutch brought Protestant Christianity, the Spanish brought Catholicism and the Japanese brought Shinto. When the Communists captured China in 1949, many religious organizations and their officials, as well as ministers and priests, fled to Taiwan, thereby adding to Taiwan’s religious mix.56 The principal religions of Taiwan—by number of followers—are Buddhism, Taoism, Christianity and I-Kuan Tao (the Religion of Unity). Buddhists are said to constitute 35.1 percent of the population and Taoists 33.0 percent. Christians total 3.7 percent (Protestants are 2.6 percent and Catholics 1.3 percent). I-Kuan Tao followers are 3.5 percent. Several other religious groups claim adherents numbering more than 100,000. There are nearly 60,000 people of the Islamic faith in Taiwan, most having come from China in 1949, though Islam was practiced in Taiwan before that.57 It is also worth noting that many people in Taiwan will say they follow more than one religion: frequently Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism (those belief systems not being exclusivist). Having said this, there is a major caveat: some say almost all Chinese in Taiwan are Confucian. But this means espousing Chinese culture, philosophy

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and certain ethical principles rather than holding to special religious beliefs. Though many people regard Confucianism as a religion most do not technically see it as such. Also, surveys reveal a large portion, 18.7 percent, of the population reports to be agnostics or atheists (though not in the anti-religious sense) or having no religion.58 Taoism is the oldest of the Chinese religions on Taiwan, tracing its origins to the teachings and writings of Lao Tzu, who lived in the sixth century BC. Lao Tzu taught individual freedom, laissez-faire attitudes about government, human spontaneity, living in accord with nature or the Tao (meaning “the way” or “path”) and mystical experience. Taoist teachings became more spiritual in nature in the third century BC, after which Taoism evolved into an organized religion. Central to Taoism’s religious side is belief in the attainment of immortality. In other words, people who live in harmony with their natural environment, according to Taoist teachings, are able to become immortals. Taoism also incorporates the theory of opposites, or yin and yang, which must be reconciled to strike an essential equilibrium or balance in the universe.59 During the seventh through the ninth centuries AD, Taoism became the religion of the court in China. Subsequently, it adopted aspects of Buddhism and Confucianism and fragmented into different sects or schools. The Tao Te Ching is the classic text or “bible” of Taoism. Taoism was brought to Taiwan by the earliest Chinese immigrants and was practiced on the island by Chinese communities. During the Japanese period, however, Taoism was suppressed because it was associated with Chinese patriotism and nationalism. As a result, many Taoist temples were reregistered as Buddhist temples. After World War II, Taoism made a revival. In 1950, Chang En-pu, a Taoist priest from China, established a Taoist fellowship while creating a more organized form of Taoism in Taiwan. There are now more than 18,000 Taoist temples, more than any other religion, and a large number of clergy in Taiwan, as well as a college, various other schools, hospitals and a library.60 Buddhism originated in India in the sixth century BC from the teachings of an Indian prince, Siddhartha Gautama, who renounced his royal status and lifestyle to engage in a search for truth. Better known as the Buddha, he taught the Four Noble Truths: life is suffering, suffering is the result of one’s desires, one should control one’s desires and the way to eliminate desire is the Eightfold Path. The Eightfold Path consists of right views, intentions, speech, conduct, livelihood, effort, mindfulness and concentration. In the second century BC, Mahayana (the Greater Vehicle) Buddhism developed the belief in Bodhisattvas, or enlightened people capable of saving sentient beings, and the idea that attainders of merit (for doing good deeds) would reach a state of release called Nirvana. These ideas were similar to many Taoist beliefs prevalent in China, an affinity that helped Buddhism gain acceptance there.61 Brought by early Chinese immigrants, Buddhism became more popular in Taiwan in the late sixteenth century when Cheng Ch’eng-kung built many

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Buddhist temples and supported the religion in other ways. Some of the temples were also used by practitioners of Taiwan’s folk religions, thus giving Buddhism a local flavor. The main Buddhist sect that prospered in Taiwan was Chan. During the Japanese period, when Japanese Buddhists of various sects proselytized in Taiwan and Japanese monks took leading positions in the temples, Buddhist teachings and doctrine changed to resemble Japanese Buddhism in many ways. Moral and disciplinary codes and education were particularly affected. In 1949, many Buddhist monks fled to Taiwan from China and brought with them Buddhist practices and traditions not known previously in Taiwan.62 In recent years, Buddhist organizations in Taiwan have been socially active, especially in working with the island’s youth. They have also taken an interest in education, even building institutions of higher learning and sponsoring religious programs on television. Taiwan has numerous Buddhist temples, though Taoist temples are much more in number (18,274 compared to 4,006).63 There are also a number of Buddhist seminaries, universities, colleges, orphanages, hospitals, retirement homes and libraries. In addition, Buddhist organizations have been heavily involved in social welfare. In 1991, Master Sheng Yen, a leading Buddhist priest, received the Roman Magsaysay Award (Asia’s version of the Nobel Peace Prize) for his contributions to the society. That same year, the Tzu Chi Foundation raised US$16 million for flood victims in China. In 1996, several Buddhist organizations supported Chen Li-an—son of former governor Chen Ch’eng under Chiang Kai-shek, and a devout Buddhist—for president, though this help did not prove very useful to his campaign. In March 1997, the Dalai Lama visited Taiwan for five days and met with President Lee; he visited again in April 2001. He visited Taiwan in 2009 after Typhoon Morakot, notwithstanding protests from China.64 In 2012 a visit was cancelled due to pressure from China. After Tsai Ing-wen was elected president she invited him to visit Taiwan and that visit happened in September 2016 notwithstanding China’s protests.65 Confucianism originated in China in the pre-Christian period based on the teachings of Confucius, born in 551 BC. Confucius is said to have edited or written several classic books: The Book of Songs, The Book of History, The Book of Rites, The Book of Change and The Spring and Autumn Annals. The ethical teachings of Confucius are recorded in The Analects and The Great Learning. The metaphysical aspects of Confucianism are found in The Doctrine of the Mean. Through their teachings and writings, Mencius and Hsun Tzu, Chinese philosophers who lived two centuries later, contributed to what later became Confucian doctrine.66 Confucianism, in its original form, may be said to be more an ethical code or handbook for behavior than a religion. When it became China’s official ideology—or the Imperial Court’s political philosophy—during the Han Dynasty (206 BC–AD 221), it embraced a broad spectrum of ideas, though its central themes were rationalism and worldliness. Confucianism later took on

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the characteristics of a philosophy and a religion, but this transformation did not overshadow its rational side, nor did it affect the opposing ideas it held about human nature, social order and the like. For example, Mencius taught that man was basically good, whereas Hsun Tzu was pessimistic. Mencius was democratic, Hsun Tzu legalistic. Confucianism, despite its eclecticism, expresses a unique reverence toward heaven and supports ancestor worship and in these ways is as much a religion as a philosophy.67 Confucianism came to Taiwan with the early Chinese migrants, though Chinese officials who came to Taiwan later propagated it more. Thought of as a political philosophy or ethical code for officials, it is also a “people’s philosophy” and has contributed to ideals about the family and interactions among people. There are Confucian temples in Taiwan, though some say they serve the purpose of honoring Confucius and are not strictly for worship. Over the years, Confucianism incorporated many local religious beliefs in China. It did the same in Taiwan.68 I-Kuan Tao (also written Yiguandao) was founded by Wang Jueyi in China’s Shandong Province in the late nineteenth century. It grew to become a major religious movement in China in the 1930s reaching 12 million followers. It spread to Korea, Japan and Taiwan and was recognized as a legal religion in 1987 in Taiwan. Meanwhile, it was banned in China in 1949, though that ban was lifted early in the twenty-first century.69 I-Kuan Tao means the consistent or persistent way or the tao that “unifies all with one.” It is also considered a folk religion that emphasizes redemption and salvation. Its highest deity is the primordial energy of the universe and embraces the idea of a universal reality. It is also regarded as a strong spiritual movement that emphasizes family, honor and respect. It encourages missionary activity.70 Christianity’s stature in Taiwan is more a function of its social and political influence than the number of its followers. In the past Christian missionaries were actively involved in social-help programs and education, founding a number of schools (both secondary and higher) and hospitals. Many are quite influential in Taiwan today. Taiwan’s Christians to a considerable extent maintain ties with followers in other countries, thereby adding to Taiwan’s cosmopolitanism and internationalism.71 A number of Taiwan’s top political leaders have been Christian. In fact, before 2000 all presidents were Christians. Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo were Methodists (though how serious they were has often been questioned). Yen Chia-kan, the “interim president” between them, was Catholic. Lee Teng-hui was Presbyterian—a denomination that actively supports Fukien Taiwanese interests and was and is pro-independence. In 1991, it issued a public statement saying Taiwan was a sovereign state and Taiwan and China were two countries.72 Ma Ying-jeou was baptized in the Catholic Church when he was eight years old. However, when he was older and as president he did not make much of his religion. Chen Shui-bian was reported to be a follower of I-Kuan Tao though some said he was also Buddhist and Taoist. During the 2000 election campaign,

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Chen claimed the “Royal Lords” (local Taoist deities) supported him. However, unlike other presidents he was not much of a supporter of Confucianism; in fact, Chen cancelled Confucias’ Birthday, also Teachers’ Day (September 28) as a national holiday when he was president. Tsai Ing-wen has not stated that she is a follower of any religion, but many assume she adheres to the “three teachings” (Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism). During the 2016 election campaign, Buddhist Master Hsing Yun compared her to Mazu, the Chinese goddess of the sea that people associate with compassion and with love for Taiwan. After this, local Buddhist notables praised Tsai. This likely helped her win votes.73 There are few major differences among the ethnic groups in Taiwan in terms of religious preferences, though there are more Christians among Mainland Chinese and Aborigines due to Western influence and proselytizing. Taiwanese more frequently say they are Buddhist. But, as mentioned, the people and the government in Taiwan are very tolerant of religious beliefs and practices, so what religion (or religions) one espouses is not usually considered important. In China, after 1949 religion was viewed as a challenge to communism, an “opiate of the people,” and a propagator of superstition; thus, it was the target of eradication or suppression. In consequence, on the issue of religion, there has long been little understanding between the people on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. On the other hand, religious freedom in China has increased since Mao’s death, and the gap between China and Taiwan in this regard has closed somewhat.

Early Forces of Social Change As noted earlier, the Chinese who emigrated to Taiwan several centuries ago had to adjust to a new and in many ways hostile environment. Hence, the culture and social organizations in the Chinese settlements evolved in response to an array of often harsh challenges presented by life in Taiwan: hostile Aborigines, ethnic feuds, civil unrest, violence, high crime rates, an imbalance in the sex ratio— societal traits that characterized “frontier areas” elsewhere in the world.74 The Chinese communities were thus organized more along ethnic lines and for defense, not like the farming communities they had been accustomed to in China. So Taiwan’s Chinese population culturally became more one based on security needs. In addition, it became more eclectic than in most parts of China, being influenced by the mingling of customs of Aboriginal groups, Western culture and contacts with other peoples or nations in the region. Education and family origins did not remain so critical to class status as they were in China. Another matter was that the Chinese communities in Taiwan were confused about relations with China—and even about their roots. Some wanted to keep their ties with China; some did not. Thus, their society and culture changed, yet they remained in many ways Chinese. However, a Taiwanese national identity did not develop. This helps explain why foreign influence on Taiwan’s culture was considerable in ensuing years.75

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Dutch rule brought significant social change to Taiwan, making Taiwan more cosmopolitan and Western, though its influence was limited to one generation and affected a relatively small portion of the population. The Dutch did, however, have a definite modernizing affect in Taiwan. Some of it was lasting: a money system, trade, capitalism, Christianity. Cheng family rule, which followed the Dutch period, generated a sense of local identity, but not among all Chinese living on the island and not for very long. Subsequent Chinese rule changed Taiwan socially and culturally, though the Manchus (the rulers of China at the time) had little lasting influence in transferring their culture to Taiwan. During this period some aspects of Chinese society and culture that faded in China were retained in Taiwan.76 After 1895, Japanese rule brought a new round of social change, both positive and negative. Tokyo abolished certain land use laws, namely the practice whereby the government granted permanent first title to land that was then transferred to secondary owners who, in turn, paid the first owners for its use and then cultivated or rented the land. Japan also outlawed the practice of buying servants (a form of slavery) along with a host of Chinese superstitions. Meanwhile, the building of a national economy created a new business class that included bankers and financial experts, not to mention entrepreneurs. The Japanese language was used in the education system and in official transactions, providing greater access to foreign—especially Western—technology and learning.77 There, of course, was more. When Taiwan reverted to China in 1945, Japanese social and other influences were eliminated by deliberate policies of the Nationalist government. The Japanese language was no longer used in government matters or in education. Japanese newspapers, magazines, books and movies were banned. Chinese officials spread their culture and enforced new social norms and rules. The Chinese, as well as the Aborigines, had a difficult time adjusting. They had to learn Mandarin Chinese and the culture brought by the Mainland Chinese—difficult tasks considering there had been little contact between Taiwan and China for 50 years. They also had to adjust to a new legal and political system. In 1949, an influx of Mainland Chinese required housing, education, social services and jobs—all of which were in short supply. They displaced many Taiwanese from their jobs and dominated the upper echelons of society via positions in the government and education. These developments, understandably, created further ethnic friction and social instability.78 After 1945, social status in Taiwan depended largely on education and/or a position in the government or the military and, of course, wealth. Success in business, except small businesses, depended to a large extent on connections with the government because much of the economy, especially large enterprises, was in the public sector. Non-Mainland Chinese found better opportunities to rise socially by learning Mandarin Chinese and establishing ties in government, business and educational circles, or in the Nationalist Party. In all these realms, Mainland Chinese and their culture assumed a dominant role.79

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The most important factor fostering social progress in the post-1949 period in Taiwan, particularly in rural areas, was land reform. Rent reduction, the distribution of public lands and the land-to-the-tiller laws, which were put in effect between 1949 and 1953, were its main components. Together, they increased the percentage of owner-farmers from about one-third of rural residents in 1948 to nearly 60 percent in 1953. Meanwhile, the amount of land cultivated by owners increased to more than 75 percent of the total land tilled. Among its most immediate social impacts, land reform undermined the feudal political and social structures that had existed in rural Taiwan for some time. This created more citizen participation and democracy in local government and benefited economic growth and the capitalist system.80 In China, Mao implemented land reform, but it had quite different results from Taiwan and was in most respects judged a failure. Land reform had secondary effects on the culture and society. Landlords, mostly Taiwanese, who were compelled to sell their land, were compensated in the form of bonds in government corporations. Not happy with this policy while perceiving that the bonds had no potential for growth, most landowners sold them. Also, because land prices dropped in anticipation of the effects of land reform, the land was worth less than expected when it was sold. As a result, many landlords not only received a depressed price for their land but also missed an economic windfall from subsequent increases in the value of the stocks they were given for their land. The socioeconomic position of the former landlords, an elite group in Taiwan’s society, thus fell dramatically. It is fair to say that land reform not only eliminated the landlord–tenant relationship that was a central part of the island’s social system but it also reduced the landlord class to a small group with much less money and influence. This helped wipe out gross inequities in wealth in rural Taiwan; in fact, it contributed more than anything else to the levelling of incomes in Taiwan before the onset of industrialization.81 Land reform in Taiwan also brought secondary or delayed social changes or effects. It prompted the restructuring of rural society. The family no longer commanded the unquestioning loyalty of its members. The relationship between men and women changed, as did the practice of filial piety. The birth rate dropped. Agriculture became more efficient, leading younger people to seek jobs in the cities and farm families to decrease in size and number. Rural society became smaller and much more mobile.82 The success of land reform and the resultant increases in agricultural productivity gave rise to many farmers moving to the cities, as was noted in Chapters 1 and 5. The resultant urbanization of Taiwan’s population during the 1960s and after had a profound and lasting social impact. On the positive side, it fostered greater job specialization, created new employment opportunities, promoted social equality, reduced social and class barriers, and vastly increased cultural opportunities. On the negative side, it weakened the family and engendered social alienation, giving rise to serious increases in crime, juvenile problems and drug addiction.83

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The United States was also a catalyst for social change in Taiwan, especially after 1949. At first, U.S. influence was exerted through American economic and military assistance, plus the presence of a sizable number of U.S. military personnel on the island. After aid was ended in 1964, trade links with the United States became just as important, as did American capital investment. Contacts with Americans brought the ideals of democracy, social equality and progress to Taiwan. American books and movies also had a noticeable social impact, as did the many students who returned to Taiwan after studying in the United States—including many of its political leaders. (For some years, Taiwan sent more students to colleges and universities in the United States than did any country in the world.) The United States thus served as a model for social as well as economic and political change.84 Because of the importance of the United States and other Western countries and the fact Taipei claimed to be Free China, the government was especially responsive to and influenced by Western democratic culture. Further, because economic growth was export driven, Taiwan’s economic health and prosperity depended on friendly foreign markets, and as a consequence the island became increasingly penetrated by outside customs and ideas. Foreign travel, which became common in the 1970s and 1980s, also helped make Taiwan’s citizens global in their outlook. In short, Taiwan’s society and culture were heavily influenced by the external world notably the West.85 Underscoring the importance of the forces of change cited earlier, almost all of the social evolution (or devolution) that occurred in Taiwan after 1945 became permanent. This was facilitated by the attendant modernization being embraced heartily by most of the population while it was seen as either progressive or inevitable, or both. The key expediters of social change were economic growth, greater social and geographical mobility, expanded educational opportunities, and consumerism. They fostered even greater change in Taiwan because these and other influencers of change were mutually reinforcing and most contributed to a fast growing middle class.

Economic Development and Social Change Rapid economic growth has been a powerful force contributing to social and cultural change in Taiwan. Prosperity, in fact, has been the major “driver” behind its evolutionary—and in many ways “revolutionary”—social change Taiwan has experienced for the past six-plus decades. To understand both its speed and depth, it is helpful to re-examine some of Taiwan’s economic data, particularly as they show how prosperity engendered social change. From 1953 to 1970, farm output in Taiwan grew rapidly—at two to three times the rate of population growth. Extremely large productivity increases in the agricultural sector and then in industry in the mid-1960s caused personal incomes in Taiwan to skyrocket—from about US$50 per year in 1950 to $200 in 1964 to more than $3,000 by the mid-1980s and north of $10,000 by 1992. During this period the average income of citizens in Taiwan increased a stunning 200-fold.86

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Such rapid economic growth caused surplus labor to be quickly absorbed. Taiwan’s unemployment rate (which was probably in the 20 percent range in the 1950s) fell to 5.2 percent in 1963 and to less than 2 percent in the 1970s— a level, economists say, that is needed to allow workers to change jobs or seek retraining. In subsequent years, unemployment remained consistently below 3 percent.87 Low jobless rates caused base salaries—or the salaries of unskilled workers—to increase faster than others, markedly reducing the income gap between rich and poor. As a result, the income disparity ratio in Taiwan dropped from 15 percentage points (based on a comparison between the top 20 percent and the bottom 20 percent of the population) in 1952 to 4.9 in 1982 and to 4.1 a few years later. Taiwan’s level of income inequality became not only one of the lowest among developing nations, it even fell below that of both Japan and the United States.88 Prosperity first had an impact on diet: from 1952 to 1981, caloric intake increased from an average of 2,070 per day to 2,830—a figure that exceeded that of any place in Asia. Protein consumption grew and a greater variety of foods were added to the diets of residents. Next, it affected consumer buying. By 1986, 97.2 percent of families owned color television sets, 98.8 percent had refrigerators, 78.5 percent had washing machines, 83.2 percent had telephones, 30.3 percent owned air conditioners and 12.3 percent had automobiles. Soon the number of color TVs, refrigerators and washing machines per family in Taiwan was higher than in the United States. During this time, almost 80 percent of families in Taiwan became homeowners—one of the highest percentages in the world.89 In other words, growth with equity benefited almost everyone, causing Taiwan to become a modern, mass-consumption society. Growing affluence affected Taiwan’s society in other important ways. A decline in the birth rate, an aging population and rapid urbanization have already been discussed. The impact on education will be assessed in the next section of this chapter. The changing structure of employment and a new interest in politics will be discussed in subsequent chapters. Here, special attention will be given to changes in the social structure—both rural and urban, social classes, the status of women, the family, and leisure and travel. In rural Taiwan, as a result of the economic boom (which, as noted earlier, the agricultural sector experienced first because of land reform), the social structure changed from a family- or kinship-based one to an “associated” one. In other words, the interactions among friends and associates became relatively more important than contacts among relatives. Peasant society became less authoritarian and more democratic. The “leveling effect” of rural economic growth also led to the creation of new social and political organizations that were generally much bigger and comprised of more diverse memberships. In the language of sociologists, social organizations became horizontal rather than hierarchical in structure. Paternal and kinship relationships were replaced by mutual-benefit relations, while friendships and collegial relations supplanted family ties in the daily lives of residents.

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Societal leadership saw Confucian academics and the traditional gentry replaced by successful business people, professionals, educators, heads of farmers’ associations, community affairs leaders, politicians, and others.90 With increases in farm incomes came electrification, which made it possible for farmers to lead more active lives simply because they could stay up later. The popularity of radio and television that followed brought new forms of culture. Schools became more the locus of social interactions and cultural activities. Meanwhile, higher crop yields and increases in the planting of cash crops linked farmers to the marketplace, thus cementing ties between farmers and the government through crop improvement efforts, subsidies, and farmers’ co-ops. These relationships integrated rural Taiwan more fully into the national economy and broke down other barriers between rural and urban Taiwan. This helped a national culture emerge.91 In the cities, traditional culture broke down even faster and more completely. As a result of Taiwan’s rapid industrialization, people formed new bonds based on their professions. Even more than in rural Taiwan, in the cities people looked to the government for solutions to their problems. Western culture became much more widely accepted. Differences between rich and poor decreased, yet wealth became more important. Friendships, work, business and school ties became more important. The role of family declined. In short, many found new opportunities to change, usually enhance, their social status.92 These developments heralded the creation of a large middle class in a society that had once been bifurcated into high and low classes. By the 1980s, when asked about their social-class status, three-fourths of the population in Taiwan said they were middle class—a huge increase over the 1950s. More precisely, more than two-thirds of the population (according to a poll taken in 1986) ranked themselves between 4 and 7 on a social strata scale of 1 to 10. During this same period, over 60 percent said that their social position was higher than their parents, an indication that, for the majority of the population, social change was positive. Social transformation resulting from economic growth had still other ramifications: the effect of a father’s occupation on his son’s became small—about the same as it was in the United States. Profession became a more important indicator of class status (as self-defined, at least).93 Because of Taiwan’s economic prosperity, women’s roles changed markedly, especially in marriage and employment. Arranged marriages became a thing of the past, though arranged meetings, wherein either party had the right to refuse or reject the other, became common. Love came to be regarded as a desirable incentive to marry rather than a dangerous diversion from family arranged pairings. Women also began marrying later: at an average age of 26.1 in 2000 compared to 22.2 in 1971. In 2010, 37 percent of women in Taiwan aged 30–34 and 21 percent of those aged 35–39 were single.94 The number of women joining the labor force likewise increased very rapidly. In the past, women worked in the home; this began to change significantly in the 1950s. By 1961, 35.8 percent held jobs outside the home. In

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1990, the figure was 44.5 percent and in 2000, 46 percent—about the same percentage as in the United States and the countries of Western Europe. Perhaps even more telling was the large percentage of married women who began to work or stayed in the workforce after marriage. In 2008, almost half of adult women were working full-time.95 The social status of women, of course, improved markedly, though it was never as low as many Westerners have perceived it to be. Women in Chinese societies traditionally had much more control over their husbands and broader authority in the family than is generally assumed. Thus the transition to a modern society was not as difficult as it may have appeared. Today, women in Taiwan are active in politics, form their own companies and own or control a significant portion of the national wealth—more, proportionately, than women in the United States. They also travel alone more and are less frequently victims of crime and abuse compared to women in the United States. Global surveys confirm the positive changes in the status of women in Taiwan. In one survey, Taiwan ranked number 20 in the world in the U.N. Gender-related Development Index and number four in the Gender Inequality Index.96 Women do, however, report difficulties in their new roles. For example, many married women say they are burdened by working while retaining the primary responsibility for keeping the family together and raising the children. They complain that they cannot maintain close bonds with their children because they must put them in child-care centers or with relatives during the day. Many women say that they are severely discriminated against if they divorce. A large number of women report they do not enjoy opportunities available to men in business and politics. Many more women now suffer from stress and say they cannot cope with social change. Owing to this, a number of laws and other government actions were recently put in place to address these concerns.97 Economic and social changes have also wrought a profound transformation in the family structure in both rural and urban Taiwan. The extended family, which was the rule in the past, is now less common. By the early 1980s, more than half of families were nuclear, less than a quarter were extended and more than 5 percent were single-parent households. Meanwhile, family size decreased from an average of 5.9 persons in 1951 to 4.0 in 1990. A large part of the shift was accounted for by the fact that Taiwan was no longer an agricultural society. By 1996, less than 11 percent of the working population was employed in agriculture. Most of those who quit farming went to the big cities to live. Soon 50 percent of the population lived in the four largest cities. These statistics reflect the continuing weakening of the family.98 Still another facet of social change associated with economic growth, and one that seems to be more pervasive than all others, was the growing generation gap. Upon the arrival of the new millennium, most older citizens in Taiwan had a rural background, while the majority of younger people did not. Social change was accepted by the younger generation more than by

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older people, who felt they were not able to keep up. The youth said elders espouse “odd” views of society and the world and espouse different standards of morals and behavior. Elders complained that respect for age has been diminished by economic progress; many believed their children, and young people generally, had abandoned them for a different world.99 There are other major differences in life experiences between the older and younger generations. Older people remembered the period of Japanese colonization, Japan’s defeat in World War II and the beginning of Nationalist Chinese rule. Younger people did not. Older people recalled many hardships. Younger people have not known poverty or deprivation; instead they “suffer” from affluence. The younger generation is much more Westernized. The early period of Nationalist rule is seen differently by those who experienced it and those who have only heard about it. Older people recall the serious problems they faced when the Nationalists came, and they remember when U.S. aid was critical to Taiwan. Younger people do not know about these things from personal experience. Some of Taiwan’s youth even think the United States has become a failed country where a large percentage of the population is poor—a view that seems all the more real when they see Americans coming to Taiwan looking for jobs and sometimes begging on the streets. Older Taiwanese identify with the Japan of the past. Older Mainland Chinese remember their life in China before Communist rule. Taiwan’s youth are different. Even Taiwan’s political elite is split between those with traditional views and education and those holding foreign degrees, particularly graduate degrees from top American universities.100 Economic progress fostered still other social and cultural changes. As Taiwan became affluent, recreation became more important. Mountain climbing and walking in the parks became common spare-time activities. Kung Fu and archery, which were traditional sports, were still practiced, but baseball, basketball, soccer, tennis and golf became more popular. Talking in the teahouses and visiting museums were common pastimes, as were listening to music (in music halls or discos), karaoke and dancing. More people engaged in recreational activities at home or close to home so as to avoid traffic and other problems. Many people spent a good portion of their free time watching television, videotapes or discs—about the same amount of time spent by people in the United States and Japan. The advent of new cable stations made television more popular. Yet many young people complained that they do not have as much leisure time as their counterparts in Western countries because they spend much more time studying and preparing for college entrance examinations or tests to study abroad.101 Back to the issue of Taiwan’s links with China, more than cultural differences the age factor connects to the question of whether Taiwan should be independent or should reunite with China. Separation created in Taiwan a unique society very different from that of the People’s Republic of China and which young people knew little about. They were aware of the political extremism and poverty in China under communism and hence most young people in

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Taiwan came to identify socially and politically with the United States, Japan and, to a lesser extent, Western Europe. They also saw themselves—and Taiwan—as a part of the international community and not part of China.102 But this changed beginning in the late 1980s. The proliferation of people from Taiwan visiting China and vice versa accounts for this in large measure. In 1992, 4.2 million people made trips overseas, more than one-third of those visited China. In 1993, the number reached 4.6 million, an increase of 10 percent in just one year. In 2001, 7.2 million people travelled abroad. One would conclude from the number of trips that more than one-fourth of the population travels abroad each year. In fact, the percentage of Taiwan’s population that engaged in foreign travel became one of the highest in the world. The large proportion of Taiwan’s citizens travelling made the population quite worldly and affected the population’s view of Taiwan’s place in the world, including whether Taiwan is part of China or is a separate country.103 Cross-Strait contacts altered the attitudes of the people of Taiwan in complex ways. There grew differences among Taiwan’s ethnic groups regarding Taiwan’s relationship with China. Taiwanese did not favor ties with China as much as Mainland Chinese and saw Taiwan’s future linked more to Japan and the United States. To some extent, they feared China. They also opposed Chinese immigration. Mainland Chinese saw more hope in a “Greater China,” Hakkas were in between. Aborigines were less concerned about the issue. There were also divisions by profession. Businesspeople favored ties with the Mainland to enhance commercial opportunities and profits and, more than others, saw Taiwan as part of a Pacific Basin or a Greater China bloc.104 Shortly after Chen Shui-bian was elected president, Taiwan witnessed a turning point in terms of the impact of economic growth, or rather the lack of it, on its society and culture and also its politics. Slow growth for Taiwan, at least relative to the past, impacted how Taiwan’s residents viewed its social problems and challenges as well as its culture and its place in the world.105 Many expected better growth, in fact even impressive growth, to return. That didn’t happen. Ma Ying-jeou promised it and in considerable measure won two elections based on that expectation. But he did not deliver. Tsai Ingwen promised better growth too; she did bring Taiwan out of a period of negative growth. But it was not good growth. Moreover, there seemed to be no “light at the end of the tunnel.” Projections for years ahead were not for good, not even above average growth (compared to the rest of the world) in terms of GDP increases.106 The Tsai administration could not “buy” solutions to many social problems it promised to fix. President Tsai had to turn to talking about social justice, a green environment, democracy and a pleasant life for its residents (something like the social democracies of Europe where citizens were happy; but these countries were fast becoming less relevant in the world). The government of Taiwan could not deal very effectively with its youth’s disenchantment and their “fleeing” to China for better paying jobs with better prospects for advancement because China hosted many big and important foreign companies

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and controlled production chains. Taiwan’s influence among developing countries was also waning and there was little hope of this changing. Taiwan was no longer a model. Taiwan’s progressive agenda had its advantages, but it also had serious shortcomings. Clearly Taiwan’s slow growth economy put it in a different world in terms of social problems and their solutions and its culture and its image in the world.107 It was a special dilemma in terms of relations with China. Slower growth meant more reliance on China for its economic health. Yet that conflicted with Taiwan’s pitch that it was a democracy—or even that it was a nation.

Education Education has long played a special societal role in Taiwan. In the past, one’s level of education correlated closely with his or her class status more than it did in most other places in the world, except for China. During its period of rapid economic growth, education afforded an avenue for social mobility and social-class change, while it made the population more cosmopolitan and conscious of events elsewhere in the world. It was also a source for many new interactions and opportunities, and it helped promote culture, a sense of national unity, and democracy.108 It still does, but less so. In the way of background, an important element of Chinese culture is the high regard and the central role played by the educated elite in governance. This was not as strong in Taiwan as in China, but education was still revered and was important. Before the Japanese period, the educated portion of the population was small. Upon making Taiwan a colony, Tokyo promoted mass education, and, within a few years, 70 percent of children attended elementary school. As a result, a basic education did not convey the elite status it once did.109 But mass education had many positive effects: a broadly educated population begat social progress and helped maintain economic growth while it enhanced Japan’s image as a colonial power. Still, only a small portion of Taiwan’s population received higher education and, as noted in Chapter 2, few studied law, the humanities or the social sciences. The best students went to Japan to study, leaving the second best to form student organizations in Taiwan; they had less social impact than would have otherwise been the case. The principle of equality in education was followed, but it did not apply to the Japanese themselves as they went to separate schools. Under the Japanese, the Chinese classics fell into disuse, and knowledge of the Chinese language and literature deteriorated. In terms of acculturation, Japanese education influenced the masses, but was much deeper among Taiwan’s elite.110 The re-establishment of Chinese rule in 1945 brought continued support for educating the general population. The Constitution of the Nationalist government contained special provisions concerning education, including the right to education and a promise that education shall be provided free by the government to all children up to the age of 12 and to older people who have

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not received an adequate education. The Constitution allocated 15 percent of the budget of the national government, 25 percent of the provincial government’s budget and 35 percent of municipal governments’ budgets to “education and culture.”111 These constitutional provisions were fairly rigidly adhered to, and only defense accounted for a bigger portion of government spending. Because the society emphasized both the importance of education and supported economic development, and education was thought to be closely linked to improving the skills of the workforce, upgrading teaching standards, keeping young people in school and spending more money to do this had strong public approval.112 There was also support at the top. Chiang Kai-shek and government officials under him viewed schooling as one of the most important tools for building social consensus as well as a means of promoting economic, social and political progress. Early on, the national government not only set about upgrading schools but also planned the restructuring of the educational system. The Ministry of Education followed Sun Yat-sen’s suggestions: that there should be compulsory education for six years (increased to nine years in 1968 and 12 years in 2011), that scholarships should be available to enable intelligent but economically disadvantaged students to attain further education, that education should be job oriented and that teaching must be guided by government policies (to advance patriotism, national unity and the like).113 Confucian learning was de-emphasized while Sun’s writings, military strategy, and science and technology were accorded a higher place in the curriculum. In short, education was made more practical and goal oriented.114 Some specific policies that were part of the government’s educational reform program deserve special mention. To prevent cramming, examinations for entry to middle school were dropped. Girls were encouraged to go to school; thus, gender bias was removed from education. The government gave more financial support to vocational schools, which taught subjects that the economy and the job market required. Other government actions further linked education to employment. Teacher training and parent–teacher organizations received government support, as did schools that taught night and specialized courses.115 Textbooks and curriculum, approved by the Ministry of Education, were upgraded. Grade levels, curriculum and the academic calendar were adjusted to follow the U.S. system. Unlike the United States, however, Taiwan used national competitive examinations in order to restrict the number of college students and, to a considerable degree, determined their majors. For most students, passing the entrance examination to college or university was very difficult, although passing courses and remaining in school to graduation were less difficult than in the United States.116 From the early 1950s on, there was a phenomenal increase in the number of schools and students at all grade levels. The number of schools rose from 1,504 in 1950 to 4,950 in 1979 while the student population jumped from 1,055,00 to 4,570,000.117 In primary schools, the number of students enrolled

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increased from less than one million in 1950 to nearly 2.5 million in 1985. The number of high school students rose even more dramatically: from 67,000 to more than 1.7 million, an increase from 8.8 percent of the student population to 44.6 percent. In the meantime, the number of colleges climbed from seven to 105 and the number of students pursuing higher education increased from 6,665 to 412,381. In short, the student population of Taiwan increased markedly. In 1950, there were 139.6 students per 1,000 residents; by 1979, the number was nearly double, and more than 25 percent of the population attended school.118 The social impact of greater educational opportunities was evident at both ends of the spectrum. At one end was illiteracy. Although Taiwan’s illiteracy rate was the second lowest in Asia (after Japan’s) in 1950, it was still a concern to the government and the citizenry. By 1962, illiteracy fell to 24.8 percent of the population over age 6. By 1990, it was reduced to 6.8 percent and after that continued to decline.119 At the other end of the spectrum, more people attained higher education. In 1990, over half of those receiving an education got some secondary education, and Taiwan was rated one of the top countries in the world by the percentage of the population enrolled in college or university.120 The quality of education also improved. By the 1980s, compared with countries at a similar level of development, Taiwan’s level of education was six times higher. U.N. statistics indicated that its standards exceeded those of all major underdeveloped and developing nations, an achievement that reflected the tremendous improvements in education in Taiwan over the previous three decades. Taiwan was even able to compete with developed countries in the educational attainments of its citizens. For example, before the end of the 1980s, there were twice as many college students in Taiwan per capita as in Great Britain.121 By the 1990s, Taiwan was winning accolades around the world for its educational system. In a survey assessing knowledge of science and mathematics among 13-year-old children, Taiwan ranked first in the world. One author attributed Taiwan’s excellent educational system to standardized instruction, intense competition, more time in class, more homework, more exams and special schools.122 The high status of teachers and their professionalization were also important factors. Still another aspect of education in Taiwan that was important when assessing its societal impact was its globalization effect. At the college level, many of Taiwan’s best students studied abroad: between 1954 and 1989, 115,000 did so, with 30 percent earning engineering degrees.123 Subsequently the number increased—especially students going to the United States (33,881 in 2010 or 46 percent of its total).124 However, in following years fewer students went abroad for advanced degrees because of the improvements made in local colleges and universities and the proliferation of home graduate degree programs. Also, because Taiwan’s primary and secondary schools were so much more demanding than

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Western high schools and because going abroad now was affordable, younger but less outstanding students went to the United States and elsewhere to study. Another feature of the internationalization of Taiwan’s education can be seen in what Taiwan’s students have done after going abroad. During the 1950s and 1960s, few of these students returned home after receiving their degrees. But this turned around in the 1970s and 1980s as a result of Taiwan’s prosperity and the job opportunities that economic growth afforded (while at this time unemployment became a serious problem in the United States). This reverse brain drain contributed immensely to Taiwan’s research capabilities and to the growth of knowledge-intensive industries. Returned students also stimulated political and social change as they began to assume various leadership roles.125 Meanwhile, Taiwan attracted a sizable number of foreign students to its colleges and universities. In 1996, 5,432 students from more than 50 countries enrolled in humanities courses (most studying Chinese) in various institutions in Taiwan.126 Taiwan thus had considerable influence on Western Sinology by providing language training and research facilities to foreign students and scholars. Even more important was the large number of overseas Chinese students who enrolled in Taiwan’s schools. From 1951 to 1992, 63,000 overseas Chinese students graduated from Taiwan’s educational institutions. More than 10,000 attended various schools at any one time.127 Students from the People’s Republic of China also studied in Taiwan, and some students from Taiwan studied and even pursued degrees in China. The numbers were small, but they increased steadily. Researchers also crossed the Taiwan Strait in both directions.128 The political impact of Taiwan’s students receiving a foreign higher education can hardly be overestimated. In the 1990s, 70 percent or more of cabinet members had been educated abroad, and 60 percent or more typically held doctoral degrees. Taiwan’s top echelon of government was often described as the world’s most educated. However, with the change in ruling parties in 2000, less stress was placed on higher education. Educational credentials for government jobs fell and the cabinet and other top agencies had fewer people with top university diplomas. Nonetheless, standards remained high compared to those in most countries of the world.129 Meanwhile, because of the rapidly expanding demand for education, private educational institutions flourished even though education in Taiwan was, and is, widely assumed to be a public matter. Private education grew for the very young and for college and university level students. In 1980, there were twice as many private colleges as public ones, though they were generally smaller.130 In the 1990s, private schools accounted for 23 percent of the nation’s students, including 55 percent of all college and university students.131 Private schools were, and still are, generally affiliated with a church or religious organization. The best schools, especially colleges and universities, however, remained public, although the best kindergartens and specialty schools were private.

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With the expansion of educational opportunities, the number of college students increased markedly and more colleges and universities were built. Soon few students who wanted to attend college could not go. However, more students who attended college dropped out or failed to earn degrees. Some say, as a result, there was a depreciation in respect for college and a devaluation of the college degree. In 1992, 43.8 percent of graduating high school students went to college or university; in 2002, it was 80 percent. In 1992, Taiwan had 50 universities with 278,000 students; by 2002, this had increased to 148 universities (89 of them private) and 780,000 students.132 During the Chen presidency, the government put considerable emphasis on revising textbooks to teach Taiwan’s history rather than China’s, while using education to promote localism and a Taiwanese identity. Critics said education was being used to promote a political agenda rather than teach, though this was also heard during the years following World War II. Meanwhile, “Taiwanization” alienated many overseas Chinese, who found going to Taiwan for an education less attractive than studying in China. As a consequence, the ranking of Taiwan’s universities fell; in 2002 none of Taiwan’s universities was rated in the top 100 in the world, compared to six in China (three in Hong Kong), two in Singapore, five in Australia, four in Japan and one in Korea.133 Unfortunately the government also did not try to resolve the problem of too many universities and the process of cheapening education that had been underway before 2000. In the final years of the Chen presidency it seemed likely that educational policies would be changed to fix these problems. Most college and university presidents believed that Taiwan should open up to students from China and that Taiwan should try to attract more overseas Chinese students to improve the quality of education in Taiwan.134 Others suggested many more ways. But little happened; other problems got in the way. The Ma administration decried the decline of educational standards and sought means to foster improvements such as offering government scholarships to go abroad, more strict evaluations of colleges and universities, e-learning, and more. One of the top issues was the decline in Taiwan’s top institutions of higher learning as reflected in their ranking in various listings and studies.135 Thus Taiwan National University and other top institutions in Taiwan saw some improvement in their rankings. But this did not continue. With China’s (and Hong Kong’s) institutions enjoying fast rising quality standards and higher ranking, it seemed obvious Taiwan should pursue more educational ties with China. But by this time the Ma administration was suffering from declining popularity and politics got in the way.136 During the 2016 election campaign, Tsai Ing-wen promised to give more attention to education. But closer ties with China in this realm contradicted the Tsai administration’s goal to further separate Taiwan from China. An alternative was to pursue a regional approach and seek closer educational ties with the countries of Southeast Asia. As a consequence educational ties with China were reduced. In terms of attracting quality students (especially in view

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of the language handicaps of Southeast Asian students in both Chinese and English) this was a good choice. The government discouraging more ties with China was also reflected in students from Taiwan going to China and scholars going both ways. As one writer put it “the flow of knowledge between China and Taiwan was stifled.”137 Looking into what was behind the problems there was a reluctance to upgrade Taiwan’s education on the part of DPP leaders because educated people, meaning those with college or graduate school degrees, were more likely to vote for the KMT or pan-blue parties.138 It was also fed by the DPP espousing egalitarian goals in education and its favoring teaching Taiwan’s history and culture as opposed to a broader or more universal curriculum. Related to this matter, the dispute over whether Taiwan should be, or eventually become, part of China or legally independent began to influence decision-making in the educational community—especially in college and university faculties. In fact, it was, and is, often the basis of promotions and tenure, which poisoned the atmosphere in these institutions and impeded learning and much more. It was and still is a stain on Taiwan’s education. Also affecting Taiwan’s education, especially higher education, is the fact that, as noted earlier, Taiwan’s birth rate is low and has already caused a decline in the number of young people who apply to colleges or universities. In other words, the pool of prospective students has shrunk. The Ministry of Education projects that there will be a decline of students in higher education from 273,000 in 2015 to 158,000 by 2028 and 20 to 40 universities will be in danger of closing.139 Accepting more students from other countries can ameliorate this. But the best students come from China; they study harder and that creates some jealousy. It is also counter to the anti-immigrant sentiment in Taiwan in particular anti-Chinese feelings espoused by the DPP.140 In the meantime, China has made “special offers” to Taiwan’s students, researchers and those with special skills. The government in Taiwan tried to impede this, but it was not very effective in doing so. This has not only caused the brain drain in Taiwan to worsen but it alarmed the Tsai administration and the DPP for political reasons.141 Finally, the business community in Taiwan does not influence educational policies as much as in the past. One of the results is that currently education in Taiwan is not so heavy in the sciences and engineering and not so much aimed at finding jobs and as a result there are more unemployed graduates, especially in the humanities and social sciences. Last but not least, Taiwan’s image in the United States for providing many of the “best and brightest” foreign students has waned. Taiwan sends as many students to the United States as it did in the past, in fact, more. Taiwan is the seventh largest source of foreign students in the United States and the fourth per capita. But this is deceptive. Just over 40 percent are graduate students (less than in the past). Also the Taiwan students who go to America are less qualified and less hard working (almost 20 percent go to the United States for optional practical training).142 Thus, among the great foreign students in U.S.

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colleges and universities from Taiwan, in reputation students from China who shine for their intelligence and devotion now upstage them.

Social Welfare Social welfare has an interesting history in Taiwan. Social programs were in evidence on the island when it came under Chinese rule in the seventeenth century. They consisted mainly of special aid to the poor, to women and to children. However, the family was the main organization that was responsible for helping the needed or the less fortunate. Under Japanese rule, government social welfare was expanded considerably in scope. Japanese colonial governors used welfare programs as a means of facilitating their political control. Specifically, Tokyo enhanced the colonial government’s image and popularity by eliminating poverty, equalizing incomes and wealth, and engaging in charity work—all in the name of the emperor. The Japanese later used the term “social enterprises” to include education and research as well as social relief and economic assistance programs of various kinds.143 After Nationalist China assumed sovereignty over Taiwan in 1945, Governor Ch’en Yi, who regarded the welfare system as a tool used by the Japanese to destroy Chinese culture and render the population dependent, eliminated much of it, leaving intact only relief for the poor, medical care for the impoverished, and famine and disaster relief organizations. However, in 1949 the Nationalist government took several important social welfare programs to Taiwan. Also, need at the time dictated both the expansion of existing programs and the creation of new ones. The aforementioned areas of welfare that were in operation in the late 1940s were expanded. New efforts focused on soldiers. Newly arrived Mainland Chinese were given help in finding housing and jobs while Taiwanese who had been displaced from jobs or suffered during the economic hard times of the previous half decade were provided assistance.144 In the 1960s and 1970s, as Taiwan began to prosper economically, the scope of welfare efforts grew to include vocational training, labor security, health and public housing. New government agencies were created and the number of social workers increased accordingly. The government at this time also assumed a new responsibility: child welfare. As a result, government spending increased. In fact, expenditures from all levels of government soared from 2.8 percent of budgets in the early 1950s to over 10 percent in the early 1970s.145 Meanwhile Taiwan received funds from the United States and from the United Nations and its related agencies for some of its efforts. In the 1980s, amid Taiwan’s continuing economic growth, the government and the ruling Nationalist Party embarked on a variety of formerly untried social welfare projects and again increased government spending on welfare. One motive was unique: the government faced a problem of legitimacy after the United States severed diplomatic relations in 1979 and established its embassy in Beijing. As disaffection with the government grew because of this,

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KMT leaders perceived that they needed to take steps to defuse this potentially explosive situation. They concluded that increases in welfare spending would make the government popular both at home and abroad, inasmuch as welfare would further alleviate poverty and convey the impression that the government cared for its people. Increased welfare outlays would likewise send the message that the country was democratic and that the voters, even poor voters, had an input in formulating government policies. In the late 1980s, the government found another reason to undertake welfare projects: the newly formed opposition DPP pressured the government to further expand welfare and made specific suggestions. The government enacted many of them at the KMT’s behest in an effort to pre-empt an important part of the DPP’s platform.146 At this time the thrust of social welfare also changed. Previously, it had been aimed at groups considered vital to maintaining political stability: the military, labor and government employees were the main beneficiaries. Hardly by coincidence, these groups were KMT supporters.147 It now shifted to help almost anyone who needed it. In the early 1980s, the government passed three pieces of legislation that reflected this policy change: the Aged Welfare Law, the Handicapped Welfare Law and the Social Assistance Law. It also enacted laws to help youth and launched a new insurance program for teachers and administrative staff in private schools. In 1985, the Bureau of Labor Insurance was ordered to work on a program for giving farmers health insurance.148 All of this caused social spending to increase considerably during the 1980s. Welfare expenditures at the national level, which were under 2 percent of the GNP in 1980, passed 3 percent by 1990. Spending at all levels of government by the mid-1990s reached more than 4.5 percent of GDP. Social welfare expenditures peaked in 1996.149 One of the items in particular that caused social welfare spending to balloon was health care. In 1995, the legislature passed into law the National Health Insurance (NHI) act that incorporated 13 existing health insurance plans while extending coverage to an additional 7.5 million people. Participation was mandatory. The main beneficiaries were those who did not have insurance: the elderly, children, students and housewives. A fierce debate soon raged about who would pay for the program. It was finally decided that employers would pay 60 percent of the cost, employees 30 percent and the government 10 percent. Citizens over 70 paid no premiums. Between 70 and 95 percent of costs were covered for patients admitted to hospitals and somewhat less for those seeing a doctor in an office or clinic.150 NHI was widely praised. In fact, some viewed Taiwan as a model for managing health care and the KMT took credit for the achievement. But NHI has not been without problems. The program’s reputation was sullied early on when better doctors demanded additional money for their services or refused to accept the scheduled payments. Overuse resulted in much higher costs than anticipated, while the program’s effectiveness measured by increases in life expectancy and reduced health disparity among social classes was

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less than expected. Also the Nationalist Party did not win many kudos from the business community owing to the increased tax burden it created that allegedly made Taiwan’s exports less competitive in the world marketplace.151 Subsequently, doctors complained of having to see too many patients and suffering from overwork and health problems themselves. They also charged they didn’t have time to keep up in their field and improve their skills and that medical students selected their specialty according to the NHI’s compensation schedules and the time they had to spend seeing patients. Plus it was reported that many of Taiwan’s very best doctors left to take up residence and practice elsewhere, including Hong Kong, China and the United States.152 In the meantime, the government got into new realms of social welfare. Added to the list of welfare causes were child protection services, campaigns against drug abuse, youth counselling and guidance, women’s education, women’s services networks, divorce counselling and aid, elderly day care, special services for the aged, help for the disabled, low-cost housing, and assistance to the Aborigines. In 2002, the government launched a program to help older citizens who received no pensions or other such benefits. In mid2007, the legislature passed the National Pension Act, which was inclusive for all citizens age 25 to 64 who did not already participate in a program.153 Thus social welfare spending again saw fairly large increases. The budget for 2012 exceeded $13 billion and constituted 21 percent of the central government’s spending. For the first time it was the largest item in the central government’s budget, passing spending for the military and funding for economic development, while showing a 10.6 percent increase from the previous year. Most of the increase was accounted for by higher expenditures by the NHI plan plus the National Pension System and the Labor Insurance Annuity program launched in late 2008 and 2009 respectively.154 The bottom line was this: Taiwan’s aging society caused welfare spending to increase as did more demands from the public for help of various kinds from the government. The proliferation of welfare initiatives and the costs associated with them had their critics. Many argued that welfare contributed to undermining and even destroying the family. Others contended that welfare weakened the nation’s work ethic and hurt its competitiveness in the global marketplace. Some worried that the polity was evolving from a capitalist to a socialist one, or a nanny state, and that welfare was “breaking the bank” of the country. The controversies intensified in 2001 when unemployment benefits and other welfare costs skyrocketed because of an economic recession and the worst earthquake ever that struck the island.155 The issue of social welfare plainly had its political side. The DPP, which had long stood for helping the poor and disadvantaged, had to cut social welfare because of a poor economy soon after it became the ruling party in 2000, especially after the 2001 economic downturn. As a result, the party’s poor and disadvantaged constituencies were alienated. Also many citizens in Taiwan noticed that China, after adopting free market reform beginning in the late 1970s, cut welfare spending and it subsequently boomed economically. Not

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only that but China at this time was hollowing out and even destroying many of Taiwan’s industries. This engendered a debate about whether Taiwan’s generous welfare compromised its ability to compete with China and, if so, because of this whether China might use its economic might more effectively to pressure Taiwan into unification. Then, in 2008, the global recession hit Taiwan hard. At this time Taiwan faced a greater need for social welfare for a host of reasons: an aging society, factories moving out (and causing loss of jobs), a rising cost of living, increases in the divorce rate creating more single mothers, a weakening of the family and more. To bear the costs the Ma administration pushed improved relations with China, arguing cross-Strait commercial ties would help economic growth. The DPP, having just lost an election badly, was not in a position to oppose Ma’s policies and took the position that expanded welfare was a solution to the economic travails and cooperated with the KMT in that effort.156 The government thus enacted measures to help near-poor families not covered by social assistance, started a program to pay for college graduates’ internships and more.157 Taiwan’s pace of economic growth fell again in 2011 and dropped further the next two years and even more in 2015 and 2016. This coincided with China’s economy slowing (falling from double digit growth in 2011, dropping by almost 2 percentage points in 2012 and sliding lower after that). This hurt Taiwan’s exports. Meanwhile factories were still moving out of Taiwan in large numbers to China and/or Southeast Asia while the cost of living in Taiwan was rising. Hence, the number of people living below the poverty line increased. All of this was bad news for Taiwan. Yet compared to other places in the world Taiwan’s situation did not look too grim. The government reported that the percent of residents below the poverty line was only 1.78 percent of the population, much lower than Western countries where the number was often 10 to 15 percent. The Ma government also noted that the tax rate in Taiwan averaged 12 percent while in some European welfare states it was 40 percent; thus Taiwan could pay for welfare costs. Meanwhile there had been a change of attitude in Taiwan and more people came to view welfare as a necessity and a right. Thus the government spending just 3.98 percent on social welfare while Western governments were spending an infinitely larger amount, and South Korea and Japan were spending 9 percent and 22 percent respectively, made the Ma government appear frugal and to some uncaring.158 The opposition parties adopted populism as a modus operandi to win coming elections and expanding the government’s role in managing the people’s welfare was a central part of this.159 However, there was one bright spot in this otherwise bleak situation. In 2013, a major reform of Taiwan’s National Health Insurance was done to create a “second generation NHI.” It established a new premium base that included getting money from bonuses, rents, interest, dividends, professional fees and pay from second jobs. This provided income that put the plan on a

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solid financial footing. Information technology also made the administration of the system more efficient.160 Meanwhile residents became more accustomed to national health care and were more satisfied with it—80 percent on average giving a positive response in a number of polls. Abuse was not a growing problem and Taiwan was able to provide nearly complete coverage to all of its residents and even foreigners living there for more than six months. Total health spending in Taiwan was 6.63 percent of the GDP, compared to OECD countries that averaged 9.3 percent and the United States that spent nearly 17 percent of GDP and did not cover all residents.161 Going forward, Taiwan’s health care system appeared to be solvent for at least a few years. Aging presented a serious problem, as did the fact that cancer, cardiovascular and cerebral vascular diseases were the leading causes of death and often required expensive treatments. A shortage of doctors and nurses remained a problem: 1.7 and 5.7 per 1,000 population compared to OECD average of 3.3 and 8.6. Also there were frequent complaints by patients about being given too short a time with doctors.162 In 2015 and during the part of 2016 when the KMT was still in power, the government reckoned that since unemployment was below 4 percent (considered a threshold by global standards) and Taiwan ranked high on the U.N. Human Development Index while income inequity remained low that social conditions were not so bad.163 But complacency turned out to be a mistake. There were significant groups of voters that were suffering while a larger portion of the population felt that government should be taking more positive actions. This was arguably a major reason the KMT suffered a big election defeat in early 2016. When Tsai Ing-wen assumed the presidency in 2016, she faced an economy that was in decline. She brought back growth, but it was slow growth. She thus faced the problem of being able to afford more growth in social welfare. Also the Ma administration had arguably overextended in that realm. Further she faced a serious problem of aging and the need for more social welfare to deal with this problem. In particular she had to deal with the matter of the KMT having enlarged pensions for government workers that she felt was done for political reasons, but would create controversy to correct. As a consequence of all of this she did not give the issue of social welfare a high priority.164

Other Social Problems A number of Taiwan’s “social ills” were not cited earlier or were barely mentioned; some of these deserve further discussion. A few are new and/or unique; some are serious. Taiwan’s rapid economic growth and its accompanying vast political and social changes account for most of them; meanwhile gaps, leaving some people out, account for many. Many people say the most hapless group in Taiwan is its veterans. Around 150,000 soldiers came to Taiwan with Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist

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Party and government in 1949. They were promised land in China when they returned and were even given titles or deeds. These, of course, proved worthless. A large proportion of the most miserable veterans were men of low socioeconomic status who could not find wives and had no families. Now many are in their eighties or older and need care but have little money, while their veterans’ benefits have not kept up with inflation. Also, because government welfare budgets are now stretched and focus on other groups, soldiers, as a consequence, have gotten little attention. Veterans thus suffer from alienation and serious adjustment and health problems. Many commit suicide.165 In early 2016, Taiwan’s vets protested against the Ma administration’s failure to protect veterans’ benefits and many threatened to vote against the KMT.166 But the DPP proved no better. In early 2018, veterans staged a public protest that culminated in an effort to break into the Parliament compound in Taipei after their small pensions were scheduled to be cut as part of an effort by the Tsai administration to deal with the large cost of government pensions.167 The issue turned heated again in mid-year after the legislature passed a bill cutting veterans’ pensions.168 Clearly the lot of the veterans has been and remains appalling. Critics of the Tsai administration attribute this to the hostility of the DPP toward veterans because the military is dominated by Mainland Chinese KMT voters. Others say it is the product of a slow economy and more money being used for helping other groups. Still another social problem is a housing shortage, especially in some cities, and the fact that houses and apartments are too expensive for many people to purchase. The rate of home ownership in Taiwan is high, but in recent years—because of the very fast appreciation in the value of land and property—many people who want to buy, especially for the first time, find it difficult or impossible. During the 1989 election campaign, the so-called “snails without shells” (or people who could not afford housing) staged massive protest demonstrations in exclusive areas of Taipei. The government at various levels intervened and built more public housing while also providing lowcost loans to workers and first-time buyers. But the problem persisted. In 2010, the government calculated that the average family needed to save 100 percent of its income for 9.2 years to buy an average house or apartment in Taiwan’s large cities. President Ma promised action as part of his “Golden Decade” plan and provided government land to some builders and offered government housing for lease for 70 years.169 Still this was not enough. During the 2016 election campaign, Tsai Ing-wen made the lack of affordable housing one of her core “bread and butter” issues in response to a report saying that 90 percent of Taipei metropolitan residents could not afford to buy an apartment. She said, “a home is a place to live, not a tool for financial speculation.” Whereupon the KMT accused her personally of making a windfall profit on the sale of a property in 1998 (a 13-fold increase in value).170 In August 2018, President Tsai announced during the inauguration of the National Housing and Urban Regeneration Center that one of its initiatives was the management of 2,500 housing units that were part of the

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athletes’ village for the 2017 Taipei Universiade. She also mentioned that 40,000 subsidized units would be built by the end of the year as part of the revised Housing and Rental Housing Market Development and Regulation acts.171 It remained to be seen if this is enough. Related at least indirectly to the housing problem is the matter of lowincome households and individuals, although poverty has been virtually eliminated in Taiwan owing to the economic miracle of the past and the ease with which most people could find employment. But families with children still have difficulty making ends meet because of high rents and Taiwan’s rapidly accelerating cost of living while factories were moving out to China and Southeast Asia in large numbers causing job losses. The society’s fast aging is also a contributing factor. Welfare is available to poor people, but it is restricted in many ways while some are discouraged to look for work as it would put them above the poverty line and thus ineligible for government help. In response, in 2011 the government raised the poverty line, relaxed income thresholds for the poor to receive financial assistance and enacted new taxes (including one on the turnover of luxury homes) to pay for aid to the poor.172 Still some needy people were missed. Meanwhile, a number of people, out of pride, do not wish to collect government welfare. Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP campaigned in 2016 on the poverty issue and promised to take actions to fix it. They have acted, but it remains to be seen how effective their actions will be. It is still an issue. Crime is a social problem that appeared rather suddenly in the 1960s and 1970s and became regarded as serious by many of Taiwan’s citizens. Indeed, crime has consistently been among the top issues of residents’ concerns, as reflected in public opinion surveys in recent years. Higher crime rates are generally considered the result of urbanization and the social alienation it created, such as materialism, a weakening of the family structure, social permissiveness and Westernization. Some say democratization brought lax law enforcement and less severe punishments and that this accounted for dangerous streets and high crime rates.173 Specifically a significant growth in crime began in the late 1960s and increased even faster in ensuing years. Increases were especially large in violent crimes and juvenile offenses. Those crimes continued to grow in numbers. Violent crimes rose from 7.4 percent of the total in 1981 to 10.9 percent in 1990; juvenile crimes went up from 12.8 per 10,000 in 1970 to 27.6 per 10,000 in 1990. In the late 1990s, violent and juvenile crimes declined, but people were still alarmed as the total number of crimes committed in Taiwan in 2000 was eight times what it was 20 years earlier. Larcenies increased nearly sixfold, robberies by about that, and rape by more than three times. In 2001, recession caused the crime rate to shoot up—12 percent overall and 40 percent for violent crimes.174 Subsequently crime in Taiwan, including crimes in almost all categories, declined. This was attributed to better law enforcement, more public vigilance,

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confidence in the police and government programs to deal with the causes of crime. It was also the product of an agreement signed in June 2005 with China to fight narcotics smuggling, money laundering, economic crimes, telecom fraud and cooperation in apprehending and repatriating fugitives.175 However, sensational crimes made headline news, thereby making the crime problem appear serious while causing public alarm. The children of very wealthy citizens were kidnapped and murdered. There was also growing public concern about gangs in Taiwan and their ties to politics and religion. By the new century it was estimated that 15 to 20 percent of local township and county councillors are heidaoren or people “of the black way” (bad people or criminals), more common in rural central and south Taiwan. Some even serve openly in the Legislative Yuan. Many people believe gang influence began in the early 1980s with the lottery in Taiwan that provided the opportunity to get big money.176 More recent crime statistics show that pickpocketing, petty theft and fraud are the more frequent crimes. Cybercrimes have increased in number very recently. Having said all of this, the data indicate Taiwan is one of the safest places in the world. Murders and violent crime are rare; so are incidences of terrorism.177 In 2017, Taiwan ranked 128 (among 132 countries and territories rated) in the frequency of crimes. The U.S. crime rate was four times higher than Taiwan. That same year Taipei was ranked the third safest city in the world.178 Still the crime problem was a matter of public concern and was a political issue. Connected to increases in the crime rate is the rapid growth in drug use in Taiwan. Although still low by the standards of Western countries, the number of drug users and the amounts sold and consumed have escalated rapidly. Arrest statistics reflect the seriousness of drug abuse. In the past, drug-related crimes were about 5 percent of the total, but this rose to 13 percent in 1991 and to 32 percent in 1993. In 1994, drug offenders and drug-related crime accounted for 63 percent of prison inmates, the largest of any category. In 1993, convictions for drug crimes increased 70 percent. That same year, the amount of marijuana seized by the police increased 133 percent. Meanwhile, heroin seized increased 23-fold from 1989.179 Drug use and related crimes declined in 1995 after the government adopted stern measures to control the flow of drugs and their use in Taiwan. Specifically, several laws were passed to prevent smuggling and money laundering, resulting in Taiwan being taken off the blacklist of transhipment countries by the U.S. Department of State in 2000. Nevertheless, the drug problem was still seen as a very serious social ill. Some said drugs became a problem after the lifting of martial law, when sentences were reduced and pushers were seldom executed. Others said it was the product of modernization and Westernization. Still others related it to organized crime and politics. Another social problem that is a cause of concern is the increase in the divorce rate and accompanying family dislocations. Early on the divorce rate in Taiwan increased 10 percent or more a year, contributing to a nearly seven-

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fold increase in the 40-year period beginning in the 1950s. From 1985 to 2006, the incidences of divorce more than doubled.180 The rate has since continued to increase. It is estimated that 25–30 percent of marriages end in divorce. There are a number of side effects; for example, single-parent families account for 60 percent of child abuse. Some say the high divorce rate is the product of democracy, and a diminished loyalty to the family.181 Child abuse has also become a social problem of serious proportions, at least in perception. The number of cases reported more than doubled between 1993 and 1996. Physical abuse was the most common complaint (40.9 percent), followed by neglect (24.3 percent) and substandard parenting (19.1 percent). The Children’s Welfare Law was enacted in 1973 and was subsequently revised in 1993 to deal with the problems. The approach was both unique and severe. Names of offenders were published, and fines would be as high as $11,000. Men were most frequently charged under this law, though (interesting to foreigners) child abuse has a broader definition in Taiwan: women are punished for smoking, drinking, taking drugs and chewing betel nuts while pregnant.182 In the past two decades the government took other serious legal steps to deal with the problem. Still, the data show that child abuse increased 30 percent from 2005 to 2009. The causes listed were lack of parenting skills, negligence, alcohol and lack of anger management.183 In early 2018, it was reported that of the 59,912 cases of child abuse reported in 2017 only 7 percent were investigated.184 Government officials said these crimes are very difficult to handle. Rape, child prostitution and other sex crimes have also attracted increasing attention in Taiwan. Although the frequency of these crimes is much lower in Taiwan than in most other countries, they have generated grave concern among Taiwan’s populace because they are widely reported in the press and cause alarm. Many people blame society for becoming too permissive and for lax law enforcement. Another problem was a sudden increase in the number of both men and women who do not want to marry. In the 20-year period between 1980 and 2000, the percentage of men in the eligible age range each year that marry fell from 6.7 percent to 4.65 percent. For women, it dropped from 9.19 percent to 6.37 percent. Taiwan in this respect seems to be following similar trends evident in Japan and some other countries, where more and more people don’t want to marry or at least don’t marry. Some observers feel this trend will make the society unstable, threaten the family and cause a further decline in population growth.185 Suicide has become a serious social problem, being rated in recent years the ninth leading cause of death in Taiwan and the second cause of death among the youth. The death rate from suicide is 18.8 per 100,000 people with 70 percent occurring in the age group 20 to 50. Unemployment is cited as one of the top reasons. Youth suicide is reported to stem from emotional and interpersonal problems. Formerly it was said to result from academic stress, but recently this has been the cause of only 3 percent of young people killing

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themselves. Elderly people in Taiwan commit suicide more than in other countries. It is reported that one-fourth of gays and lesbians consider suicide even though Taiwan is considered a place that is not hostile toward either.186 In 2018, it was reported that after seeing a decline for several years, in the previous three years it has been on the upswing. It has been associated with emotional problems and it is twice as common for men to kill themselves as women.187 In response, the National Suicide Prevention Center in Taiwan urged intervention to deal with the problem including helping people with depression.188 Still another problem in Taiwan is obesity. Various data indicate that a fastgrowing number of both adults and children are overweight. A recent study shows that the percentage of overweight children (age 2–18) has increased from 6 to 25 percent in the past ten years and is close in seriousness to the rates in the United States. Sedentary lifestyles and a poor diet are seen as the main causes. In 2009, the government considered enacting the world’s first tax on junk food. Recently various groups have called on the government to “declare war” on obesity.189 Although Taiwan’s social problems are not as serious as those found in the modern Western democracies, they seem to be worse because they have appeared so suddenly. This very abruptness might lead to quicker, better solutions; in fact, Taiwan may be able to solve these problems as efficiently as it has dealt with so many others. The alternative is a worsening social environment.

Notes 1 The most detailed anthropological studies on Taiwan, including social systems, are to be found in Ahern and Gates (eds.), The Anthropology of Taiwanese Society. 2 Chen Kang Chai, Taiwan’s Aborigines: A Genetic Study of Tribal Variations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 43. 3 See Hsieh, Taiwan—Ilha Formosa, pp. 127–31. 4 Area Handbook for the Republic of China, pp. 54–55. 5 See Edwin A. Winckler, “Roles Linking State and Society,” in Ahern and Gates (eds.), The Anthropology of Taiwanese Society, pp. 63–65. 6 Edgar Wickberg, “Continuities in Land Tenure, 1900–1940,” in Ahern and Gates (eds.), The Anthropology of Taiwanese Society, p. 212. 7 Eduard B. Vermeer, “Up the Mountains and Out to Sea: The Expansion of the Fukienese in the Late Ming Period,” in Rubinstein (ed.), Taiwan: A New History, p. 64. 8 Ibid., p. 66. 9 See Arthur P. Wolf, “Domestic Organization,” in Ahern and Gates (eds.), The Anthropology of Taiwanese Society, pp. 341–61. 10 The Republic of China Yearbook 1996, p. 305. This was based largely on the ageold tradition of filial piety. 11 Murray A. Rubinstein, “Taiwan’s Socio-Economic Modernization,” in Rubinstein (ed.), Taiwan: A New History, pp. 388–89. 12 Burton Pasternak, “Economics and Ecology,” in Ahern and Gates (eds.), The Anthropology of Taiwanese Society, pp. 151–59.

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13 For details on the family in Taiwan, see Myron L. Cohen, House United, House Divided: The Chinese Family in Taiwan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1618). 14 The CIA World Factbook 2018–2019 (New York: Skyhorse publishing, 2018), p. 191. The exact figure is 91.6 percent. 15 See Hill Gates, “Ethnicity and Social Class,” in Ahern and Gates (eds.), The Anthropology of Taiwanese Society, pp. 241–82. 16 “The First Nations of Taiwan: A Special Report on Taiwan’s Indigenous People,” Cultural Survival Quarterly, June 2002 (online at culturalsurvival.org). 17 Article 5 of the Constitution states that all national minorities are equal. Articles 168 and 169 state that “frontier” people (which would include the Aborigines) are to be defended and their interests promoted. 18 See “The First Nations of Taiwan.” 19 For data on the Aborigines, see The Republic of China 2011 Yearbook (Taipei: Government Information Office, 2011), p. 30. 20 “The First Nations of Taiwan.” 21 See Chapter 4 for details. 22 Lin Yi-yin, “Taiwanese Plains Aborigines Protest Government’s Default to Recognize their Legal Status,” TCNN, October 2–9, 2016 (online at tcnn.org.tw). 23 Harry Lamley, “Subethnic Revivals in the Ch’ing Period,” in Ahern and Gates (eds.), The Anthropology of Taiwanese Society, p. 296. 24 Ibid. Hsinchu, for example, is largely populated by Hakka. 25 Kerr, Formosa, pp. 9 and 29. 26 Roy, Taiwan: A Political History, p. 6. 27 Fu Hu and Yun-han Chu, “Electoral Competition and Political Democratization,” in Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard (eds.), Political Change in Taiwan (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1992), p. 193. 28 Some say the Hakkas constitute a buffer between the Mainland Chinese and the Fukien Taiwanese. Others say they identify with the Fukien Taiwanese but favor a government of Mainland Chinese. See Copper, Taiwan’s Democracy on Trial, p. 75. 29 Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese?, pp. 15–16. 30 Hu Ching-hui, “Most Hoklo, Hakka Have Aboriginal Genes, Study Finds,” Taipei Times, November 21, 2007. According to the author, 85 percent of both groups have Aboriginal genes, though the study also indicated 90 percent have some Vietnamese ancestry stemming from their family origins on China’s southeast coast, as do the Chinese living in that part of China now. 31 Fukienese have benefitted tremendously from the appreciation of land values and from democracy. 32 See Chapter 4 for further details on this point. 33 See Chapter 2 for further details. 34 Clough, Island China, p. 41. 35 This was natural given the tendency in Chinese politics to form cliques. 36 See Chapter 1, section on culture. 37 See Gates, “Ethnicity and Social Class,” pp. 261–62. Gates notes that one of the main reasons for this is that Mainland Chinese took houses evacuated by Japanese in Taipei after 1945. 38 See Chapter 1. 39 Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “Changing Identities in Taiwan under Ma Ying-jeou,” in Lowell Dittmer (ed.), Taiwan and China: Fitful Embrace (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2017), p. 54; “Migrant worker 2018 remittances to top US$3 billion: Central Bank,” China Post, February 7, 2019 (online at chinapost. com.tw).

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40 For further information on this topic, see Kuo-shu Yang, “Transformation of the Chinese People,” in Hsiung (ed.), Contemporary Republic of China pp. 268–81. In recent polls, nearly 40 percent of those asked said they were both Chinese and Taiwanese as compared to less than 30 percent in 1995. Also, the number saying they were Taiwanese decreased from nearly 50 percent to under 40 percent, and the number calling themselves Chinese fell from nearly 25 percent to just over 15 percent during the same time period. See “Cross Strait Breakthrough,” Topics (November 1998), p. 13. 41 See Chapter 4, section on elections. 42 Copper, Taiwan’s Democracy on Trial, p. 97. 43 See Chapter 4 for further details. 44 Cabestan, “Changing Identities in Taiwan under Ma Ying-jeou,” in Dittmer (ed.), Taiwan and China, p. 55. 45 Copper, Taiwan at a Tipping Point, p. 205. 46 Ibid. 47 See Chapter 4, section on Taiwan’s elections. 48 For details about the languages used in Taiwan, see Area Handbook for the Republic of China, pp. 48–52. Also see The Republic of China 1998 Yearbook (Taipei: Government Information Office, 1998), chapter 3. 49 The Republic of China Yearbook 2011, p. 39. 50 Min nan refers to the south of the Min River in Fukien Province. 51 See Lai, Myers, and Wei, A Tragic Beginning, pp. 93–97. Also see Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese?, p. 59. 52 The Republic of China Yearbook 2011, p. 39. 53 The number of speakers of Mandarin Chinese exceeded one billion. No other language compares. The population of Fukien Province is only 36 million. 54 Taiwan Yearbook 2007 (Taipei: Government Information Office, 2007), pp. 30–31. 55 See Anthony Kubek, Modernizing China: A Comparative Analysis of the Two Chinas (Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 1987), pp. 187–89. 56 See Cheng-tien Kuo, “Introduction,” in Cheng-tien Kuo (ed.), Religion and Nationalism in Chinese Societies (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2017). 57 “Religious Beliefs in Taiwan,” World Atlas (online at worldatlas.com), viewed August 2018. 58 Ibid. 59 The Republic of China Yearbook, Taiwan 2002, p. 457. 60 Taiwan Yearbook 2007, pp. 251–52. 61 The Republic of China Yearbook, Taiwan 2002, p. 459. 62 Ibid. 63 “Religious Beliefs in Taiwan,” World Atlas (online at worldatlas.com), viewed August 2018. 64 “Dalai Lama Visits Typhoon Morakot victims,” Daily Telegraph, August 31, 2009 (online at telegraph.co.uk). 65 Ben Blanchard and Faith Hung, “China Warns Taiwan Not to Allow Dalai Lama to Visit,” Reuters, September 14, 2016 (online at reuters.com). 66 The Republic of China Yearbook, Taiwan 2002, p. 455. 67 Ibid. 68 Taiwan Yearbook 2007, p. 460. 69 Taiwan Yearbook 2006, pp. 345–46. 70 Eric Lin, “What is Tao?” World I-Kuan Tao Headquarters (online at with.org), viewed August 2018. 71 Taiwan Yearbook 2007, p. 252. 72 Lin, Taiwan’s China Dilemma, p. 76.

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73 “The Role of Religion in the Taiwan Presidential Election,” Today, January 10, 2016 (online at today.com). 74 See Peng, A Taste of Freedom. The author compares Taiwan to the West and the United States a hundred or more years ago and also Australia in the past. 75 A Taiwanese national identity did not develop to any degree at this time because there was no central government and little communication between or among the Chinese on the island. See, for example, Hughes, Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism, chapters 1 and 2. 76 See Chapter 2 for further details. 77 Area Handbook for the Republic of China, pp. 55–57. 78 Ibid., p.57 79 Ibid., pp. 58–61. 80 Land reform is also discussed in Chapter 5. For details on its impact on landowners and social change, see Gold, State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle, pp. 37–38, 65–67. Also see Kubek, Modernizing China, chapter 3. 81 John C. H. Fei, Gustav Ranis, and Shirley W. Y. Kuok, Growth with Equity: The Taiwan Case (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 38. 82 Tien, The Great Transition, p. 24. 83 For details on this point see Chapter 1. 84 For some assessment on Taiwan’s political leadership, see Tsai, In Making China Modernized, p. 118. 85 Tien, The Great Transition, p. 228. The author attributes this to the awareness in Taiwan that it depended on the United States for its very survival. Other writers give more emphasis to the attraction of U.S. culture, especially to young people. 86 See Chapter 5 for further details. 87 For background and further details on this topic, see Tien, The Great Transition, chapter 2; and Yu Tzong-shian, The Story of Taiwan: Economy (Taipei: Government Printing Office, 2001), p. 50. For recent per capita income data, see “Taiwan Claims Economy Grew a Robust 5.46 Percent,” Earth Times, December 27, 2007 (online at earthtimes.org). 88 For details, see Shirley W. Y. Kuo, Gustov Ranis, and John C. H. Fei, The Taiwan Success Story: Rapid Growth with Improved Distribution in the Republic of China, 1952–1979 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), chapter 1 and pp. 5–12. 89 See Beatrice Liu, “Housing Crisis Grows Worse,” Free China Journal, May 25, 1989, p. 7. 90 See Peter Chen-main Wang, “A Bastion Created, a Regime Reformed, an Economy Reengineered, 1949–1970,” in Rubinstein (ed.), Taiwan: A New History, pp. 320–38. 91 See Ronald G. Knapp, “The Shaping of Taiwan’s Landscapes,” in Rubenstein (ed.), Taiwan: A New History, p. 22. 92 See Tsai, In Making China Modernized, pp. 103–39, for a detailed discussion on the many factors stemming from economic growth that promoted social change. 93 For a comparison between Taiwan and other Asian countries, see the chart in Yuan-li Wu and Kung-chia Yeh (eds.), Growth, Distribution, and Social Change: Essays on the Economy of the Republic of China (Baltimore, MD: University of Maryland School of Law, 1978), pp. 42–43. 94 “The Flight from Marriage,” The Economist, August 20, 2011 (online at economist.com). 95 “More Women Participating in the Work Force,” China Post, October 13, 2009 (online at http://chinapost.com.tw). For details on women in the workforce, see Catherine Farris, Anru Lee, and Murray Rubinstein (eds.), Women in the New Taiwan: Gender Roles and Gender Consciousness in a Changing Society (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2004).

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96 Pat Gao, “Promoting Gender Parity,” Taiwan Review, September 1, 2011 (online at taiwanreview.gov.tw). Taiwan, of course, is not a member of the U.N.; these rankings are derived by plugging statistics on Taiwan into the U.N. lists. 97 The Republic of China Yearbook 2011, pp. 184–85. 98 Taiwan Yearbook 2007, p. 171. 99 For details, see Yui-chun Yu and Peter Miller, “The Generation Gap and Cultural Influence—a Taiwan Empirical Investigation,” Cross Cultural Management: An International Journal 10, no. 3 (2003), pp. 23–41. 100 This became most apparent in the late 1980s when Lee Teng-hui was president. He and a large number of members of his cabinet had PhD degrees from top American universities. 101 For details, see Area Handbook for the Republic of China, pp. 99–101. 102 Taiwan Yearbook 2007, p. 82. 103 See Chapter 1, section on tourism, for further details. 104 Lin, Taiwan’s China Dilemma, pp. 31–33. 105 For details see Chapter 5. 106 See Chapter 5 for further details. 107 See Chapter 5 for further details. 108 For general background information on education in Taiwan, see The Republic of China: Educational System (Taipei: Kwan Hwa, 1980). 109 Mancall, Formosa Today, p. 2. 110 Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese?, p. 55. 111 These provisions are to be found in Article 164 of the Constitution. 112 Theodore Hsi-en Chen, “The Educational System,” in Hsiung (ed.), Contemporary Republic of China, p. 68. 113 These principles were also stated in the Constitution. For their application to the goal of economic development, see Cal Clark and Alexander C. Tan, Taiwan’s Political Economy: Meeting Challenges, Pursuing Progress (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012), pp. 34–36. 114 Area Handbook for the Republic of China, p. 105. 115 The Republic of China Yearbook 1988, p. 297. 116 Ibid. 117 Chen, “The Education System,” in Hsiung (ed.), Contemporary Republic of China, p. 66. 118 Taiwan Yearbook 2007, p. 200. 119 The Republic of China Yearbook, Taiwan 2002, p. 101. 120 The Republic of China Yearbook 2011, p. 221. 121 Kubek, Modernizing China, p. 157. 122 Fei-yun Wang, “Solving Problems,” Free China Review (January 1994), p. 42. 123 Chong-pin Lin, “China’s Students From Abroad: Rates of Return,” American Enterprise (November–December 1994), p. 14. 124 The Republic of China Yearbook 2011, p. 230. 125 See Lin, “Chinese Students From Abroad.” 126 See “The Combative Cabinet,” Taipei Review, April 2002, pp. 4–9. An impressive 62 percent of cabinet members in Taiwan had foreign degrees and 42 percent had PhDs. 127 Kelly Hu, “In Pursuit of Excellence,” Taiwan Review, December 1, 2002. 128 Lin, Taiwan’s China Dilemma, p. 51. 129 The Republic of China Yearbook 1998, p. 298. 130 Chen, “The Educational System,” in Hsiung (ed.), Contemporary Republic of China, p. 74. 131 The Republic of China Yearbook, Taiwan 2002, p. 296. 132 See Hu, “In Pursuit of Excellence.” 133 Asiaweek has rated the universities, and Taiwan does not make the top ten list. Recently, more than 80 percent of high school graduates taking their college or

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137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151

152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162

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university entrance examinations passed. See “465 Places Still Vacant in Taiwan’s Universities,” China Post, August 10, 2002, p. 4. See Jenny W. Hsu, “College Presidents Back PRC Students: Poll,” Taipei Times, May 15, 2008 (online at taipeitimes.com). William Yat Wai Lo, University Rankings: Implications for Higher Education in Taiwan (New York: Springer, 2016), p. 165. According to World University Rankings, Taiwan National University rose in ranking from 185 in 2007 to 98 in 2014, breaking into the top 100. It fell after that from 112 in 2016 to 122 in 2018. Taiwan’s Cheng Kung University and Tsing Hua University moved almost in tandem. Others publishing rankings, such as Times Higher Education, were very similar. Chia-Ming Hsueh, “Higher Education Crisis in Taiwan,” The World View, August 5, 2018 (online at insidehighered.com). Chia-hung Tsai, “Who is the Taiwan Voter?” in Christopher H. Achen and T. Y. Wang (eds.), The Taiwan Voter (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2017), p. 33. See Hsueh, “Higher Education Crisis in Taiwan.” Lin, Taiwan’s China Dilemma, p. 51. This issue is covered in greater detail in Chapter 4. “Taiwan-Education,” Taiwan Country Commercial Guide, October 10, 2018 (online at export.gov). For details, see Yeun-wen Ku, Welfare Capitalism in Taiwan: State, Economy and Social Policy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), Part I. Ibid., pp. 36–37. Ibid., p. 41. Ibid., p. 188. Fell, Government and Politics in Taiwan, pp. 224–25. Ku, Welfare Capitalism in Taiwan, p. 35. The Republic of China Yearbook 2011, p. 178. Ibid., pp. 192–94. For details, see Chi Pang Wen, Shan Pou Tsai, and Wen-Shen Isabella Chung, “A 10-Year Experience with Universal Health Insurance in Taiwan: Measuring Changes in Health and Health Disparity,” Annals of Internal Medicine (February 2008), pp. 258–67. Kelly Her, “Doctors’ Talk,” Taiwan Review, May 1, 2012 (online at taiwanre view.gov.tw). Ibid. Also see Pat Gao, “The State of Welfare,” Taipei Review, March 2001, p. 6. Pat Gao, “Strengthening the Safety Net,” Taiwan Review, December 1, 2011 (online at taiwanreview.gov.tw). See Chien-Hsun Chen, “Taiwan’s Burgeoning Budget Deficit: A Crisis in the Making,” Asian Survey, May/June 2005, pp. 383–96. Lin, Taiwan’s China Dilemma, p. 47. Cherng-Tay and Yu-Fang Chang, “Social Welfare Policies During the Global Financial Crisis: An Example of Social Inclusion in Taiwan,” Asia-Pacific Journal of Social Work and Development, August 2016 (online at tandfonline.com). Cindy Sui, “Changing Times Force Taiwan to Raise Welfare Spending,” BBC News, April 24, 2013 (online at bbc.com). See Chapter 5, section on elections, for details. Tsung-mei Cheng, “Reflections on the 20th Anniversary of Taiwan’s Single-Payer National Health Insurance System,” Health Affairs, March 2015 (online at hea lthaffairs.org). Tsung-mei Cheng, “Taiwan’s Health Care System: The Next 20 Years,” Brookings Institution, May 14, 2015 (online at brookings.edu). Ibid.

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163 See “BTI 2018/Taiwan Country Report,” Bertelsmann Stiftung (online at bti-project.org), viewed August 2018. 164 Copper, Taiwan at a Tipping Point, p. 156. 165 Y. C. Ku, Y. F. Tsai, Y. C. Lin and Y. P. Lin, “Suicide Experience Among Institutionalized Older Veterans in Taiwan,” Gerontocracy, December 2009 (online at ncbi.nim.nih.gov). 166 “Taiwan’s Military Veterans Ready to ‘Betray’ Their Past at the Ballot Boxes and Vote Against the KMT,” South China Morning Post, February 14, 2016 (online at scmp.com). 167 “Taiwan Cabinet Shelves Military Pension Reform Bill,” Taiwan News, February 27, 2018 (online at taiwannews.com.tw). 168 “Taiwan Passes Bill to Cut Veterans’ Pensions that Sparked Violent Protests,” South China Morning Post, June 21, 2018 (online at scmp.com). 169 Jim Huang, “Real Property, Real Problems,” Taiwan Review, April 1, 2012 (online at taiwanreview.gov.tw). Taiwan’s home ownership is 80 percent compared to between 50 and 70 percent for most developed countries. 170 Jekub Piesecki, “Taiwan Presidential Campaign Exposes Housing Problem,” The Diplomat, December 25, 2015 (online at thediplomat.com). 171 “Tsai Touts Taiwan’s Progress in Achieving Housing Justice,” Taiwan Today, August 3, 2018 (online at mofa.gov.tw). 172 “Promoting a Just Society,” Taiwan Review, December 1, 2011 (online at taiwanreview.gov.tw). 173 Tsai, In Making China Modernized, pp. 141–45. In fact, the author found crime as the number one concern of the public in the 1990s. 174 Ibid. Also see “It’s Time to Face the Crime Problem,” China Post, July 22, 2002 (online at chinapost.com.tw). 175 See Jerome A. Cohen and Yu-jie Chen, “Cross Strait Cooperation in Fighting Organized Crime,” U.S. Asia Law Institute, July 5, 2011 (online at www.usasiala w.org). Data on crime in Taiwan can be found at the National Police Agency’s website (npa.gov.tw). 176 Jonathan Adams, “Gangster Life: Taiwan’s Real Life Sopranos,” Global Post, May 4, 2010 (online at http://globalpost.com). 177 “Taiwan 2018 Crime and Safety Report,” U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security (online at osac.gov), viewed August 2018. 178 George Liao, “Numbeo.com: Taipei Third Safest City in the World,” Taiwan News, April 24, 2017 (online at taiwannews.com.tw). 179 The Republic of China Yearbook 1994, p. 350. See also “War Against Drugs Posts Some Success,” Free China Journal, March 3, 1995, p. 7. This article was based on a speech by Minister of Justice Ma Ying-jeou. 180 Republic of China Yearbook, Taiwan 2002, p. 325. The later figure is in Taiwan Yearbook 2007, p. 27. 181 “Taiwan’s High Divorce Rate Signals Social Problems,” Chinese Women’s Research Network, April 13, 2012 (online at en.wsic.ac.cn). 182 The Republic of China Yearbook, Taiwan 2002, p. 323. Also see The Republic of China Yearbook 2011, pp. 179–80. 183 “Reports of Child Abuse Increasing Significantly,” China Post, April 3, 2010 (online at chinapost.com.tw). 184 Leer I-chia, “Child Abuse Ignored as Deaths Mount: Doctor,” Taipei Times, April 25, 2018 (online at taipeitimes.com). 185 See “Who’s Afraid of Marriage,” Taipei Review (February 2002), p. 14. 186 “Suicide Rate Climbing as Economy Falters,” China Post, July 16, 2006, “Youth Suicide Rate on the Rise,” China Post, September 21, 2010 (online at chinapost. com.tw). Also see Steve Hsu, “Groups Call for Gay Rights Protection and Awareness,” Taiwan News, April 18, 2012 (online at taiwannews.com.tw).

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187 “Suicides in Taiwan Rise for Third Year in a Row,” Focus Taiwan, September 9, 2018 (online at focustaiwan.tw). 188 Lee I-chia, “As Suicide Rate Increases, Center Urges Intervention,” Taipei Times, September 10, 2018 (online at taipeitimes.com). 189 “Taiwan Mulls World’s First Junk Food Tax: Report,” AFP, December 21, 2009 (online at afp.com); “The Government Should Declare War on Obesity,” China Post, December 20, 2009, “Youth Need More Support to Overcome Weight Obsession,” China Post, May 21, 2012 (online at chinapost.com.tw).

4

Political System

Taiwan’s politics are unique in a multitude of ways. Its history embraces a complex background of inputs: local family rule, Western colonialism, China’s bureaucratic system, Japanese feudalism, Sun Yat-sen’s political ideals and American democracy. After World War II, Chiang Kai-shek transplanted China’s political system to Taiwan. But it had to adjust to a new and different environment. The Nationalist government was democratic in form and constitutional. In practice it was authoritarian, based on one-party rule, a strong executive, the military’s involvement in judicial matters and police control. But it evolved. Reform made it more efficient and less corrupt. Beginning in the 1950s local elections created some expectations for democracy. In the 1960s and 1970s, Taiwan changed politically as a result of the rapid economic growth under a free-market economic system, which begat a middle class that demanded expanded voter participation, reform in both local and national politics, and other elements of democratic change. In the 1980s, the rise of new political parties, competitive elections, the expansion of political and civil liberties, and concern for Taiwan’s image in the international community gave rise to a flourishing democracy. The formation of the DPP in 1986, the termination of martial law in 1987 and the direct election of the president and vice president in 1996 were especially salient events in Taiwan’s march toward a working democratic system. Some even referred to Taiwan’s rapid and peaceful democratization as a “political miracle.” Taiwan also experienced some negative trends: identity politics (based on ethnicity), corruption, political polarization (that often engendered gridlock), ideological rigidity (especially views on Taiwan’s independence versus unification with China), populism, party factionalism, the rise of a class of professional politicians and candidates for office (that knowingly lied to voters realizing they would not likely be held accountable), and partisan impediments to accomplishing constitutional reforms. A growing bureaucracy, frequent law suits, self-serving officials and the undue influence of China and the United States were also problems. On the positive side, religion seldom became a divisive matter and did not define one’s qualifications for office as was common in many places in the

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world. Also political participation remained high. Finally, Taiwan’s residents were confident in democracy and strongly supported it.

Political History and Traditions Taiwan’s political system evolved in China and was transplanted.1 In theory, China had a unitary political system; in fact, however, political power to a considerable degree was decentralized. Local government officials, nominally responsible to the emperor, were in reality quite autonomous. Officials sent by the emperor to govern provinces and lower units of government checked on local administrators and advised them; but, because these “emissaries” usually did not know the language (dialect) of the regions they served and were rotated at regular intervals, they seldom became entrenched or powerful. A kind of balance of authority between the central and local governments was also the product of physical distance and the lack of modern transportation and communications facilities with centrifugal tendencies and localism being dampened or contained by the cohesive force of Chinese culture. This hampered China’s breakup.2 China’s “bureaucratic system,” as it was called, was taken to Taiwan, but in many ways it did not fit.3 The control of water and the maintenance of public works, critical in China, were not important in Taiwan. Taiwan was much more geographically fragmented, and the livelihood of its population depended more on fishing, hunting and, later, trading, than on farming. In addition, owing to Taiwan’s good soil, moderate climate and more regular and predictable rainfall, working the land was less risky than in China. Therefore, peasants on the island did not need extensive government-built public works as was true in China. Finally, Taiwan’s early cosmopolitanism and foreign influences affected its political culture. There were other reasons China’s system of government was not appropriate for Taiwan. Throughout most of Taiwan’s history, there was not much government at the top, even in theory. Today, centralized political authority in Taiwan is quite feasible, given the small size of the island and the efficient means of transportation and political communications available to its rulers. However, a free-market economic system, political party competition, constitutional limits on the authority of the national government and dynamic local governments all prevented too much concentration of political power at the top.4 Taiwan’s political tradition was also affected, in some ways profoundly, by Japanese rule from 1895 to 1945. In the Japanese political tradition, arms and money were the crucial ingredients of political power; the bureaucracy was less important. Japanese rule thus reinforced the already present feudal nature of Taiwan’s political culture and how its political system would evolve. Japanese influence in Taiwan was also notable for its legalism because the establishment of a framework of laws and regulations was important in Japan and was part of its colonial rule. Likewise obedience and loyalty were esteemed in

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Japanese political thinking, while individualism was not.5 Finally, Japanese rule engendered the beginning, however weak, of a sense of community and national identity in Taiwan.6 Taiwan’s political thinking comes from the ancient Chinese sages but also the thinking and teachings of Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), the first president of the Republic of China and founder of the Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang (KMT). He spent time in Taiwan during the Japanese period of governance and discussed politics and reform in China with locals. Loyal supporters spread his political ideals. Many in Taiwan also knew of Sun through their relatives and contacts in China. Thus, in 1945, when the Nationalist Chinese government assumed political control over Taiwan, Sun and his teachings were familiar to a segment of the local population. Sun’s writings subsequently provided Taiwan with a political philosophy and a formula for political development.7 On the other hand, while there was a rebirth of Chinese political culture in Taiwan after World War II, Taiwanese dislike of KMT rule created resistance to accept it. Meanwhile economic development in Taiwan in the 1950s and thereafter diluted its elitist nature, as did democratic reforms. Success in business and the professions, meanwhile, afforded political careers to newcomers to politics. Still, authoritarianism persisted as the population of Taiwan felt a need for a strong leader and because the ruling elite demanded it. In addition, the Republic of China was technically at war (in a state of readiness perceiving that a conflict with the People’s Republic of China was likely). Finally, Confucianism helped advance the cause of a strong central ruling class.8 From the 1960s on, Taiwan became imbued with Western political ideas. Political rights as practiced in the West became idealized, especially among younger Chinese. Also, as the free market expanded and foreign trade grew, democracy came to be seen as a necessity, especially because the free flow of information (which the authoritarian system impeded) came to be viewed as essential to importing and using of technology to upgrade the economy and to sustaining economic growth. Thus, Taiwan’s political thinking absorbed new democratic components.9 In the 1970s and after, as Taiwan became diplomatically isolated, the desire of both the government and the population to protect Taiwan’s (or the Republic of China’s) sovereignty inspired both national unity and democratization. Threats from Beijing and the need for Taiwan to impress the international community with its political modernization also impacted Taiwan’s politics. Taiwan’s economic boom that spawned a middle class, societal change and growing cosmopolitanism, all of which stimulated feelings of national pride, likewise contributed to changes in its politics. In terms of regime type and the wielding political authority, one specialist uses the term “hard authoritarianism” (1945 to 1960), less hard or “remunerative” authoritarianism (1960 to 1975) and “soft authoritarianism” (1975 to 1990) to describe the evolution of Taiwan’s political system.10 Clearly Taiwan’s political system changed in positive ways before democracy took hold.

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In summary, Taiwan’s politics were shaped by a variety of inputs, but in recent years democracy was the most important one.11 However, Taiwan differed from the West in being more conservative while favoring society over the individual. The term “Asian democracy” in many ways described it. Advocates of Asian democracy see a danger in permissiveness, put a high value on hard work and social stability, view the family as the basic social institution, pay deference to the elderly and favor a less bureaucratic system that is less costly than in Western democratic systems. Asian democracy, or at least Asian values, seemed to be what most people in Taiwan wanted.12 In the last two decades, however, Taiwan’s political culture has seen a host of new forces that suggest serious unfavorable change. The Chen administration oversaw a narrow emphasis on local or Taiwanese political culture. Chinese culture was de-emphasized and in some ways was put under attack. This was reversed during the Ma presidency. It was “adjusted” by the Tsai administration. New ingredients or trends were and are evident: populism, progressivism, identity politics and much more. It is difficult to predict at this juncture to what extent these trends will have a lasting impact on Taiwan’s political system. Thus examining the legal or formal basis of its polity is in order.

The Constitution Another place to begin an assessment of Taiwan’s political system is its Constitution. Chiang Kai-shek brought the Republic of China’s Constitution to Taiwan after World War II.13 The framers of this Constitution created a republican-style representative democracy. The system was a mixed one, though; it included cabinet, presidential and parliamentary features. It set forth neither executive nor legislative supremacy (though in practice the former prevailed). The system was unitary, though it had many characteristics of a federal system, such as allowing local governments a number of special powers. The Constitution guaranteed citizens a broad range of political and civil rights. It embraced broader provisions for the separation of powers and checks and balances than are found in most Western nations’ constitutions.14 Intended to rule a very big country, the president and the vice president were elected by the National Assembly rather than by the electorate directly. The framers of the Constitution anticipated that political parties (or one party, the Nationalist Party) would perform many of the responsibilities relating to the functioning of democratic government, such as measuring and reacting to public opinion, responding to special interests, recruiting both local officials and political leaders, and designing alternative policies.15 Because of the war with the Communists and the ethnic tension that accompanied the unrest that broke out in Taiwan in February 1947, the Constitution was amended (or its implementation delayed, depending on one’s interpretation) by the Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion. The

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Temporary Provisions gave the president emergency powers to deal with threats to national security as well as financial and economic crises. Based on this authority, in 1949 the executive branch of government pushed through the legislature a bill called chieh yen fa (literally “vigilance measures law,” but generally translated as “emergency decree” in Taiwan and “martial law” by the Western media).16 The emergency decree (or martial law) made it legal for Chiang Kai-shek to keep in place an authoritarian regime. Specifically the Temporary Provisions banned the formation of new political parties, nullified the two-term limit on the president (Article 47 of the Constitution) and empowered the president to set up ad hoc organizations to mobilize and control the population and to appoint delegates when vacancies occurred in the elected organs of government. It also gave the military and intelligence agencies a special role in politics.17 In ensuing years, those who argued that the process of democratization was too slow condemned the Temporary Provisions. Others, however, contended that Taiwan successfully became a democracy precisely because the Temporary Provisions held back democratization until social and economic conditions were right (that is, until there was a large middle class and the population was sufficiently educated and otherwise ready to participate intelligently in democratic government). Indeed the public in Taiwan was aware of the failure of premature democratization in many developing countries during the 1950s and 1960s.18 But Taiwan’s populace also believed that the country had to democratize to accommodate Taiwan’s rapid economic development and its high-speed social change. The Constitution contains provisions guaranteeing citizens basic rights similar to those found in Western countries: freedom of speech, belief, residence, publication, assembly, association and the right to privacy. Also arrests, trials and punishments must be carried out according to constitutional provisions. For a number of years, critics charged that the Temporary Provisions and martial law undermined or seriously weakened these basic freedoms, especially guarantees of political and civil rights. In particular, they cited the role intelligence organizations played in censorship, the use of military courts to try civilians, and restrictions on publishing and forming political organizations.19 In response, the government lifted many restrictions in these areas in the 1970s and early 1980s. In 1986, President Chiang Ching-kuo announced he would lift martial law and he did so in 1987. In 1991, President Lee Teng-hui announced he would rescind the Temporary Provisions and that happened later that year.20 Meanwhile, opposition politicians formed the DPP. At that time public demonstrations became commonplace while the KMT pushed legislation enlarging basic constitutional rights and freedoms. All of this indicated political liberalization was happening fast.21 Compared with Western democracies, constitutional guarantees of freedom of assembly, speech and press in Taiwan were somewhat weaker, though the

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press was more representative of the populace in age, gender and political views than counterparts in many Western countries. Pundits in Taiwan, however, noted that the expression of civil and political liberties is conditioned by the political culture, and, given the greater respect for political leaders and the values placed on stability, freedom of speech was self-limited more than in Western democracies. For example, most people in Taiwan did not consider it proper to criticize officials using vulgar language. In any event, in recent years, there seems to be little difference in the practice of basic rights by residents of Taiwan as compared to most Western democracies. In some ways Taiwan has gone further. Certainly individuals and the media assail political leaders with a verve that often surpasses what is seen in Western polities. Religious freedom is considered broader and deeper in Taiwan than in most Western nations and for that matter almost anywhere in the world because few religious organizations (other than the Presbyterian Church) have become involved in politics and because social problems seldom involved religious bias. Also, few people discriminate against others in society or in politics for reasons of religious differences.22 Taiwan’s lower crime rate affords great freedom of movement. Freedom of association and privacy are guaranteed at about the same level as in Western nations. By the 1990s, respect for basic rights and political and other freedoms was ranked high by various international organizations, in marked contrast to the authoritarian tendencies in the People’s Republic of China and many Third World countries.23 The Constitution provides citizens with the right to vote and the powers of recall, initiative and referendum. Elections are held in Taiwan more often than in Western countries; indeed, political elites as well as many residents complain they are too frequent. However, campaigns are shorter than those in the West, and campaigning is more limited by election rules than in most Western countries (though the trend is toward fewer campaign restrictions).24 Written with the intent to legitimate rule over a heterogeneous nation (when the Nationalists ruled China, or all of China), the Constitution contains protections for the rights of the various minorities. These provisions are so strong and specific that government officials sometimes dub them “affirmative action” provisions. For example, if they are not elected in sufficient numbers, the Constitution allocates seats in the elective bodies of government to racial and ethnic minorities, women, labor and other groups. Few Western constitutions have gone this far in guaranteeing representation of minorities or the underprivileged.25 The Constitution also specifies certain policies and goals in the areas of national economy, defense, foreign policy, social security and education not usually found in Western constitutions.26 Some say these provisions have facilitated government planning, especially long-range planning, in these areas. Some critics say it is unnecessary to have these things in the Constitution. In early 1991, in an extraordinary session, the National Assembly abolished the Temporary Provisions and adopted ten amendments, or “additional articles,”

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to the Constitution. Observers said that these articles created genuine constitutional rule in Taiwan. The amendments ended the representation in Taiwan’s elected bodies of government (the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan) of delegates representing areas on the Mainland.27 The political system was also changed to include the election of a national constituency in the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan based on proportional representation, with at-large seats granted to the political parties (including a provision for a small number of delegates to represent “Chinese who reside abroad”). These revisions also provided for laws to handle matters arising from the increasing contacts between Taiwan and China. Finally, in December 1991 provisions were made for the election of a new National Assembly that would enact further amendments.28 In fact, in May 1992, the second National Assembly met as a kind of constitutional convention and added eight more amendments to the Constitution. These articles provided for the following changes in Taiwan’s political system: the election of the National Assembly every four years, the direct election of the president (though the details were to be worked out later) every four years, the appointment of members of the Control Yuan (instead of their being chosen by indirect election), the implementation of reforms in provincial and local governments, guarantees of state support for science and technology, provisions for environmental protection, the equivalent of an equal rights amendment for women, and safeguards for the handicapped, disabled and the Aborigines.29 In July 1994, the National Assembly revised and consolidated the 18 amendments, reducing them to ten. Some new provisions were added. One of these set forth the details for the direct election of the president and vice president beginning in 1996. Another one restricted—and nearly cancelled—the power of the premier to countersign presidential appointments and dismissals. Also the National Assembly was given more political power through provisions added for a speaker and yearly meetings. Other minor changes were made.30 In the summer of 1997, the Constitution was amended once again with 11 more “additional articles.” Important provisions in these articles, made necessary by democratization and multiparty politics, changed the nature of the relationship among the branches of the national government. As a result, the president appoints the premier without approval of the Legislative Yuan and can dissolve the latter. The Legislative Yuan, however, can render a vote of no confidence in the premier. The Legislative Yuan was also given the power of impeachment. One amendment all but eliminated the provincial government. Various local government offices were turned into appointed positions in order to reduce the impact of vote buying and other kinds of corruption.31 Notwithstanding numerous constitutional amendments, Taiwan’s political system remained a mixed one. Many officials and scholars believed the Constitution should be amended further in order to create either a presidential or a parliamentary structure. In the past, this did not matter because the Nationalist Party controlled both the executive and legislative branches of

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government. But this changed in May 2000 after Chen Shui-bian, candidate of the DPP, became president.32 The advocacy for change went even further than proposing amendments. Both Chen and DPP leaders advocated scrapping the Constitution and writing a “Taiwan Constitution,” which to his critics meant an independent Taiwan. But since Chen’s party did not have sufficient support in the legislature this came to naught. In any case, China and the United States opposed Taiwan writing a new constitution. Chen thus had to find another approach. Referendums were popular with the public and that became Chen’s approach of choice. Thus in 2003, the Legislative Yuan passed the Referendum Act, which defined this term (used in the Constitution). However, because the KMT and its allies had a majority in the legislature the act did not allow a referendum to be called to decide the national territory; thus a referendum presumably could not be used to address the matter of independence. It did, however, allow the electorate to decide issues relating to national defense (if Taiwan were threatened militarily). President Chen used this provision to add two referendums to the ballot during the 2004 presidential election that related to Taiwan’s status as part of China or not. These referendums failed.33 Again that September Chen announced his intention to create a new constitution for Taiwan to be ratified by referendum in 2006 and put into effect in 2008. Chen argued that previous constitutional reforms were incomplete and a new one would make Taiwan a “normal, complete, great state.” He also contended that Taiwan’s political system was inefficient, an argument few could challenge. But China reacted harshly. So did the United States. So ended the debate.34 The awkward relationship among Taiwan’s political institutions remained. In fact, on this matter the DPP and the KMT agreed. Thus they decided to cooperate to institute constitutional change. In 2005, the Constitution was amended to abolish the National Assembly and transfer its power to ratify the Constitution to the Legislative Yuan and the people. Another amendment changed the electoral system from a single, non-transferable vote in multimember districts to a single constituency, two-ballot system (one vote for a candidate and one for a political party); this advantaged the large parties and seemed to ensure Taiwan would thenceforth have a two-party system.35 Soon President Chen’s popularity was in decline, later in free-fall. This and the provision whereby future constitutional amendments would have to be approved by the legislature and then endorsed by 50 percent of eligible voters in a referendum made it appear very unlikely there would be further talk of a new constitution or a drastically revised one. When the KMT and Ma Ying-jeou won elections in early 2008 the matter seemed closed. In fact, President Ma showed no interest in changing the Constitution, other than possibly formalizing ties with China. During the end of Ma’s tenure in 2016 and in the context of a presidential election campaign,

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the KMT’s presidential candidate, Eric Chu, proposed a number of reforms that were constitutional in nature: shifting from a presidential system to a parliamentary one, absentee voting, lowering the voting age to 18, reducing the requirement for a party to sponsor legislators-at-large to just 3 percent of the vote, and reviewing the current electoral system.36 Because Tsai Ing-wen at the time was almost sure to win the election she (and her party) chose not to respond to Chu’s proposals and instead talked of various reforms to be undertaken after the election. However, President Tsai avoided changing the Constitution seeing that it might be “opening a can of worms” in view of the fact her policy toward China was to maintain the status quo (while not accepting the 92 Consensus). Her accepting the Constitution as it stood, to her at least, kept the status quo regarding the question of unification and independence.37 Later President Tsai seemed too preoccupied with other issues to consider constitutional matters.

The National Assembly and the Presidency The Constitution (before it was amended) provided for an elected National Assembly, members of which were chosen for six-year terms to represent counties, municipalities and other areas. The National Assembly’s most important functions were to (1) elect the president and vice president, (2) recall the same if necessary, (3) amend the Constitution, (4) make provisions to exercise initiatives and referendums and (5) approve appointments made by the president.38 The first National Assembly was elected in 1947 before the Nationalists fled to Taiwan. For the most part it kept its original members after the move. Until 1991, no full election of the National Assembly was held. The official reason for this was that the “Communist rebellion” on the Mainland precluded a nationwide election. Political reformists, however, charged that the Assembly was “frozen in time” in order to impede both democratization and Taiwanization.39 Critics of the National Assembly voiced other complaints: that it met only once every six years (therefore its members did not earn their pay); that it was too large to deliberate effectively; and that it was composed largely of delegates without significant political experience and/or qualifications, many of whom were too old to do much work. Finally, opposition politicians charged that the National Assembly was little more than a rubber-stamp body for approving decisions made by the ruling Nationalist Party.40 As democratization gained momentum in the 1980s, pressure grew to fix or abolish the National Assembly. In January 1989, the Legislative Yuan passed the Law on Voluntary Retirement of Senior Parliamentarians in the hope of persuading the elder members of the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan to step down. But only a few did so. The Nationalist Party then tried to induce its older members, most of the body, to resign, but with little effect. In June 1990, the Council of Grand Justices (a group of justices that serves as a

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constitutional court) made a ruling that they had to retire before December 1991. This measure succeeded.41 In December 1991, a second National Assembly was elected to a four-year term. The new National Assembly, democratically chosen and representing the population of Taiwan, almost exclusively, became a true democratic body of government. In 1994, the National Assembly’s powers were expanded through changes in the Constitution. However, because the president and vice president were now to be elected directly, the Assembly lost its most important function.42 As the 2000 presidential election approached, the future status of the National Assembly became the subject of heated debate. The DPP, which had long advocated abolishing the Assembly, made an issue of it providing highsalaried sinecures for its members, this constituting, it said, a form of political corruption. In April, its members voted to reduce the National Assembly to an ad hoc body. As a result, it virtually ceased to function. However, it retained its powers to ratify constitutional amendments and to vote on a presidential impeachment. To do either, though, a new National Assembly would have to be constituted when called upon, and that would no doubt complicate implementing its powers and probably make forming a National Assembly infrequent. In 2005, an ad hoc National Assembly ratified an additional article of the Constitution that included a provision to abolish itself.43 Unlike the National Assembly, the Office of the President has considerable authority that derives both specifically from the Constitution and that which has evolved through practice. As chief of state, the president is formally responsible for state functions such as promulgating laws, declaring martial law, appointing officials, granting amnesty and commutations, and conducting foreign relations. He or she also commands the armed forces and can declare war. Finally, the president is responsible for resolving disputes among the five branches of government and for exercising emergency powers.44 The president, in addition, has powers that derive from his or her leadership position in the ruling party (if the president is of that party), though this authority has not been institutionalized. (Yen Chia-kan, who became president when Chiang Kai-shek died, was not a strong president because he did not lead his party. Chen Shui-bian gave up his party posts after he became president because his presidency was weak owing to his party’s failure to achieve a majority in the Legislative Yuan.) This “derivative power,” when the president has it, strengthens the authority of the presidential office considerably. The power of the president has been bolstered further as a result of the perceived need for strong leadership at the top and also because Taiwan’s past presidents have been a major force behind successful economic and political reform. Symbolic duties and the president’s role in representing the nation in the international community have similarly enhanced the power of the office. In 1967, the National Security Council was established within the Office of the President to coordinate national strategy. In 1990, the National Unification

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Council was founded to bring various groups and individuals together to discuss and implement the unification of Taiwan with China. Academia Sinica, the nation’s foremost think tank or association of scholars, and Academia Historica, a historical research center and document-preservation organization, were already under presidential administration.45 In 1994, the details were worked out, following the passage of a relevant constitutional amendment, for the direct election of the president and vice president. The first such election was held in 1996. Lee Teng-hui, then president, won re-election. Because it was a direct election, he gained a much stronger mandate and enhanced his political power. Meanwhile, a constitutional provision reduced the authority of the premier, thereby making Taiwan’s political system, according to many observers, more clearly presidential. Other constitutional provisions, however, such as the Legislative Yuan’s expanded powers—especially its power to initiate impeachment of the president and the vice president—suggested otherwise. In any event, the lines of authority between the president and the legislature were in some important respects still in need of clarification.46 This situation remains. Chiang Kai-shek was president from 1950 until his death in 1975, having been elected in 1972 to a fifth six-year term that he did not complete. The Temporary Provisions enhanced Chiang’s presidential powers, as did martial law and the fact that he held undisputed control over the ruling party, the military and the police. He was thus an “authoritarian president.”47 Chiang Kai-shek did little to change the structure or nature of the presidency. However, he did reform the KMT and contributed to democratization by engineering economic growth that produced a middle class. He also held elections that, though they were controlled by the KMT’s hold over local factions, did start the ball rolling by training local politicians in democratic processes. When Chiang died, Yen Chia-kan, a former governor of Taiwan Province and vice president from 1966 to 1975, succeeded him. Premier Chiang Chingkuo, Chiang Kai-shek’s son, controlled the ruling Nationalist Party and wielded considerable political influence elsewhere, notably with the police, the military and the intelligence services. This did not create an untenable situation because Yen and Chiang Ching-kuo were not political opponents and because the Constitution, as noted earlier, was at this time ambiguous about whether the system was presidential, parliamentary or cabinet. Chiang Ching-kuo was elected president in 1978. He sought strenuously to make Taiwan a democracy and did not rule so much in an authoritarian way; in so doing, he weakened the powers of the presidency somewhat. He was reelected in March 1984 for a second six-year term. Shieh Tung-min, the first Taiwanese to attain such a high office, was Chiang’s first vice president. Chiang chose Lee Teng-hui, the former governor of Taiwan Province, also Taiwanese (Hakka), as his second vice president and heir apparent in 1984. In January 1988, Chiang died while in office but not before he changed the office of the president by making it a force for democratization, bringing Taiwanese

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into the government and the party and constitutionally by getting rid of martial law, the ban on new parties and more. He said he wanted to democratize Taiwan within the framework of the Constitution. For all intents and purposes, he did that and it was for the good of Taiwan.48 Some democratic changes he made by fiat. Alas he was a force for change both formally and informally. Upon Chiang Ching-kuo’s death, Lee Teng-hui became president according to provisions in the Constitution. For a time, though, there was talk that Lee might be a figurehead president because he did not have the power base or popularity of Chiang. However, Lee prevailed over his opponents. Still Lee faced the difficult task of transforming Taiwan’s political system into a full, working democracy. Lee orchestrated a number of constitutional changes to make possible the further transition to democracy. As noted earlier he called town-hall style meetings to do this. In 1990, he convened the National Affairs Conference and in 1996 the National Development Conference. Both were large meetings attended by a variety of people: scholars, politicians, the media and other luminaries. These meetings paved the way for getting rid of the National Assembly and the provincial government and much more. Meanwhile, in 1990 and 1991, Lee established the National Unification Council and the Mainland Affairs Council (within the Executive Yuan) to deal with cross-Strait issues. Some thought these agencies were set up to placate Chinese leaders in Beijing who perceived Lee, who was Taiwanese and appointed more Taiwanese to important positions in the government and the party, was taking Taiwan in the direction of independence. Others said Lee was trying to mollify members of his own party that also thought this.49 In May 2000, Chen Shui-bian, a member of the opposition DPP, became Taiwan’s fifth president. Almost immediately after his inauguration, the nowopposition Nationalist Party, in cooperation with James Soong’s newly formed People First Party, through their control of the legislature, engaged in a power struggle with President Chen that focused to a large extent on the legal authority of the president. The gridlock that followed showed that presidential and legislative powers set forth in the Constitution should have been delineated more clearly. The problem of divided government persisted throughout Chen’s presidency.50 Chen made a multitude of efforts to change the system through constitutional and other means, mostly the latter. But his efforts generally failed, though politics in other ways was different as a result of Chen’s presidency and a change in ruling parties. In 2008, Ma Ying-jeou, a former minister of justice and Taipei mayor, was elected president, representing the Nationalist Party. Ma won the largest number of votes and the biggest percentage of the popular vote since direct elections of the president began. With the KMT having won a solid victory in the legislature two months earlier, Ma did not face a divided government and seemed destined to be a stronger and more effective president than Chen had

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been. In fact, in many ways Ma returned the presidency and the polity to what it had been before 2000. But he did not seek to make changes in the Constitution, which some thought odd with Ma being a lawyer and a constitutional scholar. Also, Ma’s second term went less well. The economy stuttered. Ma’s elitiststyle of government was less appreciated. Likewise for his morality. The opposition employed populist themes against him while the DPP made issue of economic inequities and the plight of the youth. DPP leaders labelled Ma a weak president and attacked him for “selling out” Taiwan to China. Ma’s presidency ended on a low note.51 In 2016, Tsai Ing-wen former head of the Mainland Affairs Council and vice premier under President Chen and subsequent chairwoman of the DPP took advantage of the situation and won the election handily. So did the DPP, winning a majority legislature. Her presidency began with great hope and optimism.52 But she took on too many reforms most of which did not become legislation. Also, many were not well received and that caused her popularity to drop fast. Her middle-of-the-road stance on Taiwan’s legal status, whether it is going to be independence or part of China, seemed to satisfy no one. She did not cope with China well. The economy did not grow up to expectations. In 2018, the DPP performed badly in the off-year election, which most observers attributed to her.53

The Five-Branch Government As noted earlier, Taiwan’s central government is patterned after the U.S. threebranch system, with the addition of two more branches or Yuan—the Control Yuan and the Examination Yuan. It was thought that a five-branch government would ensure a greater separation of powers and more effective checks and balances. It had other advantages as well (though also some disadvantages). At the time the Constitution was enacted in 1947 the role of each branch of the fivebranch system was widely debated by officials and scholars and it was considered to be both a good system and uniquely Chinese.54 Of the five branches of government, the Executive Yuan was the most powerful. The reason was that the president connects to this branch of the government and he or she was given broad powers of governance. The Executive Yuan early on was also efficient and responsive to public opinion, taking big strides in that direction after Chiang Ching-kuo took steps to reform the government in the late 1970s. In fact, before the retirement of the “elder parliamentarians,” the Executive Yuan was regarded as more sensitive to the public pulse than the Legislative Yuan. In many respects, it still is. The head of the Executive Yuan was the premier, chosen by the president. Under the premier were a vice premier and eight important ministers (interior, foreign affairs, defense, finance, education, justice, economic affairs, and transportation and communications) also appointed by the president upon the recommendation of the premier. These ministries performed functions similar to those of

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their counterparts in other political systems. Attached to the Executive Yuan were a number of other important ministerial-level bodies.55 In 2010, the Legislative Yuan passed bills to restructure and streamline the executive branch of government to be implemented during the period from January 1, 2012 to December 31, 2014. The Executive Yuan was to consist of 14 ministries, four councils, three independent agencies and four additional organizations. The next year legislation was enacted to transform certain state-run organizations into independent bodies. These included the ChungShan Institute of Science and Technology, the National Sports Training Center, the National Science and Technology Center for Disaster Reduction, and the National Science Council.56 In 2012, the Executive Yuan, in particular the Ministry of Culture, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs assumed the functions of the Government Information Office. The National Development Council took the duties of the Council for Economic Planning, the Public Construction Commission and some from the Research, Development and Evaluation Commission.57 In 2016, four new ministries were created from reorganizations or consolidations: the Ministry of Labor, Ministry of Health and Welfare, Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Science and Technology. The numerous government organs that are part of the Executive Yuan reflect its broad authority for policy formulation as well as its host of administrative duties. In fact, this is where most bills or laws are drafted and important political decisions are implemented. Officials of the Executive Yuan work closely with the president and top leaders of the ruling party who, as a matter of practice, take the initiative to make policy and exercise strong influence on the political agenda.58 Decisions made by the Executive Yuan are checked by the Legislative Yuan, a unicameral law-making body of the national government often called the parliament or senate. It has the power to interpret, reject or alter bills or acts drafted by the Executive Yuan. In the past, checks on the executive branch were rather feeble, owing to an usually weak legislature and the fact that the Nationalist Party dominated the setting of policy goals. The Legislative Yuan gained power as it became more representative of the population and more active, coinciding with Taiwan’s rapid democratization in the 1980s and 1990s. After Chen Shui-bian was elected president in 2000, the Legislative Yuan became even stronger and aggressively impeded many of his actions and policies and put forth its own agenda.59 In addition to its legislative functions, it confirms emergency orders, approves budgets (submitted by the Executive Yuan) and proposes amendments to the Constitution. The Legislative Yuan also indorses Executive Yuan policy statements and reports and serves as a check on the Judicial Yuan, the Control Yuan and the Examination Yuan. It may, as noted earlier, also initiate impeachment proceedings against the president and vice president. It has some lesser powers as well, such as providing grants-in-aid to provincial government organs and settling disputes between the national government and units of local government.60

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Legislative Yuan members elect a president or speaker and a vice president and endorse an appointment of a secretary-general. Members of the legislature make their own rules regarding procedures for debating and passing laws and bills as well as for dealing with members who misbehave or violate ethical standards, although such responsibilities also belong to the Control Yuan. Much of the work of the Legislative Yuan is done in its standing committees.61 The Legislative Yuan numbered 225 members (enlarged by 61 seats before the December 1998 election); it was made up of 176 delegates who represented electoral districts (mostly multimember districts of varying size) and 49 at-large senators (41 of whom represented a national constituency and eight of whom represented Chinese overseas). Recently it has been downsized (as will be discussed later). The Legislative Yuan convenes two sessions each year: one from February to the end of May, the other from September to the end of the year. It may hold extraordinary sessions, called by its president, at any time. A simple majority passes resolutions, with some exceptions specified in the Constitution. Legislative Yuan members have immunity from being sued or indicted for most crimes while in office, though the scope of these exemptions has been narrowed in recent years because of abuse.62 The Legislative Yuan, when first formed, represented all of China, the Mainland as well as Taiwan, and continued to do so after the government moved to Taiwan in 1949. It became more representative of Taiwan’s population after 1969, when a number of new members were elected. Subsequently, elections brought in more new blood that were mainly Taiwanese. To a large degree they dominated work in the Legislative Yuan. Still, critics protested that not all members of the Legislative Yuan were elected and that it unrealistically claimed to represent China.63 As in the case of the National Assembly, defenders pointed out that if the Legislative Yuan stopped representing districts in China, Taiwan would be de facto adopting a two-China policy and Beijing’s leaders had promised to use military force against Taiwan to prevent what they thought was tantamount to a move toward Taiwan’s legal independence. Clearly this was a case of Taiwan’s democratization colliding with maintaining peaceful relations with China. As noted earlier, the Legislative Yuan traditionally had much less decisionmaking authority than the Executive Yuan. This changed with democratization; but it was not all positive change. Antics that went on in legislative sessions and the bad behavior of some of its members aroused public ridicule and satire in the press at home and abroad. Known—indeed famous—criminals winning election to the legislature and legislators with underworld ties, not to mention frequent cases of corruption and fistfights during lawmaking sessions, also brought dishonor to the body.64 Thus the voter turnout for legislative elections declined over the years: from 72 percent in 1992, to an average of 67 percent in 1995 through 2001, to 59 percent in 2004 and 58 percent in 2008.65 It is uncertain if these numbers represented a deterioration of

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Taiwan’s democracy or simply it becoming consolidated; probably it was more the latter. In any event, the legislative and executive elections were combined in 2012 and this improved voter turnout. A number of reforms have been enacted to enhance the prestige and effectiveness of the Legislative Yuan. In 1993, the legislature improved its image when it passed a “sunshine bill” that required members to disclose their personal wealth.66 In 2004, the Legislative Yuan voted 217 to 1 (in the context of 70 percent public support according to public opinion polls) to halve the number of seats to 113 and increase the terms of members to four years (so that elections would coincide with presidential elections). It also voted to change the electoral system for the legislature. The new legislature seated in January 2008 was thus comprised of 73 directly elected members and 6 seats reserved for Aborigines, plus 34 seats filled by the parties, half of which must be women. There was considerable debate at the time concerning whether this would improve the efficiency of the legislature and the respect accorded its members.67 The Judicial Yuan is the third most important of the five branches of Taiwan’s government. One of its functions is to oversee Taiwan’s courts, hear criminal and civil cases and check on the administrative court system. Judges to the courts are appointed from among public prosecutors, attorneys-at-law and scholars or through an examination system. Judges are appointed for life, though they may be removed for “incompetence” according to the Judges Act passed in June 2011. At the top of the court system is the Constitutional Court. It is made up of 15 high judges appointed by the president of the Republic of China for 8-year terms. One judge serves as president (or the equivalent of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in the United States); another serves as vice president. Judges may not serve consecutive terms. The president and vice president of this court are not guaranteed eight years in their positions.68 The Judicial Yuan functions much like the judicial branches of governments elsewhere, although structurally it is somewhat different. The Judicial Yuan is organized into a Council of Grand Justices, three levels of ordinary courts (the Supreme Court, high courts, and district courts), administrative courts, and a Committee on the Discipline of Public Functionaries. The Council of Grand Justices, which meets twice weekly, interprets the Constitution in a fashion that resembles the process of judicial review in Western systems. In doing so it formalises legal statutes and regulations. An interpretation of the Constitution requires a three-fourths vote from the members present and a quorum of three-fourths of members; a simple majority is sufficient to make other decisions. Government agencies and individuals can call for an interpretation of the Constitution.69 The Supreme Court, which is the highest of the three levels of ordinary courts, in addition to interpreting the Constitution it hears appeals in civil and criminal cases, makes motions to set aside decisions of the high courts, and takes special cases. The Supreme Court is divided into several civil and

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criminal “senates” (eight and twelve, respectively). Each senate includes a presiding judge and four associates. Because of this division of work, the Supreme Court can hear more cases than would otherwise be possible and thus avoid backlogs and delays. Because the Supreme Court decides only issues of law, not of fact, its proceedings are primarily documentary; also, because few of its proceedings are oral, the system is less adversarial than Western legal systems.70 The high courts hear cases of appeal from district courts, criminal cases involving rebellion and treason, cases involving other nations, and election lawsuits. District courts hear original civil and criminal cases involving juvenile, family, traffic, and financial cases and other less contentious matters. Administrative courts handle suits against the government and cases involving violations of citizens’ rights by administrative actions of the government. The Committee on the Discipline of Public Functionaries serves as a check on decisions of the Control Yuan involving impeachment, dismissal, and the like.71 Taiwan is a civil law society; thus the judicial system places an emphasis on statutes rather than on case law. Its legal culture has several historical origins in addition to its design based on the Constitutional structure just cited. Commerce and technology have influenced the system in recent years, as has legal education modelled on that in the United States. In terms of how the legal system operates in court, Taiwan’s judicial system has been moved in recent years from a “judge-centered, inquisitorial system” (the German model) to an “attorney-based, adversarial system” (like that of the United States) in response to growing public interest in lawsuits and lawyers becoming more activist. There was concern at the time this change would lead to a glut of legal cases in the courts; this, however, has been alleviated by a number of means including prosecutor plea-bargaining.72 Critics of the Judicial Yuan have argued that it is not as strong a judicial body of government as it should be and it is not sufficiently independent of ruling party influence. This charge was often levelled at the KMT when it was in power, but subsequently also the DPP. Some observers complained that judges are government employees recruited through a government examination and are thus not impartial.73 Defenders point out that the 1980 Separation of Trial from Prosecution Reform Act made the Judicial Yuan more independent and maintained that it should not be given excessive power because it is not an elected organ of government. Furthermore, they say that public distaste for instituting legal proceedings lessens the need for a strong judicial body. Taiwan is a less litigious society than the United States and other Western countries, though this has changed considerably in recent years. Citizens’ confidence in the judiciary suffered considerably during the Chen administration. The president promised judicial reform, but because of his administration’s standoff with the Legislative Yuan and the paralysis that caused, plus corruption in his administration, little happened. Also, critics accused the Chen administration of making judicial appointments as political favors. In fact, street protest against President Chen and the DPP in 2006 was

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in part prompted by the fact that it was widely perceived that Chen controlled the judiciary, including prosecutors, and that they protected a corrupt administration. Confidence was to some extent restored when prosecutors indicted Chen’s son-in-law and the president’s wife for various crimes when Chen Shui-bian was still serving as president.74 Under President Ma Ying-jeou, the judicial system was the target of quite intense though mostly partisan criticism related to its handling of former president Chen Shui-bian’s indictment and sentencing for corruption, accepting bribes, misusing state funds, and money laundering. The criticism focused on the fact Chen was held in detention for some time without charges. Also there were frequent leaks to the media about the case when it was in progress.75 Part of reason for the controversy was that many supporters believed him innocent even of the crimes to which he confessed, while others wanted to use the trial to embarrass him and disgrace his political party.76 In May 2017 the Constitutional Court rendered a significant but also controversial decision on same-sex marriages that ostensibly resolved bills pending in the legislature to amend the Civil Code. The Court’s decision was based on the equality before the law provision in the Constitution, which reads “irrespective of sex, religion, race, class or party affiliation.” The court ruled that sexual orientation should also be included.77 The Control Yuan was originally a special branch of government patterned after the Censorate in Imperial China, a watchdog body similar to the Government Accountability Office in the United States. Provincial and municipal councils elected its twenty-nine members. Because of scandals that arose over the buying of seats and a decline in the number of important cases it heard, among other reasons, the duties of the Control Yuan were reduced dramatically over time. In February 1993, the Control Yuan became a body of government appointed by the president with the approval of the Legislative Yuan. Its basic functions were truncated so it was no longer a parliamentary (elected) body and in the process it lost many of its supervisory functions.78 The Control Yuan is now best described as a quasi-judicial oversight branch of government designed to check on officials. The Control Yuan retained the powers of impeachment, censure, and audit—though the authority to impeach the president or vice president was taken away in 1997. However, it kept the power to investigate the Executive Yuan and its subordinate agencies. It could still censure public officials. It also oversees the Ministry of Audit—now one of its main functions. It approves presidential appointments (by a secret vote in a plenary session) and has the power to investigate and hear complaints from the public.79 In 2004, President Chen submitted a list of Control Yuan appointees, which the Legislative Yuan declined to approve. The legislature asked for a new list, but Chen did not submit one, and the Control Yuan, for all intents and purposes, ceased to function. Some observers said it was a casualty of the power struggle between the president and the opposition. Critics of the president said he did not want it revived, as it would investigate corruption in his

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administration. A fully functioning Control Yuan would certainly have taken action against President Chen’s wife when she was subsequently indicted for embezzlement, forgery and perjury, and it may have taken action against President Chen.80 There have been frequent calls for abolishing the Control Yuan both in the past and the present. Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP made this part of their agenda during the 2016 election campaign. However, there was no serious follow-up. In 2017 President Tsai stated she wanted to strengthen the Control Yuan’s supervision of the judicial branch of government.81 The Examination Yuan has the responsibility for writing and administering the equivalent of civil service examinations in Western political systems. In the Chinese political tradition, examinations for political office were of such importance that a special branch of government was created to conduct and oversee them. Today, the Examination Yuan administers four kinds of special examinations to recruit and screen applicants for government service. It also deals with job qualifications, job security, and retirement issues. The Examination Yuan is organized into a council, a secretariat, and two ministries: the Ministry of Examination and the Ministry of Personnel. The president appoints members of the Examination Yuan.82 There has been considerable public debate about the Five Yuan system and more broadly of the structure of the government in Taiwan. Various noted individuals and leaders of the political parties have proposed abolishing both the Control Yuan and the Examination Yuan and establishing a three-branch system of government. If this were done, the functions of the two would be transferred to the other Yuans.

Local Government As stated earlier, Taiwan’s political system is a unitary one (meaning that the central government is the dominant political authority), though it also has some of the characteristics of a federal system (meaning that local government has first or primary jurisdiction in certain realms).83 There is also overlapping authority. The organization of local government is based on provisions in the Constitution for local self-government that created provisions for provincial and other levels of government such as county, city, town, and village borough systems. Although the various units of local government report to officials or sections of government at a higher level, all are given some powers and responsibilities that do not relate directly to other units of government and do not depend on higher authority, as in federal systems.84 On the other side of the coin external threats and advances in transportation and communications and also science and technology have expanded the role of the central government, as has its ability to make quick responses to problems associated with rapid economic and political change.85 Finally, most top government officials both past and present have favored keeping power at the center.

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In addition, funding is a problem in local governments, which in particular affects providing services to constituents. In fact, the inconsistencies in providing welfare and other benefits cause many residents to think these things should be taken over by the central government.86 Still Taiwan’s local governments get a great deal of credit for political reform and democratization. In fact, some argue democracy at the local level, plus Taiwan moving to a free market economy and its impressive economic growth that engendered a middle class, were the main motivators for the KMT-led government to pursue democratization.87 Certainly electoral competition in Taiwan began at the local level and expanded from there into national politics.88 Many thus contend that democracy evolved in Taiwan “from the bottom up,” meaning that democratic change came first to local politics. Another fact to consider is that global economic trends in the 1970s and 1980s favored the decentralization of political authority, because both exporting companies and their governments had to maintain cost-efficiency. In addition, in Taiwan’s case localization was a reaction to China’s rise and Taiwan’s effort to build support to deal with it from the international community.89 Another factor that favored local government is that Taiwan’s political system allows local politicians to gain experience and name recognition, thus providing them with an avenue by which they can move up to positions in the national government. Hence competition for positions in governments in Taiwan remains strong, and its various offices find talent quite easily.90 Furthermore local officials who rise to the top tend to favor keeping the functions and powers of local government intact. Finally, there has been and remains a strong interest in local politics on the part of the voters in Taiwan. The provincial government, the highest level of local government in Taiwan, was established in May 1947 coinciding with abolishing the Office of Governor-General following mass unrest after February 28 and ill feeling toward the central government. However, in 1949, after the Nationalists fled to Taiwan, Taiwan Province came almost totally under the control of the central government. Because the latter had jurisdiction over nearly all of the land and population of the Republic of China, many provincial government functions and duties overlapped with those of the central government. In these areas, the national government usually dominated.91 Below the provincial government were 16 counties, where most of the work of local government was performed. County governments were divided into urban or rural categories, the former being subdivided into boroughs and the latter into villages. Two metropolitan governments were established later: Taipei and Kaohsiung. In many respects, the two became more important than the county governments and more powerful than even the provincial government (before it was downsized) because of the large number of people under their jurisdiction, the many difficult but important tasks they performed, and their close relationship with organs of the central government.92 The top level of local government was the popularly elected Provincial Assembly, composed of members who served four-year terms, and an appointed

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governor. At its center was the Provincial Government Council, which consisted of 23 of the 79 members of the Provincial Assembly, specially selected by the Executive Yuan and the governor. It served as a cabinet. Though the powers of the Provincial Assembly were not broad, the body mirrored public opinion more accurately than the elected bodies of the national government since the former was elected by voters in full every four years and represented only Taiwan.93 For some years, many who demanded more democracy in Taiwan—especially those who rejected the ruling Nationalist Party’s claim to represent China—advocated a greater role for the provincial government even though the KMT exercised control over local governments via its issuing government permits, playing one local faction against another, etc.94 In particular, they sought to give broader responsibilities and powers to the Provincial Assembly and grant it greater independence from the national government. However, after plenary elections democratized the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan, this feeling subsided. In 1992, the formalization of local autonomy was realized by constitutional amendment. This had a major impact in sustaining and even strengthening local government.95 In the process, Quemoy, Matsu and the parts of the Pratas and Spratly Areas under Taipei’s direct (military jurisdiction) control were granted local autonomy. Quemoy and Matsu now have county governments. At this time, the provincial governor was made an elective office, and in 1994 Taiwan’s voters elected James Soong governor. With Lien Chan vice president and Soong provincial governor, both close Lee supporters, President Lee had much better control over executive functions.96 As noted earlier, in 1996, President Lee Teng-hui convened a gathering of officials, scholars and politicians (called the National Development Conference) to discuss political reforms and additional constitutional amendments. One of the main topics at the meeting was downsizing or eliminating the provincial and village levels of government. The duplication of functions by the national and provincial governments was seen to be expensive and made government less efficient. The opposition DPP, as well as many scholars and government officials, supported Lee’s proposals. The National Assembly subsequently acted, and, in 1997, made constitutional changes to shrink the provincial government drastically. In December 1998, the Provincial Assembly was virtually eliminated, along with the elected governorship and most other organs of the provincial government.97 When the National Development Conference recommended that the provincial governor once again be made an appointed job, James Soong resigned. His resignation was not accepted, however, and he remained on the job until the end of 1998. In the meantime, his relationship with President Lee, which was once very close, deteriorated, and the two became mutually hostile. Thus many disputes associated with downsizing the provincial government, such as where its assets and personnel would go and who would control them, were aired in public.98 In the meantime, in 1967, Taipei was made a “special municipality” followed by Kaohsiung in 1979. As a result, the mayors of Taiwan’s two largest

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cities were thereafter appointed by the national government. The official reason given was that the size of these two cities made it necessary for their executive heads to coordinate policies and actions with the national government—a seemingly logical explanation given that Taipei was the seat of the national government and Kaohsiung was Taiwan’s second largest city and its major port. However, opposition politicians claimed that the national government sought to inhibit the development of democratic government in these cities and eliminate a political base for popular Taiwanese politicians. In any event, the mayorships of these two cities were made elective offices again, and in December 1994, their respective electorates chose the two mayors. The mayors of the two cities, but especially the mayor of Taipei, have been important and very visible political figures. Former president Chen was mayor of Taipei from 1994 to 1998; President Ma Ying-jeou was mayor of Taipei from 1998 to 2006; Frank Hsieh was mayor of Kaohsiung from 1998 to 2005. In 2010, three new metropolitan cities were created: New Taipei City, which was originally Taipei County; Taichung City, formed by a merger of Taichung City and Taichung County; and Tainan City, formed from Tainan City and Tainan County. Kaohsiung City was enlarged by adding Kaohsiung County, and Taipei City remained the same. Taoyuan County, the site of Taipei International Airport, was made a provisional special municipality effective January 2011.99 According to the Constitution before it was amended, below the provincial government (except for the municipal governments just mentioned) were county, town and village governments. These units of local government operated with considerable autonomy and authority. Local leaders had considerable say over budget issues and some other matters that did not relate directly to national policy. The National Development Conference, in addition to proposing that the provisional government be scrapped, recommended the elimination of another level of government: village government. Again, efficiency was the main consideration; but reducing vote buying was also a reason. In fact, the National Development Conference’s suggestion was made into another constitutional amendment, and village government was virtually eliminated. Some say it came at the expense of local democracy; others contend it made for better, more efficient and more honest government.100 Shortly after the Nationalists arrived in Taiwan, they held provincial and local elections. Contrary to expectations, the Kuomintang did not try to suppress democracy locally; rather, KMT officials encouraged it. Because of strong opposing factions in local politics and potent centrifugal forces, the KMT could play a mediator role and/or control or effectively play off local factions against one another while bringing many local leaders into the ruling party.101 This stunted the growth of a political opposition to the KMT. Another factor was the success of Taiwan’s land reform in the 1950s that generated positive feelings toward the KMT in rural Taiwan.

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On the other hand, many KMT leaders genuinely wanted to create a democratic system in accordance with Sun Yat-sen’s teachings and felt that existing local governments were not sufficiently democratic.102 Likewise many local officials did not share the KMT’s views about local politics and believed that they could build the foundations for democracy locally, and later they said they did. Their view comported with the idea that democracy came from “the bottom up.” Proof of this was, they said, that democracy had been practiced locally for 30 years in the form of regular elections yet the first competitive election in national politics wasn’t until 1980. Another trait about local politics in Taiwan when assessing its importance is that voter turnout is high in local elections. This suggests that the electorate sees democracy as it is practiced locally as more meaningful than politics at the national level. Part of the explanation is that the electorate, like that in Japan and France (but unlike the United States and most other Western democracies), tends to identify more with local issues. Voters thus perceive that their votes are more important in deciding local matters than national ones, and they are generally better informed about candidates for positions in local government. This was shown recently by the fact the turnout was higher in the 2014 local elections than in the 2016 national election.103 When it was founded in 1986, the DPP attracted leaders including candidates for high office that, for the most part, had made their careers in local politics. In 1997, after the DPP won a major victory in local elections, there was talk that the DPP may come to control local politics while the KMT would continue to run the national government. This did not happen, though DPP officials continued to perform well in local offices and many rose to top positions in the national government, especially during the Chen presidency. It is still said that DPP officials in local offices perform better than their KMT counterparts. There was, and is, also a noticeable shift in terms of the backgrounds of top central government officials—from those with science backgrounds, technocrats and those with experience in the national government, to lawyers and those that gained experience and reputation serving in local governments.104 As noted, prior to the local elections in 2010, new metropolitan cities were created. The combined population of them approached 14 million, or 60 percent of Taiwan’s total population. The KMT and the DPP were the main contenders and the results were inconclusive in terms of proclaiming a winner.105 Prior to the 2014 local elections, Taoyuan County was upgraded to a metropolitan city and other local offices were “consolidated” so that this “nine-in-one” collection of local elections was even bigger and more important than previous local elections. Virtually all voters chose a local official or officials to represent them. The DPP won this “mid-term” election, as it was called, decisively. Pundits opined this election would predict who would win the next presidential and legislative election. They were right. The DPP won handily the 2016 presidential/vice presidential and legislative election.106 In 2018, the situation reversed. The DPP lost the mid-term collection of local elections badly. At this time pundits suggested that local elections set the

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stage for national ones and that local politics were important in ways not considered seriously in the past.

Political Parties To grasp how political power is exercised in Taiwan, one must understand the roles and functions of political parties, how they are organized and how their leaderships operate.107 This applies especially to the Nationalist Party and the Democratic Progressive Party—Taiwan’s two major parties. It is likewise essential to fathom the nature of two parties’ structures, how they have changed in some important respects in recent years and what kind of political party system, a two-party one or something else, is evolving. In the way of background, Taiwan experienced the development of political organizations that were something like advocacy groups for local representation under Japanese rule. However, political parties in the real sense evolved in China, and one of them, the Nationalist Party, moved to Taiwan in 1945 and henceforth functioned there. There were two other parties that went: the Young China Party and the China Democratic Socialist Party. But they were “outgrowths” of the KMT and did not compete with it in any serious way. Under the Temporary Provisions discussed earlier in this chapter, it was unlawful to form a new political party in Taiwan. Thus until 1986, Taiwan had a de facto one-party system. In fact, for many years, the Nationalist Party almost alone carried out the functions of recruitment and training, interest articulation and interest aggregation that are the main things a political party does. It also made decisions and formulated policies that the government generally adopted pro forma, typical of oneparty states.108 The Nationalist Party traces its origins to several political organizations founded by Sun Yat-sen, the first being the Hsing Chung Hui, or the Society for Regenerating China, set up in Hawaii in 1894. In August 1912, the Tung Meng Hui, or the Revolutionary Alliance, which Sun had established in Japan in 1905, merged with other groups to form the Nationalist Party or Kuomintang (KMT).109 In February of the next year, the KMT won a victory in China’s first parliamentary elections. Meanwhile, however, Yuan Shih-kai, an adviser to the former imperial government, seized the reins of power in Peking and threatened battle with Sun’s supporters in the south. The standoff seemed likely to ignite a civil war, so Sun abdicated rather than see that happen. Yuan subsequently suppressed KMT activities and established himself as a virtual dictator. However, the KMT survived, and, after Yuan’s death in 1916, Sun made several attempts to establish a democratic form of government with the KMT serving as its power base. However, these efforts failed.110 Sun died in 1925. After a brief power struggle, Chiang Kai-shek, with the military as his base of support, assumed leadership of the KMT.111 Chiang, mainly using his leadership of the military and the KMT, ruled China until

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1949 when the Communists defeated his armies. At that point, a portion of the Nationalist Party, along with the government and the military and a number of Chiang’s followers, fled to Taiwan. Chiang headed the Nationalist Party until his passing in 1975. After his father’s death, Chiang’s son, Chiang Ching-kuo, was unanimously elected chairman of the Central Committee of the party—and thereby head of the Nationalist Party. He remained chairman of the party until he passed away in January 1988. President Lee Teng-hui then became acting chairman of the KMT; he was formally elected chairman at the Thirteenth Party Congress in July 1988. Lee was forced to resign as head of the party after the party’s defeat in the presidential election of 2000. Lien Chan replaced him.112 Ma Ying-jeou was elected party chairman in 2005 and held that office until 2007, after which there were interim party heads. Ma was elected chairman again in 2009 and served until 2013. He was again followed by interim or acting party leaders. In August 2017, Wu Den-yih was elected chairman of the KMT.113 Regarding the KMT’s organizational structure, owing to the influence of Soviet advisers, Sun’s perception that the West had not adequately supported him and his calls for democracy in China, plus the need for strong organization, the Nationalist Party took its organizational structure from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Thus many refer to it as a “Leninist party,” which is a somewhat accurate description of the KMT’s structure.114 The National Party Congress is theoretically the highest decision-making body in the KMT, but it is too large to deliberate on issues efficiently and was for some time generally considered a rubber-stamp body. To a large extent, it still is. When not in session, the National Party Congress delegates decisionmaking authority to the party’s Central Committee and its 30-some-member Central Standing Committee. Most analysts long regarded the latter as the center of political power in Taiwan. As with other Leninist parties, the secretarygeneral of the party, in concert with the chairman and other top-ranking members, make policy “recommendations.” The Central Committee confirmed their decisions.115 The KMT differed, however, from Leninist parties in some important ways. For example, unlike the ruling parties in Communist countries (including China), the KMT is more a mass party than an elite party. In the 1990s, the KMT claimed a membership of 2.1 million, or about 10 percent of the population.116 Also, in contrast to the Chinese Communist Party, it did not create a centrally planned economy or attempt to completely mobilize and control the population. Furthermore, it never gave such high importance to ideology. Finally, the KMT altered its organizational structure and decision-making process to keep up with the nation’s political modernization. Successful efforts to democratize the KMT were undertaken at the Thirteenth Party Congress as well as at subsequent congresses.117 Various departments in the KMT carry out party work: Organization Affairs, Mainland Operations, Overseas Affairs, Cultural Affairs, Social

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Affairs, Youth Activities, Women’s Activities, and commissions dealing with financial affairs, party history, and discipline. Party activities are broad and involve such matters as welfare, recruitment for government jobs and guiding or promoting government policies. In the past, the KMT operated numerous profit-making enterprises.118 Critics contended that the KMT monopolized many realms of commerce; clearly it owned or invested in many businesses. Its past influence over news organizations, publishing and the movie industry, in many respects, amounted to media control, though that changed with Taiwan’s democratization. In fact, the KMT sold many of its enterprises and cut many of its ties with certain media organizations.119 It still owns some businesses and manages some newspapers and television stations; but so does the DPP. The KMT was also a rich party. At one time, with assets of at least $2 billion (some say it was much more), it was labelled the richest political party in the world.120 Its assets naturally were an advantage for the party in running election campaigns. In fact, many voters felt this was an unfair advantage. But its wealth was also a handicap in the context of the growth of popular democracy, especially when the opposition claimed the KMT bought elections and this undermined good government. In response Lien Chan, when running as the KMT’s nominee for president in the 2000 election, pledged to put the party’s assets in trust. Still the DPP and President Chen continued to carp about the KMT’s money and how it got it, implying it did so by illegal means. They repeatedly called for investigations into the matter. The DPP even put the issue before the voters in a referendum in January 2008, but it failed to win sufficient votes. In the meantime, DPP corruption became a serious issue. This and the depletion of the KMT’s financial resources fostered a different view of whether the KMT is a rich party that thrives on money politics.121 In any event, the Tsai administration, after winning the 2016 election, launched an investigation of KMT assets and made legal claims against its funds.122 In the past, important political decisions in Taiwan to a large extent were made by and within the Nationalist Party and it controlled or manipulated the government. Hence, in the minds of most citizens, the KMT was the government. Others described Taiwan as a “corporate state.”123 However, beginning in the 1980s, party leaders sought to change the KMT’s image by breaking ties between it and the government—a necessary process if the party were to avoid being blamed for mistakes made by government officials and if the country’s electoral system were to evolve into a competitive two-party or multiparty one.124 Prior to this, beginning in the 1960s, Nationalist Party leaders began to change their attitudes markedly about the need for party competition. As a consequence, the government allowed a number of opposition politicians to run in elections as independents. In the 1970s, a loose political organization called the tangwai, or “outside the party” (meaning the KMT as it was the only significant party), began to become active. It “sponsored” candidates in various local elections and began to recruit and train political leaders.125

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After 1980, Taiwan witnessed the rapid growth of opposition politics. In the 1983 national election, the tangwai set “party goals” and was, in the minds of most observers, a “political organization.” Some called it a virtual party or proto-political party. It had a platform that included issues upon which the opposition generally agreed: placing more seats up for election in the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan; holding popular elections for the governor of Taiwan and the mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung; appointing more Taiwanese to high government posts; allowing new political parties to form legally; expanding the scope of freedom of the press, speech and assembly; loosening restrictions on campaigning; abolishing the Temporary Provisions; reviewing trials that had resulted in the jailing of “political prisoners”; and demanding that the KMT relinquish powers and prerogatives that should belong to the government, not to a political party.126 However, the tangwai suffered from factionalism and did not immediately evolve into a viable, competitive political party. In particular, it was plagued by differences between radicals and moderates and by personality disputes among its leaders. Many of its members also made unrealistic demands for more extensive reforms of the political system than the public wanted or were feasible at the time. Thus, it did not perform as well as hoped at the polls or in recruiting new members.127 In early 1986, President Chiang Ching-kuo appointed a 12-member committee made up of party leaders and government officials, among others, to discuss terminating martial law, ending the ban on forming new political parties, and making other reforms. In September, in a unilateral (and technically illegal) move, a group of tangwai politicians met and announced the formation of the DPP. President Chiang ordered the government not to take any actions to block this move because he planned to soon lift the restriction on forming new parties.128 The newly formed DPP announced a platform that closely resembled that of the tangwai’s. A slate of candidates campaigned in the December election with a DPP party flag and party slogans. Meanwhile, most tangwai members and many other independents joined the DPP. The electorate, as well as most observers, thus viewed the 1986 campaign as a two-party contest.129 The DPP appealed to Fukienese Taiwanese, city dwellers, the poor and people who simply did not like the KMT or the government (some say from 10 to 15 percent of the population) and the protest vote. The DPP also sought support from farmers and workers. Because the KMT was well organized and had strong rural support (stemming from its successful efforts in land reform), building a base among farmers was difficult for the DPP. An effort to attract workers owing to its socialist agenda also failed. Meanwhile the DPP’s socialist ideals alienated many business people who might otherwise have provided money and talent for the DPP. The DPP’s frequent use of street demonstrations, disruptive tactics and violence in Legislative Yuan sessions also sullied its image. These tactics conflicted with the basic Chinese desire for stability.130

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The DPP, like the tangwai, also suffered from factionalism and from fundamental differences in views on some important political questions. One of the most divisive issues was support of Taiwan’s independence. Many DPP members supported independence or the permanent separation from China, while others considered this premature, dangerous or both. Another controversial matter was the party’s relationship with the KMT. Some argued that the DPP had little chance of carrying out its agenda unless it cooperated with the KMT, at least at times. Others regarded the KMT as “the enemy” and found any compromise unacceptable. Still another issue was whether to welcome Chinese residents of other countries to return to Taiwan and whether those not born in Taiwan should be allowed to vote or run for political office.131 Notwithstanding these obstacles and pitfalls, the DPP succeeded in attracting new members and running some well-known, popular and qualified people for office, and sometimes winning at the polls. It adopted a host of fresh issues, many of which it promoted successfully between elections, and won broad public support on many of them. In addition, it exploited KMT weaknesses and capitalized on the public’s desire for democratization, which required, it said (and many believed), party competition. It also used its underdog status and what some called the Taiwanese feeling of victimhood to win votes. Last but not least, it learned quickly and became adept at democratic politics.132 The DPP performed well in national elections in 1989 and 1992, as well as in local elections in 1997. After these election victories, pundits regularly voiced the opinion that the DPP was the only real opposition party. Some even said it would not be long before it was in power. This prediction indeed proved accurate. In 2000, the DPP’s candidate, Chen Shui-bian, was elected president. Subsequently, the DPP was designated the “ruling party,” even though it did not control a majority of the seats in the Legislative Yuan. In 2001, the DPP became the largest party in the Legislative Yuan, and at that point the term “ruling party” seemed more accurate though it still lacked a legislative majority.133 Interestingly, the DPP is organized in much the same way as the KMT and, for that reason, it may also be called a Leninist party. It holds party congresses and its delegates pick a central committee, which then selects a core leadership—just as the KMT does. Its leadership, however, was not very stable during the several years immediately after its formation. Party leaders said this made the party’s decision-making process more democratic; others used the term chaotic.134 The DPP is a mass party, like the KMT, which it intended to be from the beginning. Thus it has engaged in energetic recruitment efforts (though new party members had to be recommended by current members, and there were some other requirements to attain membership).135 After Chen Shui-bian was elected president in March 2000, the DPP was much more successful in attracting new members.

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The DPP, on the other hand, was not the only opposition party to arrive on the political scene during the 1980s and 1990s. Six new political parties appeared in 1987, and several more in 1988. In February 1989, when the formation of new political parties became legal, 16 parties registered. Leading up to the 1991 election, Taiwan had 67 registered political parties, though only 17 ran candidates, and only two besides the KMT and the DPP supported enough candidates to qualify for television time. Before the 1992 election, there were 17 political parties but only 14 fielded candidates, and only two other than the KMT and the DPP met the requirements for TV time.136 Because it was easy to form a political party in Taiwan and because typically a number of parties registered and supported candidates in election contests, until very recently observers described Taiwan’s party system as a multiparty one notwithstanding the fact there were only a few, or just two, serious contending political parties. There were other reasons—including an election law that favors big parties and the U.S. model, which has an attraction in Taiwan—to believe Taiwan had, in fact, a two-party system or it was evolving in that direction.137 In 1992, the KMT became badly divided between “mainstream” (pro–Lee Teng-hui) and “nonmainstream” factions (the latter comprised mostly Mainland Chinese who supported Premier Hau Pei-tsun). In 1993, a number of members of the non-mainstream faction left the KMT to form the New China Party, which later changed its name to the New Party (NP). Supporters of the NP charged that the DPP was a party of and for Fukienese Taiwanese and separatists (or champions of Taiwan’s independence). They further complained that the KMT under Lee Teng-hui had moved to the left to co-opt many of the tenets of the DPP and, like the DPP, did not support the reunification of China. Interestingly, many members of the NP and the nonmainstream faction of the KMT (not all of its members joined the NP) that had been hard-line antiCommunists now supported better relations with the People’s Republic of China and the idea of “Greater China.” This was a major shift in policy that reflected a changed China under Deng Xiaoping and a DPP more strongly advocating independence.138 The DPP at this time experienced similar problems with party splits, though the results were very different. Perceiving the DPP had “surrendered” to the KMT on the issue of independence, a number of DPP members and some top leaders left the party. The party’s 1996 presidential candidate, Peng Ming-min, long known as the “father of Taiwan independence,” called the DPP’s independence view weak. After losing the election, he formed the Taiwan Independence Party (Chienkuotang or “nation-building party” in Chinese). Some other DPP members and former heads of the party departed for other reasons. Some formed new parties. This, however, did not fatally hurt the DPP inasmuch as these parties experienced serious problems in recruiting and raising funds and, most critically, did not perform well in elections. Also, most voters believed the DPP stood for an independent Taiwan even though it moderated its stance on this issue.139

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In 2000, immediately after the presidential election, James Soong formed the People First Party (PFP). Though he had little money and not much grassroots organization, he was able to attract KMT members into his party, including members of the Legislative Yuan. Also being a political star, Soong gave the party broad appeal. However, those who questioned whether the PFP would grow and survive called it a “one man party” (meaning it was Soong’s personal party). In any case the party performed very well in the 2001 legislative election and was subsequently considered a viable party.140 During the 2001 Legislative Yuan election campaign, former Interior Minister Huang Chu-wen formed the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) with former president Lee Teng-hui’s blessing and backing. Lee was angry about being removed from the chairmanship of the KMT and from his party membership and was upset that the KMT was going in a pro-unification direction under Lien Chan. He also opposed Lien’s cooperation with James Soong to block President Chen Shui-bian’s legislative agenda.141 Lee hoped to entice some members of the KMT into the TSU and win over some independents; in fact, he found some success in this effort. On the issue of independence, the TSU took a noticeably stronger position than the DPP. The TSU performed well in the election that year, especially for a new party, and was subsequently considered an important political party and a force in Taiwan politics.142 Thus, after the 2001 election, Taiwan had what many called a “two-bloc” party system. The KMT, PFP and the NP together opposed the Chen administration and through their control of the legislature blocked Chen’s policies and set forth their own agenda. Observers called them the “blue team” or “panblue.” The TSU supported President Chen and the DPP’s agenda, and the two were referred to as the “green team” or “pan-green.” After changing the electoral system, pundits speculated that the two blocs of parties would likely be transformed into two parties as a result of the new electoral system that greatly advantaged large parties.143 Some speculated at this time that pan-green would become the dominant force in Taiwan politics as the KMT had been in the past and that the system was evolving toward a new dominant one-party (or bloc) system. However, after the 2004 legislative election and subsequent local elections, this view was rarely heard. In fact, during 2006 and 2007, when the Chen administration and the DPP suffered from falling public support due to poor governance— especially the perception of terrible corruption in the Chen administration and the party—this view almost ceased to be spoken.144 In the January 2008 legislative election, the KMT performed very well while the DPP fared badly as did the smaller parties and independents. This was followed by a big victory for the KMT in the March presidential election. At this point Taiwan’s political party system seemed to be evolving back into a one-party dominant system; in fact, some even questioned whether the DPP would weather the storm of President Chen’s corruption and law-breaking that seriously damaged the party’s reputation.145

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In any case, the DPP survived, won some local elections and did well enough in the 2010 metropolitan elections and the dual presidential and legislative election in 2012 to quiet this speculation. The view thus again became commonplace that Taiwan had a two-party or two-bloc system. On the other hand, the flavor of the 2014, 2016 and 2018 election campaigns and their results suggested this was not the case. Opinion surveys during both campaigns showed considerable, and growing, disappointment with the two major parties and growing support for independent candidates and third parties. Ko Wen-je, running as an independent, won the biggest prize in the 2014 election: the Taipei metropolitan mayorship. The New Power Party (NPP), a newly formed party, performed credibly in the 2016 election. Rogue candidates and “special” entrants also won seats in both elections.146 Non-voters, presumably disenchanted with party politics, increased in numbers.147 Public opinion surveys continued to show declining support for political parties, especially the large ones, and more support for new and smaller parties and for independents. This continued to be the case in 2018 and 2019.148 Notwithstanding the numerous evolutionary changes and some radical shifts in Taiwan’s parties and its political party system, one can make some generalizations and even some conclusions about both. First, the KMT was, and is, a multi-ethnic party.149 It had to be given that Mainland Chinese that originally made up the party’s core was a minority group. The DPP was to some degree multi-ethnic early on, but morphed into a one-ethnic group party (Fukien Taiwanese), though that changed with the election of 2016. It remains to be seen if this sticks. The KMT was active in both local and national politics early on. The DPP grew from local politics. A change in the electoral system in 2005 appeared to make Taiwan’s party system a two-party or at least a two bloc one. Yet this is uncertain due to the public’s negative view of political parties in recent years. Elections since 2000 indicate the voters prefer a rotation of ruling parties. However, it is probably too early to say that this will last.

Elections Elections have played a vital role in Taiwan politics locally since 1950 and nationally since 1980. They have been instrumental in bolstering political participation, helping formulate policy, democratizing the polity and much more. Thus grasping how elections have evolved to become a central part of the political process and how they work now is essential to understanding politics in Taiwan.150 As noted in Chapter 2, under Japanese rule, in 1935, elections were held for some town, county and prefectural offices. Although these elections were unprecedented, they were of limited significance because the number of officials elected had to be balanced by an equal or larger number of appointed Japanese officials. Other similar elections followed. However, there was no island-wide election in Taiwan during the Japanese colonial period.151

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After 1945 when Taiwan was returned to China, Chiang Kai-shek’s military forces were at war with the Communists and he and his government as a consequence considered Taiwan’s affairs to be a low priority. Unrest in Taiwan after the February 28 Incident and even more the Nationalist’s defeat in China were hard but instructive lessons for Chiang. Thus in 1949, when the Nationalist government moved to Taiwan, Chiang realized he had to begin to implement democracy in Taiwan and holding elections was central to that effort. Fortuitous for the government the principle of universal suffrage was already established; thus there was no debate or conflict over franchise issues.152 Thus, in 1950 after the United States extended its military protection to Taiwan, the government was afforded a secure environment in which to hold elections. That year, local election contests were held for county and city councils and for magistrates and mayors in 16 counties and five cities. Also smaller townships and villages elected councils and village or town chiefs. The elections went smoothly. Voter turnout was high, and the electorate was knowledgeable about the qualifications and the views of candidates.153 Subsequently similar elections were held and were meaningful. In December 1951, an election was held for the Taiwan Provincial Assembly; it was the first island-wide election ever.154 However, there were no democratic elections at the national level at this time. Thus the electoral contribution to democratization took place at the provincial, county and city and sub-county levels. Some referred to this as the “first stage” in Taiwan’s elections.155 In the 1960s, local elections in Taiwan continued to be significant and promoted democratization. Meanwhile some independent (non-KMT) candidates ran for office and in a few cases won significant high offices. For example, in 1964 Henry Kao became the first popularly elected mayor of Taipei. He inspired a number of other politicians to run as independents.156 In 1971, Taiwan lost its U.N. seat and the following year President Richard Nixon travelled to China marking an historic rapprochement between the United States and China. It was desperate times for Taiwan. In fact the situation engendered talk of an “emergency” need for political reforms including adding “supplementary seats” to the legislature, bringing more Taiwanese into the government while allowing non-KMT politicians more latitude in seeking office. Taiwan’s government responded and endeavored to change its authoritarian image to win support for Taiwan’s sovereignty globally. Elections became more important. This, it was said, was the “second stage of limited competitive national elections.”157 A truly competitive national election, to be Taiwan’s first, was scheduled for December 1978. However, it was cancelled when the United States, Taiwan’s ally and protector, broke diplomatic relations with Taipei. The election was subsequently rescheduled for December 1980. In the meantime, under President Chiang Ching-kuo’s leadership, agreements were worked out with tangwai leaders, independents and other opposition politicians so that they could genuinely compete with KMT candidates for seats in the legislature.158

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Hence, 1980 was a turning point: Taiwan held its first competitive national election. The campaign was the most lively and interesting one to date; in fact, it was arguably more exciting than any subsequent campaigns. In a milieu of unprecedented freedom and openness, opposition candidates said things publicly, many quite provocative, they had never enunciated before. They had agreed not to advocate communism or Taiwan’s independence. They didn’t; but this did not stop them from talking about these topics and that was truly alarming to many people.159 The public was, to say the least, surprised—amazed or flabbergasted would be better words. But the election went smoothly. After the election, cynics said the election was for show and that such free and open campaigns would not be allowed again. But another open and competitive election was held in 1983, and thus this skepticism faded. In both of these elections, the KMT performed well against competition it had never had before. Its successes gave party leaders confidence.160 In December 1986, after tangwai politicians founded the DPP, Taiwan witnessed its first two-party election. Because no Chinese nation had ever had a two-party election contest, this election constituted another watershed event. There were still doubters though. Opposition politicians said the KMT still controlled the government and the media and enjoyed many other unfair advantages. Others noted that the ruling party had performed well in spite of electoral competition; this meant that the KMT had truly won support from the electorate.161 Subsequently the DPP learned from its defeats while the KMT became overconfident. In the 1989 election, the DPP performed much better than it had in 1986. Major newspapers called the DPP’s performance a “victory” and a “breakthrough.” Many spoke of Taiwan as now having a true two-party system.162 But DPP leaders, while celebrating the victory, were quick to point out that, because the election was only supplemental and because so many delegates representing the Mainland were still in office, the opposition could not gain control of the parliamentary body of government even if it won a majority of the popular vote. Some declared that, if a plenary election were held, the DPP would rule.163 Prior to the 1991 National Assembly election, the “elder parliamentarians” resigned; thus a non-supplemental, or plenary, election was held. Deploying their superior organizational skills and benefiting from the DPP’s ill-advised strategy of making Taiwan’s independence a major issue, and also having learned from an election setback in 1989, the KMT won a big victory on what many said was a “level playing field.” The KMT could now truly claim a popular mandate. Significantly, it won three-fourths of the seats, thus ensuring its ability to amend the Constitution without interference by the opposition. Last but not least, with countries throughout the world tossing out ruling parties in the context of profound global change that seemed to make parties in power almost by definition unpopular, the KMT’s win seemed even more impressive.164

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However, the KMT did not repeat its stellar performance in what was a more important Legislative Yuan election in 1992. DPP candidates learned from their defeat the previous year and its more talented DPP candidates entered this race. (Many had refused to run in the National Assembly election because they argued that this body of government was superfluous and should be abolished.) Though the KMT won a comfortable majority in seats and the popular vote, it was accustomed to winning by a wider margin. Most analysts looking at the vote tallies saw gains and a “victory” for the DPP. Post-election, some of DPP’s leaders spoke of “ruling the country in three to five years.”165 Subsequent local elections, though, did not see the DPP’s upward trend continue. The first election for the governor of Taiwan and the re-established elections for the mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung in late 1994 were something between a KMT win and a split decision. The DPP won the mayorship of Taipei but lost the other two offices while it performed only marginally better in the Taiwan Provincial Assembly, Taipei City Council and Kaohsiung City Council contests.166 In the 1995 Legislative Yuan election, in the context of charges of corruption, a weak economy (for Taiwan), and other problems, the KMT performed poorly. However, the DPP’s internal difficulties, along with China’s intimidation (conducting missile tests in the Taiwan Strait during the summer and threatening just before the election to invade Taiwan if it declared independence), minimized the DPP’s gains. The NP, in contrast, more than tripled its seats. After the election, Taiwan pundits talked of an evolving three-party system and future party coalitions.167 In 1996, the Republic of China held an unprecedented and truly watershed direct election for its president and vice president. Incumbent President Lee Teng-hui and his vice presidential running mate, Lien Chan, won handily, getting over 54 percent of the popular vote against three other pairs of candidates: the DPP’s candidates and two sets of independents (although one set tacitly stood for the NP). The election was lauded by the Western media and was seen by many observers as a defining event in the history of Taiwan’s democratization. Even Taiwan’s critics acknowledged that Taiwan was now a genuine democracy. Indeed the election was the first of its kind in Chinese history.168 President Lee now had a genuine mandate with his new status as Taiwan’s popularly elected president. The Nationalist Party also emerged with a big victory, though the DPP and the NP made marginal gains in the concurrent National Assembly election.169 Offsetting this KMT win, the DPP scored a momentous victory in local elections in November 1997: it captured a number of county and city executive offices, putting the DPP in a position of running local governments with jurisdiction over more than 70 percent of the population. In subsequent local elections, however, the DPP did not do so well, and in the 1998 Legislative Yuan and metropolitan mayor and city council races, the Nationalist Party

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won significant victories, including taking back the Taipei mayorship, with Ma Ying-jeou defeating incumbent mayor Chen Shui-bian. Thus the backdrop to the 2000 election in terms of it providing an advantage or momentum was unclear. In any case, Taiwan’s second direct presidential election in March 2000 was another landmark event. As noted in Chapter 2, the KMT was divided before the voting. President Lee refused to support the KMT’s most popular candidate, James Soong, instead favoring Lien Chan. Soong as a result ran as an independent. Chen Shui-bian did not experience a divided party. Also the DPP desperately wanted to win. Chen also ran an astute campaign. He played down his pro-independence views while painting the KMT as a corrupt party with a big stash of ill-gotten money and ties to criminal elements. Chen convinced voters he could manage the economy and, because of increasing interest in the environment and other issues, the KMT did not find promoting economic growth as good a campaign issue as it had been in the past. With the late help of the Nobel Prize winner and head of Academia, Sinica Lee Yuan-tseh, and several important business leaders, Chen peaked just days before the election. China’s Premier Zhu Rongji’s warning to Taiwan’s voters not to vote for Chen evoked a backlash that also helped him.170 The change in ruling parties was a first. It was historic. Taiwan would never be the same. In the subsequent December 2001 Legislative Yuan election, not only did the KMT lose its majority, but also the DPP made big gains and became the largest party in the legislature. Former President Lee’s TSU performed fairly well and helped Chen gain a near majority. James Soong’s PFP, however, also turned in a stellar performance and, together with the KMT, they kept a slim majority for the “blue team.” Although this election helped President Chen and gave him a better environment in which to govern after the election, it did not reflect a palpable shift in voter preference. Moreover, the DPP’s election victory was tainted by ethnic appeals and by the undemocratic practice of allocating votes (telling voters to cast ballots for weaker candidates instead of their favorites so more of their party’s candidates would win).171 In the spring of 2004, President Chen and Vice President Lu were re-elected in a very close election that Chen’s critics charged they stole. Chen and Lu were both shot the day before the voting, though their injuries were slight, and President Chen used this as justification for ordering the military and the police, who would have voted mostly pan-blue, to stay at their posts. There was also a sympathy vote from pan-green’s base that was otherwise disenchanted with Chen. In light of the fact that the polls, gamblers’ odds on the election and the stock market all predicted a pan-blue win, there was a widespread perception that Chen would not have won had it not been for the shooting.172 The DPP lost the next several elections. It was defeated in the legislative election in late 2004 and two subsequent local elections. The KMT won the metropolitan mayoral and city council races in 2006, except for the mayorship of Kaohsiung.173 The DPP suffered an even more serious setback in the

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January 2008 legislative election: the KMT won two-thirds of the seats (controlling three-fourths with party allies). The Chen administration’s poor management of the economy, its stoking ethnic ill-will and its rampant corruption were the main reasons.174 The KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou and Vincent Siew thus won the March 2008 presidential/vice presidential election by a huge margin—capturing more of the popular vote than any candidate ever in a direct election of the president and vice president.175 This put the KMT strongly back in power. In ensuing months the DPP won some local and replacement elections but lost the 2010 metropolitan mayoral and other local races. In 2012, for the first time elections were held concurrently for the legislature and the president and vice president. President Ma (running with Wu Den-yih, Vice President Vincent Siew having declined to run again for health reasons) was re-elected by a comfortable margin, while the KMT won the legislative election handily. Convincing voters they would better manage the economy, maintain social stability and promote better relations with China and the United States facilitated their victories. Ma won more votes than the DPP’s candidate Tsai Ing-wen among every ethnic group, both men and women, and every age group.176 After the 2012 election victory, Ma and the KMT’s reputation and thus their popularity went south. The DPP won a stunning victory in the 2014 collection of local elections, even taking metropolitan city mayorships the KMT had long held and were KMT strongholds.177 The DPP won another victory in the 2016 combined presidential/vice presidential and legislative election. It also was a big win. It made Tsai In-wen the president and the DPP the majority party in the legislature—something it had never before enjoyed. Tsai and her party now had a clear mandate to govern. Not only that, but the political climate had seemed to change. Tsai was Taiwan’s first female president and was a member of an ethnic minority, Hakka. She and her party represented change and reform and more; these items were the stories of the day. It was a new day in Taiwan’s political history.178 However, it did not turn out well for President Tsai or the DPP. Many of the reforms they proposed did not get passed. The economy performed poorly. They alienated the business community, workers and others. Many DPP members felt President Tsai was weak on dealing with China. Their rating in the polls soon dropped and continued to fall. In the 2018 mid-term, DPP candidates performed poorly. The KMT won the election. Most observers blamed President Tsai and DPP members of the legislature.179 From an examination of Taiwan’s post-World War II elections, analysts have provided a number of election theories that should or, in fact, do tell us why one party or bloc can win. These theories tell us more about Taiwan’s elections. The most commonly cited theory and one that has been apparent during the campaigns and after of virtually every election is the economic or pocketbook theory.180 In other words, the party with the best reputation or plan for economic expansion will win. This theory has proven itself in every

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election with some caveats. In the early years the KMT often promised stability in the economy as much as or more than growth. As its economic plans worked to bring GDP expansion, KMT leaders talked about that. It boasted that it created the Taiwan “economic miracle.” Chen Shui-bian departed from this theory a bit in 2000: he promised to keep economic development on track and said he could do it while expanding social benefits by reining in KMT corruption. This proved untrue. Ma Ying-jeou pledged to return Taiwan’s economy to good growth after Chen and his administration had, they charged, failed in this realm. He did not do this; in fact, poor economic growth goes far in explaining the KMT’s defeats in 2014 and 2016. However, it must be noted that during those election campaigns the DPP and its candidates talked more about economic equity than growth: the gap between rich and poor, youth unemployment, etc.181 This theory, especially if economic equality is added as a component, has a record of proving itself. This, of course, is not unusual looking at elections elsewhere. But it seems more true of Taiwan. Two alternative (or opposite) theories have also been frequently cited in both predicting and explaining the results of elections in Taiwan. The first is the continuity theory or the idea that one does not change horses in mid-steam, meaning voters don’t want a different party to rule if the one in power has done a good job or during a time of crisis. Further, voters often vote according to habit or prefer the party they voted for last. Many want order and predictability. In Taiwan, this is called the “watermelon theory.” Someone eating a watermelon, assuming it tastes good, will want to finish it.182 The contending theory is called the rotating party theory or the pendulum theory, meaning that many voters think that there should be new blood or a change in ruling parties to protect democracy and prevent corruption and bureaucratism. This belief gives rise to a useful theory and often explains who wins Taiwan’s elections. It is reinforced by the fact that more and more during election campaigns in Taiwan (not unlike Western democracies), candidates typically promise more than they can deliver in order to win votes. In office, voters become aware of their failures to produce and the fact they exaggerated or did not tell the truth during the campaign.183 Another popular theory of elections is the ethnic voting theory. As noted in Chapter 1 and discussed further in Chapter 3, Taiwan’s population is comprised of four ethnic or sub ethnic groups: Fukien Taiwanese, Hakka, Mainland Chinese and Aborigines. All tend to vote as a group. Another part of the theory is this: if a candidate or a political party can capture a large segment of the Fukien Taiwanese (the majority ethnic group) vote they will win elections and can govern. The DPP has to some extent followed this theory. As the party grew its leadership became almost exclusively Fukienese Taiwanese. Chen Shui-bian appealed to his ethnic group and governed based on consolidating the support of Fukienese Taiwanese. Thus the DPP became labelled an “ethnic party.”184

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The KMT appealed to the other three groups, the minority ethnic groups, while relying to some degree on winning Fukienese Taiwanese voters that were indebted to the KMT because of land reform and/or were loyal to the KMT out of habit or for other reasons. The KMT was thus viewed as a multiethnic party. In counterpoint, but still employing the importance of ethnicity, Ma Yingjeou won votes by condemning the Chen administration’s governing by creating ethnic tensions. Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP won elections in 2014 and 2016 with progressive policies that favored disadvantaged groups and used populism and identity politics while also appealing to the DPP base. The results of the latter election showed that she made headway in some measure by getting votes from two of the KMT’s support groups—the Hakka and the Aborigines—and some handicapped groups.185 Notwithstanding many factors that counter ethnic consciousness, such as inter-marriage, profession-based interactions and simply modernization, ethnic voting is still quite apparent in Taiwan’s elections. Many voters prefer candidates of their ethnic group. Also with pictures being part of the campaigns, voters who don’t know the candidates personally or who have not learned about their backgrounds can identify them from their looks.186 Some writers mention other theories, such as the divide and conquer strategy (which explains the results of the 2000 presidential election, though one may also say it was the product of the KMT dividing itself or shooting itself in the foot), identity politics strategies (which seemed to work in the 2016 election), populist versus elitism (that characterized the 2014 and 2016 elections) and a number of other theories or election strategies that evolve into theories about winning. All of the theories about elections in Taiwan have some pitfalls. The most popular one, the economic (growth) theory, has been undermined by concern over economic equity—though some argue this is still an economic theory. Some say that most of Taiwan’s voters have accepted the reality that Taiwan will never experience fast growth again and most accept the fact that slow growth will be the norm in the future as it is in Japan and Europe.187 The watermelon theory and the pendulum theory contradict each other. This, however, hardly refutes either. The watermelon theory, advocates say, means that voters elect candidates or parties that are worthy of their vote, and if they have experience this is better. The pendulum theory contends that new blood and a turnover of ruling parties is good for democracy and is the heart of democratic politics. The histories of the two in Europe and America do not give strong proof for either. With modernization, ethnicity has played a decreasing role in Taiwan’s society. Yet ethnic identity has increased in recent years and it always plays a more important role during election campaigns than at other times. This is true in America and Europe; it perhaps should be expected in Taiwan. However, it has become more complex and is likely not so easy to calculate when formulating an election strategy when there are many other variables to look at.

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In any case, theories of elections and how to win them or predict them, and certainly how to govern afterwards, need more study and more time to understand them.

Ideology, Modernization and the Future To acquire a handle on Taiwan’s politics, it is essential to comprehend its philosophical and ideological components. Both have influenced the political culture, the nature and structure of the political system, how its democracy works, and much more. Both have impacted its search for national identity, about which there are conflicting views, as well as other core issues that are often the subject of debate. Both have evolved in recent times rapidly and profoundly. Finally, the political parties hold different ideological views. Before looking at these matters specifically, it is necessary to explain where Taiwan came from in terms of the basic political thinking of its population. There was historically no systematic “Taiwanese” political philosophy espoused by the local population other than certain of the ancient tenets of political thinking taught by Confucius, Mencius, Lao Tzu and others, and some elements of Japanese political philosophy. When the Nationalists assumed governance over Taiwan, their political ideology—Sun Yat-sen’s Three People’s Principles (nationalism, democracy and people’s livelihood)—were transplanted. Sun’s ideas were not generally at odds with those of the ancient sages, though Sun’s philosophy was in some ways anti-traditional. On the other hand, ethnic enmity created some reluctance on the part of Taiwanese to accept what they considered a Mainland Chinese ideology.188 Sun’s Three People’s Principles emphasized nation building (because China was traditionally more a culture than a nation), democracy (mass participation in politics to emulate what many—certainly Sun—saw as successful Western democratic systems) and economic development (to make the nation rich and powerful and the people prosperous). Sun, however, taught that democracy would have to develop in stages because the people were not yet trained or ready to accept their responsibilities as citizen-participants. There would thus be a period of “political tutelage” before full democracy could be realized. Sun’s political ideals provided the KMT with an ideology and a basic blueprint for government.189 Opposition groups in Taiwan, for the most part, did not offer alternative ideas; rather, most embraced Sun’s teachings, but selectively. Early on they actively promoted the second and third principles—and argued for some time that the KMT was not trying hard enough to carry out Sun’s ideals of democratic government and/or economic equity. On the other hand, Sun was unique in that he saw an intimate relationship between economic and political development; indeed, some say he was the first political theorist to see a causal link between the two.190 He strongly believed that economic growth would spur both social change and political

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modernization and thus lead to democracy. Most people in Taiwan accepted this premise. In the 1970s and 1980s, however, some critics warned that the lag between economic development and political modernization in Taiwan created an explosive and even dangerous situation.191 But the gap closed, and observers now speak of Taiwan’s combined approach to economic and political modernization as a model. Some have called this the “Taiwan political miracle.”192 However, in terms of political ideologies, there were more than simply Sun’s teachings. One writer describes Taiwan’s “ideological marketplace” as the following: the “official doctrine” based on Sun’s Three Principles of the People, a petty bourgeois outlook of lauding the free market, Buddhist-Confucian morality, modern Confucian humanism, and Chinese liberalism.193 Gu Ying was the strongest philosophical advocate of the free market. Tang Zhunyi and Mou Zongsan stood for modern Confucian humanism. Hu Shih, Yin Hai-kuan and Lei Chen propounded Chinese liberalism.194 In the early days, the KMT also promoted anti-communism as one of its core ideological tenets, which was tied to the cause of returning to the Mainland and liberating it from communism. However, Taiwan’s populace never found communism appealing; but neither were most Taiwanese persuaded by the government’s anti-Communist philosophy. The masses in Taiwan, likewise, never enthusiastically accepted the government’s policy of retaking the Mainland. The KMT embraced free-market capitalism and free trade as important tenets of their “principles.” Some argue that other than the tenets just mentioned, they also espoused developmentalism that was known in Taiwan from the Japanese period and institutionalism that comported with the transition from militarism. The KMT also promoted liberalism that coincided with its view of democratization.195 Opposition politicians, though they opposed neither capitalism nor free trade, advocated more welfare, better pay for workers, and what would be described in the West as a leftist or liberal agenda. Some DPP leaders, in fact, called for Taiwan to adopt policies that resembled European social democracy. However, in the 1980s and 1990s, because the KMT instituted rather broad social and other welfare programs and because most of the population remained supportive of capitalism and a free market, the opposition’s liberal cum socialist ideology did not appeal broadly to the populace. Yet many of the DPP’s ideas and programs did have public appeal. So the KMT pre-empted or copied many of them. This was especially true of social welfare. Opposition leaders pushed environmental protection, but so did the KMT. Opposition politicians advocated unemployment insurance and national health care, so the KMT adopted these policies.196 The government and the opposition advocated quite similar policies regarding such problems as traffic, public transportation, land use, water control and crime. In the 1970s, the ideological gap between the KMT and the opposition began to close in many ways. This was especially noticeable as both tried to

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win over a bigger segment of the voting population. Specifically, the tangwai became more moderate as it participated seriously in elections. Subsequently, the DPP took practical positions on issues that public opinion polls showed to be important concerns among the electorate. It also abandoned its more radical ideological ideas as its candidates won office and had to make policy decisions and employ horse-trading and compromise to get things done. The DPP’s political ideals may be summarized as follows: more rapid democratization, political reform, local nationalism and a Taiwanese consciousness or local identity; also more social welfare. However, most observers perceived a basic philosophical principle espoused by both the KMT and the DPP (as well as the PFP and the TSU) was pragmatism.197 In power after 2000, the DPP made no serious effort to develop a new political philosophy or ideology for Taiwan. Sun’s teachings and other tenets of the KMT’s ideology were played down and sometimes criticized, and, some might say, they were even discarded. The same was true for Confucianism. But nothing significant was substituted for them. For a time President Chen praised British sociologist Anthony Gidden’s “third way”—which offered a moderate leftist ideological perspective yet was supportive of global capitalism, especially trade and foreign investment. To some this seemed an effort to construct a DPP ideology. But it never developed into anything much more than some headlines even though it made sense to DPP supporters and offered an alternative to KMT political ideas.198 Some DPP leaders referred to their party as a liberal party; some even made comparisons with the Democratic Party in the United States. The problem with this was that the DPP took an aggressive stance on Taiwan’s independence that often provoked China and, because of this, Taiwan needed America’s military backing. The fact the U.S. Republican Party favored using military force to defend Taiwan much more than the Democratic Party, and was more supportive of Taiwan generally, dampened the DPP’s fascination with the Democratic Party.199 The blue and green blocs differed, and still do, on the issue of Taiwan’s national identity and whether its history, culture and the like should be more locally focused or not. This may be said to constitute a philosophical divide. Pan-green favored localization. The blue camp advocated more links with China and favored the idea of “Greater China.” Yet both sides for the most part saw independence versus unification as a campaign issue in elections and a future problem more than an issue to be resolved immediately. The two camps espoused opposing views concerning foreign policy, Asian democracy versus Western democracy, taxes, welfare and a number of other issues. But these differences can hardly be called ideological. Thus it was commonly said that neither party implemented policies that were genuinely “ideological.” One might conclude that Taiwan’s political culture and the pragmatism of its people precluded the success of any ideology that was very constraining.200 When Ma Ying-jeou was elected president in March 2008, there appeared to be a revival of some of the KMT’s traditional political philosophy cum

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ideology. Ma supported Confucian ethnics in government and Chinese humanism. But one can also say he was a strong supporter of free market capitalism, globalism, Western democracy and a generally conservative agenda. Yet Ma ultimately exhibited little concern over ideology; rather he proved by most of his actions and policies that he was a pragmatist.201 Meanwhile, during Ma’s presidency two “isms” became an important part of the political debate in Taiwan: populism and progressivism.202 The DPP and its supporters espoused both. Party leaders gave them even more salience after Tsai and the DPP assumed governance in 2016. They thus deserve special attention in terms of a Taiwan ideology not to mention its political future. First, populism, which may be defined as “an appeal to ordinary people who feel their concerns were disregarded by established elites.”203 It was a feature of Chen Shui-bian’s presidency and even the administrations before him. Chiang Kai-shek presented himself in public as a military man, which made him in a sense a populist. He also gave public speeches before large crowds. The First Lady, Madam Chiang Kai-shek, met with intellectuals, talked to the media and was active in charities. President Chiang Ching-kuo spent time with ordinary people and listened to public opinion when making policies. He eschewed spending time with rich business people. Thus populism, or at least aspects of it, has a history. Chen criticized the KMT “elitists” during his campaign and railed against the KMT as an elitist party throughout his time in office and even after that. However, it backfired due to his distressing corruption and his playing the ethnic card in order to bolster his political influence and his ability to remain in office. In the end it worked against him. When Ma Ying-jeou ran for president in 2008, he travelled from one end of the island to the other by bicycle and stayed at the homes of ordinary citizens along the way. During his campaign, he and KMT confederates excoriated the Chen administration’s greed and money politics and the fact a number of Chen’s associates were indicted for financial crimes while Chen was accused of selling government jobs and absconding with public funds. Ma characterized the Chen administration as an enemy of the people and one that did not care about the economic situations of the common person.204 But Ma and his party soon forgot populism. Ma ruled as an elitist Mandarin that governed as an honest, morally upstanding leader that created a government for the people but not of or by the people. He did not pay much attention to public opinion surveys. He focused heavily on avoiding conflict with China and getting along with the United States. Peace was one of his major objectives. Improving the economy was another. Both were for the people, but he did not characterize his success in fostering tranquillity in the Taiwan Strait as much for public good as for peace. His performance in managing the economy in any case did not redound to his credit.205 DPP activists employed populist arguments against Ma, noting especially the rising gap between the rich and the poor, those in power and the youth, and other inequities. A turning point came in 2010 when DPP leaders turned

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the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement negotiated in 2010 into public suspicion of the deal as one that would take away Taiwan’s sovereignty. Populism grew and begat the Sunflower Movement and public protest that challenged Ma’s presidency. The same happened with the Cross Strait Services Trade Agreement and culminated in the huge election loss for Ma and the KMT in 2014.206 During that election, Ko Wen-je ran for mayor of Taipei, the most important position up for grabs, as a populist-independent sponsored and supported by the DPP. A number of DPP candidates also ran using populist themes to defeat their KMT opponents.207 The DPP’s railing against President Ma’s economic agreements with China led some observers to suggest the party had adopted dependency theory as part of its ideology. But this was hardly the case as DPP activists focused mainly on the linkage between commercial agreements and political ones and the latter’s danger to Taiwan sovereignty. They did not often advocate cutting trade ties, as they knew that would seriously hurt Taiwan’s economy. DPP populism was even more in evidence during the 2016 national presidential/vice presidential and legislative election. It energized DPP candidates and it connected to and fed (or was fed by) the argument for Taiwan’s independence. It undermined the tenets of the KMT’s campaign. As a direct result, Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP won a huge victory at the polls.208 There were, however, some caveats. President Tsai was not really a populist. In fact she said so. She lacked charisma that is one of the traits of most populist leaders. She had made her way to the top via hard work and cleaver planning and finally in a campaign that saw the KMT defeat itself.209 Also, as president she did not govern as a populist. In office, President Tsai undertook some reforms that turned out to be very unpopular. She might have predicted this and arguably should have avoided these issues. She didn’t, at least in some noted cases, because she realized they were important and needed to be done. She didn’t pay sufficient attention to public opinion polls (for a populist anyway) and this hurt her and her administration badly. Finally, her populism did not comport with right-wing populism in Europe or President Trump’s conservative agenda in the United States. Meanwhile there grew some doubts about populism among academics in Taiwan and KMT strategists. It was not a positive democratic force. It encouraged emotionalism and discouraged rational thinking on the part of voters. It was considered anti-intellectual, xenophobic and linked to the rise of fascism and communism. It was considered the tool of the opportunist and a distraction from serious economic and political reform.210 Finally, it did not fit with the adulation the DPP continually gave to Taiwan’s democracy. In the 2018 election, Han Kuo-yu, a KMT candidate running for mayor of Kaohsiung, a city that was long in the DPP’s camp, adopted a very populist mien and attracted widespread mass support and won the election in a near landslide. He condemned the DPP “elitists” who had not managed the city well and that oversaw its deterioration according to various markers. He said

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shocking things during the campaign, often using unconventional language considered rude by many. Some said he beat the DPP at its own game. Ko Wen-je also won the Taipei mayor’s election based on a populist agenda and populist campaign techniques. But this time he was not supported by the DPP that ran a candidate against him who lost very badly.211 It also appeared that the DPP had lost its populist appeal, with many of its legislators becoming insiders and the party losing its knack for utilizing populism to keep its common man image and broad support from voters. The KMT in the meantime continued to support Han after the election. As of 2019, it was puzzling where populism was heading in terms of Taiwan’s politics. The second of Taiwan’s “contemporary isms” is progressivism. It is defined as a social and/or political movement that aims to represent ordinary people through change and the support of certain government actions.212 More specifically it advocates reform and social change, pushes science and technology, and claims enlightenment. Many progressives profess to be ahead of the times and say they are unselfish in trying to help the masses and their nation. Many associate progressivism with democracy and liberalism. Some connect it with economic development, especially economic growth with equity. In earlier years the KMT, especially reformers in the party, thought of their party as progressive. They boasted of being the agents of positive change. They noted that they were smarter and better educated then their opponents and promoted science and technology and learning in general. They knew where they and Taiwan should go. They also had more foreign experience and knowledge of the United States and other countries. They said they proudly brought change to Taiwan, specifically advancing prosperity and democracy. Nevertheless the DPP also made progressivism a central part of its political philosophy—as was reflected in the word progressive in the name of the party. It adopted many of the basic tenets of progressivism: a commitment to democracy, including decentralization and accountability of the system and greater citizen participation; economic reform to embrace transparency and technology; advancing the civil society through educational reform, better social and labor policies; and finally pushing a friendly and sustainable environment.213 Toward the end of the Ma presidency, the DPP adopted not only populism but also a distinctly progressive agenda. Meanwhile, progressivism had acquired a new definition, or at least what was a progressive agenda had changed. It was now green energy, the rights of the LGBT community, help to the poor and disadvantaged, rights for minority groups, breaking the glass ceiling that had kept women down, mass democracy, an innovative economy to replace the “old economy,” a borderless world, etc. Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP used its progressive agenda very well in the 2016 election campaign. Tsai became Taiwan’s first female president and the first in Asia that was not a child of a political dynasty. She broke the glass ceiling that applied to women in Taiwan. She was also single. Female candidates won 43 of 113 seats in Taiwan’s parliament—giving Taiwan tenth place among “free democracies” according to a local scholar. Aborigines got 7 percent of

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the seats in the legislature even though they are less than 2 percent of the population. Freddie Lim, a young rock star, was head of a newly founded party, the New Power Party, which advanced progressive views. He led his party to victory (five seats in the legislature). Taiwan hosted the largest LGBT festival ever. Progressives in the United States and Europe praised Taiwan. All of this further portrayed Taiwan as different from China and, as intended, advanced the idea that Taiwan should be independent.214 But in mid-2018, the New Power Party, a DPP ally, pushed the legislature to legalize same-sex marriage. Their efforts failed. Most of the votes against the motion came from DPP legislators. (The KMT boycotted the vote.) President Tsai and many DPP leaders were afraid that taking such an action would hurt their chances in the coming election. Anyway, it was learned that many DPP members of the legislature do not believe in same-sex marriage. One analyst stated that voting in a democratic election is easy; voting for progress is complex. The latter involves deconstruction. Thus this issue cannot muster the support one thinks when hearing discussion about it, especially on the Internet.215 The results of the November 2018 mid-term elections were even more telling about the progressive agenda. It was front and center in the DPP candidates’ agendas. Gay marriage and green energy were, in addition, put to the voter via referendums. Gay marriage was voted down. So was green energy, at least as the DPP advocated it. The KMT won the election. Still another problem was the DPP’s progressive agenda put at odds with the Trump administration in the United States. Considering the United States alone guarantees Taiwan’s sovereignty in the face of China’s threats to absorb Taiwan this seemed incongruent if not unwise. Clearly the DPP’s views on most progressive issues collide with those of the Trump administration. This is notably very true of the refugee issue. (President Tsai during the 2016 campaign promised that Taiwan would accept refugees.) Most of the other progressive agenda was not in accord with the Trump administration, causing some in the media to question whether America’s support of Taiwan would continue.216 The same was true to a lesser extent of Taiwan’s relations with a number of European countries where progressive ideas were not faring well at the polls, especially on the refugee issue. Japan also. Thus one might doubt whether progressivism was around to stay in Taiwan, at least as strong as it has been.

Notes 1 For a discussion of China’s political traditions, see June Teufel Dreyer, China’s Political System: Modernization and Transformation (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1996), chapter 2; Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995), chapter 1; James R. Townsend and Brantley Womack, Politics in China (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1986), chapters 1 and 2; and James C. F. Wang, Contemporary Chinese Politics: An Introduction (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1999), chapter 1. 2 See Regis-Evarfiste Huc, The Chinese Empire (London: Longman, 1855), pp. 83–89 and 96–97.

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3 Little has been written in detail on the subject of Taiwan’s political culture. For some discussion on this topic, see Area Handbook for the Republic of China (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1982), chapter 16; Hughes, Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism, chapter 1; Gary Klintworth, New Taiwan, New China: Taiwan’s Changing Role in the Asia-Pacific Region (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), chapter 1; and Alan M. Wachman, Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), chapter 1. 4 For details, see John F. Copper, with George P. Chen, Taiwan’s Elections: Political Development and Democratization in the Republic of China (Baltimore, MD: University of Maryland School of Law, 1984), chapter 2. 5 See Chapter 2 for further details. 6 Wachman, Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization, pp. 93–94. 7 For details, see A. James Gregor, with Maria Hsia Chang and Andrew B. Zimmerman, Ideology and Development: Sun Yat-sen and the Economic History of Taiwan (Berkeley, CA: University of California Institute of East Asian Studies, 1982). 8 Steve Tsang, “Transforming a Party State into a Democracy,” in Steve Tsang and Hung-mao Tien (eds.), Democratization in Taiwan: Implications for China (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1999), pp. 7–8. 9 Thomas M. Gold, “Civil Society and Taiwan’s Quest for Identity,” in Harrell and Huang (eds.), Cultural Change in Postwar Taiwan, pp. 54–55. 10 Edwin A. Winckler, “Taiwan Transition,” in Cheng and Haggard (eds.), Political Change in Taiwan, p. 224. 11 See Lucian W. Pie, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 228–36. 12 See Celine Pajor, “Democracy in Asia: Beliefs, Trends and Geopolitical Implications,” Lettre du Centre Asie, February 2018. 13 For details on the writing and enacting of Taiwan’s Constitution, see Zhao Suisheng, Power by Design: Constitution-Making in Nationalist China (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996). Also see Jiunn-rong Yeh, The Constitution of Taiwan: A Contextual Analysis (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016). 14 For details, see the two sources cited in Note 13 and also Ray S. Cline and Hungdah Chiu (eds.), The United States Constitution and Constitutionalism in China (Washington, DC: US Global Strategy Council, 1988). 15 Zhao, Power by Design, pp. 44–45. The KMT had already written and published party statutes, the first being in 1924. The Nationalist Party was the only consequential political party in the Nationalist governed part of China. 16 Ibid., pp. 147–48. 17 Ibid. The National Assembly, which was controlled by the ruling Nationalist Party, was authorized to amend or abrogate the Temporary Provisions. However, it took no steps to do so until President Chiang Ching-kuo ordered it to do so much later. 18 For details, see John F. Copper, A Quiet Revolution: Political Development in the Republic of China (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988), chapter 2. 19 Tien, The Great Transition, pp. 110–12. 20 Shelley Rigger, Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 110 and 152. 21 Constance Squires Meaney “Liberalization, Democratization, and the Role of the KMT,” in Cheng and Haggard (eds), Political Change in Taiwan, p. 100. 22 Taiwan receives a rating of four out of four (the top rating) by Freedom House for religious freedom. See “Freedom in the World 2018,” Freedom House (online at freedomhouse.com), viewed March 2019. 23 Amnesty International ranks Taiwan one (the highest possible rating) in political rights and two in civil liberties—the same rating as France, Germany, Italy and

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26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55

Political System Japan. It is called a “free” nation. China is ranked seven (the lowest number possible) in both categories and is labeled “not free.” The U.S. Department of State and several other organizations paint a similar picture. See worldaudit.org for further details. This point is discussed further later in this chapter. In allocating seats in the elected bodies of government for women, if a certain number are not elected some are declared winners anyway. Minority groups are also given a certain number of seats. The Republic of China’s Constitution is unique in this sense. This is found in Article 13 of the Constitution. See Republic of China 1981: A Reference Book, p. 128. There were, however, a small number of representatives for Chinese overseas. Chao and Myers, The First Chinese Democracy, pp. 261–64. Fell, Government and Politics in Taiwan, pp. 56–62. Also see The Republic of China Yearbook 2011, p. 57. The Republic of China Yearbook 1995, p. 92. Yeong-kuang Ger, The Story of Taiwan: Politics (Taipei: Government Information Office, 1998), pp. 45–48. Fell, Government and Politics in Taiwan, pp. 287–92. Ibid., pp. 60–61. Ibid. Also see Shelley Rigger, Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2011), p. 83. Taiwan Yearbook 2006 (Taipei: Government Information Office, 2006), pp. 68–69. Whether this actually happened is discussed later in this chapter. Copper, Taiwan at a Tipping Point, p. 122. Ibid., pp. 200–01. Area Handbook for the Republic of China, pp. 179–81. Fell, Government and Politics in Taiwan, p. 53 Tien, The Great Transition, p. 155. Yeh, The Constitution of Taiwan, p. 95. Wu, Taiwan’s Democratization, pp. 129–32. Taiwan Yearbook 2007, p. 66. Area Handbook for the Republic of China, pp. 181–82. Chao and Myers, The First Chinese Democracy, pp.141 and 227. For the background of this situation, see Harvey J. Feldman, ed., Constitutional Reform and the Future of the Republic of China (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1991). Wu, Taiwan’s Democratization, pp. 24–25. Feldman (ed.), Constitutional Reform and the Future of the Republic of China, p. 163. This was in a statement made by Edwin Winckler at the end of a conference. Ibid., pp. 72–73. Antonio Chiang, a well-known academic and journalist in Taiwan, expressed this view. Fell, Government and Politics in Taiwan, chapter 12. Copper, Taiwan at a Tipping Point, pp. 24–25. Ibid., chapter 3. Tsai Chung-Min, “Taiwan in 2018: A Bitter Campaign and an Uncertain Future,” Asian Survey, January/February 2019. Yeh, The Constitution of Taiwan, pp. 52–57. Among them were the Mainland Affairs Council; the Department of Health; the Council for Cultural Planning and Development; the Government Information Office; the Council for Economic Planning and Development; the National Youth Commission; the Research, Development, and Evaluation Commission; the National Science Council; the Atomic Energy Council; the Council of

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56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68

69 70 71 72

73 74

75 76 77 78 79 80

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Agriculture; the Fair Trade Commission; the Environmental Protection Administration; the Council for Labor Affairs; the National Palace Museum; the Central Bank; the Central Election Commission; the Vocational Assistance Commission; the directorate general of Budget Accounting and Statistics; and the Central Personnel Administration. Recent additions include the Public Construction Commission, the Council for Aboriginal Affairs, the National Sports Council, the Coast Guard, the Council for Hakka Affairs, and the National Communications Commission. The Republic of China Yearbook 2011, p. 60. The Republic of China Yearbook 2016, pp. 58–59. Han, Taiwan Today, p. 18. Shelley Rigger, From Opposition to Power: Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), p. 210. The Republic of China Yearbook, Taiwan 2002, pp. 67–68. Ibid. The Republic of China Yearbook 2011, p. 61. See section on elections later in this chapter. See John F. Copper, “Taiwan in Gridlock,” in Copper (ed.), Taiwan in Troubled Times. Chung-li Wu and Tzu-Ping Liu, “Political Participation in Taiwan,” in Achen and Wang (eds.) The Taiwan Voter, pp. 256–57. Rigger, Politics in Taiwan, p. 184. See Steve Chan, “Taiwan in 2005: Strategic Interaction in Two-Level Games,” Asian Survey (January–February 2006), p. 67. For background on Taiwan’s judicial system, see Hungdah Chiu, “Legal Development in the Republic of China, 1949–1981,” in Hungdah Chiu and Shaochuan Leng (eds.), China: Seventy Years After the 1911 Hsia-Hai Revolution Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1984) pp. 287–331. “Judicial Yuan: Introduction,” Judicial Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan), (online at judicial.gov.tw/en), viewed August 2018. Ibid. Ibid. Brian Kennedy, “Modified Adversarial System Proposed,” Taipei Journal, November 30, 2001, p. 6; Margaret K. Lewis, “Taiwan’s New Adversarial System and the Overlooked Challenge of Efficiency-Driven Reforms,” Virginia Journal of International Law (Spring 2009), p. 651. This is also the practice in some other democracies, such as France. See John F. Copper, Taiwan’s 2006 Metropolitan Mayoral and City Council Elections and the Politics of Corruption (Baltimore: University of Maryland School of Law, 2006), 28–34. For details on problems in the judiciary, see Brian Kennedy and Elizabeth Guo, “The Verdict on Judicial Reforms,” Topics, October 2006. 21–28. Jonathan Adams, “Taiwan: Spotlight on the Young Democracy’s Judicial System,” Christian Science Monitor, May 21, 2009 (online at csm.com). Yeh, The Constitution of Taiwan, pp. 123–26. Laney Zhang, “Taiwan: Constitutional Court Rules Same-Sex Marriage Prohibition Unconstitutional,” Global Legal Monitor (Library of Congress), June 5, 2017 (online at loc.gov/law), See Hung-mao Tien, The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the Republic of China (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1989), 152–153, regarding the decline in cases heard by the Control Yuan. Republic of China Yearbook, Taiwan 2002, pp. 73–74. “‘Defunct’ Control Yuan,” China Post, February 20, 2008 (online at chinapost. com.tw).

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81 Abraham Gerber, “Time to get rid of Control Yuan, civic groups say,” Taipei Times, January 22, 2017 (online at taipeitimes.com). 82 Yeh, The Constitution of Taiwan, pp. 87–89. 83 Much less has been written on local government in Taiwan than on other aspects of its politics. For a brief discussion of the topic, see Area Handbook for the Republic of China, 188–190; and Tien, The Great Transition, 128–132. The workings of local government and various changes made in recent years are described in various editions of The Republic of China Yearbook. 84 The Republic of China Yearbook 2012, p. 60 and Republic of China Yearbook 2016, p. 65. It is also worth noting that when the Republic of China’s Constitution was applied to Taiwan it was clear that this part of the constitution did not apply well so the legislature passed the Local Government Act. See Yeh, The Constitution of Taiwan, p. 16. 85 See Tien, The Great Transition, p. 131. 86 Ibid., p. 132. 87 Tun-jen Cheng, “Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan,” World Politics, Number 4, 1989, pp. 471–99. 88 Wu and Liu, “Political Participation in Taiwan,” in Achen and Wang (eds.), The Taiwan Voter, p. 256. 89 Lu, The Politics of Locality, p. 15. 90 Tien, The Great Transition, p. 130. 91 Defense, foreign affairs and the courts were exempted. See Tien, The Great Transition, p. 130. 92 The population of these two cities at that time was about one-fifth of the nation’s population. The two mayors were members of the Executive Yuan. A host of other reasons can be cited for the importance of these metropolitan governments. 93 For a thorough, though now somewhat out-dated, study on the Provincial Assembly, see Arthur J. Lerman, Taiwan’s Politics: The Provincial Assemblyman’s World (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1978). 94 Roy, Taiwan: A Political History, p. 86. 95 Yung-mao Chao and Michael Y. M. Kay, “Local Government and Political Development in Taiwan,” In Depth (Winter 1993), p. 17. 96 Rigger, Politics in Taiwan, p. 170. 97 Ibid., p. 185. 98 Ibid. It is worth noting that China considered abolishing the provincial government a move toward independence. See Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese?, p. 252, note 123. 99 The Republic of China Yearbook 2011, p. 63. 100 Fell, Government and Politics in Taiwan, p. 143. 101 Ibid., chapter 7. 102 See Copper, with Chen, Taiwan’s Elections, pp. 40–46. 103 “Voter Turnout Was the Lowest Since 1996,” Taipei Times, January 18, 2016 (online at taipeitimes.com). 104 Copper, Taiwan at a Tipping Point, pp. 17–18. 105 See Copper, The KMT Returns to Power, pp. 132–39. 106 Copper, Taiwan at a Tipping Point, chapter 2. 107 A political party is defined, if a definition is needed, as a group of persons organized to acquire and exercise political power. Political parties originated in their modern form in Europe and the United States in the nineteenth century. The term has come to refer to organized groups that seek political power whether by democratic elections or by revolution. See Maurice Duverger, “Political Party,” Encyclopedia Britannica (online at briticannia.com), viewed March 2019. 108 For background and details on the history and organization of the Nationalist Party and its rule of Taiwan, see Moody, Political Change in Taiwan; and

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109 110

111 112 113 114 115 116 117

118 119 120 121

122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141

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Stephen J. Hood, The Kuomintang and the Democratization of Taiwan (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997). Republic of China 1981: A Reference Book, pp. 411–13. C. Martin Wilbur, “Nationalist China, 1928–1950: An Interpretation,” in Hungdah Chiu with Shao-chuan Leng (eds.), China: Seventy Years after the 1911 Hsin-Hai Revolution (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1984), pp. 2–3. Ibid., pp. 4–5. Fell, Government and Politics in Taiwan, p. 111. Ibid., p. 112. Hood, The Kuomintang and the Democratization of Taiwan, pp. 6–7. Tien, The Great Transition, pp. 75–81. The Republic of China Yearbook 1998, p. 109. For details, see John F. Copper, “The KMT’s 13th Party Congress: Reform, Democratization, New Blood,” in Cynthia Chennault (ed.), Modernizing East Asia: Economic and Cultural Dimensions of Political Change, (New York: St. John’s University Press, 1989); John F. Copper, “The KMT’s 14th Party Congress: Toward Unity or Disunity?” Journal of Chinese Studies (October 1994). Also see John F. Copper, The KMT’s 15th Party Congress: The Ruling Party at a Crossroads (Baltimore, MD: University of Maryland School of Law, 1997). Rigger, Politics in Taiwan, pp. 73–74. See section on the media in Chapter 1 for further details. See Julian Baum, “The Money Machine,” Far Eastern Economic Review (August 11, 1994), pp. 62–64. In 2006, the KMT sold its headquarters building for $96 million to Evergreen Group and laid off a number of staff. This reflected the fact the party was having financial troubles. See Mo Yan-chih, “KMT Headquarters Sold for NT$2.3 bn,” Taipei Times, March 23, 2006 (online at taipeitimes.com). Copper, Taiwan at a Tipping Point, p. 203. For further details, see Edwin A. Winckler and Susan Greenhalgh, (eds.), Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1988). See Tien, The Great Transition, p. 90. Rigger, From Opposition to Power, pp. 17–18. Tien, The Great Transition, pp. 98–99. Rigger, From Opposition to Power, pp. 19–23. Rigger, Politics in Taiwan, p. 126. Rigger, From Opposition to Power, p. 15. For details, see Wu, Taiwan’s Democratization, especially chapter 4. See Alexander Yale Lu, “Political Opposition in Taiwan: The Development of the Democratic Progressive Party,” in Cheng and Haggard (eds.). Political Change in Taiwan. See Rigger, From Opposition to Power, p. 7. This point is discussed further in the next section of this chapter. Tien, The Great Transition, p. 100. See Rigger, From Opposition to Power, pp. 61–66. See John F. Copper, “The Role of Minor Parties in Taiwan,” World Affairs (Winter 1993). John F. Copper, “The Evolution of Political Parties in Taiwan,” Asian Affairs (Spring 1989). Wu, Taiwan’s Democratization, pp. 100–01. Rigger, From Opposition to Power, p. 165. Fell, Government and Politics in Taiwan, pp. 70–71. Lin, Taiwan’s China Dilemma, p. 107.

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142 This point is discussed in the next section of this chapter. 143 For details see Chi Huang, “Electoral System Change and Its Effects on the Party System in Taiwan,” in Achen and Wang (eds.), The Taiwan Voter, pp. 223–51. Also see Fell, Government and Politics in Taiwan, pp. 76–78. 144 See section of this chapter on elections. 145 See Copper, Taiwan’s Democracy on Trial, Introduction. 146 See Ian Tsung-yen Chen and Da-chi Liao, “The Rise of the New Power Party in Taiwan’s 2016 Legislative Election: Reality and Challenges,” in Wei-chin Lee (ed.), Taiwan’s Political Re-Alignment and Diplomatic Challenges (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), pp. 71–96. 147 Copper, Taiwan at a Tipping Point, pp. 61–62, pp. 147 and 149. 148 See John F. Copper, “Taiwan’s Political Party System—Past, Present and Future,” Taiwan Insight, January 4, 2018 (taiwaninsight.org). 149 Wu, Taiwan’s Democratization, p. 18. 150 Tien, The Great Transition, p. 163. 151 See Copper, with Chen, Taiwan’s Elections, chapter 4. 152 Tien, The Great Transition, p. 162. 153 Copper, with Chen, Taiwan’s Elections, chapter 4. 154 See Lerman, Taiwan’s Politics. 155 Hung-mao Tien, “Elections and Taiwan’s Democratic Development,” in HungMao Tien (ed.), Taiwan’s Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), p. 8. 156 Wu, Taiwan’s Democratization, p. 78. 157 Ibid., pp. 9–10. 158 Copper, with Chen, Taiwan’s Elections, chapters 5 and 7. 159 Ibid., chapter 5. 160 Ibid., chapter 7. 161 See John F. Copper, Taiwan’s Recent Elections: Fulfilling the Democratic Promise (Baltimore, MD: University of Maryland School of Law, 1990), chapter 3. 162 Ibid., chapter 4, especially pp. 77–81. 163 Ibid., p. 25. 164 John F. Copper, Taiwan’s 1991 and 1992 Non-Supplemental Elections: Reaching a Higher State of Democracy (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994), chapter 2. 165 Ibid., chapter 3. 166 John F. Copper, Taiwan’s Mid-1990s Elections: Taking the Final Steps to Democracy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), chapter 2. 167 Ibid., chapter 3. 168 Ibid., pp. 122–26. 169 Ibid., chapter 4. 170 John F. Copper, Taiwan’s 2000 Presidential and Vice Presidential Election: Consolidating Democracy and Creating a New Era of Politics (Baltimore, MD: University of Maryland School of Law, 2000). 171 See John F. Copper, Taiwan’s 2001 Legislative, Magistrates and Mayors Election: Further Consolidating Democracy (Singapore: World Scientific/Singapore University Press, 2002). Voter allocation undermines the democratic processes since voting results do not reflect how popular certain candidates were, not to mention the issues they stood for. 172 John F. Copper, Taiwan’s 2004 Presidential and Vice Presidential Election: Democracy’s Consolidation or Devolution (Baltimore, MD: University of Maryland School of Law, 2004). 173 John F. Copper, Taiwan’s 2006 Metropolitan Mayoral and City Council Elections and the Politics of Corruption (Baltimore, MD: University of Maryland School of Law, 2006); and John F. Copper, Taiwan’s 2012 Presidential/Vice Presidential

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174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186

187 188 189 190 191 192 193

194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201

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and Legislative Elections: Assessing Current Politics and Charting the Future (Baltimore, MD: University of Maryland School of Law, 2012). Ibid. Copper, The KMT Returns to Power, chapter 2. John F. Copper, Taiwan’s 2008 Presidential and Vice Presidential Election: Maturing Democracy (Baltimore, MD: University of Maryland School of Law, 2008). Copper, Taiwan at a Tipping Point, chapter 2. Ibid., chapter 3. “The Liberty Times Editorial: The Warning From the Ballot Box,” Taipei Times, November 26, 2018 (online at taipeitimes.com). Copper, Taiwan at a Tipping Point, pp. 152 and 206. Ibid., pp. 179–86. Ibid., pp. 108 and 153. Copper, The KMT Returns to Power, pp. 116–18; Copper, Taiwan at a Tipping Point, pp. 108 and 133. Copper, The KMT Returns to Power, p. 114. Copper, Taiwan at a Tipping Point, p. 205. Chien-Kai Chang, Mary Wen-Reng Ho and Sarine Hui-Lin Chang, “Categorizing Two Taiwanese Major Political Parties from Their Faces: The Influence of Provincial Appearance,” Frontier Psychology, March 21, 2018 (online at fron tieresin.org). Copper, Taiwan at a Tipping Point, p. 118. See Paul M. A. Linebarger, The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen (Westport, CT: Hyperion Press, 1973). Sun’s writings also provided a blueprint for economic development as will be seen in Chapter 5. Ibid. Also see C. Martin Wilbur, Sun Yat-sen: Frustrated Patriot (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976). See Gregor, with Chang and Zimmerman, Ideology and Development, chapter 1. Clark, Taiwan’s Development, p 115. This writer has used this term. See John F. Copper, The Taiwan Political Miracle: Essays on Political Development, Elections and Foreign Relations (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1997). Thomas A. Metzger, “The Chinese Reconciliation of Moral-Sacred Values with Modern Pluralism: Political Discourse in the ROC 1949–1989,” in Ramon H. Myers (ed.) Two Societies in Opposition: The Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China after Forty Years (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1991). Metzger also cites Taiwan’s independence, promoted by Peng Ming-min and others, as a tenet of Taiwan’s political thinking, though it developed later. Ibid. These ideas are summarized in Chao and Myers, The First Chinese Democracy, pp. 65–66. Clark, Taiwan’s Development, pp. 233–34 and 239. See Yeun-wen Ku, Welfare Capitalism in Taiwan: State, Economy and Social Policy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997). Also see Chapter 3 for further details. See Wachman, Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization, pp. 65–68. Su Lin Chieh-yu, “Chen Greets the British Sociologist Who Inspired His Election Success,” Taipei Times, April 16, 2002 (online at www.taipeitimes.com). This issue is discussed in the next chapter. It should be noted that both scholars and politicians in Taiwan seldom use the word ideology. In an interview with Time magazine, Ma stated that he is very pragmatic. See Zoher Abdoolcarin and Natalie Tso, “Interview with Ma Ying-jeou,” Time, July 10, 2006 (online at time.com).

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202 It is worth noting that neither of these terms appeared in the main academic works on Taiwan in the past. 203 For a discussion of populism’s recent impact on Taiwan politics, see John F. Copper, “Is Populism Infecting Taiwan Politics,” Review of Global Politics, 51 (2015). 204 See section on elections earlier in this chapter. 205 See Copper, Taiwan at a Tipping Point, p. 152. 206 J. Michael Cole, Convergence or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait: The Illusion of Peace? (London: Routledge, 2017), p. 104. 207 Copper, Taiwan at a Tipping Point, p. 121. 208 Ibid., p. 106. 209 See section earlier in this chapter on Taiwan’s elections. 210 Copper, Taiwan at a Tipping Point, p. 119. 211 See section earlier in this chapter on elections. 212 Cambridge Academic Content Dictionary (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press) (online at cambridgedictionary.com), viewed March 2019. 213 Rigger, From Opposition to Power, p. 119. These items were in the DPP’s Year 2000 Policy Manifesto that summarized their core principles for the election that year. 214 Simon Denyer, “‘Progressive, Tolerant and Diverse’: How Taiwan is Moving Ever Further From China,” Washington Post, January 19, 2016 (online at wa shingtonpost.com). 215 Chan Wei-hsiung, “DPP’s Retreat From Progressivism,” Taipei Times, June 1, 2018 (online at taipeitimes.com). 216 Brian Hioe, “Under Trump, Will Taiwan’s Progressive Values Become a Liability to It?” New Bloom, February 2017 (online at newbloommag.net).

5

The Economy

In its past Taiwan experienced periods of economic boom and decline. Several centuries ago, Taiwan was for a time a center of trade and commerce in East Asia. Then this ended. Under Japanese governance from 1895 to 1945, Taiwan thrived economically, surpassing by most standards all of East Asia except for Japan. After World War II, Taiwan’s economy deteriorated. In the mid-1960s, however, based on privatizing the economy, further adopting free-market capitalism, a good labor force, astute planning and engaging full throttle in global trade, Taiwan’s economy took off and its fast-paced growth soon became the envy of the world. Many used the term “miracle” to describe Taiwan’s economic growth. Its economic boom engendered vast social and political change, producing a large middle class, consumerism, Westernization, democratization and more. Regarding Taiwan’s relationship with China, its fast economic growth dampened the desire on the part of its political leadership, not to mention its residents, for unification with China. Different standards of living were the main cause. But then this changed. In 2001, Taiwan experienced a severe recession caused partly by a slowdown in the West and the global economy and partly by the Chen administration’s poor economic management and political gridlock. Meanwhile China had already experienced two decades plus of rapid growth to become a global economic powerhouse. Taiwan thus sought to expand trade and other economic ties with China. Taiwan’s economy was hit by the 2008 global recession, but by the end of 2009 was doing well. Then its growth slowed again. But China’s economy continued to boom. With Taiwan’s exports to the United States, Europe and Japan in relative decline and exports to China increasing fast, many perceive that expanding links with China was the only way for Taiwan’s economy to grow and remain dynamic. But its economic ties with China became a double-edged sword. China helped Taiwan grow economically; yet political ties that came with that contradicted Taiwan’s bid for independence. Further, those ties, but also Taiwan integrating with the global economy, engendered economic inequities. These issues helped the opposition Democratic Progressive Party win the 2016 election. But the DPP’s progressive agenda appeared to relegate Taiwan

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to meagre GDP increases. Would Taiwan’s residents be satisfied with that? Would slow growth make economic ties with China more necessary? Herein lies uncertainties.

The Economy to 1950 Centuries ago, although Taiwan’s economy was in a primitive state of development, the Aborigines engaged in commerce with other areas in the region and Taiwan was more prosperous than most parts of East Asia. By the 1500s, however, Taiwan’s external trade had all but disappeared. Thus the economic activities of the island’s residents, the Aborigines, were generally limited to hunting, fishing, berry picking and some farming. The mountain Aborigines engaged mainly in the former three pursuits, while the lowland Aborigines cultivated some of the level land on the island. Taiwan subsequently became the base of operations for Chinese and Japanese pirates, who engaged in various forms of trade in the area both before and during the time of the arrival of Europeans. Meanwhile Chinese emigration to the island began.1 In the seventeenth century Holland made Taiwan a colony. The Dutch introduced oxen and farm implements to the island, created a cash economy and launched modern facets of commerce and trade. The Dutch East India Company, which managed the economy, promoted the exports of rice, sugar and deerskins, and the imports of silk, porcelain and other goods from China mainly for re-export. The Company encouraged the immigration of Chinese, who came in large numbers. They revolutionized farming by bringing new crops as well as the more advanced cultivation and irrigation techniques used in South China.2 Under Chinese rule from the late 1600s to 1895, Taiwan’s economy experienced some economic modernization. Owing to a continued increase in the Chinese population of the island, agricultural production expanded markedly; land under cultivation grew from a very small area to nearly all the island’s flatlands. Trade also increased, and significant quantities of rice and sugar were shipped to China. The mining of coal and other minerals also became a part of the economy—coal primarily because it was exported and also because Taiwan became a coaling station for steamship traffic in the region in the mid-1800s. Still, the island’s economy was largely agricultural. Improvements in the economic infrastructure and the growth of business enterprises saw only modest progress.3 In the very late 1800s, this changed as a result of Peking appointing better governors that adopted new policies to improve the economy of the island. As noted in Chapter 2, the best was Liu Ming-ch’uan, whom Peking made governor of Fukien Province (which Taiwan was a part of) in 1884. Liu, a close friend of China’s modernizer, Li Hung-chang, was given a mandate to extend to Taiwan the popular “self-strengthening” movement launched in China to improve economic conditions there.4

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At this time, the island lacked modern transportation and communications facilities, and its industries were few and mostly small and inefficient. Liu acted to remedy this. He expanded telegraph lines built by a former governor and oversaw the construction of harbors and railroads. He opened new mines. He conducted an extensive land survey and improved the island’s transportation system. Liu also adopted policies to expand the production of camphor, which quickly became a major export product. He then made cultivating tea a priority. Rice and sugar growing were increased. In a few years, he transformed Taiwan from one of China’s most backward areas into an advanced one. Although much of what Liu did, particularly at first, was aimed at strengthening Taiwan militarily in order to fend off foreign encroachments, his efforts had quite a positive effect on the economy.5 But most of Liu’s efforts were short-lived. The powerful families in Taiwan felt threatened by Liu’s modernization efforts and employed various means to undercut him. Liu then contracted malaria. Finally, his support in Peking waned. As a result, in 1891 Liu left Taiwan without accomplishing much of what he had hoped to do. In fact, most of Liu’s economic improvements would probably have had little lasting effect had Taiwan not soon become part of the Japanese empire. The Japanese completed many of his projects.6 While Taiwan briefly experienced impressive economic progress before Japan colonized the island, its economic structure remained quite similar in many ways to that of the provinces of coastal southern China. There were vast discrepancies in income and wealth, and most people were poor. Yet Taiwan differed economically from China in some significant ways. Taiwan did not have a history of frequent famine caused by floods and crop failures. Fishing provided a more important food source than it did in China, especially inland China. Crop yields were better than China’s because of Taiwan’s rich volcanic soil and its heavier and more even rainfall. The island’s economy was also much more linked to trade. Finally, capitalism, which was brought to Taiwan earlier by the European colonial powers, was more in evidence.7 Serious economic modernization in Taiwan began shortly after the island became a Japanese colony in 1895. Important progress in four areas laid the foundation for Taiwan’s later growth: (1) the building of an economic infrastructure, including roads, railroads, port facilities and electrification; (2) the establishment of profitable local industries (such as food processing) and an export-oriented economy; (3) the organizing and training of the labor force; and (4) the opening of banking and other economic institutions. Japan’s colonial leaders concentrated first on agriculture. Tokyo provided needed capital investment, technology and management skills. Crops were improved by the introduction of new farming techniques, irrigation and fertilizers. Rice and sugar were given the highest priority; both were shipped to Japan in significant quantities. From 1910 until World War II, growth in Taiwan’s agricultural sector of the economy spearheaded its economic development, which overall exceeded population growth by about three-fold.

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Agriculture also made a major contribution to capital formation and aided the subsequent growth of other sectors of the economy.8 A decade or so after 1895, Japan started building factories in Taiwan in significant numbers, marking the beginning of Taiwan’s industrial revolution. The decline of European trade during World War I and new Japanese policies aimed at making Taiwan’s economy more industrial, along with the infusion of large amounts of Japanese capital into the island’s economy, contributed to the process. World War II, which started in Asia in the 1930s, further stimulated Taiwan’s industrialization and contributed to even faster economic growth.9 But there was another side to the story: Japan’s management of Taiwan’s economy during the decades before the end of World War II contributed immensely to its economic development and growth; however, the island and its population were exploited by Japan’s capitalist system. The Chinese population’s standard of living saw unprecedented increases, but it lagged behind rises in productivity and overall economic growth. Evidence of its colonial status was the fact Taiwan exported considerably more to Japan than it imported.10 Before and during World War II, Japan used Taiwan as a base of its military operations and Tokyo invested in building some heavy industries on the island. Taiwan’s economy benefitted. Because U.S. bombing during the war was generally restricted to military targets and oil storage depots, Taiwan sustained less damage to its economy than other Japanese-controlled areas of East Asia. Meanwhile, Japan and China both suffered widespread war damage. Hence, Taiwan was in much better shape economically when the war ended than either Japan or China. From 1945 to 1949, however, Taiwan’s economy endured several severe shocks. The first was caused by the sudden withdrawal of Japanese administrators and businesses and the return of 160,000 Taiwanese soldiers that served in the Japanese military that needed jobs.11 The Nationalist Chinese government’s lack of attention to the economy in the immediate post-war period made the situation worse. Ruinous economic policies resulting from Nationalist leaders’ preoccupation with fighting a war against the Communists on the Mainland also caused serious economic harm. Further, Governor-General Ch’en Yi’s efforts to create a state-managed socialist economy on the island and his leadership in terms of fixing the economy were disastrous. In short, for several years after World War II, Taiwan suffered economically almost as if it were a country at war.12 Economic activity declined precipitously during this period as measured by the output of nearly all goods and services. By 1946, just a year after Taiwan was turned over to Nationalist China, economic output had fallen to less than half of what it had been.13 Subsequently, the economy declined still further. Many consumer products became scarce or unaffordable. Poverty and disease followed. The education system and public services deteriorated commensurately. Because China’s monetary system was used in Taiwan, inflation

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decimated many commercial enterprises. In a period of just over one year (from November 1945 to the beginning of 1947), the price of food rose 700 percent, fuel and construction materials 1,400 percent, and fertilizer 25,000 percent.14 In short, Taiwan’s economy was severely traumatized by the Nationalist government’s policies—or, in many cases, lack of policies—and its bad economic oversight.15 Another economic shock came in 1949 in the form of approximately 1.5 million Chinese fleeing China to come to Taiwan. This influx of people caused severe dislocations in housing, employment and an already weak infrastructure. On top of this, preparations to defend the island against an invasion from the Mainland diverted precious resources that might have been used to revive the economy. At this time most people in Taiwan, as well as Western observers, were extremely pessimistic about Taiwan’s economic future.16 Given the situation just cited, plus the fact Chiang’s government was discredited after losing a war to Mao’s communist forces, the island had but meagre natural resources, the population-to-land ratio was unfavorable and there was a shortage of capital, some labelled Taiwan a “basket case” and predicted Taiwan would never develop economically.17

Economic Recovery and Boom: 1950–2000 In the 1950s, Taiwan’s economy began to recover. The Korean War and a consequent shift in U.S. policy to again favor Chiang Kai-shek and his government meant the U.S. Navy provided Taiwan with a secure environment for economic planning. U.S. economic and military aid made up for a serious foreign exchange shortfall and allowed Taipei to divert funds from defense spending to economic rebuilding. Last but not least, the huge pool of administrative and other human talent that came from China in 1949 with Chiang Kai-shek charted intelligent plans for the implementation of economic development that accommodated the desire of Taiwan’s population for economic rehabilitation.18 Because of concern over feeding Taiwan’s rapidly growing population and the realization that the loss of peasant support in China had been a major factor in the Nationalists loss to the Communists, economic planners in Taipei decided to focus first on the agricultural sector, a choice that comported with Taiwan’s planners’ ideas about economic development and also advice they received from U.S. aid personnel. This turned out to be a very wise decision.19 Land reform was the first big decision taken to foster growth in the farming sector. It was carried out in three stages: (1) rent reduction in 1949 (from around 50 percent to 37.5 percent of the main crop); (2) the forced sale of public lands in 1951 to tenant farmers at 2.5 times the value of one year’s crop (resulting in 96,000 hectares of public land going to 156,000 tenant farm families); and (3) the “land-to-the-tiller” program, which forced landlords to sell land they did not farm themselves, except for 2.1 hectares of paddy field and double that amount for dry land.20

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The Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR), composed of two U.S. and three Chinese commissioners, planned and carried out these decisions. After land reform was completed, the JCRR created farmers’ associations, initiated a government program to exchange fertilizer for rice, and sponsored other activities that helped farmers. Nearly all of the commission’s efforts were successful—so much so that Taiwan’s land reform program was and still is emulated by economists in developing countries.21 Individual initiative and hard work on the part of the farmers, who could now realize profits from their efforts, and flexible government planning that encouraged the planting of new crops and adopting innovative farming techniques, were critical to increasing agricultural productivity.22 Taiwan’s agricultural sector also responded to market opportunities abroad. In the early 1950s, when Japan lifted restrictions on banana imports, Taiwan’s farmers doubled their yield in two years and took most of the Japanese market. Farmers began asparagus cultivation and canning in 1954, increasing production almost 100-fold in the next 15 years. Mushroom growing and canning became major enterprises in the 1960s. By 1971, asparagus and mushroom exports had earned $82 million in foreign exchange.23 Taiwan’s average annual real growth rate of the agricultural sector during the 1950s was an impressive 14 percent. However, by the 1960s, farming had nearly reached its full potential. Growth in the agricultural sector of the economy subsequently dropped to 4.5 percent annually. Forestry saw the slowest growth, while livestock, fish farming and fruit production surpassed the average. Expansion of the agricultural sector overall was around 3 percent in the 1970s and 2 percent from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s.24 In short, early on agriculture’s contribution to Taiwan’s economic development was very significant. During the 1950s and early 1960s, agricultural exports supplied half the nation’s foreign exchange earnings. Taxes collected from rural Taiwan, farmers’ savings (40 percent of capital formation in the 1950s) and their purchases of goods from Taiwan’s fledgling factories greatly facilitated Taiwan’s industrialization. Even more important, rural Taiwan, because of rapid increases in agricultural productivity, was able to supply nearly half of the new labor used in non-agricultural production from the 1950s to the 1970s. Meanwhile, by the mid-1960s, Taiwan’s farmers provided the population with a level of food consumption superior to that of any country in Asia except Japan; in caloric content, Taiwan even eclipsed Japan.25 From the 1970s on, while farmers continued to enjoy an improved standard of living, they suffered from relatively declining incomes. Farmers’ buying power fell and agricultural work became less attractive. In addition, soaring labor and land costs, an aging workforce, foreign competition and environmentalism beset farmers. The result was that the agricultural sector’s contribution to the nation’s gross national product (GNP) fell from over 32 percent in 1952 to just 1.7 percent in 2000, while the farm population dropped from more than one-third of the total population to 15 percent during the period from 1975 to 2005.26 Joining the World Trade Organization

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in January 2002 had a further negative impact on agriculture since it forced Taiwan to cut tariffs on food products that had heretofore been protected.27 Taiwan’s farmers adjusted to a changing economic situation by reducing the production of some crops and increasing others. Production of sugar, sweet potatoes, rice and other grains was cut; production of soybeans, tea, fruits and vegetables was expanded. Hog and chicken raising increased. Because fishing was affected by fewer catches in proximate waters, fishermen shifted to other endeavors: deep-sea fishing (farther and farther away from Taiwan’s shore), marine aquaculture and on-land fish farming.28 Meanwhile farmers became more politically active: in 1988, they engaged in a mass street demonstration to draw the public’s attention to their plight.29 In response, the government rezoned farmland so that it could be sold for other uses. This decision pleased many farmers but did not help agriculture overall. The government helped farmers to mechanize and diversify their crops; but this had only a limited impact. Because of joining international agreements on free trade, the government could not subsidize agriculture (except to help it adjust to new and different situations). Thus the future of agriculture in Taiwan was not promising. In fact, in the future it is almost certain to continue to fall in terms of its contribution to the GDP.30 After the late 1950s, industry became the engine driving Taiwan’s economic growth. Annual growth in the industrial sector of the economy was around 12 percent; it exceeded 17 percent during the 1960s and rose at an even faster pace in the 1970s. Factories proliferated such that by 1977 the industrial index had increased by more than 28 times its level in 1950. In fact, Taiwan’s industrial sector grew at a rate seldom equalled anywhere at any time in history.31 Comparisons with other countries are instructive: during the 1960s and early 1970s, industry’s share of Taiwan’s GNP grew by 18 percent annually, double the rate of Britain and Japan during their industrial take-offs. Even compared to other booming East Asian countries, Taiwan’s industrialization was considerably faster. As a result, Taiwan was more industrialized by the mid-1970s than any other country in Asia except Japan.32 What accounted for this lighting pace of industrialization? The key factors were (1) the expansion of industrial employment; (2) increases in labor productivity; (3) U.S. economic assistance; (4) privatization; (5) a high rate of local savings and considerable foreign investment; (6) a solid economic infrastructure, including transportation and port facilities; and (7) excellent planning by the government and the business community. The contribution of each needs some elaboration. The industrial labor force in Taiwan grew from virtually nothing in 1950 to 850,000 by the mid-1960s and to more than two million by the mid-1970s. The increases were especially large in manufacturing and construction. Taiwan’s rapid population growth and the movement of workers out of the agricultural sector owing to mechanization and other increases in farming efficiency were the main reasons for the large numbers of new entrants into

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the industrial labor force. From 1952 to 1968, workers employed in industry increased from 16.9 percent to 41.5 percent of the total workforce.33 Labor productivity in industry, not initially high, began to increase rapidly in the early 1950s and continued to rise sharply thereafter. Initially, Taiwan’s industrial sector benefited from high skill levels and good education among workers (particularly compared to labor costs), and a strong work ethic. Later, rising labor productivity came from the efficient organization of labor, labor saving devices, and the capitalization of production.34 In the early years, U.S. economic aid and advice were as important to Taiwan’s industrial progress as they were to its agricultural growth. From 1951 to 1964, the United States injected nearly $100 million annually into Taiwan’s economy, money critically needed to build Taiwan’s new factories. As a matter of record, from the early 1950s to 1960, U.S. aid accounted for 40 percent of Taiwan’s capital formation, most of which helped the industrial sector. Few underdeveloped nations at that time or since benefited as much from economic growth generated by foreign aid. Although U.S. help ended in 1964, it had by then stimulated Taiwan’s industrial progress such that the island’s economy was able to sustain its rapid growth. In short, Taiwan’s economy “took off.” Taiwan later was widely applauded for it being the only country in the world to experience increasing economic growth after the termination of U.S. aid.35 Privatization also spurred Taiwan’s industrial growth. In 1945, the government assumed management over most of the large manufacturing enterprises left by the Japanese. It kept in place government monopolies it had created on the Mainland to provide needed sources of tax revenues. Top government leaders at that time also believed that large industries must be government owned because of their size and importance to the economy and for reasons relating to national security. In 1954, only 43.4 percent of industrial production was privately owned. Subsequently, government economic planners changed their views and the government sold many public companies. By the early 1960s, the portion of industrial production in private hands was over 50 percent and was growing fast. It reached 80 percent by 1972 and nearly 90 percent by the mid-1980s.36 Subsequently, even compared with the other successful capitalist, free-market countries in Asia, a larger portion of Taiwan’s enterprises was privately owned—due both to government privatization policies and the proliferation of small family-owned businesses. This became a hallmark of Taiwan’s growth economy.37 A high rate of domestic savings and large inputs of foreign investment also helped Taiwan’s economic development. During the 1950s and 1960s, growth in the agricultural sector and U.S. economic assistance were the primary sources of capital accumulation. Meanwhile, in the mid-1950s new investment laws made it possible for foreign firms to import plants and equipment and sell their products in the domestic market to make profits and generate additional capital. Tax incentives were added in 1959 to attract foreign capital.

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Special laws were passed that included a maximum tax rate of 18 percent and a tax-exempt “holiday” lasting as long as five years for some new investors.38 In the mid-1960s, export processing zones (EPZs)—a Taiwan invention according to some economic historians—were established, giving foreign companies special set-aside zones to build factories where they enjoyed freeport status for imports and exports, relief from government red tape, and access to good harbors. Taiwan’s EPZs were extremely successful in attracting foreign companies that invested in Taiwan’s economy and created jobs while also training workers and upgrading labor skills.39 These policies resulted in a marked increase in foreign capital input in Taiwan: from a total of $20 million from 1952 to 1959 to more than $950 million between 1966 and 1973. Amazingly, foreign investment in Taiwan’s economy increased by almost 50-fold during the 1960s and the early 1970s. Most of it came from the United States, Japan and Overseas Chinese (especially from Southeast Asia); most was private investment. By the mid-1980s, Taiwan was absorbing more than $500 million in foreign capital annually.40 Meanwhile, by the 1970s, the rate of individual and company savings rose rapidly—to about 25 percent annually—providing further money for investment. Personal savings were also increasing. In 1987, individual savings reached 40 percent—the highest rate in the world. The main reasons for this high rate of savings were favorable interest rates, individual frugality and optimism about future economic growth.41 In the 1990s, the rate of savings in Taiwan fell to the high 20 percent range for private savings and company investment. The main reason for the decline was that Taiwan now had a capital surplus. Also, because of high labor costs, environmental problems and a host of other factors, Taiwanese entrepreneurs began to invest elsewhere. Still, a high level of capital accumulation helped Taiwan to continue to transform the economy into one based on capital- and knowledge-intensive production. Foreign investment in Taiwan remained high, and, though it was not now as vital as it had been in fostering economic growth, it did aid the development of new industries and the inward transfer of technology while it bolstered commitments to Taiwan among countries that were economically and politically important to Taipei.42 A good economic infrastructure also helped Taiwan’s economic growth. In the early years, the government offered help to domestic businesses and foreign enterprises in the form of cheap electricity and easy access to ports, good roads and a well-trained labor force. Later, transportation, energy and banking were improved to further upgrade the economic facilities and systems in Taiwan. In 1973, the government launched ten big projects at a cost of $5 billion. Beginning in 1975 and for the next ten years, it spent $2.7 billion on transportation projects, including an island-long freeway, railroads, airports, harbors and ports. More projects were begun even before earlier ones were completed. In addition to these transportation projects, a steel mill, a shipyard, a petrochemical facility and a nuclear power plant were built. In 1978, 14 more large

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projects were started, which included housing construction and farm mechanization. In 1985, an additional 14 were added at a cost of $3 billion. In 1991, more than 700 other projects were approved as part of a six-year development plan. The cost of this last group of projects was projected to be more than $300 billion. The government boasted at the time that these infrastructure improvements would ensure continued economic growth and make Taiwan one of the top 20 countries in the world in per capita income by the year 2000.43 Meanwhile, the government helped finance the Asia-Pacific Regional Operations Center to make Taiwan a “hub” for business in the region; it included a $16 billion-plus high-speed railroad, energy development and more infrastructure projects.44 Finally, intelligent planning lay behind Taiwan’s economic success. This included research, forecasting and planning done by the Ministry of Economic Affairs; the Research, Development, and Evaluation Commission; the Economic Planning Council (later the Council for Economic Planning and Development); and other organs of government. Although Taiwan did not have a planned or command economy and business was not highly regulated even compared to other similar free-market nations—including Japan, South Korea and Singapore—the government “gave directions” about the economy. The business community, farmers and others benefited greatly from government forecasts about economic prospects (including both opportunities and difficulties). Government policy, in fact, played an important role in Taiwan’s economic miracle such that it warranted special kudos.45 Taiwan’s rapid economic growth, and what many considered broadly its economic miracle, began to encounter challenges the end of the 1980s and after. In 1988, Taiwan’s double-digit GDP growth ended. In the 1990s, Taiwan’s economic growth came under serious challenge due to foreign economic competition, especially from China, and owing to Taiwan’s economy maturing. Then 2001 saw the bursting of the global high-tech bubble that in Taiwan coincided with serious political polarization and gridlock. Taiwan thus entered a new, slower phase in terms of its economic development.46 At this time Taiwan’s economic relations with China shifted and China became a big factor in Taiwan’s economy. In 1985, the government in Taiwan announced it would not interfere with its merchants exporting to China and in 1987 lifted restrictions on its residents traveling to China. Trade had to be indirect (through Hong Kong or some other place), but it boomed anyway. By 1993, China was Taiwan’s second-largest export market; it went on to become its largest market in 2002, which may have in reality happened sooner because re-exporting was not fully counted and commerce through taxexempt areas such as the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands was generally not included. Taiwan benefited more than the numbers showed when considering that cross-Strait trade was unbalanced very much in favor of Taiwan (in fact, when calculating its overall trade most of the excess of Taiwan’s exports came from trade with China). In fact, some observers noted that in China’s economic

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dealings with Taiwan, Beijing deliberately favored Taiwan. Also at this time, especially after the Asian economic crisis of 1997–98, regional trade blocs became more important. Southeast Asia was a region close-by but dominated by China. As a consequence, by the 1990s Taiwan became quite economically linked with China.47

Economic Growth Strategies When Taiwan entered the new millennium, its economic system was clearly a free-market capitalist one. It ranked as one of the freest in the world by various key yardsticks: trade policies, taxation, monetary policy, wage and price controls, property rights and regulations, foreign investment, and banking. Arguably that is why Taiwan up to that point was one of the most successful economies in the world.48 As noted earlier, the reasons behind Taiwan favoring capitalist development were numerous. However, four deserve special mention: (1) Japan had bequeathed the Nationalist government a capitalist economy; (2) the February 28 Incident in 1947 engendered public hostility toward government monopolies; (3) socialist planning and a socialist economy were associated with former governor Ch’en Yi; and (4) the world had split into two camps— communist and capitalist—and Taiwan was in the latter, aligned with the United States.49 However, it is not enough to say that Taiwan’s economy was a free-market capitalist one. Taiwan’s capitalism was indeed laissez fare. However, the government guided, and in some respects designed, economic growth. Government planners also altered development strategies several times (radically at one point) and fine-tuned the nation’s development strategies periodically— though within the scope of the capitalist model. An examination of the work of these planners is essential to any assessment of Taiwan’s economy as is understanding their attitudes about a free-market economy and the limited, yet critical, role of government. In the late 1940s, the first task of Taiwan’s economic planners was to stabilize the economy and reduce inflation, which was around 500 percent annually. In early 1949, because of the defeat of the Nationalist regime on the Mainland, it was a horrendous 3,000 percent. The government, in response, legislated and enforced currency reform. Specifically, government officials imposed regulations on the financial system to control the money supply in order to prevent a resurgence of inflationary pressures. Finally, economic planners adopted conservative fiscal policies that required balanced budgets, reduced government spending and stable interest rates.50 These policies worked. Skyrocketing inflation was curtailed. The inflation index fell from 300 percent in 1950 to 30 percent in 1951–52 and subsequently dropped to a “reasonable” 10 percent annually. In addition to stabilizing the economy, anti-inflationary policies benefited industrialization in two important ways: they encouraged labor-intensive production and made Taiwan’s

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businesses compete. Reduced inflation meanwhile made economic planning easier and facilitated growth in general.51 In 1953, the government expanded its role in managing the economy when it launched a four-year plan, setting goals and guidelines for overall economic development. The objectives were stated in general terms, but planners were specific about the government’s role, thereby sending the business community clear signals concerning expectations about the economy going forward. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Finance, under the general supervision of the premier, provided the leadership; other government organs and agencies followed. The government worked on zoning for business operations, improved the infrastructure, passed laws such as the Statute for Encouraging Investments (in 1960) and more.52 With respect to generating economic growth, in the early 1950s Taiwan’s development strategy was based on a policy called import substitution. Several conditions dictated this choice: Taiwan’s Japanese market for food products had been cut off, capital and technology were in short supply, the currency was overvalued, and the bureaucracy was an obstacle to implementing a policy of promoting exports. Thus, the best economic growth strategy available was to aid the growth of certain local industries by guaranteeing them special access to the domestic market. This approach, it was perceived, would help absorb excess labor, stabilize prices and conserve foreign exchange. Industries such as textiles, food processing, fertilizers and chemicals benefited greatly from this policy. Finally, the import-substitution policy facilitated Taiwan’s continued efforts at controlling inflation and stabilizing the economy.53 In accordance with the government’s import-substitution strategy, in the next several years Taiwan’s currency was pegged above its real value, tariffs were high (doubling from 20 percent in 1948 to 40 percent in 1955), and import quotas and other controls were rigidly enforced—all measures that blocked or discouraged the purchase of foreign goods. Imports of flour and yarn, for example, fell from 70 and 80 percent respectively to less than 5 percent of local consumption, while synthetic yarn and bicycles fell from 100 percent to 1 percent. Selected businesses quickly grasped the opportunity to produce and market these items. In 1951, a system of multiple exchange rates was established that discriminated in favor of certain industries. Also, special laws and regulations provided certain producers with favored treatment in acquiring credit.54 Taiwan’s import-substitution policy was very successful. Between 1952 and 1959, various chosen industries grew at a rapid rate—sufficient to increase by 6 percent industry’s share of the GNP. In fact, over 70 percent of the industrial sector’s new production came from food (including tobacco), cotton and wool textiles, leather goods, and chemicals (including rubber goods, plastics and petroleum)—all favored industries. Government policies also helped some other industries. Factories making sheet glass, non-metal mineral products, machinery, equipment and rayon managed to gain a foothold and grew at this time.55

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Although the government deserves high marks for adopting an importsubstitution policy at the proper time and for making it work, thus promoting economic growth, it probably warrants more applause for realizing that it had to be a temporary strategy. Otherwise, many industries would have become accustomed to protection and grown weak and non-competitive. Taiwan’s leaders thus resisted long-term reliance on the import-substitution policy— unlike planners in many developing countries then and now.56 In the late 1950s, the government made a major shift in economic strategy when, for several good reasons, it decided to scrap its import-substitution policy in favor of an export-promotion policy. First, the domestic market for the protected industries had become saturated and there was little room for expansion. Second, some of Taiwan’s industries had gained sufficient experience and presumably the capacity to be internationally competitive. Third, the workforce had improved. Finally, Taiwan now enjoyed a competitive advantage over Japan in some industries because of rising labor costs there. Thus, in 1959, in order to transform Taiwan’s economy into one that was export led, the government abolished its dual exchange-rate system and devalued the currency. It reduced tariffs and established laws and regulations favoring export companies. Taxes, interest rates on loans, and regulations on the importation of raw materials were altered, as were laws regulating foreign investment. Later, as noted earlier, EPZs were established.57 The industries picked as “leading” export industries were chiefly those that produced consumer goods: textiles, processed food products (mostly canned), leather goods, wood products and paper products. These industries, almost exclusively labor-intensive ones using small-scale production facilities, accounted for nearly 60 percent of the increase in Taiwan’s exports during the early 1960s.58 Taiwan’s export policy was a big success. The industries slated to sell abroad did so. During the first half of the 1960s, the value of exports rose nearly 20 percent a year. Export companies absorbed considerable excess labor, generated needed foreign exchange, and attracted foreign investment. Companies that aimed at specific foreign markets, in particular, contributed to growth, propelling the GNP to record double-digit annual increases. As a result, by the 1970s Taiwan became referred to as a “newly industrializing country,” or NIC. But continued growth required more policy adjustments. The decade of the 1970s saw Taiwan’s economic development strategy shift dramatically again in the use of labor and capital. The nation’s labor surplus had turned into a labor shortage, and labor costs rose dramatically. This situation, and the availability of large quantities of investment capital, made it logical to promote capital-intensive industries such as electronics, electrical products, chemicals, machinery, instruments and metal products. Textiles continued to do well because the industry turned to high fashion and a better grade of textiles; cheap textiles soon became only a memory. In other words, the export-oriented policy of the 1960s continued, but the quality, sophistication and price of Taiwan’s

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exports changed with capital becoming a bigger factor. Industrial exports became more than three-fourths of the total.59 Taiwan’s economy continued to boom, though it suffered a severe shock during the 1973–74 oil crisis. Economic planners quickly adjusted to higher energy costs. They diversified energy sources, encouraged conservation and tried to promote less energy-intensive industries. Partly for security reasons, Taiwan needed to store more energy—and did so. To justify keeping large stores of petroleum, planners facilitated the start-up and, later, the growth of Taiwan’s petrochemical industry, which soon became large.60 During the first half of the 1980s, Taiwan’s economy encountered even higher domestic labor costs and faced more intense international trade competition. But, with high standards of education, which enhanced the quality of Taiwan’s human resources, and its entrance into such areas as computers and electronics, Taiwan had—or appeared to have—a comparative advantage globally in knowledge-intensive industries.61 Government planners, therefore, favored the computer and other knowledge-intensive businesses. Meanwhile, Taiwan accumulated valuable experience in selling in the global marketplace. The quality of Taiwan-made products rose quickly in the late 1980s and early 1990s as the government began to promote Taiwan’s best companies, aimed at building an international reputation for its high-quality products. Taiwan thus became increasingly conscious of the need for quality control standards for its export products, even prohibiting the sale abroad of what it deemed inferior products. Innovation was also crucial, and government policies shifted accordingly.62 The government, meanwhile, encouraged the growth of financial services companies and sought to make Taiwan a regional distribution hub. Government planners, working with business and labor, continued to attract foreign capital and expertise. It put more money into education as well as research and development (double-digit or near double-digit increases), kept taxes low (13 percent of GDP, compared to 30 percent in the United States and much higher figures in Europe), helped build a good infrastructure (especially roads and railroads), wisely regulated banking and financial institutions, and maintained social and political stability. Together, these efforts earned Taiwan a favored position among analysts who ranked countries for investment potential and risk.63

Key Industries and the Taiwan “Economic Miracle” A brief survey of Taiwan’s successful industries—including those that played a major role during the import-substitution policy period, then during Taiwan’s export-led economic growth policy, and later during its efforts to move to upmarket and into capital- and knowledge-intensive production—sheds considerable light on the origins and nature of Taiwan’s economic miracle. Some industries were important only in the past during certain phases of Taiwan’s economic history; others became, and remain, cutting-edge and world leaders.

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For a number of years, textiles constituted Taiwan’s largest industry measured by both the value of production and employment. Taiwan got its start with two textile mills at the end of World War II. By 1962, 1,500 mills were operating on the island employing 60,000 workers virtually all in the private sector.64 The industry was helped both by import-substitution and exportpromotion policies. Later the industry was hurt by high labor costs; however, for a number of reasons it remained viable. Meanwhile the industry became highly integrated and factories that produced basic ingredients such as cloth moved offshore. Also production was automated. Taiwan specialized in highend products, while most of the rest of the industry linked up with other producers including those in China.65 Beginning in the 1960s, the electrical equipment and electronics industries appeared to have bright futures, and did. In fact, these industries blossomed, beginning with electric fans, integrated circuits and other labor-intensive products. As labor costs escalated, factories went upscale to produce household appliances, communications equipment and consumer electronics. In a few years, Taiwan became a major producer of radios, tape recorders, televisions, videocassette recorders, stereo equipment, calculators and video games, not to mention parts and accessories and electrical equipment.66 Information products (mostly computer products) followed and saw the fastest growth of any sector of Taiwan’s economy. Taiwan soon ranked number one in global market share for the production of liquid crystal monitors, motherboards and notebook computers. In 2006, sales amounted to $88.6 billion. And although a large share of Taiwan’s production was for foreign companies, Taiwan’s own brands, such as Acer, took a growing market share (especially in Third World countries). Related to its success in manufacturing computers was its semiconductor industry. Taiwan established two of the world’s largest contract semiconductor companies—Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Ltd. and United Microelectronics Corporation. The value of chips and related products produced in Taiwan in 2006 was $37.2 billion.67 But many of Taiwan’s electronics, computer hardware and chip factories subsequently moved to China because of high labor costs in Taiwan. Also many moved due to the attraction of China’s huge market. These industries are now highly specialized and fit into global production chains in which Taiwan became linked with other countries, especially China. Taiwan became proportionally more involved in research and design, with many of its factories producing hardware in China instead of at home. In fact, it has been estimated that by the early years of the new century, 85 percent of Taiwan’s information and communications hardware was manufactured outside of the island, mostly in China.68 The petrochemical industry in Taiwan became promising beginning in the 1970s. Government planners saw that Taiwan had a comparative advantage in making petrochemical products. Twenty years later, Taiwan became one of the world’s largest producers of petrochemicals and the world leader in

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ethylene production.69 In 2006, the total value of production of its petrochemical factories was $39.1 billion. Taiwan’s petrochemical companies not only exported but also produced for domestic use by providing the ingredients for plastics, synthetic rubber, textiles and more. Plastics, in fact, for some time was one of Taiwan’s strongest industries. Plastics went into many of the goods Taiwan exported. Rising labor costs and environmental problems, as well as public protest against new factories, however, confronted the petrochemical industry with serious problems and many factories moved; new ones were built elsewhere, especially in China. Production in Taiwan declined from the early-2000s, though some of Taiwan’s companies have been doing well in China.70 In the late 1970s, Taiwan got into the production of steel, opening a blast furnace in 1977. In fact, it was one of the world’s most efficient.71 The decision seemed questionable for a time because of tough competition in the world market, especially from much larger Japanese steel plants. Initially, the only customer of any importance was Taiwan’s China Shipbuilding Corporation, which was not a growth company. But Taiwan’s China Steel Corporation also built offshore drilling platforms (though this market did not expand at the time) and moved into ship breaking for scrap iron (which did grow). Both aided Taiwan’s steel industry, as did the rise of the Japanese yen. Subsequently, the auto industry and shipbuilding saw better growth, providing markets for Taiwan’s steel. Recently exports have accounted for most of Taiwan’s steel production. Vietnam, China and the United States are the main markets. Steel production peaked in 2014 and has levelled off since.72 At the time Tsai Ing-wen was elected president in 2016, Taiwan was the world’s 13th-largest exporter of steel exporting 3 percent of the world’s total. But this was but one-sixth of China that was the world’s largest exporter. That year China had Taiwan barred from a steel industry event in Europe and subsequently Taiwan’s exports dropped off, by 1 percent in 2017 and more in 2018.73 It appeared that Taiwan’s steel industry needed good relations with China. Meanwhile, Taiwan’s production of aluminium, copper and other metals grew, spurred by the growth of an aviation industry and extensive building construction.74 In subsequent years, Taiwan’s metal industries remained healthy, in large part because they went upscale and diversified. Still they suffered from higher labor costs, a more expensive Taiwan dollar, foreign competition and environmental concerns. Taiwan launched a shipbuilding industry in the 1970s. In 1973, it completed a dockyard that had a capacity of 1.6 million tons of construction and 2.5 million tons in repairs. But the timing was bad because of a surplus of tankers and other ships on the world market at the time. Then, in the 1980s, Taiwan’s shipbuilding industry was hit by a global decline in fishing fleets and foreign competition. As a result, China Shipbuilding Corporation was not profitable for some years. Consequently, it diverted a considerable amount of its productive capacity to nuclear power plant equipment, steel structures and

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the like. Meanwhile, Taiwan developed a world-class yacht industry. But in the 1980s and after, the yacht industry fell on hard times as the U.S. market contracted and the Taiwan currency appreciated.75 In 2016, new ship construction was announced as part of the Tsai administration’s defense industry that included force modernization projects for the Navy worth $14.7 billion. Specific items included an Aegis destroyer, frigates, submarines, high-speed minelayers, corvettes and an assault vehicle and other weapons. Critics questioned the decision since building the Aegis ship depended on technology from the United States while building submarines is something Taiwan had talked about since 2001 but had done little and the local design faced serious challenges. Also building even eight (the top number cited) seemed too expensive while some said they would have little utility against China’s more than 50. The effort, which extends into the future to 2040, will be likely subject to changes or even a cancellation by any future administration.76 In 1953, an automobile industry was launched in Taiwan; but overprotection prevented it from becoming competitive enough to export. Beginning in the mid-1980s, with a local buying boom, auto production increased markedly, although most of this came from foreign companies operating factories in Taiwan. In 2006, the value of auto production was $14.5 billion. Foreign companies controlled Taiwan’s auto production: Toyota, 28 percent; China Motor Corporation (which also markets Mitsubishi cars in Taiwan), 10.9 percent; Nissan, 9.6 percent, Honda, 7.7 percent.77 That situation remains. Meanwhile, Taiwan became a world leader in car parts, motorcycles and bicycles. In the 1980s, the island, for a while, became the world’s largest manufacturer of bicycles.78 A number of other industries are worth mentioning for their role in the Taiwan economic miracle and/or for their promise of future growth. In the 1980s, Taiwan experienced a quite impressive expansion in the production of telecommunication equipment, precision tools, optical machines and supplies, and sporting and fitness goods. At this time the construction business boomed because of higher standards of living, which led many people to seek better housing, and owing to the nation’s ambitious public works projects. Less strong were food processing, tobacco, alcoholic beverages, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, rubber products, cement, glass products, nonferrous metals, wood products and paper products. Tourism also became a major industry. Among these industries Taiwan has seen moderate success, except for tourism that has done quite well though it is dependent on good relations with China.79 During the Ma presidency the government announced supporting six “emerging industries.” They were biotechnology (including R&D, drug testing and a biotech incubation center), tourism (especially high-end tourism), green energy (photovoltaics, LED lighting, wind energy, hydrogen fuel cells), medical care (medical tourism, long-term care, improving rural care), highend agriculture (organic farming and agri-tourism), and cultural and creative industries (filmmaking, pop music, new designs in entertainment). Some

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special projects included computerizing government agencies, building electric vehicles, promoting green architecture (integrating electronics and computers into construction) and patent commercialization.80 The government pledged to rely mainly on private investment to start new industries thus respecting free-market economics. Taiwan’s planners also spoke of “five pillars” of its economic planning for the future: attracting foreign talent, boosting higher education, ensuring energy security, promoting industrial innovation and implementing trade liberalization.81

The Labor Force Labor deserves special attention for its role in the Taiwan economic miracle; after all, Taiwan has almost no natural resources of commercial value. Its only resource of any importance is its human talent. The expansion of the workforce was, in the early years after World War II, an especially important factor in the country’s economic growth. Because of Taiwan’s rapid population increases between the early 1950s and the early 1970s, the labor pool more than doubled. Employment thus rose from 2.89 million in 1953 to 5.5 million in 1974. By 1987, it had reached eight million. The percentage of the population in the workforce—58.07 percent of those over age 15 and below 65—was high by international standards. In this category, Taiwan was on par with Western nations.82 The skills and education levels of Taiwan’s workers were impressive, particularly relative to labor costs. In fact, this was a critical factor driving the nation’s competitiveness and its rapid economic growth. Even more important, the labor skills and the education levels of workers increased at rapid rates and evolved according to the changing needs of the economy. In addition, worker flexibility, including the willingness to change jobs or acquire new skills, was high.83 As a result of the success of Taiwan’s industrialization there was naturally a huge shift of employment from agriculture to industry and to services. In 1952, the mix was 52.1 percent agriculture, 20.8 percent industry and 27.7 percent services; in 1962, the percentages were 45.9, 22.5 and 31.6, respectively; and in 1972, 33.0, 32.1 and 34.8 percent. By 1988, the number of employees in agriculture had shrunk dramatically. Meanwhile, industry’s portion had increased to 41.5 percent and services to 40.9 percent. By the 1990s, most new jobs were being generated in the service sector.84 Meanwhile, unemployment, in double-digit figures in the 1950s, dropped markedly from the 1960s on. During the economic crisis of the early 1970s, Taiwan boasted the lowest unemployment rate in the world.85 During the 1980s and early 1990s, the rate hovered below 2 percent and was among the lowest in the world. The Asian financial crisis, which started in mid-1997, caused it to increase a bit, though it remained below 3 percent. In fact, many companies complained of difficulties in hiring and retaining workers and sought to solve these problems by increasing automation, transplanting factories to other countries and hiring foreign workers.86

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However, as a result of the 2001 recession, the next year Taiwan’s rate of unemployment exceeded 5 percent and remained above 4 percent for the next three years. It spiked again in 2008, rising to more than 5 percent in 2009 after which it plateaued; in 2012, it was 4 percent.87 Since then the unemployment rate has been below 4 percent, which is not high by most standards. But it was high among the youth (below age 25); in 2018, it was above 11 percent.88 This prompted many young people to seek jobs elsewhere, especially in China where they do not have a language problem and where they could look for jobs with large international companies that had no presence in Taiwan. In the 1950s, wages in Taiwan increased with economic growth, especially for unskilled workers, who early in that decade earned around $5 to $10 monthly. Salaries rose very quickly in the mid-1960s and on. In 1985, the average monthly income for workers in eight primary industries was $368 per month. In 1999, it was $1,263 per month; it was $1,421 for service workers.89 Clearly the days of cheap labor were gone and Taiwan’s business community had to adjust to higher labor costs. Labor saving methods and equipment, increased specialization, and better labor organization helped increase productivity, which offset some of the increases in labor costs. In addition, labor and management both realized that labor costs had to be kept from increasing too quickly if many of Taiwan’s products were to remain competitive in the international marketplace. In order to adjust to rising labor costs, the government pressured businesses to invest in research and development and to phase out labor-intensive production. But more than anything, Taiwan shifted production to China; it did this more than other countries because its economy depended so much on trade and it was easy to use Chinese labor.90 The quality of labor, however, remained high in Taiwan, and the labor force hardworking. In the early 2000s, the average worker put in nearly 200 hours per month (196.8 hours in the industrial sector and 183.7 in the service sector)—which was high even compared to other East Asian countries.91 Many economists said the Confucian ethic of “work hard and don’t complain” made labor a positive contributor to Taiwan’s economic miracle and explained why Taiwan’s labor force was considered one of the finest in the world. At the time Taiwan’s workforce was rated third in the world for quality.92 There are a host of other reasons for labor’s positive contribution to the economy both past and present, such as labor laws, labor organizations and government regulations. During the early period of Taiwan’s rapid industrialization, workers were generally not organized. The formation of labor unions was discouraged—actually pre-empted—by the government and the ruling Nationalist Party. Strikes were forbidden under martial law. Later, labor unions in Taiwan did not wield much clout compared to their counterparts in most Western countries, the main reason being that a large portion of the labor force was employed in small or family businesses.93 Also, many

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workers worked in factories that sold to large foreign companies. Workers in these factories had little bargaining power. Much changed in the 1980s and after. When martial law was lifted in 1987, workers became more active. Within a year, new unions began to organize and compete with the government-controlled Chinese Federation of Labor. Soon, nearly 1,200 industrial unions and 2,400 craft guilds had formed.94 Subsequently, new laws were written to cover bargaining, strikes and other issues. Partly because of the existence of numerous competing labor organizations, but for a variety of other reasons, labor did not become a supporter of a particular political party. In late 1987, the Labor Party formed to represent workers; in March 1989, the Workers Party was founded. Both failed. The DPP made numerous appeals to labor groups and took up workers’ causes, yet most workers viewed the DPP as too preoccupied with Taiwan’s independence and other ideological issues. The KMT was seen as pro-business, though it had and continued to enjoy some labor support; but this did not grow. It seemed likely labor would remain uncommitted to any political party. Though labor was not as active or as militant as it is in most other countries, the rate of union membership was high. Unionized workers came to constitute more than a third of union-qualified labor. This percentage was around triple the United States and much higher than Japan and other East Asian countries. If labor organizations were defined broadly to include all kinds of workers’ groups, such as craft guilds and other such organizations, over half of Taiwan’s labor force was organized. However, the reason for the high rate of union participants was that legislation required it in factories employing more than a small number of workers. Thus most workers considered union membership pro forma and the main benefit of membership was labor insurance rather than bargaining strength through organization.95 Workers in Taiwan have been guaranteed the right to negotiate, organize and strike. In 2010, the legislature amended a labor law to allow teachers to unionize and, subsequent to that, caregivers. At this time people began to complain that unionization was too encompassing and that in some cases compulsory membership was an infringement on workers’ rights.96 Meanwhile, the fast expansion of cross-Strait trade and Taiwan joining the WTO in 2002 pounded Taiwan’s traditional manufacturing. At that time, it appeared the state of unions and unionization would not see positive change in the future. In 2017, a survey of Taiwan’s unions showed the major concerns were, in order, low wages, inadequate retirement provisions and the meagre benefits of company unions. This represented a shift from 2000 when the main concerns were foreign workers, union independence and low pay. The causes for the change were said to be neoliberal globalization and the resultant increase in corporate power plus the closing of factories and with that the demise of many company unions. This gave rise to more support for industrial unions, which appeared to be a trend in Taiwan.97

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If labor organizations do not tell the whole story, the status and conditions of workers and government laws and regulations to help workers say more. In 1945, the government of the Republic of China brought with it to Taiwan laws and regulations that affected labor. Subsequently many more laws were passed into law. In 1958, the legislature enacted the Labor Insurance Act. The most important piece of legislation involving working conditions, however, went into effect in 1984: the Labor Standards Act. It provided comprehensive guarantees and rights to workers and defined many unclear provisions in labor-management relations. Later, the government expanded the coverage of the Labor Standards Law to include contracts, wages, work hours, leave and more.98 The legislature also amended the Labor Standards Act to add details on the workweek, paid annual leave and overtime and tried to resolve some controversial issues involving labor-management relations in the context of stagnant wages, economic inequity and more. However, neither workers nor businesses were satisfied with the results.99 In 2017 and 2018, the Labor Standards Act was amended to add details regarding the structure of the workweek, paid annual leave and to fix some problems. Again, neither business nor labor was satisfied with the results.100 The legislature, in the meantime, enacted the Employment Insurance Act that provides pay for workers who are unemployed—60 percent of their salary for up to 12 months. In 1994, the law-making body of government passed the Labor Safety and Health Law, which regulates hazardous jobs, and the Sexual Harassment Prevention Act aimed to prevent bad behavior toward the opposite sex on the job.101 The subsequently enacted Labor Pension Act and the National Pension Act provided for retirement benefits for workers.102 In 1992, the Employment Services Act legalized the employment of foreign workers in Taiwan. This law was needed due to a shrinking labor force caused by a slowdown in the birth rate for more than two decades. Also, more people were pursuing advanced education and thus staying out of the labor force for extended periods. As a result, the number of foreign workers recruited by employers in Taiwan soared; by 2001 it reached 325,000, or 3.3 percent of the workforce. Some 54 percent were employed in manufacturing and 11 percent in construction. There were also many foreign workers in the nursing and caretaking fields, and many more worked as maids. Most of Taiwan’s foreign workers came from Thailand (43 percent), Indonesia (27 percent), the Philippines (26 percent) and Vietnam (3 percent). A significant number of foreign workers came from several other countries, notably China, and were employed in Taiwan illegally.103 Most labor organizations opposed foreign workers for fear they would depress wages. Members of the DPP expressed concern that workers from China would alter the ethnic balance in Taiwan. During the 2000 election campaign, presidential candidate Chen Shui-bian promised to cut the number of foreign workers. The following year, his administration reduced the figure by 15,000 immediately and promised to cut by 5 percent more yearly after

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that. Nevertheless, later foreign workers increased in numbers, reaching 367,119 by April 2008, up 5.75 percent from a year earlier. The largest percentage was from Indonesia. Most were employed in industry, followed by caregiving and construction.104 After the 2016 election the new government of President Tsai Ing-wen announced the New Southbound Policy; this caused the number of foreign workers in Taiwan from Southeast Asia to increase markedly. In 2018, the number was said to be 670,000. While the workers were desperately needed, they created problems. It was reported that between 3 and 4 percent fled each year and that there were 50,000 “escapees” that were unaccounted for.105 That year, several thousand protested in downtown Taipei demanding that domestic caregivers be protected by the Labor Standards Act, that workers should be allowed to change jobs freely and the government get rid of the private employment brokerage system.106 Amendments were proposed to the Employment Services Act to change the manner of fines imposed on employers who violate the law, banning holding identification cards and punishing sexual assault. Still serious problems, even murders of migrant workers, remained.107

Trade, Investments and Energy Foreign trade, foreign investments and imported energy are three special factors that help explain not only the nature of Taiwan’s economy but also problems it faced and the successes and/or failures it has reaped in handling them. Hence the three deserve special attention. Although Taiwan traditionally, though sporadically, engaged in foreign commerce, the growth of trade over the past six-plus decades has been momentous by any standard. In 1953, Taiwan’s imports and exports totalled only $320 million. Trade began to increase very rapidly in the late 1950s and especially, in the early 1960s, with the launching of Taiwan’s export-oriented growth policy. In fact, trade grew at the astounding rate of more than 22 percent a year from 1959 to 1965 at which time it reached an annual value of more than $1 billion. It grew to $3 billion by 1970.108 Not only did Taiwan’s industrialization and its up-scaling production further accelerate exports, but both caused the value of exports to continue to skyrocket. By 1984, two-way trade totalled $52.4 billion; Taiwan thus became the tenth-largest exporting nation in the world and the 15th-largest trading nation. And the boom continued: in 2010, the value of Taiwan’s trade exceeded $526 billion.109 Clearly, Taiwan’s trade growth was by design. Having almost no resources and facing a serious population-to-land ratio handicap, the government early on calculated that Taiwan had to trade to survive. When the nation’s importsubstitution policy of the 1950s was abandoned in favor of an export-led growth strategy, foreign commerce became even more crucial to Taiwan’s economic health, something almost everyone in Taiwan knew. Anyway, conditions were favorable to exporting. The surplus of well-trained laborers

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meant that the economy could easily grow by marketing Taiwan-produced goods abroad. Another relevant factor was that Taiwan was burdened by foreign debt and it needed more foreign capital to pay down the debt but also to improve infrastructure and build new factories. Taiwan’s economic planners clearly anticipated economic benefits through specializing and selling in the global marketplace and maintaining a favorable trade balance to increase foreign exchange holdings and keep employment up. They also perceived that certain of Taiwan’s industries were globally competitive and that more such enterprises could be built.110 There were still other considerations. Being small with a limited domestic market trade was especially essential. By the 1980s, Taiwan’s imports and exports amounted to more than 85 percent of its GNP (compared to Japan’s 30 percent). Taiwan exported well over half of what it produced. Moreover, because most of its exports—over 75 percent—went to developed Western countries, Taiwan became very sensitive to the trade and other policies of the capitalist industrial nations, particularly of the United States and Japan, which, in the late 1980s, accounted for more than 40 and 30 percent, respectively, of Taiwan’s foreign trade.111 The scope and the direction of Taiwan’s trade by the 1970s, and even more clearly by the 1980s, might have set off alarm bells had economic planners in Taipei believed in “dependency theory.” Elsewhere economic planners, especially in Third World nations, were apprehensive about tying their trade to Western nations, thinking they would lose control over their economies and that Western countries would impede their economic development. But Taiwan’s planners did not think this way. Instead they calculated that participating in international trade was much more of an advantage than a disadvantage; so, they did almost precisely what some critics said was potentially ruinous. A number of economists subsequently argued that Taiwan, by directing such a large portion of its exports to Western countries and benefiting from doing so, disproved dependency theory.112 In fact, Taiwan experienced quite a different set of problems. Its exports found so many customers in America that Taiwan soon developed a large and controversial trade surplus with the United States. This surplus grew throughout the 1970s and 1980s—peaking at $16 billion in 1987. In response, the United States ended special concessionary tariffs for Taiwan under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). In a few cases, the United States took legal actions against Taiwan for dumping. In response, Taipei adopted measures to cut its trade surplus with the United States: sending buying missions, limiting or even banning the purchase of certain goods from other countries, and giving U.S. exporters various kinds of preferences.113 In contrast, Taiwan had a big deficit in its trade with Japan—its secondlargest trading partner. Taiwan took various steps to increase its exports to and cut imports from Japan, though these measures had only marginal success. Trade with other Asian countries, excluding Japan, accounted for about

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15 percent of Taiwan’s foreign trade in the 1970s and 1980s, with neither surpluses nor deficits constituting serious problems. Western Europe accounted for 10 percent of Taiwan’s foreign commerce, and the Middle East another 10 percent, largely from oil purchases. Taiwan carried a trade surplus with most Western European countries and a deficit with Middle Eastern countries.114 In the 1980s, Taiwan began trading with Eastern European Communist countries and the Soviet Union, though this trade did not become economically significant. Taiwan also began trading with China, indirectly (largely through Hong Kong). Taiwan’s China trade soon skyrocketed, with exports leading imports by a huge margin. By the early 1990s, the Mainland became a big market for Taiwan. Soon, China was competing with the United States as a market, and by 2000 Taiwan’s exports to the two were almost the same.115 After that, Taiwan’s exports to China grew even faster. In fact, the growth of cross-Strait trade was truly phenomenal. Growing from 1 percent of Taiwan’s exports in 1984 it expanded to 20 percent by the new century and to over 30 percent by 2010.116 Several factors accounted for the rapid growth of trade across the Taiwan Strait. First, Taiwan’s products had a particularly good reputation in China for their quality and style. Second, beginning in the early 1980s, Beijing encouraged the purchase of Taiwan-made products and exempted them from tariffs by labelling them “domestic,” though this policy was later revised because of the excessive demand for Taiwan-made goods and a shortage of foreign exchange in China. Third, Chinese economic planners noted that Taiwan’s trade surplus with China provided Taiwan’s companies with profits, which they invested in China; thus, to China the trade deficit with Taiwan did not really matter. Fourth, Taipei took the position that although trade with China was illegal, it was not practical to try to control where its products were sold. Hence, exports remained primarily indirect but continued to grow. Taipei, meanwhile, allowed imports from China, but only through third countries.117 Trade with China went on to boom. By 2002, China had become Taiwan’s largest export market, and by 2006, its sales to China far exceeded that to any other country. By 2010, exports to China were almost four-fold exports to the United States or Europe. Japan and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) followed in rank as Taiwan’s biggest export markets. Taiwan’s imports, in order, came from Japan, China, the ASEAN countries,, the European Union and the United States.118 It was truly mind-boggling how quickly and to what degree China became important to Taiwan economically. In fact, this situation became of grave concern to some in Taiwan, especially those that advocated an independent Taiwan and who feared trade with China would lead to “ties that bind.” This was natural not only because of the volume of trade, but the uneven nature of the relationship. The data reveal the scope of what lay behind this issue. Between 1990, when crossStrait trade blossomed, and 2014, China’s GDP grew by more than 20-fold;

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Taiwan’s grew by three-fold. In 1990, China’s economy was but double Taiwan’s; by 2014, it was 18 times larger. China’s global trade meanwhile grew to seven times Taiwan’s. Thus Taiwan’s comparative advantage in trade vis-à-vis China diminished.119 On the other hand China allowed the balance of trade to favor Taiwan for political reasons. Anyway, this in large part explains the unease associated with Taiwan–China trade that will be discussed in greater length at the end of this chapter. Another relevant factor when dissecting Taiwan’s economy is that the kinds of products Taiwan exported changed dramatically. In 1952, industrial goods accounted for only 8 percent of Taiwan’s foreign sales; agricultural products were Taiwan’s main export category. Within a decade or so, manufactured goods accounted for over 90 percent of Taiwan’s total foreign sales. Then the portion of capital-intensive, high-tech and knowledge-intensive products in the manufactured goods category increased as Taiwan’s exporters went upmarket. Soon Taiwan’s main exports were electronics, precision instruments, plastic and rubber products, chemicals, machinery, and iron and steel products. Meanwhile a large share of Taiwan’s exports became part of networking chains that included many nations, but especially China. In 2010, its companies operating in China filled more than half of Taiwan’s export orders.120 In fact, in recent years the direction of Taiwan’s trade, especially its exports, has again changed. It has changed markedly. In the 1970s, the United States was Taiwan’s largest trading partner, followed by Japan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (the latter two because of Taiwan’s large imports of oil).121 In 2018, 74.7 percent of Taiwan’s exports went to other Asian countries, while only 13.1 percent were sent to North America, 9.2 percent to European importers, 1.1 percent to Latin America (excluding Mexico) and only 0.6 percent to Africa.122 Of the new Asia emphasis in Taiwan’s trade, China accounted for the biggest increases. In 2017, notwithstanding the tension between Taiwan and China following the 2016 election, trade increased by a significant 17.6 percent while Taiwan’s exports grew by 20.4 percent.123 During part of Taiwan’s period of fast economic growth, capital inputs, mostly from large quantities of foreign investment, facilitated this expansion. In the 1950s, Taiwan’s main source of foreign capital was U.S. economic assistance. Later, Taiwan attracted foreign firms and private investors that provided large sums of needed capital. Most foreign funds went into manufacturing; indeed, close to 10 percent of investment in companies in the manufacturing sector came from foreign sources during the 1960s and 1970s—a very high figure when compared to the percentages in other developing countries. And this made a mark: in 1979, 795 foreign firms accounted for more than 8 percent of Taiwan’s GNP. At this time, the exports of foreign firms accounted for 20 percent of its exports.124 Foreign investors contributed to Taiwan’s economic growth in still another important way, namely, by facilitating technology imports. Non-local firms brought new production techniques to Taiwan while stimulating research and

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providing training for workers. Because Taiwan’s educational system was geared toward training young people to learn new technologies, the rate of technology absorption and use was high and this facilitated Taiwan’s rapid growth. Among less-developed nations, for some years Taiwan enjoyed the world’s highest proportion of growth through the addition of new technologies.125 Government policies were in large part responsible for the large inputs of foreign investment. Legislation made foreign companies beneficiaries of lower, or no, taxation. Government agencies recruited and trained workers for external investors. In the meantime, foreign firms benefited from Taiwan’s EPZs, which, as noted earlier, afforded foreign companies freedom from taxes and many regulations. Finally, private businesses in Taiwan often sought foreign partners and usually worked well with them. In 1995, when foreigners were allowed to invest in Taiwan’s stock market, considerable funds flowed in from abroad. During the Asian economic crisis that began in 1997, Taiwan’s stable economy caused it to attract capital from other countries in the region. In 2006, foreign investment in Taiwan was almost $14 billion, and it reached $15 billion in 2007. Most of it came from offshore banking sources, the Netherlands, the United States, Singapore, Japan and the United Kingdom. The favorite areas of the economy attracting foreign capital were electronics, financial services and venture capital.126 However, at the turn of the century Taiwan became the recipient of much less foreign investment. In 2002, foreign direct investment in Taiwan dropped by 64 percent. The American Chamber of Commerce in Taiwan attributed this to poor cross-Strait relations, Taiwan’s growing debt and falling competitiveness.127 In 2015, inward investment dropped 16.09 percent to $4.8 billion.128 In 2017, it fell to $3.2 billion, blamed on speculative activities, rising housing prices, excessive bureaucracy and legislative obstacles.129 Meanwhile Taiwan became a foreign investor in China. This began in 1987 when martial law was lifted. It reached $100 million by the end of the year involving 80 projects. By 1992 this grew to more than $5 billion involving more than 6,000 projects.130 In 2010, Taiwan’s outward investment totalled $15.05 billion, of which more than 80 percent went to China. Electronics and information technology products were the big areas.131 Taiwan’s balance of trade and its accumulation of foreign currencies was also a factor in its economic development. Beginning in the 1970s, Taiwan began to have a favorable balance of trade. This and its high rate of savings made it possible for Taiwan to accumulate large amounts of foreign exchange. As of mid-2012, Taiwan was the world’s fourth-largest holder of foreign exchange (after China, Japan and Russia).132 Its large reserves of capital meant that the government did not have to pay interest or the principle on debt and could keep taxes low, which were advantages in terms of competing in global trade, increasing its research and development, and the government encouraging and supporting entrepreneurship. In 2018, Taiwan’s foreign exchange reached $457 billion giving it a ranking of sixth in the world (behind China, Japan, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia and

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Russia). Most of this was attained through a trade surplus, mainly with China. As might be deduced from Taiwan’s economic success and the rapid rise of living standards that has accompanied it, Taiwan has been a fast growing energy consumer. From 1954 through 1985, energy consumption increased at an average rate of 9.2 percent per year—growing faster toward the end of the period. Subsequent increases in energy were also large. As a consequence of its growing consumption of energy, combined with limited indigenous supplies, Taiwan became a major importer of energy. In the mid-1950s, Taiwan produced more than 80 percent of the energy it used. Cheap hydroelectric power helped the growth of industry. However, by the late 1960s, only half of Taiwan’s energy was derived locally. In 1972, that amount fell to 34 percent.134 Now Taiwan imports more than 98 percent of its energy.135 Consequently, Taiwan is extremely dependent on foreign energy sources. There were consequent problems. After the oil crisis in 1973, and again in 1978, energy costs soared and uncertainty about supplies caused anxiety for economic planners as well as the business community in Taiwan. Moreover, Taiwan could not do much about the quantity of energy it imported. Its coalmines could not increase production; in fact, most were closed. Taiwan found some natural gas and petroleum, but further exploration yielded disappointing commercial results. Hence Taiwan’s situation of energy importdependency persisted. On the other hand, the government was quite successful in diversification. From the early 1970s, Taiwan imported large quantities of oil, its main source of energy, from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Those countries remained the main suppliers for Taiwan; in fact, 80 percent of its supply came from the Middle East. After the oil crisis, Taiwan began buying petroleum from Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, several Latin American countries, the United States (Alaska) and some other countries. It also began buying coal. During the 1950s and until the mid-1960s, the use of coal had declined rapidly accounting for only 13 percent of the total energy used in 1979. Then, owing to better burning techniques, Taiwan began importing a considerable amount of coal, and suppliers were not generally the same countries from which Taiwan purchased oil: the United States, Australia, Canada, South Africa and China. Taiwan also began importing liquid natural gas, mostly from Indonesia. In 2011, petroleum accounted for 49 percent, coal 32.1 percent and natural gas 10.2 percent of Taiwan’s energy use.136 Meanwhile, in the late 1970s, Taiwan became a user of nuclear power. The first plant was opened in 1978. Later, with the building of more nuclear plants, Taiwan became a major consumer of nuclear power. Taiwan had six nuclear units (in three plants) that by 2012 produced 17 percent of the nation’s electricity. A fourth nuclear plant was under construction. However, as a result of the nuclear power plant accident in Japan in 2011, opposition to nuclear power grew fast in Taiwan. President Ma pledged to apply new safety equipment and standards to the new plant and phase out the older plants.

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Thus the future of nuclear power in Taiwan at this juncture appeared questionable.137 In the 1980s, Taiwan began to experiment with solar, wind and thermal power. The government also pushed conservation. In 2010, Taiwan ranked number three in the world in per capita solar energy use. That year green energy accounted for 6.8 percent of Taiwan’s energy consumption and generated $10.97 billion in production value. At that time the government planned to invest $838 million in renewable energy promotion and $635 million in research and development.138 Taiwan’s energy use has also changed markedly over the years. As the industrial sector became a major part of Taiwan’s economy, it was the consumer of the lion’s share of energy. In 1972, it took 61 percent of the nation’s energy. This proportion subsequently declined with Taiwan’s economy shifting to less energy-intensive and more knowledge-intensive enterprises and to a service economy. Industry’s share of energy use by the turn of the century was around 58.7 percent. Meanwhile, transportation’s share rose from 8 percent in 1972 to 15.5 percent. Agriculture dropped from 4 percent to 1 percent during that same period, while residential use rose from 9 percent to 12 percent, and commercial use from 2 to 11.1 percent.139 In 2015, the mix for consumption was: industry, 37.19 percent; service, 11.07 percent; residential, 10.72 percent; transportation, 11.94 percent; the energy sector’s own use, 6.61 percent; non-energy use (such as asphalt), 21.55 percent; agriculture, 0.92 percent.140 The main sources of energy were: petroleum (48 percent), coal (29 percent), natural gas (13 percent), nuclear and renewables (9.1percent). Of the renewables the largest in order were: hydro power (39.6 percent), solar (33.5 percent), wind (13.1 percent), waste (11.9 percent) and biomass (1.8 percent).141 Although both Taiwan and China were (and are) energy deficient and imported large quantities of energy, there was room for cooperation between the two. Taiwan started importing a significant amount of coal from China and it became its third-largest supplier. Taiwan had more experience in civilian nuclear power use and could help China. There was also hope for cooperative efforts to develop potential oil and gas reserves in the Taiwan Strait and near the Senkaku Islands. In fact, China invited Taiwan to invest in and work on China’s exploration and the development of its offshore areas. Finally, China had become one of the world’s most advanced nations in the use of wind and solar energy. Taiwan could benefit from links with China in these areas. In 2008, the government announced a plan to increase renewable energy to 8 percent of Taiwan’s total usage (from less than 1 percent). In 2009, Taipei took steps to expand cooperation with China to accomplish this.

The Economy Under Chen Shui-bian, Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen As noted earlier, Taiwan’s economic growth slowed in the 1990s. This was due largely to its economy maturing. Growth was still impressive compared to the

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rest of the world and Taiwan continued to do well through the “Asian meltdown” of 1997–98 that hit hard several Southeast Asian countries and South Korea. However, big changes and the transition to slow to moderate growth came with three administrations that governed Taiwan beginning in 2000. That year Chen Shui-bian was elected president. The next year, in 2001, Taiwan’s economy fell into recession. The proximate cause was the Chen administration’s fight with the opposition parties over the construction of Taiwan’s fourth nuclear plant, which President Chen and the DPP opposed but the legislature had already approved. The opposition won the fight and President Chen’s image was hurt with the business community, which worried about future energy supplies. Chen’s critics charged him with poor leadership and mismanagement of economic affairs. Alas Chen and his party had meagre talent in running a national economy. They were mostly trained in law and local politics. Chen said the economic downturn was caused by the world recession that had adversely affected high-tech industries, and the opposition stubbornly blocking his economic agenda; he was partly right.142 In any case, by the end of the year, the stock market had lost 50 percent of its value, defaults on loans reached new highs and private investment fell dramatically as capital fled to China (triple the amount a year earlier) where the business climate was better. The Council for Economic Planning and Development reported that Taiwan’s “economic fitness index” had fallen ten points to the lowest point since it had begun keeping records.143 By midyear, the stock market had fallen by another 40 percent and unemployment topped 400,000, or 4 percent of the workforce (both 40-year highs). The media reported that the business community lacked confidence in the Chen administration and many people with skills chose to leave Taiwan. Most went to China. “China fever” (investing and/or doing business in China) in Taiwan, it was reported, was 50 to 80 times what it was in Japan and the United States. By year-end, unemployment rose to 5 percent and the GNP contracted by 2 percent.144 In response, the government took funds from the National Stabilization Fund and labor insurance and pension reserves to prop up the stock market, adding NT$350 billion to the national debt. The Chen administration pressured banks to help companies facing bankruptcy; this diverted funds that otherwise would have been available to help start-up companies and finance growth by healthy enterprises. The stock market and Taiwan’s currency fell further. The president then established the Economic Development Advisory Council to give him recommendations on fixing the economy, but many top business leaders refused to participate, citing the poisonous political atmosphere at the time while fearing that Chen was seeking to pass blame for the situation.145 In 2002, the economy showed signs of recovering from the recession. But it did not perform up to the expectations of most residents. The GNP grew by only 3.5 percent, and unemployment remained high (for Taiwan) at 4 percent. The Chen administration tried various means to stimulate growth and

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employment. It cut taxes, which meant programs to help the poor had to be pared. The government sold state assets and increased fees and fines, sometimes to very high levels. This hurt the administration’s public image. Chen proposed making Taiwan a “gateway to China” for foreign business, but this idea failed to gain traction. Anyway, many in his party opposed the idea as it would mean expanding commercial relations with China, making Taiwan more dependent; former president Lee Teng-hui and Vice President Annette Lu both issued public warnings about economic reliance on China.146 In any event, China did not cooperate and promoted Shanghai as the place to operate from in doing business in China. The economy continued to grow, but slowly and at what citizens in Taiwan considered an anaemic rate. Unemployment, foreign investment and stock market figures did not provide evidence of a good recovery. The Chen administration continued borrowing to the point that public debt by the end of President Chen’s second term was 45 percent of the GNP—if hidden debt were counted, it was perhaps 90 percent.147 Chen administration critics cited bad economic news with regularity. For example, in 2002 Taiwan’s economy measured by the GNP was the 16th largest in the world, but in 2006 it ranked 22nd—dropping six places. During that same period, Taiwan declined from 30 percent of China’s economy to 18 percent. When Chen Shui-bian became president, South Korea’s per capita income was two-thirds of Taiwan’s; in 2006, South Korea was higher. In 2000, Kaohsiung was the second busiest port in Asia; six years later it ranked seventh.148 In early 2007, Bloomberg reported that Taiwan’s stock exchange had devalued 18.5 percent in U.S. dollars during President Chen’s tenure—the worst among 90 indexes it tracked. Shortly thereafter, the World Competitiveness Report showed Taiwan had dropped one place in the past year while China rose three slots—to pass Taiwan for the first time ever. Taiwan’s directorate general of Budget, Accounting and Statistics announced that the wages of workers increased 1.77 percent in 2007 the last year of the Chen presidency; this was below the rate of inflation. In other words, workers’ buying power had declined.149 When Ma Ying-jeou ran for president in 2008, he lured voters with talk of the KMT’s previous economic record and Ma’s plans to restore good economic growth. He assailed Chen’s stewardship of the economy. Alas President Chen and the DPP’s record on running the economy dismayed many voters. After Ma won the election, the stock market rose, as did Taiwan’s currency, housing values and other indicators. Observers expected Taiwan to see bright times again. But that was not to be. The global recession that year hit Taiwan hard. The economy contracted by more than 8 percent in the last quarter of the year, and for the year growth finished under 2 percent. This was followed by an even more serious economic downturn in 2009: economic output fell by 32 percent in 12 months causing Taiwan to suffer from the global economic crisis more than any of the 55 nations The Economist followed.150

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In response to the crisis, the government launched a $5.6 billion stimulus plan equal to 3 percent of Taiwan’s GDP. The plan included financial incentives to businesses and tax cuts. It provided funds for infrastructure, aid to small and medium-sized businesses and money for building low-cost housing. Vouchers were even given to residents to boost consumption. Government planners also helped exporters seeking new markets. The plan was implemented quickly and efficiently, and in the last half of 2009 the economy was in a fast recovery mode.151 In 2010, the economy saw very rapid growth, ending the year with 10.5 percent rise in the GDP—a figure higher than China. However, Taiwan’s economy slowed again in 2011 and 2012 because of the continued bad global economy, though Taiwan performed better than most countries including the United States, Europe and Japan, indicating Taiwan’s economic fundamentals were good and government planning was working.152 There was a special reason for optimism in Taiwan’s economic growth: in June 2010, Taiwan signed the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with China, which lowered tariffs on a number of products (most on Taiwan’s exports), allowed for more Chinese investment in Taiwan, raised the number of Chinese tourists permitted to visit Taiwan and broadened other commercial relations. The agreement also gave Taiwan greater opportunities for trade with Southeast Asia, China having reached an agreement with ASEAN countries in January that created the first stage of a China–ASEAN common market.153 Also the agreement, according to a respected U.S. economic think tank, would raise Taiwan’s GDP by 5.3 percent above what was otherwise expected.154 But ECFA generated concern in Taiwan of becoming economically (and ultimately politically) dangerously dependent on China. Then Ma’s opposition advanced this narrative quite effectively via its promoting populism and local nationalism. Networking and joining chains of production made this seem even more serious even though most countries in Southeast Asia and many elsewhere also worried about this. In any case, Taiwan had been through this dilemma with its deep commercial links with the United States in the past, and managed trade or protectionism did not seem to offer much in terms of a healthy economy. Further economic integration with China seemed inevitable. But the DPP put a different spin on this. They argued it would mean political ties leading to the loss of Taiwan’s sovereignty given the fact China claimed Taiwan was its possession.155 DPP activists organized public protest against the agreement and won their points: that it would not only risk Taiwan’s sovereignty but was the cause of economic inequities including the growing gaps between rich and poor, businesses with Chinese connections benefitting and those without (especially small businesses) not benefitting and the youth falling behind. Thus after the economy’s banner year of 2010, the GDP grew by just 3.8 percent in 2011. The next two years it saw barely over 2 percent increases. In 2014, the economy performed better with 4.02 percent GDP growth. However, in

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2015, the last full year of the Ma presidency, it fell to below 1 percent.156 Taking a final total GDP growth that included one year of negative growth (in 2009) and two years (2013 and 2014) of growth of barely 2 percent and one year of anaemic growth of less than 1 percent (2015), during the Ma years Taiwan’s economic growth was below the Chen years.157 Another problem was that economic data other than growth in the GDP were very nettlesome: a widening gap in incomes and net worth between rich and poor, stagnant wages, inflation, unaffordable housing (to many people), lack of good job opportunities, youth unemployment, a brain drain and more. Businesses complained of high taxes, too much regulation and obstacles to trade (especially with China). Young people who wanted better economic opportunities fled to China. In fact, these issues made many residents of Taiwan feel more pessimistic about the economy than the GDP figures suggested.158 Summing up the reasons for Taiwan’s poor economic performance during the Ma years, the following are important points: Ma became president during a prolonged global recession (which hit Taiwan hard, it being very dependent on exporting), globalization was hard on Taiwan (squeezing it between countries with lower labor costs and more developed countries with more advanced technology), WTO rules continued to damage certain sectors of Taiwan’s economy, competition with China accelerated (hurting Taiwan’s best industries), inward investment declined (though Taiwan did not lack capital this slowed the import of innovative ideas), political polarization stymied Ma’s plans to promote economic growth (especially the DPP’s opposition to Ma’s closer economic ties with China), lack of KMT party unity (especially the conflict between Ma and Wang Jin-pyng, Speaker of the legislature), the DPP’s effective use of populism (which made economic inequities a much bigger issue than usual) and high taxes and overregulation (that put Taiwan at a disadvantage in competing with other nations at a similar level of development, such as South Korea).159 In 2016, President Tsai and the DPP assumed power after a big election victory early in the year. The economy had been a campaign issue; in fact, it was a major one. Moreover, it clearly contributed to a big win for Tsai and her party largely because of the bad performance of the Ma administration in the months prior to voting day and the fact voters perceived that Ma had not done a good job and Tsai and the DPP might. The salient facts were: in the weeks before the election GDP growth was negative, the business community was pessimistic and the population in general noticed the economy was not doing well and that was hurting many people.160 During the campaign, Tsai Ing-wen proposed a “forward looking” economy based on an “innovation driven model” instead of an efficiency driven one. More specifically, Tsai advanced the idea of “strategic industries”: green energy, defense, the “Internet of Things,” biotechnology and smart precision machinery. Later she presented a somewhat different vision, and added a number of components: a “mature industrial cluster,” enhanced R&D, flexible

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small businesses, smart investing, the government integrating private and global resources, and building advanced defense industries. She also broached some other ideas, such as promoting an “Asian Silicon Valley,” biomedicine, new agriculture and a “circular economy.” Finally, she put forward a “new southbound policy” to promote economic ties with Southeast Asia.161 Her model was supposed to make Taiwan’s economic growth less dependent on trade and production chains with China. However, critics questioned this policy since trade had worked so well in fostering economic growth in the past. Also, commercial ties with the United States, Europe and Japan were not promising due to the state of low growth in all three. Some said Tsai’s thinking involved untested ideas more than workable plans. Others said they would not work or would take time to produce growth.162 In any event, President Tsai and her administration put an end to Taiwan’s negative economic growth slide. In 2016, Taiwan’s GDP grew by 1.41 percent. In 2017, the GDP grew by 2.84 percent. Thus President Tsai ended what some had called a recession. This, together with the fact China had taken measures to harm Taiwan’s economy and the international economy was in somewhat of a slump, meant that President Tsai deserved, and got, some kudos for Taiwan’s economic performance under her leadership.163 However, by some other key measures the Tsai administration’s performance was not at all praiseworthy. In 2016, Taiwan’s GDP growth ended the lowest in Asia. It was below average in the world. It was well below the mean growth of the GDP during the Ma years, which was 4.4 percent.164 At year’s end 2016, more than half of business leaders registered their dissatisfaction with the Tsai administration’s economic performance, while only 18 percent expressed satisfaction.165 At this time it was evident the administration faced some serious obstacles to growth and it was not in command of a real economic turnaround. One troubling issue was Taiwan’s energy situation. Tsai and her party had promised to eliminate nuclear power and so acted. But this created a shortfall in electricity generation that meant the greater use of coal, which was not a clean energy (that President Tsai had promoted) and was linked to a high incidence of lung disease in Taiwan. Also, worry about adequate energy prompted some companies to build new plants elsewhere. Taiwan’s Foxconn at this time decided to build a new facility for making LCD panels in the United States for this reason; the impact was the loss to Taiwan of $10 billion in investment money and 13,000 new jobs.166 Solar energy was promising and Taiwan being the world’s second-largest producer of solar cells President Tsai hoped it would generate exports. But China was the world’s leader in solar energy and this meant linking up with Chinese companies through production chains and thus greater economic dependence on China.167 This contradicted the Tsai administration’s policy to reduce Taiwan’s cross-Strait economic ties. In August 2017, Taiwan suffered a blackout that affected millions of households and businesses. It was reportedly caused by human error; but

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further investigation revealed that Taiwan’s power infrastructure is woefully out of date and vulnerable to storms, etc. Since Taipower (which provides Taiwan with electricity) operated at a loss and the public opposed higher rates it could do little to fix the problems or the reality that Taiwan’s grid is not ready to take more renewable sources.168 At this time it was reported that Tsai’s vaunted Southbound Policy was not getting the desired results. Trade was not increasing to any meaningful degree considering investment on Taiwan’s part and it encouraging students from the area to come to Taiwan. In fact, in 2016 and 2017 Taiwan’s commerce with China increased faster than with Southeast Asia, clearly counter to what was supposed to happen.169 Another issue was Taiwan expanding its production of weapons. Taiwan produced some state-of-the-art weapons, including a jet fighter plane and missiles. (For further details, see Chapter 6.) President Tsai wanted to get into more high-end weapons business because of concerns about China’s military pressure on Taiwan and the reality other countries, except the United States, would not sell weapons to Taiwan and U.S. sales did not include some of the top-end weapons Taiwan wanted. Although an advanced arms industry would contribute to modernizing the economy because of a certain amount of spinoff, it was doubtful Taiwan would become globally competitive in arms, as it would not likely be able to develop markets abroad. In fact, very few economists were sanguine about Taiwan developing a profitable arms business.170 Another issue was Taiwan’s brain drain. While this pre-existed the Tsai administration it got worse on its watch. Also President Tsai had drawn attention to it during the campaign and expectations were high that she would fix it. But she had not done so. The bleeding of talent, it was said, got worse and involved 7 percent of the workforce and most were college-educated young people. The majority went to China. This was painful and was even noticed among Taiwan’s top research institutes.171 Some observers noted a contradiction for Tsai between trying to keep talent at home and dealing with the matters of economic inequity and low workers’ wages. The year 2017 ended with Taiwan’s GDP growth at the bottom of what the four Asian dragons had done. It was also lower than other East Asian countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines. It was but one-third of China’s growth.172 As a result, workers demonstrated in the streets complaining that wages had not increased in 15 years. Late in 2017, a local research organization reported that among President Tsai’s five cutting-edge industries, only one, smart industry, was bringing in higher earnings.173 Meanwhile the International Monetary Fund projected Taiwan’s GDP growth in 2019 to be lower than 2018 and forecast low growth in ensuing years, with only a 1.9 percent increase in 2023.174 In November 2018, the DPP lost Taiwan’s mid-term elections badly; most attributed President Tsai’s management of the economy largely to this. Following the election, at the juncture of President Tsai and the DPP’s three years in office, Taiwan’s GDP grew at an average annual rate of 2.40 percent; it

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had grown considerably faster during the Ma presidency. Companies in Taiwan closed at a rate of 10.8 percent under the Tsai administration; they grew at a rate of 6.4 percent under Ma. The Tsai administration concluded two free trade agreements (both with very small countries—Paraguay and Eswatini); during the KMT’s governance Taiwan recorded three. Tourism grew at a rate of 1.97 percent during three years of DPP rule; the previous eight years it grew at a yearly pace of 14.06 percent.175

A Model of Economic Development, or Not Taiwan’s economic development for four decades was so successful that referring to it as an “economic miracle” was hardly an overstatement. Alas, what Taiwan accomplished in economic growth made it a model—for economists, leaders of developing nations and even students of political development.176 To grasp the moment of this it is necessary to recapitulate a bit and look at the data on Taiwan’s economic growth over four decades in the past. During the 1950s, the island’s economy grew at a healthy rate of 7.6 percent annually; expansion in the 1960s averaged 10 percent annually. Taiwan was hit hard by the oil crisis in the early 1970s, but it quickly adjusted and forthwith turned a slowdown back into “miracle growth” following a two-year hiatus. After the adjustment, Taiwan’s economy grew even faster than it had before the oil crisis—notwithstanding much higher energy prices. During the 1980s, Taiwan’s annual GDP growth was 8.1 percent. Taiwan’s economy slowed down a bit more in the 1990s. Still its economy percolated and economic growth remained impressive.177 But now the reality is that this is history; it exists no more. Taiwan’s recent three presidents endeavored to return Taiwan to noteworthy growth and a good economy. None was successful. President Chen said he could do it by getting rid of KMT corruption and designing a fairer economy. He failed. President Ma perceived Taiwan’s economic health depended on expanding commercial relations with China. He created a backlash and his plan failed. President Tsai propounded ideas for an innovative economy, but at the same time sought to reduce ties with China. Her efforts failed. Since the beginning of the new millennium Taiwan’s economy has not done well, especially compared to its past performance. Most of the time it has underperformed or performed poorly. Recently it has not kept up with the other Asian dragons or even the average of Asian countries. It has also not done as well as the world’s average. Predictions from reputable organizations are that Taiwan will not perform up to par in coming years.178 What is being done to ensure a turnaround, and will these measures succeed? The government has boasted of Taiwan’s “New Economic Development Model.” The core principles are innovation, job creation and more equitable distribution of economic benefits. It says it will actively promote major innovative industries including: smart machinery, an Asian Silicon

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Valley, Asia-Pacific biotech pharmaceuticals, a national defense industry, green energy and new materials.179 There will also be smart machinery, academic research teams, upgrading the Internet of Things and boosting aerospace. The Asian Silicon Valley is to integrate research and development, linking technology clusters and become a base for Asia-Pacific innovation. Taiwan will strive to be an R&D center based on its science parks. Its national defense industry will focus on information security, aerospace and shipbuilding. Taiwan will push cutting edge renewable energy. New materials means transforming chemicals into high value-added production while promoting new products derived from a new industrial park devoted to realizing that objective.180 Some observers believe these goals can and will be realized. Taiwan has a lot going for it. Taiwan registers the fourth highest scores on math tests of any place in the world, 25 percent of its university degrees are in engineering, 70 percent of the planet’s integrated circuits are made in Taiwan, it boasts of one of the highest number of patents per capita and spends more on R&D per capita than many others.181 According to the World Economic Forum, since 2011 Taiwan has made a successful transition from a factor-driven, to an efficiency-driven to an innovation-driven economy. This view is based on the fact that Taiwan has demonstrated a long-term vision, a methodological approach to achieving it, a sophisticated sense of design and graphics, and a motivated workforce with skillsets to invent and execute. The National Development Council promotes start-ups and entrepreneurship, links relationships with R&D clusters elsewhere in the world, pushes software applications and advances innovation into prototypes.182 Hence Taiwan has a lot to boast about in terms of transitioning to a new phase in its economic development. But there is another side to the coin. It is one that generates quite foreboding pessimism. The current data on economic growth and interpretations of the numbers by experts indicate Taiwan’s economy suffers from serious weaknesses and that future economic growth is seriously handicapped. This begets a different story than the one just presented. Put simply, since economic vitality and progress depend on GDP growth, the narratives about new and innovative ideas and thus the expectation that Taiwan’s assets will be meaningfully used to turn around its slow growth are off-track or just plain wrong. Another error, the biggest one, in looking at Taiwan’s economic situation is to compare Taiwan to developed countries around the world. The developed countries, especially Europe and Japan, are not doing well. In fact, they are in the doldrums in terms of economic growth. And most experts do not see this changing in the future.183 Anyway, for good reasons Taiwan’s economic performance has to be compared to China’s. As noted, China seeks to force Taiwan into unification using economic means to do that. China is also the dynamo driving global

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economic growth upon which Taiwan’s economy depends. In 2019, China accounted for 33 percent of global GDP growth; the United States contributed 11 percent (one-third of China); Japan 1 percent. Moreover, China’s portion is expected to rise in the next five years.184 How did China get to this position? And what does it mean? A look at what China has done over the past four decades is profoundly instructive. So are the data on China’s current economic size and status. In other words, understanding China’s economic success is compelling to Taiwan. In 1976, Mao, the revolutionary hero that established the People’s Republic of China and its strongman leader, passed away. After a brief hiatus, the end of 1978 to be precise, Deng Xiaoping took over the reins of power. He and his supporters in the Chinese Communist Party realized China had not performed well economically under Mao and that new policies were decided upon to change that. Otherwise China would remain poor and a second rate power.185 Deng and company reformed China’s economy. They got rid of the Maoist economic principles, notably communist egalitarianism and state control of the economy that were firmly in place. In 20 years, Deng transformed China from a poor country to something quite different. Deng’s reforms were kept on track and China grew even faster in the new century to become a commercial and financial leviathan and a world power as a product of its economic growth. What Deng did and how he did it are telling. He started in rural China (as Taiwan did with land reform). He got rid of the communes and established a free market for agricultural products. He allowed peasants to lease land, almost equivalent to ownership. He rationalized agriculture by allowing farmers to choose what crops to plant and where and when to sell what they produced. Agricultural productivity exploded and Deng won the support of 800 million rural residents.186 Deng then moved to industry. He sold many of the state-owned enterprises, which were mostly reporting a negative return on investment. He encouraged small and privately owned businesses. He reduced party control of the economy and put managers (rather than party officials) in charge of factories. He created a flexible labor market by eliminating controls on wages. Labor mobility skyrocketed. He enacted commercial laws. He launched a stock market and let farmers and workers invest there or in their own businesses.187 When Deng launched these reforms, 40 percent of the GNP was generated by state and government-owned enterprises. By 1990 it was half of that. In fact, it was less than the United States. In short, Deng oversaw a massive privatization of the economy. He made China’s economy a free-market capitalist one, though he called it “socialism with Chinese characteristics.”188 Another part, and an important one, of Deng’s reforms was to engage in trade to take advantage of the world market place, in other words exploit China’s comparative advantages in production. China’s foreign trade doubled each decade from the beginning of the reforms, growing from 5.2 percent of

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the GNP in 1970 to over 40 percent by the end of the century. Trade was more important to China’s economy than it was to most capitalist trading nations.189 The most important element of trade to China was its exports, which contributed immensely to China’s economic growth. In 1979, the external sales of China’s products totalled $14.8 billion; in 1992, they brought in $85 billion. During the 1990s, the value of China’s exports increased by 18 percent yearly—twice the world’s average. Also its exports went up-market: half of exports were manufactured goods in 1985 rising to three-quarters in 1991, while their values increased markedly.190 Related to opening up to trade, Deng sought foreign investment. China’s main targets were those that had large foreign exchange holdings, namely Japan and Taiwan. Both invested in China. The United States was another. Hong Kong had a huge store of private capital. The Overseas Chinese were rich.191 Meanwhile Deng resolved some old legal issues with the United States, including property claims and other matters. This led to the unfreezing of China’s assets in the United States. It also paved the way for China to win diplomatic relations with the United States in 1979, which also helped China’s economic planners realize a spike in China’s exports that helped them realize their GDP growth objectives.192 In 2000, at the beginning of a new century, Jiang Zemin was in charge of China’s government and the Chinese Communist Party. (Deng had died in 1997.) Jiang was a supporter of Deng’s reforms and worked assiduously to protect them and keep economic growth on track. And he was spectacularly successful in doing that.193 In 2001, China joined the WTO. This helped President Jiang convince members of the party and government that Deng’s reforms had to stay. (Some had wanted to return to Maoism.) China’s economy grew even faster after this. Two years later foreign investments reached $52 billion, propelling China to surpass the United States and become the world’s largest recipient of foreign capital investment.194 From 2001 to 2009, China’s manufacturing output increased by more than 136 percent, while all of the major European countries and the United States witnessed manufacturing declines. In 2007, manufacturing accounted for 40 percent of China’s GDP. In 2008, China passed Japan in industrial output (having already passed Germany in 1999) and in 2010 passed the United States. At that point China became known as the “manufacturing house of the world.”195 This happened because of the tremendous increases in the output of the Chinese economy. In 2005, per capita productivity was nine-fold what it was in 1978. The total GDP increased by 14 times. No other large nation had ever done this. The impact on the world was no less than phenomenal. China was now contributing to the planet’s economic growth more than any other country, including the United States.

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During the global recession of 2008–09, Chinese leaders took measures to ensure that China’s growth was not stunted. Thus China continued to boom, while the other big economic powers witnessed a recession and the contractions of their economies. The world took notice. China became the economic model for most of the developing world and a good portion of the rest. As one writer put it, the “Beijing consensus” had overshadowed the “Washington consensus.”196 At this time, in 2009, China became the largest exporting nation in the world. In 2013, China surpassed the United States to become the world’s largest trading country, with its trade volume having passed $4 trillion based on an annual growth of nearly 8 percent for several years.197 Coinciding with China’s new ranking in trade the hub of finance in the world changed from two blocs (U.S.–Europe and East Asia) to one centered on China.198 In 2014, China grabbed the status cum honor of having the world’s largest economy in terms of its GDP gauged by purchasing power parity—the means of measuring economic influence used by the World Bank and a number of other financial institutions and arguably the most accurate sign of economic prowess. In any event, China was on the road to quickly becoming number one on the planet measured by absolute dollars; how quick to some degree simply depended on China’s revaluing its currency. Its growth relative to the United States ensured that this would eventually happen. At this time observers were noticing that Asia had become a major regional bloc, especially in trade and other economic matters, and China was its leader—naturally, since its economy was bigger than all of the other countries of Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia combined. This, according to one observer, gave it “enormous economic leverage.”199 Paralleling China’s newly acquired station in the world as a trading giant and an economic vanguard, China also became the world’s richest nation computed by its foreign exchange holdings. In 2008, China was adding a billion dollars a day to its trove, which passed $2 trillion that year. In 2011, China had over $3 trillion on hand. At mid-point the next year its foreign exchange position was three-fold Japan’s (that had been number one for some time) and four times Europe. In 2015, China’s “cash on hand” almost reached $4 trillion.200 This fortune in riches translated into China becoming the world’s foremost provider of foreign aid and foreign investments. Both had long been a source of global influence used by the United States and other powers. Now China was in the catbird seat.201 Looking ahead, critical data that reflected nations’ trends in science, technology and business and their futures showed that China was doing what it needed to do to continue to shine and excel and even surpass others. In 2015, China was almost on par with the United States in spending on research and development. In 2016, it became the top nation in the world in registering patents and was soon to be in publishing scientific articles. Some called this China’s “third revolution.” Mirroring what that meant in terms of

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commercial prowess, the previous year Alibaba issued an initial public offering on the stock exchange: $21.8 billion or the largest in history. In 2016, Chinese auto companies sold 28 million cars, compared to American companies that marketed 17.6 million.202 In 2019, China passed the United States in R&D spending. China also boasted of having nine of the world’s largest high-tech companies. It had the world’s largest single-dish radio telescope, several of the fastest supercomputers, with plans at hand to build the world’s largest supercollider. It was matching or beating the United States in 5G mobile technologies, seed breeding, robotics and much more.203 What then are the facts of life for Taiwan regarding its economic relationship with China? First of all Taiwan is economically small compared to China. Its GDP is $613 billion compared to China’s $14 trillion. Worse, its current GDP growth is meagre: projected to be 2.0 percent in 2021 and 1.99 percent in 2022. This is but a third of China’s rate of economic growth.204 China is the elephant in the room for Taiwan. Looking forward there are other details to entertain: Taiwan’s spending on R&D is high in per capita terms, but in absolute amounts is not large. It is tiny compared to China: $16 billion in 2018 compared to China’s $377 billion.205 It has been, and is, relative to the rest of the world, high in terms of increases (over 3 percent), but is very low in comparison to China’s 15 to 20 percent increases. Taiwan ranks high in registering patents but China has been growing much faster and is now the world’s leader. China is going gangbusters in terms of advances in technology.206 Taiwan lacks top-flight cutting-edge (in science and technology) universities. Among the top innovative universities in Asia, China has six (11 if Hong Kong is counted), South Korea has six, Singapore has two (both in the top five, including National University of Singapore, which ranks number one), Japan has two.207 Taiwan has no universities in Reuter’s Global Top Innovative Universities 100 ranking. Among those specializing in science and technology, Taiwan has none in the top 200 in the world. In Asia, Taiwan does not have one institution of higher learning that ranks in the top 20.208 Add to this Taiwan, as noted earlier, has a very serious brain drain and its talented people, notably those with college education and its youth, are fleeing to go to other places to find employment—especially China. Finally, there is the matter of global supply chains (Taiwan is more exposed than any place in the world) and more export dependent than other countries—57.8 percent recently, compared to South Korea’s 35.5 percent and Japan’s 14 percent.209 More and more of its production is in or goes through China. In either case it is largely controlled by China. In short, Taiwan’s economic health depends on China.210 Meanwhile, China’s “made in China 2025” (a plan to upgrade China’s economy by shifting more of its production to high-tech products) is an existential threat to Taiwan’s best industries. A vivid example is Taiwan

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Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, which accounts for 50 percent of the global market and had an income of $11 billion in 2016. What with China getting into this business, not to mention a host of others among Taiwan’s best, staying in China’s production chains has become a daunting challenge to Taiwan.211 Another matter worth mentioning is China’s famous Belt and Road Initiative that is linking up East Asia with Europe, Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and Southeast Asia. Taiwan has been left out of this several trillion-dollar project that links up 70 countries in the world and is often labelled the “building project of all times.” It is, as one author puts it, the equivalent of the midtwentieth-century founding of the United Nations and the World Bank and the Marshall Plan “all rolled into one.”212 Taiwan has not been included, though Beijing has made offers. China has even proposed a tunnel under the Taiwan Strait, to which Taiwan’s government has been unreceptive.213 After the 2016 election, when Tsai Ing-wen became president and the DPP took a majority in the legislature and both proclaimed Taiwan was a democracy and they would abide by the people’s choice about unification, China took retaliatory economic actions against Taiwan. Beijing forthwith announced that it would reduce the number of Chinese tourists going to Taiwan by one-third to one-half and that there would be no more trade talks based on the 2010 Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement. Chinese officials stated pointedly that this would adversely impact Taiwan’s economy. The Chinese government also put the squeeze on pro-DPP businesses in China by enforcing tax and other regulations that applied to them. Later China barred Taiwan’s pro-DPP business people from entering Hong Kong and cut the purchase of Taiwan’s agricultural products from districts in Taiwan that were governed locally by the DPP.214 Yet it was patently obvious Beijing was “pulling its punches” in seeking to seriously hurt Taiwan’s economy. In 2017, trade with Taiwan increased by 17.6 percent. In 2018, trade was up again. Chinese investment in Taiwan also increased. China continued to encourage Taiwan’s businesses to relocate to China; it could offer big incentives to do so. Beijing had a much greater capability to shut Taiwan out of global information and communications supply chains.215 The conclusion is inescapable that Taiwan needs to have more, not fewer, economic linkages with China. Both China’s huge success in economic development and Taiwan’s linkages to the global economy says loudly that Taiwan needs much greater economic relations with China lest its poor economic growth fall further. In other words, an independence policy would be deadly to Taiwan’s economic health.216

Notes 1 For details about Taiwan’s early economic history, see Davidson, The Island of Formosa. 2 Hung, A History of Taiwan, pp. 34–35.

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3 G. W. Goodard, Formosa: A Study in Chinese History (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1966), pp. 96–97. 4 Cal Clark, Taiwan’s Development, p. 55. 5 See Ho, Economic Development of Taiwan, 1860–1970. 6 Samuel Chu, “Liu Ming-chuan and the Modernization of Taiwan,” Journal of Asian Studies (November 1963), pp. 37–53. 7 See Chapter 2 for further details on this point. 8 For details on capital formation during this period, see Teng-hui Lee, Intersectoral Capital Flows in the Economic Development of Taiwan, 1895–1960 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1971), pp. 19–20. 9 Ramon H. Myers, “The Economic Development of Taiwan,” in Hungdah Chiu (ed.), China and the Question of Taiwan: Documents and Analysis (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 40. 10 Clark, Taiwan’s Development, p. 60. 11 Hung, A History of Taiwan, p. 248. 12 Chao and Myers, The First Chinese Democracy, p. 21. 13 Ho, Economic Development of Taiwan, 1860–1970, p. 104. 14 See Anthony Y. C. Koo, “Economic Development of Taiwan,” in Sih (ed.), Taiwan in Modern Times, pp. 402–06. 15 Myers, “The Economic Development of Taiwan,” pp. 42–43. 16 Clark, Taiwan’s Development, p. 75. 17 Ibid., pp. 85–86. 18 Area Handbook for the Republic of China, p. 249. 19 Li Kuo-ting, The Evolution of Policy Behind Taiwan’s Development Success (Singapore: World Scientific, 1995), pp. 222–23. 20 See Anthony Y. C. Koo, The Role of Land Reform in Economic Development: A Case Study of Taiwan (New York: Praeger, 1968); and Ho, Economic Development of Taiwan, 1860–1970, for further details. 21 Clark, Taiwan’s Development, pp. 162–63. 22 So was the fact that chemical fertilizers that were widely unavailable at the end of the war were provided by the United States. See Area Handbook for the Republic of China, p. 259. 23 Walter P. Falcon, “Lessons and Issues in Taiwan’s Development,” in T. H. Shen (ed.), Agriculture’s Place in the Strategy of Development: The Taiwan Experience (Taipei: Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, 1974), p. 275. 24 The Republic of China Yearbook 1998, pp. 164 and 199. 25 Clark, Taiwan’s Development, pp. 160–61. 26 Yu Tzong-shian, The Story of Taiwan: Economy (Taipei: Government Information Office, 2001), p. 7; Taiwan Statistical Yearbook 2007 (Taipei: Council for Economic Planning and Development, 2007), p. 84. 27 Taiwan Yearbook 2007, pp. 102–03. 28 The Republic of China Yearbook, Taiwan 2002, p. 189. 29 Ibid., p, 138. 30 “Taiwan Economy Profile 2018,” Index Mundi (online at indexmundi.com), viewed June 2018. 31 See Yuan-li Wu, Becoming an Industrialized Country: ROC’s Development on Taiwan (New York: Praeger, 1985), for further details on this subject. 32 Ibid. Moreover, Taiwan’s agricultural sector did not experience the adverse effects that Britain’s did during its industrial revolution. 33 “Farming Population Declines,” Free China Journal, August 14, 1998, p. 4. 34 Area Handbook for the Republic of China, chapter 20. 35 See Neil Jacoby, U.S. Aid to Taiwan: a Study of Foreign Aid, Self-Help and Development (New York: Praeger 1967) for details. 36 The data cited are from Kubek, Modernizing China, p. 94.

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37 By the late 1990s more than 95 percent of registered companies in Taiwan were privately owned. See Chen Chien-jen, “ROC Looks to Future with a Vision,” Free China Journal, April 10, 1998, p. 7. 38 Clark, Taiwan’s Development, p. 183. 39 Ibid, pp. 174–75. 40 See Wu, Becoming an Industrialized Nation, pp. 12 and 48–49. 41 See Stanford Research Institute International, The Taiwan Development Experience and Its Relevance to Other Countries (Taipei: Kwang Hwa, 1988), p. 25. 42 Cal Clark and Alexander C. Tan, Taiwan’s Political Economy: Meeting Challenges, Pursuing Progress (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012), p. 24. 43 Wei Wou, Capitalism: A Chinese Version (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1992), pp. 85–86. 44 See The Republic of China Yearbook, Taiwan 2001 (Taipei: Government Information Office, 2001), p. 216. 45 For details, see Wu, Becoming an Industrialized Nation, chapter 2. 46 Clark and Tan, Taiwan’s Political Economy, p. 22. 47 Richard C. K. Burdekin, Shenm Shin-hui and I. H. Whitehead, “Cross-Strait Linkages: Historical Perspective and Empirical Evidence,” in Peter C. Y. Chow (ed.), Economic Integration Across the Taiwan Strait (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2013), pp. 1–29. 48 See various issues of The Index of Economic Freedom, published by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal. 49 See Wou, Capitalism: A Chinese Version, p. 55. 50 See Clark, Taiwan’s Development, p. 168. 51 Ibid. 52 Area Handbook for the Republic of China, p. 279. 53 See Wou, Capitalism: A Chinese Version, chapter 7. 54 Clark, Taiwan’s Development, pp. 167–73. 55 Area Handbook for the Republic of China, pp. 288–303. 56 Wou, Capitalism: A Chinese Version, p. 61. 57 Clark, Taiwan’s Development, pp. 174–75. 58 Ibid. 59 Wou, Capitalism: A Chinese Version, p. 70. 60 Clark and Tan, Taiwan’s Political Economy, p. 18. 61 Ibid., pp. 39–40 and pp. 45–46. 62 Chi-ming Hou and San Gee, “National Systems Supporting Technical Advance in Industry: The Case of Taiwan,” in Richard R. Nelson (ed.), National Innovation: A Comparative Analysis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 384–413. 63 See Richard Dobson, “New Report Contradicts AmCham,” Taipei Times, May 6, 2002 (online at www.taipeitimes.com). Dobson cites Switzerland’s Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI) as his source. 64 Area Handbook for the Republic of China, p. 293. 65 “Overview of Taiwan Textile Industry—2010,” Taiwan Textile Federation, March 2011 (online at ttf.textiles.org.tw); “Taiwan Textile Industry’s Production Value Expected to Exceed NT$530B in 2012,” Yarn and Fiber Exchange, March 9, 2012 (online at yarnandfibers.com). 66 Area Handbook for the Republic of China, pp. 297–98. 67 Taiwan Yearbook 2007, p. 105. 68 Lin, Taiwan’s China Dilemma, p. 6. 69 Area Handbook for the Republic of China, pp. 281–82. 70 “Taiwan Petrochemicals Report 2012,” Business Monitor International, November 1, 2011 (online at marketpublishers.com). 71 Clark and Tan, Taiwan’s Political Economy, p. 19.

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72 “Steel Exports Report: Taiwan,” Global Steel Trade Monitor, May 2918 (online at trade.gov). 73 Ibid. and “Taiwan Lodges Protest After It’s Barred From Steel Industry Event in Europe,” South China Morning Post, April 20, 2016 (online at scmp.com). 74 Area Handbook for the Republic of China, pp. 298–99. 75 Steven Crook, “Navigating Rough Waters: Taiwan’s Yacht Industry,” Topics, August 22, 2016 (at topics.amcham.com.tw). 76 Wendell Minnick, “Taiwan Moves on $14.7B Indigenous Shipbuilding, Upgrade Projects,” Defense News, June 23, 2016 (online at defensenews.com) and Duncan DeAeth, “An Ambitious Future Planned for Defense Shipbuilding in Taiwan,” Taiwan News, May 10, 2018 (online at taiwannews.com.tw), viewed March 2019. 77 “Taiwan, the Unsung Hero of Automotive Innovation,” Global Fleet, October 2, 2018 (online at globalfleets.com). 78 Taiwan Yearbook 2007, p. 107. 79 For details on tourism in Taiwan see Chapter 1. 80 The Republic of China Yearbook 2011, pp. 114–115. 81 Grace Kuo, “Ma’s Five Pillars Initiative Wins AmCham Support,” Taiwan Today, June 5, 2012 (online at taiwantoday.tw). 82 The Republic of China Yearbook 2011, pp. 178 and 185. 83 Yana van der Meulen Rodgers and Sita Natarfaj, “Labor Market Flexibility in East Asia: Lessons from Taiwan,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, October 1999. 84 The Republic of China Yearbook 2011, p. 105. 85 See Jan Prybyla, “Economic Development in Taiwan,” in Chiu (ed.), China and the Taiwan Issue, p. 106. See also National Economic Statistics of the Republic of China (Taipei: Department of Budgeting and Statistics, 1985), p. 34. 86 See Yu, Story of Taiwan: Economy, pp. 49–50. 87 “National Statistics: Republic of China (Taiwan),” June 2012, from the government’s Statistics Bureau (online at eng.stat.gov.tw); Taiwan Statistical Yearbook 2007 (Taipei: Executive Yuan, 2007), p. 19. This book is a collection of data prepared by the Council for Economic Planning and Development. 88 “Taiwan Youth Unemployment Rate,” Trading Economics (online at tradingeco nomics.com), viewed July 2018. Its record low was 2.42 percent in 1978; its record high was 16.26 percent in August 2009. 89 The Republic of China 2001 Yearbook, p. 337; “Most Workers Unhappy with Salaries: Poll,” China Post, May 23, 2012 (online at chinapost.com.tw). 90 Lin, Taiwan’s China Dilemma, pp. 3 and 9. 91 Taiwan Statistical Yearbook 2007, p. 336. 92 The Republic of China 2011 Yearbook, p. 185. The 2010 “Labor Force Evaluation Measure,” a report done by the U.S. Business Environment Risk Intelligence, is cited as the source. 93 Clark, Taiwan’s Development, p. 203. 94 The Republic of China 2001 Yearbook, p. 343. 95 Jim Huang, “Behind the Numbers,” Taipei Review (November 2001), pp. 22–23; U.S. Department of State, “Taiwan: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2007,” March 11, 2008 (online at state.gov). 96 “Taiwan: Labor Union Law Amended, Giving Teachers Right to Unionize,” News and Events (Library of Congress), n.d. (online at loc.gov/lawweb). 97 Abraham Gerber, “Low Wages, Pensions Top Labor Unions’ Concerns,” Taipei Times, January 7, 2017 (online at taipeitimes.com). 98 “30 Years of Labor Standards Act for a Continuous Protection of Labor Rights,” Ministry of Labor, Republic of China (Taiwan), March 30, 2017 (online at english.mol.gov.tw).

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99 “Taiwan’s Latest Labor Standards Act Amendments,” AmCham, March 6, 2018 (online at topics.amcham.com). 100 Nathan Snyder and Jeffrey Lien, “Taiwan’s Latest Labor Standards Act Amendments,” Topics, March 6, 2018 (online at amcham.com.tw). 101 The Republic of China Yearbook 1998, p. 338. 102 The Republic of China Yearbook 2011, pp. 187–88. 103 Pat Gao, “Adjusting Foreign Labor’s Role,” Taipei Review (November 2001), p. 10. Between 1990 and 1994, there were reportedly 73,000 foreign workers illegally in Taiwan. See The Republic of China Yearbook 1995, p. 388. 104 “Council Urged to Control Number of Migrant Workers,” China Post, May 23, 2008 (online at chinapost.com.tw). 105 Tabatha Anderson, “Foreign Laborers in Taiwan and Taiwan’s Democracy,” The Diplomat, April 27, 2018 (online at thediplomat.com). 106 “Migrant Workers in Taiwan Rally for Better Labor Rights,” Focus Taiwan, January 7, 2018 (online at focustaiwan.tw). 107 Jeremy Olivier, “Improving the Conditions for Migrant Workers in Taiwan: A Long Road Ahead,” Taiwan Sentinel, September 5, 2017 (online at sentinel.tw). 108 See Shirley W. Y. Kuo, Gustav Ranis and John C. H. Fei, The Taiwan Success Story: Rapid Growth with Improved Distribution in the Republic of China, 1952– 79 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), chapter 6. 109 The Republic of China Yearbook 2011, p. 110. 110 See Wei, Capitalism, chapters 2 and 3, for further details. 111 The United States accounted for almost half of Taiwan’s trade in the mid-1980s. New trade policies and efforts to expand trade elsewhere soon reduced this proportion to less than 40 percent. 112 For details, see Edwin A. Winkler and Susan Greenhalgh, “Analytical Issues and Historical Episodes,” in Winckler and Greenhalgh (eds.), Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan, pp. 6–7. Also, see Clark, Taiwan’s Development, pp. 227–30. 113 Robert E. Baldwin, Tien-Ju Chen and Douglas R. Nelson, The Political Economy of U.S.-Taiwan Trade (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1995), p. 87. 114 Republic of China 1987—A Reference Book (Taipei: Hilit Publishing Company, 1987), pp. 270–71. 115 For the reasons for this, see Hans H. Bass, “Export Dynamism in Taiwan and Mainland China, 1950s–2000,” Institute for World Economics and Management (University of Bremen), January 1999. 116 Clark and Tan, Taiwan’s Political Economy, p. 97. 117 The Republic of China Yearbook, Taiwan 2002, p. 148. 118 The Republic of China Yearbook 2011, p. 111. 119 Lin, Taiwan’s China Dilemma, pp. 8–9. 120 Ibid., p. 110. 121 Republic of China 1987—A Reference Book, p. 87. 122 Daniel Workman, “Taiwan’s Top 10 Exports,” World’s Top Exports, March 8, 2018 (online at worldstopexports.com). 123 Shannon Tiezzi, “A Cross Strait Chill? You Wouldn’t Know It From Taiwan’s Economic Data,” The Diplomat, February 16, 2018 (online at thediplomat.com). Data are based on the first 11 months of 2017. 124 Chi Schive, The Foreign Factor: The Multinational Corporation’s Contribution to the Economic Modernization of the Republic of China (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1990), p. 4. 125 Ibid. 126 “2000 Taiwan White Paper,” Topics, May 2008, p. 10. 127 Lin, Taiwan’s China Dilemma, p. 131.

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128 The Republic of China Yearbook Taiwan 2016, p. 122. 129 “Taiwan: Foreign Investment,” Santander (online at en.portal.santandertrade. com) viewed March 2019. 130 Chu-yuan Cheng, “Economic Relations,” in Winberg Chai and May-lee Chai (eds.), Chinese Mainland and Taiwan: A Study of Historical, Cultural, Economic and Political Relations (Dubuque, IA: Kendal/Hunt Publisher, 1996), pp. 77–82. 131 The Republic of China Yearbook 2011, p. 110. In 2010, foreigners, including Chinese, purchased $170 billion in Taiwan’s stock and sold $161 billion. 132 “Taiwan Forex Reserves Down 1.5 Pct in May,” Currency and Forex News, June 5, 2012 (online at xe.com). 133 “Taiwan’s Foreign Exchange Reserves,” Trading Economics (online at tradinge conomics.com), viewed July 2018. 134 For background details on Taiwan’s energy problems, see John F. Copper, “Taiwan’s Energy Situation,” in Kenneth R. Stunkel (ed.), National Energy Profiles (New York: Praeger/Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979). For details on the current situation, see Taiwan Yearbook 2007, p. 104. 135 Josh Horwitz, “Taiwan, at the Heart of the World’s Tech Supply Chain, Has a Serious Electricity Problem,” Quartz, August 17, 2017 (online at qz.com). 136 “Energy Supply,” Bureau of Energy of Ministry of Economic Affairs, cited in Wikipedia, accessed June 7, 2012. 137 Mo Yan-chih and Chris Wang, “Ma Unveils His Nuclear Energy Policy,” Taipei Times, November 4, 2011 (online at taipeitimes.com). 138 Tomas Clancy, Countries of the World: Republic of China (n.p.: Create Space, 2012), p. 311; Oscar Chang, “Contributing to a Greener World,” Taiwan Review, March 2010 (online at taiwanreview.nat.gov.tw). 139 For the early figures, see The Republic of China Yearbook, Taiwan 2001, p. 166. For the recent data, see “Invest in Taiwan,” Department of Investment Services. Data are for 2007 (online at investintaiwan.nat.gov.tw). 140 The Republic of China Yearbook 2016, p. 170. 141 “Taiwan,” U.S. Energy Information, December 2016 (online at eia.com) and “Renewable Energy in Taiwan,” Lexology, December 30, 2018 (online at lexol ogy.com). 142 Yu-shan Wu, “Taiwan in 2000: Managing the Aftershock of Power Transfer,” Asian Survey (January/February 2001), p. 47. 143 “Taiwan Economic Outlook Dim,” Economic News Daily, March 20, 2001 (online at taiwanheadlines.com). 144 Ramon H. Myers and Jialin Zhang, The Struggle Across the Taiwan Strait: The Divided China Problem (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2006), p. 70. 145 Yun-han Chu, “The Political Economy of Taiwan’s Politics: Implications for Northeast Asia” (paper presented at the London School of Economics and Politics, May 12, 2007). 146 Lin, Taiwan’s China Dilemma, p. 105. 147 Taiwan’s debt rose from a low in 1998 to 33.1 percent of GDP in 2006. It rose again in 2009. See “Taiwan Government Debt: % of GDP,” CEIC (online at ceic.com), viewed March 2019. 148 See David DeVoss, “Tear Gas and Running Dogs,” Weekly Standard, December 4, 2006, pp. 18–19. 149 See “The State of the Nation,” CommonWealth, March 28, 2007 (online at cw. com.tw). 150 “Mirror, Mirror on the Wall,” The Economist, February 12, 2009 (online at economist.com). 151 Lin, Taiwan’s China Dilemma, p. 168. 152 Clancy, Countries of the World, p. 308.

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153 Lin, Taiwan’s China Dilemma, p. 177–81 and The Republic of China Yearbook 2011, pp. 115–16. 154 Daniel H. Rosen and Zhi Wang, Deepening China-Taiwan Relations through the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2010). 155 Lin, Taiwan’s China Dilemma, p. 8. 156 “Annual Change of the Gross National Product in Taiwan From 2007 to 2016,” Statista (online at stastica.com), viewed July 2018. 157 Frank Hsiao, “How Bad is Taiwan’s Economy,” The Diplomat, July 22, 2016 (online at thediplomat.com). 158 Copper, Taiwan at a Tipping Point, pp. 116–17. 159 Ibid., pp. 117–18 160 Ibid., pp. 217–18. 161 Ibid., pp. 180–81. 162 Ibid., p. 181. 163 Hsiao, “How Bad is Taiwan’s Economy?” 164 Ibid. 165 Kwangyin Liu, “Majority of CEOs Dissatisfied with Tsai Administration,” CommonWealth, December 12, 2016 (online at english.cw.com.tw). 166 David Shepardson, “Foxconn Announces U.S. Manufacturing Plant in Wisconsin,” Reuters, July 26, 2017 (online at reuters.com). 167 Copper, Taiwan at a Tipping Point, p. 182. 168 Horwitz, “Taiwan, at the Heart of the World’s Tech Supply Chain, Has a Serious Electricity Problem.” 169 Chen-Dong Tso and Gratiana Jung, “Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy: Oneyear Economic Performance Review,” National Bureau of Asian Research, January 18, 2018 (online at nbr.com). 170 “Taiwan’s Small Arms List,” Warfighter (no date provided), (online at military factory.com—viewed September 2019) 171 Nicola Smith, “Taiwan is Suffering from a Massive Brain Drain and the Main Beneficiary is China,” Time, August 21, 2017 (online at time.com). 172 “Economic and Financial Indicators,” The Economist, January 6, 2018, p. 64. 173 “Hurry Up,” The Economist, May 28, 2018, p. 38. 174 “IMF Raises 2018 Forecast for Taiwan GDP,” Taipei Times, October 10, 2018 (online at taipeitimes.com). 175 “Opposition Gives President Tsai Failing Grade on 3rd Anniversary,” China Post, May 21, 2019 (online at chinapost.com.tw). 176 For further details see Clark, Taiwan’s Development, chapter 7. 177 Pan-Long Tsai, “Explaining Taiwan’s Economic Miracle: Are the Revisionist Right?” Agenda, Number 1, 1999, pp. 69–82. Also see John M. Leger, “The Book: How Asians Started the ‘Pacific Century’ Early,” Far Eastern Economic Review, November 24, 1994, p. 43. China, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore rank in that order after Taiwan. The ranking is based on the period from 1975 to 1993. For the period 1968–98, Taiwan ranks number one in the world in per capita growth in GDP, but it was surpassed by Botswana, Oman and South Korea in overall GNP growth. 178 The World Bank, the IMF, OECD, the Economist Intelligence Unit and a number of other organizations all predict low GDP growth for Taiwan in both the near term and the long term. 179 “Taiwan’s New Economic Development Model,” Ministry of Economic Affairs, July 12, 2018 (online at moea.gov.tw). 180 Ibid.

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181 Michelle Greenwald, “How Taiwan is Reinventing Its National Culture from Manufacturing Efficiency To Innovation and IP,” Forbes, February 7, 2017 (online at forbes.com). 182 Ibid. 183 Knoema, an organization that collects statistics on predictions on economic growth, is pessimistic on the three. All are forecast to be low in coming years, both in the short term and the long term, meaning 2 percent GDP growth or less. Japan’s will be much lower than that. See knoema.com. 184 Alexandra Tanzi and Wei Lu, “Where Will Global GDP Growth Come From in the Next Five Years?” Bloomberg, October 28, 2018 (online at bloomberg.com). 185 Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007), p. 86. 186 Maurice Meisner, The Deng Xiaoping Era: An Inquiry into the Fate of Chinese Socialism, 1974–1994 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1996), pp. 222–26. 187 See Naughton, The Chinese Economy, chapter 13 and William Overholt, The Rise of China: How Economic Reform is Creating a New Superpower (London: W.W. Norton 1993), p. 45. 188 Fred D. Bergsten, Bates Gill, Nicholas R. Lardy and Derek Mitchell, China: The Balance Sheet (New York: Public Affairs Press, 2006), p. 24. 189 Bergsten et al., China: The Balance Sheet, p. 9 and Overholt, The Rise of China, p. 49. 190 Edward Tse, The China Strategy: Harnessing the Power of the World’s Fastest Growing Economy (New York: Basic Books, 2010), p. 38and Overholt, The Rise of China, pp. 30–31. 191 James C. Abegglen, Sea Change: Pacific Asia as the New World Industrial Center (New York: Free Press, 1994), pp. 103–04. 192 John W. Garver, “China’s U.S. Policies,” in Yong Deng and Fei-ling Wang (eds.), China Rising: Power and Motivation in China’s Foreign Policy (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), p. 207. 193 Bruce Gilley, Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China’s New Elite (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), pp. 268 and 270. 194 Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order (New York: Penguin, 2009), p. 159. 195 CIA World Factbook 2011 (online at cia.com); “Made in China,” The Economist, March12, 2015 (online at economist.com). 196 Stefan Halper, The Beijing Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century (New York: Perseus, 2010), pp. 51–52. 197 Angela Monaghan, “China Surpasses US as World’s Largest Trading Nation,” The Guardian, January 10, 2014 (online at guardian.com). 198 Gideon Rahman, Easternization: Asia’s Rise and America’s Decline (New York: Other Press, 2016). 199 Miller, China’s Asian Dream, pp. 11–12. Also see Parag Khanna, The Future is Asian (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2019), pp. 11–12. 200 John F. Copper, China’s Foreign Aid and Investment Diplomacy, Volume 1: Nature, Scope and Origins (New York: Palgrave, 2016), p. 109. 201 Ibid. 202 Elizabeth Economy, The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 122–23. 203 Mara Hvistendahl, “Land of Giants,” MIT Technology Review (special issue on China), January/February 2019, pp. 8–13. 204 Statistics Time, May 6, 2018 (online at statisticstime.com). 205 “Chart: The Global Leaders in R&D Spending, by Country and Company,” Visual Capitalist, October 13, 2017 (online at visualcapitalist.com).

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206 See “China Rules,” MIT Technology Review, January/February 2019, entire issue. 207 “Top Universities in the World, 2018,” Top Universities in the World, June 8, 2017 (online at topuniversitiesintheworld.com). 208 Ibid. 209 Huang Tien-lin, “Han Pursuing Hawker Economy,” Taipei Times, March 11, 2019 (online at taipeitimes.com). 210 Jason Douglas, “Smaller Players Caught in Trade Fight,” Wall Street Journal, July 23, 2018, p. A2. 211 See Connor Cislo and Jiyhuen Lee, “As China Climbs the Value Chain, a New Trade Challenge Looms in Asia,” Japan Times, March 26, 2018 (online at japa times.com.jp). 212 Paraag Khanna, “Why We’re Living in the ‘Asian Century,’” World Economic Forum, March 8, 2019 (online at worldeconomicforum.com). 213 “China Wants to Build a Massive Underwater Tunnel to Taiwan. What Could Go Wrong?” National Interest, April 11, 2018 (online at nationalinterest.com). 214 Copper, Taiwan at a Tipping Point, pp. 186–93. 215 2018 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2018), pp. 353–56. 216 Lin, Taiwan’s China Dilemma, p. 8.

6

Foreign and Military Policies

Taiwan has long been, and still is, a unique actor on the stage of international affairs. At times it was an important player. It was the first Western colony in Asia to become independent. It was the launching pad for Japan’s invasion of Southeast Asia at the onset of World War II. During the Cold War, on two or more occasions, it engaged in conflicts with China that portended to explode into a global war. For 22 years, from 1949 to 1971, as the Republic of China, it represented China in the United Nations. Then it lost the China seat. In 1979, Taipei suffered a break in formal ties with its only important friend and ally, the United States. Taiwan appeared hapless. Yet it resisted Beijing’s efforts to isolate and delegitimize it. Its government maintained close ties with America—its protector. It carried on diplomacy by way of commercial, cultural and other means. In 1991, Taipei officially terminated its war with the People’s Republic of China. This and the end of the Cold War should have given Taiwan a greater sense of security. But Beijing saw President Lee Teng-hui as promoting independence. Also China lost its main enemy (the Soviet Union) and thus moved more of its military resources to areas close to the Taiwan Strait. Further, at this time China’s military power grew quickly as a product of its booming economy. In 1996, China intimidated Taiwan with missile tests close to Taiwan’s shores during an important election campaign, prompting President Clinton to send aircraft carriers to protect Taiwan. This precipitated a face-off between Washington and Beijing that by many accounts almost led to war. Pundits labelled the Taiwan Strait the world’s number one flashpoint. Elected president in 2000, Chen Shui-bian made statements suggesting he supported Taiwan’s legal independence. So doing he infuriated China’s leaders and alienated the United States, which after 2001 was at war against terrorism and considered Chen an unwanted distraction. Meanwhile President Chen reduced Taiwan’s military spending yet increased its economic dependence on China. This was inconsistent. President Ma Ying-jeou, elected in 2008, rejected independence and as a consequence Taiwan enjoyed cordial relations with both China and the

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United States. Tension in the Taiwan Strait abated. But Ma’s policy created a backlash at home and his opponents convinced many residents that he sought unification with China. In 2016, Tsai Ing-wen was elected Taiwan’s president. Almost as if it were repeating past history the Tsai administration kept Taiwan on a path of growing economic dependence on China amid tensions over its supporting Taiwan’s separation from China. President Tsai’s foreign policy seemed to please no one.

Background Before the era of Western colonialism, as noted in Chapter 2, Taiwan periodically had contacts with neighboring peoples, though one would not equate this to diplomatic relations as were being practiced in the West. The exchanges involved mostly the island’s merchants’ dealing with trading centers in East Asia, including some in China. In the sixteenth century, both the Chinese inhabitants of the island and the Aborigines established some contacts with the Western powers and Japan, though this did not lead to much.1 During the time Taiwan was under Dutch colonial rule, its foreign relations were managed by the mother country. Subsequently, when the island was governed by China, Peking handled Taiwan’s external affairs. China, however, did not adhere to modern diplomatic practices and at times made disclaimers to the United States, Japan and other foreign countries of its responsibilities over Taiwan. This gave rise to doubts about whether China claimed the island.2 Between 1895 and 1945, while a Japanese colony, Taiwan’s external relations were handled by Tokyo. The scope of relations with other nations varied during this period; they were more restricted during the later years of Japanese rule. Contacts with China at any time during this period were quite limited. In 1945, responsibility for Taiwan’s external affairs passed to the Nationalist Chinese government in Nanking, even though the issue of Taiwan’s legal status was not formally decided.3 In 1949, after its defeat by the Communists, the Nationalist government moved to Taiwan, at which time Taiwan and the Republic of China became virtually synonymous. At the time the United States abandoned Chiang Kai-shek and it appeared that China would forthwith attack and incorporate Taiwan. But Washington abruptly changed its policy as a result of the outbreak of the Korean War and the United States once again became Taiwan’s protector.4 President Chiang Kai-shek contended Mao’s government was illegitimate and would not last—a somewhat credible claim at the time because of internal instability in China, U.S. antipathy toward the Communist regime and the U.N.-inspired boycott of the People’s Republic of China after its entry into the Korean War. Most Western countries—with a few exceptions (such as the United Kingdom, because of Hong Kong)—accorded diplomatic relations to Taipei and supported Taipei’s claim to represent the Chinese people in

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international affairs.5 Chiang’s Republic of China thus continued to occupy the China seat in the United Nations, including a permanent seat on the Security Council. Soviet-bloc countries, of course, accorded diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China and set up embassies in Peking.6 Both Nationalist China’s foreign and defense policies were founded on the premise that its military would counterattack the Mainland, defeat Mao’s armies and again rule China. But carrying out this plan with any real hope of success depended on help from the United States and/or a global conflict between the Communist and Western blocs. Neither happened.7 Because the government of the Republic of China regarded Mao’s Communist regime its enemy, links between Taiwan and the Mainland that had been established after 1945 were severed. Two Chinas thus emerged: Nationalist China and Communist China, or the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China. The two vied for legitimacy, influence in the world community and the allegiance of the Overseas Chinese. Because it espoused capitalism and aligned with the United States, Nationalist China enjoyed advantages that offset its much smaller size and population.8 Owing to Nationalist China’s new situation, especially its reliance on the United States for its survival, its diplomatic practices and foreign policy changed. The vestiges of traditional Chinese-style diplomacy to a large degree were displaced by Western practices. The island’s external policies reflected both its government-in-exile status and its dependence on America both for economic and security support.9 In the late 1950s, Taipei began to play down its policy of “liberating” the Mainland. In his 1959 New Year’s speech, Chiang Kai-shek defined the Mainland recovery policy as 70 percent political. Many thought this remark signalled a change of strategy and believed the plan to return to China would eventually be scrapped.10 Chiang’s decision arguably stemmed from the perception that the United States no longer supported Taipei’s desire to liberate China, as demonstrated by Washington’s actions during the two Offshore Islands crises of 1954–55 and 1958. In fact, the U.S. Department of State conveyed the message, emphatically after the second conflict, that it did not sanction efforts by Taipei to start a conflict with Peking and believed that two Chinese nation-states would become a permanent arrangement.11 In 1960, Taipei again began to perceive the world differently—as it became aware of the gravity of Sino-Soviet discord. The rift between Moscow and Peking virtually ended Soviet military support for China, a decision that diminished China’s military capabilities and, thus, the likelihood that it would attack Taiwan. Another factor influenced Taipei’s thinking: its underground and intelligence networks on the Mainland no longer functioned as they had before; its personnel there had aged, some had defected and many were captured. Hence Taipei’s foreign affairs leaders pondered a new relationship with both China and the Soviet Union.12 Nationalist Chinese leaders similarly understood that world opinion was shifting Peking’s way in the battle for diplomatic recognition; in other words,

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Taipei could not continue to garner as much global support to represent China in various international forums and organizations as it had. In fact, in the United Nations General Assembly, each year Peking won more votes on the issue of whether it or Taipei should represent China. Still, as noted in Chapter 2, Chiang Kai-shek did not formulate a new policy to deal with this matter. Had it not been for the Vietnam War and the Cultural Revolution in the People’s Republic of China, both of which played into the hands of hard-liners in Taiwan, a new and different foreign policy might have been forthcoming.13 Some Western scholars as well as critics of the government in Taiwan have argued that in the early 1960s Taipei might have been successful in promoting a two-Chinas or a one-China, one-Taiwan policy, thereby avoiding the subsequent humiliation of being “expelled” (technically Taipei withdrew) from the United Nations in 1971 and its diplomatic isolation caused by the loss of recognition from a host of countries after that.14 Others, however, doubt this. They say Taipei could not forsake the oneChina ideal because of the fear of ethnic tensions between the ruling Mainland Chinese and the Taiwanese as such a change would have evoked demands by Taiwanese for a bigger political role in governance too soon. Indeed, abandoning the one-China policy might have engendered domestic political instability that would have made Taiwan vulnerable to Peking’s efforts to subvert and weaken it, or, alternatively, give Mao a pretext for attacking Taiwan, as he had long planned to do.15

Diplomatic Setbacks, Partial Recovery In 1968, U.S. voters elected Richard M. Nixon president of the United States with a mandate to get out of the Vietnam War with honor. To do this, Nixon needed to dramatically improve U.S.–China relations, which at that time were hostile. In fact, he made this a top goal in his foreign policy. Both the U.S.–China rapprochement that followed and Peking (now spelled Beijing) ending its selfimposed isolationism happened to Taiwan’s disadvantage. In 1972, President Nixon engaged in a fortnight long visit to China where he engaged in negotiations culminating in the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué with Chinese leaders at the end of his visit. In this document the United States “did not challenge” China’s position that there is only one China and Taiwan is part of China. This marked a profound and, as it turned out, lasting shift in U.S. policy toward China, and Taiwan.16 For all intents and purposes it also ended America’s view of Taiwan as the symbol of the worldwide struggle against communism.17 Taiwan would have to adjust. Meanwhile, in 1971, Taiwan “lost” the China seat in the United Nations and, with it, membership in that important world body. Henceforth, Taiwan could no longer claim to represent the Chinese people in international affairs. This constituted a major foreign policy setback for Taipei. It also resulted in the subsequent loss of its memberships in other international organizations. So, too, with Taiwan’s diplomatic ties with a slew of nations.

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By 1973, Beijing had more than twice as many embassies in its capital, 85 to 39. In 1977, Beijing had 111 compared to Taipei’s 23.18 Fearing that diplomatic seclusion would make it vulnerable to Beijing’s claim that Taiwan belonged to China and had to be returned, Taipei sought to substitute commercial and other ties for formal diplomatic links. In December 1978, Taipei suffered still another body blow when President Jimmy Carter announced the termination of U.S. diplomatic relations with Taipei effective January 1, 1979 and the cancellation of the U.S.–Republic of China defense treaty a year later. Taipei reacted stoically. President Chiang Ching-kuo reiterated Taiwan’s earlier declared “three no’s policy”: no contact, no negotiations, and no compromise (with China). But Taiwan’s hard stance and it avoiding contact with China could not last. The tenor of Taiwan’s foreign policy soon became much more pragmatic and based increasingly on domestic politics and public opinion.19 Beijing forthwith broached reunification (unification from Taipei’s point of view because Taiwan had never been governed by the People’s Republic of China) proposals to Taipei. On the surface, its offers seemed generous; but to Taiwan the bottom line was Chinese leaders called on Taipei to surrender its sovereignty.20 Thus Taiwan’s leaders did not consider China’s proposals seriously. Nevertheless, the Western media often treated Beijing’s gestures as reasonable while labelling Taipei’s responses obstinate. Taiwan’s foreign policy leaders thus adopted new stratagems: making counter-offers that Beijing could not accept, publicizing Taiwan’s desire (and its moral and legal right) to determine its own future while stating its residents’ desire to remain separate.21 In ensuing years, Taipei sought energetically to cement as many contacts as possible with willing nations and global organizations to avoid Beijing isolating Taiwan. Taipei went a step further with what some called its “substantive foreign policy,” meaning it sought to enlarge the scope of foreign relations by including less formal contacts. Beginning in late 1988 it began to speak about its “flexible diplomacy.” While the number of countries having official relations with Taiwan remained low, many wanted to carry on commercial and various other kinds of informal ties with Taiwan. Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs encouraged this while abandoning Taiwan’s previous all-or-nothing approach of claiming to be the only government to represent the Chinese people. This policy was fairly successful.22 Another of Taipei’s tactics was to proclaim it was an economic and political model for China and relations would improve once China had democratized.23 The 1980s saw another change in Taiwan’s diplomacy. Taipei began to pursue a lowering of cross-Strait tensions while allowing economic and other ties with China. Though its leaders valued Taiwan’s sovereignty, they perceived that they needed to pursue at least amicable relations with Beijing. Some thought that, ultimately, unification was likely and desirable. Still others perceived establishing closer economic and other relations with China would counterbalance growing demands for independence.

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The reality was that the People’s Republic of China had in many ways become a new and different country following the death of Mao in 1976 and the ascendancy of Deng Xiaoping to power in 1978. Deng’s economic policies brought prosperity, which gave rise to manifold political and social change in China. More important, China was on the way to becoming a global economic power that no one, especially Taiwan, could ignore. Some even opined that in light of the “new China” Taiwan could no longer control its “international destiny.”24 But there were countervailing winds.25 The Tiananmen Massacre in June 1989 made the People’s Republic of China a pariah nation in the eyes of many Western countries. Taiwan looked good by comparison, yet Taipei could not, or at least perceived it should not, try to isolate China or eschew contacts with Beijing. It had attempted this before. More important, China and Taiwan were in the same economic bloc in what many in Taiwan perceived was an evolving tri-polar (the European Union, the North American Free Trade Association and the Pacific Basin bloc) world.26 In the meantime, in January 1988 Lee Teng-hui became Taiwan’s first Taiwanese president. He coined the term “pragmatic diplomacy” to describe Taiwan’s approach to foreign affairs. Lee accelerated Taiwan’s efforts to reestablish or maintain contacts with as many nations as possible—even those having formal diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic of China. This meant dual recognition, which Taipei had heretofore rejected. Taipei at this time adopted still another concept. Some called it a multidirectional or omnidirectional approach to diplomacy.27 Subsequently, Taiwan sought trade and other relations with former and current Communist nations. Taipei also made efforts to become part of the “New World Order” and take advantage of new rules and ideals in global politics, including the notion that no country or political entity should be barred from participating in the global community.28 In 1991, Lee ended Taiwan’s so-called period of mobilization, officially terminating the state of war with Beijing. In 1993, Taiwan engaged in open talks with Beijing for the first time. The meetings were predicated on Taiwan accepting the doctrine of one China, though Taipei could have its own interpretation of the meaning of “China.” This was called the “92 Consensus.” There followed for a while a significant thaw in cross-Strait relations.29 However, President Lee soon perceived China was still closing Taiwan’s “international space” and undermining its diplomatic status. Lee wanted to “break out.” In 1995, he visited the United States and there made a pitch for Taiwan’s right to be regarded a sovereign country. This seriously soured relations with China. In 1999, President Lee announced what was called the “two-state theory” (that Taiwan and China were two countries) again angering China’s leaders. Thus his tenure as president ended on a low note in terms of cross-Strait relations.30 When Chen Shui-bian became president in 2000, he promised to improve relations with both the United States and China. In his inauguration speech

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he announced that he did not seek independence and supported the ’92 Consensus.31 Beijing took a wait-and-see stance toward Chen. Meanwhile, early in the Bush administration U.S.–Taiwan relations were arguably better than they had been. But this soon changed, and Taiwan’s relations with both Beijing and Washington deteriorated badly. President Chen forgot his earlier statements and provoked China with comments about Taiwan’s independence. Chinese leaders could not accept this. Neither could the United States. After 9/11 China joined the United States in fighting the war on terrorism—which the Bush administration much appreciated. Washington came to perceive that Chen sought to rile China for his own political gain while disregarding America’s preoccupation with terrorism; thus, President Bush questioned whether Taiwan under the Chen administration was a faithful ally.32 Facing these circumstances China showed its mettle. Beijing established diplomatic relations with several of Taiwan’s allies. (Chen had earlier boasted that he could improve Taiwan’s diplomatic situation.) Chen’s subsequent efforts to win representation in the United Nations as Taiwan (not the Republic of China) turned into an embarrassment for Taiwan. The Chen administration’s advancing local nationalism in the meantime prompted many Overseas Chinese communities to switch sides to China when Beijing made a pitch for their loyalty. In short, under Chen Taiwan became more isolated and its foreign policy overall less successful.33 In 2008, Ma Ying-jeou was elected president. Ma sought to reduce tension with China that President Chen had engendered and also improve relations with the United States. He succeeded in doing both. In fact, observers said he had lowered the previous high level of tension in the Taiwan Strait and they worried less about a conflict there that might turn this flashpoint into the site of a major conflict or war. Ma adopted a new policy that he called “viable diplomacy,” which was basically pragmatism, or using better relations with China to pursue Taiwan’s diplomatic objectives elsewhere. In fact, when he left office his external policies enjoyed high marks.34 But this did not resolve the problem Ma faced with the opposition parties portraying Ma as “selling out” Taiwan to China. Ma had to face the reality that the population of the island wanted to preserve Taiwan’s sovereignty, that many feared China was a fast growing power both economically and militarily and it had designs on Taiwan, and finally that the United States was declining in influence. Thus managing foreign relations, especially with China, which was once figured as a major Ma asset, turned into a liability during the latter part of his presidency.35 Tsai Ing-wen’s foreign policy agenda enunciated during the 2016 presidential election campaign managed to please the United States and caused China to “wait and see” to some extent, though Chinese leaders assailed her for not accepting the ’92 Consensus. After the election her relations with Beijing tumbled badly, while her dealings with the United States, Japan and Europe to some extent (yet to be determined) compensated for that.36 As of

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mid-2019, President Tsai’s management of foreign affairs, especially Taiwan’s relations with China, did not receive many kudos. Relations with the United States were good.

Domestic Affairs and Foreign Policy The influence of domestic politics on Taiwan’s foreign policy is a relatively recent phenomenon even though in the past internal affairs arguably influenced foreign policy making more than it did in other places in the world. The reasons: Taiwan is small, it lacks natural resources, it is highly dependent on trade, etc. However, most relevant to the rise of domestic politics in influencing foreign policy making, of course, were Taiwan’s close relations with the United States, its important role in global affairs and its democratization.37 Early on Taiwan’s membership in the United Nations, including the Security Council, drew public attention to its global importance. The KMT proclaimed that it, rather than the Communist regime on the Mainland, represented the Chinese people; hence officials in Taipei felt compelled to demonstrate that they had public support at home for the major tenets of Taiwan’s foreign policy. At an early date the government also had to heed public opinion for other reasons. For example, most people in Taiwan felt that the government should be more concerned about domestic problems, especially economic development, than with overthrowing Mao’s regime in China. This explains why the leadership started playing down this issue.38 Yet the public in Taiwan generally supported the government’s external relations, especially its ties with the developed Western countries—most notably the United States. Security was most important. The United States (and other Western countries including Japan) also provided investment capital for Taiwan’s economic expansion. Thus, neither the populace in Taiwan nor top government officials ever seriously considered questioning Washington’s lead in international affairs or the wisdom of Taiwan maintaining close relations with the United States. During the 1960s, when Taiwan’s diplomatic ties with much of the world began to look tenuous, foreign policy makers began to seek even more solid domestic support for their main external goals.39 In particular policy makers sought public approval for their economic and cultural diplomacy, and they got it. In the early 1970s, public inputs into foreign policy making increased in importance. Taipei’s expulsion from the United Nations in 1971 engendered widespread public apprehension that the Republic of China was doomed to de-legitimization and isolation. For the first time, serious public debate ensued over foreign policy. As noted earlier when Chiang Ching-kuo became premier in 1972, he ordered the Nationalist Party and the government to respect public opinion in making both domestic and foreign policy. Foreign policy decision makers also declared that Taiwan’s future should be determined in a democratic way, the implication being that Taiwan should

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remain sovereign and independent because its population wanted this. Meanwhile Taiwan’s Mainland Chinese leaders had become increasingly comfortable with the idea of remaining in Taiwan and, with the exception of a few hard-liners, abandoned any hope of returning to China. Most, because of their bad experience negotiating with the Chinese Communists in the 1930s and 1940s and the now bright economic prospects at home, they saw little advantage in trying to reach a reconciliation with Beijing.40 With Taiwan’s first national competitive election in 1980, a two-party election in 1986 and the termination of martial law the following year, opposition politicians became much more active, and with that their influence on the formulation of foreign policy grew. Their dissatisfaction with their government’s external relations was often expressed in public. In response the Ministry of Foreign Affairs became even more sensitive to the public’s views. In fact, some say this gave rise to the term “public diplomacy” that became a popular theme talked up by Taiwan’s diplomats.41 In one important respect, the public debate worked to the advantage of foreign policy decision makers: because of democratization, they could say the reason they resisted negotiating with Beijing about reunification was that the people of Taiwan did not want it, at least not now. They also pointed out that the Nationalist Party was no longer the only political party in Taiwan; thus party-to-party talks were inappropriate (which Beijing called for to avoid government-to-government contacts that would, China feared, accord Taipei nation-state status).42 In 1979, after the United States broke diplomatic relations with Taipei, widespread debate on foreign relations again ensued. Opposition politicians became particularly vocal at this time. They advocated a more “democratically based” foreign policy lest, they said, Taiwan would not survive China’s pressure to negotiate reunification. The issue of Taiwan’s independence was thus thrust into the foreign policy debate. However, there was a dilemma: advocacy of legally separating Taiwan from China was sedition according to the law even though the government had virtually abandoned its policy of liberating China. Moreover, proclaiming an independent Taiwan was unnecessarily risky in the eyes of most of Taiwan’s residents because it might provoke Beijing to use military force against Taiwan. Plus the United States opposed it. Yet because of democratization, talk of independence could not be curtailed.43 Incidentally the government, or at least the ruling Nationalist Party, found it convenient to argue that its policy was “moderate” or middle ground between Beijing demanding reunification and Taiwanese independence advocates asking for separation and no ties with China. In fact, the KMT’s status quo or “wait and see” policy looked reasonable and found broad support as reflected in opinion polls.44 In 1989, after the massacre of students and other protesters in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, the People’s Republic of China became seen as a pariah to the population of Taiwan. This and an election victory by the opposition

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DPP that year further caused the Western media to treat Taiwan as a democracy and worthy of praise. Beijing’s overtures and its pressure on Taipei to negotiate reunification lost credibility. President Lee Teng-hui took advantage of the situation. He adopted a strategy he called “flexible diplomacy” to promote Taiwan in ways that the public supported.45 This included remaining a member of the Asian Development Bank under a new name, “Taipei, China,” when China gained membership, establishing diplomatic relations (or restoring them) with more developing countries, agreeing to have formal ties with countries that recognized Beijing, making well publicized foreign trips, the “Go South” policy to divert Taiwan’s investments and trade from China to Southeast Asia, and more.46 Subsequently, concern for public opinion was widely cited in Taipei’s efforts to participate in various international organizations.47 Although Taiwan did not win support from any important global political bodies in this effort, by citing its successful democratization and the wishes of Taiwan’s population, it embarrassed various organizations that excluded Taiwan. In the early 1990s, the independence issue seemed in large part resolved, or at least defused, when, in 1991, the DPP placed the issue of independence in its campaign platform that year and voters rebuffed it.48 Then with the resumption of talks between Taipei and Beijing and a meeting of the minds leading to the ’92 Consensus, the issue receded a bit more. However, after China conducted missile tests to intimidate Taiwan in 1995 and 1996, independence gained considerably in popularity. But supporters of independence did poorly in the December 1998 election.49 The upshot was that only sometimes was independence a winning issue at the polls; alternatively it was at once a rallying call and something voters feared to support. In the meantime, with so many citizens traveling to China and with trade and investment there increasing rapidly, public attitudes regarding contacts with China began to change. Many people in Taiwan, especially businesspeople (including many Taiwanese), opposed government restrictions preventing more extensive commercial contacts. Many feared being left out of the “China boom.” Finally, with the advent of a New World Order, President Lee began to think about broader economic ties with China.50 In the 1970s, public opinion began to have an impact through the legislature in Taiwan. Lawmakers were sensitive to public views, especially organized special interest or lobbying groups. The most noteworthy was the influence the business community had on legislation to push expanding commercial relations with China and legalize direct contacts across the Taiwan Strait. The legislature put pressure on foreign policy decision makers in a number of ways. Elections also had a greater impact on foreign policy, especially legislative elections. Voters judged candidates increasingly by their foreign policy agendas and what they said about foreign affairs.51 Almost simultaneous with this trend, think tanks, interest groups and the mass media became influencers on foreign policy issues. Their influence went

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far in explaining the policy choices for decision makers and often determined an obvious decision.52 Another aspect of the public’s interest in foreign policy was the government promoting its “democratic foreign policy” via its publication of treatises on defense and foreign policy.53 In early 1993, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs published its first-ever foreign relations white paper, presenting an easy-toread but fairly detailed statement of Taiwan’s foreign policy matters. In recent years, reports and statements on defense and foreign policy have been issued regularly. Meanwhile, high officials including many who had spent time in the academic world wrote books and contributed articles on Taiwan’s foreign relations and foreign policy.54 When Chen Shui-bian campaigned for president, he built the main tenets of his foreign policy largely on public opinion surveys and the notion of public diplomacy. As president, Chen found that he could improve his image by making foreign policy pronouncements and personally taking charge of the conduct of Taiwan’s diplomacy. He was also quite effective in drawing public attention with foreign trips. Some observers even said that Chen was Taiwan’s first “foreign policy president.”55 However, as his popularity waned his foreign policy and his personal conduct of diplomacy ceased to work well; in fact, some opined it created an uncomfortable disconnect between public sentiment and the conduct of foreign relations. President Ma Ying-jeou heeded and used the views of the public on various issues in making foreign policy decisions. His relationship with China was supported by the public’s view that trade ties should go forward quickly but that political change should proceed slowly, if at all. In fact, he won re-election in 2012 in some part because the public supported his diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis China and the United States.56 However, as it turned out President Ma overreached in pursuing closer relations with China, at least more than the public would accept, and this affected his presidency adversely. Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP watched closely public opinion during the 2014 and 2016 election campaigns. In the case of the latter, when she was running for president she adopted positions that were either supported by the majority of voters or were not controversial. She avoided being specific about relations with China with her status quo policy. She spoke in cordial language about the United States. She was positive about Taiwan’s role in the world.57 However, as we will see in a following section, her policies vis-à-vis China created serious controversy. She was caught between a rock and a hard place in dealing with Chinese leaders. Then with a new administration in the United States, Tsai found herself in a bind between supporting progressive ideals, keeping military spending low and trade in a favorable status (larger exports than imports) with the United States. This did not satisfy the Trump administration. Satisfying local opinions and dealing with foreign policy were in this instance at odds.

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Taiwan’s National Security Policy It is said that national security is the driving force that undergirds if not governs Taiwan’s foreign policy making.58 The reason is that almost without peers, Taiwan has been under threat by a much bigger power, in fact, now a truly global power or superpower: China. Thus, its strategic thinking has been dominated by how to deal with the China military threat. That is still true. Some background will help put Taiwan’s national security problems in perspective. As noted in Chapter 2, shortly after the Nationalists fled to Taiwan in 1949, Mao made plans to “liberate” the island by force—specifically an invasion. With the launching of the Korean War, which China was presumed to be an important party to, the United States not only stopped a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) plan to invade Taiwan by dispatching the 7th Fleet to the Taiwan Strait, but also became the guarantor of Taiwan’s security. However, Washington declined the help of Nationalist troops in Korea and sought to limit Taiwan’s offensive military capabilities by supplying it almost exclusively with defensive arms. The U.S. sought to prevent a confrontation Taiwan might start with China that would ignite a broader war and entangle the United States. American advisors also tried to persuade Taipei to reduce its forces on Quemoy and Matsu. The United States reasoned that they constituted a tinderbox or tripwire plus they were vulnerable to being cut off and destroyed or captured by Mao’s People’s Liberation Army forces. But Chiang Kai-shek was unwilling to do this because the Offshore Islands symbolized Taipei’s links with the Mainland and connected to his claim to be the legitimate government of China. Thus, Chiang kept approximately one-third of Taiwan’s military manpower on these islands.59 Eventually realizing its military manpower was too small to successfully attack China, Taiwan’s leaders adopted an economic/political strategy to defeat China. In any case, President Chiang cut the size of Taiwan’s military, including the number of soldiers on the Offshore Islands. At the same time he upgraded the military’s professionalism and the quality of its weapons and moved toward a defensive military strategy.60 A serious problem remained: Taiwan could not obtain all of the weapons it wanted to raise the level of sophistication of its military. In particular, Taiwan needed state-of-the-art fighter planes and antisubmarine warfare capabilities. The United States was Taiwan’s only meaningful supplier of such weapons, but it refused to sell Taipei everything it wanted. So Taiwan had to look for other sources. The government managed to purchase two submarines from Holland (delivered in 1988), but Beijing put such pressure on the Dutch government that it pledged not to make any more weapons sales to Taiwan. Taiwan purchased weapons from other European countries but nothing significant. Israel was willing to sell weapons to Taiwan, but Taipei, with a few exceptions, eschewed buying weapons from Israel because of Taiwan’s good relations with Saudi Arabia and its dependence on several Middle Eastern countries for oil.61

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The situation looked to worsen badly for Taiwan in 1982 when Washington promised Beijing it would cut and eventually end arms sales to Taiwan. However, the pledge did not include military technology. In fact, such transfers made it possible for Taiwan to build its own high-performance jet aircraft called the Indigenous Defense Fighter or Ching Kuo (after the late president), a prototype of which was put into service in 1994. The plane gave Taiwan added ability to control the air space over Taiwan and part of the Taiwan Strait. However, it was designed by the United States to lack long-range flight and it thus could not be used effectively as a weapon to attack China. One hundred and thirty planes were built at a unit cost of $24 million. Building it was not cost-efficient as Taiwan was the only buyer.62 Then there was a breakthrough: in 1992, the Bush administration offered to sell F-16 fighter planes to Taiwan. At almost the same time, France proposed selling Taipei its Mirage fighters. The government bought both. This change in policy by two major arms producers seemed to reflect a consensus abroad, in the United States at least, that Beijing’s increased defense spending and its purchasing more sophisticated weapons from Moscow after the breakup of the Soviet Union needed to be balanced.63 Subsequently, Taiwan’s biggest concern became China’s military build-up across the Taiwan Strait made possible by improved relations with Russia and reduced tension on China’s northern border. The big item was the short-range missiles Beijing had built and placed in areas adjacent to Taiwan. Beijing’s missiles clearly exposed one of Taiwan’s vulnerabilities. Soon China had more than 1,000 missiles aimed at Taiwan and was reportedly increasing the number by 50 to 100 per year.64 In addition to the damage that a missile attack would inflict on military facilities and population centers, Taiwan also had to worry that Beijing might quarantine the island through verbal threats and military maneuvers (with missiles to back them up). China could shut down Taiwan’s trade. In response, and coinciding with an increased willingness on the part of the United States to sell arms to Taiwan, Taipei purchased antimissile defense systems (including the Patriot missile system) and other weapons.65 After 2000, the Chen administration formulated a new strategy to deal with the China threat. President Chen adopted an offensive policy to replace what had long been essentially a defensive posture when he announced a new strategy called a “decisive offshore campaign.” This policy was much more aggressive in nature. Chen’s premier even spoke publicly of bombing Shanghai and Hong Kong in retaliation if China were to attack Taiwan.66 But President Chen had his detractors. Many felt the new strategy and his “wild talk” of independence would make Taiwan less secure. In any event, the United States and a number of other countries did not support Chen’s proposed new policy thereby weakening it to the point of it having little impact.67 In 2008, the just elected Ma administration adopted a security policy of improving relations with China while upgrading Taiwan’s military forces. This strategy brought changes in the makeup of Taiwan’s military. The manpower

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of its military was cut to 275,000 with a further reduction to 215,000 planned for 2014. Half of its personnel were career military. Compulsory military service was cut to 12 months. More funds were allotted to the air force and navy. More money was also allocated to military training and high-tech weapons.68 Yet, in almost all realms of preparedness Taiwan was not keeping up with China’s military expansion. Thus President Ma intended Taiwan’s military to be purely a defensive force that would fend off a PLA attack for a short time until the United States could come to Taiwan’s rescue—which had been the thrust of Taiwan’s military planning before President Chen. President Ma, however, was reluctant to state that Taiwan was utterly dependent on the United States for its defense. This led to a serious question: What were Taiwan’s options? Clearly Taiwan could not match China’s military build-up with one of its own and had to rely on the U.S. military to deter China from attacking the island. What else could it do? Taipei might look for other allies. In the past one possibility was the Soviet Union. During the 1960s and 1970s, because of strained relations between Moscow and Beijing, there was reason to believe that Soviet leaders wanted to see Taiwan remain outside Beijing’s control. The Soviet Union’s Pacific Fleet indeed benefited from the Taiwan Strait being an open international waterway. Moscow gave some signals, including making references to Taiwan as a “nation” and giving Taipei information on Soviet naval maneuvers, that it wished to see the status quo in the area preserved.69 But with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fact that Russia was soon pursuing good relations with China, this option no longer existed, if indeed it ever did. Japan was considered a possible ally and still is. Many, probably most, policy makers in Tokyo preferred a separate Taiwan to one that is part of the People’s Republic of China because of the importance of Japan’s trade and investment ties with Taiwan, historical links and Japan’s possible interest in eventually extending its naval power farther south. In a joint communiqué with the United States in 1969, Tokyo referred to Taiwan as being “within its defense perimeter.” In 1997, Tokyo signed an agreement with the United States whereby Japan promised to provide logistical support to the United States in “situations surrounding Japan”—presumably including Taiwan.70 However, Tokyo was restrained by pacifism at home. Also, the Japanese government faced the problem of apprehension and even fear among nations in the region about its growing military strength. Thus, even though Japan wished Taiwan to remain independent, Tokyo was reluctant to translate this into policy. Certainly Japan was highly unlikely to pursue a Taiwan policy that is at odds with that of the United States. Finally, increasingly Japan did not seek to challenge China militarily. Then there was the issue of theater missile defense (TMD). The United States and Japan were working on such a system for Northeast Asia, nominally aimed at the North Korean missile (and nuclear weapons) threat. Many observers, however, opined that TMD was also (primarily perhaps) directed at

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China, and Taiwan might join this project. Its leaders hinted strongly that Taiwan would like to. If Taipei were to participate, Taiwan could better defend itself against the threat (and use of) Chinese missiles. Also, Taiwan would benefit from an important psychological boost because its security would be linked to Japan’s and the U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan would be increased. But China adamantly opposed TMD and was hostile to the idea of Taiwan’s joining and that did not happen.71 Another presumed option for Taiwan was to build nuclear weapons. Because Beijing had them—and never ceased to threaten to use military force against Taiwan—Taipei would seem to have been justified in making its own. Taipei had done research on nuclear power and had the technology, the money and the scientists to build nuclear bombs, maybe within less than a year if it decided to do so.72 However, as noted earlier, in the 1970s, the United States pressured Taiwan to stop its nuclear weapons program, and Taipei obliged. It was rumored that Taipei had concluded a secret agreement with the United States that affords Taiwan certain military guarantees in return for Taiwan’s not developing nuclear weapons.73 In any case, Taipei could reinstate its program, or it might try to purchase nuclear weapons. Perhaps, even worse, it might produce or buy chemical and biological weapons. Beijing claimed Taiwan could produce nuclear weapons easily and speculated that it already had chemical and biological weapons (although Taipei denied this).74 Several other options were available to Taipei in the event of a military clash with China. Taipei could cause considerable dislocation to trade and travel in the area by declaring a state of war and/or by delineating military zones and warning ships and planes to stay away. It might surrender islands it controls in the South China Sea to Vietnam or some other country in the region, thereby creating a diversion. It might allow or even encourage citizens to flee thereby creating a refugee problem for the United States and/or the international community. Taiwan might even threaten to bomb Chinese cities or dams (including the Three Gorges dam, which would cause tremendous losses in lives and property if hit).75 Finally, Taipei’s strategic planners showed an interest in joining an East Asian security system or collective security organization—with or without Beijing. If an “Asian NATO” were to evolve, Taiwan might use it to bolster its security. Such an alliance system, however, seemed but a distant possibility, if one at all. A more realistic option for Taiwan was supporting a U.S.-managed Asian balance of power system. Such a concept had been around for some years. It offered the United States a way to cope with China’s military expansion and America’s decline. It also offered Japan, the countries of Southeast Asia and India a means to counter China’s growing military prowess.76 In any case such a “system” never materialized. Thus Taiwan had to rely on the U.S. security guarantees. But there were some questions about that, including whether Taiwan was doing its part. During the Chen, Ma and Tsai presidencies Taiwan’s defense spending, as a

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portion of its GDP, was quite low. In Chen’s case, he viewed the military as manned at the top by an ethnic group he did not like—Mainland Chinese. Also he was confronted with a recession soon after he became president. To Ma, larger defense budgets were not necessary in view of Taiwan’s relations with China having improved and Taiwan being without other military challengers. Never mind that China’s defense spending and its capabilities were increasing fast. For Tsai, Taiwan’s economy was doing poorly when she took office. Also she needed funds for many of her “progressive” projects while moving to an all-volunteer service began by Ma and continued by Tsai, which was expensive. Taiwan’s defense budget did not meet the 3 percent of GDP the United States expected or that was judged needed for Taiwan to be able to handle, even for a short time, a Chinese attack. This resulted in U.S. military strategists wondering (and sometimes saying) “if Taiwan is not interested in defending itself why should the U.S. spill its soldiers’ blood to do it.” Opinion polls in the United States showed Americans did not favor a war to defend Taiwan and further brought into question U.S. help. During the Obama presidency some military experts and think tanks even opined that given the cuts in U.S. defense spending and China’s fast rise in military prowess the United States should consider seriously letting China have Taiwan.77 Taiwan’s “saving grace” may be President Donald Trump’s rebuilding America’s military that is focused on Asia and aimed especially at enhancing the U.S. Navy’s capabilities. Perhaps Taiwan has a role. Its geostrategic position as a bulwark in blocking China’s naval expansion into the Pacific Ocean seems critical.78 One must also consider the fact that China’s civilian leadership wants to deal with the “Taiwan problem” with economic means, not military force, and has set a date of 2049 to finish the task—a date so far in advance that for some years it should not be a priority or emergency matter.79

Taiwan and the United States As noted in previous chapters, Taiwan’s relationship with America was, and is, based first and foremost on the United States being Taiwan’s security shield and protector against China. In other words, Taiwan would have perished had the United States in 1950 not assumed this role. The United States also provided Taiwan with economic help and served as an indispensable source of investments and a vital trading partner. Finally, America was Taiwan’s mentor from whom it learned democracy, came to respect human rights and much more. In other words, of all the nations in the world, the United States has been, and remains, by far the most important one to Taiwan. No other nation that Taiwan related to in the past or now connects with can compare.80 Furthermore, that relationship was generally a positive one. Yet some say otherwise. Some observers have called Taiwan a “U.S. vassal,” America’s “51st state,” and say Taiwan is excessively pro-American. Some even say Taiwan’s drive

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for independence has been contained because it “fell into a hole” of slavish dependence on America. Others say Taiwan survived because of its close relationship with the United States. The devil is in the details. U.S.–Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty concluded in 1954 committed the United States to defend Taiwan and the Pescadores and other close-by islands, and by a joint resolution passed by Congress in January 1955, also the Offshore Islands.81 U.S. aid, up to 1965, totalled $1.5 billion—more than the United States had given to any country not at war. In ensuing years, the United States was Taiwan’s leading trading partner and source of investment capital. U.S. defense and economic assistance to Taiwan were plainly vital to Taiwan’s well-being and it subsequently becoming an economic and later a political miracle.82 How did Taiwan win America’s favor? During the early years, Taipei maintained intimate ties with the China Lobby in the United States that had close ties with the Republican Party. The China Lobby had strong influence with Congress and supported close U.S. relations with Taiwan and opposed the U.S. dealing with “Red China.” In addition, Americans generally sympathized with Taiwan and saw China as an enemy country allied with the Soviet Union. Thus Washington also gave Taiwan backing so that it could remain in the United Nations and represent China in the global community. Taiwan’s government and its citizens viewed Republicans as being more favorably disposed toward Taiwan than Democrats given Republicans felt more in common with Asia and Democrats more comfortable with Europe because of their conservative versus liberal bents.83 Thus Republicans indeed treated Taiwan better, though Nixon’s rapprochement with China became a big exception.. Nevertheless Taiwan has had to deal with whatever administration is in power and has generally been adroit in doing this. Taipei employed various other means to keep U.S. support including sending outstanding diplomats to Washington, making efforts to impress U.S. tourists visiting Taiwan and expanding contacts with U.S. military personnel stationed in Taiwan. Taiwan also hired top public relations firms in Washington. In short, Taiwan studiously cultivated a close relationship with the United States. However, by the late 1960s America needed to normalize relations with the People’s Republic of China and this became a problem for Taiwan. In fact, in the early 1960s a two-China policy began to evolve in the United States. The reasons were apparent. After two Offshore Islands crises, the Eisenhower administration began seriously considering such a policy in an effort to preclude the outbreak of hostilities between Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung’s armies that might ensnare the United States in an unwanted war.84 But events intervened: the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution resulted in China’s self-imposed isolation while an escalation of the war in Vietnam again increased hostilities between the United States and China.85 In the former case, Taiwan condemned China’s Communist extremism and its bad impact on China’s population. In the latter case, Taiwan helped America fight

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the war. It provided bases for U.S. C-130 planes that operated in Vietnam plus considerable other logistical support. It offered bases for U.S. B-52s that bombed targets in both North and South Vietnam, though the United States declined this offer apparently to avoid making the “Taiwan issue” part of the war.86 A U.S. rapprochement with China, which seemed inevitable, thus was delayed. So it fell to President Richard Nixon to change U.S. policy toward China/Taiwan. Why Nixon? Nixon was determined to get out of Vietnam (with honor) and avoid U.S. involvement in another land war in Asia; he promised this during the campaign. He had to establish better relations with China to realize these goals.87 Nixon was also a follower of the realist school of thought in international politics. President Nixon faced still another serious foreign policy problem: because of diminishing public support for military spending at home and steadily larger military outlays by the Soviet Union, the United States was losing the global arms race. Nixon thus sought to establish strategic ties with China as a way to avoid having to continue to engage in a weapons-building contest with the Kremlin that the United States could not win, at least not in the short run. To Nixon’s advantage, China’s relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated markedly following a war on their border in the spring of 1969. President Nixon was thus able to employ what became known in the West as the “China card” (using closer ties with China to hold the Soviet Union in check). Thus for another reason, relations between Washington and Beijing improved markedly.88 U.S.–China relations being so vital, Nixon could not allow Taiwan to block a U.S.–China rapprochement; thus America’s commitment to Taiwan and Taipei–Washington relations were affected adversely. However, Taipei had no alternatives to holding on to its vital U.S. ties and keeping its reliance on Washington as its protector. Although Taipei knew it could not prevent U.S.– China relations from improving, it felt, or hoped, it could maintain good enough relations with the United States such that Washington would not abandon Taiwan.89 Taipei adjusted by democratizing its political system along lines suggested by Washington.. It paid more attention to human rights. At the request (more accurately pressure) of the United States, Taiwan terminated its plans to build nuclear weapons and promised never to go nuclear. In short, Taiwan sought energetically to maintain its friendship with the United States and the U.S. government.90 In 1979, Taiwan survived another trauma: the United States severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan while pledging to terminate the U.S.–Republic of China defense treaty a year later. However, the shock was softened by actions taken by the U.S. Congress. Congress reacted to President Jimmy Carter’s one-China policy and his alleged “abandonment” of Taiwan by enacting the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). This was the first-ever U.S. law

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establishing guidelines for relations with another political entity. President Carter signed it reluctantly in April 1979. The TRA to some degree re-established Taiwan’s status as a sovereign nation-state in allowing Taipei to continue to post diplomatic representatives in the United States, have access to U.S. courts, and enjoying diplomatic privileges. Finally, it provided Taiwan with continued U.S. security and economic guarantees.91 Yet some in Taiwan did not fancy the TRA. Throughout the document, the terms “Taiwan” or “the people of Taiwan” were used rather than “Republic of China.” This, some officials said, was demeaning. Some even complained it supported Taiwan’s independence. Still, most government officials in Taiwan supported the Act because it preserved the role of the United States as Taiwan’s protector and put Taipei–Washington political and other ties on a stable— albeit less formal—basis. Most important, the TRA did not acknowledge that Taiwan is part of China as was stated in President Carter’s Normalization Agreement.92 Taiwan’s relations with the United States remained steady for the next few years. President Reagan pursued good relations with China, but kept close ties with Taiwan. In 1989, as a result of the Tiananmen Massacre in Beijing and an election that year in Taiwan that reflected its fast-paced democratization, the U.S. public and the American media began to seriously reassess U.S.–Taiwan relations. An even more important event to policy makers in the United States and in Taiwan occurred at this time: the Soviet bloc began to disintegrate signalling that the Cold War was drawing to an end, which it did less than two years later. The impact of this event was uncertain at the time, but proved to be profound.93 With this as its backdrop, in 1992, President George H. W. Bush approved the sale of 150 F-16 fighter planes to Taiwan for $6 billion. The move reflected U.S. concern that Beijing, by fast increasing its defence spending and buying sophisticated weapons from Russia, had undermined the balance of forces in the Taiwan Strait. Washington also questioned why Beijing was expanding its military budget when other powers throughout the world were cutting theirs in response to the end of the Cold War. In any event, Taiwan’s most serious strategic problem, air superiority over the island and part of the Taiwan Strait, at least for the time being, was resolved in its favor.94 When he became president, Bill Clinton seemed kindly disposed toward Taiwan. Clinton had made four trips to Taiwan when he was the governor of Arkansas (his purpose being to sell the state’s products). He had never visited China. During his presidential campaign, he was hyper critical of Beijing for its human rights abuses while assailing President Bush for not registering sufficient concern about this.95 In 1994, the Clinton administration reviewed U.S. policy toward Taiwan and made adjustments that allowed senior officials to visit Taiwan, permitted Taiwan’s leaders to make stopovers in the United States, and changed the title of Taiwan’s diplomatic offices in the United States (from the Coordination

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Council for North American Affairs to Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office, which indicated the office represented Taiwan). He also promised support for Taipei’s entrance into international organizations where statehood was not at issue.96 But Clinton’s pro-Taiwan stance didn’t last. He soon began to tilt toward China, recognizing the economic importance of China and the need to promote trade and job creation at home. In rejoinder to Clinton’s shift to a proChina foreign policy, Congress sided with Taiwan and attached a provision to an appropriations bill stating that the TRA had precedence over the communiqués negotiated with Beijing. President Clinton signed it. Congress also pressured the president to allow President Lee Teng-hui to visit the United States (which he did in June 1995) and began work on a bill called the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act to upgrade the defence provisions of the TRA. Congress, so acting, assumed the role of protecting Taiwan against what it saw was a hostile State Department and White House.97 In 1995 and 1996, the United States literally came to Taiwan’s rescue when China conducted threatening missile tests near Taiwan’s shores. President Clinton dispatched two U.S. carrier groups to the Taiwan Strait to display U.S. power and checkmate Beijing (though some say he did this in anticipation of Congress taking the initiative if he failed to act). In any event, this action constituted the largest display of U.S. military power in Asia since the Vietnam War. Some said later that the United States and China nearly went to war. But most observers said China backed down.98 In the aftermath of the crisis, the White House spoke of ending America’s policy of “strategic ambiguity” in U.S.–China/Taiwan policy. Why? Clinton’s advisors expressed concern that Taiwan’s major opposition party, the DPP, might seek to push Taiwan toward a formal separation from China in defiance of America’s one-China policy. Hence, President Clinton sent officials to Taipei to “send them a message.” Washington also changed a major tenet of its Taiwan policy: no longer did it believe that the Taiwan issue was “a matter for the Chinese themselves to resolve” (as many U.S. leaders had said). Rather, the crisis warranted a steady U.S. concern.99 In 1998, President Clinton travelled to China. There, he formally stated what was known as the “three no’s” policy: no to two Chinas, no to one China and one Taiwan, and no to Taiwan’s joining international organizations that required statehood for membership. This had been U.S. policy, but no president had ever stated it in public, much less in China. The president also poignantly described the relationship of the United States with the People’s Republic of China as a “strategic partnership.”100 Both statements upset Taiwan as well as the U.S. Congress. Led by Republicans, Congress forthwith passed several resolutions repudiating Clinton’s idea of strategic ties with China while condemning his “ill treatment” of Taiwan. Subsequently Clinton’s efforts to improve relations with China were undermined for another reason: his decision to pursue theater missile defense (TMD) in Northeast Asia (part of his national missile

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defense program) with Japan. Chinese leaders were in particular angered by talk of Taiwan’s participation.101 During the presidential election campaign in 2000, George W. Bush took a decidedly friendlier stance toward Taiwan and as president adopted distinctly pro-Taiwan policies. He repudiated Clinton’s strategic partnership (with China) idea. After a crisis in April 2001 that followed a mid-air collision of a U.S. reconnaissance plane and a Chinese air force fighter (called the EP-3 Incident), Bush said he would do “whatever it took” to defend Taiwan. He subsequently approved the largest arms sales deal ever for Taiwan, save his father’s F-16 sales. Finally, he allowed some high officials from Taiwan to visit or travel through the United States. Observers reported that U.S.–Taiwan relations had not been better in many years.102 But Bush did not alter America’s one-China policy or support Taiwan’s independence. These “mainstays” of U.S.–Taiwan policy remained. Then, after 9/11, the Bush administration’s relationship with Beijing shifted dramatically. This was largely due to the fact that China signed on as a “partner” in Bush’s war on terrorism. But the Bush administration also became convinced that President Chen was taking the United States for granted and disregarded U.S. concerns when, for his own political reasons, he provoked China with talk of an independent Taiwan. Also he flouted his campaign promises to lower tensions in the Taiwan Strait.103 U.S. policy makers concluded that Chen was dangerous, labelled him a loose cannon and took various measures to express America’s dislike of him and his policies. This included questioning Taiwan’s sovereignty (though this was a warning, not a shift in U.S. policy) while restricting Chen and members of his administration from visiting and/or transiting the United States. The United States also openly opposed Chen’s push for Taiwan’s legal independence when he proposed a referendum to join the United Nations as Taiwan.104 Washington’s distrust of Chen remained for the rest of his presidency. President Chen’s offensive strategy to cope with the threat from China was obviously a deep concern to U.S. officials who presumed it might spark an American conflict with China. This evoked a “what if” question, meaning what action the United States would take if it anticipated the Chen administration might cross the line in inciting Beijing. The United States had intelligence facilities in Taiwan and good relations with Taiwan’s military, which probably enabled the American government to know in advance if such a policy were in play. Patently the United States might have taken active steps to stop Chen. When Ma Ying-jeou was elected Taiwan’s president in 2008, the United States sighed in relief and sent its congratulations. Ma lived up to his billing: he reduced tensions with China. President Ma also sent effective diplomats to Washington, and in a number of other ways engineered much better U.S.– Taiwan relations. Ma and his administration maintained a low profile when visiting the United States and in other ways were cautious not to cause friction between the United States and China. Finally, Ma oversaw closer U.S.– Taiwan military ties.105

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However, some U.S. officials felt that Ma was too pro-China. Arguably the United States did not want Taiwan’s unification with China—notwithstanding America’s one-China policy. Otherwise, why did Washington espouse the position that Taiwan should decide its future and declare that the “Taiwan issue” had to be resolved peacefully? Both favored the advocates of independence. Also there was a palpable shift in Washington away from unequivocally supporting Ma and the KMT (or opposing the DPP), especially toward the end of the Ma years when his administration was visibly moving away from the president’s 2008 campaign slogan “no to unification or independence” to favor the former.106 To some important officials in the U.S. defense and intelligence agencies, those who talked unification were oblivious to the fact that Taiwan was important to the United States for some important reasons: American intelligence facilities on Taiwan provided valuable information on China, numerous patents and technology (both civilian and military) would be lost to China if Taiwan were to unify, and the effect unification would have on U.S. allies was a grave matter. Also, not mentioned often by Taiwan (including the advocates of independence) Taiwan has, or can, play a vital role in blocking China from projecting its military power in the Pacific Ocean where it would then threaten the U.S. West Coast. In other words, Taiwan is important in maintaining the “first island chain” that contains China’s navy.107 They also lost faith in Ma when his public support at home faded and he became a less effective leader. Another factor was that Taiwan’s defense spending was not what the United States wanted or expected. Washington’s misgivings about Taiwan during the Ma years to some degree were fed by the DPP and its friends and lobbyists in the United States. Adding to that, Tsai Ing-wen was busy trying to make a good impression in the United States before the 2016 election. She told officials in Washington, many of whom took notice, that Ma’s close relationship with China would damage Taiwan’s relationship with the United States and that Taiwan’s democracy was vulnerable to Chinese influence.108 There was another new variable in U.S.–Taiwan relations: Barack Obama was elected president of the United States the same year as Ma assumed the presidency in Taiwan. Obama had said almost nothing about Taiwan during the campaign. As president, U.S.–Taiwan policy for some months remained what it was under the Bush administration. President Obama focused on problems in the Middle East. His reference point in terms of his view of the world was Europe; he paid little attention to Asia.109 However, in 2009, during the president’s first visit to China, this changed. President Obama concurred with Beijing that Taiwan was one of its “core interests,” which was taken by most observers to mean that in America’s judgment Taiwan is territory that belongs to China and should be returned. To some pundits, Obama’s words reflected the increasingly large debt the United States owed to China, and the United States not keeping pace with China’s military advances. Others said the United States should extricate itself

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from the Chinese civil war. Subsequently the pro-Obama media and proObama scholars and officials began to speak and write that the United States should consider abandoning Taiwan. Some pro-Obama military leaders even declared Taiwan could not be defended and anyway was not worth the problems it posed to U.S.–China relations.110 However, President Obama soon came to perceive that China had manipulated him to agree to Taiwan being a “core issue” and that the U.S. trade deficit with China and its accompanying debt were serious matters. Obama concluded that China was not a friend but rather a challenge, perhaps worse. In 2012, he adopted a new and important tenet of U.S. policy: the “pivot to Asia.” This policy was accompanied by the Transpacific Partnership deal that was the economic leg of the pivot. Both were distinctly anti-China.111 U.S.–Taiwan policy, which might have been upgraded, was not. President Obama apparently did not want to risk a new controversy or a new conflict with China. In any case, by the end of the Obama presidency, in large measure because of cutting defense spending amidst a weak U.S. economy, Obama’s pivot to Asia was deemed dead on arrival.112 In 2015 and early 2016, Tsai Ing-wen, the candidate of the opposition DPP, was poised to win the coming presidential election in Taiwan. Previously the United States had not supported her or her party. But during the campaign she curried favor with U.S. officials and to the liking of U.S. diplomats pledged to support the status quo in relations with China. The State Department and the White House adopted a neutral position and perhaps even favored her before the election. Congress and the U.S. populace liked her.113 When she won the election, U.S. officials congratulated her and praised her, as did the media and academe. That November, Donald J. Trump won the U.S. presidential election. The next month president-elect Trump took a telephone call from President Tsai and a cordial conversation followed. China expressed anger while many observers in the United States said Trump had violated protocol. In any event Tsai and her party and many others in Taiwan were elated. But soon President Trump in a call with President Xi subsequently said he accepted the one-China policy. In April, President Trump entertained President Xi at his second home in Florida; during and after the visit Trump praised Xi and spoke of a great personal relationship with him. That connection became even better when President Trump travelled to China in November. At this point U.S.–Taiwan policy palpably shifted and it appeared Taiwan was downgraded as an American interest.114 However, it was not long after this that U.S.–China relations turned south over trade issues and in that context Washington–Taipei relations improved markedly on several fronts with Congress leading the way. In fact, there was talk among academics as well as others that the Trump administration was playing the “Taiwan card.” This meant that the United States was using better relations with Taiwan as leverage against China. Whether this was a favorable trend for Taiwan or simply a temporary diversion was uncertain.

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Some of the issues of U.S. cordiality toward Taiwan looked overstated or fleeting.115 Searching for trends in U.S. relations with Taiwan, several can be cited. Clearly close ties with Taiwan and China tend to alternate; relations with Taiwan are better during election campaigns and early in a new administration and then reality sets in and relations become better with China; Congress is more pro-Taiwan than the executive branch of government; Republicans are more favorably disposed toward Taiwan than Democrats. The United States wants neither unification nor independence in spite of what often appears to be leanings one way or the other. The Trump administration, however, is not typical of U.S. presidencies, so too its China/Taiwan policy. President Trump is unique among U.S. presidents. He is unpredictable, as he wants to be. He stresses negotiations. In fact, some DPP leaders have expressed concern that he may bargain Taiwan away for something he wants from China. He has also stated that he questions going to war to protect Taiwan and opposes America’s involvement in wars generally.116 The bottom line is that U.S. relations with Taiwan are not certain.

Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China How to parse the disparate views of Taiwan–China (or Republic of China– People’s Republic of China) relations has vexed both China and Taiwan scholars, not to mention specialists in global strategic studies, U.S. foreign policy wonks and others for years. Thus, where to begin? Alternative ways of looking at their contacts are basically from the perspective of domestic politics on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait and the international milieu. Yet neither, or even both of these together, is little more than marginally sufficient.117 First, Taiwan’s perception of China…To Taiwan, the cross-Strait relationship is mainly based on their economic ties and the real or imagined perilous economic dependence on China that may lead to political bonds that Taiwan feels it must avoid, but cannot. Taiwan’s perception of being bullied by China and its resorting to victimhood are other variables. Both have been amplified by the DPP’s rise.118 One might also cite Taiwan’s feeling of advantage cum arrogance that it is a democracy and China is not. Looking at the relationship from a broader global perspective, Taiwan sees China from the viewpoint of a U.S.–China–Taiwan triangle wherein Taiwan must play one of the two big powers against the other; but it is the small actor trying to influence two great power nations, which is next to impossible.119 Bringing this up-to-date, Taiwan has recently tried to join forces with progressive regimes around the world that oppose China’s rise in power and stature. How did we get here? It was a product of the Cold War and its end. But in the early 1960s, the international political scene changed. Détente between

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the superpowers impacted Taiwan’s view of China. Then in the 1970s, Taipei lost two diplomatic battles with Beijing: one over representing China in the United Nations and the other in maintaining diplomatic ties with the United States. Taiwan’s China policy perforce pivoted from its Cold War “China is the enemy” perspective to something quite different. This was a critical time. Taiwan’s very survival was in doubt. Subsequently, Beijing pressured Taiwan to reunify with China. Taipei resisted. However, Taipei’s harsh rhetoric appeared counterproductive and was modified. Taipei stopped using pejorative language like “Communist bandits” to describe the government in China. Taiwan expressed a willingness to parlay with Beijing.120 In the early 1980s, China proposed to Taiwan what it called the “three links”—mail, trade and transportation ties. Taiwan’s response was cautious but not hostile. In 1986, a plane belonging to Taiwan’s flag carrier, China Airlines (CAL), was hijacked and flown to China. In an unexpected move, CAL officials (with the approval of the government) offered to negotiate with officials from Beijing to get the plane back.121 This was the first time the two sides talked, cum negotiated, openly at least. Not long after this, Taipei announced that its citizens could participate in conferences and its athletes were permitted to join in games in Communist countries—including the People’s Republic of China. Taipei’s change of stance toward Beijing was influenced by both its diplomatic setbacks and the economic and political reforms launched by Deng Xiaoping after 1978 that dramatically changed China in very positive ways in the 1980s. Taiwan’s democratization was also a factor. Most of Taiwan’s residents did not want to eschew contacts with China. In 1987, Taipei enacted a new policy allowing its citizens to travel to the Mainland. Contacts with China, including trade and investments, mushroomed as a result. The next year, at its Thirteenth Party Congress, the Kuomintang adopted a new “Mainland policy,” formally scrapping Taiwan’s heretofore staunchly anti-Communist policies.122 To manage its new relationship with China and simultaneous demands for independence, President Lee (who became president in 1988), in October 1989, created the Mainland Affairs Council to regulate exchanges across the Taiwan Strait. The council became an official organ of government in 1990. Subsequently the National Unification Council was established in the Office of the President. It was to oversee the unification of Taiwan with China. Still another organization (this one private or semiprivate), the Straits Exchange Foundation, was created to manage unofficial relations.123 Was President Lee serious or was this a Kabuki play? It was hard to say. Meanwhile, in June 1989, cross-Strait “détente” was put on hold due to the Tiananmen Square “incident.” Residents of Taiwan were appalled by the brutal killings that followed a sudden lurch to the left politically (and to some degree economically) in China. They were also shocked by the fact Beijing blamed Taiwan for instigating the student protests that led to the “blow-up.” Notwithstanding, Taipei took the view that, though the People’s

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Republic of China had become a global pariah and was hostile toward Taiwan, Beijing would not likely adopt a self-imposed isolationist policy as it had in the mid-1960s, and China would continue to boom economically. Hence, Taipei still had to deal with Beijing and did.124 In 1991, the National Unification Council adopted the Guidelines for National Unification, which amounted, some said, to a formal statement of Taiwan’s China policy. The document said unification would have to be attained in three stages: first, establish exchanges and reciprocity; second, build trust and confidence; and third, promote consultations and unification. The timing for moving from stage one to stages two and three, it read, should “respect the rights and interests of the people in the Taiwan area and protect their security and welfare.” Whether President Lee Teng-hui genuinely sought unification is uncertain.125 China viewed this as a “delaying tactic.”126 That same year, Lee proclaimed Taiwan would not employ force to unify China spelling an end to the state of war with the People’s Republic of China. Although Taiwan starting a war with China was not really at issue, formally ending this policy was meaningful. It seemed a friendly gesture toward China, though oddly Taipei’s reversals on the Beijing government’s legitimacy (which the declaration implied) while cancelling the policy of liberating China were construed by Chinese officials as ending Taiwan’s one-China policy and as another step in separating Taiwan from China.127 Notwithstanding, in April 1993, unprecedented “negotiations” were held between representatives from Taipei and Beijing in Singapore. The Koo-Wang (Wang-Gu in Beijing) talks, named after the heads of the unofficial organizations they represented (the Straits Exchange Foundation in Taiwan and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait in China), led to agreements on legalizing documents and establishing formal channels for communications between Taiwan and China. Although the agreements were not of great substance, the talks that produced them marked a significant breakthrough in cross-Strait relations. In addition, both sides promised more significant talks in the future.128 The meeting was thus called historic. Trade and investment contacts continued to flourish at this time, and Taiwan soon became the People’s Republic of China’s second-largest source of investment capital (after Hong Kong). Also, China became one of Taiwan’s biggest export markets.129 But President Lee feared that getting closer to China was proceeding too fast. Thus in 1993 he announced the “Go South” policy to encourage Taiwan’s business community to look for trade and investment opportunities in Southeast Asia instead of China, because, Lee said, Taiwan was becoming economically dependent on the Mainland. He reiterated this policy in stronger language in 1995 in what was called his “no haste” (to furthering relations with China) policy. The government later formalized this policy with “guidelines,” stating that no enterprise in Taiwan should invest more than $50 million in the Mainland or put money into infrastructure projects.130

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Relations between Taipei and Beijing under Lee were subsequently further hampered by the latter’s hostile reaction to Taipei’s attempt to rejoin various governmental and international organizations, including the United Nations, and by actions Taipei took because of what it regarded as Beijing’s “scheme” to isolate Taiwan. A white paper on reunification, released in late 1993 by the People’s Republic of China, contributed to more ill feelings, as did an incident at the time when some tourists from Taiwan were murdered in China, following which Beijing engaged in a cover-up.131 President Lee Teng-hui also became more assertive about Taiwan’s national identity and its sovereignty. He spoke of his “grief” at being born in Taiwan and depicted the KMT as a “foreign power” that had come to Taiwan to rule. He suggested unification with China would result in oppression and “another 2-2-8.” He spoke of himself as another Moses that would lead his people out of such a dire situation. He even said that China’s view that Taiwan was a province of China was a “weird fantasy.”132 In 1994, Taiwan’s government published a white paper elaborating on Lee’s perspectives. It mentioned that China’s “one China” idea referred to a “historical, geographical, cultural and racial entity.” It did not include sovereignty. The Republic of China, he said, was an independent sovereign state (since 1912) and the two sides should “coexist as two legal entities.”133 The White Paper also cited Lee’s presidential platform that included achieving international status and respect for Taiwan. To advertise his views, Lee inaugurated what was called “vacation diplomacy” meaning private visits to other countries to “show the flag.”134 Relations were badly strained by Lee Teng-hui visiting the United States in 1995 in an effort to “break out” of the isolationism that Lee said China had imposed on Taiwan. Beijing conducted missile tests in the Taiwan Strait in response and did even more provocative tests and military exercises in the spring of 1996 during Taiwan’s first direct presidential election campaign. The Clinton administration came to Taiwan’s rescue. Taiwan’s voters then expressed their displeasure with Beijing by re-electing President Lee with more votes and a stronger mandate than he would have won otherwise.135 After the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997, Beijing proffered its “one country, two systems” formula for resolving the “Taiwan issue” by unifying the country following the pattern of the incorporation of Hong Kong. (Deng had originally broached the plan to Taiwan in 1983.) President Lee replied, saying the construct did not apply to Taiwan, as Taiwan possessed sovereignty and could defend itself—neither of which applied to Hong Kong. Lee’s opposition’s reaction was different; DPP leaders spoke of self-determination and the right of Taiwan’s citizens to determine their future. However, both sides saw Taiwan’s democracy as a bulwark against unification.136 Two years later, cross-Strait relations witnessed improvements, with the United States encouraging and apparently pressuring both sides to cool their differences. In October 1998, the Koo-Wang talks were put back on track. Koo Chen-fu, head of the Straits Exchange Foundation, travelled to China to

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meet with his counterpart. He even talked with President Jiang Zemin. The meetings were cordial and seemingly productive.137 But, in July 1999, President Lee Teng-hui, during an interview with a German radio station, announced that hereafter cross-Strait relations must be considered state-to-state. Chinese leaders were incensed and castigated Lee in hostile public statements. Some observers said that Lee’s pronouncement was a response to President Clinton’s “three no’s” statement made in China in 1998 that many considered hostile toward Taiwan. In any event, cross-Strait relations again turned visibly sour.138 The 12 years of the Lee presidency saw Taiwan’s relationship with China and its cross-Strait policy vary considerably with many ups and downs. This was caused by President Lee’s conflicted views of China, his difficulties dealing with domestic matters (including both a KMT dominated by opponents of independence and the DPP’s very different views on Taiwan’s ties with China), Taiwan’s relations with the United States, and finally Taiwan’s democratization. On China’s part, Beijing’s confidence in dealing with Taiwan rose with its economic boom and its increased military strength. Though its civilian leaders preferred to go slow in dealing with Taiwan and use its burgeoning economic influence to bring them together. Employing armed pressure was the other choice (the one preferred by military leaders). One or the other prevailed at different times.139 The year 2000 marked the end of the Lee era. During the presidential election campaign in Taiwan, all of the major candidates adopted policies of pursuing better cross-Strait relations. Chen Shui-bian, who had been a staunch advocate of independence, softened his views dramatically—many observers said for the purpose of winning the election because voters viewed him and his party as too radical on this issue. Following up, in his inauguration address, President Chen pledged that, as long as China does not use military force against Taiwan, he would not declare independence, change the national title, put former president Lee Teng-hui’s state-to-state relationship idea into the Constitution or promote a referendum to change the status quo. He also promised not to abolish the National Unification Council or nullify the National Unification Guidelines. This statement was labelled Chen’s “five no’s” policy.140 But not long after this, in the context of political paralysis and President Chen’s failed efforts at building a governing coalition, and an obstructionist legislature, he played the “China card.” Chen rebuffed Beijing’s one-country, two-systems formula (except as a talking point) and repudiated the so-called ’92 Consensus, which had made possible the Koo-Wang talks. This and Chen’s previous advocacy of Taiwan’s independence prompted Chinese leaders in Beijing to shun dealing with him.141 In August 2002, President Chen, owing to continued strained cross-Strait relations and Beijing’s still shunning him, announced that perhaps Taiwan’s future should be decided by a referendum. He also spoke of two sovereign states, one on each side of the Taiwan Strait. Beijing’s reaction was immediate

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and hostile. In 2004, Chen had referendums put on the presidential election ballot dealing with Taiwan’s future (as separate from China) that further provoked Beijing. After his re-election in 2004, he said he had a mandate to energetically push for Taiwan’s independence.142 In 2005, in response to President Chen’s provocations, China’s parliament enacted the Anti-Secession Law that read that China would employ “nonpeaceful means” to prevent Taiwan from implementing legal independence. Taiwan’s response understandably was negative. But the law did not specify any time limit and did not cite any specifics about enforcement. Moreover, Beijing soon invited leaders of Chen’s KMT opposition in Taiwan to visit China, took a more friendly line on trade and some other issues and the next year offered pandas to the Taipei Zoo.143 Notwithstanding, in 2006, Chen declared the National Unification Council and the unification guidelines defunct. Meanwhile, President Chen stated his intent to rewrite Taiwan’s Constitution (obviously to remove the provision that Taiwan was a part of China) while advocating a referendum on participation in the United Nations as Taiwan not as the Republic of China. Beijing’s response was multidimensional: China requested that the United States “handle” Chen, promoted expanded commercial relations with Taiwan and ignored Chen’s provocations so as to avoid helping him politically.144 It was commonly said that Chinese leaders personally hated Chen Shuibian and opposed all of his policies. He was no doubt an unwanted distraction to Beijing to say the least. Chen definitely caused discord between China’s civilian and military leaders. But there was another view on the Chen issue: that Chinese leaders “appreciated” Chen because he mismanaged Taiwan’s economy causing a recession while he increased trade and other commercial ties across the Strait, thereby making Taiwan economically more dependent on China. Further he ruined Taiwan’s democratic image (with his policies of ethnic discrimination and disregard for press freedom and civil rights, and, more important, the chaos he created). He also undermined Taiwan’s relations with the United States (thereby strengthening Sino–U.S. ties). Some even said Beijing viewed the Chen administration as having done more to bring Taiwan “into the fold” and make reunification more likely than had any other leader in Taiwan.145 In any event, when Ma Ying-jeou ran for president in 2008 he promised to promote better relations with China. One of his campaign slogans was “no independence, no unification, and no war.” Most voters agreed. Most wanted improved relations with China and increased trade. After Ma became president, the 1992 consensus was re-established as the basis of relations. Tensions across the Taiwan Strait subsided. Talks were resumed on a number of issues. Leaders of nations throughout Asia and elsewhere, including importantly the United States, praised Ma for reducing the likelihood of conflict in the area.146 In June 2010, the two sides negotiated the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). This deal lowered tariffs on a large number of

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items traded between the two sides. Provisions were also made to increase Chinese tourism and bolster investments from each side to the other, reduce restrictions on academic contacts and establish the right for China to station permanent media representatives in Taiwan.147 Taiwan’s exports to China increased 8.66 percent in 2011, a development largely attributed to the agreement. Tourism and other exchanges increased significantly. When Ma ran for re-election in 2012 much improved cross-Strait ties clearly helped him win votes.148 On the other hand, ECFA exacerbated the already polar split between the DPP and the KMT about Taiwan’s relations with China and whether unification or separation should or would happen. To the KMT and its supporters it was simply the recognition of the China economic leviathan that Taiwan might eschew at the risk of hurting its economy. In other words, Taiwan could not grow economically without working relations with China. To the DPP and its supporters it was a Trojan Horse. To them it spelled Taiwan losing its sovereignty and its democracy and sacrificing its current way of life. The divide was huge. The question at this juncture was whether China’s policy of promoting economic ties with Taiwan would lead to closer political ties and convince Taiwan’s residents that unification was both inevitable and a good thing, or not. Evidence drawn from elsewhere about close economic ties between two entities of very unequal size and the larger promoting political ties suggests an inverse relationship; in other words, economic dependency generates fear about increasing political ties. The evidence provided by the Hong Kong experience seems to have confirmed this: the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement of 2003 that Beijing designed to help Hong Kong’s ailing economy did not speed up political integration (just as ECFA failed to do that in the case of Taiwan).149 The counter-argument was that China’s Taiwan policy was not really spearheaded by economic relations but was rather more a broader positive– negative one or a carrot and stick approach. China used economic favors as an incentive, while brandishing its newly acquired military capabilities as an unveiled threat combined with diplomatic efforts to isolate Taiwan as punishment or at least pressure.150 According to this view the prospects for peace and conflict could rise at the same time.151 The argument about this continued after 2016 with the election of Tsai Ingwen president and the DPP winning a majority in the Legislative Yuan. In fact, the issue got bigger and broader and tension grew fast. After the election, DPP leaders declared that China would have to “come around” and accept the fact that President Tsai and a DPP-controlled legislature governed Taiwan. They further asserted that Taiwan was a democracy and that whether Taiwan would become part of China would be up to voters and furthermore support for joining China was not high and was trending lower. They criticized the authoritarian government in China and its bullying Taiwan.152

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However, President Tsai kept the China policy she put forth during the campaign: maintain the status quo. Elaborating on this, she said she would abide by Taiwan’s Constitution, which declares Taiwan is part of China (thus not qualified to be legally independent). Clearly Tsai did not enunciate an assertive policy of independence.153 Making accepting the ’92 Consensus a litmus test (which Tsai refused to support), Beijing adopted a hard-edged policy against Tsai and the DPP. It cut the number of tourists China sent to Taiwan. China ended trade concessions that were in ECFA. It staged several displays of China’s advances in military power for everyone in Taiwan to see, including sending China’s new aircraft carrier around the island. China took five of Taiwan’s diplomatic partners, pressured others to downgrade their relations with Taiwan, trammelled Taipei’s efforts to join or rejoin any international organization, pressured foreign companies to change any reference to Taiwan suggesting it is a nation-state in their advertising and changed flight routes near Taiwan or its outlying islands to indicate Taiwan was a part of China.154 Yet, it was clear China could do much more to harm Taiwan. It was pulling its punches. In any case, Taiwan’s voters blamed President Tsai for the situation. She was clearly caught in a bind between her party’s left wing that wanted a tougher policy toward China and others that blamed her for the deteriorating relations with China that had hurt Taiwan’s economy.155 The results of the 2018 election indicated that Tsai’s cross-Strait policies had not worked.156

Taiwan and the Rest of the World As the Republic of China, after 1949 Taiwan sought to maintain as many contacts as possible with countries around the world. Chiang Kai-shek and his government and the KMT aimed to alone represent China in the global community and sought to prevent Beijing from doing so. Having close relations with the United States and good ties with most Western nations, Taipei succeeded for some time. However, as time passed this became a losing battle. After the United Nations voted to seat the People’s Republic of China in the world body in 1971, Taiwan departed. Soon Taiwan lost diplomatic ties with most of the nations with which it had them.157 Taiwan lost diplomatic ties with both large nations and small nations and important ones and less important ones. However, it generally maintained unofficial relations after their embassies closed; in most cases the new relationships were meaningful to some degree or another. Other than the United States and China (both assessed earlier), Japan was by far the most important country in the world to Taiwan. Taiwan maintained contacts with Japan after World War II, especially economic ones. These grew as Japan recovered from the war and experienced rapid economic growth. Political and military ties, however, lagged behind to the degree that they were much less meaningful.

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Taiwan was popular in Japan. In fact, some scholars have called Taiwan the friendliest political entity in the world toward Japan.158 Others have said Japan sought to gain more influence with Taiwan due to its concern over sealanes south of Japan and tense relations with China. Japan broke formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan in 1972, as did a host of other countries. But Tokyo opened the Japan Interchange Association in Taipei while Taiwan set up the Association of East Asian Relations in Tokyo. Both were designed to handle business formerly done by their embassies. This became known as the “Japan Formula,” which many other nations used as a model when they shifted formal diplomatic ties to Beijing.159 Japan continued to trade with Taiwan and maintained other contacts generally without interruption. In fact, commercial relations increased, even while most Japanese businesses renamed their operations in Taiwan. In 1992, Tokyo “upgraded” Taiwan’s representative office in Japan, renaming it the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office. The word “Taipei” made the title seem more official and eliminated any ambiguity about whether or not the organization represented Taiwan. Again, many nations followed Japan’s lead on this name change.160 For some years Japan was Taiwan’s foremost source of foreign investment and was its second-largest trading partner after the United States. These relationships were important to Taiwan, though government officials in Taiwan often expressed concern, and still do, about a large and persistent trade deficit with Japan. In another realm, Taiwan’s leaders believed Japan had a security interest in Taiwan and that Tokyo favored Taiwan’s continued sovereignty (though neither side said this openly). In China, officials frequently expressed apprehension over Japan’s non-economic ties with Taiwan. This seemed overblown given that Japan’s military was linked to the United States not only by treaty but also by Japan’s weapons procurement and their “shared responsibilities” (under America’s lead) in the event of a crisis. Clearly Japan was not in a position to cope with China militarily or challenge U.S. policy.161 In 1996–97 the U.S.–Japan security guidelines were altered to allow Japan’s Self-Defense Forces to operate further from Japan’s shores. In 2005, the two countries issued a joint security statement that included Taiwan as a “shared security concern.” In 2014, Japan increased its defense budget for the first time in a number of years.162 It thus appeared that Japan might help Taiwan defend itself against a military attack by China. Yet China’s rapid military build-up, much larger than Japan’s, limited the significance of this. In 2016, viewing Japan as more friendly to the DPP than the KMT and seeing Japan as sharing her view of the world and to some extent her progressive agenda, President Tsai sought much closer relations with Japan and even saw Japan as a balancer to a hostile China.163 President Tsai personally pursued close relations with Japan; she even supported Japan on some territorial issues that involve China.164 Thus Taiwan’s relations with Japan improved. Understandably this generated concern in Beijing.

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In the immediate post-World War II period Taiwan shared a bond with South Korea based on their strongly anti-Communist policies. The two were economic competitors, but in political and other relations were friendly. Diplomatic relations, however, were cut in 1992. At the time South Korea was one of the last important countries (and the last in Asia) with which Taipei retained formal diplomatic ties. Like Japan, other contacts were for the most part kept with Taiwan.165 With the end of the Cold War era, Taipei made some contacts with North Korea; however, this did not seriously affect relations with South Korea. Neither did China’s growing economic and political ties with South Korea, including their establishing diplomatic relations. Interestingly, in pursuing relations with nations who had formal ties with Beijing, Taiwan’s diplomats sometimes cited the fact that China has formal relations with both North and South Korea (or a two-Koreas policy)—hinting that if there were two Koreas then why not two Chinas. In 2014, South Korea negotiated a free trade agreement with China, which threatened to hurt Taiwan’s exports since Taiwan and South Korea exported many of the same or similar products (more than three-fourths according to one source). Taiwan’s exporting companies were alarmed.166 Taiwan’s contacts with Hong Kong have long been important, though they have also presented Taipei with some unique challenges. The Nationalist Chinese cause once found many supporters (both anti-Communists and admirers of the Republic of China) among Hong Kong Chinese. Also trade with the British colony was significant. Thus the 1984 agreement between Beijing and London on Hong Kong’s reunification with China presented Taipei with a serious dilemma: whether to try to continue contacts with Hong Kong after July 1, 1997 (the date Hong Kong would revert to China), and, if so, in what fashion.167 Taiwan decided to maintain commercial ties with Hong Kong and did so successfully. In fact, much of Taiwan’s growing trade with the People’s Republic of China continued to transit Hong Kong. So too with Taiwan’s vast investments in China.168 The very extensive economic ties between Taiwan and Hong Kong and the linkages to China generated thoughts of a “Greater China Common Market” and/or a “Greater China Economic Sphere” that might tie the three (Macau would be a fourth) together into an organization that might involve the United States and other countries and become more than just economic in nature. Or at least scholars saw the possibilities in the 1990s.169 After Tsai Ing-wen became president in 2016, she and her supporters showed considerable sympathy for Hong Kong’s residents’ efforts to gain more autonomy from China including the protests there to advance democracy. The media even made comparisons between the Sunflower movement in Taiwan and a “comparable” movement in Hong Kong, the Umbrella Movement.170 China was not pleased with this and restricted Taiwan’s activities in Hong Kong. Beijing even barred DPP members and pro-DPP businesses from

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getting visas to enter Hong Kong—which was very upsetting to President Tsai and DPP business people. Following the 2018 election that the DPP lost, China repeated the one country, two systems proposal that it had applied to Hong Kong’s return. Tsai and the DPP assailed the proposal and adopted an even more hostile attitude toward China. In the wake of World War II, Taipei enjoyed diplomatic, trade and other ties with almost every country in Southeast Asia. North Vietnam was an exception, it being a member of the Communist bloc. Also relations with Myanmar (formerly Burma) were strained because of the unwanted presence of more than 10,000 Nationalist soldiers there after the war especially given the Burmese government’s close ties with Beijing.171 In the last few years, however, Taiwan’s relations with Myanmar have improved. Taipei lost its diplomatic ties with most Southeast Asian countries in the 1970s and 1980s. For some time, Singapore and Indonesia diplomatically recognized neither Beijing or Taipei, but in 1990 both established formal ties with China. In 1993, President Lee Teng-hui sought to balance Taiwan’s trade and other ties with Beijing by what he called the “Go South” strategy aimed at forging closer economic ties with the countries of Southeast Asia. Taiwan became (if it wasn’t already) a major trading partner with the capitalist countries in the region and a critical foreign investor in several. Taiwan imported natural resources from the area, including sizable quantities of oil from Indonesia. Foreign workers from some countries in the area found employment in Taiwan, most of them from Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia. This situation remains.172 Following the U.S. defeat in the Vietnam War and Cambodia and Laos joining the Communist Bloc, relations between these countries were all but non-existent. Later, as Taipei changed its policy of not dealing with Communist nations, relations changed—especially with Vietnam, where Taiwan became a major investor. That situation remains.173 As noted earlier, when Chen Shui-bian was president, his support of local Taiwanese nationalism, playing ethnic politics, and his anti-Chinese (as opposed to Taiwanese) policies undermined Taiwan’s relations with the Overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia. He was also viewed (in the eyes of most Southeast Asian leaders) as needlessly provoking Beijing, which increased tensions in the region. This and China’s enlarged foreign aid and investments in the countries in the region easily undermined Taiwan’s diplomatic efforts.174 After 2008, better relations were restored and trade and other commercial ties grew with the countries of Southeast Asia. In 2009, the ASEAN countries collectively became Taiwan’s second-largest export market and were already its third source of imports (behind China and Japan). Political, cultural and other relations also grew.175 The Tsai administration pursued an even more active policy of improving relations with the countries of Southeast Asia in an effort to wean Taiwan

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from what it considered over-extended economic ties with China. This included accepting more immigrants from the region and expanding cultural and educational ties. To date it is uncertain how successful these policies are. One sticking point is the fact China has close economic and other ties with all of the countries in the region and has a virtual veto over Taiwan’s efforts to cement closer commercial relations with them to use if it chooses.176 In the past, ties with the countries of South Asia were not very meaningful to Taiwan politically, economically, militarily or in other ways. Taiwan did not perceive the region as one where it had vital interests. However, this has changed in recent years and Taiwan has pursued closer relations with countries in South Asia, especially India. Taiwan has a representative office in India, and trade and investment ties between the two countries are growing.177 There has been some speculation that Taipei believes that India can plays a “balancing role” against China, and this may become more meaningful in the future, especially if U.S.–Indian relations (particularly at the strategic level) improve. In other words, India may become part of an Asian balance of power that will have relevance to Taiwan. Taipei has taken note of the new concept of an “Indo-Pacific” region broached by the Trump administration.178 Taiwan’s relations with other South Asian countries have not been very important. However, there have not been strained relations either. Early on during the post-World War years, Taiwan established meaningful ties with several Middle Eastern countries, especially those that were strongly anti-Communist. That included diplomatic relations. But, over time, Taiwan lost formal relations with all of the countries in the region. In 1991, Taipei ended its diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia—the most important nation in the world with which Taipei still had formal relations and the last country in the region to still have an embassy in Taipei. Incidentally, Taipei’s loss of ties with Saudi Arabia happened at almost the same time as Indonesia and Singapore established ties with Beijing and affected the balance in Taipei between government officials that wanted to put more restrictions on trade with China and the business community that wanted fewer limits to favor the former.179 Yet relations remained cordial with Saudi Arabia, and it is still one of Taiwan’s largest suppliers of petroleum. Kuwait was also a major source of oil for Taiwan, and relations between the two countries remained good in spite of severing diplomatic ties. This still holds. Taipei maintained friendly relations with other Middle Eastern countries and still does. Taiwan’s Middle East policy is focused on maintaining reliable sources of petroleum (getting a large portion of its imports from the area), encouraging trade and maintaining cultural contacts.180 Early on Taipei maintained, and still does, informal, low keyed—but in some ways important—ties with Israel. In 1949, Israel extended an offer of diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China, which Beijing did not accept. But Israel did not establish diplomatic ties with Taiwan and Taipei did not openly try to promote better relations with Israel because it did

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not want to endanger its relationship with Saudi Arabia and other Middle East countries. Nevertheless, Taiwan traded with Israel and purchased some of its weapons. For some time, observers saw Taiwan’s position in the world as similar to that of Israel: facing enemies (in Taiwan’s case just one—China) that have support from the Third World; its pariah nation status among left-leaning countries; and its role as a successful, albeit controversial, regional actor (although Taiwan is certainly no longer a pariah). Taiwan’s relations with countries in the Middle East have not changed markedly in spite of recent wars there. Also China’s more extensive ties with countries in the region have not troubled Taiwan seriously. In Western Europe, some years ago Taipei lost formal ties with most of the countries in the region. Now it has formal diplomatic ties with only one nation—the Vatican. The good relationship with the Vatican hinged mainly on strained relations between the Catholic Church and Beijing. In 1999, Taipei established relations with Macedonia, reportedly based on a large donation of foreign aid, possibly as much $1 billion. But little of this was delivered. Subsequently, Beijing vetoed a U.N. plan to extend the mandate of peacekeeping forces in Macedonia causing it serious concern. In 2001, Macedonia broke with Taipei and established diplomatic relations with China.181 Taipei’s contacts with other European nations were, and are, primarily commercial. Several Western European countries are significant trading partners for Taiwan, the largest being Germany. Trade and other relations between Taiwan and the European Union (E.U.) have grown in recent years. The E.U. is Taiwan’s fourth-largest trading partner. It has been a big investor in Taiwan, in fact, recently the largest, accounting for more than 40 percent of Taiwan’s incoming investment funds.182 After 2008 when Ma Ying-jeou became president, the E.U. praised his success in easing tensions in the Taiwan Strait. In 2010, E.U. countries applauded the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement to further commercial relations with China. Taiwan–E.U. relations remained generally good during the rest of Ma’s presidency. After Tsai Ing-wen became president Taiwan’s relations with the E.U. became even closer owing to her progressive agenda appealing to European countries while Europe and China experienced disagreements on a host of issues. Most E.U. countries support Taiwan’s democracy and to a certain degree its efforts to gain international space. Specifically, the E.U. agrees with Taipei that it should be a member of more international organizations. But E.U. countries could not be expected to help Taiwan in the event of a military confrontation with China. Taiwan’s relationship with the E.U. is special in some ways that deserve mention. One is the idea of inter-parliamentary diplomacy that was launched by President Lee and continued by subsequent presidents. In 1993, Lee established a liaison group to organize the exchange of legislators from the two sides. President Chen subsequently promoted this idea in his foreign

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policy white paper. During the Bush II presidency, the U.S. Congress supported this idea and pushed pro-Taiwan resolutions, including one to treat Taiwan as a “non-NATO ally.”183 President Ma and President Tsai have continued this aspect of Taiwan’s foreign policy. The second idea is that Taiwan can resolve its relationship with China as the countries of Europe did in constructing the E.U. In other words, economic ties lead to closer political relations and to a peaceful and harmonious integration. The E.U. was thus a model for Taiwan to resolve its difficulties with China. Recently, however, Brexit and similar movements that have threatened the dissolution of the E.U. have had the opposite effect. In short, the E.U. seems to offer different lessons to Taiwan.184 Taiwan has no diplomatic ties with any of the nations of Eastern Europe. Taipei established formal relations with Macedonia when it became independent after the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, but subsequently those ties were broken. After the collapse of the Soviet bloc in 1991, Taipei initiated informal contacts with several Eastern European countries that led to establishing trade and cultural ties. In fact, links with Eastern European nations helped Taiwan diversify its imports and exports. Taiwan’s “dollar diplomacy” (giving economic aid for increased political ties) also produced results, though limited, in the region for a while.185 The countries of Eastern Europe give evidence for both economic and political integration with a larger political entity (the E.U. or Russia) and for going its own way.186 Taiwan’s foreign policy makers no doubt noticed this; but it is hardly the case that they saw a trend or model in Eastern Europe that might apply to Taiwan. Before 1990, as mentioned earlier, Taiwan had few meaningful contacts and no formal ties with the Soviet Union, though there were some reports of behind-the-scenes meetings in the 1960s as Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated. In 1990, Taiwan ended many restrictions on contacts with the Soviet Union as part of its flexible diplomacy. Trade, which was minimal, increased quickly though it has not become large.187 After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Taipei sought to develop contacts with Russia and also members of the new Commonwealth of Independent States, though it did not think seriously of establishing formal diplomatic relations with any of them. In 1991, Taipei’s China External Trade Development Council opened an office in Moscow, and, in 1992, Taipei negotiated establishing a presence there called the Taipei Moscow Economic and Cultural Coordination Commission, which it opened in 1993. In 1996, Russia established a similar office in Taipei.188 Currently decision makers in Taipei have little hope of establishing broader relations, especially political ties, with Russia because of close relations between Moscow and Beijing. Russia now supports China’s position that Taiwan is its territory and is to be recovered.189 In the 1960s, Taipei established and maintained formal diplomatic ties with a number of the newly independent countries in Africa, notwithstanding

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Taipei’s close relations with South Africa that “revolutionary” African countries objected to. Taiwan’s successful diplomatic efforts were facilitated by the fact a number of African nations were suspicious of China and were antiCommunist. Taiwan also established formal diplomatic ties with a number of African countries through its economic assistance program.190 Relations with South Africa were the most meaningful of countries Taiwan dealt with on the continent. In fact, South Africa was, when it severed formal ties with Taipei in 1996, the most important nation in the world with which Taipei still maintained formal diplomatic relations. Informal relations were established and lasted. Taiwan purchased uranium from South Africa, and other trade between the two was significant. Investments from Taiwan have diminished with the break in diplomatic relations, however.191 Taipei lost its diplomatic ties with most African states in the competition with Beijing for recognition in the 1960s and 1970s. However, many of these states established ties with Beijing, mainly for symbolic reasons, to support what was then considered a Third World cause. Few broke with Taiwan for other reasons. A few re-established formal diplomatic ties with Taipei even after establishing them with Beijing. Taipei accepted dual recognition, but Beijing did not. In the 1970s, Taipei maintained a good image in Africa— generally because of its economic success and because Beijing, with its new cordial relations with the West, disappointed some African countries.192 In the 1980s, China began taking the lion’s share of loans and grants from various international financial organizations to the detriment of many African countries. Taiwan took advantage of this. Taipei also won sympathy from African countries because it is a small nation bullied by a larger one—a familiar situation for many African nations. Finally, Taiwan’s enlarged economic assistance program, called the International Economic and Cooperation Development Fund, established in 1988, enabled Taiwan to re-establish ties with several African nations and even restore formal diplomatic relations with some of them.193 In recent years, however, Taiwan has suffered repeated diplomatic setbacks in Africa due to China’s increased interest in the area, Africa being a source of energy and raw materials China needed to keep its economy booming. China also had big money to spend on aid and investments, which African nations sorely needed. Taiwan was not able to compete.194 In the early years after World War II, Taipei had diplomatic relations with most of the countries of Latin America. China rarely challenged Taiwan’s presence in the region, as it perceived the Western Hemisphere was America’s sphere of influence. Still Taipei lost ties with many Latin American countries after its membership in the United Nations was ended. However, it kept informal relations with most. Currently Taiwan maintains formal diplomatic ties with more nations in Latin America than anywhere else—mostly Central American and Caribbean countries. The reason for this is that most of these countries simply lacked any motive for establishing relations with Beijing. Taipei’s efforts to rejoin the

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United Nations (after 1993) and other international organizations were supported by several of these nations. However, like Africa, China’s increased trade, investments and aid have recently undermined Taiwan’s relations with nations in the region.195 In lieu of formal diplomatic relations (Canada broke with Taipei in 1971, Australia and New Zealand in 1972), in the 1970s, Taiwan cultivated trade and cultural ties with Australia, New Zealand and Canada. Relations have improved with all three in recent years, most noticeably with Canada, whose government was cool toward Taiwan for some years after it established diplomatic relations with Beijing. Australia is a major source of natural resources for Taiwan, and Taiwan has made sizable investments there. However, it is unlikely Taiwan can count on any of these nations for support for its separation from China.196 Taipei has maintained formal diplomatic ties with several Pacific island countries. Though aid competition with China in this region the last couple of decades favored Beijing, Taipei was able to keep its ties with a number of these nations because it could concentrate aid to smaller countries. In any event, though the aid game diminished after 2008, Taipei has maintained ties there. Still, these countries do not have much global influence and certainly won’t impact Taiwan’s status as a nation.197 When the Chen administration left office in May 2008, only 23 countries, all minor ones, maintained formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. This was half a dozen fewer than in 2000 when President Chen assumed office. He had promised to expand Taipei’s formal diplomatic relations when he campaigned for president, saying that he would establish ties with foreign countries as Taiwan rather than the Republic of China. In this effort, he failed. Some argue he thus damaged Taiwan’s bid to be a sovereign nation.198 During the Ma presidency Taiwan did not lose diplomatic relations with any country, save Gambia (which granted diplomatic ties to China after Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP had won the 2016 election). President Ma pursued closer ties with China and did not pursue Taiwan’s independence and thus kept Taiwan’s diplomatic relations in tact. Critics, of course, said he did this by making concessions to China and only with China’s help did he stop the erosion of Taiwan’s external ties. Indeed China did not make efforts to strip Taiwan of its diplomatic friends and in some cases refused, or at least delayed, countries that wanted diplomatic ties with China.199 When Tsai and the DPP won the election in 2016, China changed its policy and Taiwan quickly lost five more countries. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed serious concern about this. The United States expressed concern about this to China.

Ties with International Organizations In 1945, the Republic of China became a founding member of the United Nations and also one of the five big powers given a permanent seat on the

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U.N. Security Council. When the Nationalist government fled to Taiwan in 1949, it retained both mainly for two reasons: (1) the government of the Republic of China had survived and Chiang Kai-shek sought to continue to represent China around the world, and (2) the newly founded People’s Republic of China expressed hostility toward the Western rules of diplomatic practice as well as toward most international organizations, including the United Nations.200 Regarding reason number one, it was, of course, a matter of prestige for Chiang Kai-shek and his government to hold the China seat in the United Nations. Both needed cachet after losing a war and being driven from the China Mainland. Chiang also needed to build credibility with the population of Taiwan for his legitimate right to govern there. About the second reason, after China became an active participant in the Korean War, especially after sending troops that did battle with U.N. forces, China’s relations with global organizations, notably the United Nations, deteriorated badly. Anyway, Mao regarded them as tools of Western imperialism and didn’t care. In ensuing years, Taipei and many of its friends contended the Communist regime in China did not meet the U.N. Charter’s requirement that member nations be “peace-loving.” Finally, the world had become divided sharply into two opposing camps and the Western antiCommunist bloc controlled the United Nations.201 For the next two decades, given Peking’s fervently anti-status quo foreign policy, it was obvious that China had no desire to join the world body. Moscow likewise did not appear to want the People’s Republic of China admitted, though it consistently said it did. Taipei, on the other hand, wished to remain a member and represent China. The United States and many other Western countries continued to support Taipei’s position.202 However, as memories of the Korean War faded and global politics evolved away from a rigidly bipolar structure, and as the People’s Republic of China established diplomatic ties with a significant number of nations around the world, Taipei lost support to continue to represent China in the international community.203 As early as the 1960s, Taipei encountered some problems with the United Nations and other international organizations regarding its representing China in these organizations. In 1961, Taipei was put in an awkward position in the United Nations when the Soviet Union proposed that Outer Mongolia be admitted. Taipei claimed Outer Mongolia was Chinese territory; furthermore, it did not want to see another Communist country admitted to the United Nations for fear of setting a precedent that might lead to the seating of the People’s Republic of China. But, the proposal was to admit Outer Mongolia and Mauritania simultaneously and Taipei did not want to anger African nations by invoking the veto. Taiwan, therefore, did not block Moscow’s move.204 More such situations followed. Meanwhile, the charge that the People’s Republic of China was not a peace-loving nation began to fade while it became well known that a number

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of U.N. members very often committed less than peace-loving acts. Moreover, because universality was considered important, many nations felt it was wrong to exclude the People’s Republic of China, the largest nation in the world in population. Hence, Taipei’s supporters, rather than continuing to condemn the People’s Republic of China, switched approaches, arguing that the issue of China’s representation in the United Nations was an “important matter” that required a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly to pass. China was unlikely, Taipei reckoned, to get two-thirds of U.N. members to support its admission.205 In the way of a sidebar, in the 1960s Beijing sought to create a new “revolutionary” United Nations (in cooperation with Indonesia). This did not succeed and it further hurt Beijing’s reputation with the global community. The Cultural Revolution likewise damaged China’s image. Nevertheless, throughout the decade, the U.N. vote on the issue of Chinese representation increasingly favored Beijing. In 1965, it was a tie: 47 for the People’s Republic of China, 47 against and 20 abstentions. By this time China seemed destined to win the China representation battle before long. In 1970, Beijing got two more votes than Taipei when the issue of the China seat was considered. This margin was not enough, though.206 China’s admission needed a two-thirds majority. In 1971, U.S. National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger flew to Beijing and arranged for President Nixon’s visit to China in February of the following year. This was highly publicized news that to many observers reflected a change in Washington’s view of China. In that context a vote was taken on the two-thirds rule. The United States, which supported the rule, put little pressure on its allies to vote with the United States and in other ways did not push to save Taiwan’s U.N. membership.207 The United Nations thereupon dispensed with the two-thirds rule and seated Beijing. In the wake of losing the U.N. fight and not wanting to create a crisis by claiming the right to veto, Taipei ended it ties with the United Nations. Also Taipei withdrew from the United Nations rather than proposing two China seats or a new seat for Taiwan. It reckoned that doing either would have caused chaos and would not have been good for Taiwan’s image. Taiwan subsequently lost its representation in a host of other international organizations. By 1977, due to China’s efforts to cut Taiwan’s memberships in international organizations, the number fell from 39 it held in the 1960s to ten.208 Beijing sought Taipei’s expulsion from all international public or governmental institutions, even demanding the exclusion of statistics on Taiwan from the United Nations and its affiliated agencies’ publications. Its objective was to completely isolate Taiwan from the international community and thereby compel Taipei to negotiate reunification. The government in Taiwan worried seriously about this and sought solutions.209 On the other hand, it was not convincing to argue that Taiwan no longer possessed statehood because it was not a U.N. member—as that would mean that the People’s Republic of China was not a nation before this. But it did

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result in most nations and most peoples’ changes of minds, namely that the People’s Republic was China from this point on.210 By the 1980s, Taiwan belonged to but a few governmental international bodies. In 1981, however, Taipei rejoined the International Olympic Committee under the name “Taipei, China.” This term was humiliating to Taiwan; yet it reflected Taipei’s flexible diplomacy and prevented Taiwan from being further isolated. In 1988, it regained membership in the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The ADB had different rules for membership; in addition, the United States supported Taipei’s efforts to stay. Still, pressure mounted to admit the People’s Republic of China. A compromise was reached in 1985 that allowed representation of both in the bank.211 Meanwhile Taiwan remained a member of many international bodies that were less important and/or were not overtly political and/or did not require statehood for membership. From 1979 to 1982, it increased its representation in non-political or non-governmental international organizations from 254 to 630. By the middle of the 1980s, Taiwan was represented in a host of nonpolitical organizations including some in which Beijing also participated.212 In the late 1980s, Taipei launched some new and creative efforts to rejoin some international bodies, chiefly financial or trade groups. In 1990, Taipei formally applied for membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); it was given observer status. The next year, it attained membership (together with the People’s Republic of China and Hong Kong) in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group, using the appellation “Chinese, Taipei,” while agreeing to be represented by its minister of economic affairs rather than its foreign minister. In 1992, Taipei was admitted to the South Pacific Forum using the name “Taiwan/Republic of China.”213 In 1991, the Legislative Yuan passed a motion saying that Taiwan should be allowed to rejoin the United Nations. Two years later, President Lee Tenghui announced that Taipei would seek participation in the world body, after which the Foreign Ministry declared this a major goal of the Republic of China’s foreign policy.214 Though the proposal did not succeed, supporters continued to speak for Taiwan’s representation in the U.N. General Assembly and U.N.-affiliated organizations. In ensuing years, Taipei failed in annual bids to “participate” in the United Nations, though the number of supporters increased from three in 1993 to 17 in 1996. In 1996, the European Parliament passed a resolution stating that Taiwan deserved a seat in all major international organizations. Subsequently, several U.S. states passed resolutions supporting Taiwan.215 In 1997, Taipei changed its strategy and asked its supporters to request that the U.N. General Assembly reassess Resolution 2758 (which, in 1971, unseated Taipei and seated Beijing) and revoke it. The efficacy of such a tactic—or, for that matter, any other—however, was dubious. Beijing remained adamantly opposed to Taipei’s presence in the United Nations in any form and held the veto power over its admission; it also had Washington’s support for this position. On the other hand, the United Nations had

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allowed non-nation-state representation, and it endeavored to be more universal, giving Taiwan some hope. Interestingly, the DPP opposed President Lee’s applying for membership in the United Nations, as it would undercut the opposition’s claim to independence.216 In any event, President Lee’s proposal failed. In January 2002, Taiwan gained membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Because the WTO was a prominent international organization, this was a win for Taipei. However, Taiwan had to wait several years to enter because of an understanding that China would enter first. Also Taiwan had to accept the title “Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu.” Some in Taipei said that Taiwan’s membership would serve as the venue to negotiate with Beijing. But, this did not prove true. In ensuing years Taipei often charged that not being allowed a voice in the United Nations and other bodies was based on a “myth” (reminding one of the argument used by supporters of Beijing’s application in the 1960s) that Taiwan does not exist. It contended that its exclusion was a violation of the human rights of its 23 million people and further claimed that its being denied membership was not consonant with the inclusive and non-discriminatory ideals of these organizations. Finally, Taipei noted that it was democratic and an upstanding member of the international community and did not deserve the nasty treatment it had received from the world body.217 Reason did suggest Taiwan be allowed membership in some global regulatory organizations, such as the World Health Organization (to prevent the spread of communicable diseases) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (because Taiwan is a major user of nuclear energy), as well as environmental, law enforcement (such as INTERPOL) and other such agencies. Taiwan, its government argued, should have some presence, if not a voice, in these bodies. As of 2011, it had a presence in 32 international organizations. In 2015, the number was 37.218 Meanwhile, in 2007, the Chen administration made a bid for Taiwan to participate in the United Nations as “Taiwan.” But the United Nations rejected its bid. Many nations, including the United States, saw this as an effort by President Chen to grandstand and to provoke China for his own political reasons, and thus opposed his proposal. The Chen administration subsequently presented the issue to the electorate in the form of a referendum, but it failed to pass. To some degree, this discredited Taiwan’s effort to gain greater global recognition or at least discouraged further such efforts. In any case, the government viewed the prospects as “distant.”219 In 2008, the Ma administration took a different approach to participating in international organizations: avoid conflict with China and in the process perhaps get Beijing to acquiesce on some issues. In May 2009, the World Health Organization secretariat invited Taiwan to send an observer to its annual assembly meeting. China did not object. Taiwan thus attended meetings in 2010 and 2011. Subsequently Taiwan acquired “special guest” status

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in the Civil Aviation Organization. In the next few years Taiwan participated in some other international bodies.220 Some saw this as a breakthrough for Taiwan. At this point Taiwan looked forward to participating in more global organizations, though this ostensibly depended upon continued good relations with China and Beijing’s acquiesce. Ma’s opposition argued that Ma was sacrificing Taiwan’s sovereignty in doing this. Meanwhile President Ma supported, and in many cases pushed, legislation to confirm U.N. resolutions on issues ranging from human rights to women’s causes and more. Clearly Ma was a backer of U.N. ideals. However, since the United Nations and its affiliated agencies treated Taiwan shabbily, Ma’s efforts won him little acclaim at home. In fact, Ma’s critics said he was wasting his time.221 When Tsai Ing-wen campaigned for the presidency in 2015 and 2016, a tenet of her campaign was for Taiwan to attain more “international space” including a greater presence in global organizations. But Beijing stiffened its policies on this matter and blocked Taiwan’s every effort.222 Even before Tsai’s inauguration China insisted that the one-China principle be incorporated into Taiwan’s invitation to send an observer to the World Health Organization’s (WHO) annual meeting. WHO complied. The Tsai administration could not accept the conditions and its representative did not go. China in effect also blocked Taiwan from receiving an invite from the International Civil Aviation Organization, making it contingent on accepting the ’92 Consensus. China even put up barriers to Taiwan participating in the summit meeting of the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol).223 Some countries friendly to Taiwan voted for Taiwan’s admission to some international organizations or spoke for Taiwan in the media. But they were not effective in engendering any changes in the policies of relevant international organizations.

Notes 1 See Goddard, Formosa: A Study in Chinese History, p. 25. 2 See Roy, Taiwan: A Political History, pp. 29–30. 3 For a detailed study of Taiwan’s external relations for the three decades after 1949, see Chiao Chiao Hsieh, Strategy for Survival. For a more recent analysis, see Yu San Wang (ed.), Foreign Policy of the Republic of China on Taiwan: An Unorthodox Approach (New York: Praeger, 1990). 4 Barnett, Communist China and Asia, pp. 389–90. 5 Denmark, Holland, Sweden and a few other countries also recognized the People’s Republic of China. 6 Hsieh, Strategy for Survival, pp. 45–46. 7 See ibid., chapter 3. 8 Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, United States–Taiwan Security Ties: From the Cold War to Beyond Containment (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), chapter 1. 9 Hsieh, Strategy for Survival, chapter 1.

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10 Chiang’s speech can be found in The China 1959–1960 Yearbook (Taipei: China, 1960), p. 947. 11 Stolper, China, Taiwan and the Offshore Islands, pp. 88–90. Also see David M. Finkelstein, Washington’s Taiwan Dilemma: From Abandonment to Salvation (Fairfax, VA: George Mason University Press, 1993). This agreement was formalized in a communiqué between Washington and Taipei. See “ROC-US Joint Communiqué, October 23, 1958,” in American Foreign Policy Documents (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 1184–85. 12 Hsieh, Strategy for Survival, p. 152. 13 Ibid., pp. 140–46. 14 See final section of this chapter for further details. 15 Hsieh, Strategy for Survival, pp. 151–65. This point is further argued in John F. Copper, “Taiwan’s Strategy and U.S. Recognition of China,” Orbis (Summer 1977), pp. 261–76. 16 The statement that the United States “acknowledged” China’s position and does not challenge it is vague and seems to suggest possible disagreement. See Copper, China Diplomacy, pp. 26–39. It was also seemingly contradicted by U.S. statements (of policy) that the Taiwan’s issue should be resolved peacefully and the residents of Taiwan should determine their future. On the other hand, it has remained U.S. policy that there is one China and Taiwan is a part of China. 17 A. Doak Barnett, China and the Major Powers in East Asia (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1977), p. 238. 18 Clough, Island China, pp. 153–54. 19 Hickey, Foreign Policy Making in Taiwan, pp. 83–87. 20 For details, see Robert L. Downen, To Bridge the Taiwan Strait (Washington, DC: Council for Social and Economic Studies, 1984). 21 Copper, China Diplomacy, p. 80. 22 Andrew J. Nathan, “The Effect of Taiwan’s Political Reform on Taiwan-Mainland Relations,” in Chen and Haggard (eds.), Political Change in Taiwan, p. 211. 23 Steve Tsang, “Transforming a Party State into a Democracy,” in Tsang and Tien (eds.), Democratization in Taiwan, pp. 15–16. 24 Edward Friedman, “Preface,” in Edward Friedman (ed.), China’s Rise, Taiwan’s Dilemma and International Peace (London: Routledge, 2005), p. xix. 25 See John F. Copper, “Taiwan and the New World Order,” Journal of East Asian Affairs (Winter/Spring 1995), for further details. 26 See John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, “Chiefs, Staffers, Indians, and Others: How Was Taiwan’s Mainland China Policy Made?” in Tun-jen Cheng, Chi Huang, and Samuel S. G. Wu (eds.), Inherited Rivalry: Conflict Across the Taiwan Straits (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995). 27 Wachman, Why Taiwan?, p. 8. Flexible diplomacy was also called elastic diplomacy. 28 Hickey, Foreign Policy Making in Taiwan, chapter 3. 29 See the following section on Taiwan’s relations with China for details. 30 Wachman, Why Taiwan?, p. 14. 31 He pledged in his inauguration speech not to seek independence. In June 2000, he said he could adhere to the ’92 Consensus. See Goldstein, China and Taiwan, p. 103. 32 John F. Copper, “Why the Bush Administration Soured on Taiwan,” in Shuisheng Zhao (ed.), U.S.-China Relations: Cooperation and Competition in Northeast Asia (London: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2008). 33 Hickey, Foreign Policy Making in Taiwan, pp. 94–103. 34 “Most Taiwanese Satisfied with Ma’s ‘Viable Diplomacy’: Survey,” Focus Taiwan, May 12, 2016 (online at forcustaiwan.tw). 35 Goldstein, China and Taiwan, p. 127.

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55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

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This is explained in detail in following sections in this chapter. Hsieh, Strategy for Survival, chapter 5. Hickey, Foreign Policy Making in Taiwan, pp. 64–69. See ibid., chapter 5. The author notes that at this time the government began to pay attention to leading politicians, think tanks, interest groups, the media and opinion polls. For details see Martin L. Lasater, The Taiwan Issue in Sino-American Strategic Relations (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984). Gary D. Rawnsley, “Taiwan’s Soft Power and Public Diplomacy,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, No. 3, 2014. Hickey, Foreign Policy Making in Taiwan, p. 56. Ibid., p. 22. Ibid. “Flexible diplomacy” was a term used by President Chiang Ching-kuo though Lee gave it much more importance. See Copper, Historical Dictionary of Taiwan, p. 128. Tsai, Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan’s Quest for Identity, pp. 171–75. Clough, Island China, pp. 118–20. See section on elections in Chapter 4. Ibid. At this time President Lee thought of Taiwan as the “center” of a Greater Chinese economy and multinational corporations expanding into China from their Taiwan base. See Lin, Taiwan’s China Dilemma, p. 68. See Hickey, Foreign Policy Making in Taiwan, pp. 66–67. Ibid., pp. 69–75. See John W. Garver, “Taiwan’s Russian Option: Image and Reality,” Asian Survey (July 1978), p. 752. See, for example, King-yuh Chang, A Framework for China’s Unification (Taipei: Kwang Hwa, 1986); Parris H. Chang, “China’s Relations with Hong Kong and Taiwan,” The Annals (January 1992); Parris H. Chang, “Beijing’s Relations with Taiwan,” in Parris H. Chang and Martin L. Lasater (eds.), If China Crosses the Taiwan Strait (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993); Frederick Chien, “A View From Taipei,” Foreign Affairs (Winter 1991–92); Bih-jaw Lin, “Taipei’s Search for a New Foreign Policy Approach,” in Steven W. Mosher (ed.), The United States and the Republic of China: Democratic Friends, Strategic Allies, and Economic Partners (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1992); and Yu-ming Shaw, “Taiwan: A View from Taipei,” Foreign Affairs (Summer 1985). Hickey, Foreign Policy Making in Taiwan, p. 97. Copper, Taiwan’s 2012 Presidential/Vice Presidential and Legislative Elections, pp. 15–23. Copper, Taiwan at a Tipping Point, p. 122. See, United States–Taiwan Security Ties, pp. 79–81. See Clough, Island China, pp. 64–66. Clough, Reaching Across the Taiwan Strait, p. 13. Hickey, United States–Taiwan Security Ties, p. 124. “Ching-kuo Indigenous Defense Fighter F-CK-I,” Global Security.org, viewed April 2019 (online at globalsecurity.org). Clough, Reaching Across the Taiwan Strait, pp. 156–57. See, in particular, chapter 4 of this book. See Jonathan D. Pollack, “Short-Range Ballistic Missile Capabilities,” in Steve Tsang (ed.), If China Attacks Taiwan: Military Strategy, Politics and Economics (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 57–72. Ibid.

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66 Michael D. Swaine, “Taiwan’s Defense Reforms and Military Modernization Program: Objectives, Achievements, and Obstacles,” in Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (ed.), Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), p. 156. 67 Ibid. 68 The Republic of China Yearbook 2011, pp. 96–97; Clancy, Countries of the World, p. 294. 69 See Dennis Hickey, “Coming in from the Cold,” Issues and Studies (October 1994), pp. 101–02. 70 James E. Auer and Tetsuo Kotani, “Reaffirming in the ‘Taiwan Clause’: Japan’s National Interest in the Taiwan Strait and the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” NBR Analysis, November 1, 2005. 71 Copper, Playing with Fire, p. 156. 72 Ibid., pp. 160–61. Various authors and publications have listed Taiwan as a potential nuclear power. There seems little question that Taiwan could build a nuclear weapon if it chose to do so. 73 See ROC Foreign Affairs Report (Taipei: Government Information Office, 1993). 74 Ibid., pp. 12–13. 75 Copper, China Diplomacy, p. 162. 76 Henry Kissinger broached this idea. See Henry Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? (New York: Touchstone, 2001). 77 See John F. Copper, “Taiwan’s Defense Budget: Promises Made, Promises Not Kept,” IPP Review, July 26, 2018 (online at ippreview.com). 78 See concluding chapter of this book. 79 This policy was to some degree formalized in the 2000s by Hu Jintao’s administration. It is interesting that President Hu supposedly said at the time that it is “easier and cheaper to buy Taiwan than to conquer it.” See Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower (New York: Henry Holt, 2015), p. 201. President Xi has made some threats to Taiwan, but it might be considered that his deepest convictions about Taiwan indicate he is thinking as President Hu did. See, for example, Xi Jinping, The Governance of China, II (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2017), pp. 459–63. 80 Area Handbook for the Republic of China, pp. 207–09. 81 See Paul H. Tai, “Introduction,” in Paul H. Tai (ed.), United States, China and Taiwan (Carbondale, IL: Public Policy Institute, University of Illinois, 1999), p. 1. The Congressional resolution was called the “Formosa resolution.” 82 For background details, see Jerome Alan Cohen, Edward Friedman, Harold C. Hinton and Allen S. Whiting, Taiwan and American Policy: The Dilemma in U.S. China Relations (New York: Praeger, 1981). 83 See Franz Schurmann, The Logic of World Power: An Inquiry into the Origins, Currents and Contradictions of World Politics (New York: Pantheon, 1974) for details. Also see Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Taiwan, Hong Kong and the United States, 1945–1992: Uncertain Friendships (New York: Twayne, 1994), pp. 45–47. Schurmann also notes that the U.S. Navy is more Republican than the Army and is more important to effectuating U.S. policy in Asia. 84 See Roderick MacFarquhar, Sino-American Relations: 1949–1971 (New York: Praeger, 1972), pp. 183–84. 85 A. James Gregor and Maria Hsia Chang, “Taiwan: The ‘Wild Card’ in U.S. Defense Policy in the Far Pacific,” in James C. Hsiung and Winberg Chai (eds.), Asia and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1981). 86 Ching Chuan Kang base was used by the U.S. Air Force during the Vietnam War. Taipei offered to lengthen the runway to accommodate B-52 bombers, but the United States declined.

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87 Margaret MacMillan, Nixon and Mao: The Week that Changed the World (New York: Random House, 2008), chapter 9. 88 Ibid. 89 Clough, Island China, pp. 213–15. 90 Ibid., pp. 118–20. 91 David Tawei Lee, The Making of the Taiwan Relations Act: Twenty Years in Retrospect (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1999), chapter 7. 92 See Copper, China Diplomacy, pp. 88–95. 93 Richard C. Bush, Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2005), pp. 25–26. 94 T. Y. Wang, “United States Arms Sales Policy Toward Taiwan: A Review of Two Decades of Implementation” in Tai (ed.), United States, China and Taiwan, pp. 115–42. 95 For further details, see Robert G. Sutter, “Taiwan: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy Choices,” CRS Issue Brief (Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress), January 23, 1995. 96 Ibid. 97 Bush, Untying the Knot, pp. 249–50. 98 See Copper, Playing with Fire, chapter 13. 99 See John F. Copper, “A U.S. Negotiating Role in Resolving Beijing-Taipei Differences,” Journal of East Asian Affairs (Summer/Fall 1998). 100 Bush, Untying the Knot, p. 255. 101 “House Resolution: On U.S.-Taiwan Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation Act,” reprinted in Tai (ed.), United States, China and Taiwan, pp. 266–71. 102 Hickey, Foreign Policy Making in Taiwan, p. 36. Also see Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “If Taiwan Chooses Unification, Should the United States Care?” Washington Quarterly (Summer 2002). 103 Bush, Untying the Knot, pp. 61–62. 104 Hickey, Foreign Policy Making in Taiwan, pp. 38–39. 105 Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2012), p. 162. 106 See Eleanor Albert, “China-Taiwan Relations,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 15, 2018 (online at cfr.org). 107 Robert D. Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography (New York: Random House, 2013), pp. 213–17. 108 Lin, Taiwan’s China Dilemma, p. 179. 109 Richard C. Bush, Uncharted Strait (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2013), p. 216. 110 See John F. Copper, “Will the United States Desert Taiwan?” in Wang Gungwu and Zheng Yongnian (eds.), China: The State of Governance (Singapore: World Scientific, 2012). 111 Victor Cha, “The Unfinished Legacy of Obama’s Pivot to Asia,” Foreign Policy, September 6, 2016 (online at foreignpolicy.com). 112 Ankit Panda, “Straight From the U.S. State Department: The ‘Pivot to Asia’ is over,” The Diplomat, March 14, 2017 (online at thediplomat.com). 113 Copper, Taiwan at a Tipping Point, pp. 133–34. 114 “Trump China Visit: US Leader Strikes a Warmer Tone with Xi Jinping,” BBC, November 9, 2017 (online at bbc.com). 115 John F. Copper, “Trump’s ‘Taiwan card’: How Real?” IPPReview, April 29, 2019 (online at ippreview.com). 116 Ibid. 117 See Weiqun Gu, Conflicts of Divided Nations: The Cases of China and Korea (Westport, CT: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 4–5. The author uses the term “transpolital” to describe the relationship, though this term has not become popular among other scholars.

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118 See Yu-shan Wu, “The DPP Ascendancy and Cross-Strait Relations,” in Weichin Lee (ed.), Taiwan’s Political Realignment and Diplomatic Challenges (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), pp. 177–206. The author notes that election campaigns especially affect Taiwan’s stance toward China. The military, as this author has noted, has an impact on China’s Taiwan policies and they tend to be more tough leading up to important party meetings. 119 Brantley Womack and Yufan Hao (eds.), Rethinking the Triangle: WashingtonBeijing-Taipei (Singapore: Word Scientific, 2015). 120 Premier Sun made this pitch in a speech titled “The China Issue and China’s Reunification” in June 1982. The Government Information Office in Taipei subsequently published this speech. 121 Officials of CAL represented Taipei, but because CAL is the Republic of China’s national carrier, talks were considered official. 122 See John F. Copper, “The KMT’s 13th Party Congress: Reform, Democratization, New Blood,” in Chennault (ed.), Modernizing East Asia. 123 Goldstein, China and Taiwan, pp. 77–78. 124 Copper, Playing with Fire, pp. 31–35. 125 Chia-lung Lin and Bo Tedards, “Lee Teng-hui: Transformational Leadership in Taiwan’s Transition,” in Lee and Wang (eds.), Sayonara to the Lee Teng-hui Era, p. 32. 126 Xiaobo Hu and Gang Lin, “The PRC View of Taiwan under Lee Teng-hui,” in ibid., p. 286. 127 The Republic of China Yearbook 2011, p. 82. 128 For details, see Chiu, Koo-Wang Talks and the Prospect of Building Constructive and Stable Relations Across the Taiwan Straits. 129 Goldstein, China and Taiwan, pp. 79–81. 130 Tsai, Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan’s Quest for Identity, pp. 171–72 and p. 194. 131 For details on Beijing’s white paper and its policies toward Taiwan, see John F. Copper, Words Across the Taiwan Strait: A Critique of Beijing’s “White Paper” on China’s Re-unification (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1995). 132 Goldstein, China and Taiwan, p. 82. 133 “Taiwan White Paper on Relations Across the Taiwan Straits,” (sic) Mainland Affairs Council, July 1994 (online at aepasi.com). 134 Ibid., pp. 82–83. 135 See Chapter 5, section on Taiwan’s elections. 136 “Taiwan White Paper on Relations Across the Taiwan Straits,” chapter 4. 137 See Hu and Lin, “The PRC View of Taiwan under Lee Teng-hui,” in Lee and Wang (eds.), Sayonara to the Lee Teng-hui Era, p. 290. 138 See Alan M. Wachman, “Taiwan: Parent, Province, or Blackballed State?” in Wei-chin Lee (ed.), Taiwan in Perspective (Leiden: Brill, 2000), pp. 183–84. 139 See Copper, Playing with Fire, p. 6. Another view was that China’s military modernization favored the PLA’s more aggressive view. See Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations, p. 114. 140 Hickey, Foreign Policy Making in Taiwan, pp. 100–01. 141 For details, see Sheng, China and Taiwan, chapter 4. 142 See Chapter 4, section on elections. 143 Goldstein, China and Taiwan, pp. 116–17. 144 Ibid., pp. 113–17. 145 See John F. Copper, “China’s Choice for Taiwan’s Next Leader,” Taipei Times, July 15, 2007 (online at taipeitimes.com). 146 Fell, Government and Politics in Taiwan, p. 267.

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147 Lin, Taiwan’s China Dilemma, pp. 174–96. Also see The Republic of China Yearbook 2011, pp. 85–89. 148 See Chapter 4, section on elections. 149 See Wei-chin Lee, “The Turn of Fortune: Realignment in Taiwan’s Domestic Politics and Diplomacy,” in Lee (ed.), Taiwan’s Political Re-Alignment and Diplomatic Challenges, pp. 8–9. 150 Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations, p. 153. 151 Hickey, Foreign Policy Making in Taiwan, p. 121. 152 Copper, Taiwan at a Tipping Point, p. 186. 153 Ibid. 154 2018 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2018), pp. 345–48. 155 Copper, Taiwan at a Tipping Point, pp. 186–93. 156 See Chapter 4, section on elections. 157 See Clough, Island China, chapter 7. 158 Goldstein, China and Taiwan, p. 231. 159 Hsieh, Strategy for Survival, p. 231. 160 Ibid. Also see Hickey, Foreign Policy Making in Taiwan, p. 16. 161 Lyle J. Goldstein, Meeting China Halfway: How to Defuse the Emerging U.S.China Rivalry (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015), chapter 9. 162 Lowell Dittmer, China’s Asia: Triangular Dynamics since the Cold War (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2018), pp. 133–34. 163 Copper, Taiwan at a Tipping Point, pp. 150 and 180–81. 164 Wei-chin Lee, “The Turn of Fortune: Realignment in Taiwan’s Domestic Politics and Diplomacy,” in Lee (ed.), Taiwan’s Political Re-Alignment and Diplomatic Challenges, p. 16. 165 Lin, Taiwan’s China Dilemma, p. 65. 166 Goldstein, China and Taiwan, p. 158. 167 Ibid., p. 70 and Lin, Taiwan’s China Dilemma, p. 30. 168 Lin, Taiwan’s China Dilemma, pp. 4 and 6. 169 Clough, Reaching Across the Taiwan Strait, pp. 170–71. 170 Lin, Taiwan’s China Dilemma, pp. 130–31. 171 Barnett, Communist China and Asia, p. 321. 172 See Chapter 5 for further details. 173 “Taiwan is 4th Largest Investor in Vietnam,” Total Taiwan, April 2, 2017 (online at totaltaipei.com). 174 Copper, China’s Foreign Aid and Investment Diplomacy, Volume II (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 164–65. 175 Ming-tong Chen, “Taiwan in 2011: Focus on Crucial Presidential Election,” Asian Survey, January/February 2012, p. 79. 176 See Samuel C.Y. Ku, “Strategies of China’s Expansion and Taiwan’s Survival in Southeast Asia,” in Dittmer (ed.), Taiwan and China, pp. 249–79. 177 Denny Roy, “Taiwan’s Potential Role in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy Convergence in the South Pacific,” NBR Special Report (National Bureau of Asian Research), March 19, 2019. 178 Ibid. 179 Clough, Reaching Across the Taiwan Strait, p. 53. 180 More than 77 percent of Taiwan’s oil imports came from the Middle East. See The Republic of China Yearbook 1995, p. 221. 181 See “Taiwan is Loser as Macedonia Aligns with China,” Deseret News, June 18, 2001 (online at deseretnews.com). 182 “EU Committed to Investment Agreement with Taiwan: Representative,” Focus Taiwan, August 25, 2018 (online at focustaiwan.tw). 183 Hickey, Foreign Policy Making in Taiwan, p. 55.

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184 See Ho et al., “A Comparative Study of the China Factor in Taiwan and Hong Kong Elections,” in Lee (ed.), Taiwan’s Political Re-Alignment and Diplomatic Challenges, p. 120. 185 The Republic of China Yearbook 1999, pp. 152–53. 186 Lin, Taiwan’s China Dilemma, pp. 26–27. 187 The Republic of China Yearbook 1999, pp. 175–76. 188 The Republic of China Yearbook 2002, p. 132. 189 Douglas E. Schoen and Melik Kaylan, The Russia-China Axis: The New Cold War and America’s Leadership Crisis (New York: Encounter, 2014), p. 250. 190 The Republic of China Yearbook 1999, pp. 148–49. 191 The Republic of China Yearbook 1995, p. 174. 192 Hsieh, Strategy for Survival, p. 217. 193 The Republic of China Yearbook 1995, p. 172. 194 Copper, China’s Foreign Aid and Investment Diplomacy Volume III (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), chapters 1 and 2. 195 Ibid., chapter 3. 196 Ibid. 197 Ibid. 198 See Chapter 5 for details. 199 Copper, Taiwan at a Tipping Point, p. 187. Gambia was the nation in question. 200 For background, see Jerome Alan Cohen, “U.S. Policy Options: The United Nations, Diplomatic Relations, and the Status of Taiwan,” in Cohen et al., Taiwan and American Policy, pp. 156–66. 201 Suisheng Zhao, Power Competition in East Asia: From the Old Chinese World Order to Post-Cold War Regional Multipolarity (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), pp. 87–98. 202 Hickey, Foreign Policy Making in Taiwan, p. 10. The author notes that U.S. support for Taiwan also kept many countries from giving diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China. 203 Clough, Island China, pp. 155–56. 204 See Samuel S. Kim, China, the United Nations and World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 189. 205 Hickey, Foreign Policy Making in Taiwan, p. 10. 206 Clough, Island China, pp. 151–52. 207 Macmillan, Nixon and Mao, p. 216. 208 Wei-chin Lee, “Consensus Found and Consensus Lost: Taiwan’s 2016 Election, the ‘1992 Consensus,’ and Cross Strait Relations,” in Lee (ed.), Taiwan’s Political Re-Alignment and Diplomatic Challenges, p. 146. 209 Hickey, Foreign Policy Making in Taiwan, p. 114. Taipei feared, among other things, this might severely damage Taiwan’s trade-oriented economy. 210 Alan M. Wachman, “Taiwan: Parent, Province, or Blackballed State,” in Lee, Taiwan in Perspective, p. 199. 211 Hickey, Foreign Policy Making in Taiwan, p. 20. 212 Taiwan Yearbook 2007, p. 127. 213 Hickey, Foreign Policy Making in Taiwan, p. 20. 214 T. Y. Wang, “Taiwan’s Foreign Relations Under Lee Teng-hui’s Rule, 1988– 2000,” in Lee and Wang (eds.), Sayonara to the Lee Teng-hui Era, p. 265. 215 Lynn T. White III, “America’s Interests in the First Democratic Chinese President,” in Lee and Wang (eds.), Sayonara to the Lee Teng-hui Era, p. 209. 216 Allen Chun, “Democracy as Hegemony, Globalization as Indigenization, or the ‘Culture’ in Taiwanese National Politics,” in Lee, Taiwan in Perspective, p. 19. 217 Taiwan Yearbook 2007, pp. 42 and 85. 218 The Republic of China Yearbook 2001, p. 68 and The Republic of China Yearbook 2016, p. 80.

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The Republic of China Yearbook 2016, p. 81. Ibid. Copper, Taiwan at a Tipping Point, pp. 75–76. Wei-chin Lee, “Consensus Found and Consensus Lost: Taiwan’s 2016 Election, the 1992 Consensus, and Cross Strait Relations,” in Lee (ed.), Taiwan’s Political Re-Alignment and Diplomatic Challenges, chapter 7. 223 Copper, Taiwan at a Tipping Point, pp. 188 and 190.

7

Summary, Conclusions, the Future The Situation Defined

In the preceding chapters of this book the author presented various views and assessments of how and why Taiwan’s status in the world, in other words whether it is a nation-state or a province of China, is both controversial and uncertain. The arguments will be abridged here and conclusions drawn. Doing so will afford a look at Taiwan’s future. Here is the starting point… The People’s Republic of China, based on centuries-old historical records, claims Taiwan is its territory. Its view of recent history is Taiwan was “stolen” by Japan and then “occupied by American imperialists” with Chiang Kaishek’s connivance. This is a lifeblood part of China’s “century of humiliation” that will not end until Taiwan is recovered. Worse still, China fears that if Taiwan goes its own way, Tibet and other parts of China may try to also. The disintegration of China might well follow. The virulence of both Chinese nationalism and irredentism thus connects to the “Taiwan issue” and gives the Chinese military, which espouses an especially hostile stance about Taiwan’s separate status, a loud voice. Beijing’s civilian leaders must heed their military. In fact, civilian officials have to keep the military convinced that they are doing something to recover Taiwan, in other words that it is not slipping away and time is on China’s side. They promise to employ military force if necessary to resolve the matter. Yet China’s civilian leaders prefer to use economic measures to increase Taiwan’s dependence on China for its economic health and in this way make reunification attractive and independence not. They say the deadline for reunifying is 2049—the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China. This gives them plenty of time. They want, in the meantime, to make China a formidable world power, hopefully the world’s number one power. If they accomplish that, in their view, Taiwan will want to become part of China. Their optimistic view embraces the perception that they need not fear Taiwan is going anywhere else. Japan prefers Taiwan to remain separate from China and would like to increase its influence in and over Taiwan. But Japan is too weak militarily to do much. Its economic prowess is fading. China is beating Japan in both realms. Anyway, Japan follows America’s lead when it

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comes to Taiwan. Chinese leaders are confident the United States does not and will not support Taiwan’s legal independence. American leaders have said cum promised this on many occasions and it has been Washington’s policy for some years. It would be a grave matter if the United States reneged on it. The United States needs a friendly China. Finally, in the minds of Chinese civilian leaders, legal independence does not have sufficient support locally for it to become a policy to act upon. Alas, the advocates of independence in Taiwan are not like the previous generation of activists who risked their jobs, property and even their blood for that cause. The current proponents of independence are not willing to take such risks; their lives are too cushy for that. Therefore, they use independence as a prop when running for election or as a topic to mention when they talk to the media—little else. Supporting this view, as noted toward the end of Chapter 2, the most reliable opinion polls conducted in Taiwan show that there is little support for independence (single digits) and most residents opine that unification will eventually occur. This is significant. Perhaps an explanation is due. It is because most residents believe independence will cause a war and Taiwan has no hope of defeating China’s military. Also they know that it is economic suicide. They believe that unification will inevitably happen given the current situation and future trends. In any event the United States espouses a different perspective from China’s. It firmly believes Taiwan must have the right to choose its future. It is a democracy. Furthermore, it should be noted the United States created and nurtured that democracy. Officials in Washington also deem that if the United States were to abandon Taiwan, America’s role in promoting democracy throughout the world would become a hollow cause. Worse, its credibility in Asia would be fatally damaged. Its allies would no longer trust the United States and they would go their own way. The United States would then cease to be an Asian power. Because Asia is the dynamic area of the world, Washington would see its global influence shrink and the United States would become a second-ranking power. The other side of the story is that Washington has agreed that there is only one China and Taiwan is a part of China. There was some ambiguity about this in 1972 when President Nixon and Chairman Mao met and discussed détente. But since then it has been reiterated often and in many different contexts; thus it must be considered a fixed U.S. policy. Add to that numerous public opinion polls in the United States indicate Americans are not willing to go to war with China over Taiwan. These different, even conflicting views espoused by China and the United States make the “Taiwan question” a difficult one. So does the fluid—sometimes friendly, sometimes tense—relationship between the two big powers. Likewise for the nature of international politics. Has the status quo become accepted? It hardly seems so.

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One thing that is certain is that in deciding Taiwan’s status, the United States has been, and is, the kingpin. To date, if Beijing were to invade Taiwan and the United States did not intervene, Taiwan would not have survived; if the United States intervened on Taiwan’s side, it would. But, in the last three-plus decades much has changed. Currently China is a fast-rising power. America is in decline. The question then is: How long will the United States be able (and willing) to defend Taiwan? Apparently not long. But America has allies. China is not popular in much of the world that counts. Hence, some say what Taiwan wants be considered. The majority in Taiwan prefers the status quo. More precisely, most people in Taiwan want separation from China, but they also favor cordial, even expanded, crossStrait relations. In other words, they want their government to promote economic ties sans any political ties that bind. That is a contradiction. Also, obviously it does not answer the central question posed here. Residents of Taiwan boast Taiwan is a democracy. Furthermore, it is incompatible with China’s political system, they say. But democracy does not have the magnetism it did a decade or so ago. The support for it in the West has declined markedly. The same goes for the world in general. Even in Taiwan, the polls show, respect for democracy over the last three presidencies is not what it was before that. So, does the proposition that Taiwan is a democracy really matter? It seems doubtful. Anyway, the reality is Taiwan, neither the government nor its people, has decided the answer to the question whether it is a nation or a province—now or in the future. Furthermore, what they think about this has changed, or at least the level of support for one or the other has. It is subject to more shifts in the future. The rotation of ruling parties in Taiwan seems to ensure this will continue to be. The international community superficially regards Taiwan highly. Taiwan is democratic, has a fine human rights record and has performed miraculously in engineering economic development and improving the human condition in Taiwan. It has provided extremely well for its population. To many it is a model. Furthermore, the principles espoused by the United Nations and other global organizations suggest they support Taiwan. Ditto for the European Union. But, in point of fact, they have not. Further, there is little reason to think they will. They hypocritically ignore Taiwan when it comes to the matter of its survival. Even worse, they are hostile toward Taiwan much of the time. This situation is unlikely to change. The United Nations and its affiliated organizations plus Western democracies (other than the United States) will not buck China. Likewise nations other than the United States and China will not play a meaningful role in deciding Taiwan’s status. They have neither the capability nor the will power to challenge China or the United States. Patently, in the event of a crisis they will not be relevant. Hence, Taiwan’s future will be decided either by the United States or China, or both. Arguably it should not be this way. But it is.

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To give a more thorough and better answer to the question at hand, it is necessary to look more deeply into the views and policies of the two main actors, the United States and China, and anticipate what new events or different situations might change their views. But first we must make, or at least consider, some assumptions. They provide a starting point in dissecting how the two big powers see the matter of whether or not Taiwan is or will be a nation and what they might do about the “Taiwan issue.” In other words, how might the world’s two nations that matter collide or compromise over Taiwan?

Seeking Truth from Fiction, Assumptions, the Basics Neither Taiwan nor China’s early historical records are very useful in ascertaining whether Taiwan is or should be part of China. There are no early written records in Taiwan. In China’s case, the records are scattered and vague. Chinese officials generally did not regard Taiwan as part of China; but that was because China was a cultural rather than a political entity. Taiwan was not a place of Chinese culture; rather it was a wild place. Western nations, including the United States, assumed China did not claim Taiwan. Yet no one else made claim to it. Nor is any other country claiming Taiwan now. China ruled Taiwan for more than two centuries from 1683 to 1895. China’s governance faced opposition domestically, but that was mainly because the quality of officials it sent to Taiwan (few wanted to go) was not good and Taiwan was a frontier, lawless land. However, indicating Taiwan was under its jurisdiction cum ownership China sent police to Taiwan and subsidized Taiwan financially. Officials in Peking later felt that Taiwan was important for strategic reasons, though that view was often challenged. The Chinese population of the island increased during this time and there was considerable cross-Strait trade. In the end, however, some foreign powers questioned China’s sovereignty over Taiwan and Chinese officials, apparently confirming this, in 1895 helped in the transfer of Taiwan to Japan. Recent history does not help much in discerning the issue of Taiwan’s “ownership.” Taiwan was part of China for only four years in the twentieth century. For a longer period, Taiwan, as the Republic of China, claimed legal jurisdiction over all of China. But that obviously could not last. Both the elder Chiang and his son, however, stuck to that position. In fact, Taiwan has technically retained it to this day. Taiwan’s Constitution says it is part of China. Changing it would likely broadcast that Taiwan is independent. That would be explosive. So, the Constitution stays as it is. This is an untidy and awkward situation; but it keeps the peace. Further, China does not oppose this view. In fact, it prefers it to the alternative, namely independence. President Lee Teng-hui spoke frequently of unification. In fact, he established official government organizations for that. But he mainly acted for

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independence. President Chen Shui-bian was long an ardent advocate of Taiwan’s permanent separation from China. But the Chen government was inconsistent about this. Indeed, many of its actions suggested its policy was independence, while others, especially Chen’s promoting economic ties with China, did not. In the end, President Chen alienated the United States (not to mention China) and arguably hurt the cause of a separate Taiwan more than he helped it. Presidents Ma and Tsai offered alternative views. One was for unification; one was against unification. But neither truly acted based on their views. Both, in fact, kept the status quo. From the perspective of international law, Taiwan possesses sovereignty. Under traditional international law, there were four qualifications for nationhood: territory, population, government and diplomatic ties. As noted in Chapter 1, Taiwan is as large in territory as nearly half the world’s nations. The land under its control has remained unchanged for more than a generation. Its population is larger than more than two-thirds of the member states of the United Nations. Its government is stable. Only Taiwan’s diplomatic status is in doubt because of the small number of its formal diplomatic partners. But some nations survived with fewer. Meanwhile, according to modern practice, the qualifications for nationhood have been weakened so that former colonies, trust territories and numerous small Third World wannabe countries could qualify. There was a popular expectation that all the land territory in the world would become sovereign nation-states or join one of them—most likely the former. The proliferation of nation-states, based on the idea of self-determination, bolstered that view. Finally, in the wake of the Cold War, international institutions were supposed to support this view and make it happen. All of these factors appeared to advantage Taiwan if it wanted to be a nation-state. But, in reality these ideas seem to be of a time gone past. Recently various bids for self-determination around the world have not seen much success. Nor does the future look different. This contradicts what was written in the previous paragraph. In any case, Taiwan lacks a podium. It is not a member of the United Nations or any other global organization where it can effectively present its case. The United Nations treats Taiwan as if it had a contagious disease. Most international organizations are focused on other issues. The relevant global institutions are not very daring and are not at all sympathetic to Taiwan. It is improbable this will change. Anyway, power politics trumps the legal and moral arguments. Indeed, Beijing has successfully pressured most nations of the world to eschew diplomatic relations with Taiwan and it blocks Taipei from entering international organizations where statehood is a qualification for membership. Hence, the international community does not act as if Taiwan has sovereignty. Even if it did, or wanted to, it is not likely to be able to challenge China on this matter. This situation is unlikely to change.

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On the other hand, over the last half century-plus, Taiwan has developed its own identity. This process, which was called Taiwanization or localization, was overlaid on the official view of the government that the island’s heritage was linked with the Mainland. Moreover, with democratization, the Taiwanese majority began playing a much greater role in education, social policy, the economy and politics. There is more. Taiwanese historians provided a “revisionist” history of the island. It underscored the island’s uniqueness rather than its affinity to China. Taiwan thus became more Taiwanese. Local “things,” such as books, dance, songs and much more, became as visible as Chinese “things.” Yet, in the last three and a half decades, these trends have been diluted, some of them even negated, by the population of Taiwan taking an increasing interest in China. Many people in Taiwan are now looking for their roots. They are proud of China. Many share a desire to see China restored to its once-dominant role in the world. They recognize that Taiwan is too small to make an impact on the world…or on history. They believe that if Taiwan were to become part of China, it would be different. These views are espoused more by the educated and city residents, suggesting they will ultimately prevail. Therefore, the end point or the future is cloaked in mystery, at least in uncertainty. There is another twist on the topic of Taiwan’s future; if Taiwan is, as many in Taiwan and elsewhere suggest, the model that the People’s Republic of China employed for its economic and political development (the former at least); there will perhaps be a convergence and eventually the foundation laid for a smooth, peaceful reconciliation. Maybe China will continue to emulate Taiwan’s experience. The human condition in Taiwan is very good, as are many other things that are measurable and worth bragging about. China may even copy Taiwan’s democracy and the two will become friends and more might follow. Some in Taiwan frequently say this and believe it will bring the two together. But a model is mainly something that Taiwan used to be. It is not now. Anyway, Chinese leaders feel they have engineered economic growth another way and their system is better. And they have supporters around the world. They also see democracy as something Taiwan equates with independence and they despise Taiwan boasting about it. Another issue is that the island’s residents are more and more choosing a Taiwan identity rather than a Chinese one. Yet Chinese leaders note studies that show that identity does not equate to favoring or supporting independence. Moreover, the majority in Taiwan favors the status quo, not independence. In other words, independence does not follow identity. It would seem it would. The fact that it doesn’t seems quite counterintuitive. . But there are many contradictions or enigmas when it comes to Taiwan’s status. Another is that doubt has grown in Taiwan about its wholesale imitation of the United States that used to be so much in vogue. Unlike two or three decades ago, a large number of people in Taiwan today see much in the

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United States that is undesirable: crime, mistreatment of the aged, child abuse, juvenile delinquency, pornography, drugs, a decline in the quality of its education, excessive freedom, unsustainable government spending, unpopular and bureaucratic governments, political polarization (and its accompanying hate) and more. Most people oppose allowing these problems to “infect” Taiwan’s society—even though America is Taiwan’s guardian. Also, many in Taiwan are aware of racial discrimination against Asians, notably in America’s best academic institutions, but also in America’s immigration policies, which keep Asians out while ignoring millions of illegal immigrants from Latin America. Likewise Hollywood and the media; in the eyes of Asians (including residents of Taiwan), America is without conscience biased against them based on race. There is thus a feeling in Taiwan that its experiment with American-style democracy has gone far enough, perhaps too far. Taiwan is the only Asian country that so faithfully followed the American model in its quest for political modernization. Many in Taiwan are now thinking more of Asian democracy. Certainly America is not seen in Taiwan as the shining point of light on the mountain or the model it once was. Taiwan’s populace also harbors similar if less impassioned feelings about contemporary Europe. Europeans are seen as lazy. People in Taiwan also perceive Europe as increasingly uncompetitive, protectionist and irrelevant in world affairs. Few in Taiwan now read or cite European authors or scholars. One hardly hears the word “model” together with the name of a European country anymore. Fewer students want to study in Europe, and there is less interest in learning European languages (with the exception of English). Part of the reason is that for more than two decades, Taiwan’s residents have been visiting China in large numbers. Early on, such visits reinforced their faith in Taiwan’s superior economic and political systems and its standards of living and lifestyles. Clearly, China was not a country that the people of Taiwan admired. But that changed quite suddenly. Now China is modern. Its trains, airports and much more are better than the United States or Western Europe. The Chinese government has money, lots of it. Its R&D spending is growing at a pace that astonishes other countries. China has become the axis of the world economically. Taiwan’s residents are impressed, many are in awe. As a product of this, easily 5 percent of Taiwan’s population now resides in China, and a higher percentage of its workforce is there. Taiwan’s entrepreneurs are in China or go there frequently. Taiwan’s brain drain usually means moving to China. A significant percent of college graduates favor a career in China. All of these facts reflect a rising China that Taiwan admires and respects. Further, China’s advances in science, education and more matter to Taiwan’s population. They may offset the fear of political ties. Important trends tell us more. What are they? First, the economic trends. Up until 2001, when it was hit by recession, Taiwan was seen as owning a “miracle economy.” That term was heard

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infrequently after that. In 2008, Taiwan was hit by another economic downturn. It recovered quickly, but growth soon slowed again commensurate with low global economic growth. But there were also social, political and other conditions in Taiwan that indicated slow growth would last. In fact, Taiwan’s economic vitality seems to have hit a stone wall: an aging society, social and political division, a sagging work ethic, anti-business sentiment, an economy squeezed between low labor cost countries and richer high-tech countries. Political paralysis was also a factor. Finally, sacrifice had become less a part of Taiwan’s DNA. Now Taiwan is not even average in the world in GDP growth and is but a third of China’s. Projections, made by global institutions, indicate slow growth, both short-term and long-term. In other words, Taiwan will not experience rapid growth again, in the foreseeable future at least. Another important trend to consider when assessing Taiwan’s economic future is the already far-reaching integration of Taiwan’s economy with China’s. Many of Taiwan’s companies are linked at the hip with China’s enterprises in terms of division of labor, production chains, R&D and in a host of other ways. This will only grow owing to China’s continued successes in going upmarket and its investments in Taiwan not to mention increasing trade and other commerce across the Strait. In short, Taiwan’s economy became joined at the hip with China’s and the conflict between that and independence helps explain Taiwan’s slow growth. Still another trend is the development of an Asian, or at least East Asian, economic bloc. Regionalism, economically at least, is a growing trend. The East Asia region is dynamic and is experiencing good growth, while the United States and Europe are not. Asian countries are thus increasingly trading with and investing in each other and less with the United States and Europe. Many people believe this is a long-term trend. Certainly it is likely to continue for some time. But China virtually controls the region. Then there is the military equation. The rise of China’s military power in recent years has not been met by Taiwan strengthening its military proportionally or in any way that might help it seriously counter the China threat. During the Chen era, Taiwan’s military budget decreased as a proportion of its GNP. Troop levels were cut. Taiwan bought only a portion of the weapons the United States allocated in 2001. Taiwan thus became very vulnerable to China’s missiles and other military intimidation. It became more dependent on the U.S. military while relations with the United States plummeted—a contradiction that portended to evolve into a problem. The Chen administration spoke of a new offensive strategy as the driver of Taiwan’s military policy. Some of Taiwan’s top leaders even talked of attacking China. But most in Taiwan and elsewhere thought this was wrong thinking, had little chance of succeeding and would hurt Taiwan’s global image. Also there was the matter of America intervening if there was any chance of Taiwan causing a U.S.–China confrontation. The United States had long prepared for such an event and given its intelligence capabilities on the island

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and its relationship with Taiwan’s military, which didn’t like Chen, America would no doubt have succeeded. The reality was that Taiwan had no other choice than to assume the United States would defend the island and accept other of America’s Taiwan policies. Meanwhile there grew serious apprehension in Taiwan that the U.S. military was declining fast in strength because of budget problems and in consequence the United States (at least before the Trump administration) was retreating from East Asia. President Obama’s U.S. “Asia pivot”—especially when it was scrapped—convinced many in Taiwan that Washington would not rebuild its Asian military forces or even sustain them at current levels. The Trump administration has restored America’s military spending and has started to rebuild its strength. But it is too soon to say what this means or if it will last. Likewise, whether and how Taiwan might play a part is not yet clear. Taiwan may try to join an East Asian alliance system (one that includes China or not). But the likelihood of this providing a solution to Taiwan’s defense problems seems farfetched. Such a system would require the cooperation and commitment of Asia’s major powers and probably the formal approval of a majority of Asian countries. There has never been such an arrangement. Few experts see an “Asian NATO” as possible. Thus this seems little more than a dream. A balance of power system seems more promising. Japan, ASEAN and India have expressed grave concerns about China’s rise, especially the growth of its military power. America’s discussion of an Indo-Pacific strategy suggests an anti-China balancing act. But power balancing is not in Asia’s DNA either. An alternative for Taiwan is a Greater China federation, confederation or commonwealth. Such ideas have been broached in both Taiwan and China. One of them might become very attractive to either or both for a host of reasons. Beijing does not want to risk serious negative reactions from the United States (even short of military action) for using force against Taiwan. China is concerned about its global image. As Chinese leaders have stated repeatedly, they do not want to kill their own people. For its part Taiwan can resolve the matter of China’s fatal attraction, or of having intense economic relations with China with few political ties, by coming to some agreement about a Greater China organization. The sticky issue is Taiwan’s sovereignty, which means that such a political arrangement will be difficult to reach and will probably be slow in coming—if it ever does. Another obstacle is the fact that China’s leaders view these ideas as a plot to keep China split. They are suspicious. From all of this one has to conclude the “Taiwan issue” is a complicated one that will be difficult to resolve. The two main players have a big job on their hands.

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The U.S. Role, the Bottom Line When it comes to Taiwan’s status and certainly its future, the United States is the power or influencer of the first order; it is the “decider.” How long it will retain that role is a question that will be examined later in this chapter. First, there are some other questions that need to be addressed: What exactly is U.S. policy toward Taiwan? What might change it? What might these changes do? As noted in chapter 2, in May 1950, China’s People’s Liberation Army was readying 100,000 troops in southwest China to invade Taiwan. President Truman said the United States would not intervene. Taiwan’s fate appeared to be sealed. Chiang Kai-shek and his government and the KMT prepared for an emergency evacuation. But owing to the outbreak of the Korean War, President Truman made a sudden and surprising about face and sent the U.S. 7th Fleet to the Taiwan Strait (instead of to the vicinity of Korea) to block Mao’s invasion of Taiwan. Was this sudden shift in U.S. policy something that could happen again? That is a poignant question. President Truman’s assumption was that China was the Soviet Union’s ally. The two had signed a defense treaty in February and Mao was party to the plan whereby North Korea invaded South Korea four months later. So, Nationalist China was again America’s friend and ally. The battle lines were drawn and America assumed the role of Taiwan’s guardian. The United States fulfilled this role during crises over the Offshore Islands in the 1950s and finessed one in the 1960s. It is worthy to note that U.S. policy toward Korea and Taiwan were linked at this time. Mao called them bases to use to attack China. It is said that the United States thwarting his attack on Taiwan made Mao so angry he ordered Chinese troops to fight American forces in Korea. Arguably, to Chinese leaders Taiwan and Korea are still linked strategically. Some pundits now speculate that the Trump administration may be strategizing about linking U.S.–Taiwan policy and a deal with North Korea. Indeed U.S. relations with the two appear connected. Furthermore, President Trump is a proponent of realism and that means flexibility. He is also a negotiating president and wants to keep his objectives undisclosed to others. (More will be said about this later in this chapter.) There is also a precedent. In 1968, when Richard Nixon was elected president, it was obvious (to him but also many architects of U.S. foreign policy) that the United States should not ignore the People’s Republic of China. No longer could America contain or isolate China. It did so in the past, but that was because China was isolationist. That was not the case now. In addition, given the realities of international politics—in particular, the Soviet Union’s massive military build-up, which the United States could not alone match—it was imperative President Nixon improve relations with China to counterbalance growing Soviet power. Just as important, perhaps more important, Nixon perceived that the United States had to get out of the Vietnam War. China could and probably would help the United States deal

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with both problems. In the meantime, China realized it needed a new relationship with Washington due to seriously stained relations with Moscow. There was even cause to think those erstwhile allies might go to war. In fact, they did, on their common border in 1969. Beijing and Washington, during Nixon’s trip to China in 1972, thus ended two decades of enmity and became friends, perhaps even allies. Nixon’s thinking was influenced by his adherence to realism and power balancing. In any event Nixon and Mao forgot about ideology and changed the world. Most observers thought this was a good thing. China came out of its shell to become not only a world power but also a supporter of the Western liberal world order, at least some thought so. This idea, of course, turned out to be wrongheaded. China had its own ideas about a world order, taken from its history, politics and culture.. Taiwan could not be allowed to obstruct the United States from forging a new relationship with China. Yet President Nixon could not abandon Taiwan. Thus he did not declare that Taiwan was a part of China, but rather he said that the United States “does not challenge” Beijing’s view—a quite ambiguous statement. Other matters were dealt with obliquely or ignored. The issue of Taiwan was not (and ostensibly could not be) resolved at this time. It was put aside. Nixon and Henry Kissinger, his national security advisor, thought Taiwan had strategic value.. They had to wonder if the breakthrough in U.S.–China relations would really last. The impact of U.S. public opinion on the Nixon presidency was another factor. Taiwan enjoyed considerable public support in the United States, especially among Nixon’s conservative base (and an election was not far away). Henry Kissinger later dismissed those thoughts, writing that he expected U.S.–China relations to improve fast and Washington and Beijing would cement formal diplomatic relations forthwith. But events intervened. In 1974, President Nixon resigned from office. In 1976, Mao died. There was thus an unanswered “what if” question. The lesson of those years was the reality that international politics can change and if that happens everyone must accommodate. In any event, U.S.–China/Taiwan policy became the purview of President Jimmy Carter. In 1978 Carter, in the milieu of his failing popularity at home, concluded the Normalization Agreement establishing diplomatic relations with China, concurring with Deng Xiaoping (as he demanded) that Taiwan is part of China. Washington also gave notification of cancelling the U.S.– Republic of China mutual defense treaty. At this juncture, it appeared that the United States had alas finally decided to abandon Taiwan. But Carter went too far. His policy was reversed, or was at least seriously diluted, a few months later when Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). The TRA, for all intents and purposes, restored Taiwan’s sovereignty in the eyes of the United States. By the way, some say President Carter anticipated this.

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After that, the United States had, pundits explained, two China policies: one made by the White House and the Department of State (pro-Beijing), the other made by Congress (pro-Taiwan). The State Department usually had the upper hand, as it was much more on top of foreign policy issues. Congress had many other concerns. Congress thus became Taiwan’s “friend in need” and acted to help Taiwan, but mainly on special occasions. In any case, this created a new ambiguity in America’s relations with China and Taiwan. Such was convenient (and needed) for U.S. diplomats that interacted with China. They also had to manage U.S.–China relations during a time of global sea change. In fact, lack of clarity became in some senses institutionalized. Though ambiguity had been a tactic or even a strategy before, there were two themes that became a lasting part of U.S.–China/Taiwan policy at that time: strategic ambiguity and dual deterrence. The former meant that the United States was not lucid about what it would do if either Beijing or Taipei precipitated an armed conflict. Arguably the two would thus be less likely to act aggressively against the other. The second meant that the United States adopted a policy of deliberately deterring both from taking any threatening or dangerous acts against the other and could in this way keep the peace. This seemed to work…for a while. Fast forward to 1982. Deng Xiaoping was in trouble at home. His opponents thought he had gone too far in making friends with the “head capitalist nation.” Clearly Deng had overstepped certain bounds. Many issues were in play but Taiwan was the issue Deng’s detractors assailed him about the most. It was Deng’s “Achilles heel.” To help Deng, who was considered America’s friend (and an ally against the Soviet Union) and because he was promoting deep capitalist reform and more, the Reagan administration promised to end arms sales to Taiwan. But President Reagan also had to placate his pro-Taiwan supporters. So he declared this agreement was predicated on a “peaceful solution only” of the “Taiwan issue”—which Beijing supposedly pledged. But Deng Xiaoping said he had made no such promise. How could he? To China, Taiwan was its property. In any case the communiqué was not signed; later the State Department said it “lacks status” in international law. More important, Reagan did not restrict military technology transfers to Taiwan. More ambiguity! The first President Bush had good rapport with Beijing; but there soon emerged a big problem. Relations with China changed in June 1989 as a result of the Tiananmen Square massacre. It caused China to become a pariah nation in America’s eyes. Congress and Democrats assailed Bush’s “pro-Beijing policy.” Then with the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, Washington no longer needed the “China card” as leverage against the Soviet Union. The givens about U.S.–China relations shifted dramatically.

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In 1992, Bush adopted what seemed to be a pro-Taiwan policy, or at least a policy much more favorable to Taipei in the security realm. He broke Reagan’s commitment to cut arms sales to Taiwan and sold 150 F-16 fighter planes to Taipei. With these planes, Taiwan could protect its air space. This also engendered the view that Taipei didn’t need to negotiate with China and could remain separate and sovereign. Deng “understood” Bush’s decision, or he was too preoccupied with a war with Vietnam. So the divisive issue of the sale of jet fighter planes faded in importance and a crisis in U.S.–China relations was avoided. The Clinton administration was hostile toward China early on. President Clinton called Chinese leaders “butchers” when he criticized Bush’s China policy. He allowed the planes promised to Taiwan by the Bush administration to be delivered; he could have blocked the sale. He sold more weapons to Taiwan. In 1994, Clinton “upgraded” relations with Taiwan (as a part of a “Taiwan policy review”), making it possible for high U.S. government officials to have contacts with government officials from Taiwan. (They heretofore avoided contacts.) President Clinton also accepted the position that the TRA has precedence over communiqués signed with Beijing. In 1995, President Lee Teng-hui, with White House approval, was given the go-ahead to visit the United States even though the State Department had promised Chinese leaders he would not be given a visa. Congress had pressured President Clinton and he relented. But soon Clinton shifted gears. China had become too important. President Clinton needed closer relations with China for a host of domestic reasons: trade, employment and loans. He also needed China’s cooperation to deal with many global problems. So Clinton travelled to China. There he spoke of a “strategic partnership” with the People’s Republic of China and announced supporting a “three no’s” policy: no to independence for Taiwan; no to two Chinas or one Taiwan, one China; and no to Taiwan joining any organization for which statehood is a requirement. Clinton became pro-China. President Clinton denied that he changed U.S.–China/Taiwan policy or that he in any way had hurt Taiwan. Still, his pronouncements deeply troubled Taipei and the U.S. Congress. Congress acted to override Clinton’s antiTaiwan policy changes by voting on resolutions favorable to Taiwan while expressing America’s support for Taipei. The gap between executive- and legislative-branch views relating to U.S.–China policy, and especially toward Taiwan, widened. In fact, a pattern visible in U.S.–China/Taiwan relations was confirmed. Early in presidential administrations the executive branch of government was friendly toward Taiwan. This was because U.S. public opinion (and voters) favored Taiwan. But then it became evident that China was too important to the United States and good relations were required to keep the international financial system and more working smoothly. There was another pattern: Congress exerted its authority over U.S.–China/ Taiwan policy but only periodically—when there was an important issue at

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hand or in the event of an emergency. Otherwise it didn’t. In fact, the next time it influenced U.S.–Taiwan policy was in 1996 when China tested missiles in the Taiwan Strait and essentially quarantined Taiwan. Had not President Clinton acted to stop China’s military, Congress would have done something to pressure him that would have weakened his presidency. So he acted. Initially President George W. Bush was more friendly toward Taiwan and tougher toward China than his predecessor. He denied that China, as President Clinton had said, was a strategic partner. Instead, he called China a challenge and a competitor and said he would do “whatever it took” to defend Taiwan. He increased arms sales to Taipei, including offensive weapons (submarines), even though the TRA specified only defensive weapons. Yet President Bush followed precedent. He did not alter the U.S. one-China policy, nor did he even hint that he supported Taiwan’s independence—other than by allowing some of Taiwan’s top leaders who advocated independence to visit the United States. Then, as presidents before him, though faster, Bush moved away from a pro-Taiwan stance. He was engrossed in America’s war on terrorism and grateful for the fact that China “signed on” and became an important U.S. ally in that “war.” The Bush administration also came to view President Chen as a provocateur who would chance a war between the United States and China for his own political gains. Hence President Bush ceased to view Taiwan as a loyal ally; he even openly displayed anger and hostility toward President Chen.. President Obama followed a somewhat different course. In his first two years in office, he showed little interest in Taiwan. U.S.–Taiwan policy remained unchanged from the Bush administration. One explanation was that the Obama administration was not influenced by Taiwan’s Republican friends or by public opinion about Taiwan, that were usually factors in making China/Taiwan policy. Also Obama was liberal and Europe-centered. But as a realization of China’s rise grew, as did America’s dependence on China’s financial help. Thus as Beijing adopted more assertive policies, the Obama administration showed signs it was willing to jilt Taiwan. A host of President Obama’s friends and supporters made the case for him. Then came a big turnaround. In late 2011, President Obama launched a new Asia policy, the “pivot to Asia” policy. It was anti-China. This and an election approaching and Obama (not wanting to appear too friendly with China), shifted course. But President Obama did not become friendlier toward Taiwan. That was not part of the equation as it had been. What is to be gleaned from all of this? U.S.–Taiwan policy shifted a number of times, at least once in every administration. It was affected by differences of viewpoints among foreign policy makers. It was pushed to and fro by very different perspectives espoused by the White House and the Department of State on the one hand and Congress on the other. It was impacted by the triangular relationship of Washington, Taipei and Beijing, as well as the vagaries of world politics and domestic affairs within the three actors.

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In 2016, Donald Trump was elected America’s president. He was a very different president. He was a transactional president. He ignored precedent. He talked to President Tsai when pundits opined he should not. He then made friends with President Xi. However, the trade issue soon took a front and center role and President Trump negotiated hard with China. In the process he became friendlier with Taiwan. He played the Taiwan card. The Tsai administration used good relations with the United States to enhance its popularity at home. But some DPP leaders warned that President Trump might turn around and once again promote better relations with China. Did the international milieu require this? That was the $64,000 question. The bottom line? Both history and the record of U.S.–Taiwan policy suggest the United States will intervene if China threatens Taiwan. So does U.S. law. The TRA seems to legally obligate the United States to do so. So the Clinton administration acted with resolve during the 1996 missile tests in the Taiwan Strait. Yet President Trump, though friendly toward Taiwan, at a national security meeting asked rhetorically: Why should the United States fight a war for Taiwan? He had pledged to keep America out of wars.

The China Factor, Unvarnished In 1949, Mao viewed Taiwan as the final battle to end China’s long civil war between his armies and Chiang Kai-shek’s. Further Taiwan housed a competing regime that claimed Mao’s government was illegitimate. Mao wanted to finish it off. Some Chinese leaders compared the situation to President Abraham Lincoln’s situation during the American civil war (an idea that didn’t please American diplomats). President Truman checked Mao from liberating Taiwan, making it an unresolved and apparently non-negotiable issue between the United States and China. Reportedly Mao sent troops to fight American troops in Korea in revenge. He then pledged he would never negotiate with the United States until China had recovered Taiwan. In 1954, and again in 1958, he ordered his People’s Liberation Army to attack the Offshore Islands hoping to split the United States and Chiang Kai-shek. That didn’t succeed. Mao then came to the conclusion that this was not a good idea inasmuch as it would further separate Taiwan from China. The feud with the United States thus entered a new and different phase. Mao fought the United States in a proxy war in Vietnam. He caused, according to some analysts, America to lose its first war. He certainly humiliated the United States and sapped its will to fight another war for a while. He challenged America in the rest of the world in various ways. But the international scene then changed profoundly. Mao was at odds with the Soviet Union. They even fought a war on their border. Moscow contemplated invading China and removing Mao from power. This was serious stuff. Mao needed the United States. He thus relented over Taiwan when he met President Nixon in 1972. Nixon was a friend and supporter of Taiwan; but he

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also gave ground. Nixon and Mao brokered a deal. But they were not able to finalize it. Nixon resigned from the presidency. Mao died. In 1978, after two years of confusion and struggles within China’s political leadership, Deng Xiaoping assumed command of China’s government. He sought to continue, even advance, the “era of good feeling” between the United States and China. But for different reasons! Deng sought to fix China’s economy and by doing so make China rich and strong, and he equated the two. Fighting a war could wait until China modernized and was ready for it, and that would take time. Possibly a long time. In the interim he needed America’s friendship, and got it. China indeed became a great economic power. For four decades, its economy boomed. Its economic performance was unmatched in human history. Never had a big country grown so fast. Further, Deng’s successors kept China’s economy growing at warp speed. As a result, China’s economy eclipsed that of other world powers. The record was there for all to see: the People’s Republic of China passed every other country in the world except the United States in economic lift. China outsized the United States in manufacturing, in trade (which projected its economic prowess) and even by GDP if purchasing power was used to measure it. A side effect of this was that China’s military spending outpaced all competitors except the United States. Amplifying the importance of this, most other world powers cut their military budgets after the end of the Cold War. The rise of China economically and militarily affected how others viewed China. The United States saw China as a new and powerful supporter of the liberal world order. China was to be a stakeholder in the system as America wanted. But this did not turn out to be. China had its own ideas, called the “China dream.” Some, of course, cast doubt about whether China would continue to grow economically at such a fast pace. China indeed faced problems that could derail its economic growth. But there were better reasons for thinking that would not happen. Even if China’s boom slowed (which it inevitably would), it could still grow at a respectable pace and faster in absolute terms than other nations.. Predicting China’s economic future, one had to consider the following: China was historically a rich country; it was in the process of returning to that status. China followed the model and the growth trajectory of the four dragons (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore); they continued to do well. Globalism, with its free markets and free trade, favored China. China’s inexpensive labor would continue to be an advantage for a while. Also China’s quality of education, innovation and productivity all favored continued good growth. China’s huge market likewise gave it a decisive advantage over most competitors. Finally Chinese were hardworking and driven to succeed and make their country stronger and greater. Deng’s policies were to be humble and hide China’s ambitions. His successors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, accepted Deng’s views and implemented his

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policies. China continued to boom economically and expanded in other ways and became a big power. Xi Jinping, who became head of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012 and president of China in 2013, was of a different mind from his predecessors, especially about secreting China’s big power goals. He perceived that China could not, and should not, try to shroud its ambitions. He talked and wrote about China becoming a great power; the “China dream” was his dream. He cited “China 2025” when China would lead the world in high tech. He made China the world’s builder with the Belt and Road Initiative that involved trillions of dollars and scores of countries. It made all roads lead to China. It overshadowed anything America had ever done by trillions of dollars.. The question at hand was: How would Xi’s China treat Taiwan? The crux of the matter is this: Chinese leaders in Beijing with their new power status contested Taiwan’s claim to nationhood and threatened to deploy their military against Taiwan—under certain circumstances. Beijing said it would use the force of arms if Taipei (1) allowed foreign bases on Taiwan or foreign control of any or all of Taiwan’s territory, (2) built nuclear weapons, (3) experienced internal turmoil, (4) declared independence or (5) refused to negotiate reunification over a long period. These conditions need to be assessed one by one. So do President Xi and other Chinese leaders’ views about how serious any of them are or might become. As noted earlier, in the years immediately after 1949, Chinese leaders feared that some nation or nations might harbor territorial designs on Taiwan. The United States was first on the list. But America did not have any intention to colonize Taiwan or make it part of the United States. That was not in America’s character anymore. Further it did not comport with America’s newly created liberal world order. After 1960, China suspected the Soviet Union of having designs on Taiwan. But if that were true at that time, it didn’t last long. Now Russia is weak and anyway it is once again China’s ally. Japanese leaders may well covet Taiwan and may even want to govern it; but this cannot happen. Given China’s rise, the situation is different. Beijing had reason to fear that other outsiders had designs on Taiwan, but no more. It does not now need to worry seriously that Taiwan will become the property of another nation or come under significant foreign influence. Given these circumstances, there appears to be no need for Chinese leaders to consider using force against Taiwan to keep it from falling into someone else’s hands. Yet arguably they do worry. What about a foreign nation acquiring bases on Taiwan? That also seems improbable. The United States closed its bases in Taiwan after President Nixon’s rapprochement with China, and it is not Washington’s policy to reestablish them. The possibility of stationing U.S. troops on Taiwan, at least temporarily, was broached during the 1996 missile crisis. But it did not happen.

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If there is a future conflict in the Taiwan Strait or an attack on Taiwan, the United States may well be tempted to exercise this option. But, in this event, the conflict will likely have already started, so the issue of foreign bases on Taiwan would probably be little more than a minor irritant in a broad war overshadowed by other much more serious matters. What about Taiwan going nuclear? As noted in Chapter 6, at one time Taiwan considered the “nuclear option.” But Washington’s policy of preventing it from starting a crisis remained under presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter. That included Taiwan not having a nuclear weapon. The United States even took overt (brazen and illegal) actions to stop it—including kidnapping Taiwan’s top nuclear scientists. Nothing much has been heard of this since. Even if Taiwan were to acquire nuclear weapons, it could not rationally engage in a nuclear war with China. Taiwan would lose. So why try? Both presidential candidates in Taiwan during the 2008 election campaign forswore seeking nuclear weapons. President Ma subsequently declared that Taiwan would not acquire nuclear weapons. The DPP has not changed this policy. Thus, the likelihood is nil that Taiwan will go nuclear. If it did, the United States would doubtless intrude. In this regard, there is an inconvenient truth for Taiwan: the more high-tech the weapons America sells it, including delivery systems, the less control Taiwan has over them. Therefore, the People’s Republic of China has no “nuclear reason” to attack Taiwan. Internal stability, or the lack of it, in Taiwan cannot be easily defined, much less predicted. One can say that Taiwan (as was noted in Chapter 4) has a record of political and social stability, particularly given the vast economic, political, social and other changes it has experienced in recent years. It democratized smoothly and without bloodshed. Taiwan made a peaceful transition of ruling parties in 2000. This produced less turmoil and uncertainty than similar changes of governments in many developing nations. In 2000 and after China was apprehensive, but it turned out nothing bad happened. In 2008, Taiwan’s democracy was “consolidated again” when the KMT returned to power. In 2016, a rotation of ruling parties happened a third time, but a crisis didn’t follow. Taiwan has a potential for ethnic conflict notwithstanding equitable economic and social opportunities, considerable intermarriage and other indicators. Candidates play the “ethnic card” during election campaigns. In the future, ethnic friction might erupt as a by-product of proposals about reunification with the People’s Republic of China or independence. It is a potential problem. Yet exacerbating ethnic ill will was a reason the DPP lost power in 2008. That year and in 2012, citizens voted for better ethnic relations, and ethnic tension is now less of a problem though it is still part of most election campaigns. Other possible causes of political instability are crime, corruption and some other (perceived at least) serious social problems. The public’s alarm about crime has increased in recent years. However, while crime has become a more

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serious problem, it has certainly not reached dangerous proportions. Corruption is a major concern to Taiwan’s populace because it is viewed as bad for its democratization and is related in the public’s mind to crime (inasmuch as politicians and gangs are associated). But it is viewed as a more serious problem than it really is—at least comparing Taiwan to other countries. Anyway, it was a prime cause of the ruling party’s fall from power in 2008. That was a good lesson, and corruption is now arguably a less serious problem. Taiwan has other social problems, but they do not seem of such a magnitude as to cause the kind of serious instability that might justify Beijing’s military intervention. A declaration of independence by a political party or a top politician has long been considered a distinct possibility. Depending on how “declaration” is defined, it may be very likely or not likely at all. For years politicians, especially opposition politicians, discussed the issue of self-determination. They spoke in favor of it and even advocated it, citing provisions in the Atlantic Charter and the U.N. Charter that support it. This legitimated their bid for a government free from Nationalist Party control and in the future a Taiwan separate from China. With democratization, self-determination came to mean separation from the People’s Republic of China. Subsequently, independence, a more provocative term, was discussed in public, advocated by the main opposition party, and even put into the DPP’s party’s charter. Taiwanese politicians, while calling for independence, burned the flags of the People’s Republic of China in public before television cameras and cursed Chinese leaders in Beijing. They then called them cowards for not invading Taiwan as they promised. But Beijing did not take the bait. What then might constitute an “official” declaration, or one provocative enough to cause Beijing to attack Taiwan? If the ruling party were to issue a formal proclamation of independence or amend the Constitution to this effect, this might be viewed in Beijing as an “official declaration.” President Chen and the DPP broached ideas like this. Chen, however, is no longer in power, and the DPP has dampened its advocacy of an independent Taiwan—in this sense at least. A joint declaration of independence by two or more political parties might happen if Taipei becomes too isolated, feels excessively threatened or becomes desperate for some other reasons. This would likely provoke hard-liners in Beijing. A statement by the president or a future president unequivocally suggesting the permanent separation of Taiwan from China might be enough for the People’s Liberation Army to call for military action. But these scenarios do not seem highly probable. Statements or actions, if made only by individual politicians, could easily be ignored in Beijing. Finally, what constitutes refusing to negotiate over an extended period is very unclear. Chou En-lai (Zhou En-lai) once talked about Taiwan “returning to the fold” after 50, 100 or 1,000 years. Mao said something similar. Deng Xiaoping spoke of Taiwan as being a “back burner” issue that could wait until later—perhaps much later—to be resolved. Yet Deng also made quite different statements about Taiwan, no doubt under pressure from the military and in the context of nationalist sentiment

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that grew in China during his rule. Jiang Zemin was subject to even greater pressure and spoke of resolving the “Taiwan question” earlier rather than later. In 1995 and 1996, Beijing ordered missile tests near Taiwan. President Xi has paid respect to the military and brandished it for Taiwan to see. But his eyes were, and are, focused more on China becoming a global power based on a huge economy and its advances in science and technology. Concerning the time limit, one might query: As long as Taiwan does not declare independence and does not allow its territory to be used for bases or taken by another nation, why should there be a deadline? Anyway, a deadline is not an ultimatum. Regardless, deadlines have been discussed—even set— and they have come and gone. Clearly, a long time may be, or become, acceptable. Chinese are known for their patience. Another factor to consider is that Chinese leaders face some harsh realities regarding incorporating Taiwan. If Beijing were to obtain and govern Taiwan in the near future, the island’s economy would likely suffer because Taiwan has a different kind of economy and its global trade, upon which its economic health depends, would likely be disrupted. There would be social and political unrest, even chaos. Taiwan would become a burden to China, not an asset. Even talk of an invasion might precipitate a full-blown economic disaster, including the flight of Taiwan’s valuable human capital. Money would also go. Taiwan would become a human rights case. For good reason, then, Chinese officials may find it to their advantage not to hurry the process of unification. In any case, economic and other relations between China and Taiwan currently are good—better than they would be after unification. Making an even better case for patience, Chinese leaders have good reason to believe that time is on their side. China will likely continue to grow faster economically than other world powers and much faster than Taiwan. As mentioned earlier, globalism favors China. So does its size. China’s growing economic relations with other Asian countries mean Taiwan must see its future as with China, not against it. Also the military balance in Asia is tilting in China’s favor. So, China can simply wait. In sum, it would clearly be best for China if Taiwan were to be incorporated based on economic ties and a voluntary affiliation with (and presumably an eventual joining) China. This would be much preferable to military means. The latter would damage China’s image abroad, undermine its relations with many countries and hurt its image in the international community. In addition, if the military option were exercised it would likely give the generals undue influence over foreign policy making and more than that for some time. China’s civilian leaders do not want this.

Final Thoughts, Caveats Scholars, pundits and policy makers have broached ideas that help understand the unification versus independence dichotomy or sometimes called the “Taiwan problem” and its connection to Taiwan’s future. Some

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of them are optimistic; others are not. Some offer solutions, these need to be cited and conclusions drawn. The most common one, and arguably the best and/or the most practical answer to the unification/independence problem, is that no solution can be accepted as the final word and Taiwan remains separate from China but cordial toward Beijing in the short run. The short run may become the long run. In other words, keep the status quo. In fact, the status quo is something that all of the players involved can find temporarily or tentatively acceptable. They may get accustomed to it. The unification versus independence question will then arguably become less important and will less likely evolve into a crisis. Alternatively, another solution may become self-evident and less provocative. Time does heal wounds they say. Both the United States and China favor the status quo, though neither (especially China) says so. The advantages to this solution are that it can be accomplished without doing anything sudden or provocative. It does not require a change in policy or a policy statement. It can be sustained simply by consultations and effective negotiations if necessary. The United States favors this solution because it has a multitude of problems elsewhere and considers the Taiwan issue a distraction. Also the U.S. military is spread too thin. More military spending diverts resources that are better used to help America improve its economy, fix its infrastructure, help the poor and devote more money to research and development. Americans do not want a war. They are tired of the costly wars the United States has pursued in the Middle East during the past two administrations, to the tune of trillions of dollars and many soldiers killed and injured. President Trump has promised not to repeat this. Also most Americans realize the United States and China need to work together. Functioning U.S.–China relations is a sine qua non for the global financial system to work, for nuclear weapons to be controlled, for global warming to be checked and a host of other problems prevented from becoming perlious. Only these two powers can keep the international system stable and operating as it should. The view of China’s leaders is very similar. They have plans for China to be a world power. They can best accomplish this by not letting Taiwan become a crisis. They can work around the “Taiwan question.” China is the penultimate builder. China is a dominant economic power and its military grows stronger accordingly. These appear its best paths to becoming a great nation—not war. Being a big power in every respect, a superpower, Taiwan will simply fall into China’s lap. Taiwan will choose unification. However, there are a number of caveats if accepting the status quo. In terms of the decision-making processes in China, the military in China is the most serious. It chaffs at Taiwan’s separation and what the DPP and its leaders say about China being an undemocratic, evil country, etc. Taking a more aggressive stance toward Taiwan would also afford it a pitch for a bigger

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budget and for more say in Chinese politics. It would distract from internal problems in the military if and when they appear. Yet China’s leaders are also aware that China’s military is not as strong as it appears. It has made progress beyond many observers’ expectations. In fact, it has been regularly ahead of schedule in breaking barriers to become a modern cum formidable global force. But its weapons have not been tested in combat. China lacks recent experience in war. Also China needs allies and military bases abroad. It does not have them! America has a plenitude of both. The reality is the United States is ahead of China in military power by ten years or more. Furthermore, it is uncertain how fast China can catch up. Yet a crisis over Taiwan might also serve as a useful diversion for the civilian leadership in China in the event of an internal leadership crisis. Certainly China’s leaders are not of one mind on a number of issues. A fight over Taiwan might unify them. Indeed there are advocates of war to resolve the Taiwan matter among civilian leaders. A small war with or over Taiwan might also alleviate China’s unemployment problem (which seems perennial), as more human resources would be absorbed by the military. It would similarly serve as a stimulus for China’s economy, which it seems to often need. On the other side of the coin, China’s citizens do not want a war. Peace is more enjoyable. China’s culture has become materialistic. Last but not least, the one-child policy means that each family has but one son or daughter and most parents oppose war for that reason. In the case of the United States, Taiwan is popular in the U.S. and it influences some votes. American politicians make points by supporting Taiwan. It bears repeating the U.S. military sees Taiwan as a provider of intelligence and a vital link in the island chain that blocks China’s naval penetration into the Pacific Ocean. It doesn’t want to give up either; they are vital to America’s Asia policy and the U.S. military build-up under President Trump. Abandoning Taiwan or even thinking about it would undermine both. China’s rise and its perceived existential threat to the United States seems to prompt America to see a separate Taiwan as being in its national interest. But will America retain the will and means to do what it has in the past? Perhaps. In any case, America has friends and allies that fear and oppose China’s rise. Protecting Taiwan and feuding with China may be the glue that keeps them together. Likewise the vagaries of America’s domestic politics suggest China is a political football cum scapegoat. Oddly Democrats praise President Trump for his hard line on tariffs and other punitive actions against China, including his verbal blasts at China over trade. Tension with China can be a unifying factor in American party politics. Another matter is the fact the Democratic Party, Hollywood, academe and the media all despise China. They see China as seeking to destroy the liberal world order they helped create and covet. China, they fear, will impose its own world order at an unacceptable cost to liberal democracy and the current

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international system. Seeing China as a threat also justifies their hatred of China and Chinese and their racism toward Asians, especially Chinese that apply to America’s top colleges and universities. The same bias is seen in movies and television and in the media, which the left approves. Certainly America’s relationship with China is unusual. China is America’s foremost enemy, but China is also its most important friend. This paradox will not likely end soon. Taiwan is also a conundrum. That was stated succinctly in the preface to this book. In terms of its status, Taiwan will likely remain an anomaly for some time. Many say Taiwan is not a nation, but few can say what it should be called. Taiwan will remain diplomatically isolated, yet it will also remain an active and important player in international politics and economics. The Taiwan Strait will likely remain an area of possible conflict. Yet political entities have seldom been regarded simultaneously as a pariah and a role model, as a sovereign nation-state and a disconnected part of a major power. Few small entities have played a key role in many of the major dramas of modern history. Such characterizes Taiwan. Speaking more of Taiwan, it can be said to be the trigger cum catalyst, as it has long been, for a U.S.–China confrontation. Since the KMT’s election defeat in 2016, after which the once opposition DPP assumed power, their leaders, party activists and the pro-DPP segment of the media have been criticizing China harshly at almost every turn. They speak regularly about Taiwan being a democracy and China a dictatorship. They repeat the liberal Western media’s attacks on China for everything from President Xi ending term limits, to China spying on its citizens, to the mistreatment of Muslims, to oppression of dissidents and a bad human rights record to its cheating other countries with its foreign aid and investment projects. Taiwan has become one of China’s most aggressive and annoying hypercritics. Foreign supporters of the DPP likewise. Taiwan’s pundits and politicians also say things that are unfathomable. Some say that Taiwan can defend itself against China without the help of the United States. This is ridiculous to the point many analysts say it is just plain stupid. But it is also a dangerous lie. Taiwan standing alone cannot defend itself beyond a few hours or a couple of days. One has to wonder if Chinese leaders are scratching their heads about this or think that it might evolve into some other irrational thinking. Another matter is that populism and progressivism have come to dominate Taiwan’s politics. The effects of both are hard to predict. Some say populism has “infected” Taiwan. It promotes emotionalism and impedes rational decision-making. It reinforces anti-China sentiments. It crowds out moderate voices and politicians. Many note that it was the beginning point of communism and fascism. But never mind, many believe it purifies and strengthens democracy. Taiwan’s populism is reinforced by populism succeeding in Europe and a host of other countries, although most of that is right-wing populism as opposed to Taiwan’s left-wing populism (in the case of the DPP at least).

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Progressivism is also at issue in Taiwan. It is supposed to enliven and strengthen its democracy. But it aligns Taiwan with countries of Europe, Japan and other nations that would be useless to Taiwan in the event of a conflict with China. It does not comport with cementing relations with the Trump administration in the United States (which already complains of Taiwan not living up to promises to increase its defense spending and it maintaining a persistent balance of trade surplus with the United States— complaints President Trump has made loudly vis-à-vis some other countries). This has prompted some observers, including some senior DPP leaders, to suggest President Trump may “sell out” Taiwan and others to think he would be justified if he did. Another hitch is the shifting of the power capabilities of nations and regional organizations (vis. the E.U.) that comprise the great players in the world. Europe, Russia and Japan are fast declining powers as reflected by their demographics, economies, military strength and a number of other factors. There are two players left: the United States and China. In other words, arguably the world is returning to bipolarity. But many world leaders, not to mention pundits and scholars, prefer a world transitioning to multi-polarity. It is unlikely they will accept or help the United States and China presiding over bipolarity. Another issue is America’s debt. It is increasing and eventually will reach a point of critical mass and of wrecking the global financial system. What if China does not come to the rescue or even tries to make it worse? Still another matter to worry about is China getting so far ahead of the United States in critical areas of science that its national power status leapfrogs the United States by a margin such that there is no more balance. China is spending much more in areas such as artificial intelligence, quantum computers, robotics and more. China might then become the hyper power. What will the United States do? The Taiwan issue must be seen in the context of all of these caveats that diminish the status quo solution. Hopefully the status quo can be preserved until a solution to whether Taiwan is a nation or part of China is found.

Selected Bibliography

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Sutter, Robert G. Taiwan: Entering the 21st Century. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988. Taiwan Statistical Data Book 2011. Taipei: Executive Yuan, 2011.* This book is published every few years. Yung-hwan, Jo., ed. Taiwan’s Future. Tempe: Arizona State University, 1974. History Andrade, Tonio. How Taiwan Became Chinese: Dutch, Spanish, and Han Colonization in the Seventeenth Century. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008. Andrade, Tonio. Lost Colony: The Untold Story of China’s First Great Victory over the West. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011. Brown, Kerry and Tzu Hui Kalley Wu. The Trouble with Taiwan: History, Identity and a Rising China. London: Zed Books, 2019. Chai, Chen Kang. Taiwan’s Aborigines: A Genetic Study of Tribal Variations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967. Cline, Ray S. Chiang Ching-kuo Remembered: The Man and His Political Legacy. Washington, DC: US Global Strategy Council, 1989. Copper, John F. Historical Dictionary of Taiwan (Republic of China). 4th ed. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015. Crozier, Ralph C. Koxinga and Chinese Nationalism: History, Myth and the Hero. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977. Davidson, James W. The Island of Formosa: Past and Present. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. Davison, Gary Marvin. A Short History of Taiwan: The Case for Independence. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003. Edmonds, Richard L., and Stephen M. Goldstein. Taiwan in the Twentieth Century: A Retrospective View. The China Quarterly Special Issues, n.s., no. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Furuya, Keiji. Chiang Kai-shek: His Life and Times. New York: St. John’s University Press, 1981. Gilbert, Stephen P., and William M. Carpenter. America and Island China: A Documentary History. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989. Goddard, W. G. Formosa: A Study in Chinese History. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1966. Gordon, Leonard H. D., ed. Taiwan: Studies in Chinese Local History. New York: Columbia University Press, 1970. Hung, Chien-chao. A History of Taiwan. Rimini, Italy: Il Cerchio, 2000. Kagan, Richard C. Taiwan’s Statesman: Lee Teng-hui and Democracy in Asia. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007. Kerr, George H. Formosa Betrayed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965. Kerr, George H. Formosa: Licensed Revolution and the Home Rule Movement, 1895– 1945. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1974. Knapp, Ronald G., ed. China’s Island Frontier: Studies in the Historical Geography of Taiwan. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1980. Lai, Tse-han, Ramon H. Myers, and Wou Wei. A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991. Lee, Wei-chin, and T. Y. Wang, eds. Sayonara to the Lee Teng-hui Era: Politics in Taiwan, 1988–2000. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2003.

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Leng, Shao-chuan, ed. Chiang Ching-kuo’s Leadership in the Development of the Republic of China on Taiwan. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993. Li, Laura Tyson. Madame Chiang Kai-shek: China’s Eternal First Lady. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006. Lou, Tsu-kiang. Personal Legends of Formosa. Pasadena, CA: Oriental Book Store, 1975. Lumley, F. A. The Republic of China Under Chiang Kai-shek. London: Barrie and Jenkins, 1978. Manthorpe, Jonathan. Forbidden Nation: A History of Taiwan. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. Phillips, Steven E. Between Assimilation and Independence: The Taiwanese Encounter with Nationalist China, 1945–1950. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003. Riggs, Fred W. Formosa Under Chinese Nationalist Rule. New York: Macmillan, 1952. Reprint, New York: Octagon Books, 1972. Roy, Denny. Taiwan: A Political History. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003. Rubinstein, Murray A., ed. The Other Taiwan: 1945 to the Present. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994. Rutter, Owen. Through Formosa: An Account of Japan’s Island Colony. Taipei: SMC Publishing, Inc, 1995. Rubinstein, Murray A. Taiwan: A History. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998. Rubinstein, Murray A., ed. Taiwan: A New History. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999. Takekoshi, Yosaburo. Japanese Rule in Formosa. 1907. Reprint, Pasadena, CA: Oriental Book Store, 1978. Taylor, Jay. The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009. Taylor, Jay. The Generalissimo’s Son: Chiang Ching-kuo and the Revolutions in China and Taiwan. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000. Tsai, Shih-shan Henry. Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan’s Quest for Identity. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. Tsai, Shih-Shan Henry. Maritime Taiwan: Historical Encounters with the East and West. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2009. Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf. Taiwan, Hong Kong and the United States, 1945–1992: Uncertain Friendships. New York: Twayne, 1994. Wang, David Der-wei, and Carlos Rojas, eds. Writing Taiwan: A Literary History. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007. Wilbur, C. Martin. Sun Yet-sen: Frustrated Patriot. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976. Society and Culture Ahern, Emily Martin, and Hill Gates, eds. The Anthropology of Taiwanese Society. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1981. Aspalter, Christian. Democratization and Welfare State Development in Taiwan. London: Ashgate, 2002. Brown, Melissa J. Is Taiwan Chinese? The Impact of Culture, Power, and Migration on Changing Identities. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004. Canquelin, Jovian. The Aborigines of Taiwan. London: Routledge, 2010.

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Chen, Ya-chen. Women in Taiwan: Sociocultural Perspectives. Indianapolis: University of Indianapolis Press, 2008. Ching, Leo T. S. Becoming Japanese: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001. Clart, Philip, and Charles B. Jones, eds. Religion in Taiwan: Tradition and Innovation in a Changing Society. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2003. Cohen, Marc J. Taiwan at the Crossroads: Human Rights, Political Development and Social Change on the Beautiful Island. Washington, DC: Asia Resource Center, 1988. Cohen, Myron L. House United, House Divided: The Chinese Family in Taiwan. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976. Corcuff, Stephane, ed. Memories of the Future: National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2002. Eberhard, Wolfram. Moral and Social Values of the Chinese: Collected Essays. San Francisco: Chinese Materials and Research Aids Service Center, 1974. Gold, Thomas B. State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1986. Harrell, Steven, and Huang Chun-chieh, eds. Cultural Change in Postwar Taiwan. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994. Hsiao, Hsin-huang Michael, Wei-yuan Cheng, and Hou-sheng Chan, eds. Taiwan: A Newly Industrialized State. Taipei: Department of Sociology, National Taiwan University, 1989. Kang, Peng-cheng. The Story of Taiwan: Culture. Taipei: Government Information Office, 2001. Ku, Yeun-wen. Welfare Capitalism in Taiwan: State, Economy and Social Policy. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997. Lai, Ming-yan. Nativism and Modernity: Cultural Contestations in China and Taiwan Under Global Capitalism. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008. Liao, Ping-hui, and David Der-wei Wang, eds. Taiwan Under Japanese Rule 1895– 1945: History, Culture, Memory. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006. Liu, Alan P. L. Social Change on Mainland China and Taiwan. Baltimore: University of Maryland School of Law, 1982. Lu, Hsin-yi. The Politics of Locality: Making a Nation of Communities in Taiwan. New York: Routledge, 2002. Marsh, Robert M. The Great Transformation: Social Change in Taipei, Taiwan Since the 1960s. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1996. Moser, Michael J. Law and Social Change in a Chinese Community: A Case Study from Rural Taiwan. Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana, 1983. Moskowitz, Marc L. Popular Culture in Taiwan: Charismatic Modernity. London: Routledge, 2011. Myers, Ramon H., ed. Two Societies in Opposition: The Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China after Forty Years. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1990. Rubinstein, Murray A., ed. The Protestant Community on Modern Taiwan: Mission, Seminary and Church. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1991. The Story of Taiwan. Taipei: Government Information Office, 2000. Thornton, Arland, and Hui-sheng Lin. Social Change and the Family in Taiwan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.

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Tien, Hung-mao. The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the Republic of China. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1989. Tsai, Wen-hui. In Making China Modernized: Comparative Modernization Between Mainland China and Taiwan. Baltimore, MD: University of Maryland School of Law, 1993. Wei, Jennifer M. Language Choice and Identity Politics in Taiwan. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008. Weller, Robert P. Alternate Civilities: Democracy and Culture in China and Taiwan. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001. Wilson, Richard W. Learning to Be Chinese: The Political Socialization of Children in Taiwan. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1970. Wu, Tsong-shien. Taiwan’s Changing Rural Society. Pasadena, CA: Oriental Book Store, 1973. Yip, June. Envisioning Taiwan: Fiction, Cinema, and the Nation in the Cultural Imaginary. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004. Government and Politics Achen, Christopher H. and T. Y. Wang, eds, The Taiwan Voter. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2017. Alagappa, Muthiah, ed. Taiwan’s Presidential Politics: Democratization and CrossStrait Relations in the Twenty-First Century. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2001. Chao, Linda, and Ramon H. Myers. The First Chinese Democracy: Political Life in the Republic of China on Taiwan. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998. Cheng, Chu-yuan, ed. Sun Yat-sen’s Doctrine in the Modern World. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989. Cheng, Tun-jen, and Stephen Haggard, eds. Political Change in Taiwan. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992. Chin, Ko-lin. Heijin: Organized Crime, Business, and Politics in Taiwan. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2003. Ching, Cheong. Will Taiwan Break Away? The Rise of Taiwanese Nationalism. Singapore: World Scientific, 2001. Copper, John F. A Quiet Revolution: Political Development in the Republic of China. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988. Copper, John F. Consolidating Taiwan’s Democracy. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2005. Copper, John F. Taiwan Approaches the New Millennium: Essays on Politics and Foreign Affairs. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1999. Copper, John F. Taiwan at a Tipping Point: The Democratic Progressive Party’s Return to Power. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2018 Copper, John F. The KMT Returns to Power: Elections in Taiwan 2008 to 2012. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2013. Copper, John F. The Taiwan Political Miracle: Essays on Political Development, Elections and Foreign Relations. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1997. Copper, John F. Taiwan’s Democracy on Trial: Political Change During the Chen Shuibian Era and Beyond. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2010. Copper, John F. Taiwan’s Mid-1990s Elections: Taking the Final Steps to Democracy. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998.

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Koo, Anthony Y. C. The Role of Land Reform in Economic Development: A Case Study of Taiwan. New York: Praeger, 1968. Kuo, Shirley W. Y. The Taiwan Economy in Transition. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983. Kuo, Shirley W. Y., Gustav Ranis, and John C. H. Fei. The Taiwan Success Story: Rapid Growth with Improved Distribution in the Republic of China, 1952–79. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981. Kuo, Tai-chun, and Ramon H. Myers. Taiwan’s Economic Transformation: Leadership, Property Rights and Institutional Change, 1945–1965. London: Routledge, 2011. Lee, Teng-hui. Intersectoral Capital Flows in the Economic Development of Taiwan, 1895–1960. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1971. Li, Kuo-ting. The Evolution of Policy Behind Taiwan’s Development Success. Singapore: World Scientific, 1995. Lin, Syaru Shirley. Taiwan’s China Dilemma: Contested Identities and Multiple Interests in Taiwan’s Cross-Strait Economic Policy. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016. Mai, Zhaocheng, and Jiansheng Shi. Taiwan’s Economic Success Since 1980. London: Edward Elgar, 2001. Naughton, Barry. The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007. Poon, Teresa Shuk-ching. Competition and Cooperation in Taiwan’s Information Technology Industry: Inter-Firm Networks and Industrial Upgrading. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002. Reardon-Anderson, James. Population, Politics and Foreign Intervention in Taiwan. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1992. Rosen, Daniel H. and Zhi Wang. Deepening China-Taiwan Relations through the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2010. Schive, Chi. The Foreign Factor: The Multinational Corporation’s Contribution to the Economic Modernization of the Republic of China. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1990. Shen, T. H., ed., Agriculture’s Place in the Strategy of Development: The Taiwan Experience. Taipei: Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, 1974. Simon, Dennis, and Michael Yin-mao Kao, eds. Taiwan: Beyond the Economic Miracle. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1992. Stanford Research Institute International. The Taiwan Development Experience and Its Relevance to Other Countries. Taipei: Kwan Hwa, 1988. Wang, N. T., ed. Taiwan Enterprises in Global Perspective. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1992. Wei, Wou. Capitalism: A Chinese Version. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1992. Winckler, Edwin A., and Susan Greenhalgh, eds. Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1988. Wu, Yuan-li. Becoming an Industrialized Nation: ROC’s Development on Taiwan. New York: Praeger, 1985. Wu, Yuan-li, and Kung-chia Yeh, eds. Growth, Distribution, and Social Change: Essays on the Economy of the Republic of China. Baltimore: University of Maryland School of Law, 1978.

330

Selected Bibliography

Yang, Maysing H., ed. Taiwan’s Expanding Role in the International Arena. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997. Yu, Tzong-shian. The Story of Taiwan: Economy. Taipei: Government Printing Office, 2001. Foreign Relations Ballantine, Joseph W. Formosa: A Problem for United States Foreign Policy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1952. Barnett, A. Doak. U.S. Arms Sales: The China-Taiwan Tangle. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1982. Bereuter, Douglas. Taiwan, the PRC and the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act. Collingdale, PA: Diane, 2001. Blanchard, Jean-Marc F., and Dennis V. Hickey. New Thinking About the Taiwan Issue: Theoretical Insights into Its Origins, Dynamics, and Prospects. London: Routledge, 2012. Bush, Richard C. At Cross Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan Relations Since 1942. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2004. Bush, Richard C. Uncharted Strait. Washington, DC: Brookings, 2013. Bush, Richard C. Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2005. Chang, Cecilia S. T., ed. U.S.-R.O.C. Relations: From the White Paper to the Taiwan Relations Act. Jamaica, NY: St. John’s University Press, 1984. Chang, King-yuh. A Framework for China’s Unification. Taipei: Kwang Hwa, 1986. Chang, King-yuh. ROC-US Relations Under the Taiwan Relations Act: Practice and Prospects. Taipei: Institute of International Relations, 1988. Chang, Parris H., and Martin L. Lasater, eds. If China Crosses the Taiwan Strait. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993. Chase, Michael S. Taiwan’s Security Policy: External Threats and Domestic Politics. Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner, 2008. Cheng, Tun-jen, Chi Huang, and Samuel S. G. Wu, eds. Inherited Rivalry: Conflict Across the Taiwan Straits. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995. Chien, Frederick F. Faith and Residence: The Republic of China Forges Ahead. Houston: Kwan Hwa (USA), 1988. Ching, Chong. Will Taiwan Break Away: The Rise of Taiwanese Nationalism. Singapore: World Scientific, 2001. Chiu, Hungdah. Koo-Wang Talks and the Prospect of Building Constructive and Stable Relations Across the Taiwan Straits. Baltimore, MD: University of Maryland School of Law, 1993. Chiu, Hungdah, and Karen Murphy. The Chinese Connection and Normalization. Baltimore: University of Maryland School of Law, 1979. Chiu, Hungdah, ed., China and the Question of Taiwan: Documents and Analysis. New York: Praeger, 1973. Cline, Ray S., ed. The Role of the Republic of China in the International Community. Washington, DC: US Global Strategy Council, 1991. Clough, Ralph N. Reaching Across the Taiwan Strait: People-to-People Diplomacy. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993. Cole, J. Michael. Convergence or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait: The Illusion of Peace? London: Routledge, 2017.

Selected Bibliography

331

Copper, John F. China Diplomacy: The Washington-Taipei-Beijing Triangle. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992. Copper, John F. Playing with Fire: The Looming War with China Over Taiwan. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006. Copper, John F. Words Across the Taiwan Strait: A Critique of Beijing’s “White Paper” on China’s Re-unification. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1995. Denise, Donald J., and Diane D. Pikcanas. Can Two Chinas Become One?Washington, DC: Council for Social and Economic Studies, 1989. Dittmer, Lowell, ed. Taiwan and China: Fitful Embrace. Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2017. Downen, Robert L. Of Grave Concern: U.S.-Taiwan Relations on the Threshold of the 1980s. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1981. Downen, Robert L. To Bridge the Taiwan Strait. Washington, DC: Council for Social and Economic Studies, 1984. Finkelstein, David M. Washington’s Taiwan Dilemma: From Abandonment to Salvation. Fairfax, VA: George Mason University Press, 1993. Friedman, Edward, ed., China’s Rise, Taiwan’s Dilemma and International Peace. London: Routledge, 2005. Frost, Michael S. Taiwan’s Security and the United States Policy: Executive and Congressional Strategies. Baltimore, MD: University of Maryland School of Law, 1982. Goldstein, Steven M. China and Taiwan. Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2015. Gregor, James A., and Maria Hsia Chang. The Republic of China and U.S. Policy: A Study in Human Rights. Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1983. Henckaerts, Jean-Marie, ed. The International Status of Taiwan in the New World Order. London: Kluwer Law International, 1996. Hickey, Dennis Van Vranken. Foreign Policy Making in Taiwan: From Principle to Pragmatism. London: Routledge, 2007. Hickey, Dennis Van Vranken. Taiwan’s Security in the Changing International System. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997. Hickey, Dennis Van Vranken. United States–Taiwan Security Ties: From Cold War to Beyond Containment. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994. Hsieh, Chiao Chiao. Strategy for Survival: The Foreign Policy and External Relations of the Republic of China on Taiwan, 1959–1979. London: Sherwood Press, 1985. Kintner, William, and John F. Copper. A Matter of Two Chinas. Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1979. Lasater, Martin L. The Changing of the Guard: President Clinton and the Security of Taiwan. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995. Hickey, Dennis Van Vranken. Policy and Evolution: The U.S. Role in China’s Reunification. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988. Hickey, Dennis Van Vranken. Security of Taiwan: Unraveling the Dilemma. Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1978. Hickey, Dennis Van Vranken. The Taiwan Issue in Sino-American Strategic Relations. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984. Hickey, Dennis Van Vranken. U.S. Interests in the New Taiwan. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993. Lasater, Martin L. The Taiwan Issue in Sino-American Strategic Relations. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984. Lee, Bernice. The Security Implications of the New Taiwan. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.

332

Selected Bibliography

Lee, David Tawei. The Making of the Taiwan Relations Act: Twenty Years in Retrospect. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1999. Lee, Wei-chin, ed. Taiwan’s Political Re-Alignment and Diplomatic Challenges. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. Li, Victor H. Derecognizing Taiwan: The Legal Problems. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1977. Lilley, James R., and Chuck Downs, eds. Crisis in the Taiwan Strait. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1997 MacFarquhar, Roderick. Sino-American Relations: 1949–1971. New York: Praeger, 1972. Mosher, Steven W., ed., The United States and the Republic of China: Democratic Friends, Strategic Allies, and Economic Partners. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1992. Myers, Ramon H. A Unique Relationship: The United States and the People’s Republic of China Under the Taiwan Relations Act. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1989. Myers, Ramon H., and Jialin Zhang. The Struggle Across the Taiwan Strait: The Divided China Problem. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2006. Rawnsley, Gary D. Taiwan’s Informal Diplomacy and Propaganda. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000. Rigger, Shelley. Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2011. Romberg, Alan D. Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice: American Policy Toward Taiwan and U.S.-PRC Relations. Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003. Sheng, Lijun. China and Taiwan: Cross-Strait Relations Under Chen Shui-bian. London: Zed Books, 2002. Sheng, Lijun. China’s Dilemma: The Taiwan Issue. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001. Snyder, Edwin A., James Gregor, and Maria Hsia Chang. The Taiwan Relations Act and the Defense of the Republic of China. Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, 1980. So, Alvin Y., Nan Lin, and Dudley L. Poston. The Chinese Triangle of Mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong: Comparative Institutional Analyses. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001. Stolper, Thomas E. China, Taiwan and the Offshore Islands. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1985. Su, Chi. Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China: A Tail Wagging Two Dogs. London: Routledge, 2009. Swaine, Michael D., Andrew N. D. Yang, and Evan S. Medeiros, with Oriana Skylark Mastro, eds. Assessing the Threat: The Chinese Military and Taiwan’s Security. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007. Tai, Paul H., ed., United States, China and Taiwan. Carbondale, IL: Public Policy Institute, University of Illinois, 1999. Tan, Alexander C., Steve Chan, and Calvin Jillson. Taiwan’s National Security: Dilemmas and Opportunities. London: Ashgate, 2001. Tkacik, John J., Jr., ed. Reshaping the Taiwan Strait. Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2007. Tsang, Steve, ed. If China Attacks Taiwan: Military Strategy, Politics and Economics. London: Routledge, 2006.

Selected Bibliography

333

Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf, ed. Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005. Wang, Mei-ling. The Dust That Never Settles: The Taiwan Independence Campaign and U.S.-China Relations. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2002. Wang, Yu San, ed. Foreign Policy of the Republic of China on Taiwan: An Unorthodox Approach. New York: Praeger, 1990. Wheeler, Jimmy W., and Perry L. Wood. Beyond Recrimination: Perspectives on U.S. Taiwan Trade Tensions. Indianapolis, IN: The Hudson Institute, 1987. Womack, Brantley, and Yufan Hao (eds), Rethinking the Triangle: Washington-Beijing-Taipei. Singapore: Word Scientific, 2015. Wu, Hsin-hsing. Bridging the Strait: Taiwan, China, and the Prospects for Reunification. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. Zagoria, Donald S., ed. Breaking the China-Taiwan Impasse. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003. Zhao, Suisheng, ed. Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995– 1996 Crisis. London: Routledge, 1999.

Index

Taiwan refers to the Republic of China and Nationalist China. China and People’s Republic of China refers to Mainland China. Individuals with Western first names and Asian surnames are inverted in the index. Aborigines: in 2016 election 187–188; on China’s claim on Taiwan 120; as corvee laborers 20; discrimination and prejudice against 99; Dutch colonial rule and 49; early commerce 198; enmity with Hans 20; as first known inhabitants 45–47; influence on Chinese culture in Taiwan 19; under Japanese colonial rule 56; languages 106; in Legislative Yuan 159; mixed genetic makeup 137n30; origin possibilities 46–47; outward migration and commerce of 45; overview 14–15; problems and progress of 99–100; religious beliefs 108; tensions with Fukien Taiwanese 102; tribal social system differences 96 Academia Historica 154 Academia Sinica 77, 154 ADB see Asian Development Bank adoption of males 97 affirmative action 149 affordable housing 132–133 African nations, International Economic and Cooperation Development Fund for 282–283 Aged Welfare Law 128 aging population 10–11, 116, 129, 130, 131, 133, 202, 305 agriculture/food industries: from 1953–1970 115; advances in 117; in China under Deng 233; during Chinese rule (1600–1895) 198; concentration on and support for 201–202, 238n22; crops and fishing

8–9; under Dutch colonial rule 49; family social system changes and 118; growth and decline 202–203, 238n32; Japan’s development of 55, 113, 199–200; labor force movement in 214; land reform effects 114; under Ma 213; in prehistory 46; protest demonstrations and riots 203; sedentary Aborigines in 15; water for 7–8 Ainus 46 airlines 26, 36, 270 airports 26, 205, 304 Ali Shan (Mount Ali) 38 Alibaba Group 236 American Chamber of Commerce 222 Ami tribe 14 Amnesty International 189n23 Ang Lee 17, 32, 33 anti-communism 183 antimissile defense systems 258 Anti-Secession Law (China) 274 Apple Daily 29 architecture 23 arms industry and sales 230, 257–258, 266 arranged marriages 98, 117 ASEAN see Association of Southeast Asian Nations Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 287 Asia pivot see pivot to Asia Asian democracy 147, 184 Asian Development Bank (ADB) 255, 287 Asian Film Festival 32 Asian financial crisis/Asian meltdown 75, 214, 225

Index Asian Silicon Valley 231–232 Asia-Pacific Regional Operations Center 206 Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait 271 Association of East Asian Relations 277 Association of Southeast Asian Nations 81, 220, 227, 279–280, 306 Atlantic Charter 58–59 Australia 34, 46, 125, 223, 284 authoritarianism x, 21, 68, 79, 116, 144, 146, 148, 149, 184, 175, 275 automobiles and automobile industry 25, 213 balance of power 260, 280, 306 balance of trade 56, 221, 222, 321 banking 27, 199, 205, 207, 210 BCC see Broadcasting Corporation of China Beautiful Duckling (film) 32 Beijing consensus 235 Belt and Road Initiative 237, 314 ben sheng jen (local province people) 16 BenQ Corporation 31 bentu hua (indigenization) 18 Beyond Beauty: Taiwan From Above (film) 33 biological weapons 260 biotechnology industry 213 bipolarity 63, 285, 321 birth rate 10, 16, 114, 116, 126, 217 birth-control program 10 blackout crisis 229–230 Bloomberg report 226 “blue team” (pan-blue bloc) 173, 178, 184 Bodhisattvas 109 book publishing 30–31 brain drain 124, 126, 230, 236, 304 British model of colonization 54 Broadcasting Corporation of China (BCC) 31 Brunei 3, 4, 14, 46, 223 Buddha statue 38 Buddhism 108, 109–110, 112 Budget, Accounting, and Statistics department 226 Bureau of Labor Insurance 128 Bush, George H. W. 264, 309–310 Bush, George W. 18, 79, 252, 266, 282, 310–311 business community 120, 126

335

cable media systems 31 Cable Television Law 31 Café Waiting (film) 33 Cairo 59, 64 Canada 223, 284 Cape No. 7 (film) 33 capital-intensive industries 209–210 capitalism 19–20, 199, 200, 207–208, 233 Caribbean nations 283–284 Carter, Jimmy 69, 250, 263–264, 308 CCK see Chiang Ching-kuo Central American nations 283–284 Central Committee (of KMT) 70, 168 (of DPP) 171 Central Daily News 29 Central Motion Picture Corporation 32 Central Mountain Range 6, 15 Central News Agency (CNA) 29 Central Standing Committee (of KMT) 168 Chan Buddhism 110 Chang, Michael 17 Chang En-pu 109 Chao, Elaine 17–18 chemical weapons 260 Chen Kunhou 32 Chen Li-an 110 Chen Shui-bian: on ‘92 Consensus 273; in 2000 elections 178; anti-Chinese policies 279; Bush’s anger at 311; ceded party leadership 153; checks by Legislative Yuan 157; China relations and 35, 246, 251–252, 290n31; Chinese leaders’ views of 274; coalition government attempt 77–78; confidence in judiciary 160–161; Control Yuan under 161–162; corruption and disgrace 79, 161–162; cultural support 23; divided government struggles 155; economic (pocketbook) election theory 180; economic downturn under 120, 225–226; educational system and policies 125; ethnic voting theory and 180; as first DPP president 171; “five no’s policy” 273; foreign policy under 256; foreign spouses policy 11; on foreign workers 217–218; as Fukien Taiwanese 102, 104; Gidden’s third way 184; on independence 76, 77, 302; inter-parliamentary diplomacy 281–282; magazine publishing 30; mayoral election loss 75; military budget and strength under 305; nations with diplomatic relations

336

Index

under 284; new constitution attempts 151; offshore campaign 258; on one-country two-systems formula 273; political trends under 147; populism 185; Referendum Act 151; referendums on Taiwan’s future 273–274; on rejoining UN 288; religious beliefs 111–112; role in history 75–79; shooting of 78–79, 178; as Taipei mayor 165; as Taiwan president 76; three mini links policy 5; tourism to China policy 35; 2-2-8 Peace Park naming 62–63; U.S. relations and 251–252, 266; workforce and immigration policy 12 Ch’en Yi 60–63, 90n83, 127, 200–201, 207 Cheng (Zheng) period 20, 50–52 Cheng Ch’eng-kung (Koxinga) 20, 50–51, 109–110 Cheng Chih-lung 50 Cheng Ching 51–52 Cheng Dynasty 113 Cheng Ho 48–49 Chiang Ching-kuo (CCK): as Christian 111; democratization push 70, 154–155; flexible diplomacy 291n45; as KMT chairman 168; martial law abolished 148; on one-China policy and separation 71; populism 185; public opinion in policy making 253–254; re-election 70; reforms under 68–69, 70, 156, 170; role in history 68–71; three no’s policy 250; tourism to China policy 35 Chiang Kai-shek: actions after 2-2-8 62; as authoritarian president 154; on Chiang Wei-kuo 92n144; as Christian 111; claim on Taiwan after WWII 58–59; Constitution written under 147; cultural interests 21; death 68; defensive military strategy 257; economic and infrastructure development in Taiwan 65; education under 122; elections under 175–176; encouragement of Chinese culture 23; flight to Taiwan 63, 90n69, 167–168, 201; as KMT leader 167–168; KMT reforms under 154; on liberation of mainland China 91n110; loss to Mao 62; on Mao’s government as illegitimate 247–248; martial law under 148; on Nixon’s China policy 66; populism 185; on Quemoy and Matsu islands 5; strategy change about Mainland 248; Taiwan as UN member

284–285; on Taiwan’s status after Japan’s defeat 64; tourism policy 34 Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall (National Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall) 37 Chiang Wei-kuo 72, 92n144 chieh yen fa (emergency decree or martial law) 148 child abuse 135 child welfare 127, 128 Children’s Welfare Law 135 China: admitted to United Nations 67; African nations and 282–283; ASEAN and 81; bureaucratic political system 145; civil liberties rating 189n23; communications 27; Cultural Revolution 37, 67, 249, 262, 286; democracy movement in 72–73; economic growth 130, 232–234, 313; as economic model 235; family social systems 96–97; foreign and military policies and 269–276; foreign trade under Deng 233; global trade 220–221; higher education 236; immigration from 12; industry and exports under Deng and Jiang 233–234; isolation of 67; land dispute with Taiwan 2; local government autonomy in 145; media positions 27–28; military 258, 298, 318–319; missile tests by ix, 246, 255, 258, 265, 272; as origin of Taiwan political system 145; physical work, prejudice against 96; population and labor trends 13; provincial cultural differences 18; rapprochement with U.S. 65–66, 67; renewable energy 224; science and technology advancements 321; threat of war with U.S. 299; as true China in world affairs 66; as U.S. friend and enemy 319–320; war on terrorism 252; World Competitiveness Report 226; world order plan 308; as world’s richest nation 235; see also China’s claim on Taiwan; China’s relations with Taiwan “China 2025” 314 China Airlines (CAL) 26, 270, 294n121 “China card” 263 China Democratic Party 30 China Democratic Socialist Party 167 “China dream” 313–314 China Economic News Service 29 China External Trade Development Council 282 “China fever” 225

Index China Lobby 262 China Post 29 China Shipbuilding Corporation 212 China Steel Corporation 212 China Television Company 31 China Times 29 China Times Weekly 29–30 China–ASEAN common market 227 China’s claim to Taiwan: British sailors, protection of 53; Cheng Ho visit 48–49; Cheng’s role in Taiwan’s development 50–51; conditions for military force against Taiwan 314–316; Cross-Strait trade fears 220–221; Cross-Strait travel 120; cultural memories of older Taiwanese 119–120; DPP on Fukien Taiwanese 102; early arrival of Chinese 15; early explorations by China 47; ECFA effects 227; education decisions and 126; ethnic groups’ desire for independence 104; fear of losing other territories 298; governed Taiwan 1683–1885 52–53; history regarding 47–49, 301; ignored under Japanese rule 56; under Ma 105, 252; Mao’s invasion plan 64; mutual ill feelings 60–61; one country, two systems proposal 272; Opium War 52; power transition to Taiwan 70; religious beliefs and 112; social welfare costs as factor 129–130; as stolen by Japan and occupied by KMT 298; Taiwanese on colonial rule of 103; Treaty of Shimonoseki ceded to Japan 53–54; Truman on 91n98; U.S. and British opinions on 53; U.S.-Taiwan ties severed by Carter 69 China’s relations with Taiwan: aggression against Taiwan 74; brain drain to 126, 230, 236; Chinese culture in Taiwan 19, 20–23; coal importation to Taiwan 224; economic solution to Taiwan problem 261, 292n79, 298; economy vs. Taiwan 236; educational ties with 124–126; Fukien Taiwanese, tensions with 102; hostility toward Tsai 86, 276; media relations 28; observations on Taiwan 37, 44n180; state-to-state relations with Taiwan 75; status quo as best solution 318–321; Taiwan Affairs Office 33; Taiwan films in 32–33; Taiwan industries move to 211–212; Taiwan recognized as legitimate China 286–287; on Taiwanese culture 18; Taiwan’s current view of 304;

337

territorial disputes with Taiwan 3; three links proposed 270; tourism to Taiwan policies 34–36; trade/travel restrictions eased with 120, 206–207 China’s rule of Taiwan (1683–1895) 52–53, 121–122, 198–199, 247 Chinese Communist Party 64, 68, 233, 234, 314 Chinese cultural revival 21–23 Chinese cultural treasures in Taiwan 37 Chinese Federation of Labor 216 Chinese immigration to Taiwan: from 1949 16, 201; during Dutch colonial rule 49–50, 198; history 15–17; Japanese rule supported 58; social systems 96; Taiwan as permanent home 17; banned by China Chinese liberalism 183 Chinese New Year (Lunar New Year) 38 Chinese rule after 1945, social change during 113 Chinese spouses 104 Chinese tourists 34–36 Ch’ing (Qing) Dynasty 50 Ch’ing China 20 Ching Kuo defense fighter plane 258 Choushui River 6 Christianity 111–112 Chu, Eric 152 Chu, Steven 17 Chu Li-lun see Eric Chu Chunghwa Post 27 Chunghwa Telecom 27 Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology 157 Churchill, Winston 59, 64 City of Sadness (film) 32 Civil Aviation Organization 288–289 civil code 161 civil courts 55 civil disobedience 61 civil law 160 civil liberties 144, 149, 189n23 civil rights 71, 147, 148, 274 civil service examinations 23, 162 civil society 187 civil unrest 112 civil war 60, 167, 168, 312 climate and natural resources 1, 7–9 Clinton, Bill: help against missile tests by China 74, 265, 272; pro-China policies 265, 310; pro-Taiwan policies 264–265, 310; three no’s policy 75, 265, 310 CNA see Central News Agency

338

Index

coal 9, 52, 198, 223–224, 229 Cold War 66, 264, 269–270 colleges and universities 122–125 commerce l, 169, 197, 198, 206, 218, 220, 230, 305 commercial class 98 Commercial Times, published by China Times 29 Committee on the Discipline of Public Functionaries 159 CommonWealth, financial magazine 30 communications 24–27, 28, 35, 60, 105, 145, 156, 162, 199, 211, 237 Communism 63–64, 98, 112, 279 A Confucian Confusion (film) 32 Confucianism 108–111, 122, 146, 182–184 Constitution 22, 147–152, 165, 189n17, 274, 301 Constitutional amendments 73–74 Constitutional Court 159, 161 “constitutional style” meeting 73 construction business 213 consumer buying 116 contending (rotating party or pendulum) election theory 180, 181 contested identities 13–14 continuity (watermelon) election theory 180, 181 Control Yuan 73, 150, 156, 158, 161–162 Coordination Council for North American Affairs 264–265 corruption: Chen administration and family 79, 173, 185; China’s rule 1683–1895 52; criminals in Legislative Yuan 158; Democratic Progressive Party 79; National Assembly sinecures 153; as political instability cause 315–316 corvee labor 20 Council for Economic Planning 157 Council for Economic Planning and Development 206, 225 Council of Grand Justices 152–153, 159 county governments 163 crime 133–134, 142n173, 158, 315–316 Cross Strait Services Trade Agreement 186 cross-Strait relations and issues 35, 155, 271 cross-Strait trade 206–207, 216, 220, 250, 255–256, 301 cross-Strait travel 120, 206–207 Crouching Tiger Hidden Dragon (film) 32 cultural and creative industries 213

Cultural Revolution, in China 37, 67, 249, 262, 286 culture 1, 18–24, 117 currency fall 225 currency reform 207–208, 209 cyberspace see Internet services Dalai Lama 110 debt 56, 219, 222, 225, 226, 267, 268, 321 deconstruction in progressivism 188 defense budget 260–261 democracy/democratization: from 1950s 146–147; 1996 direct presidential elections 177; under CCK 68–70, 154–155; China seen as threat to 319– 320; economic growth and 66; ethnic divisions and 105; free media under 28– 29; Fukien Taiwanese and 102; KMT encouraged 165–166; under Lee 155; Legislative Yuan’s position 158; local elections and government 163–164, 175; National Assembly role 152; nuclear weapons agreement with U.S. 263; progressivism and 187; reunification rejection 254; social change and 95; Taiwan’s uniqueness from China in 303; Temporary Provisions law and 148; in Three People’s Principles 182; world view of 300; see also independence movement “democratic foreign policy” 256 Democratic Progressive Party (DPP): on 2-2-8 events 63; 1986 first two-party election 70–71, 176; in 2000 elections 76; in 2014 election 83; 2016 victory 84–86; appeals to labor groups and unions 216; corruption in 79; crossStrait relationship and 269, 293n118; current criticisms of China 320; democratization speed 72; on ECFA 81, 227; education, views on 126; as ethnic party 180; factions 172; on foreign workers 217–218; on Fukien Taiwanese 102, 174; Hakkas, relationship with 101; history and formation 144, 148, 169–174; Hsieh as chairman and presidential candidate 80; as inexperienced in leadership 77; on KMT assets 169; as Leninist party 171; local vs. national politics 82, 166; magazine publishing 30; National Assembly functions reduced 153; political ideals 184; populism and progressivism 185–188; on rejoining UN 288; social democracy policies 183–184; social

Index welfare costs under 129–130; television and film industry effect on 33; tourism to China policy 35 demonstrations see protest demonstrations and riots Deng Lijun (Theresa Teng) 33 Deng Xiaoping: economic growth under 233–234, 251; era of good feeling with U.S. 313; as Hakka 101; on reunification 316–317; stance on TRA 69; U.S. relations under 309 dependency theory 186, 219 derivative power of presidency 153 developmentalism 183 diet 116 diplomatic setbacks in foreign and military policies 249–253 disease control, under Japanese colonial rule 56 diversionary possibilities against China 260 divide and conquer election theory 181 divided government 77, 155 divorce and family dislocation 134–135 DNA testing of Aborigines 46 dollar diplomacy 282 domestic affairs and foreign policy 253–256, 291n39 Double Ten Day (National Day) 38 DPP see Democratic Progressive Party Dragon Boat Festival 38 drug abuse 134 dual deterrence 309 dual exchange-rate system 209 Dutch colonial rule (1624–1662): Aborigines and 49–50, 106; commerce and trade 198; defeated by Cheng’s army 50; encouraged Chinese migration to Taiwan 16; foreign relations under 247; modernization under 49–50; on Pescadores Islands 49; social change during 113; treaty with China 49; Western cultural influences from 19–20 Dutch East India Company 49, 198 e publishing 31 early explorations, of Taiwan by China 47 early human life on Taiwan 45 earthquakes 6 East Asian alliance system 306 East Asian economic bloc 305 East Asian security system 260 East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone 5

339

Eastern Europe, trade and cultural ties with 282 Eastern European Communist countries and Soviet Union, trade with 220 Eat Drink Man Woman (film) 32 ECFA see Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement economic (pocketbook) election theory 179–181 Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) 81, 185, 227, 237, 274–275, 281 Economic Daily News 29 Economic Development Advisory Council 225 economic fitness index 225 economic growth and development: in 1960s 66; in 2009 81; after late 1980s 206; comparison to China 232–233; current trends 304–305; decentralization of political authority in 163; decline under Chen 78; ethnic identities, changing 104; five pillars of 214; growth strategies 207–210; import substitution effects 208–209; in Ma’s final term 82–83; model for 231–237; negative in global recession 80; outlook for 232–233, 244n183; overview 231, 243n 177–178; planning and fiscal policies 207–208, 210; social change and 95, 115–121; social welfare and 130; strategies 207–210; Taiwan and China integration of 305; in Three People’s Principles 182, 195n188; wages in 215; see also economy economic infrastructure 199, 205–206, 210 economic miracle: challenges to 206–207; key industries in 210–214; labor’s factor in 214–218; as model 231 Economic Planning Council 206, 225 The Economist 226 economy 197–245; to 1950 198–201; before 1950 198–201; 1950–2000 recovery and boom 201–207; under Chen, Ma, and Tsai 224–231; economic development model 231–237; innovation model components under Tsai 228–229; labor force 214–218; “New Economic Development Model” 231–232; 1945–1949 struggles 200–201; oil crisis (1973–1974) policies 210; planning and research 206, 210; recent presidents on 224–231; trade, investment, and energy 218–224; see

340

Index

also economic growth and development education 121–127; American universities 115, 119, 140n100; Buddhist organizations in 110; class status and 96, 98; under Japanese colonial rule 56; of labor force 214; languages taught in 107, 108; Mainland Chinese ethnic group 103; Taiwan vs. China 236; Taiwanese students overseas 115, 119, 140n100; technological orientation 222 Eightfold Path 109 Eighties magazine 30 Eisenhower administration 262 elections 174–182; 1978 68; 1980 70, 175–176; 1984 70; 1986 first two-party election 170, 176; 1988 72; 1989 171; 1990 72; 1991 176; 1992 73, 171, 177; 1994 74–75, 177; 1996 direct presidential elections 74, 177; 1997 171, 177; 1998 75, 177–178; 2000 75– 77, 171, 178; 2001 78, 178; 2004 78, 178; 2006 178; 2008 79–80, 173, 179; 2010 179; 2012 81–82, 159, 179; 2014 83, 166, 174, 179, 186; 2016 83–84, 100, 131, 166, 174, 179, 186; 2018 87, 166–167, 174, 179, 186, 188; 2019 174; 2020 87; amendments affecting 150, 154; Constitutional amendments for 150; election theories 179–181; for Legislative Yuan 158–159; local governments’ role 163; in loss of diplomatic status 175–176; plenary elections 176; voter turnout for local elections 166; voting rights 149 electrical equipment industry 211 electrification 55, 117 electronics industries 211 emergency decree see chieh yen fa emigration to China 12 employment 9, 34, 114, 117, 122 133, 201, 203, 211, 214, 219, 226 236, 279, 310 Employment Insurance Act 217 Employment Services Act 217, 218 energy 9, 111, 181, 188, 205, 206, 210, 213, 223–224, 225, 228, 229, 231, 232, 283, 288 English, as compulsory language 108 EP-3 Incident 266 EPZ see export processing zone er er ba see 2-2-8 massacre ethnic groups 13–18, 112 ethnic issues 98–105

ethnic voting theory 180–181 Europe 188, 197, 198, 210, 212, 220, 227, 229, 232, 235, 237m 25 2m 257, 262 267m 281m 281, 300, 304, 305, 311, 320, 321 European Parliament on Taiwan in international organizations 287 European Union (E.U.) 221, 251, 281–282 Europeans 198, 200, 220, 234 EVA Airways 26 Evergreen Marine Corporation 26 Examination Yuan 156, 162 Executive Yuan 156–157, 190n55 export processing zones (EPZs) 205, 209, 222 exports: economic prosperity with 66; export industries 209; export market countries 219–220; export products changes over time 221; export-oriented economy under Japanese colonial rule 199; export-promotion policy 209–210, 218 F-16 fighter planes 258, 264 Facebook 32 family social systems 116–117, 118 February 28 Incident see 2-2-8 massacre Federal Express 27 film industry 23, 32–33, 42n106, 169 fiscal policies 207 fishing 9 15, 16, 47, 51, 100, 145, 198, 199, 202–203, 212 five big powers 284 five pillars of economic planning 214 five no’s policy 273 five-branch government 156–162 flexible diplomacy 255, 291n45 flora and fauna 8 Focus Taiwan (website) 29 foreign and military policies 246–297; background 247–249; diplomatic setbacks 249–253; domestic affairs and foreign policy 253–256; international organization ties 284–289; national security policy 257–261; People’s Republic of China (PRC) 269–276; United States and 261–269; world situations and 276–284 foreign exchange 34, 201, 202, 208, 209, 220, 222, 234, 235 foreign immigrants 104 foreign investment and aid 202–205, 221–222, 225–226, 234, 235

Index foreign policy influencers 255–256 foreign relations white paper 256 foreign spouses 11 foreign students 124, 126 foreign trade see trade foreign travel 22, 115, 120 foreign workers 12, 214, 217–218, 279 forested area 39n39 Formosa, Taiwan as 2 Formosa Freeway 24 Formosa Group 30 Formosa Home Rule Formula 57 Formosa magazine 30 Formosa Television 31 four dragons 313 Four Noble Truths 109 Fourteenth Congress of KMT 74 Foxconn 229 Free China 2, 28, 115 Free China Fortnightly 30 free market 29 129, 144, 145, 146, 163, 183, 185m 204, 206, 207, 214, 233, 313 Freedom Era Weekly 30 Freedom House 28, 189n22 freedom of movement 149, 189n23 freedom of speech 149 freedom of the press 28–29 freeways (toll roads) 24–25 French model of colonization 54 Fukien Province 19, 52 Fukien Taiwanese: 2-2-8 massacre and 102; DPP appeal 170; ethnic voting theory and 180; Hakkas, relationship with 101; immigration to Taiwan 15–16, 48, 51–52; language (min nan hua) 106, 107; mixed genetic makeup 137n30; social customs and mores 101–102; socioeconomic status 102, 137n31 Fukienese (Hoklo/Holo) ethnic group 14 future of Taiwan 298–321; China factor 312–317; final thoughts and caveats 317–321; truth and fiction 301–312 Gambia 284 gangs 134, 316 Gautama, Siddhartha (Buddha) 109 gay marriages see same sex marriages GDP see Gross Domestic Product gender bias 122 Gender Inequality Index 118 gender ratios 11 Gender-related Development Index 118 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 287

341

Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) 219 generation gap 118–119 geography ix, 1, 4, 5, 7 Germany 234, 281 Gidden, Anthony 184 GIO see Government Information Office global arms race 263 global economic depression of 1929 57–58 global recession 80, 130, 197, 226–227, 235 global supply chains 236 globalism 23, 185, 313, 317 globalization viii, 18, 93n172, 123, 216, 228 GNP see gross national product Go South policy 255, 271, 279 Golden Decade plan 132, 142n169 government employee examinations 160, 162, 191n73 Government Information Office (GIO) 28, 157 government pensions 131–132 Graham, Katharine 70 Great Depression 57–58 Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution see Cultural Revolution Greater China bloc 120 “Greater China Common Market” 278 “Greater China Economic Sphere” 278 Greater China federation 306 green bloc/pan green 78, 173, 184 green energy industry 213, 224 green energy referendum 188 Green Island (Lü Tao) 2, 3 Gross Domestic Product (GDP): Taiwan 36, 81; China 235; under Ma 227–228; Taiwan vs. China 220–221, 236; under Tsai 229, 230–231 Gross National Product (GNP): agriculture’s contribution 202–203; under Chen 225–226; China 233–234; export industries effects 209; import substitution effects 208; imports and exports 219; industrialization’s contribution 203; slow economic growth from late 1980s 206 Growing Up (film) 32 Gu Ying 183 Guangdong (Kwangtung) province, China 15, 19 Guidelines for National Unification 271, 273 Gulf of Tonkin Incident 67

342

Index

habu-mongoose fights 37 Hakka ethnic group: Aborigines, relationship with 100; as buffer between Mainland Chinese and Fukienese 137n28; in China 15–16; on China’s claim on Taiwan 120; Fukien Taiwanese, relationship with 101; identification with Taiwan and China 101; language 106; as major ethnic group 14; mixed genetic makeup 137n30; social customs and mores 100; Taiwanese culture from 19; tensions with Fukien Taiwanese 102; Tsai as 179 “Han” Chinese 14, 17 Han Dynasty, Taiwan as Yinchow 47 Han Kuo-yu 186–187 Han/Aborigine enmity 20 Handicapped Welfare Law 128 “hard authoritarianism” 146 Harris, Townsend 53 Hau Pei-tsun 73 headhunting 56, 99, 108 health care 128–131 heidaoren (bad people/criminals) 134 higher education 121, 122–125m 126, 214 history 45–94; Chen Shui-bian 75–79; Chiang Ching-kuo 68–71; Japanese Empire 53–56; Lee Teng-hui 71–75; Ma Ying-jeou 79–84; political history and traditions 145–147; pre- and early history 46–49; Retrocession 60–63; Taiwan as the Republic of China 63–68; Tsai Ing-wen 84–87; western and Chinese rule 49–53; World War II 57–60 Holland see Dutch colonial rule Home Rule Association 57 homeownership 116 Hon Hai see Foxconn Hong Kong 75, 272, 275, 278–279 Hong Xiuquan 100 horizontal social organizations 116 Hou Hsiao-hsien 32 Housing and Rental Housing Market Development and Regulation acts 133 housing shortages and costs 132–133 Hsieh, Frank 80, 165 Hsing Chung Hui (Society for Regenerating China) 167 Hsing Yun 112 Hsun Tzu 111 Hu Jintao 313–314 Hu Shih 183 Huang Chu-wen 173 Human Development Index 131

Hung Hsiu-chu 84 hydroelectric power 8 identity politics election theory 181 ideological marketplace 183, 195n193 ideologies 182–188, 195n200 I-Kuan Tao (Yiguandao) 111 Ilha Formosa 49 illegal immigration 12 immigration 11–12, 50, 120, 198, 304 import substitution policy 208–209, 218 income disparity ratio 116 income increases 115 indentured servitude 97 independence movement: Chen Shui-bian in 273–274; citizen support 299; in DPP 171, 172, 184; economic conflicts in 197; foreign policies and 254; as future possibility 316; identity and 303; KMT, relationship with 171; Legislative Yuan’s position 158; Peng Ming-min as advocate 172; progressivism and 188; referendums for 151; Tsai’s position 152; voted down 255; see also democracy/ democratization India 280, 306 Indigenous Defense Fighter (Ching Kuo) 258 Indonesia 3, 279 Indo-Pacific region and strategy 280, 306 industrialization: agriculture’s contribution 202; in China under Deng 234; effects on culture 117; under Japanese colonial rule 200; labor force movement in 214; from late 1950s 203–204; productivity increases 115; WWII contribution to 200 inflation 207–208 information products 211 institutionalism 183 intermarriage 104, 181, 315 International Atomic Energy Agency 288 International Civil Aviation Organization 289 International Criminal Police Organization 288, 289 International Economic and Cooperation Development Fund 283 international law 4, 302, 309 International Monetary Fund 230 International Olympic Committee 287 international organizations 249, 255, 265, 272, 276, 281, 284–289, 302

Index international stability 318 internet services 27, 31–32 INTERPOL see International Criminal Police Organization inter-parliamentary diplomacy 281–282 isolation and foreign policies 250 Israel 257, 280–281 Itu Aba 4 Japan: Asian balance of power concern 306; designs on Taiwan 314; economic investments 205; as first Taiwan settlers 88n13; goals for Taiwan 298–299; imports from Taiwan 219; Japanese Empire 53–56; Japanese language 107–108; Mainland Chinese ethnic group and 102–103; peace treaty 90n69; poetry and painting influence 41n97; as possible military ally 259; Ryukyu Islands returned by U.S. 4–5; Sino-Japanese War 57; as Taiwan ally 276–277; Taiwan as war base 57–58; territorial disputes with Taiwan 3; trade deficit with 219 Japan Communist Party 64 Japan Current 7 “Japan Formula” 277 Japan Interchange Association 277 Japanese colonial rule (1895–1945): colonial policy re Sino-Japanese War 57; colonialization of Taiwan 54–56; economic and infrastructure development in Taiwan 55–56, 197, 199; effect on political traditions 145–146; elections under 174; foreign relations under 247; imports vs. exports 200; influence and changes during colonial period 20–21; life expectancies under 56; mass education under 121; political parties as advocacy groups 167; public hygiene and sanitation 89n53; shipwrecked sailors abused 53; social change during 113; social welfare under 127; Taiwan surrendered to China 59; Taiwanese culture from 19; Taiwanese on colonial rule of 103; travel restrictions 89n62 Jiang Zemin: continued Deng’s reforms 234; followed Deng’s policies 313–314; Koo Chen-fu and 272–273 Johnson, Lyndon B. 65 Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR) 202 Judges Act 159

343

judgeship appointments 159 Judicial Yuan 159–160, 160–161 Justice Alliance (DPP) 76 Kang Ning-hsiang 30 Kao, Henry 175 Kaohsiung: Kaohsiung Incident of 1979 76; Kaohsiung International Airport 26; Kaohsiung port 6; population 13; powerful metropolitan government in 163, 192n92; protest demonstration 70; shipyard 69; as special municipality 164–165; subway system 26 Kaohsiung County 165 Keelung 49, 53 Keelung harbor 6 Kennedy, John F. 65 Ketagelan 2, 38n1 Kissinger, Henry 67–68, 286, 308 KMT see Nationalist Party knowledge-intensive industries 210 Ko Wen-je 174, 186, 187 kominka (assimilation) 57 Koo Chen-fu 272–273 Koo-Wang (Wang-Gu) talks 28, 74, 271, 272–273 Korea War (1894–1895) 53 Korean War 64, 257, 285, 296n202, 307, 312 Koxinga see Cheng Ch’eng-kung kuo yusee Mandarin Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) see Nationalist Party Kuwait 280 Kwangtung (Guangdong) province, China 15, 19 labor force: in 1970s 209; in 1980s 210; economic situation under Ma 228; high cost of in Taiwan 211–212; industrialization 203–204; under Japanese colonial rule 199; overview 214–218 Labor Insurance Act 217 Labor Insurance Annuity program 129 Labor Party 216 Labor Pension Act 217 Labor Safety and Health Law 217 Labor Standards Act 217, 218 labor unions 215–217 Lai, Stan 32 laissez fare capitalism 207 Lan Tao (Orchid Island) 2, 3, 15 land and people 1–44; climate and natural resources 7–9; culture 18–24;

344

Index

ethnic groups 13–18; media 27–33; physical setting 2–7; population 9–13; tourism 33–38; transportation and communications 24–27 land reform 114, 201–202, 233 land tenure and social structure 97 landlord social system 97, 114 “land-to-the-tiller” program 201 language issues 60–61 languages 105–112; Hakka ethnic group 100–101; during Japanese colonial period 113; see also Mandarin Chinese Lao Tzu 109, 182 Latin American nations 283–284 Law on Voluntary Retirement of Senior Parliamentarians 152 LGBT festival 188 Lee Huan 72 Lee Kuan Yew 101 Lee Teng-hui: on 2-2-8 events 62, 63; in 1996 election 177; as Chiang Chingkuo’s successor 154–155; as Christian 111; on democracy movement in China 73; economic ties with China under 226, 255, 291n50; ended period of mobilization 251; first direct presidential election 154; flexible diplomacy 255, 291n45; formed Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) 78; Go South policy 255, 271, 279; as Hakka 101; on independence 246, 302; inter-parliamentary diplomacy 281–282; as KMT chairman 72, 168; local government downsizing 164, 192n98; Mainland Affairs Council 270; National Unification Council 270; political reforms under 73; pragmatic diplomacy 251; rapprochement with China 73–74; re-election 74; on rejoining UN 287–288; on reunification 75, 271, 301–302; role in history 71–75; speeches published by Taiwan media 28; succeeded Chiang 70–72; support for Lien in 2000 76; on Taiwan national identity and sovereignty 272; Taiwan Solidarity Union support 173; Temporary Provisions law rescinded 148; tourism to China policy 35; two-China policy 251, 272, 273; U.S. visit 74, 265, 272, 310; vacation diplomacy 272; varied relations with China 273 Lee Yuan-tseh 17, 77, 178

Legislative Yuan: 1992 election 177; 1995 election 177; 2001 election 178; checks on Chen 77, 157; Constitutional amendments for 150, 154; Constitutional ratification power 151; democratization of 164; duties and responsibilities 157–158; Executive Yuan restructuring 157; Law on Voluntary Retirement of Senior Parliamentarians 152; no Mainland representation 150; Referendum Act 151; reforms of 159; on rejoining UN 287; reorganization under Lee 73; representation of Mainland and Taiwan 158 Lei Chen 30, 183 leisure time 119 Leninist parties 168, 171 liberalism 183 Liberty Times 29–30 Lien Chan 73–74, 76, 164, 168–169, 173, 177 Lim, Freddie 188 Lin, Jeremy 17 Lin Hsien-t’ang 57 Lin Yang-kang 72 literacy/illiteracy 56, 106, 123 literature 23 litigations 160 Liu, Henry 17 Liu Ming-ch’uan 53, 198–199 local government: autonomy in China 145; China’s rise and 163; Chinese immigration encouraged 16; land reform in 114; Local Government Act 192n84; overview 162–167; powers under Constitution 147, 150; responsibilities under Ma 81 Local Government Act 192n84 localization, green bloc/pan green and 184 Love Monga (film) 33 low income citizens 133 lowland Aborigines 96 Lu, Annette 30, 76, 78, 79, 178, 226 Lü Tao (Green Island) 2, 3 Lunar New Year (Chinese New Year) 38 Lungshan Temple 37 Lust, Caution (film) 33 Ma Ying-jeou: 2-2-8 and 90n89; 2008 election win 79–80, 179; 2012 election win 179; as Christian 111; Constitution status 151–152; cultural support 23;

Index economic (pocketbook) election theory 180; Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) 81; economy under 120, 226–228; educational system and policies 125; as elitist Mandarin 185–186; emerging industry support 213–214; ethnic voting theory and 181; European Union praised 281; foreign policy under 256; foreign spouses policy 11; Golden Decade plan 132, 142n169; as Hakka 101; on healing ethnic relations 104–105; ideologies 195n201; improved relations with China 130; on international organization membership 288–289; inter-parliamentary diplomacy 282; judicial system under 161; as KMT chairman 168; military changes 258–259; National Memorial Day honoring 63; nations with diplomatic relations under 284; no independence, unification, or war 246–247, 274; on nuclear plants 223; political trends under 147; populism and progressivism 185, 187, 196n202; re-election 2012 81–82; role in history 79–84; on Ryukyu Islands 5; second term curse 82–83, 156; stimulus plan under 227; as Taipei mayor 75–76, 165, 178; tax rate under 130; tourism with China 36; on Typhoon Morakot 81; as UN ideals backer 289; on unification 302; united government in KMT 155–156; U.S.-Taiwan relations 266–267; viable diplomacy 252; workforce and immigration policy 12 MacArthur, Douglas 89n67 Macedonia 281–282 Madam Chiang Kai-shek 185 “made in China 2025” 236–237 magazine publishing 30 Mahayana (the Greater Vehicle) Buddhism 109 Mainland Affairs Council 35, 80, 84, 155, 156, 270 mainland China see China Mainland Chinese ethnic group 14, 102–104, 113, 120, 137n35, 137n37 “Mainland policy” adopted 270 Malaysia 3, 14, 46, 223, 230 Manchuria (Manchukuo), Japanese capture of 57, 58 Manchus 20, 50, 51–52, 113

345

Mandarin Chinese (kuo yu; pu tung hua) 31, 60, 103, 105–107, 113, 138n53 Mandarin Film Festival 32 Mao Zedong: on 2-2-8 events 63; blocked by U.S. 7th Fleet 307; Chiang’s defeat 90n69; China in Vietnam War 312; death 68; détente discussion with Nixon 299; People’s Liberation Army (PLA) plan to invade Taiwan 257; on Quemoy and Matsu islands 5; rapprochement with U.S. 65–66, 67; Sino-Soviet war 312; on Taiwan, 1972 67–68; Taiwan as final battle in civil war 312; Taiwan invasion plans 64; victory over Chiang 62, 63; see also Cultural Revolution Marco Polo Bridge Incident 57 marriage 11, 20, 98, 108, 117 118, 135, 161 also see intermarriage martial law: abolished 62, 70–71, 144, 148, 155, 222; imposed 57; strikes forbidden under 215 see also chieh yen fa mass education 28, 98, 121 Matsu island group 2–3, 5, 10, 35, 39n38, 65, 164 Mauritania, proposed as UN member 285 media 27–33, 35, 70, 71, 83, 148, 149, 155, 161, 169, 176, 177, 185 188, 225, 250, 255, 256, 264, 268, 275, 278, 289, 299, 304, 319, 320 medical care 128–129, 213 see also National Health Insurance Meiji constitution 54 Mencius 111, 182 merchant marine 26 Mid-Autumn Festival (Moon Festival) 38 middle class 28, 95, 117, 144, 146 148, 154, 163, 197 middle class growth 117 middle class values 95 Middle Eastern countries, relationships with 280–281 migrant workers 104 see also foreign workers military under Japanese colonial rule 200 mineral resources 9 Ming Dynasty 48–51 Ministry of Culture 157 Ministry of Economic Affairs 206, 208 Ministry of Education 22, 122, 126 Ministry of Examination 162 Ministry of Finance 208 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 157, 250, 254, 256, 284, 286

346

Index

Ministry of Health and Welfare 157 Ministry of Labor 157 Ministry of National Defense 22 Ministry of Personnel 162 Ministry of Science and Technology 157 minority rights and representation 149, 190n25 Mirage fighter planes 258 missile tests by China ix, 246, 255, 258, 265, 272 missionaries and scholars 19 mixed political system 77–78 modernization 13, 98, 101, 104, 181, 183 monetary system under Japanese colonial rule 55 monsoonal winds 8 Mou Zongsan 183 Mount Ali (Ali Shan) 38 Mount Everest 6 Mountain Aborigines 15, 96 mountain topography 6 Mukden Incident 57 multidirectional diplomacy 251 mutual-benefit relations 116 Myanmar (Burma), relations with 279 nation building 107, 172, 182 National Affairs Conference 73, 155 National Assembly: abolished 151; Constitutional amendments 73, 74, 149–150; critics 152; as democratic body 153; democratization of 164; election of president under Constitution 147; local government downsizing 164; no Mainland representation 150; original functions 152; Presidency and 152–156; Temporary Provisions abolished 149 National Central Library 22 National Concert Hall 37 National Day (Double Ten Day) 38 National Development Conference 74, 155, 164, 165 National Development Council 157, 232 National Educational Television station 31 National Health Insurance (NHI) 128–131 National Housing and Urban Regeneration Center 132–133 National Immigration Agency 12 National Memorial Day 62–63 National Palace Museum 37 National Party Congress, of KMT 168 National Pension Act 129, 217 National Science and Technology Center for Disaster Reduction 157

National Science Council 157 National Security Council 153–154 national security policy 257–261 National Sports Training Center 157 National Stabilization Fund 225 National Suicide Prevention Center 136 National Theater 37 National Unification Council 153–154, 155, 270–271, 273, 274 National Unification Guidelines 273 nationalism: under Chen 252, 279; Chinese nationalism 298; as controversial 14; culture and 18, 22; in DPP 184; from KMT 98; under Ma 227; Taoism and 109; in Three People’s Principles 182 Nationalist China see Taiwan Nationalist government, evolution of 144 Nationalist Party (Kuomintang; KMT): on 2-2-8 events 63; 1991 elections 176; 2000 elections 76–77, 150–151; 2001 elections 78; 2014 elections 83; 2016 defeat 84–86; anti-communism tenet 183; assets 169, 193n121; as carpetbag regime 60; Central Motion Picture Corporation 32; chairmen 167–168; cultural support 22; on democratization 66, 166; departments 168–169; ECFA support 81; economic (pocketbook) election theory 180; factions 172; in first competitive national election 175–176; Fukienese Taiwanese, relationship with 102; Hakkas, relationship with 101; history 167–169; on illegal immigration 12; infighting under Lee 72, 74; as Leninist party 168; “Mainland policy” adopted 270; media control 28, 31, 32; as multiethnic party 174, 181; National Health Insurance (NHI) act 128–129; newspaper publishing 29; one-party elections 70, 167; organizational structure 168; power struggle with Chen 155; progressivism in 187; reforms under CCK 70; on reunification vs. independence 254; social welfare under 127–128, 130, 183; tenets of 183; Three People’s Principles in 182 nationalism 14, 18, 22, 98, 109, 182, 184, 252, 279, 298 Nationalists 63, 66, 119 nautical technology in prehistory 46 Neolithic period 46 New Chinese Party (New Party) 74, 172, 177

Index “New Economic Development Model” 231–232 New Power Party (NPP) 174, 188 New Southbound Policy 218, 229–230 New Taipei City (Taipei County) 165 New World Order 251, 255 New Zealand 14, 46, 284 newly industrializing country (NIC) 209 Next magazine 30 Nine Dash Line 3, 4 ‘92 Consensus: Chen repudiated 273; as end of state of war with China 251–252, 255; re-established under Ma 274; support in 2019 86; Tsai on 152, 276, 289 Nixon, Richard M.: détente discussion with Mao 299; rapprochement with China 65–66, 67, 92n123, 175, 249, 262, 263, 307–308, 312–313; Shanghai Communiqué 67; Taiwan, relationship with 263; Taiwan issue not addressed 308 Normalization Agreement 264, 308 North Korea 259, 260, 278, 307, North Vietnam 279 nuclear plants/nuclear power 78, 223–224, 225, 229 nuclear weapons 260, 263, 292n72, 315 Obama administration 261, 267–268, 311 obesity 136 ocean geography 5 Office of Governor-General 163 Office of the President 153–154 Offshore Islands: crises in 65, 91n110, 248, 262, 307, 312; military manpower on 257; U.S.–Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty covered 262; see also Matsu island group; Quemoy island group offshore television broadcasting 31 oil crisis (1973–1974) 210, 223 oil industry 3, 4, 224 omnidirectional diplomacy 251 one country, two systems 75, 272, 273, 279 one-China policy 10, 71, 79, 249, 265, 266, 267, 268, 271, 263–264, 299 311 online news 29–30 Opium War 52 opposition parties and politics 77–78, 169–170, 173–174, 183, 254 optical machines and supplies industry 213 Orchid Island (Lan Tao) 2, 3, 15

347

Our Times (film) 33 Outer Mongolia 285 outward tourism 34 Overseas Chinese: alienated by Taiwanization 125, 279; competition for allegiance 248, 252; economic investments from 205; students in Taiwan 124–125; wealth of 234 Oyster Girl (film) 32 Pacific Basin bloc 120 Pacific island nations 284 Paleolithic Age 46 pan green bloc 78, 173, 184 pan-blue bloc see “blue team” pao chia (common responsibility) 56 patriarchal/patrilineal social hierarchy 97 The Peace Blossom Land (film) 32 Pearl River Delta 39n40 pen ti jen (natives) 16 pendulum election theory see rotating party election theory Peng Ming-min 172 Penghu Islands 3 People First Party (PFP) 77, 78, 155, 173, 178 people’s culture (globalism) 23 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 65, 257, 307, 312 Pepper (robot) 27 period of mobilization 251 Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague 4 Perry, Matthew C. 53 Pescadores (Penghu) Islands: Dutch presence on 49; Hakka ethnic group in 16; as part of Taiwan 2; population 10; precipitation 8; Treaty of Shimonoseki ceded to Japan 53–54; under Yuan Dynasty 48 petrochemical industry 210, 211–212 Philippines 3, 51 piracy 48–49, 50, 198 pivot to Asia 268, 311 plastics industry 212 plenary elections 73, 176 pocketbook (economic) election theory 179–181 political development 28, 144, 146, 182, 231 political parties 167–174, 192n107 political system 144–196; Constitution 147–152; elections 174–182; five-branch government 156–162;

348

Index

history and traditions 145–147; ideology, modernization, and the future 182–188; local government 162–167; National Assembly and Presidency 152–156; political parties 167–174 political tutelage 182 politicians’ education levels 123–124 politics, cultural influences on 22 population 9–13 populism: in current Taiwan politics 147, 181, 186, 320; definition and history 185–187; DPP support for 105, 130, 227–228; vs. elitism election theory 181; impact on Taiwan 196n203; under Ma 82 ports and harbors 24, 25–26 post-1949 period, social progress during 114 postal services 26–27 Potsdam Declaration 59 poverty 23, 119, 127, 128, 130, 133, 200 Powell, Colin 79 pragmatic diplomacy 74, 251 pragmatism 122, 184, 252 Pratas (Dongsha) Islands 3, 164 pre- and early history, of Taiwan 46–49 precipitation 7–8 precision tools industry 213 premier, as Executive Yuan head 156 premier’s power reduced 154 private education 123–124 private employment brokerage system 218 privatization 204, 239n37 productivity 13, 55, 114, 115, 200, 202, 203, 204, 215, 233, 234, 313 progressivism: in current Taiwan politics 320–321; definition and history 187–188; DPP support for 185; under Ma 83; under Tsai 23, 147 propaganda to Chinese tourists 34 proportional representation in government 150 protest demonstrations and riots: agriculture/food industries 203; for democratization 72; DPP use of 170; on ECFA 227; over Chen’s corruption 79; over veteran benefits 132 Provincial Assembly 163–164 Provincial Government Council 164 provincial government elimination 74, 150 provincial vs. central government 163 Public Construction Commission 157 public diplomacy 254 public hygiene and sanitation under Japanese colonial rule 56

public safety, under Ma 84 Public Television Service 31 public transportation 25, 189 quality control 210 Quemoy island group: claimed by Taiwan 2, 3; local autonomy granted 164; population 10; territorial disputes with PRC 5; three mini links policy 5; tourism from China 35; troops stationed on 39n38, 257 radio 28, 30, 31, 106, 107, 117, 128, 211, 273 Radio Taiwan International 31 railroads 24, 25, 42n115, 55, 69 Reagan, Ronald 309 recreation and sports 119 Referendum Act 151 refugees 11, 50, 188, 260 regional accents as ethnic identification 106, 138n40 regionalism 305 religion 108–112, 144–145, 149, 189n22 renewable energy 224 “Republic of Taiwan” failure 54 Republican Party 262, 292n83 Research, Development, and Evaluation Commission 157, 206 research and development: in China 235–236, 304, 305; in Taiwan 210, 222, 224, 232, 236 Resolution 2758 (United Nations) 287–288 Retrocession 60–63 reunification see unification/reunification Reuter’s Global Top Innovative Universities 100 ranking 236 “revolutionary” United Nations 286 rice production 8–9, 55, 199, 203 riots see protest demonstrations and riots road building and quality 24, 69 Roman Magsaysay Award 110 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 64, 89n67 rotating party election theory 180, 181 rural economic growth 116 Russia 282, 314 Ryukyu Islands: claimed by Japan, Taiwan, and China 4–5; pirates from 47–48; Taiwan as part of 48 same-sex marriages 161, 188 Saudi Arabia 203, 221, 222, 223m 257, 280, 281

Index savings 203, 204, 205, 222 sculpture 23 second term curse 82, 156 sedition 254 Seediq Bale (film) 33 “self-strengthening” movement 198–199 semiconductor industry 211 Senkaku Islands see Tiaoyutai (Diaoyutai) Islands Separation of Trial from Prosecution Reform Act 160 sex crimes 135 Sexual Harassment Prevention Act 217 shan ti jen (mountain people) 16 Shanghai Communiqué 67, 249, 290n16 Sheng Yen 110 Shieh Tung-min 154 Shih Ming-teh 79, 94n177 Shimonoseki, treaty 53–54 shipbuilding industry 212–213 Siew, Vincent 80, 81, 179 Singapore 26, 31, 34, 101, 125, 206, 222, 236, 271, 279, 280, 313 singers/singing 33 Sino-Soviet relations 65, 67, 248, 263 Six-Year Development Plan 73 snake alley 37 Social Assistance Law 128 social changes 95, 112–115 social spending 128 social structure: in Aborigine tribes 96; affluence and 116; Chinese in Taiwan 98; in Fukien Taiwanese 102; in Hakkas 100; land reform effects 114, 116; in Mainlander soldiers 104; order and 96–98 social welfare 127–131, 183 societal leadership roles 117 society 95–139; economic development and social change 115–121; education 121–127; ethic issues 98–105; languages and religions 105–112; social changes 95, 112–115; social problems 131–136; social structure and order 96–98; social welfare 127–131, 183 “soft authoritarianism” 146 soil composition and quality 8 solar energy 224, 229 Soong, James: in 2000 elections 76–77, 104, 178; in 2016 elections 85; as Lee’s enemy 74–75; People First Party (PFP) 155, 173; as provincial governor 164 South Africa 223, 282, 283 South China Sea 2, 3–4

349

South Korea 31, 33, 130m 206, 225, 226, 227, 236, 278, 307, 313, South Pacific Forum 287 Soviet Union: designs on Taiwan 314; disintegration 264; few contacts with 282; as possible military ally 259; Sino-Soviet war 312 Spain 49, 51 sporting and fitness goods industry 213 sports and recreation 119 Spratly (Nansha) Islands 3, 164 status quo, independence vs. reunification: as best solution 318, 321; caveats 318–321; China on 318; KMT’s policy 254; Lee on 273; scholars and pundits on 318; Soviet Union on 259; Taiwan public support for 86, 300, 303; Tsai’s support for 152, 256, 268, 276; United States on 299, 318 Statute for the Encouraging Investments 208 steel/metals industry 212 stimulus, economic 227, 319 stock market 222, 225–226, 233 Straits Exchange Foundation 270, 271, 272 strategic ambiguity policy 265, 309 students studying abroad 123–126 Su Tseng-chang 80 Suao Bay 6, 69 “substantive foreign policy” 250 subway systems 26 sugar production 9, 55, 198–199 Sui Dynasty 47 suicides 79, 132, 135–136 Sun Moon Lake 38 Sun Yat-sen: democratization 166; economic and political development relationship 182–183; on education 122; effect on political traditions 146; Hakkas on 101; as KMT founder 167; status under 59; tenets downplayed by DPP 184; Three People’s Principles 182 Sun Yat-sen Freeway (North-South Freeway) 24 Sunflower Movement 82, 186, 278 Sung, Vivian 33 sunshine bill 159 Supreme Court 159–160 Sze Tsung 50 Taichung 6, 13, 26, 165 Taichung International Airport 26 Taichung port 6

350

Index

Tainan 6, 26, 38, 50, 76, 165 Tainan port 6 Taipei: Chen as mayor 165; Kao as mayor 175; Ma as mayor 75–76, 165, 178; population trends 13; powerful metropolitan government in 163, 192n92; as special municipality 164–165; subway system 26; tourism in 37; tourist attractions 37 Taipei 101 37 Taipei Airport 26 Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office 265, 277 Taipei Moscow Economic and Cultural Coordination Commission 282 Taipei Story (film) 32 Taipei Times 29 Taipei Zoo, Chinese pandas for 274 Taiping Rebellion 16, 100 Taipower 230 Taishang 104 Taiwan (Republic of China): as aged society 10–11; alternate names 2; anthropological studies 14; avoiding isolation 250; birth rate 10; capitalism in 19–20; Carter severed ties with 69; categorization variants viii–ix; as civil law society 160; class statuses 96–98; continued effort to rejoin UN 287–288; as corporate state of KMT 169; on defense capabilities 320; democracy ranking under Tsai 187; deteriorizations under Nationalist China rule 60–61; diplomatic isolation of 45; diplomatic setbacks 302; early social order 96; economic and infrastructure development under Japan 55–56; economic and social progress 66; education, quality of 123; emigration from 17; ethnic conflict 315; expansion of social welfare 127; family social system changes 98; foreign relations under 247; geography 2–3; in global economic depression of 1929 57–58; governance possibilities after WWII 59–60; internal stability 315–316; international isolation 67; as international organizations member 287–289; international view of 300; islands included in 2; key industries and economic miracle 210–214; Korean links 307; as land of Yangchow 47; military 17, 305; military allies 259; mixed political system 77–78; multilingual

105–107; national identity 112, 139n75; national pride amidst diplomatic isolation 146; Nationalist rule accepted 63; need for economic links to China 237; as non-NATO ally 282; observations on Chinese tourists 37; Old West America and Australia comparison 112; oneparty system 167; opposition parties in 172; other countries’ designs on 314; as permanent Nationalist home 65; physical setting 1, 2–7; poor conditions stressed by Chiang’s arrival 63; population breakdown 16–17; ports and harbors 6; poverty level in 130, 133; as Republic of China (ROC) 2; resistance to KMT after WWII 146; rivers 6; rule after 1945 200–201; sixteenth century contacts 247; social traits 37; social welfare under 127; sovereignty of 45, 302; state-to-state relations with China 75; support for Japan in Sino-Japanese War 58; tax rate 130; troops on Offshore Islands 257; as uncivilized 87n8; United Nations membership 65–67, 249–250, 253, 287–288; urbanization effects 114; U.S. military aid to 201, 230, 257, 258, 305, 310–311; war with PRC ended 246; as Western Bloc member 64–65; see also individual leaders Taiwan Affairs Office, “31 policy initiatives” 33 Taiwan and Mainland China: adaptation of China’s political system 145; as catalyst for U.S.-China confrontation 320; Chinese culture in 19, 96–98; Chinese films in 32–33; Chinese population social forces 112; differences and closeness to China 45–46; economy vs. China ix, 236; efforts to maintain legitimate status to world 276; geographic relationship to mainland 5–7; government-in-exile as Nationalist China 248; growing interest in China 303; historical claims on 301; industry shifts to China 215; investment in China 222; isolation of sought by China 286, 296n209; loss of diplomatic status 175; loss of international organization memberships 286; loss of UN seat and diplomatic ties 249–250; as model for democratic China 250; no longer recognized as true China 66; omitted from Belt and Road Initiative 237;

Index rebellions against China 52; social differences from China 95; sports and conference participation with China 270; on three no’s policy 265–266; ties severed with Mainland 248; trade/ travel restrictions with China eased 206–207, 270; views on China’s claim on 120 Taiwan Communist Party 64 Taiwan Garrison Command 73 Taiwan Independence Party (Chienkuotang) 172 Taiwan miracle see economic miracle Taiwan National Security Survey 86–87 Taiwan National University 125 Taiwan News 29 “Taiwan political miracle” 183 Taiwan Political Review 30 Taiwan problem see independence movement; unification/reunification Taiwan Provincial Assembly 175 Taiwan Provincial Government 22 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) 69, 263–264, 265, 308, 310, 312 Taiwan Security Enhancement Act 265 Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Ltd. 211, 236–237 Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) 78, 173, 178 Taiwan Strait: Bush on 266; as flashpoint ix, 299; geography of 5, 46; missile tests by China 74; tensions with China 246–247; U.S. 7th Fleet to 307 Taiwan Television Enterprise 31 Taiwanese Americans, achievements and characteristics 17–18 Taiwanese as unique language 107 Taiwanization 72, 125, 152, 303 Tamsui 49, 53 Tamsui River 6 Tang Fei 77 Tang Zhunyi 183 tangwai (outside the party organization) 169–170, 175–176 Tao Te Ching 109 Taoism 109, 110 Taoyuan County 165, 166 Taoyuan International Airport (Chiang Kai-shek International Airport) 26, 69 tariffs 219 Taroko Gorge 38 tax laws and incentives for foreign investment 204–205 technology, in China 236

351

telecommunication equipment industry 213 telephone service 27 television broadcasting 31, 107 Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion 147–148, 154, 167, 189n17 Ten Major Construction Projects 24 Teng, Theresa 33 textile industry 208, 211 “The Moon Represents my Heart” (Teng) 33 theater missile defense (TMD) 259–260, 265–266 Thirteenth Party Congress 72, 168, 270 three links 270 “three no’s policy” 75, 250, 265, 310 three party system 177 Three People’s Principles 59, 182, 184 three-branch government system 162 Tiananmen Square Massacre 72–73, 254, 264, 270–271, 309 Tiaoyutai (Diaoyutan) Islands 4, 224 TMD see theater missile defense Tokugawa Shogunate 49 toll roads (freeways) 24–25 tourism industry 1, 33–38, 120, 213, 231 trade 218–224 trade deficits 219 trade surpluses 219–220 Transpacific Partnership 268 transpolitical relationships 293n117 transportation and communications 1, 24–27 travel restrictions 34–35, 71, 270 tri-polar world 251 Truman, Harry S. 91n98, 307, 312 Trump administration: American military focus on Asia 261; on Chinese tariffs 319; conflicts with Tsai 256; progressivism and 188, 321; Taiwan-Korea links 307; U.S.-China relationships under 268–269, 312 Tsai Ing-wen: on 2-2-8 63; 2016 election win 179; Aborigines, relationship with 100; ASEAN countries and 279–280; China policy 86–87, 156; conflicts with Trump administration 256; Constitution status 152, 275–276; Control Yuan under 162; criticisms and disappointments 86–87; cultural support 23–24; Dalai Lama visit 110; as DPP candidate 81; economy under

352

Index

120–121, 228–231; education and political career 84–85; educational system and policies 125; ethnic and cultural promises 105; ethnic voting theory and 181; foreign policy agenda 252–253; foreign spouses policy 11; on The Hague map ruling 4; as Hakka 101, 105; hope in leadership 83; housing shortages and costs 132–133; interparliamentary diplomacy 282; Japan relations pursued 277; on KMT assets 169; on mulitculturism and diversity 105; nations with diplomatic relations under 284; New Southbound Policy 218, 229–230; performance as president 179; political trends under 147; on populism 186; poverty issues 133; on progressivism 187; reforms under 186; refugee issue 188; religious beliefs 112; role in history 84–87; on same-sex marriage 188; shipbuilding industry under 213; social issues addressed 120; steel industry under 212; on Taiwan in international organizations 289; tourism from China policy 35; unclear goals toward China 247, 256; united government in DPP 156; U.S. support for 268; veteran care and benefits 131–132; workforce and immigration policy 12 Tsai Ming-liang 32 Tung Meng Hui (Revolutionary Alliance) 167 2017 Taipei Universiade 132–133 two Chinas: in 1945 248; U.S. Department of State view 248, 290n11; world view of 248–249 2-2-8 massacre 61–63, 90n85, 101, 163, 207 2-2-8 Peace Park 62–63 two-bloc party system 173 two-Chinas policy 262 two-party elections 70–71, 176–177 two-party political system 151 “two-state theory” 251 Typhoon Morakot 81, 110 typhoons 8 Tzu Chi Foundation 110 Umbrella Movement 278 U.N. General Assembly 249, 286, 287 unemployment 62, 78, 81, 99, 116, 124, 129, 136, 131, 214–215, 180, 183, 214, 215, 217, 225–226, 228, 319

unification/reunification: ‘92 Consensus 251; changing desires with economic cycles 197; from China after Cold War 270; China’s response to Tsai 237; China’s white paper on 272; citizen support 299; deadline 298, 316–317; Deng on 316–317; economic, social, and political unrest for Taiwan 317; KMT vs. DPP 275; Ma’s position(s) 266–267; not desired by masses 183; Obama administration opinions on 261; opposed by U.S. 266–267; panblue political bloc 184; proposed by China 250; reunification rejection 75; Taiwan as model 303; Taiwan public opinion on 299; Tsai’s position 152; Zhou on 316 unified culture 95–96 unitary vs. federal government systems 162 United Daily News 29 United Evening News 29 United Microelectronics Corporation 211 United Nations: Chen’s attempt to rejoin 252; General Assembly 249, 286, 287; growing support for PRC 285–286; Outer Mongolia proposed as member 285; PRC admitted and Taiwan withdrew 67, 91n113, 270, 276, 286; Republic of China as founding member 284–285; Resolution 2758 287; Taipei as China in 45; Taiwan continued effort to rejoin 274, 287–288; Taiwan’s position with 248, 300, 302 United States: American universities 115, 119, 140n100; changing formal ties to 246–248; China, relationship with 299; Chinese map ruling support 4; conflict with China over aggression 74; Congress and Taiwan Relations Act 69; cultural support 22; current views on China 319–320; debt and global financial system 321; diplomatic relations with Taiwan 69, 263–264, 270; on DPP and KMT 83; education system modeled on 122; era of good feeling 312–313; foreign and military policies and 261–269; as guarantor of Taiwan’s security 257; imports from Taiwan 219, 241n111; improved economic relationships with China 234; industrialization assistance 203–205; interest in Taiwan 53; inter-parliamentary diplomacy 282;

Index involvement possibility in war for Taiwan independence 257, 261–263, 265, 268, 299, 311, 312, 315, 318; military aid to Taiwan 201, 230, 257, 258, 305, 310–311; military superiority over China 319; Offshore Islands conflicts 65, 91n110, 248, 262, 307, 312; rapprochement with China 65–66, 67; rejection of Chen 79; Shanghai Communiqué 249, 290n16; as social change catalyst 115, 139n85; on status quo as best solution 318; students from Taiwan 126; support for Taiwan 67, 184, 253, 299; support in 1950s 201–202, 238n22; on Taiwan and Tsai 86–87; as Taiwan security shield and mentor 261–262; Taiwanese culture from 19; Taiwanese in 104; Taiwan/ mainland China position 65; Taiwan’s popularity with 319; Taiwan’s prior emulation of 303–304; Taiwan’s protection in Korean War 64; Taiwan’s value to 319; threat of war with China 299; trade surplus with 219; two-China policy 262; unclear goals toward China 309; U.S.-China/Taiwan relations 310–311; viewed as failed country 119; WWII action in Taiwan 58 university rankings 125, 140n133, 140n136 unmarried adults 135 UPS service 27 urbanization 12–13, 114 U.S. Department of State 134 U.S. military bases on Taiwan 314–315 U.S.-China relationships overview 269 U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle 269, 310–312 U.S.–Japan security guidelines 277 U.S.–Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty 262, 263, 308 vacation diplomacy 272 Vatican 281 veteran care and benefits 131–132 viable diplomacy 252 Vietnam 3, 8, 59, 65, 67, 212, 217, 260 Vietnam War 67, 69, 249, 262, 279, 292n86 Vietnamese, ancestry 102 Vietnamese, language 31 village government 165 village social structure 96–97 Vive L’Amour (film) 32

353

vocational schools 122 vote buying 165 voter allocation 178, 194n171 voting rights 149 wages and salaries 215 wai sheng jen (outside-province people) 16 Wang Jin-pyng 83–84, 105 Wang Jueyi 111 Want Daily 29 war for Taiwan independence: under Chiang 34, 59–60, 146; citizen support for 87; as distraction for China 319; under Lee 246, 251, 271; under Ma 81, 252, 274; options for Taiwan 260; Taiwan public opinion on 299; unwanted by U.S. 318; U.S.involvement possibility 257, 261–263, 265, 268, 299, 305–306, 311, 312, 315, 318 war on terrorism 252, 266, 311 warlordism 54, 55 watermelon (continuity) election theory see continuity election theory 180, 181 weather and climate 7–8 The Wedding Banquet (film) 32 Wei Te-sheng 33 welfare see social welfare Western and Chinese rule, of Taiwan 49–53 Western countries view of Mao’s government 247–248, 289n5 Western Europe 281 Western Sinology 124 Western social problems 95 Westernization 13, 22, 52, 115, 117, 146 “When will You Return” (Teng) 33 wind patterns 8 women: in arranged marriages 98; changing roles in economic prosperity 117–118; child abuse charges 135; education for girls 122; in government 190n25; Hakka women 100; in the labor force 117–118; in Legislative Yuan 159; pressures and difficulties 118; Sexual Harassment Prevention Act 217; social status 118; see also Tsai Ing-wen The Wonderful Wedding (film) 33 Workers Party 216 workers’ rights 216–217 workforce see labor force World Bank 235 World Competitiveness Report 226

354

Index

World Economic Forum 232 World Health Organization (WHO) 81, 288, 289 World Journal, published by United Daily News 29 World Press Freedom 28 world situations, foreign and military policies and 276–284 World Trade Organization (WTO) 9, 35, 202–203, 234, 288 World War II 16, 57–60, 200 Wu Den-yih 81, 84, 168, 179 Wu Poh-hsiung 101 Wulai, tourist attractions 37 Xi Jinping 314, 317 Xinhua 28 yacht industry 213 Yami tribe 15

Yang, Edward 32 Yangchow 47 Yangmingshan Park 37 Yangtze River Delta 39n40 Yehliu, tourist attractions 37–38 Yen Chia-kan 68, 111, 153, 154 Yin Hai-kuan 183 Yinchow 47 Young China Party 167 youth emigration to China 120–121 youth unemployment rate 215, 240n88 Yu Shan (Jade Mountain) 6, 38 Yu Shan Chen 33 Yuan Dynasty 48 Yuan Shih-kai 167 Zeelandia 50 Zhou En-lai (Chou En-lai) 67, 316 Zhu Rongji 77, 178